[House Hearing, 109 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
REDUCING NUCLEAR AND BIOLOGICAL THREATS AT THE SOURCE
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON PREVENTION OF NUCLEAR AND BIOLOGICAL ATTACK
of the
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
JUNE 22, 2006
__________
Serial No. 109-87
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Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/
index.html
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COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Peter T. King, New York, Chairman
Don Young, Alaska Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Lamar S. Smith, Texas Loretta Sanchez, California
Curt Weldon, Pennsylvania Edward J. Markey, Massachusetts
Christopher Shays, Connecticut Norman D. Dicks, Washington
John Linder, Georgia Jane Harman, California
Mark E. Souder, Indiana Peter A. DeFazio, Oregon
Tom Davis, Virginia Nita M. Lowey, New York
Daniel E. Lungren, California Eleanor Holmes Norton, District of
Jim Gibbons, Nevada Columbia
Rob Simmons, Connecticut Zoe Lofgren, California
Mike Rogers, Alabama Sheila Jackson-Lee, Texas
Stevan Pearce, New Mexico Bill Pascrell, Jr., New Jersey
Katherine Harris, Florida Donna M. Christensen, U.S. Virgin
Bobby Jindal, Louisiana Islands
Dave G. Reichert, Washington Bob Etheridge, North Carolina
Michael T. McCaul, Texas James R. Langevin, Rhode Island
Charlie Dent, Pennsylvania Kendrick B. Meek, Florida
Ginny Brown-Waite, Florida
______
SUBCOMMITTEE ON PREVENTION OF NUCLEAR AND BIOLOGICAL ATTACK
John Linder, Georgia, Chairman
Don Young, Alaska James R. Langevin, Rhode Island
Christopher Shays, Connecticut EdwarD J. Markey, Massachusetts
Daniel E. Lungren, California Norman D. Dicks, Washington
Jim Gibbons, Nevada Jane Harman, California
Rob Simmons, Connecticut Eleanor Holmes Norton, District of
Bobby Jindal, Louisiana Columbia
Charlie Dent, Pennsylvania Donna M. Christensen, U.S. Virgin
Peter T. King, New York (Ex Islands
Officio) Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
(Ex Officio)
(II)
C O N T E N T S
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Page
STATEMENTS
The Honorable John Linder, a Representative in Congress For the
State of Georgia, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Prevention of
Nuclear and Biological Attack.................................. 1
The Honorable Charlie Dent, a Representative in Congress For the
State of Pennsylvania.......................................... 35
The Honorable James R. Langevin, a Representative in Congress For
the State of Rhode Island...................................... 2
The Honorable Edward J. Markey, a Representative in Congress For
the State of Massachusetts..................................... 40
The Honorable Norman D. Dicks, a Representative in Congress For
the State of Washington........................................ 37
The Honorable Eleanor Holmes Norton, a Representative in Congress
For the District of Columbia................................... 58
WITNESSES
Jerry Paul, Princicpal Deputy Administrator, National Nuclear
Security
Administration, Department of Energy:
Oral Statement................................................. 4
Prepared Statement............................................. 6
Frank Record, Acting Assistant Secretary, Bureau of International
Security and Nonproliferation, Department of State:
Oral Statement................................................. 12
Prepared Statement............................................. 15
Jack David, Deputy Assistant Secretary, International Security
Policy,
Department of Defense:
Oral Statement................................................. 22
Prepared Statement............................................. 25
Dr. Igor Khripunov, Associate Director, Center for International
Trade and Security, University of Georgia:
Oral Statement................................................. 43
Prepared Statement............................................. 45
Dr. David Franz, Vice President and Chief Biological Scientist,
Midwest
Research Institute:
Oral Statement................................................. 50
Prepared Statement............................................. 52
REDUCING NUCLEAR AND BIOLOGICAL THREATS AT THE SOURCE
----------
Thursday, June 22, 2006
U.S. House of Representatives,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Subcommittee on Prevention of
Nuclear and Biological Attack,
Washington, D.C.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:00 p.m., in
Room 2212, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. John Linder
[chairman of the subcommittee] presiding.
Present: Representatives Linder, Gibbons, Dent, Langevin,
Markey, Dicks and Norton.
Mr. Linder. The Committee on Homeland Security Subcommittee
on Prevention of Nuclear and Biological Attack will come to
order.
Today, the subcommittee meets to hear testimony on reducing
nuclear and biological threats at their source. I want to thank
our distinguished witnesses for appearing today.
The end of the Cold War and the breakup of the former
Soviet Union dramatically reduced the chances of an all-out
nuclear and biological war with the United States. The legacy
of its nuclear and biological weapons program, however, still
has the potential of doing enormous harm. Unsecured nuclear
material, unemployed biological weapons experts and the
patchwork of administrative controls opens the door for a
terrorist group to acquire that material or use the skills of
those scientists to launch an attack on the United States.
Today, this subcommittee will hear about U.S. and
multilateral efforts to secure nuclear and biological material
and redirect former weapon scientists into peaceful endeavor.
We have no room to fail in this mission.
The detonation of a nuclear device in the United States or
the dispersal of a biological agent must be prevented, and
prevention is best achieved at its source. Encouragement
efforts being made through various agencies before us,
bilateral projects with Russia, such as the various cooperative
threat reduction programs, for example, are helping to secure
nuclear warheads and biological pathogens and to stabilize
employment for nuclear and biological experts.
U.S. partnering with organizations like the International
Atomic Energy Agency and the nations of the G8 must continue to
take the lead in keeping nuclear and biological materials out
of the hands of terrorists. Recent examples demonstrate this
success, including the removal of eight nuclear weapons worth
of highly enriched uranium over the last 2 years. For the past
year, this effort led to the conversion of three research
reactors from the use of highly enriched uranium--which can be
used in a nuclear weapon--to the use of low-enriched uranium,
thereby limiting the risk of theft.
On the biological side, a U.S.-Russian collaboration led to
the discovery of highly pathogenic avian flu in birds in
Siberia in 2005. To date, the U.S. has gained access to nearly
a dozen former biological weapons facilities. Securing nuclear
and biological material is only half the weapon, though.
Redirecting former weapons scientists into peaceful and
productive of work and discouraging them from disclosing
secrets to terrorist networks not only requires a coordination
between governments but also the creation of an environment of
awareness among scientists around the world.
The sheer numbers of scientists with a skill set that could
be used by terrorists could quickly overwhelm any state-
sponsored control effort. Self-regulation and the importance of
a security culture in a nuclear and biological science arena is
the focus of our second panel of witnesses, and I look forward
to hearing how Congress can encourage these effects.
The hope through this hearing, in the testimony of our
witnesses today, is that we can continue to pressure the
international community to make good on the $20 billion pledge
to prevent acts of terrorism using weapons of mass destruction
that was made initially at the June of 2002 G8 Summit.
With that, I now recognize my friend from Rhode Island, Mr.
Langevin, the ranking member of this subcommittee, for any
statement he would like to make.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I would like to welcome our witnesses today, and I look
forward to hearing their testimony certainly.
After listening to witnesses at hearings and briefings held
by this subcommittee, I feel that our government must move
quickly to accelerate our efforts to secure nuclear and
biological material at the source.
Now we have learned about the relative ease with which a
terrorist can build a crude nuclear device, and we must do all
we can to prevent them from obtaining nuclear materials. We
know that securing biological weapons and materials is much
more difficult due to the dual nature of technology and the
ability to grow a lot of bioweapon agent from a small amount.
So I am very interested to hear how our efforts are proceeding
on this front.
Given the fact that a majority of fissile materials and
bioweapons labs are located in Russia and its former republics,
I would like to get a sense of how well we are doing in the
former Soviet Union as well. Security of fissile materials in
Russia still concerns me, especially after the National
Intelligence Council reported in December of 2004 that
undetected smuggling of nuclear materials has occurred at
Russian weapons facilities.
Last November, this subcommittee held a hearing at which a
senior official from the Department of Energy stated that his
Russian counterpart informed him that there were 200 cases of
suspected nuclear and radiological material last year. This
testimony, coupled with the National Intelligence Council
report, doesn't give me great confidence in the security of
fissile materials abroad and leads me to believe that if we
don't move quickly this material will end up in the wrong
hands.
Now, according to the June, 2004, National Commission on
Terrorist Attack report, al Qaeda continues to pursue its
strategic objective of obtaining nuclear weapons. I strongly
believe that nonproliferation is the best way for the U.S. to
protect itself from a WMD attack. It is my hope that by holding
these hearings, even though this committee does not have
jurisdiction--oversight jurisdiction--we can highlight the fact
that these programs are our best chance at securing these
weapons.
Nonengagement and threats, the strategy our government has
taken also both with North Korea and Iran until very recently,
has not worked. The strategy, in fact, has put our country, I
believe, in danger, highlighted by the possibility that
material from North Korea could each our shores--I am sorry, a
missile from North Korea could each our shores.
For our effort to be successful, greater funding and
diplomacy will be needed to complete the important work in
Russia and address these new situations that we now face.
Finally, I would like to hear from our witnesses on how our
government could better coordinate its nonproliferation
programs. A GAO report issued in January of 2005 stated there
was no overall plan that integrates the programs carried out by
the Department of Defense and the Department of Energy.
Integration is critically important as our government looks to
expand its nonproliferation programs beyond Russia.
As I have said in previous hearings, we must begin to move
with a sense of urgency to prevent terrorists from executing a
nuclear or biological attack on our shores, and that begins
with securing weapons material at its source.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to hearing from our
witnesses.
Mr. Linder. Thank you, Mr. Langevin.
Mr. Linder. We are pleased to have two panels of
distinguished witnesses before us today. Our first panel, I
will begin with Mr. Jerry Paul. Mr. Paul is a Principal Deputy
Administrator of the U.S. National Nuclear Security
Administration. He has responsibility for overseeing a variety
of nuclear net reduction programs, including the Global Threat
Reduction Initiative.
From the Department of State, we have Mr. Frank Record. Mr.
Record is the Acting Assistant Secretary of the Bureau of
International Security and Nonproliferation. He is responsible
for managing a broad range of nonproliferation, counter
proliferation and arms control functions.
And, finally, we will hear from Mr. Jack David, Deputy
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security
Policy, Office of the Secretary of Defense. His office provides
direction to the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, which
implements a Cooperative Threat Reduction program. CTR is also
known as a Nunn-Lugar program and has been the flagship for
U.S. threat reduction for more than a decade.
Let me remind the witnesses that your testimony will be
part of the record. We would like to ask you to summarize in 5
minutes.
Mr. Linder. Mr. Paul.
STATEMENTS OF JERRY PAUL, PRINCIPAL DEPUTY
ADMINISTRATOR, NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION,
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
Mr. Paul. Mr. Chairman, thank you for focusing on our
Nation's nonproliferation activities and on the work of the
Department of Energy and providing us with this opportunity to
testify today. It is an honor to be here. It is a pleasure to
be here with my colleagues from the State Department and
Department of Defense.
In particular, I appreciate the opportunity to highlight
the activities to date on the U.S.-Russian Senior Interagency
Working Group on Nuclear Security Cooperation established by
Presidents Bush and Putin, commonly referred to as the
Bratislava Initiative.
In the aftermath of September 11, we have intensified our
efforts to keep nuclear materials and nuclear weapons out of
the hands of terrorists. The NNSA has accelerated and expanded
its implementation of what we call a five-pronged strategy to
deny terrorists and states of concern the materials, the
technology, and the expertise that would be needed to develop
nuclear weapons.
Those five prongs are: one, to account for and secure
nuclear material in Russia and the former Soviet Union; two, to
detect and prevent the movement or trafficking of weapons-
grade, weapons-usable technologies and usable nuclear
materials; three, to stop the production of new fissile
material in Russia; four, to eliminate existing weapons-usable
material; and, finally, number five, eliminate or consolidate
the remaining weapons-usable nuclear material and radiological
materials that exist throughout the remainder of the world.
I should also point out that, underpinning our policy
initiatives, we maintain a vigorous nonproliferation research
and development program conducting applied research,
development, testing and evaluation to produce the technologies
that lead to detection systems strengthening the U.S. response
to current and projected threats to national security
worldwide.
The R&D program is the technical base that provides our
policy programs and operational agencies, including the
Department of Defense, the Department of Homeland Security and
the Intelligence Community, with innovative systems and
technologies to meet the U.S. government's nonproliferation,
counter-proliferation and counter-terrorism mission
responsibilities. The NSA invests in strategic and often high-
risk technical solutions to detect the proliferation of WMD.
Now, building on the above outline of our five-pronged
strategy and our priorities, I now turn to the Bratislava
Senior Interagency Working Group and its progress to date.
As you know, this working group came out of the February,
2005, meeting in Bratislava between President Bush and
President Putin where they, together, issued a statement
outlining efforts to enhance our nuclear security cooperation.
They established a Bilateral Senior Interagency Working Group
co-chaired by Secretary Sam Bodman at the Department of Energy
and also Director Sergei Kiriyenko of the Russian Federal
Atomic Energy Agency, or Rusatom, as it is more commonly known.
Our expanded nuclear security cooperation for Bratislava is
in five distinct areas: emergency response cooperation,
exchanging best practices, focusing on security culture,
collaboration on issues related to research reactors, and
nuclear security cooperation, which is largely MPC&A material
protection and control accountability measures.
First, as to the emergency response, this component of the
Bratislava Initiative envisions cooperation in enhancing
emergency response capabilities to deal with a nuclear or
radiological incident, including the training and development
of additional technical methods to detect nuclear and
radioactive materials involved in the incident. To address
this, a U.S.-Russian expert working group on emergency response
was established to review current and future activities in the
areas of incident response and consequence management.
The plans for next year include further discussions on
nuclear incident response and consequence management
methodologies, plans and preparations for such incidents. The
group plans to move on from a tabletop exercise--which we have
done--to a field exercise in Russia with experts late this
year. The scenario we will focus on is on search and
consequence management for a terrorist radiological event.
This initiative is truly an important partnership in the
global war on terror. In addition to preventing and responding
to nuclear radiological incidents, both our nations really do
need to be prepared to mitigate the consequences in the event
of the unthinkable.
Best practices. The idea behind this task was to have high-
level nuclear security practitioners from both of our countries
work together on common problems and to share solutions and
methodologies to those problems and how to address them.
Prior to Bratislava, the majority of our bilateral nuclear
work had taken place really at the site or local level with
security managers. But for this effort we enlisted the help of
those in our organization outside our Russian cooperative
programs, those who are actually tasked with providing and
overseeing nuclear security at our facilities across the United
States, for example.
The countries have agreed to continue collaborating in the
area of nuclear security best practices and have begun a
dialogue on topics to be discussed at the next meeting, which
we are planning for this fall.
As for third-country consultations, both countries are
reviewing how best to accomplish this. We think it is essential
for the U.S. and Russia to have a common understanding of what
those best practices are, and we have worked continually to
better define those and come to agreement on what those best
practices are and also share those with third countries. We are
anticipating at least one more round of bilateral workshops
before any kind of consensus can actually be reached, but we
will certainly report that to you as it develops.
On security culture. It is important, in addition to best
practices, that we focus on security culture; and the joint
statement says this when it mentions calling for the fostering
of disciplined, well-trained and responsible custodians and
protective forces and fully utilized and well-maintained
security systems. The concept of security culture has been the
topic at many international meetings. It is an issue that we
provide leadership on through the IAEA, and it is one where we
feel as though we are making more and more progress in Russia.
Research reactors. We are very proud of the progress that
we have made on converting research reactors, as the
Congressman mentioned a moment ago, three research reactors
converted post Bratislava, two Russian design, one of U.S.
design; and we continue to make good progress on converting the
others on the list.
We have worked in this area with Russia for many years,
but, as I mentioned earlier, in order to accelerate and
expedite that important work that is yet to be done we
consolidated several programs under the GTRI or Global Threat
Reduction Initiative in 2004. We have made a lot of progress.
The experts on both sides, pursuant to Bratislava, have agreed
to a prioritized schedule for all of the remaining Russian-
origin fresh fuel shipments and agreed that they will be
completed by 2006 and, for the spent fuel shipments, by 2010.
In order to meet that schedule, a joint U.S. DOE-Rosatom
technical working group will be operating under a joint
coordinating committee with the objective of accelerating and
coordinating those preparations.
We are also working, as I mentioned earlier, on the
development of high-density, low-enriched uranium fuels to
convert the remaining reactors from high-enriched uranium. We
will continue to leverage our assets at the national
laboratories and throughout the United States complex in order
to develop that work, and we feel good about the progress that
we have made so far.
I would also like to note that, while in these areas the
work has been preceding for several years, Bratislava really
did help to accelerate the timetable and helped us set more
aggressive schedules, if you will, and gain enhanced Russian
commitment to this important work.
Mr. Linder. Your time is up by about 4 and a half minutes.
Mr. Paul. With that, Mr. Chairman, I will simply close and
look forward to taking questions.
Mr. Linder. Thank you. Thank you very much.
[The statement of Mr. Paul follows:]
Prepared Statement of Jerry Paul
Mr. Chairman, thank you for focusing on the nonproliferation
activities of the U.S. Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security
Administration (NNSA) and providing this opportunity to testify. In
particular, I appreciate the opportunity to highlight our activities to
date under the U.S.-Russian Senior Interagency Working Group on Nuclear
Security Cooperation established by Presidents Bush and Putin at
Bratislava in February of 2005 and related accomplishments.
I will begin by briefly outlining NNSA's overall strategy to place
into context our work under the Senior Working Group, commonly referred
to as "The Bratislava Initiative."
In the aftermath of 9/11, we have intensified our efforts to keep
nuclear material and nuclear weapons out of the hands of terrorists.
The NNSA has accelerated and expanded its implementation of a five-
pronged strategy to deny terrorists and states of concern the
materials, technology, and expertise needed to develop nuclear weapons.
First: To account for and secure nuclear material in Russia and the
former Soviet Union.
To date, we have secured over 80 percent of the sites where these
materials are stored and we are on course to finish all of our security
upgrades by 2008--a full two years ahead of the schedule established
prior to 2001.
With over 95 percent of the warhead and nuclear fuels sites
completed, we will finish our work to secure Russian Navy warhead and
nuclear fuel sites in FY 2006. We are moving rapidly to secure all
remaining 12th Main Directorate and Strategic Rocket Forces warhead
sites on an accelerated schedule, by the end of 2008.
Second: To detect and prevent the movement or trafficking of weapons-
usable technologies and useable nuclear materials.
Through our Second Line of Defense and Core and Megaports programs,
we are working with other countries to install radiation detection
equipment at key transit choke points throughout the world - such as
sea ports, airports, and land border crossings--to improve our ability
to detect movement of nuclear and radiological materials.
Coordinated cooperation with the Department of Homeland Security
and the State Department is vital to the successful implementation of
this global program. Our staffs work together on a regular basis to
streamline communication, eliminate overlaps in responsibility, and
identify potential security gaps where added attention is necessary.
We have installed radiation detection equipment at more than 80
border crossings (rail crossings, vehicle crossings, small seaports)
and we have taken responsibility for additional radiation detection
equipment at approximately 50 locations originally equipped by the
State Department and other agencies. We have already equipped six
Megaports--Algeciras, Bahamas, Colombo, Rotterdam, Singapore (pilot)
and Piraeus. We expect to complete installations at one more Megaport
this year, and are installing equipment at ten additional ports. We
plan to sign new agreements at five additional Megaports this fiscal
year.
We are also training front-line enforcement officers worldwide, to
interdict illicit technology transfers, and we are helping states
strengthen nuclear safeguards needed to secure nuclear materials. It is
critical that states take on responsibilities for meeting global
nonproliferation responsibilities. These programs help realize that
objective.
Third: To stop the production of new fissile material in Russia.
In 1997, the U.S. signed an agreement with the Russian Federation
providing for the cessation of production of weapons-grade plutonium
that could be used in nuclear weapons, expediting the shut down of
Russia's last three plutonium-producing nuclear reactors. In March
2003, the two governments signed an amendment to the agreement under
which the USG would assist in providing fossil fuel plants to supply
alternative energy sources thereby allowing Russia to shut down the
reactors and cease production of new plutonium.
We are making progress in this area. We began construction work at
the first site, Seversk, last year and started construction at the
other site, Zheleznogorsk, earlier this year, with expected completion
dates of 2008 and 2011 respectively.
Fourth: To eliminate existing weapons-usable material.
More than 270 metric tons of Russian Highly Enriched Uranium (the
equivalent of about 11,000 warheads) from dismantled weapons have been
down-blended to low-enriched, non-weapons grade material for use in
commercial power reactors pursuant to the HEU Agreement or what is
often called the "Megatons to Megawatts" program. Altogether, 500
metric tons of Russia's HEU will be converted and used to support
civilian nuclear power here in the United States at little or no cost
to the American taxpayer. This down-blended material accounts for 10
percent of U.S. electricity production. In other words, in effect one
in every ten light bulbs in America is powered by material that was
once contained in a Soviet nuclear warhead.
Additionally, we are working with the Russians to eliminate 34
metric tons of weapons-grade plutonium in each country, enough for over
17,000 nuclear weapons, through our plutonium disposition programs.
Fifth: To eliminate or consolidate the remaining weapons-useable
nuclear and radiological materials that exist throughout the remainder
of the world.
In May 2004, DOE launched the Global Threat Reduction Initiative--
"GTRI"--to identify, secure, recover and facilitate the disposition of
vulnerable nuclear and radiological materials around the world.
Under the GTRI program, we are converting research reactors around
the world from highly-enriched uranium (HEU) fuel to low enriched
uranium (LEU) fuel.
We are working with the Russian Federation to develop technologies
that will enable the conversion from HEU to LEU fuel of Russian-
designed research and test reactors in third countries.
We signed an agreement with Russia that provides the overall legal
framework for repatriating Russian HEU nuclear fuel from Russian-
supplied research reactors located around the world for safe storage
and disposition. To date, we have completed 12 shipments of HEU fresh
and spent nuclear fuel under this program.
Last fall, we took the actions necessary to extend the period
during which spent nuclear fuel containing HEU of U.S. origin could be
repatriated to the United States and continue to accept shipments from
around the world.
GTRI reduces the risk of radiological materials being used in a
radiological dispersal device by working cooperatively with foreign
counterparts to locate, recover, consolidate, and enhance the security
of high-risk radioactive materials. To date, the program has completed
security upgrades in more than 40 countries containing radiological
sources of concern.
We are also securing weapons expertise through joint collaboration
and alternate infrastructure development. Through the Department's
Global Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention ("GIPP") program we are
engaging former weapons experts in nuclear, chemical and biological
weapons institutes in Russia and the Former Soviet Union (FSU). We
often say that the proliferation threat has three elements including
technology, materials, and expertise. This program addresses the third
element. By redirecting weapons scientists to peaceful, commercially
viable activities, we reduce the likelihood that these individuals will
want to work with proliferators and reduce the likelihood that a
terrorist organization will be able to recruit them.
Underpinning these policy initiatives, we maintain a vigorous
Nonproliferation Research and Development (R&D) Program conducting
applied research, development, testing, and evaluation to produce
technologies that lead to detection systems strengthening the U.S.
response to current and projected threats to national security
worldwide posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and
the diversion of special nuclear material. The R&D program is the
technical base that provides our policy programs and operational
agencies (including the Department of Defense, the Department of
Homeland Security, and the Intelligence community) with innovative
systems and technologies to meet the U.S. Government's
nonproliferation, counter-proliferation, and counter-terrorism mission
responsibilities. NNSA invests in strategic and often high-risk
technical solutions to detect the proliferation of WMD.
