

[H.A.S.C. No. 109-88]

**THE ARMY'S M1114 UP-ARMOR HIGH MO-  
BILITY MULTIPURPOSE WHEELED VEHI-  
CLE (UAH) DISTRIBUTION STRATEGY**

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HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES  
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES  
ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

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HEARING HELD  
OCTOBER 20, 2005



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HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS

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# CONTENTS

## CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS

2005

	Page
HEARING:	
Thursday, October 20, 2005, The Army's M1114 Up-Armor High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (UAH) Distribution Strategy .....	1
APPENDIX:	
Thursday, October 20, 2005 .....	35

### THURSDAY, OCTOBER 20, 2005

#### THE ARMY'S M1114 UP-ARMOR HIGH MOBILITY MULTIPURPOSE WHEELED VEHICLE (UAH) DISTRIBUTION STRATEGY

##### STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

Hunter, Hon. Duncan, a Representative from California, Chairman, Committee on Armed Services .....	1
Skelton, Hon. Ike, a Representative from Missouri, Ranking Member, Committee on Armed Services .....	3

##### WITNESSES

Cody, Gen. Richard A., Vice Chief of Staff, U.S. Army .....	6
Harvey, Hon. Francis J., Secretary of the Army .....	4

##### APPENDIX

PREPARED STATEMENTS:	
Hunter, Hon. Duncan .....	39
DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD:	
Force XXI Battle Command, Brigade-and-Below (FBCB2) .....	59
Information Paper, Providing Force Protection Capability to Iraq: 4th Infantry Division Up Armored HMMWV (UAH) Flow to Iraq .....	66
Slides presented by General Cody .....	47
Timeline for Vehicle Allocation in Theater .....	52
U.S. Casualty Status .....	61
United States Marine Corps 90 Day Casualty Report .....	58
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD:	
[There were no Questions submitted.]	



**THE ARMY'S M1114 UP-ARMOR HIGH MOBILITY MULTI-PURPOSE WHEELED VEHICLE (UAH) DISTRIBUTION STRATEGY**

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HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,  
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,  
*Washington, DC, Thursday, October 20, 2005.*

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 9 a.m., in room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Duncan Hunter (chairman of the committee) presiding.

**OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. DUNCAN HUNTER, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM CALIFORNIA, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES**

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

This morning, the committee continues its ongoing review of Operation Iraqi Freedom and force protection issues. For the past two years, we have had, as one of our highest priorities, the timely provision of adequately armored tactical vehicles to our men and women in combat.

Today we will address a directly related issue having to do with the Army's distribution policy for new production, M1114 up-armored Humvees. The committee must fully understand the rationale behind the Army's tactical vehicle distribution policy that calls for the delivery, beginning in late July of this year, of new production up-armored Humvees to the fourth infantry division, currently based in Fort Hood, Texas, while there exists an immediate need for the vehicles in United States central command Theater of Operations, particularly in Iraq.

With us today to examine these issues are two distinguished public servants representing the U.S. Army, the Honorable Francis J. Harvey, Secretary of the Army, and General Richard A. Cody, Vice Chief of Staff of the Army. Gentlemen, thanks for being with us this morning. We thank you for your service to our country and it is good to see you both again.

This committee established force protection, and specifically, the adequacy of tactical-wheeled vehicle protection as a high priority area of interest and concern. This marks another hearing in a continuing series of hearings and briefings the committee has held on force protection issues.

At issue today is whether the best armor solution is being provided to the warfighters who are fully engaged against a very adaptive enemy. Terrorists continue to employ roughly 30 daily IEDs, or improvised explosive device attacks against our troops in Iraq. Until we have a better solution, adding armor to our military

vehicles and expediting new armored vehicles to theater appears to be our best course of action to protect our troops.

Our troops deserve nothing less than the best possible protection. And they need to know that not only is the best equipment being provided to them, but it is being done in a timely manner. And that brings us to the focus of today's hearing.

Why is a division that is still based here in the United States and not scheduled to complete deployment to theater until after the first of next calendar year receiving 824 new production up-armored Humvees while there remains an immediate need in theater for these vehicles for both the Army and the Marine Corps? I understand the Marines have an up-armored Humvee requirement of 2,814, but only have 744 of these vehicles on-hand in Iraq, just over 25 percent of the requirement. I also understand that the Army has fulfilled its theater requirement for up-armored Humvees, yet the third ID, the division taking most of the Army casualties in Iraq, has less than 20 percent of this total requirement.

In addition, the Army is still operating with close to 1,800 Humvees that have only level III protection. It would appear that there are immediate tactical vehicle armor needs that warrant a more immediate response. Units in theater have indicated a need for a level I armor solution. While we continue to emphasize parallel efforts for rapid development in fielding the systems to counter IEDs and persistent surveillance solutions, we must maintain a high priority of fielding the up-armored Humvees to protect our warfighters.

We need to better understand why the Army has a policy that does not appear to be meeting the objective in the most timely possible manner.

So Secretary Harvey and General Cody, we look forward to hearing your assessment of the rationale behind the current M1114 up-armored Humvee distribution plan.

And what I would like to do is direct our witnesses in the committee to the Army plan. In fact, maybe we could move that chart up here to where the witnesses can see it. I don't know if you see the Army, the Army plan that has got the arrows it is over to the left of the room.

Basically what that shows is that we have had three tranches of Humvees, of up-armored Humvees, which is considered to be the gold standard for protection, troop protection. Turn it a little bit this way so members can see it also.

You had, in July, some 75 M1114s moving not to Iraq, but to Fort Hood. In August, 319 of the same up-armored Humvees moving not to Iraq but to Fort Hood, and in September, 430 Humvees moving not to Iraq, but to Fort Hood. Now understanding that the fourth ID is going to Iraq, we understand that at some point, those vehicles are going to be married up with the personnel of the fourth infantry division when they get to the theater after the first of the year. Nonetheless, it appears that there is a fairly substantial delay for the first tranche, much more than the last tranche, but a 5-month delay for the 75 Humvees going to Iraq.

There is approximately a 4-month delay for the second tranche of 319 Humvees which are built, completed, manufactured, and

here in the States, and in September, 430 Humvees delivered not to Iraq, but to Fort Hood. That is approximately a 3-month delay.

Now, understanding that at some point, those are going to be married up with fourth ID troops, when the fourth ID is totally deployed to Iraq after the first of the year, the question that the committee has, gentlemen, is why couldn't we be utilizing those up-armored Humvees, which are considered to be the gold standard in protection for our troops, why couldn't they be in theater now?

Now, I understand that the Army has stated that they need to do C4ISR upgrades, so-called blue force tracking primarily and put those systems in those up-armored Humvees. Our staff in being briefed on this by the Army has been instructed that this takes about one to two days to put a blue force tracking system in place. That doesn't explain, gentlemen, or take a big piece of these four—three-, four- and five-month delays of these fairly significant numbers of up-armored Humvees going to troops who don't have them in theater, and are having to use level II and level III armor on a daily basis.

So gentlemen, thank you for being with us. We think this is an important issue. And I am concerned that this is going to become a—that this holding armor back and moving it into theater with forces is going to end up becoming the standard method of delivering armor and troops to theater.

So we look forward to your testimony today. And before we do that, let me turn to my partner on the committee, the very distinguished gentleman from Missouri, Mr. Skelton, for any remarks he would like to make.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Hunter can be found in the Appendix on page 39.]

**STATEMENT OF HON. IKE SKELTON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM MISSOURI, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES**

Mr. SKELTON. Senator Harvey, General Cody, welcome. We thank you for being with us. This is a very important hearing. And Mr. Chairman, let me commend you for calling this hearing. I agree with you that no issue is more important to our committee than ensuring our soldiers in Iraq have all the force protection equipment that they need, and I share your concern about the Army's distribution strategy on this issue.

Although I understand the Army's desire to have the 4th infantry division trained on the equipment they will be fighting, I am troubled by the decision to detour the M1114 up-armored Humvees to Texas instead of sending them to Iraq as soon as possible. I look forward to hearing the Army's explanation for this decision. Even more importantly, however, I look forward to hearing how the Army plans to get the highest quality armored vehicles to our troops as fast as possible in the future.

Today in Iraq, 95 percent of all vehicles have either level I armor straight from the factory, or level II armor kits. Although our level II armor kits seem to be working and are providing good protection, they have been put on Humvees that weren't built to that their weight. These vehicles are wearing down rapidly. And I believe the Army should commit now to replace high mileage level II

Humvees in Iraq with new up-armored vehicles thus requiring continuing production in a high rate and perhaps even increasing production of up-armored Humvees for at least the next year, or maybe longer.

We have seen several times in last two years where the Army has allowed up-armored Humvee production and armored kit production slow down when it appeared their requirements were being close to being met. Let's not make that mistake again. I am encouraged that the Army is moving toward a new version of the up-armored Humvee called the M-1151, whose design the Government will own. The Army will be able to produce M-1151s faster than they have been able to do so with the M1114 by diversifying suppliers.

Now as I stated at our last hearing, gentlemen, on armored vehicles, I also believe we need to think about now about getting beyond the Humvee to tactical vehicles designed for the kind of fights we are currently engaged in. I understand that next year the Army will host a demonstration day for industry to show what kind of tactical wheeled vehicles they can produce with today's technology. Vehicles that are designed for light combat from the ground up with V shaped hulls, and integrated armor will protect our soldiers, I think, even better. I urge the Army to continue with its plan for an industry demonstration date. I hope you will notify Congress of that when it comes to pass.

I know that the Army leadership is dedicated to its soldiers and wants to protect them. We here on this committee are no less committed to this effort as evidenced by the hearings and the questions we put to previous witnesses before today.

We can only help when we are informed of Army decisions in time. My view on this issue such as today's is where we have expressed great interest over and over again. Early communication—I will repeat that again—early communication with us is a mandate. It is not just a mere courtesy. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank the gentleman.

Again, gentlemen, thank you for being with us this morning to talk about this important issue. Secretary Harvey, the floor is yours sir.

**STATEMENT OF HON. FRANCIS J. HARVEY, SECRETARY OF  
THE ARMY**

Secretary HARVEY. Chairman Hunter, Congressman Skelton and members of the committee, General Cody and I are here today to discuss the Army's efforts to provide the Marines with M1114 up-armored Humvees.

The CHAIRMAN. Secretary Harvey, without objection, your total written statement will be taken into the record as will General Cody's, so feel free to depart from it if you want to and the written statement will be in the record.

Secretary HARVEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. As I said, we are here today to discuss the Army's efforts to provide the Marines with M1114 up-armored Humvees while simultaneously upgrading the Army's 4th infantry division M1114s with communication equipment that significantly improves soldiers' situational awareness, combat effectiveness and fratricide prevention.



In a classified letter to you, Mr. Chairman, dated September 22, General Cody explained the joint Army, Marine Corps plans for M1114 production and allocation to meet the immediate needs of both services.

While I am limited in the details, I can provide in this unclassified forum, the plan agreed upon in July of 2005 allows the Marine Corps to meet its M1114 requirements in April 2006, and the Army to meet its M1114 requirements 16 months later in July of 2007.

Under this joint Army-Marine Corps agreement, the 824 up-armored Humvees allocated to the Army would first be sent to Fort Hood to install the 4th infantry division's version of the battle command system in the vehicles prior to deployment.

The installation of this equipment at Fort Hood was deemed to be a much more efficient and effective way of adding this critical situational awareness combat effectiveness and fratricide prevention technology.

More specifically, the hardware systems knowledge, and technical expertise are all located at Fort Hood.

Doing this upgrade at home station takes about 14 days versus an estimated 60 days it would take to do the work in Kuwait. That 14 days is effective, is efficient, and well worth the time it takes to give our soldiers the best equipment available.

Furthermore, doing the work at Fort Hood enhances training by allowing soldiers in units to work with the equipment prior to deployment while ample training and technical support is available.

Once units arrive in theater, they can immediately begin training in Kuwait rather than devote critical time to installing the battle command system.

The Army did not act in a vacuum. Three star representatives from the Army, Marine Corps and joint staff approved this plan of action in July of 2005. And this plan was further coordinated and approved by commanders in the field. The services revised the overall allocation to accelerate delivery of up-armored Humvees to the Marine Corps at the same time as well.

Work on equipping the Army's 824 up-armored Humvees is already far along, and we are ahead of scheduled as described in the same classified letter to you, Mr. Chairman. All 824 have been delivered to Fort Hood. Work has been completed on the majority of vehicles and more than half have already been shipped to Kuwait. The remainder will depart for Kuwait by November 1st.

In closing, let me reiterate, there is nothing more important than protecting the service men and women we send daily into harm's way.

The Army is totally committed to providing the highest level of protection to include fielding a fleet of level I Humvees in theater, and we have made these decisions in full coordination with the Marine Corps and the joint staff.

Thank you. Before we answer your questions, General Cody will make a few remarks.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. Go right ahead, General.

