[House Hearing, 109 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
A NEW ASSESSMENT OF IRAQ
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY,
EMERGING THREATS, AND INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS
of the
COMMITTEE ON
GOVERNMENT REFORM
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
APRIL 25, 2006
__________
Serial No. 109-200
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Government Reform
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/
index.html
http://www.house.gov/reform
______
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
30-897 WASHINGTON : 2006
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COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM
TOM DAVIS, Virginia, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut HENRY A. WAXMAN, California
DAN BURTON, Indiana TOM LANTOS, California
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida MAJOR R. OWENS, New York
JOHN M. McHUGH, New York EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York
JOHN L. MICA, Florida PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania
GIL GUTKNECHT, Minnesota CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York
MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland
STEVEN C. LaTOURETTE, Ohio DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio
TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois
CHRIS CANNON, Utah WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri
JOHN J. DUNCAN, Jr., Tennessee DIANE E. WATSON, California
CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts
MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland
DARRELL E. ISSA, California LINDA T. SANCHEZ, California
JON C. PORTER, Nevada C.A. DUTCH RUPPERSBERGER, Maryland
KENNY MARCHANT, Texas BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
LYNN A. WESTMORELAND, Georgia ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of
PATRICK T. McHENRY, North Carolina Columbia
CHARLES W. DENT, Pennsylvania ------
VIRGINIA FOXX, North Carolina BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont
JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio (Independent)
------ ------
David Marin, Staff Director
Lawrence Halloran, Deputy Staff Director
Teresa Austin, Chief Clerk
Phil Barnett, Minority Chief of Staff/Chief Counsel
Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and International
Relations
CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut, Chairman
KENNY MARCHANT, Texas DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio
DAN BURTON, Indiana TOM LANTOS, California
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont
JOHN M. McHUGH, New York CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York
STEVEN C. LaTOURETTE, Ohio CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland
TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania LINDA T. SANCHEZ, California
JOHN J. DUNCAN, Jr., Tennessee C.A. DUTCH RUPPERSBERGER, Maryland
MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts
JON C. PORTER, Nevada BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
CHARLES W. DENT, Pennsylvania
Ex Officio
TOM DAVIS, Virginia HENRY A. WAXMAN, California
R. Nicholas Palarino, Ph.D., Staff Director
Robert A. Briggs, Clerk
Andrew Su, Minority Professional Staff Member
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Hearing held on April 25, 2006................................... 1
Statement of:
Walker, David M., Comptroller General, U.S. Government
Accountability Office, accompanied by Joseph Christoff..... 31
Letters, statements, etc., submitted for the record by:
Shays, Hon. Christopher, a Representative in Congress from
the State of Connecticut, prepared statement of............ 3
Walker, David M., Comptroller General, U.S. Government
Accountability Office:
Information concerning Iraq contracting.................. 92
Prepared statement of.................................... 34
Waxman, Hon. Henry A., a Representative in Congress from the
State of California:
Minority staff report.................................... 7
New York Times article................................... 23
A NEW ASSESSMENT OF IRAQ
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TUESDAY, APRIL 25, 2006
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging
Threats, and International Relations,
Committee on Government Reform,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:02 a.m., in
room 2154, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Christopher
Shays (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Present: Representatives Shays, Waxman, Van Hollen, and
Ruppersberger.
Staff present: J. Vincent Chase, chief investigator; R.
Nicholas Palarino, Ph.D., staff director; Robert A. Briggs,
analyst; Marc LaRoche, intern; Phil Barnett, minority staff
director/chief counsel; Karen Lightfoot, minority
communications director/senior policy advisor; Jeff Baran,
minority counsel; David Rapallo, minority chief investigative
counsel; Andrew Su, minority professional staff member; Earley
Green, minority chief clerk; and Jean Gosa, minority assistant
clerk.
Mr. Shays. The quorum being present, the Subcommittee on
National Security, Emerging Threats, and International
Relations hearing entitled, ``A New Assessment of Iraq,'' is
called to order.
The selection of a prime minister offers hope Iraq will
continue on the path toward a representative government,
diminished violence and economic growth. But for the
foreseeable future, Iraq will require continued support. And
because we overthrew the former Iraqi regime, the majority of
that support must come from the American people.
As we look to the future, it is essential we ask ourselves
the right questions. We have been asking, when do we pull our
troops out of Iraq? This is the wrong question. We should be
asking, what can we do to help the Iraqis succeed? And we
should be clear what we mean by success.
To help answer the question of how to succeed, we require
objective on-the-ground assessments. We cannot afford to be
mislead by rosy assessments painted by some, nor apocalyptic
assessments by others.
In this regard, I call attention to a bipartisan group
formed at the urging of Congressman Frank Wolf of Virginia,
myself and others, the Iraqi Study Group. This group is charged
with conducting a fresh-eyes assessment of the current and
prospective situation in Iraq, and is cochaired by former
Secretary of State James Baker and former Congressman Lee
Hamilton. We look forward to this bipartisan group's findings
and recommendations.
Today we are here to receive testimony from David Walker,
Comptroller General of the Government Accountability Office.
Mr. Walker and his audit teams have recently returned from
Iraq. The GAO's examination identifies mistakes, progress and,
most importantly, future challenges we face. His testimony can
help us better understand how to empower Iraqis so they may
have security, representative government and economic
prosperity.
I recently returned from my twelfth trip to Iraq. While
there, we also visited three countries in the region, the
United Arab Emirates, Jordan, and Israel. Their leaders
provided us with one overriding message: We must not fail in
Iraq, and the United States should not withdraw from Iraq
prematurely.
I am convinced premature withdrawal of our military will
guarantee failure. I believe we must replace our withdrawal
mindset with a mindset that appreciates what our military,
State Department and others have accomplished in Iraq and the
sacrifices made by the people of Iraq to grasp hold of
democracy and live a better life.
I agree with Comptroller David Walker and his team when
they say, ``the war in Iraq will not be won by the military
alone, that Iraq's future requires strong Iraqi leadership,
sustained U.S. commitment and a reenergized international
community.''
I think we get the first point; are wrestling with the
second, sustained U.S. commitment; and are not doing enough on
the third, to reengage the international community.
As always, we thank the GAO for its absolutely invaluable
oversight and look forward to the Comptroller General's
testimony this morning.
At this time, the Chair would recognize Mr. Waxman.
[The prepared statement of Hon. Christopher Shays follows:]
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Mr. Waxman. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for calling
this important hearing.
In March 2005, the Bush administration took the United
States to war against Iraq. Today, more than 3 years later,
Iraq is actually worse off in key reconstruction sectors than
before we arrived, and the Bush administration is nowhere near
feeling the rosy promises it made before the war.
In October, I released a report, the Bush Administration
Record, The Reconstruction of Iraq. This report compared the
administration's rhetoric with the reality on the ground, and
it found that the administration had failed to deliver on its
promises in three of the most important reconstruction efforts:
oil, electricity and water.
I would like to make this report part of the record for
today's hearings, Mr. Chairman.
[The information referred to follows:]
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Mr. Shays. Without objection, so ordered.
Mr. Waxman. The report found that, in the oil sector, the
administration promised to restore Iraq to pre-war oil
production levels. This was important so Iraq could ``finance
its own reconstruction,'' but today, Iraq's oil production and
export levels are still well below the pre-war levels. We spent
over $2 billion, and the situation is worse than before we
started.
In the electricity sector, the administration promised to
increase Iraq's peak electricity output to 6,000 megawatts.
After spending more than $4 billion, peak output in October was
4,600 megawatts. Today, it has dropped to 4,100 megawatts,
which is below pre-war levels. In fact, embassy officials in
Baghdad told our staffs we'll never meet demand.
In the water sector, the administration promised that 90
percent of Iraqis would have access to clean, drinkable water,
but despite spending over $1 billion, we're nowhere near this
goal. Before the war, 50 percent of Iraqis had access to
drinkable water. By late 2005, only 32 percent did.
The special inspector general for Iraq reconstruction,
Stuart Bowen, confirmed these findings. In testimony before
this subcommittee, he concluded that there is a great chasm
between what the administration has promised and what it has
delivered. Mr. Bowen called this the reconstruction gap. In
January, Mr. Bowen's office issued its own report concluding
that reconstruction efforts in these three key sectors of the
Iraqi economy are failing.
And these aren't the only areas in which progress has been
poor. A Washington Post article just this month described how
the Parsons Company will complete only 20 health centers out of
a planned 142. Despite spending $200 million over 2 years, this
reconstruction project will suffer an 86 percent shortfall,
which is really just shocking.
This morning, in the New York Times, in their lead story on
the left-hand side, Rebuilding of Iraq Oil Pipeline As Disaster
Waiting to Happen, this front-page article described
Halliburton's atrocious work and the Bush administration's
atrocious oversight on a key project to build oil pipelines
under the Tigris River at a crossing called Al Fatah. The
article describes how Halliburton was specifically and
repeatedly warned by geologists and other experts that its
approach was flawed and wouldn't work, but the company ignored
these warnings, pushing forward with the project and wasting
over $75 million.
The article, which I would also like to have included in
the record, is astounding. Halliburton received a $100,000 a
day just for waiting around and doing nothing. Halliburton cut
a deal with a subcontractor that required them to drill holes,
not to actually succeed, but to drill holes. In essence, the
taxpayer was paying Halliburton to drill holes to nowhere, but
Halliburton still received its percentage of profits on the
deal.
We know that large government contractors like Halliburton
have repeatedly overcharged the taxpayers. Auditors and the
Defense Contract Audit Agency have identified over $1.4 billion
in unreasonable and unsupported charges by Halliburton in Iraq.
$1.4 billion. Yet, the Defense Department keeps awarding
Halliburton millions in reimbursements, profits and bonuses
that the auditors recommended against paying.
The problem is that the administration's management of the
reconstruction has been fundamentally incompetent. Billion
dollar contracts were awarded with little or no competition to
favored contractors. Competition for discrete projects was
suppressed by dividing the country into a handful of thiefdoms.
The administration shipped nearly $12 billion in cash to
Iraq but disbursed it with virtually no financial controls.
U.S. Government officials, contractors and subcontractors have
been charged with kickback and bribery schemes, and dozens of
additional criminal corruption cases are now being processed.
