[House Hearing, 109 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
REGIONAL INSECURITY: DHS GRANTS TO THE NATIONAL CAPITAL AREA
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
COMMITTEE ON
GOVERNMENT REFORM
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
JUNE 15, 2006
__________
Serial No. 109-193
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Government Reform
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/
index.html
http://www.house.gov/reform
______
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COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM
TOM DAVIS, Virginia, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut HENRY A. WAXMAN, California
DAN BURTON, Indiana TOM LANTOS, California
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida MAJOR R. OWENS, New York
JOHN M. McHUGH, New York EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York
JOHN L. MICA, Florida PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania
GIL GUTKNECHT, Minnesota CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York
MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland
STEVEN C. LaTOURETTE, Ohio DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio
TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois
CHRIS CANNON, Utah WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri
JOHN J. DUNCAN, Jr., Tennessee DIANE E. WATSON, California
CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts
MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland
DARRELL E. ISSA, California LINDA T. SANCHEZ, California
JON C. PORTER, Nevada C.A. DUTCH RUPPERSBERGER, Maryland
KENNY MARCHANT, Texas BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
LYNN A. WESTMORELAND, Georgia ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of
PATRICK T. McHENRY, North Carolina Columbia
CHARLES W. DENT, Pennsylvania ------
VIRGINIA FOXX, North Carolina BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont
JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio (Independent)
------ ------
David Marin, Staff Director
Lawrence Halloran, Deputy Staff Director
Teresa Austin, Chief Clerk
Phil Barnett, Minority Chief of Staff/Chief Counsel
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Hearing held on June 15, 2006.................................... 1
Statement of:
Foresman, George W., Undersecretary for Preparedness,
Department of Homeland Security; Edward D. Reiskin, deputy
mayor for public safety and justice, government of the
District of Columbia; Robert P. Crouch, Jr., assistant to
the Governor for the Commonwealth preparedness,
Commonwealth of Virginia; Dennis R. Schrader, director,
Governor's Office of Homeland Security, State of Maryland;
and David J. Robertson, executive director, Metropolitan
Washington Council of Governments.......................... 33
Crouch, Robert P., Jr.................................... 68
Foresman, George W....................................... 33
Reiskin, Edward D........................................ 53
Robertson, David J....................................... 71
Schrader, Dennis R....................................... 70
Letters, statements, etc., submitted for the record by:
Clay, Hon. Wm. Lacy, a Representative in Congress from the
State of Missouri, prepared statement of................... 109
Cummings, Hon. Elijah E., a Representative in Congress from
the State of Maryland, prepared statement of............... 124
Davis, Chairman Tom, a Representative in Congress from the
State of Virginia:
Prepared statement of.................................... 4
D.C. Resolution 16-677................................... 113
Foresman, George W., Undersecretary for Preparedness,
Department of Homeland Security, prepared statement of..... 37
Maloney, Hon. Carolyn B., a Representative in Congress from
the State of New York, prepared statement of............... 18
Moran, Hon. James P., a Representative in Congress from the
State of Virginia, prepared statement of................... 26
Norton, Hon. Eleanor Holmes, a Delegate in Congress from the
District of Columbia, prepared statement of................ 14
Reiskin, Edward D., deputy mayor for public safety and
justice, government of the District of Columbia, prepared
statement of............................................... 56
Robertson, David J., executive director, Metropolitan
Washington Council of Governments, prepared statement of... 74
Ruppersberger, Hon. C.A. Dutch, a Representative in Congress
from the State of Maryland, prepared statement of.......... 127
Towns, Hon. Edolphus, a Representative in Congress from the
State of New York, prepared statement of................... 120
Waxman, Hon. Henry A., a Representative in Congress from the
State of California, prepared statement of................. 8
REGIONAL INSECURITY: DHS GRANTS TO THE NATIONAL CAPITAL AREA
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THURSDAY, JUNE 15, 2006
House of Representatives,
Committee on Government Reform,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m., in room
2154, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Tom Davis (chairman
of the committee) presiding.
Present: Representatives Tom Davis, Mica, Gutknecht,
Platts, Foxx, Schmidt, Fossella, Wolf, Waxman, Maloney,
Cummings, Kucinich, Clay, Watson, Van Hollen, Ruppersberger,
Higgins, Norton, and Moran.
Staff present: David Marin, staff director; Keith Ausbrook,
chief counsel; John Hunter, counsel; Rob White, communications
director; Andrea LeBlanc, deputy director of communications;
Shalley Kim and Wimberly Fair, professional staff members;
Teresa Austin, chief clerk; Sarah D'Orsie, deputy clerk; Leneal
Scott, computer systems manager; Kirstin Amerling; minority
general counsel; Karen Lightfoot, minority communications
director/senior policy advisor; Michael McCarthy and Kim
Trinca, minority counsels; Richard Butcher, minority
professional staff member; Earley Green, minority chief clerk;
and Jean Gosa, minority assistant clerk.
Chairman Tom Davis. The meeting will come to order.
I would ask unanimous consent that Mr. Moran, Mr. Wynn, Mr.
Cardin, Mr. Hoyer, Mr. Fossella and Mr. Wolf be able to
participate in today's hearing. Without objection, it is so
ordered.
The committee will come to order. On May 31st, the
Department of Homeland Security announced fiscal year 2006
grant allocations for States and eligible high-risk urban
areas. For the first time, grant awards reflected the use of
relative risk and effectiveness criteria in an effort to better
target Federal investments and make measurable progress toward
the National Preparedness Goal. The new elaborate evaluation
process used by DHS produced some unexpected, seemingly
punitive results, particularly for the National Capital Region.
We convene this morning to shed some needed light on how DHS
assessed risks and needs in a region that has already been
attacked and remains an attractive target for terrorists.
Without question, the Nation's Capital bears a
disproportionate burden in terms of public safety challenges
and Homeland Security costs. Comprised of 12 local
jurisdictions, two States and the District of Columbia, this
region must be prepared to protect critically important
facilities and monuments of high operational and symbolic value
to the entire Nation: the White House, the Pentagon, the
Congress, the Supreme Court, to name just a few. The tragic
events of September 11, 2001, and the anthrax attacks that same
year unfortunately confirmed our unwelcome status as a prime
target.
Yet one discretionary DHS grant program allocated on the
basis of risk, the Urban Areas Security Initiative, yielded a
reduced award to the National Capital Region this year: $47
million. Last year, the region received $77 million. True,
Congress appropriated 14 percent less for the program this
year, but the 40 percent reduction suffered by the NCR is
clearly the product of something more than tight budgets.
According to DHS, this region stands in the top 25 percent
of urban areas at risk in terms of both critical assets and
geographic vulnerabilities. But the effectiveness of the
proposed grant expenditures was ranked by DHS reviewers in the
bottom 25 percent of all similar investment strategies. Leaders
in this region and in other high-risk jurisdictions like New
York and Los Angeles are asking, what happened? Why did some
grant justifications score so poorly under the DHS system? And
how much did secret reviews of unquestionably subjective
factors, like relevance, innovative necessary and feasibility,
undermine efforts to address real security needs?
In attempting to implement a risk-based grant allocation
system and improve State and local response capabilities, DHS
appears to have built a dangerous house of mirrors for the
unwary, an overly elaborate system of marginally relevant
evaluation criteria that equates the risk of terrorism with the
risk of filing a bad grant application. The system seems to
have taken little or no account of the most obvious indicator
of risk imaginable, that the Nation's Capital has already been
attacked.
Last week, the chairman of the 9/11 Commission, appointed
by President Bush, former New Jersey Governor Thomas keen, said
the grant awards to D.C. and New York appeared to ``defy common
sense.'' The process so far has also defied clear explanation,
as DHS officials have offered different accounts of what
factors produced the surprising allocations and what applicants
might have done to improve their chances.
So today we seek to bring greater transparency to an
important Homeland Security program. The effort to apply sound
risk analysis and risk management standards to Homeland
Security grants is commendable, and overdue. Scarce resources
need to be focused on development of tangible and sustainable
preparedness and response capabilities. But regional readiness
to meet the threat of terrorism is not enhanced by wide,
unpredictable and disruptive funding swings. At-risk cities and
regions need to know their grant applications are being fully
and fairly evaluated. The rules of the game should be clear.
Now, grant applicants can only guess at the outcome of ``black
box'' procedures fueled by classified threat information and
secret peer reviews.
The Department has proposed a sustained and detailed debate
on the difficult process of assessing risk, evaluating need and
judging the effectiveness of local plans to build capabilities.
We take them up on that pledge. Officials from the National
Capital Region are also here to give their perspectives on
their application and its evaluation. We look forward to a
productive discussion of how DHS and this region plan to work
together to address the National Capital area's unique security
needs.
Let me just remind everybody, for the inaugural costs last
year, 2 years ago, the money came out of the Department of
Homeland Security grant money to the region. This was a burden
shouldered by the city as well. Nothing was taken into account
there, no reimbursements except to take it out of Homeland
Security moneys at that point.
I would now recognize the distinguished ranking member, Mr.
Waxman, for his opening statement.
[The prepared statement of Chairman Tom Davis follows:]
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Mr. Waxman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this
hearing, examining the drastic cuts in Homeland Security
funding for the National Capital Region. The reduction in
funding is sudden and unexpected, and it presents a serious
challenge to the State and local officials work to protect this
area. It also calls into question the priorities of this
administration.
The Department of Homeland Security says that one reason
for the cuts to D.C. is that the level of the risk for the
region is lower relative to other cities according to
classified computer programs and matrixes that the DHS uses.
Well, this is difficult to understand. The Nation's Capital has
enormous symbolic importance and is the center of our
government and has already been the sight of a deadly attack.
It is hard to see how it could be downgraded like this, and it
is hard to have confidence in the secret system that the
Department is using to rank risk when it comes to conclusions
like this.
Ever since September 11th, I have been asking the
administration to provide Congress with a comprehensive threat
and risk assessment that we could use to inform budget
decisions. To date, we have received a lot of rhetoric about
how important it is to make sound risk-based decisions, but we
have never seen the proof.
Local officials also suffer from the lack of transparency
at the Department of Homeland Security. According to DHS,
another reason for the cuts to D.C. was that the region's
proposal scored poorly for effectiveness. But officials from
D.C., Maryland and Virginia will testify today that they are
baffled about why their proposals received low marks from DHS.
Ironically, one of the criteria for effectiveness that DHS
claims to examine is sustainability. How could local officials
build sustainable programs when DHS funding for them varies
wildly from year to year?
To protect our Nation, we need to think outside the narrow
box the administration wants to put us in. The Department is
proposing to increase funding for Los Angeles, which is
absolutely right. The answer to the underfunding of D.C. is not
to take funds from other high priorities. Instead, we need to
look at our national priorities.
Last week, the Senate tried to pass a complete repeal of
the estate tax. That boondoggle for the wealthiest families in
the United States would have cost over $1 trillion. Yet we are
being told today that we can't afford $30 million more to
protect the Nation's Capital from terrorist attacks.
Earlier this year, we learned that auditors had challenged
over $250 million in charges by Halliburton, yet the
administration went ahead and paid them anyway. If we had saved
that money, we would have had more than enough to fully fund
Homeland Security grants to all of our urban areas.
Just this week, we learned that FEMA paid more than $1
billion in fraudulent claims in the aftermath of Katrina
because the administration failed to have even basic controls
in place. If we had spent these funds responsibly, we could
have paid for the protections this region desperately needs.
Ultimately, the problem our Nation faces isn't the lack of
funds; it is a lack of accountability and a failure of
government to be responsible stewards of taxpayers' dollars. I
am glad we are having this hearing on how to protect the
National Capital Region, and I hope we can get answers about
why funding was cut so dramatically and how the threats to this
area can be addressed. I also hope the administration and
Congress will reassess their spending priorities so we can
truly make this Nation safer.
[The prepared statement of Hon. Henry A. Waxman follows:]
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Chairman Tom Davis. Thank you very much.
Ms. Norton.
Ms. Norton. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I appreciate that you called this hearing. I believe, as I
will indicate in my own statement, that the hearing you called
today is a public service not only for this region but for our
country because of the responsibilities of security officials
in localities in this region.
Actually, this is the first of two hearings by committees
on which I serve seeking answers to the same question: How
could a risk-based security formula lead to unusually large
reductions in Homeland Security funds for al Qaeda's favorite
targets? Among them the National Capital Region, the sight of
the September 11th attack on the Pentagon and site of the
Capitol, located on this campus, where analysts believe the
plane that was brought down in Pennsylvania was headed?
The Homeland Security Committee has asked the mayors of New
York City and the District of Columbia to testify on this same
subject next Wednesday. I have asked for a face-to-face meeting
between regional officials and Department of Homeland Security
headquarters staff, not only to get a greater understanding of
the basis for the DHS decisions but particularly to understand
how the region is expected to meet its unique dual obligations
as officials charged with preventing and responding both for
the Federal Government and local communities.
When the DHS grants were announced, the initial despair and
bewilderment of residents and officials in this region quickly
escalated to anger and outrage. The decision that was as
astonishing as it was counter-intuitive was made with little
explanation. We seek that explanation today.
Regional residents and Federal employees alike have
admirably learned to live with higher risks than their fellow
Americans, in part because of the special effort they see from
regional and Federal security officials and the funding they
assumed would come annually. Among these residents are 200,000
Federal employees from whom are drawn scores of thousands
directly charged with the principal responsibility for
designing and planning the National Homeland Security effort.
This region ranks high as a target, not only because of its
almost 4 million residents, but unlike other targeted areas,
the entire Federal presence, including the Nation's priceless
iconic monuments and the Capitol, the Supreme Court and the
White House and the Pentagon, all extremely inviting targets,
are concentrated in a few square miles in the District of
Columbia, Maryland and Virginia. Although individual sites are
protected by Federal police and security guards, prevention and
response for the region where the Federal presence is located
is up to local officials and first responders, not the Federal
Government.
When the Pentagon was attacked on September 11th, this
Federal installation was completely dependent upon the largest
fire department in the region, the D.C. Fire Department and
other regional fire services and a helicopter and burn unit at
Washington Hospital Center, among other local services.
The Nation learned that local officials here had a unique
double responsibility for their own residents as well as for
the Nation's most valuable and priceless Federal assets. And if
I may say so, the Congress learned that the District of
Columbia had almost total responsibility after the anthrax
attack in the Congress of the United States, not the Federal
Government, no agency of the Federal Government. They were sent
to the old D.C. General Hospital for the District of Columbia
to figure it out when we had an unprecedented attack right here
on the campus of the Congress of the United States.
It is this twin responsibility that accounts for this
region's unique obligations. It is this twin responsibility
that most seriously raises questions about the judgment of the
Department of Homeland Security in severely cutting the
region's security funding. Even with the funding the region has
received, I have spent more time than I can say worrying that
there has not been enough time or funding to staunch, major and
obvious vulnerabilities that mainly affect Federal employees
who work here, not my own constituents. Working with
appropriators, not DHS, I have gotten some but not all of the
funding for ER One, for Washington Hospital Center, the only
place where visitors to the Capitol and others in the region
could be taken and isolated if there is a biological, chemical
or other major such attack in Washington.
The tunnels, bridges and Metro rail and bus system that are
responsible for bringing Federal workers to and from Federal
jobs in the District every day present major untouched and
difficult security issues, such as preventing and responding to
attacks and accidents involving chemical, biological and other
hazardous substances and fires from explosives in tunnels and
the tunnels leading to this city.
After September 11th, a lack of interoperability here
should be unthinkable, but that is a work in progress that
requires additional funding. Perhaps most telling, given the
many Federal buildings here where controversial decisions are
made every day, is the lack of necessary equipment even for
area bomb squads, not one of which has the equipment necessary
to meet FEMA's top standard.
We will hear of other vulnerabilities today. We will want
to know whether they were considered when DHS funding decisions
were made, and we will want to know what precisely is now
expected from local security officials charged with major
prevention and recovery operations in the National Capital
Region.
We will want to know not only because of those we
represent; we will want to know because of the weighty, unique
burden local security officials carry for the region where the
Nation's most highly targeted assets are located.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Hon. Eleanor Holmes Norton
follows:]
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Chairman Tom Davis. Thank you very much.
Mrs. Maloney, any opening statement?
Mrs. Maloney. Thank you very much, Chairman Davis and
Ranking Member Waxman, for holding this very important hearing.
My only wish is that this hearing would not only focus on
D.C.'s Homeland Security but also New York's Homeland Security.
