[House Hearing, 109 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY INTELLIGENCE AND BORDER SECURITY:
DELIVERING OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE,
INFORMATION SHARING, AND
TERRORISM RISK ASSESSMENT
of the
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
JUNE 28, 2006
__________
Serial No. 109-89
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
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Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/
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COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Peter T. King, New York, Chairman
Don Young, Alaska Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Lamar S. Smith, Texas Loretta Sanchez, California
Curt Weldon, Pennsylvania Edward J. Markey, Massachusetts
Christopher Shays, Connecticut Norman D. Dicks, Washington
John Linder, Georgia Jane Harman, California
Mark E. Souder, Indiana Peter A. DeFazio, Oregon
Tom Davis, Virginia Nita M. Lowey, New York
Daniel E. Lungren, California Eleanor Holmes Norton, District of
Jim Gibbons, Nevada Columbia
Rob Simmons, Connecticut Zoe Lofgren, California
Mike Rogers, Alabama Sheila Jackson-Lee, Texas
Stevan Pearce, New Mexico Bill Pascrell, Jr., New Jersey
Katherine Harris, Florida Donna M. Christensen, U.S. Virgin
Bobby Jindal, Louisiana Islands
Dave G. Reichert, Washington Bob Etheridge, North Carolina
Michael T. McCaul, Texas James R. Langevin, Rhode Island
Charlie Dent, Pennsylvania Kendrick B. Meek, Florida
Ginny Brown-Waite, Florida
______
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE, INFORMATION SHARING, AND TERRORISM RISK
ASSESSMENT
Rob Simmons, Connecticut, Chairman
Curt Weldon, Pennsylvania Zoe Lofgren, California
Mark E. Souder, Indiana Loretta Sanchez, California
Daniel E. Lungren, California Jane Harman, California
Jim Gibbons, Nevada Nita M. Lowey, New York
Stevan Pearce, New Mexico Sheila Jackson-Lee, Texas
Bobby Jindal, Louisiana James R. Langevin, Rhode Island
Charlie Dent, Pennsylvania Kendrick B. Meek, Florida
Ginny Brown-Waite, Florida Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Peter T. King, New York (Ex (Ex Officio)
Officio)
(II)
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
STATEMENT
The Honorable Rob Simmons, a Representative in Congress For the
State of Connecticut, and Chairman, Subcommittee on
Intelligence, Information Sharing, and Terrorism Risk
Assessment..................................................... 1
The Honorable Zoe Lofgren, a Representative in Congress For the
State of California and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on
Intelligence, Informaton Sharing, and Terrorism Risk Assessment 2
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress
For the State of Mississippi, (ex officio)..................... 4
The Honorable Mark E. Souder, a Representative in Congress For
the State of Indiana........................................... 12
The Honorable Jim Gibbons, a Representative in Congress For the
State of Nevada................................................ 16
The Honorable Jane Harman, a Representative in Congress For the
State of California............................................ 20
The Honorable Nita M. Lowey, a Representative in Congress For the
State of New York.............................................. 38
WITNESSES
Panel I
Mr. Charles E. Allen, Chief Intelligence Officer, Office of
Intelligence and Analysis, U.S. Department of Homeland
Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 6
Prepared Statement............................................. 7
Panel II
Mr. L. Thomas Bortmes, Director, Office of Intelligence, Customs
and Border Protection, U.S. Department of Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 31
Prepared Statement............................................. 33
Ms. Cynthia O'Connell, Acting Director, Office of Intelligence,
Immigration and Customs Enforcement, U.S. Department of
Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 27
Prepared Statement............................................. 29
Mr. James Sloan, Assistant Commandant for Intelligence, U.S.
Coast Guard, U.S. Department of Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 22
Prepared Statement............................................. 23
Panel III
Mr. Michael W. Cutler, Fellow Center for Immigration Studies:
Oral Staement.................................................. 44
Prepared Statement............................................. 46
Mr. Michael O'Hanlon, Senior in Foreign Policy Studies, Brookings
Institution:
Oral Statement................................................. 48
Prepared Statement............................................. 49
Questions for the Record
Questions from Representative Rob Simmons for Assistant Secretary
Charles Allen.................................................. 60
DHS INTELLIGENCE AND BORDER SECURITY: DELIVERING OPERATIONAL
INTELLIGENCE
----------
Wednesday, June 28, 2006
House of Representatives,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Subcommittee on Intelligence, Information .
Sharing, and Terrorism Risk Assessment,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:05 a.m., in
Room 311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Rob Simmons
[chairman of the subcommittee] presiding.
Present: Representatives Simmons, Souder, Gibbons, Dent,
Lofgren, Harman, Lowey and Thompson (ex officio).
Mr. Simmons. A quorum being present, the Committee on
Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Intelligence, Information
Sharing and Terrorism Risk Assessment will come to order.
Today the subcommittee meets to hear testimony on the
Department of Homeland Security's border security intelligence
operations. One of the Department's primary jobs is to secure
the homeland against the illegal entry of people, goods and
illicit materials. The 9/11 Commission wrote in their
comprehensive study, and I quote, targeting travel is at least
as powerful a weapon against terrorists as targeting their
money. The United States should combine terrorist travel
intelligence, operations and law enforcement in a strategy to
intercept terrorists, fine terrorist travel facilitators and
constrain terrorist mobility.
DHS works to do this through the hard work of people,
through U.S. Customs and Border Protection, Immigration and
Customs Enforcement and the United States Coast Guard, among
others in the intelligence and law enforcement communities. But
as we all know, thousands of people illegally stream across our
international borders.
The 9/11 Commission estimated that annually approximately
500,000 people enter this country illegally, without
inspection, and overstay their legal welcome. Many come for
opportunities that America provides, and we understand that,
but others have a more sinister intent. In order to better
protect our borders, we need to know who is attempting to
cross, and what are they bringing into this country, and why.
Our border immigration and Coast Guard officials protect
more than 5,000 miles of the border with Canada, 1,900 miles of
border with Mexico, and approximately 12,400 miles of shoreline
east and west. To protect this vast international border,
intelligence-driven operations will be the key to targeting and
interdicting these threats before their arrival.
On a typical day Federal officials will apprehend over
3,000 people trying to cross between ports of entry, and on a
typical day will intercept one person for terrorism or national
security-related reasons. These apprehensions net fraudulent
documents and seemingly innocuous pocket litter, both of which
can have tremendous intelligence value. Therefore, DES
frontline operators must have the tools, the training,
capability and processes in place to weave the information from
these everyday encounters into a comprehensive intelligence
picture.
In addition to those who try to cross our borders
illegally, on a typical day approximately 1,200,000 people and
passengers arrive at our ports of entry, and approximately
80,000 shipments of goods arrive for approved entry. Nothing
wrong with this, we want to encourage this. And we must make
sure that this lawful travel and lawful commercial activity
proceeds efficiently, without undue delay, while focusing again
on those who deserve additional scrutiny. It is a daunting but
necessary task.
Today we will hear from Charlie Allen, the Chief
Intelligence Officer of the Department of Homeland Security,
who will give an overall perspective of the Department's
strategic intelligence efforts and his support to DHS
operational components. Again, welcome, Mr. Allen. This task is
a huge task and a new task for United States as Americans.
Next we will hear from the Coast Guard, the Customs and
Border Patrol and the ICE on how they incorporate intelligence
into their operations, and on how the Office of Intelligence
and Analysis is supporting their efforts.
And then finally, our third panel will consistent of Mr.
Michael W. Cutler from the Center for Immigration Studies, and
Mr. Michael O'Hanlon from the Brookings Institute, who will
provide the subcommittee with their perspective on how
intelligence can best be used to secure and control America's
borders.
Mr. Simmons. The Chair is now happy to recognize the
Ranking Member of the subcommittee, the gentlelady from
California, Ms. Lofgren for her opening statement.
Ms. Lofgren. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
While I am pleased that we are finally turning our
attention today to the question of intelligence and border
security, I must say, Mr. Chairman, this hearing and other
hearings the Republican leadership has scheduled in the next
few months are a day late and dollar short--correction, we are
6 years late and millions of dollars short.
President Bush took office in 2001, and this Congress has
been controlled by Republicans since 1995. The Senate, with one
exception, has had a majority of Republicans since 1995. The
Federal Government, charged with making and enforcing the laws
of this Nation, have been under the sole control of Republicans
for the last 6 years.
With complete control of legislation and enforcement of the
law for 6 years, you would think that a party that now calls so
vigor
[[Page 3]]
ously for border security and enforcement of immigration law
could have solved the problem of illegal immigration by now,
but, Mr. Chairman, the Republican Party seems to be all talk on
this subject.
Here is just a partial list of the failures presided over
by the Republican majority on illegal immigration.
Since 1996, when the Senate and the House were taken over
by the Republican Party, 5.3 million undocumented immigrants
came to the United States. Since 2003, when President Bush came
to power, over 2 million undocumented immigrants have entered
the United States.
In 2004, Congress enacted the Intelligence Reform Act, or
the 9/11 Act, which mandated an additional 2,000 Border Patrol
agents being hired over each of the next 5 years. But the
President's subsequent budgets and Congress have failed to
include adequate resources to implement the act. Indeed, the
President's fiscal year 2006 budget called for only 210
additional Border Patrol agents. In fiscal year 2006, the
Congress, with both House and Senate controlled by Republicans,
eventually funded only 1,000 additional agents.
The 9/11 Act also mandated an additional 800 immigration
enforcement agents over each of the next 5 years, and yet for
fiscal year 2006, the Congress funded only 350 additional
agents. The act also mandated an additional 8,000 detention
beds, but for fiscal year 2006, the Congress funded only 1,800
additional detention beds.
President Bush and the House Republicans continue to
underfund the Border Patrol. The President's fiscal year 2007
budget does not fully fund the authorized levels for the Border
Patrol.
During the Bush administration, Catch and Release has been
rampant, a program under which 12,000 undocumented immigrants
each month are apprehended from countries other than Mexico and
are released and allowed to live in the United States while
awaiting a deportation hearing, yet the Federal Government,
which is completely controlled by Republicans, 70 percent of
the OTMs are released into the interior with notices to appear
at a later date and are never heard from again.
According to the Washington Post, between 1999 and 2003,
work-site enforcement operations were scaled back 95 percent by
the Immigration and Naturalization Service. The number of
employers prosecuted for unlawfully employing immigrants
dropped from 182 in 1999 to only 4 in 2003. And fines collected
declined from $3.6 million to 212,000. In 1999, the United
States initiated fines against 417 companies; in 2004, it
issued fine notices to only three.
Next to nothing has been done to secure our northern border
at a time when 17 suspected terrorists were arrested in
Toronto, and there are reportedly 50 terrorist groups in
Canada. The millennium bomber was arrested as he attempted to
cross the northern border with explosives, and the
Congressional Research Service says that Canada is, quote, ``a
favored destination for terrorist groups as a safe haven,
transit point and place to raise funds.''
While the Republican leadership in Congress focuses on the
southern border, with 10,000 Border Patrol agents stationed
along a 2,000-mile border with Mexico, only one-tenth of that
amount is on the Canadian border, a border that is 2.5 times as
long as the Mexican border. Recent news stories state that
people drive, walk, sail, ski and sled across the northern
border all the time.
On December 16, 2005, all 219 House Republicans voting that
day opposed a proposal, the Democratic motion to approve border
security and immigration enforcement by fulfilling the 9/11
Commission's border security recommendations. The proposal
would have hired more border guards; ended the Catch and
Release practice by authorizing 100,000 additional detention
beds; and incorporated state-of-the art technology, including
cameras, sensors, radar satellites and unmanned aerial vehicles
in order to ensure 100 percent border coverage.
In 2005, all but one Republican voted against a
comprehensive Homeland Security proposal that would commit 41
billion to securing the Nation from terrorists, 6.9 million
more than the President's budget. In 2005, all but two
Republicans voted against an effort to add $284 million to an
emergency spending bill for securing the Nation's borders.
Mr. Chairman, there has been a lot of talk about
immigration these days, tough talk, but the pattern is talk and
not action. And I say this because I have been made aware that
there is a schedule--and this hearing, I think, is on that
schedule, and I was on a hearing last week that was part of
this schedule--to raise the issue of immigration, and I think
the Republican leadership has made it a political issue. There
was the hearing in the House Administration Committee last
week; this hearing today; on July 5th, the hearing from the
House International Relations subcommittee in San Diego, the
Senate Majority is on it; July-h, another hearing in Laredo,
Texas; mid-July a hearing, House Education and Workforce;
August 14th, Government Reform and the like.
So I am quite skeptical that this hearing on border
intelligence is more than talk. It seems to me this is just
another long list of the hearings held and planned by the
Republican-led Congress that does not lead to solutions to a
problem that the American public cares about, and I thank the
gentleman for recognizing me.
Mr. Simmons. Yes. And I think some of the items that you
have listed in your opening statement are just the reason why
we are having this hearing today, so that we can hear from our
Chief Intelligence Officer how he is working to incorporate the
various components of the Department of Homeland Security
intelligence to better address this important issue. And I
think we understand it is an important issue, and we look
forward to their testimony, and hopefully their statement of
progress in these difficult issues.
And now the Chair would like to recognize the distinguished
Ranking Member of the full committee Mr. Thompson of
Mississippi for any statement he would like to make.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and Ranking
Member. I appreciate the opportunity to participate in this
hearing.
[[Page 5]]
Always nice to see my friend Charlie Allen. First day of
work he came by, and it has been a good relationship so far. I
appreciate you, Mr. Allen.
But for the sake of this hearing today, Mr. Chairman, we
really should have been talking about border intelligence 5
years ago after 9/11. If we had conducted oversight and border
intelligence during that time, we could focus legislation more
adequately on what our problems are now. More importantly, it
would have given us some meaningful starting point when taking
up border security legislation.
Essentially we have a bill pending now that is not informed
by what is known at the border. This Republican Congress passes
bill after bill--and I have five different bills that we have
passed on border security, Mr. Chairman--and nothing has
happened with them. If we are going to do top-notch border
intelligence, it is essential that we develop a risk-based
approach to border security.
The United States has 216 airports, 143 seaports, and 115
land border crossings that are official ports of entry.
Screening all the people and goods coming through these busy
ports is already an enormous resource challenge for the men and
women of the Department of Homeland Security. I have serious
concerns that they lack the resources necessary to obtain true
situational awareness at these locations, not to mention among
the many hundreds of miles of unguarded rural and remote border
locations.
As we know, the threat to our northern border was thrown
into sharp relief with the arrest of an apparent terrorist
sailor in Toronto. This administration has failed to adequately
secure our northern border by the fact that the northern border
is more than twice the length of the southern border, with only
one-tenth of the agents.
State, local and tribal law enforcement is uniquely
situated to help out with border intelligence where resources
are stretched thin. What I am hearing from police and sheriffs'
offices, however, worries me. When it comes to border security,
the Department should have an all-hands-on-deck attitude.
Instead, I hear CBP holds back information from local law
enforcement because they view locals as competitors. Some local
officers tell me that if they arrest someone coming over the
border illegally, CBP headquarters sees it as a black eye for
them.
Making matters worse, officers in northern border
communities have told me that they often receive more specific
and actionable information from their Canadian colleagues than
they do from the Department. Add to this the fact that border
security is a Federal responsibility, Mr. Chairman, and yet
this administration has passed the buck to State and local
authorities in some areas, relying on them to do its job,
without providing adequate support.
Whether it is a turf issue, a resource issue or something
else, this is unacceptable. CBP, ICE and the Coast Guard need
to adopt common and consistent practices to share information
with all their border security partners. While I had high hopes
for the Homeland Security information network as a key way to
communicate with State and locals, moreover, I am troubled
about a Department report yesterday that found that most
officers either don't trust it or don't think it contains much
useful information.
[[Page 6]]
This hearing, therefore, is both important and timely, Mr.
Chairman. This administration has dropped the ball on border
security by underfunding critical programs for recruiting
Border Patrol agents, leaving large planks of our border
vulnerable in not procuring sufficient detention beds.
Constructive and thoughtful Democratic amendments that seek to
fill these critical gaps have been rejected time and again, and
now we face a possible intelligence breakdown on our borders.
How we proceed from here will have a big impact both on how we
go about securing our border, and ensuring that our immigration
laws are fully enforced.
I welcome all the witnesses and look forward to your
thoughts on these critical issues. I yield back.
Mr. Simmons. I thank the Ranking Member for his comments,
and I agree with him completely. I think this hearing is
important, and I think it is timely. Other Members who are
present know that they can submit opening statements for the
record.
Mr. Simmons. We will move now to the first panel. The
Chairman calls the first panel, which is assembled; recognizes
Mr.Allen as our Chief Intelligence Officer of the Department--
of the Office of Intelligence and Analysis, who reports
directly to Secretary Chertoff. In this role, he is responsible
for coordinating with the Intelligence Community and providing
guidance on Homeland Security intelligence issues.
Mr. Allen has a long and distinguished career in the U.S.
Intelligence Community, beginning in 1958, when he joined the
Central Intelligence Agency. He has subsequently held
assignments of increasing responsibility within that
organization, within the Office of Secretary of Defense, and he
has served his country in a variety of other capacities.
Mr. Allen, welcome. It is good to see you again. We look
forward to your testimony.
STATEMENT OF CHARLES E. ALLEN, ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR
INTELLIGENCE AND ANALYSIS, CHIEF INTELLIGENCE OFFICER,
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Mr. Allen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Lofgren
and members of the committee. I am very grateful for the
invitation to speak to you today. I am also gratified to appear
alongside my colleagues from the United States Coast Guard;
Customs and Border Protection; and Immigration and Customs
Enforcement. As members of the Homeland Security Intelligence
Council, which I chair, they have been invaluable partners in
realizing the Secretary's vision of an integrated Department of
Homeland Security intelligence enterprise.
I have a very brief statement, and I would request that my
full statement be submitted for the record.
Providing intelligence support to border security is a
subject that I have devoted considerable time and energy during
my relatively short time as Chief Intelligence Officer of the
Department. One of my first actions was to launch an
intelligence campaign
[[Page 7]]
plan for border security. We began this process last October by
holding a border security intelligence conference that enabled
us to gain inputs from a wide range of Department of Homeland
Security and Intelligence Community partners.
Since then we have worked on two tracks. On one track, we
have taken concrete measures to deliver discrete, actionable
intelligence to the men and women securing our borders. And
although the need to protect sensitive sources and methods
precludes my discussing these measures in detail today, I can
tell you that members of my office have drawn on the extensive
experience in the Intelligence Community to help the Department
get full benefit from national collection assets, and that is a
process that was not evident before I came. We have changed
that substantially.
On the other track, we have been developing a phased
framework for sustainable intelligence support to border
security. Our overall approach is to bring national
intelligence to bear on the border, while at the same time
fusing intelligence from border and immigration activities into
an integrated threat picture, at first within individual
sectors, but eventually across the length of the borders. The
approach is consistent with ongoing operational efforts to push
the border outward and to build a layered defense extending
into the U.S. Interior.
As befits an office with department-wide responsibilities,
my office has focused its own staff resources on strategic
efforts, including the development of a department-wide
intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance architecture;
establishing a border security analysis branch; and working
with interagency partners to coordinate and streamline Federal
intelligence efforts on the border.
Some of our efforts have had an indirect but strong effect
on the delivery of operational intelligence in support of
border security. Our plan for supporting State and local fusion
centers envisions deploying DHS personnel, including
intelligence officers, in a way that is most responsive to each
center's particular need, including augmenting border security
intelligence capabilities, if required.
Our work on enhancing the Homeland Security Information
Network, which will invigorate an important channel for sending
intelligence to and receiving information from the State and
local authorities.
Finally, my office's development of an information
architecture for the Department's intelligence enterprise will
promote faster information sharing and greater
interoperability, improving the delivery of operational
intelligence in support of border security.
In summary, my office has been an active and effective
advocate of intelligence support to border security, deploying
our department-wide perspective and authorities and the
particular skills of our officers on behalf of the entire DHS
intelligence enterprise.
Mr. Chairman, I look forward to your questions.
Mr. Simmons. Thank you for that testimony.
[The statement of Mr. Allen follows:]
Prepared Statement of Charles E. Allen
Chairman Simmons, Ranking Member Lofgren, Members of the
Subcommittee,
Thank you for inviting me to speak with you about my role in
providing intelligence support to border security. The subject of
today's hearing is one to which I have devoted considerable time and
energy during my tenure as Assistant Secretary for Intelligence and
Analysis and Chief Intelligence Officer of the Department. I am
gratified to appear alongside my esteemed colleagues from the Coast
Guard, Customs and Border Protection, and Immigration and Customs
Enforcement. As members of the Homeland Security Intelligence Council,
which I chair, they have been invaluable partners in realizing the
Secretary's vision of an integrated DHS intelligence enterprise.
When I arrived last September, the Office of Intelligence and
Analysis already was leading a working group on intelligence
initiatives in support of the Secretary's Secure Borders Initiative, or
SBI. One of my first acts was to launch an Intelligence Campaign Plan
for Border Security, or ICP, which Deputy Secretary Jackson introduced
to General Michael Hayden, then the Deputy Director for National
Intelligence, on Sept. 27, 2005. We kicked off our planning efforts by
holding a DHS Border Security Intelligence Conference on 24-25 October,
2005. This conference, held in a secure facility, enabled us to gather
inputs from a wide range of DHS and Intelligence Community partners. It
proved highly valuable to our subsequent planning.