Against this backdrop, the Bush administration continues to
ignore reality.
Vice President Cheney says that the insurgency is in its
last throes and that progress on Iraq reconstruction has been
superb. And in a major speech in December, President Bush
claimed there had been quiet, steady progress in Iraq. Either
the President and the Vice President are remarkably out of
touch, or they are not leveling with the American people.
Today, as we mark more than 3 years since the invasion, GAO
will update the subcommittee on the status of these key areas,
and I look forward to the Comptroller General's testimony.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Shays. Thank you, Mr. Waxman.
Thank you, Mr. Van Hollen, for being here, and you have the
floor.
Mr. Van Hollen. Thank you, Mr. Shays, for holding this
hearing. I also want to thank Mr. Waxman for his leadership on
a whole series of these issues, including his unveiling of the
misexpenditures of funds of Halliburton and the other problems
in the reconstruction effort.
Mr. Walker, welcome to you. I'm looking forward to your
testimony.
Let me just say, we know from the record that the Bush
administration has bungled the operations in Iraq in many
different ways. They planned for the immediate invasion and
toppling of Saddam Hussein, but they did not plan for winning
the piece. In fact, we know now that, with respect to the
warfighting effort, they ignored the advice of many of the
generals at the Pentagon with respect to the number of troops.
General Shinseki's prediction was famously, of course, proved
right despite the fact that he was ignored, and worse than
that, sort of panned at the time by senior leaders at the
Pentagon with respect to what he said would be needed for boots
on the ground in order to make the reconstruction of Iraq
successful.
Because of many failures, the fact of the matter is, a lot
of the funds that we had hoped to spend on reconstruction had
to be diverted simply to provide security for those people who
have been involved in the reconstruction effort.
We also know that while there were plans in place at the
State Department and elsewhere for the reconstruction effort,
the fact of the matter is those plans were essentially junked
and ignored. The whole reconstruction effort was turned over to
the folks, Secretary Rumsfeld and others at the Pentagon, who
were totally unprepared for the reconstruction effort and for
rebuilding in Iraq.
We famously heard before the war from Under Secretary
Wolfowitz at the time that the Iraqi oil production would
quickly be able to pay for the costs in Iraq. We know now that
we have not even come up yet to pre-war production levels, and
that is not beginning to cover the costs that we are incurring
in Iraq and, of course, doesn't begin of course to pay for the
lives lost.
So I think there are many, many serious questions that we
are facing in Iraq. We have heard rosy predictions continuously
from the administration with respect to Iraq, and sometimes you
just have to think that it's Alice in Wonderland over there.
So I'm looking forward to your assessment, a hardnosed
assessment; I hope a realistic assessment of what's going on in
Iraq.
And, Mr. Chairman, again, thank you for holding the
hearing.
Mr. Shays. Thank the gentleman.
Before swearing you in, Mr. Walker, and receiving your
testimony, I would like to ask unanimous consent that all
members of the subcommittee be permitted to place an opening
statement in the record and the record remain open for 3 days
for that purpose, and without objection, so ordered.
Ask further unanimous consent all witnesses be permitted to
include their written statement in the record. Without
objection, so ordered.
Mr. Waxman, I know you wanted two requests. We put the
first in; what was the second?
Mr. Waxman. The second was today's New York Times article
about Halliburton drilling holes.
Mr. Shays. We'll put the New York Times in without
objection, so ordered. The other one was?
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Mr. Waxman. The first one was our report on last October.
Mr. Shays. OK. This is the report of the minority staff of
the full committee.
Mr. Waxman. Correct.
Mr. Shays. Mr. Walker, it's a pleasure to have you here. I
would like to swear you in, but I think, as I mentioned to you,
anyone else who may be asked to give some comment, I would like
you to stand up, not sit at the desk, but at least stand up and
be sworn in. Only two.
[Witnesses sworn.]
Mr. Shays. I'd note for the record the witnesses responded
in the affirmative.
I think it's fairly clear you're the only witness, the only
panel. I have no interest in you trying to finish in 5 minutes.
I want you to say whatever you need to say and then what we're
going to do is we're going to have the Members have 10 minutes.
We'll keep time but keep coming back so we may have one, two,
three, four, whatever rounds, and maybe there will be some
other Members that will join us.
At this time, Mr. Walker, we're going to keep the clock on
and keep turning it over every 5 minutes so you get a sense of
how long, but speak as long as you need to.
STATEMENT OF DAVID M. WALKER, COMPTROLLER GENERAL, U.S.
GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, ACCOMPANIED BY JOSEPH
CHRISTOFF
Mr. Walker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Waxman, Mr. Van
Hollen. I appreciate all of you being here today, and I also
appreciate the opportunity to testify before this subcommittee
on the U.S. efforts to stabilize and rebuild Iraq. Since you
have entered my entire statement in the record, Mr. Chairman, I
will summarize so we have more time for questions and answers.
Between fiscal years 2001 and 2005 the U.S. direct
financial commitment to securing and establishing Iraq grew to
$278 billion. In February 2006, the administration requested an
additional $123 billion to support U.S. stabilization and
reconstruction operations in Iraq and Afghanistan in fiscal
years 2006 and 2007. These amounts do not include future direct
costs nor do they include the significant additional
recapitalization and other longer-term costs that will be
incurred due to the conflict in Iraq.
In November 2005, the President issued the National
Strategy for Victory in Iraq. That strategy states that
progress along the political, security or economic track serves
to reinforce the other tracks. My testimony today is based on
the four reports that we've issued to the Congress since July
2005 and on our team's recent trips to Iraq, including my own
most recent visit to Iraq earlier this year.
In summary, the war in Iraq will not be won by the military
alone. Real success requires an integrated Iraqi, United States
and international effort to meet the political, security,
economic and other needs of the Iraqi people. In this regard,
calendar 2006 will be a critically important year, and more
needs to be done by both the United States and the
international community to help ensure that it results in real
and sustainable progress within Iraq.
The United States, our partners in Iraq have made some
progress in stabilizing and rebuilding Iraq. Iraqis have voted
in increasing numbers, with over 12 million casting votes in
the December 2005 election.
The number of security forces that the Coalition has
trained and equipped has increased from about 142,000 in March
2005 to about 242,000 in March 2006. In addition, the Iraqi
forces are increasingly assuming greater responsibility for
their Nation's security.
Finally, the United States has completed or has underway
about 500 water, oil and electricity reconstruction projects.
However, this progress is tempered by the overwhelming
challenges faced in forming a permanent government, quelling
the insurgency and sectarian violence, providing basic
services, and financing future reconstruction efforts.
As previously noted, the Iraqis have held three national
elections, each with higher voter turnout percentages than the
previous election. This is a real accomplishment. However, 4
months after the December 2005 election, Iraq is still forming
a permanent government. Recent events provide some hope that
the new government will be formed in the near future.
Once formed, the new government will confront the enormous
task of strengthening a range of government institutions,
disbanding the militias, resolving disputes over national
borders and oil revenues, and addressing significant
corruption. Appointments to the key ministries of interior,
defense and oil in particular will be critical to unifying Iraq
and minimizing sectarian violence.
As the new government develops, the Iraqis will need
assistance in training to help strengthen their national and
provincial governments. They need more capacity-building
assistance of a civilian nature, and it needs to come not just
from the United States but also from others in the
international community.
From 2004 to 2005, attacks against the Coalition, Iraqis
and infrastructure increased 23 percent. Despite Coalition
efforts, the insurgents continue to demonstrate to recruit,
supply and attack Coalition and Iraqi security forces.
In addition, the sectarian tensions and violence increased
following the February 2006 bombing of the Shi'a shrine in
Samarra. Since then, Iraqis have become increasingly concerned
that civil war could break out.
U.S. reconstruction efforts have focused on restoring
Iraq's basic services, including refurbishing oil facilities,
increasing electrical generating capacity and rebuilding water
treatment plants. As of March 2006, oil and electricity
production were below pre-war levels, and reconstruction goals
for oil, electricity and water had not been met.
Higher than expected security costs, funding reallocations,
inadequate maintenance and other challenges have slowed the
pace of reconstruction efforts and limited the impact of the
services provided.
Iraq will likely need more than $56 billion, more than the
additional $56 billion estimated, for reconstruction and
stabilization efforts. Let me restate that. They will likely
need more than the originally estimated $56 billion in order to
achieve the reconstruction and stabilization objectives, but it
is unclear how Iraq will finance its reconstruction needs.
U.S. commitments are largely obligated, and future
commitments focus on sustaining existing infrastructure,
strengthening ministerial capacity, and training and equipping
Iraqi security forces. International donors have been reluctant
to commit additional funds until security improves and Iraq
accounts for the donors' previous contributions.
Iraq can only contribute to its future reconstruction needs
if it increases its oil revenues, reduces energy and food
subsidies, controls government operating expenses and takes
steps to effectively combat corruption.
Iraq is at a precarious stage in its emerging democracy.
2006 will be a critically important year in its development. In
moving forward to achieve U.S. goals, it is important that the
United States continue training and equipping Iraqi security
forces and, more importantly, ensuring that these forces have
the logistical capabilities to support and sustain themselves.
This is a key gap and a critical need.
The United States, along with the international community,
should also help Iraqis develop the budgeting and
administrative tools they need to run their national and
provincial governments. Additionally, transparency and
accountability mechanisms are essential, given the legacy of
corruption inherited from the previous regime.
Efforts should also be taken to assure the Iraqis are
capable of maintaining power plants, water treatment facilities
and other U.S.-funded infrastructure improvements. Although the
United States has played a key role in addressing these
challenges, it is important for the Iraqis to assume greater
leadership and for the international community to increase its
efforts.
Collectively, Iraq's future requires strong Iraqi
leadership, sustained U.S. commitment, and a reengaged
international community that can provide support for a range of
civilian needs for a significant period of time. More needs to
be done to help the Iraqis help themselves build capable
government institutions that can deliver real results that
benefit all the Iraqi people. All of these steps will be
essential in order for real success to be achieved in a
reasonably timely and sustainable manner.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Walker follows:]
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Mr. Shays. Thank you, Mr. Walker. We appreciate your
testimony.
There are three Members here. I think I'll start with Mr.
Waxman then I'll jump in, and then we'll go to Mr. Van Hollen,
and then we'll just come back.
