[House Hearing, 109 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
THE SECURE BORDER INITIATIVE:
ENSURING EFFECTIVE IMPLEMENTATION
AND FINANCIAL ACCOUNTABILITY OF SBINET
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON MANAGEMENT,
INTEGRATION, AND OVERSIGHT
of the
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
NOVEMBER 15, 2006
__________
Serial No. 109-108
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
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Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/
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__________
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COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Peter T. King, New York, Chairman
Don Young, Alaska Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Lamar S. Smith, Texas Loretta Sanchez, California
Curt Weldon, Pennsylvania Edward J. Markey, Massachusetts
Christopher Shays, Connecticut Norman D. Dicks, Washington
John Linder, Georgia Jane Harman, California
Mark E. Souder, Indiana Peter A. DeFazio, Oregon
Tom Davis, Virginia Nita M. Lowey, New York
Daniel E. Lungren, California Eleanor Holmes Norton, District of
Jim Gibbons, Nevada Columbia
Rob Simmons, Connecticut Zoe Lofgren, California
Mike Rogers, Alabama Sheila Jackson-Lee, Texas
Stevan Pearce, New Mexico Bill Pascrell, Jr., New Jersey
Katherine Harris, Florida Donna M. Christensen, U.S. Virgin
Bobby Jindal, Louisiana Islands
Dave G. Reichert, Washington Bob Etheridge, North Carolina
Michael McCaul, Texas James R. Langevin, Rhode Island
Charlie Dent, Pennsylvania Kendrick B. Meek, Florida
Ginny Brown-Waite, Florida
______
Subcommittee on Management, Integration, and Oversight
Mike Rogers, Alabama, Chairman
John Linder, Georgia Kendrick B. Meek, Florida
Mark E. Souder, Indiana Edward J. Markey, Massachusetts
Tom Davis, Virginia Zoe Lofgren, California
Katherine Harris, Florida Sheila Jackson-Lee, Texas
Dave G. Reichert, Washington Bill Pascrell, Jr., New Jersey
Michael McCaul, Texas Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Peter T. King, New York (Ex (Ex Officio)
Officio)
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
STATEMENTS
The Honorable Mike Rogers, a Representative in Congress From the
State of Alabama, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Management,
Integration, and Oversight..................................... 1
The Honorable Kendrick Meek, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Florida, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on
Management, Integration, and Oversight......................... 2
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Mississippi, and Ranking Member, Committee on
Homeland Security.............................................. 3
The Honorable Mark E. Souder, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Indiana........................................... 30
Witnesses
Panel I
Ms. Elaine Duke, Chief Procurement Officer, U.S. Department of
Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 14
Prepared Statement............................................. 16
The Honorable Richard L. Skinner, Inspector General, U.S.
Department of Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 19
prepared Statement............................................. 21
Mr. Gregory L. Giddens, Director, Secure Border Initiative
Program, U.S. Department of Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 4
Prepared Statement............................................. 7
Ms. Deborah J. Spero, Deputy Commissioner, Customs and Border
Protection, U.S. Department of Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 7
Prepared Statement............................................. 13
Panel II
Mr. Jerry W. McElwee, Vice President SBInet, Boeing Advanced
Systems:
Oral Statement................................................. 40
Prepared Statement............................................. 41
Mr. Tom Miiller, General Counsel, L-3 Services Group:
Oral Statement................................................. 46
Prepared Statement............................................. 48
Mr. Brian Seagrave, Vice President for Border Security, Unisys:
Oral Statement................................................. 43
Prepared Statement............................................. 45
THE SECURE BORDER INITIATIVE:
ENSURING EFFECTIVE IMPLEMENTATION AND FINANCIAL ACCOUNTABILITY OF
SBINET
----------
Wednesday, November 15, 2006
U.S. House of Representatives,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Subcommittee on Management,
Integration, and Oversight,
Washington, DC.
The Subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 3:05 p.m., in
Room 311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Mike Rogers
[Chairman of the Subcommittee] presiding.
Present: Representatives Rogers, Souder, Meek and Thompson
(ex officio).
Mr. Rogers. I would like to call this meeting to order.
This is going to be the Committee on Homeland Security,
Subcommittee on Management, Integration, and Oversight, and
today we are holding a hearing on technology contracts under
the Secure Border Initiative, referred to as SBInet.
First I would like to take a moment to welcome all of our
panelists here. I told them a little earlier it is like old
friends, wink, wink. We are seeing regular leadership people
here today. They have been before this Committee many times,
and we are happy to have you back talking about this very
important initiative.
This hearing will review the new multiyear, multibillion-
dollar contract which the Department of Homeland Security
announced in September to help secure the northern and southern
borders of the United States.
The hearing builds on three previous hearings we held on
the mismanagement of the existing border technology program
known as the Integrated Surveillance Intelligence System, or
ISIS. At our first hearing in June of last year, the Deputy
Inspector General for the General Services Administration
testified that ISIS was, quote, a major project gone awry and,
quote, a waste of taxpayers' dollars.
In our December hearing, the DHS Inspector General outlined
many contracting and operational problems with ISIS which
wasted tax dollars and left sections of our borders without
camera coverage. In February of this year we explored what
disciplinary actions were taken against those Federal employees
who mismanaged the ISIS program. Unfortunately, we learned that
most of those employees involved received only a slap on the
wrist, while others were simply allowed to retire or move on to
other agencies.
Due to these disturbing findings, I announced at that time
we would hold a hearing shortly after the DHS--shortly after
DHS awarded the SBInet contract, and that is why we are
convening this hearing today.
Today we have four objectives. First, we will hear how
SBInet will help secure the borders and how those responsible
for planning it will implement it. Second, we want to ensure
that the financial and program mismanagement that occurred in
ISIS is not repeated in SBInet. Third, we also want to ensure
that the operational problems of ISIS are fixed by SBInet. And
fourth, we want assurances by both the government officials and
company representatives that their employees involved in this
program will be held fully accountable.
To further ensure that SBInet is properly managed, Ranking
Member Thompson, Ranking Member Meek, and I introduced the
Secure Border Initiative Financial Accountability Act of 2006.
Last month the full House passed our bill, which requires the
Inspector General to review contracts over $2 million and
identify any problems. A similar provision was included in the
DHS appropriations bill that was signed into law.
ISIS has been a poster child for government waste and
mismanagement. Today I want to put the Department on notice I
intend to work with the Members of this Committee and hold the
Department's feet to the fire to ensure that the mistakes of
the past are not repeated in SBInet.
Also, as the Ranking Member assumes the gavel in the next
Congress, I look forward to continuing our bipartisan working
relationship to improve the operations of DHS while
safeguarding taxpayer dollars.
Mr. Rogers. And now I would like to yield to my friend and
colleague, the Ranking Member, Mr. Meek of Florida.
Mr. Meek. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I can tell you that we--
it seems like deja vu all over again with a couple of new
faces, but we are glad you are here today to testify before
this committee, and I want to thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your
leadership in continuing to focus on this issue. This is very,
very important.
I believe that counterparts in the Department and the
different oversight agencies that are paying attention to the
financial dealings of the Department of Homeland Security holds
the same spirit as we do on the committee, and through our
committee work I hope that message is going throughout the
Department that we are paying very close attention to it, not
just our staffs, but Members of Congress and definitely members
of this subcommittee.
I can also share with you that this hearing today,
especially the topic that we are going to discuss, once again
has been studied a great deal by this subcommittee. SBInet is
the Department's third try at putting technology on border--I
mean, on border protection to get 24-hour, 7-days-a-week, 365-
days-a-year surveillance between port entries.
Today we have--we have this third hearing to continue to
follow step by step with the Department and also with those
that have not only an investigative eye on the Department, but
also as it relates to putting the standards towards
accountability, and we want to hear your observations to date.
I know that we have--Ms. Duke, you have embedded, I
wouldn't call them auditors, I would say individuals that are
working along with the contract, as the contract is being
executed. And I think it is also important for everyone to know
that I, and I know many members of the subcommittee and full
committee, still have questions that are yet unanswered about
overall accountability.
I think that we have really a short time to continue to
have the trust and confidence with the American people as it
relates to any program similar to SBInet because of the past.
Secretary Chertoff was here before this committee before we
left on break, the full committee, assured us that he is paying
very close attention to what is happening, and that he assured
the committee that we wouldn't--would not see some of the
mistakes of the past.
This hearing today, and I am glad that the Chairman called
it in the 109th Congress, will definitely be in the record of
this committee and also will continue to keep the staff updated
on the forward progress of our work here.
I want to personally thank Mr. Chairman here for his
cooperation during the 109th Congress and also the Congress
before that. I mean, we have been working together; we are
going to continue to work as a team. Like my grandmother says,
as long as God preserves life, and we will continue to work
with this Department together in a bipartisan way.
I think in this area, as we look at national security, is
paramount. So I know that Mr. King holds that same--and I know
that Mr. Thompson, I don't want to speak for him, holds that
same spirit. I think that is the reason why we have been able
to pass a lot of legislation out of this subcommittee. And
right before we left, we passed legislation on the floor, and I
think that the rest of the Congress knows that when we work
together and work in a bipartisan way, that the American people
win, and the national security wins.
Thank you, sir.
Mr. Rogers. I agree and I thank you.
Mr. Rogers. The Chair now recognizes the Ranking Member of
the Full Committee, my friend and colleague from Mississippi,
Mr. Thompson, for any statement he may have.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I look
forward to the testimony of our witnesses here today.
As has already been indicated, this is our third approach
to this same problem. Hopefully, we will get it right this
time. Boeing and Unisys have been awarded a contract to start
with management and systems engineering of this Department.
Some of us are a little concerned that, in essence, they would
have to submit to the Department what they plan to do, the
Department would have to approve, and so we still don't have
that plan for border security.
As you know, Congress approved a 700-mile fence, physical
fence. Somebody in the Department needs to explain to us how
the physical fence relates to the virtual fence and whether or
not the plan that should have been submitted this month, which
I understand might be coming next month, will, in fact, become
a reality.
So there are some things we need to work on. I look forward
to it. I believe technology is the way to go in terms of these
issues, but I want to make sure the technology we are promoting
will get the job done.
The number one and number two approaches failed primarily
because of procurement and management and lack of oversight,
which I also want to get some information on how do we resolve
some of those past issues.
The other thing, there is a goal of 40 percent small
minority business requirement for this procurement. I want to
know how the Department plans to monitor and make sure that
these goals are met. It is wonderful; all of us represent areas
where there are small businesses who report just all the time
as to how we can get involved in this homeland security work.
This is a wonderful opportunity, and I hope we structure some
subcontracting plans that will allow that to occur.
Apart from that, Mr. Chairman, it has been good working
with you. I look forward to the 110th to continue that process.
There is no sense in interrupting our issues that we all deem
necessary to address on this committee.
And I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. Rogers. I thank the gentleman.
I would like to call up the first panel. Under ordinary
protocol, we would start with Ms. Spero, but today, as many of
you can tell, the Chamber has been remodeled, and we got some
new gadgets in here this time. And since Greg is in charge of
gadgets for DHS, we would like Greg to start off with a
presentation that will utilize some of this new technology in
here.
So with that, I would call up Mr. Giddens. Also, I would
remind all of the panelists if you could keep your opening
statements to five minutes or less, you can submit your full
written statement for the record, but that would get more time
for us to have interaction, which is always, I think, one of
those beneficial parts of these hearings.
And with that, the Chair recognizes Greg Giddens.
STATEMENT OF GREGORY L. GIDDENS, DIRECTOR, SECURE BORDER
INITIATIVE PROGRAM, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Mr. Giddens. Good afternoon, and thank you, Mr. Chairman,
Ranking Member Meek, Ranking Member Thompson. It is an honor to
come before you to talk about SBInet. It is an urgent issue for
the Nation, and it is one that I respectfully submit that is
worthy of your oversight.
I will not sit before you today and try to convince you in
any way that this is an easy undertaking. This is a difficult
challenge, and as you have noted, we have had attempts before
this and have not been successful. We believe we have learned
from those and are applying some of those lessons as we go
forward.
Sir, I will try to keep my comments short, and I ask
respectfully that the written comments be entered into the
record, and we will see if we can use some of the technology
here in the room.
The Department has an overall initiative to secure the
border which tries to link in a very systematic way the efforts
within Customs and Border Protection and Immigration and
Customs Enforcement, CIS, the Coast Guard, intelligence in a
really comprehensive manner that allows us to make progress on
many fronts, and that we recognize that in order to secure the
border, we cannot just focus on the line; we have to think
about what is happening beyond the border as well as at the
border and in the interior, whether that is work site
compliance or enforcement, whether that is supporting the
passage of some temporary worker program to release some of the
stress between the ports of industry.
Today we will be focusing on SBInet, which is the CBP
program to provide the capability and capacity to allow our
agents and officers to gain control of the border. CBP is an
executive agent for that program, and it is really a
comprehensive approach. While it does involve technology and
gadgets and gizmos, that is not sort of the focus of this
acquisition. The focus of this is to allow us to gain
performance so we can get control of the border.
We started, as you may remember, back in January with an
Industry Day, and at that point charted out a course to make
this award by September, and in September, as has already been
noted, we did make this award to Boeing. This was a full and
open competition that CBP undertook and went through and made
that award in September in that full and open environment. The
SBInet contract is a 3-year base contract with three 1-year
options, so it makes a maximum life of 6 years.
Now if I could, we will see if we can engage some of the
technology on the screen. And there you go. So far so good with
technology. That is a good start.
What I wanted to do, the point to make on this chart is
what is in the middle of the chart, and that is the people.
SBInet, no matter the technology, the infrastructure, the
process, is not going to replace the people. It is going to
allow people, the agents, and the officers to be more effective
in the field. And we want to surround them with the right tool
sets from infrastructure, from sensors, communication,
providing them real-time situational awareness, and be able
from a command-and-control perspective to support them as they
deploy out in the field, but all of that making a strong
linkage to the field operators.
In fact, when we started an at-source selection, we brought
in people from the field from the beginning. In fact, at
Industry Day, you may remember that Kevin Stevens, who is now
the Deputy Chief of the Border Patrol, gave the keynote at the
Industry Day to provide that perspective from the operators.
And we have had them involved from the very beginning and even
through the source selection activity to make sure that the
decisions that we were making were well grounded and well
founded from an operational perspective.
The next chart is to start to walk through some of the
solutions that are being put forth in their proposal. The first
shows mobile systems. Boeing chose to use mobile towers so that
they could go out and through this mobile system make sure that
the placement of these towers were indeed where they needed to
be. The testing that will be done in the lab, the engineering
work that will be done in the laboratory will help get this
correct, but without a doubt there will be some cases where we
go to field something, and we need ability to shift that
around, and this mobile capability will allow us to do that so
that we can get the towers, along with their radars and their
infrared and their electro-optical cameras, in the right place,
and we can go out with GPS and go down and fill those in later
with a fixed system.
What this also does is provide a communications backbone so
that our agents and officers in the field can stay in touch
with their organization, with their Border Patrol stations, as
well as their sector headquarters, as well as be
interoperational with the State and local partners. It also
provides an opportunity to push that situation awareness out to
the Border Patrol agent and to the field patrol officer. And in
some cases, we can do that on landlines, but as you can
imagine, in some cases along the border, it is very remote, and
we will need to use satellite and footprints from the satellite
for that coverage.
One of the things we are most excited about with this
capability is to take that operational picture and to put it
out in the hands in the people of the field so they can see
real time the display with the camera. We will have this
automated inview so they can see the blue force tracking and be
able to see the picture from the camera right there in their
hand. We think that is going to be very powerful not only from
a performance perspective, but from a safety perspective as
well.
My last chart, while it looks very complicated, it is not.
It basically uses a time dimension to look at the border. And
what it is trying to indicate with the top line that is
indicating the vanishing point is trying to lay out a very
simple algorithm that our ability to respond to a border
incursion needs to be much less than the time it takes an
illegal alien to get to a vanishing point.
For example, if you think that an illegal alien that may
cross a remote area, if they make it to Tucson or Phoenix and
get on a bus out of town, our chance at apprehension goes way
down. We need to understand that dynamic all along the border,
but at the same time understanding it is different along the
border. We find out once you go out of the border, you have
seen a mile of the border, you have seen a mile of the border.
And we want to be very careful not to take something that works
for one location and just apply that nondiscriminately across
the border. We want to look at each aspect of the border and
put the right decision in terms of the mix of infrastructure,
technology and staffing.
The middle of the chart has borders, barriers, and fences
along the port of entry. If you think about a border town such
as Nogales, the time that someone would get to that vanishing
point is very short, so you would want to use technical
infrastructure to slow them down and allow us to have more
response time. This basic border calculus chart and its
governing algorithm that we want to make sure we can respond
well within the time it takes an illegal alien to get to that
vanishing point is what is going to guide us in a very
systematic, disciplined manner to lay out the solution in each
part of the border by understanding that it will change as we
go forward. As we go forward in secure areas, the coyotes and
the smugglers are going to react to that, and they are going
the use different routes and different parts, and we need to be
able to be less bureaucratic and more nimble in our approach so
we can be more responsive to that so we can try to predict some
of that, so we can be ready.
So this is certainly not a one-size-fits-all going out
initially. The foundation of that would apply, but the
placement and the mix of that will change to meet the
operational needs so we can gain control of the border.
With that, I would just like to close by saying that we do
recognize the complexity of this. We are committing significant
resources to manage this, and there are certain areas that we
need to focus on. And we have appreciated the relationship that
we have had with the Office of Inspector General and the
recommendations that they put forth, and we are working very
closely with them and, as we go forward, implement those as it
relates to things such as program management structure and
staffing as well as solidifying the requirements as we go
forward and how we are going to measure performance so we do
have accountability not just within the government side, but
accountability between the government and private industry.
And, sir, with that I would close, and I appreciate your
indulgence if I went a little long.
Mr. Rogers. No problem. Good job. I want to thank you for
that.
[The statement of Mr. Giddens follows:]
Prepared Joint Statement of Deborah J. Spero and Gregory Giddens
Introduction
Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, for allowing
me to appear before you today. I appreciate the opportunity to discuss
the urgent and essential mission and management of the SBInet contract
and how SBInet fits into the larger comprehensive Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) strategy of securing America's borders. My
testimony is intended to provide you with the information necessary to
conduct your oversight role in this endeavor.
Secure Border Initiative (SBI): The DHS Approach to Comprehensive
Border Security
The challenge of securing the Nation’s borders is enormous.
Border security is a continuum that begins far beyond the borders of
the United States and continues to the interior of our country. It must
account for the movement of both people and goods and is not successful
unless it protects the country from harm while allowing lawful trade
and immigration. Border security requires a critical blend of tangible
resources, such as personnel, technology, and infrastructure, along
with intangible items, such as useful intelligence and strong
partnerships with foreign governments.
