[House Hearing, 109 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
INCIDENT COMMAND, CONTROL,
AND COMMUNICATIONS DURING
CATASTROPHIC EVENTS
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGENCY
PREPAREDNESS, SCIENCE, AND
TECHNOLOGY
of the
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
SEPTEMBER 29, 2005
__________
Serial No. 109-44
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TONGRESS.#13
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/
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__________
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COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Peter T. King, New York, Chairman
Don Young, Alaska Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Lamar S. Smith, Texas Loretta Sanchez, California
Curt Weldon, Pennsylvania Edward J. Markey, Massachusetts
Christopher Shays, Connecticut Norman D. Dicks, Washington
John Linder, Georgia Jane Harman, California
Mark E. Souder, Indiana Peter A. DeFazio, Oregon
Tom Davis, Virginia Nita M. Lowey, New York
Daniel E. Lungren, California Eleanor Holmes Norton, District of
Jim Gibbons, Nevada Columbia
Rob Simmons, Connecticut Zoe Lofgren, California
Mike Rogers, Alabama Sheila Jackson-Lee, Texas
Stevan Pearce, New Mexico Bill Pascrell, Jr., New Jersey
Katherine Harris, Florida Donna M. Christensen, U.S. Virgin
Bobby Jindal, Louisiana Islands
Dave G. Reichert, Washington Bob Etheridge, North Carolina
Michael McCaul, Texas James R. Langevin, Rhode Island
Charlie Dent, Pennsylvania Kendrick B. Meek, Florida
Ginny Brown-Waite, Florida
______
SUBCOMMITTE ON EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS, SCIENCE, AND TECHNOLOGY
Dave G. Reichert, Washington, Chairman
Lamar S. Smith, Texas Bill Pascrell, Jr., New Jersey
Curt Weldon, Pennsylvania Loretta Sanchez, California
Rob Simmons, Connecticut Norman D. Dicks, Washington
Mike Rogers, Alabama Jane Harman, California
Stevan Pearce, New Mexico Nita M. Lowey, New York
Katherine Harris, Florida Eleanor Holmes Norton, District of
Michael McCaul, Texas Columbia
Charlie Dent, Pennsylvania Donna M. Christensen, U.S. Virgin
Peter T. King, New York (Ex Islands
Officio) Bob Etheridge, North Carolina
Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
(Ex Officio)
(II)
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
STATEMENTS
The Honorable Dave G. Reichert, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Washington, and Chairman, Subcommittee on
Emergency Preparedness, Science, and Technology................ 1
The Honorable Bill Pascrell, Jr., a Representative in Congress
From the State of New Jersey, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee
on Emergency Preparedness, Science and Technology.............. 2
The Honorable Peter T. King, a Representative in Congress From
the State of New York, and Chairman, Committee on Homeland
Security....................................................... 4
The Honorable Benie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Mississippi:
Prepared Statement............................................. 5
The Honorable Michael McCaul, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Texas............................................. 41
WITNESSES
Mr. Chuck Canterbury, National President, Fraternal Order of
Police:
Oral Statement................................................. 6
Prepared Statement............................................. 8
Mr. Bob Freudenthal, President, American Public Works
Association:
Oral Statement................................................. 15
Prepared Statement............................................. 17
Mr. Robert L. Garner, President and CEO, American Ambulance
Association:
Oral Statement................................................. 19
Prepared Statement............................................. 21
Mark Edward Gebhart, M.D.,, Assistant Professor of Emergency,
Medicine, Boonshoft School of Medicine at Wright State
University:
Oral Statement................................................. 32
Prepared Statement............................................. 34
Mr. William D. ''Bill'' Killen, Chief, President, International
Association of Fire Chiefs:
Oral Statement................................................. 9
Prepared Statement............................................. 11
Mr. David E. Liebersbach, Immediate Past President, National
Emergency Management Association:
Oral Statement................................................. 26
Prepared Statement............................................. 28
INCIDENT COMMAND, CONTROL,
AND COMMUNICATION DURING
CATASTROPHIC EVENTS
----------
Thursday, September 29, 2005
U.S. House of Representatives,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness,
Science and Technology,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 1:02 p.m., in
Room 311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Dave Reichert
[chairman of the subcommittee] presiding.
Present: Representatives Reichert, King, McCaul, Pascrell,
Christensen, and Etheridge.
Mr. Reichert. [Presiding.] Good afternoon. The Committee on
Homeland Security's Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness,
Science, and Technology will come to order.
The subcommittee will hear testimony today on incident
command, control, and communications during catastrophic
events.
I would first like to welcome our witnesses and thank them
for taking time out of their schedules to be with us here
today, so thank you all very much.
I want to take a moment to welcome everyone to this
hearing. This is my first hearing as chairman, as most of you
know. I am honored to lead this subcommittee, especially as a
freshman. As you know, it is my first term in Congress and not
everyone here knows me very well, but hopefully over the next
few years we will gain some respect and a working relationship
with each other.
Our most important asset as a subcommittee is the witnesses
that appear before us, and hearing your different arguments
empowers us to make educated decisions for the American people.
I thank you all again for being here.
We are here today to discuss a topic that affects every one
of us. I believe you will find it is not partisan, but
personal. Today, we will examine disaster response on the
ground and how to ensure that our nation is not ever again
overwhelmed by a large-scale emergency or disaster.
This issue is central to the mission of this subcommittee
and is also at the heart of who I am. As the former sheriff of
King County in Seattle, Washington, as a first responder for
over 33 years, I can personally attest there has to be
effective and efficient responses to catastrophic events.
Without planning, training and communication, of course this
would not happen.
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita were so catastrophic and so
unexpectedly damaging that they burned right through the
resources of our first responders. This country's first
responders are phenomenal, as we all know, and frequently are
putting their lives on the line for all of us. Yet as these
hurricanes struck, they faced unprecedented operational,
logistical and financial problems.
As we look to the future, it is critical that we put an
effective incident command structure in place so that, even if
communications are knocked out, emergency response continues.
There is no denying mistakes were made in the wake of these
two storms. It is clear we need to put a system in place to
handle the massive influx of support personnel and resources to
a disaster site, while at the same time managing timely and
accurate information on incident commanders and the public.
There are many concerns to be addressed, and I do not doubt
we will realize all of that as we continue forward. I also
believe that, however, we must all have the same common
interest: wanting to ensure that the American people have an
emergency system that responds quickly and effectively in times
of need. The bottom line is that we want to protect citizens,
especially in times of great loss.
I know that working together we will make progress. We will
examine how to ensure the short-term and long-term health and
safety of our first responders and how to effectively treat
victims in mass-casualty events and how to ensure that response
and recovery funds are spent wisely and many more important
issues.
My predecessor as chairman of the subcommittee, Peter King,
left big shoes to fill, as we know, and I will work hard to do
my best to continue the integrity and dedication that he has
instilled. I know I speak for every member here today when I
say we are honored to have him as chairman of the Homeland
Security Committee.
I am also lucky to have next to me Bill Pascrell at my side
as the subcommittee's distinguished ranking member. I am eager
to work together with him.
While we take time to examine disaster responses today, I
think it is important we not forget the most important thing
that we have seen following the storms: the strength, the power
and bravery of the families and loved ones in the Gulf Coast.
They have shown amazing heart and our prayers are with them.
So thank you, and welcome again.
The chair now recognizes the ranking minority member of the
subcommittee, the gentleman from New Jersey, Mr. Pascrell, for
a statement.
Mr. Pascrell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Today's hearing is designed to examine incident command,
control, and communications during times of crisis. We will
specifically focus on the progress toward the national adoption
of the Incident Command System, the ICS, very critical and very
important to everybody here--a standardized response system for
emergency responders. ICS is designed to ensure that the first-
responder community maintains adequate and operable means of
communication in the event of a disaster.
Additionally, this hearing will build upon the September
2004 hearing on the National Incident Management System, a
nationwide model for federal, state, and local governments to
work together to prepare for, to respond to, and recover from
domestic incidents.
It goes without saying that these are areas of extreme
importance that Congress must examine, must explore with robust
vigor. I am glad that this subcommittee has taken the lead on
these vital issues.
I am confident in saying that I do not think we could have
a much better advocate for the needs of first responders than
our new chairman, David Reichert. With 30 years of noted law
enforcement experience, Chairman Reichert knows first-hand what
our men and women in the field go through on a daily basis.
I want to just say this about that: It is critical that the
Congress listens to those people who have the boots on the
ground out in the field. For too long, this Congress on every
issue listens to consultants. You are the consultants. You are
there. You deal with this every day. We should be listening to
you.
I do not speak for the chairman of the overall committee,
but I know Peter King feels the same way that I do. We need to
pay a lot more attention to you who are in the field, the men
and women who are in the field day-in and day-out, because when
there is not a crisis, you have to be there also.
I congratulate my friend, David, on his position. I am
excited to work with him in a bipartisan fashion for the common
good.
The hearing comes at a poignant time in our collective
conscience. The tragedy of Hurricane Katrina and the searing
images of Americans dying, suffering, calling desperately for
help, has raised enormously important questions related to our
nation's emergency response capabilities.
While the Homeland Security Committee has yet to schedule
any specific hearings related to the response to Hurricanes
Katrina and Rita, I believe today's meeting in our subcommittee
can still be used to probe issues related to response to these
catastrophic storms.
Both Hurricanes Katrina and Rita involved mass evacuation
of people from major metropolitan areas. Mass evacuations can
greatly impact command and control of major disasters. In
addition, mass care and sheltering of evacuees for what can be
a lengthy period of time is a major issue for the areas not
directly impacted by the storm. To what extent does the
National Incident Management System and the ICS take into
consideration evacuation planning and routes?
During Hurricane Katrina, communications problems were
compounded by the destruction of the communications
infrastructure. First responders were often unable to have
operable communications of any type. This fact made the
inability to communicate with other first-responder disciplines
and agencies a secondary concern. Beyond interoperability, what
were the major obstacles to effective communications? How did
this affect the command and control of the disaster, as well as
hinder the overall response?
After Hurricane Katrina, there was a great outpouring of
volunteers and donations to support the relief efforts. As we
know, volunteers and donations are often needed to adequately
recover from disasters, yet both individuals and companies have
experienced difficulties donating goods and services to the
relief effort. A better system of managing these donations may
be needed and should be discussed. Has the National Response
Plan and the National Incident Management System adequately
addressed these areas? What changes do you think we need to
make?
These questions, just to name but a few, must be examined
and explored thoroughly by our committee. Today is a good first
step. I hope that in the weeks and months ahead we will
continue to explore these issues in a thorough manner.
I want to thank today's witnesses not only for their
testimony, but more importantly for your services, each
representing a large amount of people in this country. You
provided these services to the American community in your roles
as emergency managers and responders. There is no doubt this
panel can learn a great deal from each of you.
I came to the Congress as one of my major priorities to do
you justice. I hope I have not let you down. I pray God I never
will. Thank you for being here today.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Reichert. Thank you, Mr. Pascrell.
The chair now recognizes the chairman of the full
committee, the gentleman from New York, Mr. King.
Mr. King. Thank you, Chairman Reichert.
I have a formal statement which I would like to be made
part of the record. I would just like to make a few remarks.
First of all, I want to congratulate Dave Reichert on being
appointed chairman of the subcommittee. I cannot think of
anybody more qualified. He has an extensive and distinguished
career. Even more than that, he has the dedication. During the
time that I was chairman of the subcommittee and Congressman
Reichert was a member, I do not think anyone took more notes or
asked more questions or followed up more than he did. He is
absolutely dedicated to this, and he is going to do a truly
outstanding job.
One of the reasons he will do an outstanding job is he is
working with Bill Pascrell, who is an old friend of mine. Bill
and I certainly managed to put all partisanship aside to treat
this not as a Republican or Democratic issue, but as an
American issue. I really commend Bill. When there were times
when we could have gone into partisan directions, he did not. I
thank him for that. I certainly look forward to working with
him in my new capacity as chairman of the full committee.
I also want to thank the witnesses for being here today. As
Bill Pascrell said, you are the people that are on the ground.
You are the ones who do the job. Others talk about it, others
deliberate about it, but you guys do it. It really means a
tremendous amount to our country. Like Congressman Pascrell and
Congressman Reichert, I hope that we can in some small way
repay you for the service that you have given to our country.
The issue today, the whole issue of incident command,
control, and communications is absolutely essential. It is
vital. It was certainly driven home to us during the Katrina
and Rita Hurricanes. These are issues that must be addressed.
They are issues that have to be looked at, perhaps from a fresh
look.
I know that this subcommittee hearing today is a good first
step along those lines. I know that Chairman Reichert will do
an excellent job. I wish him well, and I look forward to the
testimony and the questions.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Prepare Statement of the Honorable Bennie G. Thompson
One month ago today, Hurricane Katrina made landfall in Louisiana
and in my home state of Mississippi. This past weekend, Hurricane Rita
hit Southeast Texas and Southwest Louisiana.
Both hurricanes left us with many questions on our nation's
preparedness.
As the Committee responsible for homeland security, it is our
responsibility to figure out what went wrong and why. We owe it to our
constituents and to the nation as a whole.
During the aftermath of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, we witnessed
what can happen when there is not an organized and adequate response.
We also know that effective communication during an incident is
vital to a safe and effective response. We saw and were told as much
after 9/11.
Somehow, four years later, we still know but are not doing.
Why is this the case?
Why couldn't the police in towns in Mississippi talk to each other?
Why did the police in New Orleans suffer as much as they did, driving a
couple of officers to suicide?
This past weekend with Rita, why did the local officials have to
rely on battery-drained cells to communicate with one another?
What happened to lessons learned?
It was not just an issue of communications interoperability with
the hurricanes, but an issue of having ANY operable means of
communication.
Communication during an incident is also dependent on state and
local officials having someone to turn to in the federal government and
not having their requests lost in the bureaucracy.
Unfortunately, during Katrina, communication at all levels of
government was not what it should have been.
I heard about incidents where FEMA required local officials to
``Fax'' requests in order to receive assistance. I heard it from local
officials in Mississippi and then again earlier this week from police
chiefs in Texas who were told the same thing.
I don't understand what type of bureaucracy requires a fax from
folks underwater, with little food, no communications, and no
electricity.
It is also shameful that my colleagues, Congressmen Melancon and
Taylor, had to call this Committee to ask for assistance to get
satellite phones from the Department of Homeland Security.
Before we got involved, they were told that they had to fill out
some nonsense paperwork and talk to some office that I had never heard
of.
I want to thank the folks at the Department of Homeland Security
Legislative Affairs Office who recognized how ridiculous this was and
worked to cut the bureaucracy and get Louisiana and Mississippi the
help it needed.
If it weren't for those folks, our colleagues might still be
waiting for communications to arrive while the paperwork was filed,
stamped, and filled out in triplicate.
As a former volunteer firefighter and local official, I understand
the importance of a clear command and control structure, and the
benefits that such a structure provides during incident response.
I also understand that it is sill for the federal government to
think that any local or state entity can withstand a massive event--
whether a natural disaster or terrorist attack.
If anyone has any questions about this, they should read the 9/11
Commission report, which found that the attacks on the World Trade
Center completely overwhelmed New York City's robust emergency response
capability.
Specifically, they noted that even though the New York Police and
Fire Departments were both prominent emergency response organizations,
there were problems.
Read the National Response Plan or National Planning Scenarios
issued by the Department in the past year--BEFORE THE HURRICANES HIT--
that said that in the event of a hurricane, state and locals would be
overwhelmed and, most likely, underwater.
Again I ask, what happened to lessons learned?
After 9/11, the citizens of New York and neighboring states
deserved better than the status quo. After Hurricanes Katrina and Rita,
the citizens of Mississippi, Louisiana, Alabama, Florida, and Texas
deserve better.
Actually, all first responders across the nation deserve better.
Americans deserve to know that if an earthquake strikes California,
our First responders are prepared and have the command system and
communications they need.
If wild fires spread across New Mexico, Arizona, or California,
they are prepared.
Hopefully this will be the first of many hearings in this Committee
that will assess the response to and recovery from Hurricanes Katrina
and Rita, so we can assure this preparedness.
I thank the witnesses for appearing before the Subcommittee, I look
forward your testimony.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Reichert. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I have to respond by saying thank you for having faith in a
new member to take on this responsibility. It is a new,
exciting adventure that we are going to be on together, and
hopefully we will do some good work together to make sure,
again, that this country is ready for the next event that may
happen in the future.
We are pleased to have a distinguished panel of witnesses
with us today. With us are Mr. Chuck Canterbury, the national
president, Fraternal Order of Police; Chief William ``Bill''
Killen, president, International Association of Fire Chiefs;
Mr. Bob Freudenthal, president, American Public Works
Association; Mr. Robert Garner, president and CEO, American
Ambulance Association; Mr. David Liebersbach, immediate past
president, National Emergency Management Association; and Dr.
Mark Gebhart, assistant professor of emergency medicine,
Boonshoft School of Medicine at Wright State University.
Let me remind the witnesses that their entire written
statement will appear on the record. We ask that, due to the
number of witnesses on our panel today, you strive to limit
your oral testimony to no more than 5 minutes please.
The chair now recognizes Mr. Chuck Canterbury, national
president of the Fraternal Order of Police, to testify.
STATEMENT OF CHUCK CANTERBURY
Mr. Canterbury. Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman and Ranking
Member Pascrell and distinguished members of the House
Committee on Homeland Security. As the chairman has told you,
my name is Chuck Canterbury. I am the national president of the
Fraternal Order of Police. I am the elected spokesperson
representing 321,000 rank-and-file police officers.
I am here this afternoon to share our views on the
challenges faced by law enforcement officers during critical
incidents.