**STATEMENT OF GEN. RICHARD A. CODY, VICE CHIEF OF  
STAFF, U.S. ARMY**

General CODY. Thank you, Chairman Hunter, Congressman Skelton, members of the committee. Thank you for this opportunity to speak to you and provide you an update of our progress of equipment to protect our soldiers. On behalf of our Army Chief of Staff, who is traveling right now in Europe Pete Schoomaker, and the 612,000 soldiers we have on active duty today, active guard reserve in over 120 countries, of which 150,000 are serving in harm's way in Afghanistan and Iraq, let me offer a sincere thank you to this committee for your commitment in investing to the welfare of our men and women in uniform.

Our soldiers know and appreciate the support of this committee to provide them the mission of essential equipment they need to prosecute and win this Global War on Terror.

In 2003, as we transitioned from a conventional combat force to reconstruction security operation in irregular warfare, we knew we faced substantial requirements to acquire a variety of equipment to ensure the safety and effectiveness of our soldiers not just the up-armored Humvees. And as we managed the 17 brigade combat team force in Iraq and Afghanistan for Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) 1, OIF 2, OIF 3, and now the fourth rotation as well as seven National Guard brigades that we had to fully equip with front line equipment, the Army has been in a rapid fielding, equipping and managing assets of organizational equipment in combat with the priority there first and then back here for the next uptrained units.

Because of these resource challenges that we experienced in our investment accounts during the 1990's not every unit was equipped to the necessary level. We are now rapidly closing that gap and must bear in mind the need to stay ready for future commitments by continuing to invest in the modernization of our Army. Our soldiers deserve no less, and I know this committee is committed to it.

I just recapped on this chart up here to my right what this committee has enabled us to do, and what we have done for our soldiers to put it in context. We know the story of the soldiers' body armor. From the base line of September of 2003. We now have over 520,000 sets as well as the deltoid protectors.

We know where we were with the IED jammers when this war started, and we now have over 21,000 IED jammers down range and more to follow. And there is not a single jammer back here in the States. We are pushing them all forward, which is an interesting point because right now we are getting some criticism and some discussion about why don't you keep some jammers back here in the states to train with because of the complexity of it, and we have made this commitment to send every one of them downrange to do that because we are short jammers.

Likewise, we had no tactical or small Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) in theater in September of 2003. We now have over 155. We have had to buy back the aircraft survivability equipment for our aircraft, and we are doing that as well as buy back our ammo production so that we could not only fight this war, but train our soldiers on each one of those rotations we talked about so we can

get ready for the next war, and then, of course, the commitment in this committee and Army to buy all the shortages of radios.

So it is about humvees, but it is about a bunch of other ready equipment that we had to buy back. And we appreciate the support of this committee. And I look forward to discussing in detail the charts that you passed out, chairman, that is labeled the Army plan, because quite frankly, that is not the Army plan. And we thank you for your support.

The CHAIRMAN. Okay, I thank you, General Cody.

General Cody and Mr. Secretary, what you have labeled the Army plan is precisely what we were informed from the Army were the delivery schedules of the Humvees, and let's walk that down. If we are wrong, I want you to show us.

General CODY. Okay.

The CHAIRMAN. The 75 Humvees were delivered to Fort Hood in July; is that accurate?

General CODY. What I have—and I just came from Fort Hood, and I believe—throw the chart up of flow of up-armored Humvees to Fort Hood. What I have here is a copy of the fourth infantry division of every Humvee that came in and when it came in and for what unit. So side by side, I think if you aggregate what you have there on the left on your slide, those numbers may be close. What I disagree with, and I think is not accurately portrayed, is the arrows that say 5-month delays. If you take a look at the first two units—

The CHAIRMAN. But let's walk through this first, General Cody. We will do it piece by piece and we will give you an opportunity to disagree with that delay. I want to go to the arrival dates first because that is the key date. So in the aggregate, 75 Humvees did arrive, up-armored Humvees did arrive in July at Fort Hood.

General CODY. I am showing 35, for the support troops and for the division headquarters.

The CHAIRMAN. When did the others come in?

General CODY. We had 14 in 22 August, 36 by 22 August and then the largest traunch came in 22 September, 157 for the second brigade combat team, 83 on 26 September for aviation brigade, 157 on 9 October for the third brigade, the fires brigade got 42 on 10 October. The fourth brigade got 157 in 11 October. And then the last brigade, which is first brigade, which is the last one deployed, got another 157 on 18 October. And then across the line, you will see that those numbers I just read, those that arrived on the end of July were shipped 10 August.

They went through the Central Technical Support Facility (CTSF), had the stuff put on, and that was the command and control vehicles and the forward, what we called the advanced party of the division headquarters that is in Kuwait now moving towards—and some were in Iraq doing the battle handover.

The CHAIRMAN. How many of those—

General CODY. 35 shipped in 10 August, first 35.

The CHAIRMAN. So how many Humvees are in Kuwait out of those 824?

General CODY. I think over 400 right now. Over 400, and the last 157 will be shipped November 1st.

The CHAIRMAN. Okay, so—

General CODY. I guess what I am telling you is those arrows may be—the months may be okay, in the aggregate it doesn't project the true picture of how they flowed in because they didn't all flow in in September. Four hundred and thirty didn't flow in in September, 319 didn't flow in August. These things were echeloned in based upon the production rate and based upon what they needed and how—what the throughput was through the CTSF at Fort Hood, and then they were quickly given to the unit, tested, and then put on boats at Beaumont and shipped. And it was based upon the—

The CHAIRMAN. General Cody, we did do these three arrows in the aggregate.

Now you may have tranches of 5 and 10 and 15 and 20 vehicles. But if you didn't have—75 vehicles did not arrive in July, I want to know how many vehicles did arrive in July? Because we got these numbers from the Army.

General CODY. Thirty-five vehicles which arrived at Fort Hood on 28 July.

The CHAIRMAN. I have got your distribution picture right here.

General CODY. This is from the fourth infantry Marine—

The CHAIRMAN. I am reading this picture to you as of 24 August. This is what your people sent over to us. It says in August, 319 Humvees.

General CODY. That is a production chart. That was not what arrived. This is what the division command received on the ground at Fort Hood.

The CHAIRMAN. So these were—so this was labeled the level I Humvee Distribution Plan. It said that as of—in August, you had 319 Humvees produced for distribution.

It said in July, and I will send it down to you, you had 75, and in September you had 430.

Now, this is against—so you did—so the numbers that we have taken have been taken off the distribution sheet that you folks, your shop, delivered to us. And it says, as of 24 August, 2005. So you may—

General CODY. If you read that chart, it will tell you the fourth ID C4ISR requirement 75 in July. What was delivered in July was 35. And this is a distribution plan based upon the requirement. And you can see that those are large numbers. That is not how they flowed.

The CHAIRMAN. Okay. Have all of the Humvees now been delivered?

General CODY. Yes. They are all at Fort Hood and most of them are downrange and we have got 432 have been shipped, and the rest are flowing through the CTSF to boats to marry up with the transfer of authority time of each one of those brigades and battalions with the third infantry division.

The CHAIRMAN. But they are not going to the third infantry division. They are going to Kuwait.

General CODY. They are going to Kuwait.

The CHAIRMAN. Now the ones that are in Kuwait—

General CODY. Third infantry division is being replaced by the fourth infantry division.

The CHAIRMAN. We understand. So the point is they are not going to third infantry division, and the committee is concerned by

the fact they are not going to the third infantry division because you have soldiers in the third infantry division who are going out every day on operations, and they don't all have what is considered to be the gold standard in armor, which is the M1114.

Now, the ones that are in Kuwait, as I understand—in fact, our staff, the reason we even knew about this plan, and because this wasn't briefed to us, even though we have had numerous armor briefings with you, the reason we know about it is because we had a staff member who was down and members of our professional HASC staff who were in Fort Hood and noticed up-armored Humvees in Fort Hood.

Now our understanding was that the lives of our people in Iraq were the most precious things that we have. And we have literally gone around to the Areas of Operation (AOs) around the world where we have up-armored Humvees, including Korea, and taking every single vehicle that is available and moved it to the ongoing operations in Iraq with the idea that when troops got there, they would marry up with the vehicles.

This is a departure. So whether you say that the arrows that show that you had 75 vehicles coming in in July, you had 319 in August and you had 430 in September, they must have come in at some point in there if they are all here now.

General CODY. That is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. And my point is, even if they only came in now, and you don't come into the end of the warfighting theater until after the first of 2006, you have, by all accounts, at least two or three months of completed production up-armored Humvees that could be operated right now.

Now, the second point I would make is this: We asked our professional staff to contact the Army and find out how long it took to put the C4ISR upgrades in. The response that we got back was one to two days.

Now, Secretary Harvey has just told me it is 14 days and people are worried that if we get it anyplace else, we could go to 60 days?

Secretary HARVEY. Correct.

The CHAIRMAN. Even if you take 14 days, you have a lengthy delay between troops in theater, whether they are third ID, fourth ID, or some other unit—or even another service—operating those Humvees. The ones that are going over to be married up with the bulk of your troops are going to be parked in parking lots in Kuwait until your troops arrive. Is that not accurate?

General CODY. Mr. Chairman, if I could respectfully say a few things here because these, the way you present it is not accurate.

And if our people told you one to two days, that is talking about blue force tracking, which is not Force XXI Battle Command, Brigade-and-Below (FBCB2), Enhanced Position Location and Reporting System (EPLRS) based system that the fourth infantry division has, which is much more complex, and is a ground-based system that has its own network, very similar to what we have—extremely similar to what we have on the Stryker brigade. Blue force tracking units that we put in for everybody is a satellite-based piece of equipment that is not FBCB2 total. It is an SA, situational awareness thing, and that only does take two or three days. But when you talk about the EPLRS-based fourth infantry division striker

brigade and first Cavalry (CAV) division, it is an entirely different system, and what we have had to do is make them talk to each other.

So two days, if you ask somebody about blue force tracking, is probably accurate. When you talk about this system, it is 14 days.

The second piece, if I could, if I could show you the two courses of actions that the three stars, not just at the Pentagon, but the three stars downrange, the commanding generals of the troops in the field, were faced with, as we looked at the fourth infantry division, and then, we can have the discussion about whether the decision to go with one course of action or the other was right or not.

And I think that may help us through this discussion.

The CHAIRMAN. Well go right ahead. Do you want to make a further presentation?

General CODY. Yes, sir. And I think I gave you these slides. Course of action, one that they looked at was to install the systems in Kuwait. In other words, keep the—take the bare up-armored Humvees, take them out of Cincinnati, bring them down to Charleston, ship them over to Kuwait. At the same time, take the EPLRS-based systems that are on nonarmored Humvees that the fourth ID had back at home station—and they only had about 40 percent of their equipment of tactical vehicles—take them off. Pack them up. Put them in Connexes and ship that equipment to marry up with the Humvees in Kuwait.

And to do that, we would have had to take almost all of them and put them over there at the same time that they had mission rehearsal exercises at the National Training Center. And so we were trying to balance, and moral obligation we had to keep these troops trained and ready and equipped at the same time.

So then, under this course of action, the EPLRS-based, blue FBCB2 equipment would then be broken out of the Connexes, married up with the Humvees as they came in. We would have to recreate the CTSF workforce we had at Fort Hood that supports the rest of the Army, as well as the Stryker brigades, put that at Kuwait, divert some of the workers we had working building 200 up-armored Humvees to level I and IIs that we have in Kuwait that is producing every month, divert that workforce to do this work, and it was going to take two months. And the flow of the brigades into Iraq would have extended and we would have missed the Transfer of Authority (TOA).

And so when we showed this plan and we had an Multi-National Corps-Iraq (MNC-I) commander and the staffs of the third infantry division and all the people that looked at this. They said, during this time frame in December—because remember, you said January 2006, a lot of this stuff is moving prior to that and some of the brigades and units are moving in December. During this time frame, we can't afford that operational slip. We said okay.

Then we came up with the second course of action, the one that you have talked about. This course of action was to take those Humvees, move them down to Fort Hood, run them through the CTSF and then flow them in to marry up at the same time that the troops are moving for Reception, Staging, Onward-Movement and Integration (RSOI) and move them through Kuwait and into theater.

When we presented that plan, it saved us about 2 to 3 weeks. It allowed us not to take all the EPLRS-based equipment away from the fourth infantry division's units that were training and allowed it to flow and meet the TOA dates. And that was the course of action that the commanders in the field, and my three stars and the Marines signed up to.

And when they brought it to me, I asked these questions. And we meet every Saturday, as you know, with about 30 generals all downrange. And we had this conversation. And I asked them, are you short any up-armored Humvees? Will this affect any operational requirements? The answer was no.

You have an edict out that no vehicles leave the FOB unless they are up-armored. Will this cause any problems? The answer was no.

Will this affect the TOA and give you the operational flexibility that you want? And the answer was yes.