As you well know, securing the borders of the United States is a
Presidential priority. In his May 15, 2006 Address to the Nation,
President Bush said: ``First, the United States must secure its
borders. This is a basic responsibility of a sovereign nation. It is
also an urgent requirement of our national security. Our objective is
straightforward: The border should be open to trade and lawful
immigration--and shut to illegal immigrants, as well as criminals, drug
dealers, and terrorists. . . .We are launching the most technologically
advanced border security initiative in American history. We will
construct high-tech fences in urban corridors, and build new patrol
roads and barriers in rural areas. We will employ motion sensors,
infrared cameras, and unmanned aerial vehicles to prevent illegal
crossings. America has the best technology in the world, and we will
ensure that the Border Patrol has the technology they need to do their
job and secure our border.”
The Secure Border Initiative (SBI) is the DHS approach to lead our
efforts against cross-border and international activities that threaten
border security. This approach recognizes that the border is not merely
a physical frontier. Securing it effectively requires attention to
processes that begin far outside our borders, occur at the border, and
continue within all regions of the United States. SBI will integrate
and unify the systems, programs, and policies needed to secure the
border and enforce our customs and immigration laws. It is a national
effort to transform the border security continuum with the objective to
disrupt, dismantle, and deter all cross-border crime and balance
legitimate travel and trade into and out of the United States.
While SBI is a Department-wide priority and entity, my testimony
today will only discuss the U.S. Customs and Border Protection's role
and the SBI.net program.
CBP Overview
U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) is the executive agent for
the contracting and implementation of SBInet. CBP acts as the guardian
of our Nation's borders, safeguarding the homeland against the entry of
terrorists and the instruments of terrorism and enforcing the laws of
the United States while fostering the Nation's economic security
through lawful travel and trade. Within CBP's larger mission, the
Border Patrol's time-honored duty of interdicting illegal aliens and
drugs and those who attempt to smuggle them across our borders between
the ports of entry remains a priority. The nexus between this
traditional role and our post-September 11th mission is clear:
terrorists and violent criminals may exploit smuggling routes used by
migrants to enter the United States illegally and do us harm. Reducing
illegal entries across our borders is now more than ever a matter of
national security.
To secure operational control of our borders, President Bush
announced a plan to increase the number of Border Patrol Agents by
6,000 by the end of 2008. We are grateful that the 2006 Supplemental
and 2007 DHS Appropriations have provided 2,500 agents as part of this
plan. This plan, when completed, will bring the total number of Border
Patrol Agents to over 18,000, doubling the number of agents since the
President took office in 2001. These additional agents will serve as a
tremendous resource in combating border violence and the organizations
that prey on innocent people on both sides of the border.
There is no stretch of border in the United States that can be
considered completely inaccessible or lacking in the potential to
provide an entry point for a terrorist or terrorist weapon. Stretches
of border that in the past were thought to be impenetrable, or at least
highly unlikely locations for entry into the United States, have in
recent years become active illegal entry corridors as other routes have
been made less accessible to smugglers. This vulnerability in the
Nation’s borders must be accounted for when determining future
infrastructure requirements.
SBInet Acquisition Overview
As part of the comprehensive DHS solution for border security, CBP
will use the SBInet contract to acquire, deploy, and sustain the
technology and tactical infrastructure necessary to achieve control at
and between ports of entry. The SBInet Program incorporates acquisition
best practices and lessons learned from previous border technology
procurements to provide the most cost and operationally effective
solution for securing the border. CBP selected an indefinite delivery,
indefinite quantity (IDIQ) contract vehicle because the vastly
different terrain, threats, and evolving nature of the operational
environment require a solution that is flexible, adaptable, and
tailored to specific needs.
The SBInet acquisition was conducted using full and open
competition and resulted in a performance-based IDIQ contract. Several
large businesses participated in the competition, submitting proposals
that detailed the partnering relationships they intended to utilize to
meet the Government’s program objectives and that provided
solutions to securing the borders. The award of the SBInet contract to
Boeing was announced on September 21, 2006.
The SBInet contract has a base period of three years and three one-
year option periods for a total of six years. The Government's minimum
obligation under the contract is $2 million over the term of the
contract. The Government's maximum obligation is the full panoply of
supplies and services necessary to provide 6,000 miles of secure
border. The supplies and services required for this integration effort
are, for the most part, commercially available. Major components
consist of integration services, sensors, communication technologies
and equipment, command and control systems and subsystems, and
infrastructure and response capabilities.
The SBInet contract supports different contractual agreements due
to the wide range of tasks to be performed. This allows DHS to
structure the acquisition into discrete, workable phases, implemented
through task and delivery orders, without committing the Government to
acquire additional capability from the SBInet integration contractor.
This approach will provide the greatest amount of flexibility to
respond to ever-changing conditions and provide the best protection for
the Government.
Further, the SBInet contract allows DHS to use other contract
vehicles for the goods and services required for the SBInet Program.
Thus, the Government reserves the right to compete some SBInet
requirements through the use of other contract vehicles or methods when
it is in the best interest of the Government. This includes the right
to use other DHS contracts or Government-wide acquisition contracts, as
appropriate. All such requirements will be carefully reviewed for small
business set-aside potential.
Accountability
Drawing from previous experience, CBP used the IDIQ contract
structure to select the company that offered the best overall strategy
and value to the Government for SBInet while allowing direct government
oversight and decision-making authority to oversee implementation. The
technical proposals submitted by each company were required to include:
Overall concept of operations for the SBInet solution.
Quality assurance plan, measures, and metrics for the
overall concept, as well as those that will apply to task
orders/individual deliverables.
Detailed management plan, including a defined conflict
of interest mitigation plan.
Detailed subcontracting plan.
Past Performance information.
Application of the concept, from both technical and
cost perspectives, to the Tucson Sector.
Differences in the application of the solution to the
Swanton Sector.
Defined deliverable to award with the master contract.
To ensure a clear scope for the over-arching SBInet contract, CBP
selected stable top-level requirements, and we believe that the
selection of the Boeing proposal validates the approach for acquiring a
low-risk technological solution. The requirements for the SBInet
solution are:
Detect an entry when it occurs;
Identify what the entry is;
Classify its level of threat (who the entrant is, what
the entrant is doing, how many, etc.); and
Respond effectively and efficiently to the entry,
bringing the situation to an appropriate law enforcement
resolution.
These requirements are enduring and fundamental to the task of
securing the border at and between ports of entry.
Additionally, the Government will evaluate each task order with
separate measures and metrics. CBP will negotiate specific technical,
operational, and performance requirements for each subcontract and
delivery task order. This approach to task order management provides
CBP greater visibility into the overall success of the SBInet solution,
not only from a budget and schedule perspective, but most importantly
from a requirements perspective. CBP will employ Make/Buy decision
processes, to include evaluations of alternatives and cost, prior to
awarding delivery task orders to ensure that the Government is
receiving optimal value and that mission requirements are met. Once
under contract, each delivery task order will be monitored with
accredited Earned Value Measurement processes and will have a qualified
and accountable Project Manager.
SBInet Oversight and Management
DHS and CBP believe that strong program management and contract
oversight will ensure successful execution of SBInet. As part of the
aforementioned lessons learned from a past acquisition program, CBP
will manage the SBInet in-house for greater connectivity to the
operators and control through direct oversight. CBP has established a
robust program management structure to oversee the successful
implementation of the solution and is rapidly building upon this
foundation. The SBInet project team includes seasoned certified program
managers and senior contract specialists. The DHS Joint Requirements
Council and Investment Review Board will oversee deployment of the
system throughout its life cycle.
As is appropriate with an acquisition of this scope, value, and
importance, the DHS Office of the Inspector General (OIG) has already
begun evaluating SBInet and offering recommendations. Independent
insight is essential for making continuous progress in improvements to
program structure and management. OIG insight is helpful in identifying
risks inherent to programs where there simply is no risk-free approach
and in managing those risks accordingly. The recommendations received
from OIG to date have provided useful and collaborative improvements in
SBInet program management and contract execution. Attention to
enhancing organizational capacity, increasing requirement definition
tailored to specific task orders as the program matures, and diligent
oversight of cost, schedule, and performance are essential elements of
program management embraced by DHS and CBP.
In conjunction with these OIG recommendations, CBP is pursuing the
following areas of improvements to strengthen government program
management and contractor oversight:
Defining Program Management Structure;
Providing Appropriate Staffing and Human Capital;
Enhancing Definition of Operational Requirements; and
Measuring Contractor Performance.
Defining Program Management Structure: The SBInet Program is
finalizing a Program Management Plan (PMP) to apply a plan of action
with performance milestones so as to develop the capacity to manage
SBInet, administer its contracts and agreements, and ensure effective
oversight and implementation. The PMP will serve as the overall plan
for managing the SBInet Program. Included within the PMP are
delineations of Program Organization and Responsibilities, explanation
of the CBP's Program and Technical Management Approach, and Key Program
Management Processes.
To solidify its capacity to manage the SBInet Program and
administer its contracts and agreements, CBP is employing best
practices in project management. The organizational structure set up by
CBP allows for the concentration of subject-matter expertise into
appropriate directorates, creating a ready resource pool to staff
Integrated Project Teams (IPTs) to execute projects under the SBInet
Program.
IPTs are cross-functional teams under the leadership of an
accountable government manager. IPTs use the tenets of integrated
process and product development to get the right people and skills
involved in managing a project. Each IPT in the SBInet Program will be
formed with appropriate representatives to ensure a common
understanding of the activities involved and to secure input from all
relevant entities.
As CBP carries out SBInet, other organizations within DHS will
carry out additional elements of the SBI. There are specific program
areas within SBI that are the responsibility of CBP, Immigration and
Customs Enforcement (ICE), and Citizenship and Immigration Services
(CIS). DHS has established a Secure Border Initiative Coordination
Council to work with the PMOs to ensure consistency and alignment of
program elements and to provide adequate Departmental oversight.
SBInet is developing an SBInet Program Plan that describes and
documents the work breakdown structure, Integrated Master Schedule, and
the program budget. SBInet will establish an SBInet Process Library
that will contain management processes associated with program and
project management. Examples include task order initiation processes,
deliverable review processes, design review processes, and IPT
Charters. An Office Management Plan will be developed to contain the
administrative processes and procedures associated with managing a
large office, such as new employee orientation, supply ordering, etc.
Providing Appropriate Staffing and Human Capital: CBP commissioned
an independent third-party study through the Homeland Security
Institute (HSI) to assess the SBInet Program's staffing and human
capital needs. Leveraging the results of the HSI staffing study, the
PMO has developed a FY 2007 staffing plan. This staffing plan includes
an additional 169 staff positions (96 government and 85 contractors),
bringing the total PMO staff to 270.
The CBP Commissioner has established an Executive Steering
Committee (ESC) that meets as needed to discuss program progress
against SBInet goals and objectives. The PMO will provide periodic
updates to both CBP and DHS leadership.
Enhancing Definition of Operational Requirements: To continue
definition of the top-level requirements provided during the contract
solicitation, the PMO developed a Mission Needs Statement that was
approved on October 1, 2006. The Mission Needs Statement identifies
capability gaps and certain needs of the SBInet Program.
The SBInet Program completed a comprehensive requirements workshop
with CBP operational stakeholders on October 13, 2006. The resulting
Operational Requirements Document (ORD) will be finalized and approved
by January 19, 2007. This document will be used to derive contract
requirements and establish the appropriate performance metrics for each
future task order.
In addition to the ORD, a System Engineering Management Plan (SEMP)
will be developed to outline the technical management and processes.
Testing will include an Independent Validation and Verification (IV&V)
contractor who will test software and systems development. Test and
Evaluation will also include Operational Test and Evaluation (OT&E),
using an independent government organization to evaluate performance,
effectiveness, and operational suitability of the installed solution.
Measuring Contractor Performance: The plan of action and milestones
(POA&M) currently in development will include measurable and meaningful
performance metrics and controls. Additionally, the SBInet Program will
use Earned Value Management (EVM) as a technique to integrate cost,
schedule, and technical accomplishments for SBInet task orders where
appropriate. EVM is a common method for measuring performance,
reporting and analyzing project status, and comparing actual costs and
accomplishments to a baseline. EVM serves as an early warning indicator
for effective management decisions and corrective actions. It supports
effective ``what-if,'' tradeoff and trend analyses; helps to highlight
potential risks; and provides more accurate forecasts of cost and
schedule performance. Using EVM on the SBInet Program satisfies the
acquisition requirements of OMB Circular A-11, Part 3, and the
Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 GPRA.
Issues related to EVM will be addressed and resolved, as
appropriate, with guidance and support from the CBP Commissioner and
Chief Procurement Officer (CPO). A status of EVM issues will be
provided to the CBP Commissioner and CPO on a monthly basis.
Boeing will provide regular implementation status reports and
reviews on the SBInet task orders. Specific requirements for reports
and reviews will be detailed in the individual task orders and may
include cost performance reports; schedule and planning reports and
reviews; technical performance reports and reviews; management reports
and reviews; Integrated Baseline Reviews; and project cost estimates.
CBP is currently working with Boeing Corporation to prepare the
POA&M. It will be reviewed as recommended by the CBP Commissioner and
the CPO, and recommended actions will be instituted and tracked to
completion. To ensure continued attention and adequate provision of
resources, the PMO will provide periodic updates to both CBP and DHS
CPO leadership.
Monthly Program Management Reviews (PMRs), which include the status
of risks, action items and issues, key milestones, budget, and
deliverables, will be provided to the CBP Commissioner and CPO monthly.
The PMRs will provide a forum to facilitate timely decision-making by
presenting leadership with a thorough status of the SBInet Program
while raising issues that need management attention.
The PMO will lead task order working-level meetings with Boeing on
a regular basis to discuss and resolve project-level status and issues.
These reviews will focus on assessing performance, facilitating the
SBInet Integrator's work efforts, and addressing issues requiring
resolution by either party.
SBInet project managers will be responsible for assessing and
reporting project status and the likelihood of meeting the scope, cost,
schedule, and technical performance objectives through weekly reports
to the SBInet Program Manager, PMO Directors, and other project
stakeholders on a weekly basis. Status reporting will begin as soon as
a new project is initiated and will end upon project completion.
Without a dramatic shift in the way that we as a Nation protect our
land borders, we leave ourselves and our citizens vulnerable. We
recognize the challenges that lie ahead. By defending our borders with
the latest technology and infrastructure and additional well-trained
personnel, and by maintaining a vigilant interior enforcement of our
Nation’s immigration laws, we will fulfill our mission of
protecting our country and its citizens.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Rogers. And the Chair now recognizes Ms. Deborah Spero,
Deputy Commissioner for Customs and Border Protection for the
U.S. Department of Homeland Security.
Welcome, Ms. Spero. We look forward to your comments.
STATEMENT OF DEBORAH J. SPERO, DEPUTY COMMISSIONER, CUSTOMS AND
BORDER PROTECTION, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Ms. Spero. Thank you very much. And good afternoon to
everyone, Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Meek, members of the
subcommittee. It is an honor to be before you today to discuss
SBInet and its role in helping U.S. Customs and Border
Protection ensure greater control of our borders.
Commissioner Basham asked that I convey to you his personal
regrets that he was unable to attend today because he had
previous travel commitments, but I am pleased to be here in his
stead along with Inspector General Richard Skinner, Chief
Procurement Officer Elaine Duke, and, of course, our SBI
Executive Director, whom you have just heard from.
I want to begin by thanking you, Mr. Chairman, and the
Ranking Member and the other members of the committee for the
strong support that you have provided to CBP that is enabling
us to carry out our priority mission of preventing terrorists
and terrorist weapons from entering our Nation.
The men and women on the front line, our CBP officers,
Border Patrol, and our pilots, our marine officers, are all
charged with what is clearly one of the most important missions
of any Federal Government agency today, and that is protecting
our borders at and between the ports of entry while at the same
time facilitating the flow of legitimate trade and travel. With
your strong support, and under the leadership of the President
and Secretary Chertoff, CBP is taking definitive steps to
gaining operational control at our border through the Secure
Border Initiative.
SBInet is a major component of the Secure Border
Initiative, establishing a framework for a comprehensive
integrative solution that includes technology, tactical
infrastructure and front-line personnel. The significant
increases in Border Patrol personnel and related technology and
infrastructure which Congress authorized and funded in fiscal
years 2006 and 2007 are solid down payments in carrying out
this initiative. And I believe CBP is making great progress on
SBInet.
The SBInet integrator has been selected, and we are moving
forward in designing and implementing an integrated view to
border securement. We are also very pleased that Mr. Giddens
has joined us at CBP to launch this initiative, and he is
leading the strength of the infrastructure and our staff to
carry out the SBInet program.
Commissioner Basham and I are both personally committed to
bringing all parts of CBP together to ensure the success of
SBInet and of the Secure Border Initiative overall. To that
end, Commissioner Basham has established an executive steering
committee that meets as needed to discuss program progress
against the SBInet goals and objectives. The SBI program
management office will provide periodic outputs to both CBP and
to DHS leadership. This will help ensure that the key risks
that need to be mitigated, such as staffing, are receiving top-
level attention and commensurate resources.
Also, a status of cost and schedule performance will be
provided to the Commissioner and to me on a monthly basis. We
also recognize that our success is closely connected to the
effectiveness of our sister agencies such as ICE and CIS, and
we have been working with them under the SBI umbrella to ensure
that our efforts complement each other.
While there will no doubt be challenges ahead, I am
confident that we are moving in the right direction, and that,
with the continued support of the Congress, CBP will succeed in
meeting these challenges.
I will be happy to answer any questions you may have. Thank
you very much.
Mr. Rogers. Thank you, Commissioner Spero, for your
statement.
The Chair now recognizes Ms. Elaine Duke, Chief Procurement
Officer for the Department of Homeland Security, for your
statement. Welcome.
STATEMENT OF ELAINE C. DUKE, CHIEF PROCUREMENT OFFICER,
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Ms. Duke. Good afternoon, Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member
Meek, Ranking Member Thompson, members of the committee. Thank
you for inviting me here this afternoon to talk with you about
the SBInet contract.
SBInet is an extremely high priority for the Department of
Homeland Security, and it is one of our most complex and
visible contracts. The Deputy Secretary asked that I convey to
you the personal commitment that he and the Secretary have to
make this program successful along with the rest of the
Department. We want to ensure that the program works and is
successful.
In addition, I can commit to my own personal commitment.
You have the commitment of the other chiefs, specifically the
Chief Information Officer and the Chief Human Capital Officer,
and they are equally engaged in making sure that this program
gets the priority treatment it needs.
In fiscal year 2006, DHS obligated nearly $15 billion in
prime contract dollars. Our preliminary small business
accomplishments indicate that we awarded about 33 percent of
those prime contracts to small business programs. The SBInet
contract at Boeing is one of these contracts. Boeing has now
undertaken the task of using this contract vehicle to help
achieve the critical national priority of securing the Nation's
borders.
My top priorities for the entire DHS procurement program,
which I provided to you in my written testimony for your
review, are very applicable to the SBInet contract and
important for a successful execution.