First, let me say we are very pleased to have a law
enforcement professional as the chairman of this committee. We
look forward to a long relationship with you, Mr. Chairman.
Command and control during critical incidents, particularly
in the first few hours after an event, is the single most
important factor in mitigating the loss of life and property.
However, the effectiveness of the incident commander and his
ability to maintain oversight of the situation hinges on his
ability to communicate with the public safety governmental and
private entities who play a role in the response to a critical
incident. In short, without the ability to talk to the various
elements which play a role in critical incident response, even
the best-laid preparations can quickly come undone.
My testimony this afternoon will focus on the incident
commander the vital communications needs of the command in
particular.
In order to establish and maintain command and control,
most emergency services, particularly when multiple layers of
government or first-responder disciplines are involved, utilize
the ICS system. ICS features or should feature a common
organizational structure and apply key management principles in
a standardized way by providing a means to coordinate the
efforts of individual agencies to achieve three main
priorities: life safety, incident stability and conservation of
property.
Generally speaking, an ICS has five major functions:
command, planning, operations, logistics, and finance-
administration. These three priorities and five elements are
present in every incident command system and its use it not
limited to large-scale incidents. In fact, most communities use
some form of ICS to respond to routine emergencies on small-
scale events, and in many cases all five elements are relevant
to some extent, though sometimes they are through one person
who may manage them all.
For example, after receiving report of a single-car
accident on a busy highway, a single dispatcher and the
appropriate command authority can deploy a variety of emergency
service assets: law enforcement officers to secure the scene
and direct traffic, firefighters to extract the victims from
the car and clean hazardous materials spills, EMTs to treat
injuries. Under the ICS theory, the scale of the response
expands to meet the scale of the incident. So whether the
situation is as minor as a fender-bender or a widespread
catastrophic event like a hurricane or terrorist attack, the
ICS theory should be in place.
The highest-ranking position within the ICS is obviously
the incident commander who is ultimately responsible for all
the activities that take place during the incident, including
development and implementation of strategic decisions. In order
to make these life and death decision, an incident commander
must be able to receive accurate information. The entire
command and control doctrine depends on integrated systems for
communication to allow data to be continuously updated during
an incident, provide a common framework that covers the
incident's life-cycle across jurisdictions and disciplines.
With such a communication system in place, the incident
commander is able to disseminate warnings to civilians caught
up in the incident, as well as public safety officers involved
in the response, to formulate, execute and communicate
operational decisions, as well as between the incident-
management entities across jurisdictions, and to develop and
maintain overall awareness and understanding of an incident
within and across jurisdictions.
If you would, without the reliable communications,
sometimes we end up with situations like we had recently with
the failure of the communications system with the New Orleans
Police Department, which was inoperative for 3 days following
the hurricane. At one point, hundreds of New Orleans officers
were trying to communicate on two radio channels on a backup
system, forcing them to wait for an opening in radio traffic in
order to transmit or receive critical information.
Interoperability is a frequent post-incident buzzword, but
little progress has been made in developing and implementing a
truly interoperable communications system. For instance, in
1997, the FOP pushed for legislation that would provide 24 MHz
of spectrum on the 700 MHz band for use by public safety
agencies. Yet in our nation's most populated areas, television
broadcasters still occupy this spectrum nearly 9 years after it
was allocated exclusively for the use of public safety.
In closing, Mr. Chairman, we would just like to thank you
for allowing us to appear here today. Obviously, 5 minutes is
not very long and we have submitted written comments that were
much more detailed.
Thank you very much.
[The statement of Mr. Canterbury follows:]
Prepared Statement of Chuck Canterbury
Good morning, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Pascrell, and
distinguished Members of the House Committee on Homeland Security. My
name is Chuck Canterbury, National President of the Fraternal Order of
Police. I am the elected spokesperson of more than 321,000 rank-and-
file police officers--the largest law enforcement labor organization in
the United States. I am here this afternoon to share with you the views
of the F.O.P. on the challenges faced by law enforcement officers
during critical incidents.
Before I begin my testimony, I want to offer my congratulations
toChairman Reichert, a thirty-year law enforcement veteran for having
assumed the chairmanship of this Subcommittee. The F.O.P. often feels
that law enforcement's preventive role in homeland security is
overlooked in favor of ``response and recovery,'' and we believe that
his experience will greatly benefit the work of his Subcommittee and
the Committee as a whole.
Command and control during a critical incident, particularly in the
first few hours after an event, is the single most important factor in
mitigating the loss of life and property.
However, the effectiveness of the Incident Commander, and his
ability to maintain oversight of the situation, hinges on his ability
to communicate with the myriad public safety, governmental, and private
entities who will play a role in the response to a critical incident.
In short, without the ability to talk to the various elements which
play a role in critical incident response, even the best laid
preparations can quickly come undone. My testimony this afternoon will
thus focus on the role of the Incident Commander and the vital
communications needs of the command in particular.
In order to establish and maintain command and control, most
emergency services, particularly when multiple layers of government or
first responder disciplines are involved, utilize an Incident Command
Structure or Incident Command System (ICS). An ICS features, or should
feature, a common organizational structure and apply key management
principles in a standardized way by providing a means to coordinate the
efforts of individual agencies to achieve three main priorities: life
safety, incident stability, and conservation of property. Generally
speaking, an ICS has five major functions: command, planning,
operations, logistics, and finance/administration.
These three priorities and five elements are present in every
Incident Command System and its use is not limited to large scale
incidents. In fact, most communities use some form of ICS to respond to
``routine emergencies'' or small scale events and, in many cases, all
five elements of ICS are relevant to some extent, though one person may
be able manage them all.
For example, after receiving reports of a single car accident on a
busy highway, a single dispatcher and the appropriate command authority
can deploy a variety of emergency service assets--law enforcement
officers to secure the scene and divert traffic flow, firefighters to
extract individuals from the car or assist with any spills of hazardous
materials, and emergency medical technicians to treat any injuries.
Under ICS theory, the scale of the response expands to meet the scale
of the incident, for emergency response to be effective, it must be
complete, whether the situation is as minor as a fender-bender, or a
widespread, catastrophic event like a hurricane or terrorist attack.
The highest ranking position within the ICS is the Incident
Commander, who is ultimately responsible for all activities that take
place during an incident, including the development and implementation
of strategic decisions and the ordering and releasing of resources. In
order to make these life-and-death decisions, an Incident Commander
must be able to receive accurate information from assets in the field
and to communicate with those assets during the entirety of the
incident. A common operating picture is necessary for consistency at
all levels of incident management across jurisdictions, as well as
between various governmental jurisdictions and private-sector and
nongovernmental entities that may be engaged.
The entire command and control doctrine depends on integrated
systems for communication, to allow data to be continuously updated
during an incident, providing a common framework that covers the
incident's life cycle across jurisdictions and disciplines. With such a
communication system in place, the Incident Commander is able to
disseminate warnings to civilians caught up in the incident as well as
public safety officers involved in the response; to formulate, execute,
and communicate operational decisions at the incident site, as well as
between incident management entities across jurisdictions and
functional agencies; to prepare for potential requirements and requests
supporting incident management activities; and develop and maintain
overall awareness and understanding of an incident within and across
jurisdictions.
Without reliable and effective communications, the effectiveness of
ICS is compromised because it is impossible for the Incident Commander
to establish and maintain a common operational picture of the incident,
and thus he is unable to make effective, consistent, and timely
decisions.
Consider, for example, the failure of the communications system
serving the New Orleans Police Department, which was inoperative for
three days following the hurricane. At one point, hundreds of New
Orleans officers were trying to communicate on two radio channels on a
back-up system, forcing them to wait for an opening in radio traffic to
transmit or receive critical information.
``Interoperability'' is a frequent post-incident buzzword, but
little real progress has been made on developing and implementing truly
interoperable communications systems. For instance, in 1997, the F.O.P.
pushed for legislation that provided 24MHz of spectrum on the 700MHz
band for use by public safety agencies.
Yet, in our nation's most populous areas, television broadcasters
still occupy this spectrum nearly nine years after it was allocated for
the exclusive use of public safety.
The F.O.P. and other public safety organizations are lobbying
Congress to set a hard date for broadcasters to vacate this spectrum in
order to increase the capacity of current systems, alleviate dangerous
radio communications congestion, and allow implementation of new and
expanded multi-agency and wide-area radio systems. This will enable
greater communications interoperability among agencies at all levels of
government and allow the implementation of newer, more advanced mission
critical communications, including high speed data, imaging and video
systems. But, I am saddened to say, we are encountering resistance from
certain members of Congress who are reluctant to take on the
broadcasters and a successful conclusion on this issue is anything but
certain.
The effectiveness of any Incident Commander and the entire ICS
paradigm is tied to the ability to communicate quickly and reliably. If
we are to improve our ability to respond to a catastrophic event, then
the first order of business must be to address the communications needs
of public safety agencies at every level of government.
I want to thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member Pascrell, as
well as the other Members of this distinguished Subcommittee for your
continued leadership and for the chance to appear before you today. I
will now take any questions you may have.
Mr. Reichert. Thank you, Mr. Canterbury.
The chair now recognizes Chief Killen, president of the
International Association of Fire Chiefs, to testify.
STATEMENT OF WILLIAM KILLEN
Chief Killen. Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member
Pascrell and members of the subcommittee. Thank you for this
opportunity to testify this afternoon about an issue of
paramount importance to America's fine emergency services.
Before I begin, I would like to congratulate you, Mr.
Chairman, on being chosen to lead this subcommittee. I am
really tickled to see a first responder sitting up there in
charge of this committee.
The International Association of Fire Chiefs emphatically
endorses the National Incident Management System. This system
is based on an incident command system that has been in use in
the fire service for more than 20 years on everything from
house fires to terrorist attacks.
I must stress, however, that the National Incident
Management System will work only when government officials at
all levels have the knowledge and the willingness to use it.
Agencies must work together, exercise together, plan together
and understand everyone's capabilities and determine ahead of
time who will be in charge.
The National Incident Management System requires hard
decisions, but incident command cannot be saved for the big
one. We must implement it for every incident, every day.
Mr. Chairman, the response to Hurricane Katrina made clear
that this nation is nowhere near being ready to implement the
National Incident Management System. The National Incident
Management System Integration Center must take more aggressive
steps to train government officials at all levels in this
system and hold them accountable to it.
The IAFC sent 29 fire chiefs to Louisiana and the Gulf
Coast to aid response and recovery efforts. My written
testimony details the experiences of Chief Kelvin Cochran of
the Shreveport Fire Department and Chief Richard Carrizzo of
the Southern Platte Fire Protection District, who was at the
state emergency operations center. Both chiefs noted the utter
lack of structure and communication at any level of government
for the first 10 days. The state did not utilize the National
Incident Management System and there was no statewide mutual
aid system for deploying resources.
Without even basic-level organizational management, the
fire service filled the void by dispatching personnel and
equipment where it was needed. Chief Cochran dispatched teams
of 27 members to New Orleans. These teams rescued people from
hospitals and the Superdome without any clear structure to
report to for guidance.
In addition, Chief Cochran was forced to manage the
treatment and transportation of evacuees without any
coordination. He literally had to see who showed up on his
doorstep and figure out how to bathe, clothe and feed them.
Chief Carrizzo served in the emergency operations center
where there was no clear incident commander or formal command
structure for the first 2 weeks. It was not clear who was
represented in the emergency operations center and there was no
formal process for making and tracking requests.
Had an incident command system been established, a state-
level official with a corresponding federal official would have
been in place in the state emergency operations center for each
of the necessary aspects of response.
For example, representatives of the Arlington County Fire
Department, the Police Department and the Federal Bureau of
Investigation had been meeting for years prior to 9/11. Each
understood the other's needs and had established a high-degree
of trust. Because of those relationships and understandings,
each agency was represented at the command post within 10
minutes. The unified command structure facilitated
communications, operability and saved lives.
Mr. Chairman, we must build a national capability to
respond that includes the ability to use the National Incident
Management System. To accomplish this goal, we make the
following recommendations.
One, the Department of Homeland Security must establish a
baseline capacity by requiring everyone from the executive
level to the responder level, to take the online National
Incident Management System introduction course.
Two, the Department of Homeland Security should issue a
list of practical steps that each state must accomplish over
the next year to become NIMS-compliant, including a requirement
to use the National Incident Management System in exercises as
a prerequisite to receiving state homeland security grant
funds. Without exercise, learning the National Incident
Management System would be like learning to ride a bike by
reading a book.
Three, the Department of Homeland Security must foster
regionalism by requiring each state's homeland security plan to
identify regions within its borders, create regional boards,
and require those boards to submit a mutual aid plan to the
state for inclusion in the federal grant application.
Fourth, the Department of Homeland Security should also
require metropolitan areas, the states and the federal
government to establish standing incident management teams to
support each other. The response would start at the local level
and work its way up the chain as necessary.
And fifth, Congress should fully fund the National Incident
Management System Integration Center.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for inviting me to speak to you
today. It has been my pleasure to share the International
Association of Fire Chiefs' views at this hearing. I look
forward to answering any questions that you might have.
[The statement of Chief Killen follows:]
Prepared Statement of Chief William D. Killen
Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I am Bill Killen, Chief
of Fire and Emergency Services for the Holston Army Ammunition Plant in
Kingsport, Tennessee. I appear today in my role as president of the
International Association of Fire Chiefs.
The IAFC represents the leaders and managers of America's fire and
emergency service. America's fire and emergency service reaches every
community across the nation, protecting urban, suburban, and rural
neighborhoods. Nearly 1.1 million men and women serve in more than
30,000 career, volunteer, and combination fire departments across the
United States. The fire service is the only entity that is locally
situated, staffed, and equipped to respond to all types of emergencies.
Members of the fire service respond to natural disasters such as
earthquakes, tornadoes, and hurricanes as well as to man-made
catastrophes, both accidental and deliberate, such as hazardous
materials incidents and acts of terrorism. As such, America's fire
service is an all-risk, all-hazards response entity.
The IAFC Endorses the National Incident Management System
Mr. Chairman, one cannot address incident command, control, and
communication without discussing the National Incident Management
System, commonly known as the NIMS. Homeland Security Presidential
Directive (HSPD) 5, Management of Domestic Incidents, directed the
Secretary of Homeland Security to develop the NIMS to provide a
consistent nationwide approach for federal, state, local and tribal
governments ``to work effectively and efficiently together to prepare
for, prevent, respond to, and recover from domestic incidents,
regardless of cause, size, or complexity.'' \1\ The Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) issued the NIMS Document on March 1, 2004. As
of September 30 of this year, federal, state, and local governments
must be compliant with the NIMS, meaning that every government agency
at every level should be familiar with its concepts and be able to use
it during a catastrophic event. The response to Hurricane Katrina
showed us that these requirements have not been met.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Memorandum from Homeland Security Secretary Tom Ridge on the
National Incident Management System, March 1, 2004, found in the NIMS
Document, published on March 1, 2004, found at http://www.fema.gov/pdf/
nims/nims_doc_full.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In preparing my remarks, I consulted with Chief Kelvin Cochran of
the Shreveport (LA) Fire Department, who sent firefighting teams into
New Orleans and coordinated the receipt of evacuees into Shreveport. I
also consulted with Chief Richard Carrizzo, who heads the Southern
Platte (MO) Fire Protection District and is a member of the IAFC's
board, who I sent to the state emergency operations center (EOC) to
help coordinate the fire service aspect of Hurricane Katrina response.
My testimony today will include their first-hand experience with the
use of the NIMS and the problems with command and control in the wake
of the hurricane.
In addition, I consulted Chief Jim Schwartz of the Arlington County
(VA) Fire Department, who was the operations chief for that department
on September 11, 2001, and was the incident commander at the Pentagon
that day. He used the incident command system with great success. I
wanted to share his experiences and recommendations with this committee
to show what can be accomplished when an incident command system is
used to its full potential.
As noted at last year's subcommittee hearing on this issue, the
IAFC endorses the NIMS as an efficient and effective way to bring
resources together to respond to large-scale incidents. The reason the
document is strong is that actual practitioners were intimately
involved in drafting it. As long as responders and officials at all
levels use the system, it will provide a solid chain of command and
organizational system.
The fire service has been using the incident command system (ICS)
for decades. In fact, the state of California was the first to create
and adopt an ICS system. It grew out of the devastating 1970 fire
season when California's fire services were severely criticized for
failing to provide leadership in areas of cooperation, command and
control, communications, and training.
Since then, America's fire service has fully embraced the ICS.
Simply put, it is the way we do business. The ICS has allowed the fire
service across the country to expand roles and resources as the
complexity of an incident grows, incorporating local, state, and
federal agencies.
Governments at All Levels Are Not Conversant in the NIMS
Mr. Chairman, we testified last year that Fiscal Year (FY) 2006 was
too soon to begin to tie the receipt of federal grant funding to NIMS
implementation. We understand that the NIMS Integration Center (NIC)
will require either NIMS implementation or a description of how the
states will use homeland security grant funds to become compliant by FY
2007. The IAFC believes that this is a reasonable timeline. However,
the response to Hurricane Katrina made clear that this nation is
nowhere near being ready to implement the NIMS, and that the NIC must
take more aggressive steps to train government officials at all levels
in this system--and to hold them accountable to it.
Chiefs Cochran and Carrizzo both noted the utter lack of structure
and communication at any level of government for the first 10 days
following Hurricane Katrina. Rather, territorialism reigned. Chief
Cochran calls this ``the disaster behind the disaster.'' He noted that
the state had a system based on the NIMS, but did not utilize it. In
fact, not even basic-level organizational management was being used.
The fire service tried to fill the void by acting as they normally
would: dispatching personnel and equipment where it was most needed.
