[House Hearing, 109 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
WMD TERRORISM AND PROLIFERENT STATES
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON PREVENTION OF
NUCLEAR AND BIOLOGICAL ATTACK
of the
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
SEPTEMBER 8, 2005
__________
Serial No. 109-40
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Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
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Committee on Homeland Security
Peter T. King, New York, Chairman
Don Young, Alaska Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Lamar S. Smith, Texas Loretta Sanchez, California
Curt Weldon, Pennsylvania Edward J. Markey, Massachusetts
Christopher Shays, Connecticut Norman D. Dicks, Washington
John Linder, Georgia Jane Harman, California
Mark E. Souder, Indiana Peter A. DeFazio, Oregon
Tom Davis, Virginia Nita M. Lowey, New York
Daniel E. Lungren, California Eleanor Holmes Norton, District of
Jim Gibbons, Nevada Columbia
Rob Simmons, Connecticut Zoe Lofgren, California
Mike Rogers, Alabama Sheila Jackson-Lee, Texas
Stevan Pearce, New Mexico Bill Pascrell, Jr., New Jersey
Katherine Harris, Florida Donna M. Christensen, U.S. Virgin
Bobby Jindal, Louisiana Islands
Dave G. Reichert, Washington Bob Etheridge, North Carolina
Michael McCaul, Texas James R. Langevin, Rhode Island
Charlie Dent, Pennsylvania Kendrick B. Meek, Florida
Ginny Brown-Waite, Florida
SUBCOMMITTEE ON PREVENTION OF NUCLEAR AND BIOLOGICAL ATTACK
John Linder, Georgia, Chairman
Don Young, Alaska James R. Langevin, Rhode Island
Christopher Shays, Connecticut EdwarD J. Markey, Massachusetts
Daniel E. Lungren, California Norman D. Dicks, Washington
Jim Gibbons, Nevada Jane Harman, California
Rob Simmons, Connecticut Eleanor Holmes Norton, District of
Bobby Jindal, Louisiana Columbia
Michael McCaul, Texas Donna M. Christensen, U.S. Virgin
Peter T. King, New York (Ex Islands
Officio) Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
(Ex Officio)
(II)
C O N T E N T S
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Page
STATEMENTS
The Honorable John Linder, a Representative in Congress From the
State of Georgia, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Prevention of
Nuclear and Biological Attack.................................. 1
The Honorable James R. Langevin, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Rhode Island, and Ranking Member,
Subcommittee on Prevention of Nuclear and Biological Attack.... 2
The Honorable Norman D. Dicks, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Washington........................................ 28
Witnesses
Mr. Gregory F. Giles, Public Witness:
Oral Statement................................................. 3
Prepared Statenment............................................ 5
Dr. Daniel Byman, Director, Center for Peace and Security
Studies, Georgetown University and Senior Fellow, Saban Center
for Middle East Policy, The Brookings Institution:
Oral Statement................................................. 9
Prepared Statement............................................. 11
Dr. Ray Takeyh, Senior Fellow, Middle Eastern Studies, Council on
Foreign Relations:
Oral Statement................................................. 20
Prepared Statement............................................. 21
WMD TERRORISM AND PROLIFERENT STATES
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Thursday, September 8, 2005
U.S. House of Representatives,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Subcommittee on Prevention of Nuclear
and Biological Attack,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 12:05 p.m., in
Room 2261, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. John Linder
[chairman of the subcommittee] presiding.
Present: Representatives Linder, Langevin, Dicks, and
Norton.
Mr. Linder. [Presiding.] The Committee on Homeland
Security, Subcommittee on Prevention of Nuclear and Biological
Attack, will come to order.
I would like to welcome and thank our distinguished panel
of witnesses for appearing before the subcommittee today.
We may not always be able to precisely predict and
anticipate the devastation that Mother Nature unleashes,
however we must ensure that we anticipate a terrorist attack
involving a weapon of mass destruction.
We only have to imagine that it was a 10-kiloton nuclear
device that was set off in the middle of New Orleans to fully
comprehend the devastation that we would be facing today. What
we would be doing is recover from a deliberate large-scale
biological attack.
As we recognize the strong effort by the Department of
Homeland Security to assist the people in the devastated Gulf
Coast region, we must not lose sight of the fact that a
terrorist assisted by a state actor who is intent on killing a
large number of U.S. citizens will dwarf in magnitude the
devastation that we have observed in Mississippi, Alabama and
Louisiana.
While natural disasters can only be mitigated, attacks of
manmade origin can and must be prevented. Prevention can only
be achieved with accurate assessments of the threat, combined
with the effective action.
It is with this outcome in mind that we focus today on a
particularly challenging threat: states which sponsor
terrorists, who also pursue weapons of mass destruction.
The WMD attack always raises questions about the
capabilities of specific terrorist organizations. Given the
hurdles that individual terrorist organizations must overcome,
assistance by a state may be critical to a terrorist group
wishing to launch a more sophisticated WMD attack.
Such states could enable terrorist groups to over come
multiple hurdles in mounting a successful chemical, biological
and nuclear attack, sanctuary for planning and preparation,
resources, expertise, material and technology, all vital to
such an enterprise, to be provided by a state that is
sympathetic to the terrorists.
As a nation with a nascent nuclear program, the well-
documented links to Hezbollah and other terrorist
organizations, Iran is a particular concern.
While Iran is by no means the only state of this type, its
continued hostility toward the United States, its past attacks
on U.S. forces, and its current well publicized proliferation
activities give it a well-deserved special status.
Iran continues to convert uranium into a form suitable for
enrichment, in defiance of IAEA requests to stop. Talks between
European Union negotiators and Iran aimed at resolving the
nuclear question have broken down, further dimming the prospect
for halting Iranian enrichment activities.
Direct Iranian support for international terrorist
organizations continues. The State Department's most recent
country reports on terrorism states that Iran remains the most
active state sponsor of terrorism. The Wall Street Journal
reports that Iran's new president has called for a wave of
Islamic revolution. This sponsorship of terror extends to Iraq
as well.
Time magazine recently published a report entitled ``Inside
Iran's Secret War for Iraq,'' and other media reports have
chronicled Iranian assistance for insurgent attacks against
U.S. forces and civilians in Iraq. This was confirmed in the
recently collected shaped charges in Iraq that clearly shows an
Iranian pedigree.
Collectively, these actions give us concern. While
historically no state, including Iran, has provided WMD to any
terrorist organization, the future holds no such guarantees. We
must remain vigilant and informed in this dynamic environment.
I look forward to hearing from our expert witnesses today
and their views of the threat as it exists today and how it
might evolve in the future.
I now recognize my colleague from Rhode Island, Mr.
Langevin.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I would like to welcome our witnesses here today. I
certainly look forward to hearing the testimony.
After listening to witnesses at previous hearings and
briefings held by the subcommittee, I feel that our government
must move quickly to accelerate its efforts to secure nuclear
material at its source. However, this cannot occur in a vacuum,
and we must monitor the activities of nations such as Pakistan,
North Korea and Iran.
I notice that all of our witnesses prepared testimony
focused on Iran, and rightly so. Given that it is the most
active state sponsor of terrorism, combined with the
unsuccessful attempts by our European allies to prevent the
Iranians from enriching uranium, we must not underestimate the
threat a nuclear Iran would pose to our national security.
I also believe that other nations pose a threat as well.
North Korea is a designated state sponsor of terrorism and has
stepped up their weapons-making activities. I have said before
that North Korea has never developed a weapon system that they
have not sold, which makes them a likely source for terrorists
to obtain a weapon of mass destruction on the black market.
Pakistan is another concern. Given the large-scale
proliferation activities of the A.Q. Khan network. In fact,
Pakistan sent enrichment technology to Iran and North Korea and
it remains unknown whether or not Khan-assisted terrorist
groups.
Finally, a large portion of the Russian nuclear stockpile
is not secure. Given that Russia is the largest source of
nuclear weapons and weapons-grade nuclear material, we must
ensure that our government does all it can to ensure that these
weapons are secured or destroyed.
I look forward to today's testimony, and I would be
particularly interested in hearing our witnesses' thoughts on
North Korea and Pakistan.
Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you again for holding this
hearing, and I yield back.
Mr. Linder. I thank the gentleman.
We now turn to our panel of expert witnesses.
Other members are reminded that they may submit written
statements for the record.
Mr. Gregory Giles is a national security consultant with
extensive experience in developing threat assessments for the
U.S. government, specializing in weapons of mass destruction.
He has published several reports on Iranian unconventional
weapons programs.
Dr. Daniel Byman comes to us from Georgetown University
where he is an associate professor in the School of Foreign
Service. Dr. Byman served as a professional staff member with
both the 9/11 Commission and the joint 9/11 inquiry of the
House and Senate Intelligence Committees. He has recently
published a book entitled ``Deadly Connections: States that
Sponsor Terrorism.''
Dr. Ray Takeyh is a senior fellow for Middle Eastern
studies at the Council of Foreign Relations and is a noted
expert on Iran. He has published extensively on the Middle East
and has a forthcoming book entitled ``The Guardians of the
Revolution: Iran's Approach to the World.''
We welcome you all. We thank you for being here.
Mr. Giles?
STATEMENT OF GREGORY GILES, PUBLIC WITNESS
Mr. Giles. Good morning, Chairman Linder and Ranking Member
Langevin and distinguished members of the subcommittee. I thank
you for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss
the potential threat of Iranian WMD terrorism against the
United States.
As we approach the fourth anniversary of the September 11
attacks, we are sadly reminded of the tragic costs of
underestimating our adversaries. It is against this backdrop
that we must continue to strengthen our efforts to anticipate
emerging threats against the United States.
The first part of my testimony suggests that the Islamic
Republic of Iran stands at a very dangerous nexus of deep
hostility towards the United States, pursuit of weapons of mass
destruction, and international terrorism. Therefore, it is only
prudent that we consider the risk Iran might one day undertake
or sponsor a WMD terrorist attack against the United States. I
will provide some scenarios for such a possibility.
I will then propose a framework that considers, on one
hand, possible impediments and, on the other, possible enablers
or inducements to Iranian WMD attack on our country.
Finally, I will suggest some implications of this threat
for U.S. national security planning.
In the interest of time, I would like to proceed directly
to the scenarios as a way to try and structure our thinking
about this potential threat. Among the possibilities are the
following scenarios arranged in order from lesser to greater
awareness and sanction by Iran's ruling elite.
Number one, zealots and profiteers in Iran's WMD scientific
and industrial communities might engage in an A.Q. Khan-like
network supplying WMD on the black market for terrorist groups.
Number two, rogue elements within the Islamic Revolutionary
Guard Corps, which oversees Iran's WMD programs and supports
international terrorism, might orchestrate a WMD terrorist
attack of their own.
Number three, Iran provides terrorist groups with advice on
how to procure WMD technology, equipment and materials.
Number four, Iran provides WMD to terrorist proxies and
trains them to carry out specified attacks.
And number five, Iran uses its own IRGC or intelligence
operatives to carry out a deliberate covert WMD attack.
This list is by no means exhaustive, and analysts have
different views as to the likelihood of each scenario. But in
thinking about the likelihood of the scenarios, I put forward a
framework and emphasize that to date there are no public
indications that Iran has engaged in WMD terrorism, so it is
useful to try and assess why that might be and how things might
change.
So I offer the following political, security and economic
impediments to Iranian involvement in WMD terrorism.
Certainly, Iranian engagement in this kind of behavior
would fly in the face of various Iranian religious edicts and
policy pronouncements condemning the use of WMD, and I believe
would further undermine the mullahs' claim to legitimacy. Also,
turning over WMD to terrorist proxies could give such groups
greater political leverage over Teheran, including the
potential for blackmail.
On the security front, certainly Iran fears the possibility
of retaliation and would not want to stimulate its own
opponents to engage in WMD activity by setting a dangerous
precedent.
Finally, on the economic front, nearly 80 percent of Iran's
foreign income is derived from the sale of oil and natural gas,
with the very risky prospect of an embargo for such behavior.
Turning to possible enablers or inducements, on the
political front, should Israel and the Palestinians appear to
be making progress toward a peaceful settlement, Iran might try
to derail the process by dramatically escalating the level of
violence. Use of WMD by Palestinian rejectionist groups would
certainly provide such a shock. Extremes within Iran might once
again initiate a wave of international terrorist attacks in
order to embarrass their more pragmatic factions in Teheran as
they did in the 1980s.
In terms of security, Iran might wish to remind its main
adversaries of their vulnerabilities by subjecting them to a
symbolic WMD attack by proxy, in essence an asymmetric shot
across the bow to deter any preemptive attacks that might be
under consideration.
In terms of economics, Iran's mullahs might be less
inhibited to engage in this kind of activity if they thought
they could undermine an international oil embargo. Their
relationship with China in this regard is an interesting
consideration.
So in terms of implications, I think in the end whether
Iran would engage in this kind of activity depends on three
factors: the regime's risk propensity, which is generally
regarded as low but not zero; the perception that the benefits
of such involvements significantly outweigh the costs; and how
well the mullahs can control the WMD programs and terrorists
operations within the IRGC and other organizations elsewhere in
the regime.
This concludes my prepared statement. With the
subcommittee's permission, I request that my formal statement
be submitted for the record.
Mr. Linder. Without objection, it will be.
Mr. Giles. Thank you, Chairman Linder and distinguished
members of the subcommittee. I would be happy to answer any
questions you have.
[The statement of Mr. Giles follows:]
Prepared Statement of Gregory Giles
I. Introduction
Good morning, Chairman Linder, Ranking Member Langevin and
distinguished Members of the Subcommittee. I thank you for the
opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the potential threat
of Iranian WMD terrorism against the United States. As we approach the
fourth anniversary of the September 11th attacks, we are sadly reminded
of the tragic costs of underestimating our adversaries. It is against
this backdrop that we must continue to strengthen our efforts to
anticipate emerging threats against the United States.
The first part of my testimony suggests that the Islamic Republic
of Iran stands at a dangerous nexus of deep hostility towards the
United States, pursuit of weapons of mass destruction, and
international terrorism. It is only prudent that we consider the risk
that Iran might one day undertake or sponsor a WMD terrorist attack
against the United States, and I provide several examples of scenarios
for such an attack.
To help assess whether and under what circumstances Iran might
engage in such behavior, I then propose a framework that considers on
one hand possible impediments, and on the other hand possible enablers
or inducements, to Iranian WMD attack on the United States. Finally, I
suggest a number of implications of this threat for U.S. national
security planning.
II. The Iranian Threat Nexus
International Terrorism
International terrorism has been a cornerstone of Iranian policy
since the inception of the Islamic Republic in 1979. Terrorism is seen
as a legitimate policy tool by Iran's ruling clerics, although they do
not refer to it as such. Instead, they try to cloak it in more
politically acceptable terms of ``resistance'' and ``export of the
revolution.'' The goals of Iran's terrorism are to advance Tehran's
influence and desire for regional hegemony, in the hopes of creating
like-minded theocracies in the region, and eliminating opposition to
the regime by liquidating dissidents wherever they may be.
