[House Hearing, 109 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
OVERSIGHT OF FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION SAFETY PROGRAMS
=======================================================================
(109-98)
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
AVIATION
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON
TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
SEPTEMBER 20, 2006
__________
Printed for the use of the
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure
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COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE
DON YOUNG, Alaska, Chairman
THOMAS E. PETRI, Wisconsin, Vice- JAMES L. OBERSTAR, Minnesota
Chair NICK J. RAHALL, II, West Virginia
SHERWOOD L. BOEHLERT, New York PETER A. DeFAZIO, Oregon
HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina JERRY F. COSTELLO, Illinois
JOHN J. DUNCAN, Jr., Tennessee ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of
WAYNE T. GILCHREST, Maryland Columbia
JOHN L. MICA, Florida JERROLD NADLER, New York
PETER HOEKSTRA, Michigan CORRINE BROWN, Florida
VERNON J. EHLERS, Michigan BOB FILNER, California
SPENCER BACHUS, Alabama EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas
STEVEN C. LaTOURETTE, Ohio GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi
SUE W. KELLY, New York JUANITA MILLENDER-McDONALD,
RICHARD H. BAKER, Louisiana California
ROBERT W. NEY, Ohio ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland
FRANK A. LoBIONDO, New Jersey EARL BLUMENAUER, Oregon
JERRY MORAN, Kansas ELLEN O. TAUSCHER, California
GARY G. MILLER, California BILL PASCRELL, Jr., New Jersey
ROBIN HAYES, North Carolina LEONARD L. BOSWELL, Iowa
ROB SIMMONS, Connecticut TIM HOLDEN, Pennsylvania
HENRY E. BROWN, Jr., South Carolina BRIAN BAIRD, Washington
TIMOTHY V. JOHNSON, Illinois SHELLEY BERKLEY, Nevada
TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania JIM MATHESON, Utah
SAM GRAVES, Missouri MICHAEL M. HONDA, California
MARK R. KENNEDY, Minnesota RICK LARSEN, Washington
BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania MICHAEL E. CAPUANO, Massachusetts
JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas ANTHONY D. WEINER, New York
JIM GERLACH, Pennsylvania JULIA CARSON, Indiana
MARIO DIAZ-BALART, Florida TIMOTHY H. BISHOP, New York
JON C. PORTER, Nevada MICHAEL H. MICHAUD, Maine
TOM OSBORNE, Nebraska LINCOLN DAVIS, Tennessee
KENNY MARCHANT, Texas BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky
MICHAEL E. SODREL, Indiana BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
CHARLES W. DENT, Pennsylvania RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri
TED POE, Texas ALLYSON Y. SCHWARTZ, Pennsylvania
DAVID G. REICHERT, Washington JOHN T. SALAZAR, Colorado
CONNIE MACK, Florida JOHN BARROW, Georgia
JOHN R. `RANDY' KUHL, Jr., New York
LUIS G. FORTUNO, Puerto Rico
LYNN A. WESTMORELAND, Georgia
CHARLES W. BOUSTANY, Jr., Louisiana
JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio
(ii)
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AVIATION
JOHN L. MICA, Florida, Chairman
THOMAS E. PETRI, Wisconsin JERRY F. COSTELLO, Illinois
HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina LEONARD L. BOSWELL, Iowa
JOHN J. DUNCAN, Jr., Tennessee PETER A. DeFAZIO, Oregon
VERNON J. EHLERS, Michigan ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of
SPENCER BACHUS, Alabama Columbia
SUE W. KELLY, New York CORRINE BROWN, Florida
RICHARD H. BAKER, Louisiana EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas
ROBERT W. NEY, Ohio JUANITA MILLENDER-McDONALD,
FRANK A. LoBIONDO, New Jersey California
JERRY MORAN, Kansas ELLEN O. TAUSCHER, California
ROBIN HAYES, North Carolina BILL PASCRELL, JR., New Jersey
HENRY E. BROWN, Jr., South Carolina TIM HOLDEN, Pennsylvania
TIMOTHY V. JOHNSON, Illinois SHELLEY BERKLEY, Nevada
SAM GRAVES, Missouri JIM MATHESON, Utah
MARK R. KENNEDY, Minnesota MICHAEL M. HONDA, California
JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas RICK LARSEN, Washington
JIM GERLACH, Pennsylvania MICHAEL E. CAPUANO, Massachusetts
MARIO DIAZ-BALART, Florida ANTHONY D. WEINER, New York
JON C. PORTER, Nevada BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky
KENNY MARCHANT, Texas RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri
CHARLES W. DENT, Pennsylvania JOHN T. SALAZAR, Colorado
TED POE, Texas NICK J. RAHALL II, West Virginia
JOHN R. `RANDY' KUHL, Jr., New BOB FILNER, California
York, Vice-Chair JAMES L. OBERSTAR, Minnesota
LYNN A. WESTMORELAND, Georgia (Ex Officio)
DON YOUNG, Alaska
(Ex Officio)
(iii)
CONTENTS
TESTIMONY
Page
Dillingham, Gerald, Director, Physical Infrastructure Issues,
U.S. Government Accountability Office.......................... 18
Haueter, Thomas, Deputy Director, Office of Aviation Safety,
National Transportation Safety Board........................... 17
Sabatini, Nicholas, Associate Administrator for Aviation Safety,
Federal Aviation Administration................................ 15
Zinser, Todd, Acting Inspector General, Office of Inspector
General, U.S. Department of Transportation..................... 19
PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Carnahan, Hon. Russ, of Missouri................................. 64
Costello, Hon. Jerry F., of Illinois............................. 65
Oberstar, Hon. James L., of Minnesota............................ 115
Reynolds, Hon. Tom, of New York.................................. 119
Ros-Lehtinen, Hon. Ileana, of Florida............................ 121
PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED BY WITNESSES
Dillingham, Gerald.............................................. 68
Haueter, Thomas................................................. 99
Sabatini, Nicholas.............................................. 125
Zinser, Todd.................................................... 165
SUBMISSIONS FOR THE RECORD
Kelly, Hon. Sue W., a Representative in Congress from New York,
article, "Air Traffic Controllers Chafe at Plan to Cut Staff",
Matthew L. Wald, New York Times, September 20, 2006............ 34
Costello, Hon. Jerry F., a Representative in Congress from
Illinois, letter to Hon. James L. Oberstar, a Representative in
Congress from Minnesota, from Gerald L. Dillingham, Director,
Civil Aviation Issues, U.S General Accounting Office, September
23, 2003....................................................... 60
Sabatini, Nicholas, Associate Administrator for Aviation Safety
Federal Aviation Administration:
Responses to questions from Rep. Mica.......................... 136
Blakey, Hon. Marion C., Administrator, Federal Aviation
Administration, U.S. Department of Transportation, letter to
Hon. Mark V. Rosenker, Acting Chairman, National
Transportation Safety Board, May 31, 2006.................... 143
Safety Alert for Operators (SAFO), memo, April 28, 2006........ 146
Responses to questions from Rep Chandler....................... 148
Responses to questions from Rep. Schwartz...................... 150
Additional responses to questions from Members................. 152
ADDITIONS TO THE RECORD
Aeronautical Repair Station Association (ARSA), Christian A.
Klein, Legislative Counsel, and Virginia K. Scattergood,
Associate Counsel, letter and charts, October 4, 2006.......... 186
Mitsubishi Heavy Industries America, Inc., Aircraft Product
Support Division, Ralph Sorrells, Deputy General Manager,
Product Support Division, statement............................ 194
OVERSIGHT OF FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION SAFETY PROGRAMS
----------
Wednesday, September 20, 2006
House of Representatives, Subcommittee on Aviation,
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure,
Washington, D.C.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:02 p.m., in
room 2167, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. John L. Mica
[Chairman of the subcommittee] Presiding.
Mr. Mica. I would like to call this hearing of the Aviation
Subcommittee to order. Welcome, everyone, today.
The subject of today's hearing is oversight of Federal
Aviation Administration safety programs, and the order of
business is going to be as follows:
We will have opening statements from members, and we have
one panel of witnesses, I see, today. I also have had requests
from a number of members, some who sit on the Transportation
and Infrastructure full committee, but not on our Aviation
Subcommittee; and then we have requests for members who are not
on the T&I Committee, who also have asked to participate.
So I am going to entertain a unanimous consent request from
Mr. Costello that these Members be allowed to participate after
members of our committee are heard. Without objection, so
ordered.
So we do welcome other Members to participate and, again,
give preference to those on our subcommittee who will
participate first. So with that under way, I will open the
proceedings today with my opening statement. I yield to Mr.
Costello, and then other members who wish to be recognized, and
then we will proceed to our panel of witnesses.
As I said, today's hearing will focus on oversight of our
Federal Aviation Administration's safety programs. We are
conducting this hearing at a time when America's aviation
system has been safer than at any time in our history. In fact,
the remarkable safety record achieved in the last several
years, I believe, is the result of sound safety policy and
continuous oversight.
Safety is the number one priority of our subcommittee. It
is also the number one priority of the FAA and the users of the
aviation system. That is why I believe also that the U.S.
aviation system is the safest in the world.
In fact, we have got a slide up there; if you want to look
at that, it does show how good our performance is vis-a-vis
other areas of the world. That safety record is clearly
reflected by the table that we have displayed, and with the
data from the Aviation Safety Network of the Flight Safety
Foundation, which is an independent, nonprofit, international
organization engaged in research, auditing and education--also
advocacy and publishing--to improve aviation safety.
The table sets forth the percentage of world departures
versus the percentage of accidents by international region.
Even though 42 percent of all the world's departures are in the
North American region, North America accounts for only 8.6 of
the world's accidents.
Aviation is also, by far, the safest form of transportation
in the United States. You are about 40 times safer in an
airliner than on the safest stretch of any highway in our
country today. And today and every day of the year,
unfortunately, more than a hundred people will die in
automobile accidents, just to give you some comparison.
Since 2001, the FAA has handled 50 million successful
flights with 2.7 billion passengers flying on commercial
aircraft in the United States and arriving at their final
destination safely. This safety record is all the more amazing
when you consider how incredibly complicated our U.S. aviation
system is. On a typical weekday in the United States, there is
an average--and this is an average--of 33,000 commercial and
55,000 instrument flight rules departures.
I think we have got a slide up there that we will now
address. This slide shows--and was produced by the Aircraft
Owners and Pilots Association; it is on their Web site, and it
shows the latest statistical data available from the National
Transportation Safety Board, and is current through August 25,
2006. The data includes both fatal and nonfatal accidents.
This graph also shows the year-to-date change of accident
counts compared to the previous year. With the exception of
business and corporate and executive operations, all other
types of operations, including commercial and general aviation,
have seen a reduction in the number of accidents compared to
the same period just last year in 2005. And we may have some
questions for our panelists about the exception category.
Let me just say a few other areas where safety has
improved. The fatal accident rate for commercial carriers is,
in fact, down. Ten years ago the rate was 0.51 fatal accidents
per 100,000 departures. Today, the rate is less than half
that--well, even--far less than that. What is that, about--do
the math on it here. But it is .02 percent, so it is down
absolutely dramatically.
General aviation fatal accidents have also dropped. The
number of fatal accidents through May 2006 is 36 less than in
the same period of 2005.
Emergency medical aircraft accidents have been cut in half
in 1 year from 2005 and 2006.
We are all aware that the risks associated with flight
cannot be eliminated completely. In fact, we have been very
boldly reminded of that with the Comair accident in Lexington,
Kentucky, last month, and that was a sobering reminder that
again we still can have accidents in our aviation industry. So
while flying is by far the safest mode of transportation, we
must continue to strive for an even safer aviation system.
The witnesses for today's hearing will provide detailed
testimony on the aviation industry's safety record as well as
issues that they believe should be addressed, including--some
of the issues we will hear about are runway safety, operational
errors, training, the inspection processes, aging aircraft,
center fuel tanks, air tours and emergency medical service
flights.
They will also highlight emerging issues that they believe
will require our attention as the system continues to expand,
areas such as the new, very light jets, unmanned aircraft
systems and commercial space transportation. These are all very
important issues for the Aviation Subcommittee, and
particularly as we assess the continued safe operation of our
National Airspace System.
Another emerging issue that has been the subject of much
review is ensuring that we have adequate air traffic control
and safety inspector training and staffing levels to deal with
expected retirements and the growing use of our airspace
system. This discussion should include not only FAA's workforce
plan and staffing models, but also ways to create efficiencies
such as consolidating FAA facilities and expanding FAA--our FAA
contract tower program.
In particular, I believe we should closely examine the
benefits both in terms of safety and funding and the
consolidating, I should say, of FAA terminal radar approach
control facilities, also known as TRACONs. Due to the
improvements in technology, the FAA is able to consolidate
TRACONs that are located in close proximity to one another and
whose separation--separate operation is highly inefficient at
the current time. The benefits of TRACON consolidation include
reducing controller workload, decreasing facility overhead
staffing requirements, enhancing safety and efficiency within
the system, and still providing, I think, even better
redundancy and backup in the system.
Another hugely beneficial program in terms of meeting
future staffing needs is our FAA contract tower program. We
have this in a number of airports. We have an outstanding
record, and I am going to ask that we submit that rather than
review it for the record. Both the contract tower program and
the TRACONs consolidation proposal, I believe, deserve due
consideration as we evaluate the best way to ensure adequate
staffing in the future.
In terms of ensuring aviation's safety, no one would argue
that air traffic controllers don't have a very important role
and certainly, at times, have a stressful job. They do have a
stressful job and an important role, and that is why our air
traffic controllers are now one of the highest paid government
groups in our entire Federal Government.
This subcommittee has been closely monitoring the FAA
staffing and hiring plans, and we have held hearings on that
topic. Since 2001 the FAA has hired some 2,500 controllers. To
date, the FAA has hired 920 controllers and expects to hire a
total of 1,100 during fiscal year 2006 alone. The FAA's fiscal
year 2006 onboard staffing target, I am told, is some 14,670
controllers. This reflects a ramping up of hiring in order to
replace controllers who, FAA anticipates, will retire in the
next few years.
As of September 3, there were 14,537 controllers on board.
The FAA expects to meet its staffing goals by the end of
September. Unfortunately it appears that some have chosen the
unfortunate tragedy of Lexington, the Lexington Comair crash in
August, to forward their own agenda.
It is important to note that the accident investigation on
that particular crash is still being investigated by the NTSB.
They haven't reached any final conclusion on the cause of the
accident, and we will pay close attention to their findings.
It is important to note that we have over 100 commercial
air service airports across the country with no tower and no
air traffic controllers, and they all function very well. I
believe that efforts to make that accident and the tragic loss
of life that occurred on that day a sounding board for one's
own agenda is not in very good taste.
I am confident the NTSB--and I have talked with officials
there that are involved in the investigation--will consider all
factors, eliminating some and drawing appropriate and fact-
based conclusions. Second-guessing and sharing piecemeal bits
of information is not only inappropriate; I think it is
uncalled for.
Today's witnesses will highlight areas where they believe
we can improve safety of our already very safe aviation system.
There is always room for improvement. This is a very healthy
exercise. Actually, this hearing was requested by the ranking
member long before the terrible accident in Lexington. So it is
not a reaction to that particular serious accident.
As we engage in discussing the important safety issues
today, I want members not to lose sight of the fact that the
United States does, in fact, have the safest aviation system in
the world. We have got some great people working at FAA. They
have set standards that are adopted by the world, and we look
forward to hearing from our witnesses on ways that we can make
our system even safer.
With that, those long opening statements--actually I had
some longer ones which we will put in the record. By unanimous
consent, so ordered.
I will be yielding to Mr. Costello in just one second.
Don't usually take a point of personal privilege, but I have a
number of personal constituents from my district, and I think
most of you on the panel have done this before, and I have had
to put up with it.
I am pleased to have from the Seventh Congressional
District of Florida, and I think many of you know, Members,
that we have had both cancer survivors and those who are here
speaking on behalf of increasing Congress' efforts towards
research and cure. So I am very pleased to welcome you to my
subcommittee. Sorry you had to endure my long opening
statement, but if you all weren't here, I would have made them
listen to even more. So thank you, and you are welcome.
Thank you, Mr. Costello. You are recognized.
Mr. Costello. Mr. Chairman, thank you, and I thank you for
calling the hearing today. As you mentioned, we requested this
hearing several months ago in order to examine the issue of
safety.
Let me also say that I want to make it clear for the
record--Mr. Chairman, I want you to hear this if you will--I
know of no one on this side of the aisle that is attempting to
use the Comair tragedy to further a personal agenda; and I want
to make that clear. And if there is anyone on our side of the
aisle that is doing that, I certainly would want you or anyone
else to identify who that might be.
I do appreciate your responding to our request for this
safety hearing today. I believe that safety is the number one
issue that this subcommittee has the responsibility of dealing
with. As the chairman pointed out, the United States does have
the safest air transportation system in the world, with the
fatal accident rate of about one in every 16 million flights.
However, we must not become complacent about our past success.
The recent crash of Comair Flight 5191 has once again
placed aviation safety in the spotlight. It is the
responsibility of this subcommittee to make certain that the
FAA is fulfilling its duties to provide effective safety
oversight in every aspect of the aviation system from aircraft
maintenance to air traffic control to runway safety.