And the reason why the commander in the field wanted this is because this unit is going into Baghdad. And the FECB2 equipped EPLRS-based Humvee that we are now fighting as a combat vehicle gives it situational awareness and situational understanding so that you don't have the 507 maintenance platoon problem where they take a left turn in Baghdad and get lost. More importantly, everybody knows where they are.

The commander of the division feels so strongly about it, he has further put it that no up-armored Humvee, EPLRS, FBCB2 equipped will leave the Forward Operating Base (FOB) unless all that equipment is operational. So it is not just the armor that he is putting this edict on. It is the situational awareness in the command and control.

So these were the two courses of action. We liked neither of them. We liked neither of them. But this is what we were faced with because as you know, we had to strip out the fourth infantry division's vehicles when they left Iraq, as well the 101st, and cascade about 3,600 vehicles to the National Guard, leave it in country, and bring those units back, short well over 3,000 vehicles, and they were the next up to go into combat. And this is what we had to manage the entire time. And so this is why we picked this course of action.

The CHAIRMAN. First, General Cody, if you asked the commanders if they had all the up-armored Humvees they needed and they said yes, they obviously weren't referring to M1114s because all the vehicles aren't M1114s. You also have level IIs and level IIIs as you know.

Secretary HARVEY. Level IIIs are not being let out of Fort Hood.

The CHAIRMAN. That is true, but you have level IIs that are operational. So they are not all M1114s. And the point is that even if you took 14 days to upgrade these systems—and I think we should look at that pretty carefully—having a tranch of vehicles that are available coming off the assembly line in July for an operation that is not going to involve a troop deployment in the main, into the theater, until at the first of the next year, having 319 in August, having 430 in September, is a great deal of time for up-armored Humvees, which can be the difference between life and death for our troops, whether they are in the 3rd ID or the 4th ID. Let me

complete here, General Cody. I will let you discuss this at some length.

The one thing I don't like about either of these plans is, I thought that our plan and our agreement with the Armed Services and all of them and the Secretary of Defense and you, was that every single M1114 in the world, would be made able into theater as soon as possible, and that it would not leave theater and it would be married up with the next force that came in. And I would presume that when you leave, the M1114s even though they have got the blue force tracking and the other C4ISR are going to be left for other units in Iraq; Is that right?

General CODY. That is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. You are not going to take them back so they are not absolutely—

General CODY. Plus they are being replaced by first CAV division that has the same system.

The CHAIRMAN. But even if you had, if you don't have the first CAV there, and I presume if you had people that were taking lots of heat in one of the AOs in Iraq, you would move your—you have up-armored Humvees for that unit. My point is you have had many, many months with a fairly large number of Humvees at a time when our guys are taking about 30 IEDs—this is a departure from the way we have done this in the past.

And this committee didn't even know about it until we had somebody down there at Fort Hood, and they see these in the parking lot. If you assume—I assume that all the Humvees you have got there now do have the C4ISR equipment, they do have the blue force tracker.

General, unless—except for a very few that are up in the AO, they are parked in Kuwait. They are parked. They aren't shedding IED fragment up in Baghdad for other people that are there that don't have as good an armor. So if you want to argue that you have got to get these things upgraded before they are good to go and bring into the theater, then let's not have them in a parking lot in Kuwait. Let's move them up into Baghdad. Let me finish. And I will let you respond. Why not move them up into Baghdad and let the 3rd ID or others that are taking a lot of hits with IEDs use them or maybe move them over to the Marines who are taking roughly 50 percent of the casualties and have roughly six or seven percent of the up-armored Humvees in theater. Why not use those Humvees, get them out of the parking lots and get them up there?

General CODY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First off, when you say that these Humvees, by not being in Iraq today, are causing soldiers to be ripped up by IEDs is a false statement.

Because we are not letting non-up-armored Humvees leave the FOB. So every soldier that goes out—

The CHAIRMAN. General Cody, that was not my statement. My statement was it is the gold standard in armor—and it does shed, according to your own testimony—it sheds this stuff better than the Level II or the level III, you still have level II in operation. And if you had all up-armored Humvees, you would take them right now, right.

General CODY. We would.

The CHAIRMAN. Then why not use them?



General CODY. Because when we looked at this plan, again in Kuwait, we are building Humvees in the workforce and everybody is working pretty hard at it. Had we been presented this a year ago, we wouldn't have done this. We would have had to do something else. But because we are over 105 percent of the up-armored production that were in theater and because of the number of level of up-armored Humvees that we had, level II, as well as the production that we had increased in Kuwait that we did not want to disrupt, and it wasn't us that didn't want to disrupt it. It was the commanders in the field that said don't disrupt that flow that we have got, fix the fourth ID this way, we will be okay, and it is the best way to do this. And so that is why we went into that.

Secretary HARVEY. Mr. Chairman, if I could, can I interject something?

The CHAIRMAN. Absolutely, go right ahead.

Secretary HARVEY. Let's look at the two alternate courses of action a little bit differently. If we would have taken the 824 Humvees and immediately put them into theater, as you suggested, and given them to the third ID, that would have accomplished a near-term objective. And let me just say parenthetically that level II protection is a very high level of protection, as you know. It is not like they don't have protection. However, then we come in with the fourth ID. The third ID is gone.

We would have had to take those 824, put them in a forward operating base for six months in order to install the communication equipment, and therefore, we would have then put the fourth ID at some risk. So, we didn't have a perfect solution, but a solution that minimized the time that soldiers were in level II.

And so, the decision that General Cody talked about, I think, minimizes the time that soldiers will not be in level I. And again, as you know, and we have talked about this in the past, armor is one component of force protection. This communication system enhances force protection by at least ten-fold because of the situational awareness that is imparted, particularly in your urban surroundings. So I think this approach provides the maximum protection to the soldiers over the long-term when you take the third and fourth together.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, are all the 824 now upgraded?

Secretary HARVEY. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Then why aren't they in theater? Not in Kuwait, not in Fort Hood. If having the upgrades is the key for that and that is your basic reason for having this delay, then why not just move them into theater right now? They are upgraded.

Secretary HARVEY. They are being moved to theater. About half of them are in Kuwait and the other half—

The CHAIRMAN. I am not talking about Kuwait. I am talking about in the theater.

Secretary HARVEY. I guess we could do that, but then, the TOWA, as you know, we can't discuss in detail, is starting in December.

And so the soldiers that start flowing in on the fourth are going to receive these things. Again, doing it in Kuwait is—

The CHAIRMAN. I am not talking about doing it in Kuwait. I am talking about the fact that they are upgraded now—

General CODY. We could give those to the 3rd infantry division, but when we look at this, it takes two weeks to train those soldiers because it is EPLRS-based. It is like mixing a Commodore 128 computer with an Apple. And so we have to train those troops on all the message tracking because EPLRS, FBCB2 is different.

We don't like this, but this is what we had 5 years ago in the Army battle command system. And it is going to take us a while to fix this whole thing. And that is why the FCS spirals are so important to get this right.

Third ID soldiers are not trained on it. We offered that solution. And we said we would send them up there, but the commander didn't have time to pull his people off of his other vehicles that they are trained on and train them on these while they are in the fight.

The CHAIRMAN. Again, the last point here if the third ID—you are talking about training third ID soldiers, and it is the difference between having a level II, and having a M1114, if they don't use the C4ISR equipment, it certainly doesn't prejudice them to drive a vehicle in an operation without using that equipment, because they don't have it right now any way on the level II vehicles.

Secretary HARVEY. Mr. Chairman, we can take a look into that. We can talk to the commanders and as you say, don't activate, the—don't activate the FBCB2. Give them to the third ID. And that is a decision, certainly that we can offer to the commanders to see if they want to do that in the meantime, before the so-called, transfer of authority.

The CHAIRMAN. Gentleman from Missouri, Mr. Skelton.

Mr. SKELTON. The chart that you showed us that says equipping our soldiers—

General CODY. Yes, sir.

Mr. SKELTON. Is that a true and accurate representation of the fact as you understand them?

General CODY. They are rounded up numbers, Congressman Skelton, random order of magnitude showing from—

Mr. SKELTON. Are they accurate, to the best of your ability?

General CODY. This one right here?

Mr. SKELTON. Yes. Are there any inaccuracies?

General CODY. They are pretty accurate, yes, sir.

Mr. SKELTON. In looking at the September, 2003 list, all the way from soldier body armor, where roughly 10 percent of our soldiers were equipped, only 500 Humvees, up-armored Humvees, they are already down to radio production, it appears to me harking back to my Boy Scout days, where I lived and learned that the motto was to be prepared, that you were not prepared to enter and perform the required duties on September, 2003, to fully protect our soldiers, as compared to what you have now, and as I go all the way down the list from soldier body armor all the way down through radio production.

Either you were unprepared, or there is another explanation for the great discrepancy. Would somebody please tell me whether you were unprepared or whether there is some other explanation for this chart?

General CODY. Well, I testified before this committee in 1999, after Task Force Hawk. In that testimony, I believe I said that the services had investment accounts that were \$5 billion short of their

requirements. In that case, we were discussing the aircraft survivability equipment, as you know, Mr. Chairman.

Those moneys never came, and we are putting them in now. That was for Infra-Red (IR) countermeasures and EPLRS and stuff like that. I don't know the full history. I guess I could go back and study the history.

I do know that when we started this war, we sent spent—and as I know, I have testified before this committee—we spent \$3.2 billion meeting the CENTCOM required task for the bridging equipment, the radio equipment, the C4ISR equipment that they wanted for the Fifth and Third Divisions, the radio requirements, and, yes, the upgraded small arms protective inserts (SAPI) that we couldn't build fast enough, as you know, until we got the six vendors. So you can go across all of our different equipment. We were an equipment-short Army when we entered this war, yes.

Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Secretary, you made a reference to the new HMMWVs having situational awareness. I think General Cody touched upon that. Would you again explain that for us, either one of you, please?

Secretary HARVEY. You mean the HMMWVs that have the EPLRS?

Mr. SKELTON. Whatever you mean by situational awareness, please.

Secretary HARVEY. The situational awareness means that, in the HMMWV, the soldiers have a display in front of them, which shows where they are in their position, just like you have on your car navigation. It shows where all their fellow soldiers are, and where all the other HMMWVs are, as well as the Bradleys, as well as the M1s, if that is the formation.

General CODY. And the enemy.

Secretary HARVEY. And the enemy. So you have situational awareness, which means you know where you are on the battlefield or in the town or in the city, and you know where your fellow soldiers are. That situational awareness gives you tremendous ability in the area of force protection, in combat effectiveness and fracture site prevention.

Mr. SKELTON. And the new HMMWVs would have that.

Secretary HARVEY. These 824 HMMWVs, which are part of the Fourth ID, would have that.

Mr. SKELTON. One last question. How much longer can we expect to use the HMMWVs in Iraq, today carrying the level II armor kits that were not designed for them?

Secretary HARVEY. As I said in my opening statement, for the Marines, they will have all level I by April of next year—and let me also say in the Marines, level II kits, they provide a very high level of protection. Then the Army will be fully—fully level I in July of 2007, but prior to that, we will have enough HMMWVs so that from—a level I HMMWV so that, from an operational point of view, the commanders will be able to send soldiers only out in level I prior to that.

General CODY. Sir, if I could follow on. As you know, we are re-capping about 900 HMMWVs back here in the States. We are upgrading the engines. I think this gets to your question, upgrading the engines and the chassis. The decision to move to the M1151s

and the M1152s will allow us the flexibility to go up-armored and carry that load. That is what we are moving to.

Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Chairman, thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. The gentleman from Colorado, Mr. Hefley.

Mr. HEFLEY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, help me understand, it has been noted that the fourth ID needed to equip their M1114 HMMWVs with the C4ISR upgrades prior to arriving in the theater, the Striker brigades and the First Cav are equipped with similar C4ISR capabilities and technology. What did these units do to prepare their vehicles for deployment, and did all of their vehicles have these C4ISR technologies, or did they simply make do in theater with what they had?

General CODY. Which unit are you talking about, the Stryker Brigade, sir?

Mr. HEFLEY. Well, the M1114 HMMWVs, yes.

General CODY. Well, first off, we have done this—I want to make sure it is clear. When the Fourth Infantry Division came home, they left in round numbers well over 1,600 of their vehicles in country. So they were short back here for a year. We had to issue and swap around brigade sets of equipment so they could put their EPLRS on these systems and train with them.

Unlike the Stryker Brigades, which we have not done that to, and they are full up—so we didn't have that swapping of gear. We left—the Stryker was a different story, so it is a different paradigm that we had to deal with.

The fourth Infantry Division, all four of their brigades, had just enough of the C4ISR blue force, not blue force tracking but FBCB2, to do their training, but they weren't full up. In fact, the division—I can give you in a classified setting, for the whole year, was certainly not C1, because of the shortage of equipment.

So that goes back to the discussion of how we were able to train them, each one of their brigades, with the barest amount of equipment, and barest amount of HMMWVs that were not up-armored, and then make the decision of whether to ship all that stuff and then marry it up, those two courses of action that I showed you.

