[House Hearing, 109 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
THE NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR MARITIME SECURITY
=======================================================================
(109-43)
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
COAST GUARD AND MARITIME TRANSPORTATION
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON
TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
JANUARY 24, 2006 (CAMDEN, NEW JERSEY)
__________
Printed for the use of the
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure
____
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COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE
DON YOUNG, Alaska, Chairman
THOMAS E. PETRI, Wisconsin, Vice- JAMES L. OBERSTAR, Minnesota
Chair NICK J. RAHALL, II, West Virginia
SHERWOOD L. BOEHLERT, New York PETER A. DeFAZIO, Oregon
HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina JERRY F. COSTELLO, Illinois
JOHN J. DUNCAN, Jr., Tennessee ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of
WAYNE T. GILCHREST, Maryland Columbia
JOHN L. MICA, Florida JERROLD NADLER, New York
PETER HOEKSTRA, Michigan CORRINE BROWN, Florida
VERNON J. EHLERS, Michigan BOB FILNER, California
SPENCER BACHUS, Alabama EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas
STEVEN C. LaTOURETTE, Ohio GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi
SUE W. KELLY, New York JUANITA MILLENDER-McDONALD,
RICHARD H. BAKER, Louisiana California
ROBERT W. NEY, Ohio ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland
FRANK A. LoBIONDO, New Jersey EARL BLUMENAUER, Oregon
JERRY MORAN, Kansas ELLEN O. TAUSCHER, California
GARY G. MILLER, California BILL PASCRELL, Jr., New Jersey
ROBIN HAYES, North Carolina LEONARD L. BOSWELL, Iowa
ROB SIMMONS, Connecticut TIM HOLDEN, Pennsylvania
HENRY E. BROWN, Jr., South Carolina BRIAN BAIRD, Washington
TIMOTHY V. JOHNSON, Illinois SHELLEY BERKLEY, Nevada
TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania JIM MATHESON, Utah
SAM GRAVES, Missouri MICHAEL M. HONDA, California
MARK R. KENNEDY, Minnesota RICK LARSEN, Washington
BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania MICHAEL E. CAPUANO, Massachusetts
JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas ANTHONY D. WEINER, New York
JIM GERLACH, Pennsylvania JULIA CARSON, Indiana
MARIO DIAZ-BALART, Florida TIMOTHY H. BISHOP, New York
JON C. PORTER, Nevada MICHAEL H. MICHAUD, Maine
TOM OSBORNE, Nebraska LINCOLN DAVIS, Tennessee
KENNY MARCHANT, Texas BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky
MICHAEL E. SODREL, Indiana BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
CHARLES W. DENT, Pennsylvania RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri
TED POE, Texas ALLYSON Y. SCHWARTZ, Pennsylvania
DAVID G. REICHERT, Washington JOHN T. SALAZAR, Colorado
CONNIE MACK, Florida JOHN BARROW, Georgia
JOHN R. `RANDY' KUHL, Jr., New York
LUIS G. FORTUNO, Puerto Rico
LYNN A. WESTMORELAND, Georgia
CHARLES W. BOUSTANY, Jr., Louisiana
JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio
(ii)
?