Both D.C. and New York City, their funding was cut by 40
percent, yet by all lists, they remain target No. 1 in this
Nation. The al Qaeda ranks them as target No. 1. Bin Laden has
attacked New York City twice and has been caught on tape saying
he intends to do it again. Likewise, the Capital Region has
been attacked and suffered many other reported attempts to
attack the Capital Region.
Since the announcement of the Homeland Security funding 2
weeks ago, I have heard a number of reasons why New York and
Washington suffered such a tremendous cut. If you listen to the
variety of explanations and excuses coming from Secretary
Chertoff, your head will start spinning. He often contradicts
himself.
We have heard that New York City and D.C. had their funding
cut because overall funding for the Urban Area Security
Initiative has been cut, the high threat funding formula. On
June 7th, Secretary Chertoff was quoted in the paper as saying,
``Congress gave us about $600 million less than our grant
programs, including $125 million less for the Urban Areas
Security Initiative.'' While it is true high-threat funding was
cut by 15 percent, New York and D.C.'s funding was cut by 40
percent each while other communities saw increases of over 70
percent.
Also the initial formula had seven high-threat cities. That
has now been expanded to 40 high-threat cities. Yet the 40
high-threat cities are not on the al Qaeda list, according to
intelligence that has been released to Congress and others.
In fact, the cut to New York City was $83 million alone, or
more than two-thirds of the total nationwide cut. When we have
questioned the jump in funding for other communities, Tracy
Henke, the DHS official in charge of the process, told me,
``You have to understand that there is risk throughout the
Nation.''
I understand that risk exists outside of New York and D.C.,
but I would have preferred to have followed the recommendations
of Secretary Chertoff when he stated in January that high
threat grants are ``not party favors to be distributed as
widely as possible.''
Then there is the much talked about listing of national
monuments and icons or lack thereof. Yet the administration
still thinks that New York has no icons, and certainly D.C. has
more than any city in the country. I would like them to take a
tour of New York. The Secretary's excuse for this is that they
listed the Empire State Building, for example, as a large
office building and the Brooklyn Bridge as a bridge. He
contrasts that with Mount Rushmore, a monument with much fewer
visitors.
To that I ask, can't our icons be listed as both? The
Empire State Building is a large office building with thousands
of workers, and it is also a very famous site that attracts
hundreds of thousands of visitors and attention from
terrorists. Al Qaeda was not videotaping the Brooklyn Bridge
because it is a bridge. They were doing so because it is a
bridge and a national icon on which thousands of people
traverse each day.
It is this kind of common sense that seems to have
completely escaped DHS as it tried to come up with a formula
that is as complicated as possible.
The next reason the Department has been giving us as to why
New York and Washington, DC, received a cut is due to our
application. We both rank at the top for risk but at the bottom
for our application.
Believe me, if there is one thing D.C. and New York know
how to do, it is paperwork. They know how to fill out an
application. They probably file more papers on more issues in
more areas than any area in the country. So I don't know about
you, Mr. Chairman, but I am going to ask the city of New York
to maybe hire Steven King next time to write our application.
Maybe then the Department will understand the full threat to
New York City. And D.C., as my colleague mentioned, has
suffered other attacks, the anthrax attacks, as has New York
City.
So what started as a promising commitment from Secretary
Chertoff at the beginning of this year that Homeland Security
funding would, in fact, be based on risk has turned into one of
the greatest displays of incompetency, and really, we cannot
afford to be incompetent in the protection of our people and in
our Homeland Security grants.
I look forward to the testimony. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Hon. Carolyn B. Maloney
follows:]
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Chairman Tom Davis. Thank you very much.
Mr. Moran.
Mr. Moran. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thanks for holding this
hearing and for staying on top of this through the Government
Reform Committee.
It does boggle the mind that we would be cutting
expenditures for Homeland Security by $690 million, that we
would be taking $122 million out of the Urban Area Security
Initiative, and then we would be paying for that $120 million
cut by taking it all out of Washington, DC, and New York City.
I mean, this is, as I say, it boggles the mind. I hear the
excuses, and that is what we are going to talk about today.
But, you know, you put it in the larger context: What are we
doing cutting Homeland Security by $690 million? We are going
to debate today and tomorrow 10 hours on the topic of Iraq.
Well, Iraq, and it has been said and will be said hundreds of
times today, I trust, had nothing to do with September 11th.
Saddam did not attack this country. He was not harboring
terrorists. And until we went in and invaded the country and
occupied it, he was no threat whatsoever to the United States
of America. And yet it is relevant because we are spending $300
million a day in Iraq, almost $9 billion a month in Iraq. And
how are we paying for it? We take $690 million out of this
entire Nation's Homeland Security funds.
We had an amendment in the Appropriations Committee, the
Homeland Security Appropriations bill. Mr. Obey offered it.
What it did was to completely pay for all of the 9/11
Commission's recommendations that the President endorsed and
the Congress endorsed. It would have paid for all of it: all of
the public transit monitoring; all of the port security;
instead of checking 5 percent of the containers, we would have
checked 100 percent of the containers for radiological,
chemical or biological threats, rail security, on and on. It
would have paid for all of it.
You know how we were going to offset it? The people who
earned more, more than $1 million a year in this country, get
$114,000 annual tax cuts in addition to all the other tax cuts
they get. This is just the new tax cuts we passed. Instead of
getting a $114,000 tax cut a year, they get $101,000; a $13,000
reduction to people making more in tax cuts than $1 million a
year. That would have paid for all of the 9/11 Commission's
Homeland Security recommendations. Now, it was defeated on a
party line vote, no surprise, but my point is, where is this
Nation's priorities?
Now, you are not going to be able to answer that, but we
have some people from DHS here. They might relay that message
to some of their bosses, that there was some questioning about
the Nation's priorities.
Now, within DHS, you tell us that you didn't like the grant
applications. I think Mrs. Maloney makes a pretty good point
that not to identify the Brooklyn Bridge as anything more than
a bridge was questionable, not to identify the Statue of
Liberty as a national icon is questionable, and not to
recognize the priority that Washington, DC, must have when we
have millions of people here, 20 million visitors a year, the
seat of the Nation's Capital, of the entire free world, and you
make a 40 percent reduction in the funding?
Now, maybe you don't like the application. But I worked in
the executive branch for a few years. We thought--this was
during the Nixon administration, and one of our roles was to
sit down with the local government and work with them, because
the objective is not to grade papers; it is to do what is in
the best interests of the American people, in this case, to
figure out how best to secure our Nation's Capital. There was
$190 million additional needs identified, and the Department of
Homeland Security decided to address 6.5 percent of those
needs, from what I see, down from almost 10 percent.
You recognize that D.C. is at the top of the terrorism
target list. To put it at the bottom of funding, these are
things that need some answers, and I don't think it is
unreasonable for us to be asking these questions.
Again, what we are going to be doing is shooting the
messenger. It is the people that sent you here who make these
top decisions in terms of allocating our Nation's resources who
are the ones who ought to be on the hot seat. But,
nevertheless, this hearing needs to be held. More importantly,
we need to get some answers.
Mr. Chairman, again, I appreciate your holding the hearing.
[The prepared statement of Hon. James P. Moran follows:]
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Chairman Tom Davis. Thank you very much.
Mr. Van Hollen.
Mr. Van Hollen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you for holding the hearing today on a very important
issue. As some of my colleagues said, this does raise the
overall question of our national priorities. We hear a lot of
rhetoric from the White House and the administration about
Homeland Security. It is a top priority. Yet when you look at
the resources devoted to it, you find out that, hey, look what
happened here?
One of the reasons we have seen cuts in Washington, DC, and
New York is because we don't have the resources this year that
we had last year. If it is the administration's position now
that the threat to the homeland has reduced that much, it would
be interesting to hear from them. Otherwise, it would be nice
to have the resources match the rhetoric.
We are often told that we shouldn't prepare for the last
war, and that is absolutely true. You got to always be thinking
about new possible threats. On the other hand, I don't think
there is anybody with a shred of common sense that can tell you
that, going forward, the Nation's Capital and New York City
don't remain top targets of al Qaeda and any other group,
terrorist group, seeking to do our Nation harm. Clearly, they
remain at the top of that list.
Now, many of us have been concerned for some time about the
degree of attention the Department of Homeland Security has
been paying to the Nation's Capital. We had a back and forth a
little while ago about the downgrading of the position of the
Office of the National Capital Region Coordinator within the
Department of Homeland Security who used to report directly to
the Secretary. The Secretary has now apparently determined that
he will be buried within a couple of layers of bureaucracy. We
haven't gotten any response to the complaints many of my
colleagues and I wrote to the Secretary with respect to that
downgrading. Now it appears that downgrading is not just with
respect to the regional coordinating position, but with respect
to the resources that are devoted to the National Capital area.
Now, this is an important hearing because we are going to
be able to find out a little bit more why these decisions were
made, because there are conflicting comments in the media. Some
media reports say that the Homeland Security evaluation that
New York City and the Washington, DC, area were given lower
amounts because they were inadequate, that they were not well
thought out and substantial. Yet there are other comments from
representatives, including some on the panel from the
Department of Homeland Security, that said that is not the
reason they were downgraded. So I think it is a mystery to many
people why these areas received less money.
I would just close by pointing out that the Washington, DC,
area, as we all know, is a multi-jurisdictional area. You have
two States, Virginia and Maryland. You have the Nation's
Capital. Within the two States, you have lots of jurisdictions.
Coordinating that area is a major challenge. To have the one
source of money that really helps pull all those different
jurisdictions together and working as one and pulling them in
the same direction, to have that source of money cut sends I
believe absolutely the wrong signal at the wrong time. There
are lots of good ongoing efforts in the regions to try to bring
everybody together. I think they can do even better, but they
can't do even better with a lot less than they are getting now.
So this is a great mystery to many of us, how this decision
was reached. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing.
Hopefully, we will get some answers.
Chairman Tom Davis. Thank you very much.
Mr. Ruppersberger.
Mr. Ruppersberger. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for having
this.
Mr. Moran, I am glad you are here to make an argument.
First, I represent Maryland's Second Congressional
District, includes the Baltimore region, part of the National
Capital area. Also in my district is the port of Baltimore,
NSA, BWI Airport, Fort Meade, Aberdeen Proving Ground and the
sector of Baltimore which is a Coast Guard shipyard.
In 2006, the Department, as we know, that is why we are
having this hearing today, the Department of Homeland Security
cut National Capital Regional funding 40 percent from the
previous year. They also cut $18 million in Homeland Security
grants from the State of Maryland from the previous year.
Now, it is of great concern to me that DHS would cut
counter-terrorism money for New York City, the Washington
region, which together have been 100 percent of al Qaeda's
terrorist attacks on American soil. Each jurisdiction has been
cut, based on my investigation, by, again, at least 40 percent.
Now, it is also of great concern to me that DHS has shown
by their actions that the National Capital Region is a low-risk
city. That is preposterous. When you compare the State of
Maryland, which I represent, with nearly 5.5 million people,
the per capita spending for DHS dollars is $4.5 per person.
That means each person in Maryland gets $4.5 that could be
allocated.
You look at Wyoming. Wyoming received nearly $16 per person
in DHS funding per capita. Wyoming gets more than 15 times as
many DHS dollars than they have people. $7.6 million and only
493,000 people who live in Wyoming.
I like Wyoming. The Grand Tetons is one of our most
magnificent rural areas in the country. I have been there. I
observed grizzly bears and other wild animals. Based on this
new funding system, it seems that DHS is protecting the grizzly
bears in Wyoming over the people who live and work around Fort
Meade and NSA and other parts of this country. I choose people
over bears.
Now, I am willing to listen to DHS's argument, and they are
on the hot seat, as they should be. But I feel very strongly
that we need to focus on our high-priority targets. I am a
Member of the House Select Intelligence Committee. We focus on
terrorism and al Qaeda all the time. I am just very, very
concerned of DHS's priorities as it exists here today.
If DHS has a better understanding of where the risk is, why
was the funding for such densely populated urban areas like
Washington, DC, New York and Baltimore cut so much? The new DHS
system which supposedly balances risk and effectiveness places
more emphasis--and this is what really concerns me--places more
emphasis on the quality of the writing of the grant proposal
than the actual risk a community faces. I want to repeat that
because that seems to be the argument that certain
jurisdictions might not have written the grant proposal the way
DHS wanted it.
I agree that giving money to States without having a plan
is putting the cart before the horse, and DHS should have been
criticized for the amount of waste, of money that went to
different jurisdictions, pork, for dog vests and everything
else. That has to stop. I am sure that is why this system is
coming here now. But giving Homeland Security dollars on the
basis of the quality of how a proposal is written is trying to
drive the cart without a horse.
If the State plans are being analyzed, where is the
congressional oversight? I question whether a group of peer
review experts should be telling first responders what projects
have value and which don't and determining how much money they
should receive. Have these peer review experts ever managed a
Federal grant or Federal emergency? I don't know, because I
don't know who they are. They haven't been before the
committee. There is an argument about being classified. I am on
the committee that is classified. So there needs to be
oversight with respect to that.
This process is not acceptable, and I believe the new DHS
system puts our most vulnerable cities at risk. I think the DHS
has put the needs of a few over the needs of the most
vulnerable. I will work with my colleagues to fix the DHS grant
formula so it accurately protects America's most vulnerable
assets, our families, our community and our Nation.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Tom Davis. Thank you.
Mr. Mica.
Mr. Mica. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I really don't have a
lengthy opening statement, which I am sure many will
appreciate. But I am actually looking forward to hearing from
some of these folks. I have never seen a goofier list of
priorities for receiving Department of Homeland Security grants
than the one most recently provided us.
I just want to figure out how they figured out how to mess
things up so badly, particularly addressing the needs of some
of our most critical cities and regions, Washington and New
York and others. I want to hear the explanations to the goofy
decisions.
Thank you. I yield back.
Chairman Tom Davis. Thank you.
Ms. Watson.
Ms. Watson. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman. This hearing
is very important to our oversight responsibilities, and I
would like to thank all the witnesses that are here today for
coming.
I believe homeland security manifested as guns, barriers
and blind response protocol is a false sense of security.
Homeland security should be about the health of the American
people. It really is not about the land; it is about the
people; the people's education and the proper expertise that
can be brought to strategic management and preparedness.
You see, these alerts go high every day. What do you do?
The people have no clue. The Department of Homeland Security
was born in America's moment of crisis. Unfortunately, as a
result, it seems the Department's management itself is in a
perpetual moment of crisis.
We saw the most devastating results of this mismanagement
during Hurricane Katrina last autumn. But the hidden disaster
is the way that our local government and our first responders
are blown about by the capricious winds of DHS's policy shifts.
Now DHS has again changed the way it allocates grant money to
the local governments that are expected to respond in a case of
disaster.
I am still concerned that we have not fixed the problems
that have plagued the way we allocate these funds since the
beginning. It seems to me that the endless debate over
allocation formula is a product of the President's failure to
provide the resources necessary to secure the homeland, the
people.
Rather than debate who is going to get the biggest piece of
a shrinking pie, we need to base not just our formula but also
our overall spending levels on the true threats and risks to
America.
So I want to thank you, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to
hearing from the witnesses about how they believe we can
improve DHS's grantmaking policies, specifically in the
National Capital area.
I yield back.
Chairman Tom Davis. Thank you. I think that will conclude
opening statements and we can get to our panel. Members will
have 7 days to submit opening statements for the record.
I recognize our very distinguished panel of witnesses.
We have the Honorable George Foresman, the Undersecretary
for Preparedness, Department of Homeland Security; there is Mr.
Edward Reiskin, Deputy Mayor for Public Safety and Justice; Mr.
Robert Crouch, the Assistant to the Governor of the
Commonwealth of Virginia for Preparedness; Mr. Dennis Schrader,
the Director of the Governor's Office of Homeland Security of
the State of Maryland; and Mr. David Robertson, the executive
director of the Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments.
It is our policy to swear all witnesses in before they
testify, if you would rise and raise your right hands.
[Witnesses sworn.]
Chairman Tom Davis. Mr. Foresman, we will start with you
and move on down the line. Thank you.
STATEMENTS OF GEORGE W. FORESMAN, UNDERSECRETARY FOR
PREPAREDNESS, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY; EDWARD D.
