[House Hearing, 109 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
HOW CAN TECHNOLOGIES
HELP SECURE OUR BORDERS?
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
SEPTEMBER 13, 2006
__________
Serial No. 109-60
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Science
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.house.gov/science
______
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
28-628 WASHINGTON : 2006
_____________________________________________________________________________
For Sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office
Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800; (202) 512�091800
Fax: (202) 512�092250 Mail: Stop SSOP, Washington, DC 20402�090001
COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE
HON. SHERWOOD L. BOEHLERT, New York, Chairman
RALPH M. HALL, Texas BART GORDON, Tennessee
LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas JERRY F. COSTELLO, Illinois
CURT WELDON, Pennsylvania EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas
DANA ROHRABACHER, California LYNN C. WOOLSEY, California
KEN CALVERT, California DARLENE HOOLEY, Oregon
ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland MARK UDALL, Colorado
VERNON J. EHLERS, Michigan DAVID WU, Oregon
GIL GUTKNECHT, Minnesota MICHAEL M. HONDA, California
FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma BRAD MILLER, North Carolina
JUDY BIGGERT, Illinois LINCOLN DAVIS, Tennessee
WAYNE T. GILCHREST, Maryland DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois
W. TODD AKIN, Missouri SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas
TIMOTHY V. JOHNSON, Illinois BRAD SHERMAN, California
J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia BRIAN BAIRD, Washington
JO BONNER, Alabama JIM MATHESON, Utah
TOM FEENEY, Florida JIM COSTA, California
RANDY NEUGEBAUER, Texas AL GREEN, Texas
BOB INGLIS, South Carolina CHARLIE MELANCON, Louisiana
DAVE G. REICHERT, Washington DENNIS MOORE, Kansas
MICHAEL E. SODREL, Indiana DORIS MATSUI, California
JOHN J.H. ``JOE'' SCHWARZ, Michigan
MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas
MARIO DIAZ-BALART, Florida
C O N T E N T S
September 13, 2006
Page
Witness List..................................................... 2
Hearing Charter.................................................. 3
Opening Statements
Statement by Representative Sherwood L. Boehlert, Chairman,
Committee on Science, U.S. House of Representatives............ 15
Written Statement............................................ 15
Statement by Representative Bart Gordon, Minority Ranking Member,
Committee on Science, U.S. House of Representatives............ 16
Written Statement............................................ 17
Prepared Statement by Representative Jerry F. Costello, Member,
Committee on Science, U.S. House of Representatives............ 17
Prepared Statement by Representative Darlene Hooley, Member,
Committee on Science, U.S. House of Representatives............ 18
Prepared Statement by Representative Lincoln Davis, Member,
Committee on Science, U.S. House of Representatives............ 18
Witnesses:
Admiral Jay M. Cohen, Under Secretary for Science and Technology,
U.S. Department of Homeland Security; Accompanied by Mr.
Gregory L. Giddens, Director, Secure Border Initiative Program
Executive Office, U.S. Department of Homeland Security
Oral Statement............................................... 19
Written Statement............................................ 22
Biography (Admiral Jay M. Cohen)............................. 26
Biography (Gregory L. Giddens)............................... 27
Mr. Gordon Daniel Tyler, Jr., Johns Hopkins University, Applied
Physics Laboratory, National Security Technology Division
Oral Statement............................................... 28
Written Statement............................................ 30
Biography.................................................... 45
Financial Disclosure......................................... 48
Dr. Peter R. Worch, Independent Consultant, Member of the U.S.
Air Force Science Advisory Board
Oral Statement............................................... 49
Written Statement............................................ 51
Biography.................................................... 60
Financial Disclosure......................................... 63
Dr. Gervasio Prado, President, Sentech, Inc.
Oral Statement............................................... 63
Written Statement............................................ 65
Biography.................................................... 66
Financial Disclosure......................................... 67
Dr. Gregory J. Pottie, Associate Dean for Research and Physical
Resources, Henry Samueli School of Engineering and Applied
Science, University of California, Los Angeles
Oral Statement............................................... 67
Written Statement............................................ 70
Biography.................................................... 80
Financial Disclosure......................................... 81
Discussion....................................................... 82
Appendix: Answers to Post-Hearing Questions
Admiral Jay M. Cohen, Under Secretary for Science and Technology,
U.S. Department of Homeland Security; Accompanied by Mr.
Gregory L. Giddens, Director, Secure Border Initiative Program
Executive Office, U.S. Department of Homeland Security......... 110
Dr. Peter R. Worch, Independent Consultant, Member of the U.S.
Air Force Science Advisory Board............................... 115
HOW CAN TECHNOLOGIES HELP SECURE OUR BORDERS?
----------
WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 13, 2006
House of Representatives,
Committee on Science,
Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to call, at 2:19 p.m., in Room
2318 of the Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Sherwood L.
Boehlert [Chairman of the Committee] presiding.
hearing charter
COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
How Can Technologies
Help Secure Our Borders?
wednesday, september 13, 2006
2:00 p.m.-4:00 p.m.
2318 rayburn house office building
1. Purpose
On September 13, 2006, the House Science Committee will hold a
hearing to examine how technology could be used to monitor the borders
of the United States to deter illegal entry into the country and aid in
apprehension of those crossing between legal points of entry.
2. Witnesses
Mr. Jay M. Cohen (RAdm., USN ret.) is the Under Secretary of Science
and Technology at the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS).
Mr. Gregory Giddens is the Director of the Secure Border Initiative
Program Executive Office at DHS.
Dr. Gregory J. Pottie is the Associate Dean for Research and Physical
Resources and a member of the Center for Embedded Network Sensors
(funded in part by the National Science Foundation), Henry Samueli
School of Engineering and Applied Science, UCLA.
Dr. Gervasio Prado is the President of Sentech, Inc. He is an expert in
seismic and acoustic ground sensors.
Mr. G. Daniel Tyler heads the National Security Technology Division at
the Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory.
Dr. Peter R. Worch is an independent consultant, member of Air Force
Science Advisory Board, and former Vice Commander of the Air Force's
Rome Air Development Center (now Rome Laboratory).
3. Overarching Questions
What technologies are currently being used at the
borders? What are the strengths and weaknesses of these
technologies? What technologies are currently available or in
development that could improve security at the borders?
How should the effectiveness of technologies be
evaluated? How can the proper balance between deployment of
technology and deployment of personnel be determined?
What research is or should be underway to develop the
next generation of border security technologies? How is DHS
determining specific technology requirements, and how are these
communicated to researchers and technology manufacturers?
4. Brief Overview
The United States shares a border with Mexico that is
over 2,000 miles long, and a border with Canada that is over
5,200 miles long. Both borders include remote stretches of land
where unauthorized aliens can and do enter the United States.
An array of technologies that are either currently
available commercially, adaptable from military applications,
or in development, could be deployed along the borders to
enhance surveillance of human or vehicular traffic. Some
experts suggest that an integrated system of advanced
surveillance technologies, deployed along the borders with the
necessary communications and information technology
infrastructure, could provide more effective security in remote
areas than would be provided by physical barriers.
Impediments to deployment of border surveillance
technologies include the cost of the technologies and their
operation; the sensitivity of high-tech surveillance equipment
to extreme temperatures and harsh environments; and the need to
efficiently monitor, analyze, and respond to the potentially
vast quantities of information generated by such equipment.
On November 2, 2005, DHS announced the Secure Border
Initiative (SBI), a multi-year plan to secure the Nation's
borders through improvements in technology and increases in
personnel. The fiscal year 2007 (FY07) budget request for SBI
is $639 million. Questions remain about how DHS will manage the
technology selection and deployment process, as well as whether
the DHS Science and Technology (S&T) Directorate is carrying
out the appropriate programs to support the SBI and develop the
next generation of border security technologies.
Congress has become increasingly concerned that the
S&T Directorate is not providing adequately technical support
to the operational units of DHS or effectively engaging the
scientific community and private sector in targeted research
and development programs. As a result, both the House and
Senate appropriators have proposed significant reductions in
the S&T Directorate's funding for FY07.
5. Background
Most traffic across the borders of the United States occurs at
formal, monitored points of entry. Between the official entry points,
however, there are vast stretches of undeveloped and unpopulated land
where drug trafficking occurs and unauthorized aliens can and do enter
the United States; these remote stretches of land along the borders
also provide an opportunity for terrorists to enter the country
undetected. Advanced sensing and information technology can assist in
improving border surveillance and may constitute an effective
alternative or supplement to physical barriers.
On November 2, 2005, DHS announced the Secure Border Initiative
(SBI), a multi-year plan to secure the Nation's borders and reduce
illegal immigration by installing state-of-the-art surveillance
technologies along the border as well as by increasing the personnel
dedicated to border security and alien detention and processing. A
component of this plan is SBInet, a system to integrate the relevant
technologies and personnel at the border. DHS plans to award a single
large contract for this technology integration project by September 30,
2006. The FY07 budget request for SBInet was $100 million, and current
estimates suggest that the SBInet program will eventually cost
approximately $2.5 billion over five years. While the House and Senate
FY07 appropriations bills allot DHS $115 and $132 million,
respectively, to start on the SBInet, both bills require DHS to provide
a strategic plan to Congress before most of the funding may be spent.
Recent articles in The Washington Post and The New York Times describe
concerns about whether the department is prepared to adequately manage
the SBInet development and acquisition process and to effectively
deploy and use the resulting technologies (see Appendices A and B).
Technologies for Border Security
The two main classes of surveillance technologies are ground
sensors and aerial vehicles. Ground sensors are devices that can detect
movement or traffic in areas near or at the borders. These may be
buried underground or elevated on fixed poles. Examples of such sensors
include magnetic sensors (which detect passing metal objects), seismic
sensors (which detect land movement resulting from the passage of
groups of people or vehicles), infrared sensors (which detect changes
in heat patterns), and visual sensors (i.e., regular or night vision
cameras). Radar systems mounted on towers may also be utilized to
detect movement. The strengths of these sensors is that their ranges
vary from tens of yards to upwards of several miles, they are ``always
on'' without getting tired or hungry, and by designing their deployment
strategically, the different types of data they supply can be
integrated to provide information on the path or behavior of whatever
traffic has been observed and reduce the likelihood of false alarms.
Their potential weaknesses relate to the cost of the sensors and their
operation, and the difficulty of operating technologies in remote
terrain, such as the need to develop long-lasting power sources to
support sensors and communication systems, and electronic hardware that
does not break down in extreme heat or cold. Acquisition costs for
ground sensors are thousands of dollars per sensor, and installing
ground-based radar systems can cost hundreds of thousands of dollars.
Aerial vehicles equipped with a variety of sensors can be used to
provide broad area surveillance over hundreds of miles. Examples
include manned or unmanned aircraft and lighter than air platforms,
including aerostats (which are tethered blimps) or airships (which
hover at high altitudes). All of these platforms can carry sensor
systems including visual cameras, radar systems, and electro-optical
and infrared devices that use physical characteristics such as heat and
movement to detect objects hidden from or too distant for visual
inspection. The attraction of these aerial vehicles is that they can
detect moving objects on the ground as well as capture images of
recently traveled paths and thus can facilitate tracking suspicious
motion in remote regions until Border Patrol agents can arrive to
investigate. In addition, unmanned aerial vehicles can spend a
significantly longer period of time in the air than manned aircraft
since they are independent of an on-board human operator. However,
there are limitations to the use of unmanned aerial vehicles in
civilian airspace, and it is likely to be at least three to eight years
before the Federal Aviation Administration approves of the use of
unmanned aerial vehicles in commercial airspace. For the FAA to approve
the use of unmanned aerial vehicles in commercial airspace, the
unmanned vehicles will have to demonstrate the same capability as a
human pilot to detect and avoid other aircraft. Unmanned aerial
vehicles cost millions of dollars. For example, the replacement cost of
the Customs and Border Protection Predator B unmanned aerial vehicle
that crashed in April 2006 is $6.8 million.
A variety of ground sensors and aerial vehicles are available today
from commercial sources and are in use at the borders and by the
military. These systems can be used to start the SBInet program, but
improved technologies and new technologies are likely to be needed for
a fully effective system. Relevant research and development is ongoing
at academic centers, military laboratories, and the private sector, and
these programs should lead to technologies with more accurate
detection, improved resolution, and reduced procurement and maintenance
costs. One question is how DHS S&T can best support, guide and
accelerate such research and development work.
Past Use of Technologies for Border Security
The security of the U.S. border is the responsibility of Customs
and Border Protection, a unit of DHS that includes the Border Patrol
and an air patrol unit. For many years, various forms of technology
have been used at the border to support Border Patrol activities. For
example, the Border Patrol has, since the early 1970s, placed sensors
in remote areas to detect traffic by using ground sensors that detect
movement and heat as well as video cameras and night vision cameras for
surveillance. However, the DHS Office of the Inspector General (OIG)
conducted a review\1\ of remote surveillance technology acquisition
programs managed by the Border Patrol, evaluating primarily the
Integrated Surveillance Intelligence System established in 1998, and
determined that the technology acquired could not be credited for
increases in apprehensions, and it consumed significant staff time to
monitor videos and investigate sensor alarms. The report, published in
December 2005, also concluded:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Report OIG-0615, ``A Review of Remote Surveillance Technology
Along the U.S. Land Borders,'' Department of Homeland Security, Office
of the Inspector General, December 2005.
There was no integration of the technology components
(i.e., if a camera was installed in the vicinity of a sensor,
it had to be manually redirected so that a visual check could
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
be done when motion was detected);
The sensor systems were unable to differentiate false
alarms due to weather changes or animal movement from incidents
worth investigating;
Efficient management of alarms and information was
lacking (i.e., messages containing no information beyond that
an alarm was triggered were sent to a remote office requiring
agents to be dispatched to investigate the area); and
Many sensors were not designed to withstand the
stresses of the variations in terrain and weather conditions
along the borders.
In February, 2006, DHS testified before Congress on the agency's
response to the OIG report.\2\ DHS agreed with the concerns outlined in
the report and noted that the Integrated Surveillance Intelligence
System program had already been terminated (in 2004). DHS faulted the
former Immigration and Naturalization Service and the General Services
Administration for the poor management and oversight, lack of
acquisition planning, and inadequate vendor competition noted by the
OIG and stated that Customs and Border Protection had already taken
steps to create a program management office with expertise in systems
acquisition, contract management and oversight, and engineering to
ensure that the administration of the SBI program would make more
appropriate and effective decisions about technology acquisition,
deployment, and use.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ Testimony of Greg Giddens, Director, Secure Border Initiative
Program Executive Office, DHS before the House Committee on Homeland
Security, Subcommittee on Management, Integration, and Oversight,
February 16, 2006.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In addition to the Border Patrol's use of sensors on the ground,
the air unit of Customs and Border Protection also conducts
surveillance and interdiction of illegal activity using helicopters and
small planes. These activities were supplemented by surveillance by
unmanned aircraft with the assistance of the Department of Defense from
June 2004 through January 2005. DHS then acquired a Predator B unmanned
aircraft and deployed it along the southern border in September 2005.
This aircraft crashed in April 2006, and the preliminary National
Transportation Safety Board review implicates a procedural error made
by the land-based pilot. DHS had already contracted to purchase a
second Predator B prior to the crash of the first one and both the
House and Senate Appropriations bills for FY07 include funding for
acquisition of unmanned aerial vehicles.
In addition to ground sensors and aerial surveillance, the Border
Patrol has also used fencing in certain locations as part of border
traffic control efforts. In 1993, the Border Patrol completed a 14-mile
fence along the San Diego sector border, and a more robust secondary
fence replacement has been built along nine of the 14 miles since then.
The effectiveness of the San Diego sector fence has been debated;
proponents cite the drastic reduction in apprehensions in the years
following its construction as evidence of its success, while opponents
attribute the reduction to growth in Border Patrol personnel and
increased local deployment of ground sensors. Outside factors such as
economics and the job market may have also played a role. In addition,
counting the number of apprehensions locally does not provide
information about the displacement of illegal traffic to areas without
a fence.\3\ Proponents continue to advocate for the construction of
physical barriers. In the current Congress, the House and Senate
immigration bills\4\ both authorize the Secretary of Homeland Security
to build a fence over hundreds of miles along the southwest border. An
amendment to fund the construction of 370 miles of fencing along the
southern border at a cost of $1.8 billion originally proposed to the
Senate's FY07 Department of Homeland Security appropriations bill was
defeated, however it was later adopted in the Senate FY07 Department of
Defense appropriations bill.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ Blas Nunez-Neto and Stephen Vina, ``Border Security: Fences
Along the U.S. International Border,'' CRS Report RS22026, January 11,
2006.
\4\ The immigration bills are H.R. 4437, The Border Protection,
Anti-terrorism, and Illegal Immigration Control Act of 2005, which
passed the House on December 16, 2005, and S. 2611, The Comprehensive
Immigration Reform Act of 2006, which passed the Senate on May 25,
2006.
Future Use of Technologies for Border Security
In determining what sensors to use, one critical issue is the
capability of the sensors to function with minimal interruption in a
variation of environments, including desert, forests, mountains, and
waterways, with significant temperature and weather fluctuations. In
remote areas, providing power to support both the sensors and the
communications systems that transmit the sensor data is also a
technical challenge.
A second critical issue is that the installation of large numbers
of sensors, cameras, and other surveillance systems in the ground, on
elevated platforms and on aerial vehicles will generate tremendous
amounts of data. Computer systems can be used to manage the data, but
it will be important to figure out where to deploy the sensors and how
to link them together into a network so that information from different
sensors can be compiled to provide a more complete picture of
activities along the border. For example, installing infrared cameras
and motion sensors in related positions can help Border Patrol
distinguish between false alarms (say a passing coyote) and events
worthy of further investigation and significantly reduce the dependence
on personnel to look into alarms triggered by each sensor separately.
Networked systems of sensors may also be used to collect data over a
period of time and distance to allow agents or even computers to track
a series of movements observed through several sensors being activated
along the path of a group of people or a vehicle. Such data would
assist in predicting where a Border Patrol agent could intercept the
group most effectively. More advanced computer systems and networks
could even take all of the information from the sensors and combine it
with information about personnel and other infrastructure assets to
provide a broad picture of activity along the border, which can be seen
both by agents on patrol and central offices as needed in order to
effectively manage responses and adjust agent deployments.
A third critical issue is how border security personnel will be
deployed to make effective use of the sensor technologies and how to
ensure that sensor information is displayed in a clear and usable
fashion.
Computer models of the border security system developed with the
support of DHS can help officials make decisions about what sensors to
purchase and how to arrange them. Modeling is a mechanism to test
system design to predict the effectiveness of different configurations
of technology, forecast the personnel necessary to respond to
incidents, and better understand the trade-offs between various
options.
Research and development at universities, federal laboratories, and
in the private sector is underway to produce the next generation of
sensors and computer software that will improve sensor data analysis
and interpretation. Nanotechnology is increasingly facilitating the
miniaturization of sensors, allowing the creation of devices that can
perform multiple sensor functions (i.e., combining movement and light
detection). Sensors may be designed that can detect mobile
communication devices such as radios and cell phones which are likely
to be carried by smugglers. New computer analysis software programs are
creating ``smart'' systems, such as sensors that can make adjustments
based on data from nearby sensors, altering their sensitivity or
orientation to focus on local activity and assist with differentiating
background noise from real events, or computer programs that can
``learn'' from past experiences to properly predict which activities
require investigation by personnel. One of the great challenges is
development of ``automated scene understanding'' programs, computer
systems that can automatically analyze images and recognize certain
types of activities, such as characteristic physical behavior of
migrants crossing through remote areas. Such automated interpretation
of the feeds from cameras could greatly reduce the time spent by people
interpreting images and deciding if they merit investigation.
The Role of the DHS Science and Technology Directorate
The DHS Science and Technology Directorate (S&T) conducts research,
development, testing, and evaluation of technologies to support the
components of DHS, such as Customs and Border Protection. The funding
levels within DHS S&T for border security activities are provided in
Table 1.
DHS S&T has supported DHS border security operations beginning in
FY04, when it participated in the analysis and selection of an unmanned
aerial vehicle for acquisition by the Border Patrol. In FY05, S&T
evaluated various commercially available sensors to determine how well
they could distinguish between animal and human traffic and how well
their power sources worked. S&T also supported the development of
BorderNet, a pilot program to provide Border Patrol agents with mobile
computers to compare names and fingerprints of apprehended individuals
with a database while still in the field and to allow them to
communicate with other agents and potential backup teams.
Currently, DHS S&T is contributing to the DHS-wide Secure Border
Initiative by developing software that simulates the relationships and
interdependencies among all personnel and assets at the border as well
as immigration and customs enforcement infrastructure. This software is
designed to allow the people making decisions about procurement and
deployment of technologies to understand the trade-offs and possible
unintended consequences of various changes in the broader border and
immigration system, such as increased apprehensions requiring more
detainment facilities and leading to backlogs in immigration court
proceedings. In addition, DHS S&T is developing software that provides
situational awareness to assist Border Patrol supervisors in tracking
the location of agents and sensor activity on computer generated map
displays to allow for efficient coordination of all possible resources
in response to incidents or alarms.
Since DHS was created in 2003, the S&T Directorate has struggled
with issues related to program execution, the setting of priorities,
and the building of relationships with the potential users of
technologies within DHS. Congress and outside observers have expressed
concerns that the S&T Directorate does not provide sufficient help in
evaluating technologies for DHS acquisition programs, is not moving
quickly enough to assess and adopt potential new technologies proposed
by the private sector, and does not have a clear way to determine
priorities for long-term research investments.
Congressional concerns about ill-defined priorities, poor financial
management systems, and staff turnover have affected DHS S&T's
appropriations. In FY07, the House and Senate-passed appropriations
levels are $956 million and $818 million, respectively; each is
significantly below the request level ($1,002 million) and the FY06
appropriated funding for the current S&T programs ($1,153 million). Jay
M. Cohen was sworn in as Under Secretary for Science and Technology on
August 10, 2007. He filled a position which had been vacant since March
2006.
6. Questions for the Witnesses
Mr. Cohen and Mr. Giddens were asked to address the following
questions in their testimony:
What technologies are currently being used at the
borders? What are the strengths and weaknesses of these
technologies? What technologies are currently available or in
development that could improve security at the borders?
How is DHS making decisions about technology
acquisition? How does DHS evaluate the effectiveness of
technologies? How is the proper balance between deployment of
technology and deployment of personnel determined?
What research is underway to develop the next
generation of border security technologies? How is DHS
determining specific technology requirements and how are these
communicated to researchers and technology manufacturers?
Dr. Pottie, Dr. Prado, Mr. Tyler, and Dr. Worch were asked to
address the following questions in their testimony:
What technologies are currently being used at the
borders? What are the strengths and weaknesses of these
technologies? What technologies are currently available or in
development that could improve security at the borders?
How should the effectiveness of technologies be
evaluated? How can the proper balance between deployment of
technology and deployment of personnel be determined?
What research is or should be underway to develop the
next generation of border security technologies? How is DHS
communicating specific technology requirements to researchers
and technology manufacturers?
Appendix A:
Technology Has Uneven Record on Securing Border
Washington Post, May 21, 2006, Page A01
By Spencer S. Hsu and John Pomfret,
Washington Post Staff Writers
Applying lessons the U.S. military has learned in Afghanistan and
Iraq, the Bush administration is embarking on a multi-billion-dollar
bid to help secure the U.S.-Mexican border with surveillance
technology--a strategy that veterans of conflicts abroad say will be
more difficult than it appears.
One component of the Strategic Border Initiative provides the
technological underpinning for the bold prediction by Homeland Security
Secretary Michael Chertoff that the United States will gain control of
the Mexican border and the Canadian border in as little as three years.
The plan envisions satellites, manned and unmanned aircraft, ground
sensors and cameras tied to a computerized dispatch system that would
alert Border Patrol units. ``We are launching the most technologically
advanced border security initiative in American history,'' President
Bush said in his address to the Nation Monday.
Skeptics contend that the Department of Homeland Security's record
of applying technology is abysmal. Industry analysts say that an
initial $2 billion private-sector estimate is low. And by allowing the
winning bidder to determine the technology and personnel needed to
detect, catch, process and remove illegal immigrants, experts say, the
plan ensures a big payday for contractors, whatever the outcome.
``If the military could seal a 6,000-mile border for $2 billion,
Iraq's borders would have been sealed two years ago,'' said Andrew F.
Krepinevich Jr., Executive Director of the Center for Strategic and
Budgetary Assessments, a defense think tank.
SBInet, part of the border initiative, will dictate the
government's long-term presence. Bush's push for a guest-worker program
is grounded in the premise that conventional ``enforcement alone will
not do the job.''
By reducing demand for immigrant labor, beefing up the Border
Patrol and deploying next-generation technology to catch illegal border
crossers, the administration plan ``assumes operational control within.
. .three to five years,'' Chertoff told Congress last month.
To supporters such as Sen. Judd Gregg (R-N.H.), Chairman of the
Senate subcommittee that funds homeland security, the Pentagon already
possesses the necessary technology.
``It's complex, but it doesn't have to be invented. It hardly even
has to be modified,'' Gregg said. ``It's really just a question of
will--and dollars.''
On the ground, early results of the government's multi-billion-
dollar wager to plug the porous border already are on display.
In far southwestern Arizona, U.S. Customs agents, the Border Patrol
and the National Guard patrol 120 miles of forbidding desert from a
communications room filled with computer workstations and lined with 25
flat-screen televisions on the wall.
The Border Patrol installed 25 fixed cameras over favored smuggling
routes in the sector in recent years. More than 100 sensors lie buried
in the ground. Seismic sensors alert at the movement of large numbers
of people. Infrared sensors pick up heat signatures of people and
objects, and magnetic sensors detect vehicles.
Agents also point to what they call the ``skybox''--a 25-square-
foot room 30 feet above the border on a hydraulic jack, with top-of-
the-line night-vision equipment. Agents say it's claustrophobic but has
one redeeming virtue--air conditioning.
Overhead, the border agencies use blimps, unmanned aircraft, Black
Hawk and Chinook helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft.
``We are starting to see substantial improvements,'' said Chris Van
Wagenen, a senior patrol agent assigned to Yuma, Ariz. ``Now we've got
sensors, cameras. We've doubled our manpower in a year, but we still
need more.''
Bush has budgeted $100 million this year for SBInet. But Chertoff's
department declined to estimate how much the three-to-six-year contract
ultimately will cost. Industry analysts expect at least $2 billion in
spending--and possibly much more over a longer period, based on the
history of overruns in major Homeland Security technology programs.
By turning to contractors such as Boeing, Ericsson, Lockheed
Martin, Northrop Grumman and Raytheon to design the workings of the
system, SBInet also marks a government reliance on private-sector
partners to carry out missions without a clear idea of what the network
will look like, according to experts and immigration officials.
``SBInet represents a potential bonanza'' for tens if not hundreds
of companies, said John Slye, senior analyst of federal opportunities
for Input, a Reston-based federal contracting consulting firm. The
project is the most anticipated single civilian information technology
contract since the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, he said.
Skeptics in Congress cite a decade of frustration at the border.
Because of poor management, two failed border technology programs
have cost taxpayers $429 million since 1998, the Homeland Security
inspector general reported in December. Nearly half of 489 remote video
surveillance sites planned for the border in the past eight years were
never installed. Sixty percent of sensor alerts are never investigated,
90 percent of the rest are false alarms and only one percent overall
result in arrests.
A 10-year, $10 billion system to automate border entry and exit
data, US-VISIT, has yet to test security and privacy controls in its
seventh year, congressional auditors reported.
Sen. Joseph I. Lieberman (Conn.), top Democrat on the homeland
security committee, called the plan to solicit bids by May 30, pick a
single winner and start to deploy by September ``unrealistic'' and
filled with ``too many questions.''
``How is `SBI' not just another three-letter acronym for failure?''
Harold Rogers (R-Ky.), Chairman of the House Appropriations
Subcommittee, asked at a hearing last month.
Chertoff deputy Michael P. Jackson said government is not the best
judge of innovation in rapidly evolving technology and will benefit
from the nimbleness of the private sector while conducting disciplined
oversight.
``We are not buying a pig in a poke.. . .We don't have to buy
everything they sell,'' said Jackson, former head of a division at
Lockheed Martin.
In Arizona, agents say cameras are mainly limited to populated
areas because other parts of the border, where most illegal crossings
occur, do not have electricity, and solar-powered cameras don't work.
Sand, insects and moisture play havoc with the sensors, causing them to
shut down or fire repeatedly. Agents and support staff are too busy to
respond to each alarm.
On April 25, the Border Patrol's first and only Predator 2 unmanned
aerial vehicle crashed outside Tubac, Ariz., just seven months after
the $6.5 million craft began its flights.
To military experts, the goal of erecting a ``virtual fence''
recalls attempts four decades ago to shut down the 1,700-square-mile
area of the Ho Chi Minh Trail used to infiltrate South Vietnam, and
more recently, to halt incursions along 1,200 miles of Iraq's border
with Iran, Saudi Arabia and Syria.
``It's always harder than you think,'' said Robert Martinage,
Krepinevich's senior defense analyst. ``The record is mixed.''
Technology has, of course, advanced rapidly over the decades. The
Southwest's climate and foliage pose fewer challenges, and U.S. law
enforcement has advantages of mobility, security and infrastructure on
its side, said retired Air Force Maj. Gen. Glen D. Shaffer, a former
director for intelligence for the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Shaffer, now President and Chief Operating Officer of dNovus RDI, a
Texas firm that may bid on SBInet, said the project is reasonable but
not foolproof. ``Where the military historically has fallen short is
putting all investments in sensors and not enough in the people that
exploit the sensors. I would hope that DHS can get this right.''
But smugglers of drugs and immigrants also are highly adaptable and
willing to escalate the border ``arms race,'' said Deborah W. Meyers,
senior policy analyst at the Migration Policy Institute, a think tank.
``Coyotes'' are regularly caught with night-vision goggles,
military-issue binoculars, hand-held global positioning systems, and a
treasure trove of cell phones and police scanners that allow them to
listen to border agents.
Border Patrol agents said that smugglers dispatch scouts every five
minutes to check enforcement through the border crossing at San Luis,
due south of Yuma on the Mexican border.
``They even know the names of our drug dogs, and which are better
at which drugs,'' one agent said. ``It's unbelievable how much we are
being watched.''
Officials say they don't need to seal the borders. They just need
to catch enough illegal border crossers to deter others from attempting
the trip.
Robert C. Bonner, head of Customs and Border Protection from 2003
to 2005, said that at current staffing, the Border Patrol can handle
only 10 percent of the illegal immigrant problem.
``But if you can reduce the flow even by half,'' he said, ``with
moderate increases for Border Patrol and technology, we actually can
control our border in a way we haven't been able to in 20 or 30
years.''
Appendix B:
Seeking to Control Borders,
Bush Turns to Big Military Contractors
The New York Times, May 18, 2006, Page A1
By Eric Lipton
The quick fix may involve sending in the National Guard. But to
really patch up the broken border, President Bush is preparing to turn
to a familiar administration partner: the Nation's giant military
contractors.
Lockheed Martin, Raytheon and Northrop Grumman, three of the
largest, are among the companies that said they would submit bids
within two weeks for a multi-billion-dollar federal contract to build
what the Administration calls a ``virtual fence'' along the Nation's
land borders.
Using some of the same high-priced, high-tech tools these companies
have already put to work in Iraq and Afghanistan--like unmanned aerial
vehicles, ground surveillance satellites and motion-detection video
equipment--the military contractors are zeroing in on the rivers,
deserts, mountains and settled areas that separate Mexico and Canada
from the United States.
It is a humbling acknowledgment that despite more than a decade of
initiatives with macho-sounding names, like Operation Hold the Line in
El Paso or Operation Gate Keeper in San Diego, the Federal Government
has repeatedly failed on its own to gain control of the land borders.
Through its Secure Border Initiative, the Bush administration
intends to not simply buy an amalgam of high-tech equipment to help it
patrol the borders--a tactic it has also already tried, at a cost of
hundreds of millions of dollars, with extremely limited success. It is
also asking the contractors to devise and build a whole new border
strategy that ties together the personnel, technology and physical
barriers.
``This is an unusual invitation,'' the deputy secretary of homeland
security, Michael Jackson, told contractors this year at an industry
briefing, just before the bidding period for this new contract started.
``We're asking you to come back and tell us how to do our business.''
The effort comes as the Senate voted Wednesday to add hundreds of
miles of fencing along the border with Mexico. The measure would also
prohibit illegal immigrants convicted of a felony or three misdemeanors
from any chance at citizenship.
The high-tech plan being bid now has many skeptics, who say they
have heard a similar refrain from the government before.
``We've been presented with expensive proposals for elaborate
border technology that eventually have proven to be ineffective and
wasteful,'' Representative Harold Rogers, Republican of Kentucky, said
at a hearing on the Secure Border Initiative program last month. ``How
is the S.B.I. not just another three-letter acronym for failure?''
President Bush, among others, said he was convinced that the
government could get it right this time.
``We are launching the most technologically advanced border
security initiative in American history,'' Mr. Bush said in his speech
from the Oval Office on Monday.
Under the initiative, the Department of Homeland Security and its
Customs and Border Protection division will still be charged with
patrolling the 6,000 miles of land borders.
The equipment these Border Patrol agents use, how and when they are
dispatched to spots along the border, where the agents assemble the
captured immigrants, how they process them and transport them--all
these steps will now be scripted by the winning contractor, who could
earn an estimated $2 billion over the next three to six years on the
Secure Border job.
More Border Patrol agents are part of the answer. The Bush
administration has committed to increasing the force from 11,500 to
about 18,500 by the time the president leaves office in 2008. But
simply spreading this army of agents out evenly along the border or
extending fences in and around urban areas is not sufficient, officials
said.
``Boots on the ground is not really enough,'' Homeland Security
Secretary Michael Chertoff said Tuesday at a news conference that
followed Mr. Bush's announcement to send as many as 6,000 National
Guard troops to the border.