For example, Chief Cochran responded to a request by the Louisiana
Department of Health and Hospitals' emergency medical services section
to help rescue people from New Orleans. He deployed teams of 27
department members, who took vehicles, rescue equipment, radios, and
dogs with them, and worked on a three-day rotating cycle. Those teams
rescued thousands of people from hospitals and the Superdome, despite
the fact that there was no clear local organizational structure to whom
they should report or request guidance. They just did what they were
trained to do.
In addition, Chief Cochran managed the decontamination, triage,
treatment, and transportation of evacuees arriving in Shreveport. Since
no one in New Orleans or Baton Rouge was coordinating the mass exodus,
he had to literally and figuratively wait to see who showed up on his
doorstep. No one called him to see how many shelters were available and
what their capacity was and, since no one had been given formal
authority for the transportation of evacuees, he had no one to ask.
Busloads of people simply arrived needing showers, food and water, and
clothing. He was given notice of one group that was to arrive at 3:00
a.m., but they arrived hours later and in much greater numbers than
Chief Cochran was told. His staff had to scramble to get the necessary
equipment in place.
Chief Carrizzo reported that the EOC did not have a formal command
structure until two weeks after the hurricane hit and, even then, no
one made clear who the incident commander was. It seemed that military
officers were in charge because they acted as the decision-makers.
However, they worked in a separate sphere from the rest of the
individuals in the EOC. Also, no one knew what branch of the military
these officers represented, or whether they were from the National
Guard or U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM).
The civilian leadership of the EOC was dysfunctional. For the first
10 days, anyone could enter the EOC by simply signing a sheet of paper
by the front door. The staff in the EOC did not clearly define who they
represented. They also did not establish a formal process for making
and tracking requests. Instead, they would simply chase down the
appropriate person and ask them for what was needed, or write it down
on a piece of paper. State-approved vendors roamed around and, for the
first week, took orders from whoever placed them. In short, everyone
simply relied on their professional knowledge to determine what needed
to be done and acted accordingly.
In addition, Louisiana's emergency response system suffered from
problems common to other states. There was no statewide mutual aid
system to move resources within the state to hurricane-affected areas.
For the fire service, that meant that there was no clearinghouse for
firefighting apparatus or personnel. In addition, the interim state
fire marshal, who was charged with organizing the fire service for the
remainder of the disaster, had no fire service experience.
Unfortunately, it is common for state fire marshals not to have
firefighting experience, because their job is to enforce building
codes.
Had an incident command system been established, a state-level
official--with a corresponding federal official--would have been in
place in the state EOC for each of the necessary aspects of response,
including first responder coordination (for example, firefighting,
search and rescue, hazardous materials cleanup, emergency medical
services, and human services), communications, and intelligence. Each
these officials would have had sufficient knowledge and experience to
meet the needs of his or her respective community, and would have acted
as a coordinator--or clearinghouse--for that community.
Mr. Chairman, the purpose of this testimony is not to cast blame or
question the compassion of the government officials who responded to
Hurricane Katrina. The IAFC believes that this response serves as an
important learning tool and example for why it is important for every
federal, state and local disaster response official to fully understand
the NIMS. In too many cases, a state or local jurisdiction may think
that ``it can't happen here.'' This sense of complacency and lack of
urgency delays NIMS implementation. Every level of government from the
local fire chief to the principal federal officer must be fully trained
and prepared to use the NIMS at the very beginning of a disaster.
The NIMS Can Work
Mr. Chairman, everyone needs to understand and use the NIMS. We
know from experience that incident command works. It worked in
California on wildland fires, which is how it came into existence. For
the past 20 years, the fire service has used it every single day on
every single incident. What makes the ICS work is for every government
agency at every level to fully understand it before an incident occurs.
Those agencies must exercise together, plan together, understand what
everyone brings to the table, and make hard decisions ahead of time
about who will be in charge of what type of incident. We cannot save
incident command for ``the big one,'' but must implement it for every
incident, every day.
The response to the Pentagon on September 11, 2001 provides a good
example. Representatives of the Arlington County Fire Department, the
Arlington County Police Department, and the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) had been meeting for years prior to 9/11. Each
understood the others' needs and capabilities and had established a
high degree of trust. Because of those relationships and
understandings, each agency was represented at the command post within
10 minutes, and knew coming in that the Arlington County Fire
Department would be the incident commander. In fact, the agencies had
previously agreed that they would not work as a committee in response
to an incident. Rather, one of them would have to be a ``first among
equals.'' In the initial response to the Pentagon, the fire department
was in charge, having worked out ahead of time how to treat victims and
remove bodies without disturbing the law enforcement community's need
to conduct a criminal investigation. Once the fire department had
concluded its work, the FBI became the lead agency.
This local command structure facilitated communications
operability. In addition to the available interoperable communications
systems, everyone benefited from having a unified command structure
that facilitated communication between and within agencies.
Firefighters on the scene could radio the command post, where each
agency representative could then radio his or her personnel on the
agency's specific radio system. This ability proved to be critical:
When the operational commander noticed structural degradation and
predicted the impending collapse of part of the Pentagon, he radioed
the command center. A timely warning went out on all frequencies for
personnel to evacuate, which saved countless lives.
How to Enforce Use of the NIMS
The response to Hurricane Katrina showed that response to a
catastrophic event will be on a national scale. All 28 Urban Search and
Rescue teams were on the ground in the stricken areas. Firefighters
from New York and Illinois came by the hundreds to assist the New
Orleans Fire Department. If we as a nation are going to build a system
to respond efficiently and effectively, we must build a national
capacity to respond. Part of that capacity will be the ability to use
the NIMS.
To accomplish this goal, the DHS must require that everyone--from
the executive level to the responder level--take the online
introduction course. This course will be the absolute minimum necessary
to establish a baseline capacity. Some agency heads, particularly those
who already use incident command, may balk; however, they should take
this course as a part of their professional duty.
The DHS should then issue a list of practical steps that each state
must accomplish over the next year to become NIMS-compliant. This list
should include a requirement to use the NIMS in exercises as a
prerequisite to receiving State Homeland Security Grant Program (SHSGP)
funds. The DHS should define who should be involved in those exercises
at the federal, state and local level. No government official should be
left out. This kind of practice will be critical to developing a
working knowledge and understanding of the NIMS. Without exercises,
learning the NIMS would be like learning to ride a bicycle by reading a
book.
The DHS also should require both horizontal and vertical approaches
to make the NIMS work. The horizontal approach would require
regionalism. Though every response is local, no locality can respond
alone when faced with a large incident. Agencies need to share manpower
and equipment. As the Pentagon example illustrates, the existence of a
mutual aid system in place provides measurably improved command and
control communications across agencies and jurisdictions. This system
must be given careful consideration by all involved parties,
determining exactly what form help will take so that nothing is left to
last-minute decisions or chance.
To foster regionalism, the DHS should require each state's homeland
security plan to identify regions within its borders, to create
regional boards, and to require those boards to submit a mutual aid
plan to the state for inclusion in the SHSGP application. This will
require regions to work together before an incident occurs, rather than
trying to exchange business cards on scene.
The vertical approach would recognize that all incidents begin at
the local level and work their way up. It also would recognize, as with
the horizontal approach, that local agencies will most likely need help
responding to a major event. For example, it would not have made sense
for St. Bernard Parish to set up an incident management team in
response to Hurricane Katrina, because the scope of the incident was
simply too large. However, it would make sense for each metropolitan
area to set up a standing incident management team to backfill and
support surrounding areas as necessary. The states should set up
standing incident management teams to support all local governments as
necessary. The federal government should set up a standing incident
management team to assist the states as necessary. Though the U.S.
Forest Service teams that the federal government uses have done an
admirable job, the response needs to reach across all agencies.
Finally, we urge Congress to fully fund the NIC. The NIC is
responsible for making sure that every agency responding to an incident
understands and is compliant with the NIMS. While the House included
$25 million for the NIC in H.R. 2360, the Department of Homeland
Security Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2006, the Senate included
no funding in its version of the bill. It is critically important that
Congress fund this office in order to ensure that we are prepared to
respond to future disasters.
Conclusion
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for inviting me here to speak to you
today. It has been my pleasure to share the IAFC's views at this
hearing. I look forward to answering any questions you may have.
Mr. Reichert. Thank you so much, Chief.
The chair now recognizes Mr. Bob Freudenthal, president of
the American Public Works Association.
STATEMENT OF BOB FREUDENTHAL
Mr. Freudenthal. Good afternoon, Chairman Reichert, Ranking
Member Pascrell, and distinguished members of the panel. My
name is Bob Freudenthal. I am the deputy general manager for
the Hendersonville Utility District in Hendersonville,
Tennessee, which is a suburb of the Nashville metropolitan
area. I am also honored to be president of the American Public
Works Association.
Today, I speak on behalf of our 27,000 members who provide
public works infrastructure and lifeline services to millions
of people in rural and urban communities, both small and large.
APWA has been and will continue to be an advocate for the
development of policy which coordinates incident response
across multi-disciplinary agencies in a way that saves lives
and restores people, property and critical lifelines. APWA's
membership includes public works directors, engineers,
managers, transit authorities, water and wastewater
professionals, and directors and senior managers of all areas
of infrastructure. We run the gamut of city services, with one
overriding commonality. We are the nuts and bolts of local
government. We are the pulse of the local communities our
citizens call home. Public safety is our priority at all times.
Public works professionals manage the design, planning and
operation of our communities' critical infrastructures and are
on the frontlines in the face of natural disasters, terrorist
attacks and other public emergencies, working with our partners
represented at this table today. We are often the last ones to
leave the scene as we manage the lengthy cleanup and
restoration of disaster sites and other problem areas.
As first responders in any catastrophic event, public works
professionals are comprehensively trained in the nature of
incident command. A part of the National Incident Management
System, the Incident Command System is the organizational
structure that facilitates and coordinates command, control and
communication of a response. It is an all-hazard, all-risk
approach to managing crisis response operations, as well as
special planned events like the Olympics in Salt Lake City or
other large gatherings.
We understand the need for command and control to be clear
so that responses minimize the loss of life, quickly restore
critical lifelines and minimize property damage. Communication
between all responders is critical to the efficiency and
effectiveness of all response and recovery activities.
To highlight this need for enhanced coordination between
agencies, FEMA created training curriculum that better reflects
the all-risk, all-hazard model, which includes such risks as
floods, earthquakes, oil spills, fires, hurricanes and
terrorist attacks. We encourage our members and member agencies
to be certified and trained through this and other systems.
Oftentimes, our crews are the first to arrive on the scene.
In such cases, ICS provides for our personnel to assess the
situation, determine the status of public safety, clear the
debris for emergency response teams, and in many cases lead
some of that response effort.
Our unique role in incident command sets us apart from
other disciplines. We go beyond damage assessment by clearing
dangerous debris to ensure lives are protected, and then stay
afterward to get to help rebuild. It is a big responsibility,
but with the help of committees such as yours and federal tools
like NIMS ICS, among others, and the coordinated effort of our
partners here at this table, we will continue to have success.
We are proud to say we have helped save people's lives,
families, homes, livelihoods and tax dollars. The importance of
continued planning for disasters cannot be underestimated. It
is colorfully illuminated in the following quote by President
Eisenhower: ``I have always found that plans are useless but
that planning is indispensable.'' Plans require constant
maintenance to meet changing conditions, new threats, and
indeed to overcome past failures.
During the recent catastrophe resulting from Hurricane
Katrina, public works officials were called to Louisiana,
Mississippi and Alabama. Our people were and continue to be on
the streets cleaning debris, reestablishing electricity for
millions of customers, providing clean water and inspecting
public buildings to determine the safety of their occupants.
However, a critical need continues for interoperable
communications among responder groups to allow people to
communicate effectively with other relief units and determine
where resources are needed most.
Our organization has an emergency management technical
committee that has consistently supported, provided comments
for, and helped to implemented HSPD-8, the National Response
Plan and NIMS. In fact, we are holding a Web broadcast this
December to inform our community of public works of the
importance of NIMS implementation and encourage their support.
We continue to support an emphasis on cross-discipline
communication and training for our members, public officials
and all first-responder groups. APWA has many members with
intimate knowledge and direct experience of recovering from and
rebuilding after major catastrophes. Paul Brun, Public Works
Director of Oklahoma City, played a critical role in recovery
efforts after the 1995 bombing of the Alfred Murrah Federal
Building.
Our emergency management committee chairman, Mary Ann
Marrocolo, is the director of plan management in the Office of
Emergency Management for the city of New York. She has gained
first-hand experience of the crucial public works role played
on September 11, 2001, as well as in the countless other
emergencies the city has faced. They can attest to the
importance of communication during a catastrophe.
To summarize, the American Public Works Association
recognizes the importance of tools like ICS that emphasize
cross-discipline communications and training for our members,
public officials and all first-responder groups. We will also
continue to support increased funding for interdisciplinary
training so that we can better be prepared for the challenges
we will all face in the future.
We realize there are gaps in the current preparedness
strategies, but with cooperation and an eye to lessons learned,
we believe that our future will be one in which we can enjoy
greater security through increased awareness, communication and
planning.
We would again like to thank the chairman of this committee
and the members of this committee for allowing us a seat at the
table, and we stand ready to work toward a better future.
Thank you.
[The statement of Mr. Freudenthal follows:]
Prepared Statement of Bob Freudenthal
Good Afternoon. Chairman Reichert, Ranking Member Pascrell,
distinguished members of the panel, my name is Bob Freudenthal and I am
the Deputy General Manager of the Hendersonville Utility District in
Hendersonville, Tennessee. I am also President of the American Public
Works Association, or APWA. I am here today on behalf of the 27,000
public works officials and nearly 2000 public agencies that are members
of APWA. We are an organization dedicated to providing public works
infrastructure and life line services to millions of people in small
and large, rural and urban communities.
I appreciate and thank you for the opportunity to speak today about
the role of public works in the incident command system during
catastrophes. I know I speak for all APWA public works officials when I
say we are indeed grateful to be sharing our thoughts with you during
this critical time for the ongoing development of our nation's
emergency response plans. APWA has been and will continue to be an
advocate for the development of policy which coordinates incident
response across multi-disciplinary agencies in a way that saves lives
and restores property and critical lifelines.
Let me take a moment to describe who public works officials are and
what we do, and then I will go into more detail about the role APWA
members play in the incident command system during catastrophes.
APWA's membership includes public works directors, city engineers,
directors and senior managers of all areas of infrastructure, city
managers, transit authorities, and water and waste water treatment
professionals among many others. Public works officials manage the very
essence of our nation's cities: we plan the city's infrastructure; we
manage, maintain and secure public buildings, vehicles and equipment,
sewer systems, water and wastewater systems; we maintain public
grounds, turnpikes, highways and port authorities; we ensure that
traffic congestion is minimized and that all roads and bridges are
maintained in safe and workable condition. Public works officials are
first responders: we work alongside police, fire, and emergency
services to ensure that water is flowing through fire hoses; traffic
lights are operating and traffic is moving; barricades are up; debris
is removed, and that the public is safe. Additionally, we are often the
last ones to leave the scene as we manage the lengthy cleanup and
restoration of any disaster site.
We run the gamut of city services with one overriding commonality:
we are the nuts and bolts of local government. We are the pulse of
local communities that our citizens call ``home.'' Public works
professionals manage the design, planning, and operation of our
communities? critical infrastructures--roads, bridges, and water
systems--and are on the front lines in the face of natural disasters,
terrorist attacks and other public emergencies. Public health and
safety is our priority at all times.
Having explained what we do, allow me to take a moment to elucidate
our history and role in disaster response. As first responders in any
catastrophic event, public works professionals are comprehensively
trained in the nature of incident command. A part of the National
Incident Management System (NIMS), the Incident Command System (ICS) is
the organizational structure that facilitates and coordinates the
command, control, and communication of a response. It is an ``all
hazard--all risk'' approach to managing crisis response operations as
well as planned special events, such as the Olympics in Salt Lake City
or other large, routine public gatherings. We understand the need for
command and control to be clear so that the response minimizes loss of
life, quickly restores critical lifelines and minimizes property
damage. Communication between all responders is critical to the
efficiency and effectiveness of all response and recovery activities.
Incidents with many ranges of significance require our participation in
the incident command structure.
ICS is based on best practices developed from years of large-scale
emergency response operations, such as multi-state wildfires, and
addresses many of the incident management challenges faced by local,
state, and federal officials in response to disasters. To highlight
this need for enhanced coordination between agencies, the Federal
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) has created training curriculum that
better reflects the ``All Hazard--All Risk'' model, which includes such
risks as floods, earthquakes, oil spills, fires, hurricanes and
terrorist attacks. We encourage our members and member agencies to be
certified and trained through this, and other systems.
Oftentimes, public works crews are the first to arrive on the scene
of a disaster. Emergency services need public works to clear the way in
order to respond. In such cases, ICS provides for our personnel to
immediately assess the situation, determine the status of public
safety, and in many cases lead a response effort. For example, at the
scene of a water main break, public works crews work to locate, isolate
and stop a leak as well as pump water out of impacted areas. And other
times, the role of incident commander transfers to the public works
director to complete the recovery.
Public works officials know what it takes to make infrastructure
less susceptible to damage from disasters as well as rebuild
infrastructure after a disaster. We know how to get the roads and water
mains in working order, how to get the power back up, how to rebuild or
reinforce public buildings damaged by natural or man-made disaster, how
to identify equipment needs, and how to assist other first responders
in dealing with immediate threats.
Our unique role in Incident Command sets us apart from other
disciplines. The role public works plays in debris management (often
the first step taken on the road to recovery), reconstruction of the
community, restoring lifeline services such as power and telephone
service, and using public works engineers in designing and implementing
search and rescue operations, are quite varied in nature. Yet, all are
essential when it comes to incident management during a catastrophic
event.
