[House Hearing, 109 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL ADVICE
FOR THE U.S. CONGRESS
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
JULY 25, 2006
__________
Serial No. 109-57
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Science
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.house.gov/science
______
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COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE
HON. SHERWOOD L. BOEHLERT, New York, Chairman
RALPH M. HALL, Texas BART GORDON, Tennessee
LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas JERRY F. COSTELLO, Illinois
CURT WELDON, Pennsylvania EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas
DANA ROHRABACHER, California LYNN C. WOOLSEY, California
KEN CALVERT, California DARLENE HOOLEY, Oregon
ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland MARK UDALL, Colorado
VERNON J. EHLERS, Michigan DAVID WU, Oregon
GIL GUTKNECHT, Minnesota MICHAEL M. HONDA, California
FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma BRAD MILLER, North Carolina
JUDY BIGGERT, Illinois LINCOLN DAVIS, Tennessee
WAYNE T. GILCHREST, Maryland DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois
W. TODD AKIN, Missouri SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas
TIMOTHY V. JOHNSON, Illinois BRAD SHERMAN, California
J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia BRIAN BAIRD, Washington
JO BONNER, Alabama JIM MATHESON, Utah
TOM FEENEY, Florida JIM COSTA, California
RANDY NEUGEBAUER, Texas AL GREEN, Texas
BOB INGLIS, South Carolina CHARLIE MELANCON, Louisiana
DAVE G. REICHERT, Washington DENNIS MOORE, Kansas
MICHAEL E. SODREL, Indiana DORIS MATSUI, California
JOHN J.H. ``JOE'' SCHWARZ, Michigan
MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas
MARIO DIAZ-BALART, Florida
C O N T E N T S
July 25, 2006
Page
Witness List..................................................... 2
Hearing Charter.................................................. 3
Opening Statements
Statement by Representative Sherwood L. Boehlert, Chairman,
Committee on Science, U.S. House of Representatives............ 6
Written Statement............................................ 7
Statement by Representative Bart Gordon, Minority Ranking Member,
Committee on Science, U.S. House of Representatives............ 7
Written Statement............................................ 8
Prepared Statement by Representative Jerry F. Costello, Member,
Committee on Science, U.S. House of Representatives............ 9
Prepared Statement by Representative Eddie Bernice Johnson,
Member, Committee on Science, U.S. House of Representatives.... 9
Prepared Statement by Representative Sheila Jackson Lee, Member,
Committee on Science, U.S. House of Representatives............ 9
Panel I:
The Hon. Rush Holt, a Representative in Congress from the State
of New Jersey
Oral Statement............................................... 10
Written Statement............................................ 12
Biography.................................................... 14
Discussion....................................................... 15
Panel II:
Dr. Jon M. Peha, Professor, Departments of Engineering and Public
Policy and Electrical and Computer Engineering, Carnegie Mellon
University
Oral Statement............................................... 19
Written Statement............................................ 20
Biography.................................................... 28
Financial Disclosure......................................... 29
Dr. Albert H. Teich, Director of Science and Policy Programs,
American Association for the Advancement of Science
Oral Statement............................................... 29
Written Statement............................................ 31
Biography.................................................... 34
Financial Disclosure......................................... 35
Dr. Peter D. Blair, Executive Director, Division on Engineering
and Physical Sciences, National Academy of Sciences
Oral Statement............................................... 36
Written Statement............................................ 38
Biography.................................................... 47
Financial Disclosure......................................... 47
Dr. Catherine T. Hunt, President-Elect, American Chemical
Society; Leader for Technology Partnerships, Rohm and Haas
Company
Oral Statement............................................... 48
Written Statement............................................ 49
Biography.................................................... 51
Financial Disclosure......................................... 53
Discussion....................................................... 54
Appendix 1: Answers to Post-Hearing Questions
The Hon. Rush Holt, a Representative in Congress from the State
of New Jersey 73
Dr. Jon M. Peha, Professor, Departments of Engineering and Public
Policy and Electrical and Computer Engineering, Carnegie Mellon
University 318
Dr. Albert H. Teich, Director of Science and Policy Programs,
American Association for the Advancement of Science 319
Dr. Peter D. Blair, Executive Director, Division on Engineering
and Physical Sciences, National Academy of Sciences 320
Dr. Catherine T. Hunt, President-Elect, American Chemical
Society; Leader for Technology Partnerships, Rohm and Haas
Company 322
Appendix 2: Additional Material for the Record
Statement of the Institute of Electrical and Electronics
Engineers-United States of America (IEEE-USA).................. 324
Technology Assessment in Congress: History and Legislative
Options, CRS Report for Congress, Genevieve J. Knezo,
Specialist in Science and Technology Policy, Resources,
Science, and Industry Division................................. 327
Scientific Advice for Policy in the United States: Lessons From
the National Academies and the Former Congressional Office of
Technology Assessment, Peter D. Blair, Executive Director,
Division on Engineering and Physical Sciences, National Academy
of Sciences.................................................... 333
SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL ADVICE FOR THE U.S. CONGRESS
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TUESDAY, JULY 25, 2006
House of Representatives,
Committee on Science,
Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:09 a.m., in Room
2318 of the Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Sherwood L.
Boehlert [Chairman of the Committee] presiding.
hearing charter
COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Science and Technology Advice
for the U.S. Congress
tuesday, july 25, 2006
10:00 a.m.-12:00 p.m.
2318 rayburn house office building
1. Purpose
On Tuesday, July 25, 2006, the Committee on Science of the U.S.
House of Representatives will hold a hearing to examine how Congress
receives advice about science, and whether and how the mechanisms for
providing that advice need to be improved.
2. Witnesses
Panel 1:
The Honorable Rush Holt is the Representative from the 12th District of
New Jersey.
Panel 2:
Dr. Jon Peha is a Professor in the Department of Engineering and Public
Policy and Electrical and Computer Engineering at Carnegie Mellon
University. He also was the co-editor with M. Granger Morgan of Science
and Technology Advice for Congress, a compilation of policy papers
evaluating existing systems and providing recommendations for science
and technology advice for the legislative branch.
Dr. Al Teich is the Director of Science and Policy Programs at the
American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS). He is also
the author of Technology and the Future, a collection of papers on how
technology and society interact.
Dr. Peter Blair is the Executive Director of the Division on
Engineering and Physical Sciences at the National Academy of Sciences.
He previously served as Assistant Director of the Office of Technology
Assessment.
Dr. Catherine Hunt is the President-elect of the American Chemical
Society and the Leader for Technology Partnerships (Emerging
Technologies) at the Rohm and Haas Company. She is a member of the
Executive Board of the Council for Chemical Research.
3. Overarching Questions
The hearing will address the following overarching questions:
1. What resources are available to Congress to provide
scientific and technical advice or assessments? How does
Congress use these resources?
2. What are the strengths and weaknesses of the current system
through which Congress receives scientific and technical
advice? Overall, does the current system effectively meet
Congress' needs, or do gaps exist?
3. What options are available to supplement or improve
existing resources to provide advice and assessments on
scientific or technical issues?
4. Brief Overview
Congress currently receives information and advice on
science and technology issues from, among others, the National
Academy of Sciences (NAS) and the Congressional Research
Service (CRS), science and engineering professional societies,
interest groups and think tanks. Additionally, some
Congressional offices employ staff with scientific backgrounds.
From 1972 to 1995, the Office of Technology
Assessment (OTA), a Congressional support office, prepared
reports at Congressional request on science and technology
issues. In 1995, funding for OTA was eliminated.
Reports from scientific groups and experts released
in recent years have criticized the lack of a dedicated source
of scientific and technical advice and assessment for Congress.
They argue that the resources currently available do not always
provide Congress with in-depth analysis, including analysis of
multiple policy options, in a form and on a schedule that is
useful to legislators.
Congressional advocates of creating (or recreating) a
Congressional entity for science advice responded to this
criticism, in part, by creating a pilot project within the
General Accounting Office (GAO) to provide advice on specific
issues. The Legislative Branch appropriation in fiscal years
2002-2004. GAO has completed four assessments as a result--one
each on biometrics, cyber security, wildland fires and cargo
security.
Advocates of an expanded scientific and technical
assessment capability to support the Legislative Branch have
proposed several options, including: (1) augmenting the
capabilities of existing Congressional agencies, (2) expanding
the use of the National Academy of Sciences, (3) increasing the
number of privately-sponsored Congressional science and
engineering fellows, (4) establishing a small Congressional
office that would farm Members' requests for information out to
expert non-governmental organizations, or (5) chartering a non-
governmental organization dedicated to providing science advice
and technology assessment for Congress.
5. Background
History of the Office of Technology Assessment
Congress created the Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) in 1972
to aid Congress ``in the identification and consideration of existing
and probable impacts of technological application.'' \1\ All technology
assessments conducted by the office were approved by the Technology
Assessment Board, a bipartisan body made up of six Senators and six
Representatives. Assessments could be requested by a committee chair,
the ranking minority member of a committee, the majority of members in
a committee, the Technology Assessment Board, or the director of OTA.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ OTA was created by the Technology Assessment Act of 1972 (P.L.
92-484).
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Funding for OTA was eliminated in 1995 as part of an effort to
reduce size of the federal budget and the Congressional budget and
bureaucracy. Proponents of eliminating OTA also argued that OTA reports
took over a year to complete (as do many National Academy reports) and,
therefore, were not available to legislators in a timeframe that was
useful to them, and that Congress would be able to obtain similar
advice from NAS, CRS, and GAO. Also, some Members felt that some of the
reports produced by OTA were not pertinent to the legislative agenda or
reflected a political bias.
GAO pilot program in technology assessments
The Fiscal Year 2002 (FY 2002) Legislative Branch Appropriations
Conference Report allocated $500,000 to GAO to conduct a study as part
of a pilot project in technology assessment. The resulting report,
released in November 2002, was entitled Using Biometrics for Border
Security.\2\ FY 2003 and FY 2004 appropriations reports contained
similar allocations, and GAO completed another technology assessment in
May 2004--Cyber Security for Critical Infrastructure Protection.\3\ GAO
completed the pilot project with two other technology assessments--
Protecting Structures and Improving Communications During Wildland
Fires, released in 2005, and Securing the Transport of Cargo
Containers, released in 2006.
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\2\ Using Biometrics for Border Security, Report GAO-03-174, is
available on-line at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03174.pdf.
\3\ Cyber Security for Critical Infrastructure Protection, Report
GAO-04-321, is available on-line at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/
d04321.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In addition to providing funds for these pilot technology
assessments, Congress requested two reviews of the pilot project's
performance. Overall, the external review, completed in 2002, reflected
very favorably on GAO's performance. The reviewers found that GAO did a
``very good job'' given the constraints--a very short timescale for the
assessment and no previous experience with conducting technology
assessments. However, the reviewers also noted that GAO has few staff
with adequate knowledge and experience of broad scientific and
technical issues necessary to evaluate a range of policy options.
6. Proposals for Improving Science Advice to Congress
Over the past several years, numerous proposals have been offered
for improving Congress' access to science advice and technology
assessment through legislation and policy recommendations. Bills to
directly re-establish the Office of Technology Assessment were
introduced in the 107th and 108th Congresses. Additionally, legislation
to create new Congressional agencies responsible for providing non-
partisan scientific and technical advice has been introduced. In June
2004, Congressman Holt introduced H.R. 4670, which would build upon the
pilot project at GAO by establishing within GAO a Center for Scientific
and Technical Assessment. (That bill has not been re-introduced.) The
Center would be dedicated to providing Congress with information,
analysis, and advice on issues related to science and technology. In
the Senate, Senator John Kerry introduced S. 1716 in 2001, in which
Section 153 created a Science and Technology Assessment Service to
provide ongoing independent science and technology advice ``. .
.within. . .the legislative branch.'' Assessments would have been
conducted using experts selected in consultation with the National
Academy of Sciences.
Science and Technology Advice for Congress, a collection of essays
by various authors, analyzes a number of potential means for expanding
the scientific and technical assessment capability for the Legislative
Branch. In addition to legislating mandating the creation of a
dedicated Congressional support office in this area, authors
representing groups such as AAAS, NAS, and various universities suggest
improving the access to and responsiveness of private organizations
capable of providing expert advice. One recommendation is to establish
a cadre of private organizations who are prepared to quickly respond to
questions distributed by a central office in Congress with knowledge of
their areas of expertise. Another suggestion involves expanding the
role of privately-sponsored Congressional science fellows by increasing
the number of fellows available for employment in Congressional offices
and better preparing them to deal with policy issues that arise in
these positions. The editors, Morgan and Peha, note that ``any analysis
process must continuously work to build widespread support among
members on a bipartisan, bicameral basis, so that when conflicts arise.
. .support for the analysis institution remains firm.'' \4\
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\4\ Morgan and Peha, 103.
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7. Questions for the Witnesses
What resources are available to Congress to provide
scientific and technical advice or assessments? How does
Congress use these resources?
What are the strengths and weaknesses of the current
system through which Congress receives scientific and technical
advice, particularly with regard to depth and breadth,
timeliness, and impartiality? Overall, does the current system
effectively meet Congress' needs, or does a significant gap
exist?
What options are available to supplement or improve
existing resources to provide assessments and advice on
scientific or technical issues?
Chairman Boehlert. Good morning. I want to welcome everyone
here to--for today's hearing on the vitally important topic of
how Congress should get scientific advice. I want to thank Dr.
Holt for urging us to have this hearing.
We have an excellent panel of witnesses before us today,
and I hope they will give us some specific ideas for how we
might improve the mechanisms for providing science advice to
the Congress. I think we need to get beyond the debate about
reviving the Office of Technology Assessment.
I must add I am a very strong defender of OTA, and I voted
against defunding it, but the others didn't see the wisdom of
the path that Dr. Holt and Dr. Ehlers and Dr. Bartlett and all
our distinguished scientists were leading us down.
Unfortunately, we didn't prevail. But OTA is not likely to be
coming back any time soon.
I also have to say, as a proponent of OTA, that the
reaction to the loss of OTA has been somewhat disproportionate.
If you listen to the scientific community, you might think that
OTA was the only thing separating Congress from barbarianism.
We do have plenty of current sources of information,
particularly the National Academies, and boy, do they do
wonderful work. So the question before us today is: what
specific gaps exist, and how can they be filled?
Also, much of the lament one hears about OTA's demise is
really not a concern about what advice Congress is getting, but
rather, about what decisions Congress is making when it gets
that advice. So, it is important to remember that not all
people will reach the same policy conclusions based on the same
scientific information, even if they understand and accept that
information.
Perhaps the most dangerous fallacy in Washington is: ``If
you knew what I know, you would think like I think.'' Let us
not confuse policy differences with ignorance.
Which is not to say that Congress does not sometimes
display ignorance, sometimes willful ignorance. But that is not
a problem of not receiving advice, it is a problem of not
listening to it. To take one current example, a high profile
example, I might add, the National Academy, a few weeks ago,
released a clear, balanced, and thoughtful overview of the
current understanding of global temperature over the past 1,000
years. Some Members have taken that report to heart. Others are
trying to distract from its conclusions by focusing on
individual papers that have already been superseded. That is
their right, but my only point here is that debate says nothing
about the quality of information Congress is receiving.
I like to tell people that I work in an institution, and in
a town, where everybody likes to say they are for science-based
decision-making, but when the overwhelming scientific consensus
leads to a politically inconvenient conclusion, then they want
to go to Plan B.
Well, I look forward to hearing from our witnesses today,
but in discussing what kinds of information science needs, let
us make sure we are not confusing the availability of
information with any other issues.
With that, I am pleased to turn to Mr. Gordon.
[The prepared statement of Chairman Boehlert follows:]
Prepared Statement of Chairman Sherwood L. Boehlert
I want to welcome everyone here for today's hearing on the vitally
important topic of how Congress should get scientific advice, and I
want to thank Mr. Holt for urging us to have this hearing.
We have an excellent panel of witnesses before us today, and I hope
they will give us some specific ideas for how we might improve the
mechanisms for providing science advice to the Congress. I think we
need to get beyond the debate about reviving the Office of Technology
Assessment (OTA).
I was a strong defender of OTA--and I voted against defunding it--
but OTA is not likely to be coming back any time soon.
I also have to say, as a proponent of OTA, that the reaction to the
loss of OTA has been somewhat disproportionate. If you listen to the
scientific community, you might think that OTA was the only thing
separating Congress from barbarism. We do have plenty of current
sources of information, particularly the National Academies, so the
question before us today is: what specific gaps exist and how can they
be filled?
Also, much of the lament one hears about OTA's demise is really not
a concern about what advice Congress is getting, but rather about what
decisions Congress is making. So it's important to remember that not
all people will reach the same policy conclusion based on the same
scientific information--even if they understand and accept that
information.
Perhaps the most dangerous fallacy in Washington is: ``If you knew
what I know, you'd think like I think.'' Let's not confuse policy
differences with ignorance.
Which is not to say that Congress does not sometimes display
ignorance, sometimes willful ignorance. But that's not a problem of not
receiving advice; it's a problem of not listening to it. To take one
current example, the National Academy a few weeks ago released a clear,
balanced and thoughtful overview of the current understanding of global
temperature over the past 1,000 years. Some Members have taken that
report to heart; others are trying to distract from its conclusions by
focusing on individual papers that have already been superseded. That's
their right, but my only point here is that the debate says nothing
about the quality of the information Congress is receiving.
So I look forward to hearing from our witnesses today. But in
discussing what kinds of information science needs, let's make sure
we're not confusing the availability of information with any other
issues.
Mr. Gordon.
Mr. Gordon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for
scheduling a hearing on this important topic of science and
technology advice to the Committee, and we are particularly
pleased that Congressman Dr. Holt is among our witnesses, and
thank you for being here, Rush. You lend a particular dual role
to this hearing.
We appreciate your leadership on this topic, and are
pleased to join you in seeking better ways to incorporate the
best available scientific and engineering knowledge to our
legislative activities.
It was over 40 years ago that the Science Committee first
addressed the topic of science advice to Congress. Congressman
Mim Daddario, a Member of the Committee, a charter Member of
this committee, and Republican Chuck Mosher co-authored the
legislation that created the Office of Technical Assessment.
It was Charles Lindbergh who got Congressman Daddario
focused on technology assessment. In the early 1960s, Lindbergh
was concerned that the Earth was heading for disaster, unless
the balance between science and ecology were properly adjusted.
Does my friend from California, Mr. Rohrabacher, think that
this sounds familiar?
Mr. Rohrabacher. Well, I certainly do respect Mr.
Lindbergh.
Mr. Gordon. Lindbergh felt Congress needed specialized
scientific expertise to analyze this and other tough problems.
Daddario and Lindbergh continued to talk about technology
assessment for several years. During the 1960s, the Committee
had many hearings, and issued several reports on science advice
to the Congress that paved the way for legislation creating OTA
in the early 1970s.
In the early '70s, the legislation that established OTA was
reported unanimously by the Committee on Science. The Committee
leadership then worked bipartisanly to get the bill through the
House and Senate.
During its twenty years of operation, OTA created 700
reports on the science and technology behind issues of
importance to Congress.
We could use a service like OTA today, since relatively few
Members of Congress have formal training and experience as
scientists and engineers, and since much of the information we
receive comes from advocates selling their points of view.
In the years since OTA, we have had an increasingly
difficult time of reaching consensus on a wide variety of these
topics. We certainly could use in-house help in sorting through
conflicting expert opinion.
I therefore look forward to the testimony of today's
experts, and to taking the first steps toward improving the way
in which Congress receives and uses scientific and technical
advice.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Gordon follows:]
Prepared Statement of Representative Bart Gordon
Mr. Chairman, thank you for scheduling a hearing on the important
topic of science and technology advice to the Committee and for
including Congressman Holt among the witnesses.
We appreciate your leadership on this topic and are pleased to join
you in seeking better ways to incorporate the best available scientific
and engineering knowledge into our legislative activities.
It was over 40 years ago that the Science Committee first addressed
the topic of science advice to Congress. Democrat Mim Daddario, a
charter Member of our committee, and Republican Chuck Mosher co-
authored the legislation that created the Office of Technology
Assessment.
It was Charles Lindbergh who got Congressman Daddario focused on
technology assessment. In the early 1960s, Lindbergh was concerned that
the Earth was heading for disaster unless the balance between science
and ecology were properly adjusted.
Lindbergh felt Congress needed specialized scientific expertise to
analyze this and other tough problems. Daddario and Lindbergh continued
to talk about technology assessment for several years.
During the 1960s, the Committee had many hearings and issued
several reports on science advice to the Congress that paved the way
for the legislation creating OTA in the early 1970s.
In the early 1970s, the legislation establishing OTA was reported
unanimously by the Committee on Science. The Committee leadership then
worked bipartisanly to get the bill through the House and Senate.
During its 20 years of operation, OTA created 700 reports on the
science and technology behind issues of importance to Congress.
We could use a service like OTA today since relatively few Members
of Congress have formal training and experience as scientists and
engineers and since much of the information we receive comes from
advocates selling their points of view.
In the years since OTA, we have had an increasingly difficult time
of reaching consensus on a wide variety of these topics. We certainly
could use in-house help in sorting through conflicting expert opinion.
I look forward to the testimony of today's experts, and to taking
the first steps towards improving the way in which Congress receives
and uses scientific and technical advice.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Costello follows:]
Prepared Statement of Representative Jerry F. Costello
Good afternoon. I want to thank the witnesses for appearing before
our committee to examine how Congress receives advice about science and
discuss how this process can be improved.
For over twenty years, the Office of Technology Assessment (OTA)
prepared reports by Congressional request on science and technology
issues. In 1995, funding for OTA was eliminated. Currently, Congress
receives information and advice on science and technology issues from
the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) and the Congressional Research
Service (CRS), science and engineering professional organizations,
interest groups and think tanks. In recent years, reports from
scientific groups have raised concerns over the lack of scientific and
technical advice and assessment for Congress.
I am interested to hear from our witnesses what options are
available to supplement or improve existing resources to provide advice
and assessments on scientific and technical issues given recent
concerns. I look forward to hearing from the panel of witnesses.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Johnson follows:]
Prepared Statement of Representative Eddie Bernice Johnson
Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member. I would like to welcome
today's witnesses and thank you for the perspective you will provide
today.
Congress relies on experts from the scientific research community
to assess the needs of our national scientific enterprise. It is
important to know how America ranks compared with other nations.
Our competitive nature is what makes Americans, with our
capitalistic society, one of the richest nations in the world.
Americans are leaders.
In order to maintain our cutting edge when it comes to technology
matters, we lawmakers need a consistent and reliable source of unbiased
advice.
The National Academy of Sciences, the Congressional Research
Service, professional societies, and think tanks are all examples of
current advisors to Congress.
It is interesting to hear your perspective on whether the way
Congress receives its advice needs to be changed or even improved.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back the remainder of my time.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Jackson Lee follows:]
Prepared Statement of Representative Sheila Jackson Lee
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, I appreciate the fact
that this hearing has been called today in order to re-examine the way
in which Congress receives scientific and technological advice.
I would like to thank my colleague Mr. Holt for his interest and
commitment to addressing this issue, as well as the other witnesses for
testifying today: Dr. Blair, Dr. Peha, Dr. Teich, and Dr. Hunt.
As early as the 1950s, Members of Congress understood the
importance not only of scientific and technological advice, but of
even-handed ``Technology Assessment Board'' to explore and report on
how technological advances would affect the environment. This lead to
the creation of the Office of Technology Assessment in 1971.
For those who utilized the studies and resources of the OTA, its
benefits and value were never in question. Sadly, the agency was cut in
1995 as part of a government-wide belt tightening, and Congress lost
its most reliable and balanced science analysis tool.
The Office of Technology Assessment can be compared to the other
three remaining legislative branch research organizations: the
Government Accountability Office, the Congressional Budget Office, and
the Congressional Research Service. As well respected as these
organizations are, none of the three have the infrastructure, staff, or
expertise to conduct thorough scientific examinations into legislative
proposals or impact analyses on public policy.
Clearly, as we move into the 21st century, we will need
increasingly sophisticated resources with which to develop the law of
the land, and the public policy of our future. It is crucial that
Congress make informed, intelligent, and evidence-based decisions in
crafting this nation's energy, technology, and science policy. I hope
that the hearing today will be able to further advise and inform us on
how to proceed.
Thank you Mr. Chairman, and I yield the balance of my time.
Panel I:
Chairman Boehlert. Thank you very much, and now, we will
hear from our first witness, the very distinguished witness,
and a colleague with whom it is a pleasure to work, Dr. Rush
Holt.
STATEMENT OF HON. RUSH HOLT, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM
THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY
Mr. Holt. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I thank you and Mr.
Gordon for those good remarks.
I know in this committee, you are accustomed to hearing
testimony of astounding novelty about really path-breaking
advances, but I often tell witnesses, when they are testifying
before a Congressional committee, that they shouldn't
underestimate the pleasure they give an audience by telling
them something they already know. And in this case, I will talk
about something that, at least if we are honest with ourselves,
we already know, and that is that none of us in Congress either
have the time, or in many cases, the ability to analyze
scientific and technological advances, make reasoned, logical
determinations about their direction and the impact on industry
and on nations and on education, on our citizens. And yet, we
vote on decisions about topics on a regular basis that include
technical and scientific components. The connections to science
and technology are not always obvious, especially to Members
who avoid science and technology, which, I must say, are most
Members. So, if we are honest with ourselves, we have to say we
cannot do this alone.
I will be brief, because we have some excellent people
speaking after me, and I have read their testimony, I have
talked with some of them, and I think we can learn a lot about
what maybe we already know. Congress used to have an in-house
professional office dedicated to providing technological
assessment services. Mr. Gordon referred to Representative
Daddario, for example, who helped set this up. And Congress
received regular reports, in a legislatively relevant form, on
such topics as agricultural technology, alternative fuels, arms
control, banking, business and industry, communications,
climate change, computer security, defense technology, economic
development, education, energy efficiency, fishing, health,
technology, international relations in technology transfer,
natural disasters, nuclear energy, nuclear war and weapons,
oceanography, oil, gas, mineral resources, transportation, yes,
all of those things, on a regular basis.
And Congress decided in 1995 that we didn't need an in-
house body dedicated to technological assessment. The
technological assessment could come, we told ourselves--this
was before my time here--could come through committee hearings,
through CRS reports, through experts in our district, through
think tanks, through the National Research Council and the
National Academies.
Now, you and I know that Members of Congress have a low
comfort level with technology in general and are generally
unable to probe beyond our personal understanding or the
briefing books crafted by our staffers, but let us look at the
history. In the ten years since we said that these various
groups could provide the technical advice that we need, we have
not gotten what we need in order to do the people's work. We
should acknowledge that.
Yes, there are organizations that separate us from the
barbarians, as the Chairman has said, Congressional Research
Service, the National Academies, institutions like Stanford or
Carnegie Mellon or Princeton. We have organizations like the
AAAS, the American Chemical Society.
We do not suffer from a lack of information here on Capitol
Hill, but from a lack of ability to glean the knowledge and to
gauge the validity, the credibility, and the usefulness of the
large amounts of information and advice that we receive.
And there are real gaps in what Congress gets. We are not
getting what we need, I would argue.
But why is this of such importance to Congress? Why do we
need a specialized in-house scientific and technical assessment
organization or organ? Well, I can think of three what I would
call compelling reasons. Science and technology pervade almost
all of the issues before us. If you look at today's hearings in
the House and the Senate, or yesterday's, or last week's, you
will find a number of topics that are being considered that
most Members of Congress don't even think of as technological
issues, and yet, they have technological components. What we
will have on the Floor this week, what we had on the Floor last
week, had technological components that in many cases, were not
considered fully.
Secondly, the language and technologies are specialized and
complex and require translation for Members and their staff.
Third, Members think science and technology are for scientists
and technologists, thus avoiding science and technology
themselves. I think every Member of Congress is aware of the
social, economic, moral, and political aspects of the issues
before us, and in many cases, Members are good at analyzing
those things. Not so with the scientific and technological
aspects of the issues before us. Members duck those aspects,
flee them, ignore them, or perhaps most often, march off
oblivious to them.
The Science Committee is of least concern. Most Members
here recognize that the issues that come before you have
technological components, and you get the help necessary.
However, this may not be true for other committees, all of
which, every one of which, handles topics that have some
scientific and technological components, whether it is the
Agriculture Committee, the Appropriations Committee, the
Education and Workforce Committee, or on down the line.
We need to fill the gaps in our science and technology
advice. Technology has been studied extensively by scholars,
some of whom we will hear from today, and the lessons are
clear. The issues are too complex and the stakes are too high
for us to try to wing it on issues like stem cell research or
biofuels or technology transfer or healthcare. But if we are
honest with ourselves, we should say that we actually don't
even need scholars, however good today's witnesses are. We
don't need scholars to tell us we need help. If we are honest
with ourselves, we know it. We need a dedicated, in-house,
permanently staffed organization to give us objective,
nonpartisan advice on science and technology issues.
We know it can be done. We have done it before, as a body.
I hope we will find a way to do it again, and I thank the
Chairman for leading us off on this.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Holt follows:]
Prepared Statement of Representative Rush Holt
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, I thank you for the
opportunity to explore the state of science and technology advice and
assessment for Congress. You each know my passion for this subject, and
I appreciate the opportunity to speak with you on this matter today. I
look forward to working with you on this critical topic in the future.
To use a cliche, but to set the stage properly, our world is
changing at an accelerated rate brought on by technology. The invention
of the transistor in 1947 led to the development of the computer.
DARPA, our own military R&D facility, invented the Internet, and in
1989, a scientist at the Center for European Research in Nuclear
Physics in Switzerland, invented the World Wide Web to meet the demand
for automatic information sharing between scientists working at
different locations around the world. Nothing has been the same since
these advances; we all depend on our Blackberries and cell phones to
keep appraised of the happenings of the world. However, technological
advancements extend beyond communications into health care, education,
transportation, intelligence and military activities, agriculture,
environmental protection, as well as the very process of government
from voting to judicial punishments, to agency record keeping. We see
the effect of technological advances reverberate around the globe. The
gap between industrialized nations and developing nations grows for
some. Others nip at our heels to gain the world lead in one technology
or another. Human interaction across the globe will never be the same,
and it is hard to know where it is going. Yet, that is our job as
Members of the United States House of Representatives. We were sent
here by our constituents to lead our nation into the future, securing
the livelihoods of each person we represent as well as protecting and
maintaining the competitive edge of our nation in the emerging global
knowledge economy.
None of us in Congress have time to analyze scientific and
technological advances and make reasoned, logical determinations of
their direction and impact on industry, nations, and education, but we
vote on decisions about topics on a regular basis that include
technical or scientific components. The connections to science and
technology are not always obvious, especially to Members who avoid
science and technology, which are most Members. We cannot do this
alone.
Congress used to have an in-house professional office dedicated to
providing technological assessment services. Congress received regular
reports in a legislatively relevant form on such subjects as
agriculture technology, alternative fuels, arms control, banking,
business and industry, communications, climate change, computer
security & technology, defense technology, economic development,
education, energy efficiency, the fishing industry, health and health
technology, international relations and technology transfer, natural
disasters, nuclear energy, nuclear war & nuclear weapons, oceans and
oceanography, oil, gas, and mineral resources, transportation, and
waste management. Congress decided in 1995 that we did not need an in-
house body dedicated to technological assessment.
The technical assessment could come, we told ourselves (before my
time here), through committee hearings, CRS reports, experts in our
district, think tanks, and the National Academy of Sciences. Now, you
and I each know that Members of Congress have a low comfort level with
technology and are generally unable to probe beyond our personal
understanding or the briefing books crafted by our staffers. In the ten
years since we said these various groups would provide the technical
advice we need, we have not gotten what we need in order to do the
people's work. We should acknowledge that.
The Congressional Research Service does a good job of gathering the
current information from a myriad of sources and presents the issues
clearly in its reports. The GAO has taken upon itself to do some
technical assessments. Some of us represent districts rich in
scientific and technological expertise, in business, academia, or
national laboratories and we informally or formally draw on the
knowledge of our constituents. The National Academy of Sciences has the
National Research Council, which completes studies for the Federal
Government including recommendations of actions to be taken by the
agency or branch of government. Some professional societies have
started to reach out to Congress, and you will hear from the American
Association for the Advancement of Science and the American Chemical
Society today about what they do for Congress as far as technical or
scientific advice or assessments.
We do not suffer from a lack of information here on Capitol Hill,
but from a lack of ability to glean the knowledge and to gauge the
validity, credibility, and usefulness of the large amounts of
information and advice received on a daily basis. Although we would
like to believe that the scientific and technical advice and assessment
provided from outside remains politically neutral, this is not
necessarily the case. In general, groups tend to be slow in responding
to real-time needs of Members of Congress or their staffers in terms of
science and technology assessment or advice, they often do not know
what is happening in the halls of Congress, and have their own agendas.
There are real gaps in what Congress gets.
We are not getting what we need.
We need unbiased technical and scientific assessments in a
Congressional time-frame by those who are familiar with the functions,
the language, and the workings of Congress. We had this for twenty-
three years through the Office of Technology Assessment, commonly
referred to as the OTA. Although the OTA had its detractors, the OTA
was a part of the Legislative Branch of the U.S. Government and existed
to serve the Congress in one manner: scientific and technical advice
for Congress. The OTA was able to elaborate on the broader context of
an issue and inform the policy debate with assiduous and objective
analysis of the policy consequences of alternative courses of action.