Domestic politics has had an important influence on the scope and
timing of Iranian terrorist attacks. In the 1980s, for example,
extremist factions in Tehran launched a new wave of terrorist attacks
against Western and Israeli targets in a bid to embarrass and
outmaneuver their more pragmatic domestic rivals. The pragmatists, for
their part, had advocated merely a pause in Iranian-sponsored terror
attacks in order to ease Iran's diplomatic isolation and replenish arms
needed to continue the war against Iraq.
A hallmark of Iranian terrorism is the cultivation and reliance on
foreign Shia extremist groups to do Tehran's bidding. Iran was largely
responsible for the creation of Hezbollah in Lebanon, and its Islamic
Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) has been training and equipping
Hezbollah terrorists for decades. Hezbollah, which has a global
presence, has been described by senior US Government officials as a far
more capable organization than al-Qa'ida. In 2002, a Hezbollah fund
raising cell was uncovered in North Carolina, and the FBI was reported
to be investigating about 20 other potential Hezbollah cells in the
United States. Hezbollah had killed more Americans than any other
terrorist group until September 11th.
Iran has courted al-Qa'ida over the years, apparently willing to
set aside Shia-Sunni religious differences in common pursuit of
toppling moderate Arab states, the destruction of Israel, and the
withdrawal of the US presence in the Middle East. As detailed by the 9-
11 Commission Report, Iran provided training to al-Qa'ida operatives in
the early 1990s, helping them to become proficient in the manufacture
of car bombs, which they have used so effectively against US and
Western targets worldwide. Iran maintains an ambiguous relationship
with al-Qa'ida, either ``detaining'' or ``hosting'' a number of senior
al-Qa'ida operatives who fled Afghanistan, reportedly including Bin
Laden's son.
Other terrorist proxies of Iran include Palestinian Islamic Jihad,
the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades, the Popular Front for the Liberation of
Palestine-General Command, and Hamas. Hamas has made crude attempts to
introduce poisons into its suicide bombs since the late 1990s. Overall,
the use of such proxies enables Iran to advance its goals through the
use of force without the risk of direct reprisals from stronger powers.
Weapons of Mass Destruction
Iran has been pursuing WMD since the 1980s, in contravention of its
numerous nonproliferation treaty obligations. In response to Saddam
Hussein's use of chemical weapons during the 1980-1988 war with Iran,
Tehran launched its own chemical warfare (CW) effort and used such
weapons against Iraq, although it steadfastly denies this. The State
Department recently declared that, ``. . .Iran is in violation of its
[Chemical Warfare Convention] obligations because Iran is acting to
retain and modernize key elements of its CW infrastructure to include
an offensive CW R&D capability and dispersed mobilization facilities.''
Likewise, Iran is an original signatory of the Biological Weapons
Convention, yet is believed to have an active biological warfare
program masked within its civilian pharmaceutical and biotechnology
industries.
Since the 2002 revelation of secret facilities in Iran to enrich
uranium and produce heavy water, the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) has uncovered a large-scale nuclear program in Iran that dates
back to the 1980s. Much of this program, including the separation of
plutonium and the enrichment of uranium, was deliberately hidden from
the IAEA in contravention of Iran's safeguards agreement under the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).
Of particular note is Iran's acquisition of uranium enrichment
technology and equipment from the A.Q. Khan network, which provided
similar assistance and actual nuclear weapon designs to Libya.
Since the cover was blown on its clandestine nuclear program, Iran
has reacted with the same ``cheat and retreat'' tactics Iraq used to
conceal its nuclear weapons program from UN inspectors after the 1990
Gulf War. In numerous instances, Iran has understated its nuclear
activities, only acknowledging their wider scope when presented with
irrefutable evidence to the contrary by IAEA officials.
This pattern of deception, denial, and delay has served Iran well,
helping it to avoid international sanctions for the past three years.
Indeed, Iran has met international calls to constrain its nuclear
program with steadfast defiance.
This defiance belies a determination to attain a nuclear weapons
capability. Tehran has numerous motivations to get the bomb, spanning
prestige, security, hegemonic, and domestic political concerns. Should
they succeed in acquiring nuclear weapons, Iran's mullah's are likely
to become emboldened on both the international and domestic political
fronts.
Hostility Towards the United States
Hatred of the United States has been the mantra of Iran's theocracy
since its inception. That hostility derives from a broader anti-
colonial sentiment, resentment of US intervention in Iranian domestic
politics in the early-1950s, support of the monarchy, a perceived
``tilt'' toward Iraq during the Iran-Iraq war, and subsequent US
efforts to isolate the Islamic Republic, including technology denial.
The leadership's enmity stands in contrast to broad segments of the
Iranian populace, particularly the post-Khomeini generation, which has
a more favorable view of the United States.
The mullah's hostility toward the United States is manifest in the
1980-81 Tehran embassy hostage crisis, as well as numerous terrorist
attacks perpetrated by Hezbollah and other proxies at Tehran's behest,
which resulted in the deaths and wounding of hundreds of US citizens.
In addition, Iran has orchestrated deadly attacks against US military
forces, including the bombing of the US Marine barracks in Lebanon in
1983 and the bombing of Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia in 1996.
Many of Iran's extremists harbor a fatalistic vision of
``inevitable'' conflict with the United States. Iranian leaders have
long since concluded that a direct confrontation with the United States
on our terms would spell certain defeat for Tehran. As former defense
minister Akbar Torkan explained in 1993:
`` `Can our air force. . .take on the Americans, or our navy
take on the American navy? If we put all our country's budget
into such a war we would have just burned our money. The way to
go about dealing with such a threat requires a different
solution entirely.' ''
In touting Iran's new asymmetric warfare doctrine against the
United States last fall, IRGC Commander Rahim-Safavi warned that,
``They know full well that if they start an onslaught against us, we
will not be confined to our land borders and that we will attack them
outside the boundaries of our land borders.''
In short, Iran's hostility towards the United States,
institutionalized use of terrorist proxies, and large-scale investments
in asymmetric weapons capabilities and doctrine, provide a disturbing
picture of what might one day converge in a WMD terrorist attack
against the United States.
III.What Possible Forms of Involvement?
Before turning to the framework, it is useful to consider the
various ways in which Iran might become involved in WMD terrorism.
Among the possibilities are the following scenarios, arranged in order
from lesser to greater awareness and sanction by Iran's ruling elite:
Zealots and profiteers in Iran's WMD, scientific, and
industrial communities engage in an A.Q. Khan-like WMD black
market for terrorist groups
Rogue elements within the IRGC, which plays a key role
both in Iran's WMD programs and terrorist operations,
orchestrate a WMD terrorist attack
Iran provides terrorist groups with advice on how to
procure WMD technology, equipment, and materials
Iran provides WMD to terrorist proxies and trains them
to carry out specified attacks
Iran uses its own IRGC/intelligence operatives to
carry out a deliberate, covert WMD attack.
The list is by no means exhaustive, and analysts have different
views as to the likelihood of each scenario. Still, it is essential to
develop initially a broad list of potential threat scenarios, evaluate
the factors which could make them more or less likely, and develop
intelligence indicators that might signal shifts that could make one
scenario more or less likely than another.
IV. A Framework for Assessing the Risk of Iranian WMD Terrorism
To date, there are no public indications that Iran has engaged in
WMD terrorism. Consequently, it may be useful to think about the issue
in terms of the political, security, and economic considerations that
prevent Iran from engaging in such behavior, as well as shifts which
may enable it.
Impediments to Involvement in WMD Terrorism
A. Political
Iranian involvement in WMD terrorism, if discovered or inferred,
would carry substantial political costs for the ruling clerics. It
would undo years of effort to end Iran's isolation and stabilize its
economy. Such involvement would fly in the face of various Iranian
religious edicts and policy pronouncements, including Ayatollah
Khamene'i's declaration shortly after the September 11th attacks that,
``Killing of people in any place and with any kind of weapons,
including atomic bombs, long-range missiles, biological or chemical
weapons, passenger or war planes, carried out by any organization,
country, or individuals is condemned.'' Official complicity in WMD
terrorism would likely spell the end of Khamene'i's rule--whose
legitimacy as the Supreme Leader of Iran is already on weak footing--
whether the result of internal or external pressures.
Those external pressures could be immense and, increasingly,
multilateral. In particular, UN Security Council Resolution 1540, which
was recently adopted by consensus, requires all states to, ``. . .
refrain from providing any form of support to non-State actors that
attempt to develop, acquire, manufacture, possess, transport, transfer
or use nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their means of
delivery.'' The new International Convention on Nuclear Terrorism, also
adopted by consensus in the UN General Assembly, will open for
signature next week and place additional obligations on states. These
developments underscore the growing international intolerance of state-
sponsored WMD terrorism. Whether Iran will take heed of this norm will
probably hinge upon the consequences of violating it, since Tehran also
signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Chemical Warfare Convention,
and the Biological Warfare Convention and appears to have violated all
three.
Short of leadership or broader regime change, turning over WMD to
terrorist proxies, who maintain their own agendas and degree of
independence, could potentially give such groups greater political
leverage over Tehran. They could, for example, use the weapons in ways
other than those intended by Iranian leaders. They might also blackmail
Tehran into meeting certain demands or risk public exposure of the WMD
transfer.
B. Security
As suggested above, the risk of international retribution,
including military attack against Iran's WMD-related infrastructure and
possibly regime change, likely exercises a strong restraining influence
over possible Iranian consideration of engaging in WMD terrorism. Such
involvement might open a ``Pandora's box'' of another sort, inspiring
regime opponents like the Mujahedeen-e-Khalq to acquire WMD and use
them in their campaign to unseat the mullahs, a concern reflected by
Iranian officials and academics.
C. Economic
Approximately 80 percent of Iran's foreign income is derived from
the sale of its oil and natural gas. This dependency, and the potential
for its exploitation by a punitive international oil embargo,
presumably exercises some degree of restraint on the more risky forms
of Iranian behavior, such as involvement in WMD terrorism.
Possible Enablers/Inducements to Engage in WMD Terrorism
A. Political
It is important to consider the range of political developments
that might erode Iran's reluctance to engage in WMD terrorism. For
example, should Israel and the Palestinians appear to be making
tangible progress toward a peaceful settlement, it is possible that
Iran might try to derail the process by dramatically escalating the
level of violence. Use of WMD by Palestinian rejectionist groups would
certainly provide such a ``shock'' and goad the Israeli military into a
massive crack-down that would put a halt to a negotiated solution.
It is also possible that extremists within Iran's formal and
informal ruling circles might once again initiate a wave of
international terrorist attacks to counter any perceived challenges
from more pragmatic factions in Tehran, as they did in the 1980s. WMD
terrorist attacks by Islamic proxies against Western interests would
certainly exacerbate tensions with Iran and politically isolate any
faction that might have been seeking a rapprochement with Washington.
Another possibility is simple bureaucratic momentum. As mentioned
above, the IRGC's WMD and terrorism roles might one day conflate in
unanticipated ways. In this regard, it is important to note the IRGC's
relative lack of religious oversight, compared to, say, Iran's regular
military forces.
B. Security
Developments in the security realm might likewise undermine Iranian
reluctance to engage in WMD terrorism. Consistent with its asymmetric
strategy, Iran may wish to remind its main adversaries (i.e., the
United States and Israel) of their vulnerabilities by subjecting them
to a symbolic WMD attack by proxy. The overall goal may be to deter any
pre-emptive strikes against Iran's WMD infrastructure--in essence, an
asymmetric ``shot across the bow.''
Should Iran succeed in producing fissile material, developing
nuclear weapons, and mating them to long-range delivery systems,
Iranian foreign policy could be expected to become more assertive
generally. In the perhaps mistaken confidence that such a capability
would then preclude future retaliation against Iran, Tehran's leaders
might be more inclined to support WMD terrorism.
C. Economic
In spite of its dependency on oil and natural gas exports to keep
the Iranian economy afloat, Iran's mullahs may be less inhibited to
engage in WMD terrorism if they believed that an international oil
embargo could be averted by shrewd exploitation of the ever increasing
international demand for energy. In this regard, it is noteworthy that
Iran has recently deepened its energy ties with China, signing
contracts to supply Beijing with natural gas for the next 25 years and
to develop the Yadaravan oil field, deals worth an estimated $200
billion. The mullahs likely view China's growing dependency on Iranian
oil and natural gas as a means of securing Beijing's veto in the event
Iran faces UN Security Council sanctions, be it for pushing its nuclear
program or other objectionable activity such as involvement in WMD
terrorism.
V. Implications
In the end, whether Iran would engage in WMD terrorism probably
depends on three factors:
the regime's risk propensity--which is generally
regarded as low but not ``zero'';
its perception that the benefits of such involvement
significantly outweigh the costs; and
how well the mullahs can control WMD programs and
terrorist operations within the IRGC and other organizations
elsewhere in the regime.
What I have attempted to demonstrate is that it is possible to
conceive of situations that might result in a higher Iranian risk
propensity, a more favorable cost-benefit calculus, and a greater
possibility of involvement in WMD terrorism than currently appears to
exist. Undoubtedly, analysts will hold different views on these issues.
If we are to succeed in correctly anticipating the emergence of an
Iranian WMD terrorism threat, however, these hypotheses should
continuously compete with one another as new intelligence is developed
that might ``narrow the field.''
Further, as a hedge against intelligence surprise, I believe that
we should continue to move forward on other fronts, such as the
development of a network to detect the smuggling of nuclear materials
and devices into the United States. Such a network should be designed
with a thinking, adaptive adversary--like Iran--in mind.
This concludes my prepared statement. With the Subcommittee's
permission, I request that my formal statement be submitted for the
record. Chairman Linder, Congressman Langevin, and Members of the
Subcommittee, I thank you for your attention and will be happy to
answer any questions you may have.
Mr. Linder. Thank you, Mr. Giles.
Dr. Byman?
STATEMENT OF DANIEL BYMAN, DIRECTOR, CENTER FOR PEACE AND
SECURITY STUDIES, GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY SENIOR FELLOW, SABAN
CENTER FOR MIDDLE EAST POLICY AT THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION
Mr. Byman. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, thank
you for this opportunity to speak before you today.
To make my position clear from the start, although Iran is
one of the world's leading sponsors of terrorism, I believe it
is not likely to transfer chemical, biological or other
unconventional weapons to terrorist groups.
My spoken remarks will concentrate on this theme, while my
prepared remarks discuss Iran's support for terrorism more
broadly.
Iran has supported terrorism steadily for 25 years. It has
had chemical weapons at least for 15 years. Yet during this
time, it has not transferred these systems. Several reasons
explain this restraint.
