[House Hearing, 109 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
PREPAREDNESS GRANTS: RISK BASED OR GUESS WORK?
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
JUNE 21, 2006
__________
Serial No. 109-86
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TONGRESS.#13
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COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Peter T. King, New York, Chairman
Don Young, Alaska Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Lamar S. Smith, Texas Loretta Sanchez, California
Curt Weldon, Pennsylvania Edward J. Markey, Massachusetts
Christopher Shays, Connecticut Norman D. Dicks, Washington
John Linder, Georgia Jane Harman, California
Mark E. Souder, Indiana Peter A. DeFazio, Oregon
Tom Davis, Virginia Nita M. Lowey, New York
Daniel E. Lungren, California Eleanor Holmes Norton, District of
Jim Gibbons, Nevada Columbia
Rob Simmons, Connecticut Zoe Lofgren, California
Mike Rogers, Alabama Sheila Jackson-Lee, Texas
Stevan Pearce, New Mexico Bill Pascrell, Jr., New Jersey
Katherine Harris, Florida Donna M. Christensen, U.S. Virgin
Bobby Jindal, Louisiana Islands
Dave G. Reichert, Washington Bob Etheridge, North Carolina
Michael McCaul, Texas James R. Langevin, Rhode Island
Charlie Dent, Pennsylvania Kendrick B. Meek, Florida
Ginny Brown-Waite, Florida
(II)
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
STATEMENTS
The Honorable Peter T. King, a Representativein Congress From the
State of New York, and Chairman, Committee on Homeland Security 1
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Mississippi, and Ranking Member, Committee on
Homeland Security.............................................. 3
The Honorable Charlie Dent, a Representative in Congress From the
State of Pennsylvania.......................................... 68
The Honorable Norman D. Dicks, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Washington........................................ 30
The Honorable Vito Fossella, a Representative in Congress From
the State of New York.......................................... 4
The Honorable Jim Gibbons, a Representative in Congress From the
State of Nevada................................................ 38
The Honorable Sheila Jackson-Lee, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Texas:
Oral Statement................................................. 45
Prepared Statement............................................. 78
The Honorable Nita M. Lowey, a Representative in Congress From
the State of New York.......................................... 35
The Honorable Daniel E. Lungren, a Representative in Congress
From the State of California................................... 64
The Honorable Michael T. McCaul, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Texas........................................ 44
The Honorable Eleanor Holmes Norton, a Representative in Congress
From the District of Columbia.................................. 40
The Honorable Bill Pascrell, Jr., a Representative in Congress
From the State of New Jersey................................... 49
The Honorable Dave G. Reichert, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Washington........................................ 47
The Honorable Christopher Shays, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Connecticut.................................. 27
The Honorable Rob Simmons, a Representative in Congress From the
State of Connecticut........................................... 32
WITNESSES
The Honorable Michael Bloomberg, Mayor, City of New York, New
York:
Oral Statement................................................. 5
Prepared Statement............................................. 8
Acccompanied by:
Police Commissioner Raymond W. Kelly........................... 20
The Honorable Anthony Williams, Mayor, City of Washington,
District of Columbia:
Oral Statement................................................. 14
Prepared Statement............................................. 17
Accompanied by:
Deputy Mayor Ed Reiskin........................................ 28
Police Chief Charles Ramsey.................................... 22
Mike Smith, Director Sacramento Regional Office of Homeland
Security:
Prepared Statement for the Record.............................. 26
The Honorable George Foresman, Under Secretary for Preparedness,
U.S. Department of Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 51
Prepared Statement............................................. 54
APPENDIX
Questions and Responses:
Under Secretary George Foresman Responses to the Honorable Bennie
G. Thompson Questions.......................................... 83
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
PREPAREDNESS GRANTS: RISK BASED OR GUESS WORK?
----------
Wednesday, June 21, 2006
U.S. House of Representatives,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Washington, D.C.
The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:00 a.m., in Room
311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Peter King [chairman of
the committee] presiding.
Present: Representatives King, Shays, Linder, Lungren,
Gibbons, Simmons, Rogers, Reichert, McCaul, Dent, Brown-Waite,
Thompson, Sanchez, Markey, Dicks, Harman, Lowey, Norton,
Zofgren, Jackson Lee, Pascrell, Christensen, Etheridge, and
Langevin.
Also Present: Representatives Fossella, Crowley, and
Weiner.
Chairman King. Morning. The Committee on Homeland Security
will come to order. The committee is meeting today to hear
testimony on the reduction of terrorism preparedness grants and
its potential effects on New York City, the National Capital
Region, and our Nation.
I will make a brief opening statement then I will ask the
Ranking Member, Mr. Thompson, to make a statement and then we
will proceed immediately to our witnesses on the first panel.
I think this morning's hearing is as important as any
hearing this committee is going to have, because to me it goes
right to the heart of what the purpose of the Department of
Homeland Security is and whether or not the Department of
Homeland Security is equipped to meet the threats which face
our Nation today.
I happen to be from New York, and I actually have a very
personal interest in what happens to the city of New York, but
this goes far beyond New York City, it goes far beyond
Washington, D.C., which is obviously where I also spend a good
deal of time, and where I am also a very close neighbor of
Mayor Williams. But it goes beyond all this personal--it
involves the country as a whole, because on September 11 and
since then, the city of New York and Washington, D.C. have
symbolized the very essence of threat and risk in our Nation.
New York City has been attacked twice, and New York City, as
Mayor Bloomberg and Commissioner Kelly will point out, a series
of at least 18 attacks or threats against the City of New York
over the last decade. This indicates to me and indicates to any
rational person that New York City is clearly the number one
city at risk in our Nation today. And yet this year the
Department of Homeland Security, in making its grants, its
homeland security funding, cut the city of New York by 40%. I
said then and I say now, this is a stab in the back to the city
of New York. It is indefensible. It was indefensible. It was
disgraceful. And to me it raises very, very real questions
about the competency of this Department in determining how it
is going to protect America.
We have heard one, two, three, four, five, six, seven
different explanations, maybe more than that I lost count at
seven--as to why the funding was reduced. The bottom line is
when you have a city which by the Department's own accounts is
the number one city at risk in the Nation today, and then you
cut that funding by 40%, that is indefensible.
The Department is entrusted with finding a way to secure
the lives of Americans who are most at risk, and when they
acknowledge that New York City is the most at risk and then
can't find a way to get funding to that city, to me that is a
failure and an abdication of responsibility, especially since
the city of New York is acknowledged to have one of the
foremost police departments in the world, one of the foremost
fire departments in the world.
As the Mayor will point out, in the city of New York, we
have police officers and Federal officers from all over the
country coming to the NYPD for training and counterterrorism.
In spite of that, the applications of the city, the fire
department, the police department, were ranked almost near the
bottom, and yet these are two departments which by all accounts
should be at the top, or very near the top in my mind. They are
clearly at the top, in deference to Chief Ramsey.
I am not going to pursue the point, but the fact is NYPD
and FDNY are certainly examples to the entire world. I know
this past January a number of us traveled to Europe, going to
London, to Rome, to Madrid. All of the homeland security
officials we met with in those countries pointed to New York as
the example of what they look for as finding ways to cope with
the terrorism. And when I think of all of the money, all of the
effort that New York City puts in, day after day after day, and
to see them cut by 40%, I have said then and I say now, this is
to me a dark day in the Department of Homeland Security. It is
one from which I am not certain the current leadership can
recover. I think it is, just again, totally indefensible.
So I look forward to the hearing today because Mayor
Bloomberg accompanied by Commissioner Kelly, and Mayor Williams
accompanied by Chief Ramsey, will lay out exactly what the
cities have gone through, what their cities are doing in an
attempt to stave off threat of international terrorism, and how
as a result of this arbitrary and wrong decision by the
Department of Homeland Security they are going to be impacted
both this year and over the next several years. So I look
forward to the testimony.
I really thank Mayor Bloomberg and Mayor Williams for being
here. Chief Ramsey, Commissioner Kelly, thank you for what you
are doing to protect the citizens that you represent. And,
again, I want you to know that you have very, very strong
support from, I believe it is fair to say, a majority of
members of this committee and even in the United States
Congress as to what happened last month when those funding cuts
were enacted.
And with that, I will now recognize the gentleman from
Mississippi, the Ranking Member of the full committee, Mr.
Thompson.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you very much, Mr. King. And I welcome
the witnesses to this very important hearing today. Mr.
Chairman, ever since its inception, the Department of Homeland
Security has been tinkering with the formula it uses to dole
out homeland security dollars, hoping to get it right.
Unfortunately, as this hearing will demonstrate, the Department
has not yet gotten it right.
Mr. Chairman, America can't wait for the Department to use
a ``try and try again'' approach to homeland security. This is
especially true in the grant-making process. Many of us knew
that the Department was on the road to failing again when it
announced the cities eligible for the Urban Areas Security
Initiative program. Large, high-risk cities such as Las Vegas
and San Diego were not among the top 35 cities eligible. With
everything we have heard from this administration about the
terrorists, how they hate the United States for our values and
they want to pick targets that are of symbolic value, you would
think that Las Vegas, the entertainment capital of our country,
would at least make the top 35.
With all the recent talk coming from many in this House
about security risks we face on illegal immigrants coming
across our southern border, you would think that San Diego, 20
miles from the world's busiest port of entry, would make the
top 35.
One excuse that Secretary Chertoff has used for explaining
the cuts is to blame Congress. Now, George Washington Carver
once said that 99 percent of the failures come from people who
have a habit of making excuses. The Department probably is to
blame for 99 percent of the Washington grant fiasco, but I
think Congress has some responsibility here too. The Urban
Areas Security Initiative program was cut by $120 million in
fiscal year 2006. The State Homeland Security Grant program was
slashed by $550 million. It seems to me that regardless of what
formula we use, if we don't properly fund these programs, our
first responders are not going to have what they need to do
their job.
Finally, I think the Department's blunders are completely
out of control and growing. Last week, Mr. Chairman, I
requested that Mr. Chertoff and Mr. Jackson be called before
this committee to explain the massive waste, fraud, and abuse
and incompetence at the Department. I want to repeat that
request today. They should not be allowed a free pass when
lower-level officials, both political and career, are put on
the hot seat. Just last week we have seen the Department claim
that a letter didn't exist, only to find the letter Friday
afternoon after Congress had adjourned.
We have seen a Department tepidly defend itself against the
findings of a GAO report which said that there were many
excesses of $100 billion in individual assistance fraud in the
wake of Hurricane Katrina and Rita. This report did not include
the hundreds of millions of dollars in no-bid contracts the
Department gave to its friends. And now the Department is
defending a process which challenges conventional wisdom.
Given the factors of the Department's poor track record,
this committee must conduct aggressive oversight and bring the
leadership responsible for the Department's problem before us.
Otherwise, it will look like the Department is just doing bad
business, as usual.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I look forward to the
speakers, but I also look forward to having our Secretary and/
or his deputy before this committee to answer some questions.
And I yield back.
Chairman King. I thank you, Mr. Thompson, and I would
assure you that we will be calling Secretary Chertoff before
this committee for a number of issues, including Shirlington
Limousine which is a separate issue, but you and I have
discussed it, and I believe it is a very, very significant
issue.
Chairman King. I would now like to ask the gentleman from
Staten Island, Brooklyn, Congressman Fossella, to introduce
Mayor Bloomberg.
Mr. Fossella. Thank you, Chairman King and Ranking Member
Thompson, all members of the Homeland Security Committee.
First, let me thank you, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Thompson. Mr.
Chairman, you have been a great spokesperson and a great leader
on all issues relating to homeland security, especially the
recent debacle as has been referenced in terms of homeland
security funding.
It is my pleasure to introduce to the committee the Mayor
of the city of New York, the Honorable Michael Bloomberg. Mayor
Bloomberg is a tireless advocate for New York City and has done
a tremendous job ensuring New Yorkers can go about their daily
lives without living under the constant fear of another
terrorist attack. Mayor Bloomberg's vigilance has been
confirmed in the recent conviction of the Herald Square bombing
plot. Furthermore, the Mayor has been a leader in the struggle
for more rational distribution of homeland security funds since
day one. He, working with the entire New York delegation and
others, helped get the Urban Security Initiative program
started to begin with.
I know the Mayor has come to Washington many times to meet
with both Congress and the executive branch to push for risk-
based homeland security funding because lives are truly at
risk; not just the millions of people who live in New York
City, but the many, many more millions who come and visit on an
annual basis. I am confident the testimony today will bring
light for the committee and for the country, while New York
deserves its full and fair share of homeland security funding.
Also, I would like to introduce Commissioner Ray Kelly, the
Police Commissioner of the City of New York, as someone who
represents, as you mentioned Staten Island and Brooklyn, home
to thousands of police officers, the greatest in the country. I
know that Mayor Kelly--Commissioner Kelly has done an
outstanding job standing side by side with Mayor Bloomberg.
Appointed by Mayor Bloomberg, Commissioner Kelly is the first
person to hold the post for the second separate tenure. Among
his many duties, Commissioner Kelly oversees the police
department's antiterrorism efforts through both the
counterterrorism unit and intelligence unit of the New York
City Police Department.
Among many operations and exercises, Operation Atlas
enables the police department to mount a coordinated defense of
the city. I applaud his efforts in leading New York City Police
Department to be recognized as the best antiterror police force
in the country, and, I would say, the world. No city faces the
risk that New York City does. The Mayor and Police Commissioner
deserve our thanks for creating innovative strategies to
prevent terrorist attacks, to keeping the boots on the ground,
and I look forward to their testimony. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman King. Thank you, Congressman Fossella.
Chairman King. I will now recognize Mayor Bloomberg. Mayor
Bloomberg, we generally have a 5-minute rule here, but I have
discussed this with the Ranking Member, and due to the
importance of this topic, you and Mayor Williams will allow--it
is your discretion as to how long you wish to testify. And then
we will proceed to ask you questions.
Anyway, the Chair is now privileged to recognize Michael
Bloomberg. The Mayor of the city of New York is recognized.
STATEMENT OF THE HON. MICHAEL BLOOMBERG, MAYOR, CITY OF NEW
YORK, NEW YORK
Mayor Bloomberg. Chairman King and Congressman Thompson,
members of the committee, thank you and good morning. I promise
I won't talk for more than an hour and a half.
One thing that Congressman Fossella failed to mention when
he described Police Commissioner Kelly's experience, he not
only has been the Commissioner of the NYPD twice, he has held
every single rank in the New York City Police Department,
starting out as a cop on the beat and working his way up. So
certainly his experience in how to provide the kind of security
the city needs is without parallel.
Let me thank you, Chairman King, for calling this hearing.
It is more evidence, I think, of your long standing principled
determination to make risk and threat the basis for homeland
security funding. Today's hearing is entitled, ``DHS
Preparedness Grants: Risk-Based or Guess-Work?'' That question
I think certainly captures the sense of bafflement produced by
DHS's recent allocation of Urban Areas Security Initiative
funds, or AISI funds, for fiscal year 2006.
New York City and Washington, D.C, represented this morning
by my colleague and copanelist and friend, Mayor Anthony
Williams, have been and continue to be the Nation's prime
targets for terrorist attack. New York is the Nation's
financial capital, its media center, and the headquarters of
the United Nations, for which the NYPD provides security and
for which services our city is currently owed some $75 million
by the U.S. State Department. This is debt that has accumulated
over the years. Perhaps this is what the critics of the United
Nations are referring to when they rile against deadbeats at
the United Nations.
Our prominence explains why the streets of lower Manhattan
were the first battleground, and the war on terror and New York
City and the Nation's Capital remain the only American cities
to have sustained terrorist attacks originating from overseas.
The written testimony that I am submitting to the committee
discusses 18 separate planned, attempted, or successful attacks
in New York City, 18 in our city's history with terrorism. They
go back to 1990, and include al Qaeda's abortive plot,
according to recent reports, to release deadly cyanide gas in
our subway system in early 2003.
Yet, despite this history, DHS's grant allocation reduces
Federal support for vital antiterrorist activities in New York
City by 40 percent. This is $83 million less than we received
from DHS last year. The logic of that is, to borrow the words
of Winston Churchill, truly a riddle wrapped in a mystery
inside an enigma. That is not because there has been any
shortage of explanations from DHS. On the contrary, we have
heard an abundance of them. But none has satisfactorily
answered the question: How could a rational process produce
such a dysfunctional conclusion?
The Department of Homeland Security was created in November
2002. From the outset, New York City has energetically taken
the lead before Congress, at the White House, and in testimony
to the 9/11 Commission. In arguing DHS grants, the localities
should be allocated solely on the basis of threat and risk.
Former DHS Secretary Tom Ridge repeatedly told us that those
were the criteria he would apply to local funding if he were
freed from congressional restrictions, that DHS funds be
allocated using a per capita formula.
In response to our arguments, the UASI program was
established in fiscal year 2003. It has always been intended
for high-threat cities. New York City and Washington, D.C. were
originally on a list of just seven such high-risk cities. But
in typical fashion, that number subsequently ballooned to 50,
and, in this fiscal year, stands at 46. Is this the spirit of
high-threat allocation? No. Instead, it makes the program the
exact kind of political pork barrel it was specifically
designed to avoid, contributing to the preposterous
underfunding of homeland security in New York City for the
current fiscal year.
It is a typical example of say one thing for the press
avail and do something quite different. And it makes the fiscal
year 2005 Department Secretary's discretion to avoid 60 percent
of homeland security block grant money based on risk a sad
joke. This was to be a step forward, although we continue to
believe that all homeland security grants should be based
solely on risk, but the redefining of risk to include something
for everyone leads us right back where we started.
Now, I applaud this committee's decision to review the
entire decision-making process and methodology used by DHS in
awarding its grants, because it is a process that appears to be
fundamentally broken. I suggest you take a wide-ranging
approach to reassess the example for--to reassess, for example,
the role of the peer review panels that evaluated funding
applications. I urge you to ask if by reviewing requests to
protect more than a quarter million critical infrastructure
facilities across the Nation, the DHS committed the classic
error of losing sight of the forest for all those trees. Just
because a facility is critical doesn't make it a likely target,
and that is the test that ought to be met in allocating high-
risk funds.
I also hope you will also revisit Congress's prohibition on
using DHS funds for so-called target-hardening construction
projects that would make infrastructure installations less
vulnerable to attack. Isn't prevention what we should be
striving for in response to a fallback position?
I would especially ask you to focus on DHS's clearly and
frequently stated predisposition against providing grants to
support recurring costs, what they choose to call supplanting
local effort. For New York City, this is really the heart of
the matter. This bias on the part of DHS penalizes us for our
aggressiveness and diligence in protecting our city. To better
protect New York City, we will invest close to a billion
dollars over the next 4 years in counterterrorism initiatives.
From hardening our bridges and upgrading our communications
infrastructure to implementing a comprehensive security plan
for the lower Manhattan financial district, these projects are
crucial to protecting all New Yorkers.
In addition, to guard our city against terrorist attacks,
we already spend more than $250 million per year of our
taxpayers' money in annual operating expenses. In the face of
such substantial needs, DHS's refusal to pay recurring costs
puts unnecessary burdens on our city.
After 9/11, for example, New York City very sensibly
increased aerial surveillance of our watershed reservoirs, but
DHS has denied requests for funds to support this program on
the grounds that since New York City has been covering the
costs ourselves, we can just continue to do so. Under that
reasoning, if we had been negligent and had not stepped up
these surveillance flights, than we would now be eligible for
Federal funds to start them, a prime example of dysfunctional
bureaucratic logic.
As I have said repeatedly, we will do everything possible
to protect our city and then find a way to pay for it. But
having the Federal Government penalize us for doing what is
right is hardly a sensible national policy. DHS's bias against
supporting recurring local costs punishes New York City for the
effectiveness of all of our locally funded counterterrorism and
intelligence activities, efforts which have been deemed models
for the Nation by former Secretary Ridge, FBI Director Robert
Mueller, and other leaders in the counterterrorism community,
both inside and outside of government. I would argue that they
are better qualified to judge the effectiveness of our efforts
than are members of a peer review panel who may not live in
major urban areas.
In particular, consider two of the NYPD's key initiatives.
First, its Counterterrorism Bureau, which is so highly regarded
that it has provided training to more than 800 Federal
employees including employees of the Department of Homeland
Security. And second, there is Operation Atlas, which deploys
specifically trained and specially equipped patrol units to
protect the city's landmarks and critical transportation and
financial infrastructure.
The effectiveness of such security was demonstrated in
2003. After repeated reconnaissance, an al Qaeda operative
called off the attempted sabotage of the Brooklyn Bridge,
telling his controllers that ``the weather is too hot,'' a
coded reference to the intense security on the bridge and in
the waters of the East River. That plot was not foiled by
satellite-guided technology or other high-tech equipment. What
protected our city was good old-fashioned boots on the ground.
And that is precisely why we continue to assign approximately
1,000 of NYPD's best officers to the Department's
counterterrorism and insurance--intelligence divisions.
This year we asked DHS to support both the Counterterrorism
Bureau and Operation Atlas, but unfortunately we have been told
that the Department does not intend to help cover such day-to-
day personal expenses. Members of the committee, I hardly know
where to begin in stating my disagreement. But essentially the
question is whether you think, as we do, that investment in
people is as valuable as purchases of hardware and protecting
our country. There is no doubt in my mind what the answer is.
Nor is there doubt in the minds of Commissioner Kelly or other
experts in the realm of counterterrorism and
counterintelligence or terrorism, or in the minds of the
American people. The only doubt seems to arise from the
bureaucratic ``group think'' at DHS which has produced such a
nonsensical conclusion. Time and again, human intelligence has
disrupted terrorism planning from a plot to bomb a major subway
station in our city during the 2004 National Republican
Convention to the conspiracy revealed earlier this month to
attack targets in Ontario, Canada.
To make the most of human intelligence, we must train
police officers throughout their careers how to contend with
emerging threats and how to use the equipment that Federal
funds may purchase, and we need ongoing Federal partnership in
that effort.
It is clear to me that we are still too slow in learning
the most basic lesson of 9/11, that we now live in a
fundamentally altered world, one requiring that we think anew
and act anew. In the area of homeland security, that means
establishing a dynamic partnership for the long haul between
Federal and local authorities. We must, for example, recognize
that the ongoing and painstaking work of training intelligence
analysts in the NYPD is a shared responsibility, one vital to
all Americans.
Over the years, we have fought long and hard for the
rational allocation of homeland security funds on the basis of
risk. Now, sadly, we are losing the ground that we had gained.
I hope this hearing begins the process of setting things right
again. Thank you very much.
Chairman King. Thank you, Mayor Bloomberg.
[The statement of Mayor Bloomberg follows:]
Prepared Statement of the Honorable Mayor Michael R. Bloomberg
Chairman King; Congressman Thompson; members of the committee: Good
morning. Thank you for inviting me to testify before you, and let me
introduce to the members of the committee New York City's Police
Commissioner, Raymond Kelly.
I want to thank you, Chairman King, for calling this hearing. It's
more evidence of your longstanding, principled determination to make
risk and threat the basis for Homeland Security funding.
Today's hearing is entitled "DHS Preparedness Grants: Risk-Based or
Guesswork?" That question certainly captures the sense of bafflement
produced by DHS's recent allocation of Urban Area Security Initiative,
or "UASI," funds for Fiscal Year 2006.
New York City and Washington DC-represented this morning by my
colleague and co-panelist, Mayor Anthony Williams-have been, and
continue to be, the nation's prime targets for terrorist attack.
New York is the nation's financial capital. its media center. and
the headquarters city of the United Nations, for which the NYPD
provides security, and for which services our city is currently owed
some $75 million by the U.S. State Department. This is debt that has
accumulated for years; talk about "deadbeats" at the UN!
Our prominence explains why the streets of Lower Manhattan were the
first battleground in the war on terror. And New York City and the
nation's capital remain the only American cities to have sustained
terrorist attack originating from overseas.
The written testimony that I am submitting to the committee
discusses 18 separate planned, attempted, or successful attacks in New
York City-18 chapters in our city's history with terrorism. They go
back to 1990, and include al-Qaeda's aborted plot-according to recent
reports-to release deadly cyanide gas in our subway system in early
2003.
Yet despite this history, DHS's grant allocation reduces Federal
support for vital anti-terrorist activities in New York City by 40%.
This is $83 million less than we received from DHS last year.
The logic of that is, to borrow the words of Winston Churchill,
truly "a riddle, wrapped in a mystery, inside an enigma."
That's not because there has been any shortage of explanations from
DHS; on the contrary, we've heard an abundance of them. But none has
satisfactorily answered the question: "How could a rational process
produce such a dysfunctional conclusion?"
The Department of Homeland Security was created in November, 2002.
From the outset, New York City has energetically taken the lead-before
Congress, at the White House, and in testimony to the 9/11 Commission-
in arguing that DHS grants to localities should be allocated solely on
the basis of risk and threat.
Former DHS Secretary Tom Ridge repeatedly told us that those were
the criteria he would apply to local funding if he were freed from
Congressional restrictions that DHS funds be allocated using a per
capita formula.
In response to our arguments, the UASI program was established in
Fiscal Year 2003. It has always been intended for "high-threat" cities.
New York City and Washington DC were originally on a list of just seven
such high-risk cities.
But, in typical fashion, that number subsequently ballooned to 50,
and, in this fiscal year stands at 46. Is this the spirit of "high-
threat" allocation? No! Instead, it makes the program the kind of
political pork barrel it was specifically designed to avoid,
contributing to the preposterous under-funding of Homeland Security in
New York City for the current fiscal year.
Also because of our efforts, in Fiscal Year 2005, the Department's
Secretary was given discretion to award 60% of Homeland Security block-
grant money based on risk. This was a step forward, although we
continue to believe that all Homeland Security grants should be based
solely on risk.
I applaud this committee's decision to review the entire decision-
making procedure and methodology used by DHS in awarding its grants,
because it is a process that appears to be fundamentally broken.
I suggest you take a wide-ranging approach-to reassess, for
example, the role of the peer review panels that evaluated funding
applications.
I hope you will also revisit Congress's prohibition on using DHS
funds for so-called "target hardening" construction projects that would
make infrastructure installations less vulnerable to attack.
I urge you to ask if, by reviewing requests to protect more than a
quarter-million "critical" infrastructure facilities across the nation,
DHS committed the classic error of losing sight of the forest for all
those trees. Just because a facility is "critical" doesn't make it a
likely target-and that's the test that ought to be met in allocating
"high-threat" funds.
I would especially ask you to focus on DHS's clearly and frequently
stated predisposition against providing grants to support recurring
costs-what they choose to call "supplanting" local effort.
For New York City, this is the heart of the matter. This bias on
the part of DHS penalizes us for our aggressiveness and diligence in
protecting our city.
To guard our city against terrorist attack, we spend more than $250
million per year of our taxpayers' money in annual operating expenses.
In addition, to better protect New York City, we need to invest close
to $1 billion over the next four years in counter-terrorism
initiatives. From hardening our bridges and upgrading our
communications infrastructure to implementing a comprehensive security
plan for the Lower Manhattan financial district, these projects are
crucial to protecting all New Yorkers.
In the face of such substantial needs, DHS's refusal to pay
recurring costs puts unnecessary burdens on our city. After 9/11, for
example, New York City very sensibly increased aerial surveillance of
our watershed reservoirs. But DHS has denied requests for funds to
support this program on the grounds that, since New York City has been
covering the costs ourselves, we can just continue to do so.
Under that reasoning, if we'd been negligent, and not stepped up
these surveillance flights, then we'd now be eligible for Federal funds
to start them-a prime example of dysfunctional bureaucratic logic.
DHS's bias against supporting recurring local costs punishes New
York City for the effectiveness of all our locally funded counter-
terrorism and intelligence activities-
Efforts which have been deemed models for the nation by former
Secretary Ridge, FBI Director Robert Mueller, and other leaders in the
counter-terrorism community, both inside and outside of government. I
would argue that they're better qualified to judge the effectiveness of
our efforts than are members of a peer review panel who may not live in
major urban areas.
In particular, consider two of the NYPD's key initiatives: First,
its Counter-Terrorism Bureau, which is so highly regarded that it has
provided training to more than 800 Federal employees-including
employees in the Department of Homeland Security.
And second, there is Operation Atlas, which deploys specially
trained and equipped patrol units to protect the city's landmarks and
critical transportation and financial infrastructure.
The effectiveness of such security was demonstrated in 2003. After
repeated reconnaissance, an al-Qaeda operative called off the attempted
sabotage of the Brooklyn Bridge, telling his controllers that "the
weather is too hot"-a coded reference to the intense security on the
bridge and in the waters of the East River.
That plot was not foiled by satellite-guided technology or other
high-tech equipment; what protected our city was good old-fashioned
"boots on the ground." And that is precisely why we continue to assign
approximately 1,000 of the NYPD's best officers to the department's
counter-terrorism and intelligence divisions.
This year, we asked DHS to support both the Counter-Terrorism
Bureau and Operation Atlas. But unfortunately, we have been told that
the Department does not intend to help cover such day-to-day personnel
expenses.
