

AFGHANISTAN: FIVE YEARS AFTER 9/11

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AFGHANISTAN: FIVE YEARS AFTER 9/11

WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 20, 2006

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:47 a.m., in room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Henry J. Hyde (Chairman of the Committee) presiding.

Chairman HYDE. The Committee will come to order

Five years ago, the United States experienced a terrible tragedy that led our Nation to destroy the Taliban safe haven in Afghanistan protecting Osama bin Laden and his al-Qaeda movement. Our mission was to provide a safe, stable and secure Afghanistan, free from the threat of international terrorism or as a base for global terrorists.

Despite significant political achievements, nearly 5 years later, the window of opportunity in Afghanistan is imperiled. A 60 percent increase in illicit opium cultivation is producing over 90 percent of the world's supply of heroin. The revenues are financing and strengthening the Taliban and anti-Coalition activity, increasing crime and corruption, and eroding the authority of central government institutions.

Afghanistan is on the brink of becoming a failed state, and the retrained Taliban are showing their strength in new attacks that appear to be influenced by a spiraling Iraqi insurgency. The recent assassination of a governor committed to peace and a recent attack near the American Embassy aimed at a U.S. convoy reaffirms the serious challenges to establishing security throughout the country.

Reinforcing the democratic successes in Afghanistan is critical to supporting its national reconciliation process and rebuilding a viable and independent nation-state that is secure and free from terrorism. The 9/11 Commission Report confirmed this viewpoint in its recommendations. How effective have the United States and the international community been in helping Afghanistan meet this goal?

The War on Terror must be comprehensive. In Afghanistan, it requires an expansion of United States and other Coalition forces in remote areas, an effective unified counternarcotics, counterterrorism strategy and an Afghan Government committed to reducing corruption. Only with this comprehensive approach will we accelerate reconstruction on the ground, improve the quality of life for Afghan citizens and help win the war against the Taliban. The United States commanding officer in Afghanistan, General Eikenberry, emphasized the link between reconstruction and vio-

lence, observing that, “wherever the roads end, that is where the Taliban starts.”

Nonetheless, despite the worst upsurge in violence, NATO has failed to respond to General James L. Jones’ request to increase the deployment of troops from alliance nations.

In the absence of a fully trained Afghan national army and police force and an adequate number of Coalition forces in the South to combat the Taliban, President Karzai is rearming militias. This is a dangerous path that seriously jeopardizes the ability of the central government to exert its authority in the south, engendering an opportunity for Taliban control. The Afghan Government needs to be more accountable to its citizens and work to sustain the progress made thus far.

The National Assembly has the potential to increase stability in the country by drawing support to central governing institutions. However, the absence of political parties contributes to the slow pace of the legislature. Furthermore, the inability to form political blocks in support of a national agenda leaves room for corruption as unlikely alliances are formed.

President Karzai has shown courage in leading his people under challenging circumstances. I hope that President Karzai will be strong and hold corrupt officials accountable for their actions.

Congress has given the Administration the tools it needs to succeed in Afghanistan. The new PATRIOT Act “narco-terrorism” provision I authored to punish drug trafficking in support of terrorism tightens the scope of the War on Terror by going after the major drug lords, not the poor farmers.

Today we will hear from Antonio Maria Costa, the executive director of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, about how NATO can expand its mandate. Mr. Costa asked the 26 NATO states to give their forces the mandate and the resources to destroy heroin laboratories, dismantle opium marketplaces, attack convoys that transport opium and bring the major drug dealers to justice. I fully concur with his findings.

We also will hear from the Colombian National Police team that traveled 10,000 miles to Afghanistan to lend its support in combating powerful drug lords. We thank our Colombian friends and allies for making this trip and look forward to hearing their recommendations.

Dr. Barnett Rubin recently traveled to Afghanistan, and we are fortunate to have his firsthand insights into the increasing threats and challenges to Afghanistan.

And without objection, I submit a letter that Representative Kirk and I recently sent to President Bush on Afghanistan for inclusion in the record.

[The information referred to follows:]

Congress of the United States
Washington, DC 20515

September 7, 2006

The President
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

The creation of a democratically-elected government in Afghanistan was a major victory for the world, but recent failures in the fight against narco-terrorism there threaten to undermine that success. An increase of nearly 60 percent in illicit opium production in the course of the last year undergirds warlord support of anti-coalition forces, such as the Taliban. We have to revisit our counterdrug and counterterrorism policies in Afghanistan or we risk creation of a "failed narcotics state."

United States efforts in Afghanistan are failing. Afghanistan faces its highest levels of violence and corruption since its liberation. Drug money continues to finance terrorism. That failure, coupled with the aggressive efforts of the terrorists, threatens to destroy Afghanistan's nascent democracy-free government that Americans and Coalition Forces have died to support.

To succeed in Afghanistan, we need to change our failing strategies. The tools we need are already in place. Afghanistan is not the first battleground in the War on Drugs. We must build on and learn from our experiences in Colombia. There, we mistakenly focused on drugs to the exclusion of terrorism. In Afghanistan, we are focusing primarily on terrorism. In Colombia, we have jointly made great progress by conducting a unified campaign against both. In Afghanistan, we must do the same.

Our focus must shift from an eradication program that the Afghani government has proven it will not or cannot carry out and instead focus on the drug kingpins, their warlord allies, and the heroin production labs and trade routes. The recently reauthorized PATRIOT Act created the extraterritorial federal offense of "narco-terrorism." This provision enables U.S. law enforcement to pursue drug kingpins who use illicit drugs to finance terrorist attacks or fund foreign terrorist organizations, irrespective of whether the drugs are intended for the United States.

The Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) has established excellent counternarcotics teams in Afghanistan, but to successfully combat drug kingpins, DEA needs support from the Department of Defense (DoD) and access to all U.S. military assets and intelligence. In all of 2005, only three DEA operations were supported by DoD. We need to increase that number to three or more *a month*. Significantly increasing the number of military support missions is the only way to help DEA and other law enforcement agencies implement the PATRIOT Act and take down drug kingpins, destroy heroin labs, and interdict drug convoys and the arms they often carry.

The President
September 7, 2006
Page two

The success of this approach has been demonstrated in Colombia. The steps taken by the President Alvaro Uribe to ensure democratic security have resulted in an 80 percent reduction in kidnappings in the past year. In addition, terrorist attacks have decreased by 63 percent, and homicides have been reduced by 37 percent. Colombia has seized more assets of drug traffickers, and extradited more kingpins to the United States, than has any other country in the world. In Colombia, we learned that drugs and terrorism must be fought simultaneously.

Because of the successes in Colombia, we recently pushed for a team of experienced anti-narcotics officers from the Colombian National Police (CNP) to visit Afghanistan and make recommendations on how we can best tackle narco-terrorism there. The CNP team is back and has made recommendations. President Uribe has offered to help fight narco-terrorism in Afghanistan. Experienced, retired CNP anti-narcotics experts are ready to help. We should encourage cooperation between our Colombian and Afghan allies.


Our government provided critical help against both drugs and terror in Colombia. The war against drugs is an integral part of the War on Terrorism. Drugs finance terrorists and we need to tackle both. We need to apply our experience from Colombia to Afghanistan and use all our assets and intelligence to fight not only the drugs but the terrorism they support. Only then can we expect to win, preserving the democratic victory in Afghanistan and making America safer from the threat of terrorism.

As you prepare to meet with President Karzai, we hope you will also raise the serious issue of government corruption, which is undermining our all of our efforts.

We are prepared to help lead the effort for a unified campaign against drugs and terror, but we need your support. We can prevail in Afghanistan just as we are prevailing today in Colombia.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,



HENRY J. HYDE
Chairman
Committee on International Relations



MARK KIRK
Member of Congress

HJH:jm/jc

Afghan opium cultivation soars 59 percent in 2006, UNODC survey shows

KABUL, 2 September (UNODC) - Opium cultivation in Afghanistan rose 59 percent in 2006, largely due to a dramatic increase in the troubled southern provinces, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) said on Saturday.

UNODC's Annual Opium Survey for Afghanistan showed the area under opium cultivation reached a record 165,000 hectares in 2006 compared with 104,000 in 2005. In the southern province of Helmand, where Taliban insurgents have scaled up their attacks on Afghan government and international forces, cultivation soared 162 percent to 69,324 hectares.

"These are very alarming numbers. Afghanistan is increasingly hooked on its own drug," UNODC Executive Director Antonio Maria Costa said in Kabul after presenting the survey to Afghan President Hamid Karzai.

"This year's harvest will be around 6,100 tons of opium - a staggering 92 percent of total world supply. It exceeds global consumption by 30 percent."

The Survey will be published in full at the end of October. A detailed summary, with commentary, will be released on September 12.

The UNODC chief said the southern part of Afghanistan was displaying the ominous hallmarks of incipient collapse, with large-scale drug cultivation and trafficking, insurgency and terrorism, crime and corruption. In other provinces, especially Badakhshan in the north-east, opium crop increases were the result of weak governance, poverty and the influence of powerful warlords.

Only six of the country's 34 provinces are now opium-free. Cultivation fell this year in eight other provinces, mainly in the north of the country. In Nangarhar, the huge successes in eradicating opium in 2005 were not reversed, although some increase was seen in the area under cultivation.

"Public opinion is increasingly frustrated by the fact that opium cultivation in Afghanistan is out of control. The political, military and economic investments by coalition countries are not having much visible impact on drug cultivation. As a result, Afghan opium is fuelling insurgency in western Asia, feeding international mafias and causing a hundred thousand deaths from overdoses every year," the UNODC Executive Director said.

Mr Costa called on the Afghan government to take much tougher action to root out corruption and arrest major drug traffickers and wealthy opium-farming landlords, seizing their assets.

"We trained police and prosecutors, we constructed court houses and detention centres. Now the government has the responsibility to use the judicial system to impose the rule of law and re-establish confidence in Kabul. Significant arrests and convictions will set an example and serve as a deterrent."

Mr Costa urged the Afghan authorities to double the number of opium-free provinces by the end of 2007 and again by 2008, so as to create a drug-free Afghanistan province by province.

"Drug-free areas should be rewarded with more substantial and more visible development aid. Governors and police officials presiding over opium growing provinces should be removed and charged. This would draw a battle line in what could otherwise be an un-winnable war against insurgency mixed with drug trafficking."

Afghanistan is one of the poorest countries in the world. Better living standards, especially in the countryside, and better governance are both vital for tackling the drug problem.

The United Nations drugs chief said Afghanistan had not received as much economic aid per head of population as other post-conflict areas and greater efforts were needed.

"It is not only a question of more money. Aid money gets stuck due to bureaucratic delays. Some is misused, or even stolen, by incompetent intermediaries and corrupt administrators. International aid is plagued by huge overhead costs. Add the arrogant power of the warlords turned drug-lords and you understand why people's confidence in the government and in the international community is being undermined," he added.

The Afghan Government, the Parliament and partner nations have made it clear that legalizing cultivation or buying up the opium crop for medical purposes is not an option under current circumstances. The price differential between the legal market, where opium costs about \$20-30 per kilo, and the illegal one, where the price is \$100, would lead to even greater cultivation and the massive diversion of supplies to the black market.

The UNODC Executive Director also called on western governments to do more to curb drug abuse in their countries, not least in order to protect the health and safety of their own people. "Heroin habits in the West put huge sums of money into the pockets of criminals and insurgents who destabilize Afghanistan and kill soldiers and civilians alike," he said.

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Chairman HYDE. I now am pleased to yield to my colleague and friend, Ranking Member Tom Lantos, for any opening remarks he may wish to make.

Mr. Lantos.

Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Chairman, let me first apologize to you for not being here for the start of the hearing, but we went to the Floor thinking that we will have a vote and expecting to meet you there.

Mr. Chairman, in response to the first terrorist attack ever on American soil, 5 years ago, the United States led an international coalition to liberate the Afghan people from brutal Taliban rule. Those who had aided and sheltered the perpetrators of the September 11th attacks were swept from power.

Five years later, the Administration has badly bungled Afghanistan policy, and we are once again on the brink of losing Afghanistan to armed terrorists. The Administration failed and failed in a potentially catastrophic way to stabilize Afghanistan so that it can never again be used as a terrorist base. The horrifying truth is that, as a result, we in this country are in many ways less secure today than we were 5 years ago.

Yesterday, I led the Democrats of this Committee in sending a letter to President Bush calling for immediate action to reverse the descent of Afghanistan into lawlessness. The enormous sacrifices made by American and other troops to liberate Afghanistan and its people must not be in vain.

In our letter, Mr. Chairman, we pointed out what is painfully obvious to every outside observer of Afghanistan, that the Government in Kabul is still too weak, too poor and too riddled with cor-

ruption to provide basic services and security or to promote economic opportunity.

The Taliban, who coddled the 9/11 terrorists, are resurgent in the south and east, showing surprising military force and using new terror tactics that we have heretofore seen only in Iraq. And there has been an almost unimaginable growth in opium cultivation and narcotics this year. The UN Office of Drug Control and Policy, whose director, Mr. Antonio Maria Costa, is one of our witnesses here today, is reporting a nearly 60 percent increase this year in poppy growth over last year, exceeding the already record levels of 2 years ago. These three elements have coalesced into a vicious cycle of fear and despair for the Afghan people. Each element reinforces the other.

To break this cycle, the Administration must devote far more attention and resources to Afghanistan than what it has managed to toss together over the last 5 years. We have therefore called upon the President to conduct an immediate bottom-up review of the Administration's failed Afghanistan policies and programs, with a significant increase in funding to match our vital national interests in a secure and democratic Afghanistan. This effort, Mr. Chairman, must be overseen by a senior White House official who reports directly to the President, and whose sole responsibility will be to lead and to coordinate all United States activities in Afghanistan.

Second, we have urged the President to direct our Armed Forces in Afghanistan and to encourage NATO forces to begin operations against drug traffickers and narco warlords immediately throughout Afghanistan, but especially in the southern regions.

Mr. Chairman, opium poppy is becoming the Taliban's weapon of choice in its demented quest to bring down Afghan democracy. For the income it provides to the terrorists, every poppy that blooms will only sew seeds of chaos and destruction.

No country in recorded history has produced as much opium as Afghanistan is producing today. Narcotics trafficking accounts for nearly one-third of Afghanistan's economy, more than \$2 billion a year. The huge profits from the opium trade are funding the implements of terror for the Taliban, al-Qaeda and criminal gangs that are preying on the innocent and killing our people, Coalition allies and Afghan soldiers, officials and civilians. The narco warlords are making plantations of whole regions of Afghanistan, entangling poor farmers in a web of desperation, economic dependency and fear. They are also buying themselves government positions and parliamentary elections, further corrupting Afghanistan's nascent democracy.

The more aggressive counternarcotics program must also include much greater efforts and resources for reconstruction, political development, alternative livelihood programs and poppy eradication. Otherwise, there can be no hope of stopping the tidal wave of violence, corruption and despair that is presently consuming Afghanistan.

Mr. Chairman, the courageous men and women of this country's armed forces and their NATO and Afghan counterparts are fighting and, in disturbingly larger numbers, are dying for a noble cause, the liberation of the people of Afghanistan from the tyranny and barbarism of the Taliban and al-Qaeda and from the degradation

of more than 20 years of civil war. They are also fighting to ensure that Afghanistan never again becomes a terrorist country from which future 9/11s can be launched. We must ensure that their valor and their sacrifices are more than meaningful, that they achieve a satisfactory end. We cannot afford to lose Afghanistan again.

Mr. Chairman, let me briefly address the Administration's refusal to send an authoritative witness to today's critically important hearing.

As Afghanistan is going down the tubes before our eyes, the Administration couldn't be bothered to spare for even 1 hour the United States Ambassador to Afghanistan, Ronald Neumann, who was scheduled to be in Washington today, to appear before our Committee to explain the Administration's policy in Afghanistan.

By thumbing its nose at this Committee, the Administration shows the world what it thinks about congressional oversight. I urge, Mr. Chairman, that you demand that the Administration send a high-level witness to appear before this Committee next week.

In light of the importance of this hearing, Mr. Chairman, I respectfully request that all Members who wish be afforded the opportunity to make an opening statement. The time it would have taken a proper Administration witness to testify before us today can instead be given to Members' opening remarks.

Before I conclude, Mr. Chairman, I would like to say a word about a subject equally important, and perhaps more so, namely, the future of NATO. NATO, with a force of hundreds of thousands of ready men and women, protected Europe for two generations from a possible Soviet onslaught. When the NATO commander in Afghanistan, a short while ago, requested 2,500 additional NATO troops, the NATO meeting subsequently could not respond affirmatively. We had a feeble offer from Poland to supply an additional 900 soldiers, most of them in February.

We are witnessing, Mr. Chairman, the unraveling of NATO, and I am calling on the Administration to call a special conference on the future of NATO because NATO, while it served nobly for two generations in Europe, now has a function outside of the European area. With 24 unwilling allies, NATO is in the process of disintegrating. And unless we take urgent action, NATO will be merely a historic instrument.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman HYDE. Thank you, Mr. Lantos, for an excellent statement.

The Chair will recognize Members in the order in which they appeared in the Committee for a 3-minute opening statement before we get to the witnesses, pursuant to Mr. Lantos' request.

The Chair recognizes Mr. Rohrabacher of California.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And I would like to thank you and Mr. Lantos again for the leadership you have provided on a number of significant issues in the last 2 years but, in particular, the leadership you have provided in this challenge that we face during the war with radical Islam and especially in Afghanistan.

Let us note that 9/11 was a result of the policies that were in place during the 10 years prior to 9/11. And the Clinton policies, the policies of the Clinton Administration gave us 9/11. And what we do today and the policies that we put in place today will provide the reality of 10 years from now. And if we continue to permit the trends that exist at this moment to continue, we will have left our children and the people who will follow us a much greater crisis to handle than what President Clinton handed us when we experienced 9/11.

