    [House Hearing, 109 Congress]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                            THE FUTURE OF CYBER AND
                       TELECOMMUNICATIONS SECURITY AT DHS

    =======================================================================

                                    HEARING

                                   before the

                            SUBCOMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC
                            SECURITY, INFRASTRUCTURE
                         PROTECTION, AND CYBERSECURITY

                                     of the

                         COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
                            HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                           ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS

                                 SECOND SESSION

                                   __________

                               SEPTEMBER 13, 2006

                                   __________

                               Serial No. 109-102

                                   __________

           Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security

    [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TONGRESS.#13

      Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/
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                         COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY

                       Peter T. King, New York, Chairman

    Don Young, Alaska                    Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
    Lamar S. Smith, Texas                Loretta Sanchez, California
    Curt Weldon, Pennsylvania            Edward J. Markey, Massachusetts
    Christopher Shays, Connecticut       Norman D. Dicks, Washington
    John Linder, Georgia                 Jane Harman, California
    Mark E. Souder, Indiana              Peter A. DeFazio, Oregon
    Tom Davis, Virginia                  Nita M. Lowey, New York
    Daniel E. Lungren, California        Eleanor Holmes Norton, District of
    Jim Gibbons, Nevada                  Columbia
    Rob Simmons, Connecticut             Zoe Lofgren, California
    Mike Rogers, Alabama                 Sheila Jackson-Lee, Texas
    Stevan Pearce, New Mexico            Bill Pascrell, Jr., New Jersey
    Katherine Harris, Florida            Donna M. Christensen, U.S. Virgin
    Bobby Jindal, Louisiana              Islands
    Dave G. Reichert, Washington         Bob Etheridge, North Carolina
    Michael McCaul, Texas                James R. Langevin, Rhode Island
    Charlie Dent, Pennsylvania           Kendrick B. Meek, Florida
    Ginny Brown-Waite, Florida

            .........................................................

       Subcommittee on Economic Security, Infrastructure Protection, and
                                 Cybersecurity

                    Daniel E. Lungren, California, Chairman

    Don Young, Alaska                    Loretta Sanchez, California
    Lamar S. Smith, Texas                Edward J. Markey, Massachusetts
    John Linder, Georgia                 Norman D. Dicks, Washington
    Mark E. Souder, Indiana              Peter A. DeFazio, Oregon
    Mike Rogers, Alabama                 Zoe Lofgren, California
    Stevan Pearce, New Mexico            Sheila Jackson-Lee, Texas
    Katherine Harris, Florida            James R. Langevin, Rhode Island
    Bobby Jindal, Louisiana              Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
    Peter T. King, New York (Ex          (Ex Officio)
    Officio)

                                      (II)
                                C O N T E N T S

                                  ----------
                                                                       Page

                                   Statements

    The Honorable Daniel E. Lungren, a Representative in Congress
      From the State of California, and Chairman, Subcommittee on
      Economic Security, Infrastructure Protection, and
      Cybersecurity:
      Oral Statement.................................................     1
      Prepared Opening Statement.....................................     2
    The Honorable Loretta Sanchez, a Representative in Congress From
      the State of California, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on
      Economic Security, Infrastructure Protection, and Cybersecurity     3
    The Honorable Norman D. Dicks, a Representative in Congress From
      the State of Washington........................................    39
    The Honorable Sheila Jackson-Lee, a Representative in Congress
      From the State of Texas........................................    43
    The Honorable Stevan Pearce, a Representative in Congress From
      New Mexico.....................................................    55
    The Honorable Mark E. Souder, a Representative in Congress From
      the State Indiana..............................................    51

                                   Witnesses
                                    Panel I

    The Honorable George Foresman, Undersecretary for Preparedness,
      U.S. Department of Homeland Security:
      Oral Statement.................................................     4
      Prepared Statement.............................................     6
    Mr. David Powner, Director, Information Technology Management
      Issues, Government Accountability Office:
      Oral Statement.................................................     9
      Prepared Statement.............................................    12

                                    Panel II

    Mr. David Barron, Chair, Telecommunications Sector Coordinating
      Council:
      Oral Statement.................................................    93
      Prepared Statement.............................................    95
    Mr. Guy Copeland, Chair, Information Technology Sector,
      Coordinating Council:
      Oral Statement.................................................    80
      Prepared Statement.............................................    82
    Mr. Paul B. Kurtz, Executive Director, Cyber Security Industry
      Alliance:
      Oral Statement.................................................    74
      Prepared Statement.............................................    75
    Mr. William Pelgrin, Director, New YorK State Office of Cyber
      Security and Critical Infrastructure:
      Oral Statement.................................................    58
      Prepared Statement.............................................    60

              THE FUTURE OF CYBER AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS SECURITY

                                     AT DHS

                                  ----------

                         Wednesday, September 13, 2006

                         U.S. House of Representatives,
                        Committee on Homeland Security,
             Subcommittee on Economic Security, Infrastructure
                                 Protection, and Cybersecurity,
                                                        Washington, DC.
        The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 3:21 p.m., in
    Room 2212, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Daniel Lungren
    [chairman of the subcommittee] presiding.
        Present: Representatives Lungren, Souder, Pearce, Sanchez,
    Dicks, and Jackson-Lee.
        Mr. Lungren. [Presiding.] I would like to welcome everyone
    this afternoon to the Subcommittee on Economic Security,
    Infrastructure Protection and Cybersecurity of the Homeland
    Security as hearing on the future of cyber and
    telecommunications security at Department of Homeland Security.
        The security of information infrastructure has not received
    the emphasis that it deserves, in spite of the fact that our
    economy and our nation's preparedness is so dependent on this
    technology.
        Two days ago, this country commemorated the 5-year
    anniversary of the worst terrorist attack on American soil. The
    attacks of 9/11 not only killed thousands of American citizens,
    but also targeted our way of life.
        Those responsible have vowed to continue to attack our
    country and our economy.
        Information and communications technology are a prime
    target for those intending to do us harm and a successful
    terrorist attack could cause immeasurable danger and damage to
    our everyday lives, for example, disrupt our electrical power
    supply or disrupt our ability to respond to emergencies.
        The Department of Homeland Security has been designated the
    point of government contact for the critical infrastructure
    owners and operators within both the information technology
    sector and the telecommunications sector.
        It is, therefore, incumbent upon the department to develop
    an organization that can work effectively with these two
    critical sectors to protect the assets under their control that
    benefit the entire country.
        This committee has been critical of the department's
    priorities regarding cybersecurity and telecommunications in
    the past and has called for the creation of an assistant
    secretary for these issues to ensure their visibility within
    the department.
        Disappointingly, it has been over a year since the
    secretary announced the creation of acting secretary for
    cybersecurity and telecommunications, and, yet, the position
    has not been filled.
        We are concerned the department has not been as effective
    as possible in ensuring the security and resiliency of our
    information infrastructure or its efficient reconstitution in
    the case of an incident of national significance.
        We have been fortunate enough not to have suffered a
    debilitating information infrastructure incident, but we cannot
    rely upon good fortunate alone. We must create a strong,
    focused organization to ensure our cyber assets our protected
    and to enable us to respond effectively to a cyber incident.
        Today we will hear from Undersecretary for Preparedness
    George Foresman, to whom the yet to be named assistant
    secretary will report. And we look forward to hearing your
    vision for the department with regard to these important
    issues.
        We will also hear from David Powner, with the Government
    Accountability Office, who has reviewed the department's
    programs and priorities for the past several years and will
    present their findings and recommendations for going forward.
        On our second panel, we will hear from William Pelgrin, the
    director of New York State's Office of Cybersecurity and
    Critical Infrastructure Coordination. He has experience in
    running a government organization task, with coordinating the
    protection of information infrastructure, and will provide
    important insight on how this can be done successfully.
        Also, Mr. Paul Kurtz, executive director of the
    Cybersecurity Industry Alliance, will provide a private sector
    perspective on the department's leadership, priorities and
    programs.
        We will also hear from Guy Copeland, the chairman of the
    Information Technology Sector Coordinating Council, and David
    Barron, the chairman of the Telecommunications Sector
    Coordinating Council.
        Both of these gentlemen have extensive experience with
    managing critical information infrastructure and dealing with
    the department and they will provide private sector
    expectations and priorities for the future.
        I would like to thank all the witnesses for joining us
    today, look forward to hearing everyone's testimony.
        Before recognizing the ranking member, Ms. Sanchez, for any
    opening statement she may wish to make, I give everybody
    permission to take their coats off, because I don't know why we
    decided that we need to heat the place up in September in
    Washington, D.C. But someone has evidently thought that was a
    good thing.

           Prepared Opening Statement of the Honorable Daniel Lungren

        I would like to welcome everyone this afternoon to the Subcommittee
    on Economic Security, Infrastructure Protection, and Cybersecurity of
    the Committee on Homeland Security's hearing on the future of cyber and
    telecommunications security at the Department of Homeland Security.
        The security of our information infrastructure has not received the
    emphasis that it deserves, in spite of the fact that our economy and
    our nation's preparedness is so dependent on this technology.
        Two days ago this country commemorated the five year anniversary of
    the worst terrorist attack on American soil.
        The attacks of 9/11 not only killed thousands of American citizens
    they also targeted our way of life. Those responsible have vowed to
    continue to attack our Country, and our economy.
        Information and communications technology are a prime target for
    those intending to do us harm.
        A successful terrorist attack could cause immeasurable damage to
    our everyday lives, for example, disrupt our electrical power supply or
    disrupt our ability to respond to emergencies.
        The Department of Homeland Security has been designated the point
    of governmental contact for the critical infrastructure owners and
    operators within both the information technology sector and the
    telecommunications sector.
        It is therefore incumbent upon DHS to develop an organization that
    can work effectively with these two critical sectors to protect the
    assets under their control that benefit the entire country.
        This Committee has been critical of the Department's priorities
    regarding cybersecurity and telecommunications in the past and has
    called for the creation of an Assistant Secretary for these issues to
    ensure their visibility within the department.
        It has been over a year since the Secretary announced the creation
    of an Assistant Secretary for Cyber Security and Telecommunications and
    yet the position has not been filled.
        I am concerned that the Department has not been as effective as
    possible in ensuring the security and resiliency of our information
    infrastructure or its efficient reconstitution in the case of an
    incident of national significance.
        We have been fortunate enough not to have suffered a debilitating
    information infrastructure incident, but we can not rely upon good
    fortune alone; we must create a strong, focused organization to ensure
    our cyber assets are protected and to enable us to respond effectively
    to a cyber incident.
        Today we will hear from Under Secretary for Preparedness, George
    Foresman, to whom the yet to be named Assistant Secretary will report.
    I look forward to hearing his vision for the Department with regard to
    these important issues.
        We will also hear from David Powner with the Government
    Accountability Office who has reviewed the Department's programs and
    priorities for the past several years and will present their findings
    and recommendations for going forward.
        On our second panel we will hear from William Pelgrin the Director
    of New York State's Office of Cyber Security and Critical
    Infrastructure Coordination. Mr. Pelgrin has experience in running a
    government organization tasked with coordinating the protection of
    information infrastructure and will provide important insight on how
    this can be done successfully.
        Also, Mr. Paul Kurtz, the Executive Director of the Cyber Security
    Industry Alliance will provide a private sector perspective on the
    Department's leadership, priorities and programs.
        We will also hear from Guy Copeland, the chairman of the
    Information Technology Sector Coordinating Council and David Barron the
    chairman of the Telecommunications Sector Coordinating Council. Both of
    these gentlemen have extensive experience with managing critical
    information infrastructure and dealing with the Department. They will
    provide private sector expectations and priorities for the future.
        I would like to thank all our witnesses for joining us today.
        I look forward to hearing everyone's testimony, and I now recognize
    the Ranking Member, Ms. Sanchez, for any opening statement she may wish
    to make.

        Ms. Sanchez?
        Ms. Sanchez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for
    agreeing to hold this hearing. I think it is an incredibly
    important one.
        As you know, cybersecurity is a critical issue that I
    believe deserves a lot more attention than this committee and
    others have been paying to it, and I think it also needs a lot
    more resources than we have devoted to it in the Department of
    Homeland Security.
        Our whole infrastructure, when you think about business
    these days, relies on secure information networks, so that we
    can ensure that reliable operations of water systems,
    electrical grids, emergency response systems, Internet,
    everything.
        In addition, for many Americans, it is really a part of
    their lives. This is the way we communicate. And,
    unfortunately, I think that the information networks that we
    have that we really rely on are really big areas for attack.
        And, you know, we are not talking about maybe losing
    people, but we are talking about an economic crunch that would
    happen to our nation. And I am always just as concerned that
    the terrorists affect us economically, because then I think
    they will have won this issue of trying to come after our
    lifestyle.
        So I am looking forward to hearing from our witnesses.
    There is a lot of issues that I am concerned with with respect
    to cybersecurity. I want to find out when the assistant
    secretary for cybersecurity and telecommunications is going to
    be appointed.
        I think the position has been open over a year now. I also
    know that there are a lot of titles in this area that are still
    acting and I want to find out when we are going to see more
    permanent appointments of people, because I think that this is
    just one little piece, but it sends a really big message.
        Do we take cybersecurity seriously? And when we have acting
    and empty spots, et cetera, then I think we are not devoting
    the resources we need. And, lastly, do we have the right
    resources for the department? And I look forward to discussing
    these.
        Thank you for calling this hearing, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Lungren. I thank the gentlelady for her comments.
        I might say that I know the ranking member of the full
    committee and the chairman of the full committee wish they
    could be here. They are on the floor right now managing time on
    the bill commemorating 9/11 and the efforts of Congress
    thereafter.
        The chair now recognizes Mr. George Foresman, the
    undersecretary for preparedness, to testify.

    STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE GEORGE FORESMAN, UNDERSECRETARY FOR
             PREPAREDNESS, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

        Mr. Foresman. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Sanchez, and
    members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to
    appear today to discuss cyber and telecommunications security.
        Before I begin, I would very much like to acknowledge this
    committee's exceptional leadership and dedication to
    strengthening the cybersecurity of our nation.
        Mr. Chairman, I look forward to working closely with this
    committee to receive your guidance and to collaborate as we
    continue the process that we have already made.
        You have my written statement and I offer that for the
    record.
        I would like to briefly, though, highlight several points.
    First, there has, in fact, been much discussion about the
    department's ability to find and hire a qualified individual to
    serve as the assistant secretary for cyber and
    telecommunications security.
        I want to be very clear. This has been and remains a top
    priority for the department. We are, in fact, in the final
    stages of a security review process for a candidate that we
    feel is very well qualified. We look forward to announcing the
    candidate with Congress very soon and I am confident that this
    individual will continue to build on the progress that is being
    made every day.
        Second, today, the department is releasing its after action
    report from our recent government, private sector, national and
    international cybersecurity exercise, Cyberstorm.
        This report will measurably advance refinements to
    operational protocols and our coordination between the public
    sector and the private sector.
        Its lessons will not simply be documented. They will be
    implemented.
        Third, telecommunication networks and information
    technology activities are both mutually dependent and
    interdependent. They have, in fact, converged. By the end of
    the year, we will complete our efforts to collocate together
    the U.S. computer emergency readiness team and the national
    coordination center for telecommunications to improve
    operational coordination.
        This means better coordination among all levels of
    government and better coordination between government and the
    private sector during threats and actual events.
        Secretary Chertoff said last week, in his speech that
    reflected on the 5 years since 9/11, the way to protect the
    critical infrastructure is to work in partnership with federal,
    state and local officials, and with the private sector folks
    who actually own the things that we are trying to protect.
        This collaboration is key to our approach to protecting
    telecommunications and cyber infrastructure. We remain resolute
    in our approach that will balance the security of the nation
    against the economic security of the nation.
        Last month, our cybersecurity experts worked quietly with
    their counterparts at Microsoft to address critical software
    vulnerability. Microsoft was competent in their partnership
    with DHS and quickly brought this to our attention.
        While Microsoft worked over several weeks to develop a
    patch, our U.S. CERT was quietly and effectively monitoring
    Internet activity to ensure the vulnerabilities were not being
    exploited.
        At the same time, the department was working domestically
    and internationally with our private sector partners and public
    sector partners to mitigate terrorist threats associated with
    the British airline plot.
        These two concurrent actions are just examples of many of
    the day-to-day public and private sector activities taking
    place in the department's preparedness efforts.
        Maintaining these types of collaborations remains, as you
    know, as it relates to cybersecurity and telecommunications
    security, a multi-dimensional challenge. From personal
    computers in homes to vast networks to control systems to the
    Internet, cyber and telecommunications security presents
    enormous challenges.
        These challenges are obvious: prioritizing our work,
    partnering for effective collaboration, balancing security and
    economic considerations, and, most notably, increasing
    understanding.
        The other witnesses today will add clarity to this points
    from varying perspectives. I think it is safe to say, however,
    there is no one that will appear before you today that does not
    share the belief that protecting America's cyber and
    telecommunications systems is as critical to national security
    as it is to citizen security.
        I want to be clear, Mr. Chairman and members of the
    subcommittee. Progress is being made every day. There is more
    to be done.
        Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, as you well
    know, the security of America's cyber and telecommunications
    systems do not lend themselves to surrounding one building with
    heavily armed police officers or simply mandating an action and
    we are safe.
        Simply put, there is no magic bullet.
        In closing, the success of our national cyber and
    telecommunications security efforts depend on unity of purpose
    and continuing public/private sector collaboration. This is
    serious business and we are serious about this business.
        We look forward to continuing discussions with Congress on
    the wide range of policy issues that we must confront together.
        Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.
        [The statement of Mr. Foresman follows:]

                   Prepared Statement of Hon. George Foresman

        Good morning, Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee. Thank
    you for inviting me to speak about cyber security and the recovery and
    reconstitution of critical networks in the event of a catastrophic
    Internet disruption.
        One of the most pressing challenges facing the Department of
    Homeland Security is preparing for attacks on the Internet and the
    information networks supporting our critical infrastructure. Our
    vision, our philosophy, and our strategy for preventing, responding to,
    and recovering from cyber attacks reflect the expanding importance of
    communications and the information infrastructure in all aspects of our
    lives today. Policies that advance a safe and secure communications
    infrastructure rely on fostering valuable relationships between the
    public and private sectors, and promoting public trust and confidence.
    Strong policies also project stability and strength to those who wish
    us harm.
        The key to continued success is partnering strategically with the
    communications and information technology sectors, end-users of
    Internet technologies, and other experts.
        During the past several weeks our cyber security experts worked
    quietly with their counterparts at Microsoft to address a critical
    software vulnerability first identified to us by the Department of
    State's cyber defense team. In the interim between identification of
    the vulnerability and development of the solution, the Department was
    closely monitoring technical indicators for indications of additional
    exploitation of the vulnerability. Once a patch was available, the
    Department's U.S. Computer Emergency Readiness Team (US-CERT)
    coordinated an alert with Microsoft. DHS issued an alert through the
    National Cyber Alert System urging the public, private industry, as
    well as federal users to apply the security patch in order to protect
    their systems. Overshadowed in the news media by the successful foiling
    of the U.K. terror threat, this collaboration is typical of the kind of
    behind-the-scenes, day-to-day public-private cyber security activity
    that exemplifies the work being accomplished between the Department and
    so many of our strategic partners.
        These partnerships also entail strengthening cooperation across the
    government institutions and, at a minimum, finding ways to cultivate
    support outside of the Department where expertise clearly exists. We
    are actively collaborating with 116 private firms. We are working
    closely with the private sector entities established within the
    National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) framework to collaborate
    on risk management, including the Information Technology (IT) Sector
    Coordinating Council (SCC) and the Telecommunications SCC. From an
    operational perspective, we work with the Information Technology
    Information Sharing and Analysis Center (IT-ISAC) and the National
    Coordinating Center (NCC)/Telecommunications ISAC through various
    information sharing mechanisms, including the US-CERT Portal. Our
    partners, both public and private, are involved in a number of
    programmatic activities that address software assurance, Internet
    disruption, as well as exercises such as Cyber Storm.
        In addition, there are about 400 firms that are part of the Process
    Control Systems Forum, which was recently transferred from Science and
    Technology Directorate to National Cyber Security Division (NCSD) and
    addresses Control Systems security. There are 21 associations that we
    work with on a regular basis that represent hundreds of companies,
    including large enterprises and smaller companies. Whether public or
    private, these partnerships must deliver real and measurable value in
    light of the catastrophic damages that could occur to our national
    cyber assets if we do not collaborate effectively.
        Finally, we must reinforce a culture of preparedness and
    increasingly shift from a reactive to a proactive stance. In sum, we
    must prepare by promoting effective security strategies that evolve as
    the risks evolve.

        Assistant Secretary for Cyber Security and Telecommunications

        Mr. Chairman, the Committee has expressed as a priority the
    designation of the Assistant Secretary for Cyber Security and
    Telecommunications, and has communicated interest in the Department's
    plan to fill this vacancy.
        Mr. Chairman, the Department shares the Committee's view on the
    importance of filling the position of Assistant Secretary for Cyber
    Security and Telecommunications with a qualified candidate.
        Given the complexity of the portfolio, we believe it is important
    to fill this position with a person of necessary talent and expertise
    who understands both policy and technology issues regarding cyber
    security and telecommunications and can further strengthen our national
    efforts.I am personally engaged in this process and, in the interim, am
    providing program direction to the talented men and women who are part
    of our NCSD and National Communications System (NCS). Because of the
    importance of our mission, all parties want to ensure that the
    individual appointed to this position possesses the right combination
    of skills, experience, and leadership necessary to succeed.
        In the interim, I want to assure you, Mr. Chairman, that I am
    personally overseeing strategic management objectives associated with
    NCSD and specifically Internet recovery. These include, by way of
    example:
             Positioning the NCSD, especially the US Computer
            Emergency Readiness Team (US-CERT), and the NCS so these
            organizations are structured to be at the forefront of
            preventing, responding to, and recovering from massive Internet
            disruptions. Just as FEMA is on point for coordinating disaster
            response, and the Coast Guard is on point for coordinating the
            response to an oil spill, key experts like NCS and NCSD must be
            capable of coordinating our response to events that target the
            Internet;
             Re-aligning CS&T component entities to create a
            cohesive organization. The NCS and NCSD (including the US-CERT
            and the NCC) must more fully synchronize their activities,
            without a loss of either's core mission capabilities.
            Communications convergence, threats against the communications
            infrastructure, the increasing use of Voice over Internet
            Protocol (VOIP) for emergency communications purposes, and
            other influences demand that we merge the work of these
            entities to create new and stronger synergies and;
             Ensuring resources are sufficiently allocated to meet
            new needs. I am personally overseeing the development of a
            budget strategy that spans the next five years. This strategy
            is essential for shepherding CS&T priority programs into the
            next decade.

        Information Sharing and Internet Recovery
        Mr. Chairman, the Committee has communicated interest in the
    programs within the Department that are designed to improve information
    sharing regarding the recovery of the Internet
        We fully recognize the challenges inherent in our preparedness
    responsibilities. As the President stated in the National Strategy to
    Secure Cyberspace, it is the policy of the United States to protect
    against ``the debilitating disruption of the operation of information
    systems for critical infrastructures and, thereby, help to protect the
    people, economy, and national security of the United States.'' The
    strategy also underscores the importance of partnering with the private
    sector as well as State, local, and tribal governments to effectuate
    this policy.
        On my fourth day as Undersecretary for Preparedness, I met with the
    Business Roundtable to discuss strategic collaboration and their
    Internet reconstitution study. We outlined a 120-day plan to advance
    our collaboration on this important work and continue to work in tandem
    with the Roundtable as they expand their efforts to focus on business
    needs and issues regarding Internet recovery and reconstitution in the
    coming year. The timeframes for specific actions and results will be
    the topic of more discussion with the Business Roundtable in the next
    several months. That effort supplements the work we are doing with the
    IT-SCC and the Telecommunications SCC under the NIPP to address
    Internet protection and prioritization as part of our collaborative
    approach to risk management in the core sectors for the Internet.
        US-CERT, NCC & the NAIRG
        In addition to coordinating with the Business Roundtable, our
    outreach specifically focuses on building relationships with private
    industry owners and operators of the Internet and information networks.
    For example, the US-Computer Emergency Readiness Team (US-CERT)
    continues to develop operational relationships and processes to enhance
    its ability to respond to an Internet disruption of national
    significance through its work with the IT-ISAC, and with the North
    American Incident Response Group (NAIRG) of industry participants. In
    addition, the NCC represents a fully collaborative model as the ISAC
    for the Telecommunications Sector, with both public and private
    participation in its operations.
        The US-CERT has deployed several programs as part of its efforts to
    support cyber incident response. We expect funding in Fiscal Year 2007
    to reach approximately $37 million. These funds support deployment of
    multiple programs, including the Einstein Program, which tracks attacks
    on federal information systems and warns stakeholders in near real-
    time. Other program areas funded as part of this total include an
    Internet Health Service for federal agency incident response teams, the
    US-CERT's 24X7 cyber incident handling center, vulnerability
    management, forensics education and support, and malicious code
    analysis.

        Internet Disruption Working Group (IDWG)
        The NCSD and NCS have also established an Internet Disruption
    Working Group (IDWG) to address the resiliency and recovery of Internet
    functions in the event of a major cyber incident. With public and
    private sector representatives, the IDWG's near-term objectives help to
    augment the level of information sharing among government and the
    private sector. The IDWG is also undertaking an information sharing
    assessment to better understand the information exchange landscape
    involving Internet incidents.

    National Cyber Response Coordination Group (NCRCG)
        The Business Roundtable report also underscores the role of the
    National Cyber Response Coordination Group (NCRCG). Established in
    partnership with the Department of Defense and the Department of
    Justice in the National Response Plan's (NRP) Cyber Annex, the NCRCG
    serves as the Federal government's principal interagency mechanism for
    coordinating the federal effort to respond to and recover from cyber
    incidents of national significance and includes 19 federal agencies
    including the Intelligence Community. The NCSD is working with industry
    to establish a private sector counterpart to the NCRCG, which would
    communicate and collaborate with the Federal government NCRCG during
    times of crisis.
        Mr. Chairman, further detail regarding the Committee's inquiries
    related to the goals, resources, and timeframes for implementation
    associated with these programs is also provided in the Department's
    recent letter in response to your July 5, 2006 query.

        The Role of US-CERT in Internet Recovery
        Mr. Chairman, the Committee has expressed concern about the role
    and responsibility of the United States Computer Emergency Readiness
    Team with regard to Internet reconstitution.
        US-CERT is the operational component of the National Cyber Security
    Division and represents a partnership between the Department and the
    public and private sectors. US-CERT is charged with protecting our
    nation's Internet infrastructure by coordinating defense against and
    response to cyber attacks. US-CERT is responsible for:
             Analyzing and reducing cyber threats and
            vulnerabilities;
             Disseminating cyber threat warning information; and
             Coordinating incident response activities.
        As indicated above, I am personally overseeing the retooling of the
    US-CERT and CS&T to ensure that roles and responsibilities align with
    our mission with regard to Internet recovery and the NRP.

        The Role of FEMA in Internet Recovery
    Mr. Chairman, the Committee has communicated interest in learning about
    the role of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) with regard
    to restoration of Internet functions in the case of a major disruption
    or attack.

        Depending upon the nature of the disruption or attack, FEMA, under
    the direction of the Secretary of Homeland Security, and advised by the
    Assistant Secretary for Cyber Security and Telecommunications and other
    Department officials, may be called upon to support industry and other
    Federal efforts to restore connections to the Internet. FEMA's specific
    responsibilities under the National Response Plan through Emergency
    Support Function (ESF) #5--Emergency Management may entail providing
    logistical, communications or administrative support as they would for
    any other emergency or disaster that they do not have the primary lead
    role. However FEMA would not have the lead role for Internet
    restoration.

    Conclusion
        The National Cyber Security Division has established its mission
    and priority objectives, developed a strategic plan, and undertaken
    significant steps to implement its strategic plan across the programs
    outlined here. Our progress to date is tangible: we have a construct
    for public-private partnership; we have a track record of success in
    our cyber operations; we have established relationships at various
    levels to manage cyber incidents; we have built international
    communities of interest to address a global problem; and we have tested
    ourselves at a critical development stage and will continue to examine
    our internal policies, procedures, and communications paths in future
    exercises. We are building on each of these achievements to take
    further steps to address Internet recovery and reconstitution as well
    as to increase our overall cyber preparedness and improve our response
    and recovery capabilities.
        In this ever-evolving environment, we know that we must always be
    attuned to new threats, new vulnerabilities, and new technologies. We
    need to be flexible enough to adjust our efforts to meet these new
    challenges.
        I would like to thank the Subcommittee for its time today, and I
    appreciate this opportunity to bring further transparency to these
    important cyber security priorities.