As Greg already mentioned, SBInet acquisition was done
during a full and open competition, and it is a definite
delivery and definite contract, which means all work
requirements will be negotiated and awarded on individual task
orders. Each task order issued under the SBInet contract will
be individually negotiated, and we will be deciding contract
type-appropriate risk sharing between the government and Boeing
and appropriate award incentive fee structures and measures to
ensure performance. The SBInet contract, therefore, allows DHS
to structure the acquisition in discrete workable phases
implemented through task orders. This approach will provide the
greatest amount of flexibility to respond to evolving
requirements.
Further, it is important to note that the contract with
Boeing is not an exclusive contract. DHS at its discretion may
use other contract vehicles for goods and services required for
the SBInet program. The government reserves the right to
compete SBInet requirements through the use of other contract
vehicles and methods. DHS will work with Boeing to ensure that
the requirements under this contract are evaluated for sound
make-or-buy decisions ensuring that we have adequate
competitions throughout the life of the contract.
My initial focus in providing DHS oversight of the SBInet
contract is to ensure that the right number of people with the
right skills are in the program and contract offices at CBP.
Additionally, I am working to make sure that processes are in
place to control the effective issuance and administration of
the task orders under this contract.
The CBP acquisition office envisions a full complement of
contract and support staff and is taking appropriate steps to
add staff dedicated solely to the SBInet program. The staffing
plan includes 31 contacting personnel, and currently they are
over half staffed towards that goal.
Both DHS and CBP are committed to acquisition management
and oversight of the SBInet contract. My senior staff and I
have been working very closely with CBP to ensure appropriate
planning, execution and management of the contract. I will be
actively involved in reviewing the SBInet program and will
participate in the departmental review activities, including
the Investment Review Board. We are going to aggressively
manage small business subcontracting. Boeing subcontract plan
does show commitment to small business. All requirements
relating to SBInet, whether acquired by this contract or other
contract vehicles, will be carefully reviewed for small
business potential.
The oversight and management work for this contract is
supported by DHS-wide initiatives from my office. This includes
the formation of a Program Management Council throughout DHS to
build a program manager cadre throughout the Department.
Additionally, we have built a Model Intern Program that we have
a pilot in TSA and we will be implementing throughout the
Department.
In closing, there are several key factors that will ensure
the successful practice of the SBInet contract. These include
negotiating task orders with sound requirements, measurable
outcomes and good incentives; continuously measuring
performance and adhering to program metrics; strong program
management and contract administration; and sustained
competition through disciplined make-or-buy designs. I am
committed to working with CBP and this committee to make sure
these key factors are addressed throughout the contract
performance.
Thank you.
Mr. Rogers. I thank you, Ms. Duke.
[The statement of Ms. Duke follows:]
Prepared Statement Elaine C. Duke
Chairman Rogers, Congressman Meek, and Members of the Committee, I
am Elaine Duke, the Chief Procurement Officer for the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS). I am pleased to be here today with Mr. Gregory
Giddens of U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), who is the Program
Executive for the SBInet contract. Thank you for the opportunity to
appear before you to discuss the SBInet contract.
The SBInet contract has been awarded, and now DHS, with its
industry partner Boeing, has undertaken the task of using this contract
vehicle to help achieve the critical national priority of securing the
Nation’s borders.
My top priorities are worth reviewing because they are essential
for the successful execution of the SBInet contract, as well as other
DHS acquisitions. My top four priorities are:
First, to build the DHS acquisition workforce to enhance
the DHS acquisition program.
Second, to establish an acquisition system whereby each
requirement has a well-defined mission and a management team that
includes professionals with the requisite skills to achieve mission
results.
Third, to ensure more effective buying across the eight
contracting offices through the use of strategic sourcing and supplier
management.
Fourth, to strengthen contract administration to ensure
that products and services purchased meet contract requirements and
mission needs.
My initial focus in providing DHS oversight of the SBInet contract
is to ensure that the right numbers of people with the right skills are
in the program and contract offices of CBP. Additionally, I will ensure
that processes are in place to control the effective issuance and
administration of task orders under this contract.
SBInet Program
U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) is the executive agent for
DHS in the development of the SBInet solution. SBInet requires a
comprehensive and aggressive strategy to deploy the optimum mix of
personnel, technology, and infrastructure in a manner that will
significantly reduce the probability of illegal entries and successful
cross-border violations into the United States. SBInet supports the
strategic plans and objectives of DHS and CBP.
As part of the comprehensive DHS solution for border security, CBP
will use the SBInet contract to acquire, deploy, and sustain the
technology and tactical infrastructure necessary to achieve control at
and between ports of entry. The initial focus of SBInet will be where
there are the most serious vulnerabilities to border security. It
requires integrating a common operating picture (COP) of the border
environment within a command and control center that will provide DHS
components and stakeholders external to DHS an unprecedented level of
interoperability. The SBInet solution will do the following:
Develop a Common Operating Picture (COP) throughout
CBP and DHS to integrate multiple state-of-the art systems,
infrastructure, response capabilities, and personnel into a
single comprehensive border security solution that communicates
relevant situational awareness, including intelligence-driven
operations capabilities at all operational levels and
locations;
Deploy the most effective combination of current- and
next-generation technology, infrastructure, response
capabilities, and personnel;
Integrate technology, infrastructure, and processes to
rapidly dispatch personnel;
Cover all areas along the land border with Mexico and
Canada, including the Great Lakes, but not including Alaska;
and
Cover all types of geographic areas, topology, land
forms, population centers (urban, rural, remote), and
environmental conditions.
This comprehensive solution carries out the goal of securing the
border, which requires that four key elements be met:
Detect an entry when it occurs;
Identify what the entry is;
Classify its level of threat (who they are, what they
are doing, how many, etc); and
Effectively and efficiently respond to the entry,
bringing the situation to an appropriate law enforcement
resolution.
Boeing will work with DHS to ensure that all aspects of the SBInet
solution are compatible with other DHS and CBP initiatives.
SBInet Acquisition Overview
As part of the comprehensive DHS solution for border security, CBP
will use the SBInet contract to acquire, deploy, and sustain the
technology and tactical infrastructure necessary to achieve control at
and between ports of entry (POE). The SBInet Program incorporates
acquisition best practices and lessons learned from previous border
technology procurements to provide the most cost and operationally
effective solution for securing the border. CBP selected an indefinite
delivery, indefinite quantity (IDIQ) contract vehicle because the
vastly different terrain, threats, and evolving nature of the
operational environment require a solution that is flexible, adaptable,
and tailored to specific needs.
The SBInet acquisition was conducted using full and open
competition and resulted in a performance-based IDIQ contract being
awarded to Boeing in September 2006. Several businesses submitted
proposals that provided solutions for securing the borders and detailed
the partnering relationships they intended to utilize to meet the
Government’s program objectives.
The contract has a base period of three years and three one-year
option periods for a total of six years. The maximum that the
Government may obligate under the contract covers the full panoply of
supplies and services necessary to provide 6,000 miles of secure
border. The Government has already met its minimum obligation under the
contract (i.e., $2 million). It is expected that the supplies and
services required for this effort are, for the most part, commercially
available. Major components consist of sensors, communication
technologies and equipment, command and control systems and subsystems,
infrastructure and response capabilities, and the integration of all of
the above.
Task and delivery orders will be negotiated and may range from cost
reimbursement to firm fixed price with appropriate risk-sharing between
the Government and the contractor and award/incentive fee structures.
It is anticipated that DHS will accept more of the risk during the
design and development phases, which are expected to be cost
reimbursement tasks. After the development phase has been completed,
the contract task and delivery orders may shift to other types of
arrangements. The SBInet contract, therefore, allows DHS to structure
the acquisition into discrete, workable phases, implemented through
task and delivery orders. This approach will provide the greatest
amount of flexibility to respond to evolving requirements.
Further, the contract with Boeing is not an exclusive contract. DHS
may at its discretion use other contract vehicles for the goods and
services required for the SBInet Program. The Government reserves the
right to compete SBInet requirements through the use of other contract
vehicles or methods when it is in the best interest of the Government.
This includes using other DHS contracts or Government-wide acquisition
contracts, as appropriate. All such requirements will be carefully
reviewed for small business set-aside potential. DHS will work with
Boeing to ensure that requirements awarded under the contract are
evaluated for make-or-buy decisions, i.e., subcontracting versus Boeing
completing the work itself.
DHS Commitment to the Small Business Community through SBInet
During the solicitation phase of the SBInet acquisition, DHS
emphasized its commitment to ensuring that any resulting contract would
contain a substantial commitment to the small business community. The
goals of the SBInet contract are related to the small business goals of
DHS. The Boeing subcontract plan shows, in our view, the company's
commitment to small businesses. Small business subcontracting and
participation in the DHS Mentor-Protege program were part of the
evaluation criteria in the solicitation, contributing to a rigorous
competition. Boeing submitted three Mentor-Proteges as part of its
winning proposal. Our next major step is to ensure that procedures are
in place to monitor Boeing's progress in the small business
subcontracting arena.
In addition to the submission of required semi-annual electronic
reports, DHS/CBP will enter into an agreement with the Defense Contract
Management Agency (DCMA) to monitor Boeing's subcontracting. DCMA will
perform on-site Small Business Program Compliance Reviews. The DHS
Office of Small and Disadvantaged Business Utilization (OSDBU) will
work closely with CBP to monitor Boeing’s progress. OSDBU and CBP
will work with Boeing to establish a small business outreach program.
Acquisition Management and Oversight
Both DHS and CBP are committed to acquisition management and
oversight of the SBInet contract. My senior staff and I have been
working very closely with CBP to ensure appropriate planning,
execution, and management of the contract. From solicitation through
contract award and task order issuance, my senior staff and I have been
involved throughout the acquisition.
My Acquisition Oversight Directorate will be actively involved in
reviewing the SBInet Program. As a Level 1 Procurement, my office will
participate in all Departmental program review activities, including
the meetings of the Investment Review Board. Also, we will routinely
review acquisition planning documents, solicitations, task order
awards, and contract administration activities. The SBInet Program will
also be checked quarterly as part of the CBP Operational Assessment
review in accordance with the DHS Acquisition Oversight Program. There
will be a comprehensive acquisition management review of SBInet in
conjunction with the Tri-annual Component review. Additionally, my
oversight office has been, and will continue to be, available to
consult with the SBInet Program Manager and Contracting Officer as
needed.
The CBP Acquisition Office and the Program Management Office work
hand in hand and are developing a Contract Management Plan. There are
weekly meetings scheduled with senior management staff within the
Program Management Office to discuss all work planned and in progress.
Integrated Project Teams were formed at the initiation of task orders,
allowing the Acquisition team to work with the Program Management
Office in the development phase. There are a number of processes and
procedures being implemented to ensure compliance with all DHS and CBP
directives. Also, a training schedule will be developed for the entire
Program Management Office. A Governance workshop is planned this month
for the senior staff of the Program Management Office and Boeing. This
is the first of many such joint workshops that will include the Program
Management Office, the Acquisition team, and Boeing.
Program Management Council
The Office of the Chief Procurement Officer (OCPO) has led the
formation of a Program Management Council (PMC) as part of the
Procurement Program Management Center of Excellence. The PMC is working
to develop the policies, procedures, and other tool sets needed for DHS
Program Managers to succeed. On a semi-annual basis I, as the CPO, and
the current PMC Chairman, Gregory Giddens, will report to the Deputy
Secretary on Department-wide progress in key areas of program
management. They are:
State of the DHS Program Manager (PM);
PM effectiveness, successes, and recommendations;
Certification status of PM’s;
PM training and career development;
PM policies and procedures; and
Lessons learned.
DHS has implemented Earned Value Management (EVM) within high
priority programs and a Program Management Periodic Reporting process
to assess the performance of all major investments each quarter.
Staffing
The CBP Acquisition Office envisions a full complement of contract
and support staff and is taking appropriate steps to add staff
dedicated solely to the SBInet Program. The SBInet staffing plan
includes 31 contracting personnel. The SBInet contract staff will be
supported by other staff within the CBP Contracting Office. CBP
currently has eight Government staff and eleven contractor staff
dedicated to SBInet.
Balancing the appropriate number of DHS contracting officials with
the growth of DHS contracting requirements has been a challenge. The
gap between DHS acquisition spending and acquisition staffing levels
has placed increased demands on procurement officials. The challenges
stretch across the entire DHS acquisition organization and are not
limited to one major acquisition program such as SBInet.
Within the Washington, D.C., area, competition for procurement
personnel is intense. DHS has initiated staffing solutions to resolve
personnel shortages. In particular, the Department is considering
creating one centralized recruitment system for contracting personnel
as well as enhance the DHS Acquisition Fellows Program which aims to
recruit recent college graduates. Our office is also working with Human
Resources to streamline the direct hire process. The FY 2007 Budget
provided funding to hire additional acquisition personnel. Higher
staffing levels will improve DHS' ability to monitor Department
contracts and effectively identify and correct poor contractor
performance. Other examples of our efforts to address contracting staff
shortages are:
Formulating a strategy to develop relationships with
local universities that have accredited contracting curriculums
to attract collegiate talent at the junior level instead of
waiting until graduation;
Devising a recruitment strategy to attract mid-level
professionals that includes targeting military personnel who
possess the prerequisite skills and who are separating or
retiring from military service; and
Considering participating in the Department of
Veterans Affairs program for hiring injured veterans returning
from Iraq and Afghanistan.
In closing, there are several key factors that will
ensure the successful performance of the SBInet contract. Some
of those key factors include:
Negotiating task orders with sound requirements,
measurable outcomes, and good incentives;
Continuously measuring performance and adherence to
program metrics;
Strong program management and contract administration;
and
Sustained competition through disciplined make-or-buy
decision processes.
I am committed to working with CBP to ensure that these key factors
are addressed throughout contract performance.
Mr. Rogers. The Chair now recognizes the Honorable Richard
Skinner, the Inspector General of the Department of Homeland
Security.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE RICHARD L. SKINNER, INSPECTOR
GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Mr. Skinner. Thank you, Chairman Rogers. I appreciate the
opportunity to be here today. I submitted a statement for the
record.
What I would like to do with the time allotted to me is
just to discuss briefly what our office is doing to provide
oversight in the procurement operation of the Department and
also to discuss some of the challenges and tasks that lay ahead
for the Department as it tries to execute its SBInet
initiative.
First, concerning our procurement oversight role, the
inherent nature of the Department's mission will always require
reliance on contractors. In fact, more than 40 percent of the
Department's annual budget is spent on procurements. For this
reason, acquisition management has been and will continue to be
a priority for my office and an area where we plan to focus
considerable resources.
During the past year, we have created a Procurement
Oversight Office. We have hired a director and are now in the
process of hiring staff. The office will be responsible for
examining cross-cutting issues. It is currently developing an
inventory of major acquisitions with an eye towards identifying
those most vulnerable to fraud, waste, and abuse. That is sole-
source contracts, limited competition contracts, and time and
material contracts.
We also plan to review the training and qualifications of
the Department's acquisition workforce across the board. We
have just recently have created what I would like to refer to
as the acquisition focus teams. That is teams that specialize
in a particular subject matter. Today we have teams that
provide continuing and ongoing oversight. This includes
Deepwater programs, CBPs, SBInet program, and, of course,
FEMA's disaster operation program.
We also have become an active member on the Department of
Justice Katrina Fraud Task Force, most of which right now is
focused on procurement activity, and we have just recently
joined the Department of Justice's newly established
Procurement Fraud Task Force and will be active members on that
team as well. It will consist both with investigators and
auditors as we work our way through the procurements within the
department. We will work with them to identify fraud, waste,
and abuse and, where necessary, get prosecution if we do, in
fact, find fraud.
Details of our procurement activities can be found in our
performance plan which we just recently published, and it is
also up on the Web site.
Now concerning the tasks and challenges that we believe lay
ahead within the Department's SBInet initiative, the approach
to SBInet recognizes the need for a comprehensive systemic
solution to the complex challenges of border security. It will
not be easy. The Department's performance-based acquisition
strategy to address those challenges is, in our opinion, a good
one.
Partnering with the private sector will add a fresh
perspective, insight, creative energy and innovation to the
Department's efforts to meet its mandate to securing our
borders. It shifts the focus from traditional acquisition
models, that is strict compliance, contract compliance, into
one of collaborative performance-oriented teamwork with a focus
on performance, improvements and innovation.
Nevertheless, using this type of approach does not come
without risk. To ensure that this partnership is successful,
the Department must lay the foundation to oversee and assess
contractor performance and control costs and schedules. In our
opinion, the Department has not yet laid that foundation, at
least not fully.
Specifically, the Department acquisition management
capacity lacks the appropriate workforce, business processes,
and management controls for executing a new start for a major
acquisition program such as SBInet. Key positions are still
being identified and filled. CBP is still trying to come from
behind and create the organization needed to manage the
program. That is why we believe the Department needs to proceed
with caution as it moves forward with the implementation of the
SBI initiative or SBInet initiative. Expediency and urgency
should not drive the acquisition. Instead, the Department needs
to ensure that it has the capacity to manage such an
initiative. Then and only then can it provide assurances that
it is being a good steward of the taxpayers' dollar.
Also, the Department deferred fully defining operational
requirements to after the award of the systems integration
contract, that is the Boeing contract. In selecting the
system's integrator, the Department used a broad statement of
objectives as part of its acquisition strategy in order to
allow the industry to be creative in its solutions, and
consequently deferring setting contract requirements, including
performance metrics, until delivery of the task orders are
actually negotiated. Right now I believe we have awarded two
tasks under the existing contract.
This is fine, in our opinion, at least for the moment.
However, until the Department fully defines, validates, and
stabilizes the operational requirements underlying the SBInet
program, the program's objectives are at risk, and effective
cost and schedule control are precluded.
Now that the contract has been awarded, the Department
needs to move quickly to ensure performance and management
systems and processes are in place and functioning. As
reflected in our advisory--our Advisory Report on the SBI
Initiative and Procurement, which we just published today and
will go up on our Web page tonight, and CBI's Corrective Action
Plan, the tasks and challenges that lay ahead include building
the management and oversight capacity that will allow the
Department to oversee the execution of the program; refining
operational requirements with Boeing's proposed solution;
establishing an acquisition program baseline of costs, schedule
and technical performance parameters, a performance baseline
upon which the program cost estimates and budgets and cost
metrics could be based; and implementing an earned value
management system to ensure that Department's understanding of
the program status, the contractor's performance and the
reliability of program budgets and cost estimates.
Performance management systems will ensure transparency.
That is a clear roadmap on how the contractor plans to meet the
Department's Border Security Initiative or objective.
Visibility. That is a clear, open line of communications
with all of the stakeholders on the progress of the initiative.
Accountability. That is the means to determine on a real-
time basis what is working and what is not working.
And finally oversight. This includes just not the program
management office, but oversight by the OIG and by the
Congress.
Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, that concludes my
oral statement. I will be pleased to answer any questions you
may have.
Mr. Rogers. Thank you, Mr. Skinner.
[The statement of Mr. Skinner follows:]
Prepared Statement of Richard L. Skinner
Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee. I am
Richard L. Skinner, Inspector General for the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS). Thank you for the opportunity to discuss our risk
management review of the SBInet program initiative.