And I would give President Bush's Administration high marks on what happened immediately after 9/11, but a failing grade on the way they have been dealing with Afghanistan and the challenge—especially the challenge of drugs in Afghanistan—in the last few years. Let's note that the Taliban was driven out of Afghanistan by a coalition of Afghans, who we supported. It wasn't the United States military that drove the Taliban out, but the people themselves, which shows us that moderate Muslims will join with us when confronted with a commitment to defeat radical Islam, which is represented by the Taliban. However, in order to ensure the success of that operation—and as many people here realize, I was very active during the 1990's opposing the policy of the Clinton Administration, which was basically a covert support for the Taliban, but during—after 9/11, I was very involved with the Bush Administration in trying to guide the policy. And especially on my list of things to do was to tackle the issue of drug production in Afghanistan because, as I warned, that could undue all the good things that we had been doing in helping the Afghan people rid themselves of the Taliban.

And here we are 5 years after 9/11, and again, as Mr. Lantos has pointed out, the situation in Afghanistan is getting worse. And in fact, NATO itself, a power base for the West, is disintegrating in terms of what it can accomplish. Why? Because the United States, because the Clinton—because the Bush Administration has refused to take the steps necessary to end the poppy production in Afghanistan.

It was very clear we would reach this point, and there have been many of us warning we would reach this point unless something was done. But the Bush Administration has continued to fail in its responsibilities to act aggressively to thwart this problem.

We have options, Mr. Chairman—

Chairman HYDE. The gentleman's time has expired.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much. But one last word, if you would indulge me, just to say that Central Asia will be in a crisis 10 years from now, beyond our imagination, unless we do what is right today, and that is the Bush Administration's responsibility.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman HYDE. The Chair notes there is a vote pending, and we shall withhold further proceedings pending the vote. We will stand in recess until shortly after the vote when we can come back.

[Recess.]

Chairman HYDE. The Committee will come to order.

The Chair is pleased to recognize, for purposes of an opening statement for 3 minutes, Gary Ackerman of New York.

Mr. ACKERMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, they are back, the Taliban that is, the terrorists, the midwives of the September 11th attacks, the protectors of Osama bin Laden. I guess they didn't get the memo telling them they had been defeated almost 5 years ago because they are almost certainly not defeated, not even close.

The violence since the July handover of command in southern Afghanistan to NATO has been building since 2002 and is a direct result of the President taking his eye off the ball. We were told that the Administration could walk and chew gum at the same time. Given the way events in both Iraq and Afghanistan are unfolding, it looks like the Administration can do neither.

The laundry list of unfinished tasks in Afghanistan is long, but let's start with just one, security. Members of this Committee have been telling the Administration since the beginning of the war with Afghanistan that reconstruction efforts would fail without a secure and stable environment; the Administration was deaf, dumb and blind. The Administration has consistently miscalculated what was required to resolve the serious security problems facing Afghanistan.

After the fall of the Taliban and the establishment of the International Security Assistance Force, many on this Committee called for an expansion of the ISAF beyond the city limits of Kabul, arguing that the presence of peacekeepers in the capital only was insufficient to provide the security necessary to deliver much-needed relief and reconstruction assistance. Those calls were rebuffed.

Drowning in billions of dollars of drug money, the Afghan Government cannot hope to provide basic law and order if the officials responsible for law and order are also the drug traffickers.

Almost 5 years after the removal of the Taliban, there are vast areas of Afghanistan where the central government simply does not run. Rather than being on the cusp of a free and prosperous future, Afghans are instead staring into the eyes of a narcotics-fueled anarchy.

The fact of the matter, Mr. Chairman, is that the people who attacked us on September 11th are still loose. And they aren't in Baghdad. They are in Kandahar and Kabul and the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan, where they have always been, operating in the same way they always have, supported by the same people who always supported them.

Mr. Chairman, we have lost our moral high ground. We have lost billions of dollars to corruption. We have lost the lives of thousands of brave Americans, and there is no happy end in sight. The President led our military, our Nation, our people into a blind dead end chasm for which there is no safe exit, and that is inexcusable. The Bush Administration witnesses have cut and run. They are not here. They have not accepted your invitation to participate in our responsibility for oversight. The truth is that this is the worst blunder in modern warfare. We have lost our allies. We have lost the respect of the world. We have lost a good part of our integrity, and amazingly enough, today we seem to be less popular in Great Britain than we were during the Revolutionary War.

I look forward to hearing from our witnesses. I ask unanimous consent to put the rest of my statement in the record.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Ackerman follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE GARY L. ACKERMAN, A REPRESENTATIVE
IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEW YORK

Well, Mr. Chairman, they're back! The Taliban that is. The terrorists, the midwives of the September 11 attacks, the protectors of Osama bin Laden. I guess they didn't get the memo telling them they'd been defeated almost 5 years ago, because they most certainly are not defeated, not even close.

The violence since the July handover of command in southern Afghanistan to NATO has been building since 2002 and is a direct result of the President taking his eye off the ball. Before the invasion of Iraq, we were told that the Administration could walk and chew gum at the same time. Given the way events in both Iraq and Afghanistan are unfolding, it looks like the Administration can do neither.

The laundry list of unfinished tasks in Afghanistan is long, but let's start with just one: security. Members of this committee have been telling the Administration since the beginning of the war in Afghanistan that reconstruction efforts would fail without a secure and stable environment. Deaf dumb and blind, this Administration has consistently miscalculated what was required to resolve the serious security problems facing Afghanistan.

After the fall of the Taliban, and the establishment of the International Security Assistance Force, many of us on this committee called for an expansion of ISAF beyond the city limits of Kabul arguing that the presence of peacekeepers in the capital only was insufficient to provide the security necessary to deliver much needed relief and reconstruction assistance. Those calls were rebuffed.

Now drowning in billions of dollars of drug money the Afghan government cannot hope to provide basic law and order if the officials responsible for law and order are also the drug traffickers. Indeed almost five years after the removal of the Taliban there are still vast areas of Afghanistan where the central government's writ simply does not run. Rather than being on the cusp of a free and prosperous future, Afghanistan is instead staring into the abyss of narcotics fueled anarchy.

The fact of the matter, Mr. Chairman, is that the people who attacked us on September 11 are still on the loose. And they aren't in Baghdad, they're in Kandahar and Kabul and on the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan where they've always been, operating in the same way they always have, supported by the same people who have always supported them.

We have lost the moral high ground, Mr. Chairman, we have lost our allies and are now less popular in England than at any point since the revolution, we have lost billions to corruption and we've lost thousands of brave Americans with no happy end in sight. The President led our military and our nation into a blind dead-end chasm from which there is no safe exit, and that is inexcusable.

Today, the Bush Administration witnesses have cut and run from our oversight process, frightened by the truth that the President has led America into the worst strategic blunder in modern warfare.

Thank you.

Chairman HYDE. Without objection, so ordered.

Mr. Paul of Texas.

Mr. PAUL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, I noticed that both your statement and the Ranking Member's statement was pretty negative in the sense that you were realistic to at least make the point that things aren't going perfectly well in Afghanistan, and even the gentlemen from California sort of followed up on that saying that the President ought to be doing better. And I certainly share that. Of course my solution would have been—would be a lot different than maybe what you might propose, but I think that the world has come to realize that it is a serious problem.

In Afghanistan, they are asking for more troops, and we are facing this mess that we have, and yet we don't see an end to it.

You know, there is a rule of law that most of us know about and believe in, and that is, even with the best of intentions, there is a law of unintended consequences, and here is a pretty good example of it. And I think I would like to modify that law, I call it the law

of opposite, so if we go over to do something, too often—like get rid of the Taliban, get rid of drugs—we end up with the Taliban in charge and more drugs. As a matter of fact, when the Taliban was in charge, actually, there were less drugs, and now we see reports where the Taliban is in control of a large portion of Afghanistan.

But, you know, I don't see any solution to this unless people come to understand what prohibition is all about. Everybody in this country understood prohibition clearly with alcohol, but they don't want to apply the same rules and logic to that of other drugs. We don't treat people who overly indulge in alcohol as criminals; we treat them as patients. As a physician, I am very much aware of this. At the same time, if you go out and you see some kid smoking a marijuana cigarette, they are thrown in prison. The whole thing is nuts. And as long as this happens, there is no solution to it. You can spray from here to kingdom come and you can change all the types of plants that you want and genetic engineering, and it is not going to solve the problem. And yet this affects our foreign policy.

We were sent over there—and I supported the effort to go over after the people who attacked us, but it turns out that most of the people who attacked us were Saudi Arabians. And we go over there—we didn't give the President the instruction to go over there and occupy an Arab country forever. And what did we do? We chased al-Qaeda out, who was in Pakistan. And Pakistan is a protector of ours. They are our allies. We give them funds. We subsidize them.

The whole idea of what we are doing I don't think makes any sense whatsoever, and the consequence is exactly what you should have expected.

So without the change in policy, I see no possibility that we are going to tinker with the policy and improve the conditions in Afghanistan. Thank you.

Chairman HYDE. The gentleman's time has expired.

Ms. Watson of California.

Ms. WATSON. Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you for holding this hearing, and I want to thank you for the great service that you have paid to our country as Chairman of our Committee.

Chairman HYDE. Thank you.

Ms. WATSON. I must say that I find it truly regrettable that the President would not see fit to send someone from the highest level to this hearing, but I find that typical of this Administration. In fact, it is the same behavior that leads the President to believe he can ignore Congress. It is the same stubborn arrogance that has brought our Nation almost to the brink of failure to defend our Nation from the terrorists.

Five years ago this month, terrorists hijacked planes and used them to kill close to 3,000 Americans. In the response, the President vowed to defeat the terrorists. He vowed he would secure America from this threat, and when he embarked on that task, he had the full support of every American, including every Member of Congress.

Five years later, we are forced to acknowledge the truth, we have fallen short in protecting America effectively. Five years later, the Taliban are resurgent. Afghanistan is on the verge of, once again,

becoming a failed state and a terrorist haven. And Osama bin Laden and Mullah Omar are still at large.

How did we get there? How is it that President Bush has managed in Afghanistan, like in Iraq, to turn a questionable victory around, despite having the full resources of the world's only superpower, the most powerful nation the world has ever known?

Mr. Chairman, the answer is right here today in this room. We are swiftly moving toward losing the war against the terrorists. We are sending the wrong message to the American people. And the fact that the President is unwilling to defend his policies in front of Congress shows that his policies are questionable at best. If the President were willing to communicate with his critics, I believe we would not be failing in Afghanistan. And if he were willing to work with us, I believe we would still turn this situation around. But the very fact that the President will not work with his critics shows that he is not willing to use the full force of American might to make America safe. Instead, he would rather be right than to win.

This same bullheadedness is on display with our allies. When NATO agreed to support the effort in Afghanistan, it was seen as a bright new day for the alliance. But by going out of his way to alienate our allies, the President has shown he is not serious about having their support to defeat the terrorists. As a result, NATO today is in crisis.

Chairman HYDE. The gentlelady's time has expired.

Ms. WATSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman HYDE. You are welcome.

Ms. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to thank you for holding this hearing and for your ongoing leadership and commitment to our national security and your distinguished career as a public servant.

And turning to the subject of this morning's hearing, I led a congressional delegation to Afghanistan earlier this year, and it was difficult to imagine that a mere 5 years ago the Taliban ruled Afghanistan, exporting terrorism and calcifying archaic extremism. Now today, media, cultural, business and political leaders are free to meet, to discuss, to demonstrate and to guide policies that are transforming their nation across all sectors.

However, the Islamic extremists are seeking to reclaim Afghanistan as a terrorist haven and have intensified their attacks.

The issue of Taliban and al-Qaeda reemergence cannot be considered in a vacuum. As we have learned from experiences in our own hemisphere, for example, in Colombia, linkages exist between terrorists networks and narcotrafficking. It is therefore incumbent upon us to examine the current situation in an integrated fashion and identify all parallels that may help us address the ongoing threats that we do face in Afghanistan.

In briefings and in hearings that we have held at the Subcommittee level, we have been advised by military and civilian experts alike, both U.S. and foreign, that the future security situation is tied into the economic and political reconstruction of the country. The UN-Afghanistan opium survey of September 2006 suggests offering greater development assistance to address the poverty that makes farmers vulnerable to extremists and to entering the opium

trade. The survey also says that a no-drug, no-corruption pledge and conditions should be linked to the levels of development assistance. I would like to have the panelists tell us how we can reconcile these two goals; how do we address the short-term goals to reduce opium activity and related corruption while addressing longer-term development goals which have an impact on our counterterrorism and counternarcotics policies. I would like to hear the witnesses' views on these and other recommendations that they pose for short- and long-term solutions and strategies in our efforts in Afghanistan.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman HYDE. Thank you.

Ms. Barbara Lee of California.

Ms. LEE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I do want to thank you and Mr. Lantos for this hearing and welcome our witnesses.

My belief is that this Administration's strategy in Afghanistan and the region really stands as a cautionary tale. Congress had the opportunity to determine how we would respond to the terrible attacks of 9/11 with a comprehensive, sophisticated and multi-faceted strategy to bring the terrorist sponsors of this terrible act to justice; to promote peace and stability and economic development in the region; and to work with the world community to support our goals as we road, quite frankly, a quest of—a wave of sympathy, as we all know, for our pain and revulsion for those who attacked us.

Now the resolution granting the President the use of force—this was H.J. Res. 64—was vague and lacked specificity and was one-dimensional, and of course, for that reason, I did not support it. But at a time when the majority of the world stood with us, Congress uncritically gave the President the benefit of the doubt, and his policies now have squandered the good will that was at our disposal.

Also, I was concerned then, as I am today, that this Administration would become distracted by an overly broad mandate and a belligerent foreign policy stance; concerns which, unfortunately and sadly, have been borne out.

So, Mr. Chairman, after 5 years, we should know, quite frankly, where Osama bin Laden is. The war on Iraq is a blunder that we should have never started in the first place. And this has affected our ability to capture Osama bin Laden. This reality is made even starker given the recent report of the Senate Intelligence Committee that included findings that there was no connection between al-Qaeda, Afghanistan and Saddam Hussein. The reality is that Afghanistan is deteriorating; Iraq is in a civil war; and the Middle East is more unstable than in recent memory. And we are clearly less safe and less secure in protecting or security interests and our country than we have been before.

While the subject of this hearing, in terms of the counternarcotics effort in Afghanistan, is very important, I agree that we should be looking at a broader hearing in terms of our full oversight with regard to what is taking place in Afghanistan. There are serious ramifications for the reconstruction effort when entire regions of Afghanistan fall prey to the opium trade, and on the other hand, the temptation to pursue opium production can only be

stanchied effectively with full economic developments that provide people in these areas with real economic alternatives. This is only part of the ongoing story in Afghanistan.

And I am really sorry that our Ambassador did not come, Ambassador Ronald Neumann, and I don't know if it was scheduling or unwillingness on the part of the Administration to answer tough questions on Afghanistan, but I think that we definitely need to make sure we hear from the Administration, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman HYDE. The gentlelady's time has expired.

Ms. LEE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman HYDE. Mr. Tancredo of Colorado.

Mr. TANCREDO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I simply want to thank the members of the panel and the organizations they represent, especially the military, the people in our security apparatus, the folks in NSA and the CIA and the President of the United States, for the fact that we have been 5 years without an attack, 5 years subsequent to the most brutal attack America has suffered on its own soil and with constant threats of attack almost every day since that time and attempts to do something similar to 9/11 ever since that time.

Some good things have happened, and they have happened because of good people who are working as hard as they possibly can to make sure that we are safe. Certainly there are setbacks, and yes, not every single member of the Taliban was killed. And we are going to have setbacks for as long as we are involved in this clash of civilizations, and it is going to last longer than any other war we have ever been in. But the number of—and to hear my colleagues talk about this, it would seem that all is lost, that everything we have done subsequent to 9/11, 5 years ago, is in vain, has been in vain. That is absolutely untrue. And at least we have to have, I think, the courage to say, even to people with whom I disagree—and I certainly disagree with the President on many, many issues—but we have to have the courage to say it sometime: Job well done.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman HYDE. Thank you.

Mr. Blumenauer of Oregon.

Mr. BLUMENAUER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate your calling the hearing at this time, the work of our Ranking Member, Mr. Lantos, because I think it is important for the leadership that this Committee can provide.

I think, clearly, the vision that people had for Afghanistan is slipping away from us. We had now an opportunity 5 years ago with a united Congress supporting action against the Taliban and the al-Qaeda in Afghanistan. One of the reasons I was strongly opposed to our venture in Iraq was the shifting of our focus and the redeploying of resources. NATO isn't even getting the minimum number of troops; this last week, they were asking for 2,200 troops that they needed to be able to round out their deployment.

We have heard from witnesses before this Committee that our minimal efforts at reconstruction in Afghanistan, a country, after all, larger than Iraq, with a larger population than Iraq and more severely damaged than Iraq, we were giving a fraction of the aid to that country. And we had, for example, USAID didn't even have

an airplane available to them to be able to deal with their reconstruction work. There was not an adequate security footprint for our reconstruction efforts and for the NGOs.

We are watching as Pakistan appears to be cutting a deal with the Taliban, suppressing democracy at home, while at best being—to be polite, an ambiguous partner in our efforts against Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda. Now all of this is disturbing when we know this is where al-Qaeda launched its attacks, and this will be the last place seemingly that we are going to be able to move forward and stabilize it.

I am hopeful that, as a result of this hearing, Mr. Chairman, your leadership yet in this Congress—we know you are looking forward to a different venue after this Congress—but we really need you and this Committee to continue the involvement, the critical role that the International Relations Committee can play to make sure that the bright spot that we had with Afghanistan doesn't slide away.

Thank you, and I yield back.

Chairman HYDE. Thank you.

Mr. Wexler of Florida.

