[House Hearing, 109 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
MAJOR INITIATIVES FOR 2007 AND BEYOND
=======================================================================
FULL HEARING
of the
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
SEPTEMBER 26, 2007
__________
Serial No. 109-106
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/
index.html
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
35-628 PDF WASHINGTON DC: 2008
---------------------------------------------------------------------
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing
Office Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866)512-1800
DC area (202)512-1800 Fax: (202) 512-2250 Mail Stop SSOP,
Washington, DC 20402-0001
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Peter T. King, New York, Chairman
Don Young, Alaska Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Lamar S. Smith, Texas Loretta Sanchez, California
Curt Weldon, Pennsylvania Edward J. Markey, Massachusetts
Christopher Shays, Connecticut Norman D. Dicks, Washington
John Linder, Georgia Jane Harman, California
Mark E. Souder, Indiana Peter A. DeFazio, Oregon
Tom Davis, Virginia Nita M. Lowey, New York
Daniel E. Lungren, California Eleanor Holmes Norton, District of
Jim Gibbons, Nevada Columbia
Rob Simmons, Connecticut Zoe Lofgren, California
Mike Rogers, Alabama Sheila Jackson-Lee, Texas
Stevan Pearce, New Mexico Bill Pascrell, Jr., New Jersey
Katherine Harris, Florida Donna M. Christensen, U.S. Virgin
Bobby Jindal, Louisiana Islands
Dave G. Reichert, Washington Bob Etheridge, North Carolina
Michael McCaul, Texas James R. Langevin, Rhode Island
Charlie Dent, Pennsylvania Kendrick B. Meek, Florida
Ginny Brown-Waite, Florida
II
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Statements
The Honorable Peter T. King, a Representative in Congress From
the State of New York, and Chairman, Committee on Homeland
Security....................................................... 1
The Honorable G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress From the
State of Mississippi, and Ranking Member, Committee on Homeland
Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 2
Prepared Statement............................................. 3
The Honorable Donna M. Christensen, a Delegate in Congress From
the U.S. Virgin Islands........................................ 38
The Honorable Peter A. DeFazio, a Representative in Congress From
the States of California....................................... 20
The Honorable Charlie Dent, a Representative in Congress From the
State of Pennsylvania.......................................... 40
The Honorable Bob Etheridge, a Representative in Congress From
the State of North Carolina.................................... 32
The Honorable Jim Gibbons, a Representative in Congress From the
State of Nevada................................................ 47
The Honorable Jane Harman, a Representative in Congress From the
State of Caifornia............................................. 52
The Honorable James R. Langevin, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Rhode Island................................. 42
The Honorable Sheila Jackson-Lee, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Texas:
Oral Statement................................................. 24
Prepared Statement............................................. 25
The Honorable Zoe Lofgren, a Representative in Congress From the
State of California............................................ 53
The Honorable Nita M. Lowey, a Representative in Congress From
the State of New York.......................................... 48
The Honorable Daniel E. Lungren, a Representative in Congress
From the State of California................................... 23
The Honorable Edward J. Markey, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Washington........................................ 45
The Honorable Michael T. McCaul, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Texas........................................ 37
The Honorable Kendrick B. Meek, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Florida........................................... 35
The Honorable Bill Pascrell, Jr., a Representative in Congress
From the State New Jersey...................................... 28
The Honorable Stevan Pearce, a Representative in Congress From
New Mexico..................................................... 30
The Honorable Dave G. Reichert, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Washington........................................ 33
The Honorable Mike Rogers, a Representative in Congress From the
State of Alabama............................................... 43
The Honorable Rob Simmons, a Representative in Congress From the
State of Connecticut........................................... 27
The Honorable Mark E. Souder, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Indiana........................................... 19
The Honorable Ginny Brown-Waite, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Florida
Oral Statement................................................. 50
Prepared Statement............................................. 50
Witness
The Honorable Michael Chertoff, Secretary, Department of Homeland
Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 4
Prepared Statement............................................. 7
Questions and Responses for the Honorable Michael Chertoff..... 56
THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND
SECURITY'S MAJOR INITIATIVES
FOR 2007 AND BEYOND
----------
Tuesday, September 26, 2006
U.S. House of Representatives,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:09 a.m., in Room
311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Peter King [chairman of
the committee] presiding.
Present: Representatives King, Souder, Lungren, Gibbons,
Simmons, Rogers, Pearce, Jindal, Reichert, McCaul, Dent, Brown-
Waite, Thompson, Markey, Dicks, Harman, DeFazio, Lowey, Norton,
Lofgren, Jackson-Lee, Pascrell, Christensen, Etheridge,
Langevin, and Meek.
Mr. King. [Presiding.] The Committee on Homeland Security
will come to order.
The committee is meeting today to hear testimony from
Secretary Chertoff on the Department of Homeland Security's
major initiatives for 2007 and beyond.
I would like just to make a very brief opening statement,
and hopefully it will set the tone for the morning so we can
move through this so that each member will get the opportunity
to ask a question and the secretary will get a chance to answer
those questions.
I have discussed this with the ranking member, my friend
Mr. Thompson, and it is agreed that the 5 minutes will include
both the question and the answer. So I would ask members to
make their questions as brief as possible so the secretary will
get a chance to fully answer it within the 5-minute time limit.
It is my stated goal and pledge to make sure we reach Mr.
Meek on the questions today.
[Laughter.]
That is the intention.
And let me, at the outset, also thank Secretary Chertoff
for being here this morning, thank him for his service. We
realize he has a very busy schedule, but I believe it is also
imperative that the secretary appear before this committee on a
regular basis. And we certainly appreciate you being here
today.
I would just make several comments, Mr. Secretary.
Obviously there have been some differences between our
committee and yourself and the department. That, to me, is
normal in a democratic society. And also the fact that the
department is now in its 4th year, our committee is in its 2nd
full year. And I believe that all of us are going forward
though, and tremendous progress is being made.
I especially want to commend the department for the way the
entire unraveling of the London plot was handled. It was very
important that, unlike in previous times when there was a major
news conference held or a major announcement made, the
secretary of homeland security, it was clear, was in charge and
that all the other departments were subordinate to the
department.
Not to be playing turf wars here, but I believe that, for
the department to be the effective voice for homeland security,
it has to be clear that the secretary is in charge. And that
was certainly demonstrated this past August. I want to commend
you for that, for establishing that priority.
Also I believe that your team seems to be much more in
place: Michael Jackson, Kip Hawley--we could go through a list,
obviously. And much more has to be done; I am sure you will
hear that from both sides today, what we feel needs to be done.
Certainly you and I have had some differences over the aid
package to New York and other areas around the country. But all
of that is part of the ongoing dialogue.
So I will now end my remarks with that, just to say we look
forward to your testimony, and yield to the gentleman from
Mississippi, the ranking member, Mr. Thompson.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you very much.
Welcome, Mr. Secretary.
Let me compliment the chairman on our new digs.
[Laughter.]
It is absolutely very nice. I appreciate it.
Again, Mr. Secretary, we are glad you are here. It has been
a while. In fact, it has been more than 6 months since you
testified before this full committee.
And a lot of things have happened in that time frame. We
have seen fraud allegations against FEMA; an uproar over
foreign ownership of ports; questions about contracting
practices and vacancies; faulty grant formulas that cut the
funding to D.C. and New York City, two cities directly targeted
by the 9/11 terrorists. And the list goes on.
I hope we can get a commitment from you to appear more
often before the committee, so that we can do effective
oversight on what some of us see as a still-troubled
department.
I hope today we can get honest dialogue on what troubles
the department, devoid of political speeches, euphemisms and
feel-good testimony that portray an unrealistic view of your
agency.
The truth of the matter is that the department has a long
way to go if it is to protect our nation. Yes, there have been
some bright moments here and there, such as your outreach
during the London air threat, but those remain overshadowed by
what we have left undone.
Overshadowed, for example, by the memories and lessons of
Hurricane Katrina and Rita. Two days ago marks the 1-year
anniversary of Hurricane Rita striking the Gulf Coast. Friday
marks the 1-year-and-1-month anniversary of Hurricane Katrina.
And from what I have observed, the department may be falling
back into a pre-Katrina mindset.
This shows in FEMA's continuing staffing crisis. Just a few
weeks ago, the GAO found that you still have not issued the
critical catastrophic planning supplement to the National
Response Plan. I have also seen the struggle of thousands in my
home state of Mississippi, who are still living in FEMA
trailers.
Mr. Secretary, America simply cannot go back to a pre-
Katrina mindset, just as we can't go back to a pre-9/11
mindset, which I am also fearful of.
Lately there has been a lot of talk about all the kinds of
security: border, port, cargo and chemical. The volume seems to
be turning up rather loud these days on the security rhetoric,
but I don't see the rhetoric, however, with the resources.
Just yesterday, The Washington Post ran a story on the
security appropriations bill in Congress, which, Mr. Chairman,
I would like to enter into the record, and it--
Mr. King. Without objection, it will be so entered.
Mr. Thompson. And basically, it said it is more style than
substance. We absolutely need to fund as many of our
vulnerabilities as we know.
Mr. Secretary, I know you would agree with me that our
homeland security efforts must urgently address 21st-century
threats, whether from man-made or natural disasters. That is
why today I ask you to help me help you.
Help me help you by telling us what we need to do to secure
our nation against 21st-century threats. Help me help you by
telling us what remains left to be done and by not giving us
another laundry list of the department's perceived successes.
We get the press releases and don't need to have a hearing to
read them or have you recite them back to us.
Mr. Secretary, help me help you by talking frankly about
what it will cost to implement some vitally important but badly
overdue security initiatives. Help me help you, and together we
all will help the American people.
I yield back the balance of my time.
Prepared Statement of the Honorable Bennie G. Thompson
Mr. Secretary, we're glad to have you here. It's been a while since
we've seen you. In fact, it has been more than six months since you've
testified before this Full Committee--and a lot has happened in that
time frame. We've seen. . . fraud allegations against FEMA, an uproar
over foreign ownership of ports, questions about contracting practices
and key leadership vacancies, faulty grant formulas that cut funding to
DC and New York City-the two cities directly targeted by the 9/11
terrorists. . . And the list goes on and on. . .
Moving forward--I hope I can get a commitment from you to appear
more often before this Committee so that we can conduct more effective
oversight over a still-troubled Department. I hope today that we have
an honest dialogue of what troubles the Department--devoid of political
speech, euphemisms, and feel-good testimony that portray an unrealistic
view of your agency.
The truth of the matter is that the Department has a long way to go
if it is to protect our nation. Yes, there have been some bright
moments here and there--such as your outreach during the London air
threat--but those instances remain overshadowed by what has been left
undone. Overshadowed, for example, by the memories and lessons of
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.
Two days ago marks the one year anniversary of Hurricane Rita
striking the Gulf Coast. Friday marks the one year, one month
anniversary of Katrina. And, from what I've observed, the Department
may be falling back into a pre-Katrina mindset. This shows in FEMA's
continuing staffing crisis. Just a few weeks ago, the GAO found that
you still have not issued the crucial catastrophic planning supplement
to the National Response Plan. I've also seen the struggle of thousands
in my home state of Mississippi who are still living in FEMA trailers.
Mr. Secretary, America simply cannot go back to a pre-Katrina mindset.
Just as we can't go back to a pre-9/11-mindset, which I'm also
fearful of. Lately, there has been a lot of talk about all kinds of
security--border, port, cargo, and chemical. The volume seems to be
turned up rather loud these days on the security rhetoric. What I don't
see in the rhetoric, however, are the resources.
Just yesterday, the Washington Post ran this story, on the security
appropriations bill in Congress, which I would like to enter into the
record as part of my testimony. For those who can't read the headline,
it says--Homeland Security Bill Is More Style than Substance, Analysts
Say. The article points out, for example, that the bill only pays for
at most a little more than half of the 700 mile fence that so many of
my colleagues felt the need to re-vote on two weeks ago because of its
alleged necessity to our border efforts. The article quotes a Heritage
Foundation scholar as saying, ``most of it, quite frankly, is a lot of
political theater.''
Upon reading the article, I wanted to say to those who are
advocating last minute security initiatives in these final weeks ``show
me the money.'' Otherwise, we will continue to just have the ``security
on the cheap'' approach that is leaving our nation vulnerable.
Mr. Secretary, I know you would agree with me that our homeland
security efforts must urgently address 21st century threats--whether
from man-made or natural dangers. That is why today, I ask you to
``help me help you.'' Help me help you by telling us what we need to do
to secure our nation against 21st century threats. Help me help you by
telling us what remains left to be done and by not giving us another
laundry-list of the Department's perceived successes. We get the press
releases and don't need to have a hearing to read them or have you
recite them back to us. Mr. Secretary, help me help you by talking
frankly about what it will really cost to implement some vitally
important--but badly overdue--security initiatives. Help me help you
and together we'll all help the American people.
Mr. King. I thank the gentleman from Mississippi.
And, again, I remind members of the committee that, under
our rules, opening statements are limited to the chair and
ranking member. However, all members are entitled to submit
written opening statements for the record.
Due to our time constraints today, we will move immediately
to the testimony from our witness. And, as I mentioned before,
our witness today is the Honorable Michael Chertoff, secretary
of the Department of Homeland Security. And I now recognize
Secretary Chertoff.
Secretary Chertoff?
STATEMENT OF HON. MICHAEL CHERTOFF, SECRETARY, U.S. DEPARTMENT
OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Secretary Chertoff. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you,
Ranking Member Thompson and members of the committee. I
appreciate the opportunity to testify before you.
And I agree with what Ranking Member Thompson said a few
moments ago. This should be an honest and open dialogue about
what we have accomplished and what we continue to need to do in
order to make sure that we complete the job that everybody here
wants to get done.
I think this is an area where everybody is on the same page
and has the same objective. We want to make this country as
secure as possible, but of course without sacrificing our way
of life or our fundamental freedoms.
And while there may be differences of opinion about the
best way to achieve some of these goals, I don't think that
anybody should have a doubt about our being united on the fact
that we do want to achieve a good result for the American
people.
I would say that there are three basic principles that I
want to rely upon in talking about where we have come and where
we need to go over the next year.
The first is I think we have to be realistic. We have to be
realistic about what resources we have, what the constraints
are in what we can do, but also about the urgent need to
address the issue of terrorism, which remains very much a
serious threat against the American people.
There is no question that we are safer now than we have
ever been against the threat of terror. But it is also without
a doubt that the enemy is continuing to adapt and change, and
we have to not only keep pace but we have to stay ahead of
them.
And that is our challenge, is not to become complacent or
rest upon the fact that we have not been successfully attacked
in the past 5 years, but to look ahead for the next 5 years, to
make sure that there is no success for the enemy over that
period of time as well.
Second, we have to constantly challenge ourselves and our
assumptions through a dialogue. I am the last person to say
that I am the repository of all the received wisdom on homeland
security. I am willing to listen to constructive suggestions
and adopt those that are appropriate. And I think we need to
continue to move forward in that spirit of constructive
engagement.
And finally, I think we need to have a clear strategy about
where we are headed. And what I want to do today, both in my
first statement, which I ask be made part of the record, and in
my oral testimony, is address that strategy.
Let me divide what we have to do into five general
categories.
First, we have to screen bad people out of the country.
That is a critical listen that we all learned on September
11th.
We have made some very significant steps in that regard. We
have unified watchlists. We now have the ability to keep people
that we know to be terrorists from crossing our borders and
entering the country to do us harm. Every day our border
inspectors and Border Patrol agents are turning away dangerous
people from entering this country.
But we also have to confront the challenge of the unknown
terrorist, the person who is a threat but whose identity we
have not yet been able to uncover.
And we can address that in two ways: one by collecting a
little bit more information about individuals and their travel
pattern and their communications and who pays for their
tickets; and the second by using the fingerprint, which
everybody who watches television knows is probably still the
best forensic tool that people have in identifying those who
have done bad things in the past.
And so, our strategy, moving forward, is to leverage on
both of those capabilities: increased information about people
who are potential threats to the country and increased use of
biometric identifiers like fingerprints.
For that reason, we are currently engaged with the European
Union in moving forward with respect to passenger name record
data--that is, the additional data accumulated by the airlines
for international travelers that we can use, if we are
permitted to, applied against our databases, to identify those
who have had tickets paid for by terrorists or who have been in
communication with terrorists or who have been travelling with
terrorists.
And I am optimistic, but also very determined, to make sure
that, as we move forward with the Europeans over the next year,
we have the permission and the ability to use this kind of
information with our databases to increase the level of
protection against people who are perhaps not yet identified as
threats but who are very much real threats if we look at their
background.
Second, and perhaps even more important, this fall we are
going to begin to deploy our 10-fingerprint-capture machines
that will allow us to capture from people who seek visas to
enter the U.S. and who enter our ports of entry not only the
two fingerprints we currently collect with our U.S.-VISIT
program but all 10 fingerprints.
What that will enable us to do is to run the fingerprints
of every non-American entering the United States against a
database of latent fingerprints collected from safe houses and
battlefields and bomb fragments all over the world.
What it means when we get this system fully deployed, which
I anticipate and expect to do over the next couple of years, is
that every terrorist, even if their name is not known to us,
who has ever been in a safe house or who has ever built a bomb
or who has ever been on a battlefield carrying arms against the
U.S. will have to wonder whether we have got their
fingerprints. Because if we have those fingerprints, we will
catch them when they cross the American border.
And that will be a huge, giant step forward in raising our
defense against bad people coming into this country.
The second area we have to focus on is screening cargo. I
am pleased, of course, that there is a port bill that this
House passed that I think is an excellent bill. I know it is
currently entering into the conference phase. And that is one
dimension of the steps forward we are taking in screening bad
cargo out of the country.
We are intending to collect more and more data about cargo.
We expect to have deployed by the end of this year radiation
portal monitors that cover 80 percent of the container cargo
coming into this country. And we will be at almost 100 percent
by the end of next year.
These are big steps forward, but we want to continue moving
forward in that line, including by promoting screening overseas
as rapidly as we can accomplish it and working with our foreign
allies in the private sector to get that done.
Third, as you have pointed out, Mr. Chairman, we are doing
a lot more with respect to airline security, but we are also
doing quite a bit more with respect to rail security and other
modes of infrastructure protection, as evidenced most recently
by the announcement yesterday of almost $400 million in
transportation infrastructure grants.
