[House Hearing, 109 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
FRONT-LINE DEFENSE: SECURITY TRAINING FOR MASS TRANSIT AND RAIL
EMPLOYEES
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC
SECURITY, INFRASTRUCTURE
PROTECTION, AND CYBERSECURITY
of the
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
SEPTEMBER 28, 2006
__________
Serial No. 109-107
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Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/
index.html
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COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Peter T. King, New York, Chairman
Don Young, Alaska Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Lamar S. Smith, Texas Loretta Sanchez, California
Curt Weldon, Pennsylvania Edward J. Markey, Massachusetts
Christopher Shays, Connecticut Norman D. Dicks, Washington
John Linder, Georgia Jane Harman, California
Mark E. Souder, Indiana Peter A. DeFazio, Oregon
Tom Davis, Virginia Nita M. Lowey, New York
Daniel E. Lungren, California Eleanor Holmes Norton, District of
Jim Gibbons, Nevada Columbia
Rob Simmons, Connecticut Zoe Lofgren, California
Mike Rogers, Alabama Sheila Jackson-Lee, Texas
Stevan Pearce, New Mexico Bill Pascrell, Jr., New Jersey
Katherine Harris, Florida Donna M. Christensen, U.S. Virgin
Bobby Jindal, Louisiana Islands
Dave G. Reichert, Washington Bob Etheridge, North Carolina
Michael McCaul, Texas James R. Langevin, Rhode Island
Charlie Dent, Pennsylvania Kendrick B. Meek, Florida
Ginny Brown-Waite, Florida
.........................................................
Subcommittee on Economic Security, Infrastructure Protection, and
Cybersecurity
Daniel E. Lungren, California, Chairman
Don Young, Alaska Loretta Sanchez, California
Lamar S. Smith, Texas Edward J. Markey, Massachusetts
John Linder, Georgia Norman D. Dicks, Washington
Mark E. Souder, Indiana Peter A. DeFazio, Oregon
Mike Rogers, Alabama Zoe Lofgren, California
Stevan Pearce, New Mexico Sheila Jackson-Lee, Texas
Katherine Harris, Florida James R. Langevin, Rhode Island
Bobby Jindal, Louisiana Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Peter T. King, New York (ex (ex officio)
officio)
(II)
C O N T E N T S
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Page
STATEMENTS
The Honorable Daniel E. Lungren, a Representative in Congress
From the State of California, and Chairman, Subcommittee on
Economic Security, Infrastructure Protection and Cybersecurity. 1
The Honorable Loretta Sanchez, a Representative in Congress From
the State of California, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on
Economic Security, Infrastructure Protection and Cybersecurity. 15
The Honorable Norman D. Dicks, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Washington........................................ 19
The Honorable James R. Langevin, a Representative in Congress
From the State Rhode Island.................................... 2
Witnesses
Mr. William Fagan, Director of Security, Federal Railroad
Administration................................................. 18
Mr. Terry Rosapep, Deputy Associate Administrator, Office of
Program Management, Federal Transit Agency:
Oral Statement................................................. 7
Prepared Statement............................................. 9
Mr. John Sammon, Assistant Administrator, Transportation Sector
Network Management, Transportation Security Administration:
Oral Statement................................................. 3
Prepared Statement............................................. 5
Panel II
Mr. Edward Hamberger, President & CEO, American Association of
Railroads:
Oral Statement................................................. 38
Prepared Statement............................................. 40
Chief Polly Hanson, Metro Transit Police Department, Washington
Metro Area Transit Authority:
Oral Statement................................................. 34
Prepared Statement............................................. 36
Mr. John P. Tolman, Vice President and National Legislative
Representative, Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers:
Oral Statement................................................. 31
Prepared Statement............................................. 32
Mr. Ed Wytkind, President, Transportation Trades Department, AFL-
CIO:
Oral Statement................................................. 25
Prepared Statement............................................. 27
FRONT-LINE DEFENSE: SECURITY TRAINING FOR MASS TRANSIT AND RAIL
EMPLOYEES
----------
Thursday, September 27, 2006
U.S. House of Representatives,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Subcommittee on Economic Security, Infrastructure
Protection, and Cybersecurity,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:21 a.m., in
Room 311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Dan Lungren
[chairman of the subcommittee] presiding.
Present: Representatives Lungren, Sanchez, Dicks, and
Langevin.
Mr. Lungren. [Presiding.] The Committee on Homeland
Security's Subcommittee on Economic Security, Infrastructure
Protection, and Cybersecurity will come to order.
The subcommittee is meeting today to discuss security
training for mass transit and rail employees. And I would like
to thank everyone for being here today, especially our
witnesses.
We meet today to discuss security training programs for
rail and mass transit agencies. The importance of railroads and
mass transit to our daily lives and national economy cannot be
overstated. Mass transit commuter rail and freight rail are
responsible for moving millions of people every day and for
delivering thousands of freight shipments across the country.
The subcommittee has looked at the security of these
important systems in a variety of ways. Last year, in the
aftermath of the London subway attacks, we looked at the
vulnerabilities of soft targets, including public
transportation, and the security measures being taken to
protect them. We also looked at the various ways the DHS and
our rail and transit agencies were working to prevent a
terrorist attack from ever occurring.
Today we address another important component of our
security, and that is training. Thousands of employees have
been trained in the years since 9/11 on security issues, and
these include police officers, emergency responders, management
security officers, and sometimes front-line employees.
We know that, in the event of an attack on our rail or mass
transit facilities, employees will often be the first people
impacted by the event. They will play a key role in managing
the terror aftermath, evacuating civilians and providing first
aid, which could significantly reduce the number of lives lost.
In addition, rail and transit employees are an important
part in the fight to prevent an attack from ever occurring.
Employees such as operators, drivers, clerks, mechanics and
other front-line employees are valuable allies, watching for
suspicious activity and packages. These employees, who know
their surroundings and work environment, are well-suited to
identify when something or someone does not belong.
It is important to note that much discussion has been given
to security-specific training. And I just want to recognize
that employees oftentimes receive other forms of training that
may serve a dual purpose, such as emergency response training,
which is applicable whether the incident was a terrorist attack
or an accident.
Our goal today is to hear what the federal government has
been doing to provide employee training on security. In some
instances, our transportation systems have gone beyond what the
federal government has offered and have developed their own
training courses. We look forward to learning about these, as
well.
Security training for employees is an important part of the
overall effort to implement layered security measures. And I
look forward to the testimony today about the numerous efforts
to train employees to recognize and respond to potential
security problems.
And I certainly thank our witnesses for being here.
And I would recognize the only other member of the
subcommittee here, Mr. Langevin, if he has any comments at this
time.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And I want to welcome our witnesses here today. I look
forward to your testimony on this very important topic.
And I am pleased that this subcommittee is holding a
hearing on security training for mass transit and rail
employees.
I, along with many of my colleagues, particularly Ms.
Sanchez, have been very concerned about the fact that most mass
transit and rail employees are not receiving comprehensive
training on how to recognize and report potential threats, also
to protect themselves and passengers, and to respond if there
is an incident.
Over the last 5 years, Congress has done a lot of talking
about supporting first responders and providing them with the
tools that they need. But when it comes to rail security, we
must remember that, in the bombings of mass transit and rail
systems in Madrid, London and Mumbai, the first people on the
scene were transportation workers.
In the critical first few minutes after an incident,
transportation workers who have received adequate training can
help save lives and mitigate the damage of an attack. The
knowledge and experience that transportation workers have about
their workplace is a critical resource in responding to an
incident.
We need to maximize the first-responder potential of all
rail and mass transit employees by ensuring that they receive
substantive security training.
For this reason, I know my colleague Ms. Sanchez has
proposed an amendment to the Transportation Security
Authorization Bill that would have required rail and mass
transit systems to establish security training programs for
their workers. And during the discussion of this amendment,
both Chairman King and Chairman Lungren indicated that they
wanted to learn more about this important topic before acting.
And so, we agreed to hold this hearing today.
So I am pleased that we are able to consider this important
topic before the October recess. And I am looking forward to
discussion on all of the issues relating to employee training.
And I want to thank, again, the witnesses for being here to
share your insights and also, in particular, thank Chairman
Lungren for holding this hearing.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Mr. Lungren. Thank you very much, Mr. Langevin.
And other members of the committee are reminded that
opening statements may be submitted for the record.
We are pleased to have two panels of distinguished
witnesses before us today on this important topic.
And I would just remind the witnesses that your entire
written statements will appear in the record, and we would ask
you to make opening 5-minute summaries of your statements.
The chair would now recognize the first panel and ask Mr.
John Sammon, the assistant administrator of the Transportation
Sector Network Management Office at TSA, the Transportation
Security Administration, to testify.
STATEMENT OF JOHN SAMMON, ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR,
TRANSPORTATION SECTOR NETWORK MANAGEMENT, TRANSPORTATION
SECURITY ADMINISTRATION
Mr. Sammon. Thank you.
Good morning, Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee.
I am pleased to have this opportunity to testify on the
important subject of security training for freight rail, mass
transit, and passenger rail employees.
I would like to highlight some of the important steps TSA
is taking in partnership with DHS, DOT, state and local
governments, and industry to ensure these employees receive the
best training possible to protect themselves, the public, and
the rail and mass transit systems.
I first would like to introduce myself to the committee. I
am the assistant administrator of TSA for the Office of
Transportation Sector Network Management. TSA created that
office in 2005 to open a direct line of communication and
foster cooperation with the industry across 10 different modes
of transportation, including mass transit and freight rail.
Prior to joining TSA, I worked for more than 25 years in
the transportation industry, including positions as senior vice
president at CSX and Conrail. In these positions, I gained
valuable experience working with network and customer partners
to get things done.
The Department of Homeland Security pursues a layered
approach to security and transportation, including transit and
rail security. The effort starts with gathering effective data
analysis and dissemination of intelligence. The recent
disruption of the terror plot in the United Kingdom and the
developing plot targeting the underwater tunnels in New York
and New Jersey illustrate the necessity of that approach.
The best defenses are preventing the terrorists from ever
reaching their targets and by creating visible, unpredictable
deterrence environments to disrupt their planning capabilities.
Transit and rail employees are part of America's first line
of defense, and will be among our first responders in the event
of a terrorist attack or other disruption in the transit
system. We depend on their vigilance and observations to detect
indicators of a developing plan or attack.
The actions taken by these individuals in the critical
moments immediately after an attack or disruption can
significantly reduce the severity of injuries and the number of
deaths. As a result, there is simply no substitute for security
awareness and emergency response training for the nation's
transit and rail employees.
We must rely on and cultivate human capabilities to
prevent, deter, detect and respond to security threats. These
skills can be acquired through extensive training, rigorous
emergency planning, and regular emergency testing and drills.
We recognize that TSA and the transit and rail industry
need to provide more training for more employees. While there
are a number of cooperative initiatives being undertaken, the
real story comes with the Transit Security Grant Program.
It is TSA's intention to leverage this program to ensure
that qualifying systems meet certain baseline standards. These
standards include front-line employee awareness training,
front-line employee response training, and emergency drill
training; these in addition to incident response plans,
vulnerability assessments, mitigation plans, invisible/
unpredictable deterrence programs.
By leveraging in excess of $100 million in security grants
in fiscal year 2006 and $175 million in fiscal year 2007, TSA
can focus the transit agencies on training before technology.
And we can use that transit grant funding to bring training up
to baseline standards across the nation.
TSA is acutely aware of the importance of training in the
freight rail area. And this year, in conjunction with DOT, we
issued a list of recommended security action items for rail
carriers for the transport of toxic inhalation hazard
materials. The list included recommendations that relate
directly to continued education and training.
Four video training modules have been developed by the
railroad industry over the past several years, covering
security awareness training. These video training modules help
front-line employees identify potential security breaches,
threats, risks, and underscore the importance of reporting.
Our general manager of freight rail has over 30 years of
field operating experience in the railroad industry as general
manager and vice president. He has directed our rail inspectors
to conduct an initial assessment of how well the classroom
training translates to security compliance in the day-to-day
activities of the front-line employees. This assessment will
include all rail carriers that transport toxic inhalation
railcar shipments.
In addition to the rail industry's training program, we are
currently developing an interactive training program on the
recognition of explosive devices on railcars and rail property.
This will be made available to the rail carriers at no cost in
the coming months.
In summary, we value the critical role that Congress, and
especially this subcommittee, plays in the effort to protect
rail security. We look forward to working with you in the
future to achieve this goal.
Thank you. And I would be pleased to respond to any
questions later.
[The statement of Mr. Sammon follows:]
Prepared Statement of John P. Sammon
Good morning Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Sanchez, and Members of
the Subcommittee. I am pleased to have this opportunity to testify on
the important subject of security training for freight rail, mass
transit, and passenger rail employees.
America has some form of rail transit (i.e., some combination of
subway, light rail and/or commuter rail systems) in 30 cities in 22
states. These systems provide 11.3 million passenger trips each
weekday. In fact, of the 3.5 billion rail trips taken annually, 77
percent are on heavy rail systems, more commonly known as subways. As
you know, public transportation is inherently an open, accessible
system intended to help people move rapidly and efficiently between
home and work, shopping, medical care, and other community activities
on a daily basis.
Federal Rail Transit Security Initiatives Since 9/11
Immediately following September 11, 2001, the Federal Transit
Administration (FTA) of the Department of Transportation (DOT)
undertook an aggressive nationwide security program and led the initial
Federal effort on transit security. The initial response included
conducting threat and vulnerability assessments in 37 large transit
systems, 30 of which carry almost 90 percent of all transit riders. The
assessments gave us a comprehensive view of transit system readiness,
vulnerabilities, and consequences and identified the three important
areas that continue to form the fundamental baseline of transit
security: employee training, public awareness and emergency
preparedness. TSA continues to build upon these fundamentals.
In 2002, to help guide transit agency priorities, FTA issued a Top
20 Security Action Item List to improve transit safety and security
operations, particularly with regard to employee training, public
awareness, and emergency preparedness. In a joint effort coordinated
with the Mass Transit Sector Coordinating Council, TSA and FTA revised
the Security Action Items this year.
The Role of Transit Employees in Transit Security
Transit employees are part of America's first line of defense and
will be our first responders in the event of a terrorist attack or
other emergency on a transit system. Their vigilant observations may
detect indicators of a developing plan or attack. Their actions taken
in the critical moments immediately after an attack or an emergency can
significantly reduce the severity of injuries and the number of deaths
that result. As a result, there is simply no substitute for security
awareness and emergency response training for transit employees. We
must rely on--and cultivate--human capabilities to prevent, detect, and
respond to security threats.
The 400,000-plus transit employees throughout America are the
``eyes and ears'' of our most important security system. Transit
employees travel the same routes, maintain the same facilities, and see
the same people every day as they go about their duties. They are in
the best position to identify unusual packages, suspicious substances,
and people who are acting suspiciously. But they need to develop an
understanding of what to look for and skills in how to respond. These
skills can be acquired through extensive training, rigorous emergency
planning, and regular emergency testing and drills.
Rail Transit Security Training Initiatives at TSA
I want to affirm that training remains a core fundamental for TSA.
We understand that training and preparedness are critical if transit
agencies are to respond appropriately to a terrorist attack or a
natural disaster. We recognize that TSA and the transit industry need
to provide more training for more employees to realize our goal of
thoroughly integrating security awareness training as part of the
security paradigm.
In fiscal year 2006, TSA provided nearly $1.5 million in direct
financial support for the implementation and continuing development of
programs to enhance transit security, most notably security training
for transit employees. Of the allocation, $1,196,000 enables expansion
of multiple Federal training programs that have come to be recognized
for their quality and are widely used by transit systems. This funding
will enable an additional 22 courses on Counter-Terrorism Strategies
and the FTA developed Terrorist Activity Recognition and Reaction to be
held over the next year. We continue to focus on training that outlines
for transit employees actions that can be taken in the minutes
preceding and immediately after an event that are crucial to mitigating
the potential impact. Timely decisions by an operator or controller to
determine whether to evacuate a train station or take it to the next
station in the midst of a chemical event for example, are vital choices
that dramatically affect the impact of an attack. TSA is funding an
incident management course for operations control center personnel that
will equip them with the skills to take operational actions to respond
to a chemical, biological, or explosive incident. TSA's Surface
Transportation Security Inspectors help facilitate the availability of
course offerings to transit system security officials.
TSA has a key role in awarding the $143 million for the 2006
Transit Security Grant (TSGP) and Intercity Rail Security Grant
Programs. Working in concert with our partners, TSA has worked to
streamline the TSGP process, ensure that the resources are focused on
key risk reduction priorities. One of the security priorities
emphasized in the 2006 TSGP is the expansion of employee training
programs that emphasize basic security awareness for front line
employees, equipment familiarization, incident severity assessing and
reporting, crew communication and coordination, operational response
and evacuation procedures. As we move into the next cycle of grant
allocations, TSA wants to ensure that transit agencies have implemented
all the fundamentals before investments are made in other projects that
do not have the return on investment that fundamental training programs
provide. To date, we have awarded almost $400 million over the last
three years with training as one of the key focus areas.
Congress authorized and funded TSA to hire 100 Surface
Transportation Security Inspectors (STSIs), which we completed in
October 2005. Our inspectors are in the field every day across the
country, working to raise the baseline of security throughout the
industry. To date, our inspectors have surveyed and assessed over 750
properties. They have an assessment tool that measures an agency's
level of training for frontline staff and other personnel in addition
to monitoring other key security action items. Further, TSA's STSIs are
also empowered to provide federal assistance through existing programs
to help local agencies improve their security standards. Some of the
assistance that is offered includes Visible Intermodal Protection
Response teams, explosive detection canine assistance, joint public
awareness campaigns, and exercise and drill expertise.
Through our work with the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center
(FLETC) TSA has trained over 480 law enforcement officers, transit
police, transit system security directors and security coordinators,
and other first responders through the Land Transportation Anti-
Terrorism Training Program. This program provides training to local
authorities in protecting land transportation infrastructure including
rail, light rail, mass transit, and bus operations. Areas of focus
include security planning, transit system vulnerabilities, contingency
planning, recognition and response for threats involving explosives and
weapons of mass destruction, and crisis and consequence management. In
Fiscal Year 2006 alone, 240 persons have completed the program.
TSA will continue to monitor the level of industry compliance with
the baseline security action items. The results of these assessments
will determine if additional regulatory steps are needed to ensure that
a strong security baseline including a well trained workforce is in
place.
