[House Hearing, 109 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
CYBERSECURITY: PROTECTING AMERICA'S CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE,
ECONOMY, AND CONSUMERS
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND THE INTERNET
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
SEPTEMBER 13, 2006
Serial No. 109-137
Printed for the use of the Committee on Energy and Commerce
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.access.gpo.gov/
congress/house
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COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE
JOE BARTON, Texas, Chairman
RALPH M. HALL, Texas
MICHAEL BILIRAKIS, Florida
Vice Chairman
FRED UPTON, Michigan
CLIFF STEARNS, Florida
PAUL E. GILLMOR, Ohio
NATHAN DEAL, Georgia
ED WHITFIELD, Kentucky
CHARLIE NORWOOD, Georgia
BARBARA CUBIN, Wyoming
JOHN SHIMKUS, Illinois
HEATHER WILSON, New Mexico
JOHN B. SHADEGG, Arizona
CHARLES W. "CHIP" PICKERING, Mississippi
Vice Chairman
VITO FOSSELLA, New York
ROY BLUNT, Missouri
STEVE BUYER, Indiana
GEORGE RADANOVICH, California
CHARLES F. BASS, New Hampshire
JOSEPH R. PITTS, Pennsylvania
MARY BONO, California
GREG WALDEN, Oregon
LEE TERRY, Nebraska
MIKE FERGUSON, New Jersey
MIKE ROGERS, Michigan
C.L. "BUTCH" OTTER, Idaho
SUE MYRICK, North Carolina
JOHN SULLIVAN, Oklahoma
TIM MURPHY, Pennsylvania
MICHAEL C. BURGESS, Texas
MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee
JOHN D. DINGELL, Michigan
Ranking Member
HENRY A. WAXMAN, California
EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts
RICK BOUCHER, Virginia
EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York
FRANK PALLONE, JR., New Jersey
SHERROD BROWN, Ohio
BART GORDON, Tennessee
BOBBY L. RUSH, Illinois
ANNA G. ESHOO, California
BART STUPAK, Michigan
ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
ALBERT R. WYNN, Maryland
GENE GREEN, Texas
TED STRICKLAND, Ohio
DIANA DEGETTE, Colorado
LOIS CAPPS, California
MIKE DOYLE, Pennsylvania
TOM ALLEN, Maine
JIM DAVIS, Florida
JAN SCHAKOWSKY, Illinois
HILDA L. SOLIS, California
CHARLES A. GONZALEZ, Texas
JAY INSLEE, Washington
TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin
MIKE ROSS, Arkansas
BUD ALBRIGHT, Staff Director
DAVID CAVICKE, General Counsel
REID P. F. STUNTZ, Minority Staff Director and Chief Counsel
SUBCOMMITTEE ON TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND THE INTERNET
FRED UPTON, Michigan, Chairman
MICHAEL BILIRAKIS, Florida
CLIFF STEARNS, Florida
PAUL E. GILLMOR, Ohio
ED WHITFIELD, Kentucky
BARBARA CUBIN, Wyoming
JOHN SHIMKUS, Illinois
HEATHER WILSON, New Mexico
CHARLES W. "CHIP" PICKERING, Mississippi
VITO FOSSELLA, New York
GEORGE RADANOVICH, California
CHARLES F. BASS, New Hampshire
GREG WALDEN, Oregon
LEE TERRY, Nebraska
MIKE FERGUSON, New Jersey
JOHN SULLIVAN, Oklahoma
MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee
JOE BARTON, Texas
(EX OFFICIO)
EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts
Ranking Member
ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
ALBERT R. WYNN, Maryland
MIKE DOYLE, Pennsylvania
CHARLES A. GONZALEZ, Texas
JAY INSLEE, Washington
RICK BOUCHER, Virginia
EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York
FRANK PALLONE, JR., New Jersey
SHERROD BROWN, Ohio
BART GORDON, Tennessee
BOBBY L. RUSH, Illinois
ANNA G. ESHOO, California
BART STUPAK, Michigan
JOHN D. DINGELL, Michigan
(EX OFFICIO)
CONTENTS
Page
Testimony of:
Powner, David A., Director, Information Technology Management
Issues, U.S. Government Accountability Office
13
Foresman, Hon. George W., Undersecretary for Preparedness, U.S.
Department of Homeland Security
39
Moran, Kenneth P., Director, Office of Homeland Security, Enforcement
Bureau, Federal Communications Commission
51
Weafer, Vincent, Senior Director, Symantec Security Response,
Symantec Corporation
61
Kurtz, Paul B., Executive Director, Cyber Security Industry Alliance
71
Clinton, Larry, Chief Operating Officer, Internet Security Alliance
79
Additional material submitted for the record:
Kenney, Jeannine, Senior Policy Analyst, Consumers Union, submission
for the record
111
Powner, David A., Director, Information Technology Management
Issues, U.S. Government Accountability Office, response for the
record
119
Weafer, Vincent, Senior Director, Symantec Security Response,
Symantec Corporation, response for the record
122
Kurtz, Paul B., Executive Director, Cyber Security Industry Alliance,
response for the record
128
Clinton, Larry, Chief Operating Officer, Internet Security Alliance,
response for the record
135
Foresman, Hon. George W., Undersecretary for Preparedness, U.S.
Department of Homeland Security, response for the record
138
CYBERSECURITY: PROTECTING AMERICA'S CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE, ECONOMY,
AND CONSUMERS
WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 13, 2006
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND THE INTERNET,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:05 a.m., in
Room 2123 of the Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Fred Upton (Chairman) presiding.
Members present: Representatives Upton, Stearns, Shimkus,
Bass, Walden, Terry, Blackburn, Barton (ex officio), Markey,
Gonzalez, Inslee, Eshoo, and Dingell (ex officio).
Staff present: Kelly Cole, Counsel; Howard Waltzman, Chief
Counsel for Telecommunications and the Internet; Jaylen Jensen,
Senior Legislative Analyst; Anh Nguyen, Legislative Clerk; and
Johanna Shelton, Minority Counsel.
MR. UPTON. Good morning. I would like to welcome our
witnesses today, as well as welcome back our subcommittee members.
Today's hearing is about cybersecurity and what our Government and
the private sector are doing to prevent and mitigate attacks on
our Internet infrastructure.
I liken cybersecurity and the threat to our Internet
infrastructure to what we've seen occur on the Gulf Coast. For
years we were worried that the levees in New Orleans were not strong
enough to withstand a Category 5 hurricane. When Hurricane Katrina
blew through the Gulf Coast, and the eventuality that we all knew
was a possibility became a reality: We saw the levees break; we
saw the devastation that such a storm could wrought.
Similarly, we know that our Internet infrastructure is
subject to attack every day. The unfortunate reality is that there
will come a day when this country experiences a debilitating
Internet disruption.
The question we face now is: will we be ready? The lesson
that we have learned from Hurricane Katrina is that we must be
ready. That is why we are here today.
Normally, these types of hearings are held after a major
incident, after it, but thankfully, we are in a position to improve
our current system, to examine what steps are being taken, and what
steps are needed to further fortify the Information Superhighway.
Today's hearing will examine the steps being taken in the
public and private sectors to make us ready. We will hear the
disappointing report from the GAO that we are not quite prepared
for such an attack. I hope that today's hearing will help to
improve our readiness and to increase the coordination among
government agencies, as well as among government and private
sector entities to protect our Internet infrastructure from a
major disruption.
I thank the witnesses for appearing today. I look forward
to their testimony. I particularly appreciate their ability to send
up the testimony last night so that I could see it before I went
home.
[The prepared statement of Hon. Fred Upton follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HON. FRED UPTON, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE
ON TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND THE INTERNET
Good Morning. I would like to welcome our witnesses today
as well as welcome back our subcommittee Members.
Today's hearing is about cybersecurity, and what our
government and the private sector are doing to prevent and mitigate
attacks on our Internet infrastructure.
I liken cybersecurity and the threat to our Internet
infrastructure to what we've seen occur on the Gulf Coast. For
years we worried that the levies in New Orleans were not strong
enough to withstand a Category 5 hurricane. Then Hurricane Katrina
blew through the Gulf Coast, and the eventuality that we all knew was a possibility became a reality: we saw the levies break, and we saw the devastation that such a storm could wrought.
Similarly, we know that our Internet infrastructure is
subject to attack every day. The unfortunate reality is that there
will come a day when this country experiences a debilitating
Internet disruption.
The question we face now is: will we be ready? The lesson
we've learned from Hurricane Katrina is that we must be ready.
That is why we are here today. Normally, these types of
hearings are held after a major incident. But thankfully, we are
in a position to improve our current system, to examine what steps
are being taken and what steps are needed to further fortify the
information superhighway.
Today's hearing will examine the steps being taken in the
public and private sectors to make us ready. We will hear the
disappointing report from the GAO that we are not quite prepared
for such an attack. I hope that today's hearing will help to
improve our readiness and to increase the coordination among
government agencies as well as among government and private
sector entities to protect our Internet infrastructure from a
major disruption.
I thank the witnesses for appearing today and I look
forward to their testimony.
MR. UPTON. With that, I will yield to the Ranking Member
of the subcommittee, gentleman from Massachusetts, Mr. Markey.
MR. MARKEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, very much. I want
to commend you for calling this hearing this morning on
cybersecurity.
This subcommittee has a long history on cybersecurity. We
held a hearing, in this subcommittee, for instance, in 1993 where
we demonstrated in this room cyber attacks on the United States
Navy Pacific fleet command, on NASA's mission control, and on the
Kremlin. We knew in 1993, well before we enacted the
Telecommunications Act, that individuals would use the Internet
for nefarious purposes. Today, we revisit the issue, knowing
that the Internet is even more prevalent than ever, and that more
individuals, businesses, and critical infrastructure, public
safety, hospitals, and government agencies rely upon it.
Unquestionably, a major disruption of the Internet can
invoke dire consequences in an emergency. In addition, successful
cyber attacks can cause harm to individuals when security is
compromised in a way that leads to identify theft, fraud, or
extortion. American consumers pay dearly for such compromises
to their privacy and security each year. So-called bot networks
where computers are essentially hijacked by Internet-based software
implanted in your computer without your consent are used as vehicles
for spam and fraud and denial of service attacks. These acts,
along with computer virus attacks, have negative financial impacts
across the country that are estimated in the billions of dollars.
The Federal Communications Commission plays a vital role
in preparing and responding to cyber attacks because of its
responsibility over our Nation's telecommunications infrastructure.
The Network Reliability and Interoperability Council, for example,
was convened by the FCC in response to this subcommittee's inquiry
into the massive Bell Atlantic telephone outage in 1991, which was
caused by software glitches in digital switching systems. That
council is tasked with helping to prevent Internet disruptions
from occurring, and has developed a list of best practices for
Internet disaster recovery in emergency situations.
The Department of Homeland Security is tasked with the
lead responsibility for facilitating response and recovery efforts
surrounding major Internet disruptions. The Government
Accountability Office report from June of this year concluded that
although the Department of Homeland Security has begun several
initiatives addressing cybersecurity and Internet security, these
efforts are neither complete nor are they comprehensive. As a
member of the Homeland Security Committee since its establishment
3 years ago, I remain concerned about the Department's lack of
significant progress in the area of cybersecurity.
Obviously, many are concerned about cyber threats from
al Qeada. Certainly, cyber terrorism is something that is likely
to be in al Qeada's playbook, and we should be vigilant against
such threats. Yet, beyond the daily threats to cybersecurity from
hackers and spammers attempting to profit from fraud, the present
threat appears to be from China. Numerous published reports
highlight how China is actively probing our Internet-based
infrastructure. Last year, the Washington Post, for example,
highlighted how websites in China are being used heavily to target
computer networks in the Defense Department and other U.S.
agencies.
So based on the GAO's report, we clearly are still without
an adequate plan for cybersecurity, and we need to do a better job
preparing ourselves, not just for future threats, but for present
practices from those who may target Americans for fraud or
terrorism.
This is a timely hearing, and again, I want to commend
Chairman Upton for holding this hearing, and thank our witnesses
for their time and efforts.
MR. UPTON. I now recognize for an opening statement the
Chairman of the full committee, Mr. Barton from Texas.
CHAIRMAN BARTON. Thank you, Chairman Upton, for holding
this hearing.
Following the anniversary of September 11, 2001, today's
hearing takes on added importance. Cybersecurity is both a timely
issue to consider, and important issue to consider. Following the
events of 9/11, we learned a great deal about our country's
vulnerabilities. As a result, there have been ongoing, systemic
reviews surrounding our Nation's critical infrastructure, most of
which fall within the jurisdiction of this committee. Just as we
have taken steps to protect our electricity and drinking water,
it is also important to ensure that our information systems,
telecommunications networks, and Internet infrastructure are
protected from those that wish to do us harm.
In light of the public and private reliance on the
Internet for commerce, communications, and education, I have
requested the Government Accountability Office to complete a
report on our preparedness for a major Internet disruption.
Although, thankfully, we have never seen catastrophic Internet
disruption, such an event is not out of the realm of possibility.
The conclusion of the GAO is that recovering from a major
Internet disruption would be very difficult. Roles of
responsibility among government agencies are not fully defined,
and coordination among the vast numbers of affected entities,
both public and private, is not occurring on a satisfactory
scale, according to the GAO.
Imagine our country without a functioning Internet, even
for a little bit. Most of us have lived to adulthood without
the Internet, but it is now a big part of our daily lives. Some
people probably think they are exempt from the impact of the
Internet, but you would almost have to live in a cave to be truly
unaffected. You benefit if you have a job, see a doctor, drive
a car, or eat a meal, and the list goes on and on. Jobs, growth,
and opportunity in America without an Internet would not
disappear, but they would be dramatically tougher to achieve.
Life, business, and the economy would not tumble into a new Dark
Age, but it would be a dimmer and poorer life for all of us.
That is exactly the outcome envisioned by a man who does live
in a cave, Osama bin Laden.
Protecting our Internet is not simply a goal this country
should aim to meet. This is an imperative that the United States
must achieve. I am anxious to hear from the Department of
Homeland Security what steps are being pursued to remedy the
problems described by the GAO report. Also, I am interested in
hearing from the private industry witnesses about what they see
as the most critical issues and how they believe that we can best
resolve them.
I want to thank you, Chairman Upton. I would like to point
out that Chairman Stearns's subcommittee also has some jurisdiction
in this area, but I thank both of you for addressing this very
important issue.
With that, I yield back.
[The prepared statement of Hon. Joe Barton follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HON. JOE BARTON, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON
ENERGY AND COMMERCE
Thank you, Chairman Upton, for holding this hearing. Just
following the five-year anniversary of September 11th, today's
hearing on cybersecurity is both timely and important.
Following the events of September 11th, we learned a great
deal about our country's vulnerabilities. As a result, there have
been ongoing, systematic reviews surrounding our nation's
critical infrastructure, most of which fall within the jurisdiction
of this Committee. Just as we have to take steps to protect our
electricity and drinking water, it is also vitally important to
ensure that our information systems, telecommunications networks,
and Internet infrastructure are protected from those who wish to
do us harm.
In light of the public and private reliance on the Internet
for commerce, communications, and education, I requested the
Government Accountability Office to complete a report on our
preparedness for a major Internet disruption. Although this
country has, thankfully, never seen a catastrophic Internet
disruption, such an event is not out of the realm of possibility.
The conclusion of the GAO is that recovering from a major Internet
disruption would be difficult. Roles of responsibility among
government agencies are not fully defined, and coordination among
the vast number of affected entities, both public and private,
is not occurring on a satisfactory scale.
Imagine America without a functioning Internet, even for
a little while. Most of us lived to adulthood without the Internet,
but it is now an unnoticed part of our lives. Some people probably
think they're exempt from the impact of the Internet, but you'd
have to live in a cave to be truly unaffected. You benefit if you
have a job, see a doctor, drive a car or eat a meal, and the list
goes on and on. Jobs, growth and opportunity in America without
an Internet would not disappear, but they'd be dramatically
tougher to achieve. Life, business and the economy would not
tumble into a new Dark Age, but it would be a dimmer and poorer
one for all of us. That is exactly the outcome envisioned for
us by a man who does live in a cave.
Protecting our Internet infrastructure is not simply a goal
this country should aim to meet. This is an imperative that the
United States must achieve. I am anxious to hear from the
Department of Homeland Security what steps are being pursued to
remedy the problems described by GAO. Also, I am interested in
hearing from our private industry witnesses about what they see
as the most critical issues and how they believe we can best
resolve them.
Thank you again, Chairman Upton. I look forward to hearing
from our witnesses.
MR. UPTON. I recognize the Ranking Member of the full
committee, Mr. Dingell from the great State of Michigan.
MR. DINGELL. Mr. Chairman, we are from a great State.
Thank you for those kind words.
First of all, Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding this
hearing, and I commend you for making cybersecurity a priority for
this subcommittee.
Cyber attacks against our Nation's information infrastructure
grow in sophistication and in number every day. A failure by the
Government to plan for physical and cyber damage to the Internet
could be devastating to both our national security and our economic
stability.
Cyber criminals are attacking online operations and
infrastructure thousands of times a day, with increasingly targeted
and malicious attacks. Moving beyond these notorious wide scale
attacks of the past, these perpetrators seem bent on more calculated
invasions designed to access and misuse corporate, personal, or
government information. With a significant and growing level of
our Nation's economic activity occurring over networked connections,
a major physical or cyber breakdown of the Internet could wreak
havoc on our economy. But a loss of the public's trust in the
digital economy would likewise ripple across every industry and
severely damage the Nation's overall economic health.
Given the range of threats and vulnerabilities, this hearing
provides an excellent opportunity to understand on a broad level
what is being done to secure cyberspace. How well prepared are the
Government and the private sector to respond to and to recover from
a major Internet disruption and from other cyber threats, and what
is it that we should do about these problems?
The public sector is a holder of great responsibilities,
but the private sector is at the forefront in the defense against
cyber attacks, and it is vital that corporate management
appropriately invests in cybersecurity. Do corporations, large
and small, have the necessary commitment, information, and tools
to protect against cyber intrusions and restore systems that have
been compromised? The information technology sector is deploying
tools to help businesses and consumers manage cyber risks, but
they need a lot of help, and this is one of the places the
Government comes in. The Federal government must take a leading
role in working with the private sector to secure cyberspace.
What steps has the Government, particularly the Department
of Homeland Security, DHS, taken in regard to protecting against
and recovering from a major cyber incident, whether from cyber
warfare or from a natural disaster? Is cybersecurity receiving
the proper level of attention within the Department, or is there
more that can and should be done?
The Government Accountability Office reports that the role
of the Government in planning for Internet recovery remains
unclear. According to GAO, years after its formation, DHS is
falling short on its efforts to secure cyberspace. GAO's recent
report on Internet recovery provides a list of items upon which
the Department must focus its attention. Curiously, more than
a year after announcing, with more than a little fanfare, the
creation of an Assistant Secretary for Cybersecurity and
Telecommunications, that DHS position, along with others,
remains vacant. This is a noticeable and a lengthy absence of
cybersecurity leadership, and it conveys a clear lack of
appreciation for our Nation's real and mounting cyber threats.
The American people should not have to wait for a massive
cyber disaster to bring the necessary level of government attention
to cyber risks. Companies on the front lines are clamoring for
more leadership from the Government in securing cyberspace.
Perhaps this is because the private sector knows full well that
the costs of inaction in preparing for and recovering from a
cyber disaster could be catastrophic to our national and economic
security.
Mr. Chairman, this hearing is a very important one. Let us
hope that it helps us get some answers, but let us also hope that
it enables us to jog the Government into a more vigorous effort at
addressing these problems, and perhaps filling an empty appointment
or two at DHS.
Thank you.
MR. UPTON. Mr. Terry.
MR. TERRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this
hearing. I would just like to associate myself to all of the
remarks that have been made from this kiosk, and I yield back.
MR. UPTON. Especially the remarks about the great State of
Michigan, we are glad to have--
MR. TERRY. With that exception.
MR. UPTON. Mr. Stearns.
MR. STEARNS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Obviously, all of us
are glad that you are holding this hearing. As Mr. Barton pointed
out, my Subcommittee on Commerce, Consumer Protection, and Trade,
we have had seven hearings on privacy and we have dealt a lot with
data security, and we are also concerned with cybersecurity.
As the Government and private sector become more reliant on
widespread interconnectivity, protecting both the public and
private computer systems and the critical operations and
infrastructure they support is more critical than ever before.
Although the Bush Administration, the Department of Homeland
Security, DHS, have begun a variety of initiatives to protect the
Internet infrastructure, obviously, much work needs to be done.
According to a recently released GAO report, the efforts by DHS
to fulfill its responsibilities for developing an integrated
public, private plan for Internet recovery are neither complete
nor comprehensive. DHS has developed a high level plan for
infrastructure protection and incident response, but the components
of these plans addressing Internet infrastructure are not yet
complete.
DHS has started initiatives to improve response, such as
working groups to facilitate coordination and exercises in which
government and private industry practice responding to cyber events,
but GAO notes progress on these initiatives have been limited and
they often lack timeframe for completion.
My colleagues, much of the United States' critical
infrastructure is potentially vulnerable to cyber attacks.
Industrial control computer systems involved in this infrastructure
are specific points of vulnerability, as cybersecurity for these
systems has not been previously perceived as a very high priority.
Many international terrorist groups now actively use computers
and the Internet to communicate, and several may develop or
acquire the necessary technical skills to eventually direct a
coordinated attack against computers in the United States. A
cyber attack intended to harm the U.S. economy would likely
target computers that operate the civilian critical
infrastructure and our government agency.
While there is no published evidence that terrorist
organizations are currently planning a coordinated attack against
computers, computer system vulnerabilities persist worldwide and
initiators of the random cyber attacks that plague computers on the
Internet remain largely unknown today. Reports from security
organizations show that random attacks are now increasingly
implemented through the use of automated tools called bots that
direct large numbers of these compromised computers to launch
attacks through the Internet as swarms. The growing trend towards
the use of more automated attack tools has also overwhelmed some
of the current methodologies used for tracking Internet cyber
attacks.
The potential consequences of this are critical, and range
from temporary loss of service to catastrophic infrastructure
failure affecting multiple States for an extended duration. The
consequences of attack could vary widely. In addition, DOD has
also observed that the number of attempted intrusions into military
networks has gradually increased.
Mr. Chairman, this uncertainty highlights the necessity of
this hearing and I thank you for holding it. I look forward to
hearing from our witnesses.
MR. UPTON. Mr. Shimkus.
MR. SHIMKUS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I will just brief and say thank you for coming to the
panelists. I thank the Chairman for asking for the report in 2005.
In July, we suffered some pretty horrific storms in the
St. Louis metropolitan area. Over three-quarters of a million
people were without power for many days. My home was without power
for 5 days. I think that allowed the public to understand how
connected we are through the computer, through Internet, through
electricity, and the like. The public really needs to think what
we can do collectively. And I think what these storms showed the
public in the St. Louis metropolitan area is what they had to do
themselves to prepare. That is really the same message that we
talked about in Katrina and other major disasters. What are the
individual citizens doing to help protect themselves in the case
of attacks? This is cybersecurity, but we do rely more and more
on technology, and the public needs to be prepared to--how to do
their own work, and that is what I will be asking about later on.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
MR. UPTON. Thank you. That concludes the opening
statements by the members of the subcommittee.
[Additional statement submitted for the record follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HON. ANNA G. ESHOO, A REPRESENTATIVE IN
CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
Thank you Mr. Chairman, and thanks to the witnesses for
joining us today.
As a member of the House Intelligence Committee, I take very
seriously the range of threats to our country from terrorists and
other enemies, including threats to our basic infrastructure
including our telecommunications networks and the Internet.
In the 21st Century, no part of our national infrastructure
is more important than our technological infrastructure and
communications networks.
Former Cybersecurity Czar Richard Clarke once described the
potential for a telecom disaster as an "electronic Pearl Harbor."
CRS has estimated a cyber attack could produce an economic blow
exceeding $200 billion.
This is undoubtedly a shared responsibility of government,
the telecommunications industry, businesses, and consumers, and
critical gaps in security remain unaddressed at every level.
I'm increasingly concerned that cybersecurity is not
receiving the attention it requires from the federal government.
In the wake of 9/11 the Administration has slowly
diminished responsibility for and visibility of cybersecurity
matters at the federal level. Instead, they have focused almost
exclusively on threats to air safety and border security. These
are critical threats to our national security but they are not the
only ones. We must attend to all critical sectors, including
cybersecurity.
The position of cyber security czar once resided at the
White House and reported directly to the President, but after
Richard Clarke's resignation in 2003, the position was relegated
to a mid-level position in the Department of Homeland Security.
In July 2005, after significant pressure from Congress and
the private sector, DHS Secretary Chertoff announced the creation
of an Assistant Secretary for Cyber Security and
Telecommunications. The Assistant Secretary would have the
authority to set policy and develop public-private partnerships
with industry to improve national cybersecurity.
But in the year since the position was announced, the
Administration has yet to even nominate someone to fill it.
Clearly, we cannot expect national leadership in
cybersecurity without an individual to lead the effort. I hope
the President will act soon to appoint someone to assume this
vital function.
I also believe much of the responsibility for America's
cybersecurity lies with the private sector and individual citizens.
Many of the most potent viruses and worms that afflict our
computer networks are able to do so only because the vast majority
of personal computers are not secure, thus becoming the unwitting
distribution network for destructive programs.
Businesses and individuals must be vigilant in maintaining
appropriate security on their networks and personal computers, and
utilize sound security practices.
The federal government should play a leadership role in
promoting effective security standards and practices and assisting
private and public institutions in reaching out to individual users
to protect themselves from cyber attacks.
Data security legislation unanimously endorsed by this
Committee would provide significant government leadership in
endorsing and promoting robust security systems and standards, and
I hope the House will consider our bill before Congress adjourns.
We have to do better than react to an "electronic Pearl
Harbor." I look forward to working with my colleagues to make sure
that we do everything we can to protect our nation's vital computer
and communications networks.
MR. UPTON. At this point, we will hear the testimony by
our distinguished panel. We are joined by Mr. David Powner, the
Director of Information Technology Management Issues from the
United States Government Accountability Office; Mr. George Foresman,
Under Secretary for Preparedness of the United States Department of
Homeland Security; Mr. Ken Moran, Director of the Office of Homeland
Security of the Enforcement Bureau of the FCC; Mr. Vincent Weafer,
Senior Director of Symantec Corporation from California; Mr. Paul
Kurtz, Executive Director of Cybersecurity Industry Alliance; and
Mr. Larry Clinton, CEO of Internet Security Alliance.
Gentlemen, your testimony is made part of the record in
its entirety. We would like you to take not more than 5 minutes to
summarize it, at which point we will have questions from members of
panel.
Mr. Powner, we will start with you. Welcome.
STATEMENTS OF DAVID A. POWNER, DIRECTOR, INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY
MANAGEMENT ISSUES, U. S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE; HON.
GEORGE W. FORESMAN, UNDER SECRETARY FOR PREPAREDNESS, U. S.
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY; KENNETH P. MORAN, DIRECTOR,
OFFICE OF HOMELAND SECURITY, ENFORCEMENT BUREAU, FEDERAL
COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION; VINCENT WEAFER, SENIOR DIRECTOR,
SYMANTEC SECURITY RESPONSE, SYMANTEC CORPORATION; PAUL B. KURTZ,
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, CYBERSECURITY INDUSTRY ALLIANCE; AND LARRY
CLINTON, CHIEF OPERATING OFFICER, INTERNET SECURITY ALLIANCE
MR. POWNER. Chairman Upton, Ranking Member Markey, Chairman
Barton, and members of the subcommittee, we appreciate the
opportunity to testify on our Internet Reconstitution Report that
we recently completed at your request.
Federal law and policy calls for critical infrastructure
protection activities and establishes DHS as our Nation's focal
point. Among its many responsibilities is to work with the private
sector to develop an integrated public private Internet recovery
plan. To date, no such plan exists. Today, at your request, I
will briefly discuss the growing threats to the Internet, where
our Nation is in its efforts to develop this plan, and
recommendations to both DHS and the Congress to facilitate public
and private efforts to recover the Internet when major disruptions
occur.
First, threats. Criminal groups, foreign intelligence
services, hackers, and terrorists are threats to our Nation's
computers and networks. A recent intelligence report on global
trends forecasts that terrorists may develop capabilities to
conduct both cyber and physical attacks against infrastructure
modes, including the Internet. In fact, the Internet has been
targeted and attacked, and private sector companies who own the
majority of the Internet infrastructure deal with cyber and
physical disruptions on a regular basis. For example, viruses
and worms are often used to launch denial of service attacks
that result in traffic being slowed or stopped. Several recent
cyber attacks highlight the importance of having robust Internet
recovery plans, including a 2002 coordinated denial of service
attack that targeted all 13 Internet route servers.
For most of these attacks, the Government did not have a
role in recovering the Internet; however, recent physical attacks
like 9/11 and Katrina highlight the need for public/private
coordination associated with Internet recovery.
DHS has begun a variety of initiatives to fulfill its
responsibility for developing an integrated public/private plan,
but these efforts are not yet complete or comprehensive.
Specifically, DHS has developed high level plans for infrastructure
protection and national disaster response, but components of
these plans that are to address Internet recovery are incomplete
and inadequate. In addition, the National Response Plan cyber
annex does not reflect the National Cyber Response coordination
group's current operating procedures. DHS has started a variety
of initiatives to tackle this problem, including working groups
to facilitate response, and exercises to practice recovery
efforts; however, these efforts are immature and the relationships
among groups like the Internet disruption working group and others
are not evident.
Regarding the challenges that have impeded progress, first,
it is unclear what government entity is in charge, what the
Government's role should be, and when it should get involved.
