[House Hearing, 109 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
WORLD CRUDE-OIL PRICING
_____________________________________________________________________
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND
COMMERCE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
________
MAY 4, 2006
________
Serial No. 109-96
________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Energy and Commerce
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.access.gpo.gov/
congress/house
________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
29-386 PDF WASHINGTON : 2006
_________________________________________________________________
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government
Printing Office Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free
(866) 512-1800; DC area (202) 512-1800 Fax: (202) 512-2250 Mail:
Stop SSOP, Washington, DC 20402-0001
COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE
Joe Barton, Texas, Chairman
Ralph M. Hall, Texas John D. Dingell, Michigan
Michael Bilirakis, Florida Ranking Member
Vice Chairman Henry A. Waxman, California
Fred Upton, Michigan Edward J. Markey, Massachusetts
Cliff Stearns, Florida Rick Boucher, Virginia
Paul E. Gillmor, Ohio Edolphus Towns, New York
Nathan Deal, Georgia Frank Pallone, Jr., New Jersey
Ed Whitfield, Kentucky Sherrod Brown, Ohio
Charlie Norwood, Georgia Bart Gordon, Tennessee
Barbara Cubin, Wyoming Bobby L. Rush, Illinois
John Shimkus, Illinois Anna G. Eshoo, California
Heather Wilson, New Mexico Bart Stupak, Michigan
John B. Shadegg, Arizona Eliot L. Engel, New York
Charles W. "Chip" Pickering, Mississippi Albert R. Wynn, Maryland
Vice Chairman Gene Green, Texas
Vito Fossella, New York Ted Strickland, Ohio
Roy Blunt, Missouri Diana DeGette, Colorado
Steve Buyer, Indiana Lois Capps, California
George Radanovich, California Mike Doyle, Pennsylvania
Charles F. Bass, New Hampshire Tom Allen, Maine
Joseph R. Pitts, Pennsylvania Jim Davis, Florida
Mary Bono, California Jan Schakowsky, Illinois
Greg Walden, Oregon Hilda L. Solis, California
Lee Terry, Nebraska Charles A. Gonzalez, Texas
Mike Ferguson, New Jersey Jay Inslee, Washington
Mike Rogers, Michigan Tammy Baldwin, Wisconsin
C.L. "Butch" Otter, Idaho Mike Ross, Arkansas
Sue Myrick, North Carolina
John Sullivan, Oklahoma
Tim Murphy, Pennsylvania
Michael C. Burgess, Texas
Marsha Blackburn, Tennessee
Bud Albright, Staff Director
David Cavicke, General Counsel
Reid P. F. Stuntz, Minority Staff Director and Chief Counsel
_________
CONTENTS
Page
Testimony of:
Curaso, Hon. Guy F., Administrator, Energy Information
Administration, U.S. Department of Energy................ 32
Yergin, Daniel, Chairman, Cambridge Energy Research
Associates............................................... 42
Levin, Robert, Senior Vice President for Research,
New York Mercantile Exchange............................ 78
Williams, Orice, Director, Financial Markets and
Community Investment Team, Government Accountability
Office................................................. 88
Additional material submitted for the record:
Yergin, Daniel, Chairman, Cambridge Energy Research
Associates, response for the record..................... 110
WORLD CRUDE-OIL PRICING
____________
THURSDAY, MAY 4, 2006
House of Representatives,
Committee on Energy and Commerce,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:11 a.m., in Room 2123 of
the Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Joe Barton (chairman) presiding.
Members present: Representatives Hall, Stearns, Gillmor, Deal,
Whitfield, Norwood, Shimkus, Wilson, Buyer, Radanovich, Bass,
Bono, Terry, Otter, Myrick, Sullivan, Murphy, Burgess,
Blackburn, Markey, Pallone, Stupak, Engel, Wynn, Green,
Strickland, Allen, Schakowsky, Solis, Gonzalez, Inslee, Ross,
and Barton.
Staff present: Dave McCarthy, Chief Counsel for Energy and
Environment; Maryam Sabbaghian, Counsel; Peter Kielty,
Legislative Clerk, Sue Sheridan, Minority Senior Counsel; and
Bruce Harris, Minority Professional Staff Member.
Chairman Barton. The committee will come to order.
Today, we are going to have our hearing on world crude oil
pricing. I want to thank our witnesses for testifying today.
We have Mr. Caruso, who is the Administrator of the Energy
Information Administration. He has been guiding and advising
the Energy and Commerce Committee for over 4 years now, and we
are always appreciative to have him before us.
Dr. Daniel Yergin is recognized as one of the most highly
respected authorities on international politics and economics
in the energy field. We welcome you back to the committee
again, Dr. Yergin.
The U.S. Government does not control crude oil prices, and the
U.S. economy can�t either. We are major players in the global
market as consumers and as producers, but we don�t control the
price of crude oil in this country. Major developments in other
parts of the world have brought the price to as high as $76 a
barrel, and I think yesterday it closed at about $74 a barrel.
Let us take a look at some of the facts that we know.
As many months as it has been since the Katrina and Rita
hurricanes, we still have 300,000 barrels a day in oil
production in the Gulf of Mexico that is off line.
Iraqi production is increasing from where it was right after
the war of liberation, but it is still below its pre-war peak
and it is well below its potential.
There are many people that think Nigeria is becoming even more
unstable, and its production is horrible, and many traders are
taking account of that.
I am not even going to begin to talk about the President of
Venezuela, Mr. Chavez, but there are many of us, including
myself, who consider him to be quite a wild card.
And then we talk about Iran and their ability, or at least
expressed intention, to make nuclear weapons. The response by
the West to this troublesome mission raises more questions about
stability of oil production in that nation.
Then we have OPEC. OPEC is the cartel that tries to set the
price for oil in the world market, but I think our two experts
before us today are going to indicate that, at least for the
short term, they have lost that ability. Half of our imports
come from nations that are members of OPEC.
Now let us look at the demand side.
This is where it gets even more amazing. In spite of the surge
in gasoline prices in the United States in the last year and a
half, demand for crude products or refined products made from
crude oil is going up in the United States, including gasoline,
although there have been some months recently that the demand
for gasoline has gone down.
If we will look at China, their demand increase is incredible:
up to half-a-million or more barrels per day in that one
nation alone. Keep in mind that in a State like Texas where I
come from, you have got more cars and trucks than people, but
in China, there is only one car for every 200 people. Just
think how their demand is going to grow as more and more
Chinese demand that they have the same mobility that we have
here in the United States. China�s industrial sector is
growing, literally, on a daily basis, and their demand for
energy is increasing as their industrial sector grows.
We could say the same things about India, just at a slightly
lesser degree than is going on in China.
I expect to hear today more on these geopolitical issues
affecting crude oil prices and how much price they add to the
barrel of oil. These oil prices and the geopolitical risks
surrounding these oil prices concern me, as they concern all
Americans.
Crude oil accounts for more than half of the price of a gallon
of gasoline. And I think everybody on this committee and
everybody in our country, including the suppliers of gasoline
and crude oil, want gasoline prices to go down. In the United
States, whatever we can do, it is time for us to begin to do it.
At over $70 a barrel, the price of crude oil is four times the
spot price on the day back in 1995, 11 years ago, when then-
President Clinton vetoed drilling in ANWR. They say there are
no short-term fixes, and I would agree with that, but if we had
authorized drilling in ANWR 10 years ago, crude oil prices would
not be, in my opinion, over $70 a barrel today.
Let me take a point of personal privilege aside from my written
statement and just point out an amazing fact. Texas began to
drill and produce oil on a large-scale basis in 1894 in
Corsicana, Texas, which happens to be in my Congressional
district. Since that day in 1894, when what we would now call
the Chamber of Commerce of Corsicana decided to drill some
water wells and instead found this stuff called oil, the great
State of Texas has produced over 60 billion barrels of oil. It
is currently producing a million barrels a day from over 200,000
wells. It is estimated that in ANWR the reserve for that one
field is 10 billion barrels. The one oil field in Alaska is
expected to have at least 10 billion barrels in the one
discovery well. And in Texas, in 112 years, we have drilled
over two million wells. We have produced over 60 billion
barrels of oil. It defies rational explanation to me: drill
what would probably be the largest oil field on the North
American continent when we prove that we can do it in a safe
environmental way.
The Energy Policy Act, which passed last year with bipartisan
support, the majority of the Members on both sides of the
aisle in this committee voted for it, included some provisions
increasing supply, promoting conservation, and pursuing
research into the next generation of alternative energy sources.
But it didn�t do as much as could be done because we didn�t
have the political consensus on issues like ANWR and drilling in
the OCS.
I think that Congress can and should do more. I think we should
do things like we did yesterday, once again passing refinery
reform legislation on the floor of the House. I understand that
some people feel like that particular bill was made without the
proper vetting at the committee level, and I respect that, but
sometimes you have got to do things in a quicker way than a
normal legislative process.
A Saudi energy official not too long ago told me, "It doesn�t
matter how much oil we send you, you can�t refine it, because you
haven�t built a refinery in this country in a generation." That
is, unfortunately, sad but true.
Yesterday, we also had a hearing in this committee on reforming
the fuel efficiency standards for automobiles. And maybe that
effort will have to proceed without a consensus, too, although
I hope not.
America seems to keep praying that we can just buy a ticket in
the energy lottery and get the winning ticket without having to
do anything other than that. Some people do win the lottery,
about one out of a million, but most people don�t. I don�t
think that we should put our prayers on winning an energy
lottery. I think we need to do responsible things that make
sense, like drilling in ANWR, like looking to the OCS and the
moratorium areas, like trying to do what we can to get the oil
shale that we have in the lower 48 into production. In the
last 30 years in this country, because we have been unwilling,
in my opinion, to do some things domestically, we have almost
intentionally made ourselves dependent on the outcomes of
what�s going on in places like Nigeria, Iran, Venezuela, and
various OPEC nations as we refuse to use our own resources.
North America has tremendous natural resources of all kind.
If you equate our coal resources and our hard-to-get oil
resources, we have more energy resources by a factor of three
than Saudi Arabia does. It is time that we, in my opinion,
use the political process to try to at least begin to
rationalize and maximize the use of such resources before we
become even more dependent on foreign sources.
America just is not likely to win the energy lottery by
praying for deliverance from other people outside of our
borders.
[The prepared statement of Hon. Joe Barton follows:]
Prepared Statement of the Hon. Joe Barton, Chairman, Committee on
Energy and Committee
Good morning. I want to begin by thanking all of our witnesses for
their time today. In particular, I want to recognize the witnesses on
our first panel.
Mr. Guy Caruso, Administrator of the Energy Information Administration,
has been guiding and advising the Energy and Commerce Committee since
his appointment in 2002 and we are always very appreciative and
grateful for his analysis and views.
Dr. Daniel Yergin is one of the most highly respected authorities on
international politics and economics in the energy field. Dr. Yergin,
we welcome you back to the Committee and look forward to your testimony.
The U.S. government cannot control crude oil prices, and the U.S.
economy can�t either. We are major players in a global market, but
major developments in other parts of the world have brought us to $72
dollar crude. Let�s take a quick look at some of the factors:
300,000 barrels a day in oil production are still off-line today
because of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.
Iraqi production is increasing but has not reached its potential yet.
Nigeria is increasingly unstable, and so is it�s production, and
traders don�t know what to make of it.
We all know how unpredictable President Chavez is in Venezuela. He�s
running for re-election there, but his interest in politics extends
far beyond the borders of his country.
And the great question about Iran�s ability to make a nuclear weapon,
and the response by the West, raises even greater questions about
global energy supply.
And there�s always OPEC. While Canada is our top international
supplier, half our imports are from the OPEC nations.
Now let�s turn to demand. Sure, demand in the U.S. keeps increasing.
But the grown in China�s demand is incredible. China has one car for
every 200 people. Just think about how their demand will grow when
more Chinese get cars. And China�s industrial sector is much more
energy intensive, and less efficient, than ours.
India�s growth adds another huge pull on crude oil markets.
I expect to hear more today on these geopolitical issues affecting
crude oil prices and how much price they add to the barrel. These
oil prices and the geopolitical risks surrounding these oil prices
concern me as they concern all Americans. Crude oil accounts for
more than half of the price of a gallon of gasoline, and we want
gasoline prices to go down.
Here in the United States, we need to do what we can.
The price of crude at $72 is nearly four times the spot price on the
day in 1995 when President Clinton vetoed ANWR. . They say there
are no short-term fixes, and that�s true, but authorizing ANWR
10 years ago would have dropped world crude oil prices today.
The Energy Policy Act passed last year, with bipartisan support,
includes some noteworthy provisions increasing supply, promoting
conservation, and pursuing research into next-generation alternative
energy sources.
Congress can and should do more - like passing legislation on
refinery permitting that was on the floor yesterday. I leave it to
those who voted against more gasoline at lower prices to explain
themselves, but I think that�s going to be a tough vote to explain to
America�s drivers. People can�t fill their tanks with excuses or run
their cars on politics.
A Saudi energy official once told me "It doesn�t matter how much oil
we send you - you can�t refine it because you haven�t built refineries
in a generation! Yesterday we could not find consensus on putting
teamwork and focus into the multi-agency process of permitting
refineries, whether for gasoline, coal to liquid, or biofuels.
We also had an historic hearing yesterday or reforming
the fuel efficiency standard for automobiles. Maybe
that effort will have to proceed without a consensus,
too, if a bloc of Members has resolved to block all
progress everywhere.
America keeps praying to win the energy lottery. But, we pray to win
the energy lottery when night after night we rest on approximately 10
billion barrels of oil resources in ANWR, at least 90 billion barrels
of crude oil resources in the OCS and 2 trillion barrels of shale oil
resource in our Western States. We have made ourselves dependent on the
outcomes of situations in Nigeria, Iran, Venezuela and Chad and on OPEC
disputes because we refuse to use our own resources. North America has
tremendous natural resources of all kinds, but the government policies
restricting access to these supplies means we�re more dependent on
foreign sources. America won the energy lottery, the government just
has to buy the ticket and open up the resources for domestic production.
Many of us in the Republican party have pursued policies to expand our
energy capacity. These efforts have been blocked by politicians for
whom America�s energy security is not a priority. It is time for our
energy policy to increase America�s energy supply through both
traditional and alternative sources. Let us act now to ensure that we
have a plan for today and tomorrow.
We invited today�s witnesses to help us understand world oil prices.
With that understanding, consensus on action might materialize. Again,
I would like to thank the witnesses for coming.
Chairman Barton. With that, I want to recognize one of my
senior Democrats for an opening statement. Mr. Dingell is not
here. Mr. Pallone seems to be the only man on the upper table,
so we will go to Mr. Pallone for a statement.
Mr. Pallone. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for holding
this hearing.
In the 6 years since the Bush Administration has been in office,
gas prices have gone from $1.65 per gallon to $3.03 per gallon,
and obviously, I would like to know why this happened. And I
hope this hearing will go a long way towards furthering our
understanding of how crude oil moves around the world and how
that relates to gas prices.
I am also interested to know what factors we might need to pay
closer attention to, including speculative and unregulated oil
trading that might be keeping the price of a barrel of oil
artificially high.
But my chief concern here is the effect of demand on the world
price of crude oil. Has that continued excessive demand for
oil kept prices high and led to price volatility? In other
words, if we were to curtail our demand through efficiency,
would the market be less susceptible to price shocks due to
temporary supply disruptions? Would this help cure the
situation in which prices would be more reliable, allowing
American consumers to better plan their household budgets?
Mr. Chairman, I am also concerned about the impact of growing
demand from China and India, which you, in fact, have mentioned
in your opening statement. While the rapid industrialization
of these countries does raise serious questions about world
energy supply, this sort of discussion often neglects to
mention that their combined demand pales in comparison with
America�s insatiable thirst for oil.
And this, then, leads us into discussions like the one we had
yesterday in this committee when we considered CAFE standards,
how to curtail our demand to keep prices steady and reduce our
dependence on foreign oil.
Of course no discussion of crude oil would be complete without
mentioning the fact that the global economy�s current reliance
on fossil fuels is causing another very serious problem that
we need to confront now, and that is global warming.
Mr. Chairman, I look forward to hearing from our witnesses
today. I want to sound a note of caution, however. The
American people are not going to be impressed simply because
the Majority can cite however many hearings they have had on
gas prices or however many of the same tired ideas they have
passed on the House floor. If we needed this many hearings
to understand oil and gas markets better, why didn�t we have
them before we passed last year�s energy bill?
The truth of the matter is that years of inaction from this
Administration and this Congress have contributed to our present
crisis. Rather than increasing fuel economy standards, this
Congress gave out SUV tax breaks for the biggest cars on the
road. And instead of passing comprehensive energy policy
legislation focused on efficiency and conservation, the
Republican majority passed, and President Bush signed, a bill
chocked full of giveaways to the oil and gas companies. And I
think it is time to get serious about putting off our addiction
to oil.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Barton. Thank you, Congressman.
Does Mr. Hall, the Subcommittee Chairman, wish to make an
opening statement?
Mr. Hall. I do, Mr. Chairman. Thank you. And thank you for
holding this hearing. It is very, of course, important in our
current situation with gas prices where as high as they are,
that we understand exactly why that is.
We know that crude oil makes up about 59 percent of the price of
a gallon of gasoline, and therefore, the price of crude oil
significantly affects how much we pay for gas at the pump, so I
really look forward to hearing from our witnesses today as they
help us understand world oil prices, how they are established,
and why they are currently so high.
I would especially like to welcome Dr. Daniel Yergin, Chairman
of the Cambridge Energy Research Associates, a Pulitzer Prize
winner, probably the most knowledgeable guy in the world about
what we are talking about today, and a highly respected
authority on energy policy and international politics and
economics. He invited me to Houston one day to speak to a
group of about 300 people, and there wasn�t a person in the
audience that didn�t know ten times as much about what I was
talking about as I did. So I felt pretty intimidated down there,
but I was honored to be in your company. I have the honor of
working with you before, with both of you, and I would just
like to extend a warm welcome to you and to our witnesses.
Thank you for what you have done, what you are doing, and
giving us your time today. We appreciate it.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Barton. Thank you.
Did Mr. Stupak wish to make an opening statement?
Mr. Stupak. Yes, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Barton. The gentleman is recognized.
Mr. Stupak. Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding this hearing.
I would like to welcome our witnesses. I look forward to
hearing their views on crude oil markets and the effect on gas
prices.
Gas prices are causing consumers significant financial
hardship. Many Americans are now paying over $3 a gallon for
gasoline. This summer, Americans are expected to pay
significantly more at the pumps than last summer. And crude
oil prices have exceeded the previous record, reaching over
$75 a barrel.
As Ranking Member of the Energy and Commerce Subcommittee on
Oversight and Investigations, I have asked for the last eight
months for hearings on the cause of high gas prices. I am
pleased that the Chairman has finally realized that these
hearings are needed. They are long overdue, and I wish we
wouldn�t hold them all in one week.
Many of my colleagues look at high gas prices and claim that
gas prices are dependent on world crude oil markets that are
out of control. They say, "There is nothing we can do."
While some just chock up high gas prices to supply and demand,
the American people want their elected officials to act.
Congress has a responsibility to make every possible effort to
ensure that the markets and pricing practices are fair.
Yesterday, the House approved legislation to give the Federal
Trade Commission the tools to prosecute price gouging. I am
pleased that the Republicans finally realized this legislation
is necessary, and I look forward to working with them to
improve the bill.
Just as we continue to work to protect consumers from gouging
and predatory pricing at the pump, we must also investigate the
effect that energy futures trading can have on gas prices.
Currently, energy commodities traded on NYMEX, the New York
Mercantile Exchange, receive significant oversight from the
Commodity Futures Trading Commission, CFTC. However, energy
futures trading that occurs off the market, commonly referred to
as over-the-counter, OTC trading, does not enjoy the same
oversight and transparency. Without effective oversight from
the CFTC, there is no way to know whether energy speculators are
basing their trades on market realities or are instead taking
advantage of the system to make money at the expense of
hardworking Americans.
Last week, as Americans were hit the hardest by record crude oil
prices, the LA Times reported, in a piece entitled "Supply Fears,
Fuel Speculators Pumping up Oil Prices." It goes on in the
article. It says, "In an energy futures market wracked with
concern that oil demand might outstrip supplies, traders call it
petronoia, threats alone were enough to ignite prices."
A vast majority of the energy derivatives trading that takes
place does not violate any laws and is actually helpful in
allowing energy companies to keep their costs down by providing
them with a reliable and consistent basis for doing business.
However, when oil trader speculators, motivated by greed, take
advantage of these market fears to drive up prices, the Federal
government must intervene to prevent this manipulation from
being passed on to the American consumer.
Due to these concerns, I have introduced the Prevent Unfair
Manipulation of Prices Act, H.R. 5248, to bring over-the-counter
trading under the oversight of the CFTC. As I am sure Mr. Levin,
our witness from NYMEX, will tell us, the oversight provided by
the CFTC to market trades on NYMEX has helped provide
transparency, stability, and confidence in these markets. My
legislation would provide the same oversight and transparency
to over-the-counter trading.
As Americans continue to face sky-rocketing prices at the pump,
our constituents are looking to their representatives to enact
policies that protect them from manipulation and other unfair
market prices. Hopefully, today is the beginning of many
serious discussions about what Congress can do to ease prices
at the pump.
I look forward to hearing from our witnesses.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Barton. Thank you, Mr. Stupak.
Does Mr. Whitfield wish to make an opening statement?
Mr. Whitfield. Yes.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you so much for holding
this hearing to look more closely at one of the most pressing
issues facing the country today, and that is gas prices, and
specifically how the supply and demand of crude oil factors
into the price paid at the pump.
As you know, Mr. Chairman, you and I have sent letters to the
heads of five major oil companies in the last day or so,
ExxonMobil, Chevron, ConocoPhillips, Shell Oil, and BP America,
asking for detailed information about how those companies are
allocating their profits to improve domestic and international
oil refining efforts. You know, the easiest thing for us to
do is to blame the oil companies for these price increases,
and I know that many States are looking at price gouging and
doing investigations right now. The Federal Trade Commission
has been doing the same. But I think we all recognize that
it is a lot more complicated than simply the oil price being
manipulated by the oil companies.
We are consuming 85 million barrels of oil a day worldwide.
In the United States, we are consuming between 21 and
22 million barrels of oil a day. We are the largest consuming
nation in the world.
I would also point out that in the year 2000, ExxonMobil, as
an example, was producing 733,000 barrels of oil a day. And
in 2004, that was down to 557,000 in the United States.
I would also point out that during the years from 2000 to
2005, actual production declined in Saudi Arabia, Iran, Iraq,
Nigeria, Venezuela, and Indonesia. And all of those countries
face potential political problems that could end their
production at any time. So there are a lot of factors out
there that we cannot control.
I am particularly pleased to hear today that we are going to
have testimony from the New York Mercantile Exchange, because
all of us here are about part of the speculators, part of the
marketplace, and I know their testimony will give the committee
a better understanding of how their marketplace functions on a
daily basis and what their platform means for energy prices.
I am also specifically interested in hearing about other energy
markets and other trading platforms, which could have an impact
on energy prices. More importantly, I think all of us are
concerned based on our understanding of these other platforms,
that the regulatory attention paid to them may be somewhat less
than that received by NYMEX. If this is in fact the case, I
know we will all be interested in hearing testimony explaining
why that is the case. And if the additional regulatory
oversight is necessary, especially given the importance of
these markets in establishing prices for commodities used by all
Americans and is impacting the price, then maybe we need to take
additional steps.
Certainly, we look forward to hearing from the Energy
Information Administration and the Government Accountability
Office, and I yield back the balance of my time.
Chairman Barton. We thank the Chairman of the Oversight
Subcommittee.
Mr. Engel.
Mr. Engel. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for holding this
important hearing today on world crude oil pricing.
As Americans continue to grapple with $75 barrels of oils and
$3-plus gallons of gas, it is obviously helpful for us to hear
from the experts on the current market forces that are
contributing to these escalating prices. I share the
frustration of the American people with oil and gasoline
reaching $3-plus a gallon. I think the President of the United
States, frankly, should call the oil executives into the White
House and bang their heads together. The oil companies,
frankly, are making record profits with very little extra work,
doing nothing extra, but they are reaping these windfall
profits. It angers me greatly when the CEO of ExxonMobil gets
a $400 million golden parachute to leave and the average
American can barely fill up his or her tank and has lots and
lots of hardships. This is not something that should continue.
Oil companies are making record profits, obscene profits, and
frankly, as far as I am concerned, laughing all the way to the
bank. And I am not against people making profits, but what is
going on with oil and gasoline in terms of the cost to fill up
your car going up and up is absolutely wrong.
Our Chairman, my good friend, made a point to mention that oil
refineries have not been built in the country, and I think his
point is well taken. I think everything ought to be on the
table. However, I am angered by the fact that when the price of
a gallon of gasoline went up after Hurricane Katrina, we were
told that because of the hurricane, the oil refining facilities
in Louisiana were interrupted, and therefore, it sent the price
of a gallon of gasoline up, but once those oil refinery
capabilities were back in action, the price of gasoline would
go down. And indeed, it went down for a few weeks, and now
it�s back up again to Katrina prices and even more.
So I don�t really believe that the lack of building oil
refineries is a major reason why gasoline is going up. I think
it is manipulation, and I think, frankly, greediness on the part
of the big oil companies. Now we consume nearly 21 million
barrels of oil per day every day, and our appetite is
increasing. We cannot be so completely dependent on a single,
finite, and pollution-causing fuel. We need to change our
habits. The President is right when he said we need to wean
ourselves off of our addiction to oil, but it has got to be more
than rhetoric. He has got to really put his money where his
mouth is.
Now Congressman Kingston and I have teamed together to introduce
the bipartisan Fuel Choices for American Security Act, H.R. 4409,
which enjoys wide bipartisan support in the House and Senate.
And very briefly, let me say, it encourages production and
consumer purchase of oil-saving technologies and fuels
nationwide without adversely impacting air quality. And the
way we can do this is by providing incentives to encourage
manufacturers, distributors, and consumers to utilize
domestic resources to bring to the market a full range of
21st Century vehicles and fuels. We can go to biofuels, and
we can get off our addiction of oil. And we really need to
continue to do that.
So I thank you, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to the witnesses
today.
Chairman Barton. Thank you, Congressman Engel.
Mr. Norwood.
Mr. Norwood. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for holding
the hearing. I will put my statement in the record so we can
get to the witnesses and have a little longer for questioning.
Thank you.
Chairman Barton. Thank you.
Mr. Shimkus.
Mr. Shimkus. I will waive, Mr. Chairman, for more time.
Chairman Barton. Mr. Buyer.
Mr. Buyer. I will waive.
Chairman Barton. Mr. Bass.
Mr. Bass. I will waive.
Chairman Barton. Mr. Murphy.
Mr. Murphy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I am reminded of a story of a man who had a few too many drinks,
and he was on his hands and knees on a street at the curb, at
a streetlight. And a policeman came by and said, "What are
you doing?" The man said, "I am looking for my car keys."
And the policeman said, "Where did you lose them?" And he
said, "Down the end of that dark alley." And the policeman
said, "Why aren�t you looking down there?" And he says, "Well,
there is more light over here." And the situation here, with
these oil issues, that I think is not much beyond what this man
was doing looking for his car keys. We all know, we learned
this years ago, the issues of supply and demand. In the summer
driving season, more drivers, with MTBEs and other fuel
additives, that adds to costs as well. The many fuels. That
adds to the cost.
But we refuse to take care of the supply issues. We sit here,
and we hear people blame the President for not doing anything,
but quite frankly, it is Congress that, for 30 years, hasn�t
done the things that we need to do. For 30 years, we haven�t
built nuclear power plants. For 30 years, we haven�t used
clean coal technology to take care of some of the energy
demands. For 30 years, we haven�t built oil refineries. And
for some reason, we don�t want to drill. We don�t want to
explore. We don�t want to survey. We don�t even want to look
at maps of where the oil is on the Atlantic Coast, the Gulf
Coast, the Pacific Coast, and Alaska.
People claim that they are upset that foreign nations have so
much money they are making on oil. They get upset because so
much the executives are making on oil. But still, the issue
is we have to find oil sources here or we are going to
continue to pay through the nose. People don�t want to act.
