[House Hearing, 109 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
OFHEO'S FINAL REPORT
ON FANNIE MAE
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
CAPITAL MARKETS, INSURANCE, AND
GOVERNMENT SPONSORED ENTERPRISES
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FINANCIAL SERVICES
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
JUNE 6, 2006
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Financial Services
Serial No. 109-98
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HOUSE COMMITTEE ON FINANCIAL SERVICES
MICHAEL G. OXLEY, Ohio, Chairman
JAMES A. LEACH, Iowa BARNEY FRANK, Massachusetts
RICHARD H. BAKER, Louisiana PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania
DEBORAH PRYCE, Ohio MAXINE WATERS, California
SPENCER BACHUS, Alabama CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York
MICHAEL N. CASTLE, Delaware LUIS V. GUTIERREZ, Illinois
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California NYDIA M. VELAZQUEZ, New York
FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma MELVIN L. WATT, North Carolina
ROBERT W. NEY, Ohio GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York
SUE W. KELLY, New York, Vice Chair DARLENE HOOLEY, Oregon
RON PAUL, Texas JULIA CARSON, Indiana
PAUL E. GILLMOR, Ohio BRAD SHERMAN, California
JIM RYUN, Kansas GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
STEVEN C. LaTOURETTE, Ohio BARBARA LEE, California
DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois DENNIS MOORE, Kansas
WALTER B. JONES, Jr., North MICHAEL E. CAPUANO, Massachusetts
Carolina HAROLD E. FORD, Jr., Tennessee
JUDY BIGGERT, Illinois RUBEN HINOJOSA, Texas
CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York
VITO FOSSELLA, New York WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri
GARY G. MILLER, California STEVE ISRAEL, New York
PATRICK J. TIBERI, Ohio CAROLYN McCARTHY, New York
MARK R. KENNEDY, Minnesota JOE BACA, California
TOM FEENEY, Florida JIM MATHESON, Utah
JEB HENSARLING, Texas STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts
SCOTT GARRETT, New Jersey BRAD MILLER, North Carolina
GINNY BROWN-WAITE, Florida DAVID SCOTT, Georgia
J. GRESHAM BARRETT, South Carolina ARTUR DAVIS, Alabama
KATHERINE HARRIS, Florida AL GREEN, Texas
RICK RENZI, Arizona EMANUEL CLEAVER, Missouri
JIM GERLACH, Pennsylvania MELISSA L. BEAN, Illinois
STEVAN PEARCE, New Mexico DEBBIE WASSERMAN SCHULTZ, Florida
RANDY NEUGEBAUER, Texas GWEN MOORE, Wisconsin,
TOM PRICE, Georgia
MICHAEL G. FITZPATRICK, BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont
Pennsylvania
GEOFF DAVIS, Kentucky
PATRICK T. McHENRY, North Carolina
JOHN CAMPBELL, California
Robert U. Foster, III, Staff Director
Subcommittee on Capital Markets, Insurance, and Government Sponsored
Enterprises
RICHARD H. BAKER, Louisiana, Chairman
JIM RYUN, Kansas, Vice Chair PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania
CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York
PAUL E. GILLMOR, Ohio DARLENE HOOLEY, Oregon
SPENCER BACHUS, Alabama BRAD SHERMAN, California
MICHAEL N. CASTLE, Delaware GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
PETER T. KING, New York DENNIS MOORE, Kansas
FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma MICHAEL E. CAPUANO, Massachusetts
DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois HAROLD E. FORD, Jr., Tennessee
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California RUBEN HINOJOSA, Texas
SUE W. KELLY, New York JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York
ROBERT W. NEY, Ohio STEVE ISRAEL, New York
VITO FOSSELLA, New York, WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri
JUDY BIGGERT, Illinois CAROLYN McCARTHY, New York
GARY G. MILLER, California JOE BACA, California
MARK R. KENNEDY, Minnesota JIM MATHESON, Utah
PATRICK J. TIBERI, Ohio STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts
J. GRESHAM BARRETT, South Carolina BRAD MILLER, North Carolina
GINNY BROWN-WAITE, Florida DAVID SCOTT, Georgia
TOM FEENEY, Florida NYDIA M. VELAZQUEZ, New York
JIM GERLACH, Pennsylvania MELVIN L. WATT, North Carolina
KATHERINE HARRIS, Florida ARTUR DAVIS, Alabama
JEB HENSARLING, Texas MELISSA L. BEAN, Illinois
RICK RENZI, Arizona DEBBIE WASSERMAN SCHULTZ, Florida
GEOFF DAVIS, Kentucky BARNEY FRANK, Massachusetts
MICHAEL G. FITZPATRICK,
Pennsylvania
JOHN CAMPBELL, California
MICHAEL G. OXLEY, Ohio
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Hearing held on:
June 6, 2006................................................. 1
Appendix:
June 6, 2006................................................. 23
WITNESSES
Tuesday, June 6, 2006
Lockhart, Hon. James B. III, Acting Director, Office of Federal
Housing Enterprise Oversight................................... 9
APPENDIX
Prepared statements:
Oxley, Hon. Michael G........................................ 24
Gillmor, Hon. Paul E......................................... 26
Lockhart, Hon. James B. III.................................. 27
OFHEO'S FINAL REPORT
ON FANNIE MAE
----------
Tuesday, June 6, 2006
U.S. House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Capital Markets, Insurance,
and Government Sponsored Enterprises,
Committee on Financial Services,
Washington, D.C.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:00 p.m., in
room 2128, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Richard H. Baker
[chairman of the subcommittee] presiding.
Present: Representatives Baker, Gillmor, Royce, Kelly,
Hensarling, Davis, Oxley (Ex Officio), Moore, Frank, and Watt.
Also present: Representative Garrett.
Chairman Baker. Good afternoon. I call this meeting of the
Subcommittee on Capital Markets to order. Today, the committee
meets to discuss OFHEO's Report of the Special Examination of
Fannie Mae.
Upon preliminary review of the findings, there seems to be
validation of the work of OFHEO throughout the years,
particularly that of your predecessor, Mr. Armando Falcon, who
labored long in the vineyard trying to come to some conclusion.
This work was highlighted by an appearance before the
subcommittee 2 years ago, in which rather difficult
observations were made public by the then-acting director and
led ultimately to even more strident conversation about the
advisability and need for strengthening the tools and the
resources that the current regulatory structure may benefit
from.
The work has been difficult, and it is certainly necessary,
and I would, unfortunately, like to point out that the report
even gives us greater reasons for concern. The collection of
facts leads us to a very troubling picture, one in which there
was, apparent to me, an effort at all costs to hit certain
earnings and incentives which led to the enrichment of the
executives in control of preparation of that financial data.
We will delve today in much more detail into those elements
and try to appreciate, from the work you have done, how we can
better prepare the accountability of the agencies themselves as
well as the regulatory body going forward to oversee these
increasingly complex financial organizations.
Although it may not be said necessarily for the committee,
it should be part of the record that these enterprises are
enormously important to our housing market. Because of the
complexity of their counterparty risk and relationships with
other financial entities, if there were to be adverse economic
consequences to either of them, it would bring about
potentially systemic risk--adverse effects--and for that reason
alone, much less the exposure of the American taxpayer, the
committee should spend considerable time and effort in trying
to get our legislative proposal for reform adopted during this
term of the Congress.
Mr. Lockhart, I look forward to your testimony and your
response to the questions of the subcommittee at the
appropriate time.
