    [House Hearing, 109 Congress]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                             [H.A.S.C. No. 109-114]

                STATUS OF SECURITY AND STABILITY IN AFGHANISTAN

                                   __________

                                    HEARING

                                   BEFORE THE

                          COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

                            HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                           ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS

                                 SECOND SESSION

                                   __________

                                  HEARING HELD

                                 JUNE 28, 2006

    [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TONGRESS.#13

                       HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

                         U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

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                           One Hundred Ninth Congress

                      DUNCAN HUNTER, California, Chairman
    CURT WELDON, Pennsylvania            IKE SKELTON, Missouri
    JOEL HEFLEY, Colorado                JOHN SPRATT, South Carolina
    JIM SAXTON, New Jersey               SOLOMON P. ORTIZ, Texas
    JOHN M. McHUGH, New York             LANE EVANS, Illinois
    TERRY EVERETT, Alabama               GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi
    ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland         NEIL ABERCROMBIE, Hawaii
    HOWARD P. ``BUCK'' McKEON,           MARTY MEEHAN, Massachusetts
        California                       SILVESTRE REYES, Texas
    MAC THORNBERRY, Texas                VIC SNYDER, Arkansas
    JOHN N. HOSTETTLER, Indiana          ADAM SMITH, Washington
    WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina      LORETTA SANCHEZ, California
    JIM RYUN, Kansas                     MIKE McINTYRE, North Carolina
    JIM GIBBONS, Nevada                  ELLEN O. TAUSCHER, California
    ROBIN HAYES, North Carolina          ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania
    KEN CALVERT, California              ROBERT ANDREWS, New Jersey
    ROB SIMMONS, Connecticut             SUSAN A. DAVIS, California
    JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia               JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island
    W. TODD AKIN, Missouri               STEVE ISRAEL, New York
    J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia            RICK LARSEN, Washington
    JEFF MILLER, Florida                 JIM COOPER, Tennessee
    JOE WILSON, South Carolina           JIM MARSHALL, Georgia
    FRANK A. LoBIONDO, New Jersey        KENDRICK B. MEEK, Florida
    JEB BRADLEY, New Hampshire           MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam
    MICHAEL TURNER, Ohio                 TIM RYAN, Ohio
    JOHN KLINE, Minnesota                MARK UDALL, Colorado
    CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan          G.K. BUTTERFIELD, North Carolina
    MIKE ROGERS, Alabama                 CYNTHIA McKINNEY, Georgia
    TRENT FRANKS, Arizona                DAN BOREN, Oklahoma
    BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania
    THELMA DRAKE, Virginia
    JOE SCHWARZ, Michigan
    CATHY McMORRIS, Washington
    MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas
    GEOFF DAVIS, Kentucky
                       Robert L. Simmons, Staff Director
                   Stephanie Sanok, Professional Staff Member
                    Julie Unmacht, Professional Staff Member
                       Regina Burgess, Research Assistant

                                C O N T E N T S

                                  ----------

                         CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS
                                      2006

                                                                       Page

    Hearing:

    Wednesday, June 28, 2006, Status of Security and Stability in
      Afghanistan....................................................     1

    Appendix:

    Wednesday, June 28, 2006.........................................    57
                                  ----------

                            WEDNESDAY, JUNE 28, 2006
                STATUS OF SECURITY AND STABILITY IN AFGHANISTAN
                  STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

    Hunter, Hon. Duncan, a Representative from California, Chairman,
      Committee on Armed Services....................................     1
    Skelton, Hon. Ike, a Representative from Missouri, Ranking
      Member, Committee on Armed Services............................     2

                                   WITNESSES

    Eikenberry Lt. Gen. Karl, Commander, Combined Forces Command--
      Afghanistan, U.S. Army.........................................     9
    Kunder, Hon. James R., Assistant Administrator for Asia and the
      Near East, U.S. Agency for Intenational Development accompanied
      by John Gastright, the Afghanistan Coordinator at the State
      Department.....................................................    12
    Long, Hon. Mary Beth, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of
      Defense for International Security Affairs.....................     6
    Tandy, Hon. Karen P., Administrator, Drug Enforcement
      Administration.................................................     3

                                    APPENDIX

    Prepared Statements:

        Eikenberry, Lt. Gen. Karl....................................    77
        Kunder, Hon. James R.........................................    79
        Long, Hon. Mary Beth.........................................    73
        Skelton, Hon. Ike............................................    61
        Tandy, Hon. Karen P..........................................    66

    Documents Submitted for the Record:

        General Barry R. McCaffrey's (Ret.), June 3, 2006, Academic
          Report--Trip to Afghanistan and Pakistan, from May 19
          through May 26.............................................    89

    Questions and Answers Submitted for the Record:

        Ms. Davis of California......................................   101
        Ms. Sanchez..................................................   101
        Mr. Taylor...................................................   101
                STATUS OF SECURITY AND STABILITY IN AFGHANISTAN

                                  ----------

                              House of Representatives,
                                   Committee on Armed Services,
                              Washington, DC, Wednesday, June 28, 2006.
        The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:07 a.m., in room
    2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Duncan Hunter
    (chairman of the committee) presiding.

    OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. DUNCAN HUNTER, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
           CALIFORNIA, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

        The Chairman. The committee will come to order.
        This morning, the committee again focuses its attention on
    the Global War on Terror with a hearing on our ongoing security
    and stability activities in Afghanistan.
        Our witnesses are the Honorable Karen Tandy, administrator,
    Drug Enforcement Administration; Ms. Mary Beth Long, principal
    deputy assistant secretary for international security affairs,
    Department of Defense; Lieutenant General Karl Eikenberry,
    commanding general, Combined Forces Command-Afghanistan; and
    the Honorable James Kunder, assistant administrator for Asia
    and the Near East, U.S. Agency for International Development.
    Thank you, folks, for being with us today. We look forward to
    your testimony. Appreciate your appearance.
        Our forces in Afghanistan typify the quiet dedication and
    professionalism that we as Americans have grown used to seeing
    from our military personnel. Numbering over 21,000, these brave
    men and women often labor off the front page of our Nation's
    newspapers.
        Progress is deliberate and perhaps in the day-to-day view
    unexciting. But I think if you look back at how far that small
    but very important country has come, you begin to grasp the
    depth of the commitment of our military and civilian officials
    to see this job through until the end.
        We would do well to remember what Afghanistan looked like
    under the Taliban regime less than five years ago. Girls over
    the age of eight could not go to school. Women were treated as
    personal property. People could not believe as they saw fit.
    Taliban rulers coexisted happily and indeed supported the
    people who murdered thousands of Americans in a single day.
    Today schools are open. People can vote for their own leaders,
    a number of which are women. Far from being ruled by a regime
    that supports terrorism, Afghanistan is a fledgling democracy
    whose friendship and partnership are invaluable to the United
    States. Our last hearing on Afghanistan was over a year ago,
    and we need to get an update on the progress that is being made
    there.
        Since last summer, Afghanistan has held its first
    parliamentary and provincial elections in almost 30 years.
    December saw the first session of that inaugural parliament.
    Good men and women continue to step forward in Afghanistan and
    are taking active roles in their nation's stability and
    reconstruction.
        As expected, U.S. men and women continue to serve in the
    security sector both within North Atlantic Treaty Organization
    (NATO) and through the Combined Forces Command-Afghanistan.
    Military and civilians together are also building a better
    Afghanistan through provincial reconstruction teams and U.S.
    Agency for International Development projects.
        Coalition partners are also maintaining or even increasing
    their commitment to Afghanistan's stability and reconstruction.
    This summer, the NATO-led International Security Assistance
    Force will take over primary security responsibility for three-
    quarters of the country and will lead reconstruction efforts in
    northern, western and southern Afghanistan.
        The Afghan National Army continues to come on-line. One
    year ago, no ANA units were capable of taking the lead in
    security operations. This year, six units serve on the front
    lines of their own country's defense. A full 40 combat units
    fight along side coalition forces in the day-to-day effort to
    keep peace and build security in Afghanistan.
        A lot of work remains to be done. Afghanistan and its
    partners must cut off any resurgence of Taliban influence and
    violence now, while also clamping down on a serious poppy
    cultivation issue. No one denies that these are difficult
    problems and that the end is still far off.
        But I think the Afghans, Americans and international
    partners prove every day that, if we will give the people of
    Afghanistan the tools, they will fight for their nation's long-
    term stability and development.
        During today's hearings, I hope we hear how we can help
    you, as U.S. officials deeply involved in these efforts, to do
    your jobs better.
        So thank you for being with us. This is a very critical
    issue. And it is good to revisit this issue at this point.
        And before we go to our witnesses, let me recognize my
    great colleague on the committee, the gentleman from Missouri,
    Mr. Skelton, for any remarks he would like to make.

    STATEMENT OF HON. IKE SKELTON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM MISSOURI,
              RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

        Mr. Skelton. Mr. Chairman, to speed up the hearing, because
    we have so many witnesses, I ask unanimous consent that my
    prepared statement be put into the record.
        The Chairman. Without objection.
        Mr. Skelton. I welcome the witnesses. And it is especially
    good to see General Eikenberry here once again.
        And thank you, sir, for your leadership. It is
    extraordinary.
        It has been more than four and a half years since the
    invasion of Afghanistan following the terrorist attack of
    September the 11th. And the question is, what type of progress
    have we made since that time?
        The news media, General, reports about the resurgence of
    the Taliban in the south, about the various firefights that go
    on. Are we fighting the Taliban? Plus, are we fighting the al
    Qaeda or doing so in combination thereof? Are we fighting just
    warlords because of the nature of the culture?
        There is a transition coming up with NATO and its
    leadership and our role in the NATO piece; the huge amount of
    heroin that is being produced and whether the enemy or enemies
    are profiting from that--we would like to learn all of that
    from you.
        And since we have so many witnesses, I will stop at that.
        But we have real challenges there. I was led to believe a
    year ago that there was light at the end of the tunnel. And if
    there is light at the end of the tunnel today, we would like to
    know about it. Or will we be there 20 or 25 years?
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Skelton can be found in the
    Appendix on page 61.]
        The Chairman. I thank the gentleman.
        Administrator Tandy, thank you for being with us today. And
    obviously, your piece of this challenge is a very important
    one, one that we don't focus on a lot in this committee, but
    nonetheless one that compels review. So thank you for being
    with us, and we look forward to your statement.
        And incidentally, the written statements of all of our
    guests today will be taken into the record, so feel free to
    summarize, and your written statement will be incorporated.

         STATEMENT OF HON. KAREN P. TANDY, ADMINISTRATOR, DRUG
                       ENFORCEMENT ADMINSITRATION

        Ms. Tandy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Hunter, Ranking Member Skelton and the
    distinguished members of this committee, the Drug Enforcement
    Agency (DEA) and I, personally, appreciate the opportunity to
    appear before you today and discuss DEA's counternarcotics
    efforts in Afghanistan. And on behalf of my 11,000 DEA members,
    and in particular the brave men and women serving in
    Afghanistan with DEA, I thank you for your support for our
    counternarcotics efforts there.
        Much of the security and stability in Afghanistan rises and
    falls with the drug trade. The country's production of 92
    percent of the world's heroin substantially contributes to the
    instability, violence, and lawlessness that we see in
    Afghanistan.
        This drug trade also has the capability of financing
    terrorists and those who support them. While in power, as the
    chairman referred to, the Taliban banned poppy cultivation. But
    they did not ban trafficking or processing of opium. The
    Taliban, during that time, also used its poppy cultivation ban
    to drive up the price of its own substantial stockpiles of
    opium. The Taliban's association with opium and heroin
    smuggling trade continues today, as they opportunistically use
    proceeds from the Afghan drug trade of today, that it taxes and
    protects, as a source of revenue for the anti-coalition
    activities.
        As President Karzai said recently, if we don't destroy
    poppy, it will destroy us. Attacking the drug trade is critical
    to achieving stability in this struggling country. And DEA is
    combating drugs in Afghanistan, just as we do in every other
    country of the 85 foreign offices that we hold. We are going
    after the kingpins and the criminal organizations that control
    the drug supply.
        I need to be very clear on a point that often is confusing.
    DEA goes after the traffickers and the transnational drug
    enterprises at the command and control level, not the crops.
    DEA is not involved in poppy eradication. Crop eradication is
    handled by the State Department's Bureau for International
    Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs.
        While crop eradication and interdiction, or the seizure of
    druglords, if you will, are important to be sure to achieve
    lasting success in reducing the supply and in restoring the
    rule of law, we also must focus on identifying, disrupting, and
    dismantling high-level trafficking organizations, their
    leaders, their infrastructure, and their illicit assets, if we
    are to have lasting success. Targeting the Afghan kingpins also
    will help prevent this country from returning, as it once was
    25 years ago, the major supplier of heroin to the United
    States.
        As this committee appreciates, the challenges we face
    fighting the drug trade in Afghanistan are tough: conducting
    law enforcement operations in a war zone often controlled by
    powerful heroin warlords in a country where the drug trade and
    culture is deeply entrenched, with an undeveloped
    infrastructure and fledgling Afghan law enforcement
    organizations. But these challenges are not insurmountable. In
    the past year alone, we have made great progress.
        Afghanistan has promulgated new narcotics laws. They have
    conducted their first arrest and search warrants under those
    laws. They have ordered the first extradition of a major drug
    trafficker connected to the Taliban.
        They have established a central tribunal court and
    prosecutors, which they did not have before, and conducted the
    successful prosecution of more than 100 traffickers.
        In addition, DEA's counternarcotics programs are proving to
    be a valuable asset in the stabilization of Afghanistan and a
    value added to the security of the U.S. and coalition forces
    there. Since December 2005, DEA has collected and shared
    actionable intelligence with coalition and Afghan partners on
    more than eight occasions. And that intelligence that we shared
    directly averted deadly attacks against U.S. military personnel
    and leaders in Afghanistan.
        This past April marked the one-year anniversary of DEA's
    deployment of our foreign-deployed advisory and support, or
    FAST, teams, as they are known. FAST, which are supported and
    largely funded by DOD, re-enforce our primary mission of
    dismantling the drug-trafficking organizations in that country
    and that region.
        As part of the FAST team investigations against the drug
    supply networks, the FAST teams also destroy related opium
    storage sites, heroin processing labs and precursor chemical
    supplies, all of which directly related to the targeted drug
    enterprises.
        In just the first 6 months of those DEA operations with the
    FAST teams, opium seizures totaled 38 metric tons, which is a
    700 percent increase from the prior 6 months of opium seizures
    in Afghanistan.
        These FAST teams also were deployed to Afghanistan to
    establish the National Interdiction Unit, or NIU, as it is
    known. DEA mentors the NIU and assists them in building their
    capacity as our future counterparts to disrupt and dismantle
    these trafficking organizations.
        The first joint DEA-NIU investigation did just that. It
    resulted in the arrest of Misri Khan, the long-time head of a
    major Afghan heroin organization, and two of his key
    lieutenants. All 3 of those defendants have been convicted and
    each sentenced to 17 years in prison by the new central
    narcotics tribunal in Kabul under the new Afghan narcotics
    laws.
        DEA activities in Afghanistan also resulted in the October
    2005 landmark extradition of an Afghan citizen from
    Afghanistan. In that instance, the person extradited was a
    major trafficker, Haji Baz Mohammad, who boasted that he sent
    heroin as a form of Jihad against the United States in order to
    kill Americans.
        This Taliban-linked narco-terrorist, the first ever
    extradited to the United States from Afghanistan, was charged
    with conspiring to export more that $25 million worth of heroin
    from Afghanistan to the United States and other countries.
        In April of last year, DEA arrested former Taliban member
    Haji Bashir Noorzai on U.S. charges that he conspired to export
    more than $50 million worth of heroin from Afghanistan and
    Pakistan into the United States and other countries. His arrest
    led to the disruption of his entire organization.
        Both Noorzai and Baz Mohammad are awaiting trial in the
    U.S. courts. Both are the only two Afghan narcotics traffickers
    ever to have been listed among the world's most-wanted drug
    kingpins and sanctioned by President Bush under the Foreign
    Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act.
        DEA also has been active in the countries surrounding
    Afghanistan. In 2002, we began leading a 19-country initiative
    known as Operation Containment, which essentially was intended
    to place a security belt around Afghanistan to prevent
    chemicals from entering the country and opium and heroin from
    leaving.
        This strategy has been successful. Prior to Operation
    Containment, less than one-half of one metric ton of heroin was
    seized. In the past fiscal year, Operation Containment resulted
    in the seizure of 11.5 metric tons of heroin, which is almost a
    3,000 percent increase.
        DEA is continuing to expand our operational capacity in
    Afghanistan through the assistance and funding of DOD. DOD is
    funding and constructing a base camp that is scheduled to be
    completed this fall to provide housing and mission support for
    our FAST and NIU teams.
        And in addition, on June 10th, the first two of eight DOD-
    funded Mi-17 helicopters arrived in Kabul. And they will be
    operational by mid-July and dedicated to these counternarcotics
    efforts of DEA and the NIU. The remaining six helicopters are
    scheduled to arrive at the rate of two helicopters every six
    weeks until we reach the total of eight. These Mi-17s are
    essential, and they will be a significant help in providing
    greater mobility and increased operational security for our DEA
    and NIU agents on the ground.
        To close, the road ahead is difficult. And there is no
    short-term solution to these long-entrenched challenges facing
    Afghanistan. But DEA's counternarcotics efforts there, with the
    assistance of DOD, are contributing to the rebuilding of this
    struggling country. We are strengthening Afghanistan's
    institutions of justice and policing capabilities. And we are
    helping to protect the U.S. and coalition troops from deadly
    attacks that are funded in part by drug traffickers. All in
    all, the international law enforcement community's
    counternarcotics efforts are setting the stage for a more
    lawful and stable Afghanistan in the future.
        Thank you, and I look forward to answering the committee's
    questions at the appropriate time.
        [The prepared statement of Ms. Tandy can be found in the
    Appendix on page 66.]
        The Chairman. Thank you very much.
        Ms. Long, thank you for being with us today. And what do
    you think?

