[House Hearing, 109 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
AGROTERRORISM'S PERFECT STORM: WHERE HUMAN ANIMAL DISEASE COLLIDE
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON PREVENTION OF NUCLEAR AND BIOLOGICAL ATTACK
of the
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
JUNE 21, 2006
__________
Serial No. 109-97
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/
index.html
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
35-566 PDF WASHINGTON DC: 2006
---------------------------------------------------------------------
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing
Office Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866)512-1800
DC area (202)512-1800 Fax: (202) 512-2250 Mail Stop SSOP,
Washington, DC 20402-0001
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Peter T. King, New York, Chairman
Don Young, Alaska Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Lamar S. Smith, Texas Loretta Sanchez, California
Curt Weldon, Pennsylvania Edward J. Markey, Massachusetts
Christopher Shays, Connecticut Norman D. Dicks, Washington
John Linder, Georgia Jane Harman, California
Mark E. Souder, Indiana Peter A. DeFazio, Oregon
Tom Davis, Virginia Nita M. Lowey, New York
Daniel E. Lungren, California Eleanor Holmes Norton, District of
Jim Gibbons, Nevada Columbia
Rob Simmons, Connecticut Zoe Lofgren, California
Mike Rogers, Alabama Sheila Jackson-Lee, Texas
Stevan Pearce, New Mexico Bill Pascrell, Jr., New Jersey
Katherine Harris, Florida Donna M. Christensen, U.S. Virgin
Bobby Jindal, Louisiana Islands
Dave G. Reichert, Washington Bob Etheridge, North Carolina
Michael McCaul, Texas James R. Langevin, Rhode Island
Charlie Dent, Pennsylvania Kendrick B. Meek, Florida
Ginny Brown-Waite, Florida
______
SUBCOMMITTEE ON PREVENTION OF NUCLEAR AND BIOLOGICAL ATTACK
John Linder, Georgia, Chairman
Don Young, Alaska James R. Langevin, Rhode Island
Christopher Shays, Connecticut EdwarD J. Markey, Massachusetts
Daniel E. Lungren, California Norman D. Dicks, Washington
Jim Gibbons, Nevada Jane Harman, California
Rob Simmons, Connecticut Eleanor Holmes Norton, District of
Bobby Jindal, Louisiana Columbia
Charlie Dent, Pennsylvania Donna M. Christensen, U.S. Virgin
Peter T. King, New York (Ex Islands
Officio) Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
(Ex Officio)
(II)
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
STATEMENTS
The Honorable John Linder, a Representative in Congress from the
State of Georgia, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Prevention of
Nuclear and Biological Attack.................................. 1
The Honorable Charlie Norwood, a Representative in Congress from
the State of Georgia........................................... 3
The Honorable David Scott, a Representative in Congress from the
State of Georgia............................................... 23
The Honorable John Barrow, a Representative in Congress from the
State of Georgia............................................... 4
Witnesses
Dr. Lonnie King, Senior Veterinarian, Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services:
Oral Statement................................................. 14
Prepared Statement............................................. 16
Dr Edward Knipling, Administrator, Agricultural Research Service,
U.S. Department of Agriculture:
Oral Statement................................................. 6
Prepared Statement............................................. 9
Dr. Jeff Runge,Chief Medical Officer, U.S. Department of Homeland
Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 12
Panel II
Mr. Gary Black, Member, Georgia Rural Development Council, State
of Georgia:
Oral Statement................................................. 40
Dr. Corrie Brown, Josiah Meigs Distinguished Teaching Professor,
School of Veterinary Medicine, University of Georgia:
Oral Statement................................................. 31
Prepared Statement............................................. 33
Dr Paul Williams, special Assistant, Office of Homeland Security,
State of Georgia:
Oral Statement................................................. 37
Prepared Statement............................................. 39
AGROTERRORISM'S PERFECT STORM: WHERE HUMAN AND ANIMAL DISEASE COLLIDE
----------
Thursday, August 24, 2006
House of Representatives,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Subcommittee on Prevention of Nuclear and Biological
Attack,
Washington, DC.
The Subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 1:05 p.m., in
the Hugh Masters Hall, Center for Continuing Education, 1197
Lumpkin Street, Athens, Georgia, Hon. John Linder [Chairman of
the Subcommittee] presiding.
Present: Representatives Linder, Norwood, Scott and Barrow.
Mr. Linder. The Committee on Homeland Security,
Subcommittee on Prevention of Nuclear and Biological Attack
will come to order.
I would like to ask for unanimous consent the members of
the Georgia delegation with us today to join in this hearing.
Without objection, so ordered.
The Subcommittee is meeting today to hear testimony on
agroterrorism.
I want to thank our distinguished panel of witnesses for
traveling here today, as well as the University of Georgia for
graciously hosting this hearing.
The potential impact of an agroterrorist attack on animal
health, the agricultural community and the economy at large is
frightening to comprehend. An attack on our food supply, for
example, would lead not only to direct consequences on human
and animal health, but also a dramatic long-term psychological
and economic effect on the nation's agribusiness community.
In Georgia alone, the agriculture industry ranks as the
most important sector of our economy with approximately one in
six Georgians working in agriculture, forestry or a related
field.
Today, this Subcommittee will focus on a particular
agroterrorist threat that could impact both animal and human
health, the threat of zoonotic agents, diseases that can be
transmitted from animal to human, are particularly relevant
given the emergency of a highly pathogenic avian influenza in
southeast Asia, Africa and Europe. However, avian flu is not
the only agent that can be transmitted from animal to human. In
fact, of the agents on the CDC's list of most dangerous
pathogens, smallpox is the only one not considered to be
zoonotic. Thus, it would appear that keeping our farms safe is
key to keeping ourselves safe as well.
Building firewalls designed to prevent zoonotic agents from
emerging on our farms, our markets or even our tables is a
challenging goal that requires multiple layers of defense.
Preventing the entry of foreign disease into the country
through our borders is the first line of defense and we must
have adequate inspection and quarantine facilities at our
border and ports of entry. In addition, we must focus on people
with the intent to conduct acts of malevolence.
I have often said that we focus too much on responding to
potential things. There are an infinite number of things that
terrorists can use to cause us harm. There are a finite number
of people willing to do it. Perhaps we should be looking for
people instead of things.
This is especially true for agroterrorism. We must be able
to link the threats to U.S. agriculture gathered by the
intelligence community with the targeted actions the
agriculture community must take to prevent and prepare for an
attack.
Additionally, the vigilance from our farmers will be
critical. Farmers will be called to serve as both first
responders and first preventers. They will be the first to
detect the emergence of the zoonotic disease, the first to
report an agroterrorist attack and the first to respond to
either evil.
To aid the agriculture community, we must have solid
research into how to prevent an agroterrorist attack and, more
importantly, how to minimize its impact. Institutions like the
University of Georgia, for example and the research underway at
the College of Agriculture and Environmental Sciences and the
College of Veterinary Medicine, are vital in further
understanding infectious diseases.
The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention located in
Atlanta and the USDA research facilities in Atlanta and around
the state are also providing leading research in this field.
I cannot emphasize enough that prevention is the only
government action that will ensure failure for those who wish
to harm our people and our way of life. As such, I look forward
to hearing the testimony of our witnesses and hearing what
respective agencies are doing to address this vitally important
issue.
I now ask unanimous consent to recognize a friend of 32
years who I met in this campus in December of 1974 when we were
both elected to the Georgia House. My friend David Scott.
Mr. Scott. Thank you very much, Chairman Linder. This is
indeed a pleasure and an excellent opportunity for us to come
to the University of Georgia. It is very timely and very
appropriate that we have this hearing here because the
University of Georgia has been at the forefront of this area of
making sure we are safe in terms of any bioterrorism, and of
course the agricultural importance to our state and the tie
that that has to the University of Georgia certainly is evident
from the many, many accomplishments that the University of
Georgia has done. And of course, in this region, have the
Centers for Disease Control located here in this region is
vitally important as we bring all of these two together.
We have some extraordinary expert panelists, we are
certainly looking forward to them giving us the latest
information that they have.
An ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure. I cannot
begin to tell you, as a member of the Agriculture Committee and
now the Ranking Member on our Subcommittee in Livestock,
Horticulture and Crops, we are vitally concerned about
protecting our food supply line. If we have a weak link now in
the fight on terror, this is it.
So this is very timely. I look forward to it. Mr. Chairman,
thank you for having me join you.
Mr. Linder. I thank the gentleman.
It is against the rules of the Committee to have other
people make opening statements but I will ask unanimous consent
to allow that to happen for our other two guests on the panel.
Dr. Norwood.
Dr. Norwood. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, I
appreciate being recognized today to participate in your
hearing. I appreciate the courtesy you have extended in
allowing all of us to join in this most important, vital
hearing, and I welcome you back to your district, your old
district and I welcome you back to my old district and I
welcome you to John Barrow's district and I welcome you to my
new district.
[Laughter.]
Dr. Norwood. So we are really happy to be in Athens, Clarke
County today.
The Subcommittee on Prevention of Nuclear and Biological
Attack could not have picked a more appropriate location to
explore the federal government's strategy to combat agro- and
bioterrorism. The issue is of paramount importance to every
citizen in the state of Georgia and I am pleased that you had
the foresight to bring the message directly to the folks who
are working on the front lines in this very critical issue.
It has been said that our nation's agricultural
infrastructure represents the soft underbelly of our homeland
security network. Unlike many sectors of the nation's economy,
such as aviation, American farmers and agribusinesses are
linked together through a diffuse system that does not lend
itself to security oversight from any one particular
governmental agency. This arrangement in the private sector
allows American agriculture to provide the highest quality and
reliable source of food to citizens throughout the world. After
all, American farmers, ranchers and producers already generate
a one trillion dollar economy, including more than $50 billion
in exports. In the state of Georgia alone, the poultry
industry's annual contribution to the statewide economy exceeds
more than $13.5 billion That staggering figure ought to raise
an eyebrow. But consider this--if Georgia were an independent
country, we would rank as the world's fifth largest poultry
producer just behind the country of Mexico. That is serious
business in the 10th District of Georgia and in this state. It,
therefore, is not a stretch to say that the agricultural
industry continues to serve as the backbone of the statewide
economy in Georgia.
However, it also provides the enemies of freedom with an
attractive target for acts of international terrorism. The
Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Department of
Agriculture, Centers for Disease Control, all play an important
role in protecting the American agricultural industry from such
an attack.
Yet no single agency currently has the ability to
simultaneously defend against the threat of a terrorist attack
on agriculture, prepare the federal response to an attack and
then protect the American people from a potentially
catastrophic disruption in the food chain.
In the event of an attack, any break in the chain
connecting the three federal agencies will put American lives
at risk. It is nothing short of critical to address this
potential breach and I am so pleased that the Department of
Homeland Security is moving forward with a plan to establish an
integrated biological and agricultural defense facility. The
National Bio and Agro-Defense Facility, NBADF--I hate those
acronyms--as the project is commonly known, is simply just what
the doctor ordered. And it goes without saying that the
University of Georgia can and should play a role in the
establishment of NBADF.
The University's property off College Station Road already
houses the U.S. Department of Agriculture's Richard B. Russell
Research Center, Southeast Poultry Research Laboratory and
offers a convenient transportation link to the Centers for
Disease Control in Atlanta via Highway 316.
In addition to the deep knowledge of the University's
faculty and working relationship with the private sector, the
combination of existing government and university-based
resources will allow NBADF to quickly take root in the
community and achieve its mission.
I know you share my opinion, Mr. Chairman, so I will not
belabor this point. But I do want to take the opportunity to
thank you once again for allowing us to play a role in today's
hearing. The issue that the Committee's esteemed witnesses will
discuss today are important to my constituents in the 10th
District and I look forward to the testimony.
Mr. Linder. The gentleman from Athens, Georgia is
recognized, Mr. Barrow, for five minutes.
Mr. Barrow. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for
holding this hearing on this very important subject here at the
University of Georgia and thank you for extending the courtesy
to me as the member who has the privilege of representing this
community for the time being, participation in your Committee
hearing. It was your community yesterday, it is my community
today, it will be Congressman Norwood's community tomorrow. The
thing I want to emphasize is that institutions like the
University of Georgia are kind of like those ``be'' employees,
they be here before we here, they be here while we are here and
they be here after we are gone. And I think it is up to us to
try and provide institutions like the University of Georgia all
the resources they need in order to help make us secure.
Agroterrorism is a subject that needs a lot more attention
I think than it has gotten recently. A terrorist attack on the
agriculture industry in this country could be a low-cost but
incredibly highly effective means of destroying the economy of
the United States, and that is right up Al Qaeda's alley. No
industry is more American than agriculture and none is more
vital to our economy.
It has already been noted, agriculture accounts for about a
trillion dollars in annual economic activity in this country
and creates one-sixth of our gross national product. One in
eight Americans work in agriculture. And to bring the point
home, here in Georgia, one in six citizens work in agriculture.
According to a 2003 Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs
Report, we have evidence that agriculture and food are
potential Al Qaeda targets since 2002. That is when we found in
terrorist hideouts in Afghanistan agricultural documents and
manuals describing ways to make animal and plant poisons.
In December of 2004, then Secretary of Health and Human
Services Tommy Thompson said ``For the life of me, I cannot
understand why the terrorists have not attacked our food supply
because it is so easy to do.''
According to the Congressional Research Service,
agriculture has several characteristics that pose unique
problems for managing our response to this threat. Agriculture
production is spread out in unsecured environments all over the
country. Livestock are usually concentrated in confined
locations and then moved and commingled with other herds.
Pest and disease outbreaks can bring economically important
exports to a screeching halt. Many veterinarians lack
experience with foreign animal disease that are resilient and
endemic in foreign countries. The global economy and increased
imports of agricultural products and foreign travelers in this
country increase the possibilities for introducing foreign,
invasive agricultural pests and diseases such as avian flu and
foot and mouth disease.
It is critical to our economy and to our homeland security
that the government does everything possible to prevent either
accidental or deliberate introduction of potentially
destructive organisms in the United States.
Congress and the Administration have done a lot since 9/11
to protect the agricultural industry from the natural or
manmade attack. Congress held hearings and enacted laws,
Homeland Security Department has been created. The Executive
Branch has issued new directives creating liaison and
coordination offices. All that has happened. When you add up
the regular annual appropriations, the supplemental
appropriations and the user fees that have been adopted to
address these programs, for both the Department of Agriculture
and the Department of Homeland Security, funding for ag
security has grown by 44 percent over four years, from $552
million in fiscal year 2002 to $797 million in fiscal year
2006. And while all these things are positive, we still have a
long way to go to make sure that resources are being utilized
effectively. And one of the things I hope we can address today
is some of the concerns about how we are utilizing resources
that have been allocated so far.
On May 19 of this year, the General Accountability Office
released a report at the request of Congress on the inter-
agency coordination between the Department of Agriculture, the
Department of Homeland Security regarding ag inspections. While
the report cited some positive improvements in inter-agency
coordination since the creation of Homeland Security, the
report cited problems in several areas that I hope we can
address. For example, the Department of Homeland Security had
not developed performance measures for agricultural
inspections, but is still using USDA Animal and Plant
Inspection Service measures, which did not reflect all of DHS's
activities.
Staffing and related staffing performance measures are also
lacking.
Agriculture specialists are not always notified of urgent
inspection alerts issued by APHIS. A survey suggests that only
21 percent of agriculture specialists receive alerts in a
timely manner.
The number of canine units has gone down from 140 to 80.
And since the transfer to DHS, some 60 percent of 43 canine
teams that were tested failed in APHIS proficiency tests.
There are financial management issues. User fees are less
than program costs. DHS was unable to provide APHIS with
information of actual cost by type of activity and USDA has
sometimes been slow to transfer user fees to DHS.
I am glad that members of the Ag Committee, Congressman
Scott and I, were able to attend this hearing, and I look
forward to working with you, Mr. Chairman, and with my
colleagues to help fix some of the inter-agency problems
between the Department of Homeland Security and the Department
of Agriculture mentioned in the General Accountability Office's
report.
Once again, thank you for letting us participate and I look
forward to the testimony of the witnesses today.
Mr. Linder. Thank you.
We are pleased to have before us today a distinguished
panel of witnesses on this important topic. I would like to
remind the witnesses that your entire statement will appear in
the record. We would like to ask you to keep your comments to
no more than five minutes.
Our first witness today is Dr. Edward Knipling. Dr.
Knipling is the Administrator for USDA's Agricultural Research
Service, has held several positions with the USDA since 1968.
Dr. Jeff Runge is the Chief Medical Officer for DHS and a
former of the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration as
well as being a frequent guest in front of this Committee.
The final witness is Dr. Lonnie King. Dr. King is the
Senior Veterinarian at the Atlanta based Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention. He is a former dean of the Michigan
State University College of Veterinary Medicine and
Administrator for the USDA's Animal Plant Health Inspection
Service.
Dr. Knipling is recognized for five minutes.
STATEMENT OF DR. EDWARD KNIPLING, ADMINISTRATOR, AGRICULTURAL
RESEARCH SERVICE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE
Dr. Knipling. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of
the Subcommittee. My name is Edward Knipling, I am the
Administrator of the USDA Agricultural Research Service. ARS is
the intramural science research arm of USDA and we operate over
100 laboratories across the nation on all aspects of
agricultural science. In fact, as has already been pointed out
by members of the Subcommittee, one of our primary research
locations is right here in Athens, in cooperation with the
University of Georgia. And one of our principal activities here
in Athens deals with poultry diseases which is very much
related to the subject matter of this hearing. I will say more
about that work in a few minutes.
But I would first like to thank the Subcommittee for the
opportunity to appear before you today to present testimony
about ARS's research to prevent agroterrorism, especially
zoonotic threats. Zoonotic diseases represent an ongoing threat
to animal agriculture and public health. The pathogens causing
these diseases propagate first in some livestock and other
animal species, potentially causing severe economic harm before
spreading to humans. And this is a significant reminder that
protecting the health of livestock and the entire U.S. food and
agricultural enterprise is an important part of protecting
human health and homeland security. In other words, helping to
prevent the perfect storm, as this hearing is entitled.
Mr. Chairman, in light of the significance of these
threats, I am pleased to share with you recent ARS research
efforts to develop new knowledge and technology to help prevent
and prepare for zoonotic diseases.
In the current fiscal year, 2006, ARS is spending
approximately $100 million on food and agricultural defense,
which is about nine percent of our total annual appropriation.