Expanding on each of these: DHS's National Cybersecurity Division
and the National Communications System have overlapping
responsibilities. In addition, there is lack of consensus about
the role that DHS should play. The Government is pursuing large
scale plans with the NIPP and the National Response Plan, while
the private sector wants more of an assist or tactical role from
the Government that our report lays out in detail. Finally,
triggers that clarify when the Federal government should get
involved are unclear.
Second, our Nation is working in a legal framework that
doesn't specifically address the Government's role and
responsibilities in the event of an Internet disruption. In
addition, the Katrina recovery efforts showed that the Stafford
Act can create a roadblock when for-profit companies that own and
operate critical infrastructure need Federal assistance during
national emergencies.
Third, the private sector is reluctant to share information
with DHS because it does not see value in sharing, does not
necessarily trust the Government, and views DHS as an organization
lacking effective leadership.
To address these inadequacies, my statement includes nine
specific recommendations to DHS, including determining who should
be in charge, given the convergence of voice and data
communications, developing a plan that is consistent with what
the private sector infrastructure owners need during a time of
crisis, and incorporating lessons learned from incidents and
exercises.
In summary, Chairman Upton, exercises to date in a recently
issued report by the Business Roundtable found that both the
Government and the private sector are poorly prepared to effectively
respond to cyber events. Although DHS has various initiatives
underway, these need to be better coordinated and driven to
closure. Until this happens, the credibility of the Department
will not be where it needs to be to build effective public/private
relationships needed to effectively respond to major Internet
disruptions.
This concludes my statement. I would be pleased to respond
to any questions.
[The prepared statement of David A. Powner follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF DAVID A. POWNER, DIRECTOR, INFORMATION
TECHNOLOGY MANAGEMENT ISSUES, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY
OFFICE
MR. UPTON. Thank you.
Mr. Foresman.
MR. FORESMAN. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Markey, and
members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to appear
today to discuss cyber and telecommunication security. You have
my written statement and I offer it for the record.
I would like to briefly highlight several points.
First, there has been much discussion about the Department's
ability to find and hire a qualified individual to serve as the
Assistant Secretary for Cyber and Telecommunications Security. I
want to be very clear. This has been and remains a top priority
for the Department. We are in the final stages of a security
process review for a candidate that we feel is very well qualified.
We look forward to announcing the candidate with Congress very soon.
I am confident this individual will continue to build on the progress
that is being made every day in our cyber and telecommunications
security efforts.
Second, today, the Department is releasing its After Action
report from our recent government private sector national and
international cybersecurity exercise, Cyber Storm. This report
will measurably advance refinements to operational protocols. Its
lessons will not simply be documented, they will be implemented.
Third, telecommunication networks and information technology
activities are both mutually dependent and interdependent, and they
have converged. By the end of this year, we will complete our
efforts to collocate together the U.S. Computer Emergency Readiness
Team and the National Coordination Center for Telecommunications to
improve operational coordination. This means better coordination
among all levels of government, better and stronger relationships
between government, and the private sector during threats and actual
events.
Secretary Chertoff said last week in his speech that reflected
on five years since 9/11 the way to protect the critical
infrastructure is "in partnership with Federal, State, and local
officials, and with the private sector folks who actually own the
things that we are trying to protect." This collaboration is key
to our approach to protecting telecommunications and the Nation's
cyber infrastructures.
Last month, our cybersecurity experts worked quietly with
their counterparts at Microsoft to address a critical software
vulnerability. Microsoft was competent in their partnership with
DHS and quickly brought the vulnerability to our attention. While
Microsoft worked over several weeks to develop a patch, our U.S.
cert was quietly and effectively monitoring Internet activity to
ensure the vulnerabilities were not being exploited. At the same
time, the Department was working domestically and internationally
and with our private sector partners to mitigate terrorist threats
associated with the British airline plot. These concurrent actions
are two of many examples of the day-to-day public/private sector
activity taking place in the Department's preparedness efforts.
Maintaining these types of collaborations remains, as you
know, a multi-dimensional challenge. From personal computers in
homes, to vast networks, to control systems, to the Internet,
cyber and telecommunications security presents enormous challenges.
These challenges are obvious: prioritizing our work, partnering
for effective collaboration, balancing security and economic
considerations, and most notably, increasing the understanding.
The other witnesses today will add clarity to these points
from varying perspectives, but I think it is safe to say there is
no one before you today that does not share the belief that
protecting America's cyber and telecommunications systems is as
critical to national security as it is to citizens' security. I
want to be clear. Progress is being made every day, and there is
more to be done. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, as
you well know, the security of America's cyber and
telecommunications systems do not lend themselves to surrounding
one building with heavily armed police officers or simply mandating
an action and we will be safe. Simply put, there is no magic bullet.
The success of our national cyber and telecommunications
security efforts depends on unity of purpose and continuing
public/private sector collaboration. This is serious business and
we at the Department are serious about the business. We look
forward to continuing discussions with this committee, with the
Congress on the wide range of policy issues that we must confront
together if we are going to measurably advance our efforts to
secure the Nation's cyber assets and its telecommunications
assets.
Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Hon. George W. Foresman
follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HON. GEORGE W. FORESMAN, UNDER SECRETARY
OF PREPAREDNESS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Good morning, Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee.
Thank you for inviting me to speak about cyber security and the
recovery and reconstitution of critical networks.
Our Nation's communications and information infrastructure
will support profound improvements in the security of our homeland
in the next 20 years. States, communities, and our private sector
partners are already finding innovative ways to prevent terrorism
and protect critical infrastructure by leveraging information
technology. As I outline further below, the Federal government
is similarly deploying innovative programs that significantly raise
the level of preparedness in this critical area.
Our vision and philosophy for the future build upon
accomplishments of the past several years - critical infrastructure
businesses, home users, and government at all levels have a greater
understanding of the threat posed by malicious software. The
communications and information technology sectors have deployed new
tools to help these constituents manage cyber risks.
However, at the core of our vision and philosophy is a strong
belief that the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) must
increasingly guard against more virulent attacks and cyber
disruptions - whether caused by a terrorist attack or natural
disaster. We must prevent cyber incidents of national significance.
In this testimony, I will outline three strategic goals to
execute this vision, and examples of current and future programs
that will move us forward to these objectives.
Assistant Secretary for Cyber Security and Telecommunications
As a preliminary matter, allow me to outline the steps the
Department is currently taking while working with the White House to
actively pursue qualified candidates for the post of Assistant
Secretary for Cyber Security and Telecommunications. I am
personally engaged in the process of selecting the new Assistant
Secretary and, in the interim, am providing program direction
pending the post being filled permanently. Because of the
importance of this mission, all parties want to ensure that the
individual appointed to this position possesses the right
combination of skills, experience, and leadership necessary to
succeed.
To supplement my own personal involvement in strategy, the
Assistant Secretary for Infrastructure Protection has been serving
as the Acting Assistant Secretary for Cyber Security and
Telecommunications. As such, he has been actively engaged in
overseeing operational programs, program reviews, governance
structure, and has participated in government/industry forums to
further the advancement of this important new office as well as
the strategic goals that I will outline shortly.
Regardless of when this position is filled, the mission
of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the National Cyber
Security Division (NCSD), and the National Communications System
(NCS) remain clear. The absence of a permanent Assistant Secretary
for Cyber Security and Telecommunication has not had an impact on
NCSD's or NCS's critically important work.
Strategic Vision and Philosophy
Our vision and philosophy for cyber security and recovery
reflects the expanding importance of our communications and
information infrastructure in all walks of life. As you know, a
failure to consider and deploy effective strategies could adversely
affect homeland and national security, public health and welfare,
and our economic security. Policies that advance a safe and
secure communications infrastructure promote public trust and
confidence, project stability to those who wish us harm, and
foster valuable relationships between the public and private
sectors.
We fully recognize the challenges inherent in our
preparedness responsibilities. We are faced with difficult
choices and options. We must think about risks to the
communications and information infrastructure in new and creative
ways. We must prioritize resources, and make hard decisions where
resources are limited.
We must also continue to partner strategically with the
communications and information technology sectors as well as other
experts outside of the Federal government. As we focus on the
potential for catastrophic cyber disasters, our partnerships are
becoming more diverse and sophisticated, reflecting the different
technology, business, and policy decisions that must be made.
These partnerships also entail strengthening cooperation across the
government and, at a minimum, finding ways to cultivate support
outside of the Department where expertise clearly exists. Whether
public or private, the partnerships must deliver real and measurable
value in light of the catastrophic damages that can occur in the
absence of smart collaboration.
Finally, we must reinforce a culture of preparedness and
increasingly shift from a reactive to a proactive stance. In sum,
we must prepare by promoting effective security strategies that
evolve as the threat evolves.
Three Strategic Goals
In responding to these challenges, the Preparedness
Directorate is executing three strategic priorities. (1) We are
preparing for cyber incident of national significance; (2) we are
working to forge more effective partnerships; and (3) we are working
to foster a culture of preparedness to prevent cyber incidents
and mitigate damage when disruptions occur.
First, we must prepare for a large scale cyber disaster.
Our primary strategic goal is to prepare for high-consequence
incidents. These would include, for example, a widespread disruption
involving the Internet or critical communications infrastructure,
whether from an attack or natural disaster.
Now, as the Department matures we are preparing for large
scale cyber disasters. Our strategic intentions are ambitious and
will require resolution of multiple impediments, such as:
Identifying incidents and providing early warning;
Deploying Federal assets and services more efficiently to mitigate
damages where disruptions occur;
Responding to the speed of attacks and disruptions, which will
require new technologies and skill sets in our workforce; and
Maximizing the use of tools that promote and integrate privacy
protections as well as real-time security needs.
The Preparedness Directorate has several important programs
already underway to prepare for a cyber incident of national
significance. The Office of Cyber Security and Telecommunications
has established an Internet Disruption Working Group (IDWG) to
address the resiliency and recovery of Internet functions in the
event of a major cyber incident. The IDWG is not examining all
risks, but is focusing on and identifying measures that government
and its stakeholders can take to protect against nationally
significant Internet disruptions.
These proposed measures may yield heightened expectations,
roles, and responsibilities for the United States Computer Emergency
Readiness Team (US-CERT).
Second, we must continue to forge more effective partnership
arrangements.
Our second strategic goal is to improve the Department's
partnership programs and practices. Homeland Security Presidential
Directive 7, the Administration's policy on critical
infrastructure protection, explicitly recognizes the importance
of partnerships, which are essential for many sound reasons. In
the cyber security arena, the Department is working to nurture
existing partnerships and establish new relationships with three
key stakeholder communities: (1) the private sector; (2) Federal
departments and agencies and State, local, and tribal governments;
and (3) academia.
Private Sector Partnerships. Industry owns, operates, and
controls the bulk of the communications and information
infrastructure, so collaborating with industry to prepare for and
respond to catastrophic cyber disasters is a strategic priority.
In "The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons
Learned," the White House pinpointed specific problems experienced
by infrastructure owners in restoring communications services.
The report additionally described interdependencies between the
critical infrastructure sectors, such as energy and transportation,
that impact restoration of communications services. Our vision for
the future, and emphasis on close collaboration with the private
sector, follows directly from these lessons learned.
In our partnerships, the government must deliver real
value to our private sector partners, who are clearly committed
to a collaborative approach. Smart, effective partnerships demand
that we:
Understand how the private sector will prepare for and respond to
cyber disasters - and where the government can complement industry
practices;
Leverage state of the art technologies to improve preparedness and
response and sustain privacy protections;
Promote pools of knowledge and subject matter expertise for
reconstituting communications and information infrastructure; and
Ensure close coordination of Preparedness Directorate functions,
such as those provided by NCSD and NCS,
Government Partnerships. The Department is similarly committed to
enhancing partnership arrangements across the Federal government and
with State, local, and tribal governments. We will continue to
explore innovative ways to leverage skill sets outside of the
Department as part of our strategy for cyber-preparedness and
response. We currently partner with Multi-State Information Sharing
and Analysis Center (MS-ISAC), as well a key operational
information technology and communications officials in the states,
and we are strengthening those partnerships for recovery and
reconstitution efforts.
Partnerships with Academia. The Department is serious
about partnering aggressively with experts in academia. To date,
the Department has included academia in partnership discussions;
however, in order to lay a foundation for more effective cyber
response capability, we must seek guidance from academia on a range
of more complex problems. As an example, we expect to learn more
from academia on such matters as challenges with insurance and
risk transfer for the critical infrastructure sectors as well as
business case arguments for catastrophic preparedness. These areas
promote public and private sector collaboration.
Third, we must create a culture of preparedness - both to prevent a
cyber disaster and to mitigate damages if widespread disruptions
occur.
Our third and final strategic goal seeks to influence how we
prepare for security challenges in the coming decade. As with our
other strategic priorities, this goal demands a focused and
disciplined approach in several areas. At a minimum, we are
structuring programs to:
Clearly outline preparedness organizations, relationships, and
expectations: One of the Preparedness Directorate's strategic
priorities is to clearly set forth all aspects of "doctrine" in
accordance with legislative and Presidential direction. To create a
long-term culture of preparedness, we are developing clear
organizational doctrine, which memorializes strategic policies,
clarifies roles and responsibilities, and defines measures of
accountability.
Promote a shared way of life that measurably improves preparedness
for a catastrophic cyber disaster: Finally, we are focusing our
energies on cyber-preparedness. Our programs in the coming years
will seek to inculcate to change behavior as we continue to leverage
our government partners to help continue efforts in these other
areas. Awareness and education in the past decade have focused
on large segments of the population, including home users and
students in K-12. We hope to develop additional awareness programs
that look more carefully at catastrophic cyber risk and continue to
leverage our government partners to help advance our efforts in
these other areas.
Organizational Framework
The three strategic goals outlined above will require clear
organizational directions and programs.
HSPD-7 directs the Department to establish an organization
dedicated to cyber security. The Preparedness Directorate's
National Cyber Security Division (NCSD) has been that organization
since it was created in June 2003. Since its inception, the NCSD
has taken on the broad mandate of HSPD-7 and those provided in the
President's National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace, in its mission
to work collaboratively with private, public and international
entities to secure cyberspace and America's cyber assets.
The NCSD is just one of the valuable preparedness resources
within the Department. As part of the Preparedness Directorate, the
NCSD works closely with the Office of the Manager of the National
Communications System (NCS), which addresses national security and
emergency preparedness (NS/EP) telecommunications. These two
entities comprise what is now the Office of Cyber Security and
Telecommunications. The Office of Cyber Security and
Telecommunications works closely with the Office of Infrastructure
Protection to ensure that the ever increasing interconnected nature
of physical and cyber security is integrated throughout our
overall preparedness efforts.
The National Communications System consists of 23 Federal
departments and agencies with assets, resources, requirements
and/or regulatory authority regarding national security and
emergency preparedness (NS/EP) communications. Established
pursuant to Executive Order 12472, the community is administered
by DHS as Executive Agent and Manager and it supports the Executive
Office of the President (the National Security Council, the Homeland
Security Council, the Director of the Office of Science and
Technology Policy and the Director of the Office of Management and
Budget) in the coordination of the planning for and provision of
national security and emergency preparedness communications for
the Federal government under all circumstances, including crisis
or emergency, attack, recovery and reconstitution.
Executive Order 12472 also mandates inclusion of an
industry component, the National Coordinating Center (NCC) for
Telecommunications, or NCC Watch, a joint industry/Government body
operating a 24 hour, 7-day a week watch center to coordinate NS/EP
communications activities. The NCC Watch has a unique relationship
with members of the private telecommunications sector in the
Communications Information Sharing and Analysis Center (ISAC).
The Communications ISAC provides an opportunity for private sector
industry to partner with government to exchange information and
coordinate restoration of communications assets and services
during emergencies. In this role, the NCC Watch communicates
daily and shares a web-portal with NCSD (US-CERT) on cyber related
issues.
To meet its mission, the NCSD is focused on leading a cyber
risk management program, and building and enhancing the National
Cyberspace Response System. To address these priorities, the NCSD
is engaged in a public-private partnership which is incorporated
into all of NCSD's programs. This is especially critical since
the vast majority of our national assets and critical infrastructure
are owned and operated by the private sector.
National Cyber Risk Management Program
The National Cyber Risk Management Program reflects the
Department's overall strategic approach that is focused on risk
management, as outlined in the National Infrastructure Protection
Plan (NIPP). The NIPP incorporates the Department's overall risk
management framework to assess and reduce our cyber risk, and
improve our planning for response, recovery, and reconstitution
of our critical networks.
The Department released the NIPP on June 30 of this year after
consultation with industry. The NIPP formalizes the collaboration
between government and industry through the Sector Partnership Model
with Sector Coordinating Councils (SCC) and Government Coordinating
Councils (GCC) working together to address risk by analyzing
consequences, vulnerabilities, and threats.
* The NIPP provides a unifying structure for protection of the
Nation's 17 critical infrastructure and key resources (CI/KR)
sectors designated in HSPD-7, including the Information Technology
Sector and the Internet. The NIPP calls upon each sector to develop
a Sector Specific Plan based on the risk management framework. DHS
is the Sector Specific Agency (SSA) responsible for both the
Information Technology Sector and the Communications Sector, and
assists other sectors with the cyber elements of their
infrastructure. The NCSD works closely with the IT Sector
Coordinating Council, which was formally launched in January of
this year. The IT-SCC and IT-GCC are working together on the IT
Sector Specific Plan, which will be completed at the end of the
year.
In order to accomplish the risk management objectives of the NIPP,
we have been working closely with the private sector to build the
framework required. To facilitate the development of this
partnership, the Department has established the Critical
Infrastructure Partnership Advisory Council (CIPAC). The CIPAC
comprises representatives from each of the critical infrastructure
and key resources (CI/KR), sectors, SCCs, and GCCs, and provides a
mechanism for the information exchange and collaboration between
industry and government that is so crucial to understanding the
risk we face. The Council also prioritizes the protective
measures that need to be taken to reduce that risk.
As we develop the IT Sector Specific Plan and deepen our
collective understanding of the cyber risks in other sectors, we
are building the foundation for the development of a national cyber
risk assessment. Working with our government and private sector
partners, we are taking steps, such as developing attack scenarios
and conducting red cell workshops and exercises, to identify what
we are most concerned about in cyberspace, and then using that
information to build our response and mitigation plans. As part
of our risk management efforts, we have three priority mitigation
programs.
First, as discussed above, the Office of Cyber Security
and Telecommunications has established an IDWG to address the
resiliency and recovery of Internet functions in the event of a
major cyber incident. The IDWG is working with government, private
sector, academic and international security experts to examine
risks, improve preparedness and situational awareness, and identify
measures that we can take to protect against nationally significant
Internet disruptions. The IDWG conducted a tabletop exercise in
June to examine the kinds of scenarios that would have significant
impact on the Internet, understand when information exchange between
the public and private sector is mutually beneficial, and to
determine what roles and responsibilities industry and government
should assume in responding to and recovering from such disruptions.
Second, the NCSD is collaborating with the national
laboratories for its Control Systems Security Program to bring
together government, industry, and academia to address the threats
and vulnerabilities of the process control systems that remotely
operate and control access to many of our critical infrastructure
assets and systems. To support the Program, NCSD has established a
US-CERT Control Systems Security Center, which is an assessment and
incident response facility located at Idaho National Laboratory.
The department also partners with the industry sectors that utilize
process control systems in their operations through the Process
Control Systems Forum, or "PCSF". The PCSF met recently in San
Diego and furthered its work to accelerate the security of control
systems, provide a venue for sharing perspectives on cross-sector
security issues, and facilitate solution-driven collaborative
workshops.
Through the Process Control Systems Forum (PCSF), the
Department also partners with the industry sectors that utilize
process control systems in their operations. The PCSF met recently
in San Diego and furthered its work to accelerate the security of
control systems, provide a venue for sharing perspectives on
cross-sector security issues, and facilitate solution-driven
collaborative workshops.
The third risk mitigation effort is NCSD's Software
Assurance Program that seeks to reduce software vulnerabilities,
minimize exploitation, and address ways to improve the routine
development of trustworthy software products and tools to analyze
systems for hidden vulnerabilities. In collaboration with
industry, academia, and government partners, the Department's
approach to addressing software assurance identifies the following
as keys to success:
People - education and training for developers and users
Processes - practical guidelines and best practices for the
development of secure software
Technology - tools for evaluating software vulnerabilities and
quality
Acquisition - specifications and guidelines for acquisition and
outsourcing
To further its efforts, the Software Assurance Program holds
semi-annual Software Assurance Forums with other Federal agencies,
industry, academia, and international entities to facilitate
ongoing collaboration and progress. As part of the program, NCSD has
launched "Build Security In" to raise awareness and foster
collaborative efforts.
The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) has recently
designated NCSD as the Managing Agency for the Information Systems
Security Line of Business. As part of NCSD's work with the Federal
government, NCSD is currently working to establish a Program
Management Office for this government-wide initiative which has
an overarching goal of improving the effectiveness and consistency
of systems security across the Federal enterprise. This effort will
reduce costs through consolidation and standardization of resources.
DHS will be working closely with partner agencies in overseeing
the implementation of information systems security products and
services.
In order to reduce our collective cyber risk we need to raise
awareness of cyber security vulnerabilities and understand what we
must do as individuals to create a collective, shared secure cyber
infrastructure.
NCSD's awareness program leverages partnerships with the
Multi-State Information Sharing and Analysis Center (MS-ISAC) and
the National Cyber Security Alliance (NCSA), as well as our own
National Cyber Alert System to reach state and local governments,
small businesses, home users, and K-12 and higher education
audiences. October is National Cyber Security Awareness Month.
In October 2005, together with our state government and industry
partners, we reached millions of Americans with a public service
announcement, a satellite media tour on how to avoid identity
theft in cyberspace, a national cyber awareness webcast for fourth
and fifth graders, and many other activities. We look forward to
making this year's campaign even more successful.
Cyber space is borderless, and as such, managing cyber risk
needs to take into account international activities. NCSD has an
international affairs program that seeks to address cyber security
globally through cooperation and collaborative action toward
building and leveraging the relationships needed to prevent, protect
against, respond to and recover from cyber incidents and reduce
overall cyber risk.
National Cyberspace Security Response System
There are three elements to the National Cyberspace Security
Response System: the U.S. Computer Emergency Readiness Team
Operations, or "US-CERT Ops"; the National Cyber Response
Coordination Group, or "NCRCG"; and our regional preparedness and
recovery efforts.
The first key element, US-CERT, was established in 2003
as a partnership between the Department and the public and private
sectors to protect the nation's critical infrastructure and
coordinate defense against and responses to cyber attacks. The
US-CERT public website, http://www.us-cert.gov, the secure portal
for stakeholders, and the National Cyber Security Alert System,
provide timely, actionable information to technical and
non-technical users. We encourage each of you to sign up for
the US-CERT cyber alerts by going to http://www.us-cert.gov.
NCSD/US-CERT has an Operations component, which manages
many aspects of the Cyberspace Security Response System, including
situational awareness, incident handling and response, malicious
code analysis, and strategic operations. Under Federal Information
Security Management Act guidelines, OMB requires all Federal
civilian agencies to notify US-CERT of any data breaches,
unauthorized access, or suspicious activity, including the loss
of personally identifiable information within one hour of discovery.
US-CERT maintains a 24x7 secure Watch center; acts as a
trusted third party to assist in the responsible disclosure of
vulnerabilities; develops and participates in regional, national,
and international level exercises; supports forensic investigations
with recursive analysis on artifacts; provides malware (software
that is designed to infiltrate or damage a computer system, without
the owner knowing) analytic and recovery support for government
agencies; coordinates Federal programs of computer emergency
response teams and Chief Information Security Officer peer groups
for sharing cyber incident information, best practices, and other
cyber security information; and, collaborates with national and
international computer security incident response teams both in
the US and abroad. US-CERT's efforts in these and additional
areas build our cyber situational awareness capabilities that allow
us to prepare for and defend against cyber attacks, while also
enhancing our ability to respond to the attacks.
US-CERT has established the Government Forum of Incident
First Response Teams (GFIRST), a community of Federal agency
incident response teams, which comprises the government's critical
group of cyber first responders. GFIRST meets regularly, and we
have hosted two GFIRST conferences to enhance information sharing
and collaborative efforts to secure government cyberspace.
US-CERT provides an Internet Health Service tool to GFIRST members
through the US-CERT secure portal. IHS is a web-based application
that provides members with access to several commercially available
Internet and security products for use in building their situational
awareness capabilities through the monitoring of their respective
networks and the overall health of the Internet. In addition, as
part of our Situational Awareness Program, US-CERT also leverages
information technology for the automated sharing of critical
information across the Federal government and analysis of traffic
patterns and behavior.
US-CERT has developed a set of informational resources
that it provides to our public and private sector stakeholders,
including alerts, vulnerability notices, current activity
reports, Federal Information Notices provided to the GFIRST
community and Critical Infrastructure Information Notices provided
to the private sector Information Sharing and Analysis Centers.
In addition, US-CERT runs the National Cyber Alert System and the
public website reference above, which provide cyber security tips,
guidance, and other resource materials to technical and
non-technical audiences.
The second key element of the National Cyberspace Security
Response System is the National Cyber Response Coordination Group,
or "NCRCG". NCSD co-chairs the NCRCG with its counterparts in the
Department of Justice and the Department of Defense. The NCRCG
includes 13 agencies with responsibility for and capabilities in
cyber security matters and works to coordinate national response
activities to incidents of national significance. The NCRCG meets
monthly to prepare for cyber issues through tabletop exercises and
working groups.
In addition to the IDWG's efforts and US-CERT Operations
incident handling and analysis functions, the NRP's Emergency
Support Function 2 (ESF-2) for Communications, led by NCS, is a
critical component of advanced planning and ensuring coordinated
recovery efforts. When ESF- 2 is activated, the Manager of the
NCS ensures appropriate NS/EP communications support to operations
conducted under the NRP. As part of ESF-2, NCSD works closely
with NCS on preparing for recovery and reconstitution of
critical communications networks and services. In preparation for
this year's hurricane season, we have held ESF-2 training and
exercise sessions with participation by many Federal agencies and
organizations. We have created and published an ESF-2 Operational
Plan and a Standard Operating Plan for ESF- 2 supporting agencies
to enhance understanding across the spectrum of public and private
sector entities that participate in recovery and reconstitution
efforts. We have hired two Regional Communications Coordinators
for Federal Regions IV and VI communications pre planning with
state emergency planners. The NCS has also created more analytical
tools for predictive and post-impact analysis.
One of the critical parts of ESF-2 is a management function
to coordinate and facilitate the handling of private sector
donations for recovery and reconstitution efforts in the immediate
aftermath of a disaster such as Hurricane Katrina. We are working
with our private sector stakeholders and state and local government
partners to establish a set of requirements for such donations in
order to match those needs with the products and services
available.
The third key element of the National Cyberspace Security
Response System is our regional preparedness and recovery efforts.
Our regional efforts have greatly improved DHS's ability to
incorporate the work of our government and private sector
stakeholders at both the state and local levels. The Pacific
Northwest Economic Region and the Gulf Coast Region are
increasingly coordinating their efforts as a result of exercises
held in the respective regions, and we are working with them to
continue their preparedness planning for both cyber security
events, and manmade or natural disasters that have a cyber
impact. In addition, we are working with our industry stakeholders
in the IT-SCC and IT Information Sharing and Analysis Center) to
develop plans for industry assistance in the event of an
incident that requires surge support to recover and reconstitute
critical IT systems. These efforts depend greatly on our
partnerships with the full spectrum of affected industries,
state and local government stakeholders, and the emergency
response community.
Recent Success Stories
I would like to take this opportunity to highlight two
recent success stories in our comprehensive cyber security
efforts. First, we conducted the first National Cyber Exercise
organized and sponsored by the Federal government. Conducted in
February 2006, "Cyber Storm" was the largest multinational,
cross-sector cyber exercise to date and assessed policies and
procedures associated with a cyber-related incident of national
significance, as outlined in the National Response Plan's Cyber
Annex. The exercise tested, for the first time, the full range
of cyber-related response policy, procedures, and communications
methods required in a real world crisis.
Cyber Storm exercised the responses of over 100 public and
private agencies, associations, and corporations in over 60
locations and five countries. It achieved collaboration in crisis
response at operational, policy, and public affairs levels,
including participation of more than 30 private sector corporations
and associations in the planning, executing, and after action
analysis of a federally funded and congressionally mandated
emergency response exercise. As mentioned earlier, Cyber Storm
exercised the NCRCG as the principal Federal mechanism for
coordinating the national response to a cyber incident of national
significance. Cyber Storm demonstrated the close cooperation and
information sharing needs across Federal agencies, across
boundaries, and between the public and private sectors.
First, the exercise reinforced the importance of defining
roles and responsibilities, processes and procedures and having
strong communications and coordination among the cyber community.
In addition, it highlighted the importance of coordinating and
integrating incident communications and public affairs outreach.
Unlike a physical, self-announcing incident, a set of cyber attacks
such as those imagined in the Cyber Storm scenario are not
immediately apparent, either in occurrence or attribution. The
correlation of multiple incidents proved challenging for our
players, and only further demonstrated the importance of
public-private relationships and the need to provide on-going
training activities, discussions, and exercises to further build
those relationships to strengthen our collective response to a
cyber incident.
A second accomplishment falls in the international arena.
At the end of June, we successfully hosted here in Washington
the second multilateral conference on the development of an
International Watch and Warning Network, or "IWWN", among 15
countries in the Americas, Europe, and Asia Pacific. The country
participants included representatives from their government
critical information infrastructure protection organizations,
their computer security incident response teams, and their law
enforcement agencies with responsibility for cyber crime. The
IWWN was established in 2004 to foster international
collaboration on addressing cyber threats, attacks, and
vulnerabilities. The June conference established a clear path
forward for the IWWN community to enhance global cyber
situational awareness and incident response capabilities and
marked the launch of a secure Internet portal to facilitate
ongoing international information sharing as well as coordination
during cyber incidents.
