[House Hearing, 109 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
FEDERALISM AND DISASTER REPONSE:
EXAMINING THE ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF LOCAL, STATE AND FEDERAL
AGENCIES
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
OCTOBER 19, 2005
__________
Serial No. 109-46
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/
index.html
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COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Peter T. King, New York, Chairman
Don Young, Alaska Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Lamar S. Smith, Texas Loretta Sanchez, California
Curt Weldon, Pennsylvania Edward J. Markey, Massachusetts
Christopher Shays, Connecticut Norman D. Dicks, Washington
John Linder, Georgia Jane Harman, California
Mark E. Souder, Indiana Peter A. DeFazio, Oregon
Tom Davis, Virginia Nita M. Lowey, New York
Daniel E. Lungren, California Eleanor Holmes Norton, District of
Jim Gibbons, Nevada Columbia
Rob Simmons, Connecticut Zoe Lofgren, California
Mike Rogers, Alabama Sheila Jackson-Lee, Texas
Stevan Pearce, New Mexico Bill Pascrell, Jr., New Jersey
Katherine Harris, Florida Donna M. Christensen, U.S. Virgin
Bobby Jindal, Louisiana Islands
Dave G. Reichert, Washington Bob Etheridge, North Carolina
Michael McCaul, Texas James R. Langevin, Rhode Island
Charlie Dent, Pennsylvania Kendrick B. Meek, Florida
Ginny Brown-Waite, Florida
(II)
C O N T E N T S
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Page
STATEMENTS
The Honoralee Peter T. King, a Representative in Congress From
the State of New York, and Chairman, Committee on Homeland
Security....................................................... 1
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Mississippi, and Ranking Member, Committee on
Homeland Security.............................................. 2
The Honorable Donna M. Christensen, a Delegate in Congress From
the U.S. Virgin Islands........................................ 64
The Honorable Charlie Dent, a Representative in Congress From the
State of Pennsylvania.......................................... 56
The Honorable Norman D. Dicks, a Representative in Congress From
the State Washington........................................... 50
The Honorable Bob Etheridge, a Representative in Congress From
the State of North Carolina.................................... 66
The Honorable Jim Gibbons, a Representative in Congress From the
State of Nevada................................................ 63
The Honorable Katherine Harris, a Representative in Congress From
the Stte of Florida............................................ 12
The Honorable Sheila Jackson-Lee, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Texas:
Prepared Statement............................................. 14
The Honorable Nita M. Lowey, a Representative in Congress From
the State of New York.......................................... 53
The Honorable Daniel E. Lungren, a Representative in Congress
From the State of California................................... 60
The Honorable Michael McCaul, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Texas............................................. 13
The Honorable Kendrick B. Meek, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Florida........................................... 67
The Honorable Eleanor Holmes Norton, a Delegate in Congress From
the District of Columbia....................................... 56
The Honorable Bill Pascrell, Jr., a Representative in Congress
From the State of New Jersey................................... 62
The Honorable Stevan Pearce, a Representative in Congress From
the State of New Mexico........................................ 65
The Honorable Ted Poe, a Representative in Congress From the
State of Texas................................................. 67
The Honorable Dave G. Reichert, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Washington........................................ 58
The Honorable Loretta Sanchez, a Representative in Congress From
the State of California........................................ 45
The Honorable Lamar S. Smith, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Texas............................................. 12
Witnesses
Panel I
The Honorable Jeb Bush, Governor, State of Florida:
Oral Statement................................................. 18
Prepared Statement............................................. 19
The Honorable Rick Perry, Governor, State of Texas:
Oral Statement................................................. 30
Prepared Statement............................................. 31
The Honorable Janet Napolitano, Governor, State of Arizona:
Oral Statement................................................. 32
Prepared Statement............................................. 38
Panel II
The Honorable Roberts Eckels, County Judge, Harris County, Texas:
Prepared Statement............................................. 68
The Honorable David G. Wallace, Mayor, City of Sugar Land, Texas:
Oral Statement................................................. 76
Prepared Statement............................................. 79
The Honorable Audwin M. Samuel, Mayor Pro Tem, City of Beaumont,
Texas:
Oral Statement................................................. 86
Prepared Statement............................................. 88
For the Record
The Honorable Billy Broomfield, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Mississippi:
Prepared Statement............................................. 4
The Honorable Johnny L. Dupree, Mayor, Hattiesburg, Mississippi:
Prepared Statement............................................. 3
The Honorable Vivian Juan-Saunders, Chairwoman, Tohono O'Odham
Nation-Arizona:
Prepared Statement............................................. 34
The Honorable Oscar G. Ortiz:
Letter.........................................................
16
EXAMINING THE ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF LOCAL, STATE AND FEDERAL
AGENCIES
----------
Wednesday, October 19, 2005
U.S. House of Representatives,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:14 a.m., in Room
345, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Peter T. King [chairman
of the committee] presiding.
Present: Representatives King, Smith, Linder, Lungren,
Gibbons, Simmons, Pearce, Harris, Reichert, McCaul, Dent,
Brown-Waite, Thompson, Sanchez, Markey, Dicks, Harman, DeFazio,
Lowey, Norton, Lofgren, Jackson-Lee, Pascrell, Christensen,
Etheridge, Langevin and Meek.
Also present: Representative Poe.
Chairman King. Good morning. The Committee on Homeland
Security will come to order. The committee is meeting today to
hear testimony on federalism and disaster response, examining
the respective roles and responsibilities of local, State and
Federal agencies. And we are very privileged to have with us
an--actually both panels of absolute ultimate expert witnesses
as to confronting the hazards of nature, and, as Governor Bush
unfortunately knows, perhaps confronting another, you know,
terrible storm within the next several days. And it is
especially appropriate that we have this certainly in the
aftermath of Katrina and Rita, and now with another storm
coming to Florida this weekend, it is essential.
I believe that the committee should consider the whole
issue of what the appropriate Federal response should be, what
the obligations of State and local governments are, and how it
is best to make this combination work. Obviously, your States
have dealt with the wildfires and flash floods, mammoth
hurricanes, tornados, and it is really the real-life experience
that you can bring to the hearing today that we are really
looking forward to.
I also want to say especially to Governor Bush and Governor
Perry to thank you for what your States have done in helping
other States. Many people from Louisiana who have gone into
Texas, and almost half a million Louisiana residents are now in
the State of Texas; the fact that the Florida National Guard
was so quick to go into Mississippi during Katrina really, I
think, speaks volumes and shows that all of us are in this
together.
And I know I speak on behalf of all the members of the
committee when we talk about the tremendous sorrow and
destruction that was caused in Harris County, in Beaumont and
Sugarland by Rita. And, Governor Perry, also I know Judge
Eckels and Mayor Wallace and Audwin Samuel on the next panel, I
really want to commend you for your dedication and hard work in
recent weeks.
And, of course, Governor Napolitano, it seems as a New
Yorker--by the way, we lost Governor Napolitano from New York
many years ago, and so it is good to have you back at least for
today. You and I can sort of talk the same language even though
you have lost most of your good accent. But we do see you with
the wildfires in Arizona, what you have to confront, and it is
again the fact that all of you are here today is very
significant.
To me there are a number of issues we have to look into,
and that is the extent of the Federal response, what it should
be; what the role of the Federal Government should be ensuring
that local governments are coordinated, that they are making
adequate use of Federal funds, that there are plans in place at
the State and local level to be coordinated with the Federal
Government; and what role, if any, should the Federal
Government play in addition to what it does today.
I know the President has discussed the possibility of the
greater use of the military. All of that, I believe, should be
part of the hearing today.
I--because of the caliber of our witnesses today, I am
keeping my opening statement short. I will ask to have it
inserted into the record. But I do want to get directly to the
testimony of our witnesses because it is so important. And the
first witness will be Governor Bush of Florida, and
Congresswoman Harris has asked to make a few remarks
introducing the Governor. Oh, I am sorry. The distinguished
Ranking Member from Mississippi Mr. Thompson.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you very much. I look forward to the
testimony. If you can give me about 5 minutes, we will get to
it.
Chairman King. The Ranking Member can have as much as he
wants.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Welcome to
our panel.
I, too, am interested in federalism and Federal response
that we, as a government, should adequately do. In the past 2
months, Hurricanes Katrina and Rita have devastated much of the
gulf coast of Alabama, Louisiana, Texas and my home State of
Mississippi. I am always impressed by the spirit and resolve of
the American people in a crisis. Faced with unthinkable
circumstances, we saw many acts of heroism and compassion by
first responders and average citizens. However, both hurricanes
left us with many questions on our Nation's preparedness and
the role the Federal Government must play in disaster response.
Our Federal Government failed the American people, who they
were here to protect and serve, by not facilitating an
organized and adequate response. As a former volunteer
firefighter and local official, I know that response should be
local, and the folks in Washington, D.C., sometimes forget that
the Federal Government is here to make our communities as
strong and as robust as they need to be. That means stepping up
to the plate when communities are overwhelmed with natural
disasters of national significance.
I have spoken to local officials, mayors, firefighters and
police throughout the Gulf coast, and have uniformly discussed
the dysfunction and disconnects between the Federal Government
and our first responder communities. I have here several
statements, Mr. Chairman, I would like to have entered into the
record: the mayor of Hattiesburg, Mississippi, Mayor Johnny
Dupree; State representative Billy Broomfield. I have also
testimony from the Tahono Nation in Arizona that I would like
to also inject into the record.
Chairman King. Without objection.
[The information follows:]
FOR THE RECORD
Prepared Statement of Mayor Johnny L. Dupree
As the Mayor of the City of Hattiesburg, Mississippi, a city about
70 miles from the Mississippi Gulf Coast, I witnessed first-hand the
impact that a storm of Katrina's magnitude could have on an in-land
community and the effect that massive numbers of evacuees could have on
a city without proper federal and state disaster support.
The single most important thing I discovered after Katrina was that
FEMA and state officials have not thought enough about how to support
cities that are near enough to the scene of a natural disaster to be
somewhat affected by it, but also far enough away that they will be a
location to which large numbers of evacuees flee.
Hattiesburg suffered damage from Katrina--including widespread loss
of power and communications. Additionally, as the first major city in
Mississippi north of the Coast, we were a prime location for evacuees
to flee. As a result, even as our city's infrastructure suffered from
Katrina itself, we were faced with trying to help thousands of people
in the worst of conditions.
Although FEMA officials bragged about the way they had pre-
positioned supplies before the storm's impact, I found that the
materials we needed to help thousands of evacuees in the first crucial
days after Katrina's landfall were not available. It does not seem that
FEMA did a good job pre-positioning supplies to help communities
directly on the Coast, but it certainly did not do a good job pre-
positioning supplies for in-land locations that would house massive
numbers of evacuees.
Federal and state officials also failed to properly accept requests
for resources or to monitor them once made. We would request items
without always receiving a response as to whether they would be
delivered. Sometimes items we requested would just show up without any
notice they were arriving, which made it difficult to distribute them.
In other cases, resources arrived very late. We requested 50
portapotties a day after Katrina struck, but we did not receive them
until 3 weeks later when we did not really need them anymore.
Additionally, federal and state officials did not have an effective
means for local officials to report the damage they were observing.
Instead, these federal and state officials were often working in areas
that were not necessarily the greatest in need.
In addition to correcting these problems, I believe there are two
other key things that can be done to improve federal and state response
and coordination in a disaster.
First, in the case of potential natural disasters we know are
coming, such as a Category III or above hurricane approaching, there
needs to be a genuine FEMA decision-maker on the ground ahead of time
in communities that can be directly affected or that will be sites for
evacuees. The FEMA official sent to Hattiesburg before Katrina struck
could do little more than help us answer telephones.
Second, the federal government needs to work more with state and
local officials to develop evacuation plans for communities and the
regions in which they are located, as well as the responsibilities for
each of these levels of government in case the plan must be
implemented. The Ranking Member of the Committee, Representative Bennie
Thompson, has introduced legislation that would assist in evacuation
planning, and I wholeheartedly endorse his proposal.
Thank you for accepting my testimony.
Prepared Statement of the Hon. Billy Broomfield
As the Mississippi State Representative representing Moss Point,
Mississippi, a town in Jackson County along the Mississippi Gulf Coast,
I witnessed first hand the devastation caused by Hurricane Katrina and
the lack of coordination by federal, state and other first responders
afterwards.
If I were to recommend a single thing that federal and state
officials could do to better improve response to a disaster, it would
be establish ongoing communications with local officials before and
after the disaster occurs to the greatest extent possible.
By ``local officials,'' I do not just mean the mayor or local head
of emergency services. I believe disaster response efforts could also
be well served if state and federal officials better worked with state
representatives like me, along with city councilpeople, sheriffs,
county supervisors, and others. We know our communities very well, and
after a disaster, we are often the officials that are contacted for
help by people who cannot find it elsewhere. I will give several
examples of the problems I witnessed, and what could have been done
differently if state and federal officials had contacted me.
Although I represent several predominantly African American
neighborhoods severely affected by the storm, I did not personally see
any Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) officials until the
Sunday almost a week after the Katrina struck. They were taking
photographs of some destroyed residences along the waterfront, which
struck me as a poor use of resources at the time considering there were
several neighborhoods further from the beach that had severely damaged
buildings that were still capable of being saved if help arrived
quickly. If FEMA had returned any of my calls prior to then, or reached
out to me on its own, I could have told the agency what neighborhoods
could best be helped.
FEMA and the Red Cross's initial disaster response offices nearest
Moss Point were located near the interstate, a long way from many of
the minority and other neighborhoods severely affected by Katrina. When
I held a meeting with the Red Cross in an African American neighborhood
in order to discuss whether a new office could be located nearby in
order to better serve the area, FEMA did not attend even though its
officials were invited.
Pascagoula, Mississippi, which is near Moss Point, had a Navy
hospital ship docked nearby for several days after the hurricane.
According to the ship's commanding officer, it had treated 3,000 people
since the storm. However, while I was on the ship discussing efforts
with the commanding officer to bus in many of my constituents who still
needed medical care, he received orders to move the ship. Apparently
state officials had told the Navy the ship was no longer needed. I was
standing right there--I could have told the federal or state officials
making these decisions that it was still desperately needed.
In the days after Katrina struck, there were also numerous
volunteer doctors and other medical professionals who came to Moss
Point to help, but were turned away for various reasons, such as being
told that their medical licenses were not good for working in
Mississippi. We desperately needed this help at the time. I am sure
that state and federal officials could have worked out these problems
if they had been willing to communicate better with one another or
other elected officials, like myself, who could have encouraged the
appropriate state authorities to provide whatever waivers were
necessary.
Even now, more than six weeks after Hurricane Katrina struck, I
have not been able to get any FEMA officials to return my calls. I have
received numerous questions and complaints from my constituents about
everything from mobile home availability to the level at which their
house needs to be rebuilt to qualify for loans for rebuilding. I could
serve as a valuable tool for FEMA to communicate with many of these
victims of the hurricane--if the agency would just return my call.
Yesterday, I asked for Representative Bennie Thompson's help to get
FEMA to contact me. While I appreciate Mr. Thompson's assistance, it
should not have been necessary for a Congressman to intervene to get my
calls returned.
Finally, in addition to better reaching out to local officials
before and after a disaster, I also believe that FEMA and other federal
agencies could be of valuable assistance helping local communities,
like Moss Point, develop and test evacuation plans. If Hurricane
Katrina had struck my town head on, I am not sure that we would have
adequately evacuated all our at-risk citizens ahead of time.
Representative Thompson has introduced legislation requiring FEMA to
help local communities with evacuation planning, and I wholeheartedly
support this effort.
Thank you for accepting my testimony.
Mr. Thompson. The Federal Government has the ability,
assets and responsibility to help State and local governments
respond to major disasters that overwhelm or threaten to
overwhelm their resources. Anyone who has been a local official
knows that it is absurd for the Federal Government to sit back
and watch our towns struggle to respond to disasters of
national significance. Indeed, the National Response Plan
clearly lays out what assistance the Federal Government and DHS
are expected to provide in the case of a catastrophic event.
Mr. Chairman, I also have a copy of the DOD severe weather
order that I would like to also enter into the record.
Chairman King. Without objection, it will be part of the
record.
[The information follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Thompson. With Hurricane Wilma potentially looming over
the gulf coast, I am concerned.
I look forward to hearing from the witnesses here today
about how we can improve a broken system and ensure that State
and local communities are protected whether from a natural
disaster or a terrorist threat.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I look forward to the
testimony.
Chairman King. Thank you, Mr. Thompson.
And now, without any more delay.
Ms. Harris. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you very much. I
am grateful to have been afforded the honor of introducing to
this committee a man whose disciplined leadership and
innovative governance have placed him in a league of his own.
As Florida's 43rd Governor, Jeb Bush has developed a well-
earned repetition as a common-sense manager armed with uncommon
and noble ability to steer his ship of state through the most
trying of times. As a Floridian it is with respectful pride
that I call him Governor. As an individual it is with an equal
level of honor that I call him friend.
Prior to the truest test of leadership skills, Winston
Churchill noted even ordinary life and business involve the
encountering of unknown factors and require some effort of the
imagination, some stress of the soul to overcome them. In the
course of his two terms in governance in office, Governor Bush
has proven eminently qualified to exert an effort of the
imagination and a stress of the soul. This prosperity was
maintained even in the face of the destructively active 2004
hurricane season in which four devastating storms, including
three of which hitting my district directly, challenged
residents and public officials alike. Yet Florida was able to
retain its position as the top travel destination in the world
and as the Nation's number one State in job growth for the past
3 years. This resilience was needed.
Even with Hurricane Wilma approaching and through seven
hurricanes, two tropical storms in the past 13 months, Governor
Bush and his administration have displayed the qualities which
I believe distinguish them as an emergency response team
without peer. The lessons learned through congressional
hearings and media reports echo what we as Floridians already
know: Florida can serve the Nation as a model for State
response to emergency situations. As the Governor of South
Carolina stated when asked what he would do if his State was
threatened by a hurricane he said, call Jeb.
Thank you Mr. Chairman.
Chairman King. I thank the gentlelady.
And now Congressman Smith will introduce Governor Perry.
Mr. Smith. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chairman, before I get to the formal introduction, let
me say that in my judgment, not many elected officials emerged
from the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina as genuine heroes, but
I believe that Governor Perry is a hero given his actions after
that hurricane. Texas welcomed hundreds of thousands of
evacuees. Governor Perry immediately committed the State's
resources to make them feel welcome, and he did so not knowing
where those resources were going to come from, only knowing
that we had to help, and for that, as I say, I think he
deserves to be called a genuine hero.
Rick Perry was sworn in as the State's 47th Governor on
December 21, 2000. Prior to that he was Lieutenant Governor and
also served two terms as Texas Commissioner of Agriculture.
From 1985 to 1991, he served in the Texas House of
Representatives representing a rural west Texas district.
Between 1972 and 1977, Governor Perry served in the United
States Air Force, flying C-130 tactical airlift aircraft in the
United States, Europe and the Middle East. He is a 1972
graduate of Texas A&M University, where he was a member of the
Corps of Cadets.
Governor Perry grew up in the small community of Paint
Creek, 60 miles north of Abilene, on his family's farm and
ranch. Rick and Anita Perry are the parents of two adult
children.
Mr. Chairman, thank you again for the opportunity to
introduce the Governor of the largest State that does not
consist of ice, Governor Rick Perry.
Chairman King. Since Texas always tries to be twice as big
as everyone else, Congressman McCaul wants to say a few words.
Mr. McCaul. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
It is an honor to share in the introduction. And first I
would like to say as accustomed as Texans are to bragging, I
would like to brag a little bit about my Governor. You know,
they say crisis brings out true leadership, and I think we saw
that with this Governor. After the tragic events of Katrina, he
welcomed nearly a quarter of a million of his neighbors to his
home State, gave them clothes, food, shelter. It was the right
thing to do, it was the compassionate thing to do, and I was
proud to be a Texan.
I remember visiting the emergency operation center when the
Vice President came to Austin, and we went over the plan of
what would happen if a Katrina hit the Gulf, the State of
Texas. And they showed us these computer models of how it would
literally cover the island of Galveston and flood Houston.
Little did we know that about a week later we would be faced
with that very threat. Fortunately it did not hit the most
populated area of Texas, but fortunately the Governor
implemented the evacuation plans along with the State and local
officials. He did federalize the National Guard, and remarkably
there was no direct loss of life due to the hurricane.
My grandfather survived the 1900 Galveston hurricane. They
found him in a tree. He climbed to the top of the tree, and he
was rescued from that tree. Ten thousand people died in that
hurricane.
I think the fact that we survived with no one losing their
life in that instance is a real tribute to your leadership, and
I am proud that you are my Governor, and I am proud to call you
my friend. Thank you.
Chairman King. Mr. McCaul, I don't know if the gentlelady
from Texas has recovered from Monday night's baseball game yet,
but if she has and would like to make some remarks, she is
recognized.
Ms. Jackson-Lee. Mr. Chairman, first of all, it is
certainly an honor to share this podium with you as the new
Chairman of the Homeland Security Committee, along with a very
stellar and outstanding Ranking Member. I expect great work
that we will proceed with.
Governor Perry, you have to defend me. Obviously we know
that both of us share the dream of go Astros, but with my
colleagues, let me acknowledge all three of the Governors and
specifically point to Hurricane Rita.
I want to say to my colleagues that Texas was blessed and
we are blessed even to be able to share our lives with
Hurricane Katrina survivors. The Governor has opened up our
home to them. I thank you for that. But watching the work that
we were able to do together during Hurricane Rita, you in
Austin and those of us at the transfer center, let me thank you
for respecting the work of Mayor Bill White and Judge Robert
Eckels and all of the local officials for the work that they
did. I think if there is a stellar comment to be made about the
work of the Governor's office and our local community was that
we, you, worked with them and their leadership. Let me thank
you, and we look forward to your testimony.
Chairman King. I thank the gentlelady.
The Ranking Member.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I am happy
to introduce Governor Napolitano from Arizona. She comes, as
you know, with sterling credentials. She is Vice Chair of the
NGA. She has made it her career to be a person of the people.
We are excited to have her. We had an opportunity to have
conversation earlier. I look forward to it.
We want to welcome you. The camaraderie, Governor, you see
here this morning, we do this every day. There is never a cross
word on this committee. And so we look forward to the
testimony.
And, Mr. Chairman, if I might, I want to yield the balance
of my time to the gentlewoman from California.
Chairman King. The gentlelady is recognized.
Ms. Sanchez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I thank my great
colleague from the State of Mississippi, and I, too, want to
welcome a good friend, Governor Napolitano from Arizona, as a
daughter of parents who grew up on the Douglas, Arizona, and
Nogales border, with plenty of family in Kearney and Tucson and
Mesa and every place you can imagine in Arizona. I have had the
pleasure of being out there to hear your people and how much
they love you. And we love you also. We are glad that you are
here, and we look forward to your testimony.
I also want to add that this Governor's State is one of
only three States that has an accredited program in the
emergency area.
So we look forward to hearing your testimony this morning,
Governor.
Chairman King. For those of you who didn't get to make
introductory statements, you will know that opening remarks can
be inserted into the record.
[The information follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Sheila Jackson-Lee
I thank the Gentleman from New York, the Chairman, and the
Gentleman from Mississippi, the Ranking Member for holding this very
necessary hearing today. The distinguished panel of witnesses will
afford me a unique opportunity given that my District in Houston,
Texas, represents a significant stakeholder with respect to both
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita respectively. Prior to Hurricane Katrina,
never a disaster caused such a massive displacement of a U.S.
population. Furthermore, never has the United States seen so vividly
the exposure and vulnerability of displaced persons--primarily the
poor, the infirm, and the elderly. We know from experience that
disasters take their greatest toll on the disenfranchised, but the
distressing television images of our citizens stranded without basic
human necessities and exposed to human waste, toxins, and physical
violence awakened the public health community to a frightening
realization: given the ineffective response mechanisms that were in
place, Katrina could become a public health catastrophe.
The Homeland Security Act of 2002 established DHS to: prevent
terrorist attacks within the United States; reduce the vulnerability of
the United States to terrorism, natural disasters, and other
emergencies; and minimize the damage and assist in the recovery from
terrorist attacks, natural disasters, and other emergencies. The act
also designates DHS as ``a focal point regarding natural and manmade
crises and emergency planning.'' Poor response time, leadership,
competency levels, and recognition of the central needs of the people
illustrate the fact that this Administration simply failed at
implementing the Homeland Security Act and its legislative intent. All
the finger-pointing in the world will not bring back the individuals
who have perished as a direct result of the acts or the failure to act
by the government in connection with the administration of disaster
relief for Katrina and Rita.
Relative to the border emergency that occurred at the Arizona-
Mexico border, the Administration's failure to maintain or to restore
dollars to Arizona's emergency medical response system proved
detrimental when the state had to respond to this situation. The U.S.
border with Mexico is some 2,000 miles long, with more than 800,000
people arriving from Mexico daily and more than 4 million commercial
crossings annually--clearly, this Administration was on notice that
funding cuts would adversely affect prevention of the kind of emergency
situation that befell Arizona.
Local school districts are not under the jurisdiction of the City
or County government. Even though FEMA, the City/County are assisting
evacuees with housing, other than school districts making classroom
space available, there is no coordinated effort to see to it that
children's education continues. The record-keeping is inadequate, and
it is presumed that many of the Katrina evacuee school-aged children
are not enrolled. We must immediately find ways in which the federal
government can assist with communication when issues cross
jurisdictional lines.
Following Katrina, the American Red Cross used the Reliant
Astrodome as a shelter. A shelter at the George R. Brown Convention
Center was set up by the City of Houston with the help o faith-based
organizations. Voluntary relief organizations were quickly included.
Red Cross opened many smaller shelters across the region. However,
there were times that no one had a complete list of open shelters. At
the same time, the faith-based community generously opened their doors
to evacuees. There is no single entity or resource that these
organizations could turn to for information or for help. The federal
government has a role in coordination, but it seems limited at this
point. This body must hold a separate hearing in order to revisit the
scope of this role and to assess whether additional statutory or other
regulatory responsibility should be crafted.
As Co-Chair of the Congressional Children's Caucus, it continues to
trouble me that my District's Head Start providers have classroom space
and funding to accommodate most of the evacuee's children; however,
there is no direct liaison to help identify the students who need
enrollment. One of our Head Start representatives on the ground in
Houston expressed an interest in receiving training on how to prepare
for a natural disaster as well as policy briefings on suggested
disaster response procedures. These issues are part of the evidence
that our preparedness is severely lacking.
A letter from the Honorable Mayor Oscar Ortiz of the City of Port
Arthur accurately states the problem that we face:
[We have been told that local jurisdictions are responsible for
much of this care; however, we do not think it is realistic to believe
that local jurisdictions can provide the quality of care needed for
hundreds, even thousands, of evacuees for an extended period of time.]
Today, we must let the record reflect that local jurisdictions need
help, and they need it to be in place quickly and in adequate fashion!
Mr. Chairman, Mr. Ranking Member, again, I thank you and the panel
of witnesses for their time, and I hope that the record created today
will aid us in fixing the many problems that hinder our ability to
adequately respond to both natural disasters in addition to terrorist
attacks. I yield back.
[The information follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Chairman King. And due to our time constraints today, we
will need to move immediately to testimony from our witnesses.
The Chair now recognizes the Governor of Florida, Governor Jeb
Bush. And also if the witnesses can try to keep their remarks
to 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE JEB BUSH, GOVERNOR, STATE OF FLORIDA
Governor Bush. You bet. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Congresswoman Harris, Congressman Meek, Congresswoman Brown-
Waite, it is a delight to be with you all. The last time I was
at this committee, I believe this same committee was convened
in New York City after September 11, 2001, and we came to share
the response at the local and State level to the attack on our
homeland. And as I reflect back on that meeting, many of the
same lessons learned from four hurricanes, three--excuse me,
seven hurricanes now, two tropical storms and a hurricane that
is approaching our State, over the last 13-1/2 months apply.
The resources that local governments and State governments
apply to emergencies have a direct, positive benefit to
protecting our homeland as well, and so it is a joy to be here
to talk about something that is important for the safety of our
citizenry and also, I think, for the protection of our country.
I have prepared remarks, but this morning when I woke up at
4:00 to fly up here, I turned on the Weather Channel, which
now, unfortunately, I seem to do more often than not, and I saw
that Hurricane Wilma, the W storm--we are going to the Greek
alphabet next--now a Category 5 storm, and in all likelihood
will hit either the Florida Keys or southwest Florida hopefully
not at Category 5 force by Saturday. So perhaps rather than
tell you kind of in the esoteric or the abstract why this is
important, maybe I can tell you what I have done this morning.
The emergency operation center in Tallahassee has been
activated. It will be working by tomorrow 24 hours-a-day. So
have the emergency operations centers of all of the impacted
areas from Tampa Bay on the southwest coast down to Collier
County, as well as Monroe County. By 12:00 today, because we
have our protocols established, uniquely depending on each
county, evacuations, mandatory evacuations, will occur for
visitors in the Florida Keys at noon today. We have contractual
arrangements with every hospital in the State for them to
evacuate when they are required to do so, and that process will
begin in the Florida Keys by 1:00 today. Transport will be
provided by the Florida National Guard, and emergency room
service will be available for the Keys should a storm hit
there. Other places will evacuate probably by Friday.
Our special needs shelters, which we have expanded
dramatically in the last 2 years, will be staffed in advance by
dedicated public health nurses. We have learned lessons from
the previous storms that it is important to pre-stage people.
If we need to bring them in by Chinook helicopters, we have
actually contracted already with the North Carolina National
Guard to have Chinook helicopters be made available, so that we
can have an immediate massive response to make sure that we
save lives, as well as bring the recovery as quickly as
possible to our State.
We have pre-staged ice and water in trucks that we control,
that we contract with, in our own warehouses so that we can--
and we have created actually--because of lessons learned, we
now have points of distribution that we have designed for
maximum through--put. We brought in logistics experts from the
private sector to teach us how to do this. If Wal-Mart can do
it, why can't the government do it is kind of the question that
I have been asking for the last 6 months, and, in fact, we can.
So within 24 hours our hope is, depending on the magnitude of
this storm, that in the impacted areas, in the pre-staged, pre-
planned places and selected places designed and selected by the
communities themselves, we will have points of distribution to
provide water and ice and food and tarps for the residents of
these impacted areas.
We have pet shelters now, because we heard from our
citizens that they weren't leaving unless there was a place to
take their beloved pets as well. And so those will be activated
beginning probably tomorrow.
This will be done in a joint command, by the way, with the
FEMA representative in our State and our very able emergency
management director making these decisions together. And you
know, I have watched TV like the rest of America about the
response to the storms of this year. I can tell you one thing.
I appreciate FEMA's ability to work with States and communities
that are prepared and take this as a serious enterprise. We
have never had a problem with FEMA responding in preparation
for storms. There are things that we can all do better and FEMA
can certainly do better as it relates to processing all of the
voluminous paperwork that Governor Perry's State and community
and our States have to go through when there is a disaster.
They can do a better job in a lot of different ways. But we
appreciate the Federal response, and we appreciate the
seamlessness of it, and if you were in Tallahassee today, you
would see that the seamlessness works.
And so I would urge you not to lose the bottom-up approach
to preparing and providing relief for the citizens of our
country. If this process is federalized, the innovation, the
creativity, the sense of responsibility, the passion for
service would subside, and the local knowledge that makes it
more effective.
I appreciate the chance to come, and I hope that you will
be praying for the residents of the southwest coast of our
State in the next few days as they prepare for the big storm
that is coming.
Chairman King. Thank you very much, Governor Bush.
[The statement of Governor Bush follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Jeb Bush
Thank you, Mr. Chairman and distinguished Members of the Committee
for allowing me to speak before you today. I appreciate the opportunity
to share with you some of Florida's learned lessons with emergency
management and also provide you with some thoughts on how the federal
response system could be enhanced.
Florida learned a hard lesson about response and recovery after
Andrew, a Category 5 hurricane, which stormed through South Florida in
August of 1992. Hurricane Andrew was the most destructive of hurricanes
in the United States. It was responsible for many deaths and caused
$26.5 billion in damages. That catastrophic storm was a wake-up call
for all Floridians.
The improvements and investments made in the years since Andrew are
the reason Florida was able to effectively respond to seven hurricanes
and three tropical storms affecting our state in the past 14 months
(Hurricanes Charlie, Frances, Ivan, Jeanne, Dennis, Katrina, Rita and
Tropical Storms Bonnie, Ophelia, Tammy) and is able to help our
neighboring states in their time of need. We continue to learn lessons
from our experiences and improve our system after each disaster.
This is why I can say with certainty that federalizing emergency
response to catastrophic events would be a disaster as bad as Hurricane
Katrina. The current system works when everyone understands, accepts
and is willing to fulfill their responsibilities. Florida's system can
be successful in states throughout the nation, without the federal
government stepping on state's rights.
In fact, when local and state governments understand and follow
emergency plans appropriately, less taxpayer money is needed from the
federal government for relief. Cities, counties, states, the federal
government and we as Americans need to accept responsibility for these
disasters and learn our lessons. More importantly, if we do not apply
the lessons learned to future disasters, the problems will continue to
snowball and the disasters will become more costly--in the number of
lives and the number of dollars.
Lesson learned: the bottom-up approach yields the best results.
Just as all politics are local, so are all disasters. The most
effective response is one that starts at the local level and grows with
the support of surrounding communities, the state and then the federal
government. The bottom-up approach yields the best and quickest
results--saving lives, protecting property and getting life back to
normal as soon as possible.
Craig Fugate, our able Director of Emergency Management, says,
``Response can be quick, cheap or perfect--pick one.'' Florida invests
substantial funding in planning and training for disasters so our
response is as efficient as it can be when preparing for the unknown.
But when a disaster strikes, our focus is on speed. Our goal is to
respond quickly to needs of our citizens. Because our cities and state
have a solid plan in place, our response capabilities are able to
better serve our residents.
Although we remember a lot of destruction and damage from last
year's unprecedented hurricane season, we also remember how Floridians
united and worked as a team to overcome a crisis. County emergency
directors, law enforcement officers and first responders remained on
the job even after losing their own homes. After each storm, many of
our doctors, nurses and health care workers left their own families to
care for the hundreds of displaced residents in general and special
needs shelters. Despite the impact the storms had on their own homes
and families, these selfless individuals gave security, comfort and
care to others in a time of need. Throughout all the storms, I was
proud to be governor and witness first-hand how the worst of times
brought out the best in Floridians.
The current emergency response system plays to the strengths of
each level of government. The federal government cannot replicate or
replace the sense of purpose and urgency that unites communities
working to help their families, friends and neighbors in the aftermath
of a disaster. If the federal government removes control of
preparation, relief and recovery from cities and states, those cities
and states will lose the interest, innovation and zeal for emergency
response that has made Florida's response system better than it was a
decade ago.
Local officials should be responsible for emergency management;
however, the federal government also plays an important role. The
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) should serve as a conduit to
the tremendous resources available at the federal level. For example,
communities may not have the expertise or wherewithal to provide
temporary housing to thousands of displaced residents. It makes sense
for FEMA to coordinate a temporary housing plan that can be implemented
anywhere a disaster may happen in our country.