While there are many zoonotic diseases that could be considered
in this hearing, I have selected the ones that we believe could
be the most serious threats to American agriculture.
The current strain of high pathogenic avian influenza being
founds in parts of the world has resulted in the death of at
least 150 million domestic and wild birds. ARS scientists in
our internationally-recognized Southeastern Poultry Research
Laboratory here in Athens, Georgia are conducting extensive
research to improve detection methods, develop effective
vaccines and monitor the mutations of the disease. Several of
these scientists have accompanied me here to these hearings.
In support of the USDA Animal and Plant Health Inspection
Service, these scientists have developed and tested a rapid
detection method of finding AI infections in live bird markets.
This procedure, using modern tools and understandings of
molecular biology was also successfully employed in poultry
markets in Texas and Virginia that contained avian influenza
outbreaks in previous years and has now been distributed to
laboratories throughout the United States to use in the future
if new avian influenza outbreaks are suspected.
ARS research on AI vaccines has shown how these vaccines
can be used most effectively and has provided insights crucial
to the development of new vaccines as the virus continues to
mutate. Scientists are also evaluating AI viruses from several
countries to track if and how mutations occur.
Turning now to other diseases, anthrax, caused by spore-
forming soil bacterium can infect livestock, which is sometimes
fatal to them. Anthrax spores could be used as a bioterrorism
agent in several ways, such as contaminating liquid egg
products, milk or beef products.
As you no doubt remember, in 2001, anthrax was successfully
deployed as a biological weapon by an unknown perpetrator in
letters containing anthrax spores sent to several locations via
the U.S. Postal System. Five people died as a result. USDA
assisted in the subsequent monitoring of the potential spore
contamination of mail addressed to U.S. government agencies.
ARS is working to prevent anthrax infections by improving
detection methods, evaluating spore growth and survival
patterns of the spores and developing improved processing
techniques to remove and deactivate the bacteria in food.
Additional research is critical for developing improved
detection and processing techniques.
Brucellosis, a bacterial disease that devastates livestock
worldwide is classified by the United States biodefense
community as a potential bioweapon. It causes significant
illness and death in animals and humans. Great progress has
been made in eradicating brucellosis from the nation's cattle
and swine populations over the past 50 years and in helping to
control it in some wildlife species.
ARS research on brucellosis has identified specific gene
sequences that can be used in developing effective diagnostic
techniques and vaccines. Vaccines are being tested on wild and
domestic animals and new diagnostic methods are being developed
to trace the source of brucellosis outbreaks in the field.
The Rift Valley fever virus transmitted by mosquitos is a
biological threat agent of high priority to the U.S. livestock
industries. Introduction of this pathogen, intentionally or
even accidentally, would be catastrophic to the agricultural
economy. North American livestock have no resistance to the
virus so it would spread rapidly and result in major bans on
U.S. product exports to other countries and non-infected areas.
ARS is developing Rift Valley fever disease detection
techniques and evaluating vaccines and control methods.
ARS conducts research on other zoonotic threats that are
not officially recognized as bioterrorism agents, even though
they could be intentionally used to contaminate food supplies.
Working with other agencies within and outside USDA, ARS
research focuses on detecting and controlling food pathogens
such as E.coli, salmonella and other bacterial pathogens.
Much of this and other ARS food safety research,
particularly for poultry and meat products, is also carried out
here in Athens at the Richard Russell Agricultural Research
Center, named after the late Georgia Senator. The U.S. Food
Safety and Inspection Service is also housed with ARS in this
center, whom we work very closely with to assure the safety of
the food supply.
Here and elsewhere, ARS is also participating with other
USDA agencies and the National Swine Production Sector in a
surveillance program to monitor bacterial diseases in
relationship to farm practices, bacterial populations and the
antibiotic resistance levels of these bacteria. This program
will serve as a model for future animal disease surveillance
efforts on a national level and it also promises to be vital to
the Department of Homeland Security's National Biosecurity
Integration System and its effort to limit damages to the
economy, animal health and public health.
In summary, ARS is pleased to work toward preventing and
preparing for agroterrorism and zoonotic diseases. I thank you
once again for the opportunity to share some of our research
with you.
Mr. Chairman, this completes my brief oral comments and I
would be pleased to participate in the question/answer session
later.
Mr. Linder. Thank you, Doctor.
Dr. Runge.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Knipling follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dr. Edward B. Knipling
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, I am Edward B.
Knipling, Administrator of the Agricultural Research Service (ARS). We
are the primary intramural science research agency of the United States
Department of Agriculture (USDA). ARS operates a network of over 100
research laboratories across the Nation on all aspects of agricultural
science, including crop and livestock protection and food safety
research.
Thank you for the opportunity to appear before the Subcommittee
today to present testimony about ARS' efforts to prevent agroterrorism,
particularly zoonotic threats. I am pleased to inform you of ARS'
research to prevent and prepare for these diseases, which are of
particular significance as we seek to protect ourselves from
agroterrorism. Zoonotic diseases represent an ongoing threat to animals
and public health, propagating first in crucial species and potentially
causing severe economic devastation before spreading to humans.
Agricultural production is geographically scattered in sites that are
difficult to protect. Groups of livestock are concentrated in confined
locations and then transported and mixed with other groups on their way
to market, which can facilitate the spread of disease from one animal
to another. Furthermore, as Dr. Julie Gerberding, the Director of the
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention (CDC), has stated, "Eleven of the last 12
emerging infectious diseases that we're aware of in the world, that
have had human health consequences, have probably arisen from animal
sources." This is a significant reminder that protecting the health of
our animals is an important part of protecting human health.
Mr. Chairman, in light of the significance of these threats, I am
pleased to share with you recent ARS research efforts to prevent and
prepare for zoonotic diseases. In fiscal year 2006, ARS spent
$93,799,000 on food and agricultural defense, which was around 9
percent of our total annual budget. While there are many zoonotic
diseases that could be considered in this hearing, I am discussing some
examples that we believe could be the most serious threats to American
agriculture.
Avian Influenza
The current strain of high pathogenic avian influenza (AI)
circulating in Asia, Africa, and Europe has resulted in the death of at
least 150 million domestic and wild birds that were either killed by
the virus or destroyed because they were at risk of being infected. ARS
scientists are conducting extensive research to better understand and
control existing AI strains. While our focus is on poultry, ARS is also
working with other organizations to track mutations that occur in
existing AI strains in anticipation of the day when they may evolve
into forms that are more contagious and deadly to poultry, other avian
species including wild birds, and potentially humans.
The most effective means of controlling many zoonotic diseases is
at the source, which in the case of AI is the domestic and wild birds
that carry and contract the virus. ARS conducts AI research at its high
containment facility in Athens, Georgia. This laboratory is recognized
internationally as one of the world's leading AI research centers.
There are several areas of AI that are under active investigation
at this time. One key research area is the development of tests to
rapidly detect AI infections in chickens and other avian species. ARS
worked with the USDA Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS)
to develop and test a rapid detection method of finding AI infections
in live bird markets. Using this test, researchers can determine
infection with the H5 or H7 form of the virus in three hours. In
addition, this test has proven successful for pen-side screening,
pending the development of more sensitive screening tools in progress.
This procedure was successfully employed in poultry markets in Texas
and Virginia to contain AI outbreaks in previous years, and has now
been distributed to laboratories throughout the United States to use in
the future if new AI outbreaks are suspected.
ARS research has also supported the development of AI vaccines,
which have several use restrictions. For the H5 and H7 sub-types of the
virus, vaccine use requires APHIS, USDA, and State approval, along with
a USDA license. For other sub-types of the virus, State approval is
required for use. In the United States, immunization is not routinely
practiced for trade reasons and because routine vaccination against
certain strains is not cost-effective. However, poultry producers are
now considering vaccination more often, because immunization against
some AI strains can potentially control outbreaks at a lower cost than
large-scale culling of poultry.
ARS research includes the development of vaccines to protect
poultry from both established and mutating AI viruses. Some types of
chickens are protected from AI infection for at least 20 weeks after a
single vaccination. Two types of vaccines are currently available, but
ARS research has shown that the vaccine must match the AI strain to
provide optimal protection against the virus. In addition, if a bird is
infected with a certain strain of AI and receives a vaccine developed
for that strain, it will shed fewer viruses, which will limit its
ability to transmit the infection to other birds. Building on this
research, ARS has entered into several Cooperative Research and
Development Agreements with private companies to accelerate the
development of new vaccines to protect U.S. poultry and their use.
ARS is leading research in demonstrating that the accumulation of
mutations in the AI viral genome can reduce the effectiveness of
vaccines. As a result, three vaccines have been developed using DNA
splicing techniques, and all of them have initially shown promise in
protecting against AI. Using these vaccines would allow immunized birds
to be distinguished from naturally infected birds, thus reducing trade
issues. These new vaccines are now being compared to existing vaccines
to evaluate their cost effectiveness.
ARS is also studying AI in free-flying waterfowl by working with
collaborators at the Moscow-based International Science and Technology
Center. Researchers are collecting samples from wild birds that follow
migratory flyways over Russia. This sampling technique allows constant
monitoring of AI virus strains, and provides scientists with an early
warning system when new strains emerge in wild populations.
AI viruses obtained from the United States, Hong Kong, Italy, El
Salvador, Chile, Netherlands, Indonesia, Viet Nam, and South Korea are
being evaluated by ARS for their genetic markers, potential virulence,
source, and spread. ARS is developing and evaluating techniques to
predict which low pathogenicity AI viruses are at greatest risk for
changing into high pathogenicity AI viruses.
Working with CDC, ARS has tested proposed human influenza vaccines
to make sure they pose no threat to poultry production in the unlikely
case the viruses used by commercial manufacturers for vaccine
production are accidentally released into the poultry environment. In
addition, ARS has shared data on AI vaccines and vaccination with the
Food and Agriculture Organization and the World Organization for Animal
Health.
Anthrax
Bacillus anthracis is a spore-forming bacterium that can be found
in soil and can cause disease - commonly known as anthrax - in
livestock and other animals. Anthrax spores could be used as an
agroterrorism agent in several ways. This might include intentional
contamination of many different types of food including liquid egg
products, milk or meat. In addition, humans can become infected by
handling products from infected animals, inhaling anthrax spores from
contaminated animal products, and consuming meat products from infected
animals. Without treatment, the mortality rate for pulmonary anthrax is
70-80%. In many cases, pulmonary and gastrointestinal anthrax is fatal
if not treated immediately. However the mortality rate for
gastrointestinal infections is not as high, perhaps 50%, and less then
1% for cutaneous, if properly treated.
In 2001, anthrax was successfully deployed as a biological weapon
when letters containing anthrax spores were sent to several locations
via the U.S. postal system. Five people died as a result, and USDA
established a temporary mobile laboratory in Washington, D.C. to assist
in examination of suspicious envelopes received at several government
agency mailrooms.
ARS works to prevent anthrax contamination of food by improving
detection methods, evaluating growth and survival patterns of the
spores, and developing improved processing techniques to remove them
from and/or deactivate them in liquid egg, milk and meat products. ARS
researchers have studied and developed methods for detecting anthrax in
milk at various stages during the course of transport and processing.
Scientists showed that the Ruggedized Advanced Pathogen Identification
Device (RAPID) can be used to detect very low numbers of anthrax in
milk. Researchers also determined that high-temperature pasteurization
does not sufficiently deactivate anthrax spores in milk. To supplement
the pasteurizing process, ARS has developed a micro-filtration process
can remove anthrax spores to a level well below infectious thresholds;
this process can be used to decrease the likelihood that the milk
supply will be harmful.. Microfiltration is being used commercially for
a variety of reasons, including the removal of bacteria.
Researchers have also studied the survival trends of anthrax when
contaminated meat is stored and cooked at various temperatures. The
scientists developed models for predicting the growth and survival of
the bacteria as well as recommendations for storage and cooking to
reduce contamination. Researchers continue to work on improving
processing techniques to deactivate anthrax in liquid egg products,
where it can also threaten the safety of food. In light of the
mortality rates associated with gastrointestinal infection, anthrax
research to develop improved detection and processing techniques is
critical, and ARS continues to work toward meeting this need.
Brucellosis
Brucellosis has been classified by the United States bio-defense
community as a potential agent for bioterrorism, and is one of the most
important zoonotic diseases of livestock worldwide. It can cause
significant illness and lead to abortion and death in animals and
humans. There are several Brucella species but many can infect all
mammals to some degree. Wildlife, including bison, elk, and feral
swine, can carry and transmit brucellosis to domestic animals.
ARS researchers are conducting extensive research on brucellosis at
the National Animal Disease Center in Ames, Iowa, with a fiscal year
2006 budget of $2,987,500. Brucellosis has been subject to an intensive
eradication campaign in the U.S. for the last 50 years, and great
progress has been made in eradicating it from the Nation's cattle and
swine. However, brucellosis has been a tremendous burden for livestock
producers. Over the years, Federal and State governments, along with
the livestock industry, have spent billions of dollars to control and
eliminate the disease.
ARS has been very active in researching Brucellosis. Genetic
studies have identified specific genetic patterns in different Brucella
species, which gives scientists information to use in their search for
effective diagnostic techniques and vaccines. Vaccines are being tested
on wild and domestic animals to find effective immunization protocols
for the treatment of brucellosis and for its eradication in wildlife.
Another key area is research into new diagnostic methods that will
allow researchers to trace the source of Brucellosis outbreaks in the
field.
Rift Valley Fever
When considering both economic and public health implications, the
Rift Valley Fever virus is a priority biological threat agent for the
U.S. livestock industries. Rift Valley Fever is transmitted by
mosquitoes and affects both humans and animals. Rift Valley Fever is
more likely to cause severe disease and death in animals than in
humans, but human fatality rates as high as 20% have been reported and
it can cause severe vision damage, hemorrhaging, and inflammation of
the brain in those who survive. There have not been any reported
outbreaks in the United States, but an introduction of the virus could
be catastrophic to the agricultural economy. The disease has already
moved out of East Africa into Egypt, Yemen, and Saudi Arabia. North
American livestock have no resistance to the virus, so it would spread
rapidly, resulting in major bans on product transport and export from
infected areas.
ARS is currently working with CDC and the Department of Defense to
develop detection techniques, to evaluate vaccines, and to develop
control methods tailored to the cause of infection and the method of
transmission. ARS researchers have developed models to detect
environmental conditions that may precede disease outbreaks, which will
be useful for agricultural and public health officials for enhancing
disease surveillance and preparing for an outbreak. Other ARS
scientists are studying the mosquitoes that carry the virus to
determine natural infection rates and the genetic factors that affect
transmission. ARS is also collaborating with the Canadian Food
Inspection Agency to develop detection methods and effective vaccines
for Rift Valley Fever.
Related Food Safety and Health Research
ARS conducts research to detect and control other biological agents
such as Yersinia pestis and Salmonella species that can be
intentionally used to make the food supply unsafe. The knowledge of
detection methods, the decontamination process, and control of organism
growth that ARS has gained in these research programs all contribute to
a better understanding of how to protect against bioterrorism attacks
on the agriculture and food system using zoonotic agents.
For instance, ARS has determined that microarray technology is a
highly effective means of detecting potential bioterrorism agents.
Microarray technology allows researchers to simultaneously test
thousands of samples and to discriminate among pathogen species and
their different strains. By combining this technology with the Agency's
genome sequencing studies, ARS will be able to detect and characterize
more than 25 pathogens and toxins that threaten the safety of food.
Regarding meat contamination, ARS researchers have determined that
ionizing radiation is a highly effective means of deactivating
pathogens such as Yersinia pestis.
In support of USDA action ARS, in association with the Food Safety
Inspection Service, used a tool developed by the HHS Food and Drug
Administration, the Department of Defense, the Department of Homeland
Security, and the Central Intelligence Agency to assess and predict how
vulnerable a certain food system is to attack. This tool considers
seven factors: criticality, accessibility, recuperability,
vulnerability, effect, recognizability, and shock (CARVER + Shock). By
assessing these factors, researchers determine the level of threat that
toxins and threat agents pose to a given food system and establish
research priorities. In other collaborative efforts, ARS is working
with the United States Army to develop portable imaging devices for
pathogen detection. ARS is also working with the Food Emergency
Response Network Methods Subcommittee to evaluate technologies to be
incorporated into a Biosecurity Protocol Manual.
Surveillance
ARS is working with other USDA agencies to develop a surveillance
program to determine how farm practices affect bacterial populations
and the antibiotic resistance levels of those bacteria. This program
will serve as a model for future surveillance efforts on a national
level, assisting the Food Safety and Inspection Service, the Food and
Drug Administration, and the food animal industry in the production of
safe food products. It also promises to be vital to the Department of
Homeland Security's National Biosurveillance Integration System and to
its efforts to limit damages to the economy, animal health, and public
health. The project is conducted by ARS researchers in Ames, Iowa;
Athens, Georgia; College Station, Texas; and Beltsville, Maryland.
In summary, ARS is pleased to work toward preventing and preparing
for agroterrorism and zoonotic diseases. We thank you for the
opportunity to share our research with you. Mr. Chairman, this
concludes my remarks. I would be happy to answer any questions.
STATEMENT OF DR. JEFF RUNGE, CHIEF MEDICAL OFFICER, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Dr. Runge. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the
opportunity that you and Congressman Scott, Dr. Norwood and
Congressman Barrow have given us to talk a bit today about the
devastating effects that a bioterror incident could have on our
critical infrastructures and our way of life in this country.
The Department of Homeland Security has the duty and indeed
is in the unique position to coordinate a one medicine approach
between multiple agencies and stakeholders to reach a state of
national preparedness that we all seek. DHS is responsible for
coordinating the overall national efforts to enhance the
protection of our nation's key resources and critical
infrastructures--among them, plant and animal agriculture and
food--under the National Response Plan, and National
Infrastructure Protection Plan. In doing so, we work with our
fellow government partners that we have designated as sector-
specific agencies; in this case Department of Health and Human
Services and the Department of Agriculture.
The specific roles and responsibilities of our federal
partners in agrodefense are outlined in the various homeland
security Presidential Directives, particular 7, 9 and 10.
We use the National Response Plan and the National Incident
Management System to coordinate the federal resources to
respond and recover from high consequence events.
DHS's agrodefense activities are housed in several areas of
the Department, led by the Preparedness Directorate. Its
Infrastructure Protection Office coordinates the various
private sector entities with ownership of our national
infrastructures and facilitates public/private partnerships to
share information and develop and deploy infrastructure shields
and mitigation strategies to reduce risk.
