    [House Hearing, 109 Congress]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

      YUCCA MOUNTAIN: BROKEN MANAGEMENT, BROKEN QUALITY ASSURANCE, BROKEN
                                    PROJECT

    =======================================================================

                                    HEARING

                                   before the

                     SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE FEDERAL WORKFORCE
                            AND AGENCY ORGANIZATION

                                     of the

                                  COMMITTEE ON
                               GOVERNMENT REFORM

                            HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                           ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS

                                 SECOND SESSION

                                   __________

                                 APRIL 25, 2006

                                   __________

                               Serial No. 109-206

                                   __________

           Printed for the use of the Committee on Government Reform

      Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/
                                   index.html
                          http://www.house.gov/reform

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                         COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM

                         TOM DAVIS, Virginia, Chairman
    CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut       HENRY A. WAXMAN, California
    DAN BURTON, Indiana                  TOM LANTOS, California
    ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida         MAJOR R. OWENS, New York
    JOHN M. McHUGH, New York             EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York
    JOHN L. MICA, Florida                PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania
    GIL GUTKNECHT, Minnesota             CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York
    MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana              ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland
    STEVEN C. LaTOURETTE, Ohio           DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio
    TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania    DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois
    CHRIS CANNON, Utah                   WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri
    JOHN J. DUNCAN, Jr., Tennessee       DIANE E. WATSON, California
    CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan          STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts
    MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio              CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland
    DARRELL E. ISSA, California          LINDA T. SANCHEZ, California
    JON C. PORTER, Nevada                C.A. DUTCH RUPPERSBERGER, Maryland
    KENNY MARCHANT, Texas                BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
    LYNN A. WESTMORELAND, Georgia        ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of
    PATRICK T. McHENRY, North Carolina       Columbia
    CHARLES W. DENT, Pennsylvania                    ------
    VIRGINIA FOXX, North Carolina        BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont
    JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio                       (Independent)
    ------ ------

                          David Marin, Staff Director
                    Lawrence Halloran, Deputy Staff Director
                           Teresa Austin, Chief Clerk
              Phil Barnett, Minority Chief of Staff/Chief Counsel

         Subcommittee on the Federal Workforce and Agency Organization

                        JON C. PORTER, Nevada, Chairman
    JOHN L. MICA, Florida                DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois
    TOM DAVIS, Virginia                  MAJOR R. OWENS, New York
    DARRELL E. ISSA, California          ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of
    KENNY MARCHANT, Texas                    Columbia
    PATRICK T. McHENRY, North Carolina   ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland
    JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio                   CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland

                                   Ex Officio
                          HENRY A. WAXMAN, California

                         Ron Martinson, Staff Director
                    Shannon Meade, Professional Staff Member
                               Alex Cooper, Clerk
                Tania Shand, Minority Professional Staff Member

                                C O N T E N T S

                                  ----------
                                                                       Page
    Hearing held on April 25, 2006...................................     1
    Statement of:
        Wells, Jim, Director, Natural Resources and Environment, U.S.
          Government Accountability Office; Gregory Friedman,
          Inspector General, U.S. Department of Energy; Margaret
          Federline, Deputy Director, Office of Nuclear Material
          Safety and Safeguards, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission;
          and Paul Golan, Acting Director, Office of Civilian
          Radioactive Waste Management, U.S. Department of Energy....     9
            Federline, Margaret......................................    42
            Friedman, Gregory........................................    33
            Golan, Paul..............................................    52
            Wells, Jim...............................................     9
    Letters, statements, etc., submitted for the record by:
        Davis, Hon. Danny K., a Representative in Congress from the
          State of Illinois, prepared statement of...................    76
        Federline, Margaret, Deputy Director, Office of Nuclear
          Material Safety and Safeguards, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
          Commission, prepared statement of..........................    44
        Friedman, Gregory, Inspector General, U.S. Department of
          Energy, prepared statement of..............................    36
        Golan, Paul, Acting Director, Office of Civilian Radioactive
          Waste Management, U.S. Department of Energy, prepared
          statement of...............................................    55
        Porter, Hon. Jon C., a Representative in Congress from the
          State of Nevada, prepared statement of.....................     4
        Wells, Jim, Director, Natural Resources and Environment, U.S.
          Government Accountability Office, prepared statement of....    11

      YUCCA MOUNTAIN: BROKEN MANAGEMENT, BROKEN QUALITY ASSURANCE, BROKEN
                                    PROJECT

                                  ----------

                            TUESDAY, APRIL 25, 2006

                      House of Representatives,
          Subcommittee on Federal Workforce and Agency
                                          Organization,
                                Committee on Government Reform,
                                                        Washington, DC.
        The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2 p.m., in
    room 2154, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Jon C. Porter
    (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
        Present: Representatives Porter, Issa, and Norton.
        Also present: Representative Gibbons.
        Staff present: Ronald Martinson, staff director; Chad
    Bungard, deputy staff director/chief counsel; Shannon Meade,
    professional staff member; Alex Cooper, legislative assistant;
    Michelle Triestman, GAO detailee; Tania Shand, minority
    professional staff Member; and Teresa Coufal, minority
    assistant clerk.
        Mr. Porter. Good afternoon everyone. Welcome. I appreciate
    you all being here today.
        I would like to bring the meeting to order, this meeting of
    the Subcommittee on the Federal Workforce and Agency
    Organization.
        Today marks the third hearing the subcommittee has held
    with regard to its investigation of the Yucca Mountain Project.
    Today's hearing is about mismanagement and the problems that
    flow from it.
        Last year, when the USGS e-mails surfaced indicating
    quality assurance deficiencies, I requested the Government
    Accountability Office to conduct a followup study of the
    Department of Energy's quality assurance program. GAO recently
    completed the study and released its report entitled Quality
    Assurance at DOE's Planned Nuclear Waste Repository Needs
    Increased Management Attention. Today's hearing will examine
    these findings in more detail.
        The GAO study examined, No. 1, the history of the Project's
    quality assurance problems; No. 2, DOE's tracking of these
    problems and efforts to address them; and, No. 3, challenges
    facing DOE as it continues to address quality assurance issues
    within the Project.
        First, GAO found that DOE has had a long history of quality
    assurance problems at Yucca Mountain. In the late 1980's and
    1990's, DOE had problems assuring the Nuclear Regulatory
    Commission that it had developed adequate plans and procedures
    related to quality assurance. More recently, as it prepares to
    submit a license application to the NRC, DOE has been relying
    on costly and time-consuming rework to resolve lingering
    quality assurance problems uncovered during audits and after-
    the-fact evaluations.
        The subcommittee's investigation sheds some light on these
    findings. Subcommittee investigators have interviewed current
    and former high-level quality assurance personnel. There is a
    consensus among those interviewed professionals that the type
    of audits conducted by the program today are ineffective at
    addressing quality assurance problems. Specifically, QA
    Management has shifted from conducting performance-based audits
    to compliance audits, which look at adherence to general
    procedures only. The ability to identify substantive issues and
    technical weaknesses makes performance-based audits more
    effective in correcting problems head on. This shift to
    compliance audits restrict's DOE's ability to identify and
    correct problems, which was a poor management decision.
        Second, GAO found that DOE cannot be certain its efforts to
    improve quality assurance have been effective because of
    ineffective management tools.
        For example, in 2004, DOE announced it was making a
    commitment to continuous quality assurance improvement and that
    its efforts would be tracked by performance indicators that
    would enable it to assess progress and direct management
    attention as needed. However, GAO found that the Project's
    performance indicators and other management tools were not
    effective for this purpose. Specifically, the management tools
    did not target existing areas of concern and did not track
    progress in addressing them. The tools also had weaknesses in
    detecting and highlighting significant problems for management
    attention.
        Finally, GAO found that DOE continues to face a number of
    quality assurance and other challenges.
        First, DOE is engaged in extensive efforts to restore
    confidence in scientific documents because of the quality
    assurance problems raised in the USGS e-mails. At the
    recommendation of the DOE Inspector General, the Department has
    about 14 million more project e-mails to review.
        Second, DOE faces quality assurance challenges in resolving
    design control problems associated with its requirements
    management process. The process for ensuring the high-level
    plans and regulatory requirements are incorporated in specific
    engineering details. In fact, problems with this process lead
    to the recent December 2005, work suspension of certain project
    work.
        And, third, DOE is challenged by management continuity. In
    just the last year, the Project lost its program director,
    licensing manager and quality assurance director in all key
    managerial positions--pardon me--all key managerial position.
        GAO findings in this report present real concerns that the
    Department is running an ineffective program that has not
    implemented quality as a top priority and DOE's management of
    this project is to blame.
        The importance of a rigorous quality assurance program is
    paramount to a project of this magnitude. All of the scientific
    data and engineering design submitted to support a license for
    Yucca Mountain should be credible, have to be credible, have to
    be reliable, have to be traceable, have to be transparent. In
    short, if quality assurance is not in place, the NRC could and
    should reject the license application on that ground alone.
        Moreover, already $9 billion has been spent. $9 billion has
    been spent on this project. Rather than appropriating more
    money and pushing legislation through to expedite the Project,
    these serious problems should be fixed.
        This is clearly a project that is consistently failing
    under the weight of its own mismanagement and ineptitude at
    correcting reoccurring quality assurance deficiencies. In fact,
    in recent weeks, Secretary Bodman himself conceded the Yucca
    Mountain Project has been poorly managed and labeled the
    Project--and this is his own word--``broken.''
        Mr. Bodman is preceded by Energy Secretaries who did not
    provide the necessary quality assurance and oversight,
    including Secretary Richardson of the Clinton administration
    under whose watch two USGS scientists e-mailed accounts of
    fabricating quality assurance data to multiple recipients.
        Despite a clear record of mismanagement, however, it is
    important to recognize that the vast majority of Federal
    employees are reliable and hard-working individuals. It is
    unfortunate that management structure and the procedures at the
    Yucca Mountain Project have impaired their ability to perform.
    Therefore, I want to take a moment to recognize those Federal
    employees who have worked and continue to work very hard on
    this project.
        If this were NASA and this were a space shuttle, the space
    shuttle would not fly. We have a program that is broken, and
    the reason we are here today is to continue our investigation
    in looking at the Department of Energy and its management.
        [The prepared statement of Hon. Jon C. Porter follows:]