Mr. Watt, do you have an opening statement?
Mr. Watt. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I thank Mr.
Kanjorski, the ranking member of this subcommittee, for asking
me to sit in for him today. He has an irreconcilable conflict
and could not be here. I wish it were an indication that I was
in training either as a ranking member or a chair of one of the
subcommittees, but my--
Chairman Baker. The ranking member seems to be aggressive
enough, if I might.
Mr. Watt. --my seniority status is such that both of those
probably would appear to be somewhat out of reach at this
point, so I am just here substituting for him and doing the
best I can at today's hearing which is the fifth in a series of
hearings of accountings of irregularities at Fannie Mae. At
each of these hearings we have learned more details about what
went wrong at the government sponsored enterprise and what
needs to be done to prevent similar situations in the future.
Mr. Kanjorski, the ranking member, has been very vocal in
his statements that government sponsored enterprises with their
public responsibilities and private capital have a special
obligation to operate fairly, safely, and soundly, and I
certainly agree with his assessment. The management at these
entities must ensure that they produce accounting statements
that reflect their real financial condition, and I think we,
hopefully, are headed back in that direction.
While the report that we are having the hearing about
represents one more important step in the process of examining
the accounting issues and management issues, we must also keep
our focus on completing the legislative action that is
necessary to improve the oversight of all government sponsored
enterprises going forward. It is certainly in the public's
interest that we address regulatory issues promptly and
properly.
OFHEO has leveraged its existing general safety and
soundness authority through the adoption of specific safety and
soundness standards. The authority to adopt these standards and
any other safety and soundness standards deemed necessary would
be clearly established in the House-passed bill, which also
would strengthen the enforcement authority of the regulator,
including enforcement of safety and soundness requirements.
Additionally, the House bill gives the regulator authority
to order reductions in assets for safety and soundness reasons,
similar to the action that is taken as one of the resolutions
of today's report.
Mr. Kanjorski is also a strong supporter, as am I, of the
concept that a strong, world-class, independent regulator is
needed for the GSE's, and we hope that we can move in that
direction following these series of hearings focused primarily
on what went wrong and tangentially on looking forward to how
we can ``right the ship'' and go forward.
After reviewing OFHEO's report, I have two specific
questions that I hope will be answered. First, it would be nice
to know whether OFHEO believes it now has an appropriate level
of cooperation from the management and board of the company.
Second, it would be nice to learn how long it will take for
Fannie Mae to get back into financial shape and current with
its reporting and be able to move forward aggressively with the
housing mission that I believe most, if not all, of the members
of this committee support.
So we thank you for being here, Mr. Lockhart, and look
forward to your testimony.
Mr. Frank. Mr. Chairman, I wonder if I could proceed out of
order to note the presence of a former chairman of this
committee in this room, our former colleague from Rhode Island,
Mr. St. Germain--my former colleague, because I don't know if
anybody else is still here. You are, I guess, and Mr. Oxley.
Chairman Baker. Welcome back, sir. Nice to see you here.
Mr. St. Germain. Oh, I am looking for Rick Milano, my
former staff director.
Chairman Baker. Some things never change. We are constantly
looking for our staff.
Mr. Frank. Protocol has been tightened up since you have
been here, so you have to sit down.
Chairman Baker. Chairman Oxley.
The Chairman. Mr. Chairman, coming on the heels of Senator
Redman's work, OFHEO's staff is to be commended for giving us
the comprehensive report from the agency special exam of Fannie
Mae. I congratulate former OFHEO Director Falcon for initiating
examination and former Acting Director Blumenthal for
completing this report.
Mr. Lockhart, congratulations are in order for you on your
nomination by the President to head OFHEO, and I look forward
to your presentation today.
OFHEO's story of Fannie Mae is, unfortunately, fact, not
fiction. We are told that Fannie Mae's best-in-class image was
a facade. According to the report, the company's board of
directors was a complacent entity controlled by senior
management which systematically withheld vital information.
Management routinely violated GAAP in order to maximize bonuses
and mislead shareholders. Reported details are that Fannie Mae
sought to oversee OFHEO, instead of the other way around, even
orchestrating a HUD Inspector General investigation and
reduction in appropriations for the purpose of discrediting the
agency, as well as a report that we review today.
According to this report, in October of 2004, Fannie Mae's
former chairman and CEO Raines and CFO Howard made,
``inaccurate statements'', in sworn testimony before this
subcommittee when they denied that expense deferrals had been
made.
Compensation for senior executives tied to earnings per
share targets dwarfed basic salary and benefits. From 1998 to
2003, more than half of $200 million in compensation received
by the top five executives was EPS related. OFHEO found that
the message at Fannie Mae was clear: EPS results mattered, not
how they were achieved.
Last March, in an SEC filing, Fannie Mae reported
accounting errors in over 20 separate categories. There is no
doubt that those accounting errors were in part due to a weak
and outdated internal control system. It was only in 2005, when
making certain that the company complied with the section 404
internal control requirements of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, that
Fannie Mae's senior management finally admitted, ``that the
company's internal control over financial reporting was
ineffective.''
The failure of internal controls and the audit function at
Fannie Mae reinforces a need for the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. In
fact, if not for Sarbanes-Oxley, I wonder how much of this
would have come to light at all.
OFHEO and the SEC imposed one of the largest penalties ever
paid by an individual company, making Fannie Mae the Enron of
the financial services industry. $350 million of the $400
million penalty will go to the Fair Fund, which was
strengthened and created by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, and will
ultimately be returned to investors. The rest goes to the U.S.
Treasury.
This report reminds us how crucial it is for Congress to
approve legislation to strengthen regulations of the GSE's. We
need to prevent abuses from developing and permit swift
enforcement if they do.
In OFHEO's request, Fannie Mae has agreed to cap the growth
of its mortgage portfolio. I would point out again to those who
characterize it incorrectly that the House bill gives a new GSE
regulator clear discretionary authority to require portfolio
adjustments. OFHEO's action shows why the regulators should
have the flexibility to respond, not be directed by Congress.
It is imperative that this new regulator have the authority to
adjust portfolios as called for under the House-passed Baker
bill.
I concur that Treasury possesses the authority to approve
GSE debt issuances. The 2004 Congressional Research Service
legal analysis stated, ``If Congress wanted to limit the
Treasury Department's approval authority, then Congress could
have done so. Because Congress chose instead to use broad
language in describing Treasury's authority, it follows that a
broad interpretation of that authority would likely be judged
to be reasonable.''
I understand that the Department of Justice has given
Treasury a similar opinion. While I endorse the belief that
Treasury possesses this authority, I do not offer an opinion as
to whether the Department should use it at this time.
Congress correctly provided Treasury with broad discretion
in this area, just as we should do in the area of portfolio
powers. I only note that the Administration's rhetoric on the
matter suggests that the matter is urgent. I would like to see
that sense of urgency find a better outlet than repeatedly
asking Congress to tie the new regulators' hands on portfolio
authority.
If OFHEO's report doesn't motivate our colleagues in the
other body to act on this legislation, nothing will. Only after
full Senate action is complete will we be able to work together
on a conference committee to send the President the GSE bill in
this Congress.
And let me say to the chairman of the subcommittee, who had
been a lone wolf on this issue and alone in the wilderness for
a number of years, that his hard work, persistence, vision, and
tenacity have paid off with the revelations in the OFHEO report
and with the successful passage of his legislation by a large
bipartisan majority in the House of Representatives. We can
only hope that the other body will respond in kind.