Both the GAO and the Department of Transportation's
inspector general have highlighted numerous safety issues of
concern including the use of noncertificated repair stations
and maintenance outsourcing in general, runway incursions,
inspector staffing and general concern about the FAA's ability
to meet the changing needs of the airline industry. And it is
because of these GAO reports and the inspector general's issues
that they have raised that we asked for this hearing today.
I am particularly concerned about the increased use of
aircraft maintenance, both foreign and domestic repair
stations. Airlines continue to look for ways to trim costs by
outsourcing maintenance of their airplanes.
In January of 2005, The Wall Street Journal did a
comparison of wages paid by U.S. carriers, both wages and
benefits, and compared them to outsourced maintenance stations
in North America, Europe, Asia and Latin America. It is very
clear to me, and I think it is clear to anyone, that the U.S.
airlines are relying more heavily on outside contractors to
perform everything from routine maintenance to major overhauls
in order to cut their cost.
According to the DOT inspector general, U.S. air carriers
now outsource 62 percent of their maintenance expense, compared
to just 37 percent in 1996. The IG noted in a June 2005 report
that the FAA safety oversight has not kept pace with changes in
the aviation industry, including increased maintenance
outsourcing. This was evident in the 2003 crash of Air Midwest
Flight 5481 in Charlotte, North Carolina, which killed 21
people. The NTSB found that deficient maintenance by a third-
party repair facility and lack of oversight by both the FAA and
the air carrier of the work being performed by the repair
facility contributed to this crash. Safety must not be
compromised in an effort to save money or for a lack of
resources and oversight.
Another area of concern to me is personnel. The FAA is well
below the safety staff necessary to fulfill its critical safety
mission, including the oversight of our air carriers, as well
as foreign and domestic repair stations. The FAA, according to
the statistics and numbers that I have, have a total of 68
inspectors to oversee 688 foreign repair stations; and in fact,
in a recent conversation I had with an employee of the FAA, I
was informed that only six inspectors were responsible for
inspecting 99 foreign repair stations in the FAA's facility out
of Singapore.
The commercial aviation industry is constantly changing,
and the FAA's ability to change and adapt with that is very
questionable. As this subcommittee moves toward the FAA
reauthorization, we must make certain that the FAA is able to
meet its mission of safety first and foremost.
One final point: I have real concerns about the speed and
the completion at FAA with rulemaking. For example, the
Department of Transportation compiles a list of significant
rulemaking, giving the status of each rule and where it is in
the process. For the FAA, 21 significant rulemakings are
listed; only three of them are on schedule, and 17 are either
behind schedule or have no schedule at all. Many of these deal
with important safety issues.
In December of 1996, not even 6 months after the TWA 800
flight tragedy, the NTSB strongly recommended the installation
of a nitrogen safety system to reduce fuel tank flammability
across the fleet for U.S. commercial air carriers. Yet today--
it was December of 1996, yet today we still do not have a final
rule, almost 10 years later.
Aviation safety is the number one issue that this
subcommittee should be concerned with. We must continue to ask
tough questions, issue the even tougher and sometimes costly
rules, and push forward in order to ensure the highest level of
safety for the travelling public.
With that, Mr. Chairman, I will, as you did, submit the
rest of my statement for the record, and yield back the balance
of my time.
Mr. Hayes. [presiding.] I thank the gentleman for yielding,
and I will take my time, since I have changed seats, to thank
you and Chairman Mica for giving very well informed,
comprehensive, crucial and relevant opening statements.
This is a safety hearing. Until the accident rate reaches
zero, until the fatality rate reaches zero, until we are zero
across the board, we will continue to appropriately have these
hearings.
As I look at the system today I am impressed, constantly,
having flown as recently as today in the system, at the
professionalism, the competence, the tremendous contribution
that our controllers make to our air traffic system. By the
same token, the FAA is absolutely conscientious--not perfect--
in the prosecution of their mission.
What is left? The pilots. We also have a huge part to play
in the outcomes of aviation safety today. And I won't quote the
additional figures because both the ranking member and the
chairman have given you a very clear idea. We are moving in the
right direction, and we have the safest system in the world,
but zero is still the target that we all desire.
Now, I have talked to my friend, Mr. Costello, about the
situation that occurred in Lexington. That is not the focus of
today's hearing, but it is something that I am sure we will
discuss. Unfortunately, it was misreported. It was not the
controller's fault, it was not the FAA's fault; those are
simply the facts.
We have, that I know of, three pilots here--myself, Mr.
Salazar and Mr. Graves, maybe others; and we have a certain
knowledge of what goes on and why. And unfortunately, again for
whatever reason, the press has created an incorrect perception
of what happened there. It wasn't the controller's fault. It
wasn't the FAA's fault.
Same thing happened when we had an incursion--and
unfortunately, Mr. Chandler, Kentucky was involved again. When
we had the incursion in the airspace in Washington several
years ago, I went through every step and visited every facility
to track down exactly what happened to improve safety and to
see how we prevent that in the future.
We got there. By the time we arrived, having carefully
looked, the press had gone away. They weren't interested at
that point.
But, again, back to the purpose in being here today, it is
to continually, at every step of the way, make sure that we are
doing everything that we reasonably, responsibly and in any way
can do to make this the perfect aircraft safety transportation
system, realizing full well that human beings are flying
mechanical devices called airplanes.
Again, I thank each and every one of you for being here.
Mr. Costello. Mr. Chairman, can I ask for 20 seconds to
make a point for the record?
I would agree with your assessments in our conversation.
Everyone knows, as the chairman stated, the NTSB, regarding the
Comair fatality and tragedy, has not concluded their
investigation; and as you have said, no one has indicated that
it was the air traffic controller's fault.
But I do want to make clear for the record that the FAA has
said that a directive that they had issued--two controllers
should have been on duty at that tower at that time when, in
fact, one was on duty--that their own directive was not
followed. And I just want to make that clear for the record.
That is not to say that the tragedy would not have
happened, but the directive was not being followed by the
person in charge of the air traffic controllers in that region.
Mr. Hayes. Very relevant comment, and not necessarily in
response, but the other side of that is, the comment made by
the FAA was relevant to another situation in a different place
at a different time.
And again, what--I don't want people to come away, and I am
sure you don't either--you have to have controllers in a tower
for aviation to be safe. You don't have to have one, you don't
have to have two, you don't have to have three. All kinds of
things that you might do, but at what point do reason and
common sense take over?
But the controller who was there did exactly what he was to
do. Again, we are not arguing for the fact, for the record, for
the public responsibility of the controller is to separate
traffic, get them to the point of departure. You are cleared to
runway--I don't have the diagram in front of me--26. They
stopped at 22. So you know, that is--the FAA misspoke, NTSB
misspoke.
But that is not why we are here today. We want to make sure
that the lessons we learn are correct and that we apply them
appropriately going forward so that everybody can be as safe as
they possibly can be. Again, thank the gentleman.
Mr. Chandler, you are recognized.
Mr. Chandler. Mr. Chairman, thank you. And for the record,
I want to make it clear that I was not involved personally in
the incursion into the Capital airspace except to the extent
that I had to run for my life, like so many other people did.
It was our governor.
I appreciate the chairman and Ranking Member Costello
holding this hearing today, and I am sorry that it is timely in
respect to my district. And while we do have the best safety
record in the world in our country, and we are very proud of
that, I believe it is appropriate to ask questions when a
tragedy occurs. And the August 27 Comair Flight 5191 crash
occurred in my district at the Blue Grass Airport in Lexington,
Kentucky. It resulted in the deaths of 49 people, and has not
left one person in central Kentucky unaffected.
One of the many issues that has been raised after the crash
is that of FAA tower staffing, and let me read a number of the
headlines that were published by the two local newspapers, the
Lexington Herald Leader and the Louisville Courier Journal:
"tower Should Have Had Two Controllers; FAA Acknowledges It
Broke Its Own Rules; FAA Controllers Clash on Staffing;
Controller Had Two Hours of Sleep; New Shift Began Nine Hours
After Last Shift Ended; Controllers Say They Will Have to Work
When Tired."
Now, this has caused a great deal of confusion about what
the FAA is doing, particularly regarding air traffic controller
staffing. Earlier this month, the entire Kentucky delegation
joined me in passing House Resolution 980, which expressed the
House's condolences to the families, the friends and the loved
ones of the victims of Comair Flight 5191. I am grateful for
the House's support, but we must also answer the many questions
that remain in the wake of this terrible accident.
It is premature, I believe, to speculate on the causes of
the Comair crash, but it is not premature to ask what Congress
and the pertinent Federal agencies must do to improve our
Nation's safety policies as we move forward. It seems critical
to me that the FAA promote policies that lead to happy and
well-qualified air traffic controllers operating in a well-
staffed environment. These are serious questions--there are
serious questions as to whether this goal was being properly
pursued.
On September 6, the FAA briefed Mr. Oberstar, Mr. Costello
and me on the Comair accident. On page 14 of the briefing
packet that they gave us, the FAA stated, "We have now ensured
that all FAA tower managers understand that during the midnight
shift, regardless of low traffic levels, they should normally
schedule one controller for the tower control function and one
controller for the radar control function."
However, on September 12, the Lexington Herald Leader
published this story with the headline "Another Brush With
Short Staff, Indianapolis Almost Took Radar Duties for
Lexington." why did the Lexington air traffic control tower
nearly relinquish critical radar duties not even a week after
FAA officials personally assured us that they had addressed the
staffing problems at that tower?
It is not comforting that Lexington's air traffic control
tower ultimately may do with half of its normal number of
controllers. And that same night, between 3:00 and 4:00 a.m.,
in Louisville, Kentucky, the airport did relinquish its radar
duties to Indianapolis due to a lack of controllers.
We must make a better effort to address these sorts of
staffing shortfalls before they require last-minute decisions
like the ones I just mentioned.
The Louisville incident is reminiscent of the staffing
shortages faced by the Lexington control tower on the morning
of the Comair accident. And so we should be concerned because
the FAA has yet, in my view, to address its staffing problems.
That is a safety issue, but the Comair incident raises
other questions that I would like to address today. First, I
want to know why the FAA is issuing major safety policies via
verbal guidance rather than through written correspondence with
its towers.
Second, I want to hear more about who is responsible to
ensure that pilots have an up-to-date understanding of runway
layouts.
Finally, I want to ensure that the NTSB has all the
resources they need to conduct a comprehensive investigation of
this tragedy.
Our Nation has the most aviation traffic in the world, as
we have seen, and we maintain the highest safety standards in
the world. That is something for us all to be proud of, but we
must not, and I am sure that we will not, rest on our laurels.
Therefore, I hope as we go forward that we work together to
ensure that we are doing everything possible to prevent
tragedies like Comair 5191 from occurring again in the future.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Hayes. I thank the gentleman for most appropriate
comments and remind him that the governor was in the back. He
didn't even know what was going on.
Mr. Graves is recognized.
Mr. Graves. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you very much.
And I appreciate the opportunity to speak today and have this
hearing.
Aviation is obviously near and dear to many of us, and you
know, it is very important. As a pilot, I am concerned about
our safety, as I know you are. I am taking a little bit
different focus. I am interested in general aviation and what
is going on there and the safety there.
I know this is one of the safest periods we have ever had
in aviation. I think we can always do a little bit better, but
I enjoy hearing--or I am looking forward to hearing today what
the FAA's ideas are, and what their advancements in safety and
what their plans are to make the skies even safer; but I am
particularly interested in regards to general aviation. The
accident rate for general aviation pilots has gone down, but I
do believe too many accidents are occurring.
There are a number of great programs out there that the FAA
has put out, a number of materials, guide books, a lot of
information. I know a lot of the private organizations have put
together some great programs, mentoring programs, out there for
new pilots; and the plethora of technology, which just
continues to get better, is making the skies safer all the
time. But I want to make sure that as we move forward and we
modernize the system that general aviation isn't left behind
and is very much considered, that we don't strangle them with
so much regulation that it pushes some aspects of general
aviation out.
I am also additionally concerned about the implementation
of the new contract between the FAA and air traffic
controllers. I am afraid there could be some confusion among
controllers. Our air traffic controllers are obviously folks
that guide a lot of aircraft through a lot of different types
of weather and through some of the busiest airports in the
world; and we want to make sure that--you know, that they are
considered as this contract moves forward.
But having said all that, I do want to thank and commend
the FAA and everybody from the Department of Transportation and
the NTSB for a fantastic job in terms of safety. This has been
an incredibly safe period of time. And I am proud of that
aspect and proud to be a part of it, but again looking forward
to this hearing.
Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Hayes. Thank the gentleman for his comments.
And Mr. Pascrell is recognized for any statement he might
have.
Mr. Pascrell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Far be it from me to
defend the press; I have a different slant.
Before I get into that, I want to commend Chairman Mica for
today, exposing what the committee has talked about in terms of
the detection of explosives in passenger luggage. It is a
disgrace, and it would seem to me, Mr. Chairman, that the FAA
and the TSA better get their act together--yesterday.
Whether this Congress has the will to do what is
necessary--and I think the chairman laid out specifics and this
committee discussed them. So we are not here to exchange
pleasantries today; I want you to know that.
I want to thank the Chair and the ranking member for
putting this together. It is unconscionable that to end a
contractual agreement in the midst of a labor dispute is
absolutely not only unacceptable, but has put people in
jeopardy. And I want to address that today and not soft-coat
it.
The FAA's self-described mission is to provide the safest,
most efficient aerospace system in the world. They are tasked
with regulating the National Airspace System, to promote safety
and reduce and eliminate aviation accidents; that is their
charge.
In 1997, in response to the TWA 800 crash, the White House
Commission on Aviation Safety and Security recommended that the
FAA set a target to reduce the airline fatal accident rate
fivefold in 10 years. Over the last 4 years, the fatal accident
rate has reached an all-time low. However, having a target rate
for accidents that is anything more than zero is frankly a bit
macabre. One accident we would agree on either side of the
table is one too many.
The skies over New Jersey and New York are the busiest in
the world and are expected to grow even more crowded over the
coming years. By 2015, domestic passenger traffic will nearly
double to 1 billion passengers annually. This creates not only
an air traffic nightmare, but a real safety concern.
The National Airspace Modernization effort launched by the
Reagan administration in 1981 was supposed to be completed by
1996 at a cost of $2.5 billion; $43.5 billion later, it is not.
This committee has responsibilities of oversight and
accountability. This effort has been fraught with significant
cost overruns, delays, has had numerous high-profile program
failures. A full 10 years after the original completion date,
we are still awaiting modernization of our airspace system. The
GAO, certainly an objective agency in government, in a review
of the FAA's work on this project, reported this:
"the FAA did not recognize the technical complexity of the
effort, realistically estimate the resources that would be
required, and adequately oversee its contractors' activities or
effectively control system requirements," unquote--quote-
unquote.
In addition to poor planning, the FAA has failed to gain
appropriate cooperation and involvement by the private sector,
nor have major stakeholders been sufficiently involved in the
process. Aside from the major system development, it is my
understanding that some of our nation's major air traffic
control centers do not yet even have some of the most basic
upgrades.
Last April, the Air Traffic Organization released a
preliminary cost estimate that found that the latest project
would cost a total of $18 billion. This is in addition to the
$50 billion needed just to sustain the existing air traffic
control system between 2008-2025.
This subcommittee has shown consistent support for the goal
of modernization. We have been supportive of that; no one can
point to anything different. Yet our task is made more
difficult by the fact that a lot of time and funding has gone
into this project, and the results are sorely lacking.
Technological advancements have contributed to the
remarkable decline in fatal commercial air carrier accidents,
but technology cannot do it alone, and I would contend people
are still the most vital factor in air safety and in
controlling the airways. You can have all the technology in the
world, and if the people don't know what they are doing or
there are not enough of them or they don't get proper rest or
we don't give attention to it except when there is an accident,
there is something wrong. And there is something wrong here,
dramatically.
I think that this seems to have been a factor in the fatal
crash in Kentucky. According to those reports, there was only
one air traffic controller working at Lexington that morning;
correct me if I am wrong. The FAA acknowledged violating its
own policies when it assigned only one controller to the
airport tower that morning.
Now, what would possess the FAA to do that? And at how many
more airports is that the case? And God forbid, if there is
one, if that individual male or female has a catastrophic
illness all of a sudden, who do we turn to? Who do we turn to?
It appears that one result of that violation--and we know
what the disaster was. So I believe that the FAA has come to
grips with some very serious air traffic controller staffing
issues. And, really, when I read that in the future we are
going to change procedures and technology and we are going to
reduce the number of controllers--and I would like to know how
we are going to do that, I am trying to figure this out very
carefully.
So I am sure that you will place me on the right path
because I think we all want the same thing; and if we do, then
we can't play games about this and wait for tragedies. We are
long past the time when the redesign of the system should have
been done, and I am not satisfied that we are even close.
So, Mr. Chairman, I ask that you read The New York Times
article, September 20, about reducing staffing levels. And
nobody else wants to talk about it.
I want to talk about it.
Mr. Mica. [presiding.] I thank the gentleman, and we will,
I am sure, be asking questions in that regard.
The gentleman from Texas has requested to be recognized.
Mr. Poe.