Members of the committee, I hardly know where to begin in stating
my disagreement. But essentially, the question is whether you think, as
we do, that investments in people are as valuable as purchases of
hardware in protecting our country.
There is no doubt in my mind what the answer is. Nor is there doubt
in the minds of Commissioner Kelly, or other experts in the realm of
counter-intelligence and terrorism, or in the minds of the American
people. The only doubt seems to arise from the bureaucratic "group
think" at DHS, which has produced such a nonsensical conclusion.
Time and again, human intelligence has disrupted terrorist
planning, from the plot to bomb a major subway station in our city
during the 2004 Republican National Convention, to the conspiracy
revealed earlier this month to attack targets in Ontario, Canada.
To make the most of human intelligence, we must train police
officers throughout their careers in how to contend with emerging
threats, and how to use the equipment that Federal funds may purchase.
And we need ongoing Federal partnership in that effort.
It's clear to me that we are still too slow in learning the most
basic lesson of 9/11: That we now live in a fundamentally altered
world, one requiring that we think anew and act anew.
In the area of Homeland Security, that means establishing a dynamic
partnership, for the long haul, between Federal and local authorities.
We must, for example, recognize that the ongoing and painstaking work
of training intelligence analysts in the NYPD is a shared
responsibility-one vital to all Americans.
Over the years, we have fought long and hard for the rational
allocation of Homeland Security funds on the basis of risk. Now, sadly,
we are losing ground we have gained. I hope that this hearing begins
the process of setting things right.
Attachment 1
History of New York City and Terrorist Activities
New York City's recent history with terror threats and attacks, as
summarized below, belies any thought that the time has come to reduce
our vigilance:
1. November 5, 1990: El Sayyid Nosair shot JDL leader Meir Kahane
in front of the Marriot East Side Hotel in Manhattan. Nosair would
later become a co-conspirator with blind sheikh Omar Abdul Rahman in a
plot to destroy New York City tunnels and bridges.
2. February 26, 1993: New York City sustained the first terrorist
attack on the World Trade Center, in which six innocent people were
killed.
3. In the same year, 1993, an al Qaeda plot to destroy the Holland
and Lincoln tunnels, the George Washington Bridge, and United Nations
Headquarters was uncovered, and the plotters successfully prosecuted.
4. March 1, 1994: Rashid Baz, a Palestinian angered by an Orthodox
Jew's attack on a Muslim holy site, drove his livery cab to the
Brooklyn Bridge where he opened fire on a van occupied by Hassidic
students, killing one of them - 16-year-old Ari Halberstam.
5. February 23, 1997: Abu Kamel, a Palestinian residing in Florida,
selected the Empire State Building to carry out his intent of
"annihilating" perceived enemies. He went to the observation deck on
the 86th floor and shot seven people, including a Danish tourist who
was killed. Kamel then turned the gun on himself and committed suicide.
6. July 31, 1997: the New York City Police Department stopped a
plot at the last minute to bomb the subway complex at Atlantic Avenue
in Brooklyn. The bombers were assembling the devices when police
officers entered their apartment and shot and wounded them before they
could detonate the bombs.
7. September 11, 2001: The World Trade Center was destroyed by al
Qaeda with the loss of 2,700 lives.
8. October 2001: In the space of a week, employees and visitors of
the New York Post, NBC, CBS, and ABC News in New York City fall victim
to anthrax attacks. Later the same month a New York City woman died of
inhalation anthrax because of cross contamination of mail she handled
at work with that of the targeted media.
9. June 2002: Security personnel from Iran's Mission to the United
Nations were observed by NYPD videotaping landmarks and infrastructure.
They were expelled from the United States by the State Department
because of their suspicious activities.
10. Late 2002 and early 2003: Al Qaeda operative Iyman Faris, on
orders from his handlers overseas, twice examined the Brooklyn Bridge
to evaluate the feasibility of destroying it.
11. Early 2003: According to published reports, United State
authorities were concerned that Al Qaeda operatives had made plans to
carry out a chemical attack on the New York City subway system, but
American intelligence authorities concluded that the plot ultimately
had been abandoned. The alleged attack called for using an improvised
device to release cyanide into subway cars or other public spaces.
12. November 2003: Two more security personnel assigned to Iran's
Mission to the United Nations were caught by the NYPD video taping
tracks and tunnel of the Number 7 subway line as it entered the tunnel
under the East River. They returned to Iran soon after the incident.
13. April 10, 2004: Al Qaeda operative Mohammad Babar was arrested
by NYPD detectives and FBI agents in Queens, New York for his role in a
plot to bomb pubs, restaurants and train stations in London.
14. June 2004: Once again, two more security personnel from Iran's
Mission to the United Nations were caught - this time by the FBI -
videotaping sensitive locations in New York. Suspected of conducting
reconnaissance of New York City landmarks and infrastructure, they were
again expelled by the State Department.
15. July 2004: A laptop computer of an al Qaeda operative overseas
is recovered. On it are detailed reconnaissance plans that show al
Qaeda operatives had been in New York City to plan an attack on the New
York Stock Exchange, Citigroup headquarters in mid-town Manhattan and
the Prudential building across the river in Newark.
16. August 2004: A week before the convening of the Republican
National Convention two Islamic radicals from Brooklyn were arrested in
a plot to bomb the Herald Square subway station. One pleaded guilty and
cooperated with the investigation. The other was convicted in Federal
court earlier this month. He was found guilty on all four counts.
17. November 2005: Uzair Paracha, a Pakistani-born resident of New
York City, was convicted of providing material support to al Qaeda.
While residing in New York, Uzair posed as an al Qaeda operative who
wanted to disguise the fact that he had entered Pakistan illegally.
Paracha's father, who had met Osama Bin Laden, was part owner in a
Manhattan garment district business. It was suspected that Paracha's
ultimate goal was to use that business's shipping containers to smuggle
weapons and explosives into New York City
18. And finally only a few weks ago, on June 6: Syed Hashmi, a
Queens resident active in the New York City chapter of a radical
Islamic group known as al-Mujairoun, was arrested in London where he
was engaged in providing material support for al Qaeda fighters in
Afghanistan.
Attachment 2
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Urban Area 2006 2005 Percentage Change
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
---------------------Phoenix-----------------$3,920,000---------------$9,996,463----------------------60.79%----
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Anaheim/Santa Ana* 11,980,000 19,825,462 -39.40
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Bay Area, CA* 28,320,000 33,226,729 -14.50
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Los Angeles/Long 80,610,000 69,235,692 13.80
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Sacramento 7,390,000 6,085,663 17.30
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
San Diego 7,990,000 14,784,191 -46
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Denver 4,380,000 8,718,395 -49.75
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
National Capital Region--DC 46,470,000 77,500,000 -40.20
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ft. Lauderdale 9,980,000 N/A ..........................
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Jacksonville 9,270,000 6,882,493 26
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Miami 15,980,000 15,828,322 0.95
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Orlando 9,440,000 N/A ..........................
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Tampa 8,800,000 7,772,791 11.50
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Atlanta 18,660,000 13,117,499 29.60
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Honolulu 4,760,000 6,454,763 -26.47
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Chicago 52,260,000 45,000,000 13.80
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Indianapolis 4,370,000 5,664,822 -13.10
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Louisville 8,520,000 5,000,000 41.20
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Baton Rouge 3,740,000 5,226,495 -28.57
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
New Orleans 4,690,000 9,305,180 -49.50
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Boston 18,210,000 26,000,000 -28.57
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Baltimore 9,670,000 11,305,357 -14.53
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Detroit 18,630,000 17,068,580 8.26
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Twin Cities 4,310,000 5,763,411 -25.37
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Kansas City 9,240,000 8,213,126 11.50
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
St. Louis 9,200,000 7,040,739 23.66
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Charlotte 8,970,000 5,479,243 39.02
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Omaha 8,330,000 5,148,300 38.27
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Jersey City/Newark* 34,330,000 19,172,120 44.13
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Las Vegas 7,750,000 8,456,728 -8.26
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Buffalo 3,710,000 7,207,995 -48.45
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
New York City 124,450,000 207,563,211 -40.12
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Cincinnati 4,660,000 5,866,214 -20.63
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Cleveland 4,730,000 7,385,100 -35.90
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Columbus 4,320,000 7,573,005 -42.86
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Toledo 3,850,000 5,307,598 -27.54
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Oklahoma City 4,102,000 5,570,181 -26.47
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Portland 9,360,000 10,391,037 -9.90
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Philadelphia 19,520,000 22,818,091 -14.53
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Pittsburgh 4,870,000 9,635,991 -49.50
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Memphis 4,200,000 N/A ..........................
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Dallas/Ft. Worth* 13,830,000 19,283,018 *-28.06
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Houston 16,670,000 18,570,464 -9.90
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
San Antonio 4,460,000 5,973,524 -25.37
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Seattle 9,150,000 11,840,034 -22.49
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Milwaukee 8,570,000 6,325,872 25.93
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
$710,622,000 $824,583,899
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
*Urban areas were combined in
FY06, but were funded
individually in FY05.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Attachment 3
New York City UASI Application Summary
In December of 2005, OMB sent a memorandum to the affected City
agencies explaining a new competitive process that was required by DHS
for Federal Fiscal Year 2006 Homeland Security grant funding. Each
agency conducted a comprehensive survey of the counter terrorism needs
for their department, and prepared a submission.
After receiving input from the agencies, NYC OMB prepared a total
of 15 proposed "investments," the term used by DHS to describe the
initiatives for which funding is sought. The City's application sought
a total of $458.8 million. The categories of investments were:
$81.5 million for the Lower Manhattan Security Initiative;
$100 million for the Counter Terrorism Bureau and Operation Atlas;
and
$38.2 million for Counter Terrorism equipment and training.
$27.4 million for FDNY Tiered Response Matrix for response to CBRNE
and other disasters
$13 million to Continue FDNY implementation of NIMS and the
National Response Plan
$5.5 million for FDNY Critical Resource Logistics and Grant Program
Management
$7.7 million for FDNY Critical Infrastructure Protection and
Recovery
$6 million for FDNY Strategic Management and Planning
$12 million for FDNY: Protection of the Waterfront (Critical
Infrastructure Protection)
$82 million for Interoperable Communications
$40 million for DOT East River Bridge Hazard Mitigation Program
$21.3 million for DoHMH: Enhance Public Health Response Capacity
$10.8 million for NYC HHC: Public Hospital Preparedness and NIMS
Training
$8.5 million for NYC DEP: Critical Infrastructure Protection and
HazMat
$3.8 million for NYC OEM Citizen Preparedness and Public Outreach
Upon receipt of the City's grant application, the State Office of
Homeland Security forwarded the application to DHS properly and on
time.
Chairman King. I now will recognize the gentlelady from the
District of Columbia, Eleanor Holmes Norton, to introduce my
friend and neighbor, Mayor Williams.
Ms. Norton. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Mayor Tony
Williams was the appointed Chief Financial Officer before he
was elected Mayor of the District of Columbia almost 8 years
ago. That is not the usual job track to become mayor of a city
like this. Mayor Williams intends to leave office this year,
and he is going to leave office on the same high note he
entered office, a high note of success, deciding not to run for
a third term. He lives with a remarkably memorable record.
There will be lots to remember him by in this city, and
Members, I am not just talking about the Nationals or the new
baseball stadium.
Mayor Williams is going to be remembered as the mayor who
was the chief actor in the city's rise from the virtual dust to
become one of the hottest cities to live in and to do business
in. And he will certainly be remembered as the 9/11 mayor for
his strong leadership when the National Capital Region was
attacked and for his work in helping to secure this city and
this region.
So I thank you, Mr. Chairman, for inviting Mayor Williams
to offer what is surely a unique perspective on the issues
before us today.
Chairman King. Mayor Williams, you are recognized.
STATEMENT OF THE HON. ANTHONY WILLIAMS, MAYOR, CITY OF
WASHINGTON, DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
Mayor Williams. Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity
to testify. Thank you for your work in this city. I have gotten
to know you, as you say, as a friend and neighbor, admire your
work, and certainly thank you for this opportunity.
Ranking Member Thompson, thank you as well for your
leadership on the committee, and certainly I want to thank my
own Congresswoman, Eleanor Holmes Norton, for her work in this
Congress where I think she does a fantastic job for our city,
even though she is denied a voting role in the Congress.
I am joined today by Ed Reiskin, my Deputy Mayor For Public
Safety and Justice as well as Chief Charles Ramsey of the
Metropolitan Police Department. The three of us will be
available to answer your questions. I also want to recognize my
colleague and friend, Mayor Bloomberg, as well as Commissioner
Kelly, and, as I always do in whatever setting, whether I am in
front of him or not, commend Mayor Bloomberg for the fantastic
job I think he has done in New York City. He really is an
example for all of us as mayors, what we can do with our
cities. So thank you, Mayor, for the leadership you are
providing in this area, in the area of public safety, a couple
weeks ago with gun violence, and in so many different areas.
Indeed, Mr. Chairman, as you have remarked and
Congresswoman Norton has remarked, September 11, 2001 really
did signify a new day, and with that new day came a requirement
for a significantly heightened level of capability to respond
to disasters and major events. This requirement was especially
true here in the region where one of the hijacked planes struck
its intended target in the Pentagon and here in the District
where the fourth plane was heading. Soon thereafter, the
targeting of the Nation's capital via the anthrax attack
further demonstrated the risk faced by the Nation's capital;
indeed, by the U.S. Capitol complex.
We responded quickly and aggressively in the District,
aided by $169 million in Federal funds. We enhanced existing
systems and developed new capabilities to respond and to
prevent terrorist attacks. We upgraded our operation centers
and response plans. We purchased equipment for and provided
training to our first responders. We expanded our radio network
coverage so it would work throughout the District, including
inside of buildings and even underground in the Metro system.
In the region, I joined with the Governors of Maryland and
Virginia in developing and signing a joint statement to pursue
``Eight Commitments to Action,'' we called it, to improve the
coordination in preventing, preparing for, and responding to a
terrorist attack. The significant local and Federal funds that
have enabled us to build and sustain capability might beg the
question of whether more resources are needed. I think the
answer to that question is clearly and emphatically a yes.
Preparedness, as we have heard from Mayor Bloomberg and as I
think this committee knows, is an ongoing dynamic and complex
process. We have some of the most experienced professionals in
the District and the region working every day to improve our
safety and security, and their efforts should give comfort to
those who live, who work, and who visit here, but we remain,
and I emphasize this--we remain a high-risk area, and we have
significant unmet needs.
Much of the post-9/11 activity focused on response, but the
recent arrests in Canada--and that is just one example--
demonstrate the importance of prevention. And I think as Mayor
Bloomberg has pointed out the importance of prevention on a
human scale, involving real people and intelligence, I think
demonstrates that. And I think the current state of the city of
New Orleans demonstrates the importance of recovery and the
need to address systems and operations people and process
there.
In developing, in fact in defending our application for the
fiscal year 2006 Homeland Security Grant program, the District
identified over $37 million in needs including incident
response, critical infrastructure protection, and interoperable
communications and mass care.
For the region, we identified more than $250 million in
needs, which brings us to the question of risk and
effectiveness in this process. The process we undertook to
develop our application was defined by a new approach to
homeland security funding developed by the Department of
Homeland Security. That process was firmly grounded in the
national preparedness goal, and it used what was called a risk-
based approach to allocate funds, which all of us in the
abstract strongly support.
Who wouldn't support a risk-based approach as opposed to a
pork-barrel approach--door number A, risk approach; door number
B, pork barrel objective risk approach, who wouldn't? But while
we understood that fewer funds were available, we assumed that
with a publicly stated commitment to a more risk-based
approach, the District and the National Capital Region would
receive a higher proportion, if not the amount of the funds
than we had in previous fiscal years due to the clearly high
level of risk that we face, which brings us to funding
allocation results.
We were therefore surprised, to say the least, to learn 2
weeks ago that the awards to the District and the region were
40 percent less than the previous year. In the District, we
received 53.5 percent less in the main State program, the State
Homeland Security Grant program, compared to the program's
national decline of 50.3 percent. For the District of Columbia,
seat of the Federal Government, the Supreme Court, the FBI
Headquarters, Homeland Security Operations Center, the
Washington Monument--and I could go on and on and on--and
countless other key national installations, national icons,
critical Federal functions, the Department determined that we
faced less risk than 75 percent of the Nation's States and
territories. Further, they found that our proposal was in the
bottom 50 percent in terms of effectiveness.
To me, the effectiveness assessments are puzzling for two
main reasons. First, for both the District and the region, the
information provided by the Department of Homeland Security
showed almost every element of the proposals to be at or above
average. And a senior Homeland Security official told a
congressional committee last week emphatically and repeatedly
that our proposal was sound.
Second and more noteworthy, the experts who provided the
analysis which led to the development of the application and
who provided the content for it are among the most experienced
managers, planners, and responders in the country. These
experts--and I want to emphasize this--these experts have
responded successfully to many incidents despite the complex
nature of our governance and operation structure here in the
National Capital Region due to their high-level of expertise
and professionalism and to the extensive coordination and
collaboration that occurs here every day.
My conclusion, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee,
is that we fully support the intent of the Department to a more
objective, transparent and risk-based approach to the
allocation of scarce resources. However, we question two
fundamental aspects of the process. First, is a risk analysis
used by the Department of Homeland Security adequately
assessing the relative risks faced by cities and States of our
country?. When analysis finds the District of Columbia to be of
low risk, which I find astounding, which results in less
funding than provided to any other State in the Union,
including less populous ones, to me the viability of analysis
is questionable.
Second, if the area is high risk but the approach in this
proposal was found to be less effective, would the Federal
Government not better advance the security of the homeland by
working with the area to improve its approach than by reducing
its funding? So I will close with these two points.
First, the National Capital Region will not be less safe
and secure and will not face more risk as a result of funding
levels considerably lower than last year. We had capabilities
in place prior to 9/11 and we have built significant additional
capabilities since. Generally speaking, those capabilities are
in place and will not--and will not diminish. But second, with
the announced funding award, we will not be able to continue to
improve our capability and therefore our preparedness, our
prevention, as much or as quickly or as necessarily as we had
expected.
Regardless of how much funding we receive, we are going to
do our best to provide the most professional and expert
response possible, and we will continue to endeavor daily to
safeguard and secure the National Capital and the region. But I
must say the amount of funding announced compared to what we
had previously received certainly challenges us at a very, very
high level, an unnecessary level, to do just that.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee. I
look forward, with the Chief and with Mr. Reiskin, to answer
any questions you may have.
Chairman King. Thank you, Mayor Williams.
[The statement of Mayor Williams follows:]
Prepared Statement of the Honorable Mayor Anthony Williams
Good morning Chairperson King, Ranking Member Thompson, members of
the Committee, staff, and members of the public. I am Anthony A.
Williams, Mayor of the District of Columbia. Thank you for the
opportunity to testify today on the subject of federal homeland
security grants, a topic that is of vital importance to the District of
Columbia.
In order to discuss the allocation of federal homeland security
grants, it is important to understand the context in which they are
used. Prior to September 11,2001, we had responded to disasters and
supported major events within the District of Columbia and throughout
our metropolitan region, known as the National Capital Region. But like
it did for everyone else in America and in much of the rest of the
world, 911 signified a new day, and with that new day came a
requirement for a new and significantly heightened level of capability.
This requirement was especially true here in the region, where one of
the hijacked planes struck its intended target; and here in the
District, where the fourth plane was likely heading. Soon thereafter,
the targeting of the nation's capital via anthrax attacks further
demonstrated the risk faced by the District of Columbia.
We responded quickly and aggressively. In the District, aided by
$168.8 million in Congressionally appropriated funds, we enhanced
existing and developed new capabilities to respond to terrorist
attacks. We upgraded our operations centers and response plans; we
established new emergency functions for law enforcement, fire and
rescue, and health; we purchased equipment for and provided training to
our first responders; we expanded our radio network coverage so that it
would work inside of buildings and underground in the Metro system
stations and tunnels.
In the region, I joined with the governors of Maryland and Virginia
in developing and signing a joint statement to pursue Eight Commitments
to Action to improve coordination in preventing, preparing for and
responding to a terrorist incident. By endorsing the Eight Commitments,
we established a Senior Policy Group to provide policy and executive
level focus to the region's homeland security concerns and to ensure
full integration of regional activities with statewide efforts in the
District, Virginia, and Maryland. This group was given the collective
mandate to determine priority actions for increasing regional
preparedness and response capabilities and reducing vulnerability to
terrorist attacks.
The District as a city and state, and as part of the National
Capital Region, has since been steadily building capability to help us
prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from a terrorist
attack or natural disaster. We have had opportunity to put that
capability to the test many times since, via planned events such as the
Presidential Inauguration, State of the Union addresses, World Bank/IMF
meetings, as well as via unplanned events, such as Hurricane Isabel and
the sniper attacks.
Department of Homeland Security Grant Funds
The Department of Homeland Security, since its inception in 2003,
has aided us in improving our preparedness in the District and in the
region, including through the allocation of grant funds. The following
table summarizes the grants awarded.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
District of Columbia National Capital Region
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Percent of
Award Percent of total Award total
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FY 2003 $17.9M O.9% $60.5M 10.3%
FY 2004 18.8M 0.9% 31.9M 4.7%
FY 2005 12.5M 0.9% 77.5M 9.1%
FY 2006 7.4M 0.8% 46.5M 6.3%
Total 56.7M 0.9% 216.4M 7.6%
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
These funds, which represent significant amounts to be sure, have
helped and will continue to help the District and the region enhance
preparedness. In the District, the funds have supported training and
exercising for numerous disaster scenarios, specialized response
vehicles and equipment, and the development of a dedicated, secure,
wireless data network. In the region, the funds have supported citizen
preparedness education, the development of a syndromic surveillance
system to monitor disease in illness, hospital surge beds and
equipment, protective gear for first responders, virtual linkage of
operations centers, public alert systems, and the development of a
regional dedicated, secure, robust interoperable data communications
system.
The foregoing examples of how we have invested federal funds to
advance preparedness demonstrate the tangible gains the funds have
provided. But it is important to note that the lion's share of homeland
security funding is provided by us at the state and local level. Local
funds primarily support the first responders in the region and their
basic equipment. Local funds primarily support the management
infrastructure that plans and implements homeland security policy and
operations. Local funds primarily support the basic infrastructure upon
which all preparedness functions reside. While federal funds provide
the critical resources to enhance capabilities, local funds provide
their foundation.
The significant local and federal funds that have enabled us to
build and sustain capability might beg the question of whether more
resources are needed. The answer to that question is clearly yes.
Preparedness is a dynamic and complex process. We have some of the most
experienced professionals in the District and the region working every
day to improve our safety and security and their efforts should give
comfort to those who live, work, or visit here. But we remain a high-
risk area and we have significant unmet needs across all four mission
areas of preparedness: prevention, protection, response, and recovery.
Much of the post-911 1 activity focused on response, but the recent
alleged terrorist arrests in Canada demonstrate the importance of
prevention and the current state of New Orleans demonstrates the
importance of recovery. We remain a high risk city and region and we
consequently have significant unmet need.
Homeland Security Need
We have worked to assess our level of preparedness in a number of
ways so that we can continue to improve and enhance the safety and
security of the nation's capital. Last year we undertook strategic
planning process for both the District and the region to bring together
stakeholders from all levels of government and from the private and
nonprofit sectors to chart the course for future preparedness. As part
of the grant application process, we evaluated ourselves with respect
to over a dozen of the Target Capabilities defined in the National
Preparedness Goal. Although the District of Columbia was among the
first jurisdictions in the country to receive accreditation as part of
the Emergency Management Assessment Process, the entire region recently
underwent the assessment process to identify inter-jurisdictional gaps.
And both the District and the region participated in the National Plan
Review, the results of which were announced just last week, to guide
improvements to catastrophic planning capability. As a result of all of
these activities, we have identified significant areas of need to make
the District and the region safer and more secure.
It is within that larger context that we developed our applications
for the FY 2006 Homeland Security Grant Program. We undertook
comprehensive, exhaustive processes involving expert practitioners from
across the District and region to articulate the priority needs to
safeguard and secure us all. These stakeholders included police chiefs,
fire chiefs, transportation directors, hospital managers, emergency
management experts from the public, private, and nonprofit sectors, and
others from all levels of government. Many of these stakeholders are
the same people that responded to the 911 1 attack on the Pentagon, to
the anthrax and sniper attacks, and to Hurricane Isabel. They are the
people in whom the country places its trust for the protection of major
national events, such as State Funerals and State of the Union
Addresses. The effort and expertise we exerted to develop our
applications were significant.
In the District, we identified over $37 million in need across nine
investment areas asfollows.
Investment Area Allocation
Incident Response......................................... $2.65M
Citizen Preparedness...................................... 1.85M
Critical Infrastructure Protection........................ 1.05M
Information Sharing....................................... 3.57M
Law Enforcement Investigation & Operations................ 6.43M
Mass Care................................................. 0.97M
Medical Surge and Mass Prophylaxis........................ 0.63M
Planning.................................................. 2.15M
Total................................................. $21.82M
Specific projects within those investment areas included the
following.
Homeland Security official told a Congressional committee last week
emphatically and repeatedly that our proposal was sound. Second, and
more noteworthy, the experts who provided the analysis that led to the
development of the application and who provided the content for it are
among the most experienced managers, planners, and responders in the
country: As I previously stated, these are the people who responded to
the 911 attack on the Pentagon, to the anthrax and sniper attacks, and
to Hurricane Isabel. These experts have responded successfully in these
and many other incidents despite the complex nature of the National
Capital Region due to their high level of expertise and professionalism
and to the extensive coordination and collaboration that occurs here
every day. That their peers from across the country couId find our
application lacking in terms of effectiveness is therefore perplexing.
Conclusions
We fully support the intent of the Department of Homeland Security
to move to a more objective, transparent, and risk-based approach to
the allocation of scarce resources to protect our homeland. The
outcomes from this year's process, however, call the Department's
success in meeting its intent into question. Specifically, we have to
question two fundamental aspects of the process that led to the
allocations that served as the impetus for the hearing.First, is the
risk analysis used by the Department of Homeland Security adequately
assessing the relative risks faced by the cities and states of our
country? When analysis finds the District of Columbia to be low risk,
which results in less funding than provided to any other state in the
union, including less populous ones, the viability of the analysis is
questionable.
Second, is a peer-review process to determine effectiveness an
appropriate basis for the allocation of funds to secure our homeland?
Put simply, if an area is high risk, but the approach in its proposal
was found to be less than effective; would the federal government not
better advance the security of the homeland by working with the area to
improve its approach than by reducing its funding?
I will close by making two important points about the impact of the
recently announced homeland security grant awards for the District of
Columbia and the National Capital Region. First, the region will not be
less safe and secure, and will not face more risk as a result of
funding levels considerably lower than last year. We had capabilities
in place prior to 9111 and have built significant additional
capabilities since. Generally speaking, those capabilities are in place
and will not diminish. But second, with the announced funding award, we
will not be able to continue to improve our capability, and therefore
our preparedness, as much or as quickly as we had expected. Certain
priority improvements, such as many of those listed earlier in this
testimony, will not get done, at least not as soon as we would have
liked.
Regardless of how much funding we receive, we will provide the best
and most professional response possible and will continue to endeavor
daily to safeguard and secure the region. The amount of funding
announced compared to what we have previously received merely
challenges our ability to do so.
Chairman King. I have questions for the panel, and I am
sure all of our members here today do as well.
Mayor Bloomberg, following up on something that Mayor
Williams just said as far as the Department working with the
cities prior to the 40 percent cut being announced, had anyone
at the Department of Homeland Security contacted you and
offered to work with you to resolve the issue?
Mayor Bloomberg. Maybe they contacted somebody else, but I
have not heard that they did. And when I have talked to the
Secretary a number of times over the last year, I tried to make
the case of just how expensive it was to provide the level of
security that we think is appropriate, and there is nothing I
have seen that says that the threat level is going down. Quite
the contrary. You pick up the newspapers every day, and there
is cause to worry.
And what I counsel the people who live in New York City is
to leave it to the professionals. They should go about their
business, and they are safe, but they are safe only because we
have 40,000 police officers out there pounding the beat every
day, thinking, listening, looking. And then we take the kind of
actions in advance that one would expect to scare off anybody
who might think about attacking our city.
Chairman King. On the note, Commissioner, as far as
entrusting professionals, did anyone in the Department contact
you and tell you that the applications are being rejected and a
40 percent cut was coming?
Commissioner Kelly. No, we had no contact.
Chairman King. None whatsoever?
Commissioner Kelly. We were surprised. Perhaps someone else
in the city government; certainly not the Police Department.
Mayor Bloomberg. Mr. Chairman, let me just point out, that
is what our submission was, 200 pages done by the greatest
group of experts I think anybody has ever put together. Let me
also point out that the application process should not be a
test for who can write the best term paper for their college
class. The application process should be to present the facts
as to what is needed to keep this country safe.
Chairman King. To put a human face on this, you mentioned
18 terrorist attacks or threats in recent years. Can you or
Commissioner Kelly detail some of those to show how serious
they were; and also, Commissioner Kelly, can you describe any
program that was denied to you in these applications such as
the ring of steel in lower Manhattan?