First, Iran is aware that any major escalation in its
support of terrorism would incur American wrath and the wrath
of much of the international community, possibly leading to
U.N. sanctions and possibly even to a military strike. Iran has
not transferred much of its advanced conventional weapons to
terrorist groups in the past. That would be a logical prelude
to transferring things like chemical or biological weapons.
Iranian leaders are also extremely well aware that the
transfer of WMDs would be a U.S. redline that would provoke a
U.S. response. Traditionally, Iran has tried to have some
degree of deniability in its use of terrorism, working through
terrorist groups like the Lebanese Hezbollah to disassociate
itself from attacks.
For the most part, unfortunately, this has worked. The
United States has not retaliated when Iran has used proxies to
kill Americans in the past. If Iran were to have its proxies
use WMD, however, that disassociation would not work. The
United States and other countries would not accept that very
arbitrary and artificial division.
Also, Iran's favorite proxies, like the Lebanese Hezbollah,
do not seek these types of weapons. They, too, recognize the
red lines the United States and other powers have drawn and
their current tactics on weapons systems also enable them to
kill the numbers of people they want to kill. At this time,
they do not need these weapons.
It is arguable that some of the more advanced chemical and
biological weapons systems would be difficult for even a
skilled terrorist group like the Lebanese Hezbollah to operate
properly. Although it is worth pointing out a very important
point for homeland security: The psychological effect would be
tremendous, even if the number killed were extremely small.
September 11 also had a limiting effect. A number of states
and terrorist groups around the world recognized the increased
U.S. concern with terrorism and have made great attempts to try
to disassociate themselves or reduce their involvement in this
as a result.
In my judgment, Iran is not likely to change its behavior
with regard to support for terrorism except in the most extreme
circumstances. Iran might increase its support for terrorism if
the United States is determined to remove Iran's influence in
Iraq; if it appears that the United States is going to stay
indefinitely in Iraq; or if the United States escalates over
other issues like Iran's nuclear program.
Yet even here it is not likely to transfer chemical or
other unconventional weapons to terrorist groups. It would
instead rely first on traditional methods.
Only in the event of a truly grave threat to the Iranian
regime, like an invasion, would these restraints go out the
window. I believe Iran would start overseas, rather than in the
American homeland.
Let me conclude by talking briefly about some of the
implications for homeland security.
First of all, the risk of Iranian-sponsored terrorism
involving WMD in the United States is extremely low, in my
judgment. That said, it should remain an intelligence priority.
Given the catastrophic consequences of this, it is something
that we should be watching, even though the chances are quite
low.
I will make an aside at this moment to address what the
ranking member has noted about Pakistan and North Korea.
Pakistan in particular is an extremely dangerous state that
deserves careful watching. The regime stability there is
unclear. Unlike Iran, it has a large nuclear arsenal. Also, it
has an extremely large jihadist presence, and in contrast to
groups like the Lebanese Hezbollah, these groups want WMD.
In my judgment, Pakistan deserves particular scrutiny
because of this combination of nuclear weapons, jihadist
terrorism and internal instability. I am quite concerned over
the future of that country.
I will conclude by saying a last recommendation for the
committee to consider for homeland security is fear management.
Weapons of mass destruction like chemical weapons and
biological weapons, most of the systems available to terrorist
groups that are simple and easy to use are actually not that
lethal. They can kill dozens at times, but far fewer than
bullets, far fewer than car bombs. The real effect is
psychological.
The comparison I would make is with the anthrax attacks in
the United States, where tragically I believe five people died,
but the overall effect was relatively low in terms of actual
violence, but the psychological effect around the country was
tremendous.
Educating our population, having officials on television
ready to go to say that, while it is scary, it is not something
to panic over, is very important.
I will conclude my remarks right now, but I would like to
thank you for offering me this opportunity to talk before you,
and ask that my prepared remarks be submitted for the record.
[The statement of Mr. Byman follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dr. Daniel Byman
Chairman Linder, Members of the Committee, and Committee staff, I
am grateful for this opportunity to speak before you today.
I am speaking today as a Professor in the Georgetown University
Security Studies Program and as a non-resident Senior Fellow at the
Brookings' Saban Center for Middle East Policy. My remarks are solely
my own opinion: they do not reflect my past work for the intelligence
community, the 9/11 Commission, the U.S. Congress, or other branches of
the U.S. government.
Since the Islamic Revolution in 1979, Iran has been one of the
world's most active sponsors of terrorism. Tehran has armed, trained,
financed, inspired, organized, and otherwise supported dozens of
violent groups over the years. Iran has backed not only groups in its
Persian Gulf neighborhood, but also terrorists and radicals in Lebanon,
the Palestinian territories, Bosnia, the Philippines, and elsewhere.\1\
This support remains strong even today. It comes as no surprise then,
that almost twenty five years after the revolution, the U.S. State
Department still considers Iran ``the most active state sponsor of
terrorism.'' \2\
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\1\ This testimony draws on my recent book, Deadly Connections:
States that Sponsor Terrorism (New York: Cambridge University Press,
2005).
\2\ United States Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism
2002 (Washington, DC: 2003), p. 77.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Yet despite Iran's very real support for terrorism today, I contend
that it is not likely to transfer chemical, biological, nuclear, or
radiological weapons to terrorists for three major reasons. First,
providing terrorists with such unconventional weapons offers Iran few
tactical advantages as these groups are able to operate effectively
with existing methods and weapons. Second, Iran has become more
cautious in its backing of terrorists in recent years. And third, it is
highly aware that any major escalation in its support for terrorism
would incur U.S. wrath and international opprobrium.
In my prepared statement, I begin by reviewing how Iran has used
terrorism in the past and how this has changed over the years. I then
assess U.S. attempts to press Iran with regard to terrorism and why
they have met with little success. I conclude by arguing that, while I
believe Iranian terrorism remains a threat, Tehran is not likely to
pass chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons to terrorists.
Iran's Past Use of Terrorism
Iran initially began supporting radical groups, including many that
embraced terrorism, after the 1979 Islamic revolution and quickly
became the world's leading state supporter of terrorism. Exporting the
revolution was a leading foreign policy goal, an ambition that led
Tehran to work with a range of radicals around the world. The clerical
regime in Tehran viewed supporting revolutions overseas as part of its
revolutionary duty. The theological justifications for the Iranian
revolution espoused by the clerics emphasized the spread of Islam
regardless of state boundaries. Iran's Supreme Leader Ayatollah
Khomeini, shortly after taking power, declared, ``We should try hard to
export our revolution to the world . . . we [shall] confront the world
with our ideology.'' \3\ Indeed, Iran's constitution calls on its
military forces to ``extend the sovereignty of God's law throughout the
world.'' \4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ As quoted in Anoushiravan Ehteshami, After Khomeini (New York:
Routledge, 1995), p. 131.
\4\ As quoted in Shaul Bakhash, Reign of the Ayatollahs (New York:
Basic Books, 1986), p. 233.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
For Iran's new leaders, supporting Islam meant supporting
revolution. Typifying a view common to revolutionary regimes, Iran's
leaders saw themselves on the defensive yet believed that aggressively
promoting their revolution was the best means of ensuring its
survival.\5\ Ayatollah Khomeini declared that ``[A]ll the superpowers
and the [great] powers have risen to destroy us. If we remain in an
enclosed environment we shall definitely face defeat.''\6\ Heady with
their own success against the Shah at home, Iranian leaders made no
secret of their belief that ``corrupt'' and ``illegitimate'' leaders
abroad such as Iraq's Saddam Husayn, the Al Saud family in Saudi
Arabia, and others, would soon fall as well.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ For a review of the war-prone tendencies of revolutionary
states, see Stephen Walt, Revolution and War (Ithaca, NY: Cornell
University Press, 1994).
\6\ As quoted in R.K. Ramazani, Revolutionary Iran: Challenge and
Response in the Middle East (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University
Press, 1985), p. 24.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Immediately following the revolution, Tehran was particularly
active in working with Shi'a Muslim movements around the world. As
representatives of the world's largest Shi'a nation, Iranian leaders
feel a special affinity for the world's Shi'a. In most countries in the
Muslim world the Shi'a faced oppression and discrimination, and the
revolution both inspired them to take action and to look to Tehran for
support. Iran thus backed Shi'a groups in Iraq, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia,
Pakistan, Kuwait, and elsewhere.
In the eyes of its founders, however, the Iranian revolution was
more than simply a Shi'a movement. Tehran saw itself as the champion of
the ``dispossessed'' around the world. Thus it embraced an array of
left-wing revolutionary movements, many of which had secular
ideologies.
Not surprisingly, this ideological support engendered considerable
hostility among Iran's neighbors. They regularly condemned Iran, froze
or cut trade, formed anti-Iran alliances, welcomed Iranian dissidents
(including several groups that supported terrorism against Iran) and
took other steps designed to weaken and isolate the new regime. Thus
emerged a strategic rivalry between Iran and many of its neighbors in
which terrorism and support for subversion were the major Iranian
weapons in its toolbox.
For Iran, supporting subversive movements became a way of weakening
and destabilizing its neighbors as well as spreading its revolution and
toppling what in the eyes of Tehran were illegitimate regimes. In 1981,
shortly after the outbreak of the Iranian revolution, Tehran aided
Shi'a radicals of the Islamic Front for the Liberation of Bahrain in an
attempted coup against Bahrain's ruling Al Khalifa family.
Iran took a similar approach in its support for the Supreme Council
of the Islamic Revolution in Iraq. On taking power, Iranian leaders
held a visceral loathing of Saddam Husayn's regime in Iraq--a hatred
reinforced by Baghdad's immediate execution of several prominent Shi'a
religious leaders out of fear that they might support an Iranian-style
movement in Iraq itself. Almost immediately after the revolution, Iran
began supporting radicalism in Iraq, a decision that contributed to
Baghdad's decision to invade Iran in 1980. As the war heated up,
Khomeini declared that the path to Jerusalem's liberation went through
Baghdad. In November 1982 Tehran organized various Iraqi Shiite groups
under the umbrella of the Supreme Assembly for the Islamic Revolution
in Iraq (SCIRI).\7\ SCIRI was more than just a guerrilla front to
weaken Saddam's Iraq or an organization trying to kill Iraqi leaders:
it was also a government-in-waiting. As Iran expert R.K. Ramazani
contends, Iran's goal was to ``undermine the Hussein regime and pave
the way for the establishment of an Iranian-type Islamic government in
Iraq.''\8\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ International Crisis Group, ``Iraq's Shiites under Occupation''
(September 2003), pp. 12-13. Branches of the Da'wa party initially
joined SCIRI, as did the Organization of Islamic Action. SCIRI accepted
Ayatollah Khomeini as its spiritual leader. Iran's attempt to dominate
the movement, however, alienated many Da'wa members, leading parts of
the organization to leave the movement.
\8\ Ramazani, Revolutionary Iran, p. 37.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In addition to giving Iran a way to weaken its neighbors, terrorism
allowed Iran to influence events well beyond its borders. Lacking
aircraft carriers or other military forces that can deploy thousands of
miles away, and with its economy too weak to force far-away countries
to heed their demands, Iranian political protests have often gone
unheeded. Iran has used support for terrorists to project power,
particularly in the Arab-Israeli arena but also against Iraqi targets
and in Europe. Up until the early 1990s, Iranian intelligence services
also assassinated Iranian dissidents in Europe.
Iran supported terrorist groups not only to weaken adversaries, but
also to have a voice in the opposition to a particular regime. For
example, after the Israeli invasion of Lebanon and the subsequent U.S.
and European troop deployments there, Iran chose to undermine the
existing Shi'a group, Amal, because it had cooperated with Israel. It
is interesting to note that Iran chose to do so even though the
organization was well-established and popular. To undermine Amal,
Iranian intelligence agents, diplomats and members of the Islamic
Revolutionary Guard Corps (as well as Syrian officials) created the
Lebanese Hizballah from a motley assortment of small Shiite
organizations. Iran helped the fledgling movement train and
indoctrinate new members in the Bekaa Valley and developed an entire
infrastructure there to support it, including social services and a
fundraising network. This effort paid off with the creation of a loyal
and effective proxy. As one senior Hizballah official noted in the
early 1980s, ``Our relation with the Islamic revolution [in Iran] is
one of a junior to a senior . . . of a soldier to his commander.'' \9\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ As quoted in Martin Kramer, ``The Moral Logic of Hizballah,''
in Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States
of Mind, ed. Walter Reich (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Domestic politics also motivate Iran to support radical groups.
During the 1980s, Iran provided support to a range of Shi'a Muslim
groups such as the Iraqi Dawa party, the Islamic Front for the
Liberation of Bahrain, and the Tehrik-e Jafariya-e Pakistan in part
because the regime's legitimacy also depended on its self-proclaimed
status as the protector of Muslims, particularly Shi'as, worldwide.
Bolstering this position required clear gestures of support.
The prestige garnered from support to radicals mattered abroad as
well. After the 1979 Islamic revolution, both Saudi Arabia and Iran
competed to champion Muslim causes as a form of influence. Iran saw its
support for radical group as a way of demonstrating its bona fides to
other Islamist revolutionaries.
Terrorism, of course, was also a means for Iran to strike the
United States and Israel. With Iranian guidance, the Lebanese Hizballah
dramatically captured America's attention with devastating suicide
attacks on the U.S. Embassy in Beirut in April 1983, where 63 people
died, including 17 Americans, and on the U.S. Marine Barracks in
October 1983, where 241 U.S. Marines were killed (a simultaneous attack
killed 58 French peacekeepers). These attacks, and the sense that the
peacekeepers had little peace to keep, led President Reagan to withdraw
U.S. troops in February 1984. Hizballah also took numerous Westerners
hostage in the 1980s, executing several of them. Hizballah, often
working through suborganizations with different names, took 17
Americans, 15 Frenchmen, 14 Britons, 7 Swiss, and 7 West Germans
hostage, as well as 27 others hostage during the 1980s. In March 1992,
Hizballah and Iran worked together to bomb the Israeli Embassy in
Argentina, killing 29 and in July 1994 attacked the Jewish Community
Center in Buenos Aires, killing 86. Hizballah also aided other groups
that shared its agenda. Iran also directed the attack on the U.S.
military facility of Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia in 1996, killing 17
American troops.\10\ In addition to its support for Hizballah, Iran has
also supported a wide array of other groups that have attacked Israel.
In each of these instances, Tehran was able to compensate for its
military inferiority by relying on terrorism.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\10\ Iran sponsored Saudi Hizballah, which carried out the bombing,
and also trained cell members. One suspect detained by the FBI and
later deported to Saudi Arabia noted that the IRGC recruited him and
that an IRGC leader directed several operations in the Kingdom. The
suspects also worked with the Iranian Embassy in Damascus for
logistical support.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Terrorism also offered Iran some degree of deniability in this
effort. By working through proxies, Iran was able to achieve its own
interests against the United States, Israel, or states supporting Iraq
without paying the consequences that more direct involvement might
entail.