The tools of modern warfare must be brought to bear. That means
devices like the Tethered Aerostat Radar, a helium-filled airship made
for the Air Force by Lockheed Martin that is twice the size of the
Goodyear Blimp. Attached to the ground by a cable, the airship can
hover overhead and automatically monitor any movement night or day.
(One downside: it cannot operate in high winds.)
Northrop Grumman is considering offering its Global Hawk, an
unmanned aerial vehicle with a wingspan nearly as wide as a Boeing 737,
that can snoop on movement along the border from heights of up to
65,000 feet, said Bruce Walker, a company executive.
Closer to Earth, Northrop might deploy a fleet of much smaller,
unmanned planes that could be launched from a truck, flying perhaps
just above a group of already detected immigrants so it would be harder
for them to scatter into the brush and disappear.
Raytheon has a package of sensor and video equipment used to
protect troops in Iraq that monitors an area and uses software to
identify suspicious objects automatically, analyzing and highlighting
them even before anyone is sent to respond.
These same companies have delivered these technologies to the
Pentagon, sometimes with uneven results.
Each of these giant contractors--Lockheed Martin alone employs
135,000 people and had $37.2 billion in sales last year, including an
estimated $6 billion to the Federal Government--is teaming up with
dozens of smaller companies that will provide everything from the
automated cameras to backup energy supplies that will to keep this
equipment running in the desert.
The companies have studied every mile of border, drafting detection
and apprehension strategies that vary depending on the terrain. In a
city, for example, an immigrant can disappear into a crowd in seconds,
while agents might have hours to apprehend a group walking through the
desert, as long as they can track their movement.
If the system works, Border Patrol agents will know before they
encounter a group of intruders approximately how many people have
crossed, how fast they are moving and even if they might be armed.
Without such information, said Kevin Stevens, a Border Patrol
official, ``we send more people than we need to deal with a situation
that wasn't a significant threat,'' or, in a worst case, ``we send
fewer people than we need to deal with a significant threat, and we
find ourselves outnumbered and outgunned.''
The government's track record in the last decade in trying to buy
cutting-edge technology to monitor the border--devices like video
cameras, sensors and other tools that came at a cost of at least $425
million--is dismal.
Because of poor contract oversight, nearly half of video cameras
ordered in the late 1990's did not work or were not installed. The
ground sensors installed along the border frequently sounded alarms.
But in 92 percent of the cases, they were sending out agents to respond
to what turned out to be a passing wild animal, a train or other
nuisances, according to a report late last year by the homeland
security inspector general.
A more recent test with an unmanned aerial vehicle bought by the
department got off to a similarly troubling start. The $6.8 million
device, which has been used in the last year to patrol a 300-mile
stretch of the Arizona border at night, crashed last month.
With Secure Border, at least five so-called system integrators--
Lockheed, Raytheon and Northrop, as well as Boeing and Ericsson--are
expected to submit bids.
The winner, which is due to be selected before October, will not be
given a specific dollar commitment. Instead, each package of equipment
and management solutions the contractor offers will be evaluated and
bought individually.
``We're not just going to say, `Oh, this looks like some neat
stuff, let's buy it and then put it on the border,' '' Mr. Chertoff
said at a news conference on Tuesday.
Skepticism persists. A total of $101 million is already available
for the program. But on Wednesday, when the House Appropriations
Committee moved to approve the Homeland Security Department's proposed
$32.1 billion budget for 2007, it proposed withholding $25 million of
$115 million allocated next year for the Secure Border contracting
effort until the Administration better defined its plans.
``Unless the department can show us exactly what we're buying, we
won't fund it,'' Representative Rogers said. ``We will not fund
programs with false expectations.''
CORRECTION: A front-page article on Thursday about a federal plan
to use contractors to help secure the borders of the United States
misstated the amount that Lockheed Martin made in Federal Government
sales in 2005. Of $37.2 billion in sales, more than $31 billion, not $6
billion, was in sales to the government.
Chairman Boehlert. Sorry for the delay, but a vote is in
progress on the Floor. I don't think we will be interrupted for
several hours now, so we are all set.
I want to welcome everyone to this afternoon's hearing. I
especially want to welcome Admiral Cohen, who has been
confirmed as Under Secretary right just before the August
recess, and who is making his first appearance before our
Committee. Admiral, to know us is to love us. We have very high
hopes for Admiral Cohen, and we appreciate his efforts to make
sure he could attend today's hearing.
I want to remind Admiral Cohen, as we always reminded your
predecessor, that this is the Committee that created the
Science and Technology Directorate, and we are eager to see it
succeed. As we said at the time we were establishing the
Department of Homeland Security, ``Like the Cold War, the war
against terrorism will be won as much in the laboratory as on
the battlefield.'' We cannot afford to let the Directorate
flounder.
One of the Directorate's most important areas of
responsibility is the subject of today's hearing: border
security. There are many aspects of border security, a hot
topic right now, but one essential aspect is certainly how to
successfully deploy technology to help prevent or thwart
illegal border crossings.
My sense is that we haven't done a very good job of that so
far. We haven't methodically thought through what technology to
develop, how to deploy it, and how to integrate it with the
people who will actually be apprehending those trying to cross
the border illegally. We haven't come up with a clear,
adequately funded plan to conduct the research needed to
improve existing technologies and create new ones. And in
Congress, we haven't thought comprehensively about border
security, instead focusing on massive public works projects,
like border fences.
Hopefully, the Secure Border Initiative the Department of
Homeland Security is in the process of implementing will start
us down a more thoughtful and successful path. This committee
certainly will be watching that with great anticipation. And we
will especially want to be sure that there is adequate research
to ensure that technology can continue to improve.
We have before us today, my colleagues, some of the leading
experts in the field, who will give us their views on what the
Department, and particularly the Science and Technology
Directorate, should be doing to ensure that border security
improves. And that, in everyone's mind, is an imperative. Our
motto here should be ``better living through technology.'' That
doesn't mean technology to the exclusion of people. It means
technology that is designed with the users in mind and that is
integrated with the Border Patrol.
I am very eager to hear their testimony.
Mr. Gordon.
[The prepared statement of Chairman Boehlert follows:]
Prepared Statement of Chairman Sherwood L. Boehlert
I want to welcome everyone this afternoon's hearing. I especially
want to welcome Admiral Cohen, who was confirmed as Under Secretary
right before the August recess and who is making his first appearance
before our committee. We have very high hopes for Admiral Cohen, and we
appreciate his efforts to make sure he could attend today's hearing.
I want to remind Admiral Cohen, as we always reminded his
predecessor, that this is the Committee that created the Science and
Technology Directorate, and we are eager to see it succeed. As we said
at the time we were establishing the Department of Homeland Security,
``Like the cold war, the war against terrorism will be won as much in
the laboratory as on the battlefield.'' We cannot afford to let the
Directorate flounder.
One of the Directorate's most important areas of responsibility is
the subject of today's hearing, border security. There are many aspects
of border security--a hot topic right now--but one essential aspect is
certainly how to successfully deploy technology to help prevent or
thwart illegal border crossings.
My sense is that we haven't done a very good job of that so far. We
haven't methodically thought through what technology to deploy, how to
deploy it, and how to integrate it with the people who will actually be
apprehending those trying to cross the border illegally. We haven't
come up with a clear, adequately funded plan to conduct the research
needed to improve existing technologies and create new ones. And in
Congress, we haven't thought comprehensively about border security,
instead focusing on massive public works projects, like border fences.
Hopefully, the Secure Border Initiative the Department of Homeland
Security is in the process of implementing will start us down a more
thoughtful and successful path. This committee will certainly be
watching that with great anticipation. And we will especially want to
be sure that there is adequate research to ensure that technology can
continue to improve.
We have before us today some of the leading experts in the field,
who will give us their views on what the Department, and particularly
the Science and Technology Directorate, should be doing to ensure that
border security improves. Our motto here should be ``better living
through technology.'' That doesn't mean technology to the exclusion of
people. It means technology that is designed with the users in mind and
that is integrated with the Border Patrol.
I am very eager to hear their testimony.
Mr. Gordon.
Mr. Gordon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Securing the Nation's borders is one of the main
responsibilities of the Department of Homeland Security. Border
control is prominent in the current debate on illegal
immigration and certainly is a necessary component of the
larger issue of defending the country against terrorist
attacks.
Technology has an important role to play in border security
simply because of the size and nature of the problem. There are
thousands of miles of border, much of it remote and rugged, and
a limited number of enforcement officers. Technology can
provide tools needed to multiply the effectiveness of the
Border Patrol officers in the detecting and apprehending
illegal intruders at the border.
The question is what detection, surveillance,
communication, and computer-aided analysis and control
techniques--technologies are appropriate and cost-effective,
and how can they be integrated into an effective system for
border security.
The Department of Homeland Security's Science and
Technology Directorate has developed a resource portfolio that
is focused on improving border security. I am particularly
interested in hearing how the S&T Directorate will be providing
its expertise and advice to assist the Border Patrol in its
procurement of the new, integrated border control system called
for under the Border Security Initiative.
The Secure Border Initiative is an ambitious undertaking
that follows past unsuccessful efforts to integrate and
automate sensors and surveillance technologies in a user-
friendly system. To succeed this time will require close
supervision by DHS. I hope to hear that this S&T Directorate
will be closely involved with the establishment of a new border
control system and with its evolution as new technology becomes
available.
Again, thanks, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank you for
holding this hearing, and I look forward to this very
distinguished panel discussion.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Gordon follows:]
Prepared Statement of Representative Bart Gordon
Securing the Nation's borders is one of the main responsibilities
of the Department of Homeland Security.
Border control is prominent in the current debate on illegal
immigration and certainly is a necessary component of the larger issue
of defending the country against terrorist attacks.
Technology has an important role to play in border security simply
because of the size and nature of the problem. There are thousands of
miles of border, much of it remote and rugged, and a limited number of
enforcement officers.
Technology can provide the tools needed to multiply the
effectiveness of the Border Patrol officers in detecting and
apprehending illegal intruders at the border.
The question is what detection, surveillance, communication, and
computer-aided analysis and control technologies are appropriate and
cost-effective, and how can they be integrated into an effective system
for border security?
The Department of Homeland Security's Science and Technology
Directorate has developed a research portfolio that is focused on
improving border security.
I am particularly interested in hearing how the S&T Directorate
will be providing its expertise and advice to assist the Border Patrol
in its procurement of the new integrated border control system called
for under the Secure Border Initiative.
The Secure Border Initiative is an ambitious undertaking that
follows past, unsuccessful efforts to integrate and automate sensors
and surveillance technologies in a user-friendly system.
To succeed this time will require close supervision by DHS. I hope
to hear that the S&T Directorate will be closely involved with the
establishment of the new border control system and with its evolution,
as new technology becomes available.
Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you for calling this hearing, and I
look forward to our discussion with the panel.
Chairman Boehlert. Thank you very much.
All of our colleagues have the opportunity to insert
opening remarks in the record at this juncture, but let us go
right to the panel, as is our modus operandi here, because we
want to listen and learn from the distinguished panelists
before us.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Costello follows:]
Prepared Statement of Representative Jerry F. Costello
Good morning. I want to thank the witnesses for appearing before
our committee to examine the current and potential uses of technology
for improving border security and the research needs in this area.
I believe border security and strengthening enforcement at our
borders is the first step needed to reform our immigration policies.
With my support, Congress has taken action to improve border facility
infrastructure and to increase the number of Border Patrol agents and
immigration inspectors. In addition to an increased physical presence,
officials also need the technological capabilities, such as cameras,
sensors, and surveillance equipment, to successfully detect and
intercede illegal border activity.
Within the Department of Homeland Security, the Office of Border
Patrol (OBP) and the Science and Technology (S&T) Directorate work
together to secure the land border of the United States. Specifically,
the S&T Directorate assists the OBP in its efforts to implement the
Secure Border Initiative, the networked system for detection and
response to border incursions. To date, much of the work at S&T has
been focused on the actual border, both at ports of entry and between
ports of entry. The current technologies being used to secure the
border include cameras and Unattended Ground Sensors (UGS) to detect
and identify illegal border intrusions. I look forward to hearing from
witnesses at the Department of Homeland Security as to why the current
technological system is limited in its ability to detect activity and
effectively operate.
The number of people entering the country illegally at our borders
presents risks to national security. I share the views of the witnesses
that there is a not a ``one size fits all solution'' for border
security. I believe we must provide adequate resource levels to support
all aspects of border security in order to meet the challenges of
securing our borders.
I look forward to hearing from our witnesses.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Hooley follows:]
Prepared Statement of Representative Darlene Hooley
I first want to thank the Chairman for holding a hearing today on
this very important topic. The issue of illegal immigration is one that
evokes passionate responses from most Americans. It is a complicated
problem with many proposed solutions. However, while people may
disagree on other aspects of the immigration debate, everyone agrees
that we must have a secure border.
Securing our border is going to take a multi-pronged approach. We
will need to look at the problem comprehensively and address each
component: increase the number of Border Patrol officers, place troops
on the U.S. border, expand the use of technology to monitor our
borders, track those who come into our country on temporary visas, and
construct a fence to prevent illegal immigrants from crossing the
border.
The focus of today's hearing is on one of these components,
expanding the use of technology to monitor our borders and making this
technology easier to use for our Border Patrol officers, and I believe
that this discussion is not coming a day too early.
We need to be focusing on improving the various forms of border
monitoring: cameras, motion detectors, ground sensors, unmanned aerial
surveillance, so that they can be used effectively by the Border Patrol
to construct a virtual fence across the border.
Much talk has been made of building a fence along the entire
border, a length of approximately 2,000 miles. However, limitations in
funding and materials, as well as challenges posed by rugged terrain,
may make this an impossible task. However, if we can build up our
technology to the point that it allows for the continual monitoring of
the entire border, we will be able to achieve a balance between the
physical presence of a fence and the flexibility that technology
allows.
It is one thing for the technology to be developed and deployed. If
the people on the ground can't integrate it into their training, it
will be wasted. That is why I am heartened to hear many of the
witnesses today make the statement that the focus needs to be on what
technology works in the field, what technology will make the agents'
lives easier, and not on what seems like a good idea in the lab. We
will not achieve border security in a lab.
Again, I thank the Chairman for holding this hearing and I thank
all of today's witnesses for appearing and giving us much needed
insight and expertise.
I yield back the balance of my time.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Davis follows:]
Prepared Statement of Representative Lincoln Davis
Good morning. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member, for the
opportunity to discuss border security and the technology that can help
secure American borders. Thank you, Witnesses, for your presence today.
Over the past several months a debate about immigration and border
security has finally received the attention it deserves. As I have been
saying for years now, the influx of illegal immigrants into the United
States is a problem that I wish Congress and the Administration would
take more seriously. The ease with which people can cross the border
should concern every American. I look forward to hearing from the panel
today and to learn what technologies exist that can be used to make
America safer.
In the wake of 9/11, we must look at every possible solution and I
believe an automated system at the border would be a positive step in
securing our border. But I also believe that to make sure the taxpayers
receive a reliable system that really works, the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) must proceed carefully with this project. DHS needs to
be sure that the development process stays on time and, once complete,
produces a program that actually works. I would encourage DHS to report
back to Congress and update us on the progress of the project.
It is my hope that today's hearing will provide the committee with
the information we need to properly solve this important issue.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Boehlert. Admiral Jay M. Cohen, Under Secretary
for Science and Technology, U.S. Department of Homeland
Security in your maiden appearance before this committee.
Admiral, welcome. Mr. Gregory Giddens, Director, Secure Border
Initiative Program Executive Office, U.S. Department of
Homeland Security. Dr. Greg Pottie, Associate Dean for Research
and Physical Resources, School of Engineering and Applied
Science, University of California at Los Angeles. Dr. Gervasio
Prado, President, SenTech, Incorporated. Mr. G. Dan Tyler,
Johns Hopkins University, Applied Physics Laboratory, National
Security Technology Division. And Dr. Peter Worch, Independent
Consultant, Member of the U.S. Air Force Science Advisory
Board.
Thank you all, gentlemen. We really appreciate you being
here and serving as resources for this committee.
Now we are going to listen, hopefully learn, and then we
will get right to the questions.
Admiral, you are up first.
STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL JAY M. COHEN, UNDER SECRETARY FOR SCIENCE
AND TECHNOLOGY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY;
ACCOMPANIED BY MR. GREGORY L. GIDDENS, DIRECTOR, SECURE BORDER
INITIATIVE PROGRAM EXECUTIVE OFFICE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
HOMELAND SECURITY
Admiral Cohen. Chairman Boehlert, Congressman Gordon, and
all of the distinguished Members of this committee, I will tell
you, it is a personal honor for me to be here, and I normally
don't correct the Chairman, but I did have the honor of
testifying before this committee in my prior life as Chief of
Naval Research alongside Bob Ballard and other wonderful----
Chairman Boehlert. That was a prior life.
Admiral Cohen. It was a prior life.
Chairman Boehlert. And I won't talk about it if you won't.
Admiral Cohen. And it is looking pretty good.
But I always like to start out by reminding everybody, and
certainly not the Members or the witnesses, but everyone else
who is here why we are here. And we just had the commemoration
of the fifth anniversary, a very sad event, tragic events of
September 11 of 2001. But we would not have a Department of
Homeland Security, in my opinion, if it had not been for that
heinous attack. And Chairman, you have addressed the enabling
legislation for the Department of Homeland Security and the 19
pages that created the S&T Directorate. I think that that was a
very brave and inspired move on the part of the Congress and
the Administration, and I salute you for that.
I have had the opportunity over the last three weeks to
meet with both majority and minority staffs in a very non-
partisan, bipartisan way, of six of my seven oversight
committees and briefed the new organization, which Secretary
Chertoff very kindly approved last Wednesday, and I briefed to
the Homeland Security Committee last Thursday, and is now in
effect. And that organizational construct, and the processes
associated with it, will affect how Greg Giddens and I operate
as we go forward. From my prior life and from Greg's prior life
in deepwater, we have already a professional and a personal
relationship.
Mr. Chairman, on a personal note, I would like to thank you
for your service. I know that--I understand--I don't think I am
making that announcement. I understand it is public that you
will be leaving, but your leadership and your vision has been
incredibly important to the science and technology of this
country. We are in crisis. The young kids are turning away in
middle school from science and math, and I take that aspect of
the enabling legislation my leadership role in encouraging the
future generations to pursue the hard topics so that we
continue to enjoy the wealth and the freedom that science and
technology and innovation has brought us very, very seriously.
And in fact, I enjoy that part of my portfolio.
I had prepared remarks, which I would request be made a
part of the record.
Chairman Boehlert. Without objection, so ordered, as will
the complete statements of all our witnesses.
Admiral Cohen. And in light of the distinguished witnesses
who are here, the number of witnesses, and the number of
Members who I know have questions, and the importance of this
topic, I am going to depart even from my short oral statement
that I had prepared to share with you the answer, the short
answer, to what role does S&T play in enabling the Secure
Border Initiative.
Five years ago when Secretary Gordon England had just got
to the job as Secretary of the Navy from his General Dynamics,
F-16, very technological background, he called me in and he
said, ``Admiral, before we sit down, tell me what I will get
from my basic research investment today in 20 years.'' I wanted
to make a good impression. I didn't want to say, ``I don't
know.'' And so I said to the Secretary, ``Mr. Secretary, I
cannot answer your question unless you let me control one
variable.'' And he said, ``Well, Admiral, what is that?'' And I
said, ``Well, Mr. Secretary, I can tell you, beyond a shadow of
a doubt, that if we invest nothing today, in 20 years, you will
have nothing.'' At that point, he went from ``Admiral'' to
``Jay.'' He said, ``Sit down. You are right. Let us do
business.'' And we had a wonderful five-year run together.
So the converse of that is I could go through a litany of
individual technologies, individual capabilities, but you are
very familiar with that. The facts of life are it is S&T, in a
spiral development with risk taking, that will initially, and
you are going to hear some of the promise and some of the
deficiencies, I am sure, from the other witnesses, in making
our borders secure. One size doesn't fit all. We have different
terrain. We have coverage where we need to see through trees.
We have Rocky Mountains. We have desert. We have water. In my
organizational construct, we have established a Borders and
Maritime Department, which is enduring what I found was a
department that was organized for projects, not for enduring
disciplines where projects might come and go.
And so in the new organizational construct that the
Secretary has approved, to date, there has been a very close
alignment. We have got Merv Leavitt here, who worked with
Greg's predecessor, of offering, and we have given detailed
briefs to Members and to Hill staff and to industry. It has
been part of the SBI/BAA, and I have been involved with them
the short time I have been on board. But the facts of life are
that, in my opinion, what you will see in terms of the industry
who has come forward to give us the initial answers and the
initial construct to make our borders secure should be
considered either phase one or phase two. That is to kick-start
it and that is medium- to low-risk technology solutions, some
of which involve manpower, others of which leverage off the
incredible investment that we have made in the Department of
Defense over many years developing common operational pictures,
air, land, and sea sensors, and the weapons and integration,
both manned and unmanned.
But in my role as Under Secretary for S&T, you all and the
Congress, over many years, have wisely given S&T the authority
to take risk. I am the risk component of acquisition. I put
millions of dollars at risk in order to prevent putting
billions of dollars in acquisition at risk. And we don't have
the time today, and it is not the purpose of this hearing, but
again, both the majority and minority staff has been fully
briefed on this. I am pleased to brief you at any time. But you
will see my portfolio now has acquisition enablers. These are
the low- to medium-risk technologies across all the venues that
Greg must fulfill. This is when you go to Best Buy you have a
five mega pixel camera and they are offering an eight mega
pixel camera and it is cheaper. That is spiral development.
That is low risk. That is insertion of technologies. And by the
way, ladies and gentlemen, it has metrics and S&T of cost,
schedule, and capability.
But there are other avenues where we take higher risk, and
you gave me HSARPA, and you told me to prototype and deploy and
test. That is medium- to high-risk. With that comes the
probability of failure. But failure is not a negative in
science and technology. We learn from those failures. We get it
back into the scientific method, and we then come through with
the success. Those are two- to five-year prototypical
demonstrations. Candidly, they embarrass the status quo. They
are meant to embarrass the status quo. And if they work, when
they work, we then insert them laterally for leap-ahead
capabilities in the SBI or other initiatives.
And then finally, I have basic research. Basic research
makes leadership very uncomfortable. It doesn't make this
committee uncomfortable, because they understand the value of
change in paradigms. They understand that only the Federal
Government can make the sustained investment year to year in
our laboratories and in our universities to cultivate the
discoveries like the small investment in more precise
measurement of time in the mid 1970s that gave us global
positioning in the 1990s and changed the world, or the
transistor that has given us the wireless world today, or
E=MC2 that has given us nuclear power. But the model
that exists today, and that has worked for many, many years, is
1,000 flowers are planted in basic research, 100 projects are
taken and matured in applied research, two to three prototypes
then are developed in advanced technology, and we get the
George Foreman grill. The George Foreman grill is the profit-
maker. Now every boss I have worked for, on the output side,
this is true in industry and in the military and in government,
would like the following model: one flower will result in one
project, will give us one prototype, and then give us the
George Foreman grill. Oh, that it could be that way.
So the model you will see with me has balanced risk,
different times to delivery, but in all cases, it is slave to
the customer.
And on specific questions of different technologies, I know
Members will ask, and I will be glad to answer that.
And with that, this is a joint statement for Greg and I. I
am honored to be here and look forward to your questions, sir.
[The prepared statement of Admiral Cohen and Mr. Giddens
follows:]
Prepared Statement of Jay M. Cohen and Gregory L. Giddens
Introduction
Good morning. Chairman Boehlert, Congressman Gordon, and
distinguished Members of the Committee, it is a pleasure to be with you
today to discuss the progress the Department of Homeland Security is
making in the Nation's efforts to secure America's borders. Today, in
accordance with the Committee's letter of invitation to testify, we
will focus our testimony on how technology can help secure our borders,
especially the ways in which science and technology support the
Department of Homeland Security's Secure Border Initiative.
Under the Secure Border Initiative, the Science and Technology
(S&T) Directorate supports the homeland security missions of U.S.
Customs and Border Protection (CBP), U.S. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE), U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS),
United States Coast Guard (USCG), Intelligence and Analysis (I&A), US-
VISIT, the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO), and others by
conducting, stimulating, and enabling research, development, test,
evaluation, and timely transition of homeland security capabilities to
end-users in the field.
Problem Statement
The challenge of securing the Nation's borders is enormous. Border
security is a continuum that begins far beyond the borders of the
United States and continues to the interior of our country. It involves
the movement of both people and goods and is not successful unless it
protects the country from harm and allows lawful trade and immigration.
Border security requires a critical blend of tangible resources such as
equipment and personnel, along with intangible items such as useful
intelligence and strong partnerships with foreign governments. Securing
the United States borders is a Presidential priority. In his May 15,
2006, Address to the Nation, President Bush said, ``First, the United
States must secure its borders. This is a basic responsibility of a
sovereign nation. It is also an urgent requirement of our national
security. Our objective is straightforward: The border should be open
to trade and lawful immigration--and shut to illegal immigrants, as
well as criminals, drug dealers, and terrorists.. . .We are launching
the most technologically advanced border security initiative in
American history. We will construct high-tech fences in urban
corridors, and build new patrol roads and barriers in rural areas. We
will employ motion sensors, infrared cameras, and unmanned aerial
vehicles to prevent illegal crossings. America has the best technology
in the world, and we will ensure that the Border Patrol has the
technology they need to do their job and secure our border.''
To date, much of the work of S&T has been focused on the actual
border, both at ports of entry and between ports of entry. The current
technologies being used between ports of entry to secure the border
include cameras and Unattended Ground Sensors (UGS) to detect and
identify illegal border intrusions. Cameras--both daylight and thermal
infrared that are installed on poles and other structures along high-
volume illegal alien traffic areas of the border--constitute the Remote
Video Surveillance (RVS) system. UGS are also used along high-volume
illegal alien traffic areas of the border.
The current systems provide a remote detection and identification
capability, but with limitations. For example, (1) sensors are not able
to differentiate between illegal activity and legitimate events; (2)
RVS cameras cannot automatically detect any activity or movement and
are limited by weather; (3) sensors are limited by battery power and
RVS cameras have infrastructure requirements; and (4) system
effectiveness is dependent upon the availability and capability of
skilled operations and maintenance personnel.
Secure Border Initiative
The Secure Border Initiative (SBI) is the Department's approach to
lead, integrate, and unify our efforts against cross border and
international activities that threaten border security. SBI's approach
is that the border is not merely a physical frontier and effectively
securing it requires attention to processes that begin far outside the
U.S. borders, occur at the border and continue to all regions of the
United States. SBI brings a systems approach to meeting this challenge;
its mission is to integrate and unify the systems, programs and
policies needed to secure the border and enforce our customs and
immigration laws. It is a national effort to transform the border
security continuum with the objective to disrupt, dismantle and deter
all cross-border crime and balance legitimate travel and trade into and
out of the United States.
The Science & Technology Directorate is supporting SBI by providing
the systems engineering tools, processes, and manpower to ensure that
SBI implementation is effective and affordable. In addition to
providing systems integration, analysis and engineering support, S&T is
developing an integrated systems model. Using modeling & simulation,
SBI decision-makers will have the tools to make informed choices for
investment strategies and program and policy formulation. The decision
makers will understand: 1) where to invest scarce resources (e.g., how
many agents and detention beds, how much technology and fencing), 2)
the trade-offs associated with their decisions, and 3) where the gaps
and risks are. The first phase of this model focuses on the immigration
system.
Technology is required that will provide better detection of
illegal activity and situational awareness to give us the ability to
make near-real-time strategic and tactical decisions regarding our
response. These technological capabilities will include new sensors and
platforms using manned, unmanned, ground, air, maritime or perhaps even
space assets, as well as command and control, decision support aids,
robust communications capability, surveillance equipment, and data
transfer.
DHS has a requirement for a Common Operating Picture (COP) at the
tactical, operational and strategic levels that can seamlessly
interface with systems used by other federal, State and local law
enforcement partners. Better situational awareness and command and
control at the border will facilitate the apprehension and location of
individuals and groups who have violated or intend to violate the
border. Leveraging emerging technologies and the development of
standards, protocols and symbology enables the creation of common user
views and information exchange. These common views and information then
may be shared with all who operate at the border, independent of the
method an agency chooses to implement its specific COP.
S&T is also developing and transitioning technologies critical to
SBInet (a component program of SBI) per the request of CBP, which is
the executive agent for this program. Specific needs to be addressed to
enhance the ability to detect and interdict illegal border activity
are:
Improved technology for detection, classification and
interdiction of illegal activity and enhancing the ability to
make rapid strategic and tactical response decisions.
A COP of the border environment for tactical and
operational planning with other federal, State and local law
enforcement partners.
Access by DHS personnel, both at and between ports of
entry, to the same information at the same time to ensure tight
coordination and effective response to all threats.
Rapid response capabilities to effectively respond to
cross-border violations, including technologies that improve
situational awareness, command & control, and communications,
and provide decision aids for commanders.
Identification of individuals with hostile intentions
toward the United States and its citizenry and secure and
accurate communication of that information to those who can
expeditiously assess the risk of each person, leading to timely
interdiction.
Technologies that aid in the deterrence and
channeling of illegal cross-border activity.
Technologies that survive rugged handling and extreme
environmental and operational conditions with improved
reliability and maintainability.
Technologies that improve voice and data connectivity
in remote field areas.
While SBI initially focuses on land border security, it will also
address security of the U.S. maritime borders. Specific needs to be
addressed to enhance maritime border security are:
Improved detection, surveillance and reconnaissance
capabilities in ports and off shore, using improved platforms,
communication networks, and sensors; as well as vessel tracking
and anomaly detection.
The goal is to provide agents and officers with a total scene
awareness capability that provides a geo-spatially referenced
detection, classification and tracking capability along with
collaboration and decision-making tools to improve efficiency. Only
highly reliable technologies, coupled with a validated and improved
concept of operations, will meet the goal. Greater confidence in
successful interdiction through advanced technology will lead to force
efficiencies and an enhanced ability to prioritize the deployment of
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets. The
effectiveness of any one technology must be balanced against the
considerations of its impact on ancillary systems including people,
processes, and other deployed technologies.
While SBI is a multi-year development, it looks to S&T to provide
technology insertion on a 12-18 month cycle. This insertion into SBI
will be in the form of system hardware specifications, software code,
supporting documentation, and lessons learned from technology
developments and operational tests.
Risk
As stated above, the President has declared that securing our
borders is an urgent priority for the national security. Not resolving
existing capability gaps directly impacts the Department's overall
mission to prevent and deter terrorist attacks. One of the Department's
highest priorities is the prevention of the entry of terrorists and
their instruments of terror into the United States. S&T addresses this
priority by providing technology and processes for detecting,
apprehending and prosecuting this illegal activity.
S&T conducts continuing technical evaluation of current and future
risks to the borders as a foundation of risk-based decision-making by
both the S&T Directorate and the Department of Homeland Security.
Additionally, S&T analyzes and distills scientific and operational
information to better inform strategic and operational choices made by
decision-makers. S&T also conducts technology evaluation and assessment
by identifying, developing, testing, and facilitating the transition of
advanced homeland security technical capabilities to DHS's operational
components and State, local and tribal entities.
S&T also reduces risk by prototyping concepts and technologies and
demonstrating their capabilities in an operational environment. We are
currently piloting two important capabilities that we call BorderNet
and COP/Data Fusion System at the Douglas Border Patrol Station in the
Tucson Sector. These systems are force multipliers that decrease
officer workload and response time and increase detection and
apprehension of illegal border crossers. The results from our
prototyping and pilots provide valuable lessons learned for SBI and
future systems development. This approach ensures that the most
advanced technological solutions are provided to those who protect our
borders and that new capabilities are deployed to the field in the
shortest possible time and at an affordable cost.
S&T Border Security Programs
The Department of Homeland Security has already put several new
technologies in place to aid in securing our borders. Besides BorderNet
and the COP/Data Fusion System, we have provided a long range acoustic
device (LRAD), which gives Border Patrol agents the ability to
communicate with persons at a long distance and we partnered with CBP
in deploying Unmanned Aerial Vehicles along the Southern border. We
continue to develop and demonstrate new and enhanced capabilities to
ensure enhanced security.
The Border Watch Program is a technology-based initiative to
develop and transition capabilities that improve the security of our
nation's borders. Its goal is to develop and integrate information
management and sensor technologies necessary to prevent the entry of
terrorists and their instruments of terror, criminals, and illegal
aliens through our nation's borders. Border Watch technologies will be
integrated into SBI as capabilities mature. Border Watch consists of
the following program components:
Border Detection Grid,
Border Network (BorderNet),
Border Protection Pattern Discovery and Prediction,
and
Common Operating Picture (COP).
The Border Detection Grid components will identify available
sensors and sensor monitoring capabilities, as well as technology gaps,
in order to achieve persistent electronic surveillance of the U.S./
Mexico and U.S./Canada borders. The detection target includes people or
groups of people on foot, in vehicles (cars, trucks, and snowmobiles),
and in tunnels, vessels, and low-flying aircraft. Sensor and sensor
platform technology gaps will be addressed through studies, system
design and development, test and evaluation, and/or pilot programs. The
program will investigate the potential use of radar, Electro-Optic/
Infrared (EO/IR) cameras, unattended ground sensors (UGS), fiber optic
tripwires, and other emergent sensors. Sensor platforms will include
fixed and mobile towers, vehicles, and manned and unmanned airborne
vehicles. Variations in environmental conditions (terrain, weather,
marine versus land) and communication availability are expected to
drive the solution set for different geographical areas. Department of
Defense sensors and sensor systems will be surveyed and adopted, as
appropriate.