The fourth area is intelligence and information-sharing,
where we have not only achieved the level of information-
sharing unheralded in this past year, but where we are now
working very closely with our major state and local
stakeholders to make sure that our vertical information-
sharing, including embedding information analysts in local
information fusion centers, is progressing as a very high
priority.
Finally, let me talk about preparedness and response. We
have undertaken a major retooling of FEMA, which gives us
capabilities that this agency has never had before.
And I am pleased to tell you, Mr. Thompson, that the GAO
was wrong in saying that we haven't issued the catastrophic
incident supplement, because I actually signed it a couple of
months ago. And I think GAO might have been a little bit behind
in its information.
Finally, let me observe that there are three areas where I
think Congress is well on its way to helping us make this
country safer.
The first is in the area of chemical security. I
understand, although I haven't seen the final language, that
there is action that has been taken on that, with respect to
the appropriation legislation that is currently before the
Congress. I think the ability to give us the power to issue
interim regulations will be a very, very important tool, and we
intend to deploy it as soon as Congress gives us the power to
do so.
Second, if Congress is able to pass a port-centered
security bill, I think that is going to be a big step forward,
in terms of giving us some additional tools to continue to do
the job we are doing.
And finally, in the area of immigration, I want to commend
the House for passing legislation last week to address the
issue of what I call stale injunctions--injunctions that are
inhibiting our ability to rapidly address the issue of illegal
migration. The work of this House in passing that so-called
Orantes legislation has been very helpful to us. And if it
passes the full Congress, we look forward to implementing that
tool as well.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member Thompson. And I
look forward to answering your questions.
[The statement of Secretary Chertoff follows:]
Prepared Statement of the Honorable Michael Chertoff
INTRODUCTION
Chairman King, Ranking Member Thompson, and Members of the
Committee: I appreciate the opportunity to appear before the Committee
today to discuss the Department of Homeland Security's key priorities
for 2007 and for the years to come.
At the outset, I'd like to thank the Committee for its ongoing
leadership and support, particularly your efforts over the past year to
move forward on critical legislation that will ensure our Department
has the resources and authority needed to protect our ports, our
borders, and our chemical facilities.
Of course, two weeks ago our nation observed an important milestone
by commemorating the five year anniversary of the 9/11 attacks. We
paused to remember the unimaginable evil of the 19 hijackers that
turned our commercial aircraft into Weapons of Mass Destruction. We
honored the lives of the 3,000 innocent men, women, and children who
were murdered in cold blood on that day, including the first responders
who gave their own lives trying to save them. We also reflected on the
actions taken since 9/11, both at home and abroad, to prevent further
attacks and to keep Americans safe from harm.
Over the past five years, our nation has made substantial progress
to protect the homeland against another terrorist attack, and we have
done so in a way that respects the freedoms, liberties, and way of life
cherished by all Americans.
We have transformed how we screen visitors and cargo entering our
country. We have boosted border security, adding more boots on the
ground and new detection capabilities. We've protected critical
infrastructure through new programs, partnerships, and cutting-edge
technology. We've refashioned our intelligence community to ensure a
two-way flow of information across all levels of government and the
private sector. And we've strengthened emergency preparedness and
response.
For all of these reasons, our nation is safer today than prior to
9/11. But we know that our work is not yet done. We must continue to
identify and close security gaps. We must continue to manage risk and
prioritize our resources according to threats, vulnerabilities, and
consequences. We must expand partnerships across federal, state,
tribal, and local governments, as well as the private sector and the
international community. And we must continue to enhance protection
without creating a fortress state, bankrupting our country, or
destroying the systems we are trying to protect.
OVERVIEW OF PRIORITIES
Our priority focus at the Department of Homeland Security remains
preventing those events that pose the greatest potential consequences
to human life and the functioning of our society and economy. At the
top of that list is the threat of Weapons of Mass Destruction, which if
used, would have shattering consequences. Preventing the introduction
and use of such weapons requires our priority attention and constant
vigilance.
In addition, we must continue to guard against infiltration by
terrorists, including those with the capability and intent to cause
significant harm to our country through multiple, high-consequence
attacks on people and the economy.
Finally, we must always be mindful of the potential for homegrown
acts of terrorism, including individuals who sympathize with terrorist
organizations or embrace violence as a means to promote their radical
agenda.
For this reason, we must not only work across federal, state and
local government to prevent domestic terrorism, but we must build a new
level of confidence and trust among the American Muslim community, who
are critical partners in protecting our country.
To address these and other threats, we will redouble our efforts
over the next two years across five key areas: 1) screening people at
our borders to prevent the entry of terrorists, criminals, and illegal
aliens; 2) screening cargo to prevent the entry of Weapons of Mass
Destruction; 3) protecting critical infrastructure, including
transportation systems and chemical facilities; 4) boosting
intelligence and information sharing to help prevent attacks; and 5)
strengthening emergency preparedness and response so that if we do face
an attack or major disaster, our nation can respond quickly and
effectively.
In addition, we will also continue to strengthen our own
Departmental management, hiring, and contracting practices so that we
can continue to attract talented senior-level leadership, meet our
workforce needs, and ensure that contracts are awarded based upon our
desired goals, including those for small and minority business
participation.
1. Screening People at the Border
First let me discuss screening people at the border. Our perimeter
defense depends on keeping dangerous enemies out. Since 9/11, we have
made substantial progress to strengthen screening capabilities at our
ports of entry and boost our physical and technological presence
between the ports of entry.
Ports of Entry
At ports of entry, we have integrated counter-terror fingerprint
databases. Working with the State Department, we have dramatically
enhanced the information available to visa adjudicators and created
better links between visa and port of entry processes.
As important, we have implemented US-VISIT biometric entry
capabilities at 117 airports, 16 seaports, and 153 U.S. land ports of
entry. Within seconds, we can now positively confirm a visitor's
identity by matching the visitor's two digital finger scans captured at
the time of visa adjudication against those collected in our databases,
and screening them against terrorist and criminal watch lists.
To date, US-VISIT has facilitated entry of more than 64 million
travelers and prevented more than 1,300 criminals and immigration
violators from entering through our ports of entry. US-VISIT also has
provided the State Department with vital information for identifying
ineligibilities for denying visas to an additional 1,000 ineligible
applicants. In addition, we continue to explore departure confirmation
alternatives at airports, seaports, and land border ports of entry
around the United States as we move toward fulfilling our vision for an
automated entry-exit system under US-VISIT.
We've also strengthened oversight and coordination of our screening
efforts across the Department through our Screening Coordination
Office. This office, led by a senior member of the Department's
original leadership team, will integrate the mechanisms through which
the Department conducts terrorist and immigration-related screening,
create unified standards and policies, and develop a single redress
process for travelers.
Advance Passenger Information
So what are our key priorities for screening people over the next
two years? First, as the recent London airline threat emphasized, we
need to be able to determine as early as possible who is trying to come
into this country from overseas, and who is trying to get on an
airplane that might do us harm. Under our current arrangement, we vet
international air traveler information a full fifteen minutes after a
plane departs for the United States. That is simply too late.
Our goal is to implement a system that requires airlines to
transmit passenger information well in advance of departure. This will
give us the necessary time to check passenger names and coordinate with
airlines and foreign law enforcement to interdict a suspicious person
at the departure airport or prevent that person from boarding a plane
bound for the U.S.
Apart from known terrorist threats, we also need to be able to
identify unknown terrorist threats--that is, people who don't appear on
any watch list or in criminal databases. One of our most valuable tools
to do this is actually at our fingertips--the Passenger Name Record
(PNR) data routinely collected by the travel industry when an
international traveler makes an airline reservation or purchases an
airline ticket.
Over the coming months, I look forward to working with the European
Union to examine options to share PNR data among law enforcement
agencies while ensuring adherence to appropriate privacy safeguards.
Secure Documents
A second area where we must accelerate efforts is the development
of secure travel and identification documents. We must develop
standard, secure credentials that give us a high degree of confidence
that an individual is not using false or stolen documents to enter our
country or access our transportation systems or sensitive critical
infrastructure.
A number of initiatives now underway will allow us to do this.
Under the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative, we are working with the
State Department as they develop a secure alternative format passport
for individuals traveling between the United States, and Canada and
Mexico. The card will be a secure, fully vetted, wallet-sized passport
serving as evidence of citizenship and identification, which will allow
real-time security checks at land border crossings and certain water
border crossings.
We are also working with states to develop standards for secure
driver's licenses under the REAL ID Act. Driver's licenses are one of
the most common forms of identification used in our country. We must
have clear guidelines for how these documents are produced, who gets
them, and what security features they must contain.
To protect transportation assets, including our nation's ports, we
are also moving forward with the Transportation Worker Identification
Credential. This credential will help ensure that our nation's port
workers have undergone the appropriate background checks, are
authorized to work in our country, and do not pose a security risk. We
expect to begin issuing cards by the end of the year, with a phased
expansion in years to come.
Five years after 9/11, however, some are beginning to complain that
these measures are not necessary or that they will cost too much. I
disagree. They are as necessary now as they were five years ago. Of
course, we must implement secure document requirements as efficiently
and economically as possible. We must also continue to work with our
international partners and allies to develop appropriate standards for
secure documents and to share information and intelligence, including
information on lost and stolen passports.
But at the end of the day, we must have the will to implement these
measures if we are going to heed the lessons of 9/11 and reduce the
risks for the future. Documents such as these will not only increase
security, but ultimately speed processing for travelers.
Fingerprint Collection
We also need to make sure we are able to exploit combined law
enforcement fingerprint databases to our greatest advantage. Critical
to this is moving from a two fingerprint collection system to a 10
fingerprint system for visitors to the United States. Taking all 10
fingerprints from travelers will allow us to do a more comprehensive
identification check and a more thorough search of existing criminal
databases.
The State Department will deploy new 10-print devices at U.S. visa-
issuing posts overseas. We will also begin deployment of these same
devices to our border ports of entry to electronically collect 10 flat
fingerprints.
Border Security
Of course, we also have made tremendous progress to secure the
thousands of miles of border between our official ports of entry. This
includes giving the men and women who patrol both our Northern and
Southern land borders the tools, technology, and resources they need
for this difficult, often dangerous job.
Border Patrol
Before 9/11, our nation had 9,000 Border Patrol agents along our
Southern and Northern Border. Under the President's leadership, today
we have more than 12,000 Border Patrol agents, and by the end of
calendar year 2008, we will have more than 18,000 agents--effectively
doubling the size of the Border Patrol.
Since 9/11, the Border Patrol has apprehended and sent home some
six million illegal migrants attempting to cross our borders. Of
course, we know the vast majority of these individuals are entering our
country for economic reasons. But if we can continue to control our
border in a comprehensive, intelligent fashion, we will raise the
barrier against those who would come into our country to do us harm.
Catch and Remove
Before 9/11, we did not have adequate bed space to hold those we
detained from countries other than Mexico. Too often these individuals
would be given an order to appear in court, and then they would
disappear.
Today, by expanding bed space and decreasing processing times, we
have essentially ended this practice of ``catch and release'' at our
Southern border. Now, virtually all illegal migrants caught at the
border are subject to ``catch and remove.'' This is a major milestone
for our border security efforts and meets the goal I outlined last year
to end catch and release.
Moreover, ending catch and release is having a clear deterrent
effect on those who would consider crossing our borders illegally. For
the first time, we are now seeing a decline in the number of non-
Mexican migrants attempting to cross the southern border. The message
has gotten out: if you are apprehended illegally entering our country,
you will be sent home.
Under the Secure Border Initiative, we are also substantially
implementing new technology, staff, and tactical infrastructure at the
border. In fact, last week we announced a major contract award for the
deployment of SBInet, which is our integrated system of cameras,
sensors, and other surveillance tools that will enable us to build a
21st century ``virtual fence'' across our border. SBInet will
intelligently leverage existing assets and lessons learned, combining
the best thinking, best technologies and best practices available to
mount a comprehensive response to securing our nation's borders.
Operation Jump Start
To support this comprehensive approach, the President launched
Operation Jump Start in June of this year along with state governors to
provide up to 6,000 National Guard forces to support Border Patrol
efforts along our Southern Border. This partnership has produced
immediate and substantial results.
National Guard troops are providing surveillance support, operating
detection systems, and working in entry identification teams at the
border. These added eyes and ears are helping Border Patrol agents on
the frontline more effectively detect and respond to illegal entry.
National Guard members are also providing information analysis,
communications and administrative support. This is permitting Border
Patrol agents to focus their efforts where they are needed most--on
detecting and apprehending illegal aliens and protecting our borders
against all threats. National Guard engineering units are also
enhancing tactical infrastructure at the border, further accelerating
an important element within the Secure Border Initiative.
The results of this combined effort have been significant. Working
as one team, the National Guard has supported the Border Patrol in
apprehending more than 11,000 illegal aliens and seizing more than
38,000 pounds of marijuana, 1,800 pounds of cocaine, and $11,000 in
currency. This is a major contribution to keeping our border secure and
our communities safe.
The National Guard presence also has permitted nearly 400 Border
Patrol Agents to move from ``back offices,'' where they were performing
essential support functions and logistics jobs, to the ``front lines.''
These Agents are now working every day on the border to detect and
apprehend illegal aliens, and seize narcotics and other contraband.
The Guard will continue to assist these efforts as we train and
hire the new Border Patrol agents called for under the President's
plan. This fiscal year, we have hired more than 1,600 agents and more
than 600 have graduated from the Border Patrol Academy. The additional
force multiplier provided by the National Guard will allow us to
continue to recruit, hire, and train additional agents while we protect
the border.
Injunction Reform
Despite this clear progress, we still have much work to do to
secure our borders. One area in particular where Congress can be of
immediate assistance would be to pass legislation that would end
longstanding injunctions that hinder our ability to quickly remove
certain groups of illegal migrants from our country.
One case in particular, the Orantes Injunction, dates back more
than two decades, to a time when El Salvador was experiencing a civil
war. The war has long ended, but the injunction remains, preventing the
Department from using all the tools at our disposal to remove illegal
aliens from El Salvador, who now represent the largest group of non-
Mexican illegal aliens crossing our borders.
I ask Congress to pass injunction reform so that we can apply
expedited removal to these individuals, whose continued presence puts a
strain on our detention facilities at a tremendous cost to taxpayers,
and will make it difficult for us to sustain the success of our catch
and remove policy in the future.
Social Security No-Match Data
In addition, to support our interior enforcement efforts, I appeal
to Congress to pass legislation that would give our Immigration and
Customs Enforcement (ICE) agents greater access to Social Security no-
match information.
Greater access to no-match data would provide important direction
to ICE investigators to target their enforcement actions toward those
employers who have a disproportionate number of these no-matches, who
have reported earnings for multiple employees on the same number, and
who are therefore more likely to be engaging in unlawful behavior.
2. Screening Cargo and Preventing WMD
Let me now talk about what we've done since 9/11 to monitor the
cargo entering our nation and prevent the entry of Weapons of Mass
Destruction--and what we want to achieve in the future.
Before 9/11, we screened very few cargo containers entering our
ports or crossing our borders for terrorist weapons. We did not have
the ability to examine that cargo overseas before it left a foreign
port for the United States. Nor did we have adequate automated scanning
for radiation, next generation detection technology, or a formal
partnership with the private sector to increase security in privately
owned supply chain operations.
Today, all of this has changed. Through our National Targeting
Center, every shipping container entering the United States is assessed
for risk, and high-risk containers are inspected. Moreover, under the
Container Security Initiative, U.S. inspectors stationed at 44 overseas
ports now screen nearly 80 percent of the cargo bound for the United
States before it reaches our shores. By the end of this calendar year,
those inspectors will screen cargo at 50 foreign ports covering
approximately 82 percent of the containerized cargo destined for the
U.S.
In addition, we have deployed hundreds of Radiation Portal Monitors
and thousands of hand-held radiation detection devices domestically to
protect against radiological and nuclear threats. As a result of these
capabilities, we will screen nearly 80 percent of maritime container
cargo arriving at U.S. ports for radiation by the end of this year.
Finally, almost 6,000 companies have joined our Customs Trade
Partnership Against Terrorism to voluntarily take steps to enhance
security in their supply chain operations.
In all, the federal government has dedicated nearly $10 billion to
port security since 2004, including the efforts of the Coast Guard,
Customs and Border Protection, the research and development efforts of
our Domestic Nuclear Detection Office, and the Department of Energy.
These actions have not only increased security, but they support the
free flow of commerce and trade essential to our economy.
Biological Countermeasures
Since 9/11, we also have significantly strengthened the nation's
defenses against biological threats by developing and deploying a
network of biological sensors; establishing new facilities to monitor,
test and detect potential biological threats; and utilizing new risk
assessment tools to inform investments and potential threats.
In partnership with the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and
the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), we have deployed the
first ever bioaerosol monitoring system to more than 30 major
metropolitan areas in order to provide early warning of an attack and
enable quick and accurate response. The BioWatch system is currently
undergoing expansion in the top threat cities to enable detection of
smaller amounts of bio-agents, better define the affected areas in the
event of a release, and provide increased coverage of critical
facilities such as transportation networks.
We also have established the National Biosurveillance Integration
System to provide early recognition of biological events such as human
or animal disease outbreaks. And in partnership with the Federal Bureau
of Investigation, we have established the National BioForensics
Analysis Center to conduct and facilitate forensic analysis and
interpretation of materials recovered following a biological attack.
Radiological Screening
These are major advances in protecting our nation against Weapons
of Mass Destruction. But in the future, we must continue to develop and
deploy systems to prevent and detect nuclear or radiological attacks in
the United States. To accomplish this goal, we will do a number of
things.
First, we will complete the deployment of Radiation Portal Monitors
to all of our southern and major northern land border crossings and to
every major seaport by the end of next year. Once these systems are in
place, we will be able to screen approximately 98 percent of inbound
cargo for radiation.
We will also make substantial investments in next generation
nuclear and radiological detection technology, including $1.15 billion
for the Advanced Spectroscopic Portal (ASP) program and $1.35 billion
for the Cargo Advanced Automated Radiography System (CAARS).
These systems will harness cutting-edge technology to enhance
detection of nuclear and radiological threats at ports of entry,
including the presence of shielding that could be used to hide special
nuclear material. Making these investments also will improve our
ability to scan greater amounts of cargo in a timely manner,
facilitating the trade and commerce vital to our economy.
