[House Hearing, 109 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
STATE AND LOCAL FUSION CENTERS AND THE ROLE OF DHS
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGENCY
PREPAREDNESS, SCIENCE, AND TECHNOLOGY
of the
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
SEPTEMBER 7, 2006
__________
Serial No. 109-99
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TONGRESS.#13
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/
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__________
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Peter T. King, New York, Chairman
Don Young, Alaska Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Lamar S. Smith, Texas Loretta Sanchez, California
Curt Weldon, Pennsylvania Edward J. Markey, Massachusetts
Christopher Shays, Connecticut Norman D. Dicks, Washington
John Linder, Georgia Jane Harman, California
Mark E. Souder, Indiana Peter A. DeFazio, Oregon
Tom Davis, Virginia Nita M. Lowey, New York
Daniel E. Lungren, California Eleanor Holmes Norton, District of
Jim Gibbons, Nevada Columbia
Rob Simmons, Connecticut Zoe Lofgren, California
Mike Rogers, Alabama Sheila Jackson-Lee, Texas
Stevan Pearce, New Mexico Bill Pascrell, Jr., New Jersey
Katherine Harris, Florida Donna M. Christensen, U.S. Virgin
Bobby Jindal, Louisiana Islands
Dave G. Reichert, Washington Bob Etheridge, North Carolina
Michael T. McCaul, Texas James R. Langevin, Rhode Island
Charlie Dent, Pennsylvania Kendrick B. Meek, Florida
Ginny Brown-Waite, Florida
______
SUBCOMMITTE ON EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS, SCIENCE, AND TECHNOLOGY
Dave G. Reichert, Washington, Chairman
Lamar S. Smith, Texas Bill Pascrell, Jr., New Jersey
Curt Weldon, Pennsylvania Loretta Sanchez, California
Rob Simmons, Connecticut Norman D. Dicks, Washington
Mike Rogers, Alabama Jane Harman, California
Stevan Pearce, New Mexico Nita M. Lowey, New York
Katherine Harris, Florida Eleanor Holmes Norton, District of
Michael McCaul, Texas Columbia
Charlie Dent, Pennsylvania Donna M. Christensen, U.S. Virgin
Ginny Brown-Waite, Florida Islands
Peter T. King, New York (Ex Bob Etheridge, North Carolina
Officio) Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
(Ex Officio)
(II)
C O N T E N T S
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Page
STATEMENTS
The Honorable Rob Simmons, a Representative in Congress From the
State of Connecticut, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Emergency
Preparedness, Science, and Technology.......................... 1
Witnesses
Panel I
Mr. Charles E. Allen, Chief Intelligence Officer, U.S. Department
of Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 1
Prepared Statement............................................. 4
Panel II
Colonel Kenneth Bouche, Deputy Director, Information & Technology
Command, Illinois State Police:
Oral Statement................................................. 12
Prepared Statement............................................. 14
Ms. Amy Whitmore, Analyst Supervisor, Virginia Fusion Center,
Virginia State Police:
Oral Statement................................................. 16
Prepared Statement............................................. 18
Mr. Richard L. Canas, Director, New Jersey Office of Homeland
Security and Preparedness:
Oral Statement................................................. 20
Prepared Statement............................................. 22
STATE AND LOCAL FUSION CENTERS AND THE ROLE OF DHS
----------
Thursday, September 7, 2006
House of Representatives,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Subcommittee on Intelligence, Information Sharing, and
Terrorism Risk Assessment,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 3:20 p.m., in
Room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Rob Simmons
[chairman of the subcommittee] presiding.
Present: Representatives Simmons and Sanchez.
Mr. Simmons. By unanimous consent, I request that this
hearing of the subcommittee on Homeland Security Subcommittee
on Intelligence Sharing and Terrorism Risk Assessment will come
to order.
Are there any objections?
Hearing none, the subcommittee meets today to hear
testimony on the Department's progress in implementing one of
the most fundamental aspects of the Homeland Security Act of
2002, specifically, how DHS intends to support State and local
information sharing efforts.
I will request that the reminder of my opening statement be
placed in the record as if read, and I will simply share again
with Mr. Allen my view that the success of fusion centers in
many respects will be the benchmark of our success in securing
the homeland, that this is one of the most innovative and
critical developments that we have, and that we must succeed in
this initiative if Federal, State, local and tribal entities
are to be successful in sharing information to protecting
people in a variety of different locations throughout the
Nation.
I note, Mr. Allen, that you agree with that. I hear some of
the others nodding in agreement. So at this point I will ask
our first witness, Mr. Charles Allen, to begin with his
testimony.
STATEMENT OF CHARLES E. ALLEN, CHIEF INTELLIGENCE OFFICER, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Mr. Allen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
It is a great pleasure to be here. I have a very brief
opening statement, and I request that my formal written
statement be is entered into the record.
Mr. Simmons. Without objection, so ordered.
Mr. Allen. I would like to recognize some of my colleagues
just briefly. First Mr. Jack DeMarcio, who is my Principal
Deputy for Intelligence and Analysis, and who involves himself
almost full-time reaching out to State and local governments,
he is on the road most of the time, as well as my information
manager, Dr. Carter Morris, who works closely with the
information security environment program manager, Ted McNamara,
and serves as a Department of Homeland Security representative
on the Information Sharing Council, which Ambassador McNamara
chairs. And also here is one of my colleagues, Mr. Chet Lunar,
who is head of the DHA State and Local Government Directorate.
New threats demand new strategies to prevent and counter
potential terrorist attacks and other threats to the homeland.
First responders and front line law enforcement officers must
be armed with the information that will enable them first to
recognize and then to defeat the threat.
The Department of Homeland Security must similarly gain
insights of local law enforcement and emergency personnel as
they detect patterns that may involve threats to our homeland.
Our State and Local Fusion Center plan, which I will talk
about, is key to helping identify these threats, and is
central, as you indicated, to our mission to secure the
homeland. The processes and the programs we implement today
with our State fusion centers will help us keep more secure for
generations to come.
Since 9/11, many State and local jurisdictions have
recognized the need to improve their intelligence posture, and
they have seen the value of creating fusion centers to do so.
Fusion centers are interagency facilities designed by the
States to maximize State and local ability to detect, prevent
and respond to criminal and terrorist activity, and to recover
from natural disasters. These centers compile, analyze and
disseminate criminal information, threat assessments, and
public safety, law enforcement and health information. They are
becoming the centers of gravity for all hazards and all threats
within the States.
I recognized soon after my arrival at the Department of
Homeland Security 11 months ago that the flow of information
between DHS and the State and local authorities needed to be
mutual, robust and seamless. This judgment had been reinforced
by Secretary Chertoff's Second Stage Review conducted earlier,
and by the Secretary's direction to me to reach out fully to
State and local governments in the sharing of intelligence and
intelligence-related information. As a consequence, we have
been working closely with the program manager for Information
Sharing Environment, again, Ambassador McNamara, and the
Department of Justice on a framework, as required by
Presidential guidelines, that will strengthen relationships
between the national intelligence community and the State
fusion centers.
My Fusion Center plan, approved by Secretary Chertoff in
2006, is a plan which, when implemented, I think will go a long
way to meeting the Secretary's goal.
I plan to embed DHS intelligence and operational
professionals in State in local fusion centers. My plan has
three guiding principles: First, build on existing DHS and
Federal agency presence and established relationships with
State and local authorities. These relationships serve both
parties well, and I neither want to duplicate effort nor
inadvertently jeopardize work in progress.
Second, to recognize the particular needs and unique
situation of each Fusion Center; one size does not fit all.
Fusion centers were established to meet the individual needs of
that center. We need to develop a collaborative, synergistic
relationship with each one, one at a time, that benefits all
parties concerned.
Finally, we must move forward with mutual realistic
expectations. Too often in the past we have raised expectations
beyond the point where we can deliver. There is a clear and
attractive value proposition for us and for the local
jurisdictions, but I want to manage their and our own
expectations. I want to promise only what we can deliver and
expect that which each center can provide to us.
My goal is to establish a mutually beneficial relationship
with the State and local fusion centers. We will benefit from
access to nontraditional information sources and a closer
working relationship with the States. The States will benefit
from improved information flow from DHS and among themselves.
I have already deployed officers to support Los Angeles and
New York City, as well as Louisiana, Georgia and Maryland, and
I am pleased with the results I am seeing. Going forward, we
are tailoring our efforts to meet the specific needs of each
center.
The process begins with an assessment conducted by a team
from my office. The team spends a day or more as required at
the center to understand its particular mission, information
sources, analytic capacity, information technology
infrastructure, security environment, and existing partnerships
with other jurisdictions and other Federal agencies.
My team also tries to meet with local FBI agents to discuss
our plan and surface any issues of common concern. The
assessment results in a set of recommendations to me concerning
the staffing and services we can provide which will deliver
value both to DHS and to the fusion center concerned.
We have conducted amendments of 12 centers so far, and
based on the results of these assessments I am planning to
deploy intelligence officers during the first quarter of 2007
to Arizona, Texas, New York, Virginia, Illinois, Florida and
California.
I also strongly believe that secure connectivity to the
States is essential for this collaboration. I plan on deploying
a collateral secret communication system everywhere I send an
officer. Our collateral secret communication systems to the
States, the Homeland Security Data Network, HSDN, is the analog
of the Department of Defense secret Internet protocol network,
or Supernet. In the first instance only my officers will have
access, but I plan to expand access over time to personnel in
the State fusion centers. I intend, by the first quarter of
fiscal year 2007, to have HSDN installed everywhere I have an
officer assigned to a fusion center.
In conclusion, in close coordination again with Ted
McNamara and the Department of Justice, I have developed an
aggressive plan on behalf not only of DHS intelligence, but
also the entire Department, that fundamentally changes our
interactions with non-Federal partners, the State and local
jurisdictions. I believe this is one of the most important
initiatives that we can take to counter security threats to the
homeland.
At Secretary Chertoff's direction, I am moving now quickly
to implement this plan. I want to keep you informed of my
progress as we proceed. I welcome your questions.
[The statement of Mr. Allen follows:]
Prepared Statement of Charles E. Allen
Chairman Simmons, Ranking Member Lofgren, and members of the
Committee, thank you for giving me the opportunity to discuss my plan
to enhance intelligence and operational support to state and local
authorities. As you know, since the tragic events of 9/11 many
jurisdictions-states, some regions, and some cities-have established
intelligence fusion centers. As the report of the 9/11 Commission
states, the attacks were successful in part because "information was
not shared. Analysis was not pooled. Effective operations were not
launched." The result, said the Commission, was that analysts were
unable to "connect the dots" that might have revealed the plot. Since
then, the Federal Government as well as state and local authorities
have taken steps to improve their intelligence posture, including the
creation of fusion centers to more effectively share information.
These centers-at which state and/or local officials work in close
proximity with federal representatives to receive, integrate and
analyze information and intelligence-encourage interagency cooperation
and integrate intelligence into a system that can benefit homeland
security and counter-terrorism programs at all levels.The states have
created these centers to meet their own needs. Most states used the
Global Fusion Center Guidelines as a basis for this development. These
Guidelines, issued a year ago, were a collaborative effort between
State, local, and tribal government officials, the private sector, the
Department of Justice, and ourselves. That issuance, under DOJ
auspices, made recommendations about the centers' law enforcement role,
governance, connectivity standards, databases and security. Revised
guidelines were issued last month addressing the role of public safety
officials and the private sector in these centers. This revised
guideline document also recommends that the fusion centers prepare for
future connectivity with other state, federal and local systems.