Mr. Poe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank you for
holding this important hearing.
Down there in Texas, Bush Intercontinental Airport is in my
district, the headquarters of Continental Airlines. So when it
comes to talking about aviation safety, of course, as all
members here do, I take these matters very seriously, because
we are talking about risking the lives of many people who are
my constituents.
Recently some air traffic controllers from Bush
Intercontinental Airport have met with me--several times, in
fact--regarding their staffing levels. Bush Intercontinental
Airport is the fourth fastest growing airport in the world. It
recently opened its fifth runway, and traffic continues to
increase to about 1,700 operations every day.
On one hand, I am glad the airport is growing and serving
more customers. However, I am still concerned when I talk to
air traffic controllers, how their numbers are smaller than
they should be. Bush Intercontinental Airport is authorized to
have 42 controllers; they have 29. They need at least 28 to
fully staff throughout every day. This means they have one
extra staffer to cover if someone gets sick or goes on
vacation.
This lack of staffing leads to unnecessary overtime being
paid. It also creates extra wear and tiredness on the air
traffic controllers as they pull additional hours to cover for
each other.
And next year, 10 of those 29 will be eligible for
retirement. That is over one-third of the current workforce.
However, they are only expecting six, maybe eight new
controllers to be added to the tower. This situation isn't
helping retain our current aging controller workforce nor has
it taken the staffing level up to the authorized 42 staffing
level where it should be.
And this is not a unique problem at Bush. It occurs all
over the country with our aging air traffic controllers. So I
am concerned and curious to see what the FAA says about the air
traffic controller staffing crisis and the aging air traffic
controllers crisis that are before our Nation.
And thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will yield back.
Mr. Mica. Mr. DeFazio, you are recognized.
Mr. DeFazio. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, I would
like to associate myself with the remarks of the gentleman who
preceded me. Excellent questions, well poised; and I hope they
can be addressed.
I think we have a system under extraordinary stress when
you think about deregulation and bankruptcies that have
resulted--the economic pressures in the industry itself, the
pressures that are being exerted, both ideological and
budgetary, by the current administration. Anywhere you look,
the system is stressED.
Mechanics or mechanical work is being outsourced to foreign
countries because it is cheaper, not because it is safer,
better, more desirable or meets security needs. Noncertified
repair facilities are being used by desperate airlines. The FAA
hasn't taken adequate steps to address that. I hope to hear
about that.
Our air crews are under stress. I spent about half of a
recent flight talking to a flight attendant who was telling me
how her pension was going to be about $200 a month, and she had
lost all her stock and 401(k), let alone what has happened to
the pilots and others.
ATC is now under stress because of the arbitrary imposition
of work rules and an agreement by this administration. You
know, there are numerous reports there.
And Mr. Poe just talked about another aspect of that. The
equipment is not adequate. We are way behind schedule in terms
of updating the equipment for our ATC system. And now we have
new stresses, you know, the proliferation of private jets, the
very light jets, again which is a symptom of all the other
problems because anybody who can afford to is fleeing the
commercial system, and going to private jets to avoid it.
I think we have a system in crisis. I think it is only a
matter of time, you know, when and where it is going to break
again. And I am hoping that this hearing is the beginning of a
plan to rebuild the integrity at each and every level that I
just described.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Mica. Additional members seeking time?
Mr. Matheson.
Mr. Matheson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I associate
myself with the previous remarks about stress on the system in
addition to the staffing levels within the control towers.
I also want to raise the issue of staffing for maintenance,
and I want to refer to an article dated August 5, 2006, in the
Salt Lake Tribune about an incident that occurred at the Salt
Lake Airport, and I am just going to read a few passages from
that during my opening statement. It describes the following:
"A sudden loss of both radio and radar communications
Thursday at the Salt Lake City International Airport occurred
while six passenger jets were in the air sent air traffic
controllers scrambling for alternative communications to keep
the skies safe.
"Federal Aviation Administration technicians conducting
routine maintenance of a backup generator were to blame, but
the controllers didn't know that. All they knew was the weather
was getting worse.
"'we were panicked,' Brady Allred, a controller at the
airport's Terminal Radar Approach Control tower said Friday,
'We had a half dozen planes in the sky, a couple thousand
people.'"
Fortunately, no one was hurt in this incident.
"Allred said the scene was barely controlled desperation as
controllers broke out cell phones, whose use FAA prohibits in
the towers, to seek help from other control centers and Hill
Air Force Base," which is nearby the Salt Lake City airport.
"'we had no ability to see the airplanes or to talk to
them,' said Allred, a spokesman for the controllers' union. 'we
have battery backup, we have a huge generator, we have all
kinds of redundancies but for some reason they didn't work.'
"'that's because they were all turned off,' said Allen
Kenitzer, an FAA spokesperson based in Seattle.
"'to put it bluntly, this was human error,' he said.
"the outage was planned. Technicians who were testing a
backup generator ended up turning off all power to the radar
and the radio system.
"told Friday the reason for the outage, Allred," from the
controllers union, "fumed, 'Why pick a day when thunderstorms
are blowing through to test a backup generator?'
He pointed out the only bright side was "relatively few
flights were coming in and out of the airport at the time. 'had
the outage occurred 45 minutes earlier or 45 minutes later, it
would have been chaos,' he said.
Now, Kenitzer, the spokesman for the FAA, "said it was a
management decision"--and this is the key to all my comments
here--"it was a management decision to test the backup system
during the day instead of at night, when it would have been
more expensive."
Now, he said, "While pilots couldn't have landed on visual
flight rules because they couldn't have seen the runway through
the clouds, said Kenitzer, safety was never compromised. There
was never a total break in communications," according to the
spokesman from the FAA.
"Mr. Allred," from the controllers union, "said he is still
gathering information on the power outage. During the past 5
years, there were other situations in which controllers lost a
critical component, but losing both radio and radar 'was the
worst,' he said, and he denied the FAA's claim 'that there was
no danger.' he said, 'That's what the FAA always says, but the
reality was, it was scary.' he said, 'Safety was compromised.'"
I just bring this to light because I think this is an
incident that reflects a broader issue here about scheduled
maintenance and an effort to try to cut costs; and I think we
are compromising safety, and we have a classic example right
here.
I look forward to hearing the witnesses' testimony. And I
wanted to make sure they were aware of what happened in Salt
Lake City in August of this year.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will yield back.
Mr. Mica. Thank you.
Do any other members seek recognition at this time?
If not, what we will do is turn to our first panel of
witnesses, and we have on panel Mr. Nick Sabatini, who is the
Associate Administrator For Aviation Safety with the FAA; Mr.
Thomas Haueter, Deputy Director of the Office of Aviation
Safety at the National Transportation Safety Board; Mr. Gerald
Dillingham, Director of Physical Infrastructure Issues with the
United States Government Accountability Office; and we have Mr.
Todd Zinser, Acting Inspector General at the Office of
Inspector General, the U.S. Department of Transportation.
Welcome. I think most of you have been before us before. If
you have anything lengthy or a report you want to be to made
part of the record, just seek recognition through the Chair,
and we will accommodate you. We won't hold you to the j5
minutes, but as you can see, there will be some questions from
members who are in attendance today.
So, with that, let's turn to our number one expert on
aviation safety, Mr. Sabatini with the FAA.
Welcome back, and you are recognized.
STATEMENT OF NICHOLAS SABATINI, ASSOCIATE ADMINISTRATOR FOR
AVIATION SAFETY, FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION
Mr. Sabatini. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, Congressman
Costello, members of the subcommittee, I am pleased to appear
before you today to discuss the current state of Federal
Aviation Administration aviation safety oversight.
My primary message to you today is that despite the tragic
accident that took place in Lexington, Kentucky, last month,
the safety record of aviation in the United States is
extraordinary. And while the Kentucky accident serves as an
important reminder that our work as safety professionals is
never done, we remain in the midst of the safest period in
aviation history.
In the past 3 years, U.S. scheduled air carriers have
transported approximately 2.2 billion passengers, or 7 times
the population of our United States. Over that time period, we
have had a total of 78 passenger fatalities. All of us who work
for or with aviation professionals can take pride in the
results of our collective efforts, especially given the
economic turbulence that has been experienced by U.S. carriers
in recent years.
I am here to admit to you that while I take great pride in
the current state of aviation safety, the FAA has no intention
of becoming complacent. Aviation is extremely dynamic, and the
FAA must be prepared to not only keep pace with, but stay ahead
of changes in the industry.
In the early 1990's, the Boeing Company projected that if
the aviation industry did not take strong preventive measures
in safety initiatives in commercial aviation, the projected
growth in the operations over the next 20 years would increase
the number of hull-loss accidents worldwide to approximately
one every week. This was a wake-up call to all who work in and
care about aviation.
I would like to direct your attention to the chart
currently on the screen. It shows an accident rate that not
only has not risen, as Boeing feared, but has declined
appreciably. Because of work done collectively by government,
industry and operators today, a fatal accident occurs about
every 15 to 16 million commercial flights, an accomplishment
about which we can all be proud.
By no means do I want to downplay the Kentucky accident,
but it must be put into context so the flying public
understands that our system is extremely safe. In fact, pilots
are actually safer on the job than when they are not at work.
At about the same time, both the White House Commission on
Aviation Safety and Security and the National Civil Aviation
Review Commission recommended the adoption of a goal of an 80
percent reduction in the fatal accident rate by 2007. FAA and
industry embraced this recommendation and have made significant
inroads in meeting the goal. In virtually all segments of the
aviation industry, the accident trend lines are going in the
right direction.
The FAA sets annual goals for itself, and we are meeting
them. We know the system is safe, but it is difficult to
measure the nonevents, the accidents that did not happen, the
headlines that were not written, the lives that were not lost.
Only over time can we begin to quantify how our safety
initiatives are working. We can plot data points to represent
when certain safety initiatives were implemented and then we
can document the absence of failure, the lack of accidents.
This brings me to my second chart, which does just that. I
would like to bring your attention to the blue shaded area. It
represents the accidents that did not happen. As you can see,
it tells quite a dramatic story. We are no longer dealing with
"common cause" accidents.
As the name suggests, common cause accidents are a series
of accidents that were caused by a similar problem, such as
engine failure, controlled flight into terrain and loss of
control, to say--to just list a few examples.
Now that we have tackled the obvious safety problems that
cause multiple accidents, we are dealing with accidents that
are each caused by a unique set of circumstances. We are just
as committed to preventing these accidents, but due to the
distinctive nature of each accident, it poses a greater
challenge.
I have stated repeatedly that FAA must not and will not
become complacent when it comes to finding ways to improve an
already safe system. The one certainty we must face is that
humans make mistakes. It is the human condition. Therefore, our
focus must be on making the total system more error tolerant.
We have done a lot to create a series of intertwined defenses
to trap the human error.
This continues to be the challenge before us today. Working
with my colleagues at this table, Congress, and our partners in
the aviation industry, I am confident that safety can continue
to be improved. We are moving into an exciting period of
aviation with the advent of new aircraft types and systems.
FAA's bottom line has always been and will continue to be that
safety will never be compromised.
Mr. Chairman, I know of your commitment and this
Committee's commitment to finding solutions to the safety
challenges we face. This afternoon I want you to understand the
strength of my commitment and the commitment that exists within
FAA at all levels of the agency to do what needs to be done to
make a safe system safer.
This concludes my prepared statement. I will be happy to
answer your questions at any time.
Mr. Mica. Thank you. And we will hold the questions until
we have heard from everyone.
And we have Thomas Haueter, Deputy Director of the Office
of Safety with the NTSB.
Welcome, sir, and you are recognized.
STATEMENT OF THOMAS HAUETER, DEPUTY DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF
AVIATION SAFETY, NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD
Mr. Haueter. Good afternoon, Chairman Mica, Member Costello
and other members of the committee.
Mr. Mica. Pull that mike up as close as you can. I want to
hear every word.
Mr. Haueter. Thank you.
Since becoming an independent agency, the Safety Board has
issued over 3,500 aviation safety recommendations. Eighty-two
percent of these recommendations have been adopted by the FAA
or the aviation industry.
We believe that through the Safety Board's accident
investigations and recommendations, the United States enjoys
the safest commercial air transportation system in the world.
However, as the recent accident in Lexington, Kentucky, shows,
we must maintain our vigilance and continue to find ways to
make this very safe system even safer.
The investigation of the accident at Lexington is ongoing
and no recommendations or conclusions have been issued.
Runway incursions continue to be an area of concern. On
July 2006, a United 737 passenger jet and an Atlas Air 747
cargo plane nearly collided at O'Hare International Airport.
Only the evasive action by the pilot of the 737 prevented the
accident.
The runway incursion rate has not appreciably changed in
the United States in the last 4 years, about 5.2 runway
incursions per billion tower operations. Simulations of actual
incursions show that the alerts may occur 8 to 11 seconds
before potential collision. In recent incidents, controllers
were not alerted in time to be effective.
The investigation of the TWA 800 accident found that fuel
tank design and certification that relies solely on the
elimination of every ignition source, while accepting the
existance of fuel tank flammability, is fundamentally flawed.
In May 2006, a fuel vapor explosion occurred in the left wing
of a Transmile Airline 727 in India resulting in substantial
damage to the wing. The Safety Board believes that operating
transport category airplanes with flammable fuel air vapors in
fuel tanks represents an avoidable risk.
The comment period on FAA's proposed rulemaking for
flammability reduction is now closed. We hope that the lessons
learned from TWA will be carried forward to prevent a similar
accident.
Aircraft icing is two different types of icing events,
inflight icing and icing that occurs on the ground, more
commonly called upper wing icing. In January of 2006, an
American Eagle Saab 340 encountered icing conditions in
departed controlled flight. Fortunately there were no injuries.
An example of ground icing is the December 2004 accident
involving Canada Air 600 that crashed shortly after takeoff
from Montrose, Colorado. The flight crew failed to ensure that
the airplane's wings were free of ice and snow contamination
that accumulated while the airplane was on the ground.
Industry continues to address these types of events on a
case-by-case basis rather than incorporating standards as
recommended by the Safety Board.
The above cases are but a small sample of the Safety
Board's efforts; there are additional areas of concern, such as
landing distance calculations, emergency medical service
aircraft, fatigue, turbine engine disk failure, helicopter
servo actuators, air cargo, unmanned aerial vehicles or
systems, flight recorders, and air tour operations.
As I previously mentioned, the United States enjoys a very
safe transportation system, and the Safety Board and staff are
dedicated to continue to find ways to make aviation travel even
safer.
Mr. Chairman, that completes my statement.
Mr. Mica. Thank you.
And now we will hear from Gerald Dillingham with the U.S.
GAO office.
Welcome and you are recognized.
STATEMENT OF GERALD DILLINGHAM, DIRECTOR, PHYSICAL
INFRASTRUCTURE ISSUES, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE
Mr. Dillingham. Thank you, Chairman Mica, Mr. Costello, Mr.
Oberstar.
My testimony today focuses on three areas. The first is
FAA's safety management system. The second area is training of
the staff that are responsible for implementing that safety
management system. And third is some of the key safety-related
challenges that are on the horizon for FAA.
With regard to the safety management system, the safety
management system includes a complex array of people, programs
and processes. It also represents a major cultural shift for
FAA from the old "go out and kick every tire" approach to one
that has focused on risk identification and mitigation through
systems safety. I think that the long-term trends we see in the
decline of commercial and cargo accidents, as well as a decline
in serious runway incursions, are attributable to that system's
approach, as well as the efforts of the wider aviation
community.
Mr. Chairman, I am, however, concerned that some of the
recent developments may be the early warnings of a system under
strain. The system is again experiencing widespread delays.
There have been four fatal commercial aviation accidents this
fiscal year, and FAA will not meet its commercial air carrier
safety performance target for fiscal year 2006.
General aviation continues to be involved in a significant
number of fatal accidents every year. And although the cargo
accident rate has been on a downward trend over the last few
years, according to FAA, it is still as much as six times that
of commercial aviation.
There has also been a spike in the number of air ambulance
accidents. Over the last 3 years, there were 55 air ambulance
accidents with 54 fatalities, the highest number of accidents
since the 1980's. FAA has also missed its performance target
for the last 3 years for reducing the number of operational
errors.
Regarding my second issue, the training for safety-related
staff, GAO's work for this committee has shown that FAA has
made training an integral part of its safety oversight system
and generally follows effective management practices for its
training programs. Where we have made recommendations for
improvement, FAA has generally agreed with those
recommendations.
With regard to my final issue, safety challenges on the
horizon, the broadest and perhaps most difficult challenge will
be to continue and complete the cultural transformation that is
under way at the Agency, that is, transforming the safety
oversight program from a direct oversight approach to the
safety management system approach. We believe that this
cultural change will take several years; and for FAA to know
whether the cultural change is effective, it will have to
increase both the quantity and quality of the data available to
evaluate the initiative.
A more immediate challenge is the replacement of over
10,000, or 70 percent, of the controller workforce over the
next 10 years. This staffing situation may even be more acute
than was first realized since new data shows that the
controllers are retiring sooner than estimated.
A similar situation exists for safety inspectors. FAA
anticipates losing over 1,100 safety inspectors over the next 5
years. This will represent an average loss of about 200
inspectors per year.