That is why we picked the course of action that we picked. So we are trying to balance our training requirements, Congressman Hefley, as well as the right way to balance what we were shipping into country.

Mr. HEFLEY. To follow on, typically as you have indicated, sir, units leave behind their equipment for successor units. If the fourth ID is replacing the third ID, which uses a different type of C4ISR technology, can it be assumed that the third ID's equipment will not be used at all by the fourth ID. If not, then what will happen to the third ID's vehicles when they leave Iraq?

General CODY. That is a great question, Congressman. That was part of the—why the theater commanders made the decision. They want to take those vehicles and cascade them and thicken up the other units with them. That is what they are doing to do with them.

Secretary HARVEY. If they are level I.

General CODY. If they are level I, they will fill up and increase the percentages again, and that was what was attractive to them as they looked at this.

Mr. HEFLEY. Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman.

The gentleman from Texas, Mr. Ortiz.

Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thanks for having both of you with us this morning. The hearing of course is focusing on a CENTCOM requirement for armored vehicles and up-armor. It appears you are finally getting close to meeting the need. But looking down the road, what could be the next pressing readiness issues that the Army will phase, that it could move to the front burner sooner so that we can start paying attention to be of help to you. Do you have other issues that you feel we might need to pay attention to as well, Mr. Secretary, or General?

Secretary HARVEY. Let me just say—and General Cody mentioned this. I think we are doing an adequate job here, and that is the counter IED, the countermeasure IED devices. As you can see, we have 20,000 in theater, and as the General said, we are diverting all the production lines into theater. So I think we are generally meeting the commanders' needs, but it is very tight. In the ideal situation, we would have some to train on also.

General CODY. Well, I agree with my Secretary's assessment. But if you step back from this and look strategically, first off, no one in the Army leadership is happy with the production schedule we have. We would like to have it all faster. This committee has helped us in several, several ways, from IED jammers to the up-armor and everything else. We may disagree on how we handle it and how we distribute it. But I think we all agree we want this stuff as fast as we can.

But if you have to step back and look at this strategically, we have to ask ourselves, how did we get here? It is because we did not modernize. Why did we not modernize, and who made the decisions? Today, we are getting ready to discuss here in the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) and discuss in this body and other bodies the Army's modernization plan, which is the future combat system.

I don't think that we want to make the same mistakes or not have the same vision that we had that got us to this point. We are going to be in this long war. General Abizaid came here and testified two weeks ago. I agree with his assessment that this will be a long war.

So if we step back, we have to ask, what type of modernization accounts do we want to fund? What are the threats out there? And are we funding to the right modernization accounts? I think the paths that Secretary Harvey is restructuring the future combat system—and General Schoomaker—are right on target, especially on the battle command side. This third ID, fourth ID problem, will go away when we do the spirals, and we will fix our battle command. Battle command is a combat force multiplier and a force protection issue. We want to see them first. We want to shoot them first. We want to avoid them first. We want to know where our buddies are at all times.

So I think it is our modernization accounts, Congressman Ortiz, that we need to pay attention to right now. We will get through this with the help of Congress and with these type of oversight meetings where we stress ourselves on these things, so that we all get it right. We are going to get this piece fixed. We have got to get ready for the next fight.

Mr. ORTIZ. I seem to agree with you, but we need to stay ahead of the curve. I can, I guess, speak for the committee that we are here, because we want to help you. But we need to know what is ahead of us so we can get in a position to really respond to your needs.

Secretary HARVEY. Congressman, as the General said, it is important that we carry out the future combat system program as the baseline plan is presented. So, as the General said, in order for us not to get in this situation we are in today, we have got to continue to modernize the force, and the Future Combat Systems (FCS) technology, one of the prime technologies, is the network. And we have plans to spiral that in as well as the other advanced technology, into the current force, in real time, starting in FY 2008. So we need your total support of that program as planned in order to ensure that this force is able to fight the Global War on Terror in the long run.

Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you both. Thank you so much for being with us today.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman.

The gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. Hayes.

Mr. HAYES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I thank you, gentlemen, for being here.

As I try to listen carefully to what is being said, I am trying to see what people in the field and people back home are hearing or not hearing us say today. What I am sensing is that we are doing a good job in planning and preparation, but we are not getting the maximum amount of protection to our soldiers in the field as quickly as possible.

Now, your comment about seeing first and shooting first is absolutely critical, but number one priority, and I am more than willing to be corrected, is to protect our soldiers. Yes, they are getting shot at, and we want to be as offensive as possible. But the problems occur with these continuous car bombings and roadside bombings.

So the capabilities that you describe-- again, I am not the one to make the call, may need to be sacrificed in terms of training and capability and having this combat system available to them in order to put the protective priority in the field. Now, again, I may be missing something. I am not trying to second guess you, but I am just telling you what I have heard today.

Secretary HARVEY. Congressman, we believe that this plan that we have formulated in July, with the Marines and with the Joint Staff and importantly with the combatant commanders, with the commanders down field, down range, provides the maximum protection to our soldiers. We really believe that, because it takes the least amount of time to install this equipment at Fort Hood rather than putting it in the theatre and then taking it back out in the middle of the employment and installing it.

Remember what we are doing here is that these 824 HMMWVs with the so-called FCB2 equipment is even better than a M1114. It is the next level of protection. Armor provides a certain level of protection. But as the committee knows, even under certain situations, armor can protect you in an M1 tank. So the situational awareness gives the soldier the knowledge to avoid being put into a situation. It gives him the knowledge that he may be able to avoid an IED. So this is the next level of protection beyond armor, situational awareness, that gives you that enhanced level of force protection. To do that at Fort Hood takes the minimum amount of time. And our fourth ID soldiers get to theater. If we have to take those M1114s out and put in the so-called FCB2. That is a much longer time they would be without it.

So, overall, given the big picture, we believe that this provides the maximum protection to our soldiers, which is by and far the number one priority that I have as the second, and the chief and the advice have. The well-being of our soldiers, that protect our soldiers, is above anything else in this Army absolutely.

General CODY. Let me see if I can also add a different perspective. If you remember from the OIF 2 rotation, the combatant asked for the tank and Bradley units to come over with one tank company and two of his tank companies in HMMWVs. That was the one-third heavy, two-third light. Halfway through that rotation we shipped back over 100-some odd tanks and 100-some odd Bradleys. At that time, they said, oh, by the way, make sure they have the embedded battle command, because—even in the tanks and Bradleys—the embedded battle command, the FCB2, gives us much more situational awareness.

I bring that up to you because, when we built this plan when we came from theater about how many up-armored HMMWVs, it was based on one-third, two-thirds force for patrolling inside of Baghdad. Today, it is a three-quarter heavy, one-quarter HMMWV force. This is why the commander in the field is saying, I have got a lot of tanks over there compared to what we had in OIF 2.

It is not just HMMWVs that are providing the force protection. We have a lot of tanks of Bradleys that are in there that weren't in that second rotation that we picked them back up because of this threat.

Mr. HAYES. As I say, it is a complex subject.

General CODY. It is.

Mr. HAYES. Secretary Harvey, everything we can do to protect soldiers, my point would be—and I think the chairman has said it in another way—if we had sophisticated turn-off equipment but have the maximum armor protection, we want to make sure it is there. I thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank the gentleman.

The gentleman from Massachusetts, Mr. Meehan.

Mr. MEEHAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thanks for holding this important hearing. I join my colleagues in echoing your concerns.

Thanks to our witnesses for coming before us this morning.

I am deeply troubled for the need for today's hearing. Time and time again, I am joined with members of this committee, colleagues on both sides of the aisle and pressing our nation's military and its

civilian leadership to ensure that men and women, they risk their lives to protect our country, are fully equipped and properly protected.

Two years ago, two of my constituents, Brian and Alma Hart, received the kind of news that a parent should never have to receive. Their son, Private First Class John Hart was killed when the unarmored HMMWV he was driving was sprayed with bullets. Just days before he died, Private Hart had called his father to tell him how unsafe he felt riding in HMMWVs that lacked bulletproof shielding or reinforced doors.

We have come a long ways since then, in no small part due to the activism and dedication of parents like John and Alma Hart who have been outspoken advocates for getting us moving in the right direction. As leaders of the country and leaders of military, I think it is imperative that we do everything we can to make sure that people like Private Hart—that his colleagues get everything they need and when we send our troops in harm's way, we need to do everything that we can do to give them what they need.

You have indicated that the Marines will be all level I by April of 2006, and the Army will be level I prior to July 2007. But prior to that, we will reach the level when level Is will only be sent to the field. When will the Army reach this level I point relative to HMMWVs?

Secretary HARVEY. In terms of absolute numbers, as you indicated, Congressman, that is July of 2007, right now, the commanders in the field are determining when, before that, there will be adequate HMMWVs so that they can meet their deployment, making certain assumptions, their deployments in theater with all level Is. I don't have a specific answer, because that is being determined as we speak.

Mr. MEEHAN. Last November, November 17th, in a hearing on the status of U.S. forces, I asked General Schoomaker and General Hagee whether or not the Pentagon is tracking a number of casualties that resulted from attacks on unarmored vehicles. Both had stated that they knew of no such information during the hearing, but followed it up to say that the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Task Force had recently conducted a multidetailed analysis on this.

Is there any more current information that is available?

General CODY. I have it. Sir, as you know, we stood up the Joint Task Force. We stood it up October of 2003, and now it is under the guidance and leadership of Secretary England as a Deputy Secretary of Defense. It is classified—the chart I am holding here. We briefed this committee—Chairman, you asked for that briefing a while back. We briefed, and we did a comparison between up-armored, level II, level III. We did a comparison on Bradleys and M1113s. We also did a comparison of what type of devices and jamming devices. We are getting better. Then, if you like, Chairman, we can come back over with General Votel and lay that out for you.

Again, I am glad you asked the question.

The CHAIRMAN. I think it is about the time to have another scrub with General Votel and the task force.

General CODY. We can set that up, sir. But, again, we do this also to make the risk assessment to make sure that what we are



doing in terms of level IIIs, how quickly we need to pull them out, as well as, was there a marked difference between level II and level I.

That all came into play with these decisions that the commanders in the field were making and what we were making in terms of when to swap out the level Is for operational reasons. I don't think I want to say anything more on that, because we are doing better, but I don't want to put that information out.

Mr. MEEHAN. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. The gentlelady from Michigan, Mrs. Miller.

Mrs. MILLER OF MICHIGAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I certainly appreciate you calling this very important hearing this morning, and to both of you, gentlemen, we certainly appreciate your service to our nation under unbelievably challenging times, and I appreciate you being here.

I am trying to follow this entire thing as well and what has happened and where we are and what we might be able to do as we look to the future.

I would just say this. I come from Detroit. We are not the glitziest people in the world, but one of the things we know how to do is build things like automobiles, vehicles. In fact, during World War II, our area was known as the arsenal of democracy because we had the manufacturing capabilities that literally built the armaments that led the world to peace during that time.

In the case of the HMMWV, are we in a situation, perhaps, that because of a sole source, that this is a situation we have. And as we are grilling you on the hot seat here, I think there is a lot of—many fingers in the pie here of our procurement processes, what has happened in the past, to use my own personal analogy again. I mean, if we have a particular vehicle General Motors (GM) is making that customers want it, they will make it. They ratchet up the assembly lines, and you don't start a vehicle at the beginning of an assembly line and have to send it to this place and that place and this place and so on. That thing rolls off the end of the line. You put the key in the ignition and drive it away.

Is there something that we can do to—in fact, General, you used the term as to how we are going to modernize. Don't we go back a bit and, say, if we are going to modernize, use the old common sense of American ingenuity of how we actually built things?

Secretary HARVEY. Let me address that. And then I will turn it over to General Cody. That is a very important question. I will tell you what the Army has done in that regard. We talked about the M1114. We haven't talked a lot about the M1151 and the M1152, which is the next generation.

In that—and the M1151 and the M1152 will be built in such a way that a basic frame will be produced, and then armor from a multitude of vendors will be added on to it, and that armor can be taken off if it is not being used in a situation which requires it. That is to say, in a fort operating base or in the United States which will produce wear and tear, it will provide the same level of protection as the so-called M1114.

Unfortunately, historically, the Army got themselves into a position where we had a sole source provider of the M1114. The M1151 will have a basic frame and multitude of armors in an assembly line situation.

In order to address that situation, that led us to level II armor. These are kits that go on the basic existing HMMWVs. We had eight, in that regard, we had eight of our depots producing these add-on kits, level II. We had the Air Force, the Navy, and we had five outside vendors. We had something like 13 to 15 suppliers producing level II add-on armor. In the future, as we convert over to the so-called M1151, we will have a multitude of vendors producing that armor. So we will be in a very modern situation.

In the meantime, we had to face the reality of the M1114. As you may know and remember, the production rates have been taken from a production of 30 per month in the fall of 2003 up to today to 650 a month.

