[House Hearing, 109 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 109-85]
THE IRREGULAR WARFARE ROADMAP
__________
HEARING
BEFORE THE
TERRORISM, UNCONVENTIONAL THREATS AND CAPABILITIES SUBCOMMITTEE
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
HEARING HELD
SEPTEMBER 27, 2006
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TERRORISM, UNCONVENTIONAL THREATS AND CAPABILITIES SUBCOMMITTEE
JIM SAXTON, New Jersey, Chairman
ROBIN HAYES, North Carolina MARTY MEEHAN, Massachusetts
W. TODD AKIN, Missouri ADAM SMITH, Washington
JOE WILSON, South Carolina MIKE McINTYRE, North Carolina
JOHN KLINE, Minnesota ELLEN O. TAUSCHER, California
BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania ROBERT ANDREWS, New Jersey
GEOFF DAVIS, Kentucky JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island
JOEL HEFLEY, Colorado RICK LARSEN, Washington
MAC THORNBERRY, Texas JIM COOPER, Tennessee
JIM GIBBONS, Nevada JIM MARSHALL, Georgia
JEFF MILLER, Florida CYNTHIA McKINNEY, Georgia
FRANK A. LoBIONDO, New Jersey
Alex Kugajevsky, Professional Staff Member
Bill Natter, Professional Staff Member
Brian Anderson, Staff Assistant
C O N T E N T S
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CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS
2006
Page
Hearing:
Wednesday, September 27, 2006, The Irregular Warfare Roadmap..... 1
Appendix:
Wednesday, September 27, 2006.................................... 23
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WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 27, 2006
THE IRREGULAR WARFARE ROADMAP
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Saxton, Hon. Jim, a Representative from New Jersey, Chairman,
Terrorism, Unconventional Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee 1
Smith, Hon. Adam a Representative from Washington, Terrorism,
Unconventional Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee........... 2
WITNESSES
Mancuso, Mario, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special
Operations and Combating Terrorism, Office of the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity
Conflict....................................................... 4
Mannon, Brig. Gen. Otis G., Deputy Director, Special Operations,
J-3, Joint Staff, U.S. Air Force............................... 7
Olson, Vice Adm. Eric T., Deputy Commander, U.S. Special
Operations Command, U.S. Navy.................................. 3
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Mancuso, Mario............................................... 28
Mannon, Brig. Gen. Otis G.................................... 42
Olson, Vice Adm. Eric T...................................... 37
Saxton, Hon. Jim............................................. 27
Documents Submitted for the Record:
[There were no Documents submitted.]
Questions and Answers Submitted for the Record:
Smith, Hon. Adam............................................. 53
THE IRREGULAR WARFARE ROADMAP
----------
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Terrorism, Unconventional Threats and Capabilities
Subcommittee,
Washington, DC, Wednesday, September 27, 2006.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:30 p.m., in
room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Jim Saxton
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JIM SAXTON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM NEW
JERSEY, CHAIRMAN, TERRORISM, UNCONVENTIONAL THREATS AND
CAPABILITIES SUBCOMMITTEE
Mr. Saxton. The stenographer is ready, so if we could all
take our seats. The Subcommittee on Terrorism, Unconventional
Threats and Capabilities meets today to discuss the Department
of Defense Irregular Warfare Roadmap. The terrorist attacks on
September 11, 2001, marked the engagement of the United States
in a very different form of warfare than has been the focus of
strategic military planning during the Cold War. The global war
on terror is defined by its long-term and irregular nature, and
it requires an approach that does not solely focus on
conventional capabilities or direct action missions to kill or
capture terrorists and their supporters.
Recognizing the irregular nature of the global war on
terror, the Department of Defense is taking measures to adapt
to this new threat environment and to focus on building and
improving our military irregular warfare capability by
expanding Special Operations Forces, shifting conventional
forces toward irregular warfare and significantly developing an
Irregular Warfare Roadmap.
The roadmap will guide the implementation of the 2006
Quadrennial Defense Review recommendations as well as provide
an important tool for the department to continue refinement of
its approach to the global war on terror.
At the end of the hearing, we should walk away with a good
understanding of where the Department of Defense is developing
the Irregular Warfare Roadmap, what impacts the roadmap will
have on policy, planning and research decisions and what
operational activities and issues can be expected in the
conduct of the irregular warfare campaign.
As a committee, we must remain focused on the strategic
objectives of this war, and irregular warfare will prove to be
a deciding factor in the global war on terror.
Today we have a great panel: Mr. Mancuso, Deputy Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Special Operations in Combating
Terrorism, Office of the Assistant Secretary For Defense of
Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict; Vice Admiral
Eric Olson, U.S. Navy, Deputy Commander, U.S. Special
Operations Command; and Brigadier General O.G. Mannon, U.S. Air
Force, Deputy Director, Special Operations, Joint Staff.
We look forward to your testimony as we represent the key--
as you represent the key players in the development of the
Irregular Warfare Roadmap as well as those who will be most
closely involved in the roadmap's implementation.
Before I proceed, let me yield to the ranking member for--
Mr. Smith is the ranking member today.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Saxton can be found in the
Appendix on page 27.]
STATEMENT OF HON. ADAM SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM WASHINGTON,
TERRORISM, UNCONVENTIONAL THREATS AND CAPABILITIES SUBCOMMITTEE
Mr. Smith. Sitting in for Mr. Meehan who had a family
situation to deal with today, so I appreciate the opportunity,
and I thank the Chairman and join him in welcoming our
witnesses and look forward to their testimony.
Particularly I want to thank the Chairman for having the
hearing on this incredibly important subject. It is titled
irregular warfare, but at this point, it is pretty much regular
warfare for us. It is what we are doing now in Iraq and
Afghanistan and elsewhere and learning how to deal with all
that entails is critical to our victory in the war on terror.
And as with all warfare, it is always different than the last
one. It is just a matter of how it is different.
So learning those differences I think is critically
important, and it is worth saying that, at this point, we still
have work to do, without question. We have not had the success
we would even have liked in Iraq or even Afghanistan and
elsewhere, so we need to continue to learn lessons and move
forward and get better at it to understand the dynamics of the
irregular warfare that we face.
And with that said, I am very confident that we can figure
it out as a Nation. We have met many new challenges, things we
didn't expect. That is the normal way of life, unfortunately.
Things come that you didn't expect. It is a matter of how
quickly you change and adapt to them in order to deal with the
new challenges, and that is what the military and our country
faces right now in dealing with the brand of warfare that we
face.
It is going to be a very long war. We need to figure out
the new dynamics, adapt and do our best to contend with them. I
am confident that we will.
I will look forward to hearing from our witnesses and
asking questions as well to learn how we are doing and how we
can do better. I have a longer statement for the record which I
will submit, and I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Saxton. Without objection. Thank you very much, Mr.
Smith.
Admiral, the floor is yours sir.
STATEMENT OF VICE ADM. ERIC T. OLSON, DEPUTY COMMANDER, U.S.
SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND, U.S. NAVY
Admiral Olson. Sir, I have submitted a statement for the
record. With your permission, I will not read that but instead
make a few separate comments regarding irregular warfare. I
think it is important that we understand what irregular warfare
is, in part at least, and what it is not.
So I will focus my opening remarks on that.
Chairman Saxton, Congressman Smith and distinguished
members, I am pleased to be here before you today. I am pleased
to join my colleagues, General Mannon and Mr. Mancuso, in doing
so.
Irregular warfare is a relatively new term. It is without
doctrinal history in the Department of Defense lexicon. The
working definition of irregular warfare, which we will discuss
today, was approved by the Deputy Secretary of Defense during
the development of the Irregular Warfare Roadmap, which is
still a work in progress.
The key words in the working definition of irregular
warfare are that irregular warfare is a form of warfare. It is
not a list of units that conduct irregular warfare. It is not a
list of capabilities for irregular warfare. It is not a list of
weapons systems for irregular warfare.
Instead, it is more an approach. It is a set of activities.
It is what we do with the capability and with the units and the
systems, not those things themselves.
Irregular warfare does include aspects of insurgency and
counter insurgency, guerrilla warfare, unconventional warfare
asymmetrical warfare and much more. There can be irregular
warfare activities conducted in a regular or a major warfare
campaign. Irregular warfare activities may include direct
action and indirect action approaches.
But irregular warfare is certainly not just about a range
of military actions or military options. One tends to think
about irregular warfare as something other than direct force-
on-force confrontation between uniformed armies extending to
other less kinetic actions by the Department of Defense, and
that is true.
But it is also important to know that irregular warfare
activities include many of those activities that are squarely
in the domain of other agencies of our government and in the
domain of coalition forces and coalition nations in a global
campaign.
Irregular warfare is clearly bigger than the Department of
Defense, and although the Department of Defense (DOD) does have
a key role in leading and conducting many irregular warfare
activities, it is certainly not confined to DOD. And even
within the Department of Defense, irregular warfare is much
bigger than the United States Special Operations Command,
although United States Special Operations Command has a history
and a culture and a maturity of thought and actions that make
Special Operations Command uniquely suited to leading Defense
Department efforts in many of the areas of irregular warfare.
The nine core activities of Special Operations Forces have
significant overlap with the activities of an irregular warfare
campaign, those being: counter proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction; combating terrorism; direct-action special
reconnaissance; unconventional warfare; foreign internal
defense; civil affairs; psychological operations; and
informational operations; and synchronizing Department of
Defense activities for the global war on terror. But irregular
warfare activities, of course, include activities beyond the
range of Special Operations activities.
And just to be clear, the Irregular Warfare Roadmap that we
are addressing today is not a campaign plan or a guiding
document for the global war on terror. It does not lay out the
Department of Defense's total approach to irregular warfare. It
is one of eight roadmaps under development, some of which have
been approved and some not yet, that will serve as implementing
documents to follow through on decisions made during the
Quadrennial Defense Review. And the real purpose of the
irregular warfare is to provide resourcing guidance to the
services and the Special Operations Command within the
Department of Defense as we go forward to implement the QDR
decisions.
It represents a sub set of the universe of irregular
warfare activity and, again, remains a work in progress.
Sir, that concludes my opening remarks.
[The prepared statement of Admiral Olson can be found in
the Appendix on page 37.]
Mr. Saxton. Thank you very much. Secretary Mancuso can we
get your remarks next please? Thanks and thank you for being.
STATEMENT OF MARIO MANCUSO, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE FOR SPECIAL OPERATIONS AND COMBATING TERRORISM, OFFICE
OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR SPECIAL OPERATIONS
AND LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT
Secretary Mancuso. Thank you. It is my pleasure, sir.
Chairman Saxton, Congressman Smith and distinguished
members of the committee, thank you for inviting us here today
to present you with an update on where the Department of
Defense is regarding irregular warfare.
As the 2005 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) stated, the
United States is involved in a long war. This war is irregular
in its nature, and our enemies are not traditional conventional
military forces but rather dispersed global terrorist networks
that exploit Islam to advance radical political ends.
Three factors have intensified the danger of this irregular
war challenge: the rise of virulent extremist ideologies; the
absence of effective governance in many areas of the world; and
the potential of these enemies to acquire weapons of mass
destruction.
Irregular warfare is a form of warfare and has a long
history. Unlike traditional warfare, which focuses on defeating
an adversary's military forces, the focus of irregular warfare
is on the legitimacy of the relevant political authority.
Irregular warfare favors indirect approaches, though it may
employ the full range of military and other elements of
national power to erode an adversary's power, influence and
will.
Irregular warfare will likely be the dominant force of
conflict our Nation faces over the next two decades. The global
war on terror and irregular war in the most fundamental sense
will require the U.S. military to adopt nontraditional and
indirect approaches.
And while we must maintain our ability to deal with
traditional threats, our Armed Forces must rebalance to adjust
to this changing national security environment. Our experience
thus far on the war on terrorism underscores the need to
reorient our military forces to be able to project power
through indirect approaches on a global scale and for an
indefinite period.
The future security environment will challenge traditional
U.S. advantages. The U.S. and its partners are likely to face
state and non-state adversaries that employ irregular warfare
as their primary form of warfare. Strategic policy and
operational and other factors may preclude and constrain our
Armed Forces from conducting conventional military campaigns
against them. This problem will be exacerbated by nuclear-armed
hostile states with sophisticated anti-access capabilities that
may preclude direct military options.
These situations will require or favor an-all-of-government
effort, including an irregular military approach using indirect
and often nontraditional methods and means to achieve U.S.
strategic objectives.
Moreover, even when the use of direct conventional military
confrontation is feasible, the U.S. Government may seek the use
of indirect approaches instead. The offensive use of irregular
warfare will likely become an increasingly attractive strategic
option and preferred form of warfare for the United States to
meet its challenges and achieve its objectives.
Our Armed Forces will therefore require sufficient
capability and capacity to wage protracted irregular warfare on
a regional and global scale and for an indefinite period. The
U.S. has a long history of waging irregular warfare. But our
experience has been on limited engagements for limited periods
of time, normally in association with conventional military
operations.
What differentiates irregular warfare from more
conventional warfare is its emphasis on the use of irregular
forces generally and the other indirect nonconventional methods
and means to subvert, attrite and exhaust an adversary or
render him irrelevant to the host population rather than on
defeating him through direct means on the battlefield.
Unlike conventional warfare, irregular warfare is an armed
political struggle for control or influence over and the
support of an indigenous population.
The President's recently released National Strategy for
Combating Terrorism provides the vision for defeating terrorism
and winning this kind of war. The war on terrorism is both a
battle of arms and a battle of ideas.
This war will require us to meet and fight our terrorist
enemies in the irregular warfare battle space while promoting
freedom and human dignity as alternatives to the terrorist
ideology of oppression and totalitarian rule.
The strategy will require the application and integration
of all elements of national power and influence. The military
must be resourced to rebalance the force to permit victory in
this type of war. Specifically, we must improve the capability
of our general purpose forces to conduct counterinsurgency
operations and to partner with and train foreign forces to
defeat insurgencies and terrorist organizations.