Therefore, our role in incident command is not just assessing the
damage and then letting everyone else know how we plan to fix it--it is
also our mission to work with an eye on making sure that lives are
protected in the future. It's a big responsibility, but with the help
of Committees such as yours, and Federal tools like the National
Incident Management System (NIMS) and the Incident Command System
(ICS), among others, we have had many successes. We are proud to say we
have saved people's lives, their homes, their livelihoods, their
property, their heartache, and their tax dollars.
However, while the plans we have in place can do much to mitigate
the effects of a catastrophic event, they in and of themselves are not
enough. The importance of continued planning for disaster cannot be
underestimated--and is colorfully illuminated in the following quote by
President Eisenhower, ``I have always found that plans are useless, but
that planning is indispensable.'' Plans require constant maintenance to
meet changing conditions, new threats and indeed, to overcome past
failures.
During the recent catastrophe resulting from Hurricane Katrina,
public works officials were called in to assess the damage in
Louisiana, Mississippi and Alabama. Our people were and continue to be
on the streets clearing debris, working to reestablish electricity for
millions of customers, working to provide clean water and inspecting
public buildings to determine the safety to their occupants. However,
there continues to be a critical need for interoperable communications
among responder groups to allow people to communicate effectively with
other relief units, and determine where resources are needed most.
Because many of our members across the country wanted to help in
the wake of Katrina, the American Public Works Association immediately
posted information for its members encouraging them to work within
established Department of Homeland Security and FEMA procedures and the
congressionally-ratified Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC)
which provides form and structure to interstate mutual aid.
The American Public Works Association has an Emergency Management
Technical Committee within our organization that has consistently
supported, provided comments for and helped to implement HSPD-8, the
National Response Plan (NRP) and the National Incident Management
System (NIMS). We are hosting a web broadcast this December to ensure
that the public works community is fully informed of the importance of
NIMS implementation. We continue to support an emphasis on cross-
discipline communication and training for our members, public officials
and all first responder groups. APWA is also working with Lessons
Learned Information Sharing (LLIS.gov) to capture lessons learned from
the public works community to share with the emergency response and
homeland security communities. These lessons learned will help Incident
Command, regardless of incident size, have a better understanding of
the capabilities that public work organizations bring to preparedness,
response, and recovery.
In addition to ICS, public works personnel have been available to
interoperable communications groups over the past four years. As we
have in the past, we are again serving on the President's HSPD-8
working group, with a goal to ``establish policies to strengthen the
preparedness of the United States to prevent and respond to threatened
or actual domestic terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other
emergencies.''
Our Emergency Management Committee continues to advocate the
credentialing of key public works officials who play a critical role in
the ICS. APWA is well represented on the DHS/FEMA Public Works Working
Group that is focused on credentialing. Unlike our partners in law
enforcement, fire, and emergency services, public works officials are
not continuously posed for emergency response but are responsible for
the continuation of daily service delivery to our communities. During a
disaster, public works is not only involved in the response and
recovery but also the continuation of those critical service delivery
areas--water, sewer, solid waste, transportation and safety. Our
credentials for emergency response are in addition to our credentials
of our every day jobs.
The American Public Works Association has many members with
intimate knowledge and direct experience of what it takes to recover
from major catastrophes. Paul Brum, Public Works Director of Oklahoma
City, played a crucial role in the recovery after the 1995 bombing of
the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building. Our Emergency Management
Committee Chairman, MaryAnn Marrocolo, is the Director of Plan
Management in the Office of Emergency Management for the City of New
York, and gained first hand experience of the crucial role public works
played on September 11, 2001, as well as in the countless other
emergencies the city has faced. Diane Linderman, former Public Works
Director of Richmond, Virginia, led that city's department when
Richmond was devastated by the winds of Hurricane Isabel and the
consequential flooding from Hurricane Gaston. Brian Usher, Director of
Public Works and Engineering for the City of Zion, Illinois, dedicates
substantial time as a course instructor and trainer at the Emergency
Management Institute (EMI) in Emmitsburg, Maryland. The list goes on.
To summarize, the American Public Works Association recognizes the
importance of tools like ICS that emphasize cross-discipline
communication and training for our members, public officials and all
first responder groups. We will also continue to support increased
funding for interdisciplinary training so that we can be better
prepared for the challenges we will all face in the future. We realize
that there are gaps in current preparedness strategies, but with
cooperation and an eye to lessons learned, we believe that our future
will be one in which we can enjoy greater security through increased
awareness, communication and planning.
We again would like to thank the Chairman and this Committee for
allowing us a seat at the table as we look forward into the future.
Mr. Reichert. Thank you, Mr. Freudenthal.
The chair now recognizes Mr. Robert Garner, president and
CEO of the American Ambulance Association.
STATEMENT OF ROBERT GARNER
Mr. Garner. Chairman Reichert, Ranking Member Pascrell and
members of the committee, we greatly appreciate the opportunity
to speak before you.
Chairman Reichert, I would like to join my colleagues in
congratulating you. It is a pleasure to have a first responder
sitting in this extremely important position. Congratulations,
sir.
I am Robert Garner and currently serve as president of the
American Ambulance Association. I am the senior vice president
of Emergency Medical Services Corporation, parent for American
Medical Response and EmCare companies.
The American Ambulance Association is the primary trade
organization representing ambulance providers, both emergency
and non-emergency, for their respective communities. The AAA is
composed of over 750 ambulance operations, providing services
in all 50 states.
Member companies employ approximately 100,000 emergency
medical technicians and paramedics in their workforce. AAA
members include private, public, fire and hospital-based
agencies covering urban, suburban and rural areas throughout
America. AAA was formed in 1979 in response to the need for
improvements in medical transportation and emergency medical
services.
The association serves as a voice and clearinghouse for
ambulance service providers who view pre-hospital care not only
as a public service, but also as an essential tool as part of
the total continuum of care in the public health care system.
It is in my elected role as president of the AAA that I appear
before you today and provide a perspective of the association.
The immediate response to a catastrophic disaster, act of
terrorism or other public health emergency involves many local
public safety, public health and health care organizations. As
first responders, America's ambulance service providers are an
essential resource and a vital component of each community's
emergency response system.
During the recent response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita,
at the request of the Federal Emergency Management Agency, over
500 ambulances and crews from around the country assisted local
EMS agencies in their response to the catastrophic events along
the Gulf Coast. Member companies responded professionally and
expeditiously.
During the response to a natural or a manmade disaster, the
role of an EMS provider includes patient triage,
decontamination, treatment and transport. The role also
includes hazard recognition, symptom surveillance and
reporting, disaster shelter staffing and resupply, on-scene
medical standby, and transport and redistribution of patients
to better utilize available receiving hospital resources.
America's 911 emergency medical service providers are a
diverse group of public, private, hospital and volunteer-based
services. Indeed, many stories of heroism and sacrifice include
representatives from all these agencies as they have responded
to natural and manmade disasters.
Notably, just 2 weeks ago, President Bush posthumously
awarded Yamel Merino, medic with TransCare Ambulance Service of
New York, the 9/11 Heroes Medal of Valor. Indeed, each day
somewhere in America, an EMT or paramedic may be placed in
harm's way to potentially save the life of another.
The American Ambulance Association has been requested to
present its perspective in numerous forums over the past few
years concerning incidents of high consequence as they are
being considered. In all cases, the AAA has proffered three key
components that must be addressed for a successful response and
incident command capability.
Firstly, integration, as has been discussed, which would
include planning, setting standards and funding.
Secondly, and very critical for our responders, there must
be access to standardized and coordinated training. There must
be personal protective equipment provided for every responder
to any incidence of high consequence, and interoperability of
communications and tactical equipment. We have realized how
critical that is in the most recent incidents. We must also
have caches of medication for the event of high consequence.
And finally, coordination, planning for patient evacuation
and repatriation, and a requirement for resources that exceed
the local capacity.
In conclusion, as demonstrated during the response to
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, all providers become potential
first responders. We feel these guiding principles are
critical. We must assure the safety of EMS personnel and
ambulance patients, the security of the ambulance facilities,
and the supply inventories and vehicles. We must integrate and
effectively utilize local ambulance services in the local,
state and federal incident management and emergency management
systems. Finally, we must establish timely and equitable
funding mechanisms to support and maintain the essential
capabilities of the first-responder system.
Chairman Reichert, Ranking Member Pascrell and members of
the committee, I again thank you for the opportunity to address
this most important issue and would ask that my written
statement be made part of the record.
Thank you, sir.
[The statement of Mr. Garner follows:]
Prepared Statement of Robert L. Garner
I. Introduction
Chairman Reichert, Ranking Member Pascrell and members of the
Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness, Science and Technology, I
greatly appreciate the opportunity to speak before you today.
I am Robert L. Garner, and currently serve as the President of the
American Ambulance Association (AAA). I am the Senior Vice President of
Emergency Medical Services Corporation, parent company of American
Medical Response and EmCare companies, national providers of emergency
and non-emergency ambulance services as well as hospital physician
services.
The American Ambulance Association is the primary trade association
representing agencies that provide emergency and non-emergency
ambulance services for their respective communities. The AAA is
composed of over 750 ambulance operations providing services in all 50
states. Member companies employ approximately 100,000 paramedics and
emergency medical technicians (EMT) and in their workforce. AAA members
include private, public, fire and hospital-based providers covering
urban, suburban, and rural areas throughout America. The AAA was formed
in 1979 in response to the need for improvements in medical
transportation and emergency medical services. The Association serves
as a voice and clearinghouse for ambulance service providers who view
pre-hospital care not only as a public service but also as an essential
part of the total continuum of care in the public heath care system.
It is in my elected role as President of the AAA that I appear
before you today, and provide the perspective of the Association
regarding ``Incident Command, Control, and Communication during
Catastrophic Events.''
II. Summary of Policy Recommendations
Ambulance service providers, who are comprised of paramedics and
emergency medical technicians, serve as a core part of the first
responder's community and are a critical part of the emergency response
system. However, private providers often face difficulty in being
included in the planning and response to catastrophic events and
obtaining the funding necessary to be prepared when they are asked to
respond. To ensure that all ambulance service providers are effectively
integrated in to the National Incident Management System, I recommend
the following:
Integrate government and non-government emergency
medical service providers into local, state and federal
planning and exercises including appropriate mutual aid
agreements;
Ensure government and non-government emergency medical
service providers are eligible have access to communications
equipment and systems to achieve on scene communications
interoperability; and,
Ensure government and non-government service emergency
medical service providers have access to the appropriate
personal protective equipment and other on scene resources
necessary to support their critical public safety missions
including evacuation and response.
III. Role of Ambulance Service Providers as First Responder
The immediate response to a catastrophic disaster, act of terrorism
or other public health emergency involves many local public safety,
public health and health care organizations. As first responders,
America's ambulance service providers are an essential resource and
perform vital services as part of each community's emergency response
system. This was abundantly clear during the recent response to
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita in which over five hundred ambulances,
comprised of paramedics and emergency medical technicians, from around
the country assisted local EMS agencies in their response to the
catastrophic events along the gulf coast.
During the response to a natural or man-made disaster, the role of
an ambulance service provider includes patient triage, decontamination,
treatment, and transport. Their role also includes hazard recognition,
symptom surveillance and reporting, disaster shelter staffing and re-
supply, on-scene medical stand-by, and transport and redistribution of
patients to better utilize available receiving hospital resources. Many
agencies have begun developing ``disaster response teams'' to effect
rapid deployment in support of local, state and federal resources.
America's 9-1-1 emergency medical services (EMS) providers are a
diverse group of public, private, hospital and volunteer-based
services. Indeed, many stories of heroism and sacrifice include
representatives from all these agencies as they have responded to
natural and man-made disasters. Notably, just two weeks ago, President
Bush posthumously awarded Yamel Merino, a paramedic with TransCare
Ambulance Service of New York, the 9/11 Heroes Medal of Valor. Indeed,
each day somewhere in America, an EMT or Paramedic may be placed in
harm's way to potentially save another's life.
During a catastrophic disaster or ``Event of High Consequence,''
local ambulance services providing emergency medical services are an
essential resource and a vital part of the emergency response system.
In a review of the nation's largest 200 cities, including those most
vulnerable to attack, emergency ambulance services are provided by
private, public, volunteer, and hospital-based agencies. Experience has
shown that non-emergency ambulance providers also often serve as
``first responders'' by dedicating essential vehicle and personnel
resources within the first hours of a disaster.
IV. Importance of Private-Public Partnerships
Unlike fire and police, which are typically public sector entities,
the private sector is a major provider of emergency and non-emergency
medical services across the nation. While EMS system design varies
greatly, in almost all cases there is participation by both public and
private entities. For this reason, it is critical that a strong
partnership exist between public and private first responders and those
who manage the incident command system. Furthermore, the successful
management of any disaster response is directly related to the
coordination of all assets being deployed for mitigation of serious
injury and death.
V. Commitment to National Incident Management System
As the Department of Homeland Security and FEMA implement the
National Response Plan, the AAA has been working with our members to
assure that our providers are compliant with the ICS training
requirements established by the National Incident Management System
(NIMS). We support the full implementation of NIMS as it establishes
standardized incident management processes, protocols, and procedures
that all responders--Federal, state, tribal, and local--will use to
coordinate and conduct response operations. As stated by the NIMS
Integration Center, we agree that national preparedness and readiness
in responding to and recovering from an incident will significantly
improve once all of the Nation's emergency responders and their
authorities will be using a common language and set of procedures.
VI. Challenges of Incident Command, Control and Communications
The response by ambulance service providers locally and from across
the country to the catastrophes of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita
represents the very best of the EMS community. The Federal Emergency
Management Agency requested AAA's assistance in providing member
companies to respond to Louisiana to assist the local EMS effort. AAA
member companies responded to this request by dispatching over 215
ambulances to the region. A similar request of the Association resulted
in 250 ambulances being dispatched to Texas in anticipation of
Hurricane Rita. While this ``emergency coordination'' effort has not
historically been a core competency of the American Ambulance
Association, upon being alerted, member companies responded
professionally and expeditiously.
The American Ambulance Association has been requested to present
its perspective in various forums as preparations for Incidents of High
Consequence are being considered. In all cases, the AAA has offered
four key components that should be addressed for a successful response
and incident command capability. The components are as follows:
Standardized and coordinated training;
Personal Protective Equipment (clothing/respirators);
Interoperable communications and Tactical equipment;
and,
Caches of medications/medical equipment for Incident
of High Consequence.
VII. Specific Policy Challenges and Recommendations
Because of the nature of our services, members of the American
Ambulance Association have been part of the first responder team to
America's most devastating disasters, including September 11, the
anthrax attacks, Hurricane Katrina, Hurricane Rita and numerous other
regional and multi-state mass casualty events. Based on this extensive
experience, we offer the following recommendations to the challenges we
face in responding to the medical needs of our patients and
communities, and to ensure the effective participation of ambulance
providers in the National Incident Management System:
Challenge #1: Planning, Exercises and Mutual Aid Agreements--
Ambulance providers operate at the intersection of the public health,
public safety and health care fields, and, there is great diversity in
the types of providers delivering ambulance services and the designs of
those delivery systems. This diversity contributes to the fact that
many ambulance services are sometimes excluded from local and state
emergency preparedness and response activities. Furthermore, there are
hurdles associated with complying with FEMA's general requirement to
obtain mutual aid agreements prior to an event in order to be eligible
for federal disaster reimbursement. Ambulance providers respond to
mutual aid requests from long distances--including neighboring cities,
counties and even states. It is difficult for a local ambulance
provider to secure prior mutual aid agreements with every local
community that may request services in the future.
Recommendation #1: As recent events of national consequence have
demonstrated, government and non-government emergency medical services
are an essential asset in the evacuation, response and recovery phases
of a national disaster. Government and non-government ambulance
services must be fully integrated in the planning, training and
exercise activities at the local, state and federal level. Practical
mechanisms must be instituted to streamline and document all mutual aid
requests for assistance. As local, regional and state mutual aid plans
are strengthened and broadened, the planning process should formalize
mutual aid agreements with all potential responders and service
providers. These are critical first steps in assuring that the goals of
the National Incident Management System are achieved.
Challenge #2: Communications Interoperability--Based on a recent
AAA membership survey, AAA members have reported that communications
systems and equipment remain a significant operational need. In many
communities, ambulance service providers face challenges obtaining
access to radio frequencies. Studies clearly show the lack of a
compatible spectrum as well as a spectrum that is actually available to
local emergency responders, including emergency medical service (EMS)
providers. Despite the spectrum documented by the Federal
Communications Commission, across the nation currently only two
frequencies are dedicated to EMS (a local EMS frequency and a national
EMS frequency). During recent incidents of major consequence, AAA
members experienced serious gaps in maintaining communications with
incident command authorities.
Recommendation #2: Additional spectrum must be made available to
government and non-government emergency medical service providers and
providers must be involved in the communications interoperability
planning activities at the local, state, regional and national level.
Therefore, government and non-government emergency medical service
providers must be eligible for grants to assure communications systems
support our critical public safety mission. Access to communications
equipment and systems is a critical component of any effective incident
command system.
Challenge #3: On Scene Resources--Many ambulance service personnel
that responded to recent major incidents did not have access to the
appropriate personal protective equipment necessary for the
environments in which they would be operating including hazardous
scenes and toxic flood waters. Ambulance refueling, repair and
restocking are important considerations as well.
Recommendation #3: To provide an effective response and to protect
the health and safety of our personnel, all medics, including those who
have the potential to respond in a mutual aid capacity, must be
protected. Personnel must have access to and must be trained on the
appropriate procedures for use of personal protective equipment that
may include tyvec suits, gloves, masks, hard hats, bunker suits and
bio-hazard storage and disposal equipment. Procedures must be developed
to assure access to vaccines and antidotes when necessary. In order for
on scene personnel to be effective in the incident command structure,
these on scene resources are essential.
