[House Hearing, 109 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
THE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCE ICEBREAKER REPORT
=======================================================================
(109-99)
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
COAST GUARD AND MARITIME TRANSPORTATION
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON
TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
SEPTEMBER 26, 2006
__________
Printed for the use of the
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COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE
DON YOUNG, Alaska, Chairman
THOMAS E. PETRI, Wisconsin, Vice- JAMES L. OBERSTAR, Minnesota
Chair NICK J. RAHALL, II, West Virginia
SHERWOOD L. BOEHLERT, New York PETER A. DeFAZIO, Oregon
HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina JERRY F. COSTELLO, Illinois
JOHN J. DUNCAN, Jr., Tennessee ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of
WAYNE T. GILCHREST, Maryland Columbia
JOHN L. MICA, Florida JERROLD NADLER, New York
PETER HOEKSTRA, Michigan CORRINE BROWN, Florida
VERNON J. EHLERS, Michigan BOB FILNER, California
SPENCER BACHUS, Alabama EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas
STEVEN C. LaTOURETTE, Ohio GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi
SUE W. KELLY, New York JUANITA MILLENDER-McDONALD,
RICHARD H. BAKER, Louisiana California
ROBERT W. NEY, Ohio ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland
FRANK A. LoBIONDO, New Jersey EARL BLUMENAUER, Oregon
JERRY MORAN, Kansas ELLEN O. TAUSCHER, California
GARY G. MILLER, California BILL PASCRELL, Jr., New Jersey
ROBIN HAYES, North Carolina LEONARD L. BOSWELL, Iowa
ROB SIMMONS, Connecticut TIM HOLDEN, Pennsylvania
HENRY E. BROWN, Jr., South Carolina BRIAN BAIRD, Washington
TIMOTHY V. JOHNSON, Illinois SHELLEY BERKLEY, Nevada
TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania JIM MATHESON, Utah
SAM GRAVES, Missouri MICHAEL M. HONDA, California
MARK R. KENNEDY, Minnesota RICK LARSEN, Washington
BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania MICHAEL E. CAPUANO, Massachusetts
JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas ANTHONY D. WEINER, New York
JIM GERLACH, Pennsylvania JULIA CARSON, Indiana
MARIO DIAZ-BALART, Florida TIMOTHY H. BISHOP, New York
JON C. PORTER, Nevada MICHAEL H. MICHAUD, Maine
TOM OSBORNE, Nebraska LINCOLN DAVIS, Tennessee
KENNY MARCHANT, Texas BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky
MICHAEL E. SODREL, Indiana BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
CHARLES W. DENT, Pennsylvania RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri
TED POE, Texas ALLYSON Y. SCHWARTZ, Pennsylvania
DAVID G. REICHERT, Washington JOHN T. SALAZAR, Colorado
CONNIE MACK, Florida JOHN BARROW, Georgia
JOHN R. `RANDY' KUHL, Jr., New York
LUIS G. FORTUNO, Puerto Rico
LYNN A. WESTMORELAND, Georgia
CHARLES W. BOUSTANY, Jr., Louisiana
JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio
(ii)
SUBCOMMITTEE ON COAST GUARD AND MARITIME TRANSPORTATION
FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey, Chairman
HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina BOB FILNER, California, Ranking
WAYNE T. GILCHREST, Maryland Democrat
PETER HOEKSTRA, Michigan CORRINE BROWN, Florida
ROB SIMMONS, Connecticut GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi
MARIO DIAZ-BALART, Florida JUANITA MILLENDER-McDONALD,
DAVID G. REICHERT, Washington,Vice- California
Chair MICHAEL M. HONDA, California
CONNIE MACK, Florida ANTHONY D. WEINER, New York
LUIS G. FORTUNO, Puerto Rico BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
CHARLES W. BOUSTANY, Jr., Louisiana BRIAN BAIRD, Washington
DON YOUNG, Alaska JAMES L. OBERSTAR, Minnesota
(Ex Officio) (Ex Officio)
(iii)
CONTENTS
TESTIMONY
Page
Bement, Dr. Arden L., Jr., Director, National Science Foundation 2
Jones, Anita K., Chair, Polar Research Board, Committee to
Assess U.S. Coast Guard Polar Icebreaker Roles and Future
Needs, the National Academies.................................. 2
Nimmich, Rear Admiral Joseph L., Assistant Commandant for Policy
and Planning, U.S. Coast Guard................................. 2
Treadwell, Mead, Chairman, U.S. Arctic Research Commission...... 2
PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Filner, Hon. Bob. of California.................................. 29
LoBiondo, Hon. Frank A., of New Jersey........................... 43
Young, Hon. Don, of Alaska....................................... 54
PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED BY WITNESSES
Bement, Dr. Arden L., Jr........................................ 21
Jones, Anita K.................................................. 31
Nimmich, Rear Admiral Joseph L.................................. 44
Treadwell, Mead................................................. 49
SUBMISSION FOR THE RECORD
Nimmich, Rear Admiral Joseph L., Assistant Commandant for Policy
and Planning, U.S. Coast Guard, Mission Analysis Report: Polar
Ice Operations, June 10, 2005 (located in subcommittee file)
THE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCE ICEBREAKER REPORT
----------
Tuesday, September 26, 2006,
House of Representatives, Committee on
Transportation and Infrastructure, Subcommittee
on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation,
Washington, D.C.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 1:05 p.m., in
room 2167, Rayburn House Office Building, the Honorable Frank
A. LoBiondo [Chairman of the subcommittee] presiding.
Mr. Young. [Presiding] The Committee will come to order.
I do apologize to my Chairman, but he is not here right now
and because my time is short, we are going to go ahead and
start this fine testimony about icebreakers.
I would like to welcome the witnesses: Mr. Mead Treadwell,
an Alaskan, Dr. Bement, Rear Admiral Nimmich, and Dr. Jones.
Welcome to the hearing.
Personally, I will have to tell you I am extremely
interested in the icebreakers, where they are stationed, what
is the future, what are our plans, primarily because of the
``global warming.'' With all the negativism that is occurring,
we also have to look at the positive side that there is a
strong possibility that the northern part of our hemisphere
will be connected with the European continent via water for
year-round trade and traffic which would be a tremendous asset
because we would be able to move product without the
expenditure of fossil fuel which now occurs. In fact, it will
be a bit shorter to the two greatest markets in the world which
would be Russia and the United States. I am very much
interested in what you have to present to me today.