To date, 42 intelligence fusion centers have been established or
are in the process of being established across the country. This number
continues to grow. Ohio, for example, opened its' Strategic Analysis
and Information Center in March; the Los Angeles Joint Regional
Intelligence Center opened in July; and San Diego's Law Enforcement
Coordination Center will open in November. As intended, these centers
will maximize state and local abilities to detect, prevent, and respond
to criminal and terrorist activity and recover from natural disasters
by compiling, analyzing and disseminating criminal intelligence, threat
assessments, and public safety, law enforcement, and health
information. The success of these centers depends heavily upon the
quality of the information they receive.
I recognized early that the flow of information between DHS and the
state and local authorities needed to be mutual, robust, and seamless.
Fusion centers are recognized by the DNI as a center of gravity, key to
the effective exchange and assessment of information between the
Federal government and state and local partners. We have been working
closely with the Program Manager for the Information Sharing
Environment and the Department of Justice on a framework as required by
Presidential guidelines that will strengthen and codify relationships
and allow for an effective interface between the National Intelligence
Community and fusion centers. The draft framework draws upon existing
systems and capabilities, and mandates a coordinated and collaborative
approach to sharing homeland security information, terrorism
information, and law enforcement information with State, local, and
tribal officials and the private sector. The draft framework will
enable more effective and efficient sharing of this information both at
the Federal level (between and among departments and agencies) and with
State, local, and tribal governments and private sector entities.
The Homeland Security Act and the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism
Prevention Act give the Secretary--and he in turn delegates to me--
broad responsibilities and authority to provide intelligence support to
state, local and tribal authorities and to the private sector,
specifically in support of critical infrastructure protection and
response and recovery efforts. With this in mind and understanding the
centrality of state and local fusion centers--their particular
information needs and their unique information access--I have developed
a mechanism to link effectively these centers with our Department.
My plan is to embed in the centers intelligence professionals whose
responsibilities shall include ensuring robust, two-way, information
sharing. The plan was the culmination of meetings with representatives
across the Department, with outside input as required. The plan was
approved by Secretary Chertoff on June 7. As I execute this plan, I
will be working closely with the Department of Justice, Department of
Defense, and other members of the Information Sharing Environment to
ensure coordination and integration of effort.
There are three guiding principles for our plan:
First, build on existing DHS and Federal Agency presence and
established relationships with state and local authorities. For
example, an Immigration & Customs Enforcement, or ICE agent, is
currently embedded in the Upstate New York Regional
Intelligence Center (UNYRIC) in Albany, NY; eleven ICE agents
are already an integral part of the Arizona Counterterrorism
Intelligence Center (ACTIC) in Phoenix, AZ. These relationships
serve both parties well and I neither want to duplicate effort
nor inadvertently jeopardize work in progress.
Second, recognize the particular needs and unique situation
of each fusion center-one size does not fit all. Individual
fusion centers were established to meet the individual needs of
the jurisdiction. We need to develop a collaborative,
synergistic relationship with each one--one at a time--that
benefits all parties concerned.
Finally, we must move forward with mutual, realistic
expectations. Too often, in the past, we have raised
expectations beyond the point where we can deliver. There is a
clear and attractive value proposition, for us and for the
local jurisdictions, but I want to manage their and our own
expectations. I want to promise only what we can deliver and
expect only that which each center can provide to us.
By following these principles I have no doubt that we will all
receive value from the resources expended. For our part, I know we will
benefit from an improved flow of information from the centers, and we
can capitalize analytically on non-traditional information, which will
ultimately result in improved situational awareness at the Federal
level. We also will benefit from close and continuous consultation on
state and local issues so that we can be more attuned to their needs
and constraints.
State and local authorities will, themselves, benefit from an
improved information flow from DHS and through us from the National
Intelligence Community. I expect, too, that the centers will make good
use of the on-site intelligence expertise we will extend to them. The
result cannot be other than improved intelligence analysis and
production capabilities at the state and local level. In addition,
these jurisdictions will be able to glean greater insight into Federal
priorities and have a voice on national threat issues. Finally, they
will have a clearly defined entry point into the Department of Homeland
Security for intelligence issues.
Already, I have officers to support Los Angeles and New York City
as well as Louisiana, Georgia, and Maryland. I sense a profitable
return on this investment, based on conversations that I have had with
officials in Los Angeles and New York City, all of whom are positive
about these arrangements.In accordance with our second guiding
principle, tailoring our efforts to meet the specific needs of an
individual fusion center is the key to success. The process begins with
an in-depth assessment of each center by a team from my office. The
team spends a day or more, as required, at the center to understand its
particular mission, information sources, analytic capacity, information
technology infrastructure, security environment, and existing
partnerships with other local jurisdictions and other federal agencies.
My team also tries to meet with local FBI officials to discuss our plan
and surface any issues of common concern. The assessment results in a
set of recommendations to me concerning the staffing and services we
can provide which will deliver value to both DHS and the center. This
information, along with additional information provided by DOJ, will
inform a comprehensive assessment of Fusion center capabilities to be
completed as part of the implementation of the Information Sharing
Environment.
To date, we have conducted assessments at a dozen fusion centers.
These include:
Columbus, OH-the Strategic Analysis and Information Center
(SAIC)
Phoenix, AZ-the Arizona Counter Terrorism and Intelligence
Center (ACTIC)
North Central TX-the North Central Texas Operations, Fusion
and Communications Center
Albany, NY-the Upstate New York Regional Intelligence Center
(UNYRIC)
Richmond, VA-the Virginia State Police, Bureau of Criminal
Intelligence Fusion Center
Springfield, IL-the Statewide Terrorism Intelligence Center
(STIC)
Tallahassee, FL-the Florida Fusion Center
San Diego, CA-the Law Enforcement Coordination Center (LECC)
Los Angeles, CA-the Joint Regional Intelligence Center (JRIC)
San Francisco, CA-the Northern California Regional Terrorism
Threat Analysis Center (NC-RTTAC)
Sacramento, CA-the Sacramento Regional Terrorism Threat
Analysis Center (Sacramento RTTAC)
Sacramento, CA-the State Terrorism Threat Analysis Center
(STTAC)
Based on the results of these assessments I am planning to deploy
intelligence officers during the first quarter of FY 2007 to Arizona,
Texas, New York, Virginia, Illinois, Florida, and California. These
states have expressed interest in our increased engagement and support.
I intend to continue using a fully transparent assessment process to
determine future site staffing and support needs. By the end of Fiscal
Year 2007 my goal is to have officers embedded in up to 18 fusion
centers.
It is my hope that DHS Intelligence can work with the states as
both customers and collaborators in analytic efforts of mutual concern.
Secure connectivity to the states is essential for this collaboration.
I plan on deploying a collateral secret communications system
everywhere I send an officer. Our collateral secret communications
system to the states-the Homeland Security Data Network (HSDN)-is the
analog of the Defense Department's Secret Internet Protocol Network. In
the first instance, only my officers will have access, but I plan to
expand access over time to state personnel. I intend, by the first
Quarter of Fiscal Year 2007, to have HSDN installed everywhere I have
an officer assigned to a fusion center.
In conclusion, I am moving aggressively to implement the plan that
Secretary Chertoff approved on June 7, 2006. We are changing, in
fundamental ways, our interactions with our non-federal partners-the
states and local jurisdictions. Creating and nurturing this information
sharing network of fusion centers is one of the most important
initiatives that we can take to protect this country from the scourge
of terrorist attack. Each time I meet with the men and women who have
established and who operate these centers, I am impressed by their
professionalism, their ability, their ideas, and their accomplishments.
Their enthusiasm is gratifying.Mr. Chairman, thank you again for giving
me the opportunity to speak with you and the members of the Committee.
I welcome your questions.
Mr. Simmons. Thank you, Mr. Allen.
One of the witnesses, who has submitted testimony that I
hope we will hear from a little later, said the following in
his testimony; ``I believe our fusion center is on the cusp of
being the ultimate authority on the threats posed within our
State by homegrown terrorists and other criminals, as well as
the center that can best inform us on the response and
mitigation of national disasters. That is how it should be. We
should know more about our State than anyone else.''
Do you concur in that statement?
Mr. Allen. I believe that they are going to help keep this
country extraordinarily safe in the future because I believe
the first responders, whether they be policemen or firemen or
emergency workers of every sort, they know their county, they
know their cities, they know their State. They also know
anomalies. And when they identify anomalies that could pose
threats, I think we should be there helping them understand and
report anomalies back to the Federal government.
One of the things that we want to help and work with people
like Ken Bouche, who represents Illinois State Police, is the
fact that there is a lot of suspicious activity reporting. We
need to learn how to read that, and we can only do that I think
by jointly bringing our resources together, our knowledge, and
also local knowledge of patterns and elements of behavior that
are not always readily understood.
When I talk to New York City, when I talk to Dave Cohen, it
is clear that they have knowledge that we don't have. When I
talk to Chief Bratton out in Los Angeles, it is clear--and to
his senior people, it is clear that they see anomalies that we
don't see. And it is important that we work this mutually
obviously with law enforcement at the Federal level, including
the FBI. I think we can get this done.
Mr. Simmons. Let me read the next sentence, then, in his
testimony.
``But Mr. Chairman, what I am less sure about is that the
national effort is making the best use of this homegrown
information.'' The national effort is making the best use of
this homegrown information. And I know this is not something
that is new to us, but it is once again the question of the
information presumably that is being shared up the system being
systematically incorporated into the national level
organization.
Mr. Allen. I am very sympathetic with that statement. I
think that we collectively--not just Homeland Security, but we
collectively, as a Federal Government, must take better
advantage of the information collected and sifted at the local
level. We see fusion centers, as they are now forming, putting
out advisories, sending us information at an official use
level. Some of that information contains unique data that are
helpful not only to us as we do intelligence assessment of
potential threats, but also obviously a value to the Federal
Bureau of Investigation. I believe that the writer of that is
correct, we must significantly improve that.
One of the things that we are doing is, of course, we are
trying to define, in working both with the National
Counterterrorism Center--Dr. Morris here in particular--trying
to get a better handle on how to employ and utilize suspicious
activity reporting. I think a lot of that information that
passes flowed upward, and the Federal Government has not made
the best use of it. I am very pleased that under Scott Redd and
under Ambassador McNamara, who is an old friend of mine, that
we are going to do more of this. And by putting my officers
there with the local officers, I think we are going to--I think
we are going to do a lot of good things. When we have had the
Mumbai bombings, which occurred about the 10th of July, having
an officer in Los Angeles was a great thing. He did wonders
that day to just talk to everybody at every level as to what
that might mean. Having officers out in New York and with Los
Angeles during the recent foiled airliner event was a good
thing because we had that personal interaction right up through
the most senior level, say, of Los Angeles city government.
Mr. Simmons. I think it is fair to remark that the system
of passing information up through the chain of command has
never been perfect in the past in the previous models that we
have used. My recollection is that prior to 9/11 certain FBI
officers were reporting strange behaviors, individuals trying
to learn how to fly airplanes but not to land or take off, and
that that was a strange and unusual--an anomaly if you will,
but nonetheless, the folks at the Washington level did not see
any harm in it at the time, or at least that is my
recollection.
Is there some mechanism whereby the national level folks
can judge the value or provide a feedback loop if something is
in fact useful or is there a mechanism for providing a feedback
loop that essentially says we are not sure why you think this
is significant? In other words, is this process virtual or is
it more like a traditional stovepipe?
Mr. Allen. It is changing, because I think it used to flow
up and was not necessarily acted upon. As we recall the
Moussaoui case, that was where he was learning to steer
airplanes but not take off and land, and it was an anomaly that
we didn't understand at the time. Today, when we have people
buying large quantities of cell phones, as you know, that can
also trigger a great deal of interest.