And I yield back.
Chairman Baker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your kind
words.
Mr. Frank.
Mr. Frank. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I have never been a fan of people in our business who
invoke various ancestors for what always seems to me to be very
convenient reasons, and I strongly suspect that about 90
percent of what is attributed to our dead relatives they never
said but can't defend themselves. But, in this case, I am
reminded strongly of something I do remember hearing my father
say.
He was a man of great charity. And once he got into a major
dispute with the people who were running the Jewish Community
Center in town, which was a very important institution, and
shortly thereafter he made a large donation to them, as was his
habit. Someone expressed surprise that, after having this
argument with the people on the board of directors about the
policy of the institution, he would continue to be so
supportive, and he said, ``I am not mad at the bricks.''
And that is my attitude here. I think it is very important
for us to separate out the individuals and the institutions.
The chairman of the committee is right. The gentleman from
Louisiana, earlier than anyone else to my knowledge, saw that
there were abusive practices being engaged in by individuals
who were running Fannie Mae. There were also abusive practices
being engaged in by people running Freddie Mac, and that is
instructive because the Freddie Mac abuses, having been
uncovered earlier, we now see there is life after manipulation.
Because we have today, I believe, with Freddie Mac a good,
forthright, honorable set of leaders who have managed to rescue
that institution from a pattern of abuse, excessive
compensation, and manipulation.
Clearly, condemnation is in order for those who ran Fannie
Mae so abusively. What is important is for us to differentiate
between their behavior, which should be condemned, and the lack
of constraints which allowed that behavior to go forward and
the underlying institutions.
We continue to have in this country a serious crisis in
housing affordability not just for very low-income people but
in many parts of the country, including my own, the price of
housing for people in middle income has gone beyond what it
should be. So I want to continue to do everything we can not
just to preserve, but to improve, the ability of Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac to help us with housing, as this committee recently
did with regard to the FHA. They all worked together.
That is an important point to keep in mind, that we do not
punish the institution. The institution is not the value here.
The value here is the housing that is built for people, and it
is very important that we not do anything that compromises
that.
I believe that what OFHEO has done shows the way. OFHEO has
shown us how you can, in fact, correct the abuses without
interfering with the mission.
And I am struck, as the chairman is, by the testimony this
gives to the legislation we passed. I think much of what we did
anticipates this, the question of portfolio limits. We clearly,
in our legislation, foresaw the importance of giving the
regulator, when it became appropriate because of abuses or
dangers or problems, to be able to deal with the portfolio. So
I am very grateful that we have that example.
And I share his frustration that the Senate is refusing to
act. There can be no justification for that.
If people think that the powers of the regulator need to be
enhanced, I would be willing to listen. I must say I haven't
heard any suggestion other than kind of automatic restriction
on the portfolio, but in terms of the powers it doesn't seem to
me that they have been critiqued with any force.
One last point. In a perverse way, these events and this
report are a testimony, I believe, to the underlying strengths
of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. That is--and we have had
comparisons to Enron and MCI, and, in fact, of the abuses there
was that kind of abuse. But the abuses at Enron and MCI led to
collapses of the institutions.
What is heartening to me here is that the underlying
structure of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the strength of the
housing market, the strength of that model, allowed them to
withstand being misrun--Freddie Mac earlier, Fannie Mae today.
We have not had a serious problem--for those who say there is a
terrible drain on the taxpayers, we have seen these abuses and
the taxpayers were left whole. So I think the lesson of this is
that we need to do a better job going forward in giving the
regulator the power to prevent these kinds of abuses from
happening without in any way endangering or inhibiting the
housing mission. I think the legislation that we passed that is
gathering dust somewhere in the Senate is a very good way to
deal with that.
And I know the Senate has very pressing business. I know
the Senate has got to act immediately to prevent me from
wrecking marriages all over America. Once they have put that
safely behind them, I hope they will get down to serious
business.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Baker. I thank the gentleman.
Mr. Hensarling.
Mr. Hensarling. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and let me add my
voice to that of the chairman and ranking member and thank you
for your great leadership. Since I first came to Congress,
indeed, you have often been a lone voice in the wilderness in
trying to bring the disinfectant of the sunshine into the
activities of the GSE's and ensure that the proper regulatory
regime is in place to save both the housing markets and the
taxpayers. I am happy to note, though, that the analogy just
goes so far, since your head seems to be thoroughly attached to
your shoulder blades, and I assume that before this process is
all said and done that there will be other heads that indeed
roll.
I also want to thank Mr. Lockhart and OFHEO for the good
work done, much of it by his predecessor and that team, in
wading through often complex and arcane issues.
I suppose what we have today is the end of a 2- to 3-year
process that for many of us is reinforcing and giving us more
concrete evidence on what we already know, and that is, for the
period 1998 through 2004, the company systematically misapplied
GAAP relating to the amortization of certain fees on its
securities and their hedge accounting and that this was done at
the direction of senior management, which led to materially
false, incorrect, and misleading financial statements that were
publicly issued and relied upon.
And I suppose what else is new is, if I read the comments
of the SEC chairman correctly, I believe that this marks the
first time that there has been an official designation of
Fannie Mae's accounting practices as fraud. So, because of
that, I look forward to hearing more about the end result of
this report.
We also know that, Mr. Chairman, we simply cannot turn our
backs on the systemic risks that are posed by the GSE's. Right
now, I think what we have is the second largest borrower in the
world, second only to Uncle Sam himself, an institution holding
a Federal charter, an asset portfolio worth over a trillion
dollars, and they can't produce a reliable financial statement
for the bulk of this decade. That is troubling, to say the
least.
So, not unlike our other colleagues, I certainly urge the
other body to act, and act quickly, on this legislation so that
we may go to conference and again protect the taxpayer, protect
the consumer, and protect the housing market.
With that, I yield back.
Chairman Baker. I thank the gentleman.
Chairman Baker. Mr. Royce.
Mr. Royce. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I guess the upshot is--and let me begin by thanking
Director Lockhart for appearing before our committee today. But
I think that what we notice here is that we now have temporary
portfolio caps to try to do something about this systemic risk.
But that does not alleviate the need for portfolio authority to
be in GSE legislation, and I think the OFHEO report highlights
for us pretty clearly the fact that Fannie Mae did not have
sufficient controls in place to manage its large and risky
portfolio. Indeed it is very, very difficult at this--given the
size of these portfolios, basically, Fannie Mae concocted its
own accounting rules to cover up the weakness in its ability to
manage its portfolio.
So we notice that OFHEO still does not have the power to
adjust the portfolio levels of the GSE's. They can only do that
with the permission of Fannie Mae. That is basically what was
done here. This is not a strong regulatory position to be in,
and that is the position we will be in unless the Senate
language passes.
Even with the agreement between Fannie Mae and OFHEO, we
should reflect on the fact that the portfolio still stands at
close to three-quarters of a trillion dollars.
The reason that bankruptcy is not likely is because of the
presumption that the U.S. Government will come in and prop up
and subsidize the GSE's if there are losses.
The size of this portfolio continues to be a risk to the
domestic and the international financial system. You know it is
not just our regulators that are concerned in the United
States. It is a worldwide concern and has been for some time.
Without specific guidance to reduce the size of these
portfolios, OFHEO will continue to be unable to address the
risks to taxpayers in the financial system these portfolios
provide.