TSA remains mindful that it must have a layered approach to
security. We understand that information sharing, both classified and
unclassified, is a critical component to working with industry to
prevent and respond to attacks. We have made significant improvements
in our ability to communicate with transit agencies. TSA communicates
with the top 100 transit agencies regularly. We are working
aggressively to expand access to secure phones so that we can provide
them access to sensitive threat information in real time. Another layer
is the use of canine teams in transit systems.
Currently, we have 33 canine teams deployed in 11 systems and we
expect additional agencies will be added to our canine program this
year. We also appreciate your support in providing funding requested in
FY 2007 to support Transit Watch, a program that encourages public
awareness and preparedness. We will continue to add measures and
support programs to enhance a layered security approach prioritize
training among the many measures systems can take.
Freight Rail Security Training Initiatives
TSA is acutely aware of the importance of security training in the
freight rail arena. This year, in conjunction with DOT, we issued a
list of recommended security action items to rail carriers for the
transport of toxic inhalation hazard (TIH) materials. Included in these
security action items are recommendations that directly relate to
continued education and training. We are currently developing a CD-ROM
based interactive training program on the recognition of improvised
explosive devices on railcars and on railroad property. This training
will be made available to rail carriers at no cost in the next couple
of months.
TSA, other DHS components, and the Federal Railroad Administration
(FRA), in cooperation with affected railroads, conduct high threat
urban area (HTUA) assessments in order to identify the vulnerabilities
of selected urban areas where TIH shipments are moved in significant
quantity. TSA has developed a risk assessment tool in coordination with
railroad owners and operators and federal agencies participating in the
HTUAs. TSA has provided a comprehensive training program for railroad
security directors to effectively use this tool. TSA has also developed
a Rail Corridor Risk Management Tool for use by freight owners and
operators nationwide where on-the-ground assessments are not conducted.
Conclusion
In closing, the nation's rail and transit operators and their
employees have responded admirably to the new threat environment.
Thanks to their efforts, passenger and freight rail is more secure and
better prepared to respond to emergencies than ever before. However, we
must continue to focus on this important issue, including ensuring that
training is disseminated throughout transit organizations, that
employees are receiving refresher training, and that we are developing
training to address the emerging needs of the transit environment.
I appreciate the opportunity to provide this important update on
rail security. We value the critical role the Congress, and especially
this Subcommittee, plays in the effort to protect rail security. We
look forward to working with you on the full range of subjects so
critical to protecting America's transportation infrastructure, its
passengers, and the commerce that it carries.
Thank you. I would be pleased to respond to questions.
Mr. Lungren. Thank you very much, Mr. Sammon, for your
testimony.
The chair would now recognize Mr. Terry Rosapep, the deputy
associate administrator, Office of Program Management at the
Federal Transit Agency, to testify.
I understand that while you will be testifying for the
Department of Transportation, you also have Mr. William Fagan,
the director of security at the Federal Railroad
Administration, to answer questions regarding training for rail
at DOT.
Thank you, both, for being here.
And, sir, you may proceed.
STATEMENT OF TERRY ROSAPEP, DEPUTY ASSOCIATE ADMINISTRTOR,
OFFICE OF PROGRAM MANAGEMENT, FEDERAL TRANSIT ADMINISTRATION
Mr. Rosapep. Thank you.
Mr. Chairman, Congresswoman Sanchez, Congressman Langevin
and members of the subcommittee, I am pleased to have this
opportunity to discuss security training for transit and
railroad employees and the Department of the Transportation's
initiatives in that area, first by highlighting the Federal
Transit Administration's involvement in transit security and
then the involvement by the Federal Railroad Administration.
The FTA, its federal and state partners, and the transit
industry have built a solid foundation for security by focusing
on three priorities: public awareness, emergency preparedness
and employee training.
Since 9/11, FTA has delivered security training to almost
80,000 transit employees in an ongoing collaboration with NTI--
the National Transit Institute at Rutgers University--DOT's
Transportation Safety Institute, and the Johns Hopkins
University.
FTA now coordinates security training through the public
transportation annex to the DOT-DHS memorandum of
understanding, which sets out the respective roles of the
departments on security issues.
The annex's executive steering committee oversees eight
project management teams. The training team looks specifically
at how to develop new courses on timely security topics. The
safety and security roundtables team also enhances security
training through direct outreach to the security chiefs at the
50 largest transit agencies. Another team is dedicated to the
Transit Watch program, which is tantamount to a security
training for passengers.
In partnership with Johns Hopkins, FTA has developed and is
delivering a course on strategic counterterrorism for transit
managers. In addition, a security training assessment for the
30 largest transit agencies, and also for 20 smaller ones, is
being completed. And that will give us a better baseline to
determine training needs throughout the industry.
With NTI, FTA is working to deliver several security
training courses. These include chem-bio and explosive incident
management, as well as systems security awareness, which
imparts basic security skills to front-line employees.
FTA has collaborated with DOT's Transportation Safety
Institute on six specific security training courses. Topical
areas include security design review principles, bus and rail
hijackings, and response to threats posed by weapons of mass
destruction.
Turning to FRA, FRA promotes the safety of the U.S.
railroad industry and works closely with its federal and state
partners in the railroad industry in addressing training and
other security issues.
In the area of freight rail security, FRA worked closely
with the DOT's Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety
Administration, PHMSA, on a March 2003 regulation requiring
each shipper and carrier of significant quantities of HAZMAT to
adopt and comply with a security plan.
PHMSA regulations require each company to give its
employees both security awareness training and in-depth
security training concerning the company's security plan and
its implementation.
To date, FRA has reviewed more than 6,000 security plans
and conducted some 4,000 inspections for compliance with the
regulations security training requirements.
Further, in June of this year, FRA, TSA and the railroads
agreed on voluntary security action steps the industry should
take to enhance security in the transportation of toxic
inhalation hazard materials, TIH. The action items include
regularly reinforcing security awareness and operational
security concepts to all employees, and training employees to
recognize suspicious activity, to report security concerns
stemming from the inspection of cars containing TIH materials.
FRA and TSA have also assisted the freight railroads with
instituting their own more comprehensive security plans, and
have provided input to employee security training modules which
the railroads and NTI are now developing.
In the area of passenger railroad security, FRA issued
regulations in 1998 requiring passenger railroads to prepare
and secure FRA approval of plans to address emergencies,
conduct employee training on the plans, and conduct emergency
simulations. In addition, Amtrak and the commuter railroads
have instituted their own security plans and conduct their own
security training.
Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, be assured
that the Department of Transportation will continue to work
with DHS to strengthen transit and rail security. We look
forward to continuing to work with Congress to advance the
shared goal of protecting our transit and rail infrastructure.
We will be happy to answer any of the questions you may
have. Thank you.
[The statement of Mr. Rosapep follows:]
Prepared Statement of Terry Rosapep
Mr. Chairman and members of the Subcommittee, thank you for this
opportunity to testify today on behalf of the Secretary of
Transportation and the Federal Transit Administration (FTA). I am
pleased to have this opportunity, with my colleague, William Fagan,
Director of Security at the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA), to
update you on transit and rail security training and the U. S.
Department of Transportation's (DOT) initiatives in that area.
FTA and Transit Security
America's transit system is complex, dynamic, interconnected, and
composed of over 6,000 local systems. By their nature, these systems--
and the entire transit network--are open and accessible, and therefore
difficult to secure. Each workday, transit and commuter rail systems
move approximately 14 million passengers in the United States.
FTA, its Federal and state partners, and the transit industry have
built a solid foundation for security in the years following the
attacks of September 11, by focusing on three security priorities:
public awareness, employee training, and emergency preparedness. FTA
has designed its security training programs with the certainty that
regardless of where an attack comes from or how it is devised, security
training of employees and passenger awareness will always help to
prevent or mitigate damage.
Since September 11, in our ongoing collaboration with partners at
the National Transit Institute (NTI) of Rutgers University, the
Transportation Safety Institute (TSI) of the Department of
Transportation, and Johns Hopkins University (JHU), FTA has delivered
security training to almost 80,000 transit employees nationwide. We
have utilized an array of formats for security training, ranging from
classroom instruction and roundtables to videos and toolkits, to suit
the needs of each audience and to disseminate broadly our knowledge
about security.
In September 2005, FTA and two agencies within the Department
Homeland Security--the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and
the Office for Domestic Preparedness, now the Office of Grants and
Training (G&T), signed the Public Transportation Security Annex to the
Department of Transportation (DOT/Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on security. The annex identifies
specific areas of coordination among the parties, including citizen
awareness, training, exercises, risk assessments, and information
sharing. To implement the Annex, the three agencies have developed a
framework that leverages each agency's resources and capabilities.
With the Annex in place as a blueprint, FTA, TSA and G&T have
established an Executive Steering Committee that interacts with DHS,
DOT, and transit industry leaders. This committee oversees eight
project management teams that spearhead the Annex's programs. Each of
these programs advances one or more of FTA's three security priority
areas, which again are public awareness, employee training, and
emergency preparedness. We have been implementing the Annex
energetically since its inception.
The ``Training Team'' looks specifically at how to develop new
courses on timely, cutting-edge security topics such as strategic
counter-terrorism, and biological and chemical threats. The Annex's
``Safety and Security Roundtables'' team also enhances security
training. It works on direct outreach to the transit industry, and
plans two educational events a year for the security chiefs of the 50
largest transit agencies. Transit security leaders have responded
favorably to opportunities for peer-to-peer forums, and the security
roundtables provide just that. The next roundtable, our third, will be
held in December 2006 in Secaucus, New Jersey.
It is also worth noting that the Annex includes a team dedicated to
the ``Transit Watch'' program, which is tantamount to a security
training initiative that teaches transit passengers to become more
mindful of their environment in the context of risks of the times for
terrorism.
FTA, with our Federal partners at DHS, continues to work with Johns
Hopkins, TSI, and NTI to deliver and develop security training
programs.
Before I detail these course offerings, I would like to call your
attention to a few highlights. First, FTA's course offerings are
comprehensive and focus on all transit environments, including smaller
agencies. Second, security training aims to disseminate the most
current and up to date thinking on the most current and up to date
threat information for the transit industry. Third, these courses cover
a comprehensive range of topics that mesh with transit industry
realities and needs. Finally, FTA's courses equip transit agencies to
implement security training for all of their employees. This magnifies
the impact of security training courses, as it encourages those we
educate to educate, in turn, their peers and employees.
In partnership with JHU, FTA has already piloted and revised a two-
day course on Strategic Counter-Terrorism for Transit Managers. This
course provides counter-terrorism management training to transit police
and security forces in a large enough number to ensure a core,
consistent approach to security planning across transit agencies.
With JHU, FTA has also developed a Strategic Curriculum Development
Guidance Document, which is an essential tool for standardized, high
quality security training.
Finally, in conjunction with JHU, FTA is just now completing the
Security Training Assessment for Top 30 Transit Agencies, and for 20
smaller agencies. This assessment will help FTA and our partners in the
Federal government identify security training gaps and needs in the
industry. Usefully, it takes into account smaller agencies, whose
requirements and characteristics often differ from those of larger
urban systems.
FTA is working with NTI to deliver six security training
initiatives for the transit industry:
The System Security Awareness for Transportation Employees training
that FTA developed with NTI imparts basic security skills and is
offered in the form of a four-hour class, DVD/video or employee
handouts. FTA has also distributed over 4,200 copies of its system
security awareness Warning Signs video, developed in collaboration with
NTI. FTA is in the process of developing a parallel video targeted
specifically to smaller transit agencies.
FTA has just developed a six-hour course on Chemical/Biological and
Explosive Incident Management for Operations Control Center Personnel.
This course has been developed and is currently being delivered to ten
transit agencies in large metro areas; an additional 20 deliveries will
be scheduled for 2007.
The Terrorist Activity Recognition and Reaction course draws on
FTA's work with Israeli experts on passenger monitoring, and lessons
learned from Israel's security experts. FTA has already reached 6,000
employees with this material. In the next quarter, FTA plans to
complete two additional training initiatives with NTI. The first is an
Emergency Drills/ Exercise Guidance Document for transit agencies. The
second is a new training course that will help ensure that transit
employees can use the National Incident Management System for Transit
to collaborate effectively with emergency responders and services
during an incident.
During 2006, FTA has collaborated with TSI to offer or develop six
security training courses.
In June, FTA and TSI offered a Crime Prevention through
Environmental Design course in El Paso, Texas; FTA is now developing a
Security Design training course with TSI that achieves the same purpose
but with the emphasis against terrorism.
From April to August of this year, FTA offered its Transit System
Security course five times. This course encourages participants to
develop and implement security policies in a uniform format. The FTA-
TSI course in Effectively Managing Transit Emergencies also takes a
broad perspective and teaches transit employees how to understand the
emergency management concept.
Two additional courses train employees to handle specific kinds of
security threats. FTA offered the Threat Management and Emergency
Response to Bus and Rail Hijackings course eight times this year. It
also offered a course in the Transit Response to Weapons of Mass
Destruction.
TSI is in the process of updating and revising all of its courses
so as to be in compliance with FTA and DHS requirements.
As this brief review illustrates, FTA has forged successful
collaborations both within the Federal government, between the
government and the transit industry, and with JHU, NTI and TSI, to
develop and disseminate the latest security training and knowledge.
FTA's work with these organizations and within the MOU Annex is the
primary way that we influence security training practices in the
transit industry.
FRA's Role in Railroad Security
FRA's primary mission is to promote the safety of the U.S. railroad
industry. FRA's railroad safety mission necessarily includes its
involvement in railroad security issues, and FRA works closely with TSA
and the railroad industry on a daily basis in addressing railroad
security issues.
The United States railroad network is a vital link in the Nation's
transportation system and is critical to the economy, national defense,
and public health. Amtrak and commuter railroads provide passenger rail
service to more than 500 million passengers yearly. Freight railroads
connect businesses with each other across the country and with markets
overseas, moving 42 percent of all intercity freight, measured in ton-
miles. Passenger and freight railroads operate over 170,000 route miles
of track and employ over 227,000 workers.
FRA's involvement in railroad security predates the terrorist
attacks on September 11, 2001. From 1997 through the enactment of the
USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005 in March of
this year, DOT worked closely with Congress to secure the enactment of
Federal criminal legislation to more effectively deter and punish
terrorist who attack railroads and mass transportation systems. In
1998, FRA issued regulations requiring passenger railroads to prepare
and secure FRA approval of plans to address emergencies (such as
security threats), conduct employee training on the plan, and conduct
emergency simulations. This regulation is discussed in more detail
below.
Since the terrorist atrocities on September 11, 2001, FRA has been
actively engaged in the railroad industry's response to the terrorist
threat. The railroads have developed their own security plans, and FRA
has worked with the railroads, rail labor, and law enforcement
personnel to develop the Railway Alert Network, which enables timely
distribution of information and intelligence on security issues.
Working with the FTA, we have participated in security risk assessments
on commuter railroads, and we have conducted security risk assessments
of Amtrak as well. FRA's security director works on a daily basis to
facilitate communications on security issues between government
agencies and the railroad industry.
Freight Railroad Security
A special focus for FRA and DOT, collectively, is the security of
hazmat transported by rail. A major initiative to improve hazmat
security has been the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety
Administration's (PHMSA) March 2003 regulation requiring each shipper
and carrier of significant quantities (amounts for which placards are
required) of hazmat to adopt and comply with a security plan. Under the
regulation, security plans must include an assessment of security risks
and appropriate countermeasures or mitigation strategies, or both, to
address those risks. The plans must, at a minimum, address three
specific areas: the company personnel who prepare and handle hazmat
shipments; unauthorized access to hazmat shipments or transport
conveyances; and the security of hazmat shipped or transported by the
company from its origin to its destination. To assist railroads that
transport hazmat and shippers that offer hazmat for transportation by
rail to comply with this regulation, particularly small--and medium-
sized companies, FRA and PHMSA developed a program on how to write and
implement security plans for their companies. FRA, PHMSA, and TSA have
been working together on developing proposed revisions to the PHMSA
rule.
FRA recognizes that railroad and shipper employees' awareness and
understanding of the PHMSA regulation and procedures governing the safe
and secure transportation of hazmat shipments are critical. Therefore,
PHMSA's regulation provides for safety and security training for
employees engaged in the transportation of hazmat. Specifically, every
shipper and carrier of hazmat must give its employees training in
awareness of risks associated with hazmat transportation and methods
designed to enhance hazmat transportation security. In addition, every
shipper and carrier required to have a security plan must give its
employees in-depth security training concerning the company's security
plan and its implementation. These training requirements are also
recurrent; employees must receive the required training at least every
three years. To date, FRA personnel have reviewed more than 6,105
security plans (including the plans for all Class I freight railroad
carriers) and conducted 4,054 inspections for compliance with the
security training requirements.
Further, as a result of extensive collaboration with the freight
railroad industry, on June 23, 2006, DHS and DOT issued ``Recommended
Security Action Items for the Rail Transportation of Toxic Inhalation
Hazard (TIH) Materials.'' The Action Items are based on lessons learned
from an assessment of high-threat urban area rail corridors and from
reviews of railroads? security plans. Implementation of the Action
Items is expected to raise the security baseline for the transportation
of TIH materials. We believe the Security Action Items are of great
value and can be quickly implemented. They include regularly
reinforcing security awareness and operational security concepts to all
employees at all levels of the organization, training employees to
recognize suspicious activity and report security concerns found during
inspections of cars containing TIH materials, and other security
training program elements. DOT and TSA are monitoring implementation of
the Action Items and, should they not be voluntarily adopted as
expected, we will consider more formally instituting the Action Items.
While we must remain ever vigilant to secure hazmat shipments on
our Nation's railroads, for the sake of railroad employees and the
public whom we all serve, it bears emphasis that the vast majority of
hazmat shipments arrive at their destinations safely; few tank cars
have leaks or spills of any kind; fewer still are breached in an
accident or incident. Considering just chlorine, for example, since
1965 (the earliest data available) there have been at least 2.2 million
tank car shipments of chlorine?only 788 of which were involved in
accidents (0.036 percent of all the shipments). Of those accidents,
there were 11 instances of a catastrophic loss (i.e., a loss of all, or
nearly all) of the chlorine lading (0.0005 percent of all the
shipments). Of the 11 catastrophic losses, four resulted in fatalities
(0.00018 percent of all the shipments). For all hazardous materials, in
the 12 years from 1994 through 2005, hazardous materials released in
railroad accidents resulted in a total of 14 fatalities. While one
death is obviously too many, the record of transporting these
commodities is very good.
Railroads have also voluntarily imposed their own, additional
security requirements addressing the security of not only hazmat but of
freight in general. The Nation's freight railroads have developed and
put in place security plans based on comprehensive risk analyses and
the national intelligence community's best practices. The Association
of American Railroads (AAR) has established guidance for the major
freight railroads in the form of a model strategic security plan.