Building on the above outline of our strategy and priorities, I now
focus on the Senior Interagency Working Group and its progress to date.
As you know, this working group came out of the February 2005
summit in Bratislava between President Bush and President Putin.
Together they issued a joint statement outlining efforts to enhance our
nuclear security cooperation. They established a bilateral Senior
Interagency Working Group co-chaired by Secretary Bodman of the
Department of Energy and by Director Kiriyenko of the Russian Federal
Atomic Energy Agency, or Rosatom, as it is more commonly known.
Our expanded nuclear security cooperation has five distinct areas:
1. Emergency Response Cooperation
2. Exchanging "Best Practices"
3. Focus on "Security Culture"
4. Collaboration on issues related to Research Reactors
5. Nuclear Security Cooperation (MPC&A efforts)
Before I go into more detail on each of these areas of cooperation
and what has been accomplished to date, I want to describe a little of
the history behind the joint statement made in Bratislava, Slovak
Republic.
Some of the areas of cooperation that we talk about as "efforts
under Bratislava" you will recognize as work we have been conducting
with our Russian partners for several years. This includes our research
reactor conversion program, our spent and fresh fuel repatriation
program, and our nuclear security cooperation, all of which I noted
earlier in my remarks as part of our ongoing strategy. We have also
been collaborating with Russia for over 5 years to improve their
emergency management infrastructure. So why announce a need to further
enhance cooperation?
Because it was important to raise our collaboration to the highest
levels of Government in order to accelerate our efforts across a
spectrum of activities in a well coordinated fashion. The President has
stated that the gravest threat to the United States is the possibility
of terrorists acquiring weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear
weapons. At Bratislava, Presidents Bush and Putin committed to working
to enhance cooperation to counter this threat by building upon our
earlier work and to expand, accelerate, and deepen this cooperation.
The NNSA works directly with many agencies within the Russian
Federation, most notably Rosatom, but also the Ministry of Defense,
Rostechnadzor (which is analogous to our Nuclear Regulatory
Commission), the Ministry of Transportation, the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs and other organizations. For the most part, we can accomplish
much at the program staff level. In order to expedite cooperation in
some areas, however, we must engage the most senior levels of
Government. Bratislava has given our programs more momentum - more
visibility - and has enabled us to accelerate our programs in a way
that allows us to work more quickly to solve some of these nuclear
security problems.
Additionally, we elevated the dialogue to a national level because
we felt that would encourage Russian decision-makers to devote more of
their own resources to nuclear security. As a result of our joint
commitment to accelerate and expand cooperation, our material
protection control and accounting upgrades in Russia are now scheduled
to be complete by 2008. However, we cannot walk away and expect those
systems will be maintained without financial support from the
Government of Russia. It is important that the Russian Government -
that is the President, the Presidential Administration and the Duma -
appreciate the gravity of nuclear security issues and be willing to
commit resources to those issues as a top priority.
Finally, we all need to recognize that today's Russia is not the
same Russia we encountered in the early days of the Nunn-Lugar
initiatives. This is a new Russia with a stronger economy, stronger
leadership, and a desire to play a larger role on the world stage. We
recognize these changes and interact with Russia as a partner: a
partner in the war against terrorism, a partner in nonproliferation and
a partner in nuclear security.
Our national security demands that we continue our engagement with
Russia in the area of nuclear security and that we continue to support
programs to eliminate excess fissile material, convert research
reactors to LEU fuel, and assist in the security of nuclear material,
even as we also acknowledge Russia's need to sustain its own security
after we leave. Bratislava provides the opportunity to maintain our
long-standing partnership with Russia at the same time that it provides
a vehicle for encouraging Russian self-sustainability.
Emergency Response
The emergency response component of the Bratislava Initiative
envisioned cooperation in enhancing emergency-response capability to
deal with a nuclear or radiological incident, including training and
development of additional technical methods to detect nuclear and
radioactive materials involved in the incident. To address this, a U.S.
- Russian expert working group on emergency response was established to
review current and future activities in the areas of incident response
and consequence management.
Under the Emergency Response Initiative, U.S. experts visited a
Russian training and emergency management center in St. Petersburg. On
October 18-19, 2005, Russian specialists observed a U.S. tabletop
exercise in Nevada. These experts discussed approaches to responding to
incidents such as the detonation of a radiological dispersion device,
and cooperation on nuclear emergency response.
Plans for next year include further discussions on nuclear incident
response and consequence management methodologies, plans, and
preparations for such incidents. The group plans to move on from the
tabletop exercise to a field exercise in Russia with U.S. experts in
late 2006. The scenario will focus on search and consequence management
for a terrorist radiological event.
Russia also seeks U.S. participation in training and research
activities involving both the Rosatom Emergency Response Center in St.
Petersburg, and the Ministry of Defense's Emergency Response Center.
The first phase of this work will be completed next year.
This initiative is truly an important partnership in the global war
on terror. In addition to preventing and responding to nuclear and
radiological incidents, both our nations need to be prepared to
mitigate the consequences of any such event.
It is important to note, in addition to work under the Bratislava
Initiative, we have also made progress with Russia to develop technical
methods to detect nuclear and radiological materials under the Warhead
Safety and Security Exchange Agreement (WSSX). WSSX provides for
unclassified technical exchanges in safety and security of nuclear
warheads, technologies for potential future nonproliferation and arms
control initiatives and technologies to combat nuclear related
terrorism. Several underlying detection technologies can be applied for
both nonproliferation and counter-terrorism objectives. The
collaborative projects under WSSX can leverage the work in nuclear
weapons detection (including nuclear materials and high explosives) to
support advanced technology development to combat nuclear-related
terrorism.
Best Practices
In the Bratislava Joint Statement and corresponding "check list,"
the Interagency Working Group was charged with sharing "best practices"
for the sake of improving nuclear security at facilities and to jointly
initiate security "best practices" consultations with other countries.
The idea behind this task was to have high-level nuclear security
practitioners from both countries work together on common problems, and
to discuss solutions and methodologies for addressing those problems.
Prior to Bratislava, the majority of our bilateral nuclear work had
taken place at the site level with local security managers. For this
effort, we enlisted the help of those in our organization outside our
Russian cooperative programs: those actually tasked with providing and
overseeing nuclear security at our facilities across the United States.
In May of last year, several high-ranking Russian officials came and
observed the annual meeting of the U.S. Senior Security Managers of
Hazardous Facilities.
Additionally, a number of meetings were held at a high-level
nuclear workshop that took place September 14-15, 2005, in Moscow.
There were some 80 participants from both countries. From Russia, the
participants included specialists from several Russian sites, the
Ministry of Defense and Rosatom officials. The U.S. sent more than 20
security specialists to discuss issues ranging from protective force
training, to oversight procedures, to technology. The U.S.
presentations were well received and initiated good discussions.
The countries have agreed to continue collaborating in the area of
Nuclear Security Best Practices and have begun a dialogue on the topics
to be discussed at the next meeting that should take place this fall.
As for third-country consultations, both countries are reviewing
how best to accomplish this. We believe that it is essential for the
United States and Russia to have a common understanding of what "best
practices" we would jointly share with third countries. We are
anticipating at least one more round of bilateral workshops before any
kind of consensus could be reached in that area.
Security Culture
In addition to proposing a workshop on "best practices," the Joint
Statement also called for a workshop on Nuclear Security Culture. The
statement calls for "fostering disciplined, well-trained, and
responsible custodians and protective forces, and fully utilized and
well-maintained security systems." The concept of "security culture"
has been the topic of many international meetings, and the
International Atomic Energy Agency is working to put together a paper
on defining "security culture" and explaining the concept in depth. To
fulfill this Bratislava mandate, the U.S. and Russia conducted a
workshop in conjunction with the "best practices" workshop on September
12-13, 2005.
The workshop used experts from the Department's cadre of nuclear
security experts. The group discussed the meaning of "security culture"
and presentations were given on norms, regulations and documents that
influence the formation of a security culture, education and training
of personnel, and topics related to the "human factors" of nuclear
security.
After the workshop, both sides concluded that exploring the concept
of "security culture" was a useful endeavor. We agreed to continue the
dialogue under the auspices of the Joint Coordinating Committee,
established under the 1999 Government-to-Government Agreement regarding
Cooperation in the Area of Nuclear Material, Physical Protection,
Control and Accounting (or the MPC&A Agreement), and that the progress
would be reported back to the Senior Working Group. So far, the sides
have agreed to a definition of Security Culture as "the assembly of
characteristics, principles, attitudes, and behavior of individuals,
organizations and institutions, which serves as a means to support and
enhance nuclear security" and U.S. and Russian Co-chairs agreed to
develop principles and evaluation criteria relating to Security Culture
by the end of 2006.
Research Reactors
We have worked with Russia in the area of research reactors for
many years. As mentioned earlier, in order to accentuate and expedite
the important work yet to be done in this area, the Department
consolidated several programs under the Global Threat Reduction
Initiative in 2004. In particular, we have two related programs with
Russia that became part of the Bratislava Nuclear Security initiative:
the Russian Research Reactor Fuel Return Program (RRRFR) and the
Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test Reactors (RERTR) program. The
RRRFR program is designed to repatriate Russian-origin fresh and spent
nuclear fuel from research reactors located in third countries. The
U.S. has an analogous program to repatriate fresh and spent US fuel
from reactors in third countries. The RERTR program designs and
develops LEU fuel for use in reactors originally designed for HEU fuel.
The Bratislava initiative commits both sides to continue to work
together to achieve the goals of HEU minimization and repatriation of
fuel from third countries.
So far, a good deal of progress has been made. The experts on both
sides agreed on a prioritized schedule for all remaining Russian-origin
fresh fuel shipments and agreed that they would be completed in 2006,
and that spent fuel would be completed by 2010. In order to meet that
schedule, a joint U.S. DOE-Rosatom technical working group will operate
under the Joint Coordination Committee with the objective of
accelerating and coordinating preparations for irradiated nuclear fuel
shipments.
We're making real progress: 2.4 kilograms of Russian-origin fuel
from a research reactor in Salaspils, Latvia were repatriated in May
2005, and 14 kilograms of Russian-origin HEU fresh fuel from the VR-1
reactor at the Czech Technical University were repatriated in September
2005. Another milestone was reached this year when the first shipment
of Russian-origin HEU spent fuel from Uzbekistan was returned to
Russia. And, in accordance with the schedule to return U.S.-origin
spent fuel from U.S.-designed research reactors in third countries, 210
U.S.-origin spent fuel assemblies from the Netherlands and 128 U.S.-
origin spent fuel assemblies from Sweden were returned to the United
States in June 2005, and 46 U.S.-origin spent fuel assemblies from
Greece and 22 U.S. origin spent fuel assemblies from Austria were
returned to the U.S. in December 2005.
As I have stated, experts from the United States and Russia are
working on development of high density uranium fuels that will enable
conversion of the remaining reactors that cannot convert with currently
qualified LEU fuels. This work will continue using mechanisms to allow
continued collaboration, such as contracts between U.S. National
Laboratories and Russian institutes, information exchange through the
International Group of Independent Experts on Fuel Development, and
delivery of LEU replacement fuel to third countries.
Milestones in this program include:
The first Russian-designed research reactor located in a third
country and supplied with Russian-origin HEU fuel, the VR-1 reactor at
the Czech Technical University, was successfully converted to low
enriched fuel (LEU fuel) in October 2005. This is a significant
achievement and will facilitate conversion of other Russian-designed
research reactors in third countries to operate on LEU fuel.
LEU fuel was delivered to the Tajura research reactor in Libya to
replace repatriated HEU fuel and support reactor conversion in summer
2006.
Again, I would like to reiterate that while work in these areas has
been proceeding for several years, Bratislava has encouraged us to set
more aggressive schedules and achieve Russian commitment to this
important work.
Nuclear Security
As you may know, we have a longstanding record of cooperation in
material protection control and accounting, or MPC&A, programs with the
Russian Federation. We began these programs in collaboration with the
Department of Defense in 1993 under the CTR program. It is a robust and
broad program that addresses Russian civilian and military facilities
containing both nuclear warheads and material with physical protection
upgrades, material control and accounting upgrades, protective force
equipment and training, and upgrades to nuclear transportation system.
Additionally, the program has numerous national-level programs aimed at
larger issues involved in nuclear security, such as developing laws and
regulations, codifying standards for training and employment,
developing a national-level accountancy system, as well as developing
and training oversight bodies.
This is a mature program. We are committed to finish the upgrades
portion of our work at Rosatom's material sites on which we have
agreement by 2008 under Bratislava.
When the Presidents committed to Bratislava, we were able, for the
first time, to establish a "master plan" for completing our security
work with the Russian Federation. Working under the auspices of
established agreements, Rosatom, the Russian Ministry of Defense, the
U.S. Department of Energy and U.S. Department of Defense developed a
Joint Action Plan that outlines the agreed-upon scope of work on
upgrades to the security systems at nuclear sites in Russia (as well as
for transportation of nuclear warheads slated for disposals). The
detailed portions of this plan identify new buildings and the status of
on-going cooperation for specific buildings at specific cooperation
sites. The plan also includes cooperation in the areas of nuclear
regulatory development, sustainability, secure transport, material
protection, control and accounting expertise training, protective force
equipment and other such crosscutting issues. The Joint Action Plan for
Rosatom and the Russian Ministry of Defense sites includes evaluations
of joint projects, specific implementation timeframes, and detailed
milestones. These plans will be augmented with detailed schedules as
Rosatom and the Russian Ministry of Defense nominate new areas for
cooperative work.
Because of the sensitive nature of the information that the U.S.
side receives during the course of performing upgrades at Rosatom
sites, U.S. and Russian experts signed a Memorandum on Procedures for
the Exchange of Sensitive Information between Rosatom and the U.S.
Department of Energy's (NNSA) Office of International Material
Protection and Cooperation in August of 2004.
As I mentioned, we are in the process of completing some of the
upgrades work at Rosatom sites and commissioned two sites last August,
the Scientific Research Institute of Atomic Reactors (NIIAR) in
Dimitrovgrad and the Research Institute of Scientific Instruments
(NIIP) in Lytkarino. And by fall of 2006, upgrades will be completed at
the Bochvar All-Russian Scientific Research Institute of Inorganic
Materials (VNIINM) and the Institute of Physics and Power Engineering
(IPPE).
Working with the Ministry of Defense, we have enjoyed a good
relationship. We have completed significant work with the Russian Navy.
In the past few years we have also worked to secure some Strategic
Rocket Force sites. Perhaps the most significant breakthrough resulting
from Bratislava was that the Russian Ministry of Defense, the 12th Main
Directorate, offered to the U.S. Departments of Energy and Defense, a
list of sites for cooperative security upgrades. The sites in question
are large nuclear warhead storage sites. The U.S. has reviewed those
proposed sites and has agreed to upgrade security at fifteen of the
newly proposed sites. The Department of Defense, the Department of
Energy and the Ministry of Defense are all working together to
determine what other assistance the U.S. can provide.
In the sphere of nuclear security, both Presidents also committed
in the Joint Statement to work together to amend the Convention on the
Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM). I am pleased to report
that through the efforts of the U.S., the Russian Federation and other
States Parties, the CPPNM was amended last July. This amendment is a
significant step forward for international nuclear security. It expands
the scope of the Convention to cover not only nuclear material used for
peaceful purposes in domestic use, transport and storage, but also
nuclear facilities used for peaceful purposes. This amendment also
includes new counter-terrorism provisions requiring each State Party
bound by the amendment to make sabotage of a nuclear facility used for
peaceful purposes, or threats to do so in order to compel a person or
State to do or refrain from doing any act, a punishable offence under
its national law. We will continue to work closely with Russia and
other key partners to ensure its timely ratification, and to revise
international physical protection guidance to address these new
obligations.
We will also continue to work with Russia in the Nuclear Suppliers
Group to strengthen controls on especially dangerous nuclear
technologies. As proposed by President Bush in 2004, we seek broad
restrictions on transfers of enrichment or reprocessing technologies -
the very technologies sought by Iran and DPRK to pursue nuclear weapons
programs.
Conclusion
The Bratislava Nuclear Security initiative allows us to expand and
accelerate the work we have been doing in the area of nuclear security,
explore some new avenues of cooperation, and begin a new era in our
relationship with the Russian Federation. Bringing the issue of nuclear
security to the attention of the highest levels of both the U.S. and
Russian governments provides an immeasurable increase in focus to our
own security.
Just this past month, members of my staff and our colleagues in
other parts of the U.S. Government met with our Russian counterparts
here in Washington to discuss next steps in cooperation. Secretary
Bodman was briefed on our activities by the entire delegation and is
fully engaged. Prior to the working meeting, Secretary Bodman and
Director Kiriyenko (Rosatom) spent a considerable amount of time
together discussing a number of topics, most of which highlight
Bratislava.
We are moving toward the time when Russia assumes full
responsibility for protecting its own warheads and material, for
reducing the quantity of fissile material and the numbers of sites at
which it is located, and invests in measures to prevent, respond to and
mitigate nuclear or radiological incidents. This is a necessary
condition of both countries' security. Thus far, progress under the
Bratislava initiative indicates that Russia is willing to take on that
challenge, and we are proud of our success in helping Russia prepare to
do so. Of course, we recognize there is much work still to be done.
Again, Mr. Chairman, I thank you for the opportunity to highlight
this important Initiative. I look forward to answering your questions.
Mr. Linder. Mr. Record.
STATEMENT OF FRANK RECORD, ACTING ASSISTANT
SECRETARY, INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND NONPROFLIFERATION, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Mr. Record. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Langevin, and
other distinguished members of the committee, I thank you for
the opportunity to discuss the Department of State's ongoing
efforts to reduce the nuclear and biological threat at the
source.
Recently, I spoke to you about our initiatives to deter,
interdict and prevent acquisition of nuclear and radiological
material. Today's hearing I think points at the fact that one
of the best investments we can make overall as a nation is to
reduce the nuclear and biological threat, to keep terrorists
and states seeking WMD capabilities from ever acquiring those
WMD and WMD-related materials, technologies and expertise in
the first place.
Meeting this challenge requires a targeted U.S. government
effort; and in my detailed written statement before you, you
will see outlined the important role played by the State
Department through programs designed to deny terrorists and
states from acquiring WMD nuclear and biological materials,
technologies and expertise.
Broadly, our efforts involve programs that address three
targeted nuclear and biological elements of this source. They
include facilities and equipment that can produce or store WMD,
poorly housed WMD or WMD-related materials, and people with WMD
expertise.
The State Department implements programs and diplomatic
initiatives to address all of these sources, but based on
limited time, I would like to focus on just four at the moment.
They include global programs to combat proliferation of WMD
expertise, programs to engage and reconfigure former biological
weapons production facilities, capacity to rapidly respond to
secure or destroy WMD sources, and a newly launched State
Department program to increase security for facilities housing
dangerous pathogens outside of the former Soviet Union.
As part of the State's Cooperative Threat Reduction
efforts, we implement the Nonproliferation of Weapons of Mass
Destruction Expertise program, NWMDE. Through this program, we
seek to impede the proliferation of WMD expertise to terrorists
and states of concern.
Included within the program are three specific initiatives
in the countries of the former Soviet Union, two which were
created specifically to address biological threats.
They include the Science Centers Program, supporting
financial self-reliance for former Soviet WMD personnel through
two centers, the International Science and Technology Center in
Moscow and the Science and Technology Center in Kiev in the
Ukraine.
Second, the Bio-Chem Redirect Program, which engages former
Soviet biological and chemical weapons personnel in
collaborative research with U.S. experts from HHS and USDA.
And finally, third, the Bio Industry Initiative, BII, which
was launched after September 11th and the Anthrax attacks of
2001 and focuses exclusively on the biological threat.
For a minute then I want to focus on the BII Initiative. It
is the only U.S. program dedicated to transforming former
Soviet large-scale biological production facilities for
peaceful commercial use. Through this program, we also
facilitate collaborations between global public health experts
and industry to redirect former weapons personnel to
sustainable, peaceful commercial work, including accelerating
drug and vaccine development for global infectious diseases and
increasing surveillance for diseases like Avian Influenza.
And, Mr. Chairman, as you noted in your remarks, a BII-
funded U.S.-Russia collaboration led to the discovery of a
highly pathogenic avian flu in birds in Siberia in 2005. And I
would note our 2007 funding will allow us to build a Russian
avian flu surveillance network as well as to reconfigure the
production plans in the former Soviet Union.
Our authority to engage and redirect former weapons experts
is now global, and since 2003 we have expanded our programs to
include targeted initiatives to engage former WMD scientists in
Iraq and Libya. Our engagement efforts in Iraq and Libya are
critical components of our work to reduce threats in the
region, and we plan to continue to ensure integration of former
WMD personnel in Iraq and Libya into the international peaceful
community.
I would also like to mention a word or two about the unique
capabilities we have to rapidly respond to proliferation
threats of this source through our Nonproliferation and
Disarmament Fund, the NDF. The NDF reduces the WMD and WMD-
terrorist threat by detecting, interdicting, destroying or
securing existing weapons and related materials. NDF projects
are designed to address unanticipated opportunities to reduce
proliferation threats, including threats of this source, but it
is an extremely important part of our nonproliferation toolbox,
and I would be glad to give you more details.
Also, I would like to mention briefly a newly launched
program at State, our Biosecurity Engagement Program. I want to
emphasize in this context the immense challenge posed
specifically by the biological threat and note that dual-use
biological materials, technologies and expertise that could be
used to enhance WMD capabilities are widespread and readily
available.
Dangerous pathogens exist not only in freezers in the labs
of the former Soviet Union but are naturally occurring in many
parts of the world. Therefore, engaging in global activities to
promote biological security not only involves securing
repositories but involves programs to train laboratory and
public health workers in appropriate practices for handling and
transporting these dangerous pathogens.
The State Department's Biosecurity Engagement Program will
address this important aspect of the threat at the source by
engaging these biological facilities and infectious disease
personnel in activities to promote biosecurity. The program
will also focus on working with countries where terrorists are
known to operate and which maintain growing biotechnology
sectors and unsecured dangerous pathogen collections.
In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, through my remarks, my written
statement and my previous testimony, I think I have outlined in
a comprehensive way our efforts to address the threat posed by
terrorists and states seeking nuclear and biological WMD
capability. Our efforts to meet this challenge require that we
look for opportunities to develop new partnerships, both public
and private, and that we extend the efforts across the globe to
defend against a threat.
Looking to the future, we will continue to combine
diplomacy with strongly created programs to build support for
these international nuclear and biological security efforts.
Thank you very much.
Mr. Linder. Thank you, Mr. Record.
[The statement of Mr. Record follows:]
Prepared Statement of Francis C. Record
Opening Remarks
Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Langevin, and other distinguished
members of the committee, I would like to thank you for the opportunity
to discuss the Administration's accomplishments and ongoing efforts to
reduce the nuclear and biological threat at the source. The
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is one of the United
States' most urgent national security challenges, and meeting this
challenge requires targeted efforts to ensure that materials,
technologies and expertise that can be used to obtain or further WMD
capabilities do not fall into the hands of terrorists or rogue States
seeking WMD.