Mr. WEXLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to echo the thanks that I think you justly deserve for calling this hearing in your usual honest fashion, as well as thanks to Mr. Lantos.

I want to echo Mr. Tancredo's comments, and then follow them. I agree with Mr. Tancredo, some very important and very good things have happened, and all Americans are extremely mindful of the fact that America, thank goodness, since September 11th, in terms of our 50 States, has avoided yet another catastrophe. And the men and women in uniform and the men and women all across this country who every day work to prevent that deserve great, great praise.

But while some very good things have happened, I think we also need to understand that some very awful things have happened, and they continue to happen. And the singular event and the ongoing occurrence which should bring caution to all Americans is the apparent failing of our policy in Afghanistan.

How did we get there? Five years after September 11th, with the world unified behind us, Democrats and Republicans here and at home in support of the President's decision to declare war on the Taliban; 5 years later, Osama bin Laden is still free. Now the President now argues, well, it is not that big a deal that Osama bin Laden is still free because, in fact, even if we get Osama bin Laden, he is no longer the central player that he was on September 11th. Well, that may be true, but we gave him the time to diversify. We gave him the time to develop the institutions of terror in Europe that we should have been able to grasp out immediately after September 11th.

Where are the calls, Mr. Tancredo, respectfully, by the President, by the Republicans for additional forces in Afghanistan if that is what we need to defeat al-Qaeda? Where are the calls for additional funding if that is what we need to in order to defeat al-Qaeda? It seems to be absent from the President's agenda.

Yes, some good things have happened, but let's talk about the things that ought to trouble Americans all across the world. We

have a failing policy in Afghanistan, only matched by a failing effort in Iraq. We have a war between Israel and Hezbollah that resulted in an unsatisfactory ceasefire with a multi-national force that was supposed to be put in place that is not in place, and Hezbollah will undoubtedly have the opportunity to rebuild its forces, and Israel will fight that war once again.

Where is the Presidential leadership, as has been pointed out, with NATO's failure to provide troops in Afghanistan? Now it would be unfair to blame President Bush for the European failure to meet their obligations, but for Poland, in terms of NATO, but is America so reduced in our credibility in our power to persuade that even our European allies no longer even respond to a call of duty? That is what every American should be concerned about.

We have an Iranian nuclear threat, and now the President yesterday at the UN seems to be taking a step back. Where is, in fact, the American success or at least the possibility of success with Iran? But let's be fair. The President did do a good thing with India. When Secretary Armitage went to India, they deflated the nuclear contest between India and Pakistan, and they followed up with a very, I think, promising agreement in India—

Chairman HYDE. The gentleman's time is expired, although I am loathe to cut him off while he is on the good things.

Mr. WEXLER. I appreciate that, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.

Chairman HYDE. Ms. McCollum of Minnesota.

Ms. MCCOLLUM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And sincerely, I think you can tell how appreciative we are of this hearing that you have called today.

Since 2001, Congress has appropriated more than \$1.9 billion for counternarcotics programs in Afghanistan and surrounding countries. In 2005, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime stated, "The key to counternarcotic success is the development of a country that has infrastructure, irrigation facilities, market outlets and protection under the law." However, just this month, the United Nations announced opium cultivation in Afghanistan had increased by 59 percent just this last year. That is enough to produce more heroin than even the world's users demand. The opium trade accounts for at least 35 percent of the Afghanistan economy and provides 92 percent of the world's opium.

The *New York Times*, in a story on September 5, 2006, reported that Afghans told American officials that their biggest problem was "poverty and corruption." In fact, I had the opportunity in the August break to meet with a former Russian soldier and a United States/Iraqi soldier who both served in Afghanistan, and they said Afghanistan's biggest problem is poverty and corruption. Both those men are working with NGOs to turn that around.

We must provide hope and opportunity to the families of Afghanistan, and they must know that they can count on us to deliver those opportunities for hope. Failing to do so will undermine the success of a longlasting peace and ensuring security, which are needed in order to keep prospects alive and to allow democracy to begin to flourish. Without adequate access to healthcare, education or alternative development programs, we cannot offer the Afghani people hope for the future and activities for self-sufficiency and success.

We are spending \$3 billion a week in Iraq. And I would like to reflect on the comments from this side of the aisle about the choice to go to war in Iraq not being a necessity.

For Fiscal Year 2007, the U.S. will provide only \$42.8 million for child survival and health programs. That is \$200,000 less than 2006; \$3 billion a week in Iraq, and \$150 million for development assistance in Afghanistan. And let me follow that up with some statistics on why it is important to provide developmental assistance.

Currently, only 13 percent of the Afghans have access to safe drinking water. Now why would that be important? Well, USAID points out that in only 60 percent of the households in Afghanistan the drinking water is safe, and as a result of that, diarrhea is a leading cause of death among children under five. And in fact, if this room was filled with children under 5, only 25 percent of us would be alive after our fifth birthday.

Now is not the time for the United States to withdraw down our military forces, not allowing the security to be in place, to make opportunities for economic stability and for healthcare and for water and electricity and roads to be brought into Afghani families. Now is not the time to reduce our aid to Afghanistan. Now is the time for our country to stand tall and to show the Afghani people we stand with them, we are not standing down.

Mr. Chairman, I will put in some more remarks about Afghanistan into the record, but once again, I thank you for the opportunity to have this hearing.

Chairman HYDE. Thank you.

Mr. Delahunt of Massachusetts.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

You know, this is probably one of the most important hearings that will be held in this building in the course of the past year. You know, we speak about the War on Terror. This is about the War on Terror. You know, I guess it shouldn't come as a surprise about why the situation in Iraq is deteriorating, because we had the model here in Afghanistan: a lack of a coherent strategy, a lack of planning.

I thought what was interesting was an observation by the former Under Secretary of Defense Feith, who said, well, we won the war, and other people need to be responsible for Afghanistan now. What world was he living in? I mean, clearly, there was no plan for the aftermath. We knew we would win against those that attacked us and those that harbored them. You know, obviously, there is—it has been noted that we lack an Administration witness, and the reason we lack an Administration witness, in my opinion, is because this is a real tough sell. We can't say things are going well in Iraq. United States efforts in Afghanistan are failing. Afghanistan faces its highest levels of violence and corruption since its liberation. Those are not my words, those are the words of the Chairman of this Committee in a letter to the President. It is a disgrace. It is a disgrace. Five years later, we're back to ground zero. That is where we are at.

You know, I can remember the testimony of Bobby Charles who ran INL. He came in here in 2004, and he gave very honest testimony. He was later told by a White House official that his testi-

mony about worsening conditions was inconvenient. Then, in September of 2004, he appeared before this particular Committee and related that it was getting worse. He was then told it was highly—he had become highly inconvenient. It would be nice to get the unvarnished truth once and for all, before it is too late. Before it is too late.

The War on Terror, we're losing the War on Terror. My colleague on the other side, we've been fortunate—you bet, we have been really lucky; but what we have done in terms of Afghanistan is unacceptable. We have created conditions for another safe haven for the training of future terrorists, future al-Qaeda affiliates—to imagine that there was hardly an outcry from the Administration about the pact between Pakistan and the pro-Taliban forces as if it didn't really amount to much. I mean, go ahead. What message is that sending?

Chairman HYDE. The gentleman's time has expired.

Mr. Sherman of California.

Mr. SHERMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would like to cover three issues. The first is Europe's failure to meet its responsibilities. We need to be more explicit. When Europe faced a problem, they couldn't even handle their own continental problem; and in Kosovo and in Bosnia, to this day, are our American soldiers, which we need elsewhere, obviously. The Europeans insist upon spending a very tiny percentage of their GDP on the combination of international aid and military defense. Their total GDP percentage spent on international and security affairs usually—in most cases is less than a third or a quarter of ours. In this case, they are free to disagree with us on Iraq and to disagree with the President and for him not to be popular, but for them to use that as an excuse to fail to do their part for a mission they have endorsed is something that the President should have called them on.

The second is drugs. We need to provide Afghan farmers with an alternative. The other crops do not provide the same rate of return to those farmers. I believe we should explore arranging to pay above-market prices for the non-narcotic agricultural produce of opium-producing areas of Afghanistan. At a minimum, we could pay for the transportation of these non-narcotic agricultural goods to markets, whether they be domestic, in Afghanistan, or anywhere around the world. It will be a lot easier to convince an Afghan farmer to grow coffee or tea or whatever else can be exported if they are able to sell it not for the low price available in Afghanistan, but for the price that can be obtained when that produce reaches its ultimate market.

Finally, we should look at the Afghan situation from our national security perspective. Unfortunately, we are not going to be able to deprive terrorists of some degree of sanctuary somewhere in the world. There will always be an apartment where terrorists can gather and talk. What Afghanistan provided under the Taliban was a chance to do it out in the open, involving hundreds and thousands of acres in broad daylight, with military training. So it essential to our national security that nowhere in Afghanistan are they able to do something that terrorists could not do without us

seeing them—in Sudan, Somalia, the Hezbollah areas of Lebanon, and dozens of other places where terrorists could meet.

Chairman HYDE. The gentleman's time has expired.

Mr. Meeks of New York.

Mr. MEEKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I again thank you for calling this hearing.

You know, it seems to be clear from what I have heard, at least on this side of the aisle, that the focal point on the War on Terror clearly is Afghanistan. It was from the beginning, and it continues to be today. How we went into Iraq and why we went into Iraq when they had nothing to do with those who attacked us is puzzling.

Now, I, being a Member from New York, am greatly appreciative particularly of the fact that we have not been attacked in 5 years. But for most New Yorkers that is no relief, to say that all is well, for we know all too well that we were attacked first in 1992, and it was some almost 10 years later before a second attack took place. And it appears as though—that these groups plan long range. They don't plan to do things 2, 3 years, or so closely apart, and so we have got some—there is a heck of lot of work to be done, and if the focal point is Afghanistan, or should have been Afghanistan, then we should have been putting the kind of people, the kind of soldiers, our military, in Afghanistan to combat terror.

It seems to me it would have been just why, when we went in to talk about fighting the War on Terror, that we were going to continue to have the moral—take the moral ground, as Mr. Paul has said, which we are losing rapidly. But if we had done it in Afghanistan and figured out how we could rope off the al-Qaeda and the Taliban, clearly dealing with the Pakistan and Afghanistan borders, which we didn't do, clearly having a more well-thought-out plan so that we could cut people off, then we would have had the true coalition of the willing at that particular point approaching every—virtually every country on this planet, as opposed to having the “coalition of the billing,” which we ended up with, with those who went into Iraq, with the exception of maybe Great Britain, who really said they would be part of the coalition if we gave them something. So, again, right there, we began to lose the moral high ground to truly fight the War on Terror.

Now, there would be an opportunity to gain that back. What is that opportunity? Let's go back to the focal point. The focal point is Afghanistan where opium is now feeding, again, the terrorists, and they are again in the open—training, et cetera—and whether it is Osama bin Laden or someone else that is organizing them there, we have got to make sure that we are standing strong.

You know, one of the most difficult votes that I have had since I have been a Member of this Congress was the war on Afghanistan—was the war in Iraq. No problem about voting for going to Afghanistan because there was a clear connection, that was clear to me, that that was, in fact, the focal point. And I would not have had a problem going into Iraq if there had been any indication that Iraq was involved with what took place on 9/11 and the terrorist attacks here in the United States of America.

Chairman HYDE. The gentleman's time has expired.

Dr. Antonio Maria Costa was appointed Executive Director of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime and

Director General of the United Nations Office in Vienna in May 2002. He holds the rank of Under Secretary-General of the United Nations. Mr. Costa holds a Ph.D. in economics from the University of California at Berkeley.

Present today are members of the Colombian National Police Team that visited Afghanistan, at my request, this past summer.

We welcome the following officials from the Colombian Anti-Narcotics Police Force: a lieutenant colonel who is commander of the Interdiction group, a major who is the director for International Relations, and a pilot who flies surveillance planes.

Dr. Barnett Rubin served as Special Advisor to the former UN Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Afghanistan, Lakhdar Brahimi, during the negotiations that produced the Bonn Agreement, which Dr. Rubin helped to draft. He is now Director of Studies and Senior Fellow at the Center on International Cooperation at New York University. He is also the author of many books and articles on Afghanistan.

Thank you for joining us today from far and wide, and thanks for your patience—it borders on the saintly—but it is important that everyone express themselves on this critical issue. And so, Dr. Costa, if you could confine your remarks to about 5 minutes, we will put your full statement in the record. Thank you, Dr. Costa.

STATEMENT OF ANTONIO MARIA COSTA, PH.D., EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, UNITED NATIONS OFFICE OF DRUGS AND CRIME

Mr. COSTA. Mr. Chairman, distinguished Members of Congress, 5 years after the collapse of the Taliban, the news I bring from Afghanistan is not good. The drug situation there is out of control. My office has produced a report—this is just a summary—estimating the cultivation, as it was recognized earlier, to an unprecedented 165,000 hectares. Afghanistan is now virtually the sole provider of opium to the world, and I remind you all that there are 13 million people addicted to Afghan opium in the world. The production is actually over 6,000 tons—it is represented visually in the histogram, this is a modern-day record, we have to go back to China over 100 years ago to find a greater amount of production—with a street value of \$52 billion. This is a massive windfall for organized crime insurgents/terrorists, and it is a major health risk. We estimate it at over 100,000 to overdoses due to Afghanistan this year.

Opium has become Afghanistan's largest employer, largest income generator, largest source of capital, largest export. As it was recognized earlier, including by you, Mr. Chairman, Afghanistan is a narco-economy by all standards. Today, it is also in big risk of becoming a narco-state, not only a narco-economy, a country where drugs undermine power, rot society, and fund terrorism.

There is no rule of law in Afghanistan. There is a rule of the bullet in the south and a rule of the bribe everywhere else in the country. Last December, President Karzai warned, "either Afghanistan destroys opium or opium will destroy Afghanistan." Well, we are coming dangerously close to this second option. How is this possible? Well, because, in the southern provinces—I am referring to

Kandahar, which I visited last week, Uruzgan, Hilmand—drugs and insurgency feed off of one another. Instability enables opium growers and traffickers to prosper, and opium trade funds insurgency.

So how can we deal with this real and present danger for Afghanistan and for ourselves? First, better and stronger security. Counternarcotics and counterinsurgency are two fronts of the same war.

NATO troops will be given a mandate and a means to help the Afghan Army to fight both the war against the Taliban and the opium trade, to destroy the heroin labs, disband the opium bazaars—open as they are—attack the opium convoys and bring to justice the big traders.

Reference was made in earlier statements to the farmers. Well, second, we need to make farmers think twice before planting opium this autumn. At the moment, Afghan farmers gain high rewards and face no risks. We need to address this risk/reward imbalance, using both the carrot of development assistance but also the stick of eradication and law enforcement.

Third, Afghanistan needs more development assistance. It was mentioned earlier. Mass poverty makes Afghanistan farmers vulnerable to political extremists and to opium planting. Aid money needs to increase in size, flow faster, with lower overhead cost. I believe in fighting drug cultivation, first and foremost, with the instruments of sustainable livelihood and economic development. And I am talking about the farmers, not the traffickers; but aid, whether in the form of roads or irrigation, could be used to grow more opium. We are aware of that.

Therefore, as a fourth point, I believe that drugs and integrity conditions should be inserted into aid programs. I plea for the insertion of a double “no drug/no corruption” pledge in aid programs, which will inspire the fund recipients, the farmers, and the fund providers, the western taxpayers, at a time when they are both understandably frustrated.

Fifth, the Afghan Government needs to get tougher in terms of opposing corruption: arrest traffickers, arrest the opium-farming landlords and seize their assets. This has been working quite well in Colombia. It should work in Afghanistan. We have trained police and prosecutors. We have constructed courthouses. We have constructed detention centers. Now the government has the obligation to use this judicial system to reimpose the rule of law and to establish confidence in the Administration.

This is a proposal I would like to launch. Why not establish an internationally agreed most-wanted list of major traffickers and extradite them? It is also working in Colombia.

Finally, I believe that foreign pressures are making Afghanistan the turf for proxy wars. The country is being destabilized by an inflow of insurgents, in weapons, in money, and in intelligence. There is collusion from neighboring countries, and this is a problem in itself.

Distinguished Members of Congress, we must also look for solutions at home for the current crisis in Afghanistan. Our heroin addicts are funding the war that is killing Afghan civilians, Afghan soldiers, and NATO troops. We fear that there will be a very major

increase in overdoses because of the higher-purity heroin doses due to this oversupply from Afghanistan.

In conclusion, I am afraid, as I did not add, Mr. Chairman, much to what you and the Ranking Member here, Mr. Lantos, have already stated at the beginning and the other Members of this Committee, it is my belief that if we do not act swiftly, a year from now we can have another similar hearing here, 10 years after September 11, on the topic—the topic would be “Who Lost Afghanistan and Why?”

Thank you for your attention. I stand prepared to answer your questions.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Costa follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ANTONIO MARIA COSTA, PH.D., EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR,
UNITED NATIONS OFFICE OF DRUGS AND CRIME

Mr. Chairman,
Distinguished Members of the Congress,
It is an honour and pleasure to brief this Committee meeting.
The news that I bring is not good.

As you have probably heard from media reports on the UNODC *Afghanistan Opium Survey*, this year opium cultivation in Afghanistan rose 59 percent to a staggering 165,000 hectares. Afghanistan is now virtually the sole provider of opium with 92 percent of the world market (figures 1 and 2).

The yield from this harvest is 6,100 tons of opium, a modern day record (fig. 3). We estimate that over 600 tons of heroin will flood the world market with a potential street value of well over \$50 billion. That's a massive windfall for organized crime, insurgents and terrorists. And it is a major health risk as the number of deaths from drug overdoses around the world is now likely to exceed the 100,000 victims a year of the recent past.