The OTA expounded on the various outcomes given particular policy
choices, at times extending beyond a mere technical analysis. In 1995
Congress defunded the OTA, and no group or combination of groups has
been able to assume OTA's place as the provider of scientific and
technical assessment and advice to Congress. To give you an idea, at a
rapid glance at the list of the 703 reports produced by the OTA, there
are dozens that are still relevant today. ``Potential Environmental
Impacts of Bioenergy Crop Production,'' ``Innovation and
Commercialization of Emerging Technologies,'' ``Retiring Old Cars:
Programs to Save Gasoline and Reduce Emissions,'' ``Renewing Our Energy
Future,'' and ``Testing in America's Schools: Asking the Right
Questions,'' would all be OTA reports of use today.
Why is this of such importance to Congress? Why do we need
specialized, in-house scientific and technical assessments and advice?
I can think of three compelling reasons: science and technology pervade
almost all issues before us, including many that are not recognized
explicitly as technology issues; the language and technologies are
specialized and complex, and require translation for Members and their
staff; and Members think science and technology are for scientists and
technologists, thus avoiding science and technology themselves. Every
Member is aware of the social, economic, moral, and political aspects
of each of the issues before us. Not so with scientific and
technological aspects of the issues before us. Members duck those
aspects of the issues, flee them, ignore them, and, perhaps most often,
march off oblivious to them.
Decisions made about fisheries, biofuels, agricultural
technologies, educational technologies, intellectual property rights,
technology transfer, foreign aid, the health care system, and broadband
communications, will determine the course of our nation. On the floor
we recently have dealt with such issues as voting, missile defense, and
net neutrality, each of which has technological components. This week
we will vote on the ``U.S.-India Nuclear Cooperation Promotion Act,''
the ``Pension Protection Act,'' and the ``Carl D. Perkins Career and
Technical Education Improvement Act,'' each with a technical
component--some larger, some smaller, some obvious to Members, many not
obvious. In the last few weeks, various committees have held hearings
on subjects which contain scientific and technical components. The
committees sometimes seem unaware that the subjects contain scientific
and technological components. The Science Committee is of least
concern; most Members recognize the technological aspects of the issues
and get the help necessary. However, this may not be so true for other
committees, all of which handle topics with scientific and technical
components. For example, the Agriculture Committee recently held a
hearing on ``Reviewing the Federal Farm Policy;'' the Appropriations
Committee held a hearing on ``the Census;'' the Education and the
Workforce Committee held a hearing on ``NCLB: Can Growth Models Ensure
Improved Education for all Students;'' the Energy and Commerce
Committee held a hearing on ``Expanding the Emergency Alert System;''
the Homeland Security Committee held a hearing asking ``Is Our Nation
Prepared for a Public Health Disaster?;'' the Small Business Committee
held a hearing on ``The Effects of the High Cost of Natural Gas on
Small Business and Future Energy Technologies;'' and the House
Administration Committee held a hearing on ``Voting System Standards.''
We lack the scientific and technological analysis of each topic. OTA
could have provided this.
We, each day when we cast our vote, are deciding the future of our
nation; we are deciding the future for our children, our grandchildren,
and our great-grandchildren. We are creating a legacy for which history
will hold us accountable. We failed to assimilate some of the culture
and knowledge of the Native Americans into our own working schemas when
we spread into their lands. I am told that when the Iroquois made
decisions for their nation, they were looking ahead to make sure that
every decision related to the welfare and well-being of the seventh
generation to come, and that was the basis by which decisions were
made. They asked themselves ``Will this be a benefit to the seventh
generation?''
In our technologically advanced, short-focused society, we have
lost long-term vision. Investment and decisions concerning science and
technology require an understanding of the scientific and technological
development process, a sense of responsibility to understand the
potential policy outcomes of our decisions, and the understanding that
the pay-offs might not come until the next generation.
We need to fill the gaps in our science and technology advice.
Technology has been studied extensively by scholars, and the lessons
are clear. If we are honest with ourselves, we don't need scholars to
tell us we need help. We know it. We need a dedicated, in-house,
permanently staffed organization. Each Member of Congress should be
able to request a study. The management structure should be designed to
deal adequately with the needs of Congress. Political neutrality must
be protected. It should also be physically close to Congress. Studies
must be useful to the Members of Congress and in time and in language
to make them relevant.
Jack Gibbons, referring to the need for an in-house technology
assessment organ, sometimes quotes poet Edna St. Vincent Millay:
``Wisdom enough to leech us of our ill
Is daily spun, but there exists no loom
To weave it into fabric. . .''
There is no shortage of information and no shortage of wisdom. We
are swamped with experts. We need help in weaving it into policy-
relevant fabric.
Biography for Rush Holt
Rush Holt, 57, is a resident of Hopewell Township, N.J. Born in
West Virginia he inherited his interest in politics from his parents.
His father was the youngest person ever to be elected to the U.S.
Senate, at age 29. His mother served as Secretary of State of West
Virginia and was the first woman to have held that position.
Rep. Holt earned his B.A. in Physics from Carleton College in
Minnesota and completed his Master's and Ph.D. at NYU. He has held
positions as a teacher, Congressional Science Fellow, and arms control
expert at the U.S. State Department where he monitored the nuclear
programs of countries such as Iraq, Iran, North Korea, and the former
Soviet Union. From 1989 until he launched his 1998 congressional
campaign, Holt was Assistant Director of the Princeton Plasma Physics
Laboratory, the largest research facility of Princeton University and
the largest center for research in alternative energy in New Jersey. He
has conducted extensive research on alternative energy and has his own
patent for a solar energy device. Holt was also a five-time winner of
the game show ``Jeopardy.''
An active Member of Congress and a strong voice for his
constituents, Rep. Holt serves on two committees, including the
Committee on Education and the Workforce and the House Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence. Holt is the only scientist and only Member
from the New Jersey delegation to sit on the Intelligence Committee,
where he serves as the Ranking Minority Member on the Intelligence
Policy Subcommittee. He is also on temporary leave from a third
committee, the House Committee on Resources. Holt is also a member of
the bipartisan Commission on Congressional Mailing Standards or the
``Franking Commission.''
Holt has had the honor to serve on the National Commission on
Mathematics and Science Teaching for the 21st Century chaired by former
Senator and astronaut John Glenn and currently sits on several
caucuses, including those on Renewable Energy, Sustainable Development,
Alzheimer's, Diabetes, Biomedical Research, India and Indian-Americans,
Hellenic and Greek-American affairs, Farmland Protection, Human Rights,
and a Woman's Right to Choose. Rep. Holt is also a member of the New
Democrat Coalition.
In only a short time, Rep. Holt has won several significant
victories in Washington. He helped secure more than $700 million in new
federal funding for science and technology research. He passed an
amendment to the Land and Water Conservation Fund providing millions in
funding for protecting open space and he was instrumental in adding the
lower Delaware River to the National Wild and Scenic River program. He
also initiated a federal study to map the gene sequences of all
potential biological weapons to help first-responders and law
enforcement react more effectively in the event of biological attack
and he commissioned a Congressional investigation into the care at 91
nursing homes in New Jersey following up on reports of negligence.
Rep. Holt has brought significant federal resources to New Jersey.
He helped secure $5.6 million for security improvements at the Naval
Weapons Station Earle in Monmouth County, $2 million to establish a
Land Use Municipal Resource Center to help local communities fight
sprawl, and $500,000 for Hunterdon Medical Center to improve its
emergency room facilities. Holt has also helped secure more than a
hundred million dollars to improve roads, build libraries, and protect
historic sites in the five counties he represents.
Throughout New Jersey's 12th district, Rep. Holt has developed a
reputation as a tireless advocate for his constituents. He has assisted
over five thousand constituents who have contacted his office with
inquiries, producing resolutions for problems ranging from Medicare to
veterans' health care to immigration. He has also made hundreds of
school visits and held dozens of town meetings and forums on topics
such as Homeland Security, Alternative Energy, Economic Growth,
Prescription Drugs, Student Aid, Privacy, Long-Term Care, and Sprawl.
Rep. Holt has received numerous awards and citations for his work,
including the Planned Parenthood Community Service Award, the Biotech
Legislator of the Year, and the Science Coalition's Champion of Science
award. The magazine Scientific-American has also named Holt one of the
50 national ``visionaries'' contributing to ``a brighter technological
future.''
Rep. Holt is married to Margaret Lancefield, a physician and
Medical Director of the Princeton charity care clinic. They have three
grown children, Michael, Dejan and Rachel, and six grandchildren, Noah,
Niala, Boaz, Varun, Cecile, and Rohan.
Discussion
Chairman Boehlert. Thank you very much, Dr. Holt, and you
know what? It shows you how well we get along together,
Democrat and Republican, New Jersey, New York. I thought that
was an outstanding statement, maybe because I agree with it.
But I want to increase your comfort zone somewhat. I am
proud to report that this committee and the professional staff
has 14 Ph.D.s, 14. That is very impressive, and I am also proud
of the fact that we are very active with a number of
organizations in town, and you mentioned some of them, AAAS,
American Chemical Society, in providing opportunities for
Ph.D.s in various scientific disciplines to serve a year's
fellowship on the Hill. It is a wonderful program, and so, we
are making progress. We are moving in the right direction. That
doesn't negate anything that you said in the statement. It just
supplements what you said.
Mr. Holt. If I may, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Boehlert. Sure.
Mr. Holt. I do want to emphasize that I am not worried
about the Science Committee. I mean, I do hope that in future
years, it will have leadership as good as it has had in this
Congress. However, it is all of those other committees, all of
those other Members, that I worry about.
Chairman Boehlert. That like to wade into the science pool
of activity, and sometimes, well--we won't go into what some of
the other committees do or fail to do.
Thank you very much for your outstanding statement. I do
appreciate it. Does anyone have any particular questions for
our colleague, who has got a very busy schedule?
Mr. Rohrabacher. Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Boehlert. We are going to provide you with a treat
now, Dr. Holt. Mr. Rohrabacher.
Mr. Rohrabacher. I wonder if you could tell me what the
budget was for the Office of Technology Assessment per year in
the ten years prior to us eliminating it.
Mr. Holt. At the time it was--I don't have the exact
figures, and perhaps, staff can help us here, but when OTA was
defunded, it was never deauthorized, when it was defunded in
1995, the operating budget was something in the twenties of
millions of dollars a year. I would argue a bargain at any
price, but----
Mr. Rohrabacher. Did you ever request studies done by the
Office of Technology Assessment?
Mr. Holt. I was not a Member of Congress. However, I used
many of their studies.
Mr. Rohrabacher. I was, and I requested things, and they
were always late, and often, they got us the material after the
debate was already decided, and when the Republican majority
came in in 1994, meaning the first year was '95, we were
looking for the most inefficient things we could get rid of in
Congress, in order to say that we are cutting back here, as
well as in the rest of government, and the Members, by
majority, found out that--and those of us who had used it--that
this was one of the most inefficient operations that we had,
and thus, deserved to be cut.
Mr. Holt. Well----
Mr. Rohrabacher. Over the objection of others, like the
Chairman, et cetera, who didn't see that, but----
Chairman Boehlert. Let me point out, Mr.----
Mr. Rohrabacher. But the majority did believe that.
Chairman Boehlert. Mr. Rohrabacher, let me----
Mr. Rohrabacher. Yes.
Chairman Boehlert.--point out that not everyone looked at
the picture and saw the same vision. There were a number of us
who highly valued the outstanding work of the Office of
Technology Assessment, and many of us felt that sometimes,
while they were a little bit delinquent in responding to a
particular request that you might have advanced, because they
were getting so many requests, because it was very obvious that
there was a need for the product they were producing, because
they were getting so many requests for information. Members
like me, who are just--I pride myself in being a pretty darn
good generalist, but not a specialist in anything, and you
know, I just sort of threw up my hands, and said where do I go
for information. And I was not alone. A number of my colleagues
did the same thing, and so, I would contend they were sort of
overworked, and therefore, that is why they were somewhat
delinquent.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Well, I would agree, Mr. Chairman, that,
you know, your worldview sometimes, you know, affects your
assessment of, not only the scientific assessment, assessment
of how you should spend your money. I mean, I operate under the
assumption that bureaucracy is the most effective method ever
developed that can turn pure energy into solid waste, and if
you couple that, you know, couple great scientists with
bureaucracy, and you are expecting to get something out of it
more effective than what other bureaucracies produce, I think
it really is wishful thinking, and I think, by experience,
those of us who voted to eliminate the program, or eliminate
funding for it, realized that asking consultants on the outside
to do the same job was actually more cost-effective, and you
actually had more control on them than you did once you hired
someone as a government employee, and anyway, I would just say
that, although we all agree that science is important, and
making sure that we try to get nonpartisan assessments is
important, certainly we shouldn't give up our analysis of what
happens to even scientists when they become bureaucrats, and
part of this bureaucracy----
Chairman Boehlert. I was----
Mr. Holt. I would like to address----
Chairman Boehlert. Mr. Gordon is most anxious to have an
intervention, also, but----
Mr. Holt. I am not here, and I don't think the witnesses
are here, to re-fight old battles. I do think that we have now
10 years of data, and it is pretty clear to me, since I have
been here most of those ten years now, that we have not gotten
the kind of technological assessment and advice that we told
ourselves we would be able to get through other methods. So, it
hasn't worked over the last 10 years. Now----
Mr. Rohrabacher. Could you give me some examples of that?
Mr. Holt. There may be some----
Mr. Rohrabacher. Well, a couple examples.
Mr. Holt. Sure. How about, let me see, do I have today's--
--
Mr. Rohrabacher. Well, we have got global warming advice
coming out our ears, of course, by everyone who is being paid
to give us that advice, but go ahead.
Mr. Holt. Yeah. Well, I will illustrate this in a way.
Chairman Boehlert. I told you it would be an interesting
intervention.
Mr. Holt. Not to harp on OTA, but to make the point that we
still have a crying need for policy-relevant, I would argue in-
house, but at least policy-relevant technological assessment
and advice, let me also address your point about the timeliness
of the reports we got from OTA.
We got reports from OTA on adverse reaction to vaccines,
computer software and intellectual property, saving energy in
U.S. transportation, retiring old cars, export controls and
nonproliferation policy, electronic surveillance in a digital
age. Let me suggest to the gentleman that those reports were so
timely that they are still useful today. Now, maybe you didn't
get it on the week that you wanted it, but these are reports
that are still useful today.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Some of those reports may have been given
to us after we had the vote in Congress on the issue.
Mr. Holt. But my point----
Mr. Rohrabacher. That is the important point.
Mr. Holt. My point to the gentleman is we have not yet
resolved the issues of adverse reactions to vaccines,
intellectual property and computer software, saving energy in
U.S. transportation, retiring old cars, export controls and
nonproliferation policy, electronic surveillance in a digital
age. We still need those reports, and in fact, we are still
using them.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Thank you.
Chairman Boehlert. Mr. Gordon.
Mr. Gordon. Just briefly, I know, I disagree with my friend
from California, Mr. Rohrabacher, but I don't disagree with his
sincerity. I know that he is sincere in these issues, so I am
not going to try to get into an argument, because we are not
going to change anybody's mind.
But let me just again point out that if there was a problem
with timeliness at OTA earlier, the problem, I think, as the
Chairman pointed out, was it was underfunded and over-
requested, which demonstrates, you know, it was the wrong
reaction. We should have increased the funding, and I think by
having good information, we would have saved the country money.
And I particularly have to disagree that we want to--with
Mr. Rohrabacher's announcement that we need to contract these
things out, so we would have more control over them. We don't
want to have more control over them. We want to have good, you
know, solid scientific information.
Again, he is sincere, Mr. Holt is sincere, I think. Nobody
would be at this stimulating meeting today, if they weren't
sincere.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Well, would the gentleman yield for just
one moment.
Mr. Gordon. And so----
Mr. Rohrabacher. Would the gentleman yield?
Mr. Gordon. Certainly, certainly.
Mr. Rohrabacher. What I have been told is the budget over a
ten year period was $200 million, and they had two hundred
employees in, you know, the Office, and that is an awful lot of
consulting work that we could have had done for $200 million--
--
Mr. Gordon. Well, that is $20 million a year.
Mr. Holt. Yes, it was about $20 million a year in those
years' dollars, at its peak, 143 employees, I am told.
Chairman Boehlert. Thanks. Anyone else? All right. Thank
you very much, Dr. Holt.
We could have a spirited, over a cup of coffee, discussion
with Mr. Rohrabacher and our colleagues on the Committee,
because for the benefit of the audience, this is the type of
conversations we oftentimes will have on the floor, and Dana
Rohrabacher and I don't always see eye to eye, but we always
agree to have a nice friendly little chat about such things as
global climate change, which he thinks is a figment of my
imagination, but thank you, Dr. Holt, and thank you, Mr.
Rohrabacher, for the intervention.
Now, our second panel, and here is what I would like to do.
I ask unanimous consent that Dr. Holt be permitted to sit with
the Committee, and participate in the questioning. Without
objection, so ordered.
Now, panel number two. Dr. Jon Peha, Department of
Engineering and Public Policy, Carnegie Mellon University. Dr.
Al Teich, Director, AAAS Directorate for Science and Policy
Programs, American Association for the Advancement of Science.
Dr. Peter Blair, Executive Director, Division on Engineering
and Physical Sciences, the National Research Council, and Dr.
Catherine T. Hunt, the Leader of Technology Partnerships, Rohm
and Haas Company.
Panelists, thank you so much for being facilitators for the
Committee, information sources. We really appreciate your
preparing for this hearing, and providing testimony. Your
complete statements will be included in the record at this
juncture. We would ask that you try to summarize them, so that
we could have the benefit of a dialogue, conversations with
Congress. Thanks so much.
Dr. Peha, you are first.
Panel II:
STATEMENT OF DR. JON M. PEHA, PROFESSOR, DEPARTMENTS OF
ENGINEERING AND PUBLIC POLICY AND ELECTRICAL AND COMPUTER
ENGINEERING, CARNEGIE MELLON UNIVERSITY
Dr. Peha. So much for my mastery of technology.
Good morning. My name is Jon Peha. I am a Professor of
Electrical Engineering and Public Policy at Carnegie Mellon
University, and Associate Director for the Center for Wireless
and Broadband Networking.
There may be no institution on Earth inundated with more
unsolicited advice than Congress, so it should sound strange
for me to say that Congress is not getting information that it
needs, but that is precisely what I have come here to say.
You can master many complex issues by filling a table like
this one with people who have competing interests, and watching
them argue their points of view. Unfortunately, this approach
breaks down when the issue is highly technical. For example, in
the current debate on network neutrality and the Internet, I
have watched advocates from all sides advance their agenda by
giving misleading simplifications of how the Internet actually
works and what neutrality might mean. From that, I don't see
how any non-expert could tell what the issue is about, much
less what to do about it. I couldn't separate substance from
rhetoric until I did my own assessment, rooted in the
technology of the Internet.
With this kind of issue, Congress needs balanced analysis
that identifies possible policy options, and pros and cons of
each, without telling Congress what to do. Armed with this
basic information, Members can listen to stakeholders and make
their own decisions. But who can provide this basic background?
Congress can turn to CRS, CBO, or GAO, but this type of
analysis is not within their traditional mission. They would
have to build the capability. Congress has the National
Academies, which can bring together leading experts who will
collectively recommend a course of action. Such studies are
valuable, but Congress often needs someone to frame the issue,
not recommend a solution.
There are university faculties that try to advise Congress,
and I hope we are useful. I spend a lot of time at this. But
faculty are removed from Capitol Hill. We may not produce
reports on the issues of greatest importance to Congress at the
time of greatest need, or in the format that is useful to
Congress, and thus far, Congress has not created mechanisms to
help us do so. Moreover, without investigation, you can't know
the professor is advancing a balanced assessment or personal
agenda.
So, in short, there are information sources that produce
thorough, accurate, and balanced reports, and sources that are
attuned to the needs of the Congress, but there is a shortage
of sources that do both, and Congress should fill this gap with
a new program, either as a new agency, or inside an existing
one.
Now, there are many ways to do this. I will focus here on
four important qualities of an effective program. It should be
responsive, credible, impartial, and independent.
So first, the organization must be responsive to the needs
of Congress. To ensure this, there should be a core group of
professionals who are ultimately responsible for all products,
who interact regularly with Members and their staffs, and for
whom Congress is the principal client and funding source.
Second, the organization should have credibility in
technical communities, even from stakeholders who don't like
the latest report. Since no one organization can have credible
expertise in all areas, this organization must be able to draw
on leading scientists and engineers as needed, and leaders of
the organization should have strong professional credentials
that will earn respect outside the Beltway.
Third, the organization must be impartial and appear to be
impartial. To achieve this, it must develop procedures that
include careful outside review. It must have leaders who
understand balanced technology assessments and will make
appropriate use of dissenting views, and it must have strong
bipartisan, bicameral oversight from Congress, to ensure that
the interests of all Members are well served.
Finally, the organization must have the independence to
release controversial studies without risk of elimination. The
method of deciding which studies will be completed must be
carefully designed to reflect the needs of both the majority
and minority in Congress, and Congress should allocate budgets
years in advance, so the organization can ride out one or two
very controversial reports.
An organization with these qualities would help all Members
of Congress. It would be an insurance policy against unintended
consequences from complex legislation, and it would earn the
praise of scientific professional societies and their members.
I commend the Committee for considering this issue, and I
thank you for hearing my opinions.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Peha follows:]
Prepared Statement of Jon M. Peha
Good morning Mr. Chairman, and Members of the Committee.
My name is Jon Peha. I'm a Professor of Engineering and Public
Policy at Carnegie Mellon University, and Associate Director of the
Center for Wireless and Broadband Networking.
There may be no institution on Earth that is inundated with more
unsolicited advice than Congress, so it could sound strange for me to
say that Congress is not getting information that it needs, but that is
precisely what I've come here to say.
You can master many complex issues by filling a table like this one
with people who have competing interests, and watching them argue
different sides of the issue. Unfortunately, this approach breaks down
when the topic is highly technical. For example, in the current debate
on ``network neutrality'' in the Internet, I've seen advocates from all
sides advance their agendas by giving misleading simplifications of how
the Internet actually works and of what ``neutrality'' might mean. From
that, I don't see how any non-expert could tell what the issue is
about, much less what to do about it. I could not separate substance
from rhetoric until I did my own assessment, rooted in the technology
of the Internet.
With this kind of issue, Congress needs balanced analysis that
identifies possible policy options, and pros and cons of each, without
telling Congress what to do. Armed with this basic knowledge, Members
of Congress can listen to stakeholders, and make their own decisions
about which policy is best overall. But who can provide this
background?
Congress can always turn to CRS, CBO, or GAO, but this type of
analysis is not within their traditional mission. They would have to
build the capability. Congress also has the National Academies, which
can bring together leading experts who will collectively recommend a
course of action. Such studies are valuable, but the process can be
slow and expensive, and Congress often needs someone to frame the
issue, rather than recommend a solution.
Some university faculty try to advise Congress, and I hope we are
useful. However, faculty are removed from Capitol Hill. We may not
produce reports on the issues of greatest importance to Congress, at
the time of greatest need in Congress, or in a form that can be easily
used by Congress. Thus far, Congress has not created mechanisms that
would help us do so. Moreover, without investigation, you cannot know
if a professor is offering a balanced assessment or advancing a private
agenda.
In short, there are information sources that produce thorough,
accurate, and balanced reports, and sources that are attuned to the
needs of Congress, but there is a shortage of sources that do both.
Congress should fill this gap with a new program, either as a new
agency or inside an existing one.
There are many ways to do this. I will focus here on four important
characteristics of an effective program It must be responsive,
credible, impartial, and independent.
First, the organization must be responsive to the needs of
Congress. To insure this, there should be a core group of professionals
who are ultimately responsible for all products, who interact regularly
with Members and their staffs, and for whom Congress is the principal
client and funding source, as with GAO or CBO.
Second, the organization must have credibility in technical
communities, even from stakeholders who are not thrilled with any given
report. Since no one organization can have credible expertise in all
areas, this organization must be able to draw on the country's leading
scientists and engineers whenever needed. Moreover, the leaders of this
organization should have strong professional credentials that will earn
respect outside the beltway.
Third, the organization must be impartial, and appear to be
impartial. To achieve this, it must develop procedures that include
careful outside review, both when framing the issues and when vetting
the results. This organization must have leaders who understand what
balanced technology assessments look like, and will make appropriate
use of dissenting views. There must also be strong bipartisan bicameral
oversight from Congress, to insure that the interests of all Members of
Congress are well served.
Finally, the organization must have the independence to release
controversial studies without risk of elimination. The method of
deciding which studies will be completed must be carefully designed to
reflect the needs of both the majority and minority in Congress.
Moreover, Congress should allocate budgets years in advance, so the
organization can ride out one or two reports that offend a powerful
group.
An organization with these qualities would help all Members of
Congress. It would be an insurance policy against unintended
consequences from legislation involving science or technology. It would
also earn praise from many scientific professional societies, and their
members.
I commend the Committee for considering this important issue, and I
thank you for inviting me to express my views.
Appendix 1: Published in Renewable Resources Journal, Vol. 24, No. 2,
pp. 19-23
Science and Technology Advice for Congress:
Past, Present, and Future
Jon M. Peha
Legislation Blowing in the Wind
With visions of Hurricane Katrina dancing in their heads, many
Members of Congress wanted to immediately push some kind of legislation
that would save American lives in future disasters, but how? Disaster
response is a complex matter. Katrina, like any problem that dominates
the American news, produces a deluge of proposed ``quick fixes'' to be
evaluated by Congress. When proposals involve science or technology,
this can be difficult.
One problem Congress could address in the aftermath of Katrina is
the wireless communications systems used by firefighters, paramedics,
National Guardsmen, and other emergency responders. Search and rescue
efforts often were crippled by failures in these systems. Some will now
push for grants to local governments to improve technical ``inter-
operability,'' i.e., the ability of responders in one agency to
communicate with responders in another agency. After all, inter-
operability failures cost lives on 9/11 [1], after Katrina, and on too
many other occasions [2]. Others will push to take spectrum away from
television broadcasters, because a portion of this spectrum would go to
public safety. After all, there is good reason to fear that a dangerous
shortage of public safety spectrum is coming [3]. However, the
decisions are not simple. One company after another will tell
Congressional staff of their alleged ``solution'' to inter-operability
problems, if government agencies would only purchase their products.
Other companies will describe how the release of television spectrum in
the manner they propose would be the salvation of public safety, and by
coincidence, the proposed change also will affect their commercial
systems in subtle but important ways. It is hard for someone without
technical expertise to make sense of all these claims. Worse yet,
changes may have side effects. Some plans intended to make more
spectrum available to public safety would accidentally create new
inter-operability problems, and some plans intended to improve inter-
operability would accidentally exacerbate a spectrum shortage [4,21].
Moreover, in preparing communications systems for the next hurricane,
some issues could be even more important than either inter-operability
or a potential spectrum shortage, but no one successfully has brought
these issues to the attention of Congress. There may be no one with
sufficient incentive to do so.
There is nothing unique about this drama. This year, almost every
committee in Congress will face one or more issues that are similarly
hard to disentangle without expertise in some area of science or
technology. This includes issues related to energy, the environment,
health care, food safety, national defense, homeland security, space
exploration, intellectual property, transportation, and
telecommunications, just to name a few. The majority of these typically
are not labeled as ``science issues,'' and most do not go through the
Science Committee.
Plenty of Input, Not Enough Clarity
Congress relies primarily on adversarial procedures that are honed
for equitably setting priorities, in contrast with the very different
forums of scientists, which are honed for advancing knowledge [5,6].
Congress must answer questions like `is it more important to reduce the
cost of automobiles or to reduce gasoline consumption?' and `is it
better to increase taxes or to cut programs?' Stakeholders from all
sides of a debate make their case. Members of Congress, acting as
representatives of their constituents rather than experts in any narrow
discipline, then adopt a position based on their own values and
priorities. Debates continue until consensus emerges for a compromise
between competing interests. All of this works well if Members of
Congress have a clear understanding of the issues and tradeoffs.
Understanding can be extremely difficult when issues are rooted in
science or technology. Indeed, it can be hard for someone with no
technical expertise to ask the right questions. Thus, as shown by the
above example of communications systems for public safety, Congress may
need assistance in framing and prioritizing the fundamental problems,
identifying the legislative options, assessing advantages and
disadvantages of each option, and calling attention to any unintended
side effects. With this information, Members of Congress of all
political persuasions can apply their own values, and make informed
decisions. Unfortunately, Congress has no reliable source for this kind
of assistance on technical issues.
This does not mean Congress has no information. Indeed, Capitol
Hill is overflowing with lobbyists who are prepared to tell Members of
Congress how to vote and why. While input from stakeholders and their
representatives is essential, it clearly is no substitute for the kind
of impartial assessment described above. Members of Congress also can
turn to a cadre of dedicated and intelligent staff. However, given the
tremendous range of issues that Congress must address, most
Congressional staff are generalists whose primary expertise is the
legislative process, rather than any scientific discipline.
Alternatively, Members of Congress can seek advice from one of their
support organizations: the Congressional Research Service (CRS), the
Congressional Budget Office (CBO), or the Government Accountability
Office (GAO). While each of these organizations plays an important
role, and all are in a good position to understand Congressional needs,
the detailed assessment of technical issues simply is not part of their
historical mission, so they traditionally have not built staff
expertise, institutional mechanisms, or credibility in this area [7].
Of course, Congress may be changing that tradition--an option that will
be discussed later.
Another important source of information on issues related to
science and technology is the executive branch agencies, many of which
have significant expertise. However, the U.S. system is based on checks
and balances, and Congress is obligated to oversee the activities of
the executive branch. Meaningful oversight is impossible without
independent expertise. For example, Congress cannot oversee the
Nation's finances if they depended entirely on the White House for
analysis, which is why Congress has a Congressional Budget Office that
is completely independent of the White House Office of Management and
Budget. Unfortunately, on matters related to science and technology,
Congress has no comparable support.
There still are more sources of information outside of government.
These tend to be inappropriate for different reasons. The National
Academies sometimes are an excellent resource for Congress [8[, but for
a different purpose. The National Academies generally attempt to bring
diverse experts together to produce a consensus recommendation about
what Congress should do. In many cases, Members of Congress do not want
to be told what to do. Instead, they want a trustworthy assessment of
their options, with the pros and cons of each, so they can make up
their own minds. Universities and research institutes also produce
valuable work on some important issues, but it rarely is generated at a
time when Congress most needs it, or in a format that the overworked
generalists of Congress can readily understand and apply. Moreover,
Members of Congress must be suspicious that the authors of any
externally produced report have an undisclosed agenda.
In short, there is a fundamental gap in the information available
to Congress. There is no consistent source of in-depth assessments that
are balanced, complete, impartial, and produced at a time and in a
format that is sensitive to the specific needs of Congress [9]. CRS
reports are sensitive to Congressional needs and are designed to be
impartial, but, by design, are limited in scope and depth. Partisan
input also can be sensitive to the needs of Congress, but it is never
impartial. Other information produced outside of Congress tends to be
far less sensitive to Congressional needs, and the majority of it
advocates for particular positions rather than merely providing a
baseline assessment.
The Controversial History of Technology Assessment
There have been notable attempts to fill this gap. The flagship
solution was the Office of Technology Assessment (OTA), a stand-alone
organization that worked specifically for Congress, like CRS, CBO, and
GAO. OTA produced roughly 750 reports during its 23-year lifespan, many
of which were rigorous, respected, and widely cited by both supporters
and opponents of the controversial measures that these reports
addressed. Using OTA as a model, many nations have created similar
organizations to advise their national legislatures [10]. While OTA had
its supporters, it also had some severe critics, and this would
ultimately be the organization's undoing. When Republicans took control
of the House of Representatives in 1995 after four decades in the
minority, they eliminated OTA.
Some of the reasons for eliminating OTA had little to do with its
effectiveness. While the Republicans were in the minority, they often
had called for the elimination of various government programs and
agencies. When they became the majority party in the House, they were
under great pressure to follow though on these promises, but it was not
easy to eliminate big targets like the Department of Education.
Ultimately, they would succeed in eliminating exactly one agency--OTA--
giving it great symbolic importance.
Nevertheless, the debate over OTA was not all symbolism. Some
Members of Congress raised noteworthy concerns. The most serious
allegation was bias. It is not surprising that the party in the
minority (before 1995) would raise concerns about bias, given that the
other party had dominated Congress throughout OTA's existence. For
example, some conservatives claimed bias in a series of OTA reports
that questioned the technical feasibility of the Strategic Defense
Initiative (SDI) (dubbed ``Star Wars'' in the press) [11-14]. SDI was
intended to shield America from incoming missiles. To the horror of
then-President Ronald Reagan and his supporters in Congress, OTA
concluded that the SDI vision of protecting all Americans from Soviet
missiles was ``impossible to achieve.'' [12]
Two decades later, the debate continues over whether OTA was
biased, but this debate is largely irrelevant. Regardless of whether
the bias concern was rooted in reality, appearance, or fabrication, the
lessons are the same. Bias or the appearance of bias can be
devastating. An organization designed to serve Congress must be both
responsive and useful to the minority, as well as the majority.