I find the alertness at the State level--and not every
State has fusion centers as yet, but right across the country
we see information flowing up that will make us a lot more
attentive to be able to interpret and provide guidance back. We
are doing it on a daily basis, we need to do more of it. As I
expand outward to these other States, these are States that are
really important like Texas and Virginia and others, New York,
Arizona, the State of Illinois, which is Ken Bouche's State,
Florida, I think we are going to see a lot better interaction,
because what we need to do is more or less get on secure chat
or official use chat and get back and forth, either as you say
virtually or on the telephone. And by having officers embedded,
we can facilitate that very well.
Mr. Simmons. I thank you. Within a State or a local fusion
center, how do you differentiate the roles between the fusion
center teams and let's say the FBI field office, the JTTFs, the
Joint Terrorism Task Forces, and the Field Intelligence Groups,
for the FIGS? I have received briefings on the different
organizations. I realize that some of our fusion centers are
FBI field station based, others are based on other models. And
I know that you have testified that one size doesn't fit all
and that we have to be very careful in standardizing at a
Federal level because of the differences between the States,
but as a practical matter, as we move forward, how do we
differentiate between some of these different entities? And is
a system or a method of making them more systematic, is that
called for?
Some have actually said to me, well, we don't need the
Department of Homeland Security to be involved in the fusion
centers, the FBI's field intelligence groups are pretty much
doing the job already. How would you respond to that kind of a
comment?
Mr. Allen. I will respond by saying that we will go where
State fusion centers welcome us and want our support and our
intelligence analytic capabilities as well as our ability to
harvest information, say, from DHS's operating components that
may be of value at the State level.
I believe that is an excellent question. I believe that
JTTFs have collocated about 25 percent of the fusion centers
across the country that now exist, and there are about 42
fusion centers, give or take a fusion center. About 75 percent
of the JTTFs are not collocated. They may be collocated with
State police, emergency operation centers, or they may be
collocated with Homeland Security advisers. So I believe that
within this broad landscape there is a great deal of
significant work we can do.
Our community is a bit broader in some respects because we
are looking at threats to the homeland at large, including
border security, CBRN. We are looking at the critical
infrastructures, things where we have unique insights that
other people do not have. Between infrastructure protection of
Bob Stephan and my own analyst, we can bring together all the
best brains of this country that work on infrastructure
protection and help assess threats to infrastructure at the
fusion center level.
There is an extraordinary vital role played by the JTTFs
and the FIGS for counterterrorism and for law enforcement, but
I believe there is a broader role that DHS intelligence
analysis can play. We are happy to do that where the States
welcome us.
Mr. Simmons. You mention the States welcome you. Of the 38
that have fusion centers, has any other State or entity said,
thanks, but no thanks, we are doing fine the way we are?
Mr. Allen. I don't know. In virtually every case, everyone
where we have done assessments, all those people have been very
welcome to us. There are a couple of places where they are
still studying and evaluating whether they wish to have DHS
embed officers, and that is fine, it is up to them.
Mr. Simmons. I recently returned back from a trip to
Toronto, where we were studying radicalization; it was a very
interesting phenomenon that we discovered up in Toronto
involving over a dozen--or allegations involving over a dozen
Muslim youths who were engaged in a plot to kill the Canadian
Prime Minister and blow up some key buildings. There was very
good cooperation and coordination up there between the Royal
Canadian Mounted Police and the Intelligence Service, and I am
told cooperation with our own folks down here in the
Continental United States. Has Canada, by any chance, employed
the same model or inquired about the model we are using, let's
say, in Vancouver, Quebec or Toronto, to create fusion centers
at their level, and if so, have we cooperated in that effort?
Mr. Allen. I have met with the Canadian Border Security
Agency head of intelligence, and we have an exchange coming up
shortly. I am on my way to Canada I believe on the 26th and
27th of this month--27th and 28th of this month to meet with
Canadian officials. We have also met with their senior
assessment people.
We have explained what we are doing here with our State
fusion centers. We certainly will provide them with any data
and any information that they think may be helpful. I have not
yet had a formal exchange on that. Most of our exchanges have
been and will be on border issues and on radicalization issues,
what is the phenomenon of radicalization. The Canadians are
looking at that quite hard, as well as other countries like the
Danes, as you probably could imagine, and the Dutch.
Mr. Simmons. Thank you. Is there any shortage of
appropriate personnel to implement your proposed plan? You
talked about sending people down to half a dozen facilities. I
assume that is a 2 to 3-year assignment. Do you have the
resources and the assets to accomplish that task and still do
your own business here in Washington, D.C.?
Mr. Allen. I think that is a very good question, sir. We
obviously have sufficient resources to get us through 2007. In
fiscal year 2008 through 2012 we will have to look at our
resource requirements, because this is going to take a good
number of our people that we are going to deploy, not just TDY,
but PCS, Permanent Change of Station, and pay for their way out
there to get settled with their families for a period of 2 or 3
years, with probably an option to stay even longer.
We also have an intelligence campaign plan dealing, as you
know, Mr. Chairman, dealing with the border. I am meeting with
Commissioner Basham to decide how to deploy some intelligence
officers to work border security issues, which will be another
drain on my staff.
Right now we are okay. We will take another look with the
Secretary and his Chief Financial Officer for fiscal year 2008
through 2012.
Mr. Simmons. As you look at this issue of the few fusion
centers and all of the challenges and difficulties that we are
dealing with, not the least of which is we are developing a new
model to deal with a new problem, what are the biggest hurdles
that you are facing? And in particular, how can this committee
or this Congress assist in overcoming those hurdles?
Mr. Allen. I think our biggest hurdles of course are where
we have got to be more responsive for the State fusion centers
and their needs. One, they need crypto equipment. We are
supplying a lot of that now, working with, obviously, the
grants in training as required to pay for such things, get them
cryptographic equipment and data processing capabilities. We
have to--one of our biggest challenges is to train not only my
own people that need training as all source analysts, but reach
out and offer courses to State and local governments. We are
doing that. We have had some States participate. New York,
Maryland I know has sent officers up to take training courses
on what is analysis, how to do writing, how to do briefing. I
believe the information technology challenges are hard to get
the communications right, get it flowing down.
It is also making sure that we are communicating clearly to
the fusion centers. There has been misunderstandings as to what
we can do to support them, to most of all look on them as
customers where we can support them, not go down and try to
dictate a particular way to manage or assess information.
I think we are defining a lot of these areas as we go. The
main thing, of course, is just getting this done rapidly.
Deploying people rapidly to the field is not a forte of the
Federal Government, and we need to improve on the speed with
which we get officers out to the places where they actually
really want us. New Jersey wants a full--they are moving to one
fusion center there in Trenton. They want us to have an officer
up there, and we are trying to get an officer up there as soon
as we can by the end of this year.
Mr. Simmons. I note for the record that OPM, which is
charged with doing clearances for the Defense Department, is so
backed up that they have had to suspend doing their 5-year
updates and some of the other clearances. So I would imagine
that if you are not hiring people who have prior clearances,
that would be another factor in slowing the process.
Mr. Allen. That is a good question, a good statement,
because one of the things we are hiring is we are hiring people
right out of universities, and they have no clearances. And
trying to get it through the OPM system is a very costly as
well as a very slow process. We find that other agencies which
have more accepted services, agencies like the Central
Intelligence Agency, they plucked off a University of Texas
officer the other day, and they also took one of our finest
briefers the other day. So trying to quickly compete and offer
the kind of career development that is needed in Homeland
Security intelligence is a challenge because we don't move as
fast as we could on clearances.
Commissioner--Assistant Secretary Myers, who heads ICE, the
other day was bemoaning it took 18 months to 24 months to get
people cleared, and she really believes we need to find ways to
expedite clearances.
In my view, clearing young people coming in off campus
campuses ought to be the easiest way to clear people. They
don't have a long track record. We ought to be able to clear
them a lot faster than we do.
Mr. Simmons. Well, I concur in that. And I just want to
again extend our apologies for the delays to getting you to the
witness table this afternoon. We have good days and bad days
sometimes, and today apparently was one of the worst, and of
course following the votes everybody headed for the airport. So
I very much appreciate all of the talent and ability and
experience that you are bringing to this job. I very much
appreciate the fact that you have dedicated yourself to solve a
problem that we have not had in the past in this country, which
is new and different and challenging. And thank you very much
for your service and for your testimony here today.
Mr. Allen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Simmons. The Chair will now call the second panel.
Our first witness on the second panel will be Colonel Ken
Bouche, who is Deputy Director of the Information and
Technology Command, Illinois State Police. Colonel Bouche also
serves as Chair of the U.S. Department of Justice Global
Justice Information Sharing Initiative, Global Advisory
Committee. He will be able to testify about national
initiatives, as well as the work that Illinois is doing to
integrate its State terrorism intelligence center with other
statewide and national efforts.
We also have with us today Ms. Amy Whitmore--and I will ask
all of the witnesses to come to the table--who is an Analyst
Supervisor assigned to the Virginia State Police's Virginia
Fusion Center and manages all analytical assets for the center.
She was one of three personnel initially assigned to create a
fusion center for Virginia and played an integral role in
establishing the VFC and its policies and procedures. She will
be able to testify about the creation and the operation of the
center, as well as help provide an analyst viewpoint on what
kind of information is most helpful and what kind of analytical
support is needed.
Rounding out the panel is Mr. Richard L. Canas, who is
Director of the New Jersey Office of Homeland Security and
Preparedness, which was created this last March. He has spent
34 years in law enforcement, intelligence, counterterrorism and
policy making, and served as director of the nonprofit
Concurrent Technologies Corporation, where his main focus was
on developing open source information and technology to support
the country's emergency response community.
You have all heard the remarks that have been made by the
previous witness, you have heard some of my questions on the
subject, so I think you have a good sense of how we function
here. And with the exception of the absence of all of my
colleagues, I welcome you here to this hearing and look forward
to hearing your testimony.
We have the written testimony in our briefing books
available to us, and so I would suggest that you not read it
into the record, that if you can highlight it over a period of
about 5 minutes each, that will probably work very well. And we
will run a little light system just as a reminder, if that is
agreeable.
Why don't we start with the colonel, Colonel Bouche.
STATEMENT OF COLONEL KENNETH BOUCHE
Mr. Bouche. Thank you, Chairman Simmons.
I sincerely appreciate the opportunity to be here today to
discuss State and local law enforcement issues in relation to
Homeland Security. I have provided the committee with a written
testimony and request that it be included in the record.
Mr. Simmons. Without objection.
Mr. Bouche. As you said, I am a Colonel with the Illinois
State Police, have been for 23 years. More importantly in my
role as the Chairman of Global and the past chairman of the
Criminal Intelligence Coordinating Council in the Global
Intelligence Working Group, I have been fortunate to actively
participate in ongoing discussions regarding intelligence
reform, and I have been privy to an intimate view of our
national technological strengths and deficiencies in the area
of intelligence sharing.
Over the past year, Global has worked closely with the
Office of the Program Manager and members of the Information
Sharing Council as they work to design and implement the
Information Sharing Environment. While we appreciate the
inclusions to date, the State and local officials must become
equal partners as we move forward in establishing the ISE and
as these efforts continue.
In regard to fusion centers, it was State and local
officials who initially recognized the importance of local
intelligence centers and brought about the collaboration and
the expertise necessary to develop fusion center guidelines. I
am proud of the fact that there is recognition at the Federal
level of the important role of State and major urban fusion
centers, and that they are to be incorporated into the ISE.
I don't want to--this is where I get off course a little
bit, and I don't want you to get me wrong, I am probably the
biggest proponent of fusion centers, and I am here to say that
establishing them in every State is not enough. The role of
fusion centers, and for that matter the role of State and
tribal authorities in our Nation's effort to combat terrorism
has not been clearly defined. It dismays me that 5 years after
September 11th more progress has not been achieved as it
relates to the sharing of information needed to prevent and
respond to attacks and possible threats against our community.