        Mr. Lungren. Thank you very much, Mr. Foresman, for your
    testimony.
        The chair will now recognize Mr. David Powner, the director
    of information technology management issues at the Government
    Accountability Office, to testify.
        And, again, the full text of your comments will be in the
    record, and we would ask you to summarize for 5 minutes.

      STATEMENT OF DAVID POWNER, DIRECTOR, INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY
          MANAGEMENT ISSUES, GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE

        Mr. Powner. Thank you, Chairman Lungren, Ranking Member
    Sanchez, and members of the subcommittee. We appreciate the
    opportunity to testify on the Department of Homeland Security's
    efforts associated with securing our nation's critical
    infrastructures from cybersecurity threats.
        Recent attacks and threats have underscored the need to
    effectively manage and bolster cybersecurity of our nation's
    critical infrastructures. For example, criminal groups, foreign
    intelligence services, and terrorists are threats to our
    nation's computers and networks.
        To address these threats, federal law and policy calls for
    critical infrastructure protection activities and establishes
    DHS as our nation's focal point. It also designates other
    agencies to coordinate with key sectors, including energy,
    banking and finance, and telecommunications.
        This afternoon, as requested, I will summarize three key
    points. First, DHS has many responsibilities called for in law
    and policy that remain unfulfilled. Second, many challenges
    confront the department, including organizational stability and
    leadership. And, third, I will highlight our key
    recommendations to improve our nation's cybersecurity posture.
        Expanding on each of these. Last year, we reported to you,
    Mr. Chairman, that based on federal law and policy, DHS has 13
    key cybersecurity responsibilities that include developing a
    national plan, enhancing public-private information sharing of
    cyber threats, vulnerabilities and attacks, conducting a
    national cyber threat assessment, facilitating vulnerability
    assessments, and coordinating incident response and recovery
    efforts, if, in fact, attacks occur.
        Although DHS has initiated efforts that begin to address
    each of its responsibilities, the extent of progress varies and
    more work remains on each.
        For example, its computer emergency response team, referred
    to the U.S. CERT, issues warnings about vulnerabilities and
    coordinates responsibilities for cyber attacks. However, our
    nation still lacks a national threat assessment, sector
    vulnerability assessments, a mature analysis of warning
    capability, and key recovery plans, including a plan for
    recovering Internet functions.
        Despite federal policy requiring DHS to develop an
    integrated public-private Internet recovery plan, to date, no
    such plan exists. Such a plan is important because the Internet
    has been targeted and attacked and private sector companies,
    who own the majority of the Internet infrastructure, deal with
    cyber and physical disruptions on a regular basis.
        Several recent cyber attacks highlight the importance of
    having robust Internet recovery plans, including a 2002
    coordinated denial of service attack that targeted all 13
    Internet root servers.
        DHS faces a number of challenges in building its
    credibility as a stable, authoritative and capable organization
    that can fulfill its cyber critical infrastructure
    responsibilities.
        These include achieving organizational stability and
    authority. Filling the assistant secretary for cyber and
    telecommunications position is critical. However, leveraging
    this new authority will remain a challenge.
        Another challenge is establishing effective partnerships
    and information sharing arrangements with other government
    entities and the private sector.
        During our most recent interviews, representatives from
    various sectors told us that the level of trust is not
    sufficient to have productive information sharing.
        In addition, DHS needs to demonstrate value, meaning that
    it needs to provide useful and timely information on such items
    as threats and analytical products to key stakeholders.
        Regarding challenges that have impeded Internet recovery
    progress, it is unclear what government entity is in charge,
    what the government's role should be, and when they should get
    involved.
        Over the last several years, we have made a series of
    recommendations to enhance the cybersecurity of critical
    infrastructures that demand immediate attention, including
    conducting important threat and vulnerability assessments,
    developing a strategic analysis and warning capability for
    identifying potential threats, developing a strategy to protect
    infrastructure control systems, and developing recovery plans
    to respond to attacks, including a plan for Internet
    reconstitution.
        In summary, Mr. Chairman, DHS has made progress in planning
    and coordinating efforts to enhance cybersecurity, but much
    more needs to be done, including conducting threat
    vulnerability assessments, bolstering our analytical
    capabilities, aggressively pursuing threat and vulnerability
    reduction efforts, and developing recovery plans.
        Our testimony today lays out a comprehensive roadmap of key
    recommendations to help DHS tackle its many responsibilities.
        Until DHS addresses its many challenges and more fully
    completes critical activities, it cannot function as the
    cybersecurity focal point intended in federal law and policy,
    resulting in increased risks that large portions of our
    national infrastructure will be unprepared to effectively
    manage cybersecurity attacks.
        This concludes my statement. I would be pleased to respond
    to any questions.
        [The statement of Mr. Powner follows:]
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        Mr. Lungren. Thank you very much for your testimony, from
    both of you.
        If I knew how to work this thing, I would work it, too.
    Anyway, I will try and keep myself to 5 minutes.
        Mr. Foresman. Mr. Chairman, we do have a bunch of technical
    experts in the room.
        [Laughter.]
        Mr. Lungren. I know that. I just don't know which button to
    push. I am sure it will work out.
        Thank you very much for your testimony. I will give myself
    the first 5 minutes to ask you these questions.
        Mr. Foresman, in your testimony, you acknowledge--and in
    the letter that I received from the secretary, dated September
    12, that I received, I guess, today or last evening, in
    response to my letter of July 5--you acknowledge the importance
    of cybersecurity.
        Yet, this position has remained vacant for such a long
    period of time. From the outside looking in, that would suggest
    that you don't have that really at the top of your priority
    list or you don't think it is important to fill it, because in
    the letter that I received, you indicate that, ``Hey, we are
    still doing these things. It hasn't stopped us or slowed us
    down from doing it.''
        Why hasn't that attention been given to this?
        Mr. Foresman. Mr. Chairman, let me address it with two
    points.
        First, this has been the most top priority position since I
    came into office in January, and we have been through a number
    of candidates, candidates who have withdrawn from the IT
    industry, who found divestment of their businesses unattainable
    in the timeframes we needed to get them on board.
        We have had individuals that have gone through the security
    review process and, for a variety of reasons, have not been
    able to continue on. But we feel confident in the candidate
    that we do have.
        Part of this comes down to the fact that one person is
    absolutely critical, but not indispensable anymore than you,
    Mr. Chairman. If your director of constituent services leaves
    your office, it doesn't mean you quit doing constituent
    services.
        We have been continuing to move forward with this, but we
    weren't going to simply hire someone in order to fill the
    position. We wanted to get a top quality candidate, get a top
    quality individual.
        We believe that we are at that point. We felt like we were
    at that point several times before, but we are much further
    through the process this time.
        Mr. Lungren. Mr. Powner, based on your work, it appears
    that DHS has not fully addressed any of its 13 key
    cybersecurity responsibilities. Of the 13 key responsibilities,
    which, from your review, should be the highest priority for
    DHS?
        Mr. Powner. Clearly, within those areas of responsibility,
    there are some core areas that should be focused on. We look at
    threat assessment as being one. Vulnerability assessments and
    reduction activities in that area would be another key one. The
    third one would be bolstering their analytical capability.
        One of the issues in building credibility with the private
    sector is what does the government have that is of value to the
    private sector infrastructure owners. And if we had more robust
    analytical capability, where we were ahead of attacks, and I
    know the department is trying to pursue that with some of their
    projects, like Einstein and other things that are ongoing.
        But if we offered that to the private sector, they would be
    more willing to participate and share information with the
    government.
        Mr. Lungren. How much, if any, of the reluctance to
    participate--you say their lack of trust, I think is the word
    that you used--is the result of us not building into our
    legislation and our regulations protections against liability?
        That is, if I am on the outside looking in, the government
    comes to me and says, ``We would like you to share information
    with us with respect to the state of your cybersecurity,'' you
    may be reluctant because you may be looking at a lawsuit down
    the line if you are exposed as not having done everything that
    needs to be done, based on analysis done by the department.
        Do you have any sense of that?
        Mr. Powner. Well, we clearly hear that from some of the
    infrastructure owners that that is one reason why they do not
    provide any information.
        The second reason is, you know, they provide information,
    but what do they get back in return? If you don't get something
    in return, you are less willing to provide that.
        Although I will say, in all fairness to the department,
    they recently issued a rule which is associated with how
    critical infrastructure information is shared and there is
    greater clarity in terms of how that information is handled and
    protected on the government side.
        So that was clearly a step in the right direction that
    recently occurred.
        Mr. Lungren. Mr. Foresman, there is criticism, obviously,
    that you have not fully addressed any of the 13 key
    cybersecurity responsibilities.
        What would you say in response to that, number one? And,
    number two, how do you prioritize among those 13 in terms of
    what you need to do at the department?
        Mr. Foresman. Mr. Chairman, what I would say is we very
    much acknowledge the great work that the Government
    Accountability Office continues to do on a wide range of fronts
    and the recommendations that Mr. Powner has brought forward are
    ones that will help us chart the road ahead.
        But to the second piece of it, in terms of prioritization,
    this is not simply unilateral action on the part of the
    Department of Homeland Security.
        One of the reasons why we have a wide range of
    constituencies involved in this process, public sector and
    private sector, sector coordinating council, just being one of
    many examples, as we are working through the national
    infrastructure protection plan in the IT sector, is so that we
    can bring the private sector stakeholders to the table with
    government and in an environment of collaboration to make a
    mutual determination about where the priorities are, because if
    we in the department were to have a priority that was different
    than, say, the Office of Management and Budget at the federal
    level or the state of New York at the state level or Microsoft
    at the corporate level, we are not going to be headed in the
    same direction.
        So this is not the easiest environment in the world,
    because it is not a regulated environment. It shouldn't be a
    regulated environment. And we have got to create a mutually
    shared vision and gain a wide range of consensus.
        And, clearly, one of the things that we know is that there
    are market factors that can be brought into play that will
    incentivize. You mentioned liability, just being one of many.
        Mr. Lungren. My time, I believe, has expired. When we come
    back, I want to ask you about the three top priorities
    specifically.
        The gentlelady?
        Ms. Sanchez. Thank you, gentlemen, for being before us.
        You know, it is not just a lack of this assistant secretary
    that you have been unable to fill for the last year. I mean,
    the GAO noted, in its last report, in 2005, that there were
    various people who had left the department and that there
    really is no leadership going on.
        And my question is how can you say that because you haven't
    filled that position, you--I mean, there seems to be no
    leadership in this area.
        In fact, I think your report noted that some of the
    industry groups you had spoken to said that the lack of these
    positions being filled really noted a lack of leadership from
    that department.
        Is that not true?
        Mr. Foresman. Yes, that is true. What we heard from certain
    infrastructure owners was the lack of leadership was sending a
    message that it was not an administration priority.
        Ms. Sanchez. So is it an administration priority?
        Mr. Foresman. Ms. Sanchez, it is, in fact, an
    administration priority. When Secretary Chertoff went through
    the second stage review and we created this position, we did it
    in response to a desire on the part of the industry and a
    desire on the part of Congress, as well as the federal
    executive branch, to have greater collaboration and
    coordination.
        And I acknowledge and I am the first one to acknowledge
    that this has been a tough process to get this position filled.
        And, Congresswoman, I want to say it is not for wont of
    trying. We have been working exceptionally hard and, as you
    know, the department--it is hard to recruit, frankly, because
    there is great criticism of the department on many fronts.
        And many of the folks who have the IT background are making
    very substantial salaries in the private sector and you have to
    make a sacrifice to come into government and it has been
    difficult to find individuals willing to make the sacrifice.
        Ms. Sanchez. I think a lot of us make a sacrifice to come
    into the government.
        Mr. Dicks. Would you yield just for one question?
        On that very point, do you have an acting assistant
    secretary? We have acting secretaries all over the government.
    Is there an acting assistant secretary?
        Mr. Foresman. Congressman, there is. And we had Bob
    Stephan, who was our assistant secretary for infrastructure
    protection, was dual hatted, carrying the responsibilities of
    doing infrastructure protection, also overseeing the efforts of
    our cybersecurity and our national communications systems
    activities.
        Recently, we interjected the deputy undersecretary for
    preparedness, Rob Zitz, who works for me, to provide for the
    day-to-day management and oversight, in collaboration with the
    national cybersecurity division and the national communications
    system, simply because of the fact that we are going through
    trying to get the national infrastructure protection plan done,
    get all the sector coordination plans done.
        And Bob was doing yeoman's work with both hats on, but we
    have added an additional person in there to help make sure that
    the folks in both of these shops have the tools, the resources
    and the guidance necessary to be successful.
        Mr. Dicks. Thank you.
        Ms. Sanchez. Certainly, Mr. Dicks.
        So you are telling me that he was--did you officially do
    that? Because we never got word that you did this. You titled
    him with the acting secretary position?
        Mr. Foresman. We did not. What I am saying to you is--
        Ms. Sanchez. You just said you were going to give it all
    over to him to do.
        Mr. Foresman. No, ma'am. What we have said is that Mr. Zitz
    has the responsibility for ensuring day-to-day oversight and
    coordination efforts between the national cybersecurity
    division, as well as the national communications system.
        Ms. Sanchez. Okay, I think the question that Mr. Dicks had
    was did you have an acting assistant secretary for
    cybersecurity and telecommunications.
        Mr. Foresman. We did and that is Mr. Steffen.
        Ms. Sanchez. So he is doing both secretary positions.
        Mr. Foresman. He is doing both secretary positions. And,
    Congresswoman, he is on paper today doing the cybersecurity and
    the communications system in the context that Bob was working
    phenomenal hours, trying to do both jobs, and we added a second
    person in to provide day-to-day direction and oversight.
        Ms. Sanchez. Well, this is such an important job. I mean, I
    can't imagine that someone is going to have a real full-time
    job and then take this job on.
        And you can really sit there with a straight face and tell
    me that he was doing both jobs.
        Mr. Foresman. Congresswoman, my--
        Ms. Sanchez. That is like saying I am a congresswoman and
    Mr. Lungren's district doesn't have a congressperson,
    therefore, I am going to be the acting one. I mean, it is two
    jobs you just can't do together.
        Mr. Foresman. Well, Congresswoman, let me just offer this.
    In the context of providing advice and counsel to the men and
    women of both of these shops, providing strategic direction and
    leadership, we have plenty of folks who are available and are
    doing that on a day-to-day basis.
        Ms. Sanchez. Did you have a comment?
        Mr. Lungren. Well, if the gentlelady would yield for a
    second.
        Mr. Foresman, could you tell us when you do anticipate
    filling this position?
        Mr. Foresman. Congressman, as you know, the individual who
    will fill this position will have access to some of the most
    highly classified data that is available. They are going
    through the security clearance process.
        The way I would best characterize it is in terms of where
    one would normally expect them to be in the security clearance
    review process. They are way beyond that point, which shows
    that we are making getting the security clearance done a
    highest priority.
        Mr. Lungren. So is the answer that the only thing holding
    this up is the finalization of the security clearance?
        Mr. Foresman. That is correct.
        Ms. Sanchez. I want to talk about compensation for a
    minute, because we had the whole issue of Andy Purdy and being
    paid from different pots.
        Do you think that you have adequate protections in place to
    deal with potential conflicts of interest that arise when the
    IPA contractors oversee business arrangements between the
    government and their home employer?
        Mr. Foresman. Congresswoman, we do, but beyond that step,
    as you know, the department used a large number of IPAs in the
    early days to get the department up and running.
        We made a very deliberate decision and in consultation with
    the secretary and the deputy secretary, when I came on board,
    we are moving as many of the current IPA positions to full-time
    federal employee positions, recognizing that we are
    transitioning from what one would reasonably say is the startup
    point of the department, where IPAs were a necessity, to the
    point of where we need to convert these to full-time federal
    employees.
        Ms. Sanchez. So how many IPAs would you estimate are still
    around? And I am assuming what you are telling me is that you
    are moving them from however many you might have right now to a
    net of zero.
        You don't really want IPAs hanging around in the
    department?
        Mr. Foresman. No, Congresswoman, I wouldn't say that we are
    going to do it at a 100 percent. There is going to be a
    necessity for IPAs particularly in selected expertise areas,
    high science areas.
        But for the vast majority of positions that were IPA
    before, we are taking a very hard look at this and, frankly, we
    want to make sure that we had these as full-time federal
    employees, not subject to the provisions of some of the
    limitations that, frankly, are placed on IPAs, because they
    don't fit into that full-time federal employee status.
        Ms. Sanchez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Lungren. The time of the gentlelady has expired.
        The gentleman from the state of Washington is recognized
    for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Dicks. Well, thank you.
        You have got this person that you signed a 2-year contract
    with, Andy Purdy, is that correct?
        Mr. Foresman. That is correct.
        Mr. Dicks. And 2 years to serve as acting director of the
    national cybersecurity division.
        Mr. Foresman. That is correct.
        Mr. Dicks. In a time when enduring leadership over the
    federal government's effort in this arena is vital, why would
    the department sign a two-year contract that expressly provides
    for an interim director?
        Mr. Foresman. Congressman, I will have to offer that that
    occurred before my arrival, but what I will say is that upon my
    arrival, upon my assumption of the duties and the
    responsibilities, we have looked at our IPA activities and I
    want to convert these over to FTE, full-time federal employee
    positions, and we are in the process of doing that.
        Mr. Dicks. Now, we know that the preparedness directorate
    also uses IPAs, as was mentioned. A recent news article
    revealed that acting NCSD director Andy Purdy receives a
    $277,000 salary, mostly paid by the department, all while
    overseeing a multi-million dollar budget for this home
    institution of Carnegie Mellon.
        Does the preparedness directorate have adequate protections
    in place to deal with potential conflicts of interest?
        Mr. Foresman. Congressman, as you know, this issue did come
    up in the public, in the press over the course of the last
    several months, and we went and did an exhaustive review of it.
        When Andy came on board, he was subjected to the same
    ethics requirements that the rest of the federal employees are
    subjected to. We have a series of checks and balances.
        We have separate business functions from those who oversee
    program activities. And we do feel like it was adequate.
        Mr. Dicks. The Cybersecurity Alliance have called for
    increased funding of cybersecurity efforts within the
    department. Yet, the administration lowered the budget by
    several hundred thousand dollars this year and the Senate
    Homeland Appropriations Committee recommended a decrease of
    almost $10 million for the budget request for 2007.
        Why is cybersecurity having such a hard time obtaining
    proper funding from the administration and from the majority
    party in the Senate?
        Mr. Foresman. Congressman, I think I would articulate it
    like this. We shouldn't measure our success or failure with
    cybersecurity efforts in dollars spent, but rather in the
    ability to leverage the resources.
        As a for instance, one of the things that the GAO report
    mentions in terms of the analytical ability--Mr. Chairman, this
    goes to one of your three top priorities--is enhancing our
    analytical ability.
        Part of that hinges on leveraging better the intelligence
    community. And I will tell you, Congressman, that as we look
    across the spectrum of things that we are doing on our
    cybersecurity efforts, we are trying to break down the
    stovepipes inside the department so that we don't have, if you
    will, two activities doing the same function.
        The Secret Service does elements of cyber training. Their
    cybersecurity division is involved in cyber training. And we
    are looking to achieve efficiencies where we can merge
    activities and get more bang for the buck.
        So I would not articulate that dollars spent is a clear
    indicator of whether we are being successful or not with our
    cybersecurity efforts.
        Mr. Dicks. Well, Mr. Powner, you are the GAO fellow, right?
        Mr. Powner. Correct.
        Mr. Dicks. I missed your presentation, but you guys have
    done studies over the last several years and it is still your
    impression that we are not making very much progress in terms
    of getting this area moving forward.
        Mr. Powner. Well, if you look comprehensively at the whole
    plan for tackling the cyber critical infrastructure protection
    arena, we can go back to 1996, with Presidential Directive 63.
    We haven't made much progress.
        We put a lot of plans--
        Ms. Sanchez. May I ask a question related to that?
        Mr. Dicks. Let him finish his answer. Then I will yield to
    you.
        Mr. Powner. I mean, we put resources and there are always
    plans in place, but we need to get off of putting plans in
    place and actually get down to implementation.
        We are going to get sector-specific plans, hopefully, at
    the end of the year, that are tied to the national
    infrastructure protection plan. Hopefully, those plans move us
    beyond another plan, but more into vulnerability assessments,
    efforts to protect our infrastructure, efforts to reduce the
    vulnerabilities that are out there, and, also, to put in place
    recovery plans.
        We don't have those things, if you look at--individual
    companies do, yes, but if you look at sector by sector and what
    is called for in law and policy, we do not have those.
        Mr. Dicks. I yield.
        Ms. Sanchez. Do you think they have a vision? I mean, with
    nobody at the top really under this and with so many people
    having come in and been cyber czar, as I call them, I think the
    fifth person now.
        I mean, do the people that work in this area and does the
    department really have a vision about what they are supposed to
    be doing or do you find them struggling?
        Mr. Powner. Clearly, they are struggling, in aspects. But
    in terms of a vision, there is a national infrastructure
    protection plan that has a lot of the right pieces in place. It
    calls for the right things, to engage the right parties.
        Now, what we need to do is to engage those parties and move
    forward on the implementation phase. So I would say the
    national infrastructure protection plan, a lot of the aspects
    of that plan are pretty good, but now the challenge becomes in
    implementing it and it is tough to implement it when you have
    this history of not necessarily having the strongest
    relationship with various sectors in the private sector who own
    the majority of the infrastructure.
        It is a huge challenge.
        Ms. Sanchez. Thank you, Mr. Dicks.
        Mr. Dicks. Let me ask you these. We spent a lot of money in
    the Department of Defense looking at cybersecurity from a
    Defense Department perspective. I serve on Defense
    Appropriations. Has DHS benefited at all from the work that was
    done at the DOD?
        Mr. Powner. A couple comments. I think, clearly, we could
    leverage other aspects of the federal government where we have
    made progress. DOD, if you look at their defense cybersecurity
    lab, if you look at their joint task force, they have got many
    areas that look at cyber initiatives.
        And I think the department has acknowledged that trying to
    link up and leverage those aspects within the Department of
    Defense and build a partnership in those areas are needed.
        Mr. Dicks. Mr. Chairman, just one quick, last, brief
    question.
        Mr. Lungren. Sure, go right ahead.
        Mr. Dicks. Thank you.
        Mr. Foresman, did the DHS ethics officer approve the Purdy
    arrangement?
        Mr. Foresman. Congressman, I believe he did, but let me
    confirm that and provide you a written response.
        Mr. Dicks. Get us a response. And if there was a letter
    written at the time, we would like to have that, if that would
    be all right with the chairman.
        Mr. Lungren. That would be fine.
        Mr. Dicks. I think we need to be able to see a copy of what
    was sent at the time.
        Does the GAO know anything about that?
        Mr. Powner. No, sir.
        Mr. Dicks. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Lungren. The gentleman's time has expired.
        The gentleman from Indiana is recognized for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Souder. I appreciate your testimony and the
    unbelievable complexity of the challenge.
        I had kind of a side question, but I wonder how it is
    extending the front that you have to defend.
        I know in the GAO testimony, you have about how to protect
    government computers and there is a reference also to the
    university names that were stolen and others.
        But in the Veterans a Administration, where we, in effect,
    had most of our veterans a, a high percentage of our veterans a
    names appeared to have been stolen in a random burglary,
    because it went home and the computer went home, and, at one
    point, it looked like we might have even compromised home
    addresses and our active servicemen, meaning that they would be
    vulnerable.
        How does the whole experience of contracting out, not only
    in the government arena, but in the private arena--are you
    looking at how to build--I understand the veterans a department
    is trying to work additional firewalls in.
        How are we going to handle this without, in effect, pulling
    everything back inside a few walls? This is like making our
    entire system vulnerable at its weakest link, which is at home.
    It is vulnerable to random robberies, penetrations of some kid
    hacker on his dad's computer.
        Mr. Foresman. Congressman, let me start and maybe Mr.
    Powner may have additional comments. This actually very much
    underscores the complexity of probably among our greatest
    vulnerabilities is not on our networks, as I think some of your
    next panels of witnesses will talk about, but in the context of
    the computer sitting on the desk at home or in the small
    business office somewhere.
        And, you know, this becomes the same challenge that we have
    when we talk about how do we prepare America for emergencies
    and disasters of any kind and part of this comes back to
    citizen education.
        You know, October is national cybersecurity awareness month
    and just as much as we want the average citizen to know that
    they need to check their smoke detector batteries in October,
    we also want our citizens to know that you can at buy the
    computer, you can't load the software on it, and you can't say,
    ``Okay, I am good forever on until I get the next computer.''
        And it requires maintenance, it requires work, and this is
    one of the areas where I think strong collaboration between the
    public sector and the private sector, constant messaging is
    going to be absolutely critical.
        Mr. Powner. Just to second that, when you look at security
    as a whole, it is only as good as your weakest link.
        We do a lot of work not only looking at cyber critical
    infrastructure, but looking at individual agencies and
    departments. We have a lab internally that we attempt to break
    into systems and networks in federal departments and agencies
    and we are almost always successful.
        But there are simple things, like when you are not
    successful, we will call the Department of Homeland Security
    and say, ``We are working for Mr. Foresman and he forgot his
    password and can you give it to us.'' And you know what? We
    usually get it.
        So it is those type of things, too, and it makes it very
    difficult, because you have got this huge technological
    component that you have to secure, but it is also relying on
    the individuals and the people, too.
        And educating everyone and having that whole picture in
    place is very difficult with many of these departments.
        Mr. Souder. Well, thank you for scaring me even more. Mr.
    Chairman, I want to point out, I have blue and gold on.
        Mr. Lungren. That is very good. I am just painting my
    office blue and gold, after the victory against Penn State, I
    guess it was. Now it is Michigan, the next one coming up.
        The gentlelady from the great state of Texas is recognized
    for 5 minutes.
        Ms. Jackson-Lee. Well, you know, I am stuck in orange and
    we are struggling, but we are going to make it.
        Mr. Lungren. I wasn't going to say a thing.
        Ms. Jackson-Lee. But thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, to
    the ranking member.
        I am going to use a part of my time to try to articulate
    some of the piquing frustration. As I do that, Mr. Foresman, I
    do want to acknowledge that you are a superb professional. We
    thank you for your service.
        We thank Mr. Powner, as well, and the GAO is certainly one
    of our frequent witnesses throughout the Congress.
        But I notice that this room is particularly tranquil and
    very well appointed and would give us a sense of calm. Here is
    my frustration.
        We are not living in a calm arena. Day to day, we are
    noting the use of technology, levels of sophistication by Al
    Qaida, certainly the new sophisticated creative uses of mere
    liquids that would create havoc in the nations and the world
    skies, and, of course, as my colleague mentioned, the ludicrous
    incident or accident of a missing laptop and thousands upon
    thousands of veterans a personal information.
        I just had a hearing yesterday on the National Security
    Agency and, of course, the issues dealing with warrantless
    searches, which speaks to corporations who are now either
    engaged or not engaged in providing data, issues of data
    mining.
        These are major issues and I guess as I look at this
    structure that you have, I am a little--we call it unready, a
    great deal of discomfort.
        Mr. Purdy may be a very fine professional himself, but I am
    listening to Mr. Powner, who said he is completely blank on
    this arrangement.
        My concern would be attention span and the ability to run a
    multi-conglomerate, whatever responsibility Mr. Purdy has,
    whether or not he has put it in trust, I am not sure, and this
    very important responsibility.
        I do hear you saying that there is a process going and
    someone is being embedded as we speak.
        But I think the message I want you to take back to
    Secretary Chertoff, and we had great hopes and dreams for
    homeland security, we still do, we wouldn't be here, committed,
    as you heard, that there has to be a certain energy, a certain
    sense of urgency, a certain sense of panic, that we wouldn't
    have to see one area after another be vacant, be with acting or
    interim.
        And we are all sort of facing those uphill obstacles. You
    are not the personnel director, of course, but I think it is
    important to note that the idea of staffing is crucial.
        So maybe you can give me a sense of who is working under
    Mr. Purdy. What kind of shop do we have there? Vision has never
    been--it is good planning, but it has never been answers to
    terrorism, because we can visioning for a long time and subject
    the American people to a major, if you will, terrorist attack.
        We are all sort of sitting on edge because we know that
    just by the nature of this heinous business now that is going
    on the world, that we are certainly as vulnerable as the next.
    We are trying to secure this nation, but we have a lot of
    gaping holes.
        So tell me what staffing you have and what are you
    practically doing as it relates to cybersecurity, because you
    have got an interim person?
        And, Mr. Powner, in my closing moment, would you then take
    it to the next level of what are the Achilles heels as we are
    presently structured? The interim person, maybe some of your
    questions not being answered, in a world of cybersecurity.
        And I yield to you, Mr. Foresman.
        Mr. Foresman. Congresswoman, thank you for the question.
    And let me also, to the context of what Congressman Dicks asked
    about, I did get a note from staff and the ethics officer did
    review the arrangement before Mr. Purdy came on board. So it
    did go through the ethics review process, but we will provide
    any additional clarity that you wish.
        I would generally break four primary functions in the
    national cybersecurity division and some of the most talented
    men and women and very dedicated men and women, and I would
    invite all of you all to come out to the U.S. CERT center out
    in Northern Virginia and see what they do every day to monitor
    what is going on across the Internet, to identify and look for
    vulnerabilities.
        Ms. Jackson-Lee. Do you know the numbers of your staff, how
    many are out there?
        Mr. Foresman. I can get you an approximate. Congresswoman,
    I don't know off--
        Ms. Jackson-Lee. But is every spot filled?
        Mr. Foresman. I believe that they are close, because we are
    making sure vacancies--
        Ms. Jackson-Lee. You are making headway.
        Mr. Foresman. Minimizing vacancies. But there are four
    primary buckets. One is kind of the detection and monitoring.
    That is the U.S. CERT folks. That is the operational piece,
    knowing what is going on, having a place that the federal
    interagency and the private sector can reach into 24/7 to be
    able to do it.
        The second category is those efforts that are targeted
    towards raising education and awareness across the university
    sector and that type of activity.
        The third area is what is traditionally the planning,
    getting the private sector and the public sector folks in the
    room together and making sure that we know how we are going to
    respond to a threat, we know how we are going to respond to an
    actual event, we know how we are going to implement recovery.
        And those are the folks who had the hard time of
    translating the idea for greater cooperation.
        Ms. Jackson-Lee. And your team is engaged in information
    sharing. You are part of the component that deals with the
    information sharing component. I assume that you look at
    information.
        Are you the gatherers or are you providing information out?
        Mr. Foresman. Well, it is both. It is really both being--
        Ms. Jackson-Lee. You are functioning in two ways. You feel
    confident that you are functioning now with your staff.
        Mr. Foresman. We are functioning, but, Congresswoman, I am
    not going to mislead you or this committee. We got our high
    track activity, which is a collaborative activity that is
    responsible for getting intelligence information out to the
    private sector and getting it back in and feeding it into the
    intelligence community.
        We have got the work of the U.S. CERT. We have got our
    national operations center, the national coordination center
    for telecommunications. They are closer and better tied than
    they were a year ago. They are closer and much better tied than
    they were 4 years ago or 3 years ago, when the department was
    stood up.
        But we still have more work to do and we need to make sure
    it is a seamless operation. One of the things I said earlier in
    my testimony was we are going to put the telecommunications
    coordinating group that is there 24/7 right next to the
    information technology, the cybersecurity group that is there
    24/7, because the telecommunications infrastructure and our
    information technology infrastructure are inextricably related