Further, the AAR and Class I railroads have been working with the
National Transit Institute at Rutgers University to develop employee
training modules for security. With FRA and TSA input, four video
modules have been developed covering security awareness training. In
particular, the video training modules help frontline employees
identify potential security breaches, threats and risks and explain how
they should report them. A fifth training module is being developed to
address the notification of employees in a security incident and what
they need to do under the railroad's security plan, such as moving cars
to more secure areas. Notably, the training is intended for all
railroad employees--not just those employees responsible for the
transportation of hazmat. The video training modules will be made part
of a training library for use in recurrent training, rules classes,
training of new employees, and other training. The training modules
will also continue to be shared with the smaller railroads.
Passenger Railroad Security
In the area of passenger railroad security, FRA requires railroads
that operate intercity or commuter passenger train service or that host
the operation of that service to adopt and comply with a written
emergency preparedness plan approved by FRA. Each plan must address
employee training and qualification. Crewmembers aboard a passenger
train must be trained initially and then periodically every two years
on the applicable plan provisions. At a minimum, training must include
the following subjects: rail equipment familiarization; situational
awareness; passenger evacuation; coordination of functions; and
``hands-on'' instruction concerning the location, function, and
operation of on-board emergency equipment. Personnel of a control
center (a central location on a railroad with responsibility for
directing the safe movement of trains) must also be trained initially
and then periodically every two years on appropriate courses of action
for potential emergency situations. This training must include dispatch
territory familiarization and protocols governing internal
communications between appropriate control center personnel whenever an
imminent, potential emergency situation exists. Additionally, each
railroad must establish and maintain a working relationship with
emergency responders on its line by developing and making available a
training program on the plan, inviting them to participate in emergency
simulations, discussed more below, and by distributing updated plans to
them, including documentation concerning the railroad's equipment, the
physical characteristics of its line, necessary maps, and the position
titles and telephone numbers of relevant railroad officers to contact.
Further, railroads providing passenger service must periodically
conduct full-scale passenger train emergency simulations and must
conduct a debriefing and critique session after actual or simulated
passenger train emergency situations. These requirements for full-scale
simulations and for post-simulation and post-emergency debriefing help
ensure that employees? abstract knowledge of emergency procedures is
put into practice and then refined based on their collective
experience.
Amtrak and commuter railroads have instituted their own security
plans and conduct security training. FRA assisted Amtrak in the
development of its security plan. Specifically, in coordination with
Amtrak's Inspector General, FRA contracted with the RAND Corporation to
conduct a systematic review and assessment of Amtrak's security
posture, corporate strategic security planning, and programs focusing
on the adequacy of preparedness for combating terrorist threats.
In partnership with FTA, FRA participated in security risk
assessments on the ten largest commuter railroads and contributed the
funding for security risk assessments on three of these railroads. FRA
also participated in FTA's ``best practices tool kit'' initiative,
contributing our knowledge of commuter rail operations, infrastructure,
and organization to ensure that the recommended security enhancement
measures were sound and feasible in a railroad environment. FRA staff
worked closely with many of the railroads that receive FTA grant
funding, to plan and assist in the development and implementation of
security simulations and drills. FRA also devoted staff with both
railroad knowledge and facilitation skills to the 17 FTA-sponsored
workshops across the country (called ``Connecting Communities'') to
bring together commuter railroads, emergency responders, and State and
local government leaders so that they might better coordinate their
security plans and emergency response efforts.
The American Public Transportation Association (APTA) is also
leading commuter railroads in the development of industry standards for
passenger rail security. This initiative is in addition to APTA's
system safety audit program, to which most commuter railroads
subscribe, and which includes security as an element of overall system
safety.
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, be assured that the
Department of Transportation will continue to strengthen transit and
rail security. We look forward to continuing to work with Congress to
advance the shared goal of protecting our transit and rail
infrastructure, and all that rides on it. I, and my colleagues, will be
happy to answer any questions you may have.
Mr. Lungren. Thank you very much for your testimony.
Appreciate it.
I thank both the witnesses.
And I thank you, Mr. Fagan, for being here to respond to
questions as well.
We will start the round of questioning. And I will yield
myself 5 minutes for that purpose.
We are going to have a second panel here, and we have two
representatives of unions involved in the industry. And the
tenor of one of the prepared statements is that we would hear a
lot of good things from the administration but that, in fact,
it is more talk than action. And the suggestion that the good
work done by the National Transit Institute only represents
training approximately 30 percent of the transit industry's
total workforce.
Mr. Sammon and Mr. Rosapep, how would you respond to that?
I mean, I view that as a criticism, and I would like you to
give us an answer.
Mr. Sammon. Thank you. Let me start first.
In terms of the overall federal spending that is available,
DHS has made available about $18 billion to state and local
governments. And they use that money in various and sundry
ways, whether they use it for first responders, transit--
however they have been making decisions on that.
There is about $4 billion, or $3.5 billion, a year
available from FTA capital grants that there is more
flexibility to use with training and also for capital security
items.
And I think, since 9/11, approximately $900 million from
all federal agencies has been available for transit security.
Now, in terms of the question of training, that is why what
we want to do at TSA is in--TSA is now working with DHS in a
lead role on the grants program. And what we want to do is,
rather than have the grants go out simply for capital items, we
want to require a baseline of training before people are
eligible for capital grants.
So we want to leverage that excess of $100 million to get
the properties their front-line employee training up to
standards. And that is what we plan to do and we want to do.
And working with the unions--I worked at Conrail for quite
some time, and we had at one point one of the worst safety
records, and we turned it around to have one of the best safety
records. And we did that by working with the people on the
ground directly. Every one of our senior officers was out
working with folks on the ground.
So I think the front-line employees, at some point in this
process, should be involved. And it is very important, because
their attitude and their involvement take you from having a
training and awareness program that is on paper versus a real,
robust one in the field.
Mr. Lungren. Is it ``Rosapep'' or ``Rosapep''? I want to
make sure--
Mr. Rosapep. It is ``Rosapep.''
Mr. Lungren. Okay. Mr. Rosapep, could you respond to that,
please?
Mr. Rosapep. Yes, I would say that, you know, since 9/11,
the training programs have in fact been focused on the largest
30 transit agencies, as opposed to all of the systems out
there. So we have a higher penetration of the top 30 agencies,
probably more like that 60 percent of the employees. But
overall, the 20 percent figure is correct.
As an example, in your district--and we have been focusing
on getting out the basic security awareness course to those top
30 agencies. We have done Sacramento in your district. In
Congresswoman Sanchez's district we have done the Orange County
transit system, to get the basic security programs out there.
But those are the larger ones.
We are right now conducting an assessment of not only those
top 30, to see how well we have penetrated and the training has
gone down in those agencies, but we are also looking at a
selection of 20 smaller agencies across the country as well,
because we also think those are important.
When we have that assessment complete, I think we will have
a much better idea of what it is going to take to do the
training that is necessary at the larger systems as well as the
smaller ones and get a broader penetration throughout the
industry of the training that is really necessary.
Mr. Lungren. Have you had an opportunity to look at some of
the systems themselves? That is, you say in Orange County and
Sacramento they have had the training. In testimony that we
have coming up later from one of the union representatives,
mentions that the Washington, D.C. system has had training, the
L.A. metro have trained their front-line employees. At least
that is their statement.
Have you had any opportunity to go in and look at the
quality of that training that actually took place? I guess I
would ask it this way: Are there any metrics, are there any
performance standards, is there anything to show that it has
taken?
Mr. Rosapep. That really is part of the assessment we are
doing, is to go back to those agencies that we have trained in
the top 30 to see, has it been effective? And if it hasn't, why
not and what can we do about it?
Frankly, another parallel effort going on to actually
define some performance metrics for training. All of us are
party to this effort. But that will give us an ongoing way of
measuring just how effective the training is on an ongoing
basis.
Mr. Lungren. Do you have any sense whether these systems
sense the importance of this?
That is, you look at the bottom line of an operation.
Preparing for a terrorist attack, in many cases, might be the
outlier, you know? It is something that we don't think is going
to happen. That is, that could be the comment or a thought of
an operator. Therefore, we can't justify it to our bottom line.
Do we have that problem? Or is there a seriousness that you
find with the operators you deal with that actually they
understand how important this is?
Mr. Rosapep. Our experience so far, it is not an issue of
that. They sense the importance of it and are eager to get the
training.
The other side of it, too, is, so much of the, what we
call, security training is just as applicable to safety issues.
In fact, it is hard to define a clear line between the two.
And the fact is, our transit agencies have been doing
safety training and safety programs for years and years. They
know the importance of it. Some of these new security programs
add a new twist to it, but it is not something that they have
to be convinced of, that it is something that they would like
and need to do.
Mr. Lungren. Okay. My time is up.
The gentlelady from California, the ranking member of this
subcommittee, Ms. Sanchez, is recognized for 5 minutes.
Ms. Sanchez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am sorry for
arriving late, but I do thank you for this hearing. I think it
is very important, because I have been hearing from a lot of
different areas with respect to training and the security on
the different rail line, in particular.
So let me get this--I am a little bit concerned about, in
talking to people about the perceived lack of coordination
between the Department of Homeland Security and Transportation.
There appears to be a lot of overlap and duplication with
regards to security training.
And, you know, there are very few resources. I used to do
transportation consultation many decades ago, and so really
understand, in particular for mass transit, what it takes to
move people and where the monies are coming from, and the lack
of monies.
So who is the primary department and agency responsible for
security training? And what steps are you taking to improve the
coordination between the two departments?
And my second question has to deal with this issue of
whether TSA is just acting as a passthrough to give monies,
then, over to, let's say, FTA for this security training. It
seems to me that there recently was, for example, a $1.5
million transfer from TSA to the FTA and another $200,000
transfer that was made last year.
So is TSA developing the training? Is it just moving the
money over to FTA? Should we just be giving the money directly
to FTA? What is the coordination, and who is really doing this?
And if you answered this before I walked in, I am sorry,
but I need to, sort of, understand.
Mr. Sammon. No, that is a very good question.
I think, if you go back before 9/11, as discussed a few
minutes ago, I think most of the training and efforts in terms
of security and safety were handled by the FTA. And in many
cases, if you think about security, ``Am I going to be
mugged?'' or ``Is this a terrorist attack?'', a lot of the
things involved--there is a fine line in terms of separating
both of them.
So in the past, and in their roles of dealing with the
nation's transit agencies, FTA--in the testimony he has gone
through--developing a number of training programs in dealing
with the agencies.
In my discussions with the agencies, they want to deal
with?it is fine that the federal government has all these
different security agencies. But in terms of, if you are going
to have programs and training programs and we are going to do
training--for instance, if you do safety training and you take
an operator out of his equipment for the day and he is going to
be in a room, you can do both safety training and security
training. Security training can be against a criminal, and it
can also be terrorist security training. It is effective to do
it all at once in modules.
So a lot of the development of the training programs has
been developed by FTA. And TSA supports that effort.
What TSA is doing and what we want to do is, in terms of,
are the transit agencies at a baseline standard of training,
are they there? And we want to use the grant program through
DHS as the incentive to get people to the baseline of training.
In the other part of my oral testimony today, we mentioned
what we are doing in the rail industry. The rail industry has
developed a four-part module, in terms of training for real
employees and security awareness and so on. What we want to do
with our inspectors is to make sure to see the effectiveness as
it applies to the ground, their day-to-day activities, and how
that applies.
So I think, in terms of this, TSA is working?we have a
memorandum of understanding with FTA and FRA. We work closely
with them, in terms of these issues.
Ms. Sanchez. My last question to you: It is my
understanding that TSA has frozen all promotions and hiring for
rail and mass transit officials at TSA, in addition to halting
initiatives in these areas, due to funding shortfalls. Is there
a shortfall?
Mr. Sammon. What we have--I recently hired the general
management of rail from--promoted Gil Kovar, who is sitting in
the audience here. He has 30 years of experience in the rail
industry as a senior line operating person. We have made
permanent nine of the 11 general managers since I arrived, and
we hope to have a transit general manager here shortly.
So, we have been hiring people. We brought on an air cargo
executive on Monday, who is retired, who is from Emery
Worldwide. So we have been hiring people.
In terms of a--
Ms. Sanchez. So you haven't frozen promotions or stopped
hiring of rail and mass transit officials?
Mr. Sammon. I haven't stopped any hiring per se.
What I have done since I have gotten there, in terms of
looking at the overall resource of the group that I have, I
want to make sure that the resources are in the right place. We
may have too many people in one area and not enough people in
another, and I am making that determination.
So, before I fill jobs just because they were there before,
I want to make sure we are filling the right jobs in the right
places, and that TSA is putting its resources and using its
resources most effectively.
Ms. Sanchez. Let me ask it just one different way. I see
that my time is up.
So there is no freezing of hiring into positions in--
Mr. Sammon. I just hired the cargo general manager on
Monday. But I have told people what I want to do--
Ms. Sanchez. What about the lower rungs? Is there an
official freeze?
Mr. Sammon. There is not an official freeze. What we are
doing is, in terms of the vacancies we have, I want a review
and justification of all the vacancies in terms of the
priorities of TSA, to make sure we are putting people in the
right jobs rather than filling historic vacancies.
Ms. Sanchez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Lungren. Mr. Langevin is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And, gentlemen, thank you, again, for your testimony, for
being here today.
One of my concerns, in terms of what I have heard both from
constituents and just on a general topic, is related to Amtrak
police officers. And I am sure that we all agree that if you
want to hire and retain good people, we have to pay them
fairly.
So I am going to address my question to Mr. Fagan.
Mr. Fagan, as the director of security for the Federal
Railroad Administration, you probably understand more than most
people the need for a steady workforce of railroad police
officers.
And railroad police officers obviously serve on the front
lines to ensure passenger safety. They are responsible for
ensuring both the trains and the stations are secure, and
assisting passengers with any security concerns that they may
have.
It is therefore important that they be compensated fairly
and granted equitable contracts under which to work.
Now, while I understand that you don't work for Amtrak, I
am sure that you have heard that Amtrak's police officers have
been operating now without a contract for 7 years--7 years.
Now, the Amtrak police officers right now, as I understand
it, are not paid commensurate with what their counterparts
working for other rail companies make. Additionally, while they
do receive cost-of-living adjustments, they are less than
adequate, often amounting to an increase of one penny a month.
So this leads to the unfortunate truth that much of
Amtrak's important police force leave to find better-paying
jobs, which ultimately leaves gaping holes in rail security.
So my question is, have you heard of this problem
occurring? And do you think the Amtrak police officers should
be operating under an updated contract? And do you think that
this is a problem confined to Amtrak, or is it spilling over
into other railroad police officers?
And finally, in your capacity as the director of security
for the Federal Railroad Administration, what can you do to
help ensure Amtrak retains its important police force?
Mr. Fagan. Sir, I am very proud of our police officers both
at the railroad and transit industry and in our local
communities. Amtrak pay and personnel policies are an internal
matter to the company. And we will review that question and
provide you an answer in writing, sir.
Mr. Langevin. I would appreciate that. Obviously, 7 years,
I think even to a reasonable person, is a long time to go
without a contract. And if they are only getting about a penny-
a-month increase in their cost-of-living adjustment, that is
certainly not adequate. Doesn't speak well of morale, I am
sure, and it is going to be harder and harder to retain good
people. Particularly in this day and age, I think that is an
important topic to address.
If I could, my next question is for Mr. Sammon. We
witnessed the horrible events that unfolded during the attacks
on London's subway system just over a year ago, and we are
fortunate that here in the United States we have not yet
experienced that type of attack.
And we are currently severely, in my opinion, underprepared
to handle the results. Not only do we lack the capability to
prevent such attacks from happening, but many of out nation's
subway systems are still not cell-phone accessible, which means
that it could take first responders an even longer time to hear
about the attacks.
Now, I understand that the Washington Metro system is
fortunately able to accommodate the use of cell phones along
much of the tracks. However, cell phone simply cannot operate
in much of the New York City subway system, where most threats
to our nation's mass transit have been received.
So the fact that many of our nation's subway systems lack
the ability to allow for the use of cell phones leaves our mass
transit systems extremely vulnerable to attack.
So my question, Mr. Sammon: Do you see this as a problem to
our mass transit system? And how do you propose that we act to
make all of our nation's subway systems cell-phone accessible?
Mr. Sammon. That is a very good question. And I think what
we would, in terms of the cell phone specific, I don't know
that TSA has a specific plan on cell phones.
Part of what we are looking for is the subway systems, in
the context of the grant program, is, what is their response
program? And part of that response program certainly is
communication, and communication from the operators to the
first responders.
And we don't have a specific plan for cell phones
specifically. However, if you look at the risk-based
distribution of our grant money in the past, it has gone to?one
of the items that goes into determining that risk-based
assessment is miles of underground track and underground
stations. So certainly the systems that have the kinds of
vulnerabilities that you are speaking to do receive, have
received in the past, most of the funding.
And I will bring up the cell-phone communication to make
sure that we do have that as an important part of that
recognition of the kinds of grants and applications we look at.
Because certainly, when we talk about response plans and
effective response plans, if you can't communicate, you can't
respond.
Mr. Langevin. Well, that is exactly--
Mr. Sammon. Yes. Good point.
Mr. Langevin. --my concern, as well. And we don't want to
be talking about it after the fact. The opportunity is here to
do something about it now, and we certainly welcome the
opportunity to work with you on that.
Mr. Sammon. Very good.
Mr. Lungren. The gentleman's time has expired.
The gentleman from Washington is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Dicks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I appreciate the
testimony of the witnesses.
Mr. Sammon, why hasn't TSA required security training for
rail and mass transit employees?
Mr. Sammon. We are working with the transit industry to
develop a 1-year action plan which includes, among other
things, would be training. We are--
Mr. Dicks. I mean, this seems to me this would be, like,
the first thing we would do. But now 5 years have gone by, and
we still don't require training. So are we just leaving it up
to the transit agencies and the railroads to do this training
themselves?
Mr. Sammon. In the discussion we had before in the oral
testimony, what I spoke about was using the excess of $100
million in the grants program--
Mr. Dicks. Who does that money go to?
Mr. Sammon. That goes to the transit agencies.
Mr. Dicks. But still, there is not a requirement that they
use it for training.
Mr. Sammon. There will be. And that is what we are doing
and that is what we are changing in response to the
recognition, first of all, the training is critical, training
is essential.