Mrs. MILLER OF MICHIGAN. If I could interrupt. What percentage is that line running at though? I mean, if they went from 30 to 600, I mean, are you running that thing 24/7.

Secretary HARVEY. 24/7, and it has been expanded. It is not the original line in order to do that. This particular supplier has increased its capacity. He was capacitated out at 30, so he has gone up by a factor of 20 by increasing the size of the plant and equipment.

Mrs. MILLER OF MICHIGAN. Still, is that a single source then for that?

Secretary HARVEY. Yes, but as the M1115 and M1152 come on, we will have a multitude of sources with one frame supplier, right. So we will get ourselves into a situation—unfortunately, the intellectual property in that case was not owned by the Army. In this case, it was owned by the Army in the M1151. So, historically—I wasn't around. So I don't know how this happened. But we have changed, and now we are in a situation which is ideal. We have a multitude of vendors, and we own the intellectual property. You may want to add to my remarks.

General CODY. I think the Secretary recapped where we are going. I think it is important, Madam Congresswoman, to remember that we have to understand that we never designed the HMMWV to be a crew-served fighting vehicle except in the delta companies of our light divisions where we mounted tows on them for the anti-armor for the light forces.

Now, in this fight, we have had to modify them not just with all bringing up blue force tracking—if it was satellite based—or EPLRS-based FBCB2, but we also modified them with cupolas, protection, put in the full intercom for the driver, assistant driver and for the gunner up top. So we have now made this thing basically a fighting vehicle. So that complicates the issue also.

So when we looked at it back before the Secretary came, about how do we get these cupolas and fighting systems, it would have slowed down the production system of who was making them at the time, so we had to build the market and the capacity in Kuwait to do that. That is what we are doing. At the same time, we had to put air conditioning units on. We never designed them for the

weights. We had to put bigger engines in them, bigger springs, everything else.

So this thing has been—although it is slow and it appears slow, there is a whole bunch of things that we did to this vehicle that we never dreamed we would do.

Mrs. MILLER OF MICHIGAN. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentlelady.

The gentlelady from Guam, Ms. Bordallo.

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for calling this hearing. I would like to welcome the Secretary and the General. Thank you very much for your service to our country. This committee has been especially active on pushing the issue of armoring our forces and protecting the vital means of our service members. In light of your decision to send equipment to a stateside unit preparing to go to war so that it can properly train first, I am particularly concerned about how this decision compares to decisions made concerning the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve.

It seems to me that the guard and the reserve are badly under-equipped, and here you have made a decision to deliver equipment to the Fourth Infantry early so that they can properly train before they go into combat. But it seems to have been decided many times over in the past that the Army would not fully equip our guard and reserve so that they can train properly before they are activated into combat service.

So given the degree to which you are relying on the guard and reserve in this war, when are we going to see the equipment they are supplied become equivalent to their active duty counterparts.

Secretary HARVEY. General Cody is going to address that question.

General CODY. Thank you, Madam Congresswoman. As you know, when we started this fight, the National Guard units in particular, like the 39th, the 30th and the 81st, were the first brigade combat teams that we got ready to fight side by side as brigade combat teams in OIF-2. Like their combat support and combat service support brethren in the active force, they were short equipment. So what we did was we left equipment from the 101st, the Fourth ID in Iraq and Third ID in Iraq, as stay-behind equipment, and then we fielded first to those brigades all the brand new individual—what we call rapid fueling initiative for the soldier.

All the new equipment went to the 81st, the 39th and 30th before it went to active units that are getting ready to go. But we are still short vehicles. We are still short radios and everything else in the National Guard as well as our active CSS units. That was the shortfall I talked about. So that is what drove us to the stay-behind equipment sets.

As you get into these rotations, it was also depleting our active component, like the Fourth ID and the 101st who came back left 30 percent of their rolling stock there for the National Guard units. Then they had to train up and go back in a year later, because we never ramped down the way everybody predicted.

So that has been what we have been wrestling with. The goal is to get the National Guard equipment based upon going to modularity. The goal is to get their equipment by 2011. We have

\$21 billion in the budget, which is 5 percent more than we have for the active component vehicles, just in rolling stock, because the guard is short. The biggest thing we are tackling on the guard is, they have 14,000 M35s, A5s that are 35 years old. That is the deuce and a half. We have got to get them out of the force.

So we are getting that, and we have a balanced plan to do that, but it will take until about 2007 or 2008 to see that, because we just barely got the procurement dollars in the 2005 supplemental that we could put in so we could start buying back this shortfall.

Secretary HARVEY. But let me add, in the near term, that no unit regardless of whether they are active or National Guard goes into theater unless they are in a fully-equipped position. As the General said, we had to juggle, but no unit, as we say, goes over the berm unless they are totally armored, so every National Guard unit is fully equipped with the force protection and all the other weapons that they need.

In the long term, what the General is referring to is to modernize so that they are totally stand alone and don't have to continue to stay behind. So that works, and if the budgets that we have submitted are passed, we will have the resources to do that.

Again, as we have said in the past, we cannot do it without the National Guard and the reserves. They are a very, very important part of this and have given us the head room that we need to perform this force transformation, which we call modularity. So it is very important to the guard, very important to us.

Ms. BORDALLO. I am very pleased to hear that. Thank you. I thank the gentleman.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentlewoman.

The gentleman from Michigan, Mr. Schwarz.

Dr. SCHWARZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would like to follow up a little bit on the line of questioning of my colleague from Michigan, Mrs. Miller. As of this morning, the sole source provider of the chassis for the HMMWV is still AM General. That is correct, is it not?

General CODY. Yes.

Dr. SCHWARZ. Their individuals, right from the shop floor this morning, indicate that they are producing about M1152 chassis a day, the numbers of the M1114 down, M1151, M1152s up. Well and good, but the other information—and this is consistent over the last several months as we ask the good folks from the United Auto Workers (UAW) who are the workers on the line at AM General making these chassis—the capacity is 100 a day.

So, the there is a reason perhaps that you could produce 100 chassis a day, but you still couldn't armor them, so that the holdup, perhaps, is in the armorer. But if we are producing 52 and people on site who are doing the production tell us that we could produce 100, if given the go-ahead to do so, per day, why are they not doing it?

Where is the hold up? Is the hold up, they don't have the go-ahead to do it, or is the hold up, we could produce 100 and that would be fine but you would never have the capacity to armor those chassis?

General CODY. Well, I am not the expert on production lines. As you know, I am not the acquisition executive. But having dealt

with this for three years, a long pole in the tent has always been the armor materiel. I have some extras back here; if the Chairman would allow me to call one forward that could answer this.

The CHAIRMAN. Sure, go right ahead.

General CODY. General Speakes runs our force protection programs for all our equipment, and he has been intimately involved in all of this.

So, Steve, if you could answer the good Congressman's questions about the chassis versus the armor.

General SPEAKES. Yes, sir. Sir, let me go ahead and address this issue in the context of what the Army is trying to do, as the Secretary and General Cody both outlined earlier this morning. What we are into is a comprehensive strategy that is designed to increase the flow of armor to the theater, and also to increase the quality of that armor protection.

So, for example, back this last June, we were only producing 550 systems. As you know, that is a substantial upgrade from where we were. As we look right now at the month of October, we are up to 700 systems. I call them systems, because, as you recognized, it is AM General producing the frame.

Then what we right now have is a sole source solution for the armored solution we are putting on them. As we move to the M1114, we will move to the next generation which will essentially give us the ability to add and remove armor. We will own the property rights to the armor, and we will be able to then increase the production of frames, because armor is no longer the determining step. We are working in collaboration with the manufacturers right now, so that, at this point, we move from the 550 to where we were earlier this summer to 700 right now.

What we are in the process of doing is moving up to 1,100 frames, which is where we are going to be in February. That 1,100 frames will be supported by a variety of armored solutions. What it will have moved into then is the start of armored solutions for the next generation of vehicles, which is the M1151 and M1152, also produced by AM General but which has a difference kind of basic construction in terms of its ability to hold armor. So we are moving now to an era where we can have flexible armor, removable armor and also the ability to modernize our armor solutions because, as we all recognize, the battlefield is getting more threatening rather than less.

So that is an explanation of the depth of our program as we move from where we were this last summer to where we are now to where we will be in February of 1,100 and then about enhancing, where we own the property rights to the next generation of armored solutions. And essentially then the only determining step becomes the ability to produce frames, and then the ability to apply the rest of the ingredients that make up a total armored solution.

General CODY. So bottom line, over the next few months, we will be doubling our production rate.

Dr. SCHWARZ. Okay. So when we meet again, which we inevitably will—I checked with AM General and the folks there, what they tell me, if the plan goes as you foresee, is that the numbers of frames produced, M1151, M1152, which is what they are moving to, will be significantly more than are being produced today, be-

cause you will have broken through and found a solution or have a solution to the armoring. Am I tracking here?

General SPEAKES. Yes.

Dr. SCHWARZ. Thank you very much.

I thank the gentleman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

The gentleman from Arkansas, Dr. Snyder.

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you very much, gentlemen. We are finding down here—if we could make this the rapid fire round, I have five or six questions. If I can ask them quick and you give quick answers, we can get to several of them.

First of all, General Cody, are you satisfied with where we are at with regard to these issues of armor and equipment for Afghanistan?

General CODY. You are talking about Task Force Phoenix, Dr. Snyder?

Dr. SNYDER. Yes.

General CODY. No. I have talked to the commander in the field over there. We would like to push more. The issue becomes the threat assessment, and the Secretary and I and the chief have talked about it. In fact, we want to push aside 250, but they have done a mission analysis and threat assessment. We have asked them to go back and relook at it.

Dr. SNYDER. The second question doesn't have anything to do with this hearing today, but there has been discussion of press reports about some dissatisfaction with regard to the guard members with regard to their \$15,000 reenlistment bonus for reenlisting while they are overseas. Are you familiar with that issue at all, that it was taken back, they are not going to get it? Do you know anything about that?

General CODY. I am not familiar with that. I do know, though, there has been some discussion about reenlistment bonuses. I will tell you, in each case—the Sergeant Major in the Army and I discussed this with the Secretary the other day—in each case where a soldier had a reenlistment bonus that for some reason because of an MOS change or contract change, we are going back, because we have the authority, the Secretary, and the title goes to the soldier and we will just put it aside.

Secretary HARVEY. If that is the issue, if it is a change of MOS and then he doesn't get his bonus, we will fix that, if that is the issue you are referring to.

Dr. SNYDER. We will follow up with your folks.

Secretary HARVEY. Sure.

Dr. SNYDER. There has been ongoing discussions over the last several years about the level of troop strength in Iraq. We have had two episodes now where we have an election, troop strength—you all brought troop strength up sometime before that. Things settle down. We drop it back, then bring the level up, as we did at the most recent election, in order to provide security for the election.

In the multiple times we have asked this, General Myers, Secretary Rumsfeld, about the level of troop strength, they say that the commanders get whatever they want in terms of what they need to get their mission done. My question is, has there been a

system created, do you think, General Cody, in your years in the Army, where people have gotten the word they should not be asking for additional troop strength, because, you know, it is just really not going to be coming your way?

Because we have a situation where we can pick up the paper, can read—people, you know, people on the ground in uniform saying they can't get their job done along the Syrian border: We can't get this done without additional strength. Do you think we have created a system where people ought to get the word we ought not to ask for additional troop strength even though we think we need it?

General CODY. I know most of these generals, and they are tough. They are also loyal, but they are tough. I will tell you that I believe—and I trust them. I have got my sons over there. If any one of those general officers needs more troops, I guarantee you, they will ask for them. They may be told, no—I don't know what the discussions are that go on at that level. But I trust those guys. They are tough. If they want them, they will ask for them.

Dr. SNYDER. Then, General Cody, based on your years of experience—we haven't had, really, any discussion on the House side about Senator McCain's amendment with regard to interrogation standards that passed the Senate 90 to 9.

I am just asking this as an open-ended question. Because we have had a flare of press reports here, a front line story, a lengthy story or a program a couple of days ago. We had the incident in the papers this morning about the allegations of the burning of corpses. We have had these ongoing press reports.

It has seemed to me that Senator McCain's amendment, by laying down a bright line in statute that would apply to both the people in uniform and any governmental agencies out of uniform representing the United States, that would be helpful in terms of how war is conducted in the future, avoiding the kinds of incidents, some of these incidents we have had in the past. What is your personal opinion on that?

General CODY. Well, first, Mr. Congressman, I haven't read what the Senator has put in. I probably should go back and read it.

Dr. SNYDER. That is all right.

General CODY. I have been pretty busy with wrestling and pushing stuff forward. My professional opinion is no different than my personal opinion on these matters. That is, we have to establish a highly disciplined, highly moral, highly ethical leadership, chain of command. We have to instill those things into our soldiers as part of the training. Policy letters and decrees and everything else don't fix these issues. Tough leadership up and down the chain of command, and that is where the Chief and the Secretary and I are focusing every day on developing our leaders, training our leaders, training our soldiers, to the ethics and the moral and the physical and the mental discipline, as well as training our leaders to take care up and down.