The Border Network (BorderNet) is a proof-of-concept, prototype
development. Capabilities will be developed in spirals with each spiral
providing greater capability and user base. BorderNet provides Border
Patrol agents with the capability to conduct biometric and biographic
queries to identify detainees, in the field and at the time of
apprehension. Fusion of multiple data sources provides the agent with
actionable intelligence in the form of indications, warning and
incident responses recommendations. BorderNet also generates a tactical
situation awareness display at the agent and station level, and
includes sensor alerts and blue force tracking (BFT) or friendly force
ID. Target tracks generated by the COP/Data Fusion System, developed
under the Arizona Border Control Initiative, provide overlays on the
BorderNet situation awareness display. Field agent connectivity to the
various information sources occurs via wireless communications using
handheld digital devices and vehicle mounted mobile data computers.
Initially, BorderNet accesses biographical data from the Enforcement
Case Management System (ENFORCE), the Automated Biometric
Identification System (IDENT), and the National Criminal Information
Center (NCIC) based on personal data collected from a detainee. NCIC
will be accessed through the Arizona Criminal Justice Information
Center. Vehicle registration and status information will be obtained
through the Arizona Department of Public Safety. Subsequent spirals
will connect to the Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN) and
the Homeland Security Data Network (HSDN), as well as other local,
State and national data sources. Additional features in future spirals
may include language translation, knowledge discovery, improved Blue
Force Tracking, detainee field enrollment, video transmission, detainee
tracking, federated query, and northern border applications.
Border Protection Pattern Discovery and Prediction technologies
will provide a new capability to Customs and Border Protection to
rapidly fuse disparate information sources to discover geo-spatial,
behavioral, and temporal patterns and indicators that provide field
agents local scene awareness and actionable intelligence. A prototype
will be developed in concert with CBP customers, which will develop
patterns and indicators that address topics such as:
1) crossing routes and staging areas for cross border
smuggling,
2) crossing patterns by group--to discover patterns that will
help identify the number of organized groups involved and their
respective ``signatures,''
3) crossing patterns by tactic--to discover patterns that will
help identify distinctive ``signatures'' for specific tactics,
such as drug smuggling, human smuggling, etc.,
4) identifying the links and patterns between illegal border
crossing and criminal activity within the U.S., and
5) tunnel activity--to discover the likely next tunneling
start and end points.
The Common Operating Picture (COP) component will provide the
capability to fuse and display at a tactical level the information from
select assets within DHS, including but not limited to, Border Patrol
Stations, Ports of Entry (POE) and the U.S. Coast Guard. It will be a
layered architecture, scalable from the agent/officer in the field to
the DHS Operations Center. It will use multi-level security and
authentication measures to protect sensitive information and will
provide collaborative tools as decision aids. It will use an approved
set of standards, including interfaces, services, protocols, and
supporting structures. The COP will provide a command and control
capability and a tool for inter-agency collaboration. Initially, it
will be a sector capability focusing on the southwest border.
Subsequent versions will expand to include additional DHS components.
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs)
The Department of Homeland Security has made a great deal of
progress in the area of UAVs over the past three years. At the request
of Congress, S&T led an extensive study effort, involving all DHS
operational Components, Department of Defense (DOD), Department of
Transportation (DOT), Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), and
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) that provided a
comprehensive evaluation on the uses of UAVs to support DHS missions.
The report was delivered to Congress on time on March 31, 2004, as
directed.
Beginning in the summer of 2004, S&T funded two major UAV
evaluations as part of DHS' Arizona Border Control Initiative (ABCI).
The first period of operational evaluation ran from June through
September and utilized the Hermes 450 UAV. The second period of
operational evaluation employed the Army's Hunter UAV with operations
beginning in November 2004 and continuing through January 2005. The
data from these evaluations and other analyses, including an extensive
Analysis of Alternatives developed by S&T, led to the establishment of
a DHS UAV initial operational capability along the Southern Border.
S&T worked very closely with CBP to acquire DHS's first UAVs to
support the initial operational along the Southern Border. The initial
DHS/CBP UAV capability, consisting of one UAV system (one aircraft and
ground control equipment), became operational in 2005. CBP is the lead
for operations and acquisition with S&T providing program and systems
integration support. The priority for DHS/CBP UAVs will be to support
CBP operations along the border but they will also be used by S&T for
evaluation and development of new UAV payloads and systems that will
continuously improve DHS UAV mission effectiveness.
Current FAA restrictions on the use of UAVs within United States
air space limit their utilization. S&T is working with DOD and FAA to
remove current flight restrictions on Border Patrol Southwest border
operations through the development of Sense-and-Avoid capability to
allow freer use of CBP UAVs in the national air space.
Conclusion
The Department of Homeland Security believes strongly that, only by
developing the border security technologies that will be needed five
and ten years from now, can we fully ensure that the Nation will be
secure for decades to come.
Mr. Chairman, Congressman Gordon, and Members of the Committee,
this concludes our prepared statement. With the Committee's permission,
we request our formal statement be submitted for the record.
We thank you for the opportunity to appear before this committee
and we will be happy to answer any questions you may have.
Biography for Jay M. Cohen
Department of Homeland Security, Under Secretary for Science and
Technology, Jay M. Cohen is a native of New York. He was commissioned
in 1968 as an Ensign upon graduation from the United States Naval
Academy. He holds a joint Ocean Engineering degree from Massachusetts
Institute of Technology and Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution and
Master of Science in Marine Engineering and Naval Architecture from
MIT.
His early Navy assignments included service on conventional and
nuclear submarines. From 1985 to 1988 Cohen commanded USS HYMAN G.
RICKOVER (SSN 709) after putting this new ship into commission.
Following command, he served on the U.S. Atlantic Fleet as a senior
member of the Nuclear Propulsion Examining Board, responsible for
certifying the safe operation of nuclear powered ships and crews.
From 1991 to 1993, he commanded USS L.Y. SPEAR (AS 36) including a
deployment to the Persian Gulf in support of Operation DESERT STORM.
After Spear, he reported to the Secretary of the Navy as Deputy
Chief of Navy Legislative Affairs. During this assignment, Cohen was
responsible for supervising all Navy-Congressional liaison.
Cohen was promoted to the rank of Rear Admiral in October 1997 and
reported to the Joint Staff as Deputy Director for Operations
responsible to the President and DOD leaders for strategic weapons
release authority.
In June 1999, he assumed duties as Director Navy Y2K Project Office
responsible for transitioning all Navy computer systems into the new
century.
In June 2000, Cohen was promoted in rank and became the 20th Chief
of Naval Research. He served during war as the Department of the Navy
Chief Technology Officer (a direct report to the Secretary of the Navy,
Chief of Naval Operations and Commandant of the Marine Corps).
Responsible for the Navy and Marine Corps Science and Technology (S&T)
Program (involving basic research to applied technology portfolios and
contracting), Cohen coordinated investments with other U.S. and
international S&T providers to rapidly meet war fighter combat needs.
After an unprecedented five and a half year assignment as Chief of
Naval Research, Rear Admiral Cohen retired on February 1, 2006.
Under Secretary Cohen was sworn in to his current position at the
Department of Homeland Security on August 10, 2006.
Biography for Gregory L. Giddens
Mr. Gregory L. Giddens, a member of the Senior Executive Service,
is the Director for the Secure Border Initiative, Department of
Homeland Security. The Secure Border Initiative (SBI) is a broad multi-
year initiative that looks at all aspects of border control and
immigration enforcement using systems thinking to enhance deterrence,
detection, apprehension, detention and removal of illegal aliens, and
compliance with immigration laws.
Mr. Giddens entered civil service after completing his
undergraduate degree in Electrical Engineering at Georgia Institute of
Technology. He earned an MBA from Georgia College and completed Air War
College and is a graduate of the advanced Program Manager's course at
Defense Systems Management College. Mr. Giddens has also received an MS
in National Resource Strategy from the Industrial College of the Armed
Forces and has completed the Defense Acquisition University's Senior
Acquisition Course.
He began his civil service career at Warner Robins Air Logistics
Center where he worked in both depot production and logistics
management. He was transferred to Wright-Patterson AFB to work in the
Training System Product Group as a program manager for C-17 aircrew and
maintenance training. He subsequently served as the Deputy Director and
Director for all of the Product Group's Air Mobility Command training
programs.
Mr. Giddens was then reassigned to the Air Force's Program
Executive Office for Battle Management at the Pentagon where he was an
Assistant for Acquisition. He was detailed to the Office of the
Assistant Secretary of the Army (Research, Development, and
Acquisition) to be the director of the Department of Defense (DOD)
Acquisition Workforce Personnel Demonstration Project and jointly
reported to the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition
Reform. Mr. Giddens attended the Industrial College of the Armed Forces
(ICAF) before being assigned to Hanscom AFB as the Program Manager for
the Air Force Weather Weapon System. He was then assigned as the Deputy
System Program Director for the Airborne Warning and Control Systems
(AWACS) at Hanscom AFB. In 2000, Mr. Giddens was selected as the Deputy
Assistant Commandant for Acquisition at USCG Headquarters and later
that year was selected to be the Deputy Program Executive Officer for
the Integrated Deepwater System, United States Coast Guard. In October
2005, Mr. Giddens was selected to lead the Secure Border Initiative
(SBI) Program Office for the Department of Homeland Security.
He was a member of Air Force Materiel Command's Top Rung senior
executive development program and was an initial selectee into DOD's
Defense Leadership and Management Program. Mr. Giddens was selected as
a member of the Senior Executive Service in 2000. He was a 2004
recipient of the Presidential Rank Award Distinguished for exceptional
long-term accomplishments. He holds certifications in Program
Management and Logistics Management.
Chairman Boehlert. Thank you very much, Admiral.
I like your style. I couldn't agree more. You are not
preaching, but you are talking to the choir, so to speak, here.
And one of the reasons why, in a bipartisan basis, this
committee is optimistic is that there is a little thing called
the American Competitiveness Initiative that is finally getting
some attention around this town. The need to invest more in
basic research, the need to do a better job of preparing our
youngsters in the science and math disciplines, and we take
great pride from this committee, being one of the driving
forces for that.
So thank you very much.
And Mr. Giddens, thank you.
Mr. Tyler, you are up next.
STATEMENT OF MR. GORDON DANIEL TYLER, JR., JOHNS HOPKINS
UNIVERSITY, APPLIED PHYSICS LABORATORY, NATIONAL SECURITY
TECHNOLOGY DIVISION
Mr. Tyler. Chairman Boehlert, Congressman Gordon, Members
of the House Committee on Science, I am Daniel Tyler, head of
the National Security Technology Department at Johns Hopkins
Applied Physics Lab.
Thank you for this opportunity to share my insights with
the Committee on the applicability of a system engineering
approach to the daunting challenge of securing our nation's
border.
With your permission, I would like to submit my written
testimony for the record.
This nation has a rich history of developing massive,
complex systems. In the 1950s, three major weapons systems, the
strategic triad, were developed and integrated for the global
command control and communications network to realize an
immense strategic deterrent system of systems, and it has
worked for a decade. In the 1960s, as we all know, we went to
the Moon with a very impressive application of systems
engineering. And not so well known, in the 1970s and 1980s,
AT&T seamlessly re-engineered the Nation's entire
telecommunications infrastructure, changing the entire system
from analog to digital at a cost of $50 billion without their
customers even knowing that it was going on.
We have a lot of experience that is on a scale with the
border security challenge, which has addressed very similar
issues in the past: major technical issues, a need for research
to provide solutions, balancing technology against human
resources, developing a concept of operation, policies issues,
and involvement of numerous agencies. We have learned a lot
about what works and what doesn't work.
The systems engineering methodology has specifically
assimilated this past experience into a disciplined approach
for solving the problem of massive and complex system
development.
How is system engineering defined? It is by a set of phases
with associated activities that you have to perform. If the
activities aren't there, you are not doing system engineering.
Specifically, first phase: concept development. This is where
needs, feasibility, requirements, risks are identified and
concept definition with detailed planning.
The second phase: engineering development. Here, high-risk
mitigation prototyping is done, and very importantly, limited
systems are developed and tested to ensure operational
suitability. And that is done before the third phase where you
go to production, deployment, operations, and effectiveness
assessment.
Systems engineering brings rigor and discipline to each of
these elements of systems development. The system engineering
methodology has been institutionalized in standards and policy
by virtually all acknowledged professional technical societies,
government agencies for the development of massive complex
systems, like the DOD 5000 series.
A reasonable question for this committee to ask is: ``In an
era of tight budgets and urgent national security imperatives,
is system engineering really necessary?'' Discipline, rigor,
due diligence sounds slow and expensive. Well, picture trying
to develop a complex system that is massive in scale, has many
interrelated tasks and specific requirements, employs different
disciplines, multiple organizations, demanding schedules and
budgets, and picture all of that in the absence of a well-
defined process.
Without a defined disciplined process, there is no
knowledge of progress and no technical control over development
until the system is deployed, and then it is too late.
There is a profound difference between activity and
progress. It is easy to perform activity. You need a
disciplined methodology, like system engineering, to make and
measure progress.
We are all familiar with the current border security
problem: 10,000 miles of borders, 1.5 million illegal aliens
yearly, and according to the GAO, the DHS IG, and other
testimony, we have spent about $5 billion and more than doubled
the number of Border Patrol agents over the last decade and
haven't realized significant progress.
Secretary Chertoff and other senior government officials
have committed to rapid progress on operational control of the
borders and, in some reports, is said within two years.
The issue is then how to fix the current situation,
understand and solve the technical problems, and make progress
expeditiously. In particular, what could we do in a timeframe
like two years?
My thesis is, obviously, we need to start by employing a
disciplined system engineering methodology. Given that one has
done that, this methodology, however, is not prescriptive in
implementation. From past experience, we know how important it
is that an implementation strategy first ensure adherence to
rigid system engineering principles and second, ensure
successful execution of each phase. Recognize that the
government is ultimately accountable for results and needs to
ensure that there is governmental technical competence to
understand issues and make decisions. If the government,
itself, doesn't have the needed breadth and depth of technical
expertise, then it needs to engage third-party organizations to
support them.
Organizational roles, in general, are critical: who sets
requirements, how the broad technical community is engaged, the
existence of independent assessments for every element of the
process, the role of the prime contractor. These are critical
in determining the success.
So what can be done in two years? Well, we have learned
lessons from previous efforts that have attempted to develop
complex systems on an urgent basis, to get out of the starting
gate rapidly.
First, the existence of major hardware and infrastructure
is critical for getting started. We have got ISIS, we have got
sensors, and we have got a substantial infrastructure to build
on.
Second, open architecture is necessary to allow many
organizations to plug-and-play and to enable spiral development
upgrade, like the Admiral alluded to. This is included in the
SBI solicitation.
Third, major contracts need to be in place, because if they
are not, you know this could easily cost you a year or more.
And the DHS is about to award the prime contract for SBI.
Fourth, very critical, resolving critical technical issues
requires the key technology already be in the pipeline, and
that is that it be available now. For this, the SBI strategy
needs to encourage outreach to the broad technical community.
There is a lot of technology out there, and I think you are
going to hear about some of it in a minute.
I believe that system engineering, properly implemented,
will provide, within two years, a very good probability of
fielding an operational system on some sections of the U.S.
border, which could then demonstrate significant progress in
resolving the technical issues. Decisions could then be made
for full-scale production and deployment.
This ends my remarks concerning the applicability of system
engineering to the daunting challenge of securing our nation's
borders.
Again, thank you for this opportunity to address you today.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Tyler follows:]
Prepared Statement of Gordon Daniel Tyler, Jr.
Applying Systems Engineering Methodology
to Help Secure America's Borders
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Significant investments in securing our nation's borders over the
last decade have not produced capabilities that met operational
expectations. The issue for developing systems and operations that
address this massive, technically complex, and time critical challenge
is identifying an approach to systems development that has a high
likelihood of success. Notably, the collective experience of a rich
history of producing complex engineered systems has been assimilated
into a methodology with a proven track record of achievements--systems
engineering.
The systems engineering methodology provides a disciplined approach
to requirements, concepts, planning, prototyping, testing, and other
elements of system development and operational deployment. Systems
engineering mitigates risk, controls cost, and ensures performance when
prompt responses to exigent challenges are needed. In particular, the
systems engineering methodology can provide the oversight tool that
helps Congress and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) monitor
the progress of the Secure Border Initiative (SBInet) with metrics and
guide its ultimate success. In times of tight budgets and the need for
urgency, as in today's volatile national security environment, it is
tempting to abandon the rigor and discipline of systems engineering in
favor of ways of doing business that appear less expensive and more
rapid. Repeatedly, these other formulas have fallen short of the mark,
producing activity without real progress, while systems engineering has
a history of delivering performance, on budget and schedule. The
systems engineering methodology has been institutionalized in standards
and policy by virtually all acknowledged professional technical
societies and Government agencies for the development of massive,
complex systems.
While adopting the systems engineering methodology is essential for
engineering large-scale, highly complex systems, special attention must
be paid to employing an implementation strategy that ensures adherence
to the principles of systems engineering, and successful execution of
its various phases. The Government is ultimately accountable for
results, and must ensure adequate Government technical competence is
brought to bear for understanding issues and making decisions. When
needed, especially with complex problems, the Government may engage 3rd
party organizations to support them in this capacity.
The systems engineering discipline is not prescriptive regarding
implementation strategies, and there are assorted successful examples.
The Navy's management of the Polaris Program, initiated in 1956,
included a technical staff of 450 in the Program Office fully dedicated
to the development and production of the Polaris system. The Navy's
sonar development program started in 1996, relies heavily on the broad
technical community, operating in peer working groups, for concept
identification, feasibility assessment, prototyping, and especially for
validation and testing at every phase of the systems engineering
methodology. For each system development activity, specific
consideration should be given to the appropriate roles for Government
agencies and Government laboratories, prime contractors, associate
contractors, Federally Funded Research and Development Centers
(FFRDCs), University Affiliated Research Centers (UARCs), academia,
nonprofits, and small or minority owned businesses. In architecting an
implementation strategy, especially in defining the roles of prime
contractors, note that history has shown that the strength of this
nation for addressing massive, complex challenges is the wealth of
available domain expertise, and the power of competitive forces.
The systems engineering methodology is flexible. It can be tailored
to emphasize risk mitigation, incremental improvement, capability-based
acquisition, as well as milestone- or cost-driven development. Given
the urgency of the current national security environment, a
particularly relevant issue is how to make real and rapid progress: How
much can we improve operational effectiveness and how long will it
take? The Secure Border Initiative program component (SBInet) has
existing advantages for getting underway quickly: i.e., current
Integrated Surveillance Intelligence System (ISIS) sensors, video
surveillance, and infrastructure; an imminent Indefinite Delivery,
Indefinite Quantity (IDIQ) prime contract; very promising technology in
the pipeline; and data that can be used to address technical issues and
support technology development. The program now needs to adopt a
disciplined systems engineering methodology, and demonstrate a
successful, limited-deployment operational system, conceivably within
two years, before going into full production and deployment.
MAIN TESTIMONY
Chairman Boehlert, Congressman Gordon, and Members of the House
Committee on Science. I am G. Daniel Tyler, Head of the National
Security Technology Department at The Johns Hopkins University Applied
Physics Laboratory (JHU/APL). Thank you for the opportunity to address
you today on ``How Can Technologies Help Secure Our Borders?'' The
Applied Physics Laboratory has been a long-term, trusted strategic
partner with the Federal Government, in particular the Department of
Defense (DOD) and the Navy, for providing critical contributions to our
nation's most pressing national security challenges. I am pleased to be
able to share our insights with the Committee as to the applicability
of a disciplined systems engineering approach to the elusive challenge
of securing our nation's borders.
PREFACE
What is systems engineering? Other areas of engineering (e.g.,
electrical, mechanical, chemical, etc.) are considered ``disciplines''
in that they are fields of study, and spheres of domain expertise. More
prescriptive are ``processes'' that define the steps or tasks to be
executed conducing to an end. Systems engineering is a discipline, less
regimented than a well-defined process, best described as a
methodology. In particular, systems engineering is defined by a set of
phases with associated activities that must be performed. If these
activities are absent, then the systems engineering methodology is not
being followed.
The traditional systems engineering methodology for designing,
developing, and deploying major systems is usually described in three
phases:
1. Concept Development--needs, feasibility, requirements,
concept definition, and detailed planning
2. Engineering Development--prototyping and testing for
operational use
3. Post-Development--production, deployment, operations,
effectiveness assessment
In times of tight budgets and urgency driven by a volatile national
security environment, it is tempting to look for ways of acquiring
needed capabilities that appear to be less expensive and more rapid. A
reasonable question is: Are the rigor and discipline of the systems
engineering process really necessary for developing appreciably complex
systems? The foreman on a job site constructing a new home may be able
to manage the entire construction process, plan, and schedule in his
head, and single-handedly coordinate contractors. In contrast, consider
the program manager responsible for the construction of an aircraft
carrier, clearly dealing with more complexity than a single human brain
can accommodate at once. Major system development efforts are usually
complex, need to support specified user requirements, are composed of
many interrelated tasks, involve several different disciplines, are
performed by multiple organizations, have a specific schedule and
budget, and may require years to complete. The human brain can
conceptualize and manage small development activities, but larger
efforts demand a disciplined process. The issue is identifying a
process that, in some sense, optimizes the probability of success for
developing a complex system, while mitigating risk and controlling cost
and schedule.
SYSTEMS ENGINEERING AND SBI/SBINET
The Secure Border Initiative (SBI) and SBInet are large, complex
system solutions to an immediate critical challenge facing our nation.
Properly applying the systems engineering methodology to the challenge
of securing our borders makes sense because:
A disciplined systems engineering approach can
develop and deliver massive, complex systems with a proven high
rate of success.
Previous approaches to securing our country's borders
have not met operational expectations, according to the GAO and
other testimony.
The systems engineering methodology provides the
right tools for oversight and success: i.e., requirements,
metrics, planning, prototyping, testing, and deployment for
operational use.
Both the public and private technical and acquisition
communities have embraced systems engineering and shown its
effectiveness for controlling performance, schedules, and cost.
Organizationally, implementing a systems engineering
process properly requires appropriate roles for the Government
and Government laboratories, prime contractors, associate
contractors, independent laboratories, and academia.
There is a profound difference between mere activity and progress.
There are easy ways to simply take action, but systems engineering is
the way to ensure progress. Applying a disciplined, deliberate systems
engineering methodology to the border security challenge provides a
proven development process for controlling performance, budgets, and
schedules. Moreover, the systems engineering methodology provides an
oversight tool to help Congress and the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) monitor the progress of SBInet with metrics and therefore guide
its ultimate success.
DELIVERING MASSIVE, COMPLEX SYSTEMS WITH PROVEN SUCCESS
The Nation has a rich history of relevant experience in
successfully developing massive, engineered systems:
Investing $50B in converting the Nation's
telecommunications infrastructure from analog to digital;
Going to the Moon in less than a decade;
Integrating three major and diverse weapons systems
from two services with global command, control, and
communications, and providing interfaces with the Intelligence
Community and the White House to realize a Strategic Deterrence
system of systems.
We even have experience, similar to the border security challenge,
in more than one mission area, for providing surveillance over large
geographic areas and supplying cuing for follow-on forces. Between 1950
and 1985, for example, in support of the Anti-Submarine Warfare
mission, the Navy's surveillance community successfully produced a
system that provided surveillance and cuing for 12,000,000 square
nautical miles of ocean, including 20 worldwide Naval Facilities for
shore-based processing and analysis and thousands of Navy and civilian
support personnel.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Edward C. Whitman, ``The Secret Weapon of Undersea
Surveillance,'' Undersea Warfare, Winter 2005, Vo1. 7, No. 2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Previous efforts have tackled the same types of issues facing the
border security challenge. Historically, in the development of large
and complex systems it has been the norm that at the outset, designers
could readily identify many technical issues to address; however, there
have also been ``unknown unknowns'' that surfaced only during the
phases of development and testing. Critical system elements may have
been nonexistent and required rapid directed research to produce
seemingly miraculous results. Prior system development efforts
necessarily had to deal with the problem of balancing technology
against human resources. Concepts of Operations (CONOPS) had to be
developed. Often, the total solution for a successful mission required
addressing a myriad of issues under the jurisdiction of multiple
agencies. However, lessons have been learned in the design,
development, and deployment of these major systems that clarified what
processes, management structures, and assignment of organizational
roles and responsibilities were most effective for realizing acceptable
system performance, controlling cost, and attaining operational
capability as rapidly as possible. The modern discipline of systems
engineering has assimilated this collective experience into a proven
process.
An example that Congress is familiar with is the Navy's Fleet
Ballistic Missile (FBM) Program. This program has been so widely
recognized and studied as a DOD acquisition success story, that in
1990, the General Accounting Office (GAO) produced a report\2\ for
Congress to clarify what made this program so successful. The Navy
initiated the program in December, 1956, when it began development of a
submarine-launched ballistic missile (Polaris) under a new
organization, the Special Projects Office [now called Strategic Systems
Programs (SSP)]. SSP was given complete authority to design, develop,
produce, and support the FBM system.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ United States General Accounting Office, ``Fleet Ballistic
Missile Program,'' GAO/NSIAD-90-160, 9-6-1990.
``Three major components--a solid propellant fuel, a small
high yield nuclear warhead, and an accurate guidance/fire
control/navigation system--needed major technical breakthroughs
at the time that the Polaris project was authorized. A nuclear
attack submarine also had to be modified to carry and launch
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
the missiles while submerged.''
The first Plans and Programs Director of SSP made the analogy that,
``. . .building and fielding Polaris was similar to building
the entire automobile industry. That is, not only did the first
automobile have to be developed but also the internal
combustion engine, tires, the oil industry, gas stations, and
driver training before the automobile's feasibility was
known.'' \3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Amazingly, the technical problems were solved, and ``the Polaris
program went from concept development to deployment in three years--
three years ahead of the original schedule.'' Between 1956 and 1990,
about $74B was appropriated for FBM program acquisition. Three classes
of FBM submarines have been deployed (59 hulls), and six generations of
missiles (more than 3,000 missiles). A key finding of the GAO study is
the commitment over the entire life cycle of the system, for the
following:
``(1) concept exploration/definition, (2) concept
demonstration/validation, (3) full-scale development and low
rate initial production, (4) full-rate production and initial
deployment, and (5) operations support''
(coincidentally, all of the components of the systems engineering
paradigm).
Importantly, SSP's implementation of systems engineering relies
strongly on independent test and evaluation in all phases of the
process.
The message from the FBM program and history is clear. We have
engineered many large, complex, technology-based systems, comparable in
scale to the challenge of securing our borders. We have learned a lot
from employing different development processes and from our successes
and failures. We have developed a sense for what works and what does
not work. Although there is no guaranteed ``cookbook'' approach to
developing massively complex systems, there is a high correlation of
success with employing a disciplined systems engineering development
process.
THE CURRENT INABILITY TO MEET OPERATIONAL EXPECTATIONS
Some of the challenges in securing our nation's borders are
obvious: 10,000 miles\4\ of diverse land borders and coastline and 1.5
million illegal aliens yearly\5\ present formidable impediments to
gaining control of our borders. Solutions whose core attribute consists
of employing large quantities of sophisticated technology and
significant human resources (e.g., Border Patrol agents), may have an
intuitive appeal, but this is in the absence of a deeper understanding
of more subtle, qualitative, and complex performance drivers. This
appears to be the case in the recent history of attempts to improve
border security. Starting in the 1970s and 1980s, the Office of Border
Patrol (OBP) introduced acoustic and magnetic sensors and video cameras
to assist agents in remotely detecting illegal aliens entering the
United States. In 1998, the Immigration and Naturalization Service
(INS) formally established the Integrated Surveillance Intelligence
System (ISIS) comprising more than 11,000 seismic and magnetic sensors,
255 operational remote video surveillance (RVS) systems, and the
Integrated Computer Assisted Detection (ICAD) system. In 2003, OBP
recognized the need to further improve border surveillance and remote
assessment and monitoring technology, due to poor program management,
technology failures, and poor operational results for ISIS.\6\
Therefore, OBP began developing the America's Shield Initiative (ASI).
This initiative included additional surveillance structures, upgraded
and expanded surveillance equipment, and significantly enhanced
detection and monitoring capabilities. According to OBP, the expanded
use of surveillance technologies was viewed as an effective force-
multiplier. In an April 7, 2006 hearing of the House Appropriations
Subcommittee on Homeland Security, the opening statement of Chairman
Harold Rogers summarized real progress over this time period:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ Does not include Alaska or Hawaii.
\5\ Source: ``Estimates of the Unauthorized Migrant Population for
States Based on the March 2005 CPS,'' Pew Hispanic Data Center Fact
Sheet, 26 April 2006. Estimate is based on U.S. Census Data; estimate
of 1.5M illegal aliens per year since 2000.
\6\ Office of the Inspector General, DHS, ``A Review of Remote
Surveillance Technology Along U.S. Land Borders,'' OIG-06-15, December
2005.
``Since 1995, we have quadrupled spending on border security,
from $1.2B to $4.7B, and more than doubled the number of Border
Patrol Agents from 5,000 to 12,381; yet during that same time
period, the number of illegal immigrants in the U.S. has jumped
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
from five million to over 11 million.''
We have applied significant resources, financial and human, to this
challenge and still have limited control over our borders. If we cannot
deter or detect and stop illegal immigration, then we have no ability
to stop terrorists using the same methods from infiltrating the U.S.
The massive scope of the border security issue deriving from large
geographic areas and high volumes of illegal alien activity, is also
technically challenging, operationally complex, and programmatically
and contractually demanding for Government managers. In addition, it
possesses multiple dimensions that interact in complicated ways,
necessitating tradeoffs. In a December 2005 report,\7\ the Office of
the Inspector General (OIG) of the DHS reviewed existing remote
surveillance technology employed along U.S. land borders. This report
contains valuable insights into some of the difficulties associated
with attempts to exploit technology as a major contributor to border
security operations. The following findings, organized by category, are
from the OIG report's Executive Summary, which highlights technical,
system, operational, and programmatic/contractual challenges:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Technical Challenges:
``Remote video surveillance cameras do not have
detection capability regardless of whether they are used in
conjunction with sensors.''
``Current sensors cannot differentiate between
illegal alien activity and incidental activations caused by
animals, seismic activity, or weather. . .'' \8\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ Nonsensor alerts along the southwest border during a five-day
period generated by camera detections, vehicle stops, officer
observations, other agency observations, citizen observation, air
observation, or some other source totaled 780 alerts, resulting in 382
apprehensions. Over the same period, ISIS sensors generated 29,710
alerts, resulting in 252 apprehensions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
System Challenges:
``Integrated Surveillance Intelligence System (ISIS)
components are not fully integrated: e.g., when a sensor is
activated, a camera does not automatically pan in the direction
of the activated sensor.''
``Data entered into OBP's primary source of ISIS
information, the ICAD system, is incomplete, and not
consistently recorded by OBP sectors.''
Operational Challenges:
``. . .OBP agents are often dispatched to false
alarms.''
``OBP was unable to quantify force multiplication
benefits of remote surveillance technology.''
``ISIS remote surveillance technology yielded few
apprehensions as a percentage of detection, resulted in
needless investigations of legitimate activity, and consumed
valuable staff time to perform video analysis or investigate
sensor alerts.''
Programmatic/Contractual Challenges:
``Deficiencies in the contract management and
processes used to install ISIS equipment have resulted in more
than $37 Million in DHS funds remaining in General Services
Administration (GSA) accounts; delays in installing, testing,
and bringing on-line RVS sites that are operational; and 168
incomplete RVS camera sites.''
The OIG report concludes with helpful recommendations for
addressing some of the identified deficiencies in the existing system
and development process.\9\ Justifiably, the OIG did not accept the
charter, nor claim subject matter expertise for actually determining
how an operational system could be engineered to provide adequate
performance for meeting border security requirements. That is:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ The DHS OIG report spells out seven recommendations dealing
with system integration, processes for handling data, performance
measures, contracting issues, site selection, the use of Government and
private structures, and mobile surveillance platforms.
1. The OIG recommendations did not attempt to address specific
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
technical solutions to problems (e.g., false alarm rates).
2. Following the OIG recommendations may not be sufficient to
produce a fully functional capability.
3. The OIG report was intentionally limited in scope (i.e.,
remote surveillance technology) and did not incorporate other
critical elements of the problem.
Therefore, while the OIG addressed certain issues that stayed
within the scope of its tasking, a disciplined systems engineering
review of ISIS/ASI would have provided a better baseline upon which to
build a superior follow-on system--SBI/SBInet--to position it for
success.
The DHS OIG looked specifically at remote surveillance technology.
While solving the technical problems here will clearly be a major move
forward, other dimensions to this challenge need to be addressed before
a viable concept can be realized for securing the borders. Importantly,
these other elements interact, require interfaces, and necessitate
tradeoffs that impact responsibilities and resource requirements across
the boundaries of multiple agencies.
MULTIPLE DIMENSIONS OF THE BORDER SECURITY CHALLENGE
Fundamental tradeoffs need to be made between technology and human
resources. Technology is easily envisioned as a force multiplier, but
the experience with the current ISIS system testifies to the pitfalls
in ignoring the technical details. The high false alarm rates
associated with the currently deployed seismic/acoustic sensors drain
the supply of additional OBP agents assigned to Border Patrol
operations, producing a net decrease in operational performance.
Synergism between technology and human resources needs to be carefully
engineered, with a thorough understanding of the capabilities,
limitations, and demands of the technology. In fact, technical
solutions may burden human resources by affecting operations negatively
and by requiring human interaction in controlling, operating,
maintaining, and repairing technology and analyzing and communicating
its products.\10\ Significantly, the marriage between technology and
humans is not adequately defined until a CONOPS is developed that
thoroughly defines how the technology and human resources will be
jointly used operationally.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\10\ ISIS operations require three types of personnel: law
enforcement communications assistants for monitoring cameras and ICAD
terminals and providing radio and dispatch support to field agents; OBP
agents to respond to alerts, install and maintain cameras, and monitor
sector RVS cameras; and CBP Office of Information Technology
specialists for on-site repairs to sensors and cameras.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In addition to the technical, operational, and programmatic
challenges, consider the impact of U.S. immigration policy on concepts
for securing the borders. Nonrestrictive policy may focus attention on
verification and inspection at ports of entry (POE). Conversely,
restrictive policy will probably result in large numbers of illegal
aliens attempting to enter between ports of entry (BPOE)--in deserts,
forests, and mountainous regions--keeping attention on surveillance
systems, Border Patrol operations, and detention facilities. Decision-
makers need to be filly cognizant of the impact of policy on the
viability, cost, and schedule of any solution to this problem.