Also, the portfolio cap agreed to by Fannie Mae will only
be in place on a temporary basis. Once Fannie Mae has submitted
a plan and met the requirements set by OFHEO, they will be
permitted to go back to growing the portfolio at risky levels,
and this portfolio cap only applies to one of the GSE's, only
Fannie Mae. Freddie Mac is not a party to it. Thus, the ability
to grow the risky portfolio remains, and, thus, the problem
which we will get to during questions remain.
But we thank you very much, Director Lockhart, for the
leadership you have taken on this and your willingness to be
with us today.
Chairman Baker. I thank the gentleman.
Mr. Garrett.
Mr. Garrett. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I also applaud
you for being the lone voice in the wilderness for so many
years. Hopefully, you are now among a chorus at this point
addressing the issue.
I would just like to say that it seems it is quite a
coincidence that the very same week that OFHEO delivers its
report outlining the multiple counts of corporate greed
committed by the executives of Fannie Mae that the one man who
so epitomizes for the 21st Century so far, Ken Lay, received
his guilty verdict in the wake of the Enron scandal. I believe
that the comparison between Fannie Mae and Enron cannot be
ignored. Both companies manipulated their financial statements.
They put our financial systems at risk for the specific intent
of allowing their executives to make their already fat pockets
even fatter.
Now, due to the government benefits enjoyed by Fannie Mae--
and I think this would explain to the ranking member why their
house of cards remains standing when Enron's do not--and their
callous and negligent behavior did more than just mislead and
defraud the investors. It did this at the expense of the
American taxpayer. This has led former OFHEO Director Falcon to
suggest that Fannie Mae is, ``the Enron of government on
government steroids.''
Furthermore, as Fannie Mae was putting in overtime and
using a vast amount of their internal resources to hit these
specific earning targets, they were using less of their
resources to help accomplish what their mission is, and that is
to provide affordable low-income and minority housing. This
means that Frank Raines, Jim Johnson, and the rest were
enriching themselves at the expense of the Nation's least
fortunate. They were taking advantage of the exact people that
the company was chartered to help.
Now I appreciate you coming here to testify today, and I
will be asking some questions later on.
We know that Freddie Mac said last month that it will not
be providing quarterly financial statements for 2006 until some
time later next year. This means, honestly, that is up to OFHEO
to protect the financial markets and the taxpayers from risks,
because no one else can. No one else will have definitive
market information about what is going on in that company. They
will not have the regular market discipline to make sure to
send signals to it about what is going on.
Freddie Mac said it would curtail new initiatives because
of its huge problems. But, at the same time, it said it would
expand purchases of high-risk, nontraditional mortgages. I will
ask you, and I will ask you later on, why should OFHEO permit
either GSE to engage in anything new and potentially risky
until all the financial information has been made available to
the public?
Finally, Mr. Chairman, in 2002, Fannie Mae's duration GAAP
spiked to 14 months. At that time, Director Falcon said, ``that
the regulatory process is working as it should.'' In fact, your
report makes clear that the regulatory process was grievously
off course, because Fannie Mae took in billions of economic
losses to bring its interest rates risk back in line. These
billions were never even noticed by OFHEO until Fannie Mae's
SEC registration.
Now I recognize, and other people have already indicated,
that you have only been on the job for a short period of time.
I realize that, and it has been a very busy time for you as
well. But the questions I will be looking for you in the future
is what can we hear from you today to make sure that nothing of
this magnitude or scope will ever, ever, ever, happen again
with either of the GSE's.
And I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Baker. I thank the gentleman.
It is my pleasure to welcome, I believe for the first time
to a Congressional hearing in your capacity as acting Director
of the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight, to
testify here today on the agency's findings, Mr. James B.
Lockhart III. I believe from a review of your resume, however,
you are, by prior government experience, more than adequately
qualified to take on this difficult mission, although I suspect
that this subject matter may even have a few surprises for
someone as experienced as yourself. So please proceed at your
leisure.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE JAMES B. LOCKHART III, ACTING
DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF FEDERAL HOUSING ENTERPRISE OVERSIGHT
Mr. Lockhart. Thank you, and good afternoon.
Thank you, Chairman Baker, Chairman Oxley, Congressman
Watt, and members of the subcommittee. Thank you for your
support of OFHEO over the years and for this team that is
behind me. They are the ones who really put in all the work to
get this report out. I really welcome the opportunity to
discuss the findings of our Special Examination of Fannie Mae
and the settlement agreements.
As a government sponsored enterprise, Fannie Mae has a very
special position among American corporations and an extremely
important mission--facilitating the growth of affordable
housing in the United States.
The previous management team, led by Chairman Franklin
Raines, violated that public trust. By encouraging rapid
growth, unconstrained by proper internal controls, risk
management, and accounting systems, they did serious harm to
Fannie Mae, while enriching themselves through manipulating
earnings per share. The result was an estimated $10.6 billion
of overstated profits, well over a billion dollars of cost to
fix the problems, and ill-gotten bonuses in the hundreds of
millions of dollars.
In September of 2004, OFHEO issued an interim report that
detailed serious problems relating to Fannie Mae's accounting.
The SEC agreed and ordered Fannie Mae to restate its financial
statements.
The just-released Special Examination Report details what
can only be characterized as an arrogant and unethical
corporate culture. The image of Fannie Mae as one of the
lowest-risk and best-in-class institutions was a facade. The
examination found an environment where the ends justified the
means.
The executive compensation program at Fannie Mae focused on
managing earnings rather than risk. Indeed, Fannie Mae took
significant amounts of interest rate risk and, when interest
rates fell in 2002, incurred billions of dollars of economic
losses. Fannie Mae also had very significant and very large
operational exposures that were not properly managed. Senior
executives were managing Fannie Mae in an ``unsafe and
unsound'' manner. They also co-opted their internal auditors.
They stonewalled OFHEO.
During the period covered by this report, Fannie Mae hit
earnings per share targets with uncanny precision each quarter
by deliberately and systematically using inappropriate
accounting and improper earnings management. Senior management
of Fannie Mae benefited greatly from these manipulations. From
1998 to 2003, the total compensation of ex-CEO, Franklin
Raines, exceeded $90 million, of which $52 million was directly
tied to achieving earnings per share goals.
This inappropriate ``tone at the top'' spread throughout
the organization and, in a blatant conflict of interest, the
head of the Office of Auditing told his staff, in reference to
Mr. Raines' goal of double earnings per share by 2003, that
they must have, ``$6.46 branded in their brains.''
I will now turn to some of their improper accounting and
controls.
First, to prevent large, unpredictable earnings
fluctuations, Fannie Mae chose to implement investments,
derivatives, and other accounting standards in a fashion that
reduced volatility while ignoring GAAP.
Fannie Mae management also went to extraordinary lengths to
avoid recording and then hiding GAAP required impairment losses
on assets whose values had declined.
By keeping earnings within what could be considered a
predictable range, management was in a position every quarter
end to manipulate and manage earnings to hit specific targets,
and they did that through the use of cookie-jar reserves,
income shifting transactions, and inappropriate debt
repurchases.
The report details the conscious decisions made by
management to use outdated accounting systems and to create a
weak internal control environment.
Internal Audit failed to properly confirm compliance with
GAAP or consistently audit critical accounting issues.
Similarly, external audits performed by KPMG failed to include
an adequate review of Fannie Mae's significant accounting
policies for GAAP compliance, and when they did become aware of
the non-GAAP compliant provisions, they still continued to
issue totally unqualified opinions on Fannie Mae's financial
statements.