REISKIN, DEPUTY MAYOR FOR PUBLIC SAFETY AND JUSTICE, GOVERNMENT
OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA; ROBERT P. CROUCH, JR., ASSISTANT
TO THE GOVERNOR FOR THE COMMONWEALTH PREPAREDNESS, COMMONWEALTH
OF VIRGINIA; DENNIS R. SCHRADER, DIRECTOR, GOVERNOR'S OFFICE OF
HOMELAND SECURITY, STATE OF MARYLAND; AND DAVID J. ROBERTSON,
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, METROPOLITAN WASHINGTON COUNCIL OF
GOVERNMENTS
STATEMENT OF GEORGE W. FORESMAN
Mr. Foresman. Mr. Chairman, thank you.
Ranking Member Waxman and members of the committee, thanks
to each of you for the opportunity to appear today along with
colleagues from the National Capital Region to discuss the 2006
Homeland Security Grant Program and specifically the Urban Area
Security Initiative.
I would like to highlight several key issues for the
committee today in advance of the very important discussions
about reducing America's overall risk from terrorism. The
discussion on funding should not be an issue of placing the
safety and security of any one person, community or State in
America ahead of another. Managing risk is a national
responsibility. The process used by the Department this year
reflects the desires of the administration, Congress and the
American people to make our entire Nation safer and more
secure. It is in that vein that I feel compelled to present to
the committee some clear facts.
First, the amount of funding available for the Urban Area
Security Initiative program has been reduced by $125 million
compared to 2005. This does in fact represent a reduction of 14
percent. The State Homeland Security Grant Program has been
reduced by $550 million compared to 2005, representing a
reduction of approximately 50 percent.
Second, the Department, at congressional direction,
implemented an approach this year that includes both risk
analysis and effectiveness scoring. It is an approach that is
supported by the administration and reflects the evolution of
our post-September 11th approach to managing the risk of
terrorism.
I would like to draw two excerpts from the House Homeland
Security Appropriations Committee report for 2006: We are at a
turning point in the methodology for administering the First
Responder Grant Program. Historically, funds have been
distributed based on minimum percentages and population.
A little later, the report language reads: ODP, now known
as the Office of Grants and Training in the Department, will
begin a new methodology for administering the First Responder
Grant Program. Funding will be targeted based on threat and
risk while targeting gaps in preparedness.
This guidance from the Congress has informed the
development of the process that we used this year.
Third, the risk to our Nation is better understood than
even 1 year ago. National risk is an umbrella that encompasses
community and State risks together. No single community or
State constitutes the sum of America's risk. Our adversaries
have publicly stated their desire to kill and injure our
citizens, wreck our economy and destabilize public confidence.
We know that there are key facilities across America that, if
attacked, could cause grave harm to the people inside and in
the immediate vicinity and cause potentially devastating ripple
affects across the entire Nation, chemical and nuclear power
plants, key transportation, telecommunications and energy hubs,
as well as financial centers, just to name a few.
In 2004, at the earliest stages of our national efforts, we
had documented approximately 200 facilities nationwide. Last
year, we had documented about 11,300. Today we have documented
more than 260,000 nationwide. This documentation process is
critical to understanding both the scope and diffuse nature of
our national threat.
In addition, the post-September 11th efforts to fuse the
work of the intelligence and law enforcement communities at all
levels of government is producing a more accurate picture of
suspicious activity. This is activity that may point to an
impending plot against Americans, our economy and our way of
life anywhere in our country. This information also strengthens
our analysis and underscores mode of attack of the past may not
be the mode of attack of the future.
The Department has adopted the lessons from the tragedy of
September 11th. It is important to connect the dots, to
understand our vulnerabilities, their consequences and the
realities of potential threats all across the country.
Together, these inform our risk analysis.
The Department of Homeland Security's job is to protect an
entire Nation. We are using all available information to guide
us in doing just that. Just as we know that putting all police
resources in a single neighborhood after a robbery or murder
will not reduce the risk of crime in an entire community, we
also know that reducing an entire Nation's risk cannot be
accomplished by focusing resources in any one area alone.
Fourth, and with what I just mentioned in mind, analyzing
risk is neither absolute nor is it static. We have a much more
accurate understanding of our entire Nation's risk. New York
and the National Capital Region do not suddenly have less risk.
Because of our better analysis, we know that the risk measures
in some other urban areas are actually higher than previously
assessed in relation to New York and the Washington region.
In some cases, the share of national risk for these other
communities actually doubled or tripled as a result of our
incredible analysis this year. This means that additional
resources had to be applied to these areas to help address the
better understood risk as part of a truly national approach.
Two-thirds of funding to the 46 urban areas was based on these
risk measures.
Let me be very clear: New York City and the Washington
region continue to be at the top of our risk consideration. You
will see a chart on the screen that shows the risk curve in the
upper righthand corner and the funding curve in the lower
lefthand corner. You can see that funding corresponds to risk.
In fact, more than 45 percent of all funds go to just 5 of the
46 urban areas, New York City, the National Capital Region, Los
Angeles, Long Beach, Chicago and the San Francisco Bay area.
It is also important to note that these 46 urban areas
constitute approximate 85 percent of our national urban area
risk. I should underscore that as our knowledge and information
continue to evolve, relative risk rankings could change again
in the future.
Fifth, we assessed the effectiveness of urban area
applications this year relative to each other in support of
meeting national priorities. These assessments also included
review of how investments matched their respective State
strategies and potential for continuing beyond the flow of
Federal dollars.
The effectiveness score is not in any way a measure of how
well urban areas are implementing programs, managing their
resources, succeeding in keeping their citizens safe or how
well they write their grant applications. It is simply a
mechanism for promoting a national unified approach to the
national threat of terrorism by encouraging efforts that meet
program directions set forth by Congress and the
administration.
Effectiveness accounted for one-third of the allocation
decisions, and it is important to note that the maximum
increase or reduction of funds based on these measures would
have been at most 7 percent for any of the urban areas. The
vast majority fell into the median, meaning there was very
little change.
Finally, we continue to work on improving communication.
The Department is responsible for addressing a national threat,
and that means by working closely with many stakeholders,
including our partners at the State and local level. Before
this position, I spent nearly a quarter of a century in local
and State public safety activities, and I clearly understand
that funding decisions can send unintended messages.
The message here should be very clear: Members of the
committee, managing America's risk requires a national approach
that applies Federal resources wisely to supplement the work of
State and local governments. The Secretary and I continue to
balance the need for maximum transparency in the funding
processes with the need to avoid publicly giving our enemies a
roadmap to our national vulnerabilities.
We will continue to work closely with our partners at the
State and local level here in the National Capital Region and
with the Congress to ensure that we protect the entire Nation
and that we provide clearer understanding of the progress that
we are making on reducing America's risk from terrorism on
numerous fronts.
Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, thank you for your
attention and I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Forseman follows:]
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Chairman Tom Davis. Thank you, Mr. Foresman.
Mr. Reiskin, thanks for being with us.
STATEMENT OF EDWARD D. REISKIN
Mr. Reiskin. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, Congresswoman
Norton, members of the delegation and committee.
My name is Ed Reiskin, I am the Deputy Mayor for Public
Safety and Justice for the District of Columbia, and I have the
day-to-day responsibility for Homeland Security in the
District. I am pleased to have this opportunity to be here
today to talk about this very important issue for the District
and the region.
Mr. Crouch from Virginia, Mr. Schrader from Maryland and I
work together collectively and collaboratively on a day-to-day
basis to improve the safety and security of the region, and
that is a responsibility that we take very seriously, and it is
in that spirit that we are jointly presenting our testimony
today.
I will discuss our application, the risk and effectiveness
assessment of it and the impacts to the District. My colleagues
will discuss impacts to the region as well as impacts to pair
to their respective States. If you are following in the written
testimony, the State impacts are in the last pages of the
testimony.
With regard to the application sample, some of the
documents which are in front of me, significant effort by
experienced practitioners from fire chiefs to health directors
to communication experts, volunteer managers, hospital
executives, many of whom I am pleased to see are in the room
today, and many other stakeholders work toward the regional
security of the homeland and worked together jointly to develop
the fiscal year 2006 funding applications.
With our understanding of the fiscal climate and the
Department's shift to a more risk-based approach, we were
expecting an award somewhere in the area of $100 million to
$120 million. To be conservative, we developed an application
for $188 million, which was a prioritization of over $250
million of identified need that represented an amount we felt
comfortable we would be able to execute. The breakdown of the
areas that make up that $188 million are in your written
testimony.
As many of you have mentioned, the Nation's funding for the
Urban Area Security Initiative was reduced by 50 percent. We
were reduced by 40 percent, yielding a $46.5 million award,
which was, needless to say, considerably lower than we had
expected.
With regard to risk and effectiveness, as many of you have
said, we know we are a high-risk area. We understand through a
press release that DHS found our region to be in the 97th
percentile in terms of risk, and with risk as two-thirds of the
equation for determining the allotments, it is hard for us to
understand the disproportionate reduction that we seem to have
received.
Absent any specific feedback from the Department, which we
understand will be forthcoming, we can't speak to the
effectiveness analysis of our proposal, although it was rated
at or above average in each of their rating categories for each
of the investment areas.
What we do know is that some of the most experienced
responders and planners, many of which are in the room, people
who did respond to September 11th, who have responded to
anthrax, were the ones developing the content for this
application. So we don't understand how peers from across the
country could have somehow found this application to be
lacking.
We have built significant capability in the region over the
last 5 years that we are proud of and that should give comfort
to those who live here, work here and visit here. That
capability will not generally diminish as a result of this or
any other award. But preparedness is a dynamic and complex
process, and we have significant unmet need that remains, and
we will be unable to meet all of it in this grant cycle. We
can't speak to the levels of need or risk elsewhere in this
country, but we do know that ours is high.
With respect to the District of Columbia, as many of you
mentioned, we are the seat the Federal Government, home of the
Capitol, the White House, the Supreme Court, the Department of
Homeland Security and its national operations center, the FBI
headquarters, the Washington Monument, 20 million visitors and
countless other national icons and critical Federal functions.
Yet the Department of Homeland Security determined that we face
less risk than 75 percent of the Nation's States and
territories.
The region was found to be in the top 25 percent of risk,
but the city that serves at its core was in the bottom 25
percent. State Homeland Security grant funding was cut 50
percent nationally compared to last year. The District of
Columbia's share was cut more than 53 percent. Only American
Samoa, the Northern Marianas Islands, the Virgin Islands and
Guam received less State Homeland Security grant funding than
the District of Columbia.
Between State and law enforcement grant programs, from an
identified need of over $37 million, we submitted an
application for $21.5 million and were awarded $7.4 million.
Our application included the following, which directly support
national priority capabilities: $3.7 million for planning,
training and exercising in areas such as national incident
management system, hazardous materials response, continuity of
operations planning; $1.6 million for enhanced preparedness,
focusing especially on special needs populations, schools and
businesses; funds for mass care, $1 million for critical
infrastructure protection, there is no question we have a
significant amount of critical infrastructure here; $3.4
million for intelligence fusion, following the guidelines of
the Federal Government, both Homeland Security and justice;
$2.4 million to continue our work in interoperable
communications, including the dedicated wireless public safety
network that is currently used to support events by both
District and Federal agency users; $1.5 million for response to
chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear weapons of mass
destruction attacks that the District may face; $5 million for
law enforcement response to raise our capabilities for our
harbor patrol, our emergency response teams, our air support
unit and others to Tier I as required by Homeland Security
Presidential Directive 8.
There is obviously a lot more in the applications, and the
bottom line is we won't be able to complete all of those things
as we proposed.
I do want to close by saying we fully support a risk-based
approach, and we support and acknowledge the Department of
Homeland Security's efforts to make this process more objective
and more transparent, which I do believe it has been. However,
we have to question the outcomes, which don't seem to square
with professional or common sense.
We are confident that the lessons learned from this year's
process will ensure that next year's is better. With that, I
will turn to my colleague from Virginia.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Reiskin follows:]
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Chairman Tom Davis. Thank you very much.
Mr. Crouch.
STATEMENT OF ROBERT P. CROUCH, JR.
Mr. Crouch. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, members of the
committee. I do appreciate this opportunity to discuss this
very critical issue, critical to the States of Virginia and
Maryland and critical to the District of Columbia. Mr. Reiskin
pointed out some of the investments that were included in our
package and I think it might be useful to discuss some of the
other proposals that are also included which we think
demonstrate the forward thinking, seriousness and consideration
made by the National Capital Region. We certainly know among al
Qaeda's as targets in the past have been transit systems. We
know that from the experience of London. We know that from the
experience of Madrid.
Among our proposals is a Washington Metropolitan Area
Transit Authority Alternative Operation Control Center.
Currently, 30 percent of the region's commuters rely on Metro
rail service, and almost half of the peak period riders are
Federal employees. Recent attacks in London and Madrid have
shown the transit systems are a favorite target of terrorists.
WMATA's existing Operation Control Center directs rail and
bus operations, emergency repair actions, radio communications,
coordinates communications with the region's emergency first
responders, receives chemical sensor program data. It's an
origination point for public announcements and needs to be
extremely facile with the ability to quickly respond to a
variety of incidents.
WMATA's Operation Control Center represents a single point
of vulnerability for operating the entire rail system. If the
building that currently houses the OCC is destroyed or has to
be evacuated, it would be essentially impossible to maintain
rail service within the acceptable degree of reliability.
Addressing this single point failure in WMATA's operating
system in a timely fashion would serve to mitigate the negative
impacts and enhance the response and recovery capabilities of
the National Capital Region resulting from a terrorist attack
directed toward transit or other high threat targets in the
region.
Similarly, among our proposals is the Metro Subway Security
Strategic Initiative. Recently the National Capital Region Fire
Chiefs Committee created the Subway Tunnel Working group to
identify gaps in their response to an incident in the WMATA
Metro system.
Our current initiative is to address identified gaps in the
region's fire services' abilities to respond effectively to an
incident involving a WMATA tunnel system. This initiative
includes implementing hazardous materials detection, mitigation
and decontamination training to ensure proper hazardous
materials techniques within the Metro system.
This proposed project would also supply the first
responders with longer-duration breathing apparatus so
firefighters can rely on longer search and rescue missions
within the tunnels in the case of an attack.
Clearly one of the lessons of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita
was the need to give additional attention to special needs
populations. Included among our proposals for the National
Capital Region is a project to increase the capability of
nursing homes, group homes and providers of home health care to
service those people with disabilities or other special needs,
including economic special needs. We recognize that these
organizations in the National Capital Region are not
sufficiently prepared to shelter in place the people they serve
or to evacuate them to a place of safety and shelter.
Our current initiative would create a representative
consortium of disability advocacy groups and service providers
with national outreach and local National Capital Region focus
to prepare organizations that serve people with disabilities in
the National Capital Region to shelter in place or evacuate
those they serve and conduct exercises to shelter in place or
evacuate to a disaster shelter.
These are just three examples of the proposals in our
package. We do think they demonstrate effectiveness. They
demonstrate an attention to critical needs, unmet needs that
require the attention of the National Capital Region and the
Nation.
We are interested, as we know you are, in the process that
was engaged in, in coming to the conclusions that ranked the
National Capital Region as it has been ranked. Our colleagues,
and we do regard them as colleagues, and partners at the
Department of Homeland Security have assured us that we will
have an opportunity in the very near future to have that kind
of in-depth discussion.
As Deputy Mayor Reiskin indicated earlier, we are
interested in the process, both in learning why our proposals
were not ranked as highly as they were but also learning that
in part so we can address those issues in coming applications.
We want to get it right, and if we don't understand why we
didn't seem to get it right this year, we want to learn that
lesson.
Nevertheless, we do continue to have concerns about that
process and whether the formula that is used is really the
appropriate formula. In the Commonwealth of Virginia, we
experienced a similar cut this year, dropping from over $36
million in funds last year to $16.8 for this year.
Again, the Commonwealth was ranked in the top 50 percent in
risk, and we remain baffled why our proposals that included,
for example, funding for our intelligence gathering and
analysis fusion center, which is considered state-of-the-art
among the Nation, funding for our interoperability programs.
Virginia was the first State in the Nation to create a State
interoperability coordinator, the first State to create a
statewide interoperability strategic plan, which is being used
today by the Department of Homeland Security as a model for
other States.
We want to complete our interoperability throughout the
Commonwealth, and yet these are proposals that did not merit a
higher ranking and higher funding by the Department.
We continue to have concerns that the Hampton Roads region
not only does not get Urban Areas Security Initiative funding
but doesn't even qualify for consideration based on the
formula, with all of its maritime and military traffic.