Commissioner Kelly. Well, the 18 events start in 1990, but
I can talk to you about cases since September 11. One you
mentioned, or the Mayor mentioned in his prepared remarks, the
arrest of two individuals plotting to blow up the Harold Square
subway station. We arrested them 1 week before the Republican
National Convention.
Just 3 weeks ago the second individual--the first
individual pleaded guilty. The second individual was found
guilty on all four counts in Federal court. That was a case
that was done by the New York City Intelligence Division.
We had another case, gentleman named Mr. Paracha, Uzair
Paracha, where he was convicted of material support to al Qaeda
for planning to use his father's garment business, garment
district business, to bring in explosives into the United
States. Again, this is another--another conviction.
If you recall, Mr. Chairman, the so-called al-Hindi case
that was in July of 2004 where very detailed reconnaissance
information of New York City, of the New York Stock Exchange,
of Citicorp, and of the World Bank in Washington, it was
discovered on a laptop of an individual in the U.K. Again, a
series of investigations that are--that are out there in the
public domain.
There are other investigations that are ongoing, of course,
that we can't talk about here. But we have a very robust
program. As the Mayor mentioned, our Atlas Program involves
uniformed police officers being deployed to our sensitive
locations throughout the city. We do it every day. We mobilize
officers both on day tour and in our evening tours. We have a
Counterterrorism Division that works closely with the Joint
Terrorism Task Force, with the FBI, and I would say our
cooperation with the FBI is better now than it has ever been.
We are working more closely than ever.
But we have increased our Joint Terrorist Task Force
component from 17 on September 11, 2001, to 120 investigators
today. We have a language program. We have identified 670
uniformed officers with language skills and languages that we
think are particularly appropriate these days: Arabic, Hindi
Pashtu, Farsi. They are used in our investigations.
Another plot, of course, that was mentioned but I think it
is significant because it involves a bridge, and Homeland
Security just categorized the Brooklyn Bridge being just
another bridge. The Mayor mentioned the case in 2003 when Ayman
Ferris was arrested, taken into custody, subsequently
convicted, and in jail for 20 years for plotting to blow up the
Brooklyn Bridge. So it is certainly not just another bridge. No
other bridge in America has this track record of being in al
Qaeda cross-hairs and having someone arrested for that.
But these programs cost money, there is no question about
it. Our head count has been reduced because of the impact on
our budget as a result of 9/11, and we have to use overtime to
a certain extent to put the boots on the ground, as the Mayor
said. If not, an inexpensive program grants it. When you have
to look at the consequences of--God forbid there is another
attack in New York City. So we have I think a very
comprehensive counterterrorism program that has received praise
from both national and international counterterrorism experts.
Chairman King. Yeah. For some reason, the Department ranked
your application second from the bottom, which to me says a lot
about the Department.
I recognize the Ranking Member Mr. Thompson.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you very much. In line with the
Chairman's question, Mayor Williams, to your knowledge, was the
District of Columbia put on any notice of a reduction in funds
or anything of that nature?
Mayor Williams. Congressman Thompson, just as a summary, we
were notified. We weren't really consulted. We were notified--I
think it was in a 24-hour time cycle before it was publicly
announced. There really wasn't any opportunity to interchange,
any opportunity to improve the work product.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you.
Mayor Bloomberg, there was some concern that New York's
application was too personnel-heavy versus equipment? Is it
your opinion that separating the distinction limits one's
ability to effectively plan by saying, we will buy one but we
won't buy the other? And if you have any thoughts on it, I
would appreciate hearing them.
Mayor Bloomberg. Congressman Thompson, I think I speak for
the police commissioner but also for any expert in
counterterrorism or in an attempt to control a scourge of crime
in our country. The world is not what you see on CSI. The world
is not where technology is the key component. The real ways
that you stop the bad guys is by having well-trained, highly
motivated people who go among the community, and who pay
attention to what is going on and look for abnormalities. It is
as personal a business as anybody could possibly find.
And you keep hearing stories, even from small towns
throughout America: Homeland Security gave us some money to buy
a piece of equipment; I don't know what I am going to do with
the piece of equipment.
Now, you know, I am sure that sheriff or local police
officer probably would prefer to have a couple of more sheriffs
or cops going out there, walking the streets, or driving around
town, depending on what their location is, rather than a piece
of fancy equipment. But the fact of the matter is, fancy
equipment gets you a photo-op and once it arrives, the real
problem is who is going to man it and how do you train and how
do you keep it up to date?
I think some--unfortunately, some of these recipients of
the Federal--or just in terms of giving technology to
understand once they get it, the cost of maintenance which is
equal to or greater than the cost of acquiring the device is
invariably going to be something that they have got to pay for.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you.
Chief Ramsey, can you give me your experience with the
Department? When you have had differences of opinion as to
applications or the technical aspects of an application, have
you been able to work them out?
Chief Ramsey. Well, I have not been aware of problems. We
certainly were tasked with putting together the application,
expressing what our needs--following the format and so forth.
But the assistance, if you will, that we got from Homeland
Security was more explaining the process as opposed to
commenting and providing some input or feedback on the
application itself.
So we as an agency provided information and filled out
certain portions of the application at the direction of the
deputy mayor and other agencies, of the city government did the
same thing. But it was not a give-and-take, back-and-forth type
exchange with the Department. We were totally surprised when we
got word that these cuts were taking place to the extent that
they were. We felt then and feel now that we have put together
an application that met the needs of the District of Columbia.
It was a good application, and certainly when you look at the
State total, as the Mayor mentioned, certainly not one that
should put us in the bottom 25 percent of all States and
territories. Common sense alone would tell you that that is a
flawed process, if that was the outcome.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, I have two letters
from Congressman--Congresswoman Matsui and Congresswoman
Slaughter, and I would like to ask unanimous consent to enter
them into the record.
Chairman King. Without objection, they will be entered into
the record.
[The information follows:]
For the Record
House of Representatives,
Washington, DC, June 21, 2006
Hon. Bennie Thompson,
Ranking Member, Committee on Homeland Security,
House of Representatives, Washington, D.C.
Dear Ranking Member Thompson:
As you are aware, this is the first year that the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) used a risk- and need-based program to
determine both eligibility and grant funding for the Urban Area
Security Initiative (UASI). The Committee on Homeland Security's
hearing today is an opportunity for Members of the Committee to assert
their oversight responsibility and ask questions regarding all parts of
the new UASI assessment process, including the scope of its new risk
standards. While this hearing will focus entirely on the investment
justification part of the grant process for New York and Washington,
D.C. only, there are other aspects of this grant that raise concern. In
particular, whether DHS's criteria and process for determining
eligibility for the UASI grant accurately takes into account the risks
faced by urban areas.
The new risk- and need-based grant process puts our nation's
security at risk. As such, I have worked closely with our local first
responders and law enforcement to determine the effect that this may
have on the security of Sacramento.I have collaborated extensively with
the Director of Sacramento Regional Office of Homeland Security, Mike
Smith. Mr. Smith is a true asset to our community, whose experience
includes twenty-nine years in law enforcement, where he retired as the
Assistant Sheriff of Sacramento County. Mr. Smith is also a retired
Colonel from the California Army National Guard. For several decades,
Mr. Smith has been working on behalf of the people of this nation and
is an expert on safety and homeland security needs. Therefore, I
respectfully request that you submit this letter along with the
attached statement from Mr. Smith, for the official record for the June
21,2006, hearing on UASI.
Sincerely,
Doris Matsui,
Member of Congress
House of Representatives
Washington, DC, June 21, 2006
Hon.Bennie Thompson,
Ranking Member, Committee on Homeland Security,
House of Representatives, Washington, D.C.
Dear Ranking Member Thompson:
Thank you for providing me the opportunity to highlight my concerns
with theDepartment of Homeland Security's (DHS) decision to severely
cut homeland securityfunding for the Buffalo-Niagara region.
According to a new report issued by DHS last week, most urban areas
are as unpreparedfor a catastrophe today as they were on September 11
th. This is unacceptable and mustbe rectified immediately. A good place
to start would be to make sure that the UrbanAreas Security Initiative
(UASI) program actually serves the cities most vulnerable toterrorism.
In January, the Secretary of Homeland Security, Michael Chertoff,
rolled-out the agency's revamped UASI grant program by declaring,
"[DHS] is investing federal funding into our communities facing the
greatest risk and demonstrating the greatest need in order to receive
the highest return in our nation's security."
Many applauded this move away from awarding grants based solely on
population statistics and toward a risk-based approach. Unfortunately,
it has become clear six months later that the risk-based framework
adopted by DHS is deeply flawed and in need of an overhaul. There is no
better explanation for how Columbus, Ohio and Louisville, Kentucky have
suddenly jumped to the top of the threat list while the Buffalo-Niagara
region is now considered the least vulnerable to an attack out of 46
major U.S. urban areas. UASI funding to Buffalo-Niagara was cut ffom
$7.2 million in Fiscal Year (FY) 2005 to FY$3.7 million in 2006. DHS
has also made clear that Buffalo-Niagara will likely lose all UASI
funding FY 2007.
I agree that the UASI system must be predicated on a risk-based
system. The cities most vulnerable to terrorism ought to be the first
in the nation to receive the resources necessary to safeguard their
communities. However, I am convinced that the Department's risk-based
formula does not adequately take the Buffalo region's threats and high-
risk assets into consideration. Had these assets been factored into the
UASI equation, it would have been obvious to DHS that Buffalo should
not see their UASI finding severely cut.
The Buffalo-Niagara region sits on an international border and is a
major gateway for international tourism and commerce. The region is
home to four international bridges and two international railroad
bridges. This includes the Peace Bridge in Buffalo, which is the
nation's second busiest northern border crossing; $160 million in trade
and 20,000 vehicles cross the Peace Bridge each day. Niagara County
also hosts one of the northeast's largest producers of electricity, the
Niagara Power Project, as well as a nuclear landfill that contains half
of the world's radium. In addition, Niagara Falls is a world-renowned
tourist destination that welcomes thousands of visitors each year.
Accordingly, it is astounding that any objective model for
assessing risk would fail to conclude that Buffalo-Niagara deserves a
fair share of UASI funding. DHS' decision to cut Buffalo-Niagara's
funding means that the region will have to reduce critical security
efforts, including plans better secure the Niagara Power Project and
develop an interagency cornmunications system.
I have been concerned with the new UASI process and its
consequences on Buffalo's preparedness since DHS first announced the
changes in January. At the time, DHS declared that it was revamping the
UASI grant process and limiting awards to 35 pre- determined cities
that they deemed most at risk. Surprisingly, the Buffalo-Niagara region
did not fall into the top 35 cities, meaning that they were only
eligible to receive sustainment-funding for FY 2006. In addition, DHS
redefined the Buffalo-Niagara eligible area to be just Buffalo and a
10-mile buffer around the city.
I contacted DHS to inquire how they developed the list of cities
most at risk, and why they redefined the eligible area for Buffalo-
Niagara. I was told that the risk-assessment for the 35 city list was
classified and that no information could be provided. Lacking
information to the contrary, it appears that DHS arbitrarily created
the 10 mile buffer without any empirical data to justify it. The
redeffition of the Buffalo urban area removed key assets fiom being
factored into the risk-based assessment, including the Niagara Power
Project, 600 chemical and hazardous material facilities, and the
Lewiston- Queenston bridge.
Understanding that sensitive security information went into the
development of the UASI process, I asked DHS in May for a classified
briefing on Buffalo-Niagara's score on the UASI risk-assessment.
Despite the seriousness of the issue, this request has gone unanswered.
The first-responders and elected officials in Buffalo have similarly
run into a brick-wall when asking DHS for explanations on their score.
DHS' refusal to brief Members of Congress or local officials is
unacceptable and suggests that they cannot justify their new UASI
formula. DHS cannot expect Members of Congress or localities to embrace
their new UASI system if they refuse to provide substantive information
on the risk-based model and peer review process.
It is imperative that DHS re-evaluate their formula and factor in
critical infrastructure and assets in Buffalo-Niagara. At the same
time, Congress has a responsibility to ensure that DHS has the federal
dollars needed to safeguard the country's major urban areas. Let us not
forget that Congress voted last year to decrease UASI funding by more
than 14 percent, despite the fact that most cities remain woellly
unprepared to respond to a catastrophe. Unless DHS retools their UASI
formula, Buffalo-Niagara will be left without the critical resources
needed to safeguard the region against new and emerging threats.
I look forward to DHS explaining its new UASI system, as well as
their reasoning for the new risk-based formula. Thank you again,
Congressman Thompson, for allowing me to share my concerns with the
Committee.
Sincerely.
Louise Slaughter,
Member of Congress
For the Record
Prepared Statement of Mike Smith, Director Sacramento Regional Office
of Homeland Security
On December 2, 2005, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
published the FY06 Homeland Security Grant Program, Program Guidance
and Application Kit, and distributed it via the internet. In the FY06
Guidance, DHS substantially changed the methodology of allocating funds
from previous years. Specifically DHS wrote they were adopting a
"common risk and need based approach to allocating funds".' "For the
purposes of analysis, risk is defined as the product of three principal
variables: the consequence of a specified attack to a particular asset,
the vulnerability of that asset to that particular threat, and the
degree of threat of that particular attack threat to that specific
asset.
The "need" would be assessed through a Program and Capability
Enhancement Plan and through the submissions of Investment
Justifications. Supplemental guidance was issued by DHS throughout
December 2005, on the mechanics of completing the documentation. A
deadline of March 2,2006 was established for electronically filing the
State Enhancement Plan and Investment Justifications for States,
Temtories and Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI) jurisdictions.
Notwithstanding the statement, "DHS will release the list of UASI
candidates shortly after this release of the FY 2006 HSGP pidancem4,
UASI applicants were not identified until Office and Grants and
Training published Infonnation Bulletin No. 200 on January 3,2006.
With regard to UASI jurisdictions, DHS abandoned the previously
approved UASI jurisdiction and geographical definitions. In lieu of the
previously agreed upon UASI's, the new eligibility for inclusion
consisted of "cities with a opulation great than 100,000 and any city
with reported threat data during the past year." In a follow up meeting
with Office of Grants and Training (OGT) representatives, they
addressed the exclusion of large urban unincorporated counties. The
rationale was that since there are not counties throughout the United
States, they excluded these population centers from the computations.
With regard to risk, DHS attempted to evaluate asset-based risk and
geographically based risk. In assessing asset based risk, DHS drew a
"10 mile buffer...from the border of thatcity or combined entity to
establish the geographical area in which data was evaluated" and
inventoried up to 38 Asset Types." The way of validating data were, (1)
using assets submitted in July 2004 data call and (2) accessing 40,000
assets collected from various public data bases. DHS also used a number
of proprietary databases for an additional 100,000 assets8 In the
follow up meeting with OGT representatives, the question posed was why
DHS was looking backwards a year and half and not using their approved
Automated Critical Assessment Management System (ACAMS) as the approved
data base. Even though California had updated the database, it was not
used because not all States and Territories are inputting into the
system. During the meeting OGT representatives could not provide
transparency on how the assets were validated. Because of outsourcing
to non-government agencies under contractual relationships, OGT
representatives could not provide any backup data on the validity of
the assets counted. During the process of assessing critical
infrastructure no one from DHS contacted the Sacramento UASI to
reconcile critical infrastructure.
In assessing asset risk, DHS made 8 assumptions to be used in risk
calculations. Of particular note are two assumptions: "3. Functional
andlor spatial dependencies andlor interdependencies do not affect
risk. [This is clearly a false assumption, but necessary because the
methodology for including it has yet to be developed.] and 4.
Simultaneous or sequential attacks on more than one target do not
affect risk. [Again, clearly false, but necessary until reasonable
methodologies can be developed to incorporate such m0des.1" 'The
failure of DHS to assess interdependency and cascading affects is
not'realistic and flaws their justification of objective decisions
based on 3.2 billion calculations. In essence the numbers of
calculations are not relevant if the data points are not valid or
incomplete.
In meeting with OGT representatives, they were unable to articulate
the threat component of the grant calculations. The key points
discussed were that they rely on data from the other communities to
populate the data. The issue of opening threat cases versus cases that
have resulted in indictments, deportation or convictions and if there
was a weighting factor was unsatisfactorily answered. What was
determined is that threat data only looked at the previous fiscal year
(October 1,2004-September 30,2005) for open cases, 1-94 immigration
form destination cities and other investigations. No trend analysis was
evaluated and there was clearly no transparency to understanding the
information. It is my opinion that there exists an internal disconnect
within DHS between Information and Analysis and The Directorate of
Preparedness Risk Management Division. Until threat data is suitably
evaluated and articulated, the information provided in the UASI
assessment is just a black hole from which no reasonable conclusion can
be forecasted.
For the "need" assessment, each State, Territory and UASI were
allowed to submit up to15 Investment Justifications for the remainder
of non Patriot Act base distributed funds. This was to be a competitive
process for the balance of State Homeland Security Grant Program
(SHSGP) and Law Enforcement Terrorism Prevention Program (LETPP) funds.
On February 8,2006, DHS Grants and Training published Information
Bulletin 202, which discussed the review and scoring of Investment
Justifications. Investment Justifications were broken into four
functional areas, background, regionalization, impact and funding and
implementation plan. Within those functional areas, there were several
dialogue boxes to be filled out. Bulletin 202 provided the criteria for
filling out the boxes. This was significant, as discussed infra, in the
evaluation and scoring process during the peer review process.
In completing the Investment Justifications there was confusion
between instructions and the actual ability to upload information into
the grant management tool. If applicants did get the email of late
February 2006, then they would not have understood that only the text
that would actually print out would be seen by the reviewer. In the
peer review investments that I scored, several dialogue boxes exceeded
the allowable word count and were adversely scored because the
information they thought to be inputted was not seen by the reviewer.
My opinion is that the Investment Justifications process needs to
be revamped to more accurately assess need. I participated in the Peer
Review and provided these comments, along with others, to the OGT
representative.
The mechanics of the Investment Justification forms were not user
friendly and the guidance was inadequate. Examples are the word count
and the narrative boxes would continue to accept comments well after
the cut off. Several Investments I scored had exceeded the allotted
space thereby making them difficult to score. My UASI found out this
error when we printed our drafts and we made the appropriate changes
prior to submission.
In reviewing the Investment Justifications, the guidelines and
narratives did not encourage nor direct respondents to talk about
investments over a time continuum. In almost every Investment reviewed,
our group was unable to ascertain what had been accomplished to date
with Homeland Security funds from FY03, FY04 and W05. In essence the
application process became a stop the clock and a one time assessment.
Without more specific delineation in the narrative, it was
extremely difficult to ascertain the appropriateness of the "Investment
Funding Plan". Again, there was no beginning, middle or end to clearly
correlate the FY06 request to what has been undertaken in FY03, FY04
and FY05.
My overall comment was that I felt Investment Justifications and
the scoring process were weighted more to grant writing than actual
need assessment. If Investment Justifications are to be used in FY07, I
encourage DHS to constitute a working group of practitioners to help
revamp the process.
In conclusion my opinion is that risk was not reasonable assessed,
notwithstanding the number of calcuiations and that "need" was also not
reasonably assessed through the FY06 Homeland Security Grant Program.
Mr. Thompson. And I yield back.
Chairman King. Gentleman from Connecticut, Mr. Shays.
Mr. Shays. Mayors, thank you for being here. I happen to
think both of you are extraordinary mayors. And Mayor Williams,
you will be missed. I have appreciated, as a temporary resident
in Washington, the competence with which you have done your
job. And Mayor Bloomberg, I just think you are an extraordinary
man in terms of what you have accomplished in your life, and I
am just very grateful that you were willing to serve in public
life, given that you have been so successful in the private
sector.
I chaired a committee that looked at the terrorist threat
before September 11, and we all were warned about what was
going to happen. Basically we had three commissions that said
we have a terrorist threat, we need to assess the terrorist
threat, we need to have a strategy to deal with it, and then we
need to reorganize our government to implement the strategy.
I was a strong supporter, and am, of having a Department of
Homeland Security, and I am not bitterly disappointed--but
close to it--in terms of its effectiveness to date.
I would like to know what your sense is about--and then let
me say, the two places I am told to say if you want to help the
Department run better, have them meet with people in D.C, but--
no disrespect to D.C., but particularly Washington--
particularly New York City. That if we only learn from what all
of you do in New York City, we would have a much better
Department.
So I guess what I first want to know is, what kind of
interaction do both of your cities have with the Department?
What kind of contribution is the Department and Washington
making to D.C. and to New York? Is there a constant
interaction? Or is it, you know, not much at all?
Mayor Williams. I would like to ask Deputy Mayor Reiskin to
talk about our interaction, because he has really been involved
with the Department in the grant formulation process.
Mr. Shays. Not just in terms of the grants, in terms of
just in general. Are they providing advice to you? Are they a
value added? I am not trying to put you in a position where you
get scored badly next year but I would like to know candidly if
there is good dialogue.
We are going down the ranks here, from mayor to chief to
bureaucrat.
Mr. Reiskin. Good morning, Chairman King, Congressman
Shays. To answer your question, there are different types of
interaction we have with the Department. In terms of the grant
process they set this up to be a competitive process, so this
was not about trying to help one city or State, regardless of
their risk, fare better in that process.
We are fortunate here in the National Capital Region. We
are the only region in the country to have an office within the
Department of Homeland Security specifically in place to help
coordinate between the Department, the rest of the Federal
Government, and the National Capital Region. So through that
office we do get some assistance. We get some coordination
within the Department and across the various entities, and I
think generally the national preparedness goal that the
Department has created for everyone to lay out a framework for
how cities and States should prepare has been helpful.
There was not any kind of coaching or assistance in saying,
District of Columbia National Capital Region, you are one of
the highest risks in the Nation, let's work together to build
an application. That was not part of that.
Mr. Shays. So that is clear. I am just curious as to the
outside application. Mayor or Commissioner?
Mayor Bloomberg. Well, the Secretary always takes my call
and we periodically do touch base. I think what is important to
realize here is that for big cities they fundamentally have to
have the ability to protect themselves and to respond, in the
case of a tragedy, the day it happens. The Federal Government's
role is to give them the wherewithal so that they can in
advance prepare and then perhaps later on provide moneys to
help them recover.
But if we have learned anything, particularly from the
great tragedy in New Orleans, each city has just got to have on
the ground, ready to go, the kind of preparedness personnel,
and mainly where they can respond the day the event happens.
Washington is not really structured to come in with the kind
of--as fast as we would need to take care of the people. So we
look to Homeland Security for longer-term funding, letting us
go and keep the level of preparedness that we think is
appropriate affordable.
Thank you.
Mr. Shays. Commissioner.
Commissioner Kelly. We have an excellent working
relationship with the operational agencies of Homeland Security
and that is on a daily basis. We work closely with the Secret
Service, with Customs and Border Protection, with Immigration
and Customs Enforcement. And we have now a good working
relationship with the intelligence components of Homeland
Security after somewhat of a rough road when we raised our
response to a threat that existed against our subway system in
October of last year. We sort of worked through that. So
operationally, on a day-to-day basis, I think we are working
well.
Mr. Shays. Where is not it working well?
Commissioner Kelly. Sir?
Mr. Shays. Where is it not working well?
Commissioner Kelly. I think, obviously, at the headquarters
level, you might say. We were surprised by this reduction.
Nobody coached us how to change our application or, in fact,
that it was necessary.
Mr. Shays. Let me just quickly get to the area that also
concerns me. The Cold War strategy of contain, react, and
mutually assured destruction went out the window. It has been
replaced by detect and prevent. Obviously you don't want to
deal with the consequences of the tragedy. You want to protect
it.
And it is my understanding that New York City has got to
spend a fortune in intelligence work, that you have to because
you want to detect and prevent it. You do not want to have to
deal with the consequence.
I am just curious, if that kind of cost ever gets reflected
in the grants, that application for it being risk-based--in
other words, risk-based, you have got all these targets out
there that are tempting; but it seems to me that in order to
succeed, you have had to spend a great deal on detect and
prevent, not react. Would you speak to that?
Mayor Bloomberg. Congressman, to put it in perspective, New
York city taxpayers spend $5-1/2 billion a year on our police
department; well over another $1-1/2 billion a year on our fire
department. They also fund a very extensive and very competent
Department of Health and Mental Hygiene which is our first
defense against bioterrorism. We have an Office of Emergency
Management that has provided very valuable coordination.
So what we are doing is we are trying to keep our city as
safe as we possibly can, but at the same time we also have to
prepare for what happens if the first responders have to
respond. That is our default position. The 1,000 police
officers that Commissioner Kelly has devoted to intelligence
and counterterrorism, the police officers that he has put in
major capitals around the world so that we can see firsthand
what terrorists are doing elsewhere, and make sure that we
understand that, and that our kind of preparedness and
prevention are appropriate, those are things that the taxpayers
of the city of New York have to fund every day. And it just
means that there is less money to do other things that we would
like to do.
Commissioner, do you want to add anything?
Commissioner Kelly. To answer your question directly, sir,
we spend about anywhere from--depending on the year--from 170-
to $200 million a year on our counterterrorism issues and our
intelligence initiatives; and, no, we do not get compensated
for that. There was an effort to get that in our application
this year and that was in essence rejected by Homeland Security
when we were given some indication that they were open to
funding the programs that were shut off. So, no, we do not get
that reimbursed.
Mr. Shays. Thank you.
Chairman King. The gentleman from Washington, Mr. Dicks.
Mr. Dicks. I want to welcome our witnesses. And Mayor
Williams, I have lived in the District of Columbia for 38
years. I think you've been a good mayor. And my father was from
New York City, so I have a great sense of feeling for New York
City.
Let me ask you, there is something that just jumps out at
me when you look at these Urban Area Security Initiative
numbers. First of all, even with this amount of money, this
$124 million, New York will have received 19 percent of the
entire amount of money that has gone out between 03 and 06. Let
me go back through these numbers because I think they are
interesting.
In 2003 the city of New York got $149 million. In 2004 they
got 47 million, a big decline. I don't remember all this
concern being expressed then. And then back in 2005 you upped
to $207.5 million. That has got to be an enormous increase. And
then back in 2006 it drops back to 124.4 million.
Let me ask you a couple of questions. Have you used all of
this money and can you give us generally what you are using
this $528 million we are talking about? What do you use it for?
Mayor Bloomberg. Number one, yes, we have used all money.
We have not necessarily written checks. We do not do that until
the equipment is delivered or the training is completed or
whatever.
Mr. Dicks. So you have obligated the money.
Mayor Bloomberg. We have obligated the money, and I think
there is a feeling among a lot people that when you get federal
moneys you just get it and you might as well spend it. It is
free money. I don't view those moneys that way. Those are the
moneys of the taxpayers of this country, including the people
in New York City, and we take our responsibility to do it
prudently and effectively and efficiently and very seriously.
Whether or not 19 percent is--it is an interesting number,
but the real question is what is the percentage of the target
or a risk-weighted target list, if you will. It is probably
true. I think most people would agree that when you talk to
somebody from overseas and you say, ``Quickly, think about
America; what are you picturing?'' They picture the New York
City skyline or Washington skyline.
Mr. Dicks. I think New York is the number one target, there
is no question about it. I served for 8 years on the
Intelligence Committee. There is no question about that. But
what are you spending this money on? What are you using it for?
Can the Chief tell us?
Commissioner Kelly. We have in the police Department
received $280 million out of the money that you mentioned; $115
million of that was spent on overtime, which was the result of
the heightened alert levels put in place by Homeland Security.
When you go to an orange level, we get 15 percent
reimbursements, 10 percent at yellow level, but these are alert
levels that are generated by the Federal Government. We spent
about another $100 million of that for equipment, and the
remaining money was spent for training.
And, again, some of the training costs are generated by
overtime as well, because we have to continue to police the
city.
Mr. Dicks. I want to move on to the District, but let me
say one thing. We have been told in previous testimony that one
of the reasons you did not score as well is because you are
using a lot of money for personnel and overtime and not for
equipment that could be used into the future. And I think you
have answered that question about why you believe your strategy
is the right one.
Let me ask Mayor Williams, let me go through the numbers
for the District of Columbia. In 2003 you got $60.4 million. In
2004 you got $21.9 million, another major decline. In 2005 you
are back up to $77.5 million; and in 2006 you got 46.4, a
decline but not as severe as the decline between 2003 and 2004.
Again, maybe you can explain, have you utilized this $167
million? I am not talking about 2006 now, but for the 3
previous years, have you obligated that money and can you tell
us what you have used it for?
Mayor Williams. Congressman in terms of the obligation of
money, I could not agree more with Mayor Bloomberg that our job
is not simply to write checks. We want to make sure that the
money is going to an intended purpose and that purpose is
achieving real results in terms of whether it is detection,
prevention, mitigation, recovery, whatever; and that in fact if
you look at fiscal year 2003, all the money has been spent by
the District; fiscal year 2004, 90 percent has been spent; 7
percent of that has been obligated, so most of that was either
spent or obligated.