Again, I am a little bit concerned about the diminishing
role. I would like to promote the role of icebreakers instead
of diminishing the role, and I try to encourage the people in
the Administration to understand that there is a future to look
at, and we must not be dependent upon just other countries. We
have to be deeply involved in the icebreaking capability.
With that, I would like to call Dr. Jones to be the first
witness. Doctor, again, welcome.
TESTIMONY OF ANITA K. JONES, CHAIR, POLAR RESEARCH BOARD,
COMMITTEE TO ASSESS U.S. COAST GUARD POLAR ICEBREAKER ROLES AND
FUTURE NEEDS, THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES; REAR ADMIRAL JOSEPH L.
NIMMICH, ASSISTANT COMMANDANT FOR POLICY AND PLANNING, UNITED
STATES COAST GUARD; ARDEN L. BEMENT, JR., DIRECTOR, NATIONAL
SCIENCE FOUNDATION; MEAD TREADWELL, CHAIRMAN, U.S. ARCTIC
RESEARCH COMMISSION
Ms. Jones. Thank you. Good afternoon, Congressman Young,
members of the Subcommittee, and staff. Thank you for inviting
me to speak to you today about the current and future roles of
the U.S. Coast Guard icebreaking operations and to explain the
importance of the capability to the national needs.
My name is Anita Jones. I serve as the Chair of the
National Academies' Committee to Assess U.S. Coast Guard Polar
Icebreaker Roles and Future Needs. Our committee was asked to
provide a comprehensive assessment of polar icebreaker
missions, how these missions might change over time, and how we
can reliably meet all national needs, given the state of our
icebreaker fleet.
First, I will summarize our findings and conclusions of the
just completed study. The U.S. Coast Guard Polar Icebreaker
Fleet has substantially diminished capability. The committee
finds that the national strategic interests require that the
Nation renew that fleet to be able to operate in both polar
regions reliably and at will. We find that the Nation continues
to need to have the capability to project an active influential
presence for different reasons in the two polar regions. That
need is growing in the Arctic. The Nation should continue to be
a leader in polar region research.
The icebreaker fleet needs to be renewed by building two
new ships, a transition from the current diminished capability
to a robust icebreaking capability should be planned. The U.S.
Coast Guard should be budgeted to operate and maintain this
multi-mission fleet. Lastly, a Presidential decision directive
should be issued to reassert our interests, to clearly state
what has changed, and to clearly align agency responsibility
and budgetary authorities.
Now, I would like to elaborate on just a few of these
issues. Again, to achieve the national purposes, the Nation
needs to be able to access various sites at different times of
the year reliably and at will, and that assured access requires
icebreaking ships capable of operating in challenging ice
conditions. Over the past couple of decades, the Government has
deployed a fleet of four icebreakers and three multi-mission
ships operated by the Coast Guard. By multi-mission, I mean
that they support the conduct of science as well as the
missions of the Coast Guard, Homeland Security, maritime
safety, national security, and protection of natural resources.
In addition, the National Science Foundation operates a single
mission ship that is solely dedicated to scientific research.
Today, two of the multi-mission ships, the Polar Star and
the Polar Sea, are at the end of their service life, 30 years.
Deferred maintenance, absence of an upgrade program to extend
their lifetime, and lack of replacement has left the U.S. with
a multi-mission fleet of one ship, and the U.S. is at risk of
being unable to meet its interests in the polar region,
particularly in the Arctic. In the Arctic, the ice pack has
thinned and retreated dramatically.
This committee anticipates greater human presence in the
Arctic with increased economic activity, as you alluded to. Oil
companies have purchased a large number of leases in the sea
and on the land of the Alaskan North Slope. Adventure travel to
the North increases. The number of ice-strengthened tankers in
the world will shortly double, incurring new traffic across the
north of Russia and through the Bering Strait, we expect.
Mining will be more cost-effective in Northern Alaska as ice
retreat allows longer periods to load ore ships.
Greater human activity will increase the need for the Coast
Guard to assert a more active and influential presence in the
Arctic to protect the Nation's economic, scientific,
environmental, and foreign policy interests. This requires the
use of icebreakers. The retreat of the sea margin is not
uniform or predictable. Conditions may become more or less
difficult. In our conversations with the Coast Guard, they have
told us that they consider this their mission and actually look
forward to it.
The many needs that are documented in our report lead the
committee to conclude that the Nation requires a multi-mission
fleet. From a national point of view, from a national policy
point of view, the Coast Guard missions transcend the support
of science, but science missions are quite complementary. This
has been demonstrated admirably both with science missions on
the Healy and McMurdo break-ins using the Polar Sea and the
Polar Star.
While McMurdo break-in does not have to be performed by a
military service, the break-in does require a reliably
controlled ship. This committee concluded that that means U.S.-
owned, U.S.-operated, and U.S.-flagged. However, performing
McMurdo break-in is compatible with the other demands on the
multi-mission Coast Guard fleet, and the committee notes that a
Coast Guard asserts a tangible U.S. presence; a leased ship
does not.
So, from the total fleet perspective, the committee
believes that the Coast Guard should operate this multi-mission
fleet, that it should be provided sufficient resources and
maintenance budget to support an increased regular and
influential presence in the Arctic. The committee believes that
it will be cost-effective to the Nation if the science users
reimburse incremental costs associated with directed mission
tasking, a relationship that has worked very well in the past.
Our report documents why we recommend new ship construction
rather than upgrading existing ships, and we document the need
for two new icebreakers, not one and not zero. These ships
would be deployed solo and in concert for science missions,
including going into the North Pole area and the deep Antarctic
ice, logistics resupply to McMurdo, undersea continental shelf
mapping to either support or refute territorial claims in the
Arctic, command in case of a petroleum spill situation, search
and rescue, economic activity, and more. With three ships,
simultaneous deployment in both polar regions is possible, even
in heavy ice conditions.