Mr. Waxman, you have 10 minutes.
Mr. Waxman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Walker, I'm pleased that you're here. Six months ago,
we had a hearing in this subcommittee where we heard from a
panel of inspectors generals and auditors and their unanimous
opinion was that the Bush administration had not fulfilled its
reconstruction promises in three critical areas; in the oil,
electricity and water areas. Some sectors were actually in
worse shape than before the war. So I appreciate your testimony
because it gives us an opportunity to assess the current status
of these key sectors.
Based on your testimony, it seems clear that the
reconstruction efforts are continuing to fail. In the oil
sector, the administration committed to restoring Iraq's oil
production and exports to pre-war levels, and to do that, it
has already spent over $2 billion to meet the objective.
Mr. Walker, has the administration met this objective?
Mr. Walker. No. The objectives have not been met with
regard to the oil, electricity and water sectors.
Mr. Waxman. Are we still below pre-war levels?
Mr. Walker. We're still below pre-war levels with regard to
oil and electricity. It's unclear what the water level was pre-
war. That's information we don't have.
Mr. Waxman. Well, is the oil part higher or lower than
before we arrived?
Mr. Walker. It's lower.
Mr. Waxman. In the electricity sector, the administration
said it would increase peak electricity output to at least
6,000 megawatts, and it spent $4 billion in an attempt to meet
this objective. Has the administration reached this objective?
Mr. Walker. No, it has yet to reach that objective.
Mr. Waxman. Are we close?
Mr. Walker. We've got a ways to go. We are slightly below
pre-war levels but quite a bit below what the goal is.
Mr. Waxman. My understanding is that the peak electricity
output of 4,100 megawatts is lower than the pre-war levels of
4,400 megawatts, and of course, that's far short of the 6,000
megawatts promised.
Mr. Walker. My data, Mr. Waxman, says peak level post-war
was about 5,400 megawatts, which was achieved in July 2005, but
now we're down to about 4,100 megawatts. The pre-war was 4,300
megawatts, and the goal is 6,000 megawatts.
Mr. Waxman. Why is that? We evidently went up, but down
again.
Mr. Walker. There continues to be a significant amount of
instability in much of Iraq. There continues to be a problem
with regard to the effects of the insurgency, continues to be a
problem with regard to the ability of the Iraqis to be able to
maintain facilities that we rebuild. So it's a combination of a
number of factors that have caused us to be where we are.
Mr. Waxman. What impact is this having on the Iraqi people?
Mr. Walker. Obviously, the Iraqi people are like people
anywhere in the world, they care about safe streets, having
electricity, clean water, having the trash picked up. And
obviously, to the extent those areas are not at the levels that
they need to be, it has an adverse effect on their daily
quality of life.
Mr. Waxman. How many hours a day do the average Iraqis have
electricity?
Mr. Walker. It depends on the area. It varies. As you know,
Mr. Waxman, before the war, we had a situation where the regime
was trying to focus its efforts on providing essential
services, including electricity, to primarily the Sunni areas,
and other areas were not provided as much capability. I would
ask Mr. Christoff to provide some more details.
Mr. Christoff. The national average as of last week was
12.3 hours, but that varies. The Kurds have about 16 to 18
hours a day. The Shi'as in the south are averaging around 10.
Baghdad is at about 5 to 8.
Mr. Waxman. It's reverse rather. The Shi'a areas are
getting more electricity.
Mr. Christoff. And the Kurds.
Mr. Walker. The stability, obviously, as you know, Mr.
Waxman, and we've got it in our testimony, varies by region of
the country. Some of the most challenging areas of the country
are in the Sunni-dominated areas.
Mr. Waxman. Are these temporary problems, or are production
levels consistently below pre-war levels?
Mr. Walker. They have gone up and down. They have not
consistently been below pre-war levels because pre-war levels
were 4,300 megawatts. As I mentioned to you, in July 2005, we'd
gotten up almost to 5,400 megawatts at one time, but we've
never reached our goal. But keep in mind, our goal is
significantly higher than the pre-war level. The pre-war level
was 4,300; our goal was 6,000.
Mr. Waxman. In the water sector, the administration said it
would make sure that 90 percent of Iraqis had access to
drinkable water, and to meet this objective, we spent over $1
billion. Have we achieved this objective?
Mr. Walker. We have not with regard to potable water. Even
though production has increased of late, we still have a
problem because there are problems in transmission; there's a
significant amount of loss of water between the water treatment
facilities and Iraqi homes.
Mr. Waxman. The administration officials keep telling us
we're not hearing the good news stories from Iraq and that
substantial progress has been made in rebuilding the country.
Six months ago, the inspectors general and auditors told us
there was a huge gap between the administration's rhetoric and
reality. In fact, Stuart Bowen, the special inspector general
for Iraq reconstruction, called this a reconstruction gap.
Seems to me your testimony confirms that the reconstruction is
still failing in key sectors.
Mr. Walker, I'd like to take a closer look at the oil
sector. I recently released a report that examined
Halliburton's second oil contract, called RIO 2, which was a
followup to Halliburton's original no-bid oil contract. The
report analyzed hundreds of pages of previously undisclosed
correspondence, evaluations and audits. It revealed that
government officials and investigators have harshly criticized
Halliburton's performance under RIO 2.
Here are the exact words that the government officials and
investigators used to describe Halliburton's performance,
``Profound systematic problems, exorbitant indirect costs,
misleading, distorted cost reports, a lack of cost control, an
overwhelming negative evaluation and an obstructive corporate
attitude toward oversight.''
Halliburton's cost reports were so bad that the Army took
the extreme step of issuing a cure notice in January 2005. They
notified Halliburton that its RIO 2 contract could be
terminated if the problems were not fixed.
Are you, Mr. Walker, aware of any other cure notices issued
under major Iraq contracts?
Mr. Walker. I'm not. That was not our work, Mr. Waxman, but
I will check with my staff. And if we're aware of anything
else, I'll be happy to provide it for the record. As you know,
there's a special inspector general that has been created for
Iraq which has primary responsibility for doing audit,
investigation and evaluation work for contracting activities in
Iraq.
I hate to say it, but the simple fact is that the
contracting area has been on GAO's high-risk list for the
Defense Department for many years, and Iraq is no exception. I
wish our problems were frankly confined just to Iraq, but we
have serious contracting problems all throughout the Defense
establishment.
Mr. Waxman. Let me ask you this, in conclusion.
Halliburton's overall performance was so poor that it received
no award fees for first year of work. Are you aware of any
other major contractor in Iraq that received no award fee
over--on over a quarter of a billion dollars of work?
Mr. Walker. I'm not, but I'll check and provide it for the
record. I would note with regard to the article that you
referred to at the outset of the hearing that I had an
opportunity to review, that they did receive a 4 percent award
fee, it's my understanding, at least that's what was reported.
I think one of the problems we have in government, Mr.
Waxman, is that if we're paying incentive and award fees, we
need to pay for positive results achieved. The people do what
they promise or what we need and what they promise when they
promised it and at the cost that was agreed to. Unfortunately,
that's not the case for all too many contracting arrangements
in government. They pay for effort, and that's it, not results.
Mr. Waxman. On the House floor when we considered the
supplemental appropriations bill for the future work in Iraq,
Afghanistan and other areas, I offered an amendment that said
if the government has been overcharged by any contractor by a
sum of at least a hundred million dollars, the government
shouldn't be giving any other contracts to that contractor.
The argument that was advanced on the House floor was,
well, what if you still need the contractor, what if you still
need that contractor even though the contractor has taken
advantage and overcharged us as its client?
Are we so dependent on Halliburton or any private
contractor that we couldn't find anybody else to do work if
they turn out to be doing poor work and overcharging for that
work?
Mr. Walker. Several things. First, the practical problem
is, how do you define overcharged? That would be the practical
problem. Second, the Defense Department has relied upon KBR,
which is a subsidiary of Halliburton, to provide logistical
support and a range of other services for many years.
There are other options, but there aren't many options, and
that's one of the things we need to be looking at, is we need
to be making sure that we have viable options with regard to
known and recurring type needs such that if people aren't
delivering what they promise or if the taxpayers aren't getting
the type of deal that they deserve, that we have viable options
that we can pursue.
So the need may still be there, the question is, how many
people can meet the need?
Mr. Waxman. I appreciate that answer. That's really
somewhat distressing because, one, we ought to insist if we're
paying the money, they do what they're required to do. And if
they're not going to do what they're required to do, they
should be sanctioned and forced to give back the money, and
then we ought to be seeking out others who can do specific
tasks instead.
Mr. Walker. Mr. Waxman, if I might add, one of the
challenges that exists within the Defense Department is we need
to improve our contracting arrangements so we are very clear as
to what we are asking the contractor to do: We expect X result
by Y time for Z cost.
Now it's not always possible to do that, but many times it
is, and we haven't done that. All too frequently we're paying
for efforts rather than results. That's got to change.
Mr. Waxman. The Bush administration and others have argued
that security has been the big problem; that these contractors
can't perform because we haven't been able to get a secure
environment for reconstruction.
I would submit, and be interested in your comment, that
we've had some devastatingly poor choices made with respect to
disbanding the Iraqi army. This RIO 2 contract shows that poor
contractor performance, aside from security, poor contractor
performance is a major factor, not an incidental one. Do you
agree?
Mr. Walker. It is a problem. With regard to security, I
think it's important to keep two things in mind: As our
statement notes, estimates of the direct cost associated with
providing security associated with reconstruction efforts range
from 16 percent to around 25 percent or so. But what that does
not capture, which is very, very important, that's the direct
cost of providing security.
You also have productivity losses. When you have an
unstable security environment, then you can end up having a
significant amount of reduction in productivity and lost work
effort because of that. That number is not captured in there.
So if you wanted to totally absorb the cost, I would argue, on
a full absorption basis, it would be much higher.
Mr. Waxman. Just looking at today's New York Times article
where Halliburton had a project to build oil pipelines under
the Tigris River, and then Halliburton was, even after they
specifically and repeatedly have been warned by geologists and
other experts that their whole approach to this work was flawed
and it wouldn't work, they went ahead anyway. And they spent
over $75 million before they finally had to admit I guess it
wasn't such a good idea to ignore all the geological experts.