We are willing to have oil shipped overseas to be refined
rather than coming back here. That makes about as much sense
as saying, "I am going to go drive from Washington, DC to New
York City to pick up a pack of gum." It is a waste of energy,
it is a waste of money, and those are some big reasons why we
continue to have huge oil prices.
I applaud the Chairman for having these hearings on oil, and
I am hoping that as we look at this, not only will we shed
more light on the issues that we need to have more capacity in
this country to produce oil, to drill it, to explore it, to
survey it, to refine, but also work on some of the issues that
deal with conservation. If every American who has a car saved
one gallon of gas per week, we wouldn�t have a shortage. So
it is not just a matter of making sure that we reduce demand.
It is not just about fuel-efficient cars but fuel-efficient
drivers as well.
There are a number of things this committee has addressed.
There are a number of bills that have come before the House.
But we have to stop trying to deal with this with politics and
start rolling up our sleeves and getting to policy. I hope,
Mr. Chairman, that these hearings will continue to shed light
on the issue that we have oil in this country and we have
citizens who can come up with the ideas to reduce some of our
demand for oil, but by golly, we have got to start getting it
out of the ground and stop keeping it in there so we can use it
to push polling numbers in the next election cycle.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Barton. I thank the gentleman.
Since I pointed it out, production started in Texas in
Corsicana. Production in the United States started in
Pennsylvania. Is it in your district?
Mr. Murphy. The Oil City is north of me, but it is a fine
State, nonetheless.
Chairman Barton. Okay.
Mr. Green of Texas.
Mr. Green. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to thank you for calling this. I think it is a very
important hearing.
In the Houston Chronicle, on the front page, it talks about
"Chavez Leads Energy Sector�s Paradigm Shift," and the first
line says, "With Bolivian troops marching into gas fields,
Venezuela seizing oil concessions, and Ecuador hiking energy
royalties, so-called resource nationalism is on the rise in
South America." That is on the headline of the Houston
Chronicle, and I am sure it could be anywhere, but I don�t know
if it is on New York Times or the Washington Post, because I
come from an area where we produce, we pipeline, and we refine
crude oil. We are producing less, as the Chairman talked
about, so we import it to our refineries, whether it be from
Venezuela or anywhere else in the world, primarily from Mexico
and Venezuela. I have a blue-collar district, and our
blue-collar workers and retired folks are hit also by the high
cost of gas prices at the pump, because they are on fixed
incomes, and of course, we in Texas like to drive trucks and
SUVs, so we are feeling the pain even more.
So many of my colleagues are getting letters and e-mails from
voters who are angry about high gas prices. As elected
officials, we want to offer a solution. In our responses to
constituents, we try to explain that the price of oil is
dictated by combined supply and demand of the world�s nations.
I don�t really know if Exxon can decide the world price of oil
any more than they walked out of Venezuela because of the price
increases from President Chavez. Not many oil companies can
afford to do that. So it is a real price. Unfortunately, the
price of oil is at the most very unstable regions in the
world. And we are not really talking about Venezuela or
Ecuador or Bolivia, we are talking about Nigeria, you know, the
war in Iraq. They actually are producing less than Iraq did
before the invasion. The instability is rather incredible, and
what we are seeing is that the traders in these oil futures
respond to every problem that you hear in these countries. In
fact, I have been told that maybe 20 percent of the price of
crude is based on the speculation that we are going to have
less crude next week or next year than we do today, so the
price is going to go up.
Most of U.S. oil is off limits by Congressionally mandated
moratorium. However, still buying back productive leases in
California, which I know last year, in the energy bill, when
we passed it, that was one of the concerns. Obviously, that
oil may not bring down the Government price, but when Iran
Decides to shut off exports, we are going to wish we had ANWR,
and we are going to be glad the President actually reduced
filling just last week simply because it was time for the
United States to get our market to quit buying $70-a-barrel
oil and let it go into the market to help lower the price.
The price of oil is largely the component of gasoline. We
have talked about that. And it is great to point fingers at
refineries, but in all honesty, we haven�t built more
refineries. Again, I had a district that refined lots of
product. We have 12 refining companies in our country that
make over 500,000 barrels a day. That is more competitive
than the software-operating industry, the airline industry,
the semiconductor industry, and many others. So we do have a
competitive refining market. The point that members on both
sides might keep about no new refineries in the last 25 years is
almost irrelevant. Since 1994, existing refineries added 2.1
million barrels to capacity, the equivalent of adding a larger
than average refinery each year. Over the next several years,
capacity will increase another 1.2 million barrels per day,
according to announced expansions.
And the most popular blame everybody, even the environmentalists,
or whoever is your political opponent for the high gas prices,
but in reality, these prices are beyond any one group�s control.
The only way we can improve the situation is by bringing more
supply on the market as soon as possible. And of course, our
Congress didn�t help last year with the energy bill. We removed
MTBE for reformulated gas, and so that cost 3 percent of our
gasoline capacity. We are replacing with ethanol, but you do
not have the availability for ethanol. And just yesterday, I
heard the President talk about removing the import controls on
ethanol so we can have it. We don�t produce much ethanol in the
Houston ship channel, Mr. Chairman, but we do refine a lot of
gasoline, so I hope there are some new methods of ethanol
refineries next to all of these refineries that I represent.
And I would like the rest of my statement to be placed in the
record, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Barton. Without objection.
Mr. Green. Thank you.
Chairman Barton. We will note the clock says that the gentleman
from Texas took almost 5 minutes, but in Texas, minutes are a
little bit longer.
Mrs. Blackburn.
Mrs. Blackburn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I do want to thank you for the hearing today, and I want to thank
our witnesses for taking the time to come be with us and to work
with us through this situation. I think it is important that we
put some focus on crude oil pricing, and it is essential to
understanding why gas prices are what they are today.
And I hope this hearing does help everyone, my colleagues, the
American public, understand that ending supply with environmental
regulations during the period of the increasing demand causes
gas prices to rise.
I also hope that this hearing helps my colleagues and the public
to understand that taxes do not grow oil. Investments in
drilling and less regulation will increase the supply of oil.
We all know that. Higher taxes are not going to give you one
more drop of oil.
President Clinton vetoed drilling in ANWR in 1995, and the
environmentalists have continued the blockade ever since. China
and Venezuela are drilling in the outer continental shelf and we
are restricted. Just yesterday, many of my friends from across
the aisle voted against and defeated the refinery permit process
schedule on the floor of the House. The bill would have left
the environment regulations alone, but it would have streamlined
the permitting process of building a new refinery, something that
we really need. A vote against that bill was a vote in favor of
bureaucracy and a vote against the supply of gas at the pump.
I look forward to hearing the testimony that you have for us
today. I look forward to continuing to work with the committee.
Mr. Chairman, I thank you, and I yield back.
Chairman Barton. I thank the gentlelady.
Mr. Strickland.
Mr. Strickland. I will pass.
Chairman Barton. I think Ms. Schakowsky was here before
Mr. Allen.
Ms. Schakowsky. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gasoline prices have sent this committee scurrying to analyze
every aspect of the domestic and world energy markets.
With no disrespect at all to our witnesses, I think this is a
poor substitute for action on sensible, ready-to-go proposals,
many of which have long been languishing for lack of interest
by the Republican leadership, proposals that would address
price increases, spur alternatives to oil, and increase
conservation. For the commuter who must drive 90 minutes to
work, a senior living on a fixed income, or those who depend on
their cars to make deliveries, hearings are not sufficient.
Chairman Barton. Would Ms. Schakowsky yield just for a minute?
Ms. Schakowsky. I would.
Chairman Barton. We have been graced by the presence of one of
our former Full Committee Chairmen, Mr. Tauzin of Louisiana,
whose portrait hangs so proudly above my right shoulder. We
welcome you back and are hoping you are here to say you are
going to announce to run for reelection to Congress for
Louisiana.
Chairman Barton. I am going to restart your clock so you can
start over because that did interrupt your train of thought.
Ms. Schakowsky. Okay. Thank you.
Chairman Barton. I thank the gentlelady for yielding.
Ms. Schakowsky. The average household with children will spend
about $3,343 on transportation fuel costs this year, a
75-percent increase over 2001 costs. Memorial Day and the
summer driving season are only days away.
Let us be clear, this energy crisis was foreseeable. This
committee passed an energy bill last year, which the Energy
Information Administration predicts they would raise prices,
and it has. Republicans voted three times against giving the
Federal Trade Commission the authority to regulate and
prosecute our oil and gas companies that price gouge, once on
this committee and twice on the floor. I and other Democrats
have written to President Bush and Vice President Cheney, both
oil men, many times and asked them to bring in the energy
executives to develop a plan to immediately bring prices down.
But not once have they stood up to their big oil comrades. Not
once have they asked them for anything at all, instead
lavishing them with tax breaks and other favors.
Gasoline prices have doubled under their watch, as the oil
companies reported their highest profits ever. In fact, after
covering all of their costs last year, oil companies took
profits from consumers amounting to $1,000 from every household
in America. And the golden parachute retirement package for
Exxon�s CEO cost every household in America the average of $3.
The Bush Administration and Congress had the power.
Well, let me back up.
Prices at the pump in the United States have risen in part
because the United States has become more dependent on foreign
oil at an exponentially increasing rate. Since the Bush
Administration took office, oil imports have increased over 14
percent, and now we import about 20 percent of our oil from the
Middle East.
The President has again missed the urgency of this crisis. His
budget only increases funding for renewable energy sources by 0.2
percent this year and cuts funding for critical efficiency
programs, like weatherization assistance, EnergyStar, and the
Clean Cities Program. Democrats have a plan to make the United
States independent of Middle Eastern oil within the next
10 years.
The Bush Administration and Congress have the power, but are not
demonstrating the will to limit escalating fuel prices. We
should take action today to prevent energy companies from making
windfall profits off the backs of consumers, to provide Detroit
with the help it needs to make fuel-flexible cars, and to
increase the production of renewable fuels and use energy-
efficient technology that will wean the United States off foreign
oil.
Congressman Stupak has a bill that would regulate off-market
trading and increase penalties for market manipulation, which we
should quickly pass. Consumer confidence in Congress and the
President is tanking. Showing concern about the energy crisis is
simply not enough. Consumers want action and relief at the pump.
And I would like to deal with the refinery issue for just my
remaining moment.
We have to acknowledge that oil companies have closed 178
refineries since 1980. Only one new refinery permit has been
filed since that time. The refinery bill rejected yesterday
would have given the Administration the authority to site
refineries and close military bases bating local control and
community right to know. An ExxonMobil official told Congress
in January that flat North America demand for gasoline through
2030 means there is no need to build new U.S. refineries. In
2005 testimony, the CEOs of Shell and ConocoPhillips said they
did not believe any Federal or State regulation had prevented
them from siting new refineries. A 1995 American Petroleum
Institute letter told energy companies to limit refinery
capacity in order to boost their profits.
There are many things that we could do right now. We know
about them. They have been proposed. We have devoted time
to them in this committee. Democrats have asked for hearings
for a long time, have asked to move these pieces of
legislation, and while I appreciate the expertise of the
witnesses, I look forward to their testimony, we need to move
beyond these hearings to real solutions that our constituents,
the Americans, are demanding.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Mr. Deal. [Presiding.] Mr. Buyer is recognized for an
opening statement. Mr. Burgess.
Mr. Burgess. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I have a statement that I will submit for the record, but I
feel obligated to bring up a couple of points, because I have
been raised on the other side, talking about oil company
profits. Shad Roe, Chairman of the Texas Pension Review Board,
stated that when you look at who really owns the big oil, it is
teachers, firefighters, police officers, and ordinary people
who hope to retire someday. Their retirement plans have been
generally disappointing. The only bright spot has been the
performance of energy stocks.
The other issue before us, and we talked about it some
yesterday in talking about the demand side, and I do believe we
need to concentrate on the demand side as much as the supply
side. James Smith from Southern Methodist University said that
cutting consumption may not be as painful as we believe. If
every American motorist reduced consumption by one gallon a
week, the price of gasoline could fall by 60 cents a gallon. And
I will be interested to hear our panel�s take on that
observation. But the problems are complex. It is important
work that needs to be done for the country.
And Mr. Chairman, I am grateful we are having these hearings
this week. I don�t think we can do enough of them.
With that, I will yield back.
[The prepared statement of Hon. Michael Burgess follows:]
Prepared Statement of the Hon. Michael Burgess, a Representative in
Congress from the State of Texas
Mr. Chairman, thank you for convening this hearing this morning.
As we are hearing from our constituents on this topic, I think the
information provided by the panelists today will help this committee
get beyond the rhetoric to the facts.
The geography of oil and gas has led our country to place our energy
assurance in the hands of leaders such as Venezuelan President Hugo
Chavez and inflexible or unstable dictators of the Middle East.
There are ongoing concerns about the stability of supply from Russia
and the Nigeria Delta Region.
As we'll hear from our panelists today, these uncertainties, along
with fears about Iran's nuclear program and the ongoing war on terror,
increase the price of oil around the world.
All of these geopolitical uncertainties make foreign oil unpredictable
and unaffordable. As we heard from the panelists yesterday, the best
way to bring down prices is to increase production in the United
States. Today, we import nearly 60% of our oil, but we've prohibited
exploration in the OCS, in ANWR, and on other federal land.
I believe we should allow, and in fact encourage, exploration and
production here at home. A barrel of oil coming from the oil shale
in Utah is significantly safer than a barrel of oil coming from Iran.
I'd like to thank our panelists who are here this morning. According
to the most recent figures from EIA the price of crude accounts for
between 55 and 60 percent of the price of gasoline, so I look forward
to learning from our panelists about the market forces that influence
the price of crude oil.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. Deal. I thank the gentleman.
Mr. Gonzalez is recognized for an opening statement.
Mr. Gonzalez. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I want to welcome this opportunity to have the witnesses that
we have today. I do want to start with an observation and
that is that ANWR has been brought up, and I have been voting
against ANWR for some time. Even though I am from the State of
Texas, I believe in exploration and production, but the reason
is I believe ANWR may be a prime example of what is wrong with
our energy policy. There is no counterbalance to it. There is
no balance. And that is, yes, exploration, quota, production,
and such, but there has to be something out there when it comes
to efficiencies, conservation, and alternative fuels. It is
very hard to entertain the ANWR position. I am willing to bet
that there are many Members that have been voting against ANWR
if we had a balanced energy policy, their no vote would be
translated into a yes vote. And that is what negotiation is
all about, which there is very little of that here in Congress
in today�s environment.
Yesterday, we had a hearing regarding one part of the equation
when it comes to oil and our need for it, and that was demand.
We can do much about demand. We have greater control over
demand, yet if you listened to the testimony yesterday, we are
probably in some sort of a gridlock. Today, we are talking
about supply, that which we have less control over. But yet we
can still be masters of our own destinies.
And what I am hoping is that the witnesses, and especially one
of the witnesses, I think, will be able to point out how
certain policies, foreign energy considerations, are
inexplicably intertwined, as we used to say in the practice of
law, and that is foreign policy and such, which definitely
impacts different conditions and dynamics out there that have
a direct correlation to the price and supply of oil in this
Nation and the consequences to our consumers and our
constituents.
And with that, again, I just want to say thank you to the
witnesses for their patience, and I yield back the balance of
my time.
Chairman Barton. We thank the gentleman.
Has Dr. Burgess been given a chance? Has Mr. Terry?
Mr. Terry. Waive.
Chairman Barton. Mr. Terry waives. Mr. Otter?
Mr. Otter. Waive.
Chairman Barton. He waives. Okay. It looks like Mr. Allen.
Mr. Allen. All right. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding
this hearing, and I thank the witnesses for being here today.
Really, crude oil prices today are high for several reasons.
Global demand is rising faster than global supply. Instability
in oil-producing nations is a significant factor as well, and
there are certainly others. But it is not enough for us to say,
"Crude oil prices are high due to factors beyond our control.
Sorry." Maybe we need to look in the mirror. Much of the
instability that we find today in the world market is due to
our inept foreign policy. It wasn�t global oil markets that
suggested that the Venezuelan government should be destabilized
and overthrown. It wasn�t global oil markets that have
neglected West Africa, especially Nigeria, when it needed help.
And it wasn�t global markets that launched an ill-advised
invasion of Iraq, fumbled the reconstruction, and failed to
protect the oil-producing infrastructure.
Last week, Iraqi oil exports slipped to their lowest level since
the invasion, and they still haven�t recovered to the sanctioned
levels of the 1990s. American taxpayers are paying billions of
dollars for reconstruction of Iraq and also paying swelling
energy prices here at home. We cannot know, and maybe you will
enlighten us, how much of the spike in global oil markets is due
to our inept foreign policy, how much to greed and speculation,
and how much to rising global demand with uncertain supplies.
I do believe that is why we need to pass Mr. Stupak�s PUMP Act,
which would shine some light into the off-market trading of
energy commodities and allow the CFTC to monitor the activities
of traders in the NYMEX and other commodity exchanges. This
bill should attract bipartisan support, because it can have a
significant impact on the market and on the price of oil.
I know this is a complex issue, and I very much look forward
to the testimony of the witnesses. Thank you for being here.
Chairman Barton. Thank you, Mr. Allen.
Mr. Wynn. Oh, no. I am sorry. Mr. Inslee was here before
Mr. Wynn. I apologize.
Mr. Inslee. Thank you.
I just want to followup Mr. Allen�s comment about the fact the
Federal government�s actions had compounded the misery that
Americans are having right now. I recall, a few years back, I
was in a meeting just a couple doors down from the room we are
in now, and Paul Wolfowitz was telling us about how this
invasion of Iraq was going to be totally financed by the oil
exports. The American taxpayer would not have to pay a dime for
the war in Iraq. Well, now, we are how many hundreds of
billions of dollars in it? And, as a bonus, this was not in
that particular meeting, but in other meetings, Iraq would
increase dramatically its exports and help lessen the cost of
oil. That was a heck of a job done by our Administration on
energy policy in Iraq, a brilliant move.
And our $3-plus a gallon is tied in part because of the
incompetence, the ineffectual, and I have other adjectives I
won�t use, outright mistakes made by this Administration in
Iraq. And now to further that failure of acts of commission,
we now have acts of omission. And I appreciate the Chairman
having this hearing, but we need a lot more hearings, and we
need some action. We need Mr. Stupak�s bill to bring the
trading system under the Commodity Futures Trading Commission.
Literally, before I came to this meeting, I had a group of oil
marketers. These are businessmen who sell oil and gas mostly
to farmers in the State of Washington. And normally, the
business community doesn�t rush to endorse new regulatory
schemes proposed by Congress, but these gentlemen said, "Look,
you have got to have some transparency in the trading system
of oil and gas because there has been such huge volatility in
these areas in part because of the unregulated nature and
non-transparent nature of these trades." And we have enormous
capital rushing into these trading systems, increasing
speculation, and increase in volatility in these markets. So
this is something that if you do it for soybeans, you certainly
ought to be doing it for oil and gas. And we hope that we can
have some action from this Committee on that bill, as we will,
I hope, on some of the bipartisan efforts. Mr. Kingston and
Mr. Engel have a bill to inspire flex-fuel vehicles so we can
get biofuels to be a competitor to oil and gas. We need some
action in addition to these hearings.
Thank you.
Chairman Barton. Thank you, Mr. Inslee.
Mrs. Wilson.
Mrs. Wilson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I apologize for getting here a little bit late, and I
appreciate your holding this hearing.
I understand that there appears from the materials that you have
given us anyway to be some disagreement as to the multiple
causes of high prices for a barrel of oil. But one of the
things that surprises me is that for the last four weeks, the
average daily gasoline demand in the United States was a little
over nine million barrels per day, which was barely higher
than it was a year ago, and yet oil prices remain 36 percent
higher than they were a year ago.
I recognize that oil is a worldwide commodity and there are a
lot of things that affect this market, but I would like a
little further explanation here of why there is this great
disparity. And I have read some of the material you had given
us, but there is some of it that, for people who are just
trying to fill up their cars, really doesn�t make a lot of
sense.
Chairman Barton. Is that the end of your statement?
Mrs. Wilson. It is a question. I would like to hear why--
Chairman Barton. We are still on the opening statements.
Mrs. Wilson. Oh, I am sorry, Mr. Chairman. I apologize. I
look forward to the hearing.
Chairman Barton. I thought that was a very dramatic way to end
your opening statement.
Mrs. Wilson. I look forward to hearing why this is dramatic,
and it just doesn�t make sense to people.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Barton. Thank you.
You are still on after that after your victory on the price
gouging bill on the floor yesterday, so there you go.
Let us see. Now it is Mr. Wynn�s turn.
Mr. Wynn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I certainly appreciate you
calling this very important hearing to get a better
understanding of the global energy picture.
Let me begin by actually complimenting my colleague, Mr. Allen,
because I think he very astutely and effectively outlined the
phase and foreign policy of this Administration with respect to
energy in Venezuela, Nigeria, and Iraq, and I certainly agree
with his sentiments in that regard.
Presumably, I am hopeful that in this hearing that we will hear
somewhat extended discussion about the impact of energy policies
in China and India and the largely state-controlled, state-
influenced systems that seem to be contributing significantly
to the shortage by virtue of their expanding demand. The
information that I have received would indicate that they have
a policy, certainly China, of purchasing long-term contracts,
significantly reducing the long-term availability of oil on the
world market. If, in fact, that is the case, and I certainly
could stand to be corrected, then I would be very anxious to
hear what the United States� response to this is, because we
may have very effective conservation policy in this country,
but the demand in China continues to consume at the rate it is
consuming and if that expands and if, in fact, they are using
this strategy of long-term contracts and, in my opinion,
questionable foreign policy in places, such as Sudan, in order
to obtain oil, we will need to have an adequate response,
because our conservation will not impact the world oil market,
and thus we will continue to experience significantly high
prices at the pump. So I am hopeful the witnesses can comment
on these, among other, issues.
But again, Mr. Chairman, thank you for calling the hearing.
I look forward to hearing from the witnesses.
[The prepared statement of Hon. Albert R. Wynn follows:]
Prepared Statement of the Hon. Albert R. Wynn, a Representative in
Congress from the State of Maryland
Chairman Barton and Ranking Member Dingell, most of us understand that
today�s excessively high crude oil prices reflect the global market
for oil. For instance, Iran continues to defy world pressure to halt
its nuclear program. Recently, Iran threatened to cut off oil
production in response to possible U.N. sanctions - illustrating the
devastating impact oil producing regimes exert on world markets. The
mere threat of disruption has contributed to the volatility of world
oil prices, thus locally impacting national gas prices. In Africa,
25% of Nigeria�s oil output has been stalled due to rebel attacks,
leaving about 530,000 barrels per day are offline.
Contrary to the Administration�s pre-war claims, ongoing security
concerns in Iraq have suppressed pre-war output by about 900,000
barrels per day. In our own hemisphere, partially in response to
our own ham-fisted foreign policy, Venezuela has reasserted its
intention to exert greater control over foreign-owned oil companies,
reducing production by 400,000 barrels below its 2002 pre-strike
levels. Additionally, China's demand for oil is expected to continue
to increase by five to seven per cent per year, and over the last two
years, Asia has consumed more oil than North America. This trend is
expected to continue.
These are all factors that contribute to the world price of oil on the
New York Mercantile Exchange (NYMX), which recently hit a record high
of $75 per barrel. Speculative buying and selling also impact the
price of oil as traders update their portfolios to reflect anticipated
market conditions. According to a recent New York Times Article, until
more investments are completed in oil production and refining, markets
will remain on edge and the slightest bit of bad news will likely
increase prices. Because the U.S. is reliant on 60% of imported oil
from foreign sources, we will be forever tied to the world oil market
and be vulnerable to that market --- unless we can become self-
sustaining and self-sufficient.
Today�s global conditions lead us towards two ultimate conclusions.
First, we must wean ourselves off of foreign sources of oil from
politically unstable nations and fast track alternative forms of energy.
For instance, hydrogen is the energy of the future - anything from
nuclear to solar has the potential to produce hydrogen, and since its
only byproduct is water, the energy source is emissions free. Second,
in the interim, we must evaluate the nature of US foreign relations
with oil seeking countries. In today�s resource competitive
environment, it may be extremely difficult to change the face of US
foreign policy to promote better relations with oil producing and
consuming nations alike, but we must act quickly.
Presumably, I am hopeful that this hearing will address the impact of
energy policies in China and India, which are significantly
contributing to the shortage of oil by virtue of their expanding demand.
Data indicate that China, in particular, purchases long-term contracts,
that will significantly reduce the availability of oil on the world
market over the long haul. I would be interested in learning how the
US intends to address this concern.
Mr. Chairman, hopefully, the testimony delivered today will do more
than serve as a primer in energy prices, but as a wake up call to the
American people about the severity of today�s energy crisis - which
goes beyond $3 gasoline. Thank you, and I look forward to today�s
testimony.
Chairman Barton. I thank the gentleman.
Mr. Stearns from Florida.
Mr. Stearns. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And I submit that we hear from different Members talking about
criticizing the Administration or criticizing Congress. You
know, there are just supply and demand fundamentals involved,
and they play a critical role in world oil prices. Obviously,
there are geopolitical concerns, too.
With respect to the supply estimate, there are two million-
plus barrels per day, BPD, of aggregate disruption in the
world supply. We know that China, in 2004, increased demand
16 percent. India almost the same thing. That sent shockwaves
through the market. On May 2, 2006, the spot price for crude
oil closed at $74.78 per barrel, approximately a $25-increase
over the spot price just a year ago, and nearly four times the
spot price of crude oil a decade ago. You don�t have to go
far. You can even look in Nigeria to see there are 530,000 BPD
shut off by the insurgents. Venezuela has a large amount. Even
in Iraq, the pre-war levels were low. The U.S. Gulf of Mexico,
obviously, with Katrina. So disruptions in these countries has
created this increase in oil prices. And so really that is
beyond the Administration, and beyond the Congress at this
point, so a lot of us should realize that a lot of this is
geopolitical and there is nothing you can do unless you are
going to approach it from a political standpoint. So this
hearing, I think, should bring out some of the things I
mentioned, these countries and all of these supply disruptions
and the global crude oil inventories, the different size of
these and how they have affected the supply and demand.
So Mr. Chairman, I think in a larger sense, many members should
realize it is supply and demand, and that is what we are facing.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Hon. Cliff Stearns follows:]
Prepared Statement of the Hon. Cliff Stearns, a Representative in
Congress from the State of Florida
Mr. Chairman, thank you for convening today�s hearing on global oil
markets. This Committee, through the Energy Policy Act and the GAS Act,
has dedicated a lot of time and energy to removing the regulatory
barriers to increased oil supply and to encouraging greater efficiencies
in the use of energy and limiting its consumption. While we have worked
diligently on domestic problems within the realm of our jurisdiction, I
hope that today�s witnesses will enlighten us as to the impact of
international events on the supply of and demand for oil as a commodity.
With skyrocketing demand in China and India, a bubbling insurgency in
Nigeria, continuing instability in Iraq, potential war with Iran, and
a growing trend of nationalization and seizure of private companies�
operations in South America, it is no wonder that the price of a
barrel of oil is nearly $75 -- a nearly 25% increase from a year ago.
Disruptions in South America have received the least amount of
attention in the popular press. Just last month, Venezuelan strongman
Hugo Chavez cancelled contracts with foreign oil companies, demanding
that the government oil company be given majority ownership and
operational charge of oil fields. Potential new contracts are offering
little to no profit. Companies that refused to bolt the country
outright have found their operations seized. Mr. Chavez has a copycat
in Bolivia�s new President, Evo Morales, who nationalized his energy
sector this past Monday.
These moves will prove detrimental to both the Bolivian and Venezuelan
economies, and to the world economy. Venezuela is already suffering
from insufficient investment in energy production. Rampant corruption,
and the use of energy profits to prop up socialist rule at home and
insurgency abroad, have left Venezuela�s oil fields depleting at a rate
of 25% a year.
However, in the end, none of these global disruptions perfectly explain
the price of a barrel of oil. Only the market concepts of insufficient
supply and growing demand can do that. The low cost of oil in the
nineties discouraged exploration for new sources while encouraging
greater consumption. That is why incidents in oil-producing countries,
as well as freakish weather like Hurricane Katrina, can drive up prices
so sharply.
