[House Hearing, 109 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY'S PLAN FOR
CLIMATE CHANGE TECHNOLOGY PROGRAMS
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON ENERGY
COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
SEPTEMBER 20, 2006
__________
Serial No. 109-62
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Science
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.house.gov/science
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______
COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE
HON. SHERWOOD L. BOEHLERT, New York, Chairman
RALPH M. HALL, Texas BART GORDON, Tennessee
LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas JERRY F. COSTELLO, Illinois
CURT WELDON, Pennsylvania EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas
DANA ROHRABACHER, California LYNN C. WOOLSEY, California
KEN CALVERT, California DARLENE HOOLEY, Oregon
ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland MARK UDALL, Colorado
VERNON J. EHLERS, Michigan DAVID WU, Oregon
GIL GUTKNECHT, Minnesota MICHAEL M. HONDA, California
FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma BRAD MILLER, North Carolina
JUDY BIGGERT, Illinois LINCOLN DAVIS, Tennessee
WAYNE T. GILCHREST, Maryland DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois
W. TODD AKIN, Missouri SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas
TIMOTHY V. JOHNSON, Illinois BRAD SHERMAN, California
J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia BRIAN BAIRD, Washington
JO BONNER, Alabama JIM MATHESON, Utah
TOM FEENEY, Florida JIM COSTA, California
RANDY NEUGEBAUER, Texas AL GREEN, Texas
BOB INGLIS, South Carolina CHARLIE MELANCON, Louisiana
DAVE G. REICHERT, Washington DENNIS MOORE, Kansas
MICHAEL E. SODREL, Indiana DORIS MATSUI, California
JOHN J.H. ``JOE'' SCHWARZ, Michigan
MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas
MARIO DIAZ-BALART, Florida
------
Subcommittee on Energy
JUDY BIGGERT, Illinois, Chair
RALPH M. HALL, Texas MICHAEL M. HONDA, California
CURT WELDON, Pennsylvania LYNN C. WOOLSEY, California
ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland LINCOLN DAVIS, Tennessee
VERNON J. EHLERS, Michigan JERRY F. COSTELLO, Illinois
W. TODD AKIN, Missouri EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas
JO BONNER, Alabama DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois
RANDY NEUGEBAUER, Texas JIM MATHESON, Utah
BOB INGLIS, South Carolina SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas
DAVE G. REICHERT, Washington BRAD SHERMAN, California
MICHAEL E. SODREL, Indiana AL GREEN, Texas
JOHN J.H. ``JOE'' SCHWARZ, Michigan
SHERWOOD L. BOEHLERT, New York BART GORDON, Tennessee
DAHLIA SOKOLOV Subcommittee Staff Director
CHRIS KING Democratic Professional Staff Member
MIKE HOLLAND Chairman's Designee
COLIN HUBBELL Staff Assistant
C O N T E N T S
September 20, 2006
Page
Witness List..................................................... 2
Hearing Charter.................................................. 3
Opening Statements
Statement by Representative Judy Biggert, Chairman, Subcommittee
on Energy, Committee on Science, U.S. House of Representatives. 14
Written Statement............................................ 16
Statement by Representative Michael M. Honda, Ranking Minority
Member, Subcommittee on Energy, Committee on Science, U.S.
House of Representatives....................................... 17
Written Statement............................................ 18
Prepared Statement by Representative Jerry F. Costello, Member,
Subcommittee on Energy, Committee on Science, U.S. House of
Representatives................................................ 19
Witnesses:
Mr. Stephen Eule, Director of U.S. Climate Change Technology
Program, Department of Energy
Oral Statement............................................... 20
Written Statement............................................ 22
Biography.................................................... 34
Ms. Judith M. Greenwald, Director of Innovative Solutions, Pew
Center on Global Climate Change
Oral Statement............................................... 34
Written Statement............................................ 36
Biography.................................................... 39
Financial Disclosure......................................... 40
Mr. Chris Mottershead, Distinguished Advisor on Energy and the
Environment, BP
Oral Statement............................................... 41
Written Statement............................................ 41
Biography.................................................... 43
Dr. Martin I. Hoffert, Emeritus Professor of Physics, New York
University
Oral Statement............................................... 43
Written Statement............................................ 46
Biography.................................................... 59
Discussion....................................................... 59
Appendix 1: Answers to Post-Hearing Questions
Mr. Stephen Eule, Director of U.S. Climate Change Technology
Program, Department of Energy.................................. 80
Ms. Judith M. Greenwald, Director of Innovative Solutions, Pew
Center on Global Climate Change................................ 87
Dr. Martin I. Hoffert, Emeritus Professor of Physics, New York
University..................................................... 89
Appendix 2: Additional Material for the Record
Statement of United Technologies Corporation..................... 98
Statement of Dr. Daniel Kammen, Director, Renewable and
Appropriate Energy Laboratory, University of California,
Berkeley....................................................... 103
The Rise of Renewable Energy by Daniel M. Kammen................. 123
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY'S PLAN FOR CLIMATE CHANGE TECHNOLOGY PROGRAMS
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WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 20, 2006
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Energy,
Committee on Science,
Washington, DC.
The Subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:00 p.m., in
Room 2318 of the Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Judy
Biggert [Chairman of the Subcommittee] presiding.
HEARING CHARTER
SUBCOMMITTEE ON ENERGY
COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Department of Energy's Plan for
Climate Change Technology Programs
wednesday, september 20, 2006
2:00 p.m.-4:00 p.m.
2318 rayburn house office building
1. Purpose
On September 20, 2006 at 2:00 p.m., the Energy Subcommittee of the
House Science Committee will hold a hearing to examine the
Administration's Climate Change Technology\1\ Program's (CCTP)
Strategic Plan.\2\ The hearing is designed to review the plan and the
CCTP in the light of the Administration's own stated goals for the
program and for action on climate change. The final strategic plan (a
revision of the draft plan released last September) will be released at
the hearing.
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\1\ Climate change technologies reduce or avoid emissions of
greenhouse gases, such as carbon dioxide (CO2), methane,
nitrous oxide, and fluorinated compounds.
\2\ U.S. Climate Change Technology Program, U.S. Climate Change
Technology Program Strategic Plan--Draft for Public Comment, (September
2005). See: http://www.climatetechnology.gov/stratplan/draft/CCTP-
SratPlan-Sept-2005.pdf
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2. Witnesses
Mr. Stephen Eule is the Director of the U.S. Climate Change Technology
Program at the Department of Energy.
Ms. Judi Greenwald is the Director of Innovative Solutions for the Pew
Center on Global Climate Change.
Dr. Martin Hoffert is an Emeritus Professor of Physics at New York
University.
Mr. Chris Mottershead is a Distinguished Advisor on Energy and the
Environment at BP. He is also a Director of the Carbon Trust in the
United Kingdom and the Center for Clean Air Policy in the United
States.
3. Overarching Questions
The hearing will address the following overarching questions:
Does the CCTP draft strategic plan provide a clear
blueprint for future federal investments in climate change
technologies? What program priorities are specified in the CCTP
plan?
To what extent will the CCTP plan enable the United
States to achieve the Administration's stated goal of cutting
greenhouse gas intensity by 18 percent over the 2002 to 2012
timeframe? Does the plan set or assume a stabilization level
for concentration of atmospheric carbon dioxide?
How could the CCTP plan be improved? What next steps
are needed to implement a clear climate change technology
strategy?
4. Brief Overview
On June 11, 2001, President Bush announced the
establishment of CCTP, a multi-agency research and development
(R&D) coordination activity led by the Department of Energy
(DOE), to focus R&D activities more effectively on the
President's near- and long-term climate change goals. At the
same time, the President established an interagency Climate
Change Science Program (CCSP), led by the Department of
Commerce, to coordinate scientific research. According to the
Strategic Plan, the Federal Government will spend about $2.8
billion on CCTP in Fiscal Year (FY) 2006 in nine agencies. The
FY07 request is close to $3 billion. (See Appendix II.)
On November 21, 2002, the Secretary of Energy
established a CCTP office to provide staff and technical
support for CCTP coordination and planning activities.
In 2002, Under Secretary of Energy Robert Card
indicated that DOE was developing a draft strategic plan for
CCTP that would be released to the public by July, 2002. The
plan would define the role for advanced technology in
addressing climate change, establish a framework to guide R&D
investment decisions for federal agencies involved in climate
technology development, and identify steps toward
implementation of the Administration's climate change program
goals. (CSSP began a similar process and released a draft plan
in November, 2002.)
The CCTP draft plan was not released for public
comment until September, 2005. Approximately 30 individuals and
organizations (individual scientists, companies, consultants
and interest groups) commented on the draft strategic plan, and
their comments are posted on the CCTP website.\3\ (A list of
those commenting is Appendix III.) DOE reviewed the comments as
part of its process of completing a final strategic plan. The
final plan, which was delivered to the Committee on the
afternoon of Sept. 19, will be released at the hearing. At
first glance, the final plan does not seem to eliminate the
concerns expressed by the commenters, but rather ``fine tunes''
the draft text.
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\3\ See: http://www.climatetechnology.gov/stratplan/comments/
index.htm
In general, commenters were critical of the
approximately 200-page draft strategic plan, suggesting that it
was a description of currently ongoing activities that provided
relatively little guidance on how to direct federal climate
technology R&D activities more effectively toward achieving the
Administration's stated climate change program goals. Some
commenters did say that the plan provided a useful inventory of
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existing efforts.
In addition to the public comments, DOE organized a
series of workshops at Oak Ridge National Laboratory to review
the CCTP R&D portfolio. The workshops produced a May, 2006
report, ``Results of a Technical Review of the U.S. Climate
Change Technology Program's R&D Portfolio.'' \4\ The Technical
Review report included timelines for technology development,
identifies R&D priorities and gaps, and analyzed a subset of
the R&D portfolio in terms of the potential payoff compared to
the probability of technical success--elements that were not
included in the draft strategic plan.
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\4\ See: http://www.ornl.gov/sci/eere/PDFs/
CCTP-Wkshp-Rpt-6-28Final.pdf
5. Issues
Does the CCTP draft strategic plan provide a clear blueprint for future
federal investments in climate change technologies?
Commenters on the plan generally believed that it did not provide a
clear blueprint or a basis for making or evaluating funding or policy
decisions. (Chairmen Boehlert and Biggert reached a similar conclusion.
See their letter, Appendix I.)
For each technology research area (e.g., nuclear energy), the plan
discusses the potential role of technology, technology strategy, the
current R&D portfolio and possible future research directions. The
report also cites existing technology roadmaps and technical goals for
some specific R&D programs.
DOE officials have generally argued that they see the plan as
having a narrower purpose than do the commenters. In the Foreword to
the final version of the report, the goal of the strategic plan is
described as providing ``a long-term planning context, taking into
account the many uncertainties, in which the nature of both the
challenges and the opportunities for advanced technologies are
illuminated and balanced.'' However, the Foreword goes on to say that,
along with other documents, the plan ``provides a basis for setting
priorities through its technology strategy and investment criteria and
it highlights those opportunities that are ripe for advancement.''
But, commenters said, the strategy discussion is quite general. The
commenters noted that the draft plan does not provide any criteria for
evaluating individual technologies. (Possible criteria include
technical risk, potential cost, ease of transition to
commercialization, likelihood of acceptance by the marketplace, the
balance of risk across alternate technical pathways, and the timing of
market entry necessary to stabilize emissions profiles.)
The commenters also complained that the draft plan does not provide
criteria for allocating funding among CCTP programs and projects.
(Possible criteria include the probability of technical success, the
cost of adopting that technology, and the potential for market
penetration.) In general, they said, the plan neither sets priorities
nor adequately explains how priorities would be set. And while the plan
cites existing timelines for some technology programs, it does not
integrate them into an overall CCTP timeline.
Commenters also observed that the draft plan is silent on how
federal R&D investments will be coordinated with private research
efforts. One commenter observed that the draft plan does not discuss
the R&D effort in the context of the broad array of statutes that are
relevant to the implementation of this plan. Each of these critiques
calls into question whether the draft plan fulfills the
Administration's intention of having the plan serve as a framework for
agencies in formulating their climate change technology R&D portfolio.
How does the CCTP strategic plan relate to the Administration's
greenhouse gas emissions goals?
On February 14, 2002, President Bush said, ``My Administration is
committed to cutting our nation's greenhouse gas intensity--how much we
emit per unit of economic activity--by 18 percent over the next 10
years. This will set America on a path to slow the growth of our
greenhouse gas emissions and, as science justifies, to stop and then
reverse the growth of emissions.'' \5\ The Administration has not set a
goal for limiting total U.S. greenhouse gas emissions or for a total
greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere. Critics note that it
is the absolute concentration of gases in the atmosphere that may
affect climate, and a reduction in greenhouse gas intensity will not
necessarily result in a drop in total emissions. Moreover, they note
that the Energy Information Administration, an independent arm of DOE,
has estimated that greenhouse gas intensity would drop by 17 percent by
2012 without any government intervention.
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\5\ Office of the Press Secretary, President Announces Clear Skies
& Global Climate Change Initiatives (February 14, 2002). See: http://
www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/02/20020214-5.html.
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All that aside, the draft strategic plan does not relate any of its
goals explicitly to the overall Administration goal of reducing
greenhouse gas intensity. Moreover, some critics argue that it is hard
to judge among R&D investments without knowing what level of greenhouse
gas concentration one is trying to achieve over what time period.
What other gaps have been noted in the draft strategic plan?
Commenters noted that the plan is virtually silent on the question
of how to bring new technologies to the marketplace. They view this as
a critical question because technology that is being purchased today
will likely be in use for decades. In general, the plan is silent on
policy questions.
The plan also explicitly states that it does not deal with
technologies for adapting to climate change (as opposed to technologies
to try to limit climate change by reducing or sequestering emissions).
Commenters have also argued that the plan doesn't adequately
distinguish between technology development programs that would produce
results in different time frames (short-, medium- and long-term). The
commenters and technical reviewers came to diametrically opposed
conclusions regarding which direction the draft plan was skewed. Many
respondents during the public comment period expressed the view that
the plan was too focused on long-term initiatives at the expense of
short- to mid-term opportunities that could have a more immediate
impact on reducing greenhouse gas emissions. Conversely, experts who
participated in the Technical Review, who had greater access to the
plan's supporting documentation, budget profiles and technology
roadmaps, concluded that CCTP's R&D portfolio was much stronger in the
near-term technology development than it was in providing direction for
the mid- to long-term.
The technical reviewers, in their May 2006 report, recommended
greater emphasis on exploratory research addressing novel concepts to
uncover breakthrough technology, enabling R&D, and integrative
concepts. For example, R&D on enabling technology, such as
nanotechnology, would focus resources on improving the performance of
materials and subsystems that find application in a wide variety of
energy production and use settings. Integrative R&D would focus
resources on combining systems to provide unique advantages. These
could include engineered urban planning for low greenhouse gas
emissions, integrated waste management, and integration of plug-in
hybrid electric vehicles with zero-emissions buildings.
How does CCTP relate to the Administration's existing climate change
technology programs?
Since 2001, the Administration has undertaken a number of actions
that can begin to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Many of the
Administration's signature R&D initiatives have tended to be longer-
term projects--the Hydrogen Fuel Initiative, FutureGen (clean coal
power plant), and ITER (large-scale nuclear fusion experiment). Near-
term actions include the 2006 fuel economy increases for light trucks
and voluntary action such as the Methane-to-Markets program and the
Climate VISION Partnership, a voluntary registry for reporting
greenhouse gas reductions, and targeted incentives for greenhouse gas
sequestration. A June 30, 2005 White House fact sheet that outlined the
President's climate change initiatives, as shown in the table below,
includes a broad range of activities. (Italicized entries denote
international partnerships).\6\
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\6\ The White House, Fact Sheet: President Bush Is Addressing
Climate Change (June 30, 2005). See: www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/
2005/06/20050630-16.html
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The public comments and the comments from the technical reviewers
suggest that the draft strategic plan could better explain how the
various activities--both R&D and other policy initiatives--are linked
together to achieve stated national goals.
How is the CCTP portfolio being managed, both within DOE and across
agencies?
CCTP is a multi-agency planning and coordination activity with a
CCTP Steering Group and six working groups. However, most of the
activities in CCTP take place within DOE, which has historically
struggled to coordinate efforts within the Department and to overcome
``stovepiping,'' where different parts of an organization pursue
different goals, fail to communicate well, or see other parts of the
organization merely as competitors. It is not clear that DOE has solved
this problem internally. For example, nuclear power has a prominent
role in the CCTP plan because nuclear power plants do not emit
greenhouse gases. However, the Office of Nuclear Energy and the Office
of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management have continued to have trouble
coordinating and making decisions about spent nuclear fuel, an issue
important to both the current fleet of nuclear power plants and
deployment of the next generation of plants.
Beyond describing the basic functions of the various oversight and
advisory committees, the draft strategic plan does not describe or
address how CCTP will overcome stovepiping and other management
challenges at DOE and across agencies, coordinate budgeting activities
across agencies, or set priorities to avoid duplication. One commenter
observed that non-DOE activities classified as part of the CCTP for
funding purposes are not a part of the CCTP functions, nor are they
included in the draft plan itself.
How does the plan deal with funding?
The CCTP plan is silent on funding beyond listing funds requested
for existing programs for FY07. It does not give any sense of whether
more funding would be required to pursue the ``future research
directions'' described in the plan.
Has the process for developing the strategic plan been sufficiently
open?
DOE officials argue that they have heard from experts outside the
government in developing the plan, citing the posting of the draft plan
on the web, the posting and review of comments, and the workshop with
technical experts.
However, critics point out that this seems to be a less open and
broad-based process than the CCSP has followed. The draft plan for CCSP
was more broadly announced and the workshop on it was more open, and
was attended by more than 1,300 participants. More than 900 pages of
comments were received. In addition, the CCSP contracted with the
National Academy of Sciences to review the draft plan.
6. Summary of Draft Strategic Plan for Climate Change Technology
The strategic plan describes activities carried out in nine
departments and agencies: the Departments of Agriculture, Commerce,
Defense, Energy, Interior and Transportation, the Environmental
Protection Agency, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration
and the National Science Foundation. The Department of Health and Human
Services, the Department of State and the Agency for International
Development also participate in planning and coordination as members of
the CCTP effort; however, their activities are not included in efforts
funded under CCTP. DOE accounts for 87 percent of the $2.8 billion
funding under the CCTP umbrella in fiscal year 2006.\7\
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\7\ Federal Climate Change Expenditures Report to Congress (April
2006). See http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/legislative/
fy07-climate-change.pdf
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The Administration's draft plan states that:
the necessary cumulative emissions reductions
[worldwide] over the course of the century could be on the
order of 200 gigatons of carbon equivalents\8\ to 800 gigatons
of carbon equivalents (or more);
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\8\ Emissions of non-CO2 greenhouse gases are usually
converted to a common and roughly comparable measure of the
``equivalent CO2 emissions.'' This conversion weights actual
emissions by each gas' global warming potential (GWP). GWP is the
ability of a gas, compared to that of CO2, to trap heat in
the atmosphere over a given timeframe. GWP values allow for a
comparison of the impacts of emissions and reductions of different
gases, although they typically have uncertainties of 35 percent. All
non-CO2 gases are compared to CO2, which has a
GWP of one. Other greenhouse gases have GWPs, using a 100-year time
horizon, ranging from 23 for methane to 22,200 for sulfur hexafluoride
(SF6). (CCTP Draft Strategic Plan, p. 7-2).
emissions reductions of that scale potentially could
be achieved through combinations of many different
technologies, so a diversified approach to technology R&D is
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important;
technologies with zero or near-net-zero greenhouse
gas emissions would need to be available and moving into the
marketplace many years before the emissions ``peaks'' occur in
[any of] the hypothetical greenhouse gas-constrained cases; and
some new technologies may need to be commercially
ready for widespread implementation between 2020 and 2040, with
initial demonstrations between 2010 and 2030.\9\
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\9\ CTP Draft Strategic Plan, p. 3-28.
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It is against these concrete insights that the six goals of the
strategic plan may be assessed. These goals, articulating what the
Administration aims to accomplish with the strategy, are to:
1. reduce greenhouse gas emissions from energy end-use and
infrastructure;
2. reduce greenhouse gas emissions from energy supply;
3. capture and sequester CO2;
4. reduce emissions of non-CO2 greenhouse gases;
5. improve capabilities to measure and monitor greenhouse gas
emissions; and
6. bolster basic science contributions to technology
development.
The Administration proposes to implement the strategic plan using a
combination of the following seven ``core approaches'':
1. strengthen climate change technology R&D;
2. strengthen basic research at universities and federal
research facilities;
3. enhance opportunities for partnerships;
4. increase international cooperation;
5. support cutting-edge technology demonstrations;
6. ensure a viable technology workforce of the future through
education and training; and
7. explore and provide, as appropriate, supporting technology
policy.
7. Witness Questions
Mr. Stephen Eule
1. How is the Administration using the Climate Change
Technology Program (CCTP) draft strategic plan in preparing
future budgets? Specifically, how will the plan enable the
Department of Energy (DOE) and the Administration to choose
among competing priorities and set funding requests?
2. Will the CCTP plan enable the Administration to meet its
goal of cutting greenhouse gas intensity by 18 percent by 2012?
If DOE were able to achieve the programmatic goals for all of
the technologies listed in the plan, how would the U.S.
emissions profile change in 15 years? In 25 years?
3. How can the Administration have a comprehensive and
effective CCTP plan without setting as a goal a specific
stabilization level for atmospheric concentration of carbon
dioxide and other greenhouse gases?
4. How do you respond to critics who argue that the plan is
simply a description of current activities at DOE rather than a
roadmap to help the Administration set priorities and make
choices among competing technologies?
Ms. Judi Greenwald, Dr. Martin Hoffert, and Mr. Chris Mottershead
1. What do you see as the key strengths and weaknesses of the
plan?
2. Will the Climate Change Technology Program (CCTP) enable
the Administration to meet its goal of cutting greenhouse gas
intensity by 18 percent by 2012? Does CCTP put the United
States on a path to stabilizing greenhouse gas emissions?
3. Does the CCTP draft strategic plan provide an integrated
framework of sound guidance, clear goals and next steps for
agencies and researchers to use when prioritizing and selecting
future research efforts? If so, please explain. If not, how
should the Administration set research and development
investment priorities among various climate change technologies
and CCTP agencies?
Appendix I
Chairwoman Biggert. The hearing of the Energy Subcommittee
of the Science Committee will come to order. I will recognize
myself for an opening statement.
I would like to welcome everybody to the hearing examining
the Department of Energy's Strategic Plan for a Climate Change
Technology Program. Our essential question at this point is was
it worth the wait?
Let me start by reviewing a bit of history here. On June
11, 2001, President Bush announced two initiatives to address
climate change. Those initiatives are now known as the Climate
Change Technology Program, CCTP, and the Climate Change Science
Program, CCSP. The Administration has said that these
initiatives form the core of its policy to fulfill the U.S.
commitment to stabilize greenhouse gas concentrations under the
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change.
The Administration's admirable work on the science program
can serve as a model for how best to shape a research program
so it delivers results. Beginning in July 2002, the Department
of Commerce undertook the process of preparing a new ten year
strategic plan for the CCSP. Science program managers engaged
national and international stakeholders in a comprehensive
review of research and observational systems needs. CCSP
submitted its November 2002 draft plan to the National Academy
of Sciences for review and to the public for comment. A
December 2002 workshop attended by 1,300 scientists and other
participants from 47 states and 36 nations facilitated
extensive discussion and debate.
By July 2003, the CCSP strategic plan was complete. This
open and orderly progress--process established a research
agenda that has been universally supported, and will fill the
gaps in our knowledge and understanding of the Earth's climate.
Today, the Commerce Department is executing its CCSP
strategic plan. The first of 21 synthesis and assessment
reports were released in May of this year, and just this week,
the Secretary of Commerce announced a new federal advisory
committee to provide advice as the remaining reports are
developed.
Why did I go into such great detail for the CCSP when the
topic of our hearing today is CCTP? Because the thoughtful
deliberation and open process the Administration employed to
develop the CCSP gave Congress and others the confidence that
the $1.7 billion program is on the right track. Can I say the
same thing about the $2.9 billion dollar program, the
technological program? Unfortunately, no. Compared to CCSP, the
technology program appears stalled near the starting line.
It is now September 2006, four years and two months after
the deadline, former Department of Energy Under Secretary
Robert Card set for release of the draft technology plan, and
the revised plan is being released today. That is unacceptable,
that this hearing should be examining progress in year three of
that plan. Don't get me wrong. I strongly support the
Administration's stated policy of addressing climate change
through technology development. Technology investments are like
an insurance policy against climate change. Supporting a
diverse portfolio of climate change technologies such as energy
efficiency, carbon sequestration, and carbon neutral energy
technologies, including nuclear energy, will provide us with
the most insurance coverage for the best price.
We have a lot riding on this R&D portfolio. Not only are we
relying on it to help reduce emissions of greenhouse gases, we
need it to secure America's energy independence. As Chair of
the Subcommittee with oversight responsible for nearly 90
percent of the programs included in CCTP, I know that research
and technology are, by and large, noncontroversial ways we can
start addressing climate change now. That is why I am
determined to see progress on this front.
Since the July 2002 deadline for the release of the initial
plan, the Administration has announced a whole series of energy
technology research initiatives: the Hydrogen Fuel Initiative,
the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership, the Fusion Experiment,
ITER, and the Advanced Energy Initiatives. These are all great
energy initiatives that I enthusiastically support.
At the same time, in the absence of a rigorous, well
vetted, comprehensive plan, Congress is left to figure out how
and to what degree each of these technologies, individually and
collectively, will contribute to achieving our climate change
goals. This information is critical if Congress is to make
informed decisions about how best to allocate technology
development resources to address the problems of climate
change.
We want DOE to succeed. I think it would be terribly unfair
to our children and grandchildren to leave the Earth in worse
condition than in the way we received it. That is why the
government, the research community, and industry must work
together to develop technology solutions that make
environmental and economic sense; but for such a collaborative
effort to succeed, we need a solid game plan. I think my
colleagues share that sentiment.
We want FutureGen, GNEP, sequestration, and all the other
climate change technologies to work and to work well. We have
high expectations. We believe those expectations can be met
with a clear strategic plan. With that, let us get down the
business of today's hearing. Fundamentally, we want to know
whether the strategic plan can be used to guide R&D investment
decisions, and whether it will enable the United States to
achieve the Administration's goals.
Most importantly, I cannot stress this enough, we want to
know how the CCTP plan and DOE's planning process can be
improved, and I look forward to the discussion.
I want to thank the witnesses for sharing their experiences
with us today, particularly Professor Hoffert, who graciously
agreed to our invitation to serve on this panel at a very late
hour. We will make Professor Hoffert's written testimony
available within a few days.
Professor Dan Kammen of the University of California at
Berkeley, originally scheduled as a witness, is not able to
attend today due to a last minute scheduling conflict. I
greatly appreciate his willingness to serve as a witness each
time we tried to schedule this hearing in the past, and we will
have his prepared testimony entered into the hearing record.
Without objection.
And with that, I will yield to my colleague, the Ranking
Member of the Subcommittee, Mr. Honda from California.
[The prepared statement of Chairman Biggert follows:]
Prepared Statement of Chairman Judy Biggert
The hearing will come to order. I want to welcome you to this
Energy Subcommittee hearing examining the Department of Energy's
strategic plan for the Climate Change Technology Program. Our essential
question, at this point, is was it worth the wait?
Let me start by reviewing a bit of the history here. On June 11,
2001, President Bush announced two initiatives to address climate
change. Those initiatives are now known as the Climate Change
Technology Program--CCTP--and the Climate Change Science Program--CCSP.
The Administration has said that these initiatives form the core of its
policy to fulfill the U.S. commitment to stabilize greenhouse gas
concentrations under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change.
The Administration's admirable work on the Science Program can
serve as a model for how best to shape a research program so it
delivers results. Beginning in July 2002, the Department of Commerce
undertook the process of preparing a new 10-year strategic plan for the
CCSP. Science Program managers engaged national and international
stakeholders in a comprehensive review of research and observational
systems needs. CCSP submitted its November 2002 draft strategic plan to
the National Academy of Sciences for review and to the public for
comment. A December 2002 workshop, attended by 1,300 scientists and
other participants from 47 states and 36 nations, facilitated extensive
discussion and debate.
By July 2003, the CCSP strategic plan was complete. This open and
orderly process established a research agenda that has been universally
supported and will fill the gaps in our knowledge and understanding of
the earth's climate.
Today, the Commerce Department is executing its CCSP strategic
plan. The first of 21 synthesis and assessment reports was released in
May of this year. And just this week, the Secretary of Commerce
announced a new Federal Advisory Committee to provide advice as the
remaining reports are developed.
Why did I go into this degree of detail for the CCSP when the topic
of our hearing today is the CCTP? Because the thoughtful, deliberate,
open process the Administration employed to develop the CCSP gave
Congress and others the confidence that the $1.7 billion program is on
the right track.
Can I say the same thing about the $2.9 billion Technology Program?
Unfortunately, no. Compared to CCSP, the Technology Program appears
stalled near the starting line. It is now September 2006--four years
and two months after the deadline former DOE Under Secretary Robert
Card set for release of the draft technology plan--and the revised plan
is being released today. That is unacceptable. This hearing should be
examining progress in year three of that plan.
Don't get me wrong; I strongly support the Administration's stated
policy of addressing climate change through technology development.
Technology investments are like an insurance policy against climate
change. Supporting a diverse portfolio of climate change technologies
such as energy efficiency, carbon sequestration, and carbon-neutral
energy technologies--including nuclear energy--will provide us with the
most insurance coverage for the best price. We have a lot riding on
this R&D portfolio. Not only are we relying on it to help reduce
emissions of greenhouse gases, we need it to secure America's energy
independence.
As Chair of the Subcommittee with oversight responsibility for
nearly 90 percent of the programs included in CCTP, I know that
research and technology are, by and large, non-controversial ways we
can start addressing climate change now. That's why I am determined to
see progress on this front.
Since the July 2002 deadline for the release of the initial plan,
the Administration has announced a whole series of energy technology
research initiatives: the Hydrogen Fuel Initiative, the Global Nuclear
Energy Partnership, the fusion experiment ITER, and the Advanced Energy
Initiative. These are all great energy initiatives that I
enthusiastically support. At the same time, in the absence of a
rigorous, well-vetted, comprehensible plan, Congress is left to figure
out how and to what degree each of these technologies--individually and
collectively--will contribute to achieving our climate change goals.
This information is critical if Congress is to make informed decisions
about how best to allocate technology development resources to address
the problem of climate change.
We want DOE to succeed--we need DOE to succeed. I think it would be
terribly unfair to our children and grandchildren to leave the Earth in
worse condition than the way in which we received it. That is why the
government, the research community, and industry must work together to
develop technology solutions that make environmental and economic
sense. But for such a collaborative effort to succeed, we need a solid
game plan.
I think my colleagues share that sentiment. We want FutureGen,
GNEP, sequestration, and all the other climate change technologies to
work and to work well. We have high expectations. We believe those
expectations can be met with a clear strategic plan.
With that, let's get down to the business of today's hearing.
Fundamentally, we want to know whether the strategic plan can be used
to guide R&D investment decisions and whether it will enable the United
States to achieve the Administration's stated goals. Most importantly
and I cannot stress this enough, we want to know how the CCTP plan and
DOE's planning process can be improved. I look forward to the
discussion.
I want to thank the witnesses for sharing their expertise with us
today, particularly Professor Hoffert, who graciously agreed to our
invitation to serve on this panel at a very late hour. We will make
Professor Hoffert's written testimony available within a few days.
Professor Dan Kammen of the University of California at Berkeley,
originally scheduled as a witness, is not able to attend today due to a
last minute scheduling conflict. I greatly appreciate his willingness
to serve as a witness each time we tried to schedule this hearing in
the past. We have made his prepared testimony available and it will be
entered into the hearing record.
Mr. Honda. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman, and I want to thank
you for holding this important hearing today. And thank you to
the witnesses for taking time to prepare your testimony and to
be here personally.