Among the needed improvements we identified as a result of the
conference were greater focus on strategic analysis; coordination and
integration of analytic efforts at both the tactical and strategic
levels; inclusion of DHS agent and inspector insight in collection and
exploitation activities; better-defined areas of responsibility for
information sharing; and dissemination of-and identified repositories
for-relevant information.
Since then, we have worked on two tracks. On one track, we have
taken concrete measures to deliver discrete, actionable intelligence to
the men and women securing our borders. I would be pleased to describe
some of these measures in a closed hearing, but the need to protect
sensitive sources and methods precludes my discussing them in detail in
this setting. What I can tell you is that my officers have drawn on
their extensive experience in the Intelligence Community to help ensure
that DHS gets full benefit from national collection assets.
On the other track, we have been developing a phased framework for
sustainable intelligence support to border security. Our overall
approach is to bring national intelligence resources to bear on the
border while at the same time fusing intelligence from DHS border and
immigration activities into an integrated threat picture-at first
within individual sectors, but eventually across the length of the
border. This approach is consistent with ongoing operational efforts to
push the border outward and build a layered defense extending into the
US interior. In addition we are maintaining focus on all of our borders
to include the Northern Border and maritime domain.
In the first phase of the ICP, covering fiscal years 2006 and 2007,
we will develop and implement a comprehensive strategy for collection
and analysis of border security intelligence. During this phase, we
will apply our intelligence resources and analytic focus in areas of
immediate need. Our research will be comprehensive covering a broad
range of topics associated with cross border violence with
subcategories of human, drug, weapons, contraband smuggling and
trafficking, transnational gangs, documentation fraud, and the violence
these topics spawn on the border. The research and assessments we
produce will include all agencies with responsibilities in these areas
of interest. We will start with the southwest border, progressing to
all borders based on threat assessments. We will review lessons learned
from the first phase and make any programmatic investments and
structural changes that flow from these findings. Finally, we will be
on a sustainable footing, allowing us to push the borders outward while
supporting interior enforcement.
I should point out that even though our planning efforts pre-date
the President's decision to deploy the National Guard to the border, we
are taking this deployment into account. We plan to collaborate with
the National Guard to ensure its intelligence capabilities are
integrated with the overall intelligence enterprise at the border,
filling in shortfalls and laying the foundation for the post-deployment
period.
As befits an office with Department-wide responsibilities, my
office has focused its own staff resources on strategic efforts. In the
area of collection and requirements, we are leading the development of
a Department-wide intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR)
architecture that will serve as the central nervous system of DHS
intelligence. In the area of analysis and production, we have created a
border security branch that is focusing research and analysis on a
number of topics relevant to the border, including alien smuggling,
counter-narcotics, money laundering, transnational criminal gangs, and
identity theft and benefit fraud using travel documents. Finally, we
are deeply deeply engaged in efforts to coordinate and streamline
interagency intelligence efforts on the border, notably in El Paso,
where three valuable intelligence centers, run by elements of three
different Cabinet agencies, are exploring new ways to work together on
their common mission of securing the border.
I wish to highlight several efforts of the Office of Intelligence
and Analysis that will have an indirect, but powerful, effect on the
delivery of operational intelligence in support of border security.
First, my office has led the Department's development of a plan to
support state and local fusion centers across the country. Our plan
envisions deploying DHS personnel, including intelligence officers, in
a way that is most responsive to each center's particular need. If the
fusion centers in states along the border tell us they want particular
support in partnering with the federal government on border security,
we stand ready to deliver. Second, we have taken on the responsibility
for enhancing the Homeland Security Information Network, an important
channel for sending intelligence to, and receiving information from,
state and local authorities. Third, we are developing an information
architecture for the DHS intelligence enterprise in order to promote
faster information sharing and greater interoperability-characteristics
that undoubtedly will improve the delivery of operational intelligence
in support of border security.
In conclusion, I believe we have been an active and effective
advocate of intelligence support to border security, deploying our
Department-wide perspective and authorities and the particular skills
of our officers on behalf of the entire DHS intelligence enterprise. I
look forward to answering your questions.
Mr. Simmons. And in my opening statement I made reference
to the fact that we have a 5,000-mile border with Canada, an
undefended or demilitarized border with Canada; 1,900 miles of
border with Mexico, again, a demilitarized or undefended, in
some
[[Page 8]]
respects, border with Mexico; 12,400 miles of shoreline. This
geography presents a vast challenge.
I think back to my experience, my service in Asia, working
on the Great Wall of China, thinking about the logistics and
expense of creating such a great wall and then reflecting on
the fact for all that effort, it actually did not work; it did
not keep, if you will, the barbarian hordes from penetrating
that country.
So my point of view has always been very simply stated. We
need to be intelligent about how we control our border. We need
to focus and target our intelligence assets so we are at the
right place at the right time, doing the right things against
the right people.
Some of my colleagues, as you have heard from their opening
statements, give the impression that nothing has been done. Of
course, in the Intelligence Community it is often best not to
be on the front pages of the New York Times; I think we
understand that. But from your perspective, how have we been
focusing our intelligence assets to this problem, and what
successes do you feel that we have had over the last several
years--or at least since you have been in office, which is a
relatively short time?
Mr. Allen. Yes, Mr. Chairman. That is an excellent question
because this is a very difficult, multifaceted,
multidimensional threat, and trying to secure all those lengthy
borders is a very large challenge. But I think we have to do it
in a couple of ways. And my colleagues, who will speak later,
will speak on specific operational successes and programs on
which they are engaged.
What I see has been lacking is a good intelligence analytic
baseline to understand the threat thoroughly, to look at the
border holistically. We cannot break it into simply the legal
movement of goods and people, narcotics, human smuggling,
trafficking, contraband, potential of WMD being smuggled across
the border, terrorism, and illegal immigration. We have to look
at a secure border process.
Under the Homeland Security Act, the Secretary of Homeland
Security is charged with developing secure borders, and I think
we have to look at it in a way that we have not looked before.
One of the things that I have done since we have arrived is
establish a border security branch that is going to be quite
substantial in order to understand the threat, the drug
smuggling, the alien smuggling, and the financial transactions,
including money laundering. So we are going to have to take a
very strategic look at this problem that we have not done
previously.
The other issues that we have to bring to bear is all of
the capabilities of the national Intelligence Community on to
this problem. And there is a lot that can be done through the
various intelligence collection capabilities. I don't have the
power to collect intelligence, as the Chief Intelligence
Officer, although the DHS operating components can collect
information as part of their operational and law enforcement
duties. But I do have the right to develop the collection
requirements and priorities, which we are doing, and for the
first time we have a set of priorities which we would be happy
to talk about in a closed session.
We also are developing new capabilities within the GEOINT.
General Clapper, who just left NGA; there are things we have
done that are totally unprecedented within the area of other
intelligence collection capabilities. As I said in my opening
comments, we are developing an intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance plan to deal with border security, and working
very closely with General Maples over in the Department of
Defense, and General Cartwright at the Strategic Air Command.
All of these things we have done in the last 3 or 4 months. And
as I said, when I came in, we did not have an intelligence
campaign plan against the border. The Secretary and Deputy
Secretary of Homeland Security directed me to do so. And I
think we are in the opening stages of developing that overall
strategic picture and landscape. My colleagues will talk to you
in specific terms of successful operations.
I agree with you that we should have done more earlier, but
we are not at this vigorously. I have a weekly stand-up, and
believe me, those are rough stand-ups. Of all of my people--
Mr. Simmons. Mr. Allen, before my time runs out, in all of
these activities are you preserving and protecting civil
liberties and rights of people across our borders?
Mr. Allen. Absolutely. This is something of which we are
very concerned. Civil liberties and civil rights, privacies are
all taken carefully into account. Everything we are doing were
done under the careful scrutiny of my legal staff as well as--
and my colleagues can talk about their lawful activities. But
everything we do is absolutely lawful. And we certainly are
looking at special interest aliens from certain countries that
could have not only just alien smuggling, but perhaps terrorism
connections.
Mr. Simmons. The Chair now recognizes the Ranking Member.
Ms. Lofgren. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And it is good to see you, Mr. Allen. Certainly your
reputation in the Intelligence Community is a sterling one, and
I am glad that you are in the job that you have. However, as
you have only been there a short period of time, as we all
know, so would it be accurate to say that you have--obviously
no plan is ever completely done. Even when the plan is done, it
must be continuously updated, but would it be accurate to say
that you have completed the comprehensive DHS border
intelligence plan, including CBP, ICE and the Coast Guard, or
is that in progress still?
Mr. Allen. Congresswoman, that is still in progress. We are
still--in my view, we are only in midstream in getting that
overall plan together. I have seen a lot of vigor on the part
of the individual operating components, but we have to work
this as an integrated process. As you know, there are a number
of initiatives. There is a Southwest Counternarcotics Border
Strategy in which we are participating. It is a very layered
approach.
One of the things we are looking at is the information
flows and trying to ensure that as we acquire information, we
provide the information to the border--to the Customs and
Border Protection. And we obviously have to improve those
connectivities and the flow of information. We have a good deal
to do, but I have some good ideas on how to get this done.
Ms. Lofgren. I am sure that you do. Can you tell us, if you
know, why this wasn't done before you got here?
Mr. Allen. Well, I think the real issue is bringing the
Department together, bringing all these various agencies and
operating components together, many of which have somewhat
overlapping roles, but never ensuring there is a close
collaboration, integration.
[[Page 10]]
I meet every week with the gentlemen and ladies who will be
speaking later from the operating components, and we have 2
hours of just talking about how we can integrate our efforts
toward the borders and towards training together, developing
our analytic expertise together. And these are very tough
sessions, but we are getting things done.
Ms. Lofgren. As you know, 17 suspected terrorists were
recently arrested in Toronto, and there are reported--I don't
know if it is accurate--at least 50 terrorist groups in Canada.
And we know that the only reported terrorist caught at the
border was the millennium bomber arrested at the northern
border as he was--with explosives, and a Congressional Research
Service says that Canada is the favored destination for
terrorist groups as a safe haven, transit point and place to
raise funds.
Now, we have gone over that there are 10,000 Border Patrol
agents stationed along the 2,000-mile border with Mexico, and
we still have problems with illegal immigration with that level
of patrol, but only one-tenth of that amount is on the Canadian
border. That border is 2.5 times as long as the Mexican border.
And I know it would be incorrect to assume that those 1,000
agents are really on the job because it is a post position. If
you look at 24 hours a day, at any given time you have got
between 200 and 300 people on that whole border. And we have
had reports that people drive, walk, sail, ski, sled, crawl--
and probably a few other things--across the border with
impunity.
Does the comprehensive border plan that you are putting
together address that gaping hole in border and national
security?
Mr. Allen. Yes. Our intelligence campaign plan would also
include our northern border. We are very much concerned about
our northern border. I believe that Ambassador Negroponte spoke
indirectly to it in his hearing in front of the Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence when he did his worldwide threat. I
just met with Ambassador Negroponte and Stockwell Day, the
Minister of Public Safety up in Canada. We certainly have some
common interests. We are very impressed with what the Canadians
have done in dealing with extremism. But this is an issue, and
any nexus with the United States is of great concern to us. We
obviously need to ensure that we work at this much harder.
I just met with the head of the Border Patrol of Canada. We
and--the head of the Border Patrol is a woman. We have agreed
that we will work harder to look at issues where we should do
common cause to better secure our border.
The northern border is very different from the southern
border, and we need new tools, techniques and methods to help
make the border more secure.
Ms. Lofgren. Just before my time is up, do you think 200
Border Patrol agents on a 5,000-mile-long border is sufficient?
Mr. Allen. I think we need substantial resources on all our
land borders. And I am very impressed with what our U.S. Coast
Guards have done with our maritime borders. We obviously have
to spend a great deal of time and attention with our northern
border as well as our southern border.
I have spent time with our southern borders. I have just
made a very good trip to Mexico City where we had some very
strong dis
[[Page 11]]
cussions on how to work harder on particularly special-interest
aliens, people who might be involved in terrorism, and we are
getting good cooperation in the south.
Ms. Lofgren. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My time is up.
Mr. Simmons. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from
Indiana Mr. Souder.
Mr. Souder. First I would like to make a couple of brief
comments on the northern border. Clearly, coming from the
Midwest, I am concerned about the northern border, but it is a
little bit different than the southern border. One thing is we
work with the Canadians on harmonization of immigrationwise. I
have met teams along the border. They are taking down groups in
Canada, the millennium bomber himself, and working with the
RCMP.
We have had open testimony in this committee from Mr.
Garcia about the 10- to 12,000 that it usually takes to smuggle
a Hispanic across the southern border, and that there are areas
along the southern border where it is 30--to 35,000 to smuggle
a Middle Easterner. But since we have no real knowledge of what
is coming into Mexico, east, west or from the south, and they
don't have functional control of their country, and we don't
have functional control of our south border, that is partly why
we focus so much on the south border. We do need attention in
the north border, in fact, because so many Middle Eastern
natives in Canada and citizens of the U.S. live in Detroit and
Buffalo, Toronto and Montreal. That is clearly a pressure zone,
but it is not exactly the same as the south border.
I had a couple of questions. One is kind of simplistic, but
it has been an increasing frustration of mine. It seems like
often our agencies are spending more time meeting with each
other to try to coordinate their intelligence than trying to
figure out who the bad guys are.
I have a very simple question: Given that we will probably
never eliminate all stovepiping, and given the fact that so
many of the different intelligence subgroups have somewhat
different goals, in addition to terrorism they have a
multiplicity of goals and focusing on different things, what I
am wondering is if you are a border agent at any of the
official border crossings, and you have an ID and the name
comes up, is there a pop-up, just a signal? If the Department
of Defense doesn't want to share certain intelligence, if the
CIA doesn't want to share certain intelligence, if different
parts of DHS have different intelligence in all this that pops
up and says this is a person of interest, do we have enough
harmonization of our intelligence agencies that even if they
don't want to share the information, that if a name hits the
border system, a pop-up occurs?
Mr. Allen. I think--and I will let Customs and Border
Protection, Captain Bortmes, speak to that later, but I, having
visited the Border Patrol and spent time with it in two sectors
and traveled with Congressman Reyes to El Paso, I am convinced
that databases, as names are checked, those are done very
quickly and very efficiently. And believe me, having come from
the Central Intelligence Agency, there is no information if it
involves the security of the United States that can be withheld
by CIA or anyone else in getting that information. If it needs
to be sanitized and declas
[[Page 12]]
sified, that can be done if it deals with personalities of
interest to the Border Patrol.
Mr. Souder. So you are saying that you are confident that--
because I ran into a case in my area that we have. It was a new
category of people we are watching as opposed to our watch
list; in other words, they haven't done anything wrong, they
are not even a suspect, but they are doing certain behaviors.
You are confident that each branch of the government, that if
they have someone that they have some interest in, they may not
have an arrest warrant out, they may just be trying to trap
them, that all those names are in a system, in a computer
system, that if that person crosses a border entry, that some
warning will come up to say hold this person, here is the
agency you contact.
Mr. Allen. I am not confident that every database that has
a potential person of interest would be immediately available
to the Border Patrol. But the Border Patrol does have an
ability to check to see if there is a potential record that
would indicate that individual has engaged in something
nefarious or has connections with terrorism.
I think they do a good job. There are people turned away
every day at our borders. I am sure Mr. Bortmes can speak more
directly about this, but I do believe that this is improving.
Database management is a very hard problem for the U.S.
Government, and particularly for the U.S. Intelligence
Community.
Mr. Souder. Because this isn't a question of whether the
Border Patrol is doing their job, or CBP, this is a question
about is the information getting to them with which to do this
job, which I know we are pushing towards, but it is really hard
to get all these agencies to share complete information, and if
they won't share it, if they would at least share the name so
that people can get back to them.
I have one other question. How do you see AMO fitting in
Riverside? The maritime center.
Mr. Allen. Out in California?
Mr. Souder. Yes.
Mr. Allen. Well, we are working closely with AMOC, that is
a center there. We are providing them with strategic
information. Through our initiatives and building requirements,
we have provided them with data that they have never received
in the last 2 months. In fact, they say they are inundated with
some of the information that using national NTM systems that
they never had access before. So we are starting to make
progress. We are not where we should be, sir, but I am pushing
it every week.
Mr. Souder. Thank you. Because it is clear that the area
you are working in is the underpinnings of everything else we
do, because good intelligence and actionable intelligence is
how we are going to prevent things. Thank you for your work.
Mr. Simmons. I believe I just got a call for a vote, but we
have time for an additional--a couple of sets of questions, I
believe.
The Chair recognizes the Ranking Member Mr. Thompson.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Allen, are you aware of CBP being accused of holding
back information to local law enforcement agencies?
[[Page 13]]
Mr. Allen. No, sir, I am not. And I would--I will let Mr.
Bortmes answer that question when he appears on the second
panel. Unless it is for some reason sensitive law enforcement
case--investigative case information, one would think that
information would not necessarily be held back in ways that
would not be effective.
Mr. Thompson. So you would agree that the sharing of
information between agencies is a must, from an intelligence
standpoint.
Mr. Allen. It absolutely is. That is where I am--as you
know, Congressman Thompson, that is where I am spending a lot
of my time. We are putting people--Secretary Chertoff has just
approved my implementation plan for putting my officers out
with State fusion centers--and, in fact, I want to put them out
in every fusion center--in order to help both the sharing of
information from the national Intelligence Community down at
the lowest possible level to the local level.
Mr. Thompson. Can you give me our analysis of where CBP,
ICE and the Coast Guard is with regard to the common sharing of
intelligence with other State and local partners?
Mr. Allen. Well, I would defer to them, but we have
become--for State and local fusion centers, we have become--my
own office has become sort of the centerpiece, the executive
agent for the Department for the flow of information down to
State and local level. I am sure there is information shared at
the local level by all the operating components, and I should
let them speak directly to that.
Mr. Thompson. So your job will be to manage the fusion
center?
Mr. Allen. To ensure that there is a flow of information
down to the State fusion centers and to the major city fusion
centers. We are in the process of doing that and in the process
of deploying officers to those centers. We have deployed them
to Los Angeles, New York, Louisiana, Maryland, and we are
sending an officer to Georgia and to Virginia in the near
future.
Mr. Thompson. And the goal of those centers is to have some
common thread of intelligence available to all parties?
Mr. Allen. Yes, sir. Those are under State or city control.
And our job is to coordinate the flow of Federal information
down to those centers and to ensure that they have all the
information that they need in case there is some risk or danger
to that particular State or that particular city.
Mr. Thompson. Well, with respect to border intelligence,
will we have CBP and ICE agents in those fusion centers also?
Mr. Allen. That is a decision I think that the head of the
operating component must make. We certainly will have officers
from DHS there. They obviously, and JTTS, the Joint Terrorism
Task Force, that is managed by the FBI, and they are there in
many places, and they do a tremendous job in working and
sharing of information.
Mr. Thompson. If it was left up to you, would you have one
there?
Mr. Allen. I am not sure. I think that if we have the right
small number of officers there--and certainly officers from ICE
or CBP could come down to a fusion center working for the Chief
Intelligence Officers as part of his outreach to State and
local governments. I would like that very much. The Secretary
has designated
[[Page 14]]
me and my office as executive agent for the Department in the
flow of information to State and local governments.
Mr. Thompson. Well, since we are talking about border
intelligence--I will have some other questions, Mr. Chairman, I
will submit for the record.
Mr. Thompson. But, Mr. Allen, the only other question I
have for you is, are you aware of the IG report that came out
yesterday with respect to the Homeland Security Information
Network?
Mr. Allen. Yes, sir, I am aware of it. I have not read it.
I have asked my information management officer to send it to
me. The Homeland Security security network is run by the
operations director at the Department.
Mr. Thompson. But you also--there was some--well, you have
not seen it, but there are some weaknesses.
Mr. Allen. Yes. And one of the things that we have been
doing--and let me just say on the classified side we are doing
three things. One, on the Homeland Security Information Network
I have put in an intelligence portal for sensitive but
unclassified information to go to State and local governments.
We have run some experiments, and we have gotten good reception
on that.
Two, I took over a very broken Homeland Security
Information Network system. We have fixed that to almost every
State and fusion center.
And three, we are forming a Homeland Security data network,
which will be a more robust--a more robust classified network.
We are in the early stages of doing a pilot test on that. We
have every intention of doing that.
Very candidly, Mr. Thompson, we have been behind in our
information management, and I am not happy with it, and I know
that the Secretary isn't either.
Mr. Thompson. I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Simmons. I thank the gentleman.
For the record, we have a motion to adjourn on the floor. I
will keep the hearing going. Ms. Harman is going to go vote and
return. I think there is adequate time for the gentlelady from
New York to ask her questions of Mr. Allen, and we will try to
keep this moving along.
Mrs. Lowey. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
And I thank you, sir, for your presentation. And I
particularly appreciate your focus on fusion centers.