        [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Mr. Porter. I would like to thank, of course, our witnesses
    who are here today; and I would like to first really recognize
    my colleague to my immediate left, and that is Congressman
    Gibbons from Nevada. Welcome.
        Mr. Gibbons. Well, Mr. Chairman, first of all, I want to
    thank you for your leadership on this issue and thank you for
    what this committee is doing in terms of highlighting the very
    sincere problems that all of us feel this issue has; and I want
    to also thank you for inviting me to participate with the
    committee today in hearing this issue.
        Before I allow for you to continue, Mr. Chairman, I would
    hope that my full and written statement can be entered into the
    record on this issue.
        But since the proposed Yucca Mountain Project has begun,
    and it was started over two decades ago, Nevadans have opposed
    this ill-advised project for many, many reasons. I only hope
    that someday Nevadans will have an opportunity to see and
    celebrate the demise of this disastrous proposal, and only then
    will Nevadans no longer need to worry about living next to the
    most dangerous substance on Earth.
        Unfortunately, Mr. Chairman, today is not that day.
        I do agree with many of the panel that we must find
    solutions to the escalating nuclear waste problem in this
    country. However, simply digging a hole in the Nevada desert
    and burying the waste is not that answer.
        One only needs to look at the recent history of the Yucca
    Mountain Project to get a sense of the DOE's motivations.
    Unfortunately, it is extremely disturbing to me to see that,
    since the birth of this project, that the Department of Energy
    has consistently failed to use sound science as their guide and
    has instead been blinded by its obsession to do anything to
    rubber stamp this project in order to rush it to completion.
        While this might be OK to the bureaucrats at DOE
    headquarters 2,500 miles away, it is completely inadequate to
    the people of Nevada and throughout this country who have to
    live with the reality of this substance, the deadliest
    substance known to man, contaminating perhaps our water supply,
    traveling through our communities and along our roads and
    perhaps endangering our communities.
        Last year, under Chairman Porter's leadership, this
    committee held a hearing which shed a very revealing light on
    the recent scandal plaguing this problem; and since that time,
    it seems clear that every month a new revelation about Yucca
    Mountain is revealed that continues to disturb but should not
    surprise Nevadans.
        First, the EPA comes out with an arbitrary and grossly
    inaccurate guideline to help them push this project forward.
    Then there are accounts that Yucca Mountain Project is falling
    apart from inside and will require millions of dollars to
    repair. Next, on April 4th, DOE sent its Yucca Mountain bill to
    Congress. Since Yucca fails the test of science and cannot
    satisfy traditional safety regulations for nuclear projects,
    the bill would unabashedly do an end run around those
    obstacles, constituting DOE's last-ditch attempt to salvage a
    repository that has failed nearly every test that it has been
    put through.
        And today, Mr. Chairman, you are holding a hearing on the
    Government Accountability's Office's assessment of the
    effectiveness of DOE's quality assurance program; and this
    report, may I say, is alarming, to say the least. It reinforces
    what many have been saying for years, that the Yucca Mountain
    Project is fatally flawed and should be stopped immediately,
    without delay.
        Chairman Porter, I applaud your ongoing efforts to try to
    investigate the alleged falsifications of scientific data on
    the Yucca Mountain Project through the House Government Reform
    Committee; and I look forward to hearing today from the
    witnesses who will try to explain the need to continue forward
    with this project despite the mounting evidence that points to
    the need to look for an alternative.
        I want to thank you again for the opportunity and inviting
    me to join you today, and I look forward to the opportunity as
    well to hear from our witnesses.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Porter. Thank you, Congressman.
        I will note for the record that Members will be coming and
    going today, and we have also received or will be receiving
    statements from other members of the Nevada delegation who are
    also invited to be on the dais today but because of schedules
    weren't able to be here but will be submitting their own
    documents.
        At this point, I would like to ask that the witnesses today
    recognize that there may be additional questions that will be
    addressed later from members of the committee, and I would like
    to ask that you all stand at this point, and we will do the
    customary swearing in.
        [Witnesses sworn.]
        Mr. Porter. Let the record reflect the witnesses answered
    in the affirmative.
        Please be seated. Thank you.
        Our first witness today will be Mr. Jim Wells, who is
    Director of Natural Resources and Environment, U.S. Government
    Accountability Office; followed by Gregory Friedman, Inspector
    General, U.S. Department of Energy; Margaret Federline--did I
    pronounce that correctly--Deputy Director, Office of Nuclear
    Material Safety and Safeguards, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
    Commission; and Mr. Paul Golan, Acting Director, Office of
    Civilian Radioactive Waste Management, U.S. Department of
    Energy.
        So, first, Mr. Wells, we appreciate your testimony. Keep it
    approximately 5 minutes.

       STATEMENTS OF JIM WELLS, DIRECTOR, NATURAL RESOURCES AND
      ENVIRONMENT, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE; GREGORY
        FRIEDMAN, INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY;
    MARGARET FEDERLINE, DEPUTY DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL
    SAFETY AND SAFEGUARDS, U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION; AND
      PAUL GOLAN, ACTING DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF CIVILIAN RADIOACTIVE
              WASTE MANAGEMENT, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

                         STATEMENT OF JIM WELLS

        Mr. Wells. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you for the opportunity to discuss our work
    concerning the quality assurance challenges facing DOE as it
    tries to obtain a license to construct a geological repository
    at the Yucca Mountain site. Our most recent March 2006, report,
    Quality Assurance Needs Attention, and in our earlier 2004
    report, Persistent Quality Assurance Problems, continued the
    description of a troubled QA program.
        As a Nation, we are 25 years into a process to deal with
    geological burial of 50,000 metric tons and growing nuclear
    waste. Most in the room today are well aware of the twists and
    turns this program has taken over the years.
        Today, after continuing delays, DOE still must prepare a
    license request for approval from the NRC to begin
    construction. NRC requires that a quality program--quality
    assurance program must exist to ensure that the work and the
    technical information is supporting a license that is deemed
    accurate and defensible. DOE is not there yet.
        While we were doing our most recent audit, DOE announced
    the ``new path forward'' initiative, but it has not yet
    established a new date when they will be ready to ask for a
    license.
        I want to start and finish my statement today saying that
    resolving the QA problem we and others have found is essential
    to proceeding with construction.
        In 2004, we reported recurring QA problems could delay the
    licensing of the repository. 2006, 2 years later, we still
    don't have the request for a license.
        DOE tried to make changes to improve. In 2005, DOE reported
    that it had discovered a series of e-mail messages written in
    the late 1990's by USGS Geological Survey employees that
    appeared to imply that workers had falsified records for
    scientific work. Several of these messages appear to show
    disdain for the Project's quality assurance program and its
    requirements; and in December 2005 and again in February 2006,
    some project work has been stopped due to continuing QA
    problems.
        Our most recent report once again found problems.
        Over the years, NRC, the DOE IG and DOE's own management
    team were finding inadequate QA procedures, ineffective fixes
    to earlier problems, and continuing weaknesses in data,
    software, and modeling information.
        Mr. Chairman, of particular concern to us was DOE's
    reliance on costly and time-consuming rework to resolve
    lingering quality assurance concerns, as opposed to building
    quality assurance in at the beginning.
        Second, we found significant problems with the management
    tools, as you have mentioned in your opening statement, that
    DOE was using to target, to track, to report, and document
    successful fixes to past QA problems.
        I guess the best way to describe by findings was that, due
    to the numerous technical design flaws, what management tools
    DOE management was using to fix the problems was not adequately
    describing the problem or sufficiently drawing management's
    attention to the best solutions.
        In our report, we recommended that DOE needed to strengthen
    its management tools, and we offered suggestions as to ways to
    improve. DOE agreed with our recommendations.
        Third, DOE's aggressive new path forward faces substantial
    QA challenges going forward. They are not out of the woods yet.
        The e-mails suggesting the possible falsification of
    quality assurance records had resulted in extensive, again,
    rework efforts to restore confidence in scientific documents.
    DOE is conducting a review of 14 million additional e-mails to
    determine whether they raise additional QA problems. I suspect
    we will hear today about where the status of that is.
        DOE also has two stop-work orders in place as they continue
    to resolve new-found QA problems.
        As they announce new organizational changes, including
    bringing in new players to fix the problems, they will face
    potential for further confusion of their accountability as
    roles and responsibilities change. This will impose over an
    organization that is experiencing high managerial turnover and
    existing vacancies in various senior management positions. For
    example, 9 of the 17 key management positions at the Project
    level have turned over since 2001, and 3 different directors
    have served in Washington recently.
        In conclusion, Mr. Chairman and members, I would like to
    say that, clearly, DOE was assigned a task with a very complex
    and changing requirement to build something which has never
    been done before.
        Our GAO audit team continually met with and discussed the
    Project with some really smart DOE people, very talented people
    that are doing many things right. Our audits, however, we do
    have--this is where we find things that can be done better. We
    have made recommendations to DOE which they agree with. It is
    too early for us to conclude today whether its new path forward
    effort will resolve these tremendous challenges.
        I will end with what I started with: Resolving the QA
    problems we and others have found is essential to proceeding
    with this construction.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Porter. Thank you, Mr. Wells. Again, we appreciate your
    being here.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Wells follows:]

        [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Mr. Porter. Mr. Friedman, Inspector General, U.S.
    Department of Energy, welcome.