Representatives of both parties and both houses must provide careful
oversight, so that credit or blame for the organization's
professionalism is shared by all.
The most likely way for bias to arise is in the selection of issues
to be investigated. Consequently, both parties and both houses must
have significant say in this selection. Shared oversight can prevent a
pattern of bias across many issues, but if an unbiased organization is
doing its job well, there still will be individual reports that anger
one group within Congress. As long as there was no bias in the
selection of topics, all reports will not displease the same group.
Consequently, the organization must be constructed in such a way that
the furor over any one or two controversial issues is likely to die
down before angry partisans can eliminate the agency. For example,
funding and staff levels might be fixed four years ahead of time,
instead of just one year.
Probably the most frequent criticism of OTA from supporters and
detractors alike is that it was too slow; some studies took so long
that important decisions already were made when the relevant reports
were released. Many have argued that any future organization must be
faster. This may be the case, but there are more important lessons
here. Good work takes time, particularly if Congress is expecting a
broad scope, and extensive depth. However, this is not always the case.
Sometimes a Congressional Committee happily will accept a narrow scope
or a significant amount of recycled content, if the report is available
quickly. The most important lessons here are that an organization
providing technology assessments must offer Congress a wider range of
services with varying durations and scopes, and that it must be part of
this organization's culture to listen carefully to its client
(Congress) to understand the client's preferences for any given
project.
A New Era for Technology Assessment
In June 2001, six years after OTA's demise, Carnegie Mellon
University organized a workshop in Washington, D.C. on the state of
science and technology information in Congress. The workshop drew
leaders from both the scientific community and from Congress. Speakers
from Congress included Representatives Sherwood Boehlert (R-NY), Vernon
Ehlers (R-MI), Rush Holt (D-NJ), and Amo Houghton (R-NY). There was
remarkably strong consensus that Congress needed new institutional
support to provide advice on issues related to science and technology,
although opinions differed on the ideal form of this support. Some
preferred a return to the OTA model, and others preferred something
quite different.
Six distinct approaches are discussed in detail in Science and
Technology Advice for Congress [15], a book produced by many workshop
participants. Two difficult questions divide many of these models: (1)
should this technology assessment capability reside in an existing
organization or a new organization, and (2) should its staff work
directly for Congress or should there be institutional separation?
The problem with creating a new technology assessment capability
and placing it in an existing organization, whether it is CRS or the
National Academies, is that these organizations already have their own
missions and their own cultures, which are not perfectly compatible
with the technology assessment process. This clash can make it more
difficult to do high-quality technology assessments. Moreover, if these
assessments are viewed internally as a diversion from the
organization's real mission, there is a danger that some important
resources (e.g., staff, funding) will be directed elsewhere when
budgets are tight. On the other hand, if this new program is a division
of an existing organization, there may be more opportunities to share
scarce resources and expertise. Moreover, judging from the OTA
experience, a stand-alone organization may be more vulnerable to
complete elimination during heated controversies.
With regard to the second question of ``distance'' from Congress,
some advocated that technology assessments be conducted within an
organization that answers directly to Congress (i.e., GAO, CRS, CBO),
or a new organization that is similarly constructed. Others wanted an
organization (new or existing) that operates under contract to
Congress, and perhaps to other clients as well, as the National
Academies do today. The former would encourage staff to be more
sensitive to the needs of Congress. It also could afford them less
protection when bringing news that Members of Congress do not want to
hear. Moreover, the staff size of a Congressional organization is
always limited, making it difficult for this organization to have
expertise in every topic of potential interest to Congress. By
contracting work to outside organizations, talent can be drawn from a
much larger pool. This issue becomes particularly important if the
technology assessment effort is relatively small.
Given these tradeoffs, my proposal would create a hybrid, in which
a small dedicated staff work on Capitol Hill directly for Congress
[16]. Their job is to understand the needs of Congress, and to insure
that all reports in their final form meet those requirements. However,
much of the assessment work would be done by a collection of outside
organizations, each of which would be certified every few years for
competence, professionalism, and impartiality.
After the workshop, Senator Jeff Bingaman (D-NM) proposed the
creation of a small pilot program in technology assessment. Thanks to
bipartisan support in both the House and Senate, the pilot received
$500,000 of funding in the 2002 budget. Work began in March 2002, and
GAO's first assessment on biometric technology for border security came
out in November 2002 [17]. This was remarkably fast turn-around,
especially given that GAO had no institutional experience with this
kind of analysis. GAO also invited an external evaluation of their work
from outside experts [18], which demonstrates seriousness about
quality. (Most agencies avoid criticism rather than seek it). Other GAO
technology assessments have followed [19,20].)
Early results are quite encouraging. Experience to date shows that
a technology assessment program operating within GAO is capable of
producing balanced, timely, and relevant reports containing a range of
useful information on important issues before Congress. Not
surprisingly, early results also show that improvement is possible and
desirable, in large part because technology assessments differ
substantially from the traditional GAO studies in intent, content, and
process. Thus, for example, GAO must learn new methods of soliciting
input from outside experts, framing a technology assessment, and
subjecting work to fast but effective peer review. If Congress keeps
funding this pilot, it is likely that GAO will continue to improve with
experience.
This small pilot will do some useful work, and foreshadow the
effectiveness of a program within GAO before making longer-term
decisions. However, the GAO pilot cannot succeed in the long run if it
remains a mere pilot. A technology assessment program must develop or
recruit a staff that has strong credentials to impress both the
scientific and Congressional communities, and significant expertise in
science or technology, in communicating with Congress, and in
technology assessment. Attracting, developing, and retaining
outstanding people with these diverse skills will not be easy for a
program that could abruptly cease to exist with little warning.
Worse yet, should a technology assessment ever produce news that is
unwelcome to any powerful group within Congress, there is little to
protect the program from termination. Since management within GAO knows
this, they might be tempted to avoid controversial issues, or worse
yet, to dilute the conclusions of experts and staff members. If they
succumb to this temptation, the program will be of limited
effectiveness, and if they do not, the program will not survive for
long.
Conclusion
When issues are rooted in science or technology, Members of
Congress often need assistance in framing issues, identifying
legislative options, and assessing all the pros and cons of each
option, so they can make informed decisions that are consistent with
their own values and priorities. Today, Congress has no reliable,
impartial source available to provide detailed analysis of this type,
with the possible exception of a limited pilot effort within GAO. It is
time for Congress to move beyond pilots, and to establish a permanent
technology assessment capability. When creating a permanent solution,
the greatest challenges will be to ensure that this new technology
assessment program has careful and balanced bipartisan and bicameral
oversight, and that its staff and funding levels will remain stable,
even through heated controversies and budget crises. Ideally, they
should receive sufficient resources to offer a significant amount of
support for Congress, but stability is more important than size.
References
[1] National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States,
The 9/11 Commission Report, 2004. http://www.gpoaccess.gov/911
[2] J.M. Peha, ``Protecting Public Safety With Better Communications
Systems,'' IEEE Communications, Vol. 43, No. 3, March 2005, pp. 1011.
http://www.ece.cmu.edu/ peha/safety.html
[3] Public Safety Wireless Advisory Committee (PSWAC), Final Report,
Sept. 1996. http://ntiacsd.ntia.doc.gov/pubsafe/publications/
PSWAC-AL.PDF
[4] J.M. Peha, ``How America's Fragmented Approach to Public Safety
Wastes Spectrum and Funding,'' Proc. 33rd Telecommunications Policy
Research Conference (TPRC), Sept. 2005. http://www.ece.cmu.edu/ peha/
safety.html
[5] J.M. Peha, ``Bridging the Divide Between Technologists and
Policy-Makers,'' IEEE Spectrum, Vol. 38, No. 3, March 2001, pp 15-17.
http://www.ece.cmu.edu/ peha/policy.html
[6] M.G. Morgan and J.M. Peha, ``Analysis, Governance, and the Need
for Better Institutional Arrangements,'' Chapter 1 in Science and
Technology Advice for Congress, M.G. Morgan and J.M. Peha (eds.), RFF
Press, Washington, DC, 2003.
[7] C.T. Hill, ``An Expanded Analytical Capability in the
Congressional Research Service, the General Accounting Office, or the
Congressional Budget Office,'' Chapter 7 in Science and Technology
Advice for Congress, M.G. Morgan and J.M. Peha (eds.), RFF Press,
Washington, DC, 2003.
[8] J. Ahearne and P. Blair, ``Expanded Use of the National
Academies,'' Chapter 8 in Science and Technology Advice for Congress,
M.G. Morgan and J.M. Peha (eds.), RFF Press, Washington, DC, 2003.
[9] M.G. Morgan and J.M. Peha, ``Where Do We o From Here?,'' Chapter
13 in Science and Technology Advice for Congress, M.G. Morgan and J.M.
Peha (eds.), RFF Press, Washington, DC, 2003.
[10] N.J. Vig, ``The European Experience,'' Chapter 5 in Science and
Technology Advice for Congress, M.G. Morgan and J.M. Peha (eds.), RFF
Press, Washington, DC, 2003.
[11] R.H. Margolis, D.H. Guston, ``The Origins, Accomplishments, and
Demise of the Office of Technology Assessment,'' Chapter 3 in Science
and Technology Advice for Congress, M.G. Morgan and J.M. Peha (eds.),
RFF Press, Washington, DC, 2003.
[12] U.S. Office of Technology Assessment, Ballistic Missile Defense
Technologies, Sept. 1985. http://www.wws.princeton.edu/ota/disk2/1985/
8504-n.html
[13] U.S. Office of Technology Assessment, Anti-Satellite Weapons,
Countermeasures, and Arms Control, Sept. 1985. http://
www.wws.princeton.edu/ota/disk2/1985/8502-n.html
[14] U.S. Office of Technology Assessment, SDI: Technology,
Survivability, and Software, May 1988. http://www.wws.princeton.edu/
ota/disk2/1988/8837-n.html
[15] M.G. Morgan and J.M. Peha (eds.), Science and Technology Advice
for Congress, RFF Press, Washington, DC, 2003.
[16] M.G. Morgan and J.M. Peha, ``A Lean Distributed Organization To
Serve Congress?,'' Chapter 10 in Science and Technology Advice for
Congress, M.G. Morgan and J.M. Peha (eds.), RFF Press, Washington, DC,
2003.
[17] U.S. Government Accountability Office, Using Biometrics for
Border Security, GAO-03-174, Nov. 2002. http://www.gao.gov/new.items/
d03174.pdf
[18] R.W. Fri, M.G. Morgan, and W.A. Stiles, An External Evaluation of
the GAO's Assessment of Technologies for Border Security, Oct. 18,
2002, Appendix 3 in Science and Technology Advice for Congress, M.G.
Morgan and J.M. Peha (eds.), RFF Press, Washington, DC, 2003.
[19] U.S. Government Accountability Office, Cyber Security for
Critical Infrastructure Protection, GAO-04-321, May 2004. http://
www.gao.gov/new.items/d04321.pdf
[20] U.S. Government Accountability Office, Protecting Structures and
Improving Communications During Wildland Fires, GAO-05-380, April 2005.
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05380.pdf
[21] J.M. Peha, ``The Digital TV Transition: A Chance to Enhance
Public Safety and Improve Spectrum Auctions,'' IEEE Communications.
http://www.ece.cmu.edu/ peha/safety.html
Appendix 2
For further discussion, please see the following book
Science and Technology Advice for Congress,
M.G. Morgan and J.M. Peha,
RFF Press, Washington, DC, 2003.
PUBLISHER'S SYNOPSIS:
The elimination of the Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) in
1995 came during a storm of budget cutting and partisan conflict.
Operationally, it left Congress without an institutional arrangement to
bring expert scientific and technological advice into the process of
legislative decision-making. This deficiency has become increasingly
critical, as more and more of the decisions faced by Congress and
society require judgments based on highly specialized technical
information.
Offering perspectives from scholars and scientists with diverse
academic backgrounds and extensive experience within the policy
process, Science and Technology Advice for Congress breaks from the
politics of the OTA and its contentious aftermath. Granger Morgan and
Jon Peha begin with an overview of the use of technical information in
framing policy issues, crafting legislation, and the overall process of
governing. They note how, as non-experts, legislators must make
decisions in the face of scientific uncertainty and competing
scientific claims from stakeholders. The contributors continue with a
discussion of why OTA was created. They draw lessons from OTA's demise,
and compare the use of science and technological information in Europe
with the United States.
The second part of the book responds to requests from congressional
leaders for practical solutions. Among the options discussed are
expanded functions within existing agencies such as the General
Accounting or Congressional Budget Offices; an independent, NGO-
administrated analysis group; and a dedicated successor to OTA within
Congress. The models emphasize flexibility--and the need to make
political feasibility a core component of design.
Biography of Jon M. Peha
Jon M. Peha is Associate Director of the Center for Wireless and
Broadband Networking at Carnegie Mellon University, and a Professor in
the Department of Engineering and Public Policy and the Department of
Electrical and Computer Engineering. He has addressed telecom and e-
commerce issues on legislative staff in the House and Senate, and
helped launch a U.S. Government interagency program to assist
developing countries with information infrastructure. He has also
served as Chief Technical Officer of several high-tech start-ups, and
as a member of technical staff at SRI International, AT&T Bell
Laboratories, and Microsoft. Dr. Peha's research spans technical and
policy issues of information networks. This has included broadband
Internet, wireless networks, video and voice over IP (VOIP),
communications systems for first responders for public safety and
homeland security, spectrum management, universal service, secure
systems for financial transactions over the Internet, e-commerce
taxation and privacy, and network security. He holds a Ph.D. in
electrical engineering from Stanford.
Chairman Boehlert. Thank you very much, Dr. Peha. Let me
point out that sometimes, advice and information are two
different things entirely.
Dr. Teich.
STATEMENT OF DR. ALBERT H. TEICH, DIRECTOR OF SCIENCE AND
POLICY PROGRAMS, AMERICAN ASSOCIATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF
SCIENCE
Dr. Teich. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Gordon, Members of the
Committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear here this
morning on behalf of AAAS.
AAAS, as you may know, is the world's largest multi-
disciplinary scientific association. We were founded in 1848,
and today represent roughly 10 million individuals who are
members in our affiliated societies. We are also the publisher
of the journal Science.
Congress today is addressing an increasing number of
complex scientific issues. Last week alone, the House and its
committees addressed, among other topics, stem cell research,
climate change science, voting technology, fuel cells, and
agricultural policy.
Few Members of Congress, with the notable exception of
several Members of this committee, and relatively few
Congressional staff, at least outside of this committee, have
backgrounds in science. Do adequate resources exist for
Congress to address these kinds of issues? From our
perspective, the answer is no. Information is abundant, but
objective, timely, policy-relevant analyses, which is what
Congress really needs, are in short supply.
The increased use of technology and the Internet have
revolutionized the way in which people and organizations
communicate with elected officials. A recent study found that
Congress received four times more communications in 2004 than
it did in 1995. An average Congressional staffer, of which
there are over 10,000, receives 200 emails a day from advocacy
groups, constituents, and colleagues, and I suppose that
doesn't even include advertisements for Viagra and other
similar emails.
How can a Member of Congress, as busy as he or she is,
digest this enormous amount of information, and separate the
wheat from the chaff? Many scientific assessments are conducted
or funded by entities that have a financial or political
interest in the issue at hand, and funding from such groups is
often perceived to affect the study's findings. Conflicting
reports from groups with different viewpoints can make it
difficult to determine where the scientific consensus lies,
particularly for those not deeply familiar with the scientific
process.
Congressional support agencies, such as the Government
Accountability Office, the Congressional Budget Office, and the
Congressional Research Service, play an important role.
Nonpartisanship, objectivity, and responsiveness to Members'
requests make them valuable resources. Each one, however, has
limitations when it comes to providing scientific and technical
policy analyses, as I indicate in my written statement.
Though they are not Congressional support agencies, the
National Academies and the National Research Council respond to
approximately 10 to 20 Congressional requests for studies each
year. Though reports can be completed quickly sometimes, often,
the process takes twelve to eighteen months. These
authoritative studies by distinguished scientific experts
therefore tend to be most useful for in-depth treatment of
long-term issues.
Other large-scale assessments, including international
projects, such as the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, the
executive branch research efforts, such as the Climate Change
Science Program, also provide in-depth studies, but again, not
on a time scale that is consistent with the needs of Congress.
One resource available to Congress, as mentioned earlier,
is the Congressional Science Fellows program. Begun by AAAS in
1973, the program today provides an opportunity for
approximately 35 Ph.D. level scientists and engineers to work
as professional staff in Congressional offices for a year.
Fellows' stipends are paid by scientific societies, making them
a free source of expertise for Members. Many Fellows catch
Potomac Fever and remain in Washington as permanent
Congressional staff, providing a scientific perspective on
policy issues. Nevertheless, the relatively small number of
Fellows means that the percentage of staff with scientific
backgrounds remains low.
In recent years, universities and scientific societies,
including AAAS, have expanded efforts to bring objective
scientific information to Congress through reports on policy
relevant topics and scientific briefings. These activities are
often limited by funding. In addition, scientists are often
cautious about providing policy analyses on scientific issues,
sticking instead to providing data, limiting their ability to
inform decisions in a meaningful way.
To sum up, information is not in short supply on Capitol
Hill, as you, Mr. Chairman, indicated, but information is not
knowledge. Credible sources are needed to provide timely
analysis and synthesis of scientific and technical information
as a foundation for Congressional decisions.
These concerns are not new, as Mr. Gordon mentioned in his
statement. Back in 1970, and in fact, previous to that even, at
least in 1970, a study of Congress found that it lacked
``independent sources of scientific and technical advice.''
This realization led to a number of important organizational
innovations. The even greater role of science and technology in
today's society demands that Congress seek innovative methods
suited to 21st Century needs to obtain objective, timely,
policy-relevant analyses, that is, knowledge that Members can
use.
AAAS and the scientific community stand ready to help in
this vital endeavor. Thank you very much for allowing me to
express my views.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Teich follows:]
Prepared Statement of Albert H. Teich
Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today on behalf
of the American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) to
discuss scientific and technical advice for Congress. AAAS is the
world's largest multi-disciplinary scientific society and publisher of
the journal Science. AAAS was founded in 1848, and represents roughly
10 million individuals through its members, affiliated societies and
academies of science.
Congress is increasingly addressing complex scientific issues. Last
week alone, the House and its committees addressed--among other
topics--stem cell research, climate change science, voting technology,
fuel cells, and agricultural policy. Over the past year, the list
expands to include intellectual property, avian influenza, bioterrorism
threats, research priorities in aeronautics, and ocean resource
management.
Few Members of Congress, with the notable exception of several
Members of this committee, and relatively few congressional staff, have
backgrounds in science. Do adequate resources exist for Congress to
address these issues? From our perspective, the answer is no.
Information is abundant, but objective, timely, policy-relevant
analyses are in short supply.
The increased use of technology and the Internet have
revolutionized the way in which people and organizations communicate
with elected officials. A recent study found that Congress received
four times more communications in 2004 than it did in 1995. Virtually
all of this increase is from Internet-based communication. The average
congressional staffer (of which there are over 10,000) receives 200 e-
mails each day from advocacy groups, constituents, and colleagues.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Fitch, Brad and Nicole Griffin, Communicating With Congress:
How Capitol Hill Is Coping With the Surge in Citizen Advocacy,
Congressional Management Foundation, 2005.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
How can a Member of Congress, as busy as he or she is, digest this
enormous amount of information, and assess its validity? Many
scientific assessments are conducted or funded by entities that have a
financial or political interest in the issue at hand. Funding from such
groups or organizations is often perceived to affect the study's
findings. Conflicting reports from groups with different viewpoints can
make it difficult to determine the scientific consensus, particularly
for those not deeply familiar with the nature of science, the peer-
review process, the definitions of scientific consensus, and principles
of uncertainty.
Furthermore, a key challenge for members and their staffs is to use
the information and assistance provided by interest groups without
becoming bound to their agendas. In the words of one observer,
``interest groups usually have their own ideas about proper allocation,
and they seldom coincide with Congressmen's predilections.'' \2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ Arnold, R. Douglas, ``The Local Roots of Domestic Policy,'' in
Thomas E. Mann and Norman J. Ornstein (eds.), The New Congress
(Washington: American Enterprise Institute, 1981), pp. 250-287.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Nonpartisanship, objectivity, and responsiveness to Members'
requests make Congressional support agencies, such as the Government
Accountability Office (GAO), the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), and
the Congressional Research Service (CRS), valuable resources, though
they are not solely dedicated to science and technology. One
explanation of Members' overall positive appraisal for the agencies may
lie in an observation by Davidson and Oleszek:
``Unlike committee or personal aides, these agencies operate
under strict rules of nonpartisanship and objectivity. Staffed
with experts, they provide Congress with analytical talent
matching that in executive agencies, universities, or
specialized groups.'' \3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ Davidson, Roger H. and Walter J. Oleszek, Congress and Its
Members, 3rd ed. (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 1990).
CRS reflects its base in the Library of Congress by providing quick
responses to thousands of congressional requests annually for factual
information, as well as providing policy research and analysis. Its
reports are useful, but its ability to provide synthesis is limited.
Though it has the ability to conduct scientific and technological
assessments, GAO's work reflects its traditional major focus--
eliminating waste and fraud and improving program performance. At its
current staffing levels, GAO can only complete one to three technology
studies per year.\4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ Kelly, Henry et al., Flying Blind: The Rise, Fall and Possible
Resurrection of Science Policy Advice in the United States, Federation
of American Scientists, 2004.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Though they are not congressional support agencies, the National
Academies and National Research Council respond to approximately 10-20
requests for studies from Congress each year. Though reports can
sometimes be completed quickly, the process generally takes 12-18
months. These authoritative studies that involve distinguished
scientific experts writing peer-reviewed reports tend to be most useful
for in-depth treatment of long-term issues.
Other large-scale assessments, including international projects
such as the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment and Intergovernmental Panel
on Climate Change (IPCC), provide in-depth assessments of the current
state of knowledge on broad topics. The IPCC aims to provide
information that is policy relevant but not policy prescriptive.
Similarly, ongoing executive branch research efforts such as the
Climate Change Science Program use experts to determine the scientific
consensus on key issues. However, these large-scale projects are seldom
conducted on a time scale that is consistent with the needs of
Congress.
One resource available to Congress is the Congressional Science
Fellows program. Begun in 1973 by a group of scientific and engineering
societies led by AAAS, this program provides an opportunity for
approximately 35 Ph.D.-level scientists and engineers to work as
professional staff in congressional offices for a year. Fellows'
stipends are paid by scientific societies, making them a free source of
expertise for Members. Many Fellows catch ``Potomac Fever'' and remain
in Washington as full-time congressional staff, continuing to provide a
scientific perspective on policy issues.
Over the years, many Members of Congress have indicated how
valuable they find the program. For example Rep. John Peterson (R-PA)
noted that ``Congressional Fellows have played a key role on my staff.
. .and the knowledge and expertise which they bring to the table has
been a tremendous asset when dealing with science and technology
issues.'' Senator Harry Reid (D-NV) added that Fellows in his office
``have made critical contributions to a wide range of legislative and
oversight projects, including health, environmental, educational,
technological, economic and security issues.'' Nevertheless, the
relatively small number of fellows means that the percentage of staff
with a scientific background remains low.
Universities and scientific societies, including AAAS, have
expanded efforts to bring accurate scientific information to Congress
through reports on policy-relevant topics, position statements, and
scientific briefings. These activities are often limited by funding. In
addition, scientists are often cautious about providing policy analysis
on scientific issues, sticking instead to providing scientific data,
limiting their ability to inform decisions in a meaningful way.
To sum up, information is not in short supply on Capitol Hill, but
information is not knowledge. Credible sources are needed to provide
timely analysis and synthesis of scientific and technical information
as a foundation for Congressional decisions.
These concerns are not new. A 1970 report found that Congress
lacked sufficient ``independent sources of scientific and technical
advice.'' \5\ This realization led to a number of important
organizational innovations. The even greater role of science and
technology in today's society demands that we seek innovative methods
suited to 21st Century needs to provide Congress with objective,
timely, policy-relevant analyses--that is, knowledge that Members can
use.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ von Hippel, Frank and Joel Primack, The Politics of Technology:
Activities and Responsibilities of Scientists in the Direction of
Technology (Stanford, 1970)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
About the American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS)
The American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) is
the world's largest multi-disciplinary scientific society and publisher
of the journal Science (www.sciencemag.org). The non-profit AAAS
(www.aaas.org) is open to all, and our members come from the entire
range of science and technology disciplines. Science has the largest
paid circulation of any peer-reviewed general science journal in the
world, with an estimated total readership of over one million. AAAS
fulfills its mission to ``advance science and serve society'' through
initiatives in science education; science policy; international
programs; and an array of activities designed both to increase public
understanding and engage the public more with science. Programs
designed to provide Congress with scientific resources include:
AAAS Science & Engineering Policy Fellowships. The Science & Technology
Policy Fellowships (http://fellowships.aaas.org/) began in 1973 with
seven Fellows serving in congressional offices, providing their
scientific expertise to policy-makers facing increasingly technical
legislative issues. The ensuing decades have led to the establishment
of AAAS Science & Technology Policy Fellowships in nearly a dozen
executive branch agencies.
The fellowships provide the opportunity for scientists and
engineers, from recent Ph.D. recipients to senior-level professionals,
to learn about policy-making while contributing their knowledge and
analytical skills to the Federal Government. About 30 other scientific
and engineering societies participate, selecting and funding their own
Fellows.
The Fellows, representing a broad array of science and engineering
fields, bring a common interest in learning about the intersection of
science and policy, and a willingness to apply their technical training
in a new arena. The host offices value the Fellows for their external
perspectives and critical thinking skills, as well as for their
technical expertise.
Center for Science and Technology in Congress. The Center for Science,
Technology, and Congress (http://www.aaas.org/spp/cstc/) is one of the
principal channels for AAAS communication between the scientific
community and the legislative branch of the U.S. Government. It was
established in 1994, under an initial grant from the Carnegie
Corporation of New York. The Center's primary function is to facilitate
communication between the science and engineering community on the one
hand and the legislative community and the public it represents on the
other.
AAAS's inclusiveness and breadth of coverage among fields of
science and engineering enable it to both draw upon and reflect the
views of virtually the entire science and technology enterprise. The
Center's multi-faceted strategy is a strong example of how AAAS
approaches its mission and long-term goals. It reports on S&T-policy
relevant news through the monthly newsletter Science & Technology in
Congress; the Center organizes congressional briefings; it provides
Policy Briefs on critical scientific issues facing policy-makers; and
it assists in the preparation of AAAS formal statements and
resolutions, congressional testimony, and letters to the executive and
legislative branches of governments. Its activities reach out to
Members of Congress and staff, AAAS affiliates, academic institutions,
science attaches, and the media.
Center for Science, Technology, and Security Policy. The Center for
Science, Technology and Security Policy (http://cstsp.aaas.org/) was
established by the AAAS through support from the Science, Technology &
Security Initiative at the MacArthur Foundation. The goal of the Center
is to encourage the integration of science and public policy for
enhanced national and international security. The Center acts as a
portal that facilitates communication between academic centers, policy
institutes, and policy-makers.
The Center speeds the delivery of balanced technical analysis to
Congress, Executive Branch agencies and the public at large through
monthly briefings, special reports from panels of technical experts,
and partnerships with the broad international network of leading
universities, think-tanks, professional societies and nongovernmental
organizations.
R&D Budget and Policy Program. Every year since 1976, AAAS has
published a report analyzing research and development (R&D) in the
proposed federal budget in order to make available timely and objective
information about the Administration's plans for the coming fiscal year
to the scientific and engineering communities and policy-makers. At the
end of each congressional session, AAAS publishes a report reviewing
the impact of appropriations decisions on research and development,
entitled Congressional Action on Research and Development in the
Budget. AAAS has also established a website (www.aaas.org/spp/R&D) for
R&D data with regular updates on budget proposals, agency
appropriations, R&D trends in past years, and outyear projections for
R&D, as well as numerous tables and charts.
Biography for Albert H. Teich
Albert Teich is Director of Science & Policy Programs at AAAS, a
position he has held since 1990. He is responsible for the
Association's activities in science and technology policy and serves as
a key spokesperson on science policy issues. Science and Policy
Programs, which includes activities in ethics, law, science and
religion, and human rights, as well as science policy, has a staff of
40 and a annual budget of about $9 million. He also serves as Director
of the AAAS Archives.
He received a Bachelor's degree in physics and a Ph.D. in political
science, both from M.I.T. Prior to joining the AAAS staff in 1980, he
held positions at George Washington University, the State University of
New York, and Syracuse University. Al is the author of numerous
articles and editor of several books, including Technology and the
Future, the most widely used college textbook on technology and
society, the tenth edition of which was published by Thompson Wadsworth
in 2005.
Al is a Fellow of AAAS and the recipient of the 2004 Award for
Scientific Achievement in Science Policy from the Washington Academy of
Sciences. He is a member of the editorial advisory boards to the
journals Science Communication; Science, Technology, and Human Values;
Prometheus; and Renewable Resources and a consultant to government
agencies, national laboratories, industrial firms, and international
organizations. He is a Past Chair of the Board of Governors of the
U.S.-Israel Binational Science Foundation, where he remains a member of
the executive committee; a member of the External Research Advisory
Board of the University of California at Davis, the Norwegian Research
and Technology Forum in the United States, and the National Research
Council's Research and Technology Transfer Committee.
Al is married to Jill H. Pace, Executive Director of the American
College of Real Estate Lawyers. He has three children and three
grandchildren. He is an accomplished amateur photographer, has
published several photographs, and had a one-man show of his
photographs at the Black & White Gallery in Arlington, Virginia, in
2005, and another in the AAAS Science and Art Exhibition Gallery in
2006.
Chairman Boehlert. Thank you very much, Doctor, and just
let me point out, and I think on behalf of the entire
Committee, both sides of the aisle, the AAAS Fellows program is
a wonderful program that is warmly embraced by all.
But it is a two way street, and I would suggest that some
of the Fellows who come up, as you say, get Potomac Fever and
they stay, and that is good, because that helps us be better
informed. There are some in our committee and in our respective
individual offices, but most of the AAAS Fellows go back from
whence they came, into the community. And that is good for
science, because I find, in most instances, science, scientists
are not particularly effective at lobbying for their interests.
They need guys like me to be lobbyists, because well--and Mr.
Gordon.
So, it works well. So, you have a better appreciation for
how the political process works, and--because of the Fellows
coming back, and the Fellows who we retain guide us, and we
have a better appreciation for the science of the subject
matter we are dealing with. So, keep it up please.
Dr. Teich. Thank you.
Chairman Boehlert. Expand it, if anything.
Dr. Blair.
STATEMENT OF DR. PETER D. BLAIR, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, DIVISION
ON ENGINEERING AND PHYSICAL SCIENCES, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF
SCIENCES
Dr. Blair. Thank you for the invitation to testify today
about science and technology assessment advice to the Congress.
The subject is certainly a longstanding one with me, that I
have seen from different perspectives in my professional life.
So I appreciate the opportunity to share those experiences and
perspectives with you and the Committee.
The breathtaking pace of science and technology over the
past half-century has delivered both staggering benefits to
society as well as sobering challenges associated with the role
of technology in virtually every aspect of our lives. Society,
in reaping the benefits, must also be able to cope with the
challenges.
Indeed, among the Founding Fathers' deepest concerns about
the fledgling American democracy was that it could function
well only when the electorate, and in particular, its
institutions of government, are well informed about the issues
upon which it must decide. On the slide are Mr. Madison's
sentiments on the matter.
Because science and technology issues, perhaps in
particular, are so complex, or often so complex, and have such
impact on society, a government poorly informed on such issues
is destined to make bad policy choices. Yet today, it is
becoming increasingly difficult for anyone, or even any
institution, to keep pace with the frontier of scientific
knowledge. So how, then, can the Congress acquire useful,
relevant, informed, independent, objective, authoritative, and
timely advice on science and technology dimensions of the
issues it faces?
The information revolution has dramatically expanded the
quantity of information available to the Congress, but more has
not proved necessarily to be better. Indeed, a fundamental
problem today is not the quantity of information at all, but
rather, how to gauge validity and usefulness within the flood
of available information, advice, and advocacy.
Another way to put this is Will Rogers' old observation
that ``What gets us into trouble isn't so much what we don't
know, it is what we know for sure that just ain't so.'' The
former chairman had a similar perspective called a defense
against the dumb.
Congress certainly has many possible resources at its
disposal, such as universities, think tanks, the professional
societies, trusted constituents, existing Congressional
agencies, and of course, the National Academies. My colleagues
on the panel will explore some of these options, so I will
focus on three points.
First, the current and evolving role of the Academy in
providing advice to the Congress through its--principally,
through its operating arm, the National Research Council.
Second, what I consider to be an especially important gap in
the sources of advice available to the Congress, and third,
some concluding thoughts on the options.
As an additional and more detailed discussion, I refer to a
report, ``Scientific Advice for Policy in the United States:
Lessons from the National Academies and the Former
Congressional Office of Technology Assessment,'' which I would
like to include for the hearing record. In that document, and
also, in my written statement, I recap for you the charter of
the Academies, and how today, our studies continue to be among
those most familiar and respected sources of independent
scientific advice to the Congress.