That had nothing to do with security; that was plain
incompetence, and it didn't hurt them at all because they still
got paid.
Mr. Walker. That's an example, Mr. Waxman, of wholly
inadequate transparency among other things with regard to what
the situation was. That was an instable area, there's no
question about that. There were security challenges. But there
were other problems that occurred that led to that. One of the
problems was there was not enough transparency over exactly
where do they stand and what progress was being made and what
results were we getting for the costs that was being incurred,
and not only how much direct security costs being incurred, but
how much time was being lost in other efforts associated with
that.
Mr. Waxman. Well, the transparency, we should have been
able to see their terrible judgment, which ended up costing us
at least $75 million.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Shays. You're welcome.
Mr. Walker, thank you for being here. I want you to first
tell me how you've allocated your folks. You basically have
done four studies to this subcommittee, but tell us about your
four studies that you have done, not in any great depth but
basically what you have done.
Mr. Walker. We did work, Mr. Chairman, spanning all three
major dimensions. As you know, these are just four that we've
issued within the last several months. We have many other
engagements ongoing.
Basically, we've tried to do work dealing with the security
environment, the governance situation, also with regard to
reconstruction efforts. The specific reports that are referred
to I think are outlined in my testimony. But we're trying to
follow those three major dimensions because they are consistent
with the plan that the executive branch has developed for Iraq,
and we think it makes sense for us to try to follow that
framework to the extent possible.
As you know, we do all this work under the Comptroller
General's authority but with your support and the support of
other Members and I want to compliment you again for the number
of hearings, oversight hearings you have had. There's not
enough oversight going on in Congress, but this subcommittee is
clearly an exception to that general rule.
Mr. Shays. Thank you.
What I'd like to do is I'd like to isolate each part, the
security, the governance and the reconstruction. I'm going to
say one of my concerns is, when I hear your recommendations,
which I agree with, I want to be clear whether you think we
fail if we don't--for instance, your primary point is we need
to involve the international community. And this is clearly a
crucial year. If the international community basically sticks
their nose up at us and says, forget it, are you saying we're
going to fail? Or are you saying it's going to be a lot more
difficult and take a lot more time?
Otherwise, if you are saying that if we don't get
international help, we fail, you are basically putting it right
in the hands of the international community. I would like to
think that's not true. If it is true, I need you to tell me.
Mr. Walker. I believe it is critically important that the
international community be much more engaged with regard to
capacity building for the new Iraqi government than it has
been. As you know, there were strong differences of opinion
within the international community about whether and to what
extent we and others should have gone into Iraq, but it is in
our combined interest for the entire international community
for Iraq to succeed.
Can we be successful if the Iraqi community--pardon me, if
the international community does not engage? Yes, it's not
impossible to be successful, but a lot more difficult, take a
lot more time, a lot more money.
We also have to keep in mind that the international
community, the U.N. as an institution, as well as other
countries have significant expertise in trying to help other
countries help themselves be successful. It's important that
come forth at this point in time because, in some cases, they
may be able to do things that we won't be able to do. We have
limited resources; we have limited capacity. And, candidly, one
of the big concerns, Mr. Chairman, is, at certain levels, we
may have 15 to 20 more times people in uniform than we have
civilian players.
Mr. Shays. Let me kind of dissect part of this. This
subcommittee has done a lot of investigations. One was, we
initiated the Oil-for-Food program. When we began the Oil-for-
Food program, we learned that Saddam Hussein undersold the oil
and got kickbacks and directed it where he chose and overpaid
for commodities and got kickbacks and directed it for where he
wanted.
The Dulfer report said two things: No weapons of mass
destruction; the other thing the report said is, Saddam Hussein
had bought off the French and the Russians and was convinced
they would not support us in the Security Council and therefore
did not believe we would come. He didn't believe we would
attack him because he was convinced that his Oil-for-Food
program had bought off the French and the Russians.
So I'm wrestling with, if they were basically bought off,
what unbuys them?
Mr. Walker. First, as you know, he is gone. We're dealing
with a new situation. The one area where you can clearly say
that tremendous progress has been made is politically.
Tremendous progress.
I'm testifying on Thursday before the Congress on the issue
of the U.N. and what the U.N. needs to do in order to be able
to strengthen its controls and also what the U.N. needs to do
in order to improve its oversight practices.
I believe, Mr. Chairman, that it is possible to be able to
provide additional transparency and accountability and to get
better results. We need to learn from Oil-for-Food. We need to
try to make sure that appropriate steps are taken to minimize
that happening again.
Mr. Shays. I'm not sure you're really responding to my
question. If you don't have an answer, that's OK, but it's not
debatable. Saddam bought off the French and the Russians. They
did not support going in. It's not debatable, at least in terms
of his own people who said Saddam did not believe we would
come. He was like Stalin after we attacked; just as the Germans
attacked, he didn't believe it and had to have it reconfirmed.
That's one of the things I'm absolutely convinced about
from my hearings, is Saddam had bought off the French and
Russians; the U.N. would not support us. So what makes them
support us now? What information do you have that could make me
feel that they are going to support? That's what I'd like to
know.
Mr. Walker. There are two aspects, Mr. Chairman. I
understand what you're saying. First, whether or not the U.N.
as an institution and how it does business and what it takes
for it as an institution to provide broadbased support, whether
it can and will step forward. It is providing some support.
Mr. Shays. They have stepped forward politically. I want to
make sure it's part of the record. They have helped the
election process. And when I was there for their second
election a week before, and I met with the U.N. Commission,
they had helped organize the first vote, the second and third.
Hugely successful.
I'm not right now talking about the U.N. structure, the
commission. They said to me that the elections in October would
be the fairest anywhere in the world, that there would be
greater support of voters than we have in the United States.
And we learned that they voted, 63 percent of all adults, not
registered voters; we learned that when they voted, 79 percent
supported the constitution, contrary to what people thought.
And then in December, 76 percent of all adults. In the United
States, if we get 65 percent of the two-thirds who bother to
register, we think that's huge.
So you and I can probably agree that their election
process--in just 1 year establishing a government, created a
constitution, ratified a constitution, elected a government--is
unbelievably successful. Would you agree?
Mr. Walker. It has been successful on the political front,
yes.
Mr. Shays. So the issue now, at least in terms of the
general populace, so we can kind of put that aside and we can
kind of say that the U.N. was very helpful in that process.
That's an argument I think that says the value of having the
international communities. I'm not arguing with your point that
if we can get the international community engaged so the
political process was successful, the U.N. was helpful, other
countries helped in that process of the election. It leaves the
security and the reconstruction. Obviously, the political
process, as you point out, of 4-month delay is a big issue. So
they are learning.
Would you agree that the Sunnis and Kurds--let me ask it
this way and then I'll tell you what I think. What did you
learn from the Sunnis and Kurds saying no to Jafri and
ultimately the Shi'as agreeing to select someone else? What did
that tell you about the political process?
Mr. Walker. That's a recent event and a subsequent event to
the work that we did and so we haven't done work directly on
that.
If I can, Mr. Chairman, if you'll indulge me for a second,
let me be clear as to where I think we need additional help
from the United States and from the international community,
now that it looks----
Mr. Shays. I'm going to give you that chance because we're
going to be here all day. What I'm trying to do is isolate
where the issue is, and you want to jump right there, but I
want to make sure that we have some understanding or
disagreement, but some understanding of our disagreement on the
three fronts, the economic, the security, the political and the
economic.
What can we learn--if you want me to answer the question, I
will, if you're not inclined to, but what do you think--what
was the significance of ultimately, in your judgment, the
minority holding fast and forcing the majority to select
someone else?
Mr. Walker. It shows that one has to compromise in order to
achieve progress. It does show a willingness in the end, in my
view, for a desire to try to form a government of national
unity that can be acceptable broadly within Iraq. I think that
is a plus. The real key, Mr. Chairman----
Mr. Shays. Unless you want to still talk about the
political. Don't leave the political yet.
Mr. Walker. I will talk only about the political. The real
key is substantive success. As we know, we have a prime
minister designate that was the result of the process that you
just mentioned. Now that has to be finalized and the government
needs to be stood up beyond the prime minister, including
naming ministers to head all the different government agencies,
with particular importance to defense----
Mr. Shays. Let me get to that because you're talking about
what I think is a level underneath the democratic process of
governance, which I think is a key point.
What I learned from this was when I go to Iraq, I meet with
Iraqis, the Sunnis, Shia's and Kurds. They lecture me. They
say, I'm an Iraqi. They say, I'm a Sunni, but I'm married to a
Shi'a, or the Kurds will say, I am a Kurd, but I'm a Sunni. I
am an Iraqi.
From the press, I learned Sunnis, Shi'as and Kurds, but
from the Iraqis, I learned Iraqis. But those who never
experienced democracy, they said majority rule, we get to run
the place. And what we learned when we became a country is
majority rule, minority rights.
For me, what is thrilling about what took place was that
the minority, the Kurds and the Sunnis, both 20 percent, give
or take, link up, were able to veto the choice of the Shi'as.
The Shi'as resisted for month after month, finally said, you
know what, we accept minority right. You don't get to choose
who we choose, but you get to veto.
To me, that's just one more progress that's noticeable and
real. Now you want to uncover the top part, which is the
democracy, and get into the governance. I think there are some
huge points here, and I think the point you're telling me is to
succeed with the governance, because I'm going to tell you what
I think and you tell me if I'm wrong, you have defense,
interior, you have oil, go down the line, agriculture and so
on. We don't have the capability to be with every department,
nor do we have frankly the respect of the Iraqis to be the only
ones.
So what I'm hearing you say is if you want that level to
work, the governance, we have to bring in folks who have had
this experience in other parts of the world.
Mr. Walker. Correct. We and the international community
have to do more to help the Iraqis help themselves build these
institutions that can deliver results that all Iraqis care
about. We talked earlier in this hearing about what's the
status of the electricity, what's the status of the oil, what's
the status of the water. Ultimately Iraqis are like people
anywhere, they care about having safe streets, they want to
have jobs, they want to have electricity, they want to have
clean water, they want to have their trashed picked up, and we
need to make sure that we're helping to deliver on that and
it's not just us, it's the international community.