The federal government is capable of providing access to equipment,
manpower, programs and funds to meet the large, but temporary needs
created by a catastrophic disaster. FEMA can also provide an invaluable
service to state and local communities by coordinating the federal
response to disasters. Knowing where to get help, especially in the
maze of the big federal bureaucracy, ensures quick and effective
results in the impacted area.
Lesson learned: a successful response depends on teamwork and a clear
command structure.
Florida's emergency response team is made up of numerous agencies
at all levels of government, charitable and faith-based organizations
and private sector businesses. Members of the Florida National Guard
and state law enforcement officers work side-by-side with local
policemen and firemen. Volunteers with the Red Cross and Salvation Army
join local community organizations, volunteer groups and churches,
synagogues and mosques to provide aid and comfort to those in need.
Hospitals, nursing homes and power companies are among the many
business partners in our disaster planning, response and recovery. Once
a storm is forecast for landfall in Florida, these groups put their
disaster response-and-recovery plans into high gear.
Florida's team is led by a unified command, a partnership between
the state and federal government to coordinate efforts, share
resources, make decisions and provide direction with one voice. During
a disaster, I designate Craig Fugate, Director of Emergency Management,
to serve as the chief coordinating officer of our state response. I
delegate statutory authority to him so he can do his job effectively
and report directly to me. He works with all of the agencies in a way
that fosters respect and loyalty. Perhaps more importantly, his
colleagues, even those who may technically ``outrank'' him in our state
bureaucracy, understand his role and support our mission as a team.
Last year, FEMA designated Bill Carwile as the chief federal
coordinating officer. Together, Craig and Bill, and all the officials
from local offices to federal offices, worked as one, unified team and
as a result, did a phenomenal job helping the people of Florida.
Lesson learned: local and state governments that fail to prepare are
preparing to fail.
Natural disasters are chaotic situations. But with proper
preparation and planning, it is possible--as we in Florida have
proved--to restore order, quickly alleviate the suffering of those
affected, and get on the road to recovery. In Florida, we plan for the
worst, hope for the best and expect the unexpected.
Because critical response components are best administered at the
local level, planning for disasters and emergencies also begins at the
local level. In Florida, each county and municipality has a plan that
covers every aspect of emergency management--before, during and after a
disaster. Our year-round planning anticipates the needs and challenges
of each community--well before a storm makes landfall.
To ensure an efficient evacuation, plans to reverse traffic along
major interstates, called contra-flow, have been developed and modeled
where feasible. Shelters that provide medical care for the sick and
elderly take reservations long before a storm starts brewing. Since
1999, Florida has been successful in reducing the deficit of hurricane
shelter space by more than 50 percent. Twelve Florida counties now
demonstrate a surplus of public hurricane shelter space. Due to
retrofitting existing schools and public facilities, capacity within
shelters is approximately 764,170 and by next year, shelter capacity
will grow to 816,778 spaces.
Practicing the plan is also important. We hold several statewide
tabletop exercises a year to test the plan under different scenarios
and most local governments do the same. Our first responders meet
annually at the largest hurricane conference in the country to share
new and innovative ways to respond to emergencies. Since Hurricanes
Katrina and Rita, emergency managers from Broward, Miami-Dade, and the
Tampa region have briefed federal officials and me, reviewed plans, and
identified ways to improve our local and state response system. After
each storm, wildfire, drought, flood, other disaster or exercise, we
hold a ``hotwash'' to discuss what went right and wrong. This is an
important part of the cycle that continually allows us to improve.
Lesson learned: a successful response requires strong communication and
coordination.
When a serious storm threatens our state, the State Emergency
Operations Center, the National Hurricane Center, regional weather
services, state agencies and county emergency managers conduct numerous
conference calls to share information, identify needs and plan the
response. To ensure people get out of harm's way in a safe and orderly
manner, counties coordinate with each other and issue evacuation orders
in phases. Additionally, some counties provide shelters for other
counties.
Communicating with the public is also important before a storm is
forecast and after a storm makes landfall. One of the messages we
frequently tell Floridians is that a storm is not just a skinny black
line on the hurricane tracking map, meaning hurricanes do not only
affect a small forecasted area, but a very vast area, so all residents
need to be prepared. In communicating this and other messages, people
listen and heed the directions of their trusted leaders. Providing
accurate information immediately before and after a storm reassures
citizens that its government is responding to their plight.
Lesson learned: the state needs to support_not supplant_local efforts.
The leadership of the Florida state government meets regularly as a
team to ensure each agency has an emergency response plan that can be
executed in the event of a disaster. Each agency plays a role in
preparing, responding and mitigating disasters.
Florida's Department of Health, in coordination with federal, state
and local officials, mobilize the Disaster Medical Assistance Teams
(DMAT) to provide medical care in the aftermath of the storm. Our
Department of Health also works together with the Department of Elder
Affairs to ensure special needs shelters are open and prepared to care
for Florida's most vulnerable citizens. Following the storm, our
healthcare agencies work together to transition patients, veterans and
the elderly from shelters to stable, long-term care facilities.
The Agency for Health Care Administration works with hospitals,
nursing homes and assisted living facilities to assist in evacuation
and relocation of sick and injured patients. The agency allows
pharmacies to refill prescriptions early to ensure residents, including
those on Medicaid, have medication to treat chronic illnesses such as
diabetes, hypertension and heart conditions.
Natural disasters can be very stressful events, causing high levels
of anxiety and depression, and an increase in spouse and child abuse.
The Department of Children and Families created Project Hope, and
collaborated with FEMA and community-based organizations, to provide
short-term crisis counseling to those affected by the hurricanes. We
also expanded the state's Violence Free Florida campaign to develop and
distribute domestic materials to organizations involved in the relief
and recovery efforts. We asked government agencies, corporate and
business leaders, professional associations and other organizations to
establish or renew their ``no tolerance for domestic violence''
policies.
Florida's Department of Transportation lifts restrictions on weight
limits for trucks so supplies can get where they are needed quickly.
Immediately after the storms, transportation officials work with local
officials to clear debris and reopen roads. Thanks to the speedy
efforts of the Department and its contractors, travel and commerce
returned to the Interstate 10 Bridge within three weeks after Hurricane
Ivan washed out dozens of the massive spans that connect Pensacola to
the rest of Florida and provide a critical transportation link across
the nation from California to Jacksonville, Florida.
The Department of Environmental Protection works with power
companies to restore electricity to critical facilities, hospitals,
schools, homes and businesses, as well as the impacted areas as quickly
as possible. The Department works closely with petroleum companies and
our neighboring states to maintain fuel supplies before the storms
along major evacuation routes and after the storms for emergency
response vehicles. Fuel distribution is based on the region's
priorities and is replenished as quickly as possible.
Hurricanes impact every aspect of a community and we work quickly
for individuals to have a return to normalcy. Education is a top
priority in Florida, and it remains that way even when a hurricane
makes landfall. Children attending school is a leading indicator of
recovery. Officials with the Department of Education help county school
superintendents reopen schools quickly. Last year, after many school
bus drivers lost their homes and could not immediately return to work,
the Florida National Guard stepped in and drove Florida's children to
school.
Florida's Agency for Workforce Innovation had its personnel on the
ground shortly after last year's disasters to offer unemployment
assistance to people who lost jobs from the storms. Through their
mobile one-stop centers they were able to bring assistance to the
impacted areas to help claims be processed from impacted businesses.
They were also able to provide job training and placement for workers
whose employment was affected by the storms.
Florida's Small Business Emergency Bridge Loan Program provides
funds for small businesses to make repairs, replace inventory and
reopen for business quickly. Obtaining a loan through the U.S. SBA and
waiting for an insurance claim to be processed can often be a slow
process. These short-term, no interest loans are intended to ``bridge
the gap'' between the impact of a major catastrophe and when a business
has received insurance proceeds and secured other more long-term
financial resources. These loans are critical to keeping businesses
open and Floridians working while a company makes arrangements for more
long-term financing. Florida has made approximately $50 million
available for this loan program for the 2004-2005 hurricanes.
Historically the repayment rate has been approximately 90 percent.
Officials with our Secretary of State supported local Supervisors
of Elections to ensure counties that lost all or many of their polling
places could participate in the primary election held 18 days after
Hurricane Charley tore through Southwest Florida.
We also learned that government cannot respond alone. During last
year's hurricanes, the generous outpouring of support from the private
sector filled the gaps left by government. The Florida Hurricane Relief
Fund, established after the first storm, raised and spent more than $20
million on relief efforts that could not be met by other volunteer,
federal, state or local agencies.
Lesson learned: investing in the right tools enhances response
capabilities.
As the world learned from Katrina, receiving and providing accurate
and timely information is essential to a successful response. Good
intelligence about what is happening on the ground allows emergency
managers to make decisions about what resources are needed and where
they are needed most. Technology can improve our ability to share
information when the electricity, phones and cell towers go out.
Last year, Florida invested in a uniform statewide radio system
that allows state and local first responders to communicate with each
other during a crisis--regardless of the kind of radio system or
frequency they use. Today, more than 200 local public safety dispatch
centers in all 67 of Florida's counties are equipped to connect first
responders and law enforcement even if the radio systems they use on a
daily basis are not compatible. Simultaneous conversations can be
established quickly and seamlessly on a private network without
disruption to normal operations.
Technology, such as Global Positioning Systems (GPS) and mapping
software, can improve our preparation and response in other ways.
Identifying the likely path of storm surge and testing the impacts of
wind speed on buildings provides a sound, scientific basis for
evacuation plans. Knowing who needs to evacuate--as well as who does
not--can greatly improve disaster planning, especially in large urban
areas. The size of the evacuated population impacts nearly every aspect
of emergency preparation, response, and recovery, such as managing
traffic and gas supplies, ensuring adequate shelters, and even
anticipating potential damage to accelerate recovery.
Lesson learned: prepared citizens make the difference.
All Floridians play a role in preparing, responding and recovering
from disasters. Before hurricane season starts, we encourage our
residents to create a family disaster plan based on where they live and
the survivability of their homes. Citizens know if the order comes from
their local officials to evacuate, they may only need to travel tens of
miles rather than hundreds of miles. Citizens that don't need to
evacuate--those that can safely shelter in place--are urged to secure
their homes against potential damage and gather water, non-perishable
food and necessary supplies to last them at least three days. This
year, I partnered with the Federal Alliance for Safe Homes Inc.
(FLASH), a non-profit organization, to develop a public service
campaign in English and Spanish aimed at educating homeowners about the
correct way to board up their homes against the high winds of a
hurricane. Additionally, to encourage our citizens to prepare for
hurricane season this year, Florida suspended the state sales tax for
12 days on disaster supplies, such as flashlights, batteries and
generators.
Individuals must also plan for the financial impacts of a
catastrophic natural disaster, especially with regard to insurance.
Last year, we enacted a law that simplifies homeowners' insurance
policies. Florida requires insurance companies to offer plain language
policies with financial disclosures and a checklist of what is--and is
not--covered by their policy. Florida also requires companies to offer
policies that replace the actual value of the home rather than the
amount of the mortgage. This provision is especially important in our
fast growing state where property values are increasing by double
digits annually.
After Hurricane Andrew in 1992, the private reinsurance industry
abandoned Florida. In response to this void, Florida established the
Florida Hurricane Catastrophe Fund, which requires insurance companies
to purchase reinsurance from the fund for protection against major
disasters. Private insurance would not exist in Florida today without
our established state catastrophe fund.
After last year's hurricanes, insurance companies received more
than $3.6 billion from the Catastrophe Fund, stabilizing the Florida
market and cushioning the impact of $21 billion in insurers' losses
from the 2004 hurricane season by pooling the catastrophic risk of
hurricanes in Florida.Sec.
By providing reliable, affordable protection against catastrophic
losses to insurers doing business in Florida, only one company went
bankrupt from the most devastating hurricane season in our state's
history. In contrast, after Hurricane Andrew, at least nine insurers
were rendered insolvent as claims mounted. Others left the market
altogether.
Those who prepare for a storm, by gathering their documents,
protecting their home, stocking extra food, water, medication and other
supplies and sheltering properly in place or evacuating in the proper
amount of time, are better prepared to successfully overcome the
impacts of a storm than those who are unprepared.
Lesson learned: innovation born from disasters can improve daily
operations.
Last year, more than a million Floridians needed immediate access
to public assistance. As a result, our Department of Children and
Families launched a web based emergency system for people to apply and
receive certain benefits, including food stamps. ACCESS Florida
(Automated Community Connection to Economic Self-Sufficiency) is now a
model for the nation.
Automating the application system enabled the state to quickly
provide $161 million in disaster aid to 1.3 million people in 27
Florida counties. These innovations were so successful they became the
cornerstone of ACCESS Florida and optimized the Department's efforts to
modernize and improve the everyday delivery of public assistance for
all Floridians. The new system saves taxpayer dollars while providing
greater access and better service to the public.
Lesson learned: good plans can always be improved.
Florida has made great strides in our hurricane response; however,
no system is perfect. Each day we continue working to address needs,
vulnerabilities and areas of weakness in our communities and states.
Last year, we learned we could not wait until after the storm made
landfall to launch our relief mission. Trucks of ice, water and food
need to be ready to roll into impacted areas as soon as the skies clear
and the winds die down. To further improve the system, we needed to
know in advance where to deliver these critical commodities. This year,
the state developed criteria and standard layouts for distribution
sites to provide maximum throughput of supplies. The true measure of
success is a strong logistics system that gets much-needed products off
the trucks and into the hands of those affected as quickly as possibly.
Using this guidance along with geography and population, counties
pre-determined locations for these ``points of distribution'' or PODs.
Depending on where a storm makes landfall and damage to the location,
counties can activate one or more of these PODs within 24 hours of
landfall.
This year, we identified three priorities for improvement. First,
continuing to improve evacuation plans to ensure we move our vulnerable
population out of harm's way. This includes those with disabilities,
the elderly and medically dependent residents. Second, we must continue
to improve upon our communication by ensuring sign language
interpreters are available for our hearing-impaired community and
translators are available for our Spanish and Creole speaking citizens.
Third, we need to provide options for Floridians with pets. Families
are hesitant to seek shelter if they cannot bring their pets with them.
Providing alternatives ensures they evacuate when the order comes.
Florida will continue building on lessons learned and will not
accept the status quo. We have a responsibility to continue improving
our response and recovery efforts as Florida continues to grow.
Lesson learned: Washington needs to improve FEMA's response capability.
Just as we have a role in preparing and responding to all hazards,
the federal government also has a responsibility to understand and
tailor its role to meet the needs of impacted states. As I have said,
the State of Florida is very appreciative of the federal response that
flows through FEMA to assist Floridians and our communities. It is
important to note, if Florida had not prepared last summer, it would
have looked like FEMA had not prepared. However, there are lessons
learned from our shared experiences of the last 14 months that can
enhance the agency's effectiveness.
I do not have a preference on whether FEMA is an independent agency
or remains part of the Department of Homeland Security, however, when a
disaster is declared, the FEMA director should report directly to the
President, just like Craig Fugate, Florida's Director of Emergency
Management, reports directly to me.
The divisions within FEMA that handle preparation, response,
recovery and mitigation comprise a complete cycle of disaster. These
four components need to be managed together as one unit. FEMA's
logistics program is broken and needs to be fixed. For example, to move
one truck of ice last year, FEMA officials in Florida had to send a
request to the regional office in Atlanta, who wrote a separate
contract for each leg of the trip, who then sent it to the trucking
company, who then sent it to the trucker on the ground in Florida.
Having a strong tracking system that shows where trucks are, what they
are carrying and when they will arrive at the destination is crucial.
The process needs to be faster, more efficient and more direct.
In terms of housing, last year, the program was slow to start
because we could not gauge demand. FEMA needs a better plan to
anticipate, identify and meet the housing demand. The current system
requires several telephone interviews, which lack efficiency for
someone who lost their home, is staying with friends, without cell
phone coverage or needs to provide a ``call back number.''
The joint FEMA-Florida Long-Term Recovery office, ably led by Scott
Morris, can serve as a model for the nation. The structure provides
consistency in processing the volumes of paperwork for reimbursement.
In the nine months before the Long-Term Recovery office opened in
Florida, we were reimbursed for less than $600 million of the billions
we spent as a result of the 2004 hurricanes. In less than five months,
the Long-Term Recovery team has brought more than 90 percent of
eligible dollars to the state, totaling almost $2 billion. The average
dollars sent to Florida per day have seen a near seven-fold increase
and the office has written 100 percent of project worksheets for all 67
counties, while taking on three additional storms this season.
Eligibility standards for financial assistance should be uniform
across the nation. Aid to governments should be based on the impact to
the community, not the size of the state. Currently, disasters need to
meet a certain per capita cost statewide to meet eligibility
requirements for financial assistance to repair and replace
infrastructure. This process penalizes small communities in large
states. Because of our size, damage from Katrina did not meet the
threshold for program. Had the same amount of damage occurred in a
state the size of Rhode Island, those citizens would have received aid.
Additionally, once a state meets the threshold, then all of the damage
becomes eligible. Lowering the threshold to one standard amount and
requiring cities and states fund a certain level of repair--like an
insurance deductible--might be a better approach.
Rules should promote personal responsibility. Under the current
process, two neighbors can both lose their homes in a hurricane. Both
are homeless and both need help. Neighbor One demonstrated personal
responsibility and acquired insurance to protect his home and business,
making him ineligible for timely federal assistance. Neighbor Two
neglected to purchase insurance, but is eligible for as much as $26,000
in cash assistance, a travel trailer for six months and maybe even a
mobile home for a year and a half. To us, both people need help. In the
eyes of FEMA, only the neighbor who did not prepare receives immediate
help. The system assumes insurance companies will be able to settle
claims quickly, which we learned from last year is not always possible.
This needs to change.
Rules should also promote responsible governing by providing
incentives for governments to invest in preparation. Right now, the
federal government provides a minimum of a 75 percent match for
response and recovery. To provide incentives for upgraded emergency
management capabilities and investment in preparedness, perhaps an
85:15 percent match would be more appropriate. Additionally, the
federal government should not bail out communities that make poor
planning decisions, have inadequate building codes and fail to invest
in emergency management.
Removing debris is a tremendous cost and can place a huge financial
burden on communities. The debris left in Florida after last year's
storms was enough to completely fill, and then pile a mile high, five
of Florida's largest football stadiums. The rules for reimbursing
debris removal from private property need to be clear and applied
consistently.
Conclusion
I am proud of the way Florida has responded to the hurricanes.
Through the congressionally approved Emergency Management Assistance
Compact, 725 first responders from 35 states aided Florida after the
storms last year. This year, the Compact allowed Florida to provide
much-needed relief to our neighboring states. Within hours of Katrina's
landfall, Florida began deploying more than 3,700 first responders to
Mississippi and Louisiana. Today, hundreds of Florida National
Guardsman, law enforcement officers, medical professionals and
emergency managers remain on the ground in affected areas. Along with
essential equipment and communication tools, Florida has advanced more
than $100 million in the efforts, including more than 5.5 million
gallons of water, 4 million pounds of ice and 934,000 cases of food to
help affected residents.
Steve, a resident from Diamondhead, Mississippi, summed it up best.
He wrote, ``The first responders I remember were Florida State
Troopers. They have been nothing less than awesome. They brought us
water, ice, food and most important, they brought truck loads of
compassion, understanding and a wonderful attitude.''
As you develop plans to improve our nation's emergency management
system, I ask that you consider Florida's three guiding principles in
emergency response. Our team knows them as Craig's Rules:
1. Meet the needs of the victims.
2. Take care of the responders.
3. See Rule 1.
Rather than assume everything should be done at the federal level,
our nation is much better off holding localities to higher expectations
and improving FEMA. Taking away Florida's ability to respond takes away
our passion for creativity and service that makes us good first
responders.
Before Congress considers a larger, direct federal role, it needs
to strengthen areas within FEMA and hold communities and states
accountable for properly preparing for the inevitable storms to come.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Government works best in emergencies
By: Bill Cotterell
July, 11, 2005
Tallahassee Democrat
Hanging around the state's Emergency Operations Center, you get the
feeling that this is how Gov. Jeb Bush would like Florida government to
be all the time--without the emergency, of course.
Imagine putting all agencies into one big room. Just a few hundred
people. Everybody busy and intensely focused on the task at hand. Golf
shirts and windbreakers with agency names on them. Lots of high-tech
computerized stuff.
If Bush created a video game of state government, it would be
sorted into 17 ``support functions'' and have big, colorful satellite
maps overhead, just like the EOC. Instant teleconference hookups, yes;
bureaucracy or paper-shuffling, no.
If he could get rid of the acronyms the federal government loves so
much and outsource half the operations, Bush might never want to leave
the bunker near Southwood.
Just as hard times bring out selfless qualities in family, friends
and strangers, emergencies show the people of Florida what they're
paying taxes for. It's state government at its best, everybody working
together with no complaining or grandstanding.
``I'm inspired by the response that is underway right now,'' Bush
said after one of his weekend briefings on Hurricane Dennis. ``I think
people should expect people to respond the way they do, but it's
gratifying to see.''
Hurricane preparation and response didn't always run so well. When
Hurricane Andrew hit in 1992, the command post was a bunch of offices
in the Rhyne Building, where Gov. Lawton Chiles passed out paper maps
and held briefings in a small Department of Community Affairs
conference room.
At the modern operations center this weekend, somebody crafted a
little cartoon of Dennis the Menace with a muscular little twister
following him. It flashed on the center screen, amid constantly
changing satellite images and written updates on everything from
evacuation shelters and generator supplies to animal safety and nuclear
power plant status.
Bush had almost all of his department heads on hand. Those who were
missing--probably because they were out in the field--sent their top
deputies. Federal agencies, military units and representatives of the
insurance and utility companies, Red Cross and Salvation Army all had
seats at the big tables.
That's the drill. Hurricanes involve a lot of agencies you'd never
expect to see. Department of Juvenile Justice Secretary Anthony
Schembri, for instance, was there to decide about evacuating youthful
offenders who can't be left in danger but can't be put in adult jails,
either.
During the past session, legislators said the work of state
employees during last year's four hurricanes justified a 3.6 percent
pay raise. Actually, the fact that they didn't get a raise last year--
just a one-time $1,000 ``bonus'' that worked out to about $675 take-
home pay--was reason enough for the 3.6 percent.
But the sentiment was appropriate. Bush said it several times
during the weekend.
``People across the state should know that their fellow Floridians
are going to be by their side in the relief effort,'' he said as the
storm approached. ``It includes a lot of people who are true quiet
heroes in our state.''
Think Locally On Relief
By Jeb Bush
Washington Post
Friday, September 30, 2005; A19
In the wake of Hurricane Katrina, Americans are looking to their
leaders for answers to the tragedy and reassurances that the mistakes
made in the response will not be repeated in their own communities.
Congressional hearings on the successes and failures of the relief
effort are underway.
As the governor of a state that has been hit by seven hurricanes
and two tropical storms in the past 13 months, I can say with certainty
that federalizing emergency response to catastrophic events would be a
disaster as bad as Hurricane Katrina.
Just as all politics are local, so are all disasters. The most
effective response is one that starts at the local level and grows with
the support of surrounding communities, the state and then the federal
government. The bottom-up approach yields the best and quickest
results--saving lives, protecting property and getting life back to
normal as soon as possible. Furthermore, when local and state
governments understand and follow emergency plans appropriately, less
taxpayer money is needed from the federal government for relief.
Florida's emergency response system, under the direction of Craig
Fugate, is second to none. Our team is made up of numerous bodies at
all levels of government, including state agencies, the Florida
National Guard, first responders, volunteer organizations, private-
sector health care organizations, public health agencies and utility
companies. Once a storm is forecast for landfall in Florida, all these
groups put their disaster response-and-recovery plans into high gear.
Natural disasters are chaotic situations even when a solid response
plan is in place. But with proper preparation and planning, it is
possible--as we in Florida have proved--to restore order, quickly
alleviate the suffering of those affected and get on the road to
recovery.
The current system plays to the strengths of each level of
government. The federal government cannot replicate or replace the
sense of purpose and urgency that unites Floridians working to help
their families, friends and neighbors in the aftermath of a disaster.
If the federal government removes control of preparation, relief and
recovery from cities and states, those cities and states will lose the
interest, innovation and zeal for emergency response that has made
Florida's response system better than it was 10 years ago. Today's
system is the reason Florida has responded successfully to hurricanes
affecting our state and is able to help neighboring states.
But for this federalist system to work, all must understand, accept
and be willing to fulfill their responsibilities. The federal
government and the Federal Emergency Management Agency are valuable
partners in this coordinated effort. FEMA's role is to provide federal
resources and develop expertise on such issues as organizing mass
temporary housing. FEMA should not be responsible for manpower or a
first response--federal efforts should serve as a supplement to local
and state efforts.
Florida learned many lessons from Hurricane Andrew in 1992, and we
have continued to improve our response system after each storm. One of
the biggest lessons is that local and state governments that fail to
prepare are preparing to fail. In Florida, we plan for the worst, hope
for the best and expect the unexpected. We understand that critical
response components are best administered at the local and state
levels.
Our year-round planning anticipates Florida's needs and
challenges--well before a storm makes landfall. To encourage our
residents to prepare for hurricane season this year, for 12 days
Florida suspended the state sales tax on disaster supplies, such as
flashlights, batteries and generators. Shelters that provide medical
care for the sick and elderly take reservations long before a storm
starts brewing. To ensure that people get out of harm's way in a safe
and orderly manner, counties coordinate with each other and issue
evacuation orders in phases. Satellite positioning systems, advanced
computer software and a uniform statewide radio system allow all of
these groups and first responders to communicate when the phones, cell
towers and electricity go out.
The Florida National Guard is deployed early with clear tasks to
restore order, maintain security and assist communities in establishing
their humanitarian relief efforts. Trucks carrying ice, water and food
stand ready to roll into the affected communities once the skies clear
and the winds die down. Counties predetermine locations, called points
of distribution, that are designed for maximum use in distributing
these supplies.
Florida's response to Hurricane Katrina is a great example of how
the system works. Within hours of Katrina's landfall, Florida began
deploying more than 3,700 first responders to Mississippi and
Louisiana. Hundreds of Florida National Guardsman, law enforcement
officers, medical professionals and emergency managers remain on the
ground in affected areas. Along with essential equipment and
communication tools, Florida has advanced over $100 million in the
efforts, including more than 5.5 million gallons of water, 4 million
pounds of ice and 934,000 cases of food to help affected residents.
I am proud of the way Florida has responded to hurricanes during
the past year. Before Congress considers a larger, direct federal role,
it needs to hold communities and states accountable for properly
preparing for the inevitable storms to come.
------
HURRICANE
K A T R I N A
Florida's Response
Florida aid committed to neighboring states to date: $138,329,353
Mississippi: $136,577,345
Louisiana: $1,752,008
Total Florida responders committed to date: 6,330
Mississippi: 6,283
Civilian: 5,785
Florida National Guard: 498
Entire US EMAC Response: 23,518
Louisiana: 47
Civilian: 40
Florida National Guard: 7
Emergency Operations Center Status: The State Emergency Operations
Center remained at a full Level 1 activation for 17 days in response to
Hurricane Katrina.
Florida First Responders: 2,165
State and Local Law Enforcement Officers: 1,425
State and Local Urban Search and Rescue Teams: 740
Florida Department of Health Medical Assistance Personnel: 556
Doctors, nurses and support personnel: 416
Emergency Medical Services personnel: 140
Logistical Support Vehicles: 20
Florida State Emergency Response Team Incident Command Officials: 215
State and Local Emergency Management Officials: 194
Mass Care Coordination Team: 21 Specialists
Resource and Commodity Support Personnel: 2,261
Response Mission Support Personnel: 73
Agriculture and Animal Protection Personnel: 77
Florida Radio and Network Communications Specialists: 10
Volunteer and Donations Management Teams: 14
Florida Recovery Personnel: 20
Florida Public Information Officer Deployment Teams: 14
Florida Hazardous Material Teams: 9
Local Utility Personnel supporting drinking and wastewater programs in
Mississippi: 101
Florida Department of Elder Affairs' Community Responder Teams: 30
Florida Department of Transportation: 23
Florida Division of Forestry Support Missions:
217 Personnel
46 Pickup trucks
15 Vans
11 SUVs
1-30 KW Generator Trailer
2 Dump trucks
1 Mechanic truck
1 Semi Unit
2 Fuel Trailers
Essential commodities committed to impacted communities by
Florida's State Emergency Response Team or managed by Florida:
954 trucks of water (768 State of Florida purchased)
940 trucks of ice (457 State of Florida purchased)
Baby Food--8,438 cases; 10,318 cases of formula; 4,000 cases
of juice
Ensure--2,100 cases
Juices--16,000 cases
Diapers--1,755 cases; bottle nipples--2,495 cases
1,000-person self-contained Base Camp, including provisions
for sheltering, feeding and hygiene needs of rescue workers, deployed
to Stennis NASA Logistical Staging Area for emergency workers
500-person Life Support Package for feeding and hygiene needs
of rescue workers Urban Search and Rescue Teams
Logistical Staging Area and Points of Distribution material:
154 Forklifts
125 Pallet Jacks
97 generators
93--4,000 watt light tower sets
25 pumps
5 Field HVAC Units
25 Truck Shuttle Fleet
11 satellite data systems
4 emergency deployable interoperable communications systems
1 loading ramp
2 Logistics Support Trailers
110 Satellite Phones
1 AM/FM Radio Station Tower
------
Supplemental Page
Governor Jeb Bush
Designated Representative: Nina Oviedo
Summary
I appreciate the opportunity to share with you some of Florida's
learned lessons with emergency management and also provide you with
some thoughts on how the federal response system could be enhanced. I
can say with certainty that federalizing emergency response to
catastrophic events would be a disaster as bad as Hurricane Katrina.
The current system works when everyone understands, accepts and is
willing to fulfill their responsibilities. Florida's system can be
successful in states throughout the nation, without the federal
government stepping on state's rights. More importantly, if we do not
apply the lessons learned to future disasters, the problems will
continue to snowball and the disasters will become more costly--in the
number of lives and the number of dollars.
Lesson learned: the bottom-up approach yields the best
results.
Lesson learned: a successful response depends on
teamwork and a clear command structure.
Lesson learned: local and state governments that fail
to prepare are preparing to fail.
Lesson learned: a successful response requires strong
communication and coordination.
Lesson learned: the state needs to support--not
supplant--local efforts.
Lesson learned: investing in the right tools enhances
response capabilities.
Lesson learned: prepared citizens make the difference.
Lesson learned: innovation born from disasters can
improve daily operations.
Lesson learned: good plans can always be improved.
Lesson learned: Washington needs to improve FEMA's
response capability.
As you develop plans to improve our nation's emergency management
system, I ask that you consider Florida's three guiding principles in
emergency response:
1. Meet the needs of the victims.
2. Take care of the responders.
3. See Rule 1.
Rather than assume everything should be done at the federal level,
our nation is much better off holding localities to higher expectations
and improving FEMA. Taking away Florida's ability to respond takes away
our passion for creativity and service that makes us good first
responders.
Before Congress considers a larger, direct federal role, it needs
to strengthen areas within FEMA and hold communities and states
accountable for properly preparing for the inevitable storms to come.
Chairman King. Now Governor of Texas, Governor Rick Perry.
Governor.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE RICK PERRY
Governor Perry. Chairman King, thank you very much. It is
an honor to be with you and the members of the committee,
including my fellow Texans Lamar Smith and Sheila Jackson-Lee.
And, yes, go Astros. And tonight Mr. Thompson will be--
Chairman King. I would ask the Governor to confine his
remarks to relevant topics, not the Astros.
Governor Perry. Oh, I am sorry.
And I promise not to talk about any football from last week
either. And, Michael McCaul, it is an honor to be with you.
And, Michael, just one thing to make sure there is not any
misinformation, I did not federalize the National Guard during
our--we obviously used them substantially, but we directed them
from Austin, Texas. And as we go through these remarks, that
will become abundantly clear why I did not federalize them.
And I want to testify before you today with a very clear
point of view. I opposed the federalization of emergency
response efforts to natural disasters and other catastrophic
events. And I say this with absolutely no malice towards the
Federal Government or the military, which can and should bring
tremendous resources to bear in responding to catastrophes. I
have the highest appreciation for the capabilities of our
military partly because, as Lamar shared with you, I spent 4-1/
2 years flying those aircraft and flying a number of those
relief missions. I know what the military does best, and their
expertise is in preparing for wars, fighting wars and winning
those wars. The mission of our military is not that of a fire
department or a police department or a hospital. It is not
designed to be a first responder. Our firefighters, our peace
officers, our EMS personnel, they respond to emergencies every
day in our local communities. They know their communities best.
They have done the emergency training exercises in those
communities, and they can respond the quickest to the
emergencies in their communities. I say leave first response to
first responders. Leave decisionmaking in the hands of the
local and the State leaders. And leave, for our military, the
most important job that they have of fighting wars and keeping
the peace.
The idea of federalization raises many questions, first
being perhaps the most important. You know, if, from the
President right on down, we recognize that the Federal response
may not have been as adequate as we would have liked to have
seen during Katrina, you know, does that inspire confidence in
a greater Federal role in the solution? And if the Federal
Government takes this over, will they perform 150 emergency
exercises in Texas over the next 4 years, as we did over the
last 4 years, while also attending to the needs of the other 49
States? Will the Federal Government take over responsibility
for coordinating with our States 1,200 nursing homes, hundreds
of hospitals concerning the evacuation of people with special
needs? If the military creates a special division of first
responders, will we have highly trained, well-equipped Federal
troops unavailable for duty overseas as they wait for an
emergency large enough to respond to? Would this not turn them
into the equivalent of the Maytag repairman, waiting for the
call when an emergency strikes at home, but underutilized as
part of our main military mission at home and abroad?
First responders must train together because they respond
together. When you add a new layer of bureaucracy,
decisionmaking becomes paralyzed. Decisions are placed in the
hands of those who know less about the community, and
miscommunication becomes rampant as lives hang in the balance.
Think about it this way. When you call 911 because your loved
one's life is on the line, do you want an operator who knows
your community, or do you want an operate or who lives in
Washington, D.C.?
The military's most vital role in a disaster is to provide
specialized heavy equipment, aviation assets and the personnel
to operate them. The lesson of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita is
that while Federal resources are incredibly important, they are
going to be very important to Jeb over the course of the next
few days, no State or local community should wait on the
Federal Government to act.
We are responsible for the safety of our citizens before
and after a natural disaster, and we are responsible for
creating detailed emergency response plans and testing them. In
Texas, we ran into challenges, and we had to adapt to rather
unforeseeable circumstances. But most important to our response
is that we had a clear chain of command. We had responsible
local leadership. We had tested our capacity and our
capabilities during training exercises, and we exercised and
implemented a plan that did not depend on the Federal
bureaucratic execution. And because of that, and despite the
challenges that remain, I would call the Texas response to both
hurricanes a success.