Our lack of success is largely because a strategy has not yet
been defined.
Of course as is understood that any strategy will include
the prevention of attacks, the deterrence of terrorism and the
capacity to both respond and recover if attacked, but still we
do not have a clear picture of how that will occur. Our
Federal, State and local soldiers on the war on terror do not
understand how they fit into the Nation's strategy. They have
not been given a road map to follow because a road map does not
exist.
We are operating in a fragmented environment, rarely
coordinated and often pitted against each other. There is over
800,000 law enforcement officers and over 19,000 police
agencies in this country ready to assist with domestic
security. Important intelligence information that may forewarn
of a future attack is collected by local and State government
officials during routine crime control activities and by
interacting with our citizens.
The critical importance of intelligence for front line
police officers cannot be overstated. They are a critical
component of our Nation's security capacity as both first
responders and first preventers. Consider this, over the past
couple of years many things have happened that have really
highlighted our capacity to be first preventers. In a narcotics
investigation they revealed that a Canadian based organization
supplying precursor chemicals to Mexican methamphetamine
producers was in fact a Hezbollah sport cell. A local police
detective in California investigating a gas station robbery
uncovered a homegrown jihadist cell planning a series of
attacks. A State police investigation into cigarette smuggling
uncovered hundreds of thousands of dollars in wire transfers to
persons living in the Kashmir region of Pakistan. These are
just a few examples of how cops on the street are interacting
with citizens and creating a more secure domestic environment.
The program manager has been working closely with DOJ, DHS
and the FBI to design a framework for information sharing. This
represents a critical step forward, and we urge that it be
implemented rapidly, and the coordination that led to this
development continue. But even with this framework, there is
still a need for an inclusive comprehensive national strategy
that will define our national goals, that will solve
impediments to information sharing, such as creating a common
approach to our technological infrastructure. The pipes that
supply information and the systems that our law enforcement
agencies have to rely on are redundant and often conflicting.
We need to develop appropriate rules and markings for
sensitive unclassified information, as a recent GAO report
showed that there is far too many markings for unclassified
material, making it very difficult to bring into fusion centers
and then further disseminate. Developing an information
classification system that works in our new domestic security
environment, because clearly our Cold War approach is not
working--you said it yourself, sir. We can't clear the people
who need to be cleared to get information.
Mr. Bouche. So even when our fusion centers get information
and our police chiefs get information, they can't pass it on to
those commanders and patrol officers and detectives that need
to use it because they don't have the ability, one, to
declassify it; it can't be done rapidly; terror lines simply
aren't working; and the system is designed to keep information
secret, not to put it forward.
I see I am out of time; and, in conclusion, in order for a
strategy to be successful, we have to create a culture of
information sharing, a culture that demands participation,
quickly corrects those who fail to appropriately share. In
order for our Nation to be successful, bridges must be built
among local, State and Federal intelligence and law enforcement
and homeland security agencies. These bridges must lead to a
greater understanding of each others' needs and
responsibilities and capabilities.
Homeland security partners at all levels must recognize
that terrorism is criminal activity. It is funded through
criminal activity, and it will best be prevented in an all-
crimes approach. In a domestic environment, police are your
best weapons.
Mr. Chairman, I thank you for giving me the opportunity to
speak today; and I hope my comments will be useful in your
future deliberations.
Mr. Simmons. Thank you very much for that testimony; and I
agree with virtually everything you said, so this is going to
be a lovefest.
[The statement of Mr. Bouche follows:]
Prepared Statement of Colonel Kenneth Bouche
Chairman Simmons, Ranking Member Lofgren, Members of the
Subcommittee, I sincerely appreciate the opportunity to appear before
you today to discuss local and state law enforcement's involvement with
nationwide implementation of fusion centers and related issues
impacting local, state, and tribal law enforcement.
I have served with the Illinois State Police for over 22 years in a
variety of roles ranging from a trooper and a supervisor to a commander
with patrol and investigative assignments. Presently, I serve as the
Deputy Director of the Information and Technology Command, with
responsibility for leading the technology, information, research,
criminal history, and strategic management functions of the Illinois
State Police. In this capacity and as the chair of the U.S. Department
of Justice's (DOJ) Global Justice Information Sharing Initiative
(Global), and past chair of both the Global Intelligence Working Group
and the National Criminal Intelligence Coordinating Council (CICC), I
have been fortunate to actively participate in the ongoing discussion
regarding intelligence reform and I have been privy to an intimate view
of our national technological strengths and deficiencies in the area of
justice information sharing.
Global, a Federal Advisory Committee to U. S. Attorney General
Alberto Gonzales, supported by the Bureau of Justice Assistance, Office
of Justice Programs, is recognized nationwide as a "group of groups"
whose membership represents the entire justice community. When
implementing the National Information Sharing Environment, of which
fusion centers are an integral part, it is crucial that the federal
government leverage the capabilities and systems that local, state, and
tribal law enforcement agencies have available to support our nation's
information sharing and antiterrorism efforts. Global and all of its
related associations have been working very patiently over the past
four years to support, encourage, and recommend positive change in the
information sharing environment, while trying to build partnerships
with the federal government.
Many substantive products, tools, and resources have been produced
by Global and its partners to improve information sharing across the
country. Examples of these products include:
The National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan (NCISP)-The NCISP
represents law enforcement's commitment to take it upon itself to
ensure that the dots are connected, be it in crime or terrorism. The
Plan supports collaboration and fosters an environment in which all
levels of law enforcement can work together to improve the safety of
the nation. The Plan is the outcome of an unprecedented effort by
local, state, tribal, and federal law enforcement officials at all
levels, with the strong support of the DOJ, to strengthen the nation's
security through better intelligence analysis and sharing.The Global
Justice XML Data Model (GJXDM) and the National Information Exchange
Model (NIEM)-The GJXDM is a data exchange standard which makes it
possible for courts to talk to law enforcement, to talk to probation/
parole, and to talk to victims' advocates, all without having to build
new systems and negotiate new business rules. NIEM will extend the
information sharing capability in GJXDM to other integral justice-
related partners like emergency management, immigration, and
intelligence. NIEM not only represents the best-and-brightest technical
solutions to information sharing challenges but also a solid
partnership between DOJ and the U.S. Department of Homeland Security
(DHS).
The Fusion Center Guidelines--The Guidelines were developed
collaboratively between DOJ and DHS. The document provides a
comprehensive set of guidelines to utilize when establishing and
operating a fusion center. The guidelines include integration of law
enforcement, public safety, and the private sector into fusion centers
and utilize the intelligence and fusion processes to develop and
exchange information and intelligence among all applicable entities.
Even with these considerable accomplishments, there are many
critical issues that still require resolution, especially if fusion
centers and the intelligence-led policing effort are to be successful.
Issues such as development of a common national policy for local,
state, and federal users of sensitive but unclassified (SBU)
information, security clearances and over classification of
information, identification of a primary federal agency responsible for
receipt and dissemination of terrorism-related information to and from
local and state fusion centers, and leveraging existing systems and
networks instead of creating new, duplicative capabilities.It truly
dismays me to think that five years after the September 11th attacks,
we are still not where we should be regarding the exchange of the
information needed to prevent and respond to attacks and possible
threats against our communities. We can no longer comfort ourselves
with the notion that these attacks will occur on some distant foreign
soil. They will undoubtedly occur here in the U.S. quite possibly in
Chicago, Peoria, Springfield, or any of our Nation's communities.
Fusion centers are a key component for ensuring the flow of threat-
and crime-related information among local, state, regional, and federal
partners. The principal role of the fusion center is to compile,
analyze, and disseminate criminal and terrorist information and
intelligence, as well as other information to support efforts to
anticipate, identify, prevent, and/or monitor criminal and terrorist
activity. Fusion centers provide a mechanism through which law
enforcement, public safety, and private sector partners can come
together with a common purpose and improve the ability to safeguard our
homeland and prevent criminal activity.
In order for local and state fusion centers to effectively identify
emerging threats and trends, it is important for the federal government
to identify and communicate the national threat status to local, state,
and tribal agencies. Local, state, and tribal agencies and fusion
centers desire clearly defined intelligence and information
requirements from the federal government that prioritize and guide
planning, collection, analysis, and dissemination efforts.
Currently, local, state, and tribal agencies and fusion centers
forward information concerning suspicious incidents to multiple federal
agencies with seemingly conflicting or duplicate missions. For example,
should terrorism-related information be sent to the Federal Bureau of
Investigation's (FBI) Joint Terrorism Task Force, the FBI's Field
Intelligence Group, the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) or the
U.S. Department of Homeland Security's Headquarters? The federal
government must, in close collaboration with local and state agencies,
support the development of a national strategy for local, state, and
tribal agencies and fusion centers to use when transmitting information
to the federal government. The plan should clearly describe the flow of
information-the "lanes in the road"-beginning at the local level,
routing through the regional and/or state fusion center, and ending at
the appropriate federal entity. Additionally, a single point of contact
at the federal level should be identified for routing information that
is received at the local and state level. Developing a plan to address
the bi-directional sharing of information will assist with minimizing
duplication and possible contradiction of information, while enabling
relevant entities to maintain situational awareness.
A significant problem that local, state, and tribal agencies face
is the lack of substantive information needed to prevent terrorism.
Much of the needed intelligence information is locked away from those
who need it in the field or on the scene because of outdated cold war
mentalities regarding classification of intelligence information.
Critical information must be unclassified and disseminated
appropriately if it is to be of any use in preventing domestic
terrorism. We must develop a common national policy for local, state,
and federal users of SBU information. The policy should clearly define
appropriate uses and dissemination protocols, while respecting
originator authority and facilitating the broadest possible
dissemination to those with a need to know, including our non-law
enforcement public safety partners such as fire departments and public
health officials. By sharing timely and appropriate intelligence
information with the first responders, law enforcement will be better
able to assess danger and respond more quickly, potentially saving and
protecting many lives. The federal government must work towards a goal
of declassifying information to the maximum extent possible.
The fact that some information needs to be classified is not
disputed, however, the current process regarding the issuance and use
of security clearances needs to be revised. The present system is
archaic and designed to keep information secret, and this system does
not work in the current information sharing environment.
Additionally, federal security clearances are not recognized
between agencies, and the process for local, state, and tribal
officials to receive a clearance is cumbersome and frequently takes
multiple months or years to complete.Having a trusted sharing
environment for communicating information and intelligence is a
priority issue. There are a number of national systems and networks
that local, state, and tribal law enforcement agencies utilize for
information sharing efforts, including the Regional Information Sharing
Systems (RISS), Law Enforcement Online (LEO), the Homeland Security
Information System (HSIN), and Nlets--The International Justice and
Public Safety Information Sharing Network. Currently, users must sign
on to multiple systems in order to access information. Rather than
develop new systems, it is recommended that the existing networks and
systems be modified and augmented based on continuing information
needs. The federal government should leverage existing information
sharing systems and expand intelligence sharing by executing
interoperability between operating systems at the local, state, tribal,
regional, and federal levels using a federated identification
methodology. Local, state, and tribal users should be able to access
all pertinent information from disparate systems with a single sign-on,
based on the user's classification level and need to know.
There are over 800,000 law enforcement officers and over 19,000
police agencies in this country to assist in domestic security.
Important intelligence/information that may forewarn of a future attack
is collected by local and state government personnel through crime
control and other routine activities and by people living and working
in our local communities. The critical importance of intelligence for
frontline police officers cannot be overstated. Very real examples of
the impact of law enforcement's important role in the intelligence
collection and sharing process have been experienced by police officers
across the country. Without the benefit of intelligence, local and
state law enforcement cannot be expected to be active partners in
protecting our communities from terrorism. In Oklahoma, a vigilant
state trooper was the one who stopped and arrested Timothy McVeigh
after the Oklahoma City bombing, for charges unrelated to the terrorist
act. In an incident in Maryland, the lack of shared intelligence
information prevented a state trooper from holding an individual who
two days later became one of the 19 hijackers on September 11, 2001.
