[House Hearing, 109 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 109-126]
COMBAT VEHICLE ACTIVE PROTECTION SYSTEMS
__________
HEARING
BEFORE THE
TACTICAL AIR AND LAND FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
HEARING HELD
SEPTEMBER 21, 2006
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TONGRESS.#13
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TACTICAL AIR AND LAND FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE
CURT WELDON, Pennsylvania, Chairman
HOWARD P. ``BUCK'' McKEON, NEIL ABERCROMBIE, Hawaii
California IKE SKELTON, Missouri
JIM GIBBONS, Nevada JOHN SPRATT, South Carolina
KEN CALVERT, California SOLOMON P. ORTIZ, Texas
FRANK A. LoBIONDO, New Jersey LANE EVANS, Illinois
JEB BRADLEY, New Hampshire ADAM SMITH, Washington
MICHAEL TURNER, Ohio MIKE McINTYRE, North Carolina
MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania
TERRY EVERETT, Alabama STEVE ISRAEL, New York
ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland JIM COOPER, Tennessee
WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina KENDRICK B. MEEK, Florida
JIM RYUN, Kansas TIM RYAN, Ohio
W. TODD AKIN, Missouri G.K. BUTTERFIELD, North Carolina
J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia DAN BOREN, Oklahoma
JOE WILSON, South Carolina
BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania
John Wason, Professional Staff Member
Jesse Tolleson, Professional Staff Member
Andrew Hunter, Professional Staff Member
Benjamin Kohr, Staff Assistant
C O N T E N T S
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CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS
2006
Page
Hearing:
Thursday, September 21, 2006, Combat Vehicle Active Protection
Systems........................................................ 1
Appendix:
Thursday, September 21, 2006..................................... 27
----------
THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 21, 2006
COMBAT VEHICLE ACTIVE PROTECTION SYSTEMS
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Abercrombie, Hon. Neil, a Representative from Hawaii, Ranking
Member, Tactical Air and Land Forces Subcommittee.............. 3
Weldon, Hon. Curt, a Representative from Pennsylvania, Chairman,
Tactical Air and Land Forces Subcommittee...................... 1
WITNESSES
Buhrkuhl, Dr. Robert L., Director, Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell,
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition,
Technology & Logistics)........................................ 7
Feldman, Lloyd, Assistant Director, Office of Force
Transformation, Office of the Secretary of Defense............. 10
Sorenson, Maj. Gen. Jeffrey, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the
Army (Acquisition, Logistics and Technology) for Acquisition
and Systems Management......................................... 9
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Buhrkuhl, Dr. Robert L....................................... 31
Feldman, Lloyd............................................... 48
Sorenson, Maj. Gen. Jeffrey.................................. 39
Documents Submitted for the Record:
[There were no Documents submitted.]
Questions and Answers Submitted for the Record:
Mr. Bradley.................................................. 00
Mr. Jones.................................................... 00
Mr. Weldon................................................... 00
COMBAT VEHICLE ACTIVE PROTECTION SYSTEMS
----------
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Tactical Air and Land Forces Subcommittee,
Washington, DC, Thursday, September 21, 2006.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:02 a.m. in
room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Curt Weldon
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. CURT WELDON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
PENNSYLVANIA, CHAIRMAN, TACTICAL AIR AND LAND FORCES
SUBCOMMITTEE
Mr. Weldon. The subcommittee will come to order. Today
continuing our high priority placed on providing force
protection for our men and women in combat, the subcommittee is
holding its sixth hearing on force protection issues. We will
receive testimony from Department of Defense (DOD) witnesses on
combat vehicle active protection systems (APS), systems
designed to protect ground combat vehicles from threats like
rocket propelled grenades (RPGs) and anti-tank guided missiles
(ATGM). This capability has been described to me as a mini
missile defense systems. Only instead of a system with 20-to-30
minute timelines, a system with 2-second to 3-second timelines
and once armed is without the man-in-the-loop.
Also, because of the proximity of engagements to the
defending vehicle, there are associated potential collateral
damage considerations. So achieving this capability is not
without significant conceptual, technical, and tactical
challenges.
In April 2005, Central Command (CENTCOM) validated a Joint
Urgent Operational Needs Statement request from our forces in
Iraq for a capability that included a requirement for a fully
automated, active protection system against rocket propelled
grenades and anti-tank missiles. Initially, the tasking for the
Central Command request was assigned by the Joint Rapid
Acquisition Cell (JRAC) in the Office of the Secretary of
Defense (OSD) to the Office of Force Transformation (OFT) in
the Office of the Secretary of Defense.
After conducting a market survey of active protective
systems that offered the promise of providing near-term
capability, the Office of Force Transformation and other
agencies to include the Army, determined that a system called
TROPHY developed by an Israeli company offered the most promise
of providing the required capability. After preliminary
testing, the Office of Force Transformation estimated that the
TROPHY system could be fielded onto one demonstrator vehicle in
the first half of 2007.
However, the Army and OSD's Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell
recommended against continuing testing of TROPHY because of
technical and collateral damage issues, and that the Central
Command urgent requirement could not be met until at the
earliest, the 2011 fielding of the active protection system
being developed for the Army's Future Combat Systems (FCS)
program.
So we have a situation where Central Command has validated
an urgent requirement for an active protection system. The
Office of Force Transformation indicates that a system could be
fielded in the first half of next year, 2007. Yet the Office of
the Secretary of Defense has decided to not field a capability
until 2011 at the earliest. We would like to understand what
factors went into this decision.
Further complicated a public understanding of the facts in
the effort to develop and field a system that could protect our
personnel was a recent evening news segment. This segment
implied to the mothers and fathers of America that U.S.
officials are not doing everything they can to give their sons
and daughters the best possible equipment for the war on
terrorism. I don't know about our witnesses, but I know that it
doesn't apply to me, and I am confident they believe it doesn't
apply to them.
The news segment in question further implied and quoted an
unnamed official as saying that an active protection system is
``ready today.'' that can be put on U.S. combat vehicles in
Iraq. Well, if that is the case, I want to know where that
system is. The segment also interviewed a distraught mother who
had lost her son and implied that if only the Army had not
blocked the TROPHY active protection system, her son would be
alive today.
It further went on to infer that if the Army had not
blocked this system, 132 lives that were lost might not have
been lost. When in actuality, the reported facts are that even
if this system had been deployed in Iraq on all the vehicles
for which it was designed, 122 of the 132 would still have been
killed. Now, a loss of one service member is unacceptable and
one too many. But implying that 132 would have been saved is
just factually incorrect and outrageous.
This segment goes on to say that the Israeli military,
based on its recent experience in Lebanon, is ``rushing to
deploy TROPHY.'' yet the best available information we have
been able to get indicates that the Israelis had originally
planned to do an operational assessment of the TROPHY system in
2007, but are now in discussions to attempt to accelerate this
plan. We are all entitled to our own views, but I don't call
this type of reporting responsible journalism. This is
journalism that plays on people's deep emotions, strings
unrelated facts together which leads to false conclusions and
with an unknown intent.
Now we invited their news media, including their anchor, to
come to this hearing because if they have a story to tell, let
them tell it where we can ask questions as opposed to 30 or 60
second sound bites, and of course, the media which proclaims to
want to have all the open information and all the facts would
not send their person, even the producer, to come before this
committee, which I find highly offensive.
If you are going to make a claim to the American people,
then have the intestinal fortitude to defend your position in
front of the Members of Congress who are responsible for
implementing these systems. And if you don't, in my opinion,
you have no integrity as a media source.
Now I will tell you what I really think when you get here
in person. In addition, the Army has not always been clear in
responding to the public and Congress and has provided
contradictory information on its active protection systems
program. So I am not going to be a rubber stamp for any
service. In an information paper dated June 13 responding to a
query from our committee, the Army stated in one place that the
TROPHY system could be deployed as early as the end of 2006 on
Israeli vehicles, but further on in the response, indicated it
was on a similar developmental timeline as the only other U.S.
active protection system in development scheduled for fielding
in 2011.
Similarly, explanations regarding the selection of the
contractor for the Future Combat Systems active protection
program are unclear as to what the contractor was selected to
do. This has led to media accusations that the Army cooked
their books in the selection of the contractor. We intend to
ask the Government Accountability Office (GAO) to determine the
facts in the source selection. Contrary to information provided
in witness statements, we are not aware of any funded program
for an active protection system for current systems like the M
1 tanks, Bradley fighting vehicles or Stryker vehicles in the
Army or Marine Corps budgets.
We look forward to hearing the specifics of these purported
programs. Some of the major issues we need to address are
number one, does the current threat to our combat vehicles
require an active protection system for these vehicles? Number
two, does an effective acceptable active protection exist to
equip those vehicles? And when can it be fielded?
Number three, is the investment required to equip those
vehicles with an active protection system warranted relative to
all of our other requirements? I have additional questions
about tests that the Army may or may not have attended about
what the process was to determine which eventual course of
action we take, and if we do have a short-term capability, why
in the world aren't we implementing it while we pursue a longer
term capability?
Those are questions that this committee wants to get to the
bottom of. Again, given the urgent action request from Central
Command for our forces in Iraq, the subcommittee hopes to
understand why the Office of the Secretary of Defense has
declined to pursue an interim active system capability. With
the earliest possible projected fueling of an active system
being 2011.
Before we introduce the witnesses for their opening
remarks, I would like to recognize my good friend from Hawaii,
the ranking member, Mr. Abercrombie.
STATEMENT OF HON. NEIL ABERCROMBIE, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
HAWAII, RANKING MEMBER, TACTICAL AIR AND LAND FORCES
SUBCOMMITTEE
Mr. Abercrombie. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman,
ordinarily, you are aware that I seldom make a formal statement
at this point and submit it for the record, but in this
instance with your permission, I would like to speak more
formally.
Mr. Chairman, I believe I am correct in making the claim
that there may be other committees that have as good a record
as this committee does of focussing on testing and proving
systems, not just in the military sense, but in any process
that the Congress approves of legislatively with regard to any
issue that might come before us of a legitimate legislative
nature, but there cannot be any committee in this Congress that
pursues more assiduously the question of testing, the question
of viability with regard to any activity that is legislatively
mandated by us or any of those committees to advance the
interests of the American people.
More particularly in this instance, where the Armed
Services Committee is concerned, no committee or subcommittee
pursues the issue of adequate testing in order to make certain
that where the life and death of American servicemen and women
is at stake, that any equipment that is provided to them has
the best possible foundation. I think I can state that without
reservation.
To my knowledge, Mr. Chairman, certainly as far as me being
your ranking member is concerned, we were not contacted. The
staff associated both with my office personally and the staff
assigned by the committee certainly were never given the
opportunity to inform me that such a proposal was underway by
the media. Now, I don't know, Mr. Chairman, you said I see this
camera over here, I don't know where it is from, but I don't
see anybody named Brian Williams or Lisa Myers or any producers
or anybody like that around here. I know Mr. Williams gets paid
a good deal of money to pontificate daily on the air and
presumably has some shred of integrity that would require him
to have some kind of investigation as to what he is putting
forward for public consumption, or has some basis, in fact.
Now the subject of this hearing is a critical one. How does
our military select and develop weapon systems that help
protect the lives of our troops in combat? Is that a fair
assessment? I think so. Such a process should get the troops
what they need, be open to new ideas and be willing to try
unorthodox approaches. This committee has been a leader in that
respect.
However, the process through which we give our troops
equipment also has to be thorough. I need only cite our work on
the Presidential helicopter as the most recent example. It
would be tragic if an effort to protect our troops ended up
instead actually putting them in greater risk, what this
committee wants from the DOD and the military is a system that
is both open to new ideas and timely, but also rigorous in
vetting technologies before they go into battle.