The board of directors is really the last line of defense
in a company, and they again failed to be sufficiently informed
and independent. Their oversight failings meant that they did
not discover, let alone correct, the wide variety of unsafe and
unsound practices at Fannie Mae, even after Freddie Mac's
problems became apparent. The Auditing Committee did not
provide proper oversight of the internal audit function,
critical accounting policies, and the whistle-blower claims.
In the report, OFHEO's staff makes recommendations to
enhance safety and soundness. They recommended that we continue
to strengthen and expand our regulatory infrastructure and
regular examination programs and, also importantly, that we
continue to support legislation to provide the powers essential
to meeting our mission of assuring safe and sound operations at
both Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.
The recommendations directed to Fannie Mae were
incorporated into the settlement agreement where we had about
60 different items we agreed to. Some of the key ones were:
Fannie Mae agreed to pay a $400 million penalty; Fannie Mae
agreed to freeze the growth of its portfolio at last year end
numbers (December 31, 2005); and Fannie Mae agreed to undertake
a comprehensive reform program aimed at a top to bottom change,
from its board of directors, internal audit, risk management,
compliance, external relations, internal controls, accounting
systems, and data quality. All of those areas need improvement.
Fannie Mae also agreed to review current and separated
employees for remedial actions.
During the joint settlement announcement, as was mentioned,
Chairman Christopher Cox of the SEC said that, ``The accounting
fraud charges that the SEC is filing against Fannie Mae reflect
the failure by Fannie Mae to maintain the kinds of internal
controls that could have prevented what in all likelihood would
have been one of the largest restatements in American corporate
history.''
Thank you. I am looking forward to working with members of
this committee, and I would be pleased to answer questions at
this point.
Chairman Baker. Thank you, Mr. Lockhart.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Lockhart can be found on
page 27 of the appendix.]
Chairman Baker. I wanted to start off by analyzing the 2002
and 2003 income periods. That is when they experienced their
significant negative duration GAAP problem and, to extricate
themselves, they spent a big amount of money to cancel pay-
fixed swaps that were the cause of the interest rate losses. Am
I understanding the report correctly, that if the actual
economic consequences of that period of time were reported
accurately that the enterprise would have had about a $12
billion adjustment to its revenue?
Mr. Lockhart. Certainly, at that point in time, they
discovered and they thought before the interest rates fell
dramatically that they didn't have as big an issue as they
ended up having. We saw--
Chairman Baker. Let me make it simpler, because my time
will run quick on me. I have got a lot.
My point is that, 2002, enterprise suffered an economic
loss, earnings per share targets were still hit, so maximum
bonuses were still paid, while shareholder value was depleted.
Mr. Lockhart. That is correct.
Chairman Baker. Great. Not great, but that is what I was
trying to get at.
In a separate direction, reading from the report in several
selected areas, Fannie Mae reported extremely smooth profit
growth, hit earnings per share targets with uncanny precision--
I think you read that earlier. During the period in question,
1998 through 2003, CEO Raines earned $90 million, of which 52
was directly tied to earnings per share. It is my understanding
during the same period, aggregated for the top executives, the
total compensation--excuse me, total bonus paid was somewhere
in the neighborhood of $250 million, is that about correct?
Mr. Lockhart. That is about correct.
And you are right. That chart over there shows that the
line is the targets and the blue bars are the reported, and it
is really uncanny that they could hit those year after year
after year. And it is because of the quarter to quarter
accounting gimmicks, and it resulted in very large bonuses in
the range of several hundred million dollars, tied just to EPS.
Chairman Baker. In the October 2004 hearing, I asked Mr.
Raines, prior to the decision being executed to defer the $200
million in expense at the end of 1998 into the quarters of
1999, were you consulted or did you have knowledge of the
transaction?
Raines' response--there was no decision made to defer any
expense from 1998 to 1999. Howard can go into greater detail as
to how the process actually occurs, but we did not make any
deferral. I was part of a discussion, as I always am as CEO, in
the closing process in which decisions made in our financial
area with regard to the calculation of the catch-up provision
was discussed--that is why he got paid that much; you can't
understand anything--but the determination of that was made
through our normal process of closing our books.
In a separate question, were there any discussions related
to the consequences of that expense treatment in relation to
the earnings per share, Raines responds no.
I asked, then when did you first realize that earnings per
share would be $3.23? To which he responded, the first time I
would know what earnings figures would be is when our
comptroller would have closed the books and done all of the
analyses necessary to determine what the final results are, and
then that would be reported to me. That would be after any
decision that was made in regard to the catch-up provision.
Now a summary of the facts that we have just gone through
from your report, your testimony as well today, and then
reading through the responses of the CEO to this committee, you
can't make a legal judgment, I understand.
There seems to be clear evidence in my mind that Mr. Raines
perjured himself to this committee in answering those
questions. Would there be any reason for a person to dispute
that conclusion after listening to those facts and hearing his
responses?
Mr. Lockhart. You are right; I cannot make a legal
judgment. But I think the report, if you read it--and you have
read it, obviously--does contradict the statements that he
made.
Chairman Baker. We will examine that further.
Some discussion was made earlier today by some members
relative to portfolio constraint. The bill passed by the House
does provide authority to the director of the new entity to
adjust portfolio in any manner. In fact, it is my understanding
that if the powers conferred in that legislation were given to
you, you would have the authority, for appropriate reasons, to
reduce portfolio to zero. Is that a responsive tool that you
feel is appropriate in light of the current portfolio risk that
is presented by the enterprises?
Mr. Lockhart. I believe that there is significant risk
provided by these portfolios, when you add the two of them
together, about $1.5 trillion, half and half now, from the two
companies, and it is an issue that really does have to be
looked at.
When we froze the portfolio as part of the agreement, that
was really based on their continuing internal controls, lack of
risk management, and lack of accounting systems. It did not
address the issue of systemic risk and operational risk and, I
think if you are going to look at these companies, you have to
include that in their capital calculations and how that might
impact their portfolios.
Chairman Baker. I am out of time, but one quick follow-up.
What other tool should be given a regulator to address this
problem other than the discretionary authority to reduce,
increase, or leave alone the size of the portfolio?
Mr. Lockhart. The whole legislative package passed by the
House would be very helpful to give us a whole series of tools
to make us a better safety and soundness regulator. We don't
have the comparable tools that the banking regulators do. We
need receivership. We need not to be appropriated. We need a
whole series of tools that will make us a stronger regulator.
Chairman Baker. Thank you.
Mr. Watt.
Mr. Watt. Mr. Lockhart, I want to focus on the remedial
agreements that you all have reached with Fannie Mae as part of
the agreement to move forward, not because I am concerned about
the provisions of them, but because I am concerned about the
understanding, and knowing the impact of them.
If you take the combination of the growth limit, limiting
portfolio assets to the level as of December 31, 2005, and the
capital restrictions previously agreed requirement for a 30
percent capital surplus, can you tell us what the impact of
those two in combination will have on the housing mission of
Fannie Mae? Has OFHEO made any assessment of that?
Mr. Lockhart. We have certainly looked at the issue and,
from our standpoint, we do not see an impact. There is enough
capital there certainly to continue the mortgage-backed
security packaging that it does.
On the portfolio side, they certainly have assets that can
be sold as they want to acquire new assets, and that is really
what will happen over time. They will sell some assets off,
place them in the marketplace, and use the money to invest in
new assets.