Mr. Dicks. What was the consequence of that major drop? You
went from 60 down to 29. Did that cause a lot of disruption
because you did not get as much money as you did in 2003?
Chief Ramsey. Congressman, the biggest problem with that is
that it just slows us down. It delays a lot of the things that
we want to do. That is one of the consequences of the current
drop. We are making efforts now to become a tier 1 city in
terms of our capability, which is required by Homeland Security
Presidential Directive 5. That slows us down in terms of
reaching that goal and all the areas that we are supposed to.
So you simply cut back. And that is what we did then, and
that is what we are in the process of doing now, going back
over those requests, reprioritizing, understanding now that it
is going to take us longer to get to where we want to be. We
should be there today, right now, in every single area; but,
unfortunately, because of the way in which the funding comes
in, you really do not know until the last minute what you are
going to get, your priorities have to constantly shift. And it
does cause problems, not just in police, but all the other
areas of the government that are relying on this money for
support.
Mr. Dicks. Now, these are not the only funds that New York
and Washington--you get other funds from other programs within
Homeland Security; isn't that correct?
Mayor Bloomberg. There are other things. In New York City's
case, the vast bulk of the moneys we spend, it is the New York
City taxpayer that comes up with that $5-1/2 billion, but
moneys at the margin do matter, particularly in tough fiscal
times, which I think every city is going through. There is an
enormous demand to provide services, and the risks that we
think we face from overseas, which is something local police
departments pre-9/11 probably never thought about, those are
very expensive. And we have 8.1 million people to protect. We
have an enormous number of iconic structures. To say the
Brooklyn Bridge is just a bridge is pretty ridiculous. It is to
try to define away the Empire State Building as just a
building, as the Statue of Liberty as not belonging to New York
City. Yes, it does not, but I would probably--that it is
probably the NYPD and FDNY that would respond if there was a
problem.
Commissioner Kelly. I would simply add that other grants
that we have gotten before have been eliminated. The COPS grant
and the COPS program and the Byrne grants have been eliminated
as well. So money that you might think as coming to the
Department in other ways simply has dried up.
Chairman King. If I could be presumptuous enough for the
Mayor and the Commissioner, I would invite the gentleman from
Washington and other members of the committee to visit
Commissioner Kelly's terrorism division and also his
intelligence unit in New York to see just how some of this
money is being spent and how effectively it is being spent.
Mr. Dicks. We have had some good briefings and we have had
a lot of good information.
Chairman King. The gentleman from Connecticut, Mr. Simmons.
Mr. Simmons. I thank the Chair for holding this very
important hearing. As Representative from Connecticut, I will
simply say that we lost many constituents on 9/11. My daughter
is a resident of New York City, now living in Brooklyn, because
her apartment was so damaged by that attack she could never
return. And to Mayor Williams, my wife and I have lived two
blocks from here for 20 years, so we thank you both for your
service to your wonderful cities.
Very briefly, Mr. Chairman, Connecticut received $10
million in fiscal year 04 under the Urban Areas Security
Initiative, was defunded in 2005 and 2006; and under recent
program guidance, any urban area not identified as eligible
through the risk analysis process for 2 consecutive years will
not be eligible for continued funding under this program. This
is crazy. The terrorism target is a moving target. And to
defund a regional State like Connecticut and then to say ``no
future funding,'' does not make any sense to me.
And I would ask unanimous consent that this letter from our
Governor, Governor Jodi Rell, be inserted in the record. We
need to take a serious look at that program's guidance. I do
not think it makes any logic.
Chairman King. Without objection, the letter is made part
of the record.
[The information follows:]
For the Record
June 19, 2006
Dear Members of the Homeland Security Committee,
As you know, the National Strategy for Homeland Security provides
the framework to prevent and respond to acts of terrorism in our
nation. State public agencies play a vital role in securing our country
and U.S. Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Urban Areas Security
Initiatives (UASI) provides the vital funding necessary for combating
terrorism. The UASl has recently changed the manner in which it
evaluates the likelihood of terrorism, and those changes are
detrimental to Connecticut.
In FY2004, Connecticut was deemed eligible for funding by the DHS.
The City of New Haven and its six contiguous towns (Orange, North
Haven, West Haven, East Haven, Hamden and Woodbridge) were awarded
$10,371,407 to enhance the area's ability to prevent, respond to, and
recover from threats or acts of terrorism. Funding was determined by a
formula using a combination of current threat estimates, population
density, transit system ridership and total route miles.
In FY2005, the funding criteria changed to include credible threat,
presence of critical infrastructure, vulnerability, population,
population density, law enforcement activity, and the existence of
formal mutual aid agreements. Surprisingly, the DHS determined that New
Haven was no longer eligible for the grant program despite its
strategic location between New York and Boston, and its critical
infrastructure which includes the Strategic Petroleum Reserve in New
Haven harbor.
In January 2006, DHS again denied Connecticut access to the UASl
program. The FY2006 funding formula changed yet again with eligibility
determined by a population cap of 100,000 and risk and need analysis.
Connecticut with all of its vital assets (ports, industries, financial
institutions, nuclear facilities and transportation services) and
vulnerabilities was denied federal assistance, not only in FY2006, but
potentially on a permanent basis.
The UASl program guidance now states per DHS, Office of Grants and
Training Bulletin No. 200, that "any Urban Area not identified as
eligible through the risk analysis process for two consecutive years
will not be eligible for continued funding under the UASl program." If
Connecticut is denied the opportunity to participate in UASl in FY2007,
it will be permanently eliminated based on the aforementioned policy.
It is imperative that this feature of the UASl program be reexamined to
assure that limited federal resources are most appropriately allocated
and that potential recipients, including regions like the New Haven
area, are given a fair chance to compete for funding.
Sincerely,
M. Jodi Rell
Governor
Mr. Simmons. Moving quickly to New York and the District of
Columbia, clearly key target areas. Reduced funding does not
meet the commonsense test for me or for most Americans. I do
not see the threat reduced. I see the vulnerability still
there. I do not see any lessened risk.
And I would like to focus a little bit on the issue of
human intelligence and police on the ground. I was a CIO
officer for a decade. Human intelligence is critically,
critically important when it comes to terrorism, especially
when you have got Union Station, Penn Station, Grand Central
Station, very large areas that proposes millions of people
almost on a daily basis. You know, you cannot just put a camera
on the wall and say the problem is solved.
And so the idea that we are going to degrade or some how
reduce the priority for shoes on the street and increase the
priority for surveillance cameras, which you may not even have
enough people to monitor the surveillance camera, this does not
make any sense to me when it comes to securing the urban areas
against the terrorist threats.
And I would like to have our witnesses elaborate a little
bit on that aspect of this program. This seems to be an aspect
of the program that does not make sense to me. Are we providing
the wrong weight when it comes to these applications and when
it comes specifically to funding human resources, which I
consider to be critically important in this war on terrorism?
Commissioner Kelly. Obviously, in our application, we
looked for significant amounts of money for the human
investment that we have made. That is both uniformed officers,
boots on the ground, as the Mayor said, but also our
intelligence division, our counterterrorism operation.
We talked about the conviction we received just 3 weeks ago
in Federal court. That was a result of, I think, a very well
conducted investigation by our intelligence division in
conjunction with Federal authorities of these two individuals
who not only plotted to blow up the Helsway Subway Station, but
made maps of three police stations in Staten Island and Fort
Wadsworth.
That investigation was aided by a confidential informant
with an undercover police officer. This is open information.
This officer was born in Bangladesh. He came here when he was 7
years of age. He did an outstanding job in this investigation,
but it takes that sort of focus for the Department, I think, to
protect, obviously in our five boroughs, what we see as an
ongoing threat.
So we are looking for resources to enable us to continue
this program, to also fund, I think, a very sophisticated
civilian analyst program that we have instituted. We have
analysts from the top schools in the country: The Columbia
School of International Studies, the Fletcher School of
Diplomacy; from our service academies. They have done an
outstanding job.
Under the formula that was put out by Homeland Security, we
cannot get Homeland Security funds for these individuals
because we have already done this. We have already started
this. So if we were to pay them under Homeland Security funds,
it would be supplanting.
But we are able to hire new analysts, and that is true
throughout the country. So it gets back to what the Mayor said,
the whole notion of supplanting; we need these civilian
analysts who are doing an outstanding job, but we are being
penalized because we started this program in 2002.
Mr. Simmons. I would assume the same is true for the
District of Columbia.
Mayor Williams. Congressman, I think technology gets
overbilled, the hardware/software technology. I think history
will show you far more examples of people, where they have been
properly supported and motivated, have done extraordinary jobs,
even if they did not have the latest technology. And there are
probably many more examples of where you have had great
technology but you have it invested on the ground, in people,
and it has been a tremendous flop.
I think that this overweight on technology, not enough on
people on the ground who are going to be doing the journeyman
work, is a mistake. And I think the Chief could attest to that.
Chief Ramsey. Yes, sir, Congressman. I also think one of
the things that I think gets overlooked oftentimes is the fact
that day-to-day crime fighting has to continue to take place,
and you are drawing resources from that effort when you do not
get the kind of support from Homeland Security that we ought to
be getting. There is a lot of talk about people. Well, we need
people. 9/11 changed policing dramatically. Prior to 9/11, even
though I was the Chief here in Washington, D.C. I was not
getting regular classified briefings. I was not concerned about
homeland security. I was concerned about day-to-day street
crime primarily. That was my world. That is what I did every
day. Occasionally a threat would come in or something would
come in I had to deal with, but it was not constant like it is
now. Yet we have to deal with this issue and we have to be
effective at both.
I have got 76 homicides so far this year in the District of
Columbia; al Qaeda did not commit one of them. For the average
citizen living in our District, the threat is street crime, yet
we have to broaden our perspective and deal with both street
crime and threats abroad and threats elsewhere. That is the
real problem, is balancing the resources, and that is what is
not taken into account here. So we have to be able to do both
and we can only do both with constant support from the Federal
Government.
We can reach the level of a tier 1 city, but then you have
to maintain your ability to be a tier 1 city. You have to
upgrade technology. Certain equipment has a shelf life. We
bought personal protective equipment for all of our officers
and civilian personnel. Five-year shelf life. You have got to
be able to replace that stuff. Where is that money going to
come from? If it comes from the local budget, you are taking
away from some of the efforts that could be performed out there
in our communities.
We need intel analysts. I also need crime analysts. It
should not be an either/or proposition. It should be something
that we are able to do both, and do both well.
Mr. Simmons. Mr. Chairman, thank you. I hope you take to
heart what we have just heard. On the Armed Services Committee,
when a four-star general asks for troops, we do not give him
cameras. I yield back..
Chairman King. I thank the gentleman for his usually pithy
insights.
The gentlewoman from New York who is so committed on this
issue, Mrs. Lowey.
Mrs. Lowey. Thank you, Chairman King, for holding this
hearing and I want to join my colleagues in welcoming Mayor
Bloomberg and Commissioner Kelly. As a New Yorker, I want to
tell you that I am so pleased and proud that you are
representing us and you are in charge of the security in our
city. I personally thank you. I welcome Mayor Williams. We
spent some time here, too, and we really appreciate your
leadership.
Mayor Bloomberg, I think you, Chairman King, and I
understand exactly why New York was so shortchanged in its
grant allocations this year. So I really thank you for being
here today, for discussing the impact of these cuts and our
joint efforts to fight for adequate funds to protect the number
one terrorist target in the Nation: New York.
But let's be very clear here: First and foremost, this
administration has led the effort to slash funding for the
largest homeland security grants. The State Homeland Security
Grant program, Law Enforcement Terrorist Prevention program,
Urban Area Security Initiative. In fiscal year 05, the
President requested $2.45 billion for the three programs;
lowered it to 2.04 billion in fiscal year 06. Then, again,
reduced the request to 1.47 billion in fiscal year 07; a 60
percent overall cut in the pot before you even started divvying
out the money. And each time Congress made some adjustment, but
has failed to restore the damaging cuts to these programs.
Frankly, this is an unacceptable insult to every official
and first responder working day in and day out to protect New
York.
I am also pleased to be joined by Joe Crowley, who I am
sure will associate himself with my remarks, from Queens
County.
I offered a motion when the bill came to the floor to
recommit the fiscal year 07 spending bill to require that
States receive no less in fiscal year 07 than the higher of the
amounts received in fiscal year 05 and fiscal year 06.
Unfortunately, this amendment failed. Some people like Chairman
King supported it, but this amendment failed overwhelmingly.
The buck stops with the President, and we need you to join
us in pushing the President to insist that the Republican
majority in the House and Senate restore these funds in the
fiscal year 07 DHS appropriations bill before it completes the
process. It has to go to the Senate, then it goes to
conference. We cannot just say, okay, that is it. We have to
push the White House. We have to push the majority in the House
and Senate to get this done, because the safety of my kids,
your kids, and all our neighbors are at stake.
Now we know New York took its greatest hit in the UASI
program. It was designed to help the top urban high-risk areas,
because it has been stretched too thin. New York is protecting
its citizens from cyanide bombs in the subway. Columbus, Ohio
is buying bulletproof vests for the police dogs with Federal
grant funds. Since fiscal year 03 the number of recipients for
UASI has increased from seven cities, as you mentioned, Mayor
Bloomberg, to 46 regions comprising 53 cities. Seven cities to
46 regions, 53 cities.
This year the original seven UASI cities will receive only
50 percent of total funding. New York will receive, as you
mentioned, 40 percent less than last year and its share of UASI
has been cut by 30 percent.
In addition, DHS's efforts to base funding for all the
grants on risk just frankly failed. They created a confusing
process that, among other things, poorly categorized critical
infrastructure, evaluated assets that pose little to no risk of
being attacked, and lack common sense. You referred to the
Statue of Liberty. You referred to the Brooklyn Bridge. Just
another bridge, just another asset.
DHS. The Department of Homeland Security's assessment
deemed New York Police Department's counterterrorism program,
which has been touted by FBI Director Mueller and former
Secretary Ridge ineffective. Ineffective. Now, I remember when
the Chairman and I went down to meet with you, Commissioner
Kelly, and we were impressed. You were doing counterterrorism
when the CIA was still trying to get its act together, so we
thank you for that. One thing is certain frankly, though;
programs that go unfunded certainly will not be effective.
So, as you can see, some of us get a little upset about
this. We live in New York, we love New York, we care about New
York. If New York is the number one threat and Washington is
right there, too, it seems to me they should be getting the
greatest share of the money and they should not be cutting back
on the money that you have already gotten in the past.
So, Mr. Mayor, Commissioner Kelly, Mayor Williams, can you
work with us to get this change before the process is
completed? We need you to talk to the President. We need you to
talk to the Senate. We need you to talk to the House. They all
happen to be of the same party. And if we can get this done,
then you can do the job. Can you work with us, Mr. Mayor?
Mayor Bloomberg. Congresswoman, one of the things that our
administration has tried to do is to work with all branches of
government at every level and all parties. We believe that if
everybody works together we can improve this country and
improve the level of protection. I think that there are
certainly enough ways to improve the system that everybody can
participate, and I would urge everybody to understand what the
real risks are here. This is not a partisan thing. This is not
a geographical thing. It is true that New York and Washington
are far and away the most likely targets; but remember, if
there is an attack on either of those two cities, it is all the
people of this country that suffer. Even if they might not
suffer physical damage, the economic damage and the ability for
them to have a better life for their children is certainly
impaired.
Mrs. Lowey. Mr. Mayor, in closing I just want to make it
clear this committee, led by Chairman King, has operated in a
bipartisan way. Our delegation has operated in a bipartisan
way. We are continuing to push for the funds in a bipartisan
way. I also want to make it clear it is not strange, it is not
coincidental that New York was cut 40 percent. The request from
the White House was cut 60 percent. So the committees are
working with less money.
So if we are going to make a change to this process before
it is over--this bill passed the House and Chairman King
certainly supported the motion to recommit to get the money
resubstituted--if we are going to make a change, and I feel it
is a life-or-death issue, we have to address the White House,
we have to address the House and the Senate, because the
process is not over.
So I hope, Mr. Mayors and Police Commissioners, that you
will work with us to push as hard as we can. It is a life-or-
death issue in a bipartisan way with our Chairman to get this
done.
Mayor Bloomberg. Congresswoman, let me say when I hear you
or the Chairman or the President all say that these moneys
should be distributed on the basis of threat and risk, that
puts a smile on my face and I think the three of you are
absolutely correct.
Mrs. Lowey. Mr. Mayor, I just want to say one other point
and make it again. We have the bill to distribute the money
based on risk for all of these programs passed in the House
three times. It has not passed the Senate. We are pleased that
they will use a risk-based formula. But if you are dealing with
a cup of sugar and the recipe calls for six cups of sugar, you
cannot get the six cups of sugar out of the one cup of sugar.
So we have got to increase the pot. And before the process is
over, I hope you will all work with us because I know how hard
you are working in New York and in Washington to get the
President, the House and the Senate to acknowledge that if we
are putting, as my colleague from Connecticut said, billions of
dollars into Iraq and we both vote for it, we cannot cut back
on homeland security dollars because the implication is clear.
And I thank you and I thank the chairman, and I hope we can
all work together in a bipartisan way, Mr. Mayors, to get that
money back. Thank you.
Mayor Williams. You would certainly have my commitment,
Congresswoman, to work with you on that basis with the chairman
and Congresswoman Norton on a bipartisan basis to work on not
only increasing the pot of sugar but the allocation for the pot
of sugar.
Chairman King. I would just say for the record that I only
allowed the gentlewoman to go so far over her time because she
was saying such good things about me.
Mrs. Lowey. We are a good team.
Chairman King. The gentleman from Nevada, Mr. Gibbons.
Mr. Gibbons. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Gentleman,
thank you for your presence here today. To the Mayors, of
course, thank you for your work in our communities around this
country. This is a very complex formula, no doubt about it,
whether you are looking at the funding grants or the
discretionary grants.
My first question to Mayor Bloomberg or Mayor Williams, do
you fully understand the complexities of the funding formula so
that you know and you are comfortable with your applications
that they are meeting the needs and the expectations of those
people in the Department of Homeland Security when they issued
those grants?
Mayor Bloomberg. I didn't personally write most of the 200-
page report. I have read most of it. I cannot tell you that I
remember every single line or every single number. This is a
compilation of work from the heads of the Police Department,
the Fire Department, Office of Emergency Management, which
pulled it together and all the other city agencies.
New York City and Washington, D.C. really are different in
the sense of the complexity, and I think one of the problems
that some big cities always have is that if you try to write a
request for a proposal or whatever that applies to everybody,
it really winds up applying to nobody or certainly not applying
to those that are different. New York city's police department
is bigger than the next four police departments in the country
added together. That is not to say that the other police
departments, even some very small ones, are not very competent.
Every city adjusts the size of their police department to what
they think is appropriate to protect the people. Commissioner
Kelly and I are very proud of the job that we have done in New
York City. We have brought crime down dramatically in the last
4 years and it is a process that sadly we have to continue. We
will always be faced with that.
Mr. Gibbons. Excuse me for interrupting. I think you made a
very important point and I only have a very limited time to ask
these questions. I think the issue is that in order to meet the
expectations of the Department of Homeland Security in issuing
these grants and their formula, which are very complex and
according to the Department of Homeland Security, that the
understanding of your communities, whether it is Washington,
D.C., New York City or Las Vegas, Nevada are different in what
our needs are.
Mayor Bloomberg. Yes, Congressman, I would argue that if
Homeland Security's obligation is to try to find how to
distribute the funds in the most effective way to protect this
country, to say that we are going to have a process and if you
don't like it, tough luck, that is not their objective. It
shouldn't be their objective. Their objective should be to get
the best compromise possible. We have limited dollars and some
things are subjective.
Mr. Gibbons. That is why the formula is so difficult for
anybody to understand. Because what would be important for New
York City or for Washington, D.C. or Las Vegas, Nevada might
not be the same requirement for Portland, Oregon, or for Omaha,
Nebraska, which makes me wonder how the formula can be set in
stone or determined on the homeland security basis to meet the
needs of New York, Washington, Las Vegas, Omaha, Nebraska,
wherever. That was my question. My question was do you feel
comfortable you know what they expect out of you to get the
right determination for getting that grant?
Mayor Williams. Well, the chief can amplify what I am
saying, Congressman, but I wouldn't be sitting here if I really
knew what the risk assessment was or what the process was or
what the allocation was.
Mr. Gibbons. So we have to invent the wheel every time we
apply for a grant?
Mayor Williams. It should be an objective, transparent
process and it isn't, I don't think.
Chief Ramsey. Congressman, the formula no doubt is
complicated and probably has a little bit of everything in it
with the exception of common sense. That is the one thing that
is missing. The other things I would say is that I am very
pleased that we dropped to the bottom 25 percent in threat. I
feel real good about that, but I never got a classified or
unclassified briefing to tell me why. How could we possibly
fall that far that quickly? Now maybe someone is just pulling
my leg because I am constantly getting phone calls. I have a
briefing tomorrow at the FBI about different investigations and
so forth. I have not seen anything that would make us fall that
far. It makes absolutely no sense.
So whatever formula they came up with they need to rethink
it because it will not get you to the Moon. It won't get you
off the ground in the way in which they have calculated it
right now. If the threat is expanded for other cities, then
guess what, put more money in the pot and give them what they
need, because unless we have an umbrella protection around this
country, then we are not safe. And if one of us is not safe,
none of us are safe.
And I think the last thing we should do is get involved in
who got how much money and start fighting amongst ourselves
because the whole goal has to be homeland security, from coast
to coast, from sea to sea. It has to be, and that is exactly
what is failing in this entire process. The funding strength
should be multiple years, not just one year. It should not be,
guess what you get behind door three next year.
What is wrong with having a spending plan that gives you a
3-year projection so you can plan accordingly and make sure
that you have got what you need. These are the kinds of things
that are missing.
But I do not want to take anything away from the master's
degrees and doctorates and all the folks that had all these
degrees that put together this formula. But they are missing
something here. The cake is just not being baked properly. It
is just one of those that just will not rise.
Mr. Gibbons. Well, I know the frustrations are out there.
Even in Nevada when you deal with Las Vegas and the fact that
Las Vegas, the information that was presented to Homeland
Security obviously did not make it into the, whatever you turn
the cake mix with to make it work, because Las Vegas got taken
off but when you look at their criteria for what they consider
to be the requirements for getting this and the information was
given to me, somehow it is not getting through the system.
Whether the screen is too fine and the information that has got
to go through that screen does not get there, something is
wrong with the formula. And Mr. Chairman, I hope at some point
we get an answer as to how the formula is actually constructed.
Thank you.
Chairman King. The gentleman's time has expired. The
gentlewoman from the District of Columbia, Ms. Norton.
Ms. Norton. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Mayor
Bloomberg, everybody seeks to identify with New York in some
way. I do want to say at the outset that I am a native
Washingtonian who also loves New York, and I have a lot of
reasons for that. Both of my kids were born at Mount Sinai
Hospital. I was an appointed commissioner in the New York City
government. So I feel your pain in lots of ways along with our
own.
In fact, the question I am going to ask is based on
something from the Mayor's testimony but it is really a
question for you both because as we search and we scratched our
heads, I am on another committee that also has raised the same
question about Washington and New York. The Mayor says in his
testimony at page 7 that we are not going to face more risk but
we will not be able essentially to make the improvements we
should make.
Now, of course, we can argue about that. That is really not
the point of my question.
The police chief has already talked about equipment that
has a shelf life. Everybody knows we have got to be better off
than we were when the Pentagon was hit and when the World Trade
Center was hit.
But then he says the problem is we have to improve our
capacity and that the items he listed in his testimony would
not allow us to get it done ``at least as soon as we would have
liked.'' Now I am really, this is the basis for my question,
and it is a question for New York as well. I am asking a
question essentially trying to look at a way to revise this
formula, this cockeyed formula which may keep giving us the
same results.
Mayor Williams, you referred among these items, and I can
choose any one, to explosive device response as the ones among
the areas you identify. The fact is that we have eight bomb
squads in this region and not one of them meets part one of the
FEMA requirements. They all go out. They get it done. But they
are not top, not one of them are a top bomb squad. So over time
we will get it done. Or let's look at WMD hazardous--let's look
at interoperability communications. This is a region unlike
most areas. We are really talking about three States here. So
the notion that something happens, half the Federal presence is
in Virginia and Maryland, that there would not be instant
communications, that would make everybody's hair stand on end.
So in trying to figure out if these are the two top targets
of al-Qaeda and there is this kind of unfinished business,
should not another element of risk be the urgency of
eliminating at least certain kinds of vulnerabilities. That is
to say, what is the cost of delay, what is the cost of delay
here as opposed to other places when you are talking about WMD
hazardous materials response, Mr. Mayor. And we are talking
about all the Federal workers getting here using WMATA and
WMATA subway tunnels, and we not being prepared to deal with
biological or chemical attack there.
So my question really goes to not really only over time if
we keep giving money will these vulnerabilities be shored up.
It is whether or not the highest targeted places can afford to
do anything but have the most rapid elimination of certain
vulnerabilities in order to ensure their security, and I just
would like you to speak to the notion of timing of what gets
delayed and what your view is of delay when it comes to the
places where al-Qaeda and other terrorists are most fixed upon.
Mayor Williams. Congresswoman, I didn't mean to insinuate
by saying that we are going to do the best we can in a
difficult situation to imply that we are fine, do not worry
about it. In fact, where the threat is at the same or
increasing, if you are not improving your situation is
deteriorating. And I think the chief can point out some
specific instances for you.
Chief Ramsey. Yes, ma'am. I mentioned earlier that a lot of
what we had planned to do would be delayed. For example, an
intelligence fusion center. We have a command center and
operation center but it cannot receive certain classified
information right now. It is not networked with other fusion
centers in the region to a point where the kind of
interoperability that exists for sharing information is there.
We have people in the different fusion centers, we do a lot by
telephone. We meet on a regular basis and all that. But
electronically this money would have allowed us to be able to
have that interoperability quicker that is going to be delayed.
Interoperable communications, we are talking data, video, we
are talking about the Mayor's Command Center upgrades, mobile
communications, chemical, biological, our CBRNE response
capabilities. It is not that we do not have this but certainly
to try to raise to a tier one as you mentioned earlier--I mean,
we have a very, very good, capable bomb squad, but there are
certain requirements to be considered tier one that need to be
met and that process gets delayed. And again that is not an
overnight deal. A lot of training goes into an individual being
qualified to work in a unit like that. A lot of equipment is
needed. That equipment and technology constantly changes and
you need to upgrade and you need to make sure that you have
state of the art equipment.
Our investigative response, whether it is from our
emergency response team, our harbor branch, air support,
whatever it might be. That is a constant effort. And one of the
downsides of the fact that there hasn't been another attack
since September 11 is that it becomes more and more difficult
to keep officers focused on this aspect of police work. So you
have to have constant training, constant exercises, things of
that nature, so people stay sharp and that is one of the things
that all of us have to guard against. And I think that that
somehow sometimes gets lost.
So the training, the exercises, all those kinds of things,
can we do it with what we have got? We can do it but to a
lesser degree.
Mayor Bloomberg. Congresswoman, I think when you talk about
spending money for security, there is no question that if we
had a police officer in every block and a firehouse on every
block the public would be safer. But in the real world you
obviously cannot do that. So there is a judgmental component of
what is an appropriate level of resources to devote to
prevention and to training for response. In our city what I
have said repeatedly to the public is we will do everything
that the police commissioner and the fire commissioner and the
other commissioners tell me we absolutely have to do to keep
our city safe, and I will then go and worry about how to pay
for it elsewhere.
When you ask what have we done without because we do not
get a particular grant, let's say from Homeland Security, the
answer really is found in our school system, in our libraries,
in our cultural institutions, in helping those who are less
fortunate because in the end there is only so much money that
we have. All of these moneys are fungible and if you say your
number one priority is security, which I think it has to be,
then everything else suffers.
But we have, for example, spent the money to make our
radios interoperable. That has become a buzz phrase. Our police
department and fire department are able to communicate
electronically. What is more important is they spend the money
and we spend the moneys to get them to train together all the
time so they know each other and their interoperability is at
the level on the scene where the ranking police officer and the
ranking fire officer make those life saving decisions that only
people with experience and training and knowledge of what is
going on right then and there can do.
We still have a long ways to go. We would like to have more
communications to share data as well as voice, but in the end
the answer to your question is that we have to go, and I think
Mayor Williams said it very well, if you do not constantly
train and improve you fall back because the enemy is constantly
changing and going about things in ways that they do not repeat
the things of the past. They know we will be ready for them.
The problem is we have got to be ready for something we have
never seen before.
Commissioner.
Commissioner Kelly. One program that certainly is on hold
and we were led to believe that we were going to receive
funding for is our Lower Manhattan Security Initiative. We are
putting, or at least our plan is to put increased security in
Manhattan below Canal Street. It is an area of course that has
had two successful terrorist attacks. New York is still the
financial capital of the world. In that area we are going to
have the Freedom Tower constructed, we are going to have the
Goldman Sacks Tower constructed, the New York Stock Exchange is
there. The American Stock Change is there. The World Financial
Center is there, and there is a lot of construction planned for
that area.