Recently, I spoke to you about our initiatives to deter, interdict
and prevent acquisition of nuclear and radiological material through
export controls and border assistance, the Proliferation Security
Initiative, and our efforts to combat nuclear smuggling. These
initiatives are largely designed to interdict WMD material after it has
been procured. Today, I would like to speak more specifically about
U.S. Department of State (DOS) efforts to address the nuclear and
biological threat through programs and diplomatic initiatives designed
to deny terrorists and states from acquiring WMD capability-enhancing
nuclear and biological materials, technologies, and expertise at their
source. These include DOS programs and diplomatic efforts designed to
address the threat of nuclear and biological terrorism at the source,
including efforts to sustainably employ former weapons personnel,
right-size and reconfigure former WMD facilities, secure nuclear and
biological material and eliminate excess weapon materials, improve
U.S.-Russia bilateral cooperation, and vigorously support relevant
multilateral mechanisms that seek to secure material at the source such
as the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Additional Protocol,
and G-8 Global Partnership activities.
Although much of the critical work I will speak about today focuses
on Eurasia, where the Soviet legacy has left behind a vast architecture
of poorly secured nuclear and biological facilities and a large cadre
of unemployed weapons experts, DOS is focusing enormous effort to work
globally as we address potential sources of WMD materials, technologies
and expertise where they are housed, including those countries and
regions where terrorists are active and could more easily procure them.
I will begin with DOS programs to engage and redirect former
weapons experts, secure dangerous pathogens, and destroy WMD
infrastructure, emphasizing areas where our work fills gaps and
complements that of other USG agencies, primarily DOE and DoD. I will
then address the critical diplomatic multilateral and bilateral efforts
led by DOS to enhance success for USG programs designed to reduce
threat at the source.
I would also like to make you aware of the immense challenge posed
by the biological threat, and to compare our efforts to secure
dangerous biological material and prevent proliferation of biological
expertise with our efforts to do the same in the nuclear arena. Dual-
use biological materials, technologies and expertise that could be used
to enhance WMD capabilities are widespread and readily available.
Dangerous pathogens exist not only in freezers in labs of the former
Soviet Union but are naturally occurring in most parts of the world.
Therefore, engaging in biological security activities not only involves
traditional efforts to secure repositories, but also involves a broader
effort to train laboratory and public health workers in appropriate
practices for handling, storing, and transporting dangerous pathogens
and should bring together the public health and law enforcement
communities. The USG has placed an emphasis on combating this threat at
the source through programs to secure dangerous pathogens and employ
weapons experts in former Soviet countries, where pathogens were
weaponized and expertise abounds.
This remains a critically important task, however, we are also now
addressing the global threat posed by the expansion of dangerous
pathogen collections and high containment facilities to work with them,
particularly in regions of the world where terrorists are active.
Cooperative Threat Reduction
The former Soviet states are still littered with reminders of the
massive architecture of the former Soviet WMD program, including a
large number of facilities that could serve as potential sources for
terrorists and states seeking WMD. Since the inauguration of the
Cooperative Threat Reduction program in 1992,--or as it is often
referred to the Nunn-Lugar program--the U.S. has worked with the
Russian Federation and other former Soviet states to eliminate WMD
threats posed by the legacy of the Cold War. The U.S. has invested in
efforts to reduce the proliferation threat posed by acquisition of
materials and know-how from the vast source of poorly secured nuclear
and biological materials and underemployed former WMD personnel in the
former Soviet Union. Funding for these programs from FY1992 through
today has totaled more than $10 billion.
The Department of State leads diplomatic and negotiating efforts
necessary to conduct these programs and to provide the robust legal
frameworks for their continuation, and we also implement specific
programs, which complement and work hand-in-glove with Department of
Defense (DoD) and Department of Energy (DOE) Cooperative Threat
Reduction activities. On June 16, 2006, the United States and the
Russia Federation signed a new protocol extending the CTR umbrella
agreement for another 7 years, and the two countries are also now
finalizing a protocol for the plutonium disposition agreement that will
resolve the long-standing issue on liability protections. The
formulations in the liability protocol are also expected to facilitate
a number of other nonproliferation and cooperative programs. DOS
cooperative threat reduction programs initially focused on Eurasia, but
are now addressing the worldwide threat.
Nonproliferation of WMD Expertise (NWMDE)
To effectively develop WMD capability, terrorists and States
seeking WMD must first have access to know-how and expertise.
Therefore, it is critical that the USG engage WMD personnel in States
with WMD programs and deter them from sharing that expertise or using
it to promote proliferation. The Nonproliferation of Weapons of Mass
Destruction Expertise (NWMDE) program is specifically designed to
prevent the proliferation of WMD expertise to terrorists and states of
concern, addressing a key objective of the National Strategy to Combat
Weapons of Mass Destruction and the U.S. National Security Strategy.
This program has redirected $52.074 million in FY 2006, and we
requested $56.2 million for FY 2007. Since its inception, the program
has engaged more than 60,000 former weapons experts.
Included under NWMDE are three specific programs focused in the
countries of the former Soviet Union, two of which were created by the
Congress to specifically address the biological threat. These efforts
aim to combat the nuclear and biological threat at the source while
also providing critical diplomatic support and policy guidance for DOE
and DoD efforts.
The three DOS NWMDE programs operating in Eurasia are the Science
Centers Program, Bio-Chem Redirect Program, and BioIndustry Initiative.
While the core Science Centers program provides funding for the
International Science and Technology Center (ISTC) based in Moscow and
the Science and Technology Center in Ukraine (STCU) and engages
nuclear, chemical, biological and missile scientists, the other DOS
redirection programs are more narrowly focused to address the
biological and chemical proliferation threats.
Science Centers Program
The Science Centers Program supports financial self-reliance for
former Soviet WMD personnel through two centers - the ISTC in Moscow
and the STCU in Kiev. In addition to funding collaborative research,
the Program now also provides critical training for scientists to
compete in the global research and development community in competitive
grant writing, intellectual property protections, matchmaking with U.S.
collaborators, and meeting international standards in areas such as
Good Laboratory and Manufacturing Practice. The current focus area for
this program provides avenues to reduce the proliferation threat over
the long-term by enhancing self-sustainability for former weapons
personnel and institutes. This includes increasing U.S. private
industry participation and attracting recipient-country agencies and
industry to invest their R&D funds in Science Center-managed research
in their countries. DOS provides policy guidance and oversight for ISTC
and STCU, through which most redirection assistance in Russia and the
FSU is funded, and DOS also coordinates policy guidance and strategy
for engagement, particularly with respect to biological and chemical
engagement activities. DOS chairs an NSC-mandated interagency
roundtable, which brings together DoD, DOE and other agencies funding
biological and chemical redirection activities in the former Soviet
Union to discuss program activities and provide policy guidance.
Bio-Chem Redirect Program
The U.S. Bio-Chem Redirect Program (BCR) has allocated more than
$80 million since 1997 to engage scientists, engineers and technicians
of the former Soviet Union with biological or chemical weapons
expertise in collaborative research with U.S. experts from the U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), U.S. Department of
Agriculture (USDA), and Environmental Protection Agency (EPA),
including funding for disease surveillance initiatives and drug and
vaccine research and development in global public health priority areas
(Influenza, HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, Hepatitis, etc.). BCR also supports
key components in U.S. global efforts to combat biological and chemical
terrorism through research on countermeasures, early detection &
response, antidotes, decontamination, and other critical areas. The
current focus of this program is to prepare former Soviet biological
and chemical weapons personnel for self-sustainability and eventual
independence from USG support through capacity building; expanding
engagement in Ukraine, Central Asia, and the Caucasus; and continuing
to expand engagement of former Soviet CW personnel, some of whom
receive little or no salary. Through BCR, DOS is also working to reduce
the biological threat in countries not yet engaged by the DoD
Biological Threat Reduction program, including regional priorities such
as Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. BCR is also building on DoD's critical
effort that has destroyed the biological weapons (BW) infrastructure at
Stepnogorsk, through redirection of former Stepnogorsk weapons
personnel, including development of sustainable employment options.
BioIndustry Initiative
The U.S. BioIndustry Initiative (BII) is another DOS program
created specifically to address the biological threat at the source.
BII is a unique program, through which DOS addresses the biological
threat at its source in two major ways: first by redirecting weapons
experts and reconfiguring former WMD facilities for peaceful purposes
and second by engaging WMD personnel in work to accelerate drug and
vaccine development to combat bioterrorism and other critical global
public health threats, including avian influenza. It is important to
note that BII is the only U.S. program dedicated to the targeted
transformation of former Soviet large-scale biological production
facilities for peaceful commercial use. Through BII, for the very first
time, we are now able to address the threat posed by huge biological
weapons production facilities, which could be a source for equipment,
expertise, and materials necessary to make tons of weaponized disease
agents. Many former BW production and research and development
facilities throughout Russia and the FSU are now being reconfigured for
peaceful use, and BII has forged collaborative partnerships with
industry partnerships to aid in this effort.
In its efforts to reconfigure former biological production
facilities, BII also works closely with State Nonproliferation and
Disarmament Fund (NDF) and DoD to eliminate WMD infrastructure. In a
striking example of how DOS is reducing the biological threat at the
source, BII has worked to reconfigure critical biological production
facilities and redirect their personnel, including the Berdsk Biologics
Facility, which is the largest dual-use biological production facility
in Russia. Through these efforts we will now enable removal and
destruction of BW capacity at Berdsk and will facilitate
reconfiguration to support peaceful employment for WMD experts there.
BII is also providing for reconfiguration and redirection of personnel
at additional biological production facilities in Russia and at
production facilities in Georgia and Kazakhstan, including those where
DoD has engaged in enhancing biosecurity and destroying WMD
infrastructure.
BII is designed to provide former WMD experts with sustainable
employment, and BII focuses resources on providing training to bring
scientists and facilities up to international standards. This has
included success in aiding facilities to meet international standards
for Good Laboratory Practice (GLP), Good Manufacturing Practice (GMP)
and Association for Assessment and Accreditation of Laboratory Animal
Care (AAALAC) standards. BII has forged critical partnerships with
international accreditation and standards groups, including AAALAC, the
Regulatory Affairs Professional Society (RAPS) and others, and BII also
targets significant resources toward intellectual property protection
and training to further ensure sustainability for engaged scientists.
NWMDE-Eurasia Program Efficacy
The importance and efficacy of these three Eurasian NWMDE
initiatives is evidenced by the sobering results of a 2003 survey of
Russian scientists with weapons expertise, which revealed that 20
percent of the respondents would consider working in rogue states
(including North Korea, Syria, and Iran). However, the study also
revealed that participation in western grant programs, such as the
ISTC, reduced the likelihood that surveyed participants would consider
working for such states.
Engagement of WMD expertise in Iraq and Libya
Since 2003, we have expanded our NWMDE program to include WMD
scientists from Iraq and Libya. In FY 2004, we developed a targeted
program to redirect former Iraqi WMD scientists. Despite serious
security constraints, we have made progress in funding approximately
200 key former WMD personnel in Iraq, and have worked closely with the
UK in these efforts.
In conjunction with its decision to dismantle its WMD programs in
2004, Libya explicitly requested Western assistance to engage its
former weapons scientists and identified four priority areas for
engagement activities: nuclear medicine, water management, precision
manufacturing, and environmental monitoring. These two efforts are
critical components of our work to reduce threat in the region, and we
plan to continue to ensure integration of former WMD personnel in Iraq
and Libya into the international peaceful scientific community.
DOS Efforts to Increase Pathogen Security
In addition to our efforts to engage former WMD personnel, the U.S.
is also leading global efforts to combat the threat posed by potential
terrorist acquisition of dangerous biological materials from poorly-
secured laboratories that possess biological agents for legitimate
public health and research activities. In addition to the work
described in states of the former Soviet Union, the U.S. is working
within the international community to raise awareness of the risks, to
establish global standards, to assist in developing national
legislation and regulations, and to assist individual facilities with
upgrading security practices.
At the initiative of the U.S., the Parties to the Biological
Weapons Convention focused on this issue in 2004, highlighting national
responsibilities under the Convention and United Nations (UN) Security
Council Resolution 1540 for ensuring that pathogens are secured. For
its part, DOS is funding a project at the World Health Organization to
develop pathogen security guidelines with global applicability. We are
also a key player in work on pathogen security guidelines that is
underway at the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.
Once these guidelines are ready, our intention is to urge states,
relevant international organizations, and professional scientific
groups to adopt them as the norm. In addition, we are working with the
International Criminal Police Organization, INTERPOL, - and with
individual nations - to ensure that countries have necessary
legislation to prevent and punish biological weapons-related activity,
including efforts by non-State actors to obtain dangerous pathogens.
Important as global standards are, we are not waiting until
standards are available before we begin working with states to
strengthen pathogen security on a national level and at individual
facilities. We are already working with several countries in Asia to
raise awareness, to establish national regulations, and to upgrade
pathogen security at individual high-priority facilities.
To intensify these efforts, DOS is launching a new program to
engage biological facilities and infectious disease personnel in
regions where terrorists are known to operate. This program is called
the Biosecurity Engagement Program and is designed to engage countries
that maintain rapidly growing biotechnology sectors and unsecured
dangerous pathogen collections. Through this program, we seek to work
with countries and specific facilities to improve biosecurity and
biosafety conditions and to improve accounting for dangerous pathogens
to combat the insider threat.
Rapid Response to Reduce the WMD Threat at the Source
Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund (NDF)
As a key complement to DOS, DoD and DOE efforts to reduce the
biological and nuclear threat at the source through rapid response to
critical needs to destroy WMD and WMD infrastructure worldwide, the
Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund (NDF) is able to address
critical, immediate opportunities to reduce the WMD threat at the
source.
The NDF reduces the WMD and WMD-terrorist threat by detecting,
interdicting, destroying or securing existing weapons, related
materials and associated infrastructure. Congress has provided the NDF
with a clear mandate to develop and execute projects to stop the
proliferation of WMD, missiles and advanced conventional weapons. To
execute this mandate, NDF maintains readiness for rapid, agile and
flexible responses to a wide variety of situations and conditions--from
removing WMD and associated infrastructure in Libya, right-sizing
biological weapons facilities in Russia, removing fissile material in
Kazakhstan, and destroying SA-3 surface-to-air missiles in Southeast
Asia.
NDF proposals span the globe, and the NDF is designed to allow for
rapid responses to a wide variety of situations. Many of its projects
are developed to take advantage of unanticipated opportunities or
circumstances that might arise. For this reason, NDF resources are not
committed to any project or region in advance. NDF plays an important
and growing role in the war on terror, and has funded efforts to
destroy fermentors that could be used to make large amounts of
pathogens for biological weapons, as well as non-WMD programs for the
elimination of MANPADS, and the destruction of heavy munitions that
could be used to make Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs).
In some instances, NDF may provide resources to others agencies or
offices it deems best suited to carry out the activity (e.g. MANPADS
elimination). In other cases, the technical complexity of many projects
requires the project management experience of NDF staff. In cases where
an international agreement, MOU or implementing agreement is required,
NDF must first negotiate agreement from foreign governments to support
the activity. NDF staff then implements the project, putting contracts
in place, personnel on the ground, and equipment on location to
accomplish the project goals within the budget approved.
Combating the Nuclear Threat at the Source through Efforts to Combat
Nuclear Smuggling
In addition to our efforts to secure nuclear and biological
material, technology and expertise or destroy WMD infrastructure, DOS
also coordinates the U.S. response to nuclear smuggling incidents, a
responsibility that can lead to identification of and further security
for unsecured nuclear or radiological sources. Since 9/11 we have
strengthened this effort not only to ensure that smuggling attempts are
thwarted and that smugglers are arrested and prosecuted, but also to
make certain that the fissile or radioactive material involved is
secured and source attribution is obtained when possible. Attribution
through nuclear forensics can help us understand how and where
illicitly trafficked material is diverted from and how we can secure
those at-risk facilities. In this effort we work very closely with
other agencies in the law enforcement and intelligence communities.
DOS also coordinates interagency efforts to address the threat of
nuclear materials smuggling at the source through a Nuclear Smuggling
Outreach Initiative. This initiative includes activities aimed at
identifying and addressing shortcomings and gaps of at-risk states,
including gaps in physical security and regulatory capability to
enhance the security of nuclear materials that may not be covered by
USG programs. Under this initiative, an interagency team assesses the
needs of states identified as high risk. Then DOS engages with foreign
officials to determine specific gaps and works with the state and other
international partners to help fulfill identified needs.
DOS Diplomatic Initiatives Aimed at Improving International Efforts to
Reduce the Nuclear and Biological Threat at the Source
In parallel to the programmatic efforts implemented by DOS and by
our partners at DoD, DOE and elsewhere in the USG, DOS also focuses
several key bilateral and multilateral initiatives on reducing the
nuclear and biological threat at the source.
The Department's diplomatic efforts to combat the WMD threat at the
source extend to strengthening appropriate multilateral frameworks and
international regimes to enforce the global obligation to ensure that
materials, technologies, and expertise are not procured by terrorists
or states seeking them. Stemming the proliferation of WMD requires a
global effort, and we have actively sought to: support G-8 initiatives
aimed at increasing international efforts to combat the WMD threat at
the source, bolster the IAEA, involve and obligate more states to
improve nuclear and biological security, combat nuclear and biological
terrorism, and increase international financing of nonproliferation
assistance programs designed to employ weapons experts and secure WMD
materials.
G-8 Global Partnership
The Department has led efforts for increased participation by other
governments to meet nonproliferation and threat reduction program needs
worldwide, since success is critical not only to U.S. security, but to
international security. Under the G-8 Global Partnership launched in
2002, G-8 leaders pledged to raise $20 billion over ten years to
prevent terrorists from acquiring WMD, with an initial focus on Russia.
The President pledged $10 billion for assistance principally in Russia
and Eurasia over ten years, and asked other G-7 leaders to match the
U.S. contribution. So far the G-7, European Commission and thirteen
other donor countries that have joined the Partnership have pledged
about $7 billion for programs in Russia and Ukraine, and the Russian
Federation has pledged about $2 billion of its own funds.
Among our Global Partnership priorities are efforts specifically
focused on reducing the nuclear and biological threats at the source,
including construction of 17 facilities for dismantling nuclear
submarines to secure the safe storage of reactor compartments, the safe
disposition of excess weapons plutonium and other fissile materials,
chemical weapons destruction, and enhancing the physical protection of
active facilities with nuclear materials. We have also placed a strong
emphasis on biological threat reduction activities through the Global
Partnership and, in conjunction with Canada, the UK and other G-8
nations, the U.S. supports funding for Global Partnership initiatives
to increase biological security and improve infectious disease
surveillance. We continue to work with our partners to ensure that our
pledges are turned into concrete results and that the Partnership meets
its ambitious goals of securing weapons and materials and reducing
weapons stockpiles.
G-8 Bioterrorism Experts Group (BTEX)
To emphasize the importance of multilateral and multisectoral
cooperation to combat the threat of bioterrorism, the U.S. established
and hosted the initial meeting of the G-8 Bioterrorism Experts Group
(BTEX) under the U.S. G-8 Presidency in 2004. BTEX is an international
exchange involving foreign policy, homeland security, agriculture,
health, and defense experts and was designed to strengthen G-8 actions
to prevent and respond to bioterrorism, including diplomatic
initiatives to strengthen global expert-to-expert contacts across all
of the sectors of the G-8 governments responsible for responding to the
bioterrorism threat.
As a result of the G-8 BTEX work initiated in 2004 and the workplan
developed in 2005, G-8 nations are continuing and expanding work to:
identify gaps and best practices in protecting the food supply from
deliberate contamination; strengthen national and international
biosurveillance capabilities; share national emergency response plans;
and share methodologies for training of law enforcement and public
health experts in forensic epidemiology. G-8 nations have also shared
reviews of national legal and licensing issues that could affect the
possible international sharing of medical countermeasures (vaccines,
drugs) and have begun to identify emergency preparedness and response
events which G-8 observers can attend.
All of these initiatives represent important, productive steps
towards harmonizing and coordinating G-8 and broader international
efforts to defend against bioterrorism.
Materials, Protection, Control & Accounting (MPC&A) Program
Outside the G-8 context, DOS is also engaged in other wide-ranging
bilateral and multilateral diplomatic initiatives, which aim to control
the nuclear and biological threat at the source. Particularly critical
are diplomatic efforts that support the ability of the USG to provide
upgrades and improvements to the physical protection of nuclear weapons
and materials in Russia through DOE's Materials, Protection, Control &
Accounting (MPC&A) Program. This program provides physical security and
accounting procedures to reduce the threat of theft of nuclear material
at facilities where it is housed. Cooperation is a key component for
the continued success of such USG nonproliferation programs, and our
MPC&A efforts were challenged by a lack of access to some sensitive
Russian sites. However, in recent years progress has been made in the
area of access, with only a couple of highly sensitive sites remaining
at which the U.S. government has not been able to work. We continue to
work with our Russian colleagues to secure greater access to facilities
and materials where nuclear warheads and nuclear material are
vulnerable to potential nuclear terrorism.
In fact, I am pleased to report that we made significant progress
with Russia, including agreement at Bratislava last year, to develop a
plan of work through 2008 for cooperation on security upgrades of
nuclear facilities and for transportation of nuclear warheads slated
for disposal. The detailed portions of this plan identify specific
buildings for cooperation and upgrades, and will also be adjusted as
the Russian Ministry of Defense (MOD) nominates additional sites for
cooperative activities. The Departments of Defense and Energy have
already begun work to upgrade these sites.
In addition, the Bratislava meeting yielded two important
developments in our efforts to secure high-enriched uranium (HEU) from
U.S. and Russian-designed research reactors in third countries: a plan
to jointly develop low-enriched uranium (LEU) fuel for use in these
research reactors instead of HEU and a prioritized timeline to return
all U.S. and Russian-origin fresh and spent fuel. The agreed timeline
calls for all remaining Russian-origin fresh fuel shipments to be
completed by 2006 and spent HEU fuel shipments to be completed by 2010.
U.S. Support for IAEA and IAEA Additional Protocol
The U.S. is also strongly supporting multilateral initiatives to
decrease the threat posed by sources of nuclear and biological
materials, technologies and expertise worldwide.DOS's budget includes
financial support to the IAEA. Since September 11, 2001, the USG has
contributed over $25 million to assist states in bolstering their
nuclear and radiological security capabilities for civilian facilities
and activities.
Through our support for the IAEA, the U.S. works toward ensuring
that States are held accountable for their use to prevent proliferation
of nuclear weapons material and technology. To that end, we are
supporting universal acceptance of the IAEA Additional Protocol. The
Additional Protocol plays an important role in reducing the risk of
nuclear proliferation, and promotes our goal of verifying other states'
compliance with their nonproliferation obligations. The greater
verification role of the IAEA provided by the Additional Protocol will
facilitate detection of undeclared nuclear activity at an earlier
stage. Our global nonproliferation efforts are much more effective when
undeclared nuclear activity and nuclear weapons programs are thwarted
in their infancy.
Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM)
While greater oversight by the IAEA contributes to our nuclear
nonproliferation efforts to ensure that State sources of nuclear
materials, technology and expertise do not pursue clandestine nuclear
WMD programs, it is also critical that individual states share
responsibility for combating nuclear terrorism by securing their
nuclear materials at the source. Accordingly, the Department has sought
the broadest possible participation in international agreements that
obligate States to be proactive against proliferation and nuclear
terrorism. These agreements and commitments strengthen nuclear security
worldwide and spread the cost of improving physical nuclear security
among many states, all of whom benefit from these efforts.
To that end, the U.S. strongly supports recent progress under the
1979 Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM).