Finally, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Costello, and members of the
subcommittee, the early indications from some of the studies
that we currently have under way for this subcommittee suggest
that the changing aviation landscape would pose additional
challenges for FAA. For example, it is expected that within the
next few years several hundred very light jets, along with
unmanned aerial vehicles and vehicles participating in the
emerging space tourism industry, will be operating in the
National Airspace System. All of these developments will add to
FAA's workload, require additional FAA staff and expertise and
possibly put further strains on the system.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Mica. Thank you.
And now we will hear from Mr. Todd Zinser, Acting Inspector
General at the Office of Inspector General, U.S. Department of
Transportation.
Welcome, and you are recognized.
STATEMENT OF TODD ZINSER, ACTING INSPECTOR GENERAL, OFFICE OF
INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Mr. Zinser. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Costello, Mr.
Oberstar, members of the subcommittee, we appreciate the
opportunity to testify today and offer our observations on how
to make a safe system even safer.
Today, I would like to highlight three areas that
characterize the current aviation safety landscape and current
challenges, and request that my full statement be submitted for
the record.
Mr. Mica. Without objection, so ordered.
Mr. Zinser. First, FAA is making progress in using risk-
based systems to carry out its safety oversight mission, but a
lot of work remains. Facing a rapidly changing industry, FAA
needs effective systems to help target inspector resources to
areas of greatest risk and proactively spot problems before
they can contribute to accidents.
To its credit, FAA has developed risk-based systems for its
oversight of air carriers, repair stations, and manufacturers,
but these systems are at different levels of maturity and by no
means at an end state. FAA's old inspection system focused more
on compliance regardless of risk. For example, FAA inspectors
would schedule and conduct hundreds of inspections even where
no significant problems were found.
FAA's risk-based systems rely on data analysis to identify
where the greatest risks are in an air carrier's operations,
for example, and inspectors can then use that analysis to
target their inspections to those areas. In our view, FAA is
moving in the right direction with risk-based systems, but
substantial challenges remain.
This approach requires a significant cultural change
because inspectors may not be accustomed to working with data
analysts and using data analysis to find safety problems. FAA's
risk-based systems need to be flexible enough to adapt to
significant changes in the industry, such as the greater use of
outside repair stations by air carriers to perform maintenance
and the greater use by aircraft manufacturers of outside
suppliers, many in foreign countries, for the parts and
components for their products.
My second point is that there are several key trends and
issues that need FAA's attention. My written statement
addresses five issues. I would like to highlight two in
particular. The first is non-certificated repair facilities.
Last December, we identified a trend in air carriers' use
of external maintenance facilities that FAA was unaware of: the
use of repair facilities that have not been certificated by FAA
to perform critical and scheduled aircraft maintenance. These
facilities are not covered under FAA's routine oversight
program because FAA believes this responsibility rests with the
air carriers.
Even though the maintenance performed at these facilities
is approved by a licensed mechanic, the fact is that
noncertificated facilities do not have the same regulatory
requirements as FAA-certificated repair stations and yet
perform the same type of work.
Air carriers have used these facilities for years, but it
was widely believed they only did minor work, for example,
checking oil levels or changing tires. However, some of these
facilities perform critical maintenance, including engine
replacements.
FAA agrees it needs to gather more information on the type
of work these facilities actually perform. We think FAA needs
to move more quickly to determine the range of actions that
will be needed to improve oversight.
Second is inspector staffing. Much attention has been
focused on controller staffing, but FAA safety inspectors also
face a surge in retirements. By 2010, half the current
inspector workforce will be eligible to retire. Right now, FAA
does not have a staffing model that would provide an effective
means of determining inspector staffing needs or where they are
needed. For example, FAA has one inspector assigned to Des
Moines, Iowa, where his assigned carrier averages six flights
per day, but does not have an inspector assigned to Chicago,
Illinois, where the same air carrier averages 298 flights per
day.
It will be important for FAA to have a systematic way for
allocating inspector resources in response to changes in the
industry.
My third point this afternoon is that FAA must continue to
emphasize and address the risks of runway incursions and
operational errors. To its credit, FAA has taken significant
steps to reduce runway incursions. The total number of runway
incursions has decreased from a high of 407 in 2001 to 327 in
2005. However, since 2003, the number of runway incursions has
flattened out and very serious runway incursions continue to
occur. We are currently looking at three airports that have
recently experienced higher numbers of runway incursions and
will be reporting our findings later this year.
While FAA has reduced the number of runway incursions, it
has not had the same success with operational errors. This past
year, there were 1,489 operational errors, which is the highest
number of these errors reported in the last 6 years. Seventy-
three of those errors were serious incidents, compared to only
40 reported in fiscal year 2004.
Operational errors, especially the serious ones, are
important safety metrics, but we urge caution in making year-
to-year comparisons because, at the vast majority of
facilities, FAA relies primarily on self-reporting. As a
result, we have reported that the prior-year numbers were
subject to underreporting and, in some cases, systematically
and deliberately ignored.
FAA is taking actions to improve the reporting of
operational errors. For instance, as a result of our
recommendations, FAA now requires towers and TRACONs to conduct
random audits of radar data to identify operational errors, and
FAA is also developing an automated reporting system for
TRACONs. The imperatives are to make sure that operational
errors are accurately reported at all facilities, to establish
a good baseline to measure progress, and to examine root
causes.
That concludes my summary, Mr. Chairman. I would be pleased
to answer any questions you or other members of the committee
may have.
Mr. Mica. OK. We will start with some questions. First, to
Mr. Sabatini.
OK, let's get right to a couple of the key questions here.
I keep hearing different numbers. I heard Mr. Poe talking about
42 versus 29. We have different air traffic control people
running around, giving different figures.
What, before the committee, is your current onboard number
of controllers; do you know? I mean, within--I see your target
is 14,670 in fiscal year 2006. How many do we have onboard? It
says as of September 3, there were 14,537?
Mr. Sabatini. As of this time, Mr. Chairman, we have
14,500; and we had in the pipeline----
Mr. Mica. 14,500?
Mr. Sabatini. Yes.
Mr. Mica. And you are authorized and you are targeted for
14,670; that is your target. So that is 100 different. You have
those----
Mr. Sabatini. 14,500 onboard now, and we are in the
process----
Mr. Mica. Well, the numbers I am hearing again--is this
because folks are using old numbers or----
Mr. Sabatini. Well, let me say, sir, that even with our
organization, aviation safety, the numbers are fluid in the
sense that while you are hiring people, you are also losing
people.
Mr. Mica. But we are within a 100 or 200?
Mr. Sabatini. Absolutely. Absolutely sir.
And I would tell you that the hiring is moving along at a
very brisk pace. In fact, we recognized what has been
highlighted by some folks in terms of the retirement. In fact,
instead of hiring the 930 people that we had originally planned
to hire, we are going to hire 1,100 people to accommodate for
that change.
Mr. Mica. OK. So that other question was, with the
anticipated numbers of retirements, are you preparing--you are
prepared for that?
Mr. Sabatini. Oh, absolutely.
Mr. Mica. And you have got those numbers covered?
Mr. Sabatini. Yes.
Mr. Mica. All right.
Just for the record--I don't want to dwell on the Lexington
situation, but for the record, I was told we have over 100
airports with commercial flights, that have commercial flights
landing in them, without a tower or without an air traffic
controller. Is that correct?
Mr. Sabatini. That is correct. The rules----
Mr. Mica. Just for the record, could you just tell me--
again, do you know those numbers? Is it over a hundred?
Mr. Sabatini. Well, I don't know the number precisely, Mr.
Chairman.
Mr. Mica. But it is over 100, there is no air traffic
controller, no tower, and we have planes taking off and landing
safely?
Mr. Sabatini. We have air carriers operating into and out
of airports where there may not be an air traffic controller,
and I have--the actual figure is 145.
Mr. Mica. One hundred forty-five. And I have repeated this
to the press and to the public, I have not seen it published
one time.
Another question, I have heard a lot about the 9-hours-off
requirement. That is for air traffic controllers between
shifts?
Mr. Sabatini. They are required to have 8 hours between
their shifts.
Mr. Mica. Eight hours?
Mr. Sabatini. Eight hours.
Mr. Mica. Eight hours. How does that compare with pilots?
Mr. Sabatini. Well, it is essentially the same. By
regulation, the difference is, we have a regulation which is
part of the CFR system for pilots, and they are required to
have a prescribed set of hours for rest. The difference is
internally; it is an internal order that dictates the amount of
time that----
Mr. Mica. So if they made it 16 hours for pilots and air
traffic controllers, I mean, could somebody just go out and
pull an all-night drunk? I mean, is there a requirement they
come to work ready to work?
Mr. Sabatini. There is a requirement that they come fit for
duty. However, as you well know, Mr. Chairman, there is no way
that we can regulate what people do on their own personal time.
Mr. Mica. Do you recommend a change in that policy for
pilots and air traffic controllers?
Mr. Sabatini. A change in what, sir?
Mr. Mica. The hours.
Mr. Sabatini. Well, I believe that the system has provided
us with the safest air transportation system in the world. In
fact, we are the envy of the world. So I would be very cautious
about changing the formula that is already producing a very
safe system.
Mr. Mica. OK. We have had some areas where we have had some
problems. Business and corporate jets are one, and--do you want
to comment on that? Air ambulances, I think, was cited as
another.
Mr. Sabatini. Well, there is--as you know, Mr. Chairman,
and as has been mentioned by the Inspector General and Mr.
Dillingham from GAO, we have moved to a data-driven risk
management approach in systems safety. And we target those
areas that present as we go through our surveillance, using
those systems that present areas of risk.
We have identified an area of risk with emergency medical
services, particularly in the helicopter community, and have
addressed that in a very effective way. We engaged with the
industry, starting back in 2004; and if you look at the data,
you will see that having worked with the industry, having
identified the number of actions that they voluntarily put in
place, which is an expeditious way to deal with requirements
that should be regulatory, but--we are going to follow up with
the regulations, but the fact is, the industry and FAA work
together, and today we have essentially cut in half the number
of accidents that that particular category and group of users
was experiencing.
Mr. Mica. Well, final question: Mr. Dillingham, we went to
a risk-based system, which was something that I supported.
People said the sky was going to fall, planes were going to
fall out of the air in changing that out.
I think that the evidence that has been shown here today is
dramatic, a dramatic safety record. And also using our
resources to go after seen risk, should we have any change in
that? And I know you have spoken to making certain that we have
inspectors, et cetera, but any change in the risk-based
approach, Mr. Dillingham?
Mr. Dillingham. Chairman Mica, I don't think at this point
we can talk about having change, but we can certainly talk
about making sure that it is fully implemented; and part of
that implementation should include the ability to have
information that will allow FAA to evaluate these systems and
determine if they are actually effective.
Mr. Mica. OK.
Mr. Zinser. Yes, I would agree with Dr. Dillingham that the
key is to take the systems that the FAA has developed and make
sure that they are implemented.
I think there is more work to be done on suppliers, and
there is more work to be done on developing the system for
repair stations. The system for air carriers is pretty mature
at this point. By the end of next year, FAA should have most
air carriers under the system.
Mr. Mica. Mm-hmm. I have serious questions about the
incursion, runway incursion issue; also questions about this
outsourcing and the level and how we approach that. I don't
have time to get into all that, but I want to get back to that.
And finally, Mr. Haueter, when do you think you will be
done, any idea, on that Lexington report?
Mr. Haueter. We are hoping to have it done within a year of
the accident, and we are seeing if we can make it shorter than
that.
Mr. Mica. Mr. Costello, you are on until we vote.
Incidentally, there are--how many votes are pending, three or
four votes?
Three votes. So what we will do is try to let Mr. Costello
consume some time. Then we will recess until 4:00--I think it
is going to take until then--and then come back and grill, then
grill what is left over.
Mr. Costello. So it is clear for members, we are coming
back?
Mr. Mica. Yeah, we are, 4:00, and then we will take them,
bam, bam, bam.
Mr. Costello. Mr. Chairman, thank you.
[Resuming]
Mr. Costello. Mr. Chairman, thank you. I hope to get some
answers as well. In my opening statement, I made it very clear
that several concerns that I have that both the inspector
general and the GAO addressed and brought up as their concerns
about the outsourcing of maintenance and Mr. Sabatini, first
question, you, as I indicated in my opening remarks, there is
no question that the U.S. air carriers are outsourcing more of
their maintenance work than they have in the past. I think the
statistic was from 1996 about 37 percent of their expenses for
maintenance was outsourced. It is 62 percent and climbing as we
speak, and I think we all know why. It is because of the labor
costs.
The statistics and numbers I have, and I am not going to
quibble over a few, but I understand that your inspectors were
foreign repair stations that my understanding is that you have
68 inspectors that have the responsibility of inspecting 688
facilities. I told you of a conversation I had with one of your
people out of the Singapore office where they have six
inspectors to do 99 facilities.
First question, and we have limited time, although we are
coming back. My first question is this: In your opinion, do you
have enough inspectors to adequately provide oversight to
facilities, both here in the United States, domestic facilities
and in foreign countries?
Mr. Sabatini. Mr. Costello, let me first say that the
former Inspector General Ken Mead, as well as the acting
Inspector General today, has stated emphatically that it is not
the quality of maintenance that is of a concern, but rather the
ability to provide adequate oversight. That is a significant
statement because if you recall, there was a period of time
where there was concern about the quality of maintenance,
simply because it was being outsourced. Now that we can put
that aside, we can address the hard facts of the oversight and
how best to do that.
I would also say that we will never compromise safety ever.
So what we are doing with the resources that we have is
identify priorities. And our number one priority is the
continuing oversight of those certificated entities that are
already issued authority to perform work.
Mr. Costello. I understand that.
Mr. Sabatini. Yes, sir.
Mr. Costello. But answer my question, if you will. Do you
have enough inspectors to adequately inspect domestic
maintenance facilities, repair stations and foreign stations as
well?
Mr. Sabatini. Well, I have, in the foreign arena, several
combinations of oversight.
Mr. Costello. Your people tell me that you don't, so I want
to know if you believe that you do.
Mr. Sabatini. Well, when you have to draw comparison, Mr.
Costello, in with the foreign repair facilities, those
inspectors only have responsibility for the oversight of repair
stations, period. That is all they do. And on average, they
have about 10 certificates that they need to have that they
have responsibility to conduct oversight. Here domestically,
our inspectors have more than just 10 certificates. They on
average have about 14 to 20 certificates.
So the attention is divided here. But I will tell you that
the number is adequate to assure the level of safety where
there is a consequence when you prioritize the way we do. There
is a consequence in new applicants, and for the past several
years, we have informed the industry that we could not process
new applications because once a new applicant is issued a
certificate, it becomes an ongoing responsibility for
oversight.
Mr. Costello. Can you state emphatically that with the
foreign repair stations, that every foreign repair station has
physically one of our FAA inspectors visit their facilities at
least one time during the year.
Mr. Sabatini. There are locations where because we have
maintenance implementation agreements with----
Mr. Costello. So there are facilities where we go a whole
year without physically sending an inspector to that facility.
That is what I have been told by your people.
Mr. Sabatini. That is true, sir.
Mr. Costello. Is that acceptable?
Mr. Sabatini. Yes, it is because we have, through the
bilateral aviation's safety agreement with these countries,
with whom we have determined are competent authorities, and we
have examined those countries up close and personal, so to
speak, and have determined that they have the wherewithal to
execute, on our behalf, the oversight that we have ordinarily
had to exercise.
Mr. Costello. Regarding the report issued in this past
December by the IG, air carriers use of non-certificated repair
facilities, they were criticized, the FAA, for oversight and
they said that the work performed at non-certificated repair
facilities, they criticize the agency and said that you are not
providing adequate oversight for the non-certificated
facilities. I want to know your response to that, and number
two, what have you done about that?
Mr. Sabatini. Well, I will tell you that I always welcome
the constructive criticism we receive from my colleagues.
Mr. Costello. But you disagree or agree?
Mr. Sabatini. Well, we can certainly improve on the number
of surveillance activities. But I want to caution you that this
is not a numbers game. It is identifying risk and using system
safety principles that will take us to those places where we
will have to devote our resources. And having said that, there
is no data to suggest that there is an untoward occurrence
about to take place because of uncertificated entities.
Mr. Costello. The last before, I think, we have to run
vote, the IG has said that 28 percent of the current inspector
workforce is eligible to retire this year, and by 2010, half of
the inspector work force is eligible for retirement. And when
and how is the agency going about hiring inspectors?
Mr. Sabatini. Well, I will tell you this year consider,
sir, considering the new growth and the back filling, our
organization has hired 4,040 inspectors. But I would caution
you when people banty about the term eligible for retirement,
our organization is an organization that hires very experienced
people and they come generally speaking from an industry where
they have already completed one career and starting a new
career with us. So you might say that from the day they start
with us, they are eligible for retirement that certainly was
the case for me. When I joined the FAA, I was eligible for
retirement.
Mr. Costello. So let me ask the question. When the IG says
28 percent of eligible for retirement, now you are saying that
they are eligible for retirement under a different standard
that you are looking at versus the IG. Explain that.