The Road Ahead
As we further develop our programs and leverage our recent
successes, there are some efforts we need to undertake in the near
term with our industry and agency partners to better prepare
ourselves to respond to, and recover from, cyber incidents. These
efforts include, but are not limited to:
Further integration of the cyber security and telecommunications
efforts in the Department and with industry to reflect increasing
convergence in the sectors;
Clearer articulation of roles and responsibilities in the
public-private partnership for information sharing and incident
response through coordinated concept of operations and standard
operating procedures;
Development of the IT Sector Specific Plan in the NIPP risk
management framework;
Development of a national cyber risk assessment based upon the
cross sector cyber component of the NIPP risk management framework;
Share aggregated situational awareness across the civilian
agencies, the military, the international community, and the private
sector; and
Further collaboration between US-CERT Operations and the Department
of Defense's Joint Task Force-Global Network Operations to leverage
our respective expertise and capabilities toward common cyber
security objectives.
These action plans have defined benchmarks and milestones to
drive and track our progress in each of these areas.
Conclusion
The National Cyber Security Division has established its
mission and priority objectives, developed a strategic plan, and
undertaken significant steps to implement its strategic plan across
the programs outlined here. In this ever-evolving environment, we
know that the target will shift to accommodate new threats, new
vulnerabilities, and new technologies. We need to be flexible enough
to adjust our efforts to meet these new challenges.
Our progress to date is tangible: we have a construct for
public-private partnership; we have a track record of success in our
cyber operations; we have established relationships at various
levels to manage cyber incidents; we have built international
communities of interest to address a global problem; and we have
tested ourselves at a critical development stage and will continue
to examine our internal policies, procedures, and communications
paths in future exercises. We are building on each of these
achievements to take further steps to increase our cyber
preparedness and improve our response and recovery capabilities.
I would like to thank the Subcommittee for its time today
and I appreciate this opportunity to bring further transparency
to these important cyber security priorities.
MR. UPTON. Mr. Moran.
MR. MORAN. Thank you. Good morning, Chairman Upton,
Mr. Markey, and distinguished members of the subcommittee. My name
is Ken Moran. I serve as the Director of the Federal
Communications Commission's Office of Homeland Security. In that
role, I am responsible for coordinating the Commission's policies
and activities with respect to homeland security and emergency
preparedness.
The importance of effective communications cannot be
overstated, especially during emergencies. The attacks of
September 11 and the unprecedented devastation caused by Hurricane
Katrina remind us to be prepared for both natural and manmade
disasters. Effective response to a disaster, regardless of its
cause or lack of advanced notice, is tied to the ability of first
responders and commanding control authorities and the public to
communicate. Immediate, secure, and reliable communications are
needed across all platforms.
Today, I am testifying about the Network Reliability
and Interoperability Council, known as the NRIC, a Federal advisory
committee chartered by the Commission. I will also share some of
the lessons the Commission learned from its experiences in dealing
with Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and Wilma.
This subcommittee's attention to cybersecurity issues comes
at an important time in the development of broadband and IP-based
networks. Communications traffic is increasingly migrating to
these high speed packet based technologies. With the rollout of
these technologies, we are seeing a network security environment
very different from that of public switch telephone network, or
PSTN. Unlike the PSTN, Internet based communications systems
are decentralized and far more open. As a result, they present
new and difficult challenges in order to deliver the expected high
level of reliability and security.
The Network Reliability and Interoperability Council
examines ways to improve and strengthen the Nation's critical
communications networks. NRIC members agree on best practices
through a process of consensus and adopts solutions that are field
tested. In recent years, NRIC subject matter experts contributed
thousands of hours in study and dialog that resulted the
identification of best practices that address business continuity,
physical security, and public safety communications. In fact, over
200 best practices address cybersecurity issues. The Commission
is actively promoting both the awareness and the implementation of
these best practices.
Last fall, Hurricane Katrina caused an enormous amount of
damage to the communications infrastructure. The Commission
chartered an independent committee called the Katrina Panel to
analyze the impact that Katrina had on critical infrastructure to
examine the overall recovery effort and to recommend ways for
improvement. In June of this year, the Katrina Panel completed
its work and produced a report with a number of important
recommendations. The Commission subsequently released a notice
seeking comment on these recommendations. Here are a few.
The Federal Government should encourage and work with each
communications sector to develop and publicize readiness checklists.
State and local authorities should keep a reserve supply of
communications equipment, including IP gateways, for quick
restoration in communications functionality. The FCC should serve
as the single point of contact within the Federal Government for
communications data collection. The FCC should work with the
Department of Homeland Security and the Congress to improve the
credentialing processes and have critical infrastructure providers
treated as emergency responders under the Stafford Act.
In large measure, the functioning of the Internet is
dependent on communications networks that carry packet-based
information through both wired and wireless systems. These
communication networks support e-commerce measured in billions of
dollars per year. They enable many new communications applications,
including the use of voice over the Internet, and they help first
responders use IP solutions for interoperability.
The Commission is actively engaged in promoting the
development of new technologies to ensure that robust, reliable,
and readily restorable communications networks exist to lead our
Nation into the future.
I would be pleased to answer your questions. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Kenneth P. Moran follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF KENNETH P. MORAN, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF HOMELAND
SECURITY, ENFORCEMENT BUREAU, FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION
MR. UPTON. Mr. Weafer.
MR. WEAFER. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Markey,
distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for inviting me
here today to testify about protecting our Nation's critical
infrastructure from cyber attacks. My name is Vince Weafer and
I'm the Senior Director of Symantec Corporation.
I commend the committee for bringing attention to this
critical issue of the threat of potential cyber attacks against our
Nation's information infrastructure. I would like to provide you
with the current assessment of the vulnerabilities of our Nation's
critical infrastructure and share with you some insights of how
cyber crime is undermining consumer trust and confidence in using
the Internet for commerce.
Before I turn to the substance of my testimony, I would
like to provide some background on Symantec. We are a local leader
in information security. Symantec provides solutions that assure
security, availability, and integrity to our customer's
information. Headquartered in Cupertino, California, Symantec
employs over 15,000 professionals and has operations in over 40
countries.
I am responsible for Symantec's Security Response global
research teams, whose research provides rapid response to the latest
Internet security attacks. Our global intelligence network consists
of over 40,000 sensors monitoring the computer activity in over 180
countries. We operate four security operation centers worldwide,
in the United States, here in Alexandria, England, Germany, and
Australia. Each provides preemptive managed protection to
potential cyber threats 24/7. In short, if there is a class of
threat on the Internet, Symantec knows about it.
The important message regarding our Nation's cybersecurity
landscape is that threats in our critical infrastructure are
absolutely real, and without a doubt growing in intensity and
volume. The question is not if or when, but when will we be
attacked; how severe will that attack be?
Today's cyber threat landscape has changed. Internet
attacks these days are not the large scale fast-moving virus or worm
pandemics that we saw with frequency just a couple of years ago.
Consider this: from 2002 to 2004, there was almost 100 medium to
high severity attacks. Last year, there were only six, and this
year, there have been none.
What happened?
Well, we have certainly made significant headway in
containing these sort of threats, but the very nature of the risk we
face has also changed. Cyber crime is now the dominating security
threat we are seeing today. In the past, cyber attacks were largely
designed to destroy data and gain notoriety, but today's attacks
are increasingly designed to silently steal information for profit
or advantage. Fraud, intelligence gathering, and gaining access to
vulnerable systems are the motivation behind today's attacks.
How do many of these threats arrive in the consumer's
computer? A lot do so through botnets, programs that provide
attackers unauthorized and secret control of the computer. Botnets
are the engines that drive most of the criminal activity we see
today, as their use distributes spam, phishing, malicious code,
as well as storage for illegal material. Many of these botnets are
created on systems owned by home users, small businesses, and even
some large corporations.
Symantec releases a biannual Internet security threat
report, or ISTR, which includes a worldwide analysis of Internet
attacks, which review known threats, vulnerabilities, and security
risks. The findings consistently reveal that a strong growth in
cyber crime software built for the purpose of committing online
scams, stealing information, bots, keystroke loggers, spyware,
adware, and Trojan horses.
Attackers are not focusing just on GAN systems, but the
exploitable web browsers and also on the weaknesses of Web servers
and Web applications themselves. Bots are contributing to the rise
in cyber crime threats in the United States, having the highest
percentage of bot commander control servers in the world. There
has been an increase in modular malicious code, which initially
possesses limited functionality, but is designed to update itself
with new, more damaging capabilities.
With all of these threats and vulnerabilities that exist
on today's Internet, it is difficult to quantify the economic impact
of cyber crime, but according to the cyber crime costs about $47
billion to U.S. businesses last year. A report by the Congressional
Research Service also found that cyber attack targeted firms suffer
stock price decrease of about 1 to 5 percent in the days after
attack, which translates into shareholder loss of between $50 and
$200 million.
Over the past year, more than 53 million records of
Americans' private, personal information, an average of over 142,000
times per day, have been hacked into, lost, stolen, or otherwise
compromised from digital databases. The cost of these breaches is
astounding. According to the Federal Trade Commission, identity
thefts cost businesses annually $48 billion, and last year,
consumers lost $680 million. But more damaging than loss of money
is a lost of trust and confidence by consumers in the Internet.
That is why we can't risk losing the public's trust in online
commerce, but we are. According to a survey conducted by the
Conference Board, 41 percent are purchasing less online because
of security concerns, and a survey by the Cybersecurity Alliance
found that 32 percent of respondents strongly believe their
financial information gets stolen.
Congress can help fight cyber crime and cyber terrorism by
investing in cyber safety education, awareness, increase funding
for cyber R&D, passing strong national data breach law, extending
international cyber crime law enforcement efforts, and requiring an
Internet reconstitution plan for the U.S. government.
I would be happy to elaborate on these points and any
questions the committee may have. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Vincent Weafer follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF VINCENT WEAFER, SENIOR DIRECTOR, SYMANTEC
SECURITY RESPONSE, SYMANTEC CORPORATION
Summary of Points for Vincent Weafer Testimony
It's vitally important that we pay attention to the threats to our
nation's security including the clear and present danger of
potential cyber attacks against our nation's information
infrastructure.
An attack against the U.S. that combines both cyber and physical
elements could be particularly devastating. The threats to our
critical infrastructure are absolutely real and, without a doubt,
growing.
Cybercrime is the dominant security threat we're seeing today and
there's been a marked increase in the use of "crimeware," or
software used to conduct cybercrime.
* Cybercrime is undermining consumer trust which in turn is eroding
the publics' confidence in performing commerce over the Internet.
There are economic consequences that cyber attacks are having on
the U.S. economy.
The cyber threat landscape has changed. In the past, cyber
attacks were largely designed to destroy data or gain notoriety, but
today's attacks are increasingly designed to silently steal data
for profit or advantage, without leaving behind the system damage
that would be noticeable.
Symantec's most recent Internet Security Threat Report (ISTR) found
that the last 6 months have seen growth in attack trends, bot
infections denial of service attacks, malicious code such as Trojans
and phishing attacks.
Symantec's ISTR found that attackers are moving away from large,
multiple purpose attacks against traditional security devices such
as firewalls and routers. Instead, they are focusing their efforts
on smaller regional businesses using combination of employee and
end user desktops and Web applications to steal corporate,
personal, financial, or confidential information.
Programs that provide attackers with unauthorized control of a
computer, known as bots, also contribute to the rise in cybercrime
threats. Symantec identified an average daily total of 57,717
active bot network computers per day or a total of 4,696,903
distinct active bot network computers over the six month period.
In the first six months of 2006, the United States had the highest
percentage of bot command-and-control servers with 42% of the
worldwide total. As a result of this fifty-eight percent of all
spam detected worldwide originated in the United States
If we fail to create a trusted digital environment, we won't just
slow the growth of e-business, but of all business. And this is
the real hidden threat today - not some massive cyber attack, but
the loss of consumer confidence in the digital world.
It is difficult to quantify the economic impact of cyber crime but
according to the FBI's 2005 Cyber Crime Survey cyber crime costs
about $67 billion to U.S. firms over the last year.
The cost of these breaches, in terms of time and money, is
astounding. According to the Federal Trade Commission identity
theft costs businesses $48 billion annually, and last year cost
consumers $680 million in losses. On top of that, identity theft
victims collectively spent almost 300 million hours trying to
repair damage.
In this country, we need one, national data-breach law. The
business community must join together with Congress to push for
comprehensive privacy legislation.
Overview
Chairman Upton, Ranking Member Markey, distinguished members
of the Subcommittee: Thank you for inviting me here today to testify
about protecting our nation's critical infrastructure and the
opportunity to provide you with an overview of the current cyber
threat landscape. My name is Vincent Weafer and I am the Senior
Director of Security Response for Symantec Corporation.
I'd like to begin by commending the Subcommittee for
bringing attention to this critical issue. It's vitally important
that we pay attention to the threats to our nation's security
including the clear and present danger of potential cyber attacks
against our nation's information infrastructure.
Our society's increasing dependence on computers means that
the disruption of our networks whether due to nation-states,
terrorists, criminals, or simply pranksters could seriously impair
public safety, national security, economic prosperity and, more
generally, our way of life. An attack against the information
technology backbone of one of our nation's so-called critical
infrastructures such as communications services, energy, financial
services, manufacturing, water, transportation, health care, and
emergency services could disrupt Americans physical and economic
well-being and have a worldwide impact. An attack against the
U.S. that combines both cyber and physical elements could be
particularly devastating, such as a physical attack against a
building combined with disruption of the telecommunications
infrastructure needed to provide emergency services to the
physically affected area.
Accordingly, I would like to devote my testimony today to
two issues. I would first like to provide this Subcommittee with
Symantec's updated assessment of our nation's cyber security
landscape and discuss the vulnerabilities of the U.S.
information infrastructure to cyber attacks.
Second, I'd like to discuss the considerable negative impact
that cybercrime is having on undermining consumer trust which in
turn is eroding the publics' confidence in performing commerce
over the Internet. Finally, I will discuss the economic consequences
that cyber attacks are having on the U.S. economy.
Background on Symantec
Before I turn to the main substance of my testimony, I would
like to provide you background on Symantec Corporation. Symantec is
the global leader in information security. We provide solutions to
help individuals and enterprises assure the security, availability
and integrity of their information. Symantec's Norton brand of
products is the worldwide leader in consumer security and problem
solving solutions. Headquartered in Cupertino, California,
Symantec employs over 15,000 professionals and has operations in
more than 40 countries.
I am responsible for the Symantec Security Response global
research teams. My mission is to advance the research into the new
Internet security threats and to provide the most trusted and rapid
response to today's complex threats, security risks and cyber
attacks. Symantec Security Response protects a variety of
businesses, consumers and government agencies from the latest
security threats. Symantec Security Response consists of dedicated
intrusion experts, security engineers, virus hunters, and global
technical support teams that provide our customers with
comprehensive, global, 24x7 Internet security expertise to guard
against today's complex Internet threats.
Symantec gathers our research from our "Global Intelligence
Network" which consists of more than 40,000 sensors monitoring
activity on computers in more than 180 countries. We gather data
from over 120 million computer systems that use Symantec's anti-virus
products and probe over 2 million decoy email accounts. Symantec
also operates 4 cyber Security Operations Centers spread across the
globe -including Alexandria, Virginia; London, England; Munich,
Germany; and Sydney, Australia - each dedicated to relentlessly
searching the Internet for potential cyber threats 24 hours a day,
365 days a year to provide managed, pre-emptive protection for our
customers. If there is a class of threat on the Internet Symantec
knows about it.
State of the Nation's Cyber Security Landscape
As the company representative of the security technology
industry on this morning's panel, I want to stress an important
message about our nation's cyber security landscape: First, the
threats to our critical infrastructure are absolutely real and,
without a doubt, growing. The question is not if or even when
we'll be attacked but how severe will the attack be.
Today, I stand before you to say that the threat has
changed.
The main risks to information these days are not the
large-scale, fast-moving virus or worm pandemic type attacks that
we saw with frequency just a couple years ago. Consider this: from
2002 to 2004, there were almost 100 medium-to-high risk attacks.
Last year, there were only six and so far in 2006, there have
been none.
What happened?
We've made significant headway in containing and repelling
these sorts of threats. And an equally big part is that the very
nature of the risks we face has changed. In the past, cyber
attacks were largely designed to destroy data or gain notoriety,
but today's attacks are increasingly designed to silently steal
data for profit or advantage, without leaving behind the system
damage that would be noticeable to a user.
Fraud, intelligence gathering and gaining access to
vulnerable systems are the motivation behind many of today's
attacks. The attackers are not interested in notoriety. They're
interested in flying below the radar, using lower profile, more
targeted attacks, attacks that propagate at a slower rate in order
to avoid detection and thereby increase the likelihood of
successful compromise. Instead of exploiting vulnerabilities
in servers, as traditional attacks often did, these threats tend
to exploit vulnerabilities in client-side applications that require
a degree of user interaction, such as word processing and
spreadsheet programs. A number of these have been zero-day
vulnerabilities. These types of threats also attempt to escape
detection in order to remain on host systems for longer periods
so that they can steal information or provide remote access.
They're increasingly interested and capable of perpetrating silent,
highly-targeted attacks to steal sensitive personal, financial,
and operational information using data mining techniques to
identify the victims and improve the effectiveness of the
attack.
Cybercrime is the dominating security threat we're seeing
today and there's been a marked increase in the use of "crimeware".
Crimeware is software built with the purpose of committing online
scams and stealing information; it includes (but is not limited to)
bots, keystroke loggers, spyware, backdoors, and Trojan horses or
software used to conduct cybercrime.
Symantec just compiled the latest cyber threat data for our
tenth Internet Security Threat Report, or ISTR, which is widely
acknowledged to be the most comprehensive analysis of security
activity for today's information economy. The Report includes an
analysis of network based attacks on the Internet with a review
of known threats, vulnerabilities, and highlights of malicious
code and additional security risks. Symantec has provided this
Report semi annually since 2002.
The ISTR also offers security best practices for consumers
and businesses to help them protect against current and emerging
cyber crime threats. Symantec's ISTR found that the last 6 months
have seen growth in attack trends, bot infections denial of service
attacks, malicious code such as Trojans and phishing attacks.
Symantec's ISTR found that attackers are moving away from
large, multiple purpose attacks against traditional security
devices such as firewalls and routers. Instead, they are focusing
their efforts on regional targets, desktops and Web applications
that may allow an attacker to steal corporate, personal,
financial, or confidential information; this information could
then be used for additional criminal activity. Attackers are
focusing not just on the end users systems via exploitable
browser vulnerabilities, but also on weaknesses in the web
servers and web applications. They can use that weakness to drop
malicious code such as a keyboard logger onto a users system,
when the unwitting and unprotected user browses or 'drives-by'
the compromised Web site. This attack impacts both the end user
privacy, as well as the brand name of the company whose Web
presence has been compromised.
Programs that provide attackers with unauthorized control
of a computer, known as bots, also contribute to the rise in
cybercrime threats. Symantec's March 2006 Internet Security Threat
Report identified an average of 9,163 infected computers each
day-bot networks are being increasingly used for criminal activities
such as DoS-based extortion attempts. We believe we will see a
continuing growth trend in the area of botnet infected computers.
During that period, the United States had a very high percentage
of the bot command-and-control servers worldwide. Symantec expects
this trend to continue.
Botnets are the engine that drives most of the criminal
activity, as they get used by to distribute Spam, Phishing messages,
malicious code as well as storage for illegal material. Many of
these botnets are created on systems owned by home users, small
businesses and even some large corporations.
Symantec estimates that the measurement above is only
capturing a portion of global activity and that the actual infection
numbers are likely to be much higher. In our March 2006 Internet
Security Threat Report Symantec identified an average of 1,402 DoS
attacks per day-a 51 percent increase over the previous reporting
period. Our Reports consistently show that the United States was
the target of the most DoS attacks, accounting for over half of
the worldwide total.
We believe that this growth trend will continue as attackers
leverage an increasing number of Web-based application and browser
vulnerabilities.
In Symantec's March 2006 ISTR, we saw, attacks directed at
Web application technologies increase-69 percent of the
vulnerabilities reported to Symantec affected Web application
technologies, a 15 percent increase over the previous reporting
period. The new report does see a significant amount of attacks
targeted. We found that Web application technologies, which rely
on a browser for their user interface, present an easier target for
attackers due to their availability over commonly allowed protocols
such as HTTP.
Symantec has also consistently seen an increase in modular
malicious code, which initially possesses limited functionality but
is designed to update itself with new, more damaging capabilities.
Modular malicious threats often expose confidential information
that can then be used in identity theft, credit card fraud, or
other criminal financial activities. According to our March 2006
ISTR, malicious code that could reveal confidential information
rose from 74 percent of the top 50 malicious code samples last
reporting period to 80 percent this period-an increase of 6
percentage points. Symantec expects this growth to continue to
increase in future reporting periods.
These criminals are targeting all sorts of organizations.
By leveraging the vast number of new vulnerabilities, the
potential introduction of entirely new and more destructive forms
of malicious code and cyber attacks tools represents a
substantial future risk. Our law enforcement, military and
national security agencies face an even more sophisticated threat
with all of these new vulnerabilities, zero day attacks and highly
targeted attacks.
Right now, more than 20 nations possess dedicated computer
attack programs - and that number doesn't include terrorist
organizations.1 Cyber warfare is a part of their war plans.
Indeed, in the first half of 2004, DoD experienced more
than 150 hostile intrusion attempts per day. In the first half of
2005, that number was up to more than 500 a day.2
More specifically, cybercriminals could attack our computer
systems in a variety of ways, causing serious consequences
including: (1) compromising the integrity of data, such as deleting
records of financial institutions; (2) breaching the confidentiality
of data, such as obtaining information from power and energy plants
which can then be used to plan a physical attack; and (3) acting
as weapons of mass disruption to take-down key Internet nodes
whose failure would then lead to a cascading effect, meaning
wide-ranging disruption of other parts of our critical
infrastructures, or more likely impacting our ability to respond
to a physical event.
The Economic Impact of Cyber Attacks and the Undermining of U.S.
Consumer Confidence in Using the Internet for Commerce
Unless a trusted relationship exists between businesses and
consumers the risks associated with online transactions will
become unacceptable. So, the expectations are high. And, the
stakes are enormous.
Across industries, companies have built into their business
models the efficiencies of these new digital technologies - such as
real-time tracking of packages and online commerce. The continued
expansion of the digital lifestyle is already built into almost
every company's assumptions for growth - and underpins the
assumptions for the global economy.
Think about what would happen if banks were forced to stop
all online banking and go back to the days of long lines at teller
windows. The costs would be enormous. Today, it costs a
bank $10 when a consumer originates a loan online. That cost
jumps to more thank $200 when the loan is originated through a
branch office.
We can't go back to the old way of doing business - and,
that's why creating confidence in the digital world is everybody's
job. For the individual company, failure to protect their
customers' information will result in customers simply taking
their business someplace else, to someone they can trust. And
they won't necessarily turn to the company around the corner. In
the global economy, security can be a competitive advantage - or
disadvantage. If consumers can't trust businesses from our
country, they'll look all over the world for the one's they believe
they can trust. In such a world, security guarantees are very
likely to trump the comfort of the local brand.
If we fail to create a trusted digital environment, we won't
just slow the growth of e-business, but of all business. We won't
just hurt the digital economy, but the economy as a whole. And
this is the real hidden threat today - not some massive cyber
attack, but the loss of consumer confidence in the digital world.
The IT industry has made huge strides these past few years,
and from the evidence at hand we've made significant headway in
controlling large-scale, fast moving viruses and worms. The broad
adoption of best security practices and defense in-depth
strategies, deployment of firewall, antivirus, and intrusion
detection software and the progress operating system vendors have
made in improving the security of their operating system platforms
have made this possible. Mitigating the large scale virus and worm
challenge is a major accomplishment but those are yesterday's
problems.
Today we face a bigger challenge. As vendors and
enterprises have adapted to the changing threat environment this
has resulted in more targeted malicious code and targeted attacks
aimed at client-side applications, such as Web browsers, email
clients, and other applications. These applications are used to
communicate over networks and interact with Web-based services
and applications and Web sites. Today's threats are silent and
highly targeted. They take advantage of the naivet� and
inexperience of many online users. For example, attackers set
up fake Web sites with relative ease and dupe people into offering
up financial information or making a donation to a bogus charity.
And of course, there are the large scale data breaches - some
innocent, some inside jobs, and some the work of skilled
criminals - that have made identity theft a growing threat to the
digital lifestyle.
For six consecutive years, identity theft has topped the
annual list of consumer complaints collected by the Federal Trade
Commission. Over the past year more than 52 million records of
Americans' private personal information - an average of 142,000
per day - have been hacked into, lost, stolen or otherwise
compromised from digital databases.
The cost of these breaches, in terms of time and money, is
astounding. According to the Federal Trade Commission identity
theft costs businesses $48 billion annually, and last year cost
consumers $680 million in losses. On top of that, identity theft
victims collectively spent almost 300 million hours trying to repair
damage.
It is difficult to quantify the economic impact of cyber
crime but according to the FBI's 2005 Cyber Crime Survey cyber crime
costs about $67 billion to U.S. firms over the last year. A Report
by the Congressional Research Service found that investigations
into the stock price impact of cyber-attacks show the identified
target firms suffer losses of 1%-5% in the days after an attack.
For the average New York Stock Exchange corporation, price drops
of these magnitudes translate into shareholder losses of between
$50 million and $200 million.
But more damaging than the loss of money is the loss of
trust and confidence by consumers in the Internet economy which so
many of our nation's businesses depend upon. We can't risk losing
the public's confidence in online e-commerce but consumers are
beginning to rethink doing business on the Internet.
In the first six months of 2006, the home user sector was
the most highly targeted sector, accounting for 86% of all targeted
attacks. According to a survey of more than 10,000 households
conducted by the Conference Board, 41 percent are purchasing less
online because of security concerns. And according to a survey
by the Cyber Security Industry Alliance, 32 percent of respondents
strongly believe that their financial information may get stolen
online.
We can't allow this trust to continue to erode. We can't
continue to lose the public's confidence and expect to continue the
robust digital lifestyle that we've come to enjoy. Trust
ultimately, is the foundation of the online world.
But we have a long way to go in educating consumers. For
example, a study by Small Business Technology Institute (SBTI)
entitled, "Small Business Information Security Readiness," reveals
a real lack of appreciation of the true economic impact of
information security incidents and a lack of knowledge of cyber
threats. Additionally, they find a lack of forward planning and
matching investment required to maintain the security necessary
to protect small businesses. Shockingly this study found that
over 74 percent of small businesses perform no information
security planning whatsoever. Such a lack of knowledge and
awareness is inhibiting the wide adoption of adequate information
security protection.
Recommendations
Let me now discuss some actions that we believe Congress can
improve our cyber security.
I. Awareness and Education
Educating our consumers, our small businesses, the operators
of the critical infrastructure and all levels of government on the
importance of protecting our systems is essential. We need a broad
awareness campaign that reaches out to all users of the Internet.
The growing use of always-on broadband connections by home
users and small businesses represents a significant amount of
computing power, which left unprotected can be taken over and used
as zombie machines to damage our networks and the hinder the
commerce and services that flow through them.
At the least, these home users should deploy a minimum
protection of firewall and anti-virus technology. The remote or
wireless-connected worker is also becoming more prevalent and can
unknowingly open up a corporate network to potential vulnerabilities
and attack through unprotected connections.
Enterprises and government agencies should engage their
employees in security awareness programs to ensure better protection
of their systems. Whether it's reminding them not to post their
passwords on a yellow sticky pad on their computer, or enacting
corporate best practices to change those passwords on a regular
basis making them difficult to break.
In an effort to better educate consumers, Symantec will
participate in the October National Cyber Security Awareness Month
initiative organized by the National Cyber Security Alliance (NCSA).
As a founding sponsor of the NCSA, Symantec will also support the
NCSA's national public service announcement campaign to promote
online security among individuals, small businesses and schools.
The NCSA is a non-profit, public-private partnership
consisting of businesses, consumer groups, government agencies and
educational institutions dedicated to raising the awareness of
cyber security issues and best practices. The NCSA provides tools
and resources to empower home users, small business, and schools
to stay safe online. More information about the organization and
the October National Cyber Security Awareness Month can be found
at www.staysafeonline.info.
At the enterprise and organizational level, the issue of
IT security has for too long been an administrator or a CIO issue.
This needs to change. Cyber security needs the attention of the
CEO and the boardroom. Only then can we institute the necessary
cultural change and focus enough attention and resources to truly
address this issue. We urge the Committee to provide much needed
resources to the agencies under its jurisdiction such as the
Federal Trade Commission, the Department of Commerce and the
Federal Communications Commission to promote cyber education to
help better inform consumes of cyber threats.
II. Cyber Crime
We need to realize that protecting the Internet is really a
global issue, one that requires better international cooperation.
First, we need better resources for law enforcement to work on
computer forensics, and we need cooperation from industry to
assist prosecutors in building cases. Second, the ratification of
the Council of Europe's cyber crime treaty is a good starting point
but now that this framework is in place we need additional resources
for international cybercrime enforcement, training funds and a
single point of contact in the U.S. to coordinate such efforts.
Third, industry should reach across borders when appropriate, to
share information on best practices, threats and vulnerabilities,
in order to gain a measure of early warning of potential attacks.
Finally there should be a single point of contact in government so
that those leaders can communicate at a peer level in times of major
cyber attack.
III. Research and Development
Today, industry and government tends to look at the more
immediate threats to our cyber infrastructure, rather than a holistic
view of encompassing threats of today and tomorrow. It is a view that
needs to change. As mentioned earlier, flash threats may be on us in
the near future and we must be more proactive in our cyber security
practices focusing on behavior blocking and better patch management,
including the use of fast, safe and non-disruptive patching. Given
the shrinking time from discovery to exploit, we should engage in
projects like real-time vulnerability scanning, management and
patching and we must do it together in partnership; industry
government and academia alike. The Federal Government must focus
on funding cybersecurity R&D to meet the constantly evolving threats
that face our nation's critical infrastructure. And the Government
must also lead by example, securing its own systems through the use
of reasonable security practices.