Moreover, system developers must recognize that policy is a major
driver in system design.
The threat itself is another dimension to the problem that must
also be taken into account. The threat is not monolithic: It is
composed of illegal immigration for economic and/or political reasons;
trafficking in drugs, weapons, contraband, and human beings; and
terrorism. The tactics employed may be different, the determination and
persistence uneven, the level of desperation unpredictable, and the
resources (financial, weapons) biased in favor of the most dangerous
elements. We must fully account for the threat's ability to respond to
our efforts and actively pursue countermeasures. As an OBP official
observed, ``Once illegal aliens learn where RVS camera sites are
located, they may choose not to cross at those locations.''
The troublesome part of the problem is that many agencies are
involved, at the border and in the ``interior'' operations. Federal and
State agencies can provide critical intelligence information and
actively participate in border security operations. In addition,
decisions made at the border will impact federal, State, and local
agencies dealing with immigrant monitoring, verification of status and
employment, and apprehension.
We can design a system focusing on technology and catching people
at the border, or we can take a more holistic approach to the problems
of illegal immigration, trafficking, and terrorism. Working all
dimensions to the border security challenge collectively requires
system engineering at multiple levels. A good example of this was the
revolution in the telecommunications industry during the 1970s and
1980s. AT&T developed a three-tiered systems engineering approach for
converting the Nation's telecommunications infrastructure from analog
to digital:
1. Tier 1, the highest level, engineered the overall network,
including local access, central switching, routing, long haul
transmission, and other requirements.
2. Tier 2 system engineered each of the Tier 1 components
addressing capacity, reliability, calling patterns, service
views (e.g., 800/900 number services, calling cards).
3. Tier 3 system engineered specific technical systems (e.g.,
frame relay switches, fiber-optic networks).
A study of the AT&T experience, which required $5013 over two
decades, shows how multi-tiered systems engineering can be applied to
the border security challenge: taking into account tradeoffs between
humans and technology; addressing operations at ports of entry, between
ports of entry, and in the interior; and devising a high-level
construct encompassing roles for federal, State, and local agencies.
In summary, our attempts to date for improving border security
through the exploitation of technology combined with operations have
not met expectations or success. The problem may seem daunting--highly
variable and massive in extent geographically, technically challenging,
operationally complex, and possessing multiple dimensions that require
sophisticated planning, coordination, and interfacing across
organizational boundaries. Accepting that there are significant
shortfalls in our current response to border security, as recognized by
both Congress and DHS, the issue is where to go from here.
THE SYSTEMS ENGINEERING METHODOLOGY APPLIED TO BORDER SECURITY
Numerous paradigms exist for developing, producing, and
operationally deploying technology and systems. Consider the ``Linear
Model'' championed by great scientists like Vannevar Bush\11\ and
famous leaders like Franklin Roosevelt. This model starts with basic
research then follows a progression through applied research,
development, up through production and operations. This model pursues
``discovery'' first, then looks for application. It is a model used
very successfully by many academic organizations, the Department of
Energy (DOE) National Labs, and the services' research laboratories
[e.g., the Office of Naval Research (ONR)]. When Government funds are
used for the linear model, it is not necessarily known beforehand what
will be discovered (if anything) or what utility any discovery might
produce. At the other extreme, the Government can procure technology
and systems for which there are no unknowns that need to be resolved,
and which require only straightforward engineering to design and
produce. Because national security involves known problems that need to
be solved, with issues that frequently tend to be technically complex
and massive in scale; because there has been an explosive growth in
technology since the second half of the twentieth century; and because
there is a continuing need to advance technology to pace the threat,
neither the linear model nor straightforward procurement can
successfully address many of the Nation's security challenges. The
systems engineering method was specifically developed to meet this
need.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\11\ Vannevar Bush, ``Science, The Endless Frontier,'' Time
Magazine, April 3, 1944.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Kossiakoff and Sweet\12\ define the characteristics of a system
whose development, test, and application require the practice of
systems engineering:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\12\ Alexander Kossiakoff and William N. Sweet, Systems
Engineering, Principles and Practice, John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 2003.
1. Is an engineered product and hence satisfies a specified
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
need,
2. Consists of diverse components that have intricate
relationships with one another and hence is multi-disciplinary
and relatively complex,
3. Uses advanced technology in ways that are central to the
performance of its primary functions and hence involves
development risk and often relatively high cost.
The development of a system for securing the Nation's borders
easily meets these criteria and logically needs the deliberate
application of a disciplined systems engineering methodology to
succeed.
The systems engineering paradigm described here is based primarily
on the text of Kossiakoff and Sweet.\13\ While specific excerpts from
this reference are quoted, the majority of ideas, concepts, and
examples in this section are liberally based on material from the
reference. Implications of the systems engineering methodology for the
challenge of securing the Nation's borders, and examples based on
existing deployed systems (ISIS/ASI), are provided in italics.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\13\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As mentioned in the Preface, systems engineering is usually
partitioned into three phases:
1. Concept Development--needs, feasibility, requirement,
concept definition, detailed planning
2. Engineering Development--prototyping and testing for
operational use
3. Post-Development--production, deployment, operations,
effectiveness assessment
Concept Development Phase. This phase first establishes a need for
the system and ensures that it is technically and economically
feasible. Establishing the need typically requires analysis, modeling,
and simulation for both the system and its operational employment.
Technical feasibility generally requires that supporting science and
technology necessary for developing viable system concepts are ``in the
pipeline.'' If a gap exists in a critical technology area, directed
Science and Technology (S&T) may be needed, which increases the risk in
system development.The second part of this phase explores potential
system concepts and then formulates a formal set of requirements the
system must meet. The importance of requirements is simply stated: If
requirements are minimal, it will be easy for any system to meet them.
Allowing contractors to establish requirements to encourage innovation
and shorten acquisition cycles under OSD's acquisition reform did not
work well.\14\ Last, a viable system concept is selected, its
functional characteristics defined, and a detailed plan is developed
for the subsequent stages of engineering, production, and operational
deployment of the system.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\14\ Michael W. Wynne, Under Secretary of Defense (AT&L), ``Policy
for Systems Engineering in DOD,'' February 20, 2004.
Requirements for securing the border need to be defined for
the combined use of technology and Border Patrol agents. Choice
of an appropriate metric is important: It affects system
design, and its sensitivities may be subtle. For example,
consider as metrics the success rate for illegal entry, the
absolute number of illegal entries in a given period, and the
number of illegal immigrants in the U.S. at any given time.
Improving border security will have a direct, positive impact
on all three metrics. Improved security may additionally have a
deterrent effect on those considering attempting to enter
illegally. The first metric is not sensitive to this
deterrence, while the last two are. Additionally, observe that
the first two metrics are principally under the control of the
system designer, while the last metric is heavily dependent
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
upon other federal, state, and local agencies.
Once a Concept of Operations is developed for interfacing
humans with technology, requirements can be established for
communications and technology in the field: e.g., Personal
Digital Assistants (PDAs), decision aids, and reachback (e.g.,
terrorist databases from the National Counterterrorism Center).
Numerous other technical issues arise in the concept
development phase. Examples include: the existence of models,
simulations, and analytical techniques for addressing the
combined performance of systems and Border Patrol agents; the
detection performance for sensors and cameras; system false
alarm rates; potential Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) sensor
contributions; the impact of law enforcement human intelligence
(HUMINT) on cuing, detection, and response.
Engineering Development Phase. This phase corresponds to the
process of engineering the system to perform the functions specified in
the system concept defined in the first phase. First, any new
technology the selected system concept requires must be developed, and
its capability to meet requirements must be validated. Second, a
prototype is developed that satisfies requirements on performance,
reliability, maintainability, and safety. Third, the system is
engineered for production and operational use, and its operational
suitability is demonstrated. These last two stages require engineering
development and design, defining and managing interfaces, developing
test plans, and determining how discrepancies in system performance
uncovered during test and evaluation should be rectified.
Assuming that valid system requirements for border security
and a system concept exist [while noting that the SBlnet
Request for Proposals (RFP) provided minimal requirements],
gaps in critical technologies must be identified and addressed.
Using the system concept for the current operational system
(ISIS/ASI) as an example, critical missing technologies may
include: false alarm reduction algorithms; automation/semi-
automation of the detection process for sensors and video,
including ``Bell Ringers'' that alert operators and Large
Margin Classifiers; algorithms for fusing acoustic, magnetic,
video, and other sensor information; creation of a common
tactical scene; tactical decision aids; Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
(UAV) technologies including sensors, Automatic Target
Recognition, autonomous operations; integrated C2,
man/machine interface, and law enforcement and intelligence
interfaces.
Prototyping of individual system elements must be completed
and performance validated through testing (e.g., are we really
achieving acceptable false alarm rates from sensors?). A scaled
prototype of an integrated system must be developed and tested
in an operational environment with Border Patrol agents. Full-
scale production and deployment should begin only after any
discrepancies are resolved.
Post Development Phase. This last phase includes production,
operational deployment, in-service support and engineering, and
continuing assessment of the operational effectiveness of the system,
with feedback to prior phases and iterations as required to maintain/
improve system effectiveness (``Build-Test-Build'' ).
Full-scale production of complex systems for providing border
security is appropriate only after the system successfully
undergoes operational test and evaluation. Once deployed, it is
critical to determine the operational effectiveness of the
system, establishing whether the system is meeting its
operational requirements, and understanding discrepancies and
actions needed to be taken. There is a potential wealth of
information from a deployed system for addressing deficiencies
and improving system effectiveness: e.g., recorded sensor data;
captured performance for the combination of the analyst and
system for detecting targets and eliminating false alarms;
empirical understanding of the utility of command, control, and
communications; the success of the marriage between technology
and Bureau of Customs and Border Protection (CBP) operations.
Given the lack of maturity of this mission area and the
associated absence of subject matter expertise in critical
technical areas (e.g., target signatures, false alarm
mechanisms for sensors), a ``Spiral Development'' process of
system capabilities could be entertained that would exploit the
continually improving knowledge in this domain.
Systems Engineering a Complex System with Predecessor Technology
Descriptions of systems engineering usually appear to imply that a
new system is being designed from scratch, with no regard for current
systems that may have applicability. Existing systems will affect
development of a replacement system in three ways:
1. Deficiencies of the existing system are recognized and may
represent the driving force for a new design.
2. If deficiencies are not as serious as to make the current
system worthless, the existing overall concept and functional
architecture may constitute a good starting point for exploring
alternatives.
3. Relevant portions of existing systems may be used in new
designs, reducing risk and saving costs.
Given the significant investment in the current ISIS and ASI
systems (including seismic and magnetic sensors, RYS, and ICAD), it is
desirable to seriously entertain the employment of these assets in
future system designs.
PEDIGREE OF THE SYSTEMS ENGINEERING METHODOLOGY FOR CONTROLLING
PERFORMANCE, SCHEDULES, AND COST
The systems engineering method basically consists of defining
requirements, translating those requirements into functions (actions,
tasks) that the system must accomplish to meet the requirements,
selecting a preferred system design that is believed to accomplish
those functions, then iterating and validating the system design
through successive testing. If one views each iteration as a
``hypothesis'' that this design will optimally meet requirements, with
associated ``hypothesis testing'' to verify this assumption, then ``the
systems engineering method can be thought of as the systematic
application of the scientific method to the engineering of a complex
system.'' \15\ This is certainly not a rigorous proof that system
engineering is an optimal method for developing complex systems, but it
is a compelling rationale that appeals to the same logic that supports
the scientific method for pursuing research. Would a legitimate
researcher pursue discovery and invention without using the scientific
method?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\15\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The systems engineering methodology has gained acceptance in
virtually all acknowledged professional technical communities for the
development of massive, complex systems. Figure 1, adapted from
Kossiakoff and Sweet, shows the relationship between the elements of
systems engineering as described here, to other prominent systems
engineering life cycle models.
Consider the extensive experience realized by the United States
during the twentieth century in developing large-scale, complex
military systems (ships, tanks, planes, command and control). The
Department of Defense developed the DOD 5000 series of directives as a
set of comprehensive system acquisition guidelines, specifically to
``. . .manage the risks in the application of advanced
technology, and to minimize costly technical or management
failures.. . .In 2001, the International Organization for
Standardization (ISO) and the International Electrotechnical
Commission (IEC) issued the result of several years of effort--
a systems engineering standard designated ISO/IEC 15288. This
model is likely to become institutionalized in U.S. industry to
replace previous standards.'' \16\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\16\ Ibid.
As an additional example, the National Society of Professional
Engineers adopted a model ``mainly directed to the development of new
products, usually resulting from technological advances.'' \17\ One can
simply Google ``Systems Engineering'' and the references will testify
to the near-universal acceptance of this process for the development of
complex systems. Systems engineering, arguably, has been shown to be
the most effective process for the development and operational
deployment of complex systems. Although a disciplined approach and
technical due diligence are central to the process, systems engineering
has a proven track record for realizing progress as rapidly as
possible.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\17\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
During the 1990s, DOD experimented with acquisition reform, looking
for ways to streamline the acquisition process, decrease the
development time line, and provide more latitude for innovation to
contractors. ``Shortcuts'' were taken in the belief that less ``rigor''
and ``discipline'' may be necessary in the acquisition process. By the
turn of the century, there was significantly more insight into what
worked and what did not work. In 2004, the Under Secretary of Defense
for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics [USD (AT&L)] promulgated a
new policy\18\ mandating the use of a robust systems engineering
approach for ``all programs responding to a capabilities or
requirements document, regardless of acquisition category.'' In the
words of USD (AT&L):
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\18\ Michael W. Wynne, Under Secretary of Defense (AT&L), ``Policy
for Systems Engineering in DOD,'' February 20, 2004.
``Application of a rigorous systems engineering discipline is
paramount to the Department's ability to meet the challenge of
developing and maintaining needed war fighting capability.. .
.Systems engineering provides the integrating technical
processes to define and balance system performance, cost,
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
schedule, and risk.''
Guidance for implementation followed.\19\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\19\ Glenn F. Lamartin, Director, Defense Systems USD (AT&L),
``Implementing Systems Engineering Plans in DOD--Interim Guidance,''
March 30, 2004.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
CONSIDERATIONS FOR IMPLEMENTING THE SYSTEMS ENGINEERING METHODOLOGY
Equally as important as adopting a systems engineering methodology
for developing complex systems, is the selection of an implementation
strategy that ensures adherence to the principles of systems
engineering, and verifies successful execution of each of its various
phases. Ultimately, the Government is accountable for results, and must
ensure adequate technical competence is brought to bear for
understanding issues and making decisions. For developing massive,
complex systems, the Government may need to engage third party
organizations to support them in this capacity.
The systems engineering methodology is not prescriptive regarding
implementation strategies. The roles played by various organizations
should be considered in light of how the activities in the systems
engineering methodology might best be performed. For each system
development activity, specific consideration should be given to
enabling key roles for Government agencies and Government Laboratories,
prime contractors, associate contractors, Federally Funded Research and
Development Centers (FFRDCs), University Affiliated Research Centers
(UARCs), academia, non-profits, and small or minority owned businesses.
In architecting an implementation strategy, especially in defining the
roles of prime contractors, note that history has shown that the
strength of this nation for addressing massive, complex challenges is
the wealth of available domain expertise, and the power of competitive
forces.
To begin with, massive, complex systems normally require major
contractors because they usually have the resources for manufacturing
and production that smaller businesses do not have. In addition, large
organizations have infrastructure, logistics, and in-service
engineering capabilities that are critical to life cycle support. The
considerable scale of the challenge in securing the borders
necessitates a major contractor in the role of prime for system
development and deployment.
There are many smaller companies not engaged in manufacturing and
production; they necessarily rely on their subject matter expertise for
providing value added to their customers. These organizations can
provide critical support in assessing needs and feasibility, defining
concepts, exploring operations, and providing intellectual property in
understanding the problem and developing technologies. Because this is
all that they do, they must be very competitive in what they provide.
Therefore, one would not necessarily expect to see all the domain
expertise resident in a prime contractor. To access the ``best and
brightest,'' ways should be found to include these ``associate
contractors'' as full members of the team.
The Nation has a significant resource in its nonprofit laboratories
that can operate in the best interest of the Government as ``Honest
Brokers.'' These organizations include Government laboratories (e.g.,
DOD service laboratories), the ``National Labs'' (DOE), Federally
Funded Research and Development Centers (FFRDCs), and University
Affiliated Research Centers (UARCs). The absence of shareholders,
manufacturing, and production allows more independence (less conflict
of interest) in supporting the Government in developing requirements,
planning, prototyping, testing, and assessing operational
effectiveness.
There are numerous examples of disparate successful strategies for
implementing the systems engineering methodology. SSP's management of
the Polaris Program, previously mentioned, included a technical staff
of 450 in the program office fully dedicated to the development and
production of the Polaris system. This represents an example of a model
with a strong technical role played by the Government. Two of the five
major features identified by the GAO as contributing to this program's
success are:\20\ ``(4) program office technical expertise, and (5) good
management practices, such as open communications, independent internal
evaluation, and on-site management representation at contractor
plants.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\20\ United States General Accounting Office, ``Fleet Ballistic
Missile Program,'' GAO/NSIAD-90-160, 9-6-1990.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
A considerably different model that emerged is the recognized
successful\21\ spiral development strategy used by the U.S. Navy for
improving submarine sonars [Acoustic Rapid Commercial Off-the-Shelf
(COTS) Insertion (ARCI)/Advanced Processor Build (APB)] starting in the
mid 1990s. The Navy had made a commitment to embrace open architecture,
in general, for new systems development efforts to enable a spiral
development systems engineering methodology, and specifically to allow
contributions from many organizations across the full spectrum of
systems engineering activities. Mandating open architecture alone,
while necessary, proved to be insufficient in many programs for
changing the roles and contributions of organizations in the
acquisition process. Progress in improving the acquisition process,
had, in fact, been hampered by the continued use of traditional
business practices that limit intellectual competition. In the words of
the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO):\22\ ``Although we have made
considerable Open Architecture (OA) investments over the past several
years, we have been holding onto traditional business models and the
overall progress transitioning into OA business practices is
disappointing.'' The CNO then cites the ARCI/APB program, as an
exception, for its successful business model: ``It (ARCI/APB) provides
a clear and compelling example of competitive alternatives bringing
reduced costs, improved capability, and increased speed of delivery to
the fleet.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\21\ Winner of the Al Gore ``Hammer Award for Reinventing
Government'' in February, 1999.
\22\ M.G. Mullen, Chief of Naval Operations, ``Navy Open
Architecture,'' Department of the Navy, August 28, 2006.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The key aspect of the ARCI/APB business model cited by the CNO is
how organizational roles are carefully tailored (Figure 2) to address
the elements of systems engineering.
Requirements are set by a requirements group composed of Government
(U.S. Navy) users. These are updated based on measured performance and
changes to the threat. The broad scientific community, in general,
supports the identification of concepts and assessment of feasibility.
The Laboratory community develops prototypes, and as a group of peers
[Test, Evaluation, and Support Group (TEASG)] assesses suitability of
the concept for operational use. The results of this testing are used
by Program Executive Office (PEO) Subs (Milestone Decision Authority)
to validate that requirements are met before production. The Prime
Contractor produces and deploys the system, and the Government
[Director of Operations, Test and Evaluation (DOT&E)] verifies
operational performance. During operational patrols, the Labs
continuously assess operational effectiveness, and feed back results to
the process to continue spiral development. Organizations do what they
do best, conflicts of interest are minimized, and intellectual
competition is encouraged throughout the process.\23\ In the words of
the CNO: ``My vision for OA is not limited to systems built to a set of
open standards, but rather it is focused on open business models for
the acquisition and spiral development of new systems that enable
multiple developers to collectively and competitively participate in
cost-effective and innovative capability delivery to the Naval
Enterprise.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\23\ An unnamed staff member of the prime contractor for ARCI found
competition after contract award intellectually stimulating: ``I
wouldn't want to go back to the old way.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
One other basic aspect of the systems engineering implementation
used by the ARCI/APB program must be mentioned because of its
significance for ensuring real and rapid progress. Every concept/
design/improvement is subjected to data-driven evaluation or assessment
at every phase of the process to establish maturity, understand risk of
implementation, and determine value added to overall performance. Key
elements of this strategy are models validated with data, common data
sets (real data) and common metrics, end-to-end test beds, in-situ
testing, and peer review teams. This represents an example of a model
that exploits the greater technical community to a very considerable
extent.
Achieving Rapid Progress
Given the urgency of the current national security environment, a
crucial issue for any methodology and any implementation strategy is
``How rapidly can one make progress?'' If it takes too long to get to
the 100 percent solution, one might be willing to take a 90 percent or
80 percent solution in the short-term. (Or as a worst case, one might
pursue activities rapidly that consume resources and time and result in
no real progress.)
Begin by recognizing that there is no magic process that can
guarantee an arbitrary degree of progress in an arbitrarily short
amount of time--even by throwing money at the problem. Then recognize
that the systems engineering methodology, properly implemented, has the
proven track record for realizing real progress as rapidly as possible.
Very importantly, the systems engineering methodology can be tailored
to emphasize milestone-driven development. In the ARCI program
mentioned previously, the ``R'' stands for ``Rapid.'' Whereas, the
traditional acquisition process for submarine sonars took 12 or more
years to develop and implement improvements, the ARCI/APB spiral
development process deploys a new build for sonars every year. Properly
applying a systems engineering methodology to the border security
challenge would seemingly offer the highest likelihood of progress as
rapidly as possible. Moreover, a spiral development process for the
border security challenge could reasonably produce yearly improvements
in real performance.
The ARCI/APB program, initiated in 1996, deployed its first version
at sea in 1998--two years. Lessons from successful spiral development
programs shed light on what it takes to make rapid progress at the
initiation of a program:
Major hardware systems and infrastructure take time
to develop. The more that exists, the faster progress can be
made at the beginning.
Open Architecture and COTS systems are key enablers
for rapidly inserting software upgrades, and allowing any
organization to ``plug and play.''
Contracting can easily delay progress. Multi-year
contracting with key organizations, IDIQ contracts, and
appropriate use of sole source contracting can all help.
Technology that leads to performance improvements
needs to be ``in the pipeline,'' and the implementation
strategy should ensure accessibility to this technology,
wherever it might exist in the greater technical community.
The Government needs a key individual (Program
Manager) empowered to do the right things--and it helps if he
or she is a zealot.
RECOMMENDATIONS
The following recommendations address the scope and complexity of
the border security challenge, the impact of initial policy and
requirements development with clear, holistic metrics, and proven
implementation strategies.
Recognizing the massive scale and complexity of the
border security challenge, a firm commitment needs to be made
to a disciplined systems engineering methodology for
controlling performance, cost, and schedule and for providing
the oversight tools the Government needs for monitoring
performance and ensuring success.
Even with SBlnet prime contractor selection by September 30, 2006,
the systems engineering methodology can still be applied during rapid
development and deployment to support operational success.
Policy, goals, metrics, and requirements must be
defined at the beginning.
CONOPS, policy, goals, metrics, and requirements for SBlnet should
be clearly articulated to the prime early in the development process.
An integrated view must be developed for the roles of federal, State,
and local agencies.
An implementation strategy should consider enabling
multiple organizations to collectively and competitively
participate in all elements of system design, development, and
deployment.
Organizational constructs for SBlnet that vest too much
responsibility and authority in a single prime organization may
diminish objectivity and alternatives, and fail to exploit the Nation's
strengths for solving its challenges--a wealth of technical resources,
and an open competitive market for ideas.
Organizational conflict of interest must be avoided
in testing and evaluation by using Government, nonprofit, and
peer review organizations.
The Nation's nonprofit laboratories (e.g., DOD Labs, the DOE
``National Labs,'' FFRDCs, and UARCs) operate for the Government as
``Honest Brokers.'' The absence of shareholders, manufacturing, and
production in these organizations provides the Government an
opportunity for independent validation and oversight of SBlnet. In
particular, the Nation's nonprofit Labs can support requirements
development, planning, prototyping, testing, and assessment of
operational effectiveness.
Technology development and validation, risk
reduction, testing for operational effectiveness, prototyping,
limited production, and deployment--should all be performed
before full-scale production and deployment.
A scaled prototype of an integrated system for SBlnet should be
developed and tested in an operational environment with Border Patrol
agents. Full-scale production and deployment should begin only after
discrepancies are resolved, and operators accept the system.
A continuing assessment of operational performance--
determination of deficiencies, issues, and lessons learned--
should feed back into a spiral development process for
developing improved technologies and operations and improving
performance.
Given the lack of maturity in the marriage of technology and
operations that support the border security mission area, a ``spiral
development'' process should be used that exploits continually
developing knowledge in this domain, adapts to technology improvements,
and continually refines the CONOPS and tactical operations.
Given the urgency of today's national security
environment, DHS should take those actions necessary to ensure
real and rapid progress in the near-term.
Secretary Chertoff has stated that SBI/SBlnet will make significant
progress in two years.\24\ What could SBlnet reasonably attempt to
accomplish in that time? The current ISIS sensors, remote video
surveillance, and existing infrastructure, and an imminent multi-year,
IDIQ prime contract are significant resources for getting started.
Importantly, there exist key technologies in the pipeline that apply to
SBlnet's most critical issues: e.g., false alarm reduction algorithms,
``large margin'' classifiers, bell ringers, automatic target
recognition, data fusion algorithms, and tactical scene generation. The
data stream from existing sensors could be employed immediately for
providing critical inputs to ``data driven'' research and development
of these new technologies. These technologies, however, exist at many
different organizations, and typically, outside the DHS community. So,
the organizational implementation strategy used for SBlnet should
accommodate--even encourage--outreach to a broad technical community.
Moreover, an open architecture should be used for system development
and implementation to allow any organization to ``plug and play.''
Properly constructed and managed, in two years SBlnet could
meaningfully attempt deployment of a limited prototype that
demonstrates orders of magnitude improvement in critical performance
areas (e.g., false alarm reduction), successful resolution of critical
technical issues, and a baseline system that enables full-scale
development and deployment.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\24\ Oral Testimony by Secretary Michael Chertoff, before the U.S.
House of Representatives Appropriations Subcommittee on Homeland
Security, Rayburn House Office Building, July 27, 2006, reported by UPI
on July 28, 2006: Chertoff Pledges Better Border Security, by Martin
Sieff.
CLOSING
Again, I thank you for this opportunity to address you today on
``How Can Technologies Help Secure Our Borders?,'' and specifically how
applying the discipline of the systems engineering methodology can
ensure that Congress' investment in SBI and SBInet will be rewarded
with operational success. This ends my remarks concerning the
applicability of a disciplined systems engineering approach to the
daunting challenge of securing our nation's borders.
Biography for Gordon Daniel Tyler, Jr.
Company Title(s): Department Head, National Security Technology
Department
Business Area Head for Undersea Warfare
Business Area Head for Homeland Protection
Business Area Head for Biomedicine
Member APL Executive Council
Areas of Practice/Specialization:
With 36 years experience in research, development, test and
evaluation, Mr. Tyler has been in technical, program management, and
line management positions. He has supported DOD, the Intelligence
Community, the Department of Homeland Security, and other Government
agencies in various mission areas, including Undersea Warfare
(Submarine Security, Anti-Submarine Warfare), Homeland Security/
Homeland Defense (Maritime Domain Awareness, Border Protection,
Counterdrug, Infrastructure Protection, Preparedness and Response), and
Special Operations. His areas of technical specialization include:
Sensor and System Development; System Concept Development and System
Engineering; Operations Analysis, Modeling and Simulation, and Test and
Evaluation.
Honors, Degrees:
M.S., Johns Hopkins University, 1974, Computer Science B.S.,
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1970, Electrical
Engineering
Stanford Executive Program, Graduate School of Business, Stanford
University, 2002
Merle Tuve Fellowship (1985)
Doctoral Coursework, Johns Hopkins University (1978-1985), Applied
Mathematics
Work Experience:
1970-Present: Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory
Department Head, National Security Technology Department, 1998-Present
Head line manager for APL department of 525 staff responsible for
activities in Homeland Protection, Undersea Warfare, and Biomedicine,
with principal organizational competencies in physics, sensors, signal
and information processing, system concept development and systems
engineering, test and evaluation.
Business Area Head for Homeland Protection, 1998-Present
Responsible for APL business activities in Homeland Security/
Homeland Defense (180 staff years of effort), which includes the
following thrusts:
Preparedness and Response: Syndromic Surveillance/
Biosurveillance/ESSENCE, for DARPA, DTRA, CDC, NCR; regional
response planning, ``first responder'' support, and operational
response T&E for DHS, NIH, MD;
Key Facilities Protection: Mail screening and mail
security activities for the U.S. Government and DOD; CBRNE
sensor evaluations, pentagon security for PFPA;
Maritime and Border Security: Portal Systems T&E for
TSA; Container and In-Bond Security for C&BP; Advanced Spectral
Systems for DNDO; Maritime Domain Awareness and Maritime
Security for USCG;
Special Operations and ISR: Systems engineering and
analysis for SOCOM; Ops assessments and gaps evaluation for
JIEDDO; special ISR projects for the intelligence community;
systems engineering and analysis support for the Naval Special
Warfare Development Group;
CBRNE Detection and Defeat: CBRNE sensor/system RDT&E
for JPEO CBD; sensor T&E and performance analysis for JPEO CBD;
Spectral Sensing for Bioaerosols for DARPA; ``gold standard''
testing for HSARPA; systems engineering and analysis support
for DTRA.
Business Area Head for Undersea Warfare, 1998-Present
Responsible for APL business activities in Undersea Warfare (350
staff years of effort) which includes the following thrusts:
Submarine Security and Technology: SSBN Security
Program; Submarine Security and Survivability Program;
Anti-Submarine Warfare: Advanced Processor Builds for
Submarine Sonar, Tactical Control, and Surface Ship Sonar;
Engineering Measurements Program for Submarine Sonar (T&E);
numerous ONR S&T efforts; Integrated Undersea Surveillance
Systems; numerous special studies, analyses, and war games that
directly support the office of the CNO.
USW GWOT activities: Submarine In-Port and Near-Port
Security; Nuclear Weapons Security; Pearl Harbor Port Security
(NFESC);
Principal sponsors in Undersea Warfare include Director of
Submarine Warfare (CNO N87); PEO Integrated Warfare Systems; NAVSEA;
NAVAIR; SPAWAR; ONR; Strategic Systems Project Office; DARPA.
Business Area Head for Biomedicine, 1998-Present
Responsible for APL business activities in Biomedicine, which
includes the following efforts:
A revolutionary 22 degree of freedom upper extremity
prosthetic with full neural integration (peripheral nerves,
cortical neurons), and haptic feedback (DARPA); APL lead for
team of worldwide, expert organizations; APL responsible for
system engineering and integration;
Biomechanics: Blunt trauma modeling and testing;
Head-Supported Mass Program for the U.S. Army; vehicle and
occupant response to IED detonation; Crash Test Facility
testing.
NSTD Assistant Department Head for Programs, 1994-1998
Department supervisor responsible for program management and
development activities including: fiscal year/multi-year planning;
identification and development of strategic thrust areas; system
concept development; program/project formulation; coordination and
monitoring of program activities; identification of fiscal, human, and
capital resources required to execute program activities; development
of teaming arrangements with industry, academia, and government labs.
The principal areas addressed consist of: Undersea Warfare technologies
and systems (Submarine Security, Surveillance, Anti-Submarine Warfare,
Mine Warfare); Information Science and Technology (Simulation,
Modeling, Data Integration and Fusion, Signal and Information
Processing, C3I, Intelligent Networking); Marine
Engineering, Test and Evaluation; Counter-Drug technologies and
systems; Ocean and Atmospheric Physics; technologies and systems for
countering weapons of mass destruction; and Health Care Technologies.
Undersea Surveillance Program Area Manager, 1988-1994
Responsible for the development and management of Undersea
Surveillance and Anti-Submarine Warfare systems and technologies,
including: directed research, basic science and technology development;
system engineering (requirements definition; modeling, simulation and
analysis; system concept development; prototyping; system engineering
and integration; test and evaluation; system architecture development;
C3I; operational evaluation); concept of operations
development. Major programs included: Integrated Undersea Surveillance
Systems programs (Low Frequency Active, Critical Sea Test (Lead Lab),
Air Defense Initiative, SURTASS development (Lead Lab), Advanced
Distributed Systems, Full Spectrum Processing); avionics for the LAMPS
helo program; BEARTRAP; Periscope Detection Radar; and DARPA simulation
and modeling development.
Acoustics Program Manager for the SSBN Security Technology Program,
1981-1987
Responsible for eight to ten projects in the SSBN Security Program
investigating the underwater acoustic detection of submarines. Projects
emphasized basic physics, modeling, simulation, signal and information
processing, system concept formulation, system design and engineering,
test and evaluation, and operations analysis. Projects included:
radiated signatures of submarines; mobile, low frequency active
acoustic systems (DIANA, Standard Aura I, II, and I1I); fixed, low
frequency active systems (Fixed-Fixed I, II, III); sub-on-sub
operations (Standard Arrow I, II); exploitation of transient and
intermittent acoustic radiation (LANTSECEX and PACSECEX testing); and
sonar performance in oceanographic ducting conditions.
Advanced Concepts Section Supervisor of the Acoustics Group, 1976-1980
Line supervisor responsible for the development and evaluation of
advanced underwater acoustic technology and system concepts for the
detection of submarines. The scope of activities included:
identification of key technologies; development of operational
concepts; performance of scoping calculations with performance models;
identification of critical issues and the conduct of analytical or
experimental efforts for resolution.