In conclusion, let me just say that the discussion of
federalizing emergency response makes me wonder what these
mayors behind me, what Mayor Ortiz from Port Arthur, what
Woodville Mayor Jimmy Cooley would say if they were told that
the Federal Government would lead the response in the next
major hurricane. And I think they would tell you to leave the
resources and the manpower and the decisionmaking to the folks
of Texas, and let Texans run Texas.
Thank you, sir.
Chairman King. Thank you, Governor Perry.
[The statement of Governor Perry follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Rick Perry
Thank you Chairman King and members of the committee. I testify
before you today with a clear point of view: I oppose the
federalization of emergency response efforts to natural disasters and
other catastrophic events.
I say this with no malice toward the federal government or the
military, which can and should bring tremendous resources to bear in
responding to catastrophes.
I have great appreciation for the capabilities of our military
because I served for four and a half years. I know what the military
does best: their expertise is preparing for wars, fighting wars and
winning wars.
The mission of our military is not that of a fire department or
police department or hospital--it is not designed to be a civil first
responder.
Our firefighters, peace officers and EMS personnel respond to
emergencies every day in our local communities. They know their
communities best, they have done the emergency training exercises in
those communities, and they can respond the quickest to emergencies in
their communities.
I say leave first response to the first responders, leave decision-
making in the hands of local and state leaders, and leave for our
military the important job of fighting wars and keeping the peace.
The idea of federalization raises many questions, the first being
perhaps the most important:
If, from the President on down, we recognize the federal response
was not adequate during Katrina, does that inspire confidence that a
greater federal role is the solution?
If the federal government takes this over, will they perform 150
emergency exercises in Texas over the next four years, as we did in the
last four years, while also tending to the needs of the other 49
states?
Will the federal government take over responsibility for
coordinating with our state's twelve hundred nursing homes, and
hundreds of hospitals concerning the evacuation of people with special
needs?
If the military creates a special division of first responders,
will we have highly trained, well-equipped federal troops unavailable
for duty overseas as they wait for an emergency large enough for their
activation? Would this not turn them into the equivalent of the
Military Maytag Repairman, waiting for the call when emergency strikes
at home, but underutilized as part of our main military mission at home
and abroad?
First responders must train together because they respond together.
When you add a new layer of bureaucracy, decision-making becomes
paralyzed, decisions are placed in the hands of those who know less
about the community, and miscommunication becomes rampant as lives hang
in the balance.
Think about it this way: when you call 911 because your loved one's
life is on the line, do you want an operator who knows your community,
or do you want someone at a switchboard in Washington, D.C.?
The military's most vital role in a disaster is to provide
specialized heavy equipment and aviation assets and the personnel to
operate them.
The lesson of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita is that while federal
resources are very important, no state or local community should wait
on the federal government to act. WE are responsible for the safety of
our own citizens before and after a natural disaster, and WE are
responsible for creating detailed emergency response plans and testing
them.
In Texas, we ran into challenges and had to adapt to unforeseen
events. But most important to our response is that we had a clear chain
of command, we had responsible local leadership, we had tested our
capabilities during training exercises, and we implemented a plan that
did not depend on the federal bureaucracy's execution. Because of that,
and despite the challenges that remain, I would call the Texas response
to both hurricanes a success.
In conclusion, the discussion of federalizing emergency response
makes me wonder what local leaders like Port Arthur Mayor Oscar Ortiz,
or Woodville Mayor Jimmie Cooley, would say if they were told the
federal government would lead the response to the next major hurricane.
I think they would tell you give us your resources and manpower, but
let Texans run Texas.
It would be a great mistake to do otherwise. Thank you.
Chairman King. Now Governor Napolitano.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE JANET NAPOLITANO
Governor Napolitano. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking
Members, members of the committee. It is a pleasure to be here
with Governor Bush and Governor Perry.
Arizona does not have hurricanes, but we do have large
flash floods in the winter and huge forest fires in the summer,
among many things that I have confronted as Governor. And I
echo what Governor Bush and Governor Perry said. We operate an
emergency operations center. We are able to activate that on a
moment's notice. We have evacuation plans. We practice,
practice, practice to make sure that when a catastrophe
happens, things go smoothly.
There is a Federal role, but the Federal role is not to
lead that effort, it is to support that effort when the
circumstances warrant.
We learned lessons from the catastrophes and the disasters
that happened in 2002 in Arizona. We had the Rodeo-Chediski
fire; burned over 400,000 acres in northern Arizona, had to
evacuate many communities. The fires cost over $150 million to
suppress. We found out in the course of that fire that our
communities up in the rural parts of the State did not have
evacuation plans, and we did not have interoperability
capability of communications among the many different
departments that had to respond to the fire.
Now every one of those communities has an evacuation plan.
We have all practiced them, and we used some of the homeland
security money we got from the Federal Government to purchase
five vehicles that provide patch interoperability capability
that we can drive anywhere in the State whenever a fire or
other related disaster occurs. In fact, one of those vans was
sent to Louisiana to help with interoperability problems in the
aftermath of Katrina.
We also want to make sure that priorities are properly set
in light of the particular needs of a particular State, and I
think the State Governors are in the best position working with
their mayors and others to know what those needs happen to be.
It is no surprise that the National Governors Association,
the Governors of the States, Republican and Democrat alike,
have issued a joint statement against federalizing emergency
relief. And I think that statement is important, and I commend
it to you for your attention.
One of the things that I think this committee might want to
focus on is preparation for emergency in two specifics ways.
One is general preparation, the things you need to do all the
time for whatever emergency, making sure you have evacuation
plans, making sure you have taken care of your special needs
citizens, making sure that you have dealt with problems like
communications interoperability, and then to practice those
plans over and over and over again.
The second kind of preparation has to do with what Governor
Bush is doing now. He knows a hurricane is coming to his State.
He has some sense about the strength of that hurricane, and he
is taking specific action to prepare ahead of time. In those
areas, these are places where the Federal Government can team
with the States in terms of preparation. But, again, the
leadership must come from the State level.
I don't want to leave my testimony without mentioning a
particular problem in our country for which I declared a state
of emergency, and that is the situation at the border, because
in its own way, that has been a disaster for us, and it is one
where we request and need Federal help. We have now at the
Tucson sector of the Arizona-Mexico border over 1,500 people
being arrested per day. Those are the people they are finding.
Several hundred people were found dead in the desert who had
come across and been abandoned by the coyotes who brought them
and then left in the desert to die. This is an area where
homeland security and emergency relief combine, because we
cannot say that we have a secure country, we cannot say that we
have a national homeland security plan without a secure border,
and we have lost operational control of the border in Arizona.
Let me close with several suggestions in response to the
question presented for this hearing. First, I would ask the
committee to respect the historical and constitutional
authority of States and the Nation's Governors in emergency
situations.
Second, I would ask that you look at restoring homeland
security and emergency response resources that the Federal
Government has actually cut in the last years. Homeland
security resources to the State of Arizona have been reduced 35
percent in the last year, although I don't think our incidences
or our security issues have been reduced in the same level. The
value of proper funding for preparation and practice in advance
of an emergency cannot be underestimated.
Third, I would ask this committee and the Congress to
better evaluate and examine disaster threats such as the
Federal levees in New Orleans and prioritize funding for those
areas. Obviously securing the border must be a top funding
priority here.
Fourth, work with the States to obtain accreditation for
State emergency preparedness plans. The accreditation process
is extremely thorough and provides a mechanism for States to
ensure they have covered all that is necessary.
And last but not least, let us not forget the public health
aspects of disaster and recovery and that they must be
integrated into any response plan. Preparations or the lack
thereof for the Avian flu help illustrate this point.
Before I close, I would like to recognize the members of
the Tahono O'odham Nation that are here with us today. This is
an Indian reservation that actually covers 70 miles of the
Arizona-Mexico border. Their statement is quite compelling in
terms of their special needs, and I would hope the committee
would pay special attention to that.
Prepared Statement of Vivian Juan-Saunders, Chairwoman, Tohono O'Odham
Nation-Arizona
I. INTRODUCTION
In the wake of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, the Committee will
examine the historical and constitutional roles and responsibilities of
Local, State, and Federal governments in responding to disasters and
other emergencies. The Committee will explore the issue of Federalism
and disaster response, and the policy implications of expanding the
Federal role with respect to disaster response. This statement is
submitted by the Tohono O'odham Nation to apprise the Committee of the
Nation's unique emergency response role with regard to the 75-mile
stretch of international border that the Tohono O'odham Reservation
shares with Mexico, and to explain the impact of Federalism. Before
addressing the specifics of these issues, this statement provides
general background about the Nation and the historical background that
created the Nation's current border security crises.
II. BACKGROUND
The Tohono O'odham Nation (``Nation'') is a federally recognized
Indian Tribe in South Central Arizona with over 28,000 enrolled tribal
members. The Tohono O'odham Reservation consists of four non-contiguous
parcels totaling more than 2.8 million acres in the Sonoran Desert, and
is the second largest Indian Reservation in the United States. The
largest community, Sells, is the Nation's capital. The 75-mile southern
border of our Reservation is the longest shared international border of
any Indian Tribe in the United States.
As a federally recognized Indian Tribe, the Nation possesses
sovereign governmental authority over its members and territory.
Accordingly, the Nation provides governmental services to one of the
largest Indian populations in America and is responsible for managing
one of the largest Indian reservations in the America. Moreover, the
Nation spends approximately $7 million annually from tribal revenues to
meet the United States' border security responsibilities. The Nation's
longest international border of any Tribe in the United States has
created an unprecedented homeland security crises for America.
Prior to European contact, the aboriginal lands of the O'odham
extended east to the San Pedro River, West to the Colorado River, South
to the Gulf of California, and North to the Gila River. In 1848 the
United States and Mexico negotiated the terms of the Treaty of
Guadalupe Hidalgo, which among other things, established the southern
boundary of the United States. The Treaty placed the aboriginal lands
of the O'odham in Mexico. In 1854 through the Gadsden Purchase, the
United States and Mexico further defined the southern boundary by
placing the boundary at its present location cutting into the heart of
our aboriginal territory. Consequently, the boundary displaced our
people on both sides of the international border bisecting O'odham
lands and separating our people from relations, cultural sites and
ceremonies, and access to much needed health care, housing, and
transportation. Not surprisingly, neither the United States nor Mexico
consulted with the O'odham during the Treaty negotiations in 1848 and
1854. Respect for the sovereign status of the O'odham was simply
ignored.
Unfortunately, the lack of consultation or input from the O'odham
continued throughout the generations leaving the Nation with a modern-
day border security crisis that has caused shocking devastation of its
land and resources. The genesis of this crisis stems from the
development and implementation of the U.S. government's border policy
in the last decade. Again, without the benefit of consulting with the
Nation, federal border security policy was developed focusing on
closing down what were considered to be key points of entry along the
U.S. southern border. This policy was implemented by extensively
increasing manpower and resources at ports of entry and located at
popular entry points such as San Diego (CA), Yuma (AZ), and El Paso
(TX), and therefore, created a funnel effect causing the flow of
undocumented immigrants, drug traffickers, and other illegal activity
to shift to other less regulated spots on the border.
Consequently, because of the lack of border security resources and
attention to the Nation, illegal immigration through the Reservation
has become a prime avenue of choice for undocumented immigrants and
drug trafficking activities traveling into the United States. This has
created urgent challenges to protect against possible terrorists coming
through a very vulnerable location on our Reservation. Although the
Nation has neither the sufficient manpower nor the resources to
adequately address this crisis, we continue to be the first line of
defense in protecting America's homeland security interests this highly
volatile and dangerous region.
III. BORDER SECURITY CRISIS ON THE TOHONO O'ODHAM NATION
The modern day consequences of the border security crisis facing
the Nation is indeed devastating to our people, lands, culture and
precious resources. While immigrant and drug trafficking have decreased
on other parts of the southern border of the United States, levels have
sky rocketed on the Nation causing a flood of crime, chaos and
environmental destruction on our Reservation. By conservative
estimates, over 1,500 immigrants illegally cross daily into the United
States via the Nation's Reservation. A Border Patrol spokesman recently
reported that the Nation is in the ``busiest corridor of illegal
immigration in the [America].'' Tribal members live in fear for the
safety of their families and their properties. Often times, homes are
broken into by those desperate for food, water and shelter. It is no
longer just Mexican nationals crossing the Nation's reservation land.
Over the last year, undocumented immigrants from Guatemala, Honduras,
and Central America have been apprehended on the Nation.
The Nation's seventy-one member police force provides primary
border security law enforcement services against the unrelenting and
increasing traffic of undocumented immigrants and drug traffickers who
cross our border to enter America. The Nation has sustained a loss of
millions of dollars annually in manpower, health care, sanitation,
theft and destruction of our property and lands from the relentless
flow of illegal immigration. Equally devastating is the adverse impact
on our cultural resources and traditions as our Tribal elders no longer
gather ceremonial plants in the desert for fear of their safety. The
Nation stands on the front line of this crisis but is inhibited from
directly accessing funding and other resources from the Department of
Homeland Security.
Consider the following statistics:
In 2004 alone, 111,264 entries into the Nation, resulting
in 84,010 actual apprehensions.
Since October 2003, approximately 180,000 pounds of
narcotics have been seized.
When combining federal and Tribal law enforcement efforts,
more than 300,000 pounds of illegal narcotics were seized on the
Nation's lands in 2004.
There are 160 known illegal crossings along the 75 mile
shared border with Mexico--in 36 locations and there are no barriers at
all.
In 2003, sixty-nine people died on the Reservation
crossing the border, leaving the Nation to pay for the burial and
related costs. The Nation pays for autopsy costs at $1,600.00 per body
out of tribal police funds.
The Nation loses $2 million annually from its allocation
of Indian Health Care funding due to emergency health care treatment of
undocumented immigrants taken to our health clinic.
The Nation is forced to address the 6 tons of trash a day
that is littered on the Nation's Reservation by fleeing undocumented
immigrants. This predicament has caused serious environmental problems
and contributes to the 113 open pit dumps on the Nation's Reservation
that need to be cleaned up.
Moreover, the Tohono O'odham Nation Police Department (TOPD) has
stretched its resources to the limit and now spends over $3 million
annually in tribal funds on homeland and border security law
enforcement function and activities, more than half of its annual
budget. To date, the Nation has spent more than $10 million dollars for
these functions, which we believe are clearly federal responsibilities.
For example:
On an average day, every public safety officer in the
TOPD spends 60% of his or her time working on border related
issues.
In 2004, TOPD officers responded to over 6,000 calls
for assistance with undocumented immigrant apprehensions;
Border Protection estimates over 111,000 individual
apprehensions on the Nation's lands in 2004.
Between 2002-2003, an estimated 1500 illegally crossed
through the Nation each day. While apprehensions continue to
rise, more than 700 additional undocumented immigrants are
estimated to pass through the Nation every day undetected. In
FY 2002-2004, the U.S. Border Patrol-Casa Grande Sector
apprehended 166,514 undocumented immigrants on the Nation's
lands.
In 2002, 4300 vehicles were used for illegal drug and
immigrant smuggling. A total of 517 stolen vehicles were
recovered on tribal land. From 2003-2004, Tribal police
investigated 15 vehicle crashes involving undocumented
immigrants.
From January 2003 through mid-2005, 4380 abandoned
vehicles were found on the reservation with 308 stolen vehicles
used for criminal activities en route to Mexico. These vehicles
were stolen in Tucson, Phoenix, and Chandler etc and used for
illegal activity.
Between January 2003 and March 2004, 48 undocumented
immigrant deaths from heat and exposure were investigated by
Tribal Police. A total number of 7 staff members are in the
criminal investigations unit.
Many other areas on the Nation, such as limited hospital and
ambulance services, have been similarly negatively affected. Overall,
the Nation expends $7 million of its tribal resources annually on
services directly relating to border issues. Part of the expenditure
relates to health care and environmental clean up services. When the
Nation pays for federal responsibilities, we are unable to address
education, health care, housing, roads, infrastructure priorities, to
name a few. Below are a couple of key examples.
In 2003, the Indian Health Service (IHS)-Sells Service
Unit spent $500,000.00 on emergency health care services to
undocumented immigrants, for example, for those at risk of
dying from dehydration. These funds are not reimbursed to IHS
and result in the inability of certain tribal members to
receive health care services that are allocated for their
benefit.
The Nation spends millions of dollars a year to pay
for the 6 tons of trash per day left by undocumented immigrants
and the Nation is faced with cleaning up the 113 open pit dumps
on the Reservation.
758 homes on the Reservation (20% of all homes on the
Reservation) are without potable water and 1,393 (38% of all
homes) are without a sewer or water system. Many of the
residents at these homes use either hand-dug or agricultural
wells for drinking water and are exposed to contaminants such
as fecal coliform, arsenic and fluoride in excess of the
federal Safe Drinking Water Act standards. The total need to
construct suitable drinking water and waste water systems for
these homes is estimated at $24.4 million.
The Nation has been forced to deal with all of these
issues because we must protect our people and our lands. The
Nation's efforts are complemented by the Border Patrol, which
recently increased its presence on the Reservation through the
Arizona Border Control Initiative, for which support the Nation
is thankful to have. We also acknowledge the efforts of Arizona
Governor Janet Napolitano, who provided the Nation more than
$100,000 in resources from additional funding the State
received as a result of the Governor's recent border emergency
declaration.
However, our needs are overwhelming and we need
immediate federal assistance and direct communications with the
Department of Homeland Security on policy, funding and other
important matters that affect our Nation. Unfortunately, the
Nation has not received sufficient federal attention to address
our law enforcement/border security activities. In the wake of
the creation of the Department of Homeland Security, the
increased federal funding for the Department, and the
announcement of a number of federal initiatives to address
homeland security challenges, the Nation has respectfully
requested a seat at the table as well as the appropriate level
of federal funding to support our efforts in providing homeland
security for America. Again, we thank Governor Napolitano for
her leadership and support in ensuring that we have a role in
the State's homeland security planning and grant distribution
process. We commend her outstanding leadership and efforts to
work with the Nation. We believe that the federal governments
must step up to the plate and work directly with the Nation on
addressing the border crises we face on a daily basis.
IV. BARRIERS TO SECURING FUNDING FROM THE HOMELAND SECURITY DEPARTMENT
& LEGISLATIVE RECOMMENDATIONS.
In response to the September 11, 2001 terrorist bombing and related
events in the United States, the 107th Congress passed the Homeland
Security Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-296) authorizing the reorganization of
existing federal agencies under the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) umbrella. This led to expanded border protection policies through
the National Homeland Security Reorganization Plan. Once again,
although these changes have had dramatic impacts on the Nation's people
and land, we were not consulted and have been inhibited from receiving
direct funding for homeland security expenditures.
Under the DHS organic legislation, Indian Tribes are not eligible
to obtain direct funding for homeland security purposes. This barrier
is particularly unfair to the Nation given the unique circumstances in
protecting the 75-mile international border with Mexico on the
Reservation. This lack of consultation and lack of access to direct
funding has strained the Nation's Government-to-Government relationship
with the United States placing the Nation in a difficult and untenable
position of having to react policy decisions as opposed to proactively
working together in a unified fashion with the proper respect accorded
to the Nation's sovereign status.
To improve the federal government's emergency response and
assistance to our border security challenges, Congress must take
legislative action to authorize the Nation to obtain direct access to
Homeland Security resources. We believe this approach will
significantly improve our emergency preparedness and ability to
response to terrorist threats that may occur in this vulnerable
Southwest region. Specifically, the Nation supports the immediate
passage of H.R. 1544, The Faster and Smarter Funding for First
Responders which would accomplish the following:
Require states to consult with Tribes and ensure that
Tribes are eligible to receive pass-through funding from
states;
Allow Tribes to petition directly to the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) for funding (local units of government
also have this right under H.R. 3266).
Establish a pilot program for up to 20 ``directly
eligible tribes'' (which can include a consortia of tribes) to
receive direct funding grants each year from DHS, rather than
through the states if the petitioning Tribes meets the
following threshold eligibility criteria: (i) having
administrative capability under P.L. 93-638 to enter into self-
determination contracts or compacts, (ii) employing at least 10
full-time emergency response or public safety personnel, and
(iii) having a demonstrated level of threat as determined by
its location on or within 5 miles of an international border,
near critical infrastructure, adjacent to a large metropolitan
area or having more than 1,000 square miles of tribal land
(roughly the equivalent of the state of Rhode Island).
Set aside for the 20 directly eligible Tribes
collectively, at least 0.08 percent of the amount appropriated
for first responder grants in a given year.
Authorizes Tribes which are not selected for direct
funding, may apply to the DHS for direct funding in the event
the State fails to award funding to the Tribe consistent with
the state homeland security plan.
We will continue to coordinate and collaborate our efforts through
Arizona's regionalized approach, and we are pleased that the Nation has
been recently successful in securing funds through this process.
However, the Nation is unlike any city or municipality in Arizona. As a
constitutional matter, the Nation is a sovereign entity whose
governance is separate from that of the State. Accordingly, the Nation
supports H.R. 1544 which provides a meaningful government to government
role to Indian Tribes having discrete homeland security concerns.
Similarly, the Nation supports the following provisions in H.R.
1320--Secure Borders Act, would be of particular significant and
assistance to the Nation:
Section 151 would establish an Office of Tribal
Security (OTS) within DHS to coordinate all of its homeland
security efforts in Indian Country and to serve as an official
point of contact within DHS for Indian Tribes.
Section 152 would transfer the Shadow Wolves from the
Bureau of Customs and Border Protection (BCBP) to the Bureau of
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (BICE). This provision
would keep the Shadow Wolves in tact as a distinct unit focused
on identifying, following, and arresting illegal drug smuggler
along the 75 miles of international border along and within the
Nation. The Shadow Wolves better fit within BICE because their
work is more similar to BICE agents who investigate and crack
down on substantial drug smuggling operations. In recognition
of the Shadow Wolves' success, the provision also authorizes
the DHS Secretary to establish additional BICE special units
whose mission, similar to that of the Shadow Wolves, is to
prevent the smuggling of illegal drugs, weapons and other
contraband on Indian reservations, where such law enforcement
is clearly needed.
The Nation supports these legislative proposals because they will
strengthen the homeland security capacity of the United States through
a government-to-government relationship with Tribes to protect and
secure America. Indian Tribes subject to the highest security risks and
vulnerabilities should not be left out of the discussion to improve
national security.
Finally, the Nation proposes that the BCBP have an specific
agreement relating to federal access on the Nation's lands. BCBP is
working on an memorandum of understanding with the Department of
Interior governing federal access on public lands under Interior's
authority. In these discussions, the Bureau of Indian Affairs expressed
its view that it cannot make decisions for Indian Tribes due to tribal
sovereignty, and therefore recommended that BCBP enter into an
agreement with the Nation governing federal access on our lands. We
believe this approach would greatly improve coordination among law
enforcement personnel as well as promote and foster better government
to government relations. Because our territory is so vast, and given
the recent boost in border security activities, the Nation believes it
is imperative to have a written agreement which details our respective
roles and policies, in addition to important tribal protocols that are
otherwise unknown to law enforcement personnel inexperienced in working
with Indian tribes.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman
Chairman King. Thank you, Governor.
[The statement of Governor Napolitano follows:]
Prepared Statement of Janet Napolitano
Chairman King, Ranking Member Thompson, and Committee Members,
thank you for inviting me here today to speak about an issue foremost
on the minds of all Americans: how the local, state and federal
governments should respond to disasters and emergencies in our
homeland.
Less than two months ago, we saw the harrowing affects of Hurricane
Katrina, and the human tragedy that occurs when the government response
is delayed and disorganized.
In its aftermath, every American is rightfully asking, what if
another Hurricane Katrina happened in my community? Is the federal
government meeting its responsibility in assisting my state prepare for
a natural disaster or a terrorist attack? Will my government learn the
important lessons of Hurricane Katrina?
I applaud Congress for holding these hearings so we can learn from
the lessons of Katrina. I am increasingly troubled, however, by
suggestions that the federal government pre-empt the constitutional
authority of states and the nation's governors during an emergency.
While the federal government is often a critical partner in
disaster relief, it is the states that have historically responded
well. State and local governments are in the best position to prepare
for, respond to, and recover from emergency and disaster.
Just last week, our nation's Governors joined together--Republicans
and Democrats--and with one voice called on the federal government not
to undermine the authority and rights of states.
I encourage all of you to read the joint statement we issued
through the National Governors Association, and as vice chair of
National Governors Association and chair of the Western Governors
Association, I ask that you pay special attention to our state
commanders-in-chief throughout this process.
Governors have a particular relevancy in our nation's response
plans. Because of the continued critical role of the National Guard in
emergency and disaster response, governors would have to be universally
supportive of any changes to our nation's response strategy, or the
federal government would risk its ability to utilize the Guard.
The Constitution is clear: when a National Guard unit assists in a
primarily federal purpose under Title 32, it does so under the command
and control of governors--not Congress or the President.
When National Guard troops so admirably and capably responded to
Hurricane Katrina and in the wake of the terrorist attacks September
11, they did so under the command and authority of governors. The law
of the land demands that it stay that way.
States also have a strong track record of working together during
emergencies without federal involvement.
Through the national Emergency Management Assistance Compacts, or
EMACs, states have mutual aid agreements that direct emergency
equipment and staffing to areas that need it most during a disaster.
Because these agreements determine reimbursement and liability issues
before a disaster strikes, states are able to deploy resources to other
states quickly without the need to enter into a new agreement first.
Katrina notwithstanding, states have a long and successful history
in responding to natural and man-caused disasters. In Arizona, we have
experienced many disasters, ranging from wildfires during the summer
months to flash floods in the winter, and have learned lessons along
the way.
We have a long record of success in managing our relationship with
the federal government, and coordinating a system that works well in
fighting fires.
In Arizona, if a wildland fire starts on state land, Arizona
officials coordinate the efforts to fight the fire; if the fire grows
beyond our capacity to suppress it, or we need additional assistance,
we call on the U.S. Forest Service for help. It is a complex
relationship, and there are many elements to fighting fires, but the
system works.
We also work with other states to fight fires. We frequently draw
on resources from other states, and we often send experienced
firefighting crews from Arizona elsewhere.
Similarly, the Forest Service is the lead response agency in
fighting fires on federal land in our state. If a fire starts on
national forest land, it is the federal government that coordinates the
fire suppression efforts, and calls on Arizona for additional
assistance.
Unfortunately, as federal budget cuts take hold, we find ourselves
fighting with the federal government for reimbursement to the state for
its fair share of costs in fighting fires on federal lands.
While we have built a solid record of success, we have also had
difficulties. Some of these disasters have been particularly
devastating, but rather than re-inventing the wheel every time
something goes wrong, we learn from our experience and understand how
we can be better prepared next time.
This is particularly true of the Rodeo-Chediski Fire in 2002--a
fire that burned more than 450,000 acres, destroyed more than 400
structures including many homes, and cost more than $150 million to
suppress.
Arizona learned some tough lessons from that fire. Our emergency
responders couldn't communicate with each other, and communities caught
in the middle of the fire did not have evacuation plans.
Those communities have since developed evacuation plans, and
Arizona's fire-prone communities are also working to remove hazardous
fuels to lower the risk of fire. Further, we have purchased five
incident command vans with interoperable communications capabilities
that can travel wherever they are needed, allowing our emergency crews
to communicate with each other during any incident. In fact, one of
those vehicles was deployed to Louisiana following Hurricane Katrina.
We learned our lessons, and are better prepared for future
emergencies. That is the same approach the federal government should
take: to understand what it did wrong, and to better prepare for the
future.
Rather than embarking on a course that could have many unknowable
and unfortunate consequences, Congress should focus its attention on
how the federal government can best team with states. That analysis
should break into two parts: what the federal and state governments
should do in advance of an emergency; and what they should do
afterward.
Pre-emergency has two aspects. First, there is general preparation
for all different types of scenarios. Second, there is specific
preparation when a known emergency is developing--such as in the days
immediately preceding Katrina. In the wake of September 11, Congress
initially understood that role, and provided states with resources to
prevent and prepare for disasters. Those resources are how Arizona paid
for the five mobile communications vans I mentioned a moment ago; they
also paid for the Arizona Counter-Terrorism Information Center, a 24-7
intelligence gathering and dissemination center that links together
representatives from the local, tribal, county, state and federal
levels to detect and prevent acts of terrorism.
Federal dollars also paid for critical capability-specific training
and equipment along the Arizona-Mexico border, where we are at risk for
a terrorist strike. We exercised a mutual-aid agreement with the
Mexican State of Sonora in conducting a federally funded bi-national
training exercise--simulating a WMD attack at the border--with 22
Mexican law enforcement, medical services and emergency management
agencies and 50 local, state and federal agencies from the United
States.
We established interoperability capabilities in the four counties
that border Mexico, trained more than 900 Mexican firefighters, medical
responders and law enforcement officers, and developed the ability to
communicate with Mexican authorities during an emergency. We will have
interoperability capabilities in the entire state of Arizona by the end
of 2006.
In addition, we have also forged homeland security and preparedness
partnerships with tribal governments--like the Tohono O'odham Nation--
whose lands include 78 miles of porous international border.
Our ability to handle a disaster along the border was tested just a
few months ago when a train in Mexico derailed and spilled 10,000
gallons of sulfuric acid into the Santa Cruz River. Even though the
spill occurred in Mexico, it contaminated the water that flows through
the river into Arizona.
Arizona's local governments--from cities to counties to the state--
responded to the disaster quickly and effectively, and worked with
their counterparts in Mexico to avert what could have been a very
dangerous situation.
Arizona puts homeland security resources to good use. That's why I
am frustrated and disappointed that Congress and the Administration cut
Arizona's homeland security resources. The federal government cut our
Homeland Security Grant Program resources by 36 percent, our
Metropolitan Medical Response System by 50 percent, and our Law
Enforcement Terrorism Prevention Program by 22 percent, and failed to
fund many worthwhile homeland security projects in other states. In
terms of general preparation, having properly-funded emergency relief
initiatives is key.
In terms of specific preparation for known and anticipated crises,
the federal government needs to participate more in joint planning with
states to identify necessary assets and have them pre-positioned where
they will do the most good.
I am troubled that in recent years the federal government has
severely limited our ability to fight the huge forest fires that have
plagued the West. In March 2004, the federal government made available
33 heavy air tankers to states to fight fires, but just three months
later--at the height of our fire season--none were at our disposal.
There were many reasons for this, but none justifies the lack of pre-
planning with the states and the timing of the decision to ground the
air tankers.
Once a disaster occurs the lead responsibility should reside with
the states. One of the purposes of preparation and prevention is to
develop an ongoing partnership between state personnel and their
relevant federal counterparts. And, with specific respect to FEMA,
governors need more, not less, authority to make decisions.
Arizona is one of the states that received Katrina evacuees; we
experienced firsthand FEMA's total breakdown in providing any
meaningful information regarding the status, welfare or destinations of
those evacuees.
I cannot leave the topic of preparation for known risks without
discussion of the Arizona--Mexico border. Securing the international
border is a federal responsibility, but time and time again the federal
government has refused to provide the proper resources--and enough
Border Patrol agents--to secure it. On average, 1500 people are
apprehended every day while attempting to cross the Arizona border
illegally; that number obviously does not include those who are never
caught. The Arizona-Sonora border is the gateway for more than half of
the illegal cross-border activity that occurs along the U.S.--Mexico
border. In fact, of the 1.1 million Southwest border apprehensions in
2004, nearly half were apprehended in the Tucson Sector alone. While
most of the people who cross seek to work in the United States, we have
no way of knowing if some of those who cross seek to attack us.
Congress must make it a priority to regain operational control of the
border.
I hope that one of the lessons we learn from Hurricane Katrina is
that certain emergencies can be prevented or minimized, and that the
best disaster response actually happens years before a first responder
ever arrives on the scene.
Aside from learning that lesson, there are many things this
Congress should do to prevent and prepare for future disasters in the
United States:
First, respect the constitutional authority of states
and the nation's governors in an emergency situation.
Second, restore critical homeland security and
emergency response resources that the federal government has
cut in recent years. The value of funding for preparation and
practice in advance of a true emergency cannot be
underestimated.
Third, better evaluate and examine disaster threats,
such as the federal levees in New Orleans, and prioritize
funding for those areas. Obviously, securing the border must be
a top funding priority here.
Fourth, work with the states to obtain accreditation
for state emergency preparedness plans. The accreditation
process is extremely thorough and provides a mechanism for
states to ensure they have covered all that is necessary.
Last but not least, the public health aspects of
disaster and recovery must be integrated into any response
plan. Preparations, or the lack thereof, for the avian flu
illustrate this point.
I appreciate your time and consideration, and am pleased to answer
any questions you have at this time.
Chairman King. Governor Bush, I want to assure you that the
prayers of all Americans are with the people of Florida, for
the people of Florida, especially those in the southwest, and
we certainly wish you the very best as you confront this latest
crisis. You detailed very systematically what you have already
begun to do, how you are preparing for this weekend's
hurricane. Obviously it is based on past experience. It is
constantly being updated. But as you know, the best plans,
there is always glitches along the way.
Something unexpected is going to happen. What other
preparations do you make? For instance, what contact do you
have with the Federal Government now as to what they will do,
assuming something goes wrong, the storm goes a different way,
some evacuation doesn't work, some hospital can't be evacuated
or whatever? Are you in contact with representatives in the
Federal Government now for the unexpected?
Governor Bush. Absolutely; including the President of the
United States when appropriate. I mean, the Governors will
have, during an emergency, have direct contact with the
Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security, the head of
FEMA, the military. There is--what is interesting about
hurricanes, or disasters, is that I think the rule book gets
thrown-out about all the nooks and crannies of government at
every level. And there is a unified command structure in our
State, so for starters, in our emergency operations center we
will have a FEMA representative, and we will have a Homeland
Security representative, typically high level, typically the
admiral from the regional Coast Guard that is based in Miami.
And so we will have direct access to agencies of the Federal
Government.
And you are right. You can't plan for every contingency in
a disaster. Things happen. We prepare for the worst. We hope
for the best, and then we expect the unexpected, and that is
exactly what happens every storm. So we have a seamless
relationship. We don't expect, and if we don't get, we push
hard. We plan massively as well and worry about the paperwork
later. That can get--you know, after the fact sometimes that
may not look as pretty as you did when you make that decision,
but when you are preparing for a storm where you know there is
going to be major devastation, you don't worry about that.
And we have found that the problems with FEMA isn't at this
time--you know, the 2 or 3 days before the storm--the problem
can be in the recovery phase, trying to get housing, trying to
get individual assistance, dealing with creating a consistent
reimbursement means for debris removal, which is a much bigger
problem than you could ever imagine. The tonnage of debris that
comes from a natural disaster of any kind is enormous. And so
the bureaucratic part of FEMA becomes a problem in the
recovery, not in the relief and preparation, in my opinion.
Chairman King. Governor Perry, with Rita what contacts or
what lines of communication and coordination did you have with
the Federal Government as you prepared and as the storm was
beginning its onslaught? And did you feel that those lines of
communication were adequate?