IV. Clearly Defined Internet Response and Reconstitution Policy
The federal government needs a clearly defined Internet
response and reconstitution policy for all agencies and departments.
Public and private organizations that would oversee recovery of
the Internet have unclear or overlapping responsibilities, resulting
in too many institutions with too little interaction and
coordination. Also, existing organizations and institutions charged
with Internet recovery should have sufficient resources and
support. For example, little of the National Cyber Security
Division (NCSD)'s funding is targeted for support of cyber
recovery.
V. Secure Digital Control Systems for Physical Infrastructure
Our nation relies on a digitally controlled utility and
commercial infrastructure such as the electrical transmission
grid, oil and natural gas, water, waste water, chemicals,
telecommunications, transportation, banking and finance - and
many critical manufacturing processes. Remote control of
distributed critical infrastructure occurs with Supervisory
Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems. These systems are
designed to be open and interoperable; but their increasing use
of the Internet for communications makes them vulnerable to cyber
attack. Such attacks could have devastating consequences such
as endangering public health and safety, according to the
Government Accounting Office. We urge Congress to pass legislation
to form a task force of key government agencies, appropriate
regulators, experts in the cyber security field, and representatives
from utilities and suppliers to meet and recommend concrete actions
to improve the security of control systems supporting critical
infrastructure.
VI. Direct a Federal Agency to Track Costs Associated with Cyber
Attacks
No one in the field is satisfied with our present ability to
measure the costs and probabilities of cyber attacks. There are no
standard methodologies for the cost measurement, and study of the
frequency of attacks is hindered by the reluctance of organizations
to make public their experiences with security breaches. The lack
of a methodology or measurement program also prohibits knowing
how much national efforts to improve cyber security are working.
We urge Congress to pass legislation directing the federal
government to work with private industry on a methodology to
measure the true cost of cyber attacks, and to track those
associated costs as part of ongoing national economic assessment.
VII. Pass a National Data Breach Law and Consider Comprehensive
Privacy Reform
The business community must join together with Congress to
push for comprehensive privacy legislation. Some governments have
already stepped to the plate. However, up until now, the U.S.
government has been reactive - dealing with important parts of
the issue on a piecemeal basis. Currently, U.S. privacy
regulations focus on sensitive areas such as financial and health
information and protecting children online. It's an approach
that, ultimately, will result in a number of different confusing
regulations. In light of the growth of identity theft and the
rise of invasive threats like spyware, we need a comprehensive
response that ensures that information is protected at every step
along the way.
In this country, we need one, national data-breach law.
Instead of the quilt of state laws, we need one federal law that
protects all consumers from data breaches and requires businesses
to put in place some type of reasonable security measures. We
urge Congress to pass a national data breach law this year that
would require notification of affected consumers and would provide
tough enforcement policies.
Conclusions
In closing, let me issue this challenge to industry,
government and the individual users: We must take cyber security
more seriously and we must do it together.
The increasing prevalence of blended threats and the
potential for even more fast-spreading and damaging exploits is a
serious threat to our nation's information infrastructure and the
economic benefits that we derive from it. We need strong
leadership from industry and government to promote awareness and
education on cyber security, more resources for law enforcement to
investigate and prosecute cyber criminals, strong research and
development partnerships to tackle the challenges of future threats
to the Internet, and more vigilance from business and governments
by putting resources and support behind a proactive IT security
program.
But most importantly we all as individual users of the
Internet need to do our part, to protect cyber space. Experience
shows that effective implementations of security solutions cost
in the range of 6-8% of overall IT budgets. Few corporations
outside of the finance sector, or government departments, have
allocated such levels of funding to this critical need. It is time
that we put our resources to work to minimize the risk of a
serious disruption of our national cyber infrastructure.
Thank you and I look forward to your questions.
MR. UPTON. Mr. Kurtz.
MR. KURTZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and other members of
the committee. It is a pleasure to be here this morning.
You have asked me to comment on a very broad topic: to look
at the importance of cybersecurity, not just as it relates to our
critical infrastructures, but across America's economy and for all
consumers.
Cyber systems are our newest and most pervasive
infrastructure. They drive and organize every facet of our
collective and individual lives, from national and economic
security to personal health and well-being. And yet, we do not
have a strategic national capability to assess how well most
critical systems are protected and what the consequences are if
they fail. There is little strategic direction or leadership
from the Federal government in the area of information security.
Insuring the resiliency and integrity of our information
infrastructure and protecting the privacy of our citizens should
be a higher priority for the Government. We must move beyond
philosophy and statements of aspiration to defining priorities
in programs.
CSI believes that the Government has a responsibility to
lead, set priorities, coordinate, and facilitate protection
response. Let me be clear. This is not a call for regulation
and intervention. This is a call for leadership. It is myopic
to assume that DHS has exclusive government responsibility for
the entire continuum of security across the information
infrastructure and for all threats.
When we think about the potential impact of cyber threats
and attacks on our overall economy, for consumers as a whole we
must acknowledge that we have a strategic national interest in
cybersecurity and that a much broader review of cybersecurity is
required and extended beyond DHS.
We face various forms of cyber attacks every day, and
within businesses. Every day, thousands of citizens have their
sensitive personal information compromised through data breaches,
phishing campaigns, Internet fraud, and other cyber crimes. As
a result, consumers do not have confidence that they should in
the Internet. A major cyber disruption could prevent companies
from operating critical systems, possibly for sustained periods
of time. This means the planes may not fly, goods and services
may not be distributed, power and gas may not be available, and
all this would potentially have a devastating impact on our
economy and national security.
In preparing for how to respond to a significant cyber
event, the critical unanswered question is what is a suitable role
for the Government, including DHS, DOD, and FCC, in facilitating,
recovering, and reconstitution from an incident of national
significance? The Federal government must engage in a serious
inquiry of the following questions. What is an incident of
national significance and what is the process for determining such
an event? What are its ramifications? What obligations do the
private sector entities have to obey a DHS directive or another
entity's directive? Who would resolve conflicting demands for
scarce cyber resources, such as bandwidth? What authorities should
DHS, DOD, and FCC have to help the Nation recover from cyber
attacks? We must take a holistic view. United States needs a
strategic national information assurance policy.
We have a chart over to your right that you might take a
look at. What I have tried to do here is identify a cycle, if
you will, for responding, preparing to cyber attacks or cyber
difficulties. It is an overly simplistic chart. I will say
that right up front, you know. You could add Department of
Energy and Treasury, but the point here is that several agencies
have a role and responsibility in this process, and it would be
helpful if the White House would assert a greater level of
coordination and support for these activities as well. This
problem clearly extends beyond DHS. DHS has significant issues
that it is trying to resolve, and it would help if the White
House would step in and ensure greater level of coordination.
DHS, working with other agents, needs to articulate a
chain of command for recovery and reconstitution. In addition,
DHS needs to articulate an emergency communications system that
works, even when standard communications interconnectivity is
disrupted. Emergency communications entail more than simply
establishing a resilient mechanism for allowing people to talk;
it requires advance identification for the right people being
able to use the right language to talk, and I will note that Under
Secretary Foresman's report that was released today talks about
some of these issues.
A summary of our recommendations: consider the need for a
government-wide strategic national information assurance policy;
increase attention to cybersecurity; appoint a leader. Everybody
has talked about the need for an Assistant Secretary for Cyber
and Telecommunications. I don't need to dwell on that more. Plan
to prevent or minimize a cyber attack of major significance. Plan
to work with the private sector to recover from a major disaster.
And I have to urge the Congress to take the step and pass a national
bill to secure sensitive, personal information.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Paul B. Kurtz follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF PAUL B. KURTZ, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, CYBER
SECURITY INDUSTRY ALLIANCE
Introduction:
Chairman Upton, Congressman Markey and Members of the
Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify today. My
name is Paul Kurtz and I am Executive Director of the Cyber Security
Industry Alliance (CSIA).
CSIA is the only advocacy group dedicated to ensuring the
privacy, reliability and integrity of information systems through
public policy, technology, education and awareness. The
organization is led by CEOs from the world's top security providers
who offer the technical expertise, depth and focus needed to
encourage a better understanding of security issues. It is our
belief that a comprehensive approach to ensuring the security and
resilience of information systems is fundamental to global
protection, national security and economic stability.
Before joining CSIA, I served at the White House on the
National Security Council and Homeland Security Council. On the
NSC, I served as Director of Counterterrorism and Senior Director
of the Office of Cyberspace Security. On the HSC, I was Special
Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Critical
Infrastructure Protection.
You have asked me to comment on a very broad topic - to
look at the importance of cyber security not just as it relates
to our critical infrastructures, but across America's economy and
for all consumers. Later today I will testify before the House
Homeland Security Committee on a narrow but important piece of
your much broader inquiry - cyber security and recovery of our
critical infrastructure - so I particularly appreciate the chance
to begin that dialogue at the 50,000 foot level you posit.
Right now no one in government is really looking at the
macro-level. The fact is that cyber systems are our newest and
most pervasive infrastructure. They drive and organize every facet
of our collective and individual lives from national and economic
security to personal health and well-being - and yet we do not
have a strategic national capability to assess how well the most
critical systems are protected, and what the consequences are if
they fail. Currently, there is little strategic direction or
leadership from the federal government in the area of information
security. Ensuring the resiliency and integrity of our
information infrastructure and protecting the privacy of our
citizens should be higher on the priority list for our government.
CSIA believes the government has a responsibility to lead, set
priorities, and coordinate and facilitate protection and response.
DHS has a central role in protecting critical cyber infrastructure
from massive attack, but government must consider economic
consequences and impact to our citizens in a more comprehensive and
systematic way.
Clearly DHS has a vital and central role - HSPD 7 designates
the Department of Homeland Security as a focal point for
infrastructure protection, including cyber security. [We'll get
to how well, or poorly, they are doing in just a moment.] But it
is myopic to assume DHS has exclusive government responsibility for
the entire continuum of security across all information
infrastructures, and for all threats. DHS should, indeed must be
accountable for coordinating the protection of our most critical
infrastructures from serious attack or devastation. But when we
think about the potential impacts of cyber threats and attacks on
our overall economy, or for consumers as a whole, we must
acknowledge that we have a strategic national interest in cyber
security that is much broader than the mandate of DHS or the
immediate challenges it faces. We face various forms of cyber
attacks and efforts to exploit faulty software code every day.
Businesses routinely fight against unauthorized intrusions, whether
for sport, industrial espionage, or more nefarious reasons.
Companies incur significant costs to keep up with ever-more
sophisticated efforts to compromise their systems, ultimately
we all bear these costs. And every day, thousands of citizens
have their sensitive personal information compromised through data
breaches, phishing campaigns, Internet fraud and other cyber
crimes. As a result, consumers do not have trust and confidence
in online services and e-commerce, with significant economic results
for many industries.
The truth is that a major cyber disruption could prevent
companies from operating critical systems, possibly for sustained
periods of time. This means that planes may not fly, goods and
services may not be distributed, power and gas may not be
available, and all of this would have a potentially devastating
impact on our economy and our citizens.
Most importantly, DHS must consider and articulate how it
will work with the private sector to respond to and recover from a
massive failure of information technology systems - whether from a
cyber attack or a natural disaster. In preparing for how to
respond to a significant cyber event, the unanswered question
affecting all is: What is a suitable role for DHS as well as
other key federal agencies, including DoD and the FCC, in
facilitating recovery and reconstitution from a cyber "incident
of national significance"? The Federal government must engage
in a serious inquiry of the following questions:
What is an "incident of national significance" and what is the
process for determining such an event and its legal significance?
What obligations do private sector entities have to obey
directives from DHS, or other agencies?
Who would resolve conflicting demands for scarce cyber
resources?
What enforcement power does DHS, DOD, and the FCC have to help the
nation recover from a cyber disaster?
These are tough questions, and raise complex policy issues
which extend beyond DHS.
We must take a holistic view - the United States needs a Strategic
National Information Assurance Policy
The bottom line is that protecting our cyber infrastructure
is not just DHS's problem. In large measure, because our cyber
infrastructure is almost exclusively owned and operated by the
private sector, the front line defense is the investment made by
infrastructure providers on behalf of their customers. But, in
addition to DHS, many key departments and agencies have key roles
in protecting our cyber infrastructure:
* The Department of Commerce has a key role. The Department of
Commerce advocates for technological innovation and has
responsibility to develop and promote measurements, standards,
and technology to enhance productivity, trade, and the quality of
life. This includes conducting research to advance the U.S.
technology infrastructure and supporting the development of
technologies for broad national benefit.1 The Under Secretary for
Technology Administration has the lead in developing and promoting
information security standards and in leading research and
development efforts to enhance privacy and security. There is much
more Commerce could do. For example, Commerce currently does not
measure consumer or business confidence in the information
infrastructure or the costs of attacks or disruptions. Commerce,
in partnership with DHS, could support increased adoption of
insurance. Currently, many insurance companies are reluctant to
enter this market because of a lack of actuarial data.
The Federal Trade Commission has a key role. The FTC's
Enforcement Division conducts a wide variety of law enforcement
activities to protect consumers online, including: (1) ensuring
compliance with administrative and federal court orders entered in
consumer protection cases; (2) conducting investigations and
prosecuting civil actions to stop fraudulent, unfair or deceptive
marketing and advertising practices; and (3) enforcing consumer
protection laws, rules, and guidelines.2
The U.S. Department of Justice has a key role. The Computer
Crime and Intellectual Property Section (CCIPS) within DOJ's
Criminal Division is responsible for combating computer and
intellectual property crimes worldwide. CCIPS' Computer Crime
Initiative is a comprehensive program designed to combat
electronic penetrations, data thefts, and cyber attacks on
critical information systems. CCIPS prevents, investigates, and
prosecutes computer crimes by working with other government
agencies, the private sector, academic institutions, and foreign
counterparts.3
The Federal Communications Commission has a key role. Charged
with regulating interstate and international communications, the
FCC has established the following objectives:
To evaluate and strengthen measures for protecting the Nation's communications infrastructure.
To facilitate rapid restoration of the U.S. communications
infrastructure and facilities after disruption by a threat or attack.
To develop policies that promote access to effective communications
services by public safety, public health, and other emergency and
defense personnel in emergency situations. 4
The Department of Defense has a key role. DoD gives highest
priority to securing its national security systems. The Defense
Information Systems Agency (DISA) provides a seamless, secure and
reliable web of communications networks, computers, software,
databases, applications, and other capabilities to meet the
information processing and transport needs of DoD. DISA also
ensures the integration and interoperability of command and
control, communications, computers and intelligence systems.5
The Office of Management and Budget has a key role. The government
has a critical need to ensure critical Federal IT systems are
resilient; after all, our citizens rely on our government not to
let them down. Under the Federal Information Security Management
Act (FISMA), OMB is responsible for developing and overseeing
the implementation of government-wide policies, principles, and
standards, as well as providing guidance for the federal
government's information technology security program.6
White House Coordination. The President's staff must ensure
seamless coordination across Federal agencies and ensure sufficient
attention and fiscal resources are allocated to the issue.
Congress has a key role. Congress must exercise its traditional
role. This Committee, for example, has worked hard to enact
effective legislation to protect sensitive personal information;
Congress should act before the end of the session to pass data
security legislation.
A graphical depiction of this discussion is noted below:
Clearly, as a nation we have a strategic national interest
in making sure that we understand the risks across all our cyber
infrastructures and who is accountable for their resilience to
attack. We urge policy makers to consider the need for a strategic
national information assurance policy, developed in consultation
with industry, operating across all of government. The policy
would address many of the questions I have posed.
DHS needs to specify steps to prevent and/or minimize a massive
cyber attack or telecommunications disaster
My remaining testimony will reflect on DHS's effectiveness
to-date, because the bottom line is that cyber security is
receiving inadequate attention from DHS. Of particular urgency is
the need for DHS to specify how it and the private sector would
coordinate actions if a massive cyber attack were to occur.
Last week in his updated national strategy for
counterterrorism, President Bush declared that "America is safer
but we are not yet safe." The reality of physical terror occurring
in the United States has riveted our attention since the attacks on
September 11, 2001. Prevention of any physical incident of horror
has since been priority one.
The President's reminder for vigilance clearly applies to
threats against our physical well-being, but his admonition should
also apply to cyber security. Since 9/11, responsibility for
coordinating federal efforts on national safety shifted to the
Department of Homeland Security. DHS has predictably reacted to a
myriad of security challenges by focusing first on immediate
physical threats and natural disasters. This focus is
understandable, but it has also impeded progress toward stronger
national cyber security. As a result, the United States remains
unprepared to defend itself against a massive cyber disruption or
to systematically recover and reconstitute information systems
after such an event. However, by realistically refining the
Department's role in national cyber security, DHS can escalate cyber
security efforts along with efforts to prevent physical terror in
America.
National coordination of cyber security is the purview of
the Department of Homeland Security, and its related leadership
position is Assistant Secretary for Cyber Security and
Telecommunications. This new position was established in July
2005 by Secretary Chertoff specifically to elevate the importance
of cyber security in relation to DHS's main focus on physical
security. Unfortunately, fourteen months later, the Assistant
Secretary position is unfilled, which reflects the low priority
DHS still has toward cyber security. No one is in charge to lead
efforts to protect information infrastructure against cyber attacks
or to lead response and recovery.
For example, currently members of the IT sector are working
with DHS on a sector specific plan as required under HSPD-7 and the
National Infrastructure Protection Plan. While we have made
progress, there has been little to no senior-level attention to the
plan at DHS, as well as several other agencies. The plan seeks to
hammer out many of the questions I posited earlier.
DHS has not specified how it will work with the private sector to a
cyber incident of national significance
The Cyber Incident Annex of the National Response Plan,
published January 6, 2005, states that the federal government
plays a significant role in managing intergovernmental (federal
state, local and tribal), and, where appropriate, public and
private coordination in response to cyber incidents of national
significance. DHS is well aware that the private sector "runs
the show," which may account for its encouragement of
public-private partnerships. However, the Government Accounting
Office recently reported that progress on those initiatives is
limited, some lack time frames for completion, and relationships
between these initiatives are unclear.7
Consequently, DHS needs to articulate a chain-of-command for
each step of recovery and reconstitution. For example, the DHS's
U.S. Computer Emergency Readiness Team (US-CERT) may be aware of a
network attack, but the North American Network Operators Group
(NANOG) is the operational forum for backbone/enterprise
networking.
In addition to chain-of-command, DHS needs to articulate an
emergency communications system that works even when standard
telecommunications and Internet connectivity are disrupted.
Emergency communications entail more than simply establishing a
resilient mechanism allowing people to talk. It also requires
advance identification of the right people from appropriate
organizations who speak the "same language" for establishing
rapid recovery and reconstitution of national systems.
These are but a few of the details that must be articulated
and agreed upon in advance if the nation is to truly prepare for
recovery and reconstitution from a cyber disaster. Ostensibly,
DHS would have a leading role in planning.
These issues should be answered in the DHS's 400-plus page
National Response Plan. Unfortunately, the plan does not
articulate clear answers on how federal agencies work with each
other, with other government entities, or with the private sector
in responding to a national disaster. Instead of one coordinator,
there are at least six: Homeland Security Operations Center,
National Response Coordination Center, Regional Response
Coordination Center, Interagency Incident Management Group, Joint
Field Office, and Principal Federal Official. The National Response
Plan's discussion of cyber security is contained in the "Cyber
Incident Annex." The Annex mentions many other federal departments
and agencies with "coordinating" responsibility for cyber incident
response, including Defense, Homeland Security, Justice, State,
the Intelligence Community, Office of Science and Technology Policy,
Office of Management and Budget, and State, Local, and Tribal
Governments. The agency tasked with maintaining the National
Response Plan is FEMA.
As I draw toward the end of my testimony, I wish to comment
on one other topic that also requires close coordination of the
government and private sector - namely, the need for a cyber early
warning system that provides the nation with situational awareness
of attacks. DHS has sponsored some mechanisms toward this end,
such as US-CERT, and Information Sharing and Analysis Centers
(ISACs) that share some cyber alert data from the private sector
with the federal government. As noted by the Business Roundtable,
however, the nation lacks formal "trip wires" that provide rapid,
clear indication that an attack is under way.8 This mechanism
would be akin to NOAA's National Hurricane Center, which usually
can provide a day or so of advance notice before a dangerous storm
lands ashore. Cyber attacks provide far less notice to prepare
and react. DHS should lead the establishment of an efficient
national cyber warning system because the private sector is most
likely to first detect an attack, and data correlation and follow
through coordination closely involves the government.
Summary of Recommendations
In summary, CSIA offers the following recommendations for
the Subcommittee's consideration:
Consider the need for a government-wide strategic national
information assurance policy. Cyber security is too important to be
left to piecemeal and bifurcated approaches. There needs to be more
active engagement by the White House to lead in developing a
coherent national information assurance policy across all agencies.
Urge Congress to enact comprehensive data security
legislation this year. Sensitive personal information should be
protected whether it is being held by a commercial enterprise, non
profit organization or government entity. Millions of Americans
are looking to the government for help in safeguarding their
personal information.
Increase Attention to Cyber Security. DHS has inadvertently
exposed the nation to another vector of attack by providing
inadequate attention to cyber security. The Department should
reassess its priorities and shift some attention from an almost
exclusive focus on physical security.
Appoint a Leader. There is no leadership at DHS in terms of
a person who is solely responsible for cyber security. DHS should
swiftly fill the open position of Assistant Secretary for Cyber
Security and Telecommunications to close the leadership vacuum.
Plan to Prevent or Minimize a Major Cyber Disaster. DHS
should shift this energy to articulating a smaller set of priorities
focused on preventing and/or minimizing the likelihood or severity
of a massive cyber attack or telecommunications disaster.
Plan to Work with the Private Sector to Recover from a Major
Disaster. The existing DHS "plan" for recovery cites more than a
dozen federal departments and agencies with "coordinating"
responsibility - not including state, local and tribal governments.
DHS needs to clearly articulate a chain-of-command between
government and the private sector for recovery from a major cyber
disaster.
With that, I appreciate the opportunity to testify today
and am pleased to answer your questions.
MR. UPTON. Mr. Clinton.
MR. CLINTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Internet Security Alliance represents about 500 companies
operating worldwide from almost every sector. We basically represent
the major industrial users of the Internet.
My remarks today will focus on three messages.
First, the threat to this Nation's and the world's economic
infrastructure from cyber attack is real and growing. Second, not
enough is being done either by government or by industry to secure
cyberspace. We can't manage the 21st Century technology solely
based on regulatory models designed 2 centuries ago. While
regulation has its place, new more creative models built on market
incentives must be built. Third, there are concrete steps that can
be taken both by industry and by government to create this new model.
Let me start with some core facts. Today, there are more
than one billion Internet users. That is a 300 percent increase
since 2000. The gross in applications has increased nearly 2,000
percent in that time. Twenty-five percent of America's economic
value, $3 trillion a day, moves over the connections on the
Internet. The main protocols to protect that data are 30 years
old and contain multiple well-known security flaws. The
Congressional Research Services estimated the economic impact of
cyber attacks to business is about $226 billion. In the first
half of '06, banks financial losses from cyber attacks were up
450 percent since 2005. In addition, international terrorists
are also becoming increasingly sophisticated in their use of
the Net. A terrorist can sit at a computer and create havoc
worldwide. They don't need a bomb or explosives to cripple a
sector or shut down a power grid.
To address these issues, we have to broaden our thinking
about Internet security governance. The Internet is
international, interactive, constantly changing, and constantly
under attack. The national strategy to secure cyberspace,
published in 2002, stated correctly that regulation in this space
would be effective and possibly counterproductive. Even if
Congress enacted a lightened statute, it would only have reach to
our national borders. Even if some agency wrote a brilliant
regulation, it is likely to be outdated before it gets through
the process and could stunt innovation. But we can't sit idly
by and do nothing, either. The best mechanism to ensure
sustainable defense is to interject market incentives to
motivate the corporations who own and operate the vast majority
of the Internet to adopt best practices.
One of the untold stories of Internet security is that
we already know a good deal about how to address these issues.
Studies show that approximately 25 percent of companies who do
currently follow best practices are still intact, but the
resulting financial loss, down time, disruption, et cetera
is greatly minimized. While many have suggested, hopefully,
that a positive return on investment would stimulate enough
voluntary action, this has not been the case. Recent research
indicates that most companies still do not see security as a
core value driver. Various private sector entities are
already doing a great deal to address these problems, some of
which are detailed in my written statement. We are doing
research, creating best practices, providing incentives,
coordinating with standard-setting bodies, reaching out to
educate the corporate investment communities.
But the reason you asked us here today was to discuss
what the Government's role would be, and more specifically, how
we can work together. Acting through a range of coalition
activities known as the Corporate Information Security working
group, the National Cybersecurity Partnership, the WYE II
Coalition, et cetera, we have developed an outline of a
market-based incentive program to breach the gap between a pure
voluntary and regulatory approach. Six weeks ago the National
Infrastructure Protection Plan officially embraced the idea of
developing a market incentive program by stating, and I quote,
"The success of a public/private partnership depends on
articulating the benefits of participating to the private sector."
There is a clear national security and homeland security interest
in ensuring collective protection of our Nation's critical
infrastructure. Government can engage industry to go beyond the
efforts already justified by their corporate business needs by
creating an environment that supports incentives for companies to
voluntarily adopt widely accepted security practices.
Now, we move to the hard question: Exactly how do we do
this? Fortunately, there exist a number of paths, most with
Congressional precedent, that may provide incentives that are in
the national interest. Among these paths are Congress can tie
incentives such as civil liability safe harbors, such as those
provided in the Safety Act, or provide procurement credits for
companies who demonstrate compliance with generated best practices.
Congress can stimulate the stunted cyber insurance market by
temporarily insuring the risk of a massive cyber hurricane until the
market is sufficiently large to take the risk themselves. Congress
can create industry, government, and university consortia, similarly
to the Symantec model we developed in the 1980's to address our
computer chip problem. Congress can use tax incentives to
motivate corporations, particularly small ones, to adopt best
practices. Congress can create awards programs, such as the
Baldrige Program, to make security a market differentiator, just
as we did quality a while ago.
My written testimony provides numerous other examples of
private sector programs already underway, many without any Federal
buy-in.
The bottom line is this, Mr. Chairman. We have a major
security problem revolving around the Internet. If we attempt to
use the traditional regulatory method to address it, we will be
unsuccessful. The Federal government, in cooperation with the
private sector, can create an effective and sustainable security
system with market incentives.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Larry Clinton follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF LARRY CLINTON, CHIEF OPERATING OFFICER,
INTERNET SECURITY ALLIANCE
Good Morning, I am Larry Clinton, Chief Operating Officer of
the Internet Security Alliance. I also sit on the Board of the
National Cyber Security Partnership, and both the IT and
Telecommunications Sector Coordinating Councils. In addition, I
chair the NCSP Committee on Incentives for Improved Corporate
Security. I want to thank Chairman Upton for having this hearing
and inviting me to participate on behalf of the Internet Security
Alliance.
The ISAlliance represents about 500 companies operating
on 4 continents who are primarily major corporate users of Internet
services. Our diverse membership includes companies from a wide
variety of economic sectors including financial services, IT and
Telecommunications, entertainment, manufacturing, food services,
defense, business consulting and security services. Companies such
as American International Group, Mellon Financial Corporation,
Northrop Grumman, Visa, Verizon, Verisign, NAM, Sony, Tata
Consulting, Raytheon, Nortel and Ceridian, among many others.
Companies join ISAlliance because we believe we must work across
corporate and national boarders, and engage both security providers
and users in order to improve cyber security in a comprehensive
fashion. Our goal is to improve cyber security across the nation
and the globe through education, training and the creation of
market based incentives for action.
My remarks today will focus on three main messages I would
like to leave with the Committee today.
First, the threat to this nation's and the world's economic
infrastructure from the risk of cyber-attack is real. It is not
science fiction. It is not theoretical. It is happening today and
in all likelihood will get worse.
Second, regrettably not enough is being done, either by
government or industry, to secure cyber space. We continue down
this path at great peril. If we are to address the threats we face
in the Internet security space, we must broaden our thinking
considerably. We cannot manage what is, essentially, the first
21st century technology solely using regulatory models designed
two centuries ago. A new, more creative, model built on market
incentives and creative solutions must be developed and added to
the mix.
Third, fortunately, there are concrete steps that can be
taken to both by industry and government to create this new model.
Some of these steps have already begun, but we need to pick up
the pace of activity considerably.
CYBER THREATS ARE SIGNIFICANT AND GROWING
It was not that long ago that popular myth held that cyber
attacks were largely propagated by some Matthew Broderick type
High School student playing "war games" with the pentagon computer
system to prove how smart he was. If that ever was the case it is
no longer. Now the most likely perpetrator is more likely to be
agents of foreign countries, organized criminal syndicates or
highly educated and trained cyber-terrorists.
Here are some core facts:
The dot-com bust gave the illusion that Internet growth slowed down,
but in fact it has grown at remarkable rates. At the height of the
dot-com boom in 2000, for example, roughly 250 million people used
the Internet. Today, according to Internet World Stats, more than 1
billion users worldwide rely on the Internet, a 300 percent increase
since 2000.
The explosion of Internet-enabled devices and applications - text
messaging, music downloads, VoIP, Blackberries and device-to-device
communications - has created exponential growth in Internet traffic
far surpassing the increase in users. While users have increased
300 percent since 2000, the volume of traffic on .com and .net has
increased 1,900 percent in that same period.
This very growth of Internet users, broadband capacity and number
of Internet-enabled devices has created an opportunity for hackers,
organized criminals and even more serious terrorists to attack our
networks. Some do so for technical trophies, some for political
objectives, but today, most bad behavior on the Internet is done
for financial gain.