This committee believes that the U.S. Coast Guard should
reestablish a regular active patrol presence in the Arctic
waters to meet statutory responsibilities that inevitably
derive from increased human activity. A single ship will not
assert the presence and will not allow us to go reliably and at
will where we need to go.
The report details how we would transition to those new
ships. Our capabilities have diminished. We would rely on the
Polar Sea being kept mission-capable until new ships come in
with the Polar Star in caretaker status. In conclusion,
Congressman Young, the Nation has a problem. Diminished polar
icebreaking capability at a time when new and vital demands for
such missions are rising in the Arctic. Funding has been less
than adequate over recent years. Funding has been recently
moved between agencies. Either Congress or the Administration
or both needs to address this problem. In our report in our
recommendations, we offer what we believe is an appropriate
solution.
Finally, the committee recommends that a Presidential
decision directive be issued to reassert U.S. interests in the
polar regions, to assert that polar icebreakers are essential
instruments of U.S. National Policy and to clearly align agency
responsibilities and budgetary authorities.
Thank you, sir.
Mr. Young. Thank you, Doctor, and may I compliment you and
the committee on the report. We asked for this report. If it
had been the other way around, I probably wouldn't be
complimenting you.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Young. It reinstates what I have said publicly and
privately to the Administration, the importance of this
mission. I did encourage you. The committee was freestanding. I
just like what I have read and what has been recommended, and I
hope that somewhere along the line that Congress will wake up
to the importance of this for the future.
Admiral?
Admiral Nimmich. Chairman Young, distinguished members of
the Committee, thank you for this opportunity to discuss the
Coast Guard polar icebreaking mission.
Mr. Chairman, the Coast Guard can trace its polar
icebreaking roots at least back to 1867 when President Andrew
Johnson dispatched one of our cutters to research and chart the
coastal waters of the 30,000 miles of Alaskan coastline and
simultaneously enforce laws and ensure the safety of the new
Americans in the newly acquired territory. We accompanied
Admiral Byrd's expedition to the South Pole and for many years
ran parallel icebreaking fleets with the United States Navy.
In 1967, President Lyndon Johnson directed all of the
Federal icebreaking resources be turned over to the Coast Guard
to operate on behalf of the entire United States Government.
The role was reaffirmed in 1990, a Presidential declaration,
and validated more recently by the 1999 roles and mission study
of the U.S. Coast Guard.
The national requirements for polar icebreaking capability
that the Coast Guard has historically provided fall into three
distinct but equally important performance classifications:
direct mission tasking or scientific support; traditional Coast
Guard mission executions, search and rescue, and environmental
protection; and sovereign national presence and force
protection. The Coast Guard's polar program, embodied in these
three areas, has afforded the United States the opportunity to
operate in both polar regions, making a prominent contribution
to the continued and expanded national interest in these remote
regions.
This presence is especially vital, given the projections
for expanded shipping and commerce in the Arctic. The National
Research Council report and the related research suggest 25
percent of the world's energy reserves lie above the Arctic
Circle. Similarly, the number of offerings of Arctic excursions
indicating tremendous growth in the ecotourism in this remote
area. Ensuring safety of our citizens, security of our Nation,
and the stewardship of our national resources will require a
combination of icebreaking capability and enforcement
authorities.
If on review of the National Research Council's report, the
Administration and Congress decide a Federal polar icebreaking
program is in the best interest of the United States and
further decide that the Coast Guard should manage the execution
of the mission, consistent with our current authorities, we are
prepared to do so. We will continue in smart fashion to meet
every operational mission requirement as we have since 1964
when all of the polar icebreaking assets were entrusted to our
care.
Our resolve is to provide the safety, security, and
stewardship throughout the entire national maritime domain and
advance our Nation's maritime interests including those in the
polar regions. The Coast Guard will continue to partner closely
with the National Science Foundation to support future
scientific activities to the fullest extent possible while
simultaneously affording the Nation our full and considerable
range of capabilities as well as sovereign value of a military
vessel of the United States.
Like you, we have just received the report of the National
Research Council, and we look forward to discussing their
recommendations and working towards important national
outcomes.
Thank you for the opportunity to provide this testimony. I
ask that you allow my full written statement to be entered into
the record, and I look forward to answering any questions you
may have.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Young. Thank you, Admiral, good presentation.
Dr. Bement? It is my understanding, though, Dr. Treadwell
and Dr. Bement both have a testimony at 3:00 on the Senate
side. OK; that is one reason I started this.
For your information, we do have a vote on, and none of you
really care about this vote. But Mr. Treadwell, will you go
back home and tell them I am doing the work, so you don't have
to sit here and do nothing for hours and hours. I am going to
miss this vote because I think this is more important.
Icebreakers are more important than voting on the Minority's
motion to resolve into a secret session. I thought we were for
open Government, for goodness sakes.
Yes, sir?
Mr. Filner. Reserving the right to object.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Young. Dr. Bement, please.
Mr. Bement. Thank you, Chairman Young and Ranking Member
Filner. I am pleased to appear before this Subcommittee for the
first time to speak on behalf of the National Science
Foundation.
NSF is an extraordinary agency with an equally
extraordinary mission of enabling discovery, supporting
education, and driving innovation, all in the service of
society and the Nation. In addition, the Foundation has been
tasked with chairing the Interagency Arctic Research Policy
Committee created under Federal statute to coordinate Arctic
research sponsored by Federal agencies. NSF also manages the
U.S. Antarctic Program on behalf of the U.S. Government as
directed by Presidential Memorandum 6646 issued in 1982.
The Arctic and Antarctic are premier natural laboratories.
Their extreme environments and geographically unique settings
permit research on fundamental phenomena and processes not
feasible elsewhere. Polar research depends heavily on ships
capable of operating in ice-covered regions. They serve as
research platforms in the Arctic and southern oceans and as key
components of the logistics chain supporting on-continent
research in Antarctica. As a principal source of U.S. support
for fundamental research in these regions, NSF is the primary
customer of polar icebreaker and ice-strengthened vessel
services for scientific research purposes.
NSF's responsibilities take somewhat different forms in the
Arctic and in the Antarctic. My written testimony explains in
detail how icebreaker requirements differ in each region, but
in both cases, the question of how best to meet these
responsibilities boils down to consideration of three factors:
cost, performance, and policy.