     STATEMENT OF HON. MARY BETH LONG, PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ASSISTANT
        SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

        Ms. Long. Thank you, Chairman Hunter. Thank you,
    Congressman Skelton and distinguished members, for the
    opportunity to be here today to speak about Afghanistan.
        As you know, it has been about a year since Assistant
    Secretary Rodman was here to speak about Afghanistan.
        The Chairman. You might get a little closer to that mike.
        Ms. Long. Yes, sir.
        And a lot has been accomplished in that year. That said,
    there is a lot that we need to do.
        As you know, we at the Department of Defense are fully
    committed, as is Congress, to assisting the Afghan people and
    the government in creating a place where there is long-term
    stability and economic progress that is sustainable. We believe
    that progress toward these goals is integral to our success in
    the Global War on Terror.
        But the United States cannot do this alone. We must do so
    with our allies and our partners.
        Afghanistan must never again serve as the training ground
    for terrorists. Our goal continues to be a moderate, democratic
    Afghan government that is capable of controlling its territory
    and achieving economic self-sufficiency. To that end, the
    Afghans are and will remain our true partners.
        The Taliban, ladies and gentlemen, have absolutely nothing
    to offer. They prey on ignorance and poverty. They work through
    violence and intimidation.
        As Lieutenant General Eikenberry will elaborate, the
    coalition, the International Security Assistance Force, or
    ISAF, and importantly the Afghan national security forces are
    capable of and will be capable in the long term of handling
    this kinetic Taliban challenge.
        The larger problem lies in fostering the overall conditions
    that will enable the Afghans to achieve long-term stability and
    economic self-sufficiency.
        We must continue helping that government build and sustain
    an environment in which its citizens, from the city dwellers to
    the farmers, from the teachers to the women and children at
    home, to have a better life through legitimate means.
        That is happening in much of the country. However, it is
    not happening everywhere. In places where the insurgency is
    active and where opium is the primary crop, the Afghan and our
    forces are challenged. This is a long-term effort, and it
    requires military muscle and more.
        We see our military's hard work, their bravery, and their
    tremendous achievements most prominently now in Operation
    Mountain Thrust, where, with our allies and the Afghan National
    Army, we are successfully engaging the Taliban.
        And Lieutenant General Eikenberry will elaborate on this
    multi-month, multi-province operation and how it is preparing
    the ground for long-term stability and for the transition to
    additional responsibilities by NATO.
        He will also elaborate on the other DOD missions, the
    training and equipping of the Afghan National Security Forces.
        The Afghan National Army, in particular, has made
    considerable progress in the last year. And both of our
    governments understand that it is Afghanistan's own forces that
    must take increasing responsibility for Afghan security.
        I believe that Administrator Tandy talked to you about the
    threat that opium plays. As she outlined, the Department of
    Defense does contribute to the overall counternarcotics effort,
    and I won't repeat those contributions here.
        Just as military matters are the responsibility of the
    Department of Defense, the U.S. State Department and the U.S.
    Agency of International Development have a lead on diplomacy
    and development. And I will leave the full treatment of those
    topics to my State Department colleagues and for Mr. Kunder.
        Of course, security and development are related. You can't
    have one without the other. And that means that, at a policy
    level and at an operational level, we must work together. And
    we do.
        You see that working together most dramatically at the end
    of the chain, which is our provincial reconstruction teams,
    where representatives of USAID, the Department of Defense and
    the other agencies work together at an operational level, where
    they foster security, development, and more capable government
    for the population. This is an attempt to overturn decades, if
    not a generation, of deterioration at the provincial and
    district levels.
        Happily, as you know, the United States is not alone in
    this pursuit. Canada recently took responsibility for the
    provincial reconstruction team (PRT) in Kandahar province and
    southern command. United Kingdom took responsibility for a PRT
    in Helmand province, with contributions from Denmark and
    Estonia. And the Dutch, as you know, are sending substantial
    forces to lead the PRT in Uruzgan province, with contributions
    from Australia.
        The transfer of authority in the south to NATO in the
    coming weeks will be treated more elaborately by Lieutenant
    General Eikenberry in his remarks.
        As you know, we have active diplomacy. And the
    international community provides a lot of needed economic and
    other assistance to Afghanistan.
        Earlier this year, at the donors' conference in London,
    there was an Afghanistan compact, which was constructed as the
    post-bond framework for development and reconstruction in
    Afghanistan. For the donors, the compact emphasizes
    accountability and coordination. For the Afghans, it represents
    its capability-building and local ownership of the development
    process.
        Our bilateral relations remain close and vibrant. From the
    Department of Defense perspective, the first meetings to
    advance the strategic partnership--and that agreement was
    signed by President Karzai and President Bush in May of last
    year. And our follow-on defense meetings took place just weeks
    ago in March.
        As you know, democracy is taking root. After successful
    parliamentary elections last year, they were followed by a
    nationwide turnout for the national assembly elections, which
    was accomplished and followed through with the first national
    assembly inaugural session just weeks ago. Thus far, the
    national assembly has confirmed 20 members of its cabinet and 2
    Supreme Court justices. It also modified and passed President
    Karzai's budget.
        The legitimate economy is growing. However, Afghanistan
    must still create a legal framework that will encourage private
    initiatives and foreign investments. The banking sector remains
    weak, and that is problematic for paying soldiers and the
    teachers and those who are in the provinces and the district.
        Despite progress on many fronts, violence is indeed up this
    year. The Taliban are testing ISAF forces. But factional
    violence has gone down, in part because many of the Mujahedeen
    and the illegally armed groups were at least partially disarmed
    over the last year.
        But there is much more to do, and General Eikenberry will
    speak to many of those issues.
        We need to help the government connect with the provinces
    and the districts and to provide a robust judicial sector. We
    believe that the overwhelming majority of the Afghan people
    have confidence in President Karzai and in the advances that
    they made. We share that confidence.
        We make progress every day, but we must keep in mind that
    this is a long-term effort.
        One of the world's least-developed countries, Afghanistan
    has few national resources that are developed. It has little
    infrastructure. It has a very high illiteracy rate. And recent
    history is marked by the Soviet invasion and decades-long civil
    wars.
        We work together with the Afghans to overthrow the military
    arm of the equally despised Taliban regime. Expectations are
    high. And our nations must work together to rise to meet that
    challenge.
        I know that the support of the Congress and the American
    people is behind our intergovernmental efforts in Afghanistan.
    And I welcome your comments.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        [The prepared statement of Ms. Long can be found in the
    Appendix on page 73.]
        The Chairman. Thank you very much.
        General Eikenberry, how are you this morning?
        General Eikenberry. Very well, sir.
        The Chairman. We look forward to your comments. Thanks for
    your service and the service of all the great folks who are
    carrying the burden in that very challenging area of
    operations. And please let us know how things are going.

      STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. KARL EIKENBERRY, COMMANDER, COMBINED
                 FORCES COMMAND-AFGHANISTAN, U.S. ARMY

        General Eikenberry. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.
        Chairman Hunter, Representative Skelton, members of the
    committee, it is an honor to be here today representing the
    28,000 soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines of the Combined
    Forces Command-Afghanistan.
        When the United States and its coalition partners began
    Operation Enduring Freedom in October 2001, we started with two
    missions: first, to defeat al Qaeda and their Taliban allies;
    and second, together with the Afghan people and the
    international community, to help create the conditions where
    international terrorism could never again find witting support
    and sanctuary.
        Viewed from the baseline of October 2001, the progress made
    to date in Afghanistan is truly significant: a democratically
    elected president, a sitting parliament, a confirmed cabinet, a
    functioning constitution, Afghan National Security Forces that
    are steadily growing in strength and capability, and the
    ongoing reconstruction projects across the country that are
    improving the lives of the Afghan people.
        Against this progress, Afghanistan remains the target of
    terrorist groups, drug traffickers, and a very determined
    criminal element. Not all violence can be attributed to Taliban
    or al Qaeda, as narco-trafficking, tribal conflicts and land
    disputes also continue to challenge the overall security
    environment.
        The enemy we face is not particularly strong, but the
    institutions of the Afghan state remain relatively weak. This
    situation is enabling the enemy to operate in the absence of
    government presence in some areas of Afghanistan. To be sure,
    the presence and strength of the Taliban has grown in some
    districts, primarily in southern Afghanistan. Since being
    removed as a regime, they have reconstituted elsewhere. We are
    seeing enemy forces now operate in formations of 40 to 50
    fighters in some districts. They are demonstrating better
    command and control, and they are fighting hard.
        Our current operation in southern Afghanistan, Operation
    Mountain Thrust, seeks to deny the enemy safe havens, to
    interdict his movement routes and, most importantly, extend the
    authority and writ of the central government of Afghanistan.
        The combat phase of this operation is only the precursor to
    our longer-term goal of strengthening good governance, the rule
    of law, reconstruction and humanitarian assistance, and
    economic development. This emphasis on government and
    development is indicative of our overall approach to the Afghan
    campaign.
        Provincial reconstruction teams are actively engaging
    district and provincial leaders to facilitate good governance.
    Medical assistance teams are treating thousands of Afghans who
    otherwise would not have access to medical care. And we are
    building hundreds of miles of roads. This latter effort is key
    to expanding the reach of the central government and
    jumpstarting the rural economy. I cannot overstate its
    importance.
        I have touched on our current operations, and I will be
    happy to answer any questions you may have in the discussion to
    follow. But with your permission, Chairman, I would like to now
    discuss the future.
        This summer, the NATO International Security Assistance
    Force, or NATO ISAF, will expand its areas of operations from
    northern and western Afghanistan into southern Afghanistan. We
    anticipate that NATO will assume responsibility for the overall
    security mission for all of Afghanistan at some point later
    this year.
        A key point to remember is that the United States' full
    commitment in Afghanistan will remain undiminished. As a NATO
    member, the United States will remain by far the single-largest
    contributor or troops and capability. We will maintain our
    strong national capability to support our counterterrorism
    mission to strike al Qaeda and its associated movements
    wherever and whenever they are found. Moreover, our military
    will continue to play a central role in the training and
    equipping of the Afghan national security forces. And we will
    remain a very important contribution to Afghanistan's
    reconstruction.
        In addition to the transition from U.S.-led coalition to
    NATO ISAF international military leads, Afghanistan's continued
    development will be marked by three other important
    transitions.
        The second transition under way is the increasing emphasis
    by the government of Afghanistan and the international
    community on the non-military aspects of our collective
    efforts.
        As I just explained, this effort relates to Operation
    Mountain Thrust. I need to emphasize that it is the heart of
    our long-term effort to make Afghanistan a viable self-
    sustaining member of the international community, free from
    international terror. In short, we seek to rebuild
    Afghanistan's middle ground--that is, its civil society ravaged
    by three decades of warfare, extremism, and terrorism.
        Throughout Afghanistan's 34 provinces, rebuilding the
    middle ground remains the primary concern of the Afghan people.
    Indeed, a recent poll of the Afghans showed that 80 percent see
    economic reconstruction, not security, as their number-one
    need.
        To further enhance security and stability, the government
    of Afghanistan and the international community must continue to
    work together to improve governance, the rule of law, economic
    reconstruction, and social services.
        In campaigns such as this, the construction of roads and
    schools can be just as decisive, if not more, than military
    operations. The international community must make greater
    efforts in this area.
        The third transition is from international-to Afghan-lead
    in all dimensions of Afghan governance and security. The growth
    in size and capability of the Afghan national security forces--
    that is, the national army and the police--is one of the most
    visible aspects of this important transition.
        Today, over 66,000 army and police are trained, equipped
    and engaged in security operations. The Afghan national
    security forces, partnered with the coalition and NATO units,
    are expanding their reach and presence more widely within the
    country. They are increasingly playing a major role in ensuring
    the stability of their nation, as evidenced by their very
    successful participation in the ongoing Operation Mountain
    Thrust.
        It is imperative that the international community maintain
    its support and its commitment to this essential but still
    emerging institution of the Afghan state. We can anticipate
    emerging equipment requirements for the Afghan national army
    and police that NATO and the international community will need
    to address.
        The fourth and final transition relates to the need to find
    cooperative approaches to the fight against international
    terrorism. Afghanistan, Pakistan, and the international
    community are threatened by a common enemy. We have endeavored
    to adopt a coordinated military approach to address this
    threat, working to improve our combined operational
    effectiveness and build mutual confidence.
        For example, on June the 6th, I represented the United
    States at the 17th session of the Afghan-Pakistan-U.S.
    Tripartite Commission at Rawalpindi, Pakistan. This session,
    like those before it, served to further cooperation between the
    coalition, Afghanistan, NATO ISAF and Pakistani military
    forces. We aim to expand information-sharing, communications
    and personal interactions at all levels of command. And I
    believe we are making significant progress.
        In my discussion of the progress in Afghanistan, I do not
    want to discount the enormous obstacles that remain. Much work
    needs to be done. And the international community must remain
    patient and maintain uncompromising long-term commitment to
    Afghanistan's success if we are collectively to prevail.
        Most pressing, the continuing assaults on Afghanistan by
    international terrorism, as well as narco-trafficking and the
    related corrosive effects on the government of Afghanistan,
    could threaten the viability of the Afghan state.
        However, we should not be daunted by these challenges.
    Instead, we should take stock of the tremendous progress that
    Afghanistan and the international community have made to date
    and apply that same commitment to the difficulties that lie
    ahead.
        Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, thank you again
    to this opportunity. And I look forward to your questions.
        [The prepared statement of General Eikenberry can be found
    in the Appendix on page 77.]
        The Chairman. Thank you, General, for a very comprehensive
    statement.
        Mr. Kunder, thank you for being with us, sir. And the floor
    is yours.

      STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES KUNDER, ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR FOR
         ASIA AND THE NEAR EAST, U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL
      DEVELOPMENT ACCOMPANIED BY JOHN GASTRIGHT, THE AFGHANISTAN
                  COORDINATOR AT THE STATE DEPARTMENT