In order to succeed, bridges must be built among local, state, and
federal intelligence agencies and homeland security information
consumers. Federal agencies must declassify information at the source
with a "need to know" standard for dissemination. Local and state
agencies that could contribute toward prevention strategies should be
empowered with the information they need to do their job. Homeland
security partners at all levels must recognize that terrorism is a
criminal activity, is funded through criminal activity, and will be
best prevented in an "all crimes" approach. This is not a federal war
against terror, nor is it a war in some foreign land. This is the
fundamental protection of our citizens from a domestic act of
terrorism. If we are to continue to do our best in the prevention of
these attacks, we must work as one united force.
It appears that we have the capacity to do the job, however; we
need clear policies and processes to assist with implementing our
national information sharing initiatives. I feel there should be
recognition of the value that local, state, and tribal officials can
bring to the table-not an assumption that this is a federal problem or
that the threat will be mitigated by the federal government. This
administration has a limited time to accomplish its goals and we have
much work to do. Local and state officials have serious issues to
resolve and want to be active, ongoing partners and participants with
the federal government in the process.Mr. Chairman, I thank you and
your colleagues for giving me the opportunity to speak to you today and
I hope my comments have been of some use to you in your deliberations.
Mr. Simmons. What we will do is we will hear from our two
other witnesses and then I will get into questions. So our next
witness will be Ms. Whitmore.
What you want to do is push the red button and speak fairly
closely to the microphone. Pull it over. Don't be shy.
STATEMENT OF AMY WHITMORE
Ms. Whitmore. Good afternoon. My name is Amy Whitmore. As
you stated, I am an analyst supervisor with the Virginia State
Police, and I am responsible for coordinating the activities of
analysts assigned to the Virginia Fusion Center. Thank you for
the opportunity to testify today in regard to the State and
local fusion centers and the role of DHS. I look forward to
answering any questions posed by you at the conclusion of this
testimony.
I have submitted written testimony and request that it be
included in the record.
Mr. Simmons. Without objection, it will be included.
Ms. Whitmore. The Virginia Fusion Center was established in
February, 2005, to fuse together key counterterrorism resources
from local, State and Federal agencies as well as private
industry to facilitate information collection and sharing in
order to better defend the Commonwealth of Virginia against
terrorist threats and attacks.
The Virginia Fusion Center is a cooperative effort between
the Virginia State Police and Virginia Department of Emergency
Management, with personnel from both agencies staffing the
center on a 24-hour basis. There are also currently
representatives from the Virginia National Guard and FBI, with
future plans to staff representatives from the Virginia
Department of Fire Programs and DHS.
In order to meet this mission, the Virginia Fusion Center
has developed new partnerships with private industry and
representatives of agencies having a mission-critical role in
homeland security, such as the health and transportation
sectors. At the same time, we have strengthened existing
relationships with law enforcement and military. These
partnerships provide the foundation for the Virginia Fusion
Center, but this foundation will weaken and eventually collapse
without the critical exchange of information to all appropriate
partners in a timely manner. This is the utmost and critical
need for the Virginia Fusion Center and involves several facets
that will be discussed.
Currently, the Virginia Fusion Center must monitor several
Federal and regional systems to gather and disseminate critical
homeland security information throughout the day. Often, this
limits the operational effectiveness of the Center by having
personnel duplicate efforts and view oftentimes redundant
information. Thus, it is imperative that one uniform Federal
system be adopted that allows all partners access based on
appropriate clearances and provides real time information that
is both classified and unclassified.
The current systems are lacking time-sensitive tactical
intelligence that is needed for management at all levels to
effectively direct resources where they might be needed to
address a potential threat. Also, a majority of State and local
agencies have a limited amount of personnel that possess a
Federal security clearance, making it difficult to forward
classified information. In our experience, information
intelligence is still being overclassified.
In addition to having one Federal system with timely
information, it would also be beneficial to have one Federal
conduit from which to report and receive information. It is
often difficult for State and local centers to determine which
Federal agencies should be notified and to whom to direct that
information within that agency. This would eliminate any
guesswork in forwarding information and would ultimately
benefit the information-sharing process as it would alleviate
duplicate efforts and redundancy of information reported by
multiple agencies.
The Virginia Fusion Center has also encountered problems
with the DHS policy to forward intelligence and information
only to the State's Homeland Security Advisor, who does not
have direct involvement with the Virginia Fusion Center and is
not responsible for information sharing with other agencies.
While the Homeland Security Advisor certainly should be
provided with such information, it is critical that the
Virginia Fusion Center as well as other of local and State
centers directly receive this information in a timely manner in
order to ensure that appropriate actions are taken to include
the timely dissemination of information.
Lastly, the Virginia Fusion Center's unique structure has
made it difficult to obtain security clearances that are
recognized by various Federal agencies for all personnel
assigned to the Center. Depending on the employing agency,
personnel obtain clearances through the FBI, DHS or DOD. Since
these clearances are obtained through several different
agencies, additional steps must be taken to ensure that each
clearance is recognized by the other Federal agencies.
DHS has also certified our secure conference room as an
open storage of classified information, not to exceed the
Secret level, but the Department of Justice does not recognize
the certification. These issues present major challenges, as
operational effectiveness can be compromised if all personnel
and facilities are not consistently cleared through the same
process.
While I have addressed the needs of the Virginia Fusion
Center to ensure its operational effectiveness as it relates to
Federal agencies, it should be noted that we have been working
with DHS to better the information-sharing process. The
Virginia Fusion Center has been involved in a pilot program
aimed at information sharing at the State and local levels.
However, the system is still one of many portals that require
monitoring.
DHS is also in the process of providing the Homeland Secure
Data Network for the Virginia Fusion Center, but this cannot
currently be accessed by Center personnel.
While these efforts are helpful and a step in the right
direction, they not do not remedy the problems addressed today.
It is crucial that State and local centers be provided with
real-time information that can be disseminated to their
partners. Only when all agencies with mission-critical roles in
homeland security receive timely information will we be able to
effectively disrupt and prevent terrorist attacks from
occurring in the U.S.
Thank you for the opportunity to provide input in this
incredibly important process.
Mr. Simmons. Thank you very much.
[The statement of Ms. Whitmore follows:]
Prepared Statement of Amy Whitmore
Good morning, my name is Amy Whitmore. I am an Analyst Supervisor
with the Virginia State Police and am responsible for coordinating the
activities of the analysts assigned to the Virginia Fusion Center.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify today regarding State and
Local Fusion Centers and the role of DHS. I look forward to answering
any questions posed by the Members of this Committee at the conclusion
of this testimony.
The Virginia Fusion Center was established in February 2005 to fuse
together key counter-terrorism resources from local, state, and federal
agencies as well as private industry in a secure, centralized location,
to facilitate information collection and sharing, in order to better
defend the Commonwealth of Virginia against terrorist threats and/or
attack. The Virginia Fusion Center is a cooperative effort between the
Virginia State Police and Virginia Department of Emergency Management,
with personnel from both agencies staffing the center on a 24 hour
basis. There are also currently representatives from the Virginia
National Guard and FBI, with future plans to staff full time
representatives from the Virginia Department of Fire Programs and DHS.
In order to meet this mission, the Virginia Fusion Center has
developed new partnerships with private industry and representatives of
local, state, and federal government agencies having a mission critical
role in homeland security, such as the health and transportation
sectors. At the same time, we have strengthened existing relationships
with law enforcement and military. These partnerships provide the
foundation for the Virginia Fusion Center, but this foundation will
weaken and eventually collapse without the critical exchange of
information and intelligence to all appropriate partners in a timely
manner. This is the utmost and critical need for the Virginia Fusion
Center and involves several facets that will be discussed.
Currently, the Virginia Fusion Center must monitor on a daily basis
several Federal and Regional Information Management Systems to gather
and disseminate critical homeland security information and
intelligence. These systems include the Homeland Security Information
Network (HSIN), Law Enforcement Online (LEO), Federal Protective
Services Secure Portal System, Joint Regional Information Exchange
System (JRIES), Regional Information Sharing System (RISS), as well
several other state and local systems. To ensure that all pertinent
information and intelligence has been obtained, all of these systems
must be monitored throughout the day, ultimately limiting the
operational effectiveness of the center by having personnel duplicate
efforts and view often times redundant information.
To effectively prevent and respond to terrorist related incidents
as well as help our partners meet their homeland security missions, it
is imperative that one uniform federal system be adopted that allows
all partners access based on appropriate clearances and provides real
time information that is both classified and unclassified. While the
majority of the aforementioned systems provide excellent finished
intelligence products, they are lacking time sensitive tactical
information and intelligence that is needed for management at all
levels to effectively direct resources where they might be needed to
address a potential threat.
In addition to having one federal system with timely information,
it would also be beneficial to have one federal conduit from which to
report and receive information, as it is often difficult for state and
local centers to determine which federal agency should be notified and
to whom to direct that information within that agency. Having one
federal point of contact would eliminate any guesswork in forwarding
information. This would ultimately benefit the information sharing
process, because it would alleviate duplicate efforts and redundancy of
information reporting by multiple agencies. It would also eliminate
unnecessary efforts by state and local agencies to share information
when it is not needed by a certain federal agency.
The Virginia Fusion Center has also encountered problems with the
DHS policy to forward intelligence and information only to the state's
Homeland Security Advisor, who does not have direct involvement with
the Virginia Fusion Center and is not responsible for information
sharing with other agencies. While the Homeland Security Advisor
certainly should be provided with such information, it is critical that
the Virginia Fusion Center and other local and state centers directly
receive this information in a timely manner in order to ensure that
appropriate actions are taken to include timely dissemination of
information to Virginia Fusion Center partners.
Lastly, the Virginia Fusion Center's unique structure has also made
it difficult to obtain security clearances that are recognized by
various federal agencies for all personnel assigned to the center.
Virginia State Police personnel receive clearances through the FBI.
Personnel with the Virginia Department of Emergency Management, who
have successfully undergone full Virginia State Police background
checks and can view Law Enforcement Sensitive material, are unable to
obtain clearances through the FBI and must obtain security clearances
through DHS instead. In addition, our National Guard representative
obtains their clearance through the Department of Defense. Since these
clearances are obtained through several different Federal Agencies,
there are additional steps that must be taken to ensure that each
clearance is recognized by the other federal agencies. The Department
of Homeland Security has also certified the VFC Secure Conference Room
as an open storage of classified information, not to exceed the Secret
level, but the Department of Justice does not recognize this
certification. These issues present major challenges to the operation
of the Virginia Fusion Center, as operational effectiveness can be
compromised if all personnel and facilities are not consistently
cleared through the same process. The majority of State and Local
agencies also have a limited amount of personnel that possess a federal
security clearance. This makes it difficult to forward classified
information and intelligence to our partners that do not possess these
clearances. Information and Intelligence is still being over
classified.
While I have addressed the needs of the Virginia Fusion Center to
ensure its operational effectiveness as it relates to DHS and federal
agencies, it should also be noted that the Virginia Fusion Center has
been working with DHS to better the information sharing process. The
Virginia Fusion Center has been involved in a pilot program aimed at
information sharing at the state and local levels; however, the pilot
program is one of many portals that require monitoring and it is not
anticipated that this portal will become the only system to monitor.
DHS is also in the process of providing the Homeland Secure Data
Network (HSDN) for the Virginia Fusion Center. However, as HSDN can
only be accessed by DHS and DOD personnel at this time, the benefit of
having such a system wherein Virginia Fusion Center personnel cannot
obtain access is limited. While these efforts are helpful and a step in
the right direction, they do not remedy the problems addressed today.