I met with the head of the New York State Department of
Homeland Security just last week, and one of the points he
unfortunately shared with me is that the communication between
the Federal Government and the local officials in New York is
mediocre at best. So, number one, I would appreciate if you
would comment on that and what is being done to improve upon
it.
And secondly, there are three fusion centers, as you know,
in New York. There is one in Albany, there is New York City
Police Department, and there is one in Rockland County. I know
Westchester is in the process of putting one together, but
there isn't one now.
[[Page 15]]
I am very pleased that you talked about placing your people
in these fusion centers. Perhaps you can continue to expand on
that. How fast is this moving? Are you getting support for
doing that? Perhaps you can focus specifically on New York. I
happen to have an interest in it; it happens to be my district.
What is happening there? And if the New York State Department
of Homeland Security said there is inadequate communication,
what are you doing; what can you do; what will you do to
improve upon it?
Mr. Allen. Well, I thank you for the question because New
York City--New York State, and New York City in particular, has
been a focus right from the moment I arrived. I will soon have
three officers in New York City working with the Intelligence
Division and with the Counterterrorism Division. I have a
general liaison officer there now full time. We are going to
send up two very experienced all-sourc intelligence officers to
help in mentoring and teaching in New York City. Mr. David
Cohen and Larry Sanchez are very strong on this.
Mrs. Lowey. Didn't David originally come from New York?
Mr. Allen. Well, his wife is from Brooklyn. He came from
Boston. He still has a Bostonian accent. But he is a New
Yorker, he truly is. And up in Albany we have a UNYRIC where we
work very closely. And I have a team in UNYRIC this week. I
intend to put a full-time officer in UNYRIC, there is no
question about that. My principal deputy, I have an outsider,
Jack DiMaggio, who spends his full time working to get our
officers out to the various fusion centers.
Albany--at this stage we do not have plans to put anyone in
Rockland County, but we do have--we will put people in Albany.
And I respect that Homeland Security advisor. We are going to
improve our communications flows. When we have a threat into
New York, we always call the Homeland Security advisor. We call
him on the unclassified line if it is an open issue, but if it
is classified, we have secure communications. And Homeland
Security has made certain that the UNYRIC as well as New York
City has classified capabilities.
I have substantially augmented cryptographic capabilities
for New York City so that they can communicate with the Federal
Government. And on top of that, I am going to put in a secure
video for Commissioner Kelly up in New York City so that he can
dial in if he has a problem or a worry about something, we can
just sit and secure a video conference and discuss the threat.
Mrs. Lowey. Well, I personally, before I go and vote, want
to thank you for that, because Chairman King and I--I am not
sure, Chairman Simmons, whether you were with us at the time,
it was shortly after 9/11, and we went down there and met with
Commissioner Kelly, and it was clearly, good luck from the
Federal Government, he was on his own. And as you know, he has
established a counterterrorism network around the world. And I
have been with David Cohen and others visiting their system and
their various offices, and it really is impressive. They really
follow up on every single lead.
I just wonder, how many leads do you get from the Federal--
just on average, from the Federal Government coming down to
them, or
[[Page 16]]
are they really picking them up themselves through their own
networks?
Mr. Allen. Well, I think we get quite a number of threats
that relate to this country that flow in from overseas, and
obviously from the extraordinary capabilities of the FBI. Many
of these are not valid; we have to look at their credibility.
And this is something that goes on every day. New York City
also picks up suspicious activity, and they are very good at
informing us.
New York City is a model for doing counterterrorism, and we
learn from working with New York City it is a two-way street. I
have learned a great deal from working with Dave Cohen, a man
with whom I worked with at the CIA, as well as Mr. Sanchez. So
I think it is a mutual sharing of information. And Commissioner
Kelly has made it clear that he wants to work very closely with
the Department and with the operations that I direct.
Mrs. Lowey. I gather I have to vote, but let me just say
thank you very much. You have been on the job for how long now?
Mr. Allen. I have just arrived 9 months ago.
Mrs. Lowey. Well, I appreciate it. I remember on our other
committee it took 2-1/2 years out of 9/11 for an inspector
general to set up a computer system. So all these questions
that we have, why hasn't it been done, that is past, and I hope
that you can move as expeditiously as possible. And I know that
New York City will be grateful for your efforts.
One thing really impressed me as I visited these centers.
They follow up on every single lead, no matter how minor,
because you never know how minor it really is. So I thank you
very much for your important work, and I guess I had better
vote.
Mr. Allen. Thank you, Congresswoman. Believe me, New York
City is on my thoughts all the time. They ask me what worries
me always, and I am always worried about New York City. And I
am always sure to tell David Cohen I worry about it before I go
to sleep.
Mrs. Lowey. You keep worrying about it, because I have five
of my seven grandchildren living in New York City, plus two of
my three kids. So I worry about it morning, noon and night. And
hopefully we will continue to put all the appropriate
procedures in place. Continue to worry because that is the only
way we can make sure we are covered. And I thank you very much.
Mr. Allen. Thank you, ma'am.
Mr. Souder. [Presiding.] I assume this is done--and I am
not trying to get into specifics that would be classified, but
I assume that on a daily basis there is attempts to see where
our vulnerabilities are, where we are testing our border
crossings, where we are testing our ports, where we are testing
our airports, and you are checking to see where our holes are.
Is that a correct assumption?
Mr. Allen. That is correct. Whether it is terrorism from
abroad, al-Qa'ida, whether it is sort of global--inspired
homegrown terrorists that are looking for weaknesses. We see
alien smuggling networks and narcotraffickers always trying to
find new ways of getting across our borders, yes.
Mr. Souder. One of the concerns that I have is
historically--I chair the narcotics oversight committee
directly and have spent
[[Page 17]]
most of my career working with narcotics as well as the
Speaker's Drug Task Force, and came on here because, having
worked narcotics issues, it was a logical thing to move to
Homeland Security and border because they are so
interconnected, and their functions are interconnected--is that
often we are better at figuring out after some things happened
in explaining patterns rather than being able to prevent. And
it is much more difficult to try to put the little pieces of
the alphabet in the connection until you have actually had the
action. And yet the risk is so much higher even in Homeland
Security on one big tragic thing than kind of the daily
pounding we take on narcotics and other types of illegal
activity.
My question is, how much of the focus in the intelligence
gathering--is it the National Targeting Center? Who is
primarily trying to figure out when we do this, this is how
they may change? In other words, let's say we put a fence over
parts of the border. Where are they going to move next? Are we
going to squeeze them into the Caribbean, are we going to move
into the--if we control the Florida area, are they going to
move in where we don't have as much air surveillance between,
say, Galveston and the center of Florida? What if we do this
will move them more to the Canadian border? What will move them
to North Dakota as opposed to through the main border
crossings? Is that type of discussion occurring? Is it
interagency? How does it interrelate with the NORTHCOM and
SOUTHCOM and the JATFs?
Mr. Allen. And it is a very good question because--and I
will let my colleagues--again, Mr. Bortmes, Mr. Sloan and Ms.
O'Connell--talk particularly about the daily looking at
changing patterns.
My job--and I have here my Chief Threat Assessment
Officer--is to look at how these patterns change, working with
all sources of information from the traditional Intelligence
Community as well as from the operational components of
Homeland Security to try to focus very clearly on where things
have shifted because--and I am sure Mr. Sloan can tell you
about maritime patterns and how, as the Coast Guard increases
pressure in one area, the roots move to another.
I think we have to do this very, very systemically. I have
talked to Mr. John Walters, who heads their Office of Drug
Enforcement Policy, and he believes that we have to look at
this very holistically, and we have to stand back and get
strategic intelligence. If we simply follow the latest lead,
the latest tip, and just do tactical intelligence, we won't
understand it.
And your question is very much on target. We have to do
both; we have to do tactical operations, and we have to do
strategical analysis, otherwise we will never win this--and I
don't know if win is the right word--otherwise we will never be
successful in this struggle to secure our borders.
Mr. Souder. One of the challenges, when there was a lot of
focus on the Arizona border, we took resources from California
and Texas and moved them over. It is not clear that the groups
who are moving any kind of illegal traffic, whether it be
human, narcotics, terrorists or anything else, behave in zones
like we behave. While they may have certain syndicates that
control certain parts of those zones, they don't match up to
our sectors. And what clearly hap
[[Page 18]]
pened is we had an increase in activity in areas where we had
pulled out, and so the net reduction wasn't anything like
consolidating in one zone.
If we put the Guard on the border, if we fence certain
sections, I presume that as we are making those decisions, much
like--I mean, anybody knows who goes to San Ysidro, you can see
all the watchers. You can see the watchers on their side and
our side going back and forth, and the lane movements, and both
sides are watching that. And I would like to think that we are
increasingly doing that anticipation of what, if we do this,
the next move is going to be. And a lot of that is
intelligence-driven: Are we doing preventative intelligence as
well as reactive intelligence? And that is kind of the biggest
challenge that you have in the services.
One other question on NORTHCOM. They have been talking
about standing up more intelligence and coordination, whether
it is down at El Paso or up in Colorado. Do you know what the
status of that is? And do you have an opinion as far as how--
whether the Defense Department needs to get into more
aggressive intelligence on the border?
Mr. Allen. Well, let's just go back to proactive
intelligence activities and ways to do prevention. I think Mr.
Bortmes may talk about intelligence-driven activities or
operations on how we have tried to anticipate, if there is a
threat, to preempt people from entering and crossing our
borders who could have very nefarious plans.
The one thing that we are working on right now broadly
within the Intelligence Community as well as the Department of
Homeland Security is the issue of radicalization. We are also
working with State and local governments because we are finding
that the States are studying radicalization. What causes a
person to move from, say, a fundamentalist view of the world to
one of extreme, say, solipsism and where violence might be
created? How can you prevent that deterrence? How can you
engage in a policy of deterrence or a policy of preemption? So
we are working at that.
And my deputy for intelligence, who is not here, has formed
a Radicalization Working Group, and we work across the
community and across the Department.
On the NORTHCOM issue, that is very important. I'm getting
a NORTHCOM officer assigned directly to my office so we can
coordinate more. I met with Admiral Keating. I have met with
retired Captain Mike Knoll, who is a J-2 out there. It is clear
that they do wish to expand their energies and efforts to work
secure borders. They have had some issues getting all the
activities in which they want to undertake, but we are working
very closely with them, and they are expanding their energy on
border security.
Ms. Lofgren. Just real quickly. All of the terrorists who
attacked the World Trade Tower, the first attack and the
second, actually came in with visas through airports, not
across the land borders. Does your plan that you are working on
address that element?
Mr. Allen. The intelligence campaign plan is more focused
on securing the land borders in particular, both north and
south. We have come leaps and bounds since September 11th in
being able to control particularly the movement through the air
and our airports of entry. I believe the kind of programs that
are in place now and which are being improved is much greater.
I know that Mr. Sloan could talk about security at ports as
well as maritime and border intrusions. But what we have since
September 11 is a much harder country to enter illegally.
However, I am very concerned about the potential for "clean
skins" getting breeder documents, getting genuine documents,
say, in Western Europe and being able--as Director Mueller
might say--to be only an e-ticket away from entering the United
States. So we do worry about that.
Ms. Lofgren. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I would yield
back so that my colleague from California can begin her
questions.
Mr. Simmons. The Chair recognizes the gentlelady from
California, the distinguished Ranking Member of the
Intelligence Committee. Thank you.
Ms. Harman. Thank you for holding this hearing.
Welcome, Charlie. I just voted not to adjourn Congress. I
actually think there are some important things to do, and one
of them is to enact a comprehensive immigration reform
strategy. I realize you are not here testifying on that, but I
thought I would, until I collect myself, make a point, which is
that we do need stronger border enforcement at all of our
borders and not just our southern border. We surely need an
intelligence strategy to fit with border enforcement, because
most folks coming here are just looking for a better way of
life, they are not potential terrorists or criminals. But we
also need the rest of it, which is some fair and reasonable
suggestion for how to deal with 11--or 12 million people who
are already here. And I hope we will do both, and I think it
would be a huge mistake if some folks in this Congress prevent
us from doing both. So that is my rant. Now I have collected
myself.
And I know you have been asked that question about fusion
centers and some of the other issues that I care about, too. I
sort of want to approach this more philosophically, if I can,
and that is to get your sense, and I know you can give us your
sense because this is your background in what you do for a
living, of how critical the intelligence piece is to border
enforcement. If you get this right, and if the intelligence--if
the fusion centers work, and if information sharing actually
happens, what could we begin to see? And if you get it wrong
and there isn't information sharing, and the fusion centers
implode, and the intelligence products are bad, what could we
see?
Mr. Allen. I think a strong intelligence integrated
capability with law enforcement along with good policies and
good cooperation with our neighboring countries will make a
world of difference. I think intelligence can and should be a
major driver because, to me, to be able to understand the
threat, to focus in on those threats that are most worrisome to
us--and, as you said, it is not just the illegal workers. What
really worries us are the narcotraffickers, the alien smugglers
and, above all, special interest aliens, some of whom may be
coming here from Asia, the Middle East, South Asia, or Africa
as part of an extremist group.
If we get this right--and this is something that we are
working with Ambassador Negroponte. As you know, Ambassador
Negroponte served in Honduras, he served in Mexico City, he
knows some of the border issues very well, and we discussed it.
He looks to the intelligence-driven efforts that we are
conducting as very much part and parcel of the overall national
intelligence effort. Ambassador Negroponte, and I saw him last
night, is very determined to work with us on this issue.
Ms. Harman. Well, I agree with that. We call him Director
Negroponte, by the way, in the Intelligence Committee because
we think he has got to lead this endeavor and not just be an
ambassador. But that is a comment for the winds.
At any rate, I agree. And if we get it wrong, conversely,
the highest fences in the world, 3 million Border Patrol folks
I doubt will prevent us from being harmed by either the
criminal element or terrorist element because there is no such
thing--and I am asking a rhetorical question, but I assume you
agree with me, Charlie. But there is no such thing as 100
percent security anyway; is that correct?
Mr. Allen. That is absolutely correct. I talk about
stabilizing our borders. The term ``seal our borders'' is not a
phrase I use. I want stability on the borders so we can then be
able to focus on those real threats. And they are real threats,
and some that I see every day that give us great concern.
Ms. Harman. Well, I thank you for that. And, Mr. Chairman,
let me conclude by saying if we don't get the intelligence
piece right, we will never get border enforcement right,
period. And border enforcement obviously is more than the
Mexican and the Canadian borders. It is port security; it is
airport security; it is those folks who come in on cruise ships
to Catalina off the coast of California where there are no
border controls, and then take the ferry boat into San Pedro or
Long Beach, or pick another island in another location. None of
this will work if Charlie Allen doesn't succeed. So, no
pressure, Charlie, but please succeed.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Simmons. I thank the gentlelady for her questions and
her comments. And I share with her that I could not agree with
her more, that what we do intelligencewise on the border, how
we focus our intelligence assets is going to determine whether
or not we succeed; that we simply cannot put a policeman or a
soldier in every place for 12,000 miles. It simply won't work.
And in excusing our first panel, I would like to comment
again where he says ongoing operational efforts to push the
border outward and build a layered defense extending within the
United States. We talk about the border as a line in the sand,
but from an intelligence standpoint we are talking about
someone who may appear on the radar in Afghanistan, transit
Europe, show up on a ship or in Canada or in Mexico, and at
some point in that process we try to get a line on them so when
they hit the border, we can grab them, or when they cross the
border, they set off a trigger mechanism and ring a bell so
that subsequently we can get them within the United States.
So it is not a question of intelligence just at that point;
it is a question of intelligence in depth overseas and
intelligence follow-up within the continental United States,
again, within the framework of our civil liberties and our
rights.
[[Page 21]]
Thank you, Mr. Allen, for your testimony. And I would ask
the second panel to quickly gather. I know our Coast Guard
friends have some time constraints, but we want to pick their
brains. Thank you very much.
The second panel will be made up of what you might call the
operational components of intelligence at the border. We have
Mr. James Sloan, Assistant Commandant For Intelligence of the
U.S. Coast Guard, charged primarily with port security and
offshore security activities; Ms. Cynthia O'Connell, Acting
Director, Office of Intelligence, Immigration and Customs
Enforcement. And I think we all have an understanding of what
our Immigration and Customs folks are doing intelligencewise at
the border. And then lastly Mr. L. Thomas Bortmes, Director,
Office of Intelligence, Customs and Border Protection.
I welcome the three witnesses. I know they all have
prepared statements. We would appreciate it if they could
summarize the high points of their statements for no more than
5 minutes, allowing the Members to ask questions.
And why don't we start with the Coast Guard. Mr. Sloan, the
motto is Semper Paratus. Are you prepared?
STATEMENTS OF JAMES SLOAN, ASSISTANT COMMANDANT FOR
INTELLIGENCE, U.S. COAST GUARD, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND
SECURITY.
Mr. Sloan. Yes, I am, Mr. Chairman. And thank you. And
thanks also to Ranking Member Lofgren.
I am Jim Sloan. I am the Coast Guard's Assistant Commandant
For Intelligence and Criminal Investigations. And I do have a
prepared statement that I would ask be inserted into the
record.
Mr. Simmons. Without objection.
Mr. Sloan. Thank you, sir.
I would like to thank each of the members of the committee
for the opportunity to discuss the Coast Guard's intelligence
and criminal investigations program and its role in support to
Coast Guard missions regarding border security.
Bounded by the oceans, America always has been a maritime
Nation. The oceans are a resource that we have to protect, a
path for global commerce, and, unfortunately in today's world,
a route for potential terrorists and other threats to our
national security.
Mr. Chairman, you commented on the 12,500-mile border that
is the maritime border, but in addition to that, the Coast
Guard is responsible for 95,000 miles of coastline when you
consider the laws that the Coast Guard has to enforce within
3.4 million square miles of Exclusive Economic Zones extending
200 miles from the United States and its territories and
possessions. This places us in a position to push our borders
out and react to the threats far at sea.
[[Page 22]]
It is through the Coast Guard's Intelligence and Criminal
Investigation Program, that includes not only those personnel
serving in Coast Guard headquarters, but those serving as
liaison officers at various agencies, the intelligence
analysts, the COASTWATCH personnel at the Intelligence
Coordination Center, as part of and partnered with the Office
of Naval Intelligence at the National Maritime Intelligence
Center, the intelligence specialists at the Area Maritime
Intelligence Fusion Centers, the field intelligence support
teams at U.S. ports, and our criminal investigators are all
involved in accomplishing the objectives to provide immediate
actionable warning intelligence on terrorists and other threats
to the Coast Guard's operational commanders, the Commandant,
the Department of Homeland Security, and our other consumers.
Many Coast Guard missions are cued by intelligence such as
counterdrug initiatives, alien smuggling, migration, fisheries
enforcement, and other law enforcement functions. It is the
personnel at the Department's Office of Intelligence and
Analysis that Charlie Allen represents, the Area Maritime
Intelligence Fusion Centers, and the Intelligence Coordination
Center that blends the information and places it into the
appropriate channels.
As part of the Department of Homeland Security's
intelligence architecture, I am committed to integrating the
Coast Guard intelligence capabilities with other components in
the Department to support a unified DHS intelligence
enterprise. Significant challenges remain, and many of them
have been discussed in the last hour, and more work needs to be
done, but the Coast Guard and the organizations represented
here today are dedicated to ensuring the safety and security of
the American people.
Thanks for this opportunity, and I am prepared to answer
any questions.
Mr. Simmons. I thank you very much.
[The statement of Mr. Sloan follows:]
Prepared Statement of James Sloan
Good morning Mr. Chairman and distinguished members. It is my
pleasure to be here today, alongside Ms. Cynthia O'Connell,
Intelligence Director of ICE and Mr. Tom Bortmes, the Intelligence
Director of CBP, appearing before you today to discuss the Coast Guard
Intelligence Program's role in border security.
The security of the U.S. borders is a top priority for the Coast
Guard and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). This hearing is a
testament to the continued importance placed on border security and
recognition of the Coast Guard's vital role in port and border
security. Border security conveys the thought of land masses converging
together. The reality is our maritime borders are the longest front in
this battle. The Coast Guard's authority focuses not on land-to-land
borders but land-to-water borders that include the Pacific and Atlantic
Oceans as well as the Gulf of Mexico and the Great Lakes. These shores
involve key border security issues that must be included in any border
security discussions and decisions.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T4854.001
As the Nation's primary maritime law enforcement agency, an armed
force, and lead Department of Homeland Security (DHS) agency for
maritime security, the Coast Guard has significant authorities and
capabilities with regard to maritime security. Still, success in
achieving maritime border security requires the full and complete
cooperation of our interagency, state, local, tribal and private sector
partners.
The maritime domain is an avenue for those wishing to smuggle
people and illicit drugs into our communities - and an avenue that
could be exploited as a means to smuggle weapons of mass destruction
and/or terrorists into our country. In 2005 alone, the Coast Guard
pted 9,500 undocumented migrants attempting to enter the United
States illegally by sea, a 100 percent increase over 2001; and
Prevented more than 338,000 pounds of cocaine (an all-time maritime
record) and more than 10,000 pounds of marijuana from reaching the
United States.