Secure Freight
To expand protection of cargo moving throughout the global supply
chain, we are also increasing the extent and depth of information and
data we will be able to use to draw a more detailed picture of the
movement of a container as it travels through the supply chain.
Implementing this Secure Freight program over the next two years
will require considerable work with our interagency and overseas
partners, and international organizations. We look forward to working
at home and overseas to implement this new vision for cargo security.
Securing the Cities
Finally, by the end of 2008, we will complete the first phase of a
``Securing the Cities'' program in New York City to conduct nuclear and
radiological scanning on the principal pathways into the city--over
land, over water, and underground. In addition, we anticipate two
additional cities will be part of the ``Securing the Cities'' program.
And we will conduct radiological and nuclear preventive training for
300 state and local officials this fiscal year and quadruple that
number by the end of next year.
3. Infrastructure Protection
Let me turn now to infrastructure protection. One major area of
focus for the Department has been protecting our nation's critical
infrastructure, including transportation systems according to risk and
in partnership with state and local governments and the private sector.
Transportation
Before 9/11, our aviation system did not have secure cockpit doors.
We did not have a federalized screener workforce trained to detect bomb
components and detonation devices. We did not have thousands of Federal
Air Marshals aboard aircraft, protecting travelers every day all over
the world. We did not have armed pilots authorized to defend the
cockpit. We did not have 100 percent screening of all passenger
baggage. Nor did we have thousands of Explosive Detection System
machines scanning passengers and baggage at airports nationwide.
Today, more than a dozen layers of security are now in place and
create a protective fabric of security that keeps hundreds of thousands
of air travelers safe and secure every day. This includes more than
45,000 highly-trained Transportation Security Officers that screen
passengers and baggage every day at airports across the country. It
includes the Screening Passengers by Observation Technique, or SPOT,
program, which trains TSA officers to look for suspicious behavior
exhibited by passengers at checkpoints--including involuntary physical
or psychological reactions that a person may have when questioned.
We have substantially expanded the ranks of our Federal Air Marshal
Service. Before 9/11, only a few dozen air marshals patrolled our
skies. Today, thousands of air marshals guard flights every day across
our country and all over the world. These highly-trained law
enforcement professionals not only provide daily coverage for
commercial aviation, but they have given our Department an important
surge capability during high-threat periods and major disasters or
incidents. During the recent London aviation threat, Federal Air
Marshals provided expanded coverage on international flights from the
United Kingdom. They also assisted with the evacuations from Lebanon
and Cyprus earlier this summer.
Of course, we also have taken steps to enhance security for air
cargo aboard commercial aircraft. Since 9/11, we have added hundreds of
air cargo inspectors, strengthened our regulatory oversight and freight
forwarder certification programs, developed a known shipper database
for hundreds of thousands of trusted shippers, invested in research and
development for new explosives screening technology, and added new
canine explosive inspection teams.
To further strengthen these efforts, the Transportation Security
Administration will soon begin to enforce extensive new air cargo
regulations that will require background checks on an additional
100,000 employees across the air cargo supply chain, new federal
standards for companies that handle air cargo, and extended security
zones for air cargo operations at airports. In addition, we recently
implemented a security directive that requires that all air cargo
brought to airline counters by individuals must undergo screening.
Of course, our efforts are not confined to aviation. In the rail
and mass transit sectors, we've invested in new technology, rider
education and awareness programs, sensors and video cameras, and law
enforcement surge capabilities, including canine and multi-agency law
enforcement teams that can quickly deploy in response to threats.
Additional Infrastructure
Since 9/11, we also have performed thousands of vulnerability
assessments and reviewed thousands of security plans for privately
owned infrastructure across the country--including transportation
assets, seaports, and chemical facilities. The Coast Guard alone has
reviewed and approved 3,200 facility security plans and 6,200 vessel
security plans under the Maritime Transportation Security Act.
We also have established new information-sharing portals with the
private sector to warn of threats and to recommend protective measures.
And to coordinate protection of our nation's cyber security and
telecommunications systems, we recently appointed the Department's
first Assistant Secretary for Cyber Security and Telecommunications,
who will work with the private sector to increase protection and
resiliency of this vital infrastructure.
In all, since 2002, we have provided more than a billion dollars in
risk-based grants specifically for the protection of our nation's
critical infrastructure. This past June, we also finalized the National
Infrastructure Protection Plan, our over-arching playbook for
protecting our nation's critical infrastructure.
Chemical Security
Of course, we know that the vast majority of critical
infrastructure in our country is owned and maintained by the private
sector. The government alone cannot protect these critical assets and
key resources. Only by working together can we enhance protection.
One area where we continue to face a challenge is in developing a
risk-based regulatory structure for our nation's chemical plants and
facilities.
Since 9/11, most chemical companies have been good corporate
citizens--voluntarily taking steps to improve security in their
operations and facilities. But not all companies have increased
security to an appropriate level--and those companies put everyone else
at risk.
We must develop a balanced, common-sense approach for protecting
chemical facilities across our country--and their surrounding
communities--without destroying the businesses we are trying to
protect.
But we cannot do so unless our Department has the authority to set
standards, develop a risk-based approach for different kinds of
facilities, validate security measures, and insist on compliance.
That is why today I want to urge Congress to pass chemical security
legislation that will allow us to work with industry partners to
develop a clear way forward that includes creating a tiered structure
for assessing risk and an effective program to ensure compliance.
4. Intelligence
As we know, the best way to protect against a terrorist attack is
to prevent it from happening--and intelligence is our most effective
means of defeating terrorist plots before they become operational.
We need look no further than last month's plot in the United
Kingdom to recognize the importance of sharing timely, actionable
intelligence, both domestically and with our international partners.
Numerous intelligence components and law enforcement agencies worked
together to break apart the London plot and to take the steps necessary
to protect the American public. There was unprecedented cooperation
between the United States, the United Kingdom, and Pakistani officials.
This cooperation and trust allowed us to be nimble, fast, and flexible,
and within a matter of hours, heighten our security procedures at our
airports, including the current restrictions on liquids and gels in
carry on baggage.
Above all, the London plot reminds us that we cannot wait for the
fuse to be lit before we take action to disrupt a terrorist plot. When
we have credible information, we will act decisively to reduce the risk
to American citizens.
Since 9/11, our nation has integrated intelligence collection and
analysis across all the elements of the intelligence community under
the Director of National Intelligence, and our Federal wide terrorism
information sharing efforts are being coordinated by the Program
Manager for Information Sharing Environment.
At the Department of Homeland Security, we have strengthened and
unified our intelligence operation and hired a veteran intelligence
official to lead it. And through our Homeland Security Information
Network, thousands of state and local participants share information
every day on threats and incidents within their communities.
Fusion Centers
In the future, we intend to expand these valuable partnerships even
further by increasing federal participation in state and local fusion
centers across our country as part of an interagency effort to better
share intelligence with state and local governments.
DHS is part of a Presidentially-directed interagency effort to
incorporate state and major urban area fusion centers into the
Information Sharing Environment. DHS intelligence personnel already
work side-by-side with their federal, state and local counterparts at
fusion centers in New York, California, Georgia, Louisiana, and
Maryland. Our goal is a two-way flow, with every level of government
pooling intelligence.
By the end of 2008, working with our other federal partners, our
goal is to have intelligence and operations professionals at every
state and major metropolitan fusion center in the United States,
sitting in the same room, sharing and analyzing information and
intelligence in real time.
Intelligence Campaign Plan
In addition, we have initiated an Intelligence Campaign Plan for
Border Security (ICP) to provide comprehensive and coordinated
intelligence support for the full spectrum of the Department's border
security operations. The ICP will link DHS intelligence resources, and
those of state and local partners, with the Intelligence Community, in
order to deliver actionable intelligence to front-line operators and to
fuse national intelligence with law enforcement information.
As part of the ICP, we are developing and implementing, in
partnership with the Director of National Intelligence, a robust
strategy for collection and analysis of border security intelligence to
support our operational missions. Our strategic intelligence analysis,
conducted under the ICP, will assist policymakers in making key
decisions on the best ways to secure the border.
5. Preparedness/Response
Some threats, however, we will not be able to prevent--specifically
those created by Mother Nature. As an all-hazards Department, we must
be prepared to respond to acts of terrorism as well as acts of nature,
including acts of such catastrophic proportion that federal
intervention is required before, during, and after the storm or event.
Since 9/11, we have re-tooled and re-fashioned the Federal
Emergency Management Agency, giving this vital agency new and
experienced leadership, enhanced, real-time tracking capabilities for
emergency supplies, and robust emergency communications systems. We
have pre-designated and pre-positioned Federal leadership in hurricane
zones to work together with state and local officials, and we have
forged a stronger partnership with the Department of Defense to ensure
joint training and operations.
To respond to no-notice or short notice events, our operational
agencies--including the Coast Guard, Transportation Security
Administration and its Federal Air Marshal Service, Immigration and
Customs Enforcement, Customs and Border Protection, and the Secret
Service--have created, or are now creating, ``adaptive force
structures'' that will rapidly deploy to an incident or disaster zone
to provide an immediate surge capability and greater unity of effort.
The emergency management community now operates under a new,
comprehensive National Response Plan and a National Incident Management
System. And we have created new preparedness tools for individuals and
businesses under the Ready campaign and new community-based training
programs under Citizen Corps.
Interoperable Communications
But despite this progress, we still have more to do to fully
realize the potential of our Department to integrate the full range of
national capabilities. And one area in particular that requires
continued action and attention across all levels of government is
interoperable communications.
On 9/11, hundreds of first responders couldn't communicate with
each other because their radios were incompatible. This not only slowed
the response and increased confusion, but it cost lives. As a nation,
we simply can't let that happen again.
Today, we have achieved interoperability at the command level in 10
of the highest-threat urban areas through our RapidCom program.
Achieving interoperability continues to be one of seven National
Priorities under the Interim National Preparedness Goal. As a result,
state and local governments, and first responders, have spent about
$2.1 billion of Federal grant assistance since 2003 for interoperable
communications equipment, planning, training, and exercises.
In addition, we completed a National Interoperability Baseline
Survey to assess the capacity for communications interoperability among
law enforcement, fire, and emergency medical service first responders
in all 50 states and D.C. But more needs to be done.
By the end of this year, we will have a clear plan in place for
completing command-level interoperability among police, firefighters,
and emergency medical service providers in each of the states and at
least 75 urban areas.
Of course, we can only do so much at the Federal level to resolve
differences at the state and local level. We can develop standard
operating procedures, recommend technology, and lead training and
exercises, but local governments ultimately use the equipment and
execute their plans.
In the coming months, we will turn to our state and local partners
for guidance, for answers, and ultimately, for results.
6. Management
Finally, let me say something about the men and women at the
Department of Homeland Security who undertake this important work every
day on behalf of their fellow citizens. These remarkable individuals
serve the American people day and night, monitoring our ports, our
skies, and our borders. They have difficult, challenging jobs, which
they conduct with vigilance, urgency and a sense of common purpose.
These men and women deserve the tools, the resources, and, most
important, the leadership and guidance to succeed in their important
tasks. That is why a top priority for the Department continues to be
filling vacancies at the top levels of our organizational chart and
ensuring we have a diverse, well-trained workforce.
Hiring and Recruiting
Over the past year, we have filled several key leadership positions
across the Department, including a new Director of FEMA and a new FEMA
management team with more than 100 combined years of disaster
management experience.
In the past weeks, we have hired the first Assistant Secretary for
Cyber Security and Telecommunications. We have hired a new Director for
the Screening Coordination Office. We have filled the Chief Financial
Officer position. This month, we also announced a new Chief Human
Capital Officer, Marta Perez. In addition, we have filled newly created
positions of Assistant Secretary for Policy Development and Senior
Advisor for Weapons of Mass Destruction Intelligence.
Of course, we also want to continue to recruit a first-class
homeland security workforce, including minorities, and students from
Historically Black Colleges and Universities (HBCUs). Several of the
Department's component agencies have active minority recruitment
programs, including the Coast Guard, Secret Service, Customs and Border
Protection, and the Transportation Security Administration, among
others.
In addition, our Science and Technology Directorate's University
Centers of Excellence program is partnering with three HBCUs to conduct
vital homeland security-related research and to educate the next
generation of homeland security experts and scholars.
As part of this effort, the Science and Technology directorate
expects to make available up to $1.3 million in Research and
Development grants to seven HBCUs in fiscal year 2007. The Directorate
also expects to provide more than $133,000 in tuition assistance,
scholarships, and other aid to seven HBCUs and to continue to recruit
students for positions across the Department, including Headquarters.
Small Business Contracting
Since our inception, we have made a commitment to provide
opportunities for small businesses to participate in our procurement
program, including those small businesses owned by minorities, women,
service disabled veterans, veterans, and those located in economically
distressed areas. Small businesses in a wide variety of industries have
helped us to meet our mission through their dedicated and customer-
focused contract work.
From Fiscal Year 2003 to 2005, the Department awarded over 30
percent of our prime contracts to small businesses, exceeding the
government-wide standard of 23 percent. We also awarded over seven
percent of our prime contracts to small minority-owned businesses,
exceeding the government-wide standard of five percent, and we are on
track to meet or exceed these targets in fiscal year 2006.
CONCLUSION
Over the past three years, we have built a department whose mission
is to work on behalf of the American people to prevent, protect
against, and respond to threats to our homeland. For the 185,000 men
and women of DHS, this is a mission we are proud to undertake every
day--at our borders, across our skies, and over land and sea.
The steps we have taken since 9/11 have made our nation safer, they
have made our nation stronger, and they have made our nation more
resilient--economically resilient and resilient in spirit. Over the
next two years, we will continue to focus our energy and our resources
on building a foundation of security for our country that addresses our
immediate priorities and achieves our long term goal of creating a
Department that is sustainable in the future.
I appreciate the support of this Committee and all Members of
Congress as we continue to build and refine our capabilities and as we
continue to protect our nation in the months and years to come.
Mr. King. Thank you, Secretary Chertoff. Again, thank you
for your testimony.
I will focus on one issue, and that was the question that
you and I had severe questions about, the funding formula which
directly impacted New York City, Washington, D.C., among
others.
And, by the way, let me preface this by stressing the fact
that the transit security funding did go up by 26 percent and
the port security funding has gone up by 400 percent. So I want
all of this to be in context.
But having said that, as we go forward to the analysis for
next year's grants, especially on UASI, how is the peer review
panel going to be part of that process? Do you intend to make
any changes with the peer review panel, either as to membership
or as to procedures or as to the formulations that they base
their determinations on?
Secretary Chertoff. Well, Mr. Chairman, let me say, first
of all, we are absolutely committed to a risk-based formula.
And that means we are going to begin by tiering the cities
based on risk.
And it is not a surprise that the highest-tier risk cities
include cities like the New York metropolitan area, including
northern New Jersey; Los Angeles; the national capital region,
Washington; and Chicago. And so, we are going to anticipate or
presume that a significant portion of the resources will be
applied to those cities. And this past year it was close to 50
percent.
Second, to the extent, of course, that we are funding
multiyear programs, obviously sometimes there is going to be a
certain unevenness. Because if you have a program that is going
to take 2 or 3 years to fund, and we give you the money in year
1, we are not going to be giving you the full amount in year 2
and year 3 as well. So there will be a certain amount of
unevenness depending on the nature of the programs.
But the third thing which I do think I want to focus on a
little bit is the issue of how we work with communities, in
terms of what their specific proposals are. And I think,
looking back, that is an area where we do have some room for
improvement.
The first thing we are going to do is we are going to get
the grant guidance and the general allocations out in the first
quarter of this fiscal year. What that is going to do is it is
going to give us much more time to work with communities to
help them tailor their proposals in a way that maximizes the
amount of money that they are eligible to get under the
program.
I think one of the deficiencies that I have observed,
looking back over the last several years and in talking to
community leaders from a number of cities, is that, by having
the process be fairly late in the fiscal year cycle, a lot of
communities submitted a proposal and it was kind of like a
pass/fail test. And if there were portions of the proposal that
were not good, it tended to sink the entire proposal. And I
think that is probably not the best way for us to handle this.
By doing it earlier, we will have at least one round of
being able to have a back-and-forth, interactive discussion
with communities, and if there are some elements that we don't
think are particularly useful, they can change those elements.
And that, I think, is going to help us avoid a situation where
people feel that their needs are not adequately being taken
care of.
Mr. King. The gentleman from Mississippi?
Mr. Thompson. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, thank you for your testimony before the
committee.
You talked about GAO being wrong, with respect to the
catastrophic planning supplement. Can you tell this committee
when the supplement was circulated to all the other federal
agencies?
Secretary Chertoff. I know I signed it over the summer, and
I think it was given a limited circulation. I can't tell you
exactly which agencies get the circulation and when they got
it. But it was approved and signed, and certainly within DHS it
was in effect at some point over the summer. I can get you the
date we signed it.
Mr. Thompson. Well, if you would, please provide the
committee with when you signed it, how many other federal
agencies have signed it, and when it was circulated.
Secretary Chertoff. We will do that.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you.
In addition to that, I referenced that one of the constant
criticisms we hear is that there are so many vacancies in DHS
in critical positions. We have so many acting directors. And
part of my testimony will say that we could actually start an
actors guild in DHS because of that.
How do you propose to correct the vast number of vacancies
in critical positions that continue to exist within DHS?
Secretary Chertoff. Well, first of all, nobody wants to
fill positions permanently more than I do, because it takes
some of the burden off of my shoulders. I am pleased to say we
have actually made a lot of progress in that over the last
several months.
I know there is a vacancy in the undersecretary for
management. I am hoping that we will have a nominee shortly.
That is in process. We recently filled the cybersecurity spot,
the assistant secretary for cybersecurity. I think virtually
all, if not all, of the senior-level positions at FEMA, which
were filled with actings, are now filled with permanent people.
So I think we are well on the way to filling all of those
spots.
It is no secret that it is a challenge, particularly with
Senate-confirmed appointees, because there are people who find
the process of getting background-checked and getting confirmed
to be time-consuming and arduous. And that does, regrettably,
deter some people from applying. And it is not an original
thought with me.
But I am confident that we have in place now and will
shortly have a fully loaded complement of C.U. managers in
which I have a great deal of personal confidence.