So we do continue to have those concerns. We look forward
to that discussion with the Department and learning more about
the process and contributing to its improvement in the future.
Thank you very much.
Chairman Tom Davis. Thank you, Mr. Crouch.
Mr. Schrader.
STATEMENT OF DENNIS R. SCHRADER
Mr. Schrader. Mr. Chairman, thank you.
It is a pleasure to be here to give you our perspective in
representing Governor Ehrlich's, his homeland security advisor,
and appearing with my colleagues Bob Crouch and Ed Reiskin from
the District and our local jurisdiction representatives who are
here today.
Maryland is one of the three major components of the NCR,
and one of the things we observed according to the Homeland
Security application process is Maryland was ranged in the top
50 percent for both risk and effectiveness. One of the things
that we are wondering as we sift through this is, it is
difficult to understand how Maryland and the NCR grant funds
were cut so drastically.
Our thinking is that we have to work on improving the
process to ensure risk is properly calculated to realize a
commonsense risk-based process, particularly since it's two-
thirds of the application.
Federal Homeland Security distribution procedures changed
this past year, and we support that. But the application seems
to have gone into a black box of literally thousands of
calculations and, in the end, fell short for Maryland and the
NCR.
It appears that a laudable big picture goal which made a
lot of sense in the front end of basing funding on risk instead
got mired in complicated formulas, resulting in applications
that don't match what we intuitively know to be high-risk
areas.
The bottom line is more capabilities mean less risk. What
we are really focused on is lowering risk, and by not building
the capabilities, it slows our ability to reduce that risk.
Maryland, Virginia and the District jointly develop our
security capabilities. We share information back and forth
because it is a coordinated effort. We have three major
airports, subways, ports, landmarks and, of course, the
Nation's Capital.
Just to add on to what my colleague, Mr. Crouch, mentioned
earlier in some of the projects that are on our list but will
have to be scrutinized even more tightly than we already have,
and we have done some pretty tight scrutiny; we spent an awful
lot of time together, probably 20, 25 percent of my time with
these folks in the National Capital Region because of the
importance that the Governor places on this region.
Currently, all the bomb squads in the National Capital
Region have a high level of interoperability. They participate
in information exchange, do joint training and mutual aid, but
they are not equipped up to the level that FEMA would expect
for their highest level of standard, and we have an $8 million
project which would address that issue in the National Capital
Region.
There is an awful lot of pressure on our local
jurisdictions. We partner with the local jurisdictions in the
Capital Region, and they bear a lot of the workload in terms of
helping us with the bottoms-up process of understanding what
direction we need to go, and we need to make sure they have the
planning resources so that we can coordinate our efforts
because it is in effect coordinating the States and the
District and the local jurisdictions in a very complicated
coordination effort.
We have a program to continue to build our capabilities
around evacuation planning, mass care and sheltering, animal
shelters, regional coordination response plans, continuity of
government plans, and we have $5 million projected for that.
We were disappointed in the State because primarily the
three States--two States and the District--have to be strong to
work together collaboratively. As I said earlier, we had
expected somewhere in the neighborhood of $35 to $40 billion
because we have a Central Maryland urban area as well as our
law enforcement and State grant. We ended up with $24 million
of which of course we are very grateful for, but it was a bit
of a surprise, and we had put in an application for about $120,
$69 for the State and $51 for the central Maryland urban area.
These are for key things like information sharing and
intelligence. We have one of the Nation's first fusion centers
that has been around since November 2003. Many of my colleagues
from around the country have come to see our center and model
it. Critical infrastructure protection, interoperability are
just a couple of other major things that we need to invest in.
The bottom line is, at the State level, we have an open and
transparent process just like we have here in the National
Capital Region. We have the local jurisdictions help us to find
the priorities, and we sift through that to--basically, the
State has strategic objectives that we are focused on, and then
we would hope the Department of Homeland Security would review
those priorities and fund it as appropriate.
The bottom line is, we are looking forward to the July
review session. We have reached out to DHS to start asking
questions about these risk calculations. We do support this
process, but we need to understand it better because the
outcome in some cases just didn't make a lot of sense.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Tom Davis. Thank you, very much.
Mr. Robertson.
STATEMENT OF DAVID J. ROBERTSON
Mr. Robertson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the
committee. I'm Dave Robertson, executive director of the
Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments, and I have the
privilege to represent the interests of 20 local governments in
the National Capital Region that have vested countless hours
and energy in addressing homeland security preparedness and
response since September 11th.
Just yesterday, the Council of Governments' Board of
Directors met to examine this issue and had a very thoughtful
and helpful discussion. They, like this committee, have
questions and concerns, and I believe they are seeking many of
the same responses that the committee is seeking, which is, we
need to know how to sustain what we have started and how it can
be made more predictable and transparent for all those
concerned.
I am here today, as I said, to represent the interests of
our local governments but would comment to the committee that
most response is going to be local. The men and women that are
our first responders, our network of first responders in this
region, work for local governments by and large, and they will
continue to do what is necessary to protect and strengthen this
region regardless of UASI funds.
We know we need these funds. We have identified a range of
priorities, but in the event of an emergency, local officials
will respond as they are required, no matter what the
circumstances.
We will be looking to our State partners, our region's
mutual aid agreements and certainly our Federal partners to
support that effort. I can't speak too much to the peer review
panel that worked on these applications, but I can speak to the
peer team that helped reduce the region's proposals.
Tony Griffin, who is the county executive in Fairfax
County, and his colleagues from around the region spent dozens
of hours sifting through proposals and trying to make sure that
they meet the region's top priorities and needs.
Local governments are supported by, among the Nation's best
first responder teams: police officials, fire officials,
transportation directors, health officials and others that
worked hundreds of hours to develop these recommendations to
measure them against standards and guidelines provided by the
Federal Government. We know very strongly and very confidently
that the work that has been advanced is of great need.
Speaking to the issue of predictability and sustainability,
we are concerned that many of the projects that have been
advanced may be jeopardized by the reduced funding. Two quick
examples: Much of the equipment that has been purchased in the
early rounds of UASI funding does sometimes have a shelf life
or needs to be maintained. We will need ongoing funds to make
sure that equipment is at the ready at all times.
Certainly, the issue of citizen communication. We can't do
a one-time citizen communication campaign because this is a
tremendously transient region. We need to reach out
aggressively to citizens and the millions of visitors on an
ongoing basis.
We also believe the impact on these UASI cuts will be
serious for our region. Simply stated, this region cannot
achieve the level of sustainability and predictability and
confidence that we want to have in our region's preparedness
with the funds that are out there. We have a tremendous unmet
need that will be unmet, will not be recognized if we do not
receive additional funds in our region.
Finally, the issue of the insufficiency perhaps of the
application. Like a lot of the folks that have spoken earlier,
the Council of Governments does support and our member
governments do support the issue of risk-based assessment. We
need to understand better how that is defined. We have worked
very hard to address our proposals regionally and through the
37 capabilities that the Department of Homeland Security has
identified. If there are other guidelines or additional
information that will be coming forward in the next couple
weeks and month, we look forward to working with State and
local partners to pinpoint exactly how we can do better.
The Council of Governments was one of the first
organizations to reach out to the Federal Government, State
partners and locals immediately after September 11th to see how
we could strengthen preparedness and response. We are proud of
our work to date. We know our work is not completed; this is a
long-term commitment of our Nation and region. And we look
forward to working with Members of Congress to strength our
preparedness.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Robertson follows:]
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Chairman Tom Davis. I want to thank all of you for your
testimony.
Let me start the questioning, Mr. Foresman, with you. DHS
rated the National Capital Region in the top 25 percent for
risk but, as has already been stated, the District of Columbia
was rated in the bottom 25 percent. Considering that the
District has already been a terrorist target, it houses the
Federal Government, the White House, the Nation's Capital, the
Capitol building, Supreme Court, why was the risk rating for
D.C. in the bottom 25 percent?
Mr. Foresman. Mr. Chairman, thank you for the question.
This actually goes to the importance of us making sure that we
are very clear communicating to our State and local partners.
You are actually referring to two separate grant programs and
the analysis contained therein.
In terms of the rating for the urban area, D.C., which is
based predominantly on the risk structure, the District of
Columbia and the National Capital Region was rated in the 97th
percentile.
D.C. also is unique as a city; it has both the State status
and city status, and so it is eligible to participate in the
State Homeland Security Grant Program. So that program has a
different funding formula that is based, in part, based on a
floor amount, population-based floor amount.
So, in essence, D.C., from a ranking standpoint, is
competing against 50 States from a population base before we
even get out on the door on any of the risk discussions. So it
is an artificiality of the fact that D.C. is lumped into what
is a State-directed program with a population-based funding
formula.
Chairman Tom Davis. So the risk is there. I mean, a major
criteria of risk under the State funding formula is population.
Mr. Foresman. A major criteria, that is correct. There is
also a floor funding for the State program. There is a floor
funding before you can get into the risk discussion.
Chairman Tom Davis. So you really think under a State
formula that Montana is at higher risk than D.C.?
Mr. Foresman. Congressman, there are all sorts of
intricacies.
Chairman Tom Davis. I just asked you a question.
Mr. Foresman. Yes, sir. My answer is, we do not measure the
risk of one community against the other and place the
importance higher--the higher of one community against another.
Chairman Tom Davis. Am I right, under the State program,
you have two criteria, and one is risk, and on the risk side, I
can understand looking at the grants, I'm not going to get, at
least in this question, how good the city's grant was, but on
risk analysis alone, doesn't it seem on risk analysis alone
that the District of Columbia is a likelier target and at
higher risk than the State of Montana, or North Dakota, where
I'm from, if a terrorist can find North Dakota?
Mr. Foresman. I understand. The point is a valid point. If
it was purely risk, D.C. would have scored higher. But there is
a population-based factor on the front end of it, that amount,
for a large portion.
Chairman Tom Davis. You call it risk analysis. I mean, what
it says on the grant, it says risk; it doesn't say risk and
population. There is risk, and there is effectiveness.
Mr. Foresman. Mr. Chairman, I go back to what I said
earlier in terms of the products we provided to the
communities. We should have been clearer in our communication,
and that does not effectively articulate the nature of the
grant program and the allocation process.
Chairman Tom Davis. So, at a minimum, you would agree with
me that where it says risk, it shouldn't say risk because,
otherwise, if you're saying risk and population is a factor,
that's one thing, but you have ranked the District under the
State categories as a lower risk than North Dakota.
Mr. Foresman. Mr. Chairman, we could have provided a better
and clearer descriptive response to the community.
Chairman Tom Davis. Risk is really not a very good term
there.
Mr. Foresman. Mr. Chairman, this goes to the broader issue.
Throughout this whole debate, a number of people have been
confusing threat and risk in the same discussion, and risk
analysis is not risk management. Threat is not risk. What is
important for us----
Chairman Tom Davis. What is risk?
Mr. Foresman. Risk is the combination of threat,
vulnerability and consequences. It is the threat, the intention
of the adversary, the likely intention of the adversary to
commit an act, the consequences, what's the likely outcome, and
the vulnerability is the relative measure.
Chairman Tom Davis. Under that criteria--I say that's a
fair definition of risk. Let's agree that's fair. The city's
population is concentrated, so one incident there is going to
hit a lot more people than some of these western States where
people are all over the place. It's a much more likely target.
How in the world is, a risk or a threat in Montana, North
Dakota or South Dakota higher than the District? I just need to
understand that. They have a few more people there, but in
terms of any kind of risk analysis, I don't think that passes
the laugh test.
Mr. Foresman. Congressman, this comes down to the fact that
D.C. falls into two categories. It falls into a State category
in some of these grant programs. It falls into an urban areas
category in some of these grant programs. Deputy Mayor Reiskin
and I have talked about this over the course of the last
several years, and it creates a little bit of an artificial
challenge.
Chairman Tom Davis. I understand that DHS made
adjustments--how much was in the State versus how much was in
the urban category in terms of the amounts that DHS was
throwing in? You have two different grant categories; how much
went to the urban, and how much went to the State?
Mr. Foresman. In terms of total dollars?
Chairman Tom Davis. Yes. Or percentage wise.
Mr. Foresman. The urban area was about a little over $700
million and the State program was about, I believe, $500
million.
Chairman Tom Davis. All right. I understand that DHS did
make adjustments to the risk factor assigned to the National
Capital Region and New York City, based on a DHS briefing of
our staff. Is that correct? That after the adjustments were
made under the formulas, it looked like New York City and the
District were lower, and you made what we used to call Kentucky
windage adjustments.
Mr. Foresman. This goes back to the discussion on common
sense. Because we understand that we are responsible, and
Congress's direction is to protect the Nation's risk. When we
take a limited pot of money and we have to apply that against
an entire risk of a Nation, we wanted to ensure that we did not
reduce the National Capital Region funding and that of New York
City below the average of what they received in past years
because, frankly, this is the first year that we really
quantitatively had a good understanding of risk outside of the
National Capital Region in Washington, and that changed how we
had to allocate the money accordingly.
Chairman Tom Davis. Let's just take a look at the city side
where you say the city is treated fairly here; that is the
thesis here, isn't it? That the National Capital Region under
the urban formula is going to get treated fairly? Even under
that, as I understand it, Washington, DC, wasn't first, wasn't
second, wasn't third, wasn't fourth. I was ranked below New
Jersey; it was below the Bay area; it was below Los Angeles,
and so on. And in fact, you included additional urban areas
like Ohmaha that ate up money that could have come here.
Mr. Foresman. Let me use an example without specific
jurisdictions. There's a large metropolitan area that has
roughly the same number of assets in terms of critical
infrastructure as the National Capital Region, and it has a
population that is roughly the same.
The National Capital Region population, from a density
standpoint, is spread over 3,000 miles, and in this major
metropolitan city, it's spread over 230 square miles. So the
net effect of an event in that particular community would have
been potentially far more grave in terms of an immediate impact
on a large concentrated population. This goes back to the whole
discussion about New York City with its high population
density.
In that particular case, as we ran the numbers, when you
looked at the risk ranking, it raised that city above the
National Capital Region. But there's an intrinsic value of the
Nation's Capital psychologically to the American value system,
and that is the key reason and one of the key reasons that we
put, as you say, the Kentucky windage to it, because risk
management, risk analysis, it is not absolute. It only seeks to
guide and inform our decisionmaking process and not control or
dictate it. So we were trying to----
Chairman Tom Davis. I appreciate your explanation, but I am
going to yield to Ms. Norton in a second.
I just tell you, from my perspective, you are looking at
the Nation's Capital, which has been hit once, had the anthrax
attack on top of that. We are still I think on everybody's--
close to the top of everybody's--hit list for any terrorist
group that wants to make a statement.
Terrorists are hitting London and Madrid. They are hitting
capitals. They're not likely to hit Bull Frog Corner, WV.
The reality is, as you take a look at urban areas and our
density and everything else, I think your bean counters are
just counting the wrong beans. I mean, I just think that this
is too formula driven. I do not think that Congress makes the
right decisions when we start allocating money and earmarks;
it's not done on an equitable basis. That is why in this
particular area, when it came to allocating funds for Homeland
Security, we tried to give it to the administration because we
thought they would be fairer, that they would take a look at
what was good for the country as a whole, take a look at the
threats and try to take the politics out of it. But what you
have replaced with the politics is some bean-counting formula
that doesn't pass the laugh test.
You have, under your procedures, Montana, North Dakota, and
South Dakota ranking ahead of Washington, DC, and under the
regional analysis now, the city is not even second--now they
are fifth--and that is applying, as we say, some subjective
factors. But more importantly, you are including other urban
areas that could have been covered under State grants that
frankly don't look like they are threatened at all.
What I'm concerned about is, should an incident, God
forbid, happen--and we hope it doesn't--if it happens in Omaha,
I think you're covered. I think you can say, we took care of
them. But should something happen in New York or Washington, I
think you are going to hear a huge outcry that we didn't give
the appropriate attention. And the problem is, in these areas,
they've been hit before; they've been hit more than once. That
is the likelihood, and that's our concern.
Ms. Norton.
Ms. Norton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Picking up on your questions, by the way, I certainly hope
al Qaeda doesn't notice these rankings and the shift. They're
informed more than Members of Congress.
The chairman asked questions about the District. I'm
curious, did you, in calculating risk for the District of
Columbia in particular, take account of the fact that the
District's daytime population is two or three times its census
population?