SUBCOMMITTEE ON COAST GUARD AND MARITIME TRANSPORTATION
FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey, Chairman
HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina BOB FILNER, California, Ranking
WAYNE T. GILCHREST, Maryland Democrat
PETER HOEKSTRA, Michigan CORRINE BROWN, Florida
ROB SIMMONS, Connecticut GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi
MARIO DIAZ-BALART, Florida JUANITA MILLENDER-McDONALD,
DAVID G. REICHERT, Washington,Vice- California
Chair MICHAEL M. HONDA, California
CONNIE MACK, Florida ANTHONY D. WEINER, New York
LUIS G. FORTUNO, Puerto Rico BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
CHARLES W. BOUSTANY, Jr., Louisiana BRIAN BAIRD, Washington
DON YOUNG, Alaska JAMES L. OBERSTAR, Minnesota
(Ex Officio) (Ex Officio)
(iii)
CONTENTS
TESTIMONY
Page
Boles, William, Director of Security, Port of Wilmington........ 24
Bone, Craig E., Director of Port Security, United States Coast
Guard.......................................................... 6
Glenn, Dr. Scott, Institute of Marine and Coastal Services,
Rutgers University............................................. 24
Hatfield, Mark O., Jr., Deputy Security Director for Newark
Liberty International Airport, Transportation Security
Administration................................................. 6
Himber, Lisa, Vice President, Maritime Exchange for the Delaware
River and Bay.................................................. 24
PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED BY WITNESSES
Bone, Craig E................................................... 37
Boles, William.................................................. 48
Glenn, Dr. Scott................................................ 53
Hatfield, Mark O., Jr........................................... 37
Himber, Lisa.................................................... 59
THE NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR MARITIME SECURITY
----------
Tuesday, January 24, 2006
House of Representatives, Subcommittee on Coast
Guard and Maritime Transportation, Committee on
Transportation and Infrastructure, Washington,
D.C.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:00 a.m., in
the Multipurpose Room of the Campus Center of Rutgers State
University of New Jersey, Hon. Frank A. LoBiondo [chairman of
the subcommittee] presiding.
Mr. LoBiondo. Good morning. The Subcommittee on Coast Guard
and Maritime Transportation is meeting this morning to review
the national strategy for maritime security in several federal
programs to enhance security in the maritime domain. This field
hearing is another in a series of hearings that the
subcommittee has held since the enactment of the Maritime
Transportation Security Act of 2002 to review the state of
security in our Nation's ports and abroad. Under the Maritime
Transportation Security Act, the Coast Guard and other Federal
agencies have developed and implemented critical Maritime
Security Program systems and procedures to improve our
awareness of activities in the maritime domain and our
capabilities to prevent future attacks in the Maritime
Transportation System. However, despite the progress, several
key mandates under the Maritime Transportation Security Act
have yet to be completed.
One of these critical mandates is the National Maritime
Transportation Security Plan. Despite repeated calls by this
subcommittee and a deadline that was enacted as part of the
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act last year, we
still do not have this comprehensive national plan. I urge the
Coast Guard and the Department of Homeland Security to complete
this plan so that it can be implemented as soon as possible. I
believe it is critical. While we do not have the National
Maritime Transportation Security Plan, the administration has
recently developed and released the National Strategy for
Maritime Security to further coordinate the Federal maritime
security efforts. The National Strategy is supported by eight
components which address specific threats and challenges in the
maritime environment.
These components call for increased cooperation,
integration and in some cases, expansion of existing programs
to enhance maritime security. The components do not, however,
contain many details on how Federal agencies will accomplish
the strategic objectives outlined under the Strategy. I am very
interested to hear our witnesses testify this morning on how
their respective agencies will take the recommendations and put
them into practice in our ports and on the high seas.
The Strategy also calls for the Transportation Security
Agency and the Coast Guard to conclude development of the
Transportation Workers Identification Credential, or TWIC, that
will ensure the identity of maritime workers that have access
to sensitive areas aboard vessels and in our ports. I hope the
inclusion of this recommendation signals that the
administration is intent on finally completing this rulemaking.
Congress required the implementation of TWIC, and when we
passed the Maritime Transportation Security Act four years ago,
the original deadline for the pilot program was December of
2003 and regulations to implement the program nationwide were
supposed to go into effect in 2004.
I thank our local Delaware River ports for their
participation in the pilot program, but it is time for the TSA
to move forward with this program nationwide. I look forward to
hearing more about the results of the pilot program and expect
our witnesses to provide us with an update on when we can
expect this now long overdue program with its regulations.
The National Strategy for Maritime Security is an important
step in our efforts to improve our maritime security
responsibilities, but there still is a lot of work that must be
done and to take these plans and to translate them into
programs and systems that provide enhanced security. I hope
that the witnesses' testimony will address some of these
challenges, that the subcommittee will learn how the Federal
government plans to implement the recommendations. I welcome
the witnesses and thank them for their testimony today and I am
very pleased that we have several of our colleagues with us and
I would like to first introduce and thank Congressman Mike
Castle from Delaware for being here and Mike, ask you if you
have any opening statement you would like to make?