Mr. Thompson. So, without giving us a timetable, you assume
that you will have all the vacancies filled.
Secretary Chertoff. Yes. I mean, I think the last major PAS
to be filled, I believe, is the undersecretary for management,
and I am hoping that that nomination will be going up in the
very near future. And then, of course, it is the Senate that
has to do the confirmation.
Mr. Thompson. Several times we have had someone from FEMA
before us, and we have been told that, before June 1, FEMA
would be at a full complement. I am told today that we still
have not hired all of the people necessary in FEMA, even though
we are in the hurricane season right now.
Can you tell me what the problem is and why we can't hire
the necessary people that we need to work in FEMA?
Secretary Chertoff. Well, we have done quite a bit of
hiring. And that includes not only the permanent employees, but
the disaster assistance personnel and other personnel to do
some of the ongoing recovery work in the Gulf. But I will agree
with you that we have not succeeded in fully staffing all of
the positions at FEMA.
Frankly, a lot of that is because we have had a certain
amount of outflow. This has been a very difficult past couple
of years for FEMA. There are a lot of people who are burned out
and are tired and, frankly, had a very trying year last year.
I know Director Paulison has made hiring qualified
employees a very important element of his strategy for
retooling FEMA. So, while we are hiring very rapidly, we do
have to exceed the outflow by a significant margin in order to
get to where we have to get. And I think we have made a lot of
progress, but I would certainly be happier if we were full, and
we are not full yet.
Mr. Thompson. I yield back.
Mr. King. The gentleman from Indiana is recognized for 5
minutes.
Mr. Souder. Thank you.
I want to say at the opening that I appreciate the steady
progress on all the different elements in a very complex
question, whether it is ports, airports, border, IDs. But until
we know that our border is more secure, until we know our IDs
are more secure, until we know who is here, it is difficult to
see how we are going to be safe. It has just become so
intelligence-dependent that we run higher risks. And I hope we
continue to move on the fence, continue to move on the ID.
But I have a very particularized question. As you know, I
work with and chair the Narcotics Subcommittee and the
Speaker's Drug Task Force. There has been a lot of question
about where the narcotics mission fits in Homeland Security,
because you have most of the agents at the border, the ISE
agents, the Coast Guard. And I know that you continue to make
busts and arrests.
But the question is, based on some concern over documents
that were submitted this year, do you feel that the narcotics
mission is part of the counterterrorism mission?
This has been a problem in Colombia, and it took a long
time to sort that out. We are going through this right now in
Afghanistan. People who smuggle smuggle. People who smuggle
drugs smuggle other things and people. Plus, we had 20,000
people a year die of narcoterrorism in the United States. As we
have cracked down on meth at the state and federal level, we
have seen a surge in meth coming across the southern border.
How do you see the narcotics mission inside the homeland
security mission?
Secretary Chertoff. Well, I agree with you, I think it is
an indispensable part of the mission.
I think, first of all, criminal organizations that smuggle
drugs also smuggle illegal migrants in. And the drugs often
fuel a lot of the activities that these criminal organizations
undertake. So, as we crack down at the border, the very
measures we are taking to crack down at the border will not
only keep out migrants but will keep out drugs and other forms
of contraband and dangerous activities.
I also agree with you that you have to look at,
increasingly in this world, narcotics as a money-making effort
for some terrorist organizations. When I was head of the
criminal division, we indicted a number of the senior leaders
of FARC in Colombia for drug trafficking. And the allegations
were they were actually involved in using the narcotics to fund
the acquisition of weapons for terrorist activities.
So increasingly, I think that we have to view narcotics as
part of the terrorist arsenal, and we have to treat that as
equally serious with other things that we are trying to keep
out of the country.
Mr. Souder. In the area of the border, we have seen
progress, to some degree, in California, Arizona, some
concentration now in New Mexico. But wherever we put fence,
wherever we put more agents and Guard, the illegal migrations,
whether it is contraband or people, move to the other areas.
I see, both in the, kind of, west Texas area and parts of
the open areas of Texas as being, kind of, the next frontier in
this. Do you have any forward-looking plans in 2007 and 2008
toward that border?
Secretary Chertoff. The Border Patrol has mapped the entire
border, and they look at the high-traffic areas. And as we
deploy agents, the National Guard under Jump Start, technology
under SInet, and fencing and other kinds of tactical
infrastructure, we begin in those areas which are the highest-
traffic areas.
We recognize that it is going to shift some percentage of
the traffic. And we have a schedule to roll this out so that we
continue to hit where the traffic moves. And we drive it,
ultimately, into places that are less and less hospitable, and
therefore fewer and fewer people will undertake to cross the
border.
So this one of the things the Border Patrol treats as a
priority, on watching where the flow is and making sure we are
constantly attending to the worst places, because that is
ultimately the best strategy for controlling the whole border.
Mr. Souder. Do you know if you have a plan for Neely's
Crossing, where there is a gravel base there where they have a
bulldozer on the Mexican side, but every time we do anything,
we try to do it--and it is not part of our current fencing
proposal, although I think Chairman Hunter is looking at that.
Because I have talked to the Mexican ambassador. It seems
to me cooperation would start with get rid of the bulldozer on
the other side.
Secretary Chertoff. Well, I have to confess, I am not
personally familiar with the bulldozer. I do know the Border
Patrol is constantly reviewing what is going on on the south
side of the border, and we are also using intelligence.
And we have been working and achieving progress with the
Mexican government in coordinating joint law enforcement
efforts on both sides of the border. And I know the Border
Patrol chief, David Aguilar, has been dealing with his
counterpart on those issues.
I will look into that.
Mr. Souder. I would appreciate that, because I was with the
two sector chiefs, and the bulldozer started on the other side,
and they said, ``We all need it to leave fast.'' It has been a
continuing problem and needs to be addressed.
Mr. Lungren. [Presiding.] Thank you. The gentleman's time
has expired.
Mr. DeFazio is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. DeFazio. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, good to see you again.
You said radiation devices that cover 80 percent of cargo
are in place. Now, that certainly--
Secretary Chertoff. By the end of the year, will be in
place.
Mr. DeFazio. Does that mean we are actually screening 80
percent, or in ports where 80 percent of the cargo moves there
are radiation detection devices available?
Secretary Chertoff. It means, by the end of the year, we
will be screening 80 percent of the containers coming through
our seaports through radiation portal monitors.
Mr. DeFazio. Through radiation portal monitors.
Secretary Chertoff. Correct.
Mr. DeFazio. Okay. Not the little hand-held things that
don't work.
Secretary Chertoff. Correct.
Mr. DeFazio. Okay. Eighty percent, that would be a big step
forward.
Under the current system, I am very concerned about C-TPAT.
You know, we had the incident where there were, I believe, 22
illegal Chinese in a container, well-equipped for living, who
were smuggled into the U.S. And that came from a C-TPAT
cooperator.
You know, Ronald Reagan famously said, ``Trust, but
verify.'' I would like to verify in ways that are more certain
than a manifest. As I understand it, a manifest can actually be
changed legally, under U.S. Customs law, up to 6 months after
you have taken delivery of something.
So how can we say, ``Oh, well, we have seen the manifest,''
a piece of paper, and that gives us some level of security and
assurance of what is in that container?
Secretary Chertoff. Well, we don't rely only on the
manifest. The manifest is one element in a series of different
items of information that allow us to target high-risk
containers so we can actually have those inspected. That
includes who the shipper is, method of payment, destination,
what the track record is with respect to that particular
shipper, other kinds of documents that are provided by the
shipper.
Mr. DeFazio. Right, I understand. But I am just saying,
where I want to head here is, we had quite a discussion, this
committee, about screening containers on the other side of the
ocean.
Your deputy, Mr. Jackson, was in, and he said it was the
objective of this administration, within a short period of
time, to be able to screen all containers before they leave
U.S. ports, i.e., something goes to San Francisco before it
heads to Sacramento or Las Vegas, we are going to screen it.
And I said to him, ``Does that mean you might think there
might be a threat in that container when it arrives?'' And he
said, ``Well, obviously, or we wouldn't want to screen it.''
And you are telling me now we are going to screen them all once
they have arrived.
It seems to me, with a WMD, you would want to screen on the
other side. Why has there been resistance, on the part of the
administration and the majority here to screening all of the
containers on the other side of the ocean?
If we can put in place, by the end of this year, portals to
screen everything coming into the U.S.--which, I will be
stunned; I mean, I didn't know we were anywhere near that, but
that will be great--why can't we do it on the other side of the
ocean before they depart?
Secretary Chertoff. Well, for one thing, I do want to say
we are working and we are expecting to begin the process of
doing screening, or scanning, overseas at ports of departure.
But, for one thing, we don't own the foreign ports,
Congressman.
Mr. DeFazio. No, I--
Secretary Chertoff. Foreign countries do. And--
Mr. DeFazio. I understand that. Excuse me, sir, if you
could. We retain the right of sovereignty in international
trade, and we can refuse the entry of any cargo. The Chinese
regularly do this for commercial purposes. We can sure as heck
do it for homeland security purposes.
Anybody who isn't cooperating with us, we say, ``Well, that
is fine, but guess what? Nothing is leaving your port for the
United States of America anymore.'' It is pretty simple.
Secretary Chertoff. I guess that would put us in a position
where, if, for all kinds of reasons, 75 percent of the ports in
the world were not prepared in a short period of time to give
us the ability to do this, we would be cutting off 75 percent
of the international trade.
Mr. DeFazio. Well, then, you know, we would start making
things in America again. That would be a tragedy.
But beyond that--
Secretary Chertoff. If I could--
Mr. DeFazio. No, let's go to the point here.
Secretary Chertoff. If I could finish--
Mr. DeFazio. The point is, if we don't push them, they are
not going to do it. You are saying these containers might
contain threats when they arrive here. If I know that my
nuclear weapon is going to be found out at the U.S. port, I
will just detonate it at the port. I won't get to my ultimate
objective, but I will take out the port.
Now, why aren't we pushing harder to screen everything
overseas? We didn't say immediately; we said within 3 years.
Now, certainly we can negotiate agreements to do it within 3
years.
Secretary Chertoff. Congressman, I don't accept the premise
that we are not working hard to do this. Because, quite to the
contrary, I went to Hong Kong--
Mr. DeFazio. So if we said 3 years, would you accept that
legislation? Would you?
Secretary Chertoff. If I can finish the answer, I will tell
you what my position is.
We are working hard with partners overseas; I went to Hong
Kong. But I am also mindful of the fact that there are several
limitations in our ability to do this.
First of all, some countries aren't physically configured
to be able to do this scanning, because, among other things,
they may have a lot of radiation in the ground where the port
is, and that makes it difficult to use the scanners.
Other countries don't have the manpower to work with us to
do the inspections. Other countries may choose not to do so.
To set an artificial deadline of 3 years would be as
unrealistic as passing a law that says, ``In 3 years, cancer
has to be cured.'' It is a wonderful aspiration, but it is not
a realistic mandate.
What is realistic is to produce action. So what we are
doing is we are producing action. We are meeting with shippers,
we are meeting with foreign governments. And this year we will
be announcing the beginning of a program to do precisely what
you want us to do, but I am not going to sell the American
people pie in the sky. I am going to give them something that
is realistic, actionable and produces real results.
Mr. King. [Presiding.] The time of the gentleman has
expired.
The gentleman from California, Mr. Lungren, is recognized
for 5 minutes.
Mr. Lungren. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary, for appearing before us
and giving us a rundown of where we are right now.
As was mentioned before, we have a responsibility to do
oversight, and we have a responsibility to be critical, and we
have been in the past.
One of the areas that we have tried to encourage, both
through legislation and through hearings, is the risk-based
approach. And, at least from my standpoint, it appears that,
under your leadership, the department has been following that.
The other thing is, if you are going to be risk-based, you
have to show the agility necessary to respond to new
information and new risk. And in that regard, I commend TSA for
doing that, with respect to looking at what the increasing or
differing risks are in terms of aviation safety.
In that regard, can you tell me, in light of the decision
announced by TSA today in terms of what people can carry on
their personal luggage as they get on the airplane, how long is
that going to remain in place? Is that going to be something
that we see for 6 weeks, 6 months, so that people who travel
should be aware that things may change and how often they may
change?
Secretary Chertoff. I think the measures that were
announced yesterday, which are to limit nonprescription items
to three-ounce containers that fit within a one-quart plastic
bag, are likely to be with us for the foreseeable future. I
don't anticipate them changing within 6 weeks.
Six months, of course, is a longer period of time. But I
think we have settled on a size that we are very comfortable
with from a safety and security standpoint and also confronts
the limitations of the existing technology, in terms of
actually screening liquids.
Mr. Lungren. Last week, you announced a large contract for
the technology component of the Security Border Initiative,
something that members of this committee are very, very
concerned about, want to see work. Yet, in the past, in the
department, there has been some difficulty with what was
already there, the ISIS program, the allegation or criticism
that certain components didn't work together, that there seemed
to be bits and pieces that were out there but not integrated.
And you made a statement that you were going to go slow on
the implementation of this. Can you give us an idea of what you
mean by that, how we are going to guard against having the same
thing happen that happened before?
Which appeared to be we threw some money at things, we
bought component parts. They didn't seem to work well together.
It didn't achieve what we wanted in the Congress and, I
presume, what you want on the border.
Secretary Chertoff. Well, I said we were going to proceed
with all-deliberate speed, which I don't mean slowly. It means
quickly but it means deliberately.
First of all, we have an integrator. We are not just buying
a lot of different pieces and slapping them together. We have
somebody who has got the obligation to produce an integrated
performing system, although we reserve the right to bid out the
individual components of that system to make sure the
government gets the best price.
We are going to begin with the first 28-mile stretch of the
border, which should be done in the spring. And that will give
us an opportunity to take the technology, which is all proven
in other contexts--it is not stuff that is just sitting around
in the mad scientist's lab. This is stuff that has actually
been used in various contexts, including by the military.
But we are going to actually put it together, in an
integrated way, on a 28-mile stretch of the border, so we can
see it operate in our border environment, and then make any
additional adjustments as we continue to roll it out in the
high-tech areas.
I think the combination of proven technology, one
integrator who has responsibility for performance, a lot of
ability by government officials to modify individual components
to make sure we are getting the best price, and making sure
that the final decisions are driven by the operators, the
Border Patrol guys, and not by the scientists, I think those
are the four elements that will make this a successful program.
Mr. Lungren. If I could follow up on that, I had a hearing
with my subcommittee on the northern border. Most everybody
else went to the southern border.
When you go up to the northern border and you see the
expanse there geographically and you see the problem we have
controlling the introduction of B.C. Bud, large amounts of
marijuana coming in with high THC content, you see the
possibility and potential for that vulnerability to be utilized
by terrorists.
How can you assure us that we are not going to forget the
northern border, that we are going to do those things that are
necessary to control it? And do you view that as a
vulnerability, with respect to opportunity given to terrorists?
Mr. King. I would ask the secretary to limit his remarks.
Secretary Chertoff. The contract does envision the northern
border as well. It is likely that the particular array of
technology and tactics will be different, depending on what the
border is.
And, of course, we have an outstanding relationship with
the Canadian intelligence service, which gives us an additional
level of protection against the possibility of a threat from
the northern border.
Mr. King. The gentlelady, Ms. Jackson-Lee, from Texas is
recognized for 5 minutes.
Ms. Jackson-Lee. I thank the chairman.
I thank the secretary for his presence.
I think you know that we have had some tough times in this
nation and tough times in this committee room, and tough times
in terms of some of our responses and concerns about the
Homeland Security Department and its oversight.
And so, I want to just rattle off a series of questions,
and I appreciate your response.
Although today may be good news with respect to the
relaxing of the requirements for our travelers, I want your
best view, best consideration of whether or not, even though
many of us, as members of Congress, have conveyed the angst of
our constituents, whether or not it is good to allow liquids of
any kind alongside of the perspective that we do not yet have
the technology.
I watched an individual buy water, just yesterday, and I
thought they could carry it on at that point, and of course it
starts today. But the water bottle is big. And even after the
secured area, I would ask the question whether or not we are
jeopardizing our safety. And as you well know, there are some
experts that say that we should retain what we have done.
I am going to ask a series of questions, so that is the
first one.
I would like to know, as well, whether or not you think the
UASI's structure now, which was enormously frustrating,
rendered by one of your employees who provided grants to places
where we thought clearly had no relationship to risk, whether
or not that has been improved.
My own city of Houston lost a certain percentage of
funding. It is certainly one of the cities high on the risk
list because of our petrochemical and oil industry.
And I want to know, have you fixed that? And are we going
to be seeing politics again involved in the funding of UASI's
grants?
Just a few weeks or months ago, the FEMA Director Paulison
came into my region. I thank him for that. And he is doing, I
think, an excellent job. He met with local officials to talk
about local TOPOFF drills.
Specifically I will use the city of Houston, which, again,
jeopardized, surrounded by petrochemical areas. Promised that
we would have what we call a local community TOPOFF, not the
massive ones that we see, which we hope to have prospectively,
but ones that would be locally. And it tied in to the nonprofit
grants for preparedness.
We have seen none of those issued, and I would like your
perspective on that, why none of those are issued. And I would
like to go back and get my TOPOFF local session done.
In the northern border, we were there just recently, and I
would like to make it more dire than what has already been
said. And that is that there were no border protection agents
that could do second inspection. They are working 7 days a
week, 24 hours a day, and if they stop a car and they want to
send it in to secondary inspection, we don't have enough
individuals.
Lastly, let me say that nothing much did I hear from you on
Katrina. Maybe a small part of your testimony represented your
comment on that. We still have thousands in Houston. We still
have conflicts with those thousands not having benefits. In
fact, we have a lot of families, 2,000-plus households, that
have been claimed ineligible. We need the Stafford Act to be
removed so that we can work to provide for these individuals.
And I would appreciate your answers to those questions, and
I realize the time is short.
Prepared Statement of the Honorable Sheila Jackson-Lee
Mr. Chairman, I thank you for convening this important hearing on
the Department of Homeland Security: Major Initiatives for 2007 and
beyond. This hearing is essential to the exercise of our oversight
responsibility over the Department of Homeland Security and critical in
ensuring our great nation's preparation for future terrorist threats. I
welcome the Honorable Michael Chertoff, Secretary of the Department of
Homeland Security, and thank him for testifying today.
