[House Hearing, 109 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
COAST GUARD MISSION CAPABILITIES
=======================================================================
(109-72)
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
COAST GUARD AND MARITIME TRANSPORTATION
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON
TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
MAY 11, 2006
__________
Printed for the use of the
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure
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COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE
DON YOUNG, Alaska, Chairman
THOMAS E. PETRI, Wisconsin, Vice- JAMES L. OBERSTAR, Minnesota
Chair NICK J. RAHALL, II, West Virginia
SHERWOOD L. BOEHLERT, New York PETER A. DeFAZIO, Oregon
HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina JERRY F. COSTELLO, Illinois
JOHN J. DUNCAN, Jr., Tennessee ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of
WAYNE T. GILCHREST, Maryland Columbia
JOHN L. MICA, Florida JERROLD NADLER, New York
PETER HOEKSTRA, Michigan CORRINE BROWN, Florida
VERNON J. EHLERS, Michigan BOB FILNER, California
SPENCER BACHUS, Alabama EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas
STEVEN C. LaTOURETTE, Ohio GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi
SUE W. KELLY, New York JUANITA MILLENDER-McDONALD,
RICHARD H. BAKER, Louisiana California
ROBERT W. NEY, Ohio ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland
FRANK A. LoBIONDO, New Jersey EARL BLUMENAUER, Oregon
JERRY MORAN, Kansas ELLEN O. TAUSCHER, California
GARY G. MILLER, California BILL PASCRELL, Jr., New Jersey
ROBIN HAYES, North Carolina LEONARD L. BOSWELL, Iowa
ROB SIMMONS, Connecticut TIM HOLDEN, Pennsylvania
HENRY E. BROWN, Jr., South Carolina BRIAN BAIRD, Washington
TIMOTHY V. JOHNSON, Illinois SHELLEY BERKLEY, Nevada
TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania JIM MATHESON, Utah
SAM GRAVES, Missouri MICHAEL M. HONDA, California
MARK R. KENNEDY, Minnesota RICK LARSEN, Washington
BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania MICHAEL E. CAPUANO, Massachusetts
JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas ANTHONY D. WEINER, New York
JIM GERLACH, Pennsylvania JULIA CARSON, Indiana
MARIO DIAZ-BALART, Florida TIMOTHY H. BISHOP, New York
JON C. PORTER, Nevada MICHAEL H. MICHAUD, Maine
TOM OSBORNE, Nebraska LINCOLN DAVIS, Tennessee
KENNY MARCHANT, Texas BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky
MICHAEL E. SODREL, Indiana BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
CHARLES W. DENT, Pennsylvania RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri
TED POE, Texas ALLYSON Y. SCHWARTZ, Pennsylvania
DAVID G. REICHERT, Washington JOHN T. SALAZAR, Colorado
CONNIE MACK, Florida JOHN BARROW, Georgia
JOHN R. `RANDY' KUHL, Jr., New York
LUIS G. FORTUNO, Puerto Rico
LYNN A. WESTMORELAND, Georgia
CHARLES W. BOUSTANY, Jr., Louisiana
JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio
(ii)
?
SUBCOMMITTEE ON COAST GUARD AND MARITIME TRANSPORTATION
FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey, Chairman
HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina BOB FILNER, California, Ranking
WAYNE T. GILCHREST, Maryland Democrat
PETER HOEKSTRA, Michigan CORRINE BROWN, Florida
ROB SIMMONS, Connecticut GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi
MARIO DIAZ-BALART, Florida JUANITA MILLENDER-McDONALD,
DAVID G. REICHERT, Washington,Vice- California
Chair MICHAEL M. HONDA, California
CONNIE MACK, Florida ANTHONY D. WEINER, New York
LUIS G. FORTUNO, Puerto Rico BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
CHARLES W. BOUSTANY, Jr., Louisiana BRIAN BAIRD, Washington
DON YOUNG, Alaska JAMES L. OBERSTAR, Minnesota
(Ex Officio) (Ex Officio)
(iii)
CONTENTS
TESTIMONY
Page
Justice, Rear Admiral Wayne E., Director of Enforcement and
Incident Management, U.S. Coast Guard.......................... 4
Nimmich, Rear Admiral Joseph L., Assistant Commandant for Policy
and Planning, U.S. Coast Guard................................. 4
PREPARED STATEMENT SUBMITTED BY A MEMBER OF CONGRESS
LoBiondo, Hon. Frank A., of New Jersey........................... 34
PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED BY WITNESSES
Justice, Rear Admiral Wayne E................................... 18
Nimmich, Rear Admiral Joseph L.................................. 18
SUBMISSIONS FOR THE RECORD
Kelly, Hon. Sue, a Representative in Congress from New York, U.S.