Mr. Castle. I thank you, Chairman LoBiondo, for the
opportunity of being here and for holding this very important
and timely field hearing and also for allowing me to
participate. I would also like to thank today's panel of
distinguished witnesses, the first panel and the second panel
to come for their presence at this hearing and obviously, their
input. Although most of us are not members of the Coast Guard
and Maritime Transportation subcommittee, I must say though,
that Rob, Allyson and you and I were at a couple of these
hearings. I sort of feel like we are part of this subcommittee
at this point, but truly we are not. We have all worked closely
on issues affecting the Delaware River and Bay, sometimes
together, sometimes in opposition to each other.
In particular, since the terrorist attacks of September
2001, improving the security of the men and women who live and
work in this part of the country has been our top priority. As
all of you know, in July of 2004 the 9/11 Commission issued an
extensive report detailing the challenges facing our government
in the wake of the attacks in New York and Washington, D.C. The
9/11 report contains critical recommendations and port security
has emerged as a significant part of this debate. While the
report underscores the importance of securing our Nation's
airports, the commission also noted that the increased security
efforts around air travel have led to concerns that terrorists
may turn their attention to softer targets such as maritime and
surface transportation.
In fact, the 9/11 Commission identified container and cargo
ships as one area of seaport security most vulnerable to
terrorist infiltration. The committee's report identified
several chilling scenarios in which terrorists could exploit
holes in our commercial shipping system to smuggle nuclear,
chemical or biological weapons into the country. As many of the
people in this room are well aware, more than nine million
marine containers come through U.S. ports each year, most of
which are foreign owned and operated by foreign crews. On the
Delaware River, the Port of Wilmington is among the busiest
terminals, handling hundreds of vessels and millions of tons of
cargo annually.
As of today, Customs and Border Patrol is capable of
physically inspecting only a small fraction of a ship's cargo.
As the Department of Homeland Security continues development of
the National Strategy for Maritime Security, increased focus on
new technology, such as real-time vessel tracking systems and
smart box devices is essential to expanding our national
defense system. Once these ships reach our ports it is also
critical that we have effective procedures in place for the
screening of personnel and ensuring the integrity of critical
infrastructure.
The Transportation Worker Identification Credential program
is one such initiative which uses cutting edge biometric
technology to ensure security officials can protect against
unauthorized use of our Nation's seaports. As a former member
of the House Select Committee on Intelligence, I am a firm
believer in TWIC and other biometric document security
technologies.
In 2002 the Port of Wilmington was one of the locations
selected to participate in the TWIC pilot program and since
then thousands of Delaware workers have taken part in testing
TWIC prototypes. The technology has a myriad of uses from
border security to private sector security awareness. Although
there have been some setbacks in TWIC, I am hopeful that we
will soon be moving into the implementation phase of this
important initiative.
Although much of the Department's focus has thus far been
directed at securing our domestic port facilities, it is also
essential that we find ways of improving security at foreign
ports, especially in underdeveloped countries where true port
security is sometimes nonexistent. The majority of cargo
entering the U.S. is loaded in foreign ports and overseen by
foreign officials. This presents a serious security problem
since most foreign countries are far behind the U.S. in terms
of maritime security.
The Government Accountability Office has also documented
multiple vulnerabilities at international ports, underscoring
the fact that U.S. port security is largely ineffective as long
as foreign security remains lax. Like many other transportation
sectors, maritime spending is designed for speed and
efficiency. Container ships and other vessels carry
approximately 80 percent of world trade and it is important
that we not significantly impede the flow of commerce. In the
end, a truly successful international security strategy will
effectively increase security while minimizing the impact on
trade.
And just as the international community needs to step up
and participate in improving maritime security, so do Federal,
State and local governments here at home. One key lesson
learned from the mass confusion of September 11 and Hurricane
Katrina is that our government has a significant information
sharing problem. This is true for the intelligence community
and it is true for Maritime Security. From the TSA down to
State and local security personnel, timely information sharing
and communication with private industry is crucial to improving
our ability to accurately identify and respond to threats.
Today's hearing is an important part of this process and I
look forward to hearing from each of our distinguished
witnesses. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I yield back the
balance of my time.