The new National Biosurveillance Integration System or NBIS
is also part of the Preparedness Directorate. NBIS works with
our inter-agency partners to integrate disparate sources of
data for a fuller picture of a biothreat as it evolves in real
time.
Other DHS directorates and components have vital and
distinct responsibilities as well, including intelligence
assessments, cargo and traveler inspections at our borders and
development of response planning and operations. Specifically,
the Science and Technology Directorate, which I had the
privilege to lead for the last six months in an acting
capacity, conducts material threat determinations and
assessments and operates the Plum Island Animal Disease Center,
the only facility in the nation that is authorized to handle
certain foreign animal diseases. S&T also works closely with
USDA, both APHIS and the ARS, to develop decision-making tools,
veterinary counter-measures and disease diagnostics for
prevention of both accidental and intentional outbreaks.
All these activities, Mr. Chairman, are overseen, will be
overseen and coordinated through our new Office of the Chief
Medical Officer, which we established late last year. My first
hire within the Office of Chief Medical Officer was a Chief
Veterinarian and this past Monday, I was fortunate to have
another very experienced veterinarian hired as my Director of
Veterinary and Agricultural Security, Dr. Tom McGinn, who is
with me today.
Mr. Chairman, our world is indeed a very small place.
Advances in transportation have made it very easy to transport
diseased people, plants and animals legally or illegally
throughout the world. Foreign species are being found in the
U.S. frequently, with the organisms that they harbor. One of
our specific concerns is the transmission of zoonotic diseases
from animals to animals and animals to humans. Diseases like
tuberculosis, HIV, West Nile, Lyme disease, avian influenza,
all of which pose a threat across species, make a compelling
case for moving to a one medicine approach to the global spread
and control of disease.
This concept is not new. Sir William Osler, back in the
1800s, wrote that ``veterinary medicine and human medicine
complement each other and should be considered as one.''
Consider that 75 percent of the diseases that have emerged
in the last 25 years are zoonotic in their origin and around 80
percent of the top biological threat agents are zoonotic
diseases. And 11 of the last 12 outbreaks of global concern are
zoonotic in origin. Some of these diseases, even if they do not
make people sick, can present a challenge to the health and
well-being of our human population.
For example, foot and mouth disease or FMD affects only
cows, swine, sheep, goats, deer and similar species. But the
disease could have a very dramatic effect on our domestic and
global economy. Should the disease establish itself in our wild
species such as feral swine, it would be almost impossible to
eradicate. Our trade could be threatened if our trading
partners ban parts from all or part of the country. Some
modeling scenarios that we have developed predict that a single
point of introduction of FMD could spread very rapidly,
affecting millions of animals and costing the economy billions
of dollars. Thousands of people could be affected in terms of
jobs, income and quality of life.
DHS has focused on performing the necessary research to
understand foreign diseases and threats to our nation's
agriculture and food supply that might be imposed by natural or
man-made sources and to develop the best possible surveillance
tools to monitor data from various sources.
Mr. Chairman, a more detailed description of these and
other efforts can be found in my written statement, which we
submitted for the record and I appreciate the opportunity to be
here.
Mr. Linder. Thank you, Dr. Runge.
Dr. King.
STATEMENT OF DR. LONNIE KING, SENIOR VETERINARIAN, CENTERS FOR
DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND
HUMAN SERVICES
Dr. King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the
Subcommittee. Good afternoon. I am very pleased to be here
today to describe CDC's preparedness efforts to prepare for and
respond to agroterrorism and zoonotic threats.
Infectious diseases are a continuing threat to this
nation's health. Although modern advances have controlled some
of these diseases, certainly outbreaks of SARS, avian
influenza, West Nile infection and monkeypox are recent
reminders of the extraordinary ability of microbes to adapt, to
evolve and to move worldwide. Preventing and controlling
infectious diseases such as these require a new global
awareness, a focus on the overlap of animal and human health to
prevent the emergence, re-emergence and spread of zoonotic
diseases, which are diseases transmitted from animals to
people.
It is estimated that 75 percent of the new emerging
pathogens in humans over the last several decades have zoonotic
in origin. Five of the six CDC Category A agents for
bioterrorism are zoonotic. So while it is difficult to predict
when and where the next zoonotic event may occur, all the
critical factors are in place to ensure that this new era of
emerging zoonoses, whether they come here naturally or
intentionally will continue or may even accelerate into the
future.
Bioterrorism is the threat of deliberate introduction of
animal or plant disease that would impact the U.S. food system.
The health and security of this country depends on our
preparedness against terrorism including agroterrorism, as well
as other public health emergencies including the threat of
zoonotic diseases and vector-borne diseases.
CDC would become involved in an agroterrorism event if an
animal disease were introduced that affected human health. We
also clearly understand that effective animal health strategies
can and do improve public health. And the strategies to protect
both need to be coordinated. By partnering with other federal
agencies that focus on animal health, with state governments,
and with academic and private institutions, CDC is preparing
for agroterrorism in the event of a zoonotic incursion. The
strategic partnering is focusing on improving the collaboration
for detection, for diagnosis, for surveillance, research,
training, and strategies for containment and response.
Recognizing the importance of the interface between human
and animal health, CDC is proposing a new organizational unit,
the National Center for Zoonotic, Vector-Borne and Enteric
Diseases, which will bring together similarly focused programs,
provide national and international scientific and programmatic
leadership in zoonoses, in vector-borne diseases and foodborne,
waterborne and other related infections as we try to identify,
diagnose and prevent these diseases.
The new center will focus on the continuing challenge of
emerging and re-emerging zoonoses and indeed work
collaboratively with a broader array of public health
organizations such as those involved with agriculture, wildlife
and companion animal health.
Today, our world is progressively complex, globally inter-
dependent and thus we believe that building strategic alliances
between public health and animal health will be a critical
skill to address the contemporary challenges produced by the
convergence of people, animals and animal products--indeed the
world of one medicine and one health that Dr. Runge mentioned.
Our agriculture and food systems seem to be especially
vulnerable. Food and agriculture are exceptional national
assets, certainly impact trade, commerce, economies and both
human and animal health. Food-borne pathogens, whether it is E.
coli: O157, Listeria, campylobacter, or the varieties of
salmonellosis, move across species lines with ease, causing
serious morbidity and mortality. As with other infectious
diseases, preparedness for naturally occurring outbreaks of
foodborne illness better prepares us for unexpected attacks.
Routine disease surveillance systems coordinated by CDC
provide an essential early-warning network to detect dangers in
our food supply. In addition, these systems can be used to
indicate new or changing patterns of foodborne illness that
would likely detect early cases of agroterrorism involving a
zoonotic agent.
CDC works with state and local health departments, the
USDA, FDA and others to investigate outbreaks caused by
foodborne pathogens. Improved surveillance systems have allowed
CDC to detect foodborne outbreaks in a matter of days rather
than weeks. As a consequence, CDC can more rapidly alert the
FDA and the USDA about implicated food products associated with
foodborne illnesses so that all three agencies can take
protective public health actions.
A public health laboratory infrastructure is also critical
in the event of a zoonotic or agroterrorism attack. The
Laboratory Response Network, called LRN, created in 1999, has
improved the laboratory capacity of the public health system.
The LRN is a national network of local, state and federal
public health, military, veterinary, food testing and
environmental testing laboratories that provide the essential
infrastructure and capacity to respond to biological and
chemical terrorism and other public health emergencies.
To enhance the linkages between human and animal health,
the LRN works with USDA's Animal and Plant Health Inspection
System with the laboratory in Ames, Iowa, and the veterinary
diagnostic laboratory community.
Preparedness for a zoonotic outbreak is further enhanced in
terms of our preparedness through CDC's brand new designation
as a World Animal Health Organization*, which is through the
OIE, *(Collaborating Centre for Emerging and Re-Emerging
Zoonoses). In this role, CDC will be better equipped to forge
stronger ties between public health and the animal health
sectors to control and prevent zoonoses on a global basis.
In conclusion, the scope, scale and consequences to human
and animal health from zoonotic and agroterrorist agents are
really unprecedented today. Our animals and their products are
inextricably woven with our national economy, with the public's
health and well-being. The continuing challenges of zoonoses
and agroterrorism are transforming forces, necessitating new
partnerships at the interface of human and animal health.
I am pleased to be here today to report on CDC's
significant progress to address and to respond to this new
reality. And I thank you for the opportunity to participate at
this field hearing.
[The prepared statement of Dr. King follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dr. Lonnie King
Good afternoon, Chairman Linder and Members of the Subcommittee. I
am Lonnie King, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention's (CDC)
Senior Veterinarian, and I am leading the effort to form a new center
at CDC focusing on zoonotic, vector-borne, and enteric diseases. I am
pleased to be here today to describe CDC's preparedness efforts to
prepare for and respond to agroterrorism and zoonotic threats. Before I
begin, I would like to briefly mention the significant investments in
research, laboratory, public health and hospital surge capacity our
nation has made in recent years to protect the American people from
naturally-occurring or terror-related threats. The President's FY 2007
Budget includes a four percent increase in bioterrorism spending for a
total budget of $4.4 billion, an increase of $178 million over last
year's level. This increase will enable us to accomplish a number of
important tasks. The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) will
improve our medical surge capacity; increase the medicines and supplies
in the Strategic National Stockpile; support a mass casualty care
initiative; and promote the advanced development of biodefense
countermeasures to a stage of development so they can be considered for
procurement under Project BioShield.
We also continue to prepare against a possible pandemic influenza
outbreak and appreciate your support of $2.3 billion for the second
year of the President's Pandemic Influenza plan, in the FY 2006
Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, the Global War
on Terror, and Hurricane Recovery. The President's FY 2007 budget also
provides more than $350 million for important ongoing pandemic
influenza activities such as safeguarding the Nation's food supply,
global disease surveillance, and accelerating the development of
vaccines, drugs, and diagnostics.Finally, it is important to note that
HHS funding to enhance State and local preparedness for public health
emergencies, including pandemic influenza, has existed since 2001.
Principally through CDC and the Health Resources and Services
Administration (HRSA) funds have been provided to States and localities
to upgrade infectious disease surveillance and investigation, enhance
the readiness of hospitals and the health care system to deal with
large numbers of casualties, expand public health laboratory and
communications capacities and improve connectivity between hospitals,
and city, local and state health departments to enhance disease
reporting. Including the funding we have requested for FY07, CDC's and
HRSA's total investments in State and local preparedness since 2001
will total almost $8 billion.
Background
Infectious diseases are a continuing threat to our nation's health.
Although modern advances have conquered some diseases, the outbreaks of
Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS), avian influenza, West Nile
virus (WNV) infection, and monkeypox are recent reminders of the
extraordinary ability of microbes to adapt and evolve. Earlier
predictions of the elimination of infectious diseases often did not
take into account changes in demographics and human behaviors and the
ability of microbes to adapt, evolve, and develop resistance to
antimicrobial drugs. In 2003, the Institute of Medicine (IOM) issued a
report, "Microbial Threats to Health: Emergence, Detection, and
Response," that outlined recommendations on critical issues facing the
prevention and control of microbial threats to human health. The IOM
described thirteen factors involved in the emergence of infectious
diseases. A majority of these factors included agricultural or animal
health issues that inevitably affect human health. The report also
recognized the growing threat from diseases transmitted by an animal
vector and zoonotic diseases-diseases that can be transmitted from
animals to humans. The emergence of SARS in 2003 demonstrated that U.S.
health and global health are inextricably linked and that fulfilling
CDC's infectious diseases mission - to prevent illness, disability, and
death caused by infectious diseases in the United States and around the
world - requires global awareness and a focus on the overlap of animal
and human health.
It is estimated that 75 percent of emerging pathogens are zoonotic
in origin. High-priority bioterrorism agents (Category A agents)
include organisms that pose a risk to national security because they
can be easily disseminated or transmitted from person to person, result
in high mortality rates, and have the potential for major public health
impact. Five of the six CDC Category A potential agents of bioterrorism
are zoonotic. Agroterrorism is the threat of or deliberate introduction
of an animal or plant disease that would impact U.S. food systems. CDC
would become involved in a response if an animal disease were
introduced that affected human health. Vectors, such as insects or
ticks, are among the most common conduits for disease transmission from
animals to humans. Diseases transmitted by vectors are especially
difficult to control, as demonstrated by the rapid spread of West Nile
virus, which has so far infected more than 1.2 million Americans. Other
examples of vector-borne diseases include plague, tularemia, and many
hemorrhagic viruses, like Rift Valley fever. Current examples of this
risk are the epidemic of chikungunya virus in the Indian Ocean, the
jump of Rift Valley fever from Africa to Saudi Arabia, and outbreaks of
dengue along the U.S.-Mexican border. While it is difficult to predict
when and where the next zoonotic event will occur, all the critical
factors are in place to ensure that this new era of emerging zoonoses-
naturally or intentionally caused-will continue or even accelerate in
the future.
HHS and CDC Role in Agroterrorism Preparedness and Zoonotic Diseases
The health and security of the United States depends on our
preparedness against terrorism, including agroterrorism, as well as
other public health emergencies including the threats of zoonotic and
vector-borne diseases. These threats necessitate that we improve our
public health and medical systems so that we can respond with greater
flexibility, speed, and capacity in coordination with state and Federal
partners. As SARS and avian influenza have taught us, animal health
strategies impact public health, and the strategies to protect both
should be coordinated. Because animals and people are inextricably
linked, the possibility for exposure to zoonotic diseases is
unprecedented and presents new levels of threat and vulnerability.
HHS is responsible for leading Federal public health efforts to
ensure an integrated and focused national effort to anticipate and
respond to emerging threats from agroterrorism and zoonotic diseases.
Within HHS, CDC is gaining a better understanding of zoonotic disease
emergence, prevention, and control from quality research. By partnering
with other Federal agencies that focus on animal health and with state
governments and academic and private institutions, CDC is addressing
preparedness for an agroterrorism event due to a zoonotic disease.
Most notably to the public, HHS and CDC are leading the nation in
the area of avian influenza preparedness. This work fits within the
framework of the National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza
Implementation Plan published on May 3, 2006, by the White House
Homeland Security Council (HSC), and involves ongoing coordination with
the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Department of State
(DOS).
National Center for Zoonotic, Vector-Borne, and Enteric Diseases
(proposed)
While CDC's activities in avian flu preparedness are the most
publicized, they represent only one part of CDC's comprehensive
activities related to agroterrororism and zoonotic diseases.
Importantly, CDC is proposing a new organizational unit, the National
Center for Zoonotic, Vector-Borne, and Enteric Diseases (NCZVED), which
will bring together similarly focused programs and provide national and
international scientific and programmatic leadership for zoonotic,
vector-borne, foodborne, waterborne, mycotic, and related infections to
identify, investigate, diagnose, treat, and prevent these diseases. In
carrying out its mission, NCZVED will provide leadership, expertise,
and service in laboratory and epidemiological science, bioterrorism
preparedness, applied research, disease surveillance, outbreak
response, policy development, health communication, education and
training, and program implementation and evaluation. NCZVED will focus
on the continuing challenge of emerging and re-emerging zoonoses and
recognize the importance and need to work collaboratively, not just
across CDC and the traditional public health community but also with
agricultural, wildlife, and companion animal agencies and
organizations.
Surveillance and Epidemiology
A possible target of agroterrorism is the nation's food supply.
Surveillance of and epidemiologic response to disease are the
foundation of CDC's activities. Preparedness for naturally occurring
outbreaks better prepares the United States for the unexpected attack.
Routine disease surveillance systems coordinated by CDC provide an
essential early-information network to detect dangers in the food
supply. In addition, these systems can be used to indicate new or
changing patterns of foodborne illness and would likely detect early
cases of an agroterrorism event involving a zoonotic agent. For
example, PulseNet is a national network of public health and food
regulatory agency laboratories coordinated by CDC and consists of State
health departments, local health departments, the U.S. Department of
Agriculture (USDA), and HHS's Food and Drug Administration (FDA).
PulseNet plays a vital role in surveillance for and investigation of
foodborne illness outbreaks that were previously difficult to detect.
Participants perform standardized molecular subtyping (or
"fingerprinting") of foodborne disease-causing bacteria which are
submitted electronically to a dynamic database at CDC.
This database is available on demand to participants which allows
for rapid comparison of the patterns. When similar DNA patterns are
identified for foodborne disease-causing bacteria, scientists can
determine whether cases of illness are linked to the same food source,
even if the affected persons are geographically far apart. Outbreaks
can often be detected in a matter of days rather than weeks. As a
consequence, CDC can more rapidly alert FDA and USDA about implicated
food products associated with foodborne illness so that all three
agencies can take protective public health action.
PulseNet works in tandem with CDC's Foodborne Diseases Active
Surveillance Network (FoodNet), a collaboration among state health
departments, USDA, and FDA that closely monitors the human health
burden of foodborne diseases in the United States. FoodNet consists of
active surveillance for foodborne diseases and related epidemiologic
studies designed to help public health officials better understand the
epidemiology of foodborne diseases in the United States. These
surveillance networks have led to improvement in the public's health
and stand prepared to detect an agroterrorism event in the food supply.
For example, the incidence of E. coli O157 infections began to decrease
sharply after 2002, as investigations of PulseNet-identified clusters
focused attention on more specific controls at the level of ground
beef. By 2004, the incidence of E. coli O157 infections as measured in
FoodNet had dropped 42% since the baseline period of 1996-1998, and was
below the goal for Healthy People 2010. Since much of our food today is
imported, CDC has also emphasized the need for these systems to be more
global and to expand to detect more zoonotic agents and diseases.
CDC also has partnered the public health system with veterinary and
wildlife health partners at the Federal, state, and local levels in the
creation of ArboNET, a comprehensive CDC-developed system to monitor
West Nile virus and other mosquito-borne virus activity in the United
States.CDC is also working to build public health capacity abroad. With
the help of FY 2006 Emergency Supplemental funds, CDC is establishing
an on-ground regional presence with Global Disease Detection (GDD)
Response Centers in five key global areas: Egypt, Guatemala, Kenya,
Thailand, and PR China. This is part of CDC's efforts to strengthen
global surveillance capacity by establishing a network of Global
Disease Detection and Response Centers strategically placed in each of
the six WHO regions. Each GDD Response Center will design and implement
key interventions aimed at the early identification and containment of
pandemic health threats, whether an act of terrorism or the natural
emergence of a deadly infectious pathogen like pandemic influenza.