While the 9/11 Commission noted the continuing threat against our
aviation system, it also stated that "opportunities to do harm are as a
great, or greater, in maritime or surface transportation." There has
been a great deal of focus on container security, which is appropriate;
however, a container is only as secure as the ship and crew that
carries it. In fact, the most often observed U.S. maritime threat
remains smuggling. As on land, we know that there are numerous
professional migrant smuggling rings that operate in the maritime
realm. The proximity of U.S. population centers to the maritime domain
and the diversity of maritime users present significant and wide
ranging vulnerabilities. Effective intelligence support can address
these vulnerabilities to detect and defeat threats along our maritime
borders.
Many of the Coast Guard's mission successes are cued by
intelligence. In addition to supporting our focus on preventing
terrorist attacks, timely intelligence is critical in our efforts to
stop international maritime drug trafficking, maritime alien smuggling,
illegal high-seas driftnet fishing encroachment of U.S. natural
resources in the Exclusive Economic Zone, and damage to the marine
environment. Intelligence is a needed force multiplier given our
limited assets and expanding mission requirements, it is the value
added to enhancing maritime domain awareness.
Leveraging our longstanding partnerships and unique maritime
authorities, access and capabilities the Coast Guard has significantly
enhanced nationwide maritime security. The role of intelligence is to
provide timely, accurate and actionable information so that decisions
can be made and actions taken that support the operational commanders.
Significant challenges remain and much more work needs to be done, but
we are focused on the right priorities.
The Coast Guard Intelligence and Criminal Investigations Program
has established and actively participates in several partnerships to
enhance border security and other Homeland Security initiatives, such
as:
The Coast Guard works in close partnership with DHS Office of
Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) and other elements of the Department to
provide intelligence support to homeland security. We are providing
strong support for the standup of the intelligence functions within
OI&A by detailing intelligence analysts and assisting in building
relationships with other Intelligence Community partners.
The Coast Guard Intelligence Program and the Office of Naval
Intelligence continue to build an effective joint intelligence
partnership to enhance maritime domain awareness. The Coast Guard's
Intelligence Coordination Center is co-located with the Office of Naval
Intelligence, which comprises the National Maritime Intelligence Center
(NMIC);
The NMIC has been designated as the core element for the Global
Maritime Intelligence Integration (GMII) Plan. The GMII Plan is one of
the eight support plans that make up the National Strategy for Maritime
Security (NSMS). The Coast Guard's Intelligence Coordination Center
(ICC) and the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) have been the foci of
the GMII effort thus far. Achieving Final Operating Capability (FOC) is
dependent upon strong representation from the other core elements,
including: DHS - CBP and ICE, DOJ - FBI and DEA, Treasury - OFAC and
FINCEN, NSA, and NGA. The overarching GMII requirement is to identify,
locate, and track potential threats to U.S. maritime interests and
subsequently transfer accurate, relevant, and collaborated information
to those operational entities.
Within the Coast Guard's Intelligence Coordination Center (ICC),
the Coast Guard and CBP have exchanged personnel to enhance data
sharing between the ICC's COASTWATCH program (which gathers and
analyzes information based on the ship's 96-Hour Notice of Arrival
(NOA) report on vessels and people approaching U.S. ports) and CBP's
National Targeting Center (cargo tracking) process. COASTWATCH has
improved processing of NOAs by more than 600 percent since FY05. This
COASTWATCH mission has detected and provided advance warning about
numerous arriving individuals identified in federal law enforcement and
immigration databases as criminal or security concerns, including
active warrants and "deny entry" orders for previous border crossing
violations. In addition, several individuals wanted for questioning by
federal agencies about possible extremist associations have been
identified in advance of arrival and referred to the relevant agency
for investigation.
The Coast Guard provides access, where authorized and appropriate,
to its intelligence and criminal investigations databases, as well as
advice to others developing intelligence sharing architectures. The
Service has also provided intelligence analysts, exchange personnel,
and liaison officers to other agencies active in the maritime arena;
The Coast Guard's Intelligence and Criminal Investigations Program
provides a permanent presence on the FBI's National Joint Terrorism
Task Force (JTTF) and select regional JTTFs;
"Operation Drydock", which began in December 2002, is a joint Coast
Guard and FBI criminal and counterterrorism investigation into national
security threats and document fraud associated with U.S. merchant
mariner credentials. Currently, the databases compiled are managed by
the Coast Guard Investigative Services (CGIS) and are used by El Paso
Intelligence Center (EPIC), Coast Guard ICC, and Coast Guard Sector
Commands nationwide. The "Operation Drydock" databases are also used by
Coast Guard Regional Examination Centers (REC) to vet applicants
seeking merchant mariner documents and licenses; and
"Operation Panama Express" is a multi-agency Organized Crime Drug
Enforcement Task Force (OCDETF) investigation that began in the mid
1990s to help stem the flow of illegal narcotics flowing from Central
and South America via maritime means. The Coast Guard Investigative
Service is a partner in Panama Express. The CGIS agents assigned to
Panama Express speak fluent Spanish and have a wealth of practical
hands-on experience in Coast Guard maritime law enforcement operations
and CGIS narcotics investigations.
The Coast Guard has also increased its efforts to share law
enforcement and intelligence information collected by the Coast Guard
with other DHS components and other federal government agencies. In
addition, the Coast Guard's Intelligence Program activities have been
enhanced to assist in countering potential maritime threats there
Establishment of Field Intelligence Support Teams (FIST) in various
key U.S. ports. FISTs gather local law enforcement information,
establishes contacts, interviews masters and crewmembers to better
understand maritime threats;
Enhanced intelligence capability at the theater-level with the
standup of the Maritime Intelligence Fusion Centers (MIFCs) Atlantic
and Pacific. The MIFCs increase collection and analytical capabilities,
enhance all-source intelligence and information fusion, improve the
timeliness and quality of intelligence support to Coast Guard
operational forces. The MIFCs also ensure the rapid reporting of
information gathered by Coast Guard forces into the Department of
Homeland Security and Intelligence Community at the national level;
Conducting Port Threat Assessments as a complement to the MTSA-mandated
Port Security Assessment, to provide analyses of threats for specific
ports, inclusive of both terrorism and crime - foreign and domestic -
using law enforcement and intelligence information; Fielding of Sector
Intelligence Officers put intelligence support at the tactical level;
and, the Coast Guard's membership in the Intelligence Community; our
wide-range of missions, and our expertise in the maritime domain allows
us to interface in numerous and diverse forums at various levels within
the DoD components, law enforcement agencies, intelligence community,
state and local stakeholders, and private industry.
Analysis of the maritime threat to U.S. ports is challenging.
Characterization of incidents and trend analysis is complicated by the
convergence of large volumes of cargo, alien smuggling networks, the
narcotics trade, terrorism, regional conflict, maritime criminal
enterprises, and some activities that fall into multiple categories but
fall short of being a direct security threat to U.S. ports. It is the
Coast Guard's overarching strategy, through layered security
architecture, to "push out our borders." Our unambiguous goal is to
meet threats far offshore in order to prevent hostile persons, vessels,
or cargoes from entering our ports or coastal regions. Our ability to
push the borders out is an essential element in protecting our
homeland.The Coast Guard faces challenges in the maritime domain
similar to those of our colleagues in securing the land border - with a
limited set of resources, located amid vast geographic areas and huge
amounts of legitimate activity - stop those seeking to do us harm. The
foundation of the Coast Guard's maritime strategy relies on three key
priorities:
Achieve Maritime Domain Awareness;
Establish and Lead a Maritime Security Regime; and
Deploy effective and integrated Operational Capability.
These are not stand-alone goals, but rather part of an active
system of layered maritime security. For example, the Maritime
Transportation Security Act (MTSA) led to the establishment of domestic
and international AIS carriage requirements for certain commercial
vessels. But without investment in systems to collect, analyze and
disseminate the AIS signals we lose the opportunity to assess threats
early. Similarly, the detection, identification and interdiction of
small vessels (that certainly do not advertise their position) used by
smugglers throughout the Caribbean and Eastern Pacific requires
persistent surveillance capabilities. In the end, Coast Guard assets
must be capable of mounting a dependable response to identified threats
lest we have information but not the capability to act.
Coast Guard assets and systems are required to operate across a
diverse operating area including within our ports, in the littoral
region, and far offshore. Thanks to the strong support of the
administration and Congress, a number of initiatives are underway to
transform Coast Guard capabilities. I would like to highlight a few of
these initiatives as each will have a broad and substantial influence
on our intelligence capabilities to mitigate current and future
maritime risks.
Integrated Deepwater System. The centerpiece of the Coast Guard's
future capability is the Integrated Deepwater System, recently revised
to reflect post-9/11 mission requirements such as enhanced intelligence
gathering and handling capabilities. The Integrated Deepwater System
was designed to secure the nation's maritime borders.
The vessels delivered by the Deepwater program will serve as the
Coast Guard's "eyes and ears" and allow the nation to see, hear and
communicate activity occurring within the maritime domain. The Coast
Guard's sustained presence along our maritime borders is unique. More
capable Deepwater assets, linked to each other and multiple agencies
through Deepwater's net-centric command-and-control system will
significantly improve information sharing, collaboration, and
interoperability in the maritime domain.
Vessel tracking. Securing our vast maritime borders requires
improved awareness of the people, vessels and cargo approaching and
moving throughout U.S. ports, coasts and inland waterways. The most
pressing challenges we now face involve tracking the vast population of
vessels operating in and around the approaches to the United States. In
support of this requirement, the Coast Guard has:
Established the Automatic Identification System (AIS) to provide
continuous, real-time information on the identity, location, speed and
course of vessels in ports that are equipped with AIS receivers. AIS is
currently operational in several major U.S. ports, and the Coast
Guard's Nationwide Automatic Identification (NAIS) project will expand
AIS capabilities to ports nationwide; and
Under U.S. leadership the International Maritime Organization
recently unanimously adopted a global long Range Identification and
Tracking scheme that will provide information about all commercial
ships of 300 gross tons and above operating within a 1,000 nautical
miles of our coast whether the ship is bound for a U.S. port or is on
innocent passage. Additionally, we will have tracking information out
to 2,000 nautical miles when ships have declared its intent to arrive
in a U.S. port.
Maritime C4ISR Enhancement. Existing Command, Control,
Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and
Reconnaissance (C4ISR) systems and operational concepts must be
reoriented and integrated with current and emerging sensor capabilities
and applicable procedures. Similar to the nation's air space security
regime, the maritime security regime must integrate existing C4ISR
systems with new technologies and national command-and-control systems
and processes. For example:
The Common Operating Picture (COP) and corresponding Command
Intelligence Picture (CIP) must continue to grow and expand to federal,
state, and local agencies with maritime interests and responsibilities.
The COP provides a shared display of friendly, enemy/suspect and
neutral tracks on a map with applicable geographically referenced
overlays and data enhancements. The COP is also a central element of
the Deepwater solution tying Deepwater assets and operational
commanders together with dynamic, real-time maritime domain
information. This link is essential to ensure effective command and
control of all available Coast Guard assets responding to a myriad of
border security threats.
An expansive and interoperable communications network is critical
for maritime security operations and safety of life at sea. In the
coastal environment, the Coast Guard's Rescue 21 system will provide
the United States with an advanced maritime distress and response
communications system that bridges interoperability gaps, saves lives
and improves maritime security.There is no single solution to maritime
border security. It requires a layered system of capabilities,
established competencies, clear authorities, and strong partnerships.
The cost of allowing blind spots in our awareness, security regimes or
operational capabilities is too high.This is the mandate for the Coast
Guard Intelligence and Criminal Investigations Directorate to support
those priorities, which ultimately supports the overall strategic and
national level objectives of the Nation.Thank you for the opportunity
to testify before you today. I will be happy to answer any questions
you may have.
Mr. Simmons. And we will now go to the second witness
Ms.O'Connell. Welcome.
CYNTHIA O'CONNELL, ACTING DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE,
IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
HOMELAND SECURITY
Ms. O'Connell. Good morning. Thank you, Chairman Simmons. I
will have just a few brief statements. I respectfully request
that my full statement be submitted for the record.
Mr. Simmons. Without objection.
Ms. O'Connell. Chairman Simmons, Ranking Member Lofgren,
members of the subcommittee, I am Cynthia O'Connell, Acting
Director of the Office of Intelligence for Immigration and
Customs Enforcement. I sincerely appreciate this opportunity to
share with you how the men of women of ICE Intelligence employ
our capabilities to help secure our Nation's borders.
I am also honored to testify alongside my colleagues from
Customs and Border Protection and the U.S. Coast Guard, as well
as Mr. Charles Allen from the Department of Homeland Security.
As the DHS Chief Intelligence Officer, as you know, Mr. Allen
has been instrumental in coordinating with the Intelligence
Community and providing guidance on Homeland Security-specific
issues.
The ICE Office of Intelligence supports ICE and DHS
intelligence requirements and priorities. We have made
significant progress
[[Page 23]]
and continue in expanding our responsibilities to support the
needs of ICE, DHS, and the Intelligence Community.
With the unique Immigration and Customs authorities and
intelligence tools, ICE Intelligence has also enhanced its
detection, collection, and analysis capabilities.
In addition to ICE Intelligence headquarters in Washington,
D.C., we have six field intelligence units located in New York,
Long Beach, Chicago, Houston, Tucson, and Miami; two technical
collection facilities, the Tactical Intelligence Center, and a
Special Operations Center; and intelligence assets at the El
Paso Intelligence Center.
ICE Intelligence headquarters supports ICE management and
DHS intelligence and analysis efforts and coordinates ICE
Intelligence programs and operations nationwide. The field
intelligence units provide intelligence expertise to field
investigative offices and detention facilities and to DHS
intelligence as a whole. Our technical collection facilities
act in concert for the Intelligence Community, the military,
and other Federal agencies to safeguard the border that extends
beyond our borders outward. These are powerful capabilities,
and we have moved to organize them in a coherent and effective
support system both to advance the ICE investigative mission
and to support and integrate ICE into the DHS intelligence
functions.
Our specific intent is to integrate our intelligence
capabilities with other components in the Department to support
a unified DHS intelligence enterprise. ICE Intelligence takes
advantage of currently operating effective projects and
programs, and combines them with proposed new programs and
capabilities, and unites the whole under a common strategic
purpose, the protection of our country against threats that
could arise from our borders.
Our Special Operations Center detects and locates smugglers
moving contraband and aliens across the borders by collecting
intelligence through real-time technical means. Its
methodologies not only interdict the incursion, but also helps
identify smuggling organizations for investigation and
dismantling.
We coordinate Customs and Border Protection air and marine
operations in the Office of Border Patrol and Office of Border
Patrol assets to stop illegal activity. This year they have
supported the interdiction of about 35 tons of marijuana with
the seizure of associated vehicles and weapons and the arrest
of countless smuggled aliens.
ICE is integrating its Special Operations with geospatial
intelligence capabilities sponsored by DHS and the analytical
functions of our Southwest Field Intelligence Unit. We are
working with DHS Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance
to leverage available Department of Defense and DHS science and
technology resources for upgrades to this dedicated border
protection unit.
What I have just described to you is true border-focused
intelligence support. However, our protective effort is not
devoted to just the land borders; we are also heavily involved
in maritime and air transportation environments.
Operation Last Call exploits the intelligence value of
hundreds of thousands of individuals who enter the detention
system annually.
[[Page 24]]
This highly effective operation collects, evaluates, analyzes,
and disseminates information derived from detainees in ICE
custody.
Project Aegis supports the ICE visa security program which
places ICE personnel in foreign countries to work with State
Department consular officials in vetting these applicants.
The Border Enforcement Security Task Force is a DHS-
inspired initiative that responds to the increase in border
violence. It is actively supported by analytical resources from
our field intelligence units.
ICE Intelligence is also working with DHS I&A on its
intelligence campaign plan, a borderwide security effort aimed
at more efficient consolidation of relevant field intelligence
information.
Operation Capistrano is a cooperative initiative with
Department of State Consular Affairs where we train password
examiners to recognize indicators that may point to potential
narcotics and currency smugglers. This initiative has led to
over 1,300 seizures and 1,300 arrests with more than 1,700
pounds of heroin and 2,600 pounds of cocaine seized.
Operation Roswell uses similar techniques to identify alien
smugglers, immigration fraud violators, and child sex tourism
suspects. In the past 2 years, Operation Roswell resulted in 26
aliens removed, produced evidence of over 60 marriage fraud
schemes, and in one significant case yielded analysis that led
to eight arrests, ten removals, and the dismantling of an
organization that smuggled 37 foreign nationals into the United
States.
In spite of all these successful initiatives, we are not
content to rest on present production and current capabilities.
Business plans and performance metrics based on objective
customer evaluations must support all our work. From these
markers, ICE Intelligence proposes the development and
acquisition of advanced technologies, new techniques and new
processes, and additional integration into multiagency and
multinational operations. This is our future path to a safer
and more secure border and homeland.
I thank you for the opportunity to describe some of our
initiatives that support border security. I would be happy to
answer any questions at this time.
Mr. Simmons. Thank you very much.
[The statement of Ms. O'Connell follows:]
Prepared Statement of Cynthia O'Connell
Chairman Simmons, Ranking Member Lofgren, Members of the
Subcommittee,
I am Cynthia O'Connell, Acting Director of the Office of
Intelligence for U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). I
sincerely appreciate this opportunity to share with you how the men and
women of ICE Intelligence employ our capabilities to help secure our
nation's borders.
The ICE Office of Intelligence supports ICE and Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) intelligence requirements and priorities. We
have made significant progress in continuing and expanding our
responsibilities to support the needs of ICE, DHS, and the Intelligence
Community (IC). With unique Immigration and Customs authorities and
intelligence tools, ICE Intelligence has also enhanced its detection,
collection and analysis capabilities.
In addition to ICE Intelligence Headquarters in Washington DC, we
have six Field Intelligence Units located in New York, Long Beach,
Chicago, Houston, Tucson, and Miami; two technical collection
facilities - the Tactical Intelligence Center (TIC) and a Special
Operations Center; and intelligence assets at the El Paso Intelligence
Center (EPIC).
ICE Intelligence Headquarters supports ICE management and DHS
Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) efforts, and coordinates ICE
intelligence programs and operations nationwide. The Field Intelligence
Units provide intelligence expertise to investigative offices and
detention facilities in the field and to the DHS Intelligence as a
whole. Our technical collection facilities act in concert with the
Intelligence Community, the military, and other Federal agencies to
safeguard the southern border and to extend coverage of our borders
outward even to the shores of South America.
In intelligence terms, these are very powerful capabilities, and we
have moved aggressively to organize them into a coherent and effective
support system, both to advance the ICE investigative and operational
missions, and to support and integrate ICE in the DHS intelligence
functions. We have accomplished this through the ICE Intelligence
Strategic Plan, which was constructed with the specific intent to
integrate our intelligence capabilities with other components in the
Department, to support a unified DHS Intelligence Enterprise.
The ICE Intelligence plan takes advantage of currently operating,
demonstrably effective projects, programs, and activities; combines
them with proposed new programs and capabilities; and unites the whole
under a common strategic purpose - the protection of our country
against threats that could arise from our borders. It is more than just
a plan. It reflects real, effective action on the front lines.
Special Operations Center
The Special Operations Center detects and locates smugglers moving
contraband and aliens across our borders by collecting intelligence
through real-time technical means, primarily signals and imagery
intelligence. It supports ICE investigations with methodologies that
not only interdict the incursion, but also helps identify smuggling
organizations for investigation and dismantling. This kind of
intelligence has real long-term benefits. The unit's emphasis to date
has been on the U.S. and Mexico border.
We coordinate with Customs and Border Protection (CBP) Air and
Marine Operations and Office of Border Patrol assets to stop illegal
activity. The information we collect is disseminated to ICE and Border
Patrol agents in affected areas along the border from California to
Texas.
ICE is currently integrating its intelligence program with the
Special Operations Center geospatial intelligence capabilities,
sponsored by DHS, and the analytical functions of our Southwest Field
Intelligence Unit. We are working with DHS Intelligence, Surveillance,
and Reconnaissance (ISR) to leverage available Department of Defense
and DHS Science and Technology resources for upgrades to this dedicated
border protection unit.
What I have just described to you is true, border-focused
intelligence support; however, our protective effort is not devoted to
just the land borders. We are also heavily involved in maritime and air
transportation environments. We view border security as a continuum -
it starts in various foreign countries, proceeds internationally to our
borders, seaports, and airports, and extends into the interior of the
United States, where support structures exist for criminal
organizations as well as illegal immigrants. ICE provides intelligence
at all points along this continuum.
ICE Intelligence Projects and Programs
The Port Intelligence Center (PIC) was created in response to
Secretary Michael Chertoff's directive to develop a task force that
addresses New York and New Jersey seaport vulnerabilities. The ICE
Northeast Field Intelligence Unit (NEFIU), in coordination with the ICE
Special Agent in Charge/New York (SAC/NY) and SAC/Newark, CBP, USCG,
the New York City Police Department (NYCPD), and other state and local
law enforcement groups, have established the NY/NJ Metropolitan Area
Port Intelligence Center. The PIC will develop a seaport intelligence
collection strategy aimed primarily at cultivating human intelligence
in the maritime environment. It utilizes the intelligence resources of
its members to prioritize vulnerabilities and pursue entities and
individuals for potential source cultivation.