Opium has become Afghanistan's largest employer, income-generator and source of capital—as well as its biggest export: in simple words, Afghanistan is a *narco-economy*, with over half of its national income due to drugs. Now Afghanistan is in danger of becoming a *narco-state*, where drugs determine power, rot society and fund terrorism. There is no rule of law in Afghanistan: in the south the insurgents' bullets rule, while everywhere else is the rule of the bribe.

Last December President Karzai warned: *either Afghanistan destroys opium or opium will destroy Afghanistan*. We are coming dangerously close to this second option. If you look at the map showing main cultivation areas (fig. 4), you will see that Hilmand province in the South had 69,000 hectares of poppy fields this year—almost half of all opium grown in Afghanistan, for an extraordinary 160% increase over 2005.

It is no coincidence that if you look at the security map (fig. 5), you see the same southern region as most affected. In the provinces of Kandahar, Uruzgan and Hilmand drugs and insurgency feed off of each other: instability enables opium growers and traffickers to prosper, while the opium trade funds insurgency.

The other problem area is in the north-east, in Badakhshan, where the opium crop has increased greatly thanks to corrupt officials and powerful warlords who operate outside the control of the central government. We are working on additional maps to show the most corrupt provinces of Afghanistan as well the regions where warlords prevail. I am quite sure that we will be able to show an overlap between regions rich in opium and those that are corrupt in governance or controlled by private armies.

How can we deal with such a real and present danger?

First, *there needs to be an improvement in security and the rule of law*. This must include destroying the opium trade. The Afghan army and NATO cannot allow opium traffickers to operate with impunity. The opium money is being used to pay for arms and fighters for the insurgency. Counter-narcotics and counter-insurgency are two fronts of the same war. NATO troops should be given the mandate and means to help the Afghan army fight the opium trade: to destroy the heroin labs, disband the opium bazaars, attack the opium convoys and bring to justice the big traders.

What about the farmers?

Second, *we need to make farmers think twice before planting opium this autumn*. At the moment Afghan opium farmers gain high rewards and face almost no risk

(figures 6 and 7). We need to redress this risk/reward imbalance, using the carrot of development assistance and the stick of eradication. The goal should be to double the number of opium-free provinces next year, and double them again in 2008. I caution that NATO forces should not become involved in eradication: Afghan farmers are a political and social issue.

Third, Afghanistan *needs more development assistance*. Throughout Afghanistan, mass poverty makes farmers vulnerable both to political extremists and to the temptation of planting opium. Farmers can make 1–2 dollars a day through an honest job. They can make 4–5 dollars a day during the opium harvest, or 8–10 dollars as foot soldiers for the Taliban. Aid money needs to increase in size and flow faster, with lower overhead costs. Rural Afghanistan needs roads, irrigation, electricity, education, micro-credits and markets for farmers' products. I believe in fighting drug cultivation first and foremost with the instruments of sustainable livelihood and economic development: recent decisions by the World Bank in this regard are most welcome.

But aid—whether in the form of roads or of irrigation—should not be used to grow more opium. Therefore, as a fourth point, *drug and integrity conditions should be inserted into aid programs*. The more vigorously district and provincial leaders commit themselves to activities free of opium and to governance free of corruption, the more they deserve generous development assistance. Insertion of such a double *no drug / no corruption pledge* in aid programs will inspire both fund recipients (the farmers) and fund providers (western taxpayers) at a time when they are both understandably frustrated.

Fifth, it is time for the Afghan Government to take *tougher action to root out corruption*, arrest major drug traffickers and opium-farming landlords, and seize their assets. We have trained police and prosecutors, we have constructed court houses and detention centers. Now the government has the obligation to use the judicial system, infant as it is, to impose the rule of law and re-establish confidence in the central government. The one hundred beds at the new maximum-security prison at Pul-i-Charki (near Kabul) should be filled up as soon as possible with major traffickers and corrupt officials. Why not establish an internationally agreed most wanted list of major traffickers, and extradite them? Such measures have been effective in other contexts, proving to be a deterrent. They would also restore public confidence in a badly shaken government.

Finally, I note that *foreign pressures are making Afghanistan the turf for proxy wars*. Because of its uncontrolled borders, Afghanistan is being destabilized by an inflow of insurgents, weapons, money and intelligence. Thousands of tons of chemical precursors (needed to produce heroin) are smuggled into the country as similar amounts of opium are smuggled out (see fig. 8). Clearly, there is collusion and this is a problem in itself.

Distinguished Members of Congress,

We must also look at home for solutions to the current crisis and for ways to save lives. Coalition nations assisting Afghanistan are also *the biggest consumers of its heroin*. Heroin addicts in rich Western states are partly funding the war that is killing Afghan civilians and NATO troops. Experience shows that massive over-supply of heroin (as in 2004) does not lead to lower prices but to higher-purity heroin doses: this year more people will die from heroin overdoses in the West than as a result of violence in Afghanistan. I intend to alert health officials of this pending tragedy, avoidable to an extent if more is done to prevent and treat drug abuse.

In conclusion, we have a shared responsibility to help Afghanistan out of this crisis. If we do not act swiftly and effectively, I can imagine the subject of a future, similar Congressional hearing: *who lost Afghanistan?*

Thank you for your attention. I stand prepared to answer your questions.




UNITED NATIONS
Office on Drugs and Crime

The Opium Situation in Afghanistan
2006 Annual Opium Poppy Survey

20 September 2006




Opium cultivation in Afghanistan




Global opium production

Afghanistan = virtual sole provider







Opium production in Afghanistan




Opium cultivation in Afghanistan in 2006




Security and opium cultivation changes in 2006



Reasons for opium cultivation in 2006*




Reasons for stopping opium cultivation in 2006*



*Based on information from farmers in 1554 villages



Drug Trafficking Routes out of Afghanistan






UNITED NATIONS
Office on Drugs and Crime


*The US contribution to UNODC
for work in Afghanistan*

Contributions to Afghanistan Programme: total US\$ 48.25 M*




*Ongoing and completed projects. Timeframe 2002-2006

US 2003-2006 contributions to UNODC and the Afghanistan Programme (as at 15 September 2006)



Proportion of the US\$117.3 M in US funding to projects that is being implemented in Afghanistan in 2006 – US\$3.24 million (2.8%)



Thematic Distribution:

- 77% to Counter Narcotics Enforcement (US\$2.49 million)
- 11% to Verification of Eradication of Illicit Opium Poppy Cultivation (US\$350,000)
- 3% to Drug Demand Reduction (US\$120,000)
- 9% to the Afghanistan Field Office budget (US\$280,000)

Mr. ROHRABACHER [presiding]. Thank you very much. We will have some questions for you after we have heard from our other witnesses.

Colonel, you may proceed. If I could suggest that you go to the heart of the matter and use about 5 minutes, it will then permit us to have an exchange of ideas afterwards, so we would appreciate your concise testimony. Thank you very much, Colonel.

[The following testimony was delivered through an interpreter.]

STATEMENT OF LIEUTENANT COLONEL OSCAR ATEHORTUA DUQUE, CHIEF, ANTINARCOTICS INTERDICTION, COLOMBIAN NATIONAL POLICE

Colonel ATEHORTUA. First of all, I want to thank all the Members from the Congress and distinguished Congressmen for inviting us here. First of all, I want to thank you for inviting us here, and I also want—I wanted to thank the United States Embassy and the British Embassy for funding our support in our trip to Kabul.

Our objective of our trip in July to Kabul was to exchange our experience in Colombia in the fight against drugs with the Afghan Government, doing emphasis in the operations that we do against the narcotic trafficking and prevention, interdiction, eradication of poppy cultivations, and planning operations.

Also on our trip, we went to Kabul and to the Jalalabad city. We have the opportunity to do some recommendations to the authorities in the fight against drugs in Afghanistan especially on three topics:

First, we are going to send some instructors from our Colombian National Police to Kabul to help them in the training and help them in the planning and operations. In that way, they can see and they can use our—the interdiction plan that we have in Colombia and how we are using it; and also they can be in the field, and they can help them in the planning of the operation and help them to do their interdiction operations. Also, they're going to help them to select some people from their Interdiction Unit so they can go to Colombia and be trained for us.

Our second recommendation is to select five people from their Interdiction Unit to go to Colombia in order to be trained. So they can visit us, they can train us, and they can see how we plan our operations.

We also sought the need from the commander of the airport, the International Kabul Airport, to come down to Colombia to see how we deal with the airports, how we profile the people that goes through the airports so they can see our techniques, how we control the people that goes through the airports. Also, they can see our techniques on how we profile the people that goes through the airports so we can stop the drugs from coming out through the airports. It can help them to improve their operations and the activities they are doing against drugs in Afghanistan.


Thank you.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Colonel, thank you very much, and we appreciate your goodwill and your cooperation with our authorities in our Government and appreciate the battle that you have carried on in your country. So we want to thank you for being with us here, but also for the work that you have done to try to get control of

this major threat in your life. So thank you very much for all you have done, as well as your testimony.

[The prepared statement of Colonel Atehortua follows:]

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**SPECIAL COMMISSION OF ANTINARCOTICS DIRECTORATE - COLOMBIAN
NATIONAL POLICE TO ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN**

KABUL AFGHANISTAN, July - 2006

**COLOMBIAN NATIONAL POLICE
ANTINARCOTICS DIRECTORATE
AFGHANISTAN REPORT**

Kabul, August 2, 2006

REF: Report

ANTECEDENTS:

References:

1. Invitation from General MOHAMMED DAUD DAUD, Vice-minister of Interior for Antinarcotics of Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, August 27, 2005 to General LUIS ALBERTO GOMEZ HEREDIA, Antinarcotics Directorate, Colombian National Police, Colonel YAMILK MORENO, Deputy Director, and Major RAUL FERNANDO LOPEZ, International Liaison Officer, to visit the Afghanistan Antinarcotics Units.
2. Coordination conducted by Colombian Ambassador to the United Nations in Vienna General ROSSO JOSE SERRANO CADENA to organize an information exchange between the Afghan and Colombian antinarcotics units .
3. Letter from JULIE G. CONNOR, Director Narcotics Affairs Section (NAS), US Embassy Bogota., November 21, 2005, inviting Colombian Police Antinarcotics Directorate Officers to Afghanistan to share their experiences in combating illicit crops and drug trafficking.
4. The Colombian National Police Director and the US and UK Embassies in Bogota agreed to establish visit dates for time frame July 18 to August 05, 2006.

**COLOMBIAN NATIONAL POLICE
ANTINARCOTICS DIRECTORATE
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DELEGATION:

COLOMBIAN NATIONAL POLICE

Lieutenant Colonel OSCAR ATEHORTUA DUQUE
Chief, Antinarcotics Interdiction

Major RAUL FERNANDO LOPEZ CASTAÑO
Chief, Antinarcotics International Liaison Office

Captain EMILSE JANNETH GARCIA CUBILLOS
Antinarcotics Helicopter Pilot

Seargent. ALEX ALBERTO SILVA RIVEROS
Chief Instructor, Antinarcotics Training Center

US EMBASSY BOGOTA:

KEVIN HIGGINS
Advisor, Antinarcotics Airmobile Companies, Narcotics Affairs Section (NAS), US
Embassy Bogota.

ITINERARY:

July 18, 2006, Bogotá - New York – London

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July 23, 2006, London – Dubai.

July 24, 2006, Dubai – Kabul.

August 02, 2006, Kabul – Dubai

August 03, 2006, Dubai – London

August 04, 2006, London – New York.

August 05, 2006, New York – Bogotá.

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EVENTS:

LONDON (UNITED KINGDOM):

July 19, 2006: Arrive London. Visit the Office of International Affairs and Trade, UK Foreign Ministry. UK Foreign Ministry provided Afghan visas for the Delegation.

July 20, 2006: Meeting with Strategic Planning and Joint Intelligence Center, Department of Defence, United Kingdom. Miss CLAUDIA SPAWLS, International Affairs, UK Department Defense set up meeting with UK officials who provided updates on Afghanistan. Also in attendance were Colonel Carlos VARGAS RINCON, Colombian National Police Attaché in London and UK Army Colonel Mark Ridley, Defense Attaché UK Embassy, Bogota.

Visit to the English Parliament, House of Commons. Delegation observed floor debate on Lebanon crisis.

Meeting with Mr. Alfonso Lopez Caballero, Colombian Ambassador to the UK at the Ambassador's Reception celebrating Colombian Independence Day.

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July 21, 2006: Meeting with Serious Organized Crime Agency (SOCA), UK Foreign Ministry. Briefings included an overview on Afghan antinarcotics units, the UK sponsored Afghan prison program, and the Justice Sector Reform program. LTC Atehortua gave an overview of the current situation in Colombia to the UK Foreign Ministry Colombian and South American Desk Officers.



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July 24, 2006: Arrive Kabul. US Embassy Kabul personnel receive delegation. US Embassy Kabul provides overview of Afghanistan programs and review the visit schedule.

July 25, 2006: Meeting with Afghanistan Antinarcotics Minister, HABIBULLAH QADERI, to discuss purpose of visit.

Meeting with General MOHAMMED DAUD DAUD, Vice-minister of Antinarcotics, Afghanistan. Provided a Colombia briefing to the key Generals and Commanders of the various Afghan antinarcotics units.

The following topics were discussed:

1. Drug trafficking Situation in Colombia
2. Colombian Government policies in fight against drug trafficking
3. Colombian National Police Strategy - Antinarcotics Directorate:
 - a. Prevention.
 - b. Eradication
 - c. Interdiction.
 - d. Results 2005 – 2006
4. Discussion and answers to questions

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Meeting with General SAYED KAMAL SADAAT, Afghanistan Antinarcotics Director. General Sadaat provided an overview on his unit's organization, mission and operational results. The Colombian delegation amplified points made in the earlier presentation.

July 26, 2006: Conducted DEA King Air fixed wing over flight of Afghanistan, flying along the China, Pakistan and Tajikistan border areas. , Trafficking routes, poppy cultivations and likely heroin lab areas were observed. Visited the US Army 7th Special Forces Group compound in Jalalabad.

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July 27, 2006: Visit to new Maximum Security Penitentiary of Afghanistan. This prison is designed to house drug criminals.

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The Delegation provided the Colombia overview brief to the DEA FAST members and the Blackwater Trainers assigned to the National Interdiction Unit (NIU) Afghanistan.

July 28, 2006: Social event with Vice Minister of Interior for Antinarcotics, General MOHAMMED DAUD DAUD and other key staff.

July 29, 2006: Meeting with General MOHAMMAD ASIF JABARKHEL, National Interdiction Unit (NIU) Commander.

The delegation provided the Colombia Overview brief to the Afghanistan National Interdiction Units (N.I.U), groups 1 and 3.

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Working Lunch with General MIR ABDUL RAZAQ AMIRI, Commanding General of the Afghanistan Eradication Force. Discussed manual eradication techniques used in Colombia.

July 30, 2006: Provided Colombia Overview briefing to key members of the UK Embassy, Kabul. Group was headed by ALISTAIR CORBETT, Narcotics Affairs Section, UK Embassy, Kabul.

Conducted helicopter over flight of Bagram Valley in INL Air Wing UH-1H helicopters. The helos over flew poppy growing regions and possible heroin lab locations.

Visit to General AMINULLAH, Border Police Commander, Kabul International Airport. We discussed airport security procedures and methods for identifying drug traffickers. General AMINULLAH discussed the possibility of conducting a visit to Colombia to observe Colombia airport procedures.

July 31, 2006: Delegation provided the Colombia Overview brief to Afghanistan Interdiction Units (N.I.U), groups 2 and 4.

Captain EMILSE JANNETH GARCIA CUBILLOS met with the 12 female members of the Afghan National Interdiction Unit. During the working lunch, CPT Janneth discussed the role of women in the Colombian National Police.



August 01, 2006: Conducted out brief of the visit with Afghan Antinarcotics Minister



HABIBULLAH QADERI. We summarized our activities and observations.

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We held a joint press conference with Vice Minister HABIBULLAH QADERI. This conference was conducted in front of 16 print and TV journalists, local, national, and international. The meeting was conducted in three languages (SPANISH - ENGLISH - DARI).

Met with Ambassador Neumann, US Embassy, Kabul. We provided an overview of our activities and observations and discussed the road ahead and possible future exchanges between Colombia and Afghanistan.

The Delegation recommended the following:

- 1) **November 1 thru Dec 15, 2006.** Send two Jungla Instructors to Afghanistan to work alongside the US training cadre at the Afghan National Interdiction Unit (NIU) training school in Kabul. The Jungla Instructors will review the NIU Program of Instruction and NIU operational and training methods and offer suggestions for improvement. These two Jungla Instructors will also conduct the selection, assessment, and preparation of the five Afghan NIU members that will attend the Colombian Jungla Comando Course (February 15 thru May 15 2007).
- 2) **February 15 thru May 15, 2007.** Send five members of the Afghan National Interdiction Unit (NIU) to the 18-week Colombian Jungla Comando Course in Espinal, Colombia. The Colombian Jungla Course, founded in 1989, trains future members of the Colombian Antinarcotics Police Airmobile Interdiction Companies. The three airmobile companies (Bogota, Santa Marta, and Tulua) have enjoyed great success in conducting high risk operations against HVTs operations and Cocaine HCL labs. The Afghan NIU has a similar mission. The five Afghan NIU members will be able to share this professional development experience with their fellow team members upon return to Kabul. A US Army 7th Special Forces Group soldier (with Afghan experience) will help sponsor and interpret for the Afghans. Should this exchange be successful, consideration should be given to sending additional Afghans to follow-on courses (Medical Course, Sapper Course, and Intelligence Course).

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3) **February 15 thru March 1, 2007.** Invite the Kabul International Airport Commander and staff to Colombia to see DIRAN's airport interdiction program. The Kabul International Airport (KIA) inspection program is in its infancy. The KIA police have enjoyed some early successes in interdicting "mulas" transporting heroin. The Colombian delegation felt that the Afghan efficiency would further improve if they could see the Colombian methods and procedures.