VIII. ``Best Practices'' Recommendations on Incident Command Systems
In order to achieve a fully integrated national emergency response
system that is adaptable to any terrorist attack and all types of
national disasters, the following best practice components are
essential.
This list was developed by the AAA to assist local, state and
federal officials, in addition to ambulance service providers, in
planning, training and equipping the nation's ambulance services in
accordance with the National Incident Management System.
Incident Command Structure and Emergency Management System:
Ambulance service providers should be integrated into the overall
incident command structure. For resource planning, legal and
reimbursement purposes, local officials must document requests for all
types of assistance from ambulance providers. Services requested may
include, but are not limited to: patient triage, treatment and
transport; medical stand-by and first aid services on-scene, at
disaster shelters or at first aid stations; requests for additional
medical personnel, supplies and equipment; non-emergency transport and
redistribution of patients to free-up receiving hospital bed-space; and
other emergency services. State and local emergency managers must
integrate ambulance providers into each phase of the emergency
management planning process: mitigation, preparedness, response, and
recovery and include an ambulance representative in the emergency
operations center.
Community-Based Planning: Ambulance service providers must be
represented in the planning processes at the local, state and federal
level. These processes must facilitate coordination and integration
among various public and private (non-profit and for-profit)
organizations in order to maximize the effectiveness of all local,
regional (such as mutual aid), state and federal resources. Logistical
planning must assure the ability to sustain long-term disaster
operations and critical support functions, including mental health and
CISD (critical incident stress debriefing) support of workers and their
families. Ambulance services must appropriately interface with public
health, law enforcement, fire suppression, hazardous materials and
other responding agencies to hazardous scenes.
Personnel Protection & Safety: By definition, first responders,
including emergency medical service and ambulance service personnel
(i.e., ambulance medics), are the first on the scene of an emergency
incident. Past experience has shown that proper equipment, training and
procedures are necessary to prevent well-meaning rescuers from becoming
victims themselves, especially in the case of a biological, chemical,
radiological or nuclear attack. To provide an effective response, to
serve our communities and most importantly, to protect the health and
safety of our personnel, all medics, including those who have the
potential to respond in a mutual aid capacity, must be protected.
Personnel must have access to and must be trained on the appropriate
procedures for use of personal protective equipment that may include
tyvec suits, gloves, masks, hard hats, bunker suits and bio-hazard
storage and disposal equipment. Procedures must be developed to assure
access to vaccines and antidotes when necessary.
Training, Exercises and Continuing Education: Ambulance services
(both emergency 9-1-1 units and units regularly performing non-
emergency inter-facility transports) immediately become ``first
responders'' in the early stages of an emergency incident. Proper
training of all personnel with the potential to respond to disaster and
terrorist incidents is essential to assure effective use of resources
and to prevent crews from inadvertently becoming casualties themselves.
Each local ambulance service provider that is listed as a disaster
resource by the local community's ``emergency operations officials''
must be included in training programs. The following types of training
should be considered: nuclear, biological, chemical and radiological
terrorism awareness training, incident command system procedures,
biological/chemical symptom recognition and protocols, multi-casualty
incident drills and exercises, and cross-training of medics as public
health workers. Plans should include provisions for training updates,
new employee training and integration with continuing education
programs.
Communication System: All scene responders, including ambulance
medics, must have access to improved on-scene communications, such as
radios and cellular telephones, to assure communication between
agencies. Larger incidents involve even greater numbers of emergency
response personnel that often must respond from long distances.
Response personnel must have equipment, systems and procedures that
assure seamless on-scene communications. Emergency medical dispatchers
must be trained to screen for biological and chemical events. Other
considerations include planning for additional radios and cellular
phones and a back-up communication center in the event all or parts of
the communications center or system is inoperable.
Disease Surveillance and Reporting System: In the case of chemical,
biological, radiological and nuclear weapons, the emergency medical
services system, and specifically local ambulance dispatch (call-
taking) centers, may be one of the early points of detection. Proper
reporting and analysis of this crucial information can assist in the
detection, identification and early implementation of patient triage
and treatment protocols. Procedures must be implemented to coordinate
and integrate these essential assets with the local public health
department's disease symptom surveillance and identification system.
Recent computer-aided dispatch software enhancements enable emergency
medical dispatchers to identify sudden increases in certain caller
complaints in real time. Ambulance medics could be cross-trained for
various public health functions according to response plans.
Facilities, Equipment and Vehicles: Ambulance service providers
need to plan and develop stockpiles of secure food, water, personal
items, uniforms, and bedding for events that require sustained
operations requiring maximum staffing. Operations facilities may be
utilized as personnel sleeping quarters. The needs of their families
are also important to assure personnel can focus on the community's
needs. Ambulance service providers will need to establish a
decontamination station for personnel, vehicles, supplies and equipment
and appropriate disposal of contaminated uniforms, medical supplies,
patient bedding and other materials. Ambulance services must develop
procedures for securing facilities, equipment and vehicles to assure
they are not sabotaged, stolen or misused.
Medical Supplies and Medications: Before additional federal
stockpiles (referred to as ``Push Packs'' under the proposed plan)
arrive in affected communities, local first responders, public health
and health care providers will need the capacity to distribute adequate
levels of medical supplies and medications during the first 12 hours of
an incident. The local and regional planning and funding process must
account for these purchase, storage and distribution costs. Mass-
casualty incidents will require additional pharmaceuticals, such as,
Valium, Atropine, antidote kits, Mark 1 kits and an antibiotic (i.e.,
Cipro) cache for field personnel. Additional medical supplies will also
be required, such as, intubation, bag mask, and nebulizer supplies;
sheets, drapes, and poly masking tape for patient packaging and
additional immunization supplies.
Public Education: Through the appropriate local, state and federal
entities, the public must be educated before an emergency incident, and
must receive regular information updates during an incident especially
if there is a suspected biological, chemical or radiological exposure.
The focus of the information should include: what to do in an
emergency; where disaster shelters are located; where to receive
treatment and where not to receive treatment (in order to contain and
prevent further contamination); and, which agencies to contact for more
information or to report critical information to emergency officials.
The public has learned to rely on the local 9-1-1 system and the
community's emergency response agencies for information and these
agencies should play a key role in calming the public's understandable
fears and anxiety and to correct false information.
Mutual Aid Agreements: Generally, the larger the incident, man-made
or natural, the greater the scope of mutual aid response required. As a
result of large mass casualty incidents, ambulance providers respond to
mutual aid requests from long distances--including neighboring cities,
counties and even states. It is impossible for a local ambulance
provider to secure prior mutual aid agreements with every local
community that may request services in the future. Therefore, practical
mechanisms must be instituted to streamline and document all mutual aid
requests for assistance, especially when there is no time to work out
the financial details before a response is initiated. As local,
regional and state mutual aid plans are strengthened and broadened, the
planning process should formalize mutual aid agreements, including
financial arrangements, with all potential responders and service
providers.
Initial Emergency Preparedness Funding: Because existing resources,
surge capacities and community needs will vary, each community's
specific funding requirements will be unique. As an example, however,
one community recently developed a local plan for response to weapons
of mass destruction. According to this plan, the local emergency
ambulance provider's funding needs for planning, employee training,
personnel protective equipment, medical supplies and medications
equaled approximately $5 per resident for a community of 285,000
residents, totaling approximately $1.4 million in start-up costs. Each
community will also need to budget for the ongoing costs of training,
equipment replacement and repurchase of expired medications. Federal
funds must flow to all local entities in the emergency response system,
including private (non-profit and for-profit) service providers.
Immediate and sustained funding will also be required to increase and
maintain the health care capacity (or ``surge capacity'') needed to
respond to mass casualty incidents of various types. Program funding
should factor in the ongoing costs of the planning and training process
that is continuously reviewed and refined.
Emergency Incident Reimbursement: Each organization that responds
to a natural disaster or terrorist incident will incur costs for
personnel salaries; overtime expenses; fuel; travel expenses;
specialized equipment such as generators; drugs and supplies;
replacement costs for damaged or lost equipment; supplies and equipment
for decontamination stations and other direct costs. Even though the
service may have performed flawlessly in the public's interest, local
emergency responders can very quickly face financial devastation as a
result. Under existing laws governing federally declared disasters
(i.e., the Stafford Act), all types of ambulance service providers
(including private non-profit and for-profit services) are eligible for
federal reimbursement under both ``emergency protective measures'' and
``emergency work'' provisions. Ambulance services can also be
reimbursed as an independent contractor under provisions regarding
``use of local firms and individuals.'' Local and state officials must
assist ambulance providers involved in a disaster response with the
process of submitting requests for federal reimbursement.
IX. Conclusion
In conclusion, as demonstrated most recently in the response to
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, government and non-government emergency
medical service providers are a critical component of the state, local
and the national response to catastrophic events. In these types of
situations, all ambulance service providers, regardless of provider
type or whether the units are emergency or non-emergency, become
potential first responders.
Ambulance service providers stand ready to assist in responding to
future catastrophic events and assisting in the development of
comprehensive and integrated pre-planned response guidelines and
protocols. However to assure effectiveness, the local, state and
federal planning process must account for the resources needed by all
America's emergency medical services systems and ambulance service
providers based on the following guiding principles:
Assure the safety of ambulance service personnel and
ambulance patients, and the security of ambulance facilities,
supply inventories and vehicles;
Integrate and effectively utilize local ambulance
services in the local, state and federal incident management
and emergency management systems;
Establish timely and equitable funding mechanisms to
support and maintain the essential capabilities of the first
responder system
I again thank Chairman Reichert, Ranking Member Pascrell and
members of the Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness, Science and
Technology for the opportunity to testify on this important issue.
I will be more than happy at the appropriate time to answer
questions that Subcommittee members have for me.
Thank you.
Mr. Reichert. Thank you, Mr. Garner.
The chair now recognizes Mr. David Liebersbach, Immediate
Past president of the National Emergency Management
Association, to testify.
STATEMENT OF DAVID LIEBERSBACH
Mr. Liebersbach. Thank you, Chairman Reichert, Ranking
Member Pascrell and distinguished members of the committee for
allowing me to provide you with testimony.
My added congratulations, Mr. Reichert, for your ascension
to the chairmanship of this subcommittee.
I am representing NEMA, whose members are the directors for
emergency management in states, territories and the District of
Columbia. NEMA members are responsible to their governors for
emergency preparedness, response and recovery activities for
all disasters. Clear incident command structures, coordinated
response and working communications systems are the essential
elements for maintaining control of any disaster, regardless of
the costs.
When there is a question over communications, state
emergency management directors find that technology is often
not the problem. Often the real issue is people not
communicating before the disasters. Commonly, if people are not
talking before the disaster, then they are rarely establishing
communications during a disaster, which causes response
coordination breakdowns.
Incident command does not solve the coordination and
communications problems, but it does bring accountability,
common goals and an organizational structure to disaster
command and control. The common framework from which everyone
is working provides goals that people in all disciplines and
all levels of government can focus activity on.
The recent disasters on the Gulf Coast have shown the
challenge of command and control when the entire emergency
services sector is wiped out by a disaster and communication
links are destroyed. Exercise training and communications
before an event in the planning process are critical and
command and control systems allow for a common framework to
start with, regardless of whether communications systems are
working or not.
Incident Command System, ICS, is a process. It is not a
strategy or a tactics, but focuses on goals and objectives to
the incident action plan. In 1989, we in Alaska successfully
used ICS in response to the Exxon Valdez oil spill, which led
to the Coast Guard's adoption of the system. Alaska utilizes
incident command on the ground, executing the missions of the
state.
We typically deploy teams prior to a disaster in
anticipation of the state's mission to support local
government. Alaska's Type-1 team, incident management team, was
deployed to work post-9/11 in New York, last year's hurricane
response in Alabama, and just completed an assignment to the
Gulf Coast post-Katrina.
My colleague Craig Fugate in the state of Florida utilizes
ICS's unified command to establish the state's goals in a
disaster. In last year's Hurricane Charlie, Florida dispatched
incident management teams equipped with satellite
communications to Charlotte County prior to the disaster.
Immediately, the state was able to support the county
infrastructure and response needs with the ability to pull
resources from other places in the state. The state moved
forward with a joint command presence between a state
coordinating officer and the federal coordinating officer with
a single mission. The unified command approach was used again
in 2005.
NEMA has been on record since 1996 advocating adoption of
ICS by all levels of government. The beauty of ICS is that it
is an all-hazard system that can be used for all incidents
regardless of the size. NEMA was active on the team that
developed later drafts of the national response plan and NIMS.
Currently, states are in the process of adopting NIMS to meet
the requirements of Congress to qualify for future funding.
During the consideration of NIMS, NEMA called for
significant training and financial support. Both DHS and
Congress told states and localities to comply, but did not
provide a viable source of funding to train and exercise for
the new system. The mutual aid assistance provided during the
hurricanes vividly exposes the interdependencies of the
nation's emergency management system. For Hurricane Katrina,
the emergency management assistance compact, EMAC, has
currently fulfilled over 1,200 missions with more than 44
states providing assistance in the form of over 45,000 civilian
and military personnel and equipment assets to impacted states.
EMAC has its own command and control system operating at
the request of the governor of impacted states. The EMAC system
is built on state's requesting aid from other states with
advance teams working in a state emergency management office to
ensure that the aid is being rendered. Advance EMAC personnel
were on the ground in Baton Rouge and Jackson prior to
Hurricane Katrina's landfall. The EMAC system enables difficult
issues such as liability, reimbursement, workers compensation
and acceptance of state licenses to be addressed ahead of time,
allowing personnel and resources from all disciplines to be
utilized through EMAC's clear operating procedures.
The National Guard has been deployed through EMAC despite
being under Title 32. They like the structure and
accountability provided through the compact's command and
control structure.
We cannot afford to ignore the lessons learned from
Hurricane Katrina and Rita at the operational level. In the
aftermath of these catastrophic disasters, there are a few
areas that can be immediately identified for increased focus:
state and local coordination in the development of federally
defined preparedness capabilities; improved baseline funding
for emergency management capacity building in the nation's
mutual aid system; and federal, state and local updates are
needed for COOP and COG planning.
In conclusion, NIMS and the incident command systems are
vital to the success of emergency response in a disaster. The
system must be built on communication before a disaster,
including preparedness activities such as exercise and
training.
I thank you for the opportunity to testify on behalf of
NEMA and appreciate your partnership.
[The statement of Mr. Liebersbach follows:]
Prepared Statement of David E. Liebersbach
Introduction
Thank you Chairman Reichert, Ranking Member Pascrell, and
distinguished members of the Committee for allowing me the opportunity
to provide you with a statement for the record on the nation's
preparedness oversight system. I am Dave Liebersbach, Immediate Past-
President of the National Emergency Management Association and Director
of the Alaska Division of Homeland Security and Emergency Management.
In my statement, I am representing the National Emergency Management
Association (NEMA), whose members are the state directors of emergency
management in the states, territories, and the District of Columbia.
NEMA's members are responsible to their governors for emergency
preparedness, mitigation, response, and recovery activities for
natural, man-made, and terrorist caused disasters.
Incident Command in Emergency Management
Clear incident command structures, coordinated response, and
working communications systems are the essential elements for
maintaining control of any disaster, regardless of the cause. The onset
of each disaster raises the question over communications. Seasoned
state emergency management directors find that typically technology is
not the problem. The problem lies with people not communicating before
the disasters. Commonly, if people are not talking before the disaster,
then they are rarely establishing relationships and communication
during a disaster, which causes functional coordination break downs.
Incident command does not solve the coordination and communication
problems, but it does bring accountability, common goals, and an
organizational structure to disaster command and control. The common
framework from which everyone is working sets forth goals that people
at all levels of government and all disciplines are supporting from the
top of the organization chart to the bottom. The method of
communication is irrelevant, but the emergency response system needs
the common framework from which to operate.
The recent disasters in the Gulf Coast have shown the challenges of
command and control when the entire emergency services sector is wiped
out by a disaster and communication links are also destroyed. While
systems and plans are in place, command and control is extremely
difficult when there is no way to communicate to the players in the
system at all levels of government. Exercise, training and
communication before an event in the planning process are critical, but
command and control systems allow for a common framework to start with
regardless of whether communications systems are working or not.
Incident Command Systems (ICS) is a process, it is not strategy or
tactics, but focuses on goals and objectives through the incident
action plan.
In 1989, Alaska used incident command in response to the Exxon
Valdez oil spill. The success of ICS in that event led to the Coast
Guard picking up the system and inserting it into their operations.
Alaska has utilized incident command on the ground executing the
mission of the State, and we typically deploy teams prior to a disaster
to support the state's mission to support the local government. The
terrain and temperatures in Alaska can make communications difficult in
a disaster, so I may send an incident command team to Nome or Bethel,
Alaska to be ready with response and recovery functions if an event is
predictable. In most cases, I try to proactively offer resources to
local governments prior to an event. Sometimes the locals turn the
support down or don't agree, but the offer eliminates confusion later.
In Alaska, the state Constitution does not allow for the state to
takeover, so it is imperative that the state continues in a support
role to the local governments.
My colleague Craig Fugate in the State of Florida utilizes unified
command, which is a hybrid of NIMS, to establish the State's goals in a
disaster. In last year's Hurricane Charlie, Florida dispatched Incident
Management Teams equipped with satellite communications to Charlotte
County prior to the disaster. Immediately, the State was able to
support the county infrastructure and response needs and they plugged
right into the system with the ability to pull resources from other
places in the State. Further, the State moved forward with a joint
command presence between the State Coordinating Officer and the Federal
Coordinating Officer with single mission. Florida found that the merged
staffs under the unified command were able to move forward with joint
missions, action plans and objectives where everyone understood the
mission and each person's role in achieving the mission. With over 40
counties impacted, it was difficult to appoint a local to unified
command in Florida, but the State did include liaisons in heavily
impacted areas in the structure.