And in the past, in terms of the grants program, agencies
could apply for training. Most apply for capital grants. But in
their assessments of what is important, they have applied for
training. They have not applied it for as many training
programs--some have--as they have applied for capital.
And what we want to do is raise a bar and have that bar set
as we look at this next distribution of funds, to say, ``If you
are not trained, in our opinion, to a proper level, we don't
want to hand out money for technology before you do training.''
So we may see, in this next round, a larger portion of that
$130-or-so million go for training than it has in the past.
Because it doesn't do any good for me to pay for--
Mr. Dicks. When can we expect this requirement?
Mr. Sammon. This requirement will--as we go through the
2006 specifics, in terms of what specific projects will be
approved, it will start coming out there. Now, will it be--
Mr. Dicks. You mean 2007?
Mr. Sammon. Well, we have--
Mr. Dicks. We have got about 2 weeks to go, or a few days
to go, in 2006.
Mr. Sammon. Well, no, the amounts have been released, but
the specific projects and what we will apply and how the
money?and which projects apply, that will be done by the end of
the year, certainly by 2007.
And will it be done perfectly this first time? Probably
not. But for 2007, people will understand the guidance and the
requirements.
But the training, we want--it doesn't do anybody any good
to buy them a chem-bio detection unit if the employees don't
know how to get out of the subway system or aren't trained to
evacuate. So they have to be trained first, before we start
layering in lots of technology on these systems.
But we agree with the committee's assessment there.
Mr. Dicks. Mr. Rosapep, do you think that TSA should
mandate security training for mass transit employees?
Mr. Rosapep. When you mandate something, we need to be
prepared that we have the resources to make sure that the
training is available so that the transit agencies can take
care of that.
We concur with the notion that the training has got to be
there before people start buying technology. And FTA has been
pushing that ourselves for a number of years.
The courses that we have been pushing are those basic
security awareness training for all the front-line staff. That
plays in better to accomplishing that before funding goes in to
the hard capital side of things.
FTA's own programs, this year, people are now able to use
their FTA capital formula funds for training purposes. That
wasn't possible before this year. So there are new resources
being made available for those agencies to be able to get the
training that they need and want.
Mr. Dicks. Okay. So you are saying, until this year, the
money that we gave them was not available for training?
Mr. Rosapep. For FTA's formula programs, they are strictly
capital for the large agencies--
Mr. Dicks. Right. Right.
Mr. Rosapep. --so things like training and conducting
emergency drills and preparing plans are operational, and they
weren't eligible before.
When Congress passed the new SAFE-T legislation for the
transportation programs, they changed the definition of what is
capital for FTA and for our transit agencies so that they can
address security operational things, such as training.
Mr. Dicks. Mr. Fagan, do you think TSA should mandate
security training for rail employees?
Mr. Fagan. Sir, the Federal Railroad Administration
mandates emergency training for passenger railroad employees as
well as security training for HAZMAT employees.
In the passenger arena, we take a triad approach of
training the front-line crew employees, personnel in the
dispatch and control centers, as well as the local emergency
responders.
Mr. Dicks. Could I just--Mr. Chairman, I know I--just let
me ask one--give me a second.
FRA is doing this, right, as you said. But TSA is supposed
to be responsible for this. Why are you doing it if TSA isn't
doing it? Do you get my drift here?
TSA is supposed to do this, right?
Mr. Sammon. In terms of training?
Mr. Dicks. Yes.
Mr. Sammon. Yes. And that is why we wanted--
Mr. Dicks. For rail employees now I am talking about.
SAMMON; That is why my general manager is sending his
inspectors out, to make sure that the training that has been in
place from the rail industry is effective and in place in the
field.
Mr. Dicks. But we are not requiring it.
Mr. Sammon. We are, in terms of--
Mr. Dicks. Mandatory. In other words, a rule that you have
to do it.
Mr. Sammon. Right. Right.
Mr. Dicks. Let me ask you one quick thing, Mr. Chairman.
What about ferries? I come from the Pacific Northwest, the
Bremerton area. Who is in charge of ferry security?
We have had some issues out there, as you know. And I just
wanted to know, is TSA--I know the Coast Guard has probably
been playing the lead role here, which is probably appropriate.
But who is supposed to be in charge of this?
Mr. Sammon. Well, in most areas, the Coast Guard. But there
are grants that are applicable, in terms of security grants
that TSA direct for that area. But generally, in many of the
maritime areas, the Coast Guard does have a lead role, because
there are maritime regulations that go back for many, many
years that involve the Coast Guard.
Mr. Dicks. Yes. Thank you. I think the program that they
have developed is pretty good, by the way, for the ferry
system. I mean, they have the dogs and everything. They are
doing as much security as they can without completely
disrupting the ferry system.
Mr. Sammon. Yes, they are doing great.
Mr. Lungren. Okay. I think we will try a second round here,
and I will start off.
Mr. Rosapep, you mentioned in your both prepared and oral
testimony that you focus on three security priorities: public
awareness, employee training, and emergency preparedness.
I want to ask you about public awareness. I would dare say
that, for most people who ride on airplanes today, they are
aware of the threat. They would respond differently today than
what happened on 9/11 because we recognize the tactics of the
terrorists have changed.
But it strikes me that the average person who rides on mass
transit probably doesn't have that same awareness of what the
threat would be, how to respond to it, what they should do.
When you say that your agency is involved in public
awareness, what do you mean by that?
Mr. Rosapep. The primary transit awareness program is the
Transit Watch program, which actually is now jointly being
funded by DHS and DOT. That program was started a few years
ago.
Locally, if you go Metro, you hear the warning signs all
the time, you know, looking for unattended bags, looking for
suspicious behaviors, trying to get people to understand what
to look for; if they see it, who do they report that
information to.
Mr. Lungren. Again, what are the metrics on that?
I mean, sometimes I see we have created scenarios by
regulation that are so broad that, after a while, people don't
pay any attention to them. If you tell everybody--for instance,
in my home state of California where, under Prop 65, we have to
warn people that you might be exposed to certain cancer-causing
agents at very, very, very low amounts, but we require every
hotel, every convenience store, every supermarket to post that,
people walk by it, they don't pay any attention, it doesn't
mean anything to them.
There are other parts of Prop 65 that work, but in that
regard we have overdone it so that nobody pays any attention.
Has there been any study to go back and say, ``Hey, these
notices of people to do that actually caused them to be aware
of that?'', number one.
And number two, do you have anything that shows you how
well passengers are responding, that is, are reporting when
there does seem to be a suspicious package someplace?
Mr. Rosapep. We haven't completed a formal assessment of
that program, but that is exactly the type of thing we need to
do as these programs develop, is to determine do they get stale
and no one is paying attention to them anymore.
I think, just some of the feedback we have been getting is,
transit agencies are getting lots of calls about looking at
suspicious packages, unattended bags left on transit vehicles.
So that message is still alive and is still out there, and
people are paying attention to it.
So at this stage of the game, I don't think it is a stale
message.
We have added new wrinkles to it this year, again, that we
want the agencies to start emphasizing not only the unattended
bags but getting messages out there about how to evacuate the
systems if it is necessary. I think that is particularly an
area where most people don't pay any attention to it; they
don't want to think about it.
Mr. Lungren. Yes, I mean, if you would compare that to
airlines, I would suspect most people, even though we kind of
have our eyes glazed over when they talk about us sitting in
the emergency exit rows and when they give the demonstration,
most people, despite themselves, are paying somewhat attention,
know where they are supposed to follow, how they are supposed
to go, and those sorts of things.
But I don't sense the same thing on mass transit.
Mr. Rosapep. Oh, I think you are absolutely right, which is
why, again, the new version of Transit Watch for this year that
we are just rolling out now is starting to put emphasis on the
agencies developing and communicating the evacuation plans for
their customers and trying to get the word out so they
understand how it works.
I think that is going to take some time. You know, every
system is a little different, so there is not one standard way
of how do you evacuate these systems. But I think some
systems--and Washington Metro, locally, is putting some
emphasis on the whole evacuation part of it.
I think, as we learn from some of these efforts, we can
exchange what works best between other systems across the
country. But it is a--
Mr. Lungren. Well, just a for instance, I would assume that
certain things that you do if you are in a tunnel are different
than the things you would do when you are not in a tunnel.
Mr. Rosapep. Oh, absolutely.
Mr. Lungren. And I am not sure that I have ever heard
anybody, when I go on a mass transit system, anybody say that,
explain to me what I should or should not do, as opposed to
when I just get on and you tell me, ``Look for suspicious
packages.'' It just seems to me to be a total sense of
unawareness.
I mean, we have all been in systems where they slowed down
in a tunnel and they announce to you that they have got a
couple trains ahead of you, you are going to have to wait, and
you sit there in darkness--well, you are not in darkness, but
it is dark outside the cab--and, frankly, your reaction is,
``What would I do if I were told to evacuate?'' I wouldn't have
the foggiest idea, I think most people sense. Whereas, on an
airplane, I think people at least have some sense.
And I guess what I am saying is there is a huge cleavage
between where we are with airlines and where we are with mass
transit, just in terms of public awareness and, I think, public
confidence if you had a crisis.
Mr. Rosapep. I am in agreement with you on the whole
evacuation part of things. There is a lot more work to be done
in that area.
And, again, the changes we are doing to Transit Watch for
this year is just the beginning, I think, of what needs to be
done.
Mr. Lungren. Okay.
All right, Ms. Sanchez is recognized for 5 minutes.
Ms. Sanchez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Last year, Chris Kozub of the National Transit Institute
testified before our committee on training for mass transit
employees. In his testimony last year, he stated that the NTI
and FTA's training had reached about 20 percent of the transit
employee workforce, which we believe is about 300,000 people.
And, as of today, that number would be a little bit more
than 30 percent. NTI is not even near the halfway point of
getting this security training done.
So may I ask both Mr. Sammon and Mr. Rosapep, what steps
have been taken to reach the remaining 70 percent? And in what
time frame do we think we are going to get these people the
security training we would like to see them have?
Mr. Sammon. Thank you. That is a very good question, and it
is one of the things that we are concerned about.
And, again, that is why we want to refocus the grants
program to make sure that the eligibility for the grants is
tied to training. And it may turn out that a large portion of
the grants program turns from capital to training.
But we do expect that the training component of this has to
be a fundamental baseline that people meet before we go off and
buy complex or other hardening systems or other security
systems. If the employees aren't trained, we think that they
are the front line and the first requirement before we look at
grants.
Ms. Sanchez. And so, what is the timeline? I mean, are you
going to get the 70 percent that still aren't trained at least
one training class by the end of this fiscal year coming up?
Or--
Mr. Sammon. No, I doubt that. I would say that you will
get, as people become aware of the changing guidelines, that
you will have more people trained.
The transit workforce is--the airline workforce, you are
dealing with a controlled environment. You have a controlled
plane, you have a controlled airport. It is much more
controlled. In transit, you have buses running all over the
place. You have stops. We haul, in transit, many more times the
ridership than we do in air.
So I would say it is going to take more time.
Ms. Sanchez. But you don't have any set metrics, any
milestones? You haven't even projected this out?
Mr. Sammon. Right now what we are doing is taking an
assessment. We expect to have, as an assessment, by the end of
the year, for many of the properties, to know where their
training stands and the types of training, whether it is
awareness training or response training. And we are going to
start there and use that for the grants process--
Ms. Sanchez. Let me ask a quick question before I have Mr.
Rosapep answer this previous question.
TSA employs over 40,000 people. We know that the majority
of these people are related to aviation security. In fact, from
the numbers that I have, only 10 people work in the mass
transit section at TSA.
Why are there only 10 people?
Mr. Sammon. There are 10 people in mass transit; there are
about 10 or 12 in rail. Each of the policy areas has a limited
number of people. The 40,000 people are largely baggage
screeners and passenger screeners that are out in the field at
airports--the screeners, their supervisors and so on. And that
is the majority of the expense that TSA has there. But--
Ms. Sanchez. So you are telling me that in TSA, most of
these people are actual people hands-on. And, while you only
have 10 people who are planning the mass transit section, and
you have 10 people in the rail section, so does that mean you
only have 10 people in management for TSA that aren't actually
baggage checkers or security checkers? I mean, what is the
number for the aviation component?
Mr. Sammon. That is a good question. The comparable number
of people in airports is five. The comparable number of people
in airlines is under 10.
So to make that comparison is not a direct comparison, but
the number of policy-planning people in airports and airlines
is under 20. And it is about the same number of people in mass
transit and rail.
Ms. Sanchez. But you have the same number for mass transit
in the entire United States, not per airport.
Mr. Sammon. No, no, no. What I have in TSNM that you are
comparing the 10 people from mass transit and rail, the 10
rail, 10 mass transit, I have approximately 10 for airlines and
approximately five for airports.
Ms. Sanchez. So you only have 15 in total nationally?
Mr. Sammon. That are at the TSA office that do the same
kind of work as the people that you are comparing for mass
transit and rail, yes.
Ms. Sanchez. Okay. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I see my time is over.
Mr. Dicks. I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Lungren. Okay. Well, we thank the panel very much for
their testimony.
You might be advised that members may send to you written
questions, additional questions. We would ask you to respond to
those in writing.
And we thank you, once again, for participating.
We now have the opportunity for a second panel, and I would
ask them to come forward: Mr. Ed Wytkind, Mr. John Tolman,
Chief Polly Hanson, and Mr. Edward Hamberger.
We thank you all for coming.
We have a distinguished second panel to discuss the issue
of front-line defense, security training for mass transit and
rail employees.
As I mentioned to the first panel, your written testimony
will be included in the record in its entirety. So I would ask
each of you to confine your statements to approximately 5
minutes for summary, and then we will take questions.
The chair is now privileged to recognize Mr. Ed Wytkind,
the president of the Transportation Trades Department at the
AFL-CIO, to testify. Sir?
STATEMENT OF ED WYTKIND, PRESIDENT, TRANSPORTATION TRADES
DEPARTMENT, AFL-CIO
Mr. Wytkind. Good morning. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ms.
Sanchez and Mr. Dicks. It is certainly good to be before the
committee. Thank you for providing transportation labor this
opportunity.
I think, after listening to the first panel, it is clear to
us that our government continues to do to way too much
assessing, debating, evaluating, studying, and hiring of
consultants to look at the problems. And we are now 5 years
since September 11th, and rail and transit systems really
remain unsecure still in America.
And specifically, to the topic of this hearing, I don't
really know what workforce our government and many of our
employers think they are training. The workforce that I am
talking to, the workers that I very recently spoke to about 3
or 4 days ago, very local representatives who are workers in
the freight and the passenger rail industry, they are telling
me that they are not receiving training for security. And those
that are receiving it are receiving it, kind of, second-and
third-hand, through videos and brochures and pocket guides.
And I have been listening for 5 years about how workers are
training. And it was interesting, in questions asked by the
committee to the first panel, it is kind of shocking to me to
hear the Federal Transit Administration say that they are still
assessing, you know, what needs to be done and how the training
is being done in the field.
I have a tough time evaluating what the gentleman from the
TSA said about the grant program and how they are going to
begin to somehow condition these grants on worker training. I
have no confidence in that.
The Congress has a chance to get the job done on worker
security training after 5 years since 9/11 in the pending ports
security bill that has now been expanded, or at least there is
consideration of expansion, to include rail and transit in
there. And in that bill, mandated training is what is pending
if the bill gets completed.
That is how you will get the next panel you have before the
committee, perhaps in the coming months, to be able to come
before you and talk about how workers are actually being
trained and how they are operating under a mandate.
Until that mandate is in place, I believe the problems that
were very adequately raised by you, Mr. Chairman, by Ms.
Sanchez and by Mr. Dicks--who, in a few exchanges with the
first panel, really pointed out just how little is being done.
And I heard a lot of double-speak and a lot of excuse-making.
And frankly, I have been listening to that for 5 years.
And while I may sound a little too hard-edged about it, I
have testified many times before the House and the Senate on
this very topic. And I started working on this issue literally
weeks after September 11th, and it is actually shocking to me
that we are still having a debate with our government about
whether workers should be trained to deal with security and
terrorism risk in the transportation system.
I think, Chairman Lungren, your comments about some of the
things that aren't being done to have passengers know what is
going on around them, to understand what they ought to be doing
in the event of an attack, it is not dissimilar to what I am
hearing from Amtrak workers and from mass transit workers.
To this day, at least 60 percent of mass transit workers
are telling their union that they are not getting any training.
To this day, Amtrak workers are still telling us that the
training they are getting is abysmal.
I looked at the video that the railroad industry likes to
tout and I am sure will be touted in a few minutes. The video
is appalling. It doesn't train workers. There is no guarantee
that they will know what they are doing. It is, frankly, a low-
budget video that multibillion-dollar corporations ought to be
able to do a better job of producing.
And worst of all, no matter how good the pamphlets are, no
matter how good the brochures are, no matter how effective the
NTI's training curriculum is--which, by the way, they do a good
job--if the workers at the ground level, at the rank-and-file
level do not receive the training in classroom-style
environment, with recurring training, with updated training,
with security briefings for workers, with the proper
communications tools--in addition to passengers not having the
ability to communicate by cell, the workers don't have the
ability to communicate with each other along much of the rail
system. I am sure my colleague, Mr Tolman, may talk about that.
So I had a lot of prepared remarks for this, and I did
submit a comprehensive statement. But the panel that you had
before us really deserve to be up here another 3 or 4 hours.
Because it is appalling to the labor movement that we are still
debating, 5 years after 9/11, about whether workers ought to be
trained to deal with security risks in the United States of
America.
I don't know why we are still there. I am proud to see that
the Congress is stepping in to try to fill the gap. But it
really is time to get the job done and have workers in this
country trained.
Thank you for allowing me the time.
[The statement of Mr. Wytkind follows:]
Prepared Statement Edward Wytkind
Chairman Lungren, Ranking Member Sanchez, and Members of the
Subcommittee, on behalf of the 31 member unions of the Transportation
Trades Department, AFL-CIO (TTD), I want to thank you for the
opportunity to testify today at this important hearing on security
training for workers on our nation's railroads and public
transportation systems.\1\
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\1\ A complete list of unions affiliated with TTD is attached.
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TTD's member unions represent hundreds of thousands of bus, subway,
light and heavy rail operators, clerks and maintenance employees at
transit, commuter and freight rail systems across the country, as well
as virtually all workforces at Amtrak. These workers are literally on
the front lines of our battle to keep our transportation networks
secure each and every day and no one is more vested in improving our
lines of defense against those who wish our nation harm.