Today I will discuss performance-based acquisitions, DHS'
acquisition management capacity, and the specific risk we see related
to the Secure Border Initiative.
To accomplish its mission of securing the homeland, DHS spends
billions of taxpayer dollars annually. Of that total, about 30% of the
DHS budget goes to the private sector to procure goods and services.
Implicit in each procurement is the desire to accomplish a mission need
as reliably and as cost-effectively as possible. One procurement method
DHS uses is performance-based contracting. While this method has
certain advantages over traditional, specifications-based contracting,
it also introduces risks that, unless properly managed, threaten
achievement of cost, schedule, performance, and, ultimately, mission
objectives.
Key Concepts and Potential Benefits of Performance-Based Contracting
Over the past 25 years, the federal government has attempted to use
performance-based contracting. Its basic principals and potential
benefits are readily understandable. Nevertheless, successful use of
this approach demands additional thought, planning, and oversight
measures that may be less necessary in traditional contracting
approaches.
A performance-based contract describes needs in terms of what is to
be achieved, not how it is to be done. One appeal of performance-based
contracting is that it allows the government to focus on identifying
needs, objectives, and constraints and allows the private sector to
focus on developing a business proposal to meet those needs and
objectives. The contracting approach shifts from looking for the low
cost, technically acceptable solution to looking for the best-value
solution, which is often more innovative than the traditional approach.
To determine best value, the government must measure performance trade
offs and the cost-effectiveness of the various proposed solutions.
Oversight in specifications-based contracting is a matter of
determining whether or not the contractor complies with the explicit
terms of the contract. In performance-based contracting, oversight is a
matter of determining whether the contractor's solution, when complete,
will meet the mission needs specified in the contract. Oversight
focuses on program performance and improvement from a defined baseline,
not contract compliance.
A trivial example highlights the simplicity of these concepts, but
also the need for a precise statement of the performance objectives. A
traditional, specifications-based contract for lawn maintenance might
require weekly watering and mowing, quarterly fertilizing, and annual
aeration. A performance-based lawn maintenance contract might specify
that the lawn should never be more than 3 inches high, have no more
than 5% weeds, and never turn brown. The traditional contract tells the
contractor how to do its job; the performance-based contract tells the
contractor what the owner wants to see when looking at his lawn. With
the traditional contract, the owner may or may not get the desired
lawn, but the owner would know exactly what he paid for.
If the performance-based contract specified its objective as a
``golf course quality lawn,'' the performance-based approach would be
riskier than the traditional one. When the owner does not have a well-
defined, measurable performance objective, the owner cannot predict how
much it will cost, how long it will take, and what the end result will
be. The contractor may have a different understanding of how much it
will cost and how long it will take to achieve the golf course quality.
Therein lies the critical importance of describing mission needs,
and the yardsticks by which to measure achievement, completely and
precisely. Without clear agreement between the government and the
contractor about what the procurement is to achieve, the government is
vulnerable to cost overruns, delays, and, in the end, not receiving a
good or service that meets its needs.
Mitigation of Risks
Performance-based contracting may have additional risks, but with
forethought and vigorous oversight, the risks can be managed. ``Risk
management is the art and science of planning, assessing, and handling
future events to ensure favorable outcomes. The alternative to risk
management is crisis management, a resource-intensive process'' with
generally more limited options.\1\
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\1\ Risk Management Guide for DOD Acquisition, Department of
Defense, Defense Acquisition University, Fifth Edition (Version 2.0),
June 2003.
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While no one has yet formulated the perfect risk management
solution, risks can be controlled, avoided, assumed, and transferred.
For example, programs can develop alternative designs that use lower
risk approaches, competing systems that meet the same performance
requirements, or extensive testing and prototyping that demonstrates
performance. Risk mitigation measures usually are specific to each
procurement. The nature of the goods and services procured, the
delivery schedule, and dollars involved determine what mitigation is
appropriate.
Acquisition Management is a Major Challenge for DHS
Building an effective acquisition management infrastructure for the
significant level of contracting activities in the department is a
major challenge. DHS must have an acquisition management infrastructure
in place that allows it to oversee effectively the complex and large
dollar procurements critically important to achieving its mission.
Acquisition management is not just awarding a contract, but an entire
process that begins with identifying a mission need and developing a
strategy to fulfill that need through a thoughtful and balanced
approach that considers cost, schedule, and performance.
The urgency and complexity of the department's mission will
continue to demand rapid pursuit of major investments. We have
conducted audits and reviews of a number of individual DHS contracts.
Common themes and risks emerged from these audits, primarily the
dominant influence of expediency, poorly defined requirements, and
inadequate oversight.
Little disagreement exists about the need for our nation to protect
itself immediately against the range of threats, both natural and
manmade, that we face. At the same time, the urgency and complexity of
the department's mission create an environment in which many programs
have acquisitions with a high risk of cost overruns, mismanagement, or
failure.
The department's need for increased institutional capacity to
manage such risks is a common theme in the audits we have conducted.
The department does not have a cadre of skilled program and acquisition
management personnel, as well as robust business processes and
information systems, to meet its urgent schedule demands and complex
program objectives in a timely and effective manner.
Programs developed at top speed sometimes overlook key issues
during program planning and development of mission requirements. Also,
an over-emphasis on expedient contract awards may hinder competition,
which frequently results in increased costs. Finally, expediting
program schedules and contract awards necessarily limits time available
for adequate procurement planning and development of technical
requirements, acceptance criteria, and performance measures. This can
lead to higher costs, schedule delays, and systems that do not meet
mission objectives.
In our FY 2005 assessment of procurement operations for Secretary
Chertoff, we recommended that DHS: (1) require expanded procurement
ethics training for senior program and procurement officials; (2)
monitor departmental procurement activities for potential standards of
conduct violations; (3) create and staff a DHS organization to develop
program management policies and procedures; provide independent
technical support and share best practices; (4) optimize procurement
organization resources across DHS; and, (5) provide the Chief
Procurement Officer with sufficient staff and resources to effectively
oversee DHS procurement operations.\2\ DHS concurred with each of these
recommendations. To a great extent, the Chief Procurement Officer's
agenda reflects the issues in our report.
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\2\ DHS OIG, Department of Homeland Security's Procurement and
Program Management Operations, OIG-05-53, September 2005.
A Systems Approach To Border Security
The challenges the department faces are complex and require
comprehensive solutions. Implementing effective solutions to homeland
security vulnerabilities requires a systems approach that collectively
reduces risks, not just shifts them. Reducing America's vulnerability
to terrorism by controlling the borders of the United States is one of
DHS' primary missions. Accomplishing this mission requires a
comprehensive solution and concerted effort across the department and
its federal, state, and local partners. This mission is shared by a
number of agencies within DHS and is dependent on the coordinated
accomplishment of each agency's roles, as well as joint efforts with
other agencies.
The department recognizes the need for a coordinated systems
approach to securing the border. During FY 2006, the White House and
DHS announced a comprehensive multi-year plan to secure the borders and
reduce illegal immigration--The Secure Border Initiative (SBI). DHS
created a program executive office within the policy directorate to
plan, coordinate, and oversee implementation of SBI across DHS.
Maintaining a coordinated systems approach to addressing the
challenge of securing our borders will be a major challenge as DHS
components implement the various plans comprising SBI. The major
planned efforts under SBI are led by the three lead components for
immigration and border security.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement leads efforts to
improve the apprehension, detention, and removal of illegal
aliens, and to expand worksite enforcement. Improvements in
alien detention and removal efforts require coordinated efforts
across DHS and collaboration with the Department of Justice and
other agencies sharing responsibility for this function.
Citizenship and Immigration Services leads initiatives
for a temporary guest worker program; streamlining immigration
benefits processes; and expanding the employment verification
program. CIS efforts focus on automating and improving
processes to: (1) increase efficiency and alleviate chronic
backlogs in benefit application processing and adjudications;
and (2) handle anticipated increases in applicants under
proposed expanded guest worker initiatives.
Customs and Border Protection leads the SBInet major
investment program to gain control of the borders using a mix
of technology, infrastructure, personnel, and processes. While
SBInet is a new program, it replaces two previous efforts to
gain control of the borders--the Integrated Surveillance
Intelligence System (ISIS) and the America's Shield Initiative
(ASI)--with a more comprehensive solution.
Other DHS components share border security responsibilities and are
necessarily part of a comprehensive solution to border and immigration
control. For example, the US-VISIT Program is responsible for
developing and fielding DHS' entry-exit system. It also coordinates the
integration of two fingerprint systems: DHS' Automated Biometric
Identification System and the Federal Bureau of Investigation's
Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System. Border security
also depends on information about terrorists kept on various watch
lists, which are managed by several federal agencies. Those agencies
and DHS need to coordinate access to the lists to ensure valuable
information flows to field personnel on the line.
Observations about the SBInet Major Acquisition
The SBInet program is intended to gain operational control of the
nation's borders through improved use of technology, infrastructure,
and personnel. While SBInet is a new major acquisition program, it
replaces two previous efforts to gain control of the borders: the
Integrated Surveillance Intelligence System (ISIS) and the America's
Shield Initiative (ASI). The department's performance-based acquisition
strategy was to solicit solutions from industry and select a systems
integrator to develop solutions to manage, control, and secure the
borders using a mix of proven, current and future technology,
infrastructure, personnel, response capability, and processes.
The department awarded the SBInet contract to the Boeing Company in
September 2006. The department awarded an indefinite delivery,
indefinite quantity contract, leaving the work tasks and deliverables
largely undefined until the government negotiates a specific delivery
task order. The contract base period is three years with three
1year options. The initially awarded task is for Boeing to
provide and integrate equipment to achieve operational control of a
segment of the border near Tucson, Arizona, by June 07.
While the department has recently taken steps to establish adequate
oversight of this contract, we see risks similar to those occurring in
other DHS acquisitions where contract management and oversight has
failed. Prior to award of the SBInet contract, the department had not
laid the foundation to oversee and assess contractor performance and
control costs and schedule of this major investment.
Management and Oversight Capacity. The department's acquisition
management capacity lacked the appropriate work force, business
processes, and management controls for planning and executing a new
start major acquisition program such as SBInet. Without a pre-existing
professional acquisition workforce, CBP had to create staffing plans,
locate workspace, and establish business processes, while
simultaneously initiating one of the largest acquisition programs in
the department. At the time of the contract award, the organizational
structure was in flux and key positions were still being identified and
filled.
Only recently has the department performed the work breakdown
analysis needed to define and stabilize the SBInet organizational
structure and restructure the organization to reflect this analysis.
The emerging organization proposed 252 positions; however, it is
unclear whether that organization will be up to the challenges ahead.
Staffing the SBInet program office has been and continues to be a
critical problem for the department. We identified other specific
management oversight risks at the time the award:
Whether organizational roles and functions will be
assigned appropriately for employees and contractors? While
contractors are appropriate for support services, only federal
employees should perform inherently governmental functions.\3\
The emerging organizational structure identified 65% of the 252
positions as contractors. This appears excessive for the
management control environment that will be needed for such a
large, complex acquisition.
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\3\ OMB Policy Letter 92-1 and Circular A-76 describe inherently
governmental functions as those so intimately related to the public
interest as to mandate performance by government employees.
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Whether the staff will have the appropriate
qualifications and necessary training in acquisition
management, as well as the right skill mix? A question remains
whether the emerging organizational structure will adequately
provide for the use of integrated product teams, as required by
OMB capital budgeting regulations.\4\
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\4\ OMB Circular A-11 requires use of Integrated Product Teams
(IPTs). IPTs bring a variety of functional disciplines to the task,
ensuring full consideration of perspectives in making program
decisions, so that the potential impacts are identified and trade-offs
understood. At issue for SBInet is whether the appropriate mix of
technical and business disciplines, such as engineers, logisticians,
contracting officers, and cost analysts will be available to staff the
IPTs.
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How workforce turnover and fluctuations will be managed? As a
stopgap measure, CBP is detailing agents and other staff on temporary
assignment to identify and perform tasks they are not experienced or
trained for. The program office has no clear plan for replacing the
detailees and transferring their institutional knowledge. Without
turnover procedures and documentation of decisions and deliberations,
new personnel will be at a disadvantage in managing implementation.
Additionally, the investment review processes required by
department directive \5\ were bypassed and key decisions about the
scope of the program and the acquisition strategy were made without the
prescribed review and analysis or transparency. The department has
since announced plans to complete these reviews. The department's
Investment Review Board and Joint Requirements Council provide for
deliberative processes to obtain the counsel of functional
stakeholders. To ensure the program is on the right track, and to
bolster support for revising its FY 2008 budget estimates, CBP intends
to present program plans and the appropriate program documentation for
Joint Requirements Council review within 60 days of award and the
Investment Review Board within 90 days.
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\5\ DHS Management Directive 1400
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Operational Requirements. Until the department fully defines,
validates, and stabilizes the operational requirements underlying the
SBInet program, the program's objectives are at risk and effective cost
and schedule control are precluded.
The department deferred fully defining operational requirements
until after award of the systems integration contract. In selecting the
systems integrator, the department used a broad statement of objectives
as part of its acquisition strategy in order to allow industry to be
creative in its solutions and, consequently, deferred setting contract
requirements, including performance metrics, until delivery task order
negotiations.
While the SBInet broad statement of objectives is an appropriate
algorithm \6\ for encouraging the systems engineering desired, success
in accomplishing this macro algorithm cannot be practically measured.
By not setting measurable performance goals and thresholds, the
government was at increased risk that offerors would rely on unproven
technologies and high-risk technical solutions that would delay
implementation or be unaffordable.
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\6\ The macro algorithm is to ``detect entries, identify and
classify, respond, resolve.'' The SBInet system is to detect entries
when they occur; identify what the entry is; classify its level of
threat (who are they, what are they doing, how many, etc.); effectively
and efficiently respond to the entry; and bring the situation to the
appropriate law enforcement resolution (apprehension, interdiction,
transport to interdiction processing point, etc.).
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To mitigate this risk, the solicitation asked for solutions that
used commercial-off-the-shelf and government-off-the-shelf solutions,
even as the department publicly encouraged use of high-risk,
developmental items, such as unmanned aerial vehicles. Also, the
department required submission of quality assurance plans as part of
the proposals to mitigate this risk. However, it remains to be seen
whether the contractor's quality assurance plan will satisfy the
department's needs or whether the department's criteria for gauging
program success is sufficient to evaluate the contractor's performance.
To control this risk, the department needs to refine, validate, and set
stable operational requirements for SBInet, enabling the program office
to define and set contract requirements in task order negotiations,
including the performance metrics needed to ensure accomplishment of
the program's objectives.
The department also needs to define and document the underlying
operational requirements, i.e., translating mission needs, describing
shortcomings with the status quo systems and tactics, setting
thresholds and objectives for key performance parameters including
affordability, and prioritizing among competing needs and conflicting
goals. Without operational requirements, the department will not have a
common understanding of what it is to accomplish, and program managers
will not have the guidelines needed to balance competing objectives in
cost, schedule, and performance objectives through the life of the
program. Furthermore, until operational requirements are fully defined
and validated, providing firm support and validated assumptions for the
program's cost estimates, the credibility of budget estimates is
undermined.
The department took steps during the competition for the systems
integration contract to compensate for the lack of fully defined,
validated, stabilized, and documented requirements. While the
participating DHS and CBP officials had a strong sense of the
underlying operational requirements they expected the SBInet program to
fulfill, such an understanding was not reduced to writing and conveyed
to others. However, the department provided industry with a library of
documents and videos that describe mission goals, current operations,
and desired improvements over current operations. Also, the department
conducted an extensive ``due diligence'' process and held oral
presentations and question and answer sessions with the competitors to
exchange information. Additionally, the department developed a
structure to frame analysis of the offerors' approaches. The department
then modified the solicitation, requiring offers to be mapped to this
structure; thereby clarifying proposed approaches, assumptions, and
costs and facilitating comparisons. Eventually, this work break down
analysis should facilitate comparison of the winning industry approach
to the validated operational requirements.
However, until the operational requirements are validated and
stabilized, the SBInet program will be vulnerable to changing
direction. Changing the program's direction will likely require
contract changes and equitable adjustments, rework of the contractor's
planning, management, and systems engineering efforts, and add cost and
delay.
With firm requirements, the program office can and should move
quickly to implement a performance management processes. A deferred,
but critical, first step in establishing control of cost, schedule, and
performance is the setting of an ``acquisition program baseline.'' This
baseline of performance and schedule requirements and total cost
estimates is needed to monitor the health of the program. The absence
of an acquisition program baseline is a significant risk to the success
of the SBInet program. The department deferred setting a baseline until
after contract award because of the uncertainties related to industry
solutions. Without an acquisition program baseline, however, it is
impossible to gauge the effectiveness of the program. An acquisition
program baseline is a necessary first step in implementing an ``earned
value management.'' The department plans to rectify this omission
through the Investment Review Board and Joint Requirements Council
review and approval process.
``Earned value management'' is a comprehensive management
information and analysis system, fed by cost accounting data arrayed
against work break down structures and program schedules. It is
essential to the department's understanding of the program status, the
contractor's performance, and reliability of program budgets and cost
estimates. The program manager must know at all times how the actual
cost of the work performed compares to the budgeted cost of the work
scheduled. Automated analyses of this data across the many tasks and
activities being undertaken by all personnel working on the program
should focus management attention where needed and trigger early
corrective action. ``Earned value management'' is not only a best
practice; it is an OMB capital budgeting requirement.
The department included provisions for ``earned value management''
in the solicitation and the program office is developing plans to start
and implement the process. However, to date the system is not in place
and, until it is put in place, the department does not have a sound
basis for its program cost estimates. Early, effective ``earned value
management'' implementation will be key to understanding the impact
that changes will have on the program, including trade-offs needed to
balance progress across the many components of the program.
In conclusion, the department's mission will continue to require
rapid deployment of new equipment, technology, and processes. These
efforts will frequently entail procurements with ambitious cost,
schedule, and performance goals. For this reason acquisition management
will continue to be a priority for my office and an area where we plan
to focus considerable resources. We will examine crosscutting
acquisition issues, in addition to individual programs, such as SBInet
and Deepwater. For example, during the upcoming fiscal year we intend
review DHS use of sole source contracts and the training and
qualifications of its acquisition workforce.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared remarks. I would be happy
to answer any questions that you or the Subcommittee Members may have.
Mr. Rogers. I would like to start off with questions. I had
a different path that I was going to immediately pursue, but
you raised a lot of concerns in your statement. What I would
like to do is start with Greg and ask you to address some of
those concerns that were just outlined by Mr. Skinner,
particularly about the readiness to take on this SBInet
contract any time in the immediate future and how can you calm
fears that he just raised.
Mr. Giddens. Yes, sir. The issues that the IG just raised
are ones that we are completely in agreement with, and I will
try to run them down in order.