    and we want to make sure that those folks are sitting next to
    each other when things go on so that they can share that
    information back and forth.
        Ms. Jackson-Lee. Mr. Chairman, if you will indulge me, so
    that Mr. Powner could respond, please.
        Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Foresman.
        Mr. Powner. Congresswoman, clearly, there are--getting at
    the human capital issue within the department there, clearly,
    there are many capable men and women within the national
    cybersecurity division. Many of them are sitting in this room
    today. We just need more of them.
        In terms of leadership, though, there is a leadership void.
    We need a permanent leader not only for the department
    internally, but because of the interaction with the private
    sector, the state and local governments.
        So we clearly need that. This isn't the only department
    that has struggled with getting capable folks on board. I do
    work in many areas across the federal government. IRS is an
    example.
        They had a huge human capital issue there, not being able
    to deliver. I can say today, looking at them over a number of
    years, they have one of the better IT organizations when it
    comes to their modernization efforts.
        They still have hiccups, but how did they do that? They got
    critical position pay, where they paid folks above the SES
    salary cap. So there are things you could do and you could
    pursue.
        It is not perfect, because it is still difficult to compete
    with the private sector salaries, but there are things you
    could do and you could pursue and there are some good examples
    out there in other federal departments that we could move
    forward on.
        Ms. Jackson-Lee. Thank you.
        To you, Mr. Chairman, I would just say those of us who live
    beyond the beltway, I would really like to give an SOS e-mail
    to our friends here in Washington to start going out and
    recruiting across the country, whether it is Texas or
    California or Washington state.
        We have got to be able to find good people and good people
    are out there and there must be some recruiting blindness, but
    we need to start reaching out to our own constituents, because
    they are out there and they know this business.
        And I yield back. Thank you.
        Mr. Lungren. I thank the gentlelady. We will do a second
    round with this panel before we go to the second panel.
        Mr. Foresman, you were going to tell me what the three top
    priorities are regarding cybersecurity responsibilities? You
    gave us one, which is enhancing analytical abilities.
        What would the other two be?
        Mr. Foresman. Congressman, clearly, it is the ability to
    effect the coordination between the agencies of the federal
    government with our state and local partners and between
    government and the private sector, just the basic operational
    coordination.
        And then the second one is information sharing. As Mr.
    Powner pointed out, there has got to be a tangible benefit to
    the private sector and this is not just limited to the
    information technology sector. This is across all of our
    critical, whether we are talking about ports in transportation
    systems or our IT systems.
        What is the value added for the private sector to share
    information with government and, conversely, government has got
    to--it has got to be a two-way street.
        Mr. Lungren. I mean, part of this hearing is, obviously,
    beating up on you, because the department hasn't done as much
    as it needs to do in this area. But, look, I am going to
    confess, the Congress hasn't either.
        If there is one area that we probably lag behind in terms
    of the array of vulnerabilities we have, in my judgment, more
    than anything else, it is probably cybersecurity.
        But we will keep sending these letters to you and we will
    still keep prodding you to do these things.
        Mr. Dicks. Mr. Chairman, didn't we have national commission
    on cybersecurity? That, I thought, did an outstanding effort. I
    mean, this issue has been out there.
        Mr. Lungren. I am not saying the issue hasn't been out
    there. What I am suggesting is, I mean, as I look at the
    Congress, I am not sure that we have done what we need to do.
        Mr. Dicks. In terms of oversight?
        Mr. Lungren. In terms of oversight, in terms of prodding
    the department. I just want to let you know we are going to be
    doing a much stronger job on that. We are going to be inviting
    you to come up here more often.
        We are going to be sending letters out. We are going to
    make inquiries. We need to get moving on this.
        This is not as visible as a physical piece of critical
    infrastructure, yet it is as important, if not more important,
    because it is embedded in and underlies so much of what we do.
        And in that regard, I would ask you about the SCADA
    systems, the control systems that we have. They are so
    critical, as they provide a link between the cyber world and
    the physical world. These need to be a top priority.
        Does the department have a specific plan to work with
    various critical infrastructure sectors to protect their
    control systems, to actually get it done? As Mr. Powner said,
    we have done a lot of studies, a lot of planning.
        Are we actually doing it?
        Mr. Foresman. Congressman, three quick points on that.
    First, we are looking, as we are doing all of the sector plans,
    whether it is the chemical sector or the dam sector, all of
    these other ones that have SCADA systems that we are concerned
    about.
        We have got a cyber component that is built in as they go
    about doing their sector coordination. The sector coordinating
    councils develop their sector-specific plans and then part of
    this is having them say what is the best practice, what is the
    acceptable standard that we are promoting and pushing within a
    particular sector and having that implemented.
        The second piece is training and education and I think you
    and this committee undoubtedly understand the SCADA issues as
    well as any group out there and there is a growing need to
    educate.
        As a matter of fact, here at the end of the month, there is
    a session that we are going to be teaching out in Las Vegas in
    conjunction with a conference, where we are going to focus
    exclusively on the SCADA issues and protection and prevention
    measures associated with it.
        And then the third part of it is there is a business issue
    here. You know, if you think about SCADA systems, the control
    systems back pre-a92-a93, when we saw the major proliferation
    of information technology, the older systems tend not to be as
    reliant on the Internet as those that are built into the
    current systems.
        And a lot of this is we have to make the business case to
    corporate America that protection of their SCADA systems goes
    back to what you talked about earlier, the liability issue.
    What is the acceptable national standard by which someone will
    be judged as it relates to the protection of SCADA systems?
        And, frankly, I think that market-driven incentives rather
    than overt, heavy-handed regulation is going to get us there,
    but there is a liability issue for corporate America and we
    need to make sure that we articulate that.
        Mr. Lungren. And one of the things we have to do, from our
    standpoint, working with your department, is to ensure that we
    know that the landscape is out there. How can we get the
    information from the various sectors dealing with their own
    cybersecurity?
        How are we going to develop the trust such that they will
    give us that information, so that we can utilize it, so that we
    can make a better judgment here in the Congress as to what
    makes sense from a legislative standpoint as opposed to what
    makes sense from a regulatory standpoint as opposed to what
    makes sense from an incentive standpoint as opposed to what
    makes sense from the risk management experts, which is the
    insurance industry?
        If we don't have that information, we may be heavy-handed
    on the regulatory side or the statutory side only because we
    don't have that information.
        So we have to build a relationship of trust with the
    private sector so that they will feel free to share that
    information with us, feel free to share it with you.
        That is not an easy thing to do, even with the question of
    liability. But beyond that, do they trust us to have the
    competence to be able to deal with the information they give
    us?
        So I am looking at this not to point fingers at people. I
    am looking at this to solve a problem. And when we are given
    the responsibility in this committee and this subcommittee of
    dealing with critical infrastructure, it seems to me, if we
    don't look at cybersecurity as a part of that, we are not doing
    our job.
        And we are like a non-modern governmental entity trying to
    deal with a modern world. It just isn't going to work.
        So we will be pressing and working hard and we will do this
    on a bipartisan basis, because I know the concern is shared by
    both Democrats and Republicans.
        All right, if I can get this working again, I will start it
    off for another 5 minutes for my ranking member, the gentlelady
    from California.
        Ms. Sanchez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I just want to say
    that one of the reasons that we may have not been paying as
    much attention lately to cybersecurity is, as you will recall,
    when we first started the Homeland Security Committee, we had
    an actual subcommittee that dealt with cybersecurity.
        And then the reorg that happened in the last 2 years, this
    was put under the jurisdiction of this subcommittee, which, as
    you know, has an extensive portfolio and trying to get through
    TSA and ports and everything else.
        I guess this may be the second hearing that we have had on
    cybersecurity in the 2 years.
        So it is important to get done. I just don't know how we
    also will find the time. It is always a difficult thing to do.
        And there are some good things that have come out of the
    directorate. As you know, when we have been in the markup
    sessions, I have tried to put more money into some of the
    programs that I think have been done well.
        So for me, it is more of understanding that we have had
    this revolving door at the top and the frustration of not being
    able to fill it and the idea of the people, the rest of the
    people in the agency having less direction than they probably
    need to get things done.
        So that is why we are so, I think, concerned to see this
    issue of filling the slots with competent people who want to
    stay around, which we see in a lot of the different areas of
    homeland security. It is a major problem. And the morale issues
    and the pay issues and everything that go with it.
        And just, you know, developing something new, it takes a
    special kind of person. A lot of people can follow, but it is
    hard to lead. So we really need to fill those leadership
    positions.
        The GAO said that progress to date on initiatives to
    improve the nation's ability to recover from Internet
    disruption, that the progress had been limited and that other
    initiatives lacked timeframes for completion, and, also, that
    the relationships between these initiatives are not evident.
        Can you tell me what efforts must be made by the department
    to achieve the kinds of relationships that need to exist for
    these initiatives to work? Again, the ones that deal with
    working groups to facilitate coordination and exercises in
    which government and the private industry practice respond to
    cyber events.
        Mr. Foresman. Congresswoman, I think there are three really
    big issues here. One is clear deliverable timelines and I will
    tell you, this is an issue--you noted correctly that the
    department continues to go through growing pains, but we have
    gotten through that first visceral reaction of getting the
    department up and running.
        And we do need to take a collective deep breath and look at
    all of the things that we are doing and make sure and make sure
    what we are doing is still what we need to be doing this time
    next week, but that we are putting specific deliverable
    timelines on these.
        And I think part of this, and I talked to Mr. Powner ahead
    of time, when we get the new assistant secretary on board, I
    would like to sit down with the GAO and amalgamate all of the
    recommendations across the cyber front and develop a matrix.
        I am not going to say we are going to do them all, but
    there is a lot of great work that has gone in there. There is a
    lot of great work that is coming out of the sector coordinating
    councils.
        One of the advantages is we are working with the business
    sector. They don't do well if we don't have clear, definitive
    end products that we are looking for and timelines. So they are
    helping to push us. That is the first thing.
        The second piece of it really comes down to the issue of
    trust that we have talked about. And I want to be clear, when
    we talk about trust, these types of public-private sector
    relationships, even going back to PDD-63 in the 1990s
    timeframe, and 67, this is new. Government has always been a
    regulator and private sector has always been a regulatee.
        So we are talking about new relationships here. The PCII
    rule, the protecting critical infrastructure information, the
    tool that this Congress gave to the department, a very
    important tool, we have taken, we have implemented just here in
    the last several months, and it provides an additional layer of
    competence to the private sector that key information that they
    provide to us is not going to end up out in the public domain,
    particularly where we are talking about proprietary
    information, because you know one bad piece of information
    affects stock prices and we understand that.
        So I am anxious to see how the PCII rule, married together
    with our ongoing relationships, provides tangible benefits as
    we go forward.
        And then the third piece of it is I think it is going to
    come back to as we define and continue to work with Congress on
    this issue, we have got a national strategy on securing
    cyberspace. That is the high level document.
        As Mr. Powner said, we have got the national infrastructure
    protection plan, the next level down. We have got the sector
    coordination plans that are being put--the sector-specific
    plans that are being put together.
        But we have got to get down into the implementation level
    and that is what normally would come next in the cycle. That is
    what is normally going to come next in the cycle, but I will
    tell you I don't want to be up here 6 months from now telling
    you all we haven't made progress.
        I would like to be able to appear before this subcommittee
    and say here are the 15 or 20 things--or, actually, I would
    like to have the assistant secretary appear before you all and
    say here are the 15 or 20 things that have gotten done in the
    last 6 months and, by the way, here are the 15 or 20 things
    that the private sector agrees with us that we are going to do
    in the next 6 months.
        Ms. Sanchez. Mr. Powner, do you have anything you might
    want to enlighten us on that?
        Mr. Powner. Just one comment about the whole trust issue.
    There is a lot of discussion about building trust and I think
    naming the secretary position, that will be great going
    forward.
        But we don't build trust through individuals or because we
    are competent or a good person in this position. You are going
    to build trust with the private sector because the government
    is going to have something that is of value to them.
        And right now we need to grow the capability in the
    government to offer something that is of value. That is
    ultimately how you are going to build trust.
        I have spent some time in the telecommunications sector
    and, I will tell you, when I was there, we didn't share a lot
    with the government, because the ultimate question was what
    benefit is that to our company.
        If we are interested in stock prices, when we have someone
    we wanted prosecuted because they were in our central office,
    that is when we wanted the government assistance, because they
    could help us.
        He key question is building trust. I think we go back to
    that analytical capability and some of the key items that are
    called for, called for in policy and in law. If we start
    tackling some of those key priorities, we can build trust.
        It is difficult, but I think there are some things that are
    in place that we can march forward with.
        Ms. Sanchez. Thank you.
        Mr. Lungren. Thank you.
        The gentleman from Indiana is recognized for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Souder. First, I wanted to say something about the
    Cybersecurity Subcommittee here. That is, first, I want to
    thank the speaker for giving us any flexibility at all to do
    cybersecurity.
        The Energy and Commerce Committee has been trying to muscle
    this committee and we need to push back. In every session of
    Congress, we need to work to make sure jurisdiction for
    homeland security stays under this committee.
        It is a wonder that we have had any jurisdiction, given how
    hard they went after our committee on that.
        Mr. Lungren. If the gentleman would yield on that.
        One of the points I have been trying to make is if
    cybersecurity is not part and parcel of critical
    infrastructure, I don't know what is. And I didn't come back
    here to have fights with other committees, but we need to do
    our job and we cannot do our job in terms of critical
    infrastructure protection if we do not involve ourselves in an
    major way in terms of cybersecurity.
        Mr. Souder. There are members of Congress in both political
    parties that would love to see the death of this committee and
    we need to fight.
        Ms. Sanchez. Will the gentleman yield for one second?
        When I was talking about the history of this, what I meant
    is it is so critical. I mean, it warranted its own subcommittee
    before. It is very important.
        Mr. Souder. Because my concern was that we weren't going to
    have any jurisdiction whatsoever, because that was why we
    initially eliminated the cybersecurity, because we had that.
        Energy and Commerce tried to make a move to exclude us from
    having any jurisdiction and the chairman and the committee and
    the subcommittee chairman here has put some cybersecurity in,
    because we are all in agreement here what we need to do is make
    sure that this committee--because if you don't have
    cybersecurity, everything else falls apart.
        As the chairman just said, we are acting like we are in the
    dark ages here. This is where they are talking the stories that
    you have in here on the worms and what can happen at nuclear
    power plants, what happens if our electrical grid shuts down,
    the internal security of the United States.
        There are lots of things that people just assume are
    protected. I felt the most scaring, eye-opening hearing--it
    wasn't a hearing--a briefing that I had was with the
    cybersecurity subcommittee under this, when we first created
    homeland security, and we had the guy who had originally been
    the attacker of our systems and now the defender of our Defense
    Department systems.
        I just can't see anything other than that repeated,
    firewalls with incredible strength to feel off different parts,
    we are never going to be able to protect everything, is, in my
    book, the number one thing that has to be done.
        How that can be done on the Internet, surely, we have to
    have the ability to cut this off, much like if the bird flu
    hits, how you are going to have to do segmentation of society
    like we did in 1916 with the flu epidemic.
        You have to be able to isolate this stuff more rapidly than
    we are doing.
        But I had a couple other particular questions. I would be
    interested if you agree that that is the biggest challenge, is
    how to wall it off when we get hit.
        But one is clearly staffing and you are competing in an
    industry that pays incredible amounts of money, trying to keep
    people long term, divest stocks that they have, it is a huge
    challenge.
        Have you been looking at innovative payroll type things,
    that if somebody stays a period longer, they get a bonus? In
    other words, tier the pay somewhat on how long they are there.
        Should we be looking at personnel things that change?
    Because this is not a typical department. And I don't see, in
    the future, that there is going to be less demand for people
    with high skill cybersecurity and we don't want to have
    basically the people who couldn't quite cut it out in the
    rating field trying to defend us from the people who want to
    attack us, because there is incredible amounts of money to be
    made by attacking a system.
        And a second part of this is that as I was alluding to
    earlier and you correctly said, the weakest part of the system
    is our vulnerability.
        As we look at contracting out, as companies diversify and
    you have all these different modes of operation, are we looking
    at requiring different security systems for the level of the
    vulnerability of the site that you are at and putting in
    requirements and penalties if you fail to do that?
        In other words, yes, we need cooperation. I am a free
    market businessperson who wants to see cooperation. But there
    are certain things that the society assumes are happening.
        And the question is how do we put in certain safeguards,
    because now it isn't just your business, you can endanger
    everybody in the United States because you got sloppy.
        What are we doing in putting in standards that if you are
    going to have access that can get you into one of these
    networks, particularly if we are a little uncertain of our
    wall, to do that?
        Mr. Foresman. Congressman, let me maybe give three points,
    and I don't know whether Mr. Powner might want to add
    something, as well.
        But I would also suggest that your next panel, I think,
    could address that same question and give some good clarity to
    it.
        The first part, in terms of filling this position, I have
    looked at every innovative human resource opportunity that we
    can and there is nobody in the city of Washington who wants
    this position filled more than the undersecretary for
    preparedness at the Department of Homeland Security, for a
    whole bunch of reasons.
        But to one of the things that Congresswoman Sanchez said,
    we made it very clear that whoever was going to sign up with
    this was going to sign up for the long term, because we didn't
    need a revolving door and that would have been the worst thing
    for industry.
        So we put some strong parameters on it. Please come serve
    the nation and, oh, by the way, you have got to be here for the
    long haul, and that did scare some people off, in addition to
    the things you have mentioned.
        But we are restricted by law in certain categories, but we
    have tried to be innovative.
        To the second point, I think I would very much offer to you
    that industry has shown tremendous progress at developing, if
    you will, acceptable standards and practices, but they are not
    universally adopted across all industries.
        So part of this is going to be the ongoing dialogue and
    discussion with the private sector about how do we get
    universal compliance. Is it going to be through market-driven
    incentives, through insurance? Is it going to be through
    regulation?
        We don't know the answer to that, but I will offer to you
    that I have met very few folks in the technology community that
    don't understand the vulnerabilities. But as one person said at
    a session this morning, you have got to compare the bottom line
    and the needs of the moment.
        And these are tough decisions and I think we may need to
    provide some structural policy incentives to make it all
    happen, but ultimately, the same that we develop the Internet
    through innovation, we probably need to develop increased
    security through innovation.
        Mr. Lungren. The time of the gentleman has expired.
        The gentleman from Washington is recognized for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Dicks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I want to go back to this question about Andy Purdy. As we
    understand, as I said, he earns $245,000, roughly, a year. The
    secretary of homeland security makes $175,000, but he is also
    on loan from the school to the government, which is paying
    nearly all his salary. Is that correct?
        Mr. Foresman. Congressman, I will need to go back and--
        Mr. Dicks. He is here today. He is here in the audience.
        Mr. Foresman. I understand that. But in terms of the
    contractual relationship, I would like to provide you a written
    response to that so that we are very clear.
        But on the first part of it, let me also acknowledge that
    when we talk about compensation packages, we have to remember
    that what my base salary is in the federal government, on top
    of it, there is a 33-34 percent package on top of it.
        Mr. Dicks. Right.
        Mr. Foresman. So I think part of it is looking at this in
    terms of the total compensation, but I am more than happy to
    provide a detailed written response to you.
        Mr. Dicks. Now, as of January 2006, the national
    cybersecurity division had 27 government employees out of 40
    full-time equivalent positions assigned. These 27 employees
    make up only 27 percent of the total workforce, with the
    remaining 73 percent being provided through contracts with one
    or more of 10 different private sector organizations, such as
    Booz Allen Hamilton and SRA International, Inc.
        In addition, NCSD has contracts with Carnegie Mellon
    University totaling $19 million, which is one-fifth of the
    unit's total budget.
        Now, that appears to me to be a very questionable practice.
    How can you have a person who is running the division and being
    paid by Carnegie Mellon also giving contracts to them of $19
    million? I don't understand that.
        Mr. Foresman. Congressman, three points on that. First,
    when I assumed this position in January, we did have a large
    number of unfilled positions, as well as a lot of contractors,
    IPAs and contract support.
        We made a very deliberate policy decision in the
    department. That was the way to get the department up and
    running back when Congress created it.
        But as we move forward, we are trying to transition as many
    positions as possible into full-time federal employee
    positions. That process continues to take time, but we have
    made hiring and filling vacant positions and transitioning as
    many from contract status to permanent status a priority.
        In terms of Mr. Purdy and the relationship with Carnegie
    Mellon, we do have checks and balances in place. His ability to
    obligate funds is not sole and exclusive in the context of not
    having checks and balances.
        And, in fact, what I will--
        Mr. Dicks. What are the checks and balances?
        Mr. Foresman. Well, there are a variety of checks and
    balances. You have to go through the business review process,
    through a procurement process.
        And what I would like to do is describe those for you and
    for the committee in exact detail, because, Congressman, if I
    attempted to do it, I am going to miss an important part and
    that is going to create an incorrect picture and I want to
    paint the correct picture of what--
        Mr. Dicks. Well, the picture isn't real pretty, as far as I
    am concerned. This doesn't look right to me.
        Has he recused himself from making any decisions about
    Carnegie Mellon?
        Mr. Foresman. Congressman, I believe in the context of his
    ethics agreement, he is, but, again, let me--
        Mr. Dicks. He is right here. Why can't you let him testify?
        Mr. Foresman. But, Congressman, he is not the witness and
    what I would prefer to do is to make sure that we get you a
    factual and accurate answer, please.
        Mr. Dicks. Well, Mr. Chairman, I think the gentleman is
    here in the audience, I think we ought to have him testify.
        Mr. Lungren. Well, the problem is he was not requested to
    testify. We did not notify that he was going to be asked to
    testify.
        Mr. Dicks. Well, the administration's witnesses bring up
    people with them all the time, in all the hearings I have ever
    been in. If the person is there and can answer the question, I
    think the question ought to be answered.
        Mr. Lungren. I don't want to avoid this, but that is not
    the procedure we follow in this subcommittee. We notice people.
    They are given an opportunity to know they are going to testify
    and if it is appropriate--
        Mr. Dicks. How long is it going to take to get an answer to
    this question?
        Mr. Lungren. Mr. Foresman, could you get an answer to us in
    written form within the week?
        Mr. Foresman. Yes, sir. Well, what day of the week is it,
    Congressman, Wednesday?
        Mr. Lungren. Yes.
        Mr. Foresman. I think Friday is reasonable, yes, sir.
        Mr. Lungren. And we will make that a part of the record, as
    well.
        Ms. Sanchez. Will the gentleman yield?
        Mr. Dicks. I yield.
        Ms. Sanchez. I don't think it is going to be very
    difficult. I mean, this issue has been in the newspaper for
    about 6 months, almost day in and out in some of them. And I
    would imagine, Mr. Secretary, that you have this all written
    out already, because you have probably had to explain this over
    and over.
        It is just that our committee hasn't really gotten the real
    explanation.
        Mr. Foresman. Well, Congresswoman, I want to make sure that
    this committee, in terms of your oversight and responsibilities
    for our department and this particular area, that you get the
    information you need to do the job that you need to do.
        So we will put posthaste on this when we get back to our
    offices today.
        Mr. Lungren. So we will get that by Friday and we will make
    it a part of the record.
        Mr. Dicks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate that.
        Mr. Lungren. The gentleman's time--
        Mr. Dicks. Well, let me just ask one final question.
        Mr. Lungren. The only thing I just want to mention is Mr.
    Pearce hasn't asked any questions yet and we have a second
    panel coming up.
        Mr. Dicks. Okay, that is fine. Thank you.
        Mr. Lungren. Thank you.
        Mr. Pearce is recognized for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Pearce. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Powner, over the course of time, GAO has issued you all
    some findings, recommendations to strengthen your ability to
    implement the cybersecurity and I just wonder which of the
    recommendations are considered a priority and where we stand on
    implementing those.
        Mr. Powner. My written statement today lays out
    recommendations in five broad areas and there are 25 specific
    recommendations in that statement. I would say the priority
    areas are in four key areas, threat assessments, vulnerability
    assessments and reduction efforts, bolstering analysis and
    warning capabilities, and putting in place recovery plans.
        Mr. Pearce. Mr. Foresman, the business roundtable report
    issued suggested that too many organizations, both public and
    private, had overlapping responsibilities in managing the
    Internet reconstitution.
        Do you have any comment about their comment?
        Mr. Foresman. Congressman, one of the first meetings I took
    when I became the undersecretary was 2 or 3 days after I
    arrived in Washington on the job, was to sit down with the
    business roundtable and specifically to talk through a number
    of these issues.
        You know, it is hard for any of us to assess whether there
    are too many or too few, but I think the one thing that is
    clear from the GAO report, one thing that is clear from our
    Cyberstorm exercise is we need to have clarity and
    coordination, increased clarity and increased coordination of
    roles and responsibilities.
        We are far better than we were a year ago. There is still
    more work to be done. But, you know, I wouldn't assess whether
    we need more or fewer, but believe they need to be well
    coordinated.
        Mr. Pearce. Now, as I listened to Mr. Powner discuss the
    threat and vulnerability assessments, I wonder where we stand
    on accomplishing those.
        Mr. Foresman. That is, Congressman, actually one of the
    things that will come out of the work of the sector
    coordinating council in developing the IT sector-specific plan,
    as we will do across all of the sectors.
        Part of that will be the engagement of the public sector,
    the private sector, leveraging a wide array of U.S. government
    resources to do that vulnerability assessment, so that we
    understand what is it that we are trying to protect and how do
    we prioritize towards doing that.
        And to that end, one thing I will just mention, Mr.
    Chairman, it may be worthwhile in the early part of January for
    us to come up and brief you on what is, in fact, in those
    sectors, what each of the sectors have come up with.
        And the vulnerability analysis on the IT sector is one that
    I'm most anxious to receive.
        Mr. Pearce. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I see my time is about
    expired.
        Mr. Lungren. Does the gentlelady from Texas wish to
    participate in the second round?
        Ms. Jackson-Lee. Very briefly, Mr. Chairman, thank you.
        I think I want to go back to my point of frustration,
    because we face daily challenges. And I want to ask or at least
    emphasize why I use the term frustration. It is because we have
    noted over the last couple of weeks the administration, and I
    will yield to their higher moral responsibility which has
    caused them to utilizes the extensive media that they have
    done, meaning the president has been making speeches almost
    every day, every other day, on the war on terror, which means
    that, I guess, there is a sense of urgency.
        Of his public pronouncements, I don't see the equating of
    those public pronouncements with the agency that has the
    responsibility to carry forth those policies. So I find that
    particularly frustrating.
        And I want to go to Mr. Powner. And you went rather
    quickly, excuse me for being redundant in asking the question,
    but I would like to hear those four points again. That was
    asked by the distinguished gentleman from New Mexico.
        Then I would like you to categorize where we are, because
    those points that you enumerated were the key element of our
    line of homeland security defense, whether we are dealing with
    cybersecurity or we are talking about border patrol or
    protecting the borders.
        And you have made, I guess, a limited assessment, but let
    me hear those again and, if you would, walk us through, so that
    we are awake, where we are in that, because that is my--again,
    I am using this word frustration--the urgency of getting this
    department back--not back, but on its feet in numerous areas,
    and we are now talking about cybersecurity, infrastructure of
    that.
        And any number of incidences over the last couple of weeks
    show us that that is crucial. That is crucial.
        Again, you gave us four points. Could you just--
        Mr. Powner. And, clearly, there are multiple ways to
    prioritize and I make these four comments because this is
    really the heart and soul of information security, whether it
    is our critical infrastructure or federal agencies or private
    sector organization security. But it starts with threat,
    understanding the threat.
        Clearly, there has been a lot of work on threat. We have
    the U.S. CERT and there are many aspects within the department
    that work on threats. So it is not devoid of threat
    information. I think Mr. Foresman mentioned the threat needs to
    be bolstered through greater intelligence information. That is
    one area that could greatly be improved.
        I think when you look at the requirement, it calls for a
    national threat assessment. I don't think we have seen that
    yet.
        Ms. Jackson-Lee. No, we have been talking about that for 3
    years. But I will let you skip on. I got the gist of that one.
        Mr. Powner. So that is threat. The second one is
    vulnerability assessments. Mr. Foresman referred to the sector-
    specific plans that come out.
        I would imagine that some of those plans may get at
    vulnerability assessments. Some of those plans likely may call
    for vulnerability assessments. Hopefully, we get vulnerability
    assessments within those plans at the end of the year.
        The third area is looking at analysis and warning
    capability.
        Ms. Jackson-Lee. Analysis.
        Mr. Powner. And warning capability. And this is a point
    that I mentioned earlier, where the U.S. CERT, there is certain
    analysis and warning capability that currently exists, where we
    provide information on--more of it is after-the-fact type of
    vulnerabilities and incidents.
        We need to get more on the front end with our analytical
    capabilities, where we get precursors to attacks. And I think
    the department acknowledges that and is working on that.
        The fourth area then is recovery plans. We just completed a
    large review focusing on this, not only do the individual
    sectors need a recovery plan, and that is called for, but if
    you take the Internet, an Internet recovery plan is called for
    in national policy.
        That doesn't exist to date. That is very important that we
    work in the government with the private sector in recovering
    the Internet, if, in fact, there is a large-scale outage. And I
    think some of those lessons learned from Katrina and 9/11
    really drove that home.
        Now, that wasn't a cyber event, but in terms of the
    partnering and working together to restore some things, there
    were many lessons learned from that.
        Ms. Jackson-Lee. Many lessons, many lessons. Mr. Chairman,
    I would, in conclusion--thank you very much, Mr. Powner--say
    that it is time for Secretary Chertoff to come again before
    this committee, the full committee, because I think there are
    some large vulnerabilities.
        The idea that a threat assessment still may not be complete
    is one that I think should disturb this committee, Republicans
    and Democrats alike.
        So I thank you, Mr. Powner and Mr. Foresman, for your
    testimony and your service.
        I yield back.
        Mr. Lungren. I thank the gentlelady. And I want to thank
    both witnesses for their testimony and responses to our
    questions.
        Mr. Foresman, I know you are a busy individual, but perhaps
    you or some members of your staff could stay around to listen
    to what the other panel has to say, as we try to build that
    trust further.
        Again, thank both of you for appearing. We appreciate it.
        The chair would not like to call the second panel. Mr.
    William Pelgrin, Mr. Paul Kurtz, Mr. Guy Copeland, Mr. David
    Barron.
        We have someone to the rescue who is going to try and bring
    the heat down a little bit here.
        I thank the four of you for being with us. I introduced the
    individuals briefly beforehand and we would now ask the panel,
    again, gentlemen, your prepared testimony will be made a part
    of the record in its entirety, and we would ask you to please
    summarize your testimony.
        And we will go from my left to right or your right to left,
    starting with Mr. William Pelgrin, director of the New York
    State Office of Cybersecurity and Critical Infrastructure
    Coordination.