Chairman Barton. Let us see. Ms. Solis.
Ms. Solis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chairman, thank you for having this hearing today, and I am
glad that we are discussing the global price of oil, and I am
pleased that our witnesses today will help us better understand
how oil is priced.
And oil, as I know it, is a global commodity in the global
marketplace. Its price is seemingly driven only by the premise
that there is never enough being produced. This is true in the
United States, which has one of the largest demands for oil. We
import nearly 60 percent of our oil, more than the total oil
consumption of any other country in the world and have less than
3 percent of reserves. Because of our dependency on oil and
the lack of reserves, we are extremely vulnerable to variations
in international pricing.
And also complicating the factor is that the U.S. dollar is
weak. The United States is borrowing from foreign countries to
pay for its war in Iraq, imports of raw and manufactured
materials. Our current account deficit is 7 percent of the
economic production and is not decreasing. And our largest
trade deficit is with China, which is increasingly competing
for supplies of oil.
What this means is that we are highly integrating the global
marketplace and are affected by what happens in the
international market. Some would argue that the solution is to
dig and drill here in the United States. Some would argue that
the solution also is that we open up ANWR. However, the United
States has less than 3 percent of proven reserves. This does
not begin to touch the growing demand of U.S. consumers. No
matter how much we dig and drill at home, we will always be
vulnerable to changes in the world market. That is, unless we
take steps to become more independent of oil, not just foreign
oil but all oil.
And I strongly support diversifying our energy supply, funding
alternative supplies and conservation. Unfortunately, renewable
energy programs are being funded at less than 20 percent of what
was authorized, and funding for clean energy research is less
than 7 percent of the profits made by ExxonMobil in the last
quarter of 2005 and less than that amount included in the
President�s budget energy bill for fossil fuels.
Our Nation�s budget, in my opinion, must reflect the urgency of
reducing our dependency on all oil, not just foreign. Perhaps,
we will finally learn from our discussions today where we need
to go, and I hope that we can ascertain some of these answers.
I yield back the balance of my time.
Chairman Barton. I thank the gentlelady.
Mr. Ross.
Mr. Ross. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I would like to thank you for holding this important hearing
regarding record crude oil prices and the adverse impact they
are having on Americans. Americans are being forced to change
their way of life, being forced to choose between paying bills,
buying prescription drugs, or putting gasoline in their vehicles.
Mr. Chairman, I represent a large and rural district in the
State of Arkansas, about half the State. My district includes
21,000 square miles and 150 towns and 29 counties. About half
of the folks don�t even live in those 150 towns. They live in
what we call the country. It is not uncommon for my
constituents to drive 50 or 75 miles each way to and from work.
And in most cases, they commute these distances for a job that
pays well below the national average. Mass transit is not an
option for them. Hardworking Americans who are trying to do
the right thing by working to put food on the table, to keep the
lights on, and to provide for their families are being devastated
by these record gas prices.
In order to see true reductions in prices, we would have to
either increase supply or decrease demand or, ideally, both.
I strongly support the continued development and use of ethanol
and biodiesel as a way to reduce the demand on costly fossil
fuels. And as we continue working to increase the use of
biofuels, we must make the necessary investments to develop our
Nation�s infrastructure to support increased use of ethanol and
biodiesel.
Mr. Chairman, I am committed to working with my colleagues on
both sides of the aisle to make these investments to advance
alternative fuels, which will provide Americans with a choice
when they go to the pump.
Now Mr. Chairman, the reality is this. In the energy bill that
I voted for and we passed earlier this year, there is about
$150 million in that bill for grants for alternative renewable
fuels. That is authorized, but not yet appropriated. And yet
we send some $279 million every day to Iraq. So I want to make
sure the American people understand that while there is a lot of
talk these days about alternative renewable fuels, we are going
to invest about half as much money in grants for alternative
renewable fuels in these United States of America as what we
will spend in Iraq in the next 24 hours.
And I say these things because I recognize that as we develop
alternative fuels and flex-fuel vehicles, our Nation will
continue to rely on fossil fuels as our primary source of
energy. Therefore, I believe we must promote further
exploration and development of domestic oil and gas
production. I submit that addressing our Nation�s energy crisis
will take a multi-faceted approach consisting of increased
domestic production, conservation, the use of alternative and
renewable energy sources, utilizing energy-efficient
technologies, and end-user participation.
And with that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my
time.
Chairman Barton. I thank the gentleman.
I would like to add my support for what he said in his
statement. I am working with Mr. Dingell right now on a
bipartisan letter to send to the appropriators, outlining my
concerns about some of the programs that we have authorized
that haven�t been funded and also some of the programs that
have not been authorized that are being funded. Those
discussions are ongoing with myself and Mr. Dingell. So we are
trying to track some of the things that you have said in your
statement.
The Chairman of the Veterans� Committee is with us. Does
Mr. Buyer wish to make an opening statement?
Okay. Seeing no other Members present who have not yet had a
chance to make an opening statement, the Chair would ask
unanimous consent that all Members not present have the
requisite number of days to put their statement in the record
at the appropriate time. Without objection, so ordered.
[Additional statements submitted for the record follows:]
Prepared Statement of the Hon. Mary Bono, a Representative in Congress
from the State of California
Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding this hearing today.
I believe that almost everyone here realizes that we are far
too dependent on foreign oil. So price fluctuations abroad
have a great impact at home.
I also realize that countries like China increase the overall
worldwide demand on this resource. China is a country hungry
for oil and natural gas and it now has the resources to bid
in this marketplace.
But if our witnesses do not comment on this, I would like to
ask them how Russia will impact the future price of world oil.
Mr. Frederick Kempe in a May 2, 2006 Wall Street Journal piece
discusses how Russia has "reinvented itself as an �energy
superpower�" and "is moving quickly to consolidate and expand
its virtual gas monopoly in many parts of Europe...."
While our European allies are more directly impacted by this,
the fact that our world economy is so tied together and also
the fact that Europe could also be shopping elsewhere is
certainly a concern, never mind the geopolitical implications
of Russia�s rise to power in this field.
Of course, I also realize the impact Iran has on the price of
world oil. The instability within the region itself is a huge
concern of ours not just because its impact on energy but
because the shadow of Iran�s threat is cast beyond the sole
concerns of our access to oil.
Finally, I wanted to take a moment to discuss another
potential impact on the price of foreign crude. If you talk to
many domestic producers, they might comment on how the prices
they are getting for their oil is too low and how that
threatens to put them out of business. We are not talking
about $70 a barrel but rather, $22 to $35 dollars a barrel for
domestic oil. Imagine the impact of losing our domestic
producers and how that would impact the price we pay at the
pump.
Again, Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding this hearing today.
I look forward to hearing from the witnesses.
Prepared Statement of the Hon. Charles W. "Chip" Pickering, a
Representative in Congress from the State of Mississippi
Energy prices are on the minds of all Americans these days, given high
gas prices.� As Members of Congress, we are charged with taking the
necessary steps to ensure that appropriate safeguards exist that will
protect against unfair pricing of energy commodities, including crude
oil.� Therefore, our series of hearing on these issues is extremely
important and timely.� If we find evidence of lapses in oversight of
our energy markets, we will take necessary actions to correct the
problems.� I understand that the New York Mercantile Exchange provides
an important�platform for the trading of these energy commodities and
I�look forward to�hearing testimony today from NYMEX which will give
the committee a better understanding of how their marketplace
functions on a daily basis and what their platform means for energy
prices.� I understand that NYMEX is regulated by the U.S. Commodity
Futures Trading Commission and look forward to hearing more about
how the oversight regime works.�
� I am also interested in hearing about other energy markets
� and other platforms which could have an impact on energy
� prices.� More importantly, I am concerned based on my
� understanding of these other platforms, that the regulatory�
� attention paid to them may be somewhat less than that
� received by�NYMEX.� If this is in fact the case, I will be
� interested in hearing testimony�explaining why this is the
� case and if the additional regulatory oversight is necessary,
� especially given the important of these markets�in
� establishing prices for commodities used by all Americans.�
� If�the evidence suggests insufficient oversight, which could
� be contributing to higher prices or even market manipulation,
� it is my hope that our committee will move to fix�the problem
Chairman Barton. We now welcome our first two witnesses. We
are going to start with you, Mr. Caruso, and then we will let
Dr. Yergin be the clean-up.
Normally we do 5 minute summaries, but because of the importance
of this issue, we will recognize you for 10 minutes each, and if
you need a little bit more time, we are not going to be too
picky about that.
So welcome to the committee, and we would like to hear your
statement.
STATEMENTS OF GUY CARUSO, ADMINISTRATOR, ENERGY INFORMATION
ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY; AND DANIEL YERGIN, CHAIRMAN,
CAMBRIDGE ENERGY RESEARCH ASSOCIATES
Mr. Caruso. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, members of the
committee. I appreciate this opportunity to present the Energy
Information Administration�s views and analysis on the world oil market
situation.
As we often hear in the real estate market, the three key
factors are location, location, and location. In the global
oil market, the three key factors are capacity, capacity, and
capacity. And that is capacity from the upstream sector of the
industry to explore, develop, and produce through the midstream
transporting that crude oil to the downstream of refining,
distribution, and marketing. And as we sit here today, in an
85-million-barrel-a-day world oil industry, all of those
capacities, from the upstream through the downstream, are
stretched very thin.
During the 1990s, these capacities were looser and the price,
for example, of West Texas Intermediate crude averaged about
$20 a barrel. It even fell to $10 a barrel in 1998. OPEC
managed the market. After that price collapse, prices were
coming back and value increased to about $30 in 2003. The
main reason was world demand was growing, and prices doubled
to an average of almost $60 in 2005, and, as we know, today,
they are above $70 a barrel.
Crude oil prices are set in international markets based on
world supply and demand. These higher prices should reduce
demand and increase supply, however, we must recognize that
there are considerable time lags in responses to the higher
prices on both the demand and the supply side. Changing
consumer behavior, investment responses all take time, and
investment in new oil production and refining projects take
time for a variety of reasons.
In the short term, crude oil end-product inventories, surplus
production capacity, and international trade all serve as
cushions for unexpected shifts in demand or supply of
petroleum products. Today, the cushions just aren�t available
to make an effect on this market. As a result of that, the
only pressure relief valve is price, and that is what we have
been witnessing really beginning in 2004, and it continues as
we speak.
The robust global economic growth has been a key factor, and
it has pushed the demand for crude oil up significantly in
recent years. After slow growth in the 1990s, oil demand
grew significantly beginning in 2003 and, in 2004, it grew by
2.5 million barrels a day, the largest rate of growth in 30
years, and this was particularly stimulated by very robust
growth in China, other emerging Asian economies, in the
Middle East itself, and in the United States. Now we are
seeing a little bit of an effect of the higher oil prices
as U.S. demand was relatively flat last year, and thus, by
this year, is only up slightly.
Turning to supply, non-OPEC producers, who tend to further
utilize their available crude production capacity for
economic reasons, produce about 60 percent of the world�s
oil supply. In 2005, there was essentially no growth in
non-OPEC supply due to natural declines in the mature fields,
project delays, and most importantly, the U.S. hurricanes,
which continue to affect the U.S. production today.
The nations in OPEC produce about 40 percent of the world�s
oil, and its members in the Middle East hold the bulk of the
world�s oil reserves. For most of the time since the early
1980s, OPEC members held sizable surplus production capacity.
However, that margin has sharply narrowed as world demand has
grown. World surplus productive capacity now totals only
about one to, at most, 1.5 million barrels a day out of an
85-million-barrel-a-day world, about 98 percent of capacity.
The uncertainties that we have heard a number of committee
members mention this morning about supply in Iraq, in Nigeria,
in Venezuela, and in Russia, all are certainly adding to the
psychological pressures in this marketplace and to concerns
that future supply disruptions may occur.
Oil markets, of course, are not just about crude oil supply
but also refining. Excess refining capacity has also been
shrinking, not only in the United States but globally, in
the primary distillation facilities and, most importantly,
in conversion capacity to turn sulfurous crude into gasoline,
diesel fuel, and jet fuel, which account for about 70 percent
of our oil demand in this country.
We estimate that refinery utilization worldwide is at about
90 percent in 2006, up from 85 percent as recently as 2002.
Although refining margins have increased with these higher
product prices, there also has been considerable volatility,
which tends to effect companies� willingness to invest in
what oftentimes is a multi-year development project which
must pay off over decades.
With this virtual disappearance of U.S. excess refining
capacity, we are now seeing a number of firms, as has been
mentioned by Mr. Green, that have announced expansion plans
at existing facilities. New grassroots refineries are under
construction at this time.
Another factor affecting refineries is crude oil quality.
The limited amount of surplus capacity that exists today is
in Saudi Arabia, and it is relatively high sulfur, or sour
crude. This puts a strain on refineries around the world to
process the lower-quality oil. The trends in crude and product
slates plus frightening product specifications have increased
the need for refineries to invest in upgrades to their
existing equipment.
In tight markets without surplus capacity, inventories also
play an important role as a buffer against supply problems. We
currently are witnessing a futures market, which is in
contango, meaning that the future prices are actually higher
than the current price in the physical market. This puts
another incentive for companies to add to inventories, and the
desire to increase inventories adds to current demand, putting
additional pressure on prices.
Some analysts, as has been mentioned this morning, suggest that
the current prices reflect a "fear" premium, a "risk" premium.
In our view, supply and demand factors can explain most of the
price increases seen over the last few years, particularly when
it is recognized that demand for high inventories is rational
under conditions of tight surplus capacity and particularly
supply uncertainty. Unless surplus capacity increases
significantly, or many of the supply uncertainties are
resolved, we could see high inventories and high prices,
reflecting a shift from the traditional paradigm that
associates high inventories with low prices.
Now let me briefly turn to the current EIA short-term outlook.
We have been saying for some months that the world oil market
is tight and that prices are likely to remain high over the
next two years. Our most recent short-term energy outlook
released April 11 projected crude oil prices averaging $65 for
WTI in 2006 and $61 in 2007. Based on developments just in
the last several weeks, there is likely to be some upward
adjustment in these projections when our May outlook is issued
next week. We project continued growth in world oil demand of
about 1.5 million barrels per day in 2006 and a similar
increase in 2007. Non-OPEC production growth is expected to
run behind global demand growth in 2006, increasing the call
on OPEC�s oil, but still allowing for a small increase in
OPEC�s surplus production capacity.
Based on projects already in the pipeline, it is likely that
growth in OPEC and non-OPEC capacity will exceed demand growth
between 2007 and 2010, possibly pushing surplus production
capacity to three to five million barrels per day by 2010.
High crude oil prices, growing demand, and changing fuel
specifications are expected to keep U.S. product prices high
in 2006. High gasoline margins are expected due to demand
increases, sulfur reductions, the phase-out of MTBE, and the
unusually high level of refinery outages recently, partly due
to deferred maintenance from the Katrina and Rita aftermaths,
and to some capacity actually still off-line due to those
hurricanes.
So in summary, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, we
see oil markets over the next two years characterized by strong
demand growth, tight global capacity for both crude production
and refining, and continued supply uncertainty in a number of
key producing countries.
And with that, Mr. Chairman, I would be pleased to answer
questions at the appropriate time.
[The prepared statement of Hon. Guy F. Caruso follows:]
Prepared Statement of the Hon. Guy F. Caruso, Administrator, Energy
Information Administration, U.S. Department of Energy
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:
I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the
world oil market situation.
The Energy Information Administration (EIA) is the independent
statistical and analytical agency within the Department of Energy. We
are charged with providing objective, timely, and relevant data,
analysis, and projections for the use of the Congress, the
Administration, and the public. We do not take positions on policy
issues. We do produce data, analysis, and forecasts that are meant to
assist policymakers in their energy policy deliberations. Because we
have an element of statutory independence with respect to this work,
our views are strictly those of EIA and should not be construed as
representing those of the Department of Energy or the Administration.
Oil market developments are a matter of vital interest to all
Americans. During most of the 1990s, the West Texas Intermediate (WTI)
crude oil price averaged close to $20 per barrel, but plunged to
almost $10 per barrel in late 1998 as a result of the Asian financial
crisis slowing demand growth while extra supply from Iraq was entering
the market for the first time since the Gulf War. During that time,
the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) producers
adhered to a coordinated production quota and reduced output. Crude
oil prices not only recovered, but increased to about $30 per barrel
as demand grew. The recent increase in crude oil prices began in 2004,
when crude oil prices almost doubled from 2003 levels, rising from
about $30 per barrel at the end of 2003 to peak at $56.37 on
October 26, 2004. After falling back briefly, prices then continued
to rise in 2005 and in the early months of 2006. Just recently, we
have seen WTI prices rise above $70 per barrel. This is a significant
change from what we experienced during the latter half of the 1980s
and the 1990s. As requested in your invitation, my testimony focuses
on the major forces at work in today�s oil market and then briefly
reviews EIA�s current assessment.
Major Forces Affecting World Oil Markets
Crude oil prices are determined in international markets. All else
being equal, higher prices should tend to reduce oil demand and
increase supply. However, oil demand is also strongly influenced
by economic growth, weather patterns, and the availability and price
of other fuels. Moreover, oil supply can be significantly affected
by weather-related disruptions, instability, impediments to investment
in key oil producing areas, and, under certain market conditions,
decisions by producers to withhold supplies. Because there are
considerable lags in the investment and behavioral responses to
changing oil prices, recent price increases have had only a very
small immediate impact on the amount of oil consumed or produced.
For this reason, changes in the key non-price factors that can shift
demand and supply at any point in time can result in significant price
swings, particularly when oil markets are tight. Given the inherent
uncertainty in oil markets, commercial inventories of crude oil and
products and surplus oil production and refining capacity serve as
cushions to absorb the impacts of unexpected shifts in oil supply or
demand. International arbitrage in products, such as the movement of
gasoline from Europe to the United States, is yet another form of
cushioning. All of these factors are interrelated, as will be
discussed in more detail below.
Demand. Recent years have seen a significant acceleration in oil
consumption growth, largely driven by strong global economic growth.
As illustrated in Figure 1, oil consumption, which grew at a rate,
on average, of roughly 1 million barrels per day throughout the 1990s,
accelerated sharply in 2003 and especially in 2004, when global oil
demand grew by 2.5 million barrels per day. Demand growth has been
particularly strong in China, other emerging economies in Asia, and
the United States. In 2005, although available data to date indicate
that U.S. oil consumption was essentially flat at the 2004 level,
world consumption grew by well over 1 million barrels per day despite
rising prices. In addition to demand for consumption, there is also a
demand for commercial (non-strategic) stocks of crude oil and products.
Commercial oil stocks have recently been growing, as discussed below.
Supply. Growth in production and productive capacity is shaped by
geological, economic, and political factors. Production in countries
that are not members of OPEC accounts for about 60 percent of total
crude oil supply. Crude oil suppliers outside of OPEC generally
produce at maximum rates (i.e., no surplus production capacity) for
economic reasons.
Although they provide only about 40 percent of the world�s oil supply,
capacity, and production, statements by the member countries of OPEC
are closely watched. Unlike other producers, OPEC and its members
explicitly seek to influence world prices by varying production
levels relative to available capacity. Middle East countries that are
members of OPEC also hold the bulk of the world�s proved reserves of
oil.
For most of the time since the early 1980s, OPEC members, primarily
Saudi Arabia, have maintained a considerable margin of surplus crude
oil production capacity. The large growth in non-OPEC capacity and
production in areas like the North Sea, Russia, and Alaskan North
Slope, along with softening demand in response to the substantial
increase in oil prices following the two oil price shocks of the
1970s, led to major cuts in OPEC production in the 1980s, creating
large capacity surpluses. As oil demand grew through the 1990s, OPEC
production increased without a corresponding increase in capacity,
and the margin of surplus capacity generally narrowed. However, while
short-term imbalances between supply and demand resulted in some price
swings during the 1990s, those imbalances did not last long, as
capacity generally existed to remedy the situation within a year.
Even as demand growth slowed somewhat in 2005 compared to 2004, 2005
witnessed no real growth in non-OPEC supply, in part because of the
U.S. hurricanes, but also because of other factors such as project
delays and significant natural decline in mature producing areas.
Hence, instead of 2005 giving the market time to breathe after the
rapid demand growth in 2004, market conditions in 2005 only grew
tighter.
Ongoing supply uncertainties associated with Iraq and Nigeria and
investment uncertainties in Russia and Venezuela have added to market
concerns over the availability of crude oil, and prices have continued
to rise. In 2005, Iran and Ecuador added new uncertainties. So far in
2006, we have seen continued, if not growing, geopolitical risks, with
Chad most recently added to the list of potential concerns.
Refining (Downstream) Capacity Constraints. In the past few years,
even as crude oil prices rose sharply, a great deal of attention has
been turned toward the importance of the refining sector, especially
following the hurricanes last fall. The storm-related shutdown of many
Gulf Coast refineries highlighted a situation that had been developing
for some time. Excess capacity in the refining industry, like that for
crude oil production, has been shrinking as demand has grown, leaving
less of a buffer for emergencies or any periods when the balance
between supply and demand becomes unusually tight. The reduction in
excess refining capacity is a global phenomenon. EIA estimates that
global refinery utilization has grown to about 90 percent of capacity,
up from 85 percent as recently as 2002, as the overall growth in demand
for petroleum products has outpaced refinery additions.
Historically, price differentials between crude oil and petroleum
products have varied significantly over time due to a number of
influences, the greatest of which is seasonality. Even in the absence
of changes in the underlying cost of the crude oil from which they are
refined, gasoline and distillates (including heating oil, diesel fuel,
and jet fuel) exhibit seasonal pricing cycles over the course of the
year. Gasoline prices (and differentials from crude oil) tend to rise
before and during the summer, when demand for it is greater, and decline
in the winter. Distillate prices and differentials, on the other hand,
tend to increase over the fall and early winter, as space-heating
demand increases, then to drop in the spring.
This underlying seasonal pattern has always been subject to distortion
under unusual situations, such as supply interruptions or severe
weather, which can affect both supply and demand. But by and large,
the seasonal shifts in differentials between crude oil and petroleum
product prices were relatively consistent, and thus predictable. In
recent years, however, as excess refinery capacity has dwindled, these
price spreads have become subject to much wider swings, both seasonally
and under unusual supply or demand conditions. For example, through the
1990s, the average spread between U.S. spot gasoline and WTI crude oil
prices generally swung from a low of less than 10 cents per gallon
during the winter months to a high of around 20 cents in the summer.
Since 2000, the corresponding range has been from a winter low of
about 10 cents to a summer high of 30 to 40 cents, with last year
featuring an all-time monthly average high of 67 cents in September,
following Hurricane Katrina.
Much has been made of these higher differentials and the accompanying
higher profits to refiners. Clearly, when refinery utilization rates
were below today�s high level, margins were generally lower but so was
refining profitability, providing little incentive for the building of
new refining capacity. As a result, as product demand caught up to
existing refinery capacity, capacity that was not fully utilized has
effectively disappeared in the United States, and consequently
refining margins have grown. A number of U.S. refiners have
announced major refinery expansion projects to be completed in the
next few years.
Commercial Inventories of Crude Oil and Products. When the lack of
surplus capacity along the entire supply chain is put in context of
an oil market where uncertainties about future supply abound (e.g.,
Iran, Nigeria, Iraq, and Venezuela), market participants are concerned
about being able to get needed supplies should something cause a drop
in supply.
As a result, many of them have stored additional inventories as a
buffer should there be a supply problem at some point in the future.
In other words, whereas markets have traditionally relied on available
surplus capacity to provide a part of the response to any unexpected
supply problems, under current tight capacity conditions, inventories
must play a relatively larger role in buffering the market, and the
demand for inventories has increased, putting upward pressure on
prices.
Additionally, until the most recent surge in crude oil prices, oil
market futures prices were in contango, i.e., a market in which prices
for commodities delivered in future months are higher than for those
delivered in months closer to the present. This provides economic
incentive for suppliers to build inventories as they can buy physical
barrels at current prices, but hedge against any drop in prices by
selling contracts at higher prices on the futures market. Of course,
one of the reasons oil markets were in contango is concern about the
potential of a disruption in supplies in the future, either from
events overseas or from hurricanes, for example.
Thus, until either surplus capacity increases significantly or many of
the perceived uncertainties in the market are removed, oil markets
could see high inventories coexist with high prices for the foreseeable
future. Oil market analysts used to the old, inverse relationship
between inventories and prices need to understand that new market
dynamics (lack of surplus capacity and contango) have significantly
altered this linkage. This perception that high oil prices may continue
for some time encourages non-physical traders to buy up contracts,
adding further support to high prices on commodity markets. In
addition, the volume of non-physical traders has increased in recent
years, meaning that speculative investors have a somewhat greater effect
on price than in the past. Nevertheless, such speculation is more an
effect of real market conditions than a cause, in and of itself, of
high prices.
Crude Oil Price Differentials. As global oil demand growth has
outpaced supply, shrinking available surplus crude oil production and
refining capacity, another factor has become increasingly important -
the quality of the crude oil streams available. The very limited amount
of surplus oil production capacity is increasingly concentrated in heavy,
sour (high-sulfur) crude, at a time when demand growth for "light"
products such as gasoline, diesel fuel, and jet fuel has been
particularly strong. The decline in average crude quality has put even
more strain on a global refining system that is already running at
unprecedented utilization rates to turn available feedstocks into the
desired product slate.
The combination of higher demand for "clean" and "light" products and
tighter supply of light, sweet crude oils has resulted in wider price
differentials between crude types. Thus, in addition to higher average
world crude oil prices, the prices of high-quality crude oils, which
can yield the highest percentages of gasoline and other light products,
have grown even faster than the average, placing an even greater price
premium on "clean" products such as reformulated gasoline and low-sulfur
diesel fuel. The price differential between crude oil types also places
a greater premium on high-upgrading refinery capacity, including
facilities able to remove more sulfur and produce higher yields of light
products from heavier crude streams. Along with tightening product
specifications and other environmental constraints, these trends have
forced refiners to spend more capital on upgrading existing refinery
equipment, at the expense of greater capacity growth.
Is There an Additional "Fear" Premium? Some analysts, noting that oil
markets have recently shown price changes that they deem to be
"unwarranted" in response to seemingly innocuous news, have argued that
prices are high due to speculation or a "fear" or "risk" premium. What
is missing from this argument is recognition that under the current
tight oil market conditions described above, there is very little
flexibility in the global production or refining system to react to
potential supply shortfalls or demand surges. EIA currently estimates
that global surplus crude oil production capacity is only about 1.0-1.5
million barrels per day. The relationship between surplus OPEC capacity
and prices is depicted in Figure 2. As many as 20 different countries
currently produce at least 1 million barrels per day.
Flexibility in oil markets is currently very limited in the capacity
to produce significant incremental volumes of crude oil or light
products. Under these conditions, it is not too surprising that
traders would bid prices up and down substantially on what may, on the
surface, appear to be insignificant news, but what can, nevertheless,
change expectations about what the future may hold. This is why oil
prices can increase as fears about the damage a hurricane might
inflict arise as the hurricane approaches, only to see them fall as
the hurricane turns away from the oil facilities in the Gulf of Mexico
region, or as concerns about having enough oil on hand when world total
product demand peaks in the winter cause prices to go up in the summer.
When oil markets are as tight as they are, relatively small changes in
the actual or perceived supply and demand picture, which may result
from seemingly innocuous news items, can have a magnified impact on
oil prices. Simply put, any "fear" or "risk" premium would be hard to
sustain without the fundamentals of supply and demand already being
tight. EIA believes that supply and demand factors can explain almost
all of the price increases seen over the last few years, particularly
when it is recognized that demand for high inventories is rational
under conditions of tight surplus capacity and supply uncertainty.
The Outlook for Oil Markets
EIA�s monthly Short-Term Energy Outlook is fairly representative with
regards to projections of world oil prices and world oil market trends.
However, for the reasons discussed above, it should be noted that
energy price projections are particularly uncertain, because small
shifts in either supply or demand can necessitate large short-term
price movements to restore balance under current tight oil market
conditions.