The first one, I believe, was staffing, and we are, based
on our 2007 appropriation, behind on our staffing. We were
right on track to be staffed to what was in the President's
budget for 2007, and that was what we were planning. The 2007
appropriation was a significant increase over the President's
budget, and as soon as that was passed, then we went back and
did a different organizational structure and staffing plan. So
if we were here with what was in the President's budget or
something relatively close to that, we would be right on target
for staffing. But with that significant increase in 2007, we
are behind, but we also are measuring our execution of the
contract based on our ability to measure it.
Mr. Rogers. I am sorry. Give us a time line, then, if you
could. How do you envision your capability evolving as you
begin to start up this process? When do you think you will be
able to start moving the ball down the field with the staffing?
Mr. Giddens. We are actually--right now we have over 100
people on board right now.
Mr. Rogers. Where is your time line for the whole program?
When do you expect to have SBInet implemented and completed?
Mr. Giddens. Fully staffed?
Mr. Rogers. I am talking about this new contract. SBInet,
when do you have--you have to have some horizon out there when
you say we are going to have completed this project, by 2009,
2010. When?
Mr. Giddens. We have not got to the point to lay out the
end state in terms of timing. We are working that issue within
the administration, looking at the budget implications of that,
because currently one of the drivers of that would be the
appropriated funds that we would have to account against this
program.
Mr. Rogers. Let me ask this: When do you expect to have the
full staffing you will need to implement the program that you
have described and allay the fears raised by Mr. Skinner?
Mr. Giddens. On the staffing, we will have that done by
summer.
Mr. Rogers. By this summer.
Mr. Giddens. But we will do that in progress; as we build
staffing, we will build execution task orders.
Mr. Rogers. I raise that because the time line has not only
been a concern, but we have been concerned all along about the
cost of this program. It has been our feeling that we haven't
been able to get any kind of a handle first on what SBInet was
going to be, when it was going to be bid, how it was going to
be comprised, and definitely no ballpark in the cost area.
There were some news reports early about the time SBInet was
bid, that we were looking at maybe two to $5 billion. But now
we learn from this, the IG's report, that they are talking
between two and eight and $30 billion for this program.
First of all, what is your cost estimate on SBInet?
Mr. Giddens. We do not have a cost estimate published. That
is one of the issues that we are working through, and there are
two reports that are due in December to the Congress. And one
of the concerns that we have is--we lay that out--is the
dynamics of the environment.
For example, one of the sectors that was a focus of the
source selection was the Tucson sector. We gain control there,
the dynamics of the smugglers are going to change, and we
believe there are currently areas now that don't have much
traffic that, as we gain control in those areas, they are going
to be more prominent.
Mr. Rogers. At what point do you think you are going to be
able to talk about cost estimates with us? And keep in mind how
we framed the beginning of this hearing and how we framed them
all. We are not going to forget ISIS. What turned--what went
from a $2 million pilot project went to a quarter-billion-
dollar disaster of a management project. We want to know that
you are looking at real dollars, real estimates, and we want to
know that you are looking at gaining the fiscal feasibility of
this initiative. These are two big ballparks. Early estimates
of two--to five--; now we are talking about eight--to 30
billion. What ballpark are we in?
Mr. Giddens. Sir, I wish I could answer that with better
clarity. I think you will see in the December report how we
would apply that billion dollars and what the results and the
performance of that would be, and that would give, I think, a
good indication of what the future would portend, because in
that report with detail we would be laying out that billion
dollars, what it would be spent for, and what you should expect
to see in terms of performance, and when you should expect to
see that. So I think that--I think that will be the next cut
that will give you a better sense of granularity on the dollars
and what you would expect to see in terms of performance.
Mr. Rogers. I think you are going to see us get to a lot
higher comfort level once we start seeing a roadmap of where we
are going in terms of how it is going to look with more
clarity, but also some cost estimates on what you anticipate,
because right now this is still too cloudy for comfort.
And with that, my time has expired, and I recognize the
Ranking Member, Mr. Meek, for any questions he may have.
Mr. Meek. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And in the spirit of
your questions, these are the burning questions; that is the
reason why we continue to have these hearings.
Ms. Spero, I don't know if you have anything to add. You
heard the line of questioning. Do you have any time lines or
when we are going to make progress?
Ms. Spero. I don't have anything specific to add other than
we are working very closely with Greg and his office to develop
the kind of information we know you want and that we want also.
I think you will see a lot more clarity in our report to
Congress that will be submitted in early December that will
give you and all of us a better sense of this--of how we intend
to map out the future with securing the borders.
Mr. Meek. I notice--and I was reading here your opening
statement. I know that you abbreviated it, but in the back here
on page 5, you talked about in conjunction with the OIG
recommendations, CBP is pursuing improvements in the following
areas to strengthen the government program management and
contractor oversight: defining program management and
structure, providing appropriate staffing and human capital,
enhancing definition of operational requirements, and measuring
contractor performance.
You feel good about all of that today in those areas.
Mr. Giddens. Yes, sir.
Mr. Meek. Okay. I just want to make sure, because I am
asking the obvious, that you should be able to say yes or no,
because if that is not happening, if it is something that you
need--because I know that many times in the Department we have
had--and we have been through this with Ms. Duke and Mr.
Skinner, and Mr. Skinner knows that I am one of the main
people, if you don't have it, we want to know, because it is
cheaper for us to know versus us hearing about it after the
money is spent and no performance. So if you feel comfortable
with it, and that is what you want to stick with, but if you
change your mind any time, feel free to let us know because I
think it is important for us.
We have all of these hearings and all of this oversight and
all this committee time and all of our staff time preparing,
and to come to the Hill and we still have big fumbles, that is
going to be a problem.
Mr. Skinner, I wanted to ask you a question, sir, because I
know that you--you have been really working on this. How--I
know this is off subject, but your team is still doing some of
the Katrina stuff. Are you using best practices as it relates
to Hurricane Katrina, some of the money that was wasted in that
area, some of the contracts that weren't executed the way they
should have been executed especially along the no-bid area; are
you applying some of that? Because we are going to have the
folks in the next panel that are actually going to execute
this, or the people that were given the opportunity to do so.
Are you applying some of the things that maybe your team has
seen with Hurricane Katrina towards oversight as we look at
executing this contract?
Mr. Skinner. Yes. And like I said, we have developed what--
I referred to these as specialty teams, and we have one dealing
with nothing but Katrina operations, and we have one dealing
with nothing but SBInet initiatives, and we have one dealing
with nothing but the Coast Guard initiatives.
And we are using--the techniques we are using is we are
working hand in hand with the procurement officers, the program
officers, and the integrated project teams that are responsible
for those procurements, and we are not waiting. Unlike what we
did in Katrina, the contracts went out the door the first week,
2 weeks. Here we have an opportunity to be working with the
program offices and the contract offices before the contract
went out the door.
So we are working hand in hand with them, providing them,
for example, our first advisory report that is only the first
in a series of reports that we will be issuing so that we can
provide our perspective, our insights and our concerns on an
ongoing basis throughout not only the procurement phase, the
solicitation phase, the award phase, but also the execution
phase.
Right now we are looking at the task orders, the two tasks
that have been awarded under SBInet for the pilot project in
Tucson as well as the management tasking order that was awarded
last month. So we are doing that for both Deepwater, we are
doing that for SBInet.
And Katrina, there we are trying to catch up because there,
all of the contracts went out the door, and the money went out
the door, most of it. So what we are doing there is an
assessment of what contracts we have, and we are going through
each and every one of those that are high risk. That is sole-
source time and material and limited competition, looking for
areas where there could have been waste, fraud, and abuse, and,
of course, as you know, we are finding some of that as we go
through each of those contracts. And that will take us some
time to do that over the--we have been working on it this past
year, and we will be working on it for the next year to 2 years
before we get a full picture.
Mr. Meek. Mr. Skinner, are you pleased with the response
you are get from the Department on the obvious--or
recommendations that your people are finding? Are you all
working together better now than you have in the past; the
response from the Department in trying to resolve some of these
issues before we get into the area of embarrassment?
Mr. Skinner. Absolutely, and I am very satisfied with the
responses we are receiving from the Department, from CBP, and
from the procurement office and from the SBInet program office.
The cooperation could not be better. The issues that we have
pointed out in our advisory letter, these are issues that they
are currently working on.
One of the things we have cautioned the Department about is
we need to proceed with caution until we can develop an
acquisition program, a baseline as to what the big picture is
going to look like. If we are going to be putting together
tasking pieces of the picture, we have to know what the big
picture is going to be. We have to know what type of financial
commitment to get these things done. We can't secure one part
of the border and leave our ports unsecured. And yes, we expect
to get program management plans, program plans, systems
engineering plans, and as well as a performance plan with
measures as to when we can expect to get these documents so
that we could evaluate them and so we can move on.
Mr. Meek. Thank you so very much.
And, Mr. Chairman, thank you for the latitude. I yield
back.
Mr. Rogers. The Chair now recognizes Mr. Souder for any
questions he may have.
Mr. Souder. I have some, yes, and I have a bigger one that
I am going to get diverted to, but I want to make this brief
point.
If there is a real fence to keep people from getting to a
vanishing point, a real fence will slow them down. I spent a
lot of time on both the north and south border, and I know we
have to have a strategy. I was glad to hear Mr. Giddens say we
are not going to replace people because we don't begin to have
enough people now even if we had a hard fence because they are
still going to come over, but it is going to slow them down
more. So we have to have some kind of combination between a
hard fence and electronic fencing and virtual fencing.
And I hope the administration agrees that the hard fence,
the 700 miles, is absolutely essential, and then the hilly
areas and other more open areas are another challenge because I
don't know that we can hard-fence the entire border.
But I am baffled here. I saw Mr. Giddens' presentation with
all of this equipment, and I have seen pieces of all of these
variations of things as I have been up and down the border, but
did I hear you say that you don't have a cost estimate, and it
could be between 2--and $30 billion, you are not sure which?
How in the world did Boeing make a bid? How do you do a
contract, show us all of these things that you are going to do
on the border? I understand if you do this at Nogales, they are
going to move over to here. We know that. How does somebody
bid, and how do you choose a contractor without having any idea
of the price range? They don't even know if they can implement
this.
Mr. Giddens. Sir, the way that we conducted the competition
was to ask for several things from all of the competitors. One
was the concept of how they would proceed in securing the
border.
Mr. Souder. If funds were unlimited, was that the proposal?
Mr. Giddens. We did not put a funding constraint on it
through this solicitation process.
Mr. Souder. So it was a pie in the sky, give us your best
shot, if you have whatever unlimited amounts of money, what
would you do to seal the border?
Mr. Giddens. We also asked them not just their CONOPS, but
also in particular what would they do for the Tucson sector,
and that was a cost proposal with all of the bases of estimates
in that. And also what would they do for an 8-month, $20
million project that again was very specifically detailed and
priced in their proposal.
Mr. Souder. So that's what you were saying; if you
extrapolated that, that would give you some idea of the total
cost for the south border?
Mr. Giddens. I would hesitate to do the extrapolation on
that 28-mile area because there is a 28-mile stretch, and its
relationship to the southern border of almost 2,000 miles is
one I would not make today.
But in the upcoming plan we have delivered, that we will be
delivering in December, does talk about a broader array of how
we would roll this out, particularly initially, focusing on the
southwest border.
Mr. Souder. So they bid on a contract and gave you a
concept for two sectors, but didn't, for example, give you the
mountain sector in either California, in New Mexico, the
eastern part of Arizona.
I am still curious. We don't do this in any kind of
contracting governance, do we, where we say, give us a pie-in-
the-sky estimate, and pick the contractor within--without a
fixed budget of any type? This is what I am struggling with,
because theoretically somebody could come up with something
that was totally unachievable.
Mr. Giddens. That is why we ask for specific pricing on
those two task orders.
I guess I would be hesitant to speak so to overall
procurements; I don't know if Ms. Duke wants to add anything.
Mr. Souder. But, Mr. Skinner, Inspector General, you tend
to be retroactive afterwards, but wouldn't this be one sign
that could potentially lead to problems? Do you know of other
cases where we have bids and bids selected without even any
price range?
Mr. Skinner. No. But those were--you see that type of
activity--those are the types of contracts that are going to
get us in trouble down the road. You are going to see cost
overruns, you are going to see schedules not being met, you are
going to see possibly even services and goods that are going to
be delivered that are not going to actually work. That is why
it is essential that we develop a basic--a baseline, an
acquisition baseline plan, and that we have clearly defined
operational requirements.
And who is going to be involved here? Who are we going to
be leveraging off of? Are we going to be using other DOD
communication systems? Is it going to cost us? Are we going to
be building our own and pay for them? These are the types of
questions we are asking. That is why we are asking the
Department to move slowly until you can make--define what your
requirements are, you can define what your acquisition baseline
is.
Mr. Souder. Mr. Chairman, I know you share this concern,
because this is how you run into problems at the Capitol
Visitors Center. Because it is changing specs is what gives
cost overruns; it is true in home building, it is true in any
kind of corporation.
But this was unusual because we are not changing specs, we
don't have the specs. And I am not arguing with Boeing, I am
not arguing that this is difficult and the numbers and so on,
but it just seems extraordinary to me. I am baffled.
Mr. Rogers. You are not the only one in this room.
The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Mississippi for
any questions he may have.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I actually
want to agree with everything that has been asked so far.
Mr. Giddens, can you tell me why the Department moved with
this procurement, not having a plan or a strategy for border
security?
Mr. Giddens. The purpose of this procurement was to, as we
have focused on the border, provide that type of framework and
that solution for securing the border. So we laid out an
approach that is a performance-based approach with the stated
objectives that Mr. Skinner had already referenced, and that is
what we laid out as our requirements.
So we did have our requirements spelled out in the
solicitation, and that is what the industry bid to. We were
careful not to tell them what the solution was, but to tell
them what our requirements were; and then industry had to bid
back for that and provide very detailed proposals for the
overall Tucson Sector, including their cost schedule and
performance, and also for the $20 million, 8-month effort, and
that is a subset of the Tucson Sector.
Mr. Thompson. How do you propose to maintain control of the
cost to this contract with this kind of procurement?
Mr. Giddens. As each one of the task orders is awarded,
they will have their own cost scheduling performance that will
be negotiated, as Ms. Duke alluded to, before that task order
is awarded.
Mr. Thompson. Mr. Skinner, do you agree with that approach?
Mr. Skinner. By taking it task by task, that is a caution.
That is probably the most prudent way to go at this point in
time. But even then, you still need to know what the big
picture is going to look like.
You need to know what the life cycle of the project is
going to cost you. You need to know when these taskings will be
put in place, when is the end date for us to assume ownership
of the project. That is what is missing right now.
It is my understanding that is what is being worked on
right now. It is my understanding that is something that
sometime after the pilot project is complete the Department
will be in a better position than to come in with a--to better
define their operational requirements, develop an acquisition
program plan, as well as performance plans and plans to
measure--or judge the contractors to see what the progress is
going to be like.
I think we are several months out before they are going to
be able to do that for us, and until that is done, we need to
be very, very careful how we proceed.
Mr. Thompson. Well--and I am not certain whether Ms. Spero
or Mr. Giddens can answer. The information that we are supposed
to have about the strategic plan, can you tell me exactly where
the plan is at this moment?
Mr. Giddens. Exactly where it is?
Mr. Thompson. We are supposed to have it in December?
Mr. Giddens. Yes, sir, the 4th of December.
Mr. Thompson. Okay. We should have had it the 4th of
December. When can we expect it?
Mr. Giddens. Sir, we are still on track, we believe, to
deliver that on 4 December.
Mr. Thompson. Oh, I am sorry, I thought you said November.
Well, it was supposed to be in November, but now you have
pushed it back a month.
Mr. Giddens. Sir, I think the latest data requirement
started off as 4 December.
Mr. Thompson. So we can expect--I won't quibble over that.
So we can have it?
Mr. Giddens. Yes, sir.
Mr. Thompson. I take that back, I do want to quibble.
According to the legislation, it said November 1, but that
is--Mr. Chairman, I thought it said November.
Mr. Giddens. Sir, I believe the actual legislation that
passed did indicate in December, but--we would be happy to take
that for the record, but I believe that the actual--
Mr. Thompson. Okay.
Well, Mr. Chairman, let's just say that procurement
continues to be a problem. It is important that this committee
not shirk its responsibility both in oversight and
investigations, as well as management integration; and I would
encourage us to do that. Most of us can't really explain the
procurement, as Members of Congress, and it continues to show
that we need some other work.
If I might, one other question, Mr. Chairman, if you
indulge me.
Ms. Duke, can you give or provide me the mechanism by which
small and minority business participation will be monitored
with this contract?
Ms. Duke. Yes. Boeing did submit a subcontracting plan,
which I know you have reviewed. The way we are going to
moderate--we have had discussions before that just doing the
reporting and filing it in a folder is not enough, so we are
doing a couple things: One, we are using the Defense Contract
Management Agency, who does contract administration and
specializes in subcontracting and has in-plant representatives
at Boeing to actually do a review of Boeing's subcontracting
system.
The review consists of looking at, is it a good system; and
also doing compliance checks, meaning validating data and
ensuring whether or not they are actually performing as
reported. And that will be done in the first quarter of the
calendar year to set a baseline. We will decide whether we will
do annual reviews of the whole system after that, but we are
doing the first baseline review in the first quarter of the
calendar year.
Additionally, we are going to have regular business
meetings. Greg's office has the regular program reviews, but
there are definitely operational issues, so we are going to
have regular business meetings to talk about small business and
other types of management administrative issues with Boeing on
a regular basis. They have designated a single point of contact
for us. And so we are going to get their reporting on both the
single contract and all their business with DHS, and just
really do an aggressive monitoring of this in partnership with
DCMA.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you.
I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Rogers. I thank the gentleman.
Obviously, we have a lot of questions and concerns. We just
want to make sure this thing comes off right. We don't want
another ISIS on our hands.
As this Subcommittee has demonstrated over the last two
years, we are not turning loose of this. And this gavel is
going to go to my colleague after the first of the year, and he
has already made it clear he intends to continue to pursue
this. And I am going to still be on this Subcommittee, and we
are going to be staying after this to make sure it doesn't get
away from us.
And what we are going to want to know is exactly what do
you want to do, over what timeline, and what do you estimate it
is going to cost. Those are just three clear, simple questions
that we are looking for you all to help us get our arms around
sometime in the not too distant future. We are not going to
allow this to rock along unchecked, particularly given that we
have put so much time into preparing for this, and we have had
the flags raised by Mr. Skinner's comments.
Mr. Skinner, before I get to you, I want to go back to--Ms.
Duke talked earlier about your staffing. Do you feel like you
are fully staffed now? I know you have talked in the past about
your staffing concerns and that you are working toward
resolving that. Where are you in that effort? And as you hear
us talk about the challenges we are going to be facing with
trying to meet these new demands, are you there, are you going
to be staffed for it?