        Mr. Kunder. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Skelton, members
    of the committee. I appreciate the opportunity to be here
    today.
        I am joined by Mr. John Gastright, the Afghanistan
    coordinator at the State Department, if members of the
    committee have any questions regarding our diplomatic or
    political efforts in Afghanistan.
        Sir----
        The Chairman. Excellent.
        And I have to leave for just a few minutes, but I will be
    back very shortly, Mr. Kunder, but go right ahead, sir.
        Mr. Kunder. Thank you, sir.
        On the tried and true principle that a picture is worth a
    thousand words, I have in our testimony pack this powerpoint
    that I am going to walk through very briefly, about ten slides,
    to summarize the program. I believe each member has a copy of
    this in your packet.
        This is entitled ``Progress in Afghanistan.'' And it
    summarizes very briefly the U.S. Agency for International
    Development reconstruction program in Afghanistan.
        I want to say at the outset, as several members of the
    panel have already said, we work in very close tandem with our
    military colleagues. I had the opportunity to work in
    Afghanistan myself, and my tour of duty overlapped with the
    general's during his earlier tour.
        I think members of the committee are aware of the fact that
    this is the second time around for General Eikenberry in
    Afghanistan. He has given two years of devoted service to the
    reconstruction of that country.
        On this slide show, the very first slide just is the cover
    obviously, but I just wanted to point out that picture in the
    lower right-hand corner. I know many members of the committee
    have been to Afghanistan, but that gives you some sense of the
    terrain we are working in. This happens to be a road project
    being pushed into the central highlands. But it is some of the
    most tortured terrain in the world in which to do
    reconstruction activities.
        The first slide, entitled ``Transition Strategy,''
    basically gives the outline of what we are trying to accomplish
    from a reconstruction point of view in Afghanistan.
        Starting from the bottom of the page, it talks about the
    early stages of our work was in relief and stabilization, where
    we tried to take on problems like the humanitarian needs of
    Afghanistan, the displaced people across the country from that
    23 years of fighting that Mary Beth Long referred to.
        Where we are now is in the middle of this chart, what we
    are calling the reconstruction phase. What we are trying to do
    is focus on building Afghan capacity to take care of their own
    problems, building the Afghan government's capacity, taking
    care of economic growth because we know foreign aid is not the
    long-term answer to Afghanistan's economic stability. And where
    we are headed is at the top of the page. And we are looking at
    about 2011 forward, where we hope the Afghan government can
    take on the bulk of the responsibilities for their own
    reconstruction activities.
        On slide three, is a quick snapshot of the major
    infrastructure projects around the country, including both
    electrical and road construction projects. I think this
    illustrates two things. Number one, as we understand the
    criticality of this physical infrastructure reconstruction to
    bringing stability to Afghanistan--and we are doing a lot of
    work around the country. The total roadwork right now would
    stretch from Washington to Tulsa, Oklahoma.
        But you can also see from this slide that there is an
    awfully lot of the country that isn't spoken for yet. We are
    trying to get some of our other allies involved in the
    infrastructure area. But there is a lot going on, a lot more
    work to be done in physical infrastructure.
        Slide four gives a couple snapshots of road construction
    activities in Afghanistan. There is very extensive
    infrastructure work going on. And as I say here, roughly 75
    percent of the employees working on the Kandahar Highway, for
    example, are Afghans themselves. We are trying to bring the
    Afghan ministries and the Afghan construction firms into this
    so that we leave something behind.
        This work--and again, I know some of you have seen some of
    these highways--to build the Kabul to Kandahar Highway, we
    literally trucked blacktop asphalt from Pakistan, a truckload
    at a time, over the Khyber Pass.
        If you can imagine a road construction project where you
    travel truckloads at a time, dump a load of asphalt, then the
    truck turns around and drives back over the Khyber Pass to
    Pakistan to get another truckload, this is the kind of
    construction difficulties we are facing.
        Yes, sir?
        Mr. Saxton [presiding]. Could I just interrupt you for just
    a moment----
        Mr. Kunder. Yes, sir.
        Mr. Saxton [continuing]. To inform my friends on the
    committee.
        This is a single vote. Mr. McHugh has gone to vote. He will
    be back. When he comes back, I will go vote. So you all go,
    make up your own mind when you want to vote during this next 20
    minutes or so. But we are going to keep going.
        Mr. Kunder. Should I continue, sir?
        Mr. Saxton. Yes.
        Mr. Kunder. Slide five gives a snapshot of the schools and
    health clinics we are building in Afghanistan.
        Again, we try to illustrate two things: one, we are trying
    to cover the whole country but, second, there are enormous
    needs and enormous gaps.
        And slide six shows a typical school construction project,
    either schools that had deteriorated over the last 23 years of
    violence or schools that had been destroyed in the fighting. On
    the left are the schools before and on the right are the
    schools afterwards.
        Slide number seven shows our part in the battle against
    opium poppy cultivation. What we are trying to do is develop
    what we call the alternative livelihoods, that is to say, a
    better chance at a better living without growing poppies. I
    think members of the committee are familiar with these
    statistics, but wheat is the primary grain crop in Afghanistan.
    Depending on the price for opium, a farmer can earn somewhere
    between 10 to 30 times growing poppy what he can earn growing
    wheat--10 to 30 times. So that the problem is what kinds of
    alternative livelihoods can we develop--grapes, spices,
    almonds--where a farmer can get a decent return on investment.
        Slide eight shows the kinds of programs we are working on
    to battle opium poppy cultivation. We are doing--in the left-
    hand side you see some workers working on an irrigation canal.
    We do short-term work like this so farmers can get back to work
    without engaging in opium poppy growing. And then on the lower
    right, you see a grape field. And this is the kind of long-term
    economic opportunities we are trying to work on.
        Slide nine talks about what we are really trying to get at
    and that is building a long-term Afghan economy. The economy
    was so devastated during the years of the civil war that what
    we have got to do is rebuild the financial sector. We have got
    to create an investment regime that brings in private sector
    investment. And we are having some success. The photo on the
    right shows a sugar manufacturing facility in one of the new
    industrial parks we are building in Afghanistan.
        Slide ten attempts to answer for the committee a question I
    often get, which is, is the reconstruction effort being slowed
    down by violence in the country, by the increased violence that
    General Eikenberry was talking about.
        The top three slides show cumulative progress in paving
    roads, putting farmers back to work and building schools and
    clinics. And you can see the trend line continues up. We are
    able to continue progress in these critical reconstruction
    areas.
        The bottom slide, though, shows our casualties. These are
    civilian casualties primarily Afghans themselves who were
    involved in the reconstruction effort. On the left are security
    personnel, many of them Afghan guards, guarding highways, for
    example. And on the right are primarily international
    reconstruction workers.
        So we are taking casualties. But we are able to continue
    the reconstruction work.
        And finally, slide number 11 shows some of the benchmarks
    of reconstruction thus far. I would simply--this is for the
    members to look through at their leisure--but I would point out
    bullet number five, domestic revenues increasing, again,
    recognizing that foreign aid is not going to last forever in
    Afghanistan.
        And one of the things we have been focusing on is getting
    the Afghans to raise their own revenues. Most of the domestic
    revenues are from border crossings, from customs duties. Those
    customs posts were previously controlled by warlords. And what
    we have managed to do, as a U.S. Government team, is push that
    more and more to the central government.
        So now, the Afghan government, President Karzai, is raising
    $260 million a year of his own money to spend on
    reconstruction. And of course, we hope that number goes up
    considerably.
        Mr. Chairman, this is a snapshot of the kinds of
    reconstruction activities we are doing in Afghanistan.
        I am pleased to answer any questions the committee has.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Kunder can be found in the
    Appendix on page 79.]
        Mr. Saxton. Let me just thank each of you for what I
    interpret as a very realistic picture of what is going on in
    Afghanistan.
        The initial phase of the war on terror, at least the
    offensive phase that we put into effect was, of course,
    Afghanistan. In the years since October 2001, it has become
    fairly evident that this is a long war. And I think that it
    would be fair to characterize your very open testimony this
    morning as evidence that we have concluded that this is a long
    war.
        We have economic issues, cultural issues, societal issues,
    security issues, among other issues to deal with in places like
    Afghanistan and Iraq. Let me just ask you for your assessment
    of progress that we might expect to see going forward.
        And I would ask you, I guess in this vein--concerned is the
    wrong word--but an outlook which realistically assesses what we
    might be expecting to see in the years ahead, particularly in
    Afghanistan, and each of the sectors that you have talked
    about.
        Let's just start with Ms. Tandy and move across. Just give
    us your objective view of what we expect going forward.
        Ms. Tandy. On the counternarcotics front, I think that we
    are well under way in building the capacity for the National
    Interdiction Unit in Afghanistan both to grow beyond Kabul and
    move to forward positions in the country. As well as their
    capacity to actually go after and dismantle these principle
    trafficking organizations.
        The DEA piece of that, I would anticipate with the supply
    of the helicopters that are coming from DOD to give DEA greater
    mobility and reach in the country to some principle provinces
    where we have been unable to go that are key areas for us in
    the way ahead in fighting counternarcotics.
        Mr. McHugh [presiding]. Thank you. I am sure I asked a
    brilliant question, but I wasn't the one that asked it.
    [Laughter.]
        I hope someone has explained to our distinguished panelists
    the process here. And we appreciate your understanding and
    patience.
        This is a hard choice, but I think I will deal with----
        Ms. Tandy. Do you want the rest of the panel to comment?
        Mr. McHugh. Oh, I am sorry. The rest of the panel is going
    to answer that question. Well, see I stepped in over my pay
    grade.
        Ms. Long.
        Ms. Long. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        From a broad perspective, the national assembly just ended
    its first session, having been elected last September, just
    last week, or two weeks ago, I guess, it would be now on June
    5th. And they actually accomplished a tremendous amount in a
    very short period of time. And we went through some of those
    accomplishments with you.
        I think it is fair to expect in the next year that the
    national assembly and the ministries will be concentrating on
    building their ministerial capacity from a central government
    point of view, in particular, that they will be building their
    capacity to reach to out into the provinces and into the
    districts.
        It has been a long process in establishing the concept,
    which is working and has been favorably blessed by the Afghan
    people, the idea of a central government. And I think in the
    next years you will see an effort to stabilize that, to build
    that capacity, and to reach out into the province and district
    level in order to promulgate that governance and to build the
    institution's ability to reach out.
        Corresponding with that, we need a justice sector to reach
    out to the provinces and the districts, and a policing
    capability that corresponds with that, as well as economic
    development that reaches not only out from Kabul but that is
    seen and felt by individual Afghans in villages and provinces.
        I think all that is very realistic to see in the next
    years, particularly as NATO steps up to assume assisting the
    Afghans in stabilizing the various provinces where they will be
    occupying PRTs and providing other assistance.
        I also think it is realistic to see Afghanistan come into
    its own as a regional player. They are already reaching out to
    their neighbors. And we should expect that. And that we should
    look variably upon that. This is a sovereign government that
    deserves all of our support.
        I think that we also need, as a final comment, to play our
    role in helping the international community not only from a
    security perspective but particularly from an economic
    development perspective to assist Afghanistan in developing the
    capacities that I just outlined.
        Mr. McHugh. Thank you very much.
        General.
        General Eikenberry. Sir, for success in Afghanistan, long-
    term success, all of us, the international community, the
    United States, the Afghan people, we are going to need patience
    and perseverance to prevail there.
        I do use the metaphor of what we call the middle ground. I
    said that in my opening remarks to try to explain what we are
    accomplishing there. When I talk to my soldiers, sailors,
    airmen, and Marines, we use that metaphor of middle ground. If
    I could just explain that, it helps us, I think, to all
    identify then what are the key tasks that have to be
    accomplished.
        Afghanistan, after 30 years of very brutal civil war and
    war among themselves, they have given up what we call the
    middle ground in civil society. All of here, right here in
    Washington, D.C., we stand on middle ground that we take for
    granted.
        That middle ground in civil society is access to law
    enforcement if there is a threat against us. It is access to a
    reasonable justice system if we are threatened. It is
    reasonable access to health care and to education for our
    children, in all domains, reasonable access to different
    services and protection.
        The Afghans, over the last 30 years, they have had their
    middle ground taken away from them from a war against the
    Soviets, war among themselves and most recently war against a
    very brutal Taliban regime. And so in the absence of that
    middle ground, international terrorism then is able to get a
    foothold in places like Afghanistan.
        What we succeeded in doing in 2001, 2002, is toppling the
    al Qaeda Taliban regime. But now, our harder task at hand is to
    try to help the Afghan people rebuild that middle ground.
        So in my own remarks, I talked about the building of
    security forces. And we have had, from Ms. Tandy, a discussion
    of what has to be done in the domain of counternarcotics, from
    Mr. Kunder, the building and reconstruction. All of that coming
    together to help create this middle ground for the Afghan
    people.
        Now, our military role is--if we use the metaphor of middle
    ground, our military role is to try to provide a security
    perimeter behind which the Afghan people then can build this
    middle ground themselves with our assistance.
        Over time, our expectation is, our aspiration is, and the
    Afghan people's aspiration is that that security perimeter goes
    from us maintaining it to the Afghan national army, the Afghan
    national police.
        I am optimistic with the progress that we are making on the
    ground with the Army, and increasingly now with the police
    program that is being delivered, that the Afghans will be able
    to take charge of their own security.
        But the larger effort, the more sustained effort, has to be
    in to building that middle ground of the Afghan civil society.
        If you ask me, Chairman, the question right now, would I
    prefer to have another infantry battalion on the ground of 600
    U.S. soldiers or would I prefer to have $50 million for roads,
    I would say the answer is I would prefer to have $50 million
    for roads. Because that is what is needed right now to get the
    economy of Afghanistan moving forward, which ties then into the
    security of the Afghan people.
        Mr. McHugh. Thank you, General.
        Mr. Kunder.
        Mr. Kunder. Thank you, sir.
        To answer the question what does the future hold, you have
    to start with where are we now.
        And I am glad the chairman mentioned earlier that
    Afghanistan was one of the poorest places on the face of the
    Earth before 23 years of war--one of the poorest places before
    23 years of war.
        So that where we are starting from--it is not a question of
    we had a going concern and then it was destroyed in fighting so
    we just restore the going concern. This was a place by any
    social economic measurement you could dream up, literacy rates,
    infant mortality rates, was one of the dead last countries on
    the face of the Earth. So patience and perseverance, as General
    Eikenberry said, are the key words.
        Right now, the data are that probably about one in four
    Afghan children die before the age of five. Twenty-five percent
    of the children die before the age of five.
        To move such numbers, to make the kind of systematic change
    that requires this to be a going concern requires time based on
    our experience in a lot of other countries in the world where
    we have had success improving the education rates, the health
    care rates.
        There are no silver bullets. There are no quick fixes. The
    reason those children of dying has a whole bunch to do with the
    health-care system, nutritional practices, lack of access to
    clean water. And those things do not change over night. So I am
    very optimistic for the long term in terms of turning those
    kinds of numbers around, but only if we think in the long term.
        Mr. McHugh. Thank you all very much, gentlemen.
        Mr. Tyler. Gene. Taylor. I said Tyler.
        Mr. Taylor. Mississippi.
        Mr. McHugh. Tyler comes next.
        Mr. Taylor. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I want to thank our panel for being here, particularly you,
    general.
        You have all got tough jobs. No one wants to see our Nation
    fail. But I don't think we do ourselves any favors when we
    mislead the public. And particularly, Ms. Tandy, you know, your
    oral statements are very upbeat; your written statements are
    not.
        The idea that somehow an additional eight helicopters
    rushing surplus at that is going to make a difference that
    would stretch from New Orleans to Washington, D.C., and then
    throw in 11,000- to 13,000-foot-tall mountains; a country that
    produced over 4,000 metric tons of heroin last year; a country
    that has had skyrocketing heroin production. Again, I think we
    are a little bit smarter than that.
        Since I have never had the opportunity to speak to you, you
    know, we have got a dysfunctional drug policy. We are spending
    a fortune down in Columbia to pay DynCorp, very brave people,
    to fly crop dusters, spraying Roundup and other chemicals,
    herbicides on the poppies and on the coca down there. We are
    paying other guys to protect them, flying around in Hueys as
    gun ships to keep them from getting shot down. We are spending
    probably $1 billion a year down there between all the different
    sources.
        We are spending a lot of money apparently in Afghanistan as
    opium has skyrocketed. The only thing the Taliban did right was
    shut down opium production.
        And I want to pose this question to the lieutenant general
    in a moment. If we got serious about shutting down the drug
    trade, it is my opinion those guys would turn on us. And we
    would have a situation on our hands that even the Russians
    would find worse than what they saw.
        And in particular, Ms. Tandy, what I think--I would hope
    you would admit the drug problem in America isn't heroin from
    Afghanistan. It is not cocaine from Columbia. It is
    methamphetamines made in people's backyards in rural
    Mississippi, in rural Alabama, maybe even in rural New York,
    for all I know.
        And so again, I just see this dysfunctional system where
    there is always the silver bullet whether it is the 20
    Blackhawks that we sent to the Columbians and now the 8
    helicopters we are going to send to Afghanistan. Somehow trying
    to make the American people think this is going to make a
    difference when it really doesn't.
        And believe me, I am not a proponent of drugs. I think we
    ought to have mandatory drug testing for every single Federal
    employee, maybe starting with you and I after reading your
    testimony.
        So my question is for the record. I have had a reporter
    that I consider to be a credible source tell me that that
    reporter--I am trying not to mention a sex--thinks that
    President Karzai or his family, but certainly members of his
    administration, profit from the drug trade.
        Now, for the record, is that or is that not true, to the
    best of your knowledge?
        Ms. Tandy. Mr. Taylor, I have, first of all----
        Mr. Taylor. The second one, again, because the five-minute
    rule. I am sorry, my eyes are terrible. Mr. Canter--Kunder?
    Kunder, I am sorry. Mr. Kunder, what I would like to know--and
    again, I appreciate you trying to build roads in Afghanistan.
        But based on what I have seen around the road, my
    frustration is, and I think the typical American's frustration
    is, we think we are doing good things for the little guy in
    these countries, only to find out that time and time again the
    big recipient of the money is Halliburton, KBR, Bechtel,
    DynCorp, or someone like them.
        So for the record, I would like to know, how much money are
    we spending with those four contractors or their subsidiaries
    in Afghanistan?
        Mr. Kunder. Sir, could you please repeat them again. I
    heard Halliburton, DynCorp?
        Mr. Taylor. KBR and Bechtel. And again, I don't expect you
    to know this off the top of your head. But for the record, I
    would like that answer.
        Mr. Kunder. I will be glad to provide that information. I
    do not know it off the top of my head. Three of those companies
    USAID is not contracting with.
        The only thing that I would add, sir, is that I know USAID
    doesn't often testify before the House Armed Services
    Committee. But we have, in terms of our own American citizens
    running the U.S. foreign aid program around the world, about a
    re-enforced battalion, we have 2,100 employees, about 1,100 of
    whom are foreign service officers who deploy overseas.
        And obviously, we don't just go to the conflict--we don't
    have a lot of folks in the conflict zones like Afghanistan and
    Iraq. We are also trying to go to the places where we hope we
    don't have to send U.S. troops, Indonesia and places like that,
    Nigeria, Colombia, and so forth.
        We rely on American contractors as our arms and legs, not
    just contractors, but nongovernment organizations, Save the
    Children, CARE, World Vision, and so forth. So the mechanism of
    using American contractors or American non-government
    organizations (NGOs) to get out on the ground and help immunize
    children or build schools is the way we put some arms and legs
    to the U.S. foreign aid program.
        So I will be glad to get those numbers to you. But it is
    not that the money is going to them, sir. It is just that is
    how we do business because we only have 1,100 employees.
        [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
    beginning on page 101.]
        Mr. Taylor. I appreciate you saying that. I also doubt that
    any of these people are in the business of charity based on the
    pathetic work at least one of those contractors did in south
    Mississippi in the wake of Hurricane Katrina.
        Ms. Tandy, would you--we will start with you.
        Ms. Tandy. In response to your question, we have no
    information that President Karzai has received funding support
    income from the drug trade in Afghanistan to be----
        Mr. Taylor. His family or his administration?
        Ms. Tandy. That is correct.
        Mr. Taylor. Don't know?
        Ms. Tandy. To be sure, with a drug trade of this
    proportion, corruption follows that drug trade no matter what
    country it is in. And that is certainly true in Afghanistan. It
    is pervasive through the government, through the provincial
    governors and through other sectors in that country.
        That is an obstacle that we deal with and deal effectively
    in the narrow sphere that we are operating there through what
    is essentially a vetted unit that we are working with that has
    been investigated, and we know are not corrupt because of the
    background that we have done on them and the daily work that we
    do with them.
        So I also would like to respond to some of the comments
    that you made.
        I am the author of my written testimony and my oral remarks
    this morning. Both of them accurately depict the
    counternarcotics frustrations, the obstacles, and the reason
    for hope in the future. I have never described the delivery of
    eight MI-18 helicopters as a silver bullet. But the DEA and the
    National Interdiction Unit have functioned quite well with some
    great and measurable success over the past year with very
    limited air mobility.
        We have been confined to parts of Afghanistan as a result
    of that lack of air mobility that would have otherwise been
    daunting to anyone trying to deal with counternarcotics in that
    country.
        Yet, we have achieved substantial success, not just in
    interdictions, although there is that. Not just in taking down
    hundreds of clandestine labs, although there is that. Not just
    in the first U.S. extradition and not just in the actual
    prosecutions, convictions and sentencing of narcotics
    traffickers who are significant in Afghanistan, although there
    is all of that.
        And for DEA on the ground, we see a great deal of expanded
    opportunity with the support that we have been given by DOD
    with these helicopters along with the rest of the support that
    DOD has been and continues to provide us.
        So if you detect optimism in my opening statement, that is
    accurate. We are looking at the way ahead. And we do see and
    sense that optimism from not just the delivery of helicopters