Because that is the only way that we will remain—we are still the best army in the world and the most disciplined army in the world. That is the only way we are going to be able to retain that, by making sure we have the right leadership at every level.

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you, gentlemen, for being here.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman.

The gentleman from Texas, Mr. Conaway.

Mr. CONAWAY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The chairman and Congress have suggested you go ahead in pushing these specially-equipped FBCB2 out of Kuwait up into the theater. When we make that decision, it seems to me that there would be a cost to that. That special gear will deteriorate and degrade. Some of it will be destroyed, and then the fourth ID will show up fully trained, I guess, to really use it. There will be some lag between once they get there, and it is reaching its full capabilities and capacities. Can you speak to us about what you think the cost might be?

General CODY. I don't know what the cost will be, but it was an operational decision. If I can give you a scenario: If you are a platoon leader in the Third Infantry Division and I am a platoon leader in the Fourth Infantry Division and I am replacing you, I am going to show up in my HMMWV and we will do the right seat-left seat ride. But during the timeframe that this is going on, as you know, it is during the elections. It is during quite a bit of changing where they are operationally, where General Casey is maneuvering forces. They did not do right seat-left seat right on vehicles and have this highly important swap over vehicles. That was part of the issue.

So if it were a cost, we would pay it. But it was an operational decision not to. I mean, if there were dollars attached to this, plus or minus, we would have paid it if it made operational sense. But to the commanding generals down range, it did not make sense.

Secretary HARVEY. That is really their decision. For the record, we should say that FBCB2 is Force XXI Battle Command Brigade-and-Below, just so that is in the record. We are using too many acronyms.

Mr. CONAWAY. Thank you for that, Mr. Secretary. I would appreciate using fewer.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman.

The gentleman from Connecticut, Mr. Simmons.

Mr. SIMMONS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I apologize to our witnesses for being late and not hearing their testimony. But it is my understanding that the issue under consideration is whether or not up-armored HMMWVs and equipment that provides protection for our forces is being deployed in an expeditious manner. As somebody who got involved with the up-armor issue a couple of years ago, somebody who served for almost four years in Vietnam—so I have a sense of what it feels like when you are out there and you don't feel like your equipment is fully up to what you need to protect yourself.

I guess I think, to the families that read the news articles, it is unfortunate because sometimes news articles distort the truth and distort the picture. But for those families that I know, who have sons and daughters over there, the idea that equipment that could protect them and keep them safe, the idea that has been manufactured, it has been produced, but it hasn't been distributed—it is sit-



ting off in a parking lot somewhere—I guess that is a matter of concern.

So I would like to hear reassurances that equipment is moving to the field as rapidly as possible and that we are not holding it, waiting for a deployment when, in fact, it should be up, forward for those who are in country.

Secretary HARVEY. Congressman, we believe that is the case. If we look at the big picture of the Third ID and Fourth ID and in conjunction with what we are doing with the Marines, we believe that this is the optimum situation for protecting the soldier overall as rapidly as possible. So we firmly, in the Army, believe that.

General CODY. I agree with the Secretary,

Mr. Congressman. In fact, some of the Fourth Infantry Division Brigades have already begun their transfer of authority and relieved the people in place. The Fourth Sustainment Brigade has already taken over its area in Iraq and released the Third Infantry Division's Sustainment Brigade. So they are already there. If you look on the chart, we gave them 17 on the 28th of July.

We got it all equipped, and we shipped them over. They went into Kuwait, did a two-week RSOI, the reception, staging, onward, integration and then did their ten-day transfer of authority. So they are equipped with the up-armored HMMWVs, and they relieved in place the their Infantry Division Sustainment Brigade. We have several of those brigades and battalions starting now, all the way up through the January timeframe. This is a big outfit, and a decision was made, unlike OIF-1 and 2 where we changed everybody in 90 days, if you remember, we decided to stretch these things out, so that we weren't changing battalions and brigades simultaneously throughout this theater and giving this enemy this edge. So this also had to come into play as we looked at this.

Mr. SIMMONS. If I could just follow up, are there up-armored HMMWVs in Continental United States (CONUS) in that are sitting and have not been deployed?

General CODY. There are up-armored HMMWVs right now that came off the line of AM General for the Fourth combat team of the Fourth Infantry Division, 157 of them. They were shipped on 11 October. They are not sitting at Fort Hood. They have the EPLRS base—

Secretary HARVEY. FBCB2.

General CODY [continuing]. For battle command systems put on them, and then they will be put on boats and shipped in a timely manner so that they meet up with the Fourth Brigade that has a transfer of authority with the Third Infantry Brigade outfit, and it all throws within that 45- to 50-day time frame. So to say they are sitting would not be an accurate statement. They have gone from the plant to have the required equipment that we deem necessary for the additional survivability and control and also meets the time line of them being able to go through Kuwait with their training and get into accordance with what General Vines wants.

Mr. SIMMONS. Are there soldiers driving around in Iraq that are not armored?

General CODY. No.

Mr. SIMMONS. Bases?

General CODY. There are some HMMWVs they have at level III, about 157 give or take a few, that are on the FOBs, that do drive around the FOBs, but they are restricted. They can't go off base.

Mr. SIMMONS. Do any of those bases ever get hit with mortar attacks?

General CODY. Yes, they do, but the up-armored HMMWV will not—that is not going to stop a mortar situation, although the shrapnel will. We are dealing with mortars in a different way, as you know.

Mr. SIMMONS. So it wouldn't stop a direct hit, but it would stop a near miss with shrapnel. Can you visualize any contingency where people might have to evacuate a base, which would take those vehicles off base?

General CODY. No.

Mr. SIMMONS. So that is the problem.

Secretary HARVEY. But it has never happened.

Mr. SIMMONS. I understand it never happened. The World Trade Center situation never happened either—war is hell. You all know that. These things can happen.

What I am suggesting, and what I think the concern is that some parents may feel that their son or daughter is riding around in a vehicle that is not adequate to this situation, whereas other vehicles are sitting back in the States waiting to be deployed. I understand the logic of what you are saying, but you have to understand how some of those folks may feel about it.

Secretary HARVEY. We have 25,000 level I and II HMMWVs in theater.

Mr. SIMMONS. I thank you for your testimony.

I thank the gentleman.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman from Connecticut. I thank the ranking member for putting up with this fairly long hearing on this very focused issue.

Gentlemen, I think we have had a good hearing here. I think that—let me give you several thoughts that have been derived from the last couple of hours of testimony.

First, Mr. Secretary, while you just answered the gentleman from Connecticut, you said that level III vehicles, that is add-on type stuff that is put on generally in theater, that included the scrap iron from Iraqi machine shops, that is being kept in the forward operating bases.

Level II kits, and that is considered to be not as good as the M1114s, are deployed on operations. So if you want the real answer to the gentleman, we do have people who are taking hits, who are having IEDs blown on them on a regular basis who don't have M1114s.

General Cody, you and I, I think, had a good back and forth on this, on the effect in theater. I think that you are a good soldier, and you are dedicated, and you are steeped in the tradition of warfighting, as your family is, and we respect that very much. When an IED goes off, it is all physics. When you have a 155mm round or 105mm round go off at three or four meters, as you know from looking at the tests at Aberdeen, it is a function of how much steel or other armor you have between the body of the American soldier and that explosion, and a certain percentage of fragment

may or may not get through that particular armor and hit our soldiers. At that point, it is all a function of the mass of the fragment and the velocity at which it travels. You know, as well as—well, I think, the upgrades that are manifest in the M1114—and we don't need to go into the details in this open session—but you are aware of the upgrades which in some cases will stop a much larger degree of that fragmentation than the level II vehicles that are being used right now.

So the question is, will you, in some of those IED attacks, have fragment that doesn't enter the vehicle department where M1114, where it might enter the vehicle department according to the laws of physics and wound American soldiers? The answer is yes.

So it is desirable to M1114s in the field as early as possible. I think we agree on that. Now, having gone around Robin Hood's barn—and I think you have explained in some detail, and I think with some merit, the various considerations that you undertook in making, putting this policy together—we are left with these base facts.

Mr. Secretary, you own these vehicles when they come off that assembly line. Now, you owned 75 vehicles in July. You owned another 319 in August, and you owned another 430 in September. Now it obviously takes at least 130 days to deliver them. You have a certain checkout you want to do on these vehicles, and then you have the installation of this C4ISR package put in place.

It is a long time to own those vehicles when we are under a policy to get every vehicle we could find, not just in CONUS, but in the world between the soldiers who are experiencing these IED blasts and the blasts on those roadsides in Iraq. Even if you accept this 14 days for installation period, you are talking about the first tranche of vehicles so the delay or—if General Cody objects to the term delay—the time lapse between you owning these vehicles from the manufacturer and these things being on the road in Iraq, protecting an American soldier, so that falls down on that first tranche from five months to 4.5 months.

Let us take 14 days out of it and say you do them in CONUS. The second tranche, you cut that down from four months to 3.5 months, and the last tranche from three months to 2.5 months.

Now, we can quibble about how long they are marked in Kuwait, how long they are parked at Fort Hood and what you need some of them to train on. But if your policy is directed at getting steel between the soldiers who are operating on a daily basis and the high intensity IED environment and the blast that will be coming at them, we have some fairly long time periods between you taking ownership of these vehicles and those vehicles being in a protective mode for those soldiers on the roads in the areas of operation in Iraq.

Now, you told me, Mr. Secretary, it would take six months—you were told it would take six months if you did this in Kuwait. The question that I think I would ask—and you are an industrialist, you are a businessman, you would drill down into that and say, Tell me how it takes 14 days in Fort Hood and you can't get it done in less than 6 months in Iraq? I certainly wouldn't accept that.

Secretary HARVEY. I think it is two months, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. I would drill down on two months and say, Why does it take four times as long as it takes at Fort Hood to have that done? Do we need more people? Do we need a tiger team?

We obviously have the ability to fix sophisticated technical equipment in theater. We have gained that ability with respect to our aerial platforms and our land-based platforms. Why can't we do this?

And so I think that clearly, when all is said and done and you have demonstrated that you want to have the C4ISR equipment on these vehicles, you still have a long time between your taking ownership of these vehicles and the vehicles being in an operational mode.

Now, these things happen, and I think you have explained fairly clearly how you walk through this process and you came to the judgment that you came to. I don't agree with the results. I think that it is too long between manufacture completion and these things being in operation, especially under the policy that we have had of trying to get every single M1114 in the world that is available between the soldiers and the road as quickly as possible.

So my recommendation is that you try to come up with some kind of a plan that could utilize these M1114s in theater as quickly as possible, and use some of that time when they would be waiting for the 4th Infantry Division to marry up with their equipment, use some of that time in protecting people who are deployed right now. I think you can come up with a plan that does that.

So thank you for attending our hearing today. We will have a follow-up hearing, and the committee looks forward to your continuing to work on this issue.

And Mr. Skelton, the gentleman from Missouri, I think has a closing comment. Go right ahead.

Mr. SKELTON. Let me thank the chairman again for calling this hearing.

The American people are interested in this subject; it is not just limited to our Armed Services Committee. This is evidenced by the fact that some time ago, folks in Jefferson City, Missouri, raised money and had locally prepared and manufactured armor plating done there, which eventually ended up in Iraq, getting through the red tape, but they got it done.

So—the folks back home are very deeply interested in protecting their neighbors' sons and daughters who are over there, so I hope you will follow through on the recommendations coming from the Chair and from the other comments that we have had. I thank you for your appearance.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. Any closing comments any of you Generals would like to make?

Secretary HARVEY. Let me say thanks for this hearing, Mr. Chairman.

I think we share that mutual interest in ensuring that the soldier gets the maximum protection, and we believe our policy is one of providing that maximum protection. And that is what I try to emphasize, which is a combination of, as you say, getting the steel between the blast and the soldier, but also in the long run, giving him the knowledge so that he never even gets into that situation.

So we want to try to prevent him from ever being exposed to an IED by having that advanced situational awareness, and that is our long-range objective.

The CHAIRMAN. So I thank you, gentlemen, for participating, and let's have another—we will have another hearing soon and see where we go from here. And let's all pull together.

Secretary HARVEY. Thank you.

General CODY. Thank you.

[Whereupon, at 11:06 a.m., the committee was adjourned.]



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**A P P E N D I X**

OCTOBER 20, 2005

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**PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD**

OCTOBER 20, 2005

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**OPENING REMARKS OF CHAIRMAN HUNTER**

**Army M1114 Up-Armor HMMWV Distribution Strategy and  
Proper Allocation of Armored Vehicles in Theater**

October 20, 2005

The committee will come to order.

This morning the committee continues its ongoing review of Operation Iraqi Freedom force protection issues.