That is a difficult balance to strike, but finding that
balance is essential. The issues in question in today's hearing
are very complicated, both from a technical and a military
operational standpoint. active protection systems ``for
vehicles are a daunting technical challenge.'' I have an idea
that that--that the witnesses today are going to verify what I
am saying. The systems have to be completely automated due to
the short reaction time available to shoot down an incoming
missile or rocket-propelled grenade. I want to keep trying to
read through this without getting upset about this.
Every committee in this Congress is important. Every
subject matter of every committee is important, but this is the
only committee that deals with life and death issues in
virtually everything we do and every vote we take, the
consequences can result in somebody losing their life or their
limbs. It is not an abstraction, it is not an academic
discussion, it is not a matter of political punditry so you
could score points on somebody. This committee takes very, very
seriously issues of life and death. I am going to repeat, the
systems have to be completely automated due to the short
reaction time available to shoot down an incoming missile or
rocket-propelled grenade.
It isn't done with sound bites on television. They have to
be safe enough to use in real combat environments, not just in
a testing range. This committee does not make votes using the
men and women in our Armed Services as lead goats or as fodder
for tests in order to satisfy television. For example, a
protective system that indeed protects the vehicle but kills
all the American troops standing beside it may not exactly be
the ideal choice. At a minimum, the complexity of the issues
involved at today's hearing suggest serious testing and
military judgment must be applied to this problem before the
military moves forward.
The NBC story broadcast a few weeks ago that led to today's
hearing raised many issues about how the Army decided to
proceed with the development of an active protection system and
what kind of threats our troops face in Iraq or may face in the
future elsewhere. The NBC story alleged the following--this
is--I realize, Mr. Chairman, you elucidated your view, but I
would like to do mine.
That the Army chose to pursue its own active protecting
systems from Raytheon rather than buying an Israeli system
called TROPHY. That the Army overruled others in the Pentagon
who wanted to test the Israeli system in Iraq on select U.S.
vehicles, that the Army rejected the Israeli system due to its
ties to Raytheon, a U.S. defense company, that the Army
rejected the Israeli system because it could threaten funding
for the Future Combat System, which includes the Raytheon
Active Protection System project.
Parenthetically Mr. Chairman, the Army probably feels that
the biggest threat to the Future Combat System is you and I and
the members of this committee, because if anybody has taken the
Future Combat System through its paces, it is this
subcommittee.
Since the report came out, a number of additional facts
have emerged. In my judgment the Israeli TROPHY protection
system is not ready to deploy today. It is, at best, an
advanced prototype and does not counter roadside bombs, which
is the main threat to U.S. vehicles in Iraq. And the main
thing--I see Mr. Simmons there at the end of the row, the main
thing that we went to Iraq to investigate on a bipartisan basis
having nothing to do with Raytheon or Democrats or Republicans
or the Future Combat System. The TROPHY system essentially uses
small shotgun shell-type projectiles to shoot down incoming
threats. I am not sure that Lisa Myers has the first clue as to
what that is all about, let alone Brian Williams. He is too
busy being made up.
However, these shells can cause considerable injury to
nearby dismounted troops and/or civilians. So the utility of
the system in the war in Iraq that features lots of both
friendly infantry near U.S. vehicles and civilians is
questionable. This is urban warfare. The Army contends that the
project its working on for active protection will produce a
more effective system that is more relevant to addressing the
threats to U.S. vehicles in Iraq, and that I believe is what
the goal and purpose of the Army investigation and testing--the
weapons testing program is all about.
Finally, the Army contends that the process it went through
and analyzed various active protection systems was open and
followed all appropriate regulations and guidelines. That is
what this subcommittee investigates regularly. So the goal of
today's hearing is to lay all the facts on the table so this
committee can decide what further steps are needed.
I will tell you this, that Ms. Myers and Mr. Williams
should be ashamed of themselves. Now, that may be very hard for
self-important media types in this country who never reflect on
themselves except by way of self-congratulation, they should be
ashamed of themselves, they should be ashamed they are not here
today because they had played fast and loose with the emotions
of people whose sons and daughters, whose wives and husbands
have been put at risk, or worse, in Iraq and Afghanistan. It is
about time that they show a little responsibility to go along
with the glory. Thank you.
Mr. Weldon. As usual, it is great to have you as my ranking
member, Mr. Abercrombie, because you display the kind of
sentiment that I think best reflects what this Congress is all
about. We just want the truth. That is all. We want to know
what the truth is. We want to know what the facts are. And we
are willing to take them on, either side. I will show them no
favoritism in this hearing. I will be as aggressive with the
Army as those who propose other alternatives. We want the best
for our troops, and we will pay for it.
This committee has put dollar after dollar on the table
above the amount requested by the White House and the Pentagon
to buy equipment that is needed immediately, and we want to put
the best capability in the field immediately. But to have a
sensationalist news account come out that plays on the emotions
of people that have been traumatized by the loss of their loved
ones is just, to me, unacceptable. And I wish that NBC would
have come in here today. I wish they would have taken the same
approach to an open hearing of the Congress the same way they
purport to want the facts in their news accounts.
They claim to confess to want to know what the real story
is. Well, here we are, NBC. Where are you? Are you here? Are
you hiding behind some wall or are you on the cool camera
looking from the outside? Well, maybe it seems like Neil and I
are being a little too aggressive, but we are sick of this. We
went through this with The New York Times when they put on the
front page of The New York Times a depiction of our soldiers
showing the enemy where the most vulnerable spot is to kill one
of our soldiers based on the equipment we provide for them. And
in spite of our military generals saying, please don't use
that, The New York Times ran the story on the front page. Well,
you know the media has to be held accountable.
The media likes to hold us accountable and none of us back
away from that. When is it time to hold the nameless faceless
bureaucrats, the producers, the behind-the-scenes people who
hold the bombs, when is it time to hold them accountable? I
think it starts today. We have with us three expert witnesses
that have been directly involved with active protection
systems. Representing the Office of the Secretary of Defense is
the director of the Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell, Dr. Robert
Buhrkuhl. Is that correct?
Dr. Buhrkuhl. Buhrkuhl, sir.
Mr. Weldon. Buhrkuhl. Thank you. Representing the Army is
Major General Jeff Sorenson, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the
Army For Acquisition and Systems Management. And Assistant
Director for the Office of Force Transformation, Mr. Lloyd
Feldman. We thank you all for being here. NBC News, I will
repeat, declined our invitation to be represented here today. I
guess democracy just doesn't work both ways with the media.
Without objection, all of our witnesses' prepared testimony
will be included in the hearing record. And Doctor, we would
thank you for your service and ask you to start off, make
whatever comments you would like to make, and then we will go
to questions following the statements by all three of you.
STATEMENT OF DR. ROBERT L. BUHRKUHL, DIRECTOR, JOINT RAPID
ACQUISITION CELL, OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
(ACQUISITION, TECHNOLOGY & LOGISTICS)
Dr. Buhrkuhl. Thank you, sir. Chairman Weldon, Congressman
Abercrombie, other distinguished members of the subcommittee,
thank you for the opportunity to appear today before the
subcommittee to discuss the concerns expressed over delaying
the integration of the Israeli active protection system named
TROPHY onto the Full Spectrum Effects Platform called FSEP. As
a director of the Department's Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell,
also called the JRAC, I am responsible for facilitating the
Department's response to the immediate warfighting needs that
are submitted by the combatant commanders.
The Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell provides a single pointed
of contact in the Department for facilitating solutions to
address these urgent needs. We focus on near-term material
solutions typically involving existing off-the-shelf
capabilities that can satisfy to some degree the urgent needs
of the combatant commanders. On April 19, 2005, the United
States Central Command submitted a Joint Urgent Operational
Needs Statement for a capability that included a suite of
scalable nonlethal and lethal capabilities mounted onto a
Stryker infantry carrier vehicle. The suite of weapons would
conceptually provide the warfighter with a full spectrum of
components to conduct force protection missions, route
reconnaissance, crowd control, raids and point defense all in
an effort to save lives and reduce collateral damage. The
Central Command's concept included a component for a fully
automated active protection system to counter rocket-propelled
grenades and anti-tank missiles. This component subsystem was
the TROPHY active protection system and was to be used on the
Stryker vehicles in lieu of the slat armor. Slat armor forms a
metal cage around the vehicle and detonates rocket-propelled
grenades before they can penetrate the vehicle itself. On April
28, 2005, after evaluating the Central Command's request, the
joint staff supported the need but stated that the proposed
FSEP solution with all of its subsystems was unachievable in
the near term, which is a requirement for taking action to
resolve an immediate warfighter need. Subsequently, the Office
of Force Transformation working with Army officials and the
Naval Surface Warfare Center planned a more thorough and
accelerated schedule for integrating the subsystems onto the
FSEP vehicle and presented their proposal to the JRAC on
September 19, 2005.
Based on the JRAC's recommendation in January 2006, the
Deputy Secretary of Defense approved the use of $31.3 million
for the Army to proceed with Spiral 1 Development of FSEP. In
May of this year, however, the Army----
Mr. Abercrombie. Excuse me, Dr. Buhrkuhl. Would you just
explain for the record what you mean by that kind of
development?
Dr. Buhrkuhl. Sir, we in the JRAC do not focus on
development. What we try to do is take off-the-shelf
technologies that are available. The nearest we would get to
development would be the integration of those components on a
single platform.
In May of this year, however, the Army program manager
identified potential delays in delivering Spiral 1
capabilities, specifically, the active protection subsystem
TROPHY displayed technical development and performance risks,
which ultimately led to the decision to delay the integration
of this capability onto FSEP Spiral 1 Strykers. During my
deliberations, I consulted with numerous stakeholders that
included the joint staff, the commander Army Test and
Evaluation Command, the Office of the Director for Operational
Tests and Evaluation, the Director of Capabilities
developments, U.S. Army capability's integration center and
representatives from the Naval Surface Warfare Center and the
Office of Force Transformation, all of whom expressed their
opinions regarding the availability and the readiness of the
TROPHY active protection subsystem.
The majority of the stakeholders believes that the TROPHY,
because of technological inventory and qualification testing
requirements, would not meet the overall FSEP schedule and that
it was desired by the combatant commander. I then presented the
pertinent facts to CENTCOM and asked that they request that the
request be revalidated. In doing so, I specifically raised the
issues about the potential cost and schedule impacts of the
active protection subsystem on the overall FSEP program. On May
16, 2006, Central Command responded that they are proceeding
with Spiral 1 with the already available lethal and nonlethal
capabilities and using slat armor for vehicle and crew
protection instead of the TROPHY subsystem was the preferred
option.
Slat armor is used today, has proven itself in combat
conditions and according to the Army is very effective against
rocket-propelled grenades. Based on these consultations, I
validated the Army program's manager's decision to integrate
the active protection subsystem capability in a later spiral of
the FSEP program.
In closing, Mr. Chairman, the acquisition community is
committed to the safety of our warfighters and in ensuring that
they have the best protection and weapons systems available.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify today and I welcome
your questions.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Buhrkuhl can be found in the
Appendix on page 31.]
STATEMENT OF MAJ. GEN. JEFFREY SORENSON, DEPUTY ASSISTANT
SECRETARY OF THE ARMY (ACQUISITION, LOGISTICS AND TECHNOLOGY)
FOR ACQUISITION AND SYSTEMS MANAGEMENT
General Sorenson. Congressman Weldon--Chairman Weldon,
excuse me, and Congressman Abercrombie, distinguished members
of the House Armed Services Subcommittee, I would like to
express my appreciation for this opportunity to appear before
this committee to discuss the Army's continued effort to
improve the force protection capabilities of our soldiers,
specifically combat vehicle active protection systems,
otherwise known as APS. Although I have already submitted
testimony for the record, I would like to make some brief
opening remarks. I want to be absolutely sure that you
understand the Army is committed to making sure our soldiers
have the best force protection capability and active protection
systems available. However, the systems we provide our soldiers
must meet the current threat and they must be proven, tested
and validated. We will not give our soldiers a false sense of
security by fielding systems that are not rigorously tested in
an operational environment. Every soldier is important, and
every loss of life is tragic. The Army has taken significant
steps to counter the rocket-propelled grenade, otherwise known
as RPG, threats for many years and will continue to modernize
our force protection capabilities for future threats. The RPG
threat to our combat systems is considerably less than what has
recently been reported in the press. I have provided some, if
you will, unclassified data which I will go through in
questions later on to address that specific issue, but in fact,
the main threat to our forces is Improvised Explosive Devices
(IED), specifically to those in our wheeled vehicle fleet. To
date, the Army has fielded 950 sets of Bradley Reactive Armor
Tiles, 1,097 sets of M113 Slat Armor Kits and two brigades sets
of Stryker Slat Armor Kits.