EIA has been saying for many months that the world oil market is tight,
and that world oil prices are likely to remain high over the next
2 years. Most analysts now agree with this assessment, and last week
the International Energy Agency (which does not make short-term price
projections) went on record with this viewpoint as well. This is in
contrast to the diversity of views expressed just last year, when many
other analysts believed that prices were out of line with market
fundamentals and would not remain high for an extended time.
In addition, EIA�s assessment of world oil demand growth is similar to
those of other analysts. EIA currently projects demand growth of
1.5 million barrels per day in 2006, within the 1.2 to 1.7 million
barrels-per-day range of other forecasters. Analysts are more divided
over the prospects for growth in non-OPEC total liquids production,
with EIA�s projections of 0.8 million barrels per day growth in 2006
on the low end. Most projections range between 0.9 and 1.4 million
barrels per day, although several other forecasters have an even
lower estimate of 0.5 million barrels per day.
According to EIA�s most recent Short-Term Energy Outlook, released
April 11, 2006, continued steady world oil demand growth, only modest
increases in world surplus oil production capacity, and the continuing
risks of geopolitical instability and weather are expected to keep
crude oil prices high through 2006. The price of WTI crude oil is
projected to average $65 per barrel in 2006 and $61 in 2007. We are
currently in the process of compiling our May Outlook for release on
May 9, which will likely incorporate some upward adjustment to
projected prices in light of recent market developments.
World oil market conditions, growth in U.S. demand, and ongoing
implementation of domestic fuel quality requirements are all expected
to keep consumer prices for motor fuels and other petroleum products
high in 2006. Higher crude oil costs together with higher margins
(retail price minus crude oil cost and taxes, per gallon) are also
expected to contribute to increases at the pump. Higher gasoline
margins are likely because: 1) gasoline consumption is expected to
grow solidly following weak growth in 2005; 2) Tier 2 gasoline
requirements mandate further reduction in sulfur content this year;
3) phase-out of methyl tertiary butyl ether (MTBE) from the
gasoline pool is likely to put significant pressure on ethanol and
gasoline prices; and 4) there has been an unusual level of refinery
outages due in part to hurricane-related deferred maintenance.
Higher diesel fuel margins are expected because of the additional
cost of producing ultra-low-sulfur diesel fuel later this year.
EIA View of Capacity Additions. In OPEC, surplus production
capacity will remain tight in 2006, but EIA expects around 600
thousand barrels per day of surplus crude oil production capacity
growth and 600 thousand barrels per day of non-crude production
growth. Specifically, the UAE could add 200 thousand barrels per
day from de-bottlenecking the Zakum and Umm Shaif fields. New
crude oil production capacity at the Bonga and Erha fields in
Nigeria has been offset by disruptions to Shell-owned, offshore
oil production, and these recent disruptions could have longer-
term implications for net supply growth from Nigeria. Algeria�s
production is expected to increase by 100 thousand barrels per
day from increased oil and condensate production. Libya could also
add 100 thousand barrels per day, primarily from enhanced recovery
from existing fields. Iran and Indonesia are projected to lose
capacity by 2007. This year, EIA expects non-OPEC total liquids
supply growth of up to 800 thousand barrels per day, and we expect
an additional 1.5 million barrels per day in 2007. One major portion
of the increases in non-OPEC supply in 2006 is simply recovery from
the Gulf of Mexico hurricanes. Improvements to oil supply recovery
technology in the Gulf of Mexico, recovery of the Mars production
platform, and the beginning of production from the Thunderhorse and
Atlantis fields account for a large portion of growth from the United
States. By the fourth quarter of 2007, oil production from these
fields is expected to account for about 10 percent of the lower-48
oil production. Outside of the United States, major supply additions
in the Caspian, Brazil, and West Africa stem the decline in mature
field production in the North Sea, Russia, the Middle East, and
Mexico.
Major projects in Angola include the Chevron-led Benguela Belize
project, of 200 thousand barrels per day, and the ExxonMobil-led
Kizomba B and C projects, of 250 thousand and 240 thousand barrels
per day, respectively. By the time these projects are all producing
at their maximum rates in 2007 and 2008, they will have added almost
700 thousand barrels per day to Angola�s existing production. In the
Caspian, the BP-led consortium that is developing the Azeri-Chirag-
Guneshli (ACG) project will increase production by around 400 thousand
barrels per day between 2005 and 2007. The project operators maintain
that they will be able to double Azerbaijan�s existing production to
around 1 million barrels per day by 2010. Finally, in Canada,
conventional oil production in the Western Canada Sedimentary Basin
will continue to decline at around 3 percent per year. Taking into
account nonconventional growth from oil sands, EIA still expects 400
thousand barrels per day of net growth from Canada between 2005 and
2007.
Based on projects that are already in the pipeline, there is a strong
likelihood that additions in OPEC and non-OPEC capacity will exceed
demand growth between 2008 and 2010. World surplus production capacity
could grow to 3 to 5 million barrels per day by 2010, substantially
thickening the surplus capacity cushion, if demand projections prove
accurate. A larger surplus capacity cushion would undoubtedly be
beneficial. Based on recent experience, it is clear that geopolitical
developments in oil-producing areas will also be important to the
future supply situation, but EIA has no basis for projecting whether
the overall stability of these areas will improve or deteriorate.
This concludes my testimony, Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee.
I will be happy to answer any questions you may have.
Chairman Barton. We thank you, Mr. Administrator.
We now want to hear from Dr. Daniel Yergin, who is recognized
as one of the leading experts and consultants on the energy
sector in the world today. We appreciate you being here.
Dr. Yergin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And it is really an honor and a privilege to be able to join
you, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, as you conduct
this timely set of hearings on America�s energy situation.
As we all know, the deep concerns and the financial pressures
that the American public are experiencing are what prompted
this hearing, and I hope in the course of our discussions to
be able to contribute a little bit to understanding the context.
There are many issues here at home to address, but I think if
there is a single message I can leave you all with today, it
is that we cannot begin to understand what is happening at the
gasoline pump today unless we see it in the global context
involving both crude supply, refining, and indeed foreign
policy and geopolitics. So I am pleased to be here, and I am
very happy to be with the Administrator of the EIA, Guy Caruso,
for whom I have great respect.
I want to try and answer four questions and maybe set them out
as a framework for discussions.
First, the question on everybody�s mind, we heard it today,
why have prices doubled in the last two years. And as I say,
you need to see it in a global context. There is not, today,
a global shortage, but the oil market is very tight, pointing
to rising demand and now, to what we can see, is this kind of
slow-motion energy shock. We have developed the concept of an
aggregate disruption to try and bring it together. We put that
number at 2.2 million barrels a day, based upon Venezuela,
Iraq, the Gulf of Mexico, and Nigeria.
Guy Caruso spoke about the risk premium, or the "fear" premium,
or some call it a "security" premium. And we share the view
that it really does derive from people looking at the
fundamentals in the market. And at least our estimate right
now is that it will be somewhere between $10 and $15 a barrel.
The second question is what are these high prices telling us
about the futures world oil supply? Are we, indeed, running
out, as some say? And to that, I answer the question: yes,
indeed, we are running out, and indeed, this is the fifth time
that we have run out of oil. The first time was in the 1880s.
The last time, before this time, was in the 1970s, and since
then, world oil production has increased by 60 percent.
In other words, what I want to suggest to you all today is that
the prime risks are not the resources underground, but what is
happening above ground: politics, geopolitics, policies, and a
rebirth in some parts of the world of what sure looks like a
1970s-style resource nationalism, which is riding on this crest
of high energy prices. We saw it unfolding there past few days
in Bolivia, and it reminds us that, indeed, the broader context
of geopolitics and foreign policy is very important to the whole
energy picture.
There is, understandably, and we hear it all of the time, much
focus on energy security. It will be the number one issue on
the agenda when the G-8 nations meet in St. Petersburg in July.
But one of the things that strikes me is that everybody is in
favor of energy security, but there is not a lot of clarity on
what do we mean by energy security.
So for this hearing, I wanted to offer a set of principles,
which I will just do in shorthand, and though not offer them as
a definitive list, but really as a process of dialogue or
consideration. And there are ten of them.
One is diversification of supply. That is the starting point.
The second is the importance of a resilient security margin.
The type of issue is capacity that Guy Caruso was talking about
that gives us a buffer.
Three, and this is something that we forget a lot, is really
the reality of integration. There is, at the end of the day,
only one global oil market. There are not four or five
different ones.
Fourth, and we see it whenever emotions get hot, the importance
of quality information.
Fifth, and this is in response to some of the issues that have
been raised, the need to engage countries, such as China,
India, and Brazil, in the energy security system and to use
the sort of idiomatic parliaments to understand where they
are coming from on energy issues.
Sixth, something that I think is complicated, but very
important, is extending the energy security concept to include
the infrastructure and the entire supply chain. The hurricanes
emphasized that.
Seventh is something that, frankly, I think is probably
counterintuitive for these circumstances, recognizing that
flexible markets are actually a source of security rather than
insecurity. And I think we saw that in the response to the
hurricanes last autumn.
Certainly, as we have heard, renewing the commitment to energy
efficiency and conservation, strengthening the investment
climate, which is an international issue, and the development
and deployment of new technologies. So I offer those as ten
elements about energy security.
The final overall point that I develop in my testimony is an
urgent need to update the SEC-mandated system for defining
proved oil reserves, because it is still done on the basis of
technology from the late 1970s. It is this 1978 system. It
provides a distorted view of our reserve base. It is as though
saying that when you submit financial information to the SEC,
you should use only typewriters and carbon paper. That is,
more or less, what it is like. And this serves neither the
interest of consumers, nor investors, nor that of energy
security.
As I think Guy emphasized, we are really at a historic
juncture right now. After a quarter century, this great
cushion of surplus production capacity that was created by
the energy turbulence of the 1970s and the early 1980s has
been largely spent. It is gone, at least for the time being.
And it is on that relatively narrow band of "spare capacity"
that so much of the drama in the world oil market, and indeed
at the gasoline pump, now plays out.
We all know, and it is a question for this hearing, why people
are paying $3 a gallon or more today. But as I said, we won�t
find the answer if we only look inside the United States.
Sometimes, as I hear the debate about energy, it seems to
assume that we are an island; the United States is an island,
albeit a very large continental island.
That is not the case, as we have already heard. We imported
a third of our oil in the 1970s. Today, we import 60 percent.
What this means is that we are highly integrated into the
global marketplace, and we are surely affected by what happens
in that marketplace.
We have to remind ourselves of scale. U.S. oil companies, for
instance, produce less than 10 percent of the total oil that
is produced in the world today. Sixty-five percent is produced
by State-owned companies. They have over 80 percent of the
reserves.
Today, that balance between supply and demand is very tight.
As we have heard, part of the reason is the surge in economic
growth in developing countries. China and India are the most
noteworthy examples, although China grew by 16 percent in 2004.
That caught everybody�s attention. In 2005, China�s demand
grew by only 2 percent. And the data is still preliminary, but
we will look to EIA for what is happening in data.
On refining, and I hear the numbers about all of the refineries
that have disappeared. I think it is true, but an awful lot of
those were the "teakettles" that were created in the 1970s to
take advantage of what was called the "small refiner bias."
These were very inefficient refineries. And I think we have to
look at the overall aggregate refining capacity. That number
went down until about 1993 or 1994. It has grown by about 15
percent since then, which is as though we have built ten new
refineries in the United States, but we built them by expanding
existing capacity. And part of the discussion, of course, is
what we need to do to expand our capacity looking to the future.
But there, too, we have to look in a global context, because
there is a global shortage of what is called "complex refining
capacity," which is necessary to reflect the fact that European
motorists love diesel cars. Over half of them buy diesel cars.
Asia depends upon diesel fuel. We have complex refining
capacity, but Europe and Asia don�t have enough.
I think we can say that the focus of the market, which was on
demand, has really now shifted to supply, and that we are
experiencing, as I said, that slow motion supply shock. But
what explains the rapid rise over the last eight weeks? There
are three things that really stand out.
Number one is Nigeria, and I think there is an underestimation
in the discussion about the significance of what has happened
in Nigeria, the loss of that high-quality oil--which is so
essential for making gasoline--and the uncertainty about
whether we are going to lose more from Nigeria. Five hundred
and fifty thousand barrels a day is missing from Nigeria. The
last time there was a disruption like this a few years ago, it
was like 800,000 barrels a day. That is one reason the market
is nervous.
The second is the ratcheting up of tensions over Iran�s nuclear
program. We all know what has happened over the last month,
and the fear of disruption in one way or another of Iran�s
2.5 million barrels a day of exports. Some Iranian spokesmen
threatened to unleash an oil crisis while others seek to
separate oil from atoms. But in this market, the threat of
risk escalation is enough to send crude oil prices up. And
sometimes, I think the chief speculator in the oil market today
is the President of Iran.
The third factor that I want to just say, and you all know it
very well, is clearly this rapid switchover from MTBE to ethanol.
It has added to the pressures in the market. It comes at a
difficult time. The spring is really when you see the pressure
of the summer driving season, the additional pressures of the
hurricanes. I think when the energy legislation was passed, no
one knew that these hurricanes would, of course, follow, but it
is very well to remember when we have these changes, doing it in
compressed time is very difficult when we think in another few
weeks we will be through it, but it is certainly something that
should work now. So as I said, we think this transition, MTBE
to ethanol, will be over by the time Americans begin their
serious driving this summer. But there is little reason to
think that the tension over Iran�s nuclear program will abate,
and much uncertainty about what will happen in Nigeria. And
as we have heard, in terms of foreign policy, elsewhere in the
world as well.
So, in terms of dealing with the situation that we now see,
the $3 at the pump, the pain it is causing for American
consumers, I think we have to look for the impact of
fundamentals for price moderation. We need to look for the
build-up of supplies from elsewhere. We need to look at the
level of crude oil inventories. And we need to look to the
response to higher prices on the part of consumers, on the
part of investors, and indeed on the part of people in the
Congress and other parts of the U.S. government who are
entrusted with making wise decisions about our energy
future.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Daniel Yergin follows:]
Prepared Statement of Daniel Yergin, Chairman, Cambridge Energy
Research Associates
It is an honor and privilege to be invited to address this Committee
as it begins its important and timely set of hearings on America�s
energy position. The deep concerns among the American public that
are prompting this hearing are evident, and I appreciate the
opportunity to contribute to understanding the context. I hope that
I can provide a framework for your consideration. If there is a
single message, it is that we cannot begin to understand what is
happening at the gasoline pump unless we see it in the global context --
involving both crude supply and refining worldwide.
I hope in this hearing to answer four questions:
Why have oil prices nearly doubled during the past two years? What are
the risks going forward? I would like to present what is happening at
the pump in a global context. Although there is no actual supply
shortage, the world oil market is very tight, owing not only to rising
demand, but also to a "slow motion supply shock" -- what we have called
an "aggregate disruption" in excess of two million barrels per day.
What are current prices telling us about the world�s future oil supply?
Oil is a non-renewable resource, but we do not believe the world is
imminently facing the specter of running out. Or, to put it differently,
this current period is the fifth time the world has run out of oil. The
first time was in the 1880s and the last time before this time, in the
1970s - since which world oil production has increased 60 percent. The
prime risks today are not lack of resources underground, but what is
happening above ground - politics, geopolitics, and a rebirth in some
parts of the world of 1970s style resource nationalism that is riding
on the crest of high prices.
There is, understandably, much focus on energy security today. But
what does the concept mean for the 21st century and how does it need
to be updated from traditional definitions? I would like to offer
these principles:
Diversification of supply is the starting point
Resilience, a "security margin" in the energy supply system that
provides a buffer against shocks and facilitates recovery after
disruptions.
Recognizing the reality of integration - there is only one global
oil market
The importance of quality information
The need to engage such countries as China, India, and Brazil in the
energy security system
Expanding energy security to the include the infrastructure and the
entire energy supply chain
Recognizing flexible markets as a source of security
Renewing the commitment to energy efficiency and conservation
Strengthening the investment climate itself
j) Development and deployment of new technologies
Finally, I want to comment about the urgent need to update the
SEC-mandated definition of proved reserves, which are still based on
the technology of the late 1970s and, as a result, provides a
distorted view of our reserve base. That serves neither the interests
of consumers, nor investors, nor that of energy security.
II Prices and the Security Premium
As the sense of these hearings indicates, we are at a historic
juncture. After a quarter century, the great cushion of surplus oil
production capacity that was created by the energy turbulence of the
1970s and early 1980s has been largely spent - at least for the time
being. It is on that relatively narrow band of "spare capacity" that
so much of the drama in world oil markets is playing out.
The American people clearly want to know why they are paying about
$3 -- or more -- at the pump. But we will not find the answer if we
only look inside the United States. Sometimes, the debate about
energy prices seems to assume that the United States is an island -
albeit a very large continental island.
That, of course, is not the case. In the 1970s we imported a third of
our oil; today, it is on the order of 60 percent. Our oil imports are
larger than the total oil consumption of any other country in the
world. What this means is that we are highly integrated into the
global marketplace - and are affected by what happens in the market.
Today, the balance between supply and demand in the world oil market
is very tight. Part of the reason is the surge in economic growth in
both developed and developing countries - of which the growth of China
and, to a lesser regard, India provide the most noteworthy examples.
But the demand surge turned into slower growth in 2005 and the data is
still preliminary for 2006.
Meanwhile, the focus of the market has shifted from demand to supply.
We are currently experiencing that slow motion supply shock, the
aggregate disruption of more than two million barrels per day, to
which I referred before.
What explains the sharp rise in oil prices over the past eight weeks?
The first is the real disruption of a significant part of Nigeria�s
oil production owing to an insurgency in Nigeria�s Delta region.
Workers have been evacuated, and the local insurgents are threatening
further attacks. This means the loss of a high quality light sweet
oil particularly well-suited for making gasoline.
2. The second is the ratcheting up of tensions over Iran�s nuclear
program with a fear of a disruption of Iran�s 2.5 mbd of exports.
Some Iranian spokesmen threaten to unleash an "oil crisis" while
others seek to separate oil from atoms. But in a market this tight,
the risk of escalation is enough to send crude oil prices up.
3. The third factor is at home - the rapid switch over from MTBE
to ethanol on the East Coast and in Texas has added pressure to what
has been for a number of years the most difficult period in the
gasoline market - the spring makeover of gasoline from winter to
summer blends. This year�s switchover has been made more arduous by
the consequences of last year�s hurricanes. Refineries need downtime
for maintenance and to prepare for the switch to ultra-low sulfur
diesel in the summer. The shifting from MTBE to ethanol has required
changes all along the supply chain - different suppliers, different
transportation (trucks and rail cars instead of pipelines) and
different locations for blending (terminals instead of refineries.)
Normally a change over like this would be done in a couple of years.
As it turned out, 270 days a very compressed time for conversion in
the face of other challenges, including the unexpected fury of the
hurricanes that occurred after the passage of the energy bill.
We would expect that the transition will be complete by the time most
Americans begin their serious summer driving. But there is little
reason to think that the tension over Iran�s nuclear program will
abate, and much uncertainty remains over what will happen in Nigeria.
So we must look to the impact of fundamentals for price moderation --
in the build-up of supplies from elsewhere, the relatively high level
of crude oil inventories, and the demand response to higher prices.
The Demand Surge
The last decade has witnessed a substantial increase in the world�s
demand for oil, primarily because of the dramatic economic growth in
developing countries, in particular China and India. As late as 1993,
China was self-sufficient in oil. Since then, its GDP has almost
tripled and its demand for oil has more than doubled. Today, China
imports 3 million barrels of oil per day, which accounts for almost
half of its total consumption. China�s share of the world oil market
is about 8 percent, but its share of total growth in demand since
2000 has been 30 percent.
The impact of growth in China, India, and elsewhere on the global
demand for energy has been far-reaching. In the 1970s, North America
consumed twice as much oil as Asia. In 2004 and 2005, for the first
time ever, Asia�s oil consumption exceeded North America�s. The trend
will continue: half of the total growth in oil consumption in the next
15 years will come from Asia, according to CERA�s projections.
However, Asia�s growing impact became widely apparent only in 2004,
when the best global economic performance in a generation translated
into a "demand shock"-that is, unexpected surge in petroleum
consumption that was more than double the annual average growth rates
of the preceding decade. China�s demand in 2004 rose by an
extraordinary 16 per-cent compared to 2003, driven partly by
electricity bottlenecks that led to a sharp rise in oil use for
improvised electric generation. US consumption also grew strongly in
2004, as did that of other countries. The result was the tightest oil
market in three decades (except for the first couple of months after
Saddam�s invasion of Kuwait in 1990).
The torrid pace of demand in 2004 did not continue into 2005. Last
year China�s demand grew by 1.7 percent - compared to the 16 percent
in 2004 - and world demand grew just 1 percent.
Refining Capacity
Refining capacity is a major constraint on supply, because there is a
significant mismatch between the refined product requirements of the
world�s consumers and refineries� capabilities. Although often
presented solely as a US problem, inadequate refining capacity is in
fact a global phenomenon. The biggest growth in demand worldwide has
been for what are called "middle distillates": diesel, jet fuel, and
heating oil. Diesel is a favorite fuel of European motorists, half of
whom now buy diesel cars, and it is increasingly used to power economic
growth in Asia, where it is utilized not just for transportation but
also to generate electricity. But the global refining system does not
have enough so-called deep conversion capacity to turn heavier crudes
into middle distillates. This shortfall in capacity has created
additional demand for the lighter grades of crude.
Nevertheless, refining is a high-focus issue in the United States.
The number of U.S. refineries has gone down by about half since the
1970s. Many of these were the small "tea kettle" refineries that were
intended to take advantage of the "small refiner bias" under the 1970s
control system.
Yet what truly counts is not the number of refineries but the capacity
- the number of barrels that can be produced. Here we see a different
trend. Overall, capacity went down until the early 1990s and then
began to increase again with larger, more efficient refineries. This
does not reflect the building of new refineries, which has been
hampered by costs, siting, and permitting. Rather it is expansion
and upgrading of existing refineries and what is called "refinery
creep"-which when added up has taken some big steps. Capacity is up
15 percent - 2.2 mbd - since then. This 2.2 mbd expansion in
capacity is the equivalent of adding 10 new good-sized refineries
over the last dozen years.
There is unease, of course, about dependence on imported refined
products and possible threats to the supply chain. At this point,
half of total refined products imports come from Western Europe,
Canada, and the Caribbean (excluding Venezuela). Western Europe has
been the largest source because it has excess gasoline production.
Slow Motion Supply Shock: the Aggregate Disruption
But what has now become clear in 2006 is that we are experiencing a
slow motion supply shock - an aggregate disruption that, at present,
we would put at 2.2 million barrels per day.
Nigeria 550,000 bd
Venezuela 400,000 bd
Iraq 900,000 bd
US Gulf 324,000 bd
A good part of Gulf of Mexico production is slated to soon start up
again (as is hurricane season.) In the meantime, other transitory
interruptions elsewhere in the world can, at least for short periods,
take additional oil off the market.
These disruptions have, with the strength of demand, resulted in a
very tight oil market and one that is more vulnerable to any further
problems. Market psychology - anticipation of risk - becomes more
powerful, translating into a scarcity or risk premium. We currently
estimate that premium at $10 -15 a barrel. At the present time, the
most important contributors to the premium are the unrest in Nigeria,
and uncertainty about what will happen there, and the ratcheting up of
tension over Iran�s nuclear progress and the fear that in one way or
another, Iran�s 2.5 mbd of exports may be disrupted, with additional
collateral effects. Without these circumstance, we would not be
seeing oil over $70 per barrel.
IV Growing Resource Base - and the "Undulating Plateau"
As always happens when prices are high and supplies are uncertain,
there is much discussion about whether the world is going to run out of
oil. In the 1970s, the term was "the oil mountain," as in "the world
was about to fall off the oil mountain." The geographic imagery has
gotten higher -- today it is "peak." Our research leads us to conclude
that "peak" is a misleading image. Based upon our analysis of oil
fields and investment programs , and drawing on the databases of our
parent company IHS, which has the largest collection of data on world
production, we see a substantial buildup in world oil production
capacity for a number of years. A more relevant description is
"plateau" in production capacity that might be reached closer to the
middle of the century.
We currently project worldwide liquids production capacity (not actual
production) to grow from 88.7 mbd in 2006 to 105.3 mbd in 2015. This
involves a growing role for non-traditional liquids - oil sands, gas-to-
liquids, ultra deep water. This represents a widening of the definition
of oil. Such a development and accords with the history of the industry,
in which non-conventional technologies are introduced and, over time
become conventional.
The risks are not below ground, in terms of shortage of resources, but
above ground - political decisions by governments, conflict, natural
disaster, or price volatility. Rising costs and shortage of people are
also of concern. Our CERA Capital Costs Index indicates that offshore
costs are up 42 % since 2000 - and 14% just in the last half-year.
After 2010, growth in capacity will be concentrated in what we call the
"0il 15" - which will likely cause increased foreign policy concern.
I want to emphasize that this outlook does not detract, at all, from
the need to develop new technologies, new energy options, alternatives,
and new unconventional production. It does argue strongly for a need
to integrate energy and foreign policy in a considered way - a point
I will develop later.
Modernizing Reserve Disclosure
I have spoken about the need to understand future resources and to
expand our concepts of energy security. Let me mention one area in
which the US government could address both. The system for reserves
disclosure mandated by the Securities and Exchange Commission was
established by the US Congress in the mid-1970s, after the first Oil
Shock, for reasons of energy security - to answer the questions "how
much oil is actually there?"
The "1978 System," as put in place reflects the best practices of the
time. It was based upon the 1965 definition of The Society of
Petroleum Engineers (SPE) and discussions in the 1970s. Since then,
the SPE has revised its definition three times and is in the process
of doing so again. However, the SEC�s system still relies on the
definition of 1965 and the practices of the 1970s. Thus registrants
are basically restricted to the technology of those years in reporting
reserves - which has led to a growing divergence between what is
reported under the SEC�s 1978 system and how companies, using more
modern technologies and tools, assess their own reserve position, on
which they base investments of hundreds of million of dollars - and,
now more frequently, several billion dollars.
The changes have been enormous since the 1970s. Back then there was no
digital revolution, and the frontier for offshore developments was 600
feet of water; today it is 12,000 feet. The rules do not recognize
the vast technical progress over the last 30 years, and as a result,
standard techniques used today by companies to set multibillion
investment programs are not approved, or only partly approved, for
use in describing proved reserves for disclosure purposes to investors.
In addition, the rules simply have not kept up with the globalization
of the industry. They were devised for onshore operations in
"Texlahoma," the "oil patch" of Texas, Louisiana and Oklahoma that
was the center of industry activity in the �50s and �60s. Today more
than 80% of the total of companies� proved reserves are outside the US;
and the differences among the fiscal regimes in several countries make
it harder, not easier, to compare domestic and international reserves.
As perverse as it may sound, under the "production sharing agreements"
that are common in many oil-producing countries, when the price goes
up, the proved reserves go down.
Major projects today dwarf those in the past, both in size and
complexity. "Non-traditional projects: are drawing on increasing
share of capital, but they are not adequately accommodated under the
"1978 system." This includes a significant part of Canadian oil sands,
gas-to-liquids and projects in what�s called the "ultra-deep-water."
And yet these "non-traditional-liquids will account for as much as
45% of oil production capacity in North America by 2010. Nor does the
current system fully account for larger, commodity-driven liquefied
natural gas business that will be critical to the future US natural
gas supplies.
But the industry is still required to report using the technology of
the 1970s -- when no one had a cell phone or a personal computer, let
alone access to the Internet. It is as though companies preparing
financial reports to the SEC in 2006 could do so only use typewriters
and carbon paper. Modernizing the reserves disclosure would clearly
improve understanding of the resource base and its potential and
provide clarification for purposes of energy security.
Energy Security in the 21st Century
What has been the paradigm of energy security for the past three
decades is too limited and must be expanded to include many new
factors. Moreover, it must be recognized that energy security does not
stand by itself but is lodged in the larger relations among nations
and how they interact with one another. Energy security will be the
number one topic on the agenda when the group of eight highly
industrialized countries (G8) meets in St. Petersburg in July. The
renewed focus on energy security is driven in part by an exceedingly
tight oil market and by high oil prices, which have doubled over the
past three years. But it is also fueled by the threat of terrorism,
instability in some exporting nations, a nationalist backlash, fears
of a scramble for supplies, geopolitical rivalries, and countries�
fundamental need for energy to power their economic growth.