Mr. Watt. So your testimony is that from your perspective,
OFHEO's perception, there will be no adverse impact on the
housing mission from those things?
Mr. Lockhart. For the housing mission, and especially the
affordable housing mission, I see no impact. They obviously
have a lot of work to do in those areas and continue to do
work, but these two things should not interfere with that.
Mr. Watt. Focusing further on the part of the agreement
related to personnel, I am wondering how you--how OFHEO will
assess--how will you define success, so to speak, in there is a
part of the agreement that says, Fannie Mae's board must have a
third party review of Fannie Mae's government and industry
relations programs, and adopt a plan for setting new policies
and controls on lobbying efforts.
How would you assess the effectiveness of that? I mean, are
there criteria that you would use in evaluating the board's
performance in that regard going forward, or will this be
solely up to the board to make those determinations?
Mr. Lockhart. Certainly in that case we will look at the
review and discuss it with the board and the management team
and we will do that with many of the other proposals in the
agreement. The board of directors is responsible for the
oversight of this company and we are responsible as a safety
and soundness regulator. Because the company has so many unsafe
and sound practices at the moment, let alone in the past, we
are very, very actively involved in this company, and I might
add also in Freddie Mac from that standpoint because they also
have continuing unsafe and unsound practices. Both of these
companies are probably several years away from having adequate
accounting internal controls, so we are going to be involved in
the discussion, and in particular in this review of the
government relations area. We will look at the review and make
sure that they don't re-engage in unsafe and unsound practices.
Mr. Watt. I am about to run out of time. So I don't mean to
cut you off. I wish I had more time to allow you to elaborate,
but it sounds like there is some subjectivity involved in this
on the board's part and on your part and that's fine. I am not
being critical. I'm just trying to figure out what--how you
will define success.
Let me focus on one other area and that's the $400 million
penalty and the use of that for the benefit of--I mean, who
gets the benefit of that, and I guess the related question is,
is there a legal mechanism in place now for shareholders who
may have been adversely affected to get redress?
Mr. Lockhart. Of the $400 million, $50 million went to the
U.S. Treasury and it's a monetary penalty provided under our
law. The Sarbanes-Oxley law provided for the shareholder funds
and in consultation with the SEC, we agreed that it made a lot
of sense to put it there. The SEC will be setting up rules
related to the fund.
Mr. Watt. But is there a shareholder right of action here
or is there--
Mr. Lockhart. There are already shareholder suits going on
and, as I understand it, I believe potentially some of this
money could be used to settle those suits.
Mr. Watt. But does this cap--
Mr. Lockhart. This does not.
Mr. Watt. Okay. I appreciate it, Mr. Chairman. I yield.
Chairman Baker. The gentleman's time has expired. Chairman
Oxley.
The Chairman. I would say to my friend from North Carolina
that the Fair Fund was set up in Sarbanes-Oxley Act to be a
receptacle for fines and disgorgement. That money is now
accumulating in the billions.
Chairman Baker. Seven.
The Chairman. $7 billion plus, which will then be returned
on a pro rata basis to shareholders who were injured. A lot of
people don't like Sarbanes-Oxley. I think most people like that
part of it, particularly if you are a shareholder and you lost
your shirt.
Let me ask a couple of questions here, Mr. Lockhart. On the
executive compensation issue in the chart that was provided by
Chairman Baker, the earnings or the executive compensation
based on earnings per share and the bonuses thereon, Senator
Rudman's testimony and his committee investigating could only
cite 1 year--that was 1998--where they could conclusively say
that those earnings were manipulated. Your report is very clear
that 8 years, why this difference? Why is yours so definitive
in covering an 8-year period and Senator Rudman's just 1 year?
Mr. Lockhart. First of all, I would say that our team did a
great job, and as a government regulator we had more incentive
to really go in and really get the details. If you read the
report, it is very clear by year to year that there was
manipulation of the earnings. Some years they were looking in
the cookie jar to make earnings higher, other years they were
doing financial transactions and other things to hide earnings
for 1 year and push it out in the future. It is hard for me to
speculate why the reports are different except to say that I
believe that our team really did a good job and went thoroughly
through the accounting issues.
The Chairman. You also mentioned that the auditors had been
co-opted and could you help us with that? How did that happen?
Mr. Lockhart. The internal auditors in particular were
being paid and had bonuses related again just to EPS.
The Chairman. So you are referring to internal auditors?
Mr. Lockhart. That is what I am referring to and I read the
statement about the $6.46 target and that was the 5-year bonus
target and every member of Fannie Mae's team got a bonus
related to that. So the internal auditor in that speech where
he talks about that and thanks Frank Raines for doing it for
him, is a total conflict of interest.
The Chairman. The Enron case was just concluded with
convictions, WorldCom and many of the others had a common
thread, and that was they were described, I think accurately,
as accounting scandals. At the heart of this, this was really
an accounting scandal too, is it not?
Mr. Lockhart. Yes, it was. And there is another similarity.
These two firms were many times thought of as the best in their
class and, to a certain extent, I think that the management
team started to believe that, and believed that they could
almost walk on water and maybe they didn't have to pay
attention to the accounting rules.
The Chairman. The legislation that passed the House, and I
can characterize it a little bit with a--I think, a clear
memory. When Chairman Baker started this quest, I think it is
safe to say that he felt, first of all, that he had about 2
votes. But secondly, he had a vision to create a world class
regulator. And we have had discussions with that. I think at
that time, given the political realities, Chairman Baker felt
that if we could restructure the regulatory function that that
would be a big win. Since that time and events that have moved
in that direction, we passed legislation on a bipartisan basis
to allow the new world class regulator to determine minimum
risk base capital standard review and adjust portfolio
holdings, approve new programs and business activities, mandate
prudential management and operational standards, take prompt
corrective and enforcement actions, put a critically
undercapitalized GSE into receivership, which was very
controversial not too many months ago, and require corporate
government improvements, higher examination of accounting
experts.
Pretty comprehensive in my estimation dealing with the
problem at hand and, besides all of that, they have to comply
with Sarbanes-Oxley requirements for establishing internal
controls and in defining risk, and that is a pretty effective
package, it seems to me. I just wondered if you would just
comment again in a global sense about how this legislation that
passed, the Baker bill that passed the House along with the
requirements of section 404 and Sarbanes-Oxley worked together
to hopefully prevent, because after all we can punish all we
want but at the end of the day when investors lose money and
people's lives are destroyed, it is great, maybe that they can
feel good about some executive going to jail but at the end of
the day they would rather have their money back, and if we
could prevent this kind of activity from happening in the first
place with the Baker bill combined with the internal control
provisions of Sarbanes-Oxley, seems to me we got a pretty good
package.
Mr. Lockhart. My belief is if 8 years ago we would have had
Sarbanes-Oxley and a stronger regulator, which your bill, and
Chairman Baker's bill does, it would have been very, very
helpful. There is the issue, I think, that needs to be stressed
as to how the regulator sets the capital limits related to
portfolio levels and other issues, but my view is that it is a
very excellent start and we would be a lot better off today if
we had had it.
The Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Baker. Mr. Hensarling.