In order to prevent the next terrorist attack from happening on
U.S. soil, it is crucial that state and local agencies be provided with
real time information that can be disseminated to their partners. Only
when all agencies with mission critical roles in homeland security
receive timely information will the U.S. be able to effectively disrupt
and prevent terrorist attacks in the U.S.
Thank you for this opportunity to provide input into this
incredibly important process.
Mr. Simmons. Now we will hear from Richard Canas.
STATEMENT OF RICHARD L. CANAS
Mr. Canas. Thank you very much, Chairman Simmons; and thank
you for pronouncing my name correctly.
I have some short remarks, and I also request that my
longer testimony be included in the record.
Mr. Simmons. Without objection.
Mr. Canas. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
It is my pleasure to appear before you this afternoon to
discuss New Jersey's new State fusion center and some of the
roles that we would suggest that the Department of Homeland
Security play in relation to this new center.
Among other things, my office is responsible for
intelligence and information sharing in my State. Clearly, the
relationship of State fusion centers and the ways in which DHS
can help foster and support them is paramount to our
effectiveness.
The New Jersey Regional Operations and Intelligence Center,
or ROIC, as we affectionately call it at home, is a
collaboration that incorporates the three different phases of
information fusion: law enforcement intelligence, public safety
and private sector information. It is managed by the New Jersey
State Police, which also happens to manage the State's Office
of Emergency Management.
A new building housing the ROIC is just being completed at
a cost of approximately $28Sec. llion, which has been totally
State funded.
Mr. Chairman, as you have already mentioned, I believe our
fusion center is on the cusp of being the ultimate authority on
the threats posed within our State by home-grown terrorists and
other criminals. It will also serve as the center that can best
inform us on the response to and mitigation of emergencies from
all hazards. And that is how it should be. We should know more
about New Jersey than anyone else.
But, Mr. Chairman, what I am less sure about is that the
national effort is making the best use of this home-grown
information.
DHS has visited the ROIC and offered to place a full-time
representative there in the near future. In anticipation, my
office has already detailed a full-time analyst to DHS's
intelligence office; and the State Police has detailed a
trooper to DHS's National Operations Center. We have invested
in this cross-pollination because we believe that it is
important that we understand each other's missions as we move
forward in this information-sharing effort.
Currently, DHS and other Federal entities such as the three
FBI Joint Terrorism Task Forces that affect New Jersey and
other locally based Federal agencies provide my office and the
ROIC with almost daily general information on external threats
with only occasionally some specificity about New Jersey. There
is some duplication, but, frankly, given the intelligence
drought before 9/11, we are not complaining.
The communications links among us are excellent, and I
could not think of how to better improve the inclusiveness
Federal agencies have demonstrated in recent years. But there
is a missing piece, something which is critical and something
that only the Federal Government can provide. That is a
national fusion center of local information.
Mr. Chairman, New Jersey synthesizes and analyzes its
internal threat information through the ROIC by drawing from
our myriad of municipalities and local all-crimes reporting. We
need that local assessment to manage our homeland security
program. But that is all we can do. We do not have the time or
resources to regionalize this effort with neighboring States or
to blend our efforts with national trends or patterns.
In many ways, New Jersey is a microcosm of the entire
country, where homeland security effectiveness is viewed in
terms of the lowest common denominator. We have 479 police
departments, and as small as some are each needs to be
recognized as a security expert within its area of
responsibility.
We need an effort that pursues the entire Nation's
intelligence for its local value, but we have yet to receive
assurances that Washington is interested in systemizing the use
of this local data. If that is the reason DHS plans to place
representatives in our fusion centers, no one would welcome
them more than New Jersey.
Home-grown terrorists will not always show up on Federal
intelligence radar; and we must assume that these home-grown
terrorists are plotting in neighborhoods, prisons and meeting
halls across the country as we speak.
As New Jersey's ROIC shortly becomes one of about 40 fusion
centers on line across the Nation, we still have many questions
to answer regarding how all the information we will be
generating will be fused nationally by whom and to what ends.
In my view, this is still a national work in progress. I am
excited by the prospects, but we still have much more to do on
the State and national level to bring the promise of fusion
centers and a national intelligence gathering system to
fruition, a fruition that will better protect us from terrorist
attacks such as the one we experienced on 9/11.
I thank you for your attention, and I would be happy to
take any questions.
[The statement of Mr. Canas follows:]
Prepared Statement of Richard L. Canas
Thank you very much Chairman Simmons, Ranking Member Lofgren and
members of the Subcommittee on Intelligence, Information Sharing, and
Terrorism Risk Assessment.
My name is Richard Canas, and I'm the Director of New Jersey's
Office of Homeland Security and Preparedness. It's my pleasure to
appear before you this afternoon to discuss New Jersey's new state
fusion center and some of the roles that we would suggest that the
Department of Homeland Security play in relation to this new center.
To put things in context, however, I first want to outline the
responsibilities of my office and discuss some of our key initiatives.
My office is just about six months old. In March, New Jersey
Governor Jon Corzine signed Executive Order #5, creating the New Jersey
Office of Homeland Security and Preparedness as a cabinet-level agency.
Previously, the responsibilities of my office were spread among a
number of agencies and a statutory task force. In that configuration,
New Jersey made considerable progress in safeguarding its citizens
against potential terrorist attacks, but there was no single person or
agency responsible to coordinate all counter-terrorism and preparedness
activities.
Executive Order #5 resolves that issue of authority. The Executive
Order indicates that my office is responsible "to administer,
coordinate, lead and supervise New Jersey's counter-terrorism and
preparedness efforts."
We are charged with coordinating "emergency response efforts across
all levels of government, law enforcement, emergency management,
nonprofit organizations, other jurisdictions and the private sector, to
protect the people of New Jersey."
The Executive Order also requires that we function as the
Governor's clearinghouse for all legislation--state and federal--
related to counter-terrorism and preparedness issues. As a result, as
you can imagine, we regularly track the work of the House Homeland
Security Committee, and its subcommittees.
In brief, my job is to bring all of New Jersey's homeland security
efforts, at all levels, into a coordinated and unified whole. While
doing this I am focusing on three watchwords: Inclusiveness,
Regionalization and Transparency.
"Inclusiveness" means that all relevant agencies--state, federal,
local and private sector--must have a seat at the table. As I will
discuss, our fusion center, New Jersey's Regional Operations
Intelligence Center, commonly called the ROIC (and pronounced "rock"),
clearly will embody this principle.
"Regionalization" refers to concerns that overlap between and among
municipalities and counties--even between New Jersey and our
neighboring states. The ROIC, which already has "regional" in its name,
will embody this principle as well. We aim to reflect the concerns of
our 566 municipalities, 479 police departments, 21 counties and
countless other first responder and other agencies that populate our
disparate state.
My third watchword, "transparency" means--simply enough--that the
people of New Jersey and you, our federal partners, must be able to
understand what my office does. Our actions must be totally open,
explainable to the average person and understood by everyone. Again,
the ROIC will help us meet this objective with true two-way
communication to and from our various partners and constituencies.
To sum up, with these watchwords, my office will serve as a place
for single-stop shopping for counterterrorism information, intelligence
and analysis. We also serve as the state's coordinating agency for
emergency management functions. These roles carry a very diverse
portfolio.
We have divided our office into two major branches: a Division of
Operations and a Division of Preparedness. We work closely with the
State Office of Emergency Management--which in our state falls under
the New Jersey State Police. New Jersey is one of only two states
nationwide in which the emergency management function is contained
within a statewide law enforcement agency; the other is Michigan.
In this regard, the role of my office is--in short--to make sure
the New Jersey Office of Emergency Management does its job properly,
and has the appropriate resources it needs.
Since I took office we have been involved in a number of key
issues. To name just a few, these include planning for hurricane
preparedness, pandemic flu preparedness, fostering communications
interoperability and plans for continuity of operations and continuity
of government. We are also the central point--or State Administrative
Agency--for New Jersey's federal homeland security grant programs.
In this role, my office is distributing more than $52 million in
2006 federal homeland security grants throughout New Jersey. This year,
the federal government gave us good news and bad news: in effect, we
are receiving a larger share of a smaller pie.
Funds for our Urban Area Security Initiative, or--UASI region--
covering Jersey City, Newark and the counties of Bergen, Essex, Hudson,
Morris, Passaic and Union, is up approximately 77 percent from the year
before, to $34.4 million dollars. Ours was the fifth highest UASI grant
in the nation.
On the other hand, New Jersey is only receiving $17.7 million in
homeland security grant funds to be distributed statewide. This is a
decrease of more than 52 percent from the year before.
New Jersey's homeland security needs will always exceed the
availability of funds. But it is very disappointing that the entire pot
of federal funding to the states shrank by almost 30 percent this year.
I certainly plan to work with you to reverse this federal trend.
As we approach the fifth anniversary of 9/11, I do not understand
why some think we are safer now than just five years ago. I believe
that we are better prepared--and federal funding has certainly helped
us in that regard. But I also believe that the threats against us--
though they may be more diffuse--have increased. We have been
successful also because we are more vigilant, not because the enemy has
stopped planning against us.
To hone in on today's hearing, my office is also responsible for
intelligence and information sharing in my state. Clearly, the
relationship of state fusion centers and the ways in which DHS can help
foster and support them is paramount to our effectiveness.
As I mentioned earlier, the New Jersey Regional Operations and
Intelligence Center (ROIC) is a collaboration that incorporates the
three different phases of information fusion--law enforcement
intelligence, public safety, and private sector information.
It is managed by the New Jersey State Police, which as I mentioned,
also houses the State's Office of Emergency Management. The ROIC has
been operating in its current form since the beginning of this year,
though in cramped quarters which constrain its effectiveness.
A building housing a new Regional Operations Intelligence Center is
just being completed. It encompasses 55,000 square feet of space and we
are already adding another 11,000 square feet, which is currently under
construction. It is being built at a cost of approximately $28 million,
which has been totally state-funded. We believe the ROIC, which we
expect will open its doors next month, will be one of most cutting-edge
fusion centers in the country. Once it is open, I invite any member of
this committee to take a tour and to see its capabilities first-hand.
In developing the ROIC, New Jersey built on guidelines developed by
the U.S. Justice Department and the Department of Homeland Security for
establishing and operating fusion centers. In that regard, the ROIC
follows the recommended focus on the intelligence process, where
information is collected, integrated, evaluated, analyzed and
disseminated.
Because of its broad function, the center draws from a diverse
population and includes representatives from federal, state, local, and
private agencies who reflect the entirety of New Jersey's law
enforcement, intelligence and emergency response community.
In the area of homeland security, the fusion process supports the
implementation of risk-based, information-driven prevention, response,
and consequence management programs.
It also embraces the principles of intelligence-led policing,
community policing, and collaboration.
The ROIC centralizes information on emergencies, crimes, and
suspicious activities in support of a robust analysis process that
develops trends and patterns and other aids that ultimately increases
the ability to detect, prevent, and solve crimes while safeguarding our
state.
Mr. Chairman, and members of the subcommittee, I believe our fusion
center is on the cusp of being the ultimate authority on the threats
posed within our state by home-grown terrorists and other criminals, as
well as the center that can best inform us on the response and
mitigation of natural disasters. That is how it should be: we should
know more about New Jersey than anyone else.
But Mr. Chairman, what I am less sure about is that the national
effort is making the best use of this home-grown information.
DHS has visited the ROIC and offered to place a full-time
representative there in the near future. In anticipation, my office has
detailed a full-time analyst to DHS' Intelligence Office. The State
Police also has detailed a trooper to DHS' National Operations Center.