Coast Guard ship photographs................................... 12
Justice, Rear Admiral Wayne E., Director of Enforcement and
Incident Management, U.S. Coast Guard, and Rear Admiral Joseph
L. Nimmich, Assistant Commandant for Policy and Planning, U.S.
Coast Guard:
Rescue 21 Ground Subsystem Installation timeline, chart........ 16
Responses to questions from Rep Brown-White.................... 26
COAST GUARD MISSION CAPABILITIES
----------
May 11, 2006,
House of Representatives, Committee on
Transportation and Infrastructure, Subcommittee
on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation,
Washington, D.C.
The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:00 a.m. in room
2167, Rayburn House Office Building, the Honorable Frank A.
LoBiondo [Chairman of the committee] presiding.
Mr. LoBiondo. Good morning. The Subcommittee is coming to
order, and the Subcommittee is meeting this morning to review
the Coast Guard's capabilities to carry out its many
traditional maritime homeland security missions, as well as to
examine the progress of several systems designed to enhance
maritime domain awareness.
Over the last five years, the Coast Guard's budget,
personnel level and mission scope have expanded to meet the
Service's increased responsibility for maritime homeland
security. However, it is unclear whether these enhanced
maritime homeland security responsibilities are negatively
affecting the Coast Guard's responsibility to carry out its
many traditional missions. A GAO report in 2004 revealed that
resource hours for many of the Coast Guard's traditional
missions have decreased as demands of the port security
missions have increased.
While I do not believe the number of hours devoted to each
mission is a true indication of mission performance, I am
concerned that the Coast Guard's traditional missions may be
suffering as a result of the priority level of homeland
security missions. At the same time, the Coast Guard's legacy
vessels are increasingly unavailable, due to operational
restrictions or unscheduled maintenance, caused by the
unexpected deterioration of the assets.
For example, the 110-foot patrol boat fleet has experienced
numerous hull failures, creating an overall readiness gap.
These vessels will be replaced under the Deepwater program. But
I am very, very concerned how any shortfall in asset readiness
will affect the Coast Guard's mission capabilities in the
meantime.
I hope to hear more this morning from the Coast Guard's
plans to maintain a balance between all its missions and about
the actions the Coast Guard is taking to improve the efficiency
of each of its missions.
The Coast Guard currently is in the process of employing
improved technology systems to enhance its awareness of
activities occurring within the maritime domain. The Coast
Guard has begun the national implementation of the Automatic
Identification System, AIS, in U.S. ports and coastal waters.
AIS will enhance the Coast Guard's capabilities to target and
track vessels as they enter and exit our Nation's ports. This
system, coupled with long range vessel tracking systems, will
allow the Coast Guard to monitor commercial vessel traffic up
to 2,000 miles from shore.
Under current law, the Coast Guard is required to develop
and implement a long range vessel tracking system. However, no
such system is in place today. I believe we must extend our
tracking capabilities beyond our immediate coastal waters. I
realize that the Coast Guard is working through the
International Maritime Association to develop international
standards for such a system, but this should not stop the
United States from instituting its own program in the interim.
I hope the witnesses will provide us with an update on this
important program and an idea of when and where we should
expect a final system to be implemented.
Lastly, the Coast Guard is in the process of recapitalizing
its maritime control command and communications system through
the Rescue 21 program. This program will allow the Coast Guard
personnel to respond faster to maritime emergencies through the
use of directional finding equipment that will aid in locating
distressed mariners. Rescue 21 is already in place in my home
State of New Jersey, and we have seen the tremendous upgrades
that this program provides.
I hope to hear more about the plan for the implementation
of this system nationwide and on how the Coast Guard plans to
incorporate the capabilities of this program with the Service's
other maritime domain awareness initiatives.
I want to again thank the witnesses for coming this
morning. We look forward to hearing your testimony. Now I will
turn it over to Mr. Filner.
Mr. Filner. Good morning and thank you, Mr. Chairman, for
this hearing.
As you may remember, several years ago when Admiral Collins
testified before this Committee, he said that the multi-mission
approach of the Coast Guard means they cannot carry out any of
their missions optimally, but they can provide them in the most
cost effective manner for our Nation. If we were to have
different single purpose agencies for the various Coast Guard
missions, they might be more successful carrying out those
missions, but it would cost a lot more.
Since the transfer of the Coast Guard from the Department
of Transportation to the Department of Homeland Security, we
have seen a reduction of resources in traditional Coast Guard
missions and an increase in homeland security missions of the
Coast Guard. In the President's proposed budget for fiscal year
2007, the Administration is proposing to cut funding for marine
safety programs from $502 million to $453 million, and cutting
funding for search and rescue missions from $629 million to
$569 million. Meanwhile, funding for port security would
increase from $1.2 to $1.4 billion.