                     STATEMENT OF GREGORY FRIEDMAN

        Mr. Friedman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, I am pleased
    to be here today at your request to testify on matters related
    to quality assurance procedures and general management at the
    U.S. Department of Energy's Yucca Mountain Project.
        My office has conducted a number of reviews involving Yucca
    Mountain Project over the last several years. In today's
    testimony, I would like to highlight three recent reviews
    relating to quality assurance and general project management.
        First, my office, in coordination with the Department of
    Interior Office of Inspector General and the Federal Bureau of
    Investigation, initiated a criminal investigation focusing on
    potential falsification of research data and quality assurance
    requirements pertaining to computer modeling of net water
    infiltration at the proposed Yucca Mountain repository.
        As part of the investigation, we conducted numerous
    interviews of current and former employees of the Department of
    Energy, Yucca Mountain Project contractors, and employees of
    the U.S. Geological Survey. We analyzed about 150,000 e-mails
    directly and also obtained and examined numerous documents that
    included various reports on internal and external reviews of
    the Yucca Mountain Project operations. The objective of the
    investigation was to identify the facts and circumstances
    surrounding a series of e-mails that discussed the potential
    fabrication of data and compromise of quality assurance
    requirements.
        The extensive factual record developed was provided to the
    U.S. Attorney's Office in December 2005 at the conclusion of
    our field work.
        Just last evening, on April 24th, the U.S. Attorney's
    Office notified the OIG they had declined to pursue criminal
    prosecution in this matter. Among the reasons given by the
    Department of Justice were that they could not show intent and
    the action did not rise to the level of criminality.
        My written testimony, Mr. Chairman, does not include this
    information because it was submitted prior to our being
    notified by the Department of Justice; and my verbal testimony
    will have to do in this regard.
        During the investigation, we observed internal control
    deficiencies that warrant the attention of Department of Energy
    program managers. A memorandum highlighting these issues has
    been issued to the Secretary of Energy. We understand the
    Department of Interior's Office of Inspector General was
    planning to issue a separate report to the Department of
    Interior Management regarding issues specific to the geological
    survey.
        With respect to the Department of Energy, we identified the
    following internal control deficiencies: First, a nearly 6-year
    delay in surfacing and appropriately dealing with the
    controversial e-mails, for which, frankly, we could find no
    satisfactory explanation; second, the compromise of scientific
    notebook requirements for an analysis and model report, an AMR
    report, on simulation of net infiltration for modern potential
    future climates; and, three, a failure to properly maintain
    critical control files relating to that same AMR in accordance
    with data management system requirements established by the
    project managers.
        Although criminal prosecution will not be pursued based on
    the Department of Justice's declaration, observers have pointed
    out that the authors of the e-mails demonstrated irresponsible
    and reckless behavior and their actions have had the effect of
    undermining public confidence in the quality of science
    associated with the Yucca Mountain Project. This incident has
    forced the Department of Energy to spend millions in actions to
    address the quality assurance issues raised in the e-mails.
        The second matter I would like to address is an IG report
    issued in November 2005.
        Nuclear Regulatory Commission procedures for granting a
    license for the proposed Yucca Mountain nuclear waste
    repository require the Department publicly disclose on a Web
    site all documents, including e-mails, relative to the
    licensing process. In 2004, the Office of Civilian Radioactive
    Waste Management took action to review approximately 10 million
    archived e-mails associated with Yucca Mountain for relevancy
    to the licensing process.
        Internal to the Yucca Mountain Project, an administrative
    procedure required that throughout the course of all project
    activities--and I stress all project activities--there be a
    conscious effort to identify and resolve any and all conditions
    adverse to quality. As a result of our inspection, we concluded
    that the Department's review of the archived e-mails had not
    been structured so as to ensure the quality assurance issues
    were identified and addressed.
        We were informed that, as a result of our report, Waste
    Management is developing a corrective action plan to expand its
    quality-assurance-related search effort to include a more
    comprehensive review of the approximately 10 million or more
    archived e-mails.
        Finally, Mr. Chairman, I would like to discuss an IG report
    issued in December 2005. We found the Department had paid
    approximately $4 million in incentive fees to Bechtel SAIC,
    Yucca Mountain's prime contractor, even though the firm did not
    meet contract performance expectations. We concluded that Waste
    Management had not established an adequate process to monitor
    and evaluate the contractor's work products and services.
        As a result of management weaknesses, the contractor was
    rewarded for projects and services integral to the Yucca
    Mountain project for services that did not meet the
    requirements of the contract, including matters related to
    ensuring project quality. As a result of our report, Waste
    Management agreed to establish a performance incentive plan
    with clearly defined standards and document its rationale for
    fee payments.
        The efforts to determine whether Yucca Mountain is a
    suitable site for disposal of the Nation's high-level nuclear
    waste and spent nuclear fuel is a complex challenge. Of
    paramount concern is that this evaluation be objective and that
    it be based on sound and unbiased scientific analysis
    consistent with the highest possible quality assurance
    standards. Thus, it is vital the Department intensify its
    efforts in the quality assurance arena.
        We are committed to performing independent reviews to
    assist in this effort. In fact, in late 2005, at the request of
    the Acting Director of the Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste
    Management, Mr. Golan, we initiated a review of the
    completeness and effectiveness of the corrective action program
    to address quality assurance problems. This review is in
    process.
        Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, this
    concludes my statement. I would be pleased to answer any
    questions that you might have.
        Mr. Porter. Thank you very much, Mr. Friedman. I appreciate
    all your efforts and your staff.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Friedman follows:]

        [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Mr. Porter. Next, we have Margaret Federline, Deputy
    Director of the Office of Nuclear Material Safety and
    Safeguards, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
        Welcome, Margaret. Thank you.

                    STATEMENT OF MARGARET FEDERLINE

        Ms. Federline. Mr. Chairman and members of the
    subcommittee, it is a privilege to appear before you today to
    share with you the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's perspective
    on the role of quality assurance in the Department of Energy's
    Yucca Mountain program.
        Since I will be presenting an abbreviated version of my
    testimony, I would ask that my entire written statement be made
    part of the hearing record. Thank you very much.
        The Nuclear Waste Policy Act assigns NRC the role of
    regulator for the proposed high-level waste repository. In
    addition to reviewing DOE's license application, the NRC
    observes and comments on DOE's quality assurance program as
    part of NRC's prelicensing activity. Implementation of an
    effective QA program during the prelicensing, licensing and
    operational periods will ensure that repository activities are
    consistent with safety requirements.
        The purpose of our observing DOE activities during the
    prelicense application phase is to verify that DOE clearly
    understands our requirements. We review the implementation and
    effectiveness of DOE's quality assurance program by performing
    independent reviews, observing audits and surveillances
    performed by DOE and its contractors and monitoring significant
    quality effecting activities.
        While no regulatory conclusions are made during our
    reviews, we do provide feedback to DOE for consideration.
        For example, we performed an independent review of
    important DOE model reports. Through independent technical
    work, NRC had identified that the information in these model
    reports was significant to a safety demonstration. During the
    review, NRC staff identified concerns with some aspects of the
    technical basis and information in the model reports. Also, NRC
    staff identified concerns with the effectiveness of some of
    DOE's corrective actions.
        NRC staff members also observe DOE audits of QA program
    implementation to determine their effectiveness in identifying
    issues that pertain to safety in their design for the proposed
    repository. Of the audits that we have observed, we have noted
    that the auditors are generally qualified, trained and
    independent of the areas being audited, and most audits were
    adequate in assessing the activities being audited.
        For example, NRC observers of a DOE audit of design
    engineering products related to the fuel handling and canister
    handling facilities determined that the audit was effective in
    assessing the adequacy, implementation and effectiveness of
    technical products and processes.
        On the other hand, NRC staff has identified other concerns
    during these observations. One such observation noted that NRC
    did not agree with the DOE auditors' conclusion that Lawrence
    Livermore National Laboratories effectively implemented certain
    aspects related to control of measurement and test equipment
    and corrective action. As a result of our observations, DOE is
    performing additional reviews in this area.
        During the current year, NRC staff reviews have noted that
    DOE has made significant changes to its corrective action and
    trending process as a result of Yucca Mountain Project internal
    audit findings as well as the result of NRC comments.
        NRC staff will continue to observe DOE activities in areas
    of science as well as design work to ensure that DOE's QA
    program is appropriately applied in developing the safety case
    for licensing.
        Some current QA program implementation issues are of
    concern to us. These issues include those identified at the
    U.S. Geologic Survey, DOE's design controls and requirements
    flow-down and the calibration of test equipment at Lawrence
    Livermore Labs. These issues concern us because they raise
    questions about the systematic and effective implementation of
    DOE's QA program, which is an integral part of a high-quality
    license application. NRC staff will continue to review DOE's
    technical approaches, findings and conclusions regarding QA
    issues. We will closely observe DOE's corrective actions and
    will continue to bring any issues to DOE's attention.
        At the most recent quarterly management meeting, QA program
    implementation issues were discussed, and DOE presented its
    plans for resolving the issues.
        Our recent observations of Yucca Mountain Project
    activities have noted that DOE's plans for addressing current
    QA program issues with design control and requirements flow-
    down appear to be directed at the right problems and to be
    using good approaches for correcting the root causes.
        Recent Yucca Mountain Project staff additions have brought
    in management personnel with previous experience in
    implementing quality assurance programs for NRC-regulated
    activities.
        In March 2006, as we have heard, the Government
    Accountability Office issued its report on Yucca Mountain
    quality assurance. NRC staff had reviewed the GAO report and
    found that these conclusions are consistent with what we have
    observed, some of which I have discussed today.
        In conclusion, the NRC staff has noticed improvements in
    effectiveness of DOE's quality assurance program
    implementation. We will, however, continue to fulfill our
    responsibilities to ensure the adequate protection of public
    health and safety and the environment.
        Thank you very much.
        Mr. Porter. Thank you. Appreciate your testimony.
        [The prepared statement of Ms. Federline follows:]

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        Mr. Porter. Next, Mr. Paul Golan, Acting Director, Office
    of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management, U.S. DOE.
        Welcome.