Our Special Operations Forces must also rebalance to devote
a greater degree of effort to counterterrorism operations,
defeating terrorist networks and combating the threat of
weapons of mass destruction (WMD) proliferation.
The National Military Strategic Plan for the War on
Terrorism describes the approach the Department of Defense will
take to fulfill its role within the larger national strategy
for combating terrorism and provides the Secretary of Defense's
strategic framework for the application of the military
instrument of national power in the global war on terror.
This plan established six military strategic objectives to
permit development of the Defense Department's campaign plan
for the global war on terror. The six objectives are and
remain: denying terrorists the resources they need to operate
and survive; enabling partner nations to counter terrorist
threats; denying weapons of mass destruction technology to our
enemies and increasing our capacity for consequence management;
defeating terrorist organizations and networks; countering
state and non-state support for terrorism in coordination with
other U.S. Government agencies and partner nations; and
countering ideological support for terrorism.
As noted in the 2005 QDR, the Department of Defense must
rebalance its forces to support the National Military Strategic
Plan.
The Department of Defense has established an aggressive
time line for implementing the approximately 30 tasks over the
next year in order to improve our ability to conduct irregular
warfare, known as the Irregular Warfare Roadmap, as Admiral
Olson mentioned. The focus of this roadmap is enhancing
irregular warfare capabilities and capacities throughout the
entire Department. A companion effort entitled, Building
Partnership Capacity Roadmap, addresses interagency and
multinational initiatives related to irregular warfare.
Both of these roadmaps are complemented by the Department
of Defense directive 3000.05 which directs the Department to
improve its capabilities to conduct stability operations.
The Irregular Warfare Execution Roadmap has begun to
provide senior leadership with a mechanism to advance high-
priority issues for decision through the fiscal year 2008 to
2013 Defense program.
The roadmap will transform the department through the
implementation of five major initiatives: one, changing the way
we manage people necessary to support irregular warfare; two,
rebalancing our general purpose forces to better support
irregular warfare; three, increasing our Special Operations
Forces capabilities and capacity to support irregular warfare;
four, increasing our capacity to conduct counter network
operations; and five, redesigning our joint and service
education and training programs to conduct irregular warfare.
The assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
and low intensity conflict is fully committed to supporting the
Irregular Warfare Roadmap and identifying and addressing
capability and capacity shortfalls related to irregular warfare
in coordination with U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM)
and the Joint Staff.
In addition, we are identifying and requesting assistance
to address legal authorities related to irregular warfare
specifically section 2067 and section 1208 of Title 10 which
provides the legal authority for U.S. military personnel to
train and equip foreign forces supporting the war on terrorism.
Throughout our history, U.S. Military Forces, Active Duty,
Reserves and National Guard, have adapted to engage new threats
to our Nation.
The 2005 QDR identified the capability and capacity
shortfalls that must be addressed to meet the full range of
challenges to the United States, irregular, conventional,
disruptive and catastrophic.
The Irregular Warfare Roadmap in particular represents a
concerted effort to transform how we manage and train our
forces and to rebalance our general purpose forces and Special
Operations Forces to meet the irregular warfare challenge.
Chairman Saxton, Congressman Smith, distinguished members,
thank you again for your interest in and support of our
irregular warfare initiatives. I am honored to appear before
you today, before this distinguished committee, and at the
appropriate time, I would be happy and delighted to answer your
questions. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Secretary Mancuso can be found
in the Appendix on page 28.]
Mr. Saxton. Mr. Secretary thank you, very much.
General, the floor is yours sir.
STATEMENT OF BRIG. GEN. OTIS G. MANNON, DEPUTY DIRECTOR,
SPECIAL OPERATIONS, J-3, JOINT STAFF, U.S. AIR FORCE
General Mannon. Good afternoon, and thank you, Chairman
Saxton. Chairman Saxton, Congressman Smith, distinguished
Committee members. Thank you for inviting us here today to
present you with additional information concerning the
Irregular Warfare Roadmap.
For most of the 20th century, we knew who our enemies were
and where they lived. They had armies, navies and air forces to
attack with recognized capitals and populations to put at risk.
However, in the 21st century, as we have already alluded to, we
face a different enemy, an enemy defined by a complex network
of ideologically driven extremists who will attempt to engage
us not only far away from our shores but at home as well.
Future efforts in the long war on terror include many
operations characterized by irregular warfare, operations in
which the enemy is not a regular military force of a nation-
state. As we are all aware, we are engaged in a global
conflict, and our efforts confronting the enemy must also be
global in nature. These operations will occur on multiple
fronts and cannot be limited to primarily military activities.
The Department of Defense's 2006 QDR describes the
Department's efforts to shift emphasis from a focus on major
conventional combat operations to multiple irregular
operations.
Secretary Rumsfeld emphasized the QDR was not in itself an
end state; particular emphasis will continue in several
critical areas through the development of following roadmaps.
The purpose of the Irregular Warfare Roadmap is to
facilitate implementation of 2006 QDR decisions regarding DOD
capabilities and capacity to conduct and support protracted
irregular warfare.
The Irregular Warfare Execution Roadmap converts the broad
policy objectives established during the QDR into actionable
tasks. It also provides the Department's senior leadership with
a mechanism to advance high-priority irregular warfare issues
for program decisions through the fiscal year 2008-2013 Future
Years Defense Program as well as establishing an oversight and
management process for implementing irregular warfare
initiatives.
The execution roadmap addresses the need to develop an
increased capabilities and capacities throughout the Department
by grouping lists in five broad subject areas of reliance of
operation. Mr. Mancuso referred to those five areas, so I will
not repeat those at this point.
Today, we must cope not only with the threats produced by
the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and missile
technology among nation-states but also with threats posed by
individual terrorists and terrorist networks with global reach.
The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review was a crucial step
forward in addressing the challenges posed by these new
threats. By providing a method for continuous assessment and
refinement, the Irregular Warfare Execution Roadmap serves as a
primary means for implementing those forward-thinking
decisions.
Chairman Saxton, committee members, thank you for your
interest in and support of the Department's Irregular Warfare
Roadmap. We stand here ready to answer your questions.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of General Mannon can be found in
the Appendix on page 42.]
Mr. Saxton. Thank you, General.
Let me just take care of a little housekeeping item here.
After consultation with the minority, I now ask unanimous
consent that Mr. Taylor, a member of the House Armed Services
Committee, be allowed to participate in today's subcommittee
hearing and be authorized to question witnesses. Mr. Taylor
will be recognized at the conclusion of the questions by
members of the subcommittee. Thank you.
Mr. Smith, would you like to lead off?
Mr. Smith. Certainly. Thank you. I appreciate the
information. I am most interested in getting down to some of
the specifics in terms of how all of this is working in the
various places we are trying to deploy, obviously more in Iraq
and Afghanistan, our two most prominent places. And we are
struggling in both in varying degrees in terms of reducing
violence and getting a stable government in place and, frankly,
winning support of the people broadly in both of those
countries for support of those governments. You can disagree
with that assessment if you like.