Concerns over energy security are not limited to oil. When it comes
to natural gas, rising demand and constrained supplies mean that North
America can no longer be self-reliant, and so the United States is
joining the new global market in natural gas that will link countries,
continents, and prices together in an unprecedented way.
At the same time, a new range of vulnerabilities has become more
evident. Al Qaeda has threatened to attack what Osama bin Laden calls
the "hinges" of the world�s economy, that is, its critical
infrastructure-of which energy is among the most crucial elements. The
world will increasingly depend on new sources of supply from places
where security systems are still being developed. And the
vulnerabilities are not limited to threats of terrorism, political
turmoil, armed conflict, and piracy. In August and September 2005,
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita delivered the world�s first integrated
energy shock, simultaneously disrupting flows of oil, natural gas,
and electric power.
The key to energy security has been diversification. This remains
true, but a wider approach is now required that takes into account the
rapid evolution of the global energy trade, supply-chain
vulnerabilities, terrorism, and the integration of major new economies
into the world market.
The current energy security system was created in response to the 1973
Arab oil embargo to ensure coordination among the industrialized
countries in the event of a disruption in supply, encourage
collaboration on energy policies, avoid bruising scrambles for
supplies, and deter any future use of an "oil weapon" by exporters. Its
key elements are the Paris-based International Energy Agency (IEA),
whose members are the industrialized countries; strategic stockpiles of
oil, including the US Strategic Petroleum Reserve; continued monitoring
and analysis of energy markets and policies; and energy conservation
and coordinated emergency sharing of supplies in the event of a
disruption.
Experience has shown that to maintain energy security countries need to
recognize several key principles.
The first is diversification of supply. Multiplying one�s supply
sources reduces the impact of a disruption in supply from one source by
providing alternatives, serving the interests of both consumers and
producers, for whom stable markets are a prime concern. But
diversification is not enough.
A second principle is resilience, a "security margin" in the energy
supply system that provides a buffer against shocks and facilitates
recovery after disruptions. Resilience can come from many factors,
including sufficient spare production capacity, strategic reserves,
backup supplies of equipment, adequate storage capacity along the
supply chain, and the stockpiling of critical parts for electric
power production and distribution, as well as carefully conceived
plans for responding to disruptions that may affect large regions.
Hence the third principle: recognizing the reality of integration.
There is only one oil market, a complex and worldwide system that moves
and consumes about 86 million barrels of oil every day. For all
consumers, security resides in the stability of this market. Secession
is not an option.
A fourth principle is the importance of information. High-quality
information underpins well-functioning markets. Information is crucial
in a crisis, when consumer panics can be instigated by a mixture of
actual disruptions, rumors, and fear. Reality can be obscured by
accusations, acrimony, outrage, transforming a difficult situation
into something much worse. In such situations, governments and the
private sector should collaborate to counter panics with high-quality,
timely information.
As important as these principles are, the past several years have
highlighted the need to expand the concept of energy security in two
critical dimensions:
the recognition of the globalization of the energy security system,
which can be achieved especially by engaging China and India, and
the acknowledgment of the fact that the entire energy supply chain
needs to be protected.
It is important to get China�s situation into perspective. Despite
all the attention being paid to China�s efforts to secure international
petroleum reserves, for example, the entire amount that China currently
produces per day outside of its own borders is equivalent to just
10 percent of the daily production of one of the supermajor oil
companies. If there were a serious controversy between the United
States and China involving oil or gas, it would likely arise not
because of a competition in a well-functioning global market for the
resources themselves, but rather because they had become enmeshed in
larger foreign policy controversies (such as a clash over a specific
regime or over how to respond to Iran�s nuclear program). Indeed, from
the viewpoint of consumers in North America, Europe, and Japan, Chinese
and Indian investment in the development of new energy supplies around
the world is not a threat but something to be desired, because it means
there will be more energy available for everyone in the years ahead as
India�s and China�s demand grows.
It would be wiser-and indeed it is urgent-to engage these two giants in
the global network of trade and investment rather than see them tilt
toward a mercantilist, state-to-state approach. Engaging India and China
will require understanding what energy security means for them. Both
countries are rapidly moving from self-sufficiency to integration into
the world economy, which means they will grow increasingly dependent on
global markets even as they are under tremendous pressure to deliver
economic growth for their huge populations, which cope with energy
shortages and blackouts on a daily basis. Thus, the primary concern for
both China and India is to ensure that they have sufficient energy to
support economic growth and prevent debilitating energy shortfalls that
could trigger social and political turbulence.
The concept of energy security needs to be expanded to include the
protection of the entire energy supply chain and infrastructure. None
of the world�s complex, integrated supply chains were built with
security, defined in this broad way, in mind. Hurricanes Katrina and
Rita brought a new perspective to the security question by demonstrating
how fundamental the electric grid is to everything else.
Energy interdependence and the growing scale of energy trade require
continuing collaboration among both producers and consumers to ensure the
security of the entire supply chain. Long-distance, cross-border pipelines
are becoming an ever-larger fixture in the global energy trade. There are
also many chokepoints along the transportation routes of seaborne oil and,
in many cases, liquefied natural gas (LNG) that create particular
vulnerabilities.
The challenge of energy security will grow more urgent in the years
ahead, because the scale of the global trade in energy will grow
substantially as world markets become more integrated. Currently, every
day some 40 million barrels of oil cross oceans on tankers; by 2020,
that number could jump to 67 million. By then, without major technical
changes, the United States could be importing 70 percent of its oil
(compared to 58 percent today and 33 percent in 1973), and so could
China.
But in the United States, as in other countries, the lines of
responsibility-and the sources of funding-for protecting
critical infrastructures, such as energy, are far from clear.
The private sector, the federal government, and state and local
agencies need to take steps to better coordinate their
activities.
7. Markets need to be recognized as a source of security in
themselves. The energy security system was created when energy prices
were regulated in the United States, energy trading was only just
beginning, and futures markets were several years away.
Today, large, flexible, and well-functioning energy markets provide
security by absorbing shocks and allowing supply and demand to respond
more quickly and with greater ingenuity than a controlled system could.
Such markets will guarantee security for the growing LNG market and
thereby boost the confidence of the countries that import it. There is
much to be said in terms of resisting the temptation to intervene and
micromanage markets. . Intervention and controls, however well meaning,
can backfire, slowing and even preventing the movement of supplies to
respond to disruptions. At least in the United States, any price spike
or disruption evokes the memory of the infamous gas lines of the 1970s.
Yet those lines were to a considerable degree self-inflicted-the
consequence of price controls and a heavy-handed allocation system that
sent gasoline where it was not needed and denied its being sent where
it was.
Contrast that to what happened immediately after Hurricane Katrina. A
major disruption to the US oil supply was compounded by reports of
price spiking and of stations running out of gasoline, which together
could have created new gas lines along the East Coast. Yet the markets
were back in balance sooner and prices came down more quickly than
almost anyone had expected. Emergency supplies from the US Strategic
Petroleum Reserve and other IEA reserves were released, sending a "do
not panic" message to the market. At the same time, two critical
regulatory restrictions were eased. One was the Jones Act (which bars
non-US-flagged ships from carrying cargo between US ports), which was
waived to allow non-US tankers to ship supplies bottlenecked on the
Gulf Coast around Florida to the East Coast, where they were needed.
The other was the set of "boutique gasoline" regulations that require
different qualities of gasoline for different cities, which were
temporarily lifted to permit supplies from other parts of the country
to move into the Southeast. The experience highlights the need to
incorporate regulatory and environmental flexibility-and a clear
understanding of the impediments to adjustment-into the energy
security machinery in order to cope as effectively as possible with
disruptions and emergencies.
The US government and the private sector should also make a renewed
commitment to energy efficiency and conservation. Although often
underrated, the impact of conservation on the economy has been
enormous over the past several decades. Over the past 30 years, US
GDP has grown by 150 percent, while US energy consumption has grown
by only 25 percent. In the 1970s and 1980s, many considered that
kind of decoupling impossible, or at least certain to be
economically ruinous. Current and future advances in technology
could permit very large additional gains, which would be highly
beneficial not only for advanced economies such as that of the United
States, but also for the economies of countries such as India and
China (in fact, China has recently made conservation a priority).
The investment climate itself must become a key concern in energy
security. There needs to be a continual flow of investment and
technology in order for new resources to be developed. The IEA
recently estimated that as much as $16 trillion will be required
for new energy development over the next 25 years. These capital
flows will not materialize without reasonable and stable investment
frame-works, timely decision making by governments, and open
markets.
New Technologies
Development of new technologies will remain the fundamental
starting principle of energy security for both oil and gas. This
will require new generation of nuclear power and "clean coal"
technologies and encouraging a growing role for a variety of renewable
energy sources as they become more competitive. It will also require
investing in new technologies, ranging from near-term ones, such as
the conversion of natural gas into a liquid fuel, to ones that are
still in the lab, such as the biological engineering of energy
supplies. Investment in technology all along the energy spectrum is
surging today, and this will have a positive effect not only on the
future energy picture but also on the environment.
We talked earlier of the widening definition of oil. We will also
see the widening definition of gasoline with what has recently
become a broad commitment to introducing ethanol into the gasoline
pool. Undoubtedly we will see a substantial growth of ethanol and
the infrastructure to support it. But we have to remember the
overall scale of the target envisioned in the 2005 legislation would
be about five percent of total supply. Given the current incentive
to step up in investment, the number could be somewhat higher.
Achieving much larger objectives depends on substantial advances in
the science of cellulosic ethanol. Certainly this will be a major
focus of effort in the years ahead.
Finally, we must return to the larger context. Energy security indeed
exists in a larger context. In a world of increasing interdependence,
energy security will depend much on how countries manage their
relations with one another, whether bilaterally or within
multilateral frameworks. That is why energy security will be one of
the main challenges for US foreign policy in the years ahead. Part
of that challenge will be anticipating and assessing the "what ifs."
And that requires looking not only around the corner, but also beyond
the ups and downs of cycles to both the reality of an ever more
complex and integrated global energy system and the relations among
the countries that participate in it.
Chairman Barton. Thank you, Dr. Yergin.
The Chair is going to recognize himself for the first round of
questioning.
I want to thank each of you for your testimony. It is
refreshing to have a discussion that it is non-demagogic, about
the oil industry. I want to start with a general question that
each of you may want to address.
Each of you has indicated that the cushion between production
and reserve capacity is almost non-existent, that we produce
about 85 million barrels of oil worldwide, and we are using
about 85 million, maybe 84 million. What were the events, say,
10 years ago, and what would it be helpful if they were today,
i.e., if we had a 5 million barrel reserve margin or a
10 million barrel reserve margin. What would that do to the
price structure?
Mr. Caruso. About 10 years ago, world surplus capacity was
between three and four million barrels a day. And in the
mid-1980s, when prices collapsed, those of you who remember in
1986, world excess capacity actually reached 11 million barrels
a day. Then prices were averaging about $12 a barrel that
year. So we are talking about if you had to pick one key
factor, surplus productive capacity, there is a chart in my
testimony, shows how critical that is, that as you move
towards the 5-million-barrel-a-day mark and higher, then you
get back to what we have observed as a historical average of
around $20 a barrel in the world oil market.
Chairman Barton. Is 5 million barrels kind of the minimum?
Mr. Caruso. It is very difficult, because it is not only the
absolute number but, as has been eloquently pointed out, in
the context of what kind of geopolitical environment are you
in. I think we are not only right now in the worst of both
worlds, we have 1 or 1.5 million barrels a day of surplus--
Chairman Barton. Well, could you postulate a theory that you
need enough reserve capacity to take the expected increase
this year and next year with, then, maybe another million
barrels on top or something like that? If you had a "world
energy czar" and they adopted that as a strategy, would that
alleviate some of the price pressure that we have today at
retail?
Mr. Caruso. In my view, it would.
Chairman Barton. Because that would take some of the
speculative pressures off.
Well, the question I would ask you, Dr. Yergin, given this
tightness of the supply reserve margin cushion and these high
prices we have had, why has there not been more of a response
on the production side in these countries that have large
proven reserves?
Dr. Yergin. Right. I think you have to look at each country.
Venezuela has had a 400,000 barrel-a-day decline in production
capacity since the turmoil there in 2002 and 2003. I think
Russia was on a very strong up growth, but changes there and
the shift there has meant that Russian growth is much lower.
I think that when prices are high, governments don�t feel the
pressure or the need for revenues, and so they put a lot less
focus on--
Chairman Barton. Take a country like Mexico, if there is ever
a country that has a revenue pressure on it because of its
economy and the growth of its population, why would they not
significantly expand production on their proven reserve base,
given these prices?
Dr. Yergin. Well, I think Mexico is constrained by the nature
of its political system from responding, and it needs more
investments in its sector. They don�t have the capital to do
it. It needs technology to go out into deep waters and so
forth, and it is not doing that. And I think if you look at
the battles over the last 6 years, 5 years, and Mexico�s
political system, an awful lot of it has been do you open up
their sector to international investment, which would
certainly lead to higher production and ultimately would lead
to higher government revenues.
Chairman Barton. Well, is there any evidence, either one of
you gentlemen, that the current price level is encouraging
proven reserves coming on line in some of the nations that
actually have large reserve bases?
Dr. Yergin. Well, I think the country where you can see and
it is pretty clear a substantial increase is coming, of course,
is Saudi Arabia, which has a $50 billion program to increase
capacity. The other thing is you can see that the spending,
where you can see it by companies around the world, is
increasing very substantially to invest, but it is also coming
at a time that costs are going up pretty rapidly in the
industry. Our cost index shows the costs of developing, let us
say, an offshore field in the Gulf of Mexico, doing it today
would be 42 percent more expensive than it would have been
5 years ago. So people are increasing investment, but it is
also up against an industry that is very short of people.
There is another capacity to add to Guy�s capacity, the
shortage of people, equipment, and skills.
Chairman Barton. Okay. My time has expired. I want to ask
one more question. And I could ask questions for the next
hour, but obviously, with all of the Members here, that is
not fair.
I want each of you to speculate a little bit on what is
happening in the futures market by speculators, and what
would the reaction be if we raised the margin requirement
on the energy futures market from the current requirement,
2 or 3 percent, to 35 percent or 50 percent, something like
it is in the stock market. Dr. Yergin, in your testimony,
said that the estimates are that speculation adds $10 to
$15 a barrel or maybe 10 to 15 percent.
Dr. Yergin. Ten to 15 dollars a barrel.
Chairman Barton. So what would happen, because that is
something this Congress could do.
Dr. Yergin. Yes.
Chairman Barton. We could have a margin requirement increase
on the floor two weeks from now, maybe even next week. What
would that do to drive the speculators out of the market and
bring the price down? And what would that do for the people,
the hedgers and the traders who actually use the futures
market in their daily business regime?
Dr. Yergin. I think that, obviously, that is really getting
to the next panel, but I would say that one of the new things
in the market is that it is not only the traditional traders
and hedgers and so forth, but also you have an awful lot of
pension fund money, endowment money, and so forth, that is
going into the oil market, seeing oil as a financial
instrument, and that is long-term passive money.
Chairman Barton. They are in the futures market?
Dr. Yergin. Yes, they are buying the commodity.
Chairman Barton. A pension fund is buying a futures fund?
Dr. Yergin. Yes, pension funds now believe that they need to
diversify into their asset classes, and one of their asset
classes is commodities. And what commodity looms larger than
oil? None. So that is part of their diversification. So
that is part of it. As to what the right percentage for the
margin requirements is, that is not something that I have
studied so that I could give you an answer for that.
Chairman Barton. Well, make a guess.
Dr. Yergin. Well, I think if you raise the margin
requirements, would it reduce the volatility? I don�t know.
Guy, what do you think?
Mr. Caruso. I am not sure, probably a bit less. Our analysis,
what should I say, we don�t think the speculative part of the
price is quite as high as $10 to $15, but there is clearly an
upside bias to this market. It is because most people
perceive the risk to be on the upside. Now by raising the
margin requirements, it certainly would make the cost of
business for legitimate speculators on the market more
expensive, but I think, my understanding is the CFTC now has
very tight regulations on NYMEX, for example. So I am not so
clear it would really achieve the stability that you are
looking for. And I think volatility plays a role in the
marketplace. It reflects the uncertainty that is out there.
And ultimately, the physical market brings the futures and
the paper market back down. It can�t get too far out of line
because of the arbitrage and the normal hedging that takes
place. So my own view is it probably wouldn�t reduce
volatility that much.
Dr. Yergin. Mr. Chairman, if I could add one other thing.
I think when I assumed that $10 to $15, I think we wouldn�t
say it is a speculative premium so much as a "security" or a
"fear" premium, because the President of Iran makes a very
apocalyptic statement, and I think that participants in the
market, whether they are traders, whether they are people
worrying about long-term supplies, what they are looking at
is it reflects the fear that maybe there will be a disruption,
and it may be more of a shortage. So I just wanted to
separate out the speculative from what is really driven by,
ultimately, a concern about the fundamental.
Chairman Barton. I understand that, but there is a
difference when an airline is using the futures market to
try to hedge the price of fuel or a producer who wants to
make sure they lock in a certain price for their product
than somebody who is just literally, "Well, I think the
price is going to go up. I think the price is going to go
down." And buying a futures contract purely on speculation.
They have no intention to use the contract for anything other
than to make or lose money. There is nothing wrong with
playing the markets to make or lose money, but this particular
commodity, at this particular time, if those participants in
the market are a larger percentage than normal, I think it is
a legitimate government function to consider raising the
margin requirement to make it more difficult to just purely
be speculative in the market.
Let us see. Mr. Gonzalez would be the senior Member here who
was here at the start of the bell.
Mr. Gonzalez. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
And I share with you the concerns regarding the investments by
pension funds and such and highly speculative investments, but
I do believe, and I will have to look at it, one of my
concerns was actually included in the Republican Pension
Reform Bill out of the House, which actually lowered the
threshold to allow these pension funds to get into the hedge
markets and investments. And so maybe we ought to have that
discussion on another day, but it is out there, and it is very
real. And I share your concerns.
My question. Mr. Caruso, when was the last time you testified
here? It wasn�t that long ago. A few months ago?
Mr. Caruso. Well, after the Katrina.
Mr. Gonzalez. And at that time, I think, you had some
projections or predictions on the price of gasoline. And I
believe you were right on until very recently. Do you remember
what your predictions were? I don�t have my notes. I just
remember you--
Mr. Caruso. I think last fall, we were looking at an average
gasoline price for the United States this year would be around
about $2.40. So we were lower than the way they are going
right now, largely because I think our crude price projection
was around $60, and now we are probably looking at $66 or $67.
Mr. Gonzalez. So a lot of what we do, government agencies,
departments, Members of Congress, when we look to the future,
this is something that really is not that predictable
depending on all of these other conditions?
Mr. Caruso. Correct.
Mr. Gonzalez. Yes. Because I mean, when we went back to our
district, we were telling them that basically government
officials were telling us, and you were actually right. I mean,
I was really surprised that you were that accurate at that
point in time. I hate to say that, you know, now your batting
average in the past couple of weeks is really bad.
Mr. Yergin, this is really amazing. You know, I come from
Texas, Mexican-American descent and such, and it is a
heartbreaker to think that PEMEX is not more than it can be.
Are there any estimate studies out there showing what the
potential output would be of Mexico and, of course, the Gulf
Coast? What would they be adding as far as the output? What
is the potential out there that is untapped, and for whatever
reason, may remain untapped?
Dr. Yergin. Well, the Mexican Oil Minister came to our
conference in Houston in February, and he presented this map of
the U.S. Gulf of Mexico, which showed lots of black points in
the U.S. sector of the Gulf of Mexico and almost none in the
Mexican sector. And yet, you can�t really believe that those
oil and gas resources just end at the boundary line, because
they were there a long time before the boundaries came in, so
I can�t put a number on it, but I think that Mexico could be
a substantially larger producer, which would be good for
Mexico, and it would be good for Mexico�s neighbors.
Mr. Gonzalez. The other thing is, as I think you pointed out,
the importance of our international policy and what we do
here domestically and how it impacts our relationships with
these particular oil-producing countries. We are involved in
a highly contentious immigration proposed legislation that
demonizes, in essence, the undocumented worker and the family
coming from Mexico and parts of Latin America. Do you see a
downside? Do you see any implication? Do you see any
consequences of that policy and its potential impact on our
relationship with any oil-producing country in that area?
Dr. Yergin. Well, I don�t know how this whole issue is
playing in Mexican politics. I think the issues over Mexico�s
oil, whether they open up their system or not, goes back to
the Mexican Revolution and to the nationalization of 1938,
which is one of the most important political events in
Mexico�s history. And I think that a lot will depend upon
who is elected this year in Mexico. As I think several
Members have remarked, there are a lot of adverse
geopolitical trends in the world, and certainly we have
seen a kind of clash now, or a conflict, in Latin America
between what you might call the hard left, return to
socialism, and the sort of center left as to how engaged
or not engaged to be with the world economy. And I think
how that plays out is something we haven�t been, as a
country, giving that much attention, except sporadically.
I think that, over the next few years, is something that
will loom more significantly.
Mr. Gonzalez. And one last question. First of all, and of
course, part of the House bill has a 700 mile-long wall
being built along the Mexican border. Should we be
considering an exception for pipelines just in case?
Dr. Yergin. That is--
Mr. Gonzalez. I am making jest, but this is--
Dr. Yergin. Mexico actually--
Ms. Bono. Would the gentleman yield for one second?
Mr. Gonzalez. No, I am actually going to be--
Ms. Bono. Oh, excuse me.
Mr. Gonzalez. But I do have a question.
If we send back $100 to all of the consumers out there, if
we have a windfall profit tax and we suspend the Federal
gasoline tax, and some States suspend it, what is the
implication? What is the real consequence to the consumer
out there when they are paying $3 for a gallon of gas? How
temporary is this fix? Is it really long term? What I
want to know is, is it practical and of any real
significance.
Dr. Yergin. I think the number one factor, there are other
domestic factors we have talked about, how specifications
come in, fuel changes, and the others like refining capacity.
But at the end of the day, it is the crude oil and the price
of crude oil that is really the largest determinant, and that
is determined in the world.
Mr. Whitfield. [Presiding.] The gentleman�s time has
expired. Thank you.
I will recognize myself now.
I was reading an article the other day, and it was talking
about that over the last year, Saudi Arabia had increased its
drilling rig count from 38 to 42. And it says that all four
of these have been contracted for offshore work, two for
work-overs and two for exploration. And it went on to say
that Saudi Arabia has been trying to get rigs from all over
the world and has not been successful, which raises this
question. One of you mentioned that in the 1980s, with
prices going down to $10 a barrel, and it is my understanding
that in the 1980s, although I was not particularly focused on
the oil business at that time, that big companies went out of
business, particularly oil and gas service companies that
failed to service, and that as a result of that, we lost a
lot of technical knowledge because a lot of people did not
go to engineering school for oil exploration and service,
and that there is a real lack of supply in that whole area
right now. And I would ask you all, would you agree with
that analysis? And if so, what kind of impact does that
have on prices?
Mr. Caruso. Well, I would absolutely agree with that. We
lost about two decades of supply of engineers and other
petroleum-skilled workers. And now, there is a shortage
everywhere you go, whether you are in Canada, in Saudi
Arabia, or in Texas. There is a real lack of skilled workers
in the petroleum industry, and that is definitely part of
this story in addition to the infrastructure that you
mentioned. The rigs availability are very tight. Steel is
very tight. Even cement for drilling. So the resource,
concerns in that story from chief executive officers, whether
it be a national oil company or an international oil company.
So it is absolutely a factor.
Mr. Whitfield. It seems like if you had the adequate reserves,
it would be very difficult, I mean, that the new market is just
so tight on this supply and the training personnel. It is a
significant issue.
Dr. Yergin. Yes. And it takes time to gear up. Academic
programs that crunched in and then collapsed are now expanding
again, but it takes time to put them back.
Mr. Whitfield. Right.
Dr. Yergin. So right now, you see very active hiring campaigns
in the industry, but it is a lot of hiring from each other as
they try and bring in more people and more equipment.
Mr. Whitfield. Right. Now my recollection was that during
Katrina, the United States lost, what, about 15 percent of its
refinery capacity. Is that the right number? Is it 10 to 15
percent?
Mr. Caruso. Yes. At one point, it was even higher than that,
but the sustained reduction in capacity was about 15 percent.
Mr. Whitfield. And on the production side, it was about one
million barrels a day. Is that corrected?
Mr. Caruso. Initially, 1.5 million, and even now, it is still
300,000 barrels a day.
Mr. Whitfield. Okay. And it is my understanding that also in
the spring is when refineries normally do their maintenance.
Is that correct or is that not correct?
Mr. Caruso. Well, there are different schedules. Sometimes
they are done in the fall or in the spring. What happened
this last six months is that many of the refineries deferred
the fall maintenance because of the amount of refineries
still down. They kept running and oftentimes pushing
capacity probably very hard, and therefore, there was a
large amount of deferred maintenance this spring that is
contributing to the current gasoline situation.
Mr. Whitfield. So that is definitely having an effect
because this spring, they are having to do more because
of the push in the fall?
Mr. Caruso. Yes.
Mr. Whitfield. Okay. Now it is my understanding that in
order to refine heavy, sour crude, it is much more
difficult than it is light, sweet crude. That is correct,
isn�t it?
Mr. Caruso. Yes.
Mr. Whitfield. And I have heard that in order to do heavy,
sour crude, that you have to have retooling of the U.S.
refineries. What does that refer to? Retooling? What
does that mean?
Mr. Caruso. Well, the U.S. refineries are among the most
sophisticated in the world, so we have more ability to
convert heavy, sour crude into the product slates we need.
It is not enough. We need more. We are probably importing
about 1.5 million barrels a day of gasoline this summer.
So we need more conversion capacity to deal with this heavier,
sour crude slate. But it is critically important in places
like China where they have been relying on their own
domestic crudes for so many years, and those were lighter
and sweeter. Now they are having to input heavier, sour
crude, and they don�t have the capability to turn it into
diesel fuel and gasoline, and that is what is putting a lot
of pressure on light crudes and is why Nigeria is so
important. Nigeria produces light, sweet crude. A lot of
it was going to China. And the diminution of Nigerian
production is really affecting this factor.
Mr. Whitfield. One last question.
Which country is producing the most heavy, sour crude?
Mr. Caruso. I would say Saudi Arabia.
Mr. Whitfield. Saudi Arabia?
Mr. Caruso. Yes.
Dr. Yergin. Some of the Mexican grades are also at that
quality, some of the Venezuelan, then Saudi, and some of
the other Middle Easterns. So they have a range of
grades, but the spare capacity that does exist in Saudi
Arabia is primarily this heavier, sour crude for which
there is not the refining capacity around the world, not
just in the United States, to convert it into gasoline or
diesel.
Mr. Whitfield. Yes. Okay. Thank you very much.
My time has expired. I will recognize Mr. Green from
Texas.
Mr. Green. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Caruso, and
Mr. Yergin. And I apologize for not being here. This is
the biggest issue we are getting calls on, more than
immigration and the other issue.
I note in your opening statement you talked about,
Mr. Caruso, the loss of the gasoline supply and the impact
it will have in the ethanol we need to replace it,
particularly in areas like Houston. It is a non-attainment
area, and it has cleaned up our air since 1991 and 1992
when we first started using it. And again, I just heard
yesterday that the President was talking about relieving
the imports that our ethanol market production can ramp up.
My concern is that I want to make sure we produce, in our
own country, whether it is oil or not. I would love to
drill for oil and then refine it in our own country
instead of again depending on other parts of the world
where stability is always in question.
For both of you on the change from MTBE to ethanol, and
I know, Mr. Yergin, I heard you say something about that
you thought that the change would not have any impact
some time during the summer. That may be a bit optimistic,
but I would like you to say it again.
Dr. Yergin. Right. Well, I think that you did see that the
refining industry has a lot of resilience, too. It is a tough
transition because you needed to change the suppliers; you
weren�t using chemical companies anymore. You were getting
ethanol from corn. You couldn�t ship it in pipelines, so you
had to ship it in trucks and railway cars. And then you don�t
blend it at the refinery. You blended it at the terminal. So
you get all of those things. You are basically changing your
whole, what they call, the supply chain, and you are doing it
when you have all of these other problems. But it looks like
maybe a little optimistic, but I would think in 4 or 5 weeks
before people really hit the roads, that changeover will be
complete.