     STATEMENT OF WILLIAM PELGRIN, DIRECTOR, NEW YORK STATE OFFICE
             OF CYBER SECURITY AND CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE

        Mr. Pelgrin. Good afternoon, Chairman Lungren, Ranking
    Member Sanchez, and distinguished members of the subcommittee.
    I am William Pelgrin, the director of New York State's Office
    of Cybersecurity and chair of the multi-state Information
    Sharing and Analysis Center.
        I am honored to represent New York state and the multi-
    state ISAC to discuss our efforts to be more vigilant, prepared
    and resilient regarding cybersecurity.
        Two days ago, we marked the fifth anniversary of the tragic
    event of September 11. Since 2001, much has been implemented to
    improve our nation's security posture. I am very proud of what
    has been accomplished in cybersecurity at both the New York
    state and multi-state levels.
        Our achievements could not have been done without the
    support at the highest levels. In New York, Governor Pataki has
    been a true champion on these issues. And I would also like to
    thank Undersecretary Foresman. His leadership and support of
    our efforts are very much appreciated. It has been a great
    partnership with DHS and one that I believe has made a
    difference.
        But we cannot be complacent. We need to stay one step ahead
    of those who wish to do us harm. More than ever, we must
    continue to make significant progress in our fight against
    cyber threats.
        It is critical that we learn from the past in order to
    improve the future. It is not about how good we are, but about
    how good we can be. Cybersecurity is more about the management
    of technology. The best technology in the world, if it is not
    managed properly, can leave us vulnerable.
        Our successes have been driven by the following guiding
    principles. It is not about one person or entity, it is about
    the collective effort. It can't be territorial. We have got to
    work together across sectors and geographic boundaries.
        Trust must be earned. It is not a right. We have worked
    hard to earn trust. The culture must change. Implementing sound
    cybersecurity practices must be as second nature as buckling a
    seatbelt. This can only be done through education and
    awareness.
        We must be deliverable oriented. The time to talk is over.
    It is the time to do.
        My approach has been threefold. First, we wanted to make
    sure that New York state is strategically aligned to meet the
    emerging threats. My office was created in order to have an
    entity with a single focus, dedicated to addressing the highly
    specialized need of cybersecurity, one that wouldn't be
    diverted to other competing priorities.
        Second, we recognized early on that we could not do this
    alone. So we focus on developing strong collaboration with
    others, true partnerships. We established the New York state
    public-private cybersecurity workgroup in 2002 to foster
    sharing across sector borders and to build important trust
    relationships.
        The workgroup comprises high level executives from the
    public and private sectors, representing critical industries,
    including telecommunications, financial, utilities, chemical,
    health and food.
        Third, we recognize that the traditional geographic borders
    are irrelevant when dealing with cybersecurity issues. So there
    was a need for strong partnerships with other states and local
    governments across the nation, as well as with our federal and
    international partners.
        The multi-state ISAC was created in 2003 and I am pleased
    to say that all 50 states and D.C. are members. The mission of
    the MSISAC, consistent with the objectives of the national
    strategy to secure cyberspace, is to provide a common mechanism
    for raising the level of cybersecurity readiness and response
    in each state and with local governments.
        This volunteering and collaborative effort provides a
    central resource for gathering information on cyber threats and
    events, providing two-way sharing of information between and
    among states, and with local governments, as well as with the
    federal government.
        A key component of the MSISAC is our 7-by-24 cybersecurity
    center. This center provides cybersecurity monitoring for
    analysis of intrusions and other anomalous cyber activities for
    all the members of the multi-state ISAC.
        The center works very closely with U.S. CERT, other cyber
    researchers, security vendors, and the ISPs. In addition, we
    have deployed equipment that provides real-time monitoring of
    network traffic, specifically to two states, one in New York
    and, most recently, Alaska.
        Many other states and local governments have expressed an
    interest in being part of this service. The concept is that the
    collective view is more valuable and informative than a
    singular view.
        Another key initiative is our cybersecurity alert map,
    which allows each state to identify and display its current
    cybersecurity status and contact information. I am pleased that
    all 50 states and D.C. have adopted this common cyber alert
    protocol.
        What a tremendous step forward in facilitating information
    sharing than situational awareness.
        We have a number of other initiatives focused on helping
    local governments address cybersecurity. They are facing the
    same issues that the states are. However, many of them don't
    have the necessary resources or expertise for the cyber
    challenges that they face.
        For example, when we issued a cybersecurity advisory
    recommending patching vulnerable systems, I received a call
    from a town supervisor, telling me, ``Will, I don't understand
    what you mean by patching. When I hear the word, I look for
    duct tape.''
        To aid local governments, we have established a local
    government cybersecurity committee, with representatives from
    towns, counties, cities, schools and state governments. The
    committee has developed a roadmap for addressing the
    cybersecurity needs of local governments.
        In partnership with DHS, we have completed our first major
    deliverable, the first national cybersecurity guide for
    localities. It is called ``Just Get Started,'' and I do have
    copies for the chairman and members of the committee, as well.
        The goal of the guide was to keep it short, easy to read,
    like a magazine, that there would be periodic installments.
        In closing, I have briefly highlighted for you some of our
    major accomplishments. The key guiding principle that has been
    instrumental in these efforts is collaboration. We must ensure
    that all stakeholders are at the table. We also need to realize
    that you can't get from A to Z overnight. You have to
    prioritize and move strategically.
        I appreciate the opportunity to testify today and thank
    you, Chairman Lungren and the members of the subcommittee, for
    your strong leadership and attention to this important matter
    of cybersecurity.
        Thank you.
        [The statement of Mr. Pelgrin follows:]

                    Prepared Statement of William F. Pelgrin

        Good Afternoon Chairman Lungren, Ranking Member Sanchez, and
    distinguished Members of the Subcommittee on Economic Security,
    Infrastructure Protection, and Cyber Security. I am William Pelgrin,
    the Director of New York State Office of Cyber Security and Critical
    Infrastructure Coordination and Chair of the Multi-State Information
    Sharing and Analysis Center (Multi-State ISAC).
        I am honored to represent New York State and the Multi-State ISAC
    to discuss the challenges, successes and lessons learned in our efforts
    to address cyber security.
        It is time for plain speaking--we must be open to sharing
    information. We must learn from the past to improve the future. Cyber
    security must be everyone's responsibility. I have adopted this mantra
    as a call to action.
        Two days ago, we commemorated the 5th anniversary of the tragic
    events of September 11. Since 2001, much has been implemented to
    improve our nation's security posture. I am very proud of what has been
    accomplished in cyber security at both the New York State and Multi-
    State levels to assist in this effort to be more vigilant, prepared and
    resilient. But we cannot be complacent; we still have a long way to go.

        Why We Must Be So Concerned?
             Cyber terrorism or human error can both have
            devastating consequences;
             Cyber attacks can originate from anywhere;
             The technology to launch such cyber attacks is
            relatively inexpensive and widely available; and
             Sophisticated computer expertise is no longer
            necessary to launch attacks.
        My testimony today will describe our approach to address these
    issues and how we are working to improve the cyber security posture not
    only of New York State but of all the states and local governments in
    our nation. This could not have been done without the strong leadership
    of Governor Pataki, who has been a true champion of these issues.
        Since it is the start that stops most of us, we took the approach
    of ``let's just get started'' using the ``build it as you go'' and
    ``best effort'' rules to move forward as quickly as possible.
        The time to talk is over--it is the time for action.
        For many it is very difficult to fully grasp the cyber challenges
    and threats that we face today. My method is to make it real and
    tangible in order to provide clarity and understanding of these issues.
        None of us is as smart as all of us. Therefore, collaboration,
    cooperation and communication are the cornerstones of our approach. We
    can't do this alone. Our partnership with U.S. Department of Homeland
    Security has been a positive example of what can be accomplished when
    we truly work together toward a common goal.
        Cyber security is more about management than technology. The best
    technology in the world, if not managed properly, with appropriate
    policies and procedures, will leave us vulnerable. We all must become
    champions for good cyber security practices and set an example for
    others to follow.
        I would like to start off by describing my philosophy. I believe
    these guiding principles are major factors for our successes in New
    York, as well as with the Multi-State.
             First and foremost, it is not about one person or
            entity; it is about the collective effort.
             It is about moving in a common direction.
             Trust must be earned; it is not a right. We work hard
            to earn that trust.
             We have a willingness to share as much as possible
            without concern for what would or would not be shared with us.
            Over time, sharing is becoming two-way.
             The culture must change. Implementing sound cyber
            security practices must be as second nature as buckling a
            seatbelt.
             We continually strive to eliminate traditional
            bureaucratic impediments.
             We have created a safe haven in order to facilitate
            true collaboration and sharing.
        The remainder of this testimony will describe how we addressed our
    challenges.
        First, we needed to strategically realign our focus to meet the
    emerging threats.

    Creation of the New York State Office of Cyber Security and Critical
    Infrastructure Coordination
        The New York State Office of Cyber Security and Critical
    Infrastructure Coordination (CSCIC) was established in September 2002
    by Governor George E. Pataki in order to have an entity with a single
    focus dedicated to addressing the highly specialized needs of cyber
    security and critical infrastructure coordination.
        The Office is responsible for leading and coordinating New York
    State's efforts regarding cyber readiness and resilience; expanding the
    capabilities of the State's cyber incident response team; monitoring
    the State's networks for malicious cyber activities; coordinating the
    process by which State critical infrastructure data is collected and
    maintained; as well as leading and coordinating geographic information
    technologies.
        Second, we focused on developing strong collaboration with the
    private sector.

    NYS Public/Private Sector Cyber Security Workgroup
        Because more than 85% of critical infrastructure is owned or
    controlled by the private sector, we immediately saw the need to create
    true partnerships. New York State actively engaged the private sector
    in addressing the State's cyber security and critical infrastructure
    needs.
        Our NYS Public/Private Sector Cyber Security Workgroup comprises
    private sector high-level executives and public sector commissioners to
    represent critical industry sectors, including telecommunications,
    financial and economic, utilities, public safety, chemical, health,
    food and education/awareness. For example, for the Telecommunications
    Sector, we have as co-chair from the private sector, the Vice President
    and Chief Cyber Security Officer for AT& T, and for the public sector,
    the Chair of the NYS Public Service Commission.
        The Workgroup is examining the current state of cyber readiness
    throughout the entities within each sector, working to identify and
    assess vulnerabilities and identify mitigation strategies.
        The Workgroup has published two reports: Cyber Security: Protecting
    New York State's Critical Infrastructure details the on-going efforts
    in New York State to address cyber security readiness and response, in
    both the public and the private sectors; and The Best Practice
    Guidelines for Cyber Security Awareness which includes a number of
    useful tips and practical advice, along with links to additional
    information for all New Yorkers on how to become more ``cyber security
    aware.''
        The Workgroup has expanded its participation to include all major
    entities within the sectors. These entities work closely with the
    established sector chairs and New York State to more fully engage those
    critical entities to share information and build important
    communication relationships.
        The Workgroup meets monthly via conference call with each sector
    and meets together as a full group in person periodically. The
    participation in this Workgroup has been tremendous, and the
    information sharing relationship with the private sector serves to
    better prepare and protect New York State. This mutual information
    sharing arrangement is an important component in helping to ensure the
    readiness and resilience of New York State's critical infrastructure
    assets--both public and private. We are truly breaking down the
    traditional barriers that have prevented the public and private sectors
    from communicating. This Workgroup is important not only to New York,
    but the nation as well.
        We are also working collaboratively on the national level with the
    private sector, through the National ISAC Council. The Council
    represents the critical industry sectors and focuses on advancing the
    physical and cyber security of the critical infrastructures of North
    America. I'm honored to have been elected to serve as Vice Chair of the
    ISAC Council. This is another great example of strong relationships
    between the public and private sectors.
        Third, we recognized that traditional geographic borders are
    irrelevant when dealing with cyber security issues, so the need was
    clear for strong partnerships with other states and local governments
    across the nation.

    Multi-State Information Sharing and Analysis Center (Multi-State ISAC)
        The Multi-State ISAC is a voluntary and collaborative organization.
    I am pleased to say that we have 50 states and the District of Columbia
    as members, and we are actively pursuing local governments and
    territories. The mission of the Multi-State ISAC, consistent with the
    objectives of the National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace, is to provide
    a common mechanism for raising the level of cyber security readiness
    and response in each state and with local governments. The MS-ISAC
    provides a central resource for gathering information on cyber threats
    to critical infrastructure from the states and providing two-way
    sharing of information between and among the states and with local
    government.
        The U.S. Department of Homeland Security has officially recognized
    the Multi-State ISAC as the national ISAC for the states and local
    governments to help coordinate cyber readiness and response.

    Major Objectives of the Multi-State ISAC
             to provide two-way sharing of information on cyber
            critical infrastructure incidents and threats
             to provide a process for gathering and disseminating
            information on cyber and physical threats to cyber critical
            infrastructures
             to share security incident information among critical
            industry sectors
             to focus on the cyber and physical vigilance,
            readiness, and resilience of our country's cyber critical
            infrastructure assets
             to promote awareness of the interdependencies between
            cyber and physical critical infrastructure as well as between
            and among the different sectors
             to ensure that all necessary parties are vested
            partners in this effort
             to work collaboratively with the public and private
            sectors to foster communication and coordination
             to coordinate training and awareness
        The following major initiatives reflect the successes we--ve
    accomplished at both the New York State level and the Multi-State ISAC
    level.

    7x 24 Cyber Security Center
        One of the key components in addressing our cyber security needs is
    the establishment of a 7x24 cyber security center. This Center provides
    cyber security monitoring for and analysis of intrusions and other
    anomalous cyber activity for New York State agencies and public
    universities, as well as the members of the Multi-State ISAC. The State
    has deployed Intrusion Detection/Prevention Systems (IDS/IPS) for the
    State agencies. Since the inception of the IDS/IPS program in May 2003,
    more than 17 billion log entries have been analyzed. Currently we also
    provide intrusion prevention monitoring for the State of Alaska, and
    several other states are actively engaging the MS-ISAC in considering
    similar arrangements.
        The Center monitors cyber intelligence activity at a State,
    national and global level. It works closely with US-CERT, cyber
    researchers, security vendors and ISPs. The Center distributes cyber
    security advisories and alerts to all New York State agencies, to
    members of the private sector through its Public/Private Sector
    Workgroup and to other States and local governments through the Multi-
    State ISAC. New York State also posts cyber alerts and advisories on
    its public website: www.cscic.state.ny.us, and the Multi-State ISAC
    through its public website: www.msisac.org.
        The Center monitors State and local government websites for web
    page defacements and affected entities are notified. In 2005, 1,169
    defacements have been reported out to state and local governments.

    Incident Response Team
        New York State has an incident response team to respond to cyber
    incidents. A mandatory incident policy has been issued to all state
    agencies, which outlines what must be reported and how. The goal of
    this policy is to ensure that a state entity recovers from an incident
    in a timely and secure manner and to minimize impact. Reporting
    incidents to a central group promotes collaboration and information
    sharing with other sites that may be experiencing similar
    problems.Sec.
        The Multi-State ISAC Members also report incidents to the Multi-
    State ISAC. The Multi-State ISAC serves as the liaison between the
    states and US CERT for cyber incident reporting.

    Multi-State ISAC Secure Portal and Cyber Security Alert Map
        The Multi-State ISAC uses the US-CERT portal as its secure portal.
    The Multi-State ISAC's compartment on this portal serves as a central
    repository for Multi-State ISAC members to utilize as a secure
    mechanism in sharing important, secure and vital information among the
    states. The portal allows for secure emailing and includes a library so
    that Multi-State ISAC members can readily share information and
    documents, such as statewide policies, procedures, and white papers.
        One of the most unique features on the Multi-State ISAC secure
    portal is an alert map application that the Multi-State ISAC developed.
    This is a map of the nation, in which each state displays its current
    cyber security alert level, along with contact information for the
    Multi-ISAC Members. The Multi-State ISAC members have adopted this
    common Cyber Alert Indicator Protocol process; thus, when any Multi-
    State ISAC member state is at a ``Guarded'' level for cyber, for
    example, all of the other Multi-State ISAC Members will know the
    specific criteria used to arrive at that level.

    State ISACs on the Secure Portal
        A major step in fostering the strong relationships between and
    among state and local governments is the build-out of the secure portal
    so that each MS-ISAC Member state will have its own section of the
    portal in which to communicate securely, share documents, and display
    alert level status. This pilot is currently underway with five states.
        These individual state ``ISACs'' will include representatives from
    state agencies, counties, cities and other municipalities and
    educational institutions and will provide the following benefits to
    members:
             direct access to cyber security threat information
            from the State
             access to security awareness materials, including
            computer-based training modules
             access to security policy templates
             access to security-related solutions
             periodic meetings, teleconferences and webcasts to
            promote peer networking and information sharing
        This initiative is focusing on building strong relationships
    between and among the state and local government entities to best
    ensure our cyber readiness.
        To view examples of the alert map and the individual state ISAC
    sections of the portal, please refer to Appendix A.

    Local Government Committee
    Local governments face the same cyber security issues. However, many of
    them can be at a disadvantage in addressing the issues due to lack of
    resources and expertise. We are cognizant of the need for local
    government involvement and want local government as vested partners as
    we move forward.
        To that end, I've established a Local Government Cyber Security
    Committee (Committee), with representatives from towns, counties,
    cities, and schools and state government. The Committee, established in
    May 2005, has been meeting monthly to develop a roadmap for addressing
    the cyber security needs of local governments. The Committee is focused
    on ascertaining the issues, building communication channels, and
    identifying mitigation strategies.
        The Committee's goal was to develop a document that provides a non-
    technical resource to executives and managers to help them better
    understand the importance of cyber security and what they need to know
    about the issues.
        The Committee has produced one of its first priority projects: the
    Local Government Information Security: Getting Started Guide. This is a
    brief, practical reference intended for entities that may not have the
    technology or information security expertise of other entities and
    therefore need a basic ``how to get started'' resource for addressing
    information security challenges.
        This Guide is a joint effort with the U.S. Department of Homeland
    Security's National Cyber Security Division.

        The Getting Started guide covers the following topics:
             Introduction to Information Security
             Why is Information Security Important
             What is an Unprotected Computer
             What is a Cyber Incident
             Top Ten Things that must be done
             Glossary of information security terms
             Daily/weekly/monthly/annual checklist for the
            designated information security individual(s)
        Future volumes of the Guide will include appendices that expand on
    the topics presented in the first volume, providing more detail about
    the steps necessary to secure the information which the citizens have
    entrusted to local governments. The appendices will be distributed in
    installments periodically over the year and will contain non-technical,
    plain language descriptions with specific action steps, along with
    references for further information.
        We are also working on compiling a national database of contact
    information for local government representatives so that we can
    communicate more effectively and share information, including cyber
    alerts and advisories, future appendices of the Guides and other
    relevant information.

    National Webcast Initiative
        The MS-ISAC, in cooperation with the U.S Department of Homeland
    Security, through its National Cyber Security Division, has launched a
    partnership to deliver a series of national webcasts which examine
    critical and timely cyber security issues.
        Embracing the concept that ``cyber security is everyone's
    responsibility,'' these webcasts are available to a broad audience to
    help raise awareness and knowledge levels. The webcasts provide
    practical information and advice that users can apply immediately. All
    sessions are recorded and archived for viewing via the MS-ISAC public
    website.
        Thousands of individuals from across the country and around the
    world participate in the webcasts.
        One of the highlights of the webcast program is the national
    webcast held in October as part of National Cyber Security Awareness
    Month. This webcast is focused on how to keep our children safe online
    and features an interactive play for 4th and 5th grade age levels. The
    session will be broadcast live via the Internet and satellite and will
    be rebroadcast several times throughout the day to maximize viewing in
    each time zone. Last October, more than 5,000 teachers, parents,
    students and others participated in that broadcast and we look forward
    to another successful event this October 4!
        To view a listing of all webcasts conducted through the National
    Webcast Initiative, please refer to Appendix B.

    Partnership with U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Cyber
    Security Division
        As highlighted in this testimony, the Multi-State ISAC has a strong
    partnership with the National Cyber Security Division (NCSD) and its
    operational arm, the US-CERT. Through this partnership, we work
    together on many initiatives including sharing and analyzing
    information regarding cyber threats and events, conducting national
    webcasts, publishing cyber security awareness materials, conducting
    cyber exercises, as well as National Cyber Security Awareness Month
    activities. These initiatives help further the goal of improving our
    nation's cyber security posture.