The National Security Integration Center (NSIC) is an Office of
Investigations and Office of Intelligence joint center that assesses
information, targets suspects, and supports national security
investigations conducted by ICE.
Operation Ardent Guardian targets the illicit use of legitimate
immigration channels, seeking the indicators of asylum fraud, marriage
fraud, false documents, and other fraudulent mean of entry.
Extraterritorial Criminal Travel Strike Force (ECT) is a new
cooperative initiative by the ICE Office of Investigations and the
Criminal Division of the Justice Department. Supported by ICE
Intelligence, the targeting capabilities of ECT are designed to
leverage extraterritorial investigative and prosecutorial expertise to
attack foreign-based criminal networks.
Operation Last Call exploits the intelligence value of hundreds of
thousands of individuals who enter our detention and removal system
annually. This highly effective operation collects, evaluates,
analyzes, and disseminates information derived from detainees in ICE
custody. Customers for Operation Last Call intelligence are ICE
operational units, DHS I&A, the Intelligence Community, the Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and other Federal agencies. This program
focuses on relevant collection in the areas of force protection, anti-
terrorism, on-going criminal enterprises, human trafficking and
smuggling, contraband smuggling (weapons of mass destruction, drugs,
etc.), threats to critical infrastructure, and the movement of money
that support illicit activities.
Project Aegis (Domestic Visa Security) supports the ICE Visa
Security program, which places ICE personnel in sensitive foreign
countries to work with State Department consular officials in vetting
visa applicants. The ICE Intelligence domestic program performs
detailed research on the resident U.S. sponsors and contacts listed in
visa applications and reports on the background and potentially suspect
activities of those individuals. This program provided substantial
intelligence on the Lodi, California, Pakistani community that has
recently figured prominently in terrorist investigations and action.
Border Enforcement Security Task Force (BEST), the DHS-inspired
initiative that responds to the increase in border violence, is
actively supported by the analytic resources of the Houston and Tucson
Field Intelligence Units. In addition to the BEST program, ICE
Intelligence is working with DHS I&A on its Intelligence Campaign Plan
(ICP), a border-wide security effort aimed at more efficient
consolidation of relevant field-generated information.
Operation Crystal Ball, a joint operation involving ICE, the Office
of Naval Intelligence, the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG), and CBP, tracks
suspect vessels and crewmembers and maintains historical databases to
respond to queries from investigators and officers working in the
maritime environment. ICE Crystal Ball analysts use electronic
collection techniques and perform both classified and unclassified
research to derive movement and position information. They also
populate Naval Intelligence databases with large volumes of current
vessel tracking data. Crystal Ball support has repeatedly resulted in
drug seizures from merchant vessels and crewmembers, and continually
contributes to the strategic goal of awareness in the maritime and
seaport environment.
Operation Capistrano, a cooperative initiative with the State
Department's Office of Consular Affairs, trains passport examiners to
recognize indicators that may point to potential narcotics and currency
smugglers. This initiative has led to 1,366 seizures and 1,300 arrests.
Operation Roswell, an outgrowth of Operation Capistrano, uses
similar techniques to identify alien smugglers, immigration fraud
violators and child sex tourism suspects. In the past two years,
Operation Roswell has led to the removal of 26 aliens, provided
evidence of over 60 incidences of marriage fraud schemes, and in one
significant case, yielded analysis that led to 8 arrests, 10 removals,
and the dismantling of an organization that had successfully smuggled
37 foreign nationals into the United States.
Operation Watchtower, working in coordination with USCG and CBP,
analyzes the international movements of vessels and cargoes to provide
timely intelligence and risk assessment for investigative and threat
detection support.
These examples are all actual ongoing activities, presently
producing valuable intelligence that protects our borders. Many of
these activities also directly support the Department's Secure Border
Initiative. We also maintain a full-time senior liaison officer posted
permanently to DHS I&A, which serves as an open conduit between ICE
Intelligence and I&A.
In spite of such successful initiatives, we are not content to rest
on present production and current capabilities. Business plans and
performance metrics based on objective customer evaluations must
support all our work. From these markers, the ICE Intelligence
strategic plan proposes the development and acquisition of advanced
technologies, new techniques, new processes, and additional integration
into multi-agency and multi-national operations. This is our future
path to a safer and more secure border and Homeland.
Thank you for the opportunity to describe some of our initiatives
that support border security. I would be happy to answer any questions
at this time.
Mr. Simmons. And our third witness is from U.S. Customs and
Border Protection, Mr. Bortmes. Welcome. We have your
testimony, so if you summarize in 5 minutes, that would be
great.
L. THOMAS BORTMES, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE, CUSTOMS
AND BORDER PROTECTION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Mr. Bortmes. Will do, sir.
Thank you, Chairman Simmons, Ranking Member Lofgren,
distinguished members of the subcommittee. I thank you for the
opportunity to join my Department of Homeland Security
intelligence colleagues, Assistant Secretary Allen, Director
O'Connell, and Assistant Commandant Sloan, to discuss with you
the role intelligence plays within the United States Customs
and Border Protection to help secure our Nation's borders. I
have submitted, as you stated, sir, a formal statement, and
would request that it be accepted for the record.
I want to begin this very brief oral statement by saying
that I am privileged to serve as the Executive Director of
Customs and Border Protection's Office of Intelligence, which
is charged with three primary responsibilities. The first is to
directly support the Commissioner and Customs and Border
Protection's headquarters and field leadership with the
acquisition, analysis, and timely dissemination of intelligence
information critical to CBP's primary mission of detecting,
identifying, and preventing terrorists and terrorist weapons
from entering the United States.
The second is to efficiently manage a developing integrated
Customs and Border Protection intelligence capability that
ensures frontline CBP officers and decisionmakers have the
value-added intelligence required to sustain border situational
awareness, drive operations, and support policy. This larger
CBP intelligence enterprise consists of the intelligence
capabilities within the Office of Intelligence, the Office of
Border Patrol, CBP Air and Marine, the Office of International
Affairs, and the Office of Antiterrorism, and works very
closely with the National Targeting Center and operational
field analysis capabilities of the Office of Field Operations.
And, finally, as a member of the Department's Homeland
Security Intelligence Council, it is the responsibility of the
Office of Intelligence to represent CBP's intelligence
requirements and equities to the DHS Chief Intelligence Officer
and assist him in directing an integrated DHS intelligence
enterprise.
Customs and Border Protection intelligence exists to
support an agency that, in addition to facilitating
international trade critical to the United States economy, is
responsible for border security. As you stated earlier, Mr.
Chairman, and I won't repeat the numbers, it is responsible for
protecting more than 5,000 miles of border with Canada, 1,900
miles of border with Mexico, and operating 325 official ports
of entry.
An average day in Customs and Border Protection, from the
statements you have already made this morning, is a demanding
day. We process well over 1.1 million passengers and
pedestrians; 69,000 containers; 333,000 incoming privately
owned vehicles; $81 million, almost $82 million, in fees,
duties, and tariffs; execute 62 arrests at ports of entry; over
3,200 apprehensions between the ports for illegal entry; seized
over 5,500 pounds of narcotics; and not to forget over 1,100
prohibitive meat and plant materials, animal products at and
between the ports of entry; refuse entry to 868 noncitizens at
the ports of entry; and intercept 146 smuggled aliens, and over
200 fraudulent documents, while rescuing 7 illegal immigrants
in distress or dangerous conditions between the ports of entry.
And I remind you, again, that is every day.
As the figures demonstrate, CBP addresses a variety of
threats to U.S. borders that include illegal immigration,
illegal drugs, border violence, illegal incursions, pests and
diseases, and a host of trade violations running from smuggling
to international property rights.
While all of these threats to our borders are demanding in
their own right, everyone at Customs and Border Protection
understands that their priority mission is to prevent
terrorists and terrorist weaponry from entering the United
States.
While the Office of Intelligence and the broader CBP
intelligence enterprise directly support operations aimed at
addressing all border threat categories, they also remain
focused on supporting CBP's priority mission of preventing
terrorists and their weaponry from entering the United States.
Our first priority is to operationalize intelligence reporting
on terrorist threats.
In my formal written statement I discuss how CBP
intelligence supports border security by supporting CBP's
layered defense strategy, a strategy that, in partnership with
an array of countries, international organizations, private
businesses, trade entities, as well as State and local
governments, has developed a host of programs and initiatives
aimed at pushing our zone of defense as far outward as
responsible to identify people and cargo long before they have
the opportunity to board or enter the United States.
I look forward, sir, to answering yours and the committee's
questions and working with my colleagues here today, and
appreciate the opportunity to speak on these matters.
[The statement of Mr. Bortmes follows:]
Prepared Statement of Mr. L. Thomas Bortmes
Introduction
Chairman Simmons, Ranking Member Lofgren, distinguished Members of
the Subcommittee. I thank you for this opportunity to join my
Department of Homeland Security colleagues - Assistant Secretary for
Intelligence and Analysis, Mr. Charles Allen, Ms. Cynthia O'Connell the
Director of ICE's Office of Intelligence and Mr. Jim Sloan, the Coast
Guard's Assistant Commandant for Intelligence and Criminal
Investigations - to discuss with you the role intelligence plays within
U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) to help secure our Nation's
borders.
I am privileged to serve as the Executive Director of the CBP
Office of Intelligence (OINT), a critical element of the Office of the
Commissioner, charged with three primary responsibilities. The first is
to directly support the Commissioner and CBP headquarters and field
leadership with the acquisition, analysis and timely dissemination of
intelligence information critical to CBP's primary mission of
detecting, identifying and preventing terrorists and terrorist weapons
from entering the United States. The second is to efficiently manage an
integrated CBP intelligence capability that ensures front-line CBP
officers and decision makers have the value-added intelligence required
to sustain border situational awareness, drive operations and support
policy. And finally, as a member of the Department's Homeland Security
Intelligence Council (HSIC), it is the responsibility of the OINT to
represent CBP's intelligence requirements and equities to the DHS Chief
Intelligence Officer/Assistant Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis,
and assist him in directing an integrated DHS intelligence enterprise
that provides one DHS face to the National Intelligence Community. I
will address each of these responsibilities from the perspective of
intelligence support to border security.
U.S. Customs and Border Protection Overview
In addition to facilitating the international trade critical to the
United States economy, CBP is responsible for protecting more than
5,000 miles of border with Canada, 1,900 miles of border with Mexico
and operating 325 official Ports of Entry. On an average day in 2005,
CBP personnel: processed 1,181,605 passengers and pedestrians, 69,370
containers, 333,226 incoming privately owned vehicles and $81,834,298
in fees, duties and tariffs; executed 62 arrests at ports of entry and
over 3,257 apprehensions between the ports for illegal entry; seized
over 5,541 pounds of narcotics and 1,145 prohibited meat, plant
materials or animal products at and between the ports of entry; refused
entry to 868 non-citizens at the ports of entry; and intercepted 146
smuggled aliens and 206 fraudulent documents while rescuing 7 illegal
immigrants in distress or dangerous conditions between the ports of
entry. As these figures demonstrate, CBP, the nation's unified border
agency, addresses a variety of threats to U.S. borders that includes
illegal immigration, illegal drugs, border violence, illegal
incursions, pests/diseases and a host of trade violations ranging from
smuggling to intellectual property rights.
Countering Terrorists
While these threats to our borders are addressed each day, all CBP
personnel understand that their priority mission is to prevent
terrorists and their weaponry from entering the United States. While
OINT directly supports operations aimed at addressing all border threat
categories, it also remains focused on supporting CBP's priority
mission of preventing terrorists and their weaponry from entering the
United States. The first priority of CBP's Office of Intelligence is to
operationalize intelligence reporting on terrorist threats. Each day,
OINT watch standers and analysts review over 1000 intelligence
community products, engage with CBP liaison officers and analysts
embedded in DHS and the national intelligence community, and leverage
long-standing partnerships with federal, state, local and international
law enforcement and intelligence organizations to ensure early
awareness of all potential terrorist travel or movement of materials to
the United States. Working closely with their operational counterparts,
OINT analysts meld this intelligence with information, trends and
patterns identified in CBP operational reporting to properly assess and
place in context these threats, discern vulnerabilities, evaluate
potential consequences and ultimately calculate the risk these threats
may pose to the borders of the United States. The results of this daily
all-source analysis and risk assessment process is disseminated via
over a dozen intelligence product lines and services including
intelligence reports and alerts to CBP's operational and field elements
on the border that provide situational awareness, address officer
safety and/or assist in developing targeting criteria against specific
terrorist threats to the United States.
Operations and Intelligence Briefings/Intelligence Driven Operations
Regular, all-source, intelligence briefings are provided to the
Commissioner and CBP operational Assistant Commissioners from the
Offices of Field Operations, Border Patrol, Anti-Terrorism, Air and
Marine and International Affairs. During these briefings, CBP's senior
leadership review the most current threat developments, maintain
continuity on existing terrorist threat streams and utilize the latest
intelligence available to formulate appropriate operational actions
required to counter those threats. CBP's senior leadership has a number
of operational courses of action available to operationalize threat
intelligence, to include directing intelligence driven operations. Once
CBP's senior leadership concurs that there is viable intelligence
indicating a threat to our borders, an operational response plan is
quickly formulated to address the specific threat modus, timeframe and
geographic locations. These threat-based operations are put together by
CBP's affected headquarters and field elements, formally vetted through
the DHS Chief Intelligence Officer, then promulgated to the appropriate
CBP operational field components for implementation. Additionally, OINT
will regularly report the results of these operations via Homeland
Security Intelligence Reports, and the CBP Office of Field Operations
or Office of Border Patrol will formally assess the operational results
upon their conclusion.
Supporting Forward Operations
To meet its priority mission, CBP has implemented a layered,
defense in-depth strategy that thoroughly addresses people and cargo
for linkages to terrorism prior to entering the United States. In
partnership with an array of countries, international organizations,
private businesses, and trade entities, CBP is involved with a host of
programs and initiatives aimed at pushing our "zone of defense"
outward. A key example of this is the Container Security Initiative
(CSI), which places CBP personnel teams in key overseas ports to assist
in identifying high-risk cargo. OINT has selected and trained
intelligence research specialists to work as members of these CSI
teams. Embedded with their host country, CSI intelligence personnel are
supported daily by OINT which routinely provides them overviews of the
latest intelligence threat reporting and vets their individual and
company names of interest against U.S. intelligence terrorist data
bases for derogatory information, etc.Another example of CBP pushing
its "zone of defense" outward is the Customs and Trade Partnership
Against Terrorism (C-TPAT) which has CBP partnering with over 9,000
private businesses to ensure the security of the international supply
chain to prevent terrorists from exploiting legitimate trade.
Membership in C-TPAT requires the CBP to regularly certify partner
company due diligence, and OINT plays a significant role in supporting
CBP with intelligence research, entity searches, and the verification
of information.
Supporting Operations at the Border
In addition to OINT's regular products and support to intelligence
driven operations, OINT provides daily support to, the operational
offices charged with maintaining CBP's border presence and security.
These operational offices have placed subject matter experts within
secure OINT facilities in order to increase information sharing and
agency cooperation. Furthermore, OINT maintains a permanent detachment
at CBP's National Targeting Center (NTC) with secure connectivity to
national intelligence community reporting and data bases. This
detachment supports the NTC's mission to assess all cargo and
passengers enroute to the U.S. for potential links to terrorism and to
directly support CBP Officers and Agents when they encounter
individuals or cargo linked to terrorism.Q02
Managing the Integrated CBP Intelligence Enterprise
It is the responsibility of the Office of Intelligence to functionally
manage the larger CBP intelligence enterprise. A number of CBP
components have formally designated intelligence organizations, while
others, such as the Office of Field Operations, have robust operational
information analysis capabilities that work closely with these
intelligence organizations. The Office of the Border Patrol has a
significant intelligence organization that includes a national
headquarters division, a Border Field Intelligence Center in El Paso,
Texas and intelligence units at each of the 20 Border Patrol Sectors,
all responsible for directly supporting front line Border Patrol
Agents. CBP Air and Marine has a formal intelligence capability with
designated intelligence personnel at their national headquarters, Air
and Marine Operations Center in Riverside, California and with their
Directors of Air Operations and Branches around the United States.
These intelligence organizations are staffed with a combination of
intelligence research specialists as well as Border Patrol Agents and
CBP Air and Marine officers filling intelligence positions.
As you can imagine, each of these organizations generate standing
and ad hoc information needs, intelligence requirements, requests for
information, collection requirements, as well as a host of personnel,
training, connectivity, equipment and policy needs. OINT aggregates,
validates and prioritizes these requirements and brokers them through
the DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis to the national
intelligence community for satisfaction.
Leveraging the DHS Intelligence Enterprise
CBP leverages the DHS Intelligence Enterprise largely by OINT's
membership in the larger DHS intelligence enterprise. Working with the
Chief Intelligence Officer, Assistant Secretary Charles Allen, the
Department of Homeland Security is putting into place a rapidly
expanding capability to support its agencies' intelligence components.
As CBP's Key Intelligence Official, I am a member of Assistant
Secretary Allen's Homeland Security Intelligence Council (HSIC) - the
primary DHS intelligence decision-making body. Personnel from my office
represent CBP's intelligence requirements on over a dozen HSIC-
established panels, boards and working groups that address issues
ranging from analytical production coordination to collection,
training, and information systems. It is through this maturing DHS
intelligence enterprise management architecture that OINT is addressing
critical intelligence concerns such as supporting Operation Jumpstart's
deployment of National Guard Bureau intelligence personnel to the
Southwest Border and supporting implementation of the Southwest Border
Counter-Narcotics Strategy. Additionally, by leveraging the developing
DHS report writers and intelligence training programs, CBP is gaining
personnel and training necessary to ensure that it can translate its
significant operational information flow into a steady supply of
timely, intelligence reports. These reports are earning acclaim for
their relevancy from national, state and local intelligence and law
enforcement customers, and make CBP a leading producer of intelligence
reporting among DHS components. OINT will continue to play a leading
role in developing this DHS intelligence enterprise and leverage it to
facilitate its own developing intelligence integration plans and meet
its intelligence needs.
Closing
I would like to thank you again for the opportunity to testify
today with my Department of Homeland Security intelligence colleagues.
I will be happy to answer any questions you may have.
Mr. Simmons. I thank all three witnesses for their
testimony. We have learned there is another procedural motion
and vote on the floor. We will do our best to keep this
dialogue moving forward. My colleague has gone to vote. I will
keep the mike open, and we will do our questions.
Mr. Sloan, in your testimony on page 4 you make reference
to information collected by the Coast Guard.
Ms. O'Connell, in your testimony you also make reference to
the collection capabilities of your organization.
And, Mr. Bortmes, you just referred to what I called
surveillance and depth.
The Coast Guard is now a full members of the U.S.
Intelligence Community. The other entities I don't believe are.
But the Coast Guard does not have a history and tradition of
collection in an intelligence sense. But since 9/11 and in the
new environment, the issue of collection of these assets to me
is critically important. I don't want to know that you are
acquiring information; in other words, that somebody hands you
something and you take it. I do want to know that you are
engaged in collection, because that seems to me to be a very
worthwhile addition to our capabilities in a post-9/11
environment.
Could each of you talk a little bit about how you operate
in the field and what opportunities you have to collect
information that others don't have? In other words, what is
your value added from that standpoint to the overall
intelligence efforts of our country?
Mr. Sloan. Sir, I will begin. First of all, as you probably
know, in addition to being a member of the Intelligence
Community, the Coast Guard is also one of the largest law
enforcement agencies in the United States Government,
particularly in DHS, and our law enforcement activity
principally revolving around the maritime domain also includes
information at ports, and we have over 360 ports for which we
are responsible in addition to those miles of coastline.
In each of the ports& and I will focus first, if I may, on
the law enforcement intelligence collection activity. In most
of the strategi
[[Page 27]]
cally and economically important ports of the United States, we
have what are known as field intelligence support teams. These
are law enforcement information collectors who work with not
only the Federal counterparts, but the State and local
counterparts in each of these ports. New York, for instance,
they work with the New York City police and the police
authorities.
Mr. Simmons. If I could interrupt for just 1 minute. But
when you collect for law enforcement, is that shared with your
intelligence folks?
Mr. Sloan. Yes, sir. That is the point I was going to get
at. All of this information that is collected, to include, I
might add, the interview of the masters of ships who come from
overseas who can give us essentially the lay of the land in the
port that they just departed from, this information is then put
into field intelligence reports, which not only go to-in a law
enforcement capacity not only go to Coast Guard Intelligence
Fusion Centers, but also to the Homeland Security Department.
When they arrive at our fusion centers--and as you might
recall, I indicated we have one on each coast as well as a
production center out in Suitland with the Office of Naval
Intelligence--the information, where appropriate and
authorized, bumps up against validated requirements that the
Intelligence Community has to answer. And that is where the
nexus occurs, and then, of course, published into the larger
community if it would answer an intelligence--validated
intelligence requirement.
Mr. Simmons. I appreciate that. I know my time is going to
run out.
Ms. O'Connell, you collect, you provide new information to
the community; is that correct?