    but from the capacity-building that DEA has undertaken the
    leadership of with our future counterparts in Afghanistan and
    with the justice and policing systems that are now in place.
        When we started a year ago, Mr. Taylor, we created this
    National Interdiction Unit of about 125 Afghans, some of whom
    did not have shoes. All of them had to be taught to tie their
    shoelaces when they got shoes. All of them had to be taught how
    to do a jumping jack.
        We have started from that a year ago. So we have a great
    deal of reason to be optimistic about the future with our
    counternarcotics counterparts and the efforts that we are
    pursuing in Afghanistan.
        Thank you.
        Mr. Saxton [presiding]. Thank you. Thank the gentleman from
    Mississippi.
        The gentleman from----
        Mr. Taylor. Wait. Mr. Chairman. Just for the heck of it--
    because I intentionally missed the vote to ask that question.
        General, to the point of, if we crack down on drugs, would
    the warlords turn on us? And then, would you suddenly have a
    whole heck of a lot more enemies to be fighting? I mean, I
    would like your opinion on that.
        General Eikenberry. Sir, the efforts to eradicate drugs in
    Afghanistan, of course, there is a balance that has to be
    maintained there.
        And the threat that could come from a campaign in which--
    the efforts were being made in which the alternatives were not
    being given to farmers to have some other kind of livelihood
    that could be disrupted.
        So I think that as the international community and the
    government of Afghanistan, they look at efforts of
    eradication--as there was a fairly comprehensive effort that
    was conducted this year in Helmand. It had challenges. But it
    was the largest scale effort taken to date. That was very much
    kept in mind. And there was some good lessons learned there.
        But truly, yes, there is a balance.
        You know, in terms of trying to provide the farmers of
    Afghanistan, the people of Afghanistan alternatives to poppy
    growing, there has to be a sustained effort to accomplish that.
        You know, for instance, if you are down in Helmand province
    in southern Afghanistan. And you are told not to grow poppy and
    here is a bag of wheat to plant in lieu of. Well, the question
    of the farmer might be where is the good irrigation system so I
    have got some water now for my field.
        And if you provide him with an irrigation system, then the
    next question might be where is the road that allows me to take
    this wheat to market.
        So it is complicated. Congressman, as you said, there is no
    silver bullet up there that is out there. It has to be a very
    broad-based approach. And I think that is what the
    international community, the United States and the Afghans are
    trying to deliver right now.
        Mr. Taylor. Thank you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Saxton. Thank you.
        We are going to move now to the gentleman from New York,
    Mr. McHugh.
        Mr. McHugh. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        Let's see if we can get off a few of these here.
        General, you mentioned in your written testimony, you spoke
    to it as well, the current end-strength of the police and army.
    You combined that figure at 66,000.
        What is the goal? What are you shooting for for an end-
    strength to both of those?
        General Eikenberry. Congressman, for the army, the current
    goal is 50,000.
        However, we would like to look with the government of
    Afghanistan at a point next year to see if that number should
    go on and be built up to a figure of 70,000. Seventy thousand
    was the figure that, in 2002, that the international community,
    the United States and the government of Afghanistan, in talking
    about the army, agreed to an army at that point not to exceed
    70,000.
        So set the build up to 50,000. We will take a look early
    next year to see if we should keep moving forward.
        With regard to the police, the target right now is 62,000,
    sir.
        Mr. McHugh. Thank you.
        You heard Mr. Taylor's comments about the size of
    Afghanistan. I have had the opportunity to go there a couple of
    times. I didn't see much of it. But even what I saw was a lot,
    geographically.
        I understand there were probably some small political
    considerations driving those numbers. But is that an even
    remotely reasonable figure to do what needs to be done, in
    terms of providing security in some reachable places? It may
    not be possible certainly everywhere.
        General Eikenberry. Sir, we look with our Afghan partners
    at those numbers on a recurring basis.
        Of course, what is not important ultimately is the numbers
    of the army. It is not the numbers of the police. It is what
    effects are they delivering.
        As I had said earlier, Congressman, for instance, right
    now, if you were to ask me the question would it be more
    important to have a U.S. infantry battalion of 600 on the
    ground or $50 million for roads, we could deliver more security
    with $50 million of additional roads being put in.
        So it is the overall context of the governance, the
    security forces and the economy that come together. And if you
    have an improvement in governance and an improvement in the
    economic livelihood of the people, that does deliver security.
        Now, with that in mind, with regard to the army, I don't
    know. As I said, as we look next year at what should be the
    ultimate size of the army, more important the numbers there for
    the effect the army delivers will be perhaps more mobility,
    more helicopter forces of their own, more firepower of their
    own.
        With regard to the police, the number of 62,000, I think
    that could be a reasonable number. The police program right now
    is a bit behind that, of the delivery of the army program. The
    police program, a real comprehensive approach, did not begin
    until really last fall. And we are starting to see effects
    delivered.
        But I am optimistic that that police force, when it is
    fully manned and equipped, which should be the late 2007-2008
    period, that that will be transformational in terms of the
    security within the Afghan countryside.
        Mr. McHugh. Thank you, sir.
        Secretary Tandy, you mentioned in your written testimony
    about the drug flow patterns out of Afghanistan. You mentioned
    a number of different routes.
        Assess for me the efforts in the cooperation, if any, of
    the Tajik government, also the Russian government, kind of two
    major destination points, if you will, of the product being
    grown in Afghanistan.
        Ms. Tandy. First of all, with regard to the trafficking
    routes from Afghanistan, we have seen changes since 2004. We
    have seen a commensurate 15 percent drop in the movement of
    drugs from Pakistan and a 15 percent increase in the route
    through Central Asia to the north. Part of that is, we believe,
    due to the expanding Russian market and use of drugs.
        The border enforcement in Tajikistan has been an issue with
    the Russians phasing out of their presence on the border and
    enforcement activities of the Tajiks on the border, and other
    issues with Russian organized crime, along with Tajikistan
    organized crime. So that would be a draw for additional
    movement of drugs through Tajikistan.
        What DEA is doing is establishing an office and presence in
    Dushanbe and actually working with the border patrol and our
    law enforcement counterparts in Tajikistan in the way that we
    do around the world, which is through secure sharing of
    intelligence and shared targeting of the organizations that are
    responsible for the great deal of the smuggling across that
    border, with the opium and heroin going out of Afghanistan and
    chemicals coming into Afghanistan.
        Mr. Saxton. I thank the gentleman----
        Mr. McHugh. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Saxton. I thank the gentleman from New York.
        Dr. Snyder.
        Dr. Snyder. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Kunder, as far as I am concerned, roads, roads, more
    roads, and I appreciate your emphasizing that.
        The only thing I would say is, once you build a new road,
    there is nothing worse than having a wonderful new road, and
    the first year out realize it is covered with potholes. It is
    bad for morale. So I hope that we are building in some funding
    for you all to help keep those things maintained.
        But roads, roads and more roads I think is a big key for
    Afghanistan.
        Ms. Tandy, in your opening statement, you made mention of
    your 11,000 DEA employees. My experience with them is that you
    have a lot to be proud of amongst your 11,000 employees. As we
    are sitting here today, how many of those 11,000 employees of
    which you spoke, not contractors, are in Afghanistan right now?
        Ms. Tandy. The actual numbers--I understand we will have a
    closed session following this. And I would like to give you the
    actual numbers of DEA's presence in that session.
        I think it is public record of what the FAST team
    complement consists of. And for the FAST teams, each of the
    five task----
        Dr. Snyder. So the number of DEA employees in Afghanistan
    or wherever they are in the country is classified information?
    Or are you just choosing not to describe it here at this public
    session? Is that a classified number?
        Ms. Tandy. It is sensitive information given----
        Dr. Snyder. All right. Thank you. Thank you.
        Ms. Tandy [continuing]. The violence on the ground. I am
    happy to provide that information to you.
        Dr. Snyder. Well, General Eikenberry, I am a big fan of
    yours. And I appreciate the work you do in Afghanistan. I think
    you don't think we are doing enough to help you with what you
    are doing.
        Mr. Chairman, if I might, General McCaffrey's trip report,
    dated June 3, 2006, from his trip to Afghanistan and Pakistan,
    May 19 through 26 of this year, I would ask unanimous consent
    that it be inserted in the record.
        Mr. Saxton. We can do that, without objection. Thank you.
        [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
    on page 89.]
        Dr. Snyder. And as quickly as I can read, General
    Eikenberry, I want to read parts of it to you. And he has a lot
    of positive things about what is going on in Afghanistan. But
    this is looking ahead to where we need to go because we all
    want to have this thing get better.
        He says--this is General McCaffrey--``In my view, there is
    little question the level of fighting has intensified rapidly
    in the past year. Three years ago the Taliban operated in
    squad-sized units. Last year, they operated in company-sized
    units of 100-plus men. This year, the Taliban are operating
    battalion-sized units of 400-plus men.
        ``They now have excellent weapons, new IED technology,
    commercial communications gear and new field equipment. They
    are employing suicide bombers who are clearly not just
    foreigners. In many cases, they appear to have received
    excellent tactical camouflage and marksmanship training. They
    are very aggressive and smart in their tactics. Their base
    areas in Pakistan are secure. Drug money and international
    financial support has energized their operations.''
        And anyway, that is part of his statement.
        Then, with regard to the Afghan National Army, he has very
    positive things about their aggressiveness, their discipline,
    the training that you all have done.
        But then, this is the part that I wanted to read because it
    involves us and where, I think, we are failing you: ``The
    Afghan army is miserably under-resourced.'' Again, this is
    General McCaffrey. ``The Afghan army is miserably under-
    resourced. This is now a major morale forecaster for their
    soldiers. They have shoddy small arms, described by Minister of
    Defense Wardak as much worse than he had as a mujahedeen
    fighting the Soviets 20 years ago.
        ``Afghan field commanders told me they tried to seize
    weapons from the Taliban, who they believe are much better
    armed. The Afghan National Army reported AK-47s in such poor
    maintenance condition that rounds spin in the ground at 100
    meters.
        ``Many soldiers and police have little ammunition, few
    magazines. The ANA units do not have mortars, few machine guns,
    no MT-19 grenade machine guns and no artillery. They have
    almost no helicopter or fixed-wing transport, or attack
    aviation now or planned.
        ``They have no body armor or blast glasses. They have no
    Kevlar helmets. They have no up-armored Humvees or light-
    armored tracked vehicles like the M113A3 with machine gun
    copulas and with slat armor. They need light-armored wheeled
    vehicles.
        ``There seem to be neither U.S. resources''--again, this is
    General McCaffrey's opinion. ``There seem to be neither U.S.
    resources nor political will to equip these ANA battalions to
    rapidly replace us as the first line counter-insurgency force.
        ``I strongly suggest that this army and police force should
    be 70,000 to 100,000 troops within 18 months, not an anemic
    force of 50,000 soldiers. We should fund this effort at $1.2
    billion annually. And sustain it for ten years.''
        That was billion--$1.2 billion.
        ``The force should be expanded to include 15 or more armed
    engineer battalions and medical battalions to work on the road,
    water, micropower''--parentheses, six percent of the country
    has electricity--``medical and security infrastructure
    requirements.
        ``This situation cries out for remedy. A well-equipped,
    disciplined, multi-ethnic, literate and trained Afghan National
    Army is our ticket to be fully out of the country in the year
    2020.''
        And that is the end of the quote. That is General
    McCaffrey's.
        Now, I have listened to the statements. And I had to keep
    myself--and I know these statements have to go through Office
    of Management and Budget (OMB)--but I had to keep myself from
    humming ``Everything is Coming up Roses,'' as some of these
    statements were read here today.
        This is a different description.
        Now, we have been in Afghanistan longer than we were in
    World War II. In World War II, in 3 1/2 years, we created 100
    aircraft carriers, tens of thousands of planes, hundreds of
    thousands of vehicles.
        And yet, we are asking our allies, the Afghan National
    Army, to creep along with equipment they are having to steal
    from the Taliban.
        What do we need to help you, General Eikenberry?
        General Eikenberry. Congressman, thank you.
        I know General McCaffrey very well. And he said this--in my
    current command, this is the second time that he has visited
    us. And both of his visits were very helpful. And they provided
    a lot of insights for us. And I have read his report very
    carefully, which he sent to me when he concluded his trip to
    Afghanistan.
        Sir, a couple points I would make about the Afghan national
    security forces.
        First of all, the police, as I said, the police program is,
    let's say, behind relative to that of the army. Although, right
    now, we are in a very robust equipping of the police forces.
    There is pay and rank reform that is going on. So the police
    force, I think, will see that start to take to the field in a
    more robust way here in the latter part of this year and then
    through 2007 and 2008.
        You were talking about the army. I had the honor of serving
    in Afghanistan in 2002, 2003, where my main charter at that
    time as a major general was the building of the Afghan National
    Army.
        Sir, it is important to remember the context here and to go
    back in time. In 2002, there was nothing there. There was no
    Afghan National Army. There was a dysfunctional Ministry of
    Defense. It was really grains of sand that we were building
    from.
        Part of the challenge, of course, in trying to build what
    would be a values-based army, must be a values-based army that
    is founded upon discipline, respect for the rule of law,
    respect for the people, is leadership.
        The leadership development of the Afghan National Army has
    been slow. And it couldn't be any other way when we look back
    over the 30 years of chaos. Two generations of people without
    education, 20 percent literacy rates within that country. So
    the development of leadership has been a slow process.
        If you were to ask me in 2002, should this army get up-
    armored Humvees, for instance, should they get more
    sophisticated weapons? My answer at that time, and still today
    looking back, was correctly no, they should not. Because,
    Congressman, they would not have been able to maintain it.
        We have reached a point here in 2006 where this army is
    becoming resilient. It has a good ministry of defense. Minister
    Wardak is a great minister of defense. It has a good general
    staff. We are starting to build the whole army right now, in
    terms of what we call sustaining institutions: not just
    riflemen on the ground but maintenance facilities and
    maintenance organizations that can maintain equipment behind
    those soldiers, personnel systems, military justice systems.
    This force, at this point in time, has become a much more
    resilient force than it was in 2002. They believe in
    themselves. They are fighting well side by side with us.
        I would say with regard to the critique of equipment that,
    Congressman, it is not NATO-U.S.-standard equipment, but the
    Afghan army fighting side by side with us, we will not have
    combat formations of the Afghan National Army that are fighting
    side by side with us with broken weapons.
        The Afghan National Army, the AK-47s, its equipment that it
    has, as I said, it is not 21st-century technology, but it is
    functional equipment. And we make sure of that.
        There are challenges in terms of the distribution of
    ammunition. There are challenges within some units of
    maintenance. But we are after that.
        To get to your point though, to the future of the Afghan
    National Army, Congressman, I do believe that it is now time,
    based upon the performance of this Afghan National Army, the
    resilience they have, their capability now of taking on higher
    levels of equipment and maybe most importantly the evolution of
    the threat, which is a different threat than the army faced in
    2002, it is indeed time to look at improving the equipment, the
    mobility of this Afghan National Army.
        We have taken some steps. For instance, we are already in
    the process of procuring and delivering new improved Kevlar
    helmets, the individual body armor, which you mentioned, what
    General McCaffrey addressed. We are in the process right now of
    getting protected Humvees and purchasing those for some of the
    commando units of the Afghan National Army.
        But my sense is that we are going to have to look now very
    carefully at more important upgrades and more comprehensive
    upgrades of this force, mobility, fire power, other
    enhancements. They can maintain it at this point. They can
    effectively use it.
        But here I would say that it should not just be a U.S.
    effort. With the NATO ISAF expansion that is occurring, the
    NATO expansion of the mission in Afghanistan, I think that we
    should be looking to our NATO colleagues and our NATO allies,
    that is, to stand up and also help us out with this equipping
    of a more higher level for the Afghan National Army.
        Dr. Snyder. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you, General.
        My time is up. But, you know, four and a half years you say
    it is time to start looking at this. I mean, I know that
    Chairman Hunter will be very supportive of any information you
    can give us where the Congress can help you supply these folks
    you are training.
        Well, we can't help you if we don't know what is going on.
    And, man, it was tough reading these written statements to
    figure out where the problems are today. Thank you.
        The Chairman [presiding]. I thank the gentleman.
        Mr. Skelton. I appreciate that--Mr. Chairman.
        The Chairman. The gentleman from Missouri had a brief point
    to make.
        Mr. Skelton. I----
        The Chairman. But let me just announce we have got a 15-
    minute vote, I think, a motion to adjourn. My intent is to keep
    the hearing going. So the folks leave, your position will be
    honored when you come back. And it will be Mr. Skelton for a
    brief point. And then, the gentleman from Michigan, Mr.
    Schwarz.
        Mr. Skelton. In answering Dr. Snyder's question, may I
    suggest in either a classified or unclassified manner after
    some consideration and thought on your behalf, would you be
    kind enough to recommend to us what you need in so far as
    assisting the Afghan army, whether it should come from us,
    whether it should come from NATO or whatever the case may be.
        I think it will be very, very helpful because that is the
    way this committee works. We look at things that are necessary.
        And if you would do that within the foreseeable future, I
    think that would be a bit better answer for Dr. Snyder as well
    as the entire committee.
        Thank you.
        General Eikenberry. Yes, sir. I would be happy to do that
    if you wish during the closed session, sir.
        The Chairman. Yes, that would be good.
        The gentleman from Michigan, Dr. Schwarz.
        Dr. Schwarz. Mr. Kunder, we spoke before the hearing a
    little bit about the lack of public health facility, any sort
    of public health infrastructure in Afghanistan. People who have
    been in Afghanistan and people who are in Afghanistan now have
    come in to speak to me, as a physician Member of Congress, much
    like Dr. Snyder, about the fact that infrastructure doesn't
    exist.
        And this is a place where I believe that the Congress
    should be aware. And the Congress should be instructed by
    people like yourselves and the folks that you have in
    Afghanistan, that General Eikenberry has in Afghanistan, about
    what we need to do in regard to setting up some sort of public
    health infrastructure.
        Because literally it doesn't exist, whether it is
    immunizations, whether it is prenatal and peri-natal and post-
    natal care both for infants and mothers. The maternal mortality
    rate is the highest in the world, as you know, somewhere in the
    15 percent to 20 percent range. That is maternal mortality
    rate. So, yes, I know it is a terribly difficult environment.
    The farther away from Kabul you get, the more difficult it is.
        But could you just, kind of, free associate on this issue
    for me, perhaps General Eikenberry as well, and let us know
    what you think we could do? What we need to do to establish
    some sort of--I don't want to say health care system because it
    won't be that sophisticated--but some sort of public health
    structure in Afghanistan?
        Mr. Kunder. Thank you, sir.
        We measure maternal mortality in terms of hundred thousands
    of live births. Our data indicates that the rate of maternal
    mortality is about 1,600 per 100,000 live births. Given the
    fact that the average Afghan woman has more than six children
    over her life time, simple math would indicate you have about a
    one in ten chance of the mother dying during childbirth in
    Afghanistan. So the numbers might be a little bit different.
    But it is an astonishing high number, the worse in the world by
    far. So we take the issue quite seriously.
        And I appreciate your asking the question the way you did.
    Because it is a question of building a system. We are working
    with the Ministry of Public Health so that they can start
    taking care of some of their own problems. As General
    Eikenberry said earlier, we have got some very highly qualified
    and trained people within the Afghan government, just not
    enough of them.
        Dr. Schwarz. We are talking about the diseases of antiquity
    here.
        Mr. Kunder. Yes.
        Dr. Schwarz. It is unbelievable. So I am most interested to
    hear what you have to say.
        Mr. Kunder. And of course, improved living conditions is
    directly related to security and reconstructing this country
    and ending the insurgent threat in the countryside. So we take
    this very, very seriously.
        We are trying to do two things to provide some kind of
    immediate relief.
        First is we are trying to train birth attendants, midwives,
    if you will. Since the U.S. forces first arrived, since the
    U.S. Government reestablished its embassy there, the number of
    births in Afghanistan attended by trained midwives has doubled,
    but only up to about 25 percent. So in the mostly isolated
    rural areas, this is still--you know, in the home birth
    situation with perhaps a neighbor or family member attending.
        The second thing we have been trying to do is--our goal is
    to establish at least a basic health clinic within two hours'
    walk of each village. Now, we are not there yet. We have built
    hundreds of such centers. Of course, the road construction is
    critical. Because if you have got the road infrastructure,
    someone can hire a taxi and if it is a complicated birth, get
    the woman to at least a regional health-care facility.
        So we are moving forward. I mean, as Dr. Snyder said, this
    is a difficult question to ask folks like myself because this
    is an Administration budget request. And we realize there are
    many competing priorities, including in our country with
    Hurricane Katrina and so forth.
        If you ask my staff in the field, or I think General
    Eikenberry, or any of our staff, can you use more money? You
    know, our folks are very dedicated. The answer is always going
    to be yes, we can use a lot more money.
        Part of the answer is to get other international donors,
    like the U.N. agencies like United Nations Children's Fund
    (UNICEF), some of the other bilateral donors, engage the World
    Bank, engage so that the U.S. taxpayers are not paying it all.
        And part of the answer, as I said earlier in my testimony,
    is to raise Afghan government revenues so it is not just
    dependent on handouts internationally.
        But to answer your basic questions, there is a lot more
    that can be done. These are desperate numbers in terms of human
    suffering. And they aren't going to be turned around at our
    current resource levels any where in the near future.
        General Eikenberry. And, Congressman, if I could----
        Dr. Schwarz. If you please, General.
        General Eikenberry. I would make two points on the health
    care. And this goes back to Congressman Snyder and talking
    about roads and roads. You know, last year, I was driving in
    the Panjshir Valley of Afghanistan about, oh, 75 miles
    northeast of Kabul, and riding down this narrow valley road,
    which runs through the center of the province, a road
    completely beat up. We were with a four-wheel drive.
        And I was with the chief of the general staff of the Afghan
    army, General Bismullah Khan, who hails from that province. We
    stopped and saw a young boy walking by who the general
    recognized. And I got out with my interpreter and asked him
    where he was going. And he said, ``I am walking to school.''
    And I said, ``How far is that?'' And he pointed and said,
    ``About two hours in that direction.''
        We got into a good discussion with General Bismullah Khan