Governor Perry. Mr. Chairman, one of the--I think the keys
is the preparation that is done prior to an event. And again, I
can't stress enough how important it is for those exercises to
have been conducted, for that homeland security dollars to have
been appropriately spent, for those State and local first
responders to work together in exercises prior to, and I might
add the Federal Government is in our State operation center
working with us during those exercises.
Chairman King. Who is the Federal Government at that stage?
Governor Perry. The FEMA representative, the Air Force, the
Army, the Navy, all of those Federal agencies that you would
deal with, they game play with us on these exercises. I mean,
they are occurring, and so the issue of is your communications
there with the Federal Government, from our time that we have
worked with them, yes. I mean, the fact of the matter is this
isn't--I mean, I will tell you that from a Texas perspective,
we have had--with Rita in particular and with Katrina, our work
with the Federal Government was good. You know, was it perfect?
No. I mean, as you said, you throw out the play book. But the
fact of the matter is it is at the local level, I think, where
the first decisions have to be made, and that response is being
made.
Again, you know, I am not here to particularly criticize
FEMA or criticize any of the other agencies of government, but,
you know, the fact is that the less bureaucracy that we have to
deal with in an emergency, the better. We operate just like Jeb
and Florida in the fact that we ask for forgiveness later. We
are going to not ask for permission today to go save the lives
of our citizens, and as appropriately it should be. And, you
know, we will work out the--any bureaucratic details later.
But, so, you know, I talked to the President a number of
times prior to Rita hitting our coast and afterwards. You know,
we talked to Secretary Chertoff and to--and I talked to Jeb. I
mean, we called each other before Katrina actually. We had a
conversation, and he called me and he said, listen, we are the
bookends on this thing. And what--are we doing everything that
we need to do to help the people in Alabama and Georgia and
Mississippi and Louisiana? Because he said the fact of the
matter is, he said we are perfectly suited, and he needed some
things from us, some gasoline, and that had been disrupted from
a previous storm, and so these Governors work together. And I
think it is very important to realize that there is a lot of
good communications. There is a heck of a lot more good that
goes on than things that are bad. And it seems like there are
some folks that want to focus on the bad.
Chairman King. Thank you very much. My time has expired.
Ranking Member Mr. Thompson.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you very much. And I appreciate the
testimony of the witnesses.
One of the things I would like to be very clear on is there
is some discussion here in Washington that the Federal role in
disaster preparedness should be expanded to become a primary
role rather than a secondary role. Is it your testimony here
today that, as Governors of your State, you reject that notion
and assume the responsibility of disaster preparedness and
response for your particular State? All three of you.
Governor Bush. Absolutely. I think if this responsibility
is federalized, then that will be as big of a disaster as any
natural disaster that hits our communities.
Governor Napolitano. We can't do our jobs if it is
federalized. Our job is to protect the safety and welfare of
our citizens. We are on the ground there every day working with
our first responders, our sheriffs, our fire Department, our
police officers. Moving the locus and focus to Washington,
D.C., would be a disaster.
Governor Perry. It would be a great mistake, Mr. Thompson.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I yield
back.
Chairman King. Gentleman from Texas Mr. Smith.
Mr. Smith. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Governor Perry, a lot of observers do feel that Texas did
respond well to both Hurricane Katrina and Hurricane Rita, both
in the response to the disaster itself, as well as to meeting
the needs of hundreds of thousands of evacuees. Why was Texas
able to respond so quickly and appropriately, in your judgment?
Governor Perry. And I will be very brief because I am going
to repeat myself, but it was because of the preparation and the
appropriate coordination from our State emergency operation
center. You are going to have the opportunity to talk to local
officials from Beaumont and Jefferson County and from over in
Sugarland, and I think you are going to hear that exact same
story is that because of the preparation and the gaming out and
the exercises that we went through, we were as prepared as you
can be, and always knowing that there is going to be some curve
ball thrown at you that you did not perceive. The idea that we
were going to have evacuees from Louisiana to the numbers that
we had, and then we had to evacuate those evacuees, I am not
sure anybody put that one into the game book. But now we know
how we would deal with this massive evacuation out of one of
the most populous areas along the gulf coast. And we didn't get
it perfect. We learned, and we are analyzing and deconstructing
that as we speak so that we can make it better the next time,
because we know there will be a next time.
Mr. Smith. Governor Perry, in your prepared statement, in
fact it was the second sentence of your prepared statement, you
said, I oppose the federalization of emergency response efforts
to natural disasters and other catastrophic events. That is
pretty clear, and it sounds like all three Governors agree with
that statement. And--but my question is, that being the case,
what do you think is the appropriate--when is it appropriate
for the Federal Government to be involved, if ever, in natural
disasters?
Governor Perry. I look at the military's role. I think we
need to be careful as we talk about the government's role here.
What I was making reference to is the military taking over as
the first responder. That is the clear concern that I think all
three of us share. But there is an absolute role for the
Federal Government in a number of ways, obviously, but the
military's is to come in with their assets, with their
transportation assets, with their personnel to operate that
heavy equipment, et cetera, whether it is, you know, the
removal of huge amounts of debris on the road so that the
emergency responders can get in, and there are a lot of
different roles that they play. But it is not to come in and be
the first responder of the fire and police and people who have
been working together for years, and they almost instinctively
know what one is going to do and how those work together.
The military's role should be not unlike the National Guard
or the Reserve's role when we are in a conflict and the
military has--needs some assistance; then that is when we call
up our National Guard and our Reserves to complement the
military. I look at the Active Duty military as our Reserves in
these disasters, and we will call them up when we need them.
Mr. Smith. Okay. Thank you, Governor Perry.
Governor Bush, do you tend to agree with that response?
What do you think is the appropriate Federal role of the
government when it comes to natural disasters? I assume it is
pretty much in line with what Governor Perry said.
Governor Bush. It is. And there are unique things that can
be accessed through the EMAS system, the Emergency Mutual Aid
System that exists. Remember, in a Federal system, to put in
perspective, we had 3,700, at the peak, 3,700 firefighters,
police officers, National Guard, State law enforcement agents,
fish and game folks, and public health people in mostly
Mississippi, and some in Louisiana. That was the Federal
response, because it was asked for by the Governor, mostly the
Governor of Mississippi, some the Governor of Louisiana; it
went through FEMA and through this mutual aid pact; we
responded.
We happened to be in better shape to do it, because you
couldn't get to Mississippi from Texas or from the north. The
only way to get there was from the east. We had already
mobilized because the storm could have hit our State. So we
were the first responders literally in southern Mississippi.
That is a federalist response, coordinated by the Federal
Government. It worked. It worked really well. Ask the folks
that--at least I have gotten a lot of comments about how much
they appreciate the fact that there was that quick response in
southern Mississippi.
There are unique things that right now we are asking for,
we are beginning to plan for. If the storm hits the Florida
Keys, there is one way in, one way out. We are going to have to
have a unique means of getting in there to make sure we do our
search and rescue. That will probably be a Hoover craft. We
don't have Hoover crafts in State government. That is from the
military, and the military is already beginning the process to
see if it is possible to stage that in a way that would be
helpful.
That is the kind of response we asked for, and, again, we
typically get it. I think the problem with the Federal response
gets more burdensome in the recovery, not the preparation and
relief part of this. When people are there in line, you know,
waiting to get an SBA loan or trying to get public assistance
or communities that may have a small budget that are
overwhelmed by debris removal or having to build their
infrastructure up and are trying to get reimbursed through
FEMA, that is the place where I think there needs to be some
work. It can get really frustrating is all I can tell you.
Mr. Smith. Thank you, Governor Bush. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
Chairman King. The gentlewoman from California, Ms.
Sanchez.
Ms. Sanchez. Thank you all, governors, for being before us.
The President just signed this week a Homeland Security
appropriations bill, the spending monies for 2006, and in it he
cut by half the State Homeland Security grant program, from
$1.1 billion to $550 million, and he also cut the Urban Area
Security Initiative, UASI, by over $120 million.
Will this affect you at all? Will this affect your
programs, governors, in particular for example, Governor
Napolitano? You spoke about trying to get more of our agencies
interoperable on communications equipment, et cetera. Do you
think this will affect you at all?
Governor Napolitano. Mr. Chairman, Congresswoman, yes, it
will. It can't help but not to. I think that what the Congress
should look at is what is--what are the States doing and how do
they need to be properly funded at the Federal level to do what
we are asking the States to do? That means funding for all of
the exercises that Governor Perry has discussed. That means
funding for the right kinds of equipment so that as we
preposition it before a hurricane or forest fire, we have that
kind of equipment. It means really evaluating risks and funding
for no able risks as well as those that may be unknowable.
So from a State perspective, yes, it definitely will have
an impact and not a good one.
Ms. Sanchez. Anybody else want to talk about what impact it
might have?
Governor Perry. I would like to respond first and foremost.
I don't know what the rest of the Federal Government budget
looks like, just because they cut back in one area doesn't
necessarily mean we are not going to have dollars flowing to
the State of Texas. It is up to us to make those decisions and
prioritize where those dollars are spent. If that is the only
dollars that are going to be flowing to the State for the
purposes of Homeland Security, then the obvious answer would be
there might be some concerns there. But I would need more
information about the total budgetary outlay for Homeland
Security for those types of operations.
When you just describe it as that is the only--
Ms. Sanchez. Governor, I was assuming you might know what
types of production or what you are using those particular
Homeland Security programs for in your State.
Governor Perry. The fact of the matter is we don't know
what the total budget is, Ms. Sanchez, and I think to try to
talk about how a reduction in one line item is going to impact
your entire State's appropriation and your entire State's
activities relative to Homeland Security is inappropriate, and
I can't tell you without looking--
Ms. Sanchez. Thank you, Governor. I understand. Just for
your own information, there were three law enforcement
programs, including the COPS, which have significantly been
scaled back, and one of the reasons that this administration
has said they had done that is they were putting more monies
into these times of programs in Homeland Security. So it came
to me as somewhat of a surprise this was cut in this year's
bill.
Governor Bush, do you have any comment on those particular
programs, the State Homeland Security grant and the UASI
programs? Do they affect your State at all?
Governor Bush. I don't know, to be honest with you. You
know what, in a perfect world, I think you probably hear this
from governors a lot--
Ms. Sanchez. You just want the money and you want no
strings attached?
Governor Bush. Exactly.
Ms. Sanchez. Thank you, Governor Bush.
I have another question. We understand that.
Governor Perry. Just for the record, Governor Napolitano
agrees with that also.
Ms. Sanchez. I have a question in particular for Governor
Napolitano, but you all are, in a sense, border States, maybe
not Florida, but you certainly have this issue of ports and a
lot of coastline where people may come in. I am the ranking
member on the subcommittee here that deals in particular with
border security and the Border Patrol, et cetera, and there
have been several governors who have mentioned that this is a
national security problem.
So, my question is, in particular to Governor Napolitano,
and if we have time, to the other two, I am not picking just on
her, but she happens to have an ongoing problem of people
coming across the Sonora Desert there, as does Texas, but we
hear more of it coming out of Governor Napolitano's area, we
are looking at doing some immigration reform here in the
Congress, maybe in this next 2 months, maybe beginning with the
whole issue of border security.
Can you talk to me about the number of border patrol, what
the problem is, what we vice president done at the Federal
level, what you need to see? Not only from securing the border,
but also what happens if we do nothing about the people who are
already inside of the United States who may not have documents
or have overstayed their documents for staying here. What
problems does this cause you? What would you like for us to do
here at the Federal level?
Governor Napolitano. Congresswoman, I would like the
Federal Government to put more resources into the Arizona
border, as has been promised now for many, many years. The
resources were put in the San Diego-Tijuana area in Operation
Gatekeeper, they were put into the El Paso-Juarez area in
Operation Hold-the-Line, and the Arizona border was left
unresourced and the traffic, quite frankly, moved into Arizona.
The border has to be dealt with as a whole, the whole
stretch of it, and we need more by way of resources there. We
need Border Patrol agents north of the border. The County of
Maricopa, where Phoenix is located, is the point of destination
for literally hundreds of thousands people who are crossing on
an annual basis. We have no Border Patrol agents to pick them
up. They are caught and released. That is the policy, catch and
release. So the rule of law is not being applied. That has to
be a top priority.
Accompanying that needs to be a thorough examination of our
Federal immigration law and policy and how it should be changed
to match the economic realities of today.
Governor Perry. Absolutely, if I could, Mr. Chairman, I
would like to just give you some numbers, Mrs. Sanchez. Other
than Mexicans, that is the individuals, OTMs, that is the
biggest area of concern, not the biggest, it is one of the
great areas of concern. From 2002 to 2005 in the Del Rio
sector, the OTMs went up that were apprehended by 613 percent.
In the McAllen area, the very far southern part of the Texas
area, those numbers went up 429 percent. The number of Mexican
aliens that were apprehended stayed basically level.
But we are seeing a huge problem with OTMs, and there is a
very much a nonsensical policy today by Homeland Security to
bring those people inwards 150 miles in the case of from the
border of Texas to San Angelo, and release them on to that
community without knowing who these people are, with the
directions that he would want you to show up at a deportation
hearing in X number of days and the fact of the matter is none
of them show up. This is a real problem and it has to be dealt
with. We need more technology, we need more Border Patrol
agents, we need more dollars along the border to pay for the
overtime for our law enforcement officials that are there.
So, I think all of us share in the fact of the matter is
with all due respect, the State of Texas has about 1,200 miles
of that border to deal with, and in between those ports of
entry is where a lot of those resources are going to have to be
spent.
Ms. Sanchez. Thank you.
Governor Bush. Well, while we don't have a land border, we
do have a significant border with the Caribbean and we also are
the recipient of a tremendous number of people that cross the
Texas and Arizona borders to come to pursue their dreams in our
State. So I think protecting the homeland, one of the main ways
that you could do that, I don't know about all of the little
programs you were talking about, this is an area where Border
Patrol enforcement, more agents for the Border Patrol, not just
in the southwest, not at the expense of the southwest, we
certainly don't want to do that, but including areas like
Florida where we have seen a dramatic increase in the number of
interdictions of people coming by boat.
Then this is a dicey subject, but the treatment of illegal
immigrants, their status, is something that can't be ignored.
Ms. Sanchez. You are talking about people who are already
here who are working who might be part of the community.
Governor Bush. Which is part of your question.
Ms. Sanchez. We can fortify the border. What does that do
for the people inside?
Governor Bush. I think in turn for fortifying the border,
strengthening the border, there needs to be some recognition of
the fact that these are, by and large, most of these folks are
hard-working people, they are working so that they can provide
for their families. There needs to be a policy I think that
respects them. Until we can control our borders, I doubt that
that will be done in Washington, D.C.
So I think the first step is the proper one we are talking
about, but immediately to ignore the fact that we have millions
of people here that don't have documentation, that are making
contributions, but they are not being recognized. That may be
politically correct in this day and age, but I think it is
important to recognize.
Chairman King. The gentlewoman's time has expired.
Ms. Sanchez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your indulgence.
Chairman King. I am always willing to indulge the lady.
I would just note for the record that this is an ongoing
debate that we do, but the amount of homeland security grants
has actually increased over the last 4 years from $200 million
to $1.7 billion, and there are some States who have not spent
more than half the money that has been awarded to them from the
Department of Homeland Security, and there is almost $6 billion
in the pipeline. Again, this is debate that we have ongoing.
I recognize the gentlewoman from Florida, Ms. Harris.
Ms. Harris. Governor Bush, I wanted to ask you specifically
about some the issues that we have faced in Florida, most
notably the debris situation.
What we have had from FEMA are a number of different rules
and regulations, different types of issues that they have told
us and that has made it very difficult on counties,
particularly in my economically challenged counties like Hardy
and DeSoto. So I wanted to ask you what you saw about the
actual policies concerning debris removal?
For us, what our experience was is that FEMA focused more
on semantics, not on the sewage and waste that were
overwhelming communities. In their clean-up processes, they
instituted unworkable definitions and standards for what
constituted gated communities, for what were movable and what
was removable. It just got into a bureaucratic morass.
From Tallahassee's standpoint, we want to know you felt
that you could deal with that better. It seemed like the rules
continue to change daily. And the costs that were incurred and
then the interest rates that were incurred, that small
communities, small counties, had to borrow in order to
accommodate what government had told them on the front end,
what the Federal Government told them on the front end was
going to be permissible.
I would like to know what your thoughts are on that.
Governor Bush. I think this is a serious issue. There needs
to be greater transparency and clarity in treatment of debris
in Phoenix just as it should be treated in Orlando, just as it
should be treated in Austin. I think the interpretation of
these rules varies from community to community, which makes it
hard to determine when you should pick-up debris and when you
shouldn't.
The question of debris removal on private property, one
would think that is a legitimate restriction. But you have many
communities that have public functions but private streets.
Those aren't gated communities that you think of in affluent
areas. In Florida, as you know, many of these gated communities
are mobile home communities. Those are the ones hurt the most,
but yet they couldn't get the debris removed. I think having
greater transparency and clarity of interpretation would be
very important.
Secondly, one of the problems that we face has been just
getting the reimbursements done. The grind-it-out process
which, Congressman, you are going to probably begin to hear
about from your constituents increasingly because of Katrina,
getting invoices through the process has been quite difficult.
Thankfully, in Florida, Scott Morris came to be part of the
long-term recovery effort in Orlando and made a commitment that
he would deal with this issue and has done so. But it really
required his effort. It shouldn't be based on one individual.
There ought to be systemic change, so that the reimbursement
that we thank you for--and I haven't expressed my thanks for
the appropriation last year that saved our State--but for the
supplemental that you provided made it possible for us to
recover.
Accessing that supplemental budget that you appropriated
has been a challenge that we have now finally resolved.
Going forward, I think there should be higher expectations
of FEMA to get this process done quickly.
Ms. Harris. On another note, and I would like all the
governors to address this, we specifically had a hurricane
summit this past week, then you commented on the idea that we
have been discussing for some time on a national CAT fund. I
really liked some of the ideas you had in terms of the
accountability, that States should have their own CAT funds
established first, some of the building code issues.
Would you elaborate on some of your ideas concerning a
national catastrophic fund? I would like to hear from Governor
Perry and Governor Napolitano as well.
Governor Bush. In response to this notion of federalization
of the emergency response, maybe a better approach would be to
hold local communities and States to higher expectations. Part
of that could be to create a culture of preparedness. One of
the things we have done in our State to achieve that is we have
a statewide building code that is the toughest in the country.
It changes the dynamics of evacuations, it changes the dynamics
of cost. It creates the possibility of having a private
insurance market, which we still have.
We created, after Andrew, a catastrophe fund that had $4.5
billion, I believe, of equity built up that had the capacity to
borrow up to, I think, $18 billion to deal with these storms.
That created another buffer.
Given the fact we seem to be in an era where there are
tremendous amounts of disasters going on, maybe I am so
immersed in it, maybe it is not a typical, but it seems like
there are more of these going on, and as we see the costs of
these rise, perhaps it is time to consider a national
catastrophe fund, and to opt into something like that, the
Federal Government could perhaps require local and State
governments to have preparation second to none, to have a State
catastrophic fund to be able to buffer the private insurance
market, and to create a culture of preparedness, which I think
is essential for quicker recoveries.
Governor Perry. Just briefly, we have a State CAT fund, but
the fact of the matter is with the cost of these catastrophes
reaching the level they are today, it is certainly worth the
debate and we would be open to discussing of the Federal
catastrophic fund and then obviously it is always the strings
attached with that. But we are certainly open to discuss that.
Governor Napolitano. Certainly it is an idea worth
considering. We, too, have a State catastrophe fund. It goes by
a somewhat different name, but that effectively is what it is.
One of the things it does is advances costs that are really
legitimately Federal costs because the Federal reimbursements
come so tardily. So I think the notion of having a national
fund with State funds and whatever, leveraging against each
other, if we can clear up the paperwork, is well worth doing.
Chairman King. The gentleman from the State of Washington,
Mr. Dicks.
Mr. Dicks. I want to welcome the governors. I appreciate
your testimony.
What about the housing issue, Governor Perry in particular,
and Governor Bush, since you have been faced with this? This is
one that worries me, how do we get these people into the right
temporary housing and how do we get them into permanent
housing?
Governor Perry. Absolutely. Yesterday, in a meeting with
Secretary Chertoff and his senior staff, we discussed that
exact issue. We still have some 287,000 individuals in hotels
and in motels and those types of rooms that are very expensive
way to put folks up. One of the ideas that I laid out yesterday
in some remarks was the concept of a housing voucher that could
be used for either mortgage payments, particularly incenting
people to go to VA, FHA, USDA type of housing, or for rent, but
to put them in the responsible position of taking control of
their lives, rather than keeping them in some type of this
temporary housing that is incredibly expensive.
Mr. Dicks. Is FEMA paying for that?
Governor Perry. Yes, sir, that is my understanding. It is
$22 million--excuse me, $11 million a day, a pretty expensive
hotel bill.
Mr. Dicks. Governor Bush, what is your experience after
last year?
Governor Bush. Well, we had a frustrating experience. This
is back to the recovery side of it. As I said, prevention and
relief, I thought FEMA did a pretty good job. Recovery is
difficult. FEMA had the responsibility of providing the housing
and it just was slow coming, to be honest with you.
We ended up I think with 12,000 mobile homes or mobile
structures that, thankfully, many people now have gotten out
of, although some continue to use.
It is extraordinarily expensive, and there is really not an
easy answer to a Katrina-like storm, where you are overwhelming
the housing stock of a broad expanse of area. There is just not
a place you can go in the United States and say order me up
200,000 manufactured homes. They are not in the inventory. So
it will take an extended period of time.
I think just if there could be a way for FEMA to perhaps
challenge how they go through their process of determining if
someone is eligible, speeding up that process, it would be very
helpful. Eliminating some of just the uncertainties that--when
someone has been hit by a storm, they have lost most of their
assets typically. People that are most hurt don't have a lot of
assets to begin with or a lot of income. To try to go through
the maze is extraordinarily difficult.
Mr. Dicks. Thank you very much.
Could I ask one additional question here. On the military
side of this, I am on defense appropriations and have been on
the committee for a long time. The military isn't excited about
taking over this responsibility either, by the way. I wanted to
ask you this. Both the Coast Guard, and I think, the active
duty forces that had helicopters come in and did a lot of
important relief work. Was that done under the leadership of
the governors and your emergency people?
Governor Perry. Yes.
Mr. Dicks. So they weren't acting independently of you.
This was all coordinated with you?
Governor Perry. It came straight out of our State operating
center.
Mr. Dicks. There is no way you have that kind of equipment.
Governor Perry. We do have a substantial number of aviation
assets in the Guard, a lot of Blackhawk helicopters, but those
Coast Guard choppers that were doing the evacuations that you
saw out of Louisiana, those were directed by their assets
there.
Mr. Dicks. To be honest with you, I don't know who was in
charge of Louisiana. I don't know who was calling the shots
there. We are still wondering that ourselves up here.
Governor Napolitano, on Interior appropriations, we have
jurisdiction over the forest fires in appropriations, and I am
very interested to hear what you might want to say about what
were the strengths and weaknesses in the response to these
major forest fires that you have endured in Arizona?
Governor Napolitano. Thank you. We have developed a system,
if a fire starts on State land, we are the first responder and
we coordinate with the Forest Service to provide support. If it
starts on Federal land, they are the first responder, we
coordinate with them. One of the key things about forest fires
is you may not know precisely when or where one is going to
start, but you can pretty much predict the month you are going
to start your fire season and you can pretty much predict the
areas of your State where they are going to begin.
Mr. Dicks. Did you have problems with the Federal response
in terms of getting money back?
Governor Napolitano. Yes, indeed. When we are incurring
Federal expenses for helping fight fires on Federal land, delay
in reimbursement has been a real problem for the Forest
Service. And a second real problem has been the lack of plan
and coordination with the States on air tanker support for
wildfire fighting. We were literally in the middle of a very,
very bad fire season, then the forest season with no real
prewarning to the States, grounded all 33 of the large air
tankers that are really your first wave of attack on a large
fire. We still don't have that situation worked out. So there
are problems there in coordinating with the Forest Service.
Overall, historically, it has been a good relationship, but
in those particular areas, speed of reimbursement and air
tanker support, problematic.
Chairman King. The gentleman from Texas, Mr. McCaul.
Mr. McCaul. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to correct my
introduction. It was the Texas National Guard, and it was not
federalized.
I don't want to let one bad apple ruin the whole federalist
scheme here. I think as you stated, let first responders be
first responders. I think the Federal Government can provide
the assets, the resources to help, but not take over the entire
scheme. I think we had a situation in Louisiana where, quite
frankly, there was a breakdown of communication and leadership,
but yet that should not change our fundamental laws and
Constitution. What Louisiana did raise was the issue of
preparedness to not only Mother Nature as a terrorist, but to
the terrorists themselves.
I want to see if the panel would comment on that, how well
prepared you feel in your States you are to a potential
terrorist attack, and then as we talk about the border, which I
know in my home State is an enormous issue, could you comment
on whether you believe we need to declare a national State of
emergency?
Governor Perry. That is a pretty broad set of questions,
and I will try to hit them very quickly.
I think Texas is as prepared as humanly possible for an
event, whether it is man-made or whether it is natural
disaster. Are we prepared for every eventuality? No. That is
physically impossible to be prepared for everything. We know
that. We learn every exercise.
But the fact is that, again, I go back to if States have
adequately used their Homeland Security dollars and other funds
have funneled into their States for those purposes, and we were
really thankful to the Federal Government for the dollars we
received, and hopefully, as you audit our expenditures of
those, that you will find that we have used them in an
appropriate way and reflective of how we dealt with Katrina and
Rita, and those 150+ plus exercises, that there is proof in the
pudding, if you will.
But our big concern, as you rightfully bring up, Michael,
is the border, and it is the terrorist individual who we don't
know about. In those OTMs, Mrs. Sanchez, that have been
apprehended in the State of Texas, we see people from countries
like Iraq, Iran, Bangladesh, that tri-border region between
Brazil and Argentina and Paraguay, that we know are al-Qa'ida
hot beds. It is those individuals that cause us great concern.
And the fact of the matter is, this catch and release program
that you heard Janet, that is just the lingo of the industry,
but that is a pretty accurate description of what they do. They
are apprehended, taken inland and turned loose. If that policy
does not change, there will be another terrorist attack on
America that comes from that type of immigration policy.
We must have the resources, we must have the border patrol,
the technology. And I can't overstate the presence--we have
Operation Linebacker that is ongoing in Texas today that our
sheriffs along the border have put together. It is following,
not unlike Operation Stone garden which occurred in a couple of
regional areas along the border. But it is that presence of
uniformed individuals in particular that really stops, lowers,
the amount of criminal activity that is ongoing.
So, it is a very broad subject that you bring up, but the
entire border region, from California all the way to
Brownsville, is susceptible to--is a very porous border. It is
a huge problem that we have to deal with as a country, because
this just isn't about Texas, Arizona and New Mexico and
California. This is about the entire country that is being
impacted by that type of open border.
Governor Napolitano. I think Governor Perry said it well.
It really is resources to be deployed between the ports of
entry further north, and the susceptibility is there. This must
be a top priority of our Homeland Security effort.
Governor Bush. I think Florida is better prepared after
September 11 than before. We were maybe better prepared than
other States because of the fact we have more natural
disasters. So the natural disasters actually, and how we
respond to them it is a training process to keep local
communities and the State focused on what is a huge priority
for our State. So I think we are better prepared.
But I guess what I try to tell the team that works so hard
on this is success is never final, and that we constantly have
to be upgrading how we prevent the damage of a natural disaster
and how we prevent an attack on our country. Florida is a place
that people move in and out of more than most places. So we are
a logical place where there could be a terrorist attack, just
given our coast and given our population.
So we are trying to constantly upgrade our skills. One of
the ways we have done a better job in the last 3 or 4 years is
the communication between fire and police, the sheriffs and
police departments. We have these regional security task force
structures that demand more transparency and more
communication. Then we are using technology to back it up with
more interoperability. That has been a problem, I think, across
the country.
Chairman King. The gentleman's time has expired. The
gentlewoman from New York, Ms. Lowey.
Mrs. Lowey. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I want to
thank all three governors for appearing before us. It has been
tremendously helpful.
I want to switch the subject to the pandemic possible,
let's hope, not the reality of a possible pandemic flu. But
first, I just wanted to comment briefly on Governor Bush's last
comment concerning interoperability, and Governor Napolitano
talked about that as well.
Unfortunately, the Federal Government's office of
interoperability really hasn't shown much leadership, and for
me, this has truly been unfortunate. Many of us have been
talking about it for years with the Department of Homeland
Security. I think it was Governor Napolitano that mentioned, I
am not sure, one of you mentioned that you have an
interoperable system in place. But what did happen in
Louisiana, even if they did have an interoperable system in
place, when the Federal departments came in, Federal agencies
came in, they weren't interoperable.
What we have been calling for is not a prototype that every
State has to have the exact equipment, but there should be
standards, there should be RFPs sent out, and we haven't done
this on the Federal level. So I hope you will work with us to
encourage more Federal activity and leadership in that area,
and I congratulate you for what you have done in terms of
interoperability.
But I want to get to pandemic influenza preparedness,
because I have been talking about a year. In hearings on April
12, before that in October, about the need for a Federal
preparedness plan to deal with the possible influenza pandemic.
I am pleased to learn that each of your States has begun
working on this kind of preparedness plan. In fact, it makes me
wonder why the Federal plan has been in draft form since last
August, and we still don't have a permanent Federal influenza
plan.
Now, I think we would all agree that we wouldn't look to
Michael Chertoff to be the Nation's doctor, nor would we ask
the CDC to train firefighters and police and EMS workers.
Clearly, there is a role for multiple Federal agencies as
well as State and local governments. But in my judgment, and I
think the judgment of so many of us, we really need to plan
ahead to make sure everyone is equipped and ready to coordinate
an immediate response.
For example, do you open the schools? Do you close the
schools? Do you allow planes to fly intrastate? Does the
President stop all flights? There needs to be a great deal of
planning.
So I was pleased to learn that you have begun to make these
plans, and I would like you to perhaps give us some
information. Where are you in your planning? Have you developed
plans to date? I am sure if and when the Federal Government
comes out with their final plan, you will amend your plans. But
if you can give me an update, if, God forbid, a flu outbreak
reaches our shores and your State, what is your understanding
of your role in this scenario? Whoever would like to begin.
What have you done, what kind of meetings have you held, what
kind of--I am not sure if all that chat is you haven't done
anything.
Governor Bush. No, we were trying to figure out who gets to
go first. I think I volunteered.
Mrs. Lowey. I appreciate that. What I would like to know is
what have you done? Has there been any assistance from the
Federal Government?
Governor Bush. Absolutely. We do table-top exercises for
natural disasters--
Chairman King. If I could intervene, we are going to be
voting in about 25 minutes. I would ask if the governors can
try to keep their remarks brief. Thank you, Governor.
Governor Bush. We train for these exercises. In fact, the
public health issues are probably the highest priority for us,
given the nature of our State. So what would happen if there
was a pandemic in Florida, and Florida was a participant in it,
would be the Secretary of the Department of Health, rather than
the head of the emergency management team, would be the lead,
but we would use the exact same structure that we have in place
which is battle-tested.
Through the departments of health in the 67 counties, in
coordination with the CDC, there are protocols in place already
to deal with these issues.
There will be circumstances in the--God forbid if that
happened--that wouldn't be part of the plan that we have in
place. But many of the same lessons learned from the hurricanes
and preparing for emergencies would apply for this, as well.
Again, I hope that this is something that is only
theoretical, because it is just an enormously--it would be an
enormous challenge. But there has been significant preparation
in place. When this news came out, we had already had several
briefings. The Secretary of the Department of Health has
already begun the process of implementing the beginning parts
of this plan to be prepared.
Mrs. Lowey. What does that mean?
Governor Bush. Again, to make sure--have 67 counties in our
State; we have 67 health departments. All of them have to be
part of a successful preparation. It simply means know what
your plan is. Run through it. Make sure that the community
partners in the hospitals, for example, in the emergency rooms,
make sure that people know what their role is. Assure that--one
of the key elements of this is to identify the flu as early as
possible. There are places, whether it is schools or emergency
rooms in hospitals or doctors offices, there are ways that you
can do that if you have prepared for it in advance. That is
what we are doing.
Mrs. Lowey. Governor Napolitano.
Governor Napolitano. Congresswoman, yes, we have worked on
a flu plan, but a flu plan can apply to a number of other
scenarios as well. But the kinds of preparation includes
looking at who--
Who we would require physical exams. How we would describe
medicine and vaccine. How we would procure medicine and
vaccine. How we would provide for transportation of medical and
support personnel, if a particular area were particularly hard
hit. Those all go into a flu plan, a disease plan, as it were.
Just as in Florida, I think in most States it will be the
State Department of health services that will be the lead
agency coordinating with county health departments and
providers in terms of providing the care. But another essential
element, quite frankly, is the Department of Agriculture,
because there is an animal kind of interface that you also have
to look at.
Mrs. Lowey. I am glad you mentioned that. In fact, my
colleague, Rosa DeLauro--
Chairman King. Nita, we are really running out of time.
Mrs. Lowey. Let me just close--
Chairman King. Actually, no.
Mrs. Lowey. Can I close with one other statement?
Chairman King. No, we are really out of time. We have many
members and we only have 20 minutes to go. I hate to do this.
This is the only time in my life, I have to shut the gentlelady
off.
I have discussed this with Congresswoman Sanchez. If we can
limit the questions to a total of 3 minutes so we can try to
get as many members to ask them, and if the governors would
keep their statements within the 3-minute time period.
Mr. Dent.
Mr. Dent. Governor Perry, you obviously had an experience
recently with a major evacuation of a large metropolitan area.
My question to you is, what should the role of the Federal
Government be in preparing and implementing an evacuation plan
that is directed toward a major metropolitan area like Houston
or Philadelphia or New York City?
Governor Perry. Right. I think what you will see is what
happened in Houston and the surrounding Gulf Coast area will be
a model, not a perfect model, but a model that will be, again,
analyzed and deconstructed and talked about. We have a group
already working on recommendations on how to do this better, to
preposition fuel, to rest stops, to how you contra-flow
highways. All of those issues are in front.
I will just briefly conclude by saying that what happened
in Texas is now a model that everyone can look at, whether you
are in L.A. or New York or Atlanta or whatever major
metropolitan area, and to start looking at all of the
contingencies that occur and how to possibly make their plans
better.
Mr. Dent. As a quick follow-up, my district is less than 80
miles from New York City and the City of Philadelphia. My
question is, what was the ability of communities that were
receiving evacuees to absorb all those folks coming in?
Governor Perry. You saw some Herculean efforts by the local
folks. Again, you have the opportunity with the next group of
individuals to talk to those mayors and those county judges.
Those are the people that really have the absolute best
information. Again, it goes back to why you need to keep the
first responders being the first responders, because these are
individuals who have the real live experiences that can share
with you exactly how they absorbed those people and how they
were able to very quickly bring them in, shelter them, and now
dispersing them after the fact.
Mr. Dent. Can I quickly ask one last question?