Mr. Green. You do think we need to delay or eliminate the
import fees for ethanol from other countries?
Dr. Yergin. Well, I know the Brazilians feel passionately on
that subject, since there is a 54 cent-a-gallon import fee on
it. And it would be interesting to see, as we get up against
the limits of domestic with conventional ethanol production,
whether there will be a drive to allow some more ethanol into
the country, if that is the objective. And, you know, we
never thought of Brazil before as an energy power, but it is
on the basis of ethanol. It has the leadership.
Mr. Green. Again, on the import, as long as we need it, until
we ramp up, because like I said earlier, I would like to have
an ethanol refinery somewhere, which we don�t have on the
Texas Gulf Coast, but we do refine a lot of gasoline. But we
also need that reformulated gas in the Houston market. So we
will have to have it somewhere there. And of course, we could
import it on the short term, but I would much rather produce
it there, because that is what we do historically is produce
energy.
How does the instability in oil-producing nations today
compare with some of the worst times in history, such as the
Arab oil boycott? And what are some of the major
international developments that could bring down or further
increase the price of oil, one way or the other? I mean,
obvious ones are continued problems in Nigeria and, of course,
Iran, even though we don�t import it from Iran. It still
affects the price.
Dr. Yergin. You know, people note that 25 years ago the oil
and gold prices were both the highest they have been for
25 years, and you say, "Oh, what was happening 25 years ago?
Oh, it was Iran." And you know, here we are again. So my
sense is that how this confrontation between Iran and the
international community is going to play out, no one has a
very good handle on it at all, so I think that shadow is
going to be over the oil market for some time.
Nigeria, I think, and this goes back to the question that was
asked of Guy about his forecast, I don�t think anybody really
saw, including the Nigerian government, this insurgency in the
delta, which had its big impact. It sort of just started
sporadically in January or February and suddenly went up in
scale. And after the workers were taken hostage and threatened
and people killed, people withdrew their workers in that area,
and we are seeing the impact of that. You look around the
world and those are two things we are focused on. And looking
around the world, where else are there issues that maybe won�t
have the same scale of importance, but could add to the pressure
right now? So on the one hand, you see maybe we are seeing a
demand response, which takes the pressure off, but on the other
hand, where is the next problem going to come from that might
take out another couple hundred thousand barrels a day. And I
think the other thing that, of course, everybody is worried
about, is hurricane season begins in a month.
Mr. Green. That is right.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Hall. [Presiding.] Thank you.
And they tell me I am next for questions. Since I have the
gavel, I will take their word for it.
Mr. Yergin, in your testimony, you discussed the peak oil
theory, but you didn�t subscribe to that theory. You site
unconventional resources as part of the reason why. Can you
give some examples historically of technologies that were
considered non-conventional? And the one I am really kind of
leaning toward is the ultra deep amendment that is in the
energy bill that this Chairman passed really after 10 years
of trial by Chairman in this committee to write an energy
bill. We finally wrote one that is accepted and the President
signed. And now, there is some movement away from some parts
of that, the ultra deep being part of it that I think is a
major part of that bill and a major answer to some of our
needs for gas in the future from the depths of the Gulf and
shut-in places. But your ideas on R&D programs for oil and
gas, how shortsighted it would be to cut funding to such
research, I would just like to hear your opinion on that.
Dr. Yergin. Sure. Well, I think on resources, as you were
asking the question, I was thinking about coal bed methane,
which about 15 years ago was considered something really
exotic and now, Guy, you might know what the percentage is--
Mr. Caruso. Ten percent.
Dr. Yergin. It is now 10 percent of our natural gas supply.
So that is an example of something that has moved into the
mainstream. And people often forget that the oil industry is
really a gas industry, a pretty high-tech industry. Actually,
a good example, I mentioned the SEC reserves disclosures.
When those were put into effect at the end of the 1970s, the
deep water frontier was all of 600 feet. Today it is 12,000
feet. It is remarkable to think of drilling through 12,000
feet of water and another 12,000 feet underground. And I
think there is now growing excitement about exploration going
on in the ultra deep water and that it might be a very
significant contribution, and not just in the United States,
but around the world.
Mr. Hall. And the technology is there for the asking, but it
is expensive and it takes some supporting. And it is doubtful
that the big oil companies are going to do it. They haven�t.
I think in the ultra deep amendment, we provided, I think,
$100 million a year for 10 years on it, and then we got that
cut in two, but it was still $50 million. That is not anything
to turn down, if you don�t say $100 million or not, which they
probably could get. But that is now being looked at very
closely by the Secretary as maybe whiting that out from the
bill. And although he signed the bill less than, I don�t know
how long ago, just several months ago. So we are talking to
him and urging him, friendly persuasion to look that over
really carefully, because research and development, that is
more an R&D bill, actually, than it is an energy bill, because
it allows us to go to the depths. As you say, there are depths
that we can know, and we know it is there. Known reserves are
there. We don�t have the ability today to get them, but
cooperating with universities and others who do have that
knowledge and input, we can get them and pay for the program
with what we get, and if we don�t get it, it is going to stay
in the Gulf, and we are not going to get it. So it doesn�t
cost the taxpayers anything. And that is the beauty of it.
And I have passed that last 4 years as a Democrat four times
and a Republican the last time. And you have seen the bill,
and I am hoping that will stay in there. But that is part of
what you alluded to, is it not?
Dr. Yergin. Well, I think in general we need a constancy and
consistency on research and development. And some years ago,
I chaired a task force for the Energy Department on Energy
Research and Development, and I came to the obvious conclusion
the reason you call it research and development is because you
don�t know. And if you knew, it wouldn�t be R&D. And a large,
wide portfolio and constancy is a really important part of it.
Mr. Hall. And your reference to Nigeria is very timely, as a
matter of fact, though it is not new. The problems in Nigeria
that American businesses have had with Nigeria in the 1960s.
And you know, they had a way of raiding. They would give you
all of the political help and the bank would be guaranteed on
a percentage basis. And always Nigeria had the worst percent,
because you could send the press over there. If you sent it
FOB, they would learn to unload it. So we got to where we had
to put it in the channel in Houston to get our money. Nigeria
is just not a country that you really want to deal with, but
they are so rich in so many things that we need. And you know
of the unrest there and the recent militant group that seized
hostages and I think you said 550,000 barrels per day.
Dr. Yergin. Yes.
Mr. Hall. What is the United States to do to relieve the
tensions in Nigeria? If the instability continues, is it going
to lead to further losses? I guess that is pretty obvious, but
let me hear your thoughts on that.
Dr. Yergin. Guy, do you--
Mr. Hall. Or Mr. Caruso. When I said you were so intelligent,
I didn�t mean to exclude Mr. Caruso. I just don�t know him as
well as I know you.
Dr. Yergin. As you say, the problems in Nigeria have been
endemic in that country: the regional conflict, the poverty,
the ethnic conflict, and the poverty in the delta region.
There has been, in the last several years, an effort to really
reduce corruption, which was quite sensitive, and that has
been, I think, part of where this conflict is coming from. And
now, at least part of the conflict seems to be also about
whether President Obasanjo is going to run for a third term or
not. And that is something that will ultimately be decided in
Nigeria.
I think there is a role, as we think about energy security,
the supply chain, the infrastructure and working with countries
as we are with countries in the Cascan Sea. We could be working
with them in the Gulf of Guinea to help with issues of physical
security, given the kind of volatilities that are so evident.
Mr. Hall. I think my time has expired, and I thank both of you
men for your input.
Mr. Stupak is next for 5 minutes.
Mr. Stupak. Thank you.
Dr. Yergin, some of your answers bring up the possibility that
current price changes can be attributed to speculation on the
potential for global instability rather than actual supply
changes. In his written testimony, Mr. Caruso, and we have
talked about it before, refers to this as the "fear" or "risk"
premium. While Mr. Caruso seems to discount this argument, I
am curious to hear your opinion on this issue. Are energy
speculators, causing high prices at the pump by taking
advantage of the fears, as we mentioned Iran, Nigeria, and
Bolivia here this morning? But how does that affect the
future of gas supplies?
Dr. Yergin. Well, as I said, I think the leading speculator
on oil prices today is probably the President of Iran. If you
plot the statements by the Iranian officials over the last
month and the reaction in the oil prices, you see that people
are worried and they are taking them seriously. What I wanted
to say, and I think Guy Caruso made the point, is that there is
an underestimation of the significance of the loss of Nigeria
and what a big impact that is having at this particular time
because the market is so tight. And I think that I have
trouble differentiating between what are called speculators and
the kind of general pervasive fear and anxiety in the market
about whether there is going to be more serious disruption.
The issue of Iran�s nuclear program is, I think, both very
serious and very perplexing.
Mr. Stupak. So even the real fear that we may have, which is,
again, speculation, if you will, and Nigeria might be a little
bit more of a concrete example, but there is a "speculative"
or a "fear" premium?
Dr. Yergin. I would call it a "fear" or a "risk." As I think
I said in my remarks, Nigeria, currently, is down 550,000
barrels a day.
Mr. Stupak. Right.
Dr. Yergin. In 2003, it was down over 800,000 barrels a day.
So those who are experienced and knowledgeable are going to say,
"Is this going to spread the threats to other companies?" Some
bombs have been set off and so forth. If we were to lose
another 300,000 barrels a day without some corresponding give
somewhere else in terms of additional supplies or demand
response, I think we would see prices higher than what they are
today. It is a very tricky situation.
Going back to spare capacity, we think that the spare capacity
situation will improve over the next year or two, but right
now, we are still in a very narrow band.
Mr. Stupak. Okay. Mr. Caruso, as I continue to learn more
about this OTC, over-the-counter trading of energy derivatives,
I haven�t been able to find anyone who can tell me exactly how
much of this trading is going on. Does the EIA, or any other
Federal agency, have any way of knowing how to calculate how
big these markets are, the OTC market?
Mr. Caruso. If there was, it would probably be the Commodities
Futures Trading Commission.
Mr. Stupak. Okay. And I know they are up next.
Mr. Caruso. And I think Mr. Levin may be able to answer that
question. They certainly track the regulated markets very
closely, every week, you know, what the long positions are and
how much were by speculators versus non-speculators. But the
OTC, I am not familiar with.
Mr. Stupak. Okay. Mr. Yergin, it seems like once a month we
get some kind of reason for these prices going up. And we made
mention here this morning, even the hurricane season is going to
be starting now, so that is another fear factor, which, again,
can drive up the price of oil, at least a barrel of oil, correct?
Dr. Yergin. Yes. I think that what we will probably see is any
time a hurricane starts building up, and particularly if the
weather reports say it is going to bypass Florida and hit in
this central area of the Gulf, before anything happens, you will
see people, particularly if it is towards the end of the week,
putting up the price. And then when we see where it goes and
what the impact is, the price comes off. But I think it will
really register in a way that it really hasn�t registered before.
Mr. Stupak. Sure. Mr. Caruso.
Mr. Caruso. There is a linkage between fear and the physical
market and that is what we are seeing now--crude oil
inventories being built up, because companies are worried that
if there is a disruption, they want to have enough physical
supply, so there is a linkage between the physical and the
futures.
Mr. Stupak. We are going to live through a hurricane season
every year and go through a summer driving season every year.
We go through Iran�s instability every 10 years. There are all
of these others. I would think by now the market would figure
this out and be a little bit more stable when it comes to this,
but it is really not in their best interest, in a way, as long
as you have speculators who will use this risk factor or fear
factor to drive up the price.
Dr. Yergin. Well, let me say, I think what has happened the
last 2 years with hurricanes has made a change in psychology
that was not anticipated. We created, in the 1970s, this
energy security machinery to deal with a disruption in the
Middle East, and we ended up having to deal with a disruption
in the Gulf of Mexico. And I think that we entered a new
period with the election of the new Iranian President last June,
and Iran going from sort of finessing and being ambiguous about
what it is doing, if anything to being over-explicit and
threatening and the type of statements that are being made. So
I think people have trouble seeing how this is actually going to
play out.
Mr. Stupak. Okay.
Dr. Yergin. I mean, what kind of resolution is there going to
be?
Mr. Caruso. Yes. I think you hit, really, the crux of what is
going on here and that is why do we really have such volatility.
And the reason I think you have that volatility is it takes only
small changes in either supply or demand, regardless of the
reason, in a market that is so finely balanced to lead to large
changes in price. And once, somehow, we relieve that tightness,
whether it is on the demand side or the supply side, and you,
certainly have been debating that, that is the only way we are
going to change this point you just made.
Mr. Stupak. Thank you.
Mr. Shimkus. [Presiding.] The gentleman�s time has expired.
And I will recognize myself for 8 minutes.
And it has really been a great hearing, and I appreciate your
time and effort on this debate. I have been taking notes and
listening, and the thing that frustrates me about the energy
debate is we departmentalize energy. Here is an example. My
first trip to Iraq, I visited their power plant there in
Baghdad. It is called Al Durra, and it burns crude oil. High
sulfur crude oil is what they used. I am assuming they still
do. And it is dirty. And it is probably very inefficient.
But in the public�s debate of energy, we like to
compartmentalize it to electricity generation or we like to
compartmentalize it to fuel. And it is not always the case
where if they had nuclear power abilities or coal generation or
solar generation they could decrease that reliance on the crude
oil, and maybe that could be used in the world market. I was
interested in, Mr. Yergin, your analysis, and you were very
diplomatic. Can it be said that the exchanges in these foreign
countries and governments, Venezuela, Russia, even in Mexico, a
movement to the hard left or the populist arena already
threatens the ability for the world crude oil markets, is that
correct?
Dr. Yergin. Well, it may not threaten to disrupt, but it
changes the balance in the world crude oil market. It adds to
the tension in the market. And unbalanced, it
constrains supply.
Mr. Shimkus. What does it do to the investment and development?
Dr. Yergin. Well, I think that the Russian government has $200
billion in reserves now when it had almost none in 1998. And I
think they are not feeling the pressure for revenues and are
very focused on consolidating control of its energy sector.
Certainly, what an international company is going to go and do
investment into--
Mr. Shimkus. Eight minutes is a lot of time, but it is not
going to be very long. What do we expect to happen to the
Bolivian natural gas fields? Do we expect more efficient
production or do we expect less efficient production and, in
essence, no future development?
Dr. Yergin. Well, I think the southern part of Latin America is
suffering from gas shortage. This would aggravate the gas
shortage. There would be less investment. It will operate
less efficiently. The gas, which could be monetized and
provide revenues for the Bolivian people, to help the poorest
nation in Latin America be less poor, will not be forthcoming
to the same degree. And I think Brazil is going to be looking
for alternatives to Bolivia unless there is some resolution of
this.
Mr. Shimkus. And I really appreciate your ten points. And I
scribbled them down. I said, "Well, I haven�t looked at your
statement and your testimony." You are saying those who fail
to plan, plan to fail. And I think it pretty safe to say that
those of us who are market-based individuals, the Government
does incentivize or not and a lot of us come to a lot of
reasons. We have, in the energy sector, and I am saying that
as a broad term, not just to crude oil, but we have not
incentivized the development of energy opportunities.
You know, your first point is diversification of supply. And
so I am looking at what we have done recently to try to do
diversification of supplies. And renewables come to mind. I
have been talking extensively on coal-to-liquid development.
I don�t think we mentioned that at all in any of the comments
I have heard so far. Over to technology, level of applications,
South Africa doing it, and no looking at locations in the United
States to provide that, taking conversion. You all know all of
this debate. But that has an opportunity to positively affect
additional supply, at the United States� internal security
applications. Also, the President�s initiative FutureGen,
which is again using coal, near-zero emissions, addressing some
of the environmental concerns. As you put in other points in
your testimony, the energy markets are international markets.
FutureGen realizes this, and that is why FutureGen is not only a
U.S. Government operation, but it is private sector with our
major energy companies like Southern Company, Console Energy,
Peabody, along with companies from the international arena in
Australia and China. Because as you have stated, they are
going to be consumers. They are going to be using coal. Now
we are united in this search. The President�s initiative on
GNEP is another proposal to start addressing the electricity
future demands and how we, as an international community, can
address the nuclear fuel issue, the reprocessing issue, the
storage issue, and get as an international organization. I
mean, I have scribbled notes all over this place about
coal-to-liquid and how some of the plans that we have in place
could affect this whole international debate. But the
difficulty is in politics 101, all politics being local, high
gas prices, politicians are scared, and because of that, we
have to do something and hence we have these hearings and we
try to find some culprit. Our job is, really, to look over
the horizon so that we are not identified as folks that don�t
plan for the future.
Having said that, to look over the horizon, you offer a very
clear, 10-point agenda. And I would encourage my colleagues
to help look at that as a way and slip in some of the proposals
that we have right now, like GNEP, FutureGen, coal-to-liquid
development in that equation and look at legislative responses
to help bring those to fruition.
Dr. Yergin, can you comment on any of that?
Dr. Yergin. I realize that you all are engaged in this enormous
pressure from constituents, very justifiably so. But standing
back one step from it, I am struck by some larger elements of
consensus that I think I see, although maybe you all don�t feel
it on the floor. One is of an embrace of energy efficiency
across the spectrum. The second, a recognition that we really
do need to widen our options and choices. And I think, as you
say, basically widening the definition of what we mean by oil
or liquids is really whether it is gas to liquids, whether it
is oil sand or it is ultra-deep water, whether it is coal to
liquids, which we note the increased interest. Those are all
counterbalances to the instability and the pressures in the
international market. They are not going to provide answers
quickly. And of course, with gas prices, the pressures are
very difficult. And it does require keeping one�s balance.
Probably half of the people in this room remember the gas
lines, and the other half think they remember gas lines
because they have seen the photographs. But in fact, those
gas lines in the 1970s were self-inflicted because of
regulations and controls. And we should keep in mind the value
of the flexibility of our system and that things will change.
I would just say the first Congressional hearing I could find
for high gasoline prices when I was researching "the prize" was
in 1923, when it was going to go to $1 a gallon and within
4 years, it went from $1 a gallon to 10 cents a gallon. So I
suspect that in a couple of years, the picture, just as it
looks very different now than it did 2 years ago, will look
different again. And I think if we can keep the consistency of
the view about widening that diversification, that is something
that is an essential goal work of security for our country.
Mr. Shimkus. Thank you.
I am going to end, but Mr. Caruso, I am just going to throw this
out. If you could get back to me, because of time. I don�t
really need you to answer it now.
But can you tell me if you have done analysis of the available
coal reserves in the United States, and what would that
translate into barrels of crude oil and the lifetime of that if
we really effectively moved to coal-to-liquid technologies and
helped incentivize that? And having those numbers could help
me in my crusade here to encourage my colleagues to really look
at that as an assistance, not total salvation, but obviously an
assistance in this debate.
Now I would like to turn my colleague from Maine, Mr. Allen, for
5 minutes.
Mr. Allen. We will get it right. Thank you. Thank you,
Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Caruso, you are the Administrator of the world�s most
advanced energy data system. The EIA sets the standard for
global efforts to improve the understanding of our complex,
evolving global oil market. In fact, the International Energy
Agency depends on EIA�s data on imported oil prices. They have
recently been warning of a looming crisis in the compilation of
energy data, which, they feel, could sway world oil and natural
gas prices and affect the planning of the bigger energy
producers.
Oil companies have posted record profits. The public is out
there saying maybe these oil markets aren�t working. And there
are concerns about the ability of oil-producing nations to
respond to the demand that is increasing here and in China and
India. So the information is very important. And that is why
I am puzzled by your decision to suspend collecting domestic
and foreign crude oil price surveys, at least certain of those.
These surveys collect information used both domestically and
internationally to track and inform oil markets. The Federal
government relies on this data for a variety of purposes,
including Federal land leasing evaluations, tax assessments,
and the evaluation of current and future policies, such as
royalty payments. With crude oil prices reaching $75 a barrel
and growing public demand for increased transparency in oil
markets, it seems to me we are in no position to eliminate this
vital government data collection and market analysis.
So I wonder if you could explain to the committee precisely why
you decided to discontinue the domestic and imported crude oil
price surveys. And the ones I am talking about, EIA-182,
domestic crude oil first purchase report, and the EIA-856, the
monthly foreign crude oil acquisition report.
Mr. Caruso. Thank you.
Yes, those two surveys are among the 30 surveys that we do for
oil and gas weekly, monthly, and annually. And it was a tough
decision, largely based on the budgetary resources available,
and that was in our submission to the Appropriations Committee
in February of 2005 that, given the budgetary appropriation that
was being requested, it would mean that we would have to take a
hard look at everything we do in order to maintain total
quality of all of EIA�s data collection. And those two surveys
were a lesser priority than the other surveys that are being
done. So we said in our budget submission that if we got a
certain amount of money, we would have to drop those two
surveys. And we just felt they were less important than other
things we are doing. And we are continuing to collect price
data. So those aren�t the only surveys for collecting that data.
Now I realize that some of the users that you mentioned would
suffer from the lack of that data, and we are certainly willing
to look into seeing whether there is any way to meet the
requirements.
Mr. Allen. You are not saying that those two surveys are
unimportant, I take it?
Mr. Caruso. They are not unimportant, at all.
Mr. Allen. They would be useful in trying to understand the
global oil markets?
` Mr. Caruso. That is correct. And it was a reluctant but
tough budgetary decision.
Mr. Allen. Well, I am not on the Appropriations Committee,
Mr. Caruso, but to me, I would say that in this kind of climate,
when the Government stops producing data that would be helpful
to people trying to understand these markets, it seems to me to
be a mistake, and I hope you do better this year before the
Appropriations Committee.
But in the time I have got left, very quickly, I think you
said, and correct me if I am wrong, Mr. Caruso, between 2007
and 2010, demand will exceed the excess production capacity in
the world?
Mr. Caruso. What I said was that we do see productive capacity
growing to the point where we might have three to five million
barrels a day of spare capacity by 2010.
Mr. Allen. Okay. So the productive capacity is growing at a
rate of--
Mr. Caruso. Yes.
Mr. Allen. And that is the capacity. There are some big
questions, as I understand, about reserves, global reserves.
We also have some issues about whether or not the authorities
are reporting and giving us accurate information.
Mr. Caruso. Yes, there are a lot of issues, but the biggest one
is converting those reserves into productive capacity.
Mr. Allen. Right. Thank you. With that, I will yield back.
Mr. Shimkus. I thank my colleague for being very punctual.
And I would like to recognize now my friend from Tennessee,
Mrs. Blackburn, for 5 minutes.
Mrs. Blackburn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you all for being so patient with us this morning.
I would like to stay on the capacity issue, Mr. Caruso. In
your testimony and a couple of times in answering questions, you
talked about world refining capacity and the utilization rate
being at 90 percent compared to 85 percent in 2002. And you
have also touched a little bit on the margin of the error and
the gas prices can be affected a little bit by an outage. And
we have had some debates. We had a bill on the floor yesterday
that would have streamlined some of the issues dealing with
refineries and getting them on the books and then in the ground
and up and running. And Mr. Bass has been very involved in
this issue, so I am asking this question for myself and for
Mr. Bass, because he had to go to the floor and handle our
amendment.
Now the U.S. capacity, are we higher or lower than the
worldwide number?
Mr. Caruso. Our utilization rate is higher than the world. We
will probably average about 95 or maybe 96 percent this summer.
Mrs. Blackburn. Ninety-five to 96?
Mr. Caruso. Yes. Compared to a world of about 90.
Mrs. Blackburn. Okay. Then considering that we have that
higher utilization number, is there not an economic incentive
for more companies to either build new refineries or expand
their current capacity?
Mr. Caruso. Yes, I think we have now seen 3 years in a row
where we have had very good margins of profitability, and
this is definitely having an impact on investment plans. And
a number of companies have announced plans for expansion of
capacity at existing plants. And we think that could be as
much as 1.5 million barrels a day.
Mrs. Blackburn. One and a half million barrels a day?
Mr. Caruso. Yes.
Mrs. Blackburn. Okay. And then specifically to one of
Mr. Bass�s concerns, if we speed that capacity up, how quickly
do you think we could fill that? I mean, is it going to be
filled as soon as we can get something in the ground and
operating? Or Dr. Yergin, you may have an estimate on that,
also. Either of you.
Mr. Caruso. Well, I guess it goes back to how long it takes to
put a project together and get a permit. It depends. We are
talking about additions to existing capacity, right?
Mrs. Blackburn. That is correct.
Mr. Caruso. So what is that? A 2 or 3 year process?
Dr. Yergin. Minimum.
Mrs. Blackburn. And we are trying to streamline that.
Yesterday, we had a bill on the floor that did not pass that
would have streamlined that permitting process, and we are
looking at the availability of the product at the retail level
and having it available to consumers for usage and the refinery
capacity and the way it plays into that. So any time that we are
looking at 95 to 96 capacity, I think your points are well taken,
because as you have previously said, as you take places down for
maintenance, for routine maintenance, for scheduled maintenance,
to go in and change the equipment so that it is more
environmentally-friendly. And as I mentioned in my opening
statement, environmental goals were set in place in the
permitting bill we had on the floor yesterday. It would have
sped the process. And from what I am hearing you say, speeding
that process would yield us the results that we need, which is
a greater supply.
Mr. Caruso. I would agree: the speedier the better.
Mrs. Blackburn. Okay. All right. Well, I know we have
another panel. We want to get to them, and we are going to have
votes, so I will stop with that one question. I have three
others for you, Dr. Yergin, and four for you, Mr. Caruso, and I
will submit those to you. But thank you for your patience
today. We appreciate it.
Mr. Caruso. Thank you.
Mr. Shimkus. Thank you.
And for the record, my colleague is correct. The vote did not
pass on a super majority basis, but it did receive a vote of
237 to 188, and we expect to bring that permitting bill back to
the floor under a rule and pass it with a simple majority.
So with that, I turn to my colleague from the State of
Washington, Mr. Inslee, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Inslee. Thank you.
It is my understanding that production of oil in Iraq has been
down in the magnitude of 900,000 barrels per day. This follows
the invasion of Iraq decision by the President. The question
is, did the President�s decision to invade Iraq contribute in
some way to the increase in fuel prices that Americans are now
experiencing by disrupting Iraqi oil production and decreasing
the supply?
Mr. Caruso. The Iraqi production, as we have it right now, is
about 1.9 million barrels a day.
Mr. Inslee. I think it was about 2.6 million prior to the
invasion. So my question is it reduced oil production. It did
not achieve the foretold result of actually deadening oil
production, what we were told that is a possibility with Iraq,
after the invasion. Did the invasion of Iraq, at the request
of President George Bush, reduce oil supplies, whereby, in some
fashion, contributing to the increase of oil prices and gas
prices that Americans are now experiencing? I think a yes or
no could work pretty well.
Mr. Caruso. Well, there are a lot of factors that have
contributed to the oil price, and that is one of them.
Mr. Inslee. Okay. So the answer is yes. And on the supply
side, one of the President�s big decisions, reduced supply and
increased the costs that my constituents are now paying.
Now I am going to ask you about the demand side. When I got my
degree in economics, supply and demand was a big deal for
4 years of my life. And both are important.
So on the demand side, for the 5 years of this President�s
presidency, there have been efforts in the U.S. Congress to
decrease demand by increasing the efficiency of the passenger
cars that we drive. And in fact, the efficiency of the cars we
drive have actually reduced since the time President Bush took
the oath of office. And I will add, that has been the case for
several situations, several terms. But the President has
resisted to improving mileage for passenger cars, which he has
the statutory authority to do to improve the mileage of our
cars, something that was very successful in the late 1970s and
early 1980s where we increased our mileage by at least
60 percent, and had we continue increasing our mileage, we
would actually be free of the Persian Gulf oil today.
So the President has not used the authority he has had, and
has resisted efforts, in this Congress, to improve the mileage
of the cars we drive. Is it fair to say that the President�s
resistance, to date, to improving the efficiency of our cars,
thereby decreasing demand, has also contributed to the increase
in costs that Americans are paying today for the price of a
gallon of gasoline?