In addition, the first sets of Stryker Reactive Armor Tiles
will be available for fielding this October and the first set
of the Abrams Reactive Armor Tiles will be available for
fielding to theater in June. The reactive armor and slat armor
protection systems currently deployed contribute greatly to the
effectiveness of our current forces, specifically our combat
systems, the Stryker, the Abrams and the Bradley to defeat RPG
threats without use of an active protection system. Currently
the Army through the Future Combat System program is diligently
proceeding on a path to obtain the best single short range APS
for current force systems while they are developing a parallel
path to ensure that the common full-spectrum capability hit
avoidance subsystem for the future combat system man ground
vehicles.
The full spectrum solution is to counter both short and
long range threats and to provide a 360 degree hemispherical
bubble of protection. Contrary to news media reports, the Lead
System Integrator (LSI), that is Boeing and SAIC and the
government conducted the source selection for the subcontract
award for the APS system. Raytheon did not participate in the
source selection. The LSI, with complete government
participation and concurrence, selected Raytheon.
The Army further maintains that no contract improprieties
occurred during the source selection process. The reference to
the Raytheon participation in the trade study process was
reported incorrectly and was aired by the media. The terms of
the APS subcontract award to Raytheon, they were to conduct a
technical trade study as stipulated in their contract. Their
participation in the trade study was proper and consistent
within the context of the subcontract award requirements. And
that the purpose of the engineering trade study was to
determine the best short range APS integrate system
architecture that would meet the integration requirements for
both current force active protection requirements consistent
with an established growth path to the Future Combat System
manned ground vehicles. There are a number of U.S. and foreign-
based active protection systems under development. However,
none of these APS systems can be integrated today into our
combat systems.
The Army considers TROPHY an engineering prototype and does
not consider the system operationally validated for fielding to
the current force. Challenges exist in developing, integrating
and fielding APS systems, such as minimizing collateral damage
to the soldiers and the noncombatants while ensuring the right
for self-defense.
In conclusion, the Army is absolutely committed to
providing our soldiers with the best force protection
capability available. However, the Army will not procure and
field any system that is not proven, not tested adequately, and
not validated to be operationally ready and safe. The Army
finds the recent news reports to our approach to procuring an
APS capability biased, unfair and truly disheartening. Thank
you, and I will look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of General Sorenson can be found in
the Appendix on page 39.]
Mr. Weldon. Mr. Feldman, thank you for being here.
STATEMENT OF LLOYD FELDMAN, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF FORCE
TRANSFORMATION, OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
Mr. Feldman. Chairman Weldon, Congressman Abercrombie,
members of the subcommittee, I am honored to address the
subcommittee, and I am grateful for the opportunity to discuss
the Office of Force Transformation's innovative work on Project
Sheriff which became FSEP and its demonstration to the TROPHY
active protection system. I have included, as part of my
written testimony, four addendums that include the chronology
of the relevant events related to the initiative to process
analysis and rationale that led to the selection of the TROPHY
system and how the TROPHY system was integrated into a Stryker
vehicle provided by the U.S. Army for the Sheriff FSEP Program
and relevant testing information and results.
The United States military finds itself today engaged in a
long war against multiple types of terrorist cells and other
malignant nonstate actors whose organizations are amorphous and
ever changing. Confronting this threat requires shedding long-
held assumptions regarding our preferred methods of warfare and
how our forces go about finding, tracking and targeting an
elusive enemy who hides among civilian populations and exhibits
no moral inhibitions to sacrificing innocents to achieve their
aims.
Confronting this enemy requires waging a war against
individuals. Successfully fighting the type of war requires a
willingness to embrace new types of capabilities, vastly
different tactics and new ways of developing capabilities
relevant for this fight. That is, in part, what the Office of
Force Transformation was established to do for the Department
of Defense. The Office serves as an internal catalyst for
change. It champions those types of concept technology pairings
that are potential game changers in terms of how their future
use will fundamentally alter battlefields of tomorrow.
OFT operates at the intersection of nonarticulated needs
and nonconsensual change. In plain speak, we do things that
perhaps a Title 10 agency might not be ready to do or want to
do, and they are, in fact, are chartered to do to be against
the flow. As a result, the Office has a wide field of maneuver,
a sanctuary where new ideas and innovations can be experimented
with outside the restricted confines of established
requirements in the world of acquisition. We generate new
knowledge and create unique experimental articles for use in
the combatant commands, the warfighters, to enable an
alternative path for the Department to address future needs.
Requirements in the context of the Office of Force
Transformation are, in some ways, a term of art, and we choose
to address needs and opportunities which have not been
established working in advance of requirements.
One method that OFT uses to speed the creation of new
knowledge across the force is through the idea of concept
technology pairing. The objective is to operate in advance of
requirements. These initiatives should not be considered
programs. They are far removed from the normal acquisition
process and in some cases, the rigor the intent is the early
exploration through experimentation, operational
experimentation with surrogate technologies or early
applications around the loosely-defined concept tied to
recognized gaps and current capabilities.
In this case, complex urban operations in difficult to
discriminate scenarios where people not wearing uniforms
embedded oftentimes in human defilade need to be discriminated
while providing survival to the forces so that we don't kill
the Italian journalist and we don't have to die while
attempting not to do it.
To date, the Office of Force Transformation has launched
concept technology pairings in the areas of operationally
responsive space, Project Sheriff, Redirected Energy, Stiletto/
Wolfpac and Sense and Respond Logistics.
Concept-technology pairing is to provide the first rung in
the ladder that gets us to the future that we want to achieve
and develop operational dexterity, conceptual learning with the
forces. These pairings are not expected to be 100 percent
effective, and we should not be surprised if some of them fail.
The product here is learning in conjunction with the real
capabilities developed for the forces, addressing warfighter
needs. New knowledge can best be advanced through a process of
trial and error, exploring the limits in ways acquisition
programs are sometimes not able to do, but where the pairings
approach differs from the departmental efforts like Advanced
Concept Technology Demonstrations (ACTD) is one of intent.
ACTDs are expected to enter into production at the
completion of their 3-year phase and as such, a premium is
placed on finding and selecting the ACTDs only from those
candidates that offer a near-term promise of being produced and
procured. The result is a collection of relatively well
appreciated and understood technologies and not those more on
the cutting edge of innovation. The output from our concept
technology pairing initiatives however, is new knowledge that,
in turn, leads quickly into another more refined version of the
concept, successive iterations of the concept, in essence,
bring that concept forward and allow warfighters to use and
shape new term opportunities for concepts like Sheriff FSEP
that were previously relegated to an ill-defined future.
By getting these capabilities into the hands of warfighters
early and allowing them to experiment and exploring with
successive iterations of the capabilities allows for the rapid
coevolution of tactics concepts and leads to a level of
operational dexterity that promotes innovation among the
forces. It is the information age way of getting to an
understanding of how you would use things before they are, in
fact, laid in concrete, like riding a bicycle. It is not about
the bike. It is about what you are going to learn to do, and
eventually the Tour de France winning bike will come to Lance
Armstrong, the newspaper boy bike to somebody else, and we will
be able to work that out.
Project Sheriff and the follow on Wolfpack Platoon Project
are the Office of Force Transformation initiatives that pair
leading edge operational concepts for complex irregular warfare
with state-of-the-art enabling technology. The Project Sheriff
initiative was started in 2004 and addressed urgent warfighter
needs to integrate the sensors, lethal and nonlethal weapons
and force protection.
It is designed to rapidly and iteratively experiment with
pioneering tactics and technology through a close interaction
between innovative warriors and a supporting community of
industry, government laboratories and universities. These
rapidly executed experiments are designed to create and test an
integrated prototype no more than 18 months that fits into an
overarching operational construct to create a low-cost
experimental venue where warfighters and supporting science and
technology community and a cell closely cooperate and
complement and inform the more deliberate acquisition process
by identifying warfighter needs and experimenting with
potential technological solutions, tactics, procedures,
policies, employment of nonlethal and autonomous systems.
The ultimate goal is to be a catalyst for meeting the
emerging needs of ground battle in irregular warfare,
counterinsurgency and security and stabilization operations.
The project also specifically addressed U.S. Central Command's
urgent needs in Iraq and Afghanistan. These needs were formally
expressed in a time-critical Joint Operational Needs Statement
developed by Multi-National Corps Iraq, and endorsed by Central
Command in 2005 for capabilities to be provided by the Sheriff
Project. Project Sheriff and the new follow-on Wolfpack Platoon
Project being proposed and defined in cooperation with the
Marines are designed to specifically address the compressed
strategic and operational and tactical levels of war and
intelligence; the problem of identifying combatants intermixed
with noncombatants; the need for in-depth situational
awareness; the blurred distinction between combat and police
actions; the requirement for multiple levels of graduated
response and precise target discrimination; the opportunity for
increased command, control, communications, computers,
intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, C4ISR, to create
tactical options against a distributed threat and to move it to
the lowest level possible; the digital, organizational and
intelligence divide found between tactical units at the edge of
battle and the technology enabled higher headquarters which
have a different set of tools, and drive it down lowest; and
the increased threat of improvised explosive devices, rocket-
propelled grenades, anti-tank guided munitions, snipers, and
small arms ambushes.
To meet this new highly dynamic and evolving threat to
American forces, Project Sheriff's goals were experiment with
innovative concepts of operation, tactics, technologies and
procedures that would both inform and be informed by potential
technology enablers; integrate commercial off the shelf from
mature technologies into complementary combined arms solutions
mounted on a light armored vehicle under compressed timelines;
combine nonlethal directed energy, high power millimeter wave,
high power white light, laser glare aversion for optical
denial, long range acoustic device--with sensor enabled active
protection, lethal response, and electronic warfare; develop
the synergistic, combined arms employment of lethal kinetic
energy and nonlethal directed energy weapons in compartmented
urban terrain; and combine active protection, lethal gunfire
and electronic warfare to meet the threat of RPGs, snipers, and
IEDs; serve as an active denial technology proof-of-concept in
anticipation of fielding longer-range, more capable directed
energy technologies; and to test rapidly and rigorously but not
exhaustively in an operationally realistic environment prior to
deployment to get an initial level of assessment for safety,
utility and advantage; and to complete required bio-effects
research, legal, and policy reviews prior to deployment; and
increase the learning and inform the acquisition programs and
minimal expense, informing requirements with empirical data on
what can be done, abated tests for military forces which is
required in the information age.
The active protection system is one component of the FSEP
sheriff vehicle that we put together at that point in time. It
is an important one but it is one component of a suite that was
designed to provide congruent ability to do advanced sensing
with new sensors, to use countermeasures, to spoil shots visual
acuity and dexterity to engage our forces and provide survival
and then to do weapons systems with a congruent field of view,
the idea of getting to a rear stack instead of a trigger for
our forces that would minimize the engagement timeline and get
to self-targeting so that adversaries who engaged our forces
would not get a fast successful shot, and at the time they were
doing that, we would, in fact, be able to progress through our
own timeline of engagement with these particular tools.
As I say, active protection system is one component to this
combined arms approach that aims to fundamentally enhance
capabilities for ground battle in complex urban environments.