Now, the automatic identification system mentioned by the
Chairman was developed as a collision avoidance system to help
protect ships from colliding in our waters. The law requires,
as you know, all commercial vessels over 65 feet long and all
towing vessels over 26 feet to have an AIS system on board.
However, the Coast Guard's own regulations only require AIS
systems for those vessels that operate in a so-called vessel
traffic service area. As a result, if a towing vessel operates
above Baton Rouge, Louisiana, they are required by law but not
Coast Guard regulation to have an AIS system on board. I think
it is time for the Coast Guard to recognize that this system
was developed for prevention of marine casualties and not
solely as a means of tracking vessels for homeland security
purposes. Just because the Coast Guard can't track a vessel on
the Mississippi River north of Baton Rouge doesn't mean that
the vessels aren't required by law to have that AIS
transponder.
Similarly, Congress has required these same vessels to have
electronic charts on board beginning January 1st of 2007.
However, the Coast Guard has not yet prescribed any regulations
telling them what kind of electronic charts they have to have
on board. Again, just because the Coast Guard doesn't prescribe
the standards for electronic charts doesn't mean the vessel
owners don't have to have them.
Congress wrote this statutory requirement to prevent
accidents, like the one where the captain of the towing vessel
Mauvilla got lost in the fog and struck a railroad bridge on
September 22nd of 1993. Shortly thereafter, the Amtrak train,
Sunset Limited, crossed the bridge and plunged into the
waterway, killing 45 people. Electronic charts with GPS can
prevent these types of disasters. So the Coast Guard, I think,
needs to provide the resources necessary for the marine safety
program to prescribe these regulations on time for the industry
to comply with our statutory deadline.
If the Coast Guard is not committed or cannot carry out
these statutory responsibilities for programs like marine
safety, then maybe it is time that these functions be
transferred back to the Department of Transportation. Vessel
safety inspections, licensing of mariners, documentation of
registration of ships, are exactly the same functions that are
carried out by DOT today for both aviation and rail. Those
safety responsibilities for these other modes of transportation
were not transferred to the Department of Homeland Security,
because they were not thought to be directly related to our
security. But in fact, these safety missions of the Coast Guard
were not transferred to the Coast Guard until after World War
II and had been carried out previously by the Bureau of Marine
Inspection and Navigation.
So these are issues I hope we explore today, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you for scheduling this hearing. I look forward to
working with you to ensure that there continues to be adequate
support for all of the Coast Guard's non-homeland security
missions as well as their homeland security function.
Mr. LoBiondo. Thank you, Mr. Filner.
We are very pleased with the panel that has joined us. We
have Rear Admiral Joseph L. Nimmich, Assistant Commander for
Policy and Planning of the United States Coast Guard and Rear
Admiral Wayne E. Justice, Director of Enforcement and Incident
Management for the United States Coast Guard.
We thank you very much for being here. Admiral Justice,
please proceed.
TESTIMONY OF REAR ADMIRAL WAYNE E. JUSTICE, DIRECTOR OF
ENFORCEMENT AND INCIDENT MANAGEMENT, UNITED STATES COAST GUARD;
REAR ADMIRAL JOSEPH L. NIMMICH, ASSISTANT COMMANDANT FOR POLICY
AND PLANNING, UNITED STATES COAST GUARD
Admiral Justice. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, distinguished
members of the Committee.
It is our pleasure to appear before you today representing
the men and women of the Coast Guard to discuss our continuing
success in balancing the Coast Guard's organizational
performance across our missions. Additionally, we will provide
you with an update on the Coast Guard's ongoing efforts to
improve our mission performance for the scope and application
of technology to the Nation's maritime domain awareness needs.
I ask that my written statement be entered into the hearing
record.
The Coast Guard's world of work is our oceans, lakes,
rivers, harbors and our waterways. It is the maritime domain
and it is unique. Distinct from land borders characterized by
clear, easily distinguished legal boundaries, our oceans
represent the last global commons. It is fundamental to our own
and the international communities' economic prosperity.
As a result, maritime safety and security are not just
issues of U.S. national interest, but of global stability. The
maritime domain is extremely intricate and unparalleled by the
variety of users.
Our Nation has built a Coast Guard within the Department of
Homeland Security that is able to successfully operate in this
complex and unique environment. The Coast Guard exercises
authorities and deploys capabilities to guarantee the safety
and security of the U.S. maritime domain. That's who we are:
military, multi-mission and maritime.
While the character and the nature of our service are
clear, our missions are by no means static. New threats emerge
as others are mitigated, and the Coast Guard's capabilities,
competencies, organizational structure and processes must
evolve accordingly. The Coast Guard must be steadfast in its
character but adaptive in its methods.