                        STATEMENT OF PAUL GOLAN

        Mr. Golan. Thank you Mr. Chairman, members of the
    subcommittee.
        My name is Paul Golan, and I am Acting Director of the
    Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management since May 2005.
    Previously, I served in the Department of Energy's environment
    cleanup program; and prior to that I had the privilege of
    serving in the U.S. Navy Nuclear Propulsion Program.
        In order for my testimony to be more productive today, I
    would like to provide the subcommittee my perspective of
    quality.
        When most people speak of QA, they envision an organization
    of auditors armed with checklists and pencil stubs counting
    beans and making sure all the boxes are checked and putting an
    ``inspected by'' label on the box with your product. That is
    not quality assurance. Rather, that is an audit or assessment.
    While a necessary component of a QA program, by all means not
    the most important aspect.
        When I speak of quality today, quality assurance, I am
    referring to an organizational culture, a culture that is a
    collection of the organization's standards, actions, behaviors,
    and ultimately its performance. People and organizations that
    set high standards act professionally, behave responsibly and
    perform in accordance with the requirements, embody good
    quality.
        These characteristics are critical to an organization's
    ability to function effectively in a regulated environment.
        Quality is an organizational trait earned by an
    organization's living up to its standards and is demonstrated
    by its performance.
        Over the years, the Yucca Mountain QA program has been
    reviewed by many of the organizations at the table today. The
    set of documents here is a compilation of the reports by these
    organizations, some of which go back to the 1980's. They
    addressed deficiencies in the Yucca Mountain QA program and
    found that, despite the development of corrective action plans,
    deficiencies have not been completely corrected and the same
    deficiencies tend to reoccur.
        Again, these findings were consistent with the findings of
    the latest review by the GAO in March 2006. In nearly all these
    reviews, the Department concurred with the findings and
    instituted corrective actions to address these deficiencies. I
    have read the reports and agree with the findings.
        The QA program and, more importantly, the culture of this
    organization needs to improve. In order for us to improve,
    there are two components of this program and this culture that
    I would like to focus on. The first is focus, and the second is
    accountability.
        With respect to the first component, we need to consider
    whether we are focusing on the symptoms or we are addressing
    the root cause. It is like taking an aspirin for a headache. If
    the headache keeps on coming back, then perhaps, maybe, the
    aspirin wasn't the right medicine. We need to focus on the true
    cause of the issue and ensure that the effectiveness of our
    corrective actions can be objectively measured through
    improvements in performance.
        The second aspect is accountability. Some call
    accountability follow through. Accountability is critical for
    any organization or any program to be successful.
        Employees are trained on the requirements and understand
    the requirements. Managers and leaders need to mentor their
    staff and make sure these requirements are met. Then if
    employees or managers are either unwilling or unable to meet
    those requirements, they need to be held accountable for their
    actions. On one level, that may call for additional training.
    In more egregious cases, it may also mean consequences ranging
    from counseling to letters of reprimand, from potentially being
    removed from having the privilege to work on this project
    depending on the severity of the situation.
        At the Yucca Mountain Project, it is important to recognize
    that the vast majority of the nearly 2,000 people who work on
    the Project--most of them citizens of Nevada--have high
    standards, behave professionally and perform good work, day in
    and day out. At the same time, though, we need to recognize
    that the actions of a few or the actions of the one can
    dramatically undermine the confidence and damage the reputation
    of hundreds of credible, honest and trustworthy people who have
    worked very long and hard on this project. Managers and leaders
    of this organization need to monitor their ongoing activities
    and address quality issues real-time. They need to know what is
    going on in their work spaces and correct issues on the spot.
        In order to be effective, managers and leaders need to be
    visible, they need to be engaged, and they need to actively
    listen. Managers and leaders need to communicate issues up the
    chain of command quickly and effectively as well as be
    responsible for developing solutions.
        Managers and leaders need to do this today, and they need
    to do it again tomorrow and the day after that until it becomes
    habit. Habits, good or bad, help define who we are as
    individuals and who we are as organizations. Habits over time
    become our culture.
        If I may take a couple of minutes to talk briefly on some
    of the work stoppages that my office has ordered, I would
    appreciate 2 more minutes.
        Mr. Porter. No problem.
        Mr. Golan. First, I would like to talk about the USGS work
    performed by the Department, which were discussed in our
    technical report issued in February 2006.
        Our independent technical evaluation noninfiltration
    estimates developed by the U.S. Geologic Survey were found to
    be consistent with the conclusions that were completed by
    scientists independent of this project under future predicted
    climate conditions. Nevertheless, our quality assurance
    requirements were not met; and, consequently, we are expending
    time and resources to replace that work.
        We have directed that Sandia National Laboratories
    redevelop computer codes that will generate new infiltration
    rate estimates in accordance with our QA requirements and then
    replace those infiltration rate estimates after the work has
    been independently reviewed.
        I take full accountability for that decision, sir.
        In other matters, more recently, we suspended the authority
    of our contractor to approve quality documents in the area of
    facility design because the flow-down of design requirement was
    not documented in accordance with our procedures. While our QA
    procedures did not require us to suspend work in this case, we
    nonetheless did to address any potential issues before moving
    forward with our new design to support the clean canistered
    approach to waste handling operations.
        In January of this year, we issued a stop-work order at the
    site when a cable being laid in the exploratory tunnel did not
    meet established code requirements. Workers at the site brought
    this to our attention, and we appreciate and applaud their
    actions. We have taken steps to address this issue.
        In April, we issued a stop-work order for work associated
    with the use of certain chemical standards because we found
    procedures used to procure those standards did not meet our
    specifications. We are taking steps to address this issue.
        Additionally, we are continuing our investigation on the
    calibration and use of humidity and temperature probes by one
    of our national laboratories.
        In all these cases, after we understand the facts, we will
    in a very deliberate way take actions necessary to ensure the
    quality of our work and hold managers and employees accountable
    for their actions as well as recognize those individuals who
    identified issues and took the right action.
        We are taking aggressive actions and measures to find
    quality assurance issues as well as take actions to address
    them. However, as everyone on the panel has pointed out today,
    these corrective actions in my mind amount to rework and a
    defect. While we will do what is necessary to ensure our work
    products meet our quality assurance requirements, I have a
    management goal where we do all our work right the first time,
    every time.
        Let me digress for a moment. I do not want to give the
    impression that a good QA program or good QA is defined by the
    absence of issues. We will find those situations that do not
    meet our requirements that will necessitate action. We believe,
    however, that with a good QA program we will find these
    situations early, within hours or days, and correct issues
    while they are small. Early detection and prompt action is our
    goal.
        Secretary Bodman a year ago asked this team to focus on
    working to make this project safer, simpler and more reliable
    and to improve the quality and culture of this organization as
    our No. 1 priority. We have worked diligently on this task, and
    the Department will seek to demonstrate good quality, good
    science, and good processes in our license application and
    across our entire organization through our performance.
        Thank you very much.
        Mr. Porter. Thank you for your testimony.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Golan follows:]