Mr. Hensarling. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Lockhart, I am curious to know what your decisionmaking
process is going to be as far as unfreezing Fannie Mae's
ability to increase the size of their mortgage portfolio
assets. Specifically, I am sure you are familiar with the fact
that the former chairman of the Fed, Alan Greenspan, was quite
outspoken on the issue of the purpose of the GSE's holding
their own securities. In fact, in a speech he delivered roughly
a year ago, if I can quote, ``the key activity of the GSE is
the provision of liquidity to the primary mortgage market can
be accomplished exclusively through the securitization of
mortgages''; GSE portfolios of mortgage-related assets cannot
serve this function. To sell mortgage-backed securities to
purchase other mortgage-backed securities clearly adds no net
support to the mortgage markets.
So again, the former chairman of the Fed was quite
outspoken on this issue, and so I am curious, number one,
whether you agree with that assessment. If you don't agree with
that assessment, what is the thinking behind when you would
permit Fannie Mae to increase its mortgage portfolio?
Mr. Lockhart. Certainly I have read the testimony by the
chairman and obviously everybody respects what he has to say. I
have been in the job just a little over a month now, and most
of it has been, at this point, related to the Fannie Mae
report. So I haven't had a lot of time to really get my hands
around how you set up capital for systemic risk. I know a lot
about how you set up capital for operational risk, and those
are two of the things we must think about when we are setting
limits on portfolios or at least reserving capital against
those limits.
As for the freeze that Fannie Mae agreed to, we said in the
agreement that there is a way to get some flexibility once they
give us a report in a couple of months. There are a lot of
requirements. The risk management, liquidity, housing policy,
and internal controls would really be the concerns and frankly,
if legislation is passed, you know, the limits may be
superseded by something else. Certainly market concerns would
be another issue. We have given the company guidelines, but we
have also told them that it is really at the discretion of the
regulator when those will be lifted, and frankly it is hard to
see a total removal of limits for several years.
Mr. Hensarling. In your testimony, you talk about former
chairman and CEO Franklin Raines violating a trust. You speak
of earnings manipulation, you speak of ill gotten bonuses, and
you speak of an arrogant and unethical corporate culture. If I
read your testimony properly, though, I didn't see the term,
``fraud,'' although I have seen that used by SEC Chairman Cox,
who claims that these activities consist of accounting fraud.
Is this a mere manner of semantics or should I be reading
something into the fact that your testimony does not include
the word, ``fraud''?
Mr. Lockhart. Maybe a little semantics. It may be that the
SEC is more the keeper of the word ``fraud'' than we are as a
safety and soundness regulator.
Mr. Hensarling. In your testimony you also state that the,
``goal of senior management was straightforward to force OFHEO
to rely on the enterprise for information and expertise to such
a degree that Fannie Mae would essentially regulate itself.''
So we are--did you believe that Fannie Mae was trying to
regulate you or were you trying--was it the other way around?
Mr. Lockhart. That goes back into the history well before I
arrived. If you look at some of the indicators, the agency was
incredibly underfunded 6 years ago. It may have been under-
skilled as well. It was hard to build up the culture and the
money to really to be a first class regulator. As you all know,
Fannie Mae was an extremely strong agency. The corporation had
very strong lobbying activities and other things that I think--
and again I wasn't there but I have heard--really made it very
hard for OFHEO to do the job it should have been doing. The law
needs to be strengthened too.
Mr. Hensarling. Though I had other questions, my time has
expired. I am not a subcommittee chairman, so I can't go on.
Chairman Baker. Point well taken.
Mr. Royce.
Mr. Royce. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Lockhart, in the President's Fiscal Year 2007 budget,
the Administration calls for the creation of, in its words, a
GSE regulator with new and explicit authorities currently not
possessed by the agency. You have been nominated in this case
to lead, which is OFHEO. And the budget outlines the systemic
risks to the financial system posed by, as it explains, the
GSEs' large holdings of mortgage-backed securities. In order to
mitigate these risks, the President has called for Congress to
instruct, ``a new GSE regulator that asset portfolios are a
significant source of systemic risk and should be limited by
the GSE regulator accordingly.''
In the Administration view, ``mitigating systemic risk
requires taking action before a crisis occurs.'' And that a
regulator, in their words, limited to consideration of safety
and soundness and risk may not fully consider potential
consequences to others in the mortgage markets and the larger
economy, which is along the lines of some of the issues you
raised with regard to systemic risk and operational risk and
not having the power to the receivership authority and so
forth.
But clearly from what the Administration says, it believes
that Congress should grant the new regulator statutory
authority to address both safety and soundness and systemic
risk. Now in Congress, the House has passed legislation that
deals with part of this. We deal with the safety and soundless
regulation, in my view, whereas, the Senate Banking Committee
has passed legislation that would allow the new regulator to
address systemic risk by giving clear and unambiguous guidance
to the new regulator about the size and composition of the GSE
portfolios along the lines that our Fed regulators have talked
about. So in essence, the Senate bill would anchor the GSE
portfolios to their public mission.
As the acting Director and likely future Director of OFHEO,
I would like to know if you prefer the House legislation or if
you agree with the Administration and prefer the Senate Banking
Committee legislation. That is what is on my mind.
Mr. Lockhart. First of all, I agree with this committee,
and the Senate committee, and former Chairman Greenspan, that
there is very significant systemic risk, and it is not just the
assets. It is the liabilities, it is the borrowing, and it is
the derivatives that tie it all together, and between those
three things, there is a giant exposure to the world economy,
and if things went wrong, there could be a very large impact.
Systemic risk has to be addressed. I believe that the
regulator must address it, and I believe that it would be
helpful to give some guidance on that, that we need to address
the systemic risk and, as I say, also operational risk in a
more broad based way than we have in the past.
Mr. Royce. I thank you, and I yield back.
Chairman Baker. The gentleman yields back. Mr. Davis. I am
sorry. Mrs. Kelly.
Mrs. Kelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Lockhart, the Subcommittee on Oversight held a hearing
last year in which it was revealed that Fannie Mae had
deliberately withheld information from the United States
Government about fraudulent mortgages.
I quoted the Inspector General of HUD here. He said Fannie
Mae did not pass information on First Beneficial's
transgressions to others, allowing First Beneficial to issue
more than $7.5 million in fraudulent loans ensured by
taxpayers.
In response to that hearing, I have worked with a number of
my colleagues to include in H.R. 1461 legislative language
requiring Fannie Mae to report fraudulent transactions to a
third party--by a third party rather--to OFHEO's successor
agency, which is the Federal Housing Finance Agency. I
understand that your agency has now taken regulatory steps to
accomplish that goal and is working with FinCEN so Federal
housing enterprises will no longer occupy a unique position,
not being accessible to the Federal agencies that are fighting
money laundering or terrorist finance, and I wonder if you will
please explain to the committee your thoughts on what happened
in the First Beneficial case, how it ties in to the corruption
that was shown in the Rudman report and what your agency is
doing to ensure that every one of the people involved in this
case who failed to act as good corporate citizens, in the words
of the HUD Inspector General, are not allowed to work at a
regulated enterprise.
Mr. Lockhart. The First Beneficial case was extremely
unfortunate and I think it does show some of the arrogance of
Fannie Mae and as this was done, I think, out of the Atlanta
office, it was further down the organization. We obviously got
involved. We worked with the company and the company, I
believe, paid us a $7 million fine. The person who was the lead
on this was reprimanded. But as you pointed out, and I think
more importantly going forward, we will now be reporting
mortgage fraud to FinCEN and we are continuing to work with
other government agencies to try to prevent things like this
from happening in the future.