The unified command approach was used again in 2005 for Florida to
address Hurricanes Dennis, Katrina and Rita. Alaska's Type I Incident
Management Team was deployed to work post 9/11 in New York, in last
year's hurricane response in Alabama, and just completed an assignment
in the Gulf Coast post-Katrina.
Move to a National Incident Management System
Incident command structures prior to 9/11 were varied by state and
local government plans as well as by discipline. Emergency management
was comfortable with the Incident Command System (ICS) and most state
emergency management agencies were utilizing some form of system in the
1990s. The system is nimble enough to be used for a variety of
disasters and events.
The 9/11 Commission highlighted the lack of coordination of command
and control in their Report by calling for all emergency response
agencies to adopt the Incident Command System (ICS) and structures for
unified command. The report also called for Congress to make homeland
security funding contingent on the adoption and regular use of ICS and
unified command. Further, the report states that ``DHS should consider
making funding contingent on aggressive and realistic training in
accordance with ICS and unified command structures.'' In response, the
President offered Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5 on
Management of Domestic Incidents. Shortly after, the Office of Homeland
Security and then DHS began crafting the National Incident Management
System (NIMS) with state and local governments.
NEMA has been on the record since 1996 advocating adoption of ICS
by all levels of government. The beauty of ICS is that it is an all-
hazards system that can be used for all incidents, regardless of the
cause or size. NEMA was active in commenting on and participating in
the writing team that developed later drafts of the National Response
Plan and the NIMS. At the time of consideration of the system, NEMA
recommended that flexibility be given for DHS to recognize pre-existing
systems that meet the NIMS general criteria and standards. Currently,
states are in the process of adopting NIMS to meet the requirements of
Congress and the Administration to qualify for funding for FY 2006 and
beyond.
During the consideration of the new NIMS, NEMA called for
significant training and financial support for the training and
certification necessary for states and localities to successfully adopt
and implement the new NIMS. However, both DHS and the Congress told
states and localities to comply, but did not point to a source of
funding to train and exercise for the new system that was all-hazards
based. DHS pointed to the state homeland security grants as a source of
funding, but most emergency managers found that they were not able to
utilize that funding specifically for NIMS. Many state and local
governments have had to come up with funding themselves in an already
tight fiscal environment to implement the mandate themselves as they
formally adopt and comply with the NIMS.
NEMA did take the initiative to creatively work to introduce the
concepts to state government officials through an interagency multi-
discipline approach. NEMA, along with the Centers for Disease Control
(CDC) hosted a series of training sessions in summer 2004 based on
utilizing NIMs for bioterrorism events and also allowed for state and
local participants to immediately exercise what they had learned during
the training. Six states completed the training in 2004 and the CDC has
provided additional funds for an additional five training sessions to
be completed in the next twelve months. After the 2004 trainings, NEMA
made all of the materials for the training and the exercise available
to all states and localities that were interested. NEMA will begin
updating the course and addressing needs for the additional training in
the coming months.
EMAC
The mutual aid assistance provided during these hurricanes vividly
exposes the interdependencies of the nation's emergency management
system. For Hurricane Katrina, the Emergency Management Assistance
Compact (EMAC) has currently fulfilled over 1200 missions with 44
states, the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico providing assistance
in the form of more than 45,000 civilian and military personnel and
equipment assets to support the impacted states. The missions and
request for aid continue and are expected to continue for the next
several months.
EMAC has its own command and control system operating at the
request of the Governor of an impacted state. The EMAC system is built
on states requesting aid from other states with EMAC advance teams
(called A-teams) working in the state emergency management offices to
ensure that aid is being rendered for each request. In recent
disasters, EMAC personnel have been deployed to FEMA's National
Emergency Operations Center as the National Coordinating Team. Advance
EMAC personnel were on the ground in Baton Rogue, LA and Jackson, MS
prior to Hurricane Katrina to field the states' requests for
assistance. The National Coordinating group works to coordinate the
staffing of the A-Teams on the group. The EMAC system enables difficult
issues such as liability, reimbursement, workers' compensation, and
acceptance of states licenses to be addressed ahead of time, allowing
personnel and resources from all disciplines to be utilized through
EMAC's clear operating procedures. The National Guard status has been
deployed through EMAC, despite being in Title 32 status because they
like the structure and accountability provided through the compact's
command and control structure.
Improving Command and Control
We cannot afford ignore the lessons learned from Hurricane Katrina
and Rita at the operational level. NEMA will look closely at the state-
to-state mutual aid system in an after-action in the coming months once
operational activity wanes. In the aftermath of catastrophic disasters
and since the influx of homeland security funding, a few areas need
increased focus that can be immediately identified.
To start, the federal government must work closely with state and
local governments to define capabilities and competencies needed for
ALL disasters, regardless of the cause. The system must utilize the
Emergency Management Accreditation Program (EMAP) as the measuring
stick, since that is the accepted peer review system and practice for
addressing standards for emergency management agencies. More focus on
natural disasters as catastrophic events must be implemented in the
Administration's activities in the implementation of Homeland Security
Presidential Directive 8 on National Preparedness.
HSPD 8 states that, ``to the extent permitted by law, federal
preparedness assistance will be predicated on the adoption of statewide
comprehensive all-hazards preparedness strategies.'' Yet, the national
planning scenarios include only three scenarios of the fifteen are not
terrorist attacks. The directive calls for ``threats and hazards that
present the greatest risk''. NEMA has long maintained that changing the
focus of preparedness to weigh so heavily on terrorism could severely
hamper the ability of state and local government capabilities to
respond to a wide range of events with a higher likelihood of
occurrence such as natural disasters, non-traditional disasters like
the Columbia Space Shuttle explosion, Mad Cow disease, West Nile virus,
civil unrest, and hazardous material incidents. Increased homeland
security focus must be viewed as an enhancement to our basic emergency
management capacity. Our system for public safety and homeland security
must be mutually supportive and nimble enough to address any hazard.
NEMA strongly supports maintaining baseline funding for emergency
management capacity building to ensure national preparedness against
all hazards and maintenance of the nation's mutual aid system. The
current need for mutual aid support in response to Hurricane Katrina
vividly shows the need for all states to have appropriate capabilities
to respond to disasters of all types and sizes. Additionally, resources
are needed to build emergency response capabilities on a national basis
and to ensure the system can handle the demand of natural disasters and
other emergencies no matter where they occur. EMPG is the only means to
support this assistance that can be offered by other states in the face
of disaster through adequate preparedness. EMPG ensures all states have
funding to develop and maintain a base level capacity that can be
utilized by other states for mutual aid. Currently, there is a $264
million shortfall to the EMPG program that must be addressed in the
context that these recent disasters show in terms of the need for
personnel and planning in every state and locality.
Additionally, two long standing issues must be addressed:
1. State and local updates of Continuity of Operations Planning
and Continuity of Government Planning (COOP/COG) are needed
along with federal financial assistance to support the effort;
and,
2. Funding to improve and retrofit Emergency Operation Centers
and funding for alternate EOC locations to provide for unified
command;
Both of these points were also noted post-9/11 and were delivered
to Congress and the Administration in the White Paper on Domestic
Preparedness that was approved by NEMA, the Adjutants General
Association of the U.S., the International Association of Emergency
Managers, the National Guard Association of the U.S., and the Council
of State Governments.
NEMA also recommends that state and local governments remain in
control of their own disasters with federal support and unified command
structures. Even in extreme circumstances, we need to continue to use
and follow the plans and systems that are in place to address all
disasters. State and local governments must have buy-in for the
response and recovery of their communities. Federalizing a disaster
could be extremely difficult with so many federal agencies lending
support to a disaster. No disaster has been federalized in the past 30
years. Hurricane Camille in 1969 was the last time emergency management
can recall a declaration of martial law with the military placed in
charge. We cannot afford to return to the Civil Defense era of the
1950s and avoid all the lessons we have learned with catastrophic
disasters over the last 30 years. The time to stop the cycle of
degradation of emergency management functions by reorganization after
reorganization is now and we must systematically improve our nation's
emergency response system through verified lessons learned and not
reactionary decisions. We hope that Congress will partner with NEMA as
they move forward to consider changes to DHS organizational functions
and the role of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA).
CONCLUSION
NIMs and other incident command systems are vital to the success of
emergency management and other emergency response providers in a
disaster, provided that the system is built on communication before a
disaster. State and local governments must have adequate funding for
baseline emergency preparedness for emergency management so exercises
and training can ensure that plans and systems are effective before a
disaster. I thank you for the opportunity to testify on behalf of NEMA
and appreciate your partnership. I hope we can work together to
implement the lessons of Hurricane Katrina and Rita and ensure that the
nation is adequately prepared for any disaster, regardless of cause.
Mr. Reichert. Thank you, Mr. Liebersbach.
The chair now recognizes Dr. Gebhart, assistant professor
of emergency medicine at Boonshoft School of Medicine at Wright
State University.
STATEMENT OF MARK GEBHART
Dr. Gebhart. Chairman Reichert and Ranking Member Pascrell
and members of the committee, good afternoon. My name is Dr.
Mark Gebhart, and I currently serve as assistant professor of
emergency medicine and director of the Homeland Emergency
Learning and Preparedness Center at Wright State University,
Boonshoft School of Medicine, in Dayton, Ohio.
I am honored to represent the profession of medicine, the
specialty of emergency medicine, and fire and emergency
services. I hold board certification through the American Board
of Emergency Medicine and the rank of deputy fire chief and
chief medical officer for the City of Kettering Fire
Department.
I also serve as task force manager, Ohio Task Force One,
Urban Search and Rescue. I responded with Ohio Task Force One
to Gulfport, Mississippi, on August 28 of this year and spent 8
days searching the communities of Gulfport, Pass Christian and
Long Beach, Mississippi.
The specialty of emergency medicine is one of the youngest
recognized specialties in medicine. Over 140 training programs
exist in the United States training your nation's emergency
medicine specialists. These graduates fulfill a vitally
important role in our country, that of our nation's safety net.
The nation's emergency departments are open 24 hours a day, 7
days a week, 365 days a year, and in addition are required to
work during times of catastrophic disaster.
No specialty in medicine is better prepared to assume the
role of disaster responder than my colleagues in emergency
medicine. Hospitals across our nation have begun teaching
hospital emergency incident command, adapted from incident
management utilized in public safety response plans. The
implementation of these programs has met with modest success.
Many emergency physicians, however, serve local fire and police
departments in roles including medical director, tactical
physician, or in my case, as a member of an urban search and
rescue team.
As a result of this form of participation, many emergency
physicians have first-hand knowledge of incident management and
function seamlessly in incident management systems, and have
become compliant with presidential directives regarding the
National Incident Management System. I attribute my NIMS
compliance directly to participation as a fire officer and
member of an urban search and rescue team.
The material contained within NIMS educational initiatives
was tested during the response to Hurricane Katrina. My eyes
could not have been prepared for the devastation and
destruction I observed as our task force moved into Gulfport,
Mississippi. Lives lost, homes destroyed, families forever gone
are vivid, real and memorable experiences I will have for the
rest of my life.
Operating within the structure of NIMS, our task force,
other task forces, member physicians and other response teams
including North Carolina's Disaster Medical Team One and
Alabama Task Force One, a state asset of the State of Alabama,
were able to operate from a common point of reference. Skilled
incident support teams from the Federal Emergency Management
Agency supported us and provided leadership. These incident
support teams consisted of numerous professionals, primarily
from the fire and rescue services. They identified problems,
solutions were sought, and specific changes in operations were
handled.
It must be mentioned that the common understanding of
incident management facilitated this management structure. This
serves as an example of the requirement for all specialties in
medicine, first responders, and others to become aware of
incident management and for selected disciplines to become
completely NIMS-compliant.
Medical operations during the Hurricane Katrina disaster
clearly identified the need for medical professionals to assume
an important role in incident management. The acute care and
delivery of trauma and medical care during disasters is a
continuum of care. This care may begin in the field or it may
begin at a hospital, where many self-transport and report
during emergencies. Incident management structures must have
physicians as members of their organizational structure. This
will allow decisions to be made and input to be given.
A clear distinction must be made between clinical medicine
and public health. Clinical medicine specializes in providing
patients with medical are and public health does not. As the
definition of ``first responders'' continues to evolve, those
who practice the art of patient care, those who specialize in
treating people at the bedside, those who work in our nation's
emergency departments and trauma centers, simply must be
included and should be clearly differentiated from the field of
public health. My written comments reflect much more detailed
information.
In conclusion, the nation is preparing to be prepared.
Emergency medicine and physicians in other specialties now
categorized as part of our nation's first responders, are
beginning to awaken and realize the need to embrace the tenets
of the president's plan for a National Incident Management
System.
We have a long way to go. As a physician with Ohio Task
Force One, I watched as physicians in Gulfport, Mississippi,
wondered how we do what we do, how we understand roles,
responsibilities and clearly work as a team to solve a given
situation. In order for the nation's physicians to become
integrated into incident management, areas for improvement and
advancement require identification.
Camille was an 82-year-old resident of the state of
Mississippi. Her home was destroyed. We found her floating in
putrid water. She had sustained scrapes and abrasions to her
body and wanted to get back to her house for a bridge game. She
was expertly rescued from her home by an elite group of our
nation's first responders, my colleagues from Ohio Task Force
One, all who are NIMS-compliant. Her care was transferred to an
outstanding medical specialist, again from Ohio Task Force One,
who was NIMS-compliant. Her care was then transferred to me,
her doctor, the only doctor in Pass Christian who was NIMS-
compliant.
The communities surrounding Gulfport were seriously
impacted. I vividly recall arriving at the Harrison County
Emergency Operations Center seeing people from the fire
profession, law enforcement and other first responders
beginning to manage the incident. Our team was given a mission.
We executed that mission. Incident management was tested, and
in my small piece of this hurricane response, NIMS was
successful.
Thank you. I am honored to be here today.
[The statement of Dr. Gebhart follows:]
Prepared Statement of Mark E. Gebhart, MD
Chairman King and Members of the Committee, good afternoon. My name
is Dr. Mark Gebhart and I currently serve as assistant professor of
emergency medicine and director of the Homeland Emergency Learning and
Preparedness Center at Wright State University--Boonshoft School of
Medicine in Dayton, Ohio. I am honored to represent the profession of
medicine, the specialty of emergency medicine, the profession of
firefighting and our nations urban search and rescue community. I hold
board certification through the American Board of Medical Specialists
in emergency medicine. I hold the rank of deputy fire chief and chief
medical officer for the City of Kettering Fire Department and I serve
as task force medical manager, Ohio Task Force One, Urban Search and
Rescue. I responded with Ohio Task Force One to Gulfport, Mississippi
on August 28th of this year and spent eight days searching the
communities of Gulfport, Pass Christian, and Long Beach, Mississippi.
Background on Emergency Medicine and Incident Management
The specialty of emergency medicine is one of the youngest
recognized specialties in medicine. Over one hundred and forty training
programs exist in the United States, training the nation's specialists
in emergency care. These graduates fulfill a vitally important role in
our country, that of our nation's safety net. The nations emergency
departments are open twenty-four hours a day, three hundred and sixty
five days per year. The nations emergency departments are also required
to operate in times of catastrophic disaster. No specialty in medicine
is better prepared to assume the role of disaster responder than my
colleagues in emergency medicine.
Hospitals across our nation have begun teaching the hospital
emergency incident command system--adapted from incident management
utilized in public safety response plans. The implementation of these
programs has been met with modest success. Many emergency physicians
serve local fire and police departments in roles including medical
director, tactical physician, or in cases such as my own, as a member
of an urban search and rescue team. As a result of this participation,
many emergency physicians have first hand knowledge of incident
management, function seamlessly in incident management systems, and
have become compliant with presidential directives regarding the
national Incident Management System (NIMS). I attribute my NIMS
compliance directly to participation as a fire officer and as a member
of an urban search and rescue team.
The material contained within the NIMS educational initiatives was
tested during the response to hurricane Katrina. My eyes could not have
been prepared for the devastation and destruction I observed as our
task force moved into Gulfport, Mississippi. Lives lost, homes
destroyed, families forever gone were vivid, real, and memorable
experiences I will have for the rest of my life. Operating within the
structure of NIMS, our task force, other task forces, and other
response teams such as North Carolina's Disaster Medical Assistance
Team NC-1 and Alabama Task Force One (a state urban search and rescue
team) were able to operate from a common point of reference. Skilled
incident support teams provided leadership. These incident support
teams consisted of numerous professionals and included physicians
specializing in emergency medicine. Problems were identified, solutions
were sought, and specific changes in operations, planning, and
logistics resulted from interaction between professionals. It must be
mentioned that the common understanding of incident management
facilitated this management structure. This serves as an example of the
requirement for all specialties in medicine to become aware of incident
management and for selected disciplines to become completely NIMS
compliant.
The Role of Emergency Medicine in Educational Initiatives
The nation has responded in the post 9-1-1 era with many
educational initiatives. An outstanding example of the role played by
the specialty of emergency medicine is a strong and healthy
relationship between the Ohio Chapter of the American College of
Emergency Physicians and the Homeland Emergency Learning and
Preparedness Center at Wright State University. These entities
collaborated two years ago to deliver courses from the National
Disaster Life Support Foundation. Course work was funded by the Ohio
Department of Health and delivered by Ohio's emergency physicians.