Ms. O'Connell. We do. We have got the six field
intelligence units and the tactical intelligence centers out in
the field where we collect information and then analyze it and
put it back out into the operational components. For instance,
in Operation Watchtower we work jointly with Coast Guard,
Customs and Border Protection in order to get information and
identify individuals that may be a threat coming in. Also on
Operations Capistrano and Roswell, we are looking at those
individuals who are coming in to the airports, getting,
collecting information, and analyzing that, and then
identifying individuals that pose a vulnerability.
The field intelligence units work with State and local&
Federal, State, and local and tribal authorities collecting
intelligence, put it in Homeland Security intelligence reports,
which we then bring into--some of them are brought into
headquarters. Some of them are developed into intelligence
information reports that go to the Intelligence Community.
Other information is pumped out through the law enforcement
components.
Mr. Simmons. Mr. Bortmes.
Mr. Bortmes. Again, all the information that we are able to
put in the Intelligence Community channels is derived from our
law enforcement authorities and done in the normal process of
our duties in carrying out those authorities. For instance, at
our ports of entry each day, as individuals are encountered,
and, in fact, we realize that they might have, for instance, a
record, a tied record or something along those lines, they are
taken to a secondary examination.
[[Page 28]]
We are able to sit down with our colleagues from ICE, from the
FBI or the JTTFs, go into a more in-depth interview to
determine their admissibility. That information and what might
be obtained from those interviews will then be forwarded out to
our National Targeting Center and to the Office of
Intelligence. We ensure that gets captured in Homeland Security
information reports, intelligence reports, and sent down to the
community through the Department. So that occurs. And it gets
posted, regularly sent to the National Counterterrorism Center,
et cetera.
The value added there, again, is that granularity, the
ability to look at an individual up close. If they are denied
admissibility into the United States and returned back, we have
them for that time frame. So that is a unique piece of value
added.
Mr. Simmons. Thank you very much.
The Chair recognizes the Ranking Member.
Ms. Lofgren. I will be quick so that my colleague will also
have a chance to ask her questions.
Last year there was an effort made to add an additional 550
Border Patrol agents and additional 200 immigration
investigators, and again, in December, an effort to authorize
3,000 additional Border Patrol agents, for a total of 12,000 by
2010, along with a new training facility to expand capacity.
As the Executive Director of Intelligence Office at CBP,
would you find these resources helpful to you when you are
doing your job?
Mr. Bortmes. Border Patrol agents all represent to me a
collector, a conduit of information.
Ms. Lofgren. Thank you very much.
We have, we know, on the northern border, our 5,000-mile-
plus northern border, at any given time we have between 200 and
300 Border Patrol agents. Do you believe this is an adequate
force at the northern border?
Mr. Bortmes. I believe that the number of Border Patrol
agents on the border is closer to 1,000. But--
Ms. Lofgren. But they are post positions. So we have only
got at any given time 200 or 300 physically there. So do you
think that is adequate?
Mr. Bortmes. I don't believe anyone thinks it is adequate
right now.
Ms. Lofgren. Thank you very much.
The 9/11 Act mandated an additional 800 immigration
enforcement agents over the next 5 years, but we have only
actually funded 350. The 9/11 Act also mandated an additional
800 detention beds, but we have only funded, Congress has only
funded, an additional 1,800. Do you think that this is adequate
to deal with the flow that you have seen?
Mr. Bortmes. The question is again directed at me?
Ms. Lofgren. Yes.
Mr. Bortmes. These are questions again, ma'am, that I
believe are best answered by our operational folks, and I would
like to take it for the record and have them respond to you and
the previous question about adequate numbers on the northern
border.
Ms. Lofgren. That would be fine.
Ms. Lofgren. And I think I will stop my questioning at this
point and yield back so that my colleague Mrs. Lowey may ask
her questions, and we can all get our votes in.
Mr. Simmons. The Chair recognizes the distinguished
gentlelady from New York.
Mrs. Lowey. Thank you. And I will ask it quickly because
the bells are still going off.
I would like to direct it to Mr. Bortmes. You have heard us
talk frequently about the fact that only about 2 percent of our
cargo is being inspected while Hong Kong inspects 100 percent.
I am sure you are going to say you are not satisfied with 2
percent, but can you tell me what is actually being done to
remedy that? And why can't we move more quickly?
Mr. Bortmes. Ma'am, I believe you are really addressing the
issue of physically inspecting all of the cargo. As you know, a
great deal of the cargo from our perspective, CBP's
perspective, is inspected. The records are looked at long
before it is loaded aboard--the manifests.
Ms. Lowey. Do you think it is adequate?
Mr. Bortmes. The efforts that I have seen so far& and,
again, it is our operational elements as opposed to our intel
pieces. From what I have seen, the automated targeting system
that is in place is working extremely well at identifying those
suspect cargos that I have to worry about as the Executive
Director for Intelligence.
Mrs. Lowey. If you had your way, would you move in more
physical inspection, as you call it, or are you including a
more advanced technology in that description as well?
Mr. Bortmes. Again, this is a question that if--I think if
we bring our operational folks back to talk with you about in
more detail, they can address it far better. But from all the
discussions I have been part of, it is a combination of the
reviewing them, the manifest information, better material,
information arriving quicker, the nonintrusive inspection
capabilities that are being developed. And there are plans for
far more robust abilities to do that, and then actually
devanning or having to inspect cargo, physically inspect the
cargo. If you are doing all those things up front adequately
and robustly, then the necessity for that latter part would not
be there.
Mrs. Lowey. But as I understand it, you just said you do
have plans for more robustly inspecting the cargo.
So, Mr. Chairman, I would like to certainly request from
the gentleman more detailed information, if you can follow up
with us on that, because it is very disturbing to the average
American when we continually read that Hong Kong is doing it,
and we are not doing it, and we are all living at the edge
these days. So I would appreciate that information.
Mrs. Lowey. And I thank the panel again. I am sorry we have
to run, but I thank you for your important work.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Souder. [Presiding.] Thank you.
I have--let me first--you heard me ask the first panel that
as I visited the many border crossings north and south, and
fast pass lanes or whatever it is called in different places,
when they put their scan card in, if there is a question, a
little pop-up occurs, and the person then has run a check. And
what my question is is in the different intelligence agencies,
are you confident that, first, within DHS, all the information
is getting there with an individual name? And then, secondly,
is the entire system getting into that?
Now, the danger of having every single piece of
intelligence available to everybody, if there is one leak, you
compromise the entire system. But the question is why can't at
least a pop-up occur if anywhere in any of our intelligence
systems there is a question about this name, even if it is just
wanting to know where they are moving? Are you confident that
that information is getting into our systems at this point?
Could each of you briefly comment on that? Because you each
deal with slightly different types of things. Maybe start with
CBP, and whether the Coast Guard is getting it if they have a
boat, and then ICE if you are doing an investigation.
Mr. Bortmes. Sir, I am very confident that the information
that is within the Intelligence Community on particular names,
identifying data, the plus one data, et cetera, on those that
we know are linked particularly to terror and then to criminal
activity as well, that it is there. It is popping up. We have
done, I think, efforts and strides have been made to make sure
that it actually pops up in front of the CBP officer or the
Border Patrol agent when they do run that information check. So
I am confident that every effort--that great strides have been
made.
Clearly there leaves this hole of what you do as you are
developing information, names that are being investigated,
operations that are under way by the Intelligence Community.
There are other names there that are not quite yet definitive
or authoritative. We always worry about that. We take great
strides within CBP that as we are associating or linking
individuals with terrorist backgrounds to others to make sure
that that information gets in the appropriate law enforcement
and terrorist databases so that it is there, with the caveat
that, hey, we are now looking at this individual linked to
another in this particular way.
So great strides, I believe, have been made, and I am
comfortable that the information the community has is getting
there. You clearly always want it faster; you always want it
better, clearer. And I know there are a number of initiatives
throughout the community to make that happen.
Mr. Souder. Because you have seconds. Your agent at the
line at San Ysidro is going to be backed up hours at almost any
time of the day, so there is huge pressure in seconds. That is
why it has to--even a 6-hour delay, if it is not instantaneous,
we could miss somebody going through the border.
Before I follow up, let me clarify here, because you had
some other--you had a question I want to follow up briefly. Is
it CBP or ICE at our embassies that would have a DHS person
doing a check, a background check? Is it ICE?
Ms. O'Connell. ICE has. We have attaches and assets
overseas.
Mr. Souder. I just want to make sure. I couldn't remember
which one it was. In Pakistan, when I was there recently, that
is,
[[Page 31]]
at the front desk--this isn't just about whether we have agents
at the border, this is an interrelated system inside the United
States and externally. And the ICE agent had identified
somebody on one of the lists, but the list of this person's
name had like 12 variations, because it isn't just like Mark
Edward Souder. Often they will have six names, will have an A
and E turned around, will have two or three of the names here.
Are you confident that at our borders, at the CBP or at the
Coast Guard, or as we are doing the investigations, that all
the different variations of the name are getting into the
system as well?
Ms. O'Connell. If we have an ongoing investigation, and
with the focus on antiterrorism national security issues, I am
confident that the names are in the system. It may be the main
name and then AKAs, also known as, attached to that. Many
instances when individuals coming into the port of entry& Mr.
Bortmes can speak on this also--an inspector will look at that
name, and it will possibly highlight it, and in instances would
identify that person who would go into secondary, and then you
would work out different names and other uses.
Mr. Souder. Let us say it is not an ongoing investigation,
but a person on a watch list. We have a potential latent cell.
Part of the way they move from just kind of casual watch to an
aggressive watch to whether it is an ongoing, or whatever
information you put together, so, for example, if we think that
they are located in someplace in Indiana and haven't moved, but
then we see this person who we really were--just casually had
on the list because of his relationship to, say, several
individuals, all of a sudden we see them move at a border place
in Texas, then we see them move up by Buffalo, then we see him
at an embassy, it suggests that there may be a pattern. But
without kind of core information, you can't even get to the
point.
And so I understand if there is an active investigation, I
have seen them pull into secondary on that. I am just wondering
how far we are moving on this, and are we getting enough
information in the system to be proactive other than an ongoing
investigation?
Ms. O'Connell. If they are identified as a lookout, yes, I
am confident that they are in the system.
Now, when you mentioned about movement between States, keep
in mind that the identification of an individual in the system
would be when they are coming in through the border. So there
is obviously no checks going from State to State. But I am
confident that that individual, if they rise to the level of
putting them in as a lookout, that they would be in there, yes.
Mr. Souder. That is assuming that they are a citizen of the
United States. We would have no way of seeing whether a person
who has either overstayed their visa or is on a visa is moving
inside the United States?
Ms. O'Connell. It is not just individuals that are U.S.
citizens that would be put in the record that inspectors would
identify coming through the border. It is also other
individuals, lawfully admitted permanent residents, visitors,
students.
Mr. Souder. In the Coast Guard is there adequate technology
now on--in most of our vessels to be able to read it if they
pick somebody up or detain somebody?
[[Page 32]]
Mr. Sloan. Well, sir, if I could just back up 1 second. The
Coast Guard obviously doesn't have a border check, if you will,
but we do have a responsibility to vet the names of all crew
members of certain vessels over a certain tonnage that must be
supplied to us 96 hours prior to the arrival in the United
States; otherwise, the ship can't enter. And we vet those names
not only against the law enforcement database, but intelligence
database that you can imagine we have available to us, to
include the Terrorist Screening Center.
The names, if they provide a hit, clearly the ship will be
boarded before it arrives in the United States and the
individuals be dealt with appropriately to the degree that it
is a law enforcement matter or somebody who shouldn't be coming
into the country. But also, we provide some degree of check and
balance. We want to make certain that the names that are being
supplied to us and the passport information and the last port
of call information and the origin of the particular crew, we
will actually inspect vessels to verify before the vessel
arrives to make certain that the information that was provided
is, in fact, accurate.
Mr. Souder. Two of the biggest potential areas for
terrorists to hide are in Detroit and also crossing in upstate
New York. I am from Fort Wayne, Indiana. I have been to
Michigan many times, been at the border crossing many times
there as well as other reasons, certainly the St. Clair River,
Lake St. Clair. The islands there are such&at you can swim in 5
minutes between them, and the Coast Guard does, in fact, have
primary responsibility at that point if a boat is coming into
our waterway. The same thing in the St. Lawrence Seaway, that--
and what I am wondering is, if the--do you, if--do you have the
capability if you find that, or do you then if you have a
suspect take them into another agency, have to run them to
shore? Are we moving towards having some sort of onboard
vessels? I know for narcotics we do in the Caribbean, but I am
trying to think as we look at some of the Great Lakes areas and
the St. Lawrence River, too, as well as the area coming into
Seattle where the Coast Guard has a huge waterway with lots of
San Juan Islands and everything.
Mr. Sloan. Yes, sir. The San Juan Islands are a perfect
example as are the Great Lakes. But I would point out that
although the appearance of Coast Guard efforts in the Great
Lakes and the San Juan Islands would not look like what is
going on in the Florida straits and the eastern Pacific and the
Caribbean, the same amount of attention is being paid to it.
And I recall from some of the discussion that occurred in
the prior panel, the relationship with Canada is particularly
important. We do have representatives of the Coast Guard who
operate out of Ottawa, we have law enforcement agreements with
the Canadian authorities, and we actually have a Canadian
representative in our National Maritime Intelligence Center. So
the link and the exchange of information with the Canadians is
as important to cue our activities relative to those issues as
anything else.
Mr. Souder. I have one additional question, if I may, Mr.
Chairman, that one of the things as we have looked at the
border challenge is that--is the networks that work in between
the borders. Particularly we have looked at OTMs as a higher
risk, theoretically at least, in terrorism, other than
Mexicans, but it could be any
[[Page 33]]
number of smuggling organizations. And the question is are we
proactive?
We have tried to increase legislation on coyotes, for
example. In San Diego, Congressman Issa said that the penalty
was 6 months, and it took 9 months to get to trial, so nobody
was investigating that. Yet, in fact, for major smuggling
organizations it is much going to be like Panama Express. In
other words, when somebody--we don't believe at this point that
the Veterans Administration files were stolen for that purpose;
it appears to be some college kids, and we are watching that
very closely.
But much of identity theft in the United States is related
to trying to get the Social Security numbers and IDs; that when
somebody does a package to come across the border, whether it
be an other than Mexican or a Mexican coming across, and they
purchase this, often somebody is providing a map, providing a
van to pick them up, providing a false green card, that with
the Social Security number, and obviously work sites. As they
come into Indiana, in my district, which is the number one
manufacturing--and the bottom line is we have a number of
people there or we wouldn't be making it in manufacturing.
I am not taking immediate sides on that question. I am
asking, do we have a systematic way? Because we clearly have an
``interterior'' smuggling organization that has places they
rent the vans, buy the vans, markets. We had three green card
manufacturers taken down in 30 days in my district. Is this
being investigated
[[Page 43]]
in holistic? Because this is a gaping hole in our system over
the last couple of years.
Ms. O'Connell. I can speak a little bit about that on the
operational side of ICE. The investigations program has just
identified identity and benefit fraud units that will actively
work within the interior of the United States. I don't want to
state a number. I have got one in my head, but I don't know it
100 percent. So anyway, identity and benefit fraud units.
Then, on the intelligence front, I have got a unit at
headquarters that specifically specializes in human smuggling,
in trafficking, immigration fraud types of things that have
identified a number of areas. As a matter of fact, we had a
case related to the vans that are moving people from the
southern border up into the northwest or the northeast coast.
Also, the field intelligence units that are out there on
the ground work daily with the SAC offices, the special agent
in charge offices, and get information in and work on and
analyze different organizations and try to pull those details
together, add the classified information, and try to identify
target packages for those smuggling organizations.
Mr. Sloan. Sir, may I comment on that? Clearly asymmetrical
immigration is a concern to the Coast Guard. This is where SIAs
or people who might have a terrorist link or associations would
come in by absconding or deserting or being a stowaway on a
vessel.
But your point relative to identification, I think, is an
important one for the Coast Guard. We issue merchant mariner
licenses for hundreds of thousands of individuals, and I think
it is important for me to testify to the fact that over the
last 2 years, actually over
[[Page 34]]
2 years, the Coast Guard Investigative Service along with the
Federal Bureau of Investigation and the cooperation that we get
from our partners in Homeland Security, Defense Department, and
the Intelligence Community, has been vetting close to a quarter
of a million merchant mariner documents to make certain that
they are in the hands of the correct people.
In fact, I couldn't even tell you in an open session that
we have associated nine individuals--it doesn't seem like a lot
out of a quarter million, but it is significant--who actually
have associations with terrorism over the course of that period
of time. It is an effort that continues, ongoing, and actually
our regional centers that issue mariner documents are now
trained to go through that program before mariner documents are
actually allowed to be issued.
Mr. Simmons. [Presiding.] I want to thank this panel for
their testimony. It has been extremely interesting and thought-
provoking. I realize that some of our panelists have stayed
beyond their anticipated time of testimony, and particularly
you, Mr. Sloan. So we thank you very much. It has been very
informative.
And at this point I will excuse the second panel and invite
our third panel to come forward.
The third panel is made up of two individuals, Mr. Michael
W. Cutler from the Center for Immigration Studies, and Mr.
Michael O'Hanlon of the Brookings Institute. I welcome both of
you gentlemen to testify. I think you have already determined
that we have your written statements in our notebooks, we have
reviewed those
[[Page 44]]
written statements prior to today's hearing, so feel free to
cherry-pick the most cogent points to present to us so that we
can get into the questions and answers, which is often very
informative for the subcommittee. And, again, I thank you for
being here.
And I would ask the staff to secure the door so that we can
hear the testimony.
Thank you, gentlemen. C comes before O. Why don't we
proceed on that basis. Mr. Cutler.
STATEMENT OF MICHAEL W. CUTLER, FELLOW, CENTER FOR IMMIGRATION
STUDIES
Mr. Cutler. Thank you, sir. Chairman Simmons, Ranking
Member Lofgren, Members of Congress, ladies and gentlemen, I
welcome this invitation to appear before you today at a hearing
that I believe is of critical importance to the safety of our
citizens and indeed to the very survival of our Nation.
The gathering of effective intelligence is essential for
effective law enforcement and for issues relating to national
security. Nothing can be of greater significance than the issue
of developing effective intelligence; that is to say, the
culling of accurate information and understanding its place in
the overall picture.
Intelligence should be thought of as being comparable to
the way that a digital photograph is made. A digital photograph
is comprised of a huge number of elements or pixels which are
placed in the proper location to paint the clear picture. As
the number of pixels increases, the clarity of the photo
increases proportionately. So, too, the clarity of the picture
painted by effective intelligence is proportionate to the
quantity and quality of the intelligence nuggets or bits of
information that can be gathered and placed into
[[Page 35]]
their proper position in the mosaic that makes up the overall
pictures. And the ability to understand the significance of
each kernel of information also contributes to the clarity of
the picture that the intelligence will create.
But effective intelligence also requires that it be
disseminated quickly to the ultimate users of the intelligence.
It has a short shelf life, and, therefore, where critical
intelligence is concerned, time is of essence. Pixels do not
lose their value over time, but intelligence does.
Additionally, it is important to understand that human
nature often creates additional hurdles. Approximately 400
years ago, Sir Francis Bacon said, knowledge is power. That
statement is as true today as it was when he first said it.
Various Federal agencies realize that intelligence that they
possess provides them with a certain amount of power, and
therefore their members have been reluctant to share their
knowledge with other agencies. However, to the point that
intelligence is to protect our Nation, intelligence is critical
today that will become worthless in a very short period of time
if it is not freely and expeditiously shared with those who
possess the need to know.
Rather than to continue to read my prepared statement, what
I do want to do is point to something that I did talk about in
my prepared statement that I would like to paraphrase.
You know, I have heard today members of the subcommittee
talk about the idea of allowing people in to work because we
are con
[[Page 45]]
cerned about terrorists and we are concerned about the border.
But the point of fact, the border alone won't solve our
problems. I have often spoken about the need to think of
immigration law enforcement as a tripod, with the inspectors
who enforce the immigration laws at ports of entry, the Border
Patrol between ports of entry, but you need to have enough
special agents to enforce the immigration laws from within the
interior of the United States so that we have a seamless
coordinated effort.
I share Ms. Lofgren's concern about the numbers of people
that have been proposed to be hired. In fact, in May of last
year I testified at the Immigration Subcommittee about the fact
that while Congress had authorized the hiring of 800 new
special agents, the administration only hired 143, or wanted to
hire 143. The number was eventually increased.
But this has been going on for the longest time. There was
no response to the first attack on the World Trade Center from
an immigration perspective, and today we are in a situation
where we are not even giving foreign language training to the
special agents who are supposed to be investigating illegal
aliens operating within our country. And, quite frankly, if you
can't communicate with people, then you are unable to
investigate those people. And the day-to-day routine
enforcement of the immigration laws is critical to our security
because it is during the routine enforcement of the laws that
you will encounter potential terrorists and develop
information.
Twenty years ago--and this is also my prepared testimony--I
was doing a rather mundane and routine job. I was assigned to
the squad that was responsible for investigating locations that
were knowingly hiring illegal aliens, and we arrested a bunch
of people
[[Page 36]]
working illegal in the United States in a diner at Staten
Island. One of the individuals whom we arrested turned out to
be a citizen of Egypt; and we went back to his apartment in
order to get his passport, which was the standard procedure.