On July 8, 2005, in a culmination of eight years of USG efforts, a
diplomatic conference of more than eighty-five States Parties to the
CPPNM, meeting at the IAEA in Vienna, adopted by consensus an Amendment
that significantly broadens the scope of the original Convention. The
Convention was of limited scope, with physical protection obligations
covering only nuclear material used for peaceful purposes while in
international transport and storage incidental to such transport. The
Amendment to the Convention will provide a treaty-based anchor for an
international regime for the physical protection worldwide of nuclear
material and nuclear facilities used for peaceful purposes.
Reducing Nuclear Threat at the Source through the Nuclear Terrorism
Convention
Concurrent with our efforts to amend the CPPNM, we have made other
diplomatic strides to further combat the threat of nuclear terrorism by
providing a framework for preventing terrorists from gaining access to
nuclear weapons and material from State sources. In February, 2005,
President Bush and Russian President Putin called for early adoption of
the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear
Terrorism (Nuclear Terrorism Convention), as well as the Amendment to
the CPPNM. On April 13, 2005, the Nuclear Terrorism Convention was
unanimously adopted by consensus by the United Nations (UN) General
Assembly. The Russian Federation was the first signatory when the
Convention opened for signatures on September 14, 2005, and the United
States, the second. Our support for the Nuclear Terrorism Convention
continues our policy of international cooperation among states, which
is characterized by parallel, multilateral or joint action towards
common nonproliferation goals.
Radiological Security
The United States has developed and pursued a proactive strategy to
strengthen the control of radioactive sources and materials globally,
particularly those sources that could be used to build a radioactive
dispersal device or "dirty bomb". The U.S. strategy seeks to (1)
broaden international adherence to the IAEA Code of Conduct on the
Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources (Code of Conduct), a
voluntary set of national guidelines for cradle-to-grave control of
sources; (2) promote global implementation of the IAEA Guidance on the
Import and Export of Radioactive Sources (Guidance) that is
supplementary to the Code of Conduct, to ensure that high-risk
radioactive sources are supplied only to authorized end-users in
countries that can control them; and (3) enhance the provision of
technical and regulatory assistance to developing countries.
After the September 11, 2001, attacks, the U.S. was a key player in
revising the Code of Conduct, to enhance its security elements and
effectiveness in preventing terrorists from obtaining radioactive
material for use in a radiological dispersal device. In addition, the
U.S. took the lead in developing and gaining political momentum for the
import/export Guidance, the first international import and export
framework for radioactive sources. The revised Code of Conduct and
Guidance were approved by the IAEA Board of Governors in 2003 and 2004,
respectively, solidifying their role as global standards. The U.S. has
been successful in gaining high-level political commitments to the Code
of Conduct and import/export controls in forums such as the 2003, 2004,
and 2005 G-8 Summits; the U.S.-EU Shannon Summit; the Asia-Pacific
Economic Cooperation (APEC); and the Organization on Security
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE); as well as in gaining national
commitments to the Code of Conduct by more than 80 countries.
Conclusion
The programs and initiatives outlined above provide excellent
opportunities for DOS to introduce new the technologies and ideas to
combat states and terrorists attempting to achieve a biological or
radiological capability. Our efforts also require that we look for
opportunities to develop new partnerships, both public and private,
that extend efforts across the globe to defense against this threat.
DOS is, in particular, interested in strengthening security at WMD
facilities by emphasizing to countries and businesses within
radiological and biological industries to improve access controls by
using advanced biometric technologies, improved cybersecurity measures
to protect such facilities from hacker sabotage, and improved
background checks and screening procedures to protect against the
insider threat.
To improve our efforts to prevent States and terrorists from
acquiring WMD materials, technologies and expertise at the source, I
should note that we are actively seeking to work in partnership with
States, nongovernmental organizations, and industry in close
coordination with our interagency partners. This approach allows us the
flexibility to tailor our efforts to ensure sustainability and success
for the programs we put in place, a concept emphasized by Secretary
Rice in her vision of Transformational Diplomacy.
Looking to the future, the Department will continue to make
implementation of efforts to secure sources of nuclear and biological
WMD materials, technologies, and expertise among our highest
priorities. This will require improvisation and innovation to keep one
step ahead of proliferators. Working with DOE , DoD, other government
agencies, the private sector, relevant international organizations and
other like-minded states, we will continue to invest heavily in keeping
the world's most dangerous weapons out of the hands of the world's most
dangerous people.
Mr. Linder. Mr. David.
STATEMENT OF JACK DAVID, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
FOR COMBATING WEAPONS OF MASS
DESTRUCTION AND NEGOTIATIONS POLICY
Mr. David. Chairman Linder, Congressman Langevin, members
of the subcommittee, it is an honor and privilege to appear
before you today; and I thank you for it.
I come here today to describe the current status and recent
developments in the Defense Department's Cooperative Threat
Reduction, or CTR, program.
CTR fits within a broad strategic and organizational
context for DOD known as combating WMD. In order to provide the
subcommittee with insight to the broader context, I have used
my prepared statement to describe it. I will focus my oral
remarks more narrowly to address the challenges presented by
fissile material security and biological weapons proliferation
prevention.
Mr. Chairman, the first point I will make about fissile
material security is that this is principally not a
responsibility assigned to the Department of Defense. Of
course, we secure our own material working with the Department
of Energy, which manages our nuclear stockpile. However, with
respect to assistance to contributing to security of fissile
material in other countries, DOD's focus is on fissile material
in weaponized form. This predominantly means security of
nuclear warheads.
I mention this because the Departments of Defense and
Energy tend to define our different mission areas based on the
threat of fissile material at large, which is DOE, and nuclear
warheads specifically, which is DOE and DOD. The distinction is
not absolute, as in the case of WMD border security, where both
departments manage separate but coordinated programs to address
smuggling of nuclear materials. However, broadly speaking, it
is important to think of DOD's CTR efforts supporting nuclear
material security as focused primarily on warheads.
With respect to warheads, DOD, through the CTR program,
began addressing warhead security over a decade ago when it
helped Kyrgyzstan, Belarus and Ukraine securely repatriate
their warheads to Russia. The issue of warhead security
continues to be of great concern to us, given the magnitude of
the crisis that would be posed by a warhead gone missing.
With the Bratislava Nuclear Security Cooperation Initiative
(referred to by Mr. Paul) that Presidents Bush and Putin
announced in February, 2005, we now are poised to complete this
important security work at Russian nuclear warhead storage
sites by 2008; and I might add that this is a perfect
illustration of the cooperation and the coordination between
the Department of Energy and the Department of Defense in
dividing the work and getting it done right.
This accelerated work was already under way through CTR and
the related Department of Energy program. The work to secure
Russia's nuclear weapons storage site was not programmed for
completion before 2011. What was achieved by Bratislava was
Russian agreement to supply information promptly on all warhead
sites where Moscow concluded that it needed U.S. assistance.
This, in turn, allowed us to agree to accelerate the work.
Russia met its commitment to provide information about
warhead sites for which it could use security assistance by
providing detailed information in June, 2005. This allowed U.S.
agencies and the Russian government to agree on an accelerated
schedule to upgrade certain of the sites by 2008, 3 years
early.
In addition to securing warhead sites, CTR also supports
safe and secure transport of Russian warheads from areas where
they are detached from delivery systems to long-term storage or
dismantling sites.
I need to be very clear about CTR's warhead security work.
We are not enhancing security of warheads attached to
operational nuclear delivery systems. Rather, we are supporting
Russia in its responsibility to secure its extensive warhead
inventory across its vast and often remote array of storage
facilities.
The U.S. will be able to say by 2008 that we have done all
we can to bring the security of Russia's nuclear weapons up to
safer standards. That will be a significant achievement.
CTR activities also seek to address the threat of
biological weapons. The CTR Threat Agent Detection and Response
project, or TADR--I don't like acronyms much--the Threat Agent
Detection and Response project addresses the threat of poorly
secured dangerous pathogens in former Soviet Union countries at
the same time as it strengthens our ability to deal with these
pathogens from wherever they may come.
TADR is being implemented in Central Asian and Caucasus
states. It is a web-based disease surveillance network that
replaces the Soviet system of maintaining libraries of
dangerous pathogens in numerous unsecured locations. It will be
a vast improvement when it is fully implemented, and it is
being implemented day by day.
Through the TADR Program, we consolidate dangerous pathogen
strains currently dispersed at various locations within a
country in a central laboratory located in the capital city.
The central laboratory that we help to construct and to design
is designed to have the ability to characterize and securely
store samples of the pathogen strains brought to it.
A very important feature of this program is that the U.S.
receives samples of each strain. This helps to enable us to
determine in the future whether a disease outbreak is naturally
occurring or a potential bioterror event.
In 2005, we signed agreements on the Threat Assistance
Detection and Reduction program with Azerbaijan and with
Ukraine. These TADR program agreements follow others already in
place with Georgia, with Uzbekistan and with Kazakhstan.
The TADR project has been a key initiative for this
Administration. We believe it helps meet a significant,
unfilled requirement for the U.S. to stay abreast of and combat
the global bioterror threat. TADR-supplied equipment and
training already in place have been used to identify Avian
Influenza in Ukraine.
Mr. Chairman, I also would like to describe what DOD is
doing to address the biological threat that is facing U.S.
forces. Policy aspects of this issue are not dealt with by my
CTR policy office, but by another office under my purview, my
counter proliferation policy office.
An important conclusion of the QDR was that the Department
should focus on new defensive capabilities in the anticipation
of a continued evolution of WMD threats. In response, DOD has
decided to reallocate funding within the Chem-Bio Defense
program to invest over $1.5 billion over the next 5 years to
develop broad-spectrum countermeasures against advanced
biological threats. Rather than continuing the traditional
approach to developing countermeasures, which in effect
resulted in one drug for one bug, DOD will conduct research to
develop drugs that each can counter several pathogens.
One example is the research we will be conducting to
develop a single pharmaceutical to counter all types of viral
hemorrhagic fevers, like Ebola and Marburg. Another is the
effort we will make to develop a single pharmaceutical for all
intercellular pathogens, like Plague. In both cases, we will be
attempting to build on molecular biotechnology cutting edge
technologies currently available.
These initiatives will support combating WMD efforts in
general but will be of particular benefit to our forces that
may well be ordered to deploy to places where these fevers pose
a risk. Having one drug that can counter many bugs will improve
military effectiveness by getting forces into the theater more
quickly, by protecting our forces more effectively, and
complicating an adversary's military calculus on the effect of
his potential use of lethal pathogens against our forces.
In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, DOD understands that combating
the spread of weapons of mass destruction requires thoughtful
planning, adaptability to changing circumstances, and
unwavering determination. These, we believe, are reflected in
our new strategic guidance, realigned organizational structure,
and in changes we are making to our day-to-day activities.
Our commitment to success in this endeavor is absolute.
Failure is not an option. Congress is an essential partner in
this fight, and we look forward to continuing our work
together. Thank you again for inviting me to testify.
Mr. Linder. Thank you, Mr. David.
[The statement of Mr. David follows:]
Prepared Statement of Jack David
Chairman Linder, Congressman Langevin, Members of the Subcommittee,
it is an honor to appear today to describe the current status and
recent developments in the Defense Department's Cooperative Threat
Reduction (CTR) program, with particular attention to security of
fissile materials and biological weapons proliferation prevention. The
portions of the CTR program related to these issues are important in
and of themselves. However, they also fit within an important broader
context of DoD's efforts to combat the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction (WMD). In order to illuminate the broader context for the
subcommittee, I will use my prepared statement to describe the full
range of DoD's efforts to combat the proliferation of WMD and our plans
to implement recommendations outlined in the Quadrennial Defense Review
(QDR) regarding WMD.
The missions of preventing proliferation of WMD, preventing the use
of WMD and enabling our warfighters to continue operations in a WMD
environment are not new. Since December 2002, when the President set
forth the National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction, the
Department has taken a number of measures to enable us better to
implement the Strategy. At the same time, while adapting at the
strategic level, we have been carrying out the day-to-day activities--
some ongoing, some new, such as the Proliferation Security Initiative
(PSI)--to implement policies dictated by the Strategy.
Strategic Guidance
At the strategic level, preventing hostile states and non-state
actors from acquiring or using WMD is one of the four priorities the
Department identified in the Quadrennial Defense Review just issued by
Secretary Rumsfeld on February 6, 2006. This is the first QDR that has
devoted such attention to the threat of WMD. Also at the strategic
level, Joint Chiefs Chairman General Peter Pace issued the first-ever
National Military Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction on
February 13, 2006. Secretary Rumsfeld also endorsed the National
Military Strategy to Combat WMD. The strategic approach of the QDR and
of the National Military Strategy to Combat WMD is built on the "three
pillars" of combating WMD identified in the 2002 National Strategy to
Combat WMD: nonproliferation, counterproliferation and consequence
management. We define these terms as follows:
Nonproliferation--Actions to prevent the proliferation of weapons
of mass destruction by dissuading or impeding access to, or
distribution of, sensitive technologies, material, and expertise.
Counterproliferation--Actions to defeat the threat and/or use of
weapons of mass destruction against the United States, U.S. Armed
Forces, its allies, and partners.
WMD Consequence Management--Actions taken to mitigate the effects
of a WMD attack, or event, and to restore essential operations and
services at home and abroad.
The National Military Strategy to Combat WMD identifies eight
military mission areas that support the pillars in the National
Strategy: offensive operations, elimination operations, interdiction
operations, active defense, passive defense, WMD consequence
management, security cooperation and partner activities, and threat
reduction cooperation.
This strategic framework is the Department's way of dividing the
broad "combating WMD" mission into specific, definable, manageable
activities. By dividing the mission in this way, we can address it with
greater focus in the budget, training, doctrine and policy processes.
Organizing for the Combating WMD Mission
In addition to better defining the strategic framework to address
WMD, the Department of Defense has transformed its organizational
structure to better combat WMD. On January 6, 2005, the Secretary of
Defense designated the United States Strategic Command (STRATCOM) as
the Department's lead for synchronizing and integrating combating WMD
operational efforts in support of our Combatant Commanders. In this new
role, STRATCOM supports other Combatant Commanders as they execute
combating WMD operations. On January 31, 2006, the Secretary of Defense
gave the Director of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) an
additional duty by appointing him Director of STRATCOM's Combating WMD
Center (SCC). This appointment was recommended by the QDR. It is
intended to enhance STRATCOM's ability to synchronize and integrate the
Department's combating WMD operational efforts. STRATCOM, through the
SCC, is charged with identifying combating WMD requirements and
advocating for them throughout the budget process. Secretary Rumsfeld,
in his January 6, 2005 letter designating STRATCOM as the DoD lead for
synchronizing and integrating DoD's combating WMD efforts, specifically
directed STRATCOM to address WMD elimination and interdiction as its
first two missions and, in regard to each, to substantially increase
our capabilities.
Complementing the WMD assignment to STRATCOM, all DoD components
have been directed to realign themselves to improve execution of the
combating WMD mission. Within the Office of the Under Secretary of
Defense for Policy, for example, my own office realigned to create a
near-single point of contact for policy support of the combating WMD
mission. My office is now responsible for six of eight mission areas
identified in the National Military Strategy to Combat WMD: elimination
operations, interdiction operations, active defense, passive defense,
security cooperation and partner activities and threat reduction
cooperation. My sister office, Forces Policy, is responsible for the
"offensive operations" mission area. The Policy Organization's
oversight of the "consequence management" mission is still being
addressed.
The goal of DoD's recent elaborations of strategy and rearrangement
of components is summed up by quoting the following words from
President Bush's January 20, 2004, State of the Union address: "America
is committed to keeping the world's most dangerous weapons out of the
hands of the most dangerous regimes." To fulfill this commitment, the
QDR directs that "national efforts to counter the threat posed by
weapons of mass destruction must incorporate both preventive and
responsive dimensions." Preventive activities include those that: build
and expand global partnerships aimed at preventing proliferation; stop
WMD-related trafficking; help friendly governments improve controls
over existing WMD; and discredit WMD as an instrument of national
power. When preventive activities fail, DoD must be prepared to
respond. DoD must be prepared to locate, secure and destroy WMD.
Preventive Dimension of Combating WMD
The Toolkit for Preventive Activities
With respect to the preventive dimension, we have long viewed
nonproliferation treaties and export control regimes as integral
elements of our strategy for combating WMD. These treaties and regimes
include the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Chemical Weapons
Convention, the Biological Weapons Convention, the Nuclear Suppliers
Group, the Australia Group, the Wassenaar Arrangement and the Missile
Technology Control Regime. DoD brings significant policy and technical
expertise to bear on enforcement of these regimes through my office,
Combating WMD & Negotiations Policy and through the Defense Technology
Security Administration.
Interdiction
While these regimes are important to preventing proliferation of
WMD, not all countries are members of all regimes and many countries
that are members cheat. WMD-related programs of countries like Iran and
North Korea show the importance of additional measures such as
interdiction. Interdiction is an essential component of our effort to
prevent proliferation activities of both suppliers and customers. The
threat of interdiction increases the costs for proliferators. It may
even deter some suppliers from getting into the business of
proliferation. DoD is taking steps to strengthen U.S. military
capabilities to support interdiction. In October 2005, the Naval War
College organized the first government-wide, classified gaming exercise
for all U.S. agencies involved in interdiction. The U.S. Navy has
improved shipboarding and cargo assessment by validating its new Visit
Board Search and Seizure team capability. The Defense Intelligence
Agency has established a new division for interdiction support to DoD
policy makers. These steps and others being taken will give us an ever-
improving interdiction capability.
The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)
Since President Bush launched the PSI in May 2003, we have worked
more closely with other governments on interdiction. The PSI has
encouraged the United States and other countries to collaborate to
interdict WMD-related shipments bound to and from states of concern. It
also has encouraged and enabled them to improve national capabilities
supporting interdiction of WMD-related shipments. As a result, like-
minded nations are developing a more robust arsenal of WMD interdiction
tools.
PSI participants define interdiction broadly to include military,
law enforcement, intelligence, and diplomatic efforts to impede and
stop proliferation*-related shipments. The PSI concerns shipments by
sea, air or land, as well as trans-modal shipments. Today more than 75
countries from all regions of the world have indicated support for the
PSI. We continue to discuss the initiative with key states in the areas
where proliferators may operate.
Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR)
Mr. Chairman, Congress already is familiar with the history and
details of the Cooperative Threat Reduction program. The Under
Secretary of Defense for Policy, through my office, provides policy
guidance and oversight for the Cooperative Threat Reduction program.
The Defense Threat Reduction Agency implements that guidance.
The CTR program supports two of the mission areas identified by the
National Military Strategy to Combat WMD: threat reduction cooperation
and security cooperation/partner activities. The program continues to
help eliminate WMD material and enhance security for permissible stocks
of WMD, particularly WMD left over in the former Soviet Union. As the
subcommittee requested, I will focus my testimony on recent
developments in CTR, as well as on priorities for the year ahead. I
also will highlight the nuclear security and biodefense areas in which
the subcommittee has expressed interest.
DoD has accomplished a great deal by means of the CTR program in
fiscal years 2005 and 2006-to-date. In this timeframe, CTR continued
its WMD infrastructure elimination work in Russia: CTR projects
destroyed 42 intercontinental missiles and continued work to destroy
SS-24/25 mobile missiles as well as their rail- or road-mobile
launchers. CTR has also continued work on the Chemical Weapons
Destruction Facility at Shchuch'ye. The Shchuch'ye facility will
provide Russia a capability to eliminate some 2.1 million artillery
shells and rockets loaded with nerve agent. The shells and rockets to
be destroyed are very proliferable as they easily can be transported.
At Shchuch'ye, both the Russian-built and CTR-built main chemical
weapons elimination buildings stand near completion. They are ready to
be outfitted internally with chemical handling and neutralization
equipment.
Also in Russia, CTR has continued its assistance to improve the
security of nuclear warheads in storage. With the President's
Bratislava Nuclear Security Cooperation Initiative of February 2005, we
accelerated work that was already under way through CTR and a related
Department of Energy program. This work was not programmed for
completion before 2011. We now are poised to complete our security work
at Russian nuclear warhead storage sites by 2008.
What was achieved at Bratislava was Russian agreement to supply
information promptly on all warhead sites where Moscow viewed U.S.
assistance to be necessary. Russia met that commitment by providing
detailed information in June 2005, which allowed U.S. agencies and the
Russian government to agree on an accelerated schedule to upgrade
security at select sites by 2008.
Let me be clear: the U.S. is not enhancing security of warheads
attached to operational nuclear delivery systems; rather, we are
supporting Russia in its responsibility to secure its extensive warhead
inventory across its vast and often remote array of storage facilities.
The U.S. will be able to say by 2008 that we have done all we can to
bring security of Russia's nuclear weapons up to credible standards.
That will be a significant achievement. We needed Congressional help
with this endeavor, and Congress delivered: the accelerated schedule
required an additional $44.5 million in Fiscal Year 2006 funds, which
were included in the recently enacted Supplemental Appropriations
measure. We appreciate this support very much and look forward to
keeping Congress updated on the progress we make implementing the
Bratislava Initiative.
DoD implementation of CTR programs in the past year also has
addressed the threat of biological weapons. The CTR "Threat Agent
Detection and Response" (TADR) project addresses the threat of loose
dangerous pathogens in former Soviet Union countries at the same time
as it strengthens our ability to deal with these pathogens should they
come from another source.
TADR is being implemented in Central Asian and Caucasus states. It
is a web-based disease surveillance network that replaces the Soviet
system of maintaining libraries of dangerous pathogens in unsecured
locations. In the TADR program, we consolidate dangerous pathogen
strains currently dispersed at numerous locations within a country in
to a few central locations. We help to construct Central Reference
Laboratories typically in the capital cities of partner countries.
These are designed to have the ability to characterize and securely
store collected samples of dangerous pathogens. A very important
feature of the TADR program is that the U.S. receives samples of each
of the collected pathogen strains. This will better enable us to
determine whether a disease outbreak is naturally occurring or a
potential bio-terror event.
In 2005, we signed agreements on TADR assistance with Azerbaijan
and with Ukraine. These TADR program agreements follow others already
in place with Georgia, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. The TADR project has
been a key initiative for this Administration. We believe it helps meet
a significant, unfilled requirement for the U.S. to stay abreast of and
combat the global bio-terror threat. TADR-supplied equipment and
training already in place have been used to identify Avian Influenza.
During the past year, DoD also made advances in combating WMD as a
result of its CTR WMD border security project. This project is known as
the WMD-Proliferation Prevention Initiative (PPI). The PPI was
conceived early in the present Administration and influenced heavily by
the September 11 attacks. DoD took the CTR program in a fundamentally
new direction when it introduced PPI. Before PPI was introduced, the
CTR program dealt with WMD only at its source.
9/11 highlighted the need to address the threat of "WMD-on-the-
move." PPI focuses on countries that are willing to try to stop WMD on
the move but lack resources to do so. In initiating PPI, DoD expanded
the CTR program from simply helping countries to destroy WMD and
related items in place to helping countries to build detection/
interdiction capabilities. PPI is now working in Ukraine, Uzbekistan,
and Azerbaijan. We recently expanded activities in Ukraine, and signed
key legal agreements with Kazakhstan to allow us to begin PPI projects
with that country as well. We are focusing on Central Asian countries
because of their proximity to Russia in order to create a WMD "safety
net." As successful as we hope the CTR PPI projects are, DoD is not
limiting these combating WMD projects to merely supplying equipment
through PPI. We are working with the Combatant Commands to provide
training, doctrine and tactics for the equipment we help bring to CTR
PPI partners.