With respect to support for Arctic research, the Healy is a
capable and relatively new ship, but current Coast Guard
practices governing its use and operating costs put limitations
on its effectiveness as an Arctic research platform. For
example, current deployment standards allow Healy to spend only
200 days at sea annually, averaging 100 days less than her
international partners. Additionally, the Healy costs roughly
$100,000 per day at sea, and in contrast, the lease price to
NSF of the Louis St. Laurent, Canada's largest icebreaker is
$35,000 per day. As I have already stated, the Healy is a
capable ship. If she could be operated more efficiently, she
would be of even more value to the research community.
Antarctic ship-based research and Palmer Station resupply
depend primarily on two privately owned vessels: the Laurence
M. Gould and the Nathanial B. Palmer. These ships are well-
equipped for their mission and they operate at sea more than
300 days annually at a daily rate of roughly $24,000 and
$54,000 respectively.
The operation of McMurdo and South Pole Stations require
the annual delivery of fuel and supplies by sea. To fulfill
this requirement, NSF has long depended on the U.S. Coast Guard
Polar Sea and Polar Star to break out the thick ice in McMurdo
Sound. As these two ships are at, or close to, the end of their
service life, however, these national assets have become
extremely expensive to maintain and operate. In just the past
two years alone, NSF has spent roughly $20 million on
extraordinary maintenance. It is clear that the polar
icebreakers are a fragile resource that could jeopardize the
critical foreign policy and scientific objectives in the
Antarctic.
The overriding question is how to open the channel to
McMurdo Station so that year-round operation of the Nation's
McMurdo and South Pole Stations. This year-round occupation is
central to demonstrating the active and influential presence
which is a cornerstone of U.S. policy in Antarctica. As noted
in the National Academy report, meeting this requirement is a
significant national challenge.
Accordingly, and after consultations with officials in OSTP
and OMB, I wrote on May 31st, 2006, to Dr. Jones in her role as
Chair of the NRC icebreaker study, as follows: Given the
rapidly escalating costs of Government providers for
icebreaking services and the uncertain availability of U.S.
Coast Guard icebreakers beyond the next two years, it is NSF's
intention to seek competitive bids for icebreaking services
that support the broad goals of the U.S. Arctic Program. This
competition would be open to commercial, Government, and
international service providers.
Mr. Chairman, NSF's commitment to polar research as well as
its responsibility to manage the U.S. Antarctic Program are
unchanging. We only seek the flexibility to do so in the most
cost-effective manner possible. We are pleased to see that, in
broad terms, the NRC study released today recognizes our
constraints.
I appreciate the opportunity to appear before the
Subcommittee, and I would be pleased to answer any questions
you may have. Thank you.
Mr. Young. Mr. Treadwell, a good Alaskan, would you present
your testimony?
Mr. Treadwell. Chairman Young, Chairman LoBiondo, thank you
for the opportunity to testify before the Subcommittee.
My name is Mead Treadwell. I am from Anchorage, Alaska. I
have been a member of the Arctic Research Commission since
2001, and this is my first testimony as the Chair of the
commission, designated by the President earlier this summer. I
also serve and I am delighted to serve with Dr. Bement who
chairs the Interagency Arctic Research Policy Committee which
our commission works closely with in formulating Arctic policy.
I should also state that while I am appointed by the
President, my remarks have not been cleared by the Office of
Management and Budget.
Also, I would just like to dedicate my remarks to two crew
members of the Coast Guard icebreaker Healy who died this
summer in the conduct of Arctic research and to their families.
Lieutenant Jessica Hill and Steven Duque, both divers, should
be remembered for the contribution and sacrifice they made in
the quest for Arctic knowledge.
As far as this study, the commission worked with the
Committee as you sought this study and worked with the Academy
to see it happen, the National Research Council. As the report
has just been publicly released, we will require more time to
study it ourselves. Based on our preliminary understanding, the
Arctic Research Commission supports its conclusions, especially
one, the need to continue to lead in polar research and two,
the need to begin now to replace the polar class vessels for
all of the reasons that were given in the report.
The United States has been a polar country since 1867, and
we are a leading nation in Arctic research. With respect to
icebreakers and the Federal icebreaking mission, we work with
other agencies to make sure that these icebreaker platforms can
be used for research, and we have also worked with the agencies
and the Congress to make sure that the future of Arctic
shipping, as it is changing, is considered. Just in the way of
that, Mr. Chairman, the Commission sponsored a report called
the Arctic Marine Transport Workshop. It was a report done a
few years ago, looking at the potential future of shipping in
the Arctic which you alluded to. We also co-sponsored a report
called Advancing Oil Spill Response in Ice-Covered Waters, both
of which reflect this today.
The statute that sets up our commission as well as the
Interagency Arctic Research Policy Committee says that the
Office of Management and Budget shall seek to facilitate
planning for the design, procurement, maintenance, deployment,
and operations of icebreakers needed to provide a platform for
Arctic research by allocating all funds necessary to support
icebreaking operations, except for recurring incremental costs
associated with specific projects, to the Coast Guard.
Mr. Chairman, this report takes issue with a recent
decision by OMB to shift funding to NSF and, in fact, argues
that incremental costs should be borne by the science community
or other communities and that the main costs should go back to
the Coast Guard. I think one of the most important conclusions
of this is that a Presidential decision document on icebreakers
ought to be considered here as there hasn't been one for many
years, almost two decades, and that we ought to really
seriously look at this issue of how icebreakers and icebreaker
operations are funded.
While scientific research may be our particular purview, we
also recognize that a fleet of icebreakers is a vital part of
the Nation's strategic presence in the polar regions. Climate
change is presenting both challenges and opportunities such as
improved prospects for research, enhanced access to natural
resources, and favorable circumstances for marine
transportation. One thing this report points out, Mr. Chairman,
is that it is not just climate change that is making the Arctic
Ocean more accessible; it is technology. In fact, one of the
reasons why the National Research Council recommended building
new icebreakers as opposed to refurbishing the two that we have
is because of the dramatic changes in the technology that other
vessels such as commercial vessels will already be using.
Attached to my written testimony is a letter the Commission
sent to the President last year on icebreakers, but we have
four specific points. One, these icebreakers are vital for
scientific research. If the U.S. is to continue to lead, we
need this icebreaking capability and shouldn't a Federal
icebreaking fleet be supporting our research and polar
interests.