    Training and Awareness Activities
        In New York, we have a number of ongoing training and awareness
    activities including:
             Annual Statewide Cyber Security Conference. We just
            held our ninth annual Cyber Security Conference. This
            Conference is free of charge to government employees.
            Consistent with our motto that ``Cyber Security is everyone's
            responsibility,'' the scope of the Conference has expanded over
            the years to where we now provide multiple tracks covering a
            wide spectrum of cyber security issues, including technical,
            legal, auditing, academia, business managers and local
            government. This is the largest free government conference of
            its type in the country.
             Annual Kids Safe Online Conference. We are sponsoring
            our second annual Kids Safe Online Conference next month. Our
            target audience includes parents, educators, law enforcement
            officers as well as kids. The subject is not only what are the
            dangers for children online, but what are the solutions. This
            Conference is free to the public.
             Information Security Officers (ISOs). New York was the
            first state to appoint a statewide Information Security Office
            and I believe the first to require each agency to appoint an
            information security officer. The agency ISOs have a dotted
            line reporting relationship with my Office. We hold monthly
            meetings with the ISOs where we focus on current issues and
            training opportunities. Agency ISOs are required to have
            twenty-four hours a year of continuing professional education.
            We also sponsor statewide cyber security training for ISOs and
            technical staff. For example, we are currently sponsoring a
            seven-week online course for information security professionals
            to increase their skills.
             Technical Staff. We are sponsoring training on secure
            coding for application developers. In the past, we provided a
            12 week course designed to increase the cyber security
            knowledge of technical staff and prepare staff to sit for the
            CISSP (Certificated Information Security Systems Professional)
            Exam. This training was video taped and made available to state
            and local governments on a national level.
             Senior Staff. Once a year, we provide a half-day
            awareness session for agency heads and their senior staff. The
            focus is to keep them informed of cyber security issues and to
            ensure they have the requisite knowledge to address them. It's
            also important to employ unique and creative solutions to
            increase awareness and education. We need to make it real. One
            of the approaches I took was to demonstrate to agency
            commissioners what is really meant when a computer is hacked.
            By having them see first-hand what could happen, it increased
            their awareness of the importance of cyber security.
             End Users. We developed a toolkit for State agencies,
            along the same line as the toolkit developed for the Multi-
            State ISAC. This includes calendars, mouse pads and posters,
            all with the cyber security message. We also produced a cyber
            security video that is used for training new employees at State
            agencies, as well as local governments. This was also made
            available to state and local governments on a national level.
            In addition, we conducted a ``phishing exercise'' with several
            state agencies to assess the current state of cyber awareness
            and identify where further education is necessary.
             Cyber Exercises. We sponsor and participate in
            periodic cyber security exercises to test our plans, policies,
            practices and procedures.
        In our role as Coordinator of the Multi-State Information Sharing
    and Analysis Center, we work with states to develop, share and
    collaborate on training and awareness activities including:
             Proclamations: In 2005, thirty-six Multi-State ISAC
            members reported that proclamations were issued by their
            respective governors proclaiming October 2005 as Cyber Security
            Awareness month. This is an increase of twenty-four from the
            previous year. This demonstrates the increasing awareness of
            cyber security issues at the state level. A copy of our 2005
            Cyber Security Month After-Action Report is attached.
             Tool Kits. We develop an annual tool kit for the
            states to use to promote Cyber Security Awareness. This
            includes posters, calendars, mouse pads and new for 2006 is the
            development of Public Service Announcements that are customized
            for each state.
             Cyber Exercise. In partnership with U.S. Department of
            Homeland Security, we coordinate Multi-State (state and local
            government) participation in regional and national exercises to
            test our plans, policies, practices and processes in responding
            to a cyber event. We need to insure that we have the capability
            to provide prompt and accurate situational awareness reports at
            the state and national level.
             Technical Training. We coordinate state participation
            of state and local governments in national training programs
            sponsored by the federal government. We also negotiate some
            volume discounts for states to participate in training provided
            by the private sector.
             End User. We are just completing the development of a
            Computer Based Training Program that will be made available to
            state and local governments nationally. This is a tutorial
            which educates end users on the basics of information security
            and what their responsibilities are to safeguard our government
            information systems. We publish a monthly Cyber Security
            Newsletter for end users. The newsletter focuses on one cyber
            security issue each month that is relevant for end users/home
            users. The newsletter is distributed to the states and local
            government which then push it out to the end users.
        For a summary of the MS-ISAC Accomplishments, please refer to
    Appendix C.

    Funding for the Multi-State ISAC
        We very much appreciate the fiscal support from the Department of
    Homeland Security for the Multi-State ISAC. The current funding level
    of one million dollars a year amounts to twenty thousand dollars per
    state. While we have worked hard to leverage this available funding,
    more meaningful, long lasting change would be possible if more funding
    was available. Our ability to help raise the awareness and preparedness
    of states and local governments (for example, intrusion prevention
    monitoring and correlation of data) to help improve their cyber
    security posture is constrained due to the limited fiscal resources.
        I appreciate the opportunity to testify today. Thank you Chairman
    Lungren and Members of this Subcommittee for your strong leadership and
    attention to this important matter.
    Appendix A
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    Appendix B--National Webcase Initiative Topics and Description
    August 16, 2006
    Instant Messaging

        The broadcast presentation raised awareness on instant messaging
    (IM) and how IM is being used today as a source of communication
    online--both at home and at work. While IM can be a convenient and
    quick way to chat with others or collaborate on business matters, there
    are security concerns that we must understand and address. This webcast
    provided attendees with accurate and up-to-date information so that
    each of us can take the necessary steps to help protect ourselves
    online.

    June 28, 2006
    Remote Access

        The broadcast presentation raised awareness on popular secure
    remote access solutions in terms of business use cases, high level
    deployment scenarios, and security and operational considerations.

    April 13th, 2006
    Voice-Over IP_How secure is your network infrastructure for handling
    VoIP?

        VoIP is growing in popularity. Two-thirds of the world's 2,000
    largest companies will be using VOIP systems in 2006 and by 2009, 27
    million Americans will use Internet phones at home. The presentation
    raised awareness on network security issues and challenges that arise
    in today's network world.

    February 16th, 2006
    Identity Theft_The crime that keeps on taking!

        The February 16th broadcast presentation focused on what ID Theft
    is, how to protect yourself, and what to do if you think you may have
    become a victim. The presenters walked through a variety of scenarios
    to help explain these concepts and provided specific advice on what
    steps to take.

    December 15, 2005
    Cyber Security Tips During the Holiday Season

        The broadcast included such topics as online shopping transactions
    and the need to secure your private information online; understanding
    how to properly check your security settings on the new computer you
    just received as a gift; and what to look for when visiting legitimate
    web sites.

    October 20, 2005
    Protecting Our Children on the Internet

        The National Webcast on Protecting Our Children on the Internet
    consisted of a play entitled Cyber Smart in Cyber Space geared toward
    the 4th and 5th grade age levels in which actors performed a cyber
    security-related skit interacting with the children. The play used
    content from CyberSmart!, an organization dedicated to teaching secure,
    responsible and effective Internet and computer use, and acted out with
    members of the Plays for Living organization, a nonprofit organization
    that utilizes live theater dramas to depict the real-life challenges
    and stresses many people face on a daily basis at work, at home and in
    the community.

    July 20, 2005
    Wireless Security

        The webcast provided a non-technical presentation on Wireless
    Security. The webcast applied to all computer users--whether you are
    using your wireless-enabled laptop at the local coffee house or running
    a network that hosts sensitive customer data, you need to understand
    the issues and how to use wireless technology safely. Attendees walked
    away with a better understanding of the diversity of wireless devices
    that are used today, the security that can be applied behind the
    wireless network, and solutions of how you can be more secure.

    May 18, 2005
    Botnets

        The webcast provided a non-technical presentation on BotNets.
    BotNets are becoming a significant problem across the Internet and are
    increasing at an alarming rate. They are a growing source for staging
    denial of service attacks, identity theft, phishing attacks and SPAM
    mail relay services. Please visit the archived presentation and learn
    about how to defend against BotNets, what to do when your machine has
    been compromised, and how to respond when your machine has been
    controlled by BotNets.

    March 16, 2005
    Are You Secure?. . .Are You Sure?
    Vulnerability Management

        The webcast provided a ``low/medium technical'' discussion about
    what each of us should do on a daily basis to be more secure. The
    volume of malicious cyber activity continues on an upward curve. The
    sophistication of hacker tools continues to grow while the expertise
    required to deploy them is decreasing. Phishing schemes are becoming
    increasingly difficult to discern from legitimate email. Botnets are
    increasing at an alarming rate. These facts require that your
    information systems are as secure as possible and that you have
    appropriate measures in place to decrease your vulnerability to these
    cyber threats.

    February 9, 2005
    Adware/Spyware:
    How to Protect Yourself from Today's Most Dangerous Spyware Threats
    The webcast provided a non-technical discussion about what each of us
    should do on a daily basis to be more secure. This session focused on
    an in-depth analysis of today's most egregious spyware/adware programs.

    October 19 , 2004
    Are YOU the Weakest Link?

        The webcast provided a non-technical discussion about what each of
    us should do on a daily basis to be more secure. This session focused
    on the human elements of cyber security, which are just as important,
    if not more so, than the technical elements, and included examples of
    the various types of scams and pitfalls we need to watch out for, and
    how to protect ourselves.

    August 26, 2004
    Performing a Cyber Security Risk Assessment:
    Why? When? and How?

        The webcast focused on the steps organizations should take in
    addressing risk and provided timely and practical advice that can be
    applied immediately.

    June 22, 2004
    Cyber Security: The Three Things You Should Have Done Yesterday and The
    Three Things You Should Do Today

        The webcast included discussion of the biggest challenges to
    security, what you should have already been doing in your organization
    to address those challenges, and what you must do today.

    Appendix C--Highlights of MS-ISAC Accomplishments
             establishment of a 24 x 7 operations center
             distribution of cyber security advisories and
            bulletins
             cyber incident response assistance to MS-ISAC Members
             monthly Member conference calls
             annual meetings of the Members
             two MS-ISAC websites--a public and a secure website
             participation in cyber exercises, including the
            national Live Wire and Cyber Storm exercises
             development and adoption of common cyber alert level
            protocols
             development of draft cyber incident reporting
            protocols
             support and promotion of National Cyber Security
            Awareness Month
                    MS-ISAC Deliverables for 2005 National Cyber Awareness
                    Month:
                            36 MS-ISAC Members (35 States and the District
                            of Columbia) signed proclamations recognizing
                            Awareness Month;
                            Cyber Security Toolkits were developed and
                            distributed to all 50 States and the District
                            of Columbia;
                            PSAs for Governors were distributed;
                            National Webcast was conducted with more than
                            5,000 registrants from across the country.
                            Awareness Month materials available at: http://
                            www.cscic.state.ny.us/msisac/ncsa/oct05/
                            index.htm
             development and execution of legal NDA for the Members
            to sign
             development and adoption of the MS-ISAC Business Plan
             development and adoption of the MS-ISAC Charter
             development and adoption of MS-ISAC Member
            Representative Guidelines
             development and adoption of ISAC Council
            Representation Guidelines
             development and adoption of MS-ISAC Contact
            Administration Guidelines
             establishment of the MS-ISAC Nominating Committee
             issuance of white papers
             served as chair for the state and local section of the
            ``Awareness and Outreach'' Task Force of the NCSP--the Task
            Force issued a report detailing specific action items to be
            taken to increase end user cyber security awareness
             collaboration with all necessary parties

        Mr. Lungren. Thank you very much.
        Now, we will hear from Mr. Paul Kurtz, the executive
    director of the Cybersecurity Industry Alliance.

    STATEMENT OF PAUL B. KURTZ, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, CYBER SECURITY
                           INDUSTRY ALLIANCE

        Mr. Kurtz. Mr. Chairman and other members of the committee,
    thank you very much for asking me here today.
        Cyber systems are our newest and most pervasive
    infrastructure. They drive and organize every fact of our
    collective and individual lives from national and economic
    security to personal health and wellbeing.
        And, yet, we do not have a strategic national capability to
    assess how well the mot critical systems are protected and what
    the consequences are if they fail. There is little strategic
    direction or leadership from the federal government in the area
    of information security.
        Ensuring resiliency and integrity of our information
    infrastructure and protecting the privacy of our citizens
    should be a higher priority for the government. We must move
    beyond philosophy and statements of aspiration to defining
    priorities and programs.
        CSIA believes the government has a responsibility to lead,
    set priorities and coordinate and facilitate protection and
    response.
        Let me be clear. This is not a call for regulation for
    intervention. This is a call for leadership.
        So if I could, I am going to depart from my prepared notes
    and list six recommendations for consideration for DHS.
        Number one, lead, lead, lead. Number two, prevention and
    mitigation programs. In this area, I would highlight two key
    important points. R&D, Doug Bond, who is the head of
    cybersecurity R&D at DHS is doing a fantastic job, but he is
    lost in a bureaucratic morass. Doug's work needs to be
    recognized. It needs to be funded appropriately.
        Second, in this area, we need to investigate incentives
    specifically facilitating the growth of insurance.
        The third area that I would highlight would be establish an
    active early warning program that embraces the private sector.
    Currently, the ITISAC is being held at arm's distance by the
    Department of Homeland Security. It should be more fully
    embraced and its work should be recognized.
        Fourth, we need to establish command and control procedures
    for when the balloon goes up, and it will go up. That means two
    key questions. A, what is the process for determining an
    incident of national significance? What agencies are involved
    inside the government? Who is involved in the private sector,
    as well?
        Secondly, what are the implications of that decision?
    Legally, what does it mean for government? What does it mean
    for the private sector? A cyber incident of national
    significance, that language is drawn from the national response
    plan that has been prepared by DHS.
        The fifth recommendation is ensure we have resilient
    communications in place to execute command and control when a
    crisis surfaces. So imagine when we have a problem, we are
    going to grab that phone or we are going to use the computer,
    but think of the phone in an IT environment.
        Will it work when the very infrastructure is under attack?
    So we need to ensure we have resilient communications in place.
        The sixth recommendation is to establish a national
    information assurance policy, which enshrine basically the five
    recommendations that I outlined before.
        The protection of the information infrastructure goes
    beyond DHS. Clearly, the president has established that DHS has
    the lead in coordination. But when the balloon goes up and when
    we have problems, DOD will be involved, the FTC will be
    involved, and multiple other agencies will be involved at the
    same time.
        And with that, I will close and I will take questions
    later.
        Thank you.
        [The statement of Mr. Kurtz follows:]

                      Prepared Statement of Paul B. Kurtz

    Introduction
        Chairman Lungren, Ranking Member Sanchez and members of the
    Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify today before the
    House Subcommittee on Economic Security, Infrastructure Protection, and
    Cybersecurity. My name is Paul Kurtz and I am Executive Director of the
    Cyber Security Industry Alliance (CSIA).
        CSIA is the only advocacy group dedicated to ensuring the privacy,
    reliability and integrity of information systems through public policy,
    technology, education and awareness. The organization is led by CEOs
    from the world's top security providers who offer the technical
    expertise, depth and focus needed to encourage a better understanding
    of security issues. It is our belief that a comprehensive approach to
    ensuring the security and resilience of information systems is
    fundamental to global protection, national security and economic
    stability.
        Before joining CSIA, I served at the White House on the National
    Security Council and Homeland Security Council. On the NSC, I served as
    Director of Counterterrorism and Senior Director of the Office of
    Cyberspace Security. On the HSC, I was Special Assistant to the
    President and Senior Director for Critical Infrastructure Protection.
        My testimony will address four themes for consideration by Congress
    on refining the role of the Department of Homeland Security as it
    relates to national cyber security:
             Inadequate attention
             Lack of leadership
             No plan to prevent or minimize a major cyber disaster
             No plan for working with the private sector to recover
            from a cyber disaster

    Cyber Security is Receiving Inadequate Attention from DHS
        Last week in his updated national strategy for counterterrorism,
    President George W. Bush declared that ``America is safer but we are
    not yet safe.'' The reality of physical terror occurring in the United
    States of America has riveted our attention since the attacks on
    September 11, 2001. Prevention of any physical incident of horror has
    since been priority one.
        The President's reminder for vigilance clearly applies to threats
    against our physical well-being, but his admonition must also apply to
    the threats against cyber security. To some the idea of terrorists or
    hackers breaking into computers may sound like an abstract threat,
    especially when compared to the shock of a suicide bomber killing
    innocent people and destroying property. However, a successful massive
    cyber attack could trigger grave harm for many Americans if it knocked
    out communications and information systems for emergency response,
    energy, transportation, and other critical resources that depend on IT.
    The nation experienced such vivid fallout from a regionalized natural
    disaster last year in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina--imagine this
    disaster on a national scale.
        Since 9/11, responsibility for coordinating federal efforts on
    national safety shifted to the Department of Homeland Security. DHS has
    predictably reacted to a myriad of security challenges by focusing
    first on immediate physical threats. This focus is understandable, but
    it has also impeded progress toward stronger national cyber security.
    As a result, the United States remains unprepared to defend itself
    against a massive cyber attack or to systematically recover and
    reconstitute information systems after a successful attack.
        My testimony will describe what DHS is and is not doing with
    respect to national cyber security, plus the need for DHS to specify
    how it and the private sector would coordinate actions if a massive
    cyber attack were to occur. By realistically refining the Department's
    role in national cyber security, DHS can escalate cyber security
    efforts in concert with efforts to prevent physical terror in America.

    There is no leadership at DHS for national cyber security
        Despite publication of more than 750 pages of strategies,
    directives and response plans, leadership in the U.S. government on
    cyber security is clearly absent. The practical significance of lack of
    leadership means the nation is not ready for a major disruption to our
    information infrastructure.
        National coordination of cyber security is the purview of the
    Department of Homeland Security, and its related leadership position is
    Assistant Secretary for Cyber Security and Telecommunications. This new
    position was established in July 2005 by Secretary Chertoff
    specifically to elevate the importance of cyber security in relation to
    DHS's main focus on physical security. Unfortunately, fourteen months
    later, the Assistant Secretary position is unfilled, which reflects the
    low priority DHS still has toward cyber security. No one is in charge
    to lead efforts to protect information infrastructure against cyber
    attacks or to lead response and recovery.
        Another consequence of this leadership vacuum at DHS is an unclear,
    uncoordinated strategy for cyber security. The agency has pushed plenty
    of paper on the topic but people responsible for securing information
    technology in government, public and the private sector would be hard
    pressed to identify the top DHS priorities.
        The threats to information security are real. Digital systems
    underpin vital infrastructure throughout the nation and a major
    disruption to, or widespread lack of confidence in these systems could
    have a devastating effect on our citizens, our economy and security.
    The real need is for concrete action guided by a few key national
    priorities understood by those who must ensure cyber security. DHS
    needs to immediately fill the position for Assistant Secretary for
    Cyber Security and Telecommunications to crystallize a few key
    priorities, and develop programs that support and achieve those
    priorities.
        An important role for the new Assistant Secretary will be ensuring
    that priorities for cyber security reflect the fact that all critical
    functions of all industry sectors rely on IT and telecommunications.
    Coordination and leadership should be the primary concern for DHS.
        Lastly, DHS and the White House can take steps to consolidate
    multiple presidential-level advisory bodies in the area of IT and
    telecommunications. For example, we have NSTAC and NIAC that clearly
    have overlapping responsibilities and areas of inquiry. These should be
    combined to ensure that presidential advice and recommendations are
    made holistically, looking across key critical infrastructures, and not
    in separate silos.

    DHS needs to specify steps to prevent and/or minimize a massive cyber
    attack or telecommunications disaster
        DHS documents such as the National Response Plan and the National
    Infrastructure Protection Plan attempt to not omit any unconsidered
    detail. Virtually no agency, program or initiative is left unmentioned
    in sweeping surveys of the cyber security landscape. The downside to
    this ocean of detail is that every point seems equally important. Lack
    of prioritization makes it difficult for organizations to take
    practical coordinated action to secure their information systems.
        CSIA believes this lack of prioritization dilutes the Department's
    limited resources and makes it less effective in preparing the nation
    against a massive attack. DHS should articulate a smaller set of
    priorities focused on preventing and/or minimizing the likelihood or
    severity of a massive cyber attack or telecommunications disaster.
        Creating cyber security for critical systems entails using a
    combination of technological solutions and best practices for IT. With
    regard to cyber security technology, its successful use is linked to
    understanding vulnerabilities of operating systems, applications,
    networks, and literally thousands of protocols that enable modern IT.
    Acquiring this knowledge is a moving target due to the complex
    interdependencies of these technologies and their continuous evolution.
        There are 4 major areas of logical activity that DHS should
    crystallize programs around:
             Risk Management--identification and classification of
            Critical Infrastructure
             Research & Development--solutions to identify, prevent
            and recover from attacks
             Incentives--encourage problems to be resolved, not
            postponed
             Insurance--ensures continuing US financial viability
            after a cyber loss

    Risk Management
        An important starting place is for DHS to encourage organizations
    to pursue cyber security as they would manage other types of risks. In
    evaluating the nation's IT resources, DHS should help identify the most
    critical interdependencies and urge organizations to concentrate on
    protecting those systems first. One positive effort underway is the
    partnership between DHS and the private sector in developing a
    protection plan for the IT infrastructure. Under the plan, the private
    sector is identifying common risk-management processes and techniques.
    However, this effort is lacking senior-level attention at DHS.

    Research & Development
        DHS could play a major national role by funding cyber security
    research and development (R&D) in the private sector. Instead, more
    than 98 percent of last year's $1.039 billion science and technology
    budget of DHS went to R&D on weapons of mass destruction. Less than 2%
    ($18 million) was for cyber security, and of that only about $1.5
    million was for basic research.\1\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ See CSIA Policy Briefing, ``Federal Funding for Cyber Security
    R&D'' (July 2005).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        We understand the concern about threats to physical security, but
    CSIA believes DHS has inadvertently placed the nation in the way of
    another harmful vector by virtually ignoring R&D on cyber security.
        Where DHS has spent money on cyber security R&D there has been some
    success. Over the past 18 months, the Department's Science and
    Technology (S&T) Directorate has participated in a technology
    demonstration project with the Oil and Gas sector. The project,
    entitled LOGIIC--Linking the Oil and Gas Industry to Improve
    Cybersecurity--is a public-private partnership between DHS, several
    companies from the oil and gas sector, process control system (PCS) and
    information security technology vendors, and the National Labs. This
    project is aimed at reducing vulnerabilities in process control
    environments used in the oil and gas sector by establishing a framework
    for assessing risks, evaluating new technologies, integrating these new
    technologies into a test environment, and demonstrating commercial
    event detection and correlation technologies that can significantly
    enhance situational awareness on PCS networks used in refineries and
    other large industrial facilities.
        There is strong historical precedent for federally funding R&D for
    emerging technologies of national significance. The Internet is the
    most famous example, beginning with seed money in 1962 from with the
    Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency's (DARPA). The Internet is
    now a vital global infrastructure almost entirely owned and operated by
    the private sector. Other examples of federal funding for R&D that
    resulted in important innovations for cyber security include firewalls,
    intrusion detection systems, fault tolerant networks, open operating
    systems, cryptography and advanced authentication. CSIA urges DHS to
    shift a larger portion of its R&D budget to programs that will bolster
    national cyber security.

    Incentives
        The time-tested government practice of offering incentives for
    private investment is another avenue worthy of examination by DHS. By
    offering incentives such as tax credits for implementation of security
    solutions, the federal government could dramatically accelerate
    adoption of measures to shore up national cyber security--just as it
    has done to spur other initiatives deemed as important for the country
    by Congress. The key is to develop very carefully-crafted incentives
    targeted at high priority systems such as certain SCADA systems and
    Internet security protocols. Many SCADA systems operate on unsupported
    application platforms and must be moved to a virtual ``sandbox'' to
    remediate immediate and urgent security threats.

    Insurance
        On a related non-technical note, insurance is a practical way for
    organizations to recover from catastrophic loss. Private insurance
    policies, however, do not usually provide ``cyber risk coverage'' due
    to the newness of this concept and lack of data enabling insurers to
    establish actuarial loss tables and a viable premium structure. To be
    effective, premiums for cyber attack coverage would have to include
    natural risk management incentives for organizations to balance the
    cost of premiums against the cost of taking preventative measures for
    security. CSIA believes DHS, in partnership with the Department of
    Commerce, should sponsor research into viable uses of private-sector
    insurance coverage for cyber attacks.
    DHS has not specified how it will work with the private sector to a
    cyber incident of national significance
        The other major yet unarticulated priority for DHS is describing
    how it will work with the private sector to respond to and recover from
    a massive failure of information technology systems--whether from a
    cyber attack or a natural disaster. This issue is important because
    it's the private sector--not DHS--that owns and operates information
    technology systems for most of the nation's critical infrastructure.
    The unanswered question affecting all is: What is a suitable role for
    DHS as well as other key federal agencies, including DoD and the FCC in
    facilitating recovery and reconstitution from a cyber incident of
    national importance?
        DHS is well aware that the private sector ``runs the show,'' which
    may account for its encouragement of public-private partnerships. I am
    sure that everyone involved with the multitude of DHS-sponsored public-
    private partnerships participates with the best of intentions, but
    there is a lack of clarity in what this work is accomplishing. The
    Government Accounting Office recently reported that progress on those
    initiatives is limited, some lack time frames for completion, and
    relationships between these initiatives are unclear.\2\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \2\ ``Challenges in Developing a Public/Private Recovery Plan,''
    GAO-06-863T (July 28, 2006).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Consequently, DHS needs to articulate a chain-of-command for each
    step of recovery and reconstitution. For example, the DHS's U.S.
    Computer Emergency Readiness Team (US-CERT) may be aware of a network
    attack, but the North American Network Operators Group (NANOG) is the
    operational forum for backbone/enterprise networking. Considerations
    for this type of situation include:
             Which entity should be in charge of coordinating the
            actual work of recovery and reconstitution?
             What, if any, related legal authority is possessed by
            DHS and the federal government?
             What obligations do private sector entities have to
            obey directives from DHS?
             Who would resolve conflicting demands for scarce cyber
            resources?
             What enforcement power does DHS have in the process of
            helping the nation recover from a cyber disaster?
        In this context, I would note that DHS in February sponsored
    ``Cyber Storm,'' a large-scale exercise focused on some of these
    questions. CSIA and its members supported the exercise but some six
    months after the event, DHS's after action report containing lessons
    learned has not been shared with key owners and operators in the
    private sector.
        In addition to chain-of-command, DHS needs to articulate an
    emergency communications system that works even when standard
    telecommunications and Internet connectivity are disrupted. Emergency
    communications entail more than simply establishing a resilient
    mechanism allowing people to talk. It also requires advance
    identification of the right people from appropriate organizations who
    speak the ``same language'' for establishing rapid recovery and
    reconstitution of national systems.
        These are but a few of the details that must be articulated and
    agreed upon in advance if the nation is to truly prepare for recovery
    and reconstitution from a cyber disaster. Ostensibly, DHS would have a
    leading role in planning.
        These issues should be answered in the DHS's 400-plus page National
    Response Plan. Unfortunately, the plan does not articulate clear
    answers on how federal agencies work with each other, with other
    government entities, or with the private sector in responding to a
    national disaster. Instead of one coordinator, there are at least six:
    Homeland Security Operations Center, National Response Coordination
    Center, Regional Response Coordination Center, Interagency Incident
    Management Group, Joint Field Office, and Principal Federal Official.
    The National Response Plan's discussion of cyber security is contained
    in the ``Cyber Incident Annex.'' The Annex mentions many other federal
    departments and agencies with ``coordinating'' responsibility for cyber
    incident response, including Defense, Homeland Security, Justice,
    State, the Intelligence Community, Office of Science and Technology
    Policy, Office of Management and Budget, and State, Local, and Tribal
    Governments. The agency tasked with maintaining the National Response
    Plan is FEMA.
        As I draw toward the end of my testimony, I wish to comment on one
    other topic that also requires close coordination of the government and
    private sector--namely, the need for a cyber early warning system that
    provides the nation with situational awareness of attacks. DHS has
    sponsored some mechanisms toward this end, such as US-CERT, and
    Information Sharing and Analysis Centers (ISACs) that share some cyber
    alert data from the private sector with the federal government. As
    noted by the Business Roundtable, however, the nation lacks formal
    ``trip wires'' that provide rapid, clear indication that an attack is
    under way.\3\ This mechanism would be akin to NOAA's National Hurricane
    Center, which usually can provide a day or so of advance notice before
    a dangerous storm lands ashore. Cyber attacks often provide far less
    notice to prepare and react. DHS should lead the establishment of an
    efficient national cyber warning system because the private sector is
    most likely to first detect an attack, and data correlation and follow
    through coordination closely involves the government.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \3\ Business Roundtable, ``Essential Steps to Strengthen America's
    Cyber Terrorism Preparedness'' (June 2006); see also Section 15 of
    Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5, ``Management of Domestic
    Incidents'' (Feb. 28, 2003), and the National Strategy to Secure
    Cyberspace (Feb. 2003).

    Summary of Recommendations
        In summary, CSIA offers the following recommendations for the
    Subcommittee's consideration:
        Increase Attention to Cyber Security. DHS has inadvertently exposed
    the nation to another vector of attack by providing inadequate
    attention to cyber security. The Department should carefully assess its
    priorities to achieve more balance by shifting some attention from an
    almost exclusive focus on physical security.
        Appoint a Leader. There is no leader at DHS who is solely
    responsible for cyber security. DHS should swiftly fill the open
    position of Assistant Secretary for Cyber Security and
    Telecommunications to close the leadership vacuum.
        Plan to Prevent or Minimize a Major Cyber Disaster. DHS is too
    preoccupied with appearing to be in control of every detail related to
    cyber security. DHS should shift this energy to articulating a smaller
    set of priorities focused on preventing and/or minimizing the
    likelihood or severity of a massive cyber attack or telecommunications
    disaster.
        Plan to Work with the Private Sector to Recover from a Major
    Disaster. The existing DHS ``plan'' for recovery cites more than a
    dozen federal departments and agencies with ``coordinating''
    responsibility--not including state, local and tribal governments. DHS
    needs to clearly articulate a chain-of-command between government and
    the private sector for recovery from a major cyber disaster.
        With that, I appreciate the opportunity to testify today and am
    pleased to answer your questions. Kurtz testimony before House
    Subcommittee on Economic Security, Infrastructure Protection, and
    Cybersecurity 9/13/2006
    [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 35624.001

        Mr. Lungren. Thank you very much for your testimony. I was
    trying to write as fast as I could, since you departed from
    your prepared text.
        [Laughter.]
        Mr. Kurtz. It is all in the written statement. I will put
    this together and send it.
        Mr. Lungren. The chair recognizes Mr. Guy Copeland, the
    chairman of the Information Technology Sector Coordination
    Council.