The Coast Guard is the lead Federal agency for maritime
homeland security, a role supported by its unique complement of
authorities, maritime capabilities, proven competencies and
longstanding domestic international partnerships. Carrying out
this role requires a Coast Guard that is ready to act, enabled
by awareness and well equipped.
In addition to current activity levels, focus should be on
examining the Coast Guard's results with respect to its
performance targets and the degree to which the Coast Guard
continues to mitigate risks for me in the maritime domain
across all missions. The post-9/11 environment demands that we
focus on addressing the threats, reduce risk in the maritime
domain and strive to achieve our performance goals in all
mission areas.
The Coast Guard has successfully insured that both homeland
security and non-homeland security missions are properly
executed. We met 8 of our 11 mission goals in fiscal year 2005
through a balanced allocation of resources across all Coast
Guard mission programs. While we do not have the final results
of the fiscal year 2006 performance, all indications are that
the balance of performance will be similar to that of 2005.
Coast Guard forces are flexible, rapidly deployable and
able to respond to crises in a full range of capabilities. The
Coast Guard has adapted to growing mission demands, to enhanced
maritime security, while continuing to meet other mission
requirements. Examples of these growing demands include natural
disaster response, drug and migrant interdiction, military
security, and support for Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring
Freedom.
Looking forward to fiscal year 2007, our budgets and
missions further strengthens the Coast Guard preparedness
across all our missions and enhances our capability to respond
to all hazards and threats within the maritime domain. Our
fiscal year 2007 budget submission, among other things, reduces
the inflationary cost gaps for depot level maintenance and
energy resources, supports the medium endurance cutter mission
affecting this project and funds Deepwater logistic support.
Equally important to readiness and awareness is equipping
and training the Coast Guard personnel with capabilities and
competencies to respond effectively. For example, the advance
notice of arrival requires vessels entering the United States,
it is critical to understand who and what is arriving in order
to identify potential threats. However, if Coast Guard assets
do not have the capabilities necessary to deal with these
identified threats early and effectively, an opportunity to
mitigate risk is lost.
Fiscal year 2007 budget initiatives include funding the
Deepwater modernization program, Rescue 21, National Capital
Region Air Defense Infrastructure and Operations, enhancements
to maritime security and response team, and our airborne use of
force operations. Additionally, securing our vast maritime
borders depends upon our ability to enhance maritime domain
awareness, which Rear Admiral Nimmich will further discuss.
Thank you. It is an honor to be here, sirs, and I look
forward to answering your questions.
Mr. LoBiondo. Thank you, Admiral Justice.
I would like to ask unanimous consent that Mrs. Kelly be
allowed to participate in this hearing. Thank you.
Admiral Nimmich, please proceed.
Admiral Nimmich. Good morning, Mr. Chairman and
distinguished members of the Committee. It is a pleasure to be
here with you today to discuss the Coast Guard's maritime
domain awareness efforts. Because of its vast size and complex
nature, the maritime domain is particularly susceptible to the
exploitation by individuals, organizations and nations. It
uniquely facilitates freedom of movement and flow of goods
while allowing people, cargo and conveyances to transit with a
degree of anonymity generally unavailable with land and air
movement.
To counter these threats, the foundation of our maritime
strategy relies on three key points: achieving maritime domain
awareness, establishing and leading a maritime security regime;
and the deployment of effective and integrated operational
capability. These are not standalone goals, but rather part of
an active system of layered maritime security. Enhancing our
awareness in the maritime domain will only be made possible by
improving our ability to collect, fuse, analyze, display and
disseminate actionable information and intelligence to our
operational commanders.
This awareness must become increasingly comprehensive as
potential threats approach the U.S. coast. We must know what is
normal and what is not normal throughout the marine
transportation system and the maritime domain, so we can best
assess potential risks and take the appropriate actions.
The collection to dissemination process emphasizes unity of
effort between all levels of government, the private sector and
our international partners with the following goals in mind:
enhance transparency in the maritime domain to detect, deter
and defeat threats as early and as distant from our shores as
possible; enable accurate, dynamic and competent decisions and
responses to the full spectrum of the maritime threat;
persistently monitor vessels and craft, cargo, crews and
passengers, in identified areas of interest in the global
maritime domain, and then fully adhere to the law to ensure the
freedom of navigation, the efficient flow of commerce and
individual rights.
Thanks to the strong support of the Administration,
Congress and this Committee in particular, a number of
initiatives are underway to transform Coast Guard capabilities
to align with these national goals and the efforts of our
partners. However, we must do more than provide improved
capabilities. Our efforts must also include policy, technology
and operation contributions that will enable enhanced global
maritime security.
I would like to provide you with three examples related to
partnerships, research and technology deployment. In
partnerships, we are establishing partnerships to share
information and better leverage resources. These efforts
include partnerships with Federal departments such as the
Project Seahawk in Charleston, and the Joint Harbor Operations
Centers with the Navy and other partners in San Diego and the
Hampton Roads.