Indeed, Academy committees produce over two hundred reports
annually, of which between 15 and 25 a year are mandated by
Congress, which means that while the Academy is a substantial
enterprise in the science and technology advice world overall,
its role specifically for the Congress is actually a relatively
small part of the portfolio. We could do more, and indeed, as
my colleagues on the panel will attest, the entire science
community could do much more.
The key strengths of the NRC in providing advice to the
Congress are principally threefold. First, the long established
reputation for credibility, enhanced by its association with
the prestigious memberships of the Academies. Second, a
historical ability to convene leading experts, and third, a
well established and respected study process, designed to
maintain balance and objectivity throughout a study committee's
work, that produces reports considered to be both unbiased and
authoritative.
The resulting NRC study reports often serve an important
need of Congress, that is, an authoritative set of consensus
findings and recommendations from a widely recognized group of
experts, often leading to a specific recommended course of
action. Some of the sample reports shown on this slide should
be very familiar to this committee, you have talked about just
in recent weeks, and one the chairman mentioned a while ago.
Nonetheless, like any process designed to serve many needs,
the NRC study process is not perfectly tuned to serve all
government needs. For example, our process is less well
equipped, currently, to go beyond technical analysis, to gauge
the broader policy implications of alternative actions,
especially those implications that may involve fundamental
value judgments or tradeoffs for which it may be difficult to
impossible to achieve consensus. In short, and at some risk of
being simplistic, what seems to be missing is a mechanism to
inform the Congressional debate, including perspectives that
may go beyond science and technology to include the broader
implications of alternative actions related to science and
technology issues being considered, and especially, a
comprehensive evaluation of such perspectives. In the question
period, I would be happy to offer some examples.
In my view, both of these kinds of analysis, that is, both
the traditional NRC study and this new type of study I am
talking about, are important to Congressional deliberations.
Since the closure of OTA now a decade ago, this latter type of
analysis, as performed by a disinterested, analytical
organization tuned specifically to the needs of Congress, is
not readily accessible to the Congress.
Such a function may need to be reconstructed in some way,
through adapting an existing organization, or through creation
of a new organization answerable directly to the Congress, or
perhaps by creating a new process within an existing
Congressional agency. There are some experiments underway at
GAO, for example.
Let me conclude by reiterating that the need for useful,
relevant, informed, independent, objective, authoritative, and
timely advice on the science and technology issues to the
Congress is becoming more and more noticeable out here. There
are certainly a variety of options for filling the various
gaps, including the specific gap I mentioned today. We at the
Academy look forward to playing a role in building those
various options. I mentioned Will Rogers' advice earlier, but
perhaps Yogi Berra's advice seems appropriate here concerning
which path to take on improving and expanding the mechanisms
for science and technology assessment and advice to the
Congress: ``When you get to the road, and you have to--when you
get to that fork in the road, and you have to choose, take
it.'' Since there are multiple paths that you can follow.
Mr. Chairman, thank you again for the opportunity to share
my thoughts, and I look forward to answer any questions you may
have.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Blair follows:]
Prepared Statement of Peter D. Blair
Mr. Chairman,
Thank you for the invitation to testify today about the science and
technology advice to the Congress. The subject is certainly a
longstanding one with me that I have seen from many perspectives--from
academia, to private science and engineering consulting, to a senior
management role in the former Office of Technology Assessment (OTA), to
managing a professional scientific society, to my current post at the
National Academies. I appreciate the opportunity to share those
experiences and perspectives with you and the Committee.
The breathtaking pace of science and technology over the past half-
century--from the remarkable advances in medicine, to cell phones, to
the Internet, to countless others--has delivered both staggering
benefits to society as well as sobering challenges associated with the
role of technology in virtually every aspect of our lives. Society, in
reaping the benefits, must also be able to cope with the challenges.
Among the founding fathers' deepest concerns about the fledgling
American democracy was that it could function well only when the
electorate and, in particular, its institutions of government are well
informed about the issues upon which it must decide.
James Madison or Thomas Jefferson might well have argued that a
government poorly informed about science and technology issues, because
such issues are often so complex and have such impact on society, is
destined to make bad policy choices. Yet, today, it is becoming
increasingly more difficult for anyone, or even any institution, to
keep pace with the frontier of knowledge. How, then, can the Congress
receive useful, relevant, informed, independent, authoritative and
timely advice on the science and technology dimensions of the issues it
faces? So your hearing today is important and timely.
Introduction
In the last decade the information revolution has dramatically
expanded the quantity of information available to the Congress, but
more information is certainly not necessarily better information.
Indeed, a fundamental problem now is not really the lack of
information; rather, it is how to gauge validity and usefulness within
the flood of available information and advice.
Congress certainly has many possible resources at its disposal,
ranging from universities, to independent think tanks, to existing
Congressional agencies such as GAO, CBO, and CRS, and, of course, the
National Academies. Other witnesses at this hearing will explore many
of these options, so in my testimony I will focus on (1) the current
and evolving role of the National Academies in providing advice to
Congress, (2) what I consider to be an especially important gap in the
current sources of advice for Congress, and (3) some thoughts related
to a number of the options under consideration for filling this gap.
As an additional and more detailed discussion of some of these
issues I would like to include for the record a report I prepared for a
conference in Berlin earlier this year on precisely this topic:
Scientific Advice for Policy in the United States: Lessons from the
National Academies and the former Congressional Office of Technology
Assessment.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Forthcoming in Proceedings of the Symposium on Quality Control
and Assurance in Scientific Advice to Policy, Working Group on
``Scientific Advice to Policy in Democracy,'' Berlin-Brandenburg
Academy of Science & Humanities, Berlin, Germany, January 12, 2006.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Traditional Role of the National Academies
Today, among the most familiar sources of independent scientific
and technical advice to Congress is the collection of organizations we
now refer to as the National Academies, which include the National
Academy of Sciences (NAS), the National Academy of Engineering (NAE),
the Institute of Medicine (IOM), and their ``operating arm,'' the
National Research Council (NRC). In 1863 Congress chartered the NAS as
an independent non-profit corporation to ``whenever called upon by any
department of the Government, investigate, examine, experiment, and
report upon any subject of science or art.'' This charter was signed by
President Lincoln during the height of the U.S. Civil War, and the
President was among the first to call upon the Academy for advice.
Today, the NAS, NAE, and IOM are each honorary societies that elect
new members to their ranks annually and all operate under the original
NAS charter. The NRC assembles committees of academy members and other
experts to carry out studies for executive branch agencies, but
Congress also frequently mandates studies by the NRC spanning the
entire spectrum of science and technology related issues. The NRC
produces around 200 reports annually, of which approximately 25 are
mandated by Congress.
The studies at the National Academies involve nearly 10,000
volunteers annually serving on expert committees and in the review
process as well as over a 1,000 professional staff. In the science and
technology advice world, the Academy is a substantial enterprise for
providing advice to the Federal Government in a broad range of areas,
although the role specifically for Congress has traditionally been a
relatively small part of the overall Academy portfolio.
The key strengths of the NRC in providing advice to the
Administration and to Congress are its long-established reputation for
credibility, its convening power, and the integrity of its study
process resulting in reports widely accepted as unbiased. Some features
of these key strengths include the following:
Credibility. Perhaps the principal strength of the
NRC is its institutional credibility, enabled significantly by
its association with the prestigious memberships of the NAS,
NAE, and IOM. The process by which this nongovernmental
institution conducts its work is designed to ensure the results
are evidence-based and tightly reasoned, and its independence
from outside influences and pressures from various interest
groups including government agencies. It should also be noted
that the Academies conduct several studies each year using our
own endowment or foundation sources, often focusing on topics
that the Academies believe to be important but that the
government may not be willing or able to fund. Examples include
the recent effort, Rising Above the Gathering Storm: Energizing
and Employing America for a Brighter Economic Future, and the
2002 study Making the Nation Safer: The Role of Science and
Technology in Countering Terrorism as well as many others very
well known to this committee.
Convening Power. A second major strength is the
convening power of the NRC. That is, the experts invited by the
NRC to participate in its studies generally accept the
invitation and are willing to invest considerable time and
energy on a pro bono basis. Studies are carried out by groups
of volunteers who are broadly considered among the best experts
on the issues to be studied, are free of conflicts of interest,
and have very carefully balanced biases. Because of the breadth
of membership in the academies and the links of the
organization to the scientific and technical communities
worldwide, the NRC is well equipped to identify and recruit
leading experts to serve on study committees.
Study Process and Products. Finally, another key
strength that has continued to evolve over the years is the NRC
study process itself that is designed to maintain balance and
objectivity throughout a committee's work and that produces
reports considered to be both unbiased and authoritative. A key
quality control feature in the process is independent peer
review. After consensus is achieved by a study committee and a
draft report is prepared, the NRC process requires the
committee to address all of the comments from a carefully
selected collection of peer reviewers, whose identity is not
revealed to the committee until the study is publicly released.
Challenges for Serving Congressional Needs
Over the years the NRC process has proved consistently to be a
strong model for providing independent authoritative advice to
government. Like any process designed to serve many needs, however, it
is not perfectly tuned to serve all the needs of all parts of
government that need science and technology advice. The most commonly
cited issues associated with the NRC study process, especially perhaps
as they relate to Congressional needs, are the following:
Cost. It is often perceived to be expensive to
commission an NRC study; even though committee members are
volunteers whose time is contributed pro bono (except for
travel expenses). At least in part this perception is due to
the fact that a separate contract is negotiated for each
individual study--unlike the central funding for agency
advisory committees.
Timeliness. The NRC process, which includes
commissioning and contracting for the study, selecting and
convening a study committee, arranging subsequent meetings
among busy people who are serving on a volunteer basis, and
navigating a report through peer review, editing, production,
and release takes time. The average time for an NRC study is 18
months, but can be longer. It should also be noted, however,
that studies can be carried out quite rapidly given an
important national need or specific agency or Congressional
requirements. As examples, both Rising Above the Gathering
Storm and Making the Nation Safer, noted earlier, were
completed in about six months and a widely cited study, Climate
Change Science, was completed in one month.
Sources of Sponsorship. Most NRC studies are
commissioned and paid for by federal agencies through
contracts, even those mandated by Congress which adds the
additional hurdle of enacting a law. On the one hand, this is
beneficial in that it helps ensure that what the NRC does is
relevant and important, and the diversity of support helps
assure independence. On the other hand, it often takes six to
nine months through a government procurement process to
initiate an NRC study even after a mandated study has been
enacted in law (or included in report language). For those
studies mandated by Congress, an additional delay often results
from the time needed to enact the relevant legislation.
A Gap in Types of Advice Currently Available to Congress
The NRC study process is well developed and serves an important
need of Congress--an authoritative set of findings and recommendations
from widely recognized experts, often leading to a specific recommended
course of action. In particular, NRC committees are usually assembled
with the intention of achieving consensus recommendations supported by
evidence. In a very controversial subject area with scientific and
other uncertainties, if a broad set of perspectives are included in the
study committee, as one might expect if the purpose is to include all
possible scientific and other perspectives on a problem, a consensus
might be difficult to achieve. This is why the NRC places a high
priority on an appropriately balanced committee and a rigorous
information-gathering phase of a committee's work, where such
perspectives are heard.
Since the historical focus of the NRC process has been on
delivering consensus-based advice on science and technology topics, the
process is less well equipped to elaborate on the broader context of an
issue and inform the policy debate with careful and objective analysis
of the policy consequences of alternative courses of action, especially
those that may involve value judgments and trade-offs beyond the scope
of technical analysis. Consequently, it has been far less common for
the NRC to assemble committees charged with identifying and evaluating
the pros and cons of a range of alternative policy options, although it
would certainly be possible to develop such a study process in the
National Academies.
Both types of analysis just described are important to
congressional deliberation depending upon the circumstances. With the
closure of the former Office of Technology Assessment (OTA), the latter
type of analysis as performed by a disinterested analytical
organization is no longer readily accessible to the Congress and may
need to be reconstructed in some way, either through adapting an
existing organization or through creation of an organization that is
answerable directly to the Congress or perhaps creating a new process
within an existing Congressional agency.
As an example illustrating the analysis gap just noted, consider
the case where Congress may be interested in the future of the Nation's
electric power system, following a major blackout. The salient issues
could be posed in two alternative ways:
One type of study would be to seek an authoritative
set of recommendations for making the system more secure and
reliable in the wake of blackouts or threats of terrorist
attacks on the Nation's infrastructure. In such a study, the
well established NRC approach would be to assemble a committee
of experts, review what is known about the power system and
where it is headed, and deliver specific engineering and
operational recommendations about how to improve system
reliability and performance. Indeed, we currently have such a
study underway to assist the Department of Homeland Security.
In another type of study, Congress might be
interested in exploring the technical as well as societal,
environmental, economic, regulatory, or other broad
implications of alternative scenarios for the future of the
Nation's electric utility industry, perhaps once again
precipitated by a blackout. Not only technical, but also
political, economic, social, environmental, and probably many
other kinds of tradeoffs and value judgments are involved in
characterizing a series of scenarios for the future structure
of the industry, ranging from moving toward a national
centrally controlled grid to fully deregulating wholesale and
retail electricity segments of the industry.
These two types of studies are not necessarily mutually exclusive,
but unlike the first case, in the second case a set of consensus
recommendations is not the principal objective, and the collection of
stakeholders and experts necessary to carefully identify and explore
these alternatives would be considerably different than for the study
committee structured to reach an evidence-based, tightly reasoned
consensus recommendations based on scientific evidence and on specific
technical issues.
In short, and perhaps at the risk of being simplistic, the first
type of analysis is designed to illuminate the scientific and technical
aspects of a problem to help in directing a specific course of action
while, in the second case, the analysis is designed principally to
inform the Congressional debate, including perspectives that may go
beyond science and technology about the broader implications of
alternative actions related to the science and technology issues being
considered, but both types of analysis are very important to
Congressional deliberations.
Evolving Study Processes at the NRC
The fact that the NRC process does not now accommodate the second
form of advice noted above does not mean that it could not; indeed, NRC
processes to do change from time to time in response to government
needs. As a case in point--the horrific terrorist events of September
11, 2001 spurred widespread interest in findings ways to contribute to
the understanding of the science and technology dimensions of homeland
security and countering terrorism. Specifically, many government
agencies expressed urgent needs for immediate advice in these areas. In
response, the NRC used its convening power to assemble small groups of
experts who then provide advice as individuals, rather than as a group
constituting an NRC committee. Such ``real-time'' advice, which is done
orally and not by a written report, does not carry the imprimatur of
the NRC study process, especially the quality control aspects of
committee deliberation and peer review of a written report. It does,
however, provide a new means of satisfying a real need of the
government, i.e., providing timely input to policy makers and other
organizations, including the Government Accountability Office (GAO)
with whom we now have a longstanding relationship along these lines.
Additional Congressional needs vary widely, including such
deliverables as (1) ``instant education'' on a complex science and
technology issue, (2) ``translations'' of authoritative reports to more
readable and understandable language tuned to the needs of broad
policy-makers, (3) summaries of landmark authoritative reports, and (4)
updates or adaptations of existing reports and information to current
needs, and (5) readily available and trusted expert consultants on call
to help with quick turnaround questions and interpretations of complex
technical information. Some of these capabilities are accessible to
varying degrees through the Congressional Research Service and through
various other means. Missing, however, especially since the closure of
OTA, is an ability to provide comprehensive analysis in any organized
or readily accessible way by an organization directly accountable to
Congress.
Collaboration and a GAO Experiment
In an experiment to test the feasibility of developing a
``technology assessment'' capability in the Government Accountability
Office (GAO), a first-of-a-kind GAO technology assessment report on
biometric technologies was released in 2002. The NRC did not
participate in developing this assessment, but it did use its contacts
to assist the GAO in identifying individuals with the proper expertise.
There are some shortcomings in the approach adopted by the GAO in
carrying out its first attempt at a technology assessment, most notably
the lack of a substantive and accountable peer review process.
Nevertheless, the experiment has been more successful than many
anticipated and the GAO seems receptive to incorporating improvements
suggested by a review group commissioned to review the GAO approach. In
particular, the group identified a number of significant organizational
challenges that it felt were necessary to refine the GAO approach, such
as the incorporation of a mechanism for peer review, which could then
possibly evolve into a more mature technology assessment capability
within the legislative branch.
Whether the GAO is capable of such reforms on a larger scale
remains to be seen, but it seems fair to conclude that the initial GAO
experiment has yielded evidence sufficient to continue the experiment.
We are pleased that the NRC's modest role in this experiment, by
providing experts to talk with GAO, appears to have been one of the
successful features of this approach and may constitute a way in which
the National Academies can contribute to a renewed technology
assessment capability within the legislative branch, in addition to its
more traditional response to congressionally mandated requests for
assistance. Such a mechanism provides the GAO a degree of access to the
National Academies' considerable network of technical expertise. If
needed, the Academies would also be willing to conduct similar studies
commissioned by GAO to aid in responding to important Congressional
requests.
The Former Office of Technology Assessment
By comparison with and in contrast to the NRC study process, the
former Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) study process used an
authoritative committee of volunteers as an advisory panel rather than
assuming authorship of the study itself, which was produced by
professional staff. As with NRC reports, OTA reports were also subject
to a rigorous peer review. On the one hand, this approach permitted
easier regulation of the role of the committee, particular if achieving
a consensus in a broad controversial area was unlikely, but, on the
other hand, such a practice also sacrificed the authoritativeness of
the volunteer experts as authors of the report, an important feature of
the NRC process.
Because the former OTA panels were advisory, and not the report's
authors, the necessity of reaching a consensus was seldom an issue.
Indeed, OTA was prohibited in its enabling legislation from making
recommendations, so the panel was created to try to collect the views
of all important stakeholders rather than to try to produce consensus
recommendations (although consensus findings and conclusions were
provided and viewed as important by requesting Congressional
committees). Instead, the OTA project teams sought to analyze and
articulate the consequences of alternative courses of action and
elaborate on the context of a problem without coming to consensus
recommendations on a specific course of action, which would be
difficult anyway with a diverse group with points of view that
prevented consensus on many controversial issues.
If required to come to a consensus set of recommendations, even if
it were permitted under the enabling legislation, the former OTA model
would likely be unworkable for controversial subjects with many
opposing points of view. Nonetheless, the type of study undertaken by
the former OTA was an important input to Congressional deliberation and
it has not yet been reproduced in the Legislative Branch agencies or
elsewhere, including the National Academies. The Academies could carry
out such studies but that would require some changes in its study
procedures for such studies as indicated above.
Conclusions
The National Academies have enjoyed a longstanding and effective
working relationship with Congress on even the most contentious issues.
There are, no doubt, many characteristics of that relationship that
could be improved, both to perform the traditional NRC role more
effectively and to provide some opportunities to expand that role.
The gaps I mentioned earlier in the mechanisms for providing
useful, relevant, informed, independent, authoritative and timely
advice on the science and technology issues to the Congress are
becoming more and more noticeable. There are certainly a variety of
options for filling these gaps, some of which might involve the Academy
and some that would not. Many of them are worthy of serious
consideration and we in the National Academies look forward to playing
a role in this very important area in whatever mechanism develops.
Thank you again for the opportunity to share my thoughts with you today
and I look forward to addressing any questions the Committee might
have.
Biography for Peter D. Blair
Peter Blair joined the National Research Council's (NRC) Division
for Engineering and Physical Sciences as its first Executive Director
in 2001, responsible for the NRC's portfolio in defense, energy and
environmental systems, information and telecommunications, physics,
astronomy, mathematics and operations research, aeronautics and space
science and engineering, materials, manufacturing and engineering
design, and civil engineering infrastructure.
Prior to his appointment at the NRC, from 1996-2001, Dr. Blair was
Executive Director of Sigma Xi, the Scientific Research Society and
publisher of American Scientist magazine, as well as an Adjunct
Professor of Public Policy Analysis at the University of North Carolina
at Chapel Hill.
From 1983-1996 Dr. Blair served in several capacities at the
Congressional Office of Technology Assessment (OTA), concluding as
Assistant Director of the agency and Director of the Industry, Commerce
and International Security Division where he was responsible for the
agency's research programs on energy, transportation, infrastructure,
international security, space, industry, commerce, and
telecommunications. He received the OTA's distinguished service award
in 1991.
Prior to his government service, Dr. Blair served on the faculty of
the University of Pennsylvania with appointments in the graduate groups
of energy management, regional science, and public policy and was a co-
founder of Technecon, Inc., a Philadelphia engineering-economic
consulting firm specializing in investment decision analysis of energy
projects and in developing, financing, and managing independent power
generation projects.
Dr. Blair holds a B.S. in engineering from Swarthmore College, an
M.S.E. in systems engineering and M.S. and Ph.D. degrees in energy
management and policy from the University of Pennsylvania. He is the
author or co-author of three books and over a hundred technical
articles in areas of electric power systems engineering, energy and
environmental policy, computer modeling of energy systems, regional
science and input-output analysis, and commercialization of new
technology.
Chairman Boehlert. And thank you for sharing the wisdom of
one of the most beloved Yankees.
Dr. Hunt.
STATEMENT OF DR. CATHERINE T. HUNT, PRESIDENT-ELECT, AMERICAN
CHEMICAL SOCIETY; LEADER FOR TECHNOLOGY PARTNERSHIPS, ROHM AND
HAAS COMPANY
Dr. Hunt. Chairman Boehlert, Ranking Member Gordon, and
distinguished Members of the Committee.
Good morning. My name is Dr. Catherine Hunt, and I am
pleased to address you this morning on behalf of the more than
158,000 members of the American Chemical Society, the largest
professional society in the world, or I should say, the largest
scientific society in the world. I am the 2007 President of the
Society, and I am also a technology manager at the Rohm and
Haas Company, an $8 billion specialty materials company, where
I build and champion technology partnerships across industry,
academia, and national labs.
In this age of lightning fast technological advancement,
and potentially massive information overload, it is
increasingly important that Congress have a reliable, credible,
and unbiased source of scientific and technical advice to help
sort through complex and often conflicting data.
Take this glass of water, for example. It looks perfectly
clean and pure, but as an analytical chemist, I can tell you
that there are trace chemicals and minerals in this water that
we couldn't detect even five years ago. Today's analytical
technologies can take us down to the part per quadrillion
level. That is part per quadrillion. That would be one inch in
the distance it would take you to travel to Mars round trip 168
times. So, are these substances bad or good? Should they be
banned or enhanced? Any such decision should be based on sound
technical assessment.
In essence, the flow of scientific and technical
information to Congress from any source should be subject to
critical measures. In other words, I would like to hear
everyone say: Is this accurate? Is it complete? Is it current?
And most importantly, is it reliable? To be useful, it is
critical, and you have heard this morning, that this
information be available in a timely manner, and that it be
easily used and understood by those with and also without
extensive scientific and technological background.
Since ACS was founded in 1876, the effective dissemination
of reliable information and advice has been one of the
Society's central tenets. In fact, ACS was chartered by
Congress in 1937 to share scientific knowledge with a broad
constituency, including Congress and the executive branch.
Since the elimination of the Office of Technology
Assessment in 1995, Members of Congress have had to rely more
heavily on their personal staffs, and on the relatively small
number of expert professional staff that populate committees
like yours. Also since 1995, the ACS has hosted 109 Science &
the Congress program briefings on Capitol Hill, seeking to
present unbiased information on technical and public policy
subjects. Congressional staff tell us that these briefings
provide balance of views and information that is what I need to
know and when I need to know it.
To meet its needs for S&T assessments, Congress clearly
should continue to use outside experts, including the National
Academies, to provide nonpartisan analysis of large scale,
complex issues. However, these experts cannot meet all of
Congress's frequent and extensive needs.
Congress does also tap into the expertise at the
Congressional Research Services and the GAO, as you have
already heard this morning. But again, these support agencies
are not currently structured to perform all of the analysis
required by legislators.
So, in summary, ACS, the American Chemical Society,
believes that Congress should consider establishing an in-house
science and technology unit, a properly structured unit, and
what do I mean by properly? I think it should have several
qualities. It should be bipartisan. It should be sufficiently
staffed to furnish complete analyses. It should have strong
links to outside experts, to facilitate collecting a broad
selection of inputs, and it should be staffed with
professionals who are especially skilled, and I can tell you
these are skills I look for in my staff to do technology
assessment at Rohm and Haas, that they can look at the pros and
cons of an issue, that they can look at the strengths and
weaknesses, that they can identify opportunities and threats.
And refining this input that they collect broadly into
potential policy options for Congressional use.
It should consider leveraging current science and
technology fellowships that we have heard about this morning.
These have been funded by outside groups. And sponsor new
fellowships to supplement the standing capabilities. I think it
should also consider using existing models. I like to learn
from the past, and to learn from what works in other places, if
it can work for you. Looking at openness and peer review, that
is what allows the National Academies and think tanks and
others to assemble world class science and technology reports.
So, in closing, a new science and technology unit should be
equally effective in performing two sometimes contradictory
functions. First, assembling world-class science and technology
assessments, and second, providing information to Congress in a
form and manner that facilitates your making sound policy
decisions.
So, with that, I would like to thank you for allowing me to
come and present our views on this important topic, and I would
be happy to answer any questions that you may have.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Hunt follows:]
Prepared Statement of Catherine T. Hunt
Chairman Boehlert, Ranking Member Gordon, and distinguished Members of
the Committee:
Good Morning. My name is Dr. Catherine Hunt.
I am pleased to address you this morning on behalf of the more than
158,000 chemical professionals (chemists, engineers, educators and
entrepreneurs) of the American Chemical Society (ACS), the largest
scientific society in the world. I am the 2007 President of the Society
and I'm also a technology manager with Rohm and Haas, an $8 billion
specialty materials company, where I manage technology partnerships
with the public and private sectors.
Today's hearing explores how Congress receives and analyzes the
scientific and technological information that it requires to evaluate
legislation, and how those information-gathering processes might be
improved. As technology increasingly drives our nation's economy,
security, and quality of life, the list of policy issues that demand
sound science and engineering understanding is rapidly expanding in
size and complexity. Over the past month, the House has held hearings
on topics ranging from energy to climate change, from cyber security to
voting standards--all of which contain a strong element of science and
that might have benefited from additional technological assessment. In
fact, I don't believe that there is a Congressional Committee that does
not in some manner deal with science and technology issues--even though
it may not be obvious at first blush. For instance, if we consider
water quality and supply, the Agriculture Committee is concerned about
water conservation, the Energy and Commerce Committee has jurisdiction
over drinking water, the Transportation Committee handles clean water,
this committee has oversight of water-related research and the
International Relations Committee needs to understand technologies that
impact potable water resources in the Middle East.
Sometimes information received by these committees, though
popularly accepted and reported as fact, ultimately turns out to be
unreliable, or worse yet--false. I think we would all agree that
legislative action taken on the basis of this type of information would
be regrettable and potentially damaging. Sometimes public opinion can
drive policy, but as important as public opinion and media reports are,
we mustn't allow these to push a rush to judgment without a careful
evaluation of the facts. This is where I think it becomes increasingly
important that Congress have a reliable, credible and unbiased source
for scientific and technical assessment to help it sort through complex
and often conflicting data.
Take this glass of water as an example. It looks perfectly clean
and pure--and it probably is. But given the new advances in chemical
detection technology, I'd venture to say that we could find numerous
trace chemicals and minerals in this glass that five years ago would
have been impossible to detect. Today's analytical technology takes us
down to the part per quadrillion level--a part per quadrillion is equal
to one inch in the distance you must travel to make 168 roundtrips to
Mars. But would we, or should we, legislate an immediate ban on the
materials found in this glass of water just because we could detect
them? In this example, I would suggest that information about the
presence of these substances in and of itself should not be the basis
for legislating a ban on the material, but rather such a decision
should be based on an assessment of what impact, or potential impact,
might these materials have on the health of the drinker--if any.
It is well known that the demands and expectations on Congress
continue to increase. Ease and reliability of electronic communications
has resulted in Congress being bombarded on a daily basis with hundreds
of thousands of e-mails, faxes, and phone calls from interest groups,
trade associations, scientific societies, and interested citizens and
constituents. This constant river of communication is sorted,
categorized, and assimilated by Members of Congress and their staffs to
identify that most valuable of treasures in Washington--reliable
information.
Since its founding in 1876, ACS has viewed the effective
dissemination of reliable information and advice as one of its central
functions. In fact, ACS was chartered by Congress in 1937 to share
scientific knowledge with a broad constituency, including the Congress
and the Executive branch. In truth, sharing scientific information is
fundamental to scientific and technical societies and associations.
Collectively, they provide a direct source of information and analysis
via testimony and letters, face-to-face meetings and consultations,
formal and informal communications, and other types of interactions.
These organizations also organize educational and informational
briefings for members and staff on a wide variety of science and
technology issues. Since 1995, the ACS Science & the Congress program
has hosted 109 briefings on Capitol Hill that seek to provide balanced
and unbiased first-hand information from subject-matter experts on a
wide range of technical and public policy subjects. The feedback we
have received from these briefings, which are well attended, is that
they provide a balance of views and an educational overview for
congressional staff who are generally seeking such information on a
just-in-time, tell-me-what-I-need-to-know basis.
Many other stakeholders in the legislative process utilize the same
tools and seek to provide similar services, including think tanks,
universities, federal agencies, trade associations, and companies. Most
of these groups place great emphasis on their own credibility before
Congress and thus strive to be regarded as honest brokers of reliable
information. However, to some extent, most of these outside sources of
information have a vested interest in the outcome of your
deliberations.
The flow of scientific and technical information to Congress from
any source should be subjected to critical measures: Is it accurate? Is
it complete? It is current? And, most importantly, is it reliable? To
be able to use this information, it is also important that it be
available in a timely manner and in a way that it is easily used by
those without backgrounds in science and technology.
To meet its need for science and technology assessments, Congress
clearly should continue to use outside experts, including the National
Academies, to scope, integrate, and provide non-partisan analysis of
large-scale complex issues involving science and technology. However,
these experts cannot meet all of Congress' frequent and extensive
needs, and ACS believes that Congress should have greater access to
assessments on a wider range of subjects than outside organizations are
capable of providing.
Since the elimination of the Office of Technology Assessment in
1995, Congress has functioned without an impartial internal unit that
can frame complex issues, provide comprehensive and balanced insights
and analysis, and set out policy options on science and engineering
issues. Members of Congress have had to rely more heavily on their
personal staffs and on the relatively small number of expert
professional staff that populate committees like yours to perform this
critical function. Congress also taps the professional expertise at the
Library of Congress Congressional Research Services (CRS) and the
Government Accountability Office (GAO).
Many experts believe that these congressional support agencies are
not currently structured and staffed to perform all of the in-depth,
unbiased scientific and technical analyses required by legislators.
Congress should consider establishing an in-house science and
technology unit that supplements their capabilities and provides
timely, thorough assessments for decisions on issues involving a wide
range of science, engineering, and technology. This unit could be
housed in CRS, GAO, or stand alone as a congressional support agency.
What would such a unit look like? A properly structured, in-house
unit should have sufficient staff to furnish complete analyses. It also
should rely significantly on outside experts to refine their input for
congressional use. Its operations should be economical and efficient in
order to provide a regular stream of timely advice to Congress. The new
science and technology assessment unit might also consider leveraging
current science and technology fellowships funded by outside groups,
and sponsor new fellowships to supplement its standing capabilities. By
placing scientists and engineers in various legislative offices and
committees, the new unit would be more relevant and approachable to all
congressional members and staff.
To be effective, a new science and technology assessment unit must
be equally effective in two sometimes contradictory functions--(1)
assembling world-class scientific and technology assessments and (2)
providing information to Congress in a form and manner that facilitates
your making policy decisions. In the former area, the unit should use
the existing models, including openness and peer review, that allow the
National Academies, academics, and think tanks to assemble world-class
science and technology reports. While I am not an expert on the latter
challenge, I would observe that you are in the best position to
determine how the unit should be organized to most effectively operate
in your unique environment and meet your needs.
Thank you for this opportunity to present our views on this
important topic. I will be happy to answer any questions you may have.
Biography for Catherine T. Hunt
Education and Employment
Dr. Catherine ``Katie'' T. Hunt is Leader, Technology Partnerships
for Rohm and Haas Company, where she builds collaborations between the
company, academia, government agencies, and private foundations. Since
creating the unit in 2002, she has helped secure multi-million dollar
grants from federal agencies to improve collaboration across all
sectors of the chemical enterprise. In 2002, Dr. Hunt acted as a member
of the steering committee for the ``Nanomaterials and the Chemical
Industry Roadmap Workshop,'' a collaborative effort between the
Department of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (DOE/EERE), the
National Nanotechnology Initiative (NNI), and the Chemical Industry
Vision 2020 Technology Partnership. As a result of this workshop, Dr.
Hunt co-authored the Chemical Industry R&D Roadmap for Nanomaterials by
Design: From Fundamentals to Function.
Dr. Hunt began her career in industry with Rohm and Haas Company in
1984 after completing an NIH Postdoctoral Fellowship at Yale
University. Since then, Dr. Hunt has held a variety of positions at
every level of the company from Senior Scientist in Analytical Research
(1984) to Philadelphia Plant Laboratory Manager (1991) to Director of
Worldwide Analytical and Computational Competency Network and
Technology Development (1998). She was named to her current position in
2002.