The lack of resources available to DHS has been a troubling
concern. Democratic efforts to increase the number of Border Patrol
agents, provide funding for interoperable communications, provide
funding for rail and port security, and increase Homeland Security
grant programs have been rejected by Republicans. This year, New York
City two most at-risk jurisdictions in our nation, received an
approximately 40% cut in funding from the Urban Area Security
Initiative (UASI) for FY 2006, despite the fact the Department
broadened its new allocation process for FY 2006 to include both risk
and need.
In addition, New York City and Washington, D.C, are not the only
high risk cities to be subjected to the Department's maldistribution of
homeland security dollars. My own district of Houston, which is among
the top 50% of all Urban Areas based on the FY 2006 DHS comparative
risk analysis and among the top 25% of all Urban Areas in effectiveness
of proposed solutions, was subjected to a more than 10% decrease in
funding by UASI. Moreover, my state of Texas faced even more severe
cuts of 53% in funding from the State Homeland Security Grant Program
(SHSGP) and 29% in UASI funding.
Accordingly, this hearing is crucial in highlighting the
Department's ongoing failure on a wide range of issues including its
inability to cogently articulate the distribution of its Homeland
Security dollars. Moreover, the Department's ineptitude in the grants
allocation process is emblematic of its handling of issues vital to our
nation's security, such as disaster response, FEMA assistance, port and
rail security, and contracting.
Yesterday, I was pleased to be informed of the awarding of several
grants that would strengthen the nation's ability to prevent, protect
against, respond to, and recover from terrorist attacks, major
disasters, and other emergencies that could impact this country's
critical infrastructure. I think it is important that under these
grants, my city of Houston and my state of Texas will receive the
following grants:
More than $11.6 million for the Port of Houston;
$800,000 for intercity rail and ferry systems for
Houston;
More than $2.2 million for Buffer Zone Plans for
Texas; and
More than $5 million for Chemical Buffer Zone Plans
for Texas.
As we proceed with the hearing today, I have serious concerns
regarding the inadequacy of funding faced by DHS due to drastic cuts
orchestrated by this Administration and Congress. One of the main
reasons high risk cities have seen a cut in FY 2006 grant funding is
because funding for the UASI program was cut by $120 million, the SHSGP
was decimated by the 50% cut of $550 million, and the Administration
has twice attempted to eliminate the Laws Enforcement Terrorism
Prevention Program (LETPP).
As we struggle to emeliorate the prudence and effectiveness of the
Department's new allocation process, which determines the allocation of
funding based on a combination of risk and anticipated effectiveness of
the proposed solutions to reduce such risk, it is imperative that the
Department work closely with these high risk cities and states to
improve their plans to utilize DHS funds rather than simply penalizing
them for the quality of their applications.
In addition to a lack of resources, lack of accountability has been
a recurring theme in DHS. The preparation for and response to Hurricane
Katrina is the only the most obvious example of the lack of
accountability within DHS. An estimated 11% of the $19 billion that has
been spent by FEMA, which is $2 billion has been waste, fraud, and
abuse, clearly illustrating how DHS' poor management practices can
directly translate into waste, fraud, and abuse.
Furthermore, the failure of this Republication Congress to enact
the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission is troubling. The 9/11
Commission report found that the inability of first responders to talk
with each other and their commanders resulted in a loss of life.
Despite these recommendations, the Republican leadership in the House
repeatedly rejected attempts by Democratic members to address the vital
need for emergency communication capabilities for first responders.
Consequently, accountability, resources, and the failure to
implement the 9/11 Commission recommendations are all critical issues
that DHS has failed to adequately address. I eagerly look forward to
your testimony and discussion today of these issues.
Mr. King. I would ask the secretary if he could confine his
answers to a minute and 30 seconds.
[Laughter.]
Secretary Chertoff. All right.
The answer is that bomb experts tell us that the limit we
have placed on the size of liquid is such that it does not make
it feasible for someone to conduct a chemical assembly
operation that would be necessary to create a bomb on a plane.
I think it is a good balance. And we are really, frankly,
relied on the experts for that limitation.
We do intend to focus UASI and all our grants on a risk-
based approach. As I said earlier, obviously the projects have
to be projects that fall within our preparedness guidelines.
And I think this year, because of the timing change, we will be
able to work with communities to help them do a better job.
We do support local drills. I think the appropriations bill
that is moving its way through Congress will provide us with
resources to fund local preparedness exercises, which is
important.
On the nonprofit grants, there is a particular issue
involving religious institutions. A significant organization
actually requested us to hold off on making the grants until
the new fiscal year when the eligibility requirements become a
little bit more favorable.
We are paying attention to the northern border. And, as I
say, although the precise mix of resources is going to be
different in different places at the border, we have not
neglected that.
As far as FEMA is concerned, as I say, there is legislation
currently working its way in the appropriations bill with
respect to the Stafford Act. When the law changes, of course we
will apply the new law. As it is, though, we do have an
obligation, as long as legal limitations are placed in effect,
we are going to have to apply those limitations.
Mr. King. The time of the gentlelady is expired.
The gentleman from Connecticut, Mr. Simmons, is recognized
fo 5 minutes.
Mr. Simmons. I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
Going back a little bit in history, I recall that Oleg
Penkovsky, a Russian colonel, walked into the Soviet embassy
and eventually became one of the most productive intelligence
assets in the history of the Cold War.
Today, to secure our homeland, we have created field
intelligence groups; BICS, or border intelligence centers;
fusion centers; and all kinds of centers and facilities that
involve homeland security, law enforcement and everything else.
Which is good, assuming we can coordinate all of these
activities.
But my question goes to the issue of radicalization, the
idea that homegrown terrorists can become radicalized in
Toronto or Great Britain or, yes, even here in the United
States.
And going back to the analogy of Oleg Penkovsky, a guy who
walked into the embassy, who recruited himself, what programs
or what capabilities do we have to take advantage of an
American citizen, who might be a Muslim, might not, who comes
in and says, ``Something interesting is going on in my
neighborhood''? What capacity do we have to take that
individual and to develop that individual and collect
information?
Secretary Chertoff. Well, the answer is that we regard that
as a very important asset.
Clearly the issue of homegrown radicalization is one in
which--though intelligence about a threat is likely to come
from a community itself. And that is one of the reasons we are
spending a fair amount of time, including I personally, doing
outreach to the Muslim community. I know Bob Mueller is and the
other intelligence folks are.
And the idea is, first of all, obviously tips are very
valuable. And we do follow up on those, and they are a source
of, for certainly our domestic investigators, to look into
potential threats. But also because we do want to cultivate,
ultimately, more significant long-term sources.
So I think everybody involved in the intelligence community
treats the cultivation of human intelligence as a very big
priority.
Mr. Simmons. Well, I thank you for that answer.
Second question: Two years ago, the U.S. Army put out a
manual on intelligence. And they considered that open-source
intelligence was simply another source of information. I
objected to that. And the most recent manual that has come out
says that open-source intelligence is, in fact, a discipline
like the disciplines: HUMINT, SIGINT, so on and so on and so
forth.
What is your future vision for open-source intelligence
within the Department of Homeland Security, especially given
the fact that, if you are developing, producing open-source
intelligence, it is easier to share not just with other
entities--the local, state and tribal entities--because you
don't need a clearance or you don't need to be cleared as high,
but also you can share some of this information with the
American people?
What is your vision for open-source?
Secretary Chertoff. I heartily agree that open-source
intelligence is a critical discipline in the intelligence
field. And I don't want to speak for the DNI, but I know he
agrees with that and he is focused on this as well.
Sometimes there is a tendency to view that which is
presented in front of your face as less valuable because you
haven't had to steal it or intercept it. I don't think that is
true.
And in this case, the enemy actually is pretty open about
what its intentions are and plans are, and there is a lot to be
gleaned from looking at that kind of open-source material. We
do look at that very seriously in our department, and it is
looked at that way throughout the entire community.
Mr. Simmons. I recently wrote a forward to a book called,
``The Smart Nation Act: Public Intelligence in the Public
Interest.'' I would like to share with you a copy, and
hopefully somebody on your staff can take a look at the ideas
contained therein.
Mr. King. The gentleman from New Jersey, my friend, Mr.
Pascrell, is recognized for 5 minutes. And if he has any books
to peddle, he has the right to do it in the interest of equal
time.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Pascrell. This is not off my time, Mr. Chairman.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Secretary, good morning.
I would like to continue the path of Congressman Simmons. I
believe in my heart that there is no ground, no anchor to your
administration's strategy to fight terror. You, sir, are
working in an environment that has not reduced the potential
for the multiplication of terrorists. I don't think it is to
your doing, but that is the environment that you are working
in.
And if I may refer to ``The True Believer'' by Eric Hoffer,
going back to when you were school, and I am sure you read it,
he says in section 85 on page 107, ``It is probably as true
that violence breeds fanaticism as that fanaticism begets
violence. It is often impossible to tell which came first. Both
those who employ violence and those subject to it are likely to
develop a fanatical state of mine.'' And he goes on from there.
So I want to direct my focus on the nature of the beast.
How do we get people to understand that the terrorists are the
infidels and they are the pagans, the true pagans? How do we
get people to understand that?
And we can be talking about all the D's and the F's today.
That is a good subject for Democrats. You know it, and I know
it.
We could be talking about how many border guards there are.
I mean, when you look at the south, there is only one guard for
every 16 miles, since one-quarter of them are on duty at any
given time. We could talk about the north, where we have not
done the job, period.
We could talk about how many containers are being
inspected, or we could talk about the 9/11 Commission
recommendations that have not been implemented.
But, Mr. Secretary, I am interested in, what is the long-
term plan in combating terror?
We know that the Department of Homeland Security must be
thinking about working with other federal agencies to combat a
growing anti-Western agenda, both domestically and
internationally. People who are coming back from Europe,
friends of mine, are telling me that this is a true phenomenon.
Folks have turned against us, our friends. We can't ignore
this, when we are trying to protect our families and our
neighborhoods and our borders.
And my second part of that question is, besides what is the
long-term, what are we using in terms of resources? And this is
not a war issue, but isn't it true that the resources that we
use in Iraq could be strongly used to deter the terrorists and
to educate people as to who we really are?
How do we prevent terrorists? You know, we can't do this at
the end of the sword. You even said that when you got sworn.
You may not have used those specific words.
But how do you intend, how does your department intend to
prevent it? And I hope you don't mind me asking that question.
Secretary Chertoff. Well, let me begin by saying,
Congressman, I think we all want the same thing, which is a
safe America. So I never doubt anybody's motives. I think
everybody, on both sides, believes that. Sometimes there are
differences of opinion about how to achieve it.
I will give you my view about what we need to do.
I think, at the end of the day, we are in a struggle with
an ideology of hate, that is not susceptible to being reasoned
with. I can't tell you I fully understand the psychology of
what attracts people to convert to an ideology and become
suicide-bombers. I don't think it is just about economic
circumstances. I think a lot of it has to do with particularly
what goes on in the mind of young men.
But I think the long-term cure for that is to establish in
the world spaces for freedom and democracy and the rule of law.
I think, in the long run, where people live in an environment
where they do have freedom and they do have democracy and they
do have the rule of law, that is infertile ground for
terrorism.
And I think, even in the West, where we see homegrown
radicalism, it tends to flourish in societies where there are
ghettos of people who are denied opportunity.
One of the strengths of this country is, and something the
president said literally a couple of days after September 11th
is, we could not get misled into the treating the acts of a few
ideologues as a reason to condemn a whole community. And we
haven't done that, and that has been a very good thing.
But the second thing I would say, with respect to
resources, is this: For those people who have become
radicalized and who are hardcore ideologues and want to kill
us, I think that virtually anything will provoke them, whether
it is a statement by the pope or a cartoon or a comment on a
television. And I think trying to avoid the problem of terror
by running around worrying about what we might do to give
offense is a very self-defeating strategy.
I think persistence and constancy and steadfastness on the
battlefield are the number-one tool we have in order to win the
war against terror.
I would tell you, having looked at the history of this for
a long period of time, when we have been seen as retreating in
the face of the threat, the enemy has become emboldened. And
talk about open-source; they don't keep it a secret. They tell
you out front, ``We are going to chase the Americans out of
here. They are going to run with their tails between their
legs.'' Our friends begin to doubt our constancy, and our
allies are afraid to step forward in Iraq and Afghanistan if
they don't feel we are going to be there with them in the long
run.
So that steadfastness and the propagation of the rule of
law and democracy and freedom are, to me, the long-term
strategies to prevail in this--
Mr. King. The time of the gentleman is expired.
The gentleman from New Mexico, Mr. Pearce.
Mr. Pearce. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
As you know, I have been among the critics of the policies
on the border. I would report that I had my staff call this
morning to the border in New Mexico, and the family that was
putting the greatest pressure on us right across from Chepas,
Mexico--that is where the governor of New Mexico requested to
bulldoze because they were mounting so many efforts; 200 and
300 people a night were crossing this person's frontyard. They
stayed on us constantly.
We talked to them this morning, and they said it has been
weeks--weeks--since they have seen a single person coming
across. And I just want to compliment you and your agents
there, because I see the effect of the National Guard and I see
the effect of a long-term policy that you all couldn't state
previously. It was our office that put in the bill, the
homeland security bill that we sent across to the Senate about
6 months ago, that you had to have a coherent policy. And even
without legislation, I have seen Chief Aguilar now able to tell
that. And the results are showing up at the border today.
I would echo Mr. Souder's comments that methamphetamines
are now pouring across the border in a very refined form. We
have taken steps in this country to limit access to the
amphetamines. And the result is we have cut down a lot of the
local meth labs. We produce, on this side, when people are
creating meth, it is about 20 percent pure, 98 percent pure. So
we have got a lot of work to do.
I think my question would be if there is a need at the
border today because of the very solid program of catch and
detain and remove when possible, the reports are along our
border that we are out of holding space. And we are out of
holding space for people who are just coming across to look for
work. And it is pretty easy for our border patrol to
differentiate.
Is it possible for us to have some low-impact space that
goes up immediately and increase that detention space? The
tents, maybe, like the sheriff in Arizona has? These are not
people, I don't think, that are going to try to run and get
away; just people that we need time to process.
And so, that would be my first question.
Secretary Chertoff. I think we do have currently
sufficiently capacity. We look at, not tents, because tents
actually don't save you a lot of money, but we have looked at
temporary structures. And we are prepared to deploy those. And
I believe that the appropriation bill that is currently before
the Congress would allow us money for 6,700 additional beds.
But I want to come back to that Orantes case. If we can get
that injunction lifted, that is going to free up a lot of bed
space, because the amount of time we have to detain the El
Salvadorans will decrease.
So I think we can address this using the enhanced resources
that Congress has given us, or I think is about to give us, I
hope is about to give us, and some help with respect to these
old court orders.
Mr. Pearce. And that call that says that we are basically
out of detention space is also from today, so keep in mind that
we are doing pretty good work, but we are almost at a threshold
where it begins to deteriorate.
As I listened to the comments of my friend about what
causes terror, I always ask the people who declare that terror
comes from our policies here, I always wonder, ``Exactly what
is it that Sri Lanka does?'' A greater percent of Sri Lanka's
domestic airlines have been bombed than any other country in
the world, and they don't have policies that enter the Middle
East. They are a really docile nation.
So I appreciate your idea that steadfastness and strong
responses are a key to fighting the long-term war on terror.
The vehicle barrier that is going up, the National Guard is
putting up vehicle barriers. And I can tell you that I visited
Organ Pipe National Monument in the southern part of Arizona.
It is about a 300,000-acre national monument; 100,000 acres of
that have been restricted to American traffic. And the vehicle
barrier is beginning to work there too. They have already cut
it. We knew they would. But they put it back up when they come
through. And that four-inch pipe right there at windshield
level is a very good deterrent at 100 miles an hour, which is
what they have been doing.
So, again, we have got a long way to go. I know we are
going to have some periods of ups and downs. But I appreciate
what your office has done, the long-term focus, and especially
with the Pakistani solution and London, where we found before
they used a process rather than after.
So thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. King. The time of the gentleman has expired.
And now I am privileged to recognize the gentleman who has
shown extraordinary patience and forbearance in the past, not
always being reached, the gentleman from North Carolina, Mr.
Etheridge.
Mr. Etheridge. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And, Mr. Secretary, thank you for being here today. I know
your schedule is busy.
Mr. Secretary, in today's testimony, you list three things
as your priority focus, and you have touched on that: threat of
weapons of mass destruction, penetration in the country by
terrorists, and the risk of homegrown terrorists. And, of
course, we all are concerned about that and terrorism.
Having read the testimony, I just want to share some
numbers. ``9/11'' appears 21 times in your prepared testimony,
while the word ``hurricane'' appears just once. And I will tell
you in a minute why I was a little concerned about that. The
word ``Katrina'' appears not at all, ``Rita'' neither.
Just 1 year and 1 month after Katrina, I had to read 12
pages to find this half-page to discuss the natural disaster
preparedness and the response thereto. This half-page
represents about 4 percent of the 14 1/2 pages.
I ask that question, because in North Carolina we
understand hurricanes and tornadoes. We get hit a lot, as does
a lot of the East Coast and the Gulf Coast. And whatever reason
you happen to be disturbed, whether by a terrorist and natural
disaster, we are more likely to be hit by natural disaster than
otherwise. And preparedness is important.
What do you say to those who are out there and concerned
about it and to those who say that we are only paying lip
service, at best, to the risk of natural disaster?
Because I met with our preparedness people in the last
couple of weeks, and they are quite concerned that we really
aren't giving them the time and the tools to do it, on the risk
of natural disasters and having a balance.
Because I have to say that it is hard to conclude otherwise
when I read the testimony, because the testimony does not talk
about those issues.
Secretary Chertoff. Well, I will tell you, Congressman, if
you look at words like ``all hazards,'' which appears elsewhere
in the testimony, and if you look at the volume--and I am not
encouraging you to read all my speeches, but if you look at the
volume of speeches and other testimony I have given to
Congress, talking about natural disasters, all hazards, I don't
think I ever give a speech talking about the department and the
department's goals in which I don't explicitly say and repeat
maybe ad nauseum the fact that we are an all-hazards agency and
we focus on natural as well as man-made disasters.