We had requested moneys for that program. It would have
involved additional cameras. There are 535 intersections in
that area. We wanted to have cameras at half of those
intersections. We wanted to put in license plate readers,
physical barriers that would enable us to cut off that area if
necessary and a coordination center where public and private
stakeholders would man a coordination center 24 hours a day. We
believe that is a very important initiative. That is now put on
hold as a result of the funding that we have received from
Homeland Security in 2006.
Ms. Norton. Thank you. I just want to say, my point here
was, and I think you have responded, is factoring in the cost
of delay as a cost in security. And there are certain things
that high targeted cities like New York and Washington would
hate to get caught not done. And it does seem to me that
Homeland Security figured whatever else you do, we agree that
those things must be done, the tunnels, for example, or the
interoperability. And I think you made it clear that there
would be some, there would be some advantage in it. And instead
of just looking at these things as a list and figuring out
these things, if you do not do them now maybe it will not
matter at all. So let's at least get those things done.
Chairman King. The time of the gentlewoman has expired.
Commissioner Kelly, the project you are referring to is similar
to what is in the City of London, right, the Ring of Steel?
Commissioner Kelly. Yes, it has similarities and we of
course consult with them. They call it the Ring of Steel. We
also want to enlist and bring together the private security
personnel, particularly in that area. We are doing it generally
throughout the city, but particularly in that area. So yes, it
is roughly similar to the so-called Ring of Steel in London.
Chairman King. Recognize the gentleman from Texas, Mr.
McCaul, who was the chairman of the Investigation Subcommittee
and former member of the Joint Terrorism Task Force. Mr.
McCaul.
Mr. McCaul. Thank you. It is good to see you all here
again. I think I was just as shocked as the chairman was when
we got the news that funding was cut nearly in half not only
for New York, Washington, but my home State of Texas. Let me
get your comment. One thing I heard is that landmarks were not
considered targeted assets. I used to work at counterterrorism
in the Justice Department. I recall in 1995 that Ramzi Yousef,
who was the architect of the 1993 World Trade Center met with a
guy named Khalid Sheik Mohammed, who was his uncle in Pakistan,
and discussed with him the idea of flying airplanes into
buildings, including landmarks, and that was the specific
language of the reporting I saw, including landmarks, because
of the high psychological significance of hitting a landmark.
Like the Statue of Liberty, like the Washington Monument or
like the United States Capitol. And of course we know Khalid
Sheik Mohammed was the mastermind behind September 11.
So I am just baffled and I wanted to get your feedback as
to why a landmark of that magnitude is not considered to be a
targeted asset, at least your understanding of talking with
DHS.
Mayor Bloomberg. I do not think any of us can give you a
good answer to this. I think it goes back to what we talked
about before where it seems to me that Homeland Security's job
and what this committee should be ensuring that they do, and do
well, is to figure out where the moneys should be spent, rather
than setting up a competition and seeing who can write a better
report or a report that pleases them or defining things one way
or another.
If you went to the private sector, to the insurance
companies and said where is the risk, I do not think anybody
doubts what they would say. It would not have New York and
Washington way down, quite the contrary. It would have the two
of them up there and there would be three or four other cities,
maybe you get to seven, some number like that, and then there
would be a gap. Because while there are clearly things
throughout this country that are critical to the
infrastructure, to the survival of this country, to our economy
and our ability to live our lives, those tend not to be, most
of them, targets. And what you are trying to do is to prevent
an attack and so if the critical item is not a target, having
Homeland Security moneys to protect that does not make a lot of
sense, particularly in a world where we will never have enough
money. Even Washington does not have enough money to do
everything.
What this is about is setting priorities and when you set
priorities the easiest way is to say, well, everybody gets
something because then nobody gets disappointed and nobody has
to go home and explain why for this particular program they
didn't get any money.
Now nobody has asked me in a long time nor have I come to
Washington to argue that New York should have more money than
the next agriculture bill, but nevertheless I think it is very
similar. There are places that deserve agriculture money
because they have agriculture. There are places that should get
the most of the Homeland Security money because they have
targets. And the questions that you are asking us, how the
structure, the application process is, seems to me you should
ask them. And their obligation is to have an applications
process that produces the results that are in the country's
interest. Not to say, well, here is our process and if you do
not pass, so what? The question of the applicability of their
process is what you should be talking about.
Mr. McCaul. Mr. Chairman, I think this is the clarion call
to have the faster and smarter funding bill passed out of the
Senate. It has been sitting over there. It is the reason why we
have this result today, and it is time for this to pass.
And if I could just ask one last question. $5 billion in
the pipeline, unspent money in, do you understand why that
money is being held up and why it is not being allocated to the
States and locals?
Mayor Williams. I have no idea, Congressman, and I would
just echo what Mayor Bloomberg is saying. I think there is a
risk assessment which I would question and then there is the
process used to allocate based on that risk, and both are
problematic.
Mr. McCaul. I yield back the balance of my time.
Chairman King. The gentlewoman from Texas, Ms. Jackson Lee.
Ms. Jackson-Lee. I thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I
thank you and the ranking member for what I think is a
provocative, a vital, crucial statement being made by this
Congress and the responsibility that we have of oversight.
I make a simple point and I hope that it is one that
resonates with the Department of Homeland Security and also
that fighting terrorism is not business as usual. And frankly,
if we were to be truthful in the process, I think the simple
questions of the applicants should be how do we protect the
homeland from terrorism in the homeland? That is one question.
And how do we fight the terrorists? And if cities who are at
risk with targets can enunciate and detail those particular
questions, which I think is what we are asking you to do, then
my question to DHS in a very fair and hopeful objective and
factual seeking manner is why.
I noticed that there was quite an array that fall on this
list and they are all attractive cities, and I might say that
Houston is included. And so I certainly would not want to pull
any off the list and give any commentary about whether they
need more agricultural money, but I might agree with you, Mayor
Bloomberg, that some of these might be more apt to get more
funding in agriculture. And this is not to denigrate the
interest of cities across America.
As I speak about where we are and whether we need the
furtherance of the many legislation that my good friend has
spoken about that has stalled in the Senate, I have to admit
that all we need to do is take the backdrop of 9/11. It is sad
that sometimes our memory fades. The absolute horror and fear
that struck America and certainly struck all of us as we
watched our cities, New York and Washington and other cities
whose names were floating around. I recalled standing on the
grassy knoll of the Capitol watching the Pentagon, phones
jammed but rumors floating. Commissioner Kelly your predecessor
Lee Brown was the Mayor of Houston at that time. We were very
fortunate, and finding out or thinking or getting a rumor that
planes also were headed to Houston, Texas. Why? Because it is
noted as the energy capital of the world.
But as I look at my own set of circumstances I find that
even though we might be in the mix, we were subjected to,
Houston, a 10 percent decrease in funding and if you compared
our 2006 funding to our 2005, we actually got in 2005, 2006
dollars, $3 million less. And these are cities I think that
clearly speak to the question or the, I think, formula that you
have utilized, Mayor Bloomberg, which is threat and risk as I
understand it. And I think your point was just because there
are critical sites does not make it a risk and we should
combine threat and risk together. And I think both you and
Mayor Williams are clearly in that vein.
Let me cite for you a process utilized by the DHS, and I
would welcome your comments. Information Bulletin 99 said,
essentially it told the State and local governments that DHS
could not answer questions about the application process. The
bottom line, DHS was not going to provide guidance but only
directives.
So you could not engage, as I understand, to even find out
whether you were off the beaten path. And let me add this point
and I yield to you for questions. When I look at the language
that is used for these grants, again, I said simply how do we
fight terrorists on our soil, I see these words, ``relevance,
the relationship of the investment to the tenets of the interim
national preparedness goal.'' Commissioner Kelly, I guess you
have to spend some time trying to understand what that is all
about.
Regionalization, which I think ``communications'' would
have been a good word, ``sustainability,'' ``implementation
approach,'' ``impact,'' and then they go down to say ``the peer
review committee.'' ``Relevance to interim national
preparedness goal implementation.'' ``Connection to the
enhancement plan.'' ``Complete picture.'' ``Innovativeness,
feasibility and reasonableness.''
My question to you is if we are in the business of fighting
terrorism that raises its ugly head every day, can you instruct
us on what you would think would be the fine points that we
need to ask as the bureaucrats of DHS are doing the best they
can do to get to the crux of the problem in terms of providing
dollars where they need to go?
Now you made the general statement about risk and threat,
but if we wanted to be fair and say there was a criteria what
should it be, putting aside the fact of course that you have
talked about the needs, and I will start with you, Mayor
Williams, the needs that you have before general crime
fighting? And I am sorry we cut the COPS program and a number
of other programs that would help you. What would be something
that we could point out and give directive as we write
legislation as it makes its way back to the House.
Chairman King. If the gentlelady would yield, I was going
to say Mayor Bloomberg has to leave in about 15, 20 minutes. I
would ask the witnesses to limit the answers to 30 seconds, and
each of the other questioners to stay within the 5-minute limit
so we can get as many people to question Mayor Bloomberg, and
then any follow-up we can give you in writing.
Mayor Williams. I would just say, again, and I will be
brief, recognizing that Mayor Bloomberg has got a tight
schedule. Again, you have got risk out there in terms of, you
know, the probability of something happening, the severity of
something that happens, it is not based on area. It is not
based on the quality of someone's application. If I get a lower
SAT score than Mayor Bloomberg, so what? Because the country is
advancing, because of a higher SAT score people are moving
forward. This isn't like that.
Let's assume my application wasn't written well, and you
step in there, and you fix the problem because again the risk
is based on locality. That is the number one consideration.
Chairman King. Mayor Bloomberg.
Mayor Bloomberg. Number one, let me thank the people of
Houston for everything you have done for the people of New
Orleans. You are a role model, and I was lucky enough to have
the Mayor of Houston Bill White as our guest to look at how we
are doing, building affordable housing. And I think Mayor
Williams said it exactly right. This is not a competition of
who gets the highest SAT scores. This is a competition of who
needs something and it is the Department of Homeland Security's
obligation to help them write an application that presents the
facts, not to put them in the competition. They just seem to
have the objective wrong here.
Chairman King. Gentleman from the State of Washington, who
is the chairman of the Emergency Preparedness Subcommittee and
former sheriff of King County, Mr. Reichert.
Mr. Reichert. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First of all, I can
certainly identify with the chief and the commissioner on
managing your resources on much smaller scale, as sheriff in
Seattle with 1,100 employees, not 40,000, but still struggling
with the same sort of issues. And Seattle is one of those
cities that has been identified as a risk in this Nation, and
we have had several instances that have occurred within our
region. And we took a 24 percent cut in our grant funds.
But I wanted to just focus on--everyone on the panel today
has made similar comments in that we are in a new world, that
we need to think anew, and recognize and realize that the
attack on September 11 changed the world and changed this
Nation, and we should be focused on protecting our country and
those cities that are most vulnerable, and threat and risk is
the way that we need to move. There are some questions about
grant moneys, and I wanted to just ask--I have a list here of
moneys. First, responder funding. Both cities receive first
responder funding, funding from DHS?
Mayor Bloomberg. Sure.
Mayor Williams. Sure.
Mr. Reichert. Do you know the amount?
Commissioner Kelly. I don't know if you break it down into
first responders. It would depend on what category you are
talking about. As far as the police department is concerned, I
mentioned before we had received a total since fiscal year 2002
of $280 million. Obviously we are first responders. Fire
department has received over a $100 million in New York City.
Mr. Reichert. These are grant categories. You want to
receive moneys. That is certainly why we are here today, State
Homeland Security Grant Program, moneys from that. Law
Enforcement Terrorism Prevention grants, Port Security grants.
Commissioner Kelly. Yes. Yeah. We received, I think, $28
million of that. That program, by the way, is being eliminated,
I believe, the Terrorist Prevention Program next fiscal year.
Mr. Reichert. Firefighter assistance grants, those are
all--I just wonder, how much money--first to Mayor Williams.
How much money does the City of Washington, D.C., get in
Federal grants to assist them in their efforts to protect?
Mayor Williams. Yeah, comprehensively--
Mr. Reiskin. Congressman, the State this year--as a State,
the District of Columbia is getting about $7.5 million from the
Department of Homeland Security outside of the UASI process.
That is the State Homeland Security Program, Law Enforcement
Terrorism Prevention Program, and $165,000 for Citizen Corps.
That is what we get as a State. There is no separate first
responder program that I am aware of.
Mr. Reichert. What is the total Federal grant moneys to the
fire department, police department, emergency management, Mr.
Mayor? Would you know?
Mayor Bloomberg. This year, under the proposed budget we
will get $124 million. As I pointed out earlier, our budget, if
you add $5.5 billion annually for the police department, which
doesn't count our capital budget, if you add another billion
and a half or so for our fire department, which doesn't count
our capital budget, so a lot of things in homeland security
where they give you money for capital items, that is just a
whole separate thing for us and then all of these other
agencies. The problem is that sometimes the ways that Homeland
Security divides out, and I understand they are trying to craft
something that applies nationwide. I tried to make the point
before that as the old joke about clothing, one size fits all,
fits nobody.
Mr. Reichert. Yes. The $250 million that you say you spend,
that comes directly out of the police department's budget? Or
does the city increase the police department's budget to
accomplish that? Do you have to remove personnel from the
streets from other assignments, sir?
Commissioner Kelly. The $280 million we receive--
Mr. Reichert. The Mayor mentioned the $250 million a year
figure you spend in the police department.
Commissioner Kelly. Yes. Right. Again, it fluctuates from
year to year depending on the threat to a certain extent, but
it comes through the police department budget, yes, sir.
Mr. Reichert. Since September 11, you have received Federal
grant moneys and you have purchased some equipment in both
cities and also accomplished some training. What are some of
the things that you see? First to Mayor Williams, what are the
things--specific things today that you need to spend some of
your money on as far as equipment and training? Does the
chief--
Mayor Williams. Yeah. The chief in an answer to a previous
question, Congressman, mentioned the need for training,
mentioned the need for enhancement of intelligence analysis,
which asks that it be based on the ground level.
Mr. Reichert. The fusion center.
Mayor Williams. Exactly, yes. Fusion center process. And in
response to another part of your question, talked about in
terms of the impact, not only are we failing to keep up with an
ever changing and increasing threat, which is serious in and of
itself as to the terrorism aspect of this, there is a back felt
aspect of this, other consequence of this, which is resources
you are putting here, right. Mayor Bloomberg alluded to this.
You only have a limited number of funds. If you say that anti-
terrorism, counterterrorism is your number one priority, then
those are funds that would have been going into your
neighborhoods, would have been going into better health care,
would have been going into other things that a city necessarily
has to do.
Mayor Bloomberg. Congressman, a lot of times people ask the
question, well, you got this money last year. Why do you need
more money? And the truth of the matter is virtually everything
that we do to provide homeland security for our homeland is a
recurring expense, the moneys we spend with police on the
ground, we are going to have to have people next year. The
training, every year there is turnover but there is also new
things to learn and there is refresher stuff. Equipment, it all
has service lives, it all requires maintenance. You buy a
computer, the software--ongoing maintenance and software costs
more than the computer every single year. So this argument that
we gave you some money at one point in time, therefore, you
should be protected forever, just isn't very realistic.
Chairman King. The time of the gentleman has expired.
Mr. Reichert. May I make one comment, Mr. Chairman?
Chairman King. Of course.
Mr. Reichert. Mr. Mayor, you just made my point for me.
Thank you very much.
Chairman King. The time of the gentleman has expired. I
would advise the committee we will have to end this first panel
at 12:15 and then 15-minute recess, we will go to the second
panel.
The gentleman from Paterson, New Jersey, my good friend,
Mr. Pascrell.
Mr. Pascrell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman King. Who has been patiently waiting.
Mr. Pascrell. It is good to talk and listen to fellow
Mayors. There is only 26 of us here, you know. That is part of
the problem. This is a sham, not this hearing, but this whole
operation, and we blame the folks that come before us in
Homeland Security because we look for scapegoats, but you know
better, let's be honest. Your funding--each of you in your
cities, Mayor Williams, Mayor Bloomberg--was cut 50 percent in
areas that we haven't even talked about. State homeland
security money, yours was cut 50 percent, yours was cut 50
percent, Mayor, so when we talk about the urban part of this,
the urban side of this, which both of you were devastated,
unless you understand the day-to-day operations of the
community, small or large in this country, you have no idea. So
the pressures that are placed on both of you in terms of--you
have heard it mentioned on both sides of the aisle, of the COPS
program being decimated, the administration attempting to cut
by 35 percent the fire grant dollars that puts more pressure on
you to get the job done on a day-to-day basis. So there is
bipartisanship here, but when we leave this room, it is not
bipartisanship. I don't mean the people in this room. I am
talking about what is happening here and across the street. So
we are going to have Homeland Security come after you, and they
have to bear the brunt. They have to protect the folks down the
street that have given us a budget that literally cut your
funding for the whole country by $1.4 billion. So the pie got
smaller, and we have decided to cut it up in a different way.
So that is where we are in this moment of time.
The per capita even makes it look worse, makes it look
worse. So what you brought up weeks and months and months ago,
Mayor Bloomberg, about the per capita was not just a sidebar,
it goes to the very, very heart of the matter, of what you need
to do day to day. I asked Governor Ridge when he was in charge
of this monstrosity that we put together, I asked him, did you
ever see the terror on people's faces in neighborhoods that
don't know whether their kids are going to come back from
school? You ever see that terror? How do we respond to that
terror? We respond by putting uniformed police officers, as we
have done since 1993, out in the street. Of course if they are
there, we can do that in community policing. What has that got
to do with terror? It has a lot to do with what you have to
deal with day in and day out. And frankly, I don't know how the
hell you do it.
I am being honest with you. I have got a question for both
of you.
Much has been said about the massive $83 million cut in New
York City. Much has been said about the $31 million cut in the
UASI money imposed on Washington, D.C. These are obviously
significant sums of money, but I think that sometimes we all
lose sight of the real significance of these cuts when we just
speak in terms of dollars. Can either of you or your chiefs
respectively in their areas, can you speak about how these cuts
will impact your daily operations? What happens to New York and
Washington, D.C., when we have to increase the alert? Does it
cost you anything? If we understand your plight, we don't make
these dumb moves that we are making in this budget. Either one
of you or all--
Mayor Bloomberg. Congressman, I think, you know, Mayors--I
probably speak for all the Mayors of small towns and big
cities. We have budgets that we have to live within. The public
wants more services and doesn't want to pay any more local
taxes. We have to make decisions, allocations, pick and choose,
cut back and increase depending on what there has--what the
needs of the day are. But what we can't do is we can't adjust
our security kinds of activities every day or every year based
on funding. We have to hire people and train them, we have to
build buildings, we have to buy equipment, we have to train,
and those are--as Chief Ramsey said, those are long-term
commitments that require a consistent funding stream, and that
is one of the things that makes dealing with this so difficult.
Mr. Pascrell. Mayor Williams.
Mayor Williams. Congressman, again there is two parts to
this. I keep saying there is a risk assessment and then there
is a funding. Now, based on the risk assessment, really we
shouldn't have any problem because I am going to expect to see
80 percent fewer requests for aid over the next year because
apparently everything is fixed. Now, that is not going to
happen. We know that. Look at the presidential inauguration, an
unprecedented level and show of force at the presidential
inauguration, recognizing that like New York the financial
center of the world, Washington is the political center of the
world, right? How has that changed? I can't even fathom that.
And the chief can talk to you, as he has in our previous
answers to questions, the impact material, substantive impact
this has in trying to make the city work, as you suggest, Mr.
Congressman.
Mr. Pascrell. And Mr. Chairman, in New Jersey--and we
responded together, as you well know, in New Jersey. What
happens to New York impacts us across the river appreciably,
and we are here to tell you that we are going to do everything
in our power to get the Homeland Security Department--I have
given up on the folks down the street. I don't know what party
they belong to, to be very honest with you, but I am trying to
get the Homeland Security Department to understand your plight
every day and to give us a real simple explanation about what
effectiveness means. Of course you have high risk and yet you
weren't very effective in your application. Doesn't make any
sense whatsoever.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman King. Time of the gentleman has expired. Chief
Ramsey and then we will close the panel.
Chief Ramsey. Just a real quick response because there is a
hidden cost in what you are saying. We get--does not cause the
alert level to go up. If the alert level goes to orange, we can
seek reimbursement. It stays at yellow yet the information
coming in is no less important that would be actionable for us
at a local level, which cost us resources. I am sure it happens
in New York all the time. It certainly happens in Washington
all the time. There is no reimbursement for that, but it causes
you to have to extend hours, call people in especially to
handle a particular situation, or what have you, and those are
the kinds of hidden costs that are incurred.
Chairman King. I would like to thank our panel. Mayor
Williams, Chief Ramsey, Deputy Mayor Reiskin, Mayor Bloomberg,
of course Commissioner Kelly. I excuse the first panel. I thank
them for their testimony. They are excused, and the committee
will stand in recess until approximately 12:30.
[Recess.]
Chairman King. The committee will come to order. First of
all, Secretary Foresman, I deeply regret keeping you waiting
and I do appreciate your coming back before the committee. I
know we had a classified meeting with you several weeks ago,
and you and I have had a number of personal conversations and
what we will do in the next session since--Chairman Lungren,
you can begin the next session since you were here first. And
with that, recognizing Secretary Foresman.
STATEMENT OF THE HON. GEORGE FORESMAN, UNDER
SECRETARY FOR PREPAREDNESS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND
SECURITY
Mr. Foresman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member
Thompson and members of the committee. I appreciate the
opportunity to appear today to discuss the 2006 Homeland
Security Grant Program and specifically their Urban Areas
Security Initiative. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee,
I will say I both appreciate and acknowledge the perspectives
offered by Mayors Bloomberg and Williams. I consider Ray Kelly
and Chuck Ramsey to be two of the best police professionals in
America and I think it was a good discussion. And I will note
that both Mayors are forceful advocates for New York City and
Washington. Their communities are well served by their
leadership.
But Mr. Chairman, just as the Mayors are advocates for
their communities and their individual ability to ready for the
risk of terrorism, the Department of Homeland Security must do
the same for our entire Nation. These are not competing goals.
They are complementary, albeit from different vantage points.
Mr. Chairman, I would like to be clear with several facts.
Number one, New York City has the highest risk from terrorism.
Their ranking in this year's analysis did not change. It is the
highest funded city in the UASI program, $124 million this year
and that is $44 million higher than the next urban area on the
ranking list. In fact since the inception of the UASI program
in 2003, New York City has received $525 million, more than
twice the amount of any other city in the Nation.
The National Capital Region also ranks among the top six
urban areas and ranks third in total UASI funding, having
received $167 million since the start of the program.
Two, the changes in allocated funds for New York City and
the National Capital Region were primarily driven by two key
factors. First, there was less money available this year for
UASI, specifically, 14 percent less or a total reduction of
$125 million. Secondly, we have a better understanding of the
risk in the other urban areas that comprise the UASI program.
It is not that New York City's or the National Capital Region's
risk is less. It is because the measure of risk in other areas
outside of New York and the National Capital Region has
increased. Forty-four of the 46 urban areas saw their relative
risk measure rise this year, in some cases by three or
fourfold. Why? Because we are improving in our ability to
measure urban risk beyond the borders of New York City and
Washington. Until now, there was little data available to
support an analysis on a nationwide level outside of these two
metropolitan areas.
In fact, Chicago, Newark, Jersey City, L.A., Long Beach,
Houston and San Francisco required an additional $53 million to
address their increased risk rankings relative to New York
City.
Incidentally, after considering the 14 percent across the
board reduction in UASI funding, this corresponds about
approximately to the change to New York City.
Risk does not equal threat, and this is my point number
three. In conducting our risk analysis, we considered
population, population density, critical assets, threats based
on law enforcement and intelligence data, vulnerability and
consequences among other factors. Threat is one element of risk
analysis. For instance, last year 11,300 critical facilities
nationwide were factored into our risk analysis. This year
there were more than 260,000. These are facilities that if
attacked could cause grave impacts on those who live and work
inside or nearby or could cause a national level impact similar
to what Mayor Bloomberg described an attack on New York City
doing.
New York City had the highest risk ranking. New York City
received the highest amount of funding. I have personally
looked at the classified threat summaries over the last several
days. We have all seen public reports in the media about
arrests, investigations and the like. Commissioner Kelly
underscored many of these. New York City and the National
Capital Region are the most discussed, but there are threat
concerns across our entire country.
Point number four, the investment justification and
effectiveness of the review process was not--and I repeat, was
not a measure of grant writing skills or how well programs in a
particular community were performing. It was simply an analysis
of how a particular urban area was tying its use of Federal
funds to previously developed local, State and national
strategies as well as program guidelines. It also assessed the
ability of the community to ensure sustained commitment of
effort beyond the availability of Federal funds. Each community
can pursue any or all investment justifications with their
funding that they do receive this year as long as it is not
prohibitive by program regulations. My point being that the
City of New York will not have to stop doing any of its
programs if it chooses to apply all of its funding against
those areas that it applied for funding for. None of those are
exclusively prohibited.
Five, there have also been innuendos that contractors
providing routine and administrative support to the
effectiveness review process may have played a role in the
allocation decisions. Let me be clear. All policy development
and decision making during the fiscal year 2006 Homeland
Security Grant Program, UASI allocation process was initiated
and approved by Federal staff, specifically staff from the
Department of Homeland Security. Contract staff is routinely
used throughout the Federal Government to provide
administrative support for everything from grant management to
top secret weapons system design.
Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, what the facts
demonstrate are this: New York City and the National Capital
Region only received less money this year because Congress
provided less money to give out this year and because we
understand that other urban areas had higher risk than
previously understood in previous years. New York and
Washington, the National Capital Region are still the most at-
risk cities in the Nation, and that is why they are both
receiving the vast majority of grant money this year.
That being said, Mr. Chairman, and members in the
committee, we at the Department of Homeland Security have a
responsibility to look at the risk for the entire Nation, not
just the risk for one or two select cities across the country.
We remain committed in that effort to providing flexibility in
how we assess risk and how we apply resources.
The process this year represents the lessons of 9/11. As a
nation, we must understand the methods terrorists may use to
kill and injure and to inflict pain on our Nation. New York
City and the National Capital Region were the targets of the
last attack, and they will likely be target of future attacks.
But they are not alone. The risks they face are shared by every
State and every community to some degree. We at the Department
of Homeland Security are charged with America's safety and
security, and that is what drives the allocation of our UASI
resources.
DHS continues to balance the need for maximum transparency
in the funding processes with the need to avoid publicly giving
our enemies a roadmap to our national vulnerabilities. We will
continue to work closely with our partners at the State and
local level, with Congress to ensure that we protect the entire
Nation and that we provide a clear understanding of the
progress we are making in reducing America's risk from
terrorism.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, and I
look forward to your questions.
[The statement of Mr. Foresman follows:]
Prepared Statement of George W. Foresman
Introduction
Chairman King, Ranking Member Thompson and Members of the
Committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to
discuss the Homeland Security Grant Program and specifically, concerns
raised about the allocation process for the Urban Areas Security
Initiative (UASI) funds.
There has been much debate and discussion during the past several
weeks. Some of the information presented in public has been accurate
and some has not. The debate itself is positive - it is welcome and
necessary for us to be engaged in discussion over homeland security
priorities and funding.
One thing however is very clear: the discussion on funding should
not be an issue of placing the safety and security of any one person,
community or State in America ahead of another. This is very much about
making our entire nation safer and more secure by managing risk in a
way that lessens the vulnerability of the entire country.
The safety and security of each and every American lies at the core
of the mission of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and it is
a mission that the men and women of the Department take seriously.
However, a safer and more secure America is not an exclusive
mission of the Department of Homeland Security. America's safety and
security is a shared national responsibility. It is a mission that is
shared among local, State and Federal agencies, the public and private
sectors and the American people. In the context of terrorism, it
requires an unprecedented mix of efforts - border and immigration
controls, security in our ports, and airports and protection of
critical assets and infrastructure, including transportation,
communication, financial and energy. Homeland security is about
managing risk for the entire nation based on a comprehensive national
approach; it is about applying limited resources most effectively based
on our understanding of America's overall risk.
Let me be very clear, there is a critical distinction to be made:
Threat is not synonymous with risk, nor is risk analysis synonymous
with risk management, as I will discuss later.
There are many tools employed every day and in every way to keep
our nation safer and more secure from the threat of terrorism and a
host of other hazards and threats that comprise our national risk
continuum. Today, I would like to focus on the Homeland Security Grant
Program (HSGP).
The HSGP is the Department's primary means of homeland security
assistance to the states and local communities, and it includes the
State Homeland Security Program (SHSP), the Law Enforcement Terrorism
Prevention Program (LETPP), and the Urban Areas Security Initiative
(UASI), along with the Metropolitan Medical Response System and Citizen
Corps Programs. As such, HSGP is one of the Department's most important
and visible mechanisms to manage national strategic risk.