Mr. Shays. I just want to cover this territory. We
obviously have the concern about their learning about
democracy, being able to recognize majority rule, minority
rights. The public has proved to us--they put us to shame. In
their country, they participate at risk of death. I would also
say at risk of death. You have Sunnis, Shi'as and Kurds that
are trying to form a government, and in some areas, they're
targets. They're not dead men walking, but their lives are at
risk every day. Very brave people.
But it gets into this issue of corruption. Obviously,
knowing how to do things, but corruption. I would like to say
to you if anything brings down Iraq, my biggest fear is
corruption. It leads me to make a parenthetical.
When Duke Cunningham, a Vietnam war hero and I believe a
very patriotic person slipped in, step by step, into
corruption, into payoffs, he not only was a corrupt person, he
was a traitor. Because in the end, that's what brings down a
democracy.
How do we deal with the corruption in Iraq? And you put it
up there at high a level, as I would. Way up there.
Mr. Walker. It is a very serious problem. When I went to
Iraq the latest time, the two primary reasons that I went there
was, No. 1, to participate in a monthly meeting that is held
between General Casey, our Ambassador, and all the other top
officials where they're trying to develop metrics and
milestones to measure progress across all these dimensions
which we and others have recommended for some time; and,
second, to meet with my counterpart who's head of the Iraqi
supreme audit institution.
I might note that I met his predecessor, who 3 weeks after
meeting him was killed in a car bomb. When I met with my
counterpart in Iraq, we actually had to change locations
because one of our bomb sniffing dogs sniffed an explosive
device close to where we were supposed to meet. So you're
right, the people there are risking their lives in many cases
to do their job.
We, the GAO, the international organization of supreme
audit institutions, and others are trying to work to help the
Iraqi Supreme Audit Board build its capacity to be able to do
its job. I met last week with the chief justice of the
Commission on Public Integrity, which as you know is a critical
part of the Iraqi government to try to be able to combat
corruption, and we are trying to work with him along with
helping him network and my counterpart in Iraq to network with
their Arab counterparts and others in the international
community to try to deliver results.
In the final analysis, there are several things that are
going to have to happen. There are significant revenues being
lost as a result of corruption and as a result of the resale of
oil and products--oil products.
Part of the problem with that is the pricing structure for
petroleum products in Iraq is much lower than it is in the
surrounding area, which creates a great incentive to arbitrage,
to be able to obtain access to this and, you know, just go next
door, one of several countries next door in order to generate
the revenues from that. That has to be addressed, but that is
going to be a difficult political decision because you're going
to have to raise oil prices and gasoline prices in order to
undercut that. Now look at how much controversy there is in
this country right now with the increase in gasoline prices,
but there you're talking about going from, you know, 25 cents a
gallon to 85 to $1.25.
Mr. Shays. Let me just close up with a question so I can
move to Mr. Van Hollen. Mr. Van Hollen, Mr. Waxman and I both
ended up with 15 minutes, so you will have that time.
So the bottom line is corruption is huge. And do you
believe it's systemic throughout----
Mr. Walker. It is a pervasive problem. It is particularly
acute in the oil sector because that's over 90 percent of the
government's revenues.
For example, when I was in this meeting, and some of the
information is classified so I can't get into this information,
I looked at the data that they put up on the chart, and within
15 seconds I could tell that there was tremendous corruption
going on. Because you know what the price of oil is, you know
what production is, and you can see what's going on with
revenues, and they don't track. So this is a serious issue that
has to be addressed, but it's not confined just to that sector
of the economy.
Mr. Shays. I'm just going to conclude by telling you what I
think I'm hearing you say. And what I think I'm hearing you
saying is that we absolutely need the help of the international
community if we are going to see real and noticeable progress;
that, absent that, it is going to stretch out at infinitum--and
I'm going to put my parenthetical in--and then I question
whether the American people will have the staying power if they
don't start to see just continued and real progress. And,
obviously, if the Iraqis don't see real progress, then I think
they also look to do things in a different way.
I'm also going to say what I'm hearing you say--which I
wasn't thinking about in the way you were, but I'm happy you
brought it out--is I've been looking at the government sector,
the democratic--the governance sector more in terms of the
elected officials, and you're opening my eyes to see, lift that
cover up and look at individual government agencies and the
need to have some real oversight there, and obviously our
foreign friends could be helpful in that.
Mr. Walker. It's not just oversight. It's capacity building
to help the people responsible for managing those agencies and
delivering results to be effective in doing so but then having
oversight to provide checks and balances to maximize the----
Mr. Shays. The training and the mentoring.
Mr. Walker. Right.
Mr. Shays. Thank you, Mr. Van Hollen, for your patience.
Mr. Van Hollen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Walker, thank you again for your testimony.
You were very charitable when you said that there hadn't
been enough oversight in the Congress here. With the exception
of this subcommittee pursuing some oversight within its limited
jurisdiction, I think the House of Representatives has been
totally AWOL when it comes to oversight on this issue and has
failed to live up to its constitutional responsibilities. And I
think, frankly--again, with the exception of the subcommittee--
it's embarrassing as an institution, as a separate branch of
government.
We all remember back in May 2003, back on the aircraft
carrier Abraham Lincoln when the President unveiled the big
placard saying ``Mission Accomplished.'' That was May 2003. I
think we can understand why the American people now have some
skepticism when the President talks about his strategy for
victory and has a big placard there.
If you go through the measurements that we're talking about
today and you look at the strategy for victory and their list
of accomplishments, it is missing progress in the areas we're
talking about, in the oil sector, in terms of comparison to
prewar levels, electricity, other major measures of
infrastructure improvement in the country. As we've said, you
know, a big part of the problem has been the totally difficult
security situation on the ground in Iraq.
In February of this year, when the report was issued, it
stated that the security situation in Iraq has deteriorated
since June 2003, with significant increases in attacks against
Iraqi and coalition forces. Since that report, of course, we
did have the bombing of the Mosque. Even after the new prime
minister was named, we had a series of bombings in Baghdad.
That same day we found a number of people, again, who had been
shot through the head by militias.
I take it that between February and today you continue to
believe that the security--we have not turned the corner on the
security situation; is that right?
Mr. Walker. There are still challenges. The data with
regard to attacks from March is still classified. We were able
to work with the Defense Department to obtain declassification
of the January and February data but not March yet. I think if
you look at page 11 of my testimony, figure two, you'll see a
summary of the stability status, including security for Iraq. I
don't think that's changed materially.
Mr. Van Hollen. Did you have an opportunity to form an
opinion during your visit there with respect to whether we've
made any progress in terms of reducing militia activity,
reducing the infiltration of militias into police forces, and
the extent to which the armed forces--not the police forces,
but the national armed forces--are successful in being free of
sectarian sort of divisions in their ranks?
Mr. Walker. We are doing additional work in that area.
I will tell you that, based upon the work that we've done
so far, much more progress has been made with the military in a
number of fronts, including that front, than with regard to the
police forces. The military has come along further, and the
infiltration is a bigger issue based upon data that we have so
far with regard to the police forces.
Mr. Van Hollen. And no signs of improvement, to your
knowledge, in that area.
Mr. Walker. I couldn't say there's no signs of improvement.
It's still a challenge.
Mr. Van Hollen. All right. Let me ask a little bit about
the sustainability issue because that's been a continuing
challenge. Even when we've had some limited success in
rebuilding infrastructure, the capacity of the Iraqi agencies,
civilian agencies to maintain those improved infrastructures
has been a very serious problem. The chairman alluded to it a
little bit at the end of the questioning, the fact that, in
addition to the political components, just the experts and
everyday ability to maintain services is a challenge, to say
the least.
Can you give us any kind of confidence that we are
improving in that area? Because if you look at the measures, it
doesn't seem to be. It seems, you know, we take one step
forward in terms of infrastructure, reconstruction, and then
two steps back with respect to the failure to maintain it. What
is going on in that----
Mr. Walker. Well, I think we have a problem with regard to
planning and execution. Some of the examples have been provided
here at this hearing already. Another example is that if you
look, for example, at the health facilities, we have several
hundred that we've been working on, but we're going to run out
of money before a vast majority of them are completed.
I think one of the things we need to be thinking about is
we've got a limited amount of resources. We need to make sure
that we target those resources to generate the best results as
quickly as possible. In some cases, that means building fewer
in areas where we think we can actually be successful and then,
after we end up achieving some successes, then focusing on
other areas over time.
At the same point in time I will mention to you, as I said
in my testimony, there's not going to be enough money.
Additional money is going to be necessary in order to rebuild
all the areas that need to be rebuilt, and the real question is
where is it coming from and to what extent are the Iraqis going
to be able to do it. And they're not going to be able to do it
all, it's very clear, irrespective of what the price of oil is
today. And, furthermore, you know, whether and to what extent
we and others in the international community may step up in
that regard; the jury is out on that.
Mr. Van Hollen. Well, let me ask you, you're referring now
to the $56 billion number you referred to. Where exactly does
that number come from? Because there are lots of numbers, as
I'm sure you know, out there with respect to----
Mr. Walker. I'll ask Mr. Christoff to give you the details.
Mr. Christoff. The $56 billion was estimated in 2003 by a
combination of the World Bank, the U.N. and CPA doing a quick
initial estimate of about--I think all of the sectors,
including oil and electricity.
Mr. Van Hollen. And your estimate now is that's a low
number, is that right, based on your testimony? Do you have any
idea what the number is?
Mr. Christoff. We haven't concluded a number. But just the
events that transpired after that estimate, a great deal of
looting, higher security costs, plus estimates from both the
Ministry of Oil and Electricity, that those two ministries
alone will need $50 billion makes the $56 billion figure----
Mr. Van Hollen. Clearly, the assumptions that were in place
at the time of that $56 billion have not proven to be true.
They were obviously very optimistic assumptions.
Let me ask you, with respect to the costs of reconstruction
and the international commitments that have been made to date
at donors' conferences, do you have any overall numbers
pledged? And, second, do you have any numbers with respect to
how many people have followed through with their commitments,
who has followed through to date, who who has not followed
through to date?
Mr. Walker. We have some data on that. I'll ask Mr.
Christoff to give the details.
But, as you know, Mr. Van Hollen, a lot of those pledges
were in the form of loans rather than grants; and we all know
there is a fundamental difference between a grant and a loan.