        [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Mr. Porter. At this time, I would like to ask unanimous
    consent that all Members have 5 legislative days to submit
    written statements and questions for the hearing record, and
    answers to written questions provided by the witnesses also be
    included in the record.
        Without objection, it is so ordered.
        I would also like to ask unanimous consent that all
    exhibits, documents and other materials referred to by Members
    and witnesses may be included in the hearing record and that
    all Members be permitted to revise and extend remarks. Without
    objection.
        Let the record reflect a quorum is now present. Thank you.
        I would like to now open it up for some questions for the
    panel. I would like to really begin myself and, since we are
    two Members--Congressmen--will be informal with questions. I
    would like to begin.
        Mr. Golan, I wear two hats, one as a Member of Congress
    from Nevada, one as chairman of this subcommittee. And
    whether--of course, my position is very clear on the Project,
    because I represent the State of Nevada and am very concerned
    about Yucca Mountain and its impact on our community and State.
    But let me put on my hat for one moment as chairman.
        It appears to me that no one is in charge of the Yucca
    Mountain Project. And I appreciate that you have been there
    about a year. But whether this is a design of a space shuttle
    or whether this is a design of an airplane, I personally would
    be afraid to fly it. And I know that a lot of DOE folks mean
    well and are working hard and a lot of great employees that
    mean well, but I am not sure any of them are responsible or
    taking full responsibility. And I am not sure whether you would
    let one of your children fly on an airplane that DOE is
    building right now, referring to Yucca Mountain.
        Time and time again, there has been questions of the safety
    and quality assurance. And, again, whether it is Wall Street or
    the private sector, with this much turnover in management, Wall
    Street would shut you down, the private sector or local
    government would shut you down, with 9 of 17 key management
    positions gone, 3 of the directors gone.
        Time and time again, testimony by experts that are saying
    that there are serious, serious safety problems--forget the
    word quality assurance. This is safety about men, women, and
    children around this country and in the State of Nevada.
        But my biggest concern, whether I was for or against the
    Project--and you know I am opposed to the Project--I would not
    trust my child to fly on your airplane. I would not trust my
    child's safety to be in your hands, because I don't believe
    anybody is in charge.
        My staff has done hours and hours of testimony with
    employees. I have spent time talking to employees, again, find
    hard-working individuals, but I have yet to find anyone that
    says that this project to date will be safe, other than
    management personnel. They are all very concerned. Employees
    are concerned. There's a morale problem. They are concerned
    about the turnover in management. They are concerned about the
    change in design of your airplane every other week. So I, too,
    share that concern.
        I know today is about some questions, but I will tell you
    that I am very, very troubled as a Member of this Congress. And
    I know other Members of Congress, all they want to do is find--
    not all but many just want to find a place for the storage of
    nuclear waste. And out of sight out of mind. But for the folks
    living in Nevada, it is not out of sight, out of mind; and I am
    very concerned.
        Again, we have document after document after document
    stating that there is serious problems from management of the
    contract, with your subcontractors, there has been safety of
    employees because of different things through the years. I
    state that I question if anybody is in charge.
        Mr. Golan. Well, sir, I am in charge; and I take
    responsibility for this operation. Over the last year, I have
    spent a lot of time on various aspects of the Project, from the
    total systems performance assessment [TSPA], through the
    seismic analysis, through the design analysis of the
    facilities, all the way down to the layout of the facility at
    the site.
        Secretary Bodman asked--he gave us direction a year ago,
    very clear direction. He said, make it simpler and make it
    safer; and over the last year, we focused on that, sir.
        We talked about the redesign of the surface facilities.
    That is the first time we have done the redesign of the surface
    facilities since the site recommendation was basically made.
    And we took the approach with the clean canistered approach to
    make it safer, simpler and more reliable. Rather than handling
    bare spent fuel at the site, we are going to predominantly
    handle canister fuel. That is safer for the workers. That is
    safer for the State. That is simpler and more reliable.
        Second, we designated Sandia National Laboratory to
    coordinate all our scientific work. We are taking advantage of
    truly one of the gems of the national laboratory system in
    Sandia, and Sandia earned the right as our lead laboratory
    because of the good work they did at the waste isolation pilot
    plant. We want to establish a trust but verify culture.
        A couple of weeks back, we designated the Oak Ridge
    Institute for Science and Education [ORISE], as our independent
    review of our technical work. When we issued our technical
    report on the USGS infiltration work, we had that work
    independently verified, but we had to put together a team of
    individuals from the University of Arizona, Colorado School of
    Mines and the Department of Agriculture. Now we have access to
    nearly 100 universities to do the independent work.
        We have established our safety conscious work environment
    across the entire organization. Before, it was just set up in
    the Yucca Mountain Project office out in Las Vegas. I have the
    employee concerns manager and the director of quality assurance
    reporting to my office. We recently reorganized our staff to
    focus on line management accountability; and we have project
    offices, from chief scientist to chief engineer, regulatory
    authority, all assigned line management responsibilities,
    reporting to the director to clarify roles and
    responsibilities.
        These are just a few actions that we have taken to focus on
    making it safer, simpler, and more reliable. As I said, I have
    looked at aspects of this project from the infiltration down to
    the transport of the water as it leaves the waste package here.
    I think our science is sound, our engineering is sound and
    conservative, and the path forward that we intend to put this
    project on will make it safer, simpler and more reliable than
    it was before.
        Mr. Porter. Do you agree with the Secretary's comments that
    our Yucca Mountain Project is broken?
        Mr. Golan. I want to put that into context. The Yucca
    Mountain was supposed to start accepting waste in 1998. We are
    8 years beyond that schedule. Clearly, there were things not
    going right for us not to meet that deadline. So I can
    understand the Secretary's frustration, and I can understand
    that classification of the Project as being broken.
        Mr. Porter. Thank you.
        Congressman Gibbons.
        Mr. Gibbons. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Golan, I think you can agree with GAO's study, can you
    not, that there has been a serious quality control problem over
    years. Do you agree with that?
        Mr. Golan. I agree. I have read the reports by the general
    of the Government Accountability Office over the years; and I
    agree with the conclusions of their reports, sir.
        Mr. Gibbons. And, as you heard today, in their testimony it
    does tell of a long history of quality assurance problems. You
    heard their testimony as they sat here today.
        Mr. Golan. I did. But the reports also include, sir, the
    recognition over the years that the quality assurance program
    has been improving since the 1980's.
        Mr. Gibbons. I will buy that. You say you are making
    improvements; you are making steps forward.
        Let me ask you a question, because you just testified that
    you want to make it safer. The legislative bill that you are
    supporting, that you are pushing, that is coming before this
    Congress eliminates any applicability of our Nation's hazardous
    waste disposable laws, preempts State and local air quality
    regulations and usurps a State's traditional authority to
    administer the waters within its regions. How do you believe
    that makes it safer?
        Mr. Golan. Sir, if I may, in regards to the Resource
    Conservation and Recovery Act provision, the requirements for
    shallow land disposal of hazardous waste compared to the
    disposal requirements of the spent nuclear fuel and high-level
    waste proposed for Yucca Mountain, Yucca Mountain has orders of
    magnitude, more safeguards and more protection than what you
    would find in a standard hazardous waste disposal cell.
        Mr. Gibbons. So you're saying that DOE's high-level waste
    management protection would preempt and actually be on an order
    of magnitude greater maybe than the State laws that have air
    and water quality assurances in them?
        Mr. Golan. Sir, I am talking about the Resource
    Conservation and Recovery Act provision----
        Mr. Gibbons. I am talking about the bill that is before
    Congress today that your organization--your Department
    supports.
        Mr. Golan. I would like to go through the other two aspects
    of the bill that you mentioned, sir.
        Mr. Gibbons. I just want your statement. Do you believe
    that DOE, by supporting this piece of legislation, will make
    Yucca Mountain safer?
        Mr. Golan. If I might just add the air provision, sir----
        Mr. Gibbons. It is a yes or no question.
        Mr. Golan. I would like just to go through the three
    provisions that you mentioned.
        Mr. Gibbons. You can go through the provisions. Just give
    me a yes or no answer to it.
        Mr. Golan. With regard to the air provision, we still are
    required to get air permits; and the environmental protection
    agency would be the issues of those air permits.
        Mr. Gibbons. But this legislation is going to take State
    standards out of it.
        Mr. Golan. It puts authority to issue air permits with the
    Environmental Protection Agency, sir.
        Mr. Gibbons. Yes, the government, Federal Government.
        Mr. Golan. Yes, sir.
        And, last, with regard to water, the only thing the
    Department is asking for is to be treated by like any other
    entity. Most of the water we are using is for worker safety. It
    is for dust suppression. It gets very dry and dusty. Most of
    the water is being used for dust suppression.
        Over the course of 5 years we intend to use the equivalent
    of 4 days worth of water that is used in Las Vegas, so over the
    course of 5 years we are just asking to be treated as any other
    person or any other entity asking for a State water permit. We
    would not be using the water that Las Vegas typically uses the
    aquifers for, and all we are asking for is to be treated
    equally under that provision.
        Mr. Gibbons. Well, that doesn't require a law change.
        Mr. Golan. We find it very difficult, sir, to get water
    permits issued for simple things such as dust suppression at
    the site.
        Mr. Gibbons. Is that because you don't have access or you
    don't have title to the water?
        Mr. Golan. It is because we have a difficult time getting
    permits from the State and to get access to the water, sir.
        Mr. Gibbons. There are courts to deal with that if the
    State doesn't give you a permit.
        But let me ask you a question, because you are the expert
    and you are the person sitting here talking to me about quality
    assurance. I am a scientist. I come out of the mining industry.
    Let me ask you a question.
        Do you feel that the quality assurance standards for the
    rock bolts that are in the mine that are applied today meet the
    quality assurance for a long-term assessment for those rock
    bolts that are in there? I mean----
        Mr. Golan. Are we talking about the rocks bolts that are
    currently installed, sir?
        Mr. Gibbons. Yes.
        Mr. Golan. For the--when--if we get construction
    authorization from the NRC, our intent is to change the nature
    of the support structures inside the Yucca Mountain facility.
        Mr. Gibbons. Why do you need to do that?
        Mr. Golan. Because we have a provision that has--the waste