Mr. Sabatini. Well, they may be eligible for retirement but
you will find that they have short tenure with the FAA and are
planning to stay. These people that we have hired, and I
personally talked to these folks. They are here, they have
some--many have military and previous government service and
they come and they have the age and the period of time
necessary for retirement and then can, if they choose to with
FERS, which allows you to retire with as little as 5 years, but
I can tell you practically speaking Mr. Costello they do not
retire. They stay for a long period of time.
Mr. Costello. We will follow up. But I do want to point out
for the record, and you can correct me if I am wrong when we
come back, that the FAA has seen more retirements in the area
of air traffic controllers than they anticipated.
Mr. Sabatini. Well, I was addressing the safety
organization.
Mr. Costello. What I was saying if your agency was wrong in
anticipating how many traffic controllers would retire, how
would we--would be reasonable to assume that when we say 28
percent are eligible for retirement, but you don't anticipate
that--that the agency may be wrong again.
Mr. Sabatini. I don't think the agency is wrong. We--I
would agree that those are the numbers that represent the
number of people eligible for retirement, but they may not
necessarily retire, and that is the only point I wish to make.
Mr. Mica. We will stand in recess until 4 o'clock and then
we will continue. Thank you.
[recess.]
Mr. Mica. The subcommittee will come back to order. The
witnesses will please take their places and see if Mr. Costello
had any concluding questions. He got cut a little short. We
don't want to deprive him any opportunity to question the
witnesses.
Mr. Costello. Thank you. Dr. Dillingham, let me ask you the
same question. The same questions, number one about staffing
issues, both the GAO and the IG have either criticized or
commented or questioned, number one, do we have enough
inspectors for the adequate oversight both domestically and at
foreign repair stations. So I would ask you, one, do you
believe that the FAA at their current staffing level if they
have adequate staff to perform adequate oversight?
Mr. Dillingham. Mr. Costello, I think that we haven't done
any work on the foreign repair stations, but with regard to
inspectors staffing, we can't tell you whether they have
enough, and I don't think FAA can tell you whether they have
enough either, because there is no staffing standard for that
position. I think the National Academy of Sciences has been
asked to do some work to sort of help FAA along in developing a
staffing standard.
Mr. Costello. I would ask the same question of Mr. Zinser.
Mr. Zinser. I would say two things. I would agree that a
model is needed and the work that the National Academy of
Sciences was commissioned to do should help FAA get to such a
model and establish some staffing standards, but I would also
say that the staffing levels underscore the importance of a
risk-based approach here because you are never going to have
enough inspectors to be at the repair stations 100 percent of
the time and to see everything that is going on.
You really have to target risk areas. And so I think
between the staffing model that they are working on and this
risk-based approach, FAA will have adequate staffing levels for
inspectors.
Mr. Costello. Before we go on to other members, let me give
both Dr. Dillingham and you, Mr. Zinser, the opportunity to
comment on any of the other either GAO or IG observations
concerning staffing foreign repair stations or anything in
general that you would like to address at this hearing.
Dr. Dillingham.
Mr. Dillingham. I would just like to reiterate that we,
too, agree that we have the safest aviation system in the
world. However, again, I want to also agree with Mr. DeFazio
when he said that some of the things that we are currently
seeing, we need to take them as early warnings of a system in
distress in that we need to address those before they become
critical issues in our system.
Mr. Costello. Mr. Zinser.
Mr. Zinser. I would comment on a couple of things, Mr.
Costello. One is on the use of repair stations by air carriers,
the increasing use of outsourced maintenance. And Mr. Sabatini
is correct. We are not saying thatthat, in and of itself,
outsourcing poses a safety issue. What we are saying is that
you have to provide oversight where the maintenance is
performed, and the maintenance is moving to outside repair
stations.
And our recommendations on repair stations to FAA included
things as simple as finding out where air carriers are sending
their planes for repairs and what repairs are being done. Let
us get the data and then see what the implications of that are.
So that is a key point for us.
My second issue would be non-certificated repair
facilities. If there are 5,000 certificated repair stations and
FAA knows where they are and who they are, they cannot say the
same thing about non-certificated repair facilities. I think it
took everybody by surprise when we went out and found the types
of maintenance being performed at these non-certificated
facilities.
The common wisdom or the common thinking was that these
non-certificated facilities were being used to do emergency
repairs or small repairs and, lo and behold, we find that the
airlines are using these non-certificated facilities for some
major repairs. And our only point there is to find out who they
are and what repairs or maintenance they are actually
performing because when we went out and looked at 19 carriers,
and their maintenance vendor lists, we found the use of non-
certificated repair stations ranges from 1 percent of the
maintenance vendors these carriers were using up to--to up to
39 percent. We think that this is an area that FAA has to get
on top of: who they are using and what they are using them for.
Mr. Costello. Final question, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Haueter, I
want to ask you about the May 16th, 2006 letter to the FAA
regarding the runway incursion at Chicago O'Hare Airport, and
the NTSB referenced the issue of air traffic controller
fatigue. In your view, is this controller fatigue an issue that
needs to be examined more closely?
Mr. Haueter. In the event in Chicago, the particular air
controller had a sleep disorder and he was fatigued. It was a
kind of a different situation than what we normally see.
Clearly, in our investigations, if we find fatigue, we will
highlight it, make recommendations and so we look into those
areas.
Mr. Costello. Very good. Mr. Chairman, thank you.
Mr. Mica. Thank you, and I guess we will hear now from Mr.
Hayes. Are you ready?
Mr. Hayes. Yes, sir, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Zinser, you posed an interesting issue. Mr. Sabatini,
could you comment on his observation for the sake of the
audience and the press, distinguish between certificated and
non-certificated repair stations?
Mr. Sabatini. Yes, sir. Actually for precision and
accuracy, there is no such thing as an uncertificated repair
station. There are facilities that are authorized to be used by
an entity such as an air carrier, which is certificated and a
repair station can outsource.
So both of those entities can outsource to those facilities
that have a capability that those entities, certificated
entities do not have. So for example, if an air carrier wishes
to have something down, for which they themselves do not wish
to take on or wish to farm out, they can go to an organization
and let us use, for example, an engine change at a location
where they do not have their own facility there.
They can't contract with an organization that has repair
men or A&P certificated mechanics and they can arrange under
certain conditions under the air carriers quality control
program, which means that the air carrier continues to be
responsible for its total system. It has already been said. We
will never have enough inspectors to be everywhere. But quality
management systems, safety management systems, deal with system
level design and attributes that assure that no matter where
the work is being done, whether it is being done on the
property by the air carriers, or it is being done by someone
that the air carrier contracted with.
It is then the air carriers' responsibility to ensure that
that entity has the wherewithal, the facilities and the
knowledge and the appropriate tools to do what it is going to
do on behalf of that carrier within that very narrow piece that
that carrier is asking it to do.
So we may not be present at every one of those entities
that do work for air carriers, but we certainly can improve on
that, but it is going to be driven by risk, data that
identifies, hazard analysis. Identify the risks and to date,
the data does not suggest a significant change in what we are
doing today.
But we are always about continuous improvements. System
safety is about continuous improvement, and I welcome the
constructive criticism that we receive from our colleagues
here. But you have got to keep it in perspective.
Mr. Hayes. To follow-up on the question. The public is
present here, as is the press. Is it a correct statement to say
that when aircraft, airline or any other type maintenance is
done, and it is done correctly, then it will be done by
certificated mechanics, an A&P, which stands for Air Frame and
Power Plant, or A&I, aircraft inspection? Not by boat mechanic
or truck mechanic. Is that correct?
Mr. Sabatini. There are circumstances under which certain
work must be done under the supervision of a person who is
certified by the FAA. So there are circumstances when work that
is not critical can be done by someone who is not necessarily
certificated by the FAA, but is under the supervision of the
carrier's system, but they would not have the responsibility to
return, for example, an aircraft to service. That can only be
done by a certificated person. So it is low-level work that
doesn't--that does not require the knowledge and the skills and
the abilities that we expect from a certificated mechanic.
Mr. Hayes. And when that is done, let us say it is a person
who is learning, it still has to be inspected and signed off by
the station inspectors. Again, I think it is important that
people know that various and sundry things in place, again, to
address the safety issues. Point for clarification, not to take
sides in this very, very important discussion.
Mr. Haueter, has the NTSB ever investigated an aviation
accident where the air traffic controller staffing level or air
traffic controller fatigue was determined to be a contributing
cause of the accident? I think I just heard Mr. Costello's
question answered or somebody said there was a sleep disorder
issue that there was.
Mr. Haueter. There was a runway incursion event in Chicago
where the controller did have sleep disorder and fatigue was
probably part of that event. That wasn't an incident. It was an
incursion. Looking at our database, we don't have any accident
with a probable cause mentioning controller fatigue.
Mr. Hayes. Now, again for clarification, talk about what an
incursion could be. It could be your nose wheel crossing the
whole shore line or it could be as serious as entering an
active runway when you are not supposed to be there. So
distinguish that a little bit.
Mr. Haueter. That is correct. An incursion can be two
aircraft on the same runway at the same time coming in close
proximity to each other. It can be an aircraft has gone into
the runway of an aircraft is ready to take off and maybe its
only the nose that has gone over the runway. That can count as
an incursion. There are different levels of these, obviously.
Mr. Hayes. One more issue on safety again. I think it was
Mr. Porter. I am not sure who talked about the situation at
Salt Lake City where there was a power interruption. Obviously,
bad judgment mistake was made. But again, if one of you all
would point out, not me, that in the event of a loss of
communication in the eyes of our system, both the controllers,
and that is a tough situation for them, but there are
provisions in place where every one of those pilots has a
clearance.
It may be the landing, but his instructions are to proceed
to his last point of clearance and then commence the published
approach. So again, I don't want folks to come away thinking
the power goes off, it is not the situation you want. You do
everything to prevent it, but chaos is not the automatic result
because the controllers and their professionalism has set their
aircrafts and those pilots up to follow published procedures
and the properly trained pilot knows what to do. So if you
could clarify that just a little bit.
Mr. Sabatini. Yes, sir, Mr. Hayes. I would say that to be,
again, where there is no recorded accident or incident because
of communication failure. And the analogy I would share with
you is one of a football game. There is a playbook. We all have
the same playbook. I am an active pilot. I know my
responsibilities in the event of loss of communications, even
on--especially under instrument conditions. The world class,
hard working professionals, the air traffic controllers have
the same playbook.
In the event of a loss of communication, I know what they
are going to expect me to do, and they know what I am expected
to do. And we can continue to a safe landing under IFR
conditions, so it is absolutely not chaos whatsoever.
Mr. Hayes. I think it is a good point and just, again, to
endorse the system and I will say, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Pascrell
has a little different accent than I. I have trouble
understanding him sometimes. And the controllers in the
northeast, they talk a lot like him. I am not sure what
language it is. But they do a good job. I was flying up to the
northeast and the weather was bad, and they had lots of traffic
and a lot of things going on, but those guys handled the
situation extremely well professionally, they used my knowledge
of where I was and what I needed to do and what they had to do
and they get it done.
So again, our hats off not to a perfect system, but to a
group of professional controllers and professional FAA
personnel who are working together.
And the last thing, we put a lot of blame in the air by a
lot of things. But it is us, Congress, who funds. If you want
to double the number of this, that or the other, then we can do
that. But we have a certain responsibility there. So that
hadn't been mentioned, or at least I didn't hear it.
Mr. Mica. I thank the gentleman.
Mr. DeFazio has been waiting patiently.
Mr. DeFazio. Mr. Sabatini, to continue on the questioning
about non-certificated repair. I was a bit, you know, I just
harken back to Value Jet. Now remind me whether that was non-
certificated or certificated incompetence of mechanics or
unlicensed incompetent mechanics who stowed the loaded air, the
oxygen containers that caused a lot of people to die. Now that
is out, you know, like sub-contracting. I mean, tell me how--
what was that setup? Was that non-certificated under the
supervision of the airline? A lot of people died.
Mr. Sabatini. I don't recall the particulars, but I can
certainly provide you with the fix on that.
Mr. DeFazio. But that is the problem we have today. We have
airlines that are under tremendous stress trying to make a buck
coming out of bankruptcy, in bankruptcy, whatever, and you know
they are chasing the cheapest labor around the world around the
country. I am just not quite so sanguine about the fact that
gee, no one at the airline is going to sign off on this that
was done three levels away from the airline and they don't know
how incompetent that person really was and they assume the
person two levels away from the airline actually checked on
what the person did, and the person one level from the airline
assumes that the person two levels away did, and the person at
the airline assumes the person one level, two levels and three
levels away all knew what they were doing, and they did it the
way they said they did it, and the piece of paper that the
first person signed ends up getting adopted by the airline, and
then you have a tragedy.
So I am just not quite so sanguine about all of this
outsourcing that is going on here, and the level of supervision
or oversight that we are getting. I just--I am not, and I am
not sure that the computers provide us with that level of
oversight that we lack.
And I would go to another, the designee program. I mean, as
I recall testimony here from your folks, they say maybe once
every 9 or 10 years they can get around to designees, because
their scope is you talked about a scope of 1 in 10 and foreign
1 in 4 to 20 national. What is the scope for people who
supervise designees? I think it was--I remember it was one to
several hundred was what we heard testimony, it was a huge
number.
Mr. Sabatini. Well, I can get you the specific number in
terms of ratio inspectors to designees. But I will certainly
provide you with that information.
Mr. DeFazio. Again, I am not totally saying what the number
of people that you have and the level of oversight we are
providing in these areas should be. And if any one else has a
comment on either designees or level of oversight, I would be
happy to hear it. Dr. Dillingham.
Mr. Dillingham. Congressman DeFazio, we did a report that
looked at the oversight of designees and the designee program
and we concluded that much the same thing that you just
discussed. But in fairness to FAA, in response to some of the
recommendations that we made, that oversight needed to be
tighten up. It needed to be more systematic and it needed to be
closer. They are, in fact, developing systems that will
increase their ability to oversee what designees do.
Mr. DeFazio. OK. Well, I will look forward to a bit of
follow-up on that.
Mr. Sabatini, I would congratulate the FAA on standing firm
on the A-380 and the actual physical evacuation. I have always
been dubious about the drills as conducted by computer
simulation as opposed to the physical approach. The NTSB is
against that. Are we going to stick with a new type, or a
reconfiguration, stick with the actual evacuation tests?
Mr. Sabatini. Well, the regulation allows a combination of
options for the 380. It was new and novel, and certainly, we
don't have any airplanes that have two full decks and for those
reasons and that kind of logic, we decided the best course of
action in the interest of safety was to have an actual full
evacuation.
The rules do permit under certain circumstances airplanes
that have a history of preceding models where we have
demonstrated initially with a full evacuation. We could use
computer modeling in a variant of that particular model or
similarly situated aircraft.
Mr. DeFazio. All right. My final questions go to the issue
of, and again, you are the only person from the FAA, so you get
all the questions.
The air traffic controllers. I am just, you know, getting
bombarded with, and I assume other members of the committee
are, too, a number of concerns from air traffic controllers,
real folks who work in my district and elsewhere around the
country. And what they are saying is that some of the new work
rules are very arbitrary, and potentially jeopardize safety,
particularly those that relate to you know people who are not
feeling up to snuff to work or are ill, and what would be
required to be relieved, and whether there are adequate people
to relieve them. Other sorts of petty harassment. People who
are retiring early. We have a crisis in terms of replacing our
qualified controllers.
And I guess I would just ask what the FAA intends to do to
try and rebuild a relationship and some morale with the vital
link in our air traffic control system.
Mr. Sabatini. Well, sir, I would tell you, Mr. DeFazio,
that I don't think that the retirement situation is at crisis
situation to date. The numbers that have been projected are not
materializing. There have been 463 retirements in 2005. 541
through September 3rd of 2006, and we fully expect to go beyond
the numbers that we had originally thought which was 930, and
we will have 1,100 people, 1,100 controllers on staff by the
end of September.
So we will certainly have addressed the concern and the
concern that was basically said has basically not materialized.
Mr. DeFazio. Since the arbitrary imposition of a unilateral
agreement, you haven't seen any acceleration in retirements?
Mr. Sabatini. Well, let me say that there was approximately
15 to 18 months of negotiations between----
Mr. DeFazio. I am familiar with the history. We disagree
with the result or history in terms of how long there were
material negotiations ongoing. But the point is have you seen
any increase in retirement since the arbitrary imposition of
this and the new work rules?
Mr. Sabatini. Well, I would say these are the numbers and I
can get you----
Mr. DeFazio. I know, but they are not since the unilateral
imposition of the agreement. So I guess I would like to see
numbers since that date, if you could, and how they compared to
other months.
Mr. Sabatini. Well, let me say that we can certainly
provide you with that information. The numbers that I can tell
you that are accurate as of this moment, and that is the 463 in
2005 and you take it from there to 541. That is more than last
year. So if you want to consider that an acceleration.
Mr. DeFazio. Again, to me, the question is, you know, I
can't be getting this many e-mails and contacts to my staff and
other members from people who are talking about working
conditions, arbitrary things being done by management. I have
one photo here provided to me with a guide essentially pulling
down his jeans or pulling up his shirt to show the supervisor
that those really aren't jeans that he is wearing.
Now I don't care what an air traffic controller wears. They
can be sitting there in shorts and Tevas, if they are
comfortable and it is hot. That is fine with me. I don't know
what bureaucrat has decided to go to this level of harassment.