In fact, the very devices and increased bandwidth that make the
Internet more robust and user friendly are being deployed to
compromise the Internet. Now that computers are always-on, they
are easily accessible to hackers and other abusers to hijack.
And the increased bandwidth and computing power available
literally gives hackers more ammunition to utilize against the
infrastructure.
In October 2002, the Internet community got a wake-up call when
the 13 DNS root servers, which serve as the heart of the Internet
addressing system, came under heavy denial of service (DoS) attack.
In these attacks, the hackers send countless bogus inquiries to
domain-name servers, which are computers that direct Internet
traffic. By sending phony website requests to these servers, they
overload and disable them, making websites unavailable.
The most alarming of attacks occurred in early January 2006, when
a hacker systematically disabled over 1,500 websites using hijacked
PCs. In these attacks, the hacker didn't directly attack the
domain-name servers. Instead, they sent their traffic to a
legitimate server with a DNS query and a forged source address.
Twenty-five percent of America's economic value ---up to 3 trillion
dollars a day--- moves over network connections each day. The main
protocol used to protect this data is over 30 years old and has
multiple well-know security flaws. There are now more electronic
financial transactions each day than there are paper checks written.
If the Internet were to go down for a just few hours, we would
lose hundreds of millions of dollars of economic activity. If it went
down for several days, U.S. economic activity would be severely
curtailed; payrolls would not be met, securities transactions not
cleared; invoices not paid.
In 2004 the Congressional Research Service estimated that the
economic impact of cyber attacks on business grew to $226 billion.
In truth, we don't know the precise amount of the economic losses
because there is a tremendous disincentive to disclose this
information. But we do know it's huge and growing.
In August 2006 the SANS Institute claimed that bank's financial
losses caused by cyber attacks were up 450% from the first half of
2005.
August 2006 was the worst month in history for data breach
notifications according to SANS. Consumers Union tells us that
although about 98% of bank robbers get caught, only 1 in a thousand
identity thefts are prosecuted. One of the main reasons is again
the internet infrastructure itself makes tracing these thieves very
difficult.
There has been a massive increase in cyber crime from organized
groups in Eastern Europe and Asia.
This is the on-going chronic cyber security problem we face day in
and day out.
However, the threat is not just from criminals.
International terrorists are becoming increasingly sophisticated in
their use of the global net creating a threat potentially more
dangerous than physical explosives. Of course, for some time now,
terrorists have used the net for fund raising, communication and
recruitment activities. However, there is growing testimony from
the intelligence community that they are pursuing methods to inflict
a deadly combination of electronic breakdown and serious physical
injury either using cyber means alone or in combination with
physical explosives.
Former CIA Director George Tenent has said the Internet
represents the "Achilles heel" of our financial stability and
physical security. Former CIA Director Gates has warned that
cyber-terrorism could be the most devastating weapon of mass
destruction yet.
In April of 2002, then Homeland Security Director Tom Ridge
probably said it best: "Terrorists can sit at one computer connected
to one network and can create worldwide havoc. [They] don't
necessarily need a bomb or explosives to cripple a sector of the
economy, or shut down a power grid."
A recent Google search on the term "cyber-terrorism" found
over 900,000 entries.
Accordingly to the Insurance Information Institute, 2005 was
the most costly on record for the insurance industry, with insured
losses from Hurricane Katrina alone at $40.6 billion and total
catastrophe losses for the year from 24 disasters totaling
$61.2 billion. We have but to watch the news to see vividly the
misery and destruction caused to New Orleans and the surrounding
areas.
Now, imagine a hurricane with intelligence. One that learns
and grows more destructive with each year. Imagine a hurricane
that methodically, intentionally with malice born of a lifetime of
anger plans and executes a destructive force to precisely hit the
very fabric of our economy and daily life. That is a
cyber-terrorism attack.
However, those of us who operate major information systems
know that we must worry not just about that cyber-hurricane of the
future but of the smaller attacks we are under every day---thousands
of times a day.
Thus, it is our job in industry to work with you in
government to address not just the large scale, massive, attack
scenarios but also to address the chronic cyber security problems
we face.
To do this, we must broaden our approach.
WE NEED TO BROADEN OUR THINKING ABOUT INTERNET SECURITY GOVERNANCE
When I say we need to broaden our thinking about the
Internet, I mean that we need to do at least three things.
First, we need to realize that the Internet is unlike
anything we have dealt with before.
It transmits phone calls but it is not a phone line.
It makes copies but it is not a Xerox machine.
It houses books but it is not a library.
It broadcasts images but it is not a TV station.
It's critical to our national defense, but it is not a military
installation.
It's all these things and much much more.
The Internet is international, interactive, constantly changing
and constantly under attack.
Consequently, it will require a security system unlike anything we
have designed before.
It's not even really an "It." Its actually lots of "Its" all
knitted together. Some public, some private --all transmitting
information across corporate and national boarders without stopping
to pay tolls or check regional sensitivities.
The regulatory model we have traditionally used to govern business
has not changed much since we created it to deal with the
breakthrough technology of 2 centuries ago---the railroad.
To manage the railroad, Congress decided to create an expert
agency, the ICC to pass specific regulations. The ICC begat the
rest of the alphabet soup, the FCC, the SEC and the FTC. And that
system has worked arguably well in most instances.
But that system, whatever its advantages, will not work with
Internet security. Even if Congress were to enact an enlightened
statute, it would not reach beyond our national boarders and hence
would not be comprehensive enough. Even if some agency wrote a
brilliant regulation, it is likely to be out-dated before it went
through the process, a process that can be further delayed with
court challenges.
And that assumes, unrealistically, that the political
process inherent in a government regulation system doesn't
compromise, simplify and "dumb-down" the eventual regulations so
that we end up with a standard which offends no one, where everyone
can attest that they met the new federal regulations, but everyone
knows the system is not really working.
That is not to say that regulation doesn't have its place,
especially with traditionally regulated industries. It is to say
that regulation, standing alone, will not be sufficient.
We must, together, develop a mechanism to assure an
effective and sustainable system of security that will accommodate
the global breadth of the Internet and still result in a dynamic
and constantly improving system of mutual security.
We, the Internet Security alliance, contend that the best
mechanism to assure an adequate and sustainable defense system is
to inject the market with a combination of motivations.
We need to have corporations, who own and operate the vast
majority of the Internet, to perceive that it is their own self
interest to continually improve not only their own security, but
that of everyone else with whom they interact.
Sadly, this is not the case now.
A range of studies have demonstrated that corporations, for
various reasons, tend to regard security and resilience, including
cyber security, as a cost center to be minimized.
Moreover, the enlightened companies will do what they
perceive is appropriate to assure the cyber defense within their
corporate borders, however, the Internet is a shared infrastructure.
We need to develop a system that assures comprehensive
security---and nothing motivates the private sector like market
incentives.
Psychologists tell us that punishment as the sole means of
behavioral modification doesn't effectively work past the age of
two. Rather, the best course of action is the use of the carrot,
sometimes alone and sometimes in combination, with an already in
place and existing stick.
THE ROLE OF INSURANCE
Numerous private and governmental documents have encouraged
the use of cyber-insurance and the creation of a robust
cyber-insurance market. There is little wonder about this.
Insurance can:
(1) motivate best practices by modifying the availability and
affordability of insurance based on the degree of implementation of
such best practices,
(2) spread the financial costs of a cyber-attack, especially a
massive cyber-attack, among society creating an efficient funding
mechanism in the event of "digital Pearl Harbor", and
(3) be a primary distribution channel for risk management
information on preventing and mitigating cyber-risks given the
history view of the insurance industry as the "risk management
experts".
Given that a robust insurance market is necessary to achieve
these essential public goods, the question is how best to achieve
such a market. While the primary burden is on the insurance sector
itself to make this happen, left purely on its own, the industry
will move "too little, too late". One main reason for this is that
the lack of historical loss information makes the creation of
standard actuarial tables impossible leaving carriers to
``quesstimate" correct rates, something most carriers do not want
to do. Thus, the market is currently estimated to be less than
$200 million in premium with only a handful of carriers willing to
issue policies.
Fortunately, there are concrete steps, some easy and some
hard, that can be taken by the insurance industry and government
to achieve the goal of a sustainable and robust insurance system
for the inevitable cyber-hurricane.
THERE ARE CONCRETE STEPS THAT WE CAN TAKE TO DEVELOP A SUSTAINABLE
MODEL OF INTERNET SECURITY
A. What We Are Doing
The mantra of the Internet Security Alliance is that since
the Internet is largely owned and operated by the private sector,
it is up to the private sector to provide Internet security.
Consistent with that policy, the Internet Security
Alliance has executed and supported a wide range of activities
within the private sector to improve security.
INFORMATION SHARING
ISAlliance was founded in April 2004---5 months before the
tragedy of 9/11 placed an increased emphasis on security because,
even then, we realized the need for advanced information sharing.
We established one of the first and most sophisticated information
sharing operations in conjunction with our partners at Carnegie
Mellon University's CERT/cc. This became the model used by DHS,
which eventually took over that function from us with the creation
of US-CERT.
BEST PRACTICE DEVELOPMENT
One of the under-reported stories of Internet security is
that we actually know how to solve much of these problems. Best
Practices in various areas of Internet security have been developed
in the private sector and research has empirically demonstrated
that these Best Practices work: though corporations, who follow
them invariably still get attacked, they can better withstand
and manage the attacks suffering little if any down time or
financial loss.
ISAlliance has been a leader in the development of best
practices, and has published a continuing series of works that
communicate those best practices to the full range of large, small,
and medium size enterprises.
Unfortunately, so far, only a minority of corporations
follow these best practices.
WORKING WITH THE INSURANCE INDUSTRY
AIG insurance has, in conjunction with ISAlliance, attempted
to stimulate wider adoption of these best practices by offering
credits on cyber insurance for corporations who comply with them.
Working closely with the ISAlliance technical team and Carnegie
Mellon University, AIG developed the first cyber-insurance
certification tool to be used in conjunction with ISAlliance's
Best Practice Guides. This tool permits companies to show that
they are meeting the standards of the Best Practice Guides and
are entitled to insurance credits where permitted by law.
SMALL COMPANIES
In 2004 the private sector, in conjunction with DHS, held
the first national Cyber Summit. The very first recommendation to
come out of that summit was that something had to be done to bring
more small companies into the perimeter of a secure cyber space.
The ISAlliance was asked to create a program specifically to
address the needs of smaller companies. In the past two years we
have developed a separate set of best practices for them, developed
a self assessment tool to assess these needs, offered private
incentives such as lower insurance rates for compliant companies
and created an innovative mechanism for small companies to
participate in our information sharing and educational programs.
Since the cyber summit, the ISAlliance has increased its reach
into the small company community by several hundred new companies.
REACHING OUT TO THE INVESTMENT COMMUNITY
Next month we, along with several coalition partners such
as the Council on Competitiveness and BITS, will be holding a major
event at NASDAQ. The purpose of that event is to reach out to the
investment community who we believe have been undervaluing
corporate investment in security and business resilience. Based
on recent research we hope to convince the investment community
that companies who do invest in business resiliency projects are
indeed better investments. That is, companies that invest in
cyber security are not dumping money in to economic black-hole.
Rather, an investment in cyber security not only makes a company
more resilient but also produces a positive return on investment.
Clearly, if we can make this case strongly it would have a major
impact on increasing the market incentive for improved security.
REVIEWING CORPORATE STRUCTURES
In addition, based on a series of recent studies, we believe
that in many corporations there is insufficient integration among
CSO's, CIO's and Risk Managers leading to less commitment from the
COO, CEO and Boards of Directors for security and resiliency
investments. As a result, we are engaged in a program to get this
message out and achieve results in improved corporate governance.
ADDRESSING PARTNERSHIP AND OUT-SOURCING SECURITY ISSUES THROUGH
MODEL CONTRACTS
Companies who participate in organizations like the Internet
Security Alliance are often also among those "best practices"
companies who are actually doing a very good job of assuring the
security of their own cyber systems. However, with a shared
infrastructure like the Internet you are only as secure as the
company with whom you are interacting. Hence, we needed to develop
a market system to expand the state-of-the-art procedures we follow
to all our partners including those who are based off-shore. The
mechanism we chose was commercial agreements recognizing that the
agreement was an inherent part of setting up shared
infrastructure. We developed a set of model contract terms and
conditions which provide contract trading partners with a market
mechanism that assures that both sides are following the necessary
procedures to assure each other's compliance, while at the same
time cutting legal costs.
Our work in this model contract project was endorsed by
the Information Systems Security Association, an international
professional association of over 10,000 information security
professionals.
COORDINATING WITH RECOGNIZED STANDARD SETTING BODIES
As a next step within the Model Contracts Project,
ISAlliance is collaborating with the American National Standard
Institute (ANSI). We have agreed to work cooperatively to take
the adopted standards for information security programs and
develop contract language that embraces these standards. We are
also hoping to broaden this effort to embrace international
standards, and are working with internationally based partner
corporations to incorporate legal requirements in other
countries.
INTEGRATION OF MULTI-FACETED SECURITY ISSUES
It is a misnomer that cyber security is a technical problem.
While it obviously has many technical aspects maintaining cyber
security has technical, legal, business operational and public
policy dimensions. Unfortunately, many organizations are
ill-equipped to address these issues in an integrated fashion
leading to uncoordinated and inefficient security programs.
In cooperation with our partners at Carnegie Mellon University
CyLab, ISAlliance is developing integration programs including
legal/technical and business analysis coordinated with web-based
education and training to improve our member's performance in
their own management of cyber security as part of the business
agenda.
ADDRESSING THE INSIDER THREAT
Many of the breakdowns in cyberspace (including the recent
highly publicized personal security breeches on the part of agencies
of the federal government) have been the function of personnel
misconduct rather than technology failures. DHS Chief for Cyber
Security research, Scott Borg, has reported that the single
biggest vulnerability in industry is the lack of adherence of
senior corporate personnel to cyber security policies and best
practices. ISAlliance in conjunction with CMU and the US Secret
Service has developed a separate set of best practices for
addressing insider threats. This is coupled with web-based
training which is also made available to Congressional and
government personnel at no charge.
COOPERATION WITH INDUSTRY AND GOVERNMENT COALITIONS
The ISAlliance contributes both time and resources to support
a range of voluntary industry and government coalitions such as
the Information Technilogy Sector Specific Council, the
Telecommunications Sector Specific Council, The National Cyber
Security Partnership, and US-CERT.
B. What government Can Do
BACKGROUND
As I have already outlined, the private sector must take a
leadership role in assuring the security of cyber space. Many
organizations, including ISAlliance, its members, and the many
coalition partners we have referred to above are doing a great
deal.
But, the current level of effort is not enough.
Although research indicates that by following already
identified best practices companies can make substantial progress
toward mitigating the effect of cyber attacks. However, current
research also suggests only about 1/4 of corporations adhere to
them.
The biggest obstacle is cost, weighed against perceived
value.
The National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace, published almost
exactly 4 years ago, correctly concluded that reliance upon
government regulation in this domain was not the proper course of
action. Given the ever changing nature of the Internet, it would
be largely ineffective and most likely counter productive for
American industry.
Yet, we have also maintained, since our comments filed in
the development of that document, that there was a missing link
in the strategy. While regulation would likely be ineffective,
largely for the reasons detailed above, a pure voluntary program
would also likely fail.
Although many have hopefully suggested that there would be
a positive return on investment to cyber security spending, it has
not so far been demonstrated effectively in most corporate board
rooms.
Since the publication of the National Strategy, the
ISAlliance has campaigned for the development of an incentive
program to assure an effective and sustainable program of cyber
infrastructure protection.
The road has been a long one, involving substantial
dialogue and productive analysis of the alternatives available.
Here are several notable activities to which the ISAlliance has
contributed.
CISWG
In 2004, the then Chairman of the House Information
Policy Subcommittee on Government Reform appointed a group of
45 industry executives to present a program that would take a
deregulatory approach to cyber security. I was honored to serve
as co-chair (along with ISAlliance COO Larry Clinton) of the
Incentives Committee. We issued a series of fairly detailed
reports covering issues such as best practices, educational
outreach, and incentives.
WYE II
In 2005, the National Cyber Security Partnership engaged
with DHS and 13 federal agencies in a series of off-site meetings
built on DHS's own conference on cyber security held in December
of 2004 at Wye River. The Wye II program also recommended an
incentive program built on and extending the work done by CISWG.
NIPP and the SECTOR COORDINATING COUNCILS
In 2006, as part of the process in developing the National
Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP), DHS requested that each sector
form a Coordinating Council to help provide input on and
eventually implementation of the Sector Specific plans that are
expected to grow out of the NIPP.
As with the CISWG reports and the WYE II reports, both the
IT and Communications Sector Coordinating Councils provided almost
identical comments to DHS suggesting that the NIPP include the need
to develop a value proposition and market incentives to improve and
sustain cyber security.
NIPP ESTABLISHES THE NATIONAL SECURITY LINK FOR ESTABLISHING A
VALUE PROPOSITION FOR INDUSTRY INCLUDING INCENTIVES
The NIPP was published on June 30, 2006. It embraces the
notion that as a matter of national security and homeland security
a value proposition for industry must be developed including the
creation of economic incentives.
"The public private partnership called for in the NIPP
provides for the foundation for effective CI/KR protection...The
success of the partnership depends on articulating mutual benefits
to government and private sector partners. While articulating the
value proposition to the government typically is clear, it is often
difficult to articulate the direct benefits of participation for
the private sector...In assessing the value proposition for the
private sector there is a clear national security and homeland
security interest in ensuring the collective protection of the
Nation's CI/KR. Government can engage industry to go beyond
efforts already justified by their corporate business needs to
assist in broad-scale CI/KR protection through activates such
as:...
Creating an environment that supports incentives for
companies to voluntarily adopt widely accepted sound security
practices" (NIPP page 9)
ISAlliance wants to thank and congratulate DHS Assistant
Secretary for Infrastructure Protection Bob Stephan and Acting
Cyber Security Director Andy Purdy and their staff for making
this paradigm shifting assessment and including it in the
National Infrastructure Protection Plan.
NOW IT'S TIME FOR CONGRESS
It is now time to move from the general notion of
recognizing the national security need to develop a value
proposition for industry for improved security to the much
harder question, "how exactly do we do it?"
The ISAlliance does not come to the Committee today with
legislative language to be introduced. That is premature today,
but it may not be in a few months. What we do come to you today
is specific legislature ideas which, once agreed to, will then
be translated into suggested legislative language.
Congress should continue the process you have started
today and hold hearings on the various ideas we have identified
for creating an incentive-based security model so that we can
address the issue with the attention that the national security
perspective suggests.
What I can provide for the members today is a fairly
specific list of suggestions that have been developed through the
CISWG, WYE II and NIPP comment processes I have discussed. In
brief we can identify numerous paths, most with Congressional
precedent for Congressional action to provide incentives that
are in the national interest. These are all appropriate for
adaptation and application in the cyber security space.
Among the alternatives we believe are appropriate for
Congressional review are:
1. Congress can tie incentives such as civil liability safe harbors
or procurement credits to companies who can demonstrate compliance
with market generated best practices for cyber security. As I
previously noted, research has demonstrated that a substantial
minority of corporations currently follow industry generated
cyber best practices which yield empirical success. The problem
is motivating more companies to adopt these procedures. In the
last Congress Chairman Putnam of the Information Policy
Subcommittee of Government Reform created the Corporate Information
Security Working Group. The Incentives Committee of that group
proposed a system though which this can be accomplished.
2. Congress can stimulate the stunted cyber insurance market.
Cyber insurance can help achieve social goals by managing government
risk in a cyber hurricane while providing a mechanism to maximize
corporate security behavior that is dynamic enough to address the
fast changing and international characteristics of cyberspace.
This can be done by:
a. Having government serve as an insurer of last resort to stimulate
the market (Precedent: Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002).
b. Establish a revolving fund reinsurance system funded by taxes on
insurance products (Precedent: Federal Aviation Act 1958).
c. Requiring government contractors to purchase cyber insurance.
(Precedent: Federal Acquisition Regulations)
d. Promote cyber security information sharing allowing for the
creation of better actuarial tables resulting in lower premium
costs, increased competition and broader coverage. (Precedent
The Year 2000 Information Readiness Disclosure Act of 1998)
3. The Congress can create an industry/government/university
consortium to stimulate the needed research, development and
adoption of security protocols. This will enable government,
academia and industry to work together to replace today's security
poor Internet protocols with security rich protocols. Congress
followed a similar model (Sema-Tech) in the late 1980s to address
the computer chip gap.
4. The Congress can use tax incentives to motivate corporations to
adopt security practices beyond those already justified by their
own corporate needs but conducive to the national and Homeland
Security needs cited in the National Infrastructure Protection Plan
(NIPP July 2006). (Precedent: IRS Code 26 U.S.C; IRS Code 26
U.S.C.832 (e); Energy Policy Act 2005).
5. The Government can create awards programs to highlight the
contributions of corporations and senior executives who have gone
beyond their own corporate interests and expended resources. In the
1980s when industry believed that "Quality" was a luxury they could
not afford the federal government initiated the "Baldrige Awards"
for quality which eventually became a sought after market
differentiator for corporations.
6. The government can support private sector initiatives to use
market forces to enhance cyber security. As noted, the ISAlliance,
in conjunction with the ISSA and ANSI is developing a series of
publications of model contract language that enable traditional
and emerging standards of security within commercial agreements
utilizing the market power of business alliances as a means to
expand security. The ISAlliance in conjunction with BITS and the
Council on Competitiveness is sponsoring a series of studies and
forums educating the investment community as to the business
benefits of security/resiliency and the corporate organizational
reforms needed to expand this concept. All this is simultaneously
in the public's national security interest. DHS, the Department of
Commerce and other federal agencies should identify, promote and
support these programs aggressively as a cost effective mechanism;
doing so serves to expand their culture of security message.
I would like to thank the committee again for allowing
ISAlliance to testify today and I would be happy to answer any
questions the Committee may have.
MR. UPTON. Thank you all for your testimony. It seems as
though we have our work cut out for us. I am glad that my Chairman
is here, because that means if we do all the things that you
explain, Mr. Clinton, that we would have jurisdiction over all the
other committees, and I think we would welcome that here.
MR. CLINTON. Know your audience, Mr. Chairman.
MR. UPTON. Mr. Foresman, how long has this vacancy been in
terms of the Assistant Secretary at DHS?
MR. FORESMAN. Mr. Chairman, as you know, Secretary
Chertoff now announced last July the second stage review and the
creation of the Preparedness Director and the creation of this new
position that was officially established on October the 1st, so
since that period of time.
MR. UPTON. So almost a year?
MR. FORESMAN. That is correct.
MR. UPTON. And I am pleased to hear that you are getting
close. Is this a position that has to be confirmed by the Senate?
MR. FORESMAN. No, sir, it does not.
MR. UPTON. Good. That may be the best news we have this
morning.
I would like, as you go back this morning, to just underscore
the need to see that this position is filled as quickly as we can,
so that we can, in fact, have a high profile leadership spot willing
to tackle this and to be able to work with the other agencies that
are out there.
Mr. Weafer, we appreciated your testimony. I would be very
interested in the difference or the changes in the attacks from
perhaps this year to previous years. You talked a little bit about
a rapid response. Obviously, the impact of what would happen to the
economy, but I am interested how these attacks change as
particularly the private sector has prepared themselves for it.
What has been the next stage? What has been the evolution?
MR. WEAFER. Well, the good news is we do believe a lot of
people have listened to some of the best practices defense in depth,
which is why some of the pandemic, the local events have died down.
However, they have been replaced by a level of intensity in volume
that we have not seen since a long time for us. We are seeing this
driven by fraud, cyber crime, people trying to invade personal
privacy. Largely, it is also driven by the use of broadband
connectivity and home users, bringing work home, having data
leakage from there.
MR. UPTON. Do a lot of these attacks originate from
overseas?
MR. WEAFER. Actually, we find that most of the attacks
originate within the U.S., attacking victims inside the U.S. Of
course, cyber crime is very international. The people controlling
those machines could be sitting over in Europe or South America,
or anywhere around the world. So it is a very international
problem.
MR. UPTON. Mr. Powner, you indicated in your testimony, you
said that the Internet recovery was by far incomplete. We had real
threats. You painted a pretty bleak picture. Do you see that we
are making some progress? What are the most critical things that
we can do in the coming months?
MR. POWNER. Well, clearly there is some progress with some
of the plans and working groups that are being put in place within
the Department, but--and I think some of the panel members mentioned
we need to move beyond plans and some of the initial stages.
One of the key things that we learned in our study for
you, Mr. Chairman, is that what the private sector wants during
a time of crisis isn't exactly where we are right now within the
Department of Homeland Security with their planning efforts. They
want items like what we learned in Katrina: help with logistics,
help with prioritization, backup communications. Those types of
things aren't being discussed. We are talking about these great
large-scale plans, and we need to get together on the same page on
this to have a plan that would be helpful to the private sector
infrastructure owners.
MR. UPTON. I know that you studied the Business Roundtable
report that was put out. Did you find that it helped you interface
at all in terms of your report that you made?
MR. POWNER. The Business Roundtable report was very
consistent with the number of findings that we had, and a number
of those recommendations were quite consistent. We obviously
weren't as critical as the private sector, because we couldn't look
at that.
When you look at that report, and I think some of our panel
members mentioned today, it is clear there is room for improvement
on the private sector side of things also. There was one
recommendation in that report, though, that talked about another
group being formed. I think we need to stop forming groups and we
need to hold the current groups accountable. We have enough groups
that are looking at this. Let us just get some accountability here
and get the job done.
MR. UPTON. That leads, actually, to my next question to
Mr. Kurtz, who said we needed more of a role by the White House and
others that try and take a leadership role. Now, Mr. Kurtz,
I don't know all of your background, but I know that you once
worked at the White House. Is that correct?
MR. KURTZ. Correct. In the early part of the first term
of the Bush Administration, President Bush spent a great deal of
time looking at putting together a national strategy to secure
cyberspace. It came out in February '03. It is actually a good
document. The problem is since that strategy was issued in
February of '03, we have actually been running in place.
We--keep in mind--
MR. UPTON. Do you think that once an assistant secretary
is named, that that will be a big help?
MR. KURTZ. I think it will help. One of the issues that
I am trying to point out in the testimony is that DHS, under
Homeland Security directive Presidential 7 and under the National
Strategy, clearly have a lead coordinating role in putting together
our national strategy to secure cyberspace. But what we need to
understand is that while DHS has that leading role, there are
multiple other agencies involved in this process, in particular,
when we talk about an issue that is important to this committee
when it comes to recovery and reconstitution issues. You know,
agencies like the FCC have a role. Agencies like DOD have a role.
The classic example is Hurricane Katrina. At the end of the day
when the problems were so significant with Hurricane Katrina, the
President ultimately turned to DOD for their assistance.
So what would happen in an event of a large-scale cyber
disaster? What is the chain of command? Who is calling the
shots? And at the end of the day, you may not have a situation
where the Internet is, if you will, dark, that there is a
blackout. In fact, I think that would be a pretty extreme case.
But what you may have is a situation where you have very limited
bandwidth or certain sectors cannot connect with each other. That
means real decisions about priority need to be made. What traffic
gets through? What traffic gets stopped? Likewise, can FedEx or
UPS deliver their packages by the way--they base all their
operations on the Internet.
A lot of these key questions require resolution, and that is
why we are arguing for a national information assurance policy to
put in place a directive across agencies, so we have a firm
understanding of roles and responsibility and who is doing what in
the event of a crisis.
MR. UPTON. My time is expired.
Mr. Gonzalez.
MR. GONZALEZ. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
The first thing I want to do is read from Mr. Clinton's
submitted written testimony. I don't think you covered it,
Mr. Clinton, but I really liked it, and I think it tells the
American people exactly what we are talking about. It says "First
we need to realize that the Internet is unlike anything we have
ever dealt with before. It transmits phone calls, but it is not
a phone line. It makes copies, but it is not a Xerox machine.
It houses books, but it is not a library. It broadcasts images,
but it is not a TV station. It is critical to our national
defense, but it is not a military installation. It is all these
things and much, much more." It seems that what I am hearing is
that we have got a piecemeal way of addressing many of these
different uses and such, and we really need something that is
holistic. I just really enjoyed reading what is a very
thoughtful written statement.
It appears that we are talking about a couple of things,
of course. One is prevention. Obviously, we need to prevent the
disruption of this incredible system that we have in the United
States. The other thing is what do we do to respond once we have
the disruption or the attack or whatever. And yet, we don't seem
to be coordinated or getting a handle on what the problem really
is. We haven't even figured out where the agencies--we are not
even staffing them timely. It seems so overwhelming, and I don't
mean to sound defeatist, but if we took the totality of your
testimony today, we would have to admit that Congress is not really
meeting its challenge effectively or timely. I am part of that
Congress.
The first thing that comes to mind is the lack of
cooperation between government and the private sector, more so on
the private sector. In fact, I think Mr. Powner indicated that
there is somewhat--I guess they guard jealously what they may
sense is proprietary in nature, the edge, or whatever it is.
I want to break down the players in this scheme when we talk
about the Internet. We have networks, AT&T, cable, and so on,
right? We have ISPs, the Internet service providers, and we have
the content aggregators, the search engines, the Googles. Everybody
that goes out there--and this is all part of a communication system.
It seems to me, Mr. Powner, that the private sector really is
looking to the Government when there is disruption to make sure
that it is minimal and will not interfere or interrupt or disrupt
the doing of business, yet, they don't see that it is a two-way
street, that they have to be making their contribution to make sure
that we prevent and that we are able to respond. Am I correct in
that particular assumption?
MR. POWNER. I think when you look at a potential
large-scale disruption, it is very clear that we need to work
collectively on it. So the private sector, the owners of the
Internet components, telecom companies, the route server operators,
all those folks clearly are in charge of recovery.