Second, the icebreakers maintain our national presence in
both the Arctic and the Antarctic. We are hearing a lot from
Canada's Prime Minister about sovereignty issues in the North.
We are working with the State Department to try to develop a
better mapping program for our potential claims outside the
200-mile limit there, and we need icebreaker platforms to get
there. We also have a growing need for an oil spill response
system in the Arctic, which requires icebreaker support.
Third, marine access and shipping are increasing. We are
going to see a large part of America's oil supply come out of
the Arctic in the years to come. As Arctic sea ice disappears,
marine access will open up. Mr. Chairman, you and I have had
discussions. The cost of a few icebreakers is very small
compared to building a new Panama Canal or building a Suez
Canal, and having the icebreaker capability to support commerce
ultimately is a low cost relatively for the Country.
Finally, as I mentioned before, claims to extend U.S.
sovereignty in the Arctic is another point the Commission has
made. Whether or not the U.S. accedes to the Convention on the
Law of the Sea, we must conduct surveys of our Nation's
extended continental shelf in order to support our claims of
sovereignty, and there is no other platform that can do this.
We have looked at the submarines, and they can be very, very
helpful, but we need the icebreaker platforms to make this go.
With that, I will conclude, but I want to underscore the
issue which Chairman Bement brought to you, that the daily
operational cost of $100,000 for the Healy puts science and
scientists in a bind. I think we need to look at these funding
issues and the costs and try to balance the costs of these
missions and the other factors, and I believe that is why the
National Research Council report needs to be dealt with fairly
quickly.
Mr. Young. I want to thank the panel.
Dr. Bement, under the present proposal and actually last
year's activity, how much money did you transfer to the Coast
Guard for Coast Guard icebreaker maintenance and improvement?
Mr. Bement. Well, in Fiscal Year 2006, we received $47
million from the Coast Guard under transfer in order to fulfill
total O and M requirements.
Mr. Young. Pardon me; the Coast Guard received $47 million?
Mr. Bement. We received that from the Coast Guard.
Mr. Young. Wait a minute; the Coast Guard, you gave them
the money?
Admiral Nimmich. Sir, in the 2006 appropriations, the base
transfer of 47, almost $48 million went out of the Coast
Guard's budget into NSF's budget with their agreement that NSF
then would repay.
Mr. Young. That is what I wanted; 48. Now, Doctor, how much
was transferred back to Coast Guard for maintenance of the
cutters?
Mr. Bement. Close to $55 million.
Mr. Young. Fifty-five, is that correct, Admiral?
Admiral Nimmich. To date, $51.9 million has transferred
with a commitment up to about $54 million in 2006, and 2007,
the commitment is to $57 million. But what I would point out,
Mr. Chairman, is that the base transfer that went over didn't
include the normal non-recurring funding that NSF would send
back to the Coast Guard. So we are pretty much at a zero sum
game at this point in time, sir.
Mr. Young. The Coast Guard?
Admiral Nimmich. Yes, sir.
Mr. Young. Now, Doctor, the other thing is how much did you
pay the Russian sub that broke down for the Antarctica
icebreaker?
Mr. Bement. You are talking about this past year?
Mr. Young. Yes.
Mr. Bement. Where the Russian icebreaker broke a blade ff
the stern?
Mr. Young. Yes.
Mr. Bement. Just a moment; the total cost, I can't give you
the exact cost to repair the blade of the ship, but the total
cost of commissioning that ship was $8 million.
Mr. Young. Eight million; what was the yearly contract, $8
million, or what was the yearly contract for that icebreaker?
Mr. Bement. We don't have an annual contract. We only
contracted for the time that we were actually using the ship in
the Antarctic, and that was $8 million.
Mr. Young. Well, what I am leading up to is if the Healy is
not operative and the Polar Star, if you go out, as you
mentioned in your testimony, you are going out to fulfill the
science research. You are going out and actually leasing or
contracting to a foreign country, not U.S.-flagged, icebreaking
capability, what are your estimates of expenditures?
Mr. Bement. Generally speaking, our experience in leasing
icebreaker services from foreign ships is about anywhere from
$6 million to $8 million a year because they only operate
during the time that they are required. Our memorandum of
agreement with the Coast Guard is that we pay total annual
costs for operation and maintenance, total crew costs, and
those costs can be a size I indicated, including unusual
maintenance costs.
Mr. Young. Again, I might have read it. But I do believe
before I can cast any stones which I very rarely do because
this uses ballast usually on my watch, to my whiner, excuse me,
Mr. Filner.
Doctor, my interest, of course, is having American-flagged
icebreakers for not only research which is the thing now, but
as that research occurs, I think we ought to have these
American-flagged icebreakers for commerce, and that is our
responsibility. We have to decide in this Congress. If we don't
have them American-flagged, then it goes to somebody else.
I just talked to my staffer here, and I will talk to you,
Mr. Filner. I think we ought to have Filner Young and Rayfield
Icebreakers, Incorporated. We may not see much of it, but our
great grandkids probably would be multi-billionaires. That is
the next highway.
Mr. Bement. Mr. Chairman?
Mr. Young. Yes.
Mr. Bement. I am fully in agreement with your goal and
fully support it. We have worked with the Coast Guard for over
four decades, and the Coast Guard has fulfilled their mission
with distinction over that period of time. So we have a very
close working relationship. But the issue we are dealing with
very fragile resources at this point that are very expensive to
maintain.
Mr. Young. We need to get you more money.
Mr. Bement. Yes.
Mr. Young. That solves the problem.
Mr. Bement. That is right. The point is we also have a
requirement under Presidential memorandum that we should
operate in the most cost-effective way. So we have this
dichotomy.
Furthermore, it is very risky to operate with a single
icebreaker because there can be breakdowns. So you always have
to consider having a backup ship.
Mr. Young. You need three or four?
Mr. Bement. Well, we need two.
Mr. Young. We need three or four.
Mr. Bement. Oh, well, if you are talking about-
Mr. Young. I am not much interested in the Antarctic, but I
am more interested in the Arctic.
Mr. Bement. I totally agree with the NRC report, and if you
are talking about what the fleet size should be, I would agree.