Dr. Hunt holds an A.B. in Chemistry (Cum Laude) from Smith College,
Northampton, MA, and a Ph.D. in Chemistry from the University of
California, Davis. She has authored 13 papers, one book chapter on
Metallothionein.
Professional Organization Leadership
Dr. Hunt is the 2006 President-Elect for the American Chemical
Society. She will serve as President in 2007 and as a member of the
Board of Directors from 2006-2008. She has been a member of the society
since 1977. She is also an active member of the American Association
for the Advancement of Science, the International Union on Pure and
Applied Chemistry, and Sigma Xi. Dr. Hunt serves on the Board of
Directors of the Council for Chemistry Research and was a participant
in the Vision 2020 Industry Group.
Over her professional career Dr. Hunt has received many awards
including being a member of the Women in Science Delegation to Cuba
(2001); Best Paper Award from INDA, Association of Nonwoven Fabrics
Industry (1997); Rohm and Haas Company, S.J. Talucci Quality Award
(1996); and NIH Postdoctoral Fellowship (1982-1984).
American Chemical Society
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organization that consists of more than 159,000 individual members at
all degree levels and in all fields of chemistry and chemical
engineering. The organization provides a broad range of opportunities
for peer interaction and career development, for a wide range of
professional and scientific interests. As the world's largest
scientific society and in keeping with its congressional charter, ACS
advances the chemical enterprise, increases public understanding of
chemistry, and brings its expertise to bear on state and national
matters.
Discussion
Chairman Boehlert. Thank you very much, Dr. Hunt. And let
the Chair note for the record that the glass Dr. Hunt used in
her illustration is half full.
You know, Dr. Blair gave an example of the kind of study
that he thinks Congress is not getting, and although he noted
that the Academy might be able to fill the gap. Could the rest
of you on the panel describe a kind of study, a specific
example, that Congress doesn't receive now, because we lack a
mechanism to do so, and then, could you tell me what you think
would be the preferred mechanism to get the information to
Congress?
That is a tough question. Who wants to go first? Dr. Peha?
Dr. Peha. Well, one issue I have been following, both
inspired and horrified by 9/11, is communication systems for
first responders, firefighters, police, National Guard. There
have been hearings on this topic in a variety of committees, on
both the House and Senate side, where I have seen people come
in and say here is the little piece of the problem that I see,
and here is the incremental change that would help me deal with
it. And that is great, but that doesn't allow you to look at
the whole problem, and one of the reasons we are in the mess we
are in is because the problem has been fragmented so many ways,
with each organization looking at its little piece. And another
problem is that sometimes, incremental change isn't the way to
go, and----
Chairman Boehlert. How would you address that particular
one?
Dr. Peha. I think--I mean, a study that came in and said
here are a variety of options, and some of them are
incremental, and some of them are, you know, some of them are
to do nothing, some of them are to beef up this and to beef up
that. Others are to look at more fundamental kinds of change.
In this case, I in particular think that we have to stop
looking at municipally-led systems, tens of thousands of them,
and start looking at broad regional and national systems.
And to study the technical, economic, organizational
impact, you would need some other kind of organization to look
at something that broad, and to compare it to the other
incremental approaches.
Chairman Boehlert. Well, would the Academy be able to fill
that gap, or would you create a new vehicle, and----
Dr. Peha. I think the--I mean, the Academy has also looked
at parts of this. They also, because, you know--Peter and I
were talking about this exactly before, they have to bring
together people who will come to consensus, and they have been
looking at all the neat little technologies that they could use
incrementally to advance what people are doing. But to look at
something radically different, it is very difficult for the
Academy to do.
And you know, you could look at something radically
different and say it is the wrong idea, but to come along and
say here is a very different choice. Here is what would happen
if the Department of Homeland Security took the lead, instead
of city governments. That would have to come from somewhere
else.
Chairman Boehlert. Do you have an idea where that somewhere
might be?
Dr. Peha. Well----
Chairman Boehlert. Should we resurrect OTA, for example?
Did that pass your four----
Dr. Peha. Yeah. At the moment, frankly, Carnegie Mellon
University is trying to look at this, but we are too far
removed. I would like to see some organization that answers
directly to Congress, that is--has staff that are, you know,
that answer only to Congress. They may do some of the work
themselves. They may farm it out to--pieces of it out to
consultants, as Congressman Rohrabacher suggested, but
ultimately, they would put those pieces together. They would
negotiate with Congress what they are supposed to do, and they
would present it to Congress when they are done.
Chairman Boehlert. Thanks. Dr. Teich, do you have an
observation you would share with us?
Dr. Teich. Well, I can--I could say what he said, that I
like, but I think--pick a different area, pick energy
conservation, for example. That is an area in which there are a
huge number of existing studies. There are a wide range of
views on how to accomplish it, but we are very far from having
a systems point of view on that, and of implementing programs
on a sufficient scale to accomplish what we need to accomplish,
I think.
So, what Congress needs is some kind of mechanism that will
synthesize the knowledge, and will give it ownership of a set
of ideas that will satisfy the diverse needs that conflict in
this--in that kind of an arena, the various companies that have
a vested interest, the other organizations. And to take the
scientific data out of all that, and put it in a framework that
Congress can look at and can use.
Chairman Boehlert. With all due respect, in that particular
example you are using, energy conservation, we are not short on
getting good science up here. We just don't want to accept it.
We ignore it.
Dr. Teich. Well, I am----
Chairman Boehlert. You know, we like to say we are for
scientific consensus, until the scientific consensus leads to a
politically inconvenient conclusion. Then we want to go to Plan
B.
Dr. Teich. Right.
Chairman Boehlert. The sciences--for example, one of my pet
causes, CAFE standards. We have got off the shelf technology,
don't have to launch a new research program, off the shelf
technology that could be employed that would save us, you know,
millions of barrels of oil at a time when we are so dependent
on foreign source oil. Pretty logical, but you have people
questioning the science. Not--scientists questioning the
science, you have policy-makers, so the problem, the
frustration I have is that you can lead a horse to water, but
you can't make him drink sort of thing. And we have got the
good science there, in this area particularly, and we ignore
it, because it is not politically convenient to address the
good science in a meaningful way. But----
Dr. Teich. I guess that was the point I was trying to make,
and perhaps not as well as I would have liked, but Congress
needs an institution that will help it to drink in this case.
Chairman Boehlert. Well, but once again, you get--the
institution, whether it is a reconstituted OTA or any other
sort of think tank, objective, impartial, independent,
adequately funded. You can have, you know, hordes of people
with--spending tens of millions of dollars, but when they
present something to Congress, Congress has to make policy
decisions, and not science decisions. All the science is there
to prove the point, but so many people ignore it,
unfortunately.
Dr. Blair, you are going to answer your own question?
Dr. Blair. Yeah, if you don't mind.
Chairman Boehlert. Well, that is fine.
Dr. Blair. I would like to offer an example that may
illustrate the gap I described. I mentioned in my written
testimony, but I didn't describe in detail, I think, an example
of the kind of gap I am talking about.
Out in California right now, we are in the middle of
rolling blackouts in some parts of the electric power system,
and there is a lot going on in the electric power industry
right now, and where the future is headed.
We at the Academies are very well suited to look at, for
example, producing an authoritative set of recommendations for
making the power system more secure and reliable in the wake of
blackouts and the threat of terrorist attacks. In fact, we are
doing that study right now for the Department of Homeland
Security. However, we are not looking at, for example, a way in
which the electric power system might evolve over the next
decade with the pressures of increasing competition, how it has
worked or not worked in different parts of the country, how the
role of technology is affecting our ability to install new
generation in different parts of the country, the social,
economic, political, and other dimensions where it is almost
impossible to achieve a consensus, but it is important for
Congress to have the context of those issues laid out in a way
that helps inform the debate, in a realistic way, which is very
important.
Chairman Boehlert. What would you suggest--what would be
the vehicle to carry that forward?
Dr. Blair. Well, I laid out a few of the options in the--in
my testimony, that I suppose the Academies could evolve in that
direction. We are currently not now constituted to do that very
well, because as Al mentioned, we are designed to come to
scientific consensus on committees, come up with consensus
findings and recommendations. That would be almost impossible
in this kind of an argument.
So, having a body that could do this, directly tuned to the
needs of Congress, is important. It could happen in a variety
of ways, anywhere from resurrecting the function that was
provided by the former Office of Technology Assessment, to
perhaps modifications in some of the existing Congressional
agencies, to perhaps even adapting some mechanisms outside the
Congress, but directly reportable in Congress.
Chairman Boehlert. I have far exceeded my time, but Dr.
Hunt, do you have something special you would like to offer?
Dr. Hunt. What I would say is, the way I like to approach
this in industry is to put out a grand challenge, or in any
case, something where you look and say, how could that possibly
happen? Like, let us cut gas prices by a factor of ten, or a
factor of a hundred, or let us just go non-petroleum. What
would it take to do that?
And the reason you start with something like that is it
makes you think out of the box. It makes you come up with
solutions you might not be able to come up with looking at
standard reports. And where I would say this would take you
would be to look at energy policy, right. If we had an energy
policy that looked at short-term, long-term, mid-term types of
capabilities, and I think there are a lot of reports out there,
as you have said, there is a lot of information. How do you
assimilate that together and put forward an energy policy that
will truly decrease our dependence on foreign oil?
And it takes what we call at work institutional fortitude,
right, there are things and--that are not politically
acceptable, but the question is, can we focus with the end in
mind, and develop a place where there is an independent body
that can provide choices.
Chairman Boehlert. Thank you very much. I apologize to my
colleagues. I went way over my time limit.
Mr. Gordon.
Mr. Gordon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It was a good area of
inquiry.
I am one that thinks that Congress needs additional
nonpartisan, independent scientific information. I think it
will help us make better decisions, and I think it will help us
use the taxpayer's dollars more wisely. And so, let us--I want
to get more specific than sort of the wide-ranging discussion
we have had so far.
There are some that think that after the November
elections, that the Congressional horse might be more willing
to drink, and if that occurs, then let us again be more
specific. One approach would be, OTA is already authorized. It
is just not funded. And so, my question would be what are the
pros and cons of properly funding and staffing OTA to
accomplish the goals that we had been talking earlier, and I
will let each witness try to succinctly give us an opinion on
that.
And why don't we do it in reverse order this time.
Dr. Hunt. So, I think--sometimes, I think that it is
important to change the name of something, so that indeed, you
don't go back to what you had before, but that you look at what
the qualities are that you want in the future.
And I think that you heard a lot of summary of that here
this morning that I think you would want to go back to. It
needs to be bipartisan. What you are----
Mr. Gordon. Yeah, but I--my sincere question is----
Dr. Hunt. Okay.
Mr. Gordon.--is what are the pros and cons of appropriately
funding OTA? It is already authorized. What are the pros and
cons of doing OTA?
Dr. Hunt. Okay. I would say one of the pros is, it would be
expeditious, okay. It would be something you could do and put
in place quickly. What I think one of the cons would be is that
you would want to make sure you construct it, not just revive
it as it was, but construct it to address any issues you felt
that were not appropriate, or not satisfactory.
So, if timeliness is important, you need a process that
will direct timeliness. If choice of projects is important--am
I going down the road you----
Mr. Gordon. Not really, but we will go to Dr. Blair.
Dr. Hunt. Okay.
Mr. Gordon. Let us see if he can get down there.
Dr. Blair. Well, this may be context, but I have either the
distinction or the misfortune of being the one who literally
turned the lights out at OTA, and handed the keys over to the
Architect of the Capitol, and I think that, as I think back, at
the time of OTA's closing, and what OTA would look like now, I
think it would be a very different place.
A lot has happened in those 10 years. The way in which
people communicate with Congress, the day-to-day operations,
perhaps the--at the time OTA was closed, the ability to react
more nimbly, to provide interim results to major assessments,
to interact more with the broad individual membership of
Congress, in addition to the committees. All of these are
things that were sort of on the table at the time, but in the
flurry of the decade ago, didn't have time to mature.
So, on one hand, yes, the pros are that the function
exists. It could be started up again, but I think it would have
to be a different place. The function is quite clear, and I
think OTA could do it. Perhaps some of the other experiments
that are going on, such as the enhancement of the GAO
technology assessment experiment, or perhaps, the idea of
building a function like this within the Congressional Research
Service. But there are cultural changes that would be necessary
there in order to really appeal to this function we have been
talking about.
Mr. Gordon. Well, you are starting from scratch.
Dr. Blair. Yes.
Mr. Gordon. So, it is not a matter of having, I don't
think, those liabilities.
Dr. Blair. Right.
Mr. Gordon. In terms of updating it, you can trade in your
manual typewriters for computers, and you can also recognize
you are dealing in a different age.
Let us see, Dr. Teich.
Dr. Teich. Well, I think the pro is obvious, and has been
identified by my colleagues, which is that it would be the
easiest route legislatively, since you would not need to pass
new authorizing legislation to establish it.
I think one of the cons is the legacy of--which may not be
such a major consideration at this point, since I think many of
the people who were involved in the decision on OTA are no
longer in the Congress, and a lot of others have, perhaps,
forgotten that the issue existed. But I think that is also one
of the problems, which is--that needs to be addressed in
creating a new function, and I don't know what you call it, and
I don't have a formula for establishing it, but too many people
in the Congress, too many Members, I think, didn't really care.
It wasn't that important to them. It didn't serve them
sufficiently, and I think that somehow, a new function has to
be created that would serve the Congress more broadly than OTA
did.
OTA tried. It didn't have the resources, I think. It never
established the kind of presence in the Congress that made it
indispensable. It needs to have that kind of presence. It needs
to have a connection to a wide range of committees, and to a
wide range of Members.
Mr. Gordon. I think to some extent, it was the victim of a
drive-by shooting in '95. There was an interest to take a
scalp, and it was a handy scalp. Do you want to finish up, and
then we will move on?
Dr. Peha. I agree with everything that is said. If it would
be easy, and if that method is used of creating an
organization, it would have to be understood that it is not
reviving OTA. It is creating a new organization in that shell,
that would look different, and learning the lessons of OTA.
But let me put this in the context of the alternative. The
alternative is to create this function, or to establish this
functionality in an existing organization, like GAO, Library of
Congress, or CBO. That has advantages, in that you can share
resources, particularly if you are establishing something that
is initially not all that large, as large as OTA was in the
earlier days. Establishing something in a new organization
would have the disadvantage that you have a dissimilar existing
mission, and you would have to protect the new activity from
the old, it would, you know, it would have to have different
processes. It would have to have staff with different skills,
and you would have to make sure that there was sufficient
independence in this new piece.
Or one other option, you create a standalone agency that
looks, that, you know, with new authorization, that is whatever
the new thing is.
Mr. Gordon. Okay. Thank you, and let me just suggest to all
of the think tank folks, you know, that are here. This would be
a good area to be thinking about. And that, I think, at least
this committee would welcome recommendations, thoughtful
papers, on how to set this operation up.
Thank you.
Chairman Boehlert. Thank you very much. The ever patient
and always persistent Mr. Rohrabacher.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Thank you very much.
This is one drive-by shooter to the other. Let me note,
there is some, you know, although we do recognize that drive-by
shooters are bad people, but some people need shooting, you
know. I will just have to tell you this, and frankly, when we
were trying to get control of Federal spending, this Office
jumped out at us as something that needed our attention, it
needed to be put in our sights.
I--let me put it this way. What I hear today is the
assumption that having something like the OTA reestablished is
going to be--it is going to be an objective organization, and
it has got to be, you know, all of these great words that are
coming up to describe another layer of bureaucracy, and a
buffer between us and the scientific world. You are assuming
that this is going to be a very positive element, that now we
put in place. I don't know what makes you--is there any
scientific reason to assume that putting in this new layer of
government between us and the scientific community will yield
positive things? I don't think so. I mean, every time I have
heard about hiring new government employees, and putting--and
letting them be your, you know, one who is going to put it all
together and describe to us what is good and what is bad, it
has turned out bad.
Let me just note that what we need is not an organization
that will serve as a conduit for which everybody has to come to
us through. We need competing sources of information. That is
what we need, and unfortunately, at some of our own hearings,
we don't have both sides. I mean, I think the most important
thing that we can do is have people in the scientific community
representing both sides of any issue, here, debating it in
front of us, and recognizing that no matter how many people
speak about what their authority is, there is disagreement
among people even in the scientific community about which
direction to go on certain issues, on most issues, I might add.
I remember when cyclamates, when I was a kid--Remember
cyclamates?--were banned. By the way, they were never banned in
Canada, let me note that. But we banned them, and we had
terrific scientific information, the entire scientific
community eliminated the billions of dollars that our soft
drink companies had invested in cyclamates, and we eliminated
them, and of course, 15 years later, we found out no, well, we
were wrong. Sorry. Cyclamates really don't cause the cancer we
thought they would, and of course, in the meantime, we got an
obesity problem springing from soft drinks that are being
consumed by people without cyclamates. So, anyway, there are--
what we needed to hear perhaps, back then, was a competing view
on cyclamates, rather than just having one scientific buffer
between us.
Finally, let me note, Mr. Chairman, the fellowship programs
that have been mentioned today, the AAAS fellowship program, I
would like to commend the AAAS, and I would like to make sure
that we all know that there are wonderful, wonderful sources
for Congress right now that I take advantage of. I have had a
AAAS Fellow with my office for the last 15 years, and they have
all been superior. They have really contributed greatly to my
effectiveness and my efficiency and my understanding of various
issues, as well as broadening the amount of sources of
information that I have.
These are the ways that we should go. We should be
encouraging universities and people to be available to us on a
contractual basis, and fast turnaround, rather than well, we
will tell you in ten years turnaround. Let us hear an
assessment, and have someone who can go through the scientific
assessment of what has already been researched, and get back to
us with a report in two months, rather than two years. These
are the type of things we need. We certainly don't need another
buffer between us and the scientific community.
And with that, I would just--anything you would like to
disagree with, or say you agree with, go right ahead.
Dr. Peha. I would agree that you don't need a buffer
between Congress and the scientific community, and that, I
think, is the last thing this organization ought to do. If you
want to go out and reach out to----
Mr. Rohrabacher. Even though it may evolve into that.
Dr. Peha. This should simply be another information source,
a more objective information source than many that you will get
that will help you reach out to those other sources.
Dr. Teich. Yeah, I would--first of all, I want to thank you
for your vote of confidence in the fellows program, both the
things that you said, Mr. Rohrabacher, as well as----
Mr. Rohrabacher. Well, thank you. We thank you.
Dr. Teich. Well----
Mr. Rohrabacher. You have done a terrific job.
Dr. Teich. We--it is a two way street. We benefit from the
ability to assist you, I think, and we are pleased that you are
appreciative of the assistance that we have provided, as Mr.
Boehlert said, the--some of the--many of the Fellows go back to
their careers in their universities and other institutions, and
serve as points of contact between the policy-makers and the
scientific community, and I think it is a very valuable thing
to see happening.
And I think that same kind of thing can be created, if it
is done right in an institution, such as the one we have been
talking about, and I am not talking about reestablishing an
OTA, but I am suggesting that some kind of institution does not
have to be a buffer or layer or an insulating mechanism. It can
be a semi-permeable membrane, if you want to use a scientific
analogy. It can be something which transmits information in
both directions, and that is the thing, that is the kind of
thing I would like to see.
I would add that I think we have plenty of competing
sources of information, and I think that is part of the
problem.
Dr. Blair. Let me give you a California example. It is a
buyer's market for houses in California right now. As a
metaphor, if you are a buyer coming to look at houses, you can
rely on the advice of the realtor, or his friends next door, or
many others, but if they really would like to have an
objective, independent view, they hire a house inspector to
look at the quality of all of the--to be able to dig in the
muck and see all of the things that are going on in that house
before they buy it.
What you need is a house inspector. You need an
organization that can provide this sorting out of all the
conflicting pieces of advice, and do it in a way that is
trusted to you, to you Members of Congress. And that is my
California metaphor.
Dr. Hunt. So, I guess my industrial metaphor would be that
when you have something important to do, and in this
technology-driven society, I would say technology assessments
would be what we would call mission critical, and that would be
something that you don't outsource, your mission critical work.
You certainly collect outside information, but you have that
house inspector that is chartered to get you that information,
to synthesize that information, and to present you with the
options in the way that you can trust.
Chairman Boehlert. Thank you very much, and thank the
gentleman. Ms. Matsui.
Ms. Matsui. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I want to thank
the panel for being here today.
I have only been on the Committee for about three months,
so I am one of those who can look at it as a newcomer, in
essence. And I wasn't here 10 years ago at the demise of OTA,
but as you have also said, a lot has happened in ten years, and
I think one of you indicated that Members, perhaps, then didn't
care about the area of OTA.
Today, however, as I think every single one of you has
said, science and technology affects every part of our lives.
We brought up last week stem cells, climate, energy. Everything
is involved in this, so it is not just relegated in a sense, as
being a part of just the Science Committee. So, every committee
in Congress can benefit by whatever entity we are talking about
here. I also believe that we have a lot of information, almost
too much information. Ten years ago, we were barely using
email, and today, they are just blasting us all the time. We
thought we had problems with fax machines, but that was nothing
compared to email today.
And honestly, every single one of us probably has some sort
of a personal scientific type of question, whether it be
medical or whatever, and usually, the first thing you do is go
to the Internet to try to figure it out, and you realize oh,
boy, this is not the way to do it. And I think to a certain
degree, for all of us here, we would like to be able to manage
the information in a way which is independent, accurate, and
timely, and I think all those things have to be factored in. I
even believe that my very committed and very passionate
California colleague would also like to see that, too.
We are all so very busy, and if it would be great for all
of us, every single one of us in our districts have--we are
from California, obviously, here. We have an energy crisis. We
know that. It is 109 in Sacramento, and it is too hot, and
gases are too expensive, and all that. So, science touches us
everywhere. So, every single one of us has a need for some
information, and we just can't go to the Internet. We can't
just kind of look into the books, or go to the Academies. That
is too much information. So, we need something of the caliber
that we are trying to figure out here.
Now, is it possible, as we are talking about, to
restructure this OTA, rename it, and come up with a different
type of--the same mission, but perhaps more relevant to today.
Because my feeling is, is that you brought up net neutrality. I
mean, those of us here, I have a little bit of knowledge of it,
but I didn't think that it was what was portrayed, and either,
you know, you see the advertisements or hear it, and it is not
quite what I thought it was going to be.
So, therefore, there is a real need, but it is a need, as
my colleague says, this needs to be information that has to be
given to us very quickly, and most of the time, we hear from
the people who come to see us with their particular advocacies.
So, I am trying to figure out, is there a way to do this,
so that we have adequate, accurate information. Maybe there is
a system set up where there are hot issues that you can deal
with, and other types of issues that are more lengthy and
study. Can we do that in a manner which can address some of the
concerns that Mr. Rohrabacher has, and that I would have, as
far as independent, accurate information? I like to hear
debates, but you know, you can get tired after a while, and you
don't come back with that much information. I would like to
have somebody give me good information.
So, each of you, could you respond to that?
Dr. Teich. Well, I think you have identified the problem
very succinctly, and I would answer in response to your basic
question that yes, it is possible to do this. I don't think we
are going to decide exactly how right here and right now, but I
think what is necessary initially is a recognition, and a
recognition among a majority of Members, that it is necessary
to have this kind of function.
And then, I think the kind of information that you need
that will help you establish this in an effective way can be
generated through additional hearings, through staff studies,
through outside contributions, but a variety, there are a
variety of mechanisms that will assist you in developing this.
But first of all, you need to recognize that it needs to be
done.
Dr. Blair. In thinking back ten years ago, as I mentioned
earlier, the centralized organization in the Congress would
probably be a very different place now. But one of the things
that struck me at that time, and even now, perhaps more, even
more current, is an ability to collaborate among the
Congressional support agencies. For example, CRS is very good
at the off-the-shelf kind of analysis, the ability to give you
the very quick answer. The former OTA was designed for the
comprehensive, large scale assessments. There is a lot of room
in between those two extremes. And is there an ability to
network the organizations in the Congress, like the General
Accounting Office, the Congressional Budget Office, CRS, and
perhaps a new function that resembles the function of the old
OTA, to provide a whole that is more than just the sum of the
parts, to be able to react to that network of activities?
And actually in my paper, I talk a little about some of the
experiments that are going on now. For example, the GAO
experiment, where partnering with outside organizations, as
well, for example, the Academies now have a relationship with
the Government Accountability Office, to use our Rolodex to get
experts to come in and convene and provide meetings of experts,
to help inform GAO investigations. So, an ability to combine
the strengths of multiple organizations has benefit, I think,
for having a whole that is greater than just the sum of the
parts.
Chairman Boehlert. Thank you very much. The gentlelady's
time has expired.
Dr. Bartlett.
Mr. Bartlett. Thank you very much.
For the past 18 months or so, I have been involved in a
dialogue on energy in this country, and a lot of people are now
engaged in that dialogue, a lot of very bright people, and
sometimes, equally ignorant people are engaged in that
dialogue.
And we have a number of questions of fact for which we need
answers, and I have two questions to ask you, and I will
mention a few of those. I would like to know are these the kind
of things that we could reasonably expect an OTA-like
organization to give us answers to? And after that, where
should we go now?
One of these is the amount of fissionable, the uranium that
remains in the world. If we are going to move to light water
reactors, how much fissionable uranium remains in the world? I
get widely divergent answers to this, like 15 years and 100
years. Where are we?
The energy profit ratio of ethanol. Some believe that more
fossil fuel energy goes into producing ethanol than we get out
of ethanol. Clearly, if we are going to have a debate on where
we go, we need to have an answer to this. To whom do we turn
for that answer?
If there is a positive energy profit ratio for ethanol, is
it reasonable that we could displace a meaningful amount of our
gasoline with ethanol? Brazil now has no foreign oil imports.
Of course, Brazil is not the United States. They get their
ethanol from sugar cane, which they grow largely with hand
labor, and they don't have very many cars and so forth.
If it is true, as I am told, that 13 percent of our corn
could displace two percent of our gasoline, and if you had to
grow corn using the energy from corn, with a reasonable energy
profit ratio, if we doubled our corn crop, one calculation says
you would have to double our corn crop and use it all for
ethanol, just to displace 10 percent of our gasoline--of how
much of our biomass can we rob from our topsoil, and still have
topsoil? What is the potential? To whom should we go for an
answer?
USGS is using what I think is an interesting, if not
bizarre use of statistics, where they take the 50 percent
probability, and call it the mean, and using that, they project
that we will find as much more oil in the world as all the oil
that now remains in the world. Professor LaPierre says that
that is just implausible. That just can't happen. But our
Energy Information Administration uses this bizarre use of
statistics by USGS to tell us that--not to worry about energy,
because it just goes up and up into the wild blue yonder, and
they--for the foreseeable future, they have energy going up and
up when oil is $75 a barrel today.
How much energy goes into producing the oil from the tar
sands in Alberta? I am told that they may use more energy from
natural gas than they get out of the tar sands. Okay, from a
dollar profit ratio, the gas is stranded, but at the end of the
day, that may be really dumb use of that energy in that gas. We
had an experiment by Shell Oil Company in getting oil out of
our oil shales in the West. They freeze a big vessel, then they
cook it inside that for a year or so, and then, they pump for a
year or so. What is the energy profit ratio there? And I have a
lot of trouble believing that it is really a positive energy
profit ratio.
And then, another consideration. Maybe we will move to
nuclear. You build a nuclear power plant, it takes a lot of
fossil fuel energy. For how many years do you have to operate
the nuclear power plant before you get any net energy out of
it? How many years do you operate it before you get back the
energy you put into building the plant?
Now, are these the kinds of questions that an OTA type of
organization could answer for us, and absent that, where can we
go now for answers to these questions, because we can't have a
reasonable dialogue until we agree on these facts, and there is
no agreement.
Chairman Boehlert. Now, there is a test. Who wants to go
first?
Dr. Blair. Well, I can take a crack at some of that. I
think many of the dimensions of what you cite--in fact, let me
say that my staff, our staff at the Academies, who have been
talking with you, Mr. Bartlett, about energy problems, have
been very inspired by a lot of the discussions they have had
with you. And I think that many of the issues you describe are
issues where a consensus group of experts from, say, the
Academies could provide important insights onto questions of,
let us say, fact.
But some of them that you described are moving in the
direction of choices, and issues that would require tradeoffs
in understanding and the like, and it would be more difficult,
as I think I mentioned earlier, for the Academies to come to
consensus on those kinds of tradeoffs.
For example, one of the energy issues you didn't mention
was--well, you did, sort of--on fuel economy of automobiles and
gasoline, and there are dimensions of that where, you know, you
might raise the issue of whether or not--how far off are plug-
in hybrids, or how quickly can the auto industry turn over its
fleet to a new generation of vehicles. We can certainly
identify the technical potential, but identifying the policy
tradeoffs, and how to get there, whether you adopt CAFE
standards or fuel taxes, or all kinds of other policy
mechanisms--
Mr. Bartlett. Yeah, both of those, thank you.
Dr. Blair. --those are much more subjective and policy rich
discussions, but they are very complicated, and very intimately
related to the technology. So, many of the issues you
described, where the debate hinges on the interface between
policy and technology are more in this, the kind of
organization we have been talking about.
If you would like to talk specifically about cellulosic
ethanol versus grain-based ethanol, and switchgrass, and all of
that, I would be happy to do that with you at some point, but
there is plenty of room in there for both approaches that we
have been talking about.
Chairman Boehlert. Thank you very much. The gentleman's
time has expired.
Mr. Green.
Mr. Green. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I thank you and the
Ranking Member for hosting this most valuable hearing.
I would like to share a brief vignette that is not true,
before I make my inquiry. The story is told of a person who
receives information from messengers, and he tells the
messengers: ``I want your most truthful, your most honest, your
unbiased opinion.'' And the first messenger gives an opinion,
and the recipient immediately shoots him. Then he says to the
next messenger: ``I want your most honest, your most truthful,
and your most unbiased opinion.'' The next messenger says ``I
agree with you.'' And he says ``But how can you agree with me?
You haven't heard my opinion.'' And the messenger says ``I
don't need to know your opinion to know that I agree with
you.''
Now, here is my question. What impact does closing an
agency have on the opinions of those that remain behind? When
we shut down one agency that gives us information, we have
others that take up the task. Are they impacted by the
knowledge that we can cease to fund you, and you will cease to
exist? Does that color, in any way, the opinions of those left
behind? And I am asking this in a sort of rhetorical sense, I
guess, because we really are dealing with a question here of
how do we have, or give those experts, a comfort level such
that they can truthfully give honest opinions, and not assume
that there may be some consequences associated with those
opinions that may not be entirely positive?
How do we structure the process, the agency and the
process, the methodology by which we acquire the intelligence,
such that we get--that what we are seeking, because people
understand that they will still be around after they give us
opinions that we don't necessarily like?
Anyone want to comment on that? We have--yes. Thank you.
Dr. Hunt. Well, I think any--we learn at an early age that
actions speak louder than words, and that if you do something,
and there are negative consequences, we learn to modify those
behaviors, or sometimes, even restrict those responses.
Now, what you find in some of the best scientists, however,
are those people that stick to their guns and have the courage
of their convictions, because they truly believe in reporting
the science or the data, or the information that they collect
as they see it. And I think what we have to do is, we have to
do two things. We have to continue to work with those
scientists, and we also have to continue to have open minds
about information, even when we get it, when it isn't what we
want to hear, right.
And so there is really, those are the soft side of
relationship skills that this--that we have to work with. One
other place we look at that is with funding of science and
technology, and if you look at funding going away from the
physical sciences, it is difficult to bring students into that
realm. But you can also look at that as your opportunity,
because if you know that putting the funding there brings the
students there, then you know how to make that change. And I am
not saying that throwing money at something is the way to make
that change, but as you said, by being consistent with your
actions, and having your actions follow your words is, I think,
the solution to that.
Mr. Green. Yes, sir.
Dr. Peha. This clearly is a problem. Actually, I mentioned
a couple of things in my testimony I will expand on. First of
all, I think Congress always has to have the ability to defund
something that isn't working, but if it takes them a while,
then any one particular study that, you know, they won't get
shot on the first answer. It will take multiple answers, and
one way to do that is to make staff decisions, budget
decisions, hiring decisions not annual but longer term than
that.
And that still doesn't help if there is a systematic
problem, if the organization is always hitting the same group
of powerful people who are unhappy. I think if that is
happening, it may be that there is a real problem with the
organization, or it may be, very likely, a problem with the
choices of topics they are looking at, which is why the
Congressional oversight is so important, the method of
oversight, and particularly, the method of choosing which
studies to conduct has to be done in a way that majority and
minority and everyone in Congress feels that their issues are
being represented, maybe not in every report, but overall, in
the long term.
Mr. Green. Mr. Chairman, I yield back. Thank you.
Chairman Boehlert. Thank you so much. Mr. Holt.
Mr. Holt. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. As a guest here on the
dais, I think I would like to allow all of the Members of the
Committee to ask questions if they want, before I take my time.