Mrs. Kelly. I appreciate that, but I want to go back to the
idea that someone who has essentially committed fraud in a
government agency is then allowed to go on and work at another
government agency that is a regulated agency. Is there any kind
of step being put in place to prevent people from moving from
job to job?
Mr. Lockhart. At this point, I am not really sure of the
details of that. I thought this individual was actually working
at Fannie Mae. But I can tell you that, in some cases, we can,
and have, exercised debarment, which is effectively what you
are talking about in the Fannie Mae case, and Frank Raines and
CFO Howard had been debarred as part of our agreement and, yes,
we can do that if these situations reach that proportion.
Mrs. Kelly. Thank you very much. I have one other question.
I want to know if you think that OFHEO's risk-based capital
rule needs revision.
Mr. Lockhart. OFHEO's risk-based capital rule is useful but
it is really just a stress test in my mind, and coming out of
the insurance and banking industries, and having worked
actually at a leading firm that was a risk management firm for
4 years, my view is that it needs a lot of work. We need to--
and hopefully part of the legislation will give the agency the
power to do that--start looking at how to set up a best in
class, if I can use that phrase, enterprise risk management
risk-based capital standard.
Mrs. Kelly. I would hope that you would work diligently to
do that. I think that is an oversight piece that needs to be
done, and I am glad you are willing to jump in and help. Thank
you very much.
I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Baker. I thank the gentlelady. I have a few
follow-up questions.
First on the gentlelady's comment, legislation pending
provides explicit authority for the Director to engage in a
whole set of binocular observations and microscopic analysis,
so I think we have got you well-tooled.
Going back to the portfolio discussion because that really
is where we are today, is the linchpin on being able to get a
legislative remedy moving forward. I would not suspect, but I
have to ask, that you would have today a methodology nor a
dollar figure in mind to which portfolios would be reduced if
you are confirmed and if legislation grants you by whatever
mechanism the authority to reduce. Or would that rather be
something arrived at by some counsel study with staff over some
period of time?
Mr. Lockhart. Certainly not a dollar figure because I am
not sure a dollar figure is the right way to go. I think there
is a methodology and we have to look at the methodology.
Chairman Baker. You don't have that in your pocket?
Mr. Lockhart. I do not have a methodology especially for
systemic risk. I may have a methodology from operational risk
given my background. I basically believe that we need to do
further study and we are starting to do that kind of study.
Chairman Baker. That is the reason for my question, to get
to that study conclusion because whether it was Secretary Snow
or other financial regulators, no individual has yet
recommended a particular target or a particular formula by
which you get to a target, but rather some sort of studied
approach. The bill now pending does provide and I want to
address--Mr. Royce has stepped out--but for the record, the
study requires the new Director over a period of 12 months to
assess a general description of portfolio, a description of the
risk implications, an analysis of the portfolio for safety and
soundness purposes, which everybody points to, analysis of
whether the holdings fulfill the mission purposes, which is not
often mentioned, an analysis of the potential systemic risk,
which has been missed on occasion, for the enterprises, for the
housing and capital markets and for the entire U.S. financial
system. So it is a very broad-based risk assessment strategy
and coupled with that is the clear mandate to reach a
conclusion and report as to whether those portfolios should be
reduced, limited in growth. Whatever conclusion that is
appropriately to be reached we specifically--specifically and
intended to leave out the word, ``grow'' or ``enlarge'', so the
bias in the bill as it stands is to give the new Director the
tool to say within 12 months you got to, and here are the
guidelines which you must utilize, and come back with a reason
why, and a method to get to a specific target.
We also, on the subject of capital, had very intentional
language on page 56 of the bill pending, notwithstanding the
capital classifications of the enterprise, that the Director by
order may require, and goes on with a bunch of things. Today
they have to be significantly capital-impaired in order for you
to take certain actions. As I understand it, the basis on which
the consent agreement was reached with Fannie Mae was
principally leveraged by the uncertainty of their financial
conditions because of the inability to certify financials.
Therefore, you could then, as Director, enter into negotiations
and reach an agreement, which ultimately was signed, leveraged
by the underlying financial uncertainty. If Freddie Mac's
financials were not certified, you could impose the portfolio
limit on them at this time, utilizing that same ability, that
legal leverage. But as I understand it, the agency has found
Freddie Mac's financial condition at this time is sufficiently
well to certify therefore that you are not in a regulatory
position to engage in a portfolio limit as you did with Fannie
Mae, is that correct?
Mr. Lockhart. Not necessarily.
Chairman Baker. Okay.
Mr. Lockhart. Freddie Mac is still years away, at least 2
years away, from really having acceptable accounting and
internal controls and a risk management system.
Chairman Baker. That being the case and that was the
leverage point which you entered into the discussion with
Fannie Mae and reached a consent agreement which limited the
growth of portfolio, what is the regulatory impairment to doing
a similar strategy with Freddie Mac because I am an equal
treatment GSE guy? I believe whatever you do to one you should
do to both. Is there any impairment in your ability to enter
into a consent agreement for that purpose?
Mr. Lockhart. Again, we can enter into a consent agreement
if they consent and, because the law is not as strong as we
would like, it may be difficult if they didn't consent. The
chairman of Freddie Mac mentioned that, I believe last week, in
a press conference he did mention that we have discussed the
idea that there should be some sort of freeze there as well.
And, frankly, it is not that well known but over the last 3 or
4 years, Freddie Mac has grown its portfolio by 20 percent,
while Fannie Mae has shrunk its portfolio by 20 percent. So
there is an issue there that we are considering, but I can't
say at this point whether we are going to do anything about it
or not.
Chairman Baker. If you fail to act on that point, it will
not be due to a regulatory impairment to act, it will be a
question of whether or not it is appropriate to act?
Mr. Lockhart. I believe that is correct, yes.
Chairman Baker. Mr. Watt.
Mr. Watt. I chose not to focus on the shortcomings of OFHEO
because I think everybody is aware that there was a period of
time, for whatever reason, that OFHEO was being duped just like
the internal auditors and the external auditors were being
duped.
I want to get your assessment generally of how much better
equipped OFHEO is now. I mean, are you confident that OFHEO has
the capacity currently, and the resources currently, to do what
the current regulatory scheme allows you to do, as well as what
both the House and Senate bills might allow OFHEO to do in the
future?
Mr. Lockhart. Certainly we would like a bill, and that will
give us some of the strength that we need to be the safety and
soundness regulator we should be. We want to work with
everybody and make that happen. On the resource side, we were
significantly under-resourced. Over the last 6 or 7 years, we
probably tripled the number of people in our budget. We have
added some really good people, some very professional people.
We are going to need to continue to hire people. We are going
to continue to need to do training and we are going to need to
have to have occasionally a team that we can put in the field
very quickly if there is a crisis, which then speaks to getting
outside the appropriations process which this bill does.
Mr. Watt. I am not sure you answered my question.
Mr. Lockhart. I guess the answer is yes, we have a very
good team. I think we can build on this team and continue to
get better and better, but we do need legislation to really get
us to where we want to be.
Mr. Watt. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Baker. I thank the gentleman.
Mr. Lockhart, some of us have said they are paving the way
to home ownership. Nobody had ever in mind it would be an
interstate system to go from coast to coast to get us to final
resolution on this manner. I appreciate very much, and all
members of the committee do, your participation here today, but
it is a very long road. We have a long way to go. We look
forward to working with you as Director in the coming months.
Mr. Lockhart. I thank you and I look forward to working
with you.
Chairman Baker. Our meeting stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 3:20 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
June 6, 2006
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