In addition to IEDs, RPGs and an increasingly sophisticated and
prevalent threat in irregular warfare, and an active protection
system enables light armored vehicles to survive a first shot
from a hidden enemy while the TROPHY active protection system
was selected as the most promising near-term capability for
experimental assessment based on government laboratory
evaluation. Initial U.S. defense laboratory testing of TROPHY
began this year. The ongoing Wolfpack Platoon Project will
continue a testing program that builds on these initial
successful tests and that validates extensive Israeli testing
in U.S. industry evaluations. The aim of this testing program
is to evaluate near-term active protection technology to
rapidly meet immediate warfighting needs; determine how APS
fits into a combined arms approach to the RPG, IEG, sniper and
small arms ambush threat; and conduct experiments led by
warfighters to advance operating concepts and refine needs that
will inform the development of any active protective system.
My testimony does not address the issue of the
deliberations that led to the removal of the active protection
system from FSEP, as the Office of Force Transformation is not
a member of the Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell. Representatives
from the Office of Force Transformation were invited to
numerous meetings with Dr. Buhrkuhl and the JRAC, and we
presented our views in the course of these discussions.
I thank the committee for its interest in Office of Force
Transformation's Sheriff and follow-on efforts and the
continued support for the department-wide transformation. I
look forward to providing more detail to any questions you may
have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Feldman can be found in the
Appendix on page 48.]
Mr. Weldon. Thank you for your statements, and thank you
for your service to the country. And there will be no five-
minute rule. So I will give the members all a chance to ask as
much questions as they want, and we will eventually ask for
unanimous consent to allow our good friend and colleague to
join us in asking questions today. Dr. Buhrkuhl, I would want
to focus on, first of all, a couple of questions to you. In
your prepared statement, you indicate that Central Command's
requirement was for a fully automated active protection system
against rocket-propelled grenades and anti-tank missiles. Our
reading of the requirement also dated April 19, 2005, that you
reference indicates that the requirement was for ``an improved
active protection capability against rocket-propelled
grenades.'' would you please clarify what Central Command's
request was for?
Dr. Buhrkuhl. Yes, sir. Central command's request was, as
you stated, for an improved active protection capability
against RPGs. What was briefed to us was the Full Spectrum
Effects Weapon System (F-SEWS). This program called FSEP now
was in Sheriff in F-SEWs and FSEP. The name kept changing. And
the F-SEWS, inherent in that was the TROPHY's subsystem where
we were briefed on the joint urgent operational need.
Mr. Weldon. When the decision was made to proceed with the
Full Spectrum Effects Platform without the TROPHY system, what
was the estimate of the Office of Force Transformation's
fielding need based on continued required testing?
Dr. Buhrkuhl. I am not sure on the Office of Force
Transformation. I don't recall their date. I can tell you, we
had estimates from 6 to 14 fields to field it from the testing
community, whether it was the Army Test and Evaluation Command
or the OFT operational testing.
Mr. Weldon. Mr. Feldman, would you like to respond to that?
Mr. Feldman. My recollection at this time----
Mr. Weldon. Could you pull the mike closer?
Mr. Feldman. My recollection at this time was that we felt
that we could have the testing completed and fielding by
September 2007.
Mr. Weldon. September of 2007.
Mr. Feldman. Yes, sir.
Mr. Weldon. The Office of Force Transformation had
indicated a readiness for fielding of the TROPHY system in
2007, the estimated fielding date for the this system
associated with FCS is 2011. A decision was made to not proceed
with the TROPHY system. What was the decision based on?
Dr. Buhrkuhl. The decision for us for FSEP--and remember we
are looking--we were looking at a full package program was what
the user required, was to meet a national training center date
of the end of February to be able to deploy for an operational
assessment the end of July.
So the time frame didn't fit, waiting on the TROPHY to fit
into that timeline. We also consulted and looked at the slat
armor as an alternative, and since it seems to be very
effective against RPGs, we felt like that provided the
effectiveness against that danger for warfighters.
Therefore, we, as we normally do or sometimes do in the
JRAC provide the warfighter with a 95 percent solution now in
the near term, now, we didn't disapprove, obviously, a Spiral
update later, but for now, to meet the immediate needs, we felt
like we had to move forward.
Mr. Weldon. Well, that is one I am sure my colleagues are
going to want to explore further. It is hard for me to
understand. I understand that you are saying that you had
alternative proposals and technologies that, in fact, you felt
would meet the threat, but I still want to further explore in
the committee the reasons why we didn't aggressively pursue a
short-term varient if, in fact, that was, in the opinion of the
Army, possible.
In your statement, you indicate you made a statement in May
of this year to validate the Army program manager's decision,
integrate the active protection capability and subsequent
development. Is there an ongoing testing to field this
capability? If so, what is your estimated date of fielding of
the capability?
Dr. Buhrkuhl. Sir, there is an ongoing effort between the
Naval Warfare Center, the Army Program Manager (PM). The first
priority though is to get the three Strykers prepared and ready
to go to theater in July. They are focused on that. I am not
sure what they are doing as far as continual testing of the
TROPHY.
Mr. Weldon. What is your experience with the status of
CENTCOM? Urgent action needs statements, how many have come
through your office and how many have been deferred?
Dr. Buhrkuhl. I can't remember an exact amount. We deferred
for probably two or three, and we have addressed about $250
million worth of needs over the last two years.
Mr. Weldon. The point that we want to reinforce is this
committee has been wanting to take the lead in providing
whatever additional funding has been necessary. We did that
back when the President was running for re-election and
Secretary Wolfowitz didn't want us to talk about a
supplemental.
This committee stood up as Democrats and Republicans and
demanded that we put an additional $25 billion on the table
because the Army's request for its budget for that year was
actually a requested decrease while we had $6 billion of
unfunded requirements not being met.
So there should not be a question of dollars. We want--what
is the ultimate fact that this committee stands behind is, we
do not want to have an additional soldier, marine, sailor,
corps man killed if there is a way for us to avoid that, and
cost should never be an issue. So there should never be an
issue of the expense necessary to put an acceptable technology
into the field. Now, granted, as Neil pointed out very
precisely, we want the testing, we want to make sure there is
not collateral damage. We want to make sure that we are testing
it before we go into--but as soon as possible, we want
deployment so that we can protect the soldiers.
Let me ask you a couple of specific questions just for the
record; maybe, General, you would be the best to answer this,
or I don't know who.
Last year, the Army planned a test competing RPG defense
systems in a shoot-off rodeo, and this competition was
cancelled, I understand, by the Army, supposedly in part due to
cost. Now, my understanding is that contractors usually pay the
costs of such tests. There was speculation that the Army
cancelled the tests because the Raytheon system was not yet
ready. So for the record, would you comment on that, please?
General Sorenson. Yes, Chairman. I would say from my
understanding, certainly cost was not the overriding factor. I
think the issue was in order to make an assessment of what we
would be doing for active protection systems for not only the
future force, but also the current force, that it was best to
be done in a source selection process as opposed to somebody
who might have a capability show up, and we not take a look at
others that in many cases could be in development and
available.
So the decision was made at that point, rather than just
kind of doing the rodeo where maybe a few people show up, but
really canvass industry, canvass foreign industry to find out
potentially in a time frame what actually could we find----
Mr. Weldon. How long would that take?
General Sorenson. I am sorry?
Mr. Weldon. How long would that take to do that canvassing?
General Sorenson. The selection?
Mr. Weldon. For the systems.
General Sorenson. Again, as we walk through this, we
basically put out a Request for Proposal (RFP) back out in 2005
with respect to having an APS developer. The contract was
awarded to Raytheon here in March. A trace study was done
subsequent to that and looked at 20 different systems. The
systems were analyzed in terms of their capabilities based upon
data that had already been evaluated by our Research,
Development, and Engineering Command (RDECOM), as well as other
commands within, if you will, the Tank Automotive Command,
TARDEC, et cetera. And that particular study was basically done
within a matter of about three or four days in terms of trying
to assess what additional systems could potentially be put in
to current force and future force activity.
Mr. Abercrombie. Mr. Chairman, would you yield for just a
moment?
Mr. Weldon. Certainly.
Mr. Abercrombie. Just so we get clear, because a lot of the
technical expressions that you have made in the course to the
testimony here I think members of the committee understand
pretty clear, but maybe not everybody in the public has a grip
on it. Let me just see if I understand what you said so far--
and I have this clear, particularly in the light of the
document that we have had a chance to look at here.
Now isn't it a fact, isn't it a clear fact of the matter
that very few deaths--rather, let me restate that--most deaths
come from small-arms fire or roadside bombs, and that the RPG
and missile fire account for the very few? And as a result,
there is other protective equipment which you have cited in
terms of armor, various types of armor that help protect
against RPGs and missiles already, and effectively so; isn't
that the case?
General Sorenson. Yes.
Mr. Abercrombie. So when you are making the representation
to the Chairman here, part of the time frames and everything
else is based on what you conceive of as being the essential
nature of the kind of protection that you either are providing
now or have to provide.
General Sorenson. Correct.
Mr. Abercrombie. This gives you your 95 versus 100 percent
and so on; in other words, the RPG and missile fire. If you
read the text of the NBC report and imagine it being said, you
would think that the RPG and missile fire is the essential
feature of the deaths and maiming that takes place, and that is
not the case, is it?
General Sorenson. No, it is not. And again, the data that
we have provided here is basically for official use (FOU), it
has been sanitized, it is basically National Ground
Intelligence Center (NGIC) data. It essentially says that 85
percent of attacks with respect to our combat vehicles are from
IEDs. And you can see there we have identified, in terms of
percentage, what the killed in action are from the IEDs.
Mr. Abercrombie. So for purposes of public information, the
context within which you are making the decisions has to be
what is the existing danger to the people we are trying to
protect and the vehicles we are trying to equip; isn't that
correct?
General Sorenson. Yes, sir. And if you look----
Mr. Abercrombie. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Sorenson. If you look at chart two, you can see
that the total RPG attacks in our combat systems is a very
small percentage. And even with that small percentage, most of
the attacks have resulted in no damage to those vehicles
because of what we put on those vehicles, whether it is Slat
armor, reactive tiles, or whatever; and you can see right there
there is zero killed in action, none.
Mr. Abercrombie. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Weldon. I thank the gentleman.
What I am going to do, because we are scheduled to have
votes at 11:30, I am going to go to the other Members. And I
turn now to Mr. Abercrombie for further questions. Or we will
come back; you and I will get more.
Let's go to--Mr. Gibbons is next. You are recognized.
Mr. Gibbons. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
And, gentlemen, thank you for being here today to help us
better understand these very perplexing issues.
You know, oftentimes in government we tend to let the
perfect get in the way of the good. And many times we have a
tendency to resist fielding technology until we have created
the Library of Congress information on that technology to avoid
any risk. And oftentimes we here get a little frustrated with
the process, think it is a little too bureaucratic. Sometimes
we would like to see things happen more quickly than we do.
You know, we need to be risk takers. And I know that is not
a popular idea when we are in a war, but when I look back over
the course of history of things that have been developed during
the trying times of war, some systems have proven to be much
better that were instantly created and thrown out there. And I
will just give you the P-51 Mustang during World War II,
created in a very short time frame, became a remarkable
aircraft interceptor for the United States Army Air Corps at
the time.
When I look at IED and jamming devices, many times we have
a tendency to want to believe that we can do this technology,
but in order to cover every spectrum of jamming technology, we
have got to have a system as big as this room before we can get
something out there to protect the soldiers in some form or
some fashion. And I would presume it is in the same tendency
that we are looking at this system here.
Let me ask just a basic question for those of you that are
knowledgeable about the Trophy system or the Raytheon APS
system. When you compare the two, how long has the Trophy
system been under development, under the same kind of process
as compared to the Raytheon system? And which one can go into
production today?
General Sorenson. Sir, if I may address that particular
piece of it. I think our understanding, in our working with the
Israeli Defense Forces, (IDF) basically the Trophy system has
been certainly under development, I would say, probably for
about the last decade. With respect to the Raytheon system, it
has not been under development that long, but in terms of our
analysis, in terms of system engineering, we have done some
looking at the particular system here and found out that if you
put the Trophy system on our combat systems, it is about 1-1/2
times heavier, it takes up 1-1/2 times more volume, 10 times
the power, and 3 times the integration problems. So it is not
just a simple solution.