I believe that climate change is one of the most important
issues we face as a nation and as a member of the global
community. James Hansen, a NASA scientist who is one of the
country's leading climate researchers, has said he thinks ``we
have a very brief window of opportunity to deal with climate
change, no longer than a decade, at the most.''
Most of my colleagues on this committee, from both sides of
the aisle, agree that something must be done, for which I am
thankful. Unfortunately, the same cannot be said for the full
membership of the House, the Senate, or the current
Administration.
In 2002, when the Environmental Protection Agency released
a report that concluded global warming ``is real and has been
particularly strong within the past 20 years, due mostly to
human activities,'' President Bush quickly dismissed the EPA's
work as a ``report put out by the bureaucracy.''
Instead, his Administration has used an argument of
``uncertainty'' to justify more research and no action. On a
positive note, the National Academy of Sciences has declared
that the Climate Change Science Program's strategic plan
``articulates a guiding vision, is appropriately ambitious, and
is broad in scope.'' However, the review was critical of the
program for its failure to state projected budget requirements
and lack of milestones and evaluation mechanisms.
Both of these failings seem linked to a broader strategy
designed to avoid taking any action on this very real problem.
For example, in August, the House Majority Whip stated that he
thought the information on climate change is ``not adequate yet
for us to do anything meaningful.''
This effort to foster ``uncertainty'' has impacted even the
setting of goals for greenhouse gas emission reductions.
Because of ``uncertainty,'' the Administration has refused to
set a goal for the stabilization of greenhouse gas
concentrations in the atmosphere. Instead, a goal for
greenhouse intensity, how much we emit per unit of economic
activity, has been identified.
The problem with this measure is that if our economy grows,
emission will increase. But the Earth's systems don't care
about our economy. It is the absolute amount of emissions that
matter, and more emissions are a problem.
Sadly, even the emissions intensity reductions the
Administration has set are week. According to the Energy
Information Administration, the goal that has been set is as
little as one percent improvement over business as usual.
The main question before us today is whether the Climate
Change Technology Program plan actually lays out a path for how
to achieve even the moderate targets the Administration has
set.
From the many comments about the draft plan, the answer
appears to be no. The plan may be an excellent compendium of
current technologies, but it seems to be lacking in a number of
areas.
To wit, there is no mention of cross-cutting enabling
technologies or integrated approaches to greenhouse gas
emission reduction. There are no timelines or technology
roadmaps. It places a low priority on measurement and
monitoring technologies. It makes no mention of adaptation to
climate change, and there is no mention of policy framework for
making all this happen.
Other problems have been identified with the draft plan,
but I won't take the time to list any more. They are in the
Committee hearing charter, and I expect that the witnesses will
tell us more about them in greater detail.
If we are going to achieve real reductions in greenhouse
gas emissions in order to address global climate change, it is
critical that we develop the technologies that will allow us to
do so.
The Climate Change Technology Program plan is supposed to
accelerate the development of those technologies, and so it
should be an important part of our response to climate change.
But I am worried that the draft plan that has been
developed does not provide the roadmap that is necessary to
help the Administration set priorities and make choices among
competing technologies. I hope the final plan will do so.
I look forward to hearing from the witnesses today on how
we can do just that.
And I again want to thank Madam Chairwoman for this
hearing, and I yield back the balance of my time.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Honda follows:]
Prepared Statement of Representative Michael M. Honda
Madam Chairwoman, thank you for holding this important hearing
today, and thank you to the witnesses for taking the time to prepare
your testimony and to be here.
I believe that Climate Change is one of the most important issues
we face as a nation and as a member of the global community. James
Hansen, a NASA scientist who is one of the country's leading climate
researchers, has said he thinks ``we have a very brief window of
opportunity to deal with climate change. . .no longer than a decade, at
the most.''
Most of my colleagues on this committee, from both sides of the
aisle, agree that something must be done, for which I am thankful.
Unfortunately, the same cannot be said for the full membership of the
House, the Senate, or the current Administration.
In 2002, when the Environmental Protection Agency released a report
that concluded global warming ``is real and has been particularly
strong within the past 20 years. . .due mostly to human activities,''
President Bush quickly dismissed the EPA's work as a ``report put out
by the bureaucracy.''
Instead, his Administration has used an argument of `uncertainty'
to justify more research and no action. On a positive note, the
National Academy of Sciences has declared that the Climate Change
Science Program's strategic plan ``articulates a guiding vision, is
appropriately ambitious, and is broad in scope.'' However, the review
was critical of the program for its failure to state projected budget
requirements and lack of milestones and evaluation mechanisms.
Both of these failings seem linked to a broader strategy designed
to avoid taking any action on this very real problem. For example, in
August, the House Majority Whip stated that he thought the information
on climate change is ``not adequate yet for us to do anything
meaningful.''
This effort to foster `uncertainty' has impacted even the setting
of goals for greenhouse gas emission reductions. Because of
`uncertainty,' the Administration has refused to set a goal for the
stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere;
instead, a goal for ``greenhouse gas intensity,'' how much we emit per
unit of economic activity, has been identified.
The problem with this measure is that if our economy grows,
emissions will increase. But the Earth's systems don't care about our
economy--it is the absolute amount of emissions that matters, and more
emissions are a problem.
Sadly, even the emissions intensity reductions the Administration
has set are weak. According to the Energy Information Administration,
the goal that has been set is as little as a one percent improvement
over ``business as usual.''
The main question before us today is whether the Climate Change
Technology Program plan actually lays out a path for how to achieve
even the moderate targets the Administration has set.
From the many comments about the draft plan, the answer appears to
be no. The plan may be an excellent compendium of current technologies,
but it seems to be lacking in a number of areas:
there is no mention of cross-cutting enabling
technologies or integrated approaches to greenhouse gas
emissions reduction;
there are no timelines or technology roadmaps;
it places a low priority on measurement and
monitoring technologies;
it makes no mention of adaptation to climate change;
and there is no mention of a policy framework for
making this all happen.
Other problems have been identified with the draft plan but I won't
take the time to list any more, they are in the Committee hearing
charter and I expect that the witnesses will tell us about them in
greater detail.
If we are going to achieve real reductions in greenhouse gas
emissions in order to address global climate change, it is critical
that we develop the technologies that will allow us to do so.
The Climate Change Technology Program plan is supposed to
accelerate the development of those technologies, and so it should be
an important part of our response to climate change.
But I am worried that the draft plan that has been developed does
not provide the roadmap that is necessary to help the Administration
set priorities and make choices among competing technologies. I hope
the final plan will do so.
I look forward to hearing from the witnesses today on how we can do
just that.
Thank you, Madam Chairwoman; I yield back the balance of my time.
Chairwoman Biggert. Thank you, Mr. Honda.
With that, any additional opening statements submitted by
the Members may be added to the record. Without objection.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Costello follows:]
Prepared Statement of Representative Jerry F. Costello
Good afternoon. I want to thank the witnesses for appearing before
our committee to discuss the Administration's Climate Change Technology
Program (CCTP) report being released today.
In 2002, President Bush set a national goal to reduce the
greenhouse gas intensity of the U.S. economy by 18 percent by 2012. To
this end, the Administration is now implementing numerous programs to
implement near-term policies and measures to slow the growth of
greenhouse gas emissions, advance climate change science, accelerate
technology development and commercialization, and promote international
collaboration.
Climate change plays a role in my district because of the
combustion of fossil fuels. The coal industry is of great importance to
my district in Southern Illinois which is rich in high-sulfur coal. The
shifting of production to low-sulfur coal has cost many of my
constituents high-paying jobs. The United States and my home state of
Illinois have vast reserves of coal, and about half of its electricity
is generated from this fuel. Further, coal is projected to continue to
supply one-half of U.S. electricity demands through the year 2025. In
order to continue to use coal, even under scenarios calling for
substantial carbon dioxide emission limitations, I support research and
development (R&D) of clean coal technology and I believe clean coal R&D
projects must be part of a balanced energy plan for this country. We
must burn coal more efficiently and cleanly and I authored provisions
in the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (P.L. 109-58) to accomplish this goal.
In my congressional district, Southern Illinois University
Carbondale operates its Coal Research Center, one of the field's most
comprehensive programs in the United States, with a combination of
facilities and achievements that make it a unique contributor to our
nation's energy infrastructure. The Coal Research Center conducts a
wide range of studies with direct practical applicability to the
commercial development of coal, including carbon sequestration
technology. Illinois is a national leader in developing clean and
efficient coal technologies, such as carbon sequestration, and I am
hopeful we will have the ability to host the President's FutureGen
Project to demonstrate how coal can be used cleanly, efficiently, and
represents a viable fuel source alternative to natural gas and oil.
As Congress continues to debate climate change, I believe we should
continue to further our research and development programs to advance
clean coal technology to improve our air quality and reduce greenhouse
gas emissions.
I welcome our panel of witnesses and look forward to their
testimony.
Chairwoman Biggert. At this time, I would like to introduce
all of our witnesses, and thank you for being here this
afternoon. We have, first of all, Mr. Stephen Eule is the
Director of the U.S. Climate Change Technology Program at the
Department of Energy.
Next is Ms. Judi Greenwald, the Director of Innovative
Solutions for the Pew Center on Climate Change. Thank you for
coming. Mr. Chris Mottershead is a Distinguished Advisor on
Energy and the Environment at BP. He is also a Director of the
Carbon Trust to the United Kingdom, and the Center for Clean
Air Policy in the United States. Thank you. Dr. Martin Hoffert
is an Emeritus Professor of Physics at the New York University.
Thank you for being here.
As the witnesses know, spoken testimony will be limited to
five minutes each, after which the members will have five
minutes each to ask questions.
And we will begin with Mr. Eule. Thank you.
STATEMENT OF MR. STEPHEN D. EULE, DIRECTOR OF THE U.S. CLIMATE
CHANGE TECHNOLOGY PROGRAM, DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
Mr. Eule. Madam Chairwoman and Ranking Member Honda, and
Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to
appear before you today. I am particularly pleased to be able
to use the occasion of this hearing to announce the release of
the Climate Change Technology Program's strategic plan.
The Administration believes the most effective way to meet
the challenge of climate change is through an agenda that
promotes economic growth, provides energy security, reduces
pollution, and mitigates greenhouse gases. To meet these goals,
the Administration has established a comprehensive approach,
major elements of which include policies and measures to slow
the growth of greenhouse gas emissions, advancing climate
change science, accelerating technology development, and
promoting international collaboration.
Since fiscal year 2001, the Federal Government has devoted
nearly $29 billion to climate change programs.
In 2002, President Bush set a goal to reduce the Nation's
greenhouse gas intensity, that is, emissions per unit of
economic output, by 18 percent by 2012. To this end, the
Administration has implemented about 60 federal programs.
Recent data suggests that we are well on our way toward meeting
the President's goal.
While acting to slow the growth of greenhouse gas emissions
in the near-term, the United States is laying a strong
scientific and technological foundation. In 2002, two multi-
agency programs were established to coordinate federal climate
change science and technology R&D activities: the Climate
Change Science Program, or CCSP, and CCTP. CCSP is an
interagency planning and coordinating entity charged with:
investigating natural and human-induced changes in the Earth's
global environmental system; monitoring, understanding, and
predicting global change; and providing a sound scientific
basis for decision-making.
CCTP, which was authorized in the Energy Policy Act of
2005, was formed to coordinate and prioritize the Federal
Government's investment in climate-related technology, which
was nearly $3 billion in fiscal year 2006, and to further the
President's National Climate Change Technology Initiative, or
NCCTI. Ten R&D agencies participate in CCTP.
CCTP's principal aim is to accelerate the development and
lower the cost of advanced technologies that reduce, avoid, or
sequester greenhouse gases. It strives for a diversified
Federal R&D portfolio that will help to reduce technology risk
and improve the prospects that such technologies can be adopted
in the marketplace. In August 2005, CCTP issued its Vision and
Framework for Strategy and Planning, which provided broad
guidance for the program, and shortly thereafter released its
draft strategic plan for public review. More than 250 comments
were received.
This revised strategic plan articulates a vision for the
role of advanced technology in addressing climate change,
establishes strategic direction and guiding principles,
outlines approaches to achieve CTCP's strategic goals, and
identifies a series of next steps. The six CTCP goals are:
reducing emissions from energy use and infrastructure; reducing
emissions from energy supply; capturing and sequestering carbon
dioxide; reducing emissions from non-carbon dioxide greenhouse
gases; measuring and monitoring emissions; and bolstering the
contributions of basic science.
The strategic plan defines clear and promising roles for
advanced technologies for the near-, mid-, and long-term,
outlines a process and establishes criteria for setting
priorities, such as those in NCCTI, and provides details of the
current climate change technology portfolio with links to
individual technology roadmaps.
CCTP's portfolio includes realigned activities as well as
new initiatives, such as the President's Advanced Energy and
Hydrogen Fuel Initiatives, carbon sequestration, and FutureGen.
CCTP agencies also periodically conduct portfolio reviews to
assess the ability of these programs to meet CCTP goals, and to
identify gaps and opportunities. In addition, CCTP uses
scenario analyses to assess the potential climate change
benefits of different technology mixes over the century, on the
global scale, and across a range of uncertainties. When
comparing the costs of achieving different greenhouse gas
constraints, the cost savings for the advanced technologies
cases were 60 percent or more.
The Administration believes that well designed multilateral
collaborations can leverage resources and quicken technology
development. The International Partnership for the Hydrogen
Economy, Carbon Sequestration Leadership Forum, Generation IV
International Forum, Methane to Markets--all U.S. initiatives--
and the ITER fusion project, provide vehicles for international
collaboration to advance these technologies.
The New Global Nuclear Energy Partnership seeks to develop
a worldwide consensus on approaches to expand safe use of zero
emission nuclear power. And of course, through the Asian
Pacific Partnership, the U.S. is working with Australia, China,
India, and South Korea, and Japan, to accelerate the uptake of
clean technologies in this rapidly growing region of the world.
The United States has embarked on an ambitious undertake to
develop advanced climate change technologies. CCTP's strategic
plan, the first of its kind, sets out an overall strategy to
guide these efforts, and provides a long-term planning context
in which the nature of both the challenges and the
opportunities for advanced technologies are considered and
realized.
Thank you for your kind attention, and I will, of course,
be delighted to answer any questions you may have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Eule follows:]
Prepared Statement of Stephen D. Eule
INTRODUCTION
Madam Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the
opportunity to appear before you today and report on the Climate Change
Technology Program (CCTP). I am particularly pleased to be able to use
the occasion of this hearing to announce the release of CCTP's
completed Strategic Plan. It represents the culmination of strong
interagency effort, shaped by expert technical input and public
comment.
I would like to begin my testimony by providing a brief overview of
the Administration's approach to climate change, which provides the
context in which CCTP operates. I will also discuss the role of CCTP,
explain the purpose of the Strategic Plan, and discuss how the Plan
will help the Administration and Congress make decisions about
investments in advanced technologies that can have a significant impact
on reducing greenhouse gas emissions.
As a party to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change (UNFCCC), the United States shares with many countries its
ultimate objective: stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in
the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic
interference with the climate system. In February 2002, President Bush
reaffirmed the Administration's commitment to this long-term goal of
the Framework Convention.
There is a growing recognition that climate change cannot be dealt
with effectively in isolation. Rather, it needs to be addressed as part
of an integrated agenda that promotes economic growth, provides energy
security, reduces pollution, and also mitigates greenhouse gas
emissions. In July 2005, the G8 leaders, meeting in Gleneagles,
Scotland, agreed to a plan of action that interlinked climate change
objectives with these other important considerations.
Meeting these complementary objectives will require a sustained,
long-term commitment by all nations over many generations. To this end,
the President has established a robust and flexible climate change
policy that harnesses the power of markets and technological
innovation, maintains economic growth, and encourages global
participation.
Major elements of this approach include: (1) implementing near-term
policies and measures to slow the growth in greenhouse gas emissions;
(2) advancing climate change science; (3) accelerating technology
development and commercialization; and (4) promoting international
collaboration.
From fiscal years 2001 to the end of 2006, the Federal Government
will have devoted nearly $29 billion to science, technology,
international assistance, and incentive programs that support climate
change objectives, more than any other nation. The President's fiscal
year 2007 budget calls for $6.5 billion for climate-related activities.
NEAR-TERM POLICIES AND MEASURES
In 2002, President Bush set an ambitious but achievable national
goal to reduce the greenhouse gas intensity--that is, emissions per
unit of economic output--of the U.S. economy by 18 percent by 2012. At
the time, the Administration estimated that achieving this commitment
would avoid an additional 106 million metric tons of carbon-equivalent
emissions in 2012 compared to the Energy Information Administration's
Annual Energy Outlook 2002 business as usual base case projection, and
would result in cumulative savings of more than 500 million metric tons
of carbon-equivalent emissions over the decade.
To this end, the Administration is now implementing numerous
programs--including partnerships, consumer information campaigns,
incentives, and mandatory regulations--that are directed at developing
and deploying cleaner, more efficient energy technologies,
conservation, biological sequestration, geological sequestration and
adaptation. For example, the Department of Energy's (DOE) Climate
VISION program and the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) Climate
Leaders and SmartWay Transport Partnership programs work in voluntary
partnership with specific commitments by industry to verifiably reduce
emissions. The Department of Agriculture (USDA) is using its
conservation programs to provide substantial incentives to increase
carbon sequestration in soils and trees, and to reduce methane and
nitrous oxide emissions, two additional and potent greenhouse gases,
from crop and animal agricultural systems. The Department of
Transportation (DOT) has implemented a new fuel economy standard for
light trucks, including sport utility vehicles, that is projected to
result in significant reductions in CO2 emissions over the
life of the affected vehicles. DOT has also submitted an Administration
proposal to Congress for authority to reform the setting and
calculation of fuel economy standards for passenger automobiles.
In terms of financial incentives, new tax rules on expensing and
dividends are helping to promote substantial new capital investment,
including purchases of cleaner, more efficient equipment and
facilities. The Energy Policy Act of 2005 provides for approximately
$1.6 billion in tax credits and incentives in fiscal year 2007 to
accelerate the market penetration of clean, efficient technologies. For
example, the Act also provides tax credits of up to $3,400 for the most
highly fuel efficient vehicles such as hybrids and clean diesel. It
also establishes 15 new appliance efficiency mandates and a 7.5 billion
gallon renewable fuel requirement by 2012.
We expect these efforts will contribute to meeting the President's
18 percent, 10-year goal, which represents an average annual rate of
improvement of about 1.96 percent. Data from the Energy Information
Administration (EIA) suggest steady progress. Since 2002, EIA reports
annual improvements in greenhouse gas emissions intensity of 1.6
percent and 2.1 percent in 2003 and 2004, respectively. Further, a June
2006 EIA preliminary ``flash estimate'' estimate of energy-related
carbon dioxide emissions--which account for about four fifths of total
greenhouse gas emissions--shows an improvement in carbon dioxide
emissions intensity of 3.3 percent in 2005. Although we are only a few
years into the effort, the Nation appears on track to meet the
President's goal.
While acting to slow the growth of greenhouse gas emissions in the
near-term, the United States is laying a strong scientific and
technological foundation to reduce uncertainties, clarify risks and
benefits, and develop realistic mitigation options through better
integration and management of its climate change related scientific and
technological activities. In February 2002, President Bush announced
the creation of a cabinet-level Committee on Climate Change Science and
Technology Integration, co-chaired by the Secretaries of Commerce and
Energy. Two multi-agency programs were established to coordinate
federal activities in climate change scientific research and advance
the President's vision under his National Climate Change Technology
Initiative (NCCTI). These are the U.S. Climate Change Science Program
(CCSP), led by the Department of Commerce, and CCTP, led by DOE.
CLIMATE CHANGE SCIENCE PROGRAM\1\
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\1\ See: http://www.climatescience.gov.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
CCSP is an interagency research planning and coordinating entity
charged with investigating natural and human-induced changes in the
Earth's global environmental system, monitoring, understanding, and
predicting global change, and providing a sound scientific basis for
national and international decision-making. CCSP combines the near-term
focus of the Administration's Climate Change Research Initiative--
including a focus on advancing the understanding of aerosols and carbon
sources and sinks and improvements in climate modeling--with the
breadth of the long-term research elements of the U.S. Global Change
Research Program.
In July 2003, CCSP released its Strategic Plan for guiding climate
research. The plan is organized around five goals: (1) improving our
knowledge of climate history, variability, and change; (2) improving
our ability to quantify factors that affect climate; (3) reducing
uncertainty in climate projections; (4) improving our understanding of
the sensitivity and adaptability of ecosystems and human systems to
climate change; and (5) exploring options to manage risks associated
with climate variability and change. CCSP is now in the process of
implementing its 10-year Plan. The President's fiscal year 2007 budget
request includes $1.715 billion for the climate change science. The
knowledge gained through CCSP will be invaluable in helping CCTP plan
for needed technology development.
CLIMATE CHANGE TECHNOLOGY PROGRAM\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ See: http://www.climatetechnology.gov.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
To address the challenges of energy security, economic development,
and climate change, there is need for a visionary, long-term
perspective. The International Energy Agency estimates there are about
two billion people who lack modern energy services. Many countries are
focusing efforts on providing power to their citizens. Although
projections vary considerably, a tripling of energy demand by 2100 is
certainly not unreasonable. When one considers further that energy-
related carbon dioxide emissions account for about four fifths of all
greenhouse gas emissions, the scale of the challenge becomes apparent.
Most anthropogenic greenhouse gases emitted over the course of the 21st
century will come from equipment and infrastructure not yet built, a
circumstance that poses significant opportunities to reduce or
eliminate these emissions.
As we look to the future, providing the energy necessary to power
economic growth and development while at the same time reducing
greenhouse gas emissions is going to require cost-effective
transformational technologies that can fundamentally alter the way we
produce and use energy. Given the huge capital investment in existing
energy systems, the desired transformation of the global energy system
may take many decades. A robust research effort undertaken today can
make new, competitive technologies available sooner rather than later
and accelerate modernization of capital stock.
Other greenhouse gases from non-energy related sources--methane,
nitrous oxides, sulfur hexafluoride, and fluorocarbons, among others--
also pose a concern. They have higher warming potentials than carbon
dioxide. In aggregate, these gases present a large opportunity to
reduce global radiative forcing and, in many cases, the technical
strategies to reduce their emissions are straightforward and tractable.
Finding ways to mitigate these other greenhouse gases is an important
part of CCTP's technology strategy.
The United States is leading the development of many advanced
technology options that have the potential to reduce, avoid, or
sequester greenhouse gas emissions. CCTP was created in 2002, and
subsequently authorized in Title XVI of the Energy Policy Act of 2005,
to coordinate and prioritize the Federal Government's investment in
climate-related technology and to further the President's National
Climate Change Technology Initiative (NCCTI). The fiscal year 2007
Budget includes nearly $3 billion for CCTP-related activities.
CCTP's principal aim is to accelerate the development and reduce
the cost of new and advanced technologies with the potential to reduce,
avoid, or sequester greenhouse gas emissions. It does this by providing
strategic direction for the CCTP-related elements of the overall
federal technology portfolio. It also facilitates the coordinated
planning, programming, budgeting, and implementation of the technology
development and deployment aspects of U.S. climate change strategy.
CCTP also is assessing different technology options and their potential
contributions to reducing greenhouse gas emissions over the short-,
mid-, and long-term to help inform budget decisions and priorities.
STRATEGIC PLANNING FOR TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT: CCTP conducts its
planning under conditions of uncertainty and across a wide range of
possible futures. The pace and scope of needed change will be driven
partially by future trends in greenhouse gas emissions that are subject
to great a deal of ambiguity. The complex relationships among
population growth, economic development, energy demand, mix, and
intensity, resource availability, technology, and other variables make
it impossible to accurately predict future greenhouse gas emissions on
a 100-year time scale.
In August 2005, CCTP issued its Vision and Framework for Strategy
and Planning. This document provides an overall strategy to guide and
strengthen our technical efforts to reduce emissions. Shortly
thereafter, CCTP released its draft Strategic Plan for public review
and comment. More than 250 comments were received and addressed. We
appreciate the thoughtful comments we received, which have improved the
document.
Today, CCTP issues its completed Strategic Plan. Building on the
guidance in the Vision and Framework, the Strategic Plan articulates a
vision of the role for advanced technology in addressing climate
change, defines a supporting mission for CCTP, establishes strategic
direction and guiding principles for Federal R&D agencies to use in
formulating research and development portfolio, outlines approaches to
attain CCTP's strategic goals, and identifies a series of next steps
toward implementation.
CCTP's strategic vision has six complementary goals: (1) reducing
emissions from energy use and infrastructure; (2) reducing emissions
from energy supply; (3) capturing and sequestering CO2; (4)
reducing emissions of non-CO2 greenhouse gases; (5)
measuring and monitoring emissions; and (6) bolstering the
contributions of basic science.
Ten federal agencies support a broad portfolio of activities within
this framework. Participating federal agencies in CCTP include the
Departments of Energy, Agriculture, Commerce, Defense, Health and Human
Services, Interior, State, and Transportation, as well as the
Environmental Protection Agency, the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration, and the National Science Foundation.
The Strategic Plan provides a comprehensive, long-term look at the
nature of the climate change challenge and its potential solutions. It
defines clear and promising roles for advanced technologies by grouping
technologies for near-, mid- and long-term deployment. Together these
technologies will facilitate meeting CCTP goals. It also outlines a
process and criteria for setting priorities by organizing and aligning
federal climate change R&D and discusses in detail the current climate
change technology portfolio, with links to individual technology
roadmaps and goals. CCTP and the participating agencies periodically
conduct and support strategic planning exercises to identify gaps and
opportunities in climate change technology and realign the portfolio as
appropriate.
The Strategic Plan also identifies a number of next steps outlining
an ambitious agenda for advancing climate change technology
development. These include strengthening the Federal R&D portfolio,
intensifying basic research support of the applied technology R&D
programs, extending international cooperation, and exploring a number
of supporting technology policy mechanisms.
Many CCTP activities build on existing work, but the Administration
also has expanded and realigned some activities and launched new
initiatives in key technology areas to support the CCTP's goals. The
President's NCCTI includes 12 discrete activities that could advance
technologies to avoid, reduce, or capture and store greenhouse gas
emissions on a large scale. The Administration's budget proposal for
fiscal year 2007 included $306 million for these NCCTI priorities.
CCTP anticipates that a progression of advanced technologies will
be available and enter the marketplace in the near-, mid-, and long-
terms. Figure 1 provides a schematic roadmap for the technologies being
pursued under CCTP. Readers wishing a fuller explanation of the
technology research described below should consult CCTP's Research and
Current Activities and Technology Options for the Near- and Long-Term
reports, both of which are available on the CCTP web page. Short
descriptions of each of the NCCTI priorities are also available on the
CCTP web page.
ENERGY USE AND INFRASTRUCTURE: Improving energy efficiency and reducing
greenhouse gas emissions intensity in transportation, buildings, and
industrial processes can contribute greatly to overall greenhouse gas
emission reductions. In addition, improving the electricity
transmission and distribution ``grid'' infrastructure can reduce
greenhouse gas emissions by making power generation more efficient of
by providing greater grid access for wind and solar power.
Key research activities include FreedomCAR (Cooperative Automotive
Research)\3\ program, a cost-shared government-industry partnership
that is pursuing fuel cell and other advanced automotive technologies.
Advanced heavy-duty vehicles technologies, zero-energy homes and
commercial buildings, solid-state lighting, and superconducting wires
that virtually eliminate electricity transmission losses are other
areas of research that could yield significant emissions reduction.
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\3\ See: http://www1.eere.energy.gov/vehiclesandfuels/about/
partnerships/freedomcar/index.html
ENERGY SUPPLY: Fossil fuels, which emit CO2 when burned,
remain the world's energy supply of choice. A transition to a low-
carbon energy future would, therefore, require the availability of
cost-competitive low- or zero-carbon energy supply options. When
combined with alternative energy carriers--such as electricity and
hydrogen--these options could offer the prospect of considerable
reductions in greenhouse gas emissions.
Renewable energy includes a range of different technologies that
can play an important role in reducing greenhouse gas emissions. The
United States invests considerable resources in wind, solar
photovoltaics, and biomass technologies. We have made much progress in
price competitiveness of many of these technologies, but there still is
a need to reduce their manufacturing, operating, and maintenance costs.
For example, new biotechnology breakthroughs offer the potential for
extensive domestic production of cellulosic ethanol by both improving
feedstocks and increasing the efficiency of converting lignocellulosic
material to ethanol. DOE's Office of Science has awarded up to $250
million over five years (subject to appropriations) for two new
bioenergy research centers to advance the science needed to develop new
cellulosic conversion technologies, which could decrease greatly the
greenhouse gas emissions from liquid transportation fuels.\4\
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\4\ See: http://genomicsgtl.energy.gov/centers/index.shtml
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There will be a continuing need for portable, storable energy
carriers for heat, power, and transportation. Hydrogen is an excellent
energy carrier, produces no emissions when used in a fuel cell, and can
be produced from diverse sources, including renewables, nuclear, and
fossil fuels (which in the latter case could be combined with carbon
capture). President Bush's $1.2 billion Hydrogen Fuel Initiative\5\ is
exploring these production options as well as the infrastructure needed
to store and deliver hydrogen economically and safely. It is expected
that the research being performed under the program will make possible
a commercialization decision by industry in 2015 and possible market
introduction of hydrogen fuel-cell vehicles by 2020.
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\5\ See: http://www.eere.energy.gov/hydrogenandfuelcells/
presidents--initiative.html
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The United States has vast reserves of coal, and about half of its
electricity is generated from this fuel. Advanced fossil-based power
and fuels, therefore, is an area of special interest. The FutureGen\6\
project is a 10-year, $1 billion government-industry collaboration--
which includes India and the Republic of Korea--to build the world's
first near-zero atmospheric emissions coal-fired power plant. This
project will incorporate the latest technologies in carbon
sequestration, oxygen and hydrogen separation membranes, turbines, fuel
cells, and coal-to-hydrogen gasification. This research can help coal
remain part of a diverse, secure, and environmentally acceptable energy
portfolio well into the future.
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\6\ See: http://fossil.energy.gov/programs/powersystems/futuregen/
index.html
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Concerns over resource availability, energy security, and air
quality as well as climate change suggest a larger role for nuclear
power as an energy supply choice. The Generation IV Nuclear Energy
Systems Initiative\7\ is investigating the next-generation reactor and
fuel cycle systems that represent a significant leap in economic
performance, safety, and proliferation-resistance. While the primary
focus for developing a next-generation reactor is on producing
electricity in a highly efficient manner, there is also the possibility
of coupling a reactor with advanced technology that would allow for the
production of hydrogen. These advanced technologies are being developed
under the Nuclear Hydrogen Initiative\8\ and could possibly enable the
production of hydrogen on a scale to meet transportation needs.
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\7\ See: http://gen-iv.ne.doe.gov
\8\ See: http://nuclear.gov/hydrogen/hydrogenOV.html
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Fusion energy\9\ is a way to generate power that, if successfully
developed, could be used to produce electricity and possibly hydrogen.
Fusion has features that make it is an attractive option from both an
environmental and safety perspective. However, the technical hurdles of
fusion energy are very high, and with a commercialization objective of
2050, its potential impact would be in the second half of the century.
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\9\ See: http://www.sc.doe.gov/Program--Offices/fes.htm
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In his 2006 State of the Union Address, President Bush outlined
plans for an Advanced Energy Initiative (AEI).\10\ AEI aims to
accelerate the development of advanced technologies that could change
the way American homes, businesses, and automobiles are powered. AEI is
designed to take advantage of technologies that with a little push
could play a big role in helping to reduce the Nation's use of foreign
sources of energy and its pollution and greenhouse gas emissions. AEI
includes greater investments in near-zero atmospheric emissions coal-
fired plants, solar and wind power, nuclear energy, better battery and
fuel cell technologies for pollution-free cars, and cellulosic
biorefining technologies for biofuels production.
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\10\ See: http://www.whitehouse.gov/stateoftheunion/2006/energy/
index.html
CARBON SEQUESTRATION: Carbon capture and sequestration is a central
element of CCTP's strategy because for the foreseeable future, fossil
fuels will continue to be among the world's most reliable and lowest-
cost form of energy. A realistic approach, then, is to find ways to
``sequester'' the CO2 produced when these fuels--especially
coal--are used. The phrase ``carbon sequestration'' describes a number
of technologies and methods to capture, transport, and store CO2
or remove it from the atmosphere.