DEVELOPMENT VISIT:

LONDON (UNITED KINGDOM):

August 03, 2006: Conducted an AAR with SOCA, UK Foreign Ministry.

LTC OSCAR ATEHORTUA DUQUE
Operative Chief - Antinarcotics Directorate
Colombian National Police

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Dr. Rubin, again, if you could be concise and leave it down to 5 minutes, we will have some time for some questions.

STATEMENT OF BARNETT R. RUBIN, PH.D., DIRECTOR OF STUDIES AND SENIOR FELLOW, CENTER ON INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION, NEW YORK UNIVERSITY

Mr. RUBIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

First, I am sorry Representative Hyde left. I hope that you will convey to him my appreciation also for all he has done on this Committee over the years to keep attention on this issue. We have all appreciated it a great deal.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. He will get that message, I can assure you.

Mr. RUBIN. Thank you very much, and thank you for unanimous consent to enter my statement into the record. I will focus mainly on issues that have not been addressed that much thus far. I think that there has been a very full accounting of the problems in our policy, so if I do not focus on certain issues, it is not because I do not think that they are important, but because I wish to fill in certain gaps in what we have discussed so far.

Six weeks ago, I returned from my 26th trip to Afghanistan. Ten days ago, a friend of mine, whom I have known for 20 years, was assassinated by a suicide bomb in Gardez—that is Governor Taniwal—and there was an article that I wrote about that in the *Washington Post* Outlook section this past Sunday. I met with him in his office in Gardez on August 5th, and that article reflects that.

As many of the speakers have said, all trends are moving in the wrong direction. I would like to add, from my interviews with people in Afghanistan around the region, including elders from 10 provinces, that there is a universal belief in the region and in Afghanistan that success in Afghanistan is not a high priority for the United States, and people cite in this the amount of our funding, the level of our troop presence, the invasion of Iraq, and many other things that we have been doing. When people in the region believe that that success in Afghanistan is not a high priority for the United States, they make arrangements to protect their interests in the absence of the United States. Therefore, they keep their clients on the ready, and they prepare to fill what they believe will be a power vacuum. And in a way, that is the fundamental cause of the things that are going wrong in Afghanistan.

Now, the subject of the hearing is not only narcotics but, as it was conveyed to me, the situation in Afghanistan in general. A very good article in the *New York Times* today pointed out that basic security is necessary. The insurgency is undermining that security. You cannot defeat an insurgency that has a safe haven. The center of global terrorism today is in Pakistan. It is not in Iraq. It is not in Lebanon. It is in Pakistan. That is why Pakistan cooperates with us so much, because al-Qaeda is in Pakistan, and the Taliban are also in Pakistan.

A week from today, there will be an extremely important meeting between President Bush—among President Bush, President Musharraf and President Karzai. I urge you to make your views known on this, because, while there are many failings, innumerable ones, of the Afghan administration—corruption and so on—

they cannot be corrected as long as the Taliban have a safe haven in Pakistan. There is a unanimous consensus among the security agencies and diplomats in Kabul from all countries, those friendly to us and those hostile to us, that the command center of the Taliban is a Sharia, or council, that sits in Quetta. It is not sitting in an inaccessible cave. It is sitting in the capital of the Balujistan Province of Pakistan. There is a consensus among all the military commanders and security people that Pakistan has done nothing to disrupt this command center of the Taliban. When we ask Pakistan about it, they say, disingenuously, "We don't have any information about them."

The fact that they have been supporting them, arming, organizing them for 20 years through their Secret Service which speaks the same language and lives with them, apparently is insufficient for them to understand what they are doing. This is not credible, and yet our Government continues to take this too much at face value as, Mr. Chairman, the Clinton Administration did before that. We need to bring out as much—to bring as much pressure to bear as we can on Pakistan. That is not sufficient, but it is necessary.

I would like to read to you a statement that was sent to me anonymously by a very senior western diplomat in Kabul a few days ago.

He says:

"Without the use of overwhelming diplomatic force by the U.S. President against President Musharraf, little progress can be expected. There need to be rapid arrests of the top 50 Taliban commanders in and around Quetta. Full stop. Anything less will not do. Pakistani protests that they lack the capacity are spurious. The Iran issue and Pakistani domestic politics argue against the U.S. using this big diplomatic stick, but we need it now. Otherwise, the slide will continue."

Pakistan, Mr. Chairman, is harboring terrorists. I thought we had a policy of no tolerance for that, but apparently we do not. Pakistan has already done all the things we accuse Iran of wanting to do, and yet we continue—now, I don't believe we should invade Pakistan; we should offer them a lot of assistance as well.

If you will indulge me for 30 seconds on narcotics, first, I want to commend Mr.—or, perhaps, Dr. Paul.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. We will be happy to indulge you for more than 30 seconds. You go right ahead.

Mr. RUBIN. Okay. Thank you, sir.

I want to commend Dr. Paul for, I think, a very rational statement. We should treat a medical problem as a medical problem, not as a criminal problem. We should not create the conditions that fund our enemies, which is, in my belief, what we do with our narcotics policy, as we do to some extent with our energy policy as well, and I hope that we can have more open discussion of that.

On drugs, we need to be clear. What is our objective in Afghanistan? Our objective is not to solve the world's drug problem in Afghanistan. It seems that because our law enforcement is not efficient to stop it in the United States, we thought we will solve it in Afghanistan where, of course, law enforcement is much more ef-

ficient. That is ridiculous. The goal in Afghanistan is to promote better governance of Afghanistan so it can be secure from terrorists and secure in the region.

Therefore, the problem in Afghanistan is not drugs, it is drug money. Today that drug money is largely under the control, by the way, of the Ministry of the Interior of Afghanistan. A lesser portion of it goes to the Taliban and other anti-government figures, and to administrators throughout Afghanistan.

At the moment, the perception is that our policy is to attack poor farmers and reward powerful traffickers who were among those that we funded and supplied in order to defeat the Taliban. We need to reverse that policy and help the farmers and isolate the traffickers.

I have much more in my written testimony, but I am interested in your questions, and I'll stop here.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Rubin follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF BARNETT R. RUBIN, PH.D., DIRECTOR OF STUDIES AND SENIOR FELLOW, CENTER ON INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION, NEW YORK UNIVERSITY

STILL OURS TO LOSE: AFGHANISTAN ON THE BRINK

Barnett R. Rubin, author of the Council on Foreign Relations Special Report, "Afghanistan's Uncertain Transition from Turmoil to Normalcy" (CSR no. 12, March 2006) visited Afghanistan from July 29 to August 8, in order to evaluate trends since the publication of that report. This update, based on interviews and other information collected during that trip and since then, provides his assessment of the current situation in Afghanistan. CIC's research on Afghanistan is supported by grants from the Open Society Institute and the governments of Norway and the UK, but all views are those of the author, not of these donors or of the Council on Foreign Relations.

"The pyramid of Afghanistan government's legitimacy should not be brought down due to our inefficiency in knowing the enemy, knowing ourselves and applying resources effectively."

Saleh, 2006.¹

In the past six months, a number of events have raised the stakes in Afghanistan and further threatened the international effort there. The handover of command from the US-led coalition to NATO means that Afghanistan is now not only the first battleground of the so-called "War on Terror," but a testing ground for the future of the Atlantic alliance. The Taliban-led insurgency based in Pakistan has shown new capabilities in the south and east, challenging both the US and NATO, while suicide bombings, unknown in Afghanistan before their successful use by the Iraqi insurgents, have sown terror in Kabul and other areas as well.² A particularly daring attack on a Coalition convoy killed 16 people, including two US soldiers, close to the US embassy in one of the most heavily defended areas of Kabul on September 8.

On May 29th in Kabul an accidental crash of a US military vehicle that killed an Afghan sparked a riot in which 17 people were killed. Rioters, who chanted slogans against the US, President Karzai, and foreigners in general, attacked NGOs, diplomatic residences, brothels, hotels and restaurants where they thought alcohol was served, media offices, businesses, and the parliament. These riots exposed the incapacity of the police, many of whom disappeared, and the vulnerability of the government to mass violence, even in the capital. This event exacerbated ethno-factional tensions within the governing elite, as the President accused opposition leaders of exploiting acts of violence by demonstrators largely from Panjshir, home of

¹A. Saleh, *Strategy of Insurgents and Terrorists in Afghanistan*, National Directorate of Security, Kabul Afghanistan, May 2006. I obtained a copy of this document from a U.S. source in Washington, D.C.

²Hekmat Karzai and Seth Jones, "How to curb suicide terrorism in Afghanistan," *Christian Science Monitor*, July 18, 2006.

the leading group of the Northern Alliance, charges that Panjsheri leaders denied.³ The riots showed violent opposition to the government and the US not from the Taliban but also from members a group that had led the resistance to the Taliban.

With many trends pointing in the wrong direction, it is time to rethink strategy and significantly increase both the level of resources available and the effectiveness of their use. As the largest troop contributor and aid donor, the US has to lead this transformation. For decades US policy makers of all administrations, however, have underestimated the stakes for the US and the world in Afghanistan, and they continue to do so today.

Contrary to the analysis of the Bush administration, whose response to September 11 wandered off to Iraq and dreams of a "New Middle East," the main center of global terrorism is in Pakistan, especially the Pakistan-Afghanistan border region. In the words of one military commander, "Until we transform the tribal belt, the US is at risk." Far from achieving this objective, in 2001 the US-led coalition pushed the core leadership of al-Qaida and the Taliban out of Afghanistan into Pakistan without a strategy for consolidating this tactical victory. Thereafter, while the Bush administration focused on unrelated or overblown threats elsewhere, it failed to provide those Taliban who did not want to fight for al-Qaida with a way back to Afghanistan, instead adopting a policy of incommunicado detention in Guantanamo, Bagram, and "black sites," making refuge in Pakistan a more attractive option. Drawing in part on such fugitives and in part on newly minted recruits from militant madrasas and training camps that continued to operate without impediment, the Taliban reconstituted their command structure, recruitment networks, and support bases in Pakistan, while Afghans waited in vain for the major reconstruction effort they expected to build their state and improve their lives. As a result, a cross-border insurgency is now exploiting the weaknesses of an impoverished society and an ineffective government to threaten the achievements of the last five years.

The frustration of those on the ground is palpable.

A Western diplomat who has been in Afghanistan for three years opened our meeting with an outburst: "I have never been so depressed. The insurgency is triumphant," he said, accusing the US and the entire international community in Afghanistan of "appeasement" of Pakistan, from where Taliban leaders direct the insurgency and terrorist attacks. "Things are looking very dark," wrote an Afghan-American woman who is risking her life working in one of the most dangerous areas of Southern Afghanistan, where the burgeoning opium trade supports insurgency, criminality, and lawlessness. An elder from Kunar Province in Eastern Afghanistan said that government efforts against the insurgency are weak because communities will not share information with the authorities: "The people don't trust any of the people in government offices." An unemployed engineer who lives in Kabul and an elder from the northern province of Baghlan echoed the sentiment: "The people have totally lost trust in the government," said the former; "the people have no hope for this government now," said the latter. "There is a big distance between the current system and Islamic virtues," said an elder from Paktia in Eastern Afghanistan, citing the bribery of judges.⁴

A former minister, now a leader in the parliament, commented, "The conditions in Afghanistan are ripe for fundamentalism. Our situation was not resolved before Iraq started. Iraq has not been resolved, and now there is fighting in Palestine and Lebanon. Then maybe Iran. . . . We pay the price for all of it." "So many people have left the country recently," recounted a UN official, "that the government has run out of passports." An elder from the southern province of Uruzgan, who had sheltered Hamid Karzai when he was working underground against the Taliban, told how he was later arrested by Americans who placed a hood on his head, whisked him away, and then released him. He shrugged off the indignity: "I understand that in this country if you do good, you will receive evil in return. This is our tradition." He added, however, "What we have realized is that the foreigners are not really helping us. We think that the foreigners do not want Afghanistan to be rebuilt."

Yet no one advocated giving up. The same elders who expressed frustration with the corruption of the government and its distance from the people also said, "We have been with the Taliban and have seen their cruelty. People don't want them back." Fruit traders from Qandahar who complained that "The Taliban beat us and ask for food, and then the government beats us for helping the Taliban," also said

³The accident occurred in Khairkhana, an area of Kabul largely populated by Tajiks from regions north of the capital.

⁴I would like to thank Hamed Wardak for organizing meetings with elders through his movement, Fidayin-i Sulh (Sacrificers for Peace). Wardak did not attend the meetings and bears no responsibility for the views expressed.

that President Karzai was the country's best leader in thirty years—a modest endorsement, given the competition, but still significant. One military leader opined, “My working assumption is that the international community needs to double its resources. We can't do it on the margins. We have no hedge against domestic and regional counter-forces.” But, he concluded, “It's still ours to lose.”

INTENSIFIED THREATS

With access to a safe haven for its leadership, training, supplies, funding, and recruitment in Pakistan, with additional funding from Arab donors in the Persian Gulf, the Taliban-led insurgency has increased its effectiveness and both broadened and deepened its presence. The government and international forces have prevailed in virtually all tactical engagements. The weakness of the government and the reconstruction effort, however, has often prevented consolidation of tactical gains, while the failure to deny the insurgency its safe haven in Pakistan has blocked strategic victory. The invasion of Iraq under false premises and the US's unstinting support for Israel's staggering reprisals against Lebanon have handed the insurgency additional propaganda victories, further weakening the US's allies in both Afghanistan and Pakistan. The increased tempo of suicide bombings and attacks on school buildings even outside the insurgency's main area of operation has spread insecurity into Kabul itself. One suicide bomber was stopped in Kabul by police during my visit; and a major attack on September 8 killed 16 people in the most secure area of the city.

The Taliban's recent offensives were partly responses to changes initiated by the international forces. The US-led Coalition has handed off command of the southern region of Afghanistan to NATO, which was already in charge in the north and west. The NATO force has deployed to areas, notably Helmand province, where the Coalition had neither ousted the Taliban nor made substantive efforts to stem the drug trade (Helmand now produces about half of the world's total supply of opium). The Taliban offensives in the south have aimed to press public opinion in the principal non-US NATO troop contributing countries (the UK, Canada, and the Netherlands) to force a withdrawal. This is NATO's first military operation, the success of which is essential to the future of the alliance; as one US official put it, “The failure of NATO in Afghanistan is not an option.”

The Taliban have increased the size of their units, their maneuverability, and their intelligence capabilities to establish a large and resilient presence in the rural areas of the south. The resiliency of their presence, the effectiveness of some of their institutions, and their ruthless retribution against those charged with collaboration has neutralized much of the population. They have established a parallel administration in some areas and they occasionally take control outlying districts. Though some of their officials (such as provincial governors) are based in Pakistan, people are increasingly patronizing Taliban courts, seen as more effective and fair than the corrupt official system.

International military officials in Afghanistan state that intelligence confirms that the Pakistani Directorate of Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) is providing aid to the Quetta shura (council), the main center of Taliban strategic command and control in Southern Afghanistan. Quetta is the capital of the province of Baluchistan, where Pakistani military dealt a blow to a Baluch ethnic nationalist insurgency and killed one of its key political leaders, the 79-year-old former Governor Nawab Akbar Bugti, while leaving the Taliban command center untouched.

In Kabul on September 7, General Musharraf virtually admitted these charges. According to the *New York Times*:

General Musharraf said that his government had rounded up Al Qaeda supporters in Pakistan's cities and had pursued foreign fighters in the frontier tribal areas, but he said the focus has now shifted to dealing with the Taliban. . . . “We have to see where their command structure is, who is their commander and we must destroy the command structure,” [said General Musharraf].⁵

Another Taliban shura, directing operations in eastern Afghanistan, is based in the Pakistani tribal agencies of North and South Waziristan. It has consolidated its alliance with Pakistani Taliban, as well as foreign jihadi fighters from Uzbekistan and elsewhere. Just one day before Musharraf's statement in Kabul, Pakistani authorities signed a peace deal with the local Taliban in North Waziristan. The Taliban are expected not to cross over into Afghanistan to attack US and Afghan forces and refrain from killing local tribal leaders, while the foreign militants

⁵ Carlotta Gall, “Pakistani Leader Admits Taliban Cross into Afghanistan,” *New York Times*, September 7, 2006.

(Uzbeks, Chechens, and Arabs affiliated with al-Qaida) are expected to either live peacefully or leave the region in peace. Within hours of the signing ceremony a legislator from the region told media that there never were any foreign militants in the region. In neighboring South Waziristan tribal district similar peace deals in 2004 empowered the Taliban to the extent that they now control the region. The agreement was widely perceived as a confession of failure by the Pakistani military that conceded the Taliban a haven in return for a face-saving agreement that will not be implemented.

Further north, veteran Islamist leader Gulbuddin Hikmatyar, a favorite of the ISI since 1973, operates from Peshawar and the Bajaur and Momand tribal agencies adjacent to northeast Afghanistan.

The insurgency cannot be explained solely by its sanctuary in Pakistan, but few insurgencies with safe havens abroad have ever been defeated.⁶ While bad governance and corruption are indeed rampant in southern and eastern Afghanistan, conditions are no better in northern and western Afghanistan, where poverty, narcotics, corruption, and criminality have bred insecurity and violent clashes over resources, but not an anti-government insurgency.

While ending foreign sanctuary for the Taliban is necessary, it will not be sufficient to stabilize Afghanistan. The state and economy need urgent reform and assistance. While no statistics are available, people in Kabul and throughout the country complain that crime is increasing, and that the police are the main criminals. The formation of the Afghan National Army, a professional force now approaching 35,000 men, has been one of the success stories of the past five years. One reason for the army's professionalism has been that nearly all infantry are fresh recruits. Many of the over 60,000 men who have been demobilized from militias have joined the police, private security firms, or organized crime, and sometimes all three. One former mujahidin commander who became a general in the ministry of the interior is widely reported (including by his former mujahidin colleagues) to be a major figure in organized crime, who was responsible for the murder of a cabinet minister in February 2002. He is also a partner in the local branch of a US-based firm, which provides many international offices with security guards, most of them fighters from this commander's militia and subsequently his employees in the Ministry of the Interior.