And as you alluded to earlier, while the particular system
itself might be something of avoiding a kill, there is a whole
envelope of an onion here. We try to avoid the encounter to
begin with by improving our situational awareness. We began to
avoid, if you will, the detection of our systems through
signature management and tactics, we began to avoid the
acquisition or our targets, another envelope here of the onion,
and then to avoid the hits, and to avoid the penetration and to
avoid the kill.
And we have put improvements with respect to situation
awareness, we have put improvements with respect to our current
suite of Slat armor and reactive armor tiles. We put
countermeasure systems in terms of other ballistics protection.
And that all is being used right now, as well as our tactics
changes, to increase the force protection capabilities. It is
just not a simple, you have got this, you have got the Klingon
cloak, everything is going to be fine; it is a very complicated
capability in terms of force protection.
Mr. Gibbons. What do we sacrifice if we had put the Trophy
system, say, for example, on a few vehicles today, sent them
over there? What are we sacrificing if we did that?
General Sorenson. Sir, it is not that we are sacrificing.
Just from a systems engineering standpoint, if you put it on
Stryker today, which essentially is what it was put on, first
of all, the radars are exposed. Those radars can be taken out
very easily in a complex attack by someone shooting a rifle at
it and beginning to destroy the radar; therefore the system
becomes ineffective.
If you talk about what this particular system was looked
at, it is going to be in a crowd; it is going to be the
tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP) that you want to make
sure it is not basically killing everybody in its--anywhere
around there. Can we put a Trophy system on there that would be
effective in doing that? The answer to that is no. Even the
Israelis at this point in time are struggling to put it onto
their Merkava tank; not a Stryker, not a Humvee, but their tank
system.
And so the final integration of this capability is
something that has to be looked at. How does it affect power,
how does it affect weight, how does it affect volume? It is not
just something you hang on and it makes work.
Mr. Gibbons. So you are saying today we could not adapt the
Trophy system to----
General Sorenson. Absolutely not. In fact, the test report
that we got in from our tester said at best, even with Trophy
system, at best, today if we had the system to get it
integrated and get tested and then ultimately get fielded, we
are looking at 2008, at best. And even today, we don't have the
produceable item yet that we could basically do that with.
Mr. Gibbons. So the contract with the Raytheon system would
be to address all of these issues, to reduce the amount of
power consumption, to reduce the profile of the radar on the
vehicle, to eliminate the idea that the radar is going to be
susceptible to a multiple complex attack, to distinguish that
system--to have a system that distinguishes between true and
false attacks that are going to be on that system.
General Sorenson. Yes, indeed. And, in fact, we will have
the capability from the Raytheon system at this point in time
in terms of what we would basically hang on a vehicle in about
2008. After that, it is the integration into a Stryker--which,
oh, by the way, we thank the committee for having given us
money to begin to do that not only this year in fiscal year
2006, but we have additional funds in fiscal year 2007 that we
are beginning to do the integration work on how we would
basically begin to do that into a Stryker platform, which,
quite frankly, would be more vulnerable than our Abrams and
Bradley platforms.
Mr. Gibbons. Well, without having to reinvent the wheel,
General, would it be possible to modify the Trophy system to
accommodate your concerns and to make those changes in that
system that would more clearly reflect your concerns about
power, about exposure, about distinguishing targeting and
capability there, and have that system on line faster than
completely doing a Raytheon system from the ground up?
General Sorenson. Sir, at this point in time, in terms of
we have done that analysis, we have done that through our trace
studies and so forth, we have looked at the possibility of
doing that, and at the very best we potentially could save
maybe six or seven months, but that is a potential. And quite
frankly, with the other issues that I talked to with respect to
the Trophy system, not the least of which from the standpoint
of providing 360-degree coverage, we have issues. From the
standpoint of an autoloader that is not yet developed, we have
issues. From the standpoint of the fact that it would basically
be vulnerable to our one shot, now that particular side is
completely vulnerable to another attack. In other words, I'm
the enemy, I shoot, I basically deploy that system. Now it has
got nothing; I shoot, I kill.
So there are some issues right now with the Trophy system
that would take additional development and integration before
we could even be capable of putting it on our platforms. It is
still long-term.
Mr. Gibbons. General, I want to thank you for your
explanations here today. And I can understand the difficulty. I
know that it occurs in every system we produce for our men and
women in the military. And I know there are evolutions of
improvements that start--whether it is body armor, armor for a
vehicle, jamming capability for IEDs, and now active protective
systems for RPGs or other missiles coming in our tanks. And I
know the difficulties there. I know the challenges that are
ahead of you. I know the commitment that our men and women out
there in your position are looking at today to make us all
safer, and I thank you for that.
Mr. Chairman, I want to associate myself with your words
and that of Mr. Abercrombie in your opening remarks about the
responsibility of this committee, the responsibility of our
government to protect our troops. We grow, we evolve just as
the attacks as on our troops do, and I hope that we are able to
find those solutions quickly so that not another life is risked
or lost unnecessarily. But I can think that these people out
here know how difficult it is to send somebody to war, and how
much they want to protect those individuals as well as anybody
else. So thank you.
Mr. Weldon. I thank the gentleman.
The gentleman from Texas Mr. Conaway is recognized.
Mr. Conaway. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I just have one
question.
The idea of fratricide, in other words, our dismounted
troops alongside most of these vehicles, right now at this
stage the risks for an RPG or an antitank missile exploding
against the side of a vehicle and the collateral damage for
that, is that more or less than if we blow up that RPG round or
that antitank missile away from that unit? What does that look
like from a test standpoint?
General Sorenson. With respect to the reactive--first of
all, the Slat armor is essentially something that is going to
just prevent the capability from basically penetrating. With
the reactive armor tiles, there is a blast effect from the
collateral damage, but it is localized. And we have done
extensive testing on exactly what that particular dimension of
vulnerability would be with respect to those reactive armor
tiles.
With respect to the Trophy system, or in this case as well
with the Raytheon Quick Kill system, these two issues with
respect to collateral damage are yet to be investigated or
fully understood. But clearly it is going to be a little
farther out as opposed to right against the vehicle, so
consequently you are going to put a lot more people in harm's
way just because of when those explosions are going to take
place.
But again, with the reactive armor tile, it is more or less
a blast issue. When you begin to use a Trophy system or another
type of APS system, you now begin to introduce fragmentation,
which becomes a lot more deadly and a lot more lethal.
Mr. Conaway. Any one of the three. Part of this hearing was
triggered by the NBC report, maybe the Fox report, whatever,
and you may have covered this in your opening statements, but
just in a free kind of a response, what should we be saying to
our constituents back home in response to their concerns raised
by obviously an emotional appeal that went out over that two-
night broadcast? What should our response be?
General Sorenson. Sir, I would say from the Army
perspective, the response is we have provided--again, thanks to
this committee for the funding that we have received--Slat
armor, which essentially is Slat tiles on our Stryker systems,
two brigade sets' worth; 950 sets of the Bradley reactive
armor; 1,000-plus sets of the reactor armor tiles for the M-113
personnel carriers. Those have found to be the most effective
capabilities.
The proof in the pudding is in this data chart. If you go
to chart two and look at the attacks that have taken place from
RPGs and our combat systems, the current capabilities that we
have fielded have resulted in only minimal damage to our
platforms. You can see that in red with respect to the
percentage there, it is a low percentage. In addition, you can
see in terms of the killed in action is basically zero.
So the systems that we currently field have in fact
protected our soldiers today. We are continuing to look at new
threats, evolving threats, and I would contend, based upon our
discussions with the Israelis and so forth, that right now what
we have postured in terms of our developments for both short
and long range is the most effective capability that we can
give our soldiers into the future. I could go into that in more
detail, but not in this particular setting.
Mr. Feldman. I would also like to say, in addition to what
the Army has contributed at this point in time and is going
forward with, that the elements of force transformation that
will continue to work in the environment under Secretary of
Defense for Advanced Technology and Logistics, exploring some
concept technology solutions, fully intend to press ahead with
an experimental article to allow us to explore the capabilities
of this close-in generation's active protection system in a
sweep of lethal and nonlethal countermeasures to allow us to do
the exploration of tactics and concept development.
In addition to that, there has been some discussion that,
in fact, we were going to explore the possibility of doing a
comparative test evaluation of something like what we have been
talking about here, the Trophy active protection system. It is
not on the table at this point, but it is being explored.
It is very important for us to understand, as to the
Department's future in force transformation, that looking at
those things which are hitting us right now and which we have
had some success against is not all we need to do. We need to
take a look at the recent engagement in Lebanon in which areas
were flooded with antitank munitions, hundreds of them, in
fact. And these things do provide enhanced lethality.
Additional variants of RPGs in our future provide enhanced
lethality, and things that engage these are highly nuanced.
As we noticed before with antishift munitions coming at
vessels, when you interdict the kinematic package of a Mach 2
2-ton missile coming at you, in fact, you have to deal with the
residuals and the fragmentations are significant. But there is
a great benefit to interdicting weapon systems that come at you
in a way that interferes with their design function of the
warhead, whether it be shape charge or whether it be high
explosive. In those cases we need to understand with witness
boards and tactics the nuance of how we like to deploy our
forces and how we would like to be able to utilize some of the
benefits that come with systems that are highly directional in
their response, as the Trophy system was, and that enable you
to virtually put a capability down the bearing through which an
RPG or a weapon has come in a retrodirective manner.
So an additional part of the answer should be, we are
looking in small numbers in prototypical programs at the
potential to address this and develop the concepts and the
tactics to go with it. And that informs the debate and informs
the requirements for what we would do in the future.
General Sorenson. If I could just have one more alibi. I
would say the other piece of it, which I found to be extremely
disturbing and disheartening, was the second part which talked
about the Army's attempt to block the potential selection based
upon intent to cook the books. And I can tell you without any
equivocation--and any member of the committee can inspect those
books if they would like--that particular source selection was
above board; there were no improprieties conducted by any
member of the LSI nor the government team, and they were the
ones that made the decision, not Raytheon.
Dr. Buhrkuhl. Sir, I would just like to add that the
Department is committed to the safety of our warfighters, and
we try to provide them with the best equipment possible.
And for the record I want to make sure, Mr. Chairman, that
you understand on the two joiners and operational needs that
were turned back, neither was the result of a lack of funds.
The Department has been very good in that regard.
Mr. Weldon. Thank you.
The gentleman from New Jersey is recognized.
Mr. Taylor is recognized.
After consultation with the Minority, I now ask unanimous
consent that Mr. Simmons, a member of the House Armed Services
Committee, be allowed to participate in today's Tactical Air
and Land Subcommittee hearing and be authorized to ask the
witness questions. Any objections?
Mr. Simmons will be recognized now for his time.
Mr. Simmons. I thank the Chairman, and I thank the Ranking
Member, and I commend them for the hearing, but more
importantly, over the years that I have seen the Chairman and
the Ranking Member operate, I commend them for their
bipartisanship and their fairness and their insight into these
issues, and I think this hearing is a very good example of
that.
Years ago, in another life and in another place, I had some
up close and personal associations with RPGs, RPGs 2 and 7 in
Vietnam, and in particular during the Tet Offensive. And what I
learned about them was that if they were fired correctly, if
the rocket-propelled grenade was fired correctly, the shape
charge was properly aligned with the metallic surface, whatever
it may be, it could be very devastating. But if you were able
to disrupt its trajectory, if it hit at an angle--and we, in
fact, had one hit during the Tet Offensive off an Armored
Personnel Carrier (APC) at an angle, hit a soldier in the back
in his flack jacket, knocked him out and hospitalized him for
three days, but it didn't even explode. So the unique
properties of the RPG are such that it has to be aimed
properly, it has to be in proper alignment to be fully
successful.