How Iran Uses Terrorism Today
Iran's use of terrorism has changed dramatically since the 1980s.
Most importantly, Iran appears not to target Americans directly, though
it still retains the capability to do so. Iran instead uses terrorism
as a form of deterrence, ``casing'' U.S. Embassies and other facilities
to give it a response should the United States step up pressure.\11\
Tehran also dramatically cut back on operations in Europe and the Gulf
states in the last 10 years. Iranian officials feared that attacks on
Iranian dissidents there would lead to European support for sanctions
and reduce investment in Iran's economy. In the mid-1990s, Iran's then
President Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani engineered a rapprochement with
the Arabian Gulf states, which led Iran to stop actively trying to
overthrow those regimes, though it retains ties to a number of Shi'a
groups there. Taken together, these three shifts represent a dramatic
change in Iran's support for terrorism.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\11\ Paul Pillar, Terrorism and U.S. Foreign Policy (Washington,
DC: The Brookings Institution, 2001), p. 159.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Today, Iran uses terrorism and support for radicals in several
distinct ways. Particularly important for the United States are
Tehran's close relationship with the Lebanese Hizballah; support for
anti-Israel Palestinian groups; ties to various factions within Iraq;
and loose contacts with al-Qa'ida.
The Lebanese Hizballah
Of the many terrorist groups that Iran has sponsored, none is more
important to Tehran than the Lebanese Hizballah.\12\ Their close
relationship is perhaps the strongest and most effective relationship
between a state sponsor and a terrorist group in history. Iran helped
found, organize, and train Hizballah, eventually creating a strong and
relatively independent terrorist group. In exchange, Hizballah has
served Iran loyally, striking Iran's various foreign enemies, helping
assassinate Iranian dissidents, and otherwise advance the interests of
the Islamic Republic.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\12\ Iranian-linked groups frequently use the label ``Hizballah,''
leading to much confusion. In Iran, ``Hizballahis'' are associated with
pro-regime militants, many of whom fought street battles against rival
leftist or other organizations in the early days of the revolution.
Over time, this term became a label used to signify loyalty to the
Islamic regime. Hizballah movements have reportedly appeared in Kuwait,
Bahrain, and Saudi Arabia, among other countries. These movements often
have links to Iran, but have few close ties to the Lebanese Hizballah.
Other groups that are not linked in any way to Tehran, such as Turkish
Hizballah, have from time to time adopted the name ``Hizballah''.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Iran, as noted above, helped build the movement from the ground up
and to this day plays a major role in sustaining it and in its day-to-
day operations. Iranian sponsorship of Hizballah is a major reason why
Iran consistently tops the U.S. list of state sponsors of terrorism.
Although exact figures are difficult to verify, Tehran provides perhaps
$100 million per year to Hizballah. In addition, Iranian forces train
the movement and provide it with intelligence. Moreover, Hizballah
operatives enjoy close ties to Iranian intelligence and the Islamic
Revolutionary Guard Corps, which is linked directly to Iranian Supreme
Leader Ali Khamenei. Hizballah's senior terrorist, Imad Mugniyieh,
reportedly enjoys Iranian citizenship and regularly travels there.
Hizballah's leadership proclaims its loyalty to Khamenei, and he
reportedly serves as an arbiter for group decisions. Iran is
particularly influential with regard to Hizballah activities overseas.
Hizballah, for example, stopped its attacks in Europe as part of a
broader Iranian decision to halt attacks there.
In exchange for this aid, Iran gains a weapon against Israel and
influence far beyond its borders. Because of Hizballah, Iran has defied
geography and has become a player in the Middle East peace process.
Hizballah also has cells and operatives around the world--a presence
that allows Iran to step up terrorism should it so choose.
Hizballah today is far more cautious than in the past, in large
part because its earlier successes have reduced the organization's
incentive to kill large numbers of civilians. Having forced American
and other Western troops out--and then triumphantly expelled Israel in
2000--Hizballah enjoys remarkable prestige. Much of the popularity the
movement enjoys among the Lebanese population comes from removing what
was widely perceived as a foreign occupier. If the organization were to
conduct a sustained campaign outside of Lebanon, one that led to an
Israeli or U.S. retaliation, it would not enjoy similar backing. The
recent Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon also may force the organization
to focus even more on Lebanon and less on its activities overseas.
Hizballah is now better characterized as a guerrilla and political
movement that at times uses terrorism than as a pure terrorist group.
Hizballah has reduced its direct involvement in terrorism in recent
years even as it retained the potential to act and helped Palestinians
carry out their own terrorist attacks. Indeed, even with regard to
guerrilla war the movement has shown itself to be a careful actor.
Hizballah has not used all the weapons available to it, saving long-
range rockets that might strike larger Israeli cities such as Haifa for
use to deter Israeli escalation. Hizballah made this shift in part
because it recognized that attacks on civilians that could be labeled
as ``terrorism'' hurt its image among potential supporters, both inside
the region and outside it.\13\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\13\ Judith Palmer Harik, Hezbollah: The Changing Face of Terrorism
(New York: I.B. Tauris, 2004), pp. 2-4.
Palestinian Groups
Iran has long supported Palestinian violence against Israel, and it
has continued to do so since the outbreak of the second intifada in
September 2000. For Iran, support for the Palestinians serves several
purposes. First, Iranian leaders have a genuine commitment to help the
Palestinians fight what Tehran regards as an illegitimate colonial
regime. Second, support for the Palestinians enhances Iran's prestige
throughout the Muslim world. Third, and perhaps most importantly, by
disrupting the Israel-Palestine peace process Iran is able to prevent
its isolation in the Muslim world. Tehran has long feared (correctly)
that the United States wanted to isolate it for its rogue behavior. By
keeping the Palestinian-Israel conflict alive (something that Iran's
support for terrorism succeeded in doing in the 1990s), Tehran was able
to divert U.S. pressure (including efforts at regime change) toward
others in the region.
Over the years, Tehran has backed several Palestinian groups,
including those linked to Fatah and the Islamist movement HAMAS. Iran
gave some money and provided limited training, often through its proxy,
the Lebanese Hizballah. Both movements, however, remain highly
independent of Iran. Tehran's most important Palestinian proxy, the
Palestine Islamic Jihad, is far more willing to follow Iran's lead.
Palestine Islamic Jihad has proven a particularly bloody group and
remains committed to conducting heinous attacks on Israeli citizens.
Radicals in Iraq
Iran has a daunting array of interests in Iraq. Tehran and Baghdad
have long been rivals for dominance in the Gulf region. Iran shares a
long border with Iraq, and the bitter war between the two in the 1980s
highlighted the security threat that a hostile regime in Baghdad can
pose to Tehran. As the self-proclaimed champion of the world's Shi'a,
Iran also takes a strong interest in the fate of Iraq's Shi'a majority:
an interest reinforced by decades of intermarriage among leading
clerical families of Iraq and Iran. Tehran also fears that instability
in Iraq could spill over into Iran, inflaming its own Kurdish
population or leading to a refugee crisis. Not surprisingly, Iran has
flooded Iraq with intelligence agents, and members of the Lebanese
Hizballah have also set up at least a temporary presence there.
Tehran today has particularly close ties to an array of Iraqi Shi'a
groups, many of which are leading actors in the new Iraqi government.
Some of Iran's proxies in the Iran-Iraq war are now major players in
the government. Although they are not Iranian pawns, they have close
relations with many leading figures in Iran. For the most part, Iran
has tried to unite Iraqi Shi'a, recognizing that the U.S.-backed
political process serves many Iranian interests.
Tehran's contacts in Iraq, however, go well beyond the Shi'a
community. Tehran recognizes that in Iraq local influence is as
important as influence with the central government and almost certainly
has ties at a local level with various militias and tribal leaders.
Iran has also tried to cultivate Shi'a leaders such as Moqtada al-Sadr,
even though he is often vociferously anti-Iranian. For Iran, having
ties to a wide range of groups gives it additional leverage as well as
options should one proxy prove unreliable or should the situation on
the ground suddenly change.
Although some groups tied to Iran have at times attacked Americans
or pro-U.S. actors in Iraq, in general Tehran has been a force for
stabilization. It is not clear if the attacks that did occur were at
Iran's behest. In part, this restraint is because the leadership that
has emerged in Iraq in recent months is close to Tehran's ideal. Iran,
however, is also concerned that greater instability in Iraq could spill
over into Iran and fears the potential for U.S. retaliation. Thus,
while Tehran and Washington do not have the same interests in Iraq,
Iran has not turned Iraq into another Lebanon.
Iran's ability to wreak havoc in Iraq is immense, however.
Fortunately for the United States, violence in the Shi'a parts of Iraq
has been limited. But a force of only a few hundred fighters could
overturn this tenuous peace, since U.S. forces are currently
overstretched as they focus on the Sunni and mixed-population parts of
Iraq. This ability to affect hostilities in Iraq is risky for Iran, but
it also gives Tehran additional leverage over a future Iraqi government
as well as the United States. Iran might increase the violence in Iraq
if it looks like the United States is trying to remove Iran's
influence, if the United States appears determined to stay
indefinitely, or if the United States hardens its position in other
areas, such as the standoff over Iran's nuclear programs.
Al-Qa'ida and Sunni jihadists
Iran has long pursued ties to Sunni jihadists, including members of
al-Qa'ida. The 9/11 Commission reports that in 1991 or 1992 al-Qa'ida
and Iran had contacts in Sudan and that individuals linked to al-Qa'ida
received training in Iran and Lebanon in the early 1990s. Several of
the 9/11 hijackers transited Iran, taking advantage of its policy of
not stamping the passports of those traveling from Afghanistan--a
practice that hindered Saudi security agencies? ability to detect the
terrorists when they later returned to the Kingdom.
Since 9/11, Iran has cooperated fitfully with the United States in
fighting various Sunni jihadists. At times Iran has provided
considerable cooperation, such as sending many jihadists back to their
home countries, where pro-U.S. security services can question them.
Tehran, however, has allowed several very senior al-Qa'ida figures,
such as Saif al-Adel, Saad Bin Ladin, and Abu Hafs the Mauritanian, to
remain in Iran. Although Iran supposedly monitors individuals linked to
al-Qa'ida, some reports indicate they played a major role in the May
2003 attacks in Saudi Arabia--suggesting Iran is not exercising true
control over them. Iran claims it has subsequently clamped down on
those suspected of links to the Saudi attacks, but its long-term
intentions with regard to al-Qa'ida are still unclear and its past
actions in this regard are cause for concern.
Iran appears to be keeping its options open with regard to the
jihadists. On the one hand, it recognizes the heavy price to be paid if
it openly backs them. Moreover, many jihadists regard the Shi'a as
apostates deserving death. Sectarian violence is a growing problem in
Iraq. On the other hand, the jihadists are a potent weapon for Iran,
which historically has tried to keep as many options open as possible.
At the very least, Iran seeks to use the jihadists in its custody as a
bargaining chip. Indeed, it probably hoped to swap the senior al-Qa'ida
figures for members of the anti-Tehran terrorist group the Mujahedin-e
Khalq, who were long based in Iraq and, after the U.S. removal of
Saddam's regime, came under U.S. control. At most, Iran may see the
jihadists as a potential future ally.
Keeping Options Open Elsewhere
Although Iran has cut ties to terrorist groups in the Gulf and
Europe, it retains a wide network and contacts with many radicals in
these countries. Such contacts provide Iranian officials with options
should they seek to use terrorism in these areas again. Moreover, these
ties are a deterrent, allowing Tehran to tacitly threaten the United
States or other countries that might seek to act against the clerical
regime.
Sources of Restraint
Although Iran's support for terrorists groups have made them more
lethal (particularly with regard to Hizballah), Tehran is also a source
of restraint on its proxies. Most importantly, Tehran takes seriously
the threat of escalation from Israel, the United States, or other
potential victims should its proxies wreak massive violence. Iran
stopped supporting attacks by Gulf Shi'a on U.S. forces in the Persian
Gulf after the 1996 Khobar Towers bombing--despite a continued desire
to expel Americans from the region--in part because it feared an
increase in political, economic, and perhaps even military pressure.
After the bombing, Iranian leaders worried they might have crossed the
line they had long walked between confrontation and provocation.
Similarly, Iran did not let the SCIRI make an all-out push to topple
Saddam's regime when it was reeling after the 1991 Gulf War--despite
the massacres of Iraqi Shi'a--because Tehran feared a confrontation
with the victorious U.S. and other coalition forces.
The restraints states impose are often best observed in what
terrorist groups do not do. As Iran sought to improve its reputation in
Europe and the Middle East, the Lebanese Hizballah curtailed its
attacks on targets in Europe and on Israeli targets worldwide, focusing
instead on expelling Israel from the security zone along the Lebanon-
Israel border: a struggle widely seen as legitimate in many parts of
the world.
The Limits of U.S. Pressure
The problem of terrorism has plagued the U.S.-Iran relationship
since the Islamic revolution. Arguably, the United States pressured
Iran more than almost any other country in the world during the 1980s
and 1990s. After the hostage crisis, the United States cut diplomatic
ties to Tehran. During Iran's war with Iraq, the United States provided
intelligence, financial assistance, and other forms of aid to help
Baghdad survive and eventually forced Iran to the negotiating
table.\14\
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\14\ In 1983, the United States initiated ``Operation Staunch'' to
prevent Iran from receiving arms. This hindered the war effort against
Iraq, making it far harder to buy arms, particularly from America,
formerly Iran's major supplier. Washington also provided limited
support to Iranian exiles in an attempt to weaken the regime. Such
efforts hindered Iran, though the reason for the war's end was
primarily the horrendous costs on both sides and mutual exhaustion.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
At times, tension escalated into outright conflict. In response to
Iranian attacks on U.S. re- flagged oil tankers in 1988, the United
States sank several ships in the Iranian Navy and also destroyed
several Iranian oil platforms. The United States also accidentally
downed an Iranian civilian airliner, killing almost 300--a mistake that
still angers many Iranians. U.S. strikes were however successful in
getting the Iranians to cease their efforts at intimidating Iraq's
allies in the Gulf.
Following the 1991 war with Iraq, the United States continued to
maintain a large military presence in the Gulf. The U.S. troop presence
in the Gulf varied between 8,000 and 25,000. The United States also
established a series of basing and prepositioning arrangements with
several of the Gulf monarchies. This presence was in large part
intended to deter Iraqi aggression and contain the regime in Baghdad.
However, implicitly--and at times explicitly--the United States also
sought to use this presence to deter any Iranian adventurism and weaken
Iran's regional influence.
The United States also took several covert measures to counter
Iran. In 1995, the United States Congress proposed $20 million to
overthrow Iran's government. This attempt at rather overt covert
action, however, does not appear to have made any significant progress.