Mr. Young. Again, I thank the staff.
Mr. Chairman, would you mind sitting in my warm seat for a
while? I will have to leave you right now.
Mr. LoBiondo. [Presiding] Mr. Filner?
Mr. Filner. I thank the Chair.
Mr. LoBiondo. You are up.
Mr. Filner. I am sorry. I thank Mr. Young for being here.
I was going to ask him why they would need the icebreakers
in his area since the liberal plot of global warming may
alleviate the needs. I am glad you all accept it. The way I
heard your testimony, climate change, global warming is a fact
much as some people like to think it is a political something
or other. I think the evidence is clear on that. Sometime I
would like to see some projects of what that means for some of
the things we are talking about today.
Admiral, I though we had Admiral Nimitz here, and I was
prepared to be very----
Admiral Nimmich. No relation, sir.
Mr. Filner. Admiral Nimmich, right?
Nimitz is very important to San Diego where I come from.
I think Chairman Young talked about the basic necessity of
money, and I think we would agree on that. Do you have any
estimate for building two more polar icebreakers?
Admiral Nimmich. Yes, sir; both the Coast Guard and the
National Science Academy have indicated that it would be at
least $600 million to $700 million per icebreaker, so about
$1.4 billion, sir.
Mr. Filner. Now, given the commitment of the Coast Guard to
deepwater, do you see any way that the Coast Guard could build
those over the next decade or so?
Admiral Nimmich. No, sir; the polar icebreakers are not
part of the deepwater acquisitions, sir. So any desire to build
a new fleet would require additional assets over the deepwater.
Mr. Filner. How many days, do you know, per year is the
current fleet used for such things as law enforcement or oil
spills? Do you have a number on that?
Admiral Nimmich. Sir, they are primarily used right now for
scientific research. We are indicating the expanding role in
the Arctic. The number of ecotours that you could Google,
Arctic adventures on the web, you would find pages and pages of
opportunities to go into the Arctic, creating a safety risk.
The leases for exploratory drilling in the Arctic Region have
all been released and sold. The expanding nature up there would
require the additional capabilities of Coast Guard icebreakers,
sir.
Mr. Filner. The need for additional is clear to you, given
those needs?
Admiral Nimmich. Sir, for the Nation to meet their
expectations in the Arctic and Antarctic, the current suite of
icebreakers are not adequate.
Mr. Filner. By the way, it slipped my mind with the
research you mentioned. Is there any update on the
investigation into the deaths that were referred to earlier of
that Coast Guard crew, the two members who died?
Admiral Nimmich. Sir, it is an ongoing investigation. As
you would expect, there are extraordinary amounts of detail
that they want to get to make sure it is right, and I don't
have a projection when the investigation will be done. Whenever
a loss of life is done in a commercial side, the National
Transportation Safety Board takes makes sure that they get the
details right because we don't want to mislead anyone. This
could impact future diving operations or procedures and
additional people's lives. So we are making sure that we get
all the details particularly right, and I don't have a
prediction of when that will be available.
Mr. Filner. It is kind of long; that is all. I mean I watch
CSI all the time. They do it in an hour, so I don't know.
Did you think, by the way, that this whole polar
icebreaking research is part of the core mission of the 21st
Century Coast Guard? Should it be assigned to some other agency
like NOAA perhaps? What is your sense of that, given your
inability right now at least to fund any expansion?
Admiral Nimmich. Sir, the competencies and the capabilities
to operate in the polar region are pretty unique, and once you
have those, to create those competencies and capabilities in
other agencies become redundant.
I would suggest that the National Science capability can be
incorporated with the sovereignty and security issues that you
want in the polar region, and the Healy is a prime example.
Although the Healy costs more than other icebreakers, that is
because she can do more things than other icebreakers can, and
she can represent the United States as a military vessel there
that other vessels cannot. But the Healy has been designed in
cooperation with the National Science Foundation to accommodate
and to be an excellent platform for research, more so than
other icebreakers of their style, sir.
Mr. Filner. Dr. Bement, were you in agreement with his
estimates and the use and the need?
Mr. Bement. I am sorry. Yes, I am in agreement.
Mr. Filner. Obviously, NSF doesn't have the ability to
build these right now.
Mr. Bement. We are science foundation; we are not an
operating agency.
Mr. Filner. Here we are in the 21st Century, and we don't
have science agencies funded at any level that they should be.
Mr. Bement. But I think the National Research Council put
it appropriately that these missions are part of a multi-
mission suite that can best be performed by either a Government
icebreaker service or even a commercial icebreaker service. We
find that in making inquiries, there is an increasing need for
icebreaking for commercial applications, and we have, through
our request for information, potential takers who would be
willing to take on the icebreaking mission in the Antarctic as
well as the resupply mission on an incremental cost basis. As a
matter of fact, the ships that we operate in the southern ocean
that have much less capabilities in icebreaking are
commercially operated and commercially owned.
Mr. Filner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. LoBiondo. Mr. Coble?
Mr. Coble. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
At the outset, Chairman Young expressed his intense
interest in the strong polar icebreaker program, and I share
that intense interest. I regret that I missed most of the
testimony because of the vote on the floor.
Admiral, I think you responded to the gentleman from
California, but I am going to give you a chance to extend it,
if you want to. My question is: Alluding to the NRC report that
stated very clearly that the United States need a strong polar
icebreaker program, why is the Coast Guard the best agency to
manage this program? I think you touched on it earlier, but did
you want to extend on that?
Admiral Nimmich. Yes, sir. Mr. Coble, we know you have a
strong interest in icebreakers and thank you for the service
that you performed back on the north one, I believe it was.
Mr. Coble. You have a good memory, sir.
Admiral Nimmich. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Coble. My service was not that outstanding, but thank
you for mentioning that.
Admiral Nimmich. As I indicated, commercial entities can
break ice, but they don't bring the full suite of competencies
and capabilities that a U.S. law enforcement and military
organization do. You are talking about the ability to enforce
environmental laws, the ability to provide search and rescue
capability which is not an inherent characteristic of
commercial vessels. So the full suite of capabilities and
competencies, law enforcement authorities that you have
invested in the Coast Guard become available to you as
protecting U.S. interests both in the Arctic and Antarctic,
sir.