Mr. Foresman. Congresswoman, we do take in the computing
population in the day and night population, and again, it
depends on which of the programs.
Ms. Norton. I'm talking about the area grant.
Mr. Foresman. The urban area, yes, ma'am.
Ms. Norton. So then, of course, we're talking about between
15 and 20 million people a year who come; we're talking about a
population that is not 600,000 but three times that. That's the
population figure you used?
Mr. Foresman. Congresswoman, I don't have the exact figures
in front of me, but when I was serving in Virginia, whatever
the current population of the National Capital Region is, with
some slight increase for tourist population, is going to be the
number that you see used, and I don't whether it's 4 million or
5 million.
Ms. Norton. I was asking you about the District of
Columbia.
Mr. Foresman. But the District of Columbia, Congresswoman,
this is a very important distinction because the District of
Columbia under the Urban Area Security Initiative program is
part of the National Capital Region, and it looks at the
combined total of all of the jurisdictions.
Ms. Norton. If you look at the District of Columbia grant
itself, did the District of Columbia grant take into account
that what you're protecting is the daytime population, in
effect?
Mr. Foresman. Congresswoman, I don't know specifically on
the State Homeland Security grant program, but I will find out
which of the two numbers was used in the formula and give you a
written answer.
Ms. Norton. Very much appreciate that.
Mr. Foresman, I know you would always, when grants are
being made, expect some disagreement. I believe there would
have been less disagreement or certainly less outrage if there
had perhaps been cuts but they had been more modest.
The impression created is that we got cut Homeland
Security; who got the money, let's cut them. So without some
explanation, it looks like you said, where's the money, and the
money is in New York and the National Capital Region.
This is my question. I have not heard you indicating in
your formula what I will call, for lack of a better term, the
price of postponement. In a real sense, if we know what we all
know about the region, what al Qaeda and the terrorists know
about this region, my question is: Isn't there some reason to
make haste in places which are particularly at risk to get it
done, as it were, to get its most vulnerable parts staunch down
as opposed to looking at, of course, the various
vulnerabilities across the country? Some have not been as
adequately funded as you would like.
But if you factor in what a single incident would mean here
because we hadn't gotten to it as opposed to making sure that
you take care of what is vulnerable in other regions, isn't
there a value that the Department would put on getting as much
of it done as rapidly as possible in this region and perhaps in
New York, the other target that everyone is aware of?
Mr. Foresman. Congresswoman, let me address it this way;
that is a large part of why you see a major change. If you look
at the five high urban areas: Los Angeles/Long Beach region,
Chicago, the Newark region, San Francisco, the combined
increase because of the understanding of the risk score in
those communities, very densely populated areas with very
critical infrastructure, that the change in allocation based on
the risk scoring alone was $38 million.
So part of what I offer to you, Congresswoman, is while
everybody talks about Omaha or Louisville, they represent a
very low dollar amount in the context of how these dollars were
adjusted. A large amount of dollars went to these high
metropolitan areas, recognizing that Chicago, for instance, is
a major financial and transportation center, a major
manufacturing center.
So our concern is about making sure that we bring percent
readiness up, and that we don't have any weak links or
Achilles' heels, particularly in those urban areas.
Ms. Norton. I looked at the other cities, New York, LA,
Chicago. I don't understand Florida. You will have to make me
understand that one. Then we get to D.C. I said, well,
population, I can understand that.
I have to tell you that with all of its population in LA
spread out the way it is, they are now only making a downtown
in LA, one only wonders if MO of al Qaeda is simply to look for
population or whether it's not to look for concentration of
icons and population.
Why New York in the first place? Why was New York hit
twice? Why was the same building hit twice?
Mr. Foresman. Congresswoman, that goes to a key point. One
of the great criticisms after September 11th was no one thought
about a plane being flown into a building. We have heard bin
Laden say on numerous occasions since September 11th he wants
to hurt America physically, psychologically and, most
importantly, economically.
Take the LA area as a good example. It is spread out like
the National Capital Region but with a higher density. It is a
major center of economic activities.
Ms. Norton. I have to stop you right there for a minute.
They may well have gotten cut. What I indicated was, I'm asking
you if you recognize that al Qaeda does have an MO, a known MO.
They are looking for large concentrations of people that you
can hit. We are not talking about the atom bomb here, so you
can't just hit LA and expect it--we're talking about somebody
that wants to hit someplace, and by hitting that one place you
get an icon or you get huge numbers of people.
The reason there is more chatter about New York than D.C.
is because you hit a few blocks there, you have so many folks
that you don't need to worry about LA, San Francisco or even
Chicago.
So I'm asking, with this notion of population, whether or
not you are really focusing in on density, where al Qaeda has
been focused, not just population.
Mr. Foresman. We are focused on population. We're focused
on population density. But, Congresswoman, as a good example,
the day before Hurricane Katrina, one of our major metropolitan
areas in America constituted 25 percent of the chemical
production capability in America. The day after that, it
constituted 45 percent because--not chemical, but petroleum--
because of the number of refineries that had been knocked out
of service in Louisiana.
What this points out to us is that there is a physical
impact on people, but we also have to be concerned about the
impacts on infrastructure, because you and I both felt the pain
at the pump right after Hurricane Katrina when we had to go in
and pay more for gas because the petroleum industry's
capabilities had been reduced.
Ms. Norton. Did you take into account, because you just
named infrastructure, Madrid and London and the vulnerability
of WMATA and its tunnels when these cuts were made?
Mr. Foresman. We have taken into account the critical
infrastructure here, and if you look at the other metropolitan
areas where you have subway and metro systems, some that are
subject to worse flooding than metro, as a prime example, we
take all of these factors into consideration.
Chairman Tom Davis. Thank you.
Mr. Gutknecht.
Mr. Gutknecht. I yield to my colleague from New York.
Chairman Tom Davis. Mr. Fossella.
Mr. Fossella. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for the
indulgence here.
We are here, as you all know, because of what happened on
September 11th. The Department of Homeland Security exists
because of what happened on September 11th. It happened in New
York and Washington, DC, and obviously in Pennsylvania.
There are many who I think share the goal that the
fundamental responsibility of the National Government is to
protect innocent people. That was the intent of the Department
of Homeland Security. We are here today in addition to answer
the question fundamentally how we have gone astray.
By way of background, I represent Staten Island and
Brooklyn. More than 200 people were killed on September 11th;
78 of the 343 firemen were from Staten Island; 29 people in my
parish were killed. And I just don't want to have another day
of mourning, another September 11th.
I have been wholehearted in support to ensure that not one
family in America ever again has to fall victim to an act of
terror. So when we wake up and we realize that New York City
sees a reduction percentage wise of upwards of 40 percent while
other cities around the country, arguably not as high on the
threat list, receive increases of 20, 30, 40 percent, we have
to ask the fundamental question, are we doing what's right?
The original intent of UASI went from seven cities to 35 to
46 regions that now cover over 100 cities; is that right?
Mr. Foresman. That's correct, Congressman.
Mr. Fossella. Are we not drifting from the original intent
of much of what USAI was meant to serve, that is, the areas
like Washington, DC, like Chicago? I'm not saying here that New
York deserves 100 percent, or Washington, DC, deserves 100
percent. Just follow the threat, follow the risk.
Mr. Foresman. Congressman, I think it's a very reasonable
question that you have asked here. The 46 urban areas represent
about 85 percent of the Nation's urban area risk, and why this
is important--and part of this gets into the debate that you go
for 80 percent, 90 percent, 85 percent. Where we saw the risk
measures have a measurable decline to where there was a clear
separation was about the 85 percent point, and that was those
46 urban areas.
I don't think there was any intent of the program that I'm
aware of back when it was first established to say it was going
to be 7 versus 50 versus 46 versus 30, but I think that we have
to get beyond the discussion of funding on a single year and
look at it over the course of funding activity and look at it
in the context of managing risk. And we are responsible for
finding a way to manage America's risk, and the way we best
feel we can do that is to apply those dollars to get the
maximum reduction in our nationwide risk, and that's how we
came up with the 46 urban areas.
Mr. Fossella. Having said that, in all the intelligence
chatter, I'm not asking you to divulge anything classified, is
there any city that is more targeted than New York City? Not
just in this country but in the entire world.
Mr. Foresman. Congressman, I don't know the specific answer
to that. I will make the assumption that probably not, but I
won't make it exclusively, but we should not equate threats
with the complete discussion on risk. Threats are one component
to it, but we have clear indications of al Qaeda and other
groups' intents; through the radicalization and the
globalization of the al Qaeda activities, we have clear
understandings of their intent to wreak economic, physical and
psychological pain elsewhere.
Mr. Fossella. But am I asking too much to indicate that New
York City is still the No. 1 threat?
Mr. Foresman. It was the No. 1 risk ranker last year; it
remains this year.
Mr. Fossella. So if you sit back and know, far and above,
with the two attacks in 1993 and 2001, that New York City is
indeed No. 1, isn't there anybody sitting back saying, well,
why are they seeing a reduction in funding? I'm just curious,
nothing about the good people of Omaha, but are they in the top
10 or 20?
Mr. Foresman. Congressman, I think one of the things I
would go to is this particular pie chart. If you look at New
York City alone in terms of the total allocation of the UASI
program from fiscal year 2003 through fiscal year 2006, you
know they have not quite gotten a quarter but almost a quarter
of the dollars have gone to New York City alone, and they have
about 14 percent of the Nation's urban area population.
But what I will tell you is, we are putting our heaviest
focus and our heaviest attention in terms of financial
commitments into New York City. We have and we can continue to
do so this year, and it's averaged twice as much as other--as
the next highest jurisdiction, not quite----
Mr. Fossella. The reason is because that's where the risk
and the threat is. Whether you live in New York or have family
who visits, the millions of people from across the country, if
you have a daughter or son who's a tourist, I think you would
want them to be there.
I have one other question.
Mr. Gutknecht [presiding]. I have to intervene here because
we are going to try to keep the hearing going through the vote.
We have a vote on the floor of the House, and the chairman has
run over to vote, he's going to come back, and we're going to
go. I really need to let Mrs. Maloney have her chance. We can
have a second round. If you want to run and vote, you can come
back, and I think the chairman would be more than willing to
entertain questions.
Mrs. Maloney.
Mrs. Maloney. Thank you, and I support my colleague's line
of questioning. He has joined, as I have, the chairman of
Homeland Security Peter King in asking for a meeting with
Secretary Chertoff. We sent that letter off in a bipartisan
effort roughly 2 weeks ago. We have not heard back. Can you
give us any indication when he'll be able to meet with us?
Mr. Foresman. I don't know the specific date the meeting
has been scheduled, but it's my understanding when I was last
briefed on that a couple of days ago that the Secretary was
more than willing to meet with the delegation, and it may in
fact be early next week.
Mrs. Maloney. I would like to go over my understanding of
this year's process for distributing the Homeland Security
funding. Let me see if I have this correct.
Cities and States prepared an application for submission to
the Department of Homeland Security, making their best case as
to their threat, need and vulnerability. However, the
individuals preparing the applications frequently do not have
security clearances and, therefore, a lack of access to real-
time information about true risk and vulnerability their city
or State may actually face. It is therefore the job of the
applicant to give their best guess on what their need is,
absent a classified threat assessment.
After the applications are submitted, they are analyzed by
a peer review board, and it is the job of the peer review board
to analyze and rank applications on the basis of risk,
vulnerability, among other things.
Once again, due to the sensitive nature of some of the
information involved and the lack of security clearances among
members of the peer review board, they also lack real-time
information regarding the actual risk or vulnerabilities to the
cities and States being reviewed and ranking.
I have been informed that the methodology for the peer
review process was developed and implemented by a consultant
firm hired by the Department of Homeland Security, reportedly
Booz Allen Hamilton, and it is my understanding that it was
this consulting firm that administered the review, collected
the review, scored the sheets following the review and ranked
State and urban area applications.
I have also been informed that it was only after Booz Allen
Hamilton completed their analysis that the Department of
Homeland Security became involved in the process by signing off
on the analysis and allocated funding based on Booz Allen
Hamilton's works.
So my first question, Mr. Foresman, is my understanding of
the process correct?
Mr. Foresman. It is not very correct at all, Congresswoman.
Mrs. Maloney. Let me ask you, do State and city application
writers have access to the threat information to best prepare
their applications?
Mr. Foresman. Congresswoman, if you might, I can maybe try
an explanation to capture all of it.
Mrs. Maloney. If I could, answer----
Mr. Foresman. There are two very distinct points. The
application writers do not have the specific threat analysis
data or the risk analysis data in front of them, but it's not
necessary in the context of the preparation of the application.
Mrs. Maloney. Let me just ask you, do the members of the
peer review process have security clearance and access to real-
time threat and risk assessment?
Did they have security clearance and access to real-time
threat and risk assessment?
Mr. Foresman. Congresswoman, I won't give you a blanket
answer, but I'll be more than happy to give you a written
response on whether all, some, none. But what they were looking
at was not the risk piece of it. Let me be very clear. In
terms----
Mrs. Maloney. Why in the world were they not looking at the
risk piece of it? Your application says risk analysis, risk-
based funding.
Mr. Foresman. Congresswoman, there are two parts to the
analytical process. The first part is the risk analysis. The
risk analysis is conducted by the Federal interagency, if you
will, predominantly by the Department of Homeland Security.
That is based on the classified information, the unclassified,
the open-source information, the data sets, the population
data. That forms one piece of the allocation equation.
On the effectiveness score, the peer reviewers were
provided, in terms of the application packages, all the
applicants were given a package that says, here are the
national priorities, here are the things by which your
application will be rated toward those national priorities; you
understand your risk, what you need to do locally. And we've
asked them to submit the peer review data.
Mrs. Maloney. My time is running out, and I would just like
some questions asked, specific questions. Do members of the
peer review process have access to and sign off on the final
rankings of the applications, yes or no?
Mr. Foresman. No.
Mrs. Maloney. Did the Department of Homeland Security have
a contract with Booz Allen Hamilton to conduct the peer review
of these grants, yes or no?
Mr. Foresman. Congresswoman, that cannot be answered with a
yes-or-no question.
Mrs. Maloney. Did Booz Allen have a contract with the
Homeland Security Department?
Mr. Foresman. Booz Allen had a contract with the Department
of Homeland Security to facilitate the peer review process, not
to do the evaluation of the investment justification.
Mrs. Maloney. Can you provide me and the committee with a
copy of that contract?
Mr. Foresman. We'd be more than happy to, Congresswoman.
Mrs. Maloney. Was the Department of Homeland Security an
active participant in the peer review process, or was that
responsibility contracted out to Booz Allen Hamilton?
Mr. Foresman. We used Booz Allen Hamilton to help
facilitate the peer review process, but there was a second
level of review by Federal Department of Homeland Security
employees of the scoring, and they were also present during the
scoring processes.
Mrs. Maloney. Who actually ranked the States and the urban
areas? Was it the peer review process, Booz Allen or the
Department of Homeland Security?
Mr. Foresman. The Department of Homeland Security, based on
an amalgamation of information from the risk analysis and the
peer review process.
Mrs. Maloney. Who in the Department of Homeland Security
made that decision?
Mr. Foresman. Congresswoman, I don't know that it was any
one person, but I will get you the specifics of who was
involved in that.
Mrs. Maloney. It appears that you shifted the formula from
risk to need. Because if you based it on intelligence and real
risk, there's no question that it would be New York City and
D.C. I mean, did you consult the list of targets from al Qaeda
and the intelligence from al Qaeda that has been reported in
the papers? And some of us have seen it where all of the
chatter is primarily, three-fourths, New York. Then maybe they
get down to D.C. But by all security accounts, whether it's the
FBI, the CIA, the National Intelligence Director, the 9/11
Commission, all of them report that all of the intelligence,
that the risk is New York City. The threat they believe is a
bomb that would be put off that would kill hundreds of
thousands of people.
I lost--as my colleague Mr. Fossella and we've worked on
many responses to September 11th together--I lost 500, he lost
300. All of us lost people in New York. We appreciate the help
of our colleagues here in Congress, but this formula does not
reflect the reality of what's out there or the reality of risk.
I'm all in favor of a State aid formula to help States, but
don't call it Homeland Security, call it municipal overburden.
Call it aid to States, but don't call it Homeland Security.
I look forward to our meeting with Mr. Chertoff, and my
time is up.
Mr. Foresman. Thank you, Congresswoman.