    has to be retrievable for a period of time from 50 to up to 300
    years after emplacement. So we are going to change the nature
    of the ground support.
        Mr. Gibbons. In other words, the rock bolt quality
    assurance today doesn't meet those standards?
        Mr. Golan. Again, this is an exploratory tunnel, sir; and
    when we go into actual mining excavation and preparation for
    the tunnel for actual waste disposal, there will be a different
    set of standards and a different set of requirements that will
    be implemented.
        Mr. Gibbons. But the standards today don't meet what your
    expectations are, do they?
        Mr. Golan. We don't intend to dispose of the waste in the
    exploratory tunnels.
        Mr. Gibbons. You have a wonderful way of articulating a
    non-answer to my question.
        Mr. Golan. I just said we are going to use a different set
    of standards when we actually----
        Mr. Gibbons. We will move on.
        You anticipate removing about 147,000 acres, withdrawing
    that land----
        Mr. Golan. Yes, sir.
        Mr. Gibbons [continuing]. In the State of Nevada. Where is
    that land located today?
        Mr. Golan. It is located around the Yucca Mountain site;
    and I can provide a map for the record, sir.
        Mr. Gibbons. Would you please?
        Mr. Golan. Yes, sir.
        Mr. Gibbons. Is it within the Air Force training area?
        Mr. Golan. Part of the land is within Nellis Air Force
    Base, yes, sir.
        Mr. Gibbons. How much of it?
        Mr. Golan. About a quarter, sir.
        Mr. Gibbons. You anticipate restricting overflight and
    training from Nellis Air Force Base in that area.
        Mr. Golan. We anticipate there will be some flight
    restrictions that may be required during the waste in place and
    the waste handling operations.
        Mr. Gibbons. So about 30,000 acres is going to be removed
    from the Air Force training capability, a little more?
        Mr. Golan. About, a little more, somewhere around that,
    yes, sir.
        Mr. Gibbons. Somewhere around 37. Nellis is one of the
    principal pilot training areas that we have in this country,
    one of the few remaining where those of us who have trained
    there are able to get the skills and the ability to defend this
    country; and because of your now urgency of withdrawing 147,000
    acres, taking part of that away from the Air Force, we are
    going to restrict those pilots from being able to get that
    training, to be able to protect this country, to be able to
    learn themselves how to better do their jobs. How do you
    justify national security concerns?
        Mr. Golan. Because, sir, this project has been approved by
    the President and both Houses of Congress.
        Mr. Gibbons. There is a lot of things we approved in this
    Congress, a lot of things that are signed by the President of
    United States and a lot of things that don't jeopardize the
    national security of this country.
        Your removal of that land, your removal of restricting that
    area, in my view, takes away a measurable part of the training
    area that these pilots train on; and, in addition to that, you
    are going to restrict them because of the railroad access, the
    highway accesses that you are going to have to build in there.
    So it is more than just that small fragment. You are going to
    set aside a large part of true training area that is the PhD
    for our men and women who fly these airplanes and defend this
    country because you want a larger and restricted area for this
    waste management area.
        You know, I am not opposed to nuclear energy. I am opposed
    to the poorly thought-out provision of Yucca Mountain.
        Mr. Golan. Sir, I am a member of the U.S. Armed Forces; and
    I appreciate your concern. But when the site recommendation was
    approved by Congress, it was always the intent to remove the
    147,000 acres permanently as part----
        Mr. Gibbons. Whose intent? I have been here for 10 years.
        Mr. Gulan. That was--in order for us to receive a
    construction authorization from the Nuclear Regulatory
    Commission require permanent land withdrawal.
        Mr. Gibbons. Congress hasn't said we are going to
    permanently withdraw 147,000----
        Mr. Gulan. No, that's in front of Congress to decide, sir.
        Mr. Gibbons. Exactly. It's your decision to bring it before
    us today.
        We'll have another round, Mr. Chairman. I'm sorry to keep
    dominating the questions here.
        Mr. Porter. Thank you, Congressman.
        Question. Margaret, explain the process of the licensing
    application. Once it's provided to you, then your team
    investigates all the information of the provider? How does that
    work?
        Ms. Federline. Yes, sir. Once the license application is
    submitted to the NRC we have a 90-day acceptance period where
    we will conduct an acceptance review before we decide if it
    will be docketed. At that point all the information needs to be
    complete. Once the application is docketed, we will conduct a
    detailed rigorous independent review based on our staff's
    independent knowledge of Yucca Mountain. Once that is complete,
    we will develop a safety evaluation report and it will go to
    the licensing board for decision.
        Mr. Porter. How do you do that in 90 days?
        Ms. Federline. We have established a prelicensing--
    Congress, in its wisdom, established a prelicensing
    consultation. And when I say consultation, I don't mean--it is
    a process by which we interact with DOE so that we can identify
    issues which would be essential to address to ensure a complete
    license application. We have referred to these as key technical
    issues, and we've identified over 290 of these issues which we
    believe would be important to address in order to have adequate
    information to conduct a licensing review.
        Mr. Porter. So in other words, you're periodically doing
    audits of your own and working with DOE and giving advice,
    although they don't have to follow it at this point. Will you
    give some direction as to some of the things they need to do
    prior to the application being submitted?
        Ms. Federline. We want to make sure that DOE understands
    our licensing requirement, so we feel it's very important for
    them in developing a license application to be clear as to what
    our licensing requirements require. And so the prelicensing
    period is for us to interact with DOE and to provide
    information and guidance similar to what we do with other--
    licensing other nuclear facilities.
        Mr. Porter. So are we technically in the prelicensing stage
    at this point?
        Ms. Federline. Yes, we are.
        Mr. Porter. So the last 20 years technically has been
    prelicensing period?
        Ms. Federline. Yes, it has.
        Mr. Porter. So you have found close to 290 areas of
    concern; is that what you're saying?
        Ms. Federline. No. We identified a framework of issues
    which need to be addressed to thoroughly characterize or
    thoroughly make a safety case which answers the requirements in
    our regulations.
        Mr. Porter. So it's like questions that you have that they
    need to answer?
        Ms. Federline. Well, they're actually part of the
    demonstration of the safety case, pieces of the safety case
    that would need to be demonstrated to provide adequate
    information for us to conduct a safety review.
        Mr. Porter. So do they, then, give you preliminary
    prelicensing information that may be a test prior to the final
    application being submitted?
        Ms. Federline. No, they don't. We have interactions in
    which we identify the types of information that would be
    necessary, and we do provide guidance back to them if we feel
    that they don't understand our requirements. It's not--it would
    be--as a regulator, we could not make a predecision before the
    license application comes in. And so it's strictly intended to
    establish a framework which explains our regulations and what
    would be required.
        Mr. Porter. So throughout this process there has been
    communication between NRC and DOE which is normal in whether it
    be a nuclear reactor or Department of Energy, sort of following
    the guidelines that are consistent throughout the industry,
    correct?
        Ms. Federline. Yes. As part of design certification we do
    do precertification reviews where we do a similar type of
    thing, identify issues which need to be addressed as part of
    the design certification.
        Mr. Porter. Would the USNRC have a problem with Congress
    being able to see a draft license application from DOE
    regarding this project?
        Ms. Federline. We have not seen a draft license
    application. And when one became available to us when it was
    submitted, if DOE had not made it publically available,
    obviously we would make it publically available.
        Mr. Porter. Would you have a problem with Congress seeing
    one today if one were--or I guess let me ask this question a
    little differently. We have asked numerous times for a copy of
    a draft license application, and Department of Energy has
    consistently refused to provide it to the American public.
    Would you have a problem with us asking for a copy of that from
    the Department of Energy?
        Ms. Federline. Well, my sense is that at the time the
    license application is submitted it would contain the necessary
    and complete information. You know, we would not get involved
    between Congress and DOE in terms of what you require from DOE.
        Mr. Porter. So you wouldn't have a problem, then, with us
    requesting that information, it's between us and DOE?
        Ms. Federline. Yes.
        Mr. Porter. Thank you.
        Congressman.
        Mr. Gibbons. Let me followup with some of my questioning
    that I started before. And Director Federline, if the proposal
    that's before Congress today, the legislation which, if I may
    describe radically undercuts the traditional requirements by
    demonstrating nuclear safety by allowing unlimited changes in
    the repository with no right to a formal or informal oral
    hearing and only 18 months for environmental review, do you
    feel that is sufficient to give the American public confidence
    in the proposals as they move forward?
        Ms. Federline. I'm sorry, sir, but the Commission has not
    completed its review of the legislation; we have not completed
    development of comments.
        Mr. Gibbons. OK. Without having a formal opinion of the--
    about the condition, what's your personal opinion of language
    that completely undercuts and removes the, as I said, removes
    the right to a formal or informal oral hearing and restricts it
    to 18 months for environmental review?
        Ms. Federline. With all due respect, sir, it would be
    inappropriate for me as a regulator to comment on standards
    that could be the subject of a licensing proceeding.
        Mr. Gibbons. Well, let me go back to Mr. Gulan. What's your
    opinion of having no right to a formal or informal oral hearing
    on changes to Yucca Mountain?
        Mr. Gulan. Well, first, sir, after we submit the license
    application the NRC, in accordance with the Nuclear Waste
    Policy Act, is 3 years, with the possible exception they can
    request an additional 4th year before they make a decision on
    whether to grant the Department construction authorization.
        What we are asking for in the legislative package is, in
    the second phase of that--in other words, the licensing
    amendment to receive and possess--that the NRC basically have
    12 months, with the possible extension of 6 months, to review
    that process, which I don't think is inconsistent with--because
    they'll have had 4 years to review the license before--
    inconsistent with potentially how they would review an action
    in a nuclear reactor licensing arena.
        Mr. Gibbons. But in demonstrating nuclear safety there's a
    lot of people outside of DOE would have concerns, and you're
    now restricting or limiting to any formal or informal oral
    statements or position----
        Mr. Gulan. I don't believe the proposed legislation
    restricts the interactions as you're talking through here, sir.
        Mr. Gibbons. Well, the way I read it for those unlimited
    changes that DOE wants to make to Yucca Mountain, and that
    means expanding from 70,000 to whatever number you plan to
    propose in the future, that you are going to restrict the
    informal and formal oral hearings.
        Mr. Gulan. Sir, that provision in the legislative proposal
    refers to the second step in the licensing process. When we
    submit our license application to the NRC, they'll have a
    period up to 4 years to review and to grant the Department the
    license----
        Mr. Gibbons. But that's for the original 70,000 tons?
        Mr. Gulan. Yes, sir.