These educational initiatives included basic principles of incident
management, response to catastrophic natural and man made disasters.
Ohio continues to have a strong role in educating responders at all
levels and has trained in excess of 2000 responders in three states.
National efforts through the American College of Emergency
Physicians are a broader and more distributed network of educational
initiatives seen by many in the specialty as the gold standard.
Currently, relationships are evolving to strengthen the role of the
college in disaster preparedness and education. The college is
committed to the nations first responders and its members.
The specialty of emergency medicine has stood hand in hand with the
nations emergency medical technicians and paramedics. Emergency
medicine specialists are the recognized leaders in providing oversight
and medical direction to the nations first medical responders. As such,
emergency physicians are tasked with prescribing the programs of study,
continuing education delivery, and ongoing quality assurance
monitoring. Numerous emergency physicians have prescribed and delivered
incident management training to emergency medical technicians.
Areas for Improvement
Mr. Chairman, the nation is preparing to be prepared. Emergency
medicine, physicians in other specialties--now categorized as first
responders are beginning to awaken and realize the need to embrace the
tenant's of President Bush's plans for a national incident management
system. We have a long way to go. As a physician with Ohio Task Force
One, I watched as physicians in Gulfport wondered how we do what we do.
How we understand roles, responsibilities, and clearly work as a team
to solve a given situation.
The nation's fire and rescue services, emergency medical services,
and recently public health practitioners have embraced incident
management in many of the nation's larger and more financially stable
communities. Much of the nation's rural and frontier communities,
served by volunteers have not. In these same rural and frontier
communities, medicine parallels the public safety-first responders in
its need for educational initiatives. The United States House of
Representatives has developed legislation for a Rural Domestic
Preparedness Consortium. To date, no progress has been made on
identification of members, development of training programs, and most
importantly, little has been done to empower these first responders.
Higher education in our nation must embrace the role of provider of
educational initiatives related to incident management. These
institutions should be allowed to acquire the resources necessary to
form collaborative relationships across the nation with fire and police
departments, professional associations such as the international
association of fire chiefs, governmental bodies, and the private
sector.
The nations colleges and universities could fulfill a vitally
important role in preparing all aspects of our nation utilizing an all-
hazards approach to disaster management, response and recovery.
G4Awareness/Education Campaigns
The Department of Homeland Security has developed and fielded
educational initiatives directed at providing the nation's first
responders with a high quality educational experience. In addressing
the nation's medical compliance with incident management, we simply
must more openly make physicians aware of this material. Plans should
be made to encourage boards of medicine in each state to explore
specific requirements for physicians--now members of our nations first
response corps. Without this organizational oversight, the vast
majority of our nation's physicians will likely not even be aware of
these educational opportunities.
Conclusion
Camille was an eighty-two year old resident of the State of
Mississippi. Her home was destroyed, she was found floating in putrid
water, had sustained scrapes and abrasions to her body, and wanted to
get back to her house as soon as possible to meet her friends for a
bridge game. She was expertly rescued from her home by an elite group
of our nations first responders--my colleagues from Ohio Task Force
One. All who were NIMS compliant. Her care was transferred to an
outstanding medical specialist--again from Ohio Task Force One who was
NIMS compliant. He care was then transferred to me, her doctor, the
only doctor in Pass Christian--who is NIMS compliant.
Camille was not seriously injured and during these initial stages
of the response, vital local ambulance resources could not be utilized
to transport her. Camille spent nearly a day with the task force.
Camille suffered from dementia--likely Alzheimer's. She required
constant attention, assistance with all activities of daily living, and
was eventually transported by a citizen, and American willing to help
another in this horrific time.
The success of this task force stems from the personal commitment
of its members. The success of teams like North Carolina and the many
other disaster response teams share this same level of commitment. Our
nations newest members to the first responder ranks--physicians,
nurses, and other health care providers will share in this same
commitment and I encourage you, the elected leadership of this great
nation to make all necessary provisions needed to enhance delivery of
incident management education, to enhance communications for public
safety forces, and to enforce legislation relating to compliance with
the National Incident Management System.
Mr. Reichert. Thank you, Dr. Gebhart.
I am not surprised by the information that has been shared
today, as we have talked about this upcoming hearing and things
that have happened in the past few weeks across our country.
The three things that kept coming up are planning, joint
training and communication. Those are three things that all of
you clearly touched upon.
You also mentioned that ICS is not a new concept. It has
been around for a while. I think it may have developed back in
the early 1970s when California wild fires took over the state.
Actually, I have to be honest with you here. As a police
officer for 30-some years, it is hard for me to admit this, but
the firefighters of this country have been far ahead of all of
us in the area of incident command. So I have to congratulate
the fire chiefs and firefighters across the nation. They have
put together an organization that needs to be modeled across
our country.
I have a lot of personal experience in this area. One of
the areas where really we saw the need for incident command,
and maybe many of you might be familiar with WTO in Seattle,
and the difficulty we had in communicating with 20-some police
departments and firefighting agencies that came into the city
to help us with that. It is certainly not on the magnitude of
Katrina or Rita, but it was an event that was fairly
catastrophic to the city of Seattle and the county that I was
sheriff of.
As you are involved in one of those incidents, disasters
and tragedies, after you have finished your job in your
specific discipline, there is always an opportunity to stop and
pause and go back and take a look at what you did right and
what you did wrong. We did that during WTO and other incidents
that I have been involved in.
We are still evaluating Katrina and our response, but we
see some mistakes that have been made there, and many of you
have mentioned those today. Based on your personal experiences
and some of the information you are getting back from members
of your associations, can you describe some of the difficulties
that have been shared with you in Louisiana, Mississippi,
Alabama, Texas in setting up their incident command?
That is a question for anyone on the board. Yes?
Mr. Canterbury. Mr. Chairman, I think one of the things
that many of our members found was that because of the national
media, most of the response originally in the New Orleans area
went to New Orleans proper. St. Tammany, St. Bernard's Parish,
St. Charles Parish needed assistance and had a lot of trouble
getting help. I know that there were a lot of complaints about
self-dispatching from especially law enforcement agencies that
responded to assist.
But being a former sheriff, you will understand when the
sheriff of St. Charles Parish, 3 days after the incident,
finally was able to reach me by phone and ask me for some help,
we sent help. They were stopped by officials saying if you do
not have your EMAC number, go home. They went anyway because
the sheriff requested it. He is the chief constitutional
officer of that county. They responded. We sent our own mobile
kitchen to feed them. We are not asking for reimbursement. We
went to assist fellow law enforcement professionals.
I believe that that was one of the major problems, besides
the communication. The first call that I got from that region
turned out to be on a Nextel cell phone. Nothing else worked.
That was only after their backup satellite systems arrived. And
St. Charles was on the good side of the storm, and their
communication was down for at least 3 days. So that was one of
the problems that we had. We understand that the EMAC system
was being preapproved, but the bottom line is that they needed
help and were not getting it.
Mr. Reichert. Thank you.
Anyone else care to answer?
Chief Killen. Mr. Chairman, one of the success stories to
come out of this was the fact that experiences learned in
hurricanes in Florida, that the Florida fire chiefs were able
through their system to stage massive units and resources. I
think there were six task forces that were staged east of the
storm area and were able to get into Mississippi and provide
some communications because they had learned and built systems
that would work in that environment.
Communications were extremely horrible, whether it was
communications by landline, cell phone or whatever. I know from
personal experiences trying to reach family members to see how
they were. It was really a sad state of affairs. And the
getting calls for assistance and writing the information down
on a 3-by-5 card and handing it to somebody in the fire
department so he or she could run outside and hand it to a
company officer so they could dispatch, that is how
communications was being handled in New Orleans because of the
impact of the flooding of the system.
Mr. Freudenthal. Mr. Chairman, one of the key things to
have in any kind of response like this is experience.
Unfortunately, the only way to get it is live through a painful
process. I think everybody at this table can attest to that,
and this is certainly probably the most painful process we are
going to go through as far as learning from this experience.
But it is an opportunity, an opportunity to improve the
quality of life for everybody in that area, hopefully in this
country, and an opportunity to improve our system. Like
everyone at this table, general communications were nonexistent
for the most part. We did work through the EMAC system. It
certainly has some areas that need focus and improvement, but
it was the system to use. With experience, we will improve
those as well.
One of the tough things are those immediate decisions that
need to be made. For example, how to re-route the ambulance
service to respond when there is no bridge to go across the
water. So those types of thing we need to focus on how to do a
better control, command and communication decision-making
process, allowing those immediate decisions to be made, and
deal with the response at hand.
Mr. Reichert. Okay.
Yes, sir?
Mr. Garner. Mr. Chairman, I think that one interesting
thing about this disaster is the fact that as we have done in
the last few years preparing for the WMD consideration, is that
we saw a lot of what we may see in that type of disaster in the
future. Any incident command system is as strong as the core
incident command structure. The best people to lead that
structure are the ones that are in the local area.
I think what we saw here was the virtual destruction of
what the local command system would typically do to lead those
that come to assist. Therein, just as has been described here,
there were calls made on an ad hoc basis requesting assistance,
and it was very difficult to get direction from a central
command structure.
So I think what we saw here was something that we need to
learn from, and that is that when that central structure is
destroyed, then there needs to be an immediate ability to back
that up with something which the national structure would do.
So I think that that is one of the lessons learned from this
experience.
Mr. Reichert. Thank you.
If I could just follow up very quickly with Chief Killen,
you mentioned that two of your colleagues noted that there was
an utter lack of structure. Could you just elaborate on that
just a little bit more, to follow up with Mr. Garner's
comments?
Chief Killen. Mr. Chairman, one of the difficulties in our
government system is that state levels, in many cases--and I
will quote an example. There are a number of states that the
insurance commissioner is dual-headed as the state fire
marshall. For several days, there was no fire presence in the
state EOC because the insurance commissioner was, by training,
an engineer, and there was no fire experience at that level of
the state EOC.
Also, there was a lot of confusion in trying to identify
command and people with the right organizations, for example,
in the New Orleans command post as well. No structure and no
one to identify was very difficult to really find out who was
in charge and who was making the decisions.
Mr. Reichert. Thank you.
The chair recognizes Mr. Pascrell.
Mr. Pascrell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Reiterating again, the men and women who are there every
day, day-in and day-out, are a critical part of this. Dave
Paulison has taken over at FEMA. He obviously had the
experience, and also is probably the first person that I know
of in Homeland Security from the fire side that is involved in
upper management.
Fire services have been left out, which is nothing new. In
many of the state apparatus', the same situation. I have been a
strong advocate of both the police and the fire and paramedics.
You have been the forgotten part of the public safety equation,
both at the state and national level.
I want to ask you a question, Chief Killen, to start this
afternoon. My question is this--and if anybody else wants to
jump in, make your responses brief and I will try to make my
questions brief.
Much has been said and written about the president's
potential idea to give the military the main authority for
response during a disaster within our borders. What is your
initial feeling toward this, and how do you view it impacting
first responders?
I will start off with an easy question.
Chief Killen. Congressman Pascrell, I have spent 30 years
employed by the Department of Defense, and I am very proud of
that--and the Fire Emergency Services. But the first responders
are the people that we need to have in there. I am very proud
of the Department of Defense, but it takes time to mobilize and
dispatch the Department of Defense.
Emergencies are like politics. They are all local. The
local responders are there first and it takes 12 to 24 hours to
get the first Department of Defense units moving unless they
are already stationed there.
I do not think that it is good idea and the International
Association of Fire Chiefs is not very much in favor of that,
but we will work with our government, our president and our
Congress to do what is right for our country.
Mr. Pascrell. Let me ask you this, Chief, as a follow up.
FEMA's job is primarily to coordinate.
Chief Killen. Yes, sir.
Mr. Pascrell. You do not have to have the disaster happen
before you start to coordinate. I spend a lot of debate and
discussion about who pushed who and who sent letters.
Looking back over this experience--and this is not an easy
question to answer. We are not here to criticize. We are here
to make it better. Do you think the coordination, do you think
that we got that kind of coordination from FEMA?
Chief Killen. I think the coordination would have been a
lot better if there had been more people with operational
experience in emergency response in positions. The eight top
positions in FEMA, two of them had fire and emergency services-
skilled persons in them, and they were not utilized early-on. I
think that made a difference.
Mr. Pascrell. Okay.
To anyone in the committee, I want to ask this question. We
have what I consider to be--and correct me if I am wrong--a
major problem, both fire and police, in terms of common
elements of training. I want to ask a question to anybody who
wants to answer this.
Do you think that the federal government--is this what you
are hinting at today or outright saying, that the federal
government should take over all emergency training that now is
afforded through the states? What are your feelings about that?
Who wants to respond? Because we are going to have a
hearing I think next month on training. I hope you are all
involved in some manner, shape or form. We want to learn.
Yes? Mr. Garner?
Mr. Garner. Yes, Ranking Member Pascrell, I would say this,
that we think that there needs to be a coordinated effort in
terms of training so that there is consistency.
In a large disaster where there is tremendous mutual aid
response, it is critical that the responders to the incident
have the kind of training necessary to be able to work with
first responders from many other areas of the country. If you
do not have some kind of coordination, the question becomes
exactly how that is funded and exactly how that is going to be
organized. However, without that, in some of the early online
opportunities that we have for training seem to be working
well, one based in Anniston, Alabama. So the fact that I think
that we need to follow up on that. I think that is critical.
You mentioned Director Paulison. Having spent 30 years in
South Florida and working with him through Hurricane Andrew, I
can tell you that he strongly believes in that coordinated type
of national training. He is qualified.
Mr. Pascrell. He is very qualified, in my opinion.
Anybody on the panel want to respond to my question?
Mr. Liebersbach. If I could, through the chair, Ranking
Member Pascrell.
Mr. Pascrell. Yes, sir.
Mr. Liebersbach. Dave Liebersbach.
I, prior to the life I am in now, I served as 12 years as
the incident commander on Alaska's Type-1 incident management
team in wild-land and fire management.
I think this training issue and a need for leadership at
the national level really is not just training. It has to do
with standards and credentialing standards. I do not believe we
want the federal government to do it all or to decide it all,
but they probably should lead in developing those so that when
a type-X whatever comes from Alaska to Mississippi or Alabama
as they did this year, Mississippi and Alabama know what type-X
means.
Likewise, as I am currently having windstorms and I have
teams in the field right now in western Alaska in disasters and
may be requesting assistance, that assistance comes from Idaho
as a type-Y, I want to know what a type-Y is and we all agree
to it.
I think to make it a national standard, the federal
government needs to lead in that.
Mr. Pascrell. Let me just conclude by asking a question,
not getting an answer because my time is up. My question is
this--and I would like you if you could to write me a note on
this, and the chairman as well.
I would like to know what you think the role of Congress
should be in all the things that are being discussed, either by
the chairman, by Mr. Etheridge, by Mr. McCaul, questions that
you are going to get today. What should our role be? What do
you think is the appropriate role?
You have already heard from many of us that we think your
role should be expanded and extended because you are there
every day. I mean that seriously.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Reichert. Thank you, Mr. Pascrell.
The chair recognizes Mr. McCaul.
Mr. McCaul. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
On a point of personal privilege, I would like to
congratulate the chairman on his new position. I cannot think
of anybody better qualified than a first responder to chair
this subcommittee.
I wanted to compare Katrina with Rita. About 2 weeks ago, I
had--and I am from Texas--I had the opportunity to sit down
with our state emergency manager at the EOC. The vice president
came down. There was a briefing. We were shown computer models
of what would happen if a Katrina-like hurricane hit the state
of Texas. It was targeted toward Galveston and Houston, and it
would put Galveston under water and it would flood the majority
of Houston.
We got lucky. It took a turn to the north, to the east, and
missed the trajectory that it was originally planned to do.
Little did we know when we got this briefing that a week later
we would be faced with that very scenario. There was no loss of
life directly attributed to the hurricane with respect to Rita.
There was an evacuation, albeit we had some problems with the
roads turning into parking lots. There was a reference to the
Louisiana state EOC.
When we met with the Texas EOC, it was clear that they were
in daily and constant communication with the local judges, with
the mayors, with the first responders. As somebody who has
worked in law enforcement, my view is that communication is
always the key, whether it is having a fancy radio system or
whether it is just picking up the telephone and knowing who to
call.
Having said that, I would like for the panel, whoever would
like to answer the question, to compare and contrast the
response to Katrina versus Rita, recognizing that the Rita
Hurricane was downgraded to a category three and did miss a
major population center.
Mr. Freudenthal. Yes, sir. One thing that comes to mind
initially was that fortunately Galveston and Houston had the
experience of Katrina. Katrina and New Orleans and that area
did not have the like experience. So good for you, you had the
experience. Bad for them, they had to show you that.
Mr. McCaul. Right.
Mr. Freudenthal. But I think that has a lot to do with it.
Your example of going through that exercise before it ever
happened is a lot of what we are talking about, is to plan
before the event. It is a little tough afterwards.
So I think that hits a high point of what you are trying to
say and what we are trying to say. Communication and
cooperation are essential in this effort, and planning those
events, as painful as they are, saves hundreds, thousands or
more lives and affects millions of lives. So I think that is a
key element of that.
Mr. McCaul. Anybody else care to comment?
Chief Killen. Yes, sir. I think that everything we learn is
from experiences, whether they are good or bad experiences. I
would like to just point out something that I kept looking at
and thinking about. My Lord, what will we do if we have a
terrorist attack and it is a toxic gas or something of that
nature--
Mr. McCaul. Right.
Chief Killen. --and we do not have the ability to get our
citizens moved?
I want to point out one thing. There was a success story in
the Louisiana EOC, and that was the state police. They had
their act together. That was one element of Louisiana EOC that
worked very well.