Chairman King. Mr. Dent, we have to wrap up within one
minute.
Mr. Dent. Posse comitatus. Do you think we should
reconsider it?
Governor Perry. No.
Governor Napolitano. No.
Chairman King. The gentlelady from the District of
Columbia, Ms. Norton.
Ms. Norton. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I thank the
governors for their respective views. It has been very
important.
Let me get the red herring out of the room. I don't think
you will see a single member here that wants to federalize
first responders. I want to assure you of that. President Bush
has asked to me it seems a responsible question, and
essentially that requested asked before Katrina and since is
under what circumstances should the military be used. That is
all we are interested in.
It is about disaster response here. Not only natural
disaster response. I just wanted to put the dilemma we face to
you. Assuming that the State and local responses were as
perfect as they could be, the preparation and execution, in
Katrina, of course, there is the Emergency Assistance Act,
Stafford Act. He used the military, my friends, every branch of
the military there. We, of course, want to fix FEMA. I was
surprised the gentlewoman--rather, at the governors' response
on FEMA, because I am on the subcommittee that has taken a lot
of hits for not having calling FEMA in in 2004 when we are told
that four hurricanes in Florida had the handwriting all on the
wall about problems in FEMA. So we bear responsibility for
looking at what we can do to make all of this moot.
But I think the reason the President has put this to us is
that in any case, for example, a disaster could be a terrorist
disaster, the information then the response could be totally in
his hands or if not the response, the intelligence, the
Northern Command, ladies and gentlemen, are already gaming on
the theory that there would be circumstances where any local
and State would be overwhelmed and where the military would be
necessary, if you are serious about saving human lives.
I want to know if you oppose the use of the Army, the Navy,
the Air Force, every branch of the military as it was used in
Louisiana, apparently with the approval of the Governor and it
was also used in Mississippi. Would you oppose the use of the
military if there were a terrorist attack? And do you think
this committee ought to try to figure out what circumstances
should lead to the use of the military in either of those
situations? For me, that is the only issue before us today,
frankly.
Chairman King. I would ask the witnesses to give the
briefest possible answer they could.
Governor Bush. I do think this committee needs to look at
the circumstances in which the military would play and the
President would play a direct role and the military play the
direct role. There are, God forbid, we would be in this
circumstance where an overwhelming event of national importance
could take place, where the intelligence and the information
available would be provided the commander-in-chief and not a
Governor or mayor. Again, God forbid that would happen. Under
those circumstances, in some way it could be appropriate for
direct action. But it should not be in natural disasters, where
we have a responsibility and we should be held accountable for
that responsibility to respond.
Ms. Norton. You don't oppose the use of the military, with
the Governor, as was done in Louisiana, or not?
Governor Bush. I do not oppose the military's involvement
in preparation and relief, so long as the Governor of the State
is in charge of that effort.
Chairman King. Governor Perry?
Governor Perry. Briefly, there is an absolute military
aspect to most disasters. The military, the active duty
military, should be at the discretion of the local Governor.
Ms. Norton. The active duty Federal military?
Governor Perry. Yes, ma'am.
Ms. Norton. With the permission of the local government?
Governor Perry. Yes.
Ms. Norton. You don't have any authority over the active
duty military?
Governor Perry. The fact of the matter is with the State
operations center shall the people who are organizing, we do
work as a team. I think that is a very important thing to
understand, is we do work as a team. If our State operations
center says to the active duty C-130 crews that are sitting
there waiting to move people with special needs, we need three
C-130's in Beaumont, Texas, at 10:30 in the morning.
Ms. Norton. I am talking about the Army, Air Force and
Marines.
Chairman King. The gentlewoman's time has expired. Other
members have waited a long time.
Governor Perry. The fact of the matter is we worked
together. It can be the active duty Air Force, and they do, in
fact, work with us. When we say this is what we need, yes, we
go through the chain of command, but the fact of the matter is,
that is the important part of this, is that realizing that we
have this organizational chart and it is the States that would
continue to be at the heart of the decisionmaking on where
these assets would be placed.
Chairman King. Governor Napolitano?
Governor Napolitano. Very quickly, there is a role for the
military, but it needs to be under the direction of the State
Governor and in cooperation. That is exactly what we practice
and prepare for, and we do use active duty military in these
response plans, but we don't cede control over the response to
the Pentagon.
Chairman King. The gentleman from the State of Washington
for 3 minutes.
Mr. Reichert. All three of you have commented on three
major points, communication planning and joint exercises and
practice. I want to focus just on the communication piece that
was mentioned earlier, a two-part question for anyone on the
panel who chooses to answer.
One, how can the Federal Government help those States that
do not have a statewide communication? If you were just setting
up a system in your State and you all three have systems, as
does my State, the State of Washington, what could the Federal
Government do to help you or the State do that?
The second part of the question would be do you have a plan
in place that would, in case your communications systems
totally collapsed?
Governor Perry. We do. In Texas, as a matter of fact, we
have a substantial amount of satellite communications, the
Texas task force 1 also has that type of capability. As a
matter of fact, they were the first people in Louisiana with
the ability to communicate because every land-based and cell
tower was down in Louisiana, so those are already in place. We
prepositioned them.
If Jeb has the need for those over the course of the next
three or four days, they will be prepositioned to the west of
Florida to go in to assist.
Chairman King. Governor Napolitano.
Governor Napolitano. Thank you. The answer is we have an
interoperability. We used our Homeland Security money not to
create a statewide system of fixed assets, but to buy vans that
you could literally drive anywhere, that Federal, State and
local responders can all plug into. It is like having mobile
patches that we can make available throughout Arizona, but, as
I said, we made available in Louisiana.
What you can do is work with States to help them develop
strategies like that, if they haven't done so already.
Chairman King. Governor Bush.
Governor Bush. Absolutely. The key to this is to have a
robust system that is redundant. We have that, and it is
mobile. It has been funded by State and Federal dollars. So
Washington has done its part. Again, have I expressed my
appreciation for the money you all have given us?
Chairman King. Yes, Governor. We know that.
Governor Perry. Mr. Chairman, let me just add one thing.
The private sector plays a very important role in that also.
For instance, our satellite trucks went into the Gulf Coast
regions, Gycom, which is one of the local satellite trucks, to
give us real-time pictures in the advent that we lost all of
our electrical power. So the private sector also plays a very
important role in this, as well as both the State and the
Federal.
Chairman King. The gentlewoman from Texas is recognized for
3 minutes. We have cut the time to 3 minutes because of the
votes coming up, not that I have to remind you in particular,
but I just thought I would do it.
Ms. Jackson-Lee. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is hard to
count, but you have given me that number, and I do appreciate
it very much.
Let me, first of all, again, acknowledge the governors for
their work and let me also acknowledge Michael Williams, who I
have had the pleasure in the State of Texas to work with on the
Texas Railroad Commission. For those uninformed about the
processes of government in Texas, I commend you to--I have
taken up about 30 seconds--but I commend you to Texas history.
In any event, it is a very important commission. We thank you
very much for your leadership.
You can tell we are troubled by this question dealing with
Federal levels of help. Let me share my focus with you and
raise some questions so that we can be appropriately
instructive in our work.
One, we agree, I believe, that you have heard no interest
in federalizing local law enforcement. In fact, one of my
questions at the end will be that we like to take the burden of
border security, which is another point, off of the States and
do the job we are supposed to do.
But just noticing a White House declaration shortly after
Hurricanes Charlie and Francis, I think in the fall of 2004, if
I am correct, and Governor Bush, you have certainly, if you
will, been tested. But the efforts were defined and definitive,
if you will.
He submitted a request for emergency funds to Congress to
ensure response efforts in Florida and elsewhere continued
without any interruption. The President announced he would
submit a supplemental request for approximately $2 billion to
pay for the response and recovery efforts related to the
hurricane, and the request for the first supplemental
appropriation requests will total $2.2 billion that went to
FEMA, primarily for emergency clean-up, et cetera.
I also noted in your comments that you had talked about
pre-deployment. Some of the other issues, about 100 trucks of
water and 280 trucks of ice are present and will arrive in
Jacksonville staging area today. 900,000 meals ready to eat. I
notice 7,000 cases of food. So we concede there is a prime role
for the Federal Government.
What I would appreciate hearing, I am going to first start
with my own governor, because we did one of the most massive
evacuations, Governor Perry. Can I ask you to place in there
where an appropriate government role would have been?
For example, the added fuel trucks along the freeway, the
utilization you did of the National Guard, but whatever other
resources you might have needed, ice and water down in port
Arthur. Is there not a role in synergies am with you, and
Governor Napolitano, would you answer that? I am not asking
Governor Bush, because you laid it out for us. If there is
time, I welcome you to answer that question as well, and
comment on the need for Federal resources and border security.
Chairman King. Actually, there isn't enough. I would ask
Governor Perry and Governor Napolitano to answer questions as
briefly as possible.
Governor Perry. Absolutely, there is a Federal response,
and the coordination and its assets. It is those transportation
assets, those heavy equipment assets, it is those fuel trucks.
It is just the coordination of them. That is the important
thing again that we can reiterate, the continual coordination
between the State and the local and the Federal Government, and
that is the real key to an evacuation, is having thought
through all of those places where you need those individuals,
where the bottlenecks are going to be, where you can use either
the active duty or the military to direct traffic. It is a
matter of managing those assets.
Governor Napolitano. I would agree with Governor Perry,
although I would say that border security issue itself on an
ongoing basis is a Federal responsibility and requires
federally-trained and paid-for law enforcement at the border.
But in terms of managing a disaster and how you interact with
the military and other Federal resources, it is a matter of
coordination.
Chairman King. The gentleman from California, Mr. Lungren.
Mr. Lungren. With respect to the issue everybody has
brought up, border security, I just might advise people that
the bill the President signed yesterday, the fiscal year 2006
appropriations bill for first responders, specifically added
money for more Border Patrol officers, more interior
enforcement, more beds, so that we don't have the OTMs caught
and released.
In reflection of that, or as a factor in that, it was the
Congress that made the decision with respect to lesser money
for the State Homeland Security Grant Program. We transferred
some of the funds so that those things could be done in light
of the fact that we discovered there are literally billions of
dollars still in the pipeline from the previous two years that
had not yet been spent. I would like that for the record.
Secondly, and this is the question I would like to direct
to you, when I was Attorney General of California, we dealt
with fires and floods and earthquakes and riots and so forth
and we dealt with the Federal Government on all levels, and we
dealt with these issues. We never had a problem of where the
Federal Government should be and where we should be.
The problem that has really come out, and the big elephant
in the room, is the fact that there was a failure of
leadership, at least some of us think, at the State and local
level, in Katrina. So some of the discussion here in Congress
has been where does the Federal Government enter in? Not when
under the Insurrection Act the Federal Government can use the
military to subdue any insurrection, domestic violence,
unlawful combination or conspiracy as an exception to posse
comitatus, but is there another level of decision that ought to
be made by the Federal Government?
That is, some members have come to me and said when we have
a certain size hurricane, Category 5, we ought to assume that
the Federal Government is going to come in. Others have said
when we make a decision that there has been a certain amount of
loss of life, then the Federal Government should come in.
Others have said we ought to reserve the ability to make the
judgment when there has been a failure of leadership at the
Governor level or at the local level, that the Federal
Government should then presume it can come in, using Federal
forces, including active military, as first responders. That is
the real issue here.
I would like to have your response to that, because I feel
very strongly that posse comitatus has served us well and that
we should be very leery of giving a President that kind of
authority. But I would like to ask the three of you to respond
to that.
Governor Bush. I will start very briefly simply by saying
that of the scenarios you described, that the only one that
possibly would be appropriate is the last one, and it is not
different than what happens--it hasn't happened in Florida
since I have been Governor, it may have happened in the past,
where a mayor was derelict in their duties, and under our
emergency powers, we have the ability to countermand a decision
made by a mayor or county chairman that endangers the lives of
the people of that community as it relates to maybe not
evacuating when they are supposed to or something like that.
The last thing that should happen though is to create a
system where you enable bad behavior. We should be rewarding--
we should make it a higher priority in every community,
emergency response needs to be a higher priority, given the
realities of the world we live in. And the more that the
Federal Government assumes responsibility, the less likely it
is that local first responders, local elected officials and
governors, will feel compelled to make it their first priority.
Chairman King. Governor Napolitano, and then Governor
Perry.
Governor Napolitano. I agree. As a former attorney general
myself, the saying is bad cases make bad law, and I think
changing the whole system because of one incident would be
unwise.
Governor Perry. Here is what I think that the government
can do, is the dollars, you have had 4 years to see whether or
not the States had expended those Homeland Security dollars
appropriately. I think that is one of the real keys for you to
look at, each State, and I don't know how you do that, you look
at each State, see how those dollars have been spent, see if
they are exercising and gaming out the types of events that
could happen in those States and make a decision at that
particular point in time. If they are not directing their
States to these types of activities, then the public will
respond appropriately to that Governor or to that mayor or to
that doubt I judge, that you are not spending the money right
to protect our citizens.
Chairman King. The gentleman's time has expired.
The gentleman from New Jersey, the Ranking Member of the
Emergency Preparedness Subcommittee, Mr. Pascrell.
Mr. Pascrell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I have three questions, yes or no, from each and every one
of you, and then a final question which I would ask Governor
Bush to respond to, if you would. So this should go very
quickly, like teeth extraction.
Since the creation of the Department of Homeland Security,
much of the Federal focus has been on preparing for and
responding to terrorist attacks. Is the Department giving
enough adequate focus, in your opinion, to natural disaster?
Governor Bush?
Governor Bush. Yes.
Mr. Pascrell. Governor Perry.
Governor Perry. Yes.
Mr. Pascrell. Governor Napolitano.
Governor Napolitano. No.
Mr. Pascrell. Thank you.
Second question is this: Does the Federal Government have a
role in ensuring that each State has interoperable, better
known to us in Paterson, New Jersey, as proper communications
systems? Do you think that the Federal Government has a role?
Governor Bush?
Governor Bush. Yes.
Governor Perry. Yes.
Mr. Pascrell. Governor Napolitano.
Governor Napolitano. Yes.
Mr. Pascrell. All right. Thank you.
The third question is this: Do you think--should the
President have the ability to declare a disaster under the
provisions of the Stafford Act and direct Federal aid without a
State request? Governor Bush?
Governor Bush. I would say no just to keep it simple.
Mr. Pascrell. No. Okay.
Governor Perry. I will take a pass on that one.
Mr. Pascrell. Okay.
Governor Napolitano. No.
Mr. Pascrell. All right. Here is my final question. This is
to you Governor Bush
Governor Bush. Is this like the $500 Jeopardy question?
Mr. Pascrell. You are doing very well so far.
Governor Bush. I don't know where this is leading.
Mr. Pascrell. Do you think, Governor Bush, that FEMA--and
you have had more experience here because of the disasters that
have occurred in your State--do you think it should be
extracted from the Department of Homeland Security?
Governor Bush. I don't think it matters one way or the
other. I think what matters is that the business practices of
FEMA need to be reviewed and updated, and I think in an
emergency the FEMA Director needs to report directly to the
President of the United States, just as the director of
emergency management who is embedded in a department in State
government reports directly to me when there is a declaration
of an emergency.
Mr. Pascrell. You said in your testimony, Governor, that
the FEMA logistic program is broken, and I agree with you
100Sec. rcent. You gave an example. You gave an example of the
ice that was supposed to get to Florida, and, you know, we
don't have the time for you to go through that whole example.
It is right in your testimony. It would seem to me that we need
to do something very substantial here to get FEMA up and going
again, to give it teeth so that it is of value to you before
and in preparation and afterwards, God forbid, if the
catastrophe does happen. It would seem to me that we should
look at your testimony here, and then we ought to be thinking
and talking amongst ourselves as we should make some very
fundamental changes with FEMA. It is not working, in my
estimation. Thank you.
Chairman King. There has been a series of votes called,
which means it is probably going to last over an hour. What we
will do is try to go through two more questioners, and then we
will have to excuse the panel. The committee will stand in
recess subject to the call of the Chair for approximately 1
hour, and then we will resume with the second panel after that.
The gentleman from Nevada Mr. Gibbons.
Mr. Gibbons. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And to our Governors, thank you for being here today. We
appreciate your testimony.
My question would deal with the military, of course,
serving on the Armed Services Committee. As you know, under
State law, title 32 gives each Governor control of the National
Guard within their respective States. Title 10 controls Active
Duty Forces. There is a provision to allow for activation of
title 32, National Guard into the Active Duty Forces, but not
vice versa. In other words, no title 10 can go down to title
32.
My question would be, I read with interest the New York
Times dated October 11, the military proposes an Active Duty
Force for relief effort. Now, in each of your jurisdictions, do
you believe that Congress would be better suited to ensure that
our National Guard Forces who deal primarily with first
responders within their individual States should be better
prepared and better equipped to deal with natural disasters, or
do you feel that it is better for Congress to take that giant
leap and create a new division within our military forces that
would be an overriding singular entity to deal with natural
disasters with the equipment and the kind of responses that you
talked about earlier?
Governor Napolitano. My initial response without knowing
the details is that, no, you want to work with your existing
National Guards. There is a mechanism by which title--you can
have a joint task force of title 32 National Guard married with
title 10, and that happened at the national conventions last
summer. That is how they managed the security at both the
Democratic and Republican convention. You can do it under
existing law.
Mr. Gibbons. But you would also agree that there is no
legal jurisdiction and chain of command in title 10, too.
Governor Napolitano. No. You have to use the mechanism of
the joint task force approach. But it has been used before.
Governor Perry. Yes, sir. You just have to coordinate, and
we do that very well in Texas, and I think these, all these
Governors work. But my statement that I talked about the Maytag
repairman I think is what you are talking about. If you create
an Active Duty military group that is sitting around waiting
for the next disaster, they may sit 6 months out doing anything
when they could be out serving the people, keeping the peace,
you know, fighting the wars that the military is supposed to be
doing. So I would certainly be opposed to creating a special
military unit just for disasters.
Governor Bush. I agree. And I think enhancing the Guard is
the way to go. We will have 1,000 guardsmen and women activated
by tomorrow and 6,000 available for this storm, and they are
citizen soldiers. They want to do this, and they do a darn good
job.
Mr. Gibbons. And States can share resources through a
memorandum of agreement between States for anything.
Governor Bush. Absolutely
Chairman King. The gentleman's time has expired.
The gentlelady from the Virgin Islands, Donna Christensen.
Mrs. Christensen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I have gone through several hurricanes, being from the
Virgin Islands, both on the hurricane side and then FEMA side,
and I will say that in the response to Katrina, I did not
recognize FEMA at all, the FEMA that I am accustomed to. I am
going ask a question; I guess one question is what I have time
for. The National Response Plan outlines seven responsibilities
of the Federal Government in a catastrophic event, and I
consider Katrina catastrophic: mass care, housing, urban search
and rescue, decontamination, public health, medical support,
medical equipment, supplies, casualty and fatality management
and public information. Is there any one of those seven in
which you would give the Department or the Federal Government a
C or better? Did you think that they met their responsibility?
Governor Napolitano. With relation to Katrina or other--
Mrs. Christensen. Katrina.
Governor Napolitano. With relation to Katrina, no.
Governor Bush. I can only speak from the Florida
experience, and as it relates to the emergency response, the
first response, I would give FEMA strong grades. As it relates
to recovery, I think there is a lot of work that needs to get
done.
Mrs. Christensen. Even given the fact that there were
people standing on bridges not being fed for 3 days?
Governor Bush. I am talking about the Florida experience,
which, again, you know, I think you can't grade FEMA based on
that particular disaster where it is possible that the local
and State response was inadequate.
Mrs. Christensen. In my experience, FEMA is supposed to
come in, the Federal Government is supposed to come in at the
level at which the State is at capacity and fill in the gaps.
One State is perhaps better prepared than another. FEMA should
be coming in at the level at which that State has maxed out its
capacity and build from there. Your State is well prepared. But
through the coordination process they should be able to assess
the capacity of the State and build up that capacity.
Governor Bush. I guess the number of employees in FEMA,
there is 2,500 employees in FEMA. We had 3,700 people that went
to the aid of people in Louisiana and Mississippi. Because this
system is not a FEMA system, it is a Federalist system, there
were people from all over the United States, and still are in
these regions. And I am not sure that you can grade FEMA as an
agency by itself based on the emergency system that we have in
place.
Governor Perry. And I think the very key phrase that you
used was that his State was prepared. And I think that is a
very important aspect of this debate that we are having is
there are some States that are very well prepared. There are
some that aren't.
Mrs. Christensen. And FEMA should come in and build up the
level of preparedness and the coordination of it.
Governor Perry. You have obviously had some good
experiences with FEMA with the hurricanes that you have. As you
said, that wasn't the FEMA that you recognized. So I think the
analysis of Katrina may be as much with the local level as it
is with how do you make FEMA better. And the fact of the matter
is if the Federal Government is perfect in its activation and
its efforts, and the local is less than adequate, then you are
going to have some problems.
Chairman King. The gentlelady's time has expired.
There are about 6 minutes left in the vote, so I recognize
the gentleman from New Mexico for 2 minutes.
Mr. Pearce. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Again, those yes or no answers, Mr. Pascrell.
Governor Napolitano, you said that the border security is
your real emergency, and that the national and the Federal
Government is not doing enough. Are there any immigration
enforcement-free zones either in Arizona or any locality in
Arizona?
Governor Napolitano. Any what?
Mr. Pearce. Enforcement-free zones; that is, free spaces
where immigrants can come without having any fears of having
Federal--
Governor Napolitano. The answer is no. And, in fact, I
signed legislation this year including--
Mr. Pearce. Thank you. This is just a yes or no question.
Governor Napolitano, you said that you would be greatly
inconvenienced by the cuts that--in answer to Ms. Sanchez's
question. Are you aware that Arizona, according to the DHS
spending report, has, fiscal year 2002, $28 thousand unspent;
fiscal year 2003, $16 million unspent; fiscal year 2004, $47
million; and fiscal year 2005, $40 million unspent, $131
million total unspent dollars nationwide? It was the same with
all States, about $3 billion unspent. So we did go in and we
cut the budget, but it is hard to see where you would be
inconvenienced
Governor Napolitano. May I respond, please? Those monies
have been allocated.
Mr. Pearce. Ma'am, I have got 2 minutes. You are either
aware of it or you or not. Yes or no?
Governor Napolitano. You either want the information or you
don't want the information. Everything has been allocated.
Mr. Pearce. It has been allocated, but if it is like my
State, we continually go things have been allocated back in
2002, but the checks never been written to the first
responders. Thank you.
Again, in the last of my 2 minutes, Mr. Chairman, looking
at the national preparedness goal and national preparedness
guidance, are you all aware that the Federal homeland security
grants are going to be contingent on complying with those goals
starting next year? Yes or no?
Governor Bush. Am I aware of that?
Mr. Pearce. Yes. Federal national preparedness goal. Are
you aware that your Federal homeland security grants are going
to be contingent on you all being in compliance with that?
Governor Bush. I am now.
Mr. Pearce. Okay. Thank you, Mr. Chairman
Chairman King. The gentleman's time has expired.
The gentleman from North Carolina for 1-1/2 to 2 minutes,
if you can try to wrap it up.
Mr. Etheridge. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Let me thank each one of you for being here this morning.
And, Governor Bush, in your written testimony you talk about
the need for the Department of Homeland Security to consolidate
preparedness response recovery mitigation in the one shop. I
agree. I hope the Secretary is listening to that and he reads
your testimony.
We had Floyd in our State. I would share with each one of
you as we talk about--I don't want to get into what happened
with Katrina and others other than to say when a State is
overwhelmed, and we were in North Carolina, the military and
others moved in. They were there and helped. We can prepare for
hurricanes. As you well know, North Carolina has had a lot. But
when you get overwhelmed, you need the Federal Government to be
there as a partner, and then you move very quickly and respond
immediately. And I won't go there other than to say that.
But let me ask you a question to answer as has just been
followed up. What can FEMA and DHS do to enhance your States'
ability to respond quickly to a natural disaster or terrorist
attacks? You know, currently a lot of our funds are focused on
terrorism, but for many of you and our State, natural disasters
may be greater than the terrorist attack. But for the
individual at the end of the line, the first responder, it
doesn't matter which one comes. You have the same problem.
Chairman King. Could you answer it within 15 seconds?
Governor Napolitano. They can help with training,
preparation and equipment.
Mr. Etheridge. Resources.
Governor Bush. And I think Governor Perry is correct that
it is legitimate for you all to hold us accountable for how our
homeland security dollars are being spent. You can spend this
money in a way that does allow you to prepare for natural
disasters at the same time that you are training and preparing
for the defense of the homeland.
Governor Perry. Yes, sir.
Let me just say it has been a real honor to be with you,
Mr. Chairman.
Chairman King. Again, I will overlook the fact that in our
prior meeting you did make some deprecating remarks about the
Notre Dame-Southern Cal game. Mr. Lungren was very upset over
that. But we will overlook that.
Mr. Meek. Mr. Chairman,
Chairman King. Mr. Meek.
Mr. Meek. Yes. I would just like 1 minute, if you can give
it to me.
Chairman King. You can get 1 minute with no time for
answers. Just total 1 minute.
Mr. Meek. Thank you very much. I appreciate it.
Thank you all for being here today. I just basically have
one question for you. A lot of you, I have heard your
testimony, I have actually read your testimony about the
importance of lessons learned so that we can all do better in
the future. As it relates to Katrina and Rita, Governor, I know
that you had a lot with traffic and a lot of things, but I look
at this as being a member of the Homeland Security Committee as
something that we really need to know more about, because it
could be a terrorist attack and we need to evacuate a U.S.
city, so we need to review this. And this book, this 9/11
Commission report, has helped to improve security here in
America. We are asking for the same thing as it relates to an
independent commission looking into Hurricane Katrina and Rita.
I wanted to ask you all, do you believe that we need an
independent commission of--a bipartisan, independent commission
that is away from this Congress that can do the work to be able
to find the success and failures in the recovery of Katrina at
this particular time?
Governor Perry. I can save you a little money, and we will
tell you everything that we did with Katrina and with Rita and
no charge.
Mr. Meek. Governor Bush.
Governor Bush. I think Congress is more than capable of
exercising its responsibilities in terms of an oversight over
how to improve.
Governor Napolitano. I most respectfully disagree. I think
the national public would have more credibility if there were
an independent commission created as it was for 9/11.
Mr. Meek. Thank you. Thank you, Governors.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman King. Thank the Governors for their testimony.
The committee stands in recess subject to the call of the
Chair.
[Whereupon, at 12:17 p.m., the committee recessed, subject
to the call of the Chair.]
Chairman King. The subcommittee will come to order.
First of all, let me thank the witnesses for staying
around. We had a very unfortunate situation with the votes
today, and then Secretary Rice is speaking to Members of
Congress, which is also cutting into the turnout here at the
hearing. So I really want to thank you for being here, for
staying with us.
You certainly have valuable testimony to give. We look
forward to it, and I have discussed this with Congresswoman
Christensen. Congressman Poe has asked to introduce the guests
today. He is not a member of the committee, so I ask unanimous
consent that he be allowed to sit on the dais and conduct the
introductions. Without objection.
So ordered, Congressman Poe.
Mr. Poe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate you having
this important hearing on appropriate roles of local State and
Federal officials when it comes to disaster management and the
response.
As all of you know, Texas was recently hard hit by
Hurricane Rita and this committee is indeed fortunate to hear
from local officials in Texas, who just recently served on the
front lines of that disaster. County Judge Robert Eckels, who
was going to testify, has been asked to be over at the White
House, so he will not be here this afternoon to testify. But
his testimony is in the record.
[The statement of Mr. Eckels follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Robert A. Eckels
Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee, I am Robert Eckels, and
I serve as the County Judge of Harris County, Texas. To clarify my
role, a County Judge in Texas is the presiding officer of the
Commissioners Court, the governing body of the county. I represent all
the citizens of the third most populous county in the United States.
Harris County is 1,756 square miles in area and home to 3.6 million
residents, making it more populous than 23 states. There are 34
municipalities within the county, including the City of Houston, the
fourth largest city in the country. More than 1.2 million people live
in unincorporated Harris County and rely on the county to be the
primary provider of basic government services.
As County Judge, I am charged by statute with the responsibility
for emergency management planning and operations for Harris County.
Most departments within Harris County have emergency functions in
addition to their normal duties and play key roles in our emergency
operations strategy. All departments work together to coordinate
services and prepare for an emergency or disaster.
I want to thank the Committee for inviting me to testify on
Federalism and Disaster Response. Because of my involvement in
emergency management, I have had numerous opportunities to consider the
best alternatives and I will try to make a case for the National
Response Plan (NRP) because I believe it is the best way to respond in
Harris County and in our region to catastrophic events.
I also believe that there are situations that would call for a
Federal response, such as military intervention, but only when
circumstances prevent implementation of the NRP. I expect the more
serious incidents to seriously strain our resources and capabilities
and it would only be when we are overwhelmed to the point of failure
that I could see asking for a Federal response to take over. Other than
extreme situations, I believe that the best method of handling response
is at the local level where we have first responders who are closest to
the incident not only in proximity but in their training. No one knows
Harris County better than those who live and work in Harris County.
As we seek to make our communities more prepared for any kind of
disaster and resilient to those disasters, it is clear that all
government functions are interrelated. A healthy and robust community
is better prepared for emergencies. I believe that local governments
which work well together and work well with the state and federal
governments in day-to-day operations, will work well together in times
of stress. A number of issues stand out as we look at Hurricane Katrina
and Hurricane Rita and there were a number of lessons learned as we
responded quite differently to these two Incidents of National
Significance.
Hurricane Katrina Response
Harris County played a major role along with the State of Texas
and, in fact, nearly every other state in the nation to address the
short-term effects of the devastation of Katrina. Harris County
provided shelter and comfort to Hurricane Katrina victims in what
became the largest mass evacuation in US History at that a time. It is
estimated that more than 373,000 evacuees came to Texas and more than
150,000 came to Harris County alone. Our response was an unprecedented
coalition of the Harris County government as well as the City of
Houston, the State of Texas, the Federal government, the private
sector, non-profit organizations, and citizen volunteers. The mission
of the coalition was to provide temporary shelter, social services and
relocation options for the citizens displaced by Hurricane Katrina. In
less than a day a city was created which, at its peak, offered more
than 27,000 people shelter, health care, child care, mental health
services, housing assistance, travel vouchers, employment services, and
much more. The population eventually became so large at the Reliant
Park Complex that the US Postal Service assigned the complex its own
zip code.
Harris County and the greater Houston area is a caring community.
We welcomed our neighbors in need when they had no where else to turn.
Harris County through its Reliant Astrodome shelter and later
expansions to our related venues absorbed the sudden shock of the
exodus from Louisiana for a few days and gave the rest of the nation
time to respond by creating more shelters.
We had a plan and we executed the plan. It was not a plan for the
Dome, but a plan for action. We learned as we went along, but the
structure was sound and the people knew their roles and
responsibilities.
We dealt with problems and forces beyond our control and kept a
giving spirit. I believe that the Katrina victims were a blessing to
our city and that we are stronger today for our service to our
neighbors.
Hurricane Katrina Houston Response Unified Command
As we watched Hurricane Katrina intensify in the Gulf of Mexico
after passing over Florida and approach New Orleans, it became clear
that the threat was serious and growing. On Sunday, August 28, 2005, I
visited with Jack Colley, the State Coordinator of Governor Rick
Perry's Division of Emergency Management (GDEM). He asked if the
Reliant Astrodome was capable of housing potentially as many as 2,000
evacuees, should the need arise. I assured him that we would do
whatever necessary to make our facilities available.
When the levees breached on August 30 and New Orleans began to
flood, it forced the evacuation of the Superdome, where residents had
gone for initial sheltering. I received a call at 3:00 a.m. on
Wednesday, August 31, from Jack Colley asking me to implement our plan
to open the Reliant Astrodome to evacuees who would be coming to us
from the Superdome that night. The number of evacuees he expected grew
to 23,750.
At approximately 6:00 a.m. on August 31, 2005 we began to organize
the Hurricane Katrina Houston Response Unified Command under the Harris
County Emergency Management Basic Plan and the National Response Plan.
We created a relatively flat unified incident command center in
accordance with the National Incident Management System (NIMS) at the
Reliant Park Complex composed of the Federal government, the State of
Texas, Harris County, the City of Houston, and non-governmental
organizations. The Reliant Park Complex which includes the Reliant
Astrodome, the Reliant Arena, and the Reliant Center is managed by SMG
Management. Other non-governmental organizations include Aramark Food
Services, which provided all food services in the Reliant Park Complex;
Contemporary Services Corporation (CSC), which provided security; the
Red Cross which provided shelter operations; and numerous other
charitable organizations.
We also recognized that with such a large number of evacuees, we
would need to have a strong and unified communication to those housed
in our facilities, to those evacuees in other shelters and motel and
hotels in Harris County and in other parts of Texas and other states,
to our volunteers, to our citizens, and to the news media covering the
event. The Joint Information Center (JIC) was established in the
Reliant Astrodome headed by a Public Information Officer who was
responsible for unified coordinated communications, both internally to
the unified command and externally. We established an extensive
telephone system and created an Internet Web page at www.hcjic.org that
contained situation reports, press releases, media alerts, and other
critical command announcements. We had frequent press conferences each
day and media updates to keep the public informed about developments
and to share information.
Another element of the JIC that gave us greater communication
opportunities was the interoperable communication system that we have
been developing in Harris and surrounding counties over the past 8 to
10 years. With a price tag in excess of $250 million, neither Harris
County, nor most counties around the country, are capable of purchasing
such a system as a replacement for existing systems. What we have done
is to develop our communication system in stages to give us the ability
to communicate across jurisdictional and disciplinary lines. We are
currently working to expand our system geographically and to have more
mobile communication devices and lap top computers/personal data
assistants (PDA) with text and file transfer capabilities in the hands
of our first responders. Our objective is to have streaming video
capability so that first responders can send live video from the field
back to incident command and better tactical decision-making can be
done with real time information. With our system in the Reliant Park
Complex we were able to respond to developing situations and bring in
the correct professional and voluntary assistance to resolve problems
as quickly as possible.
It is very important for Congress to continue to fund state and
local government efforts to evolve or transform existing system
capabilities to achieve interoperability. I know that in our situation
we can't afford the downtime required to learn how to operate a new
system, so we have chosen to make improvements in manageable bites that
enhance rather than disrupt our capabilities. Congress and the federal
agencies should create rules that set minimum standards but allow local
government the flexibility to work within their means to achieve those
standards.
On September 20, 2005, at approximately 7:00 p.m. we announced that
our mission had been completed and our unified command at the Reliant
Park Complex was standing down after 21 days of around-the-clock
operation. Lt. Joe Leonard of the US Coast Guard, who led the
operation, said, ``Our success is directly attributable to the strong
personal relationships developed long before the Hurricane in
Louisiana.''