In 1997, in contrast, the United States launched ``Operation
Sapphire,'' which led to the successful identification and expulsion of
Iranian intelligence officers around the world.\15\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\15\ Barbara Slavin, `Officials: U.S. `Outed' Iran's Spies in
1997,'' USA Today, March 30, 2004.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Although sanctions have proven the cornerstone of U.S. policy
toward Iran since the 1979 Islamic revolution, they have not persuaded
Tehran to abandon its support for terrorism. Immediately after the
revolution, Iranian students and other activists seized the U.S.
Embassy, holding 66 (eventually 52) Americans hostage. In response to
this and other provocations, the United States froze $12 billion in
Iranian assets, suspended hundreds of millions of dollars worth of arms
purchases, and banned imports from Iran. Although the UN failed to join
in these measures and did not require its member states to punish Iran,
Western European states and Japan also banned the export of arms,
halted new contracts from being signed, and limited investment in the
revolutionary state.
U.S. sanctions continued even after the hostage crisis ended.
Washington remained hostile to the Iranian regime as it began an
ambitious effort to export its revolution, backing radical groups,
including many that used terrorism, throughout the Middle East. In
addition to punishing Iran for its support of terrorism, Washington
used sanctions to address other grievances: to curtail Iran's weapons
of mass destruction programs, to limit Iran's rebuilding of its
conventional military arsenal, and to dissuade Iran from opposing the
Middle East Peace Process.
With each passing year, the number and type of U.S. sanctions
increased. In 1984, Iran was added to the state sponsor list, which
brought a host of mandatory economic restrictions. In particular, the
United States denied Iran arms--a serious loss, as the pre-
revolutionary regime relied almost entirely on U.S. weapons systems and
was engaged in a life-or-death struggle with the Iraqi regime from 1980
to 1988. In 1987, the United States stopped most imports from Iran due
to terrorism. This policy did not end with the end of the Cold War
however. In 1995 President Clinton prohibited investment in Iran's oil
industry. The United States also opposed an oil pipeline that would
cross Iranian territory, blocked international bank loans, and opposed
Iran's memberships in international organizations.
The United States also extended the reach of sanctions beyond Iran,
punishing those countries that assisted or invested in Iran. In 1996,
the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act outlawed any
financial relations with Iran and also prohibited assistance to
countries that provided military aid to Iran. That same year, Congress
passed the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA), which imposed penalties on
foreign companies that invested more than $20 million in Iran's oil
industry.
As U.S. pressure increased in the mid-1990s, several European
states tried to foster moderation in Iran through a process known as
``critical dialogue.'' European states--despite having experienced
Tehran's terrorism more recently than the United States--did not see
Iran as a major threat. Moreover, some European leaders believed that
dialogue would reduce Iran's hostility.
Even after the beginning of ``critical dialogue,'' Iran continued
to use terrorism in the early and mid-1990s and as a result risked
multilateral sanctions. The killing of Iranian dissidents in Europe and
the religious decree calling for the murder of British author Salman
Rushdie both strained relations with European capitals. U.S. diplomatic
pressure on Europe to act against Iran further increased the pressure.
The Khobar Towers bombing also increased the risk of a strong U.S.
response and gave Washington additional leverage to use with its allies
when it pressed them on terrorism.
Over time, however, the cumulative effect of sanctions and
isolation--and, more importantly, the risk that additional attacks
would lead to increased pressure--led Iran to reduce its direct
involvement in terrorism. Fearing that this growing pressure would
jeopardize his government's economic program and isolate his regime,
Rafsanjani drew back. He put a stop to the assassination of dissidents
in Europe and mended fences with the Gulf monarchies. The lesson
learned was that Rafsanjani and other Iranian leaders proved
particularly sensitive to the risk of a joint U.S.-European front.
U.S. pressure eased somewhat in the late 1990s, as the United
States hoped that the new, reformist government of President Khatami
elected in 1997 would lead to a rapprochement with Iran. In 1997, the
Clinton administration removed Iran from the list of states involved in
narcotics trafficking and placed the Mujahedin-e Khalq, a murderous
terrorist group that had enjoyed some sympathy in Washington because it
was opposed to the clerical regime, on the initial listing of Foreign
Terrorist Organizations. In 1998, the Clinton administration issued a
waiver to ILSA for the French oil company, Total, allowing it to invest
in Iran's oil industry and averting a transatlantic crisis. Secretary
Albright also gave a speech that welcomed Khatami's election and called
for an improved relationship. One year later, permission was given to
export food and medicine to Iran. In 2000, the Secretary of State
lifted restrictions on the import of Iranian carpets, caviar, and
pistachios. For the most part, these gestures had little impact on
Iran's economy but were intended as symbolic gestures of U.S. openness
in addition to paving the way for further rapprochement.
Most importantly, however, the Clinton administration decided not
to retaliate for the Khobar Towers attack despite considerable evidence
of Iranian complicity. Administration officials reasoned that
retaliation would strengthen the opponents of reform in Iran. Moreover,
limited military strikes in retaliation for terrorist attacks
historically have had a poor record of success. Finally, the passage of
time since the 1996 attacks and the eventual determination of Iranian
culpability made it harder to generate international support for any
retaliation.
Though unsuccessful in stopping terrorism, the range of U.S.
sanctions did hurt Iran considerably. Financial pressure, in particular
Washington's successful efforts to block IMF and World Bank funding to
Iran, made Iran's debt crisis more debilitating. Until the 1998 waiver
for Total, ILSA also discouraged foreign investment, which along with
other sanctions delayed the development of Iran's dilapidated oil
infrastructure. Meghan O'Sullivan, however, contends that sanctions are
only a small part of the explanation for Iran's economic morass. She
notes that the plunge in the price of oil (in the 1980s and 1990s),
along with the war with Iraq, and political mismanagement would have
led to a crisis in any event.\16\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\16\ Meghen O'Sullivan, Shrewd Sanctions: Statecraft and State
Sponsors of Terrorism (Washington, DC: Brookings, 2003), pp. 61, 67-72.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Although the economic impact of sanctions on Iran was damaging, it
did not affect the political orientation of the regime, particularly
with regard to terrorism. Iran did shift its terrorism away from Europe
and the Gulf and toward Israel, but this shift did not advance, and
arguably set back, overall U.S. objectives. Moreover, the sanctions
increased Iran's hostility toward the United States, enabling the
regime to cite sanctions as ``proof'' that Washington sought to crush
the Islamic revolution.
Iran was able to resist sanctions for several reasons. First and
most importantly, the costs were manageable, allowing Iran to offset
much of the potential damage. Although the United States was a major
market for Iranian products, Tehran diversified its trade partners and
worked through third countries to reach the United States. Second,
Iran's major export--oil--is in essence a global commodity, and the
cutoff of one market to one supplier has no significant impact on a
country's ability to gain the maximize price for its exports.
Because Iran's regime depended for legitimacy on Islamic radicalism
and Persian nationalism, both of which opposed any perceived kowtowing
to Washington, the costs of complying with U.S. pressure were
considerable. Iranian leaders risked being branded as puppets of the
United States if they gave into U.S. pressure, a particularly heavy
charge as the regime came to power in part on a wave of anti-
Americanism. The consolidation of conservative power in Iran in recent
years, symbolized by the election in June of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad as
Iran's new President, will only worsen this problem.
The cost to the United States was also considerable. Sanctions, of
course, meant that U.S. companies lost trade and investment
opportunities. Indirect sanctions proved particularly costly. ILSA led
to vociferous protests from European and other governments.
Iran and WMD Terrorism
The picture painted above is not pretty, but it is not hopeless
either. One bright spot is that Iran's past behavior suggests it is not
likely to provide chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear
weapons to a terrorist group. Because these weapons can be
devastating--or, at the very least, psychologically terrifying even
when the number directly affected is low--they are far more likely to
provoke escalation. In addition, these weapons are widely seen as
heinous, potentially de-legitimating both the group and its state
sponsor. Perhaps not surprisingly, Iran has not transferred chemical or
biological weapons or agents to its proxies, despite its capability to
do so.
Tehran has also sought at least a degree of deniability in its use
of terrorism--a reason it often works through the Lebanese Hizballah to
this day when backing terrorists. As Iran expert Kenneth Pollack notes,
a chemical or biological attack (to say nothing of a nuclear strike)
would lead the victim to respond with full force almost
immediately.\17\ The use of proxies or cutouts would not shield Iran
from retaliation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\17\ Kenneth Pollack, The Persian Puzzle (New York: Random House,
2004), pp. 420-421.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
An even better indicator of Iran's restraint so far is its
unwillingness to transfer more advanced conventional systems--ones that
would provoke far less outcry than a transfer of chemical weapons--to
even its close proxies such as the Lebanese Hizballah. Hizballah's most
infamous weapon, the Katyusha rocket launcher, is based on a 1940s
Soviet weapons system. Nor have Iran's proxies used man-portable
surface-to-air missiles.
September 11 has also had a limiting effect. The attacks occurred
over a year after the Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon. The tremendous
worldwide concern about terrorism, and the active U.S. campaign against
al-Qa'ida, made Iran's proxies cautious about any attacks that would
lead them to be compared to al-Qa'ida.
Nor do Iran's favored proxies actively seek weapons of mass
destruction as does al-Qida. They appear to recognize the ``red line''
drawn by the United States and other powers with regard to terrorist
use of these weapons. Moreover, their current tactics and systems
enable them to inflict considerable casualties. Indeed, some of the
more available types of chemical and biological agents would be
difficult for even a skilled terrorist group to use to inflict mass
casualties, though the psychological impact would be considerable from
even a limited attack with unconventional weapons.
Tehran is not likely to change its behavior on this score except in
the most extreme circumstances. Traditional terrorist tactics such as
assassinations and truck bombs have proven effective for Tehran. Only
in the event of a truly grave threat such as an invasion of Iran would
many of Tehran's traditional cautions go out the window.
Recommendations
The United States should consider several steps to ensure Tehran
does not provide chemical or biological weapons or other unconventional
systems to terrorists and to decrease its support for terrorism in
general.
Most obviously, the United States must work to maintain pressure
with regard to any transfer of unconventional systems. This is a clear
success for U.S. policy. Preventing any transfer of unconventional
weapons was a concern that received tremendous attention in the Clinton
administration and even more from the Bush administration after 9/11.
As a result, states today are more cautious than ever in their support
for terrorism and recognize that providing chemical, biological,
nuclear, or radiological weapons would cross a U.S. ``red line.''
In addition to continuing this pressure at a diplomatic level, the
link between terrorists and weapons of mass destruction must remain a
top intelligence priority. Although it is difficult to inflict mass
casualties with many chemical, biological, or radiological agents or
weapons, the psychological impact--and thus the effect on the world
economy and overall confidence in government--would still be
considerable.
A priority must also be given to cutting any ties between Iran and
al-Qa'ida. In contrast to Iran's traditional proxies, al-Qa'ida does
not recognize the U.S. ``red lines'' and actively seeks weapons of mass
destruction. The United States must make clear to Tehran that it will
not tolerate continued harboring of senior al-Qa'ida members or any
Iranian ties, even indirect ones, to the terrorist group.
Effective pressure and intelligence efforts cannot be maintained by
us alone. The relative failure of pressure on Iran suggests the
importance of multilateralism. When Iran feared in the mid-1990s that
the United States would succeed in getting European states to join in
sanctions, it reduced its support for terrorism in Europe. U.S. power
alone has proved far less effective.
To decrease Iran's use of terrorism in general, the United States
must develop a more nuanced approach to state terrorism. This requires
giving the executive branch more flexibility in its implementation of
punishments linked to the ``state sponsors'' list. In particular, the
executive branch should be given more power to reward states that are
improving their behavior with regard to terrorism, even though they
fall short of all the desired criteria.
The converse is that U.S. categories and lists should recognize,
and punish, other types of Iranian support for terrorism. In
particular, Tehran's inactions should be noted as well as its actions,
particularly the Iranian regime's unwillingness to expel senior al-
Qa'ida members to countries where they will be brought to justice. The
United States should also hold Iran more accountable when it uses
proxies such as the Lebanese Hizballah to sponsor Palestinian
terrorism.
Finally, policymakers should recognize that U.S. options with
regard to Iranian support for terrorism are limited. The United States
has other vital concerns with regard to Iran--both its nuclear program
and its activities in Iraq--and pressing hard on terrorism may
jeopardize any progress, however limited, in these areas. Iran has
shown itself able to resist U.S. economic pressure in the past and is
likely to do so in the future as well. Limited military strikes would
do little to damage Iran's capacity to conduct terrorism and would
almost certainly increase its activities, both out of revenge and out
of a sense that the United States is irrevocably hostile. The best bet
for the United States is to continue to try to shore up allied support
to increase pressure on Tehran and otherwise ensure that
counterterrorism remains a priority in U.S. policy towards Iran.
Mr. Linder. They will, without objection. Thank you, Dr.
Byman.
Dr. Takeyh?
STATEMENT OF RAY TAKEYH, SENIOR FELLOW, MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES,
COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
Mr. Takeyh. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for inviting me. Some
of my comments will echo what my colleagues have said.
What we do know is that Iran is rapidly developing the
necessary infrastructure for construction of nuclear weapons.
The question therefore is, would it consider a transfer of
these weapons to some of its terrorist allies should it achieve
that capability?
Here, what we need to consider first of all is that much of
Iranian terrorism today is actually confined to the Israeli-
Palestinian arena and much of the most reliable and intimate of
its terrorist allies are Hezbollah and to a lesser extent the
Palestinian rejectionist groups Hamas and Islamic Jihad.
Certainly, even a cursory examination of Iranian rhetoric
reveals that they tend to reject Israel as an illegitimate
state that is usurping sacred Islamic land and is acting as
sort of an agent of American imperial aggrandizement in the
Middle East.
But Iran as a regime does not seem inordinately concerned
about Israel's nuclear monopoly, nor does it necessarily feel
threatened by Israel's formidable armed forces. For the Islamic
Republic, Israel may be an ideological affront, but it is not
an existential threat mandating provision of nuclear weapons or
offering such weapons to its terrorist clients.
Despite Iran's inflammatory conduct in the Palestinian-
Israeli arena, it is important to reflect that during the past
quarter-century, it has sought to regulate its low-intensity
conflict with Israel and has avoided direct military
confrontation with Jerusalem.
This is conflict that is largely waged by proxies in a
controlled manner. For such a strategy to succeed, Iran does
not need to necessarily transfer such weaponry or escalate the
conflict. For example, as Dan Byman mentioned, Iran has not
transferred its chemical and biological weapons to terrorist
organizations, nor for that matter its more powerful and
sophisticated missile technology.
For Iran it may be important for these groups to persist,
to survive, to conduct violence against the Israeli state, but
such conflict has to take place within distinct redlines. A
policy of restrained hostility best serves Iran's strategic and
ideological purposes.