Assistant Program Element Manager of the Acoustics Group, 1979-1980
Assistant Program Manager for the acoustics projects in the SSBN
Security Program. Supported the Program Manager in planning, executing,
and monitoring major acoustics projects including Standard Argo
(exploitation of acoustic noise field anisotropy with high resolution
sonar arrays), LANTSECEX 302-80 (detectability of specific signature
components in acoustic surface ducts), and special analyses of Sonar
Evaluation Program data.
Protect Leader for SSBN Security Program Efforts, 1976-1980
Standard Aries Sea Test and Analysis: Exploitation of
underwater acoustic surface ducting conditions for submarine
detection. Directed project team performing environmental
surveys and test area selection, pre-test performance
predictions, test geometry designs, identification of critical
issues associated with physics of acoustic propagation and
scattering, measurement designs, signal processing, and overall
analysis plans.
Advanced Concepts Analysis Project: Directed team of
analysts investigating advanced acoustic concepts for submarine
detection as part of the SSBN Security Program. Specific
concepts included inter-array processing (IAP), low frequency
active acoustic sonars, planar arrays, distributed sensors,
oceanographic exploitation, and the utilization of loud,
intermittent acoustic evolutions.
Skeleton Array Exercise (SKELEX): Principal analyst
and Project team lead, for planning, conducting, and performing
analysis for the SKELEX at-sea exercise addressing maximum
achievable gains for passive sonar towed arrays.
Associate Engineer, Acoustics Group, 1970-1976
Designed and developed digital signal processing hardware,
algorithms, and software in support of analysis of underwater acoustics
data, for assessing sonar performance in support of the SSBN Security
Program. Designed and developed high-speed programmable array
processor. Designed and implemented high-speed frequency domain
algorithms for correlation, beamforming, and automated detection.
Principal investigator for infrasonic detection of submarines, surface
scattering effects on sonar performance, and Inter-array Processing.
Publications:
The Emergence of Low Frequency Active Acoustics as a Critical Anti-
Submarine Warfare Technology, Johns Hopkins APL Technical
Digest, Vol. 13, No. 1, 1992.
An Overview of the Critical Sea Test Program, U.S. Navy Journal of
Underwater Acoustics, Vol. 42, No. 2, 1992.
Array Signal Gain Measurements for a Large Aperture Acoustic Array
Operating in a Convergence Zone Environment, Proc. 32nd Navy
Symposium on Underwater Acoustics, 1978.
Measurement of Signal Coherence, Propagation, and Array Dynamics with a
Large Acoustic Array, APL/JHU POR-3143, April, 1976.
Associations:
Naval Submarine League
National Defense Industrial Association
Armed Forces Communications and Electronics Association
Chairman Boehlert. Thank you very much, Mr. Tyler.
Dr. Worch.
STATEMENT OF DR. PETER R. WORCH, INDEPENDENT CONSULTANT, MEMBER
OF THE U.S. AIR FORCE SCIENCE ADVISORY BOARD
Dr. Worch. Chairman Boehlert, distinguished Members of the
House Committee on Science. I am, indeed, honored to be asked
to provide you my comments relative to technologies for border
security. I would like to point out that these are my opinions
and not necessarily those of either the Air Force Scientific
Advisory Board or the Air Force.
I look at this border security as a system problem, and so
it is fitting that I follow Dan here. It is a set of layered
systems, layered elements. And it starts with information and
it ends with information, by the way. At the front end, and I
hear this too seldom, we need to have the information on the
people that might cross the borders, their culture, their
behavior, their motivation, their training. We need to know
about the terrain, the topography. We need to know about the
motivation or the possible routes that the people might take.
And we need to know about the objectives.
Call this intelligence, if you will, but it is not to be
considered as a separate element. It is an integral part of the
surveillance problem. And I have seen too little mention of
that important role. And where it helps, right from the start,
it tells where to put the sensors and how to use the sensors,
and that is important.
The next piece I see is a tripwire. It can successfully
protect our borders, yet remain within the limits of acceptable
behavior of a broad area. Unattended ground sensors happen to
be my favorite along with unmanned air vehicles that can detect
just motion--not imagery--just motion at this point, we are
trying to detect.
The next level is to investigate those detections, and that
is where images come into play from UAVs, which I will repeat
several times here, seem, to me, to be the best way to go about
it.
And finally, people. And what we need to do is think about
these technologies, I believe, in how they aid the human, the
human that is the agent, the human that is operating the
command center, the human who needs to have the information
brought to him and put in the proper form that he can make a
rapid and effective and correct decision. The consequences of
bad decisions here are severe, and one needs to take into
consideration the need to aid people, not replace them.
On UAVs: UAVs clearly, in my mind, offer significant
advantage over all other platforms. They can rapidly deploy to
an area in which there is a suspected or a real intrusion. They
can investigate that area. They can provide persistent
surveillance, 24/7, and no one gets tired. And they can provide
relentless tracking of individuals or vehicles that may have
crossed the border. So I think they play a key role.
Let me switch gears now to the technology part.
I see technology needs really in three areas: sensors, and
UAVs, and again, in the information management portion. Call it
intelligence, if you will. It is some of both, really.
In the sensor area, I think there is much to be done in
area of unattended ground sensors. There has been some good
work done in the field. There has been some good work done by
Sandia Laboratories and other activities, the military labs,
and in industry, and in the universities, Berkeley, for
example. This sort of work in the basic, unattended ground
sensors is essential, because they can provide a very low-cost
tripwire, if you will, and eventually even some level of
identification.
Other work needs to be done in multi-spectral and hyper-
spectral sensors and in radar processing, radar processing to
extract these slow-moving, small radar cross-section people
from the background that is there. A very difficult problem.
And finally, automatic target recognition, not as a
replacement for an individual, but again, to aid that
individual making the right decisions.
UAV technologies fall in two areas: human system
integration, the ability to give the man on the ground the same
feel for the aircraft, the same indications, the same
situational awareness he would have if he were in the aircraft
himself. Not enough work has been done on that. We can build
wings, we can build engines, but we have got to deal with the
human finally and do that at a much better rate.
The other area is really a group of projects that are
necessary for air safety. Many of these projects have been
pursued for manned aircraft. Some of them are unique for
unattended aircraft, UAVs. And those are the areas that need to
be pushed. Unfortunately, much of this was funded by NASA and
since they have reduced the budget in that area, we definitely
have a shortfall. They have some very good programs
specifically aimed at operating UAVs in manned airspace.
The third area is that of information management. And yes,
connectivity communications is part of this, but the more
difficult thing is to gain knowledge out of data that comes
from a large number of sources, a large number of independent
sources, and some of it may be history, some of it may be real-
time from the sensors, but to put that in a form where the
decision-maker can make a quick and accurate decision.
So those are the three areas: sensors, UAV technologies,
and information management technologies.
Now getting there.
Very quickly, I think it is important to partner with the
military laboratories. I think the military problem is very
similar to this. It may not have been five years ago or five
years and a few days ago, but it is now, both from what has
happened in this country and what we are dealing with in Iraq.
Very similar. There needs to be cooperation much better than
there is. Fortunately, there is one good example where this is
happening. The National Law Enforcement and Corrections
Technology Center Northeast is partnering with the Air Force
Research Laboratory Information Director at Rome, New York.
They are in adjacent buildings. They are working together. The
technology is flowing in both ways, but it is a small
operation, and much more needs to be done in that regard.
In the area of systems, I am in favor of evolutionary
approaches to system acquisition, not--I am disappointed, quite
frankly, in a turnkey, large system integrator approach that we
have or large system approach that is on the streets now. I
feel a contract--and it is backed up in some of the appendixes.
Contractor A is going to put contractor A's equipment on the
line. Contractor B is going to put contractor B's equipment. We
don't know whether either one of those are the right ones. But
that is--a piece of this evolutionary acquisition needs to be
brought to this table, and it builds on what is there now and
gradually improves this. I think we need to insist on
integration of information, not integration of systems.
That concludes my remarks.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Worch follows:]
Prepared Statement of Peter R. Worch
Chairman Boehlert, distinguished Members of the House Committee on
Science. I am honored to be asked to share with you my thoughts on the
difficult topic of border security. To successfully protect our
borders, yet remain within the limits of acceptable behavior of a
democratic society is indeed a challenge.
To set the record, my background is in the development of
technology to support military operations, based on 24 years of an Air
Force career involving both operational and technical experience,
followed by a second career in unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and
associated sensors and communications. Many of the systems lessons
learned, as well as the technology developments, could contribute to
the border security problems. My expertise is not the entry-point
problem; I concentrate on the remote border problem.
Overview
The detection of border security violations has some similarities
to the military border and area security challenges faced in Iraq and
many other locations today. The differences are sufficient, however,
that the system solutions are quite different in most cases. But, the
technologies that have been developed and tested in military
applications deserve consideration for homeland security, and the
benefits and savings achieved by joint endeavors are significant.
In this paper, I attempt to review the technologies that, in my
opinion, offer promise for significantly improved detection of border
incursions. I will urge the homeland security and military laboratory
teams to work together on these technologies.
A Context
I was asked to make assessments and compare, or evaluate
technologies for border security. I find it most useful to consider
technologies in the context of system concepts, and hence I would like
to spend a few moments on the system aspect.
Border security is much like what the air forces call time-critical
targeting. In the battlespace, a detected target must be attacked
within a time frame (typically 10 minutes) determined by the
possibility that the target will act or escape or both. The 10 minutes
must be budgeted across numerous actions--Find, Fix, Track, Target,
Engage and Assess.
In the case of border security, the objective is to intercept the
detected intruding individual or vehicle before it can escape.--Detect,
locate, identify, decide, intercept. Once again, the time must be
budgeted across these elements. If a human moves at five mph, you have
just 12 minutes to catch that human if you want to limit travel to one
mile from the border. I say this to emphasize that one minute saved in
the detection and reporting process is a minute that the border agent
has to get to the point of intrusion.
Human eyes and reasoning are essential in order to avoid
fratricide--but a system of shoulder-to-shoulder border agents is not
possible, and it is not practical to continuously watch images of the
entire border from airborne or surface sensors 24/7 across 8000 miles
of border on the chance an intruder will be seen. Though a bank guard
can view the few camera images of the bank access points, the vault,
and perhaps the cashiers, the problem of monitoring sensors that may
themselves be moving (creating a dynamically changing background), and
the large area being guarded suggest a challenging situation. Yet,
direct viewing or high resolution imagery is the only acceptable means
of verifying that an unwanted intrusion has occurred. Automated target
recognition (ATR) techniques may be able to determine that a human has
been detected, but nothing more about identification or intent, given
today's state-of-the-art.
I see no magic--no single solution--The system solution must be a
layered sensor approach, tailored to the nature of the specific border
situation. It must include:
An interagency information system that can point to
likely areas of intrusion
A ``trip-wire'' to detect an intrusion and alert the
system. A means to aim or focus an imaging sensor at the point
of intrusion or other alerting cues
A communication of an image containing the suspected
intruder to a human agent for confirmation
Collaboration of information from available sources,
including the sensors, to expedite and improve the analysis
process
Presentation to the human decision-maker in a form
that is immediately sufficient to make an informed decision
A means to expeditiously dispatch an agent to
intercept the intruder
An effective concept of operations, with the
associated procedures and training to accomplish the above.
There are a number of options for systems that meet this construct.
Table 1 depicts some of the more powerful techniques.
Air intruders are an additional threat. These could be manned
aircraft--perhaps a Cessna 172 piloted by a terrorist or a smuggler of
narcotics or humans, or could be an unmanned aircraft, ranging in size
and complexity from a miniature radio-controlled (RC) hobby model
capable of carrying a few ounces of a deadly chemical agent to a Cessna
172 aircraft that has been rigged for unmanned operation, perhaps
looking like a conventional manned aircraft with a mannequin in the
cockpit seat but carrying 500 lbs. of explosive. The Air Force
Scientific Advisory Board has recently studied this problem.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Air Force Scientific Advisory Board Study, ``Air Defense
Against UAVs,'' 2006.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Low and slow small aircraft pose unique challenges to our air
defense system. Often the radar features that improve the ability to
discern aircraft from background ground traffic by remove the slow
movers (judged to be ground vehicles) on the basis of speed, would
similarly gate out the UAVs and slow manned aircraft. Technology
efforts are in order to address the processing of slow-moving small
aircraft from background clutter.
The second key challenge for air targets is to determine intent.
Given that the goal will be to force the air vehicle to the ground or
shoot it down, we must be quite certain that this air vehicle has a
hostile intent. This will be extremely difficult to determine and
sensors are not available to accomplish the task. Intelligence will be
the best indicator.
It will be especially important to provide air defense for the
National Capitol Region and National Special Security Events, but
borders must be considered as well.
The key to effective border surveillance and security is the
intelligence that allows the security team to concentrate their search
efforts and prepare the agent team. This cannot be over-emphasized, and
includes intelligence information gained from the point of origin of
the would-be intruders as well as the local intelligence information on
staging areas and transportation means. The information may be gained
over a significant time and geographical span, thus requiring both an
effective network and an efficient correlation and dissemination
process. This will be addressed in a later section.
Sensors
Sensor technology for airborne applications is very well developed.
The experiences in Iraq have demonstrated the advanced capabilities,
and have generated yet further improvements in sensor systems, driven
by the unique nature of the operations of the adversary. The military
laboratories and industry have succeeded in gaining high resolution and
compact packaging such that even small UAVs can carry the sensors and
associated communications equipment. Table 2 shows the common sensors
for this application.
Despite the fact that Unattended Ground Sensors (UGS) have been in
development for many years,\2\ the state-of-the-art is still lagging.
The military services have been slow to develop and employ ground
sensors, largely due to wariness as to the performance. The DHS Customs
and Border Protection has reportedly placed some 11,000 (11,000 sensors
spaced 100 feet means approximately 200 miles of ground-sensor
monitored border) along the northern and southwestern borders. The
false alarm rate has been uncomfortably high for sensor detections
(animals, sun glint, etc.), and short battery life. Yet, their have
been successes in other government laboratories\3\ the commercial world
including the development of grape-size sensors that are capable of
self-organizing and robust networking. Table 3 provides advantages and
disadvantages of the ground sensors.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ Perhaps one of the most widely-publicized failures of ground
sensors was McNamara's attempt to stall supply flows along the Ho Chi
Ming trail in Vietnam during that conflict.
\3\ Sandia National Laboratories has an excellent unattended ground
sensor program.
The false alarm rate was the Achille's Heel of the Southeast Asia
application of ground sensors. More recently, the use of combination
sensors (acoustic with seismic, for example) coupled with the progress
in miniature processing hardware has shown great promise for low false
alarm rates and long battery performance. This unattended ground
sensors offer great promise for the monitoring for border intrusions,
particularly in areas of dense vegetation and rough terrain.
There remain some important areas for further technology
development. These tend to be more in the effective utilization of
current sensing regimes
Multi- and Hyperspectral Imagery sensors for
detection and identification of humans from airborne & UGS
platforms. Hyperspectral imaging offers the capability for
identification of vehicles and, perhaps, humans. Moreover, it
has shown promise in the identification of packages and
equipment being transported across borders.
Automatic Target Classification/Recognition
techniques for EO & IR imagery. The key to improving the
efficiency of the limited number of border agents is to provide
tools, such as the ability to scan images for humans or
targets, to provide alerts with low false alarm categorization
of the detection to the operator.\4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ The gambling casinos are now using automatic recognition
techniques to spot undesirable participants.
Low cost, miniature, self-organizing, multi-sensor
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
unattended ground sensors for detection and classification
Acoustic
Seismic
EO
Imaging IR
Thermal IR
This is perhaps the most promising area of technology
development for the border surveillance. The sensing elements
should be developed further to reduce size and battery power,
and the processing of multiple complementary sensors for
improved recognition or reduced false alarm rate is important.
Radar processing techniques for extracting small slow
moving air and ground targets from background low speed
clutter. To date, MTI radar has been very effective in
generating a situational awareness picture of a battle area,
including the tracking of supply and equipment movements, but
the slow speed and small cross-section of humans has limited
effectiveness against humans. There is now hope for the
detection of slow moving humans, and that area needs a
technology investment.
UAV Platforms
The unmanned aerial vehicle has revolutionized the airborne sensor
world. The aircraft and propulsions are mature and efficient. The
vehicle mission management systems are reliable, partly due to improved
hardware and software and partly due to the redundancy now being
included in such aircraft as Predator B. They have the advantage (over
manned aircraft) of long endurance--30 to 50 hours. UAVs (like manned
aircraft) tend to avoid failures once airborne, so the long endurance
affects reliability as well.
The experiences of the Air Force and CIA in operation of long
surveillance flights have been excellent. Predator and Global Hawk UAVs
have been instrumental in gaining surveillance information around the
clock. Both have been paired very successfully with attack aircraft.
The Predator UAV has been successful in lingering in harms way to
monitor suspected hideouts and laser designating targets for buddy
strike. There have been cases of Predator surveillance of IED placement
that resulted in many saved lives.
Even within the Border Patrol mission, UAVs have shown their value.
The Predator B has been quite successful in its operation, being given
credit for finding, tracking and the eventual capture of border
crossing intruders. There have been a minimum of failures.
There are some advocates for aerostats as sensor platforms. In view
of their inability to cope with higher winds, they seem to be achieving
a 60-70 percent airborne rate. The UAV can move closer to an area to
increase the look-down (grazing) angle, providing a better opportunity
to view areas of vegetation, structures and terrain. Aerostats do not
have that flexibility. In my mind, the low rate, combined with the need
for substantial real estate and ground support equipment suggests the
UAV for the mission.
An area of possible technology investment would be in the
development of a hybrid aerostat that could morph to a parafoil kite
when winds increased, and thus stay on station.
Table 4 shows the classes of UAVs suitable for border surveillance.
Within the classes of possible UAVs for border security, the medium
altitude endurance UAVs are most suited because they give the best
trade between cost and endurance, with the border surveillance mission.
But there remain UAV technology issues deserving attention.
Developing and operating UAVs present unique technology needs that go
beyond the airframes and propulsion (and border surveillance flights):
Human-System Integration--situational awareness,
controls and displays, health management, and emergency
procedures all require improved HSI.
Detect, See and Avoid techniques that are highly
automated, vision-based systems are needed for UAV operations
(and would benefit civil and military aircraft).
Automatic Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance
System (TCAS) to do the tasks of the current TCAS, but
translate the alerts into control commands suitable for
avoiding collisions.
Automated landing systems based on GPS but tailored
for UAVs suitable for alternate precision landings at all
airports.
Automated voice for declaration of position and
intentions for lost-comm or other emergency situations, and for
receiving emergency comms from disadvantaged nodes.
Communications networks that support machine-to-
machine connectivity between ATC and UAV operators.
One might have expected NASA to pioneer in developing many of the
technologies listed above, as UAVs have both military and commercial
applications in addition to those of the DHS. The UAV National Industry
Team (UNITE) and the NASA ACCESS 5 Project were addressing the issues.
With the reduction in the NASA aeronautics budget, ACCESS 5 was
canceled and it appears this will not happen. The military services and
DHS are not funded to accomplish this either.
Certification of new systems will be rigorous, and is beyond the
means of the UAV industry to fund. Here the Government should support
this process, as it is long and costly.
Intelligence and Information Management
While I see much to be accomplished in the development of new
sensors, our major shortfall, both in the military and in homeland
border security, is the inability to effectively and efficiently deal
with the large amount of information that is collected by our sensors
or is available from other sources. This problem starts with the
gathering of that information which will help us determine when and
where sensors should be placed. This needn't be tapping of telephones
or bugging residences, but is a matter of understanding the nature of
the border (e.g., what is the terrain like; where are access points
from highways; did it snow heavily in this area today), monitoring
locations that might give indications of impending activity, and
understanding the nature and behavior patterns of the individuals being
sought. From this analysis, the limited resource budget of sensing
systems and responding agents can be efficiently deployed. The notion
of 24/7 surveillance of the entire border (or even 10 percent of the
border) from the air is just not practical.
A good analogy is that of the ardent deer hunter. The deer hunter
doesn't go out and sit at the first stump to wait for a deer. He (or
she) has analyzed the general hunting area and selected an area most
likely to be productive. Further analysis will tell the hunter which
paths the deer will likely take under what conditions of weather and
time of day. The deer doesn't worry about deer coming across a river or
lake (though it sometimes happens). The hunter selects a location from
which to observe, and uses his natural sensors wisely--usually motion
or noise are the tipoff, and the combination of the two--eyes sensing a
movement as the noise emanates from the same spot. The hunter then
casts a focused eyeball on the source of the movement or noise will
confirm the target, and track that `target'' to the point of
``intercept.'' Those same eyeballs couldn't possibly ``image'' all the
area all the time.
The second information shortfall is that of communicating sensed
data to a location(s) at which these data can be fused, analyzed,
compared to stored data, stored, and presented in a coherent picture to
the operator--Thomas Friedman terms this ``connect and collaborate.''
At the current time, information is available, but difficult to access.
Information is located within various organizations and many locations.
The information may be seconds old or years old. Data formats are
different. Scales may be different on different images. The sources may
have different levels of credibility.
The presentation to the decision maker is the final level of
information management. The agent who must decide on a course of action
has little time. He cannot search databases for relevant information.
He, or she, must be presented with a fused picture that includes the
material with appropriate indications of the reliability and nature of
the information. It may be necessary to discuss the information with
another individual, so the information must be shared, whether the
distant individual has a 21-inch screen at the command center or a PDA
he has carried into the movie theater.
Little attention has been given to information management. The Air
Force Scientific Advisory Board has recently completed a study\5\ which
makes the case for inter-operability and the integration of
information. In that study, it is pointed out that recent programs have
created ``stovepipes'' of information, and solutions that lean toward
integrating stovepipe systems will simply create further stovepipes.
Instead, inter-operability, achieved by metadata tagging (recording the
data about the data--time and location, context, content descriptions,
format) of all data can make it accessible to all. Moreover, the use if
a service-oriented architecture providing the common tools for
transferring, storing, fusing, and disseminating data assures a
coherent management of the information.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ Air Force Scientific Advisory Board, ``Domain Integration,''
2005.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
I see the following areas as important information technology
investment areas:
Communications networking
Internet Protocol (IP) based communications sensor
networking
Self-forming/self healing network management
Low power dynamically variable bandwidth comms for
ground sensors.
Data management and knowledge generation
Descriptive metadata (i.e., content, context, and
structure)
Semantic matching
Geospatial and temporal registration (co-
registration of multi-sensor data)
Fusion
Real-time publish-subscribe-query service
Rules and tools for constructing metadata
vocabularies
Automated metadata insertion into legacy databases
Rules for information sharing
Performance issues when scaling to many COIs and
operational users.
Visualization technology
Aids to interpretation of large amounts of imagery
Aids to human interpretation of machine data
Aids to developing a concise and complete
situational assessment picture in a timely manner for
the decision-maker.
An Approach
It seems fitting to make some comment relative to achieving the
improved border security capitalizing on the technology advancements.
In so far as developing the pertinent technologies is concerned,
there are some fundamental science issues and as the science is
matured, there are some prototyping and experimentation phases. To be
sure, there will be a need to focus resources. I am concerned that the
costs, both direct and overhead, associated with a new/expanded DHS
sensors laboratory program will be significant. I see the need to
partner with Service laboratories\6\ in the technology program, not
only in capitalizing on the lessons learned in long years of military
endeavor in sensor development, production, deployment, and employment,
but also in using facilities and other resources already in place. Some
arrangement to, perhaps, provide funding and tasking to the military
laboratories for sensor developments, or to co-locate DHS scientists
with military laboratory teams should be pursued.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ The partnering of the National Law Enforcement & Corrections
Technology Center--Northeast Region with the Air Force Research
Laboratory--Information Directorate is a good step.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Testing should also be conducted in conjunction with military. Once
again, sharing the cost of the tests will lead to joint management and
sharing the results. Over and above that, there exist test ranges,
experienced test managers, and procedures that could be used jointly to
satisfy the needs of both DHS and the Military.
For the development of a system of advanced sensors, processing
systems, and command centers, I strongly recommend against turn-key
integrated systems, Much of the past work addressing integration has
actually been focusing on creating monolithic large scale systems. This
a costly approach that inevitably restricts the introduction of new
elements to those provided by the integration contractor. An end user
only requires virtual integration--he needs to receive integrated data.
He does not require actual domain integration nor does he have the
responsibility and resources to accomplish it. For this reason, and
many others, it is prudent to define an architecture that is flexible
and is inter-operable with the legacy systems. Quality of Service
should be the metric, and hence a service-oriented architecture (SOA)
is in order. A service-oriented architecture is an approach to defining
integration-architectures based on the concept of service. A service is
a collection of applications, data, and tools with which one interacts
via message exchange.
Integrate information, not systems
Finally, It is important to adopt an evolutionary acquisition
approach. I quote from an Air Force Instruction:
``Evolutionary acquisition (EA) is a nontraditional,
overarching acquisition strategy that a program can use to
develop and field a core capability meeting a valid requirement
with the intent to develop and field additional capabilities in
successive increments.''\7\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ From Air Force Instruction 63-123, ``Evolutionary Acquisition
of C2 Systems,'' 1 Apr. 2000.
``The simple goals of EA for systems are to achieve
modernization and deployment efficiently and quickly. Use of an
EA strategy for systems will deliver a core operational
capability sooner by dividing a large, single development into
many smaller developments or increments. EA allows a program to
quickly respond to changing conditions by allowing each
increment to accommodate the following three activities: 1)
develop new capabilities supporting the operational
requirements and goals of the system, 2) exploit opportunities
to insert new technologies that reduce cost of ownership or
accelerate fielding of new capabilities resulting from
experimentation or technology demonstrations, and 3) refine
current capabilities based on user feedback, testing, or
experimentation.'' \8\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Summary
There have been shown to be several border security technology
areas worthy of increased emphasis by the Department of Homeland
Security Customs and Border Protection service. For the most part, the
developments are not breakthrough basic science, but rather a matter of
applying science and making it available in a deployable form for
application to the borders. More importantly, it is a matter of
processing the raw data from multiple sensors, along with intelligence
information data, in such a way as to extract the full content of
knowledge from the data. This is not a job for sensor developers, but
for information experts with a strong understanding of the sensor
outputs. It seems we have radar experts and EO/IR experts and UAV
experts, but lack in ``find the human'' experts.
This testimony is formulated to suggest the maturation of the
technologies be conducted jointly with the U.S. military services. The
techniques for the detection of humans entering the United States are,
with minor variations in employment, essential to the protection of
U.S. Forces and U.S. interests abroad.
Biography for Peter R. Worch
EDUCATION
Oklahoma State University, Ph.D., Electrical Engineering
Oklahoma State University, M.S., Electrical Engineering
Union College, B.S., Electrical Engineering
PROFESSIONAL SUMMARY
Dr. Worch is a senior systems scientist with over forty years R&D
experience in the areas of avionics, communications, navigation,
intelligence, command and control, emitter location, identification and
surveillance; as well as overall military technology research and
development management. He has been assisting in unmanned air vehicle
(UAV) development programs and in UAV payload development efforts. Dr.
Worch is a member of the Air Force Scientific Advisory Board.
Dr. Worch is a Research Scientist with George Mason University,
conducting research in command and control systems concepts.
EXPERIENCE
Consultant (1994 to Present).
Dr. Worch provides assistance in operational, technical, and
program analyses as well as both strategic and tactical sensor,
electronic warfare, and C3I architecture studies. He
conducts analyses in time critical targets, UAVs, reconnaissance
sensors, C3I interface for advanced weapons systems,
avionics, data links, smart weapons, navigation; LPI/LPE
communications, electronic warfare and information warfare. He is also
an advisor in the SIGINT technologies.
Manager, Defense Systems Technology Operation, SAIC (1989-1994).
Dr. Worch directed the activities of three Divisions involved in
advanced research and development programs. The activities were
primarily in the area of advanced C3I and reconnaissance/
surveillance technology with emphasis on sensor technology for the
detection recognition of ground and air targets that are hidden or
possess reduced observables characteristics. Dr. Worch served directly
as a technical advisor to ARPA on numerous program areas relating to
C3I.
Manager, C3I Technology Division, SAIC (1982-1989).
Dr. Worch was involved in operational and technical analyses as
well as both strategic and tactical sensor, electronic warfare, and
C3I architecture studies corporate-wide. He conducted
analyses and managed programs in relocatable targets, RPVs,
reconnaissance systems, C3I interface for advanced weapons
systems, data links, smart weapons, navigation; LPI/LPE communications,
electronic warfare and C3CM. He was active in C3I
R&D for strategic, tactical and special operations forces.
U. S. Air Force (1957-1981).
Dr. Worch served in numerous roles as an Air Force officer
including both development and maintenance of communications and
electronics systems; weapons systems; and avionics equipment of
tactical and airlift aircraft. He served as project engineer
responsible for research and exploratory development of electromagnetic
signal reconnaissance techniques, communications and navigation
projects at Rome Laboratory (formerly Rome Air Development Center). Dr.
Worch completed his service as Vice Commander of Rome Air Development
Center at which he was principal assistant to the Commander and shared
responsibility for command and direction of the Center research and
development in command, control, communications and intelligence.
R&D Program Manager, Tactical Technology Office, DARPA (1973-1976).
Managed and technically directed multi-service exploratory
development efforts of critical importance to defense programs.
Initiated, planned, directed and evaluated programs in electronics
intelligence, advanced communications, advanced LPI airborne radar,
target identification, navigation, and low observables aircraft.
Directed and participated in OSD studies, symposia and panels of
technical and operational nature. Dr. Worch conceived and managed a
program for precision emitter location from remotely piloted vehicles
(RPV) and participated in RPV communications and sensor system
developments. He formulated and directed programs in bistatic radar and
low probability of intercept airborne radar.
PUBLICATIONS
Reports
Worch, P.R., et al., Strategic Conventional Standoff Capability (SCSC)
C3I System Architecture (U), AAMRC-TR-86-031,
SECRET/NOFORN, 1987.
Worch, P.R., et al., Mission Electronic Equipment for Special
Operations Forces (U), SAIC Report to DARPA/TTO, SECRET, 1984.
Worch, P.R., et al., Joint STARS Radar Review Final Report (U), SAI
Report to DARPA/TTO, SECRET,1984.
Worch, P.R., et al., Far Term Fighter Force Modernization (U), SAI
Report to U.S. Air Force Aeronautical Systems Division, SECRET,
1984.
Worch, P.R., et al., System Options for an Enduring Strategic C3
Capability (U), Institute for Defense Analyses, Report S-548,
TOP SECRET, 1983.
Worch, P.R., LPI Communications; Background and Solution Concepts (U),
SAI report to DARPA, SECRET, 15 April 1983.
Worch, P.R., et al., System Options for Improving Joint Tactical
C3 Capabilities (U), Institute for Defense Analysis,
Report S-545, SECRET, 1983.
Worch, P.R., Communications and Navigation Technology for Remotely
Controlled Vehicles, A Part of the RADC RCV R&D Study, 25 April
1972.
Worch, P.R., Communications and Navigation for Remotely Piloted
Vehicles, RADC, 16 July 1971.
Worch, P.R., et al., Laser Communications Study, RADC, 30 December
1970.
Worch, P.R., (Ph.D. Dissertation), An Experimental Investigation of
Generation--Recombination Noise in Double-Injection Diodes,
Oklahoma State University Graduate College, 1970.
Worch, P.R., Transverse Mode Studies in a Helium-Neon Gas Laser,
Oklahoma State University School of Electrical Engineering,
Department Report, 1965.