Many members of the Hurricane Katrina Houston Response Unified
Command staff first worked as a team during the Tropical Storm Allison
disaster that hit our community in June 2001. We learned a lot from
responding to this disaster and then rebuilding our own community. We
also developed those relationships over time by developing a
coordinated emergency preparedness and response plan and then having
serious and frequent training exercises to enable us to work the plan
when incidents occur. These relationships were absolutely critical to
the success of our mission.
Developing and working a plan requires complete communication,
coordination, cooperation, and even friendships between emergency
managers and professionals at all levels of government.
I urge Congress to continue to provide adequate funding to assist
the funding provided by state and local governments as well as to
provide incentives for thorough training and exercises for further
improvements to the NRP. Lee Trevino, the great golfer, said it best,
``The more you practice the luckier you get.''
Based upon the risks facing a community, preparedness is ultimately
defined differently in different areas of the country. Local leaders
must determine the level of faith that their constituency have in their
emergency response plan and improve it until citizens will follow the
plan with the highest degree of confidence when an emergency arises.
The current model of the NRP with uniform standards for training,
equipment, and procedures among state and local governments can
continue to work well. As more counties and municipalities operate
under that plan and our capabilities increase over jurisdictional
lines, first responders from Harris County could go to Florida or
California or any other area of the country or first responder could
come help us if we need it. The more interoperable our equipment is and
the more common training we have the better our capability will be to
respond under the NRP.
We began housing evacuees in the Reliant Astrodome. It became
apparent as the population grew that we could not safely house all of
the evacuees that we expected in the Astrodome. The City of Houston's
fire marshal ordered us to cap the evacuee population in the Astrodome
at 8,000. Houston's mayor overrode his fire marshal and authorized up
to 12,000 evacuees. Eventually the population inside the Astrodome
would reach 17,500. As additional evacuees came in we included the
Reliant Arena that housed 4,500 evacuees, while 2,300 were housed in
the Reliant Center. The City of Houston opened the George R. Brown
Convention Center downtown in order to handle 2,800 more.
Evacuees received hot meals and plenty of liquids and were able to
sleep on cots with blankets and pillows. They were given comfort
packages that included basic toiletry needs and, importantly, they were
able to take a hot shower for the first time in several days. They were
comforted by volunteers and were able for the first time to begin to
have a feeling that they were finally in a secure location.
Not everything went as smoothly as I would have liked, but we were
able to quickly adapt. Emergency planning coordinators in our Homeland
Security & Emergency Management division had to learn on the fly what
worked and what didn't work. Our plan was evolving continuously. Our
Unified Command and the Joint Information Center allowed us to reach
decisions more easily and to communicate changes and adaptations more
quickly. We arranged communications between evacuees not only within
our compound, but also in the various centers around the country to
expedite reunification of families. We accomplished this by
establishing television viewing areas, telephone service areas, and
Internet service areas. We also worked with airlines and bus companies
to arrange tickets for travel to help families reunite.
Because the county is the landlord of the Reliant Park Complex and
we have an ongoing relationship with SMG Management who manages the
complex, we were able to get the lights and air conditioning turned on
immediately so we could began operations. The management team, with
security assistance provided by CSC, was able to prepare various
buildings within the complex and secure sensitive areas. Aramark, who
already had the concession contract for the complex to provide food
service, hired an additional 800 food service professionals in order to
prepare meals to feed the masses when they arrived. We began food
service on September 1 and continued until the mission was completed,
having served some 450,000 meals.
Other County Departments Response to the Katrina Disaster
This was truly an all county effort, and most of our county
departments participated in the relief operation by assisting evacuees
directly or supporting those that did. We are still assessing the
expenses that were incurred and will know the extent of the
reimbursement we will be seeking, but our estimates total more than $1
million for these departments in just the first two weeks of the
operation.
Children's Assessment Center--This agency supported
the mental health needs of children at the Reliant Complex.
Expenses include salaries, contract therapists and supplies.
Commissioners Precincts--Commissioner Pct .1, El
Franco Lee; Commissioner Pct. 2, Sylvia Garcia; Commissioner
Pct. 3, Steve Radack; and Commissioner Pct. 4, Jerry Eversole
provided buses for various purposes including medical transport
and taking individuals from shelters to other temporary
housing. Pct. 1 supported various community-based shelter
operations and also opened and operates two temporary shelters
for evacuees having their own transportation.
Constables--All Constable Precincts provided security
and related services for shelter operations that were not at
the Reliant Park Complex.
County Attorney, Mike Stafford--Advised various
agencies and officials on legal matters related to the
operation.
County Library--The library system made computers
available primarily for Internet access for evacuees seeking
assistance and locating lost relatives. The library also
provided library services to evacuees at the Reliant Center.
District Clerk, Charles Bacarisse--Assisted child
support activities for evacuees by helping them get child
support payments forwarded to the right location.
Domestic Relations--The Family Court Services Division
has provided mental health assistance at the Reliant complex in
partnership with Youth and Family Services.
Fire and Emergency Service--Provided fire protection
services and fire prevention advice related to shelter
operations. The Harris County Fire Marshal's office was part of
the operation command staff.
Hospital District--Our medical teams administered
10,000 tetanus shots and other inoculations as well as filling
more than 15,000 prescriptions. The 2,700 volunteer doctors and
other medical professionals examined some 15,000 patients in
the Reliant Park Complex and another 10,000 at the George R.
Brown Convention Center.
Housing and Community Development--Provided food,
temporary shelter and related services to evacuees.
Information Technology Center--Provided support for
computer and communications for shelter operations.
Juvenile Probation--95 staff members provided services
for juveniles in the shelter effort
Medical Examiner--Provided services related to
deceased evacuees.
Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Management--
Initially established operations and continued support service
for incident command.
Protective Services for Children and Adults--Thirty of
our clinical staff provided mental health and other social
services at the Reliant Park Complex.
Public Health and Environmental Services--The
Executive Director of HCPHES coordinated all medical operations
conducted at the Reliant Park Complex. An additional 500 HCPHES
staff performed approximately 15,000 Katrina-related hours of
service for many critical duties at the Reliant Park Complex
around the clock.
Sheriff, Tommy Thomas--Coordinated security and
provided law enforcement protection for the Reliant Park
Complex.
Social Services--Provided transportation to and from
the shelters at the Reliant Park Complex to the Harris County
Housing Authority at Lantern Point for voucher applicants and
then transported applicants to housing developments around the
county.
Tax Assessor Collector, Paul Bettencourt--Provided
personnel to the emergency management center, the County
Judge's office, the joint information center and other
operations so service levels could be maintained.
Youth and Family Services Division--was a first
responder to the social and emotional needs of Katrina victims
evacuated to the Reliant Park Complex.
The Role of the Harris County Citizen Corps
After the September 11 terrorist attack, President Bush called upon
all Americans to dedicate at least two years of their lives--the
equivalent of 4,000 hours--in service to others. He launched the USA
Freedom Corps initiative to inspire and enable all Americans to find
ways to serve their community and country. The Citizen Corps is a
component of the Freedom Corps. In August 2002, I launched the Harris
County Citizen Corps to create opportunities for individuals to
volunteer to help their neighborhoods prepare for and respond to
emergencies by bringing together local leaders, citizen volunteers, and
the network of first responder organizations, such as fire and police
departments. I believe the Citizen Corps is an integral part of our
participation in the NRP and it allows us to respond to our own needs
much quicker than could ever be possible under a Federal response.
The Community Emergency Response Team (CERT) Program is a subset of
the Citizen Corps. This program educates people about disaster
preparedness and trains them in basic disaster response skills such as
fire safety, light search and rescue, and disaster medical operations.
Using their training, CERT members can assist others in their
neighborhood or workplace following an event and can take a more active
role in preparing their community.
The program is administered by the US Department of Homeland
Security as part of the National Response Plan for community
preparedness. It was the Citizen Corps with some 7,000 volunteers,
including more than 1,200 CERT members, that made our relief efforts
possible. Our volunteers came from all walks of life and disciplinary
backgrounds. They were organized, trained, and had already volunteered
collectively more than 200,000 hours of community service.
We realized that we were going to need at least as many, if not
more, volunteers than the number of evacuees we were going to shelter.
Estimates were enormous not only for Harris County but for the entire
State of Texas. When the initial e-mail was sent out to the Citizen
Corps seeking volunteers at about 9:00 a.m. on August 31, we were
overjoyed when we had 1,000 volunteers in the first hour and more
coming in continuously.
I can assure you that without these volunteers and tens of
thousands more who came forward through the organization of Citizens
Corps, we could not have responded to the disaster as we did.
Volunteers were organized into teams, and the newly recruited
volunteers were given orientation upon arrival and then assignments in
all areas of service to the evacuees. I am particularly proud to report
that our citizens in Harris County acted with courage, compassion, and
unity. We had more than 60,000 volunteers come forward, and they were
absolutely essential to the success of this operation.
I have spoken to many volunteers who said that they experienced
something during this operation that brought personal rewards far
beyond their expectations. They accomplished the near impossible with
kindness and compassion in a situation unparalleled in anyone's
experience. In the future I envision taking our Citizen Corps and CERT
members to the next level by organizing them within many more
neighborhoods so they are capable of being truly the first responders
to an incident, while they await the arrival of professional first
responders. In the role of neighbor helping neighbor, our CERT members
and Citizen Corps volunteers will be able to communicate with incident
command regarding situation reports on the ground and be prepared to
assist neighbors who need help. I can see the Citizen Corps volunteers
being able to assess the capabilities and needs of their neighbors in
the event of a needed evacuation and being able to communicate those
needs to the incident command to expedite evacuations more smoothly. A
network like this could also provide a head-count and location of those
who refuse to evacuate.
I urge Congress to continue to provide the funding necessary to
help us further develop our Citizen Corps, to develop Citizen Corps in
more communities around the country, and to provide the funding for
training of CERT members. Training and organization will be the key to
our success. I would like to invite each of you to come to Harris
County to see first hand how our Citizen Corps operates and to see
where we are in our development and where we plan to be.
The Role of the Faith Based Community
Organized through Houston's Second Baptist Church (www.second.org)
and its pastor, Dr. Ed Young, an interfaith ministry made up of a dozen
denominations came together for Operation Compassion. Collectively they
organized and provided Red Cross training for 43,500 additional
volunteers. Of these, 17,300 volunteers served 109,613 meals in the
George R. Brown Convention Center to the evacuees there. They also
produced nearly 90,000 personal hygiene kits.
Another organization, Interfaith Ministries of Greater Houston,
(www.imgh.org) has organized a program called Neighbors 2 Neighbors
(www.neighbors2neighbors.org), where volunteers are matched with
evacuees who have found housing. Most of these people have no
transportation, don't know their neighborhoods or the city, and don't
know how to get their services started. The objective is to help them
adjust to life in Harris County and their new surroundings.
The Houston Area Pastors Council, Catholic Charities, and many
other faith based organizations provided countless hours of service and
opened their homes and places of worship to evacuees. This outpouring
of volunteerism made it possible to serve evacuees at the Convention
Center and to make them more comfortable as they worked through the
process of seeking more permanent housing. This kind of community
service through volunteerism is possible under the NRP and would be
difficult to adequately coordinate without a coordinated local
response. It may be too difficult to coordinate the level of
volunteerism we realized in Harris County under a Federal response.
Corporate Community Giving
Many Houston area corporations, from Fortune 500 to smaller
regional companies, stepped into the forefront to support the Katrina
relief effort. CenterPoint Energy provided IT support for the GRB
Shelter operations, built showers for the George R. Brown Shelter, and
helped start the transitional housing Task Force. Jim MacIngvale of
Gallery Furniture provided the ``Town Center'' with recreational
facilities from the YMCA for the Reliant Park shelters as well as
thousands of cans of baby formula and other support. Tilman J. Fertitta
of Landry's Restaurants loaned helicopter support to supplement Houston
Police Department aerial surveys. Continental Airlines offered air
transport to reunite families. John Nau and Silver Eagle Distributing
Co. provided thousands of cans of water for Katrina evacuees in Houston
and in the Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama disaster zone.
Maintaining support for a response infrastructure is difficult for
local and state governments. For future events, the corporate community
has business continuation plans and resources beyond those of local
governments. Emergency preparedness is a high priority for the Houston
area today, but that commitment could fall through the cracks as
political leadership and priorities change. A ``virtual organization''
with a sustainable response capability could be built around the
corporate community in Harris County and the greater Houston region.
Future plans should include these community resources. Congress should
look for ways to encourage corporate support for community
preparedness.
Charitable Giving
In addition to providing volunteers, faith based organizations,
corporations and individuals contributed more than $7 million to help
Katrina victims. Those contributions made it possible to provide
comfort to he victims and help them begin the long road of recovery.
Houstonians and residents of Harris County brought, literally,
mountains of clothes to help victims and brought toys and books for
children. When volunteers got to know the victims better, they would
bring some of their favorite things like cookies and other favorite
dishes.
Volunteers worked endless hours to help victims find family members
and get information on the Red Cross and FEMA Debit Cards and other
benefits. It was the volunteers and those who made contributions to
Katrina victims who defined the character of our community, and I am
overwhelmed with our spirit of caring and giving.
City of Houston Mayor Bill White and I have established the Houston
Katrina Relief Fund (www.houstonkatrinarelief.org) that will raise
money to help evacuees and to transition them from shelters into the
community.
Lessons Learned--Ways to Improve the National Response Plan
Pay for Regular Time for Reassigned Employees
There are two strong disincentives for communities to accept
evacuees that should be addressed and rectified. The typical disaster
declaration will pay only for overtime for qualified first responders
and other professionals. This is because the community where the
disaster is declared would have normally paid the regular time of these
workers and the overtime is extraordinary time caused by the disaster.
In accommodating evacuees from another community our citizens had to
forego the services of these qualified workers and yet pay for those
services even though they were reassigned to serve the evacuee
population.
The Executive Director of the HCPHES demonstrated quite well what
this means to our constituents. In a press release dated September 5,
2005 she informed the public that there would be delays in service
while she and another 500 HCPHES professional staff members provided
public health services to the evacuees at the Reliant Park Complex. She
also advised the public that there would be a temporarily reduced staff
at each of our five health clinics and that she anticipated there would
be an increased number of individuals accessing the WIC program. She
warned that residents who utilize our public health services may
experience a longer than normal ``wait-time'' while staff responded to
this relief effort, and she asked for patience while this inconvenience
lasted.
This concern applies not only to our public health workers, but
also to all of our employees who participated in this operation. They
were reassigned from normal duties, and those duties went unfulfilled,
yet we still have to pay for that regular time. For example, the Harris
County Sheriff's Office incurred expenses for a little more than $1
million during the sheltering operation. Of that, about 80% or $800,000
was regular time that was paid by Harris County taxpayers even though
these officers were not performing their regularly assigned duties.
This is blatantly unfair to our citizens and is a serious disincentive
to local governments to accept a request to host evacuees.
I urge Congress and FEMA to recognize the need for an exception to
existing policy and for Congress to provide sufficient funding to pay
for regular time for reassigned workers. I hope that Congress and the
Administration will recognize the fact that in this situation, Harris
County's response to Katrina, we acted more as a contractor for DHS
under the National Response Plan and as such we should be fully
compensated for our expenses in providing these services.
Pay for Lost Revenue from Cancelled Programs at Public Facilities
It is also a strong disincentive for local governments to use their
convention centers and other public facilities for evacuee shelters,
because FEMA will not reimburse for lost income. Harris County, the
City of Houston, and our enterprise funds lost millions of dollars in
revenue that is needed to meet debt service schedules. Millions of
dollars will be lost due to canceled events in the Reliant Park Complex
and the George R. Brown Convention Center. Harris County's convention
center and sports venues are not supported by property or sales taxes.
Our reimbursement schedules have been thrown off, and we may face
penalties and additional interest. I urge Congress and FEMA to
reimburse this loss of income.
Health Care
At over $1 billion, Harris County's single largest budget item is
health care. The Houston region's health care surge capacity is at its
absolute limits. Louisiana, and to a lesser extent Alabama and
Mississippi through the Katrina evacuees, as well as Beaumont, Port
Arthur and east Texas through their Rita evacuees, have sent their most
medically dependent to Houston. The ability to respond to a disaster
depends on a robust system--and America does not have a robust health
care system.
The reasons are many and the subject of another hearing, but the
Harris County Hospital District and the health care providers of our
community were stressed before these disasters with high numbers of
uninsured patients and uncompensated care. Some short term needs are
addressed in my written remarks. In the long term, Katrina evacuees
will continue to stress our overburdened system. A sustainable system
to deal with long term needs and future disasters will require at least
a statewide initiative and federal programs that support long term
solutions.
Critical Infrastructure--
Critical infrastructure includes locally critical infrastructure,
such as water, power, transportation and communications and nationally
strategic infrastructure such as our refining and petrochemical complex
which represents as much as 15% of the nation's capacity.
These local and national interests can coincide with each other.
After Hurricane Rita, Baytown lost power to its water treatment and
distribution system. It's primary power supply was struck by lightning
and its backup generator caught fire. This problem was well on its way
to being solved, but they still had only four more days of water
supply. It turned out that the pumps for the canal supplying 12 million
gallons of water each day to Baytown had also lost their power supply
in the hurricane. Upon further inquiry I learned that this canal
supplied 80 million gallons a day to the ship channel refining
industries for industrial processing as well. Without this process
water, the refineries cannot produce gasoline for Maine, Connecticut,
Michigan or California. This canal also supplies drinking water to
Houston and other cities in the Houston area. The nation was faced with
a possibility of a severe strain on refined petroleum production and
over 600,000 people were faced with the loss of their primary water
supply because of a power outage at a single pumping station. The
problem appears to be resolved and appropriate federal agencies
including the Departments of Energy, Homeland Security and the Corp of
Engineers are all engaged. But the incident reinforces the need to
identify potential single points of failure and build redundancy into
systems. It also shows why a Member from the east coast should care
about Houston's requests for funds for security and resiliency in our
critical infrastructure.
Evacuations and Transportation
The gridlock in Texas during our evacuation in the face of Rita was
unacceptable. My wife, Jet and our daughter, Kirby were caught in a
traffic jam 20 miles long one hundred miles west of our home because a
subcontractor did not get the memo to cancel a pavement overlay
project. Precious hours were lost because of poor communications. The
next day the construction was gone but the traffic jam was worse as
conflicts as simple as a traffic light in a small town caused traffic
to back up 100 miles or more.
The state plan had recently been updated and models showed that we
could evacuate 1.2 million people from the coastal surge areas of
Galveston, Brazoria and Harris Counties within 33 hours of a
hurricane's impact. What we did not anticipate was an additional 1.5
million people leaving the non-surge areas well in advance of the
mandatory evacuation order for the coast. By the time we ordered the
mandatory evacuation, the road system had ceased to function.
Our medical examiner released a list of 31 people who died during
the evacuation. Most had underlying medical conditions and it is not
clear that they died as a result of the evacuation. However, these were
the very people who most needed to evacuate the area to avoid the same
result we saw in Louisiana where similar tragedies struck entire
nursing homes. Any loss of life due to the stress of traffic congestion
is tragic and our thoughts and prayers are with these families.
In Texas, the evacuation occurs over long distances. Dallas is 220
miles from Houston, Austin 170 miles and San Antonio is 200 miles away.
We will learn from Rita and build a better evacuation plan.
And just as a robust health care system is necessary to
successfully deal with a massive influx of patients from areas struck
by disaster, so is a robust transportation system necessary to handle a
mass evacuation.
Louisiana's initial evacuation prior to Hurricane Katrina reaching
land went relatively smoothly, but less than half of those who needed
to evacuate actually did. After the levees breached and evacuation
entered its second phase, the faced similar problems to ours when the
road capacity was diminished and the car count soared. Some evacuees
from New Orleans spent 17 hours or more on busses to Houston after
spending days on their roofs or standing on the side of the road or in
the Superdome or Convention Center. Many had to stand the whole way and
were sick from dehydration or exposure.
Texas and the nation need support for the I-69 corridor, I-35 and
I-45 running north from our coastal areas. Governor Rick Perry's Trans
Texas Corridor to finance new highway and rail capacity and our High
Speed Rail coalition linking the East Coast through Atlanta and New
Orleans with Beaumont, Houston, Dallas, Austin and San Antonio take on
a whole new significance when we look at our experiences with Katrina.
Interstate-10 which crosses our state and goes into New Orleans and
on to Florida should be a priority corridor as well. These corridors
are not only important for an evacuation every 10 years, but are
critical to the economic vitality of the nation. They all serve
America's 2nd largest port in terms of total tonnage in Houston and
link America's major economic and population centers. Transportation
infrastructure is vital to our nation's economic health and critical to
the success of the National Response Plan as well
Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I want to thank you
again for allowing me to discuss our experiences with the National
Response Plan. I hope our experience can be helpful to other
communities if they are called upon to respond to a disaster in this
way. I hope those communities will benefit from the things that worked
for us and that they can improve upon those things that did not. I also
hope that Congress will not leave us out alone on the financial ledge
and will be responsive when we come back to tell you that we need
reimbursement for Katrina and Rita related expenses.
Mr. Poe. The county judge serves in Texas as what we would
call the ``county mayor'' for Harris County, which is the
fourth largest county in the United States. It includes
Houston, Texas.
We have also with us Sugar Land Mayor Dave Wallace. He and
Judge Eckels were able to organize and plan the evacuation of
Harris County and surrounding counties before Hurricane Rita
hit and helped to bring about the orderly return of residents
to the city after the hurricane passed. Over 2.5 million people
evacuated from southeast Texas because of Rita.
We also have with us one of my constituents, Councilman
Audwin Samuel. He has been working with the mayor of Beaumont,
Mayor Goodson, and they, working together, helped to evacuate
the city of Beaumont. They worked with my office and FEMA and
DOD to make sure that folks were able to get out of the city
before Hurricane Rita hit. The city of Beaumont was very
organized, and the city of Beaumont now has started to let
residents return to that city.
So I am glad that both of them are here today. I am glad
they are able to come here to talk to you about their
experiences and explain the important role of local government
in the disaster management's response.
And thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman King. Thank you, Judge Poe.
Let me again, at the outset, thank you for being here. All
of us as Americans--no matter what part of the country we are
from, we suffered with you. It is easy to suffer when you are
thousands of miles away, but believe me, the hearts of America
were with you.
And also we are very thrilled, if you will, with the
response of Texas, both of the government and the people, the
way you really stood up and did everything that had to be done
with Hurricane Rita. So I want to thank you for coming here
today to share with us what you have learned, what you have
done, and also what you have achieved and what lessons you can
give us as far as the committee is concerned as we go forward
and try to resolve this issue of federalism.
So unless Congresswoman Christensen has any opening
statement to make, I will ask Mayor Wallace if you would go
first, and also welcome Mayor Samuel. Mayor Wallace, who again
is the mayor of Sugar Land, Texas, but also testifying on
behalf of the United States Conference of Mayors.
Chairman King. Mayor Wallace.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE DAVID G. WALLACE, MAYOR, CITY OF
SUGAR LAND, TEXAS
Mr. Wallace. Thank you, Chairman King. As you indicated, I
am Dave Wallace. The city of Sugar Land is in the southwest
portion of the Houston region. The other gentleman testifying
today is in the eastern portion of the city of Houston.
And I am providing my comments here today, again, on behalf
of the U.S. Conference of Mayors as a trustee and then also
cochair of the Homeland Security Task Force, but also as a
result of some comments, recent experiences on behalf of with
Hurricane Katrina and also Hurricane Rita.
I would like to focus on three particular areas today with
my testimony. In all of these, I would like to start with the
backdrop being the lessons learned as a result of Hurricane
Allison in the Houston region. The entire region, the entire
State, there were a number of lessons learned, a number of best
practices that we were able to implement within our area, and
so I do believe that we had a high level of preparedness.
The first area I would like to talk about are issues on
behalf of the U.S. Conference of Mayors, then move into the
lessons learned with Hurricanes Katrina and Rita and then move
into what a broad group of cities are working with the Houston-
Galveston Area Council on the creation of some regional
logistic centers. On behalf of the U.S. Conference of Mayors,
there are four issues I would like to start out discussing.
The city of Sugar Land works very closely with the State of
Texas in the chain of command. We work very closely in the flow
of funds coming through the State, work quite effectively in
the State of Texas. However, on behalf of the U.S. Conference
of Mayors, we continue to talk about enhanced direct funding,
directly to the cities, because there are a number of cities, a
number of States where we feel that that flow of funds can be
improved. So on behalf of the Conference of Mayors we would
like to find ways to speed that up.
A second area--and we talked about this earlier this
morning--has to do with communication. We urge Congress to make
expansion of the communications spectrum for public safety a
congressional priority.
The third area deals with enhanced transportation security.
The U.S. Conference of Mayors supports advance notification of
hazardous freight rail. We recognize that the manifest
information for what is on these trains is very sensitive. We
don't want to see that manifest get into the hands of
terrorists.
At the same time, there are some commercial reasons. But
nevertheless, Sugar Land is diligently working with Union
Pacific to develop a pilot program for immediate disaster
manifest notification. This notification model can be
duplicated nationwide with the help of Congress and then other
governors.
The fourth issue is military involvement in disaster
response and recovery. And the Federal Government does not
currently provide 911 related services, and I think the debate
today is ``Should they?''
Now, the Federal Government has a tradition of involvement
in certain disaster relief and hazardous response activities.
The U.S. EPA, National Forest Service, Army Corps of Engineers,
Coast Guard are the Federal agencies that more often than not
coordinate activities with State and local agencies. More
recently, the Stafford Act has broadened the military's role in
civil support, and the Insurrection Act allows the President to
call forth troops during an insurrection or civil disturbance.
Both of those issues were discussed earlier today.
There are also events that require immediate military
intervention and/or prestaging, such as weapons of mass
destruction or other catastrophes, such as Katrina and Rita,
where it was anticipated to overwhelm local and State response
capabilities.
The military can offer expertise in many areas that support
disaster relief. Many of these are already included in my
testimony. But the current legal paradigm is that the military
is viewed as the resource of last resort deployed to restore
order.
Mayors favor a coordinated approach to deploying military
and State assistance in response and recovery efforts. The role
of first responders should always be filled by true first
responders--the police, the fire fighters, the EMTs in our
communities.
Rather than confer lead agency status on the military, it
would be helpful if the process that triggered Federal
assistance were improved. Some of the lessons learned--I have
got a number of lessons in my testimony; I am just going to
cover three. One of them deals with the evacuation plan during
Hurricane Rita.
Again, there were a number of things that we have learned
with Hurricane Allison. Many of those have been implemented. We
can always continue to improve. And although the evacuation was
successful and citizens of one of the Nation's largest urban
areas were moved to safety, there were some clear challenges.
Many of those are listed in the testimony.
Emergency plans proved inadequate for a disaster of the
magnitude of Hurricane Katrina; again, we heard that this
morning. Despite the noble efforts of FEMA, Red Cross, faith
communities, so many different organizations, I think many
people were underprepared for the size and scope.
And last, the general lessons learned: The mass evacuation
and sheltering process that resulted from both hurricanes will
provide a template for revision of plans for weapons of mass
destruction and other events that may result in mass population
relocation. Both events require seamless Federal, State and
local coordination, and regional coordination proved invaluable
in these incident experiences; and it is the regional approach
that I would like to close with.
This deals with the city of Sugar Land and the Houston-
Galveston Area Council that have worked for the last 2 years to
create a mechanism to enhance local first responder
capabilities for natural and terrorist disaster. A summary of
this regional logistic center concept is included in my
testimony. The idea behind the concept was to establish a
mechanism that would pool the resources of cities to deal more
effectively with first responder activities during a major
catastrophe, in short, a prepositioning of a cache of
equipment.
Enhancing local first responder capabilities is necessary
because the Federal Government cannot be expected to mount a
substantial emergency response for a period of 72 to 120 hours
after a natural disaster of the magnitude of Katrina, Rita or a
weapon of mass destruction. This critical logistic capacity gap
could be fulfilled by this regional logistic center, developed
and managed under local authority.
The House and Senate Homeland Security Appropriations
Committees recently stated support for the idea in their
conference committee report that, in part, I would like to
read. It stated that ``The conferees encourage ODP to review
the use of logistic centers to consolidate State and local
assets, provide life cycle management and allow for rapid
deployment during an incident and allow for the sharing of
inventories across jurisdiction. We urge Congress to encourage
the Office of Domestic Preparedness to proceed without delay
the concept and use of logistic centers. We also urge Congress
to provide the funding this year for a demonstration program to
establish and make operable a regional logistics center in the
United States.''
Ladies and gentlemen, it is a pleasure to be here. I have
provided a complete summary of the testimony that I have given
and I have submitted that for the record. Thank you.
Chairman King. Thank you Mayor Wallace. Without objection
your full statement will be made part of the record.
[The statement of Mr. Wallace follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. David G. Wallace
Chairman King, Ranking Member Thompson and Committee Members, I
want to thank you for allowing me to submit written testimony. I am
David G. Wallace, Mayor of Sugar Land, Texas. Sugar Land is a city of
71,000 people within our city limits, and a further 45,000 people
within Sugar Land's Extraterritorial Jurisdiction, situated in the
southwest portion of the Houston-Galveston area.
My written comments cover three areas of concern about emergency
preparedness, response and disaster recovery. These comments originate
from my recent experience with hurricanes Katrina and Rita and events
in Sugar Land, as well as from my experience serving as Co-Chairman of
The U.S. Conference of Mayors Homeland Security Task Force.
The Conference of Mayors will be holding a special meeting of
Mayors and local emergency management personnel the week of October 24,
2005 to share recent disaster response experiences and further refine
our thoughts on emergency response policy and the federal-state-local
intergovernmental partnership.
These written comments delivered this morning will be focused on
three key areas of disaster event concerns:
1. Emergency response and management issues and priorities
identified by The U.S. Conference of Mayors.
2. Key ``lessons-learned'' at the local government level from
the Katrina and Rita natural disaster events.
3. What a broad group of cities/counties are doing in
conjunction with the Houston-Galveston Area Council (H-GAC) to
establish and implement a Regional Logistics Center (RLC) to
build local capacity to deal effectively with the immediate
needs of a community following natural or terrorist disasters.
EMERGENCY RESPONSE AND MANAGEMENT ISSUES AND PRIORITIES BEING DEVELOPED
BY THE U.S. CONFERENCE OF MAYORS
The U.S. Conference of Mayors identified a number of first
responder issues that are critical to local government. Four of the
most important issues are discussed herein.
1. First Responder Funding_A Better Distribution System is Needed:
Since the early days after September 11, 2001, the nation's mayors have
expressed serious concern with the system for coordinating preparedness
and response to both acts of terrorism and natural disasters.
Many mayors have positive working relationships with state and
federal partners, as I do, but there was a real concern from the
beginning that a complex, federal distribution system which involved
various approval levels for first responder resources and training
would be slow and result in serious delays in funding reaching high-
threat, high-risk population areas.
Unfortunately, the many surveys our organization conducted proved
this to be the case. Time and time again, our surveys showed that money
was not reaching our cities quickly. Federal restrictions and rules
made it very difficult to spend on what was needed most, such as
limitations on the use of overtime.
By raising concern on this issue through the release of our
studies, we were able to get the support from President Bush and former
Secretary Ridge to examine why money was ``stuck'' in many states. The
special Department of Homeland Security task force created to work on
this effort came up with a number of meaningful recommendations, some
of which, like a waiver from the Cash Management Act, have been
implemented for new funding, although not for previously appropriated
funding.
But major changes to the current system still have not been
implemented. I know that this Committee has been very concerned with
the issue of the first responder funding and has been championing a
number of changes to the program, including more regionalization of
efforts. The U.S. Conference of Mayors has continued to support the
concept of direct funding, and we would like to make the following
recommendations:
Congress should ensure the restrictions and rules that
govern the distribution and use of federal homeland security
funds, such as limiting the use of funds for overtime, do not
adversely affect the ability of cities and local areas to
protect citizens.
Authorizing legislation should ensure that the waiver
of the Cash Management Act, that has been approved by Congress
for fiscal years 2005 and 2006, is made permanent, and made
retroactive for fiscal years prior to 2005
Congress should work with the Conference of Mayors to
make other refinements needed to the first responder program
2. Communications Spectrum for Public Safety: Local government
continues to identify the limited access to communications spectrum as
a major impediment to effective first responder interoperability and
public safety efforts.
We urge Congress to make expansion of the
communications spectrum for public safety a Congressional
priority
Congress can support local first responders by passing
legislation to establish a firm date for the transition of
analog broadcast to digital--hopefully by no later than
December 31, 2006
This is needed to avoid the dangerous congestion on
existing voice channels that we experience today
It is essential to have this public safety access to
enable deployment of advanced mobile technologies such as
images and video to police and fire fighters in the field
3. Enhanced Transportation Security: This is an area characterized
more by neglect than the development of thoughtful policy.
The recently adopted Homeland Security Appropriations
bill includes only $150 million to protect a transportation
system that generated over 9.6 billion trips in 2004
Similarly, the potential for disaster with commercial
rail freight is substantial
Sugar Land joined many Mayors in discussions
concerning public safety and rail freight
The U.S. Conference of Mayors supports advance
notification for hazardous freight rail. Mayors
recognize that there are sensitive issues that need to
be addressed, such as concern that terrorists might
also mistakenly gain access to such information, and
the freight rail carriers are apprehensive about
sharing their client's proprietary commercial
information. We want to work with Congress and the
Administration to address these issues so a system of
advance notification can be implemented
Sugar Land is diligently working with the rail
companies to develop a Pilot Program for Immediate Disaster/
Manifest Notification
The process is such that if a derailment occurs in
Sugar Land, a single phone call from our EOC/First Responders
to the Dispatch Department for Union Pacific in Omaha, Nebraska
would trigger an immediate and comprehensive manifest, by rail
car number, to all the first responders dealing with the
situation
This notification model can be duplicated nation-wide
with help from Congress and the Governors
4. Military Involvement in Disaster Response and Recovery: The
federal government, and more specifically the Department of Defense and
the armed forces, does not currently provide 9-1-1 related services,
but should it? And, should federal authorities be given broader
authority to be designated the lead agency in disaster response
activities?
The federal government has a tradition of involvement in certain
disaster relief and hazardous response activities. To name a few, for
example, the US EPA is the lead federal agency for hazardous and toxic
substance response and clean-up. The National Forest Service has
traditionally been the agency that addresses catastrophic forest fires.
The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers often participates in flood control
activities at the local level. The U.S. Coast Guard has direct
jurisdiction over disasters in ports and harbors. The federal agencies,
in some of these circumstances, takes a lead role but more often than
not, coordinates activities with state and local government agencies.
The use of military armed forces to support civilian response,
however, is conditioned by certain legal restrictions that define their
possible activities. The military is precluded, except under certain
circumstances, from conducting law enforcement operations in civilian
setting under the Posse Comitatus Act. Posse Comitatus means ``power of
the county,'' and is derived from the old west days of the sheriff
having authority to raise a posse to pursue outlaws.
More recently, the Stafford Act has broadened the military's role
in civil support.