Internationally, we are developing information sharing
agreements with a number of other maritime nations, as well as
pursuing global solutions at the IMO, International Maritime
Organization. In research, we are also partnering with the
Department of Homeland Security, Science and Technology
Directorate, as well as numerous entities within the Department
of Defense to explore technological solutions to some of our
thorniest problems.
We have just completed the first stage of an effort to look
at probably our most difficult problem: assessing, collating
and organizing all the relevant, existing data about a given
vessel, its cargo and its persons and identifying that and
tracking it with the vessel. Technological deployment, we are
finally taking a serious and deliberate look at our needs and
how to prioritize and address them with technology that is
available today.
Through the Presidentially-chartered Maritime Domain
Awareness Implementation team, our senior officials from across
every Federal department are looking at their roles,
responsibilities, existing capabilities and gaps in the
Nation's maritime awareness. The MDA implementation team will
develop, among other things, a coherent, integrated,
interagency investment strategy that will help leverage
existing capabilities and guide future budget efforts.
Mr. Chairman, this Committee has played a significant role
in the Coast Guard's recent noteworthy achievements and our
ability to balance all of its post-9/11 missions. I would like
to thank you for your strong support on behalf of the military,
our civilian and our auxiliary volunteers.
Mr. LoBiondo. Thank you, Admiral.
I would like to turn to Mr. Filner to start off questions.
Mr. Filner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you,
Admirals, for being here. When we began this experiment of
giving the Coast Guard new homeland security duties on top of
the traditional role of the Coast Guard, we all wondered aloud,
I think, whether that could be done successfully, and whether
there were sufficient resources and sufficient adaptability of
the organization to do that.
And let me just ask some questions about that, if I may. As
I understand it, you have created sectors in your organization
that merge maritime safety with operations centers. Now, that
may make sense for homeland security. But the other aspects of
your role, for example, marine safety, may be compromised. For
example, can it happen that someone with little or no
experience in marine safety be put in charge of the whole
operation in a port, like a helicopter pilot? Is that possible
under that new organization and how do you compensate for that?
Admiral Justice. Great question, sir.
We absolutely look at the skills sets of our sector
commanders. I will speak from my experience. I just spent three
and a half years in Miami, sir, where we stood up sectors. We
made sure across the Seventh Coast Guard District, as we put
people in San Juan and St. Petersburg and Miami and Key West
and Charleston and Jacksonville that the skills sets required,
whether they be search and rescue, law enforcement, maritime
security and safety, were filled by the commanding officers.
And if the CO, if the commanding officer didn't come in
with that strongest background in one of the missions, he made
sure that the executive officer, the deputy, the number two
person, had that skill set. That was done very distinctly and
with great forethought, sir.
Mr. Filner. I'm sorry you didn't use the West Coast for
your example.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Filner. But they may put me in charge of the San Diego
sector, and that really would be a problem.
Have you thought about hiring, for example, civilian
maritime safety officers or inspectors who would have
experience directly in that field? You rotate people around,
you have to try these balancing acts. Do you have any plans to
hire civilian inspectors?
Admiral Justice. Specifically, I can't answer that, but I
do know that we absolutely have that option and we do take the
opportunity to hire civilians into the Coast Guard world that
would provide continuity. I know for a fact we have done it in
the search and rescue world, in our command centers at these
sectors. We have taken the opportunity to put one or two
civilians in there, to add some continuity and some local
knowledge to those programs. So yes, sir.
Mr. Filner. OK. I hope you will look at that for these
sector kinds of issues.
Just quickly on Katrina, where we have consistently praised
the Coast Guard for its response, as this crisis is prolonged,
I guess, you have had to reallocate resources and now we are
told by some of the vessel owners that people who were
conducting safety inspections are now doing other things. So
they are not sure they are going to have their certificate of
inspection on time.
Do you have enough inspectors in the Gulf of Mexico to make
sure that that won't happen?
Admiral Justice. I would answer that, yes, we do. I would
answer that, and I appreciate your calling that to my
attention. What we do also, as we showed in Katrina, we have
the ability, if we find an area that is light, we will surge
people to that area to make sure we can respond to the needs of
that mission.
Mr. Filner. I hope so. Maybe we can get you those exact
problem areas that have been referred to us so that we can make
sure that doesn't occur.
Mr. Chairman, I am not sure how you are going to handle the
vote that is going on now.
Mr. LoBiondo. It is going to be a long day.
We have about 11 minutes left in this vote. I don't want to
cut Mrs. Kelly off, so what I am going to ask for is a brief
recess. It looks like only one vote. As soon as we can get over
and vote and get back, we will pick back up again.
So the Committee stands in recess.