MAJOR ADVISORY ACTIVITIES
2006 Co-Chair, AFSAB Summer Study, ``Air Defense Against UAVs''
2005 Member, DARPA Study, ``Vertical Dominance''
2005 Member, AFSAB Quick Look Study, ``Automatic Target Recognition''
2005 Member, Air Force Operational Test and Evaluation Advisory Group
2005 Co-Chair, AFSAB Ad Hoc Study, ``Domain Integration''
2004-2005 Member, DARPA J-UCAS Senior Advisory Group
2004 Vice Chair, AFSAB Summer Study, ``Networking to Enable Coalition
Operations''
2004 Member, Aerospace Command, Control, Intelligence, Surveillance,
Reconnaissance Center (AC2ISRC) Commander's Advisory Group
2004 Member, Air Combat Command Commander's Advisory Group
2004 Member, Air Force Operational Test and Evaluation Center
Commander's Advisory Group
2003 Panel Chair, AFSAB Summer Study, ``Unmanned Aerial Vehicles in
Perspective''
2003 Chair, Air Force Special Operations Command Commander's Advisory
Group
2002 Chair, AFSAB Quick Look Study, ``Low Observable Aircraft
Maintenance Technologies''
2002 Member, AFSAB Summer Study, ``Immediate Attack Deep in Hostile
Territory''
2001 Chair, Concealed Targets Panel, AFSAB Summer Study, ``Sensor
Technology for Difficult Targets''
2000 Member, ASD C3I Joint Services Advisory Group (JSAG)
on C3I
2000 Chair, AFSAB Summer Study, ``Air Force Command and Control--The
Path Ahead''
1999 Co-Chair, AFSAB Summer Study, ``Technology Options to Leverage
Aerospace Power In Other Than Conventional War Situations''
1998, 2000, 2006 Chair, AFSAB S&T Review of Sensor Programs
1998 Member, AFSAB Summer Study, ``Aerospace Operations in the 21st
Century: An Investment Strategy''
1997 Member, AFSAB Summer Study, ``Global Air Navigation System''
1996 Chairman, AFSAB Summer Study, ``UAV Technologies and Combat
Operations''
1995 Member, Sensors Technology Panel, AFSAB Summer Study, New World
Vistas Long Range Forecast
1995 Chairman, AFSAB Study, ``F-22 Electronic Combat Effectiveness
Testing''
1994 Member, SAB Ad Hoc Study on Technology Opportunities for Wide
Area and Local Area Communications
1994-1996 Member, C3I Science & Technology Panel, Air Force
Scientific Advisory Board
1994 Chairman, Special Missions Aircraft Panel, Air Force Scientific
Advisory Board Summer Study, ``Mission Support and Enhancement for the
Foreseeable Aircraft Force Structure''
1993 Member, C3 Panel, Air Force Scientific Advisory Board
Summer Study, ``Options for Theater Air Defense''
1992-1993 Member, Air Force Studies Board ``Committee on Counterforce
Options Against Tactical Missiles''
1992 Member, Space and C3I Panel, Air Force Scientific
Advisory Board Summer Study, ``Concepts and Technologies for Global
Power--Global Reach''
1990-1991 Chairman, DARPA Advanced Targeting Technology Program Red
Team
1991 Member, Communications Architecture Panel, Air Force Scientific
Advisory Board Summer Study, ``Off-Board Sensor Data to Support
Military Combat Air Operations''
1985 Member, ECM, Sensors & Navigation Panel and C3 Panel,
Air Force Scientific Advisory Board Summer Study, ``Enhancement of
Special Operations Forces (SOF)''
1982 Member, C3 Panel, Air Force Scientific Advisory Board
Summer Study, ``Enhancement of Airlift in Force Projection''
1978 Member, The Technology Cooperation Program (TTCP), Subgroup K,
Radar Technology
1977-1979 Group Member and Subgroup Chairman, NATO Project 2000, Phase
II. Study on Target Detection, Location and Identification
1975 Co-Chairman, Joint Services Emitter Identification Conference
1975 Panel Chairman, EUCOM Target Acquisition Seminar
1975-1976 Associate Member, Air Force Scientific Advisory Board Panel
on TDOA Emitter Location Sorting
1975 Associate Member, Defense Science Board Task Force on
Identification, Friend, Foe or Neutral
1975 Co-Chairman, DOD Integrated Tactical Information System Study
Group
1975 Member, CIA Study Group on Precision Guided Munitions
1974 Chairman, DOD NAVSTAR Weapon Guidance Workshop
1974 Co-Chairman, Tri-Service Millimeter Wave Workshop
1974 Member, DOD Intelligence Research and Development Council Task
Force on Intercept and Position Fixing
MISCELLANEOUS
Commercial Pilots License with Single, Multi-engine and Instrument
Ratings
First Class Radiotelephone License
Senior Member, IEEE
Member, Eta Kappa Nu
Top Secret and SCI Clearances
Chairman Boehlert. Thank you very much.
I am quite familiar with the Rome----
Dr. Worch. Aren't we both.
Chairman Boehlert.--enterprise. Yes.
Dr. Prado.
STATEMENT OF DR. GERVASIO PRADO, PRESIDENT, SENTECH, INC.
Dr. Prado. Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman and----
Chairman Boehlert. Your microphone, please, Doctor. I don't
think the microphone is on.
Dr. Prado. Okay. Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman, Members of
the Committee. I am very honored to have been invited to
testify and share some of our experiences in the area of
sensors, in particular in the protection of our borders.
Because the time is short here, I would request that my
written statements be introduced into the record. I will now
just address a few of the points in a more informal way.
My company and I have been involved in the area in the
development of unattended ground sensor systems for some years
now. We have had support from DARPA, Sandia National Labs, and
various other government agencies. We have been able to
participate in some of the more important sensor programs and
demonstrations that have been conducted over the last decade.
Unattended ground sensors is an area that combines the use
of passive sensors. The ones which we specialize in are
acoustic, seismic, and electro-optic imagers, you know, like
either day imagers or thermal imagers, and combining them into
an integrated system that can work together and produce
actionable intelligence. These sensors, of course, have to
operate. They will be designed with an extremely low power
consumption, be able to operate in extremes of weather
conditions of hot and cold. They have to operate in concert,
several different types of sensors together, to produce the
best intelligence possible and to extract the most useful
critical properties of each of these types of sensing
technologies. Finally, they have to be networked and--so that
they can communicate that information to the user, sometimes
over extremely long distances.
And I would like to just discuss an application that we
have worked on where it involves the use of multiple sensors to
survey an area of terrain in a very remote location. You would
have acoustic and seismic sensors detecting the presence of
people or personnel along a road or a trail. These sensors
would alert a communications gateway device that is connected
to a thermal imager, and that imager would then take pictures
of the intrusion, you know, whether it is people or vehicles,
track those vehicles, select the images that are most useful in
terms of clarity and sharpness, compress them, and then pass
them onto the communications device that can transmit that
information, literally, to the other end of the world where
that will appear on the desk of an analyst as in the form of an
e-mail with a picture and the detection data.
This type of technology has been made possible visually by
using various off-the-shelf technologies that have been
developed, like GPS, communications satellites. A lot of the
sensing technology that we use, for example, is derived from
Navy projects dedicated to acoustic detection underwater. And
all of this is now being put together. We need to work on the
way to implement it more reliably at an affordable cost. We
realize that when we put these sensors out on the field, we
cannot rely on the abundant infrastructure that we have
available in--you know, in the cities or, you know, populated
areas.
So finally, you know, the real emphasis in terms of new
research and development that needs to be applied here is not
so much in the research on new transducers or cameras but in
the application of intelligence that is embedded on the
processors, the signal-on-image processing technologies that
allow us to extract the information from the sensors and
communicate them to the users in a form that is actionable.
I would like to conclude my statements by saying that, from
a personal perspective, as an immigrant from Cuba, I am very
aware--it has given me a perspective on the intense attraction
that this country has for people that are seeking freedom and
opportunity. And that creates an enormous demand for entering
the country, some of which is channeled in legal means, but
unfortunately, a lot of it is channeled through illegal
immigration. And we have to address that problem, because it
causes severe socioeconomic problems in our society.
I want to thank the Committee for inviting me, and that
concludes my remarks.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Prado follows:]
Prepared Statement of Gervasio Prado
Good Afternoon, Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee; I am
very pleased to have the opportunity to share with you my perspectives
on the use of technology to improve the security of our borders.
I am Gervasio Prado, President of SenTech, Inc., a small defense
contractor in Stoneham, Massachusetts. My working career spans 35 years
spent at various research and development institutions. During the last
20 years I have specialized in the development of Unattended Ground
Sensors (UGS), the last thirteen of them at SenTech, the company I
founded in 1993. Over the last decade, we have participated in many UGS
programs funded by DARPA, the U.S. Army and other agencies. I came to
this country with my family from Cuba in 1960. We were able to enter
the United States legally and my family's success is a testimony of the
opportunities that this country offers to people coming here from all
over the world.
I would like to talk about a technology widely used to survey
border areas both here and overseas. Unattended Ground Sensors (UGS)
are devices that can be placed in remote areas, where they will operate
for a long time detecting, processing and transmitting information to
military or law enforcement personnel that can act on that information.
This technology has a long history that started during the Vietnam
conflict, with a variety of acoustic and seismic devices being
developed and deployed along the Ho Chi Minh Trail. After the Gulf War
in 1991, there was considerable interest in using UGS to detect and
locate mobile missile launchers and other high value targets. In recent
years, the emphasis has turned towards the detection and localization
of civilian vehicles and personnel. This change in emphasis coincided
with the increased need and interest in using sensors along the border
as an alternative to expensive physical barriers.
A variety of these types of sensors exist and some are in limited
use along the Southwest border of the U.S. The preferred sensing
technologies are passive (sensors that do not emit radiation to detect
the targets) because they use less power and are more difficult to
detect than active sensors. The technologies employed are acoustic,
seismic, imaging--both infrared and visual and passive infrared.
Acoustic sensors are very effective in detecting ground and air
vehicles. They are easy to conceal, do not need line of sight to the
target and generally have very low power consumption. Their performance
is affected by changes in the atmospheric conditions, but generally
they will detect most vehicles at several hundred meters and heavy
trucks or military vehicles at ranges of one kilometer or more.
Acoustic sensors are not very effective at detecting personnel.
Seismic sensors are effective against both vehicles and personnel,
although their detection range is more limited than that of acoustic
sensors. They can be completely buried, making them very good for
stealthy deployment. Seismic sensors can generally detect a person
walking at ranges of 30 to 50 meters. However, their performance will
vary greatly from site to site.
Passive Infra-Red Sensors are very effective as trip-line sensors.
They are very inexpensive and economical, however they have to be
carefully emplaced and are harder to conceal.
Visual Imaging Cameras provide excellent resolution pictures and
are very reasonably priced if they are meant to be used during the
daytime or twilight hours. In extremely low light conditions Infra-Red
Imagers have a definite advantage. Their main drawback is that they are
very expensive, although the price of IR cameras with un-cooled
detectors has been coming down in the last few years.
At the heart of an Unattended Ground Sensor System there is a
capable digital signal or image processor that has the task of
extracting the relevant information from the transducer outputs. It is
in the programming of this device that the art and science of sensor
design is based. Sensors must also communicate their results in a
reliable and economical way. Sensors are typically linked in a network
to a communications Gateway that is used to concentrate the collected
data and transmit it over a long haul link (typically a satellite
link). The design of distributed sensor networks has become a very
active field of research because of its many military and commercial
applications. Distributed sensor networks are certain to find an
important role in border surveillance.
The most effective utilization of Unattended Ground Sensors
involves the use of multiple sensors of different types in order to
exploit the unique capabilities of each. For example: Several seismic
sensors can be placed to detect people walking along a trail. These
sensors, which can operate with minimal power consumption, will send a
signal to a Gateway unit connected to a visual or infrared imager. The
imager, which has relatively high power consumption, is only turned on
when there is a potential target in its field of view. A built-in image
processor on the imager detects the moving target, compresses the
picture and hands it over to the Gateway to be sent to the user.
Coordinating or fusing the data from sensors with very dissimilar
capabilities increases the reliability of the reports, and reduces
false alarms. It is important to remember that sensors cannot determine
the intent of the targets detected, only their presence, location and
direction. In this respect the use of imagers acquires a special
importance when trying to allocate limited human resources over an
extensive border area.
When we are considering the possibility of large numbers of sensors
spread over a large area, the amount of information that can be
generated could easily overwhelm the communications links and the
personnel monitoring the sensors. The biggest challenges to the design
of an Unattended Sensor system are: first to limit the number of false
alarms to an extremely low rate; second, to extract and condense the
relevant information as much as possible. To achieve these objectives,
sensors need to be endowed with as much local signal and image
processing capability as possible to make sure that only the essential
information is reaching the user.
In summary, Unattended Ground Sensors is a mature technology that
is available to provide surveillance over large areas of our borders
and enhances the capability of our law-enforcement agents. We now have
to apply our organizational skills to fund, deploy and utilize this
technology.
Small companies are often at the cutting edge of technology
development. They take risks that larger companies avoid and thus form
one of this country's most valuable resources. From our perspective,
the Department of Homeland Security can play an important role in
furthering the development of new technologies that are being conceived
on a regular basis at these small companies.
Some specific suggestions that would further these goals are:
a) Providing better access to DHS personnel at the operational
level in order to get first hand feedback of the utility of new
technologies.
b) Making test and evaluation facilities available to small
companies, where they can get access to locations and scenarios
that would otherwise be available out of their reach.
c) Allowing small companies to keep more of the Intellectual
Property Rights developed under Government Contracts as a way
to stimulate participation in programs of critical national
importance.
d) An increase in the funding allocated to small companies
through the use of Broad Agency Announcements, SBIRs, etc.,
would always be helpful. Equally helpful would be a reduction
of earmarked funds and allocation of those funds through open
competitive procurements.
I would like to conclude with the observation that securing our
borders requires solutions that are well beyond the purely technical.
While legal immigrants make a very valuable contribution to our
society, illegal entries cause serious socio-economic problem. The flow
of undocumented aliens across our southwestern border is driven by the
lack of freedom and opportunity in their countries. The irresistible
desire to immigrate to our country will only be eliminated when their
countries have improved substantially their living standards and
political institutions.
Securing our borders against terrorists and criminals involved in
the drug trade is also a matter of the greatest urgency. Unfortunately,
these individuals have the resources to gain entrance to our country
legally as tourists, students or businessmen. Deducing the intent of a
person arriving at one of our entry points is a most difficult problem
without a purely technical solution. We simply need to remember that
most the 9/11 terrorists entered the country with legitimate passports
and visas.
Thanks again for the opportunity to share my thoughts with you
today.
Biography for Gervasio Prado
Dr. Prado is President of SenTech, Inc., founded in 1993. He led
the design of the acoustic-seismic sensor for the Steel Eagle and Steel
Rattler sensors. He has also participated in the IUGS and Sniper
Detection programs with DARPA. His company is currently participating
in the development of the Intelligent Munition System for FCS and
developing affordable hand-emplaced acoustic and electro-optic sensors
sensors.
From 1986 to 1993 Dr. Prado served as Manager of the Acoustic-
Seismic Sensor Group at Textron Defense Systems where he led the
development of the sensor for the Wide Area Mine. He has also held
positions at Bolt Beranek and Newman, MIT Lincol Laboratory and the
Charles Stark Draper Laboratory.
Dr. Prado received his Ph.D. From the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology in 1971 and a B.S. in 1966. Dr. Prado was born in Havana,
Cuba.
Chairman Boehlert. Thank you very much.
Dr. Pottie.
STATEMENT OF DR. GREGORY J. POTTIE, ASSOCIATE DEAN FOR RESEARCH
AND PHYSICAL RESOURCES, HENRY SAMUELI SCHOOL OF ENGINEERING AND
APPLIED SCIENCE, UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, LOS ANGELES
Dr. Pottie. Mr. Chairman, distinguished Members, thank you
for inviting me here. I am going to depart a little bit from my
written testimony, in order to respond to some of these things,
but I am not secure enough to depart from my PowerPoint.
So I am basically going to tell a bit of a story about my
own research in wireless sensor networks beginning in the mid
1990s and walk you through some of the lessons we learned from
our initial enthusiasm to some continued enthusiasm but in new
directions.
[Slide.]
So up here is a picture of some of the nodes that have been
developed. A sensor node basically includes a sensor of some
type, signal processing, a communications means, and some way
of networking this all together so that you can do some
processing in site, save energy, and potentially build larger
networks. And our--over the years, sensor nodes have developed
in two directions, basically trying to get the initial
functionality made smaller and also just adding new
capabilities as technology moves along. And we have been
involved in both directions.
[Slide.]
Our early idea was that large numbers of nodes could--with
limited capabilities could be deployed and collectively the
network would be very powerful. As it turns out, this original
vision had to be modified.
[Slide.]
So where we are now, I am Deputy Director of a--of SENDS,
an NSF-supported STC, where we are deploying sensor networks
for basic science applications, including contaminant transport
and other environmental issues. Our thesis in forming the
center was that only with the close cooperation of the end
users, in our case the scientists and the engineers, would we
end up with tools that would be very useful. And it turns out,
this has been right. Our initial ideas about what the
scientists would find useful were pretty well wrong, and over
four years, we have really changed our direction radically in
proceeding forward.
[Slide.]
So the--I am not going to read through all of this, but the
basic lesson is that the original vision of thousands of
unattended nodes was not realistic. The logistical issues in
deployment are much larger than we thought, and in fact, as
some of our other speakers have said, you need to include other
components. In particular, you need infrastructure and support
and a lot more attention to the user interaction: how does this
fit in with what the end user really wants? And to that end,
they need to be involved in basically all stages of the
development.
As an example of a successful test, we ended up with a
robotic node that is quickly deployed, and the scientists
determined which instrument package had to be developed, and it
resulted in something that was feasible. The kind of data we
got out of this would not have been possible with a pure ground
sensor deployment. We needed to think about infrastructure and
other ways to support what they needed.
[Slide.]
I have also been involved in military-supported research,
in this case DARPA, and this is an example of a deployment in
the year 2000. And here there are two major lessons to draw
from this. One is the logistics were really hard. Even
deploying this small number of nodes was difficult in the year
2000. We have progressed since then, but it is still not
something to take lightly. And then the second thing is it
works pretty well in finding vehicles. Finding vehicles at
distance, relatively simple nodes will do the job, because the
vehicles are loud, big, and generate wonderful signals.
But if you are trying to detect personnel, the matter is
quite different. What you are trying to find is small. It is
affected very much by the environment. Is a person walking on
soft sand? Are you trying to listen in wind? Are you listening
at night? Are you listening in the day? All of these things
have a huge impact on the range you have with the sensors. And
so, as has been pointed out by previous speakers, what you need
is a complete system where you have, perhaps, ground sensors as
tripwires, but you supplement it by imagers, UAVs, and most
critically, the personnel who know where you should place the
sensors. Just as an example of a border security possible
application, one could think of a dense network of sensors
running along a fence for a boundary, but the other deployments
at choke points specifically designed to find vehicles, say, in
locations where the Border Patrol suspects or knows that there
is likely to be traffic. And this whole system has to interact
with the users. I completely agree with Dr. Worch that this is
an information integration problem, and it needs to fit in with
what the agents do so that you don't end up with a system where
the Border Patrol agents are supporting the technology rather
than having the technology support the agents. And to that end,
how do we get there with a practical research program? So this
isn't simply a matter of letting out some contracts and saying,
``In six months, you will deliver this. In one year, you will
deliver the following,'' or down-selecting on that basis. This
is something that requires an interaction between multiple
research teams and the Border Patrol and other responsible
agencies so that you have this direct user-technology developer
interaction so that you end up in the end with a system that
meets their needs.
Our experience is that the tools we develop may seem really
cool to the engineers, and that is why we do them, but may be
totally useless for the end users. It is only if they are
involved in telling us how they are using the system, what is
deficient in it that we can produce the tools that they really
want and need.
And with that, I will conclude.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Pottie follows:]
Biography for Gregory J. Pottie
Gregory J. Pottie was born in Wilmington DE and raised in Ottawa,
Canada. He received his B.Sc. in Engineering Physics from Queen's
University, Kingston, Ontario in 1984, and his M.Eng. and Ph.D. in
Electrical Engineering from McMaster University, Hamilton, Ontario, in
1985 and 1988 respectively. From 1989 to 1991 he worked in the
transmission research department of Motorola/Codex in Canton MA, with
projects related to voice band modems and digital subscriber lines.
Since 1991 he has been a faculty member of the UCLA Electrical
Engineering Department, serving in vice-chair roles from 1999-2003.
Since 2003 he has also served as Associate Dean for Research and
Physical Resources of the Henry Samueli School of Engineering and
Applied Science. His research interests include reliable
communications, wireless communication systems, and wireless sensor
networks. His current focus is on the information theory of sensor
networks. From 1997 to 1999 he was secretary to the board of governors
for the IEEE Information Theory Society. In 1998 he received the Allied
Signal Award for outstanding faculty research for UCLA engineering. In
2005 he became a Fellow of the IEEE for contributions to the modeling
and applications of sensor networks. Dr. Pottie is the deputy director
of the NSF-sponsored science and technology Center for Embedded
Networked Sensing, a member of the Bruin Master's Swim Club
(butterfly), the St. Alban's Choir (2nd bass), and is a co-founder of
Sensoria Corporation.
Discussion
Chairman Boehlert. Thank you very much. And thank all of
you very much.
I tend to be very simplistic as I approach some of these
problems, and I think I speak for a lot of people when what we
are really looking for is some master plan with all of the
technologies and the integration with people using those
technologies that we can put down on the paper and just
implement the plan. If it was easy, it would have been done by
now. It is not easy. I understand that.
And Admiral, one of the things that I like to get out of
the hearings is, and we are privileged to have some of the most
distinguished people in the business before us on these panels
down here, as we have today, is we learn an awful lot. And I
would hope that you would take away an awful lot from this
meeting.
So I would like to begin the questioning by asking the non-
government witnesses what you think the top couple of research
priorities ought to be for DHS. And incidentally, I didn't
sense anybody mentioning DHS. You talked about DARPA funding
and NSF funding. Nobody was talking about DHS funding. But I
would like to know what you think the top couple of research
priorities ought to be at DHS and the border security area and
whether you think those priorities are being adequately
addressed. And then, Admiral, I would like you to respond to
what the witnesses say.
You and I are in the same business. We are not short of
people with ideas on how we both can do a better job. And you
are the new guy on the block, and so I want to use this as an
opportunity to help and--your education from the outside world.
So let us start with--well, let us go in the reverse order.
Mr. Pottie, you go first.
Dr. Pottie. Okay. Thank you.
So there were a couple of questions there. The first is why
didn't I mention DHS funding. And the answer is because we
don't have any. In preparation for this hearing, I looked at
the website, and indeed, there are a lot of contracts that have
short-term objectives and so on and oriented to COTS
technology. And I can understand why that would be, but there
haven't been large, long-range programs in the style of the way
DARPA was in the '90s, oriented towards academia. But a more
blue sky. Okay. And I can't responsibly put Ph.D. students on a
contract that could end in a year. I, you know--except--so I--
to engage in it, we need contracts that last longer, and that
is why most of our funding is now NSF, because it matches to
how we train the next generation of scientists and engineers.
As to what the priorities should be, I think it is
reasonable that a large fraction of their resources are now
going towards short-term, what can be done to plug the holes,
because it is a problem that was neglected for a long time. And
so a focus on commercial off-the-shelf technology is not bad,
in itself. It is really more a question of proportion. So how
much of the total pie is going to be given towards long range
so we can train the engineers and scientists----
Chairman Boehlert. Pause right there. Admiral Cohen, can
you respond to that?
Admiral Cohen. Absolutely. And you know me well enough,
Chairman, we are not going to get into tit for tat, because I
found myself agreeing, in large measure, as you would imagine,
with the other witnesses.
What I found at DHS S&T Directorate when I got there was
that the Directorate was aligned, in large measure, around
projects and because of the horrendous events of 9/11. And as
we go back in time and we think about those planes going into
the towers and in the Pentagon and I was there, and we think
about the Anthrax attack going on, there was a sense of what
was the risk and what were the priorities. And so probability
of occurrence versus consequence. The probability of occurrence
in our mind before 9/11 of those events happening or chemical
attack on our homeland or a biological attack other than the
occasional hoof-and-mouth disease that we see agriculturally,
was really not on our horizon. We understood the consequences,
but we didn't think it would happen. And so the Administration
and the Congress, in a bipartisan way, went ahead and focused
on the consequence: the chemical, the biological, the nuclear,
and the radiological.
And so the initial thrust of much of the research and
development in S&T in the Department of Homeland Security
focused on those four areas.
Chairman Boehlert. How are we changing?
Admiral Cohen. What--I briefed your staff, and I will put
up, very quickly, one--just one chart is if you execute----
[Slide.]
Chairman Boehlert. I can read that clearly.
Admiral Cohen. I will read it to you, sir, but you don't
need to worry about the black line.
Chairman Boehlert. Yeah.
Admiral Cohen. And we are working on improved vision.
Chairman Boehlert. Yeah.
Admiral Cohen. For me, not you, sir.
If you are aligned to project execution, as the projects
change, you must constantly realign. This is not how effective,
world-class S&T management organizations operate. And so what
you see here is six departments with enduring disciplines of
energetics, in my case, that is not nuclear and radiological,
chem-bio, C4ISR, and I must tell you, as I went forward with
this, people said, ``Oh, no, that is too military. It should be
command and control.'' But I will tell you that Dr. Worch has
it exactly right. It is command, control, computers,
communication, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance.
I don't have an air department. If need a platform, as Dr.
Worch has so eloquently described, that is a UAV, that is in
C4ISR. I have borders and maritime. Even though those are two
8,000-pound gorillas, customs and border protection and the
Coast Guard, if they are put together, they encircle our
borders, land and sea. Human factors. That was addressed. Man-
machine interface. Critically important. Understanding the
psychology of terrorism. And then finally infrastructure, and
to me, transportation is infrastructure that moves----
Chairman Boehlert. Admiral, with all due respect----
Admiral Cohen. Yes, sir.
Chairman Boehlert.--I want to focus more narrowly. And I
know the broad mission. And it is just--well, it is the biggest
restructuring of government since the post-World War II era.
Admiral Cohen. Yes, sir.
Chairman Boehlert. Twenty-two agencies, 180,000 people. And
I am not talking about all of the other stuff. We are focusing
on border security. Should there be more of a mix with short-
term and long-range projects? I think Dr. Pottie's suggestion--
--
Admiral Cohen. Well, he is absolutely right, and that is
why I started out my testimony by telling you I now have three
portfolios that cut across this with time, risk, and
investment. Those are acquisition enablers. The HSARPA
prototypical demonstrations to leap ahead. And then finally,
the basic research, which gives us, in the eight- to ten-year
timeframe, where the Ph.D.s and post-doctorates are investing
their time, the change in paradigm. And that is how you will
see, initially, the 2008 budget when it comes to you in
February, and then more fully filled out in the 2009 budget. I
have gotten the permission from OMB and from the Department to
go ahead and make those changes as best I can in the existing
budget structure now. We have Centers of Excellence, as you are
well of, that--where we do invest the basic research dollars,
but that is not universal----
Chairman Boehlert. Well, let me ask you this. Now you are
the new guy on the block, so----
Admiral Cohen. Yes, sir.
Chairman Boehlert.--I mean--and your evaluation of where we
have come so far in this new Department of Homeland Security,
your Directorate specifically. You talked about projects,
individual projects. You talked about consequences.
Admiral Cohen. Yes, sir.
Chairman Boehlert. Was there someone sort of concerned
about integrating those projects and integrating the use of
people and technology? Was there a master plan, did you find?
Or is that still in the development stage?
Admiral Cohen. I will tell you that it varies, but in the
area of borders, I have Merv Leavitt, who is now my Department
Head of Borders and Maritime, because of his demonstrated
performance in supporting the customer, which is Customs and
Border Patrol, in this case, on SBInet. And he has an eloquent
brief that shows you--incorporates all of the technologies,
near-term, mid-term, and long-term, as well as the integration,
the common operating picture, the man-machine interface, the
use of unmanned as well as manned vehicles, et cetera.
So in this area, we have been literally aligned with my
customer, which is CBP, for this. But that, to me, is not
adequate to get us to the next stage, and that is why I felt I
had to restructure.
Chairman Boehlert. All right. I--Dr. Prado, would you care
to share some observations?
Your microphone again.
Dr. Prado. I agree with Dr. Pottie here that the reason
that we didn't mention any DHS funding is because we haven't
seen any, at least at my level. Most of our funding has come
from sources like DARPA and the U.S. Army and so on. But what--
--
Chairman Boehlert. Give me your top one or two priorities
for--that you think DHS should focus on----
Dr. Prado. Right. well, the first priority that I think we
need, from my perspective, is to get a picture of how this
border security problem is going to be structured and how we
are going to decide what technologies would be best to use, how
they would be deployed, and get a sense of, you know, what the
operational utility of these sensors are, by having--letting us
get some direct feedback from the agents in the field as they
use the sensors so that we learn, you know, where it is that we
need to add more intelligence or condense the data or transmit
it faster.
Chairman Boehlert. But----
Dr. Prado. That, to me, is the first priority.
Chairman Boehlert. Right. And you two should be comforted
by Admiral Cohen's response. And I would think that maybe a
year or two from now, when we have another panel like this to
talk about this very subject, Admiral Cohen will be able to
report, ``Yeah, we have got the mixture, short-term, long-term,
and we do--we have heard them. And we have learned from them.
And we are investing both.''
Dr. Prado. Yeah. I don't envy his job as the----
Chairman Boehlert. It is tough.
Dr. Prado. The amount of--range of problems that you have
to address are so wide, you know, from the catastrophic 9/11
type events to the steady drip of illegal immigrants that are
crossing the borders.
Chairman Boehlert. Well, one of my closest friends, we were
elected together, we came to Congress together, and we are just
close friends, was given a God-awful job. Tom Ridge. He was the
first Director of Homeland Security. ``Make our nation safer.''
Good gosh. I don't think he got to sleep--any sleep any night,
any day of any month or any year.
Dr. Prado. That is right.
Chairman Boehlert. All right. Dr. Worch, how about you?
Dr. Worch. I am not privileged to know about the relative
amounts of funding in the DHS. I am just not familiar with that
part of it.
Chairman Boehlert. Well, I--quite frankly, I think I will
agree with Admiral Cohen. They are modest, and we ought to put
more into that Directorate, and this committee is trying to do
that.
Dr. Worch. Going into the areas where I think more work--
where the high priorities should be, certainly one is
information integration, as I mentioned. As Thomas Friedman put
it, ``Connect and collaborate.''
Chairman Boehlert. Yeah, that is right. The world is flat.
Dr. Worch. They need to get on with that. The world is
flat. Right. The other area--and that involves interagency
connection of information, and to do that, one needs to get
common databases, data tagging, and so on. I would refer the
panel to the Air Force Scientific Advisory Board's study on
domain integration, which talks about how do you get
information available in a form so that everybody can use it
that needs it without the battle that we have now. And
interagency is certainly part of that.
The other part is that airspace safety. Something needs to
be done with that. The sensors are coming along for the UAVs.
They are coming along because of military needs. There is one
area that hasn't been worked hard enough, that hasn't been
mentioned here, and that is defense of the borders against
slow, slow aircraft, including unmanned aircraft that someone
else might have to deliver goods across the border. That is
another subject.
But the sensors, in general, for the UAVs are coming along
quite nicely. The resolution is improving, their ability to
detect even humans, but we need to get that airspace safety
that--on--get FAA on board and get these airplanes in the air.
Chairman Boehlert. Admiral Cohen.
Admiral Cohen. That is exactly right. We have regulatory
issues that I believe are ``handle-able'' with the authorities.
I would tell you that the common operating picture that we are
basically talking about is critically important. We do that
today on the Web. You know. You don't worry about who you are
communicating with or what program they are using, because in
the marketplace, if people want to communicate by e-mail or
send you attachments, it has to be compatible. We have to
figure out how to be able to do that, not only on the borders,
but throughout the government. And I would just tell you, 20
years after Goldwater-Nickles, there are still challenges with
interoperability amongst the other department, of which I am no
longer----
Chairman Boehlert. Oh, I know.
Admiral Cohen.--associated.
Chairman Boehlert. Mr. Tyler--I have extended my time, but
I would hope my colleagues would agree that this is a good way
to open it up, and then I will shut up for a while.
Mr. Tyler.
Mr. Tyler. Chairman Boehlert, I think your question was
what should we invest in S&T in the short-term for this
problem. The SBInet solicitations said an SBInet is supposed to
do four things: detect entries, identify what they are,
classify the level of threat, and then respond. With 10,000
miles of borders, that has to be automated. If it takes a lot
of people, you haven't helped the problem. There is a lot going
on in all of those areas.
In automated detection, there are a lot of algorithms that
have been developed, not just for things like radar and sonar,
but things in the desert for a whole lot of applications, and
that needs to be brought to bear on this problem.
For identification, the big issue is false alarms. The
current system out there, the ISIS sensors that are seismic and
magnetic, they alarm every 44 seconds. They are probably
driving the Border Patrol agents crazy. There are a lot of
algorithms that exist right now to look at how you can reduce
false alarm rates, both in the acoustic and magnetic sensors,
as well as on the video, if you can get this--the video to pan.
So I think these are really two key areas for that.
For classifying the threat, once again, you need to look at
how you would automate that. And for responding, there are
decision aids. There are a lot of technologies.
So I think if you took the four areas that SBInet is
supposed to go after, looked at what the key technical issues
were, it would drive what the S&T is.
Chairman Boehlert. Admiral Cohen?
Admiral Cohen. And that is exactly the plan that has been
in place for over the last 18 months. That is what Merv Leavitt
has devoted his life to. And I think when the solicitation is
fulfilled, you will see much of that in place, but again, it
will be a phase.
Chairman Boehlert. Thank you very much.
And I have gone well over my time.
Mr. Gordon.
Mr. Gordon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
You did lay a good foundation for us.
Mr. Giddens, let us give you a chance to get involved here.
What is the state of the SBI strategic plan? Has it been
completed? And if not, why not?
Mr. Giddens. I--sir, the plan is in development. We have,
at least pending. As far as on the House side, there was
language in appropriations to deliver that this November. We
are on track to that and are working that hard to deliver that
strategic plan, including the resulting programs and metrics
that would go along with it.
Mr. Gordon. Well, do you see a problem in initiating the
SBInet contract before completing the strategic plan?
Mr. Giddens. No, sir. We think one of the key cornerstones
of this issue is being able to address the capacity and the
capability we have at the border to address the issue. We don't
think we can address the issue only by looking at the border.
We see it as a continuum that speaks beyond the border in terms
of what Dr. Worch talked about and in terms of intel and
understanding what is coming. But there is clearly a big aspect
of this that has to be addressed at the border, and we are
comfortable that there is going to be a fifth to that----
Mr. Gordon. Well, won't the plan help to influence the kind
of technologies you are going to need?
Mr. Giddens. Sir?
Mr. Gordon. Won't the content of the plan influence the
technologies that will be incorporated into this SBInet?
Mr. Giddens. No, sir. Our intent is to be somewhat
technology-agnostic in that we don't want to get linked into a
certain technology, and as Secretary Cohen mentioned, the
changing world of technology, I don't know what it will be 18
months from now or 24 months from now, but it is going to
probably be different than it is now. But the performance and
the objectives that we need in order to be able to detect,
identify, classify, and respond, those are the things that we
wanted to focus it on.
Mr. Gordon. And Admiral Cohen, what role do you see the S&T
Directorate playing in selecting the contractor for the Net?
Admiral Cohen. I do not have a role in selecting the
contractor.
Mr. Gordon. Providing any information? Any kind of--they
are not going to look to you for some assistance there?
Admiral Cohen. I am--I will leave the acquisition to Mr.
Giddens, but I am not on the source selection. And customarily,
S&T is not on the----
Mr. Gordon. Is that a good custom here? Is that a good
custom here?
Admiral Cohen. I believe it is, yes, sir.
Mr. Gordon. To not--for you not to be providing technical
assistance?
Admiral Cohen. No, I do provide technical assistance. I am
not on the source selection.