But if you don't, how are we doing? How can we do better?
How can we get to the point where we start to see success in
Iraq, and I guess the other important question overarching all
of this is, what is the metric of success? Because that is
something that, as a policy maker, I am wrestling with now, is
we have 140,000 U.S. troops in Iraq.
How are they making the situation better? There hasn't been
a lot of evidence of that, frankly, in the last, well,
certainly year, maybe longer. And if not, you know, that
certainly shows some weaknesses in what we can do.
Is there a way to change it to start having more success?
To boil that all down, what is the measure of success focusing
on Iraq and Afghanistan? Why haven't we done better, you know,
hitting those metrics? And what is the plan to get there, to
get to the point? And overarching all of that is my assumption
that success is, you know, having a stable government that you
know is at least not directly hostile to us.
If you can take a stab at that and how unconventional
warfare is playing out and how we can do better at it, that
would be very helpful.
Secretary Mancuso. Sir, thank you for the question.
To begin with, what I would like to say is the Irregular
Warfare Roadmap is more broadly about how we can get better and
how we can institutionalize some of the best practices. So as
we think about the roadmap, it is not tied to--it is certainly
not tied to Iraq and Afghanistan directly, nor is it tied to
any particular operation. It is tied really to the future and
our ambitions for it.
Mr. Smith. Certainly, and I understand that. But that is
indicative. And I don't wish to limit it just to that; I think
it does have those broad applications that you mentioned, but
getting into the specific helps us understand better how it is
going to apply elsewhere.
Secretary Mancuso. Yes, sir. But in one sense, it is tied
in a very important way, and that is the best practices that we
have developed; the insights that our troops on the ground have
developed in fighting a protracted irregular warfare in places
like Iraq and Afghanistan have been folded up into our process
as we think about it.
So in that sense, Iraq and Afghanistan, not only are they
important missions in and of themselves, but they are important
classrooms. And I don't mean to diminish those missions by
describing them as such for the future as the Department builds
up its capability and capacity to do that.
But to get to your metric of success, clearly a free,
democratic and secure Iraq is important. We believe we are
making very, very good progress. Clearly, it is a difficult
mission. But in terms of the broader metrics and how we succeed
in the global war on terror----
Mr. Smith. Focus on the progress piece of that; where we
are making very, very good progress, that would be a good place
to go for metrics. What is the metrics of your assessment of
that progress? Where is it that this is getting better; that is
getting better? What is the progress you discussed
specifically?
Secretary Mancuso. Sir, I am not sure I am the best person
equipped to talk about Iraq generally. I have a fairly narrow--
an important but narrow portfolio on our counterterrorism
Special Operations. So I would be happy to go into that. I
could take that question for the record and get back to you.
Mr. Smith. That would be helpful. Yes, that would be
helpful if you can do that.
Secretary Mancuso. Yes, I would certainly do that. Thank
you.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
beginning on page 53.]
Mr. Smith. I thought you were going to go into some of
those metrics for success.
Secretary Mancuso. I can do that.
Our strategic end state is essentially impacting our
enemy's ability to act globally and catastrophically--the
enemy, as I use it, is al Qaeda and the affiliated movement--
and to ensure that its ability to act locally in venues is
outweighed by the capacity and willingness of our partners to
defeat them.
That sounds grand, and it sounds nebulous, but we are well
on the way of breaking up a global threat, emulsifying it, if
you will, and then focusing in on our partners and allies in
equipping them and ensuring that they are equipped to defeat
the local threat, to keep it contained. That is the strategic
end state. Are we there yet? No, we are not.
But we are making progress as we are engaged throughout the
world and throughout the entire global war on terror.
Mr. Smith. Admiral, General, if either one of you had
anything to add to that?
Admiral Olson. Sir, I think you have honed in very quickly
on the somewhat nebulous nature of irregular warfare. The
desired end state is an environment that is inhospitable to
terrorism and terrorist activity.
And there are different approaches to getting there that
will have different measures of success. Clearly, in terms of
the direct approach, that being disrupting terrorist activity
and preventing the acquisition and use of weapons of mass
destruction, I think the metrics of effectiveness of a
terrorist network clearly would show success.
We are aware of the removal, either by death or capture, of
several of the leaders of al Qaeda in Iraq. We are aware that
their infrastructure has been disrupted to the point that it is
less effective over time.
But the longer-term actions that will ultimately be
decisive in a terrorist campaign, those being partner issues,
nation capacity, an atmosphere, an environment that does not
provide tacit or active support to terrorist activity, the
metrics for those are a little bit, are quite a bit different.
And in some ways, the direct action activities do not support
and in some cases may even work against the metrics of the
indirect approach.
Mr. Smith. Absolutely. Let me take one final stab.
I appreciate your forbearance, Mr. Chairman.
Sort of getting the population on your side is one of the
key parts of irregular warfare. You know then they are
cooperating with you when it is no longer popular to be an
insurgent. You sort of--hearts and minds, not to be cliche. But
that is what we are talking about. And that is where, when I
look at what has happened in Iraq and to a lesser extent in
Afghanistan, I wouldn't be happy with the outcome if I was
you--and I am not happy with the outcome being me--it seems
like we haven't done a lot of, you know, we haven't had a lot
of success in terms of getting the population to believe that
we are the good guys and the guys we are fighting are the bad
guys. And that is where you get into the irregular aspect of
it. That is where you get beyond, okay, there is a bunch of
terrorists, we have to go blow them up; to, how do we work with
the population to get them to see that we are working in a more
positive direction? We haven't been terribly successful at
that. I am going to try one more time to try to drag you into
the specific here because I would think that, given what you do
learning specific lessons from Iraq and Afghanistan, would be
right at the top of the list in understanding how to do better
both there and elsewhere. So in terms of getting the population
to see us as the better, we have not done that very well. What
have we learned in terms of how we can do that better, either
there or elsewhere?
Admiral Olson. I will take that first, sir. I couldn't tell
who you were addressing that to.
Mr. Smith. Any one of the three of you that thinks he has a
good and answer is fine, so.
Admiral Olson. I think the attitude of the people,
particularly in Iraq but not only in Iraq, depends to a large
degree on the stability of the environment in which they live.
The stability of the environment in which they live is
largely determined by the development, the effectiveness of an
Iraqi government, self rule, and the training and effectiveness
of Iraqi police and military units so that they can ensure
stability and safety in the populace.
Those are longer-term efforts than capturing and killing
terrorists. And as those efforts are underway with, in a robust
way with great vigor, we are still in a situation where we need
to capture and kill a certain number of violent extremist
organization leaders.
And I think it is undeniable that the activities in the
direct action approach may work against some of the activities
in the indirect approach and then, therefore, create an
environment that, again, where the metrics of the direct
approach are more easily measurable than the metrics in the
indirect approach.
Clearly, we understand that--the lessons learned are that
stability contributes to success. So the efforts are to create
a stable environment, and that is occurring in many ways.