Advanced techniques to capture gaseous CO2 from energy
and industrial facilities and store it permanently in geologic
formations are under development. The Department of Energy's core
Carbon Sequestration Program\11\ emphasizes technologies that capture
CO2 from large point sources and store the emissions in
geologic formations that potentially could hold vast amounts of
CO2.
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\11\ See: http://fossil.energy.gov/programs/sequestration/
index.html
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Terrestrial sequestration--removing CO2 from the
atmosphere and sequestering it in trees, soils, or other organic
materials--has proven to be a low-cost means for long-term carbon
storage. The Carbon Sequestration in Terrestrial Ecosystems consortium,
supported by DOE's Office of Science, provides research on mechanisms
that can enhance terrestrial sequestration.
In 2003, DOE launched a nationwide network of seven Carbon
Sequestration Regional Partnerships\12\ that include 40 states, four
Canadian Provinces, three Indian Nations, and over 300 organizations.
The partnerships' main focus is on determining the best approaches for
sequestration in their regions, and they also will examine regulatory
and infrastructure needs. Small-scale validation testing of 35 sites
involving terrestrial and geologic sequestration technologies began in
2005, and will continue until 2009.
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\12\ See: http://fossil.energy.gov/programs/sequestration/
partnerships/index.html
NON-CARBON DIOXIDE GREENHOUSE GASES: A main component of the U.S.
strategy is to reduce other greenhouse gases, such as methane, nitrous
oxides (N2O), sulfur hexafluoride (SF6), and
fluorocarbons, among others.
Improvements in methods and technologies to detect and either
collect or prevent methane emissions from various sources--such as
landfills, coal mines, natural gas pipelines, and oil and gas
exploration operations--can prevent this greenhouse gas from escaping
to the atmosphere.\13\ In agriculture, improved management practices
for fertilizer applications and livestock waste can reduce methane and
N2O emissions appreciably.
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\13\ Reducing methane emissions may also have a positive benefit in
reducing local ozone problems, as methane is an ozone precursor.
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Hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), perfluorocarbons (PFCs), and SF6
are all high global warming potential (High GWP) gases. HFCs and PFCs
are used as substitutes for ozone-depleting chlorofluorocarbons and are
used in or emitted during complex manufacturing processes. Advanced
methods to reduce the leakage of, reuse, and recycle these chemicals
and lower GWP alternatives are being explored.
Programs aimed at reducing particulate matter have led to
significant advances in fuel combustion and emission control
technologies to reduce U.S. black carbon aerosol emissions. Reducing
emissions of black carbon, soot, and other chemical aerosols can have
multiple benefits, including better air quality and public health and
reduced radiative forcing.
MEASURING AND MONITORING: To meet future greenhouse gas emissions
measurement requirements, a wide array of sensors, measuring platforms,
monitoring and inventorying systems, and inference methods are being
developed. Many of the baseline measurement, observation, and sensing
systems used to advance climate change science are being developed as
part of CCSP. CCTP's efforts focus primarily on validating the
performance of various climate change technologies, such as in
terrestrial and geologic sequestration.
BASIC SCIENCE: Basic scientific research is a fundamental element of
CCTP. Meeting the dual challenges of addressing climate change and
meeting growing world energy demand is likely to require discoveries
and innovations that can shape the future in often unexpected ways. The
CCTP framework aims to strengthen the basic research enterprise through
strategic research that supports ongoing or projected research
activities and exploratory research involving innovative concepts.
SCENARIO ANALYSIS: CCTP uses scenario analyses that incorporate various
assumptions about the future to clarify the potential role of climate
change technologies and to aid in portfolio planning. Scenarios
analyses can provide a relative indication of the potential climate
change benefits of a particular technology mix compared to others, and
it can help determine which classes of technology would most likely
provide larger-scale benefits. Figure 2 offers a glimpse of the range
of emissions reductions new technologies in energy end use, energy
supply, carbon sequestration, and other non-CO2 greenhouse
gases may make possible on a 100-year scale and across a range of
uncertainties and constraints.
Potential ranges of greenhouse gas emissions reductions to 2100 by
category of activity for three technology scenarios characterized by:
viable carbon sequestration (Scenario 1); dramatically expanded nuclear
and renewable energy (Scenario 2); and novel and advanced technologies
(Scenario 3). Note also the consistently large potential reductions in
other greenhouse gas emissions under all three scenarios (CCTP 2006).
INTERNATIONAL COLLABORATIONS
The United States believes that well-designed multilateral
collaborations focused on achieving practical results can accelerate
development and commercialization of new technologies. The U.S. has
initiated or joined a number of multilateral technology collaborations
in hydrogen, carbon sequestration, nuclear energy, and fusion that
address many energy-related concerns (e.g., energy security, climate
change, environmental protection).
Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate\14\ (APP):
Launched formally in January 2006, APP is a multi-stakeholder
partnership working to generate practical and innovative projects
promoting clean development and the mitigation of greenhouse gases. The
six APP partnering nations--Australia, China, India, Japan, South
Korea, and the United States--account for about half of the world's
economy, energy use, and greenhouse gas emissions. APP is pursuing
public-private partnerships to build local capacity, improve efficiency
and reduce greenhouse gas emissions, create new investment
opportunities, and remove barriers to the introduction of clean energy
technologies in the Asia Pacific region. At the ministerial launch, the
APP partners created eight task forces in the following areas: (1)
cleaner fossil energy; (2) renewable energy and distributed generation;
(3) power generation and transmission; (4) steel; (5) aluminum; (6)
cement; (7) coal mining; and (8) buildings and appliances. Each Task
Force is completing an Action Plan that will serve as blueprint for
cooperation and provide a strategic framework for identifying and
implementing Partnership activities. The President's fiscal year 2007
budget request includes $52 million to support APP.
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\14\ See: http://www.asiapacificpartnership.org
INTERNATIONAL PARTNERSHIP FOR THE HYDROGEN ECONOMY (IPHE)\15\: In
November 2003, representatives from 16 governments gathered in
Washington, DC to launch IPHE, a vehicle to coordinate and leverage
multinational hydrogen research programs. Moreover, IPHE will develop
common recommendations for internationally-recognized standards and
safety protocols to speed market penetration of hydrogen technologies.
An important aspect of IPHE is maintaining communications with the
private sector and other stakeholders to foster public-private
collaboration and address the technological, financial, and
institutional barriers to hydrogen.
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\15\ See: http://www.iphe.net. IPHE members include the United
States, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, European Commission, France,
Germany, Iceland, India, Italy, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Republic of
Korea, Russian Federation, and United Kingdom.
CARBON SEQUESTRATION LEADERSHIP FORUM (CSLF)\16\: CSLF is a U.S.
initiative that was established at a ministerial meeting held in
Washington, DC, in June 2003. CSLF is a multilateral initiative that
provides a framework for international collaboration on sequestration
technologies. CSLF has as members 22 governments representing both
developed and developing countries.
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\16\ See: http://www.cslforum.org. CSLF members include the United
States, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, Colombia, Denmark, European
Commission, France, Germany, Greece, India, Italy, Japan, Korea,
Mexico, Netherlands, Norway, Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, South
Africa, and United Kingdom.
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The Forum's main focus is assisting the development of technologies
to separate, capture, transport, and store CO2 safely over
the long-term, making carbon sequestration technologies broadly
available internationally, and addressing wider issues, such as
regulation and policy, relating to carbon capture and storage. To date,
17 international research projects have been endorsed by the Forum,
five of which involve the United States.
GENERATION IV INTERNATIONAL FORUM (GIF)\17\: In July 2001, nine other
countries and Euratom joined together under U.S. leadership to charter
GIF, a multilateral collaboration to fulfill the objective of the
Generation IV Nuclear Energy Systems Initiative. GIF's goal is to
develop a fourth generation of advanced, economical, and safe nuclear
systems that offer enhanced proliferation-resistance and can be adopted
commercially by 2030. Six technologies have been selected as the most
promising candidates for future designs, some of which could be
commercially ready in the 2020 to 2030 timeframe. GIF countries are
jointly preparing a collaborative research program to develop and
demonstrate the projects.
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\17\ See: http://gen-iv.ne.doe.gov/GENIVintl-gif.asp. GIF member
countries include the United States, Argentina, Brazil, Canada, France,
Japan, Korea, South Africa, Switzerland, and United Kingdom.
ITER\18\: In January 2003, President Bush announced that the U.S. was
joining the negotiations for the construction and operation of the
international fusion experiment called ITER. ITER is a proposed
multilateral collaborative project to design and demonstrate a fusion
energy production system. If successful, this multi-year, multi-billion
dollar project will advance progress toward determining whether fusion
technology can produce clean, abundant, commercially available energy
by the middle of the century.
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\18\ See: http://www.iter.org. ITER members include the United
States, China, EU, India, Japan, Russian Federation, and Republic of
Korea.
GLOBAL NUCLEAR ENERGY PARTNERSHIP (GNEP)\19\: GNEP has two major goals:
(1) expand carbon-free nuclear energy to meet growing electricity
demand worldwide; and (2) promote non-proliferation objectives through
the leasing of nuclear fuel to countries which agree to forgo
enrichment and reprocessing. A more fully closed fuel cycle model
envisioned by this partnership requires development and deployment of
technologies that enable recycling and consumption of long-lived
radioactive waste. The GNEP initiative proposes international
partnerships and significant cost-sharing to achieve these goals.
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\19\ See: http://www.gnep.energy.gov
Methane to Markets: The Methane to Markets Partnership is another
highly practical major element in the series of international
technology partnerships advanced by the Administration. Launched in
November 2004, the Methane to Markets Partnership focuses on advancing
cost effective, near-term methane recovery and use as a clean energy
source from coal beds, natural gas facilities, landfills, and
agricultural waste management systems. The Partnership will reduce
global methane emissions to enhance economic growth, promote energy
security, improve the environment, and reduce greenhouse gas emissions.
Other benefits include improving mine safety, reducing waste, and
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improving local air quality.
CLOSING OBSERVATIONS
The United States, in partnership with others, has embarked on an
ambitious undertaking to develop new and advanced climate change
technologies that have the potential to transform the economic
activities that give rise to greenhouse gas emissions. CCTP's Strategic
Plan sets out an overall strategy to guide and strengthen our technical
efforts to reduce emissions, articulates a vision of the role for
advanced technology in addressing climate change, and provides a long-
term planning context in which the nature of both the challenges and
the opportunities for advanced technologies are illuminated and
balanced.
Innovations can be expected to change the ways in which the world
produces and uses energy, performs industrial processes, grows crops
and livestock, manages carbon dioxide, and uses land. In keeping with
U.S. climate change strategy, which is consistent with the United
Nations' Framework Convention, these technologies could both enable and
facilitate a gradual shift toward significantly lower global greenhouse
gas emissions. They would also continue to provide the energy-related
and other services needed to spur and sustain economic growth.
REFERENCES
CCTP 2006--U.S. Climate Change Technology Program, Strategic Plan,
Chapter 3, ``Synthesis Assessment of Long-term Climate Change
Technology Scenarios,'' (Washington, DC: CCTP). Available at:
www.climatetechnology.gov
Biography for Stephen D. Eule
Stephen D. Eule is the Director of the Climate Change Technology
Program in the Office of Policy and International Affairs at the U.S.
Department of Energy. Mr. Eule also manages DOE's participation in the
Climate VISION program and the Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean
Development and Climate, and he represents the Department at various
international fora on climate change.
Before joining DOE in June 2003, Mr. Eule spent a decade working in
various public policy positions. He spent a number of years in the U.S.
House of Representatives, first as a professional staffer and then
Subcommittee Staff Director, with the Committee on Science and then as
Legislative Director in the personal office of Representative Nick
Smith (R-MI). He also served in Christie Todd Whitman's Washington
Office as an environmental analyst. Previous to that, he spent about
eight years with The Orkand Corporation as an energy consultant to the
Energy Information Administration. His experience also includes a stint
with the Heritage Foundation, where he was Assistant Editor on the book
Free Market Energy.
Mr. Eule earned a Master of Arts degree in geography from The
George Washington University and a Bachelor of Science degree in
biology from Southern Connecticut State College.
Chairwoman Biggert. Thank you very much. Ms. Greenwald, you
are recognized for five minutes. Push the button on the----
STATEMENT OF MS. JUDITH M. GREENWALD, DIRECTOR OF INNOVATIVE
SOLUTIONS, PEW CENTER ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE
Ms. Greenwald. Thank you. Madam Chair and Members of the
Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify. My name
is Judi Greenwald, and I am the Director of Innovative
Solutions for the Pew Center of Global Climate Change.
The Pew Center believes that there are three things we in
the United States must do to reduce the real and growing risks
posed by global climate change. First, we must enact and
implement a comprehensive national program to progressively and
significantly reduce U.S. emissions of greenhouse gases in a
manner that contributes to sustained economic growth. Given
that the U.S. greenhouse gas emissions have risen steadily
despite 15 years of voluntary efforts, the national program
will need to include mandatory reductions.
Second, the United States must work with other countries to
establish an international framework that engages all the major
greenhouse gas emitting nations in a fair and effective long-
term effort to protect our global climate. Third, we must
strengthen our efforts to develop and deploy climate-friendly
technologies, and to diffuse those technologies on a global
scale.
In your invitation, you asked me to address three specific
questions. First, what do you see as the key strengths and
weaknesses of the U.S. Climate Technology Program's strategic
plan? While the draft strategic plan provides a fine overview
of greenhouse gas reducing technologies and the opportunities
each could present over the long-term, it does not provide a
plan for deploying these technologies, nor does it provide a
path to stabilizing concentrations of greenhouse gases.
The technologies considered in the plan are vitally
important. However, merely compiling information about them is
not sufficient to ensure their widespread penetration into the
marketplace. Markets work when individuals can balance out
their own costs and benefits. As with many environmental
problems, individuals generally don't receive financial
benefits from taking action on climate change. There is clearly
a value to society of maximizing climate change--of minimizing
damaging climate effects, but the market does not capture that
benefit for those who bear the costs.
Therefore, simply creating a supply of carbon reduction
technologies does not mean that there will be a demand for
them. A mandatory constraint on emissions, on the other hand,
will make emission reductions financially valuable to the
individual producing them, creating a demand for emissions
reducing technologies in the marketplace.
Your second question was will the CCTP enable the
Administration to meet its goal of cutting greenhouse gas
intensity by 18 percent by 2012, and does the CTCP put the
United States on a path to stabilizing greenhouse gas
emissions? Our response is that the draft plan is likely quite
adequate for meeting the current goal of 18 percent reduction
in intensity, but that is only because the goal largely
reflects business as usual.
But neither the plan nor the 18 percent intensity reduction
goal will put the U.S. on a path to stabilizing greenhouse gas
emissions. Even if this intensity goal is met, emissions will
continue to rise, rather than stabilize. Interestingly, DOE
only examined scenarios with emissions constraints to determine
the estimates of the technologies' potential contributions to
GHG reductions. Thus, DOE's own analysis confirms what those
who seriously examine this issue know, that potential
reductions are driven by the existence of constraints on
emissions.
Further, any effort to reduce emissions should be achieved
through a combination of technology push, i.e., R&D, with
technology pull, i.e., emission constraints. According to a
report from the Congressional Budget Office released just this
week, a combination of these two policies would be necessary to
reduce carbon emissions at the lowest possible cost. Further,
they suggest the largest gains in economic efficiency are
likely to come from pricing emissions, for example, through a
cap and trade program, rather than from funding R&D. Thus, the
Administration's approach is necessary, but not sufficient to
achieve stabilization.
Your last question was does the draft strategic plan
provide a sound framework? The Pew Center is pleased to see
that the plan does not pick winners, but rather, it examines a
broad portfolio of technologies that have the potential to
reduce emissions on a large scale, making the most cost-
effective technologies available for reductions in the future.
The Pew Center supports the portfolio planning and
investment criteria that the CCTP uses to evaluate various
technologies, maximizing return on investment, supporting
public-private partnerships, focusing on technology with large
scale potential, and sequencing R&D investments in a logical
developmental order are essential in determining what
technologies to support.
In addition to the evaluation of known technologies, we
believe that efforts to explore new and innovative
opportunities should also be promoted. We would also like to
see greater assurance that DOE's many programs will be
adequately funded on a sustained basis.
I thank and commend the Chair and the Subcommittee for
holding this hearing, and for the opportunity to testify. The
Pew Center looks forward to working with the Subcommittee in
its oversight capacity, and on the development, enactment, and
implementation of any future climate change legislation.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Greenwald follows:]
Prepared Statement of Judith M. Greenwald
Madam Chair and Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the
opportunity to testify on the U.S. Department of Energy's plan for
climate change technology programs. My name is Judi Greenwald, and I am
the Director of Innovative Solutions for the Pew Center on Global
Climate Change.
The Pew Center on Global Climate Change is a non-profit, non-
partisan and independent organization dedicated to providing credible
information, straight answers and innovative solutions in the effort to
address global climate change.\1\ Forty-one major companies participate
in the Pew Center's Business Environmental Leadership Council (BELC),
making the BELC the largest U.S.-based association of corporations
focused on addressing the challenges of climate change. Many different
sectors are represented, from high technology to diversified
manufacturing; from oil and gas to transportation; from utilities to
chemicals. These companies represent $2 trillion in market
capitalization, employ over three million people, and work with the
Center to educate the public on the risks, challenges and solutions to
climate change.
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\1\ For more on the Pew Center, see www.pewclimate.org
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Global climate change is real and likely caused mostly by human
activities. While uncertainties remain, they cannot be used as an
excuse for inaction. To quote the National Academy of Sciences, in a
statement signed by the academies of ten other nations, as well: ``The
scientific understanding of climate change is now sufficiently clear to
justify nations taking prompt action. It is vital that all nations
identify cost-effective steps that they can take now, to contribute to
substantial and long-term reduction in net global GHG emissions.''
The Pew Center believes there are three things we in the United
States must do to reduce the real and growing risks posed by global
climate change: First, we must enact and implement a comprehensive
national program to progressively and significantly reduce U.S.
emissions of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions in a manner that
contributes to sustained economic growth. Given that U.S. GHG emissions
have risen steadily despite fifteen years of voluntary efforts to
reduce them, any such national program must include mandatory
reductions. Second, the United States must work with other countries to
establish an international framework that engages all the major GHG-
emitting nations in a fair and effective long-term effort to protect
our global climate. Third, we must strengthen our efforts to develop
and deploy climate-friendly technologies and to diffuse those
technologies on a global scale.
I would like to address the questions you posed to me directly
first:
1. What do you see as the key strengths and weaknesses of the plan?
While the draft Strategic Plan provides a fine overview of GHG-
reducing technologies and the opportunities each could present over the
long-term, it does not provide a plan for deploying these technologies,
nor does it provide a path to stabilizing concentrations of GHGs. The
technologies considered in the Plan are vitally important; however,
merely compiling information about them is not sufficient to ensure
their widespread penetration into the marketplace.
Markets work when individuals can balance out their own costs and
benefits. As with many environmental problems, individuals generally do
not receive financial benefits from taking action on climate change.
There is clearly a value to society in minimizing damaging climate
effects, but the market does not capture that benefit for those who
bear the costs. Therefore, simply creating a supply of carbon-reduction
technologies does not mean there will be a demand for them. A mandatory
constraint on emissions, on the other hand, will make emissions
reductions financially valuable to the individuals producing them,
creating a demand for emissions-reducing technologies in the
marketplace.
The estimates of the technologies' potential contributions to
emissions reductions in the Strategic Plan are derived from a report
prepared by the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory. The report,
``Climate Change Technology Scenarios: Energy, Emissions and Economic
Implications,'' \2\ considers a range of energy scenarios accompanied
by a range of possible emissions constraints. Three hypothetical
scenarios are included, along with a reference (business-as-usual)
scenario. The three scenarios are each evaluated for four different
emissions-constrained cases of varying levels of stringency. Only the
reference scenario is considered under a ``no emissions constraint''
case. Yet the reference scenario with no emissions constraint--the
situation that best matches the current U.S. technology market and
policy direction--is not noted in the Strategic Plan. Instead, only the
analyses that include emissions constraints--an approach contrary to
current U.S. policy--are included in the estimates of the technologies'
potential contributions to GHG reductions. This makes it impossible to
evaluate the likelihood of the Plan's success under current policies,
and also supports what most people who seriously examine this issue
know--that potential reductions are driven by the existence of
constraints on emissions and the demand for technology to deal with
those constraints, rather than purely on the federal effort invested in
technology research and development.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ Placet, M., K.K. Humphreys, N.M. Mahasenan. 2004. ``Climate
Change Technology Scenarios: Energy, Emissions and Economic
Implications,'' Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, August 2004.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
A combination of technology ``pushing'' activities (such as those
discussed in DOE's plan) with technology ``pulling'' legislation that
mandates reductions of U.S. GHG emissions would be the most effective
and efficient way to deploy climate-friendly technology throughout the
economy. Our analysis indicates that combining push and pull will give
better results than relying on either alone: studies indicate, for
example, that combining R&D incentives with carbon caps will cost the
economy an order of magnitude less than relying on either R&D
incentives or emissions reduction policies alone.\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ See Induced Technological Change and Climate Policy, Lawrence
H. Goulder, Pew Center on Global Climate Change, Arlington, Virginia,
October 2004.
2. Will the CCTP enable the Administration to meet its goal of cutting
GHG intensity by 18 percent by 2012? Does the CCTP
put the United States on a path to stabilizing GHG
emissions?
The Plan is likely quite adequate for meeting the current goal of
18 percent reduction in intensity, but that is only because the goal
largely reflects business as usual. But neither the Plan nor the 18
percent intensity reduction goal will put the U.S. on a path to
stabilizing GHG emissions. Even if this goal is met, emissions will
continue to rise rather than stabilize.
It should also be noted that the U.S. commitment under the UN
Framework Convention on Climate Change, which is noted in the Plan, is
not to stabilize emissions, but rather to stabilize atmospheric
concentrations of GHGs. The UNFCCC commitment further specifies that
concentrations should be stabilized ``at a level that would prevent
dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system.'' \4\
While there is not yet a global consensus on the concentration at which
this would occur, it is important to consider the full extent of this
commitment in evaluating the Plan's success in achieving it. Impacts
generally considered to indicate dangerous interference range from the
disintegration of the Greenland ice sheet, eventually raising sea
levels by as much as 20 feet,\5\ increased hurricane intensity,
compounding the danger to millions of citizens in the Southeast and
Gulf coasts,\6\ depleted water resources in the Western United States
due to reductions in winter snow pack,\7\ and the threat of extinction
of thousands of species,\8\ particularly those dependent on highly
sensitive habitat (for example, polar bears, threatened by the melting
of the arctic ice pack; pika, threatened by the desiccation of alpine
meadows, and corals threatened by thermal stress and ocean
acidification). Most experts now believe that a doubling of CO2
concentrations (i.e., around 550 ppm) is too high to avoid dangerous
interference with the climate system, such as the impacts just listed.
We do not know what a safe level is, though many are proposing 450 ppm
as a level that has potential to avoid large-scale effects on the
climate. (See Schellnhuber, Cramer, Nakicenovic, Wigley and Yohe, 2006,
``Avoiding Dangerous Climate Change,'' Cambridge University Press.)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ http://unfccc.int/essentialG5-background/convention/background/
items/1349.php
\5\ Alley, R.B., et al., 2005. ``Abrupt Climate Change.''
\6\ Emanuel, K., et al., 2005. ``Increasing destructiveness of
tropical cyclones over the past 30 years.''
\7\ Mote, P. et al., 2003. ``Preparing for climatic change: The
water, salmon, and forecasts of the Pacific Northwest.''
\8\ Thomas, C.D., et al., 2004. ``Climate change and extinction
risk.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
While it is understandable that the CCTP has not chosen a specific
atmospheric concentration of GHGs to be achieved--this is not its
charge--the absence of such a target in the Nation's strategy presents
another difficulty in assessing the Plan's likelihood of success. While
a 450 ppm constraint is considered in the Plan, it is the most
stringent of all options considered. The other cases involve
concentrations well above this level (up to 750 ppm--almost a tripling
of pre-industrial levels) and have a large potential to reflect
dangerous anthropogenic interference. Given the Plan's consideration of
a range of potential stabilization targets, it would be far more
helpful if the Plan described the pace and scale of deployment that
would be needed to achieve each of the targets considered. A strategy
for CO2 stabilization at 450 ppm might look very different
from a strategy for stabilization at 750 ppm, but those differences
would not become evident unless the paths to the targets are outlined.
This would aid policy-makers in understanding the technological
implications of various targets that might be adopted, as well as aid
the CCTP in choosing its technology priorities.
Unfortunately, while the Plan gives a fine overview of GHG-reducing
technologies and the role that each could play, the analysis of
potential reductions is limited to scenarios that do not match current
conditions or stated policy directions. As demonstrated in the
estimates made in this Plan, it is mandatory emissions constraints in
conjunction with technology investment--rather than technology
investment alone--that will spur technology deployment and diffusion.
In the absence of these constraints, the potential reductions outlined
in this Plan will not be achieved.
3. Does the draft strategic plan provide an integrated framework of
sound guidance, clear goals and next steps for
agencies and researchers to use when prioritizing
and selecting future research efforts? If so,
please explain. If not, how should the
Administration set R&D investment priorities among
various climate change technologies and CCTP
agencies?
The Pew Center is pleased to see that the plan does not pick
winners, but rather it examines a broad portfolio of technologies that
have the potential to reduce emissions on a large scale, making the
most cost-effective technologies available for reductions in the
future. The Pew Center supports the Portfolio Planning and Investment
Criteria that the CCTP uses to evaluate various technologies:
maximizing return on investment, supporting public-private
partnerships, focusing on technology with large-scale potential, and
sequencing R&D investments in a logical, developmental order are
essential in determining what technologies to support. In addition to
this evaluation of known technologies, efforts to explore new and
innovative opportunities should also be promoted. The small portion of
section 9 that describes the importance of doing exploratory research
aimed at pursuing novel concepts not elsewhere covered should be given
more emphasis. The fact remains that, while there are myriad
technologies that we currently know can contribute to GHG emissions
over the long-term, it may be technologies that have not yet been
discovered that will have the most impact. With accommodations for
these unknown opportunities, the report acts as a useful summary of the
current and future technologies that may have a significant impact on
reducing carbon emissions if deployed.
Regarding your overarching questions 1 and 2, please see my
response to questions 2 and 3 above. I would like to address your third
overarching question specifically.
3. How could the CCTP plan be improved? What next steps are needed to
implement a clear climate change technology
strategy?
The U.S. Department of Energy is doing a good job in running a
rational research and development program for technologies that are
likely to contribute to solving the climate change problem in the
future. As mentioned, however, what is lacking is an emphasis on
deployment. Technologies that sit on the shelf are not useful.
Deployment depends on private companies deciding to use these new
technologies rather than their old, more carbon-intensive technologies.
Without a mandatory GHG constraint, private companies do not have
sufficient incentives to do so. The end result is an increase in
technology innovation but little demand for those technologies in the
market.
Finally, the technology initiatives discussed in the plan can only
be effective if they are adequately funded and managed, and implemented
with some urgency. DOE and the other federal agencies run a mind-
boggling collection of programs that could promote climate-friendly
technologies. There are numerous domestic and internationally focused
programs, many of these intended to advance the climate-friendly
technologies we would want deployed, including the Asia-Pacific
Partnership, Climate Leaders, Climate VISION, Climate Challenge, Clean
Cities, the Hydrogen Fuel Initiative, the Carbon Sequestration
Leadership Forum, the Methane-to-Markets Partnership, the Industrial
Technology Project, the SmartWay Transport Partnership, the Partnership
for a Hydrogen Economy, FreedomCAR, Energy STAR, Generation IV Nuclear
Initiative, Vision 21, 21st Century Truck, Nuclear Power 2010, ITER22,
FutureGen, Future Fuel Cells, Industries of the Future, and Turbines of
Tomorrow.
While it is difficult to tell exactly how much has been budgeted
for each of these programs, according to the Administration's Federal
Climate Change Expenditures Report to Congress (April 2006), the total
FY 2006 budget authority for all CCTP initiatives amounts to about $2.8
billion, with a $207 million increase proposed for 2007. This increase
is a step in the right direction, but it is not enough. In addition, it
is crucial not just that these initiatives be funded, but that they be
funded in a long-term, stable way--even forward-funded--to ensure that
research managers are able to make the kind of plans that large-scale
technology development requires.
Related to this is the challenge of implementing so many
initiatives on a timely basis. Because it is far easier to explain to
the press and public the launch of an initiative than to explain the
boring details of its implementation, the political rewards of
launching initiatives greatly outweigh those of implementation. Our
sense is that DOE and the other federal agencies are doing a good job
implementing these programs, but we are concerned that the
Administration may not be placing sufficient priority on them.
It would be a shame if three years from now, in another oversight
hearing, we learned that all these programs were under funded and given
insufficient priority within the Administration. We simply cannot
afford to lose the time.
I thank and commend the Chair and the Subcommittee for holding this
hearing and for the opportunity to testify. The Pew Center looks
forward to working with the Subcommittee in its oversight capacity and
on the development, enactment and implementation of any future climate
change legislation.
Biography for Judith M. Greenwald
Judi Greenwald is the Director of Innovative Solutions of the Pew
Center on Global Climate Change. She oversees the Solutions program and
develops mechanisms for learning about and promoting innovative
solutions--including research, publications, web-based information and
data bases, and workshops. Ms. Greenwald focuses on business solutions,
state and regional solutions, and technological innovation.
Ms. Greenwald has over 20 years of experience working on energy and
environmental policy. Prior to coming to the Pew Center, she worked as
a consultant, focusing on innovative approaches to solving
environmental problems, including climate change. She also served as a
senior advisor on the White House Climate Change Task Force. As a
member of the professional staff of the U.S. Congress Energy and
Commerce Committee, she worked on the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments,
the 1992 Energy Policy Act, and a number of other energy and
environmental statutes. She was also a Congressional Fellow with then-
Senate Majority Leader Robert C. Byrd, an environmental scientist with
the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and an environmental engineer
and policy analyst at EPA.
Ms. Greenwald has a Bachelor of Science in Engineering, cum laude,
from Princeton University, and an M.A. in Science, Technology and
Public Policy from George Washington University.
Ms. Greenwald has published papers on the future of water quality
monitoring, worker and community adjustment to climate change policy, a
multi-media approach to radon, environmental policies affecting the
development of newer coal technologies, and the implications for air
quality analysis of extended lifetimes for coal-fired boilers.
Chairwoman Biggert. Thank you, Ms. Greenwald. Mr.
Mottershead, you are recognized for five minutes.
STATEMENT OF MR. CHRIS MOTTERSHEAD, DISTINGUISHED ADVISOR ON
ENERGY AND THE ENVIRONMENT, BP
Mr. Mottershead. Thank you very much, Madam Chairwoman and
Members of the Subcommittee. Thank you for inviting BP to give
evidence.
We share the overall objective of finding a way to both
stabilize atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases, as
well as maintaining economic growth, and that we believe that
technology is a key component of managing delivery of these two
objectives.
Moving to the plan, we believe it is comprehensive, it has
the necessary breadth, while actually bringing focus to those
things that we believe are most likely to deliver reductions.
We believe that the greenhouse gases will be reduced by the
investments that we make in the future, and I think that the
plan clearly reflects that, and perhaps that challenges some of
the short-term questions about its relevance to 2012.
Fourthly, we think that it resonates with the activities of
BP, and we recognize the activities as they are laid out, and
our participation in many of the projects, from solar, to wind,
to biofuels, and to carbon capture and storage.
Fourthly, we do believe that it has weaknesses, but they
are probably more to do with the context in which the plan has
to operate, rather than in the plan itself. Particularly, we
agree with Pew that actually to have an effective plan, you
have to be clear about what the overall goal is, and therefore,
we would encourage a setting of an overall goal, so that we can
see that the necessary reductions are being made for
stabilization, and that the optimal cost is being delivered
through that plan.