Mr. Gordon. Well--and then what will be your role in the
oversight, the technical oversight of the system?
Mr. Giddens. As the Secretary Cohen indicated, his
organization is providing technical assistance and support
through the evaluation process.
Mr. Gordon. And oversight, also?
Mr. Giddens. And they will also be engaged--as we have
looked at S&T to be our systems engineering arm. Mr. Tyler
talked about the focus of systems engineering and the need for
that. And early on, we partnered with S&T in order to lay that
systems engineering foundation and also support the activities
in terms of technology-sniffing.
Mr. Gordon. And how--I am sorry. I should know, but how
long have you been in your position now?
Mr. Giddens. Since last November.
Mr. Gordon. And so what--I mean, I guess, would you concur
that there were a variety of mistakes made in previous systems?
Mr. Giddens. I think we looked at it as the learning
organization.
Mr. Gordon. Okay. Well, that is all right. Well, that is
what I want to get. So what have you learned from those
previous mistakes, and how do you see doing things differently?
Mr. Giddens. A couple things.
Mr. Gordon. That was a good answer. I mean, that was--you
are--I think that is the right thing to do.
Mr. Giddens. And we are going to learn as well. I am----
Mr. Gordon. Right.
Mr. Giddens.--not going to sit here and say we are going to
get everything right. And we intend to continue to be a
learning organization.
Mr. Gordon. Well, what are some of the mistakes that you
have learned from, and how do you intend to do things
differently?
Mr. Giddens. One thing is we don't need to have a
segregated approach to the problem set. In the past, we tried
to look at this from a very particular aspect, a very
technology-focused, and even maybe cameras and technology. In
another avenue, we would go off and look at staffing. In
another, we would look at tactical infrastructure. And that
would give you a great answer from a technology perspective,
but not from the system level and then trying to get a value
solution. And I think that is one of the big lessons that we
learned. And we have to take an integrated, comprehensive
approach at solving this big, complicated problem.
Mr. Gordon. Well, I think it is healthy to--for that to
occur, but I would certainly hope that the S&T Directorate does
have a strong role, particularly in the oversight, and we hope
you are going to do better, and we expect you, you know, to do
better, but I think there continues to--there needs to be a
technical oversight there.
Mr. Giddens. Sir, I look forward to you holding both of us
accountable for that. I could not have asked for a better
partner for S&T, and as Admiral Cohen, Secretary Cohen
mentioned, he and I have known each other before. I am
delighted to be able to work with him.
Mr. Gordon. Thank you. And just real quickly, Dr. Worch.
You had mentioned that the reduction in NASA expenditures in
some of these areas was harmful. Just quickly, could you give
us some examples?
Dr. Worch. Well, the most important example was this
Access-5. It is not an acronym, to my knowledge, but it is a
program that was started by NASA along with the UAV National
Industry Team, I think it was called, Unite. And together, they
were working this problem of the airspace management and how
one could integrate those. Now that Access-5 has been
terminated because of funding, and I don't see the laboratory--
the military being able--or industry, being able to pick it up.
It is expensive to do this research, but it is even more
expensive to do the comprehensive testing that is necessary.
Mr. Gordon. Thank you.
Chairman Boehlert. Mr. Akin.
Mr. Akin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I, unfortunately, had to step out for a minute, so I may be
plowing some already plowed ground. I just wanted to ask. I
have heard you talk about sensors and detecting. I spent a
couple days down at the border at El Paso and Juarez and just
kind of watched the operation there. They had the cameras,
chain link fence and all. Chain link fence, I would like to
have the contract in the wire that they used to repair all the
holes that people cut in it. And it seemed to me that one of
the solutions is to come up with some type of fence that you
can't cut holes in. and one of the technologies is the concept
that I think the military has used to--for, like, enclosing
compounds, which is a microwave technology, which generates a
tremendous amount of pain if you get into the field, but it
doesn't do you any physical harm. So you just basically create
a shield of microwaves. Is that something you have talked
about, and is that practical in the sense that you can't cut
holes in it? Where is that technology?
Dr. Worch. I am aware of that technology. It is relatively
short-range. It is clearly effective. The question is, is this
something that a democratic society would want to do. I mean, I
am out of my ballpark now, out of my league, so I ask your
forgiveness for that. But I--yes, it can----
Mr. Akin. So you think the technology works. The question
is the politics?
Dr. Worch. I would say so. Now the technology is not long-
range. It is relatively short-range.
Mr. Akin. And if you had to do a border----can you make a
screen of these things, put a whole series of towers or
whatever it is, in a row?
Dr. Worch. You would need a large number of them, because
you have the near-far problem. That is you want to inflict some
pain on the person that is far away, but you don't want to fry
the one that you aim it at that is nearby, right?
Mr. Akin. Right.
Dr. Worch. So you have to be very carefully in the use of
that technology, and you better be sure that it is an intruder
that is not--that is--that it is truly an intruder and not an
American citizen that has gone astray here.
Dr. Pottie. There is also----
Mr. Akin. How about expense on that? Is that very expensive
or----
Dr. Worch. It is relatively expensive, particularly when
you consider how close these would have to be deployed. It is
nice if you have a point defense problem. I want to defend this
radar site or this ammunition storage area. It is not so good
when you want to create a fence.
Dr. Pottie. There have also been issues with microwave at
high levels where communication towers have caused cataracts
before it was well regulated. So I am not--I think there would
be a lot of people who would be unhappy about long-term
exposure issues, particularly near populated areas.
Dr. Prado. I would like to comment, also, that any use of
active sensors, like microwaves or radar, that sort of thing,
are very power-intensive, and they are usually relatively
simple countermeasures that people can learn fairly fast to
protect themselves. The best sensor--the best way a sensor can
work is if the intruder does not know that the sensor is there,
in other words, that operates in a stealthy way and it can be
hidden from sight so that not only the current intruder but the
next one and the next one get--trip that sensor, and it doesn't
get destroyed by the people who are trying to come across. So,
you know, more cost-effective is a network of, like, unattended
ground sensors that will alert the law enforcement personnel
that somebody went by. You want to be able to apprehend that
person and send him back to where he came from. You don't want
to particularly pick up a dead body on the field from some
border protection measure that you use.
Mr. Akin. Yeah. I guess the thing I saw was you have got a
whole crews of people with vehicles stationed all along a long
line, and you have to replace them every shift. There is a
whole new group of people. And that looked to me to be a pretty
expensive solution, too, so you have got a sensor that says
somebody has come across. Now you have got to go find them, and
they are hiding in somebody's field or whatever it is. It is--
does that look to be expensive, too? So that is why I was
asking. But thank you for responding.
Admiral Cohen. Congressman, one of the things that all the
comments take you to and that is power and infrastructure. And
you talked about unattended ground sensors, et cetera. For them
to work, they require power, and people have come forward to
me, even in the short time I have been on the job, with e-mails
and phone calls and face-to-face, and we had one proposal of--
for being able to get electrolytic power from a cactus. Now
these are small, low-power sensors, but because of
microelectronics, they will do the job. Or from a tree, because
of the chemistry within there. So in that sense, we heard
earlier from Dr. Pottie, the numbers. He talked about 10,000
sensors. Sandia lab has done a lot of this kind of work. Small,
little sensors, all linked, but you have got to power them, and
you have got to power them for the long-term. So we need to
look not only at the microwave, which was a joint Navy-Air
Force initiative that we have been looking at, and it does
work, high power, we need to look at the low power, otherwise,
it is all about batteries and electrical cables.
Chairman Boehlert. Mr. Lipinski.
Mr. Lipinski. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Everyone who is on the Committee knows I have a background
in engineering, a mechanical engineer. I spent a little time as
a systems analyst. So I appreciate all of the technical
background and the details that all of you have gotten into
here. Unfortunately, when I go home and talk to people, they
say, ``Secure the borders.'' In looking a little more at it,
can we secure the borders? I mean, that is, essentially, the
question. So all I want to do is ask, can this really be done.
Can we really secure the borders? Because we talked about all
of the technical aspects of it, but I am not yet convinced from
all of this that what--or I should say, I am not really sure
that all of you believe this can be done in terms of
technologically, and there is also the political question,
which got into some of those ways of possibly securing the
border, ways that we may or may not want to do. You know,
people say crazy things like, ``Mine the borders,'' or
something like that. I mean, it is outrageous, obviously. But
thousands of miles of borders. Can we secure it? And how long
will it take to do it? and I know especially all of you--this
is putting you--and I am not here--and I am not asking this
question to bring you back here in a few years and grill you on
this, your answer, so I know you all are probably going to have
to dance around this a little bit. But I am looking for you to
give me an honest answer. Can we do it? How long will it take?
And we will start with Secretary Cohen.
Admiral Cohen. Well, to the best of my ability, I always
give an honest answer. I do that for two reasons: one, it tends
to work, and two, at my age, I don't have to remember what I
said.
But the short answer is, yes, the borders can be secured.
The land borders, the sea borders, the air borders, the under-
land borders. The question is, to what degree do you want to
have them secured. Do you want them absolutely secure? I mean,
we don't like speeding. We don't like drunk driving. I mean,
there are many things that we try and control and alter, et
cetera, and we decide what level. Even prison breaks, from our
maximum security prisons, occur. So this is really a policy,
political resources decision. But I think what you have heard
and with your engineering background, you will appreciate this,
the beauty of America is we are very optimistic. If the
President says we are going to put someone on the Moon this
decade, then we believe it. And do you know what? We put a man
on the Moon. So we can do this, but at what cost and on what
timeline and to what degree of fidelity.
Mr. Lipinski. No one has talked anything at all--and they
are not just talking about all of you here, but no one in the
government has talked about it, any kind of timeline. Okay. So
I say 95 percent--I want to stop 95 percent of the people
coming in who are coming in now. Five percent can still--you
know, we will allow that. What will that take? How quickly can
we get that done?
Mr. Giddens. As you somewhat indicated as you asked the
question, probably at least those of on this end of the table
are probably not going to give you a completely satisfactory
answer to the timeline. A large--let me answer the first part
of the question first. Can it be done? Absolutely. And I don't
just say that because that is part of my role and that is my
job at DHS is to put together a systems comprehensive approach
to do that. So--but I believe that can be done. I am convinced
it can be done. We are working hard to lay out that plan to
deliver to the Congress later this year on how to do that. The
speed of that is going to largely be governed by the Nation's
will to invest treasure to make that happen. It is not going to
be an inexpensive undertaking. I am not going to sit here and
say you are going to get it by rubbing two nickels together to
secure the border. This is going to take investment, and it is
going to take a well managed investment, but it can absolutely
be done. There is clearly going to be some point, whether
return on the investment to get the last one or two percent is
going to engage a lot of discussion about whether to continue
that. Is 95 percent good enough? Is 94? Is 96? That is clearly
going to be a national level debate, but it can absolutely be
done.
Mr. Lipinski. Okay. Will someone venture 95 percent--how
many billions of dollars in how many years if we want to get it
done? Any of the four of you venture?
Dr. Pottie. Okay. So my answer is that, in the short-term,
it would be enormously expensive. And you would need physical
barriers, probably cameras everywhere, and you would need
people behind those cameras until the detection algorithms get
better, and you would need other measures to deal with bad
weather when your cameras aren't working all that well. And so
if--but over time, this is the point of doing research, you
would hope to make that whole process cheaper. By working with
the end users, you would develop systems that would work better
over time and hopefully make this both less expensive and more
effective. So it is--I--well, I can't really give you a
timeframe, because I never designed anything in this scale.
Mr. Tyler. Congressman, if I might offer. At the beginning
of the Cold War, we had a real problem with Russian submarines
right off our own coast. And Admiral Cohen is an old Cold
Warrior, as I am. We are talking about 10,000 miles of border
here. And in the Cold War, at the peak, we surveyed 12 million
square nautical miles of ocean and did it exquisitely. And it
took a decade to get SOSUS and SURTASS and other Navy systems
up. And what it took was commitment. It took money, and the
money was measured in the billions, but it was not exorbitant.
But it took, basically, a spiral development. It took S&T and
commitment over a longer period of time. Now if we want to
solve this problem in three years, it could cost us a fortune,
and we are likely to make a lot of mistakes. If we have got
commitment and we are willing to see those numbers come down
with time reasonably, then I think this is a solvable problem,
and it is one that is going to be solvable with the kind of
money that we might want to put towards it.
Mr. Lipinski. Well, I certainly think it is something that
we need to do, we must do, and I know it is a very difficult
question to answer for all of you, but I thank you, Mr. Tyler.
That is something that I can go home and I can tell my
constituents. That is something I can tell them and explain to
them that makes a little bit of sense.
But thank you.
Dr. Prado. Let me make a comment, also.
Mr. Lipinski. Yes.
Dr. Prado. With regards to making the borders really
secure, to make it--do it by purely technological means would
end up being extremely expensive, and these are questions that
don't really have a purely technical solution. The desire to
enter this country by millions of people who don't have the
same opportunities that we do is just too great. And so you
know, we would be spending enormous amounts of money trying to
stop those people. I wonder if some of that money would be
better spent in fostering economic development in the other
countries so that once their centers of living and political
systems are at least, you know, farther along and they have
more hope, they--there is not so many people who have a
desperate desire to risk their lives and come into this
country.
Mr. Lipinski. Well, I think you are very right about why
people are coming--most of the people are coming into this
country, and of course you--these other parts of it we don't
deal with here on the Science Committee, but I----
Dr. Prado. Exactly. I am just pointing out that this is a--
--
Mr. Lipinski. There is no question. Yes, you are----
Dr. Prado.--problem that has a non-technical----
Mr. Lipinski.--correct.
Dr. Prado. That--a part of a solution that is not
technical.
Chairman Boehlert. Thank you very much.
Mr. Lipinski. There is no question about that.
Chairman Boehlert. The gentleman's time has expired.
Isn't it really fair to say that the technology exists? We
know how to guarantee that we have security of our borders, but
then you cost it out, and it is a jillion dollars. I mean the
technology exists, so what we have got to do is invest in
lowering the cost of doing what we know we can do right now. Is
that a fair statement? I mean, there--some people would make
this Fortress America, put a fence all around America. The--I
don't know who wants to do that. I am sure there are some
people who say, ``Why don't you just do that?'' Well, I don't
think that is a very good idea, and I don't think probably any
of you do, either. And--but you could cost--that we know how to
do it, and we could cost it out, and we could get a price tag,
but--so it is not so much a technological question. It is a
policy question that is going to be settled in the halls of the
Congress, not in the laboratories of America. But what we have
to do, it seems to me, and one of the reasons why I got so
excited about insisting that we go forward with a hearing like
this a couple of months ago, and today is a result of that, is
we have just got to pay attention to this subject in a very
meaningful way. And we can't expect miracles. We can't be
unrealistic. But we have got to be very practical
Admiral Cohen. I think you are exactly right, Mr. Chairman.
One size will not fit all. In an urban environment, we will
most likely need physical barriers, because the time from
crossing the border to being able to go into buildings or mass
transit is very short. Whereas in the more rural, whether it is
the northern or the southern border, we have the ability to
have defense in depth. And an initial trip point, monitoring--
and Border Patrol does this every day. They follow, and then
when it is convenient or it is dangerous to the individual,
they make the intercept and proceed from there. And that is--we
talked about not only the timeline, we have talked not only of
the technology, we have talked not only of policy, we have
talked not only the cost, but it is also the environment and
how we want to go about doing that. So the comments that have
been made on system of systems and system integration and
giving the analogy to the Polaris program and other things of
that nature are right on the mark. This is tough stuff. And as
we have already heard from Dr. Pottie, it is not until you have
it in the field and the customer-to-customer, the Border Patrol
agents and the Coast Guardsmen are actually operating this and
seeing how we can improve that we will get to the next stage.
But we are in this for the long haul, and I believe that
Congress is and the American people are, also.
Chairman Boehlert. I see Dr. Pottie on the edge of his
chair. Did you want to intervene at this----
Dr. Pottie. Oh, no. I was going to agree with him.
Chairman Boehlert. And Dr. Worch, you had----
Dr. Worch. Well, I am less optimistic about the 95 percent,
but I would say that if we can go for the 80 percent solution
and deter another 15 percent of the individuals from attempting
it, then we may be back up to the 95. That is to say there are
a lot of portions of the border that are going to be very tough
to put sensors in to maintain a sensor field. But I think if we
can start, we can evolve a capability at some percentage,
whether it is 80 percent of 90 percent, and then hope that some
of the other--some of the individuals that are part of the
other 20 percent or 10 percent are encouraged to proceed in a
more legal way.
Mr. Giddens. Mr. Chairman, if I could quickly add to the
point about the 15 percent. The Department is into the practice
of catch-and-release, and we have seen some great results in
terms of deterrence as a result of that. And I think it is
going to be incumbent upon us not to just look at where the
solution set at the line on the border but understand what
happens beyond the border, at the border, and in the interior
in the way that we work with private industry and work site
compliance and making sure that we are hiring people that are
documented and authorized to work.
Chairman Boehlert. Mr. Gutknecht.
Mr. Gutknecht. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
That is a nice segue to what I wanted to talk about,
because I think if you focus purely on defining the border and
defending the border, I think you are sort of missing the
biggest part of the equation. Let me give you an example. I am
aware of this only because of some of the employers in my
district where--and I will give them the benefit of the doubt.
They are trying their best to hire legal employees. But the
trade right now in illegal or counterfeit documentation has
become phenomenal. In fact, the local law enforcement know how
much it costs to buy a counterfeit driver's license. As a
matter of fact, I learned that in one town in my district, you
can buy a Puerto Rican birth certificate for about $600. And of
course, if you are born in Puerto Rico, you are a U.S. citizen.
So this business has gotten incredibly sophisticated, and it
starts not just at the border.
I just want to throw out this question, I guess, and
perhaps one or more of you can comment on this. One of the
things that many of the folks who come here illegally know is
that it will take upwards of 11 months before Social Security
will notify an employer that there is an employee working under
a Social Security number, which does not exist, or a Social
Security number under which someone is working in Worthington,
Minnesota and Laredo, Texas at the same time. Do you believe
that creating an electronic system that would respond a little
faster than 11 months is technologically possible? And could it
be done at relatively low cost? And that is a loaded question,
because we know it is done. It is done every day. A few years
ago, I had the unfortunate circumstance where I lost my
billfold, and by the time I realized what had happened, I had
already gotten a call from my credit card company that I was
making some rather unusual purchases. And so I knew what was
going on, and the law enforcement knew what was going on. And
more importantly, the credit card company knew long before I
did. It didn't take them 11 months. It took them about 11
hours.
And so I want to come back to this. One of the areas where
we have got to focus more of our attention on is some kind of
an ID system and an electronic surveillance system within the
government itself, with the systems we already have. I mean, we
have Social Security cards. We have Social Security numbers,
and yet, we are just painfully out of step. Does anybody want
to comment on that, what we can do to make sure, number one,
that employers have confidence that the documents that they are
getting are real, and number two, that we track these people so
that if they are using a false Social Security number, we can
get that information to the employer much, much faster?
Mr. Giddens. Sir, I will start with that, and then part of
this I may look for Secretary Cohen to elaborate on an aspect
of it.
But clearly, you have touched on a nerve that, while we
focus on the border and it is a very visible aspect, it is not
the only thing that we can focus on. We have to work with
private industry and find a way that is fast and efficient for
them to verify the employment eligibility for people that they
want to employ. The Department currently has a program called
Basic Pilot that is trying to do that where private industry
sends in basic information and there is a check to see if there
are any mismatches with that, and response back for that is
pretty quick. Now that is not nationwide deployed, and it is
currently a voluntary program, but it is something that we are
doing to try to provide private industry some tools. We think
it is going to be very incumbent upon us to do that. If we are
going to look to private industry and say, ``You should only
have people that are authorized to work,'' okay, how do they
know? That is a big problem for us. We are working that hard,
and we are looking to expand the use of Basic Pilot.
You talked about document fraud. There are efforts ongoing
within the Department that S&T is involved in as well as ICE.
An organization within DHS is involved with that in document
fraud. Customs and border protection is working this issue hard
at ports of entry. It is a big problem with the printers and
the capability now that people can just set up, you know, in
their bedroom with their computers and printers. It is really
going to be a hard problem to tackle. But we have got to take
that on and be able to really address that. We work very hard
with the Social Security Administration to try to find the
right way to get some access to the data they have. As you
said, I think it would be interesting to go through and have
somebody to run a routine and find out how many people are
posting income in ten different zip codes. That would probably
be a fruitful area to go----
Mr. Gutknecht. Well--and that would be relatively easy to
do, I would think. I mean--let me just make this point, because
my time is about expired. And I want everybody here to think
about this. You know, what happened on 9/11 happened five years
ago. Okay. And as far as I can tell, and one of the reasons we
are concerned about this, obviously, it is affecting our labor
markets. You know, I think it is artificially holding down
labor rates. It is increasing costs for schools and hospitals
and everything else. Illegal immigration is a big issue. And
that is certainly one concern.
But according to the statistics we have seen is that about
four percent--the estimates are that four percent of the people
who cross our borders are coming across either for illegal
purposes, in other words they want to sell drugs or they are
involved in crime, or they are from nations of interest. That
should be a real chilling concern to everybody in this city and
everybody in this room. So you know, five years into this, I
don't think we are much further along than we were five years
ago in terms of securing our own border, and part of it is we
have got to come up with ID systems that slow down the influx,
and we have got to do more to use whatever technology is
available to protect our borders and ultimately to protect the
American people.
Mr. Giddens. Sir, that four percent is one of the reasons
that we think part of the comprehensive program should include
some type of temporary worker program to allow us to try to
funnel those people through the legal means so that we can
really focus on the four or so percent that are really the ones
of interest.
Mr. Gutknecht. Let me just say, in response to that, I
mean, I am not totally adverse to that, but I think until this
Administration demonstrates that they are serious about
controlling our borders and enforcing the laws that are
currently on the books, that is really tough sell in my
district.
I yield back.
Chairman Boehlert. Thank you very much.
Mr. Green.
Mr. Green. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member.
And I would like to indicate as well, Mr. Chairman, that
you do a thorough job, you really do. And you will be missed.
You will be missed greatly. I--the only consolation that I have
is that--knowing that I may be in the majority. Thank you for
your work.
Chairman Boehlert. I never pay.
Mr. Green. Well, you know, fairy tales come true. It can
happen to you and me.
Thank you so much, members of the panel. You were--provided
us a wealth of information. And much of what I wanted to talk
to you about has been discussed, but I will just simply say it
another way, I suppose.
In my fair city, who had a regional mobility plan, or a
mobility plan that was proposed, and this plan, if 100 percent
placed--put in place such that we had it 100 percent effective,
would only impact five percent of the traffic. That was the
plan. And I mention this to you, because if our plan here is
100 percent effective to impact 100 percent of those who will
try to cross the borders and it costs us about 100 percent of
our capital, I don't know that we have really spent our money
as wisely as we should have spent our money. The Chairman said
a kajillion, or some large number, of dollars. And that causes
me a lot of concern, because one of the panel members indicated
that it is judicious, it is prudent to look at the conditions
where most of the people are coming from and try to be my
brother's keeper, to some extent, and see if I can help improve
the conditions so that I don't have as many people to contend
with. If we are securing ourselves now from people who want to
harm us as opposed to securing ourselves from people who want
jobs. At some point, we have to decide why are we securing
ourselves so as to understand why it is necessary to spend a
kajillion dollars. I think that, in the long run, to get to the
95 percent level, based upon what I am hearing you say, it is
going to be exceedingly expensive. Exceedingly expensive. I
never like to use the term ``too expensive'' when it comes to
securing our country, so I will not say that it would be too
expensive, but I would hope that we will include in our
security efforts--someone has talked about ID, identification
methodologies, but also looking at what is happening to cause
people to find themselves coming in in the middle of the night,
living in the shadows of life, leaving to go back home to see
people that they care for dearly and then try to come back into
the country under the cover of darkness again. There is a lot
going on here that securing the borders will not, as we are
talking about it, the technology just won't offset. I don't see
how it will offset it, given the needs of some of our brethren
in some of our border countries, or at least one.
And finally, we--this conversation seems to be so focused
on Mexico. Perhaps I am wrong, but it just seems that way to
me. It just seems like it is. And we have had some folks to try
to come in through the northern border who didn't mean us a lot
of good, and it seems like we ought to talk a little bit about
the northern border. And it seems to me like before we had a
lot of these concerns about the southern border, we were having
people to come in across the Gulf of Mexico. And we have got
policies, wet foot, dry foot, whatever. We--some of those
things create an inducement for people to come, knowing that I
can get one foot on dry land. ``If I get one foot on dry land,
I can go on and work my way into the country and become--
possibly become a citizen.'' And I don't begrudge anybody, but
I think inconsistent policies create a lot of the problems that
we have when you don't have consistent policies and people can
see the inconsistencies. But also, I think these inconsistent
policies create a lot of disrespect for policies, and people
can clearly see that some are being treated better than others,
and they can't rationalize it.
I thank you for your kindness, and I appreciate very much
your indulging me.
And Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
Chairman Boehlert. Thank you very much, Mr. Green.
Mr. Rohrabacher.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Thank you very much.
And first and foremost, I would like to recognize Admiral
Cohen for the great job that he did at the Office of Naval
Research and suggest that he is a fine selection for someone
who should oversee the technology and the technology
development that we need for our national security in terms of
homeland security. And I have worked with him in the past, and
I look forward to working with you in the future on this.
With that said, I just--frankly, Mr. Gutknecht said it
well. And I think we do have the technological capability, for
example, to have the identification cards and the
identification systems, not only for people who are seeking
employment or people who are seeking government benefits, but
also for people who are trying to enter our country through our
legal portals, in terms of visas, et cetera. We have that
capability, and we have not perfected it. I think that is a
black mark on this Administration, and we should have perfected
it already. I mean, frankly, five years into 9/11 we don't have
that system perfected. It is ridiculous.
Second of all, in terms of the border, I would like to just
tell you, gentlemen, it is not a matter of funding. And I am
sorry. And I say that to the Chairman, as well. He--we probably
disagree in this. This is a matter of will. Every--you know,
every time we--people come here to Washington you hear it,
``Well, just spend more money. Spend more money. It is a matter
of how much you invest.'' I am sorry. That is not it. The fact
is that we have two Border Patrol agents right now who are on--
who are being prosecuted for attempted murder for shooting at
an illegal immigrant who was trying to smuggle 743 pounds of
marijuana into the country, and as he ran away, they shot at
him, and now, they are arrested. Now what do you think that
does to the Border Patrol? Think. How much technology can make
up for that type of demoralization that you are going to have
when you have got two veteran officers, who are targeted by our
U.S. Attorney's Office, and bringing the drug smuggler back
from Mexico to testify against them? You know, this is--we can
do things in this country. We have the ability to do things in
this country, especially on our border, if we had the will to
do it. this Administration has not wanted to do it, and right
now, even with the technology that we have, and again, what I
would suggest is--Admiral, your job should be basically how do
we get the technology that you know already exists into play
rather than how do we develop new technologies for the future.
How do we get it in play so we can capture more illegals at the
border and secure those borders? And we have got that
capability now. We have got plenty of sensors. We have got
plenty of drones. Now if there are some regulatory issues that
I heard about earlier about using some of this technology, that
is when we can work together. That is what we can do. You don't
have to spend more money on the budget for that. That is just a
matter of willpower and committing ourselves to do the work.
Now that border could be secure, and it could have been secure
all of this time, but there has not been a will on the part of
this Administration or the past Administration to do it. So for
example, we are talking about--look, we have got the Civil Air
Patrol. We have got the Boy Scouts. You could have veterans
organizations. You could have volunteers for the border that
could help be the eyes and ears of people to make sure that our
country is safe and secure. And I will tell you, after 9/11, we
would be flooded with volunteers if someone tried to organize
something like that. Low cost. Limited--you know, technology
that is already there.
So I just, you know, leave you this thought. I am looking
forward to working with you, Admiral, but on the putting the
technology we have got to work rather than research programs.
Now in the past, let me note that the Admiral has been really
great and a visionary about the potential of--if someone comes
to him with a plan, what that potential would be. Now we have
got to look at it in a different way. Let us put what we have
got to work, and we don't--and instead of just looking at this
as more investing money, let us just commit ourselves to
getting the job done. And to me, that is the only thing that is
stopping us from controlling our borders. It is not a lack of
technology information, not a lack of research, but a lack of
the willpower.
So I am sorry I am--if--you are welcome to shoot that down
or agree with it, but I thought I needed to make that
statement.
Thank you very much.
Chairman Boehlert. Thank you much, Mr. Rohrabacher.
Ms. Johnson.
Ms. Johnson. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
This is a very timely hearing for somebody who is from
Texas. I guess what I would like to know is how close are you
to securing the border. And where are we receiving the most
people coming in without permission?
Mr. Giddens. Ma'am, we have a long way to go. I am not--we
do. It has been something that, for whatever reason, we have
not focused on. We are making progress, but we have got a long
way to go. We would be happy to take, for the record, to
provide you some information about the traffic and where that
comes in on the--from my memory, the bulk of that is in the
Arizona, Tucson corridor, that we would be happy to take it for
the record and get you a breakdown of those numbers.
Ms. Johnson. Thank you.
This is one of the major concerns of my constituents, and
it seems to me, the entire area where I am from, Dallas. And I
really don't know what to do, because once people get here,
most of the ones that I see are just looking for a job. And
if--you know, if it is some of the others, I don't have--I have
not yet had the opportunity to see them. And it seems to me
that we ought to have in place something now that could at
least separate that whether they have illegal drugs or--you
know, that most people--I don't want to say most people, a lot
of the people that write me think that most of them have
illegal drugs. The people that I see most often do not. They
are just looking for a job.
Mr. Giddens. That is not--I think you are correct on that.
Most of the people that are coming here, I don't think, are
intending us harm and they are not bringing contraband with
them, but if you have got 150 people lined up at the border and
they are coming across, it is hard to sort those out at the
border. As we apprehend people and our Customs and Border
Protection are fingerprinting those people so that we are
establishing the database so that we can track that and
understanding and those that we prosecute, we can work with
Justice, if there is criminal activity above the illegal entry.
But I think that, by and large, the people that are coming in
are seeking to better their lives and the lives of their
families, but they are still entering the country illegally.
Ms. Johnson. Yes. Thank you, and good luck.
Mr. Giddens. Thank you, ma'am.
Chairman Boehlert. Ms. Johnson, just let me point out that
the magnitude of the problem--and last year, DHS apprehended
over one million, one million people attempting to cross the
border illegally. That is how many were apprehended.
Ms. Johnson. Yes, but Mr. Chairman, two million of them
stopped in the Dallas/Fort Worth area.
Chairman Boehlert. Do you have any more, Ms. Johnson?
Ms. Biggert.
Ms. Biggert. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I chair the Subcommittee that has jurisdiction over the
National Labs, and how closely have these labs worked with DHS
on that--on the border security technology, and how can they be
more helpful?
Admiral Cohen. I am going to let Merv Leavitt answer how
closely they have worked, and then I would like to come back
and explain how very much involved I am with the National Labs
and how much I treasure them.
So Merv.
Mr. Leavitt. Yes, ma'am. We have--Sandia is one of our
centers that we use extensively for sensor work, radar, fiber
optic sensors, new advanced sensors. We have used the Homeland
Security Institute. There is also a BAA out to universities
that may partner with some of the labs for a border security
Center of Excellence that, you know, we will use in the future.
Admiral Cohen. If I may follow up. At the start of my
testimony, I indicated the courage and the wisdom I thought of
the enabling legislation, especially in S&T, for the Department
of Homeland Security. And as I read those 19 pages over and
over as part of the confirmation process and getting my feet on
the ground here and putting an organization in place, as we
have discussed, it became pretty clear to me, and I have
discussed this with staff, and both sides of the aisle have
confirmed this to me in both bodies, that the intent, and I
think it is a very wise intent, of the Congress and the
Administration, was that DHS S&T should not attempt to recreate
the National Institutes of Health, should not attempt to
recreate the National Science Foundation. Those are full,
robust organizations. But in your wisdom, you went ahead and
you assigned the DOE labs, which are wonderful in the basic
sciences. Incredible intellectual capability there. I have many
dealings, of course, with Argonne National Laboratory as the
others from my past service in Naval Research, and not only
that, but in the legislation, it is just one little line in
there that I read as you telling me that I can, without any
incremental increase in the cost, leverage all departments of
government: Department of Transportation, Department of
Defense, et cetera, where annually we invest tens and tens of
billions of dollars in basic, applied, and advanced technology
research. That is something that has not been exercised by my
Directorate. I plan on exercising that so I use my precious
dollars with the universities and the National Laboratories
throughout my range of investment to add onto those underlying
technologies that the government and the taxpayer have already
paid for but focus them then on Homeland Security missions.
Ms. Biggert. Well, that is the way I read the law, that we
really included the provision giving DHS the access to the
expertise, the facilities, and the technologies at DOE's
National Labs, and I hope that you will take full advantage of
that, because I think they do have the expertise in the sensors
and modeling and systems materials, and many other areas that
could help improve our border security.
So I thank you.
Admiral Cohen. I might say, my first day in the job was the
10th of August, and that was the--you know, the liquid
explosives threat to our airliners. The very next day, I
established the Rapid Response Team, led by a program manager
in my office who understood energetics, Dr. George Zarur, who
is a long-time scientist very familiar with the National Labs,
and Susan Hallowell, who is my director of my Transportation
Security Lab. And that team, on the 11th of August, we had our
first video teleconference with all of the lab directors from
all of the DOE labs and our university Centers of Excellence,
and together, we went ahead and put together a request for
information, which went out within the week, SAFETY Act
protection went out with the RFI, and we have gotten over 40
respondents in the month, and we are getting ready to test at
both Sacorro, New Mexico and Tyndall Air Force Base against
500-milliliter Gatorade bottles of the actual formula, which I
won't share here publicly, based on the technologies that came
back from that RFI and those that we have been working on. But
some of the stuff that has come out of the national labs, even
in this last month, is eye-watering, and I think will be of
great value to Kip Hawley in TSA and his screeners.