Five years have passed since the September 11, 2001 terrorist
attacks on U.S. soil. In this five-year period alone, we have witnessed
four brutal, deadly terrorist attacks on major transit systems in
countries across the globe. The July, 2006 attacks in Mumbai, India
claimed the lives of nearly 200 people and injured over 700 more. Last
year, the London Underground and bus systems were rocked by a series of
explosions in which 56 people died and over 700 were injured. In 2004,
a bomb in a Moscow Metro rail car killed 39 people and wounded 129
others, and a coordinated series of detonations on four commuter trains
in Madrid killed 191 victims and injured over 1,500 more.
It is difficult to believe, but these horrific annual wake-up calls
have not been enough to spur this Administration to take action on
transit and rail security. Obviously, public transit and rail systems
are by their very nature attractive targets for terrorism--they move
masses of people, are highly visible and exposed, and are integral to
the smooth functioning of both communities and commerce. Yet the
federal government still has not stepped in to provide the necessary
funding, oversight, and guidance to ensure that railroads and transit
systems address their immediate security needs.
Transportation labor has testified numerous times before Congress
to chronicle the unacceptable security gaps that continue to exist in
surface transportation. Staggering funding deficiencies are just the
beginning--the fact that we spend $9 per airline passenger but just one
penny per rail and transit passenger on security is a frequently-quoted
statistic, but it bears repeating. In addition, vulnerable targets have
not been hardened, access control at key facilities is lacking, and
security plans by railroads and transit systems have yet to be adopted
and implemented with federal oversight. These and other shortfalls are
well documented in the excellent report, Detour Ahead: Critical
Vulnerabilities in America's Rail and Mass Transit Security Programs,
produced by Ranking Member Thompson and others on this Committee.
Yet today I am here to focus on one fundamental aspect of enhancing
security--employee training. Preparing hundreds of thousands of transit
and rail workers in the event of a terrorist threat or attack within
the U.S. is a vital component of surface transportation security. It is
common sense that training each and every frontline employee is a
highly effective way to secure and safeguard our transit and rail
networks.
Not only do the men and women who work on buses, subways, and
railways deserve to be prepared, worker training is also a sound
investment of security dollars. With the proper training, frontline
workers are well positioned to spot potential security breaches or
other warning signs of a potential problem. As the eyes and ears of
their workplaces, they are often the first to discover suspicious
activities or threats, and are the first to receive reports from
passengers. These employees need to know how to recognize a potential
problem, what protocols to follow for reporting and responding to
potential threats, and how to protect themselves and their passengers
from harm.
In the event of an incident or attack, workers are the first on the
scene--even before police, fire fighters, and emergency medical
responders--and what they do in the first few minutes is crucial to
minimizing destruction and loss of life. On the transit and passenger
rail side, workers are often called upon to evacuate passengers away
from an incident. On the freight railroads, workers are needed to help
mitigate damage to facilities and equipment. Training will allow these
workers to quickly and efficiently handle the security scenarios they
confront on the job.
It is well documented that real security training works. According
to a study by the Volpe Center, ``probably the most significant factor
in determining whether a transportation employee makes a helpful or
harmful decision during an emergency is training. Trained and alert
transportation professionals can make the difference between success
and disaster.'' Likewise, Rafi Ron, former Director of Security at Tel-
Aviv Bun-Gurion International Airport has testified before Congress
that ``training provides the skills and confidence. . .to employees who
are present at every point in the system. No one is in a better
position to recognize irregularities on the ground than the people who
regularly work there.'' We could not agree more with these strong
endorsements of training.
Even officials from the Federal Transit Administration (FTA) and
the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) have testified before
Congress on the need for and the inherent value of worker security
training. In fact, I am sure that in their testimony here today you
will hear those exact sentiments. Yet while statements and press
releases from the Administration say all the right things, too little
has been done to actually ensure that employees receive adequate
security training. The problem is not that good training programs have
not been developed. The problem is that if railroads and transit
systems are not required to provide security training, it will not be
universally implemented by systems across the country.
The National Transit Institute (NTI) has taken the lead in
developing voluntary training courses and materials that teach workers
to improve their ability to observe, recognize, and report suspicious
objects and activities, to be more aware of pre-attack activities, and
to spot the warning signs of potential threats. Tens of thousands of
transit employees on various systems around the country have had access
to some form of these training materials.
However, even this only represents approximately 30 percent of the
transit industry's total workforce, according to testimony last July by
Chris Kozub, Associate Director of Safety and Security at NTI. A recent
survey of transit workers conducted by the Amalgamated Transit Union
(ATU) also found that even five years after 9/11, approximately 60
percent of ATU members working for transit systems in the U.S. remain
untrained. Even the best programs will have no effect--and will not
enhance security--if they are not implemented and used to train all
workers.
This low rate of training is even more staggering given that the
NTI security training programs are available to transit agencies at no
charge. Even with the existence of free programs that can be conducted
on site and tailored to the needs of each agency, many transit systems
continue to resist calls to train their employees because of the
additional costs associated with keeping the buses and trains running
during training sessions. Certainly, there are systems like WMATA here
in Washington, D.C. and the Los Angeles Metro that have trained their
frontline employees without a mandate in place, and we applaud these
efforts. Unfortunately, they are clearly the exception rather than the
rule. In fact, WMATA is a unique case because, as it is located in the
nation's capitol, the system has received record amounts of funding
from DHS for security enhancements. Experience dictates that leaving
the choice up to industry does not lead to a sufficient number of
workers being trained. Congress must step in and extend this crucial
instruction to all transit workers.
On this point, I would like to note that this Committee included
language requiring the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to issue
guidelines on rail and transit worker training during markup of the DHS
reauthorization bill. While we support the inclusion of language in
Section 903 of this bill (H.R. 5814), this provision falls short of
requiring transit systems and railroads to conduct training. Instead,
we urge the Committee to support an approach, such as the provision
included in the security bill introduced by Ranking Member Thompson,
Representative Loretta Sanchez and others (H.R. 5714) to mandate
training. In addition, the Transportation and Infrastructure Committee
has unanimously passed a transit security bill (H.R. 5808) that
includes similar language requiring transit worker training.
The reality on the freight and passenger rail side is even more
astounding, where workers are receiving virtually no security training.
Rail workers continue to tell us that if they get any training at all,
it consists of a pamphlet or a short video on suspicious packages that
offers vague, and often conflicting, guidance. I have seen one of these
videos and it does little to teach workers how to be more aware of
their surroundings in and around rail cars, yards, and maintenance
facilities or how to spot vulnerabilities--and certainly not what to do
or who to communicate with about a security breach. The training
materials are not tailored to any specific job responsibilities and are
not designed to impart any specific skills--they simply tell workers to
be vigilant. There is absolutely no way that this constitutes
meaningful training.
Let me give you just one example I recently heard from one of our
members about why security training--and treating workers as partners--
is so critical. There have been several instances of bomb threats on
Amtrak trains, during which crew members were instructed to remain on
the trains without any information or knowledge of what was happening.
Passengers were evacuated from the train and surrounding platforms
while security forces conducted a sweep of the area. This is clearly
unconscionable from a worker safety perspective. But more broadly,
leaving these workers to fend for themselves without protocols to
communicate with law enforcement personnel or without a way to provide
assistance based on what they could have witnessed on the train also
creates a huge disconnect in our efforts to strengthen the security of
passenger rail.
We understand that Amtrak and the Association of American Railroads
(AAR) have partnered with NTI and TSA to develop a computer-based,
system security training program for all passenger and freight railroad
employees. Amtrak has alleged that at least 10,000 employees had
received this training as of the end of last year and that the intent
was to have workers do this training at their worksites during layovers
or after hours. Yet, I hear from our members at Amtrak that in most
places, employees have absolutely no access to a computer, let alone
the information of how to log in to the Amtrak intranet and receive
training. Therefore, if they are even being given the information,
workers are being asked to undergo training on their own initiative and
on their own time. And despite the claims that workers had received
training materials last year, most of our members received a pamphlet
on system security awareness--but it was mailed to their homes just
last week.
Freight railroad employees have had even less access to security
training--despite what you may hear from my fellow panelist from the
AAR. These employees work in tunnels, in unsecured yards, and perform
critical maintenance at facilities without restricted access, yet they
have not been told by their employers what protocols are in place
should an incident or threat arise, or should they see something out of
the ordinary. The lack of training for these employees is even more
intolerable since there is absolutely no reason why the freight
railroads cannot leverage the resources to provide real security
training for its workers. Unlike public authorities that are dependent
on government grants to implement training, these multi-billion dollar
corporations that are awash in cash can certainly afford to continue to
run the trains while paying for on-the-job training for its workforce
To the extent that the partnership with NTI improves training
materials available to rail workers, we are clearly supportive. We
caution, however, that computer-based training materials are a good
supplement to, and not a substitute for, a live training course.
Although an interactive computer program is better than being told to
watch a video, this type of training does not provide workers with the
opportunity to ask questions or actively apply the information to their
particular workplaces. Security training cannot be a one-time, check-
the-box exercise for employers. Workers cannot be expected to retain
and apply skills which they were exposed to one time for the remainder
of their work tenure and refresher materials are critical to make sure
workers are most effective on the front lines.
More to the point, one only need look at what has happened on the
transit side to know that even with the best programs available on the
rail side, unless frontline employees are required by TSA to undergo
training, there is little reason to believe that they will receive it.
My members find it difficult to believe that the railroads, who have
argued since 9/11 that mandatory training is too burdensome or that
training is already being done and therefore no federal intervention is
needed, have had a sudden change of heart. Instead, Congress must step
in and instruct TSA to ensure that worker training actually gets done.
Finally, I would like to note that this Committee is on record in
support of mandatory security training for port employees. Thanks to
the leadership of Representatives Reichert and Pascrell, an amendment
was adopted during full Committee consideration of the port security
bill (H.R. 4954) to require DHS to develop guidelines for a port worker
security training program. While the final conference report is being
negotiated as I speak, we understand that worker training language,
which was also included in the Senate bill, will be retained. Moreover,
a Senate Commerce Committee rail security bill was included as an
amendment to the port security bill during Senate floor consideration.
This amendment also includes a worker training mandate for the rail
sector. We strongly support the inclusion of training language for all
workers--port, rail, and transit--in a final conference report on port
security.
Arming frontline transportation employees with the knowledge of how
to spot and react to potential threats and how to protect themselves,
their passengers and their workplaces in the event of an emergency is a
fundamental, common-sense security enhancement. Workers must be treated
as partners in the battle to protect our vulnerable rail and public
transit systems, and only through training will they be prepared to do
so. I urge this Committee and this Congress to pass legislation
requiring security training for rail and transit workers and to remain
vigilant in overseeing that this requirement is fully implemented.
Thank you for the opportunity to share transportation labor's views
today.
TTD MEMBER UNIONS
The following labor organizations are members of and represented by the
TTD:
Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA)
Amalgamated Transit Union (ATU)
American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees
(AFSCME)
American Federation of Teachers (AFT)
Association of Flight Attendants-CWA (AFA-CWA)
American Train Dispatchers Association (ATDA)
Brotherhood of Railroad Signalmen (BRS)
Communications Workers of America (CWA)
International Association of Fire Fighters (IAFF)
International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers
(IAM)
International Brotherhood of Boilermakers, Blacksmiths, Forgers
and Helpers (IBB)
International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (IBEW)
International Federation of Professional and Technical
Engineers (IFPTE)
International Longshoremen's Association (ILA)
International Longshore and Warehouse Union (ILWU)
International Organization of Masters, Mates & Pilots, ILA
(MM&P)
International Union of Operating Engineers (IUOE)
Laborers? International Union of North America (LIUNA)
Marine Engineers? Beneficial Association (MEBA)
National Air Traffic Controllers Association (NATCA)
National Association of Letter Carriers (NALC)
National Conference of Firemen and Oilers, SEIU (NCFO, SEIU)
National Federation of Public and Private Employees (NFOPAPE)
Office and Professional Employees International Union (OPEIU)
Professional Airways Systems Specialists (PASS)
Sheet Metal Workers International Association (SMWIA)
Transportation Communications International Union
(TCU)
Transport Workers Union of America (TWU)
United Mine Workers of America (UMWA)
United Steel, Paper and Forestry, Rubber, Manufacturing,
Energy,
Allied Industrial and Service Workers International Union (USW)
United Transportation Union (UTU)
Mr. Lungren. Thank you, Mr. Wytkind.
And now the chair would recognize Mr. John Tolman, the vice
president and national legislative representative of the
Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, to testify.
STATEMENT OF JOHN TOLMAN, VICE PRESIDENT AND NATIONAL
LEGISLATIVE REPRESENTATIVE, BROTHERHOOD OF LOCOMOTIVE ENGINEERS
Mr. Tolman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman Lungren and Ranking
Member Sanchez and members of the committee. I appreciate the
opportunity to be here today, and I appreciate the interest
that Congress has taken on this issue.
I could almost echo my colleague Ed Wytkind's testimony to
every word he said. However, I did prepare a brief statement,
and I will run through it.
I represent approximately 70,000 members of the Teamsters
Rail Conference, which is made up of Brotherhood of Locomotive
Engineers and Trainmen and Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way
Workers.
The issue of rail security is of vital concern for our rail
workers and general public. And each and every day, we are on
the front lines of our nation's transportation system and see
the woeful lack of security on the railroads.
The lack of security is more than just troubling; it is
tragic. It is tragic because we have seen the damage that can
be done by these accidents on the railroads and shudder to
think of the damage that could be wrought by the terrorists or
sabotage.
It is frightening to think today that, after more than 250
terror attacks on railroads worldwide from 1995 to 2005?since
June of 2005, we have seen attacks in London, India. And in the
past 11 years, there has been only one successful attack in the
United States, and that is in Hyder, Arizona, on October 9,
1995. It killed an Amtrak employee and injured 78 other people.
This case has not been solved today. And more recently, there
have been plans uncovered--there were attempted attacks on New
York subways on three different occasions.
The frequency and severity of the attacks on railroads
worldwide and here at home demonstrate the urgency for change
in the way the rail security system works. However, our current
regulations are severely inadequate.
As you know, the Department of Homeland Security and
Transportation Security Administration spend $9 per day per
passenger on security but only one cent per rail and mass
transit passenger. This is a pittance when compared to the
number of riders each day on our nation's rail and mass
transit.
Each weekday, 11.3 million passengers in 35 metropolitan
areas in 22 states use some form of rail or mass transit. These
passengers ride over trains that cover 10,000 miles of commuter
rail and urban rail lines.
The very nature of the rail system makes it vulnerable for
attack. In addition to more than 10,000 miles of commuter rail,
urban rail lines, there are over 300,000 miles of freight rail
lines. These lines are open and easily accessible to the
public.
In response to these concerns, we have taken a number of
actions. For example, the BMWE and the BLET have drafted model
security legislation. There has been introduced at state level
in every section of the country. This legislation, we believe,
would accomplish, among?most important is training and whistle-
blower protection.
Also, in May, a meeting with the Federal Railroad
Administration Rail Safety Advisory Committee that two of our
state legislative directors made a presentation, currently
available with a locking device for locomotive automatic brake
valves. These locks that would prevent an unauthorized person
from moving a locomotive are already in use in some European
countries and other parts of the world.
Ultimately the strongest response to potential security
threats faced by the railroad and transit industries begin in
this House. And we applaud this committee for taking this issue
up. We would ask for your consideration for H.R. 4954. We
believe that that addresses some of our concerns.
When we did a survey of over 4,000 of our members, 84
percent of them said they received absolutely zero training
post-9/11. And that was in 2004-2005. This is a major concern
for us, and we look forward to working with you to try to help
correct this issue today.
Thank you very much.
[The statement of Mr. Tolman follows:]
Prepared Statement of John P. Tolman
Mr. Chairman, Mr. Ranking Member, and the members of the committee,
I would to thank you for inviting me here today to testify on the issue
of railroad security. On the behalf of the 39,000 members of the
Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers and Trainmen--and more than 70,000
Teamsters Rail Conference members--I would like to thank you for your
interest in this subject.
The issue of railroad security is of vital concern to all railroad
workers, including Teamster Rail Conference members represented by the
BLET and the Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employes Division
(BMWED). Each and every day, we are on the front lines of the nation's
transportation system and see the woeful lack of security on our
railroads. This lack of security is more than just troubling; it is
tragic because we have seen the damage that can be done by accidents on
the railroads and shudder to think of the damage that could be wrought
by terrorism or sabotage.
It is frightening to think that there were more than 250 terror
attacks on railroads world wide from 1995 until June of 2005. Since
June 2005, we have seen attacks perpetrated in London and Mumbai,
India. In the past 11 years, there has been one successful attempt to
attack a railroad in the U.S. and several more attempted attacks. The
attack in Hyder, Arizona, on October 9, 1995, killed an Amtrak employee
and injured 78 other people. The case was never solved. More recently,
plans were uncovered to attack the New York subway system on three
different occasions.
The frequency and severity of the attacks on railroads worldwide
and here at home demonstrate the urgency for change in the way our rail
security system works. However, our current regulations are severely
inadequate.
As you know, the Department of Homeland Security and the
Transportation Security Administration spends nine dollars per airline
passenger on security, but only spends one penny per rail/mass transit
passenger. This is a pittance when compared to the number of riders
each day on our nation's rail and mass transit systems. Each weekday,
11.3 million passengers in 35 metropolitan areas and 22 states use some
form of rail or mass transit. These passengers ride on trains that
cover over 10,000 miles of commuter and urban rail lines.
The very nature of the rail system makes it vulnerable to attack.
In addition to the more than 10,000 miles of commuter and urban rail
lines, there are 300,000 miles of freight rail lines. These lines are
open and easily accessible to the general public.
In response to these concerns, we have taken a number of concrete
steps. For example, the BLET and BMWED have drafted model security
legislation that has been introduced at the state level in every
section of the country. This legislation would accomplish the
following:
require rail operators to conduct a risk assessment of
their facilities, cargo, and hazardous material storage
procedures, paying special attention to storage within a
fifteen mile radius of a school, hospital, nursing home, public
utility, or public safety facility;
develop a comprehensive security plan, to be filed
with the state's Transportation Department;
implement a Community Protection Plan covering
security, training, and emergency response; and
provide for whistle-blower protection for all rail
workers and rail contractor employees.
Also, at the May meeting of the Federal Railroad Administration's
Railroad Safety Advisory Committee, two of our State Legislative Board
Chairmen made a presentation on currently-available locking devices for
a locomotive's automatic brake valve. These locks--which would prevent
an unauthorized person from moving a locomotive--are already in use in
some European countries and in other parts of the world.