Secondly, we believe that actually, innovation happens
largely through learning by doing, and that while research is
absolutely necessary and underpins activity, actually, the
delivery of the plan will be most effective when it is actually
borne out by deployment, and therefore, we would like to see
more emphasis placed on deployment and diffusion of the
technology, as well as further creation.
And finally, we believe that there is a need to better
articulate the relative roles of public and private
participation in actually determining the overall outcome. And
while there are examples of new forms of partnership, we think
that they need to be extended in order to fully embrace the
creativity of business in delivering the necessary solutions.
So, Madam Chairwoman, thank you very much, and I would be
happy to answer questions later.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Mottershead follows:]
Prepared Statement of Chris Mottershead
Madame Chairman, Members of the Subcommittee--thank you for the
opportunity today for BP to participate in this discussion about the
Administration's approach to climate change-related technology
research, development, demonstration and deployment.
BP is involved in many discussions in the U.S. about climate
change. Our objective is to establish how we might most effectively
contribute to the task of providing the energy that is necessary to
underpin economic growth, while avoiding dangerous interference in the
climate system. While the debate continues around the long-term goal
and identifying a full set of policy options, we should take action
where there does appear to be agreement.
One of these areas is technology. Other policy instruments will be
necessary to address climate change, but technological innovation is
central. The development of the Strategic Plan clearly recognizes this
critical role of technology.
The Climate Change Technology Program's Strategic Plan is
comprehensive and well considered. It acknowledges the important role
of technology in reducing GHG emissions, providing a framework for
identifying, developing and deploying technologies.
I would like to briefly touch on what we view as important
components of the Plan, and touch upon what we view as opportunities to
improve the Plan.
We share the stated ultimate goal of the Strategic Plan--the
stabilization of GHG concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that
prevents dangerous interference with the climate system. Of course,
there are uncertainties in the science, there always will be, but we
believe that based on current science it is only prudent to take
action. The Strategic Plan is an acknowledgement of this need to take
action.
The Plan acknowledges that the overwhelming majority of GHG
emissions will be associated with equipment and infrastructure that has
yet to be built, but once built will constrain our future options. So
while we recognize the importance of getting started, and the need for
short-term emission reductions, we believe the primary focus should be
on future investment decisions, ensuring that the best technological
options are available and used.
By 2030 the world's consumption of electricity is expected to
double, as economies grow. However, the power sector is already the
largest single source of GHG's emissions, and as demand grows so will
emissions. This growth in demand for electricity is a business
opportunity, as over half of the power plants that will be needed have
yet to be built. The Plan helps to determine what the technological
options are for these investments.
The same is true for the transport sector, where we must develop
and invest in both the best available vehicle and fuel technology, as
well as looking to improve mobility more generally.
The Plan recognizes that we need research on both renewable and
fossil fuels. Solar, wind, biofuels and other alternative energy
sources one day will be able to meet a significant part of U.S. and
world energy demand. But we also need to develop the technology that
allows the U.S. to utilize fossil fuels, and particularly coal. Fossil
fuels currently supply about 80 percent of all primary energy and will
remain fundamental to global and U.S. competitiveness and energy supply
for many decades.
BP is taking action in many areas, including major investments in
both the power and transport sectors. BP Alternative Energy provides
clean power from wind, solar, gas-fired and hydrogen power. We have
already committed to investing $8 billion over the next 10 years in
this business. We are pleased to see that these alternatives are
comprehensively addressed in the Strategic Plan.
As an example let me briefly talk about Carbon Capture and Storage
technology, which sits at the heart of our new hydrogen power business.
Over the next 10 years BP, in partnership with GE, aims to develop 10
to 15 hydrogen power projects. BP, together with Edison Mission Energy,
has already announced its plans for a hydrogen power plant in Southern
California, an investment of over $1 billion dollars. The facility will
utilize a low value by-product of the refining process, petroleum coke,
to generate much needed supplies of electricity to the Southern
California market. The project will accomplish this by gasifying the
petroleum coke and using the resulting hydrogen to drive a turbine to
generate electricity. The CO2 produced by the process will
be transported by pipeline to a California oil field where it will be
injected deep underground, both stimulating domestic oil production and
permanently storing the CO2.
Where we see opportunity to improve the Strategic Plan is in
increased clarity about the scale of the task, the emphasis we would
place on Learning-By-Doing, and finally a clearer definition of the
necessary public and private partnership.
While it is not the role of Plan to determine stabilization goal,
without one it is difficult to know whether the plan will deliver
sufficient emission reductions at an optimal cost.
Many technologies already exist, and we would like to see greater
focus upon deployment and diffusion of these technologies, particularly
engineering cost reduction, removal of institutional barriers and the
building of material new markets. Many barriers are institutional and
behavioral and, as such, the social sciences can make a significant
contribution.
Finally, the opportunity exists to better define how government
will interact with the private sector. Government and business each
play key but distinct roles in developing and deploying technology. We
would like to see more thought given to encouraging innovative public-
private partnerships.
In conclusion, let me say that it would be difficult, if not
impossible, to make a determination as to whether the Strategic Plan,
by itself, is capable of meeting the President's goal of reducing GHG
intensity. The answer to this question depends largely on the level of
success of individual technologies, having the proper regulatory
frameworks in place, public acceptance, and an environment in which
companies can feel comfortable making long-term investments in these
technologies at the necessary scale.
What I can say is that the Plan is a helpful and necessary step. BP
looks forward to playing a role in the successful implementation of the
Plan.
Thank you and I look forward to answering any questions you may
have.
Biography for Chris Mottershead
Chris joined BP Research, at its London-based research laboratories
in 1978 as an instrument and control engineer. During the mid-eighties
Chris lead a team to create and commercialize large-scale scientific
computers as part of BP's then new venture activities. In the late
eighties he ran BP's exploration computing activities in London,
Glasgow and Houston. During the early nineties he became commercial
manager of exploration and production technical activities. Chris then
moved to BP's North Sea operations, first to Glasgow and then Aberdeen,
becoming the central technical manager. He returned to London, becoming
the VP Technology, Engineering and HSE for BP's global gas, power and
renewable activities.
He is currently Distinguished Advisor Energy and Environment, and
provides leadership to the BP Group on making its products and
operations consistent with the principles of sustainable energy and the
environment.
He is also a Director of the Carbon Trust in London and the Center
for Clean Air Policy in Washington, and on the Advisory Boards of the
National Center for Atmospheric Research in Boulder, the Climate Group,
the UK Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council and the G8+5
Legislators and Business Leaders Climate Change Dialogue.
Chairwoman Biggert. Thank you very much. Dr. Hoffert, you
are recognized. You want to turn--push the button. I don't
think it is on.
Dr. Hoffert. Can you hear me?
Chairwoman Biggert. Yes.
STATEMENT OF DR. MARTIN I. HOFFERT, EMERITUS PROFESSOR OF
PHYSICS, NEW YORK UNIVERSITY
Dr. Hoffert. Technology is wonderful, isn't it?
I, too, would like to thank Madam Chairman and the
Subcommittee Members for inviting me, albeit on short notice,
and I would certainly like to associate myself with some of the
comments that have been made thus far regarding the need for
goals, and regarding the need for innovation, even more so.
So, I think the best, most effective use of my time might
be to specifically discuss those goals, and how they emerge
from our scientific understanding of the program, and to make
some specific suggestions as to how innovative ideas might be
introduced into the program that are not already present in it.
In no way does this imply that I don't support the CCTP. It is
very much needed.
First, as to the goal, I don't have to belabor any more
this issue of 18 percent decrease in specific energy over ten
years. At the time GDP goes up by 30 percent, emissions will
rise by approximately 1.2 percent, which is the historical rate
at which global emissions are rising. So, this is----
Chairwoman Biggert. Could you pull the mike just a little
bit away from you?
Dr. Hoffert. Yes, okay. Can you hear me better?
Chairwoman Biggert. Yes.
Dr. Hoffert. With more clarity.
This would certainly not satisfy the objective of the
Framework Climate Convention, albeit how it was very poorly
defined when the Rio Treaty was originally enacted. It was
defined as avoiding dangerous human interference with the
climate system without defining that.
Lately, those of us who have worked in climate, I should
say parenthetically that I myself have worked both in climate
and energy research for the last 30 years, indeed, I was a
colleague of Jim Hansen's and Steve Schneider's 30 years ago
when this problem was a fascinating intellectual exercise, and
before we realized that all of these calculations that we were
doing were actually going to happen.
The point I am trying to make is that our understanding of
the problem should inform our policy, and let me put it this
way. If we were to adopt a goal of not allowing the temperature
of the Earth to exceed two degrees Celsius, this is a goal that
many have mentioned in the European Union, Tony Blair, and Jim
Hansen has articulated the reasons for this having to do with
the potential for irreversible melting of the polar icecaps.
And if we want to ensure that, and at the same time, grow the
GDP of the world between two and three percent, which is a
likely minimum for permitting equity between the vast
differences of income of developed and developing countries, if
that were to be adopted, then it is a mathematical and
engineering problem which can be solved, what would be required
in the nature of emission reductions.
There is some uncertainty, but we know what the boundaries
of that uncertainty is, and the results are staggering and very
rarely discussed. In fact, what we would have to do is
essentially phase out virtually all carbon dioxide emissions by
the middle of this century, and keep them close to constant in
the near-term. If, at the same time, we want to reach those GDP
goals, and economic growth goals, and require that this be done
with our energy consumptive society, one can calculate how much
energy capacity we would need that doesn't put CO2
into the atmosphere. I am emphasizing CO2, although
I know there are other greenhouse gases. And it is truly
staggering, it is between 100 and 300 percent of all the energy
that the world uses now would have to come, 50 years from now,
from some energy source X, as yet undetermined, and that is
even with a very large amount of energy efficiency
improvements.
I and colleagues have proposed that the focus of the
Department of Energy's program on technology should be to
roughly look at the three--and this is supply side, I am
emphasizing that, but it in no way denigrates the importance of
efficiency--roughly one third of that might come from
carbonaceous coal with CO2 sequestered or stored,
one third from nuclear reactors, albeit understanding all the
problems of nuclear reactors would have to be addressed, in
addition to the question of them becoming sustainable energy
sources for the long-term, and one third from renewables.
Now, the fact is that the world is building totally wrong
infrastructures in all of those three areas: 750 new coal-fired
power plants are being built by the U.S., China, and India that
will overwhelm Kyoto emission reductions by a factor of five,
if those reductions even take place. For the first time, people
are contemplating building nuclear reactors in this country,
the first time in 30 years, and the ones that are proposed are
once-through nuclear reactors using the U-235 isotope.
We need to be having serious discussions about the uranium
fuel cycle, because as in the case of the coal plants, once you
build these plants, you are sinking the investment for 50 to 75
years. We are, in fact, right now building the energy
infrastructure of the second half of the 21st century,
certainly the first half, and it is really going by without a
whimper, because we are living in these two parallel worlds,
the world of potentially what should we do about climate change
and energy security, and the real world of what we are doing.
As regards renewables, we are also building the wrong
infrastructure. If we want renewable energy, I think the
greatest potential, aside from buildings which, as associated
with efficiency, is from solar and wind, which are
intermittent, dispersed, and low power density sources. We
don't have the right kind of electric utility grids to
accommodate those energy sources, and when we are talking about
rebuilding the national grids to, for example, avoid blackouts,
we are not talking about what kind of grids would provide the
transmission and the storage capability to allow renewable
energy to provide roughly 30 percent.
The problem is also complicated by the fact that we are
having this discussion in terms of our own national priorities,
when this is actually an international program. And this is the
reason why I and several of my colleagues have proposed what
some are calling an Apollo program or a Manhattan Project in
alternate energy. In fact, we first proposed this program in
1998 in a paper that was published in Nature. I was first
author with many colleagues, and the week after the paper came
out, the Nature editorial writer said that well, this was--this
isn't such a very good idea, because Jimmy Carter had a program
in the 1970s, an energy program, and after all, a lot of money
was invested in that, and it didn't bear fruit. I would like to
explore that. Time doesn't permit me to, but I absolutely don't
believe that. I think that that 30 years ago program, which I
am actually old enough to have worked in, had we continued to
develop those alternative projects, alternative ways of both
producing and conserving and utilizing energy more efficiently,
we might actually have something on the shelf right now.
My own view is that the emperor has no clothes, that we
really do not have a technologically adequate set of primary
power generation to effectively address the CO2
problem, and things will almost certainly get worse before they
get better. But I am a technology optimist, and I would like
them to get better, so I would say the absolutely first
priority is to clearly define what the energy implications are
for stabilizing climate at some level that we would consider
acceptable.
The stakes are very high. What is involved is the survival
of our high technology society. There is no guarantee that just
because things are going along so well that they will continue
to do so, and climate change is basically the canary in the
mineshaft. It is the first of many problems we are going to
have to address. I don't know how much time I have left. I
should probably be winding down.
Chairwoman Biggert. I think you can wrap up.
Dr. Hoffert. Yeah. Yeah. So--well, maybe fortunately for
you, but unfortunately for me, I didn't really have the time to
continue this exposition, which would very likely offend a
number of people, but that is what would make it interesting.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Hoffert follows:]
Prepared Statement of Martin I. Hoffert
An Energy Revolution for
the Greenhouse Century
When there is no vision, the people perish.
--Proverbs 29:18
You see things: and you say, ``Why?''
But I dream things that never were; and I say, ``Why not?''
--George Bernard Shaw, Back to Methuselah
(1921)
We choose to go to the moon in this decade and do the other
things, not because they are easy, but because they are hard,
because that goal will serve to organize and measure the best
of our energies and skills, because the challenge is one that
we are willing to accept, one we are unwilling to postpone, and
one we intend to win.. . .
--John F. Kennedy, Rice University, 1962
The reality of global warming from the buildup of fossil fuel
carbon dioxide in the atmosphere is no longer in doubt. Arctic sea ice,
tundra, and alpine glaciers are melting, tropical diseases like West
Nile virus and malaria are penetrating higher latitudes, and sea
surface temperatures have risen to the point where Katrina-like
hurricanes are not only more probable, but actually occur. Also taking
place are the extinction of plants and animals adapted to cooler
regimes but unable to migrate poleward fast enough to keep pace with a
warming climate. Polar bears, already far north, may have nowhere to
go. Ominously, the melting of Greenland and Antarctic icecaps is
accelerating, threatening worldwide major sea level rise and coastal
inundation (Hansen, 2006; Gore, 2006; Kolbert, 2006; Flannery, 2006).
These are well-documented facts, not alarmist predictions by
desperate environmentalists in search of funding (Crichton, 2003) or
some colossal hoax on the American people (Inhofe, 2003). Atmospheric
warming from water vapor, CO2, and other greenhouse gases is
a basic principle of atmospheric science. It is responsible for
maintaining Earth as a habitable zone for life, and for making Venus,
with its pure CO2 atmosphere 100 times thicker than Earth's,
hot as metaphorical Hell. Cooling can result from suspended aerosol
particles also produced by burning fossil fuels, but aerosols remain in
the atmosphere a much shorter time than CO2 and their
cooling effect, so far, has mainly served to mask the full impact of
warming from CO2 emissions. (Some propose ``geoengineering''
climate by intentionally injecting aerosols to cool regions most
threatened by global warming, such as the Arctic; see for example
Teller, Wood, and Hyde, 2002.) Heat temporarily stored in oceans can
also delay or mask committed greenhouse warming, as can variations in
the output of the sun and volcanic eruptions. But volcanoes, the sun,
and the oceans cause surface temperature to rise and fall in a narrow
range. In retrospect, it was inevitable that the explosive growth (on a
geological time scale) of human CO2 emissions, driven by
population growth, industrialization and, most of all, by fossil fuel
energy use, made it inevitable that human-induced warming would
overwhelm climate change from all the other factors at some point. And
we are at that point.
That fossil fuel atmospheric carbon dioxide would warm the planet
was predicted over a century ago (Arrhenius, 1896). Roughly half the
CO2 input by humans remains in the atmosphere. The rest
mostly dissolves in the ocean, creating excess acidity that marine
organisms may not be able to tolerate, which is another problem. By the
third quarter of the twentieth century, CO2 buildup in the
atmosphere was evident, although greenhouse warming did not emerge from
background ``noise'' until the late 1980s. Hans Suess and Roger Revelle
recognized early on that transferring hundreds of billions of tons of
carbon in fossil fuels (coal, oil, and natural gas) formed over
hundreds of millions of years and locked up in Earth's crust to the
atmosphere as CO2 in a few hundred years was ``grand Fig. 1
geophysical experiment'' on a scale unseen in human history (Revelle
and Suess, 1957). Revelle was to be an influential professor of Al
Gore's at Harvard, with ramifications reverberating today (Gore, 2006).
By the late 1960s, Syukuro (Suki) Manabe, to my mind, an ``Einstein''
of atmospheric science, had worked out the detailed physics of how
greenhouse gases affect atmospheric temperature from the surface to the
stratosphere, including the water vapor feedback that roughly doubles
warming from CO2 alone (Manabe and Weatherald, 1967).
The discovery of global warming is a fascinating chapter in the
history of science (Weart, 2003). Many phenomena that we are now
seeing--heat going into the oceans, greater warming at the Arctic,
volcanic and aerosol effects--were predicted decades ago. One group,
including Steve Schneider, Richard Sommerville, Jim Hansen and this
author, worked on this problem in the 1970s, primarily as an
intellectual challenge in theoretical climate modeling and computer
science at the Goddard Institute of Space Studies (GISS), a NASA-funded
research institute near Columbia University started by Robert Jastrow
while he was still in his twenties.
Back then, global warming was not yet politicized as it is now
(Figure 1). A ``back of the envelope'' calculation I did at GISS in the
'70s suggested fossil fuel greenhouse warming would emerge from
background temperature variations by the late '80s. So I thought it
might be a good idea to publish some papers predicting this, which I
did, as did colleagues at GISS and elsewhere. That limiting CO2
emissions to avoid adverse global warming might disrupt consumerist
civilization and multinational energy companies while putting a damper
on industrialization of China and India was implicit, but academic.
Ironically, in light of the conclusive support for it developed at
the research institute he founded (Hansen et al., 2005), Jastrow was
highly critical of the global warming hypothesis. He never published
peer-reviewed climate research, in stunning contrast to the present
GISS director, Jim Hansen; but, on taking early retirement from NASA,
Jastrow and Fred Seitz of Rockefeller University founded the Marshall
Institute in Washington, D.C., a bastion of climate change deniers
allied with the American Enterprise Institute, the Cato Institute, and
other conservative think tanks in opposition to U.S. participation in
the CO2-emissions-limiting Kyoto Protocol--the first
implementation of the UN Framework Climate Change Convention (FCCC).
The United States, China, and India have not ratified Kyoto.
Indeed, 850 new coal-fired power plants to be built in these countries
by 2012 will overwhelm Kyoto emission reductions by a factor of five
(Clayton, 2004). Avoiding ``dangerous human interference with the
climate system,'' the goal of the UN FCCC, is a daunting technological
challenge because 85 percent of the world's energy comes from fossil
fuel; and stabilizing global temperature at acceptable levels will
require a revolutionary change in the world's energy systems (Hoffert
et al., 1998; 2002; ``Energy's Future,'' 2006). Although global warming
is settled science, a public relations battle continues to rage.
Problems exist on both sides of the red-blue divide. In a searing
critique of environmental nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) like the
National Resources Defense Council and Environmental Defense,
Shellenberger and Nordhaus (2005) argue that, despite major campaigns,
environmental lobbies have had little success on the global warming
front. The authors discount efforts by states in the United States to
create renewable energy portfolios with ambitious targets for alternate
energy as so much public relations. They claim, with some
justification, that ``not one of America's environmental leaders is
articulating a vision of the future commensurate with the magnitude of
the crisis.''
Why? Global warming is not only different in scale from prior
environmental challenges (acid rain, heavy metal contamination, DDT,
etc.)--its long-term planet-changing nature requires forethought and
imagination to a much greater degree than the threats to which Homo
sapiens has evolved adrenaline-pumping instinctive responses. The
growth of human population, CO2 emissions, and global
warming in the past millennium are very recent from a human
evolutionary perspective. For the first time in its history, Homo
sapiens has begun to interact more or less as a unit with the global
environmental system (Eldridge, 1996). Because modern technology
developed after we evolved biologically, we lack appropriate instincts
to deal with it--these having been unlikely to confer survivability in
our evolutionary past. By default, we have to deal with the climate/
energy problem cognitively. So far, we are not doing too well. As Carl
Sagan observed, our reptilian brains motivate aggressive and tribal, as
opposed to thoughtful, responses in ways we barely perceive and across
many spheres of human behavior.
In the climate wars, deniers often get more vociferous as the
evidence against their views gets stronger (Hoffert, 2003). The so-
called hockey stick curve (developed by paleoclimatologist Mike Mann
and colleagues) was recently attacked from the floor on Congress by
Representative Joe Barton (R-Texas), based on cherry-picked information
suggesting their statistics were flawed reported in the Wall Street
Journal. Would that Rep. Barton, and legislators in general were better
educated in statistical and scientific issues. But my experience
briefing legislators and aides is that scientific illiteracy and
intellectual laziness are rampant. Educated mainly as lawyers, many do
not get it that nature does not care about human politics.
(Unfortunately, some academics that should know better likewise argue
that science is more a ``consensual reality'' than an objective
description of nature deduced by the scientific method.) Too few bright
and imaginative students pursue careers in science and engineering
today. We need such students badly.
The hockey stick curve that shows a dramatic recent uptick in
global temperature with much more to come is easily perceived as a
threat not only to Big Oil and Big Coal, but also to election campaign
funds. Easier to blame the messenger than think critically about this.
The general trend of the Mann et al. (2003) hockey stick was
independently verified by other researchers in a recent report by the
National Research Council (NRC, 2006). Overwhelmingly, research-active
climate scientists know we are entering climatic territory unseen in
human history (Hansen, 2006). Our rapidly melting planet is so
dominated by humankind's emissions that the present climatic era is
being called the anthropocene (Crutzen and Ramanathan, 2003).
Most knowledgeable researchers are very concerned about global
warming. Some, including this author, argue for research and
development programs on an Apollo space program--like scale to create
low-carbon alternate energy supply and demand--reducing technologies in
time to make a difference (Hoffert et al., 1998, 2002; Rees, 2006).
This effort should include prompt implementation of energy
conservation, efficiency, and existing alternate energy sources
(Lovins, 1989; Metz et al., 2001; Pacala and Socolow, 2004; Socolow,
2006).
Whatever the deep evolutionary reasons, the climate/energy issue
competes for attention with other problems in the mind of the average
citizen. A frequently asked question is: ``Why even care about global
warming and climate change?'' The worst effects occur decades to
centuries from now. In cost-benefit accounting, many economists
strongly discount the present value of adverse future impacts and
``externalize'' (that is, neglect) the cost of environmentally
degrading the global commons (Daly and Townsend, 1994). Economics is,
of course, a legitimate branch of behavioral biology dealing with the
allocation of scarce resources by Homo sapiens, one of millions of
biological species inhabiting this planet. But, so far, in its
predictive mode, it resembles astrology more than a hard science.
Economist John Kenneth Galbraith went so far as to say, ``The only
reason for economists to produce forecasts is to make astrology look
respectable'' (Jaccard, 2005). Undaunted, Bjorn Lomborg, the
``skeptical environmentalist'' (Lomborg, 2001), convened a group of
economists to prioritize investments in various challenges facing
humankind. The group concluded in its ``Copenhagen Consensus'' that
climate change, even if real, is near the bottom (Bohannan, 2004).
Reading the group's findings, one is struck by how evolutionarily blind
our species can be to existential threats. Among the problems with this
indifference--noted by Harvard energy policy analyst John Holdren, and
in his film and book, An Inconvenient Truth, by Al Gore--is that
climate change is more an ethical than an economics problem.
An even more basic flaw to this physical scientist is that the
environmental constraint of global warming on energy was entirely
missed by the Copenhagen group. The late Nobel laureate Rick Smalley
astutely observed that, although civilization has many problems, energy
is key to them all. Smalley's list of problems encompasses energy,
water, food, environment (including global warming), poverty, terrorism
and war, disease, education, democracy, and population (Smalley, 2005).
Energy is key because solving all these problems requires sustainable
power on a global scale. Without it civilization collapses.
Concentrated fossil fuels are a one-shot boon of nature. Coal being
still relatively abundant, humankind might have deferred an energy
revolution to another primary power source to the twenty-second
century, or even later, were it not for global warming. Coal burned for
electricity and even shortages caused by peak oil can be handled at
higher cost by making synthetic fuels from coal. But potentially
catastrophic global warming is the ``canary in the mine.'' It trumps
everything else; moving the climate/energy issue to the front of the
list.
To generalize the Shellenberger-Nordhaus thesis, there is little
evidence that politicians of any persuasion appreciate the magnitude of
the problem, or can articulate a vision to address it. The most
relevant questions are being asked by energy scientists and engineers:
Are there technologies likely to lead to a low-carbon world in time and
still allow global GDP to continue growing two to three percent per
year (``Energy's Future,'' 2006)? What global energy systems should we
be aiming at? Can we get there in time? One leading economist put it
this way: ``The trouble with the global warming debate is that it has
become a moral crusade when it's really an engineering problem. The
inconvenient truth is that if we don't solve the engineering problem,
we're helpless'' (Samuelson, 2006).
The issue of ``energy security'' makes the need for an energy
technology revolution a viable policy option even for ``red'' states
and others indisposed see global warming for the threat it is. Two
hundred years of innovation--the famous ``Yankee ingenuity''--are
behind America's ascent to world power (Evans, 2004). Applied science
and entrepreneurship enabled by government research and development
since World War II (Bush, 1945) are a historically appropriate response
for the United States.
The need is clear. Figure 2, from Smil (1999), shows oil reserves
around the world, with the lion's share in the Persian Gulf. But Saudi
Arabia, Iran, and Iraq are powderkegs of post-9/11 Islamic
fundamentalism. Some Al Qaeda ideologues have drawn up a plan aimed at
establishing an Islamic caliphate throughout the Middle East, in which
attacks against the petroleum industry are critical to the
deterioration of American power through constant expansion of the
circle of confrontation (Wright, 2006). And because oil is
internationally traded, it is irrelevant whether oil imports by the
United States originate under a particular Middle Eastern desert. The
more oil money that flows to Saudi Arabia, Iran, etc., the more money
that flows to Al Qaeda, Hezbollah, and other terrorist groups that we
are ostensibly at war with. As Tom Friedman of the New York Times has
repeatedly emphasized, our addiction to oil combined with lack of any
serious policy to develop alternatives is why the United States is
funding both sides of the ``War on Terror.''
We know that world hydrocarbon resources are limited. Virtually all
major crude oil and natural gas reservoirs have been mapped by seismic
probes. Every day, the world consumes about 80 million barrels of oil,
a rate that has been increasing with economic growth but is ultimately
constrained by geological abundance to peak in coming decades
(Deffeyes, 2001). From a global warming perspective, the coming oil
peak, accelerated by China and India with booming GDPs, is problematic
because it is forcing a transition back to coal for primary energy and
thus ``recarbonizing'' the energy supply since coal emits more CO2
per unit of energy than oil or natural gas. And, of course, oil prices
are rapidly rising, headed for $100 per barrel or more. Figure 3 shows
the current range of oil production rate projections. As with the
climate change deniers, some ``cornucopian'' economists say the oil
peak is overblown. But consider that oil companies are motivated to
inflate, not deflate, their reserve estimates to raise their corporate
valuations on Wall Street. Royal Dutch Shell, for example, was recently
compelled by the U.S. Security and Exchange Commission to revise its
reserve estimate downward 20 percent, suggesting an oil peak sooner
rather than later. In any case, most petroleum geologists agree the
world will be ``out of gas'' by the end of the century.
I want to be clear that I am a technological optimist. I believe we
can solve the climate/energy problem. But there is no silver bullet and
it will not be easy. It will take the greatest engineering effort in
history; bigger than the Manhattan project to build the bomb, bigger
than the Apollo program to land a man on the Moon, bigger than the
mobilization to fight World War II. Moreover, the effort has to be
international in scope with sufficient inducements for developing
giants China and India to sign on. This problem will not solve itself
through the invisible hand of the market. Relevant costs and values are
not being captured. We are moving rapidly in the wrong direction.
Particularly serious is that we are investing in the wrong
infrastructures for a sustainable energy world. Vision and imagination
are critical. Sooner or later the world will realize this. The longer
we wait, the harder the job will be.
Exponential growth cannot be sustained indefinitely on a finite
planet. We could, and I believe should, try to maintain two to three
percent per year world GDP growth to the end of the century (a likely
minimum for developing nations to attain income equity) as CO2
emissions are held constant, decreased, and eventually phased out by
mid-century. This would--based on our best current models--keep the
atmospheric CO2 concentration below 500 parts per million
(ppm) and global warming below two degrees Celsius. Higher than two
degrees could trigger dangerous human interference with the climate
system, according to criteria recently adopted by the European Union
(Edmonds and Smith, 2006). Two degrees may not sound like much, but
more could put us on a planet-changing trajectory with irreversible
melting of the Greenland and Antarctic icecaps, which would inundate
the world's coastal zones (Hansen, 2006; Gore, 2006). A big job, given
that atmospheric CO2 has already risen to 380 ppm--100 ppm
above the preindustrial level from fossil fuel burning and
deforestation so far. To do it, some combination of emission-free
primary power sources and primary power demand-reduction equivalent to
generating 100 to 300 percent of present power from some as yet
unidentified set of power systems will be needed by mid-century (Figure
4, based of Hoffert et al., 1998; 2002).
How hard is that? Consider that 2050 is nearer in the future than
when Fermi's first nuclear reactor (then called an ``atomic pile'')
went critical in December 1942 at the University of Chicago is in the
past. We now produce about five percent of primary energy worldwide
from nuclear power (this is virtually all for electricity; roughly 18
percent of electricity generation is nuclear; the rest is from fossil
fuels, mostly coal and hydroelectricity). If we need some new carbon-
emission free ``energy source X'' 50 years hence, the implied growth of
these new power sources is 20 to 60 times faster than nuclear power,
the last revolutionary power source deployed on a large scale. Not
impossible, but we do have to concentrate. Below are some ideas that
could work if we get serious.
For starters, we could dramatically accelerate what some engineers
believe is the most ready for prime time major emission-free energy
source: coal with carbon capture and sequestration (CCS). Figure 5
depicts coal gasification plants making electricity and hydrogen with
the CO2 pumped to reservoirs underground, the rationale
being that we have large coal resources that can play a role in a
transition to a sustainable energy system if we can get the energy out
while putting CO2 (and other pollutants) away in reservoirs
underground. One problem is that coal with CCS deployment is unlikely
before pilot plants demonstrate that the combined technology works.
Individual components like coal gasification, combined cycle power
plants, and even CO2 sequestration have been shown, but the
technology is too costly without a carbon tax or ``cap and trade''
emissions policy in place. The United States, China, and India have not
agreed on emission limits, and these are precisely the countries with
massive coal resources where planned buildup of conventional coal
electric power stations is most intense. The lower right panel of
Figure 5 shows how conventional coal plants in the works will overwhelm
proposed CCS plants. A Department of Energy-funded CCS pilot plant
called ``FutureGen'' was cited by this administration at climate
negotiations in Montreal as the U.S. premier effort, in partnership
with the coal industry, to combat global warming (Revkin, 2005). But
this plant is unlikely before 2012 and its location is still
unannounced. Experts believe it may be more expensive to retrofit
conventional coal plans with CCS than build gasification plants with
CCS from scratch. Suppose global warming got bad--really bad. Will
conventional coal plants be abandoned, as the $6 billion Shoreham
nuclear plant was after Three Mile Island (TMI) and Chernobyl? Once
they are generating electricity from cheap coal, with capital costs
``sunk'' for 50 to 75 years, it might be so expensive to shut down and
build new ones that rate payers would balk even to slow a global
warming juggernaut. This is not a good scenario.