Ms. Biggert. Thank you.
Thank you. I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Boehlert. Ms. Jackson Lee.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, to you and the
Ranking Member.
As we speak, Admiral Cohen, there is another Homeland
Security Committee going on, so I thank you for your
indulgence. I am going to ask, because there are enormous
experts, I was just in a hearing where we were missing the
permanent Assistant Secretary for Cyber Security, so obviously
personnel is a matter that goes, more or less, hand-in-hand
with technology. And the reason I say that is because there has
to be a vision of the leader to be able to help the Department
focus on the right kinds of tools.
I have been down to the border. I have walked along the
border in the light and in the dark. And certainly, it is, I
think, a reality that our border at the southern border is a
porous border. And it is that reason for many reasons. We have
interacted with South and Central America for a very long time
of our history. The northern border, similarly situated. But
that doesn't give comfort to the American people that although
we have had longstanding friendships with our northern and
southern neighbors, that we live now in a different climate.
And frankly, I think technology is certainly the key. And I am
sure that questions have been asked and answered.
But I would raise the question of matching human resource
to technology. You are talking about Border Patrol agents, and
there are two facets of this. There is the Border Patrol agents
that are literally on the dividing lines. There are those who
are called Customs and Border Protection that are the ports of
entry that have the difficult challenge of being alert for
4,000 cars coming through, whether it is the northern or
southern border, and then having the responsibility of what we
call secondary search. What are the--there are many individuals
here, but where are we with matching human resource training so
that we are into--Members of Congress, I have put forward
legislation that talks about night goggles and laptops and a
number of others. But where are we with infrared? Where are we
with the training of the personnel that will then understand
the technology? Now I guess I want you to speak a lot about the
technology, because this is the Science Committee, so I know
that you are not here to talk about personnel. But what more
can we get in the hands of individuals who are on the front
lines that we already have not asked for? And I would
appreciate it if each of the gentlemen would answer the
question. Some level of sophisticated technology that we may
not be aware of. The night goggles are sophisticated for us,
but there are obviously other coordinating factors from what is
at the home base and what you can tell to the person on the
front line that they should be either seeing or looking for,
quick intelligence getting to them.
So I will yield to the first panelist, and I thank you very
much for your indulgence.
Mr. Leavitt. Ms. Jackson Lee, we have a pilot going on in
the Douglas station that provides the--Arizona that provides a
station. The agents are on the border with PDA capability
that----
Ms. Jackson Lee. Now what kind of capability?
Mr. Leavitt. A personal digital assistant, handheld
capability that lets them query databases to determine if a
certain individual has a criminal background. It gives them
situational awareness on where they are in relation to their
other Border Patrol agents and also sensors. That same
capability is provided in their vehicles. So primarily focusing
on providing information and situational awareness----
Ms. Jackson Lee. In real time? And this equipment is in
hand right now?
Mr. Leavitt. Yes.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Do you need more of it? Do you need more?
Mr. Leavitt. I--we need to prove that it works and
understand what the final configuration needs to be. It is a
pilot right now.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Okay. Let me just move down to the
different panelists. Thank you.
Admiral Cohen. I will give you an uncharacteristically
short answer. As you know, I am focusing on human factors as
one of my six departments. This is critically important. And
the area of hostile intent, what are the characteristics of
someone who is coming in with drugs, someone who is a
terrorist, a suicide bomber, et cetera. I am not going to go
into what those characteristics are or details in the public
fora, but I can tell you that we are investing money in that.
This needs to be done remotely. It needs to be done
holistically. It is part of the system of systems. It goes to
the kind of pilot that you are seeing. And as we demonstrate
the efficacy of these within the confines of our laws and our
traditions, we then will move into the acquisition world, which
is Greg Giddens, and I will have de-risked it and he will buy
it and deploy it. And the training of our agents is going on
right now, not just TSA screeners, but Border Patrol and across
the enterprise.
Chairman Boehlert. Thank you very much.
The gentlelady's time has expired.
Mr. Sherman.
Mr. Sherman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
As you may know, I am the Ranking Democrat on the
Subcommittee of IR that deals with proliferation. And some have
argued that it doesn't--we shouldn't go into absolute
conniptions if the wrong people get nuclear weapons, because we
will be able to prevent those weapons from reaching our cities.
Now one issue is delivery by missile and the whole missile
defense and whether that would work and whether you could hit a
bullet with a bullet, and that is outside the scope of these
hearings. The other possibility is to remark that you may not
need to be a rocket scientist to smuggle a nuclear weapon into
the United States. And you could do so by air or water or over
the border, in the sense of not coming into a legitimate port
but rather to areas of our coast, land the plane legally or
illegally, or just walk across the border where it is illegal
to do so. And--or you could focus on coming through our
airports, come--bringing it in a truck over a designated border
crossing area or into an airport. And the real question that my
constituents would want to know is, is it any harder to bring a
nuclear weapon into this country--or much harder to bring a
nuclear weapon into this country than, say, a really big bale
of marijuana, because a nuclear bomb is about the size,
physically, of a really big bale of marijuana, and my
constituents are aware that it has happened, that marijuana has
come across our border. And you know, there is the size and
weight, but obviously drugs and other contraband of that size--
the size and weight of a nuclear device has come across, so the
question is, really, does the nuclear properties of the bomb or
device itself make it highly--much easier to catch than an
equal size or weight of illegal drugs? Is there a device
available, Admiral, to your department that could detect, say,
a nuclear material, whether that be highly-enriched uranium or
whether it be plutonium, from, say, half a mile away so that if
somebody was bringing in an SUV full of marijuana you might not
catch them but you catch the nuclear because, from a mile away,
half a mile away, you could sense that there was nuclear
material?
Admiral Cohen. Well, Congressman, the short answer is yes,
there are technologies. There are multitudes of technologies,
many of which are well proven for many years.
Mr. Sherman. From a mile away?
Admiral Cohen. There are numerous technologies that have
varying ranges and sensitivities. I am not going to discuss in
open fora those capabilities. I will----
Mr. Sherman. The experts I have talked to have said,
``Forget about it.'' I mean, you can make--look, now and then,
even the experienced marijuana smuggler screws up and gets
caught. And even the foreign intelligence agency smuggling a
nuclear weapon in this country has a one in ten chance of
getting caught, the same way the experienced drug dealers--drug
smugglers occasionally get caught. But I am told that if it is
shielded in water, shielded with lead, that you are not going
to be able to detect this from even 100 feet away.
Admiral Cohen. I really don't want to cross any line here,
but when you are looking for nefarious objects, you may look
for other telltale signs. You may look for the shielding
instead of the radioactivity. I think in this particular area,
Congressman, I would feel much more comfortable asking----
Mr. Sherman. Let--if you could come by, and we will arrange
to have a briefing----
Admiral Cohen. Yes, sir.
Mr. Sherman.--on this----
Admiral Cohen. Yes, sir.
Mr. Sherman.--because I--you know, I have told my
constituents it is a little harder than bringing in an
equivalent weight of marijuana, but not much harder, and in any
case, you didn't need to be a rocket scientist to----
Admiral Cohen. I will ask our defense--excuse me, Domestic
Nuclear Defense Office, the DNDO, which has cradle-to-grave
responsibility for this in Homeland Security, similar to the
naval reactors in the Department of Defense for nuclear
propulsion. We will arrange with your staff to have them come
by and so someone who is knowledgeable can----
Mr. Sherman. I look forward to that, both for gamma
detection and neutron detection, both shielded with water,
shielded with lead, and not shielded, and both with regard to
trying to come in here legally--or not legally, but through a
legal crossing----
Admiral Cohen. Yes, sir.
Mr. Sherman.--point into our country----
Admiral Cohen. Yes, sir.
Mr. Sherman.--or the Canadian or Mexican border at a place
at which you are not supposed to cross. I have got a lot of
friends who just go skiing across the Canadian border, and
nobody has ever questioned them in or out.
And with that----
Admiral Cohen. Yes, sir.
Mr. Sherman.--I will yield back.
Chairman Boehlert. Thank you very much.
Two quick questions I have, and one--and I think I know
what the answer is going to be, but I would like to get a
response from Admiral Cohen. Dr. Worch, I will ask you this: as
a member of the Air Force Science Advisory Board and fellow
Vice Commander of Rome Lab, how can we better leverage the
expertise of Defense laboratories, like Rome, to help secure
our homeland? And should DHS fund more research at
laboratories, like Rome, and it doesn't have to be Rome
specifically, other laboratories, but our world leaders in
things like C4ISR technologies, which are critical for our
border security system?
Dr. Worch. Well, I think it is a matter of setting up a
memorandum of agreement with those particular laboratories. Now
with--probably with the Air Force between the Air Force and the
Department of Homeland Security. The funding, I think--now,
again, I can't speak for the Air Force, but there is joint
funding. There are technologies that are there in the
laboratories that they can make themselves, DHS, aware of
directly, and I am sure they are trying to do this, but----
Chairman Boehlert. Admiral, are you aware of the Rome
Laboratory?
Admiral Cohen. I am aware of the Rome Laboratory, but that
is from my prior life.
Chairman Boehlert. Yeah.
Admiral Cohen. I am a big believer in competition. I
believe in the best offer being rewarded. And as I indicated,
this very wonderful authority that you gave had not been
previously exercised. I plan on making myself a nuisance to the
other departments so that the monies they have invested, we can
harvest those technologies and then, either with those
laboratories or other providers, go ahead and mature it and
focus it for the unique requirements of Homeland Security.
Chairman Boehlert. That is another observation that Dr.
Worch made. You were somewhat critical the way the SBInet
contract is being handled, you know, as one great big contract.
How do you guys respond to that one?
Mr. Giddens, you are the acquisition man.
Mr. Giddens. So it seems, sir.
That was clearly one of the issues that, as we were putting
together the strategy, back earlier this year, that we wanted
to address, and we believe we have addressed and mitigated that
risk and the solicitation and the requests or proposal that we
put out, we have had very strong language in that the offers
had to provide their subcontracting plan. We have very strong
language in there about oversight on their make-or-buy process.
So when they decide, as he mentioned, company A is going to
bring company A's goods to the table, they have to convince us.
They have to present that make-or-buy decision to show us that
that is where the value is. And we are ultimately in control. I
don't want to make any mistake about who is working for who.
The integrator is working for the United States Government and
not the other way around, and we will make those calls. And
they have to bring that to the table. And we put very clear and
explicit language in the solicitation for them to identify how
they would work that, how they would address conflicts of
interest. I am not going to tell you it is not--we believe we
put in the correct contractual language to allow us to mitigate
and manage that risk but not avoid it.
Chairman Boehlert. Dr. Worch, do you have any response to
that?
Dr. Worch. Well, I certainly hope you have the freedom to
have on board technical experts on the government side.
Chairman Boehlert. Well, that can help with this. It can't
just be program managers. It has got to be people who have an
intimate knowledge of those technologies that can be critical
and make a decision. I am sure you are doing that. I--you know,
you are nodding your head ``yes.''
Admiral Cohen. Yes, sir. We have to be intelligent----
Chairman Boehlert. Nodding your head ``yes'' means ``yes.''
Admiral Cohen. I think Dr. Worch has it exactly right, and
my people will be at the table and showing alternate or better
or different solutions to what the prime integrator may be
proposing, and then it will be up to the customer, the
acquisition official, to decide what level of risk, cost, or
schedule upset that they are willing to take to get the best
solution at that time, but that will continue year-in and year-
out. And in fact, in the Navy we did this on, basically, a
three-year cycle, and that is not an unreasonable cycle for
technology insertia.
Chairman Boehlert. Thank you. Our goal was to wrap this up
at 4:30, but Ms. Jackson Lee wanted another minute, because she
wanted some other comment, I think, maybe on her question. And
then I will----
Ms. Jackson Lee. Mr. Giddens--thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Giddens, you had a comment on my earlier--I hope you
remember the question that I asked earlier about human resource
and technology. Would you want to just expand?
Mr. Giddens. Yes, ma'am. I was, actually, also thinking
back to the hearing we had in the spring on the Subcommittee on
Management Integration Oversight.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Yes.
Mr. Giddens. And as we said then and the Subcommittee was
interested in the lessons we had learned from ISIS and other
activities and were we indeed going to pull this off in the
SBInet by the end of September, we are still on track to do
that. But as we have been in that source selection mode, I have
been hesitant to get involved in the technology side, because
we need to keep the purity of the source selection process. S&T
has been doing that for us, and they have been very gracious at
sort of segmenting people that were technical advisors to us
and then segmenting people that could still stay in touch with
the technology. As we are looking to award SBInet, we will
have, then, a better ability to come, and we will be happy to
come and brief you or your staff on some of the technology that
is involved in that. But I am really not in a position to
detail those out today.
But your point about training, we have already engaged with
the head of training at CBP and involved them early and started
thinking about how can we prepare the men and women who are at
the pointy end of doing the king's business on how to use these
tools and not just throw those tools at them and expect them to
figure it out. And you have made a very key point, and we need
to train early and often.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Do you have a sense of urgency?
Mr. Giddens. Yes, ma'am.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you.
I yield back. Thank you very much.
Chairman Boehlert. Thank you very much.
And as is the custom here, we will have some additional
questions that we, perhaps, will submit to you individually in
writing, and we would appreciate a timely response.
For the closing word, now let the record note that we give
the closing word to Mr. Gordon.
Mr. Gordon.
Mr. Gordon. Unless the Chairman doesn't like the word.
First, let me thank all of you for spending two and a half
hours with us. These hearings aren't intended to percolate up
elegant answers to or, you know, complete answers to these
problems, but rather to start our job of oversight, to put some
fresh eyes on what goes on here. We have been able to witness a
lot of successes, but we have also--we have discussed seeing a
lot of the taxpayer money wasted and a lot of important
programs bungled. And our great hope is not to say, you know,
``We told you so,'' later, but to, again, put a little extra
oversight so you have to work a little harder and know that you
can't be, you know, cavalier.
The second point I want to make is that, again, this is,
obviously, an important problem, and the solution isn't--is
going to be more than just on the border. It is going to take
systems existing now and maybe created that will integrate with
that, and I am sure you are going to be dealing with that.
And finally, I suspect it will take ten times or more than
that or 100 times the dollar figure to go from an 80 or 90
percent penetration to a 100 percent. And it may--you know, and
it--you know, the East Germans did a pretty good job, but they
didn't stop folks from getting through. And I don't think that
our country is going to be harmed too much if, you know, a half
a dozen brick--you know, future bricklayers get through. But we
are going to be harmed if--as Brad Sherman was talking about,
if there are those folks that are coming through with bad
intentions. Now I hope that, as you go through this process,
that--I am more interested in 100 percent bad guys than I am
100 percent everybody kind of solution. And we really need to
put our attention on that. You talked about some of those
characteristics. I think, you know, they may take multiple
folks and they may take materials and a variety of things, and
this is north border as well as south border. So as we go
through and we have to make compromises, and as we have to pay
the bills, that is my highest priority, and hopefully it would
be yours, too.
Chairman Boehlert. Thank you very much.
And thank all of you. We really appreciate it.
The hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 4:34 p.m., the Committee was adjourned.]
Appendix:
----------
Answers to Post-Hearing Questions
Responses by Admiral Jay M. Cohen, Under Secretary for Science and
Technology, U.S. Department of Homeland Security; Accompanied
by Mr. Gregory L. Giddens, Director, Secure Border Initiative
Program Executive Office, U.S. Department of Homeland Security
Questions submitted by Chairman Sherwood L. Boehlert
Q1. Dr. Worch testified that there continue to be issues with the safe
operation of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) in commercial airspace.
Specifically, he emphasized the need to develop reliable anti-collision
technologies and the fact that the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration has ended much of its work in this area.
Q1a. Do you agree that this is an issue? If not, why not? If so, what
UAV-related air safety research does DHS Science and Technology
Directorate intend to sponsor or perform?
A1a. The S&T Directorate agrees that one of the most pressing needs for
allowing unmanned aircraft to operate safely in commercial airspace is
the development of reliable anti-collision technologies. To that end,
the S&T Directorate is working cooperatively with the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) and with the Department of Defense's (DOD's)
Unmanned Aircraft Systems Airspace Integration Joint Integrated Product
Team (JIPT) to define requirements for automated collision avoidance
systems that would be suitable for use in unmanned aircraft. In FY
2007, the S&T Directorate is taking a significant step by funding the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology's Lincoln Laboratory to begin
developing a simulation capable of modeling the broad spectrum of air
traffic that Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV's) will encounter and must
avoid. This will be a first-of-its-kind simulation, more complex and
capable than those used over a decade ago for the development of the
Traffic Alert/Collision Avoidance System (TCAS). When completed in FY
2008, the simulation will be used to validate requirements, test
various automated sensing and avoidance schemes, and help the FAA
certify the most effective one(s) for adoption and use in UAVs. The S&T
Directorate is also actively participating in two committees that are
engaged in developing standards for collision avoidance systems. These
standards will form the foundation for FAA policy and regulatory
action. Finally, as a full member of the JIPT and its Collision
Avoidance Sub IPT, the S&T Directorate is systematically evaluating
ongoing DOD collision avoidance efforts as potential solutions to the
U.S. Customs and Border Protection's and Coast Guard's UAV needs in
this area.
Q1b. Since the SBInet announcement was made and it appears that UAVs
are not integral to Boeing's short-term plans, will this change your
plans for supporting UAV-related research?
A1b. Boeing has reviewed Customs and Border Protection (CBP) Air and
Marine's Strategic Plan and CBP's plans for UAV's and, in particular,
for use of Predator-B UAV's. The CBP A&M plans are integral in the
Boeing solution and will: (a) provide coverage in ground-based sensor
gaps; (b) provide immediate response to classify and identify
problematic targets; and (c) extend tactical tracking capability to
improve apprehension. In addition, Boeing also proposed a small,
portable launch UAV (Skylark) with limited range (and low altitude) to
provide agent-based reconnaissance and point-to-point search for
response and apprehension teams in the field.
Q2. How do you plan to improve the interagency coordination of
research, development, testing, and evaluation relevant to homeland
security?
A2. As part of the alignment of the S&T Directorate, an Agency and
International Liaison Office was established. In accordance with the
Homeland Security Act of 2002, this division will help the S&T
Directorate fulfill its responsibility for ``coordinating with other
appropriate executive agencies in developing and carrying out the
science and technology agenda of the Department to reduce duplication
and identify unmet needs.'' The Agency and International Liaison Office
will have responsibility for building relationships and improving
coordination with executive agencies and our international partners to
leverage homeland security research, development, testing and
evaluation (RDT&E) efforts across the government. A small cadre of
talented professionals will serve as the ``ambassadors'' to executive
agencies--expanding the S&T Directorate's breadth and depth of work
with other federal agencies' laboratories and the laboratories of our
international partners.
Q3. At the hearing, the non-governmental witnesses described the key
priorities for border security research and development as work on
information integration, common operational languages, algorithm
development, and airspace safety. They also stressed the importance of
improving the communication of needs and testing and evaluation
feedback to the private sector and training the next generation of
scientist and engineers in critical areas by supporting long-term
research.
Please describe the DHS S&T priorities for research on border
security technology and how they align with the areas recommended by
the other witnesses. How were your priorities determined?
A3. The S&T Directorate's priorities for research on border security
technology align well with the priorities described by the other
witnesses. They include developing:
Improved technology for detection, classification and
interdiction of illegal activity, identification of individuals
with hostile intentions, and enhancing the ability to make
rapid strategic and tactical response decisions;
Technologies that enhance the Common Operating
Picture (COP) of the border environment for tactical and
operational planning with other federal, State and local law
enforcement partners;
Tools to provide homeland security personnel
simultaneous and uniform access to information--both at and
between ports of entry--to ensure that an agent's geographic
location does not limit his or her access to actionable
intelligence;
Rapid response capabilities to effectively respond to
cross-border violations. These include pursuit-termination
technology and command, control, and communications
technologies that improve situational awareness and provide
decision aids for commanders;
Technologies that aid in the deterrence and
channeling of illegal cross-border activity;
Technologies that improve voice and data connectivity
in remote field areas; and
Airborne detection and surveillance technologies.
These S&T Directorate border technology priorities are based upon
the requirements of our DHS component customers. Priorities are
established through an Integrated Product Team (IPT) approach among the
S&T Directorate's border security customers that include U.S. Customs
and Border Protection (CBP), U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement
(ICE), U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), United States
Coast Guard (USCG), and others.
Q4. What role will DHS S&T Directorate play in determining what
technologies are to be deployed along the borders as part of SBInet?
What role will it play in evaluating whether those technologies are
effective?
A4. The S&T Directorate identifies (through a requirements-based
process), develops, tests and facilitates the transition of advanced
homeland security technical capabilities to SBI and SBInet.
Specifically, the S&T Directorate supports SBInet through: (a)
technical risk reduction by exploration of alternative technologies,
(b) technology insertion into acquisition programs significantly
enhance performance or reduce costs, and (c) pursue specific high risk
/ high payoff innovations. The S&T Directorate will mature technologies
through a proof-of-concept testing, and then, if proved, SBInet will
incorporate them into the SBInet integrated technical solution. Because
we expect our nation's adversaries to adapt to SBInet systems, the S&T
Directorate's continuous infusion of new technology is absolutely
essential to providing a sustainable long-term capability.
Questions submitted by Representative Jo Bonner
Q1. In looking at the successful use of UAVs in the Middle East and
the Global War on Terrorism how effectively would UAVs serve the United
States along our southern border in what some may consider an non-
combat zone?
A1. The CBP Air & Marine UAV plans are integral to the SBInet solution
to: (a) provide coverage in ground based sensor gaps, (b) provide
immediate response to classify and identify problematic targets, and
(c) extend tactical tracking capability to improve apprehension. In
addition, SBInet is proposing a small, portable launch UAV (Skylark)
with limited range (and low altitude) to provide agent-based
reconnaissance and point to point search for response and apprehension
teams in the field.
Q2. Under Secretary Cohen, in your opinion, what are some of the most
affordable, effective and available technologies that we should
consider for border/coastal security?
A2. The S&T Directorate is developing border security technologies and
will transition to its customers both affordable and effective
capabilities that improve the security of our nation's borders. Its
goal is to develop and integrate information management, officer safety
and sensor technologies necessary to prevent the entry of terrorists,
weapons of mass destruction (WMD), criminals, and illegal aliens
through our nation's borders. We will address a range of technologies
such as advanced surveillance systems (including automated scene
understanding, advanced ground and maritime radars, and advanced ground
sensors), pursuit termination technology, and remote determination of
intent capability for checkpoints. These technologies will be
integrated into the Secure Border Initiative (SBI) program as
capabilities mature.
Questions submitted by Representative Judy Biggert
Q1. Who in the world do you feel we can learn from in terms of their
border security? Which countries use their technology most effectively?
How is our technology similar? What can we learn from countries like
Israel and even Mexico and Canada on their border security?
A1. There are a handful of countries that use a variety of
technological solutions, such as innovative electro-optical systems for
surveillance and tracking, optical fiber technology for security, video
communication and control systems alongside image-processing and smart
systems for electronic fences, etc. The technological components
proposed by Boeing for the SBInet first Task Order, which is a twenty-
eight mile section of the Tucson sector, is primarily the same
technology that is deployed along the Israeli border.
Q2. A recent Governmental Accountability Office report on the Visa
Waiver Program highlights several recommendations for increased
security at ports of entry against individuals using lost and stolen
passports. Among the weaknesses highlight in the report are the
following: (1) DHS has not established adequate operating procedures
for countries to report stolen or lost travel documents and (2) DHS has
not given U.S. border inspectors automatic access to the International
Criminal Police Organization (Interpol) lost and stolen travel document
databases at primary inspection points.
What technology is needed at ports of entry to correct this
deficiency? What is the cost of this technology? How has DHS addressed
these weaknesses? Is there a timeline for updating the technology
available to border inspectors at primary inspection points?
A2. The Secretary of Homeland Security has made screening of the
Interpol Stolen and Lost Travel Documents Database a goal for inbound
air passengers. The inclusion of Interpol Data on Lost and Stolen
Passports, (the Stolen and Lost Travel Documents Database or SLTD) is
less reliant upon a technological solution than an agreement between
Interpol and DHS to implement within agreed-upon parameters. Customs
and Border Protection completed a pilot in July 2006 to assess the
technical and operational issues. The expense for connectivity has been
estimated at two million dollars for implementation and $500,000 as a
yearly recurring cost. Access at airport primary inspection points is
expected to be introduced in 2007 with eventual implementation to all
primary inspection points.
Q3. How sophisticated is the technology of those smuggling people,
weapons, and drugs into our country?
A3. Smugglers, regardless of the item they are attempting to move, are
creative and resourceful. They are adept at creating concealed
compartments inside of otherwise normal appearing vehicles, shipping
containers, and cargo items. They use computers and commonly available
software to create or alter travel documents. They take advantage of
difficult terrain and remote areas of our borders to surreptitiously
enter the United States. They understand trade procedures and attempt
to mask illicit activity under the guise of legitimate import of goods.
CBP and ICE rely on a layered approach to border security that
emphasizes effective personnel, infrastructure, technology, and
resources to counter smuggling threats and ensure that regardless of
the tactics used the adversary is successfully detected and responded
to as appropriate.
Questions submitted by Representative Michael T. McCaul
Q1. I would like to discuss the U.S. Visitor and Immigrant Status
Indicator Technology (US-VISIT) program for a moment. Despite what many
folks believe, the US-VISIT program has not been fully implemented. The
Exit portion of US-VISIT is only operation as a pilot program in nine
airports and two sea-ports. As you know the exit procedures of the
program are critical component to the overall effectiveness of US-
VISIT. As visitors leave the country, US-VISIT Exit scans their travel
documents and captures their biometrics, matching the visitors'
identity, verifies departure, and confirms compliance with U.S.
immigration policy.
The U.S. allows in approximately 200 million temporary visitors a
year, with virtually no way to keep visitors from staying beyond their
authorized visit. DHS estimates that at least 30 percent of the
approximately 10 million illegal immigrants living in the U.S. are
probably visa absconders or over-stayers. The Government Accountability
Office says that figure is more likely 40 percent.
With such a national problem facing our country I am unable to
understand why DHS has not fully rolled-out an exiting Departmental
program, especially one involving bio-metrics that can help track visa
overstays. Can you explain this?
A1. Response US-VISIT is reviewing how to improve biometric exit at air
and sea ports of entry and how to improve compliance. US-VISIT will
continue to use the Advanced Passenger Information System (APIS) to
track departures.
Q2. I understand that fiscal year 2006 (FY06) expenditure plan for US-
VISIT was never submitted to Congress--contained in that spending plans
was additional FY06 monies to roll-out the Exit side of US-VISIT. The
Senate, in their version of the FY07 DHS Appropriations Bill is also
concerned regarding the current state of the Exit portion of US-VISIT.
In fact, they directed DHS to submit a strategic plan for US-VISIT 30
days after enactment of the bill.
Given the importance of this program, does the Department of
Homeland Security plan to submit to Congress a FY06 expenditure plan
that includes a further roll-out of the Exit portion of US-VISIT?
A2. The US-VISIT FY2006 expenditure plan was delivered to Congress on
August 14 and US-VISIT is now awaiting a response. The plan includes
continuing current exit pilots.
Q3. What is DHS's vision for SBInet? Mr. Giddens, what is your and
DHS's strategic plan for SBInet? What did you communicate to private
industry with regard to DHS's needs for this program?
A3. The challenges that this nation faces in having both open and
secure borders is multi-faceted and complex. It encompasses not only
the facilitation of legitimate trade and travel, but more importantly,
the protection of our homeland from cross-border and transnational
threats to our security, public safety and economy. With the mandates
to have both open and secure borders also comes the recognition that
attention must be paid to the processes that begin away from our
borders, occur at the border, and continue to all regions of the United
States. The Department's Secure Border Initiative (SBI) will create a
new border security culture within the Department, integrating and
unifying border security systems, and developing and coordinating
programs and policies to secure the border and efficiently enforce U.S.
immigration and customs laws.
SBInet is a critical component of the Department's strategic
strategy in securing the Nation's borders. SBInet, when fully
implemented, will enable DHS to detect, identify, classify, respond and
bring to a law enforcement resolution cross-border threats. SBInet will
meet the varied requirements of the U.S. border environment--southern,
northern and maritime. It will integrate capabilities by utilizing a
systems- and risk-based approach. SBInet will also develop and deploy a
Common Operating Picture providing commonality to DHS components as
well as inter-operability with external stakeholders. What has been
communicated to private industry from the onset by the highest levels
of the Department is that the proposed solution must be a dynamic,
creative systems approach that will ensure the optimum mix of
personnel.
Q4. Mr. Giddens, your testimony seemed to be very short on specifics.
Could you describe the different, specific needs of the border and how
specifically technology will address these requirements?
A4. The U.S. border can be best viewed as three basic tactical
environments--urban, rural and remote. Different environments require
different deployment tactics and this ultimately affects what specific
technology will be used.
In an urban environment, the criminal has the tactical advantage
because an illegal entrant can be across the border and into the
community infrastructure in a matter of minutes, sometimes seconds. If
accessible to entry, urban areas require an inordinate number of
enforcement personnel to effectively confront the illegal activity. The
goal of technology used for border security in an urban environment is
to create a perception of such impenetrability that potential illegal
entrants and smugglers are deterred from attempting an entry, thereby
reducing an excessive investment in personnel resources.
In a rural area, the time it takes for an illegal entrant to mix
into the community infrastructure is greater, thereby giving
enforcement personnel the tactical advantage of time to respond, and
the enforcement response may be measured. The technology used in the
rural area will be able to detect the entry in time to respond,
resolve, and bring the situation to an appropriate law enforcement
resolution.
In remote environments, the time from entry to infrastructure is
greater still and may occur in hours or even days. In many remote
areas, it may take two to three days to reach the nearest road. In such
situations, CBP makes every effort to apprehend illegal entrants at a
location as close to the point of entry as practical. Messaging
targeted toward deterrence is an essential component to attaining
border safety in a remote environment.
The technology that will be used in all of the environments along
the border will vary depending on the location, terrain, climate,
topography, etc. CBP will utilize assorted tested and proven
technologies that may include ground surveillance radars combined with
unattended ground sensors and sensor assets attached to aerial
vehicles. These technologies will complement other components and
infrastructures to ensure the proper mix of systems are deployed along
the border.
Question submitted by Representative Lincoln Davis
Q1. Since its inception, DHS has benefited from a strong working
relationship with the Department of Energy national labs, which have
helped DHS identify, develop, and examine cutting edge homeland and
border security technologies. How will the proposed reorganization of
DHS S&T Directorate affect the way DHS works with the labs?
A1. The S&T Directorate recognizes the value of the national
laboratories and will continue to utilize the expertise of the national
laboratories. The S&T Directorate plans to leverage prior investments
in the R&D capability of the national laboratories by the Department of
Energy, the Department of Defense and many other agencies and to
continue this farsighted tradition through focused investments for the
future. The recent alignment of the S&T Directorate includes
establishing a Director of Research position reporting to the Under
Secretary, who will oversee the Office of National Laboratories, which
has responsibility for coordination and utilization of the national
laboratories to support the homeland security mission. This includes
both harvesting current national laboratory science and technology and
supporting investments that are needed to develop and maintain critical
homeland security capabilities for the future. Both of these missions
are essential.
Answers to Post-Hearing Questions
Responses by Peter R. Worch, Independent Consultant, Member of the U.S.
Air Force Science Advisory Board
Question submitted by Representative Jo Bonner
Q1. I wish we could match good ideas with funding--but we have to
search out great ideas, establish the cost of the projects, and have
them implemented. As we go through this process, a lot has been said
about Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) along the border. Some reports
suggest the use of UAVs in one of the most costly means of monitoring
border security--please explain some of the uphill battles of this
costly project.
A1. The purchase and operation of unmanned aerial vehicles for border
surveillance (or any other application) is costly. I don't know the
exact numbers because the cost analyses I have seen have tended to use
flawed assumptions.
In the border security tasks, the initial ``trip-wire'' detections
would best be accomplished by buried (or covert) unattended ground
sensors. A somewhat larger area may be covered by the pole mounted
sensors (terrain, foliage, and urban structures permitting). Clearly,
ground or pole-mounted sensors are low in cost. But both are
inflexible--they can only cover that designated area around their
location. In forested areas, for example, these sensors would have to
be very closely spaced (100's of feet). Moreover, for the pole-mounted
sensors, a determined intruder would certainly figure out a way to
avoid detection by the pole-mounted sensors because he/she can easily
see the areas such a sensor could see or not see. Various cover,
concealment, and camouflage means (as well as careful timing) could
avoid detection.
The value of the UAV is that it can
-- rapidly deploy to a newly-identified area of suspected or
real penetrations
-- provide persistent surveillance at that site, and
-- provide relentless tracking of the intruder, no matter
where he/she chose to travel. (The use of Predator in Iraq has
time and again demonstrated this strength.)
In my mind, the UAVs would not patrol the entire border, but would
be selectively used in situations in which fixed (including aerostat-
carried) sensors simply could not provide the service. Thus, a limited
number would be procured and strategically based to do tasks that other
sensor concepts could not do, and to augment other elements of border
security.
Thus, I see it as a matter of cost-effectiveness, not just cost.
As for the ``uphill battles,'' I see three issues to be addressed
in establishing an effective UAV surveillance force:
Human-System Integration (HSI)--situational
awareness, controls and displays, health management, and
emergency procedures all require improved HSI to be safe and
effective in intercepting intruders
Detect, See and Avoid techniques that are highly
automated, vision-based systems are needed for UAV operations
(and would benefit civil and military aircraft) in civil
airspace
Careful, but limited, basing and an appropriate
concept of operations to provide for reasonable flyout times,
supportability, and system cost effectiveness.
These issues are not insurmountable, nor are the solutions in
themselves costly. Joint efforts with the military to address the first
two issues would be appropriate.