Mr. Christoff. $13.6 billion total that was pledged. I
think we're up to about $3 billion that has actually come into
the two trust funds, the U.N. and the World Bank trust funds.
Mr. Van Hollen. Is that $3 billion of those grants or
loans, do you know?
Mr. Christoff. That is grants, and the rest are
predominantly loans. When I met with the Japanese about a month
ago, they were on the verge of completing the loan agreement,
about a $600 million loan agreement with the Iraqi government,
so that would be probably one of the biggest loans that would
be coming through if that could be brokered.
Mr. Van Hollen. But other than the $3 billion, the
remainder of the pledges have not been made to----
Mr. Christoff. Well, there are loans that are available
once the government reaches agreement and once there is a
government.
Mr. Van Hollen. Let me followup a little bit on the
corruption issue, because especially in the oil industry it
seems to be that the lack of any kind of strong central
government has allowed a lot of the chiefs of the tribal areas
and others to take advantage of the situation.
You may have mentioned it, but I don't know if you're able
to quantify the amount of revenue lost to the central
government as a result of corruption. Obviously, it's a
difficult number to get a hold of. I don't know if you have any
estimate of what's been lost to the central government.
Mr. Walker. We don't have a specific estimate, but it is
very material.
Mr. Van Hollen. All right.
As you may have seen, there was an estimate put together by
Joe Stankiewicz, a Nobel-Prize-winning economist, as to the
total cost of operations in Iraq--it wasn't just
reconstruction; it was the total cost by the end of the day--in
the range of $2 trillion. I don't know if you had an
opportunity to look at the assumptions made in there and make a
judgment as to whether that's in the ballpark.
We all remember early on when Larry Lindsay, President
Bush's economic advisor, said that the cost might reach $200
billion--this is before the war--and the administration said,
oh, no way, it's not going to get anywhere in that ballpark.
Well, we know that his estimate we should have looked at
suspiciously, not because it was too high but because it was
too low. But I don't know if you've had any opportunity to make
a judgment about the Stankiewicz quote.
Mr. Walker. No, we haven't had an opportunity to do that.
Let me just say that, obviously, you would have to make a
lot of assumptions, including a big one, which is how long are
we going to be there and in what size and who's going to end up
helping to fund this capacity building and the reconstruction
needs over a period of time. I touched in my testimony the fact
that one has to be careful not just to consider the direct cost
but also there will be significant costs that will be incurred
to recapitalize equipment, there is significant costs that will
be incurred for disability benefits and a number of other
benefits that will be paid for many years to come.
Mr. Van Hollen. Right. And, to date, GAO has not tried to
undertake that kind of----
Mr. Walker. We have not. I would imagine that CBO may try.
As you know, the agency in the legislative branch that's
responsible for trying to run budget numbers for the Congress
is the CBO, and we try not to compete with them.
Mr. Van Hollen. Right. Let me ask you about Kirkuk--and I
don't know--you have a little section in your report on Kirkuk.
I don't know if you have any sense of the progress being made
among the parties with respect to resolving the control of
Kirkuk and control, of course, of the oil revenues that would
be generated from that oil-rich region.
Mr. Walker. I would ask Mr. Christoff to address that.
Mr. Christoff. The constitution basically says it needs to
be resolved by 2007. It hasn't been resolved.
Mr. Van Hollen. All right. And any negotiations, to your
knowledge, that have gone on that would move us in the right
direction?
Mr. Christoff. I'm not aware of any on Kirkuk.
Mr. Van Hollen. All right.
Mr. Walker. From a practical standpoint, without the
national unity government being in place, it's probably not
realistic to expect that there would be a tremendous amount of
progress. Hopefully, there will be once it is fully in place.
Mr. Van Hollen. Right. Well, they've tried off and on to
negotiate the status of the oil revenues through the
constitution and others. But you're right. I mean, I think that
while I think it's a hopeful sign that they were able to get a
prime minister named and some cabinet officials, so far I think
it would be--you would be looking through rose-colored glasses
to suggest that we're over the hill in any way, even on the
political front here, given the strong sectarian divisions in
Iraq.
Ambassador Khalilzad said what lots of us said many years
ago with respect to Iraq, which is that we took the lid off
Pandora's box; and the challenge in Iraq will always be to
ensure that Iraqis see themselves, as the chairman said, as
Iraqis first, as opposed to seeing themselves first as Sunnis,
Shi'as, Kurds and other ethnic groups within Iraq. And while
some of the political leadership may have gotten there, I'm not
sure the great majority of the country has gotten there yet;
and that, of course, is a big part of the ultimate challenge.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Shays. I thank the gentleman very much.
I would concur with the gentleman that the political
challenge in Iraq is huge. And I like using your word
governance, because it gets down below the political and also
looks at the everyday operation of the government. So I'm going
to think more about governance as opposed to the political when
I divide them into three groups.
What I do think, though, is that Iraq has an easier
opportunity of becoming a viable country than the United States
had. I look at 1776, I look at the Articles of Confederation, I
look at the Constitution. We had to amend the Constitution 10
times just to get Virginia to be a part of it.
And I'm concerned with this, they haven't done it yet in,
what, 3 years. In 1 year, they had three elections; they
established a constitution. So all I want to do is establish
the point that their progress has been huge, but it could blow
up in their face. And we will learn, how this new government is
going to perform. It seems to me on the political side of the
equation, if they don't get at corruption and don't make some
inroads, then they're going to fail ultimately. That's what I
think. Corruption has to be dealt with.
What I would like to get into is the issue of security, and
I'm going to preface my question in this way. And I'm going to
say, because I agree with my colleagues, that we totally
underestimated the challenge. I try to look as objectively as I
can and as candidly as I can. When we talked about the war
originally, I honestly in my own mind said we could fund it
with their oil. The administration rebuked me and said it's not
going to be with their own oil because then it looks like we're
going after their oil. It's going to be our own dollars.
When I came back in August 2003 and said people on the
ground tell me they don't have any money, and the
administration came in September with this request of $82
billion, I was floored by it. I mean, I was floored.
What I believe is this: that they had plans, but their
plans were always wrong, and they were constantly always having
to revise their plan. They always underestimated the challenge.
When I was speaking with Bernie Kuric, the former police
chief--and it's somewhat controversial, but he is an expert--he
told me when he was in Iraq in the early times and the people
in Baghdad said we are going to disband the army, their police
and their border patrol, he told me he got right in their face
and basically said, let me understand something, you are going
to get rid of their police? Who is going to provide security?
And his basic comment to me was the folks who made that
decision never got out of the Green Zone in Baghdad. They never
got out.
So my view is that when we disbanded their army, their
police and their border patrol, we left 24 million people
defenseless in a country the size of California; and then we
said to 150,000 coalition forces, you provide the police work,
the border patrol and you be their army. And then, by the way,
you train their police, their border patrol and their army.
That's what I think, and I think we took a huge nose drive.
So when I talk about progress, I don't look at April, 2003,
Mr. Walker, and say, OK, we're here now, and it's a trend line
like this. I look at it with a big drop, and the trend line
going up--until the bombing in the dome--significantly. We
started to train their police, their border patrol and their
army.
Now this is the area that I want to talk to you about. It's
my belief--and I will tell you a Democratic colleague from
Georgia has enlightened me a little bit on this a little bit
more. It's my belief that the Iraqi military is going to need
us for a long time. They don't have the sergeants, the
corporals. They didn't develop middle-level management. They
don't have the strategic logistic support, as you pointed out.
I'm emphasizing it. They're not going to be able to man
helicopters in the next year or two. They don't have
helicopters, and they're not going to have enough to man. So
we're going to have to be for that.
They don't have the medics. They don't have a number of
things that they need. So I thought, well, that's a bad thing.
Mr. McGovern said to me, I'm not sure in a country where
the military has overthrown the government a number of times
you want to have the military totally independent, totally
without some embedded forces that basically help guide and
mentor and make sure that these forces don't become a way to
overcome democracy. Interesting point he made. He would make it
better than I've made it.
I guess my point to you here is, do you believe that there
has been significant progress with their police, their border
patrol and Army? If not, why not and where? If you think
there's been significant progress, do you think they have a
long ways to go or what?
Mr. Walker. I think there's been progress. There's been
more progress with regard to the military than there has with
the police forces. And I would respectfully suggest that if you
want to really get a sense as to how performance is going in
this area or any area you need to look at three dimensions: No.
1, how are things today; No. 2, how are they trending; and, No.
3, how do they compare to various other metrics?
In the case of Iraq, I would suggest at least two, prewar
and goal. You have to look at all three, how do they stand, how
are they trending and how do they compare to established
metrics? Only by looking at all three of those do you really
get a full and fair view I think of where things are.
But I would say that much more progress has been made with
regard to the military forces. Some progress has been made with
both.
Mr. Shays. But when you look at the stock market over 3
years you can say you were here and then you're here; what
happened in between? Would you agree that when we disbanded
their army, their police and their border patrol we left them
basically defenseless and required an unbelievable effort on
the part of a limited number of troops, 150,000 troops--would
you agree that taking away their security left them somewhat
defenseless for a period of time?
Mr. Walker. Many believe that was a mistake and that it
created a vacuum and that--and so I understand what you're
saying, Mr. Chairman. You're saying that from a practical
standpoint that might have been the truth, that might have been
the floor. And if you look at that rather than merely prewar,
then we could be better off than otherwise, one might assert.
Mr. Shays. I would make that argument.
Mr. Walker. I understand.
Mr. Shays. OK. It strikes me, when we talk about security,
that it's logical to me that reconstruction is not going to
succeed very well if you can't provide security to which people
can do their job; and so I put security and I put
reconstruction in a closer link. And I'm somewhat reluctant to
talk about this because it's been so successful we don't draw
attention to it, but the one area that we can see no real
destruction of any of the investments we've made--and there
have been thousands of them--are the non-government
organizations.
I'm not going to name them, but one non-government
organization and another that I've interacted with, they hired
Iraqis to do the work. When things got even dicier, they hired
Iraqis to be the non-government organization and hire out the
work. So you had westerners coming in with these non-government
organizations, and they hired Iraqis, and then when security
got bad the westerners left, except for one or two, they hired
Iraqis to contract with Iraqis.