Another class of low-carbon primary power now being reconsidered
after a disastrous start is ``green'' nukes (Figure 6). No one has
started building a new nuclear reactor in the United States for the
past 30 years, though some are planned. Classic problems of nuclear
power are operational safety, waste disposal, and weapons
proliferation. However, for global warming mitigation, the major
constraint may be that planned reactors are ``once through'' and use
the supply-limited uranium 235 (U-235) isotope, which makes up less
than one percent of natural uranium. The energy content of U-235 in
identified deposits is less than natural gas. We would run out of fuel
in 30 years employing such reactors at rates sufficient to supply
present primary power demand. As with coal, we do not have the luxury
of investing in the wrong nuclear power infrastructure. Longer-term, we
will need to breed U-238 (99 percent of natural uranium) into plutonium
or more abundant thorium to U-233, a fuel I favor for several technical
reasons. Why not start now? Infrastructure and weapons proliferations
issues need to be faced now if we are serious about green nukes as
alternative energy.
The third class of primary power, my own preference, is renewable
energy, currently less than one percent of primary power (Figure 7).
Space limitations prevent an adequate discussion, but I and colleagues
at the National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) in Golden, Colorado,
and elsewhere believe solar and wind power can be scaled up, with a
proper infrastructure of transmission and storage, to provide 30
percent or more of primary emission-free power by mid-century (Pew
Center, 2004). President Jimmy Carter, a strong advocate of renewables,
created the Solar Energy Research Institute, the precursor of NREL. And
Jerry Brown, dubbed California's ``governor moonbeam'' by critics, in
the 1970s initiated tax and other incentives leading to the now cost-
effective Altamont wind farms. It is hard to overestimate the damage
done by Ronald Reagan who, on becoming president, symbolically ripped
the solar panels Carter had put on the roof of the White House,
likewise dismantling most of Carter's energy research and development
initiative. We have not recovered. Carter's Administration a quarter
century ago was the last time the U.S. had a pro-active alternate
energy policy. Unfortunately, the institutional memory of this has
dimmed. Whatever the problems of Carter plan, and there were some, the
United States, and because of our leadership, the world, was headed
toward a sustainable energy future. Not now.
What colleagues and I propose as a goal is that by mid-century,
renewables should supply roughly a third of the world's power; clean,
safe and sustainable nukes another third; and coal gasification with
CCS the final third. The total would amount to 100 to 300 percent of
present energy demand. There are major roles for business and talented
entrepreneurs, but I do not see how we get there without the stimulus
of massive Apollo-like government-funded research and development,
perhaps starting with ARPA-E (Advanced Research Projects Agency-Energy;
after DARDA, the Defense Research Projects Agency, which gave us, among
other things, the Internet) proposed by the National Academy of Science
(Committee on Science, 2005).
At the same time, we need to implement everything we have in our
alternate energy arsenal immediately. I do this myself as best I can. I
drive a hybrid and get my home's electricity from green power, mainly
wind power purchased by my utility from upstate New York (Hoffert,
2004). At this point, I pay a premium for this ``privilege.'' I do not
claim any special virtue as an early adopter. I do think both ethics
and ``cool'' technology can be early drivers of alternate energy. At
least until it become cost-effective to the average person, perhaps
stimulated by carbon and gas taxes and/or cap-and-trade schemes. We
need work on a broad spectrum of possible solutions; picking technology
winners is notoriously uncertain, even by experts (Clarke, 1982).
This is not the forum to elaborate on the most innovative high-tech
ideas that could allow us to live sustainably on the planet. Interested
readers should consult Hoffert et al. (2002) and the special issue of
Scientific American on ``Energy's Future Beyond Carbon'' (2006).
Climate and sustainable energy is a political as well a science and
engineering problem. With the memory of Rick Smalley's brilliant
exposition in mind (he gave a most engaging and accessible public
lecture at an Aspen Global Change Institute conference that I co-
organized a few years ago), I hold that energy and global warming, not
terrorism and mind-numbing dogma, are the appropriate organizing
principles for this century. There is no guarantee high-tech
civilization will survive into an ever richer future. But I find no
solace in joining with the peak oilers to hunker down to a long slow
decline with a return to agrarian (and eventually hunter-gatherer?)
lifestyles as energy runs down and sea levels rise (Urstadt, 2006).
Likewise, keep me away from Ted Kaczynski, the ``Unabomber,'' who would
destroy even a solar-powered high-tech world (Kaczynski, 2002).
I am optimistic enough about technology to believe policies based
on science and engineering can solve the climate/energy problem; that
with enough effort, thoughtful energy policies, instead of the usual
pork packaged for public relations, can become part of political party
platforms by the next U.S. presidential election. The stakes are high.
We owe to ourselves and generations to come to fight for our remarkable
technological civilization, with all its imperfections, built on the
shoulders of earlier generations. It will be hard. We will need every
ounce of creative imagination. If we do make it through the twenty-
first century without imploding, perhaps someday we might even find a
way to cope with those problems our pre-technology evolutionary history
has left us quite unprepared for.
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Supplementary Remarks by M. Hoffert on the Original CCTP Plan
This CCTP R&D Plan would be strengthened and would be a far more
effective policy tool if the problem to be solved were defined by the
quantity and timing of CO2 emission-free-power and/or
efficiency improvements needed to stabilize climate at various levels
of atmospheric CO2, or of global warming, as the global
economy grows at projected rates of two to three percent per year.
The future path is unknowable but emission-free primary power
levels needed to attain the WRE stabilization scenarios levels for
economic growth and fossil energy assumptions of the IPCC IS92a
business-as-usual (BAU) scenario.
Primary and emission-free power growth in the previous century is
also shown. [Note the emission-free-power growth rate discontinuity in
the vicinity of ``now,'' and the subsequently large growth in emission-
free energy supply just needed for BAU--with progressively larger ramp-
ups for various stabilization levels.] This is the real problem. The
Manhattan Project didn't aim to explore nuclear weapons in general;
it's goal was building a Bomb before the end of WWII. The Apollo
Program didn't aim at exploring manned space flight in general; it's
goal was putting a (US) man on the Moon by the end the '60s. So too
does the CCTP program need a more concrete goal; specifically, I'm
arguing, some combination of terawatts from supply and negaterawatts''
from demand sufficient to stabilize global warming at tolerable levels.
One doesn't have to advocate what level at this point. That should be
publicly debated, perhaps in Congress. In any case this administration
has clearly stated its opposition to specific targets. Avoiding
``dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system,'' the
stated UN FCCC goal, was undefined in that document--though melting
Arctic sea ice and tundra and increasing hurricane intensity make it
more timely than ever to do so. Tony Blair at the recent Exeter
conference in the UK set an upper limit of two degrees Celsius global
warming. This might be cited as an example of thinking by a close U.S.
ally.
Such a goal implies terawatts of emission-free power in the coming
decades (and/or negaterwatts from efficiency improvements)--as is well
documented in peer-reviewed literature. Not to be overly alarmist, but
if current GDP growth rates continues, the latter half of the 21st
century is a climatic disaster waiting to happen. To address this
realistically, a conceptual framework similar to that described above
needs to be up front of this Strategic R&D Plan; however challenging
the goal may be and however much it requires international cooperation.
Otherwise what we have is a shopping list, well-motivated and
interesting perhaps, but uncoupled from the actual problem.
Biography for Martin I. Hoffert
Martin I. Hoffert is Professor Emeritus of Physics and former Chair
of the Department of Applied Science at New York University. His
academic background includes a B.S. (1960) in Aeronautical Engineering
from the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor; M.S. (1964) and Ph.D.
(1967) from the Polytechnic Institute of Brooklyn (now the Polytechnic
Institute of New York) in Astronautics; and a Master of Arts in Liberal
Studies, M.A.L.S. (1969) from the New School for Social Research where
he did graduate work in sociology and economics. He has been on the
research staff of the Curtiss-Wright Corporation, General Applied
Science Laboratories, Advanced Technology Laboratories, Riverside
Research Institute and National Academy of Sciences Senior Resident
Research Associate at the NASA/Goddard Institute for Space Studies.
Prof. Hoffert has published broadly in fluid mechanics, plasma physics,
atmospheric science, oceanography, planetary atmospheres, environmental
science, solar and winds energy conversion and space solar power. His
work in geophysics aimed at development of theoretical models of
atmospheres and oceans to address environmental issues, including the
ocean/climate model first employed by the UN Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change (IPCC) to assess global warming from different scenarios
of fossil fuel use. His early model of the evolving CO2
greenhouse in Mars' atmosphere is also of interest today--providing
both an explanation of Mars' riverbed-like channels formed in the
distant past and a motivation for terraforming its atmosphere for human
habitability in the future. His research in alternate energy conversion
includes wind tunnel and full-scale experiments on innovative wind
turbines, photovoltaic generation of hydrogen and wireless power
transmission (WPT) applied to solar power satellites. His present
efforts focus on energy technologies that could stabilize climate
change from the fossil fuel greenhouse--including (but not limited to)
space solar power. He is a Member of the American Geophysical Union
(AGU), the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics (AIAA)
was elected Fellow of the American Association for the Advancement of
Science (AAAS). He is presently a consultant to Lawrence Livermore
National Laboratory and Versatility Software, Inc.
Discussion
Chairwoman Biggert. Thank you very much, Doctor, and we
really do appreciate you coming on such short notice, and
really do appreciate your testimony. I think that it really
adds something to the discussion, and I would say from a
policy, sitting as a policy-maker, that it is very important,
and I know that we have been working on so much of the
alternative fuels, and what I believe is that we have got to do
it now, and we have always proceeded along this path since the
'70s really, when we had a gas crisis, and all the things that
went on, to say we are going to have to solve this problem. We
are going to have to reduce our reliance on foreign oil and
fossil fuels, and then, the prices would go down, and then
people would forget about it, and I think that is why we are
now in the situation that we are in right now, because we
haven't had the development of those long-term goals, or even
the short-term goals that we need to have. And if we don't do
it now, you know, we are going to lose the momentum again, and
not do that.
In fact--and that really leads me to my question, and I
will now recognize myself for five minutes, and we will have
questions, then answers, and then, I will alternate.
Mr. Eule, and I would ask you about establishing, you know,
a greenhouse gas concentration goal. Don't you have to set the
goal before we set up the R&D priorities, and if not, why not?
Mr. Eule. I think there has been some confusion about what
the plan is intended to be. The plan is not intended, was never
intended to be a mitigation plan. It is a plan to help us
coordinate and develop technology so that we can develop
mitigation options that are cost-effective. I mean, that is the
purpose of the plan.
Now, your question goes to the issue of setting targets. We
don't set a target in the plan, but we do take a look at
alternate futures. In chapter 3 of the report, we have very
detailed scenario analyses. These were done by the folks at
Pacific Northwest National Lab, and over at the University of
Maryland, and what we essentially did was take a look at
different technology futures and assess what type of
technologies would be needed, when they would be needed, and
how they would have to be deployed in--to achieve certain
mitigation levels.
So, the plan does include some scenario analysis, and it
does take a look at the timing and the pace and the extent to
which these technologies would have to be ready. And I think
everybody--do the Members have the plan? I would just point
to----
Chairwoman Biggert. Sequestered until 2:00, so----
Mr. Eule. Right.
Chairwoman Biggert. But we have, you know, addressed the
draft plan, the----
Mr. Eule. Right, I think on page 208 and 210, we lay out
some goals that we have set for cumulative GHG emissions
mitigation under four different constraints, and for the four
goals that we have set in reducing emissions in energy end-use,
energy supply, carbon capture and sequestration, and non-
CO2 gases, and on 210, we give you an idea of the
timing that these advanced technologies would have to be ready
to enter the marketplace.
And one thing I want to point out, and this--under the
table on page 210, if you look at the four goals we have in
reducing emissions from energy, and end-use in infrastructure,
on the very high constraint case, we will just use that as an
example, technologies ready in the 2010 to 2020 timeframe,
those would be largely energy efficiency technologies, the next
one in the--would be goal four, reducing emission of non-
CO2 greenhouse gases, those technologies would be
ready about 2020 to 2030, and following that, emissions from
energy supply, and then carbon capture and sequestration.
So, there is a continuum of technologies that would be
available to address these different constraints, and for the
four specific goals, so while we haven't settled that, I think
we have done a lot of analytical work that would allow us to
plan for the future, which is what the strategic plan is all
about.
Chairwoman Biggert. It is a lot information, certainly, and
a lot of different, you know, research and development plans,
and that is--we can take this, but my problem is that there
doesn't seem to be any connection between the scenario
analysis, and then, the actual technology priorities described
in the following chapters after that, and I know that we had
sent a letter, and I know that you were not, you know, in
charge at the time. This was in December, and we had problems
with the draft, in that--and I think it--our concerns were that
it--there was no clear set of criteria for the technology
selection and prioritization, and no timelines for completing
individual programs or projects, and no metrics for evaluating
the progress, and no sense of how the budget priorities across
agencies would be developed.
And I guess, you know, we as policy people have to take
this, and you know, make decisions on how to move forward, but
we have got research that was done 10 years ago, we don't know
how that research is progressing, and how that fits into a
plan, and how the new research will then come alone. Have we--
you know, have the last 10 years, will they--how will they fit
together in how we can progress?
Mr. Eule. Excellent question. I think you are getting to
the issue of how we set priorities in the plan, and first of
all, I want to say that this is the first plan of its kind in
the world. No other country has a similar plan. I have traveled
to many countries, and I have briefed them on what we are doing
in CCTP. The impression I get is--and when I ask my
interlocutors, they really don't have a firm handle on what
they are doing in the climate change arena, how much they are
spending, and they don't really have an overall strategy.
So, I think this document is visionary in that sense, and--
but getting into--getting to your question, we have a number of
vehicles for setting priorities. One, we do portfolio
assessments. We have an interagency working group, six of them,
one for each of the strategic goals in the plan. Three of them
are led by the Department of Energy in energy use, energy
supply, and in basic research. EPA leads our other greenhouse
gas taskforce. NASA does measuring and monitoring, and USDA and
DOE jointly lead the one on carbon sequestration. So, we have
experts in the agencies who get together in the same room and
talk about these things, which has never happened before. So,
that is one way.
We also sponsor outside expert reviews. Last year, we
sponsored six workshops, again, revolving around each of the
strategic goals, and that was very useful in identifying gaps
and opportunities in the portfolio. I mentioned the scenario
analysis, which is very important, and of course, we take
these--take what we have learned from all these activities, and
we present it to the management structure that the President
has set up. And I am--as a Director of CCTP, I am one of the
principals that participates in what we call the Blue Box
meetings. These are deputy-level interagency meetings, and so,
we present the results of our analyses to them. So, we work
through both--at the agency level, and at the interagency
level, through management structures, so through those
vehicles, we intend to have a big impact on the way the budgets
are formed.
Chairwoman Biggert. Well, my time has expired, so I will
after--come back and ask the other witnesses to respond, to
comment on this issue. So, hold that thought, and I will now
turn to my colleague, Mr. Honda from California.
Mr. Honda. Thank you, Madam Chair, and I would like to
offer my five minutes to Dr. Hoffert. He ended his comments by
saying that he was looking forward to--hoping that we won't be
offended, but probably would be, to continue your testimony,
and utilize my five minutes to continue your talk, since I am
very interested, and I won't take being offended personally to
you, so I would like to invite you to----
Dr. Hoffert. I can't tell you how much I appreciate that.
The part that I was about--would have gotten to, sort of,
in this kind of freewheeling exposition, really has to do with
innovation. I think innovation is critical. For two hundred
years, what has distinguished the United States, what made the
20th century the American century, is the fact that we are a
nation of technological innovators, and we have basically led
the world.
And as I said before, that I am a technology optimist. Now,
not everyone is, and the times that we are living in are really
different than the times that I grew up in in the '50s and the
'60s, when there was a general feeling at the end of World War
II that the scientists who built the atomic bomb, and the
scientists that happened to be German, who built the
intermediate range ballistic missile, which could eventually
take us to the Moon--and von Braun's Saturn V did take us to
the Moon eventually--could do anything, that technology was a
positive force, and it was a force for good, and indeed,
technology, on balance, in my view, has been an enormous force
for good. There are two billion people who are alive today
because of the Green Revolution, because we manufacture
fertilizers with energy that wouldn't be here, and that could
lead to other discussions about whether the planet is
overpopulated.
But there is a fundamental issue of whether one believes in
the enlightenment in science and in technology, and the ability
to move forward with vision, and to maintain this wonderful, in
my opinion, civilization, technological civilization that we
created. Now, that leads to a longer-term point of view than is
associated with the terms of Congressmen, for example, or other
legislatures, or even Presidents. And yet, when it exists in a
society, you can do amazing things.
I want to get back to the innovation part, though.
Innovation is when somebody asks a question that nobody has
asked before, and the answer winds up being able to change the
world, and there is a practical problem with the way government
bureaucratic agencies like the Department of Energy are
structured.
I mean, don't get me wrong. Some of my best friends work
for these agencies, and I have friends even who are lawyers and
economists, and all of those things. But I am coming at this
from the perspective of someone who believes that there needs
to be fostering of innovation, in the way, for example, there
is in the parallel universe of the Defense Department. I did
defense research. I worked on the ballistic missile system. I
did a lot of bad things when I was young, and I did that kind
of R&D, and I admit it, and it was very interesting,
technically fascinating, as fascinating as I think working on
the Bomb was to the scientists who were working in that era.
But the culture is totally different than the culture at
the Department of Energy, or even NASA, to some extent, because
many of these projects are away from the scrutiny of the public
eye. I mean, one thing I learned, for example, is that the
black space program is bigger than the white space program. By
black, I mean, you know, the nonpublic one, and every once in a
while, something emerges from that military R&D that does
transform the world.
Since World War II, if you look at the technologies that
have really driven economic growth, and I would include gas
turbines, commercial jet aircraft, large scale integrated
circuits, computer microchips, satellites, satellite
telecommunications, and the Internet, which Wall Street is
always taking credit for, was actually supported for twenty
years by ARPA, now called DARPA, and then another ten years by
the National Science Foundation. And so, these are actually
technologies that were sponsored by government research.
There is a perception that government should not be
sponsoring technology, and it--I believe it is very
hypocritical. This very committee, as you may know, at one time
was called the House Committee on Science and Technology. The
technology part is gone, as you may know, for when a certain
party took control of Congress, they decided, for reasons
having to do with their beliefs, or their ideological feelings
about the market, that the government shouldn't be developing
technology.
And now, we are back to the same issue. The question is
would those technologies have come about, and it is a profound
question--without government R&D--or would we be living in a
totally different world? And when people talk about the market,
I would have to say this: it would be financially irresponsible
for a large company to support the kind of research that we
need to do to deal with the climate change problem, because it
is not going to pay off in the three to five year timeframe.
This is a problem that is often called the Valley of Death
by researchers. Research that has a timeframe that is
intermediate to the really short timeframe that you can get
support from industry, and the longer things, timeframes like
fusion, where it is so far in the distant future that it
doesn't have policy implications that people may fear, in terms
of their political persuasion.
We need to be doing a lot more in the Valley of Death, and
we also need to be working innovatively and fostering it. There
are many areas--now, I am not up here, actually, to be honest--
--
Chairwoman Biggert. Actually, Dr. Hoffert, Mr. Honda's time
has expired, so----
Dr. Hoffert. Oh, I am terribly sorry, but thank you so
much, sir, for giving me this opportunity to make those points.
Chairwoman Biggert. I feel like you are preaching to the
choir up here, because I think this is the one committee that
gets it, and we have been trying to spread this to our
colleagues, so we appreciated it.
Ms. Woolsey from California----
Ms. Woolsey. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
Chairwoman Biggert.--recognized for five minutes.
Ms. Woolsey. Woman. I, for one, have been preaching an
Apollo-sized energy program forever. Actually, I was part of
the telecommunications industry when the space program was all
put together, and that was the beginning of affordable parts
and pieces and integrated circuits, and it was all federal
funding that got us to the Moon.
I think our energy Apollo program probably is going to be
many, many, many, many, many of these books, these reports and
plans and strategic planning and all that, but in the end, it
will result in the industry that this United States should be
part of, which is the climate change technology industry. I
mean, we are giving it away to foreign countries. We are
letting them do it using our technologies. I mean, how dumb are
we?
So, let us not talk about this. Let us talk about--I mean,
let us do something about it. I mean, we have got to talk about
it, but let us do something about it. So, what I would like to
know from you folks is what do we, as Members of Congress, need
to do to push this forward? We can read this strategic plan. We
can talk--read the Pew recommendations. We can agree with Dr.
Hoffert and Mr. Mottershead. Did I say that right? Yes. But
what--agreeing isn't good enough, because we actually should be
making action.
So, tell me, sort of this--I love your tie, by the way. It
is a statement.
Dr. Hoffert. Some of you guys would love it.
Ms. Woolsey. It is a statement. What are the two things
each one of you, the two things that we should be doing right
now?
Dr. Hoffert. Well, I have been saying--let me say one very
specific practical thing----
Ms. Woolsey. And you have got to go fast, because we don't
have----
Dr. Hoffert.--which wouldn't cost a lot of money, is to
support our proposed Exploratory Research and Development
program, in other words, to provide funding for an effort that
might exist within DOE, or it might be funded by DOE without
outside administrators. A proposal has been written on that,
and we have submitted it, and it has never been funded, and it
its very cheap. Eventually, it will cost more, and I think that
Congress should act positively on that.
Ms. Woolsey. Thank you, Doctor. Mr. Mottershead.
Mr. Mottershead. Two things. Resonates on your point. I
think you should focus on building businesses, not for building
technology. And that building businesses requires a whole suite
of different policy instruments in order to ensure that those
businesses are thriving and growing. And it is no different
than conventional business development, economic development,
whereas climate is seen to be something different from that.
And I think that there is a lot of experience about how you
nurture and grow economic development through business
development.
And my second request is none of this will happen unless
you price carbon, so you need to price carbon.
Ms. Woolsey. Thank you. Ms. Greenwald.
Ms. Greenwald. I echo what Mr. Mottershead said. What you
really need to do is you need to unleash the power of the
private sector to address this problem. I agree with Dr.
Hoffert that the federal role is absolutely critical, but it is
in the private sector that you are going to get tremendous
innovation. What the private sector is going to invest, if they
have a price on carbon, if they have a carbon constraint, if we
have a national, mandatory policy, and an international policy
that is consistent with what works here, and will also work
globally, that is how you are going to unleash the power of the
private sector to innovate, to respond, and you will get all
kinds of inventions that the government won't think of. It is
the learning by doing that the private sector can do that the
government can't, but we really need to solve this problem.
Ms. Woolsey. Thank you. Mr. Eule.
Mr. Eule. I am going to be a little bit parochial here, and
urge that Congress fund the budget that we proposed for the
Climate Change Technology Program. I will say last year, we
didn't receive any funding, and we think that was--we don't
think there was any prejudice in that. We think it was
oversight. It was the way our budget was arranged, but we
missed the money, quite frankly, and I think that one of the
reasons the report was delayed is we didn't have the funding
that we thought we would have to get the document out the door,
but we have asked for $1 million for this fiscal year, and we
would certainly appreciate the Members' support in seeing that
that gets funded.
Ms. Woolsey. So, Mr. Eule, with that $1 million, what would
we have besides a report, or $1 billion, or how many----
Mr. Eule. Well----
Ms. Woolsey.--million, it is not----
Mr. Eule. It doesn't sound like a lot of money----
Ms. Woolsey. No.
Mr. Eule.--but it is a lot of money to us. I think we will
get implementation of the report. That is--we have a series of
next steps that are listed in Chapter 9, and one thing we would
like to do is get busy on implementing on those. I think there
are a number of analytical tasks that we would like to
undertake, for example, limits analysis.
You know, Dr. Hoffert talked about the potential of some of
these technologies, but there could be limits. I mean, when you
think about--well, there has been discussion recently about the
limits of ethanol production, you know, where it bumps up
against food production. So, what we would like to do is take a
look at not only ethanol, but other technologies to see what
type of limits are out there. That would be an excellent
planning tool. That is something that we have in mind for next
fiscal year.
We would like to beef up our scenario analyses, which I
think are very important for policymakers, and of course,
portfolio reviews are sort of the bread and butter of what we
do, and help us prioritize the R&D portfolio.
So, I think those three things are, would be at the top of
my list for next year.
Ms. Woolsey. Thank you all very, very much.
Chairwoman Biggert. Thank you. I am--I would recognize
the--Mr. Rohrabacher is--I have not recognized him yet, but
just recognize that he is here, and has joined our committee,
and would ask unanimous consent that he be--join our committee.
He is a part of the Science Committee, but not on this
subcommittee, and with that, I would call on Mr. Green from
Texas. Recognized for five minutes.
Mr. Green. Thank you, Madam Chair, and thank also the
ranking member, and I am tempted very much to give Mr. Hoffert
another five minutes, but I think I can fight the temptation.
The report addresses a number of things, and perhaps this
is contained therein. How do we deal with Mr. Hoffert's notion
that we need a global program to address the CO2
problem? How do we inculcate the rest of the world into this
grand scheme? Yes, sir.
Mr. Eule. The Administration has actually done quite a bit
of outreach with our partners overseas. Just let me give you a
few examples. Earlier, I believe it was in July 2001, we
launched the Generation IV International Forum, which has ten
countries that are partners, plus EURATOM, and they are looking
at six advanced Generation IV design for nuclear power plants.
In 2003, we launched the Carbon Sequestration Leadership
Forum. It has, I believe, over 20 members at this point, and it
is looking at technologies, primarily geological sequestration.
We all recognize that, for the foreseeable future, fossil fuels
are going to be one of the most available sources of energy.
The question is what do you do with the emissions that you get
when you use them. So, we have engaged internationally with the
Carbon Sequestration Leadership Forum on technologies that
could solve that.
The International Partnership for the Hydrogen Economy is
another U.S. initiative. It has 17 members, and it is working
on fuel cell, distribution, and production technologies to make
the hydrogen economy a reality. And I want to point out here,
too, that in these international initiatives, we have developed
countries, we have developing countries, we have countries that
are parties to the Kyoto Protocol, and countries that are--so
it is a big mix, but each of them, each country brings to the
table some technology capability, and we think that these are
great collaborative efforts that we can leverage our own
resources, and so our budgets go further.
And I would mention Methane to Markets as another
partnership that we have, that is led by the Environmental
Protection Agency, and it is focusing on using methane from
landfills, oil and gas systems, agriculture, and coal mines,
and using that as a clean fuel. Methane emissions are 20
times--over 20 times more potent than carbon dioxide, so these
are great short-term opportunities to have an impact.
So, I would just offer those as some examples of how we are
engaging internationally on the technology front.
Mr. Green. Yes, ma'am.
Ms. Greenwald. I think the most important thing that we can
do as a country is to engage with other countries in designing
an international regime for dealing with greenhouse gas
emissions. We are a quarter of the world's greenhouse gas
emissions. The Kyoto Protocol may not have been the right
agreement for the United States, but we have to figure out what
the right agreement is. We have to participate actively in
developing an international response to this issue that
develops a market for greenhouse gas emissions that our
companies can participate in, that develops markets for
technologies that we can develop and that we can implement. We
need a global response to this problem, and as an important
player, a critical player in this globally, we have a
tremendous responsibility and opportunity to help design how
the world is going to respond to this over the long-term.
Mr. Green. You mentioned Kyoto. Before you go on, are we
still encouraging others to become a part of Kyoto?
Ms. Greenwald. It depends who the we is.
Mr. Green. The United States.
Ms. Greenwald. The Europeans are moving ahead, and the
United States has decided not to participate. I think it is
probably moot at this point for our country, because it starts
in about a year or two, so I think it would be very difficult
for us to sign onto the Kyoto Protocol and participate at this
moment, but there are lots of discussions going on about what
happens beyond Kyoto? How do you develop a regime that can work
for us, that can work for developing countries, to sort of
involve all the major emitters in the world in dealing with
this problem, because it is global. We have to have a national
policy that works for us, and we have to work toward an
international program that works for us and for the rest of the
world.
Mr. Green. Was that decision that Kyoto doesn't work for us
more scientific than political?
Ms. Greenwald. I think it was more political than
scientific.
Mr. Green. Did you have an additional comment, sir?
Mr. Mottershead. I think that business competes, and this
is an issue of international competitiveness, and while
cooperation has its place, you can see that they--in the
development of solar photovoltaics, there actually--that
international competition has caused the technology to develop
more quickly than probably if we just had an international
cooperation.
So, the Japanese, building an internal industry by creating
a market inside Japan clearly led and continue to lead the
industry. Then Germany, clearly starting to build, followed by
Spain, and now, California following. And those industries are
getting built on the back of markets that were created by
policy. At the moment, actually, the most, probably the most
favorable place to come if you want to develop a wind business
is into the U.S., and that is very good and supportive. As will
next generation biofuels. But the Germans are clearly
developing a view about biodiesel, because of the importance of
diesel in their infrastructure.
Then you come to carbon capture and storage, and it seems
too, well, as everybody was interested in cooperation on
research, and we took that, and said well, actually, we are
more interested in building hydrogen power stations. So, we
have committed to building between 10 and 15 hydrogen power
stations in the next 10 years. Each one of those, therefore--an
example of one is in Carson City in California--is a $1 billion
investment, will generate 500 megawatts of power, will be
operational in 2011, and that is what is required. If you want
to actually build a business, you have to build customers who
want to buy the product. Businesses will respond. But we have--
that is an investment of something like $8 billion over the
next decade. I mean, you know, once you get into that, then
that is the degree of competition that will pull----
Mr. Green. Before my time expires, I have a question for
you, one additional question. Give a practical example, if you
would, please, of pricing carbon, a practical example of how we
can price it?
Mr. Mottershead. In Europe, the European Emission Trading
Scheme provides a cap on all large emitters, both in the
utility sector and in industry, which creates a price on carbon
that has fluctuated over the last two years between =15 to =30
a ton of carbon dioxide, and that clearly changes businesses'
attitude to their own emissions, and to their future
investments.
Mr. Green. Yes, sir.
Mr. Eule. I just want to follow up with the--you asked
about the Kyoto Protocol earlier. One of the concerns about the
Kyoto Protocol from the U.S. perspective was that it did not
include participation from developing countries in any
obligations, and I think one of the things we have to consider
as we think about policy over the long-term is that developing
countries for the most part haven't shown any interest in
committing to reducing greenhouse emissions. They are much more
interested in providing power to their citizens and economic
development.
The International Energy Agency estimates that there are
about two billion people worldwide that do not have access to
modern energy services, and governments across the globe are
working furiously to provide that energy to their citizens,
which propels economic growth. So, the question is, if carbon
can't be the driver, then what is? And what we have done
through the Asia Pacific Partnership, which includes the U.S.,
Japan, Australia, South Korea, China and India, we have placed
climate change within a much broader context, the context that
will include energy security, reducing air pollution, and
mitigating greenhouse gas emissions. So it is not focused
exclusively on climate change, and we think that--well, the
partnership with those six countries accounts for about half
the greenhouse gas emissions of the world, half the population,
half the economic activity of the globe, so it is a small
group, but it is a very big group in those terms.
And so, through the partnership, we are looking at ways to
deploy cleaner technologies in those countries, and we think
that will have a big impact.
Chairwoman Biggert. The gentleman's time has expired. Mr.
Rohrabacher, you are recognized for five minutes.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Thank you very much. I have looked at this
issue, and I can--you know, with a lot of skepticism in the
past, and I do today. I mean, having noted the countless,
perhaps a dozen times that there has been global cooling and
global warming over the long history of this planet. I mean, we
have had ice ages come and go before human beings ever were on
this planet. I have to assume they weren't caused by manmade
greenhouse gases as the glaciers went back and forth before
mankind even emerged.
So, pardon my skepticism. Also, being a surfer, I go out on
the ocean, and I know the number one rule is you don't fight
Mother Nature, you know. Surfers don't fight the waves, they
understand how the waves go, and you work with the waves. And
so, it is frustrating to hear about, you know, people
assigning, for example, political motives to--saying is this
science or this politics? Well, how about economics? You know,
maybe economics is the decision-making factor. That the--
because you can prove anything with science eventually, if you
are willing to spend all the money that is necessary for health
care, education, and everything else in our country and the
world. You dilute the Third World of all their resources, in
order to prevent certain greenhouse gases from emerging in
their electric plant.