    STATEMENT OF GUY COPELAND, CHAIR, INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY SECTOR
                          COORDINATING COUNCIL

        Mr. Copeland. Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the
    subcommittee, thank you for inviting me here today.
        As chairman of the Information Technology Sector
    Coordinating Council, I commend you for your attention to cyber
    and telecommunications security. I am also a vice president at
    Computer Sciences Corporation, but I am offering my personal
    reflections here today.
        Five years ago this week, we suffered a devastating
    terrorist attack. 9/11 did not include a cyber attack
    component, but it reaffirmed how dependent we are on
    information technology and communications.
        As an IT sector witness, I am focusing on our sector, but I
    also acknowledge the efforts of so many others who are
    dedicated to our common cause in their respective sectors.
        The IT Sector Coordinating Council formally began in
    January 2006, with over 30 founding members. It is broadly
    representative of the sector and works with DHS, our sector-
    specific agency, the national cybersecurity division, or NCSD,
    and other organizations, in developing strategies and policies
    for critical infrastructure protection, collaborations,
    analysis and information sharing.
        The IT sector's 5-year-old information sharing and analysis
    center, or ITISAC, is recognized and endorsed by the IT Sector
    Coordinating Council as our lead for the sector.
        Under Secretary Foresman, Assistant Secretary Steffen, and
    Mr. Purdy have all worked tirelessly to include us in
    initiatives that affect the private sector. During and since
    its formation, the IT Sector Coordinating Council actively
    engage with government colleagues in the update of the national
    infrastructure protection plan, the NIPP, and we have formed a
    joint effort with them to draft the IT sector-specific plan.
        Secretary Chertoff has proposed the establishment of an
    assistant secretary position, as you have discussed earlier. We
    stand ready to work with the new assistant secretary. We have
    not been on hold awaiting this appointment, but it is very
    important to us.
        Recognizing the importance of IT and communications, Under
    Secretary Foresman, as he stated earlier, has recently directed
    his deputy undersecretary, Robert Zitz, to provide day-to-day
    oversight of the NCSD and the national communications system,
    which together constitute the cybersecurity and
    telecommunications organization.
        I have some observations and suggestions. Trusted
    partnership is a key priority. DHS leadership has made huge
    strides to improving partnership, but still appears to be
    hampered by the application of laws and regulations rightly
    intended for the protection of a procurement or regulatory
    relationship, but not for the operational partnership that
    homeland security needs.
        Adequate operational preparedness and timely response
    require physical collocation and daily interaction. DHS should
    build on its over 20 years experience of the national
    coordinating center for telecommunications, the NCC, add
    representatives from the IT sector and the other time critical
    or sometimes we call them the millisecond sectors, and resident
    members should represent the core group of each sector. That
    is, the most important entities for crisis response.
        Ultimately, this should become the national crisis
    coordination center.
        Since its establishment, the NCC has been collocated in the
    defense information systems agency headquarters, with the DOD's
    joint task force for global network operations. Current plans
    call for the NCC to relocate with the DHS U.S. CERT, as you
    heard earlier today.
        Instead, DOD, DISA and DHS should consider collocating all
    of them, the U.S. CERT, the NCC, the JTFGNO, and perhaps other
    important elements. That will allow for maximum interaction
    leading to enhanced efficiency and value for both government
    and industry, for both homeland and national security missions.
        Ultimately, the collocation facility could be a part of the
    national crisis coordination center.
        Mr. Chairman, subcommittee members, Congress can help. In
    my written testimony, there are more details, but here,
    briefly, are a few recommendations.
        Examine the collocation of those three entities, the NCC,
    the CERT and the JTFGNO, and other appropriate ones, to add
    better value. Examine the national crisis coordination center
    concept. Work with DHS and the IT Sector Coordinating Council
    and the Telecommunications Sector Coordinating Council to agree
    on cybersecurity priorities and ensure that DHS has the
    resources to implement them.
        Create a better environment for the critical infrastructure
    protection partnership. Consider forming a bipartisan House
    caucus for cybersecurity for IT and communications, to help you
    all understand the issues and complexities better.
        Encourage broader industry participation in critical
    infrastructure protection through membership in the sector
    coordinating councils and the ISACs.
        Mr. Chairman, thank you again for inviting me to appear
    today.
        [The statement of Mr. Copeland follows:]

                     Prepared Statement of Guy L. Copeland

        Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the Subcommittee, thank you
    for inviting me to testify before you this afternoon. On behalf of the
    members of the Information Technology Sector Coordinating Council, I
    commend you for your continuing attention to Cyber and
    Telecommunications Security.
        Five years ago this week, we suffered the most devastating,
    terrorist attack in the history of our nation. The deliberate, horribly
    evil assaults on that day did not include a cyber attack. But they
    immediately reaffirmed how dependent we are on our information
    technology and communications sectors to respond quickly and
    effectively in any emergency and to recover and reconstitute normal
    societal functions. Subsequent analysis also showed that the
    technologies of these two sectors are equally crucial to prevention and
    preparedness at all levels.
        A little over a year ago now, Katrina painfully reminded us that
    natural emergencies can be devastating. The scale of Katrina's impact
    and the response required was unprecedented. Once again though,
    communications and information technology were essential to response,
    recovery and reconstitution. Lessons learned have since been folded
    into the preparedness posture and emergency plans of the critical
    institutions, both industry and government.
        My testimony today is based, in part, on my experiences and
    observations on how we have reacted to these and other tragedies. I've
    formed these observations, in part, based on my experience as Chairman
    of the Information Technology Sector Coordinating Council (IT SCC) and
    the immediate past President of the Information Technology Information
    Sharing and Analysis Center (IT-ISAC). Additionally, I am drawing on my
    experience as Vice President of Information Infrastructure Advisory
    Programs at Computer Sciences Corporation (CSC). However, I must
    emphasize that I am not speaking on behalf of CSC, the IT SCC or the
    IT-ISAC. I am offering my personal reflections, previously shared with
    key leaders in each organization.
        We--both the Private Sector and Government--have been building an
    increasingly strong partnership, starting long before DHS was created.
    The level and sophistication of activities and initiatives has grown
    tremendously during that period. As the Information Technology sector
    witness today, I am focusing my comments in that sector. But I am
    equally proud of the efforts of my friends, colleagues and others who
    are equally dedicated to our common cause in their respective sectors.
    Many companies--large and small--are among our best citizens in terms
    of their selfless contributions.
    IT SCC
        In January 2005, while then serving as the President of the
    Information Technology Information Sharing and Analysis Center (IT-
    ISAC), I briefed a joint industry and government group on an initial
    proposal to begin an effort in the IT sector to consider the formation
    of the IT Sector Coordinating Council (IT SCC). Working with Mr. Harris
    Miller, President of ITAA, the leadership of the IT-ISAC and other
    sector leaders and with the facilitation assistance of Meridian
    Institute provided by DHS, we developed the necessary formation
    documents through 2005. In November 2005, we announced the interim IT
    SCC and in January 2006, the formal charter, first slate of officers
    and the executive committee were approved by over thirty founding
    members.
        As with SCC's representing electricity, financial services,
    telecommunications, water, transportation, and others, the IT-SCC was
    organized to serve as a central point of coordination, collaboration
    and information sharing among the many members of the sector, and with
    the Federal agency(ies) responsible for interacting with a given
    private sector on critical infrastructure protection. The Department of
    Homeland Security--specifically the National Cyber Security Division
    (NCSD)--is the designated Sector Specific Agency responsible for
    collaborating with the IT sector.
        In January, the IT-SCC completed its formation procedures, ratified
    its operating charter, and elected its leadership. With Harris's
    departure from ITAA, Greg Garcia, ITAA's Vice President for Information
    Security, was elected to the SCC' Executive Committee, as the
    Secretary. I was elected Chairman; Michael Aisenberg of VeriSign, Vice
    Chairman; and Larry Clinton of the Internet Security Alliance,
    Treasurer.
        During and since its formation, the leadership and members of the
    IT SCC have been actively engaged in collaborative partnership with
    their government colleagues. We were invited to participate fully in
    the update of the National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) and
    our plans committee, under the leadership of Paul Kurtz of the Cyber
    Security Industry Alliance and John Lindquist of EWA, has formed a
    joint writing effort with our government colleagues, led by Cheri
    McGuire of the NCSD at DHS, to draft the IT Sector Specific Plan (SSP)
    which will in a few months be completed, staffed with our respective IT
    SCC and IT Government Coordinating Council membership, and approved as
    an annex to the NIPP. This joint effort exemplifies a marked
    improvement in the partnership as compared to the earliest days of DHS.
    The leadership on both sides should be commended for the strides that
    have been made.
        IT sector leadership has been pleased with the relationships we
    have developed with the current leadership within DHS. In particular,
    Under Secretary for Preparedness, the Honorable George Foresman:
    Assistant Secretary for Infrastructure Protection, Mr. Robert Stephan,
    and Acting Director of the National Cyber Security Division, Mr. Donald
    ``Andy'' Purdy, have all worked tirelessly to include us in initiatives
    that affect the private sector. They have provided encouragement and
    support. They have been open to consideration of our recommendations.
    They have included us in the development of key documents such as the
    recent National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP). Recognizing the
    importance of cyber securityand communications, Undersecretary Foresman
    has recently directed his Deputy Under Secretary, Robert Zitz, to
    provide day-to-day oversight of the NCSD and the National
    Communications System, which together constitute the new Cyber Security
    and Telecommunications organization. Our leadership has met with Mr.
    Zitz and we are impressed with how quickly he has picked up the reins
    and the approaches he is espousing. In short, they are trying as hard
    as anyone can--within current government restrictions on private sector
    relationships--to develop, nurture and grow a valuable and essential
    partnership for critical infrastructure protection.
        There are many challenges remaining for us to address and new ones
    are sure to arise. We look forward to meeting those challenges with
    them and with their successors.

    IT-ISAC and the ISAC Council
        PDD 63 called for industry establishment of Information Sharing and
    Analysis Centers (ISACs). The Information Technology (IT) sector
    coordinator, Mr. Harris Miller, President of the Information Technology
    Association of America (ITAA) and other sector leaders began developing
    the necessary charter documents and reaching out to potential members.
    On January 16, 2001, in a press conference held at the Department of
    Commerce, 19 founding members formally announced the IT-ISAC. The
    mission of the IT-ISAC is to provide
             Trusted and confidential reporting, exchange and
            analysis of sensitive cyber and physical information concerning
            incidents, threats, attacks, vulnerabilities, solutions,
            countermeasures, and best security practices.
             A trusted mechanism enabling the systematic and
            confidential exchange of member information with strong and
            enforceable legal protections.
             Leadership visibility for IT-ISAC members with public
            and private enterprises on cyber security processes and
            information sharing issues.

        A sampling of the value of IT-ISAC membership includes:
             Access to Sensitive Threat, Vulnerability and
            Analytical Products
             Collaboration in a Trusted Forum--vetted, trusted and
            confidential
             Anonymity for Members--within industry and to
            government
             Access to Cross Sector and Government Information,
            Contacts and Tools
             Emergency Response Coordination, Operational
            Practices, and Exercises
        In July 2001, the IT-ISAC went operational through a 24/7
    operations center manned by their contract with Internet Security
    Systems. July 2001 also found them helping coordinate the response to a
    new form of malicious software, Code Red. On September 11, 2001, they
    helped to support the response activities and a few days later helped
    to coordinate the response to another cyber threat, NIMDA.
        In 2002, the IT-ISAC established formal information sharing
    memoranda of understanding (MOUs) with the Financial Services,
    Electricity and Communications ISACs. In 2003, it helped to establish
    the ISAC Council, an informal, voluntary, cross-sector body, consisting
    of the leadership of the active sector ISACs. Mr. John Sabo, the
    current IT-ISAC President, is also the current Chairman of the ISAC
    Council. 2003 also saw the IT-ISAC start daily cross-sector cyber
    security collaboration calls for all ISACs and government agencies
    (including DHS) which adhere to the MOU information sharing agreements.
        Since then the IT-ISAC has continued to mature and expand its
    capabilities. In 2005, they hired a full time Executive Director, Mr.
    Scott Algeier. In addition to the daily cyber calls, they host twice
    weekly cyber technical calls which can dive deeply into technical
    issues and analysis, for example, those associated with emerging
    exploits or newly released patches. And they have recently added a
    weekly physical issues call which supports cross-sector sharing of
    information regarding physical incidents, vulnerabilities and related
    matters.
        Throughout 2005, IT-ISAC leadership was at the forefront of efforts
    to form an IT Sector Coordinating Council (IT SCC). SCC's were
    requested of the critical infrastructures by DHS and Homeland Security
    Presidential Directive 7 (HSPD 7) and further detailed in the National
    Partnership Model of the President's National Infrastructure Advisory
    Council (NIAC). SCCs are intended to be broadly representative of their
    sector and to work with DHS, Sector Specific Agencies (SSAs) and other
    organizations in developing strategies and policies for critical
    infrastructure protection. In January 2006, the IT SCC was formalized
    and in May it recognized the IT-ISAC as the sector's official
    operational information sharing mechanism.
            ``For operations, analysis and information sharing, the
            Information Technology Information Sharing and Analysis Center
            (IT-ISAC) is recognized and endorsed by the Information
            Technology Sector Coordinating Council (IT SCC) as our lead for
            the IT sector. The IT-ISAC has served since 2001 and will
            continue to serve as the main vehicle for communicating
            information about threats, vulnerabilities and incidents,
            especially through its Operations Center on a 24/7/365 basis.
            It is also our main vehicle for information analysis.''
                    IT SCC Chair and Vice Chair Letter to Asst. Sec. Robert
                    Stephan dated 5/26/06

    Looking to the Future

    Assistant Secretary for Cyber Security and Telecommunciations
        In his Second Stage Review, Secretary Michael Chertoff proposed the
    establishment of an Assistant Secretary position for cyber security and
    telecommunications to ``centralize the coordination of the efforts to
    protect the technological infrastructure.'' \1\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ ``Statement of Secretary Michael Chertoff, U.S. Department of
    Homeland Security, Before the United States Senate Committee on
    Commerce, Science, and Transportation.'' July 19, 2005.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        The IT Sector Coordinating Council, the IT-ISAC, and the other
    bodies I have briefly described, stand ready to welcome and work with
    the new Assistant Secretary from the moment he or she is announced. We
    have no doubts that it is in the interests of all of us to partner with
    him or her to address our common security concerns which cannot be
    addressed by each of us alone.
        Even before announcement by DHS of this Assistant Secretary
    position, the IT Sector leadership had long advocated a senior Cyber
    Security executive (IT and Communications) for long term leadership,
    visibility, making the case for resources, and giving the issue area
    stature commensurate with the growing risks as IT and Communications
    become ever more critical to so many of our most important societal
    functions. The ideal appointee to this new position
             must be credible to both government and industry,
             must be open to new ideas and recognize the value of
            experienced input,
             must be a strong leader who can build and maintain
            trusted partnerships, and
             must convey and get support for a vision of success
            and a path to achieve it.
        In addition, he or she will need the commitment of DHS and
    Administration leadership to succeed. That commitment must strive to
    ensure the new Assistant Secretary is
             empowered and supported with the resources to succeed,
             supported by positive, ``can-do'' legal advisers
            willing to break new ground for the close, trusted
            relationships required for critical infrastructure protection,
             unhampered to readily and effectively partner and
            communicate with the private sector, including
                     unhampered by administrative and bureaucratic
                    trivia,
                     unhampered by excessive diversion from
                    priorities, and
                     unhampered by well meaning but inappropriately
                    applied restrictions.

    Prioritize and Focus
        The new Assistant Secretary must avoid and be protected from
    chasing the issue of the day or week. To avoid that trap, he or she
    must ensure that lower priorities are handled as and where needed in
    the organization but focus his or her attention and that of senior
    management and oversight on the main priorities
        Congress can help empower the new Assistant Secretary by helping to
    set the right priorities, ensuring resources to achieve them, removing
    inappropriate and hampering restrictions and providing oversight to the
    priorities while avoiding diversion of time and attention to minor
    items

    Trusted Partnership
        Trusted partnership is a key, critical priority. For critical
    infrastructure protection, the directly involved key personnel from
    Government and industry must develop into a well trained, close knit
    team. The current leadership at DHS has made huge strides to improving
    partnership but still appear to be hampered by perhaps conservative
    interpretation and application of laws and regulations rightly intended
    for protection of a procurement or regulatory relationship, not the
    national security partnership that Homeland Security needs. Our sectors
    are complex, evolutionary and robust. Regulation and mandates cannot
    achieve the intelligent preparedness and response capabilities that
    thoughtful, voluntary partnership and teamwork can achieve. The best
    partnership and teamwork is fostered through physical co-location and
    daily interaction in planning, training and executing--just as in any
    successful sports team or military unit.

    Physical Co-Location for Crisis Coordination--Build on the NCC
        A top priority for continuing preparedness and timely response must
    be physical co-location and frequent daily interaction of
    representatives of all key players--industry and government--for crisis
    response management. Ultimately, we execute well that which we develop
    thoughtfully and practice carefully, learning and improving as we go.
    Writing a plan for winning isn't enough. I suggest that DHS build on
    the 20+ years experience with the NCC. Continue to strengthen NCC
    interoperation with other key 24/7 operations such as those operated by
    ISACs. Add representatives from other, time-critical (``millisecond
    sectors''). Add others in time, with core group representation (i.e.,
    representation from the most important organizations for response in
    the sector or entity.)

    National Crisis Coordination Center
        The concept of a jointly (industry and government) manned, National
    Crisis Coordination Center has been around for at least a few years
    now. In 2004, the Early Warning Task Force begun as one of the National
    Cyber Security Summit task forces, recommended \2\ creation of a
    national crisis Coordination Center to:
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \2\ National Early Warning Task Force Recommendation, A NATIONAL
    CRISIS COORDINATION CENTER, National Cyber Security Partnership, March
    2004

             House government, industry and academic security
            experts, both physical and cyber, to bridge the cultural
            barriers that have hampered a true partnership in
            counterterrorism and cyber security
             Jointly prepare, exercise, evaluate and update
            National Joint Crisis Response plans to prevent, detect and
            respond
             Operate joint watch centers
             Conduct joint exercises at the national level to train
            and test the plans
             Conduct joint field training at the regional level to
            train and further test the plans
             Respond jointly to traditional natural events, as well
            as malicious events
             Proactively share intelligence--both national security
            and law enforcement
             Include a secure, compartmented intelligence facility
            staffed equally with government and private sector
            representatives, as well as appropriate state, local and other
            representation
             Proactively address priority remediation of systemic
            vulnerabilities in national level infrastructures
        In March 2006, the NSTAC's Next Generation Networks Report
    recommended a Joint Coordination Center.\3\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \3\ Next Generation Networks Task Force Report, NSTAC, March 28,
    2006.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
            A joint coordination center for industry and Government should
            be established. This would be a cross-sector industry/
            Government facility with a round-the-clock watch, and would be
            brought up to full strength during emergencies. Such a center
            would improve communications between industry and Government as
            well as among industry members, and would incorporate and be
            modeled on the NCC.
            The center should be a Government-funded, appropriately
            equipped facility, manned jointly by experts from all key
            sectors. In a fully converged NGN environment, everything will
            be interconnected and interdependent to a greater degree, and
            thus means of coordinating among all key sectors must exist.
            Physically collocated, joint manning is vital to achieve the
            high level of interpersonal trust needed for sharing sensitive
            specific information and to achieve the level of mutual
            credibility required in a fast-paced decision-oriented
            environment. It should provide the full set of planning,
            collaboration, and decision-making tools for those experts to
            work, whether together as a whole or in focused subgroups.
            Industry is at times hesitant to share information with the
            Government because it is unsure of how the information will be
            used, and Government-to-industry information sharing should
            also be improved.\4\ DHS has a vision for how HSOC will
            function to improve information sharing; however, the HSOC's
            current operational interface to the private sector [the
            National Infrastructure Coordination Center (NICC)] is nascent
            and needs further development. An environment of trust must be
            established. A joint operations center could play a key role in
            fostering that environment and in enhancing HSOC operations. In
            addition, appropriately cleared industry experts collocated in
            a joint coordination center with their Government counterparts
            could assist the Homeland Infrastructure Threat and Risk
            Analysis Center (HITRAC), the DHS intelligence analysis arm, in
            performing its analytical and reporting functions, helping to
            ensure that HITRAC products are more complete, credible and
            useful.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \4\ Both these observations were confirmed at the August 2005 NGN
    Incident Response Subject Matter Experts meetings. See Appendix D of
    the Next Generation Networks Task Force Report, NSTAC, March 28, 2006.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        The Inspector General at DHS has also stated, ``If the partnership
    between the federal government and private sector is to be successful,
    another key requirement is establishing a permanent physical location
    or forum so that critical and non-critical sectors can interface with
    one another and their federal counterparts. This is essential to
    developing and maintaining long-term collaborative relationships.''\5\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \5\ A Review of the Top Officials 3 Exercise, DHS OIG Report OIG-
    06-07, p. 24 (Nov. 2005).

        NCC Relocation--an Immediate Concern
        Since its establishment, the National Coordinating Center for
    Telecommunications (NCC) has been housed in the Defense Information
    Systems Agency (DISA) headquarters facility. That location was natural
    because the same facility housed the National Communication System
    (NCS) which served as the support Secretariat for the NSTAC and also
    was assigned responsibility for the jointly manned NCC. That location
    turned out to be invaluable for trusted, sensitive information sharing.
    It also housed or came to house DISA's Global Network Operations and
    Security Center (GNOSC) and its subordinate Defense Department computer
    emergency response team (CERT), and the Department of Defense Joint
    Task Force--Global Network Operations (JTF-GNO). The synergy and
    trusted interaction between and among these entities has become
    important to all participants for both national security and emergency
    response purposes. Unfortunately, current plans call for relocating the
    NCC to co-locate it with the US-CERT operated by DHS.
        We should strongly consider the wisdom of separating the NCC from
    the DoD entities with which it is located. Instead we should encourage
    the leadership of the DoD, DISA and DHS to consider an approach that
    could strengthen the value for all: co-locate the US-CERT and other
    NCSD operational response elements with the NCC and their counterpart
    DoD elements. While each has a different mission and set of customers,
    they are all ultimately looking at overlapping sets of data and similar
    problem sets. Co-location will allow for greater interaction and
    synergy, leading to enhanced efficiency and value for all their
    ``customers.''
        Because the Base Realignment and Closure process is expected to
    relocate DISA in a few years, part of the examination of the value for
    the nation in achieving multi-organization co-location will have to be
    an examination of facility alternatives. But that should not deter us
    from at least exploring the potential benefits that could be achieved
    for the nation and both our national and homeland security. Ultimately,
    the co-location facility could be part of the National Crisis
    Coordination Center which I have already described.
        My industry colleagues and I would be happy to participate in such
    an examination.

    Congress Can Help
    Support Examination of NCC Co-location and Expansion to a National
    Crisis Coordination Center
        Look at co-location of the NCC, the US-CERT, the JTF-GNO and other
    existing similar entities for advantages to their missions, their
    ``customers'' and the nation. Similarly, examine the National Crisis
    Coordination Center (NCCC) concept in detail and strongly support its
    implementation if it holds up to your scrutiny as many of us expect it
    will. Be sure to include international liaison in the NCCC. Many of our
    allies are even more closely intertwined with us in the Cyber world
    than in the physical world. But in both, the interdependencies can be
    enormous. In particular, with Canada, many of our key critical
    infrastructures and dependencies are mutually shared across our common
    border.

    Focus on Priorities
        Use your oversight and appropriations powers to work with DHS and
    the private sector in the establishment of Cyber Security priorities.
    Then follow-up to ensure DHS has the necessary resources to implement
    those priorities.

    Create a Better Environment
        Congress can create a better environment for homeland security
    partnership, helping us achieve a tight knit, superbly prepared,
    professional team with high morale, and a commitment to each other to
    succeed. The current environment for government and industry
    interaction is designed rightly to prevent fraud and abuse in
    procurement or regulatory matters or other areas where an unscrupulous
    actor might try to further a personal or organizational agenda,
    contrary to the public good. In many ways, those rules implicitly
    require Government personnel to maintain an ``arms length,'' almost
    adversary relationship. At the very least, it implicitly impugns
    motives before the fact. But Homeland Security partnerships must be
    close, trusted, and non-public. Could the Washington Redskins or any
    professional team succeed if their members were not allowed to get
    together to plan and train out of sight of their opponents when needed?
        We cannot do away with protection against fraud and abuse. But the
    close teamwork and rapid response requirements of Homeland Security and
    Critical Infrastructure Protection demand high levels of interpersonal
    trust that can only be developed through frequent interaction,
    including informal, relationship building interaction. To accomplish
    this and still protect against fraud and abuse, I believe that we will
    need to replace the rigid rules and bureaucratically slow exception
    handling processes with alternative systems that provide strong,
    independent oversight to detect, report, halt and punish fraud and
    abuse but encourage true partnership, trusted relationships and team
    building, treating all participants as if they are members of the same
    organization/team, operating under the same code of ethics but free to
    form trusted and close relationships.

        Examine Innovative Ways to Encourage Private Sector Active
    Participation
        Congress might be able to help encourage even more private sector
    participation in critical infrastructure protection through private
    sector bodies such as the SCCs and ISACs. Here are a few examples which
    might be worth exploring.

            Value Proposition
        Congress and the DHS should work with SCCs, ISACs and other private
    sector institutions to develop a compelling value proposition with
    industry to further improve our working relationship for critical
    infrastructure protection and expand improved cyber security behavior.
    Not doing so is contrary to our national and homeland security
    interest. Many companies and other private sector institutions
    understand this. But many still do not. We need to make the value
    proposition compelling so that the vast majority--and all the critical
    ones--understand and pro-actively participate.

    Congressional and Executive Support for SCCs and ISACs
        Carefully examine the positive role that DHS and Administration
    executive leadership could and should play in encouraging sector
    members to participate in their respective SCCs and ISACs. Private
    sector leaders responded to previous Government requests and have
    expended significant resources to create the partnership model
    organizations requested. But when it comes to encouraging sector
    members to join those bodies and actively participate in them,
    Government executives have been strangely absent or quiet for the most
    part. Also, in some cases they have reached out through other
    organizations not formed for these specific purposes. The net effect of
    their silence or misaimed outreach is contrary to the very goals they
    envisioned achieving when they asked the private sector to form ISACs
    and SCCs.
        Simply put, they should always turn first to the organizations they
    asked us to form to fit their model for working with them. And they
    should not be shy about encouraging sector members to join those
    organizations (ISACs and SCCs), even to the extent of expressing
    unhappiness with important sector ``core'' players who fail to do so.
    If there are any rules in place that impede such demonstrable support,
    they should be revisited swiftly and decisively.

    Technical and Operational Support
        The ultimate goal of our partnership model is to create an
    infrastructure environment that is intended to deter attacks as much as
    feasible and operationally prepared to respond, recover and
    reconstitute to any attack or emergency as rapidly and effectively as
    feasible. Operational preparedness and success will depend ultimately
    on a partnership that is focused on operations even more than on
    policy. The recommendations I have made for a jointly manned, National
    Crisis Coordination Center (NCCC) will help significantly to shift to
    an operational focus. But it will also take working out and testing our
    individual and collective Concepts of Operations (CONOPS), constantly
    improving them so our operational metrics continually improve. The best
    solutions may call for cross sector or even government to industry
    provisioning of technical and operational support. For example, DHS
    support to operational ISACs might be appropriate. Operational
    readiness and improvement should be one of our highest priorities.