The testimony that we've had is not one school that they
built, not one bridge, not one water structure has been
destroyed; and my sense is that the model was Iraqis doing the
work. I'd like you to talk about reconstruction as it relates
to--if you've done any thought or work on this--having Iraqis
do the work versus our coming in with people from outside doing
the work.
Mr. Walker. I'll ask Mr. Christoff to provide some details.
We have not, to my knowledge, done specific audit work in
differentiating between those projects that were funded using
that approach versus another. But if you can imagine, you get
more ownership, you get more buy-in from the people because
they were part of the solution.
Mr. Christoff. You also spend less money.
And I think one thing we're looking at right now is just
how we move from the design/build approach that we began with
under CPA to more direct contracting. And clearly one of the
lessons learned is that you can employ more Iraqis, you can
engage more Iraqis, and you eliminate the levels of overhead
with the subcontractors and sub-subcontractors, and you can
have a more direct and immediate impact.
Mr. Walker. We have similar problems in the Katrina
situation, quite frankly.
Mr. Shays. Interesting.
Well, I note that Mr. Ruppersberger is here.
I guess what I want to conclude this part of my questioning
with is, intuitively, it strikes me that if you don't have good
security you're not going to have successful reconstruction,
particularly with the big projects. So when I hear that we
haven't been as successful, I say I'm not surprised. I don't
like it, but it seems to me when we made that fateful decision
of disbanding their army, their police and their border
patrol--because I had Iraqis come to me and say, why are you
putting my brother, my uncle and my father out of work? Why
can't we at least guard the hospitals? And I didn't have a good
answer because I don't know why we did it.
So my point to you is, when you tell me we haven't
succeeded in these areas, would it have been possible for us to
succeed without good security?
Mr. Walker. I think security is much more than
reconstruction. Clearly, it is one of the major contributors to
the fact that we haven't made as much progress we would have
liked and expected to at this point in time.
But as you know, Mr. Chairman, you and I both, when we were
in undergraduate school, remember studying Maslow's hierarchy
of needs; and the most basic thing for any civilization is
security, self-preservation. And it's not just an issue of
being able to do reconstruction, it's safe streets. So I think
that because of some of the decisions that were made in the
past we created more problems for ourselves and, in some cases,
for the Iraqi people.
Mr. Shays. Thank you.
Mr. Ruppersberger, welcome. You have 15 minutes.
Mr. Ruppersberger. Fifteen minutes, OK. I can do it
quicker.
I just got back about 3 weeks ago from Iraq--more from an
intelligence point of view on the Intelligence Committee--and
one of the things that we did was really look and see where we
were. And one of the things that I saw and what I would hope
that we would look at--and I want your opinion on this--right
now, I think the military has come a long way, the Iraqi
military. We've been training them for, what, about 2\1/2\
years now? How many years have we been training the military?
Mr. Walker. About 2 years. 2004. And I would agree, they've
come a lot further.
Mr. Ruppersberger. We've met with military, we've met with
our people, General Casey. I would think at this point it's
time that we start moving our troops from the urban areas and
out to the perimeter, and I think this would accomplish
something very positive.
First thing, the Iraqi people need to understand that this
is their country and that their military--and, hopefully,
police, even though they're not ready and we know that--that
their military would start patrolling the streets and start
letting the Iraqi people see that this is our country, this is
our military. We still, by doing that, we see over and over,
every day it seems, or at least once a week--which is very
unfortunate--that our men and women, mostly National Guard,
patrolling the urban areas in Iraq are getting blown up by
either suicide bomb or roadside bomb. If they're not being
killed, they're being maimed. There is no reason why the Iraqi
military can't take control of that patrol.
We move our troops out to the perimeter; and then, by
doing, that we are standing ready to help them when they need
us. But they have to learn to do it on their own or they will
be dependent on us forever, and that's not acceptable because
eventually we have to start moving out to that area.
In our perimeter, we have some of the best special
operations in the world, probably the best in the world. And
what we're doing now, it seems to me, is that we are really
engaging the bad guys, so to speak, on their level without
really a lot of defense for our men and women who are in the
military. By being in the perimeter, we can use our technology,
we can use our SIGIR and our intelligence to a better level
than we could by patrolling the streets, and we can also target
those areas when, in fact, if the military is having a
difficult time, they call 911 and we're there. A Blackhawk
helicopter can get you anywhere in the urban area of Iraq in
15, 20 minutes.
I think by doing this we would be able to, No. 1, start
sending a lot more of our troops home, but we have our key
operations on the perimeter. We're backing up the Iraqis. We're
not leaving because they're not ready yet, but they have to
learn themselves to provide their security.
What do you think of that theory.
Mr. Walker. I think there are a number of reasons why it is
to our benefit for the Iraqis to take the lead as much as
possible. When we came into Iraq, we were viewed as liberators
initially. The longer we stay, the more that view is
challenged.
I do think that the other thing that we need to do is we
need to focus on what are the needs of the Iraqi military. And
even if we train more and more units such that they can take
the lead, they don't have certain equipment, they don't have
certain capabilities, they don't have the type of intel, they
don't have the type of communications, they don't have the lift
capacity, the transportation capacity. But it's consistent with
what you're saying, because I think one of the things we need
to do is to focus on where it's going to be years before they
have what they need and to target our resources and target our
efforts to focus on the need but to try to get them to be out
front as much as possible so that we're providing essential
support; we're the reserve rather than being up front.
Mr. Ruppersberger. Well, there's another issue there, too.
It's the American people, and the American people understanding
that, what's happening. And we see the poll numbers going down
right now. By moving to the perimeter, it's an event. It says
to the American people that we're not just doing the same thing
every day, that there's nothing really changing. This is a
major event for us to pull out of urban areas and to back up.
And what you're saying, we can continue to supply the
intelligence from the perimeter; we can give them the
resources. They have a lot of resources now from what my
briefing said. Yours may have been different. That's No. 1.
The second thing that really disturbs me a lot, the only
way that--well, there are two issues. The first thing is that
the Iraqi government must be formed, and it looks like they're
getting to that level. If we didn't form an Iraqi government,
if they didn't form their own government, it would seem to me
we would have civil war, and once there is civil war we have to
get out of there. I mean, we can't stay there and deal with the
issues.
But I see things there starting to change. I think one
reason is that the Sunnis understand now that they used to be
in charge, but they realize that if they're not at the table,
they will have severe problems with themselves, their children
and their grandchildren. And I think the Sunnis are starting to
see that al Qaeda, who they might have had a relationship with,
especially with Zarqawi, is starting to kill a lot of their own
people, their own Sunnis; and I think, as a result of that,
that's one of the reasons why they're coming to the table.
But I think one of the things that has to be done is that--
not only from our point of view but from their new government
point of view and from the Iraqi leadership, at this point you
have to win the hearts and minds of the people; and if those
people feel that their life was better under Saddam Hussein
than it was under the present conditions, then we've lost, and
you're not going to have what we're looking for in Iraq.
Now, in order to do that, we have to do a lot better in the
area of infrastructure and dealing with basic things,
transportation, education, potable water. I mean, these are
things that need to be done.
I was very disturbed--I had a briefing with the Army Corps
of Engineering while we were there about the lack--and this is
something that I hope you can focus on--is that we have
American contractors, some they're doing the job, some are not.
But we have American contractors who have been given contracts,
and they have not been held accountable for performance, and I
think it's almost unpatriotic.
We've heard issues about Halliburton, and there is a lot
there. There is a construction company right now, a major
construction company, one of the largest in this country, who
is contracted to build health centers, which are very relevant
and very important. And money has been paid to this contractor,
and yet they are not performing. That's inexcusable and it's
unacceptable, and I just think that we have to learn from our
past mistakes.
Any American company entering into a contract that has been
given this contract and they are not performing, we have to
make that an issue; and it is not being made an issue by the
Department of Defense the way it should be. They're slipping,
and they're making excuses that, well, it's a security issue.
Well, there are some contractors over there that are doing
the job, and there are some that are not. And I would like to
talk to you after this hearing about this one contracting
company, which is one of the largest in the country, that have
walked away, basically, from the issue of health centers, and
we can't allow that to happen. They should be fined, they
should be sued, we should do whatever we can to make them
start--to help them to produce.
The amount of money that has been wasted, millions and
maybe billions of dollars has been unaccountable from the
beginning with the Office of Special Plans, we need to learn
about that, and we can't have that structure anymore.
But now that we're trying to fix the infrastructure and
we're still having problems with our own American contractors,
I think we need to set up a system to deal with it. What is
your opinion on that?
Mr. Walker. My view is that there's been a tremendous
amount of waste and mismanagement with regard to contracting.
My view is that, with the Defense Department in particular,
there have been serious, long-standing systemic problems in the
contracting area where, irrespective of the results that are
achieved, that neither the executive branch nor the legislative
branch has held the appropriate people accountable. That means
both the contractors and the government officials who are
responsible.
Mr. Shays. Would the gentleman suspend for just a second?
Mr. Ruppersberger. Yes, I will yield.
Mr. Shays. I would say to you that you give us a list of
some contractors, some areas within DOD that need a look, and
we will have a hearing or a series of hearings on that. And the
sooner you provide it to us the sooner we will do it.
Mr. Walker. I'll give you a list.
Mr. Shays. Let me just tell you something. One of the
things that I think was the problem with choosing Halliburton
was there was this political effort to say, the Vice
President--I want to just get that out. I want you--whatever it
is--if Halliburton is on the list, whatever it is, I want you
to give this subcommittee a list of things that have just
irritated you, you're outraged by or whatever, or suspect
things, we will have a hearing. And I'll pledge to this
committee that we'll call them in, whatever it is; and let's
get the politics out it, to the extent that we can, and go for
it.
Mr. Walker. I'll do that.
I'll give you one example where I've had one hearing on the
Senate side but nothing on the House side yet, and that has to
do with incentive and award fees, the fact that we issued a
report in July of last year where the Defense Department paid
out 91 percent on average of available incentive and award fees
irrespective of the results as to cost, quality and
performance. There is a systemic, longstanding problem, and
it's not just Iraq.
Mr. Ruppersberger. Does the gentleman yield back?
Mr. Shays. Yes.
Mr. Ruppersberger. We agree. And you have to look at both
sides. To begin with, when we went into Iraq, there were
probably very few major corporations--and Halliburton is one.