    about the importance of the infrastructure. Then, two hours,
    two hours back, four hours for school, how hard for the
    pregnant woman then to get to the clinic when she needs to be
    there.
        So the amount of effort that we have got to put into the
    infrastructure right now, it is the backbone I think for the
    social services for Afghanistan, which I see as vital to
    improving security.
        Congressman, the other thing I would say on the health-care
    side is that, as we talked about the weapons of the Afghan
    National Army, I would say that behind those most visible
    manifestations of the Afghan National Army, there are a lot of
    great things that are going on for this army in terms of
    building what we can the sustaining institutions.
        Health care is a primary example. The Afghan National Army
    hospital in Kabul is the best hospital that the Afghans have.
    And there are regional hospitals that are being built.
        And from those points of excellence, I think that we will
    see a transfer of those skills and that excellence to the
    civilian sector as well.
        Dr. Schwarz. Thank you. My time has expired. And I do look
    forward to discussing this with you at greater length. I think
    this is some place we can really help. Thank you very much.
        The Chairman. I thank the gentleman.
        The gentlelady from California, Ms. Sanchez.
        Ms. Sanchez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you all for
    being before us today.
        Obviously, I am one of those people who voted to go into
    Afghanistan. And I am very interested to make sure that we do
    the right thing there and stand by those people and get that
    country up and going.
        The last time I was in Afghanistan, I had the chance to
    talk to President Karzai. And I read to him a paragraph out of
    a Newsweek article that basically said that he is the mayor of
    Kabul and that basically it doesn't get to go around the
    country and he--because we don't have control of the rest of
    the country.
        And in reading a lot of the reports recently about the
    insurgency and the warlords coming back and the individual
    militias and everything, it has become even more apparent that
    we don't have much control of the rest of that nation.
        My question is, you know, we have put a lot of stake in
    this with respect to President Karzai. And there are recent
    reports, The Washington Post on June 26th talked about this
    leader losing support, for example. And, you know, it talks
    about his asking for more help to build his nation's security
    forces, that he is not getting enough from the allies.
        So I have several questions. The first question is, is
    Karzai getting around? Or is he really stuck in the capital
    right now? How is the general mood out there with respect to
    his leadership? Because it is not the only article. There have
    been several articles about his losing--you know, people being
    disillusioned and now turning maybe back to the warlords or, in
    particular, maybe to the Taliban.
        The second question I have, another article from the Post
    said late last night a riot in Kabul, which protesters attacked
    foreign facilities for hours, as police vanished from the
    streets. And it raises concerns among many people here that the
    government is too weak to protect even the capital.
        Can you talk about--I think Mr. Snyder brought up something
    that was very important, that is the outfitting and making sure
    the people have the right equipment. But this is the first
    instance that I have heard of the security forces that were
    helping to train sort of moving out of the way and really not
    going into battle, if you will. And can you comment on that?
        And last, about two months ago, I was in Brussels. And I
    was speaking to NATO Commander Jim Jones. And he was telling me
    that actually our military was doing a great job in Afghanistan
    and listing one thing after another of what we had done
    correctly. And he seemed to indicate that other pieces of the
    NATO forces there, people who were supposed to be taking care
    of the poppy situation, institution building, he rattled off
    probably about six different things. I am sure you have heard
    him talk about it.
        And he said, you know, and two or three are doing well, in
    particular, with our military. But there doesn't seem to be any
    progress made or we are moving backwards in respect to the
    whole issue of drugs, the whole issues or institution building.
    Can you comment on that? And I would like to hear across the
    spectrum on these three questions.
        General Eikenberry. Congresswoman, the first question you
    had was with regard to President Karzai and does he travel in
    Afghanistan. Yes, he does travel in Afghanistan. He is out
    every several weeks. Just last week, he made a very good trip
    up to Pol-e Khormi, north of the Hindu Kush, to one of the
    provinces up there.
        Indeed, in some instances, the U.S. coalition and NATO ISAF
    do help for making arrangements for those moves. Because there
    is a lot of--although, increasingly, the Afghan army and their
    own forces are taking the lead there.
        Second, you had mentioned the Afghan national police and
    their performance during the Kabul riots. I would say that the
    national army performed brilliantly during those riots. There
    were indeed problems with the performance of the police.
    Congresswoman, I had noted earlier that the reform of the
    Afghan national police program is somewhat behind that of the
    army. But it is under way right now.
        Ms. Sanchez. I did notice that you said that. And I wanted
    to ask you, what does that mean? And what does it look for?
        And I am worried that really the only police we really
    currently are trying to stand up would be in the capital. I
    mean, considering the insurgency going on in other places, I
    would assume we are using troops versus civil police, for
    example.
        General Eikenberry. No, there is actually, Congresswoman,
    there is a very robust program that is throughout the entire
    country of Afghanistan. When I say the police program is
    behind, the program was initiated, the reform of the police, or
    the training of the police, was initiated back in 2002. It was
    a very heavily training focus. But it was last year, last fall
    of 2005, that there was a comprehensive program that was put
    together and very much the United States government involved in
    that program.
        And that is a program that has pay and rank reform for the
    police forces, beginning at the very top in this reform
    process, now working its way down through the ranks. Critical
    piece, because leadership is essential.
        I talked about a values-based organization being the army,
    the police, exactly the same. In the end of the day, it is
    about values for the police force, their discipline, their
    loyalty to the state.
        And so there is a good reform program beginning right now
    where leaders, beginning at the most senior levels, are
    competing for positions, being vetted and working its way down
    through the ranks. There is pay reform, as I had said, rank
    reform. There is a comprehensive equipping program that is
    under way. There is the delivery of communications equipment.
    There is the delivery of vehicles.
        Very importantly, there is a very robust mentoring program
    for this police force. But there is regional training centers
    found through the country of Afghanistan. And police forces are
    being delivered throughout all the major regions. So it goes
    far beyond Kabul. Not, at the same time though, this program
    will take 6 months, 12 months, 18 months to deliver more
    effective reforms down through the ranks.
        I think that what the Ministry of the Interior experienced
    during the Kabul police riots, it is fair to say that they have
    identified some very significant shortcomings in terms of the
    communications systems, in terms of the reliability of the
    force. But they are working very hard on that. We are providing
    them with support. I am optimistic over the coming year that
    those problems will be addressed.
        The final question you had was with regard to NATO and
    talking to General Jones, who I talk to frequently as this
    transition continues.
        And I think that not talking about what has been
    accomplished or not been accomplished, but talking about what
    NATO ISAF will bring with this expansion of the mission for
    NATO, I think that they are going to be able to deliver a lot
    of--they are going to be very effective in improving this
    security environment and improving reconstruction in the areas
    that they are going into.
        Let me give an example in Helmand province, southern
    Afghanistan. In Helmand province, the United States presence in
    Helmand province was about a 100-person soldier, civil affairs
    team that was there with a provincial reconstruction team. And
    we had about 50 special forces. The British now, the British
    army is moving into Helmand versus our 50 special forces, they
    will have 3,500 British Army. Their provincial reconstruction
    team, I expect, will be delivering about three times the amount
    of reconstruction funds that we were delivering through out own
    provincial reconstruction team.
        So many of the things that General Jones is talking about,
    I think that the NATO ISAF transition, as it brings in more
    presence of international military forces, more capability of
    training with the Afghani National Security Forces, the army
    and the police, more reconstruction funds, will be exactly what
    is needed for us now to continue to advance the progress of
    Afghanistan.
        Ms. Long. Great. Congresswoman, I have very little to add
    to what General Eikenberry has said, just two data points for
    you.
        I spoke to a number of Afghan parliamentarians about the
    Kabul riots. And they shared your concern. But one of the
    things that we should note is that President Karzai made some
    changes within the police structure immediately following that
    incident in order to deal with some of the communications and
    other issues. So moving forward, measures have been taken to at
    least hopefully eliminate, if not mitigate some of the issues
    with the police as they performed in that situation.
        Importantly, the parliamentarians that I spoke to thought
    that at least as much of the problem was the result of
    unrealistic expectations and frustrations by the population in
    where the incident took place. And they actually took upon it
    themselves to go back to the constituencies and explain better
    how to react and what exactly happens in those kinds of
    incidences. And I thought that was instructive.
        On the lead nation concept, that perhaps was the
    conversation between General Jones and yourself, as you know,
    the post-bond structure had many good attributes to it, in that
    it assigned nations certain responsibilities. And that occurred
    over a number of years. I think it would be fair say that it
    had very many positive things and did some real good.
        We also noticed that there were some gaps and some
    deficiencies. In January and February, there was a meeting in
    London where the Afghan Compact was constructed. And one of the
    things that happened in that process was to take a look at the
    lead nations and try to figure out what the weaknesses were.
        And one of the weaknesses that was identified was there was
    really no ability to track or monitor how certain nations or
    NGOs or certain progresses being made in sectors. And what they
    came up with was a joint coordination and monitoring board that
    will meet in Kabul and actually includes the Afghans.
        And what the board has been apt to do is sort of oversee,
    monitor and interact with either the countries, the NATO
    members, the multi-laterals, the NGOs that have undertaken
    these responsibilities in order to tweak them as things
    progress, if they aren't progressing in the manner that the
    Afghans need, or to readjust as we go along.
        So progress has been made.
        Ms. Sanchez. And when was that board put in place?
        Ms. Long. It was discussed at the January-February London
    conference for the Afghan Compact. I don't know if the board
    has actually met yet. We can get that information for you.
        [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
    beginning on page 101.]
        Ms. Sanchez. Yes. I would appreciate that, because my
    discussion was more recent with General Jones.
        Mr. Kunder. Ms. Sanchez, just very briefly on this question
    of the writ of the Afghan government reaching, undercutting the
    site, I mean, it is a serious problem because the government
    system had broken down during the 23 years of warfare.
        But just very briefly, we recognize this problem. And in
    terms of addressing it, we are building regional government
    centers, regional judicial facilities.
        I mentioned during earlier testimony that the customs
    border post along the Afghan border, which were under the
    control of regional commanders, warlords, at the beginning of
    this government, are now under control of the Afghan government
    and putting revenues into the central treasury.
        At the beginning of the Karzai administration, the
    president couldn't even speak by radio to regional governors.
    We now have a good telecommunications system. And of course,
    the parliament is functioning, which also is part of national
    integration.
        So I would just say that, while there are still profound
    problems because of the breakdown in the physical
    infrastructure and the institutional infrastructure, there are
    a number of efforts going on with U.S. taxpayer support to make
    sure that this government is fully integrated.
        We are not there yet. But a lot of progress has been made.
        Ms. Tandy. Mr. Chairman, I would just add roads, roads,
    roads. I have been there. I think it is definitely a way to
    connect a lot of this country.
        Thank you.
        Mr. Skelton. Mr. Chairman, may I follow through on one of
    the gentlelady's thoughts? Are we still having AWOL problems
    and problems when the army is getting paid and then
    disappearing for a couple of weeks before they come back?
        General Eikenberry. Congressman, the rate of absenteeism
    over the past year has dropped appreciably. We now have an
    absentee rate. On the average it varies from unit to unit
    because it is very leadership-dependent. But in the main,
    Congressman, it is about 10 percent.
        The absentee rate of the Afghan National Army will always
    remain higher than it is within our army, than it is within the
    western armies. There are cultural issues that are there, as
    well as it is going to be many, many more years before we get
    the ATM devices installed. So there is a desire of Afghan
    soldiers to get home and deliver their pay.
        Although we are coming up, working with the ministry of
    defense--we actually have come up with some pretty good systems
    that taken into account the reality of the absence of a
    national banking system. And those rates are going down. But
    really, Congressman, the important factor is, I think, the
    improvement of leadership of the Afghan National Army.
        One other thing point I would make here as well in terms of
    the popularity of service within the Afghan National Army, also
    important two indicators of it. First of all, the retention
    rates. Now that the Afghan national army is a little bit over
    four years old, the three-year enlistment contracts of the
    forces that started to be built in 2002, those are coming to an
    end. The retention rates are about 30-percent-plus. That is
    very impressive.
        Additionally, the recruiting stations for the Afghan
    National Army has got their recruits lined up, not a problem to
    get young men to join the Afghan National Army.
        Back to your point about the rate of absenteeism, come down
    significantly. We would like to see it go lower.
        The Chairman. I thank the gentleman.
        The gentlelady from Virginia, Ms. Drake.
        Mrs. Drake. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        First of all, I am glad that all of you are here. And I am
    very sorry that we have had such a disruptive meeting.
        I have not been to Afghanistan. I have been to Iraq. So
    this is very important to me to hear what is taking place
    there.
        My first question is, what is Pakistan doing? Are they a
    full-fledged partner with us, or does it just sound like they
    are?
        General.
        General Eikenberry. Congresswoman, several points about
    Pakistan. First of all, in the war on terror, Pakistan's army
    has had more casualties over the past year in fighting
    insurgents, in fighting extremists. They have had more
    casualties, more killed in action than our coalition forces or
    the Afghan National Army has had in Afghanistan.
        The second point is the amount of al Qaeda that Pakistan's
    authority, law enforcement and their army has arrested, killed,
    captured over the last several years is the highest of any
    nation.
        We have worked very hard with Pakistan over the last
    several years to improve--when I say ``we'' now, the coalition,
    the Afghan military, ourselves have worked very hard with the
    Pakistan military to improve the amount of tactical
    coordination that we have along the border.
        And the level of cooperation, collaboration that we have in
    the border area where this enemy crosses back and forth, is
    about as good as it has ever been. It has vastly improved over
    the last year.
        We also have much work that we are doing in terms of
    facilitation of the Afghan National Army and the Pakistan army
    to try to increase mutual confidence between the two sides.
    That is more of a long-term effort. Captured by history,
    captured by geography, there is a tremendous amount of mistrust
    between the two sides. We are making progress in that area.
        Having said all of that though, Congresswoman, the fact
    remains that we are up against an enemy that is able to operate
    very effectively on both sides of the border.
        The leadership of these international terrorist groups and
    the Taliban, their associated movements, able to operate on
    both sides of the border, there are areas that they are able to
    stay within and to direct combat operations against ourselves
    and against the Afghan National Army.
        So this is a long-term problem that we are facing.
        We are taking, I think, good measures, as I said, to
    improve the tactical cooperation. But the fact is that the very
    senior leadership of the Taliban remains a very elusive target.
        Mrs. Drake. Mr. Chairman, just to follow up with that,
    because I have heard from some of our special ops guys that,
    when one of the terrorists that they are chasing goes into
    Pakistan, they can't continue to pursue. Is that true or
    untrue?
        General Eikenberry. Congresswoman, we take what means we
    need to for the protection of our forces.
        Mrs. Drake. And just one last question, because on my
    second trip to Iraq, we had the opportunity to really see the
    Iraq security forces. And it was quite a presence. So I wonder
    if it is similar in Afghanistan.
        You probably have different problems. You talked about the
    leadership. But if we are using a similar model that as those
    troops are better equipped and better trained if that will mean
    pulling forces out, similar to what we are doing in Iraq, and
    our plans to reduce troops as we have been doing?
        General Eikenberry. Congresswoman, clearly the delivery of
    well-trained, equipped, and sustainable Afghan national army
    and police forces improves the security environment of
    Afghanistan. And there is a relationship between the
    improvement of their own security forces and not only our
    presence but the presence of NATO.
        What I would say is that we talk about lines of operations
    and military campaigns, over the past several years, for our
    U.S. coalition forces--and I think our NATO partners share
    this--what we would say is our main line of operation in
    Afghanistan for our military forces is the standing up of
    capable, well-respected Afghan National Army and assisting in
    the efforts to stand up a well-training and capable Afghan
    national police.
        Mrs. Drake. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
        The Chairman. I thank the gentlelady.
        The gentlelady from California, Ms. Davis.
        Ms. Davis of California. Thank you. Thank you, Mr.
    Chairman.
        Thank you all for being here and for your service.
        And thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing
    today. But I am somewhat disappointed. I think it was mentioned
    at the beginning that the last time we focused in this
    intensity in Afghanistan was well over a year ago. And it seems
    to me that, if Afghanistan is our front line on the war against
    terror, that we probably should have been doing this all along.
        And I certainly appreciate the fact that you all are here.
    I have been to Afghanistan on several occasions, with the
    chairman initially and then back. And I look forward to going
    again.
        I do recall that our embassy officials were not able to
    move beyond the embassy. And I am hoping--I don't know--whether
    that situation has changed at all or not. You might be able to
    speak to that in a second.
        I wanted to just take a slightly different tack and just
    particularly, General Eikenberry, we focus so much on the
    Afghan National Army and, yet, there is some concern whether in
    fact we have disproportionately done that and put all of the
    bulk of our funding and, I think, the national army--I
    understand Afghanistan is spending about 90 percent of their
    revenues on the ANA.
        Is that correct? Is that a correct statement?
        General Eikenberry. Congresswoman, I would have to get back
    to you with the exact numbers. But the Afghan state is making
    significant contributions now to the salaries of the Afghan
    National Army. And they are providing for other operation
    costs.
        Ms. Davis of California. I guess my question would be, are
    we doing the same for the police?
        If that is so important and it is so important to people on
    the ground, their sense of security so that Karzai does not
    have to necessarily engage the militias, I think, in being out
    in the countryside as well, where is that balance?
        And do you feel that there have been some problems in
    focusing more on the army and certainly less on the police? Are
    we needing the level or security there that we are actually
    training the army to?
        I just wanted to provide perhaps the devil's advocate on
    that and see if we could have a discussion.
        General Eikenberry. Congresswoman, with regard to how much
    the Afghan government is currently funding the army and the
    police, we will get back and provide you with that information.
        You indicated that you will be visiting Afghanistan soon.
    And I assure you that you will be able to move freely around
    the Kabul area. And however much time that you spend in
    Afghanistan, perhaps a chance to get outside of Kabul and see
    some of the great work that the whole interagency team here,
    the Department of State, USAID, Department of Agriculture and
    your military are doing in a lot of--all over Afghanistan right
    now.
        The police program, the police are critical to success in
    Afghanistan, of course. That is the front line where the
    intersection of the government with its presence and its
    security, that is a point of intersection with the civil
    society that I talked about, the middle ground.
        And so it is critical that the police program be carried
    forward. The program that exists right now is a very
    comprehensive program, as I had indicated earlier. Actually, in
    many ways, it is modeled on the military program. It begins at
    the ministry of the interior at the high policy level and
    command and control level. It takes cognizance of the need to
    develop training institutions, logistics institutions,
    personnel systems.
        And then, very importantly, with regard to the operational
    police forces themselves, there is a very robust program of
    equipping and mentoring.
        Relative to that of the army, that program is behind. I
    wish it was farther along. But the good news is that that
    program is now in full swing and will be delivering results.
        But clearly, you need a good balance of upfront police
    forces at the law enforcement front. And importantly, they
    deliver----
        Ms. Davis of California. Is it a correct statement then to
    say currently that they are under-funded, and the police
    particularly?
        General Eikenberry. Congresswoman, I would say that now
    they are adequately funded. We have a robust program that gets
    into the----
        Ms. Davis of California. Thank you.
        General Eikenberry [continuing]. Pay----
        Ms. Davis of California. Thank you very much.
        I wanted to ask one other quick question. And that was the
    ratio of the military and the PRTs to civilians. And does that
    include civilians that are part of NGOs? Or is it civilians
    that are part of our foreign ops, USAID. What is that ratio
    today? And what is the number or the proportion of people that
    speak Farsi?
        General Eikenberry. We have, I think, a total of 12
    provincial reconstruction teams led by the United States. The
    vast majority of the personnel at those provincial
    reconstruction teams are U.S. military.
        Let's say, on average, that a provincial reconstruction
    team with the security forces, the staff, the military
    leadership, civil affairs teams--let's say that that is about
    60 to 70 military. Within that team, there will generally be
    one Department of State representative. Sometimes there will be
    a Department of Agriculture representative. And in almost all
    cases, there will be a USAID representative----
        Ms. Davis of California. Do you know how many Department of
    State individuals are there working in PRT teams throughout the
    country?
        Mr. Gastright. Congresswoman, I am John Gastright with the
    Department of State.
        There are 23 provincial reconstruction teams in the
    country. We have a State Department provincial reconstruction
    team individual at every one of those, the NATO as well as the
    coalition.
        As far as the number of Farsi, we are actually in the
    process now of developing more Farsi speakers. It is a process
    where you have to have one person in training while one person
    is out in the field. I can get the exact numbers of those in
    the field currently. But the goal is to have them all capable
    of speaking either Farsi or Pashto depending on their location.
        [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
    beginning on page 101.]
        Ms. Davis of California. Thank you very much.
        My time is up. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        The Chairman. I thank the gentlelady.
        The gentleman from Texas, Mr. Conaway.
        Mr. Conaway. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I hope not to replow
    already plowed ground.
        Ms. Tandy, you mentioned that DEA has responsibility for