Other things are being imposed and I don't know why that is
being done, but it is. I am just concerned about morale, and I
believe that there is probably going to be, or has been an
acceleration in retirements, which further jeopardize the
system. And I look forward to seeing month-by-month statistics.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Mica. Ms. Kelly.
Mrs. Kelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I am concerned about the new work rules that have been
imposed on our Nation's controllers since September 3rd, 3
months after having this new contract forced on them. There is
an article in today's New York Times, with permission and
consents, Mr. Chairman, I would like to enter into the record.
Mr. Mica. Without objection.
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Mrs. Kelly. If the picture in that looks familiar, it is
because it is from the control tower in Stewart Airport in my
district, which you visited last month. The article contains
details on the fast plans to cut its work force by 10 percent.
As many of our control facilities are already understaffed,
this goal concerns me and my constituents a great deal. I
recently heard a very troubling story regarding a controller at
the New York TRACON. The controller was on medical leave and
was doing other duties that were assigned. He was told by his
supervisor to stay home, but to call every morning to see if
the facility needed him. The controller called every morning at
6:00 a.m.
On a day when his supervisor asked him to come in, he
arrived at 7:00 a.m., one hour after his call-in time. However,
because and you heard that the--he was called at 6:00 a.m., but
because he wasn't there at 6:00 a.m., his normal start time, no
flight progress strips were being distributed to radar
position, and when the radar positions were combined, an
aircraft was overlooked and subsequently entered New York air
space without a prior coordination.
This story is unfortunately indicative of not only the
effect on safety that the new staffing rules have, could
potentially have further. But it also shows how lowering staff
levels may not necessarily be in the interest of best safety.
New imposed work rules, the FAA--at the FAA, mean all of the
memorandums of understanding that the controllers had with the
FAA before this appeared, to have gone right out the door.
There is no one for the controllers to even talk to to
express their concerns.
What I really want to do is talk to you, Mr. Dillingham. If
this story is indicative of how many--how managers are using
their new authority, and if lowering staff levels is going to
mean less safety for our flying public, how do I answer that to
my constituents and how do you answer that to me?
Mr. Dillingham. That is a very tough question. I think
that, you know, as was mentioned earlier in the hearing, that
the negotiations were long and stiff, and there were lots of
bad feelings on both sides between labor and management.
Mrs. Kelly. This isn't about bad feelings. It is about an
instance where there was a problem.
Mr. Dillingham. Right. I understand that, and what I am
getting to is I think that it is going to take some time for
labor and management to be able to work through these issues
that were the result of the contract. It is early on, and there
is still lots of unanswered questions, lots--my understanding
is that FAA and the controllers have not fully vetted all of
how the work rules are going to be put in place. And usually,
when there is a situation that is so widespread as all of the
facilities that FAA has, they will be implemented differently
at different places, until there is some understanding about
exactly how the rules should be implemented.
Mrs. Kelly. Sir, I am flying in and out of--using New York
TRACON twice a week. A lot of my constituents are flying in and
out more than twice a week out of the New York air space. If
you need someone to be there as a controller, you don't call
them at 7:00 o'clock in the morning because they are supposed
to be there at 6:00 o'clock in the morning. I am very concerned
that there is oversight over this kind of thing. We need our
air traffic controllers and we need them there for our safety.
This has been acknowledged by the whole panel. But what I am
concerned about is that there is some kind of an effective
oversight going into place that is going to happen soon, not
while we are working on it, because that is not satisfactory if
there is a problem.
And so I am challenging you to come back to me with some
kind of a plan that is going to focus on what kind of oversight
we have to make this thing work. Since the contract was
imposed, I think it is up to the FAA to work--to work with the
air traffic controllers to make sure we all feel comfortable
when we are flying in and out of New York TRACON space.
Mr. Dillingham. I agree with you, and maybe Mr. Sabatini
can probably add to whatever processes they have in place to
make this contract work and the work rules work better.
Mrs. Kelly. Mr. Sabatini, do you want to address that?
Mr. Sabatini. Yes, ma'am. I will. First, I would like to
say that we don't believe this was an arbitrarily imposed
contract. There were a fair period of time for the contract to
be negotiated, and I will say that over the course of about 5
years, it will save the taxpayers $1.9 billion.
Mrs. Kelly. Excuse me, sir. That is not my question. My
question is--goes right to what I am looking for, I have 42
seconds for you to answer my question. So I would really
appreciate it if you would talk to me about oversight and what
you are going to do to try to make this thing work.
Mr. Sabatini. St. Louis is a perfect example where there
was a negotiated agreement that said there had to be an
authorized number of controllers at that facility. It had
nothing to do with capacity or anything else. American Airlines
pulled out of St. Louis and it would be foolhardy to have what
would be considered, which are not in place any more,
authorized positions. So what we now have in place is the
flexibility for the FAA to do its job and put controllers where
they are most needed to address safety in the most effective
and efficient way.
Mrs. Kelly. Well, would you say that because this man was
called at 7 o'clock because he wasn't there at 6:00 a.m. Which
would be his normal start time and no flight progress strips
were being distributed to the radar positions, would you say
that that was an effective use?
Mr. Sabatini. I would--I will tell you that the absence of
a flight progress strip is not an unsafe condition. There is
information that is available on the aircraft from the
transponder and the data block. That information is available.
The controllers have the information they need to do the work
they need to do.
Mrs. Kelly. My husband was an air traffic controller in the
Navy. Never worked as a civilian, and I have been in the TRACON
and I have talked to my husband. I watched him control
airplanes from his--from his destroyer. And so I have been at
this a long time. My husband and I have been married a long
time. We talked about air safety. What I am concerned about
here is that there was an aircraft that was overlooked and it
got into New York air space without a prior coordination. That
is worrisome, sir. That is a very congested air space. I need
to know, and everyone in the flying public needs to know that
this kind of thing isn't going to happen. And we need
oversight.
Do you have any kind of thing to talk to me about or can
you come back at me and talk to me about what kind of
oversights you are going to put into place so this kind of
thing doesn't happen?
Mr. Sabatini. Well, let me clarify what you mean by
oversight. You mean oversight by the IG or the GAO or oversight
by the FAA?
Mrs. Kelly. You are running this show. The FAA is running
this show. You shouldn't have to have us look at this
oversight. If there is something like this that could result in
an aircraft being overlooked that enters into a busy air space,
I mean, some place like the Chicago air space. There ought to
be some mechanism in place that the FAA--so that this kind of
thing doesn't happen.
Mr. Sabatini. Well, there is a mechanism in place and----
Mrs. Kelly. It didn't work here.
Mr. Sabatini. Well, let me say that as I mentioned earlier
in the day, humans make mistakes and what we are doing is
building systems to catch errors like that. And that is what we
are doing.
So I have the responsibility now for the oversight of the
air traffic organization. I can tell you we are aggressively
staffing up that organization and it will be fully staffed by
the end of 2008, and we have programs in place to address those
situations. But I will tell you, I am an active pilot. I fly
this system. I can tell you that the system is world class and
the effectiveness of our system is demonstrated every single
day and when you look at the statistics that exist today, it is
the envy of the world in terms of the incredible safe system
that we have so there are mechanisms that are in place that
address this.
Mrs. Kelly. Well, Mr. Sabatini, in my lifetime, which has
been reasonably long, I have never found anything perfect yet.
So I would hope that you would come back at us with--and you
can just contact my office when you have something in place
that will assure me that I can assure my constituents in the
greater New York area that we are not going to have this kind
of incursion happen.
Mr. Sabatini. I agree with you, and I certainly didn't say
that the system is perfect. In fact, I will tell you that we
have imposed upon ourselves a rigorous methodology which is a
world class third party oversight of our organization, aviation
safety and that is the ISO 9001, and it is founded on the basis
of continuous improvement. That alone should say and tell
everyone that we recognize that we too will hold ourselves to
the highest standards and are subject to the rigor and
discipline of such a system and such a methodology that will
demand continuous improvement. And I will be happy to share
more information with you about what we are doing for the
oversight of the ATO as well as what we have imposed upon
ourselves.
Mrs. Kelly. Thank you, sir. I am not impugning the FAA,
because I do think you do a pretty good job. But there are
glitches, there are problems and those definitely need to be
addressed and this is an example of one.
I thank you for indulging me with a little extra time.
Mr. Mica. Mr. Chandler.
Mr. Chandler. Mr. Chairman, thank you. Mr. Sabatini, I am
afraid, not surprisingly, I am going to bring you back to the
Lexington tragedy. And I would like to ask you, I am a little
bit concerned about this whole notion that the tower was not
staffed appropriately. There was one controller there when
there should have been two, as I understand it. And you all
issued a verbal directive that there should have been two
rather than one. One thing I would like to know is does the FAA
generally issue verbal directives of this sort? Is that your
policy?
Mr. Sabatini. The FAA manages its business through orders
and other written guidance. Where there is information that
needs to be identified to be further explained, it can be done
in the moment verbally, and I believe that was what was done in
that instance.
But I would also go on to say that even if there had been
two persons in that tower, two persons would not have been in
the cab. One would have been down in a room without windows
looking at radar, radar which does not look at what is on the
ground. It was for airborne purposes.
Mr. Chandler. I understand that, Mr. Sabatini, and I am not
suggesting that this problem caused that accident. We are going
to wait for the NTSB to--I want to ask Mr. Haueter some
questions, but I know what the answer is: The report isn't
done, so we are going to have to wait and we will wait until
that gets done, and maybe we will have a shot at you. But I am
sure you are going to have do a good job.
But Mr. Sabatini, this directive was put in place for a
reason. I assume that you put the directive in place because
you thought that it was good policy to have two controllers on
that site for safety purposes. And the directive clearly wasn't
followed, and what also concerns me is that you didn't know
that the directive wasn't being followed until after the crash.
So here we get into this same issue about oversight. Do you
know whether your directives are being followed and shouldn't
directives like this, aren't they important enough to be put in
writing?
Mr. Sabatini. Well, it is in writing. In fact, the order
7110----
Mr. Chandler. Was it at that time? I mean, it is in writing
now, I guess.
Mr. Sabatini. Well, the order has been a standing order and
provides guidance on the staffing of those facilities.
Mr. Chandler. Then why wasn't that facility staffed?
Mr. Sabatini. Because it provides latitudes to the
management to make determinations based on the needs at the
time.
Mr. Chandler. So it wasn't really a directive. It was up to
whoever is in charge there. I mean, it is either a directive or
not a directive.
Mr. Sabatini. I want to make clear, sir, there is an order
that describes generally how you manage an air traffic control
tower. That order--that order is what stands in terms of the
guidance for managers to use. There was a follow-up
conversation based on an event in Raleigh-Durham and as a
result of what that event was in Raleigh-Durham, there was a
verbal conversation.
Mr. Chandler. With somebody--somebody in Lexington?
Mr. Sabatini. Explaining what was expected in terms of----
Mr. Chandler. Telling them to have the two people?
Mr. Sabatini. That the explanation was that there would be
a person on radar and a person on--of course, obviously in the
tower.
Mr. Chandler. And they still didn't do it.
Mr. Sabatini. But it still left room for interpretation.
Mr. Chandler. I mean, if you have a written directive and
then you find out that that wasn't being followed, you know,
that the Raleigh-Durham matter took place. And then you
followed that up by saying that you need to follow this
directive and they still don't follow it, at what point do you
need to interpret that? I mean, that seems pretty clear to me.
Were they directed to do it or not?
Mr. Sabatini. Well, I can get back to you with more
specifics. As I want to say that I am responsible for this
oversight of this safety, the persons who can address that more
specifically can certainly be--we can arrange to have them meet
with you from the air traffic organization.
Mr. Chandler. Do you know who was in charge of making that
decision as to whether there were one or two people there in
Lexington?
Mr. Sabatini. Well, ultimately, it is the chief operating
officer, Russ Chew, is responsible for the air traffic
organization.
Mr. Chandler. Has there been any discussion with who was
responsible that maybe they should have made a different
decision and followed the directive? Has anybody been
reprimanded for it?
Mr. Sabatini. I don't have that information, sir.
Mr. Chandler. Well, could you get back to me with that
information, please?
Mr. Sabatini. I certainly will do that.
Mr. Chandler. OK.
One other question, if I may, Mr. Chairman. Do you consider
Lexington to be adequately staffed at this time?
Mr. Sabatini. We believe that given the requirements there
for the traffic that is operating in and out of Lexington, that
it is adequately staffed.
Mr. Chandler. Well, I understand that we are short three
air traffic controllers in Lexington; is that not correct?
Mr. Sabatini. As I said, I can get you the specifics for
that tower, sir.
Mr. Chandler. Well, I wish you had, given the importance of
the Lexington tragedy, I wish that you had come with some of
this information, some of this detailed information.
One other question and I will stop. You said that there are
14,500 air traffic controllers. Is that what you said?
Mr. Sabatini. Yes, sir.
Mr. Chandler. How many of those are fully trained and
serviceable? All of them?
Mr. Sabatini. Well, I can tell you of course that
represents people who have recently been hired but if you need
a further breakdown with the precision and accuracy that I
think you are asking for, we can certainly provide----
Mr. Chandler. I understand that it is a moving target but
in general, is that number, does that number represent your
average staffing level or have you just beefed it up recently
with a flurry of new hires?
Mr. Sabatini. Well, it does of course include the 930 and
will reflect the difference as we get up to the 1,100. But a
percentage of those would be new hires and the larger
percentage would be full performance----
Mr. Chandler. What percentage will be?
Mr. Sabatini. I can get you that.
Mr. Chandler. Can you get me a ballpark?
Mr. Sabatini. I can't, sir. I don't have that information.
Mr. Chandler. Thank you.
Mr. Mica. Mr. Pascrell.
Mr. Pascrell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Sabatini, thank you for your patience with all of us.
And you understand and appreciate our concerns because our
concerns are really your concerns. I know that. No one is
questioning that whatsoever.
I am looking at your logic though in your testimony, and
your logic is puzzling to me because you are almost saying that
with less humans and we have humans who make mistakes, we have
less humans who will make mistakes, that filters down through a
lot of your testimony.
Now, the workforce plan that the FAA has put forth states
that new procedures use that term, new procedures. And
technology will reduce the number of controllers needed in the
future. What are these new procedures and what is this new
technology?
Mr. Sabatini. Sir, I will draw an analogy for you that has
proven to be very, very successful in our system. If you go
back to about the 1960's, we were operating aircraft with as
many as five crew members in the cockpit and you had a captain,
you had a first officer, you had a flight engineer, you had a
radio navigator, and you had a radio operator and the
navigator. Five people. Today the most sophisticated, the most
sophisticated aircraft that man has been able to design and
with greater capability is operated by two people: A captain
and a first officer.
Mr. Pascrell. Mr. Sabatini--I will let you finish but I
want to go so I don't lose it. I am a slow learner, so I want
to take a little bit at a time. If what you just presented to
us is very true, less people in the cockpit and there are more
people looking at radar screens. So the state of the art is
followed up in the air and also on the ground. There are
reasons and you are absolutely correct. So continue, please.
Mr. Sabatini. So continuing with the analogy, we now
operate the most sophisticated airplanes with two crew members.
The point being that we have used technology to enhance human
performance.
Let me give you an example of the technology in Atlanta.
There is a new technology, that we refer to in our
performance-based national air space that is called required
navigation performance. It provides us with tremendous
precision and accuracy for navigation such that with that kind
of precision operating out of Atlanta, and we have been doing
this now for almost a year. Delta, the major operator out of
there, claims because of that precision, $38 million a year
savings just in fuel alone. As far as the air traffic
controllers are concerned, that technology has enabled the
reduction of the voice communications between pilots and
controllers by as much as, and I will be very conservative, 40
percent. That has allowed controllers to do what they prefer to
do and that is observe and manage traffic flow and that is the
kind of technology that we need to take and bring into place
with our next generation air transportation.
Mr. Pascrell. Thank you. And you do know and you know it
better than I do, about the basics of working in the control
tower and that is--there is reading and then there is
operation. In every place that I have seen in FAA literature,
that must be designated and defined so that they are not
confused, so that there are carefully deliberated
responsibilities. It is an absolute horrific absurdity as Woody
Allen would say, that anybody could even hesitate about their
only being one person in the control tower in Kentucky.
Now Mr. Dillingham, you responded in your testimony, which
you didn't read, you couldn't read the whole thing obviously.
You did say that on page 13 that in addition, although general
aviation accidents, on a whole, decreased in recent years,
general aviation safety is also a concern because the large
number of fatal accidents every year, an average of 334 fatal
accidents since the year 2000.
So we have reduced the number of accidents and that has
still remained the average number of fatal--of fatal accidents.
Furthermore, you brought other industry sectors such as cargo
operations and on demand air balances have poor safety records
as mentioned earlier. So I notice you are double reverse before
in reaction to--in response to the gentlelady from New York,
and I understand. I--I am a decent human being, and you
shouldn't have been asked the question. In fact, isn't that
your job, Mr. Zinser, in your position as inspector general,
and you know, there is 50 inspector--over 50 inspectors
general. Half of them get appointed by the President, and the
other half get appointed by whoever the Secretary happens--
happens to be within the Department. You have a very specific
obligation and responsibility which you already know about.