They've done some good, and they've done some bad, but they
haven't been held accountable. And when you put these major
companies that want to make money--I mean, that's what they're
there for--that they have--there are some companies that would
not have been able to supply all the linen and all the things
that we need when we have a force. You need soap, you need
toilet paper, you need all these issues just to have a force,
wherever it is. But when they abuse that system and when there
is not--a lack of accountability, where our fault, both in
administration and Congress, we didn't set the standards. We
didn't set the standards, and then we didn't have anybody
overseeing them and holding them accountable for the standards,
not only from a performance point of view but also from a
financial point of view. I mean, performance audits, financial
audits, it wasn't there. And we got into it, and we allowed the
corporations to do it, and look what happened.
But where I'm concerned now--we have to learn from that in
the past. I'm concerned for right now and where we're going,
because we want to get our troops out of there as soon as we
can. We want to try to stabilize that country.
And what we are seeing now, what I'm seeing, is
contractors, large and major, that could do the job if they
wanted to, and they're using as an excuse the security. We can
provide the security in these certain areas and they can, too,
and that should be part of their contract to provide their
security. But when they don't do the job, we should cancel
every government contract they have over here and leverage it.
Why are we letting this system go forward where they're abusing
our equipment and taking our dollars?
And then, not only that, but I believe when you're over
there in a war zone, when our men and women are there and
you're over there as a contractor and you're not producing,
which slows down our process, it's unpatriotic.
And I applaud the chairman. I'm not mentioning any names
now because I don't think it's the right time, but I would love
to have this hearing. And I think it's very, very important.
You know, you get so frustrated in having these hearings
and nothing gets accomplished. We need to start focusing on
what is going on, who's abusing the process, making sure
they're being held accountable for performance and the moneys
they spend. And if they're not doing it we cut them off and we
penalize them and we aggressively pursue them.
Mr. Walker. And I think it's important to keep in mind that
some contractors are doing a very good job----
Mr. Ruppersberger. Some are.
Mr. Walker. Some aren't. And some do pluses or minuses. I
mean, sometimes the same contractor will be successful in some
areas and not successful in others.
The last thing I will mention on this is it is a shared
responsibility. In many cases, part of the problem is exactly
what you touched on: The government has not done a very good
job of being specific as to what we're looking for. What are
the requirements? What are we looking for? In the absence of
doing that, it's tough to hold people accountable. We've had
situations where, basically, we've let the contractor define
what they're going to provide, or where we keep on changing
what the requirements are such that it's almost impossible for
the contract to be successful.
I look forward to having the opportunity to focus on this
issue, not just with regard to Iraq but with regard to the
systemic problem, because it's serious.
Mr. Shays. Well, if a few years ago you couldn't audit one
trillion transactions--I guess it was more than one trillion,
wasn't it? I'm going back 4 or 5 years ago--you could not
audit. There was no audit trail.
Mr. Walker. The Defense Department remains the single
largest obstacle to the U.S. Government being able to
successfully withstand an audit.
Mr. Shays. Mr. Van Hollen.
Mr. Van Hollen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I think it's very important that we do hold hearings in
that area, and I was pleased to see you want to explore that
area. Because, in response to your original questions from Mr.
Waxman, I remember you said that. And I think most people would
sort of say, well, look, we know we've got problems in Iraq,
we've heard about the Halliburtons and the other problems in
Iraq, but to say that it's simply part of a larger problem with
DOD contracting I think is something that most people are not
aware of. And I think it's very important that we get to the
bottom of that, especially given the huge amount of money we
invest of our taxpayers' money in the area of defense.
And it does lead to a question I had with respect to the
role of the Inspector General at DOD. I know it's maybe hard
for one Inspector General to comment on the performance of the
other, but it does beg the question if there are all these
serious problems with respect to contracting at the Department
of Defense, why is it that the Inspector General at the
Department of Defense has not uncovered more of these abuses?
Have they? We just haven't heard about them?
We know that with respect to Iraq--and we had a hearing in
this subcommittee a while ago and we learned that because there
was a special Inspector General created for Iraq the Inspector
General for DOD decided not to put any people on the ground in
Iraq, that their reports were based on essentially secondhand
information--or not information direct, day-to-day on the
ground. And many of the members of this subcommittee were very
surprised to learn that they didn't have a presence on the
ground. We realize that there is a special Inspector General,
but for the DOD Inspector General not to have people on the
ground at least as of that time, which was October of last
year, was something I think shocked many of us.
So if you could comment on whether that system is broken at
the Department of Defense, both with respect to Iraq and the
oversight there, and more generally.
Mr. Walker. Well, first, you properly point out, Mr. Van
Hollen, that there is a special Inspector General in Iraq,
SIGIR, which is referred to for reconstruction. That's not for
everything. And that comes to the point that you're trying to
make, is what is really important is that we recognize that
there are a whole range of needs for oversight and
accountability, both for positive performance and to assure
appropriate accountability.
SIGIR is onsite. They have people both in Iraq as well as
back here. They have the most front-line presence with regard
to the accountability community.
DOD and others have had people there from time to time. We
have had people there from time to time. We have committed that
we are going to open an office, a small office, in Baghdad. We
are in the process of taking steps to be able to do that, to be
able to have some continuing presence there, to be able to
project people in from time to time.
At the time that I was there last, which was the end of
January, early February, DOD, I do not believe, had a recurring
presence there. They would send people in from time to time.
I think you're raising a legitimate point, that there needs
to be more done in order to assure who is covering what to make
sure that we are minimizing duplication but also minimizing
gaps.
Mr. Van Hollen. Right. Well, I mean, as you point out, the
SIGIR's responsibility covers the reconstruction effort. The
bulk of the dollars--although we spent significant money on
reconstruction, we spent even more on nonreconstruction efforts
in Iraq in military operations and other procurement efforts
going on there.
Frankly, I'm very pleased to hear you're going to have a
presence on the ground. For us to discover that even to this
day the Inspector General for the Department of Defense does
not have people on the ground in Iraq regularly is, I think,
very disconcerting and something, Mr. Chairman, I think we
should address as a committee. And I would be happy to defer--
--
Mr. Shays. Thank you. I just want to say that this was a
question raised when we had the Inspector Generals, and we
received notice from the Inspector Generals that in their
judgment they had made a mistake. They are setting up an
operation in Kuwait, which to me is fine as long as they then
are in the theater. If they're in Kuwait, we have operations
all in that area, in Qatar and elsewhere.
But what is surprising to me is, when I thought about it,
their explanation was we have an Inspector General; we don't
need to be there. But, as you point out, it is only for
reconstruction. So it was a mistake. They acknowledge it. They
are there now because of questions you and others raised.
Mr. Walker. If I could clarify for the record, Mr. Chairman
and Mr. Van Hollen, we are dedicated to having a physical
presence in the region. Our presence is Baghdad. We are looking
at other options. We haven't dotted the I's and crossed the
T's, but we're committed to having a continuing presence. We
would prefer the Green Zone in Baghdad.
Mr. Van Hollen. But just very briefly, since you made what
I think is a very important point and something the
subcommittee is going to be following up on with respect to
contracting and procurement problems, abuses and wastes at the
Department of Defense, is it that the Inspector General's
office there is not adequately--does not have adequate work
force, does not have the resources? I mean, why, given the--why
are they still on your watchlist? Why are they the No. 1 worst
performer in the U.S. Government, and why isn't the IG's office
doing more about it?
Mr. Walker. Because neither the executive branch nor the
legislative branch has held DOD accountable for years.
Mr. Van Hollen. Well, I would agree with you, as I said in
my earlier remarks, that there has not been adequate oversight
from Congress, No. 1. No. 2, I would hope--part of the purpose
of having these independent Inspector Generals in these
agencies like DOD is so that they have the freedom and the
autonomy to uncover some of this, and it's disconcerting to
learn that they have not. I'm drawing my own conclusions based
on your testimony, but clearly they've not been doing an
adequate job there.
Let me just ask one--there was some discussion a while ago
about the fact that we had contracted out some of the
interrogation efforts and things connected with torture--in
fact, a Virginia company, CACI, was one of the ones that
received that contract. Have you looked into that issue any
more? Are we still contracting out interrogation services?
Mr. Walker. I'll followup with regard to that level of
specificity and provide it for the record.
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Mr. Walker. But I will tell you that was an example of an
abuse of an interagency contracting arrangement. It's an area
that is getting a lot more attention by us. It's a situation
where there was a contract that was piggy-backed on to provide
services that were not clearly provided for under that
contract, and it really kind of puts a face on the overall
issue.
Mr. Van Hollen. They were just on some list, as I
understand, and therefore all of a sudden they were deemed
eligible to receive this much larger----
Mr. Walker. Well, I think this is an important point.
Congress has passed a number of reforms in the contracting area
which have had positive consequences, but some problems have
occurred. We have been able to eliminate a lot of paperwork.
We've been able to get things done quicker. But in some
situations we provided flexibilities where people have not
always properly implemented those flexibilities and there have
been some abuses, and this is one example, and it is one of
many that are on our high-risk list. The DOD has 14 of 25 high-
risk areas, either direct or indirect; and many of them have
been on for many, many years.
Mr. Van Hollen. Well, thank you; and thank you, Mr.
Chairman. I look forward to pursuing those issues.
Mr. Shays. I thank you, Mr. Van Hollen.
Let me just conclude by asking you, Mr. Walker, one, is
there a question or area we should have gone into that we
didn't that you want to address? No. 2, I would appreciate just
a very brief summary of your bottom line point in coming here
today to make sure that, in the course of our asking these
questions, we're not losing your bottom line point.
Mr. Walker. Well, the bottom line--I will repeat my final
paragraph, which I think sums it up.
Collectively, Iraq's future requires strong Iraqi
leadership, sustained U.S. commitment, and a re-engaged
international community. More needs to be done to help the
Iraqis help themselves build capable government institutions
that can deliver real results that benefit all of the Iraqi
people. All of these steps will be essential in order to
achieve real success in a reasonably timely and sustainable
manner.
Mr. Shays. Thank you. I think that is very helpful
testimony today. We again applaud the work of you and your
team. It is highly professional and well respected by Congress.
Thank you very much.
Mr. Walker. Thank you.
Mr. Shays. This hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:52 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]