[Recess.]
Mr. LoBiondo. The Committee will come back to order.
I will now recognize Mrs. Kelly.
Mrs. Kelly. I first want to thank you, Mr. Chairman, for
allowing me to sit in. I very much appreciate this.
My concern is that the Indian Point nuclear facility lies
in my district in Westchester County. It has a very close
proximity with New York City, and it is a highly visible target
for terrorists. And security of the plant is a top priority of
mine. You may or may not know that the planes that took down
the World Trade Towers flew over the Indian Point nuclear
facility on their way to New York City.
Currently, outside of the private security that is provided
by the plant's owners, the main source of protection is the New
York Naval Militia. Two militia vessels are stationed in the
Hudson near the Indian Point patrol for water-borne attacks.
The Naval Militia is good, brave volunteers who have an
unfortunate lack of adequate resources.
As you can imagine, I am very interested in what the Coast
Guard is doing to augment this really strong volunteer force,
and gentlemen, I have been on the boat with them. So I know
what they are doing, I know how they are equipped, and I am
interested in what you are doing to try to support them. I
don't feel that what you are doing is enough.
I was told in January that the Coast Guard conducts a
weekly patrol of a power plant with a cutter, WLR, it is a 65
foot inland tug. That is the picture of the tug. And I also
understand the Coast Guard provides a weekly fly-by.
Admiral Nimmich, both you and I know that the Coast Guard
tug is not a fast or a well-armed vessel. What the people have
on that vessel in terms of guns is sidearms. The WLR's top
speed is 10 knots. Anyone, including a terrorist, can buy a
boat that is two or three or four times faster than the WLR.
I don't know how the Coast Guard intends to stop a high-
speed boat loaded with explosives with people who want to kill
themselves, blow themselves up with the boat. I don't know how
they expect a tug to be effective at that. The terrorists have
used boats like that in the past in Israel and in locations in
the Persian Gulf. I am wondering if it wouldn't be more
appropriate to assign a high speed patrol boat with a weapon
that can sink a boat, like a Cyclone or an Island class cutter.
Small arms are only going to deter somebody. They can't
stop a boat crew that wants to die. The only weapon, it needs
to be at least a 25 millimeter or higher cannon, and the WLR
has no fixed armament, with the Coast Guard and Israeli
experience with suicide boats show a boat sinking weapon of 25
millimeters is need. There are no WYTL class tugs that have
ever been deployed in the Persian Gulf to protect. Neither we
nor the Israelis guard our naval port facilities in the Middle
East with tugs.
So why would the Coast Guard use a tug for a waterside
nuclear facility in New York? That is my question.
Admiral Justice. Yes, ma'am. Thank you for the question.
As the Coast Guard works with the industry, State, locals,
as we look at the infrastructure that needs protection in an
area. We look at it, we see what is available, we see what the
security plans are. Then as we take the threat-based approach
to it, then there is, what kinds of resources can we apply,
given the piece.
What I would answer would be that, on this issue, I will
take back this issue, we would be happy to talk with our people
in New York. I will say that I actually agree with your
construct that that vessel in itself is not properly armed to
do the mission that you are talking about. What the depth of
the water is there, I can't really speak to the peculiarities
of the security.
Mrs. Kelly. It is a pretty good deepwater port.
Admiral Justice. And how far away the plan is from the
beach and all those sorts of things. But I absolutely will take
this back and we will look at what is being done and what else
might be done, different sorts of assets that would be
available to property attend to that concern.
Mrs. Kelly. If we were able to have a cutter, if we were
able to have a 25 millimeter or larger gun, I would feel a lot
more comfortable about the job that the Coast Guard is doing.
Because we right now are being protected by naval militia
volunteers in a boat that they themselves have been working on
to make it seaworthy.
You talked about identified areas of interest being the
things you want to protect. It seems to me that this is
something we need to look at. I don't know what the Coast Guard
uses to protect a high value asset in a central command. Is it
a boat like that or more?
Admiral Justice. Certainly not. But this location and area
that you are talking about there gets into, it is a risk
mitigation strategy, and what are the threats and how--we just
can't protect everything with the best assets that we have.
That remains, of course, a struggle that we are here talking
about today, is how do we balance where we are going to put
those assets to get the most effective use out of them to deter
just what you are talking about.
Mrs. Kelly. Well, that tug is plying the river. That tug
also comes from New York City. So what you have with that tug
is a way of, I assume, you are using it as a protective device
from the river. But it is also New York City. So anything that
is coming up to protect the nuclear plants is also going to be
something I am sure you are going to be using for the ports in
New York.
Admiral Justice. Right.
Mrs. Kelly. Perhaps we need to change the asset there and
move from a 10 knot tug to something that does have the
armament that would stop people who are bent on a suicide
destructive act, with a loaded boat. And we should put the
affixed armament in a way that fixed armament is out there,
visible, so they know we will blow that boat up before it gets
to shore.