Laboratory Detection
A public health laboratory infrastructure that can provide test
results in hours rather than days is critical in the event of a
biological or chemical attack. The Laboratory Response Network (LRN)
was created in 1999, by CDC, the Association of Public Health
Laboratories (APHL), and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). The
LRN is a national network of local, state and Federal public health,
military, food testing, veterinary diagnostic, and environmental
testing laboratories that provides the laboratory infrastructure and
capacity to respond to biological and chemical terrorism and other
public health emergencies. The approximately 150 laboratories in the
LRN are affiliated with Federal agencies, military installations,
international partners, and state and local public health departments.
Since its inception, partnerships with FDA, USDA, and others have
helped to expand the LRN's capacity. FDA's Center for Food Safety and
Applied Nutrition (CFSAN) and Office of Regulatory Affairs (ORA) have
been working with the LRN on developing standardized food sample
testing methods for use among Food Emergency Response Network (FERN)
labs, some of which also operate as LRN-member laboratories. FERN is
jointly operated by FDA and USDA. FERN laboratories would be critical
in the recovery phase of an event by screening large numbers of food
samples. In addition, the LRN is also working with USDA's Animal and
Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) laboratory in Ames, Iowa, and
the veterinary diagnostic laboratory community to act as reference and
sentinel laboratories for the detection of zoonotic agents.To ensure
accurate testing of food samples, the LRN and FERN have worked on test
method harmonization for counter-terrorism purposes and have
participated in joint proficiency testing exercises. The networks have
conducted joint exercises for Bacillus anthracis, Francisella
tularensis, and Shigella spp. in vulnerable food commodities. The LRN
currently has 97 laboratoriess participating in food testing for select
biothreat agents, and it has participated in the development of the
FERN model for food surveillance testing and surge capacity.
Given that many Category A agents are zoonotic, the LRN has made an
effort to include the veterinary diagnostic laboratory (VDL) community
in the expansion of the LRN. The LRN currently includes nine VDLs,
including the APHIS laboratory in Ames, Iowa. VDLs in the LRN provide a
link between animal health and human health systems by conducting
animal health surveillance for zoonotic agents and performing food
testing. They also provide the LRN with surge capacity testing. The
American Association of Veterinary Laboratory Diagnosticians is an LRN
partner that helps recruit VDLs as LRN reference labs.Laboratory
capacity is further enhanced by Homeland Security Presidential
Directive 9 (HSPD-9) which calls for nationwide laboratory networks for
food, veterinary, and plant health that integrate existing federal and
state laboratory resources and are interconnected. Specifically, HSPD-9
requires HHS and USDA to develop robust, comprehensive, and fully
coordinated surveillance and monitoring systems that provide early
detection and awareness of disease, pest, or poisonous agents. In
response, CDC, FDA, and USDA created an interagency working group in
late 2004 to begin the process of coordinating their networks for
zoonotic disease surveillance. In 2005, the Department of Homeland
Security formed the Integrated Consortium of Laboratory Networks (ICLN)
to define the roles and responsibilities of each agency's laboratory
network. A memorandum of understanding is pending with FERN based on
roles and responsibilities spelled out in the response matrix of the
ICLN. The LRN is also working with the ICLN, USDA, and FDA on gap
analyses of laboratory testing capacity for three biological agent
scenarios, including avian influenza/human pandemic influenza. HSPD-9
also calls for the development of a National Veterinary Stockpile
(NVS). CDC is participating on USDA's advisory committee regarding the
creation of the NVS.
Select Agent Program
The Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and
Response Act of 2002 and the Agricultural Bioterrorism Protection Act
of 2002 (the Acts) require entities to register with HHS/CDC or USDA/
Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) if they possess,
use, or transfer select agents or toxins that could pose a severe
threat to public health and safety, to animal or plant health, or to
animal or plant products. In addition to ensuring that laboratories
safely handle these select agents and toxins, the Acts also require
laboratories to adopt safeguards and security measures including
controlling access, permitting the Attorney General to screen entities
and personnel (i.e., security risk assessments) and establishing a
national database of registered entities. The Acts also establish
criminal and civil penalties for failing to comply with the
requirements of the Acts.
"Overlap" select agents and toxins are those agents that have the
potential to pose a severe threat both to public health and safety and
to animal health or animal products and are subject to regulation by
both agencies. The Acts require that CDC and APHIS coordinate
activities in regard to "overlap" select agents and toxins so as to
minimize conflicts between the regulations and activities carried out
under the programs, minimize the administrative burden on the regulated
community, ensure the appropriate availability of select agents and
toxins for legitimate biomedical, agricultural or veterinary research,
education or other such purposes, and ensure that information on
entities possessing overlap select agents and toxins is available to
CDC and APHIS via a single shared web-based system.
State and Local Preparedness
CDC's Public Health Emergency Preparedness Cooperative Agreement
provides funding to states, select metropolitan areas, territories, and
other public health entities to develop emergency-ready public health
departments by upgrading, improving, and sustaining their preparedness
and response capabilities for "all-hazards" public health emergencies,
including terrorism, pandemic influenza, and other naturally-occurring
public health emergencies. These emergency preparedness and response
efforts support the National Response Plan and the National Incident
Management System.
In addition, the Centers for Public Health Preparedness (CPHP)
program was initiated by CDC in 2000, to strengthen terrorism and
emergency preparedness by linking academic expertise to state and local
health agency needs. This unique program brings together colleges and
universities with a common focus on public health preparedness to
establish a national network of education and training resources. CPHP
Network activities enhance collaboration across the CPHP Network and
with CDC, minimize duplication in development of materials, and
maximize outreach of existing resources. All 50 states, plus the
District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands are served in
some capacity (with at least one CPHP activity) through the 27 CDC-
funded Centers located within accredited Schools of Public
Health.Several CPHPs have expertise in agroterrorism-related work. For
example, Iowa State University College of Veterinary Medicine's Center
for Food Security and Public Health (CFSPH) was founded in July 2002,
as a Specialty Center in Public Health Preparedness for Veterinary
Medicine and Zoonotic Diseases. CFSPH integrates veterinary medicine
and expertise in zoonotic diseases and public health with the ongoing
activities and needs of preparing for emerging diseases.
Preparedness Goals
CDC is adapting to meet the challenges presented by terrorism and
emerging diseases. New strategies, innovations, and goals bring new
focus to the agency's work, allowing CDC to do even more to protect and
improve health. CDC has developed four major overarching goals one of
which is People Prepared for Emerging Health Threats. This goal will
address scenarios that include natural and intentional threats with an
emphasis on prevention and response to chemical, radiological, and
emerging threats including zoonoses (e.g., influenza, anthrax, and
plague).
Collaborations with Zoonotic Partners--World Organization for Animal
Health
CDC was recently selected to become a World Organization for Animal
Health (Office International des Epizooties, OIE) Collaborating Centre
for Emerging and Re-emerging Zoonoses. In this role, CDC will be better
equipped to forge stronger ties between the public health and animal
health sectors to detect, control, and prevent zoonoses.In addition,
CDC will send a veterinary public health expert to OIE for a temporary
assignment in fall 2006, to identify the most likely locations for
"twinning" of laboratories, with an aim at stronger integration between
animal and human health expertise, as well as establishment of longer
term collaboration between selected locations in developing countries
and well-established OIE Reference Laboratories. CDC will also support
a similar assignment to the United Nations' Food and Agriculture
Organization in Italy.
CDC is also seeking ways to build the veterinary public health
workforce internationally in countries for which CDC has traditionally
recruited physicians and public health epidemiologists for applied
public health training. CDC will incorporate fellowships for
veterinarians into its existing Field Epidemiology and Laboratory
Training Programs (FELTPs). Also, the director of CDC's International
Emerging Infections Program in Thailand will work with the OIE regional
representative to explore the potential for building relationships in
the region between CDC, Ministries of Health, and Ministries of
Agriculture.
World Health Organization
CDC will also send a staff person to the WHO for a temporary
assignment in fall 2006, to assist WHO's Department of Food Safety,
Zoonoses and Foodborne Diseases in determining the nature and extent of
the assistance needed by Member States to meet the obligations of the
International Health Regulation (2005) for animal- and food-related
emergencies. The assignee will work with staff in charge of WHO
surveillance systems to assess incoming reports of zoonotic and
foodborne disease outbreaks and to identify the assistance needed such
as increased surveillance, information exchange, technical cooperation,
and capacity building.
American Association of Veterinary Medical Colleges
CDC works with the American Association of Veterinary Medical
Colleges on curriculum development and fellowship opportunities to
better prepare the veterinary workforce for addressing the animal-human
health overlap. Fourteen veterinary colleges currently have public
health programs and new courses are being developed that train and
prepare veterinarians for bioterrorism, public health, and biomedical
research careers. In addition, veterinarians serve in many roles in the
public health workforce at CDC including participating in CDC's
Epidemic Intelligence Service and Emerging Infectious Diseases
Laboratory Fellowship Program.
Integrating the food safety and food defense efforts of Federal,
state, and local public health, veterinary and food safety officials is
of critical importance. CDC is collaborating with FDA, USDA, and the
Council of Association Presidents to raise awareness of current and
emerging issues and to promote coordination. The Council comprises the
ten leading public health, veterinary, and food safety associations
that work the spectrum of food safety and food defense, from animal
feed to human health. The collective expertise and collaboration of
these associations are essential to develop and implement integrated
efforts, provide needed training, and build the multi-disciplinary
capacity necessary to address food-related emergencies.
Conclusion
At this time, the scope, scale, and consequences to human and
animal health from zoonotic and agroterrorism threats are
unprecedented. Preparing for zoonotic threats requires a merging of
responsibilities at the animal-human interface, and this preparation is
leading to significant progress in CDC's ability to prepare for and
respond to an agroterrorism event. Frequent collaboration on outbreak
detection and response and close coordination among Federal and State
food safety, public health, law enforcement, and intelligence-gathering
agencies have resulted in enhancement to the nation's public health
systems. These systems improve our nation's ability to respond to
naturally occurring events and prepare the United States for a possible
agroterrorism attack. Thank you for this opportunity to discuss our
preparedness efforts.. I would be pleased to respond to any questions.
Mr. Linder. Thank you, Dr. King.
Dr. Knipling, you mentioned modern tools and new
technologies in two different sentences for detecting these
kinds of things. Explain what you mean by that.
Dr. Knipling. These are largely based upon our new
understandings of molecular biology, which are then rooted in
genomics, the gene identification and sequencing of organisms
and pathogens, and then very sensitive and rapid detection
technologies based upon that knowledge that distinguish between
species and strains and mutations and the like.
Mr. Linder. Are you surprised that we have not seen much of
the avian influenza outbreak lately?
Dr. Knipling. No, not surprised. We have a long experience
with avian influenza, much longer than most realize, over 40
years of experience in this country with the low pathogenic
strains.
Mr. Linder. H5N1?
Dr. Knipling. We have a tremendous base of knowledge. There
are both low pathogenic and high pathogenic strains of H5N1 and
in fact, the U.S. has experienced the low pathogenic strains on
a number of occasions over 40 years. So we have a lot of
experience, we already have the capability to prevent it and I
think the fact that we have not seen it in this country is
testimony that that technology is already in place. Yet, we
need to remain vigilant for the new challenges that come our
way.
Mr. Linder. You mentioned anthrax spores infecting cattle.
Does that--if humans eat that beef, does that bother them?
Dr. Knipling. Potentially. Anthrax contamination in cattle
is actually quite common, it occurs every year, there are
several outbreaks in the northern great plains right now this
year. It is quite common. It is very rare for humans to detect
it from infected cattle, but yes, it would be theoretically
possible. We do know that cooking and proper handling of meet
would deactivate the pathogen. But under improper conditions,
it could be a rare case of infection.
Mr. Linder. Dr. Runge, when you talk about one medicine,
are you talking about a broadcast kind of vaccine that is based
on DNA as opposed to one drug/one bug?
Dr. Runge. When we refer to one medicine, Mr. Chairman, we
are really talking about one approach, regardless of where the
organism arises from. The issue of a vaccine that is sort of a
universal vaccine has been around for awhile. The vaccine
experts that I have spoken with about it are not hopeful of
anything soon, although it is still very much on the radar
screen of vaccine researchers.
Clearly, the opportunity to enhance and revamp the way we
do vaccines in this country has been made possible by the
appropriation for avian flu, the $4 billion that has been made
available. And frankly, the HHS and the vaccine industry have
made great strides in a very short amount of time in improving
their systems over the next few years.
But as far as a universal vaccine, I am not aware that that
is around the corner.
Mr. Linder. Dr. King, you talked about collaborating with
public health agencies. Are you doing anything to collaborate
with international corporations, which most of this flu stuff
comes, for example, out of southeast Asia and a lot of
international corporations have plants in China and southeast
Asia. If they have a significant uptick in sick leave, are we--
is CDC getting on that?
Dr. King. We are already emphasizing sort of a new
marketing strategy where we really bring in business. CDC now
has a new concept of a Business Round Table where we actually
bring business community CEOs in to talk about how public
health really affects the bottom line of their industries. In
terms of large agribusinesses, that is very true, whether in
Brazil or southeast Asia, they are very much in tune to
biosecurity. We learn from each other, and I think the public/
private partnership is an area that we need to look at more but
CDC is actually doing that now and bringing CEOs from these
corporations and getting more engaged with them as partners.
Mr. Linder. What kind of response network do you have for
zoonotic or animal infections or problems?
Dr. King. Well, I mentioned the LRN system, the Laboratory
Response Network, which was really started as a public health
human entity. It is now being expanded to environmental
laboratories, food laboratories and veterinary diagnostic
laboratories. So we now see these communities starting to be
pulled together. The pathogens really do not care what their
host is, whether it is four-legged or two-legged. Because they
are zoonotic, we have to be prepared to have veterinary
diagnostic labs, veterinary practitioners as well as physicians
and hospitals, all on the alert and sharing information. And
that is partly what the LRN does.
Dr. Runge. Mr. Chairman, could I also make a comment about
this as well?
Mr. Linder. Go ahead.
Dr. Runge. DHS, through its Sector Coordinating Council,
which basically all the owners of the infrastructure are part
of the Sector Coordinating Councils and the Government
Coordinating Councils which are the government entities that
are associated. One of the critical sectors as you well know is
food and agriculture and we have a very robust private sector,
public/private partnership essentially in these councils.
And with respect to surveillance from overseas cases and so
forth, the reason that we are standing up the National
Biosurveillance Integration System is to take advantage of
various sources, whether it is the armed forces military
intelligence command, whether it is the CDC, whether it is Bio-
Sense which CDC operates, Bio-Watch, which we operate; we need
to integrate all of those surveillance activities to make sure
that we can see early signs of such an outbreak.
Mr. Linder. Thank you. I believe that the State Department
is talking to the CDC now about getting some medical officers
at the embassies some epidemiology training as they go
overseas, and I think all that is helpful.
Thank you all.
The gentleman from Georgia, Mr. Scott, for five minutes.
Mr. Scott. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Let us start with the nature of our food chain, let us
start with the imbalance of our export/import ratio of our
trade balance for agricultural products. As you know, the
United States is going down in the level of exports. The amount
of exports that we export to the world is almost down now from
17 percent to almost like 11 percent. Meanwhile our import of
foodstuffs into this country is going up to about 13 percent.
Specific crops and products, for example, bananas, tomatoes, 90
percent of those food lines comes from someplace else. It seems
to me that if we are going to really be prepared for this, we
have to put our minds into the thinking of these terrorists. We
need to learn, for example, from what happened in London. Who
would have thought a liquid being made a bomb.
Our efforts are on transportation, but these people come
here at one checkpoint, we can check them. Our food chain is
all over the place and I am wondering if on one point, I would
like an answer, what are we doing with our international
trading partners? It seems to me at the point of origin we need
to have some protective measures in place. How are we moving in
that direction, would be my first one. Either one of you can
answer that but I think that, Dr. Runge, you being the Homeland
Security representative here, you might want to start that.
Dr. Runge. I will quickly defer to the two experts I have
on either side of me, one whom I believe used to run the Animal
and Plant Inspection Service. As you know, Congressman Scott,
part of the APHIS came over to DHS when the department was
stood up, and this has to do with the border inspections.
Congressman Barrow referred to this as well.
We work very, very closely with USDA to make sure that
there is a systematic approach towards food and agricultural
inspections at the border as well as traveler security.
That having been said, I could not agree with you more that
the point of export is also a very, very good place to do
security checks and frankly, with the amount of cargo coming
in, it is daunting, to make sure that every single container
that might contain something bad is in fact checked.
The approach that DHS has taken to such cargo security is
in fact looking at very large threats, and in fact, the things
that worry the Secretary and I the most are nuclear security
and biosecurity. I believe that we will be putting more and
more attention towards that in the months to come.
With respect to the specifics, I will defer to these
experts.
Dr. Knipling. Well, I would just acknowledge that USDA does
have protocols in place. As was pointed out by Dr. Runge, some
of those responsibilities shifted to the Department of Homeland
Security, but some of those protocols at that time were
continued by that agency. The two agencies worked together.
I do know that there are regulatory protocols on both the--
at the point of export, pre-inspection, if you will, and then
again at the point of import to the United States. This varies
according to the country, the commodity, the time of the year
and so forth, there are many variables and the problem is one
size does not fit all.
Mr. Scott. Let me ask you specifically, if I may,
Afghanistan, Pakistan, that mideast region, those nations,
there are products that we bring in and we have some level of
trade with those. Specifically are you satisfied with the level
of checks that we have with those specific countries in the
middle east?
Dr. Knipling. I am really not familiar with the specifics
there and I would hesitate to comment on that specifically.
Certainly would seek to find answers to your questions in that
regard.
Mr. Scott. Okay. One other thing, Dr. King, before my time
slips away from me. You mentioned in your testimony that the
CDC is addressing preparedness for an act of terrorism event
due to a zoonotic disease. Can you give us what that event
might be and can you give us some specifics on that?
Dr. King. There are a number of agents that we continue to
monitor and watch and there are groups of classifications of
agents that we monitor and know. Dr. Knipling talked about a
disease such as Rift Valley, which has similar--could have a
similar origin to what we saw with West Nile virus moving from
Africa to the mideast. It is mosquito-borne and we have in this
country competent vectors, mosquito-vectors, that are ready to
carry this disease that is zoonotic in nature. And so part of
the preparedness is to understand those mechanisms, to not just
look at our borders' end, but also look globally because we
know that a problem in one country can be our problem in 24
hours. We know what those diseases are, and we are working with
the World Health Organization and others. In terms of more of a
global monitoring system that really came out during the in
SARS outbreak, that was the real lesson learned during SARS,
which was the ability to put together a global system rapidly.