For the past two years we have had as one of our highest priorities the timely provision of adequately armored tactical vehicles to our men and women in combat. Today we will address a directly related issue having to do with the Army's distribution policy for new production M1114 Up-Armor HMMWVs (HUM-VEEs). The committee must fully understand the rationale behind the Army's tactical vehicle distribution policy that calls for the delivery, beginning in late July, of new production Up-Armor Humvees to the 4<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division (ID), currently based in Ft. Hood, Texas while there exists an immediate need for these vehicles

in the United States Central Command (CENTCOM) Theater of Operations, particularly in Iraq.

With us today to examine this issue are two distinguished public servants representing the United States Army: the Honorable Francis J. Harvey, Secretary of the Army, and General Richard A. Cody (goes by Dick), Vice Chief of Staff of the Army. Gentlemen, welcome back. Thank you for your service to the nation. It is good to see you both again.

This committee established force protection and specifically the adequacy of tactical wheeled vehicle protection as a high priority area of interest and concern. This marks another hearing in a continuing series of hearings and briefings this committee has held on Force Protection issues.

At issue today is whether the best armor solution is being provided to the warfighters who are fully engaged against a ruthless and adaptive enemy. Terrorists continue to employ roughly 30 daily improvised explosive device attacks against our troops in Iraq.

Until we have a better solution, adding armor to our military vehicles and expediting new armored vehicles to theater appears to be our best course of action to protect our troops. Our troops deserve nothing less than the best possible protection. They need to know that not only is the best equipment being provided to them, but that it is being done in a timely manner.

This brings us to the focus of today's hearing. Why is a Division that is still based here in the United States, and not scheduled to complete deployment to theater until the first of next calendar year, receiving 824 new production Up-Armor Humvees while there remains an immediate need in theater for these vehicles for both the Army and the Marine Corps?

I understand the Marines have an Up-Armor Humvee requirement of 2,814 but only have 744 of these vehicles on hand in Iraq -- just over 25 percent of their requirement.

I also understand that the Army has fulfilled its theater requirement for Up-Armor Humvees, yet the 3<sup>rd</sup> ID, the Division taking most of the Army casualties in Iraq, has less than 20 percent

of this total requirement. In addition, the Army is still operating with close to 1,800 Humvees that have only level 3 protection.

It would appear that there are immediate tactical vehicle armor needs that warrant a more immediate response. Units in theater have indicated a need for a level 1 armor solution. While we continue to emphasize parallel efforts for rapid development and fielding of systems to counter improvised explosive devices and persistent surveillance solutions, we must maintain a high priority on fielding the Up-Armor Humvee to protect our warfighters. We need to better understand why the Army has a policy that does not appear to be meeting the objective in the most timely possible manner.

Secretary Harvey, General Cody, we look forward to learning your assessment of the rationale behind the current M1114 Up-Armor Humvee distribution plan.

Before we hear from our witnesses, I would like to recognize the committee's ranking Member, my good friend Ike Skelton, for any remarks he may wish to make.

**[Following Mr. Skelton's remarks]**

Without objection, the witnesses' prepared statements will be entered into the record.

Secretary Harvey, we will start with you. Please begin.





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**DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD**

OCTOBER 20, 2005

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



**EQUIPPING OUR SOLDIERS:  
PROGRESS IN IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN**

AREA	SEPTEMBER 2003	NOW: OCTOBER 2005
SOLDIER BODY ARMOR	Est 10% OIF Soldiers equipped	All Soldiers and DoD civilians in theater equipped; 520,000 IBA/SAPI sets plus 173,000 Deltoid Auxiliary Plates issued
UP-ARMORED HMMWVs	500 OEF/OIF HMMWVs	10,194 HMMWVs fielded
TACTICAL WHEELED VEHICLE ADD-ON ARMOR KITS	Contingency mission only	23,292 vehicles in theater have add-on-armor kits (Level II)
ARMORED SECURITY VEHICLES (ASV)	0 ASVs in theater	161 in theater
BRADLEY REACTIVE ARMOR TILES (BRAT)	140 sets delivered; acceleration plan	689 sets delivered; acceleration plan
COUNTER-IED DEVICE	None Fielded	20,757 systems in theater
TACTICAL AND SMALL UAVs	0 OEF/OIF system deployed	155 systems in theater (9 Shadow plts/146 Ravens)
AIRCRAFT SURVIVABILITY EQUIPMENT (ASE)	All theater aircraft upgraded with basic ASE 1	All theater rotary wing aircraft to be upgraded with Latest Common Missile Warning System
BUFFALO	0 OEF/OIF system deployed	44 OEF/OIF system deployed 39 in OIF / 5 in OEF
AMMO PRODUCTION	5.56mm-286 M Round Worldwide 7.62mm-209 M Round Worldwide .50 Cal- 23.6 M Rounds Worldwide	5.56 mm-504 M Round Worldwide 7.62mm-129 M Round Worldwide .50 Cal-49.3 M Rounds Worldwide
RADIO PRODUCTION	700 / MONTH	4,500 / MONTH

# EPLRS Based HMMWV







**FOUO- Predecisional Draft** **Flow of UAHs to FT HOOD thru CTISF to Kuwait**




Unit	Requirement	At Hood	Thru CTISF	Unit Issued	Shipped To Kuwait
STB	19	28-Jul	4-Aug	5-Aug	10-Aug
SPT	17	28-Jul	4-Aug	5-Aug	10-Aug
MLRS	14	22-Aug	9-Sep	12-Sep	24-Oct
Other	22	22-Aug	9-Sep	12-Sep	24-Oct
2nd BCT	157	22-Sep	5-Oct	6-Oct	12-Oct
AVN BDE	83	26-Sep	6-Oct	7-Oct	14 Oct
3rd BCT	157	9-Oct	11-Oct	12-Oct	15-Oct
Fires	42	10-Oct	15-Oct	17-Oct	24-Oct
4th BCT	157	11-Oct	17-Oct	17-Oct	27-Oct
1st BCT	157	18-Oct	On going	23-Oct	1-Nov

*Arrived Kuwait ?*

*350 unknown*

*468 = Shipped*



Legend:

- ▲ At Hood
- Thru CTISF
- Issued to Unit
- ★ Shipped to KU

- Cost Avoidance:**
- Associated cost with Kuwaiti facilitation of EPLRS-based C4ISR install facility (estimated to be \$3.6M)
  - Fixed costs associated with operating a theater labor force for contractor install.
- Vulnerability Avoidance**
- Quality of work issues in an forward based location; eliminates damage to C2 equipment not shipped in a vehicle
  - Theater install - complex, high technical risk;
  - Greater payoff with CONUS install and associated benefits of localized training with solution. 4ID had opportunity to test.

TIMELINE FOR VEHICLE ALLOCATION IN THEATER

**MAY 2005**

**May 4, 2005**

**Full Committee Hearing on Status of Tactical Vehicle Armoring Initiatives.**

**Equipment allocation in theater is a topic of discussion.**

52

➤ **HASC continues to work equipment allocation issue with Army, Marine Corps, and Joint Staff.**



TIMELINE FOR VEHICLE ALLOCATION IN THEATER

**JUNE 2005**

**June 21, 2005**

**Full Committee Hearing on Marine Corps Underbody Armor Kits.**

**Marines indicate new theater requirement for Up-Armor Humvees of 2,814. Have only 493 on hand in theater.**

53

TIMELINE FOR VEHICLE ALLOCATION IN THEATER

**JULY 2005**

**July 21, 2005:**

HASC holds classified Force Protection Brief. Proper equipment allocation in theater is discussed.

**July 25, 2005:**

Army and Marine Corps reach agreement on revised Up-Armor Humvee distribution strategy. Agree to 4ID distribution plan.

54

➤ 4<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division begins receiving Up-Armor Humvees. Receives approximately 75.

➤ Army meets theater requirement for Up-Armor Humvees. Has close to 2,500 Humvees still operating with level 3 kits.

➤ Chairman Hunter raises equipment allocation issue to Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS).

TIMELINE FOR VEHICLE ALLOCATION IN THEATER

**AUGUST 2005**

**August 9, 2005**

General Myers responds to Chairman Hunter inquiry on proper equipment allocation in theater. CJCS indicates Up-Armor Humvee allocation is correct.

**August 23, 2005**

HASC Readiness staff travels to 4<sup>th</sup> ID. Staff learns of revised Up-Armor Humvee distribution plan – giving 4ID 824 Up-Armor Humvees.

55

- HASC staff formally inquires to Army about 824 Up-Armor Humvees allocated to 4<sup>th</sup> ID. Army gives schedule timeline of: 75-July, 319-August, and 430-September.
- Delivery begins to 4ID. As of August 28<sup>th</sup> the 4ID had received only 183.
- Army indicates 4th ID is a fully digitized division and has unique C4ISR requirements that can only be updated here in the United States.

TIMELINE FOR VEHICLE ALLOCATION IN THEATER

**September 2005**

**September 1, 2005:**

Army indicates to HASC staff in armor strategy brief need to rotate roughly 14,000 level 2 kitted Humvees out of theater and replace them with a Up-Armor Humvee level 1 solution.

**September 15, 2005:**

Chairman Hunter raises issue of 4ID Up-Armor Humvee distribution and proper equipment allocation in theater to CJCS General Myers and General Cody. Stresses there are still immediate needs in theater.

56

**September 22, 2005:**

Army officially responds to Chairman inquiry. Indicates final delivery of vehicles to 4ID will be October 20<sup>th</sup>. Communication package upgrades installed by October 28<sup>th</sup>.

TIMELINE FOR VEHICLE ALLOCATION IN THEATER

**September/October**

September 29, 2005

HASC holds full committee hearing on operations in Iraq. Chairman raises issue to General Abizaid.

October 19, 2005

4ID received 806 out of 824 Up-Armor Humvees

57

- **FOUR MONTHS** – From first delivery of Up-Armor Humvees to 4ID. Large immediate need for Up-Armor Humvees in theater.
- Army indicates it takes only 1-2 days per vehicle for communication upgrades to vehicles.
- Is the best armor being provided to the Soldiers and Marines operating in areas with the heaviest combat?

## 90 DAY CASUALTY REPORT

United States Marine Corps

2005/10/14	1-30 Days	31-60 Days	61-90 Days	Last 90 Days	*YTD	
<b>Hostile Death</b>						
I MEF	3	1	3	7	23	
II MEF	7	1	27	35	82	
III MEF	0	0	0	0	1	
<b>Non-Hostile Death</b>						
I MEF	1	0	0	1	1	
II MEF	0	1	1	2	4	
III MEF	0	0	0	0	0	
<b>Total Deaths</b>						
I MEF	4	1	3	8	24	} 111
II MEF	7	2	28	37	86	
III MEF	0	0	0	0	1	
<b>Hostile Injured</b>						
I MEF	64	25	20	109	236	
II MEF	140	95	119	354	755	
III MEF	1	0	2	3	17	
<b>Non-Hostile Injured**</b>						
I MEF	14	3	1	18	23	
II MEF	22	11	12	45	77	
III MEF	0	0	1	1	3	
<b>Total Injured**</b>						
I MEF	78	28	21	127	259	} 1111
II MEF	162	106	131	399	832	
III MEF	1	0	3	4	20	
<b>Returned to Duty (RTD)</b>						
I MEF	57	22	20	99	220	} 926
II MEF	115	90	106	311	694	
III MEF	1	0	2	3	12	
					non-return to duty	185

\* YTD begins at TOA for OIF 04-06 -- 27 Mar 05

\*\* Does not include NH NSI numbers

Note: RTD values are included in all injured columns

### Force XXI Battle Command, Brigade-and-Below (FBCB2)

FBCB2 provides situational awareness and command and control to the lowest tactical echelons. It will facilitate a seamless flow of battle command information across the battlespace, and will interoperate with external command and control and sensor systems, such as ABCS (formerly ATCCS).

The end result will be a vertical and horizontal integration of the digital battlespace and the brigade-and-below tactical unit levels.

The FBCB2 system is comprised of:

- Appropriate category of Applique or embedded system hardware.
- FBCB2 software—architecturally compliant with the DII COE.
- Position navigation and reporting capability (e.g., Global Positioning System (GPS) or an embedded position-navigation (POSNAV) capability).
- An interface to a terrestrial communication system (e.g., SINGARS and/or Enhanced Position Location Reporting System (EPLRS) radio) or to a satellite communications system for operations over long distances or rugged terrain.
- A combat identification capability (e.g., a BCIS capability was planned, prior to the cancellation of this program in late 2001).

Functionally, the FBCB2 system supports lower-echelon battle command tactical mission requirements including:

- Real-time situational awareness for commander, staff, and soldiers.
- Shared common picture of the battlespace.
- Graphical displays, with friendly and enemy unit locations.
- Target identification.
- Integrated logistics support.
- Communications/electronics interfaces with host platforms.