But the question I have for you, and this is a question,
well, first, one other observation, I had a British Member of
Parliament out with me in California last weekend, and he told
me about how in Roman times, they have uncovered the fact that
England was covered with vineyards, where they grew wine
grapes, and by the year 1000, the Vikings were colonizing
Greenland and Iceland, but by the year 1400, it was so cold
that the colonies in Iceland and Greenland were actually almost
starved to death, because they couldn't--no longer depend on
agriculture, and the Thames River was freezing over. I don't
think that was caused by any manmade greenhouse gases, because
I think that they didn't have a lot of industry at that time.
With that said, let me say I have three babies at home, and
I want them to breathe clean air, and while I am not
sympathetic at all with this--which I consider to be total
baloney of that manmade climate change, you know, you are going
through this cycle because of what man has done, especially
considering that all the other cycles man wasn't present, but I
do want my babies to breathe clean air. I do want them to live
in an environment where what is being--producing our energy
does not hurt their health.
Is there--is this a consistent--this is a question for the
panel--if I have a target of global pollution, trying to stop
global pollution, and trying to help and clean the air that
way, is this in some way contradictory, in terms of what I
would do, then what you are proposing that we do to prevent
global warming, which of course, I reject? So, are we at odds,
or is it reality that if we really believe in it, we want to
try to do everything we can to check pollution for health
reasons, that we are actually on the same track?
Dr. Hoffert. Who are you asking?
Mr. Rohrabacher. The whole panel, just give a thumbs up,
thumbs down, you're crazy, go back to California, go surfing.
Whatever you want to do.
Ms. Greenwald. I will start. If I have to say just one
thing about the science, that the National Academy of Sciences,
which is not a, sort of, one wing or the other, has made it
very clear----
Mr. Rohrabacher. Yeah. And----
Ms. Greenwald.--that this is a very serious problem, and we
have to take----
Mr. Rohrabacher. And you noted that they--that the guy who
was in charge of the report, that they--has now indicated that
that was not his conclusion, and that his name was basically
forced on that report?
Ms. Greenwald. No.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Okay. Well, you should note that.
Ms. Greenwald. It is--well, our understanding is that that
is not correct, but our view is----
Mr. Rohrabacher. We have heard about it.
Ms. Greenwald.--and I think that is really important to
keep in mind that just over the past few years, the science has
gotten much, much stronger, and we have been closely tracking
the peer reviewed literature, and there is sort of two sets of
studies that have been coming out that are very important.
One is very careful assessments that indicate we are
actually already seeing impacts of climate change, and also, a
number of very careful assessments of pattern analysis, taking
on the specific question about is this natural variability, or
is this something new? And in all of the impact categories, we
are seeing very clear evidence that what is happening now is
unprecedented.
Mr. Rohrabacher. How is it different from the other
warmings and coolings, then? Do we have--I mean, why is that we
have had all of these different ice ages and warming ages? How
is this one different from that?
Ms. Greenwald. Well, this one is caused by greenhouse gases
in the atmosphere, and if you look at sort of a 400,000 year
temperature chart, we are going into temperature zones that we
have never been before.
Mr. Rohrabacher. And were there greenhouse gases in all the
other ones as well?
Ms. Greenwald. In part of the--we do have some natural
CO2, but the--what is taking us----
Mr. Rohrabacher. Some.
Ms. Greenwald.--into new--a new zones, is----
Mr. Rohrabacher. Yeah, 95 percent of all greenhouse gases,
and we have been through these hearings before, come from
natural sources. But was it greenhouse gases in the past that
came from natural sources that caused the global cooling and
warming, or was it sunspots, which some other scientists tell
me that it was caused from?
Ms. Greenwald. Okay. Well, we will defer this for another
time, but let me just answer your other question, which is on--
--
Mr. Rohrabacher. Okay.
Ms. Greenwald.--on the overlap between what you do about
conventional air pollution and climate change.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Right.
Ms. Greenwald. There actually is substantial overlap. Many
of the technological solutions that are good on climate change
are also good on air pollution. For example, renewables, very
limited air pollution. Nuclear power, which has----
Mr. Rohrabacher. Right.
Ms. Greenwald.--no greenhouse gas emissions, or very small
on a lifecycle basis, is also low on air emissions, sort of
NOx, SOx, the more traditional air pollution. Biofuels also
has--there is a little bit of a mixed bag, but there are--there
is some evidence that we can have good performance, better
performance on air pollution from biofuels as well, and I think
hydrogen also has some great characteristics, in terms of air
pollution.
So, there are, if you are looking at it sort of from the
overlap between----
Mr. Rohrabacher. Right.
Ms. Greenwald.--someone who cares about air pollution and
climate change, I think there is significant overlap.
Mr. Rohrabacher. So, there is ways we can work together
even if we disagree with the analysis.
Ms. Greenwald. I think so.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Okay.
Dr. Hoffert. I have a comment. First, I want to say how
delighted I am to have the opportunity to meet you, Congressman
Rohrabacher, as there is one area in which we may very well
find an area of agreement.
The global--the need for a global scale source of base-load
electricity is very acute. Right now, as you know, the world is
spending $12 billion for the International Thermonuclear
Experimental Reactor experiment, which the U.S. DOE is involved
in, in part. There is another potential source of long-term
base-load electricity which would involve capturing sunlight in
orbit, geostationary orbit. That program is, at this point,
completely unfunded, and the Department of Energy does not have
a program in space solar power----
Mr. Rohrabacher. And you know I have been pushing for just
that, you know.
Dr. Hoffert. Pardon me?
Mr. Rohrabacher. You know, I have been pushing for just
that.
Dr. Hoffert. Well, that is why I would like to----
Mr. Rohrabacher. Exactly.
Dr. Hoffert.--start with, at least, with something I think
that we might agree upon. People have different views on
different matters. I think if we can agree that it would be
desirable for a sustainable world to have a source of renewable
energy that is very long-lasting, I think one could make
technical arguments, and I know that you are aware of them,
because you have written about it yourself.
Where space solar power could become competitive, depending
on breakthroughs in technology having to do with launch
vehicles, thin film photovoltaic cells, and all the rest, and I
have heard many of your talks about this.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Thank you.
Dr. Hoffert. Having said that----
Mr. Rohrabacher. Uh-oh.
Dr. Hoffert.--and I am a fan of yours on that topic. Having
said that, sir, one of the major reasons for developing that
technology in this century, rather than the Twenty Second
Century, is climate change. If not for climate change, there is
plenty of coal, and everyone knows that we could basically make
synthetic fuels at a higher price, but we could make synthetic
fuels with coal, and we could run our electric power plants,
and if it weren't for the fact that coal produces more CO2
per unit of energy, and the fact that virtually all of us who
have done relevant, climate-relevant research, believe that
that is going to cause global warming, we wouldn't really have
to worry about this problem of a global scale energy source.
I think it is very paradoxical that the very technology
that you yourself would endorse is probably best motivated by
this problem facing us. Now, none of this has to do with
whether nature is actually causing global warming, which are
remarks that you have made, and others have made from--at
various times. Various people with expertise ranging from
Michael Crichton to Congressman Barton to Senator Inhofe, I
must tell you that it isn't just a matter of consensus of
research active scientists. Scientists are not supposed to
believe arguments from authority. You really have to take the
long march through the data. Every one of your objections are
things that we ourselves thought about. I have been working on
this for 30 years, this problem. And you basically need to
protect yourself from fooling yourself, if you are a scientist,
because you get attached to your own theories, you start to
love them, and there is nothing more disappointing than having
a beautiful theory destroyed by an ugly fact, and we have to
deal with that all the time, and some of our colleagues in the
social sciences don't deal with it as much.
But I think I am coming to the end of my time.
Chairwoman Biggert. I think you are. And we are very happy
that the illustrious Chairman of the Science Committee has
joined us, Mr. Boehlert from New York, and you are recognized.
Mr. Boehlert. Thank you very much, Madam Chair.
I don't want anyone to think this is a point counterpoint,
but Dr. Hoffert, like you, I have great admiration for my
colleague, Mr. Rohrabacher. He is a very valued Member of this
committee and this Congress. Unfortunately, on this issue, he
happens to be more wrong than he is right.
There are a lot of people in this town who think that
global climate change is a figment of the imagination of
someone like me, or scientists like you, when in fact, it is a
hard, sober reality that we have to face. And not only is it
serious and documented, overwhelming scientific consensus, but
man has contributed significantly to global climate change, and
we know that, too, and that is documented.
And incidentally, I would point out that is the current
thinking at the White House. They acknowledge it is for real.
They acknowledge that man has contributed to it.
The question is now what do we do about it? Now, times have
changed, and hope springs eternal, and I am very optimistic as
we go forward, because of a lot of things. If you had told me a
few years ago that one of the most respected journalists in
America, Tom Brokaw, would have a highly acclaimed special on
television on the Discovery Channel about this very subject, I
would have said nobody will watch it--people were watching. If
you would have told me a while back that people would be paying
money to go to their local cinema to see a movie like ``An
Inconvenient Truth,'' starring, of all people, Al Gore, I would
have said what do you mean? That is not going to happen. Well,
that has happened, and they have. And I think he has added
immensely to the national dialogue.
We have got to stop thinking the old way, Republicans
versus Democrats, or scientists versus the rest of us. And
there are some people on this Hill, as you know too well, who,
instead of trying to be informed by science, try to intimidate
the scientists, and I happen to work in a town where everyone
likes to say, particularly in this institution, they are for
science-based decision-making, until the overwhelming
scientific consensus leads to a politically inconvenient
conclusion. Then, they want to go to plan B. And I am not
talking about the morning after pill. The fact of the matter is
that this is very serious, and we have got to deal with it in a
very serious, non-confrontational, nonpartisan way.
I would ask Mr. Eule, DOE has been doing research on clean
energy technologies for decades, a long time, done some good
work. Yet, the CCTP plan is silent on deployment strategies for
those technologies already near or at the end of the R&D
pipeline. What is the Department doing to help deploy
technologies that will start making a difference next year,
rather than 15 or 20 years from now?
In other words, I think what we have before us is a
pretty--a reframing of the issue, so that we are all starting
from the same point, but we have got to establish some
priorities, and we have got to have some policy steps that are
recommended, and we have got to have forward movement. We just
can't stay static, and everybody bemoan about it. I am tired of
picking up magazines like Newsweek, where I see a cover story
about the greening of America, people are now very concerned
about this issue, and when I channel surf, as I did one day
recently, or a couple months ago, there was Miles O'Brien on
CNN having an outstanding piece on global climate change.
Everybody is talking about it. What the American people want is
for somebody to start doing something about it, and Mr. Eule,
the ball is in your court, and I think you have an opportunity.
So, enlighten me, please.
Mr. Eule. Thank you, Chairman Boehlert. You ask an
excellent question. I think the Department--what the Secretary
of Energy likes to say now is the biggest source of energy we
have is the energy that we don't use wisely. So, the Department
is making a concerted effort, I think, to get energy efficiency
technologies out into the marketplace.
Let me give you a few examples. Our Industrial Technologies
Program is undergoing two hundred energy assessments at some of
the most energy-intensive facilities in the country. We have
the Advanced Energy Initiative, which is looking at putting
money into some specific technologies, that with just a little
bit of push, we can get, make some real gains, and get them out
into the marketplace.
And I would also draw your attention to the Energy Policy
Act. I mean, the Administration has been arguing for the need
for an Energy Policy Act for a number of years, and I think we
have what I think are a number of provisions in there that are
going to be very, very useful in getting technologies in the
marketplace. In Fiscal Year 2007 alone, there is about $1.6
billion in tax credits and incentives. And I think some of the
other provisions of the bill that don't get a lot of coverage,
but are vitally important, are going to have a big impact,
Title VI, for example, provides--authorizes, I believe, $1.5
billion in standby support coverage for the next six new
nuclear plants that are built, in case of a regulatory delay.
There are also nuclear tax credits in there, but quite frankly,
builders of nuclear power plants aren't going to take the risk
to take advantage of the tax credit if they can't get their
plants commissioned and running. So, this provision in Title VI
of the bill goes to a specific risk that was really holding
back nuclear power plant constructions. I believe this is going
to be a huge, huge impetus to building new nuclear power
plants. And of course, if you couple that with our NP2010
program, which looks at the regulatory system, I mean, I think
we have in place a good strategy to deploy nuclear power in the
near-term.
And I also say that the Department is looking at exercising
its authority to issue loan guarantees. We are talking about a
figure of about $2 billion for technologies to--that avoid,
reduce, or sequester greenhouse gas emissions or reduce air
pollutants, and the office is in the process of setting up a
program to do that. And I think that will also have a
tremendous impact on getting these technologies to market.
Mr. Boehlert. Pardon me if I may, you know. Those are
longer range. What are we doing, you know, I want to talk
months, not years. What are we doing that offers some promise
that at least, there is some movement in the direction of
deploying technologies in months rather than years? You know,
most people look at Washington, and say, you know, everybody
agrees--well, everybody, even Mr. Rohrabacher, I think, is
reluctantly coming around to the conclusion that global climate
change is for real. I wish we could harness his energy. Maybe
we could solve some of the problems. But they say do something
about it in Washington, and Washington is not doing something
that is more immediate in nature.
And let me quickly, parenthetically add that I have the
greatest respect for Secretary Bodman. I think he is
unquestionably one of the best Cabinet choices this President
has made. I mean, I view him as first among equals in the
Cabinet, but we have some differences. For example, I think our
energy policy is flawed. I think we have ignored CAFE standards
and things like that. That offers some immediate hope, some
relief, but what do we--talk about months, not years.
Mr. Eule. Chairman, I can't resist putting in a plug that
we have asked Congress for authority to reform the CAFE
program.
Mr. Boehlert. Well, there is some disagreement, Mr. Eule.
Mr. Eule. Yes, I understand.
Mr. Boehlert. There is some disagreement on whether or not
the President has that authority. So, given the authority----
Mr. Eule. Okay.
Mr. Boehlert. What good is the authority if you are not
willing to use it?
Mr. Eule. I understand. No, you have asked some very good
questions. As I have said, we are doing these assessments. Our
buildings program, for example, is working with builders today
on the new home designs that are much more energy-efficient
than current homes. They have a longer-term plan, it goes out
to 2020, but they are also doing, working with the builders
now, and I believe at last count, there were close to 34,000
homes that were built through this program in the United States
today.
So, I can certainly get you--I am not prepared to get----
Mr. Boehlert. Sure, I understand, and it is not----
Mr. Eule.--but I will certainly get something for the
record.
[The information follows:]
Mr. Boehlert. All right. Thank you very much, Madam Chair.
Chairwoman Biggert. I--this is the first time I have
gaveled down the Chairman.
Mr. Boehlert. Well, I feel very passionately about this
subject.
Chairwoman Biggert. And you have done it to me, I know.
Mr. Boehlert. I think it is kind of obvious that I am
interested. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Chairwoman Biggert. And thank you so much for being here,
and I would like to thank everyone who has participated in this
hearing today, and we really appreciate your input, and your
efforts.
And let me express my appreciation to the Department for
releasing the revised CCTP strategy plan, but let me also put
you on notice that this issue is not closed. I take oversight
responsibilities seriously, and I would like to see continued
progress, and first, we need to be able to better compare the
relative value of R&D investments across the full CCTP
portfolio. And I think next, that the DOE needs to make a--
needs a better process for evaluating its plans and priorities,
and I would expect the DOE to solicit input and advice from the
technical community, industry associations, and environmental
groups on the full suite of climate change technology
activities.
And finally, I think we need to be better able to assess
the relative impact on climate change of the different
technologies in the CCTP portfolio. So, with that, I look
forward to learning of the Department's progress in these areas
in the future. I really thank all of the experts for being
here, and your excellent testimony.
If there is no further objection, the record will remain
open for additional statements from the Members, and for
answers to any followup questions the Subcommittee may ask the
panelists. Without objection, so ordered.
This hearing is now adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 3:33 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]
Appendix 1:
----------
Answers to Post-Hearing Questions
Responses by Stephen Eule, Director of U.S. Climate Change Technology
Program, Department of Energy
Questions submitted by Chairman Judy Biggert
Q1. The technical reviewers, in their May 2006 report, recommended
greater emphasis on exploratory research addressing novel concepts to
uncover breakthrough technology, enabling research and development
(R&D), and integrative concepts. How does the revised plan address
cross-cutting R&D opportunities that do not neatly fit into any one of
your technology categories? Please provide examples.
A1. The Climate Change Technology Program's (CCTP) Strategic Plan
highlights the importance of identifying and pursuing cross-cutting R&D
opportunities that do not neatly fit into any one of the applied
technology categories in Chapters 4 through 8. Specifically, Chapter 9
states that there is a need ``to augment existing applied R&D and
strategic research programs with exploratory research. Such research
would pursue novel, advanced or emergent, enabling and integrative
concepts that do not fit well within the defined parameters of existing
programs, and are not elsewhere covered.''
Chapter 9 provides some specific examples of novel concepts. We
note that many of these concepts are already being funded within
ongoing programs. In fact, in 2002, we posted a Request for Information
(RFI) for novel concepts to support our budget request for a National
Climate Change Technology Initiative competitive solicitation program.
Less than 10 of the 180 RFI responses were simultaneously assessed as
high in technical merit, responsive to the RFI criteria, and unique or
novel, that is, not easily fitting into the scope of any existing R&D
funding program, if broadly considered.
Q2. The President's budget requests $3 billion in Fiscal Year 2007 for
climate change technology development. What is the annual estimated
cost of the activities outlined in your plan?
A2. A breakdown by agency of the annual estimated federal cost of the
current CCTP portfolio, about $2.8 billion, may be found in the budget
table of Appendix A. However, this should be interpreted as a partial
figure in the overall global effort to develop new technologies. For
example, the federal cost is often augmented in the applied R&D areas
by non-federal partnering and cost-sharing, which can be as much as, or
greater than, the federal share. Further, the U.S.-sponsored activities
may be augmented independently by RDD&D activities in the private
sector, and by State, local, and regional governments. Finally, many of
the R&D activities in the Plan are being pursued, as well, by national
governments of other countries, which is why the Plan emphasizes the
importance of U.S.-sponsored initiatives for international cooperation.
The annual global investment is not known, but the figure in this
regard is likely to be significantly higher than the annual estimated
federal cost.
Q3. The Secretary of Commerce just announced that an advisory
committee will be established to provide advice on the further
development of the Climate Change Science Program. Please describe your
process for soliciting input from existing Department of Energy (DOE)
advisory committees. If no such advisory committee structure exists to
provide advice on the priorities and direction of the Climate Change
Technology Program (CCTP) R&D portfolio, would CCTP benefit from a
similar committee to provide advice on the priorities within the CCTP
R&D portfolio?
A3. The organizational structure of CCTP is one that relies on the
technical competencies of its six Working Groups (WGs)--one for each of
six strategic goals. These WGs are led and populated by senior
technical professionals among the agencies, who direct R&D programs
that are advised by external experts. The WGs, additionally, are
advised by experts in the DOE national and other federal laboratories
and academia. In this way, CCTP builds on the foundations of the
technology programs and incorporates the input of both ongoing
programmatic advisory activities and external inputs. CCTP also
sponsors its own independent technical reviews.
Q4. Mr. Mottershead indicated that BP would like to see more thought
given to encouraging innovative public-private partnerships. Several
other commenters to the draft plan made the same suggestion. Can you
discuss the types of public-private partnerships already underway at
DOE and how those partnerships and others will be used to advance CCTP?
A4. The Administration believes that private sector participation is
critical to accelerating the development and commercialization of new
energy and climate technologies. This recognizes not only the private
sector's technical expertise, but also the fact that commercialization
of advanced technologies will be largely a private sector function. It
is only by government and industry working together that we can advance
a new, cleaner energy future. Partnerships are therefore a key aspect
of CCTP's approach.
Under the provisions of the Energy Policy Act of 1992 (Section
3002), significant cost sharing of all DOE energy-related applied R&D
(20 percent minimum) and demonstration projects (50 percent minimum) is
required. This requirement necessitates public-private partnering on
virtually all projects in a substantive, financial way. Since much of
CCTP's R&D portfolio is energy-related, much of its portfolio is cost-
shared. Notable examples include innovative partnering in the carbon
sequestration program, in both the area of regional partnerships and
demonstration projects. Public-private partnerships extend beyond cost-
sharing; they include sharing a common long-term goals and strategies
to achieve them. Some examples include: FutureGen, Methane to Markets,
Nuclear Power 201 0, and FreedomCAR.
Questions submitted by Representative Michael M. Honda
Q1. Why has the Administration chosen to use greenhouse gas intensity
(a ratio of emissions to economic output) as a metric for measuring
reductions in greenhouse gases and not an absolute reduction in
emissions or in atmospheric levels of greenhouse gases? Please explain
how this metric does not effectively mask actual increases in the
absolute level of emissions.
A1. The most useful and informative measure for policy management
purposes is relative improvement in greenhouse gas emissions intensity.
The intensity measure appropriately recognizes reductions that are
achieved through increased investment in efficiency, productivity, and
economically valuable activities that require less energy or lead to
fewer emissions. The intensity measure sharply discounts reductions
produced by economic decline, job loss, or policies that shift
greenhouse gas emitting activity from the U.S. to another country.
For example, an absolute emissions reduction caused by an economic
recession may say more about reduced energy use owing to reduced
economic activity and say less about structural changes in the economy
towards more energy efficiency. However, with an intensity metric, any
slowdown in economic growth is taken into account in the results so
that no credit, from an emissions perspective, is given for a slowing
economy. Actual emissions reduction will occur when the rate of
emissions intensity decline exceeds the rate of economic growth.
Details on total U.S. emissions are provided in annual reports both
by the Energy Information Administration (EIA), which also provides a
measure of greenhouse gas intensity, and by the Environmental
Protection Agency. The most recent EIA greenhouse gas inventory report
indicates that total U.S. emissions grew just 0.6 percent in 2005,
despite economic growth of 3.2 percent.
Q2. The Energy Information Administration estimates that under a
business-as-usual scenario the U.S. would achieve a 17 percent
reduction in greenhouse gas intensity by 2012. The President's goal is
to reduce greenhouse gas intensity by 18 percent.
How much would actual emissions grow under business-
as-usual?
How much will the Administration's current plan, with
the 18 percent goal, affect U.S. emissions by 2012 and beyond?
A2. In 2002, President Bush set an ambitious but achievable national
goal to reduce the greenhouse gas intensity of the U.S. economy by 18
percent by 2012. At the time, this goal represented a nearly 30 percent
improvement in the expected rate of improvement in intensity over the
period. The Administration estimated that achieving this commitment
would avoid additionally over 100 million metric tons of carbon-
equivalent (MMTCe) of greenhouse gas emissions in 2012 compared to a
business-as-usual baseline\1\ and would result in cumulative savings of
more than 500 MMTCe in greenhouse gas emissions over the decade. Under
the business-as-usual scenario used in this 2002 analysis, total
emissions were projected to climb from 1,917 MMTCe in 2002 to 2,279
MMTCe in 2012. Achieving the President's goal was estimated to reduce
the 2012 figure to 2,173 MMTCe.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The baseline used in the 2002 analysis was based on forecasts
of energy-related carbon dioxide emissions and economic growth derived
from the Energy Information Administration's Annual Energy Outlook 2002
and forecasts of other carbon dioxide and greenhouse gas emissions
derived from Environmental Protection Agency reports.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Annual Energy Outlook (AEO) 2006 contains a projection
suggesting that total U.S. greenhouse gas emissions will climb from
1,885 MMTCe in 2002 to 2,154 MMTCe in 2012. Concerning the EIA AEO2006
intensity baseline of 16.8 percent, it is important to note that we
would expect EIA's AEO baseline to show improvement over time as
policies are implemented in support of the President's intensity goal,
which was set in 2002. The effect of higher energy prices is clearly
evident in the AEO2006 baseline projection, but it also is influenced
by new policies being implemented. For example, the CAFE standards for
light trucks finalized in 2003 and the tax credits, incentives, and
standards in the Energy Policy Act of 2005 are incorporated in the
AEO2006 baseline.
Data from EIA suggest steady progress. Since 2002, EIA reports
annual improvements in greenhouse gas emissions intensity of 1.6
percent in 2003, 1.6 percent in 2004, and 2.5 percent in 2005. Although
we are only a few years into the effort, the Nation appears on track to
meet the President's goal.
The impact of the Administration's program beyond 2012 will be
included as part of the Climate Action Report, now in preparation, that
the U.S. will submit to the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change.
Q3. The Congressional Budget Office just released a report that states
that technology development combined with carbon constraints provides
the most cost-effective approach to climate change mitigation. The
CCTP's own draft plan only included technology emissions scenarios with
carbon constraints.
Has the President's position on climate change
uncertainty and carbon constraints policy changed?
The CCTP lays out technology options, but what are
the policy drivers to get those technologies deployed into the
marketplace? If it is not your job to identify and push for
these policy drivers, who is charged with that task in the
Administration?
A3. In 2002, President Bush reaffirmed the U.S. Government's commitment
to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and its
long-term goal of stabilizing greenhouse gas emissions in the
atmosphere at a level that avoids dangerous human interference with the
climate system--a level that at present is unknown. The President set a
national goal to reduce the greenhouse gas intensity of the U.S.
economy by 18 percent by 2012. This goal sets America on a path to slow
the growth in greenhouse gas emissions and--as the science justifies
and the technology allows--to stop and reverse that growth.
The Administration places great emphasis on the development and
commercial use of advanced technologies, without which it is difficult
to see how climate mitigation can be reconciled with other pressing
needs, such as economic growth, energy security, and pollution
reduction. Given the nature of the challenge and the many unknowns, it
is appropriate that CCTP adopt a long-term planning context for the
role of technology in addressing climate change. While CCTP does not
set policy, it supports policy development, and by significantly
reducing the costs of advanced technologies, its R&D programs can open
up a wider range of politically and economically acceptable options for
policy-makers.
Overall climate policy is directed by the Executive Office of the
President with input from federal agencies.
Q4. Critics of the program claim that CCTP is merely a ``repackaging''
of existing programs. Five and one-half years after its establishment,
CCTP should be in the position of directing climate technology research
throughout the federal agencies involved in the program. Of the R&D
programs listed as part of the CCTP, which initiatives originated in
CCTP, or as a direct result of CCTP recommendations to an agency?
Please explain in detail the role CCTP staff have played in developing
budgets and priorities for all the programs listed as components of
CCTP in the Offices of Fossil Energy, Energy Efficiency, Nuclear Energy
or Science?
A4. CCTP's Strategic Plan does include current activities. To assess
the overall portfolio and set priorities, a good understanding of
current programs relevant to CCTP's mission is needed. However, the
Plan goes considerably further. It provides an overarching technology
roadmap organized by five CCTP strategic goals over the short-, mid-,
and long-term. In each of the goals chapters there are discussions of
future research directions. The Plan sets out a process and criteria
for prioritizing the federal technology R&D portfolio. These criteria
include: (1) maximizing return on investment; (2) supporting public-
private partnerships; (3) focusing on technology with large-scale
potential; and (4) sequencing R&D investments in a logical order.
CCTP's analysis and strategy inspires the pursuit of innovative
technology concepts designed, not just to address short-term GHG
emissions reductions, but the fundamental transformations required over
the long-term to meet the challenge of stabilizing GHG concentrations.
Since its inception in 2002, this multi-agency planning and
coordination activity has encouraged a number of important technology
initiatives aimed at reducing greenhouse gas emissions. There are many
rationales besides climate change mitigation--energy security, for
example--for many of the major initiatives the Administration has
undertaken, such as the Hydrogen Fuel and FreedomCAR Initiatives,
FutureGen, Advanced Energy Initiative, etc. CCTP helped provide long-
term programmatic rationale. Moreover, CCTP in the Plan has established
12 priorities that respond to the President's National Climate Change
Technology Initiative (NCCTI). These NCCTI priorities, which are
described in Appendix B of the Plan, represent R&D and other activities
that with a little push could result in significant technological
advances to reduce, avoid, or sequester greenhouse gases.
Answers to Post-Hearing Questions
Responses by Judith M. Greenwald, Director of Innovative Solutions, Pew
Center on Global Climate Change
Questions submitted by Chairman Judy Biggert
Q1. Your testimony suggests that development of carbon reduction
technologies is not very useful in the absence of mandatory constraints
on greenhouse gas emissions. But, doesn't it make sense to move
aggressively on technology development first and then tackle the
regulatory framework? Won't that sequence allow society to move toward
reducing greenhouse gas concentrations in the least economically
disruptive manner?
A1. Aggressive technology development is critical, but R&D alone will
not result in widespread deployment of low-carbon technologies.
Installation of new technologies comes at a cost, and in the absence of
mandatory constraints on emissions, most emitters have no incentive to
take on this cost. Technology development produces a supply of carbon-
reduction technologies without the corresponding demand provided by
emissions constraints. In addition, research has shown that carbon
reduction can be achieved at a lower cost through a combination of
mandatory emissions constraints and technology R&D than through either
approach alone. This conclusion was reached in a 2004 Pew Center report
by Larry Goulder, ``Induced technological change and climate policy,''
and echoed in a September 2006 study by the Congressional Budget
Office, ``Evaluating the Role of Prices and R&D in Reducing Carbon
Dioxide Emissions.'' The CBO study stated that ``a combination of the
two approaches--pricing emissions in the near-term and funding R&D--
would be necessary to reduce carbon emissions at the lowest possible
cost.''
Q2. How much do you feel the Federal Government should reasonably be
spending per year on climate change technology at the Department of
Energy and how did you arrive at that figure?
A2. The Pew Center has not calculated the specific level of funding
needed. Most importantly, it is critical that funding levels be stable
enough to ensure that key programs can plan long-term research. We
would point to the testimonies submitted by Martin Hoffert and Daniel
Kammen for specific suggestions in this area.
Questions submitted by Representative Michael M. Honda
Q1. Why has the Administration chosen to use greenhouse gas intensity
(a ratio of emissions to economic output) as the metric for measuring
reductions in greenhouse gases, and not an absolute reduction in
emissions or in atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases?
Does the use of this metric not mask actual increases
in emissions or atmospheric levels of carbon?
What metrics are used in guiding climate policies
elsewhere?
In general, do the major companies in the Business
Environmental Leadership Council find greenhouse gas intensity
to be an acceptable and useful metric?
A1. While we cannot speak for the Administration, President Bush has
repeatedly stated that he believes emissions intensity is the most
useful metric to consider. The Pew Center disagrees, but the metric is
much less important to us than the environmental result it achieves.
Intensity metrics do not indicate the overall growth or decline of
greenhouse gas emissions and an intensity-based target may allow
emissions to rise. GHG intensity can decrease while absolute emissions
increase, so an intensity target typically is not as environmentally
sound as an absolute cap. That being said, if a sufficiently strict
intensity target is chosen, one could see absolute GHG reductions.
Unfortunately, the Administration's goal of an 18 percent reduction in
GHG intensity is not noticeably different from business as usual, and
does in fact correspond to a continuing increase in GHG emissions.
The Kyoto Protocol uses an absolute GHG metric, as do the
northeastern states' Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative and
California's new law, AB 32.
In the absence of federal policy, businesses have taken to creating
GHG reduction goals themselves to anticipate policy and get ahead of
the curve. Many of these goals are absolute (DuPont--reduce GHG
emissions by 65 percent from 1990 levels by 2010; Weyerhaeuser--reduce
GHG emissions by 40 percent by 2020; Bank of America--Reduce GHG
emissions nine percent by 2009, relative to their 2004 levels; BP--
Reduce GHG emissions by 10 percent from 1990 levels by 2010), but
several companies use indexed metrics. For example, Baxter
International has a GHG target to reduce energy use and associated GHG
emissions by 30 percent per unit of product value from 1996 levels by
2005. Using indexed metrics increases the efficiency of operations
without guaranteeing an absolute reduction is made.
Q2. You say in your testimony that the roughly $3 billion the
Department claims to be spending on climate change is not enough.
What, do you believe, is required to adequately
address climate change?
Are the priorities for the various programs in line
with where they should be?
A2. Again, the Pew Center has not calculated the specific level of
funding needed. We would point to the testimonies submitted by Martin
Hoffert and Daniel Kammen for suggestions in this area, as well as on
the priorities for funding.