And so when I went with the Ranking Member up to Mosul to
the Stryker Brigade and talked to the troops, I asked them
about the Slat armor and the stand-off gauges. And one soldier
told me, we got hit six times and continued to function. He
said, I am not going to operate in any other vehicle than this
Stryker vehicle. They are absolutely enthusiastic and positive
about how that fix was working. And that was the clear
impression I got.
We have photographs that we brought back from the Stryker
Brigade, and I think in the text of our report, our bipartisan
report, which was signed off on by every member, both sides of
the aisle, that was one of the success stories that we
encountered.
And I think your data shows that these approaches are
almost--they are not 100 percent successful, but they are
pretty close to it for this type of weapon.
Point two. If you are firing a projectile to intercept a
projectile, you don't want anybody in the way of it. One of my
closest near-death experiences in Vietnam was from friendly
fire. And there is no such thing as friendly fire, let me tell
you. It will kill you just as much. It will kill you just as
much. So the idea of friendly fire, the idea that you are
shooting a projectile to hit a projectile, creates lethality
for the battlefield, for friendly soldiers and civilians. We
just have to understand that that is the nature of the beast.
And so we don't want to create another hazard in an already
hazardous situation. I think that is certainly the case.
Now, the one concern that I do have--and I think it is an
important concern, Mr. Chairman, and I hope that we might at
some point perhaps pursue it in a closed session--is if you
design an RPG that has multiple explosions--I am talking
hypothetically--where the first explosion basically destroys
the cage or destroys the tile or destroys the Slats, and then
there is a second explosion of the shape charge behind the
first, then that may tend to defeat everything that we have
deployed.
So I guess the way I look at it is I don't see an immediate
threat based by the RPG that we find in the field. I think we
have met that threat. I think this committee and this Congress,
in a bipartisan fashion, has met that threat almost 98 percent,
maybe almost 99 percent of the time. But when we look to the
future, we may need an alternative system that deals with the
multiple explosive device which somebody might be cooking up at
some time in the future because they know--based on the data
that you have presented, they know that the current system is
pretty much ineffective against the three types of vehicles
that we have deployed that are designed to deal with this.
So I would ask you if you are looking ahead and planning
ahead, and if you are future planning, does it meet that future
threat.
General Sorenson. And, Congressman, that is a great
question. I think the answer to that is, yes, we are looking at
that type of capability in terms of a threat right now, in
terms of even modifying and making changes to our current suite
that we have already deployed. But we are clearly looking at
that threat long term, as well as potential issues with respect
to antitank kinetic threats, which we think are more longer-
term, as well as more deadly in the future.
Mr. Simmons. And very briefly, a second comment. RPGs are
successful against helicopters. A helicopter, when it is
airborne, could be mounted with a Trophy-style system with 360-
degree--not a lot of ground troops around a helicopter in the
air, and it might have some applicability for a Trophy or a
similar system. Have you given any consideration to this system
as a possible air defense system for helicopters?
General Sorenson. Sir, we have not. We have actually
deployed our current suite of aircraft survivability equipment,
otherwise known as the Common Missile Warning System, and we
have found that to be effective against the threats, as
required.
Mr. Simmons. Thank you very much.
Again, Mr. Chairman, and to the Ranking Member, thank you
for your aggressive oversight of this issue.
Mr. Weldon. I thank the gentleman for his participation.
One final point I would like to make before we have votes--
and we do have three votes back to back, so this will probably
be it, unless my friend has additional questions.
There has been some confusion with regard to the source
selection process FCS/APS system. Was the decision to go with a
Quick Kill APS the result of a source selection process or the
subsequent trace study analysis?
General Sorenson. Sir, the answer to that is a little bit
of both, and let me just try to frame the issue here.
Clearly when the contract was written for the RFP, that
there was to bid back on, it was to be the APS developer as
part of the overall hit avoidance requirement. As we were--as
that contract was put out, the requirement was that they would
develop an architecture, a system engineering plan, and they
could propose their particular candidate. While the candidate
was not specifically evaluated in terms of a major factor, it
was a subfactor analysis within the source selection.
Obviously, if they got a great engineering plan, but the
particular system they are going to actually put on there would
be something that we couldn't really accept at some time in the
future, or it was too costly, schedule issues and so forth,
then that probably would have downplayed, if you will,
hypothetically that type of proposal.
Once the particular developer was identified, in this case
it was Raytheon, they then conducted a trace study, they, GD,
with the LSI, and basically did the analysis of particular
systems that could be put into place not only for the current
force, but also for the future combat system. It was at that
point in time that the vertical launch system that was proposed
by Raytheon was validated as the particular APS to proceed
further with. But all the others--we net down those, as I had
mentioned before, 20 systems down to 7. Those were evaluated in
the trace study based upon burdens to the particular system,
i.e., system integration problems, based upon cost, based on
performance, and that pretty much identified about 80 percent
of the criteria. And those selections were then evaluated, and
what came out was the Raytheon Quick Kill system.
Mr. Weldon. Any other comments by our witnesses?
Mr. Abercrombie.
Mr. Abercrombie. No.
Mr. Weldon. I want to thank all of you for your appearance
today and for your service to the country. We want you to
continue to be aggressive.
Mr. Feldman, we want you to continue to play your role and
be aggressive. We need to have systems of checks and balances
within the Pentagon itself. That is healthy. And we are
prepared to provide the financial support and the resources to
fund those systems as you deem that they are appropriate and
safe and will, in effect, protect our troops from injury or
death.
Thank you very much. This hearing now stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:28 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
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A P P E N D I X
September 21, 2006
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September 21, 2006
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QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
September 21, 2006
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. WELDON
Mr. Weldon. Do we need an interim capability to protect our
military until the objective system comes on line in 2011? Or based on
what we know about current threat systems and current armor solutions,
is it an acceptable level of risk to wait until 2011 to give our
military some sort of APS capability?
Dr. Buhrkuhl. The vast majority of threats currently being
encountered are Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs). Rocket Propelled
Grenade (RPG) attacks are much less frequent. For combat vehicles, such
as the Abrams, Bradleys and Strykers, reactive armor tiles should be
adequate to defeat almost all of the RPGs currently being encountered
or expected. Therefore, the risk to combat vehicles of not having an
Active Protection System (APS) available until 2011 is considered to be
low.
Mr. Weldon. Is Slat armor effective against all known
proliferating RPG threats?
Dr. Buhrkuhl. Slat armor is only effective against some Rocket
Propelled Grenade (RPG) threats. These specific RPGs have design
features which make Slat armor effective. To protect against the
remaining types of RPGs, the Army has developed and is procuring
reactive armor tiles for the Abrams, Bradley and Stryker combat
vehicles. These reactive armor tiles are effective against almost all
of the RPGs encountered or expected.
Mr. Weldon. How is the Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell working to
respond to CENTCOM's April 19, 2005 urgent operational need statement
calling for an ``improved active protection capability against RPGs''?
Dr. Buhrkuhl. The Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell responded to the
United States Central Command (CENTCOM) Joint Urgent Operational Need
(JUON) by funding Spiral 1 Development of the Full Spectrum Effects
Platform (FSEP), which includes a suite of capabilities that include
lethal and non-lethal responses against a variety of threats. The plan
for Spiral 1 Development included an Active Protection System against
Rocket Propelled Grenade (RPG) threats, as well as, an Active Denial
Technology against threat personnel. The Army program manager
recommended that the Active Protection System and Active Denial
Technology be delayed until those technologies were adequately
developed for operational use in a later development spiral. We
coordinated with CENTCOM and obtained their concurrence prior to
proceeding with the revised FSEP capability. The Army program manager
will be responsible for any later incorporation of active protection
capability against RPGs.
Mr. Weldon. A February 9, 2006 notification to Congress indicated
that $31.3 million was being transferred from the Iraqi Freedom Fund to
the Army for the development of Spiral 1 Full Spectrum Effects Platform
(FSEP). The documentation provided to Congress indicated that the
system would include ``a rocket-propelled grenade Active Protection
System.'' We now understand that APS will not be part of FSEP spiral 1.
How is this funding being used now that the decision has been made to
delay APS?
Dr. Buhrkuhl. To provide our service members with the most updated
capabilities, the Full Spectrum Effects Platform (FSEP) project is
following a spiral acquisition strategy. Spiral 0 provided one vehicle
for the development of tactics and employment considerations. Since the
removal of Active Protection System (APS), the FSEP project adjustments
include: 1) procuring three Stryker Infantry Carrier Vehicles for
integration, 2) incorporating a training strategy to allow the unit to
meet its go-to-war mission rehearsal exercise with the Spiral 0 vehicle
and two Infantry Combat Vehicles, 3) adjusting the in-theater support
requirements from six months to 12 months in order to provide the
operational commander this capability throughout the rotation, and 4)
adding an enhanced Counter--Improvised Explosive Device capability. The
adjustments provide the best blend of capabilities for training,
testing, and deployment.
Mr. Weldon. You mentioned in your written statement that you ``. .
. validated the Army program manager's decision to integrate the Active
Protection capability in a subsequent development.'' Please discuss
this subsequent development effort and if it is funded?
Dr. Buhrkuhl. The Department is pursuing development of Active
Protection System capability in a number of ways that have been
outlined in other responses. As that capability matures, we expect that
the Army will examine the most suitable alternatives for integrating
capability onto the Full Spectrum Effects Platform (FSEP). However, the
Army has yet to identify the funding needed to perform that integration
and testing onto FSEP.
Mr. Weldon. What services besides the Army need active protection?
If so, what has been their position on Active protection so far, and
what plans have they made, if any?
Dr. Buhrkuhl. The Navy/Marine Corps are evaluating Army assessments
of Active Protection Systems, and will continue to monitor advances in
this capability and evaluate its utility for future use by Naval Forces
on its vehicles. The Air Force has not yet identified this as a
requirement for Air Force vehicles.
Mr. Weldon. Active protection for land forces should not be limited
to heavy armored vehicles, but should include trucks and HUMVEES. Are
there systems that are scalable to these other, lighter platforms?
Dr. Buhrkuhl. First generation active protection system (examples
include the Russian Arena and Drozd and the American Close-In Active
Protection System (CIAPS) and Full Spectrum Active Protection Close-In
Shield (FCLAS), respectively) were designed for armor-on-armor combat
where the active protection systems were designed simply to protect the
armored vehicle by reducing the penetration capability of the incoming
round. While they reduced penetration to an inch or less, they were
characterized by a large lethal fratricide zone. They were also heavy,
though still lighter than the armor they could replace.
Some advanced systems (examples include Trophy, Integrated Army
Active Protective System (IAAPS), Small Low-Cost Interceptor Device
(SLID)) have attempted to address the fratricide issue by increasing
the standoff, focusing the lethal mechanism to a smaller volume, or
using a hit-to-kill mechanism. While these are a definite improvement
over first generation systems, they are more complicated and expensive.
They are still relatively heavy (500 lb or more) and still produce
collateral effects that represent unacceptable risks when used in
scenarios involving dismounted friendly combatants and/or non-combatant
personnel in proximity to the vehicles.
Some efforts have been made to address the collateral effects in
these systems. For example, the Israeli Iron Fist system uses a non-
fragmenting grenade designed to reduce (but not eliminate) the
potential for collateral damage. While several of these systems claim
to be applicable to light vehicles, they are clearly optimized for
armored combat.
Since 2003, Defense Advanced Research Project Agency (DARPA) and
the Army have been working on systems that could be used on lighter
vehicles. The objectives were:
1) No collateral damage aside from that caused by the threat
itself,
2) Residual penetration which could be handled by the light
armor appliques used for tactical vehicles in service today,
3) Light weight, and
4) Low cost.
These systems and components are under test today and promise
capability against Rocket Propelled Grenades (RPGs) and even heavy
Anti-Tank Guided Missiles (ATGMs). They do not have a growth path to be
able to counter standoff kinetic weapons such as gun fired tank rounds,
and as such are not replacements for the Quick Kill system under
development for Future Combat Systems (FCS).