What we found were bags filled to the brim with food coupons
and dog food coupons and detergent coupons. And we could not
understand why he had this, and he had no adequate explanation.
Mr. Cutler. We had no place to go with that information and
no place to make inquiries. We ultimately deported that guy.
And months later I was shocked to listen to a television news
report about how the PLO had sent some of their folks into our
country to commit coupon fraud to fund terrorism in the Middle
East.
It is important that if we are going to secure our country
and protect our people, that we have enough agents and that we
understand who we are really dealing with. And quite frankly, I
am very much concerned when I hear stories about guest worker
programs that would provide official documentation to illegal
aliens whose true identities we don't know. There is no way
that we can develop a system that will deal with millions of
people who have no way of proving who they are, where we would
wind up giving people official identity documents without
knowing whether or not these are bad guys, because I would like
to remind you that the job of a terrorist, just like a spy, is
to hide in plain sight, and if we give identity documents to
people without knowing their true identities, we make it that
much easier for them to hide in plain sight.
[[Page 46]]
And finally, I want to make one point, if I may. I have
heard some of the folks today talk about interior enforcement,
and they are right, but they have limited it to people who have
been identified on the border who fail to show up, the so-
called OTMs who failed to appear, and employer sanctions.
A big issue is immigration benefit fraud. Janice Kephart
was the counsel to the 9/11 Commission, and I provided
testimony to her, and she did a little bit of a study and found
that there were over 90 terrorists that were identified in our
country operating during the decade leading up to 9/11. Of
those 90-odd aliens, some 59, or about two-thirds, had used
immigration benefit fraud either to enter into the United
States or to embed themselves in the United States once they
got here.
If we don't address immigration from all aspects, then I
think we are going to have a very serious problem. And
intelligence is only a part of the metrics; we also need to
look at the visa waiver program as well.
I know my time is up. I thank you for your indulgence, and
I look forward to your questions.
Mr. Simmons. Thank you for that insightful statement. We
appreciate the breadth of experience you bring to the issue.
[The statement of Mr. Cutler follows:]
Prepared Statement of Michael W. Cutler
Chairman Simmons, ranking member Lofgren, members of Congress,
ladies and gentlemen, I welcome this invitation to appear before you
today at a hearing that I believe is of critical importance to the
safety of our citizens and indeed to the very survival of our nation.
The gathering of effective intelligence is essential for effective
law enforcement and for issues relating to national security. Nothing
can be of greater significance than the issue of developing effective
intelligence, that is to say, the culling of accurate information and
understanding its place in the overall picture. Intelligence should be
thought of as being comparable to the way that a digital photograph is
made. A digital photograph is comprised of a huge number of elements or
pixels, which are placed in the proper location to paint a clear
picture. As the number of pixels increases, the clarity of the photo
increases proportionately. So too, the clarity of the picture painted
by effective intelligence is proportionate to the quantity and quality
of the intelligence or nuggets of information that can be gathered and
placed in the proper position in the mosaic that makes up the overall
picture. The ability to understand the significance of each kernel of
information, also contributes to the clarity of the picture that the
intelligence will create.
Effective intelligence also requires that it be disseminated
quickly to the ultimate users of the intelligence. It has a short
"shelf life" and therefore where critical intelligence is concerned,
time is of the essence. Pixels do not lose their value over time,
intelligence does. Additionally, it is important to understand human
nature. Approximately 400 years ago Sir Francis Bacon said, "Knowledge
is power." That statement is as true today as it was when he first said
it. Various federal agencies realize that intelligence that they
possess provides them with a certain amount of power and therefore
their members have been reluctant to share their knowledge with other
agencies. However the point to intelligence is to protect our nation
and intelligence that is critical today will become worthless in a very
short period of time. That is why it must be freely and expeditiously
shared with those who truly possess the "Need to know."
It is also worth noting that intelligence comes from many sources.
It comes from electronic surveillance and other high-tech means and
also comes from low-tech sources; informants who are willing to talk
and field personnel who make observations in the field when they find
documents and other materials that yield valuable information. That is
why it is essential that field agents understand that they have a vital
role to play in the development of intelligence. They are our
government's eyes and ears on the ground and their discoveries and
insights are invaluable. Because of this, not only must they be
provided with accurate intelligence to help them do their jobs, they
must also be provided with an opportunity to share their observations
with intelligence analysts who may be able to take seemingly
unconnected observations and even "hunches" and weave them into a
tapestry of effective intelligence.
I would like to share with you an experience I had approximately 20
years ago which is as relevant today as it was when it occurred. Back
then I was assigned to a unit of the former INS in New York that was
charged with finding illegal aliens who were working illegally in the
United States. My colleagues and I were in the process of arresting a
number of illegal aliens who were working in a diner in Staten Island,
New York when one of the illegal alien employees, a citizen of Egypt,
fled the restaurant when he realized we were present. He made an
exhaustive although ultimately futile effort to evade us and we
succeeded in taking him into custody. We took him back to his apartment
to attempt to retrieve his passport, a standard procedure, since his
passport would be helpful in positively identifying him and determining
his date place and manner of entry into the United States. His passport
would also be useful in arranging for his deportation should the
immigration judge order him deported. With his consent, we entered his
apartment and were surprised to find that there were numerous
department store shopping bags lining one of the walls in his sparsely
furnished apartment. These bags were filled to the very top with
hundreds upon hundreds of coupons for all sorts of merchandise ranging
from dog food to detergent to cereal. He had no meaningful explanation
for this but we had no way of making any inquiries to understand the
possible significance of those coupons. We retrieved his passport and
he was ultimately deported. Several months later I was shocked to learn
from a televised news program that the PLO had sent a number of their
people to the United States to engage in coupon fraud in order to fund
terrorism in the Middle East. Purportedly this tactic netted the PLO
millions of dollars in ill-gotten funds. This young man who was
seemingly engaged in nothing more sinister than washing dishes in a
diner was apparently an operative of a terrorist organization. We had
him in custody and we deported him, losing a potential treasure trove
of intelligence from a terrorist operative or at least terrorist
sympathizer. To this day I wonder what intelligence we might have
gained had we understood the significance of the shopping bags filled
with coupons on the day we arrested him. I also wonder where he is now
and what efforts he might be engaged in that pose a threat to our
nation or our allies today.
If the news media understood the significance of coupon fraud, why
did not the former INS make certain that their field agents were aware
of such activities? Keeping our law enforcement personnel in the dark
not only keeps them from being as effective as possible at carrying out
their day to day duties, it also keeps them from recognizing situations
that may make their jobs more hazardous and also prevents them from
pressing an investigation further, where the results might yield highly
critical information.
This is also the reason that I am greatly concerned when I hear
members of the administration talk about the need to conduct field
investigations where critical infrastructure facilities are concerned
such as airports and nuclear power plants but where limited resources
make routine immigration law enforcement a non-priority. Certainly it
is vital that we make certain that we make vital infrastructure
facilities as secure as possible and not only where hiring illegal
aliens is concerned, but from other perspectives as well. However, as
we have seen in a number of terrorism investigations over the past
several years, many of the suspected terrorists who have been
identified and arrested have not worked as such sensitive locations as
airports and nuclear power plants, but had relatively "pedestrian" jobs
driving taxi cabs and ice cream trucks as well as teaching in schools
and working in used car lots. The goal of terrorists is to "hide in
plain sight" or in the parlance of the 911 Commission, to "embed"
themselves in our nation.
The routine enforcement of immigration laws can provide our
government with the opportunity to cultivate informants and provide
essential insight if our agents are properly briefed and properly
debriefed. They need to be encouraged to come forward whenever they
make observations that arouse their suspicions or curiosity and need to
have an easy way to report on their findings in the field.
Finally, we also need to provide our field personnel at ICE with
appropriate training, including foreign language training. When I
attended the Border Patrol Academy in 1972 I was required to
successfully complete a Spanish language training program as were all
enforcement personnel who were hired by the INS. Today, incredibly,
that foreign language training is not only not required, it is not even
offered for newly hired special agents of ICE. As I have stated at
previous Congressional hearings at which I have testified, you simply
cannot investigate people you are unable to communicate with. It is
absolutely essential that our ICE personnel be given Spanish language
training and they also need to be trained in various strategic
languages such as Arabic, Farsi and Urdu to name a few. They also need
to be given on-going training to properly identify fraudulent and/or
altered identity documents, since these documents are the linchpins
that hold the immigration system together. From what I have been told,
this training is far from adequate at present, and this is not in our
nation's best interest. I would remind you that the terrorists who
attacked our nation on September 11, 2001 used multiple identities and
false documents as well as documents that were improperly issued to
them, in order to embed themselves in our country as they prepared for
the horrific attacks that they launched against our nation and our
people on that terrible day.
I look forward to your questions.
Mr. Simmons. Mr. O'Hanlon.
STATEMENT OF MICHAEL O'HANLON, SENIOR FELLOW IN FOREIGN POLICY
STUDIES, BROOKINGS INSTITUTION
Mr. O'Hanlon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Congresswoman. It
is an honor to be here. I will try to be very quick. I just
want
[[Page 37]]
to make one broad comment. Having listened to the great
expertise this morning and learned a lot myself, I think it
highlights, if you put it all together, one broad observation,
which is that intelligence is very important clearly at land
border crossings, but we are never going to have good enough
intelligence to find individuals and be able to target Border
Patrol assets accurately. Our only hope using intelligence
really is at the places where people come through official
points of entry. That is where we spotlight attention.
So this leads me to a couple of broad conclusions. While I
think we do need to keep working on intelligence capability for
land crossings, we are never going to know enough about coyotes
and about preferred points of entry and so forth to have that
be a reliable way to stop people. It takes very good luck to
find someone, it is going to always take very good luck, which
leads me to think we need to continue to increase capacity
first to seal those borders to the extent possible, even though
we all know it is not theoretically truly possible.
Secondly, to be able to do a very good job at official
points of entry in certain areas where we are not doing very
well right now, I think we need to be making inquiries of a lot
more passengers inside of cars at official points of entry and
not simply hoping that the driver's identity gives us a
sufficient tip as to whether that car is suspicious.
And I also think that, in keeping with some of the comments
that have just been made, we do need to think hard about better
forms of identification for American citizens, standards for
driver's licenses, possibly even national ID cards.
The 9/11 Commission, I think, was quite convincing on these
points. Americans have a very strong civil liberties concept on
our Nation's history and in our thinking, and therefore, there
is always pushback against this sort of idea. But I think
tougher standards on driver's licenses and other forms of
identification are critical, because we have to always be
looking inside the country, too, because we are going to have
people keep crossing across the land borders. That is never
going to be sealed enough, and we can't assume that
intelligence is going to ever get good enough to solve that
problem.
So, official points of entry, whether it is people coming
through or cargo coming through, we need more capacity, more
capacity for land borders to reduce the likelihood of people
getting through because intelligence is not going to help us
pinpoint to know exactly when and where to look for whom. We
are going to have to try to increase general capability across
that land border. And in general, on sort of a broad unfocused
note, but more, more, more. We need more capacity in general
because intelligence is never going to be smart enough to tell
us when and where to look for whom. And I will stop with that
simple point.
[The statement of Mr. O'Hanlon follows:]
Statement of Mr. Michael O'Hanlon
Border protection is a critical pillar of homeland security. It
keeps dangerous people and materials out of the country before
terrorists can even get into a position to attack. In other words, it
is preventive in nature-and thus represents an optimal approach to
homeland security policy, as my coauthors and I argue in our new
Brookings book, Protecting the Homeland 2006/2007.
Border protection should not be principally viewed as a literal
defense of the nation's perimeter. It is not tantamount to the creation
of a moat around American borders. Rather, it is a set of efforts that
exploits the fact that people and goods are relatively easily monitored
when they arrive at checkpoints. In other words, movement across
borders allows spotlighting to occur. To be sure, some border
protection functions represent something closer to the direct physical
protection of borders-most notably, the efforts of the border patrol
along the long perimeters of the United States, as well as some
activities of the Coast Guard and the Department of Defense. But the
spotlighting role is even more critical. Its failure is what allowed
the 19 September 11 hijackers to enter the country. Similarly, the
nation's inability to know accurately what goods are coming across its
borders have much more to do with holes in the official inspection
process-that is, with the spotlighting function-than with the
weaknesses of our national walls.
Done right, border security activities can offer additional
benefits beyond the homeland security sphere, meeting another one of
our four recommended guidelines. Digitized and computerized borders can
allow more dependable and rapid movement of people and goods in and out
of the United States. They can also provide better knowledge of where
ships and goods are when in transit. That in turn translates into,
among other things, a greater ability to prevent or respond quickly to
other dangers such as piracy and ship accidents that can afflict trade
and travel. This should be the goal of tighter border protection; we
must avoid the risk of borders turning into chokepoints. Homeland
security efforts should reinforce, not compete with, economic
competitiveness.
America's geography generally helps in the effort to monitor
borders and to use them as a means of funneling goods and routing
people through places where spotlighting is possible. But the country
has two long land borders that remain very difficult to guard. And they
are far from the only main challenge facing this domain of homeland
security. This testimony considers a number of relevant problems, as
well as the general matter of aviation security, which is in part a
matter of border protection. Its conclusions, in short, are that there
is no magic bullet for keeping illicit goods and people out of the
country, and no easy analytical way to deduce what level of increased
inspection or monitoring capacity would be sufficient for national
security. Ongoing efforts since 9/11 have been headed in the right
direction, however, and the gradual increase in capacity for monitoring
borders as well as goods should continue. In addition, some additional
policy steps such as much more uniform standards for drivers' licenses
are called for.
Monitoring of People
There has been progress in regulating and monitoring the movement
of people into the United States. It is much harder for individuals to
gain access to this country while disguising their true identities,
particularly for those on terror watch lists. Notably, someone trying
to fly into an airport from abroad is unlikely to get through under
their own name if on a terrorist watch list, and indeed is unlikely to
be allowed entry even under a false name if his or her fingerprints are
already on file. This is a major step forward since 9/11.
Other useful measures have also been adopted. For example, the
Student and Exchange Visitor Information System (SEVIS) now appears to
be functioning quite well in helping track those foreigners in the
United States on student visas. Those who overstay visas can be more
quickly identified and located.
Biometric indicators are used increasingly to control foreign
travel. The U.S.-VISIT program requires foreign visitors from all
countries except Canada to submit to fingerprinting (of right and left
index fingers) and digital photography upon arrival in the United
States. A complementary program, the State Department's Biometric Visa
Program, requires that fingerprints be taken of visa applicants before
travel to the United States and compared to those in a DHS database
(known as IDENT) consisting of some five million individuals, some of
whom are ineligible for American visas. Upon arrival in the United
States, visitors' fingerprints taken by DHS under the U.S.-VISIT
program are also checked against those on the visas to confirm that the
individual in question is indeed the one to whom the visa was granted.
To reduce the chances that individuals planning terror attacks will
find a legal way into the country and then overstay their visas, it
would be useful to record exits in real time from the United States.
Those remaining longer than they should could then be more easily
identified and pursued (as the 9/11 Commission recommended).
A remaining problem in air travel security arises from what is
known as the Visa Waiver Program. Until digitized passports with
biometric indicators are widely used by qualifying countries, the visa
waiver program (VWP) will continue to constitute a substantial loophole
in U.S. border security, given the prevalence of stolen and forged
passports around the world. While individuals entering under VWP are
still checked upon entry, there is less ability to interview them
thoroughly when required if such activities must be carried out at the
actual border.
This circumstance argues for some other level of screening of
individuals from VWP countries before they can board flights for the
United States. For example, DHS security personnel could be deployed at
foreign airline check-in counters in certain VWP countries (as Israel
does with El Al flights).
Terrorist watch lists also need to be improved. The United States
is presently consolidating some dozen watchlists into a single
terrorist screening database (TSDB) using more extensive data in the
terrorist identities database (TID) that is also now being constructed.
(The effort to construct the TID began with the previous gold standard
of terrorist watch lists, the State Department's TIPOFF list. The list
was subsequently scrubbed and expanded by consolidating it with other
databases.) Some new specialized watchlists with limited information
(easier to share with people not possessing security clearances) are
being created as well, such as the Secure Flight database to assist in
monitoring aircraft passengers and improve the accuracy with which
their names are matched against those of suspected terrorists.
Thankfully none of the watchlist consolidations have turned into
complete fiascos, as the FBI's attempts to computerize its case files
unfortunately has. But the consolidation and integration process
remains slow. For example, Secure Flight had not yet been tested as of
September 2005.
Even digitized passports with biometric indicators cannot track new
recruits with no known ties to terrorist organizations. It is therefore
important to recall that there are inherent limitations to these sorts
of terrorist tracking efforts. This is one clear example of the reason
why a multi-tiered strategy for homeland security is imperative.
The problem with screening people also works in the opposite
direction--keeping good people out while they wait for security reviews
to be completed. This is true for example for foreign students, who
when screened through the so-called Visas Mantis program have had to
wait months for their visas in many cases. Improvements have been
underway in these programs, including allowing students to get a single
visa for an entire period of study (rather than requiring annual
renewal). But there are still long delays. This problem also applies to
individuals trying to enter the country to conduct business, seek
medical care, or pursue other important matters.
The student problem has not truly become severe. While the 2003/
2004 academic year did register a 2.4 percent decline in foreign
students relative to the year before, the number of foreign students
remained greater than in 2000 or any year before. Moreover, numbers of
applications from the Middle East to U.S. graduate schools actually
increased in both the 2003-2004 and 2004-2005 academic years (while
numbers from China, India, and Korea continued to fall). Indeed, the
overall number of foreign students in the United States was 4.5 percent
greater in 2004/2005 than just before the September 11, 2001 attacks,
though there was a decline of 14 percent in Middle Eastern students.
And the U.S. figures were not notably worse than those witnessed in the
United Kingdom. That said, the problem could again intensify--and could
affect some of the most talented individuals in the broader foreign
student pool, convincing disproportionate numbers of them to go
elsewhere. Further measures to address this problem, such as increases
in government capacity for processing such paperwork, are therefore
warranted.
In situations involving certain non-western countries, American
technical and financial help may be needed to ensure good border
security and travel controls. The simple fact of the matter is that the
United States has a greater interest in tracking the movement of many
terrorists than do developing countries. Even when that is not the
case, many countries will not have the resources to do all they should
given the urgency of the threat. Seen in this light, President Bush's
June 2003 East Africa Counterterrorism Initiative (EACTI) is a good
step in the right direction. It provides $100 million to improve border
control, police, airline security, and related homeland security
operations in a region that has been hit hard by terrorist violence.
The latter includes the 1998 U.S. embassy bombings in Kenya and
Tanzania and the 2002 attacks on a hotel and airline in Kenya (the
latter thankfully not successful), not to mention ongoing civil strife
in places such as Somalia. This is enough money to make a real
difference in a region of relatively low incomes. But these funds were
apparently taken in large part out of existing programs, meaning that
their net beneficial effect is difficult to ascertain. And similar
programs are probably needed in other regions such as Central Asia.
Ensuring adequate capacity to screen individuals and issue visas,
as well as proper means for verifying their identities, helps the
United States beyond the homeland security arena. It can expedite the
movement of people into the country who can contribute to the economy,
and who can ideally become goodwill ambassadors as well as important
contact points for the United States once they return home. Whenever a
homeland security program can have additional benefits beyond that
immediate objective, it is especially worthy of serious consideration
and serious support.
The Special Problem of Land Borders
The preceding discussion pertains generally to the movement of
individuals to and from the United States. But monitoring the movements
of people at land borders poses special problems. It also offers unique
opportunities, underscoring our theme about the need for greater
international cooperation in the "homeland" security effort. To the
extent Canada and Mexico make it hard for terrorists to use their
countries as staging bases or waystations, the United States benefits
from an added line of defense of its own country. That does not make
its own border enforcement job unimportant, but it does allow a
somewhat greater (and more realistic) margin for error at that
inherently difficult line of defense. If Canada and Mexico improve
their own monitoring of persons traveling into and out of the country,
only modest additional improvements may be needed in border security
along the U.S.-Canada frontier, and other lines of protection in the
broader homeland security arena may become more effective.
The United States has 216 airports, 143 seaports, and 115 land
facilities that are official ports of entry, at a total of 317 places.
Those land facilities generally involve car and truck traffic that is
especially difficult to regulate. In addition, of course, land borders
are very hard to control in between official points of entry. At many
official checkpoints, passengers in cars are not checked as long as
they are in vehicles with legitimate license plates. This policy should
be changed. Care must be taken to do it in a way that does not
seriously slow movement at checkpoints, with resulting consequences for
commerce as well as convenience of travel. That suggests that the
change in policy will have to be gradual to allow time for more
inspectors to be hired and new procedures to be developed (such as
adding lanes at checkpoints). Given typical car passenger loads, it may
be necessary to increase staffing by as much as 100 percent.
Open land borders are also a serious problem. For example, U.S.
land management agencies are responsible for the 30 percent of the
borders owned by the federal government. Yet they have only 200 full-
time law enforcement officers, a number increased by just 20 percent in
the first two years after September 11. Such numbers cannot begin to
credibly monitor or prevent off-road border crossings.