Mr. Scott. Have we done any research on what would be the
most logical event? Have we put any scenarios in place? We do
that--I am on the national security group and we do that war
games in Carlisle, Pennsylvania. Do we have anything working
where we are into this bioterrorism area where we have logical
scenarios that are going on, to our best knowledge, to be
prepared?
Dr. Runge. Yes, sir, we do. I might also say that, just as
Chairman Linder was speaking earlier about prevention, the
global prevention effort involving not only looking at things
but looking at people and trends, we have a relationship with
our own information and analysis, our intelligence sector at
DHS, to address biosecurity issues, and we do exactly that.
We also have 15 planning scenarios that have been
discussed, there are five that deal with biologic events--
smallpox, anthrax, yersinia pestic and pandemic influenza, and
foot and mouth disease. We are in the process of identifying
resources to do specific planning and play book development
against those four scenarios.
On top of that, we also--there are things that keep us up
at night that are not part of those scenarios that are in fact
based in our best knowledge.
Mr. Linder. The time of the gentleman has expired.
Mr. Scott. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Linder. The gentleman from Evans wish to inquire?
Dr. Norwood. Yes, sir. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I have two questions, gentlemen, and I hope maybe each of
you can respond to it, but prior to that, inspections at the
border. Dr. Knipling, can you give me some idea how much
poultry and how much beef we import into this country on our
southern border?
Dr. Knipling. I do not have those statistics, I do not
know.
Dr. Norwood. Anybody know?
Mr. Linder. Would you be willing to get those answers and
send them?
Dr. Knipling. Yes, of course.
Mr. Linder. Thank you.
Dr. Norwood. Really what I am asking is how much of that is
inspected, what percent of that beef and chicken that comes in.
It is great to have all these programs but the bottom line is
are we doing it. And I would really very much like to know
that.
Avian bird flu, gentlemen, is pretty important to us, at
least it is to me. I have got a whole lot of chickens in my
district and in my state and that avian bird flu tends to make
me worry just a little bit. I know we are doing great research
here in Georgia, the Department of Agriculture Southeastern
Poultry, which I am happy about of course, and the University
of Georgia Ag Research Center. Who else though is doing
research on avian bird flu around the country or around the
world? Or is it just us?
Dr. Knipling. In addition to the USDA ARS efforts right
here at Athens, Georgia, there is a network of the land grant
universities, including the University of Georgia that has
capabilities and they are working together under an umbrella
projects.
There are research efforts also in other countries around
the world. Again, I do not have the specifics but it is a very
close network. Our scientists here at Athens, USDA scientists,
are very well connected. They themselves are internationally
recognized, providing leadership to this worldwide effort. But
also we do in fact benefit from sharing knowledge with other
countries, other researchers.
Dr. Norwood. So there is a sharing process. Gentlemen,
either doctor want to respond to that, have a comment about
that?
Dr. Runge. Dr. Norwood, I am not aware of who all
specifically is doing this worldwide. However, the Science and
Technology Director at DHS does have centers of excellence in
universities, particularly at Texas A&M, which are doing
various studies of not only avian influenza, but also--
Dr. Norwood. Now are they talking to your people?
Dr. Runge. Yes, absolutely.
Dr. Norwood. That is sort of what I am trying to find out.
How much money are we spending perhaps as a nation to
prevent an attack through poultry, a terrorist attack?
Dr. Knipling. Specifically on the avian influenza, we have
a base program prior to this fiscal year of about $2 million.
We did receive the emergency avian influenza supplemental, USDA
received close to $90 million there, of which roughly 10
percent is directed toward the research function and the
balance for some of these international preventive, training,
diagnosis activities.
We also have pending in our fiscal 2007 budget request some
significant new resources as well. So we are rapidly
accelerating the activity in this area.
Dr. Norwood. Dr. Runge, do you have--we were talking about
vaccines a minute ago. Do we have a vaccine for avian flu?
Dr. Runge. We have a vaccine for--we have a limited number
of vaccine doses for the virus currently that causes avian flu,
that would be given to humans. There are vaccines that could be
given to birds as well, and in fact other countries do
vaccinate their birds. We do not.
Dr. Norwood. If we had an outbreak, can we protect America?
Dr. Runge. Well the hard truth of this is that it takes
time to develop a specific vaccine using a specific virus that
would make people sick. So we actually have to wait until
people get sick before we can harvest the virus and begin
vaccine production, which does have a lag time because of the
relatively antiquated technology of our vaccine manufacturers,
which is why I think Congress stood up to the plate and
actually stimulated the development of more cell-based and
perhaps DNA-based vaccine manufacturing.
Dr. Norwood. With your permission, Mr. Chairman, I will
have some written questions on that very subject.
And lastly, one thing that I am interested in is which
agency is in charge? Who is the general? Should we have a
zoonotic agent attack in this country, who is in charge?
Dr. Runge. I will be happy to answer that, sir. It sounds a
little arcane, but USDA has been handling the zoonotic agent
outbreaks in this country for a long, long time and doing a
very good job, not just federally, but their state partners who
put a tremendous amount of resources into this, are very well
equipped to deal with things on the state level. Particularly
this state is way, way out in front of most states in doing so.
Once such an outbreak would escape the ability of one
federal agency or state agencies to deal with it and a request
for assistance at the federal level would be made, it would
become an incident of national significance in which case the
President is always in charge, but his designee is the
Secretary of Homeland Security, and Secretary Chertoff would be
in charge of an incident of national significance.
Dr. Norwood. So if it is animal or human, the Secretary
would be in charge.
Dr. Runge. If it escapes the ability of the USDA to manage
it, if it crossed inter-agency jurisdictions or if a state
asked for federal assistance, then it may very well be declared
an incident of national significance.
Dr. Norwood. Have we done anything in terms of training
with an anticipation of that? For example, disaster people do
training all the time, the Army does training all the time,
Marine Corps does training all time. Have we ever done anything
in this country to be prepared for a zoonotic attack where all
agencies had to be coordinated, where Homeland Security
Secretary was in charge?
Dr. Runge. We have done so with respect to avian influenza,
not just in birds but after it would cross over into the human
species. We are also anticipating a table top exercise in
fiscal year 2007 on foot and mouth disease.
Mr. Linder. Did you not have a table top exercise in the
White House?
Dr. Runge. Yes, sir.
Mr. Linder. On avian influenza?
Dr. Runge. We did indeed, in December, cabinet level.
Dr. Norwood. Tell me how you do that. How did you have that
in the White House?
Dr. Runge. It is actually over in the Executive Office
Building in one of those big pretty rooms.
Dr. Norwood. I am talking about a big scale thing, I am
talking about way they train, for example, for a disaster if
Augusta, Georgia is hit by a bomb. We do training alerts for
that.
What have we done about that to--the military will tell you
right quick you are not worth your salt if you do not train,
train, train.
Dr. Runge. Absolutely. I must step back a second. The first
thing was that the Secretary of HHS and a representative,
mostly me and my colleagues in Preparedness, visited all 50
states and territories to meet with state and local officials,
folks from the faith community, the emergency response
community, the schools, et cetera, to offer them resources and
to walk through the necessity to do exactly what you are
talking about, Dr. Norwood, and that is to plan on the local
level. Preparedness ultimately is a local event. As we saw in
Katrina and other disasters, the local response is people's
preparedness. The federal government can step in and do certain
things within its limitations, but you are exactly right, in
effect, the ability to plan, train and resource appropriately
is in fact a very, very local exercise.
Dr. Norwood. Mr. Chairman, unanimous consent for just 30
seconds.
Dr. King and Dr. Knipling, are you real excited about
Homeland Security being the lead dog in this? No offense.
Dr. Knipling. As Dr. Runge said, we are very closely
connected. If there were an outbreak of avian influenza in this
country, it probably would show up first in bird species,
either domestic poultry or wild birds. USDA, in connection with
the Department of Interior with respect to wildlife, would have
a primary first role, but we are very well connected for the
handoff. There is a lot of overlap between animal infection and
human infection and we would both be involved at that
interface.
Dr. King. Yes, sir, I do not really care who is in charge,
I want to make sure it is an effective response and if it is
Homeland Security, we are certainly players in that,
participate and involved in the planning. And we would have no
problems moving ahead that way.
Dr. Norwood. A lot of people are concerned about who is in
charge of our borders.
Mr. Linder. The time of the gentleman has expired.
The gentleman from Athens wish to inquire?
Mr. Barrow. Yes, sir, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First of all, Dr. Runge, I heard you respond to Dr.
Norwood's questions about who is taking primary responsibility
for ag inspections and you said the USDA has been way out in
front for a long time. And I think I heard you acknowledge that
the Georgia Department of Agriculture has also been in the lead
in this area. Can you help me understand how we compare to
other states in that regard? I want to know more about that.
Dr. Runge. You know, I will get myself in trouble if I
start comparing states. Let me just again offer that--and
actually I met this morning with some folks from your state's
leadership on exactly this topic. I think you are going to hear
some more about this in the next panel as well.
I think because you are number one in poultry production,
the issue of agrodefense is very, very, very appropriately of
concern to Georgians. You are first in agrosecurity educational
programs. There is a curriculum that is actually floating
around this room right now that is certainly way out in front
and could be a national model. You already have a response
capacity built into your state government integrating public
health, agricultural inspections and response with the public/
private partnership. You have got agricultural response teams
that they call SART teams. There really has been a tremendous
amount of activity. Could be because your Governor is a
veterinarian. I would like to think that every state could do
that.
Mr. Barrow. Well, it could be because we have got some good
leadership in the Ag Department on behalf of Dr. Myers who is
the co-author of Dr. Brown's report and who is Assistant
Commissioner for Agriculture in charge of the animal industry
and also on behalf of Tommy Irvin, I want to thank you all for
acknowledging what they are doing here right and let us see if
we cannot get others to follow examples that we are setting
here.
I want to follow up on something that Charlie Norwood asked
about, another thing he asked about, that concerns me.
He says you work real hard to coordinate your efforts with
USDA, to make ag inspections more systematic. What I want to
know is what actually has been done to make them any different
since 9/11. Dr. Norwood tried to--he moved into this area by
asking how much of the ag imports are being inspected. We all
know, for example, that only something like five percent of
containerized shipping is getting any kind of inspection before
it gets to this country and it is not being inspected until it
gets to this country. The five percent that is being inspected
is being done in places in ports like Savannah, not at the
ports of disembarkation--embarkation.
I am concerned about how ag inspections are being done
differently now. Can anyone--I heard Dr. Norwood ask and no one
could answer how much is being inspected. Can anyone tell us
how much more is being inspected, in terms of a percentage of
the whole now as compared to how much was being inspected
before 9/11?
Dr. Knipling. I do not have that information, but again, I
will seek to--
Mr. Barrow. Dr. Runge, can you zero in on that information
and get that for us as well?
Dr. Knipling, you said that DHS has worked hard with your
agency to make sure that inspection protocols are in place. It
is one thing for protocols to be in pace and it is another for
protocols to be being followed, actually being implemented. Can
you tell us whether or not the protocols that have been adopted
by DHS in coordination with your Department are actually being
implemented, actually being followed?
Dr. Knipling. I guess--
Mr. Barrow. It is one thing to agree that this is the
procedure we ought to follow and it takes a long time to agree
on what the procedure we ought to follow ought to be, but then
it takes even more time to actually get around to doing it. How
are we coming on that score?
Dr. Knipling. Yes. Again, I cannot speak authoritatively on
that specific issue.
Mr. Barrow. Okay. Well, let me direct your attention, as I
did in my opening statement, to the report of the GAO that was
issued earlier this year. Are you all familiar with the GAO's
scoring of our efforts in this regard? Anybody familiar with
that report?
Dr. Runge. I am not, sir.
Mr. Barrow. One thing they said is that the Department of
Homeland Security has not developed performance measures for ag
inspections. We are essentially doing things the way we were
doing it before, the way the USDA was doing it before the war
on terror was really launched in 9/11, against us.
And the question I have is are there performance measures
for ag inspections that have been adopted? Again, it gets back
to my question, are we doing anything differently in the area
of ag inspection now as compared to the way we were doing it
back then? Can anybody answer that now?
Dr. Runge. Let me just say, I am not sure what the right
number is. I know that the protocols are designed to make sure
that there is a systematic, not necessarily random, but a
systematic approach to inspections at the border. I would be
very surprised if our Customs and Border Protection folks were
not adhering to those assiduously. They are a bit nimble when
it comes to turning up surveillance under certain conditions
like the importation of birds and bird parts. They certainly
have become more attuned to smuggling of live birds that show
up in live bird markets, which are then in turn inspected by
the USDA.
So I have no evidence to suggest that the protocols needed
a complete transformation after 9/11, but we will certainly be
happy to talk to you some more about that.
Mr. Barrow. One of the concerns that I would have would be
that if there was going to be an attack launched against us, it
would be in the area of bulk imports, not in the exotic, weird
stuff, it would be hiding in plain sight in the massive
quantities of stuff that we consume in massive quantities. I
would like to know more about that.
Also the GAO said that there are no staffing performance
measures, no real measures to decide how many people we need in
order to carry out these inspection responsibilities. No
standards have been adopted to tell us how many folks we need
in order to do this work in this heightened area of concern.
When are we going to have some staffing, some performance
levels as far as staffing is concerned?
Dr. Runge. I will certainly share that concern with
Commissioner Basham, and we will get back to you on that, sir.
Mr. Barrow. All right, sir. I see that my time is running
out, Mr. Chairman, thank you.
Mr. Linder. The time of the gentleman has expired. All time
has expired. We want to thank Dr. Knipling, Dr. Runge, Dr.
King.
Mr. Scott. Could I ask unanimous consent to ask one final
question that I think is appropriate before we leave?
Have we had an event? Have we come close to one? What is
our threat level as far as bioterrorism or an attempt at our
food chain? Do we have evidence that Al Qaeda, anybody, has
made an attempt to impact our food chain, with a terrorist
attack on our food chain?
Dr. Runge. Congressman Scott, we have no evidence that that
has occurred. That does not mean that we are not ever vigilant
in this. I believe someone mentioned Secretary Thompson on the
way out making the speech. It certainly is one of Secretary
Chertoff's highest priorities in terms of biodefense. We are
doing a large number of activities related to biodefense, many
of which the Chairman is very familiar with with respect to
threat characterization and so forth. We would be remiss if we
were not vigilant about this particular topic. And in fact, I
would like to assure you that we are.
Mr. Scott. Do you recall in the report, coming through our
southwestern borders, so far there have been about 1600
individuals of Islamic or middle east--our borders are being
used, drug trafficking, illegals and so forth. To what extent
is your knowledge, are you aware of that? Do you have any
substantial information that says our borders are being used as
a way of getting individuals in? I cannot recall the incident,
but we had somebody appear before our National Democratic Group
on National Security, who stated that certain individuals came
through and they had on them some composition of what it takes
to transport mad cow disease.
Dr. Runge. I certainly am not prepared to discuss that
today, Congressman, but I will point out that Secretary
Chertoff yesterday had a press conference about the borders and
cited a number of statistics showing tremendous progress over
the last six to 12 months on the number of individuals with
respect to catch and release versus catch and return. The issue
that he presented yesterday was asking for Congressional help
with some particular court orders that DHS is laboring against
with respect to having to release non-Mexican individuals at
the southern border.
I appreciate your attention to that as well.
Mr. Scott. But could you--would you confirm that report
about 1600 individuals of Islamic beliefs or faith were caught
coming through our southern borders?
Dr. Runge. I cannot confirm that.
Mr. Scott. Thank you.
Mr. Linder. Thank you all. I want to just remind you, Jeff,
you and I have talked about this several times, that you have
told me and the Secretary has told me that the greatest
catastrophic events would be nuclear or biological and we spend
one out of eight dollars on airlines. It is time to get some
proportionality here.
Thank you all.
Dr. Runge. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Linder. If I can invite our next panel to come forth--
Dr. Brown, Dr. Williams and Mr. Black.
I would like to now welcome the three distinguished
witnesses on the second panel. Dr. Corrie Brown from the
University of Georgia. She is the Coordinator of the
International Veterinary Medicine and Professor of Veterinary
Pathology at the University of Georgia College of Veterinary
Medicine and the former director of the Plum Island Animal
Disease Center.
Dr. Paul Williams is the Special Assistant to the Director
of the Georgia Emergency Management Agency and is an expert in
emergency response and agroterrorism issues.
Mr. Black, Gary Black, is a current member of the Georgia
Rural Development Council and is former president of the
Georgia Agribusiness Council. Welcome all.
Dr. Brown.
STATEMENT OF DR. CORRIE BROWN, JOSIAH MEIGS DISTINGUISHED
TEACHING PROFESSOR, SCHOOL OF VETERINARY MEDICINE, UNIVERSITY
OF GEORGIA
Dr. Brown. Thank you for the opportunity to be here. I am a
professor of pathology in the College of Veterinary Medicine. I
would like to correct a statement that you made. I was not
director of the Plum Island Animal Disease Center, but I was
the chief pathologist there.
Mr. Linder. Well, I would have made you director if I could
have.
[Laughter.]
Dr. Brown. I am not sure I want it. While I was there, I
worked on several of the diseases that are the subject of this
hearing. Foot and mouth disease, rinderpest, classical swine
fever, Rift Valley fever, Newcastle, avian influenza.
I came to the University of Georgia in 1996. I continue to
interact with USDA, FDA, DHS and Department of Health and Human
Services.
I am the witness here, but I would like to say that what I
am going to talk about has to do with what we have done in the
State of Georgia. I gathered information for my testimony from
the very synergistic, multi-disciplinary team that we have
here, the Committee on Agriculture and Food Defense. Lee Myers
is the Chair of that Committee, so she is the co-author of the
testimony. Many of the members of that committee are in this
room and I want to acknowledge them for all of their help and
all the hard work that we have done over the last few years.
Okay, let me start with some definitions. The title of this
hearing is ``Agroterrorism's Perfect Storm: Where Human and
Animal Diseases Collide''. You know, I am not sure that is
accurate. Let us define zoonotic disease. This is any disease
that can be transferred from animals to humans. Of the 1400
diseases of people, 840 are zoonotic. So most human diseases
are zoonotic.