Today's testimony will focus on the method DHS utilized to evaluate
the risk of terrorism to States, territories, and Urban Areas; the peer
review process we employed to determine the expected effectiveness of
proposed solutions, and ultimately, the risk management techniques we
used to determine allocations for Fiscal Year (FY) 2006. I will go into
great detail regarding how the Department strived to employ an
objective, comprehensive, and fair process for allocating FY2006 HSGP
grants to improve nationwide terrorism preparedness.
The debate about "who got how much" has overshadowed the more
important discussion about the best way to use limited financial
resources to increase America's security. We used an approach this year
that expands our understanding of what constitutes risk while taking
into account Congressional guidance encouraging our nation to move away
from "reaction" to "strategic preparation."
As Secretary Chertoff said in recent remarks pertaining to this
program,
"We cannot protect every single person at every moment in every place
against every threat. What we have to do is manage the risk, and that
means we have to evaluate consequence, vulnerability, and threat in
order to determine what is the most cost-effective way of maximizing
security."
The Department's grants programs have traditionally provided
financial assistance to all 50 States, the District of Columbia, the
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Territories. By the end of
Fiscal Year (FY) 2006, states and localities will have received from
DHS over $18 billion in assistance and direct support from the
Department of Homeland Security since September 11, 2001. This does not
account for the additional billions made available from the Departments
of Health and Human Services and Justice.
The Department is making significant, important, and vital changes
to HSGP, both with the analytic capabilities that support the program
and the management techniques we use to determine allocations. And, as
we have all seen from the reaction to our FY 2006 allocations,
implementation of risk management will not necessarily be an easy or a
popular shift. However, it is an important shift and one that we take
seriously. We have and will continue to solicit feedback on our
processes and are willing to listen to criticism and suggestions for
improving our processes. With billions of dollars being allocated each
year, this is a serious business--and we believe that healthy debate
about risk management principles will only make these processes better
and more transparent. Despite recent successes globally in the war on
terror, America's security will be a marathon and not a sprint. We need
an objective funding process that will sustain improvements for the
longterm.
Today, I hope to articulate the following policy considerations:
1) The objectives of the Homeland Security Grants are to enhance
capabilities to prevent, deter, respond to, and recover from acts of
terrorism, to be allocated based on risks, threats, vulnerabilities,
and unmet target capabilities. It is long-standing Administration
policy that the limited pool of Federal grant resources should be
primarily used to improve long-term capabilities that provide a maximum
return on investment, instead of to finance day-to-day occurring local
personnel operational costs.
2) The new DHS risk assessment process incorporates the tremendous
increase in relevant individual risk of urban communities, this risk in
relation to other communities,and the distribution of risk across our
entire nation.
3) In applying risk assessments to the grant process, DHS has
emphasized the principle of risk reduction, including the peer-review
assessment. This includes the likelihood that Federal resources can
help reduce long-term risk and address short falls in capability. The
new allocation formula, based on risk and effectiveness, strives to
provide an objective process that is flexible to account for improved
information on a national scale.
FY 2006-A Transition Year
In past years, DHS' risk analysis was largely driven by both
population size and density. But over time we have been able to develop
enhanced techniques to analyze risk. In FY 2006, the risk analysis
considered three primary components: Threat, Vulnerability, and
Consequence. The Threat component represents an adversary's intent to
attack a specific target and its potential capability to execute the
attack; the Vulnerability component embodies the susceptibility to an
adversary's attack and the likelihood that it will achieve an impact;
and the Consequence component measures the possible impact from such an
attack.
With the enhanced methodology and broader set of data inputs, we
were able to capture a truer estimation of relative risk for all urban
areas. The footprint used to analyze the risk to both assets as well as
geographic areas and populations was adjusted this year. This
adjustment more accurately reflects the regional context in which these
jurisdictions operate and the critical infrastructure that provides
higher potential targets and requires protecting. There is better data
better data about not just New York City and NCR, but about the entire
country and across a broader range of sectors. As a result of these
improvements, many areas' risk scores changed significantly, a
reflection of an enhanced analytical approach to gauging the risk urban
areas face relative to one another.
It is important to understand the downstream impact of these
changes in relative risk. New York City and NCR do not suddenly have
less risk in an absolute sense. New York City and NCR continue to be
among the highest risk Urban Areas. However, the relative values for
virtually all other candidates increased this year due to our better
understanding of their risk and its analysis. The relative differences
among the higher risk candidates is what changed from last year to this
year. Indeed, Urban Areas such as Los Angeles, Chicago, and Houston saw
their share of national risk relative to New York City and NCR increase
considerably, in some cases doubling or tripling compared to previous
analysis. These changes in relative risk were key drivers in the
changes in funding allocations.
FY 2006 also marks the first HSGP grant cycle in which the Interim
National Preparedness Goal is in place to identify National Priorities
and help focus local and state expenditures. This common planning
framework, and the tools that support it, allows us individually as
communities and states and collectively as a Nation to better
understand how prepared we are, how prepared we need to be, and how we
prioritize efforts to close the gap. The absence of this type of
consistent preparedness target is at the forefront of many of our
national shortcomings over the past 25 years. The Interim National
Preparedness Goal demands that we focus attention on "raising the bar"
of preparedness across the country to establish minimum capabilities
and be prepared for the risks we face. This, along with measurement of
risk, gives us an important management consideration for our grant
programs.
Accordingly, the Department of Homeland Security has been
aggressive in:
1) improving the risk analysis tools used to determine a National
risk profile, so that we can target funding at higher risk locations,
and
2) clarifying the risk management objectives for the HSGP, within
the context of the Interim National Preparedness Goal
This year we have also implemented another significant change in
how funds under the HSGP are allocated. In previous years, States and
Urban Areas knew their funding allocations prior to submitting grant
applications. Based on substantial input from the national preparedness
community Congress, and our focus on risk management, Department has
moved towards a risk-based approach that incorporates a competitive
analysis element, to allocating funds for HSGP. This is a critical step
in achieving a Homeland Security Grants Program that emphasizes risk-
informed grant making, increased accountability and is focused on
maximizing the return on investment of federal grant funds.
Risk-Based Analysis and Management
I would like to explain how we analyzed risk for determining the
2006 grant funding.The Department of Homeland Security has many risk
management resources at its disposal people, technology, and funding
are just a few. The HSGP is among the most valuable of these tools
because it allows us to partner with our States, Territories and Urban
Areas and First Responder communities, and support national
preparedness goals.
The Administration, Congress, State and Local stakeholders, first
responder organizations, and industry groups have called for more risk
management approaches to inform homeland security grant allocations.
There has been a clear recognition that our national approach requires
that we apply federal funding resources in a way that maximizes
resources to benefit all Americans.
Key to this year's process is a much better understanding of our
national risk.In our effort to improve our methods for risk management
of the terrorist threat we considered several key factors.
1. Ultimately, it is the States, Urban Areas and Territories that
own the risk in their respective areas, and they must make investments
locally that will build needed capabilities and address identified
risk. DHS's risk management job is to provide them guidance, and within
available resources, financial assistance to make these investments. In
this program, we have been directed to invest in initiatives that
promote unity of effort at the community, regional, state, and national
levels. They must continue to provide tangible benefits beyond the flow
of Federal dollars.
2. When managing risks, we must rely on analysis of risk to inform
our management process, but be cognizant of the inherent uncertainty of
this analysis. Consider this definition of risk analysis from the
Society for Risk Analysis:
"Risk analysis uses observations about what we know, to make
predictions about what we don't know."
I think this sums up risk analysis in the context of homeland
security quite nicely. We have carefully considered the factors that
experts believe lead to risk, and we have confidence in our approach.
But we are realists and we understand that risk in the terrorist
context is new, constantly changing, and lacks the measuring history of
data flow found in other hazards.
Terrorist threat cannot be predicted with the reliability of
hurricanes or floods, or mechanical failures. No matter how much we
invest in scientists and algorithms, we cannot measure terrorism risk
in an absolute sense. Therefore, we emphasize building capabilities to
manage risk nationwide based on the best estimations possible. Our
profile is built on an analysis of relative risk based on what is
known.
3. Risk Analysis DOES NOT EQUAL Risk Management. In fact, the
Society for Risk Analysis definition makes this point better than I
can:
Risk analysis seeks to inform, not to dictate, the complex and
difficult choices among possible measures to mitigate risks.
As this indicates, the risk analysis is only one input to the risk
management process that should be considered for Homeland Security. In
any risk context, risk management typically involves considerations
beyond the quantifiable analysis. Risk management includes many other
considerations such as management objectives, fiscal constraints, one's
ability to actually impact the risks one faces, and the strategy that
best serves our overall national interests. The primary risk management
objective of the HSGP is to: raise the bar of preparedness across the
at-risk states, territories and Urban Areas as part of an
interdependent national effort by directing funds to areas of greatest
risk and need.
These two objectives announced by Congress require the Department
to balance the desire to focus resources on areas at relatively greater
risk, with the desire topromote use of federal resources for strong
solutions that "raise the bar" of national preparedness and address
national risk.
Thus, common sense dictates that managing risk through the HSGP
program involves much more than just distributing dollars in proportion
to the relative risk data that we generate each year. Rather, it is
viewed as a means for reducing risk and promoting national objectives.
As previously noted, DHS defines risk by three principal variables:
Threat, or the likelihood of a type of attack that might be attempted,
vulnerability, or the likelihood that an attacker would succeed with a
particular attack type, and consequence, or the potential impact of a
particular attack. The risk model used as input to the HSGP process
includes both asset-based and geographically-based terrorist risk
calculations. DHS combines these complementary risk calculations to
produce an estimate of the relative risk of terrorism faced by a given
area.
Our enemies still wish to inflict both physical and economic harm
on the United States. Recognition of this threat is underscored by both
the Administration's and Congress's desire to assess and categorize our
national assets - things such as key transportation hubs, financial
processing sites, nuclear power and chemical plants, priority
communication and energy systems. These are sites that, if attacked,
would have an extraordinary impact not only on the surrounding
population and community, but in some cases, the nation as a whole. In
the first year of this grant program we had categorized approximately
200 sites, in 2004 some 1700, in 2005 approximately 11,300. This year,
we further expanded the number of sites to include many considered to
be `high risk' by the surrounding state and local jurisdiction, which
brought the total number of sites in the analysis to over 260,000
sites.
This asset-based approach uses strategic threat estimates from the
Intelligence Community of an adversary's intent and capability to
attack different types of assets (such as chemical plants, stadiums,
and commercial airports) using different attack methods. DHS analyzes
the vulnerability of each asset type relative to each attack method to
determine the forms of attack most likely to be successful.
Additionally, DHS estimates the consequences that a successful attack
would have on each asset type, including human health, economic,
strategic mission, and psychological impacts. This analysis yields a
relative risk estimate for each asset type, which DHS applies to a
given demographic area, based on the number of each asset type present
within that area.
The geographic-based approach allows DHS to consider general
characteristics of a geographic area mostly independent of the assets
that exist within that area. First, DHS evaluates reported threats, law
enforcement activity, and suspicious incidents reported during the
evaluation period.
Next, DHS considers vulnerability factors for each geographic area,
such as the area's proximity to international border.
Lastly, DHS estimates the potential consequences of an attack on
that area, including human health, economy, strategic mission, and
psychological impacts.
DHS's ability to analyze risks to the Nation is improving each year
in both breadth and sophistication. Despite the known limitations of
the Department's analysis, the results confirm two fairly intuitive
points:
1) The majority of the risk is contained in a handful of locations
throughout the country. This is the argument so strenuously made by
that handful of localities. However,
2) There are risks to other urban areas that we have begun to
assess more accurately. These areas have previously received relatively
small amounts of grant funding. The HSGP risk analysis considered much
more than the final number of cities that made the Urban Area list.
Those that made the list did so because they had a level of risk. In
this case, the urban areas under UASI contain 85% of our national urban
area risk. Attachment A reflects both the funding and risk curve and
you can see these correspond.
Given these two results, and drawing on intuition and common sense,
it seems reasonable that while we must fortify higher-risk locations,
we cannot ignore the risks in the other locations.
Effectiveness
For FY 2006, States and Urban Areas submitted grant applications,
called Investment Justifications, to formally request FY 2006 HSGP
funding in support of their strategies and related program planning
documents. These applications were reviewed through an intensive peer
review process. The FY 2006, competitive grant process to allocate
funds to States and Urban Areas was based on two factors:
1) The relative risk to assets and populations within the eligible
applicant's geographic area, and
2) The anticipated effectiveness of the individual investments
comprising the Investment Justification, in aligning to the Interim
National Preparedness Goal and addressing the identified homeland
security needs of each applicant.
Finding the right balance between these two factors is the central
risk management challenge. It requires us to conduct extensive analysis
of relative need and risk, thoroughly review applications, and
rigorously analyze the potential effectiveness of the grant funds. The
Department of Homeland Security conducted an unprecedented amount of
analysis to arrive at decisions about grants funding. We took into
consideration alignment with other national policy initiatives and
statute objectives, as well as ensuring consistency of approach both
over time and between the HSGP programs.
The major considerations of project requests were the following:
Relevance--Connection to the National Priorities, Target
Capabilities List, State/Urban Area Homeland Security Strategy goals
and objectives, and the Enhancement Plan.
Regionalization--Coordination of preparedness activities across
jurisdictional boundaries by spreading costs, pooling resources,
sharing risk, and increasing the value of their preparedness
investments.
Impact--The effect that the investment will have on addressing
threats, vulnerabilities, and/or consequences of catastrophic events.
Sustainability--The ability to sustain a target capability once the
benefits of an investment are achieved through identification of
funding sources that can be used beyond the current grant period.
Implementation Approach--The appropriate resources and tools are
(or will be) in place to manage the Investment, address priorities, and
deliver results.
States and Urban areas each submitted up to 15 investments for
consideration. These investments were submitted with an Investment
Justification, which allowed them to describe specific funding and
implementation approaches that would help achieve initiatives outlined
in the Statewide Program and Capability Enhancement Plan. This plan
developed in the Fall of 2005 establishes how Urban Areas and States
will work to develop their individual capabilities as part of a broader
national effort. The Investment Justification allowed the States and
Urban Areas to request funding for allocation to their near-term
priorities, consistent with the National Priorities articulated in the
Interim National Preparedness Goal.
The effectiveness review is a method to evaluate a state or Urban
Area proposal in relation to others submitted and against the grant
program criteria provided. It is not, I repeat it is not an evaluation
of how well an initiative is or is not performing in a particular State
or Urban Area. This element, added with Congressional direction and
support, is designed to encourage uses of funds in accordance with pre-
announced program guidelines and that will both enhance community,
state and national preparedness beyond a grant period.
Peer Review Process
As we are not allocating funding to specific investments, our risk
management objective was to determine the "anticipated effectiveness"
of the investments contained in the Investment Justification. To do
this, DHS convened a panel of a cross section of representatives from
States, Territories, and Urban Areas, and from a variety of Homeland
Security and Emergency Management disciplines.
States and Urban Areas sent high ranking officials to be reviewers;
for example, three States sent their most senior Homeland Security
Directors. From the Fire and Rescue community, an Assistant Deputy Fire
Chief, Battalion Chief, Fire Operations Chief, and a Fire Emergency
Management and Communications Chief participated, from Law Enforcement,
an Assistant Chief of Police, Captain of a Sheriff's Department,
Commander of a Special Response Team, and a Lieutenant from a Homeland
Security and Tactical Operations. All used their knowledge and
experience to evaluate the anticipated effectiveness of proposed
solutions from their peers. These examples are only a subset of the
vast experience of peer reviewers who participated in the HSGP process.
Peer review panels were made up of reviewers from varied
backgrounds and experience--and to avoid potential conflicts of
interest--diversity was emphasized. Each panel included a balance of
representation from each region (Eastern, Central, and Western). The
peer review panels reviewed and scored each individual Investment
included in the Investment Justification as well as the Investment
Justification submission in its entirety. The peer review panels also
reviewed the Enhancement Plan to ensure alignment among Initiatives
from the Enhancement Plan with proposed Investments.
As expected, the scores for the individual investments followed a
distribution from very low to very high, with the majority of scores
falling in the mid-range.
The peer review process provides a significant incentive for States
and Urban Areas to spend the limited pool of Federal resources on
projects that will provide a meaningful return on investment and a
lasting impact on reducing the risks of terrorism.
HSGP Guidance to All Communities
Prior to the release of the HSGP guidance, DHS provided extensive
assistance to States and local governments in their development of
updated Homeland Security Strategies and the Capability Enhancement
Plans, which link investment planning to the National Priorities
outlined in the Interim National Preparedness Goal. This guidance for
the development of Enhancement Plans was a critical precursor to the
development of successful Investment Justifications that meet the
criteria assessed by the Peer Review Panel during the HSGP application
process.
Between the time that the FY2006 Homeland Security Grant Program
(HSGP) guidance was released on December 2, 2005, and the application
due date of March 2, 2006, the DHS Grants and Training (G&T)
Preparedness Officers for both the State of New York (NY) and the
District of Columbia (DC) had frequent contact with NY and its Urban
Areas, and DC and the National Capital Region (NCR) Urban Area. The
officers were available to answer technical questions regarding the
process. Due to the competitive nature of the application process, G&T
staff members were not able to discuss or offer advice regarding
specific program or budget proposals that may unfairly benefit one
application over another.
G&T provided technical assistance to assist with the Program and
Capability Review (PCR), which was the core planning process each State
was required to conduct prior to submitting proposals. The PCR
justified how any FY 2006 funds would be invested. Approximately 34
representatives from NY State, to include representatives from both the
New York City and Buffalo Urban Areas, participated in the PCR
technical assistance on November 30, 2005. Approximately 65
representatives from DC and the NCR Urban Area participated in their
PCR technical assistance on January 5, 2006. Both of these sessions
stressed the need to emphasize broad regionalization and include
additional stakeholders, such as other local regions and the private
sector, in the program planning process.
In addition to the formal PCR technical assistance deliveries, G&T
Preparedness Officers had frequent, often daily, contact with the NY
and NCR Urban Areas. As an example, the New York Preparedness Officer
attended the NYC Urban Area Working Group meetings on a monthly basis,
and a special meeting regarding the PCR process was held on November
28, 2005, for the NCR Urban Area Senior Policy Group. Representatives
from DC and the NCR participated in the pilot development of the PCR
technical assistance program on November 4, 2005, and served on the
pilot working group to assist in shaping the PCR technical assistance
offering. Feedback provided during the pilot was used to refine the
design and materials prior to deployment to States and Territories
across the Nation.
Allocation
To support the management objectives of HSGP, we investigated
several allocation techniques, and ultimately arrived at two management
decisions. First, we gave particular attention to the analysis for New
York City and the National Capital Region to ensure that the allocation
process optimally accounts for their risk information and
infrastructure assets. In addition, we selected a two-by-two matrix
approach that allows us to evaluate Investment Justifications based on
the Relative Risk to the Applicant vs. the anticipated Effectiveness of
the Investment Justification submitted by that applicant.
This two-by-two matrix approach provided us with the following
benefits:
It allowed us to assemble a picture of the challenge recognizing
that the two factors we value: Relative Risk and anticipated
Effectiveness are distinct and not inherently correlated
It gave us a relatively simple lens through which to view the
decision space as policy makers, while still allowing a known model to
drive final allocations.
To generate final HSGP allocations, we assembled two of these
matrices: one for States and Territories subject to SHSP and LETPP
dollars, and one for Urban Areas subject to UASI dollars. The matrices
worked the same. Each applicant was plotted in the matrix by using
their relative risk score and their Investment Justification
Effectiveness rating.
Once plotted in the matrix, each applicant fell into one of four
quadrants:
Quadrant 1: higher relative risk/higher anticipated effectiveness
Quadrant 2: higher relative risk/lower anticipated effectiveness
Quadrant 3: lower relative risk/higher anticipated effectiveness
Quadrant 4: lower relative risk/lower anticipated effectiveness
Once allocations were determined for each of the four quadrants,
final dollar allocations were determined. For that, Relative Risk was
weighted two-thirds and anticipated effectiveness was weighted one-
third to emphasize the risk-based nature of the programs while
recognizing strong program solutions. Using our analytic model, we
generated the final allocation results you have seen, and which are
illustrated by the chart below.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3785.001
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3785.002
The allocation process used this year to distribute the nearly $711
million in UASI funding, $125 million less than FY 2005 (overall HSGP
funding was reduced $343 million below the President's request), to 46
metropolitan areas was structured to take into account both the risk
and effectiveness of the proposed investments.
New York City
NYC remains the highest-ranked city for relative risk; of the more
than 260,000 assets considered in the risk analysis process, nearly
7,000 came from New York City alone. However, due to the increase in
information in our analysis and our better understanding of risk in
regional areas, the "lead" that NYC had over other urban areas is
smaller than it has been in past years. In simple practical terms, this
means that there are very large UASI areas out there whose relative
level of risk has "gotten closer" to that of NYC.
Since the creation of the Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI)
program, New York City has received approximately 19% of the program's
total grant funding, or more than twice the amount of the second
largest recipient, even though the program now covers dozens of
American cities. The next largest recipient, Los Angeles, has received
approximately 8% of the funds awarded through the program.
National Capital Region
The National Capital Region has received, on average, approximately
8 percent of all funding through the Urban Areas Security Initiative
since the program's inception, and has received almost $214 million
overall from the UASI program since 2003. Over that period, the NCR
urban area has received third highest amount of grant funding from the
UASI program, behind only New York City and Los Angeles/Long Beach
Urban Areas.
The relatively high risk ranking played a major factor in the NCR
receiving 7 percent of the total UASI funds available this year, nearly
$46.5 million, and the allocation is clearly consistent with previous,
annual allocation percentages.
As we look at investing Federal dollars, within the National
Capital Region or elsewhere, we are seeking investments that promise to
increase the overall capability of a region through funding such things
as equipment and specialized training. Washington, DC, and its partners
have worked hard in this area. However, we must also ensure that
resources are also available to enable other at-risk communities to
enhance their preparedness.
We must also consider the unique resources available to the
National Capital Region through the permanent station of Federal
operational resources that supplement what is being done by local and
state officials. This includes air patrols, Federal law enforcement
agents and other specialized federal response teams whose vigilance and
capability may not be quickly available to other American urban areas.
Together, these assets contribute to an integrated network that
protects the National Capital Region.
Conclusion
Mr. Chairman it is essential to recognize the distinction between
risk and threat. Although threat is a large component of risk, risk
does not equal threat, but considers it along with vulnerability and
consequences. Likewise, risk analysis informs, but does not equal risk
management. We now have a much better understanding of nationwide risk
then we have in the past, along with the ability to evaluate risk
mitigation strategies. As a result we now have a dynamic process for
managing risk that reflects the Nation's priorities. We have come a
long way in our understanding of risk and as we learn we will continue
to improve this still evolving process.
Managing risk is a national responsibility. We would not be acting
responsibly if we simply looked at each individual state or Urban Area
as its own entity in making risk-based decisions. America's security
requires a comprehensive approach and the federal government has an
obligation to protect the entire nation. We must take steps necessary
to ensure that all of our high risk areas increase their levels of
capability. The grants allocation process is not about making Omaha, or
Chicago, or Washington D.C. safe and secure it's about making America
safe and secure.
Providing grants to the states and Urban Areas is just one aspect
of managing risk. Whether it's through border security, ensuring the
security of nuclear plants, food storage facilities, financial centers
across the country or cracking down on illegal immigrants, what we do
in one area of the country will make a difference everywhere else.
Terrorists are working hard to exploit gaps in our efforts and the
American people deserve no less than our very best effort to thwart
those who would do us harm. I am confident in our ability to work
together to do just that.
I would like to thank the committee for its time today and I
appreciate this opportunity to bring further transparency on this
process.
Chairman King. Thank you, Mr. Foresman. Gentleman from
California, Mr. Lungren.
Mr. Lungren. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I don't
know. I have a whole lot of questions. I had questions for the
other panel as well. I am one of those committed to a risk-
based assessment. I had some concerns with the Department's
database in the formulas that you use because I was informed
that, for instance, in the Sacramento region while it goes up
this year, it falls off the table next year. San Diego goes
down somewhat--actually substantially this year and then drops
off the table next year. So that brought me to a question of
questioning what the data is and the way you formulate it.
I have a lot of other questions based on what was said in
the prior panel. The Mayor of New York told us that most of
these are recurring costs, which suggests that this is a
permanent program that ought to be funded by the Federal
Government. And then there was a suggestion at least by one
member of the panel that somehow this wraps into the COPS
program, which was a program initially started, as you may
recall, in a previous administration with the promise that the
government would pay, the Federal Government, 100 percent the
first year, 75 percent the second year, 50 percent the third
year, 25 percent the fourth year, and nothing the fifth year,
and it became a permanent program here on the Federal level
where all of a sudden we on the Federal level are given the
responsibility of funding essential services at the local
level, which is what I thought law enforcement was. And the
Mayor made a statement which is very similar to what I hear
from local officials in my area, which is look, I have got
constituents who don't want to raise taxes or who don't want to
have taxes raised on them. It is almost like there is one
animal called the local taxpayer and there is another animal
called the State taxpayer and there is another animal called
the Federal taxpayer and we are on the far end of the food
chain and therefore we can either tax or go into debt and it
doesn't affect anybody, but what it gets down to is certain
priorities.
I think that is what we are all about here, and I have a
fundamental question about the way you have assessed the data
that you bring to bear because we have heard the bragging,
frankly, by your Department by now you have billions of data
points instead of tens or hundreds, and yet when I see those
data points brought together, you have a phenomena and I hate
to change the focus of this place to the other side of the
country, but let's take San Diego, which last time I checked
was near an international boundary, has military installations
there, has a nuclear facility within 10 miles, has a lot of
foreign visitors, is vulnerable from any number of standpoints.
Yet it falls off the table when it would seem that with the
additional data points suggested by your Department and the
different formulation that that would actually have a community
like that move up.
So I guess what I am saying is, I don't have all of the
deep analysis into the formula that you have used, but that
doesn't seem to pass the reasonable test to me. Am I that far
off base? Or does the Department acknowledge that there needs
to be some refinements of a substantial nature to take into
account some of these things that don't otherwise seem to be
explainable?
Mr. Foresman. Congressman, let me see if I can give you
three short answers on that. First with regards to the
infrastructure discussion. Mayor Bloomberg brought up the
discussion of the Brooklyn Bridge, and there has been a lot of
discussion. We counted the Statue of Liberty as we did the
analysis. We counted the Brooklyn Bridge, the Empire State
Building. They were grouped into categories that get a higher
score, if you will, but you know the bottom line is we have got
to make sure the data set is correct. We have had cases out in
California with dams, for instance, that were not counted that
I think as we go back and look we are looking to make sure we
are going through a process to do quality control on the data
sets and to make sure they are accurate with regard to the UASI
program, both Buffalo and San Diego fall into the same category
that we previously when we did the UASI program didn't consider
proximity to the border in terms of doing that piece of risk
analysis for the urban areas, and I think, Congressman, that
part of where we are at, is we did not have a risk assessment
process in this country for doing terrorism prior to 9/11. We
had plenty of risk assessment processes for doing natural
disasters because we have decades of history dealing with
natural disasters. So we were charged with creating a process
and it continues to move forward. To the degree that one draws
kind of a straight conclusion, if the information had presented
to us that New York City was not at the top of our risk chart
and had it indicated to us that New York City should not have
received the lion's share of dollars then I would have been
much--I would have been exceptionally concerned, but what is
key to understand, and I believe you all have the handout, is
if you look at the risk curve and funding allocations they
pretty closely track one another.
Mr. Lungren. Mr. Chairman, if you will indulge me one
minute to ask a follow-up.
We have all heard risk has been there. People were
penalized because they didn't do a good job of grant writing,
and therefore we ought to get better grant writers and that,
boy, if that is the case we are really missing the boat. Do you
take into account things like moneys already allocated and
therefore expended--do you take a look back, so to speak, to
say how effectively moneys that have already gone through a
program are expended or is that not part of your determination?
Mr. Foresman. No, Congressman, that is actually a
phenomenally good example and part of the justification process
is to take into account dollars that are being committed
locally or that are provided to urban areas by a State as well
as those that will be committed if the Federal funds are not
forthcoming and will it be sustained over the longer term, and
the effectiveness justification certainly serves as the basis
for the allocation piece of it, but it is not a factor of bad
grant writing skills or bad programs. They were just simply a
measure of how the communities were articulating the cost
effectiveness of these solutions. I will tell you I think we
have got to do a lot of work on the terminology that we use to
describe these things because that has contributed to the
confusion.
Chairman King. Gentleman from Mississippi, the ranking
member.
Mr. Pascrell. Mr. Chairman, could I have a colloquy with
the gentleman from California for a second?
Chairman King. If the gentleman from Mississippi would
yield for a second?
Mr. Thompson. I will yield.