Researchers on narcotics trafficking report that, as commanders demobilized from the ministry of defense have found positions in the ministry of the interior, the latter became the main body providing protection to drug traffickers. Positions as police chief in poppy-producing district are sold to the highest bidder; the going rate was reported to be \$100,000 for a six-month appointment to a position with a salary of \$60 per month.

Such a corrupt police force, which also lacks training and basic equipment (batons, tear gas, water cannon, plastic shields, secure communications) utterly failed when confronted with a few hundred rioters. In combination with his continuing contention with the chairman of the lower house of parliament, Muhammad Yunus Qanuni, a major figure from the leading faction of the Northern Alliance whom the President Karzai suspected of exploiting the riots, the President appointed members of a rival Northern Alliance group to key police positions, including police chief of Kabul.⁷ In order to do so the president overrode the ranking of candidates based on merit that the new process of MOI reform required for high-level police appointees. He did so with the assent of US officials, who claim that they needed to gain approval of others on the list in order to improve security in insurgency-affected areas of the south and that they lacked information on the new appointees. President Karzai argues that he is forced into such unpalatable balancing acts because the international community failed for years to respond to his requests for adequate resources for the police. Whatever the reasons, many Afghans interpret the appointment of Amanullah Guzar as police chief of Kabul and Basir Salangi as police commander of Nangarhar as placing organized crime in charge of both the security of Kabul and the capital's key supply route from Pakistan.

Afghan traders and elders reported several kidnappings of rich businessmen or their sons, in some cases leading to the payment of large ransoms and in other cases ending in the murder of the captive. Most report that the kidnappers wore police uniforms and used vehicles with blackened windows like those used by officials. On

⁶ Seth Jones, Averting failure in Afghanistan, *Survival*, Spring 2006.

⁷ Some of the rioters, who appeared to be mainly from Panjsher, carried pictures of the late Ahmed Shah Massoud and chanted anti-Karzai slogans. Qanuni firmly denies any involvement and states that the rioters also tried to attack the parliament. The new appointees, while previously allied with Massoud, came from the Shamali plain between Panjsher and Kabul and assured Karzai of their loyalty during the riots.

August 24 robbers wearing police uniforms robbed a bank van of \$60,000 in cash within easy walking distance of the MOI headquarters in Central Kabul. Such incidents have led to the departure of Afghan investors, contributing to an economic slowdown that is aggravating unemployment and discontent.

One difference between Iraq and Afghanistan has been that, while Iraq has suffered an economic collapse as a result of the US invasion, Afghanistan averaged real non-drug annual growth rates over 15 percent. The country was so poor (the world's poorest country outside of sub-Saharan Africa) that the expenditures of foreign forces and organizations combined with the end of a drought, a relatively small amount of aid, and narcotics profits could power a recovery from a 23-year war.

But as a World Bank official put it, "It has not been reliable, sustainable growth." Afghans emphasized how unemployment feeds conflict: "Those Afghans who are fighting, it is all because of unemployment," said a fruit trader from Qandahar. And this year the bubble economy has been punctured. Real estate prices and rents are dropping in Kabul, and occupancy rates are down. Fruit and vegetable sellers report a decline in demand of about 20 percent. Construction workers and members of the building trades in Kabul reported a decline in employment, leading to a drop in wages by about 20 percent. A drought in some parts of the country has also led to displacement and a decline in agricultural employment, for which the record opium poppy crop only partially compensated.

A major economic issue that is aggravating relations between Afghans and the international community is the supply of electricity to Kabul. In the past five years no major power projects have been completed. A plan to bring power to Kabul from Central Asia is two to three years from completion. As the city's population expands toward five million (up from 2.3 million five years ago), Kabulis today have less electricity than they did five years ago. While foreigners and the rich power air conditioners, hot water heaters, high-speed internet, and satellite TV with private generators, average Kabulis are now ending a summer without fans, and fearing a winter without heaters.

For the past two years, Kabul got through the winter with power supplied by diesel generators, whose fuel was purchased by the US. This year the US made no such allocation, claiming that Afghanistan did not ask for it. Regardless of who is at fault, without the purchase of diesel Kabul will have even less power in the next two years than in the past.

The narcotics economy, however, is booming. According to the UN Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC), production of opium poppy with a record crop of 6,100 metric tons this year surpassed last year's by 49 percent, overtaking the previous record crop of 1999, before the Taliban ban.⁸ This massive increase in production belies the claims of progress made on the basis of a five percent decrease last year. The Taliban exploited the counter-productive policy of crop eradication pressed on an unwilling Afghan government by the US. They gained the support of farmers in Helmand and elsewhere by providing protection against eradication. As I have argued elsewhere, eradication before significant economic development is ineffective and counter-productive.⁹ While the Taliban protect small farmers and sharecroppers from eradication, not a single high government official has been prosecuted for drug-related corruption, though many known traffickers occupy high office.

RECOMMENDATIONS

For several years the US responded to President Karzai's repeated warnings about the Taliban's sanctuary in Pakistan by assuring him that Pakistan was cooperating, that public statements were counter-productive, and that the US would soon take care of the problem. Assurances that the US would soon mop up the "remnants" of the Taliban and al-Qa'ida have proved false. Nor did the US or others respond with adequate resources or programs to strengthen the Afghan state and its relations to the communities in a way that would make Afghanistan more resistant to the Taliban. President Karzai's strategy of temporizing with corrupt and abusive power-holders has also weakened the state building effort, but he claims he has had inadequate support and resources to undertake a stronger policy. New approaches and more resources are required on both fronts.

Ending Sanctuary in Pakistan

Western and Afghan officials differ over the extent to which Pakistan's aid to the Taliban is ordered or tolerated by the highest levels of the military, but they have

⁸Carlotta Gall, "Opium harvest at record level in Afghanistan," New York Times, September 2, 2006.

⁹Barnett R. Rubin, Road to Ruin—Afghanistan's booming opium industry, Center on International Cooperation and Center for American Progress, October 7, 2004

reached a consensus, in the words of one senior military leader, that Pakistani leaders “could disrupt the senior levels of [Taliban] command and control,” but that they do not do so. President Musharraf virtually admitted in Kabul that they had not even tried. Disruption of command and control is the key to strategic victory, not control over infiltration, a tactical issue to which Pakistan consistently tries to divert discussion. A recent agreement by Afghanistan and Pakistan to conduct joint patrols on the Durand Line (which Afghanistan does not recognize as a border) to combat infiltration may help build the relationship, but it will not end the sanctuary in Pakistan.¹⁰

The failure by Pakistan even to try to disrupt the Taliban’s command and control in Quetta is a major threat to international peace and security. But pressure to stop these activities is not enough. The Pakistani military’s alliance with Islamist militant groups is a response to perceived threats, a way of managing an outmoded border regime, and the basis of the domestic legitimacy of the state.

To confront the immediate threat requires serious pressure. The first condition for serious pressure is to convey a consistent message. There is no need to berate Pakistan in public, but US officials should at least stop congratulating Islamabad for something it has not done. CENTCOM Combatant Commander General John Abizaid, for instance, stated in Kabul on August 27 that he “absolutely does not believe” that Pakistan is helping the Taliban.¹¹

Efforts are already under way by the four troop contributors in Southern Afghanistan (the US, UK, the Netherlands, and Canada) and by NATO as a whole to devise a common *démarche*. This effort should be expanded to include Russia and China as well. The central message of this *démarche* should be that failure to take forceful action against the Taliban command in Baluchistan—at least as strong as the action taken against the Baluch ethnic insurgency, which led to the killing of former Governor Nawab Akbar Bugti—constitutes a threat to international peace and security as defined in the UN Charter. Pakistan, whose leaders seek parity with their rival, India, in part by acting as a full participant in the international community through contributions to UN peacekeeping operations and the fight against al-Qa’ida, will seek to avoid such a designation, with the various consequences that might flow from it. Pakistan should not benefit from US military assistance and international aid and debt relief while it fails even to try to dismantle the command structure of the Taliban.

Threats, explicit or implicit, are not enough. A realistic assessment of Pakistan’s role does not require moving Pakistan from the “with us” to the “against us” column in the War on Terror account books, but recognizing that Pakistan’s policy derives from its leaders’ perceptions, interests, and capabilities, not from ours. The haven and support the Taliban receive in Pakistan derive in part from the hostility that has characterized relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan for as long as both have existed. That hostility, in turn, is partly driven by century-long grievances of Afghanistan, the threat that Pakistan perceives from India, and the precarious nature of Pakistan’s national unity, especially the dissidence of the Pashtun and Baluch, which Afghanistan has often supported.¹²

The unified front that all major powers must show to Pakistan in opposition to its harboring of the Taliban command centers must be matched by offers to recognize the country’s international status in return for accountability for past nuclear proliferation, and to address its conflicts with its neighbors. The US, NATO, and others should encourage the Afghan government to initiate a dialogue over the domestically sensitive issue of recognition of the Durand Line between the countries as a border, in return for secure trade and transport corridors to Pakistani ports. Transforming the border region into a frontier of cooperation rather than conflict will require political reforms and development efforts in the tribal territories, which will require further assistance, but, to repeat one U.S. senior leader’s words, “Until we transform the tribal belt, the US is at risk.” The US should also weigh in with India and Afghanistan to assure that they make extra efforts to assure Pakistan that their bilateral relations will not threaten Islamabad.

Such a shift in US policy toward Pakistan requires a transformation from supporting President Musharraf to supporting democracy. Pakistan’s people have shown in all national elections that they support centrist parties, not the Islamist parties on which the military has relied. The killing of Nawab Akbar Bugti by the

¹⁰ Ron Synovitz, “Afghanistan: U.S. Reports ‘Breakthrough’ On Afghan-Pakistan Security Cooperation,” RFE/RL, August 25, 2006.

¹¹ Fisman Abrashi, “Abizaid; Pakistan not aiding Taliban,” The Associated Press, August 27, 2006.

¹² Rubin and Siddique, “Ending the Afghanistan-Pakistan Stalemate,” USIP Special Report, September 2006.

army has sparked revulsion throughout the political spectrum, weakening the military's position and strengthening calls within Pakistan to resolve internal and external disputes through political means, rather than violence. The reassertion of the civilian political center, as well as of Pakistan's business class, which is profiting from the reconstruction of Afghanistan, provides an opportunity to move beyond the US's history of reliance on military rulers toward a more stable relationship with a Pakistani nation moving toward peace with its neighbors and with itself.

Strengthening the State

Creating a reasonably effective state in Afghanistan is a long-term project that will also require an end to major armed conflict, economic development, and the gradual replacement of narcotics by other economic activities. Recent crises, however, have exposed internal weaknesses that require both long-term programs and transitional measures.

The two fatal weak points in Afghanistan's government today are the Ministry of the Interior and the judiciary. Both are pervaded by corruption and lack basic skills, equipment, and resources. Without effective and honest administrators, police, or judges, the state can do little to provide internal security.

Within the last year Coalition military forces have devised a plan for the thoroughgoing reform of the MOI. The Coalition estimates that this plan is three years behind the similar program for the Ministry of Defense, and that it will take at least a year before Afghans see any effects on the ground.

In Afghanistan the president and minister of interior appoint all administrative and police officials throughout the country. The Afghanistan Compact requires the government to establish by the end of September a mechanism to vet such appointments for competence and integrity. Finding competent people willing to risk their lives in a rural district for \$60–70 a month will remain difficult, but such a mechanism should help avoid appointments such as those hastily made in June.

Government officials have identified the biggest gap in the administration as the district level. Elders (community leaders) from over ten provinces agreed, repeatedly complaining that the government never consults them. Some ministers have proposed paying five to ten elders and ulama (learned clergy) in each district to act as the eyes and ears of government, to be brought to meet governors and the president, to have authority over small projects, and influence what is preached in the mosques. They estimate the cost of such a program at about \$5 million per year.

These leaders could also help recruit 200 young men from each district to serve as auxiliary police. They would receive basic police training and equipment to serve under a police commander who has gone through the reform process. Unlike militias, auxiliary policeman would be paid individually, and the commander would be a professional from outside the district. The elders would be answerable for their behavior.

Courts, too, may require some temporary auxiliary institutions. Community leaders complained constantly about judicial corruption. Many demanded the implementation of shari'a law, which they contrasted not to secular law, but to corruption. As an elder from Paktia said:

Islam says that if you find a thief, he has to be punished. If a murderer is arrested, he has to be tried and executed. In our country, if a murderer is put in prison, after six months he bribes the judge and escapes. If a member of parliament is killed, as in Laghman, his murderer is released after 3–4 months in prison because of bribery.

Lack of law enforcement undermines the basic legitimacy of the government. Enforcement by the government of the decisions of Islamic courts has always constituted a basic pillar of the state's legitimacy in Afghanistan, and failure to do so brands a government as un-Islamic.

The August 5 swearing in of a new Supreme Court, which administers the entire judicial system, will make judicial reform possible, but training a corps of prosecutors, judges, and defense lawyers will take years. The only capacities for dispute resolution and law enforcement that actually exist in much of the country consist of informal village or tribal councils and mullahs who administer a crude interpretation of shari'a. During the years required for reform, the only genuine alternatives before Afghan society will be enforcement of such customary or Islamic law, or no law. The Afghan government and its international supporters will therefore have to find transitional ways to incorporate such procedures into the legal system by recognizing them and subjecting them to judicial or administrative review. Such a program would also put more local Islamic leaders—over 1,200 of whom have been dropped from the government payroll this year—back under government supervision.

Attempts to inject aid into the government have met a major bottleneck: last year the government managed to spend only 44 percent of money it received for development projects. The Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development accounted for nearly half of the government's development spending, while key ministries like agriculture, energy and water, and public works could not execute their budgets. According to the Ministry of Finance, donor countries spent about \$500 million on poorly designed and uncoordinated technical assistance, to little effect. The World Bank is designing a facility that will enable the government to hire the technical advisors it needs, rather than trying to coordinate advisors sent by donors in accord with their own priorities and domestic constituencies. The US should support this initiative as well as a major crash program to increase the implementation capacity of line ministries.

The Economy and Narcotics

Afghanistan is the poorest country in the world except for a handful of countries in sub-Saharan Africa. Policy makers focusing on "killing terrorists" or "holding democratic elections" too often ignore this fundamental fact, which affects everything we try to do there. As numerous studies have documented over the years, Afghanistan has never received the investment of resources needed to stabilize it. International military commanders, who confront the results of this poverty every day, estimate that we need to "double" our resources. Doubling the economic resources going to Afghanistan would still leave it far behind Iraq, and such aid would be far more productive in Afghanistan. Major needs are accelerated road building, purchase of diesel for immediate power production, expansion of cross-border electricity purchase including deals with Pakistan for the south and east, investment in major water projects to improve the productivity of agriculture, development of the infrastructure needed for mineral exploitation, and a massive program of skills building for both the public and private sector.

Afghanistan desperately needs to take on the threat from its narcotics economy in a way consistent with its overall struggle for security and stability. US policy consisted first of aiding all commanders who fought the Taliban, regardless of their involvement in drug trafficking, and then, when the domestic war on drugs lobby raised the issue, to pressure the Afghan government to engage in crop eradication. To Afghans this policy looks like rewarding rich drug dealers and punishing poor farmers, a perception skillfully exploited by the Taliban.

The international drug control regime, which criminalizes narcotics, does not reduce drug use, but it does produce huge profits for criminals and the armed groups and corrupt officials who protect them. Our drug policy grants huge subsidies to our enemies. As long as we maintain our ideological commitment to a policy that funds our enemies, however, the second-best option in Afghanistan is to treat narcotics as a security and development issue. The total export value of opiates produced in Afghanistan has ranged in recent years from 30 to 50 percent of the legal economy. Such an industry cannot be abolished by law enforcement. The immediate priorities are massive rural development in both poppy-growing and non-poppy-growing areas, including roads and cold storage to make other products marketable; programs for employment creation through rural industries; and thoroughgoing reform of the ministry of the interior and other government agencies to root out the major figures involved with narcotics, regardless of political or family connections.

News of this year's record crop is likely to increase pressure from the US Congress for eradication, including aerial spraying. Such a program would be disastrously self-defeating. If we want to succeed in Afghanistan, we have to help the rural poor (which is almost everyone) and isolate the leading traffickers and the corrupt officials who support them.

IS THE GLASS HALF-FULL?

Some policy-makers and observers claim that critics of the effort in Afghanistan have excessive expectations and focus on challenges rather than achievements. They want to talk about how the glass is half-full, not half empty. As this analysis shows, the glass is much less than half full. In any case, it does not matter how full the glass is, if someone manages to tip it over or pull out the table on which it is resting.

The Afghan intelligence analysis quoted at the head of this report referred implicitly to the saying of Sun Tzu:

Know your enemy, know yourself;
One hundred battles, one hundred victories.

US policy makers have misjudged Afghanistan and misjudged Pakistan; most of all, they have misjudged their own capacity to carry out major strategic changes on

the cheap in an area they do not understand. While the Bush administration has sown war and strengthened Iran while claiming to create a "New Middle East," it has failed to transform the region where the global terrorist threat began and persists. If the US wants to succeed, we need to focus on this core task. To repeat once again: "Until we transform the tribal belt, the US is at risk."

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Well, thank you, Dr. Rubin, and thank you, Colonel, and Dr. Costa. We appreciate your very thought-provoking testimony. And I will say, Dr. Rubin, I think that you have presented us a real challenge, and it is a challenge that needs to be faced. And we will—I will indulge myself as—in the chair to take the first session of questions here.