Moreover, the most critical mission for Iran's ruling class
is survival of the regime and preservation of Iran's
territorial integrity. As such, transferring nuclear arms to a
terrorist client that may be difficult to restrain or
discipline would certainly expose the regime to an unacceptable
degree of danger in terms of Israeli and potential American
military retaliation. Any measure that could threaten the
clerical leaders' hold on power will be strongly resisted by
Iran's relatively risk-adverse rulers.
The mullahs may be hostile to Israel, but they do
appreciate that such hostility, should it escape their
controlled parameters, could confront them with dangers to
their regime's survival. So long as Iran's rulers remain
focused on their power, they would recoil from rash measures
such as giving nuclear arms to third parties, however reliable
and longstanding that relationship with those third parties may
be.
Moreover, in the aftermath of September 11, there has been
a subtle calculation in Iran's approach to Hezbollah and other
terrorist clients. At a time when the United States is waging a
global war against terrorism, Iran is becoming a bit more
circumspect and cautious in its support for Hezbollah. While
Iran sustains its support for such organizations, it has in the
past tried to restrain them.
One of the ironies of the current situation is the Iranian
leadership that had sought so much to instigate Hezbollah
violence, in some cases it is seeking to restrain that
organization. The theocratic rules are beginning to discern
that tempering their approach to the peace process is a policy
that may soon be in their interests.
I conclude my statement by suggesting that Iran becoming
the next nuclear-weapons state is not necessarily an
inevitability. There is much that the United States and the
international community can still do to prevent Iran from
crossing the nuclear threshold and therefore avoiding some of
the problems such as those we are discussing today.
I will stop there. Thank you.
[The statement of Mr. Takeyh follows:]
Prepared Statement of Ray Takeyh
As the debate lingers regarding vanished Iraqi weapons of mass
destruction, yet another proliferation crisis is looming in the Middle
East. Washington and much of the international community fears that
under the auspices of civilian research program, Iran is gradually
accumulating the technology and the expertise necessary for the
construction of nuclear weapons. The critical question remains would
Iran transfer such weapons to its terrorist allies should it acquire a
nuclear capability? The answer to this question requires a better
understanding of the interlocking calculations that propel Iran toward
the nuclear option in the first place.
Why Does Iran Want the Bomb?
Contrary to many Western assumptions, Iran's quest for nuclear
weapons does not stem from irrational ideological postulations, but
from a judicious attempt to craft a viable deterrent posture against a
range of threats. It is often argued that Iran's dangerous and
unpredictable neighborhood grants it ample incentive for acquiring
nuclear weapons. However, it is hard to see how persistent volatility
on Iran's frontiers can be ameliorated by the possession of such
weapons. Instability in Afghanistan and Central Asia may be sources of
significant concern for Iran's defense planners, but nuclear weapons
can scarcely defuse such crises. A more careful examination reveals
that Iran's nuclear program has been conditioned by a narrower but more
pronounced set of threats. Historically, the need to negate the
American and Iraqi threats has been the primary motivation. In more
recent times, the simmering concerns regarding the stability of a
nuclear-armed Pakistan have similarly enhanced the value of such
weapons to Iran's planners. In the end, for Iran this is a weapon of
deterrence not one that is to be given to terrorist organizations or
brandished to gain diplomatic leverage in the region.
From the Islamic Republic's perspective, the Gulf is its most
important strategic arena, constituting its most reliable access to the
international petroleum market. For long, it was Iraq that actuated the
theocratic elite toward a search for a nuclear option. Saddam's Iraq
not only sought hegemony over the Gulf, and indeed the larger Middle
East, but also waged a merciless eight-year war against Iran. It is the
developments in the Gulf that will likely condition Iran's defense
posture and nuclear ambitions for the foreseeable future.
The impact of the Iran-Iraq war on Tehran's nuclear calculations
cannot be underestimated. Iraq's employment of chemical weapons against
Iranian civilians and combatants led to an estimated 50,000 casualties
and permanently scared Iran's national psyche. Whatever their tactical
military utility, in the hands of Saddam chemical weapons were tools of
terror, as he hoped that through their indiscriminate use he could
frighten and demoralize the Iranian populace. To an extent this
strategy proved effective, Iraq's targeting of Iranian cities during
the latter stages of the war did much to undermine the national support
for the continuation of the conflict. Far from being a historic memory,
the war and its legacy are debated daily in the pages of newspapers, in
the halls of the universities, and the floor of the parliament. As the
newspaper Ya Letharat noted, ``One can still see the wounds of our war
veterans that were inflicted by poison gas as used by Saddam Hussein
that were made in Germany and France.'' The dramatic memories of the
war have led to cries of ``never again,'' uniting a fractious public
behind the desire to achieve not just a credible deterrent posture but
potentially a convincing retaliatory capability.
Beyond the human toll, the war also changed Iran's strategic
doctrine. During the war, Iran persisted with the notion that
technological superiority cannot overcome revolutionary zeal and a
willingness to offer martyrs. To compensate for its lack of weaponry,
Iran launched human wave assaults and used its young population as a
tool of an offensive military strategy. The devastation of the war and
the loss of ``martyrdom'' appetite among Iran's youth has invalidated
that theory. As Rafsanjani acknowledged, ``With regards to chemical,
bacteriological and radiological weapons, it was made clear during the
war that these weapons are very decisive. We should fully equip
ourselves in both offensive and defensive use of these weapons.
Moreover, the indifference of the international community to Saddam's
crimes also left its mark, leading Iran to reject the notion that
international treaties and compacts can ensure its security. As the
former commander of the Revolutionary Guards Mohsen Rezai stipulated,
``We cannot, generally speaking, argue that our country will derive any
benefit from accepting international treaties.'' Deterrence could no
longer be predicated on revolutionary commitment and international
opinion, as Iran required a more credible military response.
The overthrow of Saddam's regime has diminished but by no means
eliminated the Iraqi challenge. The unpredictable nature of
developments in Iraq has intensified Iran's anxieties and further
enhanced the utility of the nuclear option. Should Iraq emerge as a
close US ally policing the Gulf on the behest of its superpower
benefactor, Iran will stand marginalized and isolated. Indeed, the
long-standing ambition of successive Iraqi governments to assert
predominance in the Gulf may finally be nurtured by a superpower
seeking local allies to contain recalcitrant states such as Iran. A
revival of the Nixon Doctrine, whereby the US sought to ensure the
stability of the Persian Gulf by arming its pliant Iranian ally, with
Iraq now assuming that role, would seriously constrain Tehran's
options. A presumptive nuclear capability would grant Iran a greater
ability to assert its interests and press its claims. At any rate, the
unforeseen conduct of the sovereign Iraqi government compels the
theocratic leadership to formulate a range of contingencies, and one
such option is to sustain a robust nuclear research program.
Iraq is not the only potential problem that Iran faces, as looking
east lies a nuclear-armed Pakistan with its own strain of anti-Shiism.
Although General Musharaff is routinely celebrated in Washington as
reliable ally in the war against terrorism, Pakistan's past is more
checkered and problematic. Throughout the 1990s, Pakistan perceived the
demise of the Soviet Union as a unique opportunity to exert its
influence in Central Asia and to capture the emerging markets in that
critical area. Afghanistan was viewed as an indispensable bridge to
Central Asia, and Pakistani intelligence services did much to ensure
the triumph of the radical Taliban movement in the ensuing Afghan civil
war. The rise of the Taliban and the eventual establishment of the al-
Qa'ida camps in Afghanistan had much to do with Pakistan's cynical
strategy. Throughout the 1990s, such Pakistani machinations caused
considerable tensions with Iran that was uneasy about the emergence of
a radical Sunni regime on its borders.
Although since September 11th with Pakistan's final abandonment of
the Taliban, its relations with Iran have improved, the specter of
instability in Islamabad haunts Iran's leadership. The possibility of
the collapse of the current military government and its displacement by
a radical Sunni regime with access to nuclear weapons is something Iran
must guard against. The detonation of the bomb by Pakistan in 1998
caused considerable anxiety in Tehran with Rafsanjani stressing, ``This
is a major step toward proliferation of nuclear weapons. This is a
truly dangerous matter and we must be concerned.'' Foreign Minister
Kamal Kharrazi also mused, ``This was one genie that was much better to
have stayed confined in the bottle.'' Along with Iraq, Pakistan is a
potential threat that Iran must take into consideration as it plots its
defense strategy.
Although both Iraq and Pakistan constitute long-term sources of
concern, today the United States stands as Iran's foremost strategic
challenge. US-Iranian relations have become even more strained in
recent years. Under the auspices of the Bush Doctrine, the United
States has arrogated itself the right to employ preemptive military
intervention as a means of disarming radical states. The massive
projection of American power on all of Iran's frontiers since September
11th has added credence to the Iranian claim of being encircled by the
United States. The conservative newspaper Jumhuri-ye Islami captured
Tehran's dilemma by noting, ``In the contemporary world, it is obvious
that having access to advanced weapons shall cause deterrence and
therefore security, and will neutralize the evil wishes of great powers
to attack other nations and countries.'' In a rare note of agreement,
the leading liberal newspaper, Aftab-e Yazd similarly stressed that,
given the regional exigencies, ``In the future Iran might be thinking
about the military aspects of nuclear energy.''
The remarkable success of Operation Iraqi Freedom in overthrowing
Saddam cannot but have made a formidable impression on Iran's
leadership. The fact remains that Iraq's anticipated chemical weapons
did not deter Washington from military intervention. As an Iranian
official confessed, ``the fact that Saddam was toppled in twenty-one
days is something that should concern all the countries in the
region.'' Conversely, North Korea offers its own lessons and
possibilities. Pyongyang's presumed nuclear capability has not only
obviated a preemptive invasion, but actually generated potential
security and economic benefits. President Bush may loathe Kim Jong Il,
but far from contemplating military action, the United States and its
allies are considering an economic relief package and security
guarantees to dissuade North Korea from its nuclear path. The
contrasting fates of Iraq and North Korea certainly elevate the
significance of nuclear weapons in the Iranian clerical cosmology.
Post September 11th developments in the Middle East have had a
paradoxical impact on the Islamic Republic. Two of Iran's formidable
foes, the Taliban and Saddam Hussein, have been overthrown by the
United States. In the meantime, Iran's American nemesis is entangled in
an Iraqi quagmire, draining its resources and tempering its ambitions.
Nevertheless, the Iranian clerical elite expect a turbulent future,
which accentuates their sense of insecurity. Iran remains in America's
crosshairs, at a time when the US military presence in the region has
never been greater. The influential Iran News emphasized this point in
an editorial stressing, ``Based on Bush's record after 9/11, one can
only conclude that the US has not invaded our two immediate neighbors
to the east and the west just to fight al-Qa'ida. Consequently, astute
political observers warn that Iran is next on the US list of direct
targets.'' Such anxieties enhance the apparent strategic utility of
nuclear weapons to Iran and validate the claim that the Islamic
Republic requires such a capability to ensure both regime survival and
territorial integrity.
As evident, Iran's nuclear calculations and terrorist activities
are distinctly separate. To be sure, any cursory observation reveals
that among Iran's most entrenched positions is its sponsorship of
terrorism. However, much of Iranian terrorist activities today are
limited to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, as the Islamic Republic
remains a generous benefactor of Hezbollah, and to a lesser extent,
Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad. Would Iran be tempted to offer its
nuclear arsenal to such forces as they wage their campaigns against
Israel? Certainly, since the inception of the Islamic Republic, Iran
has defied the laws of international politics by pursuing an irrational
policy toward the peace process that has subordinated its practical
interest to its ideological imperatives. Iran's nuclear weapons program
may have began for reasonable strategic purposes, but would those
calculations be overtaken by ideological factors, leading Iran to
transfer such arms to its terrorist clients?
The answer to these questions requires a better understanding of
the nature of Iranian-Israeli conflict. For a generation of Iranian
clerics, Israel remains an illegitimate state, usurping sacred Islamic
lands and serving as an instrument of American imperial encroachment of
the Middle East. Such an ideological animus has led Iran to offer
substantial monetary and moral support to anti-Israeli terrorist
organizations. But, Iran's regime does not seem inordinately concerned
about Israel's nuclear monopoly, nor does it feel itself necessarily
threatened by Israel's formidable armed forces. Ali Khamenei, Iran's
Supreme Leader, has stipulated Iran's controlled-rage by stressing,
``Palestine issue is not Iran's jihad.'' The alarmist Iranian rhetoric
and the immediacy of the Israeli threat is more an attempt to mobilize
domestic and regional constituencies behind an anti-Israeli policy then
a genuine reflection of concern. For the Islamic Republic, Israel maybe
an ideological affront, but it is not an existential threat mandating
provision of nuclear weapons or offering such arms to its terrorist
clients.
Despite Iran's inflammatory conduct, the fact is that during the
past quarter of a century, it has sought to regulate its low intensity
conflict with Israel and has assiduously avoided direct military
confrontation with Jerusalem. This is a conflict that is largely waged
by proxies in a controlled manner. Such a strategy allows Iran to
brandish its Islamic credentials without necessarily exposing itself to
inordinate danger and does not call for granting nuclear arms to
clients. For example, Iran has not transferred any of its chemical or
biological weapons to terrorist organizations nor its more powerful and
potent missile technology. For Iran, it may be important for these
groups to survive and wage their conflict against Israel, but such
conflict has to take place within distinct redlines. A policy of
restrained hostility best serves Iran's strategic and ideological
purposes.
Moreover, the critical mission for Iran's theocratic oligarchs is
survival of their regime and preservation of Iran's territorial
integrity. As such, transferring nuclear arms to a terrorist client
that may be difficult to restrain or discipline would certainly expose
the regime to an unacceptable degree of Israeli or American
retaliation. Any measure that could potentially threaten the clerical
leaders hold on power will be strongly resisted by Iran's risk-averse
rulers. The mullahs maybe perennially hostile to Israel, but they do
appreciate that should such hostility escape its controlled parameters,
they could find themselves in a confrontation that would indeed
threaten the survival of their regime. So long as Iran's rulers remain
focus on their power, they would recoil from rash measures such as
giving nuclear bombs to third parties, however reliable and long-
standing their relationship with those parties maybe.
It is such calculations that in the aftermath of September 11th
have somewhat even altered the nature of Iran's relationship with
Hezbollah. At a time when the US is waging a global war against
terrorism, Iran is becoming more circumspect and cautious in its
support for Hezbollah. While Iran's sustained support for rejectionist
forces has garnered it much regional acclaim in the past, such conduct
today makes it a possible target for US retaliation. In an ironic twist
of events, Iranian leaders who previously sought to instigate violence
by Hezbollah are increasingly urging it to behave with restraint. The
guardians of the theocracy are beginning to discern that tempering
their approach to the peace process is a policy that Iran may soon find
in its interest.