Ultimately, though, the strongest response to potential security
threats faced by the railroad and transit industries begins in this
House. We believe that the disproportionate attention to homeland
security and concentration of federal resources in the aviation
industry has left rail and transit vulnerable. However, the Senate
recently acted to change that calculus, which we applaud.
The amendment included in the version of H.R.I54 adopted by the
Senate addresses a number of the problems regarding rail security that
were outlined in the Teamsters Rail Conference ``High Alert'' report,
which was based on survey responses from more than 4,000 Rail
Conference members employed nationwide. Rail workers, who reported the
safety and security measures in place on any one workday during a year-
long survey period, reported as follows:
94% of respondents said that rail yard access was not
secure;
83% of respondents said that they had not received
any, or additional, training related to terrorism prevention
and response during the 12 months prior to the survey;
70% of respondents reported seeing trespassers in the
yard; and
only minimal security training had been provided to
employees who have been warned that they could be the target of
a terrorist attack.
The vulnerability assessment outlined in the Senate bill would
address key areas that the Rail Conference feels are not adequately
handled by the industry, and requires recommendations that include:
improving the security of rail tunnels, bridges,
switching and car storage areas, other rail infrastructure and
facilities, information systems, and other areas identified by
the Undersecretary as posing significant risks to public safety
and the movement of interstate commerce, taking into account
the impact that any proposed security measure might have on the
provision of rail service;
deploying equipment to detect explosives and hazardous
chemical, biological and radioactive substances, and any
appropriate countermeasures;
training employees in terrorism prevention, passenger
evacuation and response activities;
conducting public outreach campaigns on passenger
railroads;
deploying surveillance equipment; and
identifying the immediate and long-term costs of
measures that may be required to address those risks.
The employee training called for in the Senate bill is one of the
Rail Conference's most sought after security provisions. Throughout the
country, railroad workers have established that their employers provide
little or no specific training for terrorism prevention or response. In
the High Alert survey, 84% of respondents said that they had not
received any additional training in terrorism response or prevention in
the 12 months preceding the survey; and 99% said they did not receive
training related to the monitoring of nuclear shipments. This lack of
training should be of critical interest to citizens who live near rail
yards and tracks. The workers who lack this training will be the first
ones to respond to incidents.
In the absence of training by the railroads, the Teamsters Rail
Conference unions have worked together with five other unions to
develop, on their own, a five day intensive Hazardous Materials and
Rail Security training course for members, with funding from the
National Institutes of Environmental Health Sciences grants. This
training is provided through the National Labor College/George Meany
Center in Silver Spring, MD.
We also strongly support the ``whistleblower'' provisions included
in the bill. Railroad workers should not--and cannot--be subjected to
dismissal when they provide security threat information to the
government.
Rail labor has long expressed an interest in developing security
training with Congress, the FRA and the carriers. We believe that the
version of H.R.I54 adopted by the Senate should be accepted in
conference, because--if enacted into law--it will provide us the
opportunity to do so.
Mr. Lungren. Thank you very much.
And now the chair recognizes Chief Polly Hanson, Metro
Transit Police Department of the Washington Metro Area Transit
Authority, to testify.
STATEMENT OF POLLY HANSON, CHIEF, METRO TRANSIT POLICE
DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON METRO AREA TRANSIT AUTHORITY
Chief Hanson. Good morning, Chairman Lungren and members of
the committee. My name is Polly Hanson. I am the chief of the
Metro Transit Police here in Washington, D.C. The Metro Transit
Police was established in 1976 with the mission of providing
the security of Metro's customers, employees, facilities, and
revenues, and preventing crime.
The recent bombings in Madrid and London did call for a
top-to-bottom re-emphasis and re-energizing of our entire
workforce on anti-terror emergency response procedures and
training.
We did work with NTI and FTA in the development of the
``Warning Signs'' video and the brochures that have been
referred to. And we do and have offered that training in
situations where there is someone, generally a Transit Police
officer or a trained instructor, to discuss what people see and
to re-emphasize the procedures. We also have this on our
intranet, so that nonoperational employees may view the video,
which has been shown in management meetings as well. And we
look forward to working with both FTA and NTI in the
development of the next series of trainings or ``Warning Signs
II.''
We have supplemented our existing training working with NTI
to develop specialized training for employees who maintain
escalators, track structures, buses, and railcars. And we will
be using fiscal year 2005 Department of Homeland Security bus
grant money to develop anti training for not just our bus
operators but we are going to share that with all the bus
systems in the region that feed into Metro property.
As the largest transit provider for the nation's capital,
we take responsibility in homeland security with the
seriousness it demands. Our approach to transit security
involves partnerships with our employees, our customers, the
Transit Police, and our other public safety partners.
In 2004, we launched a training initiative called
``Managing Metro Emergencies.'' It was devised and developed in
response to both the Madrid bombings and a tremendous amount of
criticism that WMATA received after we had to evacuate people
from a station because of a fire.
This training has provided training to over 2,000 regional
law enforcement, fire, rescue, Department of Transportation,
and Metro personnel. And it examines mitigating, evacuating,
and recovering from a major service disruption. The course puts
particular emphasis on enhancing the management of the
pedestrians and vehicle traffic.
And it was well-received by the region so much that
firefighters in the region demanded a ``Managing Metro
Emergencies II'' class through the Council of Governments and
requested Urban Area Security Initiative money so that we can
actually run that in a tabletop setting.
Also in partnership with the Department of Homeland
Security, we did have an opportunity to pilot and launch the
Behavioral Assessment Screening System training. And we have
hosted over 300 Metro Transit Police and regional law
enforcement officers who took this highly specialized training
to spot behaviors of would-be terrorists planning to execute an
attack.
We have an emergency response facility, which we opened in
2002, that is the only transit facility of its kind in the
nation that is available 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, to
train emergency personnel. It includes a mock train tunnel that
allows regional emergency responders to train for disasters
like smoke and fire, collisions, and terrorist incidents in a
transit tunnel environment.
And more than 8,000 firefighters, police officers, first
responders, FBI, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, and
the Pentagon police have trained at this facility. And it was
given the American Public Transportation Association's
innovation award in 2004.
The training facility also houses the nation's first
passenger rail emergency evacuation simulator, which is a
simulator which can roll a commuter rail 180 degrees in a 10-
degree increment, simulating railcar positions after
derailments.
And we use this rollover rig to train police, fire, and
other first responders, and of course have invited any of our
local colleagues like Amtrak police to come out and experience
that training. And the FRA is going to use it to assist in
evaluating interior design safety of inner-city and commuter
passenger rail cars.
We continue to be an active participant in regional
exercises. Last weekend we sponsored a regional drill that
provided an opportunity for region first responders to practice
their skills in a Metro environment, using our own procedures,
using a rescue train, testing communications. We have also
participated in the regional drills and exercises sponsored by
the Department of Homeland Security and the Metropolitan
Washington Councils of Government.
We think a critical component toward ensuring that the
safety that we conduct involves our employees and regional
first responders, and we also want to engage our customers, and
we have.
And, in fact, we encourage public announcements. And I
heard some discussion about that, the ``See It, Say It''
campaign, ``Is that your bag?'' But we also have monthly open
houses, where our safety, police and corporate communications
personnel do hand out evacuation information. And we have also
provided opportunities for customers to come, get on a train,
and learn themselves how to evacuate.
And in 2004, we launched a program called Metro Citizens
Corps that provides Metro-specific training, ranging from rail
safety and emergency preparedness to looking for terrorist
activity. And more than 200 citizens across this region have
participated in that training. And we will participate in
retraining in a drill this Sunday as well.
We appreciate the important contribution that training
provides, and will continue to seek opportunities to work with
our employees and partners, including the Federal Transit
Administration and Department of Homeland Security, to refine,
expand, and progress in the training arena.
I appreciate any comments that you may have, or questions.
And I would be happy to answer them.
[The statement of Chief Hanson follows:]
Prepared Statement of Polly L. Hanson
Chairman Lungren and Members of the Committee, good morning and
thank you for asking Metro to testify at this hearing. I am Polly
Hanson, Chief of the Metro Transit Police Department (MTPD) for the
Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (WMATA).
sBackground on WMATA and MTPD
By way of background, WMATA was created in 1967 as an Interstate
Compact agency through enactment of legislation by the U.S. Congress,
and by the Commonwealth of Virginia, the State of Maryland, and the
District of Columbia. The Metro System is designed to serve the
constituencies of the National Capital Region, including employees of
the federal government, the residents of the region, the citizens of
our nation who come to Washington to do business with the federal
government, and the millions of people who visit from throughout the
world.
Since the mid 1960's, there has been dramatic growth and change in
the National Capital Region. As population and employment in this
region has skyrocketed, the demands on and expectations of WMATA have
also grown exponentially. Each day we provide 1.2 million trips on our
rail and bus systems. We are the second largest subway system and fifth
largest bus system in the United States. Metro is widely recognized as
being critical to the operation of the federal government. Over 150,000
federal employees (45 percent of the region's federal employees)
participate in the Metrochek program. Nearly half of all Metrorail
stations serve federal facilities, and approximately 10 percent of
Metro's daily ridership uses stations next to the Capitol and Pentagon.
The Metro Transit Police Department was established in 1976. MTPD
is the nation's first non federal tri-state transit police force. We
have authorized strength of 423 sworn transit police officers and 102
special police officers. Our purpose is to prevent crime, protect
Metro's customers, employees, facilities and revenues and enforce laws,
ordinances, rules and regulations.
WMATA's Employee Security/Emergency Preparedness Training Initiatives
The recent rail/transit bombings in Madrid and London have also
called for a top to bottom re-emphasis and re-energizing of our entire
workforce on anti-terror and emergency response training. Many of the
industry's best practices have been incorporated into nationally
available resources developed in partnership with the Federal Transit
Administration and the National Transit Institute (NTI). Since 2003,
all of our bus drivers, train operators and other operations employees
have been shown the National Transit Institute's Warning Signs video,
which covers key aspects of system security for transit employees,
including what to look for and what to do regarding suspicious
activity, packages, devices and substances. Last year, after the
attacks in London, we began showing the video again to all of our 8000
operations employees. They also receive job specific security brochures
covering these areas. The Warning Signs video is also being shown to
non-operations personnel, and has been posted on our internal web site
for viewing by all 2000 non-operations employees.
We look forward to the next version of Warning Signs being
developed by FTA and NTI.
We are supplementing our existing training for employees with
additional terrorist activity recognition classes. WMATA has been
working with the National Transit Institute to develop specialized
training for employees who maintain escalators, track structures, buses
and railcars. The training will review the recognition of unattended or
suspicious items and unusual behavior. WMATA is currently using a
portion of its FY05 Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Bus Transit
Grant allocation towards the development of an anti-terror training
initiative focused on bus operators. Once complete, WMATA plans to
share the training with all the local and regional bus operators that
feed into WMATA's bus systems.
All of this training will serve to reinforce the need for our
employees to respond aggressively in these situations, but it's also
worth noting that our operations employees on a daily basis face the
challenging task of keeping a prudent balance between implementing
proper security safeguards and maintaining rapid transit service.
WMATA's Regional Security/Emergency Preparedness Training Initiatives
As the largest transit provider for the National Capital Region,
Metro takes its responsibility in homeland security with the
seriousness it demands. WMATA's approach to transit security involves a
partnership between employees, customers, the transit police and other
public safety departments in the region, and the federal government.
Our training initiatives designed to enhance both WMATA and the
region's emergency preparedness reflect these partnerships.
Beginning in 2004, Metro Transit Police launched a new training
initiative entitled ``Managing Metro Emergencies.'' The training was
devised and developed in response to the Madrid bombings as well as a
recent series of service disruptions that forced thousands of customers
to evacuate the Metrorail system. The ``Managing Metro Emergencies''
course has provided over 2000 regional law enforcement, fire and
rescue, department of transportation and WMATA personnel enhanced
training for mitigating, evacuating, transporting and recovering from a
major service disruption in our system. The course puts particular
emphasis on enhancing the management of pedestrian and vehicle traffic
after any evacuations of rail stations. The course was so well received
by the region that Metro will be offering a new more operational
oriented course requested by the region's fire departments.
Metro transit police in partnership with the Department of Homeland
Security launched another new initiative focused on prevention and
detection--Behavioral Assessment Screening System (BASS) training. 300
Metro Transit Police and regional law enforcement officers took a
highly specialized training course to spot behaviors of would-be
terrorists planning or executing an attack, and learned how to take
action to mitigate danger, including identifying the behavioral
characteristics of a suicide bomber.
WMATA's Emergency Response Training Facility opened in 2002, and is
the only transit facility of its kind in the nation that is available
24 hours per day, seven days a week to train emergency personnel. The
facility includes a mock train tunnel that allows regional emergency
responders to train for disasters such as smoke/fire, collisions and
potential terrorist incidents in a transit/tunnel environment. More
than 8000 firefighters, police officers and other first responders,
including the FBI, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, and the
Pentagon Force Protection Agency have trained at the facility. The
facility was awarded the American Public Transportation Association's
Management Innovation Award for 2004.
The training facility also houses the nation's first passenger rail
emergency evacuation simulator. The simulator can roll a passenger
commuter rail car 180 degrees in 10 degree increments, simulating
railcar positions after derailments and other rail incidents. Metro
will use the ``rollover rig'' to train fire, police, and other first
responders on the complications associated with rescuing people from a
rail car. The Federal Railroad Administration will use it to assist in
evaluating interior design safety of intercity and commuter passenger
rail cars.
WMATA also continues to be an active participant in various
regional exercises. Just last week, WMATA sponsored a regional drill
that provided an opportunity for the region's first responders to
practice their skills in the Metrorail environment, along with testing
Metro's own procedures for utilizing a rescue train. WMATA has also
sponsored a series of table top exercises with all key regional
players, including federal agencies, as part of our effort to enhance
continuity of operations planning (COOP) following the September 11,
2001 attacks. WMATA also participates in regional drills and exercises
sponsored by the DHS, the Metropolitan Washington Council of
Governments and various local jurisdictions in the National Capital
Region.
Public Awareness/Education Campaigns
A critical component towards ensuring that all the training we
conduct with our employees and regional first responders raises the
National Capital Region's emergency preparedness level is to also
constantly engage our customers. WMATA has increased public
announcements to our customers, stressing the need to be attentive to
their surroundings. Our recent public outreach efforts include
campaigns known as, ``See it, Say it'' and ``Is that your bag?,'' which
was cited by former Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Under
Secretary Hutchinson as an effective tool for raising passenger
awareness and involvement in the transit environment. We are also
conducting monthly ``Open Houses'' at rail stations during the morning
rush hour. During these events, officials from the Metro Transit Police
and our safety and communications departments are on hand to answer
questions from customers as well as distribute emergency preparedness/
safety brochures and expanding upon emergency evacuation procedures
that can be found at our web site: www.wmata.com.
In 2004, Metro Transit Police launched a Metro Citizens Corps
program that provides Metro-specific training ranging from rail safety
and emergency preparedness and response to identification of terrorist
activity. More than 200 citizens across the region have received the
training. Area residents who have received specialized community/
emergency response training within their local jurisdiction are
eligible to join the Metro Citizens Corps.
Conclusion
WMATA appreciates the important contribution training provides
towards enhancing our emergency preparedness and response capabilities
and will continue to seek opportunities to work with our employees and
many partners in the National Capital Region, including the Federal
Transit Administration and the Department of Homeland Security to
refine and expand upon the progress achieved to date. I would be happy
to answer any questions posed by the Committee.
Mr. Lungren. Thank you very much, Chief. Appreciate that.
The chair would now recognize Mr. Edward Hamberger, the
president and CEO of the American Association of Railroads, to
testify.
STATEMENT OF EDWARD HAMBERGER, PRESIDENT AND CEO, AMERICAN
ASSOCIATION OF RAILROADS
Mr. Hamberger. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. On behalf of the
members of the AAR, thank you for the opportunity to discuss
security training for freight rail employees this morning.
Railroads moved forcefully and comprehensively to improve
security immediately after the events of 9/11. We did not wait
for government mandates to develop a comprehensive security
plan. Indeed, immediately following the terrorist attack, we
created a top-level security task force comprised of more than
150 railroad customer and former intelligence personnel to
conduct an exhaustive evaluation of freight rail security
issues.
The end result was the Terrorism Risk Analysis and Security
Management Plan, a comprehensive, intelligence-driven,
priority-based blueprint of actions designed to enhance freight
rail security. I know, Mr. Chairman, you have received a
briefing. I know that the majority and minority staff have
received detailed briefings on this plan. It was adopted by the
AAR in December 2001 and remains in effect today.
As a result of that plan, the railroads quickly enacted
more than 50 permanent security-enhancing countermeasures, such
as limiting access to key rail facilities and information and
tightening up cybersecurity procedures to eliminate access to
critical information.
In addition, the plan defines four progressively higher-
security alert levels and details a series of specific actions
to be taken at each level. Railroads test the plan through
regular tabletop exercises and drills to evaluate it and modify
it as necessary.
Our security plan does rely heavily on the efforts of our
industry's dedicated and highly professional employees. They
are, indeed, the eyes and ears in the industry's security
effort. As was true of our overall security plan, we did not
wait for government mandates when it came to security training
for our employees.
The industry's focus has been on recognize, record and
report. The training has included what to do when an employee
sees a stranger, suspicious activity, or suspicious object on
rail property, to whom to report the anomaly, the need to keep
information about train movements and cargo confidential, and
the need to keep rail property secure and safe.
We began implementing an employee security training shortly
after 9/11 when the Class I railroads provided training videos
and printed materials to all employees.
In the materials, the railroads expressed to their
employees three fundamental expectations that are the
cornerstones of rail employees' responsibilities regarding
security: Number one, do not put yourself in danger. Number
two, report suspicious activities on or around railroad
property. And number three, do not divulge sensitive
information about rail operations to others.
Over time, freight railroads began to incorporate security
issues in a more formal fashion, for example, as part of
employees' periodic FRA-mandated safety rules recertifications,
as part of new-hire training, and as part of new-manager
training.
Many railroads have incorporated security issues into
employees' manual of standard operating procedures.
Moreover, as you heard on the first panel, all railroads
are compliant with the U.S. DOT-mandated hazardous material 232
security training for employees who handle hazardous materials.
More recently, railroads concluded the security would be
enhanced if rail employees' security training was more
standardized across the industry through the use of a common
curriculum. And that has been accomplished.
Much of the work was done in collaboration with the
National Transit Institute at Rutgers University, which
developed the interactive uniform security curriculum for
public transit employees. With NTI's assistance, we adapted
that curriculum for use by freight rail employees.