Mr. Coble. I guess furthermore, Admiral, that would be the
justification for the United States having only one polar
icebreaker fleet, would it not?
Admiral Nimmich. Sir, it eliminates the redundancy that you
would have if you had two fleets, one to do law enforcement,
one to do icebreaking. By having it in one fleet, you made a
more effective and efficient program, sir.
Mr. Coble. When you mentioned the cutter Northwind, my mind
nostalgically refers to that. I presume she is resting in some
boneyard now, is she?
Admiral Nimmich. Sir, we will find out the answer for you.
[The informations received follows:]
USCGC NORTHWIND (WAGB 282) was decommissioned in Wilmington,
North Carolina on 20 January 1989. The "Grand Old Lady of the
North" was subsequently tranferred to Maritime Administration
(MARAD) where she remained until being scrapped by
International Shipbreakers, in the Port of Brownsville Texas in
1999. It took approximately six months to complete the
scrapping.
Mr. Coble. I would like to know that.
Finally, let me put this question to either of the four
witnesses, Mr. Chairman, and this may have been addressed
during my absence. What is the relationship between the
National Science Foundation and the United States Coast Guard
vis-a-vis the polar icebreaker program?
Mr. Bement. Mr. Coble, the arrangement is a memorandum of
agreement between the NSF and the Coast Guard. We define the
requirements for icebreaking based on the schedule for a
particular year in the Antarctic. The Coast Guard then will
identify their operating plan for meeting those requirements
plus their estimated costs. Then we provide those costs and
operate according to that plan.
Mr. Coble. Anybody want to add to that?
Admiral Nimmich. Yes, sir; I agree with Dr. Bement that all
of the funding in order to operate icebreakers exists now in
the National Science Foundation budget. That money is then,
through agreement through the memorandum of understanding,
transferred back to the Coast Guard to meet the needs that they
have decided. The Coast Guard is the operating agency that runs
the vessels, but the money to run them is in the National
Science Foundation budget.
Mr. Coble. I thank you.
Yes, Doctor?
Ms. Jones. One of our recommendations was that the
relations between the Coast Guard and all of the science
agencies--NSF, NOAA--should be more clearly set out, and we
would ask the Administration to do that. If you want an
operating entity to have a mission-capable fleet, they should
be funded to do that.
Our recommendation is that the relationship with the
Foundation and NOAA and other users ought to be that those
science users pay incremental costs, and by that, we mean the
costs beyond what the Coast Guard would be funded to operate
those ships to pay for additional direct tasking beyond the
normal crew, the normal patrol, the fuel that the normal patrol
would use. That is a relationship that used to exist in the
longer term past. Our observation was that it worked well, and
we recommend that we revert to that kind of relationship.
Mr. Coble. Thank you all for being with us.
Mr. Chairman, thank you.
Mr. LoBiondo. All right, thank you, Mr. Coble.
Since the Polar Sea completed a modest upgrade this year, I
think the estimates are that it will be mission-capable for
another three to five years. Under current Federal plans, this
means that the Healy will be the Coast Guard's only mission-
capable polar icebreaker in as soon as three years or shortly
thereafter. The National Academy study indicates that we need
three icebreakers. How does the Administration plan to respond
to the report's recommendations and how will the National
Science Foundation keep McMurdo open when the Coast Guard is
operating only the Arctic-based Healy? Anybody?
Admiral Nimmich. Sir, the Coast Guard cutter, Polar Star,
has been put in caretaker status. In caretaker status, that
means with appropriated funds, it could be brought up to
operational capability. The Polar Sea is the best equipped now
and, with the funding received from the National Science
Foundation, has been made capable of operating within the
Antarctic Region to open McMurdo Bay in 2006, I am sorry, in
2007 and 2008. Additionally, I believe the National Science
Foundation is contracting a second foreign-flagged icebreaker
to assist, but I will leave that Mr. Bement to confirm.
In the interim until replacement or rehab could be done,
external foreign-flagged vessels would have to be contracted,
sir.
Mr. Bement. It is true that the Polar Sea is now
operational. Whether it is for one or two years or four to six
years is questionable. But it is always prudent to have a
backup for an icebreaker operating in the Antarctic because of
the extreme conditions of breaking very heavy ice.
When we put out a request for information, we discovered
there were commercial entities as well as international
entities that could provide the need for a backup icebreaker
this year, and the one that seemed to be most appropriate was
the Swedish icebreaker, Oden. So we have contracted for the
Oden to serve as a backup for the Polar Sea during this season.
Mr. LoBiondo. Admiral, has the Coast Guard completed a
mission gap analysis for the icebreaking mission?
Admiral Nimmich. Sir, we have draft mission analysis and
operational requirements documents drafted. They are in draft
form at this point, sir.
Mr. LoBiondo. When will the results be available?
Admiral Nimmich. Sir, I will get that for you for the
record.
Mr. LoBiondo. OK.
Does the Coast Guard and the National Science Foundation
agree with the recommendation in the report that it should keep
the Polar Star and the Polar Sea until a new icebreaker is
built? I think you already established that. I am just trying
to confirm it.
Mr. Bement. I think our position is that we need to have
the flexibility to provide backup in the event that the only
available icebreaker should break down. If we had to
recondition the Polar Star to replace the Polar Sea, that would
be a very expensive maintenance program. Given that we can
contract for either commercial or international services at a
much lower rate, we would want to consider all options in order
to achieve that mission in the most cost-effective way.
Mr. LoBiondo. Mr. Taylor?
Mr. Taylor. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I am curious; didn't the Soviet Union have some nuclear
powered icebreakers at one point? I am curious, what was their
success or lack of success with that? I happen to be doing some
studying on Admiral Nimitz's efforts to get us towards a
nuclear powered service fleet in the sixties, and given today's
price of fuel, it sure looks like he was right then and he
would certainly be right now.
Admiral Nimmich. Sir, the Soviets do operate a fleet of
nuclear powered icebreakers. When reviewed for use in the
Antarctic and Dr. Bement can either confirm or attest to this-
they were not designed to be able to have cooling capability to
go across the warmer waters of the Equator so that their
ability to move from the Arctic to the Antarctic is severely
limited and therefore they have not been available. They are
higher horsepower and possibly more capable than the Star and
the Sea.