Mr. LoBiondo. Thank you, Mr. Castle. Congressman Andrews,
thank you so much for joining us and for all the help and
advice you have given this subcommittee. Recognized.
Mr. Andrews. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am privileged to
have this opportunity this morning. I want to begin by
referring to a meeting we had just about a year ago on a
similar related topic and that was the aftermath of the oil
spill on the Delaware River. And I do want to commend
Congressman LoBiondo, for his stewardship in achieving a
significant legislative victory in 2005 which I believe lays
the foundation to prevent such a spill from ever happening
again, and I know that that is not the purpose, Frank, of
today's hearing, but the commitments that you made and that we
supported you on that day about a year ago. We thank you for
that and congratulate you for that.
The enemy that we face in the global war against terrorism
is above all things adaptive. It is an enemy that studied us
rather well, that knows our weaknesses and is usually a few
steps ahead of where we are going. Justifiably, this country
has been focused intently on airplane and airline security
since September 11 of 2001 and we should never rule out the
possibility that the next attack will happen there. I think it
is far more likely, however, that the next major attack on this
country will happen through another means and obviously, one of
the leading candidates of that means of attack is our shipping
system, the 25,000 cargo containers a day that come into the
United States.
We have given those who will testify today a huge
responsibility. It is not surprising that there are issues of
implementation with respect to meeting that responsibility. I
am encouraged by the fact that what we have seen in the months
that have passed since September 11 is an analytical clarity as
to focusing on what the problem is. You know, there were calls
after 9/11 for us to try to board every ship, inspect every
container. We could do that. Obviously, there was an incredible
early need to be analytically focused on where the real threat
is.
There was a secondary need to follow up in putting in place
the practical tools to make good use of those analytical
conclusions and focus on where the threat is coming from. That
is the focus of today's hearing, to see how we are doing in
implementing the tools and strategies that we need to focus on
the areas where we are at greatest risk. This is by no means an
easy job, but it is an awfully important one. And you know, I
wake up every morning wondering if this is going to be the day
when the next assault will be launched on the country.
The first thing that comes to my mind is what can we do
today to be sure that when that day comes, not if it comes,
when it comes, that we are prepared to the maximum extent. So I
commend the chairman for calling the hearing. I look forward to
learning about the progress the Coast Guard and the Department
of Homeland Security have made in preparing us for that day and
in my own way, if I can contribute toward that preparation, I
am eager to do so. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. LoBiondo. Thank you, Congressman Andrews and let me
take a moment since Rob commented on that hearing of almost a
year ago and thank my colleagues because everyone that is here
today, Congressman Castle, Congressman Andrews and
Congresswoman Schwartz, along with Congressman Jim Saxton, gave
some great recommendations, and just by way of an update, we
fully expect that this will be part of the Coast Guard
conference report which we hope to get concluded, maybe
optimistically in February, sometime early in the year, that
will become law and I think will go a long ways towards
prevention in the future and I thank my colleagues.
Now I would like to turn to Congresswoman Schwartz and
thank you for being with us today.
Ms. Schwartz. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I also wanted
to acknowledge the fact that I participated in that hearing
that we had about the Athos spill just about a little over a
year ago. It was my first, I guess, my first official activity
as a new member of Congress. I actually had been a member of
the committee probably for about a few minutes and you were
very gracious in allowing me to participate in that hearing and
I have to say it is the way it is supposed to work and I really
just appreciate the fact that it was a hearing where people
took it very seriously, both those who were testifying and
those of us who were there asking the questions about how we
could clean up from the spill and how we could prevent a future
spill.
And I really thank you for your leadership in the Delaware
River Protection Act and in getting that language into
legislation and I am on that conference committee with the
express purpose of holding on to as much of that as we can and
getting that language done because it is important for us to
move ahead and not only the clean up, which is mostly done, as
I understand it, and I thank everyone for their updates on
that, but also in making sure that we prevent any future
spills. Which, again, I look forward to this hearing in a
similar capacity and all of us, being deeply concerned about
the safety and security of our citizens and of the Nation and
as has been mentioned, the attention to our airports and air
travel. Obviously, that was primary in our minds, but I have
taken some time with some of the members in the audience to
spend some time hearing more about the activities on the
Delaware River, traveling the Delaware River a bit, up and
down, and to commend the Coast Guard for the work that you do
every day in securing and keeping secure our port.