    drug infrastructure, and the state has responsibility for the
    growers or the poppy eradication. Does that present programs in
    terms of doing an effective job of eradicating the overall drug
    trade out of Afghanistan?
        Do you work well with each other? Should things be
    different or they should stay the same?
        Ms. Tandy. We work very closely with State Department INL,
    the NAF officers in Kabul. The division of labor is not an
    issue in terms of us carrying out our respective expertise. The
    funding for some of our efforts comes through the State
    Department INL. And it is a collaborative relationship.
        Mr. Conaway. So you are satisfied that the eradication of
    the actual poppies themselves, that effort is as strong as it
    needs to be or----
        Ms. Tandy. I would have to defer to the State Department on
    the eradication side since that is not what DEA does.
        Mr. Conaway. I know but----
        Ms. Tandy. But in terms of how eradication could impact
    DEA's operations, I would just say that, to the extent that
    there was prior hostility with some of the eradication efforts
    in the past, DEA could have encountered that in some of our
    missions. We did not. We were not the target of that hostility
    from eradication.
        And I think there are a couple of reasons for that. One is
    people see us very differently from eradicators. We hit the
    ground with us on our National Interdiction Unit teams is
    always a mullah who seeks out the tribal elder on our mission
    deployments and describes to the tribal elder exactly what we
    are doing there.
        And I would quickly add that what we have found on the
    ground is the opposite of hostility. What we have found is that
    the people on the ground are glad to see us there. They are
    glad to see us taking out these trafficking leaders. And we
    have had them applaud us. And then, had them direct us to point
    out other potential targets to us. So the issues that
    eradication have seen, those efforts have seen, are not issues
    that we have seen.
        Mr. Conaway. Okay. But there is not a conflict or the
    efficiencies between the two agencies in terms of a concerted
    effort of eradicating the growing of poppy, which is a cash
    crop--and it is difficult to replace cash crops--versus the
    work that you are doing.
        If you cut off the raw material, then the distribution
    chain dies on its own. So is it working well enough between the
    two agencies like that? Or should they do a better job?
        Maybe the State Department guys need to talk about----
        Mr. Gastright. I would be happy to, sir.
        Mr. Conaway [continuing]. The eradication piece in terms of
    how well you work with DEA.
        Ms. Tandy. I would defer to State.
        But I would just like to add, in closing, that these
    efforts both go hand in hand. And what we are looking at, if
    history tells us anything, is some 10 to 20 years out to
    totally eliminate cultivation. So you are dealing with a need
    for companion enforcement efforts along with the eradication
    efforts for a long term. And that is where we are invested.
        Mr. Gastright. Sir, I would just add that we recognize that
    the key to the counternarcotic strategy is five pillars working
    together.
        There is a public information piece, which is informing the
    Afghan people that poppy is bad. Our data tell us that 92
    percent of the Afghan people don't agree with growing poppy;
    they oppose it. And so that has actually been a very effective
    tool.
        There is the elimination-eradication piece that you
    highlighted. And this year, we had a substantial improvement
    over last year's effort. This is the second year we have been
    operating. We expect to eradicate between 16,000 to 18,000
    hectares. That is about 40,000 acres of opium.
        And there are teams operating in 19 provinces. Some of
    those are central teams. But it was a substantial improvement.
    Still work to do; still ways to improve that effort; and we are
    going to continue to refine it. And again, an increased
    improved effort over the last year.
        The interdiction piece that DEA is doing, a very key piece,
    a law enforcement and judicial reform effort so that we can
    actually prosecute those that the DEA arrests. And we have
    actually built a counternarcotics tribunal to streamline the
    arrest of those figures that are arrested. And then, finally,
    there is the piece that USAID does, alternative livelihoods.
        We recognize that all five pillars of this process are
    absolutely essential. The strategy doesn't work if one of the
    pillars falls off.
        And I would just comment that we recognize DEA's important
    role here. We thought so highly of their people that we stole
    away one their individuals, a gentleman named Doug Wankel. And
    he now heads the interagency effort in Kabul. We think so
    highly of him.
        Mr. Conaway. I am not sure--they reset the clock, but just
    one last quick one.
        How do we protect the fledgling judicial system from
    Colombia-like influences of corruption and intimidation and
    those kinds of things? How are they able to--or are they able
    to protect their new judicial system from undue influence by
    the money that is available in this drug trade?
        Ms. Tandy. I can tell you from the Justice Department's
    perspective, and then I would defer to state. A couple of
    things. First of all, these are hand-selected members of the
    judiciary and the prosecution staff. They have been trained,
    and they are being protected. That protection is essential to
    the justice process there. Part of that protection is being
    provided by the United States Marshals Service to that central
    tribunal of judges and prosecutors.
        The fact that they carried out, in fairly short order, the
    trial and conviction and sentencing within the last six months
    of a key narcotics trafficker and two of his lieutenants is a
    good sign that the system is beginning to work, that the judges
    are not afraid that they are going to be killed in carrying out
    their functions and responsibilities, and likewise for the
    prosecutors.
        Mr. Gastright. Sir, I would just add that, of all of the
    institutions in Afghanistan, probably the least developed and
    the most difficult to develop will be the justice system,
    because there are many contradictions.
        As Administrator Tandy identified, we established a central
    narcotics tribunal and a central narcotics task force
    specifically to address the narcotics issues and the narcotics
    cases that are now being presented and prosecuted.
        The Department of State funds the Justice Department to
    develop a criminal justice task force. They investigate and
    execute narcotics cases. And then the central narcotics
    tribunal, again, we fund their activities. And that system has
    proved very effective.
        Mr. Conaway. Thank you.
        We will go back. General Eikenberry, thank you for coming
    today.
        The Chairman. If the gentleman would yield on that line. I
    know he has asked some pretty extensive questions.
        But with respect to the alternative forms of agriculture, I
    presume that includes the orchards instead of poppies, things
    that give a fairly high yield. Because you can't replace a
    poppy crop on a little postage-stamp piece of land with wheat,
    for example, because you get pennies in the dollar in
    comparison to what is yielded with poppies? But you can, for
    example, put in almonds or other orchard-type agriculture that
    yields a pretty good cash crop if you have a market.
        And are you folks familiar with the--and I take it you
    are--with the orchards transplantation operations taking place
    in Afghanistan. Is that something you are fairly familiar with
    in detail?
        Mr. Kunder. We are, sir. We certainly understand that those
    kinds thing are taking place. Yes, sir.
        The Chairman. Ms. Tandy, are you up to speed on that, and
    Ms. Long?
        Ms. Tandy. In a more general way.
        The Chairman. Okay. Well, I think obviously that is key,
    because people are going to resent losing thousands of dollars
    in cash crop, especially those people who don't have any other
    means of survival and subsistence, if in fact it is not
    replaced with something.
        Now, are you familiar with the Ritchie brothers operation
    there, the----
        Mr. Kunder. Very much so, sir. Yes, sir, we are----
        General Eikenberry [continuing]. Yes, sir.
        The Chairman. I have heard a lot----
        Mr. Kunder. Which we are supporting. Yes, sir.
        The Chairman. I have heard lots of good things about that.
    How is that going?
        Mr. Kunder. It is going well----
        The Chairman. That is I think the almond crops and other
    types of orchards?
        Mr. Kunder. Cotton and some other cash crops.
        What that allows us to do, sir--and you are touching on a
    very critical point, and General Eikenberry alluded to this
    earlier.
        It is just like in our country. I mean, if I go out and
    grow almonds but I don't have agriculture credit at the
    beginning of the season, if I don't have a transport system to
    get my almonds to market, if I don't have a storage facility,
    if I don't have marketing information on export standards and
    so forth, I am not going to be successful.
        I am not going to get to a yield on my almonds commensurate
    with what I am--so that what the Ritchie brothers have been
    able to do, and others, are try to come up with an integrated
    system that looks at both processing and marketing, as well as
    production of the alternative crops.
        The Chairman. So almost like co-op so you----
        Mr. Kunder. All aspects of the marketing cycle have to be
    addressed. Yes, sir.
        The Chairman. How is that working?
        Mr. Kunder. In my crew, cases where we are able to
    concentrate resources, it is working very well. The Afghans are
    a marketing economy and a marketing people. They are quite
    entrepreneurial. But because of the breakdown in the
    infrastructure, the roads and the marketing system, that is
    what we have to overcome systemically.
        The Chairman. Are you working on that?
        Mr. Kunder. Absolutely. That is exactly the priority in
    that we have focused our efforts in those areas that are the
    highest poppy producers to look at integrated solutions to
    getting high-value crops to market. Yes, sir.
        The Chairman. Well, a lot of that boils down to a truck
    that will make it over the road, if you got that.
        Mr. Kunder. It is transport systems----
        The Chairman. These integrated solutions.
        Mr. Kunder. Transports, new markets, it is storage
    facilities. And it is export market standards we worry about.
        The Chairman. Okay. Where is your market at?
        Mr. Kunder. There is some internal market. But obviously,
    for high-value crops, you are looking at export market to
    really get value in the gulf, in western states, in Australia,
    globally.
        The Chairman. Have you got cooperation from the marketed
    states, or from the potential market?
        Mr. Kunder. The Afghans have traditionally transported some
    high-value products. So, yes, sir.
        The Chairman. Well, I understand that. But we all agree the
    Afghans need help, right? So if somebody is going to develop
    these markets for these alternative crops, it is probably going
    to be us. How is that going? Are you conferring with potential
    customer states, if you will? Because most of those states
    probably have quotas and tariffs and barriers to protect their
    own people.
        Mr. Kunder. Yes, so the----
        The Chairman. So it is going to require a government
    accommodation to this. Are we getting that?
        Mr. Kunder. We are, sir. Obviously, we ourselves, our own
    country created duty-free status for Afghan imports. And this
    is the kind of thing we need to discuss with other countries as
    well.
        The Chairman. Okay. How far away would you say we are from
    having a system, a total system, integrated system that will
    allow a guy to change his two or three acres of poppies into
    two or three acres of, say, almonds, and have an income on
    that?
        Mr. Kunder. Sir, I can't overemphasize how critical Mr.
    Gastright's earlier point was that 92 percent of Afghan farmers
    don't grow poppy.
        The Chairman. No, I understand.
        Mr. Kunder. And so we are talking about----
        The Chairman. I was talking about the ones that grow
    poppies.
        Mr. Kunder. We are talking about a small percentage. And in
    many cases, it is because of the topographical conditions or
    the rainfall conditions that pushes them toward the poppy crops
    as opposed to almonds and so forth.
        So there is no silver bullet, as we have said a bunch of
    times. We have all those pieces in place. In some areas, it is
    working quite well.
        But to answer your question directly, we are years away
    from building all of that kind of alternative infrastructure to
    provide viable alternative crops, competitive alternative
    crops, in all the areas where poppies are grown.
        The Chairman. Okay. Let me ask it this way. If you have
    some good, practical ag-types, some farmer types in your shop
    who kind of know what it takes to get a crop to us, get it in
    and get it to market, kind of some can-do, hands-on,
    agricultural folks who could maybe get this going--because as
    you mentioned, it is only a few percent of the Afghan farmers
    who are engaging in poppy growth.
        What that means is you don't have to convert a nation's
    agriculture system. You only have to convert a very small piece
    of it. That ought to be doable, right?
        Mr. Kunder. It is doable. Yes, sir.
        The Chairman. And it shouldn't take a long time. I mean, I
    understand it takes a while to grow trees.
        But if you have a fairly small crop, with all of our allies
    and with the American market available, we ought to be able to
    get a market up. And I suspect probably at this point the
    market is not the long pole in the tent. Because we probably
    don't have enough production right now to really intrude on
    anybody's market.
        But I would just hope that we could move that program with
    efficiency. And I don't know if it is--as you said, it seems to
    be slow in coming. Maybe there are a lot of reasons for that
    that are beyond our ability to accelerate substantially.
        Mr. Kunder. Well, it is. In fact, sir, the poppy
    productions, at least in the eastern part of Afghanistan, is
    done in some of the most isolated areas where road systems have
    never gone into it. As you mentioned correctly, almond trees
    take a while to bring to fruition. We do have some very
    practical hands-on folks who are entrepreneurial, who are
    thinking through these problems. I just want to give you a
    frank honest assessment of the time constraints. We are not
    going to snap our fingers and get it done. But we take it very
    seriously.
        The Chairman. Yes. Well, you usually need kind of some
    practical people to get things like that done. And the
    agriculture community in the United States has got lots of
    practical folks who know how to turn hillsides into farms
    quickly. And they know how to handle the practical problems of
    production and irrigation and fertilization and all of those
    things.
        I mean, American farmers are some of the most creative and
    innovative in the world. And you may need to get a little batch
    of those people, maybe out of the central valley of California
    or Arizona or some of the other orchardous states, and get
    problem-solvers over there. Find out what the long poles and
    the tent are here and get this baby moving.
        Ms. Long. Mr. Chairman, if I might----
        The Chairman. Typically, a lot of the can-do people come
    out of operations. They don't come out of academia.
        Mr. Kunder. We have got a number of partnerships with
    American-ally operatives and so forth. So we would welcome any
    other ideas you have, sir.
        The Chairman. Okay.
        Ms. Long. Excuse me for interrupting.
        I think one of the things we might have been familiar with
    or maybe recalling is that former Deputy Agricultural Secretary
    Jim Mosley, who is one of the better experts that the United
    States has the privilege of working with, volunteered and spent
    some time in Afghanistan. And in fact, may be there now working
    with USAID.
        And I know that one of the things that he may have spoken
    to you about is working with the Afghanistans to develop an
    agricultural extensive service like we developed here. And it
    is the real backbone.
        And I know that there is interest in the department for
    endeavoring to support those kinds of efforts.
        The Chairman. Okay. Well, I appreciate your thoughts on
    that. And I want to apologize to the gentlelady from Guam, Ms.
    Bordallo, for taking all this time, when she has waited for an
    hour and a half here for her question. But the gentlelady from
    Guam is recognized.
        Ms. Bordallo. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And you
    also took my question. [Laughter.]
        I would like to welcome all the witnesses this afternoon
    and been here all morning. I have made a number of trips to
    Afghanistan, as well as my other colleagues. And the question
    that our chairman asked is certainly appropriate.
        We had a long visit with President Karzai. And he was very,
    very enthusiastic about his new program. And how he was going
    to revert all these poppy fields to legitimate farming crops,
    such as the almonds and the flowers and the vegetables and so
    forth. And he was very excited about it. And we left the room
    rather dubious about it. Because, you know, the revenues
    certainly wouldn't be the same for these farmers.
        So I would like to ask you, Ms. Tandy--and I know you may
    defer it someone else--and then also we met with the women
    parliamentarians that had just recently been elected. And they,
    too, were very enthusiastic at wiping out this poppy crop.
        So how is the president involved? And did his reform
    program take effect?
        Ms. Tandy. You are correct. On that piece, I will defer to
    State Department on the eradication side.
        But I, too, have met with President Karzai and had similar
    discussions. And let me just say that I know his commitment is
    real. I am sure he probably talked with you about restoring the
    pomegranate industry to Afghanistan, which he did with me.
        With eradication, as State Department I know will discuss,
    there has been a steep decline in the actual planting in
    Nangarhar where a great deal of DEA's law enforcement efforts
    are focused right now. It drops, I think, 90 percent.
        There were rises in other areas, in southern Afghanistan in
    particular. But I think that does demonstrate that there is
    real commitment. There is success.
        The United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC) just
    came out with its annual world drug report and reflected a 21
    percent decline overall in crop planting. What President Karzai
    could not control was the weather, which I am sure you are
    aware, affected the yield. Planting was down. The hectares are
    down. But the yield was greater.
        So there are some competing issues there that I know he is
    contending with and has actually changed to mobile eradication
    units to try to address some of these issues. With that, I will
    defer to the State Department on the remainder.
        Mr. Gastright. Ma'am, as I indicated previously, it is a
    five-pillar strategy. We recognize that no one pillar is the
    silver bullet. They all have to work together, synchronized in
    an effort to address the problem. Last year, we did see that
    the crop was suppressed somewhat. Unfortunately, this year we
    are expecting a slight rebound.
        The strategy is working better. So we will just have to
    stay the course and see that, as the eradication, as the
    interdiction, as the alternative livelihoods all come on, we
    can farmers to move away from poppy and into legitimate
    services.
        I would mention, as far as political will, as Secretary
    Long indicated, the Afghanistan Compact adopted by the
    government of Afghanistan and the international community in
    January of this year, identified counternarcotics as a cross-
    cutting theme.
        Addressing that problem is something that the government of
    Afghanistan is committed to. Because they recognize that the
    money from narcotics can swamp everything else that they are
    doing.
        The corruption that is a result of the narcotics trade can
    buy off as many police officers and as many administrators as
    we can produce in an effort to deal with this problem. So they
    recognize that they have to serious about it. And I think that
    their efforts this year are a step in the right direction.
        If I could just go back to markets, the chairman mentioned
    that you have to be thinking about markets in an effort to make
    this a reality. And the secretary of state, who was in
    Afghanistan this morning, certainly has been thinking about
    that.
        Part of that is an initiative she calls the regional
    integration initiative. And the key really is to tie the
    business hub of Central Asia and Kazakhstan to the warm-water
    ports of Pakistan, Karachi and Gwadar.
        We are working with the Asian Development Bank and the
    World Bank and our partners in the region to address three
    things: One, infrastructure, you have got to have a road
    network that goes from those regions all the way to those
    ports. Two, you have got to have the markets, so we are focused
    on that. You have got to have customs fees. You have got to
    have customs systems that allow transiting borders so that all
    of your profit doesn't get sucked up as you cross border after
    border.
        So we are focused on those things. And we think that we do
    have an initiative that has merit.
        The key here is Afghanistan, the land bridge and focusing
    on those roads, roads, roads that General Eikenberry has
    highlighted so many times. It is the key, not only to the rural
    economy and security and counternarcotics and health
    infrastructure, it really is a key to all the things that we
    are doing. So we will keep coming back to that.
        Ms. Bordallo. And one last comment just on this same
    subject. What, in your estimation, currently is a percentage of
    poppy growers in Afghanistan today?
        Mr. Kunder. We estimate eight percent of the farmers are
    engaged in poppy production.
        Ms. Bordallo. Really? I am quite shocked. I thought it
    would be much higher.
        I have one other question, Mr. Chairman.
        The Chairman. Go right ahead.
        Ms. Bordallo. Okay. The interagency coordination and
    operation, such as Operation Enduring Freedom is very vital.
    And today's hearing reflects the reality of modern warfare and
    the need for interagency efforts. Our witnesses today include
    the DOD, the USAID, and the DEA--professionals.
        And this committee has had discussions about expanding
    interagency cooperation. We have talked about establishing a
    new national security university with all executive branches
    involved. We have talked about more exchanges of DOD and other
    agency personnel. We have talked about annexes to war plans
    being required from other executive agencies.
        And let me go on record one more time emphasizing how
    important it is for this Congress and this committee to really
    dig down in this issue. I think it is vital to winning the war
    on terror and all future conflicts.
        Do you believe the interagency and civil-military
    coordination within Operation Enduring Freedom is sufficient as
    the operational and the tactical levels?
        And what are the major lessons learned on interagency
    coordination in Afghanistan? And how are they going to be
    institutionalized? And how can this committee support the
    effort?
        I think the general may be the one to----
        General Eikenberry. The degree of interagency cooperation
    that we have got in Afghanistan, if you compare it to when
    Operation Enduring Freedom-Afghanistan began in late 2001, it
    is just remarkable how far we have come along.
        If you look at provincial reconstruction teams, ma'am, that
    we have spread around Afghanistan, you have combined teams
    there of Department of State; USAID; as I said earlier, in some
    cases, Department of Agriculture; the United States military
    presence there.
        If you consider how we are integrated in Afghanistan with
    regard to fighting the intelligence battle where we have got
    the very close cooperation of all the important agencies, the
    Department of Defense and our military, the CIA, the Federal
    Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the very close coordination that
    we have with the DEA in that regard, and the commendable job
    that they have done, not only in their field, but providing us
    with very important information, which has helped us enormously
    with our force protection.
        In all of those areas, there has been enormous progress.
        And at this point, I think that most of us would say,
    though, that on the ground, none of us are satisfied with where
    we are. We do need to go further.
        And there are aspects that have to do with what you are
    talking about, ma'am, about the training that we can be doing
    before we go into a conflict or even while we are in a
    conflict. And I think increasingly for different departments to
    look at what the requirements are in places.
        I can only speak for Afghanistan and seeing if they can put
    more of that expertise that is required, niche kind of
    expertise, on the ground there.
        Because at the end of the day, there is a military
    dimension to this campaign. But as I said also in my opening
    remarks, increasingly it has to do with non-military aspects
    for us to prevail, the governance, the justice, standing up a
    robust economy in Afghanistan.
        Ms. Bordallo. General, are you satisfied with all the
    information that is being shared? I think this was our problem
    with 9/11 with all these agencies. Is all the information
    above-board and being shared?
        General Eikenberry. Ma'am, I will speak to Afghanistan,
    which is where I am assigned. The intelligence cooperation that
    we have in the sharing of information that we have in
    Afghanistan is extraordinary. And I am very confident with the
    degree of sharing that does take place. It is truly a team
    effort there.
        Ms. Bordallo. Thank you, General.
        Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        The Chairman. I thank the gentlelady.
        The gentleman from Kentucky, Mr. Davis.
        Mr. Davis of Kentucky. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I want to commend you all on your work on Afghanistan and,
    particularly visiting a provincial reconstruction team down in
    Paktika province last year was quite a positive and eye-opening
    experience.
        You know, we have seen a lot of changes. And I want to
    direct my question a little more strategically rather than
    focusing just on Afghanistan here from a lessons-learned
    perspective. But back when Colonel Brigham and I were second
    lieutenants, the idea of anything to do with joint usually
    meant a uniform code of military justice (UCMJ) procedure
    against a soldier for a narcotics problem.