Chairman Tom Davis [presiding]. I have a few more
questions. DHS said it worked closely with the urban areas
applying for funding. It also provided a guide outlining the
application process.
Mr. Reiskin, what role did DHS's office of the National
Capital Region play in assisting you with the application
process?
Mr. Reiskin. The application was developed, first of all,
being guided by a strategic planning process that was in part
guided by the Office of National Capital Region Coordination.
Chairman Tom Davis. DHS helped you put together the plan,
basically.
Mr. Reiskin. They were an integral part. That office was an
integral part, really leading the effort to develop the
strategic plan guiding the region for the next 3 to 5 years.
That was the starting point for the process.
From there, the senior policy group which includes the
Office of National Capital Region Coordination and the chief
administrative officers, so, basically, the State and local
leaders outlined the direction for the application, identified
the target capabilities around which we would build the
application. There were eight national priorities. We added six
regional priorities, and then we let our subject matter
experts, the police chiefs, fire chiefs, transportation
directors, do the analysis of the region's position in each of
those capability areas.
That was all brought back together and again reviewed by
the State and local level leaders, which includes the Office of
National Capital Region Coordination.
So throughout the process, from start to finish, they were
a part of the process.
Chairman Tom Davis. Did they give you any suggestions that
you didn't take in putting the application together?
Mr. Reiskin. I would say that the office was not acting as
really an agent of the Office of Grants and Training; they were
acting really as our partner, our Federal partner in the
region, not really serving in the role of advising us on the
grant process itself.
Chairman Tom Davis. But the plan to which the grant applied
was coordinated with DHS, correct? The regional plan?
Mr. Reiskin. The regional strategic plan was coordinated
with the Office of National Capital Region Coordination.
Chairman Tom Davis. Which is part of DHS.
Mr. Reiskin. Part of DHS and submitted to another part of
DHS for approval. All urban areas have to submit these
strategies.
Chairman Tom Davis. So you were basically carrying out in
your grant application what the Department of Homeland Security
had asked you and worked with you to do.
Mr. Reiskin. Absolutely. We followed the guidance to the
letter from the Department.
Chairman Tom Davis. Did they at any point say, we don't
think this is going to cut it? We think you need to do more? As
you were working through the grant process, did they say that
anything was remiss?
Mr. Reiskin. We did not get feedback from the Office of
Grants and Training.
Chairman Tom Davis. Did you fully understand how the DHS
Homeland Security grants evaluation process was different for
fiscal year 2006, that you would have to first submit fully
justified plans for evaluation before any funds were allocated
to your jurisdiction, unlike previous years with where you were
awarded an amount without a detailed explanation?
Mr. Reiskin. No, actually the Department was fairly clear
at a high level about the risk, the effectiveness, the fact
that we were now competing for these funds, the fact that we
would have to justify our need. We didn't have visibility, and
I'm not sure they even had it developed at the time what the
actual formulas would be, how certain things would be weighted
one versus the other, but they were fairly clear that they were
using this risk.
Chairman Tom Davis. Different than it had been before?
Mr. Reiskin. That it was very different. To their credit, I
think they did a fair bit of outreach and documented process to
make that clear.
Chairman Tom Davis. Did you make adjustments in the
application preparation process from what you had in previous
years?
Mr. Reiskin. It was almost unrecognizably different.
Chairman Tom Davis. Did you undergo any internal evaluation
to determine the best strategy for preparing and submitting the
application in light of the changes at DHS?
Mr. Reiskin. There was considerable discussion among the
State level group and local level group in addition to the
emergency preparedness council for the region which has local
elected leaders, private sector folks, nonprofit folks. We
discussed starting early in December when the guidance was
first released.
Chairman Tom Davis. Mr. Foresman, let me just ask you, the
city's application was not rated that highly. When you look, it
was in the bottom quarter, I think. They were coordinating with
the local Homeland Security folks. As he said, he ran this up
the ladder, and it had kind of been approved. I don't expect
DHS to try to grease the wheels for the city. I think it is a
competitive process. But in light of that, what was deficient
about their application when you compare it to other
jurisdictions?
Mr. Foresman. Congressman, I don't have the specifics on
the National Capital Region, and we will provide that, but let
me be----
Chairman Tom Davis. Why not? You knew you were coming here
today.
Mr. Foresman. Mr. Chairman, let me get into----
Chairman Tom Davis. You knew you were coming here today to
talk about this.
Mr. Foresman. Yes, sir.
Chairman Tom Davis. I think they're interested in what they
didn't do right. They sought guidance from DHS as they went
through this process. I think there was every expectation that
they wouldn't be cut 40 percent. I'm just trying to ask what
went wrong here. Can you give me some help?
Mr. Foresman. Mr. Chairman, absolutely. Let me be very
clear, they were not deficient in their application, and I very
much want to underscore the nature of the peer review or the
peer preparation process that they used here in the National
Capital Region.
In the context of the effectiveness scoring, the
effectiveness measures, their application was reviewed in
relation to the others submitted from urban areas around the
country, a relative ranking provided to that. And the simple
reason for doing this, Mr. Chairman, is to encourage regions to
submit applications that are consistent with the national
priorities that will be sustainable even beyond the end of
Federal grant funding.
And in terms of their ranking, it doesn't mean that they
did a good job or bad job on writing the application; it simply
means that, in terms of where they chose to make their
investments in relation to the other urban areas around the
country, there was some level of ranking.
The challenge, Mr. Chairman, I would have had coming in
here is I would have had to have to know the specifics of what
was in 456 investment justifications submitted from around the
country and the specifics for all of your members on your
committee. So I will be more than happy to provide you a very
detailed written response, sir.
Chairman Tom Davis. Are you comfortable with the evaluation
criteria that DHS used this year to come to these outcomes, or
do you suspect maybe next year, in light of some of the
criticisms this has drawn, the way the allocation process
works, that maybe it ought to be reviewed?
Mr. Foresman. Congressman, Mr. Chairman, the one thing I
will tell you is that I never let any program sit still without
seeking continuous improvement. That has been the hallmark of
the way that I have approached public policy over nearly a
quarter century of service at the State and local level.
I will tell you, though, that I feel confident in our risk
analysis process. I feel confident in our peer review process,
but we have not been effective in articulating and
communicating that as we should have to the stakeholder
community including the U.S. Congress. But, Mr. Chairman, if we
can find something we can do better next year, we will
absolutely do it.
Chairman Tom Davis. George, I have a high regard for you.
You were great in Virginia, and you have a tough job here, and
you're defending something here that you didn't do these
decisions, were peer review work. But I have to tell you, on
the risk analysis side, if you're comfortable on the State side
comparing the Nation's Capital to Montana and comfortable
putting Montana and North Dakota and South Dakota ahead of the
District in terms of the risk analysis as you defined it, I
think there is something wrong.
Mr. Foresman. Mr. Chairman, let me be very clear on that
particularly. I was referring to the risk analysis as we did
the threat vulnerability and consequence piece of it. The one
thing to understand about D.C.'s ranking in relation to Montana
is that is based on a formula set by the Congress that in large
part drives our funding allocation process there, and it drives
the way that we analyze this.
I'm not comfortable, frankly, comparing the District of
Columbia to 50 other States. I think that's unfair to the
District, but it is the nature of the program. It's the nature
that they're in the program, and so we've got to make the best
of it.
Chairman Tom Davis. They were ranked below every State,
weren't they?
Mr. Foresman. Primarily because of the population issue.
Chairman Tom Davis. I think they've got more people than
Alaska.
Mr. Foresman. I don't know that they were at the total
bottom.
Chairman Tom Davis. I think there were some territories
that ranked ahead of it.
We will look forward to that information, but when you are
taking a look at your grants and you have a factor of five for
the State grants and seven for the urban grants, I think it
really skews the grant process because vulnerable areas like
the District and New York end up on the short end of the stick.
Go ahead.
Mr. Foresman. Mr. Chairman, I would just offer, I think
that is indicative of the discussion that we have had here this
morning, where it's difficult to keep separate the discussion
about the State grant programs and the urban area grants
programs, how risk versus a formula plays into each one, and I
think it underscores how we need to do a much more effective
job in our communication with the State and local partners in
future years.
Chairman Tom Davis. Let me ask this, under DHS funding
requirements, a program and capability review is the first step
in preparing a program capability enhancement plan, which is
the building block for preparing investment justifications for
Federal funding. What approach did the National Capital Region
use in its program and capability review?
For example, did the National Capital Region use a risk-
based approach based on assessing current capabilities,
determines how these capabilities responded to regional risks
and threats and the gap between current and needed
capabilities? What key information pieces were used in the
review? Did the NCR review individual jurisdiction plans? Can
you help me with that?
Mr. Reiskin. The first thing we did was we availed
ourselves of technical assistance offered by the Department of
Homeland Security to kick off the program and capability review
process both for the District and for the region. As I
mentioned, it's outlined in our testimony as well, we
identified six target capabilities in addition to the eight
national priority capabilities. We then basically held
workshops with the experts in each of those 14 capability areas
for the region. Again, these are the fire chiefs, the police
chiefs, health directors. We used that workshop process,
following the guidance religiously, to work through the
identified strengths, the weaknesses, things that were
identified through our strategic planning process last year; to
the extent that we had the information, threats that we faced,
and out of that developed a pretty comprehensive plan in the
areas of people, equipment, training, other resources, fairly
complete and voluminous, of strengths and weaknesses for each
of the 14 capability areas.
It was out of that we developed the investment plans, out
of that we developed the investment justifications that we
submitted in our application.
Chairman Tom Davis. Let me ask you this question. It's not
quite a friendly question, but can I get the answer because,
according to research by the American Enterprise Institute in
March 2006, ``Washington, DC, used the region's first wave of
Homeland Security aid as seed money for a computerized car-
towing system, and the city also used $100,000 in homeland
security money to fund the popular Summer Jobs Program.'' Is
that accurate?
Mr. Reiskin. These are not new issues that arose. This is
not Department of Homeland Security funds. This is the $168.8
million congressional appropriation we received in fiscal year
2002. There was----
Chairman Tom Davis. So that wasn't this kind of grant money
or earmarked Homeland Security money?
Mr. Reiskin. This preceded the standup of the Department of
Homeland Security. That was out of a congressional
appropriation. The Summer Jobs Program, I believe, was on the
order of $18,000 out of the $168.8 million allocation, and
there was a program, it's called--we actually still have it
through our Department of Employment Services, called Team
D.C., where we engage youth in disaster preparedness and
community outreach surrounding disasters, and it's a program
that we actually think is very good.
The computerized towing contract, I can't say for certain
if that was funded. I think it was $35,000 out of $168 million.
If it was, I would offer that the ability to efficiently move
stalled vehicles during a disaster would not have been an
unwise expenditure of funds.
Chairman Tom Davis. I just wanted to give you an
opportunity to put it on the record.
Ms. Norton.
Ms. Norton. Just a few more questions, Mr. Chairman.
I just want to understand, Mr. Foresman, whether your
testimony is that Congress, it is Congress that mandated the
increases. For example, that Louisville got a 70 percent
increase, that Omaha got a 61 percent increase, you're saying
Congress is responsible for that.
Mr. Foresman. Congresswoman, what I am offering to you is
the congressional direction was to move to a risk-based process
and an effectiveness scoring system, and those things
contributed to the changes. And the percentages, while
dramatic, represent----
Ms. Norton. Congress only mandated a risk-based system. You
had to then go and figure out what that meant. Congress doesn't
have anything to do with these increases or with these cuts.
They're based on the formula that the Department came up with,
not with any, ``congressional mandate.''
Of course everybody on this panel is for a risk-based
system; the controversy is about whether we mean the same
things when we say that.
Mr. Foresman, when I hear you describe the competition, and
we value nothing more than the competitive process of the
Federal Government, but when I heard you discuss the
competition for these funds that you couldn't tell the chairman
until you looked at all the other ones, etc., it sounded like
nothing--it sounded exactly like the kind of competition that
States and localities go through when they're applying for
education grants and the rest.
It was kind of scary to hear that it was the kind of same
old competition, albeit with subsections, just like other
competitions for grants have subsections.
The reason I ask that or raise that is, you are, of course,
aware that this region, unlike any region in the country, by
mandate of Congress in the Department of Homeland Security
legislation, has a coordinator for this region paid by the
Department, that is to say by the Federal Government.
I would like to know, in light of the fact that Congress--
you want to know what Congress has mandated, when it lays out
the money for a Federal coordinator and says that it will be
paid out of DHS funds, Congress is mandating something very
specific.
I want to know whether or not, in light of this unique
role, whether the coordinator was given instructions about how
he was to relate to this region so as to make sure that, in his
paid capacity, he helped the region to make out the kind of
application that could protect all the Federal assets here.
What was his role?
Mr. Foresman. Congresswoman, there are two parts to the
answer here. First, Tom Lockwood, who serves as our Director of
the Office of National Capital Region Coordination, the
National Capital Region is the only place where we have a
single, full-time dedicated office and Federal personnel
dedicated to regional activities. We are moving to a regional
structure elsewhere in the country, but here in the National
Capital Region, Tom works a wealth of issues from working with
the communities on strategic planning preparation, operational
coordination, coordination among the Federal work force issues.
Ms. Norton. I want to know, given the importance of this
region, that we are paying somebody to make sure that this
region, even if the rest of the regions fall flat, that this
region does what it is supposed to do because of what is
located here. I want to know whether he had a specific role in
making sure that these applications met your terms?
Mr. Foresman. Congresswoman, I will answer it this way: Mr.
Lockwood works with his three counterparts on a regular basis--
--
Ms. Norton. Yes or no? Did he have a role? My goodness, Mr.
Foresman.
Mr. Foresman. He was involved in the strategic planning
process, Congresswoman.
Mr. Norwood. He did not have a role, it seems.
Did he have a role, Mr. Reiskin? Did he have a role versus
the panel? Did he tell you, look, this is the National Capital
Region, I am the coordinator; let me just put you on notice,
these are the kind of things you have to do in order to get
your applications to pass muster? Could you all tell me,
please?
Mr. Reiskin. I would say that Mr. Lockwood in his capacity
serves as a peer with us on the senior policy group which makes
the final decisions in terms of the submission of the
application and the ultimate award of the funds. He was not
serving as a kind of liaison to the Office of Grants and
Training, which was driving the grant funding process. I think
they might argue it would have been a conflict for him to do
so.
Mr. Norwood. Would it have been a conflict? That is really
my point. If you were only protecting all of us, that might
have been a conflict. This Department, this Congress and every
Federal asset, which happens to be virtually all of them in the
United States, are implicated here.
I am not talking about whether or not he was helping you to
protect D.C. or even Maryland and Virginia. I am talking now
about, and I have to ask you, Mr. Foresman, if something
happens here, are you prepared to say, for want of a good
application, they didn't get the funds?
We are thinking about the uniqueness of this region, and I
really don't hear in your discussion of the competition a
sensitivity to that uniqueness as indicated by the Congress
with a Federal coordinator paid by Federal funds.
It sounds as though this was a region among others. We
looked at it as we look at others. We will look at 4,000 other
applications, and then we will see how you came out. If that is
what happened, that raises a very serious question.
For example, let me ask you this: We know that asset risk
is generally generic. Here I am trying to point to the
difference between this region and many others.
However, let's take Union Station. If we are talking about
an ordinary train station, everybody has a train station.
Philadelphia has a train station. Every place has a train
station. This is what we are talking about.
We are talking about the hub that the Federal workers use
as a transportation hub for the region. We are talking about
the Union Station that is within a couple of blocks of the
Capitol. We are talking about Union Station where Members of
Congress have events on the premises and can hear the trains
rolling underground as they come in.
In calculating the risk of Union Station, do you in fact
treat it as other rail stations, or how do you in fact
calculate the risk in this example I pose?
Mr. Foresman. Congresswoman, let me go back to the first
part of your question where you talked about the effectiveness
score. I want to be very clear that 66 percent of the funding
is based solely on the risk piece of it; 33 percent is based on
the effectiveness.
Ms. Norton. Say that again?
Mr. Foresman. Sixty-six percent of the funding allocations
are based solely on risk. It has nothing to do with
effectiveness. And of the 33 percent that is based on
effectiveness, the maximum, the maximum that any one
jurisdiction could be affected by that effectiveness score is 7
percent of their total allocation.
Now, to the second part of your question----
Ms. Norton. That wasn't my question. I asked about Union
Station.
Mr. Foresman. No, you asked me a question, and the first
part, I was trying to address that one for you as well.