Mr. Pascrell. I am concerned about what I just heard and I
want to make sure I heard it correctly. You are talking about
the possibility--correct me if I am wrong. You were asking
questions of the Secretary--that this may become a permanent
program, and you used in your analogy the COPS program. If you
know what the conditions are of the COPS program, universal
COPS program started in 1993 to put close to 100,000 police
officers on the streets in an effort to demonstrate how
effective community policing would be, and it did. It was a
tremendous reduction in crime based partially on the number of
police officers. But you could not simply have people leave
your department and then replace them through the COPS program.
You had to add and there had to be a deficiency within the
department. There were very strict qualifications here.
Chairman King. If I could ask the gentleman to--
Mr. Pascrell. And I don't want this analogy that he has
made to stand.
Chairman King. Gentleman can address that in his own time.
Secretary Foresman is here to testify.
Mr. Pascrell. This is something that has been said, Mr.
Chairman.
Chairman King. I know. But Secretary Foresman is here to
testify. Ranking Member from Mississippi.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you very much. Mr. Foresman, you were
talking about effectiveness and the overall rating. As you
know--do we have a tracking system to find out how these
communities have spent their money, whether they bought it
correctly? And how does that system follow into the next year?
Sort of in line with what Mr. Lungren was talking about.
Mr. Foresman. Mr. Congressman, we had a very rudimentary
approach to it, as I would offer, and we have been focused in
the Department on product, sometimes to the extent of process,
but as a good example the question was raised earlier just how
much of the urban area security dollars had been spent either
in the New York or the Washington region, for instance. And you
know the best data that we have inside the Department is
probably two or three weeks old. They have clearly obligated
100 percent of their money. They have great projects that they
are working on, but to date they have drawn down about 41--
between 41 and 45 percent of the dollars they have available to
them. So the next question becomes, how have those dollars been
applied and do we have a back-end process that goes on to it?
And Congressman, the reason we have dedicated to these urban
areas and to these States a full-time individual who does
nothing but work with them on the grants is to provide that
level of back-end auditing, if you will, program compliance
piece of it. It is also one of the reasons why we had to do the
investment justifications on the front end so that we have an
idea of being able to say this is what the urban area said they
were going to spend their dollars on, and when we go back in
afterwards, we need to have some basis by which to check
against that.
Mr. Thompson. So your testimony is we have a tracking
system that you are comfortable with?
Mr. Foresman. Well, Congressman, I am not comfortable with.
And I am going to offer to you I am not going to be comfortable
with it until we have realtime visibility among the State,
local and Federal partners in terms of where we are with dollar
utilization and until we have stronger auditing processes in
place because you know I feel bad when we get into a situation
where a community misuses or abuses a program and it lessens
the funding that is available for a place like the National
Capital Region or New York.
Mr. Thompson. So have you requested or recommended a
tracking system to get you to where you want to be?
Mr. Foresman. Yes, sir, Congressman. We are looking at a
grants management system in just tailoring some of the existing
grants management systems that we use for the fire grants, for
instance, to help us do this, but this is more process and we
are redeploying personnel to provide for this, and I will tell
you that I think within the space of about 90 to 120 days I
will be able to sit in front of you and say I feel 100 percent
comfortable. I feel 80 percent comfortable today, but not 100
percent.
Mr. Thompson. So you are going to use personnel rather than
technology?
Mr. Foresman. In the case of it, it is a combination but a
large part of it is personnel. I mean, it is having someone who
can work with the States and the communities on program
eligibility and how they are applying their dollars.
Mr. Thompson. So the system you are using now, can you tell
me what the tracking information has brought back to you?
Mr. Foresman. Well, there is very little tracking
information. We actually right now have to use the Department
of Justice's financial management system, and we are migrating
so that that is a DHS-driven activity but basically all that
tells us is that we have obligated dollars to a particular
community, that they have obligated those dollars and we know
what the drawdown is against those dollars, but we don't have a
significant amount of detail in terms of, you know, if you have
drawn down $20 million what was it drawn down to be used for.
It is getting that greater level of visibility into an
electronic system as well as by putting people in the
communities, working with New York City and Washington, D.C.,
and other places, and this is why we want to have people with
them all the time.
Mr. Thompson. Well, but that seems to be an archaic method
of tracking rather than a state-of-the-art system.
Mr. Foresman. And Congressman, let me offer it this way, I
believe in technology. I think we will harness technology but
technology empowers good business processes, we need to make
sure we have the good business processes inside the Department,
inside our grants and training shop, and once we have got those
solid business processes in place then we can overlay the
technology to empower it to be more efficient and more
effective. But right now, Assistant Secretary Henke and myself
are focused on making sure our core business processes are
sound and good.
Mr. Thompson. Sir, at what point will you be able to do the
technology part?
Mr. Foresman. Congressman, I actually would hope that we
would be there by the end of the calendar year if not before.
Frankly, all of the business processes are in place. They are
just not amalgamated and pulled together. We have a terrific
example with the fire grant program that has served us well
over the last several years and we are building off of that.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman King. Thank you, Ranking Member. The gentleman
from Pennsylvania, Mr. Dent.
Mr. Dent. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for being
here. This hearing of course is focused on the UASI
allocations. What I am trying to understand is, well, this year
we are talking about New York City losing about $83 million in
UASI funding from the previous year. I also notice too that in
2003 to 2004 New York City took about a $100 million hit. In
other words, if I look at this from fiscal year 2003, New York
took in about $150 million through UASI, then in 2004 they took
in about $247 million. What was the cause of the substantial
reduction in that fiscal year?
Mr. Foresman. Well, Congressman, I was not in the
Department in the context of that fiscal year, and I was
actually serving in my other job as a State homeland security
official, and a large part of this was I think just driven by
frankly the absence of having a very empirically driven
analytically based ability to be able to allocate dollars and,
frankly, I would be more than happy to go back and get some
additional detail for you and find out what drove it.
Mr. Dent. And also I think you provided this chart, this
pie chart.
Mr. Foresman. Yes, sir.
Mr. Dent. Where it says New York City is receiving about 18
percent of the 2006 UASI allocation. What percentage--I guess
we will move it back up. We are talking about UASI and
allocation. You also have--you have the State and local law
enforcement grants. Are there other dollars New York City may
be receiving beyond those terrorism preparedness grants that I
am not aware of or that I am not very familiar with?
Mr. Foresman. Congressman, yes, they are, and for instance
we have limited this discussion to the UASI program and the
State Homeland Security Grant Program, including those dollars
that go down to New York City. Overall New York State has
received a little over $1.1 billion in terms of the State
Homeland Security Grant Program Urban Areas Security
Initiative, port security grants, transit grants and the share
of New York City is about $666 million, give or take a couple
of dollars there. That is outside of dollars that may have come
down through the Department of Health and Human Services for
their bioterrorism program and these types of things.
Mr. Dent. Well, I am just trying to get a sense of the
total amount of homeland security spending that New York and
the capital region are receiving. Clearly they deserve a great
deal of funding because they are such likely targets but for
example, you are showing here New York City is getting 18
percent of the UASI allocation in 2006. I would be curious to
see that in 2005 and 2004.
Mr. Foresman. If you look at it over the life of the
program, they have received about 18 percent over the life of
the program. The same being true for the National Capital
Region, I believe is the same. They have received about 7
percent, 8 percent. They have received about equal over the
life of the program.
Mr. Dent. I would also be curious in seeing the total New
York City is receiving. I am assuming, for example, they may be
receiving some port security funds, maybe more this year than
they did in a previous year, the same for their very fine
intelligence unit and counterterrorism. I would like to see the
totality of funding to New York because many communities don't
have as sophisticated an operation as the City of New York
does. I would just like to get a better sense of this so I can
explain this program better to my constituents. I don't know if
you have any of that information here today.
Mr. Foresman. Congressman, we will get you a written
response to that and I just want to go on record I agree with
what Commissioner Kelly said, the importance of human
intelligence. We understand that but we also recognize that
some of the personnel limitations, the ability to pay for
personnel costs is in part driven by what congressional
direction is provided to the Department. But I will tell you
the one thing that we have pushed real hard, considering what
Commissioner Kelly has been able to do, we have given them the
approval to use a limited amount of their dollars for intel
analysts in New York City. So we are trying to be as flexible
as we can within program guidelines and within the guidelines
that are provided to us as a result of congressional direction.
Mr. Dent. Thank you. I yield back.
Chairman King. Gentlelady from Texas recognized for 5
minutes.
Ms. Jackson-Lee. Thank the Chairman. I thank the ranking
member. Secretary Foresman, let me congratulate you on your
appointment and as I indicated to you earlier, we are looking
for stick-to-itness and of course consistency in this
Department. Your addition will be I think a great asset. I am
going to start--I wanted to put in the record the impact on
Houston, which was considered among the top 50 percent of all
urban areas based on the fiscal year 2006 DHS comparative risk
analysis and among the top 25 percent of all urban areas in
effectiveness proposed solutions subjected to a more than 10
percent decrease in funding by UASI, and moreover my State of
Texas faced even more severe cuts in 53 percent of funding from
the State Homeland Security Grant Program and 29 percent in
UASI funding. I say that because I am not afraid to hold this
chart up, and I think you all provided this so that you could--
we could get the impact of how large a segment of the moneys
went to New York and that 50 some percent was left on half the
area in the other major cities such as Los Angeles and Chicago.
And I hope that the political forces will not undermine you
because you made a very important point. You are suffering from
a 14 percent cut rather than the administration going upwards
or Congress' funding going upwards. Unfortunately it went down,
and therefore you were obviously operating with a smaller pot.
And for us to be truthful in how do we reform this process, we
need to at least give you that measure of fact, and that is you
were operating with a much smaller pot. And might I also say
since I incorporated my remarks and in his absence, I want to
thank Mayor Bloomberg for his kind remarks about Houston
because we were talking about these kinds of grants dealing
with security. We of course almost a year ago faced an enormous
influx of evacuees that needed a lot of, if you will, impact
money and how could we be expected to respond to the Federal
Government's failure by taking evacuees and not have those
dollars that are necessary.
So this spreads across a number of issues and a number of
areas, but I think it is our job as members of the Homeland
Security Committee, in fact, to be problem solvers. So I want
to juxtapose your needs against comments that were made because
I made the comments about the COPS program has been cut, the
State Byrne program has been cut, the local government law
enforcement block grants have been cut. And the question is
whether we make them permanent. The American people want them
to be permanent, law enforcement wanted them to be permanent.
Coming from your position in State government, I know you
utilize those programs very effectively. We know that because
we got the return on it and we saw the decrease in crime. So it
makes no sense for us to cut programs like this program because
the American people want to be secure. So I would ask you to
follow me on these questions.
You had a statement in your--a quote in your testimony that
brings to mind the nightmares of philosophical gobbledy-gook,
for lack of a better word. This analysis seeks to inform, not
to dictate, the complex and difficult choices among possible
measures to mitigate risk. I only say that because we have got
to get down to the nuts and bolts of how you get these grants
to the right places. Tell me, did you vet the methodology with
experts like yourself in local and State government before you
utilized this risk criteria? And what did--again, you are now
telling me that you have after the fact and you are right. Will
you vet that criteria with experts in the field? And do you
know whether DHS did that?
My second question is more pointed. I am told that State
and local officials are still trying to get transit port
security grants that are not out yet and they can't get any
answers from the Department. If the goal of the Department is
to quickly get funding to those on the ground that need it and
given the fact that we are two-thirds through the fiscal year,
when do you think that funding might occur? But how do we solve
this in terms of getting the right kind of parameters to give
to the experts on the ground? The firefighter, the police
officer, the commissioner, the police chief, the mayors have no
time for theological philosophical grant making.
Mr. Foresman. Congresswoman, thank you for that question,
and let me address it two ways. One, when I came into this
position I had conversations with both Congressman Thompson,
Chairman King and others and said that we wanted to improve the
level of communication with the Congress. And we have had our
focus up here briefing on this risk assessment process. We have
had our folks briefing and interacting with State and local
officials on this risk assessment process, but it had no
meaning to everybody until they saw dollars attached to it and
I completely understand that. Everything looks fine in the
theoretical form. What does it mean to my community in terms of
dollars and resources? So yes, we were engaging the State and
local community. Yes, we were engaging primarily through the
staff in the discussions but we will--I am absolutely committed
and I talked to the staff about this, we were already scheduled
to bring the State and local stakeholders together in July for
a meeting after action, if you will, on this year's grant
cycle. I have told the staff I want them within a couple of
weeks to schedule the next session of how do we look forward to
next year and take some of the lesson from this year and apply
it to our grant process next year.
With regard to the trends in port security, Congresswoman,
I will tell you that I have personally read through all of
those grant packages, each one of them, more than five times
and they are not leaving the office until they are easily
understood and they make sense and it is not because our team
did a bad job putting them together. It is simply because a
whole bunch of people helped to put them together and we just
needed to go through a real strong process. Having said that,
we are days away and this goes to an issue that I discussed
with Chairman King when the announcements came out on this. We
are constrained by not being able to tell a wide range of
stakeholders how much money they are going to get because we
have a congressional requirement, and I think it is a
reasonable requirement, that we notify you all on the Hill
about allocations, that we notify the appropriators and so
frankly, you know, this all looked fine on paper, but when
people saw the dollars, it had a different effect on them and I
think there is a good lesson on that and we have to find a way
to be able to characterize--
Ms. Jackson-Lee. Before you finish your sentence, will you
reconfigure the formula? Will you work internally to make the
formula more understandable and more relevant to what we are
trying to do, which is to secure the homeland?
Chairman King. Time of the gentlelady has expired.
Secretary Foresman, just answer the question.
Mr. Foresman. Congresswoman, without a doubt. And let me
make this perfectly clear, I don't like the situation we all
collectively find ourselves in in terms of this discussion and
a lot of it goes back to we need to do a better job in terms of
communicating with all the stakeholders.
Ms. Jackson-Lee. Thank you. I will ask further in the
direct conversation with you. Thank the Chairman.
Chairman King. Secretary Foresman, let me again thank you
for the time you have put in here today. I am sure it wasn't a
totally pleasant experience listening to the first panel.
Mr. Foresman. Mr. Chairman, if you might, it was actually a
phenomenally positive experience from our standpoint because
the opportunity we--Secretary Chertoff and I have had good
conversations with Mayor Bloomberg. Of course I see Mayor
Williams and Chief Ramsey on a regular basis, and this is how
we are going to get better because we are starting here, we are
trying to create something new and we are very much committed
to that.
Chairman King. Let me just ask some brief questions, try to
find some meeting of the minds here. New York was number one in
risk, and as we saw from the briefing, their application ranked
somewhat near the bottom. Allowing for all limited amounts of
money and the fact that other cities have acquired risk, if the
New York application had been in the top one, two or three, is
it fair to say New York would have gotten significantly more
money?
Mr. Foresman. No, sir, it is not fair to say they would
have gotten significantly more money. In total it might have
represented somewhere between a 5 percent and 8 percent
increase, but we can run the exact numbers as it relates to New
York, Mr. Chairman, and provide that to you.
Chairman King. So then even if they had used the money for
capital, even if they had used the money for equipment or
technology, as the Department is suggesting, they still would
not have gotten a considerable amount of money more, more
amount of money?
Mr. Foresman. That is correct.
Chairman King. And yet we find other cities did go up
significantly.
Mr. Foresman. Yes, sir, Mr. Chairman. And there are a
couple of examples of percentage increases but places like
Omaha where we have a phenomenal better understanding of the
risk, a much clearer understanding of the risk and remember
risk is two-thirds of it, that is 66 percent of the total
allocation process is based on that. It had those types of
effects on it, if you will, when you have got outside of New
York City. You and I both know that New York City and
Washington are the two areas we understood the risk the best
even on 9/11, and over the last several years, and we are just
now beginning to get the visibility outside of those two
regions.
Chairman King. Yes. Part of my point is though it is not
just a question of New York is number one and other cities are
three, four and five, without going into all the details of the
classified briefing, there is really a tremendous gap between
New York and number one, the second city. It was basically New
York, maybe number two and three, and then maybe all the rest
of the cities. So it was almost in a rating by itself, no one
else being close to it, and based on that, and even if they had
submitted a proper application it is hard to say how we could
have justified making the cut. But I guess we can go back and
forth on it.
Let me ask you another question. Assuming that there is
more than enough money next year, and you continue to have the
problems as far as the effectiveness of the applications, can
you recommend a way that someone at your level or somebody at a
decision making level could deal with somebody at a decision
making level in the city or--I mean, to me it is really wrong
that Commissioner Kelly, who is leading the largest police
department in the country with all the counterterrorism,
basically he found out about the cuts from me after I found out
from you. I am not into that whole thing. That didn't bother
me. I am just saying, Commissioner Kelly, he had no advanced
notice at all that his counterterrorism, his intelligence
communities units, all of that effort he had put in, he had no
inkling whatsoever that that was at risk or that was being
threatened. And it would seem to me it would make more sense if
somehow you would have sat down with him and made it work. I
mean, if they are number one risk and they are doing the best
job, there should be some way to match the two rather than just
after the fact the commissioner to find out there was some
defect in the application.
Mr. Foresman. Congressman, first, two things. Their
application was not incorrect. Had their application been
incorrect, they wouldn't have been considered. I guess what I
would offer to you is the effectiveness score is not a report
card on how well Ray Kelly--and he is doing a fabulous job with
the Mayor in New York City. It is not a report card on what
they are doing, and you know I have had the discussions with
the management and budget folks since the conversation between
Secretary Chertoff and Mayor Bloomberg. Those discussions also
continue, but I think you make a very legitimate point and it
is part of that after action review. This is the first year we
have used a new review process. We are going to learn from this
process and one of the chief things we are going to learn from
this process is to make sure we are very well-connected at the
right levels, and frankly, it is going to be a little bit of a
wake-up call to make sure that you know when these things are
submitted for hundreds of millions of dollars that they have
passed off.
I lived in State government in Virginia and frequently
State agencies would submit an application without any level of
oversight and that was not a good way to do because on behalf
of a Governor we had a perspective that we needed to provide.
So I think we can certainly look at the process.
Chairman King. I will close on this. Leaving New York
aside, I would hate to find out a particular city did not get
the funding it needed, was entitled to, because they applied
for the wrong program or they weren't doing it in the right way
and no one in the Department sat down with them before the
deadline to tell them that, to somehow work it out. That is all
I would ask.
Mr. Foresman. Mr. Chairman, I am in line with that. I would
not want any American in any American city to be at greater
risk because we didn't have a discussion that we could very
easily have.
Chairman King. Thank you. Gentleman from New Jersey, Mr.
Pascrell.
Mr. Pascrell. Mr. Secretary, I know what you don't want but
I can tell you that what you have done to New York City does
put them in greater risk, in my estimation, in every area,
whether you are talking about the UASI allocation, which you
explained in a forthright manner as you always have, whether
you are talking about the State homeland security programs, or
whether you are talking about the LETPP. Every one of those
programs, New York got less money. And one could conclude from
that that either there are less vulnerabilities in New York or
they plugged it up, which you know is not the case. We have not
done the job, the Federal Government. And this is a Federal
responsibility. I am sorry I have to go back to the gentleman
before from California. This is a Federal responsibility. That
doesn't mean that local governments don't have responsibility.
That doesn't mean that we are not in partnership. But the
Federal Government has the primary responsibility of protecting
our borders. We may need the backup, the local folks in doing
that. They have the primary responsibility of providing the
intelligence--God bless you--the police department in New
Jersey have a great intelligence program, no one mentioned it
this morning. It doesn't run on hot air. It is effective. It
has even gotten the feds ticked off at it. Well, New York said
we are going to protect ourselves. This is what we need to do.
That costs money. In every one of these areas, New York got
less money. And there is absolutely no rationale behind it
because when we go to what you say--remember those columns we
saw that one day in this highly classified meeting? We need
this to be transparent, my friend, please. America, the public
has a right to know what we saw that day. I don't know what the
big secret is about that, to be very frank with you. I didn't
see anything in there that I haven't partially read in Newsweek
or Time Magazine or the New York Post or The New York Daily
News. And when I look at what your criteria is, the breakdown--
not your criteria, but the Department's criteria, of the
effective column, remember we saw a big drop in that area, and
when you are talking about implementation, what you are
implementing within the Department, within the city, and the
sustainability of the investment--in other words, if the
Federal Government is going to make--this is a real laugher. If
the Federal Government is going to be making an investment in
your counterterrorism activities, we want to know what is
sustainable, what is not sustainable, and the relevance of the
goals in the first place. I mean, we could learn a lot from New
York City Police Department, and we could learn a lot from New
York City in terms of how we protect our neighborhoods and our
children, etc., etc. So in that light, I want to ask you some
questions.
Mr. Simmons. You didn't ask him any questions?
Mr. Pascrell. Not yet. Do you think the Department of
Homeland Security risk methodology vetted with experts in the
risk field before it was given approval by the Department
leadership to be used, was this risk methodology vetted with
the experts? And was it vetted with the local people who are
there geographically, psychologically in every one of these
cities, and particularly now we are talking about D.C. and New
York.
Mr. Foresman. Congressman, with respect to the methodology
process, we used the national labs, the same national labs that
help the Department of Defense do threat assessment and develop
risk methodology that is used every day by our Defense
Department for a wide range of activities. So we had a wide
range of additions and practitioners that were involved in it,
folks from the intelligence community, folks from the law
enforcement community. To the degree that we did the briefings
with the State and local officials, I think it was probably
more of an after briefing, after the methodology was put
together. But it brings up the issue of being able to bring
them in on the front end and have that--
Mr. Pascrell. Right. And I think you are being very honest
about this. Peer review. We have peer review in the FIRE Act.
We have had that from the very beginning. A very competitive
process. The folks in the field are going to make a decision
about whether this application is meaningful and relevant. How
come we have this problem here? Why? Because it was imposed
from the top down. It makes no sense. The people who have to
implement this, the people who have to deal with the services
within New York City and Washington, D.C., who are on the front
lines day in and day out, unlike you and unlike me, they
weren't involved from the very get-go on this situation. Peer
review has worked out very well in the FIRE Act. Competitors
have worked out very, very well. The money goes directly to the
community, doesn't even go through the State. So we have
another component here. Not only should it be based--all the
money should be based on risk, it should be based directly--the
money should go directly to the community and directly to the
service so we can look at the accountability here.
Chairman King. Time of the gentleman is expired. Gentleman
from Connecticut, Mr. Shays.
Mr. Shays. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Foresman, many
people I respect say you are a very capable man, and so they
tell me that we should be grateful you are there. And I just
want to put that on the record.
Mr. Foresman. Thank you, Congressman.
Mr. Shays. And I appreciate your candidness at the closed
hearing that we had, and your approach at this hearing. Now,
having said that, I would like to focus in on what I wrestle
with. I was willing to see Connecticut cut if I felt everything
was based on risk. And we said 60 percent would be based on
risk, the Senate wanted more of it to be based on population.
We had a compromise. I don't think it should just be 60
percent. I think it should be based on risk. Now, any community
needs the money but it should still be based on risk. What I
wrestle with is that I feel the Department did something that
it was not authorized to do unless I am just misreading it. You
did two-thirds risk and one-third effectiveness. Now, I will
change it to say whether it is--how it scores in terms of
whether it is a good grant or not. I am using the word
effectiveness, but it seems to me if the grant reached a
certain threshold they got a passing grade, then it should have
been based on what the Congress wanted, which was totally,
completely based on risk. So walk me through why effectiveness
took one-third of the score.
Mr. Foresman. Congressman, let me address this in two
parts. First with regard--we have always got to be careful to
keep the programs separate, the State Homeland Security Grant
Program, which every State receives a base minimum 0.75 percent
and the remainder of it based on risk, which would be the type
of program that would support the State of Connecticut versus
the Urban Areas Security Initiative program, which is two-
thirds based on risk and one-third based on the effectiveness.
In the context of the effectiveness score, it was designed to
make sure that we were improving capabilities, and the
congressional direction that we have gotten out of the
appropriations act was twofold: One, to move towards a risk-
based approach and, second, to make sure we were building
sustainable capabilities. The process that we chose to do that
was a peer review process, and to work to ensure that it was
targeted against the local and the State strategies, which
Congress had directed us to make sure that communities and
States were developing. So it was an approach that was
identified as being reasonable.
Mr. Shays. Okay. Let me just say to you, though, when I
looked at what we did last week and the week before and now
here, if New York gets a score of the highest risk, I do agree
with the chairman that the next highest risk isn't even the
second, third, fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh, eighth, ninth or
tenth. I think 50 percent of the risk frankly is in New York
City, and it just seems to me that even when you count it as
scoring number one, it still gets cheated. And I would like you
to tell me how I am not seeing this the way I should see it.
Mr. Foresman. Congressman, I think that you have come up
with a conundrum that we wrestle with from a policy standpoint
every day. How do you come up with a process that is both a
fair and equitable process that doesn't penalize the most at-
risk or the least at-risk. In a process that ensures that it is
not--
Mr. Shays. Not the least at-risk. I want them to not get
any money.
Mr. Foresman. When I say the least at-risk of these 46
urban areas, what is important to understand of these 46 urban
areas, they represent 45 percent of the Nation's urban risk
that we are able to mitigate through the efforts as we
understand that risk. So I cannot sit here with 100 percent
surety.
Mr. Shays. The fact is though that when you did do this,
whoever became second in the--you didn't have gaps. You didn't
decide this--that New York is the primary target, is the
secondary target, is the third target or fourth or fifth, you
had one and then you just moved every one right up behind it,
correct?
Mr. Foresman. I think that is a fair statement,
Congressman.
Mr. Shays. And it seems to me there has got to be a way to
equate the risk so the number is not based on rank but based on
something where you see the gap. I mean, I have been in this--I
have been doing terrorist hearings since 1988, since 1998 as
chairman of the National Security Subcommittee of Government
Reform, and there is no question in my mind that all of us have
a belief that New York City is always going to be the target
and that everyone else, you know, may be.
Mr. Foresman. But Congressman, and I want to be very clear
with this, I would agree based on my work prior to coming into
this position on a national commission, and we looked at the
same issues, but again, we don't want to get caught up in one
of the things that we had criticized, the Federal Government
was criticized, about a failure in imagination, and we are
trying to find the right balance of looking at the reasonable
and likely threats against--
Mr. Shays. I made my point. You have made your point. Let
me just say Mr. Simmons is next, and he and I both have the
same concerns about an urban State, Connecticut, given we don't
have a large population--our largest city is 140,000, but we
represent collectively a large population, and we hope we are
not getting screwed.
Mr. Foresman. I would like to continue this conversation
with you.
Mr. Shays. Do it with him.
Chairman King. Time of the gentleman has expired. The other
gentleman from Connecticut, Mr. Simmons.
Mr. Simmons. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me just follow on
that thought. When we first got briefed on that formula on how
the formula was going to work, I had a concern that reflects my
concern whenever Connecticut is confronted with a Federal
formula program. Unlike most States in the country, we do not
have county-based government. It is an anachronism perhaps, but
we like it. We call it home rule. We have 169 small towns.
Looking specifically at New London County, we have the City of
New London, adjacent is Waterford, the town of Groton, City of
Groton, and the town of Ledyard. Now, within these five
municipalities you have three nuclear power plants, the New
London Submarine Base, Electric Boat, which is the premiere
design construction facility for nuclear subs, Amtrak main
line, I-95, Pfizer, Dow Chemical and a variety of other
infrastructures, and yet when you look at these entities
separately they don't add up. In fact, some would say when you
look at them in the aggregate they don't add up. Now, in 2004,
for whatever reason, New Haven added up. In 2005 and 2006, New
Haven didn't add up and under the regs New Haven will no longer
be considered for the UASI. And I just think that is an
arbitrary standard at some future date based on changing
realities, changing threat, changing information that some of
those municipalities that were dropped under UASI may if
reconsidered fall back within that domain, and so I would hope
that these formulas are not so arbitrary that human
intellectual intervention is not a possibility. And I think
that is the point I would like to make, but you can comment on
that if you wish.
But before you do, I would like to get back to the issue of
a human intelligence, and what I thought I heard you say
earlier was that Congress directed that the money for human
resources be spent in a certain way and that other dollars be
spent for equipment, which I understand. But you know, when you
are allocating dollars for human resources and it is going to a
municipality, if it is going to a meter maid, if it is going to
somebody who performs, I don't know, traffic duties, I
understand why the Federal Government does not have an interest
in necessarily funding that through this program. They can do
it through COPS or some other program. But when we are trying
to train and resource these departments now to engage in the
intelligence mission and when we have the responsibility under
the Constitution, we the Federal Government, to provide for the
common defense, which we do, Article I, Section 8, and when we
consider we are engaged in a global war on terrorism and that
is certainly what we debated last week, then I think the
Federal Government has to be much more judicious in how it
considers those requests for funding for humans because as the
preceding panel made very clear, yeah, they have standard law
enforcement missions and they are trying to accomplish them,
but this terrorism thing is totally new and they are being held
accountable for it and they need the assistance of the Federal
Government on that, so are you saying this committee or this
Congress did not allow human resource investment for
intelligence and counterterrorism purposes. Is that your
feeling?
Mr. Foresman. No, Congressman. That is not what I am
saying. Let me address the first part of your statement with
regard to infrastructure. You are right on point with the fact
that we--our understanding of risk in a particular regional
area changes and, for instance, if you all were to go back on
the UASI list that would mean that we would have to apportion
that limited pool of dollars even further than it has
apportioned now. So we would be back here for another hearing.