Then we have got the bioterror agents, the CDC list,
between 26 and 30, depending on how they are clustered. Almost
all of those are zoonotic, but that is a small subset of
overall zoonotic diseases.
Then we have agroterror. Agroterror is not about making
people sick, it is about the economy. Agroterror is either
introducing diseases into livestock that will destroy the
economy of the agricultural sector or it is about introducing
something into the food, which is going to cause hysteria and
economic impact.
So if we look at examples of agroterror of livestock
diseases--foot and mouth disease, rinderpests. Foot and mouth
disease in the UK, $12 billion. Classical swine fever in the
Netherlands, $2 billion. Newcastle disease in California, $1
billion. Those are all real, all accidental introduction, and
not a single human being sick.
Then we have got other diseases like Rift Valley fever
which was mentioned earlier, in the Arabian peninsula, caused
both agricultural problems and human illness, also accidental--
big impact.
And of course, highly pathogenic avian influenza, all over
southeast Asia, both agricultural impact and human disease.
The other aspect of agrocare is food contamination. It has
happened. It has happened many times accidentally. Big outbreak
with ice cream, big outbreak with hamburgers, big outbreak with
deli meat. All accidental.
We do know that there has been many instances of
intentional contamination of food. As was mentioned earlier,
with our systems of agriculture, they are so vast, they are so
integrated, something gets in, it is going to be all over. This
is with both livestock diseases and food contamination. And as
people mentioned earlier, terrorists know this, they know it
can happen, they know how easy it is, they know it will be big
impact.
The bottom line is, as Representative Norwood said--excuse
me, as Congressman Scott said--an ounce of prevention is worth
a pound of cure. We need to be able to detect the first
instance of an incursion and we need to be able to respond.
This is just as true for accidental as it is for intentional
incursion. And we are at great risk of accidental incursion
just because of globalization. So we may as well prepare for
the accidental as well as the intentional.
All emergencies are local. I believe, having worked with
both the central government and now working at the state level,
that there is a perception at the central level that the
federal government is going to come in and fix everything. That
is not true. I see it from a state perspective that everything
happens locally. We have to get people on the ground prepared,
aware, able to respond rapidly. The amount of damage that we
are going to feel is directly proportional to how long it takes
to detect the problem and get rid of it.
Okay, we have to respond. So we are fortunate in that the
State of Georgia, ag and food defense has been made a priority,
a state priority. Our state leaders have seen to that and that
has allowed us to take advantage of the funding that comes from
DHS to the states. And you can see in the testimony on page 6
all of the accomplishments that our committee has done.
National curriculum on agrocare, agrosecurity. We have trained
2500 people in the state.
We have the state agricultural response teams in place. We
have over 500 people trained in incident command systems. We
have done exercises. But no state stands alone. Georgia can be
very well prepared, but if say Alabama is not, then both states
are at risk.
So what I would like to leave you with are recommendations
which is in the testimony on the last page. I see three gaps.
The first gap is we need a comprehensive national strategy
for agriculture and food defense. We loved HSPD-9. That was
wonderful, it was an initial road map. But there has not been
anything substantive to follow up with that. No national
strategy. It has to include state and local governments.
The second gap is that food and agriculture defense has not
been identified by DHS as one of the national priorities.
Consequently, many states cannot take advantage of it unless
they select that as an elective, so that leaves many gaps.
And the third thing is that funding for states is really
inconsistent. Most of it comes from USDA and it tends to be
fairly meager. And for terrorism money that went to states, of
a billion dollars, only five percent was for agriculture and
food defense. So I think we are at great risk. We may need some
sort of system where states can use money regionally, so that
states can work together and not everyone has to reinvent the
wheel.
Thank you.
Mr. Linder. Thank you, Dr. Brown.
Dr. Williams.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Brown follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dr. Corrie C. Brown
Corrie Brown:
I am a veterinary pathologist and focus in infectious diseases that
affect livestock, especially those diseases that are not present in the
United States. Subsequent to attaining my PhD at the University of
California at Davis, I spent ten years as chief pathologist at the
United States Department of Agriculture's Plum Island Animal Disease
Center. There I worked for both the Agricultural Research Service and
the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service. I specialized in the
diagnosis and control of several diseases that might be used in an
agroterror attack, including foot-and-mouth disease, rinderpest, highly
pathogenic avian influenza, and Newcastle disease. Since leaving the
USDA in 1996, I took my current post as professor of veterinary
pathology at the UGA College of Veterinary Medicine, and I continue to
visit Plum Island frequently and to consult and explore ways of
defending us against the diseases which can be used for agroterrorism.
For six years (1998 - 2004), I served on the Secretary of Agriculture's
Advisory Committee on Foreign Animal and Poultry Diseases, including
two years as co-chair.
I have written numerous articles and spoken at dozens of forums
about the economic impact of a foreign animal disease entering the
United States and how easy it would be for such an incursion to happen.
I'm pleased to say that I coined the word "agroterror" in an attempt to
increase awareness of this problem. The word first appeared in The
Philadelphia Enquirer in 1999 when reporter Steve Goldstein quoted me
in stating that agroterror constituted an overlooked threat to the
United States. With Dr. Lee Myers, I am co-author of a 400-page manual
entitled Agrosecurity: Protecting America's Food and Agriculture, which
includes a special section for the State of Georgia.
Lee Myers:
I am the State Veterinarian and the Assistant Commissioner of
Animal Industry for the Georgia Department of Agriculture. I have a
Masters in Public Health and am board certified in the American College
of Veterinary Preventive Medicine. Over the last decade, I have
spearheaded various teams to develop state emergency preparedness and
response plans for foreign animal diseases, such as foot-and-mouth
disease, bovine spongiform encephalopathy, West Nile virus, and avian
influenza. Following 9-11, I realized the need to coordinate state
resources and focus our efforts on agriculture and food defense, and I
created the Committee on Agriculture and Food Defense. As a result of
those initiatives, the Director of the Georgia Office of Homeland
Security appointed me in the spring of 2006 as the inaugural
representative of agriculture and food defense on the State Homeland
Security Task Force. I continue to lead the state's strategic plan for
agroterror and agriculture emergency management, and I serve as the
subgrantee for the State Homeland Security funding for agriculture and
food.
My efforts at the state level have been recognized by national and
international colleagues. I am President Elect of the U.S. Animal
Health Association, serve on the National Food and Agriculture Sector
Government Coordinating Council, and am a member of the Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention Board of Scientific Counselors. I have
spoken at numerous national and international conferences about the
role of states in emergency management operations, and the challenges
of providing training, protecting critical infrastructure and key
resources, and building response capability for biological threats.
Introduction
As stated in the hearing synopsis, "The purpose of this hearing is
to increase awareness of the relationships between zoonotic diseases,
bioterrorism and agroterrorism and will focus on prevention and
preparedness strategies."
In order to increase awareness of the relationships, some
definitions of each of the terms are in order:
Zoonotic disease refers to any disease of humans where the
infectious agent was acquired from an animal source.
Biological terrorism, or bioterrorism, is the use of
biological agents or their toxins against humans for the
purposes of creating terror or to gain some political,
monetary, or social advantage.
Agroterror is defined as the intentional use of any CBRNE
(chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, or explosive)
weapon against the nation's agricultural and food industries,
with the purpose of destroying these resources and causing
serious economic harm to the nation.
What is the relationship among the three?
Zoonotic disease is a big umbrella category that includes a huge
range of infectious agents. These include such headline organisms as
SARS, Ebola, tularemia and anthrax, but also include many lesser known
but equally lethal agents such as Listeria, Toxoplasma, E. coli
O157:H7, Salmonella, Leptospira and alveolar hydatid disease. The whole
list is extensive, comprising as many as 800 infectious organisms.
Bioterror is the use of those agents or biological toxins that will
harm humans and could be released to cause terror. The CDC has
categorized them according to threat levels, into A, B, and C, for a
total of 26-30 diseases, depending on how the organisms are clustered.
These are the diseases that are of primary concern for bioterror
protection. Almost all of the Category A, B and C agents are zoonotic;
only a handful are not. So the bioterror agents could be considered a
subcategory of zoonotic diseases.
Agroterror involves the use of any kind of threat to the health of
livestock or adulteration of food that would damage the agriculture
sector and make our agricultural products unprofitable. Agriculture
forms the cornerstone of the American economy. A serious terrorist
event involving agriculture would lead to thousands of bankruptcies and
hundreds of thousands of people unemployed. It would destroy the health
of our American economy.
The World Organization for Animal Health, formerly known as the
Office of International Epizootics and still recognized by the
abbreviation OIE, for decades has classified certain livestock diseases
as "high risk/ high impact". These are diseases that will cause
"serious socioeconomic consequences," and consist of some of the high
profile agents, including, among others, foot-and-mouth disease,
rinderpest, classical swine fever, African swine fever, African horse
sickness, and Newcastle disease. None of these will be transmitted to
humans to cause serious disease. Highly pathogenic avian influenza (the
strains that can be transmitted to humans) and Rift Valley fever are
also on this list of diseases capable of causing "serious socioeconomic
impacts" and may be the only two diseases that pose a threat both to
human health as well as livestock. All are foreign to the United
States.
Over the last two decades there has been a plethora of high impact
animal disease outbreaks that have damaged agricultural sectors in many
countries. Examples include foot-and-mouth disease in the United
Kingdom in 2001, classical swine fever in the Netherlands in 1997 and
highly pathogenic avian influenza in Asia, Africa and Europe in 2004-
2006. In all of these, introduction of the disease was accidental but
the economic impacts were enormous. Because of globalization and world
commerce, we are at greater risk than ever of a disease being
introduced across borders accidentally.
Terrorists are aware of the ease of creating serious economic harm
through intentional introduction of these diseases. Compared to
bioterror, agroterror is appallingly easy. Access to these dangerous
pathogens is straightforward as they can be obtained from infected
animals in many parts of the world, and agent dissemination is simple
and could take place in a variety of venues.
While the food supply in the United States is one of the safest in
the world, food contamination and human illness occurs regularly. The
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) estimates that each
year 76 million people get sick, more than 300,000 are hospitalized,
and 5,000 Americans die from foodborne illness. Preventing foodborne
illness and death remains a major public health challenge.
In 1994, 224,000 people nationwide were sickened with Salmonella
enteritis from eating a national brand of ice cream. That outbreak is
estimated to have cost about $18.1 million in medical care and time
lost from work. In 2002, widely publicized disease outbreaks associated
with ground beef (E. coli O157:H7) and deli meats (Listeria
monocytogenes) occurred in over 20 states. None of these outbreaks were
deliberate.
The nature of our national systems for food transportation and
processing facilitate the wide dissemination of large-scale outbreaks.
Terrorists know how to introduce harmful chemical or biological agents
into the food supply, with extraordinary results. The Epidemic
Intelligence Service of the CDC has confirmed bioterrorism or
intentional contamination of the food supply in California, Michigan,
New York, New Hampshire, Indiana, Kentucky, Tennessee, Oregon, and
Texas.
The complex relationships among the Food and Drug Administration,
US Department of Agriculture (USDA), Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) and State and Local food safety agencies add to the challenge of
protecting our nation's food supply. Activities between these agencies
should be well coordinated to maximize the utilization of Federal,
State and Local food safety and security resources, while eliminating
the duplication of food protection activities. State and local entities
perform more than 80% of the food safety and security activities in the
United States and yet receive meager amounts of funding from the
federal government to protect consumers.
The key rule in limiting the damage caused by an introduction of a
high impact animal disease or contamination of the food supply is this:
the amount of economic damage or human illness depends directly on how
quickly the disease or contaminated food is detected and contained.
This is as true for an accidental as for an intentional introduction of
diseases. If the first instance is recognized, and adequate control
measure implemented immediately, we will likely circumvent severe
economic consequences and human illness. However, if the problem is not
initially recognized, and is allowed to spread to any extent, we will
face dire consequences in our agriculture industry, our economy and our
public health. Our best defense against this serious damage is to
increase awareness to a point where such an incursion is detected as
early as possible and that an effective state and local response
capability be developed so that deleterious spread can be effectively
intercepted through rapid and appropriate actions. This is where state
and local responses are essential as they can respond much sooner than
Federal partners.
Agriculture and Food Defense Accomplishments in the State of Georgia
The Georgia Department of Agriculture has been a leader in
developing and implementing effective agriculture and food defense
tools. Fortunately our state leaders, Commissioner of Agriculture Tommy
Irvin and Governor Sonny Perdue, have included agriculture and food
defense as a state priority, which allowed the use of Department of
Homeland Security funding to the states. With support from the
Governor's office, in 2003, a Committee for Agriculture and Food
Defense (the Committee) was initiated as a multi-agency, multi-partner
effort. The Committee functions as a representative group of key
officials from state and federal government agencies, academic
institutions, and the private sector.
The following are the accomplishments in the state of Georgia as a
result of the Committee's coordinated and integrated efforts.
Georgia completed its first Agricultural Vulnerability Assessment
utilizing the State Homeland Security 2003 Assessment and Strategy
Program, and was the only state to conduct assessments in local
jurisdictions. Consequently, we were able to secure approximately $2.5M
in State Homeland Security funding for FY04 and FY05 from the Office of
Homeland Security (OHS) Georgia Emergency Management Agency (GEMA) to
accomplish the following:
We developed a national curriculum on agrosecurity, the first in
the nation. We created a textbook covering national issues on
agrosecurity and specific issues pertinent to Georgia. The training
included website materials, powerpoint instruction, and scenario
exercises. To date agrosecurity Level I (awareness) training has been
delivered to 2,500 participants, including emergency managers, law
enforcement, firefighters, veterinarians, agricultural producers, and
various state agencies, all across Georgia. Training is now in
transition to the Georgia OHS for sustainability.Training on the
Incident Command System (ICS) was delivered to 321 people at ICS 100
and 200 levels, 50 people at ICS 300 level, and 37 people at ICS 400
level. Trainees included county extension agents, Georgia Department of
Agriculture personnel, USDA staff, and private veterinarians.
Equipment valuing $350,000 was distributed around the state for
agricultural and food emergency preparedness, including personal
protective equipment, decontamination materials, and medical
supplies.We conducted a major food security exercise involving food
processors, groceries, wholesale suppliers, law enforcement and public
safety agencies, and various other federal and state regulatory
agencies. This was co-sponsored with GEMA. The Committee in
collaboration with the Georgia Division of Public Health co-sponsored
two day training sessions on Food Supply Defense, From Farm to Fork:
Integrated Response to Food Supply Emergencies for epidemiologists,
agriculture sanitarians, and environmental health officers. The
training addressed food supply contamination investigations, operations
and procedures in a food supply emergency, and critical communications
that occur between public health and agriculture employees during a
food supply emergency.
We are developing State Agricultural Response Teams (SARTs). There
are plans for eight SARTs and one is fully developed. All will be
deployable to any part of Georgia or the Southeast. Agrosecurity Level
II (performance defensive) training was delivered to 60 SART personnel.
Agrosecurity Level III (performance offensive) training was delivered
to 30 SART personnel. National Incident Management System (NIMS), ICS
300 and 400 trainings were delivered to all SART personnel.
Geographic Positioning System equipment and handheld computers have
been delivered to SART personnel. SARTs have received strike packs of
personal protective equipment. Communications protocols and
technologies are being defined and organized.
FY06 State Homeland Security Funding - Agriculture and food defense
has once again been included in the State Strategic Plan and we are
hopeful that significant funding will be available through the Georgia
All Hazards Councils to enhance local SART capabilities. Specifically
the teams will be taken to a Level III response capability.
Additionally, a new major effort will be to conduct a comprehensive
survey of the critical infrastructure and nodes of Georgia agriculture
and agribusiness industries, to allow us to better focus our planning
and training.
Summary and Recommendations:
We are proud of our expertise and activities in preparing our state
to respond in the event of an attack on our agriculture or food sector.
Much has been accomplished with few resources and our efforts have been
recognized nationally and internationally. These successes have been
dependent on two critical factors. First, our activities are truly
multi-disciplinary and inclusive, with representation and input from
all relevant government agencies, academics and the private sector.
Response will involve all of these partners so it is important to
engage all in the planning. Second, we are fortunate that our state
government has been supportive of including defense of agriculture and
food in the strategic plan, which has allowed us to apply ourselves
vigorously in the seeking of funds from DHS.
But there are serious gaps remaining. As members of the House of
Representatives Committee on Homeland Security, you can help strengthen
this nation's agriculture and food defense initiatives through action
on the following:
Gap Number 1. There is a need for a comprehensive national strategy
for agriculture and food defense.Homeland Security Presidential
Directive 9 (HSPD-9), issued in January 2004, created an initial
roadmap for integration among federal agencies to secure agriculture
and food. Now a comprehensive strategic plan that includes federal,
state and local levels is urgently needed. According to HSPD-9, DHS
isdesignated as the lead partner but this is worrisome as the turnover
is high and there is limited depth in agriculture and animal health.
States and local governments need strategic inclusion where HSPD-9 left
off.
Solution: Congress should strongly urge that a national strategy
for agriculture and food defense be developed, as soon as possible. An
official process that requires the inclusion of states and the private
sector in order to provide the "seamless system" described in the
National Strategy for Homeland security and the National Incident
Management System is recommended.
Gap Number 2. Food and agriculture defense was not identified by
DHS as one of the seven national priorities in the FY06 National
Enhancement Plan, which directs state funding. Only those few state
administrative agencies that selected food and agriculture defense as
one of the three allowable electives received funding to enhance
agroterror and food defense capability. Consequently one state can be
very well prepared but the state next door may not have listed
agriculture as a priority and so that leaves both states at risk.
Funding is not consistent among states--from federal, state or other
sources.
Solution: Congress should require DHS to include agriculture and
food defense as a national priority for the FY07 National Enhancement
Plan and thereafter.
Gap Number 3. Funding for states to develop the infrastructure
necessary for food and agriculture defense is inconsistent and
meager.USDA has provided the most significant funding, with State
funding being the second largest source (National Association of State
Departments of Agriculture survey 2004). In 2002, an Association of
Food and Drug Officials survey of state activities indicated that more
than 80% of the food safety and security activities in the United
States are performed at the state or local levels. Almost a billion
dollars in federal funds were forwarded in 2003 to the states to
strengthen preparedness for terrorism response, with less than 5%
devoted to protecting agriculture and food. Community and state defense
programs cannot protect the consuming public with the currently
available funding. A sincere commitment to protect the nation's food
and agriculture infrastructure must be supported with sustainable
funding.