Finally, I can report that in May 2005, DoD took the initiative to
extend the CTR program's legal framework with Russia - over one-year
ahead of expiration. We took this step to avoid a disruption of CTR's
important work such as occurred seven years ago, the last time the
framework required extension. We are pleased to report that the
extension protocol was finally signed on June 17, with acceptable terms
for the U.S. This will allow CTR's important work to secure and
eliminate WMD and related infrastructure in Russia to continue
uninterrupted.
International Counterproliferation Program (ICP)
Mr. Chairman, I want to take a moment to describe DoD's
International Counterproliferation Program, which is a small but
important element of our "toolkit" for combating proliferation of WMD,
particularly radiological material. As in the case of the CTR program,
the ICP program is implemented by the Defense Threat Reduction Agency.
Also like the CTR program, policy matters for ICP are handled by my
office. The March 2006 transfer of ICP from its previous home in the
Eurasia regional office to be in my office is another example of how we
are consolidating and aligning DoD policy responsibilities related to
combating WMD.
The ICP attempts to build capabilities to secure borders of
participating nations against illicit trafficking among partner
nations. The ICP works with the US Customs and Border Protection
Service, the FBI, and other U.S. agencies to provide training that is
focused specifically at the law enforcement and regulatory level. It is
intended to make proliferation of WMD across borders much more
difficult. At first glance, the ICP looks a lot like the new CTR border
security initiative I described above. However, there are key
differences in programmatics, authorities, and policy objectives.
Programmatically, the ICP has always been a "niche" activity, with
funding at $12-$15 million annually. The ICP also has not provided
participating countries with heavy infrastructure or extensive
procurement, as CTR often has and does. The ICP's authorities are also
more geographically flexible than those of CTR: with approval of the
Secretary of Defense, the ICP can be implemented in any country in the
world. As you know, absent Presidential approval to work elsewhere, the
CTR program may be implemented only in countries of the Former Soviet
Union. In addition, the ICP has regional objectives not present with
CTR. ICP training sessions and other activities are conducted, to the
extent possible, on a multilateral basis in order that partner
countries can be encouraged to think about WMD border security as a
regional challenge, not merely a national one.
ICP is still new to my office and we are conducting a top-to-bottom
review and revalidation of past practices. We will ensure that ICP
activities are supportive of national strategies, coordinated with
other agencies' activities, and leveraged with other programs to
achieve the best results possible.
Responsive Dimension of Combating WMD
Investing for the Future
Developing our strategies, restructuring our organizations and
changing our daily activities will be of no avail without adequate
funding for corresponding capabilities, technologies and mission areas.
The autumn 2005 program/budget review undertook a comprehensive
analysis of combating WMD funding. This analytical process was carried
through the QDR. Beginning with the FY2006 budget submission, we added
$2 billion to the previous $7.6 billion Fiscal Year 2006-2011
allocation for the Chemical Biological Defense Program and related
infrastructure (an increase of almost 20%). The increase in chem-bio
defense funding represents a down payment toward elevating the policy
and programmatic attention we must give this area.
Joint Task Force for Elimination
One of the earliest lessons learned from our military operations in
Iraq was that DoD needed a well organized, well trained force to be
able to quickly and systematically locate, seize, secure, disable and
safeguard an adversary's WMD program, including sites, laboratories,
materials, and associated scientists and other personnel.
The Army's 20th Support Command, located north of Baltimore at the
Edgewood Area of Aberdeen Proving Ground, was stood up as an Army
headquarters. It is tasked to provide technically qualified chemical,
biological, radiological, nuclear and high-yield Explosives (CBRNE)
response forces to support geographic Combatant Commanders. This unique
organization includes the Army's Technical Escort Battalions as well as
an Army Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) Group. While the 20th was not
established until after Operation Iraqi Freedom, many of its units
participated in the search for WMD in Iraq.
The 20th Headquarters was activated in 2004. However, while the
military units assigned to this headquarters are deployable, the
headquarters itself cannot deploy today since nearly two-thirds of the
staff is composed of government civilians or contractors. In the QDR
process, DoD leadership approved a proposal to assign 20th Support
Command the task of becoming a deployable headquarters that could
command and control these types of operations. Establishing a joint
task force for elimination is a key element of the Department's vision,
as articulated by the QDR, to deal with all aspects of the threat posed
by weapons of mass destruction. The 20th gives us a base on which to
build.
Biodefense Initiative
Another key conclusion of the QDR was that the Department should
focus on new defensive capabilities in anticipation of the continued
evolution of WMD threats. In response, DoD has decided to reallocate
funding within the Chem-Bio Defense program to invest over $1.5B over
the next five years to develop broad-spectrum countermeasures against
advanced biological threats. Rather than continuing the traditional
approach to developing countermeasures--which in effect results in "one
drug, one bug"--DoD will conduct research to develop drugs that each
can counter several pathogens. Another example is the research we will
be conducting to develop a single pharmaceutical to counter all types
of viral hemorrhagic fevers (like Ebola and Marburg). Another is the
effort we will make to develop a single pharmaceutical for all
"intracellular" pathogens, like Plague. In both cases, we will be
leveraging molecular biotechnology cutting edge technologies currently
available. These initiatives will support combating WMD efforts in
general but will be of particular benefit to our forces that may well
be ordered to deploy to places where these fevers pose a risk. Having
one drug that can counter many bugs will improve military effectiveness
by getting forces into the theater more quickly, protecting our forces
more effectively and complicating an adversary's military calculus on
the effect of his potential use of lethal pathogens against them.
Building Partner Capacity
More than ever before, we need partners be to be prepared for
operations with us in a CBRN world. In 2002, the Department proposed
creation of a CBRN Defense Battalion for NATO. This U.S. concept was
endorsed by NATO defense ministers during the 2002 Prague Summit.
Elements of a fully operational NATO CBRN Defense Battalion supported
the 2004 Summer Olympics just over one year later. The NATO Battalion
includes a CBRN joint assessment team and mobile chemical, biological
and radiological laboratories; it has received personnel and capability
support from seventeen NATO nations to date. The concept for the
Battalion and the way it was quickly institutionalized were
unprecedented at NATO. We continue to encourage strengthening of the
Battalion's capabilities and also encourage member nations to improve
their own combating WMD capabilities. The Battalion will be a model for
future collaboration as we expand counterproliferation discussions with
other nations.
We are aggressively pursuing the establishment of formal, regular
bilateral discussions with international partners outside NATO on
counterproliferation issues ranging from policy and operational support
to detailed technical cooperation. We have or are establishing such
bilateral working groups with countries from Europe, the Middle East,
and Asia to respond to the use of WMD against us. Our partners in the
working groups share our desire to prepare to defend against the WMD
threat. A central goal of the bilateral working groups is to ensure
that U.S. and potential coalition partners can execute combined
operations in a WMD environment.
The challenge of interoperability is significant in a conventional
warfighting environment. The challenge in a WMD situation is even
greater as it raises many complicating issues. For example, if our
combat or transport aircraft are returning from an area where WMD has
been employed, we need to know in advance what decontamination our
allies will require in order to ensure ready access to important way
stations and forward depots. Similar problems relate to the
decontamination of forces--including potentially wounded personnel--who
will require immediate evacuation and attention. We have launched
discussions with our NATO allies as well with several key potential
coalition partners on these and other issues we believe need to be
resolved for combined operations in a WMD environment.
Building partner capacity takes many forms and can include building
legal capacities. In 2005, Navy, Joint Staff, General Counsel and OSD-
Policy representatives completed three years of activity to expand
legal authorities against maritime trafficking in WMD-related
materials. We helped secure adoption of amendments to the Convention on
Suppression of Unlawful Acts at Sea Against the Safety of Maritime
Navigation, establishing the first international standard for
criminalizing maritime activities related to WMD as well as a
comprehensive boarding regime for WMD-related maritime shipments. Once
the Amendment enters into force, after ratification by 12 member-
states, we will have a new law to prosecute violators and press for
greater vigilance against trafficking in WMD.
Conclusion
Mr. Chairman, DoD understands that combating the spread of weapons
of mass destruction requires thoughtful planning, adaptability to
changing circumstances and unwavering determination. These, we believe,
are reflected in our new strategic guidance, realigned organizational
structure, and in changes we are making to our day-to-day activities.
Our commitment to success in this endeavor is absolute. Failure is not
an option. Congress is an essential partner in this fight, and we look
forward to continuing our work together. Thank you again for inviting
me to testify.
Mr. Linder. Mr. David, can President Putin deliver on
behalf of Ukraine or Kazakhstan?
Mr. David. Deliver on behalf of Ukraine?
Mr. Linder. Access, for example, to sites. Clearly, all the
sites weren't in Russia.
Mr. David. I think that we are working closely with
Kazakhstan and Ukraine and the governments in those places, but
I don't know that, at this point in time, President Putin has
very much influence or information to support our efforts in
those two countries that we don't otherwise have.
Mr. Linder. So the Bratislava agreement does not affect any
of the other--
Mr. David. No.
Mr. Linder. Since we have asked Russia for access to their
sites, it is because are we giving them access to ours? Fort
Detrick, for example?
Mr. David. No. In fact, we have access to their sites--when
we have access to their sites, it is because we are in a
position to provide assistance. It is for the assistance that
we can provide that is in their interest and in our interest
that they will give us access. This is not a program or this is
not a situation like the START Agreement where there are mutual
inspections.
Mr. Linder. We have more access to their nuclear sites than
their biological sites; is that correct?
Mr. David. Yes, that is true.
Mr. Linder. What are we doing about the biology side of the
equation?
Mr. David. There are five places where we assist Russia in
biological sites for security. There are some limited joint
research projects that we have with Russia. But, other than
that, further U.S. support for collaborating with Russia in
this way, as we do in Kazakhstan or we do in Azerbaijan, for
example, under the CTR program, is prevented because Russia
doesn't want us to have access and because we don't have an
agreement in place. We can't reach an agreement which will be
satisfactory.
Mr. Linder. You said in 2008 we will be able to say we have
done all we can. Is that because we have decided all of the
sites are up to credible standards, or is that because the
Russians have decided that is the end of the road?
Mr. David. The emphasis on my answer is on the word ``we''
have done all we can because we have done all that they have
allowed to us do.
Mr. Linder. Mr. Record, what are we doing about Russia's
store of smallpox?
Mr. Record. Well, we are engaged with them on a broad
dialogue on these kind of issues through some of the programs I
mentioned, and--
Mr. Linder. Apparently, I wasn't very clear. What are we
doing with Russia with respect to their store of smallpox?
Mr. Record. Well, sir, as I said, that is something that we
have talked to them through our newly created programs,
including the BII and the biological programs I mentioned.
Mr. Linder. And where are we?
Mr. Record. Well, at this point. I can't give you a status
report. I would be glad to give you that for the record.
Mr. Linder. I would like you to do that.
Mr. Linder. Do we have a sense of how much they are
storing?
Mr. Record. I don't--I will give that to you.
Mr. Linder. Do we have a sense of whether they have more
today than they had 30 years ago or less? Because some has
disappeared.
Mr. Record. I will have to get that for you for the record,
sir.
Mr. Linder. Which countries have not held up to their
portion of the $20 billion G8 pledge?
Mr. Record. Well, the pledging--as you know, I gave general
numbers for pledging. Unfortunately, we weren't able to get
specific numbers for other countries in terms of their overall
pledges.
We have committed about, as I understand it, $3.3 billion
of our $10 billion pledge as of fiscal year 2005; and my
understanding is the global partnership has not formally
exchanged data on actual obligations, so we don't right now
have numbers for the other countries, but I can go back and get
more information on that.
Mr. Linder. Do we think it is important?
Mr. Record. Yes, we do, absolutely.
Mr. Linder. Then why aren't we tracking this?
Mr. Record. Well, as I say, there is certain data exchange
protocols you have in those countries, and it is difficult to
get those information, but we can certainly go back and try and
get it from you.
Mr. Linder. Didn't the Republic make a pledge?
Mr. Record. Yes, they have.
Mr. Linder. Did the Republic make a pledge with respect to
amounts?
Mr. Record. Yes, they have.
Mr. Linder. And we don't know if they have done anything?
Mr. Record. Well, it is hard for us to track information
this way.
Mr. Linder. Why?
Mr. Record. Because it is hard to get that information from
them. But, as I say, I can try and go back and do that. We did
check, sir, before the hearing, so we made those efforts, and
we will keep trying to make those efforts.
Mr. Linder. Mr. Paul, you mentioned in your testimony the
program to eliminate 34 metric tons of plutonium in Russia and
the U.S. How far along are we?
Mr. Paul. That is right. It is 34 metric tons in the U.S.,
34 metric tons in Russia. Each country has agreed to develop a
facility to dispose of that material--
Mr. Linder. Dispose of it or degrade it?
Mr. Paul. To ultimately dispose of it, first, by converting
it into a mixed oxide and then irradiating it in a light water
reactor, a regular commercial reactor.
On the U.S. side, the MOX plant in the Savannah River site
in South Carolina, 85 percent finished with design. We started
the site preparation back in August, and we intend to--our
schedule is to begin construction by the end of this year.
On the Russian side, they are not quite as far along. There
have been some hold-ups, more than a 2-year delay due to a
dispute over liability issues. There is a liability protocol,
an agreement that has been verbally agreed to, but the Russians
have not yet signed. We are currently waiting for that
signature.
Mr. Linder. Thank you.
Mr. Langevin.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman; and thank you again
for your testimony, gentlemen.
As I mentioned in my opening statement, security in Russia
still concerns me. I think it should concern all of us.
In a previous hearing, Davis Heisinger from the Department
of Energy had revealed that his Russian counterpart had
informed him that there were some 200 potential nuclear or
radiological smuggling incidents last year. Mr. Heisinger's
testimony confirms the key judgment of the National
Intelligence Council's report at the Congress on the safety and
security of Russian nuclear facilities and military forces
published in 2004. This report states that undetected smuggling
has occurred since the end of the Cold War, and this committee
finds this information obviously very disturbing.
Can you tell me what improvements in our nonproliferation
programs are needed to reduce the number of smuggling
incidents? And is this an issue of funding, or does the problem
lie with the political and bureaucratic hurdles that have
hindered our efforts with the Russians since the end of the
Cold War?
Mr. Paul. Yes, sir. It is indeed troubling--
Mr. Langevin. The question is for the panel, but we will
start with you.
Mr. Paul. It is indeed troubling to us as well; and it is,
of course, why we spend so much time and why you appropriate so
many resources to help us secure those facilities. Congress and
this committee has been very supportive of trying to secure
those facilities by putting in place the security upgrades and
the material protection control and accounting, shifting over
from the systems that the Russians previously had that was
really human centered to one now that is complemented by having
materials accountability, physical protection, control.
As to the Russian customs open reporting that there had
been a certain number of smuggling incidents, I don't have a
lot of information about what the split is between nuclear or
radiological. It is believed to be largely radiological. Both
are troubling, of course. But that is why we put so much time
and effort and energy into these programs. And even though at
times we talk about how proud we are of our success, we also
recognize that there is still a tremendous amount of work to be
done.
In Russia, in terms of upgrading sites, we have completed
80 percent of the material sites, 64 percent of the warhead
sites, and that is really accelerating now in part because of
Bratislava but in part because it took quite a while to get the
access. We are finally getting the type of access that we need,
and we believe that we will be able to complete those security
upgrades by 2008.
We, too, are constantly looking for creative ways to
accomplish this as fast as we possibly can, but, of course,
there are limitations in as much as we are dependent upon
cooperation from them. So the cooperation has improved in some
areas, in part because of President Bush and President Putin's
leadership on this, but I still have to state great caution,
that there is still much work to be done.
Mr. Langevin. Given the report of the National Intelligence
Council and the detailed smuggling that they have reported on
nuclear types of materials or components and given Mr.
Heisinger's comments and some information that he related to us
from his counterpart, should we and can we have a much higher
degree of confidence that that level of smuggling is not
occurring anymore?
Mr. Paul. I think that every day that we secure another
site our confidence in preventing those events goes up.
Sure, we hear your concern. That is why we focus so much
energy and attention on it--and have in the last 5 years and
prior to then as well. Each time we secure a site, each time we
secure material, each time we have some success, some progress,
get more access, put in more protection and equipment and
increase their training and work on sustainability, we improve
or increase our confidence by trying to close that gap that you
are referring to, that gap that troubles you, and it troubles
me.
Mr. Langevin. Isn't it true that that work would be
exponentially accelerated if adequate resources were funding
these programs?
Mr. Paul. Certainly. To accomplish more work certainly
requires more resources. That is why, since 2001, we have more
than doubled the amount of funding placed in nuclear
nonproliferation, including securing of material sites in
Russia, an extraordinary, really historic increase in resources
that have been dedicated to that.
So let me just answer your question by saying yes.
Mr. Langevin. I, for one, don't think we are doing nearly
enough with respect to funding these nonproliferation programs;
and until the administration, the Congress gets serious about
the value of resources, we are putting our citizens and our
country and indeed other nations of the world at great risk.
Mr. Record. Let me just say a couple of words. In addition
to the funding issues that you are highlighting, I would just
like to say a couple of words about the process, and then maybe
there is a feedback loop you can see in how we would approach.
There is a Nuclear Trafficking Response Group that is in
place. It is a state-led inter-agency body that follows up on
individual smuggling cases and reports of these; and we have
representatives of a wide number of agencies, law enforcement,
Intelligence Community, to ensure that smuggled material is
secure and, where possible, to identify the facility or country
from which it was smuggled or diverted. And to the extent this
group, this NTRG, is able to develop this actionable
information, then we would share that with those responsible
for carrying out and implementing U.S. assistance programs that
are capable of addressing material protection and control. So
those would be a loop in that so we can address the problem at
the source from a number of cases that we are looking at.
I also draw your attention to the Nuclear Smuggling
Outreach Initiative, which conducts very comprehensive reviews
of security concerns in priority countries. That is an ongoing
effort both in nuclear and radioactive materials, and that is
with DOE and other relevant agencies. So where we find gaps
existing in this effort, what we do at State is to engage other
agencies and to try to close those gaps in cooperation with
other agencies and international donors.
Also, the Nuclear Smuggling Outreach conducts comprehensive
assessments of other countries' nuclear regulatory capabilities
to look at how they can upgrade their own efforts as well.
Mr. David. One of the problems in a cooperative program is
that one side--in this case, our side, the United States--
sometimes comes to feel that we haven't gotten as much
cooperation as we would have liked, as much responsiveness as
we would have liked, the kind of action that we would have
liked. So, a couple of years ago we instituted a program--I
shouldn't say a program--we instituted a method of addressing
that, which was the executive review method.
We have executive reviews multiple times a year in each of
the countries in which we operate, including Russia. We sit
down with the Russians who are in charge of their program, and
we can assert our complaints, and we can find ways of resolving
matters and moving things forward.
Sometimes the difficulty that they have in being responsive
has to do with their capability of advancing quickly enough.
They may have budgetary concerns because we require them to
contribute their own resources because it is for them, too. It
is for them and for us, so we don't pay the whole freight. And
we want them to do that, and that is the right thing. So we
have these discussions with them, and there are actions that
come from those discussions, and we reach compromises on small
things to move things forward.
This last year I was in Russia, and we had a problem of an
explosion at a particular burn facility for strategic missiles
that were being destroyed. They didn't have the funding because
their budget cycle was different than allowed them to do it. So
we worked things around so we provided money for a short time,
and they paid us back later, but these things do slow up the
process to a degree that all of us don't like.
Mr. Linder. Does the gentleman from Pennsylvania wish to
inquire?
Mr. Dent. Yes, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I just want to get back to the funding issue that
Congressman Langevin just raised. Do you believe that the
funding for nonproliferation activities is adequate at this
current time? Do you feel that you are underfunded? Do you
think you need more resources?
Mr. David, do you want to take a crack at that?
Mr. David. I am not sure I--when you asked the question, I
thought you were referring to the nonproliferation fund at the
State Department--
Mr. Dent. I am sorry, I meant Mr. Record.
Mr. Record. You are referring to the NDF program?
Mr. Dent. Correct.
Mr. Record. Well, at present, it has certainly been
adequate. It is a very versatile program, as I alluded to
earlier in my testimony; and it is able to go the full range,
from disposing of manpads in one country to servicing their
missiles in Southeast Asia. So it has proven to be adequate,
including the new challenges.
Mr. Dent. Earlier this week, Congress was notified by the
President that insecure fissile material in Russia remains a,
quote, national emergency. I assume this relates to the annual
certification requirements to maintain the executive branch
authority for implementing the various threat reductions
productions, is that correct?
Mr. Record. That is correct.
Mr. Dent. And which project does this apply to
specifically?
Mr. Record. Well, it is a broad range. I think it is
covered pretty well in my testimony regarding some of the key
priorities that we have under the CTR, the dismantlement of
fissile material and related efforts.
Mr. Dent. Thank you.
Mr. Paul, can you tell us anything about what is going on
in Pakistan these days? There was a problem with Dr. Khan all
those years and his proliferation activities. What is the state
of affairs in Pakistan with respect to the proliferation issues
these days?
Mr. Record. Well, we are cooperating with Pakistan, with
the IAEA to fully investigate the Kahn network. I think that is
what you are looking at, right?
Mr. Dent. Correct.
Mr. Record. And we welcome--the foreign ministry just
indicated to us that that assistance is going to continue. We
look forward to working with them.
We understand that they released Mohammed Farouk from
prison. We have withheld comment until we have a better
understanding of the conditions of his release in terms of that
issue.
But it is important that all countries take steps to ensure
that the key members of the network can no longer participate
in nonproliferation-related activities. So we look to other
countries to deal with that issue.
Mr. Dent. And I guess, finally, I am encouraged to hear
that 80 percent of the sites--I think you referred to it, Mr.
Paul--have been secured. I guess what worries me is what I
don't know and what material may have escaped, unknown to you
or any of us. Could you just comment on that? All the material
that has been secured is very important, of course, but do you
have any idea of what is unsecured or lost or just simply
unaccounted for?
Mr. Paul. It is a great question. Thank you, Congressman.
We have concerns, too, about what we don't know, but we also
maintain close coordination and cooperation with the
Intelligence Community to close that gap in knowledge and try
to close the gap that the Congressman referred to between
having that sense of confidence that everything is secured. I
can assure you and assure the American people that we are doing
absolutely everything we can to close both of those gaps.
We do have a level of confidence about the progress that we
are making. There is much more work to be done.
To refer back to the question about funding--and your
question about funding as well, sir--although the point can be
made that by appropriating more funds you can accomplish more
work, that is not always the case. Obviously, in a cooperative
program there are limitations based on access and based on
cooperating with another country whose facility we don't
control. Obviously, everyone on this committee recognizes that.
What I can tell you is that, in the area of
nonproliferation, in the last 3 years and 5 years, going all
the way back to--going back to 2005, we have had historic
increases by this Congress and this administration in funding
and resources dedicated to nonproliferation, more than doubling
the total amount that was being spent in 2001. And none of the
programs that I referred to--the securing of the remainder of
those sites, for example--is limited by a lack of funds. We are
moving as fast as we can.