In sum, the Islamic Republic's search for nuclear weapons stems
from a strategic calculation of seeking deterrence against a range of
actors. This is not a weapon to be brandish as part of an aggressive
diplomacy or granted to Iran's terrorist clients. Nor are Iran's
nuclear motivations necessarily immutable, as more imaginative American
diplomacy can still prevent Iran from crossing the nuclear threshold,
obviating another proliferation crisis in the Middle East.
Mr. Linder. Thank you, Dr. Takeyh.
I will begin the questioning with Mr. Giles.
We believe there is still a remnant A.Q. Khan network out
there. Are there other copycats out there?
Mr. Giles. Mr. Chairman, I would first of all say that the
information I have is based strictly on open sources, but what
I would suspect is that this has been an extremely profitable
black market for those engaged in it. Where we may have rolled
up some of the members, I think that leaves a vacuum that
others motivated by greed or ideology would be willing to fill.
Mr. Linder. Would you anticipate Israel would make a strike
on nuclear facilities in Iran, Dr. Byman?
Mr. Byman. No, it would not. I would say that is certainly
something Israel would consider.
The problem is when you look at the military options, they
are quite poor. The Israeli raid on the Iraqi facility
succeeded in part because it had never been done before. But as
soon as that happened, every country that was pursuing a
clandestine weapons program began to disperse its facilities.
Often they are co-located with civilian facilities. From even
an American military point of view, a military attack is
extremely difficult.
So, knowing the political and diplomatic consequences, I am
not sure the Israelis believe it would succeed.
Mr. Linder. Dr. Takeyh, you seem to think that the Iranian
rulers are much like American political parties: just trying to
keep their power. Would you anticipate that North Korea would
have the same response?
Mr. Takeyh. I am not actually a North Korea expert, but I
do tend to believe that all these states that engage in
terrorism and engage in proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction, they do tend to base their calculation on some
from their perspective relatively judicious security
calculations.
For the Iranian regime--and I suspect that may actually
have some sort of an impact on the North Korean regime--these
are essentially weapons of deterrence, deterrence against an
entire range of threats, perceived threats even, whether it is
the American threat, whether it is the potential Pakistani
threat, which is felt rather acutely in Iran.
Mr. Linder. Excuse me. You don't think Iran would make an
offensive effort against Israel if they had the power to do so?
Mr. Takeyh. The argument that you can make is perhaps
Iran's engagement with terrorism would be more intensified
because they perceive certain immunities because of the
acquisition of nuclear deterrence. But I do not believe that
you will begin to see an escalation or intensification of
Iran's participation in anti-peace process affairs.
Mr. Linder. Dr. Byman, you indicated that Iran has not
transferred any of its WMD to any other terrorist groups, or I
think you said any of its conventional armaments. But wasn't it
an Iranian ship that was captured going to the Palestinian
Authority?
Mr. Byman. I am sorry; I should have clarified that. What I
meant to say is the most sophisticated conventional armaments
it has, such as missile systems. My judgment would be we would
see Iran, if it were trying to escalate, transferring its most
sophisticated weapons before it transferred things like
unconventional weapons.
So it has provided a wide, wide range of small arms to
numerous terrorist groups, but it has not provided its most
advanced systems to them.
Mr. Linder. You talked about the number of nukes in
Pakistan. Can you quantify that?
Mr. Byman. This is based on unclassified sources. My
understanding is that it is actually in the dozens, but there
are some questions in terms of both not only the number, but
the capabilities.
The Pakistani nuclear tests were successful, but the
weapons that were exploded were actually relatively small. It
is unclear whether that is because they did not have enough
fissile material, or because there was no point in doing a
large explosion. The whole point was simply to demonstrate. I
do not know the rest of that information.
Mr. Linder. The instructions in A.Q. Khan network have been
passed around everywhere. Would it still take the
sophistication of a nation-state to be able to build on those
instructions?
Mr. Byman. To build on those instructions, yes. The
infrastructure required for a nuclear program is considerable,
but there are a couple of other options.
Mr. Linder. Is that the enrichment process?
Mr. Byman. Is it partly the enrichment process; it is part
the delivery process. From blackboard to delivery, there are a
number of steps that are quite extensive. However, you can buy
a bomb off the shelf, in theory.
Also, there is the problem of radiological material which
is actually not terribly lethal in most cases, but
psychologically could be quite effective.
Mr. Linder. Thank you.
Mr. Langevin?
Mr. Langevin. Thank you.
Dr. Byman, I would just like to probe you on a few of your
points, if I could for just a minute.
You said that Iran has not shown a propensity to transfer
WMD technology, either overtly or covertly. But isn't it true,
though, that the United States in many ways is the only thing
that stands between them and a stated goal of theirs to spread
radical Islam around the world?
Simply transferring other types of WMD such as chemical
weapons would not necessarily achieve the result that a
detonation of a nuclear device would achieve if, for example, a
device were detonated in Washington and they felt that they
could decapitate the United States government. It would clearly
be a very different situation than just transferring chemical
weapons.
Can you talk about that a little bit?
I do not know that I buy into the argument that just
because they have not transferred other types of WMD that they
would not covertly, especially if they felt they could get away
with it covertly, that they would not consider transferring WMD
technology with respect to nuclear weapons.
And also, just one other thing on that point. You also
spoke about Pakistan. I agree that we should be concerned about
Pakistan of the A.Q. Khan network and the instability that
potentially exists in Pakistan. But you mentioned that
dedicated Islamic extremists exist within Pakistan.
Wouldn't you also say that dedicated Islamic extremists
also are present to a great extent in Iran as well, and that we
could very easily see a duplication of an A.Q. Khan-type emerge
from Iran if they were to develop nuclear weapons?
So just on those two points, if you could elaborate.
Mr. Byman. I would be happy to.
As odd as it sounds, Iran's efforts to spread the
revolution have declined precipitously in the last 25 years. If
we were having this hearing 20 years ago, we would be talking
about Iranian active activities in Europe, the Persian Gulf,
Latin America, Asia. Today, as Dr. Takeyh pointed out, Iran's
support for terrorism is primarily concentrated against Israel.
However, your point about the decapitation strike on the
United States is an interesting one because Iran, of course,
has tremendous enmity toward the United States. However, Iran
is intensely aware, and Iranian leaders have discussed this, of
their military inferiority toward the United States. They
believe the United States is waiting to pounce on Iran.
I believe quite strongly that, were there to be any nuclear
attack on the United States, the consequences for U.S. foreign
policy, the United States would immediately be at war with any
of the suspects. I do not think that we would be deliberating
for months trying to figure out exactly who was responsible,
but anyone who might vaguely be on the list would quickly be
under attack.
The Iranians have looked at our response to September 11,
where we overthrew two governments and that was in response to
a tragic and horrible attack, but it killed 3,000 people--
something far less than a nuclear attack. I believe they know
that the Islamic Republic would be no more if they did such an
attack, even if we could not have the evidence that would hold
up in a court of law.
Your point about Pakistan, certainly by any definition Iran
has many Islamic extremists. What is a distinction I would like
to draw is between the Sunni jihadists who have shown
themselves committed to complete annihilation and violence in
many cases and who have demonstrated that they actively seek
weapons of mass destruction--they have had programs. They have
made statements saying it is a duty. The Shia radicals in Iran
have been far more cautious in recent years and have not had
the same degree of the desire to kill in large numbers that we
have seen from the jihadists. That is why I am so concerned
about Pakistan, sir.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you.
And to your point, you would agree that the potential
exists for an A.Q. Khan-type to emerge from Iran if they were
to develop nuclear weapons. There are dedicated Islamic
extremists in Iran, just as there are in Pakistan.
I agree that Pakistan is a problem and a concern, but could
you elaborate a little more on what your concern would be in
Iran?
Mr. Byman. I am concerned about any country's control of
its nuclear material. The ones on the head of the list would be
Pakistan and Russia at the moment. Were Iran to go nuclear, I
would also be concerned about control over its nuclear program.
I would add, I think there has been useful fiction on A.Q.
Khan, which is that this was done wholly without the knowledge
of the Pakistani government. Given the sheer number of people
involved, given the rank of the individuals involved, given the
activities involved, it is shocking to me that the Pakistani
government could not be largely aware of at least some
activities.
To me, to make clear in the future to every government
around the world that we will hold them accountable for the
activities of their citizens, and the excuse that they simply
did not know, that is not acceptable to the United States,
especially for something like an illicit nuclear arms network.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you.
I see my time has expired, so I thank you for your
testimony, and I yield back.
Mr. Linder. The gentleman from Washington state is
recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Dicks. Do we have any evidence of any states providing
any weapons of mass destruction assistance to any terrorist
groups?
Mr. Byman. To my knowledge, there has been no deliberate
transfer of chemical, biological and nuclear or radiological
material to a terrorist group.
We know that the Taliban was openly tolerating al-Qa'ida
when it was openly seeking this in Afghanistan. The Taliban, of
course, was too poor and primitive to provide electricity, so I
think WMD programs are unlike there, but that is the closest.
Also, the government of Sudan was involved in some murky
activities, the details of which I have never been able to
uncover, at a time when al-Qa'ida was present there and quite
active there.
Mr. Dicks. What are the steps that any of you would suggest
we take to ensure that states are not tempted to supply
terrorists with weapons of mass destruction or their
components?
Mr. Takeyh. On the specific issue of Iran, as I mention in
my testimony, I do not believe there is anything inevitable or
necessary about Iran becoming the next member of the nuclear
club. I think, should Iran achieve that weaponry, it is a
failure of American and international diplomacy.
So one way of preventing Iran from actually transferring
such weapons or having this decentralized government being
tempted into such activities for ideological, political or
strategic reasons, is actually trying to foster a situation
where Iran does not cross the nuclear threshold.
I think we are increasingly, in a disturbing way, beginning
to move away from the idea of prevention to management, namely
preventing Iran from achieving a nuclear status, as opposed to
managing it. I am not quite sure we need to be at that level
yet.
There is still much the United States and the European
allies and the international community can do to obstruct
Iran's drive toward nuclear weapons or a nuclear energy or
nuclear capability period. I think that is what most of the
diplomatic efforts should try to focus on.
Mr. Dicks. What is the basis of the negotiations between
the Europeans and Iran?
Mr. Takeyh. It might take place under three specific
baskets.
The first basket has to do with economic and trade
cooperation between Iran and the European states and expansion
of those commercial relationships should Iran restrain its
program.
The second basket has to do with security concerns, namely
that the Europeans are trying to enhance Iran's security and
therefore to lessen its motivation for nuclear arms.
The final category is technology transfers, namely the
Iranian claim that they have a right to peaceful use of nuclear
technology and the European acceptance of the fact that should
Iran cease its own indigenous activities they could be
receiving some degree of nuclear cooperation from the
international community.
Mr. Dicks. What are the prospects for these negotiations
between Iran and the Europeans?
Mr. Takeyh. If you look at those three specific baskets,
you begin to see that at least two of those, all three of
those, it is impossible for these negotiations to succeed
without some degree of American participation.
On the issue of trade and cooperation, one of the principal
obstacles, certainly not the only one, but one of the obstacles
to greater Iranian integration into the international economy
is American resistance, sanctions policy and so on. So the
technology and cooperation basket that the Europeans are
negotiating is unlikely to succeed without the American
prohibitions being on the table.
The security basket, I mean, what sort of security
assurances are Germany and France going to give to Iran at a
time when Iran is surrounded by a substantial amount of
American forces? So that basket, in and of itself, is of
limited utility.
Finally, transfer of nuclear technology: It is
inconceivable to me that the Europeans will transfer such
transfer such technology to Iran so long as Iran continues to
have its problems with the IAEA in terms of the ambiguity of
its nuclear program, and so long as the United States finds
that particular practice legitimately objectionable.
So these negotiations are taking place and moving forward
because everyone is interested in the process and not everyone
is sanguine about the prospects of actually the E.U.-three
resolving those very critical matters.
Mr. Dicks. Why has the United States taken the position--
what is the administration's policy here?
Mr. Takeyh. As far as I can decipher it, the United States
policy at this particular point is that it refuses to engage in
negotiations in a more direct manner with the Iranian regime
because it does not want to legitimize that regime.
To me, a regime's legitimacy comes from its own internal
democratic processes. By that definition, the Islamic Republic
is an legitimate regime. It is not for the president of the
United States to ascribe that legitimacy to a government that
does not enjoy the approbation of its citizenry, and the
president of the United States cannot revoke that legitimacy
either.
So the legitimacy argument is a curious one.
Mr. Dicks. You think it would be better for the United
States to engage in these talks, right?
Mr. Takeyh. I think it is getting late, because
increasingly we have a government in Iran that may not
necessarily be interested in negotiations. So it is late but
may not necessarily be too late.
But the time certainly is passing us by. A more robust
American diplomacy 2 years ago or 3 years ago would have been
more advisable. But at this particular stage in time, I think
we are getting to a point where diplomacy--there might not be a
deal out there, Congressman.
Mr. Dicks. Yes.
Mr. Chairman, could I have another minute?
Mr. Linder. We will have another round. We will just go
another round.
Mr. Dicks. We will just go another round. That is perfect.
Thank you.
Mr. Linder. Are you saying the train has left the station?
Mr. Takeyh. All the passengers are on board. The conductor
is in there. The train is fully fueled and stocked. It is not
leaving the station, but if I am approaching the platform, I am
saying to myself, ``This train is about to leave the station.''
Mr. Linder. Can any of you tell me if there are any
internal political divisions in Iran?
Mr. Giles?
Mr. Giles. On the nuclear program in particular, I think
what is interesting is to take the historical perspective.
This program has been conducted in secret for the better
part of two decades. You have seen basically three different
factions ruling Iran during that time. You had the presidency
of Ayatollah Khamenei, who is the current supreme leader. You
had the presidency of Rafsanjani, and you had most recently the
presidency of President Khatami, each representing a different
spectrum within Iranian politics, and yet that program has
proceeded all along.
I think you can conclude from that, and in addition to
their public statements, that there is widespread political
support and investment in bringing that nuclear program to
fruition.
Mr. Linder. Dr. Byman, a recent State Department report
concluded that Iran has an offensive biological weapons
program. Can you comment on that? Would they be inclined to
share it with terrorists?
Mr. Byman. I think it would be even less likely that Iran
would share a biological weapons program than a chemical
weapons program. So my judgment is that it is unlikely they
would share it with terrorists.
Nevertheless, this program is of grave concern for a number
of reasons. I mentioned before the apparatus needed to run a
nuclear program and how it is quite considerable. That is not
true for a biological program. It is much harder to detect from
the outside. It is much harder to target from the outside.
Biological programs are of concern from a military point of
view. They are also of grave concern because their effects
simply are not known anymore. We fortunately had a world where
these programs have not been used for many years. Much of what
can be done with modern medicine, modern biochemistry is
unclear at this point. I am horrified that some day we will
find out.