There are partner nation-building activities across Iraq
and Afghanistan that will ultimately be decisive in the global
war on terror.
Secretary Mancuso. Congressman Smith, I would like to add
something. You described Iraq. In many--first, what I would
like to say is, I am not sure I agree with your assessment of
how the local population feels toward U.S. forces. That is not
to say that the situation is not complex. But I think it is
highly variable depending clearly upon who you talk to and what
part of the country you are in. But in that respect, that
entire debate is off stage left because in terms of an
irregular warfare paradigm, what is most important is not what
the Iraqis think of us but what they think of their own
government, a sovereign government of Iraq that is in the
process of standing up--that has stood up but is in the process
of maturing versus those who would destroy that government. And
I think in this complex battle, it is clear that the Iraqi
people have a greater faith in their government. But to
underscore something that Admiral Olson said, stability is key.
And that is the variable that will be decisive over the longer
term.
And it is our contention that as the government matures, as
it is better able to provide security, that that internal
dynamic between the insurgency and the government to state it
very, very succinctly, that dynamic will improve in favor of a
free, democratic and secure Iraq.
In terms of what we have learned from the dynamic, we
really learned that the world is a complex place; that
irregular warfare clearly favors indirect approaches, which is
precisely why, wherever possible, we work with the host nation.
We work with partner countries because it is their country.
They know it better, and it just works better.
Mr. Saxton. We are going to go to Mr. Hayes in just a
minute, but on the way there, one aspect of indirect warfare is
training people to be our partners. And I wonder if whoever
wants to take this question could just comment on our progress
in carrying out the mission of getting, particularly in Iraq
but perhaps also in Afghanistan, the indigenous people trained
up. We hear numbers. Sometimes we hear some assessments.
What is your assessment of how we are doing with regard to
the Iraqi military and the Iraqi police force?
Secretary Mancuso. Sir, I don't have the most recent
numbers. The last time I checked, the general trend was
positive. It was not going as quickly as we would like, but we
were generally on schedule. I can get back with the specific
response, and we will get numbers to you. And we can take that
for the record.
Admiral Olson. I don't have specific numbers either, but I
think we can generally feel pretty good about the training
activity that is taking place and its effectiveness. I will say
that it may not be going as quickly as we would have hoped, but
I don't think we knew how quickly we should expect it to go.
But we are nonstop working very closely with selected Iraqi
forces and of course, the forces of the Army and the Marine
Corps mostly, but all services are also working with Iraq and
Afghanistan on a much larger scale than we are. It is just a
different segment of the force.
And I think, anecdotally but also measurably, we have
shifted in many areas, many locations, those forces with which
we have worked the longest; we have shifted from leading them
on the target to following them on the target. We have shifted
from planning their operations to watching them plan their own
operations. And so the members of Special Operations--which I
can address specifically--who are out there doing that, they
are proud of what they are doing, and they feel--they believe
that they have good reason to think that the Iraqis in
particular and the Afghanis are showing great success over
time.
General Mannon. Sir, one other lesson that we have learned
that may be a valid point here is the fact that the ability of
the United States Military to train and equip indigenous
forces, that we need the help of the interagency community, and
we outstrip their ability to support us. So that is one of the
lessons that we found and that the Irregular Warfare Roadmap
intends to at least improve on so that we can move forward
faster.
Mr. Saxton. Thank you.
Mr. Hayes.
Mr. Hayes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, thank you for being here.
Admiral, following up on Mr. Smith's question, which was
certainly a good one, could you describe for us the conditions
in Fallujah today and Fallujah a year or 18 months ago? I think
there is dramatic progress that has occurred there. I can't
describe it too accurately, but if you are familiar, status now
versus status back then, Admiral Olson.
Admiral Olson. Sir, I would rather take that for the
record. I haven't been to Fallujah lately. I would be reporting
second- or third-hand information, and therefore, in the in the
interests of being accurate, I would like to confirm that with
people who I think would give a better report.
Mr. Hayes. Fair enough. I don't want to put you on the
spot, but I know there are dramatic changes from--significant
stability has occurred there or is what is happening there
versus the extreme instability not that long ago. It is
difficult--people at home, people in Washington, they want a
yard stick. They want to be able to measure where are we on the
yard stick. It is so hard to do. Again, going forward, people,
even though we here get to see and hear things that are
extremely reassuring, anything you all can do to help us get
the message out clearly and accurately that progress being
made, and it is difficult. You have the challenge of--we don't
do body counts. I think that is wise, but again, kind of a
hypothetical but actual situation when we were in control of
the southern part of Afghanistan; I was over there recently;
been there a number of times. U.S. Forces view the enemy and
General Boykin refers to the enemy as a worldwide insurgency.
It is not just a localized insurgency. What the insurgents have
done against U.S. Forces because of their capabilities is to
embed themselves anywhere they can and hide in the civilian
population; Baghdad, places like that.
Is there a significance to the fact, again looking for a
sign of progress, that once the U.S. Forces turned over that
part of Afghanistan to North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO), all of a sudden the tactics at least temporary changed
where significant forces came out in the open and chose to
engage our coalition partners, NATO, as opposed to really
sticking with the insurgency as long as we were there. That
seems to me to be again a sign of where we are and where we are
going. They have done that. They have been countered
successfully.
Is it positive? Is it constructive? To comment on that,
General Mannon or Admiral Olson.
General Mannon. Sir, in a general statement, I would say
that with regard to your question concerning Afghanistan and
the transition, the enemy has reacted like all enemies during
that transition period and attempted to exploit a perceived
seam. As a result of that, we have had reasonable success in
the--again, not getting to a body count--but in pursuing the
enemy, by supporting our coalition forces through air power,
and we have been able to turn that back around, and we have
also seen some indications at this level that they may be
changing the way in which they want to approach the fight in
Afghanistan.
Mr. Hayes. Admiral Olson, comment, again this is from
having been there with Ray, talking to General Richardson of
NATO, who is anxious to get in the fight; it is good news, want
us to maintain the assets, air, to support them, and they have
done a very good job. Seems like the enemy changed their
tactics. Now they are going back because of the success being
had there, and not to say it is not a tough fight.
Admiral Olson. Sir, the circle of operation against the
terrorist threat is to isolate the threat, defeat the threat
and then prevent the reemergence of that threat. I think we
have been successful in many places in isolating the threat and
defeating the threat where we have isolated it. Preventing the
reemergence of it is a continuous effort. And we will see flare
ups in different regions where we see a reemergence of the
threat which we need to isolate and then defeat it again.
We see that in Anbar province in Iraq. We see it a little
bit in Oruzgan province in Afghanistan. And it is so thus far
that is why I was uncomfortable upfront speaking with
confidence because I don't know exactly where we are in this
reemergence of the threat. When we--when we defeat the threat,
we often don't know that we have defeated it forever.
So it requires continuous pressure in some of these areas.
Obviously, we have reason to feel good about success in
Fallujah today. It is a much more stable environment than it
was a year ago, as you alluded.
What I don't know well enough is what the potential for
reemergence for a threat is in Fallujah and how much we are
going to be able to shift our focus into other regions, sir.