Ms. Duke. In my personal office, we got an additional 25
positions within the fiscal year 2007 budget, so it went up
from 45. We got 25, it was a huge increase. We filled six of
those positions in those first 6 weeks. And we are using all
those positions for oversight of procurement and oversight of
program management. And then a few of them are being used to
build the acquisition workforce, we are dedicating some to
build the skill sets of program management and contracting in
the Department. So I think in my office we are in good shape.
Unfortunately, in the eight buying offices--we have got a
generous plus-up in the 2007 budget; we got about 350 new
positions Department-wide in the eight contracting offices. Our
acquisition program continues to grow. We grew about 37 percent
from 2004 to 2005, it appears we grew about another billion and
a half to two billion from 2005 to 2006.
So we do continue to struggle. But so far the President's
budget has given us a huge increase, and we are staffing to
fill those positions, those 300-plus positions, in the
Department. But that is a challenge, and it is not only for the
contracting positions, it is for the program management
positions like Greg's.
Mr. Rogers. Tell me, as you look over the horizon at the
demands that you face, do you have a high level of confidence
that you are going to have the staffing you need when you need
it to meet those challenges, or not?
Ms. Duke. I am cautiously optimistic. We have a great
interim program. We are building the resources; they are not
out there and they don't exist, so we have to grow them
ourselves. I have been able to recruit some great people from
my--I can't talk to any of my old colleagues at Defense.
So we are really working on it, but to hire 300 people in
this marketplace is very difficult.
Mr. Rogers. All right.
Mr. Skinner, same question. When you look out over--you
talked earlier about the personnel to implement the monitoring
that you intend to have to implement. Do you have that
personnel now? If not, do you anticipate being able to have the
personnel to meet the new challenges that you are going to face
with the growth of activity?
Mr. Skinner. No, currently, I do not have it. But we do
have a very aggressive recruiting program in place, and we
anticipate by this summer that we will be able to staff up to
provide the oversight that we think is necessary. Because, like
I said earlier, procurement is just huge in the Department, and
it is going to continue to be a big cost item in the
Department, and it requires constant oversight.
We have pretty well staffed up with our specialty teams. We
have team leaders that can address the Coast Guard Deep Water
Project; we have team leaders and staff to address the SBInet
operations.
We are still shy in--although we just recently hired a
director, we still need additional resources to provide the
oversight of the FEMA contracting initiatives as a result--in
the Gulf Coast region, as well as any future disasters that may
occur. And we are still very lightweight here at headquarters
to provide oversight over the cross-cutting issues, although we
hired a very--an excellent director to lead that operation. She
is operating with a skeleton staff right now.
Mr. Rogers. Well, I would have guessed--I would have asked
you to characterize it the same way I did Ms. Duke. I asked if
her level of confidence was high that she would have the
personnel level when she needed them. She didn't quite want to
go there, but you sound like you have a higher degree of
confidence that you are going to have the personnel by the time
you need them.
Mr. Skinner. If I relay that message, let me rephrase.
Mr. Rogers. We have got a bunch of cautiously optimistic
people in this room.
Mr. Skinner. There is no magic number of what you are
really going to need. And right now what I have done is--I had
to hire these people, and to bring these people on board, I had
to take cuts in other areas of our operation. So we are
suffering in other areas as a result of this.
Mr. Rogers. Well, just understand, cautious optimism is not
what we are looking for. We want confidence that you are going
to be able to do it. And if you don't have what you need, then
we need to hear that you don't have it and exactly what you
want from us so that we, the Congress, can provide it to you.
And I do want to--before I get away, because I want to ask
another round of questions, I wanted to stay with Mr. Skinner
just a minute. I want to talk about those cost estimates.
You have heard the responses here. You all came up with
this $8 to $30 billion figure. Did I hear you make some remarks
a little while ago that you felt like it was going to be
several months before we realistically could expect to come up
with some numbers? So are you comfortable this is not starting
to get away from us?
Mr. Skinner. At this point in time, I am very comfortable
that it is not getting away with us. I know the Department is
proceeding with caution here. We only have one tasking in
Tucson. From there, I anticipate that they will learn a lot as
to what systems work and don't work, and from there they can
probably make better estimates.
As far as the 8 to 30 million, again, those were just
figures that we picked up from industry specialists and
forecasters, as well as industry rags or newsletters based on
what they knew about an initiative like this. Our frustration
right now is that we don't know what it is going to cost.
Mr. Rogers. Because we don't know what it is going to be.
Mr. Skinner. Yes. We just don't know what the big picture
looks like right now.
Mr. Rogers. So these numbers are meaningless right now.
Mr. Skinner. Yes.
Mr. Rogers. Thank you.
And I now recognize my friend and colleague from Florida,
Mr. Meek, for any additional questions he may have.
Mr. Meek. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And it seems like the
questions are repetitive along the lines of if you have what
you need, so I am going to be very brief.
I take it that you know fully--I am talking to the
Department--what you all are going to do within the time frame
that you are going to do it, but you just don't know how much
it is going to cost and what the time frame is that is going to
be met. Am I correct in asking that question?
Mr. Giddens. When you include in that the ``when'' for
particularly the 2007 funding; that is the detail to be laid
out in the report to be delivered in December.
Mr. Meek. The one that is forthcoming?
Mr. Giddens. Yes, sir.
Mr. Meek. Okay.
Mr. Chairman, I am of the belief, speaking with the ranking
member, we are just going to continue to do the things that we
have to do. And I was explaining to him--I mean, what we are
doing right now, because we have to, it is just that simple.
When I used to be a State trooper, we had intersections
where it was once a yield sign, and then it turned into a stop
sign and then it turned into a traffic light because of
fatalities at that intersection. The fatality in this case, or
the unfortunate circumstances in this case is that the American
taxpayers' dollars have been spent unwisely. It is because we
didn't have a committee that stayed on target, and especially a
subcommittee that made it their purpose to stay on target.
I also want to share with you that I think it is very, very
important that we look at it from the standpoint of the people
that are carrying out the work. I notice you have quite a few
contractors that are working on your side of the wall, and that
concerns me a lot. Not that I am against contracting or
subcontracting or what have you; and I know that there are
issues with attrition within the Department, you won't
necessarily get the Federal award for keeping people, but I
think that it is important for us to really look at this for
what it is worth.
I know Federal employees focus on what happens, especially
with a lot of these contracts. Because they are in a direct
line of command under you all's supervision, you can go to the
contractor and tell them to dismiss someone. But I think as
many Federal employees as we can get on it that have experience
in this area, the better.
Secretary Chertoff sat maybe a couple of chairs--as a
matter of fact, he was here by himself when he was before the
committee before we left for the August break. He assured us
that he is putting his best people on it. I would pretty much
say, from looking at these numbers, he is putting his best
contractors on it, and that concerns me. I think that I must
raise this concern because I don't want to have to read it in a
report from Ms. Duke or from Mr. Skinner. Because I know when
it comes to the contractors, it reminds me of Katrina, it
reminds me of other contracts that have come through this
committee or that the staff has reviewed and had concerns with.
So that is kind of a recipe for something not moving as smooth
as it should.
So I am saying this so that you can have--both of you can
have what you need when you go back to the building, and
hopefully make you the big people around the table--maybe it
will be a small or big conference table--to say that not only
does this subcommittee want to see the best team on this
project, but we want you all to be able to get what you need,
even all the way down to, Ms. Duke, what you need.
We have had several meetings together, and they have been--
we have been real with each other and we have said, listen, if
you need--if there are people, professionals, that you need in
place, then we need to know about it because if you don't tell
us and we find that, well, you know, we didn't have what we
really needed, that reflects bad on you as a professional; and
I know that the Secretary doesn't want that to happen.
And, Mr. Skinner, I carried amendments on the floor, and
some Members said--they thought maybe you were my cousin, but I
told them it was nothing personal, it was--I told them that you
are from north Georgia--
Mr. Skinner. A constituent.
Mr. Meek. But I told them, looking at the work we do here
in this committee and looking at the very obvious--the things
that took place shouldn't have taken place. And oversight is
very, very important; we want to know about it before we have
continued major problems.
My last point, Mr. Chairman--and then if we are going to go
a third round, I will stand back because I look forward to the
second panel. I think it is important to make sure that you
all, all of you there at the table, without even our staff or
without anyone on this committee asking, just let me say, a
random act of kindness, how about a random act of information?
We are saying that we want to make sure that you know
everything that you need to know. Even if we sent you something
just yesterday, here is a new development, I think that will
make us feel better. I think that will also give confidence on
the larger committee. We are focused on it as a subcommittee,
but there are members that are not on this subcommittee in full
committee. It will not only help the Secretary, it will help
the Department, it will help Members of Congress understand,
because we are going to have to be the ambassadors.
Mr. Rogers and I want to be able to walk on the floor, and
other members of this committee on the floor, when Members ask
us about what is going on--when it is, you know, above the
fold, about what happened with the SBInet--I don't want to face
them by saying, well, the Department, we fell short. We are
well beyond that now.
So, again--I have said it 10 times if I have said it once--
I just want to make sure that you all know that we are on your
side.
And many times we don't have the opportunity to walk
through this process. Usually there is some horrific event or
some political date coming up that we have to do something in a
drastic way and not have the kind of oversight and not have the
kind of discussion that we need to have or a hearing that we
need to have to make sure that we are all on the same page.
SBInet, I feel that we can't have enough hearings, and I
feel that we have a great opportunity that we have never had
before.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time. And I
want to thank the panel for their testimony.
Mr. Rogers. The Chair will now recognize Mr. Souder for any
additional questions he may have.
Mr. Souder. Ms. Spero, Mr. Giddens, why, if you don't have
a budget and you don't have a plan and you are doing it by
section, didn't you bid the contract by section?
Mr. Giddens. Because we did the contract in a way that
gives us the comprehensive ability to work this across the
border.
When you say, we don't have a plan, you are correct. I
don't know what the budget is going to be in fiscal year 2010;
and the administration is working on what the budget will be in
2008, so I don't know what that answer will be. And we are
going through the engineering process to look at what we have
learned about the Tucson Sector through the source selection,
and how that will be applied across the border, both the
southern and the northern, to get to that baseline.
But at this point to be--less than 2 months after contract
award, I think this deserves more of a look than what we could
have done as a cursory to be at this point.
So we are working hard to be responsive to Congress' call
for the report in December--
Mr. Souder. My concern isn't with the contractor; as far as
I know, they may be the best contractor. It just seems an odd
way to bid because obviously we need an integrated system, and
if you had done it by project, that would give them kind of the
one-up for the next sector because they would be able to
integrate easier.
The problem with this is that we don't know that it will
work. We don't know what their budget will be for that.
Now, I hesitate, but I understand what you are saying, and
what is done is done to some degree, but just as a business
person, I find this hard to swallow right now. So I kind of
hesitate to ask this next question, but I will anyway.
Do you have any test case like the Tucson Sector on the
north border? For example, on the British Columbia border we
are being flooded with BC Bud; we are being now flooded with
meth precursors; we are having immigration troubles coming in
from Asia in the north border, and ISIS trying to deal with
that internally.
Knowing you don't have a plan and you don't have a budget,
but do you have a test that's going on on the north border,
because they were corrected, correct, for both borders?
Mr. Giddens. The SBInet contract included scope for the
northern border, but the current task orders we have on
contract, the only contract we have for activity on the border
is on the southwest border in that 28 miles of the Tucson
Sector.
During the source selection process, all of the vendors did
look at the northern border and provided insight on the
dynamics and the difference between the southern and northern
border, but we don't have an active task force at this point on
the northern border.
Mr. Souder. In the December 4th plan, will it include any
specifics or a budget for the north border?
Mr. Giddens. Sir, I am hesitant to speak about the plan
until we have worked that through the administration and
deliver that in December.
Mr. Souder. So 2 weeks out, you are not prepared to say
that there is going to be anything in the plan on the north
border?
Mr. Giddens. I am prepared to say that we are working to be
responsive to the Congress' request for that report, but I am
not at a point now, with the report not delivered, to detail
what it would contain.
Mr. Souder. But it will have stuff on the south border?
Mr. Giddens. It will be responsive to the congressional
request for the report.
Mr. Souder. When you say ``scope out'' the north border,
what do you mean by that in the contract bid to Boeing?
Mr. Giddens. While the solicitation process required the
vendors to provide a very detailed proposal on the Tucson
Sector, it also required them to look at the distinctions and
the differences between the southern border and the northern
border, and we picked the Swanton Sector as sort of a
counterpoint to looking at the southern border. So they had to
look at their solutions and talk about its application, and on
the northern border, particularly at the Swanton Sector.
Mr. Souder. So they did have a test, it was Swanton, but it
wasn't as thorough?
Mr. Giddens. They did have a test, that did have to look at
that, and laid out their concept, but they did not do the
detail proposal, including at all the schedule and the prices
that they did on the Tucson Sector.
Mr. Souder. Thank you.
Mr. Rogers. Thank you. I want you to know we really do
appreciate the time you all take to prepare for these and to
come up here and help us. This has been very beneficial to this
Committee, and I look forward to continuing to work with you in
the next Congress. And with that, this panel is dismissed.
The Chair now calls the second panel. And I first would
like to welcome you all. We appreciate your taking the time to
be with us and talk over some statements and take some
questions.
Mr. Rogers. I would like to start off by recognizing Mr.
Jerry McElwee, the Vice President of SBInet for Boeing Advanced
Systems. And first, congratulations. And the floor is yours for
any statements you would like to offer.
And I would again remind everybody if you could keep your
opening statements to five minutes or less, you can put the
full statement in the record, if you would like to just
abbreviate it.
Mr. McElwee.
STATEMENT OF JERRY McELWEE, ICE PRESIDENT SBInet, BOEING
ADVANCED SYSTEMS
Mr. McElwee. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Meeks, and
members of the subcommittee, my name is Jerry McElwee, as you
said. And as the Boeing program manager for the SBInet program,
I am very pleased to be here today. It is a pleasure to talk
about our plans and activities on this program.
With me today are two of the teammates, Brian Seagrave with
Unysis, who is providing the information technology for the
SBInet solution, and Tom Miiller with L-3, who is providing
communications and deployment and, I might add, a vast amount
of experience from the RVS system that they deployed.
First, let me say how proud we are at Boeing to have been
selected to lead this important effort. Our enthusiasm extends
throughout the entire team. We intend to bring to bear on this
project the best technology, systems engineering and program
management practices available today in the industry.
Under the SBInet contract, we will provide a comprehensive,
open system solution to the challenge of controlling the
border. This includes supporting U.S. Customs and Border
Protection in detention, apprehending and processing people who
cross our borders illegally, as well as facilitating legitimate
cross-border travel and commerce.
The subcommittee asked the question earlier in this panel--
the previous panel, as well as much earlier, how do we know
this program will be successful when previous efforts have
fallen short? I think that the answer to the question starts
with the government's decision to address border security in a
comprehensive way and utilize the services of a systems
integrator. This approach is most appropriate for challenges
that are large, complex and are conducted in a rapidly changing
environment.
To this end, we started with the requirement that this
system had to be focused on helping the Border Patrol agent do
his or her job as well as they possibly can. We selected a
number of technologies and designed a system to satisfy the
needs of these Border Patrol agents in the field. As Mr.
Giddens referred to, we call this a ``tool kit,'' and its
purpose is to increase substantially the productivity and
effectiveness of the agent and, at the same time, enhance his
or her safety.
We had one additional issue within Boeing, and that is that
this is not a standard development contract. So I use the
analogy of a builder who hires an architect and then builds, in
this case, 17 solutions for the sectors of our U.S. border. We
are in contract to do the architecture work, based on our
proposal, and we are now waiting for the task orders to build
those 17 unique solutions, tailoring those solutions based on
the tool kit.
Of course, all of this is done on a detailed systems
engineering analysis with the Customs and Border Protection and
Border Patrol. The components will be selected from the tool
kit and deployed along the border to provide a common, yet
tailored, security solution that has been optimized for every
mile of the southern and northern borders.
The systems engineering and design approach that Boeing
uses is a process we have developed over time and with the
experience gained from many other large and complex projects.
The first step in this process is a rigorous analysis of the
SBInet requirements. Complete requirements definition sets the
foundation for all other work in the system and is critical for
the ultimate system.
This is followed by extensive modeling and simulation--Mr.
Giddens showed you some of the back border calculus that we
used to test the output of the requirements process--and then a
wide array of studies to look at potential solutions across the
full spectrum of border crossing threats.
This is an abbreviated description of why we are confident
our solution will work. Now let me describe our approach to
keeping the program on cost and on schedule.
Our management approach utilizes Boeing's proven best
practices to create a transparent governance structure that
provides unique capabilities and strengths of our team with the
oversight and knowledge of our government partners. At the
heart of our system is an Earned Value Management system that
provides a singular metric of program cost and schedule health
at all levels of the organization, as well as early warning of
potential problems and problem resolution.
As we get beyond Project 28, the initial 28-mile pilot, and
start other task orders, we envision a substantial expansion of
our team to increase capacity and bring in new technology. We
have established a dedicated Web site for SBInet suppliers, and
have received information from nearly 400 interested companies
already. We have also initiated our first solicitation through
that Web site.
In summary, we are confident we can fulfill the objectives
of the SBInet program, and I am looking forward very much to
the challenges ahead, as I am to your questions that I am
anticipating. Thank you.
Mr. Rogers. Thank you, Mr. McElwee.
[The statement of Mr. McElwee follows:]
Prepared Statement of Jerry W. McElwee
Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Meeks, and Members of
the Subcommittee. My name is Jerry I am the Boeing Program Manager for
the SBInet Program. It is a pleasure to be here to talk about our plans
and activities on this program. With me today are two of our teammates:
Brian with Unisys who is providing the information technology for our
SBInet solution, and Tom Miiller with L-3 who is providing
communications and deployment. Teammates not with us today are:
The Centech Group--Training
DRS Technologies--Program Management, System
Engineering, Mobile Towers
Kollsman--Program Management, System Engineering,
System
Lucent Technologies--Advanced Technologies
Perot Systems--Program Management, Business Process
Change Management
USIS--Program Management, Border Intelligence
Application, Intel Preparation of the Border (IBP)
First, let me say how proud we are at Boeing to have been selected
to lead this very important effort. This pride and enthusiasm extends
throughout our entire team. We intend to bring to bear on this project
the best technology, systems engineering, and management practices
available today.
Under the SBInet, contract, we will provide a comprehensive, open
system solution to the challenge of controlling the border. This
includes supporting U.S. Customs and Border Protection in detecting,
apprehending, and processing people who cross our borders illegally, as
well as facilitating legitimate cross-border travel and commerce. It
will also integrate seamlessly with the overall Secure Border
Initiative discussed by our government customer on the previous panel.
The architecture we have proposed will allow for continuous improvement
as new technology comes on the market throughout the deployment.
The Subcommittee has asked the question, ``How do we know this
program will be successful when previous efforts have fallen short?''
I think the answer to this question starts with the government's
decision to address border security in a comprehensive way, and utilize
the services of a systems integrator. This approach is most appropriate
for challenges that are large, complex, and in a rapidly changing
environment. We feel any successful solution must be capabilities-
based, fully integrated, adaptable and able to provide superior
situational awareness for effective, decentralized, decision-making and
response.