So I think what we are interested in today is to hear from
you about what works well, what doesn't, what more we can do,
and I can tell you a specific concern that I have is the
proposal for the L and G facility, the terminal that is
proposed for Port Richmond and the really very serious concerns
we have about whether, in fact, we could ever provide the
security that we would need to have at the terminals. You know
many of us are opposed to it for security reasons and I am
interested in some comments that might be made on both the
current commerce and trade, how to protect our citizens from
anyone who might be coming on board a vessel, recreation
vehicles, as well, of course. It is a very important part of my
district to keep the Delaware River a thriving commercial port
and also available for recreation, and I have all sorts of
plans for ways that we might enhance the North Delaware, as
well. So as we populate it more with both business and
residents, we also want to make sure that it is as safe and
secure as we need to make it for our citizens and for our
commercial enterprises, so I look forward to the testimony and
continuing under the leadership of Chairman LoBiondo to be able
to take actions that we might need to, to secure the port for
the citizens of both New Jersey and Pennsylvania and of course,
Delaware, as well, so thank you.
Mr. LoBiondo. Thank you very much. Now we will turn to our
first panel, Rear Admiral Craig Bone, who is the Director of
Port Security for the United States Coast Guard, and Mark
Hatfield, who is the Deputy Federal Security Director for
Newark Liberty International Airport that is part of the
Transportation Security Administration. Admiral Bone, welcome
today and await your testimony.
TESTIMONY OF CRAIG E. BONE, DIRECTOR OF PORT SECURITY, UNITED
STATES COAST GUARD; AND MARK O. HATFIELD, JR., DEPUTY SECURITY
DIRECTOR FOR NEWARK LIBERTY INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT,
TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION.
Rear Admiral Bone. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, and
distinguished Congressional members. I am Rear Admiral Craig
Bone, Director of Inspections and Compliance for the U.S. Coast
Guard. I was Director of Port Security. We have now organized
ourselves under Prevention Response and I have security
responsibilities under that Director of Inspection and
Compliance. It is an honor to be here today to discuss the
Department's role in implementing the National Strategy for
Maritime Security. The United States has a vital interest in
maritime security. The National Strategy for Maritime Security
prescribes for a holistic approach to dealing with a broad
array of threats, addressing activities that span from
prevention to post-incident recovery to achieve the following
four objectives: Prevent successful terrorist attacks and
criminal or hostile attacks; protect maritime-related
population centers and critical infrastructure; minimize damage
and expedite recovery; and safeguard the ocean and its
resources.
The Strategy strives to achieve its objectives through
enhanced international cooperation, maximize domain awareness,
embed security into commercial practices, deploy layered
security to unify public and private security measures and
assure continuity of the marine transportation system to
maintain vital commerce.
The concept of layered security is complex. It involves
multiple types of activities to create a network of
interdependent and overlapping checkpoints in this system which
are designed to reduce vulnerabilities and detect, deter, and
defeat threats. It entails developing security measures that
cover the various components of the marine transportation
system, including people, cargo, infrastructure, conveyances
and information systems. These security measures span distances
from foreign ports of embarkation, through transit zones, to
ports of entry and beyond. They involve the different modes of
transportation that feed the global supply chain and are
implemented by various commercial, regulatory, law enforcement,
intelligence, diplomatic and military entities.
The National Strategy for Maritime Security defines
Maritime Domain Awareness, or MDA, as the effective
understanding of anything associated with the global Maritime
Domain that could impact the safety, the security, the economy
or the environment of the United States. MDA, or Maritime
Domain Awareness, is neither a program nor a mission, but a
state of awareness necessary to achieve maritime security. The
Department of Homeland Security, therefore, has tasked the
Coast Guard to act on its behalf for implementing the system
and processes necessary to achieve the level of MDA required by
the National Strategy.
The Maritime Domain Awareness Implementation Team, co-led
by the Department of Defense and the Coast Guard, oversees the
implementation of the national plan to achieve MDA. This plan
is a cornerstone for the successful execution of the National
Strategy for Maritime Security and serves to unify efforts
across Federal government and the private sector, as well as
civil authorities within the U.S. and with our allies and
international partners, as well.