Answers to Post-Hearing Questions
Responses by Martin I. Hoffert, Emeritus Professor of Physics, New York
University
General Response: It's important to distinguish between (1) CCTP-
type research on alternate energy technologies that in some sense
already ``exist'' at laboratory scales, or at industrial scales for
certain components, but are too costly to permit penetration to
significant energy market share; and (2) exploratory energy R&D of the
ARPA-E type, exploiting recent scientific discoveries like high
temperature superconductivity, nanotech or bioengineering, or embodying
highly innovative systems for tapping energy flows and stores in
nature, aimed at radically transforming the global energy system to
permit continued economic growth even as fossil fuel CO22
emissions are phased out--this being the objective problem to be
solved.
Climate and energy are the technology challenges of the century.
The 9/11 Commission concluded that the most dangerous mistake one can
make when challenged by an existential threat is ``failure of
imagination.'' Likewise does the climate/energy issue call for
technological imagination, followed by rigorous testing and development
to the point of commercial viability. These are unique strengths in
which the U.S. has led the world for 200 years, particularly as
stimulated by targeted government-funded initiatives over the past 50
years. The proposed energy R&D should build on prior successful U.S.
efforts to address the technical issues and global scale of the
climate/energy problem (Hoffert, 2006). I will discuss CCTP-type
funding in my response to Representative Biggert, ARPA-E funding in my
response to Representative Honda.
Question submitted by Chairman Judy Biggert
Q1. How much do you feel the Federal Government should be reasonably
spending per year on climate change technology at the Department of
Energy and how did you arrive at that figure?
A1. The short answer is that the CCTP program, which at this point
essentially repackages government funded energy R&D of about $3
billion/year, needs to grow to $20-30 billion per year, or more. This
level of funding is similar to prior U.S. technology initiatives like
FDR's Manhattan Project of the '40s, JFK's Apollo program of the '60s,
Carter's Energy program of the '70s (unfortunately aborted) and
Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative of the '80s, as illustrated in
the figure showing U.S. R&D expenses in 1996 dollars by sector from
data in Meeks (2002). The U.S. Government today spends more than $120
billion (2002 dollars) a year on research and development (Nemet and
Kammen, 2006), of which declining fraction, only a few percent, is
expended on energy, the driver technology of civilization. We've been
lulled into passivity by historically cheap fossil fuels. Not for much
longer, as hydrocarbon production peaks and global warming become all
too evident in coming decades.
However much some may say the technology already exists to solve
the climate/energy problem many colleagues and I disagree. Such
technologies could exist, but they won't spring into existence
spontaneously, any more than gas turbines, radar, lasers, commercial
aviation, nuclear power, nuclear medicine, satellite
telecommunications, computers, and the Internet sprang into existence
without billions invested by Federal R&D since World War Two. World War
II, which President Truman in the wake of Hiroshima and von Braun's V-2
rockets characterized as a ``battle of laboratories'' as much as a
battle of armies. Vanever Bush, FDR's science advisor, is credited with
beginning large-scale public support for R&D. Frankly much of this was
motivated by defense and space during the Cold War. To emphasize this
the Mansfield amendment added ``D'' for Defense at the beginning of
ARPA (Advanced Research projects agency) to create DARPA.
But the results drove economic growth of the civil economy. Given
that we already spend $120 billion present dollars on government R&D,
the question is not whether there's enough money. When the U.S. was
attacked at Pearl Harbor our nation was in a deep depression. After a
half decade of war the ``greatest generation'' went from virtually no
air force to building fifty thousand planes a year, aircraft which
evolved technologically from biplanes to jets in an astoundingly short
time, it built the atomic bomb, created radar, and accomplished many
other technologically Herculean things, with the result that the U.S.
emerged as the leading world power in what has been called the American
Century. We're richer now than we've ever been, though this will not
last if we fail to address the major problem of the present century,
the climate/energy challenge. The problem is not lack of money. The
problem is whether we can put in the required level of engineering
creativity, effort and skill to fight a threat that doesn't involve
blowing each other's brains out.
President Carter tried to make alternate energy a ``moral
equivalent of war.'' At its peak in the late '70s, Carter's R&D program
was running at $10 billion a year and showing real progress. Too bad
the institutional memory of Carter's initiative has dimmed and been
distorted over the years. It was, of course, Carter's energy program
under which DOE built the coal-to-natural gas demonstration plant that
later became the Dakota Gasification Company. The plant was later sold
by DOE, i.e., ``privatized,'' at 6 cents on the dollar of the of the
government's investment. Ironically, this plant became a poster child
for this administration's FutureGen coal-to-hydrogen plus electricity
with carbon capture and storage (CCS) project, as the CO2
separated out is piped to (and sold for secondary oil recovery to)
Saskatchewan's Weyburn oilfields. The project is touted--along with
Norwegian Statoil's North Sea CCS project, also state subsidized, as
showing the viability of CCS. But who in this administration credits
Carter with demonstrating technology leading to FutureGen, or even
knows the story? The DOE demo isn't slated for operation until 2012.
The fact is that the most ready for prime time project to mitigate
carbon emissions from coal power plants now being built is too little,
too late. By the time FutureGen is up and running at least 850
conventional coal fired power plants in the works by non-Kyoto
signatories--the U.S., China and India--will overwhelm Kyoto emission
cuts, if they even happen, by a factor of five. The figure (submitted
by Dan Lashof of the NRDC as a critique of CCTP Strategic Plan) shows
the cumulative capacity of conventional coal plants in the works now
and carbon captures, a mere blip. Not signing Kyoto is one thing. But
offering FutureGen as a significant U.S. technology initiative to cut
carbon emissions (as was done at last winter's Kyoto meetings in
Montreal by U.S. negotiator Harlan Watson) is simply refusing to face
reality.
As Economist Robert Samuelson put it, ``The trouble with the global
warming debate is that it has become a moral crusade when it's really
an engineering problem.'' Solving an engineering problem requires
defining the goal quantitatively, facing the technical challenges, and
creating systems to address these as cost-effectively as possible.
Right now, we have little on the shelf for primary energy but burning
coal for electricity and gasoline from crude oil for cars, both of
which emitting CO2 up the stack and out the tailpipe.
Nuclear is roughly five percent and renewables collectively roughly one
percent of primary energy (neglecting hydro, which is saturated, and
firewood in preindustrial societies).
Getting serious enough about R&D to solve the climate/energy
problem to avoid, for example, more than two degrees Celsius global
warming relative to pre-industrial conditions above which polar icecap
melting may become irreversible (Hansen, 2006) will cost $20-$30
billion per year, at least. The specific way this funding would ramp up
needs careful consideration. But we have an applicable experience base
from the Manhattan, Apollo, Energy Independence & SDI programs. Also
needed is a major science education initiative, as was done in the
post-Sputnik era. The U.S. should take the lead. But we don't have to
go it alone. This is a global problem, and scientists and engineers
worldwide have a tradition of working together on a common goal like
the International Space Station, the International Thermonuclear
Experimental Reactor, high-energy particle accelerators and other
projects. Particularly important is to involve China and India in
projects that can implement on the short-term.
In summary, and without at this point preparing a detailed budget,
there is good reason to shoot for $20 to $30 billion a year for an
Apollo-type program in alternate energy. The rapid convergence of
urgent energy security issues and growing evidence of global warming
may make money the least of our problems. We need real options to do
this job and we don't have them. Out of the box ideas, like coal
gasification demonstration plants in China and India funded by the
U.S., might be an alternative to Kyoto, which the Senate has clearly
indicated its indisposition to sign. These might stem the tide while we
work on the fundamental energy system transformation; as might
geoengineering experiments to ``save the arctic.'' Other important
issues are incentivizing research by private industry and
entrepreneurial innovators, about which I have more to say below. All
this will require an integrated climate/energy policy, including
diplomacy, to implement effectively.
Question submitted by Representative Michael M. Honda
Q1. This committee has considered in various forms legislation
regarding the creation of an Advanced Research Projects Agency for
Energy, and you have advocated for the creation of a new innovation-
focused research organization.
If Congress were to move forward with a plan to
develop ARPA-E, what do you believe would be the essential
elements of such a program?
A1. Recent proposals for an independent exploratory R&D program
(Caldeira et al., 2005) or an ARPA-E (Committee on Science,
Engineering, and Public Policy, 2005) in alternate energy technology
are motivated by the perception that breakthrough research isn't being
pursued with sufficient urgency, in some cases not at all, by DOE or
elsewhere because it falls outside bureaucratic program funding lines,
or lacks champions. Not surprisingly these proposals have been resisted
on grounds that DOE is already doing what needs doing, for example, in
the CCTP and Basic Energy Science initiatives.
I indicated previously that I strongly support expanding existing
DOE R&D programs. That said, existing bureaucratic structures are not,
for reasons I won't expound upon here, the best way to incubate
innovative, potentially disruptive technology shifts. Revolutionary
technologies have changed the world many times over in the past
century, often as spin-offs of military projects. The course of future
technologies is difficult to impossible to predict, particularly by
experts. But like biological evolution, technological evolution needs
mutations.
I argue that the most robust R&D strategy is to support a broad
spectrum of potentially revolutionary technologies that are physically
plausible and address objectively real problems. For example, the
transmission and storage of intermittent widely distributed renewable
energy (solar and wind) is necessary if renewables are supply load
curves for 20 percent or more electric power generation market share.
Many states have Renewable Energy Portfolios mandating such targets by
a set date. This won't happen unless grids in the region become ``user
friendly'' to renewables. Existing grids designed for central power
generation by fossil fuel or nuclear plants are totally inadequate, and
deregulation of electric utilities has removed financial incentives for
anyone to even think about this problem. It's telling that the country
with the highest penetration of wind generated electricity, Denmark
(near 20 percent), has only accomplished his because it is integrated
into a Scandinavian grid with Norway which is 100 percent hydropower.
Power emerging from Danish wind turbines is stored by pumping water to
the reservoirs backing up Norwegian dams, and flows down them to supply
electricity as needed. But the U.S. (and most other nations) lack such
a convenient resource, so some technology for storage, perhaps
compressed air, or flywheels, or something entirely different, is
needed. This is just one example of needed research that isn't being
done, perhaps because the question hasn't been asked.
It must be realized at the outset that many ARPA-E projects will
hit an obstacles bad enough to terminate it. Beware on the other hand
of giving up too early. Hands-on engineers are familiar with Murphy's
Law: ``If something can go wrong, it will.'' And progress often means a
number of cycles of ``build, break, fix, and build again.'' Notice that
I'm emphasizing the nuts and bolts of research, as opposed to
forecasting its economics, which I confess to have little faith in.
Politicians want a sure thing. But however much we try, there will be
uncertainty and random elements at play. And still, we must stay the
course.
Technology evolution resembles biological evolution in the sense
that most mutations are unfavorable. But without mutations evolution
grinds to a halt. It only takes one transistor to justify all of Bell
Labs. Sadly, that private sector temple of applied science is a shadow
of its former glory. Today, industrial R&D is expected by large
companies and venture capitalists to yield profits on a three-year time
scale, whereas DOE basic energy sciences is often most comfortable with
``blue sky'' projects 20 or more years from fruition to avoid conflict
with industry. The result is the well-known (by researchers) ``Valley
of Death'' in the three- to 20-year payoff range for which it may be
virtually impossible to get support for a new idea from either the
private or public sector. This is the time frame ARPA-E should be
targeting. I bring this up to illustrate that the program manager is
crucial. She or he must be technically astute and possessed of
excellent judgment based on experience (and compensated accordingly).
Can we build these elements into an exploratory energy R&D program?
It was to insure that U.S. stayed on top militarily that ARPA was born
(now DARPA) with a unique program management style aimed at creating
new capabilities from scratch, funding the most able investigators
without prejudice wherever they might be--universities, national labs,
industry, entrepreneurs & inventive guys working out of garage. So too
should it be with ARPA-E. In many cases DARPA has created technologies
providing a hitherto undreamt of capability (like the Internet). As
someone who's done it I can attest that military R&D supports far more
imaginary ideas than civilian. Of course there's more money (and less
oversight) there. The ``black'' space program is bigger than the
``white'' (NASA) one. Even with less revolutionary ideas, a performance
improvement in some metric of many orders of magnitude improvement
often a precondition for DARPA to be interested. The climate/energy
problem is important enough to do likewise.
Do such ideas exist in alternate energy? This September's
Scientific American in their article ``Plan B for Energy,'' identifies
several that are high risk & high payoff. In no particular priority
they are (Gibbs, 2006): nuclear fusion breeding of fissionable fuel
from thorium, a potentially early payoff from a longer-term investment
in pure fusion; high-attitude wind turbines; space-based solar power, a
technology in which I and Representative Rohrabacher (R-CA) of the
House Science Committee share an interest (Rohrabacher and Weldon,
1998); nanotech solar cells; a global supergrid, originally proposed by
Buckminster Fuller; innovative wave and tidal energy; designer
microbes, for such applications as enzymes to convert abundant
cellulose to sugar, for fermentation to ethanol fuel. At this point R&D
in many of these areas--all of which could contribute in a major way to
carbon-free power if successful--are either unsupported by DOE or any
U.S. agency, or supported at too low a level to break out in the next
few years as worth pursuing with real money.
Some thoughts on funding levels and whether DOE as now constituted
can do it: A typical DARPA program is $300-$500 thousand in the first
year and can go up substantially as projects progress. Of course, many
ideas will be cut early on as they fail to make their targets and
milestones or encounter problems the program manager considers
showstoppers. It may be prudent to start with 100 projects at this
level by budgeting $30 to $50 million. It needs further discussion to
decide whether it would be better to continue support as projects grow
in scale within ARPA-E, or whether they should be transferred to DOE
under its growing budget, which I hope would include targeted Apollo-
like programs for the most promising systems. One such system shown in
the inset proposed by aerospace researchers in Europe would collect
solar energy in geostationary orbit with solar cells and beam it by
laser to surface photovoltaic modules in north Africa, and thence
northward by high voltage Dc transmission line. The authors find, for
plausible assumptions and available technology, that the entire
electric load curve of Europe could be powered cost-effectively by such
a system (Geuder et al., 2004). To some, but not I suspect Congressman
Rohrabacher, this vision might seem too ``far out.'' Space launch costs
may seem presently too high, and so on. But the science is sound, and
I, for one, can only admire that Europeans and Japanese and others
dream of a sustainably powered planet while we in the good old USA, the
most technologically advanced nation on Earth, seem intent on marching
backward to the Coal Age.
I hope that we as a nation will regain our bearings, as we were on
the right track 30 years ago. Just as Carter's effort was gaining
steam, Ronald Reagan became President. Reagan ripped off the solar
panels that Carter had put on the White House roof while simultaneously
dismantling Carter's energy program based on the disastrous ideology
that the government has no role in technology and that only private
sector should create energy technology by the market mechanism. Newt
Gingrich and colleagues made a similar move when the GOP took control
of Congress in '84 when they changed the name of the ``House Committee
on Science and Technology'' to the ``House Committee of Science.''
What does our government have to do with future technology
development? Almost everything. One thing I agree with in the recent
Stern report on the economics of global warming mitigation is that the
market is broken. Too many costs and values aren't being captured and
consumers are anything but enlightened about their energy self-
interest. It may be the global warming is too complex for our puny
hominid minds. As a technological optimist I believe we can solve the
climate/energy problem in time with the right leadership. But
leadership is key. To cite Proverbs 28:18, ``When the vision fails, the
people perish.''
References
Caldeira, K, D. Day, W. Fulkerson, M. Hoffert (2005). ``Climate Change
Exploratory Research (CCTER),'' Climate Policy Center,
Washington, DC; online at http://www.cpc-inc.org/
Clayton, M. ``New Coal Plants Bury Kyoto.'' Christian Science Monitor,
December 23, 2004.
Committee on Science, Engineering, and Public Policy. Rising Above the
Gathering Storm: Energizing and Employing America for a
Brighter Economic Future. Washington, D.C.: National Academy
Press, 2005: online at: http://www.nap.edu/openbook/0309100399/
html/122.html
Geuder, N., V. Quaschning, P. Viebahn, F. Steinsiek, J. Spies & C.
Hendricks (2004). ``Comparison of Solar Terrestrial and Space
Power Generation for Europe,'' presented at 4th International
Conference on Solar Power from Space--SPS '04, Granada, Spain,
30 June-2 July 2004.
Gibbs, W. (2006). ``Plan B for Energy,'' Scientific American, Sept.
2006, pp. 102-114.
Hansen et al. (2006). ``Global Temperature Change,'' Proceedings of the
National Academy of Sciences, PNAS published online Sept. 25,
2006 /pnas.0606291103; pdf online at: http://www.pnas.org/cgi/
reprint/103/39/14288
Hoffert, M. (2006). ``An Energy Revolution for the Greenhouse
Century,'' Social Research, Vol. 73, No. 3, Fall 2006, pp. 981-
1000.
Marsh, B. (2003). ``One Recipe for a (Mostly) Emissions-Free Economy,''
New York Times, Nov. 4, 2003.
Meeks, R.L. (2002). ``Federal R&D Funding by Budget Function: Fiscal
Years 2001-03.'' Special Report. National Science Foundation,
Div. of Science Resources Statistics, Arlington, VA 22230. Full
text online at http://www.nsf.gov/sbe/srs/stats.htm
Nemet, G.F. & G.M. Kammen (2006). ``U.S. Energy Research and
Development: Declining Investment, Increasing Need, and
Feasibility of Expansion,'' Energy Policy (in press).
Rohrabacher, D. & D. Weldon (1998) ``Support Space Solar Power,'' Ad
Astra: The Magazine of the National Space Society, Jan/Feb
1998, pp. 22-23.
Appendix 2:
----------
Additional Material for the Record
Statement of United Technologies Corporation
United Technologies (UTC), based in Hartford, Connecticut, is a
diversified company that provides high technology products and services
to the aerospace and commercial building industries worldwide. UTC's
products include Otis elevators, escalators and people movers; Carrier
heating, air conditioning and refrigeration systems; UTC Fire &
Security fire safety and security products and services; UTC Power fuel
cells and on-site combined cooling, heating and power applications;
Pratt & Whitney aircraft engines; Hamilton Sundstrand aerospace
systems; and Sikorsky helicopters.
The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Climate Change Technology
Program Strategic Plan (hereinafter, Strategic Plan) proposes a
coordinated federal approach to accelerate the development of advanced
technologies in order to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. To help
combat climate change, UTC is working to reduce greenhouse gases by
reducing energy use in its operations and incorporating energy-
efficient innovations in its products and services. Since 1992, UTC has
set corporate-wide performance goals to reduce its environmental
footprint worldwide in its factories, with its suppliers and throughout
its product line. UTC supports a sustained investment in federal
public-private partnerships for research, development, demonstration
and deployment (RDD&D) of greenhouse gas-reduction technologies. UTC
agrees with the DOE that it is essential to make wise RDD&D investments
in order to expedite innovative and cost-effective approaches to
reducing greenhouse gas emissions.
UTC has a diverse portfolio of advanced technology solutions that
enhance the energy efficiency of transportation applications as well as
residential, commercial and industrial buildings. We have chosen to
focus this testimony on how we are working to reduce emissions in the
building environment. We look forward to expanding our partnerships
with the Department of Energy and other federal agencies to deploy
these technologies commercially in a timely and efficient manner.
The Building Environment--Opportunities and Needs
According to the Pew Center for Global Climate Change, the building
sector is the single largest consumer of energy in the United States,
with residential, commercial and industrial buildings producing
approximately 43 percent of U.S. carbon dioxide emissions. The
generation and transmission of electricity for buildings account for
most of these emissions, but energy consumption by equipment and
appliances is also growing rapidly. In the long-term, buildings will
continue to be a significant contributor to energy demand. Increasing
population, economic expansion and urban development will create
corresponding demand for more building appliances and services.
Therefore, it is essential that the DOE commit considerable resources
to fulfill its Strategic Plan Goal #1: to ``reduce emissions from
energy end-use and infrastructure,'' including the buildings sector.
Energy conservation presents the most near-term opportunity to
reduce both consumption and emissions and should be a high priority for
our nation. Currently available technologies can save considerable
energy use in new buildings in a cost-effective manner when evaluated
on a life-cycle basis. New technologies are emerging that can lead to
further cost-effective savings. The DOE's current portfolio
appropriately targets research on residential and commercial building
equipment, including improved efficiency of heating, cooling,
ventilating, thermal distribution, microturbine and heat recovery
systems. However, the RDD&D funding for these existing technologies
must be boosted in the near-term to advance more quickly the transition
to buildings that are net-zero greenhouse gas emitters and net-zero
energy users.
The DOE's portfolio also includes a strategy for advanced research
on distributed energy systems, including highly efficient combined
cooling, heating and power systems that use waste heat from small-
scale, on-site electricity generation to provide heating and cooling
for the buildings and export excess electricity to the grid. Stationary
fuel cells for assured power also represent a significant opportunity
for near-term commercialization. Funding for these programs should be
increased to accelerate the transition to a hydrogen economy. For
example, implementation of the 2005 Energy Policy Act's (EPAct) market
transition provisions that authorize the purchase of fuel cells for use
in government buildings and fleets will help build volume and public
awareness and signal the government's endorsement of the technology.
Similarly, extension of the existing two-year fuel cell investment tax
credit will provide greater certainty and market acceptance.
UTC agrees with the DOE that significant research opportunities
exist in new building design, retrofitting of existing buildings and
integration of whole building systems. We'd like to discuss three areas
we believe to be worthy of a continued and expanded RDD&D focus, given
their applications to new and existing buildings and their potential
for delivering cost-effective greenhouse gas emission reductions and
increased energy efficiency: integrated heating, ventilation and air
conditioning; advanced combined heat and power systems, and; stationary
fuel cells.
Integrated Heating, Ventilation and Air Conditioning
The DOE has significant opportunities to expand work with
industrial partners to reduce energy consumption in commercial and
residential buildings. The Energy Information Administration (EIA) has
attributed 33 percent of the primary energy consumption in the United
States to building space heating and cooling. There are opportunities
to reduce the energy consumed by buildings by increasing equipment
efficiency, exploiting integrated system designs, improving
installation quality and ensuring efficient operation throughout the
product life cycle. A modest aggregate increase in heating, ventilation
and air conditioning (HVAC) efficiency of only one percent would
provide direct economic benefits to taxpayers, enable reduction and
better management of electric utility grid demand and reduce dependence
on fossil fuels.
To realize these benefits, many new technology options must be
evaluated to ensure their affordability and to demonstrate reliability.
The speed of technology development and market insertion in HVAC is
limited by the size of the investment. At current funding levels and
without increased funds to enable industrial partnerships, the DOE will
miss significant opportunities to accelerate the impact of HVAC
technologies on energy consumption. The federal investment in HVAC
RDD&D should be increased in the near-term.
The DOE has established aggressive peak power and energy savings
goals for buildings, and the DOE's Office of Building Technologies has
defined roadmaps and strategic plans for zero-energy buildings that
produce as much energy as they consume. Consistent with those roadmaps,
the HVAC industry, their suppliers, and the DOE's Buildings
Technologies Program officers have engaged in cooperative discussions
to implement a multi-year program plan that has already improved HVAC
equipment seasonal energy efficiency ratings (SEER) by 30% in January
2006. Additional annual investments in HVAC research could produce a
return on investment (energy saved per R&D dollar invested) on a par
with, or in excess of, that of other ongoing government-supported
energy savings programs by 2020.
UTC is committed to overcoming technology and market barriers to
enable reduced energy consumption. The net energy consumption of homes,
offices, restaurants and retail stores can be reduced through a
combination of technologies to reach a 50 percent gain in air
conditioning efficiency relative to the required 2006 standard.
Additional work is needed to develop and demonstrate affordable high
efficiency HVAC systems that are more than twice as efficient as the
systems most prevalent in the marketplace today. Some of the high-risk
enabling technologies we think will have high impact are:
system control technologies that recognize user
demand, comfort and habit profiles along with the current
``health/capability'' of the HVAC equipment while continuously
optimizing system energy performance;
wireless technologies to accelerate the market
penetration of the needed controls and diagnostics technologies
and wireless sensor technologies to simply and more cheaply
detect leaks;
variable speed systems with intelligent controls to
operate at peak efficiency independent of load and ambient
conditions;
fault detection and diagnostics technologies to
reduce or eliminate the loss of system efficiency due to
improper installation, poor maintenance and faulty operation;
high efficiency heat exchangers to improve HVAC
efficiencies by reducing losses in evaporators and condensers;
technologies to advance air purification devices
required for indoor air quality control;
integrated building system components to take
advantage of otherwise wasted resources and increase net
building efficiency;
heat pumps using carbon dioxide in residential
systems that can be used for hot-water on-demand and integrated
to take advantage of waste heat from HVAC;
thermoelectric devices that use electrical energy to
create thermal gradients and/or electricity from waste heat;
enhanced energy recovery ventilation technologies
which allow increased natural ventilation rates at reduced
energy consumption; and
increased use of geothermal for heating and cooling
systems.
Advances in HVAC materials and device technology research will be
needed if these products are to be affordable and gain market
acceptance. New HVAC devices should be designed and deployed through an
integrated building system to maximize returns.
Advanced CHP Systems
The Energy Policy Act of 2005 recognized distributed energy (DE) as
an important contributor to the enhancement of grid reliability and
disaster recovery. Combined heat and power (CHP) DE systems are the
means to also obtain high efficiency. Increased investment is necessary
to ensure that the DOE supports continuation of vital RDD&D efforts to
achieve CHP reliability, security and efficiency benefits.
CHP systems combine engines that generate electricity with thermal
devices that capture wasted engine heat (e.g., hot exhaust) and recycle
it into an energy stream useful to the owner. Engine choices include
microturbines, small gas turbines and reciprocating engines, while
thermal components include heat exchangers to produce hot air or water
and absorption chillers to produce air conditioning. The desired CHP is
fully integrated to include these major components and the controls to
ensure that the system operates predictably, reliably and safely.
Among the benefits of CHP systems are:
CHP systems can operate in parallel with the grid to
provide enhanced power reliability and quality without new
transmission or distribution infrastructure.
CHP systems can operate independently of the grid to
sustain critical services (e.g., health care, communications,
shelter, public safety) after natural or man-made disasters.
CHP systems recycle waste energy and put it to
productive use for heating and cooling, doubling fuel
utilization efficiency as compared to central power and
increasing customer benefit from each cubic foot of natural gas
consumed. CHP systems can also use renewable fuel.
Efficient CHP technologies decrease emission of toxic
pollutants and greenhouse gases.
CHP relieves grid congestion directly and provides
power not only to remote sites, but also to any constrained
area, avoiding investment for new grid wires in cities and
beyond the ``end of the line.''
A public-private partnership has successfully
developed technology for a first-generation packaged system
from which trial grocery, hotel and educational sites are
benefiting. Additional RDD&D is required for advanced
technology CHP systems and their enabling technologies to
achieve greater system efficiency and reliability, multiple and
simultaneous thermal streams and robust operation for isolated
communities and disaster relief.
Stationary Fuel Cells
In 2003, President Bush expanded federally supported fuel cell
technology development to help meet our growing demand for energy. The
Energy Policy Act of 2005 expanded fuel cells' potential to address
energy dependence, improve energy efficiency and reduce greenhouse gas
emissions. UTC Power, a UTC company, is the only company in the world
that develops and produces fuel cells for applications in each major
market: on-site power, transportation and space flight applications.
UTC Power is also the world leader in the development of innovative
combined cooling, heating and power applications in the distributed
energy market. We believe the need for a continued role by the Federal
Government in the commercialization of fuel cell technology is vital
and cannot be overstated.
Fuel cells provide an opportunity to address a variety of U.S.
energy needs including reducing dependence on foreign oil; delivering
assured, high quality reliable power; decreasing toxic air and
greenhouse gas emissions; and improving energy efficiency. We do not
see any ``show stopper'' technical barriers to the advancement of fuel
cells, but continued U.S. commitment to research, development,
demonstration and market transition initiatives are essential to reduce
cost, improve durability and enhance performance. Hydrogen storage and
infrastructure requirements represent challenging obstacles for
transportation applications, but near-term opportunities exist with
stationary fuel cells for assured power and fleet vehicles such as
transit buses.
We believe government plays an absolutely central role in
establishing the rules, creating the incentives and adopting the
requirements necessary to build a new market that encourages customers
and electric distribution companies to invest in efficient, clean
energy options that will increase our nation's energy independence and
security through environmentally-benign means. Government is also an
important customer because its vast purchasing power can help increase
volume and reduce costs to levels more competitive with traditional
energy sources.
Fuel cells are available today for the stationary and fleet
markets. Near-term successes are required to create public awareness
and acceptance, establish a viable supplier base and stimulate
continued investment. The EPAct provides the basic framework for a
comprehensive strategic focus, but a sustained national commitment to
robust funding will be critical to our success. Hurricane Katrina
reconstruction efforts represent an opportunity to deploy fuel cells in
schools to serve as emergency shelters, hospitals and other critical
infrastructure facilities to demonstrate their ability to provide
sustainable energy for assured power requirements.
Our dependence on imported oil is well-documented and personal
automobiles consume the lion's share of it. Deployment of fuel cell
vehicles powered by renewable sources of hydrogen can break our
dependence on imported oil and, at the same time, take transportation
out of the environmental debate. The auto market also represents the
highest-volume market, which is another reason this sector has received
so much attention. But fuel cell vehicles for private use in meaningful
quantities are a decade away since they represent the most demanding
application in terms of cost, packaging and infrastructure. Existing
electrical infrastructure and state and federal regulations create
hurdles for any form of base load distributed generation to overcome.
Stationary fuel cells have less demanding requirements and can
compete at costs higher than those required by autos. Concentrating on
these applications would enhance our ability to establish a profitable
industry today and create stepping stones to the most demanding longer-
term auto application. Few companies can survive the next ten years
waiting for the high volumes offered by the car market. Instead, they
must find applications where profits can be realized today that will
support the development of a strong industrial base in preparation for
the future auto market. Success in these early applications can build
the necessary public awareness and public confidence.
Since fuel cells can be deployed at the point of use and are not
reliant on the vulnerable transmission and distribution assets of the
grid, customers can benefit from the ability to capture waste heat and
put it to constructive use for space heating, domestic hot water
heating and industrial processes. Our units operating in the combined
heat and power mode can operate at 85-90 percent efficiency, generating
energy savings that can reduce the cost of electricity by four to five
cents per kilowatt hour. The cost of UTC Power's fuel cell power plants
is currently around $4,500 per kilowatt, but at volumes of 500 units
per year and with the aggressive cost reduction efforts we have
underway, we expect our next generation technology to be competitive at
less than $2,000 per kW.
In short, technology development barriers for technology fuel cells
are being addressed at a rapid pace. On a small scale, we can meet the
identified requirements and we don't envision any formidable show
stoppers. This doesn't mean, however, that we don't need to continue
our public-private partnership research, development or demonstration
efforts. We strongly endorse the continuation of these activities and
increased financial commitment to accelerate the progress we have made
in the last few years.
The basic concepts of fuel cell technology have been proven. Our
task now is to enhance key performance characteristics (such as
durability); reduce costs; validate the technology in real world
operating conditions; identify hidden failure modes through extended
operation; and then identify and incorporate cost-effective solutions.
Three strategies are necessary for cost reduction:
Internal programs to reduce cost through material
substitution, longer life parts, and fewer parts. Examples
include less expensive membranes, better seals, reduced use of
platinum, enhanced performance materials for bipolar plates and
reduced system complexity.
Improved manufacturing processes to eliminate labor-
intensive processes and identify high-volume manufacturing
solutions; and
Incentives to help increase volume, and thereby
spread costs over a larger product base.
A comprehensive national strategy is needed to achieve fuel cell
commercialization. Last year's enactment of the EPAct establishes such
a framework, but more work needs to be done. Budget requests and
appropriation figures for this year fall far short of levels authorized
by Congress. We recognize there are tight budget constraints, but given
the benefits of fuel cell technology and the price we pay today for
imported oil, health costs associated with poor air quality and lost
productivity due to lack of reliable power, substantial increases in
fuel cell technology investment represent a fiscally sound strategy.