What can the Federal government do to assist? That is
really the question, because the private sector is ultimately in
charge. They know their equipment, they deal with minor disruptions
on a daily, weekly basis. They know how to respond to things.
But when it becomes at a certain scale, when does the Government
get involved? That is unclear. What is their role on involvement?
That is really what needs to be defined moving forward.
MR. GONZALEZ. The other thing that we touched on is, of
course, the information security and the security of the systems
themselves, and the fact that we have many in the private sector
in users that don't take that into account at all. Again,
Mr. Powner, I think you heard Mr. Clinton and others saying
that--and I am going to go back, I guess, to Mr. Clinton's
testimony, if I can find it quickly, about trying old methods
in an environment that doesn't work anymore. A regulatory scheme,
maybe, and I know that someone indicated that maybe this will be a
conflict of philosophies. This is from Mr. Clinton's testimony.
"We cannot manage what is essentially the 21st Century technology
solely using regulatory models designed 2 centuries ago. A new,
more creative model built on market incentives and creative
solutions must be developed and added to the mix."
Mr. Powner, in your research and what you have done, do you
agree that there has to be maybe a totally different way of
approaching and getting these parties together and involved?
MR. POWNER. Mr. Gonzalez, that is an excellent point,
looking at market incentives. I have been involved in critical
infrastructure since the mid-'90s when Presidential Directive
Decision 63 was initially signed, left the Government for a while,
worked for a major telecommunications company, and since have come
back. So I have been on both sides of the fence.
Frankly, we haven't been successful from the mid-'90s on
having an approach to secure our critical infrastructures. We have
had a lot of good starts. We have progressed certain ways. We
have taken some steps backwards. But when you look at how we
identify threats, whether we are working collectively in
public/private partnerships, we have had mixed success dating
back to the mid-'90s. So I think looking at some new approaches,
I think that we ought to keep our eyes open and consider those
ideas.
MR. GONZALEZ. Okay. I sure do thank you, and my time
is up.
MR. UPTON. Mr. Shimkus.
MR. SHIMKUS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. A great debate,
great hearing, an important one, as you all have noted.
In listening and trying to get a handle on where we are
at and where we need to go, I am struck by this whole debate on
who is supposed to do what, when, where, and how, and that is what
we are trying to get focused. Hopefully getting an assistant
secretary will at least bring some coordination and focus and
leadership. It is really all a definition of leadership and
getting people to move and setting the tone and going forward.
The private sector has a--especially those who are highly
invested in data issues--I mean, they have a compelling financial
reason to secure their data and to harden it. Isn't that correct?
Anyone want to--let us start with Mr. Kurtz, and then we will go
to Mr. Clinton.
MR. KURTZ. Yeah, I would agree, and this goes back to the
point that Mr. Gonzalez said. I would actually disagree with you
in part about where the private sector is on this. I can answer
both at the same time.
The private sector, over the past several years, and Larry
can add to this as well, over a decade, at least, has spent a great
deal of time working to try to protect the critical infrastructure
and working to shore up the critical information infrastructure in
large part, for their own reasons. The energy and oil has to flow
through the pipelines, over the power lines. The banking systems
need to work; the health systems need to work. They all need to
do that for their own reasons, and I think in fact a great deal
of progress has been made along the way. I would also note that
there are several organizations, the National Cybersecurity
Partnership, organizations that have been set up at the behalf
of the Department of Homeland Security, like the IT Sector
Coordination Council, that have been stood up to address issues
with regard to cybersecurity.
We are, if you will, Larry and I are a piece of a much
larger set of people, both in Washington and across the country,
that are working on IT security issues on behalf of the private
sector. I think the key issue that we are at today, if I may,
is looking for more government leadership to work with the
private sector to solve some of those key questions that I
outlined in my testimony. What happens when the balloon goes
up? What happens when we really have a problem? The private
sector, for its own part, wants and needs to ensure the critical
information infrastructure, but there will be problems, so what
happens when that happens? Who is in charge, who is supposed
to do what? That is what we are looking for.
MR. SHIMKUS. Thank you.
Let me stop you. I am going to interject, and then I am
going to allow Mr. Clinton to respond also, because for us, large
versus small, what do you define? What is large breach, and then
if--based upon testimony, if there is--the other question I am
going to throw out eventually will be do you believe that whatever
is defined as a large disruption, will all communications go dark,
or will there be a reduced bandwidth? And if there is a reduced
bandwidth, then I agree definitely that there needs to be some--in
fact, we already do it. I pulled out of my wallet this Government
Emergency Telecommunications Service little phone--fortunately, I
have never had to use it, and sometimes I forget it is even here,
but someone is going to allow me in a degraded environment for
telecommunications, if I have to call back to Washington then I
hopefully will get some expedited service because of this.
So we are already doing this at the national level in one
arena of communications. So really, the debate is bandwidth, what
the prioritization or what would go through and how it would go
through.
Mr. Clinton, why don't you add, subtract, or delete.
MR. CLINTON. Maybe I can just extend.
MR. SHIMKUS. Good.
MR. CLINTON. First of all, let me thank Mr. Gonzalez and
refer partly to, Mr. Shimkus, with respect to a point that Paul made
that I, too, think that probably the record for the private sector,
in the instance of a major disruption, is actually very good,
including the sharing of information and bypassing some of the
concerns that they would have on a normal instance. I think it
is real important that we segment the problem here. You have the
concern about the major, the big one, the Hurricane Katrina, and
then you have the hurricanes of all the other sorts that we also
face every day. So it is two different things.
With respect to the big one, people--just like they did
on 9/11, bypassed their normal concerns. They just get in and they
do what they need to do, and that has been the case. But you are
correct sir, Mr. Shimkus, that what we need is a unifying motivator
to get people to do the right thing all the time so that when the
big one hits--if I can use the Chairman's metaphor a little bit,
the levees are higher already. And what we are arguing for is
that sort of resilience needs to be put into the system, and
frankly, the private sector, just like the Federal government,
and perhaps even the Congress, needs to readjust because we are
dealing with something very, very different.
You are right. There is a compelling interest for companies
to defend their systems, but frankly, the research indicates that
corporations are not currently valuing that responsibility as
highly as they probably should.
We are having a big event next month, up at NASDAQ, where
we are going out to the investment community and saying you guys
are not properly valuing the investments on security and resiliency
that the companies are making, so you are providing a disincentive
to do this. So we have to find a way to get the market incentive
moving so that the levees are built and people better appreciate
that. If we can do that, when the big one hits we won't have to
worry about bypassing our normal concerns and sharing information
we would otherwise normally--would be in position. So that is what
we need to do, and that is going to require reorganization at DHS,
the White House, in corporate America--and we can go into that in
greater detail if you like, and perhaps even in the Congress,
because it is difficult to deal with you guys.
MR. SHIMKUS. I got elected in 1996, took office in '97.
We had this big disaster coming in the future, which now seems
pretty minimal, which was Y2K. There was a financial aspect of the
private sector to get their act in order so that come the change
over of the clock that there wouldn't be--how many people on
December 31, 1999, as they welcomed in the new year, were kind of
looking at the lights to see if the lights would continue to be on?
And so it is good to have leadership, is it good that we
fill this position so that we can have communication. We started
talking about how you prioritize, and we appreciate your
testimony. Hopefully, this will lead us forward in ensuring that we
are ready to define minor versus major and that--we know we live in
a dangerous world, and we just have to do--we don't want to be sitting
on the sidelines and say we didn't act.
So thank you, Mr. Chairman. My time is expired.
MR. UPTON. Ms. Eshoo.
MS. ESHOO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this
important hearing on an issue that I think has really, for the most
part, been overlooked. It is too important to overlook. As a member
of the House Intelligence Committee, I take very seriously the range
of threats to our country, from terrorists and other enemies,
including threats to our basic infrastructure, which includes our
telecommunications network and the Internet. If you spend any time
with the NSA, you know that this is not only the most valued of infrastructures, but how it serves our national security. So this
hearing is really important, not only to identify how we can
cooperate with one another, but also really to put, I think, the
Administration's feet to the fire on this, in plain English.
We have gone without a cybersecurity czar for far too
long. I heard some testimony that an application and its approval
is in the works, but make no mistake about it--to have gone this
long without any attention to this and without having someone
direct this part of the orchestra, I think is dangerous for our
country, in plain English. I am not one to try to hype up fear
and all of that, but simply put, we have placed ourselves in a
real ditch here by not having the Administration name someone.
I remember when Richard Clark, former cybersecurity czar,
described the potential for a telecom disaster as an electronic
Pearl Harbor. And whether he is there or not, I think his words
should be taken seriously here.
So I have a couple questions. Why has it taken so long
to fill this position?
MR. FORESMAN. Congresswoman, let me make two points first.
This is not--
MS. ESHOO. I mean, there hasn't even been a permanent
director, so this is just like having erased something very
important on the blackboard. We are just operating without--
MR. FORESMAN. Congresswoman--
MS. ESHOO. --anyone there.
MR. FORESMAN. --I would strenuously object to that
characterization.
MS. ESHOO. Well, who has been in charge?
MR. FORESMAN. I have been in charge since January.
MS. ESHOO. January of this year?
MR. FORESMAN. January of this year. And let me offer that
the success or failure of efforts in the Nation's cybersecurity
efforts does not rest with one position in one agency or
organization.
When you look at the challenge that we have gone through,
and I am sure you are aware, Congresswoman, that to get an--
MS. ESHOO. Do you wear any other hat, or you are full-time
as cybersecurity czar?
MR. FORESMAN. Congresswoman, as I think you know, I am the
Under Secretary of Preparedness. I have a number of areas of
responsibility, of which cybersecurity is--
MS. ESHOO. What percentage of your time do you spend
on cybersecurity?
MR. FORESMAN. Approximately 25 percent of my personal time,
and I have a deputy who is assigned to it 75 percent of his time.
MS. ESHOO. And who is that deputy, is he or she here?
MR. FORESMAN. No, ma'am, but I will make the point that
Andy Purdy, who has been our Acting Director of the National
Cybersecurity Division, Andy has done an exceptional job and
Congresswoman, I understand the importance of getting this position
filled, but I want to be very clear with you. This was the number
one personnel priority that I had on my plate when I walked into
this position. We have been through numerous candidates,
Congresswoman, and we have had a wide variety of candidates who,
for a variety of reasons, have not made it through the process.
We have had a number who started into the process and decided
that the vestiture of their businesses, many of them were owners
of firms in the IP community--
MS. ESHOO. Does that fit with other timelines in terms
of hiring people?
MR. FORESMAN. It doesn't, and I think it points to the
unique nature, just as all of the panelists have talked about,
with dealing with IT issues. The sector is unique--
MS. ESHOO. I want to get to another point, and I have 33
seconds to do that.
Given the many vulnerabilities which exist as a result of
users and businesses with inadequate security or vulnerable
networks, what are you identifying that should establish an
environment where users and the private sector do what is
appropriate to really fill this gap to protect our
telecommunications infrastructure? That is what we are here
for. We need to identify that. I am still not pleased with
your answer. I mean, if, in fact, we are on this big search
for a cybersecurity czar and you are saying that you have spent
25 percent of your time, we have someone that is really able
that spends 75 percent of their time, but they are not even here
to testify about it, that says to me that we have a problem.
You may not agree, but I think that we do.
So given the responsibility that you say is 100 percent
covered, where is the plan to pull industry, businesses, private
sector, and the Government together? Because as far as I can see,
we don't have a plan, and that is equally as disturbing.
MR. FORESMAN. Congresswoman, no, we have action. We have
a Sector Coordinating Council that is working across the IT sector
to--
MS. ESHOO. We don't have any standards or anything that
has been pulled together. We heard that in testimony here today.
MR. FORESMAN. Absolutely, Congresswoman, and that is why
we have this group working to develop those standards. This is
not something the Federal government is going to mandate on
industry. I think you heard all of the panelists from the private
sector note that, and we are providing the leadership to get the
players in the room to have the discussion to adopt the best
practices.
MS. ESHOO. I think that we can lead in this area. I think
that we have to lead, and you know, you used the word mandate. I
think that we can create something where people buy into it without
forcing something on them. But I think unless we do take a
leadership position, it is not going to happen.
Mr. Clinton, you wanted to say something?
MR. CLINTON. Yeah. Congresswoman, what I wanted to try to
do is offer an example of where we are working together. Under the
National Infrastructure Protection Plan, there is a requirement for
each individual sector to prepare its own infrastructure protection
plan, and I happen to be working on the IT sector-specific plan,
working in partnership with some of the folks at the Department of
Homeland Security. We are making progress and we are seeking to
make that, if you will, a joint plan. In other words--
MS. ESHOO. Who has bought into it?
MR. CLINTON. Right now, it is very much at the working
level. In other words, we have individuals within the private
sector who are working on that plan in draft form. We are working
with our counterparts at DHS. Now, if I were to offer some
criticism here, and I think I have to, I wish there were more
senior level involvement in the preparation of that plan, not
only DHS, frankly, but other agencies as well, because there
are critical policy questions that need to be addressed.
But I don't want to leave the impression that nothing
is happening between the private sector and the Department of
Homeland Security and other agencies. There are things
happening. It is more leadership and attention to the problem
that would be very useful and critical.
MR. UPTON. The gentlelady's time is expired.
MS. ESHOO. Can I have Mr. Clinton give an answer to the
committee? I think he wanted--
MR. UPTON. Very briefly.
MR. CLINTON. Well, very briefly, I worked with Paul on
the infrastructure protection plan, the sector-specific plan,
and we are working very hard. I am very hopeful about that.
The comment that I wanted to make, however, dealt with
the issue of whether or not we don't have any standards. That
is--I would beg to differ. I don't think that is actually--we
have got a whole lot of stuff already out there: the NRIC
standards, the best practices are really good. The ANSI has
just come up with a new set of standards. The private sector
is well along. As I documented in my testimony, companies that
follow these things are really doing a pretty good job. If we
could get everybody to do this, and there we need motivation.
Some of this we can do on the private sector side. We have a
program to establish model contract language so that the good
actors, when they engage in contracts with the others, will put
into their contract that you have to comply with these ANSI
standards, for example. So there is a whole lot of creative
stuff that we can do.
We have to do a whole lot more on our side, absolutely, and
so does DHS, but we also are really trying to establish an
environment of working together. That is something that is tough
but we are working on it.
MS. ESHOO. Thank you.
MR. UPTON. Mr. Stearns.
MR. STEARNS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Under Secretary Foresman, let me just sort of follow up a
little bit. Ms. Eshoo had been talking about the Department of
Homeland Security sponsored exercises such as a cyber storm. Have
you found that both the Government and the private industry are
unprepared to respond to a major Internet disruption? Can you
specifically tell us how bad the situation and what is being done
to fix it?
MR. MORAN. Congressman, it is difficult to put a
quantifiable measure on where we are, but let me offer a couple--
MR. STEARNS. Don't give me vague and general.
MR. MORAN. I am not going to give you vague and general
answers.
As a number of the panelists have said, we have got to have
a clear appreciation of the roles and responsibilities of the
private sector versus the Department of Homeland Security, and
that was identified. And as we go through the update of the
National Response Plan, we will do those clarifications.
MR. STEARNS. Well, on a 1 through 10 scale, it says here
that you found that both government and private industries are
unprepared to respond. Ten being they are very prepared, and 1
being they are not prepared. On a 1 through 10 scale, how
unprepared are they to respond to a major Internet disruption?
MR. MORAN. Congressman, with all due respect, I am not
going to put a measure on it because it would be unfair to the
industry, it would be unfair to government to put a scope or a
scale on here when as we have evolved through the development
of our infrastructure protection efforts in this Nation, whether
you are talking about--
MR. STEARNS. I don't want you to--just give me general
language. I would like to get--since the report said government
and private industry are unprepared, are they very unprepared or
not prepared? In your opinion, how bad are they unprepared? Is
this significant?
MR. MORAN. Congressman, let me leave it at this. I would
offer that we are moderately well-prepared, and there is more work
to be done.
MR. STEARNS. And what should be done to fix it?
MR. MORAN. Well, Congressman, clearly the big thing is
there is a wide range of ongoing discussions, planning activities,
the exercise activities, the training activities, but I think one
of the critical things that Larry Clinton raised in his testimony
is that there are a number of policy issues that need to be
addressed so that we drive this from a market incentive standpoint.
There are certain areas of the critical infrastructure where
regulation is appropriate--
MR. STEARNS. Okay.
MR. MORAN. --there are others--
MR. STEARNS. I will just move from there.
Mr. Powner, how would legislative changes improve the ability
of the Department of Homeland Security to develop Internet recovery
plans? This is your chance to tee off and give the straight scoop
here that--
MR. POWNER. I think that two areas could move the ball
forward in a large way. Hopefully with the assistant secretary
position being filled soon, that there will be greater clarity
between the roles between the National Communication System and
the National Cybersecurity Division. Right now, those roles and
responsibilities--
MR. STEARNS. So you would want legislative overlap language
for that?
MR. POWNER. Well, the question is if they can't figure it
out soon, perhaps you could help them.
MR. STEARNS. Okay.
MR. POWNER. Okay? So I think that is the first one.
MR. STEARNS. That is a nice way to put it.
MR. POWNER. So that is the first point. The second point is
when you look at the Stafford Act and the lessons learned from
Katrina, there were private companies that needed assistance, and
they were denied. When we have a major disaster, that should not
be the case. We ought to have waivers around some of those things
during national emergencies where private companies can be assisted
by the Federal government.
MR. STEARNS. Mr. Clinton, what percentage of the United
States companies are simply implementing best practices when it
comes to protecting the IT infrastructure?
MR. CLINTON. Well, the last part makes it a little bit
tougher for me, because the statistic I was just going to quote you
goes beyond just the IT infrastructure. Well, the answer I would
give you, sir, is that the research that I have seen, which is
done by PricewaterhouseCoopers, indicates about 25 percent of
corporations are currently following what we would identify as best
practices.
MR. STEARNS. So 80 percent, then, are not doing it?
MR. CLINTON. In various degrees, yes, it is about 80
percent.
MR. STEARNS. And is there--within that 80 percent, can you
break out in terms of groups? Can you be more specific who those 80
percent are?
MR. CLINTON. Yes, although the degree to which I can do it
off the top of my head is--
MR. STEARNS. I don't want to put you to too much trouble.
If you could name a couple names that would be helpful.
MR. CLINTON. Well frankly, Mr. Stearns, probably most of
the companies that appear before this subcommittee are probably
doing a pretty good job. I mean, the major providers, et cetera.
It is when we get particularly into the small business environment
it becomes really--
MR. STEARNS. But 80 percent is a pretty big number, so is
it possible you could give me some examples who are in that 80
percent categories?
MR. CLINTON. Well, we have a major problem with small
business overall.
The first recommendation that came out of the National
Cybersecurity Summit, which was held a couple years ago, was to
reach out to small businesses and--
MR. STEARNS. Under 5 million, under 100 million, what--
MR. CLINTON. Under 50 million is--
MR. STEARNS. Under 250, so that is a lot of companies.
MR. CLINTON. That is a lot of companies, sir. And we
did research on that to figure out why was this going on, and to
really cut to the chase, we found that all the small companies
that we dealt with, series of focus groups held nationwide, had
one thing in common. Every small company wanted one thing: to
become a big company. And so the economic difficulties, the costs
involved, were really the major barriers. So what we have attempted
to do is develop a cost efficient way to deliver services to these
companies, and we have expanded our reach by several hundred.
So there are efforts that need to be made here. We need
more best practices; we have to refine the best practices that are
previously established so that they are more applicable to the
small companies. They have different needs than larger companies.
We have to find ways that we can fund a delivery system that would
be far more cost effective for them, develop assessment tools, all
of which we have done. So we are doing outreach, but sir, I am
absolutely with you. My testimony says a lot more needs to be
done. We have to find incentives to get these people more into
the boat, and we would love to work with you on that.
MR. STEARNS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
MR. UPTON. Mr. Inslee.
MR. INSLEE. Thank you. There is a lot to be concerned about
here, and I want to ask some of you gentlemen about excuses for
inaction.
We have this blatant failure to have leadership for not
filling the Assistant Secretary of Cybersecurity post at DHS. The
GAO has found that that has retarded any significant advances on
cybersecurity. That is on the Administration's side.
On the Congress's side, the House has failed to pass two
meaningful pieces of legislation, the Data Accountability and Trust
Act, H.R. 4127. We passed that unanimously on our committee on
March 29, 2006. This is supposed to be the big security month in
the House, but as far as we know, it is not scheduled for House
action. That, of course, would set national standards on how to
handle data brokers handle personal information. That hasn't
passed. The Provincia Fraudulent Access to Phone Records Act,
H.R. 4943, that passed unanimously--I'm not sure it was
unanimously-out of this committee on March 16, 2006. That hasn't
passed the House of Representatives yet.
So we have supposedly the big security month in the
Republican Administration, Republican House. We don't have a
leadership post for cybersecurity for the Nation. It has been
empty for a year. We have two major bills, one involving pretext
calling--by the way, we know this is not an abstract problem. We
see at Hewlett Packard the situation where somebody in management
basically hired a firm to do pretext calling to violate the privacy
rights of the Board members of this corporation to get their phone
records. This is going on in the major board rooms of a major
Fortune 500 company. This is not an abstract problem. It is
happening. And yet, we don't have the House passing either one
of these bills to date. I think that is a concern.
So I guess I will ask Mr. Foresman, is there any excuse
for either of these failures?
MR. FORESMAN. Congressman, let me first say with regard
to what Congress has or has not done. I am not in a position to
exercise any level of judgment on that. On the second piece with
regard to the cybersecurity post, I would offer to you progress has
been made. The absence of an individual in that particular post
has not stopped us from moving forward. Earlier, I had talked
about the fact that we had a very collaborative relationship with
Microsoft just a couple of weeks ago to deal with the vulnerability
issue.
So if it were the fact that we had a difficult time finding
a candidate to fill this position had we been in neutral the entire
time, I think there would be grave concern, but I think we have
been in overdrive the entire time, and as all the individuals have
said here today, we need to keep the pedal to the metal and
continue our efforts forward.
MR. INSLEE. Well, it is great on a ship that the people in
the boiler room are doing a good job and the navigator is doing as
good a job that he can, without a captain you just don't get the
motivation to move an agency. And sitting here, I don't think
there is any excuse for that. I don't think there is any excuse
for us not passing these two bills, either, that are consensus
products.
So I think constituents of any party ought to be
dissatisfied with both the Administration and the House today, and
I would hope this hearing, which I am glad we are having, I thank
the Chair for having this hearing, will motivate all parties to move
with the dispatch to get these jobs done.
Thank you.
MR. UPTON. Mr. Walden.
MR. WALDEN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I
appreciation the work of the GAO to give us some guidance, and the
testimony of our panelists today.
I want to ask the gentleman from Symantec, is it Weafer?
MR. WEAFER. Weafer.
MR. WALDEN. Weafer. What sort of changes have you seen in
the cyber threats over the last couple of years? I mean, we are
all subject to them. I get this garbage on my Blackberry, at home
and everywhere else, and I realize that is junk mail, but in terms
of the threat, what are you seeing?
MR. WEAFER. Well, I think we have seen a very big change
from the late '90s, which are very much driven by the teenagers,
the cyber vandals, the attention, today are very much driven by
criminalization and commercialization.
The criminalization are the ones we have talked about, the
phishers, the spammers, the people that are out there. The
commercialization is people like adware companies, bad actors, the
people who are trying to exploit vulnerabilities, take over
websites. They are trying to get sludge onto your machine. So it
is the intensity in volume and the absence of high profile events
is something of concern to us in terms of creating awareness for
users.
We hear this from home users, we hear this from CEOs of
companies, which is the problem has been solved because I don't see
it on the news anymore, and we are seeing the opposite. We are
seeing the intensity of the volumes actually increase over the last
couple of years.
MR. INSLEE. And as you see that intensity increase, what
sort of damage are you seeing to these systems?
MR. WEAFER. Well, today it is very focused on loss of
confidential, personal information: Social Security numbers,
personal information stolen from data leakage from corporations.
That seems to be where most of the money is concentrated on.
That is where most of the attacks are. Certainly, there is a lot
of concern about critical infrastructure, not just on today's
technology, but as we move into the next generation technologies
like smart phones, mobile technologies, there is a lot of concern
going forward about how prepared are we with those technologies,
which is why one of the recommendations is certainly R&D into
some of these new technologies to secure them.
MR. INSLEE. And as you look at what is coming out of the
Federal government, I mean, we have heard a lot about the lack of
an appointment to the head of this Department and all, how
important is that?
MR. WEAFER. We think it is critical. I think, to echo
many of the comments made here today, which is we have identified
many of the policies, we have identified some of the key players,
we just need to implement and get many of these ideas moving.
MR. INSLEE. All right.
Mr. Moran, what kind of security issues should we take
into consideration as we migrate from sort of the traditional phone
service to Internet-based services and communications?
MR. MORAN. Well, the newer systems, the new Internet-based
systems, they are much more open systems. The old systems were
closed systems where you had trusted a few people, trusted people,
you knew them. They were the ones that had access to like the
signaling operations so the networks were easier to maintain the
integrity of the networks. The new systems are much more open.
The channels that handle the data are the same channels that handle
the controls in many cases. This produces a lot of challenges,
and it means that anyone who is a part of the system, if they want
to maintain secure systems, they have to take a lot of steps to
make sure that they are not being sloppy with how their networks
are and whether--not being sloppy, but people into those systems
that shouldn't be in.
Through the NRIC process, we posed some of those questions
to NRIC and we have gotten a number of best practices on how to be
more secure in those things to make sure that your system will not
be so vulnerable.
MR. INSLEE. All right.
Mr. Kurtz, I guess one of the issues that has always
intrigued and yet troubled me with how we deal with the Internet
is its international scope. We can have people in place and
policies coming out of the United States government. How do you
control it when a lot of this stuff is offshore? What do you
recommend? How do we get at that issue?
MR. KURTZ. Well, there is an important milestone just
passed before the summer recess when the Senate ratified the
Council of Europe's Convention on Cyber Crime, which puts in place
that common infrastructure for investigating and prosecuting cyber
criminals. That was a very important step.
The next step now is to, if you will, take the show on the
road and ensure that other countries around the world adopt that
same convention, put in place the laws in order to investigate
and prosecute cyber criminals. It also requires the United States
to reach out, in particular, to key allies and friends, to
develop relationships about relating to infrastructure protection,
information infrastructure protection. In other words, if we have
a major problem in Europe or in Asia with regard to a critical
data link or multiple links at the same time, we are obviously
going to need to know who is who on the other side so we can have
those kind of relationships in place, getting into a broader
exercise environment.
I will note that Cyber Storm, if you will, was international
in nature. They had some other countries participating, but we
need to broaden that scope.
MR. INSLEE. But doesn't it just take one outlier, I mean,
one safe harbor, if you will, from international law where they can
drive it all through servers and--
MR. KURTZ. Well, it depends on ultimately what you want to
do at the end of the day. If you are, in fact, talking about cyber
crime, yes, if you want to have somebody who wants to go after
people's sensitive personal information, it can be just one
outlier. But if you are talking about a concerted cyber attack,
that takes more resources, more planning capabilities on the
outside and on the inside, in other words, an insider threat
capability as well. It takes a little bit more, but it is very
difficult with the Internet because I can, if you will, spoof that
I am sitting in China or I am sitting in Iran, when I am really
somewhere in Iowa. It makes it difficult.
MR. UPTON. Mrs. Blackburn.
MRS. BLACKBURN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank all of
you for being with us today and bringing the information that you
have. Listening to you, I tell you, we have--in this committee
and in Oversight and Investigations, we have talked quite a bit
about looking at the new economy, the electronic commerce needs
for drawing some bright lines distinguishing what is large
businesses and small businesses. Mr. Kurtz, listening to you it
sounds like there again that needs to be a consideration, how we
deal with the businesses and the type of business that it is, and
then looking into folding that into the laws in the government and
their responsibility.
Secretary Foresman, let me come to you first. We talked a
lot about what is not done. I have looked at your testimony, and
you lay out broad platitudes and goals that are there, and I will
tell you quite frankly, reading it, it reminded me a little bit
about the hearing that we did in New Orleans post-Katrina on the
implosion of healthcare. And as we talked with them about what
their emergency preparedness was, we found out that they had a
strategy, a plan on paper. What they did not ever do was put in
place an implementation plan. So sometimes, we can look at goals,
we can look at what a vision is, but that is not going to get
things in place to deal with recovery of information or putting a
cyber structure back in place, should we have an attack.
So for the record, why don't you articulate the steps that
you all have taken, the things that you do have in process.
MR. FORESMAN. Congresswoman, what I propose is to bring
back a comprehensive list of those things and how they fit
together in terms of implementers, but I am 110 percent with you.
The Secretary and I have talked in the context of cybersecurity.
The necessity of first defining the goals and doing that in
collaboration with industry in a way that balances security and
the national economy--
MRS. BLACKBURN. Okay. If I may interrupt you--
MR. FORESMAN. And then, Congresswoman, if I just might
say, we are going to put tangible timelines on all of these things
as we move forward. As you saw in the testimony, we are updating
the National Response Plan. The sector plan is due by December 31
at the latest, earlier if possible. We are just not going to
simply throw them out there without specific deliverable timelines.
MRS. BLACKBURN. So you can give this committee assurance
that there are some tangible items that you all--some milestones
that you have reached, some things that you have in place that we
can point to, and when our constituents say, you know, post-Katrina,
there was not communication in Southern Mississippi. What are you
looking at if we have a disaster that takes down everything again?
You can say when it comes to Internet and to our cyber
infrastructure, we have some deliverables that have been reached
and we can document that and show you.
MR. FORESMAN. Congresswoman, we will bring that and
document it and provide it to you.
MRS. BLACKBURN. Okay, thank you. I appreciate that.