Mr. Caruso. Well, I think there are a lot of factors in the
gasoline demand increase. I am not a policymaker, so I
wouldn�t want to comment.
Mr. Inslee. Well, let me stretch your job classification just
a little bit. And there are a lot of factors in this. I am
just asking about a couple of them. If you believe, as I do,
that auto efficiency will, to some degree, reduce demands,
driving the same amount of miles for less gasoline, and a
safe and handy way to do it, and I drive a car that gets 50
miles to the gallon. If you make that assumption, how has
the President�s decision failed to help at all increase the
efficiency of our passenger cars, has that contributed in
some way to the price of gasoline?
Dr. Yergin. Did you say you drive a car that gets 50 miles
to the gallon?
Mr. Inslee. Right.
Mr. Caruso. What are you driving?
Mr. Inslee. A Prius. And I am looking forward to some of our
domestic folks getting involved. And by the way, there is
some good news on that. I read that GM is now looking at a
dual drivetrain for a hybrid that could be a great entry in
this.
So let me still ask this question. Just, you know, simple.
Has it contributed, the President�s failure to move on
efficiency? Has it contributed, at least some way, to the
increase in the price of gasoline? Give it your best shot.
Mr. Caruso. Well, I think the President has done a number of
other things to deal with the efficiency side of things.
Dr. Yergin. Let me say that the two most important things we
did in energy policy in the 1970s that had an immediate effect,
one was the fuel efficiency standards on the demand side, and
the other was the building of the Alaska oil pipeline. They
each contributed about the equivalent of two million barrels
a day. And I think I hear when gas was cheap, there was not
much of a drive to change the fuel efficiency. People bought
SUVs and didn�t think about it. That is obviously very
different now. And high prices have sent a very powerful and
painful message to American automobile makers, among others.
And I think, one way or the other, we are going to get a more
efficient automobile fleet. It may not get up to your 50 miles
per gallon for everybody, but I think we will get to more
efficient cars. And when you look not just at the United
States, but if you look at China and you look at India and
other countries, you see that a greater efficiency in
transportation is really a global priority.
Mr. Inslee. I have a lot of questions, but thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Shimkus. I thank my colleague.
Now I would like to recognize the gentleman from Massachusetts,
Mr. Markey, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Markey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Yergin, reading through your testimony, I was struck by the
fact that the United States has actually added 2.2 million
barrels a day in refinery capacity over the last dozen years,
which, as you note, is the equivalent of adding ten new good-
sized refineries. Now it has been suggested by some in the
Administration and in the Majority that U.S. environmental
and permitting laws are somehow an obstacle to refinery
capacity expansion. But your testimony suggests that the oil
companies have been able to build the equivalent of ten large
refineries over the last dozen years without overriding
environmental or local zoning permitting requirements.
So would you agree that we don�t need to change our
environmental laws or override State and local land use rules
in order to expand refinery capacity?
Dr. Yergin. Congressman Markey, I don�t know. I didn�t read
the legislation that was voted upon yesterday, so I can�t
address that specifically. The increase in capacity, what
I am struck by, is focusing on the number of refineries rather
than capacity. And in terms of capacity, that is a substantial
increase. It is, of course, not building new refineries, but
is the expansion and deep bottlenecking and so forth on
existing sites. And there are plans to continue to add
increasing capacity to existing sites. A critical question is,
at some point, where will new refineries be built? Will they
be built here in the United States, or will we be importing
more product from other countries?
Mr. Markey. I also see that on page nine of your testimony,
although often presented solely as a U.S. problem, inadequate
refining capacity is, in fact, a global phenomenon. What are
the factors that have led to this global refinery capacity
problem so that we can get it out of the context of just U.S.
environmental laws and the committee can understand this
situation?
Dr. Yergin. I think there are two big things. One, the
European prices for motor fuels have been biased in favor of
diesel over gasoline, and so there has been this
extraordinary explosion in diesel cars. Half of the new cars
in Europe, 70 percent of the new cars in continental Europe
are diesel, and the refining system does not support that.
The second thing is that because of the Asian financial
crisis, refinery developments in Asia were held up. And so
Asia is short of refining capacity. In both cases, it is
short of the complex refinery, what Mr. Caruso called the
sophisticated refining capacity to turn out diesel. This is
adding to the picture on making things like Nigerian oil more
valuable in the marketplace. And if we look on a global
basis, diesel demand is growing more rapidly than gasoline.
So that is the global context, and the United States is part of
this global market.
Mr. Markey. Which, of course, has nothing to do with the U.S.
environmental laws?
Dr. Yergin. That is right. It has to do with what is
happening there.
Mr. Markey. Across the board. Thank you.
And, as you know, Newt Gingrich and the Republican Congress,
beginning in 1995, prohibited the Department of Transportation
and their part in promulgating new fuel economy standards, and
for the last 6 years, they have sat on their hands and refused
to promulgate new fuel economy standards that could have
dramatically increased the overall fleet average, including
SUVs and light trucks. What kind of a difference would it have
made if the same kind of progress that we have made from 1975
to 1986 had been made over the last 12 years in terms of
increasing the fuel economy standards?
Dr. Yergin. Well, I haven�t calculated that. Certainly, one
reason we went from a very tight oil market in the early 1970s,
which I should say that the oil market today is even tighter
than it was then, but a very tight oil market to that huge
surplus that Mr. Caruso described was, among other things, not
only the switching from oil and electric generation, but the
fuel efficiency standards. I think fuel efficiency standards
in the United States and around the world would have a big
impact. I think it is always a question whether you do it
through regulation, whether you do it through, I hate to use
that word, a gasoline tax, or some other way, or some mixture
of them, but one way or the other, it certainly seems this
country is going to move towards greater efficiency in our
transportation.
Mr. Markey. You said that we saved about two million barrels
of oil.
Dr. Yergin. Yes, in 1973 and sort of the early 1980s.
Mr. Markey. Would that have been possible again if we had made
the same progress on fuel economy standards in the past
12 years? Or would that have been possible?
Dr. Yergin. Well, I think I would have to calculate it out.
The other thing that has happened, of course, particularly when
gasoline prices were low, and it is quite striking, and I think
Mr. Caruso could say, the number of miles that Americans drive
has increased quite substantially over the 5 or 6 years, and so
that is a factor there, too. But I think that greater
efficiency, if you are talking about greater efficiency being
important, there is no place where it has a bigger immediate
impact than in transportation.
Mr. Markey. Okay. Thank you.
Mr. Shimkus. I thank my colleague.
I want to thank the panel for their long testimony and
questions and answers. We really do appreciate it. It is a
very complicated issue, and you have helped, hopefully,
enlighten us a little bit to make strong public policy
decisions.
So with that, I would like to excuse you and welcome the second
panel.
The Chairman is on his way back, but because I like to be in the
chair, the sooner we get started, the better for me.
I am going to start with some initial introductions.
On the second panel, we have Mr. Robert, is it Levin?
Mr. Levin. Levin, yes.
Mr. Shimkus. Senior Vice President for Research at the New York
Mercantile Exchange. And we appreciate your attendance.
We are also being joined by Ms. Orice Williams.
Ms. Williams. Orice.
Mr. Shimkus. Orice. Okay. Orice. No one else can make that
mistake now. Director of Financial Markets and Community
Investment Team with the Government Accountability Office.
And we are glad to have you. Your full statements are submitted
for the record. If you could summarize that statement in
5 minutes, we will be very grateful, because I know there is a
lot to talk about.
We would like to begin with Mr. Levin. Welcome.
STATEMENTS OF ROBERT LEVIN, SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT FOR RESEARCH, NEW
YORK MERCANTILE EXCHANGE; AND ORICE WILLIAMS, DIRECTOR, FINANCIAL
MARKET AND COMMUNITY INVESTMENT TEAM, GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY
OFFICE
Mr. Levin. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. On behalf of New York
Mercantile Exchange and myself, thank you for the opportunity to be
here today. I am going to briefly go over my written testimony and
then just briefly describe the New York Mercantile Exchange.
To refresh everyone�s memories, we are a regulated public
marketplace. We offer trading in many different products, a
concentration in many of the metals and energy. And of
course, energy futures products is, I think, the reason that
I am here today.
The trading in our exchange is competitive. We offer what
we consider a level playing field. We believe trading is
fair. We publicly disseminate all of our prices. Market
prices and the process of price determination is transparent.
We would refer to that as price discovery. We consider most
of what goes on at the Exchange to be very transparent.
NYMEX itself, as an institution, is neutral regarding what
happens in the market. We don�t have a view on price. The
staff, for instance, is prohibited from trading.
Regarding world energy markets, much has been discussed
previously, and I think I will just try to touch on some
types of that. But I want to emphasize that NYMEX,
especially as a staff member, we do not take views on the
price, and regarding specific questions, though, I will
try to answer any question that comes up as well as I can
under that circumstance.
The many markets in energy are highly regionalized and, to a
large degree, they are independent. As a matter of fact,
natural gas, in some sense, is on the verge of becoming an
international market, but it has not quite arrived there yet.
Electricity, certainly in North America, is still more
regionalized than oil, as has been already expressed by the
previous panel that is absolutely a predominantly
international market.
In the crude oil market, there are hundreds of different streams.
There are dozens of locations where these streams are produced.
There are probably hundreds of locations where it is refined.
And all of this oil physically trades.
Commercial trends and conditions regarding the trade of that
oil have developed over the years, and we have, as we make
distinctions to cash in the physical market, transactions
there. And sometimes, we even call the cash or the physical
market the OTC market, but the over-the-counter market, these
days, in those transactions, typically refers to financially-
settled derivatives. And then we have the futures market,
which is the most transparent of all of these markets. In all
fairness, there is a degree of transparency in the other
markets as well, but not all of those markets are transparent,
and not all parts of them, and admittedly, we do note that for
some participants in the market, lack of transparency is seen
as a commercial advantage. However, we do see the transparence
and liquidity that currently exist in crude oil markets,
especially futures markets, and especially the NYMEX futures
markets, has an unambiguous public benefit at all times.
There has been a great deal of standardization in the cash and
physical market, the OTC market, over a time, and terms and
conditions, there are many sort of standard transactions, and
one can follow the trading of those. And there is reporting of
trading and prices in those markets. These terms and conditions
govern not only the trading but the delivery and the title
transfer.
Between those markets and the futures markets, which is also, of
course, standardized, and in our market, delivery is called for
in our basic crude oil product. There is a substantial
interaction between transactions in all of these different
markets. What we find happens is there is arbitrage, there is
competition, and there is a significant degree, as I said, of
transparency in cash and OTC, and there is complete
transparency in the futures markets.
Transactions in all of these markets are constantly taking
place. Oil is an international market. It is a 24-hour market
that tends to be a 7 day market. And consequently, there are
prices that result from all of these transactions. And they
take place and they emerge all of the time. In a very real
sense, prices are determined simultaneously as well as
reactively between all of these markets. To say one market
leads another market could be very misleading.
In terms of geopolitical impacts, I think some things have
already been mentioned. I can certainly agree that there is a
coincidence in some news reports and changes of prices in our
markets and other markets. For example, on April 10, our price
increased $1.35 a barrel, so there were headlines about Iran and
potential military response.
In addition to other important factors that influence,
ultimately, gasoline prices, crude oil is very major. We have
had some discussion of some of the others. You talked about
refinery utilization, and of course the transition from MTBE to
an ethanol-based gasoline, and none of this is to say that we
have a negative view, or any view, on environmental impact,
because coincided, perhaps not the best timing, all other
things considered as far as price impacts, but it does have an
adjustment factor on the market. And we have recently
incorporated and are making a change from the MTBE-based
reformulated to the gasoline reformulated and probably have
other plans to offer other types of products as well.
That concludes my oral testimony, and I look forward to your
questions.
[The prepared statement of Robert Levin follows:]
Prepared Statement of Robert Levin, Senior Vice President for Research,
New York Mercantile Exchange
Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee, my name is Bob Levin and
I am the Senior Vice President of Research at the New York Mercantile
Exchange (NYMEX or Exchange). NYMEX is the world�s largest forum for
trading and clearing physical-commodity based futures contracts,
including energy and metals products. We have been in the business for
135 years and are a federally chartered marketplace, fully regulated by
the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) both as a contract
market and as a clearing organization. On behalf of the Exchange, its
Board of Directors and shareholders, I thank you and the members of the
Committee for the opportunity to participate in today's hearing on the
futures market and gasoline prices.
INTRODUCTION
NYMEX provides an important economic benefit to the public by
facilitating competitive price discovery and hedging. As the benchmark
for energy prices around the world, trading on NYMEX is transparent,
open and competitive and heavily regulated. Contrary to some beliefs,
NYMEX does not set prices for commodities trading on the exchange.
NYMEX does not trade in the market or otherwise hold any market
positions in any of its listed contracts and, being price neutral, does
not influence price movement. Instead, NYMEX provides trading forums
that are structured as pure auction markets for traders to come
together and execute trades at competitively determined prices that
best reflect what market participants think prices will be in the
future, given today�s information.
There is a strong beneficial and interdependent relationship between
the futures and the underlying physical commodity or "cash" markets.
The primary motivation for using the futures market is to hedge
against price risk in the cash market. Price volatility drives many
into the futures markets. Many prudent business managers rely on the
futures market to protect their business against price swings in the
cash market.
Futures markets provide a reference point for use in executing off-
exchange trades at competitively determined prices. An understanding
of the NYMEX market, its pricing mechanism and the relationship between
the futures price and the cash price will provide useful instruction
and clarity to what is often perceived as an esoteric area of the
broader financial marketplace.
OVERVIEW
Futures markets fulfill two primary functions: (1) They permit
hedging, giving market participants the ability to shift price risk to
others who have inverse risk profiles or who are willing to assume that
risk for potential profit; and (2) They facilitate price discovery and
market transparency. Transparency involves many factors, including:
(1) continuous price reporting during the trading session that is
disseminated on a real-time basis worldwide by various market data
vendors; (2) daily reporting of trading volume and open interest; and
(3) monthly reporting of deliveries against the futures contract.
NYMEX�s futures and options contracts are listed and traded by calendar
month. For energy contracts, trading terminates in the month preceding
the month of actual delivery of the underlying commodity (if positions
are not offset and instead are held through the termination of trading
for that contract month). Consequently, the front or spot month
listed for trading during most of the month of May would be the June
2006 contract month. The daily settlement price for each contract
month of a listed contract is calculated pursuant to Exchange rules.
The rules governing the calculation of our settlement price reflect
the business judgments exercised by Exchange officials.
By listing contract months for trading out into the future, a common
convention in the futures industry, our prices at all times reflect
the collective consensus of the marketplace as to the future direction
of commodity prices. By contrast, many cash markets of the underlying
commodities for our products, such as for gasoline, are quoted and
traded in the cash market as day-ahead products. Consequently, there
can be at times significant differences between futures prices on our
markets and prices in the day-ahead cash market.
NYMEX energy futures markets are highly liquid and transparent,
representing the views and expectations of a wide variety of
participants from every sector of the energy marketplace. Customers
from around the globe can place buy and sell orders through brokers on
the NYMEX trading floor. On behalf of the customers, buyers announce
their bids and sellers announce offers. The price agreed upon for sale
of any futures contract trade is immediately transmitted to the
Exchange�s electronic price reporting system and to the news wires and
information vendors who inform the world of accurate futures prices.
Price signals are the most efficient transmitters of economic
information, telling us when supplies are short or in surplus, when
demand is robust or wanting, or when we should take notice of longer-
term trends. NYMEX futures markets are the messengers carrying this
information from the energy industry to the public. The wide
dissemination of futures prices generates competition in the
establishment of current cash values for commodities.
Price Discovery
The institutional setting of futures trading helps discover the
competitive price which best represents what the market thinks prices
should be in the future, given today�s information. As such, futures
markets provide reference points for use in buying and selling
commodities at competitively determined prices. The widespread
dissemination of exchange-generated prices fosters competition in the
establishment of current cash values for commodities. Because of the
liquidity and transparency of the futures market, the marketplace uses
the futures price to provide the reference for setting prices in the
cash market. This is referred to as the "price discovery" function.
Relationship between Futures Prices and Underlying Cash Prices
Futures markets are a derivative of the cash market and are designed
to ensure that the cash and futures market prices converge to a single
price at expiration of the futures contract. The cash market typically
consists of a variety of transactions that differ in the timing,
location and form of delivery (as well as in other important commercial
terms and conditions). In many cases, the general terms governing
these transactions are standardized which results in development of a
series of fundamental products or commodities for the underlying market.
In the oil market, historically, there have been a number of specific
transaction types serving in this role. Generally, market competition
results in arbitrage by market participants between these commodity-
types of transactions and other less-standardized transactions such
that fairly reliable statistical correlations develop between different
types of products. Futures contracts are expressly designed to either
correspond to an existing cash-market "standard" product or fill that
role on its own.
Although futures and all cash prices often do not always move in
parallel, there is considerable support for the proposition that price
changes in one part of the market, cash or futures, are frequently
transmitted to other parts of the market and result in similar changes
elsewhere. The futures markets, therefore, reflect cash market prices
and, as a result, are able to be used as a hedging vehicle. The
difference between the cash and futures price at any time is known as
the "basis." Usually, basis is measured as the differential between
the cash price and the nearby futures price. The size of the
differential provides a benchmark against which the closeout prices of
both the cash and futures positions may be measured. Historically,
NYMEX futures have proven to be extremely reliable vehicles for
converging to the cash market; a marketplace that consistently has
performed with integrity.
MARKET ANALYSIS
NYMEX staff monitors the supply and demand fundamentals in the
underlying cash market to ensure that NYMEX futures prices are
consistent with broad, ongoing, cash market price movements and that
there are no price distortions. Our analysis of the market has
identified three key factors that are contributing to higher gasoline
prices in the cash and futures market: 1) high crude oil prices;
2) methyl tertiary butyl ether (MTBE) phase-out; and 3) reduced
refinery utilization rates.
High Crude Oil Prices
NYMEX trades light sweet crude oil futures contracts, one of our
most actively traded energy products. Crude oil is a strategic
commodity that responds to global political tensions, particularly
in the Middle East and West Africa. In fact, crude oil prices are
determined in a global market place. That global market place is
highly sensitive to geopolitical events, and the price of crude oil
responds immediately.
For example, recently, the Iranian nuclear threat appears to have
contributed to price volatility as the market responds to the latest
political developments. For example, on April 10, the May NYMEX
crude oil futures price increased $1.35 per barrel to $68.74 at the
same time that there was a headline story about Iran and the potential
for a military response. Two weeks later, on April 21, the NYMEX
June futures price reached an all-time high of over $75.00 coinciding
with continued concerns about Middle East security and reports of
Nigerian supply cuts arising from militant attacks. During this same
time period, there has also been reduced production in other oil
producing countries due to political unrest. Chart A (attached)
reflects global crude oil prices using the front month NYMEX Light
Sweet Crude Oil (WTI) futures and Brent Crude Oil futures prices.
Crude oil is the main feedstock for gasoline production and,
consequently, crude oil prices can have a very strong influence on
gasoline prices. As such, the strength in crude oil prices has been
an important factor leading to higher gasoline prices.
Gasoline is the largest refined product by volume sold in the United
States and accounts for almost half of the national oil consumption.
It is a highly diverse market, with hundreds of wholesale distributors
and thousands of retail outlets, often making it subject to intense
competition and price volatility.
NYMEX trades New York Harbor unleaded gasoline futures contracts.
Market conditions in the gasoline market reflect the basic market
fundamentals such as imbalance between supply and demand. Tight
gasoline supplies due to lack of refinery capacity, compounded by the
lingering impact of Hurricane Katrina, and, more recently, the
transition from MTBE to ethanol have driven prices upward dramatically
in the cash and futures market.
MTBE Phase-Out
The gasoline market is currently in a difficult transition period due to
the phase-out of MTBE, and the related transition to ethanol. As
companies eliminate the use of MTBE and replace it with ethanol, gasoline
refiners and importers must adjust their practices and systems. Ethanol,
which is chemically different than MTBE, contains more volatile compounds
than MTBE and, therefore, is harder to use in reformulated gasoline in
the summertime. In addition, ethanol cannot be carried in the nation�s
pipeline system, and must be segregated from the wholesale distribution
system until its addition at the truck rack. Finally, ethanol presents
new demand and supply implications, which must be factored into the
pricing of gasoline.
There is a level of uncertainty involved in this transition process as
the marketplace adjusts to the new supply situation. This uncertainty
typically leads to higher gasoline prices in the short term. Buyers and
sellers have concerns about demand and supply fundamentals, and the
higher costs are then passed on to consumers. The transition process is
now well underway but not yet completed, as the gasoline market begins
to phase out MTBE-blended gasoline. Most energy firms likely will
continue to draw down and use up their reformulated gasoline (RFG)
inventory during the remainder of the month of May. Market observers
continue to believe that sometime this summer the Reformulated Gasoline
Blendstock (RBOB) product will largely replace reformulated gasoline as
the predominant gasoline product in the cash market.
Chart B, attached, shows the wholesale price of ethanol and MTBE in the
New York Harbor area. As you can see, ethanol prices are currently
$1.00 per gallon higher than MTBE. This large price differential
indicates the strength of ethanol demand as compared to MTBE. The
ethanol is then added to RBOB to make finished gasoline. NYMEX first
listed RBOB gasoline futures for trading last October in anticipation
of the phase-out of MTBE from the gasoline pool. Chart C, attached,
shows recent prices for finished RFG (with MTBE included) and RBOB
(before the addition of ethanol). The current RBOB price is about
10 cents per gallon higher than finished RFG (with MTBE), and when the
ethanol is added (at a 10% blend by volume) the finished ethanol-
blended gasoline recently has been priced even higher, at 15 cents
higher than RFG with MTBE. This accounts for some of the recent price
rise in gasoline.
Reduced Refinery Utilization Rates
Gasoline prices have been supported recently by lower refinery
utilization rates due to increased refinery maintenance this spring.
Some refineries reportedly had delayed maintenance work in the
aftermath of Hurricane Katrina to ensure adequate gasoline supplies.
Furthermore, additional refinery work is needed this year to comply
with new low-sulfur requirements in diesel and gasoline. The end
result is tighter gasoline supplies in the short-term until the
higher refinery utilization rates can be restored.
Even though no new gasoline refineries have been built in the U.S.
in several decades, this imbalance has been mitigated to some extent
by higher efficiencies from existing plants, which have generally
operated at a high rate of utilization in recent years. However, such
a high utilization rate also means that when utilization rates are
reduced for any reason, there will be an immediate impact on the
availability of new supplies of gasoline.
In the face of these market factors, the NYMEX system continues to
work according to design. As intended, NYMEX�s highly transparent,
open and competitive market place adds a level of economic stability
to the situation by providing a reliable and well-regulated price
discovery and risk management forum.
CONCLUSION
At all times during periods of extreme uncertainty in the market,
NYMEX has been the source for transparent prices in the energy
markets. Our price reporting systems, which provide information to
the world�s vendors, have worked flawlessly and without delay.
The NYMEX marketplace continues to perform its responsibility to
provide regulated forums that ensure open, competitive and transparent
energy pricing. We can only imagine the market uncertainty and further
devastation to consumers if NYMEX were unable to perform its duty and
prices were determined behind closed doors.
I thank you for the opportunity to share the viewpoint of the New York
Mercantile Exchange with you today. I will be happy to answer any
questions members of the Committee may have.
Mr. Shimkus. Thank you very much.
And now we turn to Ms. Orice Williams. You are recognized for
5 minutes. And welcome.
Ms. Williams. Thank you.
Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I am pleased to be
here today to discuss our ongoing work on CFTC�s oversight of
energy futures. As you are well aware, ever-rising prices have
resulted in a number of questions about oil and petroleum
prices and the role that derivatives markets play.
Given the breadth of interest in these issues, GAO initiated
work under the authority of the Comptroller General. My remarks
today focus on this ongoing body of work. While it is too soon
to provide findings and observations, we hope you find the
overview of our work to date useful.
By way of background, futures markets consist of a variety of
participants, including hedgers and speculators. Hedgers use
futures to shift the risk of a price change onto speculators.
Speculators assume the price risk that hedgers try to avoid in
hopes of making a profit. Although speculators usually have no
commercial interest in the commodities they trade, the potential
for profit motivates them to collect market information regarding
the supply and demand of commodities to anticipate the potential
impact on prices. Oversight of futures is provided by CFTC and
the exchanges where they trade.
Our ongoing work focuses on two broad issues: one, the players
in energy futures markets, their activities, and changes in price
volatility since 2000; and two, the oversight of the energy
futures markets provided by CFTC.
In addressing the first issue, our ongoing work is designed to
describe how energy derivatives function and to what extent
market participants with different investment objectives affect
the prices of energy futures.
To do this, we are focusing on markets and market participants,
price discovery, market liquidity, and risk management
practices. We are also collecting information on the over-the-
counter settlement process and NYMEX prices.
We will discuss changes in the mix of participants and the use
of new trading platforms in futures products. As part of this
work, we are building on existing research by analyzing CFTC
market data to determine historical trends in volatility for
certain commodities, including oil and petroleum.
Our work will focusing on why volatility is an issue, how it
is measured, and what the trends show. Through our analysis,
we hope to address issues such as causes and implications of
volatility.
The second area we are studying is how energy futures are
overseen. While CFTC is the primary focus, we will also
include other relevant regulators and self-regulatory
organizations, such as NYMEX.
Specifically, we are reviewing CFTC�s and NYMEX�s surveillance
programs, oversight provided by other agencies, and information
collected through CFTC�s large trader reporting system. We
will also explore oversight of the over-the-counter and any
other relevant markets. Our work will also include reviewing
CFTC�s and NYMEX�s enforcement programs and analyzing settled
cases.
Finally, we are in the process of assessing how CFTC is
positioned to protect market users by focusing on CFTC�s
regulatory approach, structure, and resources as well as any
potential gaps.
In closing, I would like to note that we fully appreciate the
significance of these issues and hope that our report, which
is scheduled to be issued later this year, will provide useful
information to this committee and others.
This concludes my oral statement, and I would be happy to
answer any questions that you may have.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Orice M. Williams follows:]
Prepared Statement of Orice Williams, Director, Financial Markets and
Community Investment, Government Accountability Office
Mr. Shimkus. Thank you very much.
Now the Chair recognizes the Chairman of the Full Committee,
Mr. Barton, for 5 minutes.
Chairman Barton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for
chairing in my absence. I have done three things since I left
here, and I am due to be doing another one right now, actually.
Thank you, each of you, for being here.
Let me start with you, Mr. Levin.
What is the futures margin? What is the margin requirement for
energy futures right now on the market in the NYMEX?
Mr. Levin. Understood. Mr. Chairman, it depends on which
market you are speaking of. The futures margins are deposits,
and we assess them and base them on our estimate of the risk
that prices may move between now and the next settlement, which
is the next day.
Chairman Barton. Well, give me a range, then.
Mr. Levin. Sure. In the crude oil market, for members and non-members,
right now, it changes. We have different ones, because the members
often do not hold positions overnight, many of them trade through their
account and provide liquidity, is $3,500 per 1,000 barrels, but our
contract right now--
Chairman Barton. So that is three and a half cents on a
dollar?
Mr. Levin. No, three and a half dollars, I think. Yes, sir.
And that is $4,750 for non-members. In the gasoline market,
right now, it is $6,000 per contract, the same amount, 1,000
barrels, and for 10,000 BTU, which is natural gas, it is
$7,500.
Chairman Barton. So the most it is, on a percentage basis, is
7.5 percent?
Mr. Levin. Yes, I think that is about right. That is a current
right.
Chairman Barton. Okay. And under current practices, that is
not a regulated fee. It is set by the market makers themselves
and the board of directors. Is that correct?
Mr. Levin. We actually set those--
Chairman Barton. Percentages.
Mr. Levin. --contract costs, whatever you want to call it. It
is more of a staff-driven process, and in fact, I am involved
quite a bit on that.
Chairman Barton. So you are looking at it.
Mr. Levin. We are looking at it.
Chairman Barton. There are lots of reasons that I want to
participate in the futures market. I can be a producer who
wants to lock in a specific price. I can be a consumer who
wants to lock in, again, a specific cost. In my State,
Southwest Airlines has publicly said that one of the reasons
they have been able to maintain profitability is because they
hedged in the futures market and locked in prices for aviation
fuel, which is a good thing. It is good for Southwest. Now
how high would you set that fee before it would be non-economic
or problematic for the producers and the consumers of the
commodity in question to take a position for business reasons
only?