Now with regard to Union Station, when we look at a
specific asset, we look at it in the context of a particular
geographical area, and in this case, the National Capital
Region is a unique geographical area. We give special attention
to the National Capital Region because it is the seat of
government. So in the context of our evaluation, we take into
account that it is not your average train station.
Chairman Tom Davis. Thank you.
Mr. Van Hollen.
Mr. Van Hollen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. A lot of the areas
have been covered here, but I do want to ask you, with respect
to the amount of funds, Mr. Foresman, for the D.C. area under
the Urban Security Initiative, as I understood your answer to
the last question, even if the D.C. area had gotten the maximum
on the effectiveness score, the total increase would have been
7 percent? I just want to make sure I understand.
Mr. Foresman. Give or take 7 percent.
Mr. Van Hollen. But you graded their submission, as I
understand it, in the bottom 25 percent on effectiveness, is
that right?
Mr. Foresman. Congressman, I will need to double-check to
see if they were in the bottom 25 percent of effectiveness, but
I believe that is correct.
Mr. Van Hollen. I guess I really haven't heard yet today
why it is they scored in the bottom 25 percent effectiveness in
your opinion. We have representatives here who were very
involved in the submission. We have heard now that Mr.
Lockwood, I guess, was not involved, and I want to ask a couple
of questions about that. But we have representatives here who
know their stuff; they know their business. They have teams of
people working on it. Why was their application graded in the
bottom 25 percent? The bottom 25 percent in my kids' school is
a failing grade. I would like to know why that was. They would
like, I am sure, to know, so if they disagree with you, they
can contest it; or if they agree with you, they can improve in
the future.
Mr. Foresman. Congressman, let me be very specific. This
was not a grade. This was a relative measure to all of the
other urban area investments that were submitted.
Mr. Van Hollen. Where you graded on a curve.
Mr. Foresman. In the context of it, from the standpoint of
those urban areas, they submitted proposals which were deemed
during the review process by the reviewers to be at a certain
level of compliance in terms of sustainability beyond the end
of the grant program, consistent with the philosophical
approach of the national program, and this goes back to the New
York piece of it, Congressman. In the context of it, we had
this discussion with Mayor Bloomberg, they had a different
philosophical approach than what the national program is for.
We are trying to develop a bunch of independent urban area
activities as part of an interdependent national approach, so
we have to have some target from a national perspective.
But I want to be very clear in saying, having worked
closely with these gentleman over the years, having worked in
the National Capital Region and living here today, I am proud
of the work that has been done. I feel safe in terms of what
they are doing.
This was not a scoring of the capability of the National
Capital Region. This was a ranking in terms of how well the
investment justifications comported with the national
priorities in relation to the 400 or so that we received from
other metropolitan areas.
Again, I go back to the scoring piece of it. At the end of
the day, there has been much made about this effectiveness
score. In the most extreme case, the maximum of adjustment
would have been about 7 percent. I don't know in the context of
where they fall what that would have done to the dollars, but
we are talking in, probably, the single digit millions here in
the National Capital Region.
Mr. Van Hollen. But let me just get to that issue. You
mentioned sustainability and lack of compatibility with the
national plan. If you could just be specific about it.
Mr. Foresman. Yes, sir. One of the things that Congress
directed that we do is to develop the National Preparedness
Goal to make sure that we were providing States and communities
and, frankly, the Federal interagency with a clear road map of
what levels of preparedness are we trying to get to in urban
areas, in States, in regions, in individual communities; what
do we need to do as a nation?
So the National Preparedness Goal informs the grant
programs in terms of the priorities in those grant programs. So
what we are essentially saying to a particular community, or in
this case an urban area, how will your proposals increase your
ability to get to that desired National Preparedness Goal and
also fit within your regional strategy and be sustainable
beyond the end of the Federal grant funds?
Congressman, let me be clear. This is a tough position for
all of us. But, you know, at the end of the day, the Federal
assistance is not designed to be the primary tool for
protecting communities. It is designed to supplement local and
State dollars that this region has been very good about
committing to its public safety activities, whether crime or
terrorism.
And, you know, I will tell you the challenge that we face
from a public policy debate is we have not had to do give and
take at the State and local level in terms of what we are not
going to do. If we feel like these security measures that
aren't being funded by the Federal Government, if they are that
important, are we still going to go ahead and do them?
Mr. Van Hollen. I appreciate the fact that the local
jurisdiction is supposed to be the primary mover in this area,
and I think all of these gentlemen next to you do as well. But
that doesn't mean that it is not important for us to rely on
the Federal contribution, especially in the Nation's Capital.
So we are all still struggling I think with why we are seeing
such a reduction from last year.
Part of it, obviously, is due to the reduction of the
overall level. Part of it may be due to risk adjustments upward
for other areas. Part of it, though, is due to the fact that,
at least on a curve, we were at the very bottom.
I guess if I could just ask the other witnesses at the
table whether you have had an opportunity to look at the
criticisms or the evaluation by the Department of Homeland
Security and whether you have any responses to them or whether
you feel that you are still left in the dark as to why you
didn't measure up relative to other jurisdictions that
submitted their proposals?
Mr. Crouch. I will respond to that, Congressman. Thank you.
We have been offered opportunities by the Department of
Homeland Security, including Under Secretary Foresman, to meet
with them in the future to get that detailed analysis. We are
very eager to do that for all the reasons you so well stated
just awhile ago.
Mr. Van Hollen. Let me make it clear. You have not yet had
an opportunity to review any of that?
Mr. Crouch. We have not.
Mr. Van Hollen. One last question that goes to Mr.
Lockwood's role. I think we would all agree, Mr. Foresman, I am
sure you would agree, the goal is to have in place a plan that
best protects people, the National Capital Area and other areas
of threat around the country; right?
Mr. Foresman. Yes, sir.
Mr. Van Hollen. So I am a little concerned about this idea
that Lockwood's participation in this effort to come up with
the plan would somehow be seen to give this area a
disadvantage, because our goal should be for him to provide the
input that makes it the very best plan we can have so that the
people in this area can access the full amount of resources
that are potentially available for them to access.
This idea that somehow when we, the Congress, have created
this position specifically because it recognized the kind of
unique threat posed to people in the National Capital area, to
say that person would somehow be, you know, it wouldn't be fair
for that person to participate, seems to me to put sort of
bureaucratic gaming concerns over the welfare of the people of
the region. Because what we want is a good plan that everyone
agrees is a good plan.
So why would you not allow him to help participate so that
this region could get the very best plan possible?
Mr. Foresman. Congressman, I don't believe I said, it
wouldn't be fair, and, if I did, I was incorrect in that
statement. It may have been said by one of the other panelists.
We expect Tom to be engaged, but he has got a multitude of
things that he is engaged in. The greater expectation is for
our team in our Grants and Training Office, who works with the
community on a regular basis, is in constant contact with them,
to provide them the advice and counsel.
But, Congressman, let me also be clear that one of the
things, and the chairman pointed this out, that this needs to
be about a transparent process that is not driven by politics,
and there have been some incorrect allegations to that extent.
This has got to be driven by a very clear process that puts
everybody in an equitable playing field, but doesn't do it in
such a bureaucratic way that we don't get the best solution for
the region. So we understand that.
Tom is not excluded from the process, but he doesn't have
the intimate grant expertise that the other folks who are
assigned, the gentlemen who are assigned here in the National
Capital Region, will have.
So it may be more appropriate to say Tom was involved to
the degree he should have been involved, but we also had our
team members from our Grants and Training shop who are working
with the individual States and the National Capital Region as a
regional jurisdiction, working with them throughout the
process.
Mr. Van Hollen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Tom Davis. Mr. Fossella.
Mr. Fossella. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Foresman, it is my understanding that the funds from
the State Homeland Security Grant Program can be used by the
States to increase preparedness for building basic security
capacities in their States and the UASI program is intended to
protect the largest urban areas in the country. Is that
correct?
Mr. Foresman. That is correct, Congressman.
Mr. Fossella. So the question I have is whether the States
and cities, shouldn't they be competing within the State
Homeland Security Grant money for ``building basic security
capacities'' instead of UASI?
Mr. Foresman. Congressman, I think in the context of the
guidance that we received as part of the appropriations
process, they did not make the distinction between the two
programs. So what we are looking to do is to build capacity in
both contexts.
In the case of New York City, we had the conversation with
the mayor, you know, is capacity paying for the overtime costs
in the case of the New York Police Department or other things?
It represents a philosophical discussion that will go into the
grant development process in the future.
Mr. Fossella. So do you see the UASI grant program as an
opportunity to shift funds, let's say, to maybe what many of us
believe--I don't think it is a philosophical difference. I
thought that the State Homeland Security Grant Program is
different from UASI insofar as the State Homeland Security
Grant Program was to allow States to increase preparedness for
building basic security capacities, as opposed to UASI, which
was originally intended for the large Urban High Threat Areas.
You are saying you can go in there and take the money out
of UASI because you have been guided by the appropriations
process to do so?
Mr. Foresman. No, Congressman. If that is what you
perceived I said, that is not what I intended to say. We view
these programs in the context of a singular grant program. What
we are looking to do is to make sure that expenditures at the
urban area are consistent and not conflicting with what a
particular State is doing as part of an overall national
initiative.
Mr. Fossella. When you say single, so you see both fund
programs as one funding stream?
Mr. Foresman. We see them in the context of broad Homeland
Security funding but specific different program areas.
Mr. Fossella. You don't sit there and say, OK, we are going
to take some money from UASI and some money from there. You see
it as one pot of money to comply with your goal?
Mr. Foresman. Well, based on the guidance that we are
provided by Congress, we have the allocation within the
particular sub-program areas, if you will.
Mr. Fossella. Sub-program areas?
Mr. Foresman. Between the urban area program and the State
Homeland Security Grant Program.
Mr. Fossella. I don't think I have heard you. Do you see it
as one pot of money or not? Yes or no?
Mr. Foresman. Yes, Congressman, we do see it as one large
pot of money, with many different utilizations.
Mr. Fossella. We respect to, among the different
submissions, particularly to the purity of process, can you
reveal where New York fell within that process on the
applications?
Mr. Foresman. New York State or New York City?
Mr. Fossella. New York City.
Mr. Foresman. Congressman, I don't know, but I will provide
you a written response.
Mr. Fossella. It was my understanding it was toward the
bottom, like toward the lower, like Washington, DC
Mr. Foresman. That is generally my recollection based on
the discussion that Secretary Chertoff and I had with Mayor
Bloomberg. Again, one of the things, it was a very good, a very
constructive discussion in the context of, did New York, from a
philosophical standpoint, about 27 percent of what they were
asking for was personnel costs, which tend not to be allowed in
broad terms under the UASI program. So that was part of it.
There were other issues. But, again, it doesn't point to
bad programs in New York City. It doesn't point to bad
activities in New York City. It just simply says that, in terms
of your relative ranking, they scored differently than the
others submitted from around the country.
Mr. Fossella. It was my understanding, again, it was toward
the bottom. I think you are confirming that. But you say you
are going to get that.
Two points, one on process, one on substance. That
conversation took place after the grant program was announced;
is that right?
Mr. Foresman. That is correct.
Mr. Fossella. Do you think it was the responsibility of
anybody at Homeland Security to have an obligation to go back
to, for example, New York City and say that your application or
your submissions are wrong, rather than wait to make that
determination? Do you think anybody had that obligation?
Mr. Foresman. Congressman, in terms of the process, there
is ongoing discussion regular between New York City and their
designated liaison in our Grants and Training shop. When the
applications came in, we went through those applications to
make sure that all of the component pieces were there so that,
if someone left out a piece of paper, they weren't going to be
excluded from the review process.
But what we did not do, we did not go in and preview any of
the applications to say, this is on point, this is not on
point. That is what the peer review process was about. With the
recognition that, as we have gone through this process, we have
tried to make sure that we treat New York and Washington, DC,
with the understanding that they are the highest-risk urban
areas, that they are unique in many, many ways, but also put it
on an equal playing field with the other urban areas from
around the country, because, at the end of the day, the
challenge is not to be up here saying that we allowed anything
other than a very objective review process to have guided our
funding decisions.
Mr. Fossella. Back to the substance aspect of it, I am not
so sure on the process of whether--I do believe somebody in
Homeland Security had an obligation to step forward. If it was
a function of who had the best application, you can make the
hypothetical that a city with 100 percent threat that submitted
a lousy application, but a city with zero threat who submitted
the best application would get the funding. So let me push that
a side for a second.
Is there any movement to change the philosophical view? A
couple weeks ago, there was a conviction in New York city of a
man who plotted to blow up the Herald Square Subway station.
That was not done with so much building basic security
capacity; that was human intelligence for the most part. That
was the 1,000-plus New York City police officers to the tune of
$200 million on an annual basis, which is larger than the
entire Police Department of Denver, CO, for example.
If we determine that human intelligence is the best way to
thwart or prevent a terrorist attempt, don't you think that
maybe the philosophy that Homeland Security should change in
terms of providing adequate funding to meet and thwart those
threats, rather than just building basic security capacity?
Mr. Foresman. Congressman, two points to that. First, let
me address the first point where you said the effectiveness
would have--a real bad application versus a real good
application.
I just need to be very clear. It would have made very
little impact in terms of the total dollars allocated, in New
York City or anywhere else.
The second point to the particular philosophical piece.
That is the broader public policy discussion that has been had
in the U.S. Congress with States and communities over many,
many years about, should the Federal Government provide funds
to communities for personnel costs, whether it is personnel
costs in this case for cops on the beat doing crime reduction
or whether it is personnel costs for law enforcement personnel
doing human intelligence. That is part of a broader debate.
I will tell you, on the whole piece of intelligence, as a
good example, that is the one area where we have provided
flexibility to urban areas in the context of intelligence
fusion to be able to use these dollars for some personnel
costs, because we recognize, prior to September 11th, that was
a capacity that very few urban areas, New York City being one
of the exceptions, that was a capability that many areas didn't
have.
So we do give flexibility in those particular areas, but
not for a broad number of people to be out, ``collecting
intelligence for analysts.''
Mr. Fossella. If I hear you correctly, a city like New
York, for example, has that flexibility, to a point?
Mr. Foresman. To a very limited point in the context of
intelligence and from an analytical standpoint, not a
collection standpoint. You would think probably about law
enforcement personnel on the street being more on the
collection side than on the analytical side.
Mr. Fossella. I know there are other questions. I yield
back.
Chairman Tom Davis. Thank you very much.
Mr. Ruppersberger.
Mr. Ruppersberger. Well, I think one of the things that is
occurring here today is that we have people, and you, Mr.
Foresman, are attempting to do your job, and you seem to be
very competent. But it seems to me that you are trying to
defend a major system that, when you look at the end game, it
is just from public perception point of view but more from a
reality point of view, giving resources to first responders,
isn't really working.
To have a formula that really discounts the threats to
Washington, DC, to New York, to those areas, to come up with
the way it is, something is wrong.
Homeland Security has had a lot of bumps, and I hope we
have learned from those bumps, and I hope that we have become a
lot more practical and start focusing on realities, because
what I heard here today really disturbs me, and I know you have
to take your position where you are.
Let me get into some areas. The first thing, what we
haven't talked about here today, in all fairness, from what I
understand, and correct me if I am wrong, this program was cut
by Congress, the State side, by 50 percent and, on the urban
side, by 14 percent. Is that correct?
Mr. Foresman. That is correct.
Mr. Ruppersberger. OK. So you are sitting here attempting
to defend a system that I think is flawed at this point, but
you have less money, and that was because of Congress. So we
have to look at ourselves and see where we are.
You also have made a comment about what Congress has told
us to do. I am not sure what you mean by that, and I don't know
if I have time to get into it.
But what my concern is and what I would like to really
determine is where your priorities are. When it comes to
funding, it is about priorities.
According to the President, and I believe it, too, we are
at war with terror. We are at war in another country, but we
also have a terrorism war. We need to do a lot of things very
quickly, in Homeland Security and FBI, to find cells, to
protect our country. But we know right now that we have been
attacked, and we have a lot of intelligence of where we think
al Qaeda is going to go.
You made a couple comments, I wrote some notes, about
equity and how we need to be equitable. The way I see it, when
it comes to protecting our citizens from a terrorist attack, it
is not about equity. It is getting resources to the areas which
we have chosen, which the President has chosen, what the FBI,
NSA, CIA have come together--and that is, by the way, what the
Director of National Intelligence is about, to find out where
the priorities are and where we are going to put the money. I
just am concerned with this matrix, that you have grades where
they are.