I can tell you that, over the last year, I have spent a
very large amount of personal time working with Dave Paulison,
the director of FEMA, Admiral Johnson, the deputy director,
ensuring that we have done a retooling of that agency and
brought it to a level of preparedness never before dreamed of
by the people who worked in that agency.
That includes the capability to track truckloads of goods.
It includes real ability to have robust communication in the
field. I have actually met with Governor Easley personally. I
have been down to North Carolina a couple times, talking about
these issues. And the leadership of FEMA has been down there
quite a bit.
So I would venture to say that anybody who looked at my
calendar or the volume of things I talk about would have no
mistake about the fact that we are treating all kinds of
hazards, whatever the cause, as being a very, very significant
priority for this department.
Mr. Etheridge. But let me go back, Mr. Secretary. I don't
want to keep beating it, but I think it is important to
acknowledge that this testimony will be looked at. And 9/11 is
important, but when we do not mention hurricanes, an issue that
is more likely to hit people on the Gulf Coast, our coast, East
Coast, I think it is important that they get attention.
And when you talk about the issues all the time and then
you say ``all hazards,'' the people in the field do not really
believe you are talking about natural disasters.
Secretary Chertoff. I have to say, Congressman, I have
talked about natural disasters and Katrina so much over the
last year that, you know, sometimes I think my kids think they
have a sister named Katrina.
[Laughter.]
I mean, I have talked about this quite a bit. And I take it
very seriously. And I have logged thousands of miles traveling
down to the Gulf Coast. I have met with virtually every single
governor in a hurricane-affected region and talked to them
quite specifically about what their plans are and what we are
bringing to the table.
And also, by the way, I have been very clear to all of them
that we do not intend to supplant the primacy of state and
locals in natural disasters. And every single governor has gone
out of his or her way to applaud that vision.
So, you know, I don't know how many times I used the word
``all hazards'' in this particular testimony, but I think if
you looked at the totality of our actions and our words, it is
unmistakable that we have put a lot of emphasis on this.
Mr. Etheridge. Thank you. Thank you for your time.
I yield back. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. King. The time of the gentleman has expired.
The gentleman from Washington, the chairman of the
Emergency Preparedness Subcommittee, Sheriff Reichert, is
recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Reichert. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Good morning, good afternoon now, Mr. Secretary, and thank
you for being here.
I wanted to ask some questions that were specific to
Washington state and the district I represent.
As you know, on July 28th of this year, the city of Seattle
was shocked by the tragic shooting of members of the Seattle
Jewish Federation. It has been over 11 months since the
president signed into law the homeland security appropriations
bill for fiscal year 2006. And the $25 million appropriated for
security at nonprofit organizations still have not been
distributed.
And I just wanted to ask what the timeline on the
distribution of those funds might be and whether or not you
have considered, as our offices requested, a broader
application for those grants.
Secretary Chertoff. I did direct that they be distributed.
We received a letter from one of the umbrella organizations
that requested that we delay the actual distribution, because
it is multiyear money, until after the new fiscal year this
October 1. Because their view, which I think is probably
correct, is that the language in the new appropriations bill
would give us somewhat broader eligibility.
So it is really at the request of at least a significant
potential recipient that we have delayed for a few weeks.
Mr. Reichert. And then also, following up on Mr. Lungren's
comments and, I think, Ms. Jackson-Lee's comments on the
northern border, obviously Washington state shares a border
with Canada. And there is some concern from business members in
Washington state regarding the Western Hemisphere Travel
Initiative and the impact that the requirement of passports
might have upon business there.
And there has been a proposal made by members of the
Washington state business community that would use a driver's
license with either a barcoded technology attached to the
driver's license that would automatically access terrorist
lists and also criminal records lists.
Are you aware of that request, and have you considered
that?
Secretary Chertoff. I am, and we are looking at it.
The issue, of course, crossing the border, is our intent is
not to insist on a passport, but it is something that is
equivalent to a passport in terms of verifying citizenship. So
we are going to consult with the State Department.
We are obviously open to different solutions. We have
talked, in fact, about the possibility of driver's licenses
being one alternative if they reach a certain standard, which,
of course, Congress has mandated under the REAL I.D. Act.
So it is a proposal we are going to look at. Our interest
here is an efficient and inexpensive but nevertheless reliable
form of identification that achieves the recommendation of the
9/11 Commission and this Congress's mandate.
Mr. Reichert. Would a biometric solution be part of that,
considering your comments earlier in your testimony in regard
to identifying unknown terrorists? The barcode may not address
that issue.
Secretary Chertoff. Right. That is why some biometric
feature would be advantageous. And that is one of the things we
have to weigh, in looking at the proposals.
Mr. Reichert. One last question about grants. In your
testimony 2 weeks ago, before the Senate Government Affairs
Homeland Security Committee, you mentioned that, since 2002,
the department has provided $1.1 billion in risk-based grants.
Given your clear commitment to protect the critical
infrastructure, why have we seen delays in the announcement of
the critical infrastructure grants?
Secretary Chertoff. I think this year the process of, first
of all, going through the risk allegation and then processing
through the various proposals took almost the entire year.
And I am probably going to wind up giving a speech at some
point, talking a little bit more in-depth about what we are
going to do for grants this coming year. But I think one of the
great benefits we can give the local communities is coming to
a, kind of, settled vision of risk. And I think we are pretty
close to that now. I think we know what the high-risk areas
are. I don't want, every year, to throw everything back into
the pot and recook it.
As we come to more stability--we have our national
preparedness goals, we have our risk analysis--we can do this
quicker. And I think the quicker we get the guidance out, the
easier it is, first of all, to finetune the proposals, which I
think the communities have complained about and I think that is
a legitimate complaint, and then at the end we get the money
out several months earlier than we have in the past.
So I think we have built a base that will allow us to
address this concern this coming year.
Mr. Reichert. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. King. The gentleman yields back.
The gentleman from Florida, Mr. Meek, is recognized for 5
minutes.
Mr. Meek. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, good to see you here.
Mr. Secretary, we had about three hearings in the recent
months about dealing with cameras on the border. And I know
that you just pretty much, the department awarded the Secure
Border Initiative, SBInet. And, as you know, we had mainly our
hearings on the failing of ISIS and also American Shield
Initiative, which I believe $429 million of the taxpayer
dollars we spent, and we found that it was a miserable failure.
This new contract that has been awarded to Boeing Company
is, I believe, $2.5 billion. And not only the inspector general
but also the GAO has major problems, as it relates to the
department's ability to have oversight in the way that they
should have to protect the taxpayers' dollars and also, I would
add, protect the American people.
If you can, kind of, share with us, because I would hate to
continue to have these hearings talking about how we fumbled,
as it relates to oversight. We are talking $420-something
million; now we are talking $2.5 billion. What has the
department done to make sure that these dollars are spent in an
appropriate way and to make sure that we are on top of it, that
we are not playing after-the-fact if we had what we need?
And I think that the real question that I am asking here:
Do you have everything you need within the department to
oversee this particular contract?
Secretary Chertoff. Well, we took very seriously all the
lessons learned, going back a number of years through the
various programs that have failed because of a lack of
integration. And so, we begin with a strategic plan, and then
we decided to build an integrated approach. I mean, that was a
direct outcome of the lessons learned.
We also brought in and built up our procurement
capabilities, and we created a special program office for
running this program, which had not been done in the previous
program. So those were all institutional steps we took,
frankly, because of the lessons that you are talking about.
But beyond that, we have done several things with this
contract to address very specifically some of the criticisms of
past integrated contracts.
First of all, though, you used the figure $2.5 billion. The
contract does not have a dollar figure, because we are going to
negotiate each part of the contract as we go along. That will
give us the opportunity, although it will all be done within
the general framework of the overarching contract, to
substitute more competitive or more cost-effective sub-parts of
the contract, if, in fact, in our judgment, that is a better
fit for the American taxpayer.
So that avoids the problem where the integrator is given
too much authority and can start to spend the taxpayers' money
without oversight.
Through the program office, the operators are going to be
involved in evaluation at every step of the way.
And we are beginning with this 28-mile first element of the
contract, so that, between now and the spring, we can actually
see all this technology as it actually deploys in the
operational environment of the border. So if it turns out that
there is something that we have questions about, we can see it
early on in the process, not at the end of the process.
Mr. Meek. So, Mr. Secretary, I would take it that you have
your best people, as it relates to oversight, on this
particular contract?
Secretary Chertoff. We do. We do.
Mr. Meek. Also, reading you testimony, I noticed that you
mentioned the fact that we had 9,000 border agents; we now have
12,000; we are looking for 18,000 in the future.
Is that going to be enough border agents to be able to keep
up with SBInet? Because it is one thing to see illegal
immigration taking place, and it is another thing to do
something about it.
So you have the border agents and also you have the
detention beds that are there. Do you feel that everything is
on track to make that happen in the way that it should?
Secretary Chertoff. I do think it is on track. And I think
you are exactly right. I mean, the technology gives you the
detection; the agents have to do the interception. And I think
that it will free up more agents to do that interception.
Mr. Meek. Well, a part of our testimony that we heard from
members that represents the agents, they were saying in some
areas they had to shut the cameras down because they didn't
have enough personnel to be able to respond to the need.
So I look forward to hopefully hearing good reports from
this new initiative. But I can tell you that there will be a
hearing in November that will be dealing with this issue, and
hopefully you will be a part of that.
Thank you.
I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. King. The time of the gentleman has expired.
The gentleman from Texas, Mr. McCaul, is recognized for 5
minutes.
Mr. McCaul. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, thank you for being here.
And I was pleased to see that you awarded to the Houston
port authority a sizable grant, which was very much needed. I
know the chairman would prefer all of that money go to New
York, but people in Houston are very pleased with that.
I want to, first, commend you for what you have done on
catch and release. We have talked a lot about that in the
Congress. We passed legislation to end it. You didn't wait for
that. You went ahead and exercised leadership. We are in a
catch and return mode now. I agree, the Orantes decision, once
we close that loophole, it will close what I consider to be the
most dangerous loophole in our immigration policy.
However, there is one other that I wanted to focus on, and
that is the visa overstay issue. As you know, the hijackers
didn't cross the southwest border. They actually came into the
country legally. And they overstayed their visas. It is
estimated that 40 to 50 percent of the 10 million to 15 million
people here illegally have come into the country in that
fashion.
I wanted for you to comment on the exit program, as it
exists today. I do view it as, again, like catch and release, a
threat to our national security.
And tell us, on two issues: one, the exit program through
U.S.-VISIT, whether you will consider biometrics. I believe
that if you took the fingerprints, you could confirm this is
the same person.
And then secondly, the absconder program, which is a very
difficult effort to determine where are these people, as they
have come into this country. And what incentives,
legislatively, we could provide to require these people to come
back and reregister.
Secretary Chertoff. Well, I think U.S.-VISIT, of course, I
think we currently have it at 14 airports and a couple of
seaports and some land ports. It is a biometric-based program,
because the theory is you use your fingerprints to exit which
would match with the fingerprints you use to enter.
Another tool we have to track where the people are exiting
is, we are going to be moving to a system in the near future
where you have to swipe your passport in order to leave if you
are going through an airport of entry. And that will give us an
additional way to determine whether people have left.
One of the challenges with this system of regulating
comings and goings is that someone could fly in but then leave
through a RAN port of entry, where we don't at this point have
a significant amount of U.S.-VISIT because it would make the
traffic almost intolerable. So we have to work with that issue.
But the second piece is, when we know people haven't left,
what do we do about it? And that is where we have put
significant additional resources into hunting down fugitives
and absconders, whether it is students, for example, who don't
properly register with the schools that they are being admitted
to coming to, or people who are defying court orders who are
fugitives. We have significantly upped the number of agents who
are pursuing them.
So these are all areas where the application of additional
resources is going to be very helpful, in terms of reducing the
number.
But, frankly, tough internal enforcement in the employment
rules is also important, because it is that employment that
keeps people here. And if we crack down on those who
systematically violate the law, we are going to have an impact.
Mr. McCaul. Would enforcement mechanisms that we could put
in place be helpful? For instance, tie it to driver's licenses
that would have the date of the expiration be when the visa
expires, so their driver's license wouldn't be valid anymore.
Would things like that help?
Secretary Chertoff. I think things like that, which, for
example, with the REAL I.D. Act, which requires a valid
driver's license that actually has a real security for
determining identity and citizenship and your status, that is
exactly where we need to go and where we are headed.
Mr. McCaul. Okay.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. King. The gentleman yields back.
The gentlelady from the Virgin Islands, Ms. Christensen, is
recognized for 5 minutes.
Ms. Christensen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Welcome, Mr. Secretary. I am going to try to get at least
three questions in very quickly.
First, the University of Pittsburgh's Center for
Biosecurity has estimated that in order to bring the 5,000
hospitals that we have in this country up to a state of
readiness to be able to respond appropriately and adequately to
a bioterrorism attack, each hospital would need about $1
million apiece.
What is proposed for 2007 is far below what is needed, by
that estimate. And our public health systems, as well, are not
evenly or well prepared to respond.
So what is your plan for DHS, working with DHHS, moving
forward, to better prepare our country to respond to a
bioterrorism attack?
Secretary Chertoff. Well, I can't validate this study,
because I don't know anything about how accurate it is.
I can tell you, though, from our standpoint--we obviously
do partner with HHS. One of the major elements we are working
with is BioShield, which, of course, is the system that would
create market incentives for pharmaceutical companies to create
precisely the kinds of vaccines and antidotes that we would
need to respond to the major biological weapon threats.
I am pleased to say that, in the last week, we completed
all of the material threat determinations, which are necessary
to permit the program to be fully engaged. And so HHS now is
going to fund that.
Ms. Christensen. I wasn't going to ask this one, but in
BioShield, how does that reconcile with an all-hazards
approach? Here we are just completing the material threat
assessments for things that we know of. And we all know that we
can expect a virus or a bacteria or some agent that is altered,
new or manufactured.
So what is the all-hazards approach here? Because we are
only talking about seven or eight diseases, and we haven't
created anything new.
Secretary Chertoff. I want to be careful, because we are
getting into classified areas.
I do think we, obviously, want to focus on threats that
either have existed in the past, that could be weaponized, or
that could exist. Obviously you can't create a material threat
determination against a potential hazard that no one has ever
thought of or has never existed and we have no reason to think
will exist.
But we do try to stay ahead, being mindful of the fact that
we are in an era where people can use genetic tools to alter
microbes and viruses, and that is something we are mindful of.
Ms. Christensen. If I get a chance, I will come back to
that.
In your Roll Call interview, you said that there has been a
decrease in non-Mexicans and Mexicans crossing the border. Do
you have any hard data or intelligence to demonstrate that that
decrease is due to increased patrolling of the border and
security there, and not to using other entry points that are
not as secure or completely unsecured, like my border?
Secretary Chertoff. Well, I asked precisely this question
of the chief of the Border Patrol, who said to me that they
have, what they call, third-party indicators, which is crime in
the areas that are adjacent to the border and activity south of
the border that demonstrates people staging in order to come
across the border. And he said, looking at those third-party
indicators, it was his judgment that the decrease reflected a
deterrent effect.
But I also want to be clear, because I don't want to
declare victory too quickly: Smuggling migrants is a big
business for criminal organizations.
Ms. Christensen. Absolutely.
Secretary Chertoff. I anticipate that there will be a point
at which they may decide they want to take a run at us to see
whether we are really going to hold the line or not.
So I always caution people that, although we have good
news, as I think Congressman Pearce said earlier, there are
going to be ups and downs. There are going to be ebbs and
flows. And we have to be resolute. I think we will only really
keep this when the other side is convinced we really are going
to be steadfast.
Ms. Christensen. Or when all of our borders are secure.
Secretary Chertoff. Well, as we--
Ms. Christensen. May I ask one other question, though,
please, Mr. Secretary? I see that the budget for the chief
medical officer is proposed to be increased in 2007. I have
never been able to be very clear as to what that person's job
is or whether the expertise and the experience he brought to
the job is being well-utilized.
Could you tell me what you plan for that office?
Secretary Chertoff. We have a whole series of medical
issues that arise in everything that we do. To give you one
example, in working with other agencies on the planning for a
possible pandemic, avian flu, there are questions about what
the Border Patrol operations would be, if we needed to screen
at the border.
And in order to make intelligent decisions about that, we
need to have an understanding of the medical constraints and
the medical considerations. And I need to have someone in my
department who can make sure that, from our perspective, the
operational plans that we are putting into effect make medical
sense; that we are not assuming things about medical facts that
turn out to be wrong.
Mr. King. The gentlelady yields back.
The gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. Dent, is recognized
for 5 minutes.
Mr. Dent. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Good morning, Mr. Secretary.
I spent a little time down in Laredo, Texas, last month. I
was overall impressed with what CBP and Border Patrol are doing
with the resources they have available to them.
One thing I noticed, there was a lack of aviation assets
down there to help with surveillance. Do you think it might be
a good idea to incorporate other assets, like the Civil Air
Patrol specifically, to help us with surveillance on the
border? It seems like there are a lot pilots out there looking
for reasons to go up in the air. And have you given serious
consideration to CAP?
Secretary Chertoff. I have been asked about this. Of course
we don't own or fund the Civil Air Patrol, so money would have
to be appropriated through the agency that does. But volunteers
are good. My concern is always to make sure that whatever they
do is fully integrated with what we are doing. And also, we
don't want them to become an interference rather than a help.
So we are building our plan around dedicated assets, which
are not only our aerial assets for CBP, but also whatever comes
in the technology package we are going to be getting through
our SBInet, which will include some number of unmanned aerial
platforms.
And, you know, if there were money available and the intent
to get the Civil Air Patrol involved, I would certainly be open
to considering it, but it really has to be driven by
operational concerns.
Mr. Dent. Okay. My only observation was, down in Laredo, it
seemed that there were about a few airplanes and maybe a couple
helicopters, and that was it. And they needed some help.
On the issue of catch and release, I applaud what you are
doing there. You seem to have turned it into a catch-and-return
policy for people from countries other than Mexico.
With respect to Mexicans who are crossing--and you return
them usually that day--the president, at one point, indicated
that he wanted to repatriate Mexicans who crossed illegally
more deeply into the country. How is the department doing in
that effort?