I will just let you know that but as long as we understand that
going into it. A good example being down in Houston last year,
the day before Hurricane Katrina went through Louisiana,
Houston had 25 percent of the Nation's petroleum production.
The day after Hurricane Katrina, it owned 45 percent of the
Nation's petroleum production, which meant that the relative
risk of Houston both as a target, inviting target and the
potential impact on the Nation had potentially doubled
overnight and so, yes, it is dynamic and jurisdictions that may
be off at one point as a result of change of risk specific
threat information could come back on.
To the second part of your question with regard to funding,
my point was this--intelligence analysts are the one area that
we have been able to get an exception for being able to use a
limited amount of these dollars for personnel costs. As I have
noted, we have provided some additional flexibility to New York
City prior to even this announcement. That was something that
Commissioner Kelly had made a very articulate case about and we
have provided that level of flexibility, but generally
speaking, the guidance that has gone out to communities in
terms of the cap, the total amount of money that they can use
for overtime costs or personnel costs or those categories for
personnel costs is limited, and that has been further
reinforced by language in the appropriations act that has
provided guidance to us.
So we are in a situation where, yes, we can do a little
more in the intel world, particularly in the analyst world, not
necessarily for the big cop out on the street who may be
collecting intelligence, but if you were talking about a SWAT
team member or something of that nature, no, we don't have that
level of flexibility.
Mr. Simmons. So as I understand it, it is not necessarily
the authorizing committees that are providing these
limitations. It is the appropriations committees, and I think
that, Mr. Chairman, that might be fertile ground for us to take
a brief look.
Chairman King. Thank you. I thank the gentleman. Ranking
Member.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I would
like unanimous consent to get into the record a statement from
Congresswoman Sheila Jackson Lee.
Chairman King. Without objection, it is made part of the
record.
[The statement of Ms. Jackson-Lee follows:]
Prepared Statement of Congresswoman Sheila Jackson-Lee
Mr. Chairman and Members of the subcommittee, I would like to thank
you for having this hearing today, which is essential to the exercise
of our oversight responsibility over the Department of Homeland
Security and critical in ensuring our great nation's preparation for
future terrorist threats. I would like to take this opportunity to
welcome the honorable individuals serving as witnesses today: Mayors
Michael Bloomberg and Anthony Williams, and Under Secretary George
Foresman.
This hearing today is intended to investigate how the Department of
Homeland Security explains and attempts to justify why New York City
and Washington, D.C., the two areas targeted by the terrorists on 9/11,
and which remain the two most at-risk jurisdictions in our nation,
received an approximately 40% cut in fbnding fiom the Urban Area
Security Initiative (UASI) for FY 2006, despite the fact the Department
broadened its new allocation process for FY 2006 to include both risk
and need. In addition, New York City and Washington, D.C., are not the
only high risk cities to be subjected to the Department's
maldistribution of homeland security dollars.@Iy own district of
Houston, which is among the top 50% of all Urban Areas based on the FY
2006 DHS comparative risk analysis and among the top 25% of all Urban
Areas in effectiveness of proposed solutions, was subjected to a more
than 10% decrease in funding by UASI. Moreover, my state of Texas faced
even more severe cuts of 53% in funding from the State Homeland
Security Grant Program (SHSGP) and 29% in UASI funding)Accordingly,
this hearing is crucial in highlighting the Department's ongoing
failure on a wide range of issues including its inability to cogently
articulate the distribution of its homeland security dollars. Moreover,
the Department's ineptitude in the grants allocation process is
emblematic of its handling of issues vital to our nation's security,
such as disaster response, FEMA assistance, port and rail security, and
contracting.
As we proceed with the hearing today, I have serious concerns
regarding the inadequacy of funding faced by DHS due to drastic cuts
orchestrated by this Administration and Congress. One of the main
reasons high risk cities have seen a cut in FY 2006 grant funding is
because hding for the UASI program was cut by $120 million, the SHSGP
was decimated by the 50% cut of $550 million, and the Administration
has twice attempted to eliminate the Law Enforcement Terrorism
Prevention Program (LETPP).
As we struggle to ameliorate the prudence and effectiveness of the
Department's new allocation process, which determines the allocation of
funding based on a combination of risk and anticipated effectiveness of
the proposed solutions to reduce such risk, it is imperative that the
Department work closely with these high risk cities and states to
improve their plans to utilize DHS funds rather than simply penalizing
them for the quality of their applications.
I eagerly look forward to the testimony and discussion today, and
once again, I appreciate all of the witnesses for appearing today. I
thank the Chairman, and I yield back the remainder of my time.
Mr. Thompson. I don't have any further questions. I think
Mr. Pascrell has some questions for the second round.
Chairman King. Sure, he does. Mr. Pascrell.
Mr. Pascrell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Ranking Member.
Mr. Secretary, why did the administration propose cutting the
entire Law Enforcement Terrorism Prevention Program, which is a
third major area where New York and the other cities get a lot
of money?
Mr. Foresman. Congressman, I will be more than happy to
provide you a written response for the record, but I will tell
you those were decisions that preceded my arrival here in this
position.
Mr. Pascrell. Yes, because that would be quite an amount of
money, too. It would be $26 million less for New York, $7
million less for New Jersey, and about $1.5 million less for
Connecticut. Excuse me. Yeah. Connecticut was getting $5
million in a program. Now it is only getting $1 million this
year.
Many local and State officials continue complaining that
they are kept in the dark. You have heard some comments about
that today, Mr. Secretary, about the decisions that are made at
the Department and decisions that impact upon their
communities. Do you think--what is your opinion about this, do
you think the creation of a first responder advisory group that
could advise the Department on grants that could advise the
Department on a national response plan and other issues would
be useful or is that something that would be superfluous in
your mind?
Mr. Foresman. Congressman, my best guidance after having
been brought to Washington over 25 years for discussion is
whether we have a statutorily created or regulatory created
group is not as important as whether we are having ongoing
regular dialogue with our State and local partners. And I think
the major measure of our success is the degree to [which this]
we can get beyond reacting to the moment and sitting down and
having frank discussions, nationwide plan review being a good
example. When we released that information a number of folks
said, gosh, it was a peer review, we understand, but you all
are putting it out. Give us as much detail as you can on the
front end. And that went better than this grant rollout, but it
did not go as well as it could and it underscores the premium
of that ongoing collaboration.
Protecting America is a national effort, local, State
public sector, private sector, and that is who needs to be at
the table.
Mr. Pascrell. In our haste to try to demonstrate to the
American people that we are doing something, that we are really
protecting--helping to protect communities throughout the
United States, I think many times we rush into those decisions
and don't take into account what is happening in the local
level.
They have a different approach in London. When we went--the
chairman mentioned a little while ago--they have a different
approach. This is always a bottom-up situation that I noticed
in London, a very different approach to protecting their people
than we have. We expect somebody up here is going to make all
the decisions, slide them down the pole and then everybody is
going to be protected. And that is not how it worked out at
all. It is a very eerie feeling we have about that process, and
I would ask that you take--at least consider that possibility
of what I have just recommended and call it as you see it.
If the goal of the Department is to quickly get the funding
money to those on the ground that need it, and given the fact
that we are two-thirds through this fiscal year, when do we
think the funding is going to be released?
Mr. Foresman. The funding--the UASI and the State homeland
security grant funding?
Mr. Pascrell. Yes.
Mr. Foresman. Congressman, I don't have a specific date but
let me provide you a written response by the close of business
tomorrow.
Mr. Pascrell. Well, we are two-thirds the way through the
year.
Mr. Foresman. Yes, sir.
Mr. Pascrell. How did the Department of Homeland Security
find the District of Columbia--if I am not clear on the
question, please tell me--to be in the bottom 25 percent in
terms of risk for the State homeland security grant program
when the entire District falls within the borders of the
National Capital Region which is deemed to be in the top 25
percent for risk as part of the UASI program? How did you do
that?
Mr. Foresman. Congressman, that points to the abnormality
of the process. The fact that the District is considered both--
Mr. Pascrell. The abnormality of the process?
Mr. Foresman. Of a process. Let me explain to you. D.C. is
the one city that also has State status, if you will, under
these programs. So when they are competing and the reference
you made is with regard to the State homeland security grant
program. When they are competing, they are competing against 50
other States as it relates to population, population density,
number of critical assets, these types of things.
Also, remember that a large portion of this is based on the
0.75 percent figure and 60 percent of it based on risk. So it
is a simple fact that you are comparing a city to 50 States and
six territories, which probably is not the best thing in the
world unless you are the city here in the District of Columbia
because you get to draw dollars both from UASI and the State
homeland security grant program.
Chairman King. The time of the gentleman has expired. You
may ask one question.
Mr. Pascrell. We plebeians have a difficult time
understanding those contradictions and those abnormalities.
Really, we need to take a careful look at this. You have to
admit, Mr. Secretary, through all the discussions that we have
had--it is not meant to embarrass the Department--we have to
have answers when people ask us about these inconsistencies.
When you have a high risk but your program that you submitted
does not show enough effectiveness, and then when we go into
the effectiveness, you know, you are spinning.
Mr. Foresman. Congressman, you make a very valid point. And
our job, our collective job between the legislative and the
executive, between all levels of government is to reassure the
American public that we are doing everything we can to secure
the Nation and keep them safe.
Having said that, we have to make sure that the discussions
that we have about UASI and SHSGP reflect how can we fix those
things that are unintended consequences of our rush to put
programs together several years ago, and separate what is a
discussion of a communication from where we may have good
things about programs or where we may have things about
programs we need to fix, and we are very much committed to
doing that, sir.
Chairman King. I thank the gentleman. Mr. Secretary, I have
one final question. On the peer review panels, were they given
access to classified intelligence to show, for instance, why a
city may have been pursuing a specific application? In other
words, were they able to put the application against the
backdrop of specific threats or intelligence involving a
specific city or region?
Mr. Foresman. Mr. Chairman, let me provide a very detailed
written response to that. But I want to give you the broad
brush. A large part of what we asked them to do was to take the
original strategy that was developed by the region, or in this
case New York City, and by the State. And those strategies
developed by those local officials and those State officials
were based on their understanding of the threat and the risk.
And so the peer review was assessing the investment
justifications against how were they going to accomplish the
strategies that prior to the application process they said they
needed to do.
So I will provide you a detailed written response, but I do
not believe that we provided threat information and risk
ranking because we simply wanted the peer review panels to look
at these objectively in the context of do they make the case
about how these dollars are going to address the strategy and
reduce their risk.
Chairman King. The reason I ask the question--and I will be
careful how I phrase this--there are a number of situations
that I am aware of in New York where the police have a
particular response which in the abstract may not make sense
but against the nature of the threat that they perceive it
makes a lot of sense. That is why I asked the question.
Mr. Foresman. Mr. Chairman, I might mention, I think we
would do well--we are asking for a nationwide threat map, a
visual showing the more serious threats that we have
experienced over the course of the last several years. I think
this is something that we probably do want to get back together
and show it to you all, not that it is going to measurably
change other than to underscore that threats are not limited to
New York City and the National Capital Region.
Chairman King. I would also say on at least one of these
threats, it may be a threat that, at least in the eyes of New
Yorkers, is not fully appreciated by the Federal Government but
the NYPD would have a very good case to make why--at least in
their eyes why they perceive it to be a threat and why certain
methods are being used.
Mr. Foresman. Mr. Chairman, if I might. This goes to the
earlier question that you raised and I think Commissioner Kelly
outlined the fact that our operational components work very
closely with the City of New York. Our grants folks work very
closely with the folks who do the preparation of the grant
packages. We are at the stage where we need to make sure that
the operational folks and the grant folks at local level, at
the State level and the Federal level are all sitting in the
rooms at the same time for these discussions. We are doing
better. We could do much better. I want to get to the point
where these type of discussions can occur before we get into
the decision process.
Chairman King. Well, on that grand note of harmony, why
don't we end the hearing.
Mr. Foresman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman King. I thank you for your testimony, and the
hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 1:55 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
Questions and Responses for the Record
Under Secretary George Foresman Responses
to the Honorable Bennie G. Thompson Questions
1. The "low-risk" status of some urban areas and the
potential to make them ineligible for next year's UASI (UASI)
funding have raised what appear to be legitimate concerns about
the underlying risk assessment. Common sense suggests that
places like San Diego and Las Vegas should be eligible for some
funding. For example, we understand that an urban area's
proximity to an international border and the partnership
between federal, state, and local law enforcement was not a
consideration, although it was for State-level risk. We also
understand that the Department of Homeland Security did not
consult with the Department of Defense to distinguish the
scale, scope or value among military installations, or the
municipal services that support the military presence, so a
relatively remote National Guard outpost received the same
weight as the nuclear ships in the Port of San Diego.
Is the Department considering modifications to the risk
assessment for next year that take such factors into account?
Response:
The Department will both consider the presence of
international borders and include more Department of Defense
(DoD) data into the risk analysis for next year. Inclusion of
international borders will be considered as a potential factor
in the formulation of Fiscal Year (FY) 2007 Urban Areas
Security Initiative calculations. With respect to military
installations, initial discussions were held with DoD prior to
the calculation of the FY 2006 analysis. While these
conversations proved useful, they were not meant to be all-
inclusive or final. Discussions with DoD are continuing and
some important data has already been shared by them. This new
data will be used in the upcoming analysis. However, it must be
understood that these anticipated modifications must be
approved by DHS senior leadership prior to the final
calculations, and must be consistent with the Congressional
Appropriations language funding these grants. Rest assured we
will consider the full range of valuable input presented this
year.
2. Why did the Department of Homeland Security decide to
redefine the Buffalo-Niagara UASI region to the just be the
City of Buffalo and a ten mile buffer around the city?
Response:
In order to determine eligibility for participating in the
Fiscal Year (FY) 2006 Urban Areas Security Initiative (UASI),
DHS identified all cities with a population greater than
100,000 and any city with reported threat data during the past
year. Cities on that list with shared city boundaries were
combined into a single entity for data count purposes. A 10-
mile buffer was then drawn from the border of that city or
combined entity to establish the geographical area in which
data was evaluated. This enhanced approach included a broader
footprint for the data analysis than previous fiscal years
under the UASI program when only data within the city limits
was captured and evaluated. In this case, Buffalo does not
share a border with a city that has a population of over
100,000 residents.
However, the geographical area used to determine
eligibility and the geographical area in which the UASI program
is actually implemented at the local level are two separate
issues for consideration. Jurisdictions participating in the
Urban Areas Security Initiative have been and continue to be
responsible for defining the actual geographic region in which
the program will be implemented. At a minimum, those areas have
included a core city and the county in which that city was
located. Many urban areas have expanded the region covered
under program implementation to include additional cities and
counties, something the City of Buffalo has the opportunity to
do. The UASI program has historically afforded flexibility to
each Urban Area to determine implementation structures that are
sensible both programmatically and operationally. This was done
in recognition of the fact that each Urban Area is unique and
that no single structure or approach can effectively apply to
all participants in the program nationwide. However, for the
purpose of eligibility, DHS developed a definition of a
geographic area which it believes to be fair, and which was
applied consistently across the country.
3. Has the Department of Homeland Security declined to
provide either unclassified or classified briefings on the UASI
awards process to Buffalo-Niagara officials and representative
from other urban areas? If not, what has been the delay in
meeting with many of them to discuss their area's risk
assessment?
Response:
The Department has not declined unclassified or classified
briefings to Buffalo-Niagara officials or representatives from
other areas. Rather, the Department has encouraged
jurisdictions to wait until all explanatory materials are
released on the Homeland Security Grant Program allocation
process to see if these materials address their questions or
concerns.
Additionally, the Department's regionally-assigned
Protective Security Advisor recently met with the Buffalo Urban
Area working group and has begun to work with them on their
concerns related to the Urban Areas Security Initiative program
and the area's risk assessment. The Department is currently
working with Representative Slaughter's office to schedule a
briefing for the Buffalo delegation. Additionally, I have
personally traveled to Buffalo to meet with area officials
about their concerns.
4. In January, the Department of Homeland Security
announced that 11 urban areas did not fall within the top 35
urban areas most in need of UASI funding. These 11 cities were
told that they could apply for "sustainment funding" to allow
for continuity in ongoing projects, but Buffalo-Niagara
officials were given the impression that they would receive
much less than FY 2005. While Buffalo did in fact receive a 48
percent cut in UASI dollars, other sustainment areas -- Tampa,
Louisville, Sacramento, and Omaha -- received significant
increases in funding.
Can you explain why certain sustainment areas got cut
whiles others did much better than past years?
Response:
In Fiscal Year (FY) 2006, DHS introduced a new allocation
methodology for evaluating applications under the Homeland
Security Grant Program (HSGP), including the Urban Areas
Security Initiative program. The new methodology is
representative of a broader trend within DHS to prioritize
homeland security resources on the basis of objective measures
of risk. For the first time, DHS is able to align HSGP
resources with the National Priorities and target capabilities
established by the National Preparedness Goal as well as
jurisdictional specific strategies.
The methodology bases HSGP allocations primarily on two
factors:
1. An analysis of relative risk to assets as well as risk
to populations and geographic areas.
2. The anticipated effectiveness of State and Urban Area
grant proposals in addressing their identified homeland
security needs.
DHS targeted resources so as to balance protection of the
areas of our Nation at greatest risk with support for
applicants who have undertaken significant efforts to present
effective solutions. The applications were reviewed and scored
by teams of peer reviewers from States and Urban Areas across
the Nation, who evaluated each applicant's submission based on
a standard set of criteria to determine the final effectiveness
score.
Ultimately, each applicant's final funding allocation was
determined using a combination of risk and effectiveness
scores. The relative risk ranking for each Urban Area,
including sustainment areas, may have driven part of the
change. This is especially so when considering that the
Department's information regarding risk across the entire
nation was far greater in FY 2006 than in prior years.
Additionally, in FY 2006, with the introduction of investment
justifications into the allocation process, Urban Areas
receiving higher effectiveness scores based on the peer-review
evaluation may have also received a larger allocation.
5. How does the Department of Homeland Security account for
the fact that in some areas of the United States there are
extremely large urban unincorporated areas or cities that are
very large geographically?
Response:
In order to analyze relative risk of candidate Urban Areas
and determine eligibility for the Urban Areas Security
Initiative program, DHS utilized a multi-tier analysis which
was applied consistently and uniformly across the nation.
This analysis began by identifying all cities with a
population greater than 100,000 and any city with reported
threat data during the past year. Cities on this list with
shared city boundaries were combined into a single entity for
data count purposes. A 10-mile buffer was then drawn from the
border of that city or combined entity to establish the
geographical area in which data was evaluated. Unincorporated
areas are captured through the 10-mile buffer.
6. Does the risk analysis process take into account that
damage to critical infrastructure outside the arbitrary 10 mile
radius can have a devastating effect on an Urban Area?
Response:
The risk analysis used in Fiscal Year (FY) 2006 did not
take into account specific cascading effects based on analysis
regardless of distance from the Urban Area or its core city.
Such effects are the primary topic of study by the National
Infrastructure Analysis and Simulation Center (NISAC).,
Directed by the DHS Risk Management Division, NISAC is a
collaborative effort between Sandia National Laboratories and
Los Alamos National Laboratory. NISAC analyses are extremely
complex and require a great deal of data from the private
sector. Partnerships with private entities and their sharing of
data are an ongoing challenge, but are, in part, being
addressed by the Preparedness Directorate's Risk Analysis
Method for Critical Asset Protection (RAMCAP) efforts. Planning
for the FY 2007 Homeland Security Grant Program includes
incorporating at least some aspects of cascading effects.
However, as Hurricane Katrina clearly demonstrated, some limits
must be placed on whatever data is used for such an analysis as
the possibilities for data inclusion on interdependencies are
potentially endless.
7. The Department of Homeland Security noted in a written
response to a letter from Representative Doris O. Matsui (CA-
05) that, "The Department is continuing to develop a more
robust risk model as it gains the capabilities to increase its
knowledge of interdependencies, cascading effects and refine
data sets."
Since the Department of Homeland Security will begin
evaluating risk to determine grant eligibility for the FY 2007
program in the next few months, how does the Department of
Homeland Security plan on creating a more robust risk model
that takes into account interdependencies, cascading effects
and refined data sets?
Response:
The Office of Grants and Training held an After Action
Report conference in San Diego on July 11-12, which included a
three-part session on the DHS risk analysis methodology and
means to improve it. The feedback at that conference, which
includes suggestions and recommendations for the grant
programs, is in the process of being consolidated. Both the
interdependencies and data quality and review by local entities
were included as issues for the Department to address.
8. Which data and timeframe was used to evaluate threats to
a specific urban area or state? Did the Department of Homeland
Security make any attempt to validate or reconcile the types of
FBI investigations?
Response:
There were three factors used in quantifying the threats to
urban areas and states: Intelligence Community Reporting,
Suspicious Activity Reports, and law enforcement activity. The
Homeland Infrastructure Threat and Risk Analysis Center
(HITRAC) performed the analysis and had no visibility into the
specifics of any law enforcement data received from the FBI,
beyond the fact there was a terrorism nexus, however, only
Full-Field Investigations were utilized. The evaluation of both
the reports and law enforcement activity data covered October
1, 2004 to September 30, 2005.
9. Does the Department of Homeland Security give greater
credence and weight in the analysis model to critical
infrastructure than to population and population density?
Response:
Neither data have greater credence. Population and
population density are factors in what is termed the
"geographic risk", and infrastructures are factors in what is
termed the "asset risk". Additionally, within the consequences
portion of the asset risk, human casualties are the most
heavily weighted.
10. After all the state and urban area totals were
computed, did the Department of Homeland Security take a step
back from the empirical data and see if the resultant analysis
could pass a reasonableness test?
Response:
In past years, DHS' risk analysis was largely driven by
both population size and density. But over time DHS has been
able to develop enhanced techniques to analyze risk. In Fiscal
Year 2006, the risk analysis considered three primary
components: threat, vulnerability, and consequence. With the
enhanced methodology and broader set of data inputs, we were
able to capture a truer estimation of relative risk for all
urban areas. The footprint used to analyze the risk to both
assets as well as geographic areas and populations was adjusted
this year. This adjustment more accurately reflects the
regional context in which these jurisdictions operate and the
critical infrastructure that provides higher potential targets
and requires protecting.
The new DHS risk analysis process incorporates the ability
to assess the increase in relevant individual risk of urban
communities, this risk in relation to other communities, and
the distribution of risk across our entire nation. As a result
of these improvements, many areas' risk scores changed
significantly, a reflection of an enhanced analytical approach
to gauging the risk urban areas face relative to one another.
DHS is confident the results of the analysis are reasonable and
more accurate than prior years. We will, however, maintain a
constant evaluation process to ensure results remain
reasonable.
11. How does past performance in accomplishing the Homeland
Security Grant program preparedness objectives influence future
awards?
Response:
Fiscal Year (FY) 2006 marks the first year in which states
and urban areas applied for funding under the Homeland Security
Grant Program by submitting an investment justification for
evaluation through a peer review process. Included in those
submissions was information about regionalization, impact, and
the overall implementation approach for each proposed
investment. Peer reviewers evaluated each individual investment
as well as the overall portfolio of investments against
specific criteria. In future years, DHS will look to include
past performance as an element for consideration in the peer
review process, allowing reviewers to evaluate the performance
of investments from the FY 2006 process in order to better
understand the scope and feasibility of related proposed
investments in future years.
12. As the Department of Homeland Security works with the
private sector it is equally important for local authorities to
play a part in any discussion on infrastructure protection and
preparedness.
What is the Department of Homeland Security doing to
incorporate local authorities in partnerships with private
sector owners of infrastructure?
Response:
DHS has provided both strategic direction and programmatic
support to encourage the coordination of State and local
homeland security and critical infrastructure protection
efforts with the private sector. This is especially evident
with the release of the National Infrastructure Protection Plan
(NIPP) and the National Priorities in the National Preparedness
Goal, particularly those parts of the goal titled Expand
Regional Collaboration and Implement the NIPP. The NIPP, in
particular, provides the unifying structure for the integration
of existing and future critical infrastructure protection
efforts and delineates roles and responsibilities for security
partners in carrying out implementation activities.
Further, the Department's Infrastructure Protection Program
grants provide a means by which State and local governments and
private sector owners and operators can collaborate on targeted
security enhancements for critical infrastructure at the local
level. For example, port security grants, which emphasize
prevention and detection against improvised explosive devices
(IEDs), facilitate collaboration among government officials and
private owners and operators on proposals for and
implementation of specific projects that enhance security at
the highest risk port areas. Similarly, in the case of buffer-
zone protection grants, responsible local jurisdictions review
and assess ways in which they can work with relevant Federal,
State, local, tribal, and private sector agencies to coordinate
their prevention and protection activities. Additionally,
jurisdictions responsible for the protection of identified high
priority assets and the development of the Buffer Zone Plans
are required to coordinate their activities with the private
sector, including asset owners and operators.
Lastly, the Business Executives for National Security
(BENS), in partnership with DHS' Office of Grants & Training,
have developed and implemented BENS Business Force Teams across
the country. BENS Business Force Teams help build public-
private partnerships in selected regions across the nation by
connecting businesses and government officials in order to
mutually support and strengthen homeland security efforts in
the region. Each partnership is directed by its region's
government and business leaders; has membership that cuts
across industry sectors and all levels of government; and
implements multiple initiatives that improve prevention,
protection, response and recovery capabilities - addressing
both national and regional priorities. The BENS Business Force
partnerships help fill key gaps in security by taking on
initiatives that include: Business Response Network; Biological
Event Preparation; Intelligence/Information Sharing; and
Critical Infrastructure Risk Assessment.
13. We have heard complaints from state and local officials
that the Transit and Port Security grants still aren't out yet
and they are not getting answers from the Department.
If the goal of the Department is to quickly get the funding
money to those on the ground that need it and given the fact
that we are 2/3 through the fiscal year, when do you think the
funding will be released?
Response:
Funding for these programs was announced on July 6, 2006.
Applicants will have through August 4, 2006, to submit
applications, and awards will be made no later than September
30, 2006.
14. What effort is your office making to track and monitor
the delivery federal homeland security funds to tribal
governments? What outreach efforts have your office developed
to communicate to tribal nations about availability of homeland
security grants?
Response:
Based on the Homeland Security Grant Program guidance, all
state and local programs and expenditures are subject to
review, monitoring and audit at all times. The Office of Grants
and Training's (G&T) preparedness officers aggressively manage
the programs and monitor the spending of all 56 states and
territories. All state investments and spending plans are
reported to the Department through initial Investment
Justification reports and monitored through biannual financial
progress reports.
G&T has a preparedness officer assigned to coordinate and
liaise with tribal governments and communities in an effort to
ensure the effective delivery of Homeland Security programs,
technical assistance support and funds to tribal communities.
To ensure full recognition of tribal needs the tribal liaison
works directly with the assigned State preparedness officers as
well as State, local and tribal governments to ensure the
threats and risks faced by tribal communities are reduced and
that State, regional and tribal jurisdictions are fully
collaborative and coordinated.
In addition to the appointment of a tribal liaison, the
state preparedness officers conduct regular financial and
programmatic reviews through frequent program office monitoring
efforts and site visits to ensure Native American communities
are equitably targeted for funding and support appropriate for
the identified threats and risks. The preparedness officers
coordinate directly with senior state officials to address
questions or concerns when they arise.
Regarding the outreach efforts, the Native American liaison
has attended several tribal training events, conferences and
focused meetings at every opportunity. State preparedness
officers have also met with Tribal governments and
representatives throughout the Country and provided focused
communication dedicated to tribal leaders. G&T also reaches out
to Tribal leaders and encourages their full participation in
available conferences and training opportunities. G&T included
a Tribal representative as a subject matter expert on Tribal
issues at the FY 2006 HSGP peer review session.
15. Although many cities including New York have discussed
the value of their 3-1-1 non-emergency numbers during
disasters, the Department of Homeland Security has deemed that
3-1-1 systems were not eligible for homeland security grants.
Can you please provide the legal or administrative basis
for the decision? Is the Department willing to review its
position on 3-1-1?
Response:
Homeland Security Grant Program (HSGP) funds are
appropriated for the purpose of assisting State and local
governments in building their capacities to prevent, protect,
respond to, and recover from major events including acts of
terrorism. In Fiscal Year (FY) 2006, DHS has allowed grantees
to leverage HSGP funds to address an "all-hazards" approach to
emergency planning, response, and recovery.
3-1-1 systems provide access to non-emergency services, and
are intended to help divert routine inquiries and non-emergency
concerns or complaints from the public away from the 9-1-1
emergency system. Examples of calls intended for 3-1-1 systems
include issues such as debris in roadway, noise complaints,
non-working street lights, etc. DHS continues to believe that
purchase of such systems is considered to be outside the scope
of the Homeland Security Grant Program as it does not enhance a
jurisdiction's ability to carry out any of the mission areas
for which the HSGP funding is provided.