FBCB2 provides near-term C2 capabilities to Force XXI units at brigade and subordinate echelons. The FBCB2 system is comprised of hardware, software, and databases being acquired under the Applique and other programs. FBCB2 interfaces with:

- Items already found at brigade-and-below echelons. Examples of these are components of ATCCS and C4I capabilities embedded in weapons systems/platforms.
- The Army *Tactical Internet*, which is Thrust 2 of the Army's Implementation Strategy.

One of the most important aspects of this effort is the development of software and database capabilities which are common and seamlessly interoperable across all systems at these echelons. The FBCB2 software suite, which re-uses and incorporates existing commercial and government software wherever practical, will meet the open systems standards found in the ATA. The FBCB2 software suite is also being developed for forward compatibility with the mainstream of commercial hardware and software developments in order to facilitate the insertion of new technology as the Army evolves to Force XXI. FBCB2 software will incorporate essential functions from the M1A2's Inter-Vehicular Information System (IVIS) and from the Brigade-and-Below Command and Control (B2C2) prototype.

Situation awareness is provided by collecting, integrating and displaying a common *picture* of the battlefield that is consistent in both time and space at each user display. Software being developed for FBCB2 situation awareness allows the geographical location of individual soldiers, weapons/platforms, command posts, and other operational facilities to be collectively presented on a display. Because the Army *Tactical Internet* is a true, seamless internet based on the world-wide Internet model, it is possible to communicate each individual geolocation to every FBCB2-equipped user within the *Tactical Internet*. Addressing mechanisms allow geolocations to be flexibly and selectively communicated, and situation awareness software functionality will contain the necessary filters and *roll-up mechanisms* for each user to be able to selectively display only the locations of units of interest.

One of the methods by which operational control is achieved is through the transmission and receipt of orders, reports, and data in a timely manner. The VMF messaging function of FBCB2 software provides a key mechanism for effecting that exchange, using a set of 51 joint-approved VMF messages. Each FBCB2-capable system will have the ability to automatically or manually compose, edit, transmit, receive, and process either the full set of these messages or a subset which is specific to the mission profile of that system. The initial VMF message set of 21 messages was developed specifically for the TF XXI AWE and will be expanded for use in the Division XXI and Corps XXI AWEs. It provides the ability to communicate orders, reports, and data in near real-time over the bandwidth-restricted networks found at brigade-and-below echelons. The VMF messaging software also provides the ability to insert and extract data from these messages for automatic insertion or update of tactical databases.

FBCB2 is a complex system involving over 1,000 computers in each maneuver brigade, all tied together in a single seamless network. Since it is not possible for this system to start up, operate, and gracefully degrade of its own accord under all conditions without human intervention, FBCB2 software will provide the capability to initialize, control, and conduct an orderly shut-down of the FBCB2 system. Capabilities will be provided in the areas of:

- **System Management:** tasks such as loading network initialization data, maps, cryptographic keys, and network addresses prior to an operational deployment.
- **Communications Planning:** tasks such as laying out networks, making frequency assignments, and specifying address/circuit assignments/procedures prior to deployment.
- **Network Administration:** background tasks such as the monitoring and control of network resources and configuration once operations have commenced.
- **Network Management:** real-time tasks such as dynamic network reconfiguration, timekeeping, and circuit deactivation during operations.

The FBCB2 provides a common database with automated friendly positional information. It also provides current tactical battlefield geometry for friendly forces as well as for known or suspected enemy forces. Collectively, the FBCB2 systems generate the friendly operating picture. It displays relevant information, showing the user's his location, the location of other friendly forces, observed or templated enemy locations, and all known obstacles. It also provides preformatted, standardized reports, allowing leaders to disseminate graphic overlays and written OPORDs and FRAGOs rapidly. The war-fighter receives data "pushed" from all other battlefield systems to maintain real-time battle information. These battlefield systems draw upon the reports and positional data passed on from the lower tactical internet (TI) to provide information at higher command levels. They push information such as location of adjacent units, known and templated enemy positions, graphics, and OPORDs down to the FBCB2 users.

The FBCB2 screen displays an icon for each friendly vehicle in the company, which provides the BC with a clear picture of the BFV's location relative to the platoon. It also gives the platoon leader a picture of his location relative to the company.

Though the system works automatically on vehicles equipped to operate on the TI, it does not provide locations to every friendly element on the battlefield. For example, the system will not automatically track a dismounted rifle squad operating at extended ranges from an M2A3. Also, it does not cover any non-digitally -equipped units or allied or coalition forces operating next to the platoon.

Icons can be imported into FBCB2 for those elements, based on information received from FM radio reports, but the system will not update the icons in real time. Therefore, the leader cannot rely solely on FBCB2 to clear fires. No system can replace a leader's judgment in preventing fratricide.

FBCB2 displays enemy information from both top-down and bottom-up feeds. The battalion S2 inputs enemy icons into the system based on spot reports (SPOTREPs) generated by the battalion task force (TF) scouts. Based on his analysis, the S2 augments these actual locations with templated positions in the form of a situational template (SITTEMP).

As the platoon conducts operations, it adds to the enemy information by sending SPOTREPs of enemy activity and obstacles on FBCB2. When a BC sends a SPOTREP, he automatically creates an icon representing the enemy on other FBCB2 systems in the platoon. The platoon leader evaluates the validity of the report. Either he or the platoon sergeant forwards it to company, where either the commander or executive officer evaluates it for accuracy, then forwards it to the company's other platoons and to battalion.

To keep the enemy information current, units must update SPOTREPs concerning enemy locations represented by icons on the FBCB2. Elements send updates whenever the enemy situation changes—that is, when they destroy the enemy element or when the enemy element moves. As the information associated with an icon "ages," the icon fades, eventually disappearing from the FBCB2 screen. Unit SOP should govern the icon "fade" rate.

#### Functionality Implementation of FBCB2

**Applique** Use of appliques is intended to provide C2 capabilities to platforms that either have no embedded C2 capability or whose existing capability is inadequate to meet emerging user requirements. For a platform lacking an embedded digital capability, it will be *appliqued* with:

- Appropriate applique hardware.
- FBCB2 software.
- Position/navigation capability.
- An interface to a SINCGARS and/or EPLRS radio.



OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) U.S. CASUALTY STATUS *					
AS OF: Oct 19, 2005, 1000 a.m. EDT					
OIF U.S. Military Casualties by Phase	Total Deaths	KIA	Non-Hostile	WIA RTD **	WIA Not RTD **
Combat Operations - 19 Mar 03 thru 30 Apr 03	139	109	30	116	426
Post Combat Ops - 1 May thru Present	1832	1426	406	7945	6733
OIF U.S. DoD Civilian Casualties	5	5	0		
<b>Totals</b>	<b>1976</b>	<b>1540</b>	<b>436</b>	<b>8061</b>	<b>7159</b>

OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) U.S. CASUALTY STATUS ***					
AS OF: Oct 19, 2005, 1000 a.m. EDT					
OEF U.S. Military Casualties	Total Deaths	KIA	Non-Hostile	WIA RTD **	WIA Not RTD **
In and Around Afghanistan ***	200	116	84		
Other Locations ****	44	2	42		
OEF U.S. DoD Civilian Casualties	1	1			
<b>Worldwide Total</b>	<b>245</b>	<b>119</b>	<b>126</b>	<b>243</b>	<b>389</b>

* OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM includes casualties that occurred on or after March 19, 2003 in the Arabian Sea, Bahrain, Gulf of Aden, Gulf of Oman, Iraq, Kuwait, Oman, Persian Gulf, Qatar, Red Sea,
** These columns indicate the number of servicemembers who were Wounded In Action (WIA) and Returned to Duty within 72 hours AND WIA and Not Returned to Duty within 72 hours. To determine the total WIA figure, add the columns "WIA RTD" and "WIA Not RTD" together. These figures are updated on Tuesday unless there is a preceding holiday.
*** OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM (In and Around Afghanistan), includes casualties that occurred in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Uzbekistan.
**** OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM (Other Locations), includes casualties that occurred in Guantanamo Bay (Cuba), Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Jordan, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, Philippines, Seychelles, Sudan, Tajikistan, Turkey, and Yemen.

GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM													
CASUALTIES BY MILITARY SERVICE COMPONENT -- ACTIVE, GUARD and RESERVE													
October 7, 2001 Through August 27, 2005													
OIF/OEF	CAS TYPE	Army				Navy		Marines		Air Force			Totals
		USA	ARNG	USAR	USN	USNR	USMC	USMCR	USAF	ANG	USAFR		
<b>OIF TOTALS</b>		7,253	2,518	782	249	81	4,427	622	145	48	11	16,136	
OIF	Hos Death	699	210	51	12	12	379	81	8	0	0	1,452	
OIF	Non-Hos Dth	219	58	24	11	1	84	11	7	1	3	419	
OIF	WIA	6,335	2,250	707	226	68	3,964	530	130	47	8	14,265	
<b>OEF TOTALS</b>		524	69	40	31	1	88	3	54	4	0	814	
OEF	Hos Death	70	10	2	14	1	8	0	7	1	0	113	
OEF	Non-Hos Dth	56	12	11	11	0	13	2	13	0	0	118	
OEF	WIA	398	47	27	6	0	67	1	34	3	0	583	

USA=Army Active; ARNG=Army National Guard; USAR=Army Reserve; USN=Navy Active; USNR=Navy Reserve; USMC=Marine Corps Active; USMCR=Marine Corp Reserve;  
USAF=Air Force Active; ANG=Air National Guard; USAFR=Air Force Reserve  
OIF=Operation Iraqi Freedom; OEF=Operation Enduring Freedom; Hos=Hostile; Non-Hos=Non-Hostile; WIA=Wounded in Action

**Prepared by: Defense Manpower Data Center, Statistical Information Analysis Division**

3/8" RHA  
underbody/wheel  
well protection; by  
design there is none  
in the center  
covering the drive  
train.






3/8" RHA /wheel well protection;

# **MTVR Armor System (MAS) IED Attack**

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- Probable 122mm HE ~5-10 Meters in the rear passenger side corner of the troop compartment. The IED blew out all four rear tires but did no damage to armor other than paint flakes and ladder damage. Passenger side door was open and Marine was exposed and injured.

## INFORMATION PAPER

SUBJECT: Providing Force Protection Capability to Iraq: 4<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division Up Armored HMMWV (UAH) Flow to Iraq

1. Purpose. To provide requested information to the House Armed Services Committee, concerning the movement of UAH to Iraq in order to enable a successful Relief in Place/Transfer of Authority (RIP/TOA) between the 3<sup>rd</sup> Infantry Division and the 4<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division.

2. Background.

a. On 20 October, the Secretary and Vice Chief of Staff of the Army testified before the HASC concerning the decision to route 824 UAH through Fort Hood enroute to Iraq.

b. On 2 Nov 05, HASC, asked for an update on the flow of UAH.

3. Facts.

a. We appreciated the opportunity to discuss with you on 25 Oct 05 the Army's decision to route 824 UAH through Fort Hood, enroute to Iraq, in order to ensure a successful transition between the 3<sup>rd</sup> Infantry Division (3ID) and the 4<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division (4ID). Our key points were that:

(1) The Army is executing a carefully considered plan to provide the 4ID with the necessary command and control-enabled UAH in order for them to successfully relieve the 3ID.

(2) The Army views force protection holistically—encompassing all necessary enablers including armor, situational awareness, command and control, and other protective measures. This plan ensured 4ID was provided combat-ready fighting platforms versus simply armored transportation.

(3) The plan being executed was determined by the Army to be the most effective and only means available to guarantee the successful transition between 3ID and 4ID, due to the unique nature of the 4ID command and control systems and operational constraints.

b. Per your request, below is the most current information, as provided by the 4ID, concerning the flow of UAH:

- 18 Oct - Final shipment of UAH was received at Ft. Hood
  - 28 Oct - C4ISR equipment installed and final increment of vehicles accepted by 4th ID
- Current Status of vehicles:
- 19 vehicles in theater (already in use in Iraq)
  - 373 vehicles loaded on ships/enroute
  - 41 vehicles at port being loaded
  - 182 vehicles being loaded on railcars at Ft. Hood for transport to port, departure anticipated on or about 8 Nov.
  - 9 vehicles to be line hauled by truck to the port on 3 Nov.

c. The arrival of vehicles in Kuwait is carefully and deliberately phased to coincide with the arrival of the 4ID units via air. This phased plan provides for the rapid receipt of vehicles by the 4ID,

their essential final training and preparation, and prompt movement on to Iraq to meet prescribed timelines for relief of the 3ID. As described at our meeting with \_\_\_\_\_, any delays of UAH in Kuwait are anticipated to be very minimal. This timeline guarantees that the 4ID will be fully enabled and prepared to assume their responsibilities at this pivotal time and place.

4. We welcomed the opportunity to meet with \_\_\_\_\_ and we will endeavor to ensure that the Committee and staff are kept fully abreast of Army force protection plans and efforts.