Additionally, DHS has worked hard to align all our
regulatory and policy development efforts with Customs and
Border Protection, the Coast Guard and the Transportation and
Security Administration. We meet regularly to discuss policy,
participate in inter-agency regulation development teams and
sit on the Operation Safe Commerce Executive Steering
Committee. Between DHS, CBP, the Coast Guard and TSA, we
coordinate the work of our various Federal advisory committees
so we understand all of the trade community's concerns and
priorities. Now that the Maritime Transportation Security Act
of 2002 and the International Ship and Port Facility Code have
been implemented in the port and the facility and at the vessel
level, we are monitoring compliance and carefully noting issues
for further improvements to the regulatory framework.
We are working closely with TSA, the lead agency for the
implementation of the Transportation Worker Identification
Credential, TWIC, to assist in the implementation of this new
credentialing program. The credentialing program will ensure
that all U.S. port workers, including all U.S. mariners, have
undergone an extensive security background check and have been
found eligible to work within our port facilities and on U.S.
ships. The Coast Guard is fully supportive of this regulatory
effort. We will do everything within our ability to assist TSA
in the development of this rulemaking and ensure that the TWIC
and Merchant Mariner Credentialing initiatives are
complementary in order to minimize the burden on mariners in
the future.
Internationally we continue our efforts with the
International Maritime Organization, as well as visiting
foreign countries to assess the effectiveness of anti-terrorism
measures in foreign ports. To date, 44 countries have been
assessed, with Malaysia being the most recent visit, and 35
have been found to be in substantial compliance with the
International Ship and Port Security Code. The Coast Guard is
on track to assess approximately 45 countries a year, and our
goal remains at a 140 countries that we hope to engage by
September 2008.
As stated in the National Strategy for Maritime Security,
we must pursue an integrated, unified approach with all
maritime partners, domestic, international, public and private
to ensure the security of the Maritime Domain remains safe and
secure. Such collaboration is fundamental to implementing the
National Strategy and vital to protecting the interests of the
United States. Thank you for the opportunity to testify today.
I will be happy to answer any questions at the appropriate
time, sir.
Mr. LoBiondo. Thank you, Admiral Bone. Mr. Hatfield,
welcome today.
Mr. Hatfield. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. LoBiondo. We look forward to your testimony.
Mr. Hatfield. Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the
subcommittee, I am both pleased and honored to have an
opportunity to speak with you today and hopefully be responsive
to your inquiries on the Transportation Security
Administration's TWIC, or Transportation Worker Identification
Credential project, which we are partnered with our friends
from the U.S. Coast Guard in producing. The delivery of the
that program, its implementation, will fulfill requirements in
the Maritime Transportation Security Act and I am very pleased
that I am alongside Admiral Bone in front of the subcommittee
today.
The TWIC program has three major goals. First, we are
developing a common, secure biometric credential, the physical
piece that will represent the credential, that is interoperable
across transportation modes and compatible with the existing
independent access control systems. Secondly, we are
establishing processes to verify the identity of each TWIC
applicant, complete a security threat assessment on the
applicant and positively link the issued credential to the
applicant.
Finally, we will quickly revoke cardholder privileges for
individuals who are issued a TWIC credential but subsequently
are determined to pose a threat to national security after the
issuance of that credential. TSA planned the TWIC program in
four phases. We have completed the first three, the first one
being planning; the second one, a technical evaluation; the
third phase, a prototype process; and then finally, the fourth
phase, implementation, itself.
This past summer we completed the testing of the prototype
phase and the overall TWIC solution was evaluated against a
full range of business processes, policies and requirements.
This included enrollment centers and enrollment, security
threat assessments, verification of claimed identity, card
personalization and production, card issuance and processes for
card replication.
Moving to the next phase now, implementation requires the
promulgation of a rule. TSA and the Coast Guard, using the
experience and the information gained in the prototype testing
are currently preparing a joint Notice of Proposed Rulemaking.