But in case anybody who doesn't understand it of overseeing
what happens in the very department that you are assigned to.
And I have got a question to ask you. You state in your
testimony that the FAA needs to address the issue of air
traffic controller attrition and staffing at each facility.
That is what you stated in your testimony, correct----
Mr. Zinser. Yes, sir.
Mr. Pascrell. Now it is my understanding that FAA recently
released an update of its 2000 air traffic controller workforce
plan. In the IGs view, does FAA's current work force plan
provide a comprehensive roadmap to ensure that we have a
sufficient number of controllers at each facility? If you want
me to repeat the question, I will. If you understand the
question, I would like a very precise answer.
Mr. Zinser. Yes, sir. I think I understand the question.
You are referring to the workforce plan that FAA just submitted
in August.
Mr. Pascrell. That is correct.
Mr. Zinser. In our view, it is missing two critical pieces.
I think FAA has some explanation for why those pieces are not
in the report, but, in our view, it is missing the cost of
hiring the number of air traffic controllers necessary to make
up for the attrition, and it is also missing facility-by-
facility numbers of how many air traffic controllers are
necessary. We have been reporting on that for a couple of years
now, and I think the numbers are still needed.
Mr. Pascrell. Mr. Zinser, thank you so much.
There are two things I would like to leave with the
committee, if I may, with the Chair; and it is this.
We are not only talking about attrition. Attrition is
numbers. I am talking about the experience that leaves the box.
You have a similar situation, Mr. Chairman, right here on
Capitol Hill when we force police officers and our bodyguards--
whatever you want to call them--when they become 57 years of
age to get the heck out of the system. We are losing a
tremendous amount of expertise, which is being lost in the
control towers when you see the kind of training that perhaps
we should be giving but we are not giving.
There is another problem. The amount of overtime of the
police officers here on Capitol Hill is astronomical. The
problem is no one is being held accountable as we push people
out of the system. And there is a reason for it. We push out
the higher-paying folks. We bring in those at the basic salary.
I hope that we are going to look very carefully about these
so-called, Mr. Sabatini, these so-called new procedures and new
technologies. We all appreciate--we are pretty familiar not
with all the technology, but we are pretty familiar as to the
changes that have occurred in the airline business, in the
airplane business and the operations business in the past 5 or
6 years. We have a pretty good, general idea of that. Not as
good as you, but, you know, some latitude and longitude.
But, Mr. Sabatini, it has got to be very, very clear that
you are going to have to have a reckoning, I am going to have
to have a reckoning when we look back at this every year. We
have oversight. Mr. Zinser has oversight. GAO will continue to
write----
Because there is a lot of other things you said in here,
Mr. Dillingham, I don't have time to spend on now. You chose
not to read that, and you are going to have to make this
situation much better, and we are going to make sure that you
do that.
It is unacceptable as far as I am concerned. I can't speak
for Mr. Chairman. It is unacceptable, the answers you gave him,
about what happened in Kentucky. Either it is a directive or it
is not a directive. Who made the decision that there is only
one controller? You must answer that question. We have a right
to ask that question.
And your response was, I will get back to you? Who are you
talking to here? You are talking to those people who have been
duly elected--and I know when you said--and you weren't here
before when I mentioned the fact--with the great work that you
have done, Mr. Chairman, in terms of the explosive detection, I
mean, that is on the front page of many of the papers today.
And the fact is, if we don't do it, nobody is going to do it,
and it is as simple as that.
What he asked is a very basic question, and we got
gobbledygook, and you know it just as well as I do.
Mr. Mica. Well, I thank the gentleman.
And did you want to respond? Or Mr. Bishop is waiting
patiently.
Mr. Sabatini. I would just add one piece, that we have
approved many waivers that allowed folks to stay on beyond age
56--that is, air traffic controllers--and we just use a very
reasonable amount of overtime to accommodate the needs as the
need arises.
Mr. Pascrell. Mr. Chairman, we are proud Italian-Americans.
We talk straight. You are not talking straight right now. I
know you are a straight person. And you didn't answer his
question. And you know that in your heart that you did not
answer his question. That is unacceptable.
God forbid that today there is another situation in another
part of America and there is only one controller there, OK, and
there is no waiver, OK, and he has a fatality. If he dies, he
can't come up for air. A thousand things can happen when you
are a human being. What are we going to do about it? Are we
going to say, I will have to look at the circumstances and get
back to you, OK?
Mr. Mica. Mr. Bishop, waiting patiently, you are
recognized.
Mr. Bishop. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to thank you and the ranking member for allowing me
to take part in this hearing, even though I am not a member of
the subcommittee.
I have several concerns about the relationship between the
FAA and the air traffic controllers, but several of my
colleagues have addressed those. So I am here to talk about--or
ask questions about other issues.
Mr. Sabatini, I would like to ask you about center wing
fuel tanks inerting systems. It was off of East Moriches, Long
Island, which is in my district, that Flight 800 crashed into
the Atlantic in July of 1996, more than 10 years ago.
The NTSB rather quickly determined or at least surmised
that the cause of the crash was an explosion in the center wing
fuel tank. They made their first recommendation that there be
some type of flammability mitigation system installed in
December of 1996. They then added that recommendation to their
so-called most wanted list in 2002, and then I offered
legislation in October of 2005 that has actually attracted a
fair number of cosponsors that would require the installation
of some flammability mitigation system in fuel tanks.
The FAA offered a proposed rule in November of 2005. So
about nine and a half years after the crash and after the
initial recommendation from the NTSB. It is now September of
2006.
So I guess my first question to you is, why does it take
nine and a half years for the FAA to address a safety issue
that has been brought to them both by human tragedy and by an
NTSB investigation and recommendation?
Mr. Sabatini. I agree with you, sir. That was a tragic
event and a terrible loss of life.
But when you go back in time and look at the actions that
the FAA has taken, we immediately introduced a special Federal
aviation regulation, S-488, to look at what we thought could be
the identification of possible failures in wing tanks in terms
of the ignition sources. But we all know that just the
identification of ignition sources is not sufficient, and we
agree with you that fuel inerting is an important direction to
take and a solution that is significant in terms of preventing
future types of accidents.
But, at the time, the only technology that existed in terms
of inerting was what the military had; and it was very heavy,
very expensive and not very reliable for application and
commercial aviation. The FAA took it upon itself with some
industry help in doing--in research and development at the tech
center in Atlantic City and devised a very reliable, very
effective and very cost-effective lightweight fuel inerting
system; and that is what has taken time.
R&D was very challenging. It was not an easy thing to get
to, but the good news is we are there today. We have proposed a
rule, as you have acknowledged, and we are dispositioning the
comments as we speak, and we expect that to continue forward in
the rule-making process.
Mr. Bishop. Thank you very much for that.
Let me just--the rule-making period or the comment period--
pardon me--is now closed.
Mr. Sabatini. Yes.
Mr. Bishop. I have two questions. One, when do you think
you will be issuing a final rule? And, secondly, can you
outline for us briefly, because we are going to run out of
time, what are the principle arguments against installing these
systems that have been--that have come forward in the comment
period?
Mr. Sabatini. There are very sophisticated and very
knowledgeable organizations that have challenged the FAA on the
logic to even go forward. So we are working to address that.
And that is not just a simple yes or no kind of an answer. It
is a very science-based kind of response which is very
challenging. But we are confident that we are going to be
successful; and, as I said, the kind of challenges that we are
getting are on cost and challenging the science behind what we
are saying is an effective system.
Mr. Bishop. When you say you are confident that you are
going to be successful, are you suggesting that you will
ultimately issue a rule that will require the installation of
these systems both in existing aircraft and in new aircraft?
Mr. Sabatini. I am confident that we will put out a rule
that will require a flammability reduction means, and what that
really says is that we are not going to specifically mandate
that it be fuel tank inerting but the only solution to get you
to where we want you to be to meet what we call into rule of
these performance standards is only to be achieved by fuel tank
inerting. So you can come up and say we have an equivalent
means of achieving that same level of protection, and we would
accept that. So that is what the rule is going to require.
Mr. Bishop. OK. And just one last question. Thank you very
much for that. About when do you think you will issue that
rule?
Mr. Sabatini. September of 2007 we expect to have the final
rule.
Mr. Bishop. OK, so a year from now.
Mr. Sabatini. Yes, sir.
Mr. Bishop. So that would mean a 2-year period from the
time when you began the proposed rule-making process.
Mr. Sabatini. Yes, sir.
Mr. Bishop. Is that normal or is that a rather extensive
period for a proposed rule to alternately become a rule?
Mr. Sabatini. It depends on the complexity of the rule.
This is not an easy one, sir.
Mr. Bishop. OK. Thank you very much, sir.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Mica. Thank you.
Now waiting patiently, not a member of our panel, but we
welcome Ms. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I am
not a member of the subcommittee nor the full committee, so I
greatly appreciate this opportunity.
My local hometown paper, The Miami Herald, recently
published a series that they entitled "Deadly Express;" and it
exposed some very troubling facts and figures regarding the
aviation cargo industry, focusing on smaller air cargo planes.
The series exposed many of the problems that are related to
this industry, and they reported a staggering 60 crashes and 80
deaths over a 5-year period. It also revealed that cargo pilots
are frequently flying very long hours with inadequate flight
training themselves. So with less training than commercial air
pilots and with tight deadlines imposed upon them by their
business entities, they frequently fly in weather that would
normally ground commercial aviation. Inspections and
maintenance of these smaller air cargo planes are not regulated
by the same standards that apply to larger carriers, and this
frequently leads to ill-maintained and faulty equipment.
So all of these factors--older planes, tight deadlines, lax
inspections, less pilot training, bad equipment, insufficient
safety features--all of this combines to create a very
dangerous work environment that fails to protect pilots of
smaller air cargo carriers.
I would encourage our panelists to closely examine the
regulations impacting our small air cargo industry in order to
make our skies safe for pilots as well as citizens. As the
Department of Transportation Inspector General review points
out, there is a large loophole in the inspection of small air
cargo planes. Small air cargo planes are not mandated to
undergo the same rigorous inspection regimes as other older
planes, due to probably monetary concerns.
Air cargo planes that are more likely to crash are 26 years
old, three times older than commercial passenger airline planes
and had fewer safety features. As the FAA mandate states, there
should be one level of safety.
So, with that, I would like to pose three questions to the
panelists.
Why don't the same safety standards apply to all air cargo
operators? Is it a financial difficulty tied to an inspection?
Why is this standard less for small air cargo operators?
Secondly, has the FAA or the National Transportation Safety
Board conducted any studies or investigations to determine what
can be done to reduce the incidence of accidents among small
air cargo operators?
And, thirdly, if air cargo has the highest frequency of
crashes among commercial aviation, what is the FAA or the NTSB
doing to correct this trend?
I thank the Chairman for the opportunity.
Mr. Mica. Well, did you want to divide--you had questions.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Whoever would like to.
Mr. Mica. Mr. Sabatini, maybe you could take the first.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you.
Mr. Haueter. Certainly we determine probable cause on every
accident involving cargo flights. It is a difficult area. One
issue is that records aren't kept in terms of number of flight
hours, so it is hard to say whether the rate has really
increased for this group. Certainly the numbers have gone up.
We don't know if the rate has really changed.
We are aware of the standards; and if we see a trend,
definitely we would issue recommendations regarding those type
of aircraft.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. So what you are saying is that you don't
see a trend yet or you haven't done any studies to see if there
is a trend? A trend being there are more crashes. The planes
are getting older. There are no records that are truly being
kept. What is the trend? That it is not there or you haven't
done the studies to see it?
Mr. Haueter. We have not done a specific study on demand
part 135 cargo operations. We have looked at a number of
accidents, and the number has increased. However, we don't know
whether the number of flights have increased.
Taking another look, we have seen that most of the
accidents, so far, are not systemic in nature, but operational
errors. If these aircraft are driving piston-driven engines and
the pilots have lower flight times.
Mr. Sabatini. I would also add that we are working very
closely with that community. They are represented, as you well
know, by associations--RAACO being one of them, Regional
Airline Association for Cargo Operations--and we have devised a
number of interventions that can help address that. But I would
tell you that what is not sought out is the accuracy with which
newspapers report these accidents. It is not all about poor
equipment, which I would take issue with, or poor maintenance
or lack of oversight.
I would tell you that we can certainly improve. We look at
risk areas. This seems to be a risk area. We are going to
continue to focus on addressing cargo operators.
But you also need to know that there are instances, and I
will use just one, where pilots decide for their own reasons to
take an aircraft that is not certificated to fly--not
certificated by the FAA to fly into known icing conditions but
intentionally conduct an operation with that aircraft in known
icing conditions, and that led to a disaster. So you need to
sort out those kinds of accidents that are human error, those
kinds of things, and you begin to see a slightly different
picture.
But I want to assure you that we take any accident very
seriously. Any loss of life is a tragic event, and I can assure
you that we will follow up with the cargo operators and have
been and have put in place a number of interventions.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. And you are working with the agencies and
the organizations that these cargo operators belong to in order
to have them suggest these more stringent regulations? Or is it
something that we are looking at as mandated?
Mr. Sabatini. Well, the regulations already exist. So we
have direct responsibility for the oversight of the air
carriers, whether they be from the FedEx and UPS level down to
the smallest air cargo operator. So we have direct
responsibility.
But we also know that we can get very effective
introduction of the immediate corrective actions collectively
across the board by working with their associations, and they
can voluntarily agree, and you can in the moment get the sorts
of actions or interventions, you might say, that can be put in
place right away, versus going through the rule-making process
which in our form of government and our country it is checks
and balances and it does take time. So we work quickly and
actively with the associations and the operators.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Did you want to comment?
Mr. Zinser. Yes, Congresswoman.
The Chalk's Airways crash I think brought a lot of
attention to the issue of aging aircraft. In fact, the report
that we issued was issued after we received a request from Mr.
Oberstar to look at what has transpired on aging aircraft. We
did find that there are several categories of aircraft that are
exempt from any aging aircraft review or program. There are
even categories of aircraft that are required to undergo some
inspections but not what is being called supplemental
inspections to get a more detailed analysis of fatigue on
aircraft.
One thing FAA has done is put out a rulemaking on
widespread fatigue on aircraft, and my understanding of what
that rule is designed to do is establish life limits for
aircraft. You have parts on aircraft that are life limited. You
can only use them so long. But there really are not any
aircraft that are life-limited. We can keep flying them, you
know, for a long time.
So I think part of the design of this rule is to try to get
to what is the life-limitation on an aircraft and sort of
address the issue. The Chalk's Airways aircraft was 58 years
old. How long are we going to fly some of these aircraft? The
manufacturer was long gone. The airline was making its own
parts to keep the plane going. So I think the FAA is trying to
address some of those issues.
In terms of the exemptions on the current requirements, I
think that FAA should do some more research on exactly what
aircraft and what operations are exempt. The preliminary
recommendation coming out of the NTSB on the Chalk's Airways
crash is for FAA to expand their rule to cover some of these
aircraft, and I think that deserves a pretty close examination.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Mica. Well, thank you.
I have some questions I want to go back to. Some of the
issues that have been raised here have also raised some
questions with me.
Mr. Sabatini, we have been working under an old FAA air
traffic controller contract. In the new contract--and some of
that has just been released; I really don't know all the
details of what has come into play--but does anything come to
mind, specifics come to mind in the new contract that would
give better flexibility and placement of personnel, utilization
of personnel, in staffing or any of the issues that have been
raised here today?
Mr. Sabatini. I think one of the greatest benefits, not
only the reduction of costs but--is the flexibility to bring
controllers where they need to be. The example I used earlier,
St. Louis, where American Airlines pulled out of there to stay
with what was a negotiated agreement of authorized--that had no
relationship to what is actually in terms of activity at that
airport, authorizations no longer in place, but rather staffing
standards that address the need for that particular activity at
that airport. So it is a very powerful tool.
Mr. Mica. So you think that you will have more flexibility
to get people--can you get them there quicker, too, under this
new contract?
Mr. Sabatini. You can easily move them about the
countryside. You can be responsive to the changes.
Mr. Mica. So that is a change.
You know, Lexington raised a bunch of issues. I don't want
to get into the specifics of the crash, but FAA did raise this
specter publicly, or issue publicly, of putting another air
traffic controller at that location. And I heard several
things. One was that the position had been approved in January
or a year earlier. Do you have that--you said you didn't have
all the time frame. Do you know?
Mr. Sabatini. I don't have the details from----
Mr. Mica. But it had been that a position had been approved
earlier.
Mr. Sabatini. Yes, it was.
Mr. Mica. And I was told at one point that a trainee had
appeared on the scene because--and that was sometime in April
or May or--what I am trying to get here is we were cooperating
under an old contract, tough to move people around. I am
wondering, is it an inordinate amount of time--you heard the
question occur over here that, you know, you did not have that
position filled or you gave the discretion to a manager and it
wasn't filled or was somebody coming or on their way there to
fill the position. I had heard that.
Mr. Sabatini. I need to preface that by saying I need to be
accurate in what I say, and I will follow up to you with
precision with that information, but I believe a new person
was----
Mr. Mica. Obviously, it had been approved, the position,
earlier. It wasn't totally filled at the time of this incident,
or was it?