Mr. Levin. I think it really depends, Mr. Chairman, on each of
those individual companies. Some companies may already believe
that it is at that level, and they believe that their credit is
so good that nobody should be requiring them to put any good
faith deposit to participate in a market. It would be very
difficult for me to speculate on what that level is. I am not
sure for them, or for any company that, in general, it would be
much different. And I don�t want to take too much of your time,
but--
Chairman Barton. Oh, no. Every consumer in America is paying
approximately $3 a gallon for gasoline, and Dr. Yergin was on
the panel before you, and said in his testimony that $10 to $15
of the current price of oil is due to speculation. Now that is
his opinion. What I am trying to get at is I believe in the
futures markets and the derivatives markets as economic tools
for our Nation�s future prosperity. I am not down on that. But
I am willing to think seriously about getting with the CFTC or
the SEC or whatever the relevant regulator is and in the
energy�s futures, let us set some floor levels on margin costs
to try and make it more difficult for speculators to speculate.
There has got to be a level where a producer or a consumer who
is using the commodity believes the price is too high and it is
not economic for them to hedge. On the other hand, if we go
the other way and set the price as low as possible, there is
almost no risk for a speculator, especially somebody who is
making the market, to take a position overnight, and if the
market moves a certain way, you would make a pretty good piece
of change, and they have really not put up any money.
When times are flush and prices are low, requirements can be low, but
right now, if we can knock $10 or $15 a barrel off the price of oil by
raising the margin requirement on the futures market for oil futures I
would put that bill on the floor next week. Do you understand what I
am saying? Now, I am not negative on what you are doing. I support
the free market, but you have got an unregulated situation where guys
in a back room somewhere are setting these levels. If you set it so
low, there are a whole lot of folks that say, "Well, heck. I can take
a position. I can scrape up $3,000 or $4,000 and take a position. And
if things work right, boom, I am going to make a lot of money. And even
if I lose my whole investment, I have only lost $3,000 or $4,000." And
the people that are taking the short end of the stick are every one of
our consumers who are paying at the pump. You know, if it is $20 a
barrel out of $60, they are paying 33 percent more than they should,
and 33 times 3--they are paying 99 cents a gallon more for gasoline
than they should.
Mr. Levin. I would like to respond to that. And I think you
covered a lot of areas, and I think that, at least if I
understood your understanding of how things happen in the
market.
Chairman Barton. And I am not an economics major.
Mr. Levin. I may change some of the description that you just
applied. But first off, I also state this may not change your
view on anything that you said, but I think Dr. Yergin�s point
was not that speculators are causing $10 to $15 additional to
market. I think he called it a security premium that he thinks
is really there because participants in the market are not
certain about future performance and ability to get supplies.
And I don�t think he suggested it was only in the New York
Mercantile Exchange market, but I think he is suggesting that
it is in the world market. And I am not even here agreeing
that there is such a security premium or not. I certainly
respect Dr. Yergin�s opinion, but I think there was a big
distinction. And I don�t think he attached it to speculators.
Chairman Barton. Let me put it this way. If the futures
market in the next week, across the board, went down to $50
a barrel, wouldn�t retail prices go down?
Mr. Levin. I am not so certain how fast retail goes.
Chairman Barton. Would it go down? You are not going to sit
here and tell us that the futures market doesn�t influence the
retail price. The price that is on the New York Mercantile
Exchange today affects the perception of where the price is
going to be and the supply-demand availability. To err on the
side of caution, if they see that price going up, everybody in
the retail chain, from the refiner to the distributor to the
retailer, is going to raise their price up. That is a fact.
We have seen that happen. We have seen it go up 30 or 40 cents
a gallon in Texas in the last 2 � weeks. Now there are a lot
of reasons for it, I mean, Iran, Nigeria. And again, I am not
negative on the futures market. I am not at all. But when I
found out what the percentage for a margin is, if I want to go
to a New York Stock Exchange and buy a common stock, I would
put up 50 percent of the money, and in some cases, I think you
have got to put up even more, but I can go buy a futures
contract and put up 3 � or 4 � cents on the dollar. That is
pretty good leverage, you know: 90/10 leverage, 95/5 leverage.
That is not bad.
Mr. Levin. But once again, and as far as a particular margin
moment, but the New York Mercantile Exchange�s prices, we
believe, and I think evidence supports, do not just
unilaterally go up. They go in tandem. Sometimes you do see
other prices ahead of them. Sometimes you see it first.
Chairman Barton. I understand.
Mr. Levin. But to say that the prices fall, I appreciate that
you understand, sir--
Chairman Barton. I am not negative on the futures market. What
I am is trying to find out is what we would need to do to raise
the margin requirements so that the producers and the consumers
of the commodities still can participate, but make it more
expensive for the purely speculative player. The young lady to
your left and her study, or the study that she is testifying on,
indicates that speculators in the market are becoming a bigger
factor. When pension funds are buying futures contracts, that,
to me, sends up a red flag. You know? I don�t have a problem
with Boom Pickens, my good friend down in Dallas. He can play
the futures market all he wants. But he also has enough money
that if you raise the margin requirement--he is a smart boy and
a wealthy boy--he is still going to be a player. But my God,
you just said that you and a few guys kind of sit around the
coffee table and decide what the requirements are going to be.
Mr. Levin. No, I don�t think that is how I said it. I said
that it sounded like that. We aren�t sitting around a coffee
table. But getting back--
Chairman Barton. Maybe you just send e-mails back and forth
between your computer terminals, but--
Mr. Levin. And also, just to make a distinction, when you have
margin at the New York Stock Exchange, for that partial
payment, you own that stock outright. When you have a margin
at a futures exchange, you don�t own anything.
Chairman Barton. But you have a right to it.
Mr. Levin. No, no. You don�t have a right. In fact, you--
Chairman Barton. If you exercise the contract, you do.
Mr. Levin. But that is when it terminates.
Chairman Barton. Right.
Mr. Levin. At that point, you have to put up full value, and
as we get closer to termination, you have increasing amounts
of that.
Chairman Barton. And as we all know, what percentage of those
contracts go to term?
Mr. Levin. A smaller percentage.
Chairman Barton. Less than 1 percent?
Mr. Levin. In terms of the form of delivery, I would say yes.
Chairman Barton. Yes. Okay. We will be in touch.
Mr. Levin. For the purposes that you said, sir, but we base our
margin calculation, as I said, on the assessed risk in the market.
We are able to utilize parameters from the market, a technical
term, but one that is not that difficult to understand. We call
it the implied volatility that is derived from some of the
options and the futures pricing, but what volatility refers to
is the percentage representing a standard deviation of pricing.
Chairman Barton. We have a volatility test, too. It is called
the election. And the political volatility is pretty high
right now on this. I don�t begrudge the traders, but I am a
lot more worried right now about the consumers of every Member
of Congress on both sides of the aisle and that volatility in
the marketplace, on the retail price of gasoline, is at a level
that I think it is worthy of serious inquiry on how these
margin requirements are set. And I think you can make a fairly
good case that if we set them higher, the volatility in the oil
market would go down, and the price in the oil market would go
down. And at least in the short term, I think that would be a
good thing for the American consumer and American economy. And
I guarantee you, it would be a good thing for those of us that
run for election.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Shimkus. The Chair now recognizes my colleague from
Kentucky, Mr. Whitfield, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Whitfield. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Ms. Williams, in your study, you note that you are looking at
fraudulent, manipulative, and abusive practices that have been
identified by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission and also
enforcement that they are going to take. Could you elaborate
on the type of practices that you found to be fraudulent or
abusive?
Ms. Williams. I think, based on the information we have
collected to date, most of the activity taken by CFTC in the
energy area involve natural gas in fraudulent reporting.
Mr. Whitfield. Involve natural gas?
Ms. Williams. False reporting was the specific issue in the
natural gas market.
Mr. Whitfield. Maybe you could give me an example of false
reporting.
Ms. Williams. I think it actually has to deal with certain
reporting requirements, primarily in the over-the-counter market
and the information that was being provided by participants in
that market to the reporting body, that they weren�t providing
accurate information to the reporting body. And CFTC took
action, because that could potentially affect the futures
market.
Mr. Whitfield. Was that a live threat or not?
Ms. Williams. Based on what we have collected to date, I am
not sure I could say that it was characterized as a live
threat.
Mr. Whitfield. Okay. Mr. Levin, we appreciate you being here
today. And it is my understanding that there are other future
exchanges trading energy products in the United States other
than your company. Is that correct?
Mr. Levin. That is correct, Congressman.
Mr. Whitfield. And does the Commodity Futures Trading
Commission have authority to monitor trading of those markets
to ensure that the prices are not manipulated?
Mr. Levin. One of those markets is actually subject to
regulation by the FSA, which is the authority that oversees
commodities and securities regulation in the UK. The reason
being that that is where their authority emanates from, and
there are courtesies provided between the Commodity Futures
Trading Commission of the United States to other exchanges that
are under foreign authority. In this case, since I think you
are talking about domestically-traded products, that, I think,
the interpretation of that courtesy for foreign regulators
and other exchanges was with the understanding it would be
for products that are really foreign-based products, that
there may be some interest in the United States to trade as
well. And in this case, there is an exchange that is trading
U.S.-based product very similar to our product, but it is
subject not to the CFTC as the ultimate authority, but to the
FSA.
Mr. Whitfield. Do you view that as a significant issue?
Mr. Levin. We have certainly been concerned about it and have
raised it with the Commodity Futures Trading Commission,
because it opens up the possibility of differential
regulation. As examples, and with no disrespect intended to
FSA, there are really different views on position limits
between the CFTC and the FSA. But NYMEX products are subject
to position limits. The FSA-regulated products are not, even
though they are very similar. Also, there is a large trader
reporting that takes place rather extensively under the CFTC,
so we are subject to that for our U.S.-based products, but
this other exchange is not for its U.S.-based products,
because the FSA does not require that.
Mr. Whitfield. Now would legislation be required to regulate
that exchange, or can that be done administratively by the
Commodity Futures Trading Commission?
Mr. Levin. I think it can be done administratively by the
CFTC, sir.
Mr. Whitfield. And you are having ongoing discussions with
them about that?
Mr. Levin. Yes, officials from the exchange have raised that
with the CFTC.
Mr. Whitfield. Okay. Okay. I yield back the balance of my
time.
Mr. Shimkus. The gentleman yields back.
I would like to recognize myself for 5 minutes.
And Mr. Levin, in your testimony, you give an overview of the
two primary functions of future markets, including that they
permit hedging, giving market participants to shift price risk,
and that they facilitate price discovery and market
transparency. Who regulates these functions?
Mr. Levin. They are regulated at two levels, Mr. Chairman.
They are regulated by the Commodity Futures Trading
Commission. And we also, the exchange itself, has self-
regulatory responsibilities that are the result of
Congressional legislation, so we regulate it as well.
Mr. Shimkus. Is the NYMEX the only futures exchange that is
trading energy products in the United States?
Mr. Levin. No, sir. There is another one that we were just
discussing, but it is the International Commodity Exchange.
It took over the International Petroleum Exchange, IPE, that
was based in London. And it also trades in the United States.
And it trades U.S.-based products in the United States, but
subject to that foreign regulation.
Mr. Shimkus. So it is not regulated by the CFTC?
Mr. Levin. No, it is not. And I do not believe it is at all
subject to the same self-regulatory responsibilities, but by
no means do I mean that to say that they do not take oversight
of what trades there seriously, but it is not subject to the
same rigor as the CFTC.
Mr. Shimkus. Well, would you say it is regulated or
unregulated?
Mr. Levin. Well, there are aspects that are much less
regulated, because on the natural gas side, which is a
different component. The product that is U.S.-based that is
subject to the FSA are its crude oil futures, its WTI cash-
settled product. And that is less regulated, far less
regulated than we are, because of the position reporting, large
trader recording position limits they are not subject to on the
natural gas side. That is a lesser type of regulation. It is
under CFTC authority. There are also the cash-settled based
on a NYMEX product, in this case, our natural gas product. And
it has even less regulation under the authority that they
operate.
Mr. Shimkus. Can trading in that market impact crude oil
prices in the United States?
Mr. Levin. I would consider that market to be part of the
market in the same way that NYMEX and all of the other
components that I identified are, and I would say absolutely.
It is part of the world oil market. And trading in that market
has an influence, as these other components do.
Mr. Shimkus. But would you consider it a foreign market if it
is located in the United States?
Mr. Levin. Well, I think that, from our perspective, we
certainly questioned that interpretation because it is a
U.S.-based price. It is largely for U.S. participants and it
is very relevant as a U.S. market.
Mr. Shimkus. And going at some of the issues the Chairman had,
and he is pretty impassionate. There is a function for you all.
And you defined the margin as a good faith deposit, is that
correct.
Mr. Levin. I did, yes, sir.
Mr. Shimkus. Have the current margin-setting procedures proven
effective in preserving the financial integrity of the market?
Mr. Levin. Well, they absolutely have. As everyone knows,
there is a lot of volatility in the market, but the basis for
which we set our margins have been very effective, and it is
very infrequent that we find that we are under-margined. We
consider it a very bad policy to be either under-margined,
because we are not protecting ourselves against risky
performance in our market. But over-margined, too, because
that could lead to a lack of trading and the lack of a server
to perform our role, the market would, thus, suffer and be a
lot less transparent.
Mr. Shimkus. And I wish you had had a chance to really get
involved with the Chairman on that. How does the small
percentage of the contract value protect the market against
major market move, or does it?
Mr. Levin. It is not that it protects against the major
market move. Literally, it is that we have found that the
means in which we apply our margins, that this implied
volatility has been a very effective indicator of boundaries of
where price may move until the next collection of payments. The
risk management is also because every participant in the market
is sponsored and guaranteed by a financial overseer of the
many, many international banks, domestic banks, major financial
entities, or others on the market. We found that there are
margins in that collection and those guarantees that, despite
bouts of volatility in the market, we have had very good
financial performance in the market.
Mr. Shimkus. And the Chairman, I ask my colleagues for
forgiveness here, but if you raised the margins that the
Chairman is addressing, what does that do to your market and
what does it do to prices?
Mr. Levin. Well, he had indicated, I think earlier, if I heard
correctly, a percentage which was arbitrary. There may be times
in our market where we have had margins that high because of
our risk assessment. I think that would drive virtually all
participation away. And then our concern is that we will lose
the benefits of the futures market.
Mr. Shimkus. Thank you.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Michigan for 5 minutes.
Mr. Stupak. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I am glad to see that members are starting to focus on this
futures market, because we have been pushing legislation and
trying to get hearings on our legislation, and I tried to help
investigate this high price of oil. And one of the issues we
came up with and thought of on how there may be some things
that we can help to bring some stability to the price and then
also give the relief to the taxpayer, or I should say to those
that are caught up with gas. So I am glad to see all of the
interest in it. I am sorry the Chairman is back and forth. I
was actually on the floor on that amendment, so we have votes
on the floor.
So let me get to it.
Mr. Levin, as you put in your statement, trading on NYMEX is
transparent, open, and competitive because of your reporting
system. So does it not make sense to provide this same
transparency, open process of reporting to the off-market
traders or the OTCs, as they are called?
Mr. Levin. Congressman, obviously, given the transparency we
operate under and provide, we are great supporters of it. We
also recognize that there are transactions in the market that,
just in general and philosophically, that are private and that
maybe do not require or maybe are concerned that would become
advocates in intruding too overbearingly to private company
transactions. I certainly understand the sensitivity of the
topic, and there could be a perspective that supports it, but we
are also very concerned with even the well-intentioned policies
that begin to intrude more and more into principal to principal
commerce. There could be some unintended consequences. And that
is why we are somewhat timid to come out and endorse something
like that. I wouldn�t want it, as I said, to be misinterpreted,
though. We operate as a transparent institution, and we are great
supporters of transparency.
Mr. Stupak. That leaves part of the private operation more
susceptible then to greater speculation, greater margins, greater
price increases, greater fluctuation in price, because you need to
know what are the motivating factors behind some of these.
Mr. Levin. It is so early, it is possible. If they are truly
private, though, they may have no influence beyond those
individual transactions and not get reported elsewhere in the
market, and I think that is--
Mr. Stupak. But you need to know how much is there, I mean,
how much is private that OTC is trading. Some estimates, and I
was going to ask Ms. Williams if she wanted to join in, please
do, of the off-market trading could be as high as 60 to 75
percent. Is that fair to say on all future energy trading?
Mr. Levin. In all honesty, we don�t know, either, how much
there is, and we have ourselves over the years tried to make
estimates.
Mr. Stupak. So what is your best-guess estimate?
Mr. Levin. You know something? I don�t know what my best guess
is. I can tell you sometimes people have told us that over-the-
counter is much more than on exchange, but we think that when we
heard more about that, it sounded like there was multiple
counting of the same transactions. I would say somewhere, maybe
it could be, a good guess, as much as on exchange, but it could
be more. But that would be adding all of the exchanges together.
So there is a fair amount of over-the-counter trading. There
clearly is.
Mr. Stupak. I assume that to mean 25 percent?
Mr. Levin. Oh, no, before the market we were referencing before,
the cash-settled WTI at the other exchange, under the IPE, they
are grant trading. If you had added their grant trading and our
trading, it might be as large as all of that volume together.
Mr. Stupak. Okay. And Ms. Williams, does the GAO have an
ability to tell exactly how much futures trading is occurring
off the market?
Ms. Williams. I wouldn�t say that we have the ability. This
is one of the issues that we are trying to get our arms around,
but there is no central source for the information. So we are
not likely to be able to come up with a number for the over-the-
counter market.
Mr. Stupak. Sure. Okay. Is that something you are going to
try to address in the GAO report?
Ms. Williams. Yes, that is something that we are trying to
address.
Mr. Stupak. Mr. Levin, you also point out in your statement
that because of the transparency of NYMEX trading, futures
prices use the set prices on the cash market, otherwise known
as price discovery function. Does off-market trading affect
this price discovery?
Mr. Levin. We believe, I think indirectly it does, because in
many cases, the over-the-counter market has some active
organizations that are dealers in that market. And they have
many customers. And sometimes, their transactions are more
customized. Sometimes they are rather standardized. But in
their collecting of transactions, they also manage their
risk in markets such as ours or others like it where with
others in the cash or over-the-counter markets. So there is
a lot of multiple trading that finds its way into the
collection of transactions. And in that sense, I think it
has an influence, and I think, as I indicated earlier,
there is kind of simultaneity as well as a reactor-ship
between all of these transactions.
Mr. Shimkus. If the gentleman would wrap, we would give
Dr. Burgess--
Mr. Stupak. Just one quick question.
How many barrels are traded on NYMEX every day, just to give
us some reference point here?
Mr. Levin. I think these days, in a very active market,
there has been somewhere in the neighborhood of 250 million
barrels a day. I think that is a ballpark.
Mr. Stupak. Thank you both for your interest.
Mr. Shimkus. And thank the Chairman for all of the gracious
time I offered.
Mr. Stupak. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Shimkus. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Texas
for 5 minutes.
Mr. Burgess. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Ms. Williams, you talk about the CFTC and how they have the
ability or need the ability for oversight. Do they have all
of the tools they need at this point?
Ms. Williams. That is one of the things that we are looking
at in the course of our study, and I am not in a position to
give a specific response now, but we are looking at that.
Mr. Burgess. Are you going to follow up with the committee,
perhaps, with a written response, then, to that?
Ms. Williams. I will be glad to do that.
Mr. Burgess. I think that would be very, very useful. It
would give us some direction, or we will come up with some
tools, and they may not be the tools that you need.
Mr. Levin, last summer we passed the energy bill. We put
MTBE in some legal peril, and it has been abandoned. And
maybe that is a good thing, ultimately. Maybe it is not. But
the result has been, with this summer�s driving season upon us,
we see the prices increase. How much was that anticipated by
the market? Did you guys see that coming?
Mr. Levin. We knew that the transition would be difficult,
Congressman, because there have been other transitions
environmentally-based for the last, really, 15 or 16 years in
the gasoline market, in particular. And the full consequence
is that there is a lot less forward trading and thus forward
price protection--
Mr. Burgess. My time is really very short, and we have got to
go vote, but can I just ask, was there any sort of advisory or
warning put out by the Mercantile Exchange about this change?
Mr. Levin. No, I mean, I think they really accepted those
regulations as they went in. And we couldn�t have predicted,
because, as you indicated, it was really a reaction to
something in the bill, which was that it was stated explicitly
they wouldn�t be given protection by the Government. And so a
lot of the industry finally decided that they are going to
abandon it. There was no official date given. It was hard
to--
Mr. Burgess. I think that the reasons, and I think the
American people could accept the reasons. It is going to cost
us something to get MTBE out of our lives, and if it is worth
it to do that, we are willing to pay for it. But I guess what
bothers my constituents when I talk to them is that why didn�t
we see this coming? Why was there no warning? Maybe that is
the committee�s fault. Maybe that is the House�s fault?
Maybe that is the Senate�s fault. I don�t know. But from
your perspective, with NYMEX, was there any sort of advisory
circular put out there, "Hey, guys. Watch this, because MTBE
is out of the picture. When we reformulate next summer, it
is going to be big trouble. If anything else happens, like
two hurricanes, like takeover in Bolivia, you name it."
Mr. Levin. Congressman, it really wasn�t in that context.
It would be hard to predict the timing. We knew the transition
would be difficult, but because it would really be commercially
driven, we might have thought it would coincide with the
summer, but even there, we have two gasoline products.
Reformulated is still trading more at NYMEX than the
replacement in spite of the fact that there has been this
transition taking place. So we haven�t seen that full
commercial transition, and that is why it is difficult to
predict even now, and certainly back then, when it would take
place and exactly how it would take place.
Mr. Burgess. Well, looking at one of your charts, I guess
chart B, it makes me very concerned about price gouging by the
ethanol producers.
Mr. Shimkus. The gentleman�s time has expired. No.
Mr. Burgess. When we look at that, well, can you explain the
factor by which the price of ethanol has increased? Is it
because of increased demand because of replacement of MTBE or
are there other factors? I guess the thing is, we heard this
in the policy committee this morning, it is the same price as a
gallon of gas most places in the country, at least in South
Carolina.
Mr. Levin. I think it is demand driven. And we are concerned.
We know, too, that there isn�t a big difference between, as you
said, the MTBE and the ethanol. I don�t know that it is a one-
to-one replacement between them, but nonetheless, right now,
our blend-stock gasoline is trading above ten cents a gallon on
the wholesale market, and you still haven�t added the ethanol
in yet, so that will raise that even more at the time that they
are combined.
Mr. Burgess. So they affect the blend-stock and not just the
ethanol individually?
Mr. Levin. I think it is mostly the ethanol, but yes, there is
a piece of that that is blend stock, yes.
Mr. Burgess. Mr. Chairman, we have got to go vote. I will
yield back.
Mr. Shimkus. The gentleman yields back. We have about two
minutes and 58 seconds to get down to the floor to vote. I
think we are going to be fine.
We want to thank the second panel for waiting and then for your
answers. It has been very, very helpful. And with that, I--
Mr. Burgess. Mr. Chairman, before you adjourn, could I just ask
unanimous consent that we do get those guidelines from the GAO
when that report is ready?
Mr. Shimkus. Without objection, so ordered.
And with that, I adjourn the hearing.
[Whereupon, at 1:44 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
Response for the Record by Daniel Yergin, Chairman, Cambridge Energy
Research Associates
The Honorable John D. Dingell
Your written testimony of May 4, 2006, (pages 13-15) criticizes the
system for reserve disclosure mandated by the Securities and Exchange
Commission, and states that: "Modernizing the reserves disclosure
would clearly improve understanding of the resource base and its
potential and provide clarification for purposes of energy security."
Please describe and explain the specific changes that you believe are
necessary.
The basic need is to update the SEC�s "1978" system of reserves
disclosure to take into account the�major and�indeed massive changes in
four dimensions - in technology, the globalization and commoditization
of markets, the scale and complexity of projects, and the globalization
of the energy industries and capital markets.� For instance, the deep�
water frontier in the late 1970s was 600 feet; today, it is more like
12,000 feet.� Computing had only a tiny fraction of the power it has
today. Also, at�the time the system was put in places, prices were
controlled by the federal government, and the documentation from the
time indicated that the expectation was that prices would�change�as
the result of�decisions involving federal price controls.�Finally, it
is important to note that the 1978 system was created primarily for the
onshore U.S. industry, and the industry is now very much more than US
and very much more than onshore.
In designing the 1978 system, the SEC relied on the�primary source for
defining "proved reserves." That was the definition, and the expertise
around it, developed and promulgated by the�leading professional and
technical society, the�Society of Petroleum Engineers (SPE)�in 1965,
with some modification thereafter.� Since then the SPE has updated its
definitions three times and is in the process of updating them again.��
The SEC, however, has�not revisited its definitions since 1978.�
Modernizing the SEC�s definitions would provide investors with�more
complete information and would provide a more thorough understand of
the overall reserve base,�grounded in today's technology.�
� To do this, it would be sensible for the SEC to reengage with
� the contemporary expertise and current technical knowledge.
� The�upstream oil and gas industry routinely uses definitions
� and guidance issued by the SPE�s Oil and Gas Reserves Committee
� to calculate reserves. The SPE definitions are the subject of
� continuous dialogue among academics, technical experts, and
� industry participants; and they reflect the most up to date
� accepted practices. Their evergreen nature makes them robust
� as a standard�and benchmark.
� �A striking example of what would be achieved were the SEC to
� �update its definitions would be the inclusion of oil produced
� �from oil shale and oil sands in the definitions of proved
� �reserves. �It is expected that Canadian oil sands could�reach
� �2 mbd of production by 2010-the equivalent of a quarter of�total
� �current US liquids production. The United States will be the
� �major market for this resource. Yet, currently, under the 1978
� �system, there is little clarity as to the nature of these
� �resources.�
�
According to a March 16, 2006, letter from the Honorable Christopher Cox
(copy attached), the SEC is working with the International Accounting
Standards Board�s Extractive Industries Project Team to establish a
single set of reserve and resource definitions for both the mining and
oil and gas industries. The project is intended to achieve
modernization and greater convergence between the definitions and the
related accounting principles. Please explain why this undertaking is
or is not responsive to your concerns.
While we applaud the workings of the IASB and the objectives of
establishing a convergence in accounting standards, including with
disclosure of oil and gas reserves, we do raise the question as to the
speed and momentum of this project. We believe that the SEC could
effectively undertake a direct and prompt modernization of the 1978
system, thereby reaffirming its leadership and authority in this area.
The SEC letter states at page 2 that: "Reserve volumes are not included
as assets in audited balance sheets because of the inherent difficulty
of accurately estimating them. As a result, SEC and FASB rules direct
oil and gas exploration companies to provide a significant amount of
supplemental information relating to their reserves in an unaudited
footnote to their financial statements." Do you agree or disagree
with this treatment, and why?
�
We agree with the current approach-it is not practical to include
reserves volumes in the audited balance sheets. However, we think that
some re-examination of the current SEC treatment�may be warranted in a
different direction.� The SEC permits presentation of�additional data
in an un-audited footnote. However, it�appears that the�intention of
the original drafters of the regulations was that the disclosures
represented a minimum level of disclosure and that companies should
be encouraged to disclose additional data if they believed it would
better inform investors.��More recently registrants�have�been
discouraged from providing information beyond the proved level.��There
is a�case for the SEC's encouraging companies to disclose any
additional information they believe provides a fuller picture than
just the content of the footnotes mandated by FAS69 rather than to
discourage it, and that case should be examined.
�
The SEC letter further notes that only one (El Paso Corporation) of
the 10 largest oil companies has reported any material weaknesses in
its internal controls over financial reporting, but warns that
"internal controls regarding the compilation and presentation of
reserve disclosures are not covered by the internal control reports."
Should they be? Why or why not?
�
�There is no obvious reason to�require the bringing of oil and gas
�reserves disclosures within the internal control reports. It is not�
�at all clear that the additional costs and efforts would be
�justified nor that it would lead to any increase in the reliability
�of reserves estimates.