Chairman Boehlert. How gallant of you. Ms. Jackson Lee.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Mr. Chairman, that will allow me just to
be able to thank Mr. Holt for his enormous leadership on this
issue, and to thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Mr. Ehlers for your
valiant effort back in 1995. I was a baby Congressperson, and
on this Science Committee, and obviously, now can look back and
see the enormous damage that has occurred with the elimination
of the OTA.
Dr. Blair, I am going to start with you, as I reminisce
about other agencies, such as the GAO, the Congressional Budget
Office, and Congressional Research Service. All of them are
poised as effective tools to make Congress the real
implementator of the will of the people, a knowledge
implementator of the will of the people, meaning that as we
address questions, fiscal responsibility, understanding the
nuances of space exploration, or the nuances of homeland
security, or again, trying to make sure that we handle the
people's dollars effectively, that we have the arm of research.
Here we are now with an authorized, as I am informed, OTA,
but a nonfunded OTA, and in the 11 years since 1995, the world
has simply changed. It has changed after 9/11. It has changed
as we have a raging debate on immigration, and the issue is
technology, technology, technology. And therefore, our
guidepost is missing. We just heard Dr. Bartlett speak
eloquently about energy, and coming from the oil capital of the
world, I am not afraid of the discussion on alternative fuels,
because the companies were wise enough to change their name
some years ago, they are energy companies. And I have tried to
convince them that they will be as prosperous no matter what
energy science we attempt to use.
Someone who has had firsthand experience, I believe, with
the OTA, and maybe others would comment as well. How much are
we diminished because we don't have a corralling entity that
can assess, as Congressman Daddario, I think, in his original
vision, when former--well, when Mr. Lindbergh came and began to
talk about the Earth and ecology, and wanted to be concerned
about someone assessing that potential clash, how diminished,
how lacking, how much are we undermined because we don't have
an agency that is capturing for us either the most innovative
technology, or ordering it for the Congress, as these various
new either innovations or failed innovations are coming to the
forefront? And if you would, give your most honest answer of
the restoration of the funding for this as an answer to its
present hiatus.
Dr. Blair. Well, let me say first that I think that there
was a hope when OTA was closed that other agencies in the
Congressional complex would be able to fill the gap, and to a
limited extent, some experiments are ongoing that may, that are
attempting to address that. I think they will get----
Ms. Jackson Lee. Being very polite, Dr. Blair.
Dr. Blair. I believe that the gap is a large one, and it
continues to this day, and the--some function needs to be re-
injected into the Congressional infrastructure in order to fill
that gap. I think we have all expressed that view today.
I do think that a resurrected OTA, as I think I mentioned
in response to a thing earlier, a question earlier, would have
to be a different place. There would be many different features
to it to respond to some of the criticism and shortcomings that
happened earlier, and it would have to network, I think, better
with the other agencies of Congress to keep pace with the
times.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Anyone else?
Dr. Teich. Yeah.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Are we suffering as Americans because of
the lack of existence of some entity?
Dr. Teich. Well, you know, you are asking, what you are
asking is kind of an alternative history of the last eleven
years, and I happen to enjoy reading alternative history, but I
am not very good at writing it, I am afraid. So, I can't
honestly say, except to suppose, based on the--what I know
about what OTA did during its tenure, that we would be better
off today had it continued to exist, and I think it would have
been interesting.
If OTA existed throughout most of its life in a Congress
that was controlled in both Houses, for most of the time, by
the Democrats, it would be very interesting to see how it would
have functioned, and what studies it would have undertaken
under Republican leadership over the last eleven years.
So, I think it--I can't answer your question, but I can say
it certainly appears to me that it would--that we have lost
something by its absence.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Did you want to answer? All right. Thank
you so very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Mr. Bartlett. [Presiding] Thank the lady very much. Dr.
Holt.
Mr. Holt. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am pleased with the
existence of this hearing, and the progress of this hearing,
and I thank the Committee for allowing me to take part in it.
You know, science and technology shouldn't be looked to to
provide the answer of what is right. So, you know--and there
certainly are occasions--Mr. Rohrabacher mentioned cyclamates--
where, in retrospect, science has evolved to different
conclusions. That does not mean that we have nothing to learn
from science and technology. It does not mean that all bets are
off, that they have nothing to tell us, and we should wing it
with respect to what faces us.
OTA did not present conclusions. In fact, they were
scrupulous about that. They laid out a range of choices,
including the constraints that were presented by science and
technology, and some people took that to mean conclusions. Now,
one of the famous examples, of course, was the idea of a global
missile defense, where the OTA pointed out that some of the
desired or claimed properties of that were unattainable from a
scientific and engineering point of view. That was taken to be
a conclusion, when really, it was just, I think, a fairly
objective look at the constraints placed by science.
I certainly think that, in answer to Mr. Bartlett's
questions about the supply of uranium and the energy yield of
ethanol, and all of those other things, if OTA had existed over
the past 10 years, we could have expected studies, a study or
studies, that would have laid out the range, and assigned some
weight to our uncertainties about the range in the supply of
uranium, or the energy yields of ethanol, and so forth.
Well, I noticed that the panels, the panelists have been
very judicious, I guess I would say, careful, even cautious in
making recommendations to us for what we should do in our
plight. I have suggested that what we need is something that is
permanent, and therefore, not ad hoc, not something that has to
gear up each time a study is commissioned, that it be
professional, in other words, it would consist of professionals
in this permanent, full-time staff that command the respect of
the S&T community, and also, in the sense, professional,
meaning that it would be scrupulously nonpartisan. And I would
argue that, by the way, that OTA probably would not have
behaved any differently under Republican leadership than
Democratic leadership because the advisory board was
scrupulously bipartisan. That we need something that would be
in-house, and by that, I mean it would speak our language, it
would understand our processes. It would lay out things, the
choices before us in a way that is relevant, legislatively
relevant.
And also, something that hasn't been discussed this
morning, something that would be part of the life of the Hill.
When you have got 100, more or less, professionals who are
mingling with the staff, are here and there day in and day out,
it elevates the debate. Even if they have not yet completed
their result, their report, even if they have not and never
will come up with a policy conclusion to help us in our job,
they are part of the life of the Hill.
So, you know, when Harry Truman said he longed for a one-
armed economist, who wouldn't say on the one hand and on the
other hand, let me ask you to raise only one hand, and say do
you agree that we need something as I have just described, that
is permanent, professional, in-house, in order to provide what
we need?
Dr. Blair. Can I----
Dr. Teich. Yes.
Dr. Blair. Can I elaborate on----
Dr. Teich. I am sorry.
Dr. Blair. Please.
Dr. Teich. And I think I would add, as you implied,
bipartisan, as well.
Mr. Holt. Well, in fact, when I say professional, that--I
mean both commanding the respect of the S&T community, and
scrupulously nonpartisan or bipartisan.
Dr. Blair. One aspect of what you describe, I would like to
elaborate a little bit more on, which harkens back to the OTA
days, but also could be possible in other venues as well, and
that is this notion of a shared staff. The idea that in the
course of an assessment--I remember vividly the one we were
doing on increased competition in the electric power industry
at the time--that constant interaction throughout the course of
the assessment with Congressional staff was very important to
help the committees of jurisdiction and interest in really
understanding all of the information that was coming before
those committees at the time.
And they build up a body of expertise, a current,
comprehensive body of expertise that could be called upon in
the course of those kinds of deliberations. So, that is a
resource that is often not cited in the kind of organization we
are talking about, but this notion of a shared staff is a
particularly important one, I think.
Mr. Ehlers. [Presiding] Any other comments? I didn't see
any right hands go up.
Dr. Peha. I think that we need something that is permanent.
We need something that is professional, and we need at least a
piece of this to be in-house. I also think in the last decade,
everybody else in the world has learned how to move workflows
around a lot better than we used to, and we could perhaps make
better use of universities and think tanks and others things
than we used to, but everything should flow through something
that is in-house.
Mr. Ehlers. Dr. Hunt, did you have anything to add?
Dr. Hunt. I agree. I say yes. This is what we need, and we
need the scientists to be nonpartisan.
Mr. Ehlers. Thank you. I would just comment.
Mr. Holt. So, I would suggest, Mr. Chairman, we could call
it this permanent, professional, in-house organization, we
could call it TAO, OTA, or we could call it, if we wanted to
feel our oats, OATS, the Office of Assessment of Technology and
Science.
Mr. Ehlers. I see that you have given this some thought.
Well, I feel like the Terminator, because I walked in the door,
and someone said could you--can you chair it and terminate the
hearing? I don't know if everyone else gave up. I apologize. I
had to leave for another urgent meeting, which went far too
long, and I lost my temper. But other than that, I am back
here. I will not ask any questions, because I missed most of
the testimony.
I--just a couple of observations. First a quick one. Being
professional does not ensure bipartisan. I am a professional,
and I am a Republican. And Mr. Holt is a professional, and is a
Democrat, or professes to be. It takes more than that to
guarantee----
Mr. Holt. It is nice to see the physics caucus on the dais.
Mr. Ehlers. Yes. Well, we have a bipartisan physics caucus.
And so, being bipartisan means you have a balance of views
represented, and I--there are--I was here when OTA was killed,
and as far as I can discern--and I opposed that--as far I can
discern, their two items were lack of rapidity in replying and,
secondly, the Republicans had a feeling that the Democrats used
it to their own advantage, which would not be too surprising,
because they had been in power the entire time it existed. In a
sense, if we are going to do anything, we have to overcome that
perception, because the perception is still there. It is not as
strong as it was, but the perception is still there.
We have made do, not particularly well, but not
particularly badly, either, by getting our rapid advice from
CRS and our long-term advice from the National Academies, which
is not all bad. But if we are to have something in-house, we
have to be aware of the history, and design a program that
assures that we do not have the faults, real or perceived, of
the predecessor.
And I have talked to Dr. Holt about this a number of times,
also Congressman Amo Houghton, when he was here. He was an avid
fan of it, and he and I had joined in trying to stop the
slaughter, when it was killed. But it was killed, and we have
to face that, and we have to come up with something that is a
new, improved model, and that really has some advantages. I
think there are huge advantages to having such an organization.
It is not self-evident, however, to nonscientists, non-
technical people.
Another solution, of course, would be to give the Science
Committee jurisdiction over everything in this august body that
relates to science, which would decimate a few other
committees, and who would not willingly give up jurisdiction.
But that would be an improvement, too, because I think we in
this committee tend to handle things rather professionally, and
reasonably, most of the time bipartisanly.
So, with those comments, I will say more power to Mr. Holt
and others who are working on this. But I think the difficult
problem, two difficult problems. One is designing a system that
is going to work well. Second, even more difficult problem, is
selling it to the Congress, and I think it is going to take a
lot of combined work on all those who are interested, both
inside and outside the Congress, to make that come about.
With that, I am pleased to thank you for your input. You
have been very helpful to us in the things you have said and
the background from which you say them. And I thank Mr. Holt
for repetitively raising this issue. He is much younger than I,
and therefore, he will probably survive in this atmosphere much
longer than I do, and so, I am going to leave the task on his
shoulders. And I will be in a supporting role as much as I can.
With that, I am pleased to declare the hearing adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:12 p.m., the Committee was adjourned.]
Appendix 1:
----------
Answers to Post-Hearing Questions
Responses by Hon. Rush Holt, a Representative in Congress from the
State of New Jersey
Q1. Dr. Holt, as a scientist and a politician, please discuss, in
detail, your perspective on the state of scientific and technological
assessment and advice for Congress.
A1. The state of scientific and technological assessment and advice for
Congress is not where it should be, given the number of issues we
consider each day that contain scientific and technological components.
Technological assessment is the evaluation of new results considering
not only technical details but also the implications of the various
policy choices implied by the technology. When we discuss scientific
and technological assessment for Congress, we include benefit and risk
analysis, as well as the transition costs. An example includes the
management of the transition of the conventional switch-line telephone
system to using the Internet for phone and other communication methods
such as e-mail.
Congress recently dealt with such issues as health care, missile
defense, and net neutrality, each of which has technological
components. Not so obviously, issues like pension reform, technical
education, first responder issues, and voting reform each have a
technical component as well. Committees hold hearings on these topics,
sometimes, however, without addressing the scientific and technical
components. Members of Congress may or may not recognize the
technological aspects of an issue and obtain necessary advice or
assessments. Congress itself lacks an organization to complete analysis
on the scientific and technological components of a bill.
Congress does have non-partisan and objective organizations
designed to answer certain types of questions. We have the
Congressional Research Service (CRS), for example, which is designed to
research and report on all legislative issues, and provide answers
rapidly. CRS is an excellent resource for Congress. They provide non-
partisan, objective, comprehensive, and reliable research on
legislative issues in a timely manner for Congress. We also have the
General Accountability Office (GAO), which serves the Congress by
assessing the effectiveness of government spending. The Congressional
Budget Office (CBO) provides Congress information and estimates to
guide budgetary decisions. Yet, none of these bodies is chartered or
equipped to provide in-depth scientific and technological analysis to
the Congress.
There are organizations outside the infrastructure of Congress that
do provide scientific and technological assessment and advice. The
National Academies of Science (NAS) brings together committees of
experts in areas of scientific and technological endeavors to address
critical national issues and give advice to the Federal Government.
This advice usually comes in the form of reports, and the advice within
these reports--depending on the topic and mission of the committee of
experts--may include advice based on technological analysis. Most
often, NAS reports are based on the opinions and expertise of the
members of the committee, and the NAS goes to great lengths to ensure
that there is no conflict of interest for any committee member. This
process, both necessary and appropriate, increases the time of
completion of the Academy reports. Given the often rapid pace of
legislative decision-making, the Academy reports frequently fail to
reach Members and influence the debate. These reports are not usually
directed specifically for the use of Congress, and they are not written
with an understanding of familiarity of the needs, the language, and
the procedures of Congress.
Similarly, scientific and technological professional societies work
to advise Congress. Unlike the work of the Academies, however, we must
recognize that professional societies work for their members, and their
advice may not always be politically neutral. Additionally,
professional societies also do not necessarily provide technical or
policy analyses for Congress. The same is true for researchers in
academia, industry or in public-private partnerships.
Until 1995, the job of providing objective and authoritative
analysis of complex scientific and technical issues to Congress fell to
the Office of Technology Assessment (OTA). The OTA was designed to
produce scientific and technological analysis for Congress and to serve
as resource to Members of Congress and their staff. In its twenty-three
years of existence, the OTA issued 703 reports on topics ranging from
substance abuse to nuclear war specifically for Congressional needs.
OTA's structure included a Technology Assessment Board (TAB) composed
of six Senators and six Representatives, with the chairmanship and
vice-chairmanship alternating between the Senate and House each
Congress. The OTA also had an Advisory Council of ten eminent citizens
from academia, industry, and other institutions outside the Federal
Government, appointed by the TAB. Statutory Members of the Advisory
Council included the Comptroller General of the U.S. and the Director
of the CRS. Chairmen and Ranking Members of committees could request
work personally or on behalf of a committee member. The OTA staff and
Director then reviewed these requests to determine whether the OTA
could provide the information effectively and whether the interest was
broad and bipartisan. During the course of the study, the OTA assembled
an advisory panel of stakeholders and experts to ensure that the study
was objective, fair, and authoritative. However, no attempt was made to
reach consensus amongst the panel members. This ensured that differing
views were not stifled. Less formal advisory opportunities were also
sought with other outside experts and advisors.
For a more detailed explanation of the assessment process, please
see Appendix A: The Assessment Process, downloaded from http://
www.wws.princeton.edu/ota/ns20/proces-f.html
The OTA evolved over time, restructuring and reorganizing to meet
Congress' changing needs. In the end, the OTA employed 143 people and
had a budget of $20 million. Not only were lengthy studies completed,
but also shorter works as committee staff and Members requested or as
OTA staffers perceived an upcoming need. In Appendix B, I have included
some of the budget justification statements by the OTA to illuminate
its impact on legislation and the workings of Congress.
In 1995, Congress voted to defund the OTA. In doing so, Congress
lost the body that crafted reports relevant to the scientific policy
issues at hand. It also lost insight into the interdependence of
various technical aspects of a complex problem, implications of policy
decisions, and options available to provide policy-makers. The OTA's
work was credible, thorough, and fair. Its absence has left a gaping
hole in our ability to understand and address thoughtfully the complex
scientific and technical aspects of the issues we face every day.
Q2. Dr. Holt, given your perspective, how would you improve the
current process or implement a new process for Congress to receive
scientific and technological assessment and advice?
A2. The Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) is the place to start
when considering what Congress needs to do to improve the scientific
and technological assessment and advice it receives. The OTA completed
authoritative, thorough studies, many of which are still relevant
today. Studies were initiated through the request of a Chairman of any
congressional committee. This request could be on behalf of the Ranking
Member of the Committee or on behalf of a majority of the committee,
and many requests were supported by more than one committee. The OTA
Director and staff then determined whether the interest of the request
was broad and bipartisan, and whether the OTA had the resources to
complete the study. The request was then sent to the Technical Advisory
Board, a bipartisan, bicameral board of twelve Members of Congress,
which determined whether to proceed or not with a study. In addition,
the OTA had an Advisory Council, composed of ten eminent citizens from
academia, industry, and the Federal Government to advise the OTA.
Once a study was approved, a comprehensive advisory panel of
technical and relevant stakeholders was assembled to ensure the reports
were objective, thorough, fair, and inclusive of a diverse set of
viewpoints. A core team composed of OTA staff, contractors, and
consultants was assembled with an experienced project director
selected, along with contractors and consultants. Each report was
subject to an extensive formal review process that included OTA staff
and outside experts. Once the assessment was approved by the OTA
Director, copies were sent to the members of the Technical Advisory
Board for review and authorization. Approved reports were then
released, with copies going to the requesting committee or committees.
Summaries were sent to Members, and then released to the public. Often,
delivery of the report's content followed channels such as
congressional briefings, hearings, and follow-up consultation between
the OTA and congressional staff. Many of the studies are still
available online.
To further illuminate the successes of the OTA, I have included (in
Appendices B-K), the OTA Justification of Estimates for Legislative
Branch Appropriations from 1987-1996. Beyond its service as a shared
resource for the committees of Congress, the OTA interacted with staffs
of other federal agencies within both the Legislative and Executive
branches, as well as with the private sector and universities. For
example, OTA reports were often cited as justification for actions of
agencies. The OTA also participated in workshops, interagency working
groups, and commissions. It provided its expertise to organizations
such as the National Governor's Association, the Council on
Competitiveness, and the National Academies of Science. In each
Justification found in the Appendices B-K, one can find a yearly
summary of this interaction with federal agencies, universities, and
the private sector.
Additionally, the Justification of Estimates found in the
Appendices B-K, included a summary of the direct legislative use of
each OTA division's work. Reports were often used as background
material for legislative activities, used in debates on bills,
referenced during or the focus of hearings or testimonies, and
assisting in the drafting of legislation. OTA recommendations are often
cited as aspects of bills moving through the Senate or House.
Conversations and discussions with Members of Congress or staff are
also cited in conjunction with work on particular legislation. The OTA
was an integral part of the legislative process in both the Senate and
the House of Representatives.
We no longer have the OTA. As a result of the OTA's demise,
Congress lost not only its own scientific and technical assessment
body, but the resulting broad interagency collaboration, coordination,
and outreach that the OTA also provided. The operation of OTA was not
expensive, but considering the cost of ignorant mistakes of policy, OTA
would have been a bargain at several times the cost. Ill-informed
decisions result in huge amounts of financial waste. In order to be
fiscally responsible, we need a body to give us scientific and
technological assessment. Currently, the bodies which serve Congress,
the CRS, the GAO, and the CBO, do not have a mission focused on
scientific and technological assessment and its implications.
As we look to meeting the scientific and technological needs of
Congress, I believe the in-house, professional, permanently staffed
body needs to reflect much of the structure and function of the Office
of Technology Assessment. It served Congress well. However, in seizing
this opportunity to strengthen scientific and technological advice, we
must be sure that any new entity meets certain criteria.
Scientific and technological assessments require objectivity and
political neutrality. We naturally expect the CRS, the GAO, and the CBO
to handle assignments at the same professionalism, and there is no
reason to believe that an updated OTA would not maintain the same high
standard.
Studies must be timely and relevant. By crafting a management
structure to accommodate both longer term studies of topics and studies
to be completed on a shorter time scale, this new body can help ensure
that Congress makes informed, well-reasoned decisions. A way to achieve
this is to enable Representative or Senator to request a study. This
not only broadens the perspective and usefulness of the entity, its
also reduces the possibility of partisanship, since both parties can
make requests independently.
Some have suggested building this capacity into the GAO. This idea
is not without perils. For example, the Comptroller General would most
likely maintain final say on the studies completed, negating the
bipartisan decision-making structure that Members of Congress have said
they want. The same danger exists if the entity is placed within the
CBO or CRS. Budget concerns would also become an issue. When money gets
tight, the scientific and technological assessment group could be the
first cut, given that scientific and technological assessment and
analysis do not fall within the missions of the GAO, CBO, or CRS. Would
I take this scenario over nothing at all? Yes, with appropriate
negotiating. Is this scenario ideal? No, it is not.
It is time that Congress take action to give itself an in-house,
permanently and professionally staffed body to complete scientific and
technological assessments. When OTA existed, other countries came here
to learn about the OTA with the purpose of creating such a body for
themselves. We were the world leader in this arena, and we can be
again.
Answers to Post-Hearing Questions
Responses by Jon M. Peha, Professor, Departments of Engineering and
Public Policy and Electrical and Computer Engineering, Carnegie
Mellon University
Questions submitted by Representative Eddie Bernice Johnson
Q1. Do you feel it would be beneficial for Congress to have its own
internal scientific advisors such as the Office of Technology
Assessment Congressional Board? If so, how can we make sure the advice
structure would be nonpartisan?
A1. Yes, Congress needs internal advisors with significant expertise in
science and technology, where internal means in an organization
dedicated to serving Congress as CRS, GAO, and CBO do today. One way to
insure that the program remains nonpartisan is to establish a Technical
Assessment Board or Congressional Board for oversight. This bipartisan
bicameral Board should contain an equal number of members from the
majority and minority party. All important decisions should require a
majority vote, which means there must be support from both parties.
Moreover, the Chairman's power must be limited so the views held by the
majority will prevail.
The Board would be responsible for determining which studies are
undertaken, and for agreeing upon their scope, cost, and duration with
professional staff. The Board must insure that the studies produced are
of interest to both majority and minority parties. It will help if they
systematically give preference to studies that have been requested by
many members from both parties, as might be quantified by the number of
Republicans signing a letter of support times the number of Democrats
signing a letter of support.
The Board must also approve major the selection of a Director. They
should select a Director that has outstanding credentials as a
scientist or engineer, and experience producing or overseeing balanced
nonpartisan analyses of complex policy issues related to science or
technology. Some experience with Congress is also important, but
extensive service advancing one party over the other is probably a
liability rather than an asset. A highly partisan choice is unlikely to
gain support from a majority of the bipartisan Board.
Other safeguards against partisanship must be embedded in the
organization and its procedures. Studies should not be designed to
produce legislative recommendations; they should frame issues, and
analyze options. Clearly that analysis must be rigorous and
nonpartisan. It helps to conduct outside reviews of each study from a
diverse set of reviewers, and to take all the reviewers' constructive
criticism seriously. In many cases, outside review is required at more
than one stage of the study. This review process goes far beyond the
typical fact-checking that would be done today in GAO or CBO. In
addition, a culture of nonpartisan professionalism must permeate the
organization, and be sustained through hiring and promotion criteria
that reward solid balanced analysis rather than convenient answers.
History shows that this can be achieved under appropriate leadership
from a highly qualified Director.
Answers to Post-Hearing Questions
Responses by Albert H. Teich, Director of Science and Policy Programs,
American Association for the Advancement of Science
Questions submitted by Representative Eddie Bernice Johnson
Q1. Do you feel it would be beneficial for Congress to have its own
internal scientific advisors such as the Office of Technology
Assessment Congressional Board? If so, how can we make sure the advice
structure would be nonpartisan?
A1. As I indicated in my testimony, I believe that Congress needs
timely analysis and synthesis of scientific and technical information
as a foundation for its decision-making. It is my view that an
organizational mechanism that is directly responsive to congressional
requests would serve this need most effectively. Experience suggests
that establishing an internal body (i.e., a congressional service
agency whose staff is employed by Congress) is the best way to
guarantee responsiveness. The staff should be high quality and include
experts in both science and policy. Staff members need not--in fact it
cannot--be expert in all science and technology policy areas likely to
come before Congress, but they should have the ability to draw upon
external expertise as necessary. That expertise might reside in other
congressional service agencies (e.g., CRS or GAO) or it might be found
in the National Academies, scientific associations, think tanks, or the
broader scientific and policy community.
Assuring that this structure would be nonpartisan is more
complicated. I don't have a ready answer, but I would suggest that
Members examine carefully the existing sources of nonpartisan
information and advice for Congress--CRS, GAO, CBO, and the National
Academies--and identify and analyze the traits that best facilitate
their insulation from partisanship. These shared traits likely include
some combination of an independent, bipartisan oversight mechanism and
the ability to protect their staffs from undue political pressures. It
may also be useful for the advice structure to have its analytical
processes (e.g., workshops and meetings) rendered in a public rather
than in a private setting, except in instances where secrecy is needed
to protect national security.
Answers to Post-Hearing Questions
Responses by Peter D. Blair, Executive Director, Division on
Engineering and Physical Sciences, National Academy of Sciences
Questions submitted by Representative Eddie Bernice Johnson
Q1. Do you feel it would be beneficial for Congress to have its own
internal scientific advisors such as the Office of Technology
Assessment Congressional Board? If so, how can we make sure the advice
structure would be nonpartisan?
A1. Reactivating the former Office of Technology Assessment's
Technology Assessment Board (TAB) is certainly one expedient option for
filling the gap in advice the Congress is currently receiving, as
essentially all witnesses noted in the hearing (since it would only
require appropriations and not authorizing legislation). There are
other options as well but the construction of mechanisms for
nonpartisan operation would be essential to the credibility of the
advice it offers and to ensuring both such an organization's usefulness
and direct accountability to the Congress.
As a historical reference, the TAB structure as originally
incorporated into the OTA authorizing legislation was perhaps the most
important organizational mechanism for ensuring a nonpartisan
operation. Construction of something analogous in any new entity would
probably be very challenging to maintain, especially if the
organization were located outside the Congress. I pointed out in my
testimony that if an OTA-like institution existed today, it would
likely have a number of important differences from the OTA that existed
between 1972 and 1995, but the mechanisms for ensuring independent and
nonpartisan analysis are not really among those differences, since
those mechanisms were painstakingly constructed to achieve both
bicameral and bipartisan balance in the agency's oversight and
governance.
A TAB-like body would be essential to any such organization in
ensuring both relevance to the Congressional agenda and balance in its
governance in several dimensions. At the former OTA, TAB's composition
was unique among the legislative support agencies--a twelve-member
governing board with six members of the Senate and six of the House,
divided exactly equally between the political parties. TAB's principal
responsibilities were to appoint the Director, to authorize the
initiation of assessments requested by Congressional Committees, to
approve the budget authority associated with each of those assessments,
and finally to authorize delivery of assessment reports to requesting
committees and the public by certifying that OTA has carried out its
assessment process faithfully, i.e., that OTA has considered all the
relevant stakeholder interests and issues and undergone and responded
to extensive external review. For your reference, I recap the strengths
and weaknesses of these features in more detail in the 1994 paper I
prepared on the subject, Technology Assessment: Current Trends and the
Myth of a Formula (available at http://www.wws.princeton.edu/ota/) as
well as in the more recent report I included for the hearing record.
As a point of reference, in the early days of OTA many thought that
TAB would not work. It was predicted by some that TAB would either
become a disinterested body or a dysfunctional one due to partisan
disagreements. But as the agency matured organizationally, neither of
these predictions happened. Board members were appointed by the
leadership in both the House and the Senate and included very senior
members of Congress from both political parties, some of whom are still
in Congress today. The board met approximately every six weeks when
Congress was in session with a strong turnout and with few
disagreements reflecting party or ideological lines.
One historical anecdote illustrates the effective functioning of
the TAB at OTA. A TAB member voted in the board meeting to authorize
the release of a somewhat controversial study on the technological
future of textile industry, acknowledging that the assessment process
had been completed effectively. The next day, however, he issued a
press release politically criticizing some of the alternative policy
options identified in the report's conclusions. Some felt that this was
inconsistent and perhaps even hypocritical, but actually he had honored
both his responsibilities. First he honored his responsibility on the
board by not letting the implications for his constituents of some the
identified alternative policy options affect his position on the
overall perspective of the report. At the same time and in a separate
venue, he accommodated the political concerns of his constituents by
disagreeing with those options that were not in their interests.
This anecdote also underscores a fundamental point I was trying to
make in my testimony. There are many organizations that can provide
important input to Congressional deliberations and at least a few, such
as the National Academies, that can offer highly authoritative,
independent and objective consensus findings and recommendations from a
widely recognized group of experts on technical issues. However, there
are essentially no organizations well-equipped currently to inform the
Congressional debate on complex science and technology issues with
perspectives that may go beyond science and technology to include the
broader implications of alternative actions or options related to the
science and technology issues being considered and, especially, a
comprehensive evaluation of such perspectives with mechanisms in place
to ensure independence and balance of that evaluation.
Answers to Post-Hearing Questions
Responses by Catherine T. Hunt, President-Elect, American Chemical
Society; Leader for Technology Partnerships, Rohm and Haas
Company
Questions submitted by Representative Eddie Bernice Johnson
Q1. Do you feel it would be beneficial for Congress to have its own
internal scientific advisors such as the Office of Technology
Assessment Congressional Board? If so, how can we make sure the advice
structure would be nonpartisan?
A1. I do feel strongly that it would be very beneficial for Congress to
have its own internal scientific advisors. Currently, Congress has two
internal sources for obtaining input on scientific and technical
issues--the Congressional Research Service, which provides excellent
background and summary documents, and the General Accounting Office,
which performs economic analyses. Congress also can utilize the
National Academies to secure in-depth, long-term analyses of scientific
and technical issues. Each has its strengths, yet something is missing:
an internal agency that provides a data- and information-based policy
analysis to meet Congress' specific decision-making needs.
Since the Office of Technology Assessment was eliminated in 1995,
Congress has functioned without an impartial internal unit that can
frame complex issues, provide comprehensive and balanced insights and
analysis, and set out policy options on science and engineering issues.
These issues require more than facts and short reports, they need
adequate scoping, integration and non-partisan analysis of large-scale
issues involving science and technology. Congress clearly should
continue to utilize outside experts in this regard, including the
National Academies, but they cannot meet all of Congress' frequent and
extensive needs.
The need for timely, comprehensive technical analyses is clearly
demonstrated by the success that Fellow programs, such as the one
coordinated by AAAS, have had on the Hill. Individual Members of
Congress have certainly recognized the need for scientific input in
making policy decisions, but unfortunately, with only 35 or so Fellows
available each year, these programs cannot fill all the needs of all
the Members. A new congressional agency would ensure that such
information would be available to all.
The second part to your question, about ensuring that the advice is
nonpartisan, is a difficult one for me to answer. My experience is as a
scientist, not a politician, so I will defer to the experts in Congress
on the details of this question. However, I can hopefully add some
insight by highlighting the main tool my field uses to maintain
integrity: peer review. It is a central tenet of practicing scientists.
Journal articles and reports are often sent out for both internal and
external reviews by experts. This enables us to find errors, correct
misinterpretations, and generally improve our work. Reports written by
a new congressional unit should be subject to a similar process.
Employees would have to rely significantly on outside experts and to
refine their analyses. If the data and the analyses are correct, they
should hold up to external scrutiny.
Appendix 2:
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Additional Material for the Record
Scientific Advice for Policy in the United States: Lessons from the
National Academies and the former Congressional Office of Technology
Assessment
Peter D. Blair\1\
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\1\ The author is Executive Director of the Division on Engineering
and Physical Sciences of the U.S. National Academies. He was formerly
Assistant Director of the U.S. Congressional Office of Technology
Assessment (OTA) and Director of OTA's Division on Industry, Commerce,
and International Security. Conclusions in this paper are the author's
and are not necessarily those of the National Academies. This paper is
an expansion of Ahearne and Blair (2002) and includes descriptions
drawn from Blair (1994 and 1997) and The National Academies (2005a).
The author greatly appreciates the advice of a number of reviewers,
including John Gibbons, Christopher Hill, Jim Turner, Michael
Rodemeyer, Jonathan Epstein, and E. William Colglazier.
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The National Academies
500 Fifth Street, NW
Washington, DC 20001
Presented to: Symposium on Quality Control and Assurance in
Scientific Advice to Policy, Berlin-Brandenburg Academy of Science &
Humanities, Working Group on ``Scientific Advice to Policy in
Democracy,'' Berlin, Germany, January 12, 2006.
ABSTRACT
In the United States the National Research Council (NRC), the
``operating arm'' of The National Academies, is a widely used source
for science and technology policy advice by government agencies and the
U.S. Congress. Operating under an 1863 charter issued by Congress for
the independent and non-government National Academy of Sciences, the
NRC today delivers around 250 reports to government annually, spanning
a wide spectrum of important science and technology related issues. NRC
reports are viewed widely as valuable and credible because of the
institution's longstanding reputation for providing independent,
objective, and nonpartisan advice with high standards of scientific and
technical quality.