At some point, more money won't always necessarily get you
a quicker rate. That really is the whole point of Bratislava,
was to help us have something to manage to accelerate the
timetables, which we have done. For example, accelerating the
time frame for completing all of those upgrades a full 2 years,
to 2008. And we are on schedule, on task and going to meet that
deadline, a deadline that all of the experts who have looked at
this have said is the soonest you could legitimately hope to
get those things accomplished if properly funded, and this
Congress and this administration has funded them.
Mr. Linder. The time of the gentleman has expired.
Does the gentleman wish to inquire?
Mr. Dicks. Yes. Let me ask you just a couple questions.
We talked a lot about the Cooperative Threat Reduction and
the reduction of nuclear weapons. How have we done on chemical
and biological weapons? Particularly with Russia, the former
Soviet Union, how have we done in that area?
Mr. David. One of the major elements of the CTR program
policy aspects of which my office directs for the Secretary is
the destruction of chemical weapons in Russia. In that area we
have built a chemical destruction facility--we have built part
of a chemical destruction facility in Schuchye which will have
the capability of destroying tens of thousands of rounds of the
most lethal nerve agent known to man in recent years--
Mr. Dicks. Where again was that?
Mr. David. Schuchye--that is my word for the spelling bee,
Schuchye--and the total cost is capped at $1.032 billion.
There are two buildings. The Russians are building one. We
are building the other. And many of the support facilities are
even more cooperative than Russia and the United States,
because some of the other support facilities in the vicinity
are being paid for with the support from a variety of other
countries.
The status of the project right now is that the guts of the
factory--the factories are there, but the machinery and the
lines and so forth are not ready, are not installed yet.
Mr. Dicks. When do you think the bill--when will you have
your initial operating capability?
Mr. David. I believe it could be 2008, but it is probably
more likely 2009.
Mr. Dicks. 2009, is that the--
Mr. David. That is more realistic.
Mr. Dicks. Your team is saying 2009.
Mr. David. Yes, 2009.
Mr. Dicks. So we haven't done anything at all in terms of
disposing of chemical?
Mr. David. Actual destruction?
Mr. Dicks. Yes.
Mr. David. Russia has disposed of almost none of its
chemical weapons. I think Russia is up to 2 percent of its
chemical weapons that it is obliged to destroy by 2012. Whereas
the United States, for our own chemical weapons, have destroyed
37 percent.
Mr. Dicks. And how much are we funding here?
Mr. David. Schuchye is $1.032 billion, I think.
Mr. Dicks. And we are putting up all of that?
Mr. David. Russia is putting up one of the two destruction
buildings; we are putting up the other one.
Mr. Dicks. Why don't you give us, for the record, what our
piece is.
Mr. David. I believe it is 1.032--
Mr. Dicks. So that is our piece, all right; and then the
Russians are separate.
Mr. David. It is part of one facility, and it is going to
all work together.
Mr. Dicks. What about biological weapons? I am talking
about Russia now.
Mr. David. Biological weapons in Russia, there is very
little we have been able to do in Russia.
Mr. Dicks. Is that because they haven't admitted that they
have such weapons?
Mr. David. That is because we suspect that they may
continue to have offensive biological programs and because we
cannot reach agreement on the terms by which we would help
secure more than the five facilities in Russia--biological
research facilities in Russia that we do help to now secure.
Mr. David. That's because we suspect that they may continue
to have offensive biological programs, and because we cannot
reach agreement on the terms by which we would help secure more
than the five facilities in Russia--that we do help to now
secure.
Mr. Dicks. So these are two ongoing areas of concern?
Mr. David. Yes.
Mr. Dicks. We've done a lot with nuclear material and
nuclear warheads. But we're just really basically getting
started here on these other two issues?
Mr. David. We're not even getting started on biological.
We're basically--we have done a little bit. And ti doesn't look
like, in the near future, we're doing very more much more.
There doesn't seem to be disposition on Russia's part to want
to do something cooperatively as they do with nuclear.
Mr. Dicks. In the testimony, you talked about helping
Russian scientists. How succesful have we been in that--of the
people who have been involved with these programs?
Mr. Paul. Sir, I want to get to that question, but I wanted
to go back to Mr. David's--as you know, as I think I mentioned
in my testimony, I alluded to it--we've, through our Biochem
Redirect Program, I mentioned we've spent more than $80 million
since '97 to engage scientists, engineers, technicians in
collaborative research. So we're trying to redirect those
activities. Now, I know you're trying to get a more specific
weapons of concern. In the biological area, I just want to note
that, in the program I also mention the BII. We're working
closely with our other NDF program--that was mentioned--and
with DOD. We're working to reduce the threat at the source to
try and reconfigure some of the biological production
facilities, including the Berdsk biological facility. We're
beginning to get access now to some of these centers. We have
still a big problem that Mr. David has alluded to. But with
this program, with DOD support and others, we're beginning to
get access. And we're trying to reconfigure these facilities,
put them over to civilian use, and work with the scientists. So
we should--
Mr. Dicks. So these are two ongoing areas of concerns. We
have got a lot with nuclear materials and nuclear warheads, but
we are just really basically getting started here on these
other two issues. We have done a little bit [and] it doesn't
look like into the near future we are doing very much more.
There doesn't seem to be a disposition on Russia's part to want
to do something cooperatively.
In the testimony you talked about helping Russian
scientists. How successful have we been in that of the people
that have been involved in these programs?
Mr. Record. Sir, I would just like to--I want to get to
that question, but I want to go back to Mr. David, that as you
know, I think I mentioned in the testimony, I alluded to it. We
have through our Bio-Chem Redirect Program, we spent more than
50 million since 1997 to engage bioengineers, technicians in
collaborative efforts. Now I know you are trying to get to more
specific weapons of concern. In the biological area I want to
note that in the program I also mentioned the DII, where we are
working closely with other NDF programs. We are working to
reduce the threat at the source to try and reconfigure some of
the biological production facilities, including the Berdsk
Biologics Facility. We are beginning to get access now to some
of these centers. We still have now a big problem that Mr.
David alluded to. But with this program with the DOD we are
beginning to get access [and] we are trying to reconfigure
these facilities, put them over to surveillance use and work
with the scientists.
Mr. Dicks. This is in Russia?
Mr. Record. Yes. We can get you more information about that
if you want.
Mr. Dicks. That would be great.
What about this--the scientists now. How many in all of
these areas, relocating them. I know we have brought some of
them to the United States.
Mr. Record. I can't give you the figures on the relocation,
but we have worked with I think over 60,000 scientists and
technicians that have gotten this training and we spent I think
over $269 million total in these efforts across the board.
Mr. Dicks. This is the last point.
Mr. David. Let me add one footnote to that. It is in part
because of the difficulty we have had with biological programs
in Russia that we have focused local programs and the DOD DTR
program, the CTR part that DOD does, in some of the other
countries in the former Soviet Union.
Mr. Dicks. You say you have worked with 60,000. How many
are out there? How many would be possible recruits for a
program like this?
Mr. Record. I don't think I have the number for you on
that. I can give you the numbers. We have, as I say, two
ongoing centers, [and] [over all] Project 1 Center in Moscow
and a center in the Ukraine, as I mentioned, and has been in
operation since the early 1990s. And those centers are also
regional houses in other countries for the former Soviet Union
as well. So I think we are coming up to 11 countries as well. I
will be glad to give that to you.
Mr. Dicks. Thank you.
Mr. Linder. The gentleman from Massachusetts.
Mr. Markey. Pakistan continues to be a real concern about
nuclear nonproliferation, about the securing of nuclear
materials inside of their country, the threat that al Qaeda
could gain access to them. There is [and] agreement that the
President wants the Congress to approve to have a nuclear
cooperation agreement with India even though it is a
nonsignatory on the Nonproliferation Treaty, even though it
does not agree to ban the production of fissile material inside
of their country and this, even though according to the
yesterday's Indian newspapers, it will, according to their
intelligence people, give them the capacity to make 50 nuclear
warheads a year because it will free up their indigenous
nuclear material for a bomb making program.
What is your concern about the Pakistani response to this,
the Pakistani response to us today? If this goes through, they
are going to be forced once again to go back into the open
market to obtain more fissile materials so they can match the
Indian nuclear weapon expansion.
Mr. Record. As you know, sir, we are going to start in the
very near future a negotiation process with India, Pakistan and
other countries in the conference's arm in Geneva to address
the fissile material and the Fissile Material Treaty and that
is animportant priority for the administration. I know the
Indians are expressing their support for the investigations,
and that is going to be animportant element in our process.
I think, as you are probably familiar, the U.S. addressed
this issue in the process of the discussions. The Indians were
not willing to cease production of the fissile material but we
are hopeful that we can, through this treaty process, come up
with a treaty that would stop the production limit in this way.
Mr. Markey. I understand what you are saying, but since the
Indians are clearly not willing to accept that as a condition
for this transfer of nuclear material to them anit will free up
50 bombs worth of nuclear material to make more bombs in their
country. Aren't you afraid that this will put A.Q. Khan--type
scientists back on the road so there is not a gap that develops
between the Pakistanis and the Indians? Isn't that really a
real threat to our security because obviously it will have to
be a clandestine program?
Mr. Record. We have worked with both Pakistan and India to
improve their nuclear export controls. We feel that--
Mr. Markey. I am saying that since we are going to allow
India to keep this dual program without full scope safeguards,
why would the Pakistanis not empower A.Q. Khan?
Mr. Record. As I alluded to earlier, we are fully working
with Pakistan to do everything possible to take steps to deal
with the A.Q. Khan network. That is anongoing network and we
have got good cooperation right now with Pakistan.
Mr. Markey. What I am saying is that the Pakistanis are
saying you won't have cooperation if the India deal goes
through and in my perspective it is kind of reckless to create
a dual standard. Since neither country is a signatory to the
nonproliferation treaty, one way that frees up 50 bombs worth
of material a year, knowing that the other country has for 30
years responded to whatever the other one does, why would we
think it wouldn't happen again?
Mr. Record. All I can say on your first point, sir,
regarding Pakistan, we have had consultations with Pakistan and
I have not heard that. I don't think any of my colleagues have
heard that.
Mr. Markey. That is very dangerous to me, since they have
told me that, and I don't know why the experts inside of our
government aren't hearing something that the Pakistani
officials at the highest level are telling me. I can't believe
you haven't heard that. So none of you have heard that from any
Pakistani that you have spoken to?
Mr. Record. We had consultations with Pakistan recently.
Mr. Markey. But none of you have heard that they will
respond and ensure that there is not a nuclear bomb gap that
develops between India and Pakistan if this agreement goes
through? Have any of you heard that from them? They are talking
to me but not to you?
Mr. David. I haven't spoken to Pakistanis and I have--
Mr. Markey. You have not?
Mr. David. No. But it seems logical, in that context, if
India increased its nuclear warheads, Pakistan would want to do
the same thing, it is probably logical. The advantage of the
deal we are trying to forge with India is great. It brings
India into the nonproliferation world.
Mr. Markey. The problem is, Mr. David, that the President
then flew to Pakistan the next day. Musharraf asked him will
you give us the same deal. Bush, the President, said no, we
won't give you the same deal. So the issue isn't India. The
issue is Pakistan. Talk to me about Pakistan.
Mr. David. Well, one thing that I can say about Pakistan
that differentiates India from Pakistan is that Pakistan will
not allow anyone, including the IAEA, which by the way through
Director ElBaradei, supports the India--
Mr. Markey. As you know, that is false though, Mr. David.
As you know, the Indians are not going to allow any inspections
of their nuclear military program.
Mr. David. Of course.
Mr. Markey. Only of their civilian program anneither will
the Pakistanis.
Mr. David. And the Pakistanis will not produce A.Q. Khan to
speak to [anyone] about the proliferation that it has been a
part of. That is a very good sign of Pakistan's attitude toward
coming into a nonproliferation world and there is much to be
gained by India coming into a nonproliferation world. There is
much to be gained by India coming into a nonproliferation world
and supporting us and working with us--
Mr. Markey. The issue is not India. The issue is Pakistan.
If Pakistan is saying that they cannot allow this gap to
develop, that puts them back into the open market again. I
mean, what is the consequence? Have you thought about the next
step?
Mr. David. As Mr. Record has said, we have hopes and some
expectations that India will not produce, be producing many,
many weapons to--
Mr. Markey. Their own experts in yesterday's Indian
newspapers say this will give them the capacity to build 50
additional nuclear weapons a year.
Mr. David. I haven't read that paper and I read a lot of
newspapers and read a lot of things.
Mr. Markey. Obviously the reason they are putting the
nuclear reactor and these other reactors aside is they want to
continue to maintain a nuclear weapons construction program.
Otherwise, they would have put them all under inspection, and
they won't agree to a fissile material ban.
Mr. Record. They have indicated they want to maintain the
credible minimum strategic deterrent. Exactly how many weapons,
I don't know. We would have to get into a different discussion
on that. But yes, they have indicated--
Mr. Markey. They already have 40 to 50 nuclear weapons. So
if they want to go to 200 or 300, is there any reason to
believe that the Pakistanis won't as well, Mr. Record?
Mr. Record. I have no idea.
Mr. Markey. I mean from your own personal experience over
the last 30 years, do you believe there is a reason to believe
that Pakistan won't respond?
Mr. Record. Pakistan is also very desirous of keeping a
minimal strategic deterrent. They have told us--
Mr. Markey. So minimal today.
Mr. Record. I don't know how this translates into numbers.
Mr. Markey. They are going to be looking for parity with
India, don't you think, Since that is what we are talking
about, in terms of the weapons?
Mr. Record. Mr. Congressman, I have no idea. I don't know
what the basis of that article is, what the basis of that
information is in that article. I see your article but I don't
really have any idea about how many weapons that India is
thinking of.
Mr. Markey. The point is, Mr. Record, if we are going to
supply all of the uranium that they will need for their
civilian program, that will free up all of their indigenous
uranium and plutonium for their weapons program. That is the
advantage for the--if you are A.Q. Khan, you are sitting there
and you have been tasked since 1974 since the Indian explosion
to have a clandestine nuclear program anwe haven't arrested
him, we haven't brought him before the World Court, we haven't
put any pressure on Musharraf to the World Court to really
bring this guy to justice, what makes you believe that anything
is going to change and he is not or his weapons aren't going to
escalate once again?
Mr. Record. To reiterate on that last point, we have
extensive knowledge of that network anwe continue to learn more
all the time.
Mr. Markey. I am afraid you are going to have to learn a
lot more about it if this Indian program goes through because
the Pakistanis are not going to stand still and allow the
Indians to stand still and gain an exponential advantage over
them.
Mr. Record. In terms of your India-Pakistan focus of your
questions is that India and Pakistan have continued to make
progress in their bilateral relationship.
Mr. Markey. This is going to destabilize it. One country is
signing an agreement that is going to give them American and
European nuclear materials that frees up its weapons site and
the Pakistanis are going to be frozen. They won't stay frozen.
Their whole history for 30 years, as you remember when the
nuclear explosion went off in 1974, the coded cable that went
back to the Indian presidential headquarters was the Buddha is
smiling, but the next day the leader of Pakistan said if our
people have to eat grass and leaves for a generation we too
will have a nuclear weapon. And I don't know why you think this
agreement--
Mr. Record. There is a lot that has happened since that
time.
Mr. Linder. We have votes, two or three votes. I want to
thank this panel. Appreciate, thank you for being here to help
us. anwe will recess upon the call of the Chair.
The next panel we will take up as soon as the votes are
completed.
[Recess.]
Mr. Linder. The hearing will be back in order. Our second
panel, thank you for your patience. From time to time we have
to vote here, and we should be all right for the next hour,
hour and a half.
The second panel consists of Dr. Igor Khripunov, the
Associate Director for the Center for International Trade and
Security at the University of Georgia. Dr. Khripunov is an
expert on Russian nuclear and biological security and is well
known for his work on the human factor of implementation.
Dr. David Franz is Vice President and Chief Biological
Scientist at the Midwest Research Institute. Dr. Franz served
in the U.S. Army in the Medical Research and Material Command
for 23 years. He is currently a member of the National Academy
of Sciences Committee on International Security, and Mr. Franz
will testify on the role in reducing biological threats.
Let me remind the witnesses that we would like to keep your
summary to 5 minutes. Your written statement will be made part
of the record without objection.
Dr. Khripunov, you may go.
STATEMENTS OF DR. IGOR KHRIPUNOV, ASSOCIATE
DIRECTOR, CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND
SECURITY, UNIVERSITY OF GEORGIA
Mr. Khripunov. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have been with
the University of Georgia for 14 years and as a fellow
Georgian, I would like to extend warm greetings to you as
another Georgian here before me. Yes, it was very warm
yesterday. As I was leaving Atlanta it was 89 degrees
Fahrenheit.
It is a great honor and privilege to share my thoughts and
findings of my research, and the theme of my presentation is
mostly about people. The message to the distinguished members
of the subcommittee is that a security conscious work force
should be the first line of defense against catastrophic
terrorism. Indeed, the new challengers and threats in the wake
of the September 11th tragic event have dramatically enhanced
the role of the human factor in protecting sensitive
facilities, associated infrastructure and materials at the
source.
Why? The problem is that in the asymmetric warfare that has
become the buzzword as our adversaries move are increasingly
characterized as highly unpredictable, nontraditional,
indiscriminate in the use of any weapons and technologies,
disregarding the value of their own human lives and relying on
the support of a certain portion of the population and insider
collaboration.
This is why this new challenge requires a qualitatively
different response from us. On our side of the asymmetric
warfare we are developing dangerous gaps and vulnerabilities.
There is a need to come up with a state of the art, multi-
disciplinary methodology to prepare the workforce for actual
and potential threats.
The bottom line is in the new circumstances more than ever
security equipment regulations and procedures are as good as
operators, the people involved.
What can we do? If we hope to improve the human factor, the
so-called security culture, a cause that encompasses a set of
managerial, organizational, motivational and other
arrangements. Security culture can be defined as a work
environment where anethic of security permeates the entire
organization and not only guards. People's behavior focuses on
preventing malicious acts through critical self-assessment and
aggressive efforts to identify management security, safety and
other problems before they became dangerous vulnerabilities.
One important advantage of security culture is that it
enables a person to respond to known and unknown security risks
out of careful and nurtured proactive habit rather than
improvised effort that can deal with security culture within
our organization. And they are facility leadership without the
interest on the part of the leaders in enhancing security,
security culture can not be achieved.
Second, proactive policies and procedures generated by top
managers.
Three, personal performance, and one important trait of
this personal performance is questioning attitude and
whistleblowing.
And four, learning and professional improvement. You cannot
impose security culture. You can train people to be security
conscious, and as they improve their qualities, you know, the
progress is achieved.
The basics of security culture as a uniform and overarching
strategy can and must be applied to a number of sensitive
industries. In turn, these industries will build upon them what
will be specifically required by their unique features and
characteristics. For example, being less physically and
technologically protected in the nuclear industry. Bio,
pharmaceutical and chemical facilities and associated
infrastructures are much more dependent on the quality of their
human factor; in other words, skills, motivation, values and
performance of the work force.
On the other hand, security culture must be promoted
internationally because given the global scale of terrorism, we
in the need are as strong as the weakest link in facility and
material protection elsewhere.
International security culture is important for corporation
assistance and comparison. A valuable pioneering effort to
develop a concept of nuclear security culture is on the way at
the counsel of a doting agency. This concept has a good chance
to be finalized and released before the end of this year, and I
have been involved in this process from the very beginning.
Another important landmark is a Bratislava statement on
nuclear security culture that has been referred to by previous
speakers. It has the whole paragraph about nuclear security
culture, and I am very happy to say that our report regarding
nuclear security culture in Russia was released 3 months before
the Bratislava statement, and I want to believe that it
provided a clue to those who worked on the Bratislava
statement, and I will be happy to leave this report with the
secretary of the subcommittee.
What is important about security culture is that security
culture is a prerequisite for sustainability. As we provide
more equipment, fences and detectors you know to countries like
Russia, Ukraine and others, without people having security
culture it is very difficult to sustain this momentum, you
know, after we phase out our active involvement and assistance.
But several proposals that I would like to make, and I hope
you bear with me in order to promote security culture across
the board.
First of all, establish a multi-disciplinary partnership
between main stakeholders, regulators, industry anacademia. And
I think problem countries should be involved in this
international endeavor. My center is developing a dialogue with
the American Society For Industrial Security hoping that we may
contribute jointly in this interdisciplinary effort.
Two, encourage technical universities to introduce elements
of security culture in current and future courses.
Three, accelerate ratification and coming into force of the
amendments of the convention of physical protection of nuclear
material. Raising the concept to the level of the international
obligation would pressure some countries anmake them more
responsive and accountable.
Four, explore options for expanding the mandate of the
World Health Organization, to include the development and
promotion of biosecurity culture, drawing as much as reasonably
possible on the experience of the IAEA.
And finally, five, include in the agenda of the second
review conference of the Chemical Weapons Convention an item
that would authorize the organization for the prohibition for
chemical weapons for--to initiate work that was and will be
done by the IAEA.
Talking about Russia, you know, we need to continue our
work bilaterally, but international agreements, multilateral
agreements will be a powerful vehicle to force Russia to
embrace security culture.
And one final observation. We cannot build a water tight
wall to prevent some deadly materials from falling into the
hands of terrorists. For example, weapon grade material is more
controllable than components of radiological terrorism; in
other words, dirty bombs and some pathogens. Hence, we need to
be candid with the public and condition it to a higher
probability of attack from the sources.
Any new effort to prevent the proliferation at the source
must be combined with efforts to prepare ordinary citizens for
acts of WMD terrorism that are preventable. This human factor-
based, balanced formula must include a strategy to build up a
culture of resilience among the public as a counterpart to the
security culture at the source.
Resilient people bend rather than break under stressful
condition and they return to the acceptable level of their
normal psychological and social routine following misfortune.
These combined efforts focusing on the people and their mindset
help us fortify ourselves for the long war that confronts us.
Thank you very much.
[The statement of Mr. Khripunov follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dr. Igor Khripunov
Thank you, Mr. Chairman and other distinguished members of the
Subcommittee. I am pleased to have this opportunity to describe my work
in the area of the "human factor," which is becoming increasingly
important as we attempt to implement effective threat-reduction
programs. Simply put, the human factor emphasizes that the skill of
security personnel are the critical element in security. Equipment is
not enough.
In the new strategic environment of the 21st century, "asymmetric
warfare" has become a common buzzword. For those entrusted with
protecting critical infrastructure and materials at the source,
asymmetric threats imply attempts by adversaries to circumvent or
undermine our strengths while exploiting our weaknesses using methods
that differ significantly from traditional methods of operation.
Asymmetric attacks employ innovative, nontraditional tactics, weapons,
and technologies; thus they demand a spectrum of protective strategies
on our part.
But no strategy, however well-conceived, can prepare the staffs of
sensitive sites for every contingency. More than ever before, the
protective force will depend on such professional skills and traits as
situational awareness, strength of mind, mental readiness, boldness,
self-reliance, intuition, and a willingness to take risks. In the kind
of confrontations we envision, these characteristics are imperative.
They will help security forces at sites housing lethal materials expect
the unexpected and react adequately under conditions of extreme stress
and uncertainty.
Security Culture
The concept of the human factor originated with a simple insight:
that the best equipment in the world is no better than its operator.
Nor can the best written directives in the world compensate for apathy
or technical incompetence in the workforce. These material arrangements
have little effect without trained, motivated human beings to make use
of them. A vehicle to improve the human factor is "security culture," a
concept that encompasses a set of managerial, organizational, and other
arrangements. When we set out to improve security culture within an
organization active in the nuclear or biotechnology complex, we set out
to cultivate habits, attitudes, and traditions that favor security over
lesser concerns. Security becomes second nature for personnel within
such organizations.