Mr. Linder. At a meeting in the back of this very room some
months ago with some Swedish scientists, I was informed that
some Iranian families had emigrated from Iran to Sweden. All
the children had been vaccinated for smallpox.
Why would they do that? We haven't vaccinated anyone in
this country since 1980. Any comments, anybody?
Mr. Takeyh. I do know that is a large and growing Iranian
community in the entire of Scandinavia, but I just do not have
any informed judgment on that issue.
Mr. Linder. Any comments?
Mr. Byman. To my knowledge, the State Department report was
not referring to smallpox as one of the biological weapons.
Mr. Linder. That is correct, but I was just curious about
vaccinating children for smallpox.
Mr. Byman. This gets into the issue that Mr. Giles knows so
well, which is the risk of the attack versus the other
consequences, which every doctor I talk to revolts when I say,
``Should we vaccinate against smallpox?'' I have discussed it
with my own doctor with my own children for this very reason.
Their response is the small percentage of individuals who have
a negative reaction to the vaccination will be far more
suffering than the likelihood of an attack.
We have seen no serious smallpox program, to my knowledge,
outside of a very limited handful of countries. But this, to
me, should be one of the overwhelming intelligence priorities,
because if we see the spreading, the answer may be that
vaccination is necessary.
Mr. Linder. It has been pointed out that the technical
assistance in terms of weaponry provided by Iran to Hezbollah
has been limited, but in the past several months it has been
reported that more sophisticated shaped charged that are
effective against armored vehicles, including tanks, have
appeared in Iraq linked to Hezbollah.
Doesn't this suggest a higher level of technological
assistance?
Mr. Byman. Hezbollah is quite good a guerrilla warfare and
the tactics involved in guerilla warfare. It has spent 18 years
attacking the Israelis and eventually removing them from
Lebanon in part by getting better and better with Iranian help;
in part by getting better and better on its own. It has a very
formidable guerrilla cadre.
The shaped charge is something that is technically a little
difficult, but for a large guerrilla army to do, and having, as
Hezbollah does, effectively a safe haven in Lebanon from which
to operate, it is not a dramatic change. This is more a way of
using existing technologies in more effective means. It is
deadly, and that is part of the issue with WMD.
I would say that a shaped charge is actually far more
deadly in most cases than a chemical weapons attack. Therefore,
these groups, for their own purposes, do not need
unconventional systems.
Mr. Linder. Thank you.
Mr. Langevin?
Mr. Langevin. Thank you.
Dr. Takeyh, if I could just ask a few questions on your
testimony.
If I understood you right, you stated that Iran is not very
concerned or feel threatened by Israel's nuclear capabilities,
nor are they threatened by their overwhelming military
superiority.
If I understood you correctly in those two statements, then
why develop a nuclear weapons program? What do they need it
for?
Mr. Takeyh. If you look at the totality of what Iranian
leaders have said about their nuclear program since the mid-
1990s, if you kind of examine that, what struck me as rather
curious was that Israel was never invoked in those discussions,
or it was invoked I think with few exceptions.
What derives from those commentaries, sermons, media
reporting, speeches, the impression that one gets is that they
seek such weaponry for, as I said, for deterrence against a
variety of threats or perceived threats.
For a long time, it was the potential resurrection of Iraq
and the impact of the Iran-Iraq war on Iranian calculations and
defense procurement policies is just remarkable, namely that
they felt they had to develop an independent deterrent and
retaliation capability in the realm of weapons of mass
destruction. Eventually that started out with chemical weapons,
and escalated into nuclear arms.
In more recent times, there are a range of actors that have
motivated Iran's unconventional aspirations: the United States,
the strained relationship between these two countries that has
become much more strained recently; the potential collapse of
Pakistan to a radical Sunni regime with pronounced hostilities
to Iran, this sort of a Talibization of Pakistan. That is an
important security concern.
Beyond that, the unpredictable nature of the Iraqi state,
what type of Iraq will emerge; will there be a Iraq with a
close alliance with the United States; will there be an Iraq
that will house American forces; will there be an Iraq that
will act as an adjunct of American power in the Persian Gulf.
Would Iran need to hedge against a potential resurrection of a
close Iraqi-American alliance in the Gulf by possession of such
weapons?
If you want to do down the threats, potentially Israel is
there, but it is not in my view the foremost motivator of
Iran's nuclear aspirations today. That may change. When we talk
about the nuclear program, we have to talk about it as a
dynamic and fluid proposition. It is not static. The list of
motivations do change over time. Should there be a more active
military confrontation between Israel and Iran, maybe Iranians
will feel that they need the possession of this strategic
weapon for deterrence of a now-escalated Israeli-Iranian
hostility.
For the past 25 years, the two states, Iran and Israel,
have largely limited their conflict and have both worked hard
to prevent that conflict from escalating into a direct military
confrontation. Should that change, then I suspect Iran's
strategic calculus will alter as well. But we have to look at
this program both in terms of its technological aspects and
both in terms of the motivations as a changing, fluid picture
that alters from time to time.
Mr. Langevin. You mentioned that you think that diplomacy
is still possible, but isn't a very likely reason why they are
developing nuclear weapons is, in a sense, Islamic pride, and
that it is not only a threat issue, but they see it as a
obligation of Islam to develop nuclear weapons. I believe it
was Iran who said that they have the obligation within the next
10 years to develop nuclear weapons.
Mr. Takeyh. I think if you kind of look at this program,
you have to differentiate between, at least in Iranian
rhetoric, between the nuclear program as sort of a means of
modernization of the economy, and the nuclear weapons program.
They try to draw those delineations I think in a rather
unconvincing way.
In today's Iran, I actually do not believe that the
phenomena that we saw in Pakistan and India has happened,
namely the nuclear program merges with the sense of national
identity and national prestige. This is largely an elite-driven
program, not one that the Iranian population has embraced.
For the Iranian population, the nuclear program is the
regime's program. It is not a national program. It is the
government's program. And to gap between the regime and the
society, between the rulers and the ruled, is still wide. The
Iranians are so alienated from the regime that they are
unwilling to embrace it even when it is on the process of a
seeming international confrontation.
Again, we have to look at this program as a dynamic one.
That may change. Maybe the nuclear program will become embraced
by the population as it develops and it crosses successive
technological demarcations.
But the sort of embrace of the nuclear program that you saw
in Pakistan and you saw in India, that has not happened as of
yet in Iran. If you ask an Iranian, do you think your country
should have nuclear weapons? He says, oh yes. If you ask him
the second question, do you think it should have nuclear
weapons if it provokes international multilateral sanctions,
then you get a different sort of an answer.
Again, as I said, this is a changing landscape. So that is
why the sooner there can be some sort of an agreement to
suspend this program on a more permanent basis, the sooner we
can avoid a great deal of problems down the road.
Mr. Linder. The time of the gentleman has expired.
Mr. Dicks?
Mr. Dicks. What do you think the United States should do
about this situation with Pakistan? It appears to me, as you
testimony clearly demonstrates, that Pakistan has more serious
problems in terms of stability and a much more advanced
program, and clearly has nuclear weapons. Should we be
reassessing our position regarding Pakistan?
Mr. Byman. Sir, I will give you my opinion.
To me, the Bush administration's policy of embracing the
Musharaff regime is a correct one in general, but I think it
has been a bit too enthusiastic.
There are few good alternatives in Pakistan. I cannot sit
here and tell you that there is a great alternative that no one
is doing. All the choices are bad. But the problem is that our
embrace has weakened many of the sources of opposition to
Musharaff that are not Islamist. Musharaff has forged a deal
with some of the Islamists in the country. As a result, much of
the more secular opposition, much of the more traditional
opposition has become very weak.
We need to hedge our bets a bit. Although it is important
to maintain ties to this regime in the important day-to-day
efforts we have against terrorism, we need to be able to reach
out to others. That is, first of all, in case there is a shift
in regime, but it is also a way of gaining leverage over the
Musharaff regime. So he right now believes that we need him
more than he needs us. That limits our influence. For me,
having as many points of influence in the country is vital.
Mr. Dicks. Does he have control over the entire situation
in his country? There has been some discussion that maybe there
are elements within his society, maybe the intelligence arena
in one particular area, where he may not have complete control;
that they may be operating independently of the government and
causing difficulties. Do you think that is an accurate
assessment, or is that a possible problem?
Mr. Byman. I think that is an accurate assessment. I would
say several things about that.
The regime exercises control in most of the urban areas,
but it does not exercise control in all the countryside. It
relies heavily on local groups, some of which are loyal to the
regime; some of which work with it on a fitful basis.
In terms of the military and intelligence, the senior
officials are loyal to the regime, but they do not always have
control over their forces all the way down. So you may have the
border guard commander who actually wants to try to help stop
Taliban from going back and forth, but the local border
patrolman is sympathetic to the Taliban and lets them go back
and forth.
As the more junior officers become promoted, many of them
have Islamist sympathies. I am concerned that over time we are
going to see a regime that is not al-Qa'ida, is not jihadist,
but is much more sympathetic to some of their objectives.
A particular concern I have is much of the effort Pakistan
is waging against India and Kashmir involves using jihadist
groups as proxies. These jihadist groups overlap in terms of
training, recruitment, arms, passports, with groups linked to
al-Qa'ida. It is impossible for Pakistan to say it is fighting
al-Qa'ida as hard as it can, but not be dismantling the
apparatus it uses to wage war in Kashmir.
Mr. Dicks. It is true that some of the people who are
involved in the recent bombings in London had been trained or
spent time or whatever in Pakistan. Isn't that correct?
Mr. Byman. They spent time in Pakistan. What they were
doing there at this point, we do not know, or at least I do not
know, I should say. But that is, to me, one of the areas to
watch. There are camps in Pakistan where people will go for
training and the training is generic. It is meant in part to
help in Kashmir, but if you learn to build a bomb in Kashmir,
the bomb also works in London.
Mr. Dicks. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Linder. Mr. Langevin has another question.
Mr. Langevin. Just briefly, if I could--and thank you for
the extra time, Mr. Chairman.
According to the latest intelligence estimates, Iran is
approximately 10 years away from developing a nuclear weapon.
There are others who have said that the time is probably
sooner. I do not know if any of you have read my colleague's
book, Mr. Curt Weldon, ``Countdown to Terror.'' He would
suggest that the time is much shorter.
Would you care to speculate?
Mr. Takeyh. There is another study that came out from the
International Institute of Strategic Studies which I think
suggests 5 years.
But much of this depends on what type of a program it is.
Is it a crash program? Is it an accelerated program? Is the
country going to devote its resources to development of a
nuclear weapon with the singular focus that Pakistan did, or is
it going to move along on its current procurement and funding
practices? So I think it is difficult to gauge that particular
timeline.
The current efforts that Iran is making and with its
continued reliance on international technology to some extent,
then we could see that being problematic. But I would actually
suggest that the time that Iran develops nuclear weapons is not
as significant as the point that they crossed the decision, the
sort of point of no return where all political forces are
determined to actually construct the bomb.
That, to me, is a more difficult timeframe to gauge than
the technological aspect of it because if that happens, if the
regime makes a fundamental determination to utilize all
national resources behind a crash program to develop a nuclear
bomb and a delivery system, then I think that timeframe is
going to lessen dramatically.
Mr. Langevin. What data do you have to support, though,
that suggested that they have not already made that political
decision? It would seem to me, all indications now, especially
the fact that the program has been conducted in secret, that
they have already made that political decision.
In addition to the fact that the material that they are
reprocessing right now, they are attempting to make weapons-
grade uranium. It could very easily lead to the creation of a
nuclear device. In fact, you mentioned in your testimony that
the Europeans are unlikely to help transfer nuclear weapons
technology, given the context.
Mr. Takeyh. Well, nuclear technology, yes.
Mr. Langevin. Nuclear weapons-type technology. But if they
were developing weapons-grade uranium, they could simply make a
gun-type device and they do not quite frankly need European
technology.
Mr. Takeyh. Here is where we get into a difficult position.
Much of the technology that you require to build a civilian
nuclear program is quite similar to the technology that you
require to build weapons. There is a break-off point at some
point.
But at this particular point, the latest IAEA report
indicates that there is no evidence that international
inspectors have uncovered that Iran has transferred its nuclear
technology from military purposes. The activities that are
taking place right now in Isfahan, I believe you mentioned,
actually take place under the auspices of the inspection and
the inspection process.
What the Iranians are suggesting they are doing is
developing indigenous uranium enrichment capability, but not at
the weapons-grade, but for actually peaceful uses. That is the
problem with the ambiguity of technology, because enrichment up
to a certain level is suitable for energy purposes. Beyond a
certain level, then you can have a weapons capability. This is
why the development of Iranian nuclear infrastructure is
worrying.
I think the critical timeframe at this particular point, we
still believe that Iran requires external assistance for
completion of this nuclear program. But increasingly, it will
get to a point which you are suggesting, namely it will have
indigenous technological capability to complete the program
without any sort of a reliance on external actors.
I do not believe it is there yet in terms of the completion
of the centrifuge machines, which they still require technology
from abroad. They could get it from the black market. They used
to get it from A.Q. Khan network and others. But it is still a
program that as far as we know is still to a certain extent
reliant on external assistance, whether it is from black
markets in Russia or elsewhere.
But that may change. Again, that is going to change over
time.
Mr. Langevin. What data are you using to support the
conclusion that they have not yet made the political decision
to cross that red line yet?
Mr. Takeyh. I just haven't seen any evidence that suggests
it. I would say, based upon my examination, that the Iranian
regime is committed to development of a sophisticated nuclear
program that may give them the opportunity to weaponize that
program should that situation be reached. In a faction-driven
Iranian system, I think that is as far as you can go.
I think they have delayed the decision to actually cross
the threshold, but they are doing everything they can to build
the technological capability that allows them to make that
decision at some point in the future.
Mr. Langevin. In timeframe, gentlemen, do you agree that 5
years or 10 years?
Mr. Giles. Congressman, I have been following the public
side of this issue for some time. I will just say that these
estimates are very fungible and they have changed over the
years. Estimates from the Israelis have said they would be
there by now. They go up and down. The IAEA had its own
estimate. It seemed to fall around the 5-year range.
The latest swing is that they are now pushing the estimates
out, according to the press, our own intelligence estimate. The
Israelis have fallen in line with those for the most part. It
is consistent with the IASS.
I am just concerned that you are seeing conventional wisdom
maybe shifting too far in the other direction. There are people
who have noted that we are talking about technology from the
1940s, essentially, in trying to fabricate a weapon. So it
depends on your assumptions whether or the Iranians have a
secret military program in addition to the civilian program.
So I am generally skeptical about all of the estimates that
I have seen discussed publicly.
Mr. Linder. Thank you all. Thank you gentlemen for giving
us a couple of hours of your time. I am sorry we were so late
getting started. We are grateful for your time. Thanks.
[Whereupon, at 1:06 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]