        Mr. Gibbons. And now I'm talking about the unlimited
    changes that you want to make. Why would it be good, why should
    we permit you to restrict informal or formal hearings and
    restrict it to 18 months, for example, if you wanted to double
    the size?
        Mr. Gulan. Sir, that provision, I'd just like to go back
    to, that's after receiving construction authorization, the 18-
    month provision would be a license to receive and possess. So
    the Nuclear Regulatory Commission would still have up to 4
    years to review the license application and go through the
    hearing process, the formal hearing process in that 4-year
    period.
        Mr. Gibbons. Including the unlimited extensions and
    expansions that you want to put on Yucca Mountain after you get
    the original 70,000-ton determination?
        Mr. Gulan. Sir, again, the second part of the license
    application is the license amendment to receive and possess.
    And again, I don't have a copy of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act
    in front of me here, and I'd be glad to take that question for
    the record, but the Nuclear Waste Policy Act is clear on the
    amount of time the Regulatory Commission has to review and
    issue a judgment on construction authorization. What the
    Nuclear Waste Policy Act didn't have when it was written or
    amended was a timeframe in which the NRC would then grant the
    second part of that license for receive and possess.
        Mr. Gibbons. One of the things that troubles me about the
    bill that your organization is proposing to Congress is the
    authority to limit the exercise of jurisdictional power by
    States, tribal governments, etc., over the transportation
    requirements through their communities, through their
    reservations, along their highways and byways. Why do you want
    to take away local government's authority to review
    transportation routes?
        Mr. Gulan. Sir, I'd like to offer a briefing to your office
    and to you on the full scope of the legislative package. I
    didn't come prepared to necessarily talk in detail on that
    today; however, I do want to point to the transportation
    aspect.
        The Department has been transporting nuclear materials and
    nuclear waste over the last 50 years and it has a very good
    safety record. Our intention, with the transportation provision
    in our legislative proposal, was to extend all the work, all
    the interactions that we currently do when we ship special
    nuclear materials, when we ship low level waste and when we
    ship transuranic waste. And it was meant to extend those types
    of provisions to how we transport waste to Yucca Mountain, sir.
        Mr. Gibbons. If those provisions, as you say, have resulted
    in such a historic safety record, why do you want to exclude
    local government from having a say in either the routes, which
    roads or which train lines or over what bridges or along what
    schools or along which communities that this material travels?
        Mr. Gulan. Sir, again, I'd offer again that we would come
    and provide you a briefing on the legislative package; but
    again, the intent of that provision was basically to extend the
    type of activities and the type of provisions that we have with
    the other nuclear materials that we ship and extend that over
    into the shipment of spent nuclear fuel----
        Mr. Gibbons. Well, I understand the idea and the intent,
    but I don't understand the idea to exclude and cut out of the
    picture those people which are charged with overseeing the
    safety in some of these communities, including their first
    responders, which would have to respond if there was an
    incident or an accident, from you giving them or bringing them
    into the picture. That's what I don't understand.
        Mr. Gulan. Again, I would offer that our office could come
    and provide you a briefing on this and walk through that
    specific provision.
        Mr. Gibbons. Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Porter. Thank you.
        Mr. Friedman, thank you for your hard work for probably 8
    or 9 months--I didn't add up the time, but I appreciate it very
    much.
        Mr. Friedman. Thank you.
        Mr. Porter. In the report that we received today you point
    out some key areas, and I appreciate you addressing them in
    your opening comments. But more specifically, you talked about
    the compromise of scientific notebook requirements. Now I'm not
    a scientist, but it's my understanding from your information
    that a scientific notebook is a standard protocol in the
    science community--I'm quoting from your statement--that
    document research approaches and outcomes, and in doing so they
    aid an individual other than the original author in reproducing
    and tracing the effort. And according to your report as of
    today, an area of concern is there was the lack of a scientific
    notebook--or at least that they weren't following the
    requirements; and you--if I read it properly, and correct me if
    I'm wrong, it's like this--it appears that this notebook
    requirement was stopped once they found problems. Is that what
    you're saying in this report?
        Mr. Friedman. Mr. Chairman, what we--on the particular--
    first of all, you have, of course, correctly characterized the
    importance of lab notebooks. They're essential in the science
    field. It allows recording of information that's generated
    during current analyses and allows others to buildupon that. So
    you have characterized it correctly.
        What we found in the incident in question is the lab
    notebook had not been maintained from the outset, which
    violated good science principles, and this is a 6-year old
    problem. And it was compounded from our perspective by the fact
    that once it was determined that the lab notebook had never
    been maintained from the outset, the contractor and the USGS
    and the Department decided to compromise the requirement using
    an alternate document, which in our view was an unacceptable
    remedy to the problem.
        Mr. Porter. So how do you define the difference between
    intentional negligence and something that's criminal; how do
    you define the difference?
        Mr. Friedman. Well, there are questions of intent, Mr.
    Chairman, there are questions of materiality that are key, and
    those are the essence of the items that I would identify to
    you.
        Mr. Porter. It appears to me there was intentional behavior
    to not keep track of this science so no one would be able to
    check it in the future, and it appears to me that's
    intentional, is that what you're saying, that it's intentional?
        Mr. Friedman. I could not reach the conclusion that there
    was an intent to not participate in the lab notebook
    requirement for some nefarious reason as to the future ability
    to track the work. I can't reach that conclusion, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Porter. Also, you mention the 6-year delay in servicing
    is and dealing with the controversial e-mails, those are
    inconsistent with sound quality assurance protocols. You go on
    to say we could not find a satisfactory explanation as to why
    the e-mails had not been recognized as problematic years
    earlier. This would allow the Department to address the
    concerns raised by the contents of the e-mails in a timely
    manner.
        Despite this, the comments--and I'm paraphrasing and moving
    ahead on your comments because you know them better than I do,
    but despite this the comments and e-mails appears to have gone
    unchallenged. Additionally, internal quality assurance reviews
    over the years failed to identify the questionable e-mails.
        Again, can you explain to me a little bit more about what
    you're saying here?
        Mr. Friedman. Yes. Six years obviously has passed, Mr.
    Chairman, since the original offending e-mails were written.
    And in that 6-year period you referred earlier, or Mr. Gibbons
    did, to the turnover in personnel--maybe it was you, Mr.
    Chairman--people have minds, memories have faded, people have
    moved on, documentation is no longer available. And the point
    that we are trying to make is that if these offending e-mails
    had been identified contemporaneously or very close to the time
    that they were in fact written, minds would have been fresh,
    memories could have been fresh, the Department could have
    addressed the issues very promptly and saved a great deal of
    turmoil that has occurred as a result. So our point is that
    there was reason to believe--we had testimony to suggest that
    quality assurance people had in fact seen the e-mails, and yet
    for some reason the light bulb did not go on or they did not
    bring those to anybody's attention until a 6-year period had
    elapsed.
        Mr. Porter. The genesis of the project is that Yucca
    Mountain was chosen because the mountain may provide some
    natural barrier to prevent filtration--or infiltration of
    moisture into the storage which could then contaminate ground
    water. And the genesis of the science is that the mountain is
    safe, and that there is minimal, if any, infiltration of
    moisture. Again, in your report you mention that control files
    relating to the simulation of net infiltration from modern and
    potential future climates, AMR was not maintained in accordance
    with Data Management System's requirements, and that during the
    evaluation of AMR for the simulation of net infiltration from
    modern and potential future climates the team wasn't able to
    reproduce the model due to the absence of certain control
    files. Can you explain your findings under that No. 3?
        Mr. Friedman. I can, Mr. Chairman. In recent years there
    was an attempt made to reconstruct that model, to evaluate it
    further and to see whether it withstood the test of time. When
    they tried to recreate it, they found that there were certain
    control documents which they could not find in the master
    control file. And of course in a $9 billion project overall you
    would anticipate that would be absolutely essential. Ultimately
    the files were located in the residence of one of the
    participants--or at least part of the files were found there.
        Mr. Porter. Thank you.
        Mr. Gibbons. Mr. Chairman, I'm a bit taken aback by some of
    the answers we've gotten today because I expected a little more
    of being able to bridge between the problems of the quality
    assurance issues that have been described by either DOE or the
    GAO in their development of the program and the policy here at
    Yucca Mountain. But I'm more troubled by the fact that we are
    here in Congress and we are trying to bridge and overcome these
    quality assurance issues, and you know, it seems to me right
    now that we've kind of got the cart before the horse. You know,
    we've seen a lot of problems with the scientific analysis
    coming up, maybe they weren't intentionally changed or
    fraudulently put out there, and that did not give rise to a
    criminal action, but it does give rise to some serious
    concerns, concerns as a scientist myself, as a geologist, as a
    mining geologist, it gives rise of concern to me that perhaps
    those that were in charge of doing the science work and those
    who actually performed that science didn't have in their bag of
    work ethics the right motivation to be doing what they should
    have been doing on this project and simply took shortcuts. If
    that's the case, we've obviously got some serious problems
    here, or if they just simply said if they want more quality
    assurance I'll go write more quality assurance. Nonetheless,
    there's some real serious quality assurance problems here that
    haven't been answered adequately in my mind.
        There is also this question about the new piece of
    legislation which DOE is supporting before this Congress in an
    effort to overcome some problems that they can't meet today.
    And I think unfortunately I'm still of the opinion that this
    project that's fatally flawed, that no matter how much you move
    the goalpost to make it work, no matter how many times you
    change the standard to make something fit, no matter how many
    times you get a bigger hammer to fit a square peg in a round
    hole, it's still going to be a square peg in a round hole. And
    I think the bill that's before us is an unconstitutional
    usurpation of the States' sovereign prerogatives, whether it's
    in Nevada, but it sets a horrible precedence across this
    country because you're forcing communities, you're forcing
    States to give up traditional jurisdiction under the
    Constitution of areas that they normally had authority to
    regulate. It circumvents the scientific flaws that these people
    here have already said have existed and have a history of