Secretary Chertoff. We are doing that. We do have a program
with the Mexican government. I don't know if it is still in
effect. It tends to be seasonally based; it depends on the
seasonal flow.
Again, there, we have to reach an agreement with them about
the conditions under which people will be repatriated.
Historically, they have said when people volunteer for interior
repatriation, that is fine, but they haven't been willing to
let us make it mandatory.
And this is still a subject of negotiation. I think we
would, certainly with people at risk, we would really prefer to
mandate that they be repatriated to the interior, as opposed to
simply leave it up to what may be their flawed judgment.
Mr. Dent. And you had also, I think when Congressman
DeFazio was asking questions, you started to talk about Hong
Kong. You had visited Hong Kong. We hear a lot about that
screening program. It is my understanding it takes 6 minutes to
read each image, and that that was one of the problems with
that program.
In your testimony, you say that U.S. inspectors stationed
at 44 overseas ports now screen nearly 80 percent of cargo
bound for the U.S. before it reaches our shores.
Can you just give me your observations on the Hong Kong
program? What do you think are its deficiencies?
Secretary Chertoff. I mean, we do screen a lot overseas.
In terms of scanning, putting through the monitors, here
are the constraints you have: First of all, you have to make
sure that the land is not, itself, full of radioactive
material. Otherwise, if it is, in the screening you would have
to set the threshold so high it is not useful. You have to make
sure that the footprint of the port accommodates moving the
containers through a range of traffic. They are not
insurmountable, but they are obstacles in some ports.
So we are working with a number of ports, as we speak,
looking to achieve what I think we all want to achieve, which
is we would love to screen a lot of this overseas and scan a
lot of it overseas, but I can't tell you that it is going to
happen by a particular date, because the decision-making is not
entirely within the control of the U.S. government. But it is
something that, to the extent we can get done, is a high
priority.
Mr. Dent. But according to your testimony, it is 80 percent
of cargo in those SCI ports is being scanned--
Secretary Chertoff. It has been screened--
Mr. Dent. Screened, okay.
Secretary Chertoff. --overseas. And by the end of this
year, 80 percent will be scanned through radiation detectors in
our ports.
Mr. Dent. Our ports. Okay.
Another issue, you talked about vertical integration. I
hear quite a bit from my state and local officials in the
homeland security area about the ineffectual nature of some of
the information they get from the Homeland Security Information
Network.
What can you do to reinforce the confidence of our local
authorities that DHS is ready, willing and able to share
information in a way that is more effective?
Secretary Chertoff. I think one of the handicaps we had was
we had not fully deployed the classified network, so we
couldn't pass classified material over it. But we have started
to deploy that now. I think seven cities are getting it now.
And as we get that fully deployed, I think that will make
it a much more useful tool for the classified channel of
information.
Mr. Dent. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
Mr. King. The gentleman yields back.
I recognize the gentleman from Rhode Island, Mr. Langevin,
for 5 minutes.
And I will ask the gentleman from Nevada to assume the
chair for a few moments.
Mr. Langevin. If I could, I would like to just turn my
attention to the issue of radiation portal monitors.
Earlier this year, the Government Accountability Office
released a report indicating that DHS cannot meet its goal of
deploying radiation portal monitors at our borders and ports by
its target date of 2009, with the current funding levels.
Now, their report confirmed the Department of Homeland
Security's estimated cost of deploying these monitors as more
than $300 million short of the actual amount needed to acquire
and deploy the 3,034 monitors the department says it needs in
order to keep us safe.
Now, I worked very closely with Director Oxford at DNDO to
continue deploying this important technology.
So my question is, do you believe that there are adequate
funding levels for radiation portal monitors? And, if I could
just ask again, what steps are you taking to ensure that our
last best-chance technology will, in fact, be fully implemented
by 2009?
Secretary Chertoff. I believe we have adequate funding
levels. In terms of the technology improvement, we have begun
to acquire next-generation radiation detection equipment, which
I think goes by the acronym ASP, advanced spectroscopic portal,
which we will also ultimately use to substitute in some of the
existing radiation portal monitor spots. That is a little bit
more specific, in terms of being able to detect the isotope, so
you have fewer false alarms.
Now, that will not be fully deployed for quite a while. But
I believe we are on target to have almost 100 percent coverage
of the containers coming through our seaports by the end of
next year.
Mr. Langevin. I hope you won't hesitate to come back to
this Congress and make the case for more funding if, in fact,
we need that additional funding for 100 percent coverage at all
of our ports and border crossings.
The consequences are horrific if a terrorist is successful
in smuggling a nuclear device or weapons-grade plutonium or
highly enriched uranium obviously across our borders, which I
know you are well aware of. And it would be a shame if, for an
additional finite pool of money that we could provide, if we
are not getting you what you need.
I would like to turn my attention to the issue of
interoperability. In your testimony to the Senate earlier this
month and in the many subsequent interviews, you stated that
this is a two-pronged problem. The first problem involves
deploying adequate technology, and the other problem is getting
local law enforcement and first responders to effectively be
able to communicate.
Now, you have repeatedly stated that some of the rules in
place make it difficult for effective communication. So, on
this point, I would like to ask again what you are doing in
order to work with states and localities to standardize these
rules and promote optimal communication. And have you made any
progress on this, to date?
And on the technology side, do you think that enough money
is being spent to deploy interoperable technology?
Just on this one point, obviously being on this committee
and working very closely with my first responders back home,
this is an issue that they are constantly talking about, they
take very seriously. And Rhode Island, my home state, is making
significant progress in moving toward a statewide interoperable
communications system. In fact, we very well will be the first
state in the country to have a fully implemented statewide
interoperable communications system, again, provided the
funding is commensurate with the job.
But if you could address these questions.
Secretary Chertoff. I think, if memory serves me, we have
put about $2.1 billion in funding for interoperable
communications. There is a technology currently available that
allows you to bridge among these various types of frequencies.
So the technology is there.
But there are some communities which don't have it yet. So
we have undertaken a thorough survey, which is supposed to be
completed by the end of the calendar year, that will evaluate
not only just the technical means but the protocols and the
governance in our largest cities and all the 50 states to see
exactly what the gaps are.
If there are technical gaps, we can use some of the grant
money to fill those technical gaps.
By the way, what we will also do, frankly, is identify
those communities which have not been able to reach an
agreement on things like what code they are going to use, or
who is going to talk to who, or who is going to have the CON
when people are communicating with one another.
And, frankly, we don't have the authority to order people
to do this. This is the kind of thing that a fire department, a
police department, emergency management group have to agree
upon, or the mayor has to impose it. And I guess if they just
can't reach an agreement we could order it, but I am not really
sure what our legal authority to do that is. It is really
something we have to shine a spotlight on and get the community
to force the local leaders to reach those agreements.
Mr. Gibbons. [Presiding.] The gentleman's time has expired.
The chair recognizes Mr. Rogers.
Mr. Rogers. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And, Mr. Secretary, thank you for being here.
My subcommittee has spent a great deal of time over the
last 2 years looking at Border Patrol issues, and I would like
to start off my questions on that topic.
I have before me a list of courses that are taught to
Border Patrol agents. And I would like to ask you, Mr.
Secretary, do you believe that Spanish language courses can
only be effectively taught by instructors who are Federal
employees?
Secretary Chertoff. Spanish language courses? People teach
Spanish all the time who are not Federal employees.
Mr. Rogers. Okay. Do you believe that Spanish language
courses can only be taught by Border Patrol agents?
Secretary Chertoff. I would give the same answer. I mean,
my kids are taking Spanish, and they are not being taught by
the Border Patrol.
Mr. Rogers. How about CPR and basic life support? Must that
be taught by a Federal employee?
Secretary Chertoff. Again, I mean, it needs to be taught in
the context of the border by people who are familiar with the
particular constraints in a border environment, when dealing
with CPR and life rescue.
Mr. Rogers. Okay. And that can only be done by a Federal
employee who is--
Secretary Chertoff. I don't know who is available to teach
those things. But I know the skills that they need are they
have to be familiar with that environment.
Mr. Rogers. How about boxing fundamentals? Does that have
to be a Federal employee?
Secretary Chertoff. I think you could learn that in some
good gyms, probably, in New York and--
Mr. Rogers. Report writing?
Secretary Chertoff. I think you probably don't need to be--
well, I won't be humorous. But I think you don't have to be a
federal employee to teach report writing. You just need to know
what is required in the relevant report.
Mr. Rogers. Sexual harassment, HIV/AIDS awareness? Are
those two courses that would require a Federal instructor teach
them?
Secretary Chertoff. Not intrinsically.
Mr. Rogers. Physical conditioning or a course in firearm
safety and regulations?
Secretary Chertoff. Again, I mean, it has to be taught by
somebody who is familiar with the particular demands of the
Border Patrol job.
Mr. Rogers. And you are saying all the things that we all
know. It is just common sense. I could go on. There is a long
list of courses that are benign and can be taught in virtually
any academic setting, with the understanding that you have to
orient it to the subject matter of jurisdiction.
But the reason I raise these is, last night, the House and
Senate conferees to the Department of Homeland Security
Appropriations Act met to discuss the provisions of this
conference report. And they are including in this language a
provision that would classify instructors at the Federal Law
Enforcement Training Center as inherently governmental
functions.
My question to you is, do you support that provision?
Secretary Chertoff. Well, I haven't seen the language of
the particular appropriation measure, because I understand
conference has only reached an agreement; it hasn't been
released yet. So it is hard for me to give you an answer in the
abstract.
I think it is a policy decision, whether Congress believes
that this is the kind of thing that ought to be contracted out
or it is the kind of thing that ought to be done by people who
are fully employed by the agency. And--
Mr. Rogers. Well, no, this is more than a policy decision.
This is locking our hands. This is tying our hands and saying,
``These courses, in our position, must be taught by Federal
employees who are instructors as an inherently governmental
function.'' And, in my view, it is ridiculous to say that
teaching physical education is an inherently governmental
function.
Let me ask this, to put it in context. Post-9/11, the
Transportation Security Administration immediately needed to
train thousands of Federal Air Marshals to secure our airports.
Do you know how those FAMs were trained? Was it by Federal
employees?
Secretary Chertoff. I was not around then. I have
subsequently read newspaper articles that were critical of the
process that was undertaken. Although I think that, in fairness
to the people at the time, it was a crash program. And I think
the method undertaken was intended to produce a very fast
result under emergency circumstances.
Mr. Rogers. Exactly. And that is the big concern I have
with this provision that the conferees are considering, is
that, from time to time, we are going to have exigent
circumstances.
And it is my position that you, as the secretary, should
have the latitude to go outside the box, if you need to, to
meet the demands for training that we may have as the Federal
government.
This language, if it remains in the conference report, will
tie your hands and not give you that latitude. That is not only
a practical problem for you from a manager's standpoint, that
is a national security problem for this country, particularly
given the shortages that we have on the Border Patrol.
And I hope that we get a second round of questions, because
I would like to talk to you about the issues on the border and
how we are going to meet the goals that the President and you
have set by 2009.
And I thank you.
Mr. King. [Presiding.] The gentleman yields back.
The gentleman from Massachusetts, Mr. Markey, is recognized
for 5 minutes.
Mr. Markey. Earlier, in your response to Congressman
DeFazio and the question of why the department does not require
the screening of cargo containers overseas before they leave
for a port in the United States, you said that calling for the
screening of all such cargo for nuclear bombs over a 3-year
period would be like calling for a cure for cancer in the next
3 years.
I think that is a faulty analogy. I think the better
analogy would be that we called for the screening of all women
to detect whether they had breast cancer in the next 3 years;
to screen all American men to detect whether they had prostate
cancer in the next 3 years.
We are not calling for an elimination of nuclear bombs any
more than we would call for a cure for cancer. What we are
saying, though, is that there are detection devices that can be
put in place to protect Americans at an early stage against
cancer or against a nuclear bomb.
And what I find flawed in your argument is that you set
this up as almost an impossible standard, when we know that
Hong Kong has already demonstrated that they can detect, using
technology, nuclear materials, nuclear bomb materials on ships.
My fear is that while, Mr. Secretary, you are saying that
after the terrorists are in the air coming to the United States
from another country that it is already too late, that the same
thing is also true with a nuclear bomb in a ship heading for a
port in the United States.
Your administration opposed the amendment which I made to
require screening of all cargo for nuclear bombs before they
left a foreign port. I think it is a huge mistake. I think it
is a terrible signal, 5 years after 9/11. I don't think that
this Congress should leave without telling the American people
that we are going to solve that problem.
And instead, what you are saying is that it is like trying
to cure cancer, when in fact it is not. The technology exists.
The capacity to do it exists. The will of the American people
to have your administration use its leverage to have foreign
governments cooperate with us exists.
And yet, your administration takes the greatest threat,
that is, that loose nuclear materials overseas that could be
obtained and purchased by al-Qaida are placed on a ship and
brought to a port of the United States, which, at that point,
is just too late.
And I just think that your administration has not done the
job to protect us against the greatest al-Qa'ida terrorist
threat.
Secretary Chertoff. Well, I guess I would say you have,
kind of, a few false premises in this.
And I begin by saying, I think we all would desire to have
radiation scanning before things are loaded on ships. And that
is why we have been working very hard with foreign countries
and foreign ports to put precisely those measures into effect.
And we are doing that as we speak because we want to produce a
solution with real results.
On the other hand, I don't want to beat the analogy to
death, but it is a little bit like Congress mandating that
every foreigner screen themselves for cancer. It wouldn't be a
very effective mandate because Congress's writ doesn't run
overseas.
And to take the Hong Kong port as an example, I think, to
be candid, you are somewhat overstating the efficacy of what
they do in Hong Kong, in terms of their ability. In order to
make the throughput work, they had to set the bar so hard on
the radiation detection that it really wasn't terribly useful.
So we are looking at how to adjust that in a way that does make
it useful.
Among other things, for example, in some ports the ground
is so impregnated with inherently natural radioactive material
that you can't really run a radiation portal monitor
effectively because you are going to get a lot of false
positives.
Mr. Markey. By the way, there is already detection devices
available to be able to distinguish, using germanium detection
devices and other technology. That technology also exists, as
well.
Secretary Chertoff. And we are buying those. And we are
buying those.
Mr. Markey. That is what I am saying to you. You keep
throwing out these red herrings. We might as well put an
aquarium out here, there are so many of them floating around.
It goes to the central question, do you support the goal of
100 percent screening of cargo containers that could contain
nuclear weapons being screened coming into the United States
overseas? Do you support that goal?
Secretary Chertoff. We are--not only?
Mr. Markey. Do you support that goal?
Secretary Chertoff. I am going to give my answer. Not only
do we support it, but we are aiming at the goal of scanning the
maximum amount of cargo that comes in from overseas through
radiation portal--
Mr. Markey. But not overseas, Mr. Secretary.
Secretary Chertoff. No, no, I am sorry. What I--
Mr. Markey. Not overseas.
Secretary Chertoff. We are aiming at the goal of?
Mr. Markey. You are saying it is like curing cancer.
Secretary Chertoff. Well, I am not saying anything right
now, because--
Mr. King. The time of the gentleman has expired.
The gentleman from Nevada, Mr. Gibbons, is recognized for 5
minutes.
Mr. Gibbons. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary, for being
here today. I know that if some of us had our way, you would be
here every day; then you wouldn't get anything done and we
wouldn't get anything done. And I appreciate the fact that you
have got a big job ahead of you, and you are doing a yeoman's
work in trying to put it together.
We have talked a little bit today about the process of
grants. And we have talked about, just tangentially, the UASI
grants. And I want to publicly thank you for the time you spent
in my office earlier this year, talking about the Las Vegas
UASI issue.
And I know that there has been a process whereby
information now has been provided to your agency that wasn't
available or wasn't included in that grant process. And I am
hoping that, through that whole cycle of meetings and
discussions, that there has come about a procedure or policy or
even the ability to deal with information that is subsequently
added in to those types of grants.
And I certainly would appreciate that kind of consideration
within the department. Because not every grant is specific to a
specific community with the details that allows for you to have
the right information, and we understand that.
What I wanted to talk to you and ask a question about very
briefly is information and intelligence-sharing coupled up or
married with infrastructure today. Over the last several weeks,
we have had this part of our food or agriculture infrastructure
problem, the E. coli thing.
What important lessons has your department gleaned or
learned over the last few weeks, with regard to marrying up the
intelligence side of things, as we try to do, to be predicting,
to be out there working, with the infrastructure problem that
we saw with the E. coli attack here lately? Just discuss for us
a bit.
Secretary Chertoff. Well, we actually have, as part of our
infrastructure protection, we actually fund, I think it is in
the University of Minnesota, a program that has a means to
model and track outbreaks of food-borne poisoning or illness.
Now, obviously, Food and Drug Administration and USDA have
the principal responsibility for dealing with outbreaks of food
poisoning like E. coli. And I don't want to trench on their
area, but we obviously are concerned about poisoning or
something of that sort.
And the models would allow us to do pretty much what they
did with this outbreak, which is to track back the source.
Sometimes it is more difficult; sometimes it is less difficult.
But I agree, that is not, in and of itself, enough. And we
are in the process of constructing--we have gotten to the first
stage of this--a national bio-intelligence surveillance center,
which would fuse this kind of clinical data with intelligence
data, so that if, for example, you had an outbreak of a
particular food illness, and there was some intelligence coming
from overseas that someone was going to carry out a food-
poisoning attack, that would right away tell you something very
important that just having the clinical data wouldn't give you.
So I think you are exactly right in saying this ability to
fuse regular intelligence and the clinical intelligence is
important. And that is what our NBIS, national bio-intelligence
surveillance, project is designed to accomplish.
Mr. Gibbons. I yield back, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. King. The gentleman yields back.
The gentlelady from New York is recognized for 5 minutes.
And I would advise members that we have been told that
votes may start as early as 12:10. It will be a series of votes
that will take us through to 1:00, and I believe the secretary
has to leave. So I would ask members if they could try to be as
quick as possible.
The gentlelady from New York?
Mrs. Lowey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you, Mr. Secretary. You have a huge job, and I
wish you good luck.
As you probably know, for the last few years, I have been
talking to you and Kip Hawley, since he has been placed in his
position, that, to me, it is very irresponsible and unfortunate
that tens of thousands of airport workers don't have to go
through a metal detector. I do, my colleagues do, we all do.