To this end, we started with the requirement that this system had
to be focused on helping the Border Patrol Agent (BPA) do his or her
job better. We selected a number of technologies and designed a system
to satisfy the needs of the BPA in the field. We refer to these
capabilities as a ``tool kit'' and its purpose is to increase
substantially the productivity of the agent and, at the same time,
enhance his or her safety. The tool kit includes a variety of sensors,
communications systems, information technology, tactical infrastructure
(roads, barriers, and fencing), and command and control capabilities
with robust situational awareness. Additionally, the tool kit will be
expanded as new and proven technology becomes available from private
industry and federal, state and local governments.
After conducting detailed systems engineering analyses with CBP and
the Border Patrol, components will be selected from the tool kit and
deployed along the border to provide a common, yet tailored, security
solution that has been optimized for every mile of our Southern and
Northern Borders.
The systems engineering and design approach that Boeing uses is a
process we have developed over time with the experience gained from
many other large, complex projects. The first step in this process is a
rigorous analysis of SBInet requirements. Complete requirements
definition sets the foundation for all other work in the system and is
critical for the ultimate success of the system. This process includes
performance requirements, design and operational constraints, mission
definition, analysis, and system architectures. This is followed by
extensive modeling and simulation to test the output of the
requirements process and then a wide array of trade studies to look at
potential solutions across the full spectrum of environments and border
crossing threats. Following this process ensures that whatever
technology or process is ultimately deployed will provide the
government with the highest and best value.
The requirements setting, modeling, and simulation process is a
foundation of what we offer to CBP in SBInet. Our experience tells us
however, that equally important is the process by which the system
integrator partners with the government customer to ensure nothing is
missed. The government will be embedded side-by-side with the industry
team at all the key locations of program management to provide input
and help make decisions on a timely basis. We are well on our way to
finalizing this partnership and are deploying our system engineering
process. Continuous input from the CBP, the Border Patrol Agents, and
other stakeholders will further refine our solution.
That is an abbreviated description of why we are confident our
solution will work. Now let me describe our approach to keeping this
program on cost and on schedule while meeting CBP performance
objectives. Our management approach utilizes Boeing's proven best
practices to create a transparent governance structure that combines
the unique capabilities and strengths of our team with the oversight
and knowledge of our government partners. At the heart of our system is
the Earned Value Management (EVM) system which provides a singular
metric of program cost and schedule health at all levels of the
organization, as well as early warning of potential problems and
problem resolution. We employ many other tools to facilitate execution,
insure quality, reduce risk, maintain cutting edge technology, manage
assets, and otherwise create excellent management and control. Time
restrictions do not allow me to go into the details of these processes.
This process and the support tools provide total program transparency
to our government and industry partners.
Before I conclude, I would like to make a few quick points. First,
as the integrator for SBInet, our job is to find the best mature
technology available and make it work in the overall system. We are
looking for the best value solution, whether it is on the team or not.
Under the current plan, Boeing will not provide any hardware for the
solution, nor are any of our team mates guaranteed any content in the
deployments beyond Project 28. Each provider must earn their way onto
the program.
Boeing currently manages roughly 30,000 suppliers, and we've been
recognized for our expertise in this area. We want to insure a flexible
and fresh solution for the CBP, so our system design assumes that
improved technologies will become available and it provides for their
incorporation into the solution.
We have set a target of 40 percent participation by small and small
disadvantaged business, higher than the government requirement, to
ensure we have new ideas and capabilities available to the program.
Boeing has a very robust small business program and has consistently
attained the targets set in previous programs.
When we get beyond Project 28, and start other task orders, we
envision a substantial expansion of our team to increase capacity and
bring in new technology. We have established a dedicated web site for
SBInet suppliers and have received information from nearly 400
interested companies already. We have also initiated our first
solicitation through the web site. We find using the internet a good
way to communicate the opportunities in SBInet to the broadest possible
audience and to create a level playing field for selecting the many
additional suppliers we will need to complete the tasks that lie ahead.
Finally, Boeing and all the team mates are invested in the success
of this program. In addition to the personal and economic benefits we
all derive from secure borders, we have made a portion of our fee
contingent on successful performance. This rewards our commitment to
the success of SBInet and to our government partner. Rest assured, with
the leadership and assistance of CBP and the Border Patrol, we will
deliver the SBInet solution that secures our nation's land borders.
In summary, we are confident we can the objectives of the SBInet
program and look forward to the challenges ahead.
That concludes my testimony. I look forward to your questions.
Mr. Rogers. The Chair now recognizes Mr. Brian Seagrave,
Vice President for Border Security for Unysis.
Thank you for being here. We look forward to your
statement.
STATEMENT OF BRIAN SEAGRAVE, VICE PRESIDENT FOR BORDER
SECURITY, UNISYS CORPORATION
Mr. Seagrave. Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Meek and
members of the subcommittee, good afternoon. I am Brian
Seagrave, Vice President for Border Security for Unisys. I am
responsible for Unysis work on the Secure Borders Initiative.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify here today.
Unysis is pleased to work with the committee, and we look
forward to continuing this relationship with the new Congress
next year.
Unisys is a global corporation of 37,000 employees in over
100 countries providing information systems, solutions and
services. We have a long history and proud history of serving
the Federal Government.
Unysis is the leading provider of integrated security
solutions for corporations around the world. We delivered a
system for the Chilean immigration police that automates
document authentication and screens individuals arriving at
airports against international domestic watch lists, using
facial recognition. We delivered a national identification card
for Malaysia that employs biometric technology. Recently we
have been awarded contracts by Australia, New Zealand and
Canada to test a variety of technologies for immigration
control.
We are proud to be a part of the SBInet team that has been
chosen to help secure our borders and assist in assuring that
all entry into the United States occurs through proper
channels. Specifically, we are the information systems
integrator as a subcontractor to Boeing on SBInet.
In Unisys' view, the border security challenge is in large
part an information challenge. Each agency with a role in
securing our borders can more successfully perform its mission
through the effective use of information. Unisys' role in the
SBInet program is to develop, integrate, deliver and manage
information systems and their supporting infrastructure.
To define the most effective, technology-enabled concept of
operations for securing our borders, Unysis and the Boeing team
studied, modeled and simulated the impact of various concepts
of operations, detection systems, and information on multiple
factors affecting border patrol. For SBInet, we set out to
address these factors using proven technologies, especially
commercial, off-the-shelf technologies. The solutions we
envisioned fully equip the Border Patrol and the ports of entry
with information, include components already proven in other
situations.
Some examples of the solutions Unisys expects to provide
are:
First, a Common Operating Picture System, or COP, for
integrating data from sensors, cameras, transponders, other law
enforcement agencies and targeting systems into a real-time
view of the situation on the border, real-time view of where
the violations occur, with the information needed to most
effectively and efficiently respond to an illegal entry at the
fingertips of the agent;
Second, a system that enables interoperability between
disparate radio systems so that agents and officers can
communicate with Federal, State, local and tribal law
enforcement, National Guard, DOD and international partners in
times of crisis or joint operations using existing radios;
Third, a system that enables sharing information about
apprehended personnel with other Federal, State, local, tribal
and even international law enforcement agencies, and that
equips CBP to detect and disrupt criminal enterprise; and
Fourth, a system for aggregating and storing operational
data from across DHS units to enable more timely detection of
patterns of interest, nonobvious relationships, shifts in the
illegal entry threat, and changes in tactics, and thus enable a
dynamic operational stance that is a step ahead of the
adversary or, as hockey great Wayne Gretski put it, to be where
the puck is going to be.
Mr. Chairman, our country has learned an important lesson
from September 11th and the response to Hurricane Katrina.
These events have underscored the importance of enabling
different organizations to share information in real time
across silos. Unisys' work on the SBInet program will provide
solutions to securely eliminate these barriers and enable
Border Patrol, CBP and DHS to achieve their missions.
As part of the Boeing team, we are prepared to implement
several other information technology base solutions that we
have studied and simulated, and I would be happy to discuss
these other concepts if time today permits.
Like securing our borders, implementing these programs on a
large scale will not be easy. To assist Unisys' implementation,
the company will continue to rely on our diverse portfolio of
subcontractors, many of which are small businesses. In fact,
last year more than 40 percent of Unysis' subcontracting
business went to small businesses, a significant number of
which are minority--or women-owned.
Unisys' performance measures will be evaluated through
cost, schedule and service level agreements. We welcome the
Department of Homeland Security's scrutiny outlined in the
recent appropriations bill. We will continue to supply the same
high-quality work Unisys has consistently provided to
government and private sector clients. We will be accountable
for achieving objectives in costs, schedule and technical
performance of systems which we are responsible to deliver. We
are prepared to work on performance-based arrangements where we
are rewarded or penalized based on performance of key metrics.
Border management is a complex, multifaceted issue,
extending far beyond the actual line on the map. Addressing the
challenges requires initiatives involving policy, processes,
personnel, technology, information and sufficient resources.
We look forward to working with Boeing and our other
partners on the team to help the Department of Homeland
Security better secure our borders.
Mr. Rogers. I thank you, Mr. Seagrave, for your statement.
[The statement of Mr. Seagrave follows:]
Prepared Statement of Brian Seagrave
Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Meek, and members of the
subcommittee, good afternoon. I am Brian Seagrave, Vice President for
Border Security at Unisys. I am responsible for Unisys work on the
Secure Borders Initiative. Thank you for the opportunity to testify
before you today. Unisys is pleased to work with the committee and we
look forward to continuing this relationship with the new Congress next
year.
Unisys is a global corporation of 37,000 employees in over 100
countries providing information systems solutions and services. Unisys
has a long and proud history of serving the federal government.
Unisys is also a leading provider of integrated security solutions
for governments and corporations around the world. We delivered a
system to the Chilean Border Police that screens individuals arriving
at airports against Interpol and watch-lists based on facial
recognition. We delivered a national identification card for Malaysia
that employs biometric technology. Recently, we have been awarded
contracts by Australia, New Zealand and Canada to test a variety of
technologies to control the land, sea, and air borders.
Unisys is proud to be part of the SBInet team that has been chosen
to help secure our borders and assist in ensuring that all entry into
the United States occurs through proper channels. Specifically, we are
the information systems integrator as a subcontractor to Boeing.
In Unisys' view, the border security challenge is, in large part,
an information challenge. Each agency with a role in securing our
borders can more successfully perform its mission through the effective
use of information. Unisys role in the SBInet program is to develop,
integrate, deliver, and manage information systems, and their
supporting infrastructure.
To define the most effective, technology-enabled concept of
operations for securing our borders, Unisys and the Boeing team
studied, modeled and simulated the impact of various concepts of
operations, detection systems, and information on multiple factors
affecting border control. For SBInet, we set out to address these
factors using proven technologies, preferably commercial-off-the-shelf
products. The solutions we envision to fully equip the Border Patrol
and the ports of entry with information include components already
proven in other situations. Some examples of the solutions Unisys
expects to provide are:
First, a Common Operating Picture (COP) system for
integrating data from sensors, cameras, transponders, other law
enforcement agencies, and targeting systems into a real-time
view of where the violations occur, with the information needed
to most effectively and efficiently respond to an illegal entry
at the fingertips of the agent; and,
Second, a system that enables interoperability between
disparate radio systems so that agents and officers can
communicate with federal, state, local and tribal law
enforcement, National Guard, DoD, and international partners in
times of crisis or joint operations, using existing radios;
and,
Third, a system that enables sharing information about
apprehended personnel with other federal, state, local, tribal,
and even international law enforcement agencies, and that
equips CBP to detect and disrupt criminal enterprise; and,
Fourth, a system for aggregating and storing
operational data from across DHS units to enable more timely
detection of patterns of interest, non-obvious relationships,
shifts of the illegal entry threat, and changes in tactics, and
thus enable a dynamic operational stance that is a step ahead
of the adversary; or as hockey great Wayne Gretsky put it, to
``be where the puck is going to be.''
Mr. Chairman, our country has learned important lessons from
September 11 and the response to Hurricane Katrina. These events have
underscored the importance of enabling different organizations to share
information in real-time, across silos. Unisys work on the SBInet
program will provide solutions to securely eliminate these barriers and
enable the Border Patrol, CBP and DHS to achieve their mission.
As part of the Boeing team, we are prepared to implement several
other information technology-based solutions that we have studied and
simulated and I would be happy to discuss these other concepts if time
today permits.
Like securing our border, implementing these programs on a large
scale will not be easy. To assist Unisys in implementation, the company
will continue to rely on our diverse portfolio of subcontractors--many
of which are small businesses. In fact, last year more than 40 percent
of Unisys subcontracting business went to small businesses, a
significant number of which are minority or women-owned.
Unisys performance measures will be evaluated through cost,
schedule and service level agreements. We welcome the Department of
Homeland Security scrutiny outlined in the recent Appropriations bill.
We will continue to supply the same high quality work Unisys has
consistently provided to government and private sector clients. Unisys
will be accountable for achieving objectives in cost, schedule, and
technical performance of systems which we are responsible to deliver.
We are prepared to work under performance-based arrangements where we
are rewarded or penalized based on our performance on key metrics.
Border management is a complex, multifaceted issue extending far
beyond the actual line on the map. Addressing the challenges requires
initiatives involving policy, processes, personnel, technology,
information and sufficient resources. We look forward to working with
Boeing and our other partners to help the Department of Homeland
Security better secure our borders.
Mr. Rogers. The Chair now recognizes and welcomes back Mr.
Miiller, Tom Miiller, General Counsel for L-3 Services Group,
for any statement you may have.
STATEMENT OF THOMAS O. MIILLER, GENERAL COUNSEL OF L-3
COMMUNICATIONS, SERVICES GROUP
Mr. Miiller. Thank you, sir.
Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Meek, and
members of the subcommittee. My name is Tom Miiller, I am the
General Counsel of L-3 Communications Services Group, and I am
representing L-3 Communications Government Services Inc., which
is a division within the Services Group.
L-3 is honored to be a part of the Boeing team that will
implement the SBInet program. As an American industry leader,
Boeing is the ideal lead systems integrator to secure America's
borders. L-3's experience on the Remote Video Surveillance
program, RVS for short, places the Boeing team in the unique
position of having hands-on experience with many of the
challenges that SBInet will face.
When L-3 appeared before this subcommittee in June of 2005,
we testified that a program such as SBInet would require the
active involvement of Congress, providing leadership, resources
and guidance. This hearing is a manifestation of your
leadership, and we welcome it.
In the June 2005 hearing, L-3 identified what I believed
were critical considerations for SBInet's success. Those
considerations have been addressed by the Department of
Homeland Security and our team leader, Boeing. We suggested
first that DHS use an appropriate contract vehicle and
supervise the contract with an experienced program management
team. As SBInet begins, we believe DHS is doing exactly that.
Moreover, the choice of Boeing ensures that SBInet is being
performed by a contractor with world-class program management
capabilities and resources.
Second, based on our RVS experience, we testified that the
acquisition of land rights would present a challenge to any
effort to secure the country's borders. By immediately
deploying mobile cameras and sensor platforms on an interim
basis, the Boeing team will secure key border sites while the
land rights for permanent sites are obtained. Further, the
Boeing team will assist the government in acquiring the land
rights.
Finally, L-3 was concerned at the June 2005 hearing about
the use of cutting-edge technology that is potentially untested
or unreliable. Boeing's highly regarded procurement processes
and vast supplier network will ensure that optimal technology
is selected based on performance, reliability, life cycle costs
and other considerations.
What does L-3 bring to the Boeing team and SBInet?
Experience. As you know, L-3 inherited the problems of the RVS
program when it acquired International Microwave Corporation in
late 2002. Although we had to overhaul the management
performing the RVS program, we gained experience and built
lasting relationships with Border Patrol leaders and operators.
We have first-hand knowledge of the challenges confronting the
CBP agents who protect our borders. We know the practical
realities of selecting and installing permanent camera sites.
In short, L-3 has faced many of the issues that SBInet will
encounter. Our experience will now benefit SBInet.
At the time of the June 2005 hearing, there were two open
RVS matters, a GSA IG investigation, and unpaid L-3 invoices. I
am pleased to report that both of these matters have been
closed to the satisfaction of the government and L-3.
In conclusion, L-3 is proud and poised to contribute as a
member of the Boeing team in making the SBInet program a
success that protects our country.
Thank you for your time and attention. I will be pleased to
answer any questions you may have.
[The statement of Mr. Miiller follows:]
Prepared Statement of Thomas O. Miiller
Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman, Congressman Meek and Members of the
Subcommittee. My name is Tom Miiller, General Counsel of L-3
Communications Services Group, representing L-3 Communications
Government Services, Inc. (``L-3'').
L-3 appreciates the invitation to participate in this hearing and
is pleased to be able to address your questions. Moreover, we are
honored to be a part of the Boeing Team that will implement the SBInet
Program. As an American industry leader, Boeing is the ideal lead
systems integrator to secure America's borders. Finally, we recognize
that L-3--as a result of our experience on the Remote Video
Surveillance (``RVS'') Program--is in the unique position of having
hands-on experience with many of the challenges that SBInet will face.
When we appeared before this Subcommittee in June of 2005, we made
the point that a program such as SBInet (then known as the America
Shield Initiative) would require the active involvement of Congress
providing leadership, resources and guidance for the program. We
recognize that this hearing is a manifestation of your leadership and
we welcome it.
In June 2005, we identified what we believed were the critical
considerations for SBInet's success. As SBInet commences, those
considerations have been addressed by both the Department of Homeland
Security (``DHS'') and our program team leader, Boeing.
The considerations we set forth were:
(1) Proper contract vehicle and program management structure.
By awarding a contract vehicle that encompasses all relevant
disciplines required to successfully deploy SBInet, DHS has
established the first predicate for success. Similarly, DHS
recognizes the need for experienced professional program
management to implement SBInet, within both DHS and the
contractor. DHS has installed the needed internal program
management and, by selecting Boeing as the SBInet contractor,
ensured that the lead contractor will provide premier program
management.
(2) A proactive approach to acquiring the land rights for
installations. The largest program challenge faced during RVS
was acquiring land rights. This was a sequential process that
bogged down as the program expanded. First, the sites for
permanent installations have to be identified. Then,
environmental assessments are conducted before an agreement can
be consummated for the land rights. Because of the aggressive
completion objectives, this process will be a risk to SBInet as
well. Boeing's plan to use mobile camera and sensor platforms
while securing land rights and constructing permanent
installations is the best possible approach to achieve timely
coverage. Further, Boeing has a proactive plan to assist the
Government in the environmental assessment and rights
acquisition processes.
(3) Cost and performance effective technology choices. SBInet
is a high technology project. There is a temptation to use
state of the art equipment, which brings the risks that
accompany cutting edge technology. In this regard, Boeing and
its highly regarded procurement processes and vast supplier
network will ensure that the optimal technology is selected,
based on performance, reliability, life cycle costs and other
considerations. Boeing is ideally suited to bring forward the
most effective technology alternatives.