The NPRM will propose standards for security threat assessments
of workers with unescorted access to secure areas of maritime
facilities and vessels. In addition, it will offer standards
for a biometric identification credential that reflects the
results of a satisfactory assessment and for access control
procedures to prevent unauthorized entry into these secure
areas, and it will provide a process for redress for workers
who are denied a TWIC card. The proposed rule will also address
the fee authority enabling the program to be fully supported
through user fees.
Before I conclude, I would like to briefly focus on three
other areas of maritime security initiatives under way.
Intermodal transportation systems converging at America's ports
are highly interdependent and of great economic importance.
These networks have a highly critical--high criticality rating
and demand significant security attention. TSA and the Coast
Guard have jointly developed and implemented the Port Security
Training Exercises Program, otherwise known as PortSTEP, to
provide maritime transportation security communities nationwide
with training exercises, evaluations and information technology
products to enhance security in the port and maritime
environment.
Eight PortSTEP exercises have been completed and a total of
17 exercises are scheduled for the year 2006, building toward
an objective of conducting 40 exercises in all. PortSTEP will
culminate in a fully vetted and tested port and transportation
security exercise pilot program that can serve as a model for
TSA and other government agencies. In coordination with the
Coast Guard, TSA has implemented the SAIL test project to
develop screening technologies and capabilities aimed at
enhancing security on ferry systems. This multi-phased effort
has tested and evaluated the use of explosive detection systems
on two major ferry systems.
The TSA developed and deployed a van portable Z backscatter
X-ray system on the Cape May to Lewes Ferry, for explosive
detection document scanners on the passenger-only ferry in San
Francisco Bay to look for individuals who may have had contact
with explosives or IUDs. Planning is underway to initiate a
third phase of this important program which will test a total
screening program for both passengers and vehicles, targeting
that on a large ferry operation.
In addition, TSA is managing a $3.6 million research and
development grant program to test and evaluate explosives trace
detection equipment for screening passengers, baggage and
vehicles in the ferry and cruise line industries. A request for
applications for grant awards for vehicle screening equipment
will be published this spring. And grants for passenger and
baggage screening equipment have already been awarded and
procurement of that equipment for testing by the Transportation
Security Laboratory in Atlantic City is underway.
After completion of a 30-day test period for deployment of
equipment, after that 30-day test period, the deployment
equipment will commence for field tests across the maritime
passenger industry. This concludes my prepared oral statement.
I will be pleased to answer any questions of the committee.
Mr. LoBiondo. Okay. Thank you, Mr. Hatfield. We are going
to start off with Congressman Castle with questions.
Mr. Castle. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am in the
process of reading a book called Memorial Day. I don't know if
you have read it or not. I have got about 50 pages to go and
basically it is about the importation on a ship of different
aspects of a nuclear bomb and then another bomb which came in
from Mexico or something of that nature and they are at this
point getting ready to blow up Washington, D.C. I have 50 pages
to go, so if I am a little jumpy today, you will understand the
nature of my questions and my concern of what possibly can
happen here.
Let me start with you, Admiral Bone. First of all, let me
just congratulate the Coast Guard on the tremendous work in
Katrina. You have probably heard that before, but I just think
that is very admirable in terms of, you know, what our military
services can do to make a difference. My questions are, I
guess, could be anything, but I would like to know more about
the whole smart container technology. I remember the last time,
perhaps, I looked at this or perhaps at a hearing, we were
inspecting something like 2 percent of the containers and then
we were having some trouble identifying where containers were
coming from and that is where the smart container technology,
trying to determine in real time where things are, came into
place. And that still does concern me.
I frankly have an abiding concern that we have spent a lot
of our TSA dollars and time on airport security and I worry
about rail security and cargo security and I worry about how
these things are advancing. And don't get me wrong. I think
everybody is trying their very hardest and it is very hard to
do these things, but I want to make sure they advance as
rapidly as possible and I am convinced that we are going to
need things like smart technology or whatever it may be in
order to truly get the highest degree of safety we possibly
can. Can you just bring us up to date on where that whole
business of tracking cargo in real time with the smart
technology stands?
Rear Admiral Bone. Sir, first off, thanks. Thank you very
much for the commendation on behalf of the members of the men
and women of the Coast Guard responding to Katrina. But in
regard to your specific question, the lead for cargo security
is the Customs and Border Protection, not the Coