[House Hearing, 109 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
NUCLEAR INCIDENT RESPONSE TEAMS
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON PREVENTION
OF NUCLEAR AND BIOLOGICAL
ATTACK
of the
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
OCTOBER 27, 2005
__________
Serial No. 109-50
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TONGRESS.#13
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COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Peter T. King, New York, Chairman
Don Young, Alaska Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Lamar S. Smith, Texas Loretta Sanchez, California
Curt Weldon, Pennsylvania Edward J. Markey, Massachusetts
Christopher Shays, Connecticut Norman D. Dicks, Washington
John Linder, Georgia Jane Harman, California
Mark E. Souder, Indiana Peter A. DeFazio, Oregon
Tom Davis, Virginia Nita M. Lowey, New York
Daniel E. Lungren, California Eleanor Holmes Norton, District of
Jim Gibbons, Nevada Columbia
Rob Simmons, Connecticut Zoe Lofgren, California
Mike Rogers, Alabama Sheila Jackson-Lee, Texas
Stevan Pearce, New Mexico Bill Pascrell, Jr., New Jersey
Katherine Harris, Florida Donna M. Christensen, U.S. Virgin
Bobby Jindal, Louisiana Islands
Dave G. Reichert, Washington Bob Etheridge, North Carolina
Michael McCaul, Texas James R. Langevin, Rhode Island
Charlie Dent, Pennsylvania Kendrick B. Meek, Florida
Ginny Brown-Waite, Florida
______
SUBCOMMITTEE ON PREVENTION OF NUCLEAR AND BIOLOGICAL ATTACK
John Linder, Georgia, Chairman
Don Young, Alaska James R. Langevin, Rhode Island,
Christopher Shays, Connecticut Ranking Member
Daniel E. Lungren, California EdwarD J. Markey, Massachusetts
Jim Gibbons, Nevada Norman D. Dicks, Washington
Rob Simmons, Connecticut Jane Harman, California
Bobby Jindal, Louisiana Eleanor Holmes Norton, District of
Charlie Dent, Pennsylvania Columbia
Peter T. King, New York (Ex Donna M. Christensen, U.S. Virgin
Officio) Islands
Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
(Ex Officio)
(II)
C O N T E N T S
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Page
STATEMENTS
The Honorable John Linder, a Representative in Congress From the
State of Georgia and Chairman, Subcommittee on Prevention of
Nuclear and Biological Attack:
Oral Statement................................................. 1
Prepared Statement............................................. 2
The Honorable James R. Langevin, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Rhode Island, and Ranking Member,
Subcommittee on Prevention of Nuclear and Biological Attack.... 3
The Honorable Charlie Dent, a Representative in Congress From the
State of Pennsylvania.......................................... 15
The Honorable Norman D. Dicks, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Washington........................................ 12
Witnesses
Panel I
Mr. Joseph Krol, Associate Administrator, National Nuclear
Security Administration, U.S. Department of Energy:
Oral Statement................................................. 4
Prepared Statement............................................. 5
Mr. John Lewis, Deputy Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of
Investigation, U.S. Department of Justice:
Oral Statement................................................. 6
Prepared Statement............................................. 8
NUCLEAR INCIDENT RESPONSE TEAMS
----------
Thursday, October 27, 2005
U.S. House of Representatives,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Subcommittee on Prevention of Nuclear
and Biological Attack,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 1:29 p.m., in
Room B-300, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. John Linder
[chairman of the subcommittee] presiding.
Present: Representatives Linder, Dent, Langevin, Thompson,
and Dicks.
Mr. Linder. [Presiding.] The hearing of the Homeland
Security, Subcommittee on Prevention of Nuclear and Biological
Attack will begin.
I would like to welcome and thank our witnesses for
appearing before this subcommittee today.
Estimates show that a small nuclear device detonated in a
large metropolitan area will produce hundreds of thousands of
casualties, destroy critical infrastructure, force millions to
evacuate, contaminate thousands of square miles, and extract
untold billions of dollars from the U.S. economy. These are,
however, mere estimates.
No one knows the true cost of such an attack, only that the
price is far too high to pay. The United States has for a long
time lived under the threat of a nuclear attack. Although
overshadowed during the Cold War by the threat of mutually
assured destruction, concern over a clandestine nuclear attack
on one of our cities existed throughout these dark years.
In April 1974, in Boston, Massachusetts, police received a
letter stating that atomic bomb with a yield equivalent to 500
kilotons of TNT had been planted somewhere in the city and
would be detonated unless the author receive $200,000 in small
bills. Officials from the national laboratories, equipped with
nuclear detectors, swarmed the city to try to find the device.
The event turned out to be a hoax, but established a need
for dedicated teams to be ready to search for a nuclear device.
This event marked the beginning of a number of nuclear-search
programs, which are now collectively referred to as Nuclear
Incident Response Teams, NIRT.
The NIRT program was codified by the 2002 Homeland Security
Act and led to the Department of Homeland Security having a
nuclear radiological response capability. These teams consist
of specialized personnel drawn from the Departments of Energy
and Defense and the FBI, depending on the particulars of the
mission.
We are pleased to have representatives from two of these
organizations with us here today.
While these teams have existed in one form or another for
many years, their work has never been more vital than it is
now. The possibility of a terrorist nuclear attack is at an
all-time high.
We must ensure that the Department of Homeland Security
expands its nuclear-detection capabilities at the border and
elsewhere, and is fully engaged with the long-standing
programs, such as those as NIRT. We must do all we can to
detect fissile material smuggling and, should that material be
in a form of an explosive device, be prepared to render it
inoperable immediately.
Interagency coordination and action must be swift and
decisive. It is a rare opportunity to save perhaps tens of
thousands of lives through a simple act of intervention. We
must ensure that all of the many pieces of our national
response work seamlessly toward that outcome.
That is precisely what this subcommittee will focus on
today, and I look forward to the testimony of the witnesses.
And I now recognize my friend from Rhode Island, Mr.
Langevin, for the purpose of an opening statement.
Prepared Statement of Hon. John Linder
I would like to welcome and thank our witnesses for appearing
before this Subcommittee today.
Estimates show that a small nuclear device detonated in a large
metropolitan area would produce hundreds of thousands of casualties,
destroy critical infrastructure, force millions to evacuate,
contaminate thousands of square miles, and extract untold billions of
dollars from the U.S. economy.
These are, however, mere estimates. No one knows the true costs of
such an attack--only that the price is far too high to pay.
The United States has, for a long time, lived under the threat of
nuclear attack. Although overshadowed during the Cold War by the threat
of mutually assured destruction, concern over a clandestine nuclear
attack on one of our cities existed throughout those dark years.
In April 1974, Boston, Massachusetts, police received a letter
stating that an atomic bomb with a yield equivalent to 500 kilotons of
TNT had been planted somewhere in the city and would be detonated
unless the author received $200,000 in small bills. Officials from the
national laboratories equipped with nuclear detectors swarmed the city
to try to find the device. The event turned out to be a hoax, but it
established the need for dedicated teams to be ready to search for a
nuclear device.
This event marked the beginning of a number of nuclear search
programs which are now collectively referred to as Nuclear Incident
Response Teams (NIRT). The NIRT program was codified by the 2002
Homeland Security Act to provide the Department of Homeland Security
with a nuclear-radiological response capability.
These teams consist of specialized personnel drawn from the
Departments of Energy and Defense, and the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, depending on the particulars of the mission. We are
pleased to have representatives from two of these organizations with us
here today.
While these teams have existed in one form or another for many
years, their work has never been more vital than it is now. The
possibility of a terrorist nuclear attack is at an all time high. We
must ensure that as the Department of Homeland Security expands its
nuclear detection capabilities at the borders and elsewhere it is fully
engaged with long standing programs such as those of NIRT. We must do
all we can to detect fissile material smuggling, and, should that
material be in the form of an explosive device, be prepared to render
it inoperable immediately.
Interagency coordination and action must be swift and decisive. It
is a rare opportunity to save perhaps tens of thousands of lives
through a single act of intervention. We must ensure that all of the
many pieces of our national response work seamlessly toward that
outcome. That is precisely what this Subcommittee will focus on today,
and I look forward to the testimony of our witnesses.
I now recognize the Ranking Member of the Subcommittee, Mr.
Langevin of Rhodes Island, for the purpose of making an opening
statement.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I would like to welcome our witnesses here today, and I
certainly look forward to your testimony.
Today's hearing will examine our government's ability to
prevent a nuclear attack in the event a nuclear weapon is in
the United States. Searching for a nuclear weapon inside of the
United States is extremely difficult, given the size of our
country and the many locations that a terrorist could strike.
The difficulty of this search was highlighted in a recent
movie produced by the Nuclear Threat Initiative called ``The
Last Best Chance.'' In this movie, the President learns that
al-Qa'ida had been pursuing and acquiring nuclear devices from
several different fronts and as well as building a nuclear
device.
And, in fact, in this movie, al-Qa'ida had purchased a
nuclear device on the black market and planned to conduct an
attack within the United States. The movie ends with the weapon
crossing the northern border in an SUV on its way to an
American city.
The scene is chilling, because it causes one to question
whether our government has the ability to locate such a weapon
once it is the country. One thing that the movie highlights,
and our work on the subcommittee has underscored, is that
intelligence is key, if our government has any chance to
prevent a nuclear terrorist attack.
There has been numerous articles on a nuclear emergency
support teams which state that, after 9/11, these teams are
deployed based on intelligence that was not corroborated to
determine whether a threat was valid. In addition, incidents
like the one that occurred last week in Baltimore make me
wonder whether our intelligence community has improved enough
to be able to give our federal officials the tactical
intelligence required to thwart an attack.
I would like to hear from our witnesses what steps are
being taken to develop our intelligence capability to meet the
nuclear terrorist threat.
Second, our government must be organized in a way that
forces coordination and eliminates confusion. Section 504 of
the Homeland Security Act of 2002 gives the Department of
Homeland Security authority over Nuclear Incident Response
Teams. DHS, however, does not have the management or budgetary
authority over these teams.
Adding to the bureaucratic challenge, the FBI is the lead
federal agency for intelligence-driven events involving weapons
of mass destruction, while the Department of Defense plays a
large role, as well. I would like to hear our witnesses'
thoughts on the current model, specifically whether this
committee should revisit the Homeland Security Act to eliminate
any potential confusion that may occur in the event a team must
respond to a nuclear terrorist threat.
I look forward to hearing from Admiral Krol and Special
Agent Lewis.
And, Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you for holding this
hearing on this all-important issue. Thank you very much, and I
yield back.
Mr. Linder. Did the gentleman from Mississippi have an
opening statement?
Other members are reminded that the committee--to submit a
written report for the record.
Our witnesses today are Admiral Joseph Krol, the associate
administrator for emergency operations at the Department of
Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration, and Mr. John
Lewis, deputy assistant director of the Counterterrorism
Division at the FBI.
Admiral Krol.
STATEMENT OF JOSEPH KROL
Mr. Krol. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, members of the
committee.
My name is Joseph Krol, and I am the associate
administrator for emergency operations at the National Nuclear
Security Administration. Our task, in this very important
effort that you have both outlined in your statements, is to
provide a detailed technical support organization that can
operate in support of many organizations across the interagency
to locate and render safe any type of nuclear device.
I want to give you two major messages in my opening
statement. The first is our integration across the interagency
and our ability to work with a large group of government
agencies. And, second, I want to give you a quick overview of
our current capabilities.
On the first item, we have a very strong interagency
support organization that allows us to respond to a large
variety of requests from anyone in the United States, including
local authority and, of course, the government authorities that
we work with.
We primarily support the Department of Homeland Security,
the Justice Department, the FBI, under Justice, and the Defense
Department. But we have supported in the past Coast Guard,
Customs, a whole variety of government agencies.
Our primary support is the FBI, because, in most of these
situations that arise, the FBI, by virtue of their
investigatory powers in counterterrorism, ends up being the
lead federal agency.
Typically, the way these things come to us, over 90 percent
of our deployments are requested by the FBI. Upon a request, we
immediately inform the Department of Homeland Security that we
are about to deploy. And, of course, the FBI does the same
thing.
We respond to intelligence-driven radiological incidents or
potential incidents. There is a system in place, a program
called National Significant Security Events, where known events
that have high visibility, like national conventions, a lead
federal agency would be appointed, and part of that support
will be the radiological support that we provide.
For example, over the last week, we have supported both
venues for the World Series in Chicago and Houston. We do Super
Bowls. We do G-8 conferences. Whatever the federal system
identifies as a National Significant Security Event, we are at
the table providing hardcore radiological search and
monitoring.
We also get involved in unexplained radiological events.
They can be something as simple as a hot dog vendor--this has
happened--on the street in New York that recently had a medical
treatment. A policeman's pager went off, and we were called in
to verify what the real radiological issue is.
We do this with technical expertise from across the weapons
complex. I have about 1,000 people that provide exacting
technical expertise to do exacting nuclear search, radiological
search, and, if we find a device, to Render Safe, using
technical procedures, in support of the FBI or the Department
of Defense. It is a joint team effort.
We are not an organization that only has its capability on
paper. We deploy on average about once a week to do various
radiological things around the country in support of all manner
of organizations, as I have told you. We also hold full dress
rehearsal exercises that cause us to do our deployments. Our
general rule for all our assets is 4 hours response time.
We fly around the country using DOE aircraft, generally.
And we have demonstrated our ability to do that in real
training situations on numerous occasions. So this is a real
capability that is constantly exercised and constantly deployed
in support of various issues that may come up.
With that, Mr. Chairman, I am very happy to be here. And I
welcome your questions.
[The statement of Mr. Krol follows:]
Prepared Statement of Joseph J. Krol
Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee, my name is Joseph Krol
and I am the Associate Administrator for Emergency Operations at the
National Nuclear Security Administration. I am pleased to have this
opportunity to present an overview of our nuclear incident response
capabilities, emphasizing how we conduct our mission working with and
supporting other United States Government agencies with a nuclear/
radiological counter-terrorism mission.
As I begin, I want to emphasize that it is our strong inter-
relationship and close coordination with law enforcement entities and
the intelligence community that enables our joint success in executing
the United States counter-terrorism mission. Through pre-event planning
and response coordination, the Departments of Homeland Security,
Justice, Defense and Energy have demonstrated on-going success in event
execution as exemplified by National Security Special Events, such as
the National political conventions, where National Nuclear Security
Administration assets supported both the Federal Bureau of
Investigation and United States Secret Service; Special Events, such as
the Olympics and National Football League Super Bowls, where National
Nuclear Security Administration assets supported the Federal Bureau of
Investigation and numerous other federal agencies; and a variety of
other scheduled and unscheduled events, to include Federal Bureau of
Investigation /Joint Terrorism Task Force requests for technical
support within a city.
It is important to note that the equity the National Nuclear
Security Administration brings to bear on the nuclear/radiological
counter-terrorism problem is technical expertise. Our core competencies
include; (1) knowledge of U.S. nuclear weapons, radiological dispersal
devices, and improvised nuclear devices with specific specialties in
spectroscopy, device modeling, radiography and device assessment
technology; (2) knowledge of technical operations such as explosive
ordinance disposal procedures and techniques for device access,
disablement, render safe, weapon recovery, and final disposition; and
(3) knowledge of technical support requirements such as attribution,
weapons effects, health and treatment capabilities and the technical
evaluation of consequence management radiological data.
Specific to the nuclear/radiological counter-terrorism mission, we
offer mature technical capabilities to support Federal law enforcement
to search for, locate, and render safe improvised nuclear devices. In
order to support the increased number of requests since 9-11 for timely
nuclear/radiological search, we have grown our search capability from 2
search teams in one centralized location to 29 teams in numerous
locations spread across the United States. If an incident requires a
surge, we also have the capability to train and equip 60 searchers per
day.
Once a device is located, the ``render safe'' mission begins. This
mission is conducted using well-documented and well-rehearsed policies
and procedures among all levels of the National Nuclear Security
Administration, the FBI, and the Department of Defense. It is because
of National Nuclear Security Administration's equities in the U.S.
nuclear weapons program that we provide the technical support for both
the Federal Bureau of Investigation's and the Department of Defense's
response teams. This support spans from nuclear design and materials
training to the design and fabrication of specialized tools for
accomplishing the render safe mission. Key to this effort is our
technology integration and research and development programs where we
develop and integrate new tools and techniques for device access and
disablement.
In closing, I would like to say a few words about our emerging
mission and role. With the launching of the new Domestic Nuclear
Detection Office (DNDO) by a Presidential Directive signed on April 15,
2005, DOE/ National Nuclear Security Administration and DHS/DNDO have
been afforded new opportunities as well as challenges to enhance our
Nation's nuclear detection and response programs. Through the same kind
of interagency cooperation and coordination about which I have already
spoken, we at the DOE National Nuclear Security Administration
Emergency Operations Office are working with DHS/DNDO in the joint
development of: (1) better overall technical integration among the
operative agencies in the event of a domestic incident, (2) closer
coordination and cooperation in technology development and research and
development activities for enhancing our detection capabilities, and
(3) better detection reporting and communication among the key
stakeholders such as, for example, through the Joint Center for Global
Connectivity.
Mr. Chairman, in concluding my statement, I would like to emphasize
that since 9/11 we have made positive changes to improve our abilities
to respond. What has not changed, however, is DOE/ National Nuclear
Security Administration's continued close interagency working
relationships and commitment to provide quality technical support for
the nuclear/ radiological counter-terrorism mission.
Mr. Chairman, I welcome your questions.
Mr. Linder. Thank you, Mr. Krol.
Mr. Lewis?
STATEMENT OF JOHN LEWIS
Mr. Lewis. Good afternoon, Chairman Linder and members of
the committee. I am pleased to be here to discuss the
coordination between the FBI and other federal agencies in
detecting and neutralizing potential terrorist threats
involving nuclear weapons.
You are all aware of the catastrophic consequences that
would result if a nuclear device were detonated. Because of the
severity of that threat, it is imperative that the FBI and our
partner agencies have procedures and coordination mechanisms in
place before the fact, in the event that we must respond to a
potential nuclear threat or incident.
We must combine our expertise in order to meet and defeat
these threats. We must work together, and we are working
together.
Let me give you a brief overview of some of these joint
efforts. The FBI has extensive liaison relationships with DHS,
Department of Energy, and the Department of Defense. All of us
play a vital role in resolving the nuclear crisis.
As you know, special components within each agency provide
critical support in the detection, analysis, mitigation and
secure transport of a nuclear device. And when we respond to
threats today, each and every response is fully coordinated
with our colleagues.
As one example, the FBI and DOE keep DHS apprised of the
operational status and geographic disposition of DOE's nuclear
search response assets. During potential incidents or periods
of heightened alert, DHS will be fully aware of operational
response activities. This ensures national-level integration,
coordination and strategic focus.
The FBI and DHS also have developed an operational
agreement for coordinating nuclear and radiological detection
and search operations. For a general threat response, where no
specific geographic target has been identified, DHS will lead
interagency coordination in developing courses of action and
recommendations for the Secretary of Homeland Security and
other officials.
The FBI will assume tactical control or temporary authority
of any nuclear search assets that are deployed. There are some
specific exceptions to that, which I can explain later, if you
desire.
For a specific threat response of a time-sensitive nature,
where credible information suggests a particular city or
location may be a target, the FBI will immediately notify and
coordinate mission-tasking with DHS and DOE. This facilitates
the fastest possible federal government response. And DOE, on
our behalf, will immediately deploy a tailored search tactics
appropriate for the situation.
As a side note, the DHS-managed Nuclear Assessment Program
has also proven to be a very valuable asset in helping to
determine the credibility of nuclear radiological threats. The
FBI combines our own analysis with nuclear specialists and
behavior analysts that we have on our staff to determine
whether or not a threat is credible and how we may tailor our
response.
Whether the threat is general or specific, DHS may
designate and send a liaison to the FBI's Strategic Information
Operations Center, as well as the local field office command
post. This DHS official will have full access to information
and will participate in joint planning. The FBI will also keep
the Homeland Security Operations Center fully informed.
The FBI also participates in a number of interagency
efforts to help prevent terrorists from accessing, using or
smuggling nuclear weapons or materials. For instance, the FBI
coordinates extensively with DHS in response to incidents
involving possible detection of nuclear and radiological
material at U.S. ports of entry.
The FBI and DHS both maintain extensive reach-back
capability to obtain rapid technical analysis of possible
nuclear or radiological material from national laboratory
experts who can immediately analyze this data.
The FBI also participates in various joint training
initiatives, exercises that bring federal, state, and local law
enforcement and emergency management personnel together for
training so that we are all prepared to coordinate our response
to a nuclear incident, if so called upon.
On the international level, the FBI trains foreign law
enforcement officials to more effectively search, detect and
interdict nuclear materials being illicitly transported. We are
not the only ones that do this. DOE, I know, does this as well.
And on a national level, the FBI's Nuclear Site Security
Program requires each of our 56 field offices to establish
close liaison with security personnel at critical nuclear
facilities and to develop and exercise site-specific Internet
response plans with them.
The FBI has also assumed a leadership positions in the
Domestic Nuclear Detection Office. The DNDO is an interagency
effort with the goal of strengthening our collective capability
to detect, report and respond to attempts that may involve the
importation, assembly or transportation of a nuclear explosive
device, fissile material, radiological material, any of which
might be intended for illicit use.
An FBI detailee currently serves as a director of the
office of operations support at the DNDO. And in the near term,
I will be dedicating additional FBI detailees there in several
areas, including strategic planning, red-cell planning,
information analysis, reach-back development, as well as
training and protocol development. These are just a few of the
FBI's interagency efforts.
Chairman Linder and members of the committee, the FBI
continues to work aggressively, both internally and with its
partners at every level, to investigate, disrupt and respond to
potential or actual nuclear threats. We, of course, are
committed to deterring crime and terrorism and protecting our
fellow citizens from the threat of nuclear weapons.
We will do everything in our power to anticipate these
threats and prevent them from becoming a reality.
I wish to thank you again for having me here today. And I
am pleased to answer any questions you may have.
[The statement of Mr. Lewis follows:]
Prepared Statement of John E. Lewis
INTRODUCTION
Good afternoon Chairman Linder and Members of the Committee. I am
pleased to be here today to discuss the coordination between the
Federal Bureau of Investigation and other federal agencies in detecting
and neutralizing potential terrorist threats involving nuclear weapons.
We are all well aware of the catastrophic consequences that would
result if a nuclear device were detonated. Because of the severity of
the threat, it is imperative that the FBI and our partner agencies have
procedures and coordination mechanisms in place before the fact, in the
event that we must respond to a potential nuclear threat or incident.
The FBI is the lead law enforcement and investigative agency
charged with responding to terrorist threats or incidents involving
nuclear weapons or materials. However, no one agency can protect
America from every threat--especially a threat as complex as a nuclear
incident. We must combine our expertise with that of other federal
agencies, in order to meet and defeat these threats. And we are working
together. Let me give you a brief overview of some of our joint
efforts.
COORDINATION WITH THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, THE DEPARTMENT
OF ENERGY, AND THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
The FBI has extensive liaison relationships with the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS), the Department of Energy (DOE), and the
Department of Defense (DOD), all of which play a vital role in
resolving a nuclear crisis. Specialized components within these
agencies provide critical support in the detection, analysis,
mitigation, and secure transport of a nuclear device. For example, DOE
supports both the FBI and DHS by deploying mobile detection assets to
search for nuclear/radiological materials and/or devices, and also
provides high-end technical expertise. The FBI also has specialized
response components from the Critical Incident Response Group and the
FBI Laboratory. Officers assigned to these components regularly train
together in order to ensure that we are all prepared ahead of time.
The FBI also maintains a close working relationship with DHS,
particularly with regard to coordinating the U.S. Government's response
to nuclear threats and incidents. The Homeland Security Act of 2002
requires that specialized DOE emergency response assets fall under the
operational control of DHS when they are deployed in response to a
potential nuclear incident. When we respond to threats today, each and
every response is fully coordinated with our colleagues at DHS.
For example, the FBI and DOE keep DHS apprised of the operational
status and geographic disposition of the DOE/National Nuclear Security
Administration's nuclear search response assets, in accordance with the
reporting processes outlined in the National Response Plan. During
potential incidents or periods of heightened alert, DHS will be fully
aware of operational response activities, including nuclear search
operations, and provide this information to senior government
officials, as required. This process ensures national-level
integration, coordination and strategic focus.
FBI AND DHS COORDINATION ON GENERAL AND SPECIFIC THREATS
The FBI and DHS have also developed an operational agreement which
provides additional guidance for coordination in nuclear/radiological
detection and search operations--whether the threat response scenarios
are very general or highly specific. As background, ``general threat
response'' may be defined as an increase in the alert posture or
actions taken to address increased threat traffic on nuclear/
radiological materials and/or devices where no specific geographic
target has been identified. ``Specific threat response'' may be defined
as actions taken to address a time-sensitive, credible threat that an
unresolved detection event has occurred, or to address specific
information suggesting that a particular city or location may be the
target of nuclear/radiological material or device. (It should also be
noted that a general threat may evolve into a specific threat as
investigators gather intelligence.)
For a general threat response, DHS will lead interagency
coordination in developing courses of action and recommendations for
the Secretary of Homeland Security and other officials regarding the
overall distribution of search response assets. The Secretary will
direct deployment of search assets. Once employed operationally, the
FBI will assume tactical control of nuclear search assets, unless those
assets are deployed in direct support of DHS component entities, such
as Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), Customs and Border
Protection (CBP) or the United States Coast Guard (USCG). Under this
scenario, ``tactical control'' refers to temporary directive authority
and control over those nuclear search response assets in support of
planning, mission objectives and operational taskings developed by the
FBI or other federal law enforcement entities.
For a specific threat response of a time-sensitive nature within
the jurisdictional authorities of the FBI, the FBI will immediately
notify and coordinate mission tasking with DHS and DOE. To facilitate
the fastest possible federal government response, DOE will immediately
deploy a tailored search package appropriate for the situation. In the
event that DHS does not agree with the deployment or proposed
employment of this search package for any reason, redirection of DOE
assets may be effected by the Secretary of Homeland Security in
consultation with the Attorney General.
During a general or specific threat response, DHS will deploy a
liaison official to the FBI Strategic Information and Operations Center
(SIOC) as well as the local FBI command post. This DHS official will
have full access to all required operational search information,
participate in joint planning, and maintain connectivity with the local
Principal Federal Official cell, if one is activated, in accordance
with the National Response Plan. The FBI, through the SIOC, will
provide the primary pipeline of communication to headquarters elements
in Washington. The FBI will also keep the Homeland Security Operations
Center (HSOC) fully informed of all appropriate information. The FBI
will be responsible for providing information concerning the nature,
timing, location and results of search activities to appropriate
entities, including the White House, back through its chain of command.
The DHS-managed Nuclear Assessment Program (NAP) has also proven to
be a valuable asset in helping to determine the credibility of nuclear/
radiological threats. This program, which is coordinated through the
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) in Livermore, CA,
provides assessments of incidents not only involving communicated
threats to use nuclear/radiological materials but also alleged
possession of such materials. The FBI utilizes this analysis, in
conjunction with its own nuclear specialists and behavioral analysts,
to determine the credibility of a particular threat and to determine
the level of response that may be required.
FBI AND INTERAGENCY EFFORTS TO PREVENT TERRORISTS FROM ACCESSING,
USING, AND SMUGGLING NUCLEAR WEAPONS
The FBI participates in a number of interagency efforts to help
prevent terrorists from accessing, using, or smuggling nuclear
weapons--or the materials needed (such as enriched uranium or
plutonium) to construct a nuclear weapon. For instance, the FBI
coordinates extensively with DHS/CBP in response to incidents involving
possible detection of nuclear/radiological material at U.S. Ports of
Entry. The FBI and DHS both maintain extensive ``reachback capability''
to obtain rapid technical analysis of possible nuclear/radiological
material to obtain a more definitive analysis of the origin and nature
of the suspect material from DOE personnel and/or other subject matter
experts. FBI field personnel can send technical spectra back to
national laboratory experts who can immediately analyze the data.
Other interagency forums include nuclear smuggling focus groups, as
well as various joint training initiatives. For example, since 1999,
the FBI and DOE have jointly coordinated the SILENT THUNDER Tabletop
Exercise (TTX) Program. These exercises bring together FBI personnel,
state and local law enforcement officers and emergency management
personnel, and DOE facility management and security personnel. The
exercises are no-fault tabletop exercises designed to familiarize key
decision makers and managers with the U.S. government's interagency
emergency response to a nuclear or WMD domestic terrorism incident.
Approximately four exercises are conducted per year throughout the
nation.
The FBI also participates in training with foreign law enforcement
personnel, which is designed to increase their capability to search,
detect and interdict nuclear materials being illicitly transported. In
addition, the FBI provides foreign law enforcement assistance and
coordination through its Legal Attache Program, currently in 53
countries worldwide. Our hope is that aggressive investigation and
prosecution of illicit nuclear material trafficking incidents--on the
international level--will discourage and hinder thefts of such
material.
On the national level, the FBI's Nuclear Site Security Program
requires each Field Office to establish close liaison with security
personnel at critical nuclear facilities (including DOD and DOE sites,
as well as commercial nuclear power facilities under the cognizance of
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission). This program also requires FBI
Field Offices to develop site-specific incident response plans and to
exercise those plans with facility security personnel.
The FBI has also assumed a leadership position within the Domestic
Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO). The DNDO is an interagency effort to
oversee the deployment of detection architecture with the goal of
strengthening our capability to detect, report, and respond to attempts
to import, assemble, or transport a nuclear explosive device, fissile
material, or radiological material intended for illicit use. An FBI
detailee currently serves as the Director of the Office of Operations
Support, one of 5 offices which comprise the DNDO. In the near term, I
will be dedicating additional FBI detailees to the areas of strategic
planning, red cell planning, information analysis, reachback
development, and training and protocol development.
OTHER LIAISON EFFORTS
While close liaison has always been standard at U.S. nuclear sites,
it should be noted that the events of 9/11 have dramatically increased
the level of awareness regarding any suspicious activity at these
sites. Our partners at these sites are now even more proactive in their
efforts to report even potentially suspicious incidents to local law
enforcement and/or the FBI.
The establishment of a National Joint Terrorism Task Force (NJTTF)
at FBI Headquarters and the expansion of the Joint Terrorism Task
Forces (JTTFs) in the field have also increased information sharing and
improved response coordination. There are now over 100 JTTFs
nationwide, consisting of various representatives of federal, state and
local agencies.
The FBI is also a regular participant in the interagency review and
update of the threat or potential threat to U.S. nuclear facilities and
activities. The results of this annual review help to structure the
postulated threat that DOD and DOE utilize to structure their
protective forces.
Chairman Linder and Members of the Committee, the FBI continues to
work aggressively, both internally and with its partners at every
level, to investigate, disrupt, and respond to potential or actual
nuclear threats. We are committed to deterring crime and terrorism, and
protecting our fellow citizens from the threat of nuclear weapons. We
will do everything in our power to anticipate these threats and prevent
them from becoming a reality.
Thank you again for the opportunity to appear today. I would be
happy to answer your questions.
Mr. Linder. I have a couple. What are the roles, the
various roles and responsibilities, of DHS, FBI and DOE, in the
coordinating a nuclear terrorist--response to a threat?
Mr. Krol?
Mr. Krol. The Department of Homeland Security has the lead
for providing expert recommendation and advice to the
President. In the execution of that lead, in the event of an
unfolding situation, a national significant security event
would be declared and the Secretary of Homeland Security would
most probably appoint a Principal Federal Official who would
proceed to the scene of the activity.
Mr. Linder. They have not mirrored the nuclear capabilities
that your department has?
Mr. Krol. That is correct, sir.
Mr. Linder. How do they make these judgments?
Mr. Krol. Through total immersion in the process that is
ongoing. In this particular scenario, you would expect the FBI
to be the Lead Federal Agency and that DOE would be the primary
support for, say, radiological search. And you would expect
those two organizations to keep the Principal Federal Official
apprised on what the situation is and what the planning efforts
are to proceed to the next step.
We have exercised that on a couple of occasions, in
exercise scenarios. And I think we have demonstrated that DHS
is getting the information they need, and we have the ability
to educate them on the spot with what is going on.
Mr. Linder. You do your testing and game-planning with
various local agencies, as well as?
Mr. Krol. That is correct, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Linder. How do you deal with the interoperability
problem that we have run into daily here?
Mr. Krol. That is a challenge. There is no doubt about it.
Mr. Linder. Well, who is working to solve that challenge?
Mr. Krol. Department of Homeland Security. The DNDO office
that was made reference to by Director Lewis is going to be a
tremendous aid in coordinating across the various entities that
exist in the United States to standardize and provide a concept
of operations for execution of radiological counterterrorism
activity.
I am very optimistic that they will be able to have great
impact in that area.
Mr. Linder. When?
Mr. Krol. I think it is a tremendous challenge, and I think
it is going to take them some time. I mean, it is not going to
come immediately.
Mr. Linder. I thought you said the FBI is engaged in
analysis of credibility of these threats? What do you do
independent of the others?
Mr. Lewis. I would not say we do it independent, sir, as
much as we would do it to complement what Lawrence Livermore
does today. You may know that they have been in the business
for some time. And, of course, their product is one that we
highly value and will seek every time.
We have our own nuclear scientists down at Quantico. We
also have behavioral scientists that, for instance, could
listen to a tape recording or could evaluate the text of a
letter. We will draw upon those individuals for whatever value
they might add to that process.
And please bear in mind that, whatever Lawrence Livermore
tells us, whatever our own folks tell us, this is just a
pointer, if you will. It is never going to solve anything or
resolve anything. It is just some additional information for us
to consider on top of everything else that we might collect
during the course of investigation.
Mr. Linder. And say you have considered and collected all
this information, and DHS, and FBI, and DOE disagree. Who
decides?
Mr. Lewis. I am not sure I understand your question.
Mr. Linder. Let me try it again. Let me try it in English.
You have all got your independent analysis sources and you all
examined your own sources, as well as the sources of the
information from others. And you have a disagreement on the
threat. Who decides?
Mr. Krol. It is a group effort. We have been through this
many times, and there have been disagreements. When one of
these issues kicks off, what we expect is we go into a secure
video-teleconference mode, where we have video-teleconferences
twice a day, with all the agencies online coordinated by the
White House.
Mr. Linder. Who in the White House?
Mr. Krol. Homeland Security Council and, in some cases,
National Security Council. And what we expect in these VTCs is
a constant give and take. People will disagree. Organizations
will have look-ups. And we will come back again 4 or 5 hours
later and proceed down the line.
I have been through those about maybe eight or ten times
now. And, at the end of the day, we are able to achieve
consensus on a way ahead.
Mr. Linder. Thank you.
Mr. Langevin?
Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And, gentlemen, thank you for your testimony today. I
wanted to just ask you a couple of questions.
And I guess the best place to start is, in the testimony,
Mr. Lewis, you stated that DHS appoints a lead federal agency
or officer, in event of a nuclear incident or the threat of
one, and it would likely be that they would designate the FBI.
Why wouldn't we just put the FBI in charge in the
beginning? Do we need this level of bureaucracy?
Mr. Lewis. Sir, let me clarify what we just said. DHS does
not appoint the FBI to anything. The FBI's role, with respect
to investigating terrorism, is laid in a statute. That statute
was backed up most recently by HSPD-5. And the statute says
that the attorney general has primary responsibility for
addressing acts of terrorism here in this country.
As a practical matter, when we are looking at a terrorism
matter that begins to involve or involves a threat of a nuclear
device, as has been noted here, we will engage several other
members of the community in looking at that threat, often times
well before any decision is made to roll search assets, if, in
fact, we can get there.
You can rest assured that, in today's times, before any
decision to roll assets are made, several agencies around town,
through the secure video-conferencing that Admiral Krol has
just mentioned, have discussed the matter back and forth, most
likely on multiple occasions.
I have been involved in four or five of those.
Mr. Dicks. Would you tell us the name of some of those
agencies you just talked about?
Mr. Lewis. That are in the morning conference?
Mr. Dicks. Yes.
Mr. Lewis. It is chaired by Homeland Security. DOE is
there. Central Intelligence is there. National Security is
there. NCTC is there.
Mr. Krol. Defense Department.
Mr. Lewis. DOD, of course.
Mr. Krol. Justice.
Mr. Lewis. Treasury.
Mr. Krol. Treasury.
Mr. Lewis. This happens every morning, sir.
Mr. Dicks. It is good to hear who they are.
Mr. Lewis. Essentially, the hot topics of the day, if you
will, are discussed each and every morning.
Mr. Dicks. Thank you.
Mr. Lewis. Yes, sir.
Mr. Langevin. But let me ask you, given FBI's lead role in
counterterrorism and DOE's nuclear expertise, why not just put
the FBI in charge? Are we creating another level of bureaucracy
by having suddenly DHS call the shots?
Should the committee revisit the Homeland Security Act to
give DHS a role, but not the lead role?
Mr. Lewis. Well, from my seat, sir, I do not. I do not see
that they have the lead role. I think that they own the assets,
so to speak, until such a point that an FBI investigation
determines the threat to be of a specific nature.
And at that point, my experience has been over the last
year-and-a-half--and I have been involved now with three or
four of these--it is very easy for us to draw down on what has
been a very good and long relationship with DOE and get assets
rolling.
In today's times, given the creation of DHS, that call is
immediately followed by a call to DHS where all three of us are
coordinating very closely. The MOU that has been struck between
us and DHS does allow the Secretary to step in and challenge
the FBI's deployment of resources.
And should it get to a point where the Secretary and the
Attorney General actually have to talk because there is a
difference of opinion, if they cannot solve it there, there is
a process for them, where they take that before Homeland
Security and/or National Security.
I do not believe--and, Admiral, correct me if I am wrong--
if we had ever seen one at all like that.
Mr. Krol. No, I think in execution it is working exactly as
you outlined. A threat is identified. The FBI asks us for
support. We provide support. And as we are going out the door,
we inform Homeland Security. That is the execution model that
we are using, the execution model that was en vogue before DHS
stood up.
Mr. Langevin. I just want to quote here from the Homeland
Security Act. And this is--it is a nuclear incident response.
It is in general. ``At the direction of the Secretary, in
connection with an actual or threatened terrorist attack, major
disaster, or other emergency in the United States, the Nuclear
Incident Response Team shall operate as an organizational unit
of the Department. And while so operating, the Nuclear Incident
Response Team shall be subject to the direction, authority, and
control of the Secretary.''
And my question is, would it be more practical to have the
FBI in charge with a role for DHS, but not necessarily in
charge?
Mr. Lewis. Sir, after the date that what you are reading
was written, the FBI and DHS, recognizing that that language
was not entirely consistent with what is written in statute
regarding our responsibilities, came together and drafted an
MOU, which, at least as far I am concerned, straightens out the
agreement or the operational agreement between DHS and FBI.
I do not have today any problems at all with deployment of
nuclear search assets. The emergence of DHS and having them as
part of the federal team now has not hindered me in any way,
shape or form. We came together quickly. We drafted an MOU. We
both agreed with what is in here. And I think it is fine.
I understand why you might raise that question, having read
what you just did, because it does kind of conflict with what
is in statute. But, again, that is precisely the reason why we
came together and drew up an MOU, to clarify that.
Mr. Linder. This is statute.
Mr. Lewis. Sir?
Mr. Linder. It does not conflict with the statute; this is
statute.
Mr. Krol. He is making reference to the MOU, I believe.
Mr. Dicks. Is the MOU consistent with the statute?
Mr. Lewis. Right. The MOU goes beyond the actual words of
the statute. I can tell you that our attorneys within the FBI,
as well as the attorneys over at DHS, poured over both of
these.
And I am not an attorney, sir, but I know that, after both
shops looked at it, you know, the offices of general counsel,
they are fine with it.
Essentially what it does is protect deployment. It favors
rapid deployment to get the job done. And it allows for--
Mr. Dicks. That is what we want.
Mr. Lewis. Yes.
Mr. Linder. The memorandum still leaves the Secretary of
Homeland Security in control. ``While so operating, NIRT shall
be subject to the direction, authority, and control of the
Secretary of Homeland Security.''
What person would take control of nuclear search assets and
so should activities will be delegated to the Secretary of
Homeland Security and appropriate law enforcement entity or
organization. In other words, this response team--and
responsibilities--
Mr. Lewis. Are you reading from MOU between DHS and
Department of Energy, sir? If I may? Or is it ours?
Mr. Linder. Evidently.
Mr. Langevin. If I could inquire, Mr. Chairman?
Mr. Linder. Sure.
Mr. Langevin. The MOU that you are describing, that is
something that the FBI has in your possession. It is that
something we would forward to the committee?
Mr. Lewis. Absolutely, if they do not have it already, yes.
Mr. Dicks. Could I ask on this point?
Mr. Lewis. Please
Mr. Dicks. Was this done--did the Secretary of DHS delegate
this responsibility to the FBI? I mean, that sounds like, in
that language, the head of the DHS could say, ``I want the FBI
to take the lead on this.''
Mr. Lewis. The MOU executed between two agencies allows the
FBI to have tactical control of nuclear assets when they are on
the ground. They do not belong to me, but when they are
deployed for case reasons, because we have something that we
need to look for, at that point in time, the FBI has control of
those. And we use them to execute our searches.
Mr. Dicks. Is this their equipment? Is this the Department
of Energy equipment?
Mr. Lewis. Yes, sir.
Mr. Dicks. That is what we are talking about?
Mr. Lewis. Yes, sir.
Mr. Dent. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Afternoon, sir.
How often are your capabilities exercised over the years? I
know you have been around for decades.
Mr. Lewis. Yes, but not in the same position. I have been
in my current seat since May of 2004. And I want to say that,
on three or four occasions, this has been exercised.
And from my seat, not to make this sound too simplistic,
what we have today works well. I can count on very rapid,
cooperative contact with DOE to get assets rolling quickly when
I need them. And I have had no problems, with respect to
interference with a deployment from DHS or anybody else.
And I will say, throughout this entire process--and,
normally, we can see these things coming. So, in the time
leading up to this, the FBI, and DOE, and DHS are not acting in
a vacuum. There are many other agencies involved.
Mr. Dent. These capabilities are exercised three or four
times. Is that since you have been there, you said, or since
the inception?
Mr. Lewis. Yes, sir.
Mr. Dent. What was the most recent one?
Mr. Lewis. Approximately 9 or 10 months ago, New York City.
Mr. Dent. Okay. And I guess my question would be, are there
plans in place--NIRT teams plans in place that will train local
and state law enforcement officials, train in the search of a
nuclear device or radiological dispersion device?
Mr. Lewis. That is one of the reasons why the new DNDO was
set up. One of the things that is going to happen inside of
DNDO, as they build a bigger nuclear detection architecture for
the U.S., is state and local law enforcement entities are going
to be right in the middle of this mix.
DNDO is going to help states acquire, help states use, in a
standardized format throughout the U.S., nuclear search assets.
Mr. Dent. And finally--
Mr. Lewis. I am sorry, detection, not search. Detection.
There is a difference.
Mr. Dent. And then finally, what type of research are you
engaged in right now in nuclear detection? And are you making--
and what is the sense of investment in that area? And is it
effective?
Mr. Krol. From our perspective, we have a detection
research capability that we work on. We are constantly working
on coming up with more sensitive meters, more portable meters.
A lot of our work is in support of federal agencies. We
have to blend in to the general populace we are working in so
we do not create a question or a panic. So we apply budgetary
money to upgrade ourselves constantly. The figure that we are
applying is around $10 million a year.
Mr. Dent. In terms of the sensitivity of those detection
devices, I know sometimes they are a little too sensitive. For
example, certain things that get picked up. Bananas, I guess,
for example, emit a certain radiation.
How good is the technology at discriminating against those
benign objects?
Mr. Krol. Well, it is not. You have to have highly
sensitive detection devices, especially when you are dealing
with rolling stock, moving stuff, trucks and so on. And so you
have to have a reasonable sensitivity.
And we do get hits on naturally occurring sources of
radiation. And you just have to run those down. There is no way
out of it.
In some ways, we are a slave to physics. I mean, physics is
what physics is. And we are dealing in a continuum that the
rules have not been changed in a long time.
So, again, DNDO, we are optimistic that in their effort to
bring together architectures and do hardcore research into new
possibilities for radiological detection that they have an
opportunity to make a difference.
Mr. Linder. Would the gentleman yield?
How close are we to detection instruments that identify
isotopes?
Mr. Krol. Oh, we can do that now. We can get a hit and
identify an isotope. We can tell you if it is strontium-90, or
cesium-137, or cobalt-60.
Mr. Linder. Shouldn't that prevent you from having false
hits?
Mr. Krol. It can. It can. And it does in many instances.
The great equalizer for radiological search, from our
perspective, is TRIAGE. That is the home team capability, where
our teams can feed back into the weapons labs and get the
absolute best expert analysis of what we have provided to them
for identification.
Mr. Dent. And just finally here, are these detecting
devices--do you believe that a lot of our local law
enforcement, at least in our major metropolitan areas, are
adequately equipped with devices like that?
Mr. Krol. That is a hard question. They are equipped. And I
would say they are adequately equipped.
I think the issue that is a problem is that they are not
adequately trained, in many cases. And I do not blame them
necessarily, because they have a wide variety of issues they
deal with, the fire department--and the radiological--you know,
they do not spend a lot of time on radiological training.
Mr. Dent. Thank you.
Mr. Linder. Mr. Dicks?
Mr. Dicks. Where do we get most of the--where do we get
most of the information about an incident? Where does that come
from? Does that come from intelligence sources or--which we
probably cannot talk about here--but where do you get your
information?
Mr. Krol. Usually, there are two major sources that cause
us to go out the door. That would be an intelligence stream
that leads the FBI or another federal agent in the direction
that there is something going on radiologically somewhere in
the country. Or somebody, a fire department or some, has passed
a meter in front of somebody or something and the meter has
moved. And then we are asked to come in and be the arbitrator
of what they have.
Mr. Dicks. Now, where is all this equipment kept? And how
many locations do you have?
Mr. Krol. We have eight major centers of excellence tied to
the weapons labs around the United States. We have 29
deployable teams. Our rule is 4 hours deployed.
Mr. Dicks. Do you have your own airplanes?
Mr. Krol. We do not have our own airplanes, but we are--
some of our teams are in places where we can get access to
aircraft. Most of our deployments are by ground. Most of the--
Mr. Dicks. Do you have pre-arranged arrangements to get
aircraft?
Mr. Krol. No. And we do not need them in most places. For
example, the team we have at Brookhaven is equipped with vans.
And we can get downtown to New York City in an hour.
Mr. Dicks. What about Washington, D.C.?
Mr. Krol. Washington, D.C., we have team at Andrews. And so
Brookhaven, Andrews, Oak Ridge National Labs, Savannah River,
Albuquerque, Idaho National Lab, Hanford, in your area--
Mr. Dicks. Right.
Mr. Krol. --and in Livermore and Las Vegas. So when you lay
that out on a map, there are only a few areas that are
difficult to get to from a time perspective.
The Argonne National Lab in Chicago, if they have to go to
North Dakota, you know, we have an agreement in Chicago with
Coast Guard to provide us transportation, air transportation.
We are trying to provide air transportation to ourselves using
the National Guard, but that is a work in progress.
But in most--
Mr. Dicks. Well, we are getting rid of a lot of the
National Guard aircraft, too.
Mr. Krol. Yes, sir. But we do not need--the National Guard
has a small aircraft, a Twin Otter, that was just perfect for
us, because our teams are five-to seven-man teams with about
250 pounds of equipment.
But most of the places that we need to deploy that involve
metropolitan areas, we are 3 hours driving max from where we
need to get. So that is our situation.
Mr. Dicks. And how many times a year do you exercise this?
Mr. Krol. We actually go on deployments on the average of,
I would say, three times a month. I mean, real deployments that
are driven by one thing--
Mr. Dicks. Like incidents, I mean, these are--
Mr. Krol. Incidents--
Mr. Dicks. You really test this system. You know what it
will do.
Mr. Krol. We test this system. That is why I made a point
in my opening statement that this is not a system that looks
good on paper. I mean, we--and if we miss our deployment time,
we go back and do lessons learned. But very seldom to we miss
our deployment time.
We have people watch billed. We know who to reach out and
touch and make move on short notice.
Mr. Dicks. Now, when you are having all these meetings, are
the HHS people involved or the DHS people, who are going to
deal with the victims of an attack?
Mr. Lewis. DHS is a regular member, sir. Yes.
Mr. Dicks. And, you know, Mr. Chairman, I hesitated to
bring this up, but I cannot help myself.
I am still concerned that we are not, you know, on our
BioShield effort, that we are still not--we still do not have
the attention of the administration. I hope these gentleman
will take this back to one of your meetings and maybe you can
have a discussion on it. Maybe you can do better on this than
we have done, in terms of oversight.
But we are worried that we are not getting enough of these
drugs that could deal with ARS, acute radiation system, a
stockpile. And the companies out there are extremely
frustrated. They want to--some of these people have gone out,
put up their own money to try to develop these kinds of drugs
that would help with the people who were exposed to radiation.
And I just worry that all the work we are doing here--
prevention is obviously, in this case, uno, numero one. I
understand that.
But, God forbid, if something does happen and we are not
prepared to have the drugs in place so that these people can be
treated within 3 or 4 hours, whatever it takes, we are going to
lose a lot of people that we did not have to lose. And we are
going to look back on this like we looked back on 9/11 and say,
``Why didn't we do something?''
So you two the very responsible officials in this
administration. I hope you will start asking some questions. We
are trying to ask the questions. We are not getting the answers
that we think the American people would expect us to get.
And this is part of this whole scenario. I hope you will
try to help us on this.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Linder. Let me ask you one more question. I assume
that, if we have a biological event, the FBI will be involved
in the intelligence--
Mr. Lewis. Yes, sir.
Mr. Linder. Who would you look to without the DOE?
Mr. Lewis. Who would I look to if--
Mr. Linder. If you do not have the DOE?
Mr. Lewis. I am sorry. I still did not get the last part.
Mr. Linder. Who would you look to--like, currently, you
look to DOE for flushing out the analysis of the information.
Who would you look to with a biological event?
Mr. Lewis. We have reached back both at Quantico, for our
own scientists, and beyond, in terms of evaluating precisely
what kind of event we are dealing with. I did not come prepared
today to talk to you about bioterrorism, but if you want me to
take that back, or if you want to send the question over, I--
Mr. Linder. I hope we do not just reinvent the wheel. I
hope we do not just send one of these for every different bug
we have got, every kind of nuclear event that we have.
Mr. Lewis. We have a separate set of experts that we have
relied upon for years that give us quick, reach-back expertise
so that we can evaluate quickly and conclusively what it is we
are dealing with in that particular area. I would be delighted
to share that with you, if you wanted to send a question my
way.
Mr. Linder. We probably will.
Mr. Langevin?
Mr. Langevin. I would just like to revisit the discussion
we were having a minute ago. I just want to be clear you are
willing to forward that MOU to the committee between the--
Mr. Lewis. Yes. I will get my hands on the signed copy. I
do not have a signed copy in front of me, but I do know it was
signed by Admiral Loy when he was with us and the FBI. And I
will make sure you get it.
Mr. Langevin. In your opinion, would it be wise for this
committee to revisit the Homeland Security Act to make the
authority more clear, to codify that, so that the statute would
change to reflect the MOU?
You know, I just have concerns when I read things that I
have--a veteran--member was quoted in a June 2005 National
Journal article saying that adding DHS to the chain of command
compounded the confusion of multiple agencies trying to report
straight to the President.
The last thing we want in a nuclear event or a threat of a
nuclear event is to have confusion out there as to who is
reporting to whom. And, you know, we are on your side.
Mr. Lewis. I understand.
Mr. Langevin. We want to work with you. If there is
something you need, this is the time to ask.
Mr. Lewis. It is not broke, as far as I am concerned. I
come from the operational side of the house. If I have got a
situation to deal with this afternoon, I have a very high
degree of confidence that, working with my DOE and DHS
partners, I can put search assets on the ground very quickly. I
do not have any problem with that.
I do not spend a lot of time evaluating exactly what the
statute says, the two different statutes, the one that gives
the attorney general responsibility for investigating terrorism
and the one that you have read from today.
There is language in there that, when you look at it, it
appears to some, I suppose, that maybe it could be strengthened
or clarified. It does not hamper me.
I would invite Mr. Krol to chime in here. I have what I
need today to respond very quickly to take care of business.
Mr. Krol. I agree with Director Lewis completely. And I
think, if you go back to 2002, to 2003, there was a lot of
muscling with about who was in charge. I think all the effort
that we have made among our three organizations, including the
MOU, has in great degree mollified those concerns.
And I think we are all operating with a great understanding
on how we are really going to execute our mission.
Mr. Linder. Mr. Dicks?
Mr. Dicks. No more questions.
Mr. Linder. If there are not more questions, without
objection, this hearing is adjourned.
Mr. Dicks. Mr. Chairman, could I ask one thing, just one
thing?
Tell us the difference between the NEST teams and the RAP
teams?
Mr. Krol. The RAP teams is a subordinate organization to
NEST. The Radiological Assistance Program is the program I made
reference to where we had 29 teams spread across the country.
They are the primary search engine, if you will, if they are
needed. They are first out the door.
From that level on, we can go to a high-level search with
the Search Response Teams that we have in two locations, Nevada
and inside the NCR at Andrews Air Force Base. In fact, NEST is
the overall umbrella that covers all our capabilities,
including Render Safe.
Mr. Dicks. Okay. In both of your experiences, have you ever
had a time when you could not get an airplane? When you could
not get in--
Mr. Krol. No.
Mr. Lewis. No.
Mr. Dicks. Never had a problem? This never has come up?
Mr. Krol. Well, you are--Congressman, you have probably--
when you say you have never had a problem, I mean, we--
Mr. Dicks. Well, I mean, if you had a problem, you called.
They said, ``Well, we do not have any planes for you.'' They
tell us that all the time.
Mr. Krol. No, it is--
[Laughter.]
No. That may be the first answer, but persistence usually
prevails when we--
Mr. Dicks. So you have had a problem?
Mr. Krol. Well, initially, right out of the barrel. But,
like I said, persistence prevails. And when you declare you
have a national mission, everybody lines up.
And I operate from a different perspective, in that I do
have DOE aircraft available to me, you know, in Albuquerque. So
I can get on my own airplane in many cases, because our center
of excellence for a lot of these assets, including particularly
Render Safe, is in Albuquerque.
So it is a manageable problem, is the way I would answer
the question.
Mr. Dicks. Now, we make clear we can make some plans
available, if there was a need for some dedicated aircraft. I
mean, I can see all the training you do. I mean, a few
airplanes--these are small airplanes, too. These are not, you
know, budget-busters. You know, think about it.
Mr. Krol. I think we are okay.
Mr. Linder. Thank you, both. Thank you very much.
[Whereupon, at 2:27 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]