What does L-3 bring to the Boeing Team and SBInet? Experience. As
you know, L-3 acquired the problems of the RVS program when it acquired
International Microwave Corporation in late 2002. Although we had to
overhaul the management performing the RVS Program to address the
problems we purchased, we gained invaluable experience in the process
and built lasting relationships with Border Patrol leaders and
operators. We have first-hand knowledge of the difficulties that face
the agents who work in the field securing our borders. We know the
practical realities of selecting and installing permanent camera sites
that can only be obtained by putting boots on the ground. In short, L-3
has faced many of the problems that SBInet can expect to encounter.
L-3 realizes that RVS is regarded as a failed program. At the time
the contract expired, however, L-3 had solved many of the problems it
inherited. We believe that despite the shortcomings in the Government's
contracting and program management, RVS would have been completed
successfully because we had learned what was required. That experience
will now benefit SBInet.
There were two outstanding matters at the time of the June 2005
hearing: the open GSA-IG investigation and unpaid invoices. I am
pleased to report that these matters have been resolved to the
satisfaction of the Government and L-3.
L-3 cooperated fully with all aspects of the GSA-IG investigations
and was informed by the GSA-IG on February 8, 2006 that all
investigations had been closed without any action against L-3 or its
predecessor, IMC.
With regard to the unpaid invoices of approximately $11 million, L-
3, the Border Patrol, GSA and the GSA-IG participated in a process that
reviewed and reconciled all invoices--paid and unpaid--from the
beginning of the RVS Blanket Purchase Agreement until its expiration.
This review demonstrated that the RVS program was financially clean
from beginning to end.
In conclusion, L-3 is proud and poised to contribute as a member of
the Boeing Team in making the SBInet Program a success that protects
our country.
Thank you for your time and attention. I will be pleased to answer
any questions you may have.
Mr. Rogers. I thank all of you for your statements. And I
would like to start off with the questions, but before I do, I
would like to offer this observation.
I do think that you make a good point, Mr. Miiller; you all
weren't at fault for what happened with ISIS coming off track,
and you did make a valiant effort to try to right that wrong.
But we are looking for you to be a knowledgeable resource on
this team to make sure those kinds of things don't happen this
time around, because we are going to be watching.
But--we do have confidence, and I think that it says a lot
about Boeing that they brought you all in as a part of their
team, but I do want to kind of throw this out to Boeing first.
We still are trying to get our arms around--as you could
tell from the first panel questions and answers--this Committee
is still trying to get its arms around where we are and where
we are going. Well, where the Department is and where the
Department is going with these concepts and with the costs.
Since you didn't have a specific plan that you were
bidding, and you have described this architectural
relationship, tell me in more of a discussional fashion, how
did you get the bid? What is it that you bid on? And why did
you get it as opposed to somebody else?
Mr. McElwee. We, of course, didn't make the selection, but
we have been told a couple of things about why we were
selected. One, we had an excellent technical approach. The tool
kit approach that pulled together the different technologies
that are mature, available, and deployable today enhanced the
survivability and the efficiency and effectiveness of the
Border Patrol agents.
We were also told that we had a good quality assurance
surveillance plan; and within the terms of the RFP, that means
that we identified a performance metric and described a process
by which we would go about meeting that particular perform
metric.
They asked about our past performance, and we described two
different programs. One was the Army's Future Combat System
program. I was the program manager for the CTD phase; and now,
after 42 months, it has an SPI, scheduled performance index, of
99.4 percent, which means it is a day and a half behind
schedule, and it has a cost performance index of 1.01, which
means it is under budget.
That approach to managing programs and that success was
identified as a good element of our offer to the customer.
Mr. Rogers. I am trying to get in the conversation between
you and your client.
You are the architect, and your client is telling you what
they want. What did they describe for you that they wanted? And
then how did you come up with some numbers and some technical
responses to meet your client's needs?
Mr. McElwee. We puzzled over that question quite a while,
as you might imagine, when we received the Request for
Proposal. They asked us to describe how we would first detect,
then identify, then classify, and then apprehend people
crossing into this country to achieve operational control of
the border. The definition of operational control was left to
us to determine what we felt that might be--all of this in a
context, as you recall last spring, about what was going on
with the Temporary Worker Program and options for reducing, as
someone said, a magnet for attracting people here.
So, in that context, what we attempted to do was lay out a
performance metric, associate a cost with that, and then
estimate the total deployment of that solution across the
northern and southern borders.
Mr. Rogers. And you said you associated cost with the tools
that you put in place to meet your plan.
Mr. McElwee. Yes, sir.
Mr. Rogers. Do you feel comfortable that--now that you all
are getting close to developing a plan, that you--and I am not
going to ask you the number, but are you starting to feel like
you have got your arms around the kind of costs that are going
to be involved as we go forward?
Mr. McElwee. Absolutely. This is not development work, this
is mature technology. And it is like building a house, going
down to the local supplier and buying your raw materials,
pouring the footer, buying the framing, buying the plumbing and
so forth; and those costs are generally well known. There is
some risk, of course, as you integrate it and deploy it, but
the fundamental costs are very well understood and can be
easily estimated.
Mr. Rogers. So my understanding then is, it is just a
matter now for your client to tell you how big a house they
want before you can tell them the cost.
Mr. McElwee. Yes, sir.
Mr. Rogers. All right.
Let me ask Mr. Seagrave's response. Would you concur with
what Mr. McElwee just offered, or have you anything that you
would like to add to that?
Mr. Seagrave. Thank you for the question.
I certainly concur with Jerry's response to the question. I
think the key now is that we have to conduct the site surveys,
we have to get the details that we need to determine where we
have to make adjustments in the estimates that we had before we
can give them the final estimates, and that is what will occur
for each task border for each segment of the border. Unysis
will do it for the IT piece, L-3 will do it for the
communications, Boeing will integrate all of the pieces.
Mr. Rogers. Mr. Miiller, do you have anything you want to
offer to help us? Again, you all know what this Committee is
trying to find, and I am trying to get you to help us, give us
a higher degree of comfort that you all are on top of this.
Mr. Miiller. Sir, I really don't have anything to add to
what the two gentlemen have said. I agree with them.
Mr. Rogers. Well, you heard earlier what this Committee is
going to be doing in the coming year. We are going to want to
know specifically what you are going to try to do, what
timeline, and what is it going to cost. So I would urge you all
that as you continue to work with your client, you start to
formulate answers to those things, at least for this Committee,
because those are the things that we are going to be coming
back around to.
With that, my time has expired, and I will yield to my
friend and colleague from Florida, Mr. Meek, for any questions
he may have.
Mr. Meek. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank the
panel for coming before us. I had an opportunity to look at
your opening statements.
I just wanted, Mr. Chairman, based on your questioning--and
I know that from Boeing you have put forth some forthcoming
information in your testimony by saying that we are going to--
we are the prime integrator, we will be managing it, but we
will not use any of Boeing's technology. I thought that was
encouraging.
So I would assume that none of these products will have the
advantage over any decision that you may make as it relates to
Boeing products; am I correct?
Mr. McElwee. Sir, that is exactly right.
Mr. Meek. Okay.
There was one other thing you mentioned when the chairman
was asking you a question. You said that we are charged with
defining operational control. Could you explain that a little
bit more, because I want to make sure that there is some sort
of--so we are clear on what Customs and Border Protection will
be doing and what you will be doing.
Mr. McElwee. This was a rough quote from the request for a
proposal that all of the competitors received, and it basically
said, operational control is made up of the components of
detecting people across the border, identifying those that
cross, classifying them--are they an illegal alien looking for
a better job or are they a smuggler or are they a terrorist of
some sort--and then, once classified, allowing the Border
Patrol to apprehend those.
And it was up to us to determine where to deploy resources,
whether in detection, identification or apprehension
classification to achieve a level of control that would be
considered operational control. There was not a precise metric
associated with that term in the RFP.
Mr. Meek. So this will be based on information that Customs
and Border Protection shares with you and with Boeing--I don't
want to make it personal--with Boeing, and you are charged with
defining operational control?
Mr. McElwee. We were to propose a response to operational
control. It is the responsibility, of course, of the Department
of Homeland Security to define that and tell us what the
parameters are that we have to design a system to meet.
Mr. Meek. I just wanted to make sure, because I didn't want
anyone to leave the room with other impressions.
Mr. McElwee. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Meek. One other question--and I am glad to see my
friend here from L-3. Thank you for coming before the committee
again.
I think this is a wonderful opportunity--and I don't want
to leave anyone out, but I think it is a wonderful opportunity
to not only represent to the Congress that we can actually
start a project and have contractors and auditors from the
Federal Government and the inspector general play a role and be
embedded along with all of you to be able to put forth a
project that all Americans feel very passionate about, and that
is protecting our borders.
I think it is also important for us to continue to hear
some feedback, so I am just going to throw a blanket question
out there, something that we have not covered.
And, Mr. Miiller, you mentioned before in your testimony,
and in your testimony today, encouraging this subcommittee and
the entire committee to continue to be engaged in this process,
some things you think that we need to know, outside of your
written statements based on what you heard or--obviously, you
wrote these statements before you walked in the door, or
someone wrote them, but something based on a comment by our
previous panel, a problem probably we need to hear that we need
to play a role in.
I know that Mr. Rogers and I and other members of this
committee will be out in the first 28 miles of Project 28, or
whatever we want to call it; and you all probably will not be
there because it will be someone else that would take our
hands, along with the Department, briefing us on what is
actually happening here--success, roadblocks, failures, what
have you.
Based on what you have heard, is there anything that we
need to hear, you think that we need to know, something that we
need to look forward to? Because this is a work in progress,
even though we are off to a start now.
With the chairman, I want to congratulate all of you for
being a part of it. And also in the spirit of the ranking
member, I hope that there is a way that you can meet all of
your goals with small businesses playing a role in this,
because I believe that we are going to be in the business of
border security something fierce on both ends of the spectrum,
be it the north border or the south border in the future, to
protect the homeland.
Mr. McElwee. I would just respond, sir, that we welcome
your insight and your oversight and understanding of the
environment that we are working in and the challenges that we
face. It is not going to be a start at point A and go to the
end point without a lot of discussion. Part of it will involve
performance. Part of it will involve funding issues.
I realize that we will be back here, or our client,
customer, will be back here many times explaining to you what
has transpired, and what is going to happen next, and what we
anticipate the future to hold in terms of our ability to deploy
the systems and provide the level of security that we so
desperately need to the southern border and on the northern as
well
Mr. Meek. Let me ask this question, and I want to go a
little further.
I know we have heard that part about what we need.
Wonderful. We are glad we are here. My question is along the
lines of as contractors, because the three of you are there. It
is almost like if I was secretary of an agency, and I come
before Congress and I say, man, this is the way it is going to
happen. This is the way it is written out in the contract.
These are the people who are working with. We are working in a
wonderful way. But all of us have history. It is almost like I
go to a dinner and say, just introduce me as Kendrick, not as
Congressman.
But I just want to be able to--I understand that you all
are not going to be on the field. You are not going to be
making the day-to-day decisions. You will not be executing the
everyday nuts-and-bolts function of SBInet. I am going to go
ahead and say that. But you are the individuals who are going
to have to come before Congress and talk about the good, bad,
and ugly. And again, I am asking the very, you know, fourth
grade question here. Is there anything that you heard this
morning that maybe you think we need to be thinking about here?
Many times we are accused of knowing just about everything.
We assume we get on a committee, and automatically we have a
Ph.D. on the subject. I will tell you, speaking for myself,
that is not the case. So I am going to ask a very plain
question to you one more time saying that, well, I heard the
testimony, I recommended some things to the Department that
could be best practices. So we want to hear them if you have
them.
You don't have to think hard. If you don't have it, that is
fine. That is fine. You can get it to us later. But I want to
make sure there is an open-door policy. The Chairman has put it
out there. I don't get tired of asking the question over and
over again. We do it all the time with management oversight
committees. We are supposed to ask these questions.
Mr. McElwee. I will provide a comment, not a question. I
think this has been--this procurement process from start to
finish has been run very professionally. It has been as good as
any that Boeing has participated in, and it is representative,
I think, of the talent that the Department of Homeland Security
has brought to the effort. I wouldn't say that were it not the
case. But we have actually been very pleased with this, and we
have had other dealings with the Department. This one is very
well done.
Mr. Meek. That is fine.
Well, with that, Mr. Chairman, I know I am over my time. I
want to thank those of you that came before the committee and
your return, Mr. Miiller, and I look forward to continuing
discussions.
Like I shared with the Department, I would encourage--and
if it is not me, with staff, with any of us here, I know the
Chairman feels the same--even when we don't ask for the
information, please share it with us. We may be able to avoid a
hearing if we were to get more of that. And if we don't hear
that, we are going to call a hearing because we need to know.
That is why we are here.
Thank you so very much, and congratulations for getting the
contract, and hopefully we will be more secure because of it.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Mr. Rogers. I thank the gentleman.
I recognize Mr. Souder for any questions he may have.
Mr. Souder. I want to make it clear from my earlier
comments here, I am thrilled with this initiative. It is long
overdue. It is part of the whole idea of bringing the
Department of Homeland Security together. It has just been
frustrating. In my career I have been involved in narcotics, in
particular, and that led me into immigration questions, and
that trucks come, and then they get stopped, and they cross at
another point, we don't even know they were there. People go in
between, we stop them. Our agencies don't talk to them. Our
north border and south border don't talk to each other. Our
harbor and airports don't talk to our borders.
It has been--having an integrated command-and-control
system is essential. I want to compliment the Department for
proceeding and you all for working with that.
I am just flabbergasted with this. I don't know how you bid
on how you are going to have total control of terrorists on the
border. How in the world do you even figure out who is a
terrorist when there is a million people coming through,
particularly if they are a latent cell? I mean, that--it would
be very interesting to hear your discussions on how you are
going to bid that. But let me move to a couple of specifics.
On the tool kit, which is a great idea, did you have a
specific cost on that? And how many tool kits you thought you
might have, have you estimated that? What is the status of
that?
Mr. McElwee. Sir, we took, if I may, a best value approach.
We were looking for performance, and we were looking for cost.
And so all of us make those decisions every day when we shop
for our personal needs.
We looked at the overall performance, and, frankly, we
looked at not just the initial cost, we spent a lot of time
looking at life cycle costs. I think many of the costs you talk
about in a large program are not the initial procurement and
deployment. It is maintaining that equipment, supporting it,
fueling it, et cetera, that drives up your initial cost. So we
looked at all of those and selected components and sensors. We
had a number of sensors by type, and we would go out and look
at the best value sensor.
Mr. Souder. In trying to understand this, I thought this
was partly how to get it to the agents. But did you then put a
specific dollar on the Tucson sector that you bid on that tool
kit? And was that extrapolated, that you assumed you were going
to have that cost averaged through the whole contract? How do
you do that when you are putting it together for one sector
bid, but don't know what is going to be there?
Mr. McElwee. As Mr. Giddens indicated, with a detailed
analysis on Tucson and where there are different types of
terrain on Tucson, you have a little bit of urban, you have
rural, and remote, and mountains. No water. So we spend--we
broke down the border for the entire 6,000 miles into, I think,
eight or nine categories, and then we deployed our tool kit
against those different categories of terrain based on the
number of intruders we anticipated in each of those sectors,
and that is how we came up for the total cost estimate for the
6,000 miles.
Mr. Souder. I know the Chairman said he didn't want to ask
you that, But do you have a total cost estimate from the
Department of Homeland--
Mr. McElwee. There are cost and performance issues we are
not allowed to address. So we gave them a cost estimate that we
estimated would be a part of our offering. It is up to the
Department to determine which performance level they wish and
at what cost.
Mr. Souder. So, Mr. Miiller, you mentioned one of the
problems we have had is U.S. agents have had computers, they
can't get access to whether we have mobile sites. You said
about land rights and Internet and procuring those rights. Are
you proceeding with that? Do you have a contract to do that at
this point? Are you getting--how does this work inside this
contract since you are only bidding on one sector? There is not
a plan, and there is not a budget. What are you doing?
Mr. Miiller. If you don't mind, I will defer to Jerry to
answer that because he has got more details relative to how we
are handling the land rights.
Mr. McElwee. We recognized high risk based on feedback we
got from L3 as getting land rights to put in your technical
solution. We discovered or concluded that one of the most
expeditious approaches was to make them mobile. There are, in
fact, mobile sensors deployed today that are providing some
insight into the number of illegal intruders that we are
getting across the southern border. Our solution is mobile
until such time as we can secure the land rights to make it
permanent. As Mr. Giddens indicated those two advantages: One,
you make sure you get it on the right site; two, you don't have
to delay so long.
Mr. Souder. Are you able to do that? Do you have a contract
with a dollar amount that you can give, or is this theoretical?
Mr. McElwee. We have mobile solutions in the 20 million
task order for Project 28, and based on experience from that,
we extrapolate two additional task orders as they are given to
us.
Mr. Souder. At this time you aren't able to purchase those
because you haven't--you don't have any actual dollar amount.
It is theoretical at this point.
Mr. McElwee. We have a fixed price, or very close to a
fixed price, for those mobile assets, and it then becomes a
question as you would in building a house, how fast can you
roll it out based on your suppliers and your authorization to
proceed.
Mr. Souder. In your calculation of risk at the border, I am
going the raise a particular example. Did you also take into
account what is happening on the other side of the border? For
example, east of El Paso, in what I believe is at the edge of
the Marfa Sector, we have a crossing there, but that sector
from El Paso east is apparently currently controlled by the
drug cartel, not the Government of Mexico. They wouldn't
necessarily say that publicly, but I have asked the ambassador
and others about why they can't get rid of the bulldozer at
Neely's Crossing, for example. One thing you would have to have
in your sensor system is when they start up the bulldozer.
There are a couple hundred people and lots of equipment there
because they are knocking down everything we put in. That there
is a gravel base there. I don't know why it hasn't been taken
out by the Mexican Government or hasn't taken out the
bulldozer, but, my understanding, they don't have operational
control of that side of the border.
Do you factor in at the different costs what is happening
at the other side? Was that even discussed in your contract.
Mr. McElwee. As we were bidding this proposal, we were
given an opportunity for due diligence in both Swanton and in
the Tucson sector, and during those visits we were given
information that the Border Patrol faced issues they faced on a
day-to-day basis.
As you might expect in a competitive process, we did not
have security clearances for the Department of Homeland
Security, so consequently were not given access to the law
enforcement and sensitive data. Now that we are on contract, we
are getting to see that information, and, of course, we will
adjust our tool kit to deal with those issues on each segment
of the border.
Mr. Souder. Thank you very much.
Mr. Rogers. I want to thank you for your time, and I know
you are all busy. You have other things to do. The fact that
you took time to make your prepared statements is very much
appreciated. It has been very helpful to us, and we look
forward to working with you in the coming years as we make our
Nation more secure.
And with that, this panel is dismissed and this hearing is
adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 5:10 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]