Dr. Costa, let me note that Congresswoman McCollum made some very significant points, and I—points that I agree with—during her opening statement, concerning a lack of what appears to be a realistic strategy to try to end drug production in Afghanistan or at least get it under control and pointed out the lack of alternatives that—and lack of investment on the part of our Government to offering alternatives to Afghan farmers so that they can go and produce other crops that will not place drug money in the hands of the enemies of democracy.

Would you concur with that, with her observation that the United States has not had that commitment and made that investment, and that that is why we now have this nearly out-of-control situation with drugs in Afghanistan, Dr. Costa?

Mr. COSTA. Yes. My reaction to that is twofold.

First, generally speaking, if we compare the post-conflict assistance offered by all of the Coalition countries to Afghanistan, the numbers on a per-capita basis—Afghanistan is a large—24 million people—country. On a per-capita basis, Afghanistan has been receiving much less assistance than any of the other post-conflict situations that I am aware.

Point number two. Would this help the farmers? Certainly it would. The farmers are a political issue and a social issue. The farmers are among the poorest in Afghanistan, which is one of the poorest countries in the world. They succumb in terms of a level of inability to the temptation of producing something which is already market, as well as they succumb, especially in the south of the country, to the intimidation of the insurgents.

I think the instruments that are providing alternative developments—a number of Members of the Committee referred to that—is the long-term necessary instruments. In the short term, however, farmers should be reminded that cultivation of opium is against the law. It is against Islam. It is against the Constitution, and therefore, it is the right of the government to enforce eradication or other instruments which would also help in curtailing, in the shorter term, the cultivation.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Well, Turkey at one point eradicated its opium problem. I mean they—if I remember correctly, in the 1960's Turkey was the major source of opium, and yet today Turkey is not.

Were they able to do this simply by eradication and punishment, or did they have a positive alternative program for their opium farmers?

Mr. COSTA. The three countries which were able to eradicate—sorry—to put an end to the cultivation of opium. This happened in

the 1960s and the 1970s and the first part of the 1980s—Thailand took about 23 years. Pakistan took 14 years. Turkey, it took 11 years.

Recently, on day 6 of February this year, we announced that Laos is now opium free, and it has taken 10 years. In all cases, it has been a blend, a combination of eradication together with assistance of farmers. Depending on the economic condition of the country—Thailand had more assistance than eradication. Turkey at that time was a big recipient of aid, more assistance than eradication. Laos, more eradication than assistance.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Okay. So we haven't—let's just note that—and we have not as a country, nor as an alliance with other free countries, provided an alternative to poor Afghans in order to provide them an alternative to providing for their own families without going to drugs. That is number one.

Number two, in terms of the eradication effort itself, can you tell me why, after 3 years of being hammered by this Congressman, as well as several others in Congress, to at least go through the experiments and try to see what potential micro-herbicides would have in this battle, that we have not even gone through the testing yet of the micro-herbicide and the possibility that it could actually obliterate the entire opium production in Afghanistan in a very short time?

Why have we not looked at that alternative, or can you tell me that we have looked at it in an adequate way?

Mr. COSTA. As you know, because you visited us in Vienna a couple of times—

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Yes, I remember our conversations.

Mr. COSTA. And we had this conversation on a private basis. The eradication process has gained momentum in Afghanistan. Two years ago, the force of the eradication team was put in place. Last year—and they eradicated a very limited amount of land. Last year, 5,000 hectares were eradicated. This year, 2006, 15,000 hectares were eradicated. It is gaining momentum, but it is full of the policy of eradication the way—

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Now, let's see. You said eradication is gaining momentum. Yet, what was the increase of the opium per crop?

Mr. COSTA. Right.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. So that is meaningless. That is meaningless chatter. The bottom line is, if it does not result in a decrease in the opium crop and put people at work out in the field, it doesn't mean anything. I mean, we're not—this isn't a make-work situation for those people that we wanted some kind of result, and from what I understand from your testimony, they have a \$52 billion street value of these drugs?

Mr. COSTA. Worldwide.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Okay. Worldwide.

So have we decreased with our eradication program the number of billions of dollars that are now being poured into the hands of—and as Dr. Rubin points out, it is that \$52 billion that is the problem. It is not necessarily the poor farmers cultivating those crops.

Have we made a dent in it at all? No. Actually, it is increasing. So have we even looked in a way at this micro-herbicide, rather

than putting out these teams who are not doing—or who are not getting the job done?

Mr. COSTA. I respectfully—Congressman Rohrabacher.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Yes.

Mr. COSTA. The amount of eradication this year was about 10 percent of crop.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Okay.

Mr. COSTA. So it made an impact that—it probably had a very small impact. We believe that eradication, not as a subtraction of cultivated land, but as a deterrent for next crop at the time of planting, needs to reach a threshold anywhere, history tells us, between 20–30 percent. We are far away from that amount.

Regarding the micro-herbicides, it is a well-known instrument. It has not been used anywhere in the world. A micro-herbicide of sorts exists against coca plants. It has been developed for the opium plant. It is not that the—it has not met with the approval of the Government of Afghanistan.

On one fundamental—I would say it is a very valid concern that we do not know, and we would not know for many, many years, the environmental consequences of applying micro-herbicides as a form of—

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Have we proceeded—it is my understanding that we have not even proceeded with the testing of this herbicide, that it is—actually, there has been foot-dragging on the part—even to test whether it is effective.

Just for the record, let me note, so people wondering what this micro-herbicide is, that it is a naturally occurring substance that was discovered, I guess, in Uzbekistan, that can attack simply one plant—meaning the opium plant—and not have any impact on other plants, and that it poisons the ground, for that one plant only, for a 14-year period. And for 3 years we have been trying—some of us have been trying to get an adequate, at least, investigation into the potential of this as a means to cope with the opium problem;

And am I incorrect in that we have not even done the scientific testing yet or spent the money that was made available by the Congress to test the product? Am I inaccurate in that?

Mr. COSTA. Well, I would put it differently.

No, I cannot, obviously, claim that you are inaccurate. The micro-herbicide is a natural pathogen of the opium plant. It was developed, as you stated, in a lab in Uzbekistan, in a project which we have coordinated using other Coalition member countries' resources.

It has been tested, and you are right: It has no impact, at least in the first application of it. The longer-term application of it, I do not know, and that has been the major deterrent for the Government of Afghanistan.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. And what do you think the long-term effect of \$52 billion going into the hands of criminals and terrorists is going to be in the United States and the free world, not to mention the drug addicts that are out there? But I may have some sympathy for what my colleague from Texas has described as a strategy, and Dr. Rubin concurred with, in terms of trying to treat heroin addicts as patients rather than as criminals.

However, we know, and as Dr. Rubin has stated very clearly, it is the money that is the threat. And this micro-herbicide may have some long-term impact, but I will tell you, within 10 years, if we don't get control of this \$52 billion, all of Central Asia is going to be a crisis that makes the Afghanistan challenge look like a kid game. And let me just note—and we will move on to some other questions—that this Congressman who has followed this issue is totally dissatisfied with what has happened with—well, let me ask you this. Are we providing helicopters, for example, to the eradication teams in Afghanistan?

Mr. COSTA. I am sorry?

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Are there helicopters that we are providing, even to the eradication teams in Afghanistan?

Mr. COSTA. The eradication this year was mostly run by the provincial governors without the use of—

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Without the use of—we're not even giving them helicopters. And I would say that, for whatever reason, whether it is because of pressure from Pakistan—and a lot of this drug money goes into Pakistan.

Is that not the case, Dr. Rubin? There are huge amounts of—billions of dollars—

Mr. RUBIN. Yes.

Mr. ROHRABACHER [continuing]. Going into the hands of Pakistani—powerful people in Pakistan.

Mr. RUBIN. Yes. But in fairness, it goes in all directions from Afghanistan.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. All right. In all directions—to evil people in all directions.

We have dragged our feet long enough and, again, the testimony that we have heard from Dr. Rubin is on target, and we cannot drag our feet anymore, whether it is in micro-herbicides or providing helicopters or making sure that we hold the Pakistanis accountable. This Administration gets a big D on this; maybe not an F, because at least there is some indication they are trying. But this is—we are going to fail if we continue along this path.

Dr. Rubin, I have got to pass my—feel free to comment, and then I have got to pass on to Ms. McCollum for her chance to ask questions.

Mr. RUBIN. Just briefly, I do concur with Dr. Costa on the question about how to approach this issue. I will note the countries he mentioned took 11 to 23 years. And one very important point: Whatever program we want to implement for counternarcotics, we cannot implement it if there is not adequate security to send people there to carry it out. And at the moment, there is not, and this has very immense implications for how we conceive of our policy.

We focused our postwar efforts in Afghanistan on democratization; that is, on holding elections, adopting a Constitution. I was involved in all of those things. They are very good things. But those things are meaningless if people do not have basic security, if there isn't a basic administration and police that can carry out and enforce whatever laws are made democratically. And we have failed on that front. That should take precedence in this effort and in future efforts, and that will make this effort possible.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Well, I would agree with you, and I don't believe we will have that as long as we have billions of dollars going into the hands of people who are trying to undermine the effort to create security and the rule of law in Afghanistan. We have got to act boldly, as our friends in Colombia are doing, act boldly to attack the source of revenue of these terrorists, or not only Afghanistan is in danger, but all of Central Asia is in danger—and Pakistan as well, I might add. The good people in Pakistan who would like to have rule of law and democracy are going to be undermined by the radicals who are being financed by this drug money.

Ms. McCollum, you are free to proceed.

Ms. MCCOLLUM. Thank you.

Picking up on the security question—and this is to our testifiers from Colombia, and thank you very much for coming and for your testimony—it has been reported that several months ago, President Karzai appointed police commanders who have been said to be corrupt, committed human rights abuses and did not pass merit tests. And how can people move forward with security if they don't feel that the police force—and that is totally a new concept and a new idea, I understand, in Afghanistan, to actually have a police force.

So are the basics being done in a community not only to train the police force but to work with the community as to how police will work—in order to have success, the police need to have the trust and respect of the community. So it is kind of a full circle. To have security, you need police. In order to have police to be effective, people need to know that they can trust them and turn to them.

For Dr. Costa, you talked about donor fatigue, but one of the things I am concerned about is donor fatigue among foreign donors. To stay focused, to bring the dollars that are there, is for the Afghani people to really see that the international community is going to live up to the promise.

And then, Mr. Rubin, if you could expand a little more, I think for this Committee sometimes who get fixed in if we do everything militarily, if we do everything with force, the security will come. But how important it is to have the security of knowing that you can take your child to a doctor, who is very sick, the security of your drinking water, the security, if you are a business owner, that there will be electricity?

[The following testimony was delivered through an interpreter.]

Colonel ATEHORTUA. In Colombia, our policy constructs—

Ms. MCCOLLUM. Excuse us. We were doing some housekeeping up here so we didn't keep you unnecessarily, and it was—we did not mean to be rude in any way. Please accept my apology.

Colonel ATEHORTUA. In Colombia we have, of course, our fight against drugs and the corruption in our units.

In order to that—to prevent the corruption, we have a very good selection process of the units, the people that are going to come into our Interdiction Units, and the second process is giving them training so we are preventing them from being corrupted and from being killed.

We also have certain people that have been selected to be in the units. We have some controls over this unit, some counterintelligence, so we can prevent these people from being corrupted. And

also we have some laws that allow us to get—to retire these people that had been corrupted.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. But they don't put in jail the people. They just try to get them—to shove them aside rather than—good advice.

Mr. BURTON. Mr. Chairman, I have to leave, and I—if the gentleman would yield for just a second, I have some questions I would like to submit for the record.

Is it okay to do that?

Mr. ROHRABACHER. So ordered, and without objection.

Mr. BURTON. Okay. Thank you. I will submit some questions I would like to have answered for you.

[The information referred to follows:]

WRITTEN RESPONSE FROM ANTONIO MARIA COSTA, PH.D., TO QUESTION SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD BY THE HONORABLE DAN BURTON

Question:

The very experienced Colombian National Police anti-drug unit that visited Afghanistan recently said there is not enough emphasis by the Afghans on targeting major drug kingpins and high value targets related to the massive illicit drug trade, and too much emphasis on low-level targets. Do you share that sentiment?

Response:

Mr. Costa responds in the affirmative to Congressman Burton, “Yes, too much emphasis is indeed placed on low level targets.”

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Okay. It is the intention of the Chairman—because several people have asked if they would have a little bit more time to ask questions—to return here in 1 hour, and so people can have a time for lunch.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Mr. Chairman.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Yes.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Yeah. It appears that I am the only remaining questioner. I think, again, this is a very, very valuable hearing, but I would inquire as to the witnesses whether their schedule would accommodate returning. I don't want to impose on them. I can submit questions to them, but I learn by hearing. And you know, I don't know if Congressman Burton would want to come back.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Congressman Burton does want to come back, and—

Mr. DELAHUNT. Again, I would suggest that we leave it to the witnesses to see whether they—

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Are the witnesses—are you available to return in 1 hour?

Mr. COSTA. Yes, I am available because I stay here, in any event. But at 2:30, we have a meeting with administrative DA, and it would be very difficult to cancel that.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Oh, okay. So we would—if we have it in 45 minutes, would you be available to come back?

Colonel ATEHORTUA [answered in English]. It would be a pleasure to be here. No problem, sir.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Okay. Dr. Rubin?

Mr. RUBIN. Yes, I am available. We are talking about our availability at 2:00, right? I am talking to Congressman Burton.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Okay. Why don't we do this?

We will return here at 1:30 and then proceed for 20 minutes so everyone can get their questions in and maybe a second round of questions. So we are in recess until 1:30.

Thank you.

[Recess.]

Mr. ROHRBACHER [presiding]. The hearing of the International Relations Committee is now called to order again.

And I would like to thank all of our witnesses for the courtesy that you have paid to us to allow us to go down and vote. And I actually grabbed a sandwich; I hope someone else did. And I hope you had a chance to have a little bite to eat as well.

I would say that this hearing has been immensely valuable so far and that we have some other questions; we will go through a second round of questions. And Mr. Delahunt can have his chance for his first round and second round, if we get to that.

Let me just note that we have had some good advice from our friends from Colombia, tactical advice; and I have got some questions as to how their program has worked in Colombia in terms of alternatives. Dr. Costa has given us an overview of the drug situation in Afghanistan, and we have had some very, I would say, significant questions back and forth on what strategy should be used.

Dr. Rubin has, of course, presented us an overview of the situation of Afghanistan that I believe is on target, and his focus on pressuring Pakistan, I believe we need to listen to his words and examine his strategy, because I think there is a great deal of wisdom in it.

So with that, I would like Mr. Delahunt now to have his round of questioning. And then we will go over to a second round, and we will be over here no later than two o'clock.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Yes, thank you, Mr. Chairman. As you can see, we have been deserted by many. But we can't desert Afghanistan. And I honestly feel that after the initial flush of the military victory, we have deserted Afghanistan.

However, let me pose a question to Dr. Costa first. I was aware that you recently—I did not have a chance to see it—but that you appeared on CNN and indicated you were considering releasing the names of those who profit from and are significantly involved in the drug trafficking, a list of shame, if you will. I think that is a good idea. I would welcome it. And if you feel it appropriate, you could begin here, since there are so few of us.

Despite the fact that I really do mean this, I think this is really a very, very important hearing. And I am really disappointed and discouraged that there isn't more attention being paid to it because ultimately this is about terrorism and whether terrorism will be defeated. And it would appear that Afghanistan and what is happening there is not appropriately appreciated in that context.

Dr. Costa, do you care to give us names? If you don't, I understand, obviously.

Mr. COSTA. I am sorry to disappoint you, Congressman Delahunt; no, I will not release names because this is not the promise I made at CNN. When Jim Clancy interviewed me a couple of days ago, I said that it would be wise for the international community to work on an internationally agreed-upon list. They should have the highest information. We have lists, as you know, internationally

agreed by the Security Council concerning al-Qaeda operatives, concerning those involved in funding terrorists. There could be an analog of that sort of list which could be developed regarding traffickers who are involved in funding terrorists in Afghanistan. I think we are far away in terms of international agreement. We are going to get there; I sense that there is movement in that direction. It would not be difficult to provide a list itself.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Thank you, Dr. Costa.

And I would appeal to the Chair—I serve on a Subcommittee where I am a Ranking Member—that this is, I would suggest, a worthy effort on a bipartisan basis to at least be very clear about the position of the U.S. Congress in this regard. I think it would be applauded by all of the members that serve on this panel.

Dr. Rubin, I always enjoy your testimony because it really is informative. You know, if I had my way, you would be the special envoy reporting directly to the President on issues implicating the situation in Afghanistan.

Mr. RUBIN. What do you have against me?

Mr. DELAHUNT. You know, there is a certain sadistic, you know—but truly, it is refreshing to hear you and what you bring.

Give me your assessment of the agreement between the war lords/drug lords with the Pakistani Government. Is that something that we should welcome; we should reject? And if we reject, what should we do about it?

Mr. RUBIN. I believe you are referring to the agreement that was signed in Waziristan. First of all, the particular area where that took place is not a major drug-producing or drug-trafficking area. There is some trafficking coming out of that area, but I have not—they have other sources of funding there as well.

Mr. DELAHUNT. I am not particularly concerned—I am concerned about the drug issue, but more profoundly, more fundamentally is the whole concern I have about providing a haven for al-Qaeda and al-Qaeda-like organizations.

Mr. RUBIN. Well, first, this is an agreement which took place in north Waziristan, which is one of the tribal agencies of Pakistan, which is a really anomalous type of entity; that is, these tribal agencies were part of the British strategy for controlling the frontier of British India with Russia, and they are really out of date for the 21st century—

Mr. DELAHUNT. Dr. Rubin, excuse me. I have to go to a vote in Judiciary. Continue your answer. And I shall return. And I will turn to Mr. Paul.