This type of organizational culture is tightly based on the concept
of nuclear security which is defined by the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) as the prevention and detection of, and response to,
theft, sabotage, unauthorized access, illegal transfer or other
malicious acts involving nuclear material, other radioactive substances
or their associated facilities. This definition has important and
extensive overlaps with chemical and bio security.
On our side of the asymmetrical-warfare equation, where dangerous
gaps and vulnerabilities have become apparent, we can come up with a
state-of-the-art multidisciplinary methodology to prepare the workforce
for both actual and potential threats. Hence, security culture connotes
not only the technical proficiency of the people assigned security-
related duties, but also their willingness and motivation to follow
established procedures, comply with regulations, and take the
initiative when unforeseen circumstances arise-as they will, given the
limits on human foresight and the inventiveness of the adversaries we
face today.
In this sense, then, a good security culture can be defined as a
work environment where an ethic of security permeates the organization.
People's behavior focuses on preventing malicious acts through critical
self-assessment, aggressive efforts to identify management and tactical
problems, and appropriate, timely, and effective resolution of problems
before they become crises. Security culture enables a person to respond
to known and unknown security risks out of carefully nurtured and
proactive habit rather than improvised effort.
There are two categories of unexpected events of which we need to
be aware and for which security culture may be an effective tool.
First, a known danger whose timing or magnitude cannot be predicted has
been dubbed a "known unknown." Second, there are other dangers called
"unknown unknowns." Nobody is aware of these. Nobody will foresee them
or take countermeasures until they transpire. Crashing fuel-filled
passenger jets into the World Trade Center towers on September 11, 2001
represented a striking example of an unknown unknown.
Every organization has a security culture. (Incidentally, the same
could be said of safety, quality, and other fields of endeavor.) The
really important question is: Is the security culture healthy? Is it
what management needs it to be, and is it improving, decaying, or
remaining static? How effectively does it counteract security breaches
and insider threats? How can it be improved?
As we survey the world, we find numerous examples showing that a
group of unscrupulous employees-typically managers colluding with
lower-ranking technicians-can divert and steal valuable, sensitive, and
dangerous materials from the workplace despite seemingly airtight
security and anti-theft precautions. One representative case involved a
criminal operation at Elektrokhimpribor, a top-secret nuclear-weapons
facility in Russia's closed city of Lesnoy. Thefts of rare and
expensive radioactive isotopes went on unchecked for several years
because employees from all levels at the facility-ranging from rank-
and-file workers to top management-connived among themselves, abetted
by senior officials from the Ministry of Atomic Energy (the federal
agency charged with overseeing security at such sites).
Under a different set of circumstances in Pakistan, had there been
a chance to promote security culture values throughout its national
nuclear sector, some members of the workforce might have found A.Q.
Khan's shady nuclear transactions with proliferant entities
objectionable and inconsistent with world standards, prompting them to
blow a whistle. Ambassador Linton Brooks, administrator of the National
Nuclear Security Administration, delivered a presentation at the
Congressional Breakfast Club on May 19, 2006 in which he acknowledged
that "every security system ultimately depends on the people operating
it-the so-called `human factor.' Motivated by greed, coercion, or debt,
facility insiders may successfully divert nuclear materials."
Nor is the United States immune to faults in security culture that
can render nuclear facilities vulnerable to terrorist and other
malicious acts. On August 29, 2004, CBS News reported that officials
from the U.S. Department of Energy had conducted an surprise inspection
of security guards at a nuclear-weapons plant in Colorado, finding the
facility virtually unprotected because the vast majority of the guards
were watching the Super Bowl. The Department of Energy admitted that
guard forces had recently left the front gates at other nuclear
facilities wide open, and that they had failed repeatedly to respond to
emergency alarms in maximum-security areas. Some were actually caught
sleeping on the job.
Sectoral Diversity
A concept of security culture originated within the IAEA and the
nuclear sector. Twelve "fundamental principles" of nuclear security
were developed immediately after the 9/11 attacks and are now codified
in a series of (as-yet unratified) amendments to the 1980 Convention on
the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. The basic concept and
methodology of security culture continues to undergo refinement by the
IAEA Secretariat, but it can be usefully applied to other sensitive
areas, such as the biological and chemical sectors, in which breaches
of security may hand deadly materials to terrorists, posing a threat to
the public.
Nuclear. Emerging security challenges have made it obvious that the
scope of nuclear security and the associated culture need to extend
beyond the traditional task of protecting weapons-usable material. This
new, more comprehensive security culture must cover radioactive sources
and spent nuclear fuel, among other hazardous radiological substances,
while encompassing a wide variety of installations and activities. It
must account not only for power and research reactors and related fuel-
cycle facilities, but also for waste storage sites that serve research,
academic, agricultural, and industrial installations.
Of special significance is nuclear power infrastructure. An attack
on a nuclear power site would likely lead to serious consequences, even
if little or no damage were done to the plant itself or to related
structures. Public fears of radiation, combined with a possible massive
blackout and other aggravating factors, could give rise to significant
distress and panic. In other words, even a marginally successful
terrorist attack on nuclear plant infrastructure could easily bring
about a systemic disaster, characterized by a series of interconnected
and disruptive events affecting vital societal institutions.
In July 2005, the parties to the Convention on the Physical
Protection of Nuclear Material approved a series of amendments to the
Convention. Among other things, the amendments raise the 12 fundamental
principles of nuclear security to the level of binding obligations
under international law. Although security culture is listed alongside
principles such as threat evaluation, a graded approach, defense-in-
depth, and quality assurance-implying coequal status-it is clear that
culture stands above them all. It is an overarching and integrating
concept without which none of the other fundamental principles can be
successfully implemented.
The amendments make the fundamental principles of nuclear security
universal and binding, and they give the international community a way
to hold individual governments accountable for their performance in
this critical area. In this light, it is disturbing that only three
countries (the Seychelles, Turkmenistan, and Bulgaria) have ratified
the amendments almost a year after they were signed. It is clearly in
the interest of the United States to invest time and resources in
efforts to accelerate the ratification process, both in Congress and
abroad, helping the amendments to the Convention enter into force at an
early date.
Chemical. Among the threats to the chemical industry and to
chemical-weapons storage/destruction facilities are deliberate attempts
to release toxic materials while they are in transit to or from points
of storage or use; theft or diversion of chemical weapons or toxic
materials for terrorist acts elsewhere; and sabotage that releases
toxic contaminants, in effect using chemical installations as weapons
prepositioned in urban areas. A multitude of industrial chemicals,
though not as deadly as chemical-warfare agents, could be released in
massive quantities, inflicting lethal effects despite their lower
toxicity.
A classified study conducted by the U.S. Army Surgeon General,
dated October 29, 2001, projected that a terrorist attack dispersing
toxic chemicals in a densely populated area could injure or kill as
many as 2.4 million people. (The Army later clarified its findings,
noting that the estimate of 2.4 million casualties referred to the
number of people who might request medical treatment following a large-
scale release from a chemical manufacturing plant, in a densely
populated area, under ideal weather conditions that lent themselves to
maximum exposure.) If nothing else, however, this attests to the
psychological impact of chemical incidents, which would exacerbate the
actual, measurable damage to infrastructure and human health.
What kind of substances might be released? Chlorine and phosgene
are two industrial chemicals commonly transported by road and rail.
They are also chemical-warfare agents, having seen widespread use in
World War I. Rupturing the containers in which they are transported
could disseminate these gases in incapacitating or lethal amounts.
Organophosphate pesticides such as parathion fall into the same class
as nerve agents. Although these pesticides are far less toxic than
military-grade nerve agents, their effects and medical treatments are
the same. In April 2005, Dr. Richard Falkenrath, President Bush's
deputy homeland security advisor, told the Senate Committee on Homeland
Security and Governmental Affairs that, of all the capabilities
available to terrorists in the United States today, one stands alone as
uniquely deadly, pervasive, and susceptible to terrorist use:
industrial chemicals such as chlorine, ammonia, phosgene, methyl
bromide, hydrochloric acid, and various other acids.
In contrast to the nuclear sector, which is made up of relatively
few facilities equipped with costly and sophisticated protective
systems, sensitive chemical plants number in the thousands and,
generally speaking, are only lightly protected. To an even greater
degree than in the nuclear industry, accordingly, physical protection
in the chemical industry depends not so much on the design and
condition of installed security equipment as on the attitudes,
behavior, and motivation of the entire workforce. In the long run,
human performance, influenced by prevailing standards of security
culture, determines whether a chemical security regime succeeds or
fails. The sheer scale of the chemical industry increasingly makes
security culture, including the vigilance of the workforce, a key
element in protecting hazardous facilities and chemicals.
A recently released report from UN Secretary General Kofi Annan,
titled Uniting Against Terrorism: Recommendations for a Global Counter-
Terrorism Strategy (A/60/825, April 27, 2006) appropriately emphasizes
that:
To prevent terrorists from acquiring chemical materials, States
should ensure that security at chemical plants is kept to the
highest standard, and I urge the relevant United Nations
entities to provide assistance where needed. A mechanism should
also be developed to allow the Organization for the Prohibition
of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), in cooperation with other relevant
United Nations actors, to provide necessary assistance and
coordinate the response and relief operations in case of a
chemical weapon attack or the release of chemical agents.
Indeed, the OPCW, a worldwide authority on chemical weapons, is
best equipped to become a clearinghouse and coordinating center for
chemical security culture. Its expertise, knowledge, and equipment can
be put to use preventing, combating, and responding to chemical
terrorism. The Chemical Weapons Convention, the document under which
the OPCW operates, clearly provides the organization with a mandate not
only to deal with chemical weapons narrowly construed, but also to
foster security in the chemical sectors of member states.
Biological. At biotechnology labs and pharmaceutical plants, the
role of the human factor is even greater than in the nuclear and
chemical complexes because of the ease with which an unscrupulous staff
member could divert pathogen samples from their proper uses. Preventing
bioterrorism requires innovative solutions specific to the nature of
the threat. Biotechnology is not like nuclear technology. Soon, tens of
thousands of laboratories worldwide will be operating in this multi-
billion-dollar industry. Even students working in small laboratories
will be able to carry out gene manipulation. A minute amount of
pathogens can be used to create a sizable stock of weapons-usable
material. The approach to fighting the abuse of biotechnology for
terrorist purposes will have more in common with measures against
cyber-crime than with our work to control nuclear proliferation. As a
result, biosecurity culture is substantively and structurally different
from security culture in the nuclear and chemical complexes.
There is a compelling need to forge a voluntary code of conduct for
the biotech industry, governed by the principles of risk management,
ethical values, and strict compliance. Personnel accountability is a
major trait to be nurtured at these institutions. Members of the
workforce must always bear in mind the potential consequences of the
firm's research, recognizing the repercussions that would accrue were
their scientific endeavors misused. Because biosecurity depends so
heavily on vigilance and on expecting the unexpected, top leaders must
encourage their workforces to be observant and to question small
discrepancies as a matter of routine. Effective biosecurity would
include an oversight system for (a) the physical protection of
dangerous pathogens and dual-use technologies from theft, illicit sale
or transfer, or accidental release; (b) the implementation of security
regulations; (c) safety training; (d) facility licensing; and (e)
personnel vetting.
Here again, the human factor is the key to success in biosecurity
culture, even though it may require more effort and time to nurture.
Since the dividing line between biological weapons and naturally
occurring infectious diseases is blurry, the United States may wish to
turn to the World Health Organization (WHO), encouraging that body to
strengthen and diversify its involvement in this area. This would make
the WHO the biosecurity counterpart to the IAEA and the OPCW. It would
also enhance preparations for natural outbreaks such as bird flu. It
will be necessary to focus on raising standards of biosecurity culture,
both to protect the general public from naturally occurring disease and
to shield our citizens against malicious acts.
Building Security Culture
Cultures are based on a set of shared, underlying assumptions about
reality. Practically speaking, this means that an organization instills
tangible behaviors in the workforce that derive from what the
organization`s leaders assume should be most important. Even if the
leadership makes the right assumptions and sets the right goals,
however, culture will atrophy unless the leadership works actively and
continuously to promote them throughout the organization. Without
proactive leadership, the staff will simply form other assumptions
based on individual staff members' personal experiences, or even on
their whims. Top managers need to lead the way in forging the
appropriate pattern of ideas. Often underlying assumptions are
unconsciously held and never discussed in the daily course of business.
They simply become "the way we do things." But a culture needs
conscious attention if it is to thrive.
A good security culture is founded on a healthy respect for the
threat. From the most senior leader down to the lowliest technician,
the staff needs to understand that security measures truly matter. This
underlying conviction then permeates the way people work, and it drives
their behavior under normal and abnormal conditions. In a facility that
enjoys a healthy security culture, personnel typically display a deep-
rooted belief that there are credible insider and outsider threats,
including theft, sabotage, unauthorized access, illegal transfer, and
other malicious acts, and that it is their duty to counteract those
threats. A sense of mission goes a long way toward fissile-material
security, as well as the security of pathogens and toxic chemicals.
The next level in implanting healthy assumptions is to determine
basic principles and values conducive to the behaviors and physical
arrangements that make up a vibrant security culture. The necessary
principles and values include honesty, integrity, and a sense of
responsibility; a commitment to keeping equipment in good working
order; obedience to procedure; a commitment to learning and process
improvement; and effective leadership throughout the organizational
hierarchy. These traits contribute to the core of security culture.
The core consists of four major elements: (1) facility leadership,
(2) proactive policies and procedures, (3) personnel performance, and
(4) learning and professional improvement. (See Figure 1, next page.)
But the main element within the facility is the performance of leaders.
Top managers are responsible for developing and implementing a specific
set of policies and procedures that bias the behavior of their
subordinates in favor of security. Of particular importance to the core
is a manager's emphasis on clear roles and responsibilities, visible
security policies, cyber-protection, contingency plans and drills, and
personal accountability. Continuous training is the primary tool to get
the required results.
These desired traits are not, of course, confined to security; they
are mainstays of healthy management practices. Conversely, a poorly
managed work environment in which these attributes are lacking will be
indifferent to efforts to achieve a high standard of security culture.
Accordingly, any campaign to promote nuclear security culture-whether
nationally sponsored or funded primarily through international
assistance-should seek to better the overall professional culture.
It is in U.S. national interest to take the lead in supporting and
promoting security culture not only domestically but also
internationally, making its basic standards universally understood,
regardless of differing socioeconomic and political conditions from
country to country. A uniform understanding of clearly defined
standards is important for international exchanges, evaluation, and
comparison. A good example of such highly beneficial outreach is the
U.S.-Russian program on security culture currently implemented under
the bilateral Statement on Nuclear Security Cooperation signed by
Presidents George W. Bush and Vladimir Putin at their summit meeting in
Bratislava, Slovak Republic, in February 2005. Ideally, this must serve
as a powerful tool for shaping the mindset of nuclear workforce in
Russia and pave the way for similar efforts in other countries.
Indeed, there is an urgent need to engage, either bilaterally or
through the IAEA, a specific group of countries whose history,
traditions, ongoing economic developments, and other traits complicate
their ability to meet high standards of security culture. This group
includes transitional societies, countries whose nuclear programs
lacked or still lack transparency, countries instituting nuclear power
and research programs from scratch, or where nuclear industry is
undergoing ownership reform. For example, countries professing a desire
to benefit from nuclear power generation, such as Turkey, Vietnam,
Indonesia and Nigeria, need to start training a security-conscious
workforce even before they design and build appropriate physical
infrastructure.
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Beyond the Source
Security culture is no panacea. It cannot credibly prevent the
whole spectrum of terrorist attacks involving weapons of mass
destruction (WMD). Though we stand a reasonably good chance of denying
terrorists access to nuclear weapons and to the material and
technologies they would need to build an improvised nuclear device
(IND), most components for radiological terrorism or bioterrorist
attacks are easily available and technologically simple to use. They
stand out among the WMD tools available to terrorists both because of
their ready availability and because of their unique capacity to
inflict far-reaching physiological and psychological damage.
Compared to nuclear weapons and INDs, radiological weapons require
little technical sophistication. The probability that such weapons will
be used is on the rise: Conventional terrorism seems to be gradually
losing its attractiveness to perpetrators as public authorities take
defensive precautions and ordinary citizens demonstrate more resilience
in the face of its disruptive effects. From a symbolic standpoint,
moreover, al Qaeda and its ilk would be tempted to use radiological
weapons because they resemble nuclear weapons, thus conferring prestige
and an image of prowess on their efforts and heightening anxieties
among the populace targeted for attack. Similarly, acts of bioterrorism
can be prevented and mitigated only in a limited way, but they could
have long-lasting and indiscriminate effects, raising the specter of a
global pandemic.
Any new efforts to prevent the proliferation of weapons-usable
materials at the source must be combined with efforts to prepare
ordinary citizens for acts of WMD terrorism that are less preventable.
This balanced formula must include a strategy to build up a culture of
resilience among the public, which after all is a primary target for
terrorists. Resilience refers to the ability to handle disruptive
challenges, characterized as emergencies that can result in crisis.
Accordingly, resilience culture is an amalgam of beliefs, attitudes,
approaches, behaviors, and psychology that helps people fare better
during adversity. Resilient people bend rather than break under
stressful conditions, and they return to some semblance of their normal
psychological and social routine following misfortune.
The challenge of terrorism demands a global response, as
compassionate to victims as it is resolute in seeking out and defeating
perpetrators. Security culture at the source, complemented by public
resilience, offers a foundation for a partnership and strategy that
will help deny terrorists their goals. Our efforts in this area will
help us fortify ourselves for the long war that confronts us.
Mr. Linder. Thank you, Dr. Khripunov.
Mr. Franz.
STATEMENT OF DR. DAVID FRANZ, VICE PRESIDENT AND CHIEF
BIOLOGICAL SCIENTIST, MIDWEST RESEARCH INSTITUTE
Mr. Franz. Mr. Chairman, Congressman Langevin, it is anon
honor to appear before you today to address the threats at the
source.
I believe there are no perfect technical solutions or
combination of solutions to the threat of bioterrorism to our
Nation. The microbes needed are too readily available in nature
and the tools needed to transform microbes into weapons are
also too accessible to allow us to control their illicit use.
The technologies, the facilities and the humans involved are
too widespread and of dual use for our intelligence community
to discover their malevolent use. As the technical barriers to
the abuse of biology continue to fall, intent to harm becomes
more important in the calculous.
At this time in our history, as was just mentioned, we face
three trends that synergize to make protecting our citizens
from biological terrorism extremely difficult: One, it is a
smaller world; two, we are in a biotechnological revolution;
and three, we see a prevalence of asymmetry in warfare. Vast
oceans and friendly neighbors are not enough to protect us
today. Until we address intent to harm with biology and the
factors which motivate it, we have not done enough for our
citizens.
The language of science is common and powerful. I believe
that working directly with scientists internationally is
integral to defense of the homeland. Doing this has numerous
benefits. First, it builds understanding in the very community
that has the tools to do harm. Second, it provides some
transparency, not total transparency but some and a frame of
reference regarding legitimate activities that are going on in
biotechnology around the world. And three, it offers the
opportunity to build some trust between and among scientific
collaborators worldwide.
All of these outcomes reduce the likelihood of
proliferation. Although we, the U.S. government, as we heard in
the previous hearing, have been engaging foreign biological
scientists, particularly in Russia and Eurasia, since the early
1990s, I don't believe we always grasp the importance and the
value of the process that we are involved in. My personal
experiences as a scientist-soldier and my active involvement in
biological counterproliferation and nonproliferation programs
have allowed me to make the observations listed more fully in
my written statement.
To summarize, however, just a few points regarding the
biological threat.
History has demonstrated that adequate transparency cannot
be legislated, forced or enforced, or compliance assured.
Secondly, although not always possible, a most useful
approach in engagement has been to work in true collaborative
relationships on mutually beneficial projects. Difficult
technical problems related to biological safety, biological
security and public health, such as the avian flu threat that
we face today, are excellent targets for such collaboration.
I believe that the process is often as important as the
product that we look for in these programs. Working together on
a scientific project and failing is at times more beneficial
than succeeding alone.
In the end success I believe will not be related to dollars
spent on fences and locks and alarm systems to protect our
microbes. It will be related to communication and trust built
between humans.
The metrics are very difficult to apply, but we must stay
engaged. We must trust and where we can, we must verify as
well.
And the fourth point, this is a dangerous world. What I am
talking about are soft programs. They can't replace military
strength and intelligence and other components of our hard
power. But I believe these soft programs are complementary and
actually make our hard power more effective. It is very
important, I believe, that we find balance between this hard
and soft power.
As just one example in closing, I have had the opportunity
to travel to Russia two or three times per year since 1993,
first under the trilateral negotiations. When we started those
visits and the negotiation to establish mill to mill agreements
working across conference tables and taking part in rigid
inspections, which we called visits but they were more like
inspections, the tone was contentious and the progress was
slow. Next under the Nunn-Lugar program we got American
scientists involved as collaborators and saw the power of
science as a common language.
Earlier this month, actually just 2 weeks ago, in Moscow
our National Academy Committee on International Security anArms
Control met with our biological counterparts from the Russian
Academy of Sciences. For the first time in all these years I
saw a glimpse of a tipping point in the way our collaborative
work is approached. At least I saw both a willingness and now I
believe a capability, a financial capability as well, on the
Russian side to transform our relationship from one of
patronage, which is what it has been, to partnership, and I
think this is critically important.
The Russian example that I give is dated somewhat in this
age of bioterrorism, and actually I think the Russian example I
think may be the easy one. I think we are going to face more
difficult ones. But I believe it demonstrates the importance of
using our scientific soft power at the source of terror along
with the hard power. Finding balance is always difficult, but
it is so necessary.
Again, I appreciate the opportunity to present this
information before the committee, and I shall be happy to
answer your questions.
[The statement of Dr. Franz follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dr. David Franz
Mr. Chairman, distinguished Members, it is an honor to appear
before you today to address issues related to reducing proliferation of
biological weapons. I am currently Vice President & Chief Biological
Scientist at the Midwest Research Institute of Kansas City, based in
Frederick, MD; Director of the National Agriculture Biosecurity Center
at Kansas State University and Senior Fellow for Bioterrorism at the
Combating Terrorism Center at the U.S. Military Academy in West Point.
I served on active duty in the U.S. Army from 1971 to 1998, 24 of those
years in the U.S. Army Medical Research and Materiel Command. I served
for 11 years at the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious
Disease, which I commanded before my retirement. During my tour of duty
at USAMRIID, I served as Chief Inspector on three UN Special Commission
biological warfare missions to Iraq and as technical expert on the
Trilateral (US-UK-Russia) Agreement visits and negotiations with
Russia. I have worked under the auspices of the "Nunn-Lugar"
Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program in the Former Soviet Union
(FSU) since 1994 and chaired the National Academies of Science,
National Research Council committee which provides technical review to
the CTR-supported research conducted there since 1998. I am also a
current member of the National Academies of Science standing Committee
on International Security and Arms Control (CISAC), the Threat
Reduction Advisory Committee (TRAC) of the Defense Threat Reduction
Agency (DTRA) and I chair the International Panel of the National
Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB) at the Department of
Health and Human Services. The myriad opportunities given to me
throughout my career in military medical research have led me to better
understand and value the use of science as a common language to build
relationships, understanding and transparency internationally.