Mr. Hayes. I think I see a red light, Mr. Chairman. Thank
you. I will----
Mr. Saxton. Thank you.
Mr. Larsen.
Mr. Larsen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And Mr. Mancuso, are we going to expect to see in the 2008
budget proposal some language from you all regarding section
1206 and 1208 of title 10?
Secretary Mancuso. We expect that language, yes. The answer
is, yes.
Mr. Larsen. For something more long-term as opposed to, we
usually end up getting filed in appropriations as opposed to
over here in authorization.
Secretary Mancuso. We can get back to you.
Mr. Larsen. But we should expect to see language, some
language?
Secretary Mancuso. 1206 and 1208, that is correct, sir.
Mr. Larsen. Are we also going to see in the 2008 budget
proposal some specific initiatives to reflect the five
principles that are laid out in your testimony, and, Major--I
am sorry, General Mannon's testimony?
Secretary Mancuso. Sir, there are specific initiatives, but
they are internal. Once again, these execution roadmaps are
guidance internal to the Department except with regard to
building partnership capacity, which partly relates to the
Department but more importantly relates outward in the
interagency and multinationally.
But those initiatives will be internal to us.
But the end state will be to improve the capability and the
capacity for us and the interagency----
Mr. Larsen. We will look at the 2008 budget proposal which
is the first year the 2008 to 2013 fit up the year that you
talked about, how are we going to be able to assess next
February when we do the budget whether or not the budget
proposal is reflecting this, reflecting the roadmap?
Secretary Mancuso. Excuse me.
Mr. Larsen. Stop the clock, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Mancuso. I have just been told by my subject
matter expert here--excuse me--what will be reflected is a
request for authority which is what I referenced but not a
request for additional funding. To the extent that IW issues
will be addressed, they will be addressed internally inside the
Department and will not otherwise be reflected in the budget
document.
Mr. Larsen. I understand that, and I guess I will make a
point, Mr. Chairman, that if we are going to continue to show
some interest in this as a committee, we probably want to show
some interest in the internal discussions of the Department to
be sure that stays on track as well and reflective of the kinds
of interest we have here on committee.
The--seems to me, moving forward, on Irregular Warfare
Roadmap, your definitions have to be pretty firm. And General
Mannon, on page 3 of your testimony, on the bottom you say,
increasingly sophisticated irregular methods, such as terrorism
and insurgency, challenge U.S. security interests.
And I guess for you, General, and for you, Admiral, how are
you going to pick which--I had a couple of questions. How do we
pick which terrorists to engage? How do we pick which
insurgencies to care about? And are you going to aggressively
fight within the DOD bureaucracy to ensure that we have an
accurate definition of what a terrorist is and what an
insurgency is, because not all terrorists are insurgents and
not all insurgents are terrorists? And it seems to me the
definition of what these folks are will have a very important
impact on what you do and where we send you.
General, you are first. I will decide for you.
General Mannon. Thank you. Sir, we have, for approximately
4 months now since the roadmap was signed and released with the
proposed definition, we have worked between SOCOM, the
Interagency and Office of the Secretary of Defense to address
where to put our efforts, our priority of efforts based on
intelligence assessments as well as operational assessments of
how to tie all the proper pieces together, the various
interagency pieces, to go forward and to take our limited
assets and put them where they need to be placed.
So we are not completely there yet, but we have made some
reasonable progress in my estimation with regard to a listing
of or a priority of effort in various areas of the world as
well as various organizations.
Mr. Larsen. Admiral, do you have any comments with regard
to how we define, how we put a definition on these two terms?
Or are there other terms we may use when we make decisions
about where we send our folks?
Admiral Olson. Sir, the terms are being defined. Some of
them are doctrinally defined already. Terms like irregular
warfare, we have a working definition; I assume that that or
something very close to it will become the doctrinal definition
before long.
In the meantime, we have a fairly sophisticated process for
rank ordering, you know, the priority of efforts for the
Department of Defense with respect to the global war on terror.
Under the global war on terror campaign plan, there is a
complex matrix by which countries, regions are identified for
resourcing efforts, some of them because they are nations with
adversaries, some because they are partner nations with which
we want to develop a stronger relationship and build more
capacity.
This list is recommended by Special Operations Command
through the Joint Staffs of the Department of Defense for
approval. And once that list is approved, then it becomes a
factor in prioritizing the resourcing effort.
I feel pretty good about the level of sophistication of the
list. I feel pretty good about the fidelity of the list. I feel
pretty good about how much in concert that list seems to be
within DOD and across the interagency environment. And it is a
driver for application of resources in 2008 and beyond.
Mr. Larsen. Mr. Chairman, if I could make two points and
conclude time. Thank you.
The first point I want to make is with regards to Iraq. It
seems the terms terrorist and insurgents get interchanged quite
a bit. And the insurgency is something that is very much
homegrown. The terrorism is something that is very much the
foreign fighter. They may use the same tactics, but their goals
end up being very different. And how we approach them may be
the same, but they have very different goals in mind, and so
what we end up doing with them in the end may have an impact on
what happens in Iraq, good or bad. I am just trying to make a
point that we have to be discerning in how we approach these.
And I want to hear from you that we are being discerning.
The second point I want to make about the government in
Iraq is that, yes, there are folks who want to take that
government down, including some of the people in the
government. This whole fight over federalism in Iraq is in part
a fight about whether or not to have a centralized government
in Iraq or to have three governments in Iraq. And we are
spending, our military is spending time in Iraq keeping the
country from falling apart, and our State Department is
spending all this time trying to keep that government together
in one piece. And that is where we are spending so much time
focusing on those things that we can't focus on getting the
other things done in Iraq that we need to get done.
General Mannon. Congressman Larsen, let me make explicit
what I hope was implicit: We are discerning in terms of our
strategies with respect to sort of the homegrown component of
the insurgency versus al Qaeda-affiliated, for lack of a better
term, terrorists.
And that clearly is fully accounted for. We think about it
all the time.
Mr. Saxton. Thank you. I haven't asked my questions yet,
but, Gene, if you want to go ahead; I am going to be a bit
longer, so why don't you go ahead.
Mr. Taylor. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chairman, I want to thank our witnesses.
Couple of things I would like clarification from,
particularly since one of the many things our special operators
do is understand the hearts and minds of people who are on our
side, the people who might be on our side and the people who
aren't on our side.
And I think it is kind of in the lessons learned category
not only for this conflict but for future conflicts. Let's
start with the palaces. I have had a special operator tell me
early on that he just thought that the American occupation of
the palaces was just incredibly counterproductive; that those
palaces had come to be associated with evil because they were
part of the Hussein network. And when you move into that
palace, you get associated with that evil. And as you think
about it, as we watched the polling shift of the Iraqis coming
to think of us at first as liberators but then later on as
occupiers, to what extent does the occupation by General Casey
of the water palace and I guess the 4th Infantry Division (ID)
from time to time has stayed at the palace up near the River,
and other military units in the palaces, what does that do
presently? Or is there something I am missing? Is it sending a
message that we are in control here, and we are going to occupy
any place we want? Or is there something subliminal there that
I'm missing because I see it as counterproductive.