We have invested in this cross-pollination because we believe that it
is important that we understand each other's missions as we move
forward in this information-sharing effort. But we have yet to receive
assurances that Washington is interested in systemizing the use of
local data.
Let me try to describe what I mean. Early in my career as a young
federal agent, I assumed that all of my investigative reports, which
were carefully marked for headquarters distribution, were routinely
read and that they somehow factored into a sophisticated and systematic
analysis that lead to macro decisions on strategy and support.
It was not until years later when I was a federal administrator
charged with producing strategic intelligence for the country on the
threat of drugs and gangs that I saw that the volume of local data and
the fusion of that data with all other sources was an expensive and
resource-intensive proposition. And, in a local, operational-support-
starved environment, it did not add much value if it was not timely and
specific.
Conclusions such as these probably helped to foster the birth of
the state fusion center concept, which does not rely on federal
support.
Currently DHS and other federal entities such as the three FBI
Joint Terrorism Task Forces that affect New Jersey (Newark,
Philadelphia and New York City), and the High Intensity Drug
Trafficking Area program in Newark, and the other locally based federal
agencies provide my office and the ROIC with almost daily general
information on external threats with only occasionally some specificity
to New Jersey.
The communications links among us are excellent, and I could not
think of how to better improve the inclusiveness federal agencies have
demonstrated since 9/11.
But there is a missing piece; something which is critical and
something that only the federal government can do.
Mr. Chairman, New Jersey will synthesize its internal threat
information through the ROIC as I mentioned before, by drawing from the
myriad of municipalities and their local reporting. We are doing that
now and we will continue to produce an annual intelligence estimate for
our state. It is a time-consuming process, but we can do no less. We
need that assessment to manage our homeland security program.
But that is all we can do.
We do not have the time or resources to regionalize this effort or
to blend our efforts with national trends and patterns. Nor do I see an
effort by anyone at the federal level to standardize state efforts by
building a national fusion center, a center that takes my information
and looks for links with other similar events across the country. A
center that builds a national data bank from local information, from
the ground up as we are doing locally. If there is such an effort, the
intelligence and emergency response communities of New Jersey are not
routinely being informed about it.
If there are home-grown terrorists plotting in another state to
harm us in New Jersey, we would like the opportunity to defend
ourselves. In many ways, New Jersey is a microcosm of the entire
country. We do not have the ability, enjoyed by the New York or the Los
Angeles Police Departments, to place people in other fusion centers or
in countries that they perceive may present threats to their city or
region.
We need a national effort that views homeland security in terms of
the lowest common denominator. As I noted, we have 479 police
departments in New Jersey. As small as some are, each is the security
expert within its area of responsibility.
We need an effort that views all intelligence, like emergencies and
politics, for their local value.
As I say, we are getting the international and intelligence
community information from DHS and the FBI like never before, but we
are not getting routine intelligence from the other fusion centers.
We will continue to harness all-source information for the state of
New Jersey as other states are doing. If the federal government were to
tap into that resource and sift through that data and share relevant
information, we could protect ourselves better.
I think that we are generally on the right road to creating a
national information-sharing system that has potential to better
protect all states and the nation. However, we need DHS to step up and
provide a clearer road map, or a template, if you will, so that
intelligence and information from states such as ours can be easily
synthesized with information and intelligence from other states, as
well as from the national perspective.
If that is the reason DHS plans to place representatives into our
fusion centers, no one would welcome them more than New Jersey.
Right now, there is a considerably robust flow of information from
the federal government, much of it of a sensitive nature that was never
previously shared with state and local entities. But it is not
information that we can easily "operationalize." It is information that
is good to know, but it is not good information on which we can
routinely act.
As New Jersey's ROIC shortly becomes one of about 40 fusion centers
on line across the nation, we still have many questions to answer
regarding how all the information we will be generating will be
"fused." By whom and to what ends.
In my view, to sum up, this is still a national work-in-progress. I
am excited by the prospects, but we still have much more to do on the
state and national level to bring the promise of fusion centers and a
national intelligence-gathering system to fruition, a fruition that
will prevent events from 9/11 from ever happening again. Nonetheless, I
have great hopes that we will make great progress in the short months
and years to come.
I thank you for your attention. I will be happy to take your
questions.
Mr. Simmons. Thank you all very much.
Colonel Bouche, you mentioned the problem of sensitive but
unclassified information, SBU. In your day-to-day operation, to
what extent are people hindered by the fact that sensitive but
unclassified information is simply not being shared?
Mr. Bouche. I think that the problem is twofold. One is,
because there is not a clear definition of how it is being
handled, information is probably getting to people who
shouldn't see it; and, at the same time, information is not
appropriately being shared because people don't know how to
handle it.
One of the main issues in Illinois that we have with
sensitive but unclassified information is, in essence, our
classification system. And I would always argue with any of my
Federal partners that the fact that a narcotics officer or an
undercover officer working organized crime, a law enforcement
sensitive document is the highest level a Top Secret
classification could ever give, but yet his life, his methods
all depend on the fact that that be kept secret, that it be
kept from being shared. So where the confusion comes in is no
one really has a clear understanding of what ``for official use
only'' means. No one really understands what ``law enforcement
sensitive'' means.
I found it very interesting 2Sec. ars ago when we first
raised this question at Global that the Department of Justice
produced a policy on law enforcement sensitive that was written
when the agenda for Global came out that they were going to
discuss law enforcement sensitive and there wasn't a policy on
it and there hasn't been a policy on it. So what needs to
happen is we need to come forward with clear, very easy to
understand recommendations.
What we are getting back from many Federal agencies is,
well, that is just not possible. You know, the GAO originally
said there were 50 some and then they went up to 70 some and
now it is 100 and some different markings. And I understand
that they are a many of them are vested in laws, many of them
are vested in policies and procedures of agencies, but the most
important mechanism that we need to create is that when
agencies at the Federal level exchange with agencies at the
local level we follow a clear, consistent path.
It doesn't matter how agencies at the Federal level
exchange with themselves, it really doesn't matter how agencies
within Illinois exchange with themselves, as long as there is a
clear understanding of what the markings mean. But when we get
to this global environment or at least national environment
there has to be a very clear understanding. It has to be
simple. And we are kind of shocked because we don't see it as
being that difficult.
Mr. Simmons. Continuing this line of questioning, I agree
with you. When we first had hearings on SBU, it seems that the
categories grew exponentially. I suggested to the witnesses
perhaps we should get rid of all of them and then see who
screams the loudest and add a few back. I don't think we have
heard much from the executive branch on that recommendation.
But the fact of the matter is, as you have described, you
may have a situation locally in Illinois where a narcotics
officer is tracking the drug trade, which may be a part of the
finances of a terrorist group, does not want his or her source
to be jeopardized, and yet information that is being learned as
part of that investigation may apply to some other activity
across a neighboring border. So how the heck do you preserve
and protect your source who is reporting to you and at the same
time allow that information to be useful?
Now, again, law enforcement sensitive is not a
classification. We basically have three classifications--
Confidential, Secret and Top Secret--and then a whole bunch of
compartments. That is basically what the classification system
says.
But what you have described also is something I think that
you said could be local. It could be a local control. Your
local folks could be saying, hey, we have this hot tip, but you
know we can't tell anybody right now because the source is in
jeopardy. Has that been encountered by either of the other two
witnesses in New Jersey or in Virginia, the issue of sensitive
but unclassified?
Mr. Canas. In New Jersey, Mr. Chairman, what we experience
is that, of course, the most classified information we have are
informants, under a national classification would be probably
Secret or Top Secret. But under the classification guidelines
of the executive order, federally, it really poses no threat to
the United States of America if that informant is revealed, but
it does locally create a tremendous disturbance within our
local system.
So, yes, we do need a separate classification for what I
would call limited official use, which is really unclassified
under the national system, but under the State and local system
it is probably something of value.
I don't know if the Colonel wants to add to that.
Mr. Bouche. If I could, there is a recommendation from
Global to come forward with three markings for sensitive but
unclassified information, and one would be law enforcement
sensitive, one would be homeland security sensitive and the
third would be for official use only.
There would be three sub-markings for all categories. The
first and most restrictive would be restricted. So if it was
law enforcement restricted the originating agency would be able
to identify who could see the information generally by name of
officer or individual or by name of agency. If it was need to
if it was law enforcement sensitive need to know, it would be
described by a policy of what agencies and those type of
environments that it could be released to. And if it was law
enforcement sensitive it just wouldn't be released outside of
law enforcement. It could be used in places like Roll Call, but
it would still be handled sensitively. Those same three
subcategories would apply to the other two as well.
We applied that simple model across the board with many
Federal partners and tried to identify where the holes in it
were; and, quite honestly, we couldn't find any. It seemed to
really give us the opportunity and obviously would need a
better structure around it than I simply defined to you, but
there is a simple model that would really put forward some
security on information coming from the State or coming from
the Federal Government to the States.
Mr. Simmons. And that three-part system, is that currently
under consideration, in your view?
Mr. Bouche. No. It was submitted to the sensitive but
unclassified committee that was formed from what I understand
at the Federal level. From what I understand, that committee
has been disbanded, and a new committee has been formed. I had
the opportunity to speak with Ambassador McNamara about it this
morning, and he has invited me to have a representative at the
new committee to make sure it gets presented.
Mr. Simmons. Make sure you get that one back in there. He
was the witness who I suggested that we just get rid of the
whole damn thing and start over. I think he was shocked by the
thought.
We have heard earlier from Charlie Owen that there is a
sense at the Federal level that fusion centers, which are
different and are different for different reasons, should be
respected for those differences, that they have grown up in
different parts of the country with slightly different flavors
and complexions but that that may reflect in fact that region,
which is a good thing.
At the same time, Ms. Whitmore, you said it is imperative
that one uniform Federal system be adopted that allows all
partners access based on appropriate clearances and provides
real-time information. I gather what you are calling for here
is a uniform Federal system, not uniformity in fusion centers.
Is that correct?
Ms. Whitmore. That is correct.
Mr. Simmons. And how do you see the failure of that
uniformity to effect your mission?
Ms. Whitmore. Well, like I said in my statement, right now,
we are currently monitoring probably seven or eight different
systems on a daily basis throughout the day and those systems
may have the same information on each of them but you have to
check each one to make sure that you are not missing that one
piece of information. If we have one Federal system that we can
monitor for those types of information, then we are not
spending hours checking the same information.
Mr. Simmons. And you went on to say that one of the
frustrating aspects that you have encountered is the issue of
security clearances, which you have talked about a little bit,
that Virginia State Police get their clearance from the FBI, so
presumably the FBI makes the request, whereas the National
Guard folks get it through DOD, and the law enforcement other
groups get it through DHS. Which other groups get it through
DHS?
Ms. Whitmore. Virginia Department of Emergency Management
and the Virginia Department of Fire Programs.
One thing with that is that both of those agencies they
still undergo full Virginia State Police background checks so
they are cleared for law enforcement information. They are
considered part of the Virginia Fusion Center, and they can
access the same information. So that, technically, they have
undergone Virginia State Police background checks, but they are
employed by a non-law enforcement agency. So, therefore, the
FBI won't conduct a clearance investigation for them. We have
been told it can only be done by DHS, so we have to go through
different agencies.
Mr. Simmons. Is that the same situation that you have
encountered in New Jersey and Illinois?
Mr. Canas. In New Jersey, Mr. Chairman, the Department of
Homeland Security does clearances for my office, all of my
officers. If I do want to send one to the JTTF, for example,
and a Top Secret is required, then the FBI does that clearance
for us. The Governor's clearance, all of those are handled and
the Attorney General's clearances are handled by the FBI, but
DHS does the ones for my office and my staff and all the
analysts we have in the ROIC.
Mr. Simmons. Illinois?
Mr. Bouche. It is basically the same issue, sir.