Mr. Weldon. You state in your written statement that ``Retaining
Trophy as a component of Spiral 1 (FSEP) would add, at a minimum, an
additional six to fourteen months to the schedule, thereby delaying
other useful FSEP capabilities.'' Was this timeline based upon
recommendations from the Army's Test and Evaluation Command as well as
the Office of Force Transformation? If so, did both organizations agree
on this timeline?
Dr. Buhrkuhl. As I stated in my testimony, we collaborated with the
Office of Force Transformation (OFT) throughout our deliberations on
responding to the Central Command (CENTCOM) Joint Urgent Operational
Need. OFT, however, is not a test activity and so we consulted with the
Director of Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E) and U.S. Army Test
and Evaluation Command (ATEC) to determine the most likely timeframe
for testing. We were aware of the OFT concern regarding the schedule;
however, after studied consideration of the development and performance
risks involved, the Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell (JRAC) agreed with the
recommendations of the independent test organizations and the program
office.
Mr. Weldon. Do we need an interim capability to protect our
military until the objective system comes on line in 2011? Or based on
what we know about current threat systems and current armor solutions,
is it an acceptable level of risk to wait until 2011 to give our
military some sort of APS capability?
General Sorenson. No, the Army's current assessment is that we do
not need an interim capability. The vast majority of threats currently
being encountered are improvised explosive devices (IEDs). The Rocket
Propelled Grenade (RPG) attacks are much less frequent. For combat
vehicles, such as the Abrams, Bradleys and Strykers, reactive armor
tiles should be adequate to defeat almost all of the RPGs currently
being encountered or expected. Therefore, the risk to combat vehicles
of not having an Active Protection System (APS) available until as
early as 2011 is considered to be low. Note that APS is not effective
against IEDs.
The RPG threat to our combat systems is considerably less than what
has been reported in the media. Since 2003, and as of 7 November 2006,
148 Soldiers have been killed in action (KIA) or died of wounds
received in actions involving an RPG. Of the 148 killed in action, 63
were RPG only; the remaining KIAs were the result of complex attacks
involving an RPG and some other kind of weapon. Additionally, of the
148 killed in action since 2003, only ten Soldiers killed in action
involved current combat vehicle systems that the Army could potentially
accept the integration of an active protection capability (Abrams,
Bradley, Stryker, etc.).
Mr. Weldon. Is SLAT armor effective against all known proliferating
RPG threats?
General Sorenson. SLAT armor is not effective against all known
proliferating RPG threats. To protect against the remaining types of
RPGs, the Army has developed and is procuring reactive armor tiles for
the Abrams, Bradley and Stryker combat vehicles. These reactive armor
tiles are effective against almost all of the RPGs encountered or
expected.
Additionally, to counter future threats (proliferating RPG threats
being one), the Army is embarked on a holistic approach towards
survivability, including leveraging the network for improved
situational awareness, reducing signature management, improving
ballistic protection, modifying operational tactics, and pursuing hit
avoidance. In the context of military ground combat vehicles, hit
avoidance comprises technologies that enable defeat of the threat prior
to its impact with the vehicle. The hit avoidance requirement for our
future force is a 360-degree hemispherical ``bubble'' of protection to
our combat platforms.
Currently, the Future Combat Systems (FCS) program is developing a
full-spectrum solution to counter short- and long-range threats, which
include a wide range of ballistic projectiles: RPGs, antitank guided
missiles, tank-KE/HEAT, top attack munitions. This full spectrum system
will be fielded to the entire force.
Mr. Weldon. In reference to the Request for Proposal (RFP) and the
source selection process please explain the weighting of the evaluation
criteria that led to the selection of Raytheon. Specifically, did the
evaluation criteria lean more towards an APS solution for FCS, the
current force, or were they weighted the same?
General Sorenson. The source selection criteria were weighted to
determine the best Active Protection developer for FCS. A portion of
the contract statement of work addressed ``spinning out'' short-range
technology to Current Force (CF) but no specific CF requirements were
used as evaluation criteria. The trade study similarly evaluated the
best technology for FCS. The FCS objective is to develop a full
spectrum capable solution to counter short and long-range threats. The
FCS short-range system will be ``spun-out'' to the CF--the desired end
state is to enhance commonality between current and future force
systems and to enable future upgrades to both. The Lead Systems
Integrator's Request for Proposal (RFP) Statement of Work (SOW)
included:
Base Effort: Develop a robust, detailed APS architecture to
integrate into Manned Ground Vehicle (MGV) platforms and apply
architecture to Army's current force.
Option A: Supply APS B kit for current force (First Priority and
Focus)
Option B: Definitize the FCS materiel solution, including short and
long range capability
The RFP award factors in descending order of importance were:
Technical, Cost, Management/Schedule, and Past Performance. The
Technical factor was more important than the combination of Cost and
Management/Schedule. The six Technical subfactors in descending order
of importance were: Systems Engineering and Architecture; Expertise in
APS Technologies; Simulation, Modeling and Test; Fratricide and
Collateral Damage; Specialty Engineering; and Integration Capability.
Mr. Weldon. An unclassified Army information paper on APS dated 13
June 2006 states: ``The Army is currently not funding the development
and procurement of an APS for Stryker.'' Other than the FCS APS
development effort, does the Army have any other funded APS efforts
that could benefit the current force earlier than 2011?
General Sorenson. No, the Army does not have any other funded APS
efforts that could benefit the current force earlier than 2011. The
Army APS development provides APS solution for both the current (PEO
Ground Combat Systems--Stryker, Bradley, Abrams) and the future (Future
Combat Systems--FCS MGV) platforms--in close coordination with the
Science & Technology community.
The Army is developing a short range RPG countermeasure capability
for the Current Force (Stryker, Abrams and Bradley) and a full-spectrum
solution to counter short- and long-range threats, which includes a
wide range of ballistic projectiles: RPGs, antitank guided missiles,
tank-KE/HEAT, top attack/precision guided missiles, and large caliber
cannon. Developmental funding does exist and the POM fiscal year 2008-
13 is still being worked.
Mr. Weldon. Does the current force have to wait for the FCS program
to spin out an APS solution? Why can't the current force develop and
field an interim APS solution on its own? Does this mean that current
force systems can only get future technology upgrades from the FCS
program?
General Sorenson. The Army solution to an Active Protection System
currently includes the current force. The Army conducted significant
analysis to determine current and future requirements. The current
force will not get an APS capability earlier by splitting the APS
development approach in two. The current approach ensures commonality
and future upgrades to both current force and FCS MGV combat vehicles.
The Army approach to active protection includes a tightly integrated
team that includes PM Future Combat Systems, PEO Ground Combat Systems
(Stryker, Bradley and Abrams), the Science and Technology Community and
the Best of Industry. The plan is to provide short-range capability to
the current force first (Short-Range RPG defeat) and then full spectrum
capability to current (Stryker, Bradley, Abrams) and FCS (Manned Ground
Vehicles) second. No system will be procured or fielded unless the Army
is confident that the system is safe for Soldiers' use and is effective
and survivable under operational conditions. Active protection is not
just an FCS program--it is an Army program and approach to full
spectrum Soldier survivability. The Army will ensure that both current
and FCS equipped Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) receive future technology
upgrades.
Mr. Weldon. In thinking about potential scenarios, it would seem
that a close-range attack with an RPG would be very difficult to defend
against, given the extraordinarily fast reaction times required. Is
that correct? Can an APS be effective in close-range situations at all?
General Sorenson. Generally, the closer the weapon is fired and the
faster the incoming round, the harder it is for most APS solutions to
identify, track, intercept and neutralize the inbound threat. It
requires engagement closer to the vehicle, which means you need to use
a more lethal countermeasure to adequately defeat the RPG threat. The
short-range APS will be effective against the Army's requirement for
close-in attacks. A major part of the solution in the defeat of close-
range attacks may be tactics and doctrine. Technical testing and User
experimentation with APS will be conducted to establish the best way to
defeat close-range RPG attacks.
We are currently investigating different technologies to neutralize
close-range RPGs. The APS systems can be effective in close-range
situations, but like any system will have design limitations for ranges
that it can not protect against. For this reason, the Army's Current
Force and FCS APS program is developing a suite of technologies to
counter threats with multiple means--a full spectrum hit avoidance
suite.
Mr. Weldon. Do we need an interim capability to protect our
military until the objective system comes on line in 2011? Or based on
what we know about current threat systems and current armor solutions,
is it an acceptable level of risk to wait until 2011 to give our
military some sort of APS capability?
Mr. Feldman. It has been stated that current threat levels do not
merit a need for Active Protection Systems (APS) deployment before
2011, but the recent experience of the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) in
Lebanon calls this assumption into question. A majority of the
casualties sustained by the IDF in the recent conflict were directly
related to Anti-Tank Guided Missiles (ATGMs) provided to the Hezbollah
by Syria and Iran. Many of the IDF heavy and light armored vehicles
were attacked by more advanced threats in greater numbers than had been
expected. It is important that we explore near term protection
solutions, which unlike armor, are not reliant on amelioration of
lethality upon vehicle impact. An interim capability will provide
protection against emerging threats, and also provide a platform for
the development of Tactics Techniques and Procedures concerning the
usage of Active Protection Systems. It is our understanding that the
2011 timeframe is when the Quick Kill system will be ready for test.
Significant acquisition quantities would not be expected until 2 to 3
years after that. All this time could be used for learning how we
employ and specify these systems.
Mr. Weldon. Is SLAT armor effective against all known proliferating
RPG threats?
Mr. Feldman. This question needs to be answered in a classified
forum as it requires a discussion of capabilities, limitations and
vulnerabilities.
Mr. Weldon. Various news reports have quoted Office of Force
Transformation (OFT) sources implying that the Trophy system is ready
for deployment now. What is the official OFT position on the current
availability of Trophy as it pertains to the FSEP program?
Mr. Feldman. The OFT has never stated that the Trophy was ready for
deployment. In order to be ready for deployment the system must first
be subjected to additional qualification and performance testing. The
Trophy system has continued development with the IDF since the
demonstrations at NSWC Dahlgren in March including initial development
of an autoloader and the beginning of certification testing. The Army
recommended that the Tropy not be included on the FSEP program and the
JRAC, after consulting with CENTCOM who in turn consulted with the user
in the field, made the decision to delay the use of the Trophy on this
spiral of the FSEP program. Trophy is being carried forward as part of
the OFT Wolf Pack Platoon project with proposals for further
performance testing and certification for US usage should this stage
prove out. The OFT position is that with a limited procurement of 3
test systems and 40 countermeasures, and an appropriate test program,
the Trophy could be approved for US usage.
Mr. Weldon. I understand that the Office of Force Transformation
(OFT) has worked very closely with the Israeli government in regards to
integrating Trophy on a Stryker vehicle. Please tell us what your
current understanding is of when the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) plans
to field Trophy to their forces?
Mr. Feldman. OFT worked closely with Rafael, General Dynamics Land
Systems (GDLS) and the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) to integrate the
Trophy on the first Full Spectrum Effects Platform (FSEP) vehicle.
Independent of that effort, Rafael and GDLS developed an initial
integration concept for the Trophy system that would allow a Stryker
Infantry Carrier Vehicle (ICV) to fulfill all of its missions with the
Trophy system installed. According to the Embassy of Israel Research
and Development Attache the initial low rate production of Trophy will
begin by March 2007 with full production by August of 2007. Multiple
IDF platforms are being considered for Trophy integration, with the
first being Merkava Main Battle Tanks. The first Merkava MK4 equipped
with Trophy is expected to leave the production line in January 2008.
Mr. Weldon. There have been statements that there are major
collateral damage issues associated with Trophy. Based on your
understanding of the data that the Israeli government has shared with
you, do you have similar concerns?