The NRC study process is tuned primarily to the needs of federal
executive agencies but carries out on the order of 25 studies annually
requested by the U.S. Congress as well. The former Congressional Office
of Technology Assessment (OTA) was an analytical support agency created
by Congress in 1972 but closed down in 1995. During its existence OTA
produced on average 32 assessment reports annually (703 in all over the
agency's 23 year existence and on average 51 reports per year in the
last three years), primarily for the standing committees of the
Congress, using a process that produced reports on science and
technology policy issues and accompanying advice tuned specifically to
Congressional needs.
This paper explores and compares the study processes of the NRC and
the former OTA, drawing conclusions from the comparisons that relate,
in particular, to the relative strengths and weaknesses for ensuring
quality, independence, authority, and relevance in providing science
and technology advice to government and, in particular, the legislative
branch of government.
INTRODUCTION
The pace of science and technology advancement over the past half-
century has delivered enormous benefits to societies throughout the
world as well as sobering challenges associated with the role of
technology in virtually every aspect of our lives. While reaping the
benefits, all of society must also cope with the challenges.
Over two centuries ago as the American democracy took shape, the
founding fathers of the fledgling republic worried that democracy could
flourish only when the electorate and, in particular, the institutions
of government serving it are well informed about the issues upon which
they must decide. Today, and increasingly, as science and technology
issues become more and more prevalent, prominent, complex, and of far
reaching impact on society, a democratic government poorly informed
about such issues carries greater and greater risk in making bad policy
choices. Yet, it is also becoming increasingly more difficult for
anyone, or even any one institution, to keep pace with the frontier of
scientific knowledge and its impact on society. In addition, over the
last quarter century, the information revolution has expanded the
quantity of information accessible to government policy-makers, but
more information has not proved to be necessarily better information.
Indeed, a fundamental problem today is not the lack of information;
rather, it is how to gauge validity and usefulness within the torrent
of available information and advice.
How then can government policy-makers acquire useful, relevant,
informed, independent, authoritative and timely advice on the science
and technology dimensions of the issues they face? This paper reviews
the current and evolving role of the U.S. National Academies in
providing advice to government as that role compares with other current
sources of advice. For this conference, also considered more
specifically are the mechanisms of quality control in the study process
of the National Academies, again as it compares with other sources of
advice, and in particular with that of the former Office of Technology
Assessment (OTA)\2\ and with special attention to the Congressional
needs for science and technology advice. Also, for purposes of this
paper, the characterizations of the Academy and OTA study processes are
stylized in that they are described in the ideal and most common study
situations, although in both cases there were considerable variations
around the specific processes presented here.
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\2\ The Congressional Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) was an
independent analytical support agency of the U.S. Congress that was
created in 1972 and operated from 1973-1995. The authorizing
legislation for OTA still exists, but Congress no longer appropriates
funds for its operation.
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THE ROLE OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES
In the U.S. among the most familiar sources of independent
scientific and technical advice to the Federal Government is the
collection of non-government organizations we refer to today as the
National Academies, comprising the National Academy of Sciences (NAS),
the National Academy of Engineering (NAE), the Institute of Medicine
(IOM), and their collective ``operating arm,'' the National Research
Council (NRC).\3\ In 1863 the U.S. Congress chartered the NAS as an
independent non-profit corporation to ``whenever called upon by any
department of the Government, investigate, examine, experiment, and
report upon any subject of science or art.'' This charter was signed
into law by President Abraham Lincoln during the height of the U.S.
Civil War.
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\3\ More detailed descriptions can be found at The National
Academies (2004) or Ahearne and Blair (2003).
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Today the NAS, NAE, and IOM are prestigious and highly selective
honorary societies that each elect among the most respected scientists
and engineers in the world as new members to their ranks annually. The
Presidents of the NAS and NAE serve ex officio as the Chair and Vice-
Chair, respectively, of the NRC. The NRC assembles committees of
experts including many academy members to provide advice in the form of
study reports to executive branch agencies of government, but the U.S.
Congress also frequently mandates studies to be carried out by the
NRC.\4\ NRC studies span a wide spectrum of science and technology
related issues, resulting in around 250 reports\5\ annually, involving
nearly 10,000 volunteers serving on study committees and in the review
process as well as utilizing over a 1,000 professional staff to manage
and facilitate the efforts of study committees.
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\4\ Academy studies carried out for Congress are usually executed
under contract to executive departments and agencies as directed by
Congress in authorizing or appropriations legislation.
\5\ See The National Academy Press (2002), The National Academies
(2005c), or the National Academy of Sciences (2005).
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NRC reports are viewed widely as being valuable and credible
because of the institution's longstanding reputation for providing
independent, objective, and nonpartisan advice with high standards of
scientific and technical quality. The key strengths of the NRC in
providing advice to the U.S. Government rest principally on the history
of convening very high quality expertise for its study committees and
on the reputation for maintaining important quality control features
for independence and objectivity of reports prepared by those
committees. In particular, over the years as the NRC study process
evolved, many checks and balances have been incorporated to ensure
quality and protect the integrity of reports thereby helping to
maintain public confidence in them. In 1997 many of these checks and
balances, supplemented with some additional features, were codified
into federal law as NRC advice to the government became subject to a
new provision of the Federal Advisory Committee Act (discussed later).
In short, the NRC study process is widely accepted as a high standard
for independent scientific advice to government.
Key Strengths of the NRC Study Process
These commonly cited principal strengths of the NRC study process
include the following:
Credibility. The NRC's institutional credibility is
enabled in part by its association with the NAS, NAE, and IOM.
In addition, the process by which the NRC conducts its work is
designed to ensure the results are evidence-based and tightly
reasoned as well as independent from outside influences and
pressures from various interest groups including government
agencies and congressional interests. The Academies also
conduct several studies each year using their own limited
endowment resources rather than those of external sponsors.
These self-initiated studies often focus on topics that the
Academies leadership believes to be important but that the
government may not be willing or able to sponsor on a schedule
timely enough to be useful. One such example was the 2002
study, Making the Nation Safer: The Role of Science and
Technology in Countering Terrorism, which followed the
terrorist events of September 11, 2001 in the U.S. Another is
the recent report, Rising Above the Gathering Storm: Energizing
and Employing America for a Brighter Economic Future, which
puts forward recommendations for a comprehensive and
coordinated federal effort to bolster U.S. competitiveness and
preeminence in science and technology.
Convening Power. The NRC seeks to invite the ``best
and the brightest'' to participate in its studies and those
invitations are generally accepted. Studies are carried out by
groups of volunteers who are identified not only as broadly
considered among the best experts on the issues to be studied,
but also are determined through a well documented process to be
free of conflicts of interest, and represent a carefully
balanced set of perspectives on those issues. It is widely
perceived as a prestigious honor to serve on an NRC committee
and, because of the breadth of membership in the academies and
the links of the organization to the scientific and technical
communities worldwide, the NRC is well equipped to identify
leading experts to serve on study committees.
Study Process and Products. A highly structured
process guiding NRC studies has evolved steadily over the
years, but has always been and continues to be designed to
maintain balance and objectivity throughout a committee's work
and to produce reports considered to be both unbiased and
authoritative. A key quality control feature in the process is
independent peer review. After consensus is achieved by a study
committee and a draft report is prepared, the NRC process
requires the committee to address all of the comments from a
carefully selected collection of reviewers, whose identities
are not revealed to the committee until the study is publicly
released. The review process is managed by a monitor appointed
by the Report Review Committee, which is an independent
committee of the National Academies (discussed more later).
Overview of the NRC Study Process
The NRC study process can be defined as a sequence of five major
stages: (1) study definition, (2) committee selection, (3) committee
activity (meetings, information gathering, deliberations, and report
preparation), (4) report review, delivery and public release, and (5)
final publication and dissemination.\6\
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\6\ Much of this description is adapted from The National Academies
(2005a). More detailed descriptions of the NRC study process include
National Research Council (1998, 2000 and 2005b).
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STAGE 1. Study Definition
Management and staff of the National Academies along with members
of oversight committees (known as boards) appointed by the chair of the
NRC are responsible for oversight of specific segments of the overall
NRC study portfolio. There are around 50 such boards in the NRC
organization, such as the Board on Energy and Environmental Systems or
the Board on Life Sciences. These groups interact with sponsors to
define the specific set of questions to be addressed by a prospective
study resulting in a formal ``statement of task'' (SOT) as well as the
anticipated duration and cost of the proposed study. The SOT defines
and bounds the scope of a prospective study and serves as the basis for
determining the expertise and the balance of perspectives needed on the
committee that will be recruited to carry out the study. In addition,
the SOT serves as a fundamental point of departure for subsequent
independent peer review of the draft report prepared by the study
committee.
The SOT, and the accompanying detailed plan for executing the
committee's work, and the project budget are all reviewed and approved
or revised by the Executive Committee of the NRC Governing Board (GBEC)
comprised of elected and appointed officials of the NAS, NAE, and IOM.
This review can result in changes to the proposed SOT and work plan
and, on occasion, results in turning down proposed studies that the
institution, after consideration, believes are inappropriately framed
or not within the charter of the National Academies. Following GBEC
approval and execution of a contract (or grant)\7\ specifically for
that study with the agency sponsor, work begins on the study itself.
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\7\ Costs for NRC studies sponsored by government agencies are
covered and accounted for via specific contracts for each study
individually. For a variety of reasons (discussed later in this paper)
the NRC has been reluctant to operate under a more centralized funding
mechanism with the government, such as an annual appropriation from
Congress.
STAGE 2. Committee Selection
Members of NRC study committees are formally appointed by the Chair
of the NRC. Committee members serve without compensation except for
reimbursement of expenses associated with attending meetings. The
selection of appropriate committee members for an NRC study, both the
individuals selected and the composition of the group as a whole, is
key to the credibility and authority often associated with NRC reports.
A great deal of research by NRC staff and management takes place prior
to appointment of a committee in order to identify the strongest
possible candidates.
NRC committee members serve as individual experts, not as
representatives of organizations or interest groups. They are initially
appointed provisionally and a committee is not finally approved until a
discussion of the committee's composition and balance is held at the
first meeting where any issues regarding potential conflicts of
interest or balance of perspectives represented on the committee that
are raised in that discussion or by the public\8\ are investigated and
addressed. This discussion and follow up consideration by NRC
management sometimes results in changes to the committee membership.
The goal of this process of analyzing the prospective committee's
composition and balance is to ensure that committees meet the following
criteria:
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\8\ Provisional committee membership is posted on the National
Academies Internet web site for a period of 20 days prior to the first
meeting of the committee and the public is invited to provide comments
on the committee composition and balance of perspectives.
An appropriate range of expertise for the task.
Committees are designed to include experts with the specific
expertise and experience needed to address the study's SOT. One
of the strengths of the National Academies is the tradition of
bringing together recognized experts from diverse disciplines
and backgrounds who might not otherwise collaborate. These
diverse groups are encouraged to conceive new ways of thinking
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about problems.
A balance of perspectives. While ensuring that the
right expertise is represented on the committee is essential,
it is not alone sufficient for an effective committee on most
NRC studies. It is also important to evaluate the overall
composition of the committee in terms of a diversity and
balance of experiences and perspectives. The goal is to ensure
that the most important points of view, in the National
Academies' judgment, are reasonably balanced so that the
committee can carry out its charge objectively and credibly.
Screened for conflicts of interest. All provisional
committee members are screened in writing and in a confidential
group discussion regarding possible conflicts of interest. For
this purpose, a ``conflict of interest'' is actually quite
narrowly defined as any financial or other interest which
conflicts with the service of the individual on the committee
because it could significantly impair the individual's
objectivity or could create an unfair competitive advantage for
any person or organization. In particular, the term ``conflict
of interest'' in the NRC study context means something more
than individual bias. There must be an interest, ordinarily
financial, that could be directly affected by the work of the
committee. Except in very rare situations where the National
Academies determines that a conflict of interest is unavoidable
and promptly and publicly discloses the conflict of interest,
no individual can be appointed to serve (or continue to serve)
on a committee of the institution used in the development of
reports if the individual has a conflict of interest that is
relevant to the charge of the study committee. Many potential
conflicts of interest, as opposed to real conflicts as defined
above, are balanced by different viewpoints represented by
other members of the provisional committee.
Other considerations. Membership in the ``three
academies'' (NAS, NAE, IOM) and previous involvement in
National Academies studies are taken into account in committee
selection. The inclusion of women, ethnic minorities, and young
professionals are important as well, and additional factors
such as geographic diversity and a diversity of institutional
affiliations are also considered.
The specific steps in the committee selection and approval process
are as follows: (1) academy staff solicit an extensive number of
suggestions for potential committee members from a wide range of
sources; (2) a recommended a slate of nominees is put forward for
approval through several levels within the NRC management, with the
provisional slate ultimately approved by the NRC Chair; (3) the
provisional committee member list is posted for public comment on the
National Academies Internet site and members are asked to complete
background information and conflict of interest disclosure forms, which
are subsequently reviewed by academy management and staff.\9\ Then, (4)
a discussion of the committee's overall balance and potential conflicts
of interest is held at the first committee meeting; (5) any conflicts
of interest or issues of committee balance and expertise are
investigated; and, if necessary, (6) changes to the committee are
proposed and finalized before the committee is formally approved.
Finally, (7) committee members continue to be screened for conflicts of
interest throughout the duration of the committee's work.
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\9\ The NRC conflict of interest disclosure process (National
Research Council, 2003) is often cited as a high standard for
documenting independence and objectivity in science and technology
advisory bodies; see, for example, U.S. Office of Management and Budget
(2005).
STAGE 3. Committee Activity
Study committees typically gather information through: (1) meetings
that are open to the public and that are announced in advance through
the National Academies Internet site; (2) the submission of information
by outside parties; (3) reviews of the scientific literature (and other
sources as relevant), and (4) the investigations of the committee
members and staff. In all cases, efforts are made to solicit input from
individuals who have been directly involved in, or who have special
knowledge of, the problem under consideration. In accordance with
federal law and with few exceptions, information-gathering meetings of
the committee are open to the public.
Any written materials provided to the committee by individuals who
are not officials, agents, or employees of the National Academies are
maintained in a Public Access File that is available to the public for
examination. The committee deliberates in meetings closed to the public
in order to develop draft findings and recommendations free from
outside influences.\10\ The public is provided with brief summaries of
these meetings that include the list of committee members present
(posted on the Academy's Internet site), but all analyses carried out
by the committee and drafts of the report remain confidential.
Occasionally academy studies employ contractors to provide supplemental
analyses to support the staff and committee's work although this is
typically not a major component of most studies.
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\10\ Most groups created by the U.S. Government to provide advice
operate under regulations pursuant to the Federal Advisory Committee
Act (FACA), which does not permit, for example, such groups to operate
without government officials present or in meetings not open to the
public (along with many other requirements). The NRC operates under a
special provision of FACA (Section 15) that permits closed committee
meetings. Section 15 of FACA is included for reference as Appendix A.
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NRC committees assume authorship of the study report, although in
practice who actually drafts the report varies considerably. For
example in many cases the appointed committee members draft much of the
text at all stages of a report; in other cases committee members
critique drafts prepared by staff; and often collaborative combinations
of committee and staff authorship produce successive drafts.
STAGE 4. Report Review
As a final check on the quality and objectivity of an NRC study,
all reports undergo a rigorous, independent external review by experts
whose comments are provided anonymously to committee members. The NRC
recruits independent experts with a range of views and perspectives to
review and comment on the draft committee report.
The Academy's report review process is structured to ensure that a
report addresses its approved study charge and does not exceed it;\11\
that the findings are supported by the scientific evidence and that
concluding arguments are presented clearly; that the exposition and
organization of the report are effective; and that the report is
impartial and objective. Each committee is required to respond to, but
need not (necessarily) agree with reviewer comments in a detailed
``response to review'' document that is examined by one or two
independent report review ``monitors'' responsible for ensuring that
the report review criteria have been satisfied. After all committee
members and appropriate academy officials have approved the final
report, it is transmitted to the sponsor of the study (usually a
government agency) and subsequently released to the public. Sponsors
are not provided an opportunity to suggest changes in reports. The
names and affiliations of the report reviewers are made public when the
report is released.
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\11\ This is, in part, necessary because study statements of task
are contractually defined and, hence, sometimes result in committee's
frustration at not being permitted to exceed the statement of task if
the committee feels an expansion of the scope in warranted. It is
generally considered the role of the institutional governance
structures to ensure that a study's statement of task is properly
framed.
STAGE 5: Publication and Dissemination
NRC reports are sometimes delivered and released to the public in
the final published form, but more frequently are delivered and
publicly released in a pre-publication draft format, and subsequently
edited and produced in a final published form some time later. Press
briefings, congressional and executive agency briefings, and other
dissemination activities are common for many NRC studies.
Special Challenges for NRC Study Processes
Over the years the NRC process has proved consistently to be a very
strong model for providing independent and authoritative advice to
government. Like any process designed to serve many needs, however, it
is not perfectly tuned to serve all the needs of all parts of
government that need science and technology advice. The most commonly
cited issues and challenges associated with the NRC study process are
the following:
Cost. It is often perceived to be expensive to
commission an NRC study, even though committee members are
volunteers whose time is contributed pro bono (except for
travel expenses). At least in part this perception is due to
the fact that a separate contract is negotiated for each
individual study--unlike the central funding for federal agency
advisory committees. The overhead cost for the NRC is
necessarily substantial, partly because many of the staff
supporting studies are professionals who manage the activities
of standing boards and committees as well as study committees
and partly because supporting the infrastructure necessary to
maintain access to key sources of volunteers, including the
governance structures of the National Academies, must be
maintained. In general, the cost of an NRC study is perhaps
somewhat higher than that of a comparable effort carried out by
a university or nonprofit ``think tank'' and somewhat less than
that of a commercial management consulting firm.
Timeliness. The NRC study process, which includes
commissioning and contracting for the study, selecting and
convening a study committee, arranging subsequent meetings
among busy experts who are often in high demand and serving on
a volunteer basis, and navigating a report through peer review,
editing, production, and release takes time. The average (with
a very wide variance) duration of an NRC study is about 18
months, but can be longer, especially for controversial topics.
Congressionally mandated studies involve additional
complications as well (discussed below). It should also be
noted, however, that studies can also be carried out quite
rapidly given an important national need. Making the Nation
Safer, noted above, was completed in six months. Another widely
cited study, Climate Change Science, was completed in one month
and the recently completed report, Rising Above the Gathering
Storm, noted earlier was completed in six months.
Sources of Sponsorship. Most NRC studies are
commissioned and paid for by federal agencies through contracts
(at least one per study undertaken and sometimes many contracts
per study from multiple agencies). Studies are funded from
other sources as well (sometimes in addition to federal agency
sponsorship), such as foundations or even limited sponsorship
from private sector sponsors or even States. Studies mandated
by Congress also require the additional hurdle of enacting a
federal law directing an agency to contract with the NRC. On
the one hand, the practice of negotiating studies individually,
whether there are multiple sponsors or not, is beneficial in
that it can help ensure that the studies the NRC undertakes are
relevant and important. Also the diversity of financial
sponsorship for a large portfolio of studies from many
executive agencies (see Figure 1) helps assure independence,
especially by minimizing the dependence of the NRC's financial
support on any one federal source. On the other hand, it often
takes six to nine months through a government procurement
process to initiate an NRC study even after a mandated study
has been enacted in law (or included in the legislative report
language accompanying passage of the law). For those studies
mandated by Congress, yet an additional delay often results
from the time needed to implement the legislation. While it has
been sometimes suggested that the Academies consider requesting
an annual appropriation of funds from Congress (probably
executed as a task order contract with a relevant federal
agency) to facilitate improved administrative efficiency in
carrying out studies (e.g., reducing the time for securing
individual contracts for studies), the Academies' leadership
has historically been unwilling to consider this option, since
such an arrangement could lead to compromises in institutional
independence.
Committee Authorship. NRC study committees of
experts, widely considered to be a key strength of the NRC
study approach, include widely respected individuals from
academia, industry, and essentially all groups relevant to the
study committee's charge. However, the volunteer committee of
experts as authors of the report can also sometimes be a
weakness. For example, NRC committees are made up of
distinguished volunteers who have many other responsibilities
in their professional lives. Without careful oversight by the
committee chair and sometimes NRC management, committee members
with the most at stake in a study or perhaps with the most
available time to commit to the effort could have a
disproportionate influence over a study's deliberations and
outcomes. This is why the NRC places such a high priority on
recruiting strong chairs, providing experienced professional
support staff in managing committees, and executing rigorous
procedures for identifying and addressing potential bias and
conflicts of interest of prospective committee members.
Committee members who attempt to abuse their responsibilities
as committee members can be removed while a study is under way.
A CURRENT GAP IN ADVICE TUNED TO CONGRESSIONAL NEEDS
As just outlined, the NRC study process is well developed and
serves one important need of Congress--providing an authoritative
recommendation from widely recognized experts on a specific course of
action. In particular, NRC committees are usually assembled with the
intention of achieving consensus recommendations supported by evidence
and subject to rigorous peer review. In a very controversial subject
area with scientific and other uncertainties, if a broad set of
perspectives are included in the study committee a consensus might be
difficult to achieve, particularly if the purpose is to include all
possible scientific and other perspectives on a problem or if complex
policy considerations are involved. This is why the NRC places a high
priority on an appropriately balanced committee and a rigorous
information-gathering phase of a committee's work, where such
perspectives can be heard and considered by the committee.\12\
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\12\ While NRC study committees strive by design to produce
consensus findings and recommendations, academy policies and procedures
do provide for publishing dissenting views when consensus cannot be
achieved.
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Since the historical focus of the NRC process has been on
delivering consensus-based advice, the process as it has evolved is
less well equipped to elaborate on the broader context of an issue and
inform the policy debate with careful and objective analysis of the
policy consequences of alternative courses of action, especially those
that may involve value judgments and social or economic trade-offs
beyond the scope of technical analysis. Consequently, it has been less
common for the NRC to assemble committees charged with identifying and
evaluating the pros and cons of a range of alternative policy options,
although such committees are sometimes created and it would certainly
be possible to develop such a study process to be used more widely at
the National Academies.
Both types of analysis just described are important to
congressional deliberation depending upon the circumstances. With the
closure of the former OTA, organizations focused on the latter type of
analysis, either performed by a disinterested analytical organization
within the Congress itself or readily accessible to the Congress from
an external organization, do not currently exist and may at some point
need to be reconstructed, perhaps involving the National Academies in
some way.
Example: The Future of the U.S. Electric Power System
As an example illustrating the analysis gap just noted, consider
the case where the U.S. Congress may be interested in the future of the
electric power system following a major blackout. The salient issues
could be posed in two alternative ways:
One type of study would be to seek an authoritative
set of recommendations for making the system more secure and
reliable. In such a study, the well established NRC approach
would be to assemble a committee of widely recognized experts.
The Committee would review what is known about the power system
and currently expected paths of continued development and then
prepare specific engineering, technology and operational
recommendations about how to improve system reliability and
performance. Indeed, such a study is currently underway at the
NRC sponsored by the new U.S. Department of Homeland Security.
In another type of study, Congress might be
interested in exploring the technical as well as societal,
environmental, economic, regulatory, or other broad
implications of alternative scenarios of increasing competition
in the Nation's electric utility industry, perhaps once again
precipitated by a blackout widely perceived, correctly or not,
to be the result of deregulation. Not only technical, but also
political, economic, social, environmental, and probably many
other kinds of tradeoffs and value judgments are involved in
characterizing a series of scenarios for the future structure
of the industry, ranging from moving toward a national
centrally controlled electric supply grid to fully deregulating
wholesale and retail electricity segments of the industry.
In the latter case a definitive set of consensus recommendations is
not the objective, and the collection of stakeholders and experts
necessary to carefully identify and explore these alternatives would be
considerably different than for the study committee structured to reach
fact-based, tightly reasoned consensus recommendations based on
scientific evidence and on specific technical issues. Rather, the
objective would be to articulate the implications of alternative
scenarios and accompanying policy decisions, usually at a higher level
of abstraction than the former case.
In short, and perhaps at the risk of being simplistic, the first
type of analysis is designed to illuminate the scientific and technical
aspects of a problem to help direct a specific course of action while,
in the second case, the analysis is designed principally to inform the
debate, including perspectives that may go beyond science and
engineering. Both types of analysis are very important to Congressional
deliberations. The contrasts between these two types of analysis are
discussed below in a more detailed comparison of the NRC process with
that of the former OTA. As noted above, the fact that the NRC process
does not now generally accommodate this second form of advice does not
mean that it could not; the NRC often considers and implements changes
in its processes in response to government needs, although going beyond
the tradition of fact-based studies with a science and technology focus
to more policy-oriented studies could pose risks to the NRC's
credibility so such changes would have to be implemented very
carefully.
Real-Time Advice: A Continuing Imperative
As a case in point of the evolution of NRC processes, the horrific
terrorist events of September 11, 2001 in the United State spurred
widespread interest in finding ways to contribute to the understanding
of the science and technology dimensions of homeland security and
countering terrorism. Specifically, many government agencies expressed
urgent needs for immediate advice in these areas. In response, the NRC
experimented with using its convening power to assemble small groups of
experts who then provided advice as individuals, rather than as a group
constituting an NRC committee. Such ``real-time'' advice, which does
not result in a written report and does not carry the imprimatur of the
NRC process (especially the quality control aspects of committee
deliberation and peer review of a written report) does not constitute
formal advice of the Academy to government. It has, however, provided a
new means of satisfying a real government need, i.e., providing timely
input to policy-makers and other organizations, including, as an
example, a standing arrangement with the Government Accountability
Office (GAO), an agency of the Congress, discussed further below.
Additional Congressional needs vary widely, including such
deliverables as (1) ``instant education'' on a complex science and
technology issue, (2) ``translations'' of authoritative technical
reports to more readable and understandable language tuned to the needs
of policy-makers with very broad responsibilities, (3) summaries of
landmark authoritative reports, and (4) updates or adaptations of
existing reports and information to current needs, and (5) readily
available and trusted expert consultants on call to help with quick
turnaround questions and interpretations of complex technical
information. Some of these capabilities are accessible to the Congress
to varying degrees through the Congressional Research Service, but
others, especially (1) and (5) are not currently generally available to
the Congress, at least in any organized or readily accessible way by an
organization directly accountable to Congress.
Collaboration and the GAO Experiment
In an experiment referenced above to test the feasibility of
developing a ``technology assessment'' capability in another
Congressional support agency, the Government Accountability Office
(GAO), a first-of-a-kind GAO technology assessment report on biometric
technologies was released in 2002.\13\ While the NRC was not involved
in developing this assessment, it was asked to use its contacts to
assist the GAO in identifying individuals with the proper expertise. In
retrospect, there are a number of shortcomings in the approach adopted
by the GAO in carrying out its first attempt at a technology
assessment, most notably the lack of a substantive and accountable peer
review process, but the experiment was more successful than many
anticipated and the GAO seems receptive to incorporating improvements
suggested by a group commissioned to review the GAO approach (see Fri
et al., 2002). In particular, the group identified a number of
significant organizational challenges that it felt were necessary to
refine the GAO approach, which could then possibly evolve into a more
mature technology assessment capability within the legislative branch
of government. The GAO technology assessment experiment is continuing
at a modest scale of one to two assessments annually on selected
topics.
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\13\ Since 1996 members of Congress at various times have proposed
experiments to fill the perceived gap in science and technology advice
in the wake of closure of the OTA, including attempts to simply
resurrect the agency; see Jones ( 2004) and Knezo (2005). One such
experiment that has come to pass is creation of a ``pilot'' technology
assessment capability in the Government Accountability Office, a
support agency of the Congress. The first such assessment (GAO, 2002),
was released in November 2002.
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Whether the GAO is ultimately capable of the reforms identified by
the independent review panel remains to be seen, but it seems fair to
conclude that the initial GAO experiment has yielded evidence
sufficient to continue the experiment. The NRC's modest role in this
experiment, by convening groups of experts to talk with GAO study
teams, appears to have been one of the successful features of this
approach and may constitute one way in which the National Academies can
contribute to a renewed technology assessment capability within the
legislative branch, in addition to its more traditional response to
congressionally mandated requests for assistance. The NRC's
relationship with GAO also includes, more generally, a standing
arrangement to assemble experts to talk with GAO staff on a specific
set of technical issues relevant to ongoing GAO studies. Such a
mechanism provides the GAO a degree of access to the National
Academies' considerable network of technical experts.
THE FORMER OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
The GAO experiment was designed to help fill the gap in science and
technology advice for Congressional needs left by closure of OTA. By
comparison and contrast with the NRC study process, the OTA study
process used an authoritative committee of volunteers as an advisory
panel rather than in the role of assuming authorship of the study
itself. The study report was, instead, produced by professional staff
subject to external review. On one hand, this approach permitted easier
regulation of the role of the committee, particular if achieving a
consensus in a broad controversial area was unlikely, but, on the other
hand, such a practice also sacrificed the authoritativeness of the
``best and brightest'' volunteer experts identified as authors of the
report, an important feature of the NRC process.
Because the former OTA panels were advisory, and not the report's
authors, the necessity of reaching a consensus was seldom an issue.
Indeed, OTA was prohibited in its enabling legislation from making
recommendations, so the panel was created to try to collect the views
of all important stakeholders rather than to try to produce consensus
recommendations. This sometimes resulted in a frustrating experience
for panelists serving on OTA advisory panels who were eager to offer
specific recommendations. Instead, OTA project teams sought to analyze
and articulate the consequences of alternative courses of action and
elaborate on the context of a problem without coming to consensus
recommendations on a specific course of action, which would be
difficult anyway with a diverse group with points of view that
prevented consensus on many controversial issues. In the later years of
the agency's existence OTA reports included more and more specific
findings as a carefully developed alternative to recommendations.
If required to deliver a consensus set of recommendations, even if
it were permitted under the enabling legislation, the former OTA model
would likely be unworkable for controversial subjects with many
opposing points of view. Nonetheless, the type of study undertaken by
the former OTA was an important input to Congressional deliberation and
it has not yet been reproduced in the Legislative Branch agencies or
elsewhere, including the National Academies. The Academies could
probably carry out more such studies but that would likely require some
significant changes in its study procedures to accommodate such studies
as indicated above and in more detail below.
OTA's Organizational Structure
OTA operated under Congressional authorization provided in the
Technology Assessment Act of 1972 and funds were appropriated in 1973
to begin operations in 1974 with a handful of staff that grew to 200 in
the later years of the agency's existence. The staff structure included
a core permanent staff of 143 that was supplemented with temporary
staff recruited to meet the needs of current assessments. Both
permanent and temporary staff included professionals from many
disciplines, over half with Ph.D.s. OTA produced on average 32 reports
per year over its history and 51 reports per year in its last three
years of its existence.\14\
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\14\ The entire collection of OTA assessments delivered during the
agency's history (1972-1995) is preserved electronically and available
at http://www.wws.princeton.edu/ota/ and on a CD-ROM collection (Office
of Technology Assessment, 1996).
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The key organizational elements created in OTA's enabling statute
were (1) the Technology Assessment Board (TAB) composed of members of
both chambers of the U.S. Congress, the House of Representatives and
Senate; (2) a Technology Assessment Advisory Council (TAAC), composed
primarily of private citizens appointed by TAB; and (3) the Office of
the Director, which oversaw day-to-day operations of the agency.
Technology Assessment Board. TAB was the central
organizational element articulated in OTA's enabling statute
with its composition unique among the legislative support
agencies.\15\ TAB was a 12-member governing board of OTA, with
six members of the Senate and six of the House of
Representatives, divided equally between the two dominant U.S.
political parties. The principal responsibilities of TAB were
to appoint the Director, to authorize the initiation of
assessments requested by Congressional Committees, to approve
the budget authority associated with those assessments, and
finally to authorize delivery of assessment reports to
requesting committees and the public by certifying that OTA has
carried out its assessment process faithfully, i.e., that OTA
had considered all the relevant stakeholder interests and
issues and undergone extensive external review. OTA received an
annual budget appropriation from Congress allocated to OTA's
support operations and among OTA active projects as authorized
by TAB.
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\15\ During OTA's existence, there were four Congressional
analytical support agencies: the Library of Congress's Congressional
Research Service (CRS), the General Accounting Office (GAO) [GAO's name
was changed to the Government Accountability Office in 2004), and the
Congressional Budget Office (CBO). CRS, GAO, and CBO remain in
operation today.
Technology Assessment Advisory Council. TAAC was
essentially OTA's outside visiting committee. It was appointed
by TAB and met periodically to review the overall direction of
the agency and carry out more detailed reviews of the agency's
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research programs.
Office of the Director. The OTA Director was
responsible for day-to-day operations, hiring and management of
staff, interaction with TAB and TAAC, and strategic planning
for and organization of the agency.
OTA's Process of Technology Assessment\16\
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\16\ OTA's assessment process is documented widely in the
literature, including Guston (2003), Bimber (1996), and many others.