Mr. Simmons. Should that system be corrected or changed?
Mr. Bouche. The biggest problem that comes in is, one, the
nonrecognition of the different clearances from different
agencies, even though law requires them to be recognized. But
that actually is a small problem compared to the problem of our
inability to actually clear the people that need information.
When we started talking about should the classification system
be changed, if we could clear everyone that needed to be
cleared, the system still wouldn't be perfect, but it would
work better. It still is in need of reform.
For example, all of our agencies, when we go through
background investigations--and I did a comparison and actually
did a comparison with the New Jersey Attorney General's Office
of the backgrounds for Global that we conduct on our officers,
that they conduct on their officers, that the New York State
Police conduct on their officers; and with the exception of
following up on immigrant backgrounds, there was nothing that
happens in our--that doesn't happen in our investigations that
wouldn't happen in a Top Secret clearance investigation.
So it is time to reconsider who has the authority to clear
people and who has the authority to issue clearances. There
should be a central clearinghouse. If the Federal Government
can issue the authority to a contractor to do background
investigations, why couldn't they issue the authority to a
State Police agency to clear their own people? That would go a
long way in giving us the capacity to at least get the right
people cleared so we could--because I believe the battle to
reform our culture around Secret/Top Secret information is
years in the making. This would be a stop fix that would help
us get further.
Mr. Canas. I would like to add to that, Mr. Chairman, and
echo the Colonel's words; and I use myself as an example.
Coming on board, my Secret/Top Secret clearance had expired
when I took the job of what we call a four-way, which is a very
extensive background investigation done by the State Police,
lasted 2 months, extremely extensive, did everything except
checking on trips I had taken overseas recently. None of that
was included when I went for my Top Secret clearance with DHS.
None of that was accepted by the contractor, had to do all that
paperwork all over again, work that had already been done by a
qualified State officer. It would seem awfully redundant, and I
still don't have the clearance from the DHS on that. We have an
interim Secret, so it just seems like an awful lot of
duplication is taking place there that is unnecessary.
Mr. Simmons. I appreciate that I served with the Central
Intelligence Agency for 10 years. Having been a military
intelligence officer, as a CIA officer I cleared at a fairly
high level. When I resigned and went to work on Capitol Hill, I
had to be recleared by the Senate for Senate staff work, even
though I had been cleared by the Army and cleared by the CIA.
And I guess the only time I have ever encountered that I
have had no problem with my clearance is when I was elected to
Congress.
I am not suggesting that that is a good way to go. But, you
know, what you have described is the insanity of what I call
the secrecy system that we have, which is why I happen to be an
advocate for open-source intelligence, which is intelligence
that is produced from openly available sources of information
that theoretically just about anybody can access. And when you
understand that almost 80Sec. rcent of the average requirements
that are out there can be answered in one way or another with
open-source information, which can be shared, it is the path of
the future, in my view.
I think it was you, Colonel Bouche, who referred to the
800,000 law enforcement officers and 19,000 police agencies in
the country who haven't even talked about tribal entities,
which in my State they have substantial police activities.
You know this is a huge resource. It is absolutely critical
to homeland security. But if we can't share the requirements
and we can't share the tip-offs, how can they share the clues?
So it is wiring these resources in a manner in which they
can share back and forth that is so critically important and
that appears to be the challenge. So often we look at it as a
technical thing, that if we have a computer or a piece of
software we can do it. But in actual fact what seems to be
gumming up the works the most is the controls.
Any thoughts on that?
Mr. Canas. Well, I, for one, I spent most of my adult life
in the Federal system; and I also was with the CIA and NSC and
had to go through clearances and redundancy. But I am a big
advocate of open source, but, as I mentioned to Mr. Allen
before we testified, that, frankly, having these clearances,
the information we receive isn't as important as the fact that
we have access to it. That in and of itself has its own life.
But the information itself is not critical.
But knowing the so-called unknown--this is all post 9/11.
You know, prior to 9/11, the idea of a State and local officer
being shoulder to shoulder with the FBI working in a SCIF was
unheard of. So we don't want to criticize too much. And having
State and locals cleared and more of them that we have cleared
it is going to bog down the system somewhat.
But, frankly, it is much better that we have access to
information, not because it is of great value to us in our day-
to-day work. Frankly, what we do internally is probably a heck
of a lot more valuable. But it is the idea of what we don't
know, and having access to what is out there is extremely
valuable to not only the camaraderie you haven't heard too many
complaints lately of a lack of sharing of information. That has
improved a thousand percent since 9/11.
Mr. Simmons. I appreciate that comment. I know it has been
said on the record that what we are trying to do here in some
respects is a work in progress, and I agree with that. But it
is a work in progress, and I think progress has been made.
I have worked at the Federal, State and local level; and
certainly before 9/11 the way an investigation would unfold was
pretty apparent. The local police would show up. They would lay
out the yellow tape. Word would get out. The State troopers
would show up in about 2 hours. They would take over. And then
if it was really exciting, in comes the FBI: Okay, you bozos,
get the hell out of here. It was very apparent.
That model is no longer with us, and I think that is
probably a good thing. It wasn't a great model to begin with,
but I think, under the current environment, it is good that it
is gone and hopefully forever.
I have a question for all of you, and it may not be a fair
question. So if it is not fair, just let me know.
Which Federal agency should be the primary Federal agency
responsible for the receipt and dissemination of terrorism-
related information to and from State and local fusion centers?
I mean, there has been this discussion about the FBI. There has
been discussion about homeland security. I suppose, you know,
we can throw a couple of other agencies in there while we are
at it. Which one should be the lead or the top dog, or in fact
do we have what we might call a dog team? From the perspective
of each of the three of you.
Mr. Bouche. In Illinois, we are starting a new process that
I think will help define how that occurs. In fact, in our
fusion center, we have always worked what we call our desks,
and our desks were narcotics and violent crimes and terrorism,
and we had people who specialized in those. We are now going to
expand on that process, and we are looking to create the
environment where different agencies have a leadership role in
different desks.
So the FBI, for example, would clearly be defined as having
the leadership role in anti-terrorism investigations. State
officers, homeland security officers, anyone who is willing to
play would work under that supervisor; and, in that case, that
information would probably come through and go through the FBI.
At the same time, we also see a huge need for
infrastructure protection and other types of information that
clearly should come from DHS; and there will be another desk
for that, including both of our public agencies that need to be
involved in infrastructure protection as well as our private
agencies.
So I think where you started to wrap up with is that it is
a team. And where the conflict comes in is that the roles for
the team overlap; and they overlap through congressional
action, through laws. They overlap through administration's
executive orders, and they overlap from the agencies themselves
defining their mission so broadly that they overlap.
What I really think would benefit all of us is not to
create a single pipe. That will never work. There are too many
agencies that have specific missions that need to interact with
at the State and local level. What needs to happen is those
pipes need to be defined.
The Ambassador said, the lane is in the road; and that is a
catchy phrase people are using now. We need to define who is
doing what. It doesn't mean that the roles won't overlap, but
we can define the leadership agencies, and I think that will
clear up where information goes and how it is processed.
Mr. Simmons. Any of the other of you? Pretty good answer,
actually.
Mr. Canas. From my point of view, Mr. Chairman, I agree
with the Colonel.
I have intelligence. I also have preparedness. DHS has its
intelligence unit. It also has a larger role with FEMA and
preparedness as well. So I believe that, for the investigations
of counterterrorism, I believe the FBI has the lead on that and
that that lead, to use the Colonel's words, should be with the
FBI and they have primacy over investigations of
counterterrorism.
But things that don't meet that threshold, that are below
that threshold, I think that falls into our area to
investigate, the--all crimes, if you will, the home-grown, that
may not meet the FBI's threshold. That is what I am encouraging
DHS in our conversations with Mr.Allen about using our home-
grown information, someone to synthesize that information. No
one is doing that right now.
I believe that should be the DHS. I don't believe the FBI
can handle that because, by their own admission, they are
doing--they are the lead on counterterrorism. But synthesizing
home-grown information, as I call it, or from the ground up,
that is a broader--that would include open source. That would
include a lot of things the FBI is not familiar with but the
intelligence community is and DHS may--I believe should have
the role on that. That is my opinion on that.
Mr. Simmons. Does that fall into the area of building a
national fusion center from your testimony?
Mr. Canas. That is correct. That is the way I see it.
Because what is missing out there is from a national
perspective. Because we can do this for New Jersey, and the
Colonel can do it for Illinois, and we should know about our
own area. But what I know in New Jersey and what he knows in
Illinois and what she may know in Virginia no one is taking
that information and putting it on some virtual board that can
be tapped into. As a result--because now the intelligence
community and the military knows how to do this at the national
threat level, but domestically that is a little dicier to do,
and no one is doing it.
But if people could synthesize that home-grown information
I would submit to you from a national perspective we would know
more about Des Moines, Iowa. Right now, we know more about
Guatemala than we do about Des Moines, Iowa, from a Federal
level; and the reason for that is no one is taking that
information and putting it into a bucket and having analysts
look at it from that perspective. That is not occurring. I
submit that should be DHS.
Mr. Simmons. I agree with you completely. That has been
part of the struggle of creating and defining the
responsibilities of the Chief Intelligence Officer of DHS and
creating INA. Depending on how you do it, it no longer--well,
depending on how you do it, the activities of those activities
of DHS could disappear into the U.S. intelligence community, if
you will. In many respects, that is considered not a solution
but a problem.
So it has been difficult from a jurisdictional and legal
standpoint to try to define the Chief Intelligence Officer and
his mission in the activities under his jurisdiction in such a
fashion that he can be available to perform the tasks that we
want him to perform for you and not get sucked into the U.S.
intelligence community and essentially disappear from the face
of the earth.
Mr. Bouche. On that point, sir, could I add that one of the
things that concerns us greatly in law enforcement is we don't
want to become part of the intelligence community. The
intelligence community doesn't want to become part of law
enforcement.
Mr. Simmons. No kidding.
Mr. Bouche. Our roles are so distinctly different, yet we
have a need to share, and we have a need to share relevant
information. One of the roles that I believe Mr. Allen is
starting to define and that I think is desperately needed is
who is going to be the conduit between the intelligence
community and law enforcement. And that is a DHS role. It is
not an ongoing investigative role. It is a conduit role between
the two. And actually the person who can draw the line because
we--last thing I want is my officers acting on behalf of the
intelligence community. But if there is an agency between the
two that facilitates appropriate sharing that is a good role
for DHS.
Mr. Simmons. Would that fall into your comment about
building bridges?
Mr. Bouche. Yes, sir.
Mr. Simmons. That is what I thought.
Well, I want to thank you very, very much for coming here
today, for sharing with us. A lot of the comments that you have
made are right on the point of what we are trying to accomplish
here.
I have to say, looking back over the last 5 years, in some
respects it has been exceedingly frustrating because things
seem to be going very slowly. It seems to be very difficult to
reorganize, restructure the processes, the rules of procedure,
the equipment, so on and so on and so forth, which is so
essential to secure the homeland.
But, on the bright side, 6 years ago we wouldn't have this
conversation. We wouldn't have this hearing. We wouldn't have
the knowledge base of the three of you, which I would call an
expert knowledge base on attacking this problem. Nobody would
know much about it.
So, in that regard, those 6 years ago we wouldn't have a
committee like this or a subcommittee. So, in that regard, we
have made progress, painful though it may be.
But, before we close, I would like to ask each of you if
you have anything you would like to offer for the good of the
order that has not come out in the questions or the testimony
thus far.
Mr. Bouche. No, sir.
Mr. Canas. No, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Simmons. That being the case, thank you very, very much
for your testimony. Thank you for your dedication to these
important issues. Thank you for your service to your
communities, your State and to the country. Thank you all very
much.
Hearing adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 4:40 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]