Now, I am going to stop that with you, because I want to
get to Mr. Schrader. I am from the State of Maryland. You put
together what you thought was a very good proposal. Let's just
talk about the State on a risk basis. You have NSA. You have
Fort Meade. You have proximity to Washington, DC. In the
region, you have BWI Airport. You have the port of Baltimore,
and if you want to get nuclear components in and your target
is, say, Washington, DC, the port of Baltimore is the closest
port. You have Aberdeen, one of the top testing centers for the
U.S. military probably in the country. You have all of these
areas here. To me, that is an exposure issue, a risk issue.
Now, I think Homeland Security was doing well as far as
prioritizing money to New York, money to Washington. Now we
have this new matrix which I perceive is a bureaucratic matrix.
I would like to hear from you and go through your process, Mr.
Schrader; where you think the priorities are, what you did with
respect to your presentation and proposal, and then your
anxiety on what occurred and how it occurred.
I would like you to get into an area, too, because I am
concerned about a lot of this. Even though Mr. Foresman will
not admit it, I think a lot of it has to do with who has the
best grant writers and who has the ability to put certain
people in certain pegs. That might be OK if you are talking
about education funding, health funding, but when it comes to
fighting terror, I don't think that is OK.
Could you answer that?
Mr. Schrader. Congressman Ruppersberger, let me start by
saying that the unfortunate part of all of this is, I think DHS
had the right intent when they started this process.
Mr. Ruppersberger. I agree with you.
Mr. Schrader. The approach and the concept was good. Quite
frankly, the other troubling part of this, and I will get into
the direct answer, is that if we push them into changing the
process again----
Mr. Ruppersberger. By the way, the reason I want you to
answer the question is I want Mr. Foresman to hear this.
Mr. Schrader. Yes, sir. It would be very troubling at the
State and local level to have this process change completely
again next year. The nice thing about what we found is, it
seemed to be a good framework on the front end that we can then
have a multi-year planning process in place, and that is what
we did.
We organized the State into regions. We did regional
bottoms-up data. We put these governance groups together to
review our statewide program. But our policy in Maryland has
been one Maryland in coordination with the NCR, because the NCR
is not an operational unit.
For example, we have a fusion center, intelligence
gathering in Maryland, that we do for a very limited amount of
money through our grant process. It is up in Baltimore, but it
covers the entire State, and it supports the NCR. So part of
the process here is, we look at the entire State, we have a
focus on the NCR, but we also have the central Maryland urban
area.
As I said earlier, we had estimated that a reasonable
amount of money for the State of Maryland would have been about
$35 million to $40 million. We ended up getting about $24
million, which, quite frankly, shocked us.
We did have a very good quality application. So what we
were assuming was maybe the risk from the two urban areas
sucked off the risk from the State. I am being told now that is
not the case.
So the bottom line is, we have been working collaboratively
with DHS for over 7 or 8 months now to make sure we put the
very best application together. We shared a lot of that
information with the National Capital Region. There was a
tremendous amount of work that went into the application
process. And I think it was all for good intention.
Mr. Ruppersberger. Why do you think you were cut?
Mr. Schrader. To be honest with you, I am mystified still.
Mr. Ruppersberger. Why do you think you were cut, based on
what you have heard here today?
Mr. Schrader. I don't know. I don't know.
Chairman Tom Davis. Thank you.
Mr. Ruppersberger. Can he finish answering?
Chairman Tom Davis. He doesn't know. He said he didn't
know.
Mr. Schrader. Let me make it clearer. If the State program
was cut in half, we had $20 million last year, we would have
expected to get $10 million, just if we did nothing, if we
threw something up against the wall. We ended up getting $8
million, which didn't make any sense to us. We worked really
hard and thought we would get more.
Chairman Tom Davis. Let me just ask, did everybody get less
than you thought you would get?
Mr. Crouch. We did.
Chairman Tom Davis. I guess the other question, if I could
just tag along, is, what regional Homeland Security programs
will now have to be underfunded because of the loss of grant
money? If each of you could take a second and give us an idea.
Mr. Reiskin. I will start. As I mentioned, we had
identified about $250 million worth of need and submitted an
application for $188 million. We didn't expect to get an award
of $188 million. But all $188 million represents things we
think are important in advancing the safety and security of the
region. We now have $46.5 million. So about three-quarters of
what we had proposed won't get done.
One major thing I will mention, about $42 million was in
the area of interoperable communications. Of that, I think $25
million was to continue the basic infrastructure that we are
building, a secure, robust, dedicated network for interoperable
communications. That $42 million alone is the entire amount.
Chairman Tom Davis. Mr. Crouch, what will be underfunded in
Virginia, do you think?
Mr. Crouch. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
As Mr. Reiskin indicated, we had identified $188 million in
grant programs. We have already gone into a process
anticipating that we wouldn't get that amount, certainly, to
reduce the amount down to $121. That is pretty much where we
are in our analysis at this point. So as Deputy Mayor Reiskin
pointed out, we are going to have to look at that $121 million
and reduce it to the $46 million.
I mentioned some of the meritorious programs we are looking
at earlier, the WMATA operations center backup, the fire
assistance for the tunnels, programs to deal with special
needs. All of the programs that were submitted had merit to get
as far as they did in terms of our submission, and again, they
had tremendous stakeholder and local first responder
participation in their development.
We will now have to begin the process of determining what
programs we eliminate, whether we can partially fund some with
anticipation of sustaining them in the future and accomplishing
those goals but at a slower pace.
So to identify a specific program at this time, Mr.
Chairman, I am not able to do that. But, obviously, we think
all of the programs, the projects that were presented, had
merit, and obviously, we are not going to be able to proceed
with all of those.
Mr. Schrader. Three things will be difficult. We have been
working closely with Prince George's County to help them with
their radio system. It will make it more difficult. Our
Critical Infrastructure Resilience Program, reaching out to the
private sector and getting the private sector organized in
Maryland will probably be affected. Then the last thing, we
have a major focus on maritime security in the maritime
channels leading up to the Capital Region which would be of
concern.
Chairman Tom Davis. Thank you.
I am sorry, did anybody else want to add anything?
Mr. Robertson. One addition is that the regional system
education campaign I think will be quite vulnerable. We cannot
educate our citizens on a cyclical, every 2 or 3 years, basis.
We have to do that on an ongoing sustained basis.
Chairman Tom Davis. Thank you.
Mrs. Maloney.
Mrs. Maloney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Foresman, if I could ask you, did Booz Allen Hamilton
give the Department of Homeland recommendations on how to rank
urban areas based upon information that they gathered from the
peer review process?
Mr. Foresman. Congresswoman, Booz Allen Hamilton, just so I
am clear, they facilitated the peer review groups. Each one of
the investments were reviewed, and then they were reviewed as a
package. Booz Allen did the facilitation and rolled up the data
and gave it to the Federal team members. But the Federal team
members were there with the peer review process. They did the
administrative backbone work, if you will, the typing and
printing and copying and that type of thing.
Mrs. Maloney. But they did gather together the information
they had from this peer review process and gave it to the
Department of Homeland Security; correct?
Mr. Foresman. Yes, ma'am.
Mrs. Maloney. And did the Department of Homeland Security
follow the recommendations of Booz Allen Hamilton?
Mr. Foresman. They were not Booz Allen Hamilton
recommendations. They were the peer review recommendations that
Booz Allen Hamilton was responsible for simply documenting as
an administrative support function.
Congresswoman, I will go back. I do not believe there were
any deviations from the peer review process, but let me provide
you a clear written response so that I am very accurate on
that.
Mrs. Maloney. So you believe they did follow the peer
review process data compiled and presented to the Department of
Homeland Security. May this committee have copies of the data
and the rankings that were provided to the Department of
Homeland Security from Booz Allen Hamilton that compiled it
from the peer review process?
Mr. Foresman. Congresswoman, we are in the process of
providing Chairman King with a significant amount of
information. Let me sit down with the internal folks. The
Secretary and I are committed to being as transparent as we
can. The only two areas that we are trying to find the right
accommodation is the classified information, and of course,
Congress knows how to deal with classified information. That is
easier.
And then on the peer review process, peer review processes
are widely used among Federal agencies. We want to make sure,
if there were confidentiality agreements with these folks, that
we respect those agreements. But we will seek to get you
everything you are looking for.
Mrs. Maloney. You will provide that information to Mr. King
and Benny Thompson of the Homeland Security Committee?
Mr. Foresman. Congresswoman, we have already set the first
delivery over this past Friday, I believe, the first round of
material. But we want to get a whole bunch of different
material and provide it. I mean, we do. We have every reason to
be very transparent with this process.
Mrs. Maloney. Was it the peer review process that ranked
the applications of D.C. and New York City in the bottom 25
percent?
Mr. Foresman. The peer review process provided the relative
measures. How they were actually ranked against it was, you had
17 peer review teams, and all of this data had to be
corresponded because one peer review team didn't do all of the
applications. So just from a simple administrative standpoint,
someone had to take the findings from the 17 peer review teams
and mix it altogether to create the ranking, if you will, as
you describe it.
Mrs. Maloney. So it was the peer review that ranked New
York and D.C. in the bottom 25 percent. So my real question
then is, how in the world can they make a determination of the
risk and need of D.C. and New York City and others if they, as
you testified earlier, do not have access to security clearance
and to real-time threat analysis?
Mr. Foresman. Congresswoman, I did not testify earlier that
they did not have access to it. I told you I would provide to
the committee a written response just to be clear on it. What I
was offering to you earlier----
Mrs. Maloney. I was told they did not have access to it.
Mr. Foresman. Congresswoman, I want to make sure we are
dealing with facts and not what people have been told, because
that has led to some emotional debate, and I want to be very
accurate with you.
Mrs. Maloney. I would appreciate it if you would let us
know how many had security clearances.
Mr. Foresman. Absolutely, but it is not relevant to the
evaluation of the effectiveness piece. Let me just be very
clear about that.
Mrs. Maloney. Recently we had a hearing on the 9/11
Commission, and both former Governor Kean and Lee Hamilton, a
bipartisan commission, testified that the best way to combat
terrorism was intelligence, and that this should be our focus.
That is why Congress revamped our entire intelligence system
now into the National Intelligence Director. They also
testified that the biggest threat that our country faces is a
so-called dirty bomb, nuclear bomb, set off in New York City.
My question is, did the peer review council read the 9/11
Commission report? Did they take into account the intelligence
efforts of localities which our experts say is the place we
should be putting our money and our effort in combating
terrorism? Zarqawi apparently was captured through
intelligence. We have prevented several attacks that people
were plotting in New York based on intelligence. We have an
anti-terrorism intelligence center that works on this.
I want to know, in your ratings, did you give a higher
rating to the possibility that a nuclear bomb would go off in a
particular area and kill hundreds of thousands of people, or
how was this decision made? Was that part of the rating, since
the experts say that is our No. 1 threat to our country at this
point?
Mr. Foresman. Congresswoman, two parts to that. First, on
the intelligence piece, you know, both the co-chairs of the 9/
11 Commission are on point with regard to intelligence, and it
is because of that, because we are following their
recommendations and other commission recommendations, that we
have better intelligence, we have better analytical
understanding of threats.
Mrs. Maloney. Was that part of the formula?
Mr. Foresman. That is where I am going to. Congresswoman,
it was part of the formula, because in order to get to
consequences, we have to understand the consequences of a wide
range of plausible scenarios in metropolitan areas.
But let me be clear again: New York City is at the top of
the risk ranking. It doesn't own exclusive risks. Chicago, LA,
and other metropolitan areas do as well, and they also have
active threats. We have actually seen active investigations
elsewhere. So, you know, there are statements, and then there
are facts, and what we are trying to use are factual data to
inform our risk analysis.
Chairman Tom Davis. The gentlelady's time has expired.
Mr. Clay.
Mr. Clay. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Foresman, I have major concerns about fiscal
responsibility and funding management in regard to these
grants. Can you tell us how your agency is addressing these
concerns and what standards have been put in place to ensure
proper utilization of funds? And, if you could, do you have any
examples of waste and abuse in this grant program?
Mr. Foresman. Congressman, my most glowing example is the
exact reason that we are here today. It is because we simply
didn't provide funds to urban areas based on some formula and
send the dollars out the door and say, come back to us and
report. We asked them to provide various specific investment
justifications of how the dollars will produce tangible
results.
I will tell you that I am actually quite proud of the men
and women in State and local governments across America. While
there have been isolated cases of fraud and abuse, I will tell
you the vast majority of expenditures that I have personally
seen with these Homeland Security funds have measurably
improved the safety and security of America. I will tell you, I
think the rule is the vast majority of these funds are used
very effectively for their intended purposes.
Mr. Clay. Thank you.
Secretary Chertoff has testified before this committee that
DHS analyzes risk using a three-dimensional matrix. One of our
colleagues, Ms. Matsui, wrote to Secretary Chertoff asking
about how the Department assessed risk for her district in
Sacramento.
Let me quote from the reply she got: The Department is
continuing to develop a more robust risk model as it gains the
capabilities to increase its knowledge of interdependency,
cascading effects and refined data sets. These issues are
currently being studied to provide both sector-specific and
cross-sector modeling through a suite of consequence analysis
and decision support tools.
Can you translate this into plain English for me?
Mr. Foresman. Congressman, I can.
The tone and tenor of that response is that--and I think
the question may have come for two reasons: one, because
Sacramento is one of those areas that was deemed, because of
the new relative risk ranking, to go off of UASI after this
current year. The second piece, and I am not sure, I haven't
seen the specific correspondence, we have had issues with
levies up there, and we have gotten some letters about, do you
consider natural disasters and terrorism risks at the same
time?
But if it is strictly in the context of the terrorism
piece, it is because our understanding of the risk nationally
has changed in other urban areas. From a relative standpoint,
it has put Sacramento a little lower on the list.
If we need to get her a clearer response, I will be more
than happy to take personal charge of getting that done.
Mr. Clay. Thank you very much.
Chairman Tom Davis. Mr. Clay, unfortunately, we have to get
the bus over to the Pentagon, which leaves in 3 minutes.
Mr. Clay. I understand.
[The prepared statement of Hon. Wm. Lacy Clay follows:]
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Chairman Tom Davis. I appreciate it. I hate to cut you
short. A lot of this is Mr. Moran's district. Would you yield
to him for 1 minute? If you have any questions for the record,
you can submit them.
I ask unanimous consent that Resolution 16677, passed
unanimously by the Council of the District of Columbia,
resolving that Homeland Security funding be targeted to the
highest threat jurisdictions be put into the record.
Without objection, so ordered.
Mr. Moran.
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Mr. Moran. I thank my good friend from Missouri and the
chairman.
We have had the hearing now, and you have explained and
justified and excused your decisions. But what do we do now?
Where do we go? Might you consider requesting a supplemental
appropriation to address these needs? Are there other programs
we could apply to? We need to know more than just an
explanation. We need to know, what is the next step that we
should pursue? You heard the needs, and I would like to get
some guidance.
The reason our first responders are in decent shape in
northern Virginia, or at least were for the first couple years,
Mr. Davis, Mr. Wolf and I earmarked money. Maybe that is what
we need to do in the future, is just earmark the money to make
sure it goes to our Nation's priorities.
Can you give us a quick response? What you would do if you
were us?
Mr. Foresman. Congressman, three quick responses for you.
First, we had $7.5 billion worth of requests for a both pot of
money that was about $1.7 billion this year. That gives us some
measurable level of understanding of the scope of the need out
there.
Second, we will hopefully, assuming the budget process goes
forward, we will have the 2007 grant programs. I am committed
to moving those out the door much quicker and much more
effectively than we have done in the past. So I hope to have
those out the door, assuming the budget process goes forward
quickly, early in the fall.
And there are other grant programs. We will continue to
work with the folks here in the NCR to identify those other
grant programs that may be able to help them address some of
these issues.
Chairman Tom Davis. That would be very helpful, if we can
look at some of these other programs, given their reliance and
the fact this is the first year we changed it.
Mr. Moran, I appreciate the question.
I want to thank you all for being up here.
Mr. Foresman, thank you particularly for being up here and
being the chief flak catcher today.
The committee stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:55 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
[The prepared statements of Hon. Edolphus Towns, Hon.
Elijah E. Cummings, and Hon. C.A. Dutch Ruppersberger, and
additional information submitted for the hearing record
follow:]
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