Solution: Congress should provide consistent funding that would
build infrastructure in each state and encourage regional
collaborations and sharing of resources.
STATEMENT OF DR. PAUL WILLIAMS, SPECIAL ASSISTANT, GEORGIA
EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY
Mr. Williams. Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the
Committee, as you mentioned, I as a Special Assistant for the
Georgia Office of Homeland Security, the Georgia Emergency
Management Agency. I am actually assigned to the Terrorism
Emergency Response and Preparedness Division.
A portion of my duties include oversight of the Agriculture
and Food Defense Initiative, the Medical Surge and Mass
Prophylaxis Initiative and the Metropolitan Medical Response
System Initiative. My duties relate to these initiatives as my
agency is the state administrative agency for the state formula
grants administered by the Department of Homeland Security
Grants and Training Directorate. Our function is to assure that
the monies provided in these grants be solely utilized to
enhance the state's strategic plan, ensure compliance with the
National Incident Management System and the National Response
Plan. Our responsibility is to ensure that Georgia has the
capacity to respond to the 15 national scenarios and the
national target capabilities. My responsibilities place me in
an unusual position to measure preparedness capabilities for
both human and agricultural biological incidents. It is my
agency's responsibility to ensure that the two of these do not
collide.
You have my written statement in front of you and I have a
list on page 3 of areas that we consider at the state level
areas of logjam. There are issues in being able to provide the
infrastructure under the National Incident Management System
and the National Response Plan that are areas that we cannot
fix at the state level. These are issues that require national
leadership. And out of the list that I have there, there are
two that jump out at me very specifically, and there are two
that we have actually been asking for answers for, for almost a
decade.
Beginning with the National Animal Health Emergency
Management Committee that formed in the mid-1990s, one of the
things that we looked at in looking at how agriculture would be
rolled up in what was then the old federal response plan, and
at that time the current method of responding to disasters; we
saw that we had various issues that were really not very
consistent. We called at that time, the ``Tale of two
declarations''; one, the Declaration of Extraordinary Emergency
by the Secretary of Agriculture and the Declaration of
Emergency through the Stafford Act. It is completely contrary
at this point in time to the seamless organization envisioned
by the National Incident Management System. Without fixing
that, we cannot have full implementation of that system.
We are required by September 30 of this year that all
states be consistent with the National Incident Management
System to continue to receive federal funding under the DHS
formula grants. Without fixing that particular issue, I am not
sure how any state could actually be in full compliance.
The Stafford Act. The Stafford Act prior to 2000 included
the word ``pestilence''. By inclusion of that, that allowed the
infrastructure of response under the Stafford Act to actually
address some of the issues that have been brought up in this
discussion today of biological incidents. In 2000
``pestilence'' was amended out of the Stafford Act, and since
there has been major confusion of basically who is on first.
That question has been asked more than once today.
There are other issues. And I have been very encouraged by
the questions asked by the Committee today because I think they
are really quite on target. Mr. Linder and Mr. Scott both
addressed the issue of prevention. We have been--I guess since
the 2003 grant process came about, we have been addressing the
ability to respond. And I think we have to be able to do that
because we do not have the infrastructure to prevent. we have
to develop the infrastucture to respond as a short-term goal,
but our long-term goal has to be prevention because it is a lot
better to prevent one of these acts than to endure all the
consequences of responding to it.
There is really no way--in fact in listening to some of my
FBI friends in the Joint Terrorism Task Force, they are really
confounded on a daily basis with information that comes down.
For example, threats to transportation. Well, what does that
mean? You cannot protect everything. Is it ground
transportation? Is it air? Is it rail? What is it?
The confounding that we have under agriculture, which is
even a larger system, and protecting that is even a bigger
challenge, but we have to define it into critical nodes.
Production, transportation, processing, transportation,
wholesaling, retailing, transportation. Every one of those
critical nodes are easily intersected by an act of terrorism.
And a thorough risk assessment in this state, which we actually
have written in our 2006 enhancement plan to do such an
assessment, needs to be done not only in Georgia, but across
the board, because as we intersect with the infusion centers
that are required under the DHS programs, as we begin to share
intelligence, if we do not have this type of infrastructure in
place, we can do nothing with that intelligence.
I thank you very much for the opportunity to speak to this
Committee. I hope you can help us with some of the logjams that
we have and I will be available for any questions that you have
of me. Thank you very much.
Mr. Linder. Thank you, Mr. Williams.
Mr. Black.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Paul Williams follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dr. Williams
Mr. Chairman distinguished members of the committee:
My name is Paul Williams. I am a Special Assistant for the Georgia
Office of Homeland Security / Georgia Emergency Management Agency,
Terrorism Emergency Response and Preparedness Division. A portion of my
duties include oversight of the Agriculture and Food Defense
Initiative, the Medical Surge and Mass Prophylaxis Initiative and the
Metropolitan Medical Response System Initiative. My duties relate to
these initiatives as my agency is the State Administrative Agency for
the State Formula Grants administered by the Department of Homeland
Security, Grants and Training Directorate. Our function is to assure
that moneys provided in these grants be solely utilized to enhance the
State Strategic Plan, insure compliance with the National Incident
Management System, and the National Response Plan. Our responsibility
is to insure that Georgia has the capacity to respond to the fifteen
National Scenarios and the National Target Capabilities.My
responsibilities place me in an unusual position to measure the
preparedness capabilities for both human and agriculture biological
incidents. It is my agency's responsibility to insure that the two "do
not collide".
Our Agriculture and Food Defense Initiative has a primary focus of
protecting Georgia's agriculture and food infrastructure from
compromise by administering comprehensive DHS programs of prevention,
deterrence, response and recovery; at the same time applying the DHS
overarching principle of "All Hazard Preparedness" to provide for a
value added deliverable that recognizes finite resources and the need
for prioritization based on credible threat, vulnerability and risk.
Georgia's agriculture and food sectors contribute more than $57
billion, or about 16%, to the state's $350 billion annual economic
output. The importance of Georgia's agriculture industry to the state
and nation is underscored by the fact that one in every six Georgians
works in an agriculturally related sector of the state's economy.
Protection of Georgia's agriculture is a nationally significant
advantage. The state ranks first in the United States in four major
national food commodities, and second and third in at least three other
national food commodities. A disabling agriculture incident in Georgia
would affect not only the state but also directly impair the entire
national market economy. It is recognized that the agriculture and food
supply can be targets to threaten our nation's economy, but also can be
used as vehicles for the dissemination of a chemical, biological or
radiological agent to attack our citizens. Georgia is a major hub in
our nation's production, processing, marketing, and distribution of
agriculture and food resources. As such, Georgia represents at least
three critical nodes subject to compromise in this "most vulnerable"
area of our nation's Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources.
To date the State of Georgia has invested in planning,
organization, equipping, training, and exercising our response to "All
Hazard" incidents affecting food and agriculture. Specifically, Georgia
has developed a national curriculum for agrosecurity awareness and
trained thousands of first responders.
Enhanced agroterroism defense cuts across DHS programs and national
priorities originally outlined in National Incident Management System
and the National Response Plan implementation and expanded regional
collaboration. Enhancement of agroterror defense also provides a
synergy of capability in the State's Strategic Plan, the State's
Emergency Operations Plan, and the other fourteen enhancement
categories approved in the State's 2006 Enhancement Plan.
The Homeland Security infrastructure currently under construct in
Georgia regarding Agroterror and Food Defense is based on the National
Incident Management System and the National Response Plan, and includes
appropriate elements of the National Infrastructure Protection plan,
Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7 and Homeland Security
Presidential Directive 9.
Georgia is on target in fulfilling the goals and objectives
outlined in the 2004 and 2005 grant periods. Requests provided in the
2006 Enhancement Plan will support completed milestones, which involved
awareness and response, but will also allow the initiative to begin to
address the issues of prevention, protection, and recovery.
The challenges are great. Creating a national culture of "One
Medicine" rather than the current reality of two medicines fostered by
regulatory and funding programs will be painful if not impossible
without National leadership.
Many of the log jams that we face at the state level cannot be
fixed at the state level.
Many of the questions that required answers to effectively
implement the National Incident Management System and the National
Response Plan are still unanswered today.
The confusion created by the "Tale of Two Declarations" ( A
Declaration of Extraordinary Emergency by the Secretary of Agriculture
and a Declaration of Emergency thru the Stafford Act) is completely
contrary to the seamless organization envisioned in the National
Incident Management System.
The Stafford Act was amended in 2000 removing the word
"pestilence". This seemingly harmless deletion has provided major
confusion when dealing with agriculture biologic incidents where the
customary first responder community is asked to assist. This confusion
not only hampers response, but limits buy-in from the first response
community regarding training and preparedness initiatives. When the
State Administrative Agency cannot answer the question from the first
responder community of "who's on first," the entire initiative of
Agroterror-Food Defense losses its credibility.
Although well intended, the separate funding streams from The
Department of Health and Human Services for Public Health and the
Department of Homeland Security for everybody else tends to place more
emphasis on program hoops than actually building capacity that supports
the State's Strategic Plan, and conflicts the need for integrated
prioritization based upon limited resources. Only with single oversight
with the mission of building capacity under one strategic plan can we
be successful. Many of our successes have been because of individuals
rather than programs. We must do better. We cannot afford not to.
I thank you for the opportunity to address the committee.We would
appreciate your help in fixing those things that we cannot.
STATEMENT OF GARY BLACK, MEMBER, GEORGIA RURAL DEVELOPMENT
COUNCIL
Mr. Black. Mr. Chairman, members of the Subcommittee, I am
Gary Black. And for the past 17 years, I have been President of
the Georgia Agribusiness Council. I really appreciate this
opportunity to update the Committee members and the public
regarding industry's efforts to address the topic of today's
very important meeting. I want to thank all of you for your
service to our country and welcome home during the month of
August. But you are about to return and we thank you for your
service and wish you well as we wrap up this year.
Mr. Chairman, many of the other speakers have focused on
the actions and planning of government entities. Government
agencies should be commended for working to improve
agricultural and food defense through preventative measures and
preparing for ways to respond to an attack. However, industry
has worked on its own to protect consumers from disease and
attack and I would like to spend my time discussing the
progress that we have made in the agribusiness industry and the
food industry.
The threat of the Asian strain of H5N1 highly pathogenic
avian influenza has highlighted the need for proactive action
by industry. The poultry industry has responded by spending a
tremendous amount of time and resources in the area of
prevention. They know the importance of biosecurity and the
need for physical barriers to prevent infections. Without
government regulation, the poultry industry implemented strict
biosecurity measures, such as limited access to farms and
policies encouraging practices such as wearing plastic boot
covers and using disinfectant foot baths to prevent infections.
Through a federal grant, the University of Georgia will be
conducting a series of farmer meetings starting this fall, with
additional assistance from industry, to emphasize the
importance of biosecurity and preventative measures. These
meetings will reach each of the nearly 4000 poultry growers in
the state of Georgia.
Additionally, the poultry industry voluntarily established
a surveillance program prior to federal and state requirements.
The program calls for participating companies to test flocks
while they are still on the farm. If any flock tests positive
for H5 or H7 types of avian influenza, the company will destroy
the flock before it is introduced into the food chain.
Many of us have seen the impact avian influenza has had on
other areas of the world. It is important to remember that in
the United States, the modern system of production employed by
the poultry industry means that chickens and turkeys are kept
in enclosed areas from the time they are hatched until the time
they enter the processing plant. They have no contact with wild
birds.
The poultry industry has developed plans for response and
eradication of avian influenza. Many companies have identified
the personnel that would be involved in a response and these
individuals are receiving training and companies are
stockpiling equipment that would be needed to supplement
federal and state resources. They are working with state and
federal partners in the planning process and taking advantage
of joint training exercises with federal and state officials.
Even in the presence of a high degree of farm production
security measures and poultry that is voluntarily tested and
proven free of harmful agents as we have discussed here today,
there does exist a certain level of risk. It takes years of
work, research and investment to build a food industry that is
trusted by consumers. An attack on our food supply may have as
its goal the imposition of a financial harm rather than an
attack on public health and safety. And we have discussed that
in the last few minutes.
It is incumbent upon leaders in the state and federal
government to have an effective strategy to provide the public
with timely and accurate information in case of a food and
agriculture related emergency so that this hard-earned and
well-deserved consumer confidence is not lost. Because of these
risks, it is certainly appropriate for industry to help lead
the way to develop these disease prevention and response
programs. I urge government agencies engaged in these
activities to work with industry representatives and leaders to
provide the most effective programs for food safety and disease
prevention possible.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity to share these
brief remarks with the Committee today. The future of our
economy and public health in America depend upon industry and
government entities working together. A safe supply,
Congressman Norwood, of domestically produced food is a
national security issue of utmost importance. Could not agree
more. And I hope that in the future I can make a positive
contribution toward keeping the communication lines open to
ensure the safety of our food supply in Georgia.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Linder. Thank you, Mr. Black.
Dr. Brown, I have believed for some time that not on
agriculture but on biological or nuclear attack, the first
person to show up is going to be a fireman with a brand new
truck and haz-mat suit and he is not going to know what the
hell to do.
Would you think that it would be wise for the grants that
we give to communities to be tied to training?
Dr. Brown. Yes, absolutely. And our training went out to
firefighters, law enforcement officials, emergency management
people, producers, veterinarians. It was very multi-
disciplinary training. And part of the purpose of that was to
get all the people in the same room so that they all know each
other so that when they have an emergency, they are not, as
they say, exchanging business cards over the dead bodies.
Mr. Linder. That is a little bit rough there.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Linder. Thank you. We have seen estimates that--I do
not believe we have had foot and mouth disease in this country
since 1929 and virtually every cow in Afghanistan has foot and
mouth disease. It would be very easy to wipe a cloth over that
nose and put it in a vial and get in a plane and bring it to
north Texas and infect millions and millions and millions of
cows and it would be a $100 billion event.
Why have we not talked about that?
Dr. Brown. Talked about it coming from an endemic country
specifically, or--
Mr. Linder. Coming from a terrorist who has access to these
cattle in Afghanistan.
Dr. Brown. You know, I am not sure we have not talked about
it. Because this is something that I hear people in USDA talk
about quite a bit. And at Plum Island, the Department of
Homeland Security was putting together a forensics unit to do
molecular epidemiology of strains around the world. I know
unfortunately the person who was heading that unit just moved
to USDA, so that unit is temporarily inactive.
Mr. Linder. Dr. Williams, the name of this subcommittee is
the Subcommittee to Prevent Nuclear and Biological Attack. And
I was struck in talking to Dr. Gerberding at CDC some years ago
that they never thought--they respond, and they are just now
thinking about prevention. And prevention requires intelligence
which we spend about two percent of the homeland security
budget on, we spend one-eighth of it on airlines.
But is there any intersection between the biologic
community and the intelligence community? The biologic
community is an academic community with wide open borders
inviting all kinds of foreigners in to share their research and
the CIA is just exactly the opposite.
How do you create an intersection between those two
communities?
Mr. Williams. Well, it is beginning to happen. I am struck
by, as we talk about all these issues, of where we were in 2003
when we started all of these initiatives. We started with
awareness level which many people have discussed already. This
is what is called Level 1 response training, just to make
people aware of what it is we are talking about. And we did
that with the entire emergency response community, including
firefighters and others.
Level 2 response capability is what we are starting now and
we have done that because of current events with avian
influenza. We have stood up one of our teams to full
operational 4 level training, to be able to respond to pandemic
influenza and avian influenza.
So sometimes some of these projects move ahead a little
faster than what you would like to on a nice calm planning day.
The intelligence piece is really important and it is
beginning to happen from an agricultural standpoint actually
this year. In fact, in our 2005 enhancement budget, we have
written into the plan for an agricultural intelligence analyst
that will be embedded in our joint information sharing and
analysis center which is part, you know, of the Joint Terrorism
Task Force. That person will be able to look at information
that is coming through the intelligence communities and make
some sense out of it and have a matrix as to which part of the
agricultural sector needs to be notified. But we are still
crawling on that part but, you know, our short-term goal is to
add that analyst and to begin to be active with the Joint
Terrorism Task Force. And that is happening in Georgia. What is
happening elsewhere, I do not have a clue.
Mr. Linder. Mr. Black, are we getting anywhere close to
having farmers come in and sit down and talk about training
issues?
Mr. Black. Yes, sir, absolutely. I think there is a great
hunger for it. They recognize, as has been said in two or three
discussions this afternoon, the economics, their livelihood,
they understand their bank note and they understand and their
banker understands their bank note and that rural economy
understands that they are playing in a global marketplace that
has some global risks. So yes, sir, I think we are going to see
some dramatic--
And I could not agree more as far as the data that is in
our ag security or our food defense handbook. It has been some
tremendous training that has taken place and hopefully there
will be more. And I would like to also say, Congressman, that I
would love to see us do more table top exercises on
preparedness. That continued training is very important at all
levels in this particular arena. I have been involved in some
of that and would like to see more of it take place for some of
our homeland security dollars.
Mr. Linder. Thank you. We did have a table top exercise
sometime ago on foot and mouth disease. I did not realize we
did not have enough bullets in America to take care of the
problem.
Mr. Scott.
Mr. Scott. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Ms. Brown, I really think you have nailed it. You really
have nailed the essence of why we are here, the importance of
this issue and our failure up to this point.
I am very worried about our food chain. I think that is our
most vulnerable point. I have tried on the Agriculture
Committee since I have been there to raise this level up
higher. I find myself going to be in a much better position
when we go back because I will be Ranking Member of the
Subcommittee on Horticulture Crops and Livestock, and this is
going to be our number one issue that we are going to do.
I went down to the University of Georgia's Experimental
Station down in Griffin where the world needs to know and does
not know that we have a first class food safety program already
under way. Clearly, we are trying to get more dollars down
there to do that.
You mentioned several areas. One, we need a national
strategy, do not have it. Part of that is because of lack of
funding. You also mentioned certain gaps. Could you address
those and give us examples of where we are weak on the national
strategy, where we need to go and what these gaps are?
Dr. Brown. Yes, thank you.
I believe that the biggest gap is the partnering with the
states and local governments and the other large gap is that
agriculture has to be included in the national plan.