Mr. McCaul. If I could follow up on that. I know that there
was a comment made about the Louisiana state EOC that nobody
knew who was in charge. I know when we went through the Rita
exercise, obviously with the hindsight of Katrina, that it was
clear that the state emergency manager and the governor, in
concert with the locals, was very much in charge of the
situation. I guess that would be sort of a lesson learned from
what happened.
Mr. Canterbury. I think one of the things that found that
was on a state level, it was the communication from our
sheriffs and chief executives from the law enforcement agencies
that did not have the ability to call the EOC, so those
especially in the surrounding areas had no communication.
So the EOC being set up in Baton Rouge had no contact with
what was actually happening in the field. Two and three days
after the storms, we were running into division commanders in
the New Orleans Police Department that had not talked to
anybody above their rank since the storm.
So I think the bottom line was even if there was somebody
in charge of the EOC, there wasn't anybody to talk to.
Mr. McCaul. Those communications were not adequate.
Mr. Canterbury. Absolutely.
Mr. McCaul. So we need to plan a default system in the
event it is knocked out.
Mr. Canterbury. And in some of those districts, they did
have good default systems, even inside the city of New Orleans.
When the media was reporting that as many as 50 percent of
public responders were not there, it was not true. They were
just being dispatched internally with ``go here today.'' It was
a police captain or a fire captain making those calls because
there was nobody above him that he could communicate with. They
were there, many more of them were there than left.
Mr. McCaul. Mr. Killen, you mention the point that had it
been a terrorist attack, it could have been far worse. I agree.
I think in the Rita exercise, we had advance notice and people
had time to evacuate, and still again the major highways turned
into a parking lot. Had it been a terrorist attack with no
notice, it would have been far worse in terms of evacuation.
Do you have any lessons learned in terms of Hurricane Rita
in terms of evacuation and how that could go more smoothly than
it did?
Chief Killen. I think that more smoothly would have been
opening up all of the lanes out of Houston and trying to move
them by zip code, if you would, of trying to get the people
furthest out started first to start the movement. It is a very
difficult chore.
I have never driven in Houston. My son lived there for
years and his coworkers always had a six-pack of beer on the
way home from work because it was that long getting through
traffic. So I cannot imagine what it is like to try and
evacuate a city of that size.
Mr. McCaul. And a lot of people, even if it was not
mandatory, they left. After seeing what happened with Katrina,
they were leaving anyway. It is a hard thing to control.
I see my time has expired. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Reichert. The chair recognizes the gentleman from North
Carolina, Mr. Etheridge.
Mr. Etheridge. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Let me thank each of you, number one, for being here; and
number two, for your service. It is amazing we have to have a
national incident before Congress decides it is time to listen
again. We did a good job after 9/11, and it seems to me that we
have been pretty anemic since then in terms of what we did and
the kind of resources we put out. So thank you for your service
today.
A couple of questions. All of you as respective
organizations, have all of you incorporated, and this will
probably take a yes or no, ICS into your basic certification
courses so that every certified respondent professional is
familiar with it?
And number two, to your knowledge do volunteer departments
have a harder time training personnel in ICS?
Chief Killen. Since you said volunteer fire departments, it
is difficult.
Mr. Etheridge. Because that, by and large, is where
volunteer and rescue squads tend to be.
Chief Killen. It is very difficult for volunteer fire
departments to get a lot of the training that is required,
particularly because they are involved in working, families,
and raising money for the fire department to survive. We have
an excellent process in the United States in the certification
process, and the IAFC does have programs, and the states have
training programs where there are training opportunities there
for the people to be trained in incident command.
Mr. Etheridge. Anyone want to respond on EMS?
Mr. Garner. I would simply say that to answer your
question, that that is indeed true. Across the entire nation
would be inaccurate at this point. I think there are tremendous
efforts and strides being made in that way, but as the chief
says, particularly in volunteer systems, whether it be an EMS
or fire-based systems, it is very difficult to get a handle on
whether they have indeed been trained to the system.
Dr. Gebhart. Speaking specifically about medicine, since
medicine is now considered part of this first response corps,
medicine has been very slow to embrace this. It is one
specialty among hundreds of different types of physicians who
done this. It has not happened there yet. It has not happened
in our nation's medical schools. It has not happened in our
nation's residency training programs. So that is a whole other
segment of the response community, not a traditional player,
that has to be brought up to speed. Programs have to be
targeted and aimed at those groups.
Mr. Etheridge. Thank you.
Do any of you have a cost estimate for NIMS implementation,
number one, for your department and others like yours? And
number two, is the cost of training related to the
implementation?
Chief Killen. I do not have any figures on the cost for
implementing the training right off hand.
Mr. Etheridge. Just give me some general numbers, general
thoughts. Is it a barrier?
Chief Killen. It is a barrier, particularly for the
volunteer fire companies across this country. There are a large
number of them.
Mr. Etheridge. I know, about 80 percent. How about the
others?
Mr. Canterbury. For law enforcement, I think the burden is
going to be even more because as the chairman noted, NIMS is
not something that has been open-armed welcomed by law
enforcement. We live in a culture where we normally just go and
take care of the problem. The majority of the incidents that
law enforcement goes to, there is not a whole lot of doubt that
the lone law enforcement officer is in charge of that call. But
we now are implementing incident command, and I think it is
going to be very expensive. I do not think that without
mandates or without federal funds will you see a true
implementation of NIMS in a local law enforcement capacity for
years.
Mr. Etheridge. Does everyone sort of agree with that?
Mr. Freudenthal. I would agree with my colleagues that that
is critical.
Mr. Etheridge. Okay. Thank you.
One other point for my final question, because my time is
running out, I think it is general knowledge that we still have
a major problem in communication. We can talk about all the
problems that happened in New Orleans and Louisiana and
Mississippi, and to a lesser extent in Texas, but certainly in
Alabama, communications is a critical issue in any major event.
Finally, Chief Killen, in your testimony you suggested that
the Department of Homeland Security require everyone to take
the online NIMS course. It makes sense. Does this include all
DHS personnel, including FEMA? And do you know if they are
currently required to take ICS training?
Chief Killen. I cannot respond to what DHS is required to
take, but in the testimony is was implying that the government
officials at all levels that are going to be involved in this
process, so those people in FEMA who respond or in DHS respond
should know what the requirements are and what NIMS is, and so
should all of our local officials.
Mr. Etheridge. I could not agree more.
Does everybody else agree with that?
Dr. Gebhart. Yes, sir. That is a requirement as a member of
urban search and rescue. We are NIMS-compliant. We have taken
that.
Mr. Etheridge. Mr. Chairman, with your indulgence, one
final follow-up?
Mr. Reichert. Go right ahead, sir. Thank you.
Mr. Etheridge. Thank you.
Mr. Garner, when municipals contract for services with your
membership and your folks, do these contracts usually include
training requirements, including ICS and NIMS? If they do,
wouldn't the services be more valuable? And wouldn't that also
be, given the things we have been through now over the last
several years, it seems to me that would be an issue of, number
one, negotiation; but number two, that they would be a lot more
valuable in the process.
Mr. Garner. There is no question that the inclusion of the
system would be valuable in those contracts. The fact is that
typically training is included in contracts, but not
specifically the training that you are referring to here. So I
would agree with you completely that that would be an essential
component on a go-forward basis.
Mr. Etheridge. Mr. Chairman, thank you.
In closing, let me encourage each of you, because your
folks are the first line of defense and offense, whichever it
is. I think, having been to some extent in first response
because I was the state superintendent of schools for 8 years,
the one area that always gets cut early in almost any
organization is training. Without training, assessment,
evaluation and follow-up, we are going to continue to have
problems because we have a short memory after it is over with,
and we spent a lot more money rebuilding than we are ever
spending on preparation and getting prepared and the
assessments.
So hopefully you will continue to remind Congress and local
and state jurisdictions how important training of our personnel
is. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Mr. Reichert. Thank you.
I want to follow up just with a couple of thoughts and one
more question.
I cannot help but think back to 1972 as a 21-year-old cop
in King County. We had one radio frequency that served a 2,200-
square-mile county. Today, we have five or six different
frequencies set up around the county to serve the communities
that each precinct supports and serves.
Sitting here as a sheriff, as a police officer, as a
sheriff's deputy of 33 years, I am thinking back to 1972 and
hearing the testimony today, the frustration that all of us as
first responders have felt almost 35 years later in no progress
at all, really, in this whole question of interoperability, the
question of us being able to communicate, our police officers,
firefighters, first responders being able to communicate with
each other. It is a 30-or 35-year process that has been
undertaken.
I just want to assure that the witnesses here today and
anyone who happens to be listening that this committee is going
to be dedicated to solving this problem, at least we will be an
active member in pushing for a solution to get something done.
I know that everyone on this committee will be committed to
that. In fact, in October we are going to be holding a hearing
solely dedicated to operability, how we can set up a command
post when there is not the ability to communicate, and then
interoperability, what does it mean and where do we go from
here. I know all of you are so frustrated with that.
The other key and integral part to responding to any
serious incident and setting up incident command is those
partnerships that you all talked about. By the various
disciplines we have represented here today, we can see it takes
the whole community.
One of the things that I am a little bit concerned about
is, do you think in your experience and what you have seen with
Katrina and Rita, are local governments, and let's just take
these two catastrophic events that have occurred within the
past few weeks in the Gulf states, are local governments in
that area, were local governments, including the private
ambulance companies, the public works departments of their own
cities and local governments, the medical community and others,
had they reached out prior to and built those relationships? Or
is that something now that they have recognized was kind of an
integral part that they had missed?
Mr. Garner. Chairman Reichert, I would say this, that as
was mentioned in my written remarks, there are very, very
different models of EMS systems throughout America. There are
some very strong consistencies. Certainly, police and fire
components are very, very strong in all EMS systems.
I think the EMS side of the ledger, however, is most
recently being addressed more efficiently than it has been in
the past, regardless of whether the component includes public,
private, hospital-based, volunteer. I think that when we start
to look at these systems, and as we develop this plan, the key
is that we have standards, that we have consistency, that we
have interoperability because one never knows where the
disaster is going to occur, and certainly one never knows where
the resources are going to be drawn from.
So in answer to your question, I think that has been
cooperation. I think there is lots of room for improvement.
Mr. Freudenthal. Mr. Chairman, if I may, with respect to
public works, and I am sure the others, the success stories you
saw on adequate response were the results of cooperation and
planning from those agencies that in fact took that step
forward long before the event occurred. So many times, however,
that is probably a reflection of the relationship between the
players, not necessarily because it was mandated. I think the
aftermath of this incident dictates that that is the way to go,
and that whether we want to, like to, or whatever, we have to
work together on this. We have to communicate. We have to
cooperate so that our citizens are taken care of.
Mr. Reichert. Anyone else? Chief?
Chief Killen. Mr. Chairman, we learned a lot of lessons and
this overwhelmed all of our resources in those communities.
One of the big questions to come out of this was, why do so
many people have to drive 1,000 miles to get to New Orleans and
pass all of these other communities that had resources? The
IAFC has established a task force to focus on developing a
national fire mutual aid system. It is working in certain parts
of this country today, in California, Illinois, Florida,
Georgia, Maryland. We have a task force put together that is
going to address that, to work with those states that do not
have a statewide mutual aid system, to work with making
regional response and communications together.
We think that it is well time that we did this. The
International Association of Fire Chiefs has stepped up to the
plate to take that on. We will certainly keep you and this
committee informed of that progress, but we think that that
will help resolve many of the problems and help to resolve some
of the issues of self-dispatch.
Mr. Reichert. Anyone else?
Mr. Liebersbach. Mr. Chairman, if I may, I think we also
should not overlook the need to incorporate the private sector,
particularly when it comes to things like power outages in the
north and who is really going to be driving the train on many
of those to get them in the system, maybe not through mandate,
but through advice and consulting to get them into this NIMS
system, because in a big event they are going to be critical,
whether it is replacing communications or power or whatever.
We, in Alaska, found by bringing them into our training of
ICS, when we need the local gas company or electric company,
they know right where to go into the ICS system, who to report
to, and start getting their utilities back on line. The same
with the oil companies up north. Besides the private-sector
first responders, there is a big private sector out there,
whether it is Home Depot of whoever, that need to be looked at.
Mr. Reichert. I could not agree more. I kind of think of
the grocery store owner who is caught in the middle of one of
these events and decides that he can deliver food, so he gets
out his rowboat and loads it with food and he is the immediate
responder. And then he is there to help, and then we have the
first responders there. So you can really see the whole
community needs to be involved in this effort.
I just want to mention that Washington state is also one of
those that has a statewide mutual aid system in place.
I want to thank all of the witnesses and give Mr. Pascrell
additional time to ask questions.
Mr. Pascrell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
A couple of things. I want to thank you all for being here
today.
Mr. Freudenthal, having worked extensively, too, in the
public works area, you probably many, many times never are
given full credit for all that you do, and all of those folks
throughout the United States of America. It is not the most
sexy thing to talk about, and yet provide a tremendous service.
I want to assure everyone on the committee that when we
look into the communications problem, and we will do that, we
are committed to that, that we look into the spectrum problem.
I would suggest, Mr. Chairman, that we have to bring some
FCC people in front of us, fish or cut bait, because long
before I got here, long before David got there, people have
been talking about this, and nothing happens. I do not like
that situation. I feel very uncomfortable to talk about the
same thing all over again and never solve it. As Einstein said,
that was probably the best definition for insanity.
So I can assure you, we are going to get some people in
front of us, and from the FCC, too, because they are part of
this, and we are not going to be able to really solve the
problem until we get into this spectrum issue.
My final question is this, we must constantly re-evaluate
our response and command mechanisms. I understand that. Only
God is perfect, but we have to do a lot more.
What changes to command authority, particularly for the
federal response, would you make, and you think we need to
make, in response to Hurricane Katrina? What did we learn from
that? What would you suggest, if you had one sentence, looking
back at this horrible situation, this tragedy, in terms of the
command authority? I am asking about that specifically. What
would you change?
Mr. Liebersbach. If I may, to the chair and Mr. Pascrell,
my one sentence would be, use the system and the people you
trained to do it, nobody how big it gets and try not to pay as
much attention to the politics. Use the system that you have
been purporting out there, NIMS and ICS, all the way from the
top down.
Mr. Pascrell. Anyone else?
Chief Killen. I concur with that, and I think we need to
train the people at the local and state level in government,
not the first responders. They are supervisors. They are
elected officials. They need to understand that system.
Mr. Pascrell. You don't think they do?
Chief Killen. I don't think the number of officials at that
level understand it to the degree that they need to understand
it.
Mr. Pascrell. Anyone else? Thank you.
Mr. Garner. I would simply make one additional comment, and
that is understanding what we did about the infrastructure that
was where the decision-making should have been made, we have
got to work on an instant and an immediate backup plan if that
indeed occurs, so that we can have the right people making the
decisions.
Mr. Pascrell. Just as you have backup generators, you need
a backup system.
Mr. Garner. Absolutely.
Mr. Pascrell. Anybody else?
Thank you. And thank you so much for your service to this
country.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Reichert. Thank you, Mr. Pascrell.
I thank the witnesses for your valuable testimony and for
taking time to be with us today.
I thank the members for their questions.
The members of the committee may have some additional
questions for the witnesses. We would ask that you respond to
those in writing please. This hearing record will be held open
for 10 days.
Without objection, the committee stands adjourned. Thank
you.
[Whereupon, at 2:34 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
For the Record
Additional Responses from David E. Liebersbach to the Honorable David
G. Reichert Questions
In reference to your letter of October 12, 2005 requesting
additional comment on questions related to the 9/29/2005 hearing on
``Incident Command, Control, and Communications during Catastrophic
Events'', below you will find answers to the additional questions.
1. How is the Department of Homeland Security addressing the
technology needs of law enforcement and other first responders in rural
areas?
The only program specific to rural preparedness issues is the
Congressional appropriated Rural Domestic Preparedness Consortium
funded through the Office of State and Local Coordination and
Preparedness. I am not aware of any other specific programs dedicated
to rural needs including technology.
2. Is there a need for additional funds and/or special programs to
ensure rural areas have the same capability for disaster response as we
do in urban areas?
Yes, there is a need for additional programs in rural areas to
address disaster response issues. In particular, communications and
public warning systems are a challenge in rural areas and must be
addressed. Many believe that an investment in infrastructure such as
communications is a one-time cost. Systems such as NAWAS and Satellite
radios and phones require monthly cost to maintain the service. This is
another reason that the all-hazards Emergency Management Performance
Grant (EMPG) program is so critical to support the recurring costs
associated with building a capability.
3. Are there gaps in technology for law enforcement and first
response Government Relations Director in rural areas vs. urban areas?
Yes, there are gaps in rural areas for fist responder technology in
terms of getting funding for them and also the ability to utilize
current systems poses problems in rural areas. Rural areas often
provide communications challenges for current systems in remote areas
since legacy networks for communications are not often built to go into
the most remote areas or over rough terrain. Further, even if
technology is available, local emergency management officials need
training on the equipment, which requires either the state or the local
government to travel.
4. Is the infrastructure to support technology products (such as
communications devices and on-line wireless computer databases) for law
enforcement/first responders in place in rural American as it is in
urban area?
No, rural communities often need a different infrastructure because
of the terrain and topography in regions and that technology is harder
to find and sometimes more costly. In Alaska, mountainous regions pose
a challenge for communications and the problem cannot be solved with
systems specifically used in larger cities.
5. Would a rural technology pilot program for homeland security be
a useful mechanism in identifying and addressing technology barriers
and challenges in a rural setting?
Yes, I would support such a program for Alaska's participation. We
have the challenges of the coastline, mountains and the distance to the
mainland and federal support towards addressing communications
technology problems would be welcomed.