    existing. It deprives the States, as I said, and localities
    nationwide for the role in waste transport. It exonerates the
    Department of Energy from traditional regulations for nuclear
    projects.
        I think what we are doing here is getting the bigger hammer
    out and we are trying to make everything fit. As a geologist, I
    can't accept it. First of all, to build Yucca Mountain in a
    safe place or build a project at Yucca Mountain that is
    supposed to be geologically stable should at first raise the
    flags automatically when it was a mountain. You know, it didn't
    get there, it didn't get to be a mountain by some placid
    tectonic activity. It's got serious geologic problems, and we
    don't have the vision to look down the road and say when those
    are going to reoccur. We are hoping that the blindness--with
    blinders on that we will somehow get past this, wash our hands
    of it and say out of sight, out of mind, we are done, and oh,
    by the way, let's make it bigger so we can take in everything.
        What's happening here today is that, because of the NIMBY
    syndrome--and I have to admit, it's in Nevada, we don't want it
    in our back yard, no other State wants it in their back yard,
    but we've failed to meet, I think, this country's expectations
    of how to deal with nuclear energy, and it will result in the
    end of nuclear energy in this country if the Department of
    Energy is allowed to complete Yucca Mountain.
        So my view, Mr. Chairman, is that the bill is fatally
    flawed, the project is fatally flawed, the concepts of how to
    deal with nuclear waste are fatally flawed. It has for 30 years
    had blinders on to just go forward with this, to make sure the
    deep geologic burial, according to the Nuclear Energy
    Institute, accommodates all of those power plants that want to
    close down or are closed down, but it doesn't meet the safety
    requirements that this country and this public expect. And I'm
    sad, saddened by the day that we sit here in here and talk
    about changing the standards, eliminating the oversight, giving
    unlimited jurisdiction to a department who's got sole
    responsibility for this type of occurrence. And it's worse than
    the chicken watching the fox--or the hen--excuse me, the fox
    watching the chicken house--I'll get that yet.
        And so, Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you again for your
    leadership. I have no more questions about this. I haven't
    heard anything that allows me to get a better feeling for
    what's going on, but I do appreciate the fact that you've
    invited me here today, and I appreciate the fact that you have
    allowed me to participate in this hearing.
        With that, I want to thank all of our witnesses. I know you
    have tough jobs ahead of you, just as we have tough decisions
    to make, and I appreciate the fact that you have been here
    before us and responded to our questions.
        Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Porter. Thank you, Congressman. I'd like to ask just a
    couple more questions.
        And Mr. Wells, again, thank you for being here. I did not
    want you to feel like we left you out of this debate----
        Mr. Wells. No problem.
        Mr. Porter. But I know that you and your staff spent a lot
    of time and we greatly appreciate it, and on behalf of the
    American people we appreciate it.
        GAO has investigated quality assurance in Yucca Mountain
    for 20 something years. And the title of the 1988 report was
    Repository Work Should Not Proceed Until Quality Assurance Is
    Adequate. Now this is 1988. In light of the GAO's extensive
    work, why do you think DOE is still experiencing these same
    problems, since 1988, the same problems?
        Mr. Wells. You know, I think it goes back to--it was
    encouraging, everyone in the room probably picked up on Mr.
    Gulan's statement that their goal was to have early detection
    of these problems; and we have--since 1988 people have gone in
    and looked and found problems that seemed to--quality assurance
    problems that seemed to fester under the surface for a lot of
    years and under the radar screen, and all of a sudden they
    accumulate and they explode, and then the Department of Energy
    jumps to some type of fix, and it's rework and it's expensive.
    And you have to ask yourself why does that happen. And you
    know, consistently talking to the audit teams that have looked
    at the Yucca Mountain project and the quality assurance
    program, consistently we hear things with the culture, the
    importance of QA not being as high as the importance of meeting
    a schedule, or the ability to think that if it's wrong somebody
    else will find it and fix it later. And I think Mr. Gulan's
    commitment to change the culture is on the right track, to
    elevate the importance of quality assurance to keep these
    problems from festering so long. It shouldn't take 6 year e-
    mails to discover that they occurred; it shouldn't take the NRC
    to observe an audit and point out that the equipment they're
    using hasn't been calibrated in years. It's that culture that's
    unacceptable and it has to be changed.
        Mr. Porter. Thank you, Mr. Wells. And I find it truly
    amazing that we are talking about high level nuclear waste, and
    again, whether you're for or against Yucca Mountain, the fact
    that these questions of safety keeps coming up, it's nuclear
    waste, it's not about a bicycle plant someplace in Des Moines,
    we are talking about high level nuclear waste, a science that's
    untested, and continually questions of safety. And again, I
    appreciate your comments, Mr. Wells.
        Ms. Federline, another question for you, please. Is this
    turnover of management, 9 of 17 key positions and 3 directors
    in a short period of time, is that a concern for the NRC?
        Ms. Federline. Well, I think overall the NRC feels that the
    perspective of QA at DOE is very important; in other words,
    finding problems is not the problem; a good QA program will
    normally find problems. The issue with us is those problems
    need to be quickly fixed and they need to be prevented from
    recurrence. And those are two aspects that we want to emphasize
    to DOE. And they need to put in place an organizational
    structure which they feel will be effective in making those
    corrections and seeing that the problems don't reoccur.
        Mr. Porter. I see Congresswoman Eleanor Holmes has left.
    I'd like to just ask a couple of additional questions.
        Mr. Gulan, regarding the turnover of staff, 9 of 17, were
    any of those individuals asked to leave?
        Mr. Gulan. No. We did not renew a limited term SES
    appointment, but the people that you talk about left on their
    own volition.
        Mr. Porter. So there was no encouragement on the part of
    DOE for any of these individuals, it was just purely attrition
    and retirement?
        Mr. Gulan. Basically, sir.
        Mr. Porter. So then who has been held accountable for
    information that's been provided today? Has anyone been held
    accountable?
        Mr. Gulan. Yes, they have. And there are people who are no
    longer working on this project.
        Mr. Porter. You just moved them to another project,
    somewhere in the nuclear industry?
        Mr. Gulan. No. There's been folks in the contract or
    organization who are no longer part of this project, sir.
        Mr. Porter. And they're still working for the Federal
    Government?
        Mr. Gulan. I don't know, sir. They don't work on this
    project.
        Mr. Porter. OK. Is there a way that we can find out?
        Mr. Gulan. Sure. We'll take that question for the record.
        Mr. Porter. I appreciate that. Thank you.
        I guess in closing, Mr. Gulan, I'll ask you a question.
    Based on the findings of GAO and the Inspector General's
    office, in discussions today and in prior discussions, how can
    you say that we can assure the American public that Yucca
    Mountain is and will be safe?
        Mr. Gulan. Sir, that's our--the burden is on us to
    demonstrate to you and to the American public that we can
    operate Yucca Mountain safely. There is an established process
    through the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, through the licensing
    process that will be a very public process, the regulator being
    the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. So there is a formal
    process. But before we get to that formal process there is a
    process within the Department. Before we submit a license
    application it has to pass our standards. And one of the things
    that we didn't talk about today is the fact that we have not
    talked about a schedule of when the license application will be
    submitted.
        I mentioned earlier in my testimony, Secretary Bodman gave
    me clear instructions, make it simpler, make it safer, and
    improve the quality and culture of this organization. Those
    were his marching orders to me, sir, and we are following that.
        After we review everything from the model down through the
    design basis for the facilities, the safety analysis, the
    seismic analysis and develop our license application, it's our
    intent to conduct our internal reviews, our internal
    independent reviews to ensure that our standards have been met,
    to ensure that our quality standards have been met. And only
    after our standards have been met will we be in a position to
    submit our licensing application to the Nuclear Regulatory
    Commission for them to adjudicate the licensing process here.
    So there are standards that have to be met in this
    organization, and the bar is set high, before we send our
    application request in to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
        Mr. Porter. So once the application is submitted, is it the
    NRC's responsibility to determine if it's safe or is it DOE's?
        Mr. Gulan. It's the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's
    responsibility to adjudicate that process, it's not ours.
        Mr. Porter. So you don't accept responsibility if it's
    safe----
        Mr. Gulan. No. I accept responsibility. It is my
    responsibility that we submit a high quality license
    application that our standards have been met. It's the NRC's
    job then to evaluate on whether or not they issue us a license
    to construct, and then subsequently a license to receive and
    possess; but it's our responsibility to meet our standards
    first.
        Mr. Porter. You know, I can remember growing up many, many
    years ago--and I'm not sure if this cartoon is still around, it
    was Family Circle. Steve, is it still in the paper, the Family
    Circle?
        Mr. Castor. Yes, it's in the Washington Post, sir.
        Mr. Porter. Thank you. I haven't had a chance to look at
    the cartoon pages as much as I'd like to, but there was this
    cartoon, the Family Circle, and these kids were around saying
    not me, not me, not me, not my fault, not my fault, not my
    fault. And my biggest concern--again, whether you're for or
    against Yucca Mountain--is that someday we are going to wake up
    and 2000 DOE employees are going to say it wasn't my job, NRC
    may wake up and say it wasn't our job, even though there was a
    major catastrophe or major accident, and everyone is going to
    go, not me. And I sense that time and time again, as I hear the
    facts that are presented, that so far your decisions have not
    been based upon sound science at the Department of Energy. The
    White House, multiple administrations, have based decisions on
    what they believe is sound science, this Congress is basing
    decisions that are based upon what they feel are sound science,
    and I have yet to hear the Department of Energy is using sound
    science. It appears to me that there is a rush--20 years, but
    there's a rush to appease the nuclear industry, there's a rush
    to appease certain Members of Congress and certain
    administrations, and there's a rush to get the job done. And
    Mr. Gulan, I would just hope that someday Department of Energy
    officials don't wake up and say not me, because I'm very, very
    concerned.
        Mr. Gulan. You won't hear those words from my mouth, sir.
        Mr. Porter. Again, I want to thank you all for being here.
    We will continue our investigation. We still have numerous
    documents to review.
        I appreciate Mr. Wells, Mr. Friedman, Ms. Federline and Mr.
    Gulan for being here today, and look forward to continued
    testimony in the future. We will be forwarding additional
    questions that we'd like to have answers for the record. So
    with that, we'll adjourn the meeting. Thank you all very much.
        [Whereupon, at 3:38 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
        [The prepared statement of Hon. Danny K. Davis follows:]

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