It includes four modules: what is security; vulnerability
risk and threat; what to look for; and employees' role in
reducing risk. The goal of the standardized curriculum is to
provide rail employees of an understanding of their role and
responsibility in system security, and how to implement the
procedures upon detection of suspicious objects or activities.
Also as part of the standardized curriculum, employees are
trained how to react to threats, which may take the form of
perceived suspicious activity, suspicious or out-of-place
objects or vehicles, evidence of tampering with equipment, or
warning phone calls.
Again, railroads do not expect their employees to play the
hero by potentially putting themselves in harm's way. Instead,
they are expected to follow company policies and procedures,
informing appropriate authorities of the situation, moving to a
safe location, and awaiting further instructions.
One hundred percent of all of our employees will receive
this training, and there will be a written record that they
have, indeed, receive it. It will be updated and renewed each
year. And it also includes daily security briefings as part of
the daily safety briefing.
The Senate recently adopted an amendment regarding rail
workers security training as part of the port security bill.
Thanks to the rail industry's proactive efforts, freight rail
security training efforts already include the elements called
for in that legislation.
We are proud of the success we have achieved in enhancing
security while keeping our nation's vital rail network
operating efficiently and safely. We will continue to work with
Congress, federal agencies, our employees, the communities in
which we operate, and other relevant parties to further improve
security and safety even more.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The statement of Mr. Hamberger follows:]
Prepared Statement of Edward R. Hamberger
On behalf of the members of the Association of American Railroads
(AAR), thank you for the opportunity to meet with you today to discuss
rail employee security training. AAR members account for the vast
majority of rail mileage, employees, and revenue in Canada, Mexico, and
the United States.
Nothing is more important for railroads than the safety and
security of their operations. Indeed, for railroads, safety and
security are interconnected: a safer workplace will tend to be a more
secure workplace, and a more secure workplace will tend to be a safer
workplace. That's why everyone should be encouraged by the fact that
the safety of rail operations continues to improve. By a variety of
measures, railroads are the safest transportation mode.
In fact, according to Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) data,
the rail industry reduced its overall train accident rate 65 percent
from 1980 to 2005, and 15 percent since 1990. The rate of railroad
employee casualties has been reduced 79 percent since 1980 and 69
percent since 1990, and in 2005 was the lowest in history. Through the
first six months of 2006, the train accident rate is 18 percent below
the comparable rate in the first six months of 2005 and is on pace to
set a new annual record, while the employee casualty rate is down
nearly 10 percent and is also on pace to set a new record.
Freight railroads are proud of these safety accomplishments. At the
same time, though, they are keenly aware of the tension between the
need for transportation efficiency and the assurance that our
transportation systems are adequately protected from terrorist and
other threats. There must be a proper balance between efforts to
protect against terrorist acts, on the one hand, and providing for the
free flow of goods and promoting our country's international
competitiveness on the other.
Below I will briefly describe efforts freight railroads have made
to enhance security in the post 9-11 era and address the specific area
of rail employee security training. In a nutshell, railroads expect
their employees to avoid putting themselves in danger in the event of a
real or perceived security-related incident; to report any suspicious
activity on or around rail property to the proper authorities; and to
refrain from divulging sensitive information on rail operations to
those who have no need to know that information.
The Railroad Terrorism Risk Analysis and Security Management Plan
Immediately following the terrorist attacks in September 2001, U.S.
freight railroads created a top-level security task force (comprised of
more than 150 railroad, customer, and intelligence personnel) to
conduct an exhaustive evaluation of freight rail security issues. The
end result was the Terrorism Risk Analysis and Security Management
Plan, a comprehensive, intelligence-driven, priority-based blueprint of
actions designed to enhance freight rail security. The plan was adopted
by the Association of American Railroads (AAR) in December 2001 and
remains in effect today.
As a result of the plan, freight railroads quickly enacted more
than 50 permanent security-enhancing countermeasures. For example,
access to key rail facilities and information has been tightened, and
cyber-security procedures and techniques have been strengthened.
Security awareness briefings were given to railroad employees, who were
instructed to maintain high awareness and vigilance and to immediately
report suspicious activity.
In addition, the plan defines four progressively higher security
alert levels and details a series of actions to be taken at each level:
Alert Level 1 is ``New Normal Day-to-Day Operations'' and exists
when a general threat of possible terrorist activity exists, but
warrants only a routine security posture. Actions in effect at this
level include conducting security training and awareness activities;
restricting certain information to a need-to-know basis; restricting
the ability of unauthenticated persons to trace certain sensitive
materials; and periodically testing that security systems are operating
as intended.
Alert Level 2 (which is in effect today) is ``Heightened Security
Awareness.'' It applies when there is a general non-specific threat of
possible terrorist activity involving railroad personnel and
facilities. Additional actions in effect at this level include security
and awareness briefings as part of daily job briefings; conducting
content inspections of cars and containers for cause; conducting spot
content inspections of motor vehicles on railroad property; and
increasing security at designated facilities.
Alert Level 3 means there is ``a credible threat of an attack on
the United States or railroad industry.'' A decision to declare Level 3
will be evaluated in light of the specificity of a threat against
railroad personnel and facilities. Examples of Level 3 actions include
further restricting physical access and increasing security vigilance
at control centers, communications hubs, and other designated
facilities, and requesting National Guard security for critical assets.
Alert Level 4 applies when a confirmed threat against the rail
industry exists, an attack against a railroad has occurred, an attack
in the United States causing mass casualties has occurred, or other
imminent actions create grave concerns about the safety of rail
operations. Security actions taken at this level include stopping non-
mission-essential contractor services with access to critical
facilities and systems; increasing vigilance and scrutiny of railcars
and equipment during mechanical inspections to look for unusual items;
and continuous guard presence at designated facilities and structures.
Alert Levels 3 and 4 can be declared industry-wide for a short
period of time or can be declared in a particular geographic or
operational area (e.g., the Midwest or hazardous materials) where or
when intelligence has identified that terrorist action against a
specific location or operation is imminent.
Railroads test the plan through table-top exercises twice yearly,
and evaluate and modify it as needed to ensure maximum continued
effectiveness.
Access to pertinent intelligence information is a critical element
of the plan. To this end, the rail industry is in constant
communication with the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and
elsewhere within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the
Department of Defense (DOD), the Department of Transportation (DOT),
the FBI's National Joint Terrorism Task Force (NJTTF), state and local
law enforcement, and others. A railroad police officer and railroad
analysts who hold Top Secret clearances work with government
intelligence analysts at NJTTF and at DHS to help evaluate intelligence
and to serve as subject matter experts.
Intelligence information, in turn, is disseminated through the
Railway Alert Network (RAN), a secure 24/7 communications network
operated by the AAR at the Secret level that links federal security
personnel with railroad operations centers. Through the RAN, railroads
and the intelligence community share information to maintain
situational awareness and immediately institute appropriate alert
levels.
Communication is also enhanced by the Surface Transportation
Information Sharing and Analysis Center (ST-ISAC), which was
established by the AAR at the request of the DOT. The ST-ISAC collects,
analyzes, and distributes security information from worldwide resources
to help protect vital information technology systems and physical
assets from attack. It operates 24/7 at the Top Secret level. The ST-
ISAC grew out of Presidential Decision Directive 63 (May 22, 1998),
which recognizes freight railroads as ``essential to the minimum
operations of the economy and government.''
Rail security efforts strongly benefit from the fact that major
railroads have their own police forces, and a rail security amendment
to the port security bill recently passed by the Senate would further
enhance the ability of railroad police to ensure rail security. This
amendment would permit police officers in the employ of one railroad to
exercise their law enforcement powers on the property of another
railroad. This flexibility could prove especially valuable in the event
of a national security threat involving an individual railroad. AAR
strongly supports this provision.
Notwithstanding rail industry efforts, there can be no 100 percent
guarantee against terrorist assaults, including assaults involving
hazardous materials (hazmat). If such an assault involving freight
railroads occurs, railroads have well-established programs and
procedures that can and will be invoked that are designed to respond to
and minimize the impact of such incidents.
In this regard, the efforts of emergency response personnel are
critical. Railroads assist communities in developing and evaluating
hazmat emergency response plans. Through their own efforts and the
Transportation Community Awareness and Emergency Response Program
(TRANSCAER), they provide basic training for more than 20,000 emergency
responders per year.
In addition, more than 20 years ago, the AAR established the
Emergency Response Training Center (ERTC), a world-class training
facility that is part of the Transportation Technology Center, Inc.
(TTCI) in Pueblo, Colorado. The ERTC has provided in-depth hazmat
emergency response training to more than 25,000 emergency responders
and railroad and chemical industry professionals from all over the
country and abroad. Most recently, the ERTC entered into an agreement
with DHS to provide critical training for 100 new rail security
inspectors hired by the TSA.
The ERTC is considered by many to be the ``graduate school'' of
hazmat training because of its focus on comprehensive, hands-on
training using actual rail equipment. That's why the AAR strongly
supports the Allard/Salazar amendment to the port security bill that
would make the TTCI a member of the National Domestic Preparedness
Consortium (NDPC), which is a group of premier institutions that
develop, test, and deliver training to state and local emergency
responders.
Rail Employee Security Training
Railroad security efforts depend a great deal on the efforts of
railroads' dedicated and highly professional employees--including
engineers and conductors aboard trains; maintenance of way crews,
inspectors, and signalmen working along railroad right-of-way; railroad
police officers; and others. They are the ``eyes and ears'' in the
industry's security effort, and we should all be grateful for their
vigilance and care. In terms of employee security training, the freight
rail industry's focus has been on ``see something, say something,'' and
keep out of harm's way. The training has encompassed topics such as
what to do when an employee sees a stranger or suspicious activity on
rail property; to whom to report the anomaly; the need to keep
information about train movements and cargoes confidential; and the
need to keep rail property secure and safe.
With 9/11, it became clear to railroads, as it did to firms in
other industries, that security awareness would have to take on new
importance. In response, Class I railroads soon thereafter provided a
training video and/or printed materials to all employees--in most cases
mailing the materials to employees' homes--that could be characterized
as ``Security Awareness 101.'' In the materials, the railroads
expressed to their employees three fundamental expectations that to
this day remain cornerstones of rail employees' responsibilities
regarding security: don't put yourself in danger; report suspicious
activities on or around railroad property; and don't divulge sensitive
information about rail operations to others.
Over time, freight railroads began to incorporate security issues
in a more formal fashion--for example, as part of employees' periodic
FRA-mandated safety rules recertification, as part of new-hire
training, and as part of new manager training. Many railroads have
incorporated security issues into employees' manual of standard
operating practices. Moreover, all railroads are compliant with U.S.
DOT-mandated HM-232 security training for employees who handle
hazardous materials.
More recently, railroads concluded that rail security would be
enhanced if rail employee security training was more harmonized across
railroads through use of a standardized curriculum, and railroads have
made that harmonization a reality.
Much has been done in collaboration with the National Transit
Institute (NTI) at Rutgers University. NTI was established under the
Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991 to develop,
promote, and deliver training and education programs for the public
transit industry. Freight railroads are fortunate to have been able to
take advantage of NTI's success in promoting safety and security in
public transit to develop an interactive, uniform security awareness
curriculum for freight rail employees.
The standardized curriculum has four modules: What is Security;
Vulnerability, Risk, and Threat; What to Look For; and Employees' Role
in Reducing Risk. The goal of the standardized curriculum is to provide
rail employees with an understanding of their role and responsibility
in system security, and how to implement their companies' procedures
upon detection of suspicious objects or activities.
For example, one module of the curriculum focuses on what system
security entails in a general sense--i.e., the use of operating and
management policies and procedures to reduce security vulnerabilities
to the lowest practical level, as well as a process focusing on
preventing all levels of crime against people and property. Under a
system security approach, rail employees are taught to realize that
they and their duties are part of a larger, extensive system and that
system security begins with the employee. To that end, employees are
encouraged to be observant and to be familiar with their companies'
policies and procedures in the event of a threat or incident.
Another module of the curriculum covers how to identify suspicious
or dangerous activities. In the case of suspicious individuals, the
focus is on behavior--specifically, where the person is, when he or she
is there, and what he or she is doing. Railroads know that their
employees know their daily work area (e.g., facilities, right-of-way,
rolling stock) better than anyone, and will be in the best position to
know if something does not look quite right or is out of place. Thus,
for employees, training emphasis is on being familiar with their work
area; observing and reporting suspicious activities and objects;
reporting missing or malfunctioning equipment; and, if appropriate and
endorsed by their railroad's policies, approaching and engaging persons
to resolve or confirm suspicions. However, rail employees are not to
approach threatening people; are not to try to intervene in dangerous
activities; are not to pick up, touch, or move suspicious objects; are
expected to withdraw from any dangerous environment or situation; and
are expected to report dangerous situations immediately.
As part of the standardized curriculum, employees are also trained
how to react to threats, which may take the form of perceived
suspicious activity, suspicious and/or out-of-place objects or
vehicles, evidence of tampering with equipment, phone calls or other
warnings, or other circumstances. Again, railroads do not expect their
employees to ``play the hero'' by potentially putting themselves in
harm's way. Instead, they are expected to follow their company's
policies and procedures, inform the appropriate authority of the
situation, move to a safe location, and wait for further instructions.
As noted earlier, the full Senate recently adopted several rail
security amendments as part of the port security bill. The legislation
now heads to conference with a similar measure cleared by the House of
Representatives in May.
Among many other things, the Senate-passed bill requires DHS to
develop guidance for rail worker security training to include
determination of the seriousness of any occurrence, crew communication
and coordination, appropriate responses, evacuation procedures,
psychology of terrorists, and situational training. Thanks to the rail
industry's proactive efforts, the rail employee security efforts noted
above already include these elements, and more.
According to the Senate bill, within 90 days after guidance is
issued, railroads are to submit their training programs to DHS for
review. We submitted our program both to DHS and to FRA for review and
comment in February 2006. TSA has reviewed the rail industry's training
program, and earlier this week communicated that it is ``relevant and
up-to-date'' and is ``helpful'' in ``rais[ing] the baseline of
security-related knowledge.''
Earlier this week, TSA dispatched approximately 100 security
inspectors to rail facilities throughout the country to observe and
evaluate railroad compliance with seven voluntary security-related
action items. Five of these action items deal with employee security
training.
Under the Senate bill, within one year of a DHS review, railroads
must complete training of all front-line workers, defined as security
personnel, dispatchers, train operators, other on-board employees,
maintenance and maintenance support personnel, bridge tenders, and
others as deemed appropriate by the Secretary of DHS. Even without this
legislation, railroads will accomplish this objective. Going forward,
rail employee security training will be documented and records of it
maintained.
As the information noted above makes clear, railroads treat very
seriously their obligations in regard to security and have made
sustained, earnest efforts to provide their employees with the tools
and training they need to react appropriately when security-related
issues arise. Moreover, railroads are not standing still in this
regard. Through their efforts with NTI and others, railroads are
continually refining their training efforts to improve their usefulness
and effectiveness. Railroads are also always open to reasonable,
constructive suggestions on how employee security training can be
improved.
At times, though, some rail industry critics, including some
elements within rail labor, are not always constructive or reasonable.
Members of this committee should be made aware that most major freight
railroads are currently engaged in negotiations concerning a new
national collective bargaining agreement with more than a dozen unions
representing rail industry employees. During this period of
negotiations, union leaders have at times engaged in self-serving
tactics aimed at the bargaining table that misrepresent the industry's
strong record of safety and security. A case in point is a recent
Teamsters-sponsored attack on the rail industry disguised as a
``study'' of security gaps on U.S. railroads.
Conclusion
U.S. freight railroads are proud of the success they achieved in
keeping our nation's vital rail transport link open following the
September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. Since then, railroads have taken
many steps to increase the security of our nation's rail network,
including the development of a comprehensive security management plan
that incorporates four progressively severe alert levels and the
institution of effective employee security training programs designed
to keep their employees safe while enhancing security. Railroads will
continue to work with this committee, others in Congress, federal
agencies, and all other relevant parties to further enhance the safety
and security of our nation's railroads and the communities they serve.
Mr. Lungren. Thank you very much, Mr. Hamberger.
I will yield myself 5 minutes for the first line of
questioning.
If I had to describe the impact of the panel, it would
remind me of an old movie that I saw years ago when I was in
college, and the refrain used in the movie was, ``What we have
here is a failure to communicate.'' I get different messages as
I go across the panel from left to right or right to left. And
I am just trying to figure out whether there is a failure to
communicate or there is something deeper than that.
Mr. Wytkind and Mr. Tolman, the message I got from you was
that there has been very little, if any, training of your
folks; that the quality of the training is not very good; that,
unless you have absolutely classroom-setting training as
opposed to videos or CDs or written material, they can't be
effective.
And, Mr. Tolman and Mr. Wytkind, both of you seem to
suggest?well, you didn't seem to suggest, you stated?that a
small percentage of your employees have actually received the
kind of training that we have heard about.
Am I missing something here? Do you have any response to
what was said by the chief and by Mr. Hamberger?
Mr. Wytkind. Absolutely. First of all, the comments--
Mr. Lungren. And try and keep your comments very succinct
so I can try and get folks to respond.
Mr. Wytkind. I will. And the comments by the chief, we said
in our written testimony that we applaud some of the work that
is being done by L.A. Transit and by WMATA to try to deal with
these training needs. It is still not 100 percent where it
needs to be, but they have made great strides there.
On the freight side, there is a lot of material being
developed, there is no doubt about it. We also acknowledge that
in our written testimony. The issue is the rank-and-file
workers are not receiving hands-on training.
And so, the questions need to be developed that need to
focus more to the freight railroads of, you know, how are the
workers being trained? Are they being put through rigorous
training classes while on the job, or are they just being sent
home with interactive, kind of, video/Internet programs?
Mr. Lungren. So it is not the question that the material is
not good. It is the question of whether there has been a
concentration of that in an integrated program to?
Mr. Wytkind. That is right. Although we can't embrace every
piece of literature because we don't get asked to provide
input. Yes, that is basically the fundamental problem, is they
are not receiving it.
Mr. Lungren. Okay. Mr. Tolman?
Mr. Tolman. Yes, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would have to
agree with my colleague. I mean, essentially they are not
receiving anything. Eighty-three percent of them said, in our
survey, they weren't.
But we took it one step further, the labor unions, and
developed a HAZMAT training class at the George Meany Center.
We currently do a class--we probably have about two running
every month--to train our members. We take this very serious,
as you do. You know, we have taken the initiative in our own
hand. Through grant money, we have done this.
But we are not receiving--our members are not receiving--
and I can't speak for the transit industry, because we don't
represent transit employees, and, you know, so I--
Mr. Lungren. Okay. Mr. Hamberger?