Under the Stafford Act, the military may engage in:
Debris removal and road clearance
Search and rescue (EMS)
Sheltering and feeding
Public information
Providing advice to local government on disaster and
health/safety issues
Under the Stafford Act the military may not engage in:
Traffic control
Security at non-federal facilities
Patrolling civilian neighborhoods except to provide
humanitarian relief
The Stafford Act requires the local government to make an
assessment and declaration that local resources have been overwhelmed.
The state must then make an assessment that state resources have been
overwhelmed. The federal government may then take action and send
resources. This time consuming process is frequently circumvented and
informal calls are placed to state and federal agencies to activate
resources while the declarations are processed.
The Insurrection Act allows the President to call forth troops
during an insurrection or civil disturbance. The Department of Defense
Directive 3025.12, Military Assistance for Civilian Disturbances,
permits the military to intercede in local events without a
Presidential Order. The Directive may be invoked if duly constituted
authorities are unable to control the situation and circumstances
preclude obtaining a Presidential Order, and the military action will
prevent human suffering, save lives and/or mitigate great property
damage.
There are events of a certain nature that require immediate
military intervention and/or pre-staging. For example:
The detonation of a nuclear device, such as a suitcase
nuclear device, would be expected to render the local and state
government incapable of mounting adequate disaster response
Widespread biological attack or disease outbreak would
require national command and control measures be implemented
Mega catastrophes such as Katrina and Rita that could
be reasonably anticipated to overwhelm local and state response
capabilities
The military can offer expertise in many areas that support
disaster relief:
Ability to mobilize large numbers of self-sufficient
personnel
Advanced logistical operations support
Experience with command and control methodologies just
now being implemented at the local level via NIMs
Capability to provide mass feeding, water, shelters
and other support to disaster victims
Easily move across political boundaries
Provide specialized equipment and trained personnel to
address incidents involving chemical, biological, radiological,
nuclear, and explosive (CBRNE) agents
Re-establish critical infrastructure including
communications and mass care
The military does not routinely provide the following response and
relief efforts:
Urban search and rescue
Firefighting
Civilian law enforcement duties (e.g., patrols,
arrest, seizure)
The military's primary role is the provision of national defense
and security. There is a natural question that arises--what impact
would deployment of forces to overseas conflicts have on their
availability to support disaster response. Furthermore, if local/state
disaster response plans rely too heavily on the military does their
mobilization for defense and national security leave local and state
emergency plans vulnerable? It should be pointed out that terrorist DO
NOT act at a time and place that is convenient to our national
security. For example, if our military has resources deployed in
foreign land fighting a war on terrorism, and a natural disaster occurs
in the domestic USA that requires a significant deployment of military
personnel and equipment, one should be prepared for a terrorist to plan
an attack on assets in a more geographically vulnerable and less
protected area.
The current legal paradigm is that the military is viewed as the
``resource of last resort'' deployed to restore order. Because of the
sheer magnitude of the hurricane events recently experienced, and
because acts of terrorism may spring up during or in the wake of such
natural disasters, it is natural that there is a discussion about the
military in disaster response.
Mayors favor a coordinated approach to deploying military and state
assistance in response and recovery efforts. The role of first
responder should always be filled by true first responders--the police,
fire fighters, and EMTs in our communities. Rather than confer lead
agency status on the military it would be helpful if the processes that
trigger federal assistance were improved.
Virtually every municipality has entered into ``mutual aid'' or
``inter-local'' agreements for first responder activities, debris
removal, etc. However, as was seen with hurricanes Katrina and Rita,
such agreements were rendered useless as ALL municipalities in the
respective target region required full deployment of their personnel
and assets. What should be explored is the ability of municipalities to
enter into such ``mutual aid'' agreements with other cities/metro areas
with geographic dispersion to enable regions to provide ``real time''
assistance and aid to the target region.
Under the leadership of the co-chairman if the Homeland Security
Task Force of the U.S. Conference of Mayors, Baltimore mayor Martin
O'Malley is looking to formalize ``inter-metropolitan'' agreements with
many of our member mayors and their cities. The U.S. Conference of
Mayors is currently researching the benefits and logistical/legal
issues surrounding such ``inter-metropolitan'' agreements.
Nevertheless, a rough draft of the pertinent language of such agreement
can be found attached hereto in Exhibit ``A.''
Clearly, the military should always be focused on fighting wars and
winning peace. And the primary focus of Congress should be to help
local first responders develop military like logistics capabilities to
address the immediate needs of both natural and man-made disasters.
KEY ``LESSONS-LEARNED'' AT THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT LEVEL FROM THE KATRINA
AND RITA NATURAL DISASTER EVENTS
The second area of testimony is derived from first-hand experience
involving evacuation efforts related to hurricane Rita, and relief
efforts for hurricane Katrina evacuees in the Houston-Sugar Land area.
1. Reverse Nine-One-One: Communicating with the Public During
Hurricane Rita: Reverse nine-one-one is, simply stated, instead of
citizens calling in to report an emergency, local government sends
calls out to the citizens. In the case of hurricane Rita, Sugar Land
arranged to have its contract 9-1-1 auto-dialer service send a taped
message to its residents to encourage evacuation for those having
medical or physical disabilities/impairments. This turned out to be not
only partially effective, but also counterproductive to some extent.
It was determined that the contract ``Reverse 9-1-1''
service provider was also used by numerous cities, counties,
etc. in the H-GAC area
The auto-dialer services were inundated by a myriad of
city and county agencies sending similar messages
The queue of calls was so long that when Sugar Land
placed its 12:00 Noon order for the call, it fell behind over
750,000 other ``reverse 9-1-1'' calls, and the ``emergency
message'' was not received by our residents until 8:00 to 9:00
PM, a full eight to nine hours later
Inasmuch as the weather patterns adjusted materially
during such an eight to nine hours period, it is counter-
productive to have the auto-dialer message sent out after the
decision is made to halt the evacuation encouragement, and to
suggest residents to shelter-in-place
Now the obvious response to this dilemma is to
contract with numerous auto-dialer services to increase the
rate of calls per minute.
2. Limited Evacuation Transportation Service Provider Capacity-
Hurricane Rita: Many hospitals, nursing homes, hospices and other
health care institutions housing or treating disabled patients have
established contracts with emergency evacuation transportation service
providers. Yet, many of these institutions found themselves waiting for
services that came late or did not come at all.
When the list of emergency transportation service
providers was examined it became clear that the overall list
was relatively limited in the immediate region
It also became clear that the service providers had
sufficient vehicles and personnel for limited evacuations, yet
were ``oversubscribed'' in the case of a major disaster event
where several institutions would be affected
The lesson-learned is to educate institutional
consumers about contracting arrangements that go beyond the
small-scale local evacuation need situations and ensure
redundant capabilities
Where institutions are responsible for evacuating
clients or patients, they should ask service providers to
disclose their other client demands in a large-scale disaster
event
3. Evacuation Plan Lacking in Hurricane Rita: The decision to
evacuate residents when hurricane Rita was about to hit land in the
Texas gulf area was made by local governments, who have the
responsibility for deciding what is best for their jurisdictions, and
was led by Houston/Harris County. Although the evacuation was
successful and the citizens of one of the nation's largest urban areas
were moved to safety, there were some clear challenges.
The regional evacuation plan had not been fully
adopted by all affected local jurisdictions.
Police in small towns along the evacuation route were
not as coordinated as possible in order to move traffic through
their jurisdictions (i.e., a red light in Giddings, TX
literally backed-up traffic to Brenham, TX.)
Construction on major highway routes caused immediate
traffic problems
There were shortages of food, water and fuel supply on
major evacuation routes.
These were all very important lessons learned in Texas
from the Hurricane Rita evacuation, and I am confident these
lessons will lead to immediate improvements in our ability to
evacuate citizens during an emergency.
4. Media Coverage and Public Perception Exacerbated the Situation:
Local government often relies on the media to help in emergency
situations, but in the case of hurricanes Katrina and Rita, the massive
media coverage ended up confusing the public.
Recent video and print media images of devastation
along the Gulf Coast fueled the public's perception of danger,
resulting in an urge to flee the region ahead of the storm.
This resulted in evacuation of areas in the region that are not
normally required to evacuate during a hurricane
The media coverage presented dramatic predictions of
widespread destruction resulting from a Category 5 hurricane
thereby reinforcing the public's urge to flee
Future calls for evacuation are likely to be met with
skepticism and reluctance on the part of the public
The lesson-learned is that local government should re-
evaluate the regional evacuation plan and continue to develop
and improve a coordinated public education plan to ease public
concern over the evacuation process
5. Hurricane Response and Recovery Issues_Hurricane Katrina: The
state of Texas, in its efforts to provide care and compassion to its
Gulf Coast Neighbors, offered to accept hurricane Katrina evacuees.
Because of the emergency, ``life saving'' requirements, state and local
officials were forced to make many decisions based on out-dated or
incomplete information from federal partners, including FEMA, as well
as the Red Cross. With better information, we could have adequately
assessed the impact a sudden influx of people would have on local
governments.
Inaccurate or insufficient information lead to
adjustments in the normal procurement process, which may result
in an inability of municipalities to obtain reimbursement for
response, care and recovery expenditures
This may affect local government budgets and
liquidity, and could adversely affect the business economics of
vendors who came to the aid of the evacuees
If this is not dealt with fairly, and if new policies
and procedures are not adopted to reflect such situations, then
it may have a chilling affect on municipal mutual aid and
disaster response efforts in the future.
6. Emergency Plans Proved Inadequate for a Disaster of the
Magnitude of Hurricane Katrina: The events surrounding Katrina
overwhelmed affected local governments, states and federal response
agencies.
Notwithstanding the required time frames to mobilize
personnel and equipment, FEMA appeared to be under-prepared for
an incident of this magnitude
The Red Cross was overwhelmed with requests for
shelters and could not staff or operate the number of shelters
required in outlying areas
The efforts of good Samaritans (faith communities,
service organizations, and other groups) were key to supporting
evacuee needs. However, at times the effort was fragmented and
lacked coordination
The lesson-learned was that disasters of great
magnitude quickly overwhelm affected local governments, states
and federal response agencies. Emergency plans and various
assumptions contained in those plans must be examined for
accuracy, adequacy, and be modified to address disasters of
great magnitude.
7. General Lessons-Learned from the Hurricane Katrina and Rita
Incidents: The mass evacuation and sheltering process that resulted
from both hurricanes will provide a template for revision of plans
needed to address bioterrorism, radiological dispersal devices,
nuclear, and other events that may result in mass population
relocation. Both events required seamless federal, state and local
coordination. Regional coordination proved invaluable in these incident
experiences. Working with the state, the region should move forward
with the development and adoption of regional based emergency response
plans. In fact, the state of Texas has performed such research and has
previously developed a regional proposed plan for deployment of
personnel and equipment in twelve pre-selected regions of the state
(See Exhibit ``B'').
THE HOUSTON-GALVESTON AREA COUNCIL_REGIONAL LOGISTICS CENTER (RLC)
MODEL: BUILDING LOCAL CAPACITY TO DEAL EFFECTIVELY WITH NATURAL AND
TERRORIST DISASTERS
Sugar Land and the Houston-Galveston Area Council (H-GAC)
communities have worked for the last two years on developing a
mechanism to enhance local first responder capabilities for natural and
terrorist disaster events. The mechanism is referred to as a Regional
Logistics Center (RLC). The H-GAC communities adopted a resolution in
2004 (See Exhibit ``C'' for the unanimously H-GAC Board approved
concept) to support the establishment of an ``all-hazards'' logistics
center that would service the region in a disaster event. Sugar Land
and H-GAC convened a local/regional government Summit in October 2004
to further develop the concept, and it garnered considerable political
support.
The idea behind the concept was to establish a mechanism that would
pool the resources of cities to deal more effectively with first
responder activities during a major catastrophe. While individual
communities are adding to their disaster supplies and equipment
inventories with homeland security federal financial assistance granted
from Washington through the states, the scattered state of supplies and
equipment, as well as the lack of military-like logistics support make
their coordinated application less likely to be efficient and effective
in the event of a major disaster. The RLC approach remedies that
shortcoming by pooling some of those emergency response resources
coupled with professional grade logistics management to a pre-
positioned cache of equipment that is maintained and managed for a
response ready deployment.
Enhancing local first responder capabilities is necessary because
the federal government can not be expected to mount a substantial
emergency response for a period of 72 to 120 hours after a natural
disaster of the magnitude of hurricanes Katrina and Rita, or in a WMD
event where there is no warning. This is called the Critical Logistics
Capacity Gap'' period. This response Gap manifests itself in the time
it takes to stage, transport and distribute life support commodities
from sources outside the region. In the case of man-made terrorism
events, this Gap extends to time required to assess the type of
critical and sophisticated equipment needed for the identification,
suppression and remediation.
This Critical Logistics Capacity Gap could be fulfilled by Regional
Logistics Centers developed and managed under local authority. An RLC
or multiple RLCs would provide the metro region with the first
responder supplies and equipment necessary to help the general
population experiencing a major disaster during that critical 72 to 120
hours until state and federal relief can arrive on the scene to augment
and replenish the local resources. The RLCs would continue to provide
support for first responders during the post incident recovery period
after state and federal aid arrives at the incident scene.
The House and Senate Homeland Security Appropriations Committees
recently stated support for the idea in their conference committee
report. ``The conferees note that there is no real-time exchange of
information at the regional or interstate levels regarding equipment
and supplies inventory, readiness, or the compatibility of equipment.
The conferees encourage ODP to review the use of logistics centers to
consolidate State and local assets, provide life-cycle management and
maintenance of equipment, allow for easy identification and rapid
deployment during an incident, and allow for the sharing of inventories
across jurisdictions.''
We urge Congress to encourage the Office for Domestic Preparedness
in the Homeland Security Department to proceed without delay in
reviewing the value and use of logistics centers. We also urge Congress
to provide funding this year for a demonstration program to establish
and make operable a number of Regional Logistics Centers in the Untied
States.
EXHIBIT ``A''
MUTUAL AID AGREEMENT
WHEREAS, the cities of -------------------- and ------------------
-- (collectively the ``parties'') recognize the value and the potential
need of assisting each other in the event of some emergency, and each
city has personnel, equipment, and resources that could assist the
other in an emergency,
NOW, THEREFORE, the parties agree as follows this -------- day of
--------------------------, 2005:
1. In the event of an emergency as declared by the Mayor of one of
the cities that is a party to this agreement, and upon the request of
the Mayor of that city, the Mayor of the other city commits to send
forthwith and without delay such public safety (fire and police),
public works, transportation, and other personnel, equipment, and
resources as may be of assistance to the city confronting an emergency.
This obligation to provide assistance shall be subject to the right of
any city sending resources to withhold resources to the extent
necessary to provide reasonable protection for the safety and
protection of its citizens.
2. The city sending personnel, equipment, and resources to respond
to an emergency in the other city agrees to bear the cost of its action
pending the execution of any necessary contracts or other documents to
seek reimbursement from any agency of the federal or state governments,
including, without limitation, the Federal Emergency Management
Administration, or any similar or counterpart state emergency
management agency. The parties shall work together closely and
cooperatively to obtain any federal or state reimbursement that may be
available. In the event that reimbursement for some or all provided
services is unavailable, the city sending personnel, equipment, and
resources shall be entitled to request reimbursement from the other
city and that city shall make a good faith effort to provide in a
timely fashion reimbursement for all unreimbursed expenses.
3. All personnel, equipment, and resources made available to a city
confronting an emergency shall, while in the city confronting an
emergency, operate under the command, control, and supervision of the
appropriate responsible officials in the city confronting the
emergency.
4. Within 45 (forty-five) days of the parties' execution of this
mutual aid agreement, each city shall, to the extent necessary, modify
or amend its respective emergency management plans to reflect the
obligations set forth in this agreement.
EXHIBIT ``B''
EXCERPT FROM STATE OF TEXAS REGIONAL INCIDENT MANAGEMENT TEAMS
PRESENTATION TO THE GOVERNOR DIVISION OF EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT
Office of the Governor
Synopsis: Establish Regional Incident Management Teams (IMT's) to
assist with command and control of large-scale terrorist attacks and/or
natural/man-made disasters. The IMT's will be comprised of fire, EMS,
law enforcement, public works and public health professionals from
multiple jurisdictions. Each team should have a minimum of 42 members
for triple redundancy for each of the 14 positions.
Summary: Establishing Regional (Type III) Incident Management Teams
(IMT's) will provide a cadre of highly trained, qualified, and
experienced incident command officers and staff to support and
complement the existing jurisdictional command staff during significant
and long-term incidents. The IMT concept is applicable for managing any
type of chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, or explosive
(CBRNE) terrorist attack. This initiative is based on an ``all-
hazards'' and unified command approach. As an added value, the regional
IMT's can provide command and control at natural and/or man-made
disasters such as severe weather events (hurricane, floods, tornados,
etc.), hazardous materials releases, civil unrest, public health
emergencies, etc. The IMT concept is a national model and is utilized
extensively for command and control of large-scale incidents under NIMS
and Presidential Directive HSPD-5.
The Regional IMT's will be multi-disciplinary team comprised of
approximately 42 members from fire, emergency medical services, law
enforcement, public works and public health professionals from the
participating regional jurisdictions. This 42 person team allows for
three deep in each of the 14 critical team positions. Each team member
will be trained and certified in command and general staff or support
positions. Regional IMT's can be activated for local response through
existing mutual aid agreements or by the DPS Disaster District
Chairman. A full staffed team will entail approximately 14 positions
(see slide). Individual Team staffing may vary as needed based on
specific incident requirement.
EXHIBIT ``C''
REGIONAL LOGISTICS CENTER CONCEPT (AS PRESENTED IN SEPTEMBER, 2004)
The H-GAC region, through the leadership and cooperation of its
local elected officials and first responder agencies, has made dramatic
progress in enhancing homeland security preparedness, and the ability
to respond to other hazards. Additional resources will continue to
enhance local and regional capabilities. All Texas local jurisdictions
continue to benefit from the Governor's initiative and focus on
homeland security, and an all hazards approach.
These outstanding efforts and capabilities equip the region to meet
many emergency response challenges. Some challenges, however, are
inherently beyond the scope of even the best coordinated local efforts.
Among those could be: a 9/11 magnitude terrorism event, multiple
category 4 storms such as those that occurred in Florida, a major event
in a remote location. Events of this type might quickly exhaust local
resources, not only for specialized response equipment, but even for
such common items as shovels or gloves.
Critical supply needs for an unusually large or extreme emergency
response event can be addressed through an Emergency Preparedness and
Response Logistics Center, a ready store of equipment available if and
when local stocks are in danger of being exhausted. Because the timing
of a major event is unknown, as is the location, a public/private
partnership could be developed to take advantage of capabilities
already in existence in the military supply sector, and possibly access
innovative financing, if necessary.
Among the types of equipment that could be stocked in quantity at a
logistics center are:
Specialized detection and metering equipment for
radioactive and biological hazards. This equipment is expensive
to acquire in quantity and must be calibrated and maintained.
Decontamination equipment and supplies in quantities
for hundreds or thousands of persons.
Highly specialized and expensive equipment.
Basic tools and equipment to augment local resources
and quickly replace local stocks as exhausted.
The inventory of the prototype logistics center would be determined
collaboratively through the efforts of appropriate officials of the
Department of Homeland Security, State of Texas, local first responders
and emergency managers. A process would be developed to allow agencies
to quickly access logistics center stocks as needed.
Next Steps
Obtain broad local government support for concept.
Develop support from State of Texas and Department of
Homeland Security.
Request designated Federal authorization and
appropriations.
Detail local plans and processes.
Chairman King. And now Mayor Samuel, who is testifying not
just on behalf of the city of Beaumont, but also on behalf of
The National League of Cities.
Mayor Samuel?
STATEMENT OF HON. AUDWIN M. SAMUEL, MAYOR PRO TEM, CITY OF
BEAUMONT, TEXAS
Mr. Samuel. Thank you, Chairman King, Ranking Member
Thompson and members of the House Committee on Homeland
Security for this opportunity to speak to you today.
I am Audwin Samuel, Councilmember and Mayor Pro Tem of the
city of Beaumont, Texas. I am pleased to testify on behalf of
The National League of Cities.
Our policy at The National League of Cities states that the
local governments are the first levels of government to respond
to most disasters and emergencies and must be regarded as the
focal point of all disaster mitigation and recovery activities.
Seamless integration with all levels of government is critical
to prepare, respond and recover from natural or terrorist
disaster.
Beaumont, Texas, was exemplary in its planning and response
to Hurricane Rita because there was a clear understanding of
who was responsible, who had the authority to direct whom to do
what. What Beaumont did correctly to evacuate over 300,000
individuals from our area, without the loss of life, was, we
had plans under way for at least 4 days before Hurricane Rita
made landfall. There were regular telephone conferences with
key decision makers as well as Governor Perry's office at least
three times per day prior to the storm, during the storm and
after the storm.
Our command system went into effect with the county judge
as the designated command chief. Affected industries were
provided regular updates. A positive public-private sector
relationship was critical.
Entergy, the local utility company, provided necessary
space for the repositioned command center when the storm veered
on a more direct path toward Beaumont. They helped to provide
generators when the Federal bureaucratic red tape frustrated
our local officials.
We had to consider the timing, the speed, the strength and
the path of the storm, the evacuation of the special needs
populations, the volume of traffic that we expected, and the
unavailability of inland shelters already filled with evacuees
from Katrina.
Despite our careful planning, there were problems with our
emergency communications systems. Local police, with their
personal knowledge of our geographic layout of the city and the
back roads had to be paired with other law enforcement agencies
to serve as communication conduits to the State and other
officials.
Local and State first responders performed search and
rescue of the community while the Federal officials established
their staging site at Ford Park, which contained ice trucks,
generators and other amenities. The city officials were upset
to learn that the Federal officials at the staging site could
not release the generators necessary to power up our city or
the ice trucks to provide to our citizens until Washington
approved the assessment process. In reply, our county judge
made an executive decision to expend over $500,000 for
generators.
It became clear after the storm, that local authority was
marginalized by the requirements out of Washington, not our
regional command system or the Federal officials on the ground.
Local governments must be prepared to be on their own for
the first 48 to 72 hours before Federal assistance arrives to
assist with a catastrophic event. Equally important, we need
not a national, but a Federal homeland security response to
catastrophic disasters.
Here are seven National League of Cities recommendations to
establish an effective, intergovernmental preparedness and
response plan:
One, Federal and State emergency management officials must
work closely with and directly involve local officials in key
decisions affecting Homeland Security, disaster preparedness,
and response;
Two, there must be adequate funding for local emergency
preparedness, disaster planning, technical and regional
training to allow the cities to tailor planning to the special
circumstances and needs of their area;
Third, Congress should adhere to the promise that was made
in 1997 to set December1, 2006, as a date certain for the
broadcasters to vacate the spectrum by passing the Homeland
Emergency Response Operations Act, H.R. 1646, which legislation
is sponsored by Representatives Weldon and Harman, both
esteemed members of this committee;
Fourth, the Federal Government must also share information
with local governments without jeopardizing national security.
We should collect the data on the effects of disaster and the
lessons learned from Katrina and Rita, then disseminate that
analysis to aid State and local disaster related efforts;
Fifth, the Federal Government should also provide
assistance to State and local governments to help them conduct
annual hazard and risk assessments to determine the
vulnerability of particular areas or structures to disasters or
terrorist acts based on historical and intelligence
information. A unified, uniform emergency warning system should
be developed to ensure that as people travel throughout the
Nation, they will be informed of existing emergencies and
advised how to respond; and
Number seven and lastly, local governments should be
supported in their efforts to encourage the public-private
sectors to retrofit existing structures to reduce future losses
from natural disasters, to locate new constructions outside of
high-risk areas such as flood plains, coastal areas or near
earthquake faults.
In conclusion, Homeland Security is about relationships.
Whether we are talking about responding to hurricanes or fires
or the work of terrorists, clear delineation of
responsibilities and trust are critical to deploying the
response and recovery plan. Intergovernmental coordination will
improve the preparedness and response to disasters and thereby
mitigate the losses incurred, thus helping to maintain viable
communities and an economically sound Nation.
When we have a truly organized system to respond to
emergencies, the Nation will realize a natural disaster does
not have to be a national disaster.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify before this
committee. May God bless each one of you, this committee and
our great Nation.
[The statement of Mr. Samuel follows:]
Prepared Statement of Mayor Pro Tem Audwin M. Samuel
Thank you, Chairman King, Ranking Member Thompson and members of
the House Committee on Homeland Security for the opportunity to speak
with you today. I am Audwin M. Samuel, Councilmember and Mayor pro tem
of Beaumont, Texas. I am pleased to testify on behalf of the National
League of Cities on ``Federalism and Natural Disaster Response:
Examining the Roles of Local, State, and Federal Agencies.'' My remarks
are based on my service as the Vice-chair of the Public Safety and
Crime Prevention Policy and Advocacy Committee of the National League
of Cities. Most importantly, I am also relying on my seventeen years as
a council member in Beaumont, Texas--my beautiful city which recently
experienced the fury of Hurricane Rita.
The National League of Cities is the nation's oldest and largest
association representing municipal interests before the federal
government--representing more than 135,000 locally elected officials in
more than 18,000 cities of all sizes. Our largest member is New York
City, NY with a population of 8 million and our smallest member is
Vernon, CA with a population of 91. As the representative of the
nation's local leaders, the National League of Cities has a vital
interest in clarifying the roles and responsibilities of local
government and how the federal policies impact the stability of
municipalities and their ability to deliver key services to America's
citizens and residents.
Beaumont, Hurricane Rita, and Intergovernmental Relationships:
The National League of Cities (NLC) has adopted policy which states
that ``local governments are the first level of government to respond
to most disasters and emergencies and must be regarded as the focal
point of all disaster mitigation and recovery activities.'' (2005
National Municipal Policy,\1\ Sec. 6.01(A)) The highest priority of all
levels of government in addressing disaster and terrorism issues should
be prevention and mitigation. Mitigation saves lives and reduces
injuries; reduces economic losses; maintains and protects critical
infrastructure; and reduces the liability borne by local governments
and elected officials.
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\1\ The National Municipal Policy (NMP) contains the formally
adopted positions taken by the organization on national issues. As a
national membership organization, NLC focuses its policy positions on
federal actions, programs, and proposals which directly impact
municipalities.
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All in all, seamless integration with all levels of government is
critical to prepare, respond, and recover from natural and terrorist
disasters. The two most important questions that must be understood
are:
(1) Who is responsible for homeland security--whether natural
or man-made?
(2) Who has authority to tell whom to do what?
Members of the Committee, Beaumont, TX was exemplary in its
planning and response to Hurricane Rita because there was a clear
understanding of who was responsible and who had authority. Plans were
underway at least four days before Hurricane Rita made landfall in my
city. As Mayor pro tem, I was among the city and county officials who
joined Governor Perry's office on regularly scheduled telephone
conferences to discuss our incident management system. As the storm
neared and a hurricane watch turned into a hurricane warning, the
command system went into effect within the region. Specifically, the
county judge, the designated command chief, took the helm and all the
regional officials began to communicate and share their plans.
There were three telephone conferences per day at 10:00 a.m., 3:00
p.m., and 10:00 p.m. as of Tuesday before the storm. The regularly
scheduled phone calls offered an excellent opportunity for everyone to
familiarize themselves with the key decision makers--which included the
surrounding mayors, county judge, state officials, Coast Guard, and the
principle first responders. The command team received updates regarding
the storm's track and intensity, estimated time for landfall, and the
location for the pre-positioning of the necessary emergency and
response equipment. The affected industries and their representatives,
although not part of the telephone conferences, were provided regular
updates since the refineries in the area need advance notice to shut
down.
Direct communication among the regional command center continued as
the storm intensified. When the storm veered more directly toward
Beaumont, the regional command center was forced to relocate inland.
Entergy, the local utility company, graciously provided the necessary
space for the repositioned command center--a true public/private
partnership.
At 6:00 a.m. on Thursday, the county judge called for a mandatory
evacuation of the southernmost part of the county, Sabine Pass, and
then Port Arthur, the mid-county cities, then Beaumont at noon. The
decision for mandatory evacuation came after many post-conference call
breakout sessions. Let me state clearly, that the decision regarding
evacuation rested with the county judge--the incident command chief who
took into consideration the input of the area mayors. There were many
discussions regarding the timing, speed, strength, and path of the
storm before the mandatory evacuation was declared. Local officials
also engaged in planning for the evacuation of vulnerable population by
coordinating with the Coast Guard and other key players to airlift
those with compromised health.
Local officials were also in constant communication with the
Department of Public Safety (state police) and county sheriff regarding
how to deploy the evacuation. The volume of the traffic from the
previous evacuations of Galveston, Chambers, and Harris Counties and
the unavailability of inland shelters posed a great problem. Evacuees
from Katrina were housed in the designated shelter areas which were
about 70 to 80 miles from Beaumont. This forced many seeking shelter to
have to drive 200 to 600 miles to find the next available shelters.
Once the evacuation was in effect, the state played a more prominent
role because of the use of state highways and traffic concerns.
As the stormed intensified on Friday night and unleashed its fury
on Saturday, the city was deserted. The regional command system
remained in place, nevertheless. Devastation and darkness greeted me
when I returned from Dallas late Saturday evening. A typical four-hour
ride took seven hours because of the lack of gasoline along the
interstate and the need to rely on secondary roads. The Coast Guard and
some key FEMA officials (without their teams) were on hand.
I was struck to learn, however, that despite our careful planning
there were problems with our emergency communication systems. As the
state police prevented people from reentering the city, their units had
to be coupled with a Beaumont police or county sheriff because their
communication system was not interoperable. The residents' return home
was prevented by downed power lines, uprooted trees and other damage.
Local police, with personal knowledge of the geographic layout of the
city and back roads, had to be paired with other law enforcement
agencies to serve as communication conduits to the state and other
officials.
Local and state first responders performed search and rescue of the
community while the federal officials established their staging site at
Ford Park coliseum center, earlier used as the Katrina command
operation center and evacuee site. The staging site contained ice
trucks, generators, and other amenities needed to alleviate the plight
of residents. The city hall, police stations and hospitals were without
power and there was significant flooding near the underpasses of the
highway. City officials were upset to learn that federal officials at
the staging site could not release the generators necessary to power-up
the city or ice trucks until Washington, D.C. approved the ``assessment
process.'' Local officials who helped to pre-position the equipment
before the storm had to, in some reported instances, put in new
requests for generators. After the storm, however, local authority was
marginalized by the requirement that Washington, D.C.--not the regional
command system or federal officials on the ground--act as the final
decision makers.
The public's frustration grew considerably on Sunday and Monday as
they weathered the Texas heat without power, while generators and ice
stayed in the trucks awaiting approval by Washington, D.C. In reply,
the Jefferson County Judge, where Beaumont is located, made the
executive decision to expend over $500,000 for generators. The local
utility company, Entergy, also helped to provide generators.
As our recent experience with Rita indicate, a clear understanding
of who is responsible and who has authority to do what is key to an
effective intergovernmental response. In our case, federal bureaucratic
red tape prevented the county judge, who was the designated command
chief, from making the decisions on the ground necessary to mobilize
needed supplies.
Recommendations to Improve Intergovernmental Coordination
Based on my Hurricane Rita pre-planning and recovery experience, I
am now convinced more than ever that the local governments should be
prepared to be ``on their own'' for the first 48 to 72 hours before
federal assistance arrives to assist with a catastrophic event. Equally
important, we need a national, not federal homeland security response
to catastrophic disasters. Only a national effort will ensure that all
levels of government participate in the disaster planning and recovery
as full and equal partners. Listed below are the National League of
Cities' recommendations to establish an effective national preparedness
and response plan:
(1) An effective system must be developed to ensure that
federal and state emergency management officials conduct
substantive consultations with local officials to make key
decisions affecting homeland security, disaster preparedness
and response at the local level. NLC embraces efforts to
develop a comprehensive national homeland security and disaster
preparedness strategy because the likelihood of natural
disasters and the potential for hazardous or radioactive
material spills, pipeline accidents, large scale social
disorders, and domestic and international terrorism require
that all levels of government coordinate efforts to protect
communities. This is why NLC has strongly urged that the
Department of Homeland Security continue to have a central
office for coordinating local and state domestic preparedness
activities. Regional plans and cooperation must be fostered
through this central office. It is also critical that local
officials are afforded the maximum flexibility to use the
federal and state technical and financial funds to meet the
needs of their constituents.
(2) There must be adequate funding for local emergency
preparedness and disaster planning to allow a city to tailor
planning to the special circumstances and needs of the area,
particularly to areas with facilities and dense populations
that have the potential to be terrorist targets or are prone to
natural disasters. The federal government must also increase
funding to local governments for preparedness and response,
including processes to resolve equity issues in disaster relief
efforts. Specifically, when multiple cities have been damaged
by a disaster, a formula or waiver process should be available
to allocate resources for disaster-related damage in a fair
manner.
Clearly, the transfer of funding from the from the
Preparedness, Mitigation, Response, and Recovery Program at the
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) has hampered
recovery and response to Gulf State areas affected by
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. One such example is the transfer
of $79 million from FEMA's preparedness office to the
operational programs of the Transportation Security
Administration. Also, FEMA regional offices, which are central
to effective intergovernmental communication, have experienced
shortages in staffing levels which has left them with seventy-
percent of authorized positions filled. These are the types of
resource allocation and policy decisions that hinder
cooperation among levels of government, as demonstrated by the
shortcomings of the responses to areas impacted by Hurricanes
Katrina and Rita.
(3) Local governments must haveappropriate emergency
communication systems. NLC policy calls for the federal
government to take ``immediate action to provide local
governments with the broadcast channels needed to enhance their
communications capabilities. . . . The federal government
should encourage regional planning for public safety
communication needs and address the current shortage of
spectrum channels with a long-term plan that ensures available
broadcast channels to meet future public safety needs across
the nation.'' (2005 National Municipal Policy Sec. 6.02(E)(2))
In the wake of the emergency communications problems
experienced during and after Hurricane Katrina, NLC called on
Congress to take immediate action on legislation that would set
a firm date for television broadcasters to return the radio
frequencies that have been set aside for public safety
purposes. NLC has been a vocal advocate for legislation that
would permanently clear broadcast spectrum for emergency
communication since the 1995 bombing in Oklahoma City. In 1997,
Congress promised first responders that the radio frequencies
would be available to them by December 31, 2006. The 9/11
Commission's Final Report concluded that the inability of these
first responders to talk with each other and the congestion of
the frequencies on the spectrum resulted in the significant
loss of life on September 11, 2001.
Members of the Committee, when first responders cannot talk to
each other, lives are lost. This is why NLC has called on
Congress to pass the Homeland Emergency Response Operations Act
(HERO), H.R. 1646, sponsored by Representatives Weldon and
Harman, both esteemed members of this committee. NLC is again
appealing to you to do the right thing and pass legislation
sets a date certain of December 31, 2006, or as close to that
date as possible.
(4) Local governments must be provided with the technical
assistance and regional training devoted to disaster
preparedness and response. This technical assistance should
include the gathering and regular dissemination of information
to local governments on general disaster issues and terrorist
threats as well as specific disasters where they occur.