Mr. RUBIN. And I won't give all the historical background, but the governor of Pakistan, his law does not apply in those areas; therefore, they have turned into safe areas.

As I understand it, the origin of this agreement was not with the Government of Pakistan, but it was with the Taliban themselves who decided that they did not want to spend their time and energy fighting the Government of Pakistan, which had deployed its troops in those areas, but wanted to concentrate their efforts on fighting the United States, the U.K. and the Coalition. Therefore, they initiated these talks.

Now, if the agreement were implemented as written, that is, that there would be no cross-board subversion into Afghanistan and

that the foreign militants would be expelled from the area, that would be good. However, since that time, we have seen the following; the people who signed the agreement have denied that there are any international militants in the area. Four days afterwards, Abdul Hakim Taniwal, the governor of Paktia was killed, and that is right across from this area. Two days after that, his funeral was bombed. Two major tribal elders in Waziristan have been murdered, bringing the total of whose names we know to about 25. And it seems more likely that this has created a safe haven for the Taliban than that it has been a real peace agreement. There is no monitoring mechanism.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Well, thank you very much. I have my own questions that I will proceed with after Dr. Paul has his time for questions then.

Dr. Paul, you may proceed.

Mr. PAUL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I have a specific question for Dr. Rubin, but if Dr. Costa would like to comment, especially on the issue of whether we should deal with drugs as a crime versus a disease, I would be interested in that.

But I came across an article just recently by Eric Margolis, and he writes frequently about Afghanistan. The recent article he wrote he quoted the Senlis group, the Senlis council, which is said to be a European think tank specializing in Afghanistan as well. But he quoted Senlis as saying, "U.S. policies in Afghanistan have recreated the safe haven for terrorism that the 2001 invasion aimed to destroy." But the editorial comment was, this was a bomb shell; this is pretty significant if this is the conclusion.

He also said that the United States and its allies are not going to win the Afghan war, and they will be lucky, the way things are going, not to lose it in the same humiliating fashion the Soviets did in 1989. That is not very encouraging.

He said, a final point, U.S. and NATO forces are not fighting terrorists—he puts that in quotes—as their governments claim. They are fighting the Afghan people. And he made a significant—made a difference between the two. Anyone who knows the Afghans knows that they will not be defeated, even if they must resist for an entire generation. And I think history bears that out, and sometimes, I think we are up against a wall. So my contention has been all along that our policies there have been misdirected no matter how well motivated, either for our foreign policy benefits or for an effort to reduce drug usage.

I am interested, though, Dr. Rubin, do you happen to know of Robert Pape, who wrote about suicide terrorism from Chicago? His thesis is that—and he is the expert on suicide terrorism; he has studied and logged these better than and more extensively than anybody else. And his conclusion is that radical Islam is not the number one cause of suicide terrorism, but it is the occupation of a foreign country of their own land. And he goes to show that a lot of suicide terrorism occurs by non Muslims. And some of the most radical Islamists, radical religious fanatics, don't commit suicide—you don't see many Iranians right now committing suicide terrorism, which means that occupation is the big issue.

Now earlier today, several Members made the point that we—and they say we have been successful because we have not been attacked in 5 years. And I am wondering—this is what I want you to comment on—could this be self-deception? Because, in a way, we went to their doorstep, and we present ourselves there. We have lost 3,000 men and women and with 20,000 casualties. A 100,000 civilians have been killed. It has been estimated, and we just present ourselves there to say that we stopped terrorism? It looks to me like we have made it easier for them. And if it is the occupation that motivates them, why couldn't it be argued that our risk is much greater now than ever before because of the policy? Not only are we not winning in Afghanistan, is it conceivable that we are less safe here at home; at least aren't Americans less safe around the world?

Mr. RUBIN. Well, that is such an interesting question that it is hard to answer in a hearing of this nature because it requires more time than I have, but let me just address a couple points.

Afghans do not consider by and large the international presence in their country an occupation; they still do not. They wish that it was more effective in giving them security, which it is not, and they complain bitterly about that. There is friction because of civilian casualties and the vices that not so much our military but our civilians bring in their wake, such as prostitution, alcohol consumption and so on. But by and large, it is very different from Iraq. They accepted that we had a legitimate target there, and they welcomed our eliminating those targets because they wanted to rejoin the world community. I could go on about that, but I won't. That is a fact: They wanted to rejoin the international community. They are very frustrated that we have not adequately enabled them to do so.

Now, the real problem is we have become—and precisely because we empowered the UN—and Congressman Rohrabacher was also present at the Bonn talks, I saw him there—we empowered the UN to help Afghans form an interim government using some of their own institutions. We are there helping that government. And as helpers of and allies of that government, we are not occupiers. The more that government gets hollowed out by corruption and incompetence and the more we step in to take over things, the more we are in danger of becoming an occupying force, as we are seeing clearly in Iraq.

Now, with respect to the suicide bombers, I haven't read his book, but I have read accounts of what he has found, and I have actually cited—I think it is quite interesting. First, the suicide bombers are all coming from Pakistan. Even those who are legally Afghans are coming from Pakistan; they are Afghans who have been in Pakistan for a generation, in most cases, I believe, who were born in Pakistan and who have not actually—are kind of a generation whose only education—if they have an education—is coming from these very militant madrassas which are teaching this kind of radical Islam which is not the actual role of a madrassa in an Islamic society; they have a very important positive role. So that is it.

Now, as far as the suicide terrorism is concerned, I believe that is accurate what you are saying, and it is a big—the question

among these people is, who—what do they imagine as their territory? For people like Osama bin Laden and his European followers—and most of the people who have been carrying out these tactics recently are Europeans—they have an imagined Islamic global umma, and they want to establish a caliphate. So they feel that the whole Islamic world is—and even their own communities in the West—occupied. That is a very small faction.

The suicide bombers of Hamas or Hezbollah or the other, they are reacting to occupation. They are not coming to the United States to do suicide bombings. They are reacting to the situation in Palestine, Lebanon, just as the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam have reacted in the same way through their situation in Sri Lanka. And I think it is very important that we make those distinctions about who is a threat to us and who is an actor in a regional issue that we should address through other ways.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much.

Mr. Delahunt, do you want to utilize your last 2 minutes that you didn't have before you left?

Mr. DELAHUNT. Yes, thank you.

I have read the testimony from the colonel and the major; common sense. I am familiar with what you have down in Colombia. But I would like to go back again to Dr. Rubin—and Dr. Costa, feel free to join in—we need a little history lesson. How did we get in this mess? I recently read *State of War* by Jim Risen, and he talks about the Department of Defense. I quoted earlier a Mr. Phife saying, well, we won the war, now it is up to others. But to me it was just so obvious that it was clear that the escalating production and cultivation of poppy at some point in time was going to create the fuel necessary for the resurgence of the Taliban.

Is it true that the British asked us to bomb some drug labs and we refused? That was an assertion that he made. And why do the Department of Defense, as being the only potential resource to deal quickly and efficiently and effectively, why the reluctance on the part of the Department of Defense? Do we now have enough boots on the ground? And I don't necessarily mean military, okay. Have we put in the level of or the order of magnitude of resources? I guess what I am looking for, is there a real and sufficient substantial presence to extricate ourselves from this spiral downward?

Mr. RUBIN. Well, to answer a specific question first, someone, a very senior American official—I will try not to identify him any further—with whom I spoke in Afghanistan said to me that his basic assumption was we need to double our resources; that is his basic conclusion about where we are today, because we have no reserve to deal with something unexpected, which you can expect will happen.

Now, as far as how we got, in general, let me—I will just make a general remark, since we don't have much time, about how we conceive of—how we respond to this threat of terrorism.

The whole concept of the War on Terror is misconceived, and the idea of responding to September 11th with a narrowly defined counterterrorism strategy, that is, killing and capturing the terrorists, is misconceived. It would be better to think of it as counterinsurgency because these terrorists are not just a bunch of nuts like the German Red Brigades or something like that who

could be better treated as psychopathology. While the vast majority of Muslims do not support the means used by Osama bin Laden, Osama bin Laden articulates in a very fearless manner some grievances that hundreds of millions of Muslims feel are legitimate political grievances. And then he goes beyond that saying he wants to establish a caliphate and so on. But he articulates those things. And he also articulates a vision of who we are and what we are trying to do, which is malevolent.

Now, if we want to succeed, we cannot think of it in terms of capturing and killing the terrorists; it is counterinsurgency. We have to show them that we are willing to engage in dialogue, take their grievances seriously, help to solve their problems and isolate the small group. We want to do that. Unfortunately, in my view, what we did in part by invading Iraq and neglecting the Israeli-Palestinian issue is we acted out their malevolent image of who we are, thereby increasing the political base for recruitment to these terrorist organizations around the world.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Dr. Rubin, thank you very much.

And the Chair would like to—we are going to start a second round, but we only have a few more minutes.

Colonel, you heard what Dr. Rubin just said, and you are deeply involved not only in drug eradication but counterinsurgency. Can we succeed—and you have been in Afghanistan. Can we succeed in the way that things are organized and structured in Afghanistan?

Colonel ATEHORTUA. This spirit that we have had in the last year fighting against drugs, that it has to be a unified campaign, fighting against drugs and terrorists at the same time. That is why we train our interdiction units, because in the area of operation where these groups have their base, in those areas where we are doing operations, we are not only doing interdiction; we are not only doing eradication, but we are also arresting the campaigns in those areas—

Mr. ROHRABACHER. That was his point. Are we doing that in Afghanistan? You were there.

Colonel ATEHORTUA. What we saw there was they are just beginning. And they have the will, and they want to do it, but they—and at this moment, we cannot say they are doing it because what we saw is one group on one side and one group on one side. So what we did was to show what we were doing, but we didn't see them in the field.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. What you saw there, who should be the central organizer, the one who controls the effort and designs the effort? Who do you see as that? DEA, NIU, what do you suggest?

Colonel ATEHORTUA. I guess it has to be a unified campaign that all people—we have the same policy—who are there are fighting against drugs and terrorists at the same time. Because if you see the structure that we are using in Colombia, which we are short of resources, we had to use those resources to fight not only drugs but the terrorists that are in those areas—

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Excuse me, but have you done things like Dr. Rubin is suggesting in trying to offer alternatives and prevent the insurgents from having supporters by giving them alternatives and uplifting their standard of living?

Colonel ATEHORTUA. I would say the best way to do it is a unified campaign, where you would be using the military forces, the police forces and the coalition to work on just one policy against the terrorists and drugs at the same time.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. And one organizer?

Colonel ATEHORTUA. Yes.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Chairman Hyde has asked me to ask you specifically, Colonel, that you talked about the training that you are able to provide the Afghans, especially dealing with airport transportation and drug interdiction. When will you be proceeding with that training? When will it start taking place?

Colonel ATEHORTUA. The first phase we are planning to send to Afghanistan on the first week of November.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Excellent, thank you.

Colonel ATEHORTUA. They are going to be there from the first week in November until December the 15th.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Well, we appreciate that, and if more follow and this is a successful program. Let's just note that we are admirers of your courage and what you are doing in Colombia, and we appreciate you helping us out and other people out in Afghanistan in this challenge.

We are going to have to call the hearing to a close, but I just have a couple more minutes just to sort of look at what we have suggested here.

Let me note that Dr. Costa and I, over the years, I have benefited from his expertise, and would like to compliment the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime for its availability to people like myself who are involved in trying to set up policy. They have always been available to not just people from the United States governments but from all governments. They are in Vienna to give the type of immediate update as to what the situation is. And I learned through Dr. Costa, for example, that the drug-producing areas in Afghanistan—at least until recently—were focused in the southern areas in which the Taliban was the strongest. So that fact should never escape us, that the Pushtins who are down there, who are also very much of the Pakistani society, but that Pushtin region is where the greatest drug production exists. It is also the area where the Taliban finds their strongest support. And there is some significance there, which leads back to Dr. Rubin's analysis of Pakistan. And as we close the hearing, I think we need to focus on some of the suggestions that Dr. Rubin has had in terms of holding Pakistan accountable. And unless we are willing to do that and act upon that, we will not succeed in Afghanistan. Am I correct in interpreting your remarks that way, Dr. Rubin?

Mr. RUBIN. Yes, sir.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. So we couldn't be more emphatic, either we will lose and walk away in shame and create an even greater tragedy for Central Asia, or we will hold Pakistan accountable and make the tough decisions on that.

In terms of the drug trade, which is perhaps the second most important thing next to holding Pakistan responsible, although there is a crossover here, because a lot of the drug money goes through Pakistan, a lot of the drug lords and the drug criminals are located in Pakistan, so there is a crossover there.

But let me note that to get control of the drugs, as Dr. Costa—as we indicated in this conversation back and forth with Dr. Costa is—and again, and I guess Dr. Rubin agreed with this as well—that perhaps the United States should start thinking in terms of a treatment policy toward heroin addiction rather than simply looking at the solution to heroin addiction as being a multibillion-dollar eradication and interdiction program. Because these poor souls who are addicted to that, that might be a little bit cheaper than the other effort, which is very costly and perhaps not as effective.

You are welcome to comment on that, Dr. Costa.

Mr. COSTA. It is not a comment. Certainly I would like the United States to do that, but even more so Europe; heroin is mostly a European problem, much less an American problem.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Well, thank you for that thought. You also stressed the need, as Dr. Rubin, for alternatives, which we have not done. We have not provided the Afghan people with the alternatives that they need to step away from that and still support their families. In terms of eradication, we have not done a good job of eradication. And especially let me note again for the record, there is an unwillingness on the part of this Administration to take the issue of microbicide, which could offer an enormous help to eradicating this drug scourge from Afghanistan, and we have done nothing—we have actually hindered the effort to seeing if this can be a weapon or a tool to be brought to play in achieving our objectives.

Finally, we have not followed through on where the money goes from the drugs, whether it is to the Pakistanis or to the Uzbek guerrillas or just criminal elements. But we are financing terrorism at a higher rate through these drugs than we are providing for the governments and for the democratic forces in those areas to fight those enemy and hostile elements.

So this is—and we are going to lose. No wonder why we are going to lose if we leave that in place. So I would like to thank all of you—

Mr. DELAHUNT. Mr. Chairman, before you conclude—

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Mr. Delahunt, you may proceed.

Mr. DELAHUNT. You have been a voice on this issue, Mr. Chairman, but the reality is that, 5 years after 9/11, and I think we have heard a list of decisions and policy initiatives that have failed miserably. And I am glad that we had this hearing, better late than never, but the Administration, after 5 years, has not come up with a strategy, a comprehensive strategy. And I think Dr. Rubin is correct; treat it like a counterinsurgency with the core concept of the hearts and minds and an infusion of resources that meet the need. We are going to end up not just losing Afghanistan, Mr. Chairman, but we are going to end up losing the War on Terror, and it will be on the watch of this Administration.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you, Mr. Delahunt.

And rather than having Mr. Delahunt get the last word, I will have the last word, and that is, yes, this Administration has its failings. All Administrations have. The creation of the Taliban itself, as Dr. Rubin understands, happened under the Clinton Administration and was supported by the policies of the Clinton Ad-

ministration, which everybody in Pakistan believes that, everybody in Afghanistan believes that, and I believe that because I fought it tooth-and-nail for 10 years. But, okay, we all have our culpability.

What is most important is that we try to move forward from this moment on and get the job done so that all of Central Asia and Pakistan doesn't just disintegrate and become a huge crisis beyond our imagination. We have got to do that. But we have to listen to the testimony today, the direction and advice from our friends from Colombia and make sure we make the right decisions. It is tough to implement, but we should do it.

Thank you very much. This hearing is closed.

[Whereupon, at 2:09 p.m., the Committee was adjourned.]

A P P E N D I X

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING RECORD

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE DENNIS A. CARDOZA, A REPRESENTATIVE
IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

Chairman Hyde, Ranking Member Lantos, thank you for holding this important hearing on the situation in Afghanistan.

I begin my remarks today with a simple question: what is the Bush Administration's strategy for success in Afghanistan? From my vantage point, it appears that the situation in Afghanistan is steadily deteriorating, squandering the sacrifices of our troops and allies in the military campaign of 2002.

I believe the Bush Administration made a key tactical mistake when they tried to fight the war in Afghanistan on the cheap, diverting troops to Iraq and away from Afghanistan—the real central front in the war on terror. Today, the Taliban controls large sections of southern Afghanistan, while Osama bin Laden and many of his Al Qaeda henchmen remain at large.

I believe the Bush Administration's inability to secure Afghanistan has made America less safe. Since 2001, Al Qaeda has developed a network operating in 65 countries, plotting attacks against America and our allies. In fact, we recently learned that the mastermind of the plot to blow up American airliners was an Al Qaeda leader based in Afghanistan.

We cannot allow this to continue. I believe it is time to refocus our military efforts on what we should have been doing all along: defeating and destroying Al Qaeda. To achieve this goal, we must send significant number of troops, equipment and reconstruction to the front lines in Afghanistan.

I also believe we also need to do much more to win the hearts and minds of the Afghan people. To do so, we need to redouble our efforts on civil affairs and reconstruction, so the elected government in Kabul—not the Taliban or al Qaeda—rebuilds Afghanistan.

These recommendations are not new or unprecedented. In fact, the NATO commander in Afghanistan recently requested 2,500 additional troops. And his request is easy to understand. Today, there are seven times more troops in Iraq compared to Afghanistan, where bin Laden and other terrorists trained.

How is that possible? And why did the Bush Administration try to shut down the CIA unit that was hunting bin Laden? The American people and this Congress deserve answers to these questions.

Mr. Chairman, it's time that we get serious about the Bush Administration's lack of strategy in Afghanistan. We can no longer afford to treat Afghanistan like a side-show in the war on terror.

I look forward to hearing from our witnesses today, and yield back the balance of my time.