Mr. Hamberger. I had the same thought run through my mind,
as I was listening to Mr. Wytkind and Mr. Tolman, about the
failure to communicate.
One of the things that will come out of our effort to have
this training, which is part of the recertification process and
it is a very direct relationship between the trainer and the
employee, we will have a written record. We will no longer have
the discrepancy of whether or not the employees have received
the training, whether or not the training is acceptable.
We have submitted this series of four tapes to both the FRA
and the TSA last February. We did hear from the TSA earlier
this week. And what they said was that it was--
Mr. Lungren. I will hold more hearings, from now on.
Mr. Hamberger. Yes. That it was ``relevant, up-to-date and
helpful in raising the baseline of security-related
knowledge.''
We are committed, as I have tried to get across in my
testimony, to security. We understand the importance of
training of employees in security. We believe that this
training program is adequate.
And, at the same time, I will refer back to Mr. Sammon's
comments, that, beginning this week, the TSA is sending 100 of
their inspectors out onto the freight rail properties to take a
look at whether or not we are abiding by our commitment, which
we have entered into as an industry with TSA, to have rail
employee training. They are doing an evaluation and a survey of
that beginning this week. We will have third-party indication
of whether or not the training is being done and whether or not
it is effective.
Mr. Lungren. Thank you.
Chief, I respect everything you said. And maybe it is just
because I rarely ride the Metro here, but I do occasionally,
but I don't--maybe I am not attentive, but when I get on, and
if we stop under the river, frankly, I don't have a sense of
what I would do, in terms of evacuation.
Am I an odd person out on that, or do you think that most
of the folks who ride your rails do have a sense of where they
go if there is a problem?
Chief Hanson. I think some of the messages become
wallpaper. And I know our train operators make them because we
write them. And our spokesperson from the police department is
here, and if you go on the subway you hear her voice--if you
want to. People have iPods on; they are busy reading books.
And I know, myself, I have been accused of being mean
because I have suggested to customers that some of this is a
responsibility that they have to take. During an incident, I am
not going to be there to hold everybody's hand and show them
how to evacuate.
And that is why we have our information on our Web site, a
very dynamic display of how to evacuate. It is clearly posted
in a visual way that doesn't require as much reading, in case
English is not the primary language. And that is why we created
this--
Mr. Lungren. So that is where I would go find it?
Chief Hanson. There are a number of opportunities to find
it. And that is why we do do the outreach. And in September,
which was National Preparedness Month, we outreached every
week. But--
Mr. Lungren. I am not trying to be critical. I am trying to
figure out how we solve this problem. You have got our nation's
capital, where you have millions of people that come as
visitors. They don't ride it every day or every week or every
month. They come into town, they go on their--
Chief Hanson. Clearly they would have to follow the
instructions of the train operator. And I do agree that
training needs to be robust.
Once you watch this, this is about it. Then how do you take
it up a notch? And how you take it up a notch is by taking
groups of employees and putting them in practical situations,
and that costs money. And it costs overtime, because if the
train operator, the bus operator and the transit policeman are
in some training facility, who is providing the service? And
the primary mission of the railroad and the bus company is to
drive people around and give them a ride.
And so, there is a huge expense. And if you look at the
transit grants, listening to TSA say now they are going to make
everybody take their transit grant money, if you only get a
couple million dollars, poof, that is gone. And some of the
capital investment is necessary. And there is an expectation
that the public has that a transit property is doing
technology, training, public service campaigns.
So you have scarce funding spread around and diluted then.
And being able to provide transit grant money to do backfill
overtime is really what is going to help transit properties get
employees in situations where they are not having to watch a
video in the bus operators' lounge during a break and can
actually work with first responders in a situation that
replicates the stress and the immediate decision-making that is
required to act the way we need people to act when there is an
emergency.
I think the American public is not engaged because they
don't want to be, and particularly in this region. I think New
Yorkers, because it happened there, they have a recognition of
the need to be prepared that we don't sense in this region and
other parts of America.
But the American public does have to accept some
responsibility for what is going to happen in an emergency.
Because in the beginning moments, it is going to be chaotic,
and the first responders won't be there. And that is when it is
so necessary to be able to do what you need to do.
Which is why we took hundreds of CERT members, the people
we have trained to evacuate, participated in this drill where
we had a train under the water and we had to evacuate people.
And it took longer than we thought it was going to take. And we
used the cache of radios that the region has, and communication
wasn't what it should have been.
And all of those things, which just highlight once again
where we should be focusing our attention with our operational
employees. The train operator didn't keep giving messaging to
the customers. So there are issues.
And unless you really practice them in a situation like
that?watching a video is okay, but it is not really what you
want to do. But the industry doesn't have the money to spend.
And mandating that people spend their little bit of Transit
Security Grant money I don't think is going to get us there
either.
Mr. Lungren. Ms. Sanchez is recognized for 5 minutes.
Ms. Sanchez. I like this chief.
[Laughter.]
I don't think she said anything differently than what I
heard out of the people who represent the workers. And I am
sensing, from my standpoint, you know, I go up to New York
maybe a couple times a year, and I go up to the Bay area in
California maybe two or three times a year, and I am here. And
once in a while, I use the transit--certainly when I am in
those other cities. And here when I have to go anywhere off the
Hill and the transit can be used, I use it.
And, you know, I am actually one of those people who gets
on in the car and I look around and see who is there, am I
going to have any problems, you know, where are the exits. I
listen to what the guy is saying, and I read any of the signs
that tell me.
But you know what? These cars can stop anywhere: under the
tunnel, under the river, on top of a bridge or what have you.
And then what am I going to do? I mean, as a person who uses
these infrequently, I am relying the train operator.
And any different station--in New York, each station is
different. Some stations have locked stairways now because, you
know, either cuts or security problems. They don't keep all the
exits open, and it doesn't have a thing that says, ``Don't go
this way.'' I mean, if you are running through, depending on
what station you are in, you are running through, you don't
know where to run, you don't know that the gate is going to be
locked, if there is a fire going on.
So you do depend on the transit workers to keep their wits
about them, to know what they are doing, to stay there and
continue to get everybody out, except in the case of their own
personal safety. I can understand that.
But, you know, if they are not--I don't expect them to know
that off of a video. We take videos home all the time. We take
reports home all the time. And half the time, when we take
them, they sit there in the pile; we don't get a chance to read
them, for whatever reason. We are supposed to read them for the
next morning, and guess what? You are tired when you get home,
or you have to make dinner for the husband or what have you, or
vice versa or what have you.
[Laughter.]
So I am just saying that, you know, a video?
Mr. Lungren. Thank God for microwaves.
[Laughter.]
Ms. Sanchez. And takeout.
[Laughter.]
A video isn't the same as putting the time allotted to an
employee--not just once, but in the classroom, in situations
where you can see he didn't keep telling the people what to do;
it took a lot longer to get people out; the stairways were
locked where we thought they wouldn't be; or, you know,
everybody ran for the elevator, and the elevator didn't work;
whatever it is.
I mean, they need to do this, because someone like me, even
though I get on the train and I look around and I think about
what I am doing, I am still not going to know. And I need to
rely on those people.
And what I am hearing is that that just really isn't
getting done. And the employees want it. And I am sure the
chief wants it. But the money hasn't been dedicated to doing
that.
And, you know, the first 15 minutes of a disaster, whatever
it may look like, is the time when you save lives or you don't.
And that all comes down to who is trained and who is not.
So we have got to figure out how we get this done, Mr.
Chairman. If we mandate it, then we have got to figure out--I
know the farebox recovery rates. You know, I worked in that for
a long time. I know it is tough out there. So we need to figure
out how--if this is a priority, how are we going to fund it.
I would ask across the table, do you believe that the
federal government should mandate security training for rail
and mass transit employees?
Mr. Wytkind. Would you like me to start?
Obviously, from my testimony, we have been calling for a
mandate for some time.
And I also think there needs to be some consideration to
the difference between the private freight rail industry and
the public transportation industry in this country. I believe
resources need to be provided to the metro operators around the
country to help pay for security across the board, including
training.
But I also think, if you look at what the stock pickers and
the Wall Street analysts are saying about the freight
railroads, they can afford to train their workers. They have
got all the money they need to train the workers in this
country who operate and maintain the nation's freight
railroads. And that ought to just be a very specific mandate
and, ``You are going to do it.'' And then it needs to be
overseen by the Department of Homeland Security and this
committee, to make sure it is done.
Whereas on the public transportation side, I believe you
need to add some resources to it as well, because I do believe
there are resource issues in these public transit operators,
and they have to be addressed.
Mr. Tolman. Absolutely, I agree with my colleague.
I also do like the chief, as well. I like what she said.
You know, money, overtime, equals training. I mean, that is
what it is about. I just have to get my colleague, Ed
Hamberger, to agree with me.
You know, we have been in national negotiations with the
railroads for the past year and a half. You know what their
number-one issue has been? Reduce crew size from two to one, in
the middle of national security. I think, you know, it is about
the money.
And you are absolutely right. First responders, we are the
first responders. That is why we are concerned. That is why we
are doing HAZMAT training. I absolutely agree with you.
Thank you.
Chief Hanson. I believe it should be mandated if it is
funded and developed with consultation and involvement of
stakeholders, to include union personnel.
Mr. Hamberger. Number one, I appreciate Mr. Wytkind's stock
picks. I will be sure to call him next time I have a spare
dollar to invest.
[Laughter.]
Number two, I will not comment on what is being discussed
by those people who are negotiating across the table in the
round of labor discussions.
Number three, we did not object to the legislation adopted
by the Senate, as I indicated both in my written and oral
statement. We believe that we are meeting the requirements put
into the Senate bill. We believe that we are meeting the
requirements that DHS has asked us to take on, which we have
agreed to do on a voluntary basis and for which we pay.
And we are meeting the requirements developed by the
Department of Transportation, PHMSA, whatever that officially
stands for, and the requirements that that has, the higher
requirements for the movement of hazardous material.
Mr. Lungren. The gentleman from Washington?
Mr. Dicks. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Hamberger, it isn't mandatory, right, at this point,
for you--
Mr. Hamberger. The PHMSA requirements are mandatory, yes,
sir. That is for hazardous material--
Mr. Dicks. Hazardous material, but not regular cargo?
Mr. Hamberger. That is correct.
Mr. Dicks. Okay. Now, what would it cost the railroads to
train these people?
Mr. Hamberger. We are training them, as I indicated.
Mr. Dicks. But you haven't got--I mean, the numbers are
still pretty low, aren't they? These don't argue with the
argument that only, like, 30 percent or 20 percent of your
workers have been trained?
Mr. Hamberger. I do take exception to that. That is not
what my members indicate. But to set that issue aside, we have
adopted this more formal approach, whereby every employee, not
just those in the front line but every employee, will receive
the training. And there will be a written record that they have
received it when they receive it. So we disagreed--
Mr. Dicks. Well--
Mr. Hamberger. --on how many have been, but, going forward,
it will be 100 percent.
Mr. Dicks. I think what the fellows from the labor unions
are saying is that the training, thus far, has been inadequate.
They feel that--
Mr. Hamberger. That is their view, obviously.
Mr. Dicks. That is their view, that it has been inadequate,
that it is not sufficient. And, as I understand it, now that
they are going to make this mandatory, then the question will
be, how long will it take you to train all of your people?
And I am interested in the cost. I think it is important
for the Congress to understand the cost. And I agree with the
chief, that, in my view, the transit people are going to have
to have help here. And you can't take the money out of all the
capital funds; you won't have any capital projects. I mean, I
think we have to provide the training money on top.
Now, the railroads are probably going to have to pick this
up, knowing this administration. So what is it going to cost
you?
Mr. Hamberger. Could I develop that and get back to you?
Mr. Dicks. Yes. I think that is fine. But, I mean, it will
cost some money.
Mr. Hamberger. It clearly will.
Mr. Dicks. And is that the reason why it hasn't been done
up to this point?
Mr. Hamberger. Well, I would disagree with the assertion
that it hasn't been done up to this point. As I tried to
indicate, we have done training. We have adopted this--
Mr. Dicks. But isn't training just the video and the
brochure? Do you have any actual facilities where you train
people?
Mr. Hamberger. Indeed we do. I am embarrassed that I did
not bring it to the fore before you asked the question. We
indeed have the world's foremost training facility in Pueblo,
Colorado, a 56-square-mile training facility, which we operate
under contract with the Federal Railroad Administration.
Our hazardous materials emergency response teams are
trained there. We train a number of emergency response units
from around the country. In fact, many of our customers--Dow
and DuPont--send their emergency response teams to Pueblo for
training. And we do that--our own employees, obviously, we pay
for.
And if I can put a plug in, Senator Salazar did put in the
port security bill an amendment making Pueblo eligible as the
national defense preparedness curriculum for funding. Under
questioning, the Department of Homeland Security admitted that
there is a basic flaw in that program, in that there is nowhere
to have people train on the ground, hands on, in dealing with
exploding railcars and how to deal with emergency response for
hazardous materials.
So that is--
Mr. Dicks. Well--
Mr. Hamberger. --that is where we train.
And I think the--if I may, sir, the issue is not every
employee is an emergency responder.
Mr. Dicks. No, I understand that. That is why we were
talking about--
Mr. Hamberger. And so, what we are doing is training the
emergency responders.
Mr. Dicks. So you are doing the emergency response. But the
rest of it, you don't have facilities for, a special place
where you are training these people, like the chief does for
her people.
Mr. Hamberger. It is done as part of the training, the
recertification--
Mr. Dicks. Is it done on the clock or off the clock?
Mr. Hamberger. I believe it would be on the clock. Yes, it
would be on the clock.
Mr. Dicks. So you are paying for it?
Mr. Hamberger. Yes, sir.
Mr. Dicks. Okay.
Now, Chief, let's go back to your point here. And I
appreciate your candor and your directness in answering the
questions.
Am I right? Wouldn't it be better if Congress provided the
money for the training without taking it out of your capital
funds?
Chief Hanson. Yes, because, in fact, the congresswoman made
a comment about time. And the chemical detection systems--we
know, because we have one--does save time. And in the sarin gas
attack, it was a half an hour, 40 minutes, before they knew
what they had. When you have a system like that, it is moments.
Then you can shut down trains, stop trains from coming in, do
things with your exhaust fans.
So now if you tell people, ``You have a couple million
dollars, but you have to spend it on training, don't spend it
on your capital,'' people aren't going to be able to do
everything. And, in fact, they can't do much of anything now
with a couple million dollars, as much as cameras and other
things cost.
So if we are going to mandate training, it has to be
funded. And there has to be consideration for the fact that,
with operational employees, who, most of them are union folks,
it doesn't matter, operational or not, they have got to be
replaced when they are not there to run the railroad or drive a
bus. So who is going to shoulder that cost?
And the bottom line for the Transit Authority is that they
can't. They would like to do it, but they can't, because there
are other infrastructure needs--keeping the buses running,
keeping the trains up-to-date, repairing the railroad--that
requires that capital.
So if we are going to mandate it, it has to be funded.
Mr. Dicks. Well, I just want to commend the chairman,
again, for holding this hearing. I think the chairman has
leaned forward on all these areas. What shocks me is that this
is like so many other areas with homeland security, where we
are simply not doing as much as needs to be done.
And I think, as this Congress comes to its conclusion, I
hope we can keep doing this, Mr. Chairman, because I do think
it has a positive effect in getting them, Homeland Security, to
realize that they have got to do more to safeguard the American
people.
Mr. Lungren. Well, I appreciate the gentleman's comments. I
just would have to make one comment, however.
We can't gainsay the fact that we have spent, what is it,
$18 billion from the federal government on security overall. We
do need to spend more, but I hope we are not coming to the
point that money is the only thing.
Obviously you are going to have, in my judgment,
requirements that we have to spend more money. But I would hope
that we don't take the position that it is just a management/
employment issue or that people will not participate in
training unless they are absolutely paid or paid overtime or
double time or whatever it is. Because, you know, for God's
sake, you are talking about their lives too. And I would hope
that people would want to be involved in training programs that
train them how to save their lives and the lives of others.
And while money does come into it, I hope we are not going
to just put it down to a question of money. Because, God knows,
we will never have enough money to do everything we want to do.
And, you know, if the administration is taking a tack, at
least to begin the process, of leveraging money they do have to
try and get the potential recipients of that money to start
thinking about training as a part of that, frankly, that is a
good thing.
Yes, we would put more money to it, but if you have a
certain amount of money and you go back and you look at it and
you say, ``Hey, wait a second, we haven't paid enough attention
on training. Let's use the money that we do have to leverage
it''--not all for training, but, as they ask for capital
investment, we want to make sure that they have got a training
component--frankly, I think that is a good thing.
It is not the adequate--it is not the total answer. But I
would hope that it is a beginning.
Ms. Sanchez. Mr. Chairman, may I say something?
Mr. Lungren. Yes?
Ms. Sanchez. I think you are right. I mean, it is always
about resources and trying to put them in the right place and
getting the most you can. But I have got to tell you that,
again, if I am a rider on the system, I want that employee to
know what they are doing, because I am depending on them and my
life, to a large extent, may depend on their knowing what they
are doing.
And what troubles me is not that this would be a union
management thing. What troubles me is that these union
representatives are telling me, basically, that their employees
are not confident--
Mr. Lungren. Oh, I heard that, loud and clear. And we had
better answer that.
Ms. Sanchez. --that they will do the job that is required
of them and that they want to do to save my life.
Mr. Lungren. Absolutely.
Ms. Sanchez. And I want that employee to be confident that
he knows or she knows what they are doing if I am in an
emergency and I am depending on them.
Mr. Lungren. I agree. That is why I am heartened by the
fact Mr. Sammon said they are going to start sending people out
to the field to actually certify or to do evaluations to see
whether Mr. Hamberger's folks are doing what they say they are
doing.
Again, not a total answer, but at least moving in the right
direction.
And I know Mr. Dicks has--
Mr. Dicks. It has been 5 years, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Lungren. --Mr. Dicks has suggested that they do it on
the eve of the hearing--
Mr. Dicks. It has been 5 long years. And these gentlemen
have followed this very closely, and they see that the
administration continues to analyze and think but they don't
get out and do anything. And I hope the pressure of this
hearing, I hope at least they will start doing something at
long last.
Mr. Lungren. Well, we will continue having hearings.
And I want to thank the panel. You have been very helpful
to our consideration of this matter.
As we mentioned, members of the committee may have some
additional questions for you. And if they do, we would ask you
to respond to those in writing. The hearing record will be held
open for 10 days.
And, without objection, the committee stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:06 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]