But when they go into secure or sterile areas, they do not have
to go through metal detectors. This doesn't make any sense to
me at all.
And we know that, in the British plot, one of the workers
that were arrested wore a badge similar to the SIDA workers,
and they were allowed to go through, allowed to function. So we
know that this is a possibility, unfortunately. And we know
that some workers at many airports have been accused of all
kinds of plots. Okay.
TSA lifted some of the restrictions on liquid carry-ons,
including now allowing passengers to purchase liquids and gels
from within sterile areas--things like this liquid, this
liquid.
When you talk to Kip Hawley--and he has said this
publicly--that these items have been screened. Now, the
department previously stated that it doesn't have the resources
to inspect all airport employees and the goods that enter
sterile or secure areas.
So what is the story? Are they screening it? Are they not
screening it? Can Hawley's statement be verified by you, that
we are now screening all items that are entering sterile areas?
What about secure areas? If so, how are you able to do this now
if you couldn't do it a month ago? And are we now physically
screening all airport workers who enter an area, regardless of
whether they may have a SIDA badge?
It is very upsetting to me that we know there have been
incidents, certainly in London, incidents elsewhere, where
workers may have gotten a SIDA badge 3 years ago, and they are
allowed to enter these secure areas. Do you consider this a
risk?
And if we are allowing these objects to go through, why
can't we provide screening for all the workers?
Secretary Chertoff. Well, the SIDA badges, obviously to get
a SIDA badge you have to be background-checked. And in addition
to the badges themselves, there are in fact random inspections
and other measures that are taken to protect the secured area.
Goods that are shipped in, products that are shipped in to be
sold in the secure areas are, in fact, it is my understanding,
are, in fact, screened.
Mrs. Lowey. Everything is screened?
Secretary Chertoff. I can't tell you exactly what the
mechanics are, but my understanding is that the products which
are brought in to be sold are screened, so that if you are
going to go to a store and buy a product, it will have gone
through some kind of a screening product.
Mrs. Lowey. So 10 bottles of foaming face wash are
screened?
Secretary Chertoff. Well, the little bottles are what you
are allowed to bring in through the checkpoint.
Mrs. Lowey. Or you can buy them.
Secretary Chertoff. Well, you can buy anything there. And
everything in the sterile area is supposed to be, in some
fashion, screened or checked--
Mrs. Lowey. Excuse me. If I can get a written response to
that question--
Secretary Chertoff. Yes, I will get you a written response.
Mrs. Lowey. --I would like to know if every product that is
brought into this secure area is actually screened.
And secondly, what about these workers? They do get badges
every 3 years, but what happens in the interim? You are saying
that you have confidence that every worker who has that badge
cannot be a threat to the security of passengers who are going
to go on a plane.
Secretary Chertoff. What I am confident of is that there is
a layer of protections in place, involving not only the
background check for the badge but also involving the presence
of guards, the presence of dogs, the random inspections which
are being conducted of people who are employees who are coming
into the sterile area. And that, while no one of these is 100
percent fullproof, because nothing in life is 100 percent
fullproof--
Mrs. Lowey. Excuse me, Mr. Secretary. You know that there
were people with SIDA badges that were arrested at Dulles.
Secretary Chertoff. This was--
Mrs. Lowey. You know that. This was approximately about a
year ago.
Look, it seems to me, if we are taking every precaution, I
would like to know what it would cost and why we can't spend
that, when we are spending billions of dollars to make sure
that everyone who goes into a secure, sterile area goes through
a metal detector.
Mr. King. The time of the gentlelady has expired. I would
ask that the secretary give a written answer to that, since we
have, roughly, a 10-minute time frame here now.
The gentlelady from Florida, Ms. Brown-Waite, is
recognized. If you try to keep it to 2 or 3 minutes, then
everyone will get a chance to--
Ms. Brown-Waite. Yes, sir, I certainly will try.
Mr. Secretary, thank you for being here today. You have had
some tough questions, and I know you answer them to the best of
your ability.
On August 28th, I wrote a follow-up letter to you about
TSA's access control and perimeter security vulnerabilities,
exactly the same issue that Mrs. Lowey was raising.
I since have found out through some friends that I have
that a search was done of the Tampa airport workers about 18
months ago, and they found, I believe the person told me, about
20 illegals who had these badges.
I still don't have an answer to my August 28th letter,
which was a follow-up on the issue that I raised and Mrs.
Lowey, at the time, also was concerned about, that I raised at
the hearing.
I think what we need to be very careful of is that we are
not giving people a false sense of security. And I would like
to know when I can expect an answer to the letter--
For the Record
Prepared Statement of the Honorable Ginny Brown-Waite
Thank you Chairman King for holding this important hearing and
thank you Secretary Chertoff for appearing before us today to discuss
FY 2007 initiatives for the Department of Homeland Security.
I appreciate the work you have done for the Department, leading it
through some very trying times in the history of our nation. You have
gathered qualified leaders to help mold and shape legacy agencies to
face 21st century problems, like Chief Intelligence Officer Charlie
Allen and new Undersecretary for Science and Technology, Admiral Jay
Cohen.
However, I must share with you my concern that DHS is overlooking
several vital issues. For instance, I wrote you a letter on August 28th
detailing some of my concerns about TSA operations management. As you
know, the recent London terror plot involved an airport worker, and I
am very concerned that our airports continue to be vulnerable. I ask
that you take my concerns seriously and address this security gap in
future Department planning.
Additionally, I recently met with local law enforcement officers in
my district who are having trouble with ICE. State and local officers
are acting in good faith to enforce federal immigration law; however,
when they call ICE agents to pick up the illegal aliens they apprehend,
ICE is unresponsive. If we are serious about border security and
serious about ending ``catch and release,'' we cannot dump the problem
of arrest and detention on state and local law enforcement. They have
their hands more than full with protecting Floridians.
I know that Florida has an MOU with DHS so that state and local
officers can be trained and act as ICE officials in helping to enforce
immigration law, per the 287(g) program, yet that assistance cannot
take the place of an effective and responsive ICE force. Frankly, I do
not think I should be hearing from officers in Florida that we are
failing them, while at the same time we tout to the American people our
accomplishments in enforcing immigration laws and detaining illegal
aliens. I ask that you continue to oversee ICE's cooperation with state
and local law enforcement so that we can truly get a handle on our
border security, and have effective detention and removal procedures.
Finally, I must express to you my grave concern over a recent
report that ICE closed its Bradenton detention center in Florida. With
the number of illegal aliens overrunning our borders, I cannot
comprehend the reasons for closing a centrally located facility. I
understand that DHS officials are now forced to transport individuals
from the Tampa area over to Orlando and then they are met by other DHS
agents who bring the illegal to the Miami Detention Center. This is a
significant drain on DHS's precious resources and its agents' time.
Mr. Secretary, you know as well as I do that our national security
hinges on our border security. We cannot afford to be complacent in
this area. I look forward to continue working with you to secure our
nation's vulnerabilities and keep Americans safe.
Thank you, Chairman King, for the opportunity to speak with
Secretary Chertoff today, and I eagerly anticipate hearing about the
FY07 initiatives for DHS.
Secretary Chertoff. We will get it out?
Ms. Brown-Waite. --which was a follow-up to February, and
we are at the end of September here.
Secretary Chertoff. Well, I will see to it that you get an
answer in the next couple weeks.
Ms. Brown-Waite. Well, that is, I guess, at least a time
frame.
The other issue that I have concern about is, I understand
that a detention center for illegals was closed in Florida. And
it was the one down in Bradenton.
Let me share with you, I had a discussion with several law
enforcement members, sheriffs, a week and a half ago, who
expressed concern, they call it the ``I can't get there''
excuse when they call ICE. They have someone who is an illegal
alien--well, if you are closing detention centers, and for the
few that are transported they have to be driven over to Orlando
and then taken down to Miami, it is no wonder the response that
they are getting is, ``We can't get there.''
If you had to close a detention center, sir, good planning
would say that you had another one that you could have opened
up. And I really would like the answers to that.
Secretary Chertoff. Well, I can't tell you the specific
analysis of why they felt the Bradenton center was the best one
to close. I mean, we have increased the number of detention
beds, but the way we array them depends upon what the flow is
and what the demand is. So, the Customs and Border Protection
has to analyze what the usage is and whether we can combine in
a couple places.
Now, it is true that means there will be fewer places and
it may be a little bit more travel. But we can't afford to keep
centers open if they are not being fully utilized, because we
have got a limited amount of resources.
Now, I can respond to you and let you know what the
thinking was, specifically with respect to this center. But we
obviously all are trying to get the maximum usage and
efficiency out of the resources we get from Congress.
Ms. Brown-Waite. Let me just follow up on that. Apparently
it was because of some construction issues there that your
department felt it was a danger. But if it was a danger and if
it was necessary--and I am told that it was at capacity--then,
you know, we need to have something also in the Tampa Bay area.
Certainly other areas--you know, Texas, California, all
along the southern border--have problems, but we have problems
in Florida too. And I can just tell you that the morale of the
local sheriffs, when they get told, ``We can't get there'' or
``We don't have the manpower to transport them to Miami,''
doesn't send the right signal either to law enforcement or to
taxpayers or to members of Congress from the state of Florida.
Secretary Chertoff. Well, as I said, look, putting aside
the issue of the centers, there is a certain amount of manpower
that ISE has. And, as with anything else, there are competing
demands and priorities.
And, speaking about sheriffs, when I was a federal
prosecutor for over 10 years, we did not prosecute every single
case, because there was a limit on the amount of cases we could
bring. The agents didn't arrest every single person, because
there was a limit on the number of cases they could bring.
So I think the sheriffs understand, if they have been in
law enforcement, that we are always trying to focus on the
highest-priority things, and we are competing for those items.
Now, the appropriations bill gives us additional resources.
You can be assured we will use them effectively. But there will
always have to be some process of prioritizing.
Mr. King. The time of the gentlelady has expired.
The gentlelady from California, Ms. Harman, is recognized
for 5 minutes.
Ms. Harman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. King. And there are 9 minutes left in the vote.
Ms. Harman. And welcome, Mr. Secretary.
As I have been sitting here a while, I have reflected on
the fact that our committee, which few people thought would be
a serious and substantive committee, has really become a very
serious and substantive committee. And I want to thank you and
the ranking member and the hard-working staff for putting
together a series of extremely interesting hearings, including
today's, which gives us this chance to stop putting out fires
and look forward.
I am sure it is a relief to Secretary Chertoff to focus on
other issues than Katrina, although it was fair game to have
you focus on Katrina for the period that you did.
I was a strong support of this department, but, looking
back, I think we were extremely ambitious. And when you took
over, Mr. Secretary, you had a big challenge, to change
cultures in 22 agencies, to restore morale, to find better
management, and to impose a strategy on the place.
And some of your initial first steps were not perfect, but
I think it is much better. And I think you have made yourself
the public face of the department, which was a key thing for
you to do. And I want to commend you for doing that.
I also want to commend you for engaging personally with
many members of this committee, I would hope all of us, on a
nonpartisan basis to work on problems with us. That is
refreshing.
And in my case, for two trips that you made, so far, to the
Los Angeles area, to look at the ports, the airport, how TSA is
doing, how well schools are prepared, how we are doing with our
interoperable communications system and so forth. These are the
critical issues that communities like mine and communities like
everyone's face. And you have engaged hands-on, and it is very
welcome.
Everyone has questions, and it is late, but I wanted to
focus mine on port security. As we discussed as recently as
yesterday, it is critical that the House and Senate resolve
differences on the big bills that have passed.
Neither bill is perfect. I don't think perfection is an
option. I personally support the Markey amendment, but that is
not in these bills.
At any rate, I would like to ask you personally what
additional steps you are taking to engage with the House and
the Senate to see if we can close the differences and get a
conference report filed this week so we can vote on it this
week.
Secretary Chertoff. Well, first of all, let me say it is
not only a pleasure but it is always instructive to go out to
Los Angeles and talk not only with you but with the local
leaders. Because it is a great example of how everybody comes
together. That is a place where you do get a lot of
cooperation, and it is a real force multiplier. And I think the
public ought to be pleased with your leadership and the
leadership of your colleagues in the state and local
government, in terms of how they deal with things down there.
You know, we support the port bill. And I think it is
appropriate and timely to have port legislation. I have been in
discussion with people in both houses, as have others in the
legislative affairs office. What we want to do is, let's have a
ports bill. Let's not have a goulash bill.
And so, I think our impulse has been, although recognizing
that the legislative process does sometimes attach some
elements to a port bill that might not be strictly port-
related, if it becomes so much that it begins to weigh down the
underlying vehicle, then we begin to have a problem.
Not every issue is going to be addressed through this bill.
I think the bill, as it came out of the House, was a good bill.
Clearly, if there are some additional measures to be put in
place to address some related issues, like transit, that is
fair game. But it should be with a minimum of encumbrance and
micromanagement and things that would distort or unduly
micromanage the funding process.
So that is the message I am consistently carrying. And this
is very much, as you know, a work in progress. I am sure there
will be a lot of discussion over the next 24 hours about this.
Ms. Harman. Well, I hope we come to closure. The bill that
passed the House 421 to 2 was authored by this committee, and
it is a great credit to this committee. And, Mr. Secretary, any
more that you can do to close on this, to bring guaranteed
funding and layered container security to America's ports, I
think will be appreciated by the American people.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. King. I thank the gentlelady for her questioning. And I
just want to say to the secretary and to the gentlelady that
there have been strong bipartisan efforts to try to bring this
bill to fruition, and right now I am cautiously optimistic we
are going to go there.
I also thank the gentlelady for her modesty in giving the
committee credit for the bill, when it was actually hers and
Congressman Lungren's. And I appreciate that.
Ms. Lofgren, we have 4 minutes and 19 seconds to go. You
are recognized for as much time as you wish, up to 5 minutes.
Ms. Lofgren. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The terrorists who attacked us on 9/11 all came in with
visas, and many of them would not have been admitted had we had
a biometric system that alerted the inspector at the port of
entry that they were inadmissible.
And one of the things that I have focused in on, as you
know, is the utilization of biometrics.
In your opening statement, you indicated that we would be
moving to 10 prints on the IDENT system, which is good, since,
in 2004, 2 years ago, the inspector general's office in the
Department of Justice indicated that the IDENT watchlist with
the two fingerprints failed to identify more than 70 percent of
the criminal immigrants encountered by Border Patrol agents.
So I have some simple questions. When will we be fully
transitioned to the 10 fingerprints? When will we have U.S.-
VISIT deployed at all points of entry? When will we have the
exit system fully deployed?
And another issue: We had language in our authorization
bill last year and the year before, I believe, indicating that,
until we have benefits sorted and filed by biometrics in the
benefits section of immigration, we will not be able to fully
integrate this. When is that expected to be implemented?
Secretary Chertoff. Well, let me say, first of all, U.S.-
VISIT, in the two-print VISIT, which is identification
purposes, is fully deployed at all the ports of entry for
entrants. The 10 prints--
Ms. Lofgren. Including land entrants.
Secretary Chertoff. Yes, but it is only used in secondary
for land entrants, which is to say for non-Canadians and non-
Mexicans and non-Americans.
Ms. Lofgren. So is there a plan to fully implement it all
in?
Secretary Chertoff. I don't think we are going to require
Canadians and Mexicans to go through U.S.-VISIT. That would
essentially destroy cross-border trade, and I think there would
be an uprising from all the border states if we were to do
that. I don't think it is necessary because we are going to
address that through the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative,
where--
Ms. Lofgren. Actually, the Canadians told me and Mr.
Simmons they would prefer that to the implementation of a
document that they think is going to destroy communication
between--
Secretary Chertoff. I will tell you, I would be interested
to hear that, because I have never heard anything of that sort.
And I can tell you the time it would take to do that, given the
rate of traffic, would be just a huge, huge imposition on the
ports of entry.
With respect to 10-print, we are going to start rolling out
the 10-print machines in foreign consulates this autumn. And we
anticipate, in the next 2 or 2 1/2 years, having them in the
countries where we require visas and at the ports of entry.
But let me make clear, the idea is to capture the 10 prints
only one time. After that, the two prints suffice, because the
two prints will key in to the 10 prints which will be in the
database. You don't need to take the 10 prints each time.
So that is something we are looking to get done in the next
2, 2 1/2 years. And that is a very high priority for us,
because I think it really adds benefit.
Ms. Lofgren. What about the exit system? What is the bottom
line on that?
Secretary Chertoff. The exit system I think is more
challenging, because there are a couple of questions that have
to be asked about it.
First of all, is the value of the exit system commensurate
with the expense of deploying it? Obviously the point of the
entry system is to keep bad people out. But once people are in
the country, and if they get a 90-day visa, for example,
detecting their departure, while it may be very useful for
purposes of managing the immigration problem, it doesn't add
that much value with respect to terrorism, because someone will
carry out the plot on day 89 instead of day 91.
Ms. Lofgren. We have only got about a minute left. I don't
want to be rude, but we have to vote.
Where are we in terms of implementing the filing of benefit
matters by biometrics?
Secretary Chertoff. I will have to get back to you on that.
I don't know the answer to that.
Ms. Lofgren. I want to ask one other question. I had an
opportunity to spend some time looking at our consular
processes over the recess. And one of the things that struck me
was, in the homeland security act, we mandated that visa
security officers would be assigned in various consulates and
embassies around the world. And I believe they have only been
assigned in a handful, primarily in the Middle East.
Right now the consular staff does not have access to the
law enforcement information that the VSO officers would have.
Don't you think it would be worthwhile to delegate to the
consular staff that law enforcement clearance, so that they
could process these matters promptly? I mean, obviously, their
state department--
Mr. King. The time of the gentlelady has expired. I would
ask the secretary to give a very brief answer or submit his
answer in writing.
Secretary Chertoff. I am willing to consider that. I have
to talk to the State Department and see what their views are.
Mr. King. I want to thank the witness, Secretary Chertoff,
for your very valuable testimony.
I want to thank the members for their questions.
The members of the committee may have additional questions.
I would ask you to respond to these in writing. The hearing
record will remain open for up to 10 days.
The chairman again thanks the members of the committee.
Without objection, the committee stands adjourned.
We thank you, Secretary Chertoff.
Secretary Chertoff. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[Whereupon, at 12:24 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]