Mr. Feldman. Of the systems examined for the Full Spectrum Effects
Platform (FSEP), Trophy had the lowest potential for fratricide and
collateral damage of all of the intercepting systems. This is due to
the fact that the Trophy uses a small amount of explosive to fire a
limited number of small projectiles towards the incoming round in an
extremely focused group. Most of the other alternative systems launch
projectiles with large radially exploding warheads. In all cases the
Trophy projectiles will have no energy within 250 meters and in most
cases, against Rocket Propelled Grenades (RPGs) fired from ground
level, the projectiles will be in the ground within 65 meters. First
order safety studies done by the Naval Surface Warfare Center, Dahlgren
Division (NSWCDD) indicated that troops with body armor would be safe
at even closer distances. Additional testing needs to be conducted to
understand and characterize the collateral damage to noncombatants at
close range (within 65 meters). As part of the proposed Trophy test
program, countermeasure characterization and analyses of safety hazards
to dismounted troops and civilians would be conducted. In addition, the
proposed program will include the initial development of Tactics,
Techniques and Procedures by the warfighters to determine how and under
what conditions the system should be employed.
Mr. Weldon. What can you tell us about the various testing that the
Israeli's have done on Trophy?
Mr. Feldman. The Israeli's have conducted a significant amount of
testing on the Trophy system. Naval Surface Warfare Center (NSWC), with
Rafael and General Dynamics Land Systems (GDLS), has developed a
classified summary brief of this testing. The testing includes over 450
test firings in a variety of conditions as well as safety and
environmental testing. The table below summarizes the testing that was
conducted in conjunction with the Full Spectrum Effects Program (FSEP)/
Project Sheriff efforts.
The Trophy integrated on the FSEP Stryker
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Test Result
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fit and Function Trophy installed and fit as
designed. System functioned as
expected.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Electromagnetic Vulnerability No susceptibilities on
(Tailored Environment) Trophy.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Hazards of Electromagnetic Radiation Trophy caused no effects to
to Ordance (HERO) any ammunition types expected
aboard FSEP.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Hazards of Electromagnetic Radiation Below personnel exposure
to Personnel (HERP) limits.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Electromagnetic compatibility No interaction of Trophy with
other systems on board
vehicle.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Trophy integrated on the IDF Stryker
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Test Result
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fit and Function Trophy installed and fit as
designed. System functioned as
expected.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Flash Signature The flash signature seen
through the periscopes of the
vehicle would not cause ocular
damage to personnel inside the
vehicle. Flash outside of the
vehicle would not cause ocular
damage.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Acoustic Signature Adequate hearing protection
is provided by the required
standard hearing protection
worn inside the vehicle.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Blast Overpressure Minimal blast overpressure
inside of the vehicle. Trophy
is designed to be operated
with open hatches.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Debris Protection Witness panels proved that
blast shields protected crew
hatch areas from debris.
Trophy is designed to be
operated with open hatches.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Live Fire tests conducted at Naval 38 tests were conducted with
Surface Warfare Center, Dahlgren inert Rocket Propelled
Division (NSWCDD) Grenades (RPGs) being fired at
(or in close proximity to) the
vehicle Multiple tests were
conducted firing 2 RPGs nearly
simultaneously--one to each
side of the vehicle.
The test were conducted
against RPG-7 missiles with
inert warheads. These RPGs had
the same velocity and flight
profiles as live RPGs and were
certified by NSWCDD Explosive
Ordnance Device (EOD) techs as
being representative. RPGs
were fired remotely from 100
meters away using test stands.
12 of the 38 tests were
conducted as the vehicle was
moving at approximately 25mph.
35 of the 38\1\ tests were
rated as a success. System
identified, tracked and
engaged threat \2\ RPGs.
Notes:
(1) Tests using a ``live''
Trophy engagement round
accounted for 6 tests with 4
countermeasures firing. All
other Trophy tests were deemed
either a success or a failure
by using tracking cameras in
place of the ``live'' Trophy
countermeasure and analyzing
the system data with the video
coverage with modeling and
simulation to predict the
outcome.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
In addition to the tests noted above a structural test was
conducted at Aberdeen Proving Ground to determine that the loading
imposed by a Trophy warhead would not overstress a Stryker vehicle. A
1/2 kg charge of C-4 was detonated in place of the Trophy warhead and
no structural damage was noted.
Mr. Weldon. It has been said that the Trophy testing that was
conducted at the Dahlgren Naval Test Center in March 2006 required
additional power sources and control panels in the Stryker's crew
space. Is this correct, please explain?
Mr. Feldman. Two integrations of the Trophy system were performed
to support the Full Spectrum Effects Platform (FSEP) program:
1. The first was the integration of the Trophy onto the FSEP
Stryker vehicle conducted in December 2005. In this integration, the
Trophy launchers were mounted to the side of the FSEP vehicle.
Structural analysis and testing of the launcher mounting points
verified that the Stryker hull would not be adversely affected by the
Trophy system. The Trophy search radar systems were mounted on each
side and at the front and rear of the vehicle in special mounting
brackets.
Trophy on the FSEP Stryker
The internal components of the Trophy system were integrated as
part of the FSEP system and were mounted in racks and positions
suitable for employment in the FSEP vehicle. The Trophy system was
powered by the FSEP system generator. No additional electrical power
requirements were needed. This first integration incorporated the
Trophy as part of the FSEP system and was reflective of how it would be
included in a combat vehicle.
2. The second FSEP Trophy integration was on the Israeli Defense
Force Stryker. This integration was conducted to support the tests and
demonstration planned at the Naval Surface Warfare Center, Dahlgren
Division (NSWCDD) in March 2006. The exterior installation of this
system was identical to that on the initial FSEP vehicle installation.
The interior components of the Trophy system were rack mounted inside
the vehicle to facilitate the necessary testing and analysis. Again, in
this installation the Trophy system ran exclusively on vehicle power.
No additional power systems were needed. This installation was not
intended to represent a combat capable configuration. The installation
was developed as a demonstration capability to facilitate the testing,
demonstration and extraction of data from the system.
FSEP Trophy on the IDF Stryker
In addition, to the Trophy integration done to support Full
Spectrum Effects Platform (FSEP), General Dynamics Land Systems (GDLS)
and Rafael have completed a concept study and analysis of a Trophy
installation that would meet all Stryker Infantry Carrier Vehicle
requirements. This integration concept utilizes the Trophy system
components that have been developed for integration on Israeli Defense
Forces (IDF) vehicles.
Mr. Weldon. Is the OFT currently conducting any other efforts in
regards to Trophy? If so please explain.
Mr. Feldman. Rafael is currently planning to lend OFT an initial
production variant of the Trophy system. This variant is identical to
the system being provided to the IDF for integration on the Merkava MK4
main battle tank. The updated system includes an autoloader, ruggedized
radars and electronics, and an updated countermeasure design. This
system will be integrated on the Wolf Pack platoon Cougar vehicle. As
part of this effort OFT, the IDF, Rafael and GDLS will establish the
plan to ensure that appropriate testing and safety analyses are
conducted to demonstrate the capabilities and limitations of the Trophy
system.
The current plan is for the testing efforts to be completed in time
for Trophy systems to be used as part of the Wolf Pack Platoon
experimentation in January of 2008. This proposed effort would be
sufficient to demonstrate Trophy applicability on both wheeled and
tracked vehicles.
Mr. Weldon. Can you identify a proven, lightweight and low cost RPG
defeat system that provides protection for vehicles, including light
tactical vehicles, without fratricide that is made in the USA?
Mr. Feldman. Although there are several United States systems that
have been demonstrated to various degrees, none meets all of the above
requirements. All US systems that have been examined by the Office of
Force Transformation (OFT) require significant further development and
testing.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. BRADLEY
Mr. Bradley. Can you identify a proven, lightweight and low cost
RPG defeat system that provides protection for vehicles, including
light tactical vehicles, without fratricide that is made in the USA?
General Sorenson. To date, no low cost, lightweight US APS sub-
system has been fully developed, integrated, and tested on a current
ground combat or tactical system. Current systems that might be
available require significantly more testing and refinement to prove
their capabilities against all threats of interest. In the past, Army
Science and Technology program has studied at a number of approaches to
APS in programs such as Integrated Army Active Protection (IAAPS),
Close-in Active Protection System (CIAPS), Full Spectrum Active
Protection System (FSAP) and Full Spectrum Active Protection Close-in
Layered Shield (FCLAS). Both CIAPS and FCLAS investigated the
possibility of integrating active protection on light tactical vehicles
(HMMWVs, trucks, etc). There are significant challenges to overcome
with regards to putting APS on a tactical vehicle such as: integration
(space, weight, power and cooling--(SWAP-C)), lack of armor to defeat
(catch) threat debris and capability to provide 360 degree protection.
To date, no APS has been able to overcome all of these challenges for
tactical vehicles.
Mr. Bradley. Can you identify a proven, lightweight and low cost
RPG defeat system that provides protection for vehicles, including
light tactical vehicles, without fratricide that is made in the USA?
Dr. Buhrkuhl. There is currently no ``proven'' lightweight Active
Protection System (APS) for either combat or light tactical vehicles.
All the systems under development require much more refinement and
testing. While these candidate systems under development may have the
potential to meet the proven, lightweight and low cost criteria, more
development, testing, and certification is needed to prove that
potential. Specifically, these candidates include: The Defense Advanced
Research Projects Agency's (DARPA) Iron Curtain APS, recently
demonstrated on a High-Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV);
U.S. Army Tank Automotive Research, Development and Engineering
Center's (TARDEC) Tactical RPG Airbag Protection System (TRAPS)
demonstrated on a HMMWV in 2005; and the Aviation and Missile Research,
Development and Engineering Center's (AMRDEC) Close-In Active
Protection System (CIAPS II) planned for demonstration on a HMMWV in
FY07.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. JONES
Mr. Jones. In the spirit of fielding a system as soon as possible,
and if the above information is accurate, would your office support
funding and further development of a system like FCLAS?
General Sorenson. FCLAS is one of the active protection (AP)
solutions the Army S&T community assessed for vehicle platform
protection against close-in fired Rocket Propelled Grenades (RPGs) and
man portable Anti-tank Guided Missiles (ATGMs) that is in the early
stages of development. FCLAS has undergone range testing of a proof-of-
principle prototype design with some success in defeating current
threat RPGs during testing. The system experienced radar multipath
(i.e., a propagation phenomenon that results in false targets and
signal interference) as a result of ground clutter and will have to go
through a significant redesign to correct this condition before it
would be considered adequate for a ground vehicle.
The current FCLAS configuration presents an integration burden and
adds significantly to the system weight. FCLAS autonomously conducts
surveillance with the nose cone sense and tracking radar for target
acquisition, tracks the threat, launches, fuses, and detonates the
countermeasure to defeat the incoming threat. The user is provided
control over which tubes can protect the vehicle via a system
controller. This capability prevents an FCLAS round from operating in
areas where dismounts are known to be. The system is envisioned to be
effective against hand held HEAT (i.e. RPGs and man-portable ATGMs) but
some vehicle armor will be necessary to protect the occupants from
residual debris after threat intercept.
The FCLAS short-comings are: 1) the complexity of mounting and
space required to integrate a large number of launchers; 2) side-firing
warhead creates large hazard area; 3) supply chain requirement for such
a large quantity of interceptors; 4) loss of sector coverage once a
countermeasure is fired (no coverage for near simultaneously fired
threat in the same azimuth); and 5) no growth potential for long range
intercept of large anti-armor threats.
The FCLAS is not ready to hand over to the US Army Test and
Evaluation Command for testing to assess its capabilities, limitations
and level of safety. Any APS system being considered for fielding would
have to be tested to verify the developer's claims, check
compatibility, and ensure Soldier and noncombatant safety when the
system is being used in environments and conditions like those it will
be exposed to in combat. This testing would include a test to define
the potential hazard to dismounted troops and noncombatants who may be
in the vicinity of the vehicle.