Mr. Sabatini. I will turn to someone who may have that
information, if you will just bear with me for a moment.
Mr. Mica. OK. A developmental was on site and had arrived
in the summer. That was an individual--see, now that is what I
had heard. An individual had arrived, was on site in the summer
but wasn't fully--full-fledged air traffic----
Mr. Sabatini. Full performance.
Mr. Mica. What?
Mr. Sabatini. Full performance.
Mr. Mica. Full performance, OK. Again, I go back to the
contract, the provisions of the contract. You are saying that
was the old contract we are operating. The new contract went
into effect what a few weeks ago or what?
Mr. Sabatini. Yes, sir.
Mr. Mica. So things could change in that regard as far as
us being us able to place people on an expedited list.
Lexington also got me to think about--and maybe we should--
I might ask GAO, I might ask the Inspector General or other
people to look at this. But when we put someone at an air
traffic control tower like Lexington, and the reports I got was
the average traffic on a weekend night was six to eight
flights, is that the best utilization of staff?
Now I know FAA had looked at closing down some towers
from--or not having them manned from midnight to, say, 5:00
a.m. or something like that. Then at Lexington, like on a
Sunday night--but Monday morning traffic picks up at 5:30,
6:00--or I guess 6:00 is when they had a couple start taking
off.
Would it be better to go back and look at the staffing on
the model of not having somebody there--and I know you tried
that and some of that was rejected. Is that the case?
Tell me again where we went with that program. You looked
at--I know Russell did, and we got a lot of pushback. So we put
people in some places where we may not have needed people
because of pressure.
Mr. Sabatini. As you know, Mr. Mica, I am responsible for
the aviation safety organization, and I am not the person to
get into that kind of detail. We can certainly arrange to get
you a briefing.
Mr. Mica. But, again, from a safety standpoint, would it be
better to utilize your person out where you have the volume and
the traffic or should we--is this something we should be
looking at from a safety standpoint?
Mr. Sabatini. Well, from a safety perspective, sir, I would
say that the flexibility we have in this contract will enable
us to be responsive to changes in the system and put the
appropriate number of people where they need to be.
Mr. Mica. This raised another question of safety and
utilization of personnel. If I put one person at Lexington
downstairs, as was described here, he is not really a reliever
for the guy upstairs, is he? Is that part of his
responsibility? Do you know?
Mr. Sabatini. That would not be part of his responsibility.
Mr. Mica. Now if I am putting somebody downstairs and that
guy's responsibility is to look at a radar screen and he is not
looking at it, this made me think we need to be looking more at
consolidations where I can put that--if that person doesn't
have to be in that location but could be in a location where we
could have a consolidation, it seems like you would have
redundancy and backup in human personnel to be on that screen.
This guy has to go potty or he has to excuse himself for
something, and I got one guy--that is not--I don't have a lot
of redundancy in the system. Wouldn't it be safer for some
consolidations where you can have that redundancy?
Mr. Sabatini. I believe it would be, sir, and that you
would have the leverage of using resources in the way that they
combined and you get a synergy out of that.
Mr. Mica. I think we are going to have to find a way--and
people have come to me about a base closure type or BRAC kind
of thing to do some of this. Because every time we want to move
one air traffic controller, it is like we are changing the
world as we know it. You get the political pressure to call on
Members of Congress. It doesn't seem like a very efficient way
to run the railroad or the air traffic control system.
OK, now, in April of 2000, before I became chairman, we had
a GAO study done--was it GAO? I am sorry--IG study done. It
said contract towers continue to provide services that are
comparable to the quality and safety of FAA-operated towers.
Users remain supportive of the program. The program has been
successful in providing air traffic control services at low
activity airports at lower cost than the agency could otherwise
provide.
Now that showed that--and low activity--I guess with
Lexington or that kind of airport--be a low activity or--a
contract tower--and I haven't heard a lot of problems with
staffing. It seems like the private sector is able to staff
people in a little bit more expedited fashion. But I will give
you the discretion you have under the new contract to do some
of that to see how that works.
But that was 2000, and when I cited this I got hammered by
folks that this was, oh, they didn't ask the right questions.
So when I was chairman in September of 2003, we had GAO ask
more questions that were wanted to--folks said needed to be
asked. And they said this is, quote, in terms of safety of
operations as measured by operational errors slash deviations,
both the contract towers and the FAA staff VFR towers fell well
below FAA's 2002 overall average of 6.7 operational errors for
every 1 million operations handled. We found that the contract
controllers met qualification requirements, received regular
training, and users were satisfied with the services they
received at contract locations.
Mr. Zinser, so they said they were safer, at least from an
operational standpoint to operational errors and deviation.
And, actually, I think we also found they cost a lot less. Is
that correct?
Mr. Zinser. Yes, sir. Each time we looked at that program,
the results would be the same.
Mr. Mica. So you would recommend, too, from that study some
60 towers be converted to that where we could save money,
probably hire more air traffic controllers someplace else,
probably have more management, flexibility in meeting the needs
of a small airport. So it seems like we are playing a little
bit of a game where we have facts and statistics that we could
better utilize our personnel from a safety standpoint. And this
hasn't been measured once. It has been measured several times.
Mr. Zinser, am I reading--taking something from this I
shouldn't?
Mr. Zinser. No, sir. I think you are reading it correctly.
Mr. Mica. Mr. Sabatini?
Mr. Sabatini. I would agree with that as well.
Mr. Mica. So I think we really need to look at what we are
doing. I mean, this has raised--you know, it is horrible.
Forty-nine people lost their life in Lexington, but Lexington
may send a message that we need to look at the safety and
application of our personnel and utilization of personnel with
systems and programs that make us safer; and the ironic thing
is the thing even costs less for the taxpayers when instituted
and we get that management flexibility. Then the consolidation
of some of these locations we need to look at for redundancies
in the system.
We also had--I heard the outage issue, and that does
concern me. We did have a briefing before, and I don't--that
was an accidental power outage that was raised by one of the
members. That was a safety concern.
Now redundancy was mentioned by both Mr. Sabatini and Mr.
Hayes and also training and protocols that the pilots should
know. That, however, still could pose a risk, having some of
these facilities down, maybe in our larger locations. Is
anybody on the panel aware of where we may stand in power
redundancy? I mean, nice to have air traffic controllers
sitting in front of screens and directing traffic and all this
electronic equipment, but the failure to have power redundancy,
what have you got on that, Mr. Sabatini?
Mr. Sabatini. I would tell you that there are backup
systems throughout the ATO in their structure. What happened
there was human error again. It was a mistake. It was
accidental.
Mr. Mica. But there was no backup for that human error.
Mr. Sabatini. No, because they actually switched over to
the backup.
Mr. Mica. OK. OK. Mr. Zinser, did you have something?
Mr. Zinser. Sir, I do not think we have a lot of data on
how many outages occur in situations similar to what was
reported here this afternoon. I think there have been some
locations in the recent past where there have been outages but
I do not think there are data where it is a widespread issue.
Mr. Mica. OK. Well, that concerns me from some of the
incidents I have heard, and I think that is something we need
to keep an eye on to make certain we have that capability.
Anybody recommend--OK, based on what you see, what you have
heard, you are all experts on safety, is there any change that
we need to make in statute for any reason that you are aware of
at this point in time and space that would improve safety? Is
there something, a legislative change, something you can't do
by rule or your action that you already have with your current
authority?
Mr. Sabatini, anything you think we need to address
legislatively?
Mr. Sabatini. Sir, as you know, we are going through
reauthorization; and we certainly have been thinking----
Mr. Mica. Anything you can think of in safety you are
lacking? You have all the jurisdiction, the tools you need to
proceed.
Mr. Sabatini. Yes, sir. Yes, sir, we do. There are some
minor things.
Mr. Mica. Dollars that are missing, but you don't get into
that business.
Anything you can think of Mr. Haueter?
Mr. Haueter. Well, we don't have regulatory authority,
obviously, but we continue to have your support of our
recommendations to help push them.
Mr. Mica. We changed where we used to put so many
recommendations on the shelf that they are no longer just left
on the shelf. They are brought back up.
Mr. Haueter. We appreciate that, sir.
Mr. Mica. Is there anything--now you are--and we apologize.
I have tried to move your reauthorization. I am hoping we can
get it next week. That would be real fun. I would have an
NTSB--but anything there in the wrong direction, right
direction, missing?
Mr. Haueter. From the NTSB point of view?
Mr. Mica. Yeah.
Mr. Haueter. Well, certainly we could use more staff, sir.
Mr. Mica. Oh, OK. I am just teasing. Anything else
legislatively?
Mr. Haueter. No, sir.
Mr. Mica. Mr. Dillingham?
Mr. Dillingham. No, sir.
I agree with Mr. Sabatini. I think we have adequate tools.
Those tools need to be played out at this point in time before
additional legislation should be considered, we believe.
Mr. Mica. Mr. Zinser?
Mr. Zinser. Mr. Chairman, we prepared a lot for this
hearing, but we did not prepare for that question. To be honest
with you, I really cannot think of a specific issue where
legislation is needed. I think there are a lot of rulemakings
under way that if they do not move, you may want to consider
legislating them, but, at this point, I would have to say I do
not have a specific item.
Mr. Mica. Now, one question that was raised by several
members was this new--this new trend towards outsourcing
repairs, maintenance. It appears, of course, that is going to
continue; and everybody believes we have the current authority
to handle that if we want to, OK? Nothing has to be legislated
as far as the standards or requirements for aircraft that fly
in U.S. airspace and carry domestic U.S. passengers? No?
OK, I think I have covered all the remaining--not all. I
have additional questions that we will be submitting for the
record. So Mr. Costello moves that we keep the record open for
a period of what?
Mr. Costello. I do indeed.
Mr. Mica. I will give you all the time I want.
Mr. Costello. I so move for a period of 2 weeks.
Mr. Mica. Without objection, so ordered.
One other question. I should know the answer to this as
Chairman, but, actually, we don't do the--the FTEs, are there
FTEs for air traffic controllers set by Congress, by the
appropriators? Does anybody know?
Mr. Sabatini. I will ask.
Mr. Mica. FTEs.
Mr. Sabatini. We don't believe so, sir. I will get you that
information.
Mr. Mica. See, because I want to know--now, you told me--
and the other question we have--we have got to look at here is
the determination of how many air traffic controllers are
sufficient, how many inspect--I think the inspection function
is very critical to this whole process. And there are a number
of other positions, professional positions, that must be
staffed. And you know that some of the downsizing we have done,
how I have expressed my concern that we can't even get near the
margins on these things.
This brings up the question of how do we decide what is
enough as far as coverage for air traffic controllers,
inspectors, other key positions? Tell me how we do that now
within this regime, and then if FTEs are mandated by Congress,
then--and I guess they are for the rest of FAA, I would
imagine.
Mr. Sabatini. They certainly are for the safety
organization, Mr. Chairman.
I would tell you that, as I mentioned earlier, our first
priority is continued operational safety. We will never
compromise safety. But as we assure that we deploy our
personnel to address the number one priority, it shows up in
terms of not being as responsive to the applicants who wish to
receive the services of the FAA for the certification of an
engine, a component or to be certificated as an air carrier. So
that is where it shows up, and what you see is a delay in
getting to those folks.
Mr. Costello brought up the foreign repair stations. I can
tell you that we have a pending list of applicants, as many--I
believe the last figure was about 94 pending applicants for
certification, which we will not certificate because we know we
cannot add 94. So what shows up is the inability to be
responsive to those who wish to be certificated.
Mr. Mica. Again, how--are you, Russell and Marian sitting
in a dark room somewhere and saying--you have a formula in all
of that to say, 14,670 controllers, that is your--that was your
target. How did you reach that? Maybe you could just elaborate
a minute on that process. How much is adequate? Who is making
that decision?
Mr. Sabatini. Well, we respond to what we can anticipate.
There isn't a barometer for us to say, well, this year we can
expect X more people applying for what we would provide as a
service for certification. In fact, during bad economic times
you will find that that decreases; during good economic times,
as we see today, we have an increase in the number of
applicants.
But specifically for our organization, Mr. Chairman, as you
know, we are working with the National Academies of Science who
are working with us to develop a staffing standard for the ABS
organization. I do know that there is a staffing standard that
has been developed on behalf of the ATO, and while I don't have
that document here, and I am certainly not the person with the
kind of detail to address the ATO in that kind of detail, we
certainly can----
Mr. Mica. --responsibility in charge of safety? Again, I am
trying to get a handle on how we say that 14,670 is the
adequate number to service all of our towers and
responsibilities.
Mr. Sabatini. Well, sir, I would say that the evidence is
quite clear. We will acknowledge today that this is the safest
system in the world, and that is the objective evidence of good
work being done. So we are in the throes of, as I said,
addressing the staffing standard.
And I would also say that the air carriers today are
providing us with one of the safest systems in the world, and
we don't regulate them in terms of how many people they need to
have to conduct safe operations, except in those areas where it
is obvious. Well, if it is a crew of two in an airplane, you
have to have two flight crew members or where flight attendants
are required for a certain number of seating capacity. But as
far as how to operate the air carrier, we do not specify how
many people they need to have to safely conduct the operation.
The output is the objective evidence, and that is what we look
at.
And it is the same with us. Right now, we don't have a
formula. It is a complicated formula. It is no different than
what you have heard about the air traffic organization.
Mr. Mica. Drafting--again, you have got a whole new set--
new contract. Are you telling me this is in transition and you
are feeling your way, so to speak? But I mean--or is there some
formula I can address? Is it requests from the managers of
towers across the country?
Mr. Sabatini. Well, I think the transit organization--that
formula already exists. As I said, I can provide that to you,
but I don't have it myself personally today.
Mr. Mica. Anybody else want to comment on the adequacy of
the current----
Mr. Zinser. Sir, your question is a central question that
FAA has to deal with. What we have been recommending is that
FAA come up with a standard, facility by facility. There are
facilities out there right now, for example, where the
allocation from FAA headquarters is a hundred controllers more
than what they have on staff right now, and they are operating
fine. And the overtime is not exaggerated or inordinate either.
So what we are recommending is that they narrow that gap--
even if it is just a range at each facility of how many
controllers they need. What I was just told today is that FAA
managers have done a facility-by-facility bottom up estimation
of how many controllers they need at each facility. Those are
not published, but they have them. They have asked the MITRE
Corporation to come in and validate those numbers and help them
come up with a facility----
Mr. Mica. Do we know where we are on MITRE's validation?
And, again, all this would be new, because we are in a new
contract, sort of a new year.
Mr. Zinser. My understanding is that they have begun with
the enroute centers, but I don't think that is completed.
Mr. Mica. The other thing, too--and I think Mrs. Kelly is
gone--but as I recall when I visited there--now she said there
is a reduction in air traffic controllers, but there is also
reduction in air traffic. Which means you have sort of a
floating requirement.
I mean, if you have somebody like Independence pull out of
Dulles--I don't know how many they had at Dulles, but you take
out--what did they have? 350 flights a day or something? It was
just a phenomenal amount. They chopped that in half.
Under this contract, you have the ability now to move those
people to someplace else or----
Mr. Sabatini. That is absolutely correct.
Mr. Mica. --they just sit there and collect the salary.
Mr. Sabatini. They are. You are absolutely correct. With
this contract, we have the flexibility to move people where
they are needed.
Mr. Mica. I want to see the MITRE----
Mr. Zinser. I am told that it is expected in draft in the
enroute centers by the end of the year.
Mr. Mica. I hope to be here as a member.
Mr. Costello.
Mr. Costello. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I hope you are here,
too, sitting where I am.
I don't have any further questions, but let me just make a
point that in September of 2003 the GAO made some observations
concerning the issue of contract towers and looked at the issue
of safety, and I would ask unanimous consent Mr. Chairman that
we enter that GAO report into the record.
Mr. Mica. Without objection.
[The information follows:]
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Mr. Costello. With that, Mr. Chairman, I appreciate your
calling this hearing. I think that in the coming months that we
need to come back and examine some other issues concerning
safety.
Mr. Mica. And I want to compliment you because, you know,
we have been so focused on security, security, ATO--or ATC
modernization, we got back into it, but we have not paid enough
attention. I appreciate Mr. Costello's request for this
hearing, and I think we will do a follow-up. We may need to
bring in some other players, because we have a great record and
those probably--out of sight, out of mind. Maybe Lexington is a
little bit of a wake-up call or a reminder, but we do need to
see whatever we can do.
I will also submit a question asking your recommendation on
R&D for technology. Of course, we are getting into--and I have
seen the price tag on the end gas, the next generation air
traffic control system, but also things we can do in the short
term, either R&D or deployment of existing technology on a
cost-effective basis to enhance safety, and we can spend the
rest of the night talking about some of that. So I look forward
to your recommendations on that.
Finally, we did have at least one member from another panel
and from the full committee ask a question. I have a question
from Congressman Tom Reynolds. He is not on the committee, but
we also granted him the courtesy of submitting a question. That
will be submitted for Mr. Sabatini, I believe; and we will ask
for a response. It is on a specific incident.
There being no further business, I ought to just break for
a few minutes and then call you back for a few more hours. No,
I'm just kidding.
There being no business to come before the subcommittee, I
want to thank our panel of witnesses and those who participated
here today. This hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 5:53 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
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