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As noted above, OTA generally undertook assessments at the request
of the Chairs of Congressional Committees. Typical OTA assessments took
18-24 months to complete and cost on the order of $500,000 (1996
dollars) in direct costs (although indirect costs essentially doubled
the total cost).\17\ OTA assessments seldom offered specific
recommendations. Rather, they articulated policy options and the
consequences of alternative options.
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\17\ As noted earlier, OTA delivered on average 51 reports per year
during the last three years of the agency's existence.
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A great deal of effort went into defining the scope of an
assessment once it was requested by a Committee Chair. Since OTA
frequently received many more requests than it could accommodate, the
project directors often consulted with other congressional committees
of jurisdiction and interest as well as with the TAB informally to help
establish study priorities fairly. Once a general study scope was
established, a proposal was prepared for formal consideration by TAB
and, if approved, the assessment commenced. The portfolio of
assessments addressed a broad range of subjects on the Congressional
agenda, such as energy and environmental technology issues,
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, global telecommunications
policy, biological pest control, and health care reform. The key
elements of an assessment typically were the following:
a comprehensive advisory panel of technical experts
and relevant stakeholders;
a core OTA project team including an experienced
project director;
contractors and consultants selected to support major
analytical tasks;
in-house research efforts by the project team;
workshops convened with additional experts and
stakeholders to obtain the most current information possible;
extensive review and comment of draft reports by
external technical experts and stakeholder interests;
and, finally, delivery of reports through
congressional hearings, briefings, and public release, and
often considerable follow-up consultation with requesting
congressional committees of jurisdiction and interest.
OTA advisory panels were an important feature of OTA's assessment
process. They helped refine the project scope, identified additional
relevant resources and perspectives on the issues being addressed, and
provided the core of extensive peer review. The advisory panel was
central, but OTA took responsibility for the final product. The agency
did not seek consensus from the panel because most often if there were
a possible consensus decision or course of action, OTA probably
wouldn't have been asked to do the study in the first place. The
principal final product of an OTA assessment was a report, along with
summaries, report briefs, personal briefings for members and
committees, commercial publishers' reprints, and in the final years of
the agency's existence electronic delivery of these products over the
Internet and via Capitol Hill's local area network.
At the highest level of abstraction, the OTA assessment process is
similar to the NRC study process in that it also can also be defined in
terms of a sequence of five major stages similar to those of the NRC
process. However, each stage has significant differences in their
details compared with the corresponding stages in the NRC process. The
stages to the OTA process were the following: (1) project selection,
(2) project planning and preparation, (3) project execution: data
collection, analysis, and report preparation, (4) report review,
delivery and publication, and (5) report dissemination, use and follow-
up activities.
STAGE 1: Project Selection
OTA worked principally for the Committees of the U.S. Congress,
and, hence, projects were generally initiated as a result of inquiries
from Congressional committee staff ultimately resulting in formal
letters of request from Committee Chairs and ranking members (and often
from more than one committee of jurisdiction or interest). Projects
could also on occasion be initiated at the request of TAB or by the OTA
Director with TAB's approval, although such studies were rare. In
practice, OTA staff became what former TAB Chair Senator Ted Stevens
referred to as ``shared staff'' for standing House and Senate
Committees and studies were often initiated as a result of ongoing
interaction between Congressional Committee staff and OTA staff.
A great deal of preliminary work often went into the planning for a
new OTA assessment. Usually this work involved preliminary data
collection and literature research, including reviewing relevant
legislative history, congressional committee hearings and reports, and
reports from other Congressional agencies (CBO, CRS, and GAO), all to
help frame the issues for the project proposal and work plan. The major
product at this stage in the assessment process was a proposal which
first was approved internally by the OTA Director for consideration by
TAB for review and approval. The proposal included a detailed work plan
and budget proposal, and, if approved by TAB, resources would be set
aside out of OTA's annual appropriation to carry out the assessment.
STAGE 2: Project Planning and Preparation
Following TAB approval, a project team of two to six professional
staff was appointed. Usually the project director was a permanent staff
member with experience in prior OTA assessments supplemented with
additional senior and junior staff members who were either permanent
staff or rotational (temporary) staff recruited for specialized skills
needed to carry out the assessment. Overall, the research and writing
of OTA assessments was principally conducted by a staff of about 200,
of which two-thirds were the professional research staff. In the early
1990s, among the research staff, 88 percent had advanced degrees, 58
percent with Ph.D.s, primarily in the physical, life, and social
sciences, economics, and engineering. About 40 percent of the research
staff were temporary appointments of professionals recruited
specifically to staff ongoing assessments. For specific information or
analysis, OTA also contracted with key individuals or organizations.
Contractors analyzed data, conducted case studies, and otherwise
provided expertise to complement staff capability.
The project team assembled a slate of nominees for the project's
advisory panel by defining the major stakeholder interests in the
issues to be addressed, the important science and technology expertise
relevant to the assessment, and other interests as necessary to capture
a very broad range of perspectives on the study scope. The advisory
panel slate was submitted for approval through OTA management and
ultimately approved by the Director, often with revisions or additions
to the originally proposed slate. The project team organized and
commissioned the portfolio of contractor support tasks, assigned
internal analysis tasks, information gathering workshops, and other
activities as specified in the work plan.
STAGE 3: Execution: Data Collection Analysis and Report Preparation
Carrying out the assessment itself was typically organized around
meetings of the project's advisory panel. The panel's principal
responsibility was to ensure that reports were objective, fair, and
authoritative by helping to shape studies in the early stages by
suggesting alternative approaches, reviewing documents throughout the
course of the assessment, and critiquing reports at the final stages.
The panels typically met three times during a study, initially to help
frame the study, second as an opportunity to effect ``mid-course
corrections'' and, finally, as the point of departure for the initial
and perhaps most important part of peer review of the draft report.
In addition to the advisory panel, many others assisted with OTA
assessments through participation in technical workshops, provision of
background information, and review of documents. Commissioned
contractor reports, invited papers contributed to workshops, internal
working papers prepared by professional staff, and interaction with
parallel studies on-going in other organizations all helped shape the
body of information considered as the staff began to prepare the
assessment report. In all, nearly 5,000 outside panelists and workshop
participants came to OTA annually to help OTA in its work.
The role of contractors in an OTA assessment evolved considerably
over the agency's history. In the early years commissioning external
contracts were perhaps the dominant part of a study. Over the years as
the agency's professional staff developed and became much more attuned
to Congressional needs, contractors were used less, but were often an
important part of an OTA assessment.
STAGE 4: Report Review Delivery and Public Release
OTA placed a very high premium on clearly written reports that
effectively communicated very complex topics to Congressional staff and
the public. This involved writing reports specifically tuned to
Congressional needs, such as language suitable for and relevant to
broad policy discussions, extensive examples, and illustrative
anecdotes helpful for framing policy debates. Also, as noted earlier,
no attempt was made to develop a consensus among panel members; in
fact, a wide diversity of views was sought. OTA retained full
responsibility for the content and conclusions of each report. OTA
draft assessment reports went through extensive formal review and
revision conducted by OTA staff and outside experts. Some outside
reviewers examined portions of the report while others the entire
report and the total number of reviewers involved often exceeded 100
individuals.
Accompanying a final draft report for consideration by the Director
was a ``response to review'' memorandum prepared by the project
director that reviewed all comments received on the draft report and
how they were dealt with in producing the final draft report. Upon the
Director's approval of the final draft assessment report and its
response-to-review, copies of the final report were sent to TAB for its
review and authorization for publication. If approved by TAB, published
reports were then forwarded to the requesting committee or committees,
summaries and one-page report briefs were sent to all Members of
Congress, and then the report was released to the public. OTA
assessments were published by the Government Printing Office and were
frequently reprinted by commercial publishers.
STAGE 5: Dissemination Use and Follow-up
Upon delivery of a published OTA assessment report to sponsors and
public release, frequently congressional hearings and briefings
followed. Reports were disseminated widely to the relevant policy
communities, and frequently OTA staff prepared publications based on
the report for peer reviewed journals or other publications. OTA
reports were often reprinted by commercial publishers (as a government-
produced document, OTA reports carried no copyright), and in the final
years of the agency's existence electronic delivery over the Internet
and via Capitol Hill's local area network became standard practice.
Finally, senior OTA staff involved in the effort often became subject
matter experts called upon frequently by congressional staff and
members as legislative initiatives were considered in the subject area
addressed by the assessment. As noted earlier Senator Ted Stevens often
referred to OTA project teams as ``shared staff' experts in science and
technology supporting congressional committee staffs where such
expertise was often scarce.
THE NRC AND OTA STUDY PROCESSES COMPARED
Some of the differences between the NRC and OTA study processes as
they relate to studies requested by Congress have already been noted
and in some ways the processes are more similar than they are different
(see Figure 2). Both involve a carefully bounded and defined scope of
work culminating in a formal study request, usually in the form of a
letter or congressional legislation. In both cases the scope of work is
formally documented with a proposal and work plan, although in the case
of the NRC the proposal takes the form both of an internal study
prospectus to be approved by the NRC Governing Board\18\ as well as an
external contract proposal to formalize the funding sources with the
sponsoring federal agencies (or sometimes other organizations). In the
OTA case, the TAB authorized approval of expenditures for the study
against the agency's annual appropriation. The mechanism of project
funding is one of the fundamental differences between the two
approaches (discussed more below), but there are many other differences
as well.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\18\ Technically, this approval is delegated by the Governing Board
(which meets quarterly) to its Executive Committee (which meets
monthly).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Role of Volunteer Committee
The role, purpose and even composition of study committees in the
NRC case and advisory panels in the OTA case are quite different in
several respects, some of which were noted above. In the NRC case the
committee assumes authorship of the report while in the OTA case the
committee is advisory to professional staff who draft the report. The
quality of the study in the NRC case is much more dependent upon
quality of the committee recruited to carry it out, which explains why
considerable effort is spent on recruiting high quality committees for
NRC studies. Such was the case for recruiting OTA advisory panels as
well, but the success of the study was relatively less dependent on the
role of the advisory panel.
The quality of the staff project team was the dominant
consideration in the OTA case. As noted above, members serve pro bono
on NRC committees while in the OTA case a modest honoraria for service
by advisory panel members was occasionally provided. NRC committees are
generally recruited with the intention of coming to a consensus
regarding findings, conclusions, and recommendations included in the
committee's report. In the OTA case the goal was instead to have all
legitimate interests in the policy area under study represented on the
advisory panel with no expectation of reaching a consensus view.
Finally, because in the NRC case the committee assumed authorship of
the report, elaborate institutional procedures for avoiding conflicts
of interest are a high priority. In the OTA case, since the goal of the
advisory committee was to include all legitimate interests, conflicts
of interest were essentially encouraged, although carefully balanced in
the committee composition.
Role of the Professional Staff
As a consequence of the differing roles and structure of NRC
committees vs. OTA advisory panels, the roles of the professional staff
in the study process are generally quite different as well. In the NRC
case, the principal responsibilities of the staff are to plan, organize
and structure the study, initiate selection of the study committee
membership, and facilitate the committee's work, including ensuring
adherence to the policies and procedures established for NRC
studies.\19\ However, as noted above, even though NRC committees assume
authorship of the study report, in practice draft reports for the
committee's critique and consensus are produced in a variety of ways,
and frequently involve committee member drafting, committees critiquing
drafts prepared by staff, and collaborative combinations of committee
and staff authorship. In the OTA case the professional staff members
planned and managed the assessment, and took responsibility for the
report as the study authors. Finally, OTA staff were also Legislative
Branch government employees with frequent day-to-day interaction with
Congressional staff and Members before, during, and after completion of
OTA assessments.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\19\ In practice the degree to which the NRC staff members are
involved in drafting a committee report varies widely. In some studies
staff members become very actively involved in the substance of the
committee's work while in others staff principally facilitate the
committee's work.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Requests to initiate studies
Most congressionally requested NRC studies require that the study
be mandated in law or specified in a legislative report accompanying
the law when passed by Congress. Otherwise it is unlikely that the
relevant executive agency would be willing to provide the funding to
support the study. On rare occasions, letters of request from Members
of Congress lead to studies funded by internal resources of the
National Academies. In the OTA case by far most studies were requested
by Chairs and Ranking Members of standing committees of either or both
chambers of the Congress, although studies were sometimes also mandated
in law (although still subject to approval by TAB).
Funding of studies
Most NRC studies are funded by executive agencies through a sole-
source (non-competitive) contract or grant or in some cases an
individual task negotiated as part of a task order contract. Sometimes
funds for congressionally mandated studies are provided in
appropriations legislation. Often, though, mandated studies are
specified in authorizing legislation or report language accompanying
legislation and agencies may or may not choose to make funds available
to carry out the study. In the OTA case, funds for virtually all
studies were drawn from the agency's annual budget appropriation for
the agency's operations and were allocated when the study proposal was
approved by TAB.
Government Oversight of Policies and Procedures
As an independent, private, non-profit organization, many of the
same laws that apply to such organizations apply to the National
Academies, especially those related to, for example, employment
practices or contracting and financial auditing requirements. In
addition, special additional policies apply, such as Section 15 of the
Federal Advisory Committee Act (see Appendix A) and several
Presidential Executive Orders\20\ applicable to the National Academies
charter and mission. So, while there are many government oversight
mechanisms that apply to specific individual academy policies and
procedures, there is no direct overall oversight relationship with the
government.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\20\ The NRC was included formally under the charter of the NAS
with a Presidential Executive order signed by Woodrow Wilson in 1918
and reaffirmed and revised in 1956 and 1993 (see Executive Office of
the President, 1993).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
By contrast, as a Congressional agency, OTA had many fewer
operational government oversight mechanisms while the agency had three
direct oversight mechanisms within the Congress itself. (1) TAB, which
was ultimately responsible for managing the agency, (2) the Senate and
House Appropriations Committees where OTA's operating budget was
establish as part of the annual Legislative Branch appropriations
process, and (3) standing committees of the House and Senate (Senate
Committee on Governmental Affairs and the House Committee on Science)
with responsibility for oversight of OTA's authorizing statute.\21\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\21\ Technically, OTA's authorizing statute, the Technology
Assessment Act of 1972 (U.S. Code, Title 2, Chapter 15, Sections 471-
481), was never repealed by Congress so the agency does not exist only
because funds are no longer appropriated for its operations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Government oversight of study scope
As noted above the mechanism for controlling a study's scope for an
NRC study is the contract or grant with a federal executive agency
responsible for the funds to sponsor the study. Sometimes differences
between congressional expectations, as articulated in the legislative
language mandating the study, and the contract language with the
designated executive agency can be difficult to resolve to the
satisfaction of all concerns. In the OTA case the mechanism for
controlling the study scope was ultimately the responsibility of TAB.
Report peer review mechanisms
NRC reports are subjected to an independent and anonymous peer
review process. That is, the study committee is obliged to respond to
comments from peer reviewers whose identity is unknown to the committee
until after the report is published. Reviewers are selected through a
process overseen by the executive offices of the NRC's major program
divisions and the Report Review Committee (RRC), which is a National
Academies committee independent of all involved in preparation of the
study report. Judgment of the adequacy of a committee's response to
review is managed by the RRC. Typically 10-12 reviewers provide
detailed comments on the draft report. In the OTA case, while there
were as many as 100 reviewers engaged in reviewing parts or all of a
draft OTA report, the reviewers were generally selected by the OTA
project team but often supplemented with reviewers selected by senior
OTA management. The OTA project director drafted the response to review
subject to the approval of senior OTA management and ultimately TAB.
Nature of Reports
As noted above, NRC reports are usually designed to yield consensus
findings, conclusions, and recommendations from an authoritative
committee regarding a specific course of action. OTA reports generally
did not include specific recommendations but, rather, were designed to
articulate the consequences of alternative options without selecting a
preferred option, although, as noted earlier, in the later years of the
agency's existence OTA reports included more and more specific findings
as a carefully developed alternative to recommendations. It is perhaps
important to note that in neither of the NRC or OTA cases is the
intention of the study report to produce new technical understanding.
Indeed, in both cases the intent is to collect and make understandable
to broader audiences, particularly policy makers, established
perspectives on the current understanding of the issue(s) under study.
Report Delivery and Dissemination
In most cases dissemination of NRC reports is limited to delivery
to executive agency sponsors and relevant congressional committees and
released to the public through the National Academies Press and made
available on the National Academies Internet site. Often the report is
initially released in a pre-publication draft format in order to effect
as timely as possible delivery of the information to the sponsoring
agency and the public. The final printed report, including editorial
but no substantive changes to the report content, follows later as
published by the National Academies Press (NAP) and made available on
the academy Internet site. The National Academies holds the copyright
on the report and the NAP offers copies of most reports for sale to the
public and all reports available without charge on the academy Internet
site. Occasionally, the committee chair and some committee members
participate in agency or congressional briefings of the report or
provide testimony for congressional hearings. OTA reports, along with
accompanying summaries and report briefs, were widely distributed upon
public release and were available for sale through the Superintendent
of Documents (Government Printing Office) and made available without
charge on the agency's Internet site. OTA staff frequently provided
congressional briefings and testimony and occasionally executive agency
briefings as well as often preparing papers and summaries based on the
report for the peer reviewed literature.
Follow-up Activities
For the most part, when NRC reports are delivered to sponsors and
publicly released, the committee's work is largely over, except for
dissemination activities noted above. Occasionally committees are re-
convened for follow-up studies or committees are empanelled in the
first place with the intention of producing a series of reports, such
as an annual review of a Federal R&D program over a period of years. In
the OTA case, initial report dissemination activities were similar to
the NRC routine, but with much more focus on the Congressional
audience, as one might expect. However, it was also very common for
smaller scale follow-up background papers on topics included in the
assessment to be requested by Congressional committees. In addition,
OTA staff members were consulted frequently by congressional committee
staff on an ongoing basis in areas where OTA assessments had been
completed, often for many years following the completion of a major
assessment.
CONCLUSIONS
The reputation of the National Academies as a trusted source of
advice for government on science and technology issues is due not only
to the quality of expertise the NRC is able to involve in its work but
also to the highly structured process guiding NRC studies that has
evolved steadily over many years. The goal of this process, which
includes many features of quality control and assurance relating both
the process by which the advice is generated and the report documenting
that advice, is to maintain balance and objectivity throughout a
committee's work and to produce reports considered to be both unbiased
and authoritative.
The National Academies have enjoyed a longstanding and effective
working relationship with Congress on even the most controversial
issues. There are, no doubt, many characteristics of that relationship
that could be improved, both to perform the traditional NRC role more
effectively and to provide some opportunities to expand that role.
However, effective science advice in the unique policy making
environment of the Congress is a complex undertaking (see Smith and
Stine, 2003). There are a variety of options for filling the gap in
analysis capabilities left in the wake of the closure of OTA, some of
which might involve the National Academies (see Morgan and Peha, 2003).
Many features of the OTA assessment process were similar to those
used currently by the NRC, but as outlined in this paper, there are
fundamental differences as well. The OTA process was well suited to a
broad policy context, paralleling that of congressional deliberation,
where the questions involve the relationship of science and technology
to broader economic, environmental, social and other policy issues
where many legitimate courses of policy action are possible and any
consensus view with all stakeholder views represented is most
unlikely.\22\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\22\ The reasons Congressional leadership gave for closing OTA in
1995 were not so much related to the quality of the advice the agency
provided to Congress but to the timeliness of its delivery; see Walker
(2001) and Dawson (2001).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As an example of this contrast between the two approaches
(illustrated also by the electric utility industry case described
earlier), consider the case of federal policy on fuel economy
regulation of automobiles. In the early 1990s both the OTA and the NRC
were asked to consider the subject of improving automotive fuel economy
and, more specifically, the feasibility of increasing fuel economy
standards to achieve better fuel efficiency in the Nation's auto fleet.
The OTA report elaborates on the various trade-offs associated with
raising standards versus alternative policy mechanisms for achieving
automotive improved fuel economy (OTA, 1991). The NRC study (1992) much
more specifically comes to conclusions regarding the technical
feasibility of various proposed standards and provides a specific
recommendation on a particular set of standards that, in the opinion of
the committee, is technically feasible while having minimal or at least
acceptable market disruption. The NRC deliverable required that a
committee of experts reach a consensus and the recommendations are
widely considered authoritative. The OTA study could seek consensus on
facts and analysis (although the process did not require it because the
panel of experts was advisory), but it did not come to a specific
recommendations regarding the standards, partly because the agency's
charter precluded coming to a specific recommendation in the first
place and partly because the advisory panel was assembled with the
broadest range of stakeholders and would likely not have been able to
reach consensus anyway.
OTA-like Features Emerging in the NRC Study Process
It is interesting to note that in 2002 the NRC issued a new report
on fuel economy standards (NRC, 2002) where alternative mechanisms for
achieving improved U.S. automotive fuel economy were addressed, moving
in the direction of an OTA assessment, although by far the most
referenced portions of that report remain the identification and
evaluation of the technical potential for improving fuel economy. In
another more recent case, the academy report, Rising Above the
Gathering Storm: Energizing and Employing America for a Brighter
Economic Future (NRC, 2005), is very similar in scope to an OTA
assessment with the added benefits of a highly prestigious committee
identified as authors of the report and very specific recommendations
offered.
Although not carrying the 100-year-old imprimatur of the National
Academies, OTA's reports developed a reputation for being authoritative
as well, but OTA's strength was more, as the late George Brown, once
Chair of the TAB and of the House Science Committee, put it, a
``defense against the dumb'' by elaborating on the context of an issue
and informing the debate with careful analysis of the consequences of
alternative courses of action without coming to a recommendation of a
specific course of action, which often involved value judgments and
trade-offs beyond the scope of the OTA analysis.
As noted earlier, both types of analysis just described are
important to congressional deliberation depending upon the
circumstances, but with the closure of the former OTA, the latter type
of analysis neither exists within the Congress itself nor is readily
accessible to the Congress. The ``OTA style'' of analysis could be very
useful for many executive agency needs as well.
Some OTA-like features have evolved over time with NRC studies. For
example, the IOM\23\ now increasingly hires staff for new studies who
are recognized experts themselves in a particular area to work on
studies and who consequently take a more active role than was the
previous custom in drafting the committee report. This method can
increase the already high cost of doing NRC studies, but it has the
benefit of increasing the capacity of the study committee to assemble
background information efficiently, both as a basis for deliberation
and for providing background documentation for the report that would
likely not have been included. That is, the report now has more
information that can be used both to inform the ultimate decision of
the sponsor and to help rationalize the recommendations of the study
committee in a more comprehensive manner. Additional OTA-like features
are certainly possible at the National Academies, and in some cases
such features are already being introduced, but many internal and
external control issues outlined in this paper would have to be
resolved for the NRC to incorporate many features of the role OTA
played on Capitol Hill.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\23\ The IOM administers a collection of program activities that
operate under NRC policies and procedures, although formally they are
not part of the NRC.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
REFERENCES
Ahearne, John F. and Peter D. Blair (2003), ``Expanded Use of the
National Academies,'' in Morgan and Peha (2003), Chapter 8, pp.
118-133 and Appendix 2, pp. 191-207.
Bimber, Bruce (1996), The Politics of Expertise in Congress: The Rise
and Fall of the Office of Technology Assessment, Albany, NY:
SUNY Press, 1996.
Blair, Peter D. (1994), ``Technology Assessment: Current Trends and the
Myth of a Formula,'' First Meeting of the International
Association of Technology Assessment and Forecasting
Institutions, Bergen, Norway, May 2, 1994 (available at http://
www.wws.princeton.edu/ota/ns20/blair-f.html)
----(1997a), ``The Evolving Role of Government in Science and
Technology,'' The Bridge, Washington, DC: The National Academy
of Engineering, Vol. 27, No. 3 (Fall 1997), pp. 4-12 (available
at http://www.nae.edu/nae/bridgecom.nsf/weblinks/NAEW-
4NHM9J?OpenDocument
----(1997b), ``Examining our Science and Technology Enterprise,''
American Scientist, Vol. 85, No. 1 (January/February), 1997,
pp. 74.
Dawson, Jim, ``Legislation to Revive OTA Focuses on Science Advice to
Congress,'' Physics Today, Vol. 54, No. 10., October, 2001, p.
24 (available at http://www.aip.org/pt/vol-54/iss-10/p24.html)
Executive Office of the President (1993), Presidential Executive Order
12832 (George H. Bush), Amendments Relation to the National
Research Council, January 19, 1993, which amended Executive
Order 10668 (Dwight D. Eisenhower), National Research Council,
May 10, 1956 and Executive Order 2859 (Woodrow Wilson),
National Research Council, May 10, 1956 (available at http://
www7.nationalacademies.org/ocga/PolicyDocuments.asp)
Federation of American Scientists (2004), ``Flying Blind: The Rise,
Fall, and Possible Resurrection of Science Policy Advice in the
United States,'' Occasional Paper No. 2, December, 2004
(available at http://www.fas.org/resource/12022004142618.pdf)
Fri, Robert W., M. Granger Morgan (Chair), William A. (Skip) Stiles
(2002), ``An External Evaluation of the GAO's Assessment of
Technologies for Border Control,'' October 18, 2002.
Government Accountability Office (2002), Technology Assessment: Using
Biometrics for Border Security, GAO-03-174, November 2002
(available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03l74.pdf)
Guston, David (2003), ``Insights from the Office of Technology
Assessment and other Assessment Experiences,'' in Morgan and
Peha (2003), Chapter 4, pp. 77-89.
Hill, Christopher (1997), ``The Congressional Office of Technology
Assessment: A Retrospective and Prospects for the Post-OTA
World,'' Technological Forecasting and Social Change, Vol. 54,
p 191-198, 1997.
Jones, Richard M. (2004), ``House Rejects Rep. Holt Amendment to
Establish OTA-Capability,'' FYI: The AIP Bulletin of Science
Policy News, No. 116: Aug. 31, 2004 (available at http://
www.aip.org/fyi/2004/116.html)
Knezo, Genevieve J. (2005), ``Technology Assessment in Congress:
History and Legislative Options,'' Congressional Research
Service, Order Code RS21586, May 20, 2005 (available at http://
www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RS21586.pdf)
Mooney, Chris, ``Requiem for an Office,'' Bulletin of Atomic
Scientists, Vol. 61, No. 5, September/October, 2005, pp. 40-49
(available at http://www.thebulletin.org/
article.php?art-ofn=so05mooney)
Morgan, M. Granger and John M. Peha (eds.) (2003), Science and
Technology Advice for Congress, Washington, DC: RFF Press,
2003.
National Research Council (1991), Automotive Fuel Economy: How Far Can
We Go?, Washington, DC: The National Academies Press, 1991
(available at http://books.nap.edu/catalog/1806.html)
National Research Council (2002), Effectiveness and Impact of Corporate
Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) Standards, Washington, DC: The
National Academies Press, 2002 (available at http://
books.nap.edu/catalog/10172.html)
National Research Council (2003), Policy and Procedures on Committee
Composition and Balance and Conflicts of Interest for
Committees Used in the Development of Reports, May, 2003
(available at http://www.nationalacademies.org/coi/index.html)
National Research Council (2005), Rising Above the Gathering Storm:
Energizing and Employing America for a Brighter Economic
Future, Washington, DC: The National Academies Press, 2005
(available at http://books.nap.edu/catalog/11463.html)
Office of Technology Assessment (1991), Improving Automobile Fuel
Economy: New Standards, New Approaches, OTA-E-504, NTIS order
#PB92-115989, 1991 (available at http://www.wws.princeton.edu/
ota/ns20/year-f.html)
Office of Technology Assessment (1996), OTA Legacy, CD-ROM Collection
(Vols. 1-5), GPO Stock No. 052-003-01457-2, Washington, DC:
U.S. Govt. Printing Office, 1996 (available also at http://
www.wws.princeton.edu/ota/)
Smith, Bruce L.R., and Jeffrey K. Stine (2003), ``Technical Advice for
Congress: Past Trends and Present Obstacles,'' in Morgan and
Peha (2003), Chapter 2, pp. 23-52.
The National Academy of Sciences (2005), The National Academies In
Focus, published three times annually (available at http://
www.infocusmagazine.org/)
The National Academies (1997), Guidelines for the Review of National
Research Council Reports, Report Review Committee, December
1997.
The National Academies (1998), The National Academies: A Unique
National Resource, Office of News and Public Information, 1998.
The National Academies (2000), Roles of the Committee Chair, 2000
(available at http://www7.nationalacademies.org/
committees-chair-roles/index.html)
The National Academies (2004), 2004 Report to Congress, 2004 (available
at http://www.nationalacademies.org/annualreport/)
The National Academies (2005 a), The National Academies Study Process:
Ensuring Independent, Objective Advice, 2005 (available at
http://www.nationalacademies.org/studyprocess/index.html)
The National Academies (2005b), Getting to Know the Committee Process,
Office of News and Public Information, 2005.
The National Academies (2005c), Making a Difference: Selected Studies
from The National Academies, 2005 (available at http://
www.nationalacademies.org/publications/
Making-A-Difference.pdf)
The National Academy Press (2002), Complete Catalog of Books and
Periodicals, 2002. (NRC reports are now indexed and available
online at http://www.nationalacademies.org or http://
www.nap.edu)
U.S. Office of Management and Budget (2005), Final Information Quality
Bulletin for Peer Review, December 16, 2006 (available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/memoranda/fy2005/m05-03.pdf)
Walker, Robert S. (2001), ``OTA Reconsidered,'' Issues in Science and
Technology, Spring, Vol. 17, No. 3, 2001 (available at http://
www.issues.org/issues/17.3/forum.htm)
APPENDIX A:
Section 15 as amended of the Federal Advisory Committee Act
(Public Law 105-153, 105th Congress, Approved December 17, 1997)
(a) IN GENERAL.--An agency may not use any advice or recommendation
provided by the National Academy of Sciences or National Academy of
Public Administration that was developed by use of a committee created
by that academy under an agreement with an agency, unless--
(1) the committee was not subject to any actual management or
control by an agency or an officer of the Federal Government;
(2) in the case of a committee created after the date of
enactment of the Federal Advisory Committee Act Amendments of
1997, the membership of the committee was appointed in
accordance with the requirements described in subsection
(b)(1); and
(3) in developing the advice or recommendation, the academy
complied with--
(A) subsection (b)(2) through (6), in the case of any
advice or recommendation provided by the National
Academy of Sciences; or
(B) subsection (b)(2) and (5), in the case of any
advice or recommendation provided by the National
Academy of Public Administration.
(b) REQUIREMENTS--The requirements referred to in subsection (a) are as
follows:
(1) The Academy shall determine and provide public notice of
the names and brief biographies of individuals that the Academy
appoints or intends to appoint to serve on the committee. The
Academy shall determine and provide a reasonable opportunity
for the public to comment on such appointments before they are
made or, if the Academy determines such prior comment is not
practicable, in the period immediately following the
appointments. The Academy shall make its best efforts to ensure
that (A) no individual appointed to serve on the committee has
a conflict of interest that is relevant to the functions to be
performed, unless such conflict is promptly and publicly
disclosed and the Academy determines that the conflict is
unavoidable, (B) the committee membership is fairly balanced as
determined by the Academy to be appropriate for the functions
to be performed, and (C) the final report of the Academy will
be the result of the Academy's independent judgment. The
Academy shall require that individuals that the Academy
appoints or intends to appoint to serve on the committee inform
the Academy of the individual's conflicts of interest that are
relevant to the functions to be performed.
(2) The Academy shall determine and provide public notice of
committee meetings that will be open to the public.
(3) The Academy shall ensure that meetings of the committee to
gather data from individuals who are not officials, agents, or
employees of the Academy are open to the public, unless the
Academy determines that a meeting would disclose matters
described in section 552(b) of title 5, United States Code. The
Academy shall make available to the public, at reasonable
charge if appropriate, written materials presented to the
committee by individuals who are not officials, agents, or
employees of the Academy, unless the Academy determines that
making material available would disclose matters described in
that section.
(4) The Academy shall make available to the public as soon as
practicable, at reasonable charge if appropriate, a brief
summary of any committee meeting that is not a data gathering
meeting, unless the Academy determines that the summary would
disclose matters described in section 552(b) of title 5, United
States Code. The summary shall identify the committee members
present, the topics discussed, materials made available to the
committee, and such other matters that the Academy determines
should be included.
(5) The Academy shall make available to the public its final
report, at reasonable charge if appropriate, unless the Academy
determines that the report would disclose matters described in
section 552(b) of title 5, United States Code. If the Academy
determines that the report would disclose matters described in
that section, the Academy shall make public an abbreviated
version of the report that does not disclose those matters.
(6) After publication of the final report, the Academy shall
make publicly available the names of the principal reviewers
who reviewed the report in draft form and who are not
officials, agents, or employees of the Academy.
(c) REGULATIONS--The Administrator of General Services may issue
regulations implementing this section.
Note on Prior Provisions: A prior section 15 of the Federal
Advisory Committee Act was renumbered section 16 by Pub. L. 105-153.
Accompanying Legislative Report
Section 3 of Pub. L. 105-153 provided that: ``Not later than one
year after the date of the enactment of this Act [Dec. 17, 1997], the
Administrator of General Services shall submit a report to the Congress
on the implementation of and compliance with the amendments made by
this Act [enacting this section, amending section 3 of Pub. L. 92-463,
set out in this Appendix, and redesignating former section 15 of Pub.
L. 92-463, set out in this Appendix, as section 16].''