Such limited vigilance of U.S. land borders is a mistake. It can
deprive the country of the opportunity to "spotlight" people
effectively at official points of entry, thereby blunting one of the
very best homeland security tools that the United States and the
international community in general possess. There are relatively few
dependable ways to search for terrorists among the huge throngs of
individuals on the planet; this needle-in-haystack effort requires some
means of rendering people visible, and official border crossings can do
that. So it is especially important to ensure that individuals pass
through such locations when traveling.
Take for instance the sparsely guarded Canadian border, which can
be an important means of entry. The Patriot Act led to a tripling of
the number of U.S. agents along that border, but the total remains just
under 1,000 for an enormously long and porous border, and there is
little reason to think the number adequate. The United States also
needs an integrated plan involving increased, random patrols and better
equipment for surveillance and mobility for the U.S.-Canada border, as
well as better cooperation with Ottawa in this effort. There is
movement in the right direction. DHS is developing a way to have
response capability anywhere within an hour of notice of a problem, and
to improve monitoring as well. This might not help with the "lone wolf"
terrorist sneaking through the woods, but could pick up illicit vehicle
movements or groups of individuals. Five DHS bases near the Canadian
border are being created to help in the effort. Overall, this border is
better protected than before, and will soon be monitored even more
effectively. But the absolute numbers of U.S. capabilities are still
extremely modest, suggesting an enduring problem.
Although few Canadians would pose major terrorism-related concerns,
Canada's efforts to monitor its own borders against terrorist
infiltration are wanting in a number of areas. For example, its coast
guard does little to monitor Canada's long shorelines and cruise ships
coming ashore do not have passenger manifests examined. This
underscores the importance of Canada improving its own regulations on
individuals visiting the country, but also means the United States must
assume that foreign terrorists may try to reach this country via our
northern neighbor.
A greater worry is the Mexican border, where despite the presence
of almost 10,000 border agents, an estimated 4,000 illegal aliens cross
per day. They are mostly Latinos, but also include individuals from
countries such as Afghanistan, Egypt, Iran and Iraq with a greater
corresponding risk of possible terrorist infiltration. Intelligence
reports express concern that al Qaeda may indeed try to exploit the
porosity of this border and infiltrate operatives through it.
A rough benchmark for the above proposals to increase monitors at
borders is that adding 1,000 employees costs the government $100
million. So the costs associated with the above proposals might be
roughly $1 billion a year, if the doubling of inspectors recommended to
monitor passengers in vehicles crossing the border were matched by
comparable increases in other aspects of the border protection effort.
Accurately estimating the appropriate number of additional inspectors
is beyond the scope of this analysis, but the above number gives a
reasonable ballpark. The number of inspectors has grown by 5,000 over
the last decade, with some beneficial effect on estimated infiltration
rates. Indeed, it possibly reduced them by one-third, though it is
admittedly difficult to be sure of the exact numbers as well as the
true causes of any decline. It makes sense therefore to continue on the
same trajectory while also introducing new operational procedures and
new technologies--such as UAV patrols, the sea wall near San Diego, and
America's Shield Initiative involving multispectral sensors and cameras
as well as magnetic and seismic detectors. The Bush administration's
idea of using National Guard forces as a temporary means of
supplementing DHS personnel at the borders seems in this light to be a
good idea.
The right policy is to start increasing border patrol personnel
year by year in significant numbers and then attempt to modify
procedures to improve border monitoring. As experience is gained, it
can then be determined more accurately how many will be enough.
Unfortunately, the Bush administration's request for additional border
agents in 2006 totaled just 210 individuals, a far cry from the scale
of increase that would be appropriate, given the present porous nature
of the country's perimeter. But Congress wisely added $600 million to
the president's request in this area, enough for 1,000 additional
agents.
The database used by DHS's Border Patrol, IDENT, is not fully
integrated on a national scale with other databases. IDENT uses a photo
and two fingerprints, whereas the FBI's IAFIS (or Integrated Automated
Fingerprint Identification System) uses all ten fingerprints.
Reportedly, all U.S. Border Patrol stations now have interoperable
systems capable of accessing IAFIS records and cross-checking the
Border Patrol's IDENT entries against those records. But Border Patrol
agents cannot access the consolidated name-based terrorist watchlist
maintained by the Terrorist Screening Center at their stations.
Another problem is that the consular identification cards issued to
their own citizens by some foreign governments, including Mexico, can
be fraudulently obtained fairly easily. They are often used for
identification in the United States. Lax standards for such cards
cannot be tolerated. The United States may need to consider
contributing seed money to encourage Mexico in particular to develop
more rigorous and real-time databases of possible terrorists as well as
better ID technology of its own. At present, the United States has a
plan to require visitors crossing the Canadian or Mexican borders to
present a passport or one of four other hard-to-counterfeit documents.
But that plan is not due to be implemented before December 31, 2007.
Summing up, the land border security problem poses three special
challenges. One, making sure that smaller border crossing posts receive
up-to-date technology to become full participants in new efforts such
as U.S.-VISIT, is mostly a matter of taking the problem seriously and
providing adequate funds. A second, improving screening of individuals
in cars--and working toward a standard by which all who pass through a
land border are checked-is more demanding conceptually, though surely
doable. It will take new procedures not yet developed. They could slow
crossings dramatically, however, so considerable work is needed to add
inspectors and increase the numbers of lanes at key crossings. Third is
a problem for which solutions have not yet been successfully
conceptualized, even in theory--closing down U.S. land borders to
illegal infiltration, which is of course linked to broader U.S.
immigration policy. More technical and human resources to monitor
borders are generally well-advised to mitigate the problem, but are
unlikely to solve it--again underscoring the need for a multi-tier
approach to homeland security that begins by pushing America's own
borders "outward" and improving cooperation with other countries'
parallel homeland security efforts.
There is clearly also a major benefit to improving border
monitoring outside the homeland security domain. It is an important
means of reducing illegal immigration, with all of its associated
economic and political repercussions. Thus, focusing on land border
controls within a homeland security strategy is consistent with the
principle, as presented in the introduction, that the United States
should be especially keen to pursue programs with multiple benefits.
Indeed, the United States and Canada might push this logic one step
further and consider another crossing point in the Detroit/Windsor area
(where more than $100 billion of trade occurs annually between the two
countries). If built outside of the immediate urban areas, it would not
only provide backup in case a major bridge were destroyed, but reduce
traffic congestion under normal conditions.
Mr. Simmons. I thank you both for your comments.
My recollection--and I couldn't find it right away in the
book--is somewhere in the 9/11 Commission report it made some
interesting statements about who is to blame and what went
wrong. And the Commission stated that our aim has not been to
assign individual blame, which is a position that I also agree
with. If anyone
[[Page 38]]
is to blame, we are all to blame. We are all to blame because
after the Cold War ended, we felt that there were no threats,
no real threats, that were presented against us, and certainly
in those days not the threat of terrorism, which was a
nonsovereign nation, nongovernmental-sponsored activity.
But somewhere else it says that some of our failures were a
failure of imagination; a failure of imagination. I have used
the image of the Great Wall of China to try to illustrate what
I consider to be the fundamental problem. We have such
extensive borders. We are engaged economically, socially,
politically with the rest of the world on an hourly basis, much
less a daily basis. We have a set of standards and values with
regard to rights and liberties that make us the most open and
free country in the history of the world, and yet that very
freedom allows those who hate us to attack us. I mean, this is
a huge problem.
And I guess you can take pieces of it, like language
training, pieces of it like who is on a certain port of entry
and how are they trained and how many are there, but I think we
have to apply imagination as well. And I guess that, to me, is
where intelligence does come in. We don't have perfect
security, we never will, but how--you work for the
Congressional Budget Office, I believe--
Mr. O'Hanlon. I do.
Mr. Simmons. How do we apply those resources intelligently?
If we have 200 on the border, is 1,000 going to solve the
problem; or should we have 800 at the border and the money for
200 go to mandatory language training? How can we apply our
imagination to this problem for which we don't have unlimited
resources, Mr. Cutler?
Mr. Cutler. Well, one of the things that we seem to have
developed a fixation is high technology, and sometimes that can
be very good. But there was a story not long ago about--I think
it was 220--or $230 million that was spent on cameras on the
border. Cameras don't make arrests. Half the cameras, as it
turned out, didn't work.
You know, I am a New Yorker. The ashes of 9/11 actually
landed on my house. And I have been working as a volunteer with
9/11 Families for a Secure America who lost their family
members. I can't tell you how many yellow ribbons are tied to
my neighbors' trees. It is a constant reminder to me about our
failings.
And I have arrested terrorists in my career. And sometimes
you get to play a hunch, and when I was a new agent, I had a
guy come in at the airport, and he had an altered visa. And he
kept calling Israel Palestine. He had an Israeli passport. We
dug a little deeper. Long story short, he had a diagram in his
possession, and the diagram was of their oil refinery. He was
here to get the money to blow it up. We eventually prevented it
from happening, and that was in my first year as a special
agent. I had 30 years in with the INS. But what it taught me is
playing hunches and freeing people up to sometimes follow that
wild idea, but not with technology as much as with human
resources.
Mr. Simmons. If I could interrupt for just that point. When
Commissioner Kelly and Mayor Bloomberg say we need the Federal
Government to give us dollars for human beings, there is a lot
of value in that.
[[Page 39]]
Mr. Cutler. There is absolutely a lot of value. And I like
that comparison because I want you to think about something. It
is estimated that right now there is about 15--, 20 million
illegal aliens in the United States, depending on whose
statistics you want to read. New York has 8 million residents.
We are the safest big city in the United States because we have
37,000 cops. We have less than 10 percent the number of Special
Agents to enforce the immigration laws with double the number
of people as there are residents in the city of New York, and
they are scattered across a third of the North American
continent. That is not a workable situation.
When I hear about these so-called successes that ICE broke
up a ring that brought in 50 or 60 or 80 people, and we are
dealing with millions of illegal aliens, I am sorry, it leaves
me not feeling very confident. We need to make the effort to do
a far better job and dedicate the resources. We can't do it on
the cheap, but look at what 9/11 cost us, besides the precious
human lives which no money can replace.
Mr. Simmons. Mr. O'Hanlon.
Mr. O'Hanlon. Congressman, just a very brief point. I am
glad you pushed me on the issue of priorities. We do need to
establish priorities, and there are proposals in Homeland
Security that I think are excessive, but not usually on the
prevention end of things. Most of what I think you are
considering in this committee today and in general are border
protection problems, intelligence. These are on the front end,
the preventive end, and that is where we should be emphasizing
in general.
So I know I gave a bit of a broad-brush comment that most
of the things we touched on today require more resources, and
in one sense that can never be a good enough answer. But I
would prioritize preventive areas of activity over consequence
management. We need some capacity for consequence management,
but some of the ideas I have heard in the homeland security
debate in the last 5 years to equip most first responders in
the country with state-of-the-art chem gear or interoperable
radios, or have them drill several times per month in terms of
response to incidents that have already occurred that we didn't
stop, some of these are excessive, and that is where you can
spend too much. More of the money should be spent on
preventative efforts, on intelligence and on border protection.
Mr. Simmons. I really am glad to hear you say that.
And for you, Mr. Cutler, my daughter's apartment was so
close to Ground Zero that she never reoccupied it after 9/11.
She now lives in Brooklyn and works in Manhattan. So, like you,
this is a daily--
Mr. Cutler. I hope she is going okay today.
Mr. Simmons. She is physically--
Mr. Cutler. I don't think any New Yorker has been the same
after that.
Mr. Simmons. No. Well, two of her four roommates went down
with the building.
Mr. Cutler. I am so sorry.
Mr. Simmons. The gentlelady from California.
Ms. Lofgren. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[[Page 40]]
All of us, even those of us in California, were touched in
some way by 9/11. The valedictorian of my high school class,
Naomi Solomon, was on the Windows on the World that morning,
and we lost her. So this is something that touched the whole
country, and something that we are committed to preventing
again.
I don't have a lot of questions because both witnesses have
been very clear. I would note just for the record, a little
parochialism here, that although San Jose may not seem like a
big city to New York, it is the 10th largest city in the United
States and has the lowest crime rate of any major city in the
United States, just for the record.
Mr. O'Hanlon, thank you for the book that you coauthored.
The Chairman has suggested that I get your autograph on it,
which maybe we will do after the hearing. But I did want to
talk a little bit about your comments on page 103 about IDENT,
the database used by the Border Patrol, and that it is not
fully integrated on a national scale with other databases. And
this is something that bothered me from the very beginning, and
I asked about this both in the Homeland Security Committee, the
Science Committee and the Judiciary Committee on why we were
not going to have interoperability, and even asked NIST how
long and how much would it take to integrate this. And for
reasons I cannot understand, we never took care of that.
And as you point out, the FBI now has an integrated
automated fingerprint identification system using all 10
prints, and the Border Patrol now have interoperable systems
capable of accessing IDENT and the IAFIS records, but they are
not interoperable, and they don't have access to the
consolidated name base terrorism watch list.
What do you think needs to be done here? I mean, it is
heart-breaking actually that we didn't plan at the beginning,
and now we have this proliferation? What should we do? How much
is it going to cost?
Mr. O'Hanlon. Thank you for the question.
I am glad you are pursuing it, because, speaking honestly,
from the point of view of an analyst, it is hard to keep track
of this for two reasons: One, some of this is classified.
Secondly, when you are doing a book, there is a lag time
between when you write and when it is published. This has to be
followed up in real time continually, and they are making
progress, as I understand things, at integrating these two
different systems.
So I think the broad story of integrating the terrorism
watch list in the last 5 years, thanks in large part to the
scrutiny of committees like this, is that we have a progress.
Ms. Lofgren. The sad thing is they could have been the same
system at virtually no additional cost to the country.
Mr. O'Hanlon. But the reassuring news, despite that, is
that we are essentially sharing names in one way or another at
this point, even though there are these inefficiencies, and it
took us too long, and thank God we weren't attacked in the
meantime.
Ms. Lofgren. But the names yield false positives all the
time. It is the biometrics that really give you--I mean, you
can do one false identification, but only one; I mean, once you
have got their biometrics.
Mr. O'Hanlon. Well, you summarized it as least as well as I
could.
I will just make one additional point, if I could, which is
on the visa waiver program and visa issues, we typically give
our European friends a hard time, as we should, for being too
slow in some of their upgrades, but they have, I think, one
thing right that we need to reconsider, which is they realize
fingerprints are the way to go, or something better, with IRIS
for example. We are still relying too much in visas on
photographs; not a good way to do biometric-reliable
identification.
Ms. Lofgren. Well, I would just note that the other concern
that I have--and then I actually am supposed to chair a meeting
over in the Capitol 20 minutes ago--but the US-VISIT is not
interoperable in terms of the algorithms and the biometrics
with the other systems. So we are building up data that
ultimately I think we are going to have to go back in and redo.
And did you have an opportunity to examine that, along with the
IDENT, the other issue here that you mention in this chapter?
Mr. O'Hanlon. My broad sense is that, to the extent we can
understand this problem, we have had a lot of inefficiencies
and delays, but ultimately we are working towards systems that,
however inefficient, however much different from one another
where they don't need to be, at least now you do have the
ultimate information, which is the names of the individuals,
being shared in much better real-time ways. It has taken too
long, it has been too slow, and thank God we haven't been
attacked--
Ms. Lofgren. Well, I appreciate it. My time is just about
up.
I would like to ask unanimous consent to put in the record
an editorial from the San Jose Mercury News in yesterday's
paper about immigration hearings, if I could, Mr. Chairman--
Mr. Simmons. Without objection.
Ms. Lofgren.--as well as thank the witnesses and give my
opinion that in the end it is going to cost us billions to go
back and redo these biometrics. And we could have done it for a
couple of million if we had done it at the beginning.
And I yield back and thank the gentlemen.
Mr. O'Hanlon. I think you are right on cost, by the way.
Mr. Simmons. And I would ask unanimous consent that the
chapter you referred to in the book be copied and entered into
the record, if that doesn't violate your copyright rules.
Mr. Cutler. Could I make one fast point?
Mr. Simmons. Please.
Mr. Cutler. In 1997, I testified at my first congressional
hearing, and the advice I gave them was the need to use
biometrics. And after everything that I heard and saw
afterwards, the fact that here we are almost 5 years after 9/11
and we are still banging our head against the wall. You know,
World War II ended in less than 4 years. And what frustrates me
is we are not hitting the ground running, we haven't been, and
we need to be, and that is something that concerns me
tremendously.
Mr. Simmons. I appreciate the comment. And I think that
those of us who have been involved with the terror issue for
any period of time--and for me it goes back pretty much to my
service to the Central Intelligence Agency back in the mid
1970s, certainly in 1979 when colleagues were seized in the
embassy in Iran, and when my roommate was killed in the Beirut
Embassy in 1983--we have always felt--or I have always felt
that we need a consolidated database on terrorists just as we
needed it for counterespionage, and if we had moved
aggressively in the early 1980s to create those databases, we
wouldn't have the problem that we have today. But
unfortunately, there are several libertarian issues that arose
at the time, and people felt that the focus on the Cold War was
more important than a focus on this kind of unconventional war.
Sadly, we have learned the hard way that you cannot ignore
multiple threats, that the world is dangerous in multiple ways;
that our democracy is threatened and our values are threatened,
our people and resources are threatened in multiple ways. We
can't pay for it all, so we have to be smart. And in the past
mistakes have been made.
Mr. Cutler. I just wanted to respond quickly. I know we are
running long on time.
The administration has been doing these operations to
target airports and nuclear power plants, and I think we need
to. I mean, that should be a given if it is a secure facility.
But the idea of hiding in plain sight--you know, there was a
terrorist suspect who was arrested in Lodi, California, who was
driving an ice cream truck. That ice cream truck kept me awake
for a couple of weeks.
I spent half my career doing drug and terrorism
investigations, and much of what I did also involved
surveillance. When a bad guy gets into a car and drives for a
half hour to a parking lot and meets somebody else, you know he
has had a meeting. How many people approach an ice cream truck
on a hot afternoon? How hard would it be to slip a memory card
from a little PDA device into a $5 bill, pay for ice cream and
get another one in return? And those things can hold over a
gigabyte of data. There have been terrorist suspects driving
taxi cabs. The guy that was involved with terrorism in Canada
that drove a school bus, which gave him easy access to easily
persuadable children, young men.
So the problem is that if we focus on secure facilities,
two things have happened, in my judgment: Number one, we are
leaving out the broader potential that the bad guys are hiding
in plain sight. Somebody once said that a spy is somebody that
wouldn't attract the attention of a waitress in a greasy spoon
diner. The point of fact is it might well be that the waitress
or the waiter is the spy or the terrorist.
But the other thing is we have also given the other side a
playbook. Don't get a job in a nuclear power plant if you want
to stay under the radar, get a job selling hot dogs right
outside the gates of the nuclear power plant, and nobody will
pay attention to you.
The reality is that we need to have an immigration system
that has integrity. For far too long this has been a fragmented
effort. And one of the things I have testified at a few prior
hearings was about the structure of ICE versus CBP. And
literally it has been versus, where there have been barriers
erected, noncooperation and
[[Page 43]]
so forth. We need a seamless operation. And this needs to be
seen as a continuum, not simply if you get past the Border
Patrol, you are home free. It is kind of like trying to play
baseball and telling your outfielders not to bother showing up
in the outfield, hit the ball over the second baseman's head,
and you have got an in-the-park home run. And that is the way
immigration has been enforced and administered for far too
long.
And I would also ask, I don't know if procedurally this can
be done, but the GAO did a report that was issued on March 10th
of this year that addressed the issue of immigration benefit
fraud. And if we do everything possible on the border and made
the border completely impermeable, if we don't get to the issue
about how we give out residency and citizenship and do those
other things that constitute the benefits program, it would be
the same thing as a homeowner securing his house and putting
strong doors and locks on his windows and doors, and then
handing out the keys to anybody who walks by. So all the
efforts on the border will mean nothing if the immigration
system itself lacks integrity, in my judgment.
Mr. Simmons. I agree with you completely. Just again
referring back historically to the Soviet Union, Colonel Abel,
who was one of the KGB's most successful spies, came through
Canada, established himself as a photographer in Brooklyn, I
believe, for 7 years, and only after 7 years was activated, and
by that time he had established his bona fides. He was a member
of the community, et cetera, et cetera.
You know, sleepers commit espionage, sleepers commit
terrorist acts, and we need to be imaginative in how we go
about targeting these problems, because if we are not
imaginative, we will simply build that Great Wall of China,
take a look at it, say, well, you know, we have emptied the
Treasury, so therefore we have done everything we can do
because the Treasury is empty, we haven't spared a dollar, the
taxpayers have been decimated, and we have got this big wall,
but it doesn't work. Maginot Line bankrupted the French. Didn't
work. So the challenge is to apply economics and imagination,
as you have described, to the problem. And I thank you both for
your testimony. It has been very insightful.
And I would say that members of the committee who have
additional questions for the witnesses, we will ask them to
respond to these in writing. The hearing record will be held
open for 10 days.
Mr. Simmons. There being no further business, and without
objection, I thank the members of the third panel for their
excellent testimony, and the committee stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:26 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.
Questions for the Record
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