Energy Efficiency Buildings Project
The World Business Council for Sustainable Development has formed
the Energy Efficient Buildings project, an alliance of leading global
companies to determine how buildings can be designed and constructed so
they are energy- and carbon-neutral and can be built and operated at
fair market values. The industry effort is led by UTC, one of the
world's largest suppliers of capital goods including elevators,
cooling/heating and on-site power systems to the commercial building
industry, and Lafarge Group, the world leader in building materials
including cement, concrete, aggregates, gypsum and roofing.
The effort to transform the way buildings are conceived,
constructed, operated and dismantled has ambitious targets: by 2050 new
buildings will consume zero net energy from external power supplies and
produce zero net carbon dioxide emissions while being economically
viable to construct and operate. Constructing buildings that use no net
energy from power grids will require a combination of on-site power
generation and ultra-efficient building materials and equipment.
To spur industry-wide investment in climate change technologies,
governments must commit to a sustained, robust investment in public-
private partnerships for RDD&D, financial incentives and market
transition initiatives. Some of these technologies are already under
development by UTC, including collaborative information tools that
facilitate energy-efficient and economically viable buildings;
technologies that increase heating/cooling system performance and
efficiency; information infrastructures that better manage fire and
security systems; elevator-regenerable power drives; and advanced,
clean energy technologies for on-site power co-generation. With
stronger federal support for such RDD&D activities, the technologies
needed for a self-sufficient, energy-efficient building are right
around the corner.
Conclusion
Shareholder value comes in part from research and development. UTC
spends approximately $2.9 billion annually, 90 percent of that in the
United States, to develop tomorrow's technologies. Each UTC business
makes certain that their products and services are the most innovative
and technologically advanced in the world. The United Technologies
Research Center (UTRC) is an incubator for UTC products, researching
energy and environmental innovations to assist UTC in developing, and
then building, new products for the next generation. Whether it's
conducting research on hydrogen production and storage technologies,
inventing ways to heat and cool more efficiently or improving jet
engine design and efficiency, UTRC provides valuable technical
experience to further UTC's pursuit of better environmental quality in
its products. Genuine corporate responsibility requires that we make
environmental considerations priorities in new product development and
investment decisions. By creating products that use less energy and
help lower greenhouse gases that contribute to climate change, we can
differentiate our products in an increasingly environmentally conscious
global marketplace.
We are pleased to see that the DOE Strategic Plan seeks to expand
partnerships with the business community in research and development
planning, program execution and technology demonstrations, leading to
more efficient and timely commercial deployment of greenhouse gas-
reducing and energy-efficient technologies. UTC regularly forms
partnerships with the Federal Government to encourage greenhouse gas
emission reductions and meet energy efficiency goals. As an EPA Climate
Leaders partner, UTC pledged to reduce its global greenhouse gas
emissions by 16 percent per dollar of revenue from 2001 to 2007. As an
EPA Energy Star member, we are helping Americans save energy and avoid
greenhouse gas emissions by providing energy-efficient products in
residential and commercial settings. UTC Power is a member of the EPA
CHP Partnership, a public-private endeavor committed to providing
clean, efficient power and thermal energy and reducing pollutants and
greenhouse gases.
We thank the House Science Committee for giving us the opportunity
to share our thoughts on the DOE Strategic Plan and some steps that
need to be taken to ``stimulate and strengthen the scientific and
technological enterprise of the United States, through improved
coordination and prioritization of multi-agency federal climate change
technology R&D programs and investment. . ..''
Statement of Daniel M. Kammen
Professor in the Energy and Resources Group (ERG); Professor of
Public Policy in the Goldman School of Public Policy; Co-Director,
Berkeley Center for the Environment; Director, Renewable and
Appropriate Energy Laboratory (RAEL), University of California,
Berkeley
Introduction
Chairwoman Biggert and Members of the House Committee on Science, I
am grateful for the opportunity today to speak with you on the critical
issue of the United States' approach to the great challenges that
climate change presents our nation and the planet. At the heart of my
comments is the finding that leadership in protecting the environment
and improving our economic and political security can be achieved not
at a cost, but through political and economic gain to the Nation in the
form of reasserted leadership both technologically and financially,
through increased geopolitical stability and flexibility, and through
job growth in the `clean energy' sector.
I hold the Class of 1935 Distinguished Chair in Energy at the
University of California, Berkeley, where I am a Professor in the
Energy and Resources Group, the Goldman School of Public Policy, and
the Department of Nuclear Engineering. I am the founding director of
the Renewable and Appropriate Energy Laboratory, an interdisciplinary
research unit that explores a diverse set of energy technologies
through scientific, engineering, economic and policy issues. I am also
the Co-Director of the University of California, Berkeley Institute of
the Environment. I have served on the Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change (IPCC), and have testified before both U.S. House and
Senate Committees on the science of regional and global climate change,
and on the technical and economic status and the potential of a wide
range of energy systems, notably renewable and energy efficiency
technologies for use in both developed and developing nations. I am the
author of over 160 research papers, and five books, most of which can
be found online at http://socrates.berkeley.edu/ rael.
In July of last year the Honorable R. John Efford, the then
Minister of Natural Resources Canada, announced my appointment, as the
only U.S. citizen, to serve on the Canadian National Advisory Panel on
the Sustainable Energy Science and Technology (S&T) Strategy. The Panel
provides advice on energy science and technology priorities to help
Canada develop sustainable energy solutions, and is tasked to produce a
document similar in objectives to the Climate Change Technology Program
Strategic Plan, which we are here today to discuss.
Overview of Climate Change and Innovation in the Energy Sector
As described in the CCTP Strategic Plan climate change presents our
nation with a serious, long-term challenge. Central to the difficulty
of this challenge is that reducing the risks posed by climate change
will require us to transform the largest industry on the planet, the
energy industry. Energy is important, not only for its direct
contribution to ten percent of economic output by our nation's private
sector, but also as the fundamental enabling infrastructure for an
array of economic activities, from manufacturing to agriculture to
health care. The availability of reliable and affordable energy should
not be taken for granted. The challenges of renewing the U.S. energy
infrastructure to enhance economic and geopolitical security and
prevent global climate change are particularly acute, and depend on the
improvement of existing technologies as well as the invention,
development, and commercial adoption of emerging ones. Recent trends in
the energy sector--which show declining levels of technology investment
and innovation--heighten the need for an aggressive response (Appendix
A). The CCTP provides a tremendous opportunity to reverse this trend,
open up new technological options, and stimulate economic growth
through the development of a new clean energy-based sector of the
economy. Key strengths of the CCTP Strategic Plan are its leadership by
the President, the acknowledgement of the long-term nature of the
problem, and the breadth of its technology portfolio. Yet the CCTP
Strategic Plan, in its current draft, is seriously flawed. The goal
that it seeks to reach, and the basis on which we are here to evaluate
it today, is far too modest; it is not commensurate with the magnitude
of the challenges we face and not reflective of our nation's capacity
for innovation. This testimony will outline the magnitude of effort
that will be required, an overview of the innovation environment in the
energy sector, and recommendations for improvement.
The Nation's climate technology program should be based on a goal that
reduces emissions
The most significant shortcoming of the CCTP strategic plan is that
the goal it seeks to reach is not commensurate with the magnitude of
the challenges posed by climate change and other energy-related
problems. In evaluating the CCTP strategic plan one must first
seriously consider what goal it is trying to achieve. To avoid the
adverse impacts of climate change we will need to stabilize
concentrations of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere. This will require
real reductions in the amount of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse
gases that we emit. As the strategic plan itself asserts:
Stabilizing GHG concentrations, at any atmospheric
concentration level, implies that global additions of GHGs to
the atmosphere and global withdrawals of GHGs from the
atmosphere must come into a net balance. This means that growth
of net emissions of GHGs would need to slow, eventually stop,
and then reverse, so that, ultimately, net emissions would
approach levels that are low or near zero.'' (p 2-2)
However, today we are here to evaluate the program based on its
ability to meet the Administration's emissions intensity target of an
18 percent reduction in GHG intensity by 2012. Throughout this
testimony, I will argue that a major flaw in the CCTP plan is that it
is designed to meet a goal that is wholly inadequate to the challenge
we face. Only when we take this challenge seriously will we be able to
meaningfully mobilize our nation's scientific, technological, and
economic resources to meet it, as well as to reap the benefits of
international leadership in the clean and sustainable energy sector.
The need to reduce uncertainties in current climate science around
climate sensitivity and expected impacts is often cited as a reason for
delaying commitments to emissions reductions. Yet, the plan is correct
in pointing out that scientific uncertainty is neither a valid
justification nor a wise strategy for choosing to delay. In fact, there
is not much uncertainty about the basic problem and its magnitude.
Estimates done at Lawrence Livermore National Lab of carbon emissions
which assume we find a way to reduce emissions to zero by 2050 while
meeting energy service demands--i.e., very conservative estimates--will
still almost certainly result in CO2 levels exceeding 550
ppm in the atmosphere, if not more. Given that the CO2 level
is now 380 ppm--30 percent higher than it has been at any point in the
last 650,000 years--we are essentially conducting an unprecedented
experiment with the Earth. Despite the long time horizons of the
climate change problem, the availability of carbon-free energy
technologies is a relatively urgent matter because the 100-year
residence time of CO2 in the atmosphere, the 30- to 50-year
lifetime of capital stock in the energy industry, and the typical
decades-long diffusion curve for infrastructure-related technologies
are to varying extents outside of our control. The response to this
combination of uncertainty and urgency should be a commitment to the
creation of a multitude of new technological options, not a timid
approach that narrows the range of possibilities at our disposal in the
future.
In contrast, meeting the Administration's current target will
require only a slight change from the business as usual case (Figure 1)
(EPA 2005). More relevant to the climate problem, reaching this target
would actually allow emissions to grow by 12 to 16 percent. This target
would thus represent a larger increase than the 10 percent increase
that occurred in the previous decade. If we are to be serious about
meeting the climate challenge we need to set a goal consistent with the
CCTP's objective of moving toward zero net emissions. While the Kyoto
Protocol has its flaws, its targets do represent a substantial shift
toward reducing emissions. Similarly, the Governor of California's GHG
emissions targets announced last summer include both near-term and
longer-term goals that delineate a path of emissions reductions toward
climate stabilization. The administration should set a series of
targets that show a clear path to emissions reductions.
Figure 1 shows actual U.S. GHG emissions from 1990 through 2003
(EPA 2005) in giga-tons of carbon equivalent. Four future paths for
future U.S. emissions are shown; circles show the business-as-usual
(BAU), or ``reference case,'' as calculated by the Energy Information
Agency (EIA). The diamond shows the Administration's GHG intensity
target for 2012 of 18 percent below 2002 level in tons of carbon per
unit of GDP, or a 3.6 percent reduction in emissions from BAU. The
squares show U.S. emissions if the Nation were to meet the percentage
reductions that have been announced in California for 2010, 2020, and
2050 (California Executive Order 3-05, and California AB32, the
``Pavley-Nunez Bill). The triangle shows the U.S.'s target for 2010
under the Kyoto Protocol. Arrows indicate the levels required to meet
the CCTP's long-term goal of ``levels that are low or near zero'' (p.
2-2).
What is needed is a serious and sustained commitment to emissions
reductions and a time scale that conveys to the country the urgency of
the need to open future options. Much as President Nixon's announcement
of a program in the early-1970s to reduce reliance on foreign oil
stimulated efforts by the private sector to invest in alternative
energy sources, the articulation of a bold and clear target for
emissions reductions would send a signal to the private sector that
would leverage the Federal Government's direct investments in new
technologies.
Raising climate technology investment to adequate levels
In recent work, we calculated the investment in R&D required to
reach a climate stabilization level of 550 ppm, a level that would
double the amount of GHG in the atmosphere relative to that at the
beginning of industrialization in the eighteenth century. Using
emissions scenarios from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
and a previous framework for estimating the climate-related savings
from energy R&D programs (Schock et al., 1999), we calculate that U.S.
energy R&D spending of $15-$30 billion/year would be sufficient to
stabilize CO2 at double pre-industrial levels (see Appendix
for calculations). A strategy that employs a diversified portfolio
approach to manage technological uncertainty is diluted quickly when
funding levels are five to ten times below their socially optimal
levels.
The plan itself states, ``successful development of advanced
technologies could result in potentially large economic benefits''(p.
3-28). As an example of the effect of policy on abatement costs, we can
observe how a combination of R&D and demand-side policy has stimulated
cost reductions in energy technologies (Duke and Kammen, 1999, Margolis
and Kammen, 1999). For example, solar cells, known as photovoltaics,
have declined in cost by more than a factor of 20 and wind turbines by
a factor of 10. Accelerating future cost reductions in these and other
technologies will require further investments in technology development
and market creation.
Climate change programs would address other problems as well
An important finding in ours and previous work on energy R&D is
that many of the same programs that would help abate the climate
problem would address other societal problems too. Adoption of improved
zero emissions energy production and end-use technologies would offset
the adverse health effects associated with emissions of mercury, sulfur
dioxide, and oxides of nitrogen. Increased use of renewables-based
power and fuels would reduce our sensitivity to energy production in
politically unstable regions. A more distributed power system based on
smaller scale production would enhance the robustness of the
electricity system and reduce dangerous and costly power outages. And a
more diverse mix of technologies and fuels would lessen the macro-
economic effects of rapid changes in energy prices.
Comparing a major R&D initiative on climate to past programs
In our recent work we have asked how feasible it would be to raise
investment to levels commensurate with the energy-related challenges we
face. One way to consider the viability of such a project is to set the
magnitude of such a program in the context of previous programs that
this committee has participated in launching and monitoring. Scaling up
R&D by five or ten times from current levels is not a `pie in the sky'
proposal, in fact it is consistent with the scale of several previous
federal programs (Table 1), each of which took place in response to a
clearly articulated national need. While expanding energy R&D to five
or ten times today's level would be a significant initiative, the
fiscal magnitude of such a program is well within the range of previous
programs, each of which have produced demonstrable economic benefits
beyond the direct program objectives.
Declining investment in energy R&D
My students and I have documented a disturbing trend away from
investment in energy technology--both by the Federal Government and the
private sector (Figure 3). The U.S. invests about $1 billion less in
energy R&D today than it did a decade ago. This trend is remarkable,
first because the levels in the mid-1990s had already been identified
as dangerously low, and second because, as our analysis indicates, the
decline is pervasive--across almost every energy technology category,
in both the public and private sectors, and at multiple stages in the
innovation process. In each of these areas investment has been either
been stagnant or declining. Moreover, the decline in investment in
energy has occurred while overall U.S. R&D has grown by six percent per
year, and federal R&D investments in health and defense have grown by
10 to 15 percent per year, respectively.
By looking at individual energy technologies, we have found that in
case after case, R&D investment spurs invention. For example, in the
case of wind power patenting follows the wild swings in R&D budgets
(Figure 4).
A further concern regards U.S. competitiveness in these
increasingly important technologies. For example, a glance at other
nations' investments in new renewable energy technology shows the U.S.
playing a secondary role (see Appendix C). Both Europe and Japan are
investing more in R&D for renewable energy. Moreover, they have
established leading companies in the fast growing wind and solar
industries. Our economic competitiveness in these increasingly
important sectors hinges on our commitment to investing in new
technologies.
Finally, the drug and biotechnology industry provides a revealing
contrast to the trends seen in energy. Although energy R&D exceeded
that of the biotechnology industry 20 years ago, today R&D investment
by biotechnology firms is an order of magnitude larger than that of
energy firms (Figure 5). Today, total private sector energy R&D is less
than the R&D budgets of individual biotech companies such as Amgen and
Genentech.
Addressing the Committee's questions
I now address specific questions posed by the Committee.
To what extent will the draft strategic plan meet the Administration's
goal of reducing U.S. greenhouse gas emission intensity (the amount of
emissions per unit of production) by 18 percent by the year 2012?
In responding to this question, it is important to make clear how
small a change is necessary for the Nation to meet the Administration's
GHG intensity goal for 2012. In Figure 6 we compare the President's
climate change goal to the business-as-usual reference case established
by the EIA. In order to achieve the President's goal, a reduction of
3.6 percent, or 66 million tons of carbon equivalent, would be required
below the BAU projection. To put this amount in perspective, this
change could be accomplished by switching about 100 of our nation's
1500 coal burning power plants to natural gas. New technology would
make such a switch easier. But we could accomplish such a change with
no research program at all with a relatively modest change in only one
sector. If an array of changes were implemented throughout the energy
sector, to include end-use and transportation, meeting the carbon
intensity goal would be even easier. Meeting other goals such as the
Kyoto Protocol or stabilization at levels of 450 or 550 ppm would
require much larger changes, including widespread deployment of
technologies described in the Strategic Plan.
Figure shows the carbon intensity of the U.S. economy (in gC-
equivalent/2000$GDP). The historical trend is shown from 1975 to 2002,
with the EIA's ``business as usual' (BAU) projection to 2025. Also
shown are is the President's 2002 goal of an 18 percent reduction in
carbon intensity below the 2002 level by 2012 and the Kyoto Protocol's
goal of a seven percent reduction in carbon emissions below 1990 levels
by 2012. Additionally, the world ``WRE stabilization pathways,'' named
for the authors of a paper in Nature that has become a frequently used
basis for carbon stabilization concentrations (see references), are
used to calculate projected world average carbon intensity in 2020 for
the 450 ppmv and 550 ppmv stabilization levels. In order to achieve
Bush's goal, a reduction of 3.6 percent, or 66 million tons of carbon
equivalent, would be required below the BAU projection. By contrast, in
order to achieve the Kyoto Protocol's goal, a reduction of 33 percent,
or 613 million tons of carbon equivalent, would be required. Note also
that the WRE projections are world averages, which means that if enough
other countries had carbon intensities higher than these values, it is
possible that the U.S. would have to reduce carbon intensity to below
these values.
Does the Administration's strategic plan provide clear, unambiguous
resource allocation guidance for the government's climate change
technology R&D portfolio?
The plan's description of each technology program, including each
program's overall strategy, current status, and future directions, does
provide insight into the where resources will need to be allocated in
order to bring programs toward commercially viable products. The broad
array of technological options is an impressive feature of the plan.
However, it is difficult to reconcile this rich and diverse technology
portfolio with the budget summary in Appendix A.3. First, the plan does
not clearly and unambiguously describe how each of the dozens of
technology programs are to be funded. The budgets are listed at the
level of the funding agency which gives little direction, for example,
as to how much should be invested in biofuels versus carbon capture and
sequestration. Second, it is difficult to imagine how a budget of
slightly over three billion dollars per year can be used to fund the
array of activities described in the plan at more than a trivial level.
Real progress in programs such as fusion facilities and demonstrations
of geological storage will require construction of facilities that will
range in the tens to hundreds of millions of dollars. Funding a wide
array of programs at relatively equal levels will ensure that these
levels are low. A real danger exists that this funding will remain
below critical thresholds for mobilizing needed technological
improvements. If there is a prioritization of the programs that will
allocate significant funds to a few key areas, it is not evident in the
current public draft of the plan. Finally, a troubling omission is that
the plan contains no budgets beyond 2006. This extremely short timeline
for the budgets contained in the plan lies in stark contrast to the
well-specified descriptions at the beginning of the document about the
long-term nature of the problem and the time it will take to develop
the technological solutions to address it. The lack of clarity here is
especially damaging because the absence of a longer-term commitment
sends an unnecessarily ambiguous signal to the private sector dampening
the effect of the virtuous cycle that can emerge from government
investment in R&D and subsequent investment by the private sector.
Does the draft strategic plan appropriately balance the research needs
that will enable the country to take short-, medium- and long-term
actions to limit our greenhouse gas emissions and to adapt to any
anticipated effects of climate change?
The strategic plan makes good use of emissions scenarios in its
treatment of technology timing. On page 3-28, the plan makes the
crucial point that the slow turnover of capital stock in the energy
sector implies that technologies that need to achieve widespread
deployment by mid-century will need to reach commercial readiness well
before that, maybe even decades earlier. This infrastructural inertia
combined with natural lags in the flows of GHG in the ocean,
atmosphere, and biosphere creates an urgency that belies the long-time
scales involved in the climate problem.
The ``roadmap'' in Figure 10-1 is a helpful visualization of the
staged deployment of technology programs within the plan. Perhaps the
most important text in Chapter 10 is the phrase ``significant
deployment.'' Offsetting GHG emissions with new technologies requires
widespread deployment of low and zero-carbon technologies. This need
for broad adoption of the technologies at issue really brings into
question the adequacy of our near-term response to the problem. For
example, achieving widespread deployment of hydrogen fuel cell
automobiles in the 2025 to 2045 period, as the plan recommends, means
that a significant number of those vehicles would need to begin
entering the market ten years from today when a viable hydrogen fueling
infrastructure would need to be in place. Significant deployment by
2035 means almost all new vehicles would need to be fuel cell vehicles
by 2025, which implies that a large number of commercially available
models would be available by 2015. Yet the plan's goal for 2015 is
merely to achieve reliability and cost targets in demonstration
projects.
The roadmap is a succinct outline of the sequencing of the
technology programs. What is missing is a clearer path for how these
technologies emerge from modestly funded research programs, to
demonstration, to early commercial applications, to rapid adoption, to
the end goal, which is widespread deployment. As an example of what
such a path might look lie, my students and I have produced a detailed
analysis that shows how we can ``decarbonize'' the vehicles and
electricity sectors through a small set of specific policies. We
provide these illustrative scenarios in Appendix D, and note that work
underway place in the Energy and Environment Division at Lawrence
Livermore National Laboratory under the leadership of Dr. Jane Long is
coming to similar conclusions.
Two important considerations: incentives for high-payoff research and
commercialization
I would like to emphasize two additional important aspects of a
substantially enhanced climate technology program. First, special
emphasis may be needed to create incentives for high risk, high payoff
research. We refer to a section within a recent National Academies
report on this topic. And second, development efforts to hasten
commercialization need to be included as well so that research programs
acknowledge the need for demand-side incentives too.
This past fall, the National Academy of Science released an
important report that raised the issue of American technological
competitiveness and provided recommendations for improving the
country's capacity for innovation (Augustine, 2005). That report
focused on the two fundamental issues that, in the opinion of its panel
of experts, challenge our country's technical competence:
Creating high quality jobs for Americans, and
The need for clean, affordable, and reliable energy.
Setting energy-related challenges at the top of our country's
science and technology agenda is an important step and fits well with
the situation outlined in the rest of this testimony. The
recommendations in this study are admirable for their breadth including
suggestions for K-12 education, basic research, university training,
and incentives for innovation. Of particular interest to this committee
is the panel's vision of a Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
(DARPA) for energy, ``ARPA-E.'' Such a program would fund ``high-risk
research to meet the Nation's long-term energy challenges'' including
universities, existing firms, and start-up ventures. The flexibility
and independence of the DARPA model are key attributes that such a
program seeks to emulate. Establishing an adequately funded
organization like this would be a powerful commitment to securing our
nation's energy future much as the way DARPA has done for our military
power.
Important details to consider in setting up such an agency include
ensuring that the demand-side of the problem is addressed as well. The
military is unique in that the technologies being developed are created
for a single customer under public sector control. Decision-making and
technology adoption in the energy sector are much more dispersed and
are deeply impacted by market forces as well as regulation. As a
result, an ARPA-E program would need to be more cognizant of the
demand-side of the innovation process in order to bring high-risk,
high-payoff energy technologies to widespread adoption. This may
include more emphasis on collaboration and technology transfer activity
between the government and the private sector. Prior work on federal
energy R&D, such as the PCAST studies (PCAST, 1997, 1999), has
emphasized the importance of designing programs and policies that
provide pathways for technologies that emerge from R&D programs to find
full-scale commercial applications. The notion of the ``valley of
death'' is based on the observation that technologies that succeed in
proceeding from research to development to demonstration face important
new obstacles in becoming viable commercial products. Technologies at
this stage are often one-of-a-kind demonstrations and have not been
built at full scale, large volume manufacturing problems need to be
solved, and reliability must be demonstrated to skeptical customers.
Past experience shows that technological success is not sufficient to
bring new energy technologies to market. The challenges of scaling up,
investing in manufacturing and distribution, building institutional
capacity, and customer education need to be addressed as well. Past
energy R&D programs may have put too little emphasis on this critical
stage and a large new initiative needs to address these issues as well
if the United States is to take full advantage of the benefits that
emerge from the research programs. For example, public funding may need
to be allocated for demonstration projects that stimulate learning
effects, prove the viability of unfamiliar technologies, and mediate
the risks to early adopters.
Common misconceptions about an aggressive energy R&D program
Some have expressed skepticism about the need for a national
program for high-payoff energy R&D. Here I'd like to point out
important misconceptions behind five criticisms of such a program:
1. ``Energy research is already well funded by private
firms.'' Our figures shown above show that this is clearly not
the case, as R&D investment by private firms has fallen by 50
percent in the past decade and R&D intensity by energy firms is
a factor of 10 below the U.S. average.
2. ``Public sector R&D will crowd-out private sector R&D.''
For the economy as a whole, the evidence for this assertion is
mixed at best (David et al., 2000). In the energy sector, there
is so little private energy R&D that could be crowded out that
this problem is small if it exists at all.
3. ``Venture capital will identify promising opportunities in
the energy sector.'' The emergence of VC investment in the
energy sector has been encouraging. However, this is
overwhelmingly for late-stage technologies with the potential
for widespread adoption within three to five years.
4. ``Government programs would pick winners rather than let
markets decide.'' In early stage technologies, when uncertainty
is high and risks are large, the best strategy is making a
diverse set of uncorrelated investments. This strategy is best
seen as placing multiple bets, not picking winners.
5. ``Emulating the success of DARPA for an ARPA-E program does
not make sense because Department of Energy research programs
are more productive than DARPA's.'' It is extremely difficult
to measure the productivity of the early stage research that
DARPA funds. R&D productivity measures that focus on the direct
and easy-to-measure benefits of new technologies, tend to
underestimate the benefits of public R&D. For example, how
would we assess the worthiness of DARPA's funding of research
on semiconductors in the 1940s and 1950s and the Internet in
the 1970s?
Recommendations
Make Energy and the Environment a Core Area of
Education in the United States. Public interest and action on
energy and environmental themes requires attention to make us
`eco-literate and economically savvy.' We must develop in both
K-12 and college education a core of instruction in the
linkages between energy and both our social and natural
environment. The Upward Bound Math-Science Program and the
Summer Science Program each serve as highly successful models
that could be adapted to the theme of energy for a sustainable
society at all educational levels. The launch of Sputnik in
1957 mobilized U.S. science and technology to an unprecedented
extent, and should serve as a lesson in how powerful a use-
inspired drive to educate and innovate can become. The Spring
2005 Yale Environment Survey found overwhelming interest in
energy and environmental sustainability. Contrast that interest
with the results of the Third International Mathematics and
Science Study (TIMSS) where American secondary school students
ranked 19th out of 21 countries surveyed in both math and
science general knowledge. The United States can and should
reverse this trend, and sustaining our natural heritage and
greening the global energy system is the right place to begin.
Establish a Set of Energy Challenges Worthy of
Federal Action. Establish Sustainable Energy USA awards--
modeled after the successful efforts of the Ashoka Innovators
awards for social entrepreneurs and the Ansari X Prize
initially given for space vehicle launch--that inspire and
mobilize our remarkable resources of academia, industry, civil
society, and government. These initiatives would support and
encourage groups to take action on pressing challenges. An
initial set of challenges include:
Buildings that cleanly generate significant portions
of their own energy needs (`zero energy buildings');
Commercial production of 100 mile per gallon
vehicles, as can be achieved today with prototype plug-
in hybrids using a low-carbon generation technologies
accessed over the power grid, or direct charging by
renewably generated electricity, and efficient biofuel
vehicles operating on ethanol derived from cellulosic
feedstocks.
Zero Energy Appliances (Appliances that generate
their own power).
`Distributed Utilities'; challenges and milestones
for utilities to act as markets for clean power
generated at residences, businesses, and industries.
Make the Nation the Driver of Clean Vehicle
Deployment. As the Zero Emission Vehicle Mandate and the Pavley
Bill (AB 1493) have shown in California, dramatic improvements
in vehicle energy efficiency and reductions in carbon emissions
are eminently achievable, given political leadership. A clear
message, as well as dramatic carbon and financial savings,
would come from a decision to only purchase for state
transportation needs vehicles meeting a high energy efficiency
target, such as 40 miles per gallon for sedans and 30 miles per
gallon for utility vehicles. These standards are now possible
thanks to improvements in vehicle efficiencies and the wider
range of hybrids (including SUV models) now available. A key
aspect of such a policy is to announce from the outset that the
standards will rise over time, and to issue a challenge to
industry that a partnership to meet these targets will benefit
their bottom line and our nation.
Expand International Collaborations that Benefit
Developing Nations at a Carbon Benefit. The needs of many
developing nations are focused on the challenges meet
fundamental economic and environment goals for their people. At
the same time, these are our goals as well, both as a nation
that must lead the charge to a sustainable and equitable world,
and as citizens of a world where we share the rights and
responsibilities to protect the atmosphere. Greenhouse gases
emitted anywhere impact us all, not only today but for decades
to come. In many cases, tremendous opportunities exist to
offset future greenhouse gas emissions and to protect local
ecosystems both at very low cost, but also to directly address
critical development needs such as sustainable fuel sources,
the provision of affordable electricity, health, and clean
water. My laboratory has recently detailed the local
development, health, and the global carbon benefits of research
programs and partnerships on improved stoves and forestry
practices (Bailis, Ezzati, and Kammen, 2005) across Africa. Far
from an isolated example, such opportunities exist everywhere,
with the recent wave of interest in `sustainability science'
(Jacobson and Kammen, 2005) a resource, aid, and business
opportunity that the U. S. should embrace.
Recognize and Reflect Economically the Value of
Energy Investment to the Economy. Clean energy production--
through investments in energy efficiency and renewable energy
generation--has been shown to be a winner in terms of spurring
innovation and job creation. This should be reflected in
federal economic assessments of energy and infrastructure
investment. Grants to states, particularly those taking the
lead on clean energy systems, should be at heart of the federal
role in fostering a new wave of `cleantech' innovation in the
energy sector.
Begin a Serious Federal Discussion of Market-Based
Schemes to Make the Price of Carbon Emissions Reflect Their
Social Cost. A carbon tax and a tradable permit program both
provide simple, logical, and transparent methods to permit
industries and households to reward clean energy systems and
tax that which harms our economy and the environment. Cap and
trade schemes have been used with great success in the U.S. to
reduce other pollutants and several northeastern states are
experimenting with greenhouse gas emissions trading. Taxing
carbon emissions to compensate for negative social and
environmental impacts would offer the opportunity to simplify
the national tax code while remaining, if so desired,
essentially revenue neutral. A portion of the revenues from a
carbon tax could also be used to offset any regressive aspects
of the tax, for example by helping to compensate low-income
individuals and communities reliant on jobs in fossil fuel
extraction and production.
Acknowledgments
This testimony was prepared in collaboration with my students
Gregory Nemet, Carla Peterman, Sam Arons, Jenn Baka, and Derek Lemoine,
and with my post-doctoral research fellow Dr. Frank Ling. Additional
collaboration has and continues to take place with Drs. Jane Long and
Gene Berry of Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. This work was
supported by a grant from the Energy Foundation, the support of the
Karsten Family Foundation endowment of the Renewable and Appropriate
Energy Laboratory, and the support of the University of California
Class of 1935.
References and Further Reading
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and Employing America for a Brighter Economic Future.
Washington, DC, National Academies Press.
Bailis, R., Ezzati, M. and Kammen, D.M. (2005). ``Mortality and
greenhouse gas impacts of biomass and petroleum energy futures
in Africa,'' Science 308:98-103.
David, P.A., B.H. Hall, et al. (2000). ``Is public R&D a complement or
substitute for private R&D? A review of the econometric
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Duke, R.D., and Kammen, D.M. (1999). ``The economics of energy market
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EPA (2005). Inventory of U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Sinks: 1990
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Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (2001). The Scientific Basis,
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Jacobson, A. and Kammen, D.M. (2005). ``Science and engineering
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Kammen, D.M. (2005). ``Lack of vision on policy clouds energy future,''
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PCAST (1997). Report to the President on Federal Energy Research and
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