        But seeing the growth in joint operations, the great
    success of the joint interagency task force (JIATF) in hunting
    terrorists--and one area that we sensed in different parts of
    the area of responsibility (AOR) where we traveled and also
    just speaking to many people across the agencies and in the
    military specifically, is that the agencies still were learning
    in this new era.
        It seems to be a lot of tension not only between the
    agencies but really the direction of where the military needs
    to go long term for the types of 21st-century threats. It seems
    to be an appearance that many of the agencies have, let's say,
    silos of interest that have internal objectives for individuals
    that don't necessarily work for the greater whole.
        And I mean that, especially from the sense of constructive
    criticism as our strategic policy of change, we move more and
    more into an era of short wars and long peace. I think that, in
    a sense, you know, we have had to make it up as we have gone
    along and develop systems and develop processes that never
    existed before.
        And with that, and particularly from General Eikenberry,
    you are unique perspective of having watched this from really
    the very beginning in Afghanistan and then coming back again.
        I would like you all to comment on a long-term perspective
    of how we need to reorganize. The State Department obviously is
    not there from a staff and a structural standpoint to be able
    to reduce uniform presence, deal with fundamental
    infrastructure ranging from banking, democratic policing, basic
    transportation and infrastructure sources, things to help a
    market economy grow. But how do see us organizing for the
    future, for the next conflict like this is will inevitably
    emerge 5 or 10 or 15 years down the road?
        Ms. Long. Thank you for that question. And actually, I
    think the gentlewoman from Guam is going in the right
    direction.
        I think one of the things that we have learned----
        Mr. Davis of Kentucky. Incidentally, we both sat in the
    same meeting and watched people from seven different agencies
    all come up with different answers to the same question. So it
    was common ground there.
        Ms. Long. Oh, and I have no doubts that there will be
    difference among even the panel members or even--I am of two
    different minds depending on what hat I wear, whether it is my
    previously lawyer or deputy assistant secretary of counter-
    narcotics hat or whether it is my current hat in ISA, the
    international security affairs office.
        But I think the one thing that we can speak to is a point
    that General Eikenberry hinted at, which is waiting for
    interagency integration cannot wait until we are on the ground
    and in the country. It has to occur well before that.
        And I think the educational and training process to the
    extent possible needs to be integrated much earlier on among
    the agencies not only from a tasking standpoint but from a
    leveraging of resources standpoint.
        Certainly, State Department and the other departments have
    different roles to play. But we need to leverage each of our
    roles in the Global War on Terror. Because they are not just
    kinetic fights. Increasingly, they are finding that there are
    developmental and institutional fights that a kinetic answer is
    not the solution. And the more familiar we become with each
    other's institutions in a training atmosphere and an
    educational atmosphere, the better we will be when we are
    called upon to be on the ground with one another.
        I think one of the things that we have learned,
    particularly with training and equipping, is that our
    traditional stove pipes and, from a resourcing standpoint with
    the Department of Defense, in particularly, aren't
    satisfactorily flexible enough for us to respond to the kind of
    threats that we have now.
        And that a lot of the tasks that one might assume in
    previous years--perhaps World War II was an example--would be
    undertaken by either the populations themselves because they
    were advanced and there was infrastructure available, or
    increasingly falling upon the shoulders of either the United
    States Government or our coalition partners.
        And that we have to have our funding streams and our
    authorities be flexible enough that we can respond and perform
    those tasks not only within the department, but the entire
    interagency and NGOs. One of the things that we have learned in
    the Global War on Terror is it is just not the governments,
    that you require contractors, as my USAID and State Department
    colleagues pointed out.
        And non-governmental organizations that have to follow in
    behind and contribute to the effort, and that the earlier we
    expose ourselves to each other's culture, that we train
    together and educate together, the more successful we will be
    when called upon.
        General Eikenberry. Congressman, I will talk just from the
    military perspective, of course, in answer to your question.
        I think that, if we look at the building of the security
    forces, the army and the police that our military has been
    engaged with, and the Department of Defense has, if we look at,
    first of all, the army, we are reasonably good at that job.
    But----
        Mr. Davis of Kentucky. I would say more than reasonably
    good. What I saw was outstanding but----
        General Eikenberry. The task of building an army though, in
    the case of Afghanistan and indeed in Iraq, was something that
    we had not done before. We are good at building operational
    forces, tactical units and doing the training and the
    equipping.
        But this kind of enterprise that we have got in Afghanistan
    where, as I said earlier, we start with just grains of sand.
    And we have to stand up a ministry of defense and a general
    staff. We have to stand up complex institutions and complex
    structures within this army, military justice systems,
    logistics systems.
        The lessons that I think that we are getting from
    Afghanistan and from Iraq will be very helpful to us in that
    regard. Because we have to think very long term. We have to
    think of terms of having a lot of patience. But it goes far
    beyond just fielding infantry battalions and soldiers.
        Mr. Davis of Kentucky. Maybe if I could redirect this just
    a little bit, no doubt of the quality of the work that you all
    are doing. I mean, for me, my crystallizing moment was watching
    a 20-year-old E-4 explain democratic policing to an Afghan,
    which is certainly a credit to our system and the tremendous
    witness of our soldiers.
        But I feel, in a sense, we are almost in a 21st-century
    version of the Philippine campaign, dealing with scattered
    insurgencies and generally small scattered troops where the
    troops, or whoever else happens to be there, is mainly engaged
    in trying to either create or build infrastructure.
        Introduce ideas, I mean, in Paktika, where they put the
    first road in 5,000 years. I have a couple of counties like
    that in my district. But it was a remarkable exercise.
        And really what I am speaking to, particularly with the
    army, but also from the wider interagency community, is
    adapting in such a way so that, when we go into the next
    situation, when we have that six months that the local populace
    shows the love before they get upset, and have the opportunity
    to build the insurgency, what we can do to have--whether it
    changes within the nature of civil affairs, changes within the
    nature of, let's say, more of a post-conflict, peace-
    stabilization type of organization that would go on the ground
    that would have that interagency capability to deal not simply
    with cultural issues, but we look at the gap that we saw in
    Iraq.
        Things got moving in the right direction a lot more quickly
    in Afghanistan. But how we could take that model to apply
    elsewhere.
        If you would say maybe the top two or three things that
    need to be addressed either doctrinally or organizationally?
        General Eikenberry. Maybe in three, Congressman.
        The first one you led with, with regard to the police, the
    model that you have in Afghanistan and Iraq is you have to have
    the capability of building police in an environment in which
    security is not good.
        So that mixing of the civilian police expertise that is
    available through the Department of State with the reality that
    you have got to have protection provided by the military to
    extend those trainers for.
        Indeed, there are certain skills that the military brings
    that would probably have to be imparted within that police
    force for rough places, like Paktika, Congressman, where you
    went to.
        And it is not necessarily the primary policing skill as
    being a good traffic cop. It is being able to defend your
    district headquarters if you are attacked in the middle of the
    night by a Taliban force.
        So how to bring those kinds of capabilities together
    between state and the military.
        The second, with regard to civil affairs, I think we have a
    very strong civil affairs corps in the United States military
    and the United States Army.
        But when we look at some of the challenges again that we
    faced in Afghanistan where it is not only delivering
    humanitarian assistance at the very basic level, that we talk
    about building ministries of commerce, ministries of different
    sorts.
        That kind of civil affairs ability to work throughout the
    entire institution from the very highest down to the cutting
    edge, that kind of skill is something I think that we are
    developing. It needs to be furthered.
        And then, there would be, in the area of linguists, that to
    the extent that we can anticipate conflicts that we may have,
    making sure that we have a battery of linguists that are going
    to be able to serve our United States government well as we
    have to move forward into a campaign.
        Mr. Davis of Kentucky. Great.
        Thank you, Mr. Chair.
        Mr. Kunder. Sir, could I just--the U.S. Government sent me
    to work in Somalia, Bosnia, Afghanistan, Iraq. And I have one
    recurring take away from all this.
        And that is we need to create something like the new
    coordinator for reconstruction and stabilization at the State
    Department where somebody husbands the resources of the
    civilian side of the U.S. Government to link up with the
    military at D-minus-180.
        Because all of the problems we are talking about, whether
    it is linguists or more experts in building governments, you
    can't create those during the 180-day grace period.
        And what we have on the military side is a standing
    capacity both to plan and deliver. What we have with an
    organization like ours with 2,100 people, we are fully
    committed. Everybody is out doing something. We don't have any
    planning capacity.
        So what we need is to create a civilian unit that can link
    up with our military planners at D-minus-180 and then work
    these problems out ahead of time, pull the resources in. So
    that would be to my----
        Mr. Davis of Kentucky. Sort of a department of everything
    else to fill in all those blank spots we----
        Mr. Kunder. A sort of joint staff for the civilian side of
    the U.S. Government.
        But we have that idea. The U.S. interagency, to his credit,
    with full military participation created the new coordinator
    for reconstruction and stabilization at the State Department.
        And that was the concept, to bring the Justice Department,
    Agriculture, USAID, to the table ahead of time so we can link
    up without having a pick-up game in the middle of a crisis.
        And I would respect for an individual to suggest. That is
    something that we all, both branches of the U.S. Government
    ought to get firmly behind and put the resources into. Because
    that is what we need at the time when we need, not 180 days
    later.
        Mr. Davis of Kentucky. Well, if the goal is to eventually
    create a Pashto Napa Valley, I think that in a conflict that
    something like that is necessary. And let us know how we can
    help you with this.
        Thank you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        The Chairman. I thank the gentleman.
        The gentleman from Missouri had a few more questions.
        Mr. Skelton. I am somewhat confused. One of the major
    complements in Iraq is the lack of civilian agencies from our
    government assisting, as well as the interagency cooperation.
        I have had discussions with General Casey and Secretary
    Rice about this regarding Iraq. And hearing what you have to
    say today, that does not seem to be the case despite the fact
    that General McCaffrey suggested to us that an effective
    interagency process in Afghanistan is completely absent.
        What is the truth, General?
        General Eikenberry. I only speak, Congressman, from my
    experience on the ground. And if I look at the deployed out to
    the field with our provincial reconstruction teams, we do have
    coherent interagency teams that exist across the board there.
        With regard to the military's own cooperation and our
    collaboration with the United States embassy, I consider
    Ambassador Ron Neumann my teammate in our approach to our fight
    in Afghanistan.
        Mr. Skelton. That is not answering the question. Do you
    have sufficient numbers? Are they cooperating with each other?
    That is not the case in Iraq. Is that the case in Afghanistan?
        General Eikenberry. Congressman, there are different areas
    I think within our provincial reconstruction teams of
    Afghanistan, there are different kinds of expertise out there.
        We could use more Department of Agriculture, in my own
    view. We can use other kinds of experts in those provincial
    reconstruction teams. Let's say, for example, a justice expert.
        Whether or not that person has to come from the United
    States Government, should be contractor, I don't know. But
    there are certainly different kinds of expertise that are
    needed right now in our provincial reconstruction team, which
    would be helpful.
        Mr. Skelton. Thank you.
        Ms. Long, from your vantage point in your position, could
    you describe for us planned both military and civilian
    involvement in Afghanistan over the long term, both involving
    NATO, military involvement and coordinated supplemental
    operations?
        It is not clear, at least to me, about the long-term United
    States strategy from your vantage point as to where you sit.
        Ms. Long. Yes, sir. And thank you for the opportunity to do
    so.
        From a long-term perspective, the department's long-term
    strategy with Afghanistan is set forth in the agreement signed
    between President Bush and President Karzai last year, which is
    our security partnership relationship. And on that document, we
    are committed to the security of Afghanistan and helping them
    build their institutions and dealing with insurgency and other
    threats to their national sovereignty, as well as their
    security.
        We are committed to helping them and assisting them as
    regards to criminality that is a threat, their narcotics
    problem, as well as internal and external threats to their
    security.
        From a long-term perspective, as you know, sir, NATO is
    going through a number of phases in order to assume, in that
    phased approach, responsibility for additional territories
    within Afghanistan.
        The most recent phase, of course, we discussed earlier is
    the stage three, which will be occurring this July where NATO
    will move and take responsibility for additional territories in
    the south. That will be under the command of the United
    Kingdom.
        There are, as you know, provisions made for the U.S.
    Government, in particular the Defense Department, with
    coalition partners to remain and retain responsibility for the
    counterterrorism aspect of our relationship with Afghanistan in
    parallel to that structure.
        NATO has agreed and set forth a plan for stage four. The
    timing of that is conditions and undetermined at this time.
        And that will occur at the point in time when NATO is
    prepared and the conditions are right for NATO to assume the
    responsibility for the remaining territory of Afghanistan and
    that, of course, is in the east.
        I think the long-term commitment as set forth in the
    partnership agreement is the one that not only the president
    supports, but the Department of Defense and President Karzai
    are very pleased about.
        And what it is, is a commitment, long term, to help
    Afghanistan and the international community build not only the
    security apparatus, which would be the Afghan National Army and
    the police, but the corresponding institutions, as well assist
    them with the reconstruction and development of the
    corresponding economic institutions.
        Mr. Skelton. Thank you very much.
        General, tell us how well the Pakistani forces are
    cooperating with you and your military efforts?
        General Eikenberry. Congressman, the cooperation that we
    have got now with the Pakistan military along the border is, I
    think, quite good. To give you an example of the state of
    cooperation, collaboration that we have not with just the
    Pakistan army, but with the Afghan army as well and the Afghan
    National Police, in advance of Operation Mountain Thrust, which
    I discussed earlier, sir, we didn't have a full exchange of
    information with the Pakistan military and, of course, with our
    Afghan National Army allies.
        And the Pakistan army with regard to that operation has
    been very cooperative and very helpful.
        We have also achieved a level of cooperation and
    communications with them now where, along the border, we have
    communications protocols that have been established. There has
    been an exchange of radios that has taken place.
        And so when we do have incidents that occur along the
    border area, we are able to communicate quickly.
        And I am very satisfied when we do have incidents along the
    border about the degree of cooperation and teamwork that both
    sides are showing.
        Mr. Skelton. One last question. General, this falls under
    the category of who is the enemy. Of course, you have the
    Taliban. And you have the al Qaeda. But the real bottom line
    is, are the various leaders or warlords, whichever you choose
    to use, are they cooperating with them, with you, or are they
    neutral?
        General Eikenberry. Sir, the enemies of Afghanistan, they
    are complex. And I know that is what you are getting at.
        There are terrorists. There are Taliban. There are narco-
    traffickers. There are the enemies of the campaign progress
    here in Afghanistan, which can be anything from, as you would
    say, the warlord to a corrupt governor--can be enemies of
    progress in Afghanistan.
        We always keep in mind, though, that that set of al Qaeda,
    the Taliban extremists, that is a group that is separate and
    distinct.
        Did they have some connections in some places with other
    actors in Afghanistan? I am sure that they do. There are
    various connections that occur.
        But in the main, that group of Taliban extremists, al
    Qaeda, they remain the enemies of all the people of
    Afghanistan. And they remain clearly our strategic enemy.
        Mr. Skelton. Thank you very much.
        Mr. Chairman, I think the witnesses should be complimented
    on the outstanding work that they have done.
        The Chairman. Well, I agree with the gentleman. I think
    they should also be complimented on their endurance.
    [Laughter.]
        Thanks a lot.
        Yes, sir, general.
        General Eikenberry. Sir, with your permission, I would just
    like to make a final remark to recognize----
        The Chairman. Absolutely.
        General Eikenberry [continuing]. Our soldiers, sailors,
    airmen, Marines in Afghanistan.
        Sir, first of all, we are a coalition. We are partners with
    NATO. But our coalition that we have right now, I would like to
    just state that the tremendous sacrifice that the Afghan
    National Army, the Afghan National Police, who are taking
    causalities far in excess of our own casualties on the ground
    right now, and are fighting ferociously for their homeland, all
    of our coalition allies.
        In the last two months, we have lost brave French soldiers,
    Canadian soldiers, British soldiers, Romanian soldiers, and
    then our own forces on the ground, sir, that I know that
    everyone here is extremely proud of.
        On any given day in Afghanistan, at this very moment as we
    are speaking, there are female medics of the U.S. Army that are
    somewhere in Uruzgan province right now delivering for the
    first time ever to some Pashtun women in Uruzgan front-line
    medical care. There are engineers right now that are building
    roads in central Afghanistan under very tough conditions. Out
    in Herat, in the west, we have got special operations forces
    that are training the Afghan National Army.
        And then, we never forget, sir, that at this time that we
    are speaking, in northern Helmand province, at temperatures of
    about 120 degrees, we have got the Afghan National Army and our
    special forces that are taking the fight to the enemy.
        In Konar province, at altitudes of about 12,000 feet, we
    have got conventional infantry forces with the Afghan National
    Army and Police that are in extremely tough conditions,
    freezing at night, that are taking the fight to this enemy.
        And every day, sir, we remain on the offensive against this
    very dangerous threat.
        Sir, I appreciate also--and I know I speak for all the
    members of our armed forces. We appreciate your leadership and
    all the members of the committee for their great support of our
    forces as you provide the means for us to stay the best
    equipped and toughest armed forces that has ever been fielded.
        Thank you, sir.
        The Chairman. Well, General, thank you.
        And we are going to break and go up to 2337.
        But let me just observe that this is an enormous challenge.
    And maybe this could be aptly called the forgotten war, because
    so much focus has been on Iraq. This is a very difficult
    challenge. This is nation-building.
        And if there is any with great respect for our coalition
    forces and for the NATO forces in this anticipated increase in
    the NATO forces in the theater--this is an American-led
    operation. There is no other country in the world that could do
    this. And if anybody can do it, we can because we are
    Americans.
        And we very greatly appreciate and understand that both the
    elections in Iraq and the elections in Afghanistan were carried
    on the backs of American fighting personnel.
        And, you know, incidentally, these provincial
    reconstructions teams, one thing that I noticed is that our
    national guardsmen, who now are part of this total force and
    make up a big piece of the American force in both theaters, are
    special forces of a sort.
        Because, as my Marine son described to me, he said, Dad,
    these guys come from real jobs in the real world. And they have
    almost every discipline. And he said, you go over to their
    operation and many times, they have put up little communities
    because they have got plumbers and electricians and craftsmen
    and business people.
        And so I think perhaps the most effective provincial
    reconstruction teams that we have ever fielded haven't come
    from academia and haven't come from the State Department. They
    have come from the guys wearing those cami fatigues, that
    desert cami, who back home have the disciplines that are
    directly applicable to this nation-building that we are
    involved in, and in many cases community-building, in many
    cases economy-building, and in many cases, today in your
    theater, ag, lots of agriculture endeavors.
        So this is a multi-talented force that we have.
        And I think it is interesting that perhaps the most
    effective with this new dimension of having to stand up a
    nation. Not just stand up a military, but stand up a nation in
    both Iraq and Afghanistan. Some of the most effective we have
    got are forces that, heretofore, weren't deployed forward.
        When you think of the Vietnam era, most of our national
    guardsmen didn't participate. Today, we move with a total
    force. And they bring this spectrum of skills that otherwise we
    would have to pay a fortune for in terms of bringing over
    specialists in these given areas.
        And instead, we find out that the guy that we are paying a
    sergeant's salary to, who is wearing a desert camouflage
    uniform, he has the ability to wire that house, or to plumb
    that house, or to teach the people in the community how to do
    it, or to get that irrigation line going and along those lines.
        So thank you, General. Give our very best to--and let me
    tell you, the folks that are in this committee, Democrat and
    Republican, visit the warfighting theaters often, as you know.
    And we are very, very appreciative. And we are going to be
    seeing a lot of you over there.
        Now, we are going to adjourn to 2337, and we will talk
    about that.
        But one last question, ladies, and to Mr. Kunder. This loya
    jirga, in talking with folks who are working this agriculture
    substitution, if you will, program, they talk about the loya
    jirga--that is the council, I take it, the Afghan council.
        It is a traditional thing where people get together. And
    the elders bring up issues of the day and they talk it over.
    And they either accept proposals or they don't accept them.
        Is that being utilized to the fullest degree possible in
    this substitution program in terms of convincing a community to
    start substituting out poppies and substitution in almonds or
    other orchard crops? Are we using that tradition?
        Mr. Kunder. Yes, sir, very much.
        The Chairman. And we are not just imposing on them or
    telling them how it is going to be.
        Mr. Kunder. We would be fools to walk in as outsiders and
    try to lecture these folks without getting the village
    community in it.
        And by the way, sir, not just on areas on that, but where
    we have had some of these recent Taliban attacks on burning
    schools and so forth.
        We have redoubled our efforts to make sure we get the
    community buy in. Because if the community supports the
    project, it is not just going to be more successful, but they
    are going to provide the security themselves against those who
    want to push back.
        So you are absolutely correct, sir. We are asking the
    community first, ascertaining what their priorities are in
    terms of agriculture. Because they know something about
    marketing obviously well. They have been doing it a couple of
    thousand years. But that is a critical part of what we are
    doing. Yes, sir.
        The Chairman. Okay.
        Well, folks, thanks a lot. Thanks for your endurance.
        And we will take a 15-minute break. And we will go into a
    classified session at 2337.
        Thank you very much for this extended testimony.
        Mr. Kunder. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        [Whereupon, at 1:05 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
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                 QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