    Congressional Charters
        Examine the Potential Value of a Congressional Charter for
    established SCCs and ISACs. If a National Crisis Coordination Center is
    supported, consider a Congressional Charter for it as well.
    Congressional Charters would give Congress enhanced visibility into
    their functioning and would allow for periodic GAO audit. They would
    also help many SCCs and ISACs recruit the broad membership and
    participation they need from their sectors.

    Procurement
        Consider using procurement in DHS, or even government-wide, as a
    carrot for greater private sector participation and proactive,
    operational commitments.

    Congressional Awareness and Education
        Finally, to help prepare you for the increasingly complex issues of
    the Cyber Security Age, I suggest you consider forming a bipartisan
    House caucus for cyber security (IT and communications) to provide a
    forum for educating staff and members on the relevant issues.

                                   Attachment

    Summary of a few Key Cyber Security and Telecommunications Partnerships
                              and Key Initiatives

    NSTAC
        President Ronald Reagan created the National Security
    Telecommunications Advisory Committee (NSTAC) by Executive Order 12382
    in September 1982. Composed of up to 30 industry chief executives
    representing many of the major communications and network service
    providers and information technology, finance, and aerospace companies,
    the NSTAC provides industry-based advice and expertise to the President
    on issues and problems related to implementing national security and
    emergency preparedness (NS/EP) communications policy. Since its
    inception, the NSTAC has addressed a wide range of policy and technical
    issues regarding communications, information systems, information
    assurance, critical infrastructure protection, and other NS/EP
    communications concerns.
        NS/EP communications enable the Government to make an immediate and
    coordinated response to all emergencies, whether caused by a natural
    disaster, such as a hurricane, an act of domestic terrorism, such as
    the Oklahoma City bombing and the September 11th attacks, a man-made
    disaster, or a cyber attack. NS/EP communications allow the President
    and other senior Administration officials to be continually accessible,
    even under stressed conditions.
        The NSTAC has addressed numerous issues in the past 24 years. A few
    examples illustrate NSTAC's capabilities to address NS/EP
    communications issues in today's environment: the establishment of the
    National Coordinating Center for Telecommunications (NCC); the
    implementation of the Government and NSTAC Network Security Information
    Exchange (NSIE) process; the Telecommunications Service Priority (TSP)
    program; Government Emergency Telecommunications Service (GETS) and
    Wireless Priority Service (WPS); and the examination of the NS/EP
    implications of Internet technologies and the vulnerabilities of
    converged networks. These accomplishments are briefly described below.

    NCC--From ``NSTAC Report to the President on the National Coordinating
    Center,'' May 10, 2006
        The NCC was established to fulfill a critical need for a national
    coordinating mechanism to organize and manage the initiation and
    restoration of NS/EP communications services. This need was identified
    at the dawn of the divestiture of AT&T and the height of the Cold War.
    As Government increasingly relied on commercial communications services
    and no longer had a single point of contact (POC) for the industry,
    Government needed a joint industry and Government-staffed organization
    to coordinate emergency requests. The NCC became operational on January
    3, 1984.
        The National Coordinating Center (NCC) has been the hub for
    coordinating the initiation and restoration of national security and
    emergency preparedness (NS/EP) communications services for more than 20
    years--supporting four administrations and evolving as threats and
    national priorities have shifted. Following the September 11, 2001,
    terrorist attacks, the NCC proved its value to the Nation as it
    supported the restoration of communications in the New York and
    Washington, D.C., areas. The NCC has also repeatedly shown its strength
    during hurricane recovery efforts, including Hurricane Katrina.
        . . .the NSTAC recommended designating the NCC as the Information
    Sharing and Analysis Center (ISAC) for telecommunications in 1999.
        With the establishment of the Department of the Homeland Security
    (DHS) and the transfer of the National Communications System (NCS) to
    the new department in 2003, the NCC also has made the transition to
    DHS.
        The primary mission of the NCC throughout its history has been to
    coordinate the restoration and provisioning of communications services
    for NS/EP users during natural disasters, armed conflicts, and
    terrorist attacks. Significant events such as the Hinsdale, Illinois,
    central office fire, the Oklahoma terrorist bombing, the events of
    September 11, 2001, and Hurricane Katrina have proved the value of this
    partnership. During a crisis, Government personnel communicate NS/EP
    requirement priorities to industry, and industry representatives assist
    the Government in developing situational awareness by providing
    restoration status information. Having the representatives in one
    location ensures a smoother restoration effort. The NCC's all-hazards
    response depends on the flexible application of NCS resources, such as
    its priority service programs (e.g., Government Emergency
    Telecommunications Service, Wireless Priority Service, and
    Telecommunications Service Priority [TSP] Program).
        During day-to-day operations, NCC members work on plans and share
    information on vulnerabilities and threats to the telecom
    infrastructure. Planning activities include developing lessons learned
    following events, creating comprehensive service restoration plans,
    planning for continuity of operations (COOP)/continuity of Government
    (COG) activities, and participating in exercise planning. In addition,
    the NCC works with international emergency response partners, including
    the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), International
    Telecommunication Union (ITU), and Canada, on crisis communications and
    mutual assistance.
        In 2000, the NCC was designated the ISAC for telecommunications per
    the guidance in the 1998 Presidential Decision Directive 63 (PDD-63),
    Protecting America's Critical Infrastructures, which encouraged the
    private sector to establish ISACs to ``serve as the mechanism for
    gathering, analyzing, appropriately sanitizing and disseminating
    private sector information.'' As part of the ISAC mission, the NCC
    collects and shares information about threats, vulnerabilities,
    intrusions, and anomalies from the communications industry, Government,
    and other sources. Analysis on information is performed with the goal
    of averting or mitigating impact on the communications infrastructure.
        The NCC has historically been an operational element and as such
    does not fall under provisions of the Federal Advisory Committee Act
    (FACA). A June 1, 1983, letter to the NCS from Assistant Attorney
    General William F. Baxter discussed issues of incident management and
    information sharing for the proposed National Coordinating Mechanism
    (NCM) (which became the NCC) and noted that such an organization posed
    no significant antitrust problems.
        . . .Since the transition to DHS, the NCC has been involved in
    additional critical infrastructure protection (CIP) activities. As part
    of the implementation of Homeland Security Presidential Directive
    (HSPD) 7, DHS is tasked with identifying, prioritizing, and protecting
    the Nation's critical infrastructure. Through the NCC, the NCS often
    coordinates data calls on the identification of assets, coordinates
    planning for national special security events (NSSE), and provides
    impact analyses. In the future, NCC industry members may be asked to
    further assist in the risk assessment process as detailed in the
    sector's Sector-Specific Plan.

    NSIE--From ``GUIDE TO UNDERSTANDING THE NATIONAL COORDINATING CENTER
    FOR TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND THE NETWORK SECURITY INFORMATION
    EXCHANGES,'' PREPARED BY THE OFFICE OF THE MANAGER, NATIONAL
    COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM, MARCH 2001

            In April 1990, the Chairman of the National Security Council's
            (NSC) Policy Coordinating Committee--National Security
            Telecommunications and Information Systems requested the
            Manager, NCS, identify what action should be taken by
            Government and industry to protect critical national security
            telecommunications from the ``hacker'' threat. . . .In response
            to the NSC tasking, the Manager, NCS and the NSTAC established
            separate, but closely coordinated, NSIEs. In May 1991, the NSIE
            charters were finalized, and Government departments and
            agencies and NSTAC companies designated their NSIE
            representatives, chairmen, and vice-chairmen. The first joint
            meeting of the Government and NSTAC NSIEs was held in June
            1991.
        The Government and NSTAC NSIEs meet jointly approximately every two
    months. The NSIEs provide a working forum to identify issues involving
    penetration or manipulation of software and databases affecting NS/EP
    telecommunications. The NSIEs share information with the objectives of:
                     Learning more about intrusions into and
                    vulnerabilities affecting the PN--Developing
                    recommendations for reducing network security
                    vulnerabilities
                     Assessing network risks affecting network
                    assurance
                     Acquiring threat and threat mitigation
                    information
                     Providing expertise to the NSTAC on which to
                    base network security recommendations to the President.
        The success of the NSIEs is based in large part on the
    establishment of trusted interpersonal relationships. Participants--
    government and industry--must hold requisite security clearances and
    sign individual non-disclosure agreements. The organizations sending
    participants to the NSIEs must also sign organizational non-disclosure
    agreements.

    TSP--From NCS Web site
            Telecommunications Service Priority (TSP) provides service
            vendors with a Federal Communications Commission (FCC) mandate
            for prioritizing service requests by identifying those services
            critical to NS/EP. A telecommunications service with a TSP
            assignment is assured of receiving full attention by the
            service vendor before a non-TSP service.

            From briefing ``NCS Roles During the Attack on America,''
            Deputy Manager, NCS, August 9, 2002
            Nearly 40,000 TSP circuits enrolled by NCS prior to 9/11
            tragedy
                    TSP vital in accelerating the opening of Wall Street on
                    9/17
                            Major coordination in restoration of
                            telecommunications for Broad Street switches--
                            major role to restore stock and bond markets
                    NCS supported nearly 600 provisioning requests
                    following 11 Sep 01
                            46 organizations (incl. FBI, FEMA , FRB, Port
                            Authority, DoD)

    GETS--From NCS Web site
            Implemented in the early 1990's, Government Emergency
            Telecommunications Service (GETS) is an emergency phone service
            provided by the National Communications System (NCS) in the
            Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Division of
            the Department of Homeland Security. GETS supports federal,
            state, local, tribal, industry, and non-governmental
            organization (NGO) personnel in performing their National
            Security and Emergency Preparedness (NS/EP) missions. GETS
            provides emergency access and priority processing in the local
            and long distance segments of the Public Switched Telephone
            Network (PSTN). It is intended to be used in an emergency or
            crisis situation when the PSTN is congested and the probability
            of completing a call over normal or other alternate
            telecommunication means has significantly decreased.

            From briefing ``NCS Roles During the Attack on America,''
            Deputy Manager, NCS, August 9, 2002
            The AT&T long distance network carried a record 431 million
            call attempts on Sept. 11, 101 million more than the previous
            high-traffic day.
            Massive congestion in WTC & Pentagon areas
                    Over 10,000 GETS calls in WTC/Pentagon areas
                            Over 95% completion rate--Highest calling in
                            first 48 hours
                    GETS PIN Cards:
                            Over 1,500 key personnel made GETS calls
                            Over 20,000 GETS PIN cards issued following
                            events of September 11th

    WPS--From NCS Web site
            Wireless Priority Service (WPS), is the wireless complement to
            GETS. In the early 1990's, the OMNCS initiated efforts based on
            NSTAC recommendations, to develop and implement a nationwide
            cellular priority access capability in support of national
            security and emergency preparedness (NS/EP) telecommunications
            and pursued a number of activities to improve cellular call
            completion during times of network congestion. Subsequently, as
            a result of a petition filed by the NCS in October 1995, the
            FCC released a Second Report and Order [FCC-00-242, July 13,
            2000] (R&O) on wireless Priority Access Service (PAS). The R&O
            offers Federal liability relief for NS/EP wireless carriers if
            the service is implemented in accordance with uniform operating
            procedures. The FCC made PAS voluntary, found it to be in the
            public interest, and defined five priority levels for NS/EP
            wireless calls.

            Wireless network congestion was widespread on September 11,
            2001. With wireless traffic demand estimated at up to 10 times
            normal in the affected areas and double nationwide, the need
            for wireless priority service became a critical and urgent
            National requirement. In response, the National Security
            Council requested that the NCS deploy a nationwide priority
            access queuing system for wireless networks.

            From briefing ``NCS Roles During the Attack on America,''
            Deputy Manager, NCS, August 9, 2002:
                    Verizon Wireless experienced a 50 to 100 percent
                    increase nationwide. Wireless networks remained near
                    saturation in NY through September 28th.
                    Cingular Wireless' attempted calls ballooned by 400
                    percent in Washington and 1000 percent in its N.J.
                    Switching Center

    PDD 63 and Sector Coordinators
        Presidential Decision Directive 63 (PDD 63) was released in May
    1998. It ordered the development of sector-specific critical
    infrastructure protection plans and established the role of private
    industry sector coordinators. The Information & Communications Sector
    as then designated under PDD 63, had four organizations sharing the
    sector coordinator role: the Cellular Telecommunications and Internet
    Association (CTIA), the Information Technology Association of America
    (ITAA); the Telecommunications Industry Association (TIA); and the
    United States Telecom Association (USTA).
        Important early contributions of the Sector coordinators included
                     developing internal sector awareness
                     organizing voluntary sector participation in
                    planning
                     leading the way in the formation of
                    Information Sharing and Analysis Centers for
                    Information Technology and Telecommunications
                 developing the I&C Sector National Strategy Input
                for Critical Infrastructure and Cyberspace Security, May
                2002

    PCIS
        The Partnership for Critical Infrastructure Security (PCIS)
    consists generally of the leadership (usually the Chairs) of the
    organized Sector Coordinating Councils for the various critical
    infrastructures. The PCIS coordinates cross sector critical
    infrastructure protection interests and initiatives within the private
    sector and with the Government under the partnership model described
    within the National Infrastructure Protection Plan

    NCSP (Santa Clara Dec 03 Summit, TFs, reports, Wye I, Wye II)
            The National Cyber Security Partnership (NCSP) combines
            representatives from government, industry and academia working
            together to harden the nation's cyber defenses. The partnership
            provides a forum, structure and common agenda for
            interdisciplinary, cross-industry information exchange with
            government. Lead organizations of the partnership are: the
            Business Software Alliance, Information Technology Association
            of America, TechNet and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce. The
            public-private partnership was formed during the National Cyber
            Security Summit on December 3, 2003, in Santa Clara,
            California, which aimed to gather cyber security experts across
            disciplines to embark on a work program to develop
            recommendations for implementing key challenges posed in the
            2003 National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace. The partnership
            established five task forces comprised of cyber security
            experts from industry, academia and government. Each task force
            was led by two or more co-chairs. The NCSP-sponsoring trade
            associations act as secretariats in managing task force work
            flow and logistics. The task forces included:
                    Awareness for Home Users and Small Businesses
                    Cyber Security Early Warning
                    Corporate Governance
                    Security Across the Software Development Life Cycle
                    Technical Standards and Common Criteria
        The resulting task force recommendations in 2004 were provided to
    DHS. Many are still valid an valuable.
        In follow-up to the National Cyber Security Summit and the reports
    of the task forces, DHS' National Cyber Security Division hosted a
    government and private sector exchange at the Wye River Conference
    Center in Maryland in January 2005. A second follow-up exchange (``Wye
    II'') was hosted by the NCSP in Annapolis, MD, in September 2005. Many
    of the original Summit Task Forces' Recommendations continue to be
    brought up as potentially valuable.

    CIPAC--extracted from DHS sources
        In March 2006, the Department of Homeland Security established the
    Critical Infrastructure Partnership Advisory Council (CIPAC) to
    facilitate effective coordination between Federal infrastructure
    protection programs with the infrastructure protection activities of
    the private sector and of state, local, territorial and tribal
    governments.
        The CIPAC represents a partnership between government and critical
    infrastructure/key resource (CI/KR) owners and operators and provides a
    forum in which they can engage in a broad spectrum of activities to
    support and coordinate critical infrastructure protection.
        CIPAC membership will encompass CI/KR owner/operator institutions
    and their designated trade or equivalent organizations that are
    identified as members of existing Sector Coordinating Councils (SCCs).
    It is also includes representatives from Federal, state, local and
    tribal governmental entities identified as members of existing
    Government Coordinating Councils (GCCs) for each sector

    IDWG--extracted from DHS sources
        The Internet Disruption Working Group (IDWG) is a DHS hosted,
    informal gathering of industry and government Internet technical
    operation experts who collaboratively explore vulnerability issues and
    identify recommended actions to address them. The IDWG is beginning to
    establish important, trusted interpersonal relationships amongst
    government and industry technical experts. The IDWG was established by
    NCSD in partnership with the National Communications System (NCS), in
    response to security concerns surrounding the growing dependency of
    critical infrastructures and national security and emergency
    preparedness users on the Internet for communications, operational
    functions, and essential services.
        The IDWG's near-term objectives are to improve the resiliency and
    recovery of Internet functions in the event of a cyber-related incident
    of national significance; work with both government and private sector
    stakeholders to identify and prioritize protective measures necessary
    to prevent and respond to major Internet disruptions; and assess the
    operational dependencies of critical infrastructure sectors on the
    Internet. The 2005 IDWG Forum identified specific areas for action by
    both government and private sector stakeholders, including risk
    assessments, information sharing, protective measures, research and
    development, and Internet development issues. The IDWG is engaging with
    both public and private stakeholders to address these action items. The
    IDWG also plans to hold future forums and tabletop exercises, including
    an IDWG Tabletop Exercise, on June 15, 2006, to maintain both a pulse
    of the issues and an understanding of existing capabilities.

        Mr. Lungren. Thank you very much for your testimony.
        Now, we would hear from Mr. David Barron, the chairman of
    the Telecommunications Sector Coordination Council.

    STATEMENT OF DAVID M. BARRON, CHAIR, TELECOMMUNICATIONS SECTOR
                          COORDINATING COUNCIL

        Mr. Barron. Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman and fellow members
    of the subcommittee. It is an honor and a pleasure to be here
    with you today and I thank you for the opportunity to discuss
    this very important topic, the future of cybersecurity and
    telecommunications.
        I am David Barron. I am assistant vice president for
    federal relations and national security for Bell South, here in
    our Washington Office, but I am appearing today as the chair of
    the Communications Sector Coordinating Council. My testimony
    reflects my personal views as the chair of the council and not
    the views of Bell South.
        Sector-specific planning and coordination are addressed to
    private sector and government coordinating councils that are
    established for each sector through the national infrastructure
    protection plan.
        Sector coordinating councils are comprised of private
    sector entities, representatives. Government coordinating
    councils are comprised of representatives from government
    agencies, state, local and tribal entities.
        Established in 2005, the Communications Sector Coordinating
    Council has over 25 owners and operators and associations
    represented on the council today and we anticipate adding new
    members, as we continue to broaden our membership.
        While Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7 defined
    our sector as telecommunications, we in the industry feel that
    communications is a more representative title and that
    represents our diverse membership more accurately.
        Our membership today includes wire line, wireless,
    satellite, equipment manufacturers and Internet service
    providers, among others. We are also actively trying to expand
    the membership to include cable telephony, emergency service
    providers, and broadcasters, so that the Communications Sector
    Coordinating Council truly represents the breadth of this
    dynamic sectors.
        One of the sectors we call, as Guy said, the millisecond
    sector because of the nature of how our sector works.
        The Communications Sector Coordinating Council is currently
    engaged in a wide variety of activities not only with our
    government colleagues, but also with the Department of Homeland
    Security, as well as other sector coordinating councils on a
    number of initiatives the foremost of which, and you have heard
    about it today, is the creation of the sector-specific plan.
        We are well into that and we are anxious to get that
    project finished as soon as possible.
        In addition to the sector-specific plan, the Communications
    Sector Coordinating Council is engaged in several other
    important activities and I think the point is, as Guy said, we
    are not on hold. We are working every day to ensure the best
    security we can for the nation.
        These other activities include pandemic flu planning,
    national coordinating center, regional coordination concepts,
    post-Katrina issues, such as access, credentialing and
    emergency responder status as it relates to the Stafford Act,
    emergency wireless protocols, and many other activities.
        Finally, the world of communications often has considerable
    interaction and interdependencies with information technology,
    another critical infrastructure identified through HSPD-7. As
    such, the Communications Sector Coordinating Council has
    established a close working relationship with the Information
    Technology Sector Coordinating Council on issues of mutual
    concern.
        In September, the Communications and Information Technology
    Councils will be holding the first ever joint meeting with all
    four councils present, both communications, IT and the
    government counterparts, to discuss cross-sector issues, such
    as the creation of sector-specific plans that are complementary
    and support of each other.
        With the support of Under Secretary Foresman, the assistant
    secretary for infrastructure protection, Bob Steffen, has
    overseen many of these initiatives while in the acting
    assistant secretary for cybersecurity and telecommunications
    position and while serving as the manager of the national
    communications systems, known as the NCS.
        We are pleased with the progress that has been made, but
    the industry would welcome additional focus brought to bear by
    a dedicated assistant secretary for cybersecurity and
    telecommunications.
        Obviously, we should view all critical infrastructures and
    key resources defined in HSPD-7 as critically important to the
    nation. However, communications and information technology are
    unique in that they underlie and support all the other sectors.
        Each of the other sectors depends upon computer systems,
    voice networks, broadband systems, wireless networks, and
    countless other structures and services provided by the
    communications and IT communities. Those sectors are equally
    critical in support of the nation's homeland security mission.
        While DHS has been very helpful and responsive in many of
    these matters, there are areas in which the private sector
    would specifically like to see continued progress and
    improvement.
        First, while the current team of leadership at DHS has done
    a good job working with the sector, the position of assistant
    secretary for cybersecurity and telecommunications remains
    vacant. As I stated earlier in my testimony, Assistant
    Secretary Steffen has done an admirable job in working with the
    communications and IT sectors, but a dedicated assistant
    secretary could dramatically strengthen this critical public-
    private partnership.
        Second, a clear definition of the mission needs to be
    established. What does cybersecurity and telecommunications
    really mean as it relates to national security, homeland
    security and emergency preparedness? In other words, what is
    the problem we are trying to solve?
        There is such a wide range of threats and vulnerabilities
    that a clear vision of the problem tied to priorities is
    essential.
        Third, DHS needs to clearly define roles and
    responsibilities for all of those involved in this process, and
    this comes back to the understanding of the problem and a clear
    strategy based on risk assessment and priorities. By clarifying
    who is in charge of what, more will be accomplished in an
    efficient and effective manner.
        Finally, and I think very importantly, DHS should recognize
    that the private sector is willing and fully committed to this
    partnership. If this framework is truly intended to be a
    partnership, then more emphasis needs to be placed on ensuring
    there is a trusted relationship between the public and private
    sectors, which is in the best interest of the nation's
    security.
        For example, the national coordinating center for
    communications, the NCC, is a model to follow for the
    partnership that is mandated by the future. In the NCC,
    government and industry sit together every day to prepare for
    and to respond to events that threaten the nation's
    communications networks.
        The NCC has had a long history of success. I think this
    model could and should be expanded to include other
    infrastructure, like information technology and electric power.
        As I close, I would like to, again, thank the subcommittee
    for the opportunity to speak today and for your support on
    these efforts. The partnership framework is incredibly valuable
    and continues to serve as a conduit for unprecedented
    cooperation and collaboration between government and private
    industry.
        There is room for improvement, to be sure, but the
    suggestions I have presented here today are intended to further
    strengthen those valued interactions and ensure we jointly
    consider to take steps to secure our homeland.
        Thank you, sir.
        [The statement of Mr. Barron follows:]