Mr. Kurtz, back to some of your comments, and kind of
taking up where Mr. Walden had left off, do you think that the
Federal government is capable of putting in place a recovery
structure? Do you think that this is something that needs to
be done by the private sector and the stakeholders necessarily
for helping put that in place for the government? Do you think
government has the ability to move quickly enough to address it?
MR. KURTZ. I certainly think the Government has the
ability to lead those efforts. If I can go back to the 1980s and
1990s when the national communication system was set up with a
divestiture of AT&T, a group of companies came together, the
telecom firms came together to work with DOD and the rest of the
interagency on telecom issues. If you will, the Government built
the field and they all came. I think we really can do the same
thing with this situation as well.
MRS. BLACKBURN. Okay.
MR. KURTZ. We can expand the pool to include the IT
infrastructure folks, and as well as other key infrastructure
providers, the finance and energy folks as well.
I do think it is doable. It is really leadership and
sorting out roles and responsibilities in the event of a crisis
that is important.
MRS. BLACKBURN. Okay. Mr. Moran, you mentioned the 200
best practices in your testimony that your work had led to, over
200 best practices. So what do you do with that list? Are you
actively communicating that or do--
MR. MORAN. Yes, the best practices have been developed.
They are actually posted on the NRIC website. But we have an
outreach program. We get out to parties who we think need to
hear the message. The ones who were involved in NRIC development,
they obviously know them, they voted on them, they know what they
are. They are very attuned to it. But for example, we get out
to--a lot of the FCC focus is on the telecom networks, so one of
the things we do, we try to get out to the State telephone
associations and we get out and make some presentations about the
best practices, why they are important. We try to make the point,
by the way, that there are costs to implement best practices, but
the risks and the costs of not implementing the best practices and
having networks go down, lost revenues among other things, we try
to point out that there is a lot of risk and a lot of costs
associated with not implementing best practices.
So we get out there. We also get out at national
conventions and conferences to get the word out on the best
practices. So we think it is extremely important for everyone to
know about them who the best practices would be relevant to, and we
try to make that happen.
MRS. BLACKBURN. And I would assume that post-Katrina you
have some lessons learned that are also included in that?
MR. MORAN. Absolutely, yes.
MRS. BLACKBURN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
MR. UPTON. Thank you.
Mr. Gonzalez.
MR. GONZALEZ. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, to indulge
me this last question. I just didn't want to leave this untreated,
because I think we touched on it, but to make sure that we are
comprehensive.
We have touched on the role of the major player, of course,
government, and then the major players in the Internet, and I think
we have identified those as the individuals that
come--representatives that testified before our committee,
Mr. Chairman. We barely touched on the other, though, and that is
going to be small business and consumer. And so this question is
more directed to Mr. Weafer, right? Mr. Weafer, your testimony
cites a study by the Small Business Technology Institute, small
business information security readiness, and I quote "Shockingly,
this study found that over 74 percent of small businesses perform
no information security planning whatsoever." That is the first
point. Now, let us get into the consumer, and I think small
business more consumer than anything else. "The growing use of
always on broadband connections by home users and small businesses
represents a significant amount of computing power, which left
unprotected can be taken over and used as zombie machines to damage
our networks and hinder the commerce and services that flow through
them."
So on those two points, where are we today in addressing
those particular groups that are essential, obviously, if it is
going to be comprehensive, and again, what should we be doing if,
in fact, you disagree with the progress that we are making at the
present time?
MR. WEAFER. Well, I think just a couple of things you need
to do. One is increasing awareness and education, particularly for
the home user level. I think it is a danger for the home users that
they think that the problem is solved through one magic pill. That
is not the case. As we have moved from dial-up connections to
broadband connections, we have opened up our computers to not only
more pressing power, but more threats coming in: network attacks,
phishing attacks, spam attacks. I think in many cases people are
unaware of the dangers they are opening up.
Every country we look at and we log go, to broadband, we
see a complimentary increase in the number of cyber attacks
originating from within that country. So it is not just a U.S.
concept, we actually see it around the world.
So getting people to understand it is a defense in depth,
getting them to understand it is about updating security patches,
best practices, social awareness in terms of what parts of the
Internet--don't go down the dark alleys of the Internet, what they
are downloading on the machine, reading the user agreements, these
are part of the education awareness.
Secondly, the infrastructure itself, we need to make sure
we are protecting them as much as we can. Some of this can be
done at the telecommunications or the ISP layer, which is protecting
them from spam, viruses, and things coming down that pipe towards
them. We do recognize a special place the home users have,
because, of course, many of us are also remote workers. So if we
bring home our work, we are also exposing our company's data as
part of this. So this is another reason why we really need to
focus on this group and try to get them the incentive as well as
the awareness to try and improve security.
MR. UPTON. Thank you, Mr. Gonzalez.
Well, this concludes our hearing. We appreciate your
thoughtful remarks and your testimony, as well as in your
statements. I must tell you that this subcommittee is going to
stay on top of this issue. Mr. Foresman, again, if you could take
that message back that we are looking forward to working with an
assistant secretary, as we know that this is a potential real
problem that will cause just enormous damages if it is not dealt
with correctly.
Thank you and have a good day.
[Whereupon, at 11:58 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
SUBMISSION FOR THE RECORD OF JEANNINE KENNEY, SENIOR POLICY ANALYST,
CONSUMERS UNION
RESPONSE FOR THE RECORD OF DAVID A. POWNER, DIRECTOR, INFORMATION
TECHNOLOGY MANAGEMENT ISSUES, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE
RESPONSE FOR THE RECORD OF VINCENT WEAFER, SENIOR DIRECTOR, SYMANTEC
SECURITY RESPONSE, SYMANTEC CORPORATION
1.
What are the risks and benefits of private companies sharing
information with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)?
Information sharing among government agencies and the private
sector has emerged as one of the most critical challenges of the
post 9/11 era. A key element of this challenge is that while the
federal government is expected to keep the U.S. secure, the
overwhelming majority (85 to 90 percent) of the nation's critical
infrastructure is owned by the private sector.
In structuring its strategy for securing the national
critical infrastructure, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
has been designated as the lead agency and is charged with finding
ways to improve information sharing while the IT systems that
control the critical infrastructure -- such as telecommunications
networks, the electrical power grid, oil pipelines, and water
treatment plants -- remain protected from physical and cyberthreats.
In early 2005, the Government Accountability Office (GAO)
published a report that criticized the DHS for not doing enough to
reach out to the private sector. The report asserted that many
organizations responsible for the nation's critical infrastructure
"are either unaware of key areas of cybersecurity risks or
unprepared to effectively address cyber emergencies. Further, DHS
continues to have difficulties in developing partnerships -- as
called for in federal policy -- with other federal agencies, state
and local governments, and (the) private sector." Without
effective partnerships with the private sector, the government's
mission to secure our nation's infrastructure will not be
successful.
While information sharing is necessary for critical
infrastructure protection, it may also leave participants more
vulnerable to attacks. In order to effectively protect the
infrastructure, government agencies and private firms must work
together to determine what kinds of information should be shared
and why, develop the appropriate information sharing mechanisms
(such as further development of the IT-ISAC and IT-SCC for the
IT Sector), ensure that the public sector shares as much timely
information as possible, and make the intelligence more actionable
for all parties. Most of the information the private sector has
received in the past has been old information or is not enough
information to take any specific actions. We have seen some
improvement recently in this area. The advent of the Protected
Critical Infrastructure Information (PCII) program is also a
positive step toward protecting sensitive information and only
sharing it with appropriate parties. However, there are still
some questions that remain about the PCII program, including how
the information which is submitted will be protected and to what
extent a company can control the information once submitted.
Before the government can expect the private sector to fully
cooperate and share valuable IT information and assets, the
government should be able to demonstrate a secure, resilient
infrastructure of its own. The most recent FISMA scores signal that
many agencies still have a lot more to do in the area of IT
Security. By combining the right technologies, processes, and
policies, agencies can dramatically reduce the risk of unexpected
disruptions, increase their ability to maintain continuity of
normal business operations, protect highly sensitive information,
and tightly align IT to changing operational goals.
2. What improvements could DHS make in building its working
relationships with private sector information technology and
communications companies and major industrial users of the Internet?
The Department of Homeland Security should streamline
communication with private firms holding a stake in the nation's
critical infrastructure sectors. In addition, DHS should expedite
recommendations provided by private sector representatives serving
on the National Infrastructure Assurance Council (NIAC).
Symantec's Chairman and CEO, John W. Thompson, was appointed
in 2002 to the National Infrastructure Assurance Council (NIAC) by
U.S. President George W. Bush. The NIAC was established by the
President to provide advice on the security of information systems
for critical infrastructure supporting key sectors of the national
economy, including banking and finance, transportation, energy,
manufacturing, and emergency government services.
During the summer of 2005, the NIAC established a Sector
Partnership Model Working Group from a DHS requested study and
provided recommendations on its structure, function and
implementation.
In October 2005, the Working Group presented its initial
report and findings to the NIAC, affirming the structure of the
partnership model presented in the National Infrastructure
Protection Plan (NIPP), and recommending key operating principles,
including that the partnership be considered a collaboration of
equals between the government and the private sector. The approach
includes sector based and cross-sector partnerships.
We believe that DHS should implement a "sector partnership
model" in which leaders from the private sector and government
counterparts that do similar work would share information about
sector-specific topics. Unlike formal governmental advisory
committees that involve private sector voices, these groups of
leaders would be self-organized bodies and remain independent of
government control.
Symantec recommends that DHS should also continue to work
with private industry to discuss the key challenges the Department
faces that impede the private sector's willingness to share
sensitive information. Some of these key challenges for DHS
include:
defining specific government needs for critical infrastructure
information,
determining how the information will be used,
assuring the private sector that the information will be protected
and who will be authorized to have access to the information, and
demonstrating to critical infrastructure owners the benefits of
sharing the information.
If DHS were able to surmount these challenges, it and other
government users may begin to overcome the lack of trust that
critical infrastructure owners have in the government's ability to
use and protect their sensitive information.
Finally, Symantec has made numerous recommendations over the
last several years related to information sharing functions that
have been transferred to DHS. One significant area concerns the
federal government's CIP efforts, which is focused on the sharing
of information on incidents, threats, and vulnerabilities, and the
providing of warnings related to critical infrastructures both
within the federal government and between the federal government
and state and local governments and the private sector. Although
improvements have been made, further efforts are needed by DHS in
coordination with the private sector to address the following
critical CIP challenges:
developing a comprehensive and coordinated national plan to
facilitate CIP information sharing that clearly delineates the
roles and responsibilities of federal and nonfederal CIP entities,
defines interim objectives and milestones, sets timeframes for
achieving objectives, and establishes performance measures;
developing fully productive information sharing relationships
within the federal government and between the federal government
and state and local governments and the private sector;
improving the federal government's capabilities to analyze
incident, threat, and vulnerability information obtained from
numerous sources and share appropriate, timely, useful warnings
and other information concerning both cyber and physical threats
to federal entities, state and local governments, and the private
sector; and
providing appropriate incentives for non-federal entities to increase information sharing with the federal government and enhance other CIP
efforts.
The success of homeland security also relies on establishing
effective systems and processes to facilitate information sharing
among and between government entities and the private sector. The
ISAC's have identified critical success factors and other key
management issues that DHS should consider as it establishes
systems and processes to facilitate information sharing among and
between government entities and the private sector.
These success factors include establishing trust
relationships with a wide variety of federal and non-federal
entities that may be in a position to provide potentially useful
information and advice on vulnerabilities and incidents. As part of
its information technology management, DHS should continue to
develop and implement enterprise architecture to integrate the
many existing systems and processes required to support its mission
and to guide the department's investments in new systems to
effectively support homeland security in the coming years. Other
key management issues include ensuring that sensitive information
is secured, developing secure communications networks, integrating
staff from different organizations, and ensuring that the
department has properly skilled staff.
3. Describe (a) the involvement of private sector firms in the
development of the National Infrastructure Protection Plan and your
views on the efforts to develop this plan; and (b) the involvement
of private sector firms in the ongoing development of the
IT/Communications Sector specific plan in response to NIPP and
your view of the process by which the sector-specific plan is being
developed.
(A.) As the focal point for critical infrastructure
protection, DHS has many cybersecurity and other IT related
responsibilities that are called for in law and policy. In 2005 and
2006, DHS initiated efforts to address these responsibilities, but
much more remains to be done.
On June 30, pursuant to Homeland Security Presidential
Directive 7, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) released a
final (NIPP). The final NIPP builds on the framework established
in both the interim and draft versions of the NIPP, issued in
February 2005 and November 2005 respectively. Symantec believes
that DHS has made significant progress on these responsibilities
with the June 2006 release of the National Infrastructure
Protection Plan; however, supplemental sector-specific plans have
not yet been finalized.
Private sector firms were allowed little time to review and
comment on the finalized version of the NIPP. Many
IT/Communications sector specific firms had hoped to be consulted
earlier by DHS to participate in the drafting process for the NIPP
up front as opposed to being asked to comment on a DHS completed
document without prior industry consultation.
Symantec is encouraged that the final NIPP includes more
references to the IT Sector. However, we believe the plan needs to
go one step further by addressing avenues for merging physical and
cyber protection. Reconciling the two won't be any easy task but
that is what the 17 sector-specific councils are charged with doing
in 180 days; that's the deadline for preparing individual
infrastructure protection plans for the telecommunications, IT,
financial service, chemical and other industries
designated "criticial" by the DHS. These plans will be based on the
NIPP and sanctioned and released by DHS, but issued as guidance,
meaning compliance by companies will be voluntary. The key part
of each of those sector specific plans will be a risk assessment
of the possibility of a cyber or physical attack and an estimation
of its effects.
Symantec believes that it will be most difficult for
security professionals in each industry to merge those two risk
assessments, especially given the lack of specificity in the NIPP.
There is a complex web of issues which have not been dealt with
in the NIPP. For example, a dam -- and most physical assets -- are
built to certain specifications in order to resist threats, such
as a storm, of a specified magnitude. If the dam breaks, the
result can typically be predicted. But if vulnerability in an
operating system is exploited, the asset, i.e. the computer, is
not damaged. Rather, there is a loss of functionality throughout
a network, the extent of which cannot be predicted in advance.
Symantec is concerned that the sector-specific plans will confine
network security to the backseat as concern over dams, rivers,
buildings and other physical assets drives each plan. The NIPP
focuses more directly on protection of physical assets and still
needs greater emphasis on cybersecurity. Symantec recommends
greater inclusion of cyber security in the NIPP. We have
identified several clear and present cyber security threats to
U.S. critical infrastructure which exist from many sources.
(B.) Symantec is a member of the Information Technology
Sector Coordinating Council (IT-SCC) which was established on
January 27, 2006 for the purposes of bringing together
companies, associations, and other key IT sector participants
on a regular basis to coordinate strategic activities and
communicate broad sector member views associated with
infrastructure protection, response and recovery that are broadly
relevant to the IT Sector.
The IT-SCC was formed, in part, to support the "Sector
Partnership Model" developed by DHS and endorsed by the NIAC.
Symantec remains closely engaged with DHS, specifically the National
Cyber Security Division (NCSD) as our lead Sector Agency, in CIP
policy development and coordination. For operational information
sharing issues, the IT-ISAC will take leadership, with the support
of the IT SCC. The IT sector envisions a secure, resilient, and
protected global information infrastructure that can rapidly
restore services if affected by an emergency or crisis, ensuring
the continued and efficient function of information technologies,
infrastructures and services for people, governments, and
businesses worldwide.
Symantec and other Council members are working in
partnership with DHS in developing risked based, private sector
driven critical infrastructure protection (CIP) initiatives.
Specifically, the IT SCC is working with the NCSD to develop a
new understanding of IT assets that is function based, as opposed
to the traditional physical structure conception of assets. The
IT SCC has developed a Plans Working Group to coordinate the IT
SCC's input to the government's National Infrastructure
Protection Plan (NIPP) and co-development of the IT Sector Specific
Plan (SSP).
Additionally, the IT-SCC is looking to build more robust
information sharing between DHS and the private sector. As such,
the IT SCC has asked DHS to use the powers granted to it in Section
871 of the Homeland Security Act and develop a FACA exempt structure
to more easily share information. The April 2006 announcement by
DHS of the formation of the Critical Infrastructure Protection
Advisory Committee (CIPAC) responds to that need, and the IT-SCC
is working with DHS to refine architecture and operation of that
committee. Additionally, the IT-ISAC continues to engage DHS on
operational information sharing.
Symantec has been pleased with our participation in the IT
SCC and the process to collaboratively work together with other
industry players on an IT sector specific plan.
4. What factors make private/public working groups more/less
effective in planning for or responding to major Internet
disruptions?
The Internet and its communications infrastructure serve
as the backbone of information exchange that is vital to our
nation's security and our economy. Yet many feel the United States
is not sufficiently prepared for a major attack, software incident
or natural disaster that would lead to disruption of large parts
of the Internet. Despite a series of efforts in recent years to
address this issue, some gaps still exist in the response plans
of the U.S. government and the private sector for reconstituting
the Internet in the event of an unprecedented massive Internet
disruption.
The primary factor that can make private/public working
groups ineffective in planning for or responding to major Internet
disruptions is that there is currently no well-coordinated
processes or roles and responsibilities which exist today that
would integrate the disparate plans of industry and government
to restore Internet functioning when recovering from a major
cyber attack. Some of the recent government exercises demonstrate
that there is much to improve on from both sides.
According to the GAO, DHS has so far failed to establish
a comprehensive plan for responding to cyberthreats against
critical infrastructure. Criminal groups, foreign intelligence
services and terrorists all have the ability to launch disruptive
physical and cyberattacks. While the DHS developed high-level
plans for infrastructure protection, components that address
Internet recovery are "incomplete. In addition, while the DHS has
begun working with private industry on processes for jointly
responding to cyberattacks, the initiatives are "immature" and
lack deadlines for completion.
Also hampering the department's efforts to establish a
recovery plan is a lack of agreement over what the agency's role
should be when a disruption does occur and when it should get
involved. In addition, the private sector has been reluctant to
share information with the DHS because "it doesn't currently see
a value in sharing" and lacks trust in the leadership.
A July 2005 GAO report has stated that the government is
not prepared to effectively coordinate public and private-sector
plans for recovering from a major Internet attack. "Until these
challenges are addressed, DHS will have difficulty achieving
results in its role as a focal point for helping the Internet to
recover from a major disruption," the report noted.
That said, there are definite benefits to having
private/public working groups in planning for or responding to
major Internet disruptions. Specifically, by working together,
stronger trust relationships can built, processes can be developed
and streamlined, roles can be identified, and actionable information
can be shared to better protect our nation's infrastructure.
Symantec encourages more comprehensive exercises by DHS
such as the Cyber Storm Exercise involving simulated cyberattacks
against the nation's critical infrastructure that were conducted
in February. Cyber Storm was conducted by the DHS's NCSD on
Feb. 6-10. More than 110 public, private and international
organizations took part in the exercise, which simulated a
cyberattack directed at critical infrastructure. Among the key
findings in the report is the need for a well-established chain
of command in a time of crisis, the importance of information
sharing across government and industry sectors and a better
ability to correlate incident information across the two groups.
There was some negative press regarding this exercise, but the
important thing to remember is that exercises are conducted
specifically to find the problem areas or gaps and fix them before
the next exercise or real-life event occurs.
Symantec looks forward to continuing important work with
private industry, Congress and the Administration to better
enhance our nation's preparedness for a major Internet disruption
or physical attack. As I noted in my testimony to the Committee,
I firmly believe that it's not a question of "if", but "when".
Thank you.
RESPONSE FOR THE RECORD OF PAUL B. KURTZ, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, CYBER
SECURITY INDUSTRY ALLIANCE
CSIA's responses to follow-up questions from the September 13, 2006
hearing, "Cybersecurity: Protecting America's Critical
Infrastructure, Economy, and Consumers," House Committee on
Energy and Commerce, Subcommittee on Telecommunications and the
Internet.
1. What are the risks and benefits of private companies sharing
information with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)?
Private sector companies and organizations have invested
enormous financial and human resources into developing proactive and
effective partnerships with government to protect our valuable
critical information infrastructure. Despite significant progress,
barriers remain, and more needs to be done to improve the quality
of information sharing partnerships between government and
industry.
Risks: Private sector companies and the government have
identified a number of risks and barriers with respect to sharing
information with DHS or other federal entities. The
U.S. Government Accountability Office released a report in
April, 2006 that identified the following items as key challenges
that impede the private sector's willingness to share sensitive
information:
- defining specific government needs for critical infrastructure
information;
- determining how the information will be used;
- assuring the private sector that the information will be protected
and who will be authorized to have access to the information; and
- demonstrating to critical infrastructure owners the benefits of
sharing the information.
Separately, the National Cyber Security Partnership's Working
Group on Information Sharing identified additional barriers that
require improvement:
- Industry is brought into the process once government consensus is
achieved, which makes meaningful change or input difficult.
- Government consensus on major initiatives developed prior to
substantial industry input creates resistance when presented to
industry, on both substantive and partnership grounds.
- Every process that DHS develops to collect information
(i.e., HSIN, US-CERT) should be done with industry partnership to
ensure that both industry and government will have something to
gain out of sharing information and thus an incentive to share.
- Outdated clearance requirements do not fit new-era information
sharing requirements. A new, enhanced partnership with the private
sector requires a new information classification system.
Both of these lists identify fundamental problems with the
existing information-sharing process that require clarity of purpose
on the part of DHS, and inclusion of the private sector on program
planning and implementation. In order to establish functional and
effective information-sharing partnerships, DHS and other
government agencies need to establish trust among organizations and
create "true" partnerships.
Establishing Trust
DHS operates under the premise that once information or
data is provided, it is then "owned" by DHS and can be used as DHS
sees fit. This impedes trust and eliminates any incentive by
industry for information sharing. Unfortunately, the Final Rule
regarding procedures for Handling Critical Infrastructure
Information issued by DHS this September (implementing the
Critical Information Infrastructure Act of 2002) provides no
further clarity for industry. Industry needs a clear understanding
of what information they are being asked to provide, why they are
being asked for it, and how it will be used. They have concerns
with sharing sensitive proprietary information, and industry needs
assurance that this information, when shared, will be protected.
Conversely, DHS needs to reciprocate by providing industry with
critical information in a timely manner.
Establishing a "true" partnership
There are many barriers to establishing a "true" partnership.
DHS must ensure the partnership reflects all relevant parties and
sector-specific entities. Senior leadership buy-in and support from
both DHS and industry are critical in establishing this "true"
partnership. Finally, the information sharing partnership must
be voluntary and built on trust; each member must be personally
responsible for their trusted behavior.
Benefits: There are several businesses and organizations
with the tools, resources and expertise that can provide
invaluable information DHS may not otherwise have access to, or the
ability to produce. Likewise, DHS and other government agencies
have their own internal organizations, plus, previously-established
public-private partnerships that have made strides in information
sharing and program and policy development.
Private sector organizations can gather data on threats and
malicious Internet activity and present this information to DHS and
other government agencies in order to raise awareness and encourage
action. McAfee's AVERT Labs, for example, has developed a general
ranking system that indicates the severity of known global threats
and how they impact the Internet, business operations, and home
users' systems. Their 100 researchers in 14 countries continuously
monitor the latest threats and provide remediation. Internet
Security Systems' (ISS) X-Force Threat Analysis Service (XFTAS)
provides real-time threat information from ISS' international
network of Security Operations Centers and delivers customized
information about potential threats to networks.
Likewise, Symantec Corporation releases a semi-annual
Internet Security Threat Report, or ISTR, which is a comprehensive
analysis of security activity in today's information economy. It
offers an overview of threat activity over a six-month period and
is based on data collected from more than 40,000 sensors deployed
in over 180 countries in addition to a database covering more than
18,000 vulnerabilities affecting over 30,000 technologies from
more than 4,000 vendors. The Report includes an analysis of
network-based attacks on the Internet with a review of known
threats, vulnerabilities, malicious code and other security
risks. It also offers security best practices for consumers and
businesses in order to help them protect themselves against
current and emerging cyber threats. The underlying data
associated with such reports can help guide the government and
Congress toward addressing the problem.
Presidential Decision Directive 63 (PDD63), Homeland
Security Presidential Directive (HSPD-7) and Executive Order
13231 (EO - 13231) helped promote the idea of a concentrated
effort regarding the sharing of various sector issues leading
to unified and strengthened industry sectors entities. The
IT-ISAC, or Information Sharing and Analysis Center, is a
non-profit organization, providing users with real-time
information about urgent alerts, security news, vulnerabilities,
viruses and other Internet threats, thus providing a coherent
picture of the current health of the Internet to IT-ISAC members.
The purpose of the IT-ISAC is also to provide a forum for sharing
threat related information, and ways to protect against those
threats. Members can submit vulnerability, virus and general
notifications for distribution.
Below is a description of other public-private
partnerships, organizations and committees that generate
strategies, programs, and best practices, where sharing critical
cyber information data with the federal government has certainly
been a benefit:
CERT-CC: a center of Internet security expertise, located
at the Software Engineering Institute, a federally funded research
and development center operated by Carnegie Mellon University; it
studies Internet security vulnerabilities, researches long-term
changes in networked systems, and develops information and training
to help improve security.
National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee
(NSTAC): created by President Ronald Reagan in September 1982; it
is composed of up to 30 industry chief executives representing
the major communications and network service providers and
information technology, finance, and aerospace companies, and
provides industry-based advice and expertise to the President on
issues and problems related to implementing national security
and emergency preparedness (NS/EP) communications policy.
National Infrastructure Advisory Council (NIAC): an advisory
committee within DHS that is composed of a maximum of 30 members,
appointed by the President from private industry, academia, and
state and local government; they provide the President through
the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security with advice
on the security of the critical infrastructure sectors and their
information systems.
North American Network Operators Group (NANOG): an
educational and operational forum for the coordination and
dissemination of technical information related to backbone/enterprise
networking technologies and operational practices.
National Cyber-Forensics and Training Alliance (NCFTA):
provides a neutral collaborative venue where critical confidential
information about cyber incidents can be shared discreetly, and
where resources can be shared among industry, academia and law
enforcement.
National Cyber Security Alliance (NCSA): a non-profit,
public-private partnership that offers resources for cyber security
awareness and education for home user, small business, and
education audiences. NCSA sponsors include the DHS, the Federal
Trade Commission, and many private-sector corporations and
organizations. NCSA provides tools and resources to empower home
users, small businesses, and schools, colleges, and universities
to stay safe online.
National Cyber Security Partnership (NCSP): led by the
Business Software Alliance (BSA), the Information Technology
Association of America (ITAA), TechNet, and the U.S. Chamber of
Commerce; a voluntary public-private partnership with academicians,
CEOs, federal government agencies and industry experts tasked to
develop shared strategies and programs to better secure and
enhance America's critical information infrastructure.
2. What improvements could DHS make in building its working
relationships with private sector information technology and
communications companies and major industrial users of the
Internet?
Since the establishment of DHS, there has been a tension
regarding what entity - public or private - is responsible for the
protection of the critical information infrastructure. DHS has
jurisdiction over these matters, however industry generally owns
and operates the critical infrastructure; unfortunately, this
tension interferes with producing a constructive
industry-government partnership.
Both DHS and industry can take steps to improve this
partnership:
Delineation of Roles and Responsibilities
Clear, defined roles for DHS/Federal agencies and industry
must be established regarding situational awareness and early
warning, emergency communications, continuity of operations
planning, reconstitution, and resiliency. As Paul Kurtz, the
Executive Director of CSIA stated in his testimony, currently,
there is little strategic direction or leadership from the
federal government in the area of information security. CSIA
believes the government has a responsibility to lead, set
priorities, and coordinate and facilitate protection and
response.
DHS must consider and articulate how it will work with the
private sector to respond to and recover from a massive failure of
information technology systems - whether from a cyber attack or a
natural disaster. In preparing to respond to a significant cyber
event, the question that should be asked is: What is a suitable
role for DHS as well as other key federal agencies, including DoD
and the FCC, in facilitating recovery and reconstitution from a
cyber "incident of national significance? The existing DHS
"plan" for recovery cites more than a dozen federal departments
and agencies with "coordinating" responsibility - not including
state, local and tribal governments. DHS needs to articulate a
chain-of-command for each step of recovery and reconstitution.
For example, the DHS's U.S. Computer Emergency Readiness Team
(US-CERT) may be aware of a network attack, but the North American
Network Operators Group (NANOG) as the operational forum for
backbone/enterprise networking, will play the key technical role in
actually mitigating and recovering from a cyber attack.
In the event of a natural disaster, a terrorist attack, or a
failure of any kind of our critical infrastructure, both the
private and public sector need to have timely access to
situational information; they need to communicate with one another
in order to assess and remedy the situation, and oversee COOP,
reconstitution and recovery efforts. Having distinct
responsibilities identified and carried out in practice scenarios
will result in stronger public-private working relationships,
proper planning, and effective response.
Identification of Specific Needs for Information Sharing
According to the aforementioned GAO report, DHS has not
explicitly identified or defined specific needs, nor has it
explained how the information submitted to the Critical
Infrastructure Information (CII) Program Office will be utilized.
GAO also recognized that the information that has already been
submitted to the Program Office has not been utilized to issue
advisories, alerts or warnings. GAO recommends that DHS define
the CII needs of the department and other agencies, specify how
that information will be used, assure the information will be
protected, and demonstrate the benefit of information sharing.
Early and Substantive Engagement/Reciprocity of Information-Sharing
DHS should coordinate with the private sector prior to
developing plans or activities designed to protect critical
infrastructures in order to get a better understanding of the
sector-specific characteristics and operational realities. Too
often, the government develops a plan which fails to reflect
unique sector needs and requirements, and the government later
tries to sell the plan to the private sector. Likewise, the
private sector needs to provide expertise, time and resources to
identify CIP issues, and provide guidance on sector-specific
issues associated with infrastructure protection and response
planning.