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                       QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. TAYLOR

        Mr. Taylor. I would like to know, how much money are we spending
    with those four contractors or their subsidiaries in Afghanistan?
        Mr. Kunder. Since establishing its Afghanistan operations in 2002,
    USAID has not held contracts with, nor expended resources for work in
    Afghanistan to Halliburton, KRB, Bechtel or Dyncorp.
        We have held a contract with the Louis Berger Group (LBG) in the
    amount of $700 million over four years. LBG is USAID's largest
    contractor in Afghanistan and has been responsible for significant
    infrastructure projects, including: refurbishing major portions of
    Afghanistan's roads, both primary and secondary; constructing schools
    and clinics; improving critical segments of irrigation canals; and,
    rehabilitating hydropower at the Kajakai Dam, the primary source of
    power in the south.
                                     ______

                       QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. SANCHEZ
        Ms. Sanchez. When was the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board
    put in place?
        Ms. Long. The Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board (JCMB)--a key
    outcome of the London Donor's Conference on Afghanistan--was
    established to track donor pledges and monitor aid effectiveness. The
    JCMB met for the first time on April 30, 2006 and for the second time
    on July 30, 2006. Smaller, issue-focused sub-groups have met numerous
    times to accelerate progress in key areas, such as power sector
    development, airport security, and police pay reform.
                                     ______

                 QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA
        Ms. Davis. And what is the number or the proportion of people that
    speak Farsi?
        Mr. Gastright. All State Department provincial reconstruction team
    (PRT) positions in the field are language designated for either Pashto
    or Dari. Currently, there are two Dari speakers in the field, and we
    are aggressively recruiting for next year, with the goal of having one
    person in language training for every PRT position. As these are one-
    year assignments, this year we are recruiting two people for every
    position and expect to significantly increase our cadre of language-
    capable officers over the next few years.
        Ms. Davis. Do you know how many Department of State individuals are
    there working in PRT teams throughout the country [Afghanistan]?
        Mr. Gastright. At this time, there are 28 State Department
    positions in Afghanistan working at or supporting the work of
    provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs). The State Department has a
    representative at 20 out of the 23 PRTs throughout the country, as well
    as having two representatives at the ISAF Headquarters, and one
    representative each at Regional Command South and Regional Command
    East. There are also four positions inn Embassy Kabul's political
    section devoted to supporting the work of the PRTs. USAID has 18
    positions working on PRT teams throughout Afghanistan, including at all
    PRTs led by the United States.