(5) The federal government must also share the information with
local governments without jeopardizing national security.
Regions, as part of federal technical assistance efforts,
should be encouraged to share resources and equipment needed
for preparedness and response through mutual aid agreements and
regional coordination.
There also needs to be an extensive effort to expand and
improve the relationships that exist among federal, state,
local, and private sector personnel responsible for networking,
prevention, preparedness, response, and recovery. Expertise can
be pooled from national state and local government associations
along with the professional associations for public health,
public works, police and fire fighters, and the National
Emergency Management Associations and its Homeland Security
Consortium. Policy makers can also get valuable information
from advisory groups and task forces from the Department of
Homeland Security.
(6) Knowing that improved safety from disasters in the future
relies on what we can learn from the disasters of today, the
federal government should collect data on the effects of
disasters and lessons learned from Katrina and Rita and
disseminate that analysis to aid state and local disaster-
related efforts. Similarly, the federal government should
provide assistance to state and local governments to help them
conduct annual hazard and risk assessments to determine the
vulnerability of particular areas or structures to disasters or
terrorist acts based on historical and/or intelligence
information.
(7) A uniform emergency warning system should be developed to
ensure that as people travel throughout the nation they will be
informed of existing emergencies and advised how to respond.
(8) Local governments should be supported in their efforts to
encourage the public and private sectors to retrofit existing
structures to reduce future losses from natural disasters and
to locate new construction outside of high-risk areas such as
flood plains, coastal areas or on or near earthquake faults.
Conclusion
The familiar mantra after every natural disaster or act of
terrorism is that the nation needs to improve federal, state, and local
coordination regarding preparedness, recovery and response. A 1993
report by the U.S. General Accountability Office (GAO) found that there
was a need to ``provide state and local governments with training
specifically geared towards developing such necessary skills for
responding to catastrophic disasters.'' \2\ However, despite the fact
that GAO has published over 120 reports on preparedness and response,
it has found that ``the extent to which many of our earlier
recommendations have been fully implemented remains unclear.''.\3\ What
is clear is that Hurricane Katrina, and to some extent Rita, revealed
the need for improved intergovernmental response to catastrophic
disasters.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\Disaster Management: Improving the Nation's Response to
Catastrophic Disasters, Government Accountability Office, July 1993,
page 9.
\3\ Norman J. Rabkin, Managing Director, Homeland Security and
Justice Issues, Government Accountability Office, Testimony before the
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, House Committee on Energy
and Commerce, September 28, 2005.
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Homeland security is about relationships--whether we are talking
about responding to hurricanes and fires or the work of terrorists.
Public servants at all levels of government cannot accomplish the goals
of preparedness and response if they are not familiar with the people
with whom they have to work and the area and the people they need to
serve. The clear delineation of responsibilities and trust are critical
to deploying the response and recovery plan. Intergovernmental
coordination will improve the preparedness and response to disasters
and thereby mitigate the losses incurred; thus helping to maintain
viable communities and an economically sound nation. When we have a
truly organized system to respond to emergencies, the nation will
realize that a natural disaster does not have to be a national
disaster.
On behalf of the National League of Cities, I thank you for the
opportunity to submit this testimony on this most critical issue.
Chairman King. Thank you, Mayor Samuel.
Mayor Wallace, Mayor Samuel pretty much laid out a time
line of what was done in preparation for Rita. Would that be
similar also in Sugar Land?
Mr. Wallace. Identical. Actually, there were certain
activities that we had to do from a flood control perspective
where we started to bring the levels down in different lakes
that we had, starting about a week prior to Rita hitting, and
those were certain advances that we did.
And again, there were a number of things from a
preparedness perspective that all of the cities, I think, in
the greater Houston, HGAC area, had learned as a result of
Katrina. And so I think a lot of people started much earlier
than some other cities might have done if it weren't for
Katrina.
Chairman King. Mayor Samuel, you mentioned that in addition
to what is on paper and what is practiced as far as the plans,
what is really important--or almost as important--are the
personal relationships or the working relationships between the
various levels of government and the various officials
involved.
In the off years or the off seasons, when you are not
having hurricanes, what is the extent of those relationships?
Like, do mayors in one city discuss this problem with one
another? Are you in contact with people in the Federal
Government?
I mean, again, with whom in the Federal Government would
you have regular contact when there are no hurricanes.
Mr. Samuel. Well, in preparedness, we had disaster
exercises which was coordination between officials from FEMA,
the State and local governments, so I believe that because of
the exercises prior to the hurricane, as well as the exercise
with Katrina, it allowed us to be better prepared when Rita
came.
Chairman King. Do you feel the Federal Government has been
cooperative, not just before and during, but actually in the
off seasons, when there are no hurricanes, do you find the
Federal Government willing to work with you? Are they a willing
partner or a reluctant partner?
Mr. Samuel. I believe they have been a willing partner. We
have enjoyed the relationship with those officials that were in
our area working with us. However, because of the staffing
level, we believe that created some problems in FEMA. And in
preparedness, it was a good job, response, there were some
concerns; and it was because of the lack of local authority
within the Federal agency that could have been better suited.
I believe that is a lesson that was learned, not only from
the local and State perspective, but also from the agency
perspective.
Chairman King. Mayor Wallace.
Mr. Wallace. I would comment also particularly on the last
portion from a FEMA preparedness standpoint.
I think, prior to an event, the training exercises, all of
those things, the relationships that we have between the
cities, the counties, the State and the Federal Government, I
think are very, very strong, and I think they work well.
However, I think the recovery aspect could have been done
better, and I think all of us are learning new things that we
can do the next time--God forbid this were to happen again.
But when FEMA arrived, when other--Red Cross, other folks
came in, it appeared that the rules continued to change. People
started operating--whether it was for public assistance issues,
things of that nature, people were operating on one set of
circumstances; and then a few days later that would change. And
so there was a great deal of miscommunication that I think took
place in that regard.
And so I think, as we move forward, we need to look at
that, refine it and make sure that that becomes policy.
Chairman King. Some of these red tape problems that you are
talking about, have you seen any improvement from one hurricane
to the next, or the same problems remain there?
Mr. Wallace. Well, I think, from a red tape perspective,
you are talking about funding reimbursements, things of that
nature. I believe that some of these issues were around with
Hurricane Allison, because I know that there are still some
dollars that are in the pipeline.
Chairman King. Things like the decision about the
generators, I believe you said, that--
Mr. Samuel. I can address that.
One of the concerns we had, there were requisitions for
generators. We knew that that would be a problem and a concern.
We went out to Ford Park, and there were generators on trucks
available and the specifications were absolutely what we
needed. However, they could not be released until a full
assessment was done, and the authority was given from
Washington to release those generators.
There were ice trucks. There were 12 on site. Ice ready,
water ready, but they would not release it to our citizens
until a full assessment was done. I personally made trips to
one of the neighboring cities to load up my truck with water
and ice to deliver to our constituents. And there is no reason
that that should happen when it is right there.
Chairman King. Now, did you have similar problems in
previous hurricanes? What I am getting at--is FEMA getting
better or worse is, I guess, the question I am trying to get
at.
Mr. Wallace. I think--again, I think in this particular
case, I think that the magnitude of the storm in Katrina,
followed up by the magnitude of the evacuation of those
evacuees, which we talked about this morning, I think
outstripped the capabilities of FEMA; and so whether or not
they had policies and procedures in place for many of the
agencies that were there, I think many of those got dwarfed
just because of the magnitude.
Mr. Samuel. And, Mr. Chairman, I believe that what Governor
Perry stated has to be considered. This was not an ordinary
situation. We had just come off the heels of Katrina. We had
thousands of evacuees in our city and then we had to evacuate
the evacuees as well as our own citizens. So this is a
different situation.
But I believe, in the preparedness, I think FEMA did a very
good job in coming in to assist in preparation.
The response, I think there are some areas that we all
learned from and there have to be some adjustments.
Chairman King. Thank you. My time has expired.
Ranking Member Mr. Thompson.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I
appreciate the testimony of our two panelists here today.
Mr. Samuel, can you tell me whether or not Beaumont has an
evacuation plan?
Mr. Samuel. Yes, Beaumont has an evacuation plan that has
been in place with our entire region. Our mayor, our county
judge, as well as the other mayors in the surrounding cities
all work together in the planning; and they go through the
exercises for--in the event of a natural disaster or a planned
disaster.
Mr. Wallace. Yes, we do; and again it is part of an overall
evacuation plan for the region.
Mr. Thompson. So, to your knowledge, most of the adjoining
communities have this evacuation plan?
Mr. Wallace. Yes.
Mr. Thompson. Now, do you know whether it is required, or
is it just something that you have done on your own?
Mr. Wallace. I know from our perspective, as a member of
the Houston-Galveston Area Council, we are required to
participate in that overall evacuation plan. So it is required.
Mr. Thompson. Mr. Samuel.
Mr. Samuel. I am not sure if it is required, but I know
that it has been a practice in our region to develop that
evacuation plan.
Mr. Thompson. And you think--and I would assume from your
comments, both of you--that you deem this as something that is
reasonable and practical and should be basically in place by
all communities?
Mr. Wallace. Well, I think an evacuation plan should be.
Again, I think there are a lot of lessons learned as it relates
to the evacuation of the greater Houston area. And there are
things that we are going to learn from this that we can
implement the next time we have some type of an evacuation.
In the city of Sugar Land, many of the folks leaving
Galveston came right through the city of Sugar Land because the
evacuation route is through our city. So we, as a pass-through
community, not just evacuating our own citizens but as a pass-
through community, had to deal with hundreds of thousands of
cars that were going through streets that were just six-lane
divided roads. So we were able to get that done in a 24-hour
period.
Mr. Thompson. Mr. Samuel, this FEMA person that you said
that showed up in your town, what did they have authority to
do?
Mr. Samuel. Well, I am not sure how much authority they
had. But one of the dire needs immediately after the storm was
ice and water to those citizens that were still in the city,
and they did not have the authority to release ice and water.
Mr. Thompson. Mayor Wallace, can you just--I guess what I
am saying is, if the person that appeared in your community
representing FEMA, did they have sole authority to make
decisions? Or did they have to bump it up the ladder, and if
they did, how long did it take to make decisions?
Mr. Wallace. The way I would like to respond to that is,
within the first couple of days of FEMA being on the scene--I
am going back to the Katrina situation, because on a daily
basis we met with Judge Eckels, Mayor White and several others,
including the FEMA representatives.
The first few days, again, it was just trying to mobilize
the people and trying to get them there, and there was a great
deal of confusion. I think a lot of questions that were being
asked, trying to get real-time decisions, needed to be--to go
up the ladder. As time went by, that process got smoother and
smoother, and it seemed that more apparent authority was
granted to the people-on-the ground.
Mr. Thompson. So would you say to us that for FEMA to be
this robust agency responding to any natural disaster, that
those individuals that become embedded in communities need to
have the authority, real-time authority to make decisions?
Mr. Wallace. Clearly. And I also think that when we go back
and do an analysis of the things that went well and things that
went wrong, I think we need to go back and look at the policies
as to what authority will be granted to those on-the-ground
individuals.
Mr. Thompson. I guess the only other situation is, is it
too early for you all to start talking about reimbursement at
this point? Or are you involved in it at this point?
Mr. Wallace. We have already submitted reimbursables to
FEMA.
Mr. Samuel. It is still too early. We still are attempting
to recover. There is an enormous--there are tons of trash and
debris. We are still attempting to clean up. We still don't
have full power, so there are--it is too early to make an
assessment.
Mr. Thompson. So I would assume from lessons learned in
this situation, that as the emergency grew, people started
responding better in terms of making decisions and other
things.
Mr. Wallace. I think that that is definitely the case.
Mr. Thompson. Well, Mr. Chairman, I hope that if this
continues to be the practice, we are in good shape. But at the
next emergency, if it takes us 3 or 4 days to kind of get the
system in place, we still have a problem.
Now, I think our concern is, if the cavalry shows up, we
want the cavalry to be ready to respond. And I mean, I would
say that that is all our intent.
Mr. Wallace. If I might, sir, just from a local response,
this is a group effort. It is not just FEMA, it is not local.
It is the private sector. It is the faith-based communities,
things of that nature.
In less than a week within the city of Sugar Land, the
Houston area, we had a couple of hundred thousand people in our
community, thousands of people, just new kids going to school,
things of that nature. And what we wanted to do as a private
sector was put together a single-shop location where the
evacuees could go to for many of the issues, whether it was
housing, whether it was educational issues, reimbursement for
medical needs, things of that nature.
So I would encourage, as we continue to move forward, that
that be one of the first things that the local community try to
create and replicate a model that we have, because we literally
in the first week were helping thousands of people a day that
were coming through for medical needs, and in the first week we
placed over 500 jobs to people that were coming into our
community.
Again, it is not just a FEMA issue. I think it is an issue
that we all learned a lot of new lessons.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you.
Chairman King. The gentlelady from the Virgin Islands,
Donna Christensen.
Mrs. Christensen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I just wanted to
follow up on the cavalry being ready when they show up. And it
amazes me to hear some of the testimony, and I am particularly
taken aback by the fact that the local authority was
marginalized by the requirement of Washington, D.C. not the
regional command system or Federal officials on the ground were
the final decision makers.
The issue of ice and generators, those things have--the
procedure for dealing with ice and generators was something
that has been used in disasters before. It was used, we learned
about, in Hugo in 1989. We used it in Maryland in 1995 and in
subsequent hurricanes.
So it is just amazing to me how much of the experience and
the institutional knowledge of FEMA has been lost over the
years, so that when we have a disaster today, we have to
reinvent the wheel and it has already been done and invented.
We really shouldn't have had to go there.
Mr. Samuel, Mayor Samuel, you talked about--well, both of
you did, really, about the coordinating meetings between the
cities and the State, and they were happening two, three times
a day. That is my experience with FEMA as well.
Were there those kinds of coordinating meetings two or
three times a day that involved the FEMA command center near
Washington with your local officials, happening from time to
time before, during and after the storm?
Mr. Samuel. Our experience, most communications with FEMA
came about 2Zys after the storm. There was constant presence.
Mrs. Christensen. But the coordinating meetings where you
sit down and you look at what the problems are and you develop
a plan to meet them--
Mr. Samuel. They were a part of the operation plans, yes.
There were representatives from FEMA in our planning.
Mrs. Christensen. And so you all were meeting on a daily
basis or more than once a day?
Mr. Samuel. Yes.
Mr. Wallace. And we were, as well, through our emergency
operation center, on a daily basis about every 2 hours,
particularly as we were getting closer to the onset of the
storm from Rita's perspective, where we plugged into the
State's direct--the Department of Homeland Security, FEMA was
on those calls as well.
Mrs. Christensen. Then I don't understand why the judge had
to go and buy generators and ice.
But, okay, one of the problems that we saw in Katrina was a
communication problem. Everybody, different people were
talking. Sometimes the messages were confusing. It was
confusing the public and probably scaring the public, and the
media kind of took control.
It seemed as though both of you had that communications
issue under control. How did you do it? How did you centralize?
What did you do to have the city speaking with one voice, or
were you able to do that?
Mr. Samuel. Well, one thing we had to deal with, we had to
deal with the guards that were preventing individuals from
coming back into the city early on. We had to deal with State
troopers throughout our city doing patrols. And one of the
things--the interoperability was not there; therefore, we had
to couple our local law enforcement officers, one officer with
one of the State officers, in order for there to be clear
communications because of the lack of a spectrum that they
could all communicate on.
That was somewhat creative in a means of maintaining clear
communications for all entities.
Mrs. Christensen. All right. Now, what about communicating
to the public?
Mr. Wallace. I think from our perspective--let me also talk
about it from a regional view.
One of the things that benefits the greater Houston area is
what I referred to earlier about the HGAC, the Houston-
Galveston Area Council, because what that agency does is
several counties that come together, where you have county
judges, you have mayors, you have emergency responders, all
coordinate; and at that point from a communication standpoint
it is not trying to find who you are supposed to talk to, it is
picking up the phone and communicating with the people that you
know.
So I think there was a level of preparedness as it relates
to communicating with individuals on a daily basis. The city of
Sugar Land is a suburb of Houston. Yes, that is a major TV
market in the Houston area, but going into every single one of
our homes is a local access channel, so on a daily basis we
updated that.
One of the areas that I indicated in my testimony that is
of great concern and something that needs to be fixed is the
reverse 911 capability. I think the reverse 911 capability is a
wonderful tool if you want to alert a couple hundred homes
about a hostage situation, tanker derailment and evacuation
type of a situation. But when we made the decision at noon on
Thursday to let our community know what the status was--and,
remember, this is hours after we received a weather report
saying 140-mile-an-hour winds in Sugar Land--we started to
communicate with our public on a reverse 911.
Everybody in the Houston region uses the same Reverse 911
service provider. We were behind a queue of over 750 Reverse
911s. The people in our community got the emergency call at
9:00 that evening when we wanted to start it at 12:00. That is
something that clearly needs to be fixed. And whether that is a
bandwidth issue, whether that is having multiple service
providers, those are things we need to definitely go back and
look at.
Mrs. Christensen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman King. Thank the gentlelady.
At this time he will get his full 5 minutes. The gentleman
from Florida, the long-patient gentleman from Florida, Mr.
Meek.
Mr. Meek. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank the
Councilman and Mayor for joining us here under the
circumstances.
I think you had an opportunity to hear some of the
discussion that took place in the last panel with the
governors. And I only had 1 minute and because of the clock,
not because of the chairman, for the vote that came up on the
floor. But I think it is important for us to--and I was taking
a look at your testimony. I think it is important for us to
realize that after the aftermath of Katrina and Rita that there
are a lot of lessons that we all learned from it.
I can tell you one thing, that this is the first, you
know--and I know the chairman is new being the chairman, but
this is the first hearing that we have had that had anything to
deal with the response, the good or the bad, to Hurricane
Katrina and Rita. And I think, several months and several weeks
afterwards, of course, we should have been on top of it
earlier, but it goes to show you that this is beyond
partisanship. This is about preparing the country for future
events, need it be natural or need it be a terrorist event for
us to be able to respond.
Now I am creature of the State legislature in Florida. I
was there for about 8 years prior to my arrival here. And I can
tell you from watching the time of devolution of taxation on
the Federal commitment--and I know that you represent your
respective national organizations also. But as we look at
devolution of taxation, we look at the lack of resources, we
look at the priorities not being what they used to be.
And so your presence here is important and I am glad that I
was reading--Mayor Wallace, I was reading your statements here
as it relates to first responders funding. I think that is
important.
Mr. Meek. But I also think it is important to have the
validation of what I call third-party validators. What I mean
by third-party validators, when I asked the governors do you
believe that it is important to be able to have an independent
body outside of this political body to look at what went right,
what went wrong, what can we correct, you have heard, I don't
need to repeat the responses, but definitely from the Texas
Governor it was important, if I had more than a minute, I would
have said I can help you save a lot of money. I will tell you
what we learned.
Well, that is the kind of attitude that got us into a levee
situation. I am pretty sure fixing the levee in New Orleans was
something like, oh, well, we are doing something, but we are
not necessarily addressing it.
We want to be make sure that local government has what it
needs to be able to respond, since now you are being painted
into the corner of being the responder to natural disasters.
Catastrophic.
So I think it is important to take this seriously, we take
our partisan hats off, we take our regional hats off, and take
our big city versus small city hats off, big States versus
little States, because even looking at the budgets as it
compares to Texas and Florida, compared to Louisiana, Alabama
and Mississippi, it doesn't compare. So that means that the
local governments, relating to the tax base, are running into
the same issues.
So I am saying all of this to say yes, there are going to
be some delays in response, and, yes, it is kind of hard for
folks that are elected to lead and be there for people in their
time of need and at the same time say I would endorse an
opportunity for all of us to be reviewed, not only on our job
performance, but also on our responsibilities.
Now, these are hurricanes that we saw coming. What happens
when someone decides to show up in a town with a Greyhound bus
with a dirty bomb and we are down at the diner drinking coffee,
and the next thing you know, our constituents hear about it and
there are all kinds of rumors out here? Oh, if you stay here 10
more minutes, you are going to die. And you have to evacuate an
entire city, or an entire county, or an entire State. What are
we going to do? How do you respond?
We have done top-off programs, in New York City and
counties and the national organizations throughout this
country. We had Hurricane Pat in New Orleans. We knew what the
deal was. But the bottom line was it was when what we call here
in the Congress under regular order. It wasn't an independent
commission to deal with this issue and raise these issues to
the forefront so that we can be able to do something about it.
That is what we need. It may sound small, but I am hoping
that your perspective national organizations will call for an
independent commission, a Katrina Commission, which is
verbatim, which is a House bill that is now introduced here in
the Congress, many members have signed on to it, 81 percent of
Americans support it. But the bottom line is, this isn't about
who did and who didn't or what have you, it is about saving
lives, American lives.
So I wanted to hear if there is any discussion within your
national organizations that you represent, the League and the
Council of Mayors, is there any discussion on how can we
support or promote an independent commission outside of
political bodies to be appointed to be able to ask the real
questions of governors and mayors and emergency responders and
hurricane preparedness people and individuals who carried out
the top-off programs. Because I can tell you right now, with
all due respect to the institution that I serve in and the
voting card I carry in my wallet, we don't have the ability to
do it and then follow through on the task, because it was
education for all Americans, and I hate to see local elected
officials put in the posture it was.
Why didn't you do everything you were supposed to do when
you were supposed to do it? It was your responsibility. Didn't
we say that?
Or you didn't send a letter to the Governor and the
Governor didn't send you a letter back, and the President said
they didn't receive a letter, but we were talking the whole
time. What are you talking about?
So we don't have to get into that. If we can streamline it,
take it out of that process, I think that is important. I think
the League and the Council of Mayors and the Association of
Counties and the State governors and all of these folks are
missing a great opportunity, and the Federal Government, to be
able to respond to all of the people that we represent here in
the United States.
Mr. Wallace. I personally think it would be a grave
injustice if we did not create some type of a document, whether
it is an independent entity that creates it or whatever, to
come up with what is the best practice. That is one of the
things that the Conference of Mayors I know does quite well.
Whenever I go to talk with a mayor, whether it is a 2 million
population mayor or a 100,000 population mayor, everyone
shares. This is the best way we are responding to this issue.
We start that process that you just defined Sunday evening,
in a few days, here in Washington with the U.S. Conference of
Mayors. So we are starting that to sit down and what are some
of the things we can do better. We don't want to create a
situation of pointing fingers, that somebody did this or that
wrong. We just want to improve. There are lives at stake. That
is what is important, and how we can best improve our
communities. We are going to start that process this coming
Sunday.
Mr. Samuel. The National League of Cities at this point has
not taken a position as to whether or not there should be a
bipartisan committee to evaluate it. But personally, I believe
in order for us to not repeat some of the things we have done
in the past, we have to make an assessment of what has been
done and what we are doing now and move forward, whether it be
a bipartisan committee, outside committee. But it has to be
honest, straightforward communications to make sure the real
issues are brought to the table so they can be identified and
addressed.
Mr. Meek. Mr. Chairman, I thank you very much. Mr.
Chairman, I just want to say in closing, sir, I think it is
important that we continue to have oversight hearings on this
very subject. The 9/11 Commission, which, sir, you represent
the area and you were dealt with a lot of the victims of that
disaster, human disaster that was brought about, is that we
have learned so much from it, intelligence is so much better
because even though it took the Congress a year to create it,
it helped this country protect itself and it is still helping
us protect ourselves, because it put in front of the American
people where we did not--where we were failing and what we were
doing good in.
I think it was important, an area of failing, I think it is
important for us to be able to take this, the largest natural
disaster, and especially if you put Rita into it, it is really
the worst natural disaster that has ever hit this country in
the history of our existence, and not learn from it. And I
think the only thing that is stopping us, Mr. Chairman, from
doing that, is the fact that someone may feel that somebody may
say someone about someone or an administration or this person
didn't do it or an e-mail, all the silly stuff we are reading
about in the paper.
But meanwhile, back at the ranch, there were Americans
waiting for 4 or 5 days, and we watched this happen, and we
watched the loss of life and we watched the loss of property
and we watched the disorganization, the world watched it, and
we need to be able to learn from it.
So it was a year before it was created, there were a lot of
other people that came up with their own scenarios on what we
should do and how we should do it. As you know, both
intelligence committees came together and put forth a report.
The 9/11 Commission was able to take the reports, the work that
different organizations did, and put it together in a way that
it can be useful to bring about a piece of legislation to the
floor that we all voted on and the appropriations bill that
many of us went to the White House, I didn't get an opportunity
to go, I mean, I was invited but I didn't get an opportunity to
go, to sign this Homeland Security appropriations bill, and
some of the ingredients in that bill came out of that 9/11
Commission.
So, Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you for today's hearing,
okay, that we had the governors here and that we have these
fine local elected officials here representing their national
organizations. But for one member, I will be here to support
future hearings under your leadership and under the ranking
member's leadership so we can protect America even more.
Chairman King. I look forward to continuing to work with
you on that. I would also note that Chairman Reichert had a
hearing in the subcommittee last week that dealt with this
issue, and we will continue to hold hearings on this, at both
at the committee and subcommittee level.
With that, I recognize my good friend from Texas, Ms.
Jackson-Lee.
Ms. Jackson-Lee. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I would
like to just pursue a line of questioning to both of my
distinguished friends and colleagues from Texas, and might I
say that having started in local government as a member of
local government, elected official, City Council, I am well
aware of the extensive burden that local officials do face. In
fact, you are probably the first responders in terms of the
community looking toward you.
With that in mind, Mr. Chairman, I would like to make a
specific inquiry, Chairman King, to you, and to try to decipher
where I believe that we can be most effective in this
committee, and then I am going to pose some questions.
We have already had the jurisdictional mayhem, if I may
define it as such, but the will of the leadership to establish
a Katrina separate committee, and I realize that we are both
respectful and sensitive to that delineation. However, I think
that what we have heard these two panels say is a cry for the
continued work of homeland security.
Let me tell you how it can be done, to establish our base
of investigation under the heading of Hurricane Rita, because
there are distinctive issues that we can continue to look at
that would help us in our preparatory work and our going
forward work. Let me cite for you the way that I would suggest.
First of all, I think some of the key elements that I saw
being at the TranStar Emergency Center through the entire time
of Hurricane Rita was the question of evacuation and the
orderliness of evacuation. Therefore, I think it is important
that we can look under Hurricane Rita to those issues.
Let me also say an ongoing problem is how do you respond to
overlapping natural disasters and/or manmade disasters,
which is what we face in the State of Texas? We were already
hosting, Beaumont, Port Arthur, Sugar Land, Houston, we are
already hosting Hurricane Katrina survivors. Our hearts have
already been poured out. Our volunteers. Your churches, mayor,
I know, were filled. You are a faith community.
Then came Hurricane Rita with our own constituency that
compounded the impact. Right now we have some 40,000 to 50,000
in hotels that will eventually have to move out. We have cities
that turned the lights out, I hate to say, in my own State, on
evacuees that were coming. Why? Because there was not a
statewide Web, if you will, or connectedness, to say
this is a system that is in place.
So short of hoping that the insight that you have been
given by staff will not counter what I think is a way to
delineate the distinction of what our committee is doing, and
we have two very able committees, including the full committee,
the management committee my colleague chairs, or is ranking
member with another colleague, and, of course, I think there
has been established a new investigatory committee.
I can tell you for one those of us from Texas we would like
to be a guest on that kind of review, and that is not the kind
of review that can really tie with Hurricane Katrina, because
there are distinct issues that come to the receiving States who
are then impacted by an incident or event.
So, Mr. Chairman, I would welcome your studied response on
that. I will turn to the witnesses because they might give you
some greater insight to say that it is very important that are
we have these kinds of hearings.
Let me just go on this line of reasoning--
Chairman King. If the gentlewoman yield, I can give a
preliminary response. I have said all along that I intend this
committee to go, I think the way idea find it, was right to the
edge of Katrina. I think this morning's hearings were an
indication of that. Hopefully, we will not have to have
hearings on Wilma, but the purpose is to learn whatever we can
to deal with future Katrinas and do it in such a way that does
not interfere with others jurisdiction, but does go to the
edge.
I think today's hearing was very wide ranging. It did not
use Katrina as a base, but it used that also as the opportunity
to go off into the issues addressed by Katrina. What staff
counsel was mentioning to me is to let you know that next week
there is going to be a subcommittee hearing on
interoperability.
So all these issues are being discussed. They all have
relation to Katrina, not all, but many of them will, certainly
the issues raised by Katrina, and that is my intention as the
Chairman of the full committee.
Ms. Jackson-Lee. Well, I am grateful for that, and to keep
us truly pure in our jurisdiction, I am sure Rita would not
mind me using her name. I say that not that we would have
hearings on Wilma or someone else, but it represents a very
good case study of what happens through the leadership of the
ranking member and yourself. I appreciate it, and I would like
to be able to offer some suggestions, particularly on this
question of evacuation, which is a very, very difficult lesson
to learn.
If the gentleman would yield me additional time that I may
just conclude?
Chairman King. I will yield the lady an additional 5
minutes. If we could finish in that 5 minutes, I would greatly
appreciate it, for my own reasons.
Ms. Jackson-Lee. You are very kind, and I will do that,
with great appreciation.
Let me just, to both of you, say that I appreciate the U.S.
Conference of Mayors and certainly the National League of
Cities, but let me get to the point.
Mario Wallace, would you please share how we could have
been more helpful as we evacuated and gave the signal?
Obviously, your governor was here. You were very keenly in
collaboration with Judge Eckels, and might I just express my
disappointment of his previous engagement and thank him
publicly, Judge Robert Eckels of Harris County, and Mayor Bill
White of Houston, for their coordinating actions together.
But you were involved key to the evacuation issues. Tell us
how the Federal Government and State Government might have been
more effective in answering after the fact that long traffic
jam, lack of gas, as you perceive it?
Mr. Wallace. Right. I think there are a number of things,
again, that we can learn from this. The issues as it relates to
fuel, the issues as it relates to water. There were a number of
people that, of course, were stuck in traffic. My family
included, once they evacuated that morning. So I think with the
equipment that the Federal Government might be able to assist,
and I think that was mentioned this morning, fuel tankers,
water, ice, things of that nature, to assist, I think it would
be helpful. I think some of the other issues as it relates to
the evacuation process, I know that everybody had the
perception of Hurricane Katrina on their mind. They saw the
footage and it was a very frightening experience that I think
everyone lived through. And when the discussion came out as far
as sending the first two tiers out of Galveston and out of the
Gulf, I think everybody within the Houston area got on the
roads, as opposed to it being in a staggered manner.
Ms. Jackson-Lee. If, for example, we had engaged the
Federal presence, again in collaboration, meaning because they
have the numbers, not, if you will, overcoming our first
responders, but because they may have the logistical
experience, would that have been helpful in evacuating
individuals?
Mr. Wallace. I don't know if it would have been helpful in
the evacuation, because I know there were many people from the
law enforcement, on the State level as well as local, and
sheriffs, to assist in that process. Obviously the stretch of
land was pretty significant, going all the way up through I
think Buffalo or Columbus going north and then heading west on
Interstate 10. So it was a very large area of land.
I think it did take time just to get the cones out and just
to go through the process of getting both of the roads going in
one direction. So I am not sure whether the Federal Government
could have assisted in that process.
Ms. Jackson-Lee. When you say the Federal Government,
obviously you are talking about federalizing the National Guard
or utilizing them, but also providing Reservists and other
military personnel, which both Louisiana and Mississippi and
Texas are blessed with a bounty of. So what I am suggesting to
you, logistically with the ability of military to move people,
would that have been helpful as you were eking to have those
logistical procedures in place?
Mr. Wallace. I think as it relates to Rita, I don't think
it would have been helpful.
Ms. Jackson-Lee. Let me say to the council member, I for
one am aware of some of the strains that you had on your local
community. Let me thank you, one, for what you did for
Hurricane Katrina, and knowing that you had a number of
residents, but also let me thank you for some of the leadership
that I saw as a member of the Homeland Security committee
visiting Beaumont and Port Arthur, in particular, your county
judge and your mayor and certainly you and your leadership
role.
So the issue becomes, if you will, I did not see any
predeployment. What I heard from, as we had a letter submitted
in the record by Mayor Ortiz, no predeployment of water, no
predeployment of ice, no ability to get food. One thing I
noticed was that the FEMA meeting was at the Ford Arena. The
Beaumont meeting was downtown. That doesn't seem to be a
coordinated scenario that would appropriately get the right
response.
So as the chairman gavels, would you answer for me whether
predeployment would have been helpful and also whether or not
military in the right way would have been helpful as well,
getting things quickly to your area?
Mr. Samuel. First let me preface any statements I might
have: Anytime military assistance is called, I believe it
should be on an asneeded basis.
Ms. Jackson-Lee. Absolutely.
Mr. Samuel. From discussions in retrospect to what has
happened, there has been some conversations stating that a
military presence could have been helpful in the evacuation
process as we move from dual directional traffic to single
directional traffic, there was a lot of dangers that had to be
considered and manpower became an issue.
That could have been better handled or possibly handled
with military presence. But, again, on an asneeded
basis.
So I believe there is definitely a need for a working
relationship with the national, State and local governments,
and there was a statewide web in place. However, it wasn't
taken under consideration when we prepared the statewide web,
it wasn't considered that we would be dealing with two sets of
evacuees. So that complicated the issue.
Also when we talk about evacuation, this particular storm,
Rita, changed directions, or there were projections of
different locations. Immediately Galveston County began to
evacuate, Harris County began to evacuate. Then it came down to
a lot of the traffic coming from South Texas was coming up the
evacuation sites through Houston, even through but month. That
complicated the issue when the storm took a turn toward
Beaumont.
So, yes, we are looking at what we did. A lot of things
were done right. The military presence was critical to get our
special needs people out once the storm changed and came toward
Beaumont. We probably couldn't have evacuate as well as we did
had it not be been for the assistance in flying out those
special needs patients.
So there is a need. Where that comes into play, I think
that is best left with the local decisionmakers working with
the national government to make those decisions.
Ms. Jackson-Lee. They must be present and available for you
to call on them?
Mr. Samuel. Yes, and have the local authority in the
Federal prisons to make decisions on the local level.
Chairman King. The gentlelady's time has expired. I want to
thank the witnesses for their testimony. I understand Judge
Eckels has arrived. The hearing has gone on.
Just so you know, Congressman Poe gave you a very fulsome
introduction.
Mr. Eckels. My testimony has been submitted in writing, Mr.
Chairman. I apologize for the conflict and being late.
Ms. Jackson-Lee. Congresswoman Jackson-Lee thanked him very
much as well for his great work.
Chairman King. And we take all of your compliments with
great interest. So Judge Eckels, you are in great company if
you can be complimented by Ms. Jackson-Lee.
I want to thank all the witnesses for their testimony. The
hearing record will be open for 10 days for any members who
have additional questions. I would ask if the witness could
respond to those questions in writing. I want to thank the
witnesses again, thank Ms. Jackson-Lee for being here, and
without objection, the committee stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 2:22 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]