                     Prepared Statement of David M. Barron

        Good Afternoon Mr. Chairman and fellow members of the committee. It
    is an honor to appear before you today and I thank you for the
    opportunity to discuss this very important topic, the future of cyber
    security and telecommunications.
        I am David Barron, Assistant Vice President for Federal Relations/
    National Security with BellSouth Corporation here in our Washington
    office, but I am appearing today as the Chair of the Communications
    Sector Coordinating Council (CSCC). My testimony reflects my personal
    views as Chairman of the CSCC and not the views of Bell South.
        Let me begin by giving you a brief background on the Sector
    Partnership Model and the Communications SCC in particular. Homeland
    Security Presidential Directive 7 (HSPD-7) established the basis for a
    national coordinated approach to critical infrastructure protection,
    including the development of the National Infrastructure Protection
    Plan (NIPP) as well as the Sector Partnership Model. The NIPP defines
    the organizational structure that provides the framework for
    coordination of Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources (CI/KR)
    protection efforts at all levels of government, as well as within and
    across sectors.
        Sector-specific planning and coordination are addressed through
    private sector and government coordinating councils that are
    established for each sector. Sector Coordinating Councils (SCCs) are
    comprised of private sector representatives. Government Coordinating
    Councils (GCCs) are comprised of representatives of the Sector-Specific
    Agencies, other Federal departments and agencies, and state, local, and
    tribal governments.
        Established in 2005, the Communications Sector Coordinating Council
    has over 25 owner/operators and associations represented on the Council
    and we anticipate adding new members as we continue to broaden our
    membership. While HSPD-7 defined our sector as ``Telecommunications'',
    we in the industry feel that ``Communications'' is a more encompassing
    title that represents our diverse membership. Our membership today
    includes wireline, wireless, satellite, equipment manufacturers, and
    internet service providers among others. We are also actively trying to
    expand the membership to include cable telephony, emergency service
    providers and broadcasters so that our Communications Sector
    Coordinating Council truly represents the breadth of this dynamic
    sector; one of the sectors we call the ``millisecond'' sector due to
    the nature of how our sector works.
        The CSCC is currently engaged in a wide variety of activities not
    only with our Communications Government Coordinating Council
    counterparts, but also with the Department of Homeland Security as well
    as other Sector Coordinating Councils on a number of initiatives,
    foremost of which is the creation of our Sector Specific Plan.
        The NIPP base plan is supported by several Sector Specific Plans
    (SSPs) that provide further detail on how the critical infrastructure
    and key resources protection mission of each sector will be carried
    out. In late August the Communications SCC and GCC held a joint meeting
    in Washington, D.C. to coordinate on several issues, the most prominent
    of which is the development of the Sector-Specific Plan (SSP) as I
    mentioned before. The CSCC and GCC have been actively collaborating on
    a draft of the Communications SSP, with both Councils providing input
    and comments throughout the process. This effort is continuing and we
    are on track to submit the Communications SSP by the end of the year to
    DHS.
        In addition to the SSP, the Communications SCC is engaged in
    several other important activities, including Pandemic Flu planning,
    National Coordinating Center (NCC) regional coordination, post-Katrina
    issues such as access, credentialing, and emergency responder status
    related to the Stafford Act, emergency wireless protocols, and many
    other activities.
        Finally, the world of Communications often has considerable
    interaction and interdependencies with Information Technology (another
    critical infrastructure established by HSPD-7). As such, the
    Communications SCC has established a close relationship with the
    Information Technology SCC to work on issues of mutual concern. In
    September the Communications and Information Technology SCCs and GCCs
    will be holding the first ever Joint meeting, with all four councils
    present, to discuss cross-sector issues such as the creation of Sector
    Specific Plans that are complimentary and supportive of each other.
        With the support of Under Secretary Foresman, Assistant Secretary
    for Infrastructure Protection Bob Stephan has overseen many of these
    initiatives while in the Acting Assistant Secretary for Cyber Security
    and Telecommunications position and while serving as the Manager of the
    National Communications System (NCS). We are pleased with the progress
    that has been made. But the industry would welcome the additional focus
    brought to bear by a dedicated Assistant Secretary for Cyber Security
    and Telecommunications.
        Obviously, we should view all the critical infrastructures and key
    resources defined in HSPD-7 as critically important to the nation.
    However, Communications and Information Technology is unique in that it
    underlies and supports all of the other sectors. Each of the other
    sectors depend upon computer systems, voice networks, broadband
    systems, wireless networks, and countless other structures and services
    provided by the Communications and IT communities. As a result,
    Congress has mandated and DHS has begun implementing strategies and
    procedures to ensure specific emphasis on these valuable cross-sector
    interdependencies. For example, the National Infrastructure Protection
    Plan and the supporting Sector Plans are working very specifically to
    address this convergence of Communications and Information Technology
    into what is referred to as the Next Generation Networks. As this work
    continues, there must be a balanced approach when looking at Cyber
    Security and Telecommunications. Both sectors are equally critical in
    support of the Nation's Homeland Security mission.
        While DHS has been very helpful and responsive in many of these
    matters, there are areas in which the private sector would specifically
    like to see continued progress and improvement. First, while the
    current team of leadership at DHS, including Under Secretary Foresman,
    Deputy Under Secretary Robert Zitz, and Assistant Secretary Stephan,
    have done an excellent job, the position of Assistant Secretary for
    Cyber Security and Telecommunications remains vacant. As I stated
    earlier in my testimony, Assistant Secretary Stephan has done an
    admirable job in working with the Communications and Information
    Technology community but a dedicated Assistant Secretary could
    dramatically strengthen this critical public/private partnership.
        Second, a clear definition of the mission needs to be established.
    What does Cyber Security and Telecommunications really mean as it
    relates to National Security, Homeland Security and Emergency
    Preparedness? In other words, what is the problem that we are trying to
    solve? There is such a wide range of threats and vulnerabilities that a
    clear vision of the problem tied to priorities is essential.
        Third, DHS needs to clearly define roles and responsibilities for
    all of those involved in this process. Again, this comes back to the
    understanding of the problem and a clear strategy based on risk
    assessment and priorities. By clarifying who is in charge of what, more
    will be accomplished in an efficient and effective manner.
        Finally, DHS should recognize that the private sector is willing
    and fully committed to this partnership. If this framework is truly
    intended to be a partnership, then more emphasis needs to be placed on
    ensuring there is a trusted relationship between the public and private
    sectors, which is in the best interest of our Nation's security. For
    example, the National Coordinating Center for Communications--the NCC--
    is a model to follow for the partnership that is mandated by the
    future. In the NCC, government and industry sit together everyday to
    prepare for and to respond to events that threaten the Nation's
    communications networks. The NCC has had a long history of success and
    I think this model could and should be expanded to include other
    infrastructures like Information Technology/Cyber and Electric Power.
    The continued health and evolution of the partnership depends not only
    on private sector participation, but DHS' s recognition of the value of
    that partnership with a commitment to work more closely with industry.
        As I close, I would like to again thank Congress for the
    opportunity to speak today and for their support in these efforts. The
    partnership framework is incredibly valuable and continues to serve as
    a conduit for unprecedented cooperation and collaboration between
    government and private industry. There is room for improvement to be
    sure, but the suggestions I have presented here today are intended to
    further strengthen these valued interactions and ensure we jointly
    continue to take steps to secure our homeland.
        Thank You.
        Mr. Lungren. Thank you all for your testimony.
        We will go to a round of questioning. We promised that we
    would get you out of here no later than 6:00. So we will see
    how long that takes us with the members who are here.
        Let me begin the questioning by asking you, Mr. Pelgrin,
    how would you describe the overall priority that the federal
    government has placed on cyber-related critical infrastructure
    protection?
        Mr. Pelgrin. I believe that they have put a high priority
    on it. I think that they definitely need to fill the assistant
    secretary position. But I know that even the undersecretary,
    that when he was in Virginia, was actually one of our multi-
    state ISAC members.
        So he, from early on, believed very much in cybersecurity.
    So from my experience, from the governmental experience, from
    the state and local government, the support that we have
    received, the direction, the cooperation with the federal
    government has been excellent.
        I think there is always room to improve. I think that there
    is always a need, both on a state and local government side, to
    move this forward. I am a big believer that this is to build it
    as you go and it really is a time to make sure that we have
    very strict deliverables and get those deliverables executed.
        So from a priority perspective, I think that that badly, by
    not having the assistant secretary position filled, taints all
    the good work that they are doing and they are doing a lot of
    good work.
        Mr. Lungren. Mr. Kurtz, of the six points that you have
    made, the first, I noted, was lead, lead, lead.
        Is that a suggestion that the department is not leading at
    the present time?
        Mr. Kurtz. It would be a suggestion that they are not
    leading.
        Mr. Lungren. Are they compromised not leading because of
    the absence of a leadership position being filled?
        Mr. Kurtz. I think so. Certainly, the assistant secretary
    of cybersecurity and telecommunications will provide some
    leadership. It is not a panacea, though. I think we have to go
    higher up the line in the department, as well, to ensure that
    they are paying attention to the issue at the most senior
    levels.
        I commend Under Secretary Foresman for spending the time
    today to address this issue up here on the Hill. He was at a
    committee meeting earlier today, and it is very good to see him
    here.
        Mr. Lungren. And I got a deliverable. I got a letter from
    the secretary answering my questions, from my letter of July 5.
    Maybe we ought to have these meetings more often.
        Mr. Kurtz. If I can, I think it is symptomatic of across
    the federal government. We have, if you will, a reluctance
    among senior officials to engage on cyber and I think one of
    the real reasons it it is not visual. You can't see it, you
    can't touch it, you can't feel it.
        When you go into a cyber?
        Mr. Lungren. You can't show it to your constituents.
        Mr. Kurtz. You can't show it to your constituents, as well.
    You go into a cyber knock and you look at it and, quite
    frankly, it can be pretty boring. But this logical system, this
    nervous system that we depend upon controls every facet of our
    lives.
        And just because we can't see it and taste it and smell it
    doesn't mean we shouldn't be paying attention to it.
        Mr. Lungren. Mr. Kurtz, who is further along, in your
    estimate, the private sector or the federal government, in
    terms of cybersecurity?
        Mr. Kurtz. I think there are elements of the private sector
    that are quite far along. I would highlight the banking and
    finance industry. The banking and finance industry has brought
    incredible sophistication to this space.
        Can they do better? Sure. I think the energy, the oil and
    gas sector is getting more serious about this. I think Doug
    Bond's program, Doug at least was behind a little bit ago, the
    logic program that they are doing on working on SCADA control
    systems and improving the security is a fantastic program and
    it is a partner program.
        So there is work under way in that area. Frankly, I think
    the other sectors, many of the other sectors have a long way to
    go.
        Mr. Lungren. I mean, if we are going to have a team in
    this, you look at the football analogy, you have got to have
    both the offense and the defense and the special teams all
    working together.
        I look at this as a partnership opportunity and obligation,
    private sector-public sector, in part, because 85-90 percent of
    the critical infrastructure is owned not by the government, but
    by the private sector.
        I would assume that if we have got the cyber world involved
    in critical infrastructure, that we would have that same sort
    of percentage. So we have got to be firming up both sides.
        And to Mr. Copeland and Mr. Barron, thank you for your
    testimony and thank you for the work that you are doing. You
    are doing double-duty, too. I mean, you are doing the work for
    your companies and you are also doing the work in these
    coordinating councils.
        A general question to the two of you and then maybe if we
    get time for a second round, I can go into more specifics.
        How well is the concept of the coordinating councils
    working? You are putting a lot of effort into it. Obviously,
    you think it is worthwhile, because you are both still doing
    it.
        You are getting the cooperation of not only your companies,
    but like companies. But is government listening? Is government
    really acting as a partner with you in this coordinating
    councils?
        Do you feel that your time is well spent? And has the
    experience been such that it is encouraging to have other
    companies become involved and commit their people to the time
    that is necessary to actually make a contribution?
        Mr. Copeland. Mr. Chairman, as a general observation, of
    course, our sector coordinating councils are just getting
    started. So the answer is it remains to be seen how they will
    survive in the long run, but I am very excited about how they
    are starting out.
        The intention was that they would provide broad
    representation for their sectors to work with their government
    counterparts, to attack a variety of issues, many of which you
    have heard discussed here today.
        I have to say, even as we were going through our formative
    process, we were already working with our government
    colleagues, doing, for example, detailed word-by-word reviews
    on the national infrastructure protection plan.
        So we had that kind of interaction with them. The writing
    team that we have formed and which Paul co-chairs for us, that
    is working on the sector-specific plan, is made up of both
    industry and government representatives. So I am very positive
    on that.
        Is there room for progress? Yes. I am very concerned that
    we need to quickly move on to reaching out across the country
    to the many different, some very key players who need to become
    aware of the sector coordinating council and become involved in
    it, as well.
        When I spoke to the recommendation of encouragement and
    looking to our government colleagues, both the executive branch
    and Congress, for that kind of encouragement, you can do some
    of that when you are back in your districts and you are talking
    to executives.
        You can build some of that encouragement, where
    appropriate, into legislation, where there might be an
    opportunity. I would like to see more of the senior executives
    in both the executive branch and Congress sending letters to
    the senior executives in the private sector, saying, ``Look,
    this is an important activity. It will ultimately bring value
    to your company, help provide general protection to you,
    protect you in the mission or business services that you offer
    to your clients, and it will help the nation.''
        And even beyond that, because the whole issue of
    information security and cybersecurity is inextricably
    intertwined with many of our closest allies, but most
    particularly with our Canadian allies because of the border
    that we share and the way that our infrastructures happen to
    built and intertwined very, very closely.
        So it is going to have international impact, as well, for
    them to participate.
        I have watched with pleasure as some motivating factors
    have creeped into things that are extremely useful. So, for
    example, the federal financial institutions examination council
    has now built into their guidelines for examining information
    security and financial institutions a requirement that whoever
    provides their information technology and communications must
    be participating in an ISAC, and that could be the company
    itself or it could be an outsourced company like mine that may
    provide those kind of services to them.
        So that is positive reinforcement for joining those
    institutions and working together to solve these common
    problems.
        Mr. Lungren. Thank you.
        Mr. Barron?
        Mr. Barron. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think the sector
    coordinating council concept is working very well.
        Telecommunications and communications, in general, has a
    longstanding history with the government through the national
    communications system and the NCC. We have been partners with
    them for well over 20 years and there is a close relationship
    there.
        It has performed very well, 9/11, Katrina, I mean, we have
    been there and we have had a lot of success in the face of
    disasters. So I think that relationship and that partnership
    is, without question, there through the NCS.
        The key is, I think, trying to turn the sector-specific
    plans from something that you are required to do to something
    that you want to do and we are making progress there and
    bringing in what I call, Mr. Chairman, nontraditional players
    into the Communications Sector Coordinating Council, cable
    telephony, those kind of folks who haven't traditionally been
    involved, but they are very critical players, are now getting
    engaged and we are very pleased with that, and think the NCS
    and the DHS folks are helping us with that.
        So I think the partnership is working.
        Mr. Lungren. Thank you very much.
        The gentleman from Washington is recognized.
        Mr. Dicks. Thank you.
        Mr. Kurtz, when did you serve on the White House staff?
        Mr. Kurtz. I joined the White House staff in 1999, before
    the millennium, at the very end of the Clinton administration
    and stayed on into early 2004 in the Bush administration.
        Mr. Dicks. Are there people at the White House doing the
    kind of work today that you were doing at that time?
        Mr. Kurtz. Not on a full-time basis.
        Mr. Dicks. Part-time?
        Mr. Kurtz. Yes. Certainly, there are people there within
    the National Security Council, Homeland Security Council and
    the Office of Technology and Policy who are spending some time
    on this issue.
        Mr. Dicks. You described a little bit the--but flesh out
    why you think this has been downplayed in this administration.
    Why are they not taking this as seriously as the previous
    administration did? Obviously, you had the millennium, the 2000
    thing, which was a big factor and had everybody's attention on
    it.
        Mr. Kurtz. My own personal view is the Clinton
    administration, toward the end of the Clinton administration,
    they were, in fact, paying attention to this, because that is
    when we started to see the problems surface. The massive denial
    of service attacks in 2000 prompted an event with the
    president.
        However, President Bush, when he first started off, one of
    the first briefings he took was on cybersecurity. When I was on
    staff there, it was one of the very first briefings he had and
    he stood up the critical infrastructure protection board,
    which, in turn, produced the national strategy to secure
    cybersecurity in 2003.
        I think after that strategy was issued, that is when we had
    the change. Under the strategy, the vast majority of the work
    was to go over to the Department of Homeland Security. I
    believe that decision made good sense, because we were standing
    up the department at that time.
        However, the department had massive issues on its hands and
    in my written testimony we talk about the preoccupation, and
    understandable preoccupation with the physical threats, threats
    to kill people, blow up buildings. That is understandable.
        However, several years down the line, it is hard to defend
    that and especially in the context that we have increased
    threats and increased vulnerabilities and more dependency on
    this information infrastructure.
        I also think the intervening events for the department have
    been, obviously, Hurricane Katrina. Katrina took a lot of
    energy out of the department. Really, though, quite frankly, I
    am out of excuses. The time is now to have higher level
    attention within the federal government to this issue.
        And I would argue, and I talked about this a little bit
    this morning, that DHS needs to assert more leadership, but I
    would also argue that the White House needs to step up more.
        Mr. Dicks. When you say leadership, what do you mean by
    that? When I look at it, either you are talking about
    resources, as an appropriator, or you are talking about
    regulation or you are talking about bringing together people to
    work together to try to understand each other's problems and to
    convince each of these sectors that they have got to do
    something themselves to protect their own cybersecurity.
        Mr. Kurtz. I would argue, in a sense, all four of those
    issues that you mentioned, with the caveat around the third
    one, regulation.
        By leadership, I mean--
        Mr. Dicks. I know you are afraid of regulation, because of
    your clients.
        Mr. Kurtz. But leadership, I mean--
        Mr. Dicks. If you don't get the job done, and this goes
    back all the way back to the first days of the ICC and
    railroads. I mean, you know, at some point, the government has
    to step in and say you have got to do it.
        Mr. Kurtz. But by leadership, I mean a senior individual
    who is consistently focused on a problem. One of the reasons
    why we have the national strategy to secure cyberspace, and I
    still think it has good standing in the private sector, is we
    had a very senior individual push that through.
        Mr. Lungren. How about an assistant secretary for
    cybersecurity and telecommunications?
        Mr. Kurtz. I think it certainly helps, but I do argue that
    we need to have more senior involvement on a regular basis by
    others within the department and other agencies, as well.
        I think as far as resources, yes, resources, though, follow
    leadership when you can establish the priorities and programs
    that we need to pursue. Regulation in a limited degree, when we
    know we have had market failure, and there is an opportunity
    before the Congress now to pass legislation to secure sensitive
    personal information.
        There are multiple bills under consideration up here and I
    do think that is an important step forward that ought to be
    paid attention to.
        Mr. Dicks. Privacy, obviously, is a very important issue.
    But, again, you think maybe having somebody else at the White
    House staff who is on the National Security Council and
    Homeland Security Council.
        Mr. Kurtz. The decision to move it over to the Department
    of Homeland Security was correct and stands true today.
        Mr. Dicks. But it was correct that they picked up the ball
    and did something with it, but so far they haven't done that.
        Mr. Kurtz. Let me give a practical example. As we develop
    the IT sector-specific plan, we have been working very closely
    with our colleagues on a working level at the Department of
    Homeland Security. In fact, we have quite a good relationship.
        But what is absent is that we don't have other agencies at
    a more senior level participating and only within the last week
    or so have we gotten people at the White House to, if you will,
    tune in more to this problem.
        The reason why, I think, is that there are some very
    complex policy questions that need to be resolved that cross
    jurisdictions, that cross agencies. An example, in Hurricane,
    Katrina, ultimately, the president turned to the Department of
    Defense to help us in the response to Hurricane Katrina.
        If we have a massive disruption in the information
    infrastructure, DHS is going to play a lead coordinating role,
    but you can be darn sure that DOD is going to care and the FCC
    is going to care. And what would happen in that instance is you
    would have probably not a total Internet blackout, but you
    would probably have very limited bandwidth available, which
    means information going across the Internet would need to be
    prioritized.
        All right, so who is first? Does DOD take precedence? Does
    the financial community take precedence? Obviously, in the
    context of a larger scale disaster, first responders,
    hospitals, medical institutions, we haven't come close to
    making those decisions.
        That is why I argue that we have to have more senior level
    input into this process. An assistant secretary can certainly
    help queue up those issues for more senior people to ultimately
    make those decisions. That is where the assistant secretary is
    critical, as he or she can work across federal agencies to
    queue up these decisions.
        Mr. Dicks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Lungren. The time of the gentleman has expired.
        And the gentleman from Indiana is recognized for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Souder. I thought that was a very interesting
    discussion, because we keep hearing leadership without
    specifics. But you put a finger on that it is cross-
    jurisdictional, because, in effect, if the secretary of
    homeland security and the Department of Defense are in an
    argument, what kind of official, short of the president or vice
    president, is going to be able to referee that.
        There isn't going to be a national security advisor or a
    lower level staff and you have got, arguably, the two biggest
    agencies in jurisdictional tussles.
        Let me come back to a variation of the question I asked
    earlier, and the answer was there is government enforcement and
    there is private sector enforcement and insurance was
    mentioned.
        I was kind of trying to make a list in my head. What would
    be the government incentives to fix this? And, basically, other
    than altruism and a desire to help the American system, which
    is important and I am not arguing isn't a motivation, but it
    basically comes down to fear of loss of your job and career
    ruining.
        In the private sector, the incentives are somewhat
    different. Has there been any court case that has established a
    liability of, if you haven't plugged a certain hole on
    cybersecurity, that you can have a massive fee on your firm?
        Mr. Kurtz. The most obvious example that comes to my mind
    is the FTC, the Federal Trade Commission's actions over the
    past year and a half, where, in three cases, there were three
    retailers, separate events--well, two retailers and a data
    broker who did not take adequate steps to secure sensitive
    personal information.
        Those entities involved knew that they had problems and
    didn't attend to them. And in one case in particular, the FTC
    levied a $14 million fine.
        There have been subsequent cases and I think all of them
    have been less than $14 million. That is a relatively new
    development.
        Mr. Souder. Because that will certainly affect insurance
    rates on everyone and the question is how to fairly disburse
    that, then, because your weakest links are going to be driving
    up the insurance rates on those who are actually investing,
    because the catastrophic costs drive up costs.
        You also have potential loss of sales to any company that
    basically gets penetrated, because people say this isn't a safe
    place, or a financial institution. If it is others, you have
    the potential restoring costs to that, which the federal
    government would have, too, if we had damages in a facility
    that we run.
        We also have the absolute wiping out of a brand name, in
    the sense of your company could be destroyed. There are
    multiple private sector things.
        Why do you think, with all those pressures on the private
    sector, that the private sector, particularly given these kind
    of cases, isn't ramping up at a faster rate?
        At the federal government, we react to problems. We need to
    be better at preempting. Certainly, Katrina and 9/11, voters
    want to know that they have every single bag--I mean, in this
    committee we debate this--want to have every single bag checked
    multiples times and this and that we put so much money in there
    that we are not dealing with cybersecurity.
        We have X amount of money. That is risk assessment, ramping
    up, and the general public is reacting off of what happened in
    the past, to ramp up that and we are missing some bigger risks.
        Part of my question would be, as the private sector,
    clearly, has multiple risks here, why aren't they ramping up
    more? Is it that the guys at the margin who aren't making as
    much money and don't have the ability to do the costs are the
    ones not ramping up?
        Mr. Kurtz. I think that that last point is an important
    point. I think there are elements in the private sector, as I
    said earlier, that are taking this issue seriously, because if
    they experience a loss, it has a real impact on their business,
    their customers, their market share.
        Mr. Souder. Can I ask you? Because my time is about--let me
    ask you, then. Given the assumption that you are saying, that
    if you have the ability, you understand the risk and you are
    doing it.
        If it is the group--if our weakest link destroys our
    biggest link, in other words, you get into our electrical grid,
    whether it is in Canada or the United States, you are wrecked.
    If the weakest link, unless we have these firewalls that shut
    you off you are going to wreck everybody else around you.
        If the financial market incentive isn't there for our
    weakest link, do we have a choice, other than the regulatory
    side?
        Mr. Kurtz. I think, first of all, we need to pursue those
    incentives. I don't think we are at the point yet where we can
    say that the market has failed for all those industries who
    haven't necessarily taken it seriously.
        Mr. Souder. Are there tax incentive type things that we
    could do to accelerate that?
        Mr. Kurtz. I am certainly not going to say no to the idea
    of a tax incentive. I think we ought to explore that. But I
    think the insurance market is something interesting, because
    the reason why the insurance community, as I understand it, the
    reason why the insurance community cannot write as much
    insurance in this space as they would like is that there are,
    if you will, no common standards that they can base risk upon.
        In other words, if I know X firm has done the following 10
    things, that I have a reasonable understanding that a lot of
    other firms are going to follow, as well, and I can have that
    certified in some manner, self-certification or third-party
    certification, then I am going to feel, as a insurance person,
    and I have no background in this area, though, I would feel, as
    an insurance person, it is a better risk. I could write
    insurance in that area.
        The problem is we don't really have that nexus now in the
    federal government between places like the Department of
    Commerce and the Department of Homeland Security to look at
    these issues.
        If I can, the fascinating detail, I think, is currently,
    despite our dependence upon the information infrastructure, we
    have no federal agency today that is tracking the costs of
    cyber attacks. We have no one at the Department of Commerce, no
    one who is, if you will--we have all sorts of statistics as to
    how well our economy is doing, how our labor force is doing,
    how productive we are.
        But when it comes down to understanding the costs of cyber
    attacks, the cost of disruptions, and, granted, it is a
    difficult problem to solve, no one is tracking that today.
        Mr. Souder. Mr. Chairman, I would like to say, too, that in
    the GAO testimony, some of these things are out there, but they
    are usually way back in the reports or they do not put this
    clearly, but there is information in here about the slammer
    worm taking a nuclear power plant down, their security
    monitoring system, for 5 hours.
        Somebody did a movie on that. I mean, our whole nuclear
    policy is based on that Jane Fonda movie. One movie and all of
    a sudden cybersecurity changes. Similar, that in here about?
        Mr. Lungren. Are you suggesting Hollywood can make
    cybersecurity sexy?
        Mr. Souder. Yes. And TV, in other words, when you look at
    the--if you are airline flights are canceled, your automatic
    teller machine failed, and network outages, if people knew what
    actually happened, it is scary.
        And part of the problem, the way we respond is that, hey,
    we run every 2 years, the Constitution made us basically
    weather vanes and somebody has got to be blowing the weather.
        And part of the problem we have in homeland security is we
    are charging around that way and cybersecurity has to become--
    the danger has to become more sexy to the general public.
        Mr. Lungren. I thank the gentleman for his comments.
        And now I would recognize someone who I would never call a
    weather vane, the gentlelady from Houston.
        Ms. Jackson-Lee. I will take that in the spirit that it is
    offered and I will wonder about the spirit.
        Mr. Kurtz. He meant it as a compliment, I think.
        Mr. Lungren. I meant an independent thinker is what I
    meant.
        Ms. Jackson-Lee. I said I would take it as such.
        I am going to go with Mr. Souder's passion and continue at
    his level, which is where I stopped off, which is this sense of
    urgency that is not gripping some of the segments of homeland
    security as I think it deserves.
        And so I am going to go back to you, Mr. Kurtz, and then
    Mr. Pelgrin, because as we look at the tragedy of terrorist
    acts, we know that Washington is certainly a target, but so are
    our notable areas of high risk, from New York to California.
        And, of course, I happen to be a high risk proponent, but I
    do believe it is important to translate information so that all
    of the homeland can be secure.
        But I have a simple question on time. You have laid out the
    obstacles, Mr. Kurtz, and Undersecretary Mr. Foresman, in a
    February 2006 press conference on cybersecurity or Cyberstorm,
    about the role of the department in the event of an attack, at
    the time, he said, ``The key thing that you bring to the table
    is coordination. We will bring the ability to leverage multiple
    people towards a common goal, towards a common solution, in
    order to deal with the problem so that it is not a haphazard
    approach.''
        Well meaning, but the question is if you had to give an
    answer when the American people could feel comfortable that our
    cybersecurity is--the term under control is not accurate, but
    under extreme or very vibrant oversight, and our infrastructure
    is in lace and we have leveraged, when do you think that would
    be?
        Mr. Pelgrin. I guess my response, from a DHS perspective,
    when we have an early warning system in place, a solid early
    warning system program in place that embraces the private
    sector.
        Secondly, an emergency communications system that allows us
    to communicate when the very infrastructure we are seeking to
    protect is under attack.
        Ms. Jackson-Lee. Would you want that emergency system to be
    seamless, meaning that it would go across the nation, as
    opposed to saying all of New York would talk to each other?
        Mr. Kurtz. Among critical owners and operators across the
    nation. In other words, key government entities, key folks
    within the private sector.
        And then the third key area would be recovery and
    reconstitution issues. In other words, you have to accept that
    you have to plan as though there will be successful attacks. So
    what happens when that happens? How do you reconstitute the
    Internet? How do you reconstitute major protocols that may have
    been broken out there? We need to think through those.
        Once we have those questions solved, we can accept that
    there are always going to be attacks. The nature of the beast
    is we are always going to have bad guys out there and always
    going to have people coming after us. But if we have a system
    in place to protect and respond, then we will be in a much
    better spot.
        And, hopefully, along the way, we will have more resilient
    networks being developed through R&D.
        Ms. Jackson-Lee. Well, we think of Hurricane Katrina when
    we think of recovery. But for those of us who went to New York
    during 9/11 and went specifically to Wall Street, which was not
    hit, per se, but, obviously, was shut down, if, for example, an
    attack was on that system, the question is what is the timing
    of recovery.
        What preparedness do we have? Because that system is
    obviously interwoven into the cybersecurity, if you will,
    superhighway, using an old term. And what is the recovery? I
    don't know if any of us know that.
        Some of these things, I am sort of doubtful of discussing
    them publicly, but I think we have some real issues here and I
    guess I didn't hear a timeframe, but the fact that you have
    given me three elements would suggest that these three elements
    are not yet there.
        Mr. Kurtz. No, they are not yet there. But in the case of
    the banking and finance industry, it is probably worthwhile for
    you to have a discussion with them, because they are very
    advanced in that area and they learned a lot from 9/11 and they
    have got some very sophisticated programs in place, which are
    worth learning about.
        Ms. Jackson-Lee. And the only question, I would say, is
    they are probably sophisticated, but are they complete and what
    more can they do and what more can we do to help them. I think
    that is the real question.
        Mr. Pelgrin, the whole issue is to be able to communicate
    with state and local officials. Are we there yet, particularly
    on this aspect of security?
        Mr. Pelgrin. I don't think we are there yet and it has to
    do a lot with still awareness and education and dollars and
    resources at the state and local government level.
        I think we have made huge progress from when we started in
    2003. The multi-state ISAC, we meet every month with all the
    states. We share information on an interactive call every
    month.
        But trying to get that message out to local governments is
    a true challenge. We are working diligently on doing that and
    actually we have a pilot with five states, New York being one
    of those states, in which we are expanding the multi-state into
    local governments by allowing each state to have a state ISAC,
    which allows them to communicate.
        Ms. Jackson-Lee. What states are they? What are the five
    states?
        Mr. Pelgrin. It is Florida, New York, Wisconsin, Michigan,
    and I am blocking on the fifth and I will have to get back to
    you on the fifth. Congresswoman, I will get back to you on the
    fifth one. Michigan. If I didn't say Michigan, it is Michigan.
        It is an opportunity to reach them. But you need to put it
    in context from a local government perspective. When a local
    government official is a town supervisor who is part-time and
    they are working out of their home part-time and that computer
    that they are using is also, by the way, used by their kids at
    night, think about the challenges and what type information is
    contained on it.
        We had one town clerk who said when we talked about the
    importance of erasing media in an appropriate way, from
    destruction of the media to wiping it clean to ensure that data
    is protected, the comment initially was, ``I don't understand
    why we are talking about this, because we want to produce one
    of our supplements on how to do that.''
        And she said, ``When my computer dies, I just toss it
    out.'' Well, that information doesn't get deleted just because
    that computer died on her. So it is critical that we reach all
    of these individuals, education and awareness at the earliest
    of ages.
        And one of the things I would recommend, Undersecretary
    Foresman mentioned it, but October is cybersecurity awareness
    month, it would be wonderful if Congress embraced that. We
    actually have our toolkit that we are providing you.
        We have five packages of toolkits for you. That deals with
    everything from calendars for kids to adults, mouse pads,
    anything we can do to bring this message home that they have to
    take basic precautions.
        I am not sure if it was Guy or David who said that the
    weakest link is just one link that you have to be concerned
    with.
        Ms. Jackson-Lee. Mr. Chairman, thank you. It is not just
    the town supervisor's computer that is thrown way. I can tell
    you that large cities, having come out of local government, do
    likewise and I am not sure whether they are now more informed
    about cleaning those, the terminology ``cleaning,'' with
    quotes, but to eliminate the data on those thrown away computer
    and/or the donated computers that are subsequently donated to
    schools.
        I think there is certainly a large question of data
    preservation and/or particularly if we connect on some of these
    very secure matters.
        I yield back. Thank you very much.
        Mr. Lungren. I thank the gentlelady for yielding. I thank
    the witnesses for your valuable testimony today and members for
    their questions.
        Members of the committee may have some additional questions
    for the witnesses and we would ask you to respond to those in
    writing. The hearing record will be open for 10 days.
        Thank you once again for your participation. It was very,
    very helpful.
        Without objection, the committee stands adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 5:44 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]