Develop and Endorse Cyber Security Best Practices
The private sector needs to coordinate across infrastructure
sectors, national borders, and industries to develop cyber security
best practices that are realistic, responsive, adaptable, and
forward-looking. The government should then encourage and endorse
private sector cyber security best practices. It is important,
however, that these best practices are viewed as advisory, flexible
enough to accommodate differences in risks, and not be
prescriptive.
3. Describe (a) the involvement of private sector firms in the
development of the National Infrastructure Protection Plan and your
views of the efforts to develop this plan; and (b) the involvement
of private sector firms in the ongoing development of the
IT/Communications Sector Specific Plan in response to NIPP and your
views of the process by which the sector specific plan is being
developed.
The National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) provides
a basic flexible framework to translate the needs of both the
government and private sector into planning activities to enhance
national and economic security. The IT-Sector-Specific Plan (SSP)
provides a unique vehicle for articulating common goals for
partnering to accomplish specific objectives.
The private sector and government security partners over the
past six months have jointly engaged to develop an Information
Technology (IT) Sector Specific Plan (SSP) as required under the
NIPP. While we have made good progress, the IT Sector Coordinating
Council (SCC), the IT Government Coordinating Council (GCC), and
the National Cyber Security Division (NCSD) have identified three
sets of issues that require resolution to ensure effective
implementation of the IT SSP.
I. Managing Risk
There are at least three issues requiring resolution between
government and the IT sector.: (a) designation of critical
functions, (b) risk assessment and mitigation, (c) the resources
necessary to identify and protect critical functions.
(a) Critical Functions: Under the NIPP, each sector is
required to identify critical infrastructure assets. Given the
dynamic nature of the information infrastructure, government and
private sector partners jointly agreed to focus on critical
functions associated with the IT infrastructure.
(b) Risk Assessments: Implementing the IT Sector risk
assessment approach outlined in the SSP and mitigating
vulnerabilities in an effective and efficient manner requires
clarity on process. Owners and operators of the IT infrastructure
today engage in risk assessments based on widely accepted standards
and best practices in order to ensure uninterrupted service to
customers in both the public and private sector, and significant
corporate resources are dedicated to performing risk assessments
on a regular basis. In most cases, current best practices would
be sufficient for identifying the critical functions outlined
above. In some cases, risk mitigation may exceed what is required
to serve customers, especially in the case of low probability
catastrophic losses. In such instances, the private sector needs
clarity on how such assessments are performed, how conclusions can
be protected from public disclosure, and how any recommendations
for mitigation shall be adjudicated.
(c) Resources: In such instances identified above in (b),
the IT sector needs clarity on who shall pay for additional risk
assessments and any subsequent mitigation if deemed necessary.
II. Cyber Incidents of National Significance (CINS)
There are three related issues associated with Cyber Incidents
of National Significance: (a) there are no clear criteria for
designating a CINS; (b) there is no clear protocol for reaching such
a decision; and (c) there is no clarity on such a declaration's legal
or policy significance. The third issue is most critical as owners
and operators in the private sector need to understand the meaning
and potential liability if such a declaration is issued. The
issues related to CINS are very important. The Business Roundtable
issued a June report ("Essential Steps Toward Strengthening America's
Cyber Terrorism Preparedness") highlighting the importance of this
issue. Specific programs have not been implemented by DHS which need
to be. Congress should ask DHS about its programs via oversight
hearings.
(a) Criteria for Designating a Cyber Incident of National Significance: The National Response Plan (NRP) defines incidents of
national significance and the NRP's Cyber Incident Annex describes at
a high level what may constitute a CINS.
(b) CINS Protocol: There is no protocol for determining a
declaration for a disruption of the Internet or communications
infrastructure sufficient to cause catastrophic risk to public
health and safety. Such a protocol should include consultation
with the White House and appropriate federal agencies as well as
the leadership of the IT and/or Communications Sector Coordinating
Councils and other potentially affected sectors.
(c) Implications of Declaring a CINS: There is no clear
understanding of the policy or legal authority of a CINS declaration
for the IT sector.
III. Response, Recovery and Reconstitution
(a) Recovery and Reconstitution: Policies and procedures are
needed to clarify the roles and responsibilities of both government
and the private sector in response, recovery, and reconstituting in the
event a CINS is declared. DHS leadership should facilitate efforts to
create these policies and procedures.
(b) Ensuring Robust Response: The capability to respond and
recover from a CINS is critical to promoting the resiliency of
critical infrastructure sectors. An all hazards operational response
and recovery capability that brings government and the private sector
together to coordinate activities involving events (whether potential
or actual CINS) is needed. Existing operational capabilities for
prevention, detection, response, and recovery (e.g., US-CERT) need
additional resources to ensure that necessary enhancements are
made. In addition, new capabilities are needed to ensure
effective communication and reconstitution of data, services, and
networks.
4. What factors make private/public working groups more or less
effective in planning for or responding to major Internet disruptions?
Many of the impediments (described in our answer to Questions
#1) have made public/private working groups less effective. DHS has
consistently prepared plans and reports without first seeking industry
input; trust has not effectively been established between the public
and private sector; proper roles and responsibilities have not been
delineated; and manageable, pointed plans for next steps have not
been carried out or implemented. Ineffective partnerships result in
ineffective planning and response.
As the GAO report noted, creating a trusted environment for
information sharing among the private sector will lead to stronger and
more organized working groups. Currently, the lack of defined
specific needs of DHS, the uncertainty of what information is needed,
how it will be used, and who or what entities will have access to
it all prevent proper, trusted information sharing. And without
proper, trusted information sharing, neither the government nor the
private sector has the proper tools, ideas, or strategies that
will lead to effective planning for or response to major Internet
disruptions.
Congress' Role: Congress can oversee the progress of breaking
down these boundaries and minimizing these risks by holding
oversight hearings, and requesting progress reports from both DHS
and from established public-private working groups. Specifically,
Congress should request updates from DHS and industry to report on
progress toward achieving top objectives such as:
- Increase Leadership: The assistant secretary for cyber security
and telecommunications should crystallize and take steps toward
achieving key priorities
- Sponsor Prevention and Mitigation Programs: DHS should establish
programs that aim to prevent or minimize a major cyber disruption,
such as greater focus on research and development (R&D) and viable
uses of private-sector insurance coverage for cyber attacks
- Establish an Early Warning System: There are similar warning
mechanisms in place, such as the Information Sharing and Analysis
Centers (ISACs), but we still lack a federally-supported, formal
system that provides rapid and clear indication that an attack is
underway and alerts all key stakeholders. DHS should support the
ISACs and ensure that a more holistic system is put into place.
- Institute Command and Control Procedures: DHS should work with
industry to establish a clear "chain of command" in the case of
massive failure of information technology systems, either due to
a cyber attack or natural disaster. There are critical questions
to be answered such as: what defines an incident of national
significance? which government agencies should be involved? which
private sector entities? what is the legal significance of such a
declaration?
- Articulate an Emergency Communications System: DHS should ensure
that we have a resilient communications system in place to execute
command and control in the case of a major cyber disruption. Such a
system will need to work even when telecommunications and Internet
connectivity are unavailable. This requires processes and protocols
to communicate reliably and effectively and advance identification
of the key stakeholders who need access to the emergency
communications systems in order to perform their recovery and
reconstitution duties.
- Create a National Information Assurance Policy: A national policy
is needed that outlines the key roles that relevant government
agencies should play in the protection of our cyber infrastructure.
While the establishment of a national information assurance policy
is not solely the responsibility of DHS, it has a critical role to
play in its development and implementation and its support of such
a government-wide policy is needed.
RESPONSE FOR THE RECORD OF LARRY CLINTON, CHIEF OPERATING OFFICER,
INTERNET SECURITY ALLIANCE
ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS RAISED BY THE HONORABLE JOHN DINGELL AT THE
HEARING ON "CYBER SECURITY PROTECTING AMERICA'S CRITICAL
INFRASTRUCTURE, ECONOMY AND CONSUMERS" SEPTEMBER 13, 2006. SUBMITTED
BY LARRY CLINTON, CHIEF OPERATING OFFICER OF THE INTERNET SECURITY
ALLIANCE
1. What are the risks and benefits of the private sector sharing
information with the Department of Homeland Security?
As was the case of 9/11 and after hurricane Katrina, industry will
generally sweep aside long standing concerns and provide whatever
assistance the government needs, information or otherwise, in times
of crisis.
I doubt this will ever change.
However, cyber security is more than crisis management. It
is an ongoing fight fueled by thousands of attacks on the system
every day. A reliable and sustainable system of defense must be
established.
Industry has often remarked, through a variety of fora, that
information sharing with the government is critical to the maintenance
of the Internet in cases of Cyber Incidents of National Significance
(CINS).
Industry needs prompt, reliable and actionable information
about significant impending threats as well as an ongoing flow of
information to address the steady stream of threats and incidents
that occur every day.
Moreover, industry and government need to share information
on a regular basis to address the thousands of attacks the Internet
experiences every day. It is also these chronic attacks, not just
the prospect of an acute CINS, which drive the need for a reliable
exchange of information between the government and industry.
For the relationship between industry and government to
operate in the most efficient manner, cyber defense requires a far
greater degree of trust.
Much of the risk industry perceives in sharing information
with DHS has to do with uncertainty:
What is a CINS, specifically?
What are the roles and responsibilities to share information
(as well as other tasks) between industry and government in case of
a CINS, specifically?
How can industry be sure that information it provides the
government will not be misused?
Why are so many government requests placed on such short
timelines? And why so often are there no clear explanations as to
what the information requested will be used for, even post facto?
The lack of trust in the current relationship between
government and industry is the prime impediment to more efficient
and effective information sharing.
2. What changes could DHS make in building its working relationships
with private sector information technology and communications
companies and major industrial users of the Internet?
First, it should be noted that there is general consensus
within the IT and Communications communities that there has been
substantial progress made in improving the relationship between DHS
and these sectors over the past year and a half.
The Internet Security Alliance, in conjunction with the
National Cyber Security Partnership, organized an off-sight meeting
with DHS and numerous other government agencies in the fall of 2005
(called "Wye II") which highlighted a wide variety of issues that
needed to be addressed along these lines.
Many of these issues have been, at least initially,
addressed.
In particular, DHS has demonstrated willingness to bring the
private sector into its planning process at a far earlier time
period than previously.
In addition, DHS has shown some willingness to actually
develop plans in conjunction with the private sector rather than
developing their own plan and putting it out for comment. The latter
process often resulted in little more than lip service.
These attitude changes have led to improvements in the
recently published NIPP and appear at this stage to be evident in
the drafting of the Sector Specific Plans as well.
However, the "Wye II" process also produced a list of items
that could still be addressed more comprehensively. Among the
recommendations to come out of the Wye II process are those quoted
below:
The partnership's objectives must be clearly defined and embody
common goals
Institutionalized processes are important to provide lasting
benefits
The partnership needs to be an evolving relationship
The partnership needs champions and institutional support
Working members of the partnership should interact frequently
The partnership should build on existing organizations and
mechanisms first; while people may come and go, the institution
remains
Legal and liability issues can be powerful tools that may align the
interests of the partners; legal issues can be points upon which
cohesion can be built
3. Describe (a) the involvement of private sector firms in the
development of the National Infrastructure Protection Plan and your
views on the effort to develop this plan and (b) the involvement
of firms in the ongoing development of the It Sector Specific plan
in response to the NIPP and your views on the process by which the
sector specific plan is being developed.
As stated above, the NIPP process was generally seen as a
major step forward in the development of a real partnership between
the government and the IT and Communications sectors.
In addition to the process improvements I have already
referred to, there were some substantial policy directions
articulated that are very promising.
One principle example is the NIPP's articulation of the
need to develop a value proposition for industry as part of the
NIPP.
Clearly, companies will do what they perceive in their own
corporate interest to protect their information systems. And as
stated above, they have proven willing to go the extra mile(s)
needed in time of crisis.
But Cyberspace is a shared space, and there are likely gaps
between what the government feels it needs to defend it and what is
automatically done via convenient corporate self-interest.
It is vital to identify any such gaps and provide a value
proposition for industry to fill them in, because they are, by
definition, beyond what they will do in their own corporate
interest. The NIPPs recognition and commitment to developing
this value proposition is a critical element in developing the
sort of partnership that will create an effective and sustainable
cyber defense.
As to the Sector Specific Plans, apart from some of the
process improvements, there remains substantial issues that are
still being addressed (we are just over the half way mark in the
process at this writing).
In general, there are still a number of key issues that
lack definition. The required delineation of roles and
responsibilities are currently lacking. The question of resources
has not been directly addressed and there has not been ample time
to fully integrate the wide range of companies into the process
which attempts to deal with extremely complicated problems.
These and other issues have been commented on in the
current developmental drafts and we can only hope there will be
acceptable progress by the Congressionally imposed
deadline---which may have been overly optimistic in light of the
difficulty of the task.
After all, the important thing is to get these plans right
in terms of effectiveness, sustainability and real world practicality.
4. What factors make private/public working groups more or less
effective in planning for or responding to major internet disruptions.
There are many factors that relate to the effectiveness of
these efforts but the most important are:
A) The tendency to try to do too much and force a "regulatory fix"
of the problem; and
B) The lack of resources devoted to planning efforts; and
C) Needed basic research is not funded.
D) In point of fact, we already know a great deal about good cyber
defense. Large independent studies tell us that the corporations
that engage in best security management (not necessarily technical)
practices have great success in preventing, mitigating and
recovering from attacks. If the IT SSP would simply start with
encouraging the 75% of US corporations who do not currently follow
these practices to do so (probably by reaching out directly to
senior executives) real progress in overall cyber defense could be
made rather quickly. Instead, we have a plethora of random programs
and consultant driven grand schemes geared toward regulatory
solutions that cannot possibly work.
E) Almost all of the private sector efforts in cyber security
that I am familiar with are being done by a small cadre of
volunteers from the private sector. There is virtually no money
available for the sort of planning and practice that would engender
long term cyber security, probably because such efforts are not
glitzy enough. But clearly more priority driven funding is required.
F) The core protocols upon which the Internet is based are 30 years
old. They were never designed with the current environment in mind
and they are in need of a heavy lift of R&D. This is not something
the private sector is ever going to do. It will require a government
effort in cooperation with industry and academia similar to the
SemaTech program of the 1980s.
RESPONSE FOR THE RECORD OF THE HON. GEORGE W. FORESMAN, UNDER
SECRETARY OF PREPAREDNESS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Questions from Representative John Dingell
1. After more than a year since announcing the position, I was pleased
to see the appointment of a new Assistant Secretary for Cybersecurity
shortly after our Committee's hearing.
Please describe how this new position will elevate the matter of
cybersecurity and differ from the Acting Director position of the
past two years. Specifically:
(What new resources, budget, and staff will the Assistant Secretary
have, and how does that compare to the Acting Director's prior
resources, budget, and staff?
Response: The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is very
pleased that Mr. Greg Garcia has been appointed the Assistant
Secretary for Cyber Security and Telecommunications (CS&T). The
position of Assistant Secretary reflects the importance of cyber
security and communications to our homeland security and to the
Department. Assistant Secretary Garcia comes to the Department
with significant expertise and has the ability to focus resources
for cyber security and communications in a manner that is
consistent with our risk-based approach to homeland security.
In addition to the existing position of Director and
Deputy Director of the National Cyber Security Division (NCSD),
the staffing for the Assistant Secretary will include the
following new positions: Deputy Assistant Secretary for CS&T,
Chief of Staff, and an executive assistant. DHS is working
expeditiously to fill these positions.
With respect to CS&T budget and resources, the Assistant
Secretary will continue to leverage and expand collaborative
efforts with cyber security and communications stakeholders and
will be working under the President's Budget for Fiscal Year
2007. Additional needs will, of course, be evaluated as part
of ongoing budget development.
( What new authorities does the Assistant Secretary have, and how
does that compare to the Acting Director's prior authorities?
Response: The Assistant Secretary for CS&T occupies an
elevated tier within the DHS organizational structure and reports
directly to the Under Secretary for Preparedness, whereas the
Acting Director reported to the Acting Assistant Secretary for
Cyber Security and Telecommunications. The Assistant Secretary
will continue to operate under the National Strategy to Secure
Cyberspace, Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7, and the
National Infrastructure Protection Plan. In addition, the
Assistant Secretary has both a mandate for integrating cyber
security related to national security and emergency preparedness
(NS/EP), as well as communications needs for Federal, State, local
and tribal governments and private industry, including mandates
outlined in Executive Order 12472. Moreover, with the recent
enactment of the DHS Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2007,
the Assistant Secretary will also be responsible for the new
Office of Emergency Communications established in Subtitle D of
the Act.
( What new levels of access to senior decision makers within the
Department will the Assistant Secretary have, and how does that
compare to the Acting Director's prior level?
Response: The Assistant Secretary joins the DHS senior
leadership participating in high level Departmental decisions. He
reports to the Under Secretary for Preparedness. Previously, the
Acting Director of NCSD reported to the Acting Assistant Secretary
for Cyber Security and Telecommunications, who in turn reported
to the Under Secretary for Preparedness. One of my key
responsibilities is to enable effective discussion and
decision-making on key issues. As such I will ensure Mr. Garcia
is both actively and intimately engaged.
( What new programs, initiatives, or operations will the Assistant
Secretary be launching that were not contemplated or designed
under the Acting Director? Will any programs or initiatives that
the Acting Director was administering be discontinued under the
Assistant Secretary?
Response The Assistant Secretary has responsibility for
NCSD, the National Communications System (NCS), and the new Office
of Emergency Communications. The Assistant Secretary is currently
conducting program reviews within CS&T. Once the Assistant
Secretary has had an opportunity to fully evaluate the depth and
breadth of existing programs, initiatives, and operations, he
will make programmatic adjustments as necessary. We will, of
course, engage Congress as appropriate in these actions.
2. Following the release of the National Infrastructure Protection
Plan (NIPP), the Department is charged with assuring that each of
the critical infrastructure sectors develops a sector-specific
plan.
( What, specifically, are these plans supposed to yield? For
example, will they be emergency blueprints? Will they be overall
strategic plans as to how corporations should organize and perform
ongoing security operations?
Response: The release of the final NIPP Base Plan
formalized a framework for assessing and addressing the risk to
our national critical infrastructure in a public/private
partnership. The implementation of the NIPP and the accompanying
17 Sector Specific Plans (SSPs) will help build a safer, more
secure, and more resilient America by enhancing protection of
the Nation's Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources (CI/KR).
Based on guidance from DHS, SSPs are developed jointly
by Sector-Specific Agencies (SSAs) in close collaboration with
Sector Coordinating Councils (SCCs), Government Coordinating
Councils (GCCs), and others, including State, local and tribal
homeland security partners with key interests or expertise
appropriate to the sector. The SSPs provide the means by which
the NIPP is implemented across all sectors and each SSP is
tailored to address the unique characteristics and risk
landscapes of the 17 CI/KR sectors.
The objective of the SSP is to outline each sector's
unique implementation of the NIPP risk management framework.
It will also provide a statement of security goals and objectives
and identify initiatives to meet these goals. Lastly, it will
identify resources needs and performance metrics for ensuring
that the goals can be met which will be sustained by an ongoing
process for coordinated private and public sector planning.
The SSPs are intended for long-term enhancement of CI/KR
protection including proactive identification and management of
risks. While enhancement of CI/KR protection may improve emergency
response capabilities of all security partners, the SSPs are not
emergency blueprints. Rather the SSPs describe each sector's
unique implementation of the NIPP risk management framework,
provide jointly developed public and private sector security
goals and objectives; identify and align initiatives to meet
these goals; and create an ongoing process for coordinated private
and public sector planning.
The SSPs are strategic policy and planning documents that
may include suggestions of best practices for security partners,
but their primary purpose is to establish the framework for
public and private partners to work together and align their
respective efforts to protect the Nation's CI/KR.
( My understanding is that the Department is attempting to engage
the private sector in the development of these plans. What is the
specific degree of private sector participation in the
IT/Communications Sector specific plan?
Response: The SSPs for both the Information Technology (IT)
and Communications Sectors are currently under development with
significant private sector participation. Within the NIPP construct,
DHS is the Sector Specific Agency (SSA) responsible for both the
IT and Communications Sectors. The SSA responsibility for the
IT Sector is handled by NCSD within CS&T, which works closely
with the IT-Sector Coordinating Council (IT-SCC). The SSA
responsibility for the Communications Sector is handled by NCS
within CS&T, which works closely with the Communications Sector
Coordinating Council (CSCC). Through these partnership
arrangements, the Department is fostering robust working
relationships with the private sector toward the development of
SSPs.
DHS/NCSD has engaged the private sector in every aspect
of the plan. There are approximately 7 working groups made up of
SCC and GCC members engaged in identifying the basic principles and
ideas for each chapter of the plan. Each of these working groups
meets about once a week to review comments and propose changes.
The draft plan has been reviewed by the GCC and a large part of
the SCC multiple times within the last two months.
The IT SCC was formally launched in January 2006 and is
comprised of over thirty members from across the sector, including
hardware, software, IT system and service providers. For the IT
SSP, NCSD has been working closely with the IT SCC on the
development of the plan. In anticipation of the final release of
the NIPP Base Plan, the IT SCC and IT GCC held a joint meeting in
May to develop a process for co-writing the IT SSP. A writing
team was established, consisting of members from the IT GCC and
IT SCC to ensure overall coordination of the IT SSP. This team
developed a consensus outline for the IT SSP based on the SSP
Guidance and then divided into working groups with members from
both the IT GCC and IT SCC to collaboratively write each chapter
of the plan. The writing team meets on a monthly basis to review
and incorporate the chapter working groups' products into
iterative drafts of the IT SSP. The collaborative and iterative
process has ensured a coordinated plan with broad participation
from both the public and private sectors.
DHS/NCS, has historically engaged with the private sector
on many plans and initiatives. Their Sector Specific plan has been
compiled from NCS' work and vetted to the private sector multiple
times since as a draft. The private sector is engaging with NCS
on methodologies and processes for the plan.
For the Communications SSP, the NCS initiated a series of
meetings with the Communications Sector to coordinate NIPP
activities and draft the Communications SSP in 2004. Working
closely with DHS, the CSCC was established in May 2005, to work
with the NCS on matters related to the NIPP, including: the
identification of communication critical infrastructure and
resources; critical infrastructure protection (CIP) policy issues;
and drafting a sector specific plan. In addition, the CSCC seeks to
foster and facilitate the coordination of sector-wide policy
related activities and initiatives designed to improve both physical
and cyber security of communication critical infrastructure. The
CSCC is made up of communication owners and operators, and is led
by an executive committee of corporate senior executives from
wireline companies, wireless companies and the Telecommunications
Industry Association.
3. The NIPP generally takes the laudable perspective of dealing
with the largest needs first, but seems to be less clear when it
begins to consider "awareness."
( Describe the Department's vision of "awareness" efforts, and how
the Department plans to engage senior network operators in
specific cybersecurity initiatives.
Response: The Department's vision is to improve situational
awareness of the IT sector within normal operations and during
significant threats and disruptions, intentional or unintentional
incidents, crippling attacks (cyber or physical) against IT Sector
infrastructure, technological emergencies and/or failures, and
Presidentially declared disasters. In order to realize this
mission, the IT sector and the government need to collaborate,
develop, and share appropriate threat and vulnerability
information more efficiently. When completed, the SSP will
establish the mechanisms through which the Department can engage
all stakeholders regarding cyber security initiatives. HITRAC
has also just announced a program to hire private sector
critical infrastructure experts to collaborate with DHS
Intelligence and Infrastructure Protection analysts on the
Department's sector assessments and related products.
The NIPP addresses the importance of awareness towards
its overall goal of building a safer, more secure, and more
resilient America by enhancing the protection of the Nation's
CI/KR and strengthening national preparedness. As such, the NIPP
Base Plan highlights the need to build national awareness to
support CI/KR protection, related protection investments, and
associated protection activities by ensuring a focused
understanding of the threat environment.
With respect to cyber security, the Department's vision
of "awareness" efforts is based on Priority III of the National
Strategy to Secure Cyberspace, "A National Cyberspace Security
Awareness and Training Program". The Strategy calls for
promoting a comprehensive national awareness program to empower
all Americans, including the business community, the general
workforce, and the general population, to secure their own
parts of cyberspace. NCSD maintains an Outreach and Awareness
program that includes working with stakeholders to raise the
cyber security awareness of the general public. NCSD works with
the National Cyber Security Alliance (NCSA) to reach home users,
small businesses, and all levels of students. NCSD also works
with the Multi-State ISAC (MS-ISAC) to enhance cyber security
awareness among state information security professionals and the
general public. In collaboration with NCSA and the MS-ISAC, NCSD
promotes the annual National Cyber Security Awareness Month,
which occurs each October. This year, the National Cyber Security
Awareness Month initiatives included all fifty states and promoted
cyber security awareness to approximately 75 million Americans
through TV, radio, print, web and other media. Key programs
also included Congressional outreach, educational webcasts for
4th and 5th graders, and, a Small Business Workshop Series.
With respect to engaging senior network operators in
specific cyber security initiatives, the Department engages in
a number of activities. For example, the United States Computer
Emergency Readiness Team (US-CERT) established the Government
Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams (GFIRST), which
makes up the government's critical group of cyber first
responders. GFIRST meets regularly, and DHS has hosted two
GFIRST conferences to enhance information sharing and collaborative
efforts to secure government cyberspace. With respect to the
private sector, US-CERT has established working relationships
with a number of groups representing network operators, including
the Information Technology Information Sharing and Analysis Center
(IT-ISAC), the North American Incident Response Group, and the
North American Network Operators' Group (NANOG).
( In terms of spending priorities, how much money is the Department
devoting to reaching out to the senior executives who control much
of our Nation's IT/communications infrastructure?
Response: The overall budget for NCSD is $92,000,000, and
the budget for NCS is $143,272,000. Outreach and collaboration
with the private sector is a key component of nearly all cyber
security and communications programs and related activities.
Significant examples include the following:
The NCSD coordinates with the IT-Sector Coordinating Council
(IT-SCC) and IT-ISAC. In each of its program areas, as a lead
for the IT Sector, NCSD's activities involve senior executives
on control systems security, software assurance, and Internet
disruption.
Similarly, NCS engages senior executives in the
Communications Sector through the Communications Sector Coordinating
Council (CSCC), the National Coordinating Center for Communications
(NCC), and the Communications Information Sharing and Analysis
Center (ISAC).
The NCS serves as the executive secretariat for the
President's National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee
(NSTAC). The NSTAC, made up of up to 30 Chief Executive Officers
(CEOs) and other senior executives in the Communications Sector,
provides advice to the President on communications matters. DHS
works closely with the NSTAC on a wide range of NS/EP, CIP, and
response and recovery issues.
4. The NIPP encourages the private sector to implement
recommendations in the National Strategy to Secure Cyber Space.
At our hearing, witnesses from the private sector indicated that
a series of incentive programs would be critical to create the
necessary effect, and the Government Accountability Office
supported these comments. Does the Department recommend any
specific measures to develop the sort of incentive plans alluded
to in the NIPP?
Response: DHS recognizes that the private sector makes
cyber security risk management decisions based on the return on
investment, including ensuring business continuity. Market-based
incentives for cyber security investments include protection of
intellectual capital, security influenced procurement, market
differentiation, and public confidence.
The private sector acknowledges that there must be
collaborative approach with the Federal Government to secure
cyberspace. DHS is committed to working closely with the private
sector to ensure that this partnership increases overall
preparedness. The NIPP value proposition is based on sharing
the responsibility of cyber security with industry and State
and local governments, and DHS believes that this cooperation
will help encourage all parties to take the proper steps to
secure cyber assets. As CI/KR protection efforts mature, DHS
will examine specific incentive programs tailored to each
sector to encourage private sector participation in CI/KR
protection.
5. GAO reports that the private sector has expressed concerns
about the Department's ability to execute its plans and is
reluctant to share information with the Department. Does the
Department recommend any steps that can be taken to improve its
working relationships with private sector information
technology and communications companies?
Response: The Department relies heavily on its engagement
with the private sector and has taken a number of steps to improve
its working relationships with the private sector in general,
specifically with information technology and communications
companies.
The Department has taken significant measures to provide for
a more conducive information sharing environment, including
establishing and improving the Protected Critical Infrastructure
Information (PCII) Program and, importantly, establishing the Critical
Infrastructure Partnership Advisory Council (CIPAC) to provide for
the public-private collaboration for the NIPP framework. The
CIPAC encompasses all seventeen critical infrastructure sectors
and facilitates the information sharing and collaborative
environment needed to implement the NIPP.
In addition to these measures, the Department continues to
build its working relationships with information technology and
communications companies through collaboration with the IT-SCC and
CSCC. Furthermore, NCSD/US-CERT and NCS/NCC strive to provide the
analysis and information aggregation functions that enable timely
and actionable dissemination of information to the private sector,
including the IT-ISAC and the Communications ISAC. The continued
enhancement of the information sharing process through
collaboration between the Department and the private sector helps
to build a working partnership which allows critical information
to flow efficiently between all stakeholders.
1 "Information Battleground," Air Force Magazine, http://www.afa.org/magazine/Dec2005/1205info.asp.
2 "Information Battleground," Air Force Magazine, http://www.afa.org/magazine/Dec2005/1205info.asp.
1 http://www.technology.gov/Index.html
2 http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/bcpenf.htm
3 http://www.justice.gov/criminal/c ybercrime/ccips.html
4 www.fcc.gov/homeland
5 http://www.disa.mil/main/about/missman.html
6 http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/egov/
7 "Challenges in Developing a Public/Private Recovery Plan,"
GAO-06-863T (July 28, 2006).
8 Business Roundtable, "Essential Steps to Strengthen America's
Cyber Terrorism Preparedness" (June 2006); see also Section 15
of Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5, "Management of
Domestic Incidents" (Feb. 28, 2003), and the National
Strategy to Secure Cyberspace (Feb. 2003).