Admiral Justice. Yes, ma'am.
Mrs. Kelly. I thank you, Mr. Chairman, for allowing me to
come and speak----
Admiral Nimmich. Mr. Chairman, if I may?
Mrs. Kelly. Yes.
Admiral Nimmich. Ma'am, what I want to add to the picture
is, as you know, that is a very well traveled and highly dense
pleasure boat area. They move up and down in a very narrow
channel. One of the things that we need to look at is not just
how to stop but how to prevent, what is the awareness we have,
what is the regulatory framework by which we know what those
boats are and what their intent is, not just merely the end
product, but stop it before those explosives travel down the
river, stop it at its source.
So I ask that as we talk about the technologies and the
information sharing and the regulatory framework we will need
to put in place about knowing what recreational boats are
doing, where they are going, who is on board, licensing of
recreational boat operators, should be equally as important as
how do we put the end, if we fail all the way up, we need that
measurable line. But we really don't want to even get to that
point where we have to use force. We really want to prevent it
through knowledge up front.
Mrs. Kelly. And I agree with you on that score. However, if
we don't have the force in place, we couldn't use it if we
needed it. And New York is a prime target. New York is the only
place where we have experienced terrorism on our shores.
The thing is that within the area of the nuclear plants,
there are 20 million people. If you expand that, if there is an
explosion at that plant and there is a release of some kind of
nuclear material that goes into the air, that population grows
to 50 million if there is a southern wind. There are so many
people there, it is a high priority target for the terrorists.
We need to be able to protect that target. And if you can do
anything to help us do that, I would really, I think that the
people in the area would feel a lot more comfortable than what
we have now.
I know the river.
Mr. LoBiondo. Mrs. Kelly, would you yield?
Mrs. Kelly. Yes.
Mr. LoBiondo. There is something you can do. There is
something that every member in Congress who comes to this
Committee with a request like this can do. That is, redouble
your efforts on Deepwater. They don't have the assets. We have
this day in and day out.
And we have a plan in place. We first want to keep it from
slipping. We secondly want to accelerate. If Deepwater were
fully online and everything were flowing with new assets coming
in, the Coast Guard would be in a much better position to tell
you an absolute yes.
So I am sure they are going to go back, I am sure you have
done a good job articulating this. But we are going to have
another battle this year. The battle is shaping now. And again,
we have a number of members who come in with similar type
concerns, and the Coast Guard does a magnificent job with the
resources at their disposal.
But unless Operation Deepwater kicks into high gear and we
get the money to keep it flowing, we are going to continue to
have requests like this.
Mrs. Kelly. Mr. Chairman, you probably know I stand right
with you on this. Operation Deepwater is absolutely essential
for the safety of the Nation. I certainly hope we are able to
get Operation Deepwater passed and get you the money we need.
This is high priority for the safety of all of us, but
especially for people like the Chairman from New Jersey and me,
from New York. We are in the target zone. We have experienced
it. We know what it feels like, and we don't ever want this to
happen again.
So we will help, whatever we can do. And if there is
something that we can do to help you, Admiral Nimmich, to get
started on the study, I am glad to work with you in the Hudson
region. A good part of the Hudson Valley falls within my
district, and I am glad to be able to help you do anything I
can there.
Admiral Nimmich. Thank you, ma'am.
Mrs. Kelly. I thank you, and thank you again, Mr. Chairman,
for letting me come
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Mr. LoBiondo. Thank you.
I have a couple of questions I would like to ask. This sort
of points at the discussion we have been having. But very
pointedly, does the Coast Guard currently have adequate
resources, including funding, personnel and assets to carry out
all of its homeland security and traditional missions? Whoever
wants to take a stab.
Admiral Justice. Sir, that is a tough question, sir. The
answer is that we have been magnificently funded, increased
over the last few years. We have taken those resources that
have been given to us and we work hard, across all missions, to
focus on, we set goal for results, and we strive to get those
results. And each year, it is not each year, it is each month,
it is every quarter, we see how we are doing as we get toward
those results. And if need be, we shift resources to react.
And then of course, as importantly, sir, I do want to make
the point that on top of the attending to our resources on a
daily, weekly and monthly basis, you have built a surge
capacity to be able to, like last summer, take Coast Guard
completely out of the entire Country, go somewhere, do
something very important, very needed, but still leave behind
enough to get some adequate work done. So all those things go
into the mix.
Mr. LoBiondo. I certainly agree that the Coast Guard has
done a magnificent job with the assets provided. But I guess it
really wasn't a fair question, because the answer is obviously
no. And the Coast Guard, the point I am trying to make is, the
Coast Guard, over a long period of time, when asked that
question over and over again, always said yes, we can do it.