Second part is Abu Ghraib. I remember when our Nation
happily produced Zogby polls, professional pollster that showed
that the Iraqis overwhelmingly were in favor of the American
presence there.
Somewhere around December of 2004, we quit getting those
polls. And I remember asking when I was in Baghdad, and I
believe the chairman was with me, January of 2005, hadn't seen
those polls for a while, what is the number? And they were kind
of sheepish around the table and finally someone said, 80
percent. I said, damn, we are still running at 80 percent
favorable, and he said, no, 80 percent unfavorable. The
timeline, if I recall, the information about Abu Ghraib came
out around Spring of 2004, so this would have been a good 12
months after that or close to it.
Again, am I missing something? Because I would think that
what happened there was counterproductive, or is there
something about the minds of the folks in that part of the
world where it actually helped our case to do that. I am asking
this in the form of a question because, to a certain extent,
that is kind of the debate that is going on on the House floor
today.
I don't give a flip about terrorists. I don't give a flip
about enemies of the United States, but I realize each of you
people in uniform is a potential prisoner; that something could
go wrong, and you could get captured. And I sure as heck
wouldn't want any of you mistreated or held to a lower standard
because of what is happening or what is perceived is happening.
And so these are very sincere questions. Am I missing
something? Do we gain any sort of advantage by being in the
water palace? Did what happened at Abu Ghraib in any way help
our case? And to what extent do the conventional forces, if the
answer to the first thing is counterproductive, to what extent
is the regular force listening? And to what extent do we see to
it that that mistake is not made again?
Secretary Mancuso. Sir, I will start with your last
question first. We are all listening. We understand that--and I
started my comments by saying the global war on terror is an
irregular war in a fundamental sense. Well, the war in Iraq is
irregular in the sense that it is about all instruments of
national power, including for example, information.
And so starting with the fact that we are all listening, I
would like to say, of course, instances--well, real or
perceived instances of abuse that were contrary to policy by
individual soldiers, clearly that did not help us, and in fact,
it hurt. But at the same time, the many instances of good work
done by the large majority of our forces every day in multiple
parts of the world including Iraq and all parts of Iraq, that
also counts for something. I can't gauge the precise impact,
what the tradeoff is, but there is no doubt in my mind that
those specific instances hurt us but also that the incredible
good that our forces are doing and doing every day in Iraq help
us, and thank goodness for them.
With respect to your question about occupying the palaces,
I would be in no position to assess. I think that is certainly
an important point to consider.
Mr. Taylor. If I may, sir, in fairness, and again, I walked
in kind of late, but I take it that you are a political
appointee who is responsible for that segment of the United
States Military.
Secretary Mancuso. I am a political appointee responsible
for the Special Operations and combating terrorism.
Mr. Taylor. There may be instances where the only U.S.
troops who are sent somewhere will be special operators, future
conflict. So if a future conflict comes along and a likely
place to billet special operators is the palace, what do you
tell those guys? Because I think we have made a blunder. I
didn't think of this, but the guy who brought it to my
attention made a pretty convincing argument that moving into
those palaces was a blunder. I have come to agree with that. So
are we learning anything?
If the only people dispatched to an area are special
operators, therefore, they would be under your direction, what
would you tell them?
Secretary Mancuso. Well, what I would say is this: First of
all, I recognize that there might be severe policy and
strategic impacts to operational decisions. Clearly, there is
no question but that that is true. And with respect to your
example of palaces, in general, do I think that is likely a bad
idea? Probably. But there are operational tradeoffs that a
bureaucrat essentially sitting in Washington is frankly not
empowered to make in the sense that I don't have entire
situational awareness.
Now while I would say, in general, that is a bad idea to
sit in a palace, if there is a commander on the ground that has
a full battle picture and has to make a tradeoff between bad
optics versus bad security, that is a decision that I think we
owe to our troops on the ground.
I was prior service; I am actually a combat veteran of Iraq
myself. We had a dictum when I was a soldier: Mission first,
people always. And as a bureaucrat sitting in Washington, while
I can generally agree with the optics piece, I would not feel
comfortable telling that on-the-ground commander to make that
tradeoff from Washington.
Mr. Saxton. Gene, we are going to have votes between
quarter of and 4.
Admiral Olson. Can I quickly address that question? I can
address it solely as Special Operations Command, and it is all
right for special operators not to occupy palaces but to live,
eat, breath, work with the local populations in which they
serve. And as I have traveled around the theater, I have
visited Special Operations Forces in a number of remote
outposts where they are the only Americans for miles around and
where they are sharing their compounds with their Iraqi or
Afghan counterparts. Many of these are in high-risk locations,
and as they are defending against mortar attacks each night,
they are out each day building bridges across rivers and
building schools and broadcasting on radio stations that they
man themselves and running patrols to ensure the security of
their compound along the way.
I visited one palace occupied by Special Operations
soldiers. It was in a corner of Baghdad and a corner of the
Baghdad international airport. It is a palace that was occupied
because it was the highest terrain around, and in an unstable
environment, it was the best place from which to defend
oneself, and a couple miles down the road from that compound,
most of the forces assigned to that mission are living and
working with their Iraqi counterparts, the Iraqi special
operations forces and operating with them each night, coming
back and eating with them in their chow halls.
I don't think we in Special Operations would consider
occupying a compound to be a wise move. It may be the
operationally sound move for a period of time. It may be the
expedient move for security, but the goal will always be to
move out of the palaces and be out with the people. That is how
Special Operations typically works, sir.
Mr. Saxton. Thank you, Admiral.
Mr. Secretary, I believe--and I believe that perhaps you
believe as well--that irregular warfare will be the dominant or
at least one of the dominant forms of conflict for the
foreseeable future. Assuming that we are successful in dealing
with al Qaeda, what do you see our Nation facing in terms of
continued irregular warfare threats?
Secretary Mancuso. Mr. Chairman, when we talk about
irregular warfare, we often think in terms of terrorist
networks and that is clearly the most urgent, pressing
manifestation of the problem. But irregular warfare is not
limited to non-state adversaries in terms of using it. States,
hostile states in some instances, hostile states armed with
nuclear weapons or WMDs, rather, more generally could use
irregular warfare against us, and so the United States not only
has, in my view, not only has to be in a position to defend
against irregular warfare used by non-state actors; we also
have to be in a position to defend against irregular warfare
used by states and be able to counter and use irregular warfare
consistent with international law and U.S. law against both
non-state actors and state actors as well.
Mr. Saxton. I assume that you are thinking of Iran and
Hezbollah.
Secretary Mancuso. Sir, I wasn't actually thinking of any
particular country but countries that are hostile to the United
States, particularly countries that might have weapons of mass
destruction or intentions of having weapons of mass
destruction, IW may give us more strategic choices and flex in
terms of how we might deal with them.