Mr. Taylor. Does the Coast Guard or the United States Navy
ever look at a cost alternative to conventionally powered?
Since the life expectancy of this vessel is going to be 30
years anyway, which I am told is about the life expectancy of
fuel burn rate on nuclear powered.
Admiral Nimmich. Sir, in the past, we have not looked at
nuclear capability due to the extraordinary training
requirements and the technical nature of running those ships
compared to the standard diesel-electric plants that we have in
the current icebreakers, but that is not to say that we
couldn't look at that, sir.
Mr. Taylor. I am sure you speak with the Soviets, now, the
Russians. I am just curious; what has been their experiences as
far as the cost factor? You talked about the problem with
operating in warmer waters, but other than that, what kind of
problems or what kind of advantages have they found?
Admiral Nimmich. Sorry, I can't answer that, but we can
give you some answer for the record.
Mr. Taylor. OK.
Mr. Bement. If I can speak for the Krasin, the Krasin was
not a nuclear powered icebreaker. It was a conventionally
powered icebreaker that was designed and built in Finland and
operated commercially with a commercial crew so their crew size
was much less than what you would normally find in a military
operated icebreaker. The experience we had with the Krasin was
very favorable and very positive. They met all of our
requirements in the least amount of time.
Mr. Taylor. Admiral, going back, just as a matter of
curiosity, on one of your big white ones, the Chase, for
example, how many days a year would it be underway versus one
of your icebreakers?
Admiral Nimmich. Our standard for all of our larger cutters
are 185 days away from home port, give or take 10 percent. The
Healy operates under about that same parameter with one crew.
The Healy goes about 200 to a few days over 200 days underway
away from home port a year.
Mr. Taylor. What is your ballpark estimate for the cost of
fuel on any of your larger assets as a percentage of the total
operating cost of that ship? There has to be some sort of
thumbnail that the Coast Guard uses.
Admiral Nimmich. Sir, I don't want to hazard a guess on
your behalf, but we can answer that. It is a percentage of the
costs of operating the ship, realizing that in the ice, the
fuel usage to be able to break through ice is much greater than
it is to steam through open water. So the cost of fuel for a
polar breaker is far greater than it would be for a 378.
That said, I guess, Dr. Bement, my question back would be:
Before the total costs or for you, the incremental costs of
using a Coast Guard icebreaker were similar to that that you
paid for the Krasin?
Mr. Bement. I am getting information now.
Mr. Taylor. Admiral, while he is looking at that, for
comparative purposes, the shaft horsepower on a 378 is what?
The shaft horsepower on one of your polar classes is what? The
reason I want to do that is I want to see how closely that
comes to the size of each of the engines on a nuclear powered
carrier.
Admiral Nimmich. You are really testing me today, sir.
Mr. Taylor. Well, could you get that information?
Admiral Nimmich. Absolutely, sir; I can tell you the shaft
horsepower on the polar breakers, the Star and the Sea, is
60,000 shaft horsepower which is about 12,000 horsepower more
than the Krasin could provide. That said, I don't know the
exact shaft horsepower on a 378, but it depends on whether you
are running on diesel or turbines. Once it moves up on
turbines, it is fairly substantial but nowhere near the type of
horsepower that you need to break through four to twelve feet
of polar fast ice. That is an extraordinary amount of power you
need to be able to drive up on top of that ice.
[The information received follows:]
The WHEC 378-foot Hamilton class ships have 36,000 shp.
USCGC HEALY (WAGB 20) has 30,000 shp.
USCG POLAR STAR (WAGB10) has 60,000 shp.
USCGC POLAR SEA (WAGB 11) has 60,000 shp.
Mr. Taylor. I am sure you have jumped to the conclusion
that if we are serious about cutting our dependence on foreign
sources of fuel, obviously, one proven alternative would be
nuclear power for our vessels. That is why, even though I am
sure it requires some greater cross-training with the Navy as
far as where you get your engine space operators from, but we
ought to have a school for that for Charleston. We already have
a training line through the United States Navy. I just think it
bears looking into.
I know that I am on the Armed Services Committee, working
with Chairman Bartlett. We are going to do everything we can to
get the Navy to look at nuclear for future surface ships, and
this might provide an opportunity as well for what you are
doing here. Even though the price of fuel has come down a
little bit, my gut tells me the day after the election, it is
off to the races again.
Admiral Nimmich. Yes, sir, I understand your point.
[The information received follows:]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T0669.001
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Mr. Bement. Mr. Taylor, I believe I have an answer to your
question. In 2004, the two polar icebreakers cost over $3
million in fuel costs, $3,039,000. In 2005, both the Polar Star
and Krasin together cost $1,720,000 for fuel. Breaking that
down, the Polar Star which had limited service during that
campaign, the fuel cost was $1,057,000, and the cost of the
fuel for the Krasin was $662,739.
Mr. Taylor. One last question, Mr. Chairman, but I am just
curious.
One of the cases that Admiral Nimitz made back in the
sixties was the savings of all the other things that go with a
conventionally powered ship, that you don't have to have the
oil or you don't have to coordinate the refueling at sea, you
don't have the vulnerability of slowing down and having a
predictable course while you are refueling.
My question would be on one of your large icebreakers. Do
they carry enough fuel for the entire voyage? They leave the
home port, they go to the South Pole or the North Pole, they
return, or do they have to be met and replenished for fuel
underway?
Admiral Nimmich. They are not replenished underway, sir,
but they do need to make a fuel stop. Either in Hawaii or in
Australia, they stop to refuel before they go onto the ice.
Mr. Taylor. OK.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. LoBiondo. I would like to ask unanimous consent that
Mr. Filner's opening statement and my opening statement may be
part of the record. Without objection, so ordered.
Mr. Diaz-Balart, are all your icebreaking needs taken care
of in your district?
Mr. Diaz-Balart. Mr. Chairman, we have a lot of icebreaking
needs in Miami, and I think they have all been taken care of. I
appreciate that. Thank you, sir.
[Laughter.]
Mr. LoBiondo. I just wanted to make sure.
Mr. Filner, do you have anything further?
Mr. Filner. No, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. LoBiondo. I would like to thank our witnesses for being
here today.
The Subcommittee is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 2:05 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
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