And the realities are that we are now in a position where we
can't do it all because of how much has been thrown onto your
plate.
I think that the Coast Guard from top to bottom has got to
understand a clear mission to articulate why you can't do
things like Mrs. Kelly is asking for and why you can't do
everything that is asked for.
Along those same lines, has the deterioration of the 110
foot patrol boat class and operational restrictions on the 123
converted boats affected the Coast Guard's ability to carry out
its missions?
Admiral Justice. Yes, they have. Absolutely, sir. As I
mentioned, I have just spent three plus years in Miami, very up
close with our counter-drug and our counter-migrant mission
down there. The patrol boats are the backbone of getting that
mission done there, as well as they are out in San Diego and as
well as they are doing fisheries up in New England. Our patrol
boat challenge is there. We have a Deepwater solution. The
Deepwater solution has been moved up in the cycle to be sooner
than later. However, that answer is not here yet.
In the meantime, there has been mitigation that we have to
do to take care of the patrol boat challenge. That includes, we
have gotten patrol boats from the Navy, as you know, the 179
foot patrol boats that worked very well for us. We have had
more 87 foot patrol boats that have been purchased and brought
online, and we have used them as, they are not as capable maybe
as a 110, but they do get the job done, as Coast Guard people
do that.
We continue to leverage our partners, particularly our DHS
partners, to be smarter and to use their assets to support the
patrol boats as needed. And as well, we have taken an
aggressive effort to maintain the 110s. We have a 110 foot
maintenance program at the Coast Guard yard that we are going
to cycle these boats through that will get them, keep them
around for a longer period of time.
So all of that goes into trying to mitigate this patrol
boat gap that we definitely have, sir.
Mr. LoBiondo. Switching gears a little bit, can you tell me
the time line for having Rescue 21 in place by region?
Admiral Justice. Yes, sir, I can speak to it, and also I
can submit a more formal answer for you. We are finishing the
LRIP phase, as you know, in Mobile and St. Petersburg. Then we
start to, as we finish the IOC phase in Atlantic City and the
Eastern Shore, we will start to roll it out and we start to
move north and south from there in year 2007. The goal, sir, of
course, is to have it all done by 2011.
It would be easier to get a picture to you with all the
dates on it and provide it to you.
Mr. LoBiondo. You'll submit something to us?
Admiral Justice. Yes, sir.
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Mr. LoBiondo. OK. It has been three years since the long
range vessel tracking system was authorized under the Maritime
Transportation Security Act. And I understand the need that has
been articulated, to work through the International Maritime
Organization on this issue.
But has the Coast Guard set up a voluntary program in the
interim?
Admiral Nimmich. Sir, we have voluntary programs where
people can provide information. But as we talk in terms of long
range tracking, I want to make sure that you're comfortable and
aware that there is a long range tracking, non-voluntary system
using national assets that we can give you a further brief on
in a classified setting. So there is tracking of vessels.
The voluntary tracking and the providing of voluntary
information, which is critical to validate against those other
systems that we would use, we have put out several experiments,
some tests and evaluation and we are working very closely with
IMO. We have Coast Guard flag officers at IMO as we speak now,
and we believe we will get the long range tracking validation
we want.
The critical piece is it would be purely voluntary if we
don't go with IMO. So having voluntary without any regulatory
framework on which to enforce it doesn't protect you very much
more than not having a voluntary system.
Mr. LoBiondo. According to previous Coast Guard reviews,
the AIS transponders would have resulted in only a .05 percent
reduction in the number of fishing vessel casualties that
occurred between 1994 and 2000. How do the cost of imposing AIS
carriage requirements on all fishing vessels compare to the
benefits that can be expected from such a requirement?
Admiral Nimmich. Well, sir, as you know, the legislation in
ESA 2000 required that fishing vessels be included in their 65
feet and greater. As you indicated in your opening remarks, or
Representative Filner indicated in his opening remarks, we have
not closed that gap and we are moving in that direction.
We have a notice for public rulemaking prepared to be
released in the very near future that starts to close that gap.
We are working with the fishing industry to find a viable
solution between the vessel monitoring that they are currently
required under fishing regulations and the AIS we would like
for broader information, both for safety, but also security,
and how we might be able to utilize that VMS information in a
way that would produce what we need on the security side.
As you know, that is point to point information that is
restricted in our use. So if we can expand the use of that
information, we may be able to find a compromise position with
the fishing industry. We are looking at that now, sir. But even
that 5 percent, if it saves a few lives, may be worth that
$3,000 to $4,000 investment for an AIS system on a fishing
vessel.
Mr. LoBiondo. OK. I think that is all I have at this time.
I want to thank you both for being here, and the Committee
stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:40 a.m., the committee was adjourned.]
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