Mr. Saxton. Mr. Secretary, you described the need for an
all-out government effort, not just a military approach. How
are we coordinating a truly national effort in conducting
irregular warfare in order to comply with all forms of national
power at this time?
Secretary Mancuso. Very aggressively. We are--first of all,
the Department of Defense recognizes--and I said this on my
testimony, sir, and I will reiterate it because it is such an
important point--that, in most instances, the lion's share of
the burden in terms of irregular warfare is not uniquely
military; it is other. It is information, diplomacy. It is the
other elements of national power. And what we at the Department
of Defense recognize is that it is incumbent upon us to work
with our interagency partners and with our partners and allies
throughout the world to develop their capacity along with their
instruments of national power to get the job done.
This is manifested concretely in things like the National
Intelligence Priorities Framework (NIPF). It is manifested
concretely in interagency working groups. We haven't mastered
the puzzle yet. We don't have the answer. We have recognized
the problem, and we are moving with all deliberate speed to
implement the right solution.
But our institutional plumbing, Mr. Chairman, as you know
very well, wasn't geared to addressing these kinds of threats,
and so right now we are in the process of having--sort of
changing our plumbing, if you will, being able to face all of
the threats and being able to hedge against uncertainty in a
national security environment across--interagency and with our
partners and allies.
Mr. Saxton. You mentioned in that answer building partner
capacity a couple of times. Can you describe the linkage
between the Irregular Warfare Roadmap and Building Partner
Capacity Roadmap?
Secretary Mancuso. We think about it inside the Department
of Defense, sir, as sort of opposite sides of the same coin but
I would like to define what I mean by building partnership
capacity and what we more generally understand.
When we talk in terms of building partnership capacity, it
at the most basic level means developing the capacity of our
partners to do discrete tasks, but there is also a second and
perhaps more important sense that we talk about building
partnership capacity; that is in terms of not just building the
capacity of our partners to do things but to build the capacity
of the partnership, relationships with our partners and allies
throughout the world. And that is what we are focused on.
So, in the Department of Defense, when we work with our
partners and allies, of course, we are focused on transferring
skill sets because we want to empower them to do things that we
would otherwise be called to do and out of the fact that we are
mindful that terrorism is a collective threat and they
themselves in their societies are under siege as well.
But we also remember as we migrate these skill sets, we are
also mindful of the fact that, as we do that, we are building
relationships which institutionally over time will make us much
more effective in the global war on terror, and we have
certainly seen tremendous progress on that front as well.
In terms of numbers, in terms of when we ask about discrete
things, what are we doing in different countries? That is an
important part of the question, but the other part is, how are
we getting along, if you will? How are we developing more
organic relationships? And we are working on that, too, and
that is critically important.
Mr. Saxton. Let me ask you this, let me put it this way, we
have relationships with Saudi Arabia. We have relationships
with Bahrain, Qatar, United Arab Emerate (UAE), Egypt. Let me
ask you this, did the statement made by the Iranian president
recently that--or was it the Hezbollah leader--that they are
next going to concentrate on posing threats to Israel and the
Gulf states, and does that create an opportunity for us to
change or to enhance our partnerships with some countries?
Secretary Mancuso. Well, we certainly think that, as the
rest of the world, particularly in the Middle East, recognizes
that this threat is not unique to the United States, that it is
in fact a threat shared across cultures, across geographies,
that any opportunity, particularly a statement to that effect--
I am not quite sure which statement specifically you are
referring to--that might underscore the fact that the threat is
collective, that creates opportunities for us; opportunities to
work together with other countries in the region and
opportunities to ensure that we build a kind of better
ecosystem, better partnership to combat terrorism.
Mr. Saxton. I believe the statement I was referring may
have been Nazrallah, and he said, we are next going to attack
Israel and the Gulf states. When I saw that headline, I
thought, what an opportunity to create and enhance
relationships with Gulf states in particular.
Secretary Mancuso. Mr. Chairman, I would not want to get
into sort of classified information, but what I would suggest
is a statement to that effect is likely not an effective growth
strategy for Hezbollah.
Mr. Saxton. Admiral, you offered a definition of irregular
warfare as a form of warfare that focuses on undermining or
subverting the credibility, legitimacy of a political authority
in question. How would you define the political authority that
we are combating in the global war on terror?
Admiral Olson. Sir, the working definition of irregular
warfare was a definition arrived at by a committee approved by
the Deputy Secretary of Defense. I think that irregular warfare
best describes the actions that we are countering, but we have
applied it to use those counteractions themselves and lumped it
all under the term irregular warfare, which can both be
offensive and defensive under the new definition. I think the
irregular warfare that is taking place in Iraq is clearly
trying to counter the emergence of a legitimate government in
Iraq; same thing in Afghanistan. Our efforts to counter those
irregular warfare activities against those governments are also
irregular warfare activities.
Mr. Saxton. Were you going to say something?
I have no more questions.
At this point I want to thank you for being here. We are
going to have a series of votes here very soon. I want to just
say that the definition of progress for all of us is different,
and we believe that the changes that--I believe, I don't speak
for others, that the changes that SOCOM has made and the
understandings it has developed in how to fight an irregular
war are very significant pieces of progress and I want to thank
you for, each of you, for your leadership and what you do. You
are performing a great service to our country in a very
difficult time and thank you for being here today. Thank you.
[Whereupon, at 4 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
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A P P E N D I X
September 27, 2006
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
September 27, 2006
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SMITH
Mr. Smith. Focus on the progress piece of that; where we are making
very, very good progress, that would be a good place to go for metrics.
What is the metrics of your assessment of that progress? Where is it
that this is getting better? What is the progress you discussed
specifically?
Secretary Mancuso. The Department of Defense (DOD) has developed an
assessment process to measure progress in the global war on terror
(GWOT). The purpose of the assessment is to examine the efficacy of
DOD's strategy for prosecuting the GWOT.
The GWOT Assessment is a measurement tool comprised of discrete
metrics, which are derived from the six military strategic objectives
for the GWOT, outlined in the National Military Strategic Plan for the
war on terror.
The six military strategic objectives are:
Deny terrorist the resources they need to operate and
survive
Enable partner nations to counter terrorism
Deny WMD/E proliferation, recover and eliminate
uncontrolled materials, and maintain capacity for consequence
management
Defeat terrorists and their organizations
Counter state and non-state support for terrorism in
coordination with other US government agencies and partner nations
Contribute to the establishment of conditions that
counter ideological support for terrorism
The DOD develops GWOT action plans to address shortfalls derived
from the assessments findings. Currently there are 25 GWOT Action
Plans, which track the progress of policy, legislative and resourcing
issues and identify factors that inhibit the successful prosecution of
the GWOT.
In addition to this testimony, DOD is in the process of preparing a
formal GWOT Assessment for Congress. This assessment is due March 1,
2007.
In regard to Iraq, specific metrics are being developed, in line
with the President's strategy, to measure the performance of the Iraqi
military and government. The military commitments will make up the
initial assessment of Iraqi performance and its ability to reduce the
cycle of violence. Included in the security assessment will be Measures
of Effectiveness (MOEs) focusing on political and economic progress.