This committee has asked that I provide thoughts on reducing
biological threats at the source. Below are my views on a number of
related issues.
There are no perfect technical solutions-or combination of
solutions---to the threat of bioterrorism in our nation. The microbes
needed are too readily available in nature and the tools needed to
transform microbes into weapons also are too accessible to allow us to
control their illicit use. The technologies, the facilities and the
humans involved are too widespread and of "dual-use" for our
intelligence community to discover their malevolent use. As the
technical barriers to the abuse of biology fall, `intent' to harm
becomes more important in the calculus. At this time in our history, we
face three trends which synergize to make protecting our citizens from
biological terrorism extremely difficult: 1) a `smaller world', 2) a
biotechnological revolution and 3) a prevalence of asymmetry in
warfare. Vast oceans and friendly neighbors are not enough to protect
us today; until we address `intent' to harm with biology and the
factors which motivate it, we have not done enough.
The language of science is common and powerful. I believe that
working directly with scientists internationally is integral to defense
of the homeland. Doing this has numerous benefits: 1) It builds
understanding in the very community that has the tools to do harm; 2)
it provides some transparency and a frame of reference regarding
legitimate activities around the world and 3) it offers the opportunity
to build trust between and among scientific collaborators worldwide.
All of these outcomes reduce the likelihood of proliferation. Although
we---the U.S. government---have been engaging foreign biological
scientists [particularly from Russia and Eurasia] aggressively since
the early 90s, we don't always grasp the importance and value of the
process. My personal experiences as a scientist-solider and my active
involvement in biological counter-proliferation and non-proliferation
programs have allowed me to make the following observations.
Regarding the biological threat:
1. History has demonstrated that adequate transparency cannot
be legislated, forced or enforced.or compliance assured; its
development can be facilitated, however, through frankness,
honesty and efficiently administered joint science, technology
and public health programs with clear goals.
2. Human relationships among scientists and clinicians are
more effective than technological tools or regulatory regimes
in providing transparency; such relationships provide the added
benefit of building understanding and even, sometimes, trust.
3. Although not always possible, the most useful approach in
engagement has been to work in true collaborative relationships
on mutually beneficial projects. Difficult technical problems
related to public health, such as the avian flu threat, are
excellent targets of collaboration. These useful and necessary
public health relationships engage, generally, the same people,
the same technologies and the same facilities that could be
used to develop biological weapons.
4. Historically, the greatest value in our CTR programs has
come from personal relationships, facilitated by mutual respect
and the common language of science. Intellect, personal
integrity and a sense of humor among colleagues are appreciated
and respected by scientists worldwide; unfortunately,
governments are often not trusted.
5. The greatest harm in government supported, collaborative
undertakings often results from unprofessional communications,
disconnects between policy and implementation, empty promises,
reward systems with moving `goal posts' and delays in follow-
through by either party.
6. The `process' is often more important than the `product'.
In biological programs, human factors are more important in
providing security than locks, fences or signatures on paper.
Working together on a scientific project and failing is more
beneficial than succeeding alone. In the end, success will not
be related to dollars spent on fences, locks and alarm systems
to protect microbes; it will be related to communication and
trust built between humans. Metrics will be difficult to apply,
but we must stay engaged.
7. Traditional technical, bureaucratic and regulatory means of
providing biological security to the U.S. will ultimately not
be enough. Because of the unique characteristics of biology and
biotechnology.and the importance of intent in the
equation.long-term human relationships leading to whatever
transparency we can obtain will remain a key means of reducing
the threat to the homeland.
8. The long-term goal of engagement should be to get the U.S.
government out of the process of `supporting' patronage
programs, and to get U.S. scientists and public health
personnel engaged in true collaborations with international
colleagues on tough problems. Finding tough, common, health,
biosafety and educational challenges is ever easier as the
world shrinks.
9. This is a dangerous world. Soft programs cannot replace
military strength, intelligence and other components of hard
power, but are complementary and actually make our hard power
more effective. We must find `balance' between hard and soft
power.
10. And finally, we must "Trust, but verify," recognizing that
we must find new and innovative approaches to this when dealing
with biology and biotechnology.
I have had the opportunity to travel to Russia two or three times
per year since 1993. When we started, during the Trilateral
negotiations and visits, working across conference tables and taking
part in rigid inspections termed `visits', the tone was contentious and
the progress slow. I sensed we were building walls, not tearing them
down.and we learned little about thoughts or activities on the other
side of the table. Under the auspices of the Nunn-Lugar legislation of
1992, we slowly established scientific collaborations. First, it was a
scientific welfare program designed to keep former weaponeers at home
in Russia. Next we got American scientists involved as collaborators,
and saw the power of science as a common language. Earlier this month
in Moscow, our NAS CISAC committee met with our biological counterparts
from the Russian Academy of Sciences. For the first time, I saw a
glimpse of a `tipping point' in the way our collaborative work is
approached. At last, I saw both willingness and a capability on the
Russian side to transform our relationship from one of patronage to
partnership. (See "Biological Science and Biotechnology in Russia:
Controlling Disease and Enhancing Security" @ www.nap.edu ). The
Russian example is dated--and maybe the easy one--but I believe it
demonstrates the importance of using our scientific soft power at the
source of terror along with the hard. Finding balance is always
difficult, but so necessary. We have had some limited additional
opportunities in Iraq and Libya and, if given the opportunity, could
use lessons learned and best practices in other countries as well.
Again, I appreciate the opportunity to present this information
before the Committee. I shall be happy to answer your questions.
Mr. Linder. Thank you, Dr. Franz. We have heard today about
efforts to secure pathogens abroad. Are we doing enough to
secure the facilities that hold pathogens in our own country?
Mr. Franz. I believe we are. I think the Select Agent Rule
of 1997 and its subsequent beefing up after 9/11 were
significant efforts. It is still, just as in other countries,
it comes down to humans, as was mentioned in the first
comments, and we have now in this country implemented surety
programs or are implementing surety programs as well as
security programs, personal liability programs for biology.
When I was in this lab and running labs for the DOD, we didn't
have surety programs like you do in nuclear and like we did in
chemical. We have those as well. So I think we are making a
significant effort.
Again, we need balance there. If we go too far in this
country we are going to limit the capabilities of our
biotechnology industry and put us behind in the world market in
this area.
Mr. Linder. When you were at Ft. Dietrich, were there any
reports of any missing pathogens or do you keep close enough
account of them you so you could know that?
Mr. Franz. We didn't. In the old days, the rules were a lot
different than they are post-9/11, but after the incident in
which a gentleman attempted to acquire some plague from the
American type culture collection in 1995, I believe his name
was Larry Wayne Harris, the CDC was mandated to develop this
Select Agent Program, and after that the rules were tightened
significantly. There have been, as came out in the press after
10/04, after the anthrax letters, there have been--there were
some false reports of materials missing from Ft. Dietrich. Most
of those were killed samples and in almost every case I believe
they were eventually recovered and found.
Mr. Linder. Would you care to take a shot at my question
about Russian smallpox.
Mr. Franz. Yes, sir. That is really under the auspices of
the World Health Assembly and it is the WHO that works on that
problem. We have been negotiating since the mid-1990s probably,
with regard to destruction, to destroy the last of the
smallpox.
Mr. Linder. What is your take on that?
Mr. Franz. My opinion has been all along that we should
not. Initially, primarily we were working on vaccines, drugs
and diagnostics. We found that we had adequate models for
vaccines and diagnostics. We found that there were cases in
which there would be drugs that would not work against our
surrogates, but they would work against variola, smallpox
itself, so we would have been in a position to miss drugs.
At this point I believe we know enough about rebuilding
those bugs that it probably doesn't make any difference. And if
we destroy, I believe it takes away our capabilities to work
with variola, and yet someone else in the world could rebuild
the bug either from another orthopox virus or from scratch
eventually and have it.
Mr. Linder. Does it startle you--I may have asked you this
the last time you were here--to know that significant numbers
of Iranian children are being vaccinated for smallpox today?
Mr. Franz. I don't have any information on that. I really
don't know that.
Mr. Linder. Dr. Khripunov, we know that the managers of
these facilities in the past under the old Soviet Union lied on
the reports to their supervisors as to reaching certain quotas.
They over produce in one quarter, they would underscore their
numbers so they could--if they under produce they would have to
overscore their numbers and this entire culture was one of
lying to superiors.
If that was the culture, how do you change it so that they
are living under different rules?
Mr. Khripunov. You know, Russia is a country yet in
transition, you know. Certainly it is a shift from one set of
values and cultural elements to another. What is alarming is
that this new set of cultural values are yet to be put into
place. So while this process is in transition, I think this is
the most difficult period to find ways to keep people
motivated, complying with rules and regulations, staying away
from diversion and selling, and this is why I believe this
Blatislava statement is very, very important. I think in my
view there is no single more important document than this
Blatislava statement. Because it opens up ways for us to move
ahead and think a little bit with the mindset of ordinary
Russians, you know, who are custodians. Let me reveal you
something that you may not know.
The Blatislava statement in English has two words: Security
culture should apply to custodians and protective forces. And
it is clear because you don't have to impose, you know, culture
on military personnel. They have their own rules to operate. In
the Russian text on the web site of President Putin the word
``custodians'' is missing. Whether it is anintentional, you
know, omission or whether interpreters or translators didn't
know how to translate, you know, this word into Russian, I have
no way of knowing. But this document, very important document,
with the word ``custodians'' missing is becoming really
meaningless. And this is a reflection of the overall status of
the mindset that it is none of our business. We have guards. We
have soldiers. And we are just small people, you know, who are
not very significant. So the Blatislava statement gives us a
chance to talk about security culture. But what is important is
that I think the United States should move forcefully in order
to ratify the amendments to the Physical Protection Convention
because by elevating, you know, security culture to the level
of international obligation we may ask, you know, the Russian
officials you know how you comply with that. Can we cooperate?
Can we compare standards how we evaluate security culture in
your country compared to other countries? So security culture
is very, very important as the--I would say the first line of
defense at this source because very much depends on the people.
Mr. Linder. Is there a biological equivalent to the IAEA?
Mr. Khripunov. Unfortunately, World Health Organization is
very cautious about assuming any security functions. But it is
natural because you cannot divide--you cannot draw a very
distinct dividing line between infectious diseases and what may
be regarded as biological agents. So WHO is a natural
organization, but it doesn't have any security related record
really to draw upon.
Another option would be to establish, you know, a new
organization that would be doing it full time concerning
security, security culture and fighting biological terrorism.
But that would undercut the prestige of the WHO. My choice
would be to expand the mandate of the World Health
Organization.
Mr. Linder. Your comment, Dr. Franz.
Mr. Franz. There is actually a small group there run by a
Dr. Kanisova who call these problems intentional endemics. As
is mentioned, WHO doesn't like to get involved in security
anthey have stayed out. They prepare some reports and they have
been working at the seven regions, WHO regions, on some joint
meetings to look at biosafety, biosecurity, dual use issues,
sort of the soft side of these biological terrorism issues.
Mr. Linder. Is there any agents on the bio side that is not
dual use?
Mr. Franz. I am sorry?
Mr. Linder. Is there any agent on the biological side that
is not dual use?
Mr. Franz. I think some are certainly more dual use than
others. It is hard to abuse certain biological agents so you
can sort of rank order them in groups or classes.
Mr. Linder. Mr. Langevin.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you, gentlemen, for being here today. I
appreciate them for what they have had to say. Earlier in the
first panel I raised the issue of National Intelligence Council
report that has detailed a number of smuggling incidents of
weapons grade material or nuclear material or nuclear weapon
components that have been smuggled out of Russia and the former
Soviet Union. And in addition to that, Mr. Heisinger from the
Department of Energy has also revealed that his counterpart in
Russia has informed him that there were over 200 potential
radiological smuggling incidents last year alone. Clearly the
issue of proliferation is still a problem, that this nuclear
material and components have not been totally secured, and it
appears we have a lot to do before we say we are at a point
where we are at security at all of these sites where material
could be smuggled from or components could be smuggled from.
My question I guess to you is, is this a function of just
money and would it move us further on the path of securing the
material if there were abundant resources into programs like
Nunn-Lugar and the other programs, whether it is at State or
DOE or DOD? And is it a problem on the other end, on the
Russian side? They are not putting enough of their own
resources or is this a just anissue of will and more of a
political problem?
Mr. Khripunov. You know, it should be multi-thronged
approach, more funding, more transparency, severe punishment
for people who commit such acts. But I think the most important
thing is to promote public awareness of the threats because the
public is becoming more and more indifferent to threats of
terrorism. According to the most latest public opinion poll,
the threat or concern of terrorism is number 8. It is preceded
by unemployment, you know, by high cost of medical care, many
other things. But ironically enough, in a country where
terrific acts of terrorism were committed, it is number 8
because the threat perception is misplaced, mostly due to
official propaganda, mostly due to lingering Cold War
perception that threats come from NATO, that threats come from
the United States, from the ABM system to be deployed in the
United States.
So what we need to do in addition to any other things, you
know, is to help, you know, Russian NGOs promote better
awareness of nuclear security and existing threats. No one is
doing that. No one is briefing journalists about that. No one
is working with the public opinion trying to share concerns and
real risk perceptions. And as a result, there are difficulties.
People are not deterred from committing horrendous acts of
diversion, stealing, because they don't understand and they are
not under the pressure of risk perception.
Mr. Langevin. Do you have any comment?
Mr. Khripunov. I would add the rules are absolutely
different for biology than they are for nuclear and
radiological. On the one hand, it is probably easier especially
if you know what you are doing to take out material like
biological agents because you only need that much, and you
can't count what you have got there. But on the other hand, it
is less necessary to smuggle with the exception of smallpox,
which is locked up in Atlanta and Kosovo. It is less necessary
to smuggle biological agents because they are available in so
many places.
Mr. Langevin. Is that securing the biological agents, is
that just a function of money or are there other issues,
political issues in terms of hammering out agreements and
security?
Mr. Franz. I think there was mention in the earlier hearing
of consolidating agents in Russia. For example, what has
happened over the years is these agents in some of these small
laboratories have almost become currency. They realize that we
would like to take them away, and it is like knowledge is power
here. In some cases biological agents are power and people
don't want to give them up. And it is pretty hard--even though
you say you consolidate them all in one laboratory from, let us
say, five laboratories, it is hard to know you really do
because all you need to do is keep back that much. It is--you
can't take a counter there or a measuring device and say yes we
have got it all. So it is a little--biological is a little
different than these other sciences.
Mr. Khripunov. With your permission, in this nuclear field
it is the same perception, you know. As long as you have
uranium and plutonium in the view of the top manager you are
ranked very high in terms of priority for funding, for other
benefits. If there is a campaign to consolidate and move your
stockpiles of highly enriched, refined plutonium away you might
be marginalized as a result. So there is resistance to a
similar move to consolidate weapon grade materials in Russia.
Mr. Langevin. And that raises a good point and for both
securing nuclear material and biological material, the various
programs that we have in place. How do the Russians, whether it
is the government or the individuals at these particular
facilities, how do they view our involvement there? Do they
look at it as interference and/or do they look at it as working
cooperatively with them that we are looking to help both them
and us at the same time?
Mr. Khripunov. I would say the overall reaction by the
people involved in this process is positive. I think what we
have not yet evaluated accurately is the impact of the CTR on
the good will of people because CTR projects are often
implemented by Russians. They get money, you know, from
American contractors. They learn how to deal with foreign
counterparts. They earn money, and they realize that, you know,
Westerners are not that dangerous, you know. And their
intentions are beneficial, you know. And they can drink vodka
as much as Russians if there is anoccasion to do it.
So there is a core group of Russians with very positively,
you know, reacting for these programs. They realize this is a
window, a door to the West that may help them, you know, to
prosper.
But there are also nationalistic, you know, minded people
who regard that as a threat to their own interests. Let me give
you one example. A couple of months prior to the Blatislava
statement, a group of retired Russians made a statement saying
that Americans want to take all Russian nuclear weapons and
nuclear material way out of the country. And they asked people
to volunteer in patrolling the periphery of some sites to
prevent Americans from going there and taking material out of
those sites. So it was ridiculous but it was credible to some
nationalistic minded people there.
Mr. Franz. I think generally the same principles apply to
biology. The thing I would add is it has changed and I have
sort of watched it change over time. Early on in the 1994 and
1998 time frame it was we are happy to cooperate in any way
because we need your money, and then they went through a phase
where they needed our money much less and maybe didn't
cooperate as much. And I really believe that now we are going
through a phase where we are working together, as I mentioned
in my statement. It is looking more--at least in the areas I am
working--a little more like a partnership and there is more
willingness to work together anto share some of the financial
burden, which is great if it continues.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you.
Mr. Linder. The gentlelady from the District wishes to
inquire?
Ms. Norton. Yes, Mr. Chairman, and I am sorry I wasn't here
before. I am very interested in the subject matter of this
hearing and I find the testimony in its own way reassuring. It
is because of the sophistication of the understanding that it
imparts about the nature of the threats, how to deal. We live
in a country where people expect to lock it up anthrow away a
key and that will take care of it, and one of the things that
is hard to prepare Americans to understand is that you have
to--that the government and nobody else can protect you against
every threat and to condition people to understand that we are
dealing with something that is not totally in our control. And
yet not to fear that, that means that you shouldn't go about
living your life as you always have.
I hear you saying that essentially we are talking about
weapons at least of the magnitude that could initially do some
harm as being fairly easily accessible. Dr. Franz speaks about
biological weapons being put easily into nature for use,
malevolent or beneficial.
Dr. Khripunov, your testimony essentially offers an
analysis you both just talked about, the small quantities of
these materials, how easy it is for them to transport it from
one place to another.
I am interested. I mean it--and here is my question. It
seems to come down to delivery systems if one is interested in
prevention. I want to know if that is true but I particularly
want to know if it is true because of this recent report about
the New York subways where we are told that was it al Qaeda, or
whoever, called off a planned attack of cyanide or some other
agent that is not exactly esoteric in the New York subways. We
don't know why.
Ms. Norton. It caught my attention because I represent the
District of Columbia, because most of the people who use our
subways, 200,000 Federal workers, actually, are located in this
region; that is who really use the subways. There has been very
little done about the tunnels that these subways travel
through, a great concern on the part of those who run this
system, about that matter.
So my question is, one, what hypothesis would you offer,
assuming all this to be true about the New York subways, about
why perhaps it was called off? Because the theories are rampant
about that. And I would just like, from a scientific point of
view, to know what theories you might have. And particularly, I
am interested in whether one of the reasons might have been the
delivery system for truly doing some harm, because the one
thing we know about the MO, at least of al Qaeda, is they want
to do great harm. I would be interested in anything you have to
say about this recent so-called revelation about the New York
subway.
Mr. Khripunov. I am afraid I will have to give you a longer
rather than shorter answer on that, and one important issue is,
where is the threshold? Because there was not a single
meaningful, you know, case of using weapons of mass destruction
on a larger scale, except Tokyo, Japan. Why they haven't done
so, I think the main objective is to impact the public, to
cause panic, to get to the front pages of the world media. And
as they are successful in doing that using conventional ways of
terrorism, I think they may be happy to stay with the
conventional ways of terrorism
As soon as people start building resilience, as soon as the
media does not cover that on the first pages, the reaction will
be, how we can go on to escalate and disintegrate societal
institutions and impact the public?
Here comes unconventional ways of committing acts of
terrorism. And out of the old acts of terrorism, I would put
aside as something long-term nuclear weapons or improvised
nuclear devices. It will take some time for terrorists to
acquire weapons or develop technological skills.
What is more simple is what we call a dirty bomb; to
acquire radioactive material, strap conventional explosives and
explode it in a densely populated area. Why it is, I believe,
more attractive to the minds of terrorists, you know,
radiological records are intrinsically associated with nuclear
weapons; it is something nuclear. It is associated with
radiation. And we all understand that the population has what
we call radio-phobia. You know, it is something that was built
throughout the Cold War period with the bombing of Nagasaki,
all the movies on the beach with radiation, people, you know,
dying.
So terrorists may be gravitating to that type of act of
terrorism, which is simple technologically; you can acquire
radiological material or sources of radiation quite easily. You
can acquire explosives. What is needed is two persons ready to
sacrifice their lives because of the radiation and the exposure
to radiation before they explode that device. And the recent
report of the Department of State about world terrorism, April
2006, saying that many expatriates who live in western
countries declare themselves as ready to sacrifice their lives.
So we even have people who are prepared to commit these acts.
If you compare that with chemical terrorism, it is a little
bit, you know, it is a little bit less aggressive. You know, we
live in a world of toxic materials, and we will not be scared
as much as we realize an act of radiological terrorism has been
committed and you know, part of the big city is contaminated
with radiation. There will be panic. We panic when we face the
unknown, and radiation is odorless, senseless and very much
misunderstood by others.
Let me refer you to the movie, The War of the Worlds.
Steven Spielberg, who is the director of that movie, said in an
interview, I made this movie to show that under stressful
situations and facing the unknown, that society may tend to
disintegrate. And this is what terrorists may be after.
Let's take biological weapons--I understand you will not
agree with me because this is your field--but I think
biological weapons--we live with diseases, you know. We fight
bird flu. We try to prevent epidemics, so they are less
stressful than us facing radiation and dirty bombs.
And then, for terrorists, you know, any pathogen, you know,
any contamination by agents may get out of control and kill
people that are not intended to die. With radiological weapons,
it is more or less focused. Sorry for the long answer.
Ms. Norton. Thank you.
Dr. Franz.
Mr. Franz. With regard to your first point about the
availability of biological agents, I mentioned agents. And you
make a good point about dissemination systems; that is often
the hard part. Bugs are everywhere. Developing it into a weapon
is not technically a trivial issue, so that is a good technical
barrier to those who would harm us with them, and that is good
news.
With regard to cyanide, and all I know is what I heard
briefly in the media, cyanide is not a biological agent, and it
is not radiological. It is a chemical. We weaponized it in our
old offensive chemical program. And it doesn't suffer from the
problems of dissemination that some of the biological agents
do. A biological agent is a particulate; you have got to put it
up in the air so people breathe it. It needs to be in a small
particle, or it will fall out and not be of any danger.
Cyanide is a vapor, so really all you would need is tanks
of cyanide or chemicals that in combination would produce
cyanide in some way in a subway system.
Ms. Norton. Would you smell it?
Mr. Franz. Some people can smell cyanide, and some can't. I
happen to be able to smell cyanide. I used to work in a
chemical plant, and I can smell it.
Ms. Norton. Do you have to have a Ph.D. to smell it?
Mr. Franz. No, it is genetic. It is the way you are wired;
some people can, and some can't.
But I would think a barrier to using cyanide in a subway
system, for example, would be getting it into the area, you
might need some large tanks, not real large, but you would need
some tanks. And it would depend on the quantity that you could
get down there as to how much area you could cover with those
tubes.
Ms. Norton. So you doubt that that is what was in the New
York subway system?
Mr. Franz. Well, it is a reasonable one to pick.
Ms. Norton. Yeah, but you have to get some tanks down
there.
Mr. Franz. Well, they don't have to be too large. It would
be possible if you had roller bags, like people that you see
travelling on subways all the time. So it is not a matter of
getting it into the air within a system; it is a matter of just
releasing it from a tank.
Mr. Linder. Thank you, both.
You have been very helpful. We appreciate you sharing your
afternoon with us, and the hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 4:55 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]