DHS is in the driver's seat for all of this. DHS is very--
does not have a lot of depth in agriculture expertise. There
has been quite a bit of turnover with the agriculture experts
within DHS. It is a growing organization I understand, but
there is not enough in there to make the impact that the
agriculture community needs to see in a plan.
Mr. Scott. Do you think then that it needs to be out of the
Department of Homeland Security and maybe in the Agriculture
Department?
Dr. Brown. Well, it always was in the Agriculture
Department but with HSPD-9, it became clear that DHS would be
the lead. Somebody has to be the lead. We just need a few good
people to lead.
Mr. Scott. What I am hearing you say is do you think that
that leadership could come better if we reordered that into the
Agriculture Department instead of Homeland Security?
Dr. Brown. You know, I am not sure I could answer that. In
a terrorism event--in an incidental incursion, I can see how
USDA would be the lead, but in an intentional event, I do not
see how we could not have DHS front and center.
Mr. Scott. Okay. Now let me go to one other point. In your
testimony, you mentioned that the CDC had confirmed
contamination of the food supply, intentional contamination.
Dr. Brown. Yes, there have been many--yes, that is true.
Mr. Scott. Can you give us some examples of that?
Dr. Brown. No. I do not believe that information is
unclassified. I think just the fact that there has been
intentional.
Mr. Scott. Well, you know that they are there, you know
that they are intentional, you care not to give us examples
right now.
Mr. Linder. She cannot give us examples.
Mr. Scott. That is fine, I understand that. I appreciate
that too.
Dr. Brown. And it may be FDA also.
Mr. Scott. Well, let me ask you this then. Can you give us
in your opinion whether we have put in practices in place as a
result of that, have we done something about it? You may not
tell us what it is.
Dr. Brown. Yes.
Mr. Scott. But we have done something to--
Dr. Brown. Yes, there are many more safeguards in place.
Mr. Scott. Okay, now finally I wanted to ask you, how close
would you say we are to an effective national strategy, or are
we close at all?
Dr. Brown. I would say we are in the late stages--we are in
the third trimester.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Scott. Okay, let me go to you, Dr. Williams, for a
moment, if I may. In your--thank you, Ms. Brown. In your
testimony, you raise some important issues which you refer to
as the ``Tale of Two Declarations'' regarding the Declaration
of Extraordinary Emergency and the Stafford Act Declaration. We
have been concerned about similar situations in this
connection.
Can you please elaborate on this point and give us a
recommendation on how we might fix this problem?
Mr. Williams. Well, Dr. Brown alluded to this about where a
change in who is in charge occurred in one of these types of
incidents. And every day--probably there is something like 700
foreign animal disease investigations in the United States
every year. And this is part of just doing business in USDA and
state departments of agriculture and so forth.
When they find something that requires a response, if it is
something that can be done, and it is not a terrorism event, it
is something that can be handled within USDA, it is handled
through a Secretary's Declaration or Extraordinary Declaration
of Emergency. It is usually handled by USDA.
When an incident, you know, reaches a level where USDA
needs other resources outside of USDA, whether it be at the
federal level or state level, it has reached a point to where
we have to initiate the National Incident Management System.
And when the National Incident Management System is initiated,
DHS is basically in charge. In charge is a little strange. A
lot of people do not understand exactly emergency management,
some of the terms about who is on first type of situation.
I heard an analogy of emergency management playing the role
of an air traffic controller. When one of these events requires
initiation of the 15 emergency support functions that are part
of the National Response Plan, it is our job as far as
emergency managers to make sure that each of those ESFs can
land and take off without crashing into the other. It can get
refueled, it can get, you know, recrewed, so forth and so on.
That is our role. Now we are in charge of the overall incident,
but we do not tell each of those agencies how to fly their
airplane. And so that is in a nutshell what we are talking
about here as far as who is in charge.
Going back to the original question of, you know, what do
we do about the issue of the declaration of an emergency
through the Secretary. We should really probably do nothing
with that. It has served us well for over 50 years. It is a
good method of handling things. But we have to, and it is going
to require probably an amendment of the Stafford Act, to put
``pestilence'' back into the Stafford Act to allow that
structure, that is the other part of how this country responds
to disasters, to be able to support seamlessly those events
that have overwhelmed Agriculture.
And so I hope I have not confused the issue there, but it
is--
Mr. Scott. You cleared it up a bit.
May I ask--I did not know it was going to take so long, Mr.
Chairman, may I ask Mr. Black one question?
Mr. Linder. Yes.
Mr. Scott. I appreciate your kindness.
Mr. Black, you are with the Georgia Rural Development
Council, is that correct?
Mr. Black. I serve on the Georgia Rural Development Council
now; yes, sir.
Mr. Scott. Could you just share with us for the benefit of
the audience and myself what you actually do?
Mr. Black. Well, the Georgia--it is actually an appointed--
it is an overall looking at the rural economy, a council that
Governor Perdue has and it has a lot of agricultural
involvement looking at--I have served as Chairman of the Rural
Economic Development Subcommittee of the Council; yes, sir.
Mr. Scott. You are there where the real farming is going
on.
Mr. Black. Yes, sir, correct.
Mr. Scott. Let me ask you your coordination with the state
Office of Homeland Security.
Mr. Black. Yes, sir.
Mr. Scott. Do you receive advisories and actions that you
can take to protect the livestock or crops from intentionally
or naturally occurring diseases?
Mr. Black. There has been a tremendous amount of growth in
that information and how that has been disseminated into the
agricultural community. I have served on the Ag Terrorism Task
Force and have had individuals from the Georgia Agribusiness
Council, my former employer, actually helping draft the plan
that is here. So we have been integrated in that initiative
since day one.
Mr. Scott. So you can report any instances that anything
happens to these agencies.
Mr. Black. Yes, sir, there is a channel of communication;
yes, sir.
Mr. Scott. And you have done so. And how responsive have
they been?
Mr. Black. Well, I do not know that I have done so because
I have not seen, as far as the initiation of a terrorist attack
or anything actual to report.
Mr. Scott. I guess what I am trying to get at is you are
the very local level, is what I was trying to point out. You
are out there where the rubber meets the road.
Mr. Black. Yes, sir.
Mr. Scott. You are out there with the farms.
Mr. Black. Yes, sir.
Mr. Scott. And up here you have got a bureaucracy going up
the line. I was just trying to find--
Mr. Black. Can they communicate?
Mr. Scott. Yes, that there is good communication. There is
a system there. We are just trying to find a good national
model and make sure that if something happens at a specific
farm, and you are right there.
Mr. Black. Yes, sir.
Mr. Scott. I mean how quickly could you get up, is there a
line of communication?
Mr. Black. Congressman, one area to address that is the
County Extension Service or the Cooperative Extension Service
and County Agents have been engaged in these trainings
throughout the state. And certainly from a farmer's standpoint,
his first reliance on information and communication up the
chain is going to be through his County Agent. They have been
actively involved and I think that has been a good thing.
Mr. Linder. The time of the gentleman has expired twice.
Mr. Scott. And I appreciate your kindness, sir, thank you.
Mr. Linder. The Congressman from Evans.
Dr. Norwood. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Black, try to be brief.
Mr. Black. Yes, sir.
Dr. Norwood. If we have an outbreak in Georgia, foot and
mouth or avian flu, tell me briefly what do we do?
Mr. Black. Well, there has been--the terms incidental
versus an intentional.
Dr. Norwood. Either way.
Mr. Black. Those kinds of things, who sets a perimeter, who
gets in charge. If it is intentional, certainly FBI and Paul
was mentioning that, they come in charge and I believe our
Georgia Department of Agriculture and other professionals serve
as a resource.
Dr. Norwood. How long would it take for us to determine if
it was intentional or terrorism?
Mr. Black. That, sir, I do not know the particular answer
to, but I can find that out for you.
Dr. Norwood. Could it take a long time?
Mr. Black. It is certainly within--let us talk about AI
real quickly. Foot and mouth is another thing. In AI, we have
tremendous resources in this poultry industry. That test is
immediate.
Dr. Norwood. Let us just say it is terrorism, what do we do
in Georgia?
Mr. Black. What do we do? Well, companies will begin
depopulation, working with the Department of Agriculture to
secure that perimeter, so that it does not expand.
Dr. Norwood. So the Department of Agriculture says you have
to isolate your birds or you have to start killing your birds.
Mr. Black. You isolate and depopulate; yes, sir, you kill.
There will be some destroyed--those flocks will be destroyed.
Dr. Norwood. Who tells them to kill?
Mr. Black. Well, I am going to tell you, the industry will
step up and do that because it is their--they are protecting
their own interests in their economy, but certainly it is in
cooperation with the Department.
Dr. Norwood. So it does not really matter what the feds
say, we are just going to get about taking care of business in
Georgia?
Mr. Black. We are doing some of that, but certainly USDA is
a player at that table. And when you get into all the animal
health and the plant health--animal health protection, that is
very important and those USDA players are at the table.
Dr. Norwood. So you think that will be seamless without a
problem? Now remember, terrorism. So now Homeland Security is
in it who does not have anybody over there who knows anything
about agriculture. Now what are we going to do? So says Dr.
Brown, I do not know that.
Mr. Black. Those bridges need to be continually built and
resources put in place. I mentioned quite a bit about improving
communication and having those response plans, having people
well trained, so that if something does happen, that we have
actually gone through some exercises so that we will know what
to do.
Dr. Norwood. You were talking about industry is on their
own and perhaps in conjunction with the University of Georgia
training and planning. Is that going on out there now?
Mr. Black. That is going on right now. And I mentioned
there will be another series this fall with producers and
again, those will be more prevention issues.
Dr. Norwood. That falls under the heading of prevention,
Dr. Williams, does it not?
Mr. Williams. Yes, sir.
Dr. Norwood. Well, who pays for that?
Mr. Black. That is how we are investing some of our
Homeland Security dollars that come back for agriculture.
Dr. Norwood. So industry is not paying for it itself to
protect itself?
Mr. Black. Industry has resources at the table every time
they have a training, every time, they dedicate those resources
within their company to train their employees, absolutely. They
have extensive amount of resources dedicated to protecting the
public and also protecting the economy.
Dr. Norwood. What I am trying to get at here is that when
you look at some things with Homeland Security and Dr. Brown
says well, the states need to solve it, Dr. Williams says no,
the feds have got to do more. There is a lot of confusion in
all that. I am interested in--as you know, being from Commerce,
Georgia, how many chickens are in my district--I am interested
in us knowing what to do and not worrying about what they are
saying in Homeland Security or the Department of Agriculture.
We need to know in Georgia what to do with this problem. Are we
ready?
Mr. Black. We are rapidly approaching. I am going to go to
the third trimester, that was a pretty good answer. When we
look at our avian response plan and that draft plan that is
under way, there has been tremendous progress. I am satisfied
that industry understands its assets and are doing their dead
level best to protect their assets and to protect that rural
economy and in turn, protect the public health, yes, sir.
Dr. Norwood. Dr. Williams, I am focusing on that rather
than prevention, though I am a big prevention person, because I
do not think you can prevent. I do not think any of us are
smart enough, big enough, have a way to do it. It does not take
but one person with a way to get into the United States and you
can certainly do that very easily on the southern border taking
one handkerchief under one cow in Afghanistan. So I am going on
the basis that prevention is something we need to work hard at,
but if we think we are going to prevent it if it really comes
about, we are wrong. We just cannot get that done.
Now Dr. Brown, I am about to run out of time, but I tend to
agree with your statement and I will leave it there, that
states need to handle this or we need to handle it. I like the
idea of some coordination with the U.S. Department of
Agriculture but it just scares the bejesus out of me to think
that Homeland Security could get in the middle of it.
Dr. Brown. May I add one thing, to tell the difference
between an intentional and an accidental incursion may take
months of molecular epidemiology work.
Dr. Norwood. Right. So we do not need to worry about which
it is, we need to respond. We will figure out later. But what
will Homeland Security do then? Well I think we need to worry
about that.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Linder. Thank you. The gentleman from Athens wish to
inquire?
Mr. Barrow. Yes, sir, Mr. Chairman, thank you.
Mr. Black, your involvement in the ag industry and your
involvement with the industry's interaction with state
government makes you a particularly knowledgeable source in the
area of concern that I have got. I am going to throw you a
couple of softballs.
I want to know what it is that we are doing that is not
worth doing in light of what we could be doing with the same
resources; and what is that you think we are not doing that we
should be doing. So let us focus first on the first of those
two questions. What, either in state homeland defense or in
state ag, what are we doing that is not worth doing in light of
what we could be doing with the same resources? Got any ideas
along those lines?
Mr. Black. Congressman, that is a good question. When we--
if I can skip to your second question first.
Mr. Barrow. I am not going to forget the first one though.
Mr. Black. We will come back to it. There is a real
important point to make on the second one.
I think in order for us to protect our food supply, to be
able to respond with the ag industry and work hand in hand, we
must always have the best trained, well-equipped, properly
motivated and respected front line workforce with our state
Department of Agriculture, with USDA and all the entities
involved.
Mr. Barrow. Do you think we have that?
Mr. Black. I think that we definitely need some resources
in that area. I think that there is a motivation factor that
when people are motivated in that workforce, they are better
prepared and actually come to work excited about their job.
There are some issues with regard to how our front line people
in the State of Georgia in regards to pay scales and others
that I think we do need to improve and we need to work together
to meet those objectives.
Mr. Barrow. Where do the resources come from?
Mr. Black. Those are state resources; yes, sir. And I would
suggest, maybe not familiar with as much of those particular
things with USDA, but I am sure within all other areas, there
is a Farm Service Agency with in USDA which you are familiar
with, many of those things all track all across agriculture.
And I think we need to improve our resources there.
Mr. Barrow. Other than putting your finger on resources,
which they are always scarce, there is always a scarcity of
resources, that leads to the first question. Is there anything
that you regard as a misallocation of the existing resources?
Is there anything that we should not be doing that we are
doing, that we should not be doing in light of what we could be
doing with the same resources?
Mr. Black. Congressman, I will answer it this way; one
thing we must always do is be sure that when we communicate a
threat or when we have a news release, when we have an
incident, I think we have always got to continue to improve how
we communicate to the public. And how we communicate within the
agricultural arena, how we communicate with industry. Because
one misstep, one misword--and that comes back to making sure we
always have properly trained employees and making sure that we
are engaged at every level working with commodity groups
throughout the state. I think that is another improvement we
can make.
Mr. Barrow. I appreciate that. Back to my question though,
is there anything that we are spending our resources on that
you think we should not be? Is there anything you would
cannibalize or convert to other uses that we are currently
utilizing now. In other words, within the realm of existing
resources, are the proper priorities reflected in the limited
resources we have got, is what I am getting at.
Mr. Black. I would say those priorities--when we look at
the first year priorities, there is one element that I am
reminded of. I remember we bought some 10-gallon--some five-
gallon buckets for $10.00 apiece and I hope that does not go
back--these were for disinfection and some particular areas in
that first allocation of resources. Certainly there is some
basic equipment we need, we need to always make sure that we
are getting an efficient use of our purchases.
Mr. Barrow. I will grant you. But in terms of programs for
which certain resources are dedicated or committed, are there
any programs that you would sacrifice in light of being able to
free up those resources?
Mr. Black. I am not aware of any right now; no, sir.
Mr. Barrow. Okay, now shifting now from your area to the
area that Dr. Brown zeroed in on. I want to commend Dr. Brown's
statement for folks who want to put together a good statement,
because you identified--you gave us enough background
information to understand what you are talking about, but you
pinpointed areas where you thought we had problems and some of
the remedies, some of the things we need to fix.
And I want to zero in on one of those, because I sat here
and I heard Dr. Runge say that ag inspection and agroterrorism
in general are one of Secretary Chertoff's number one
priorities. And yet I find from your testimony that the
priorities, the top seven priorities established by Department
of Homeland Security do not include agroterrorism. So he says
it is one of the top, it clearly is not one of the top seven.
And you identify a clear policy choice that we need to
make, to make this either one of the top seven or to extend the
group of areas that all the states can participate in from
seven to eight.
Can you think of anything in the top seven that you would
shove aside to make room for agroterrorism if you were setting
the priorities? Or does it have to go from seven to eight? Do
you think all of those seven are properly rated or ranked
higher than agroterrorism? Or do you think that agroterrorism
belongs in the top seven, maybe the top three?
Dr. Brown. It definitely needs to be near the top.
Mr. Barrow. Right now it is not in DHS's top seven and it
is optional for the states to try and use some of their money
on a haphazard, ad hoc state by state basis. When you are
dealing with borders and an economy and stuff that moves across
borders that are even more porous, by design, than our already
too porous international borders. I mean to have Georgia taking
the lead in some areas, as we have heard some testimony on, and
then have Alabama and South Carolina not able to or not willing
to--probably not able to--it is amazing that we are that wide
open. You think it definitely ought to be at the top, would you
say the top two or three?
Dr. Brown. Yes.
Mr. Barrow. All right, thank you.
Mr. Linder. The time of the gentleman has expired.
Mr. Black. Congressman, could I add one more thing?
Mr. Linder. Sure.
Mr. Black. This may be an extra resource that we should put
on the table. And I am going to go back to my little experience
in the fertilizer industry. Right after 1993, in that first
terroristic attack, industry stepped in there to begin security
vulnerability training for fertilizer dealers. Asked them to
know their customer, better recordkeeping, better security at
their facilities.
That might be one additional area where we could invest
some resources in working with smaller food plants. Because I
have talked a lot about industry, talked about a lot of the
poultry industry, all of those are big companies. But certainly
we do have some family-owned industries. Georgia is a pretty
good magnet for food processing and I have worked a little bit
in that arena with an initiative at the state level, some state
research dollars. But security vulnerability training for some
smaller food plants might be a good place for us to look to
dedicate resources in the future.
Thank you for letting me add that.
Mr. Linder. Thank you all. I appreciate your time this
afternoon.
I would like to point out, Dr. Brown, that of all the
expert testimony we have had today, nobody has mentioned bring
back DDT. Why is that?
Dr. Brown. Bringing back DDT.
Mr. Linder. Yeah. It was eliminated on a theory and it is
being used really widely in Africa right now to eliminate a lot
of diseases. Why do experts like you not say maybe it is time
to bring it back?
Dr. Brown. I will have to look into that.
Mr. Barrow. Because it is going to get into mothers' milk
eventually, that is why. We learned that the hard way.
Mr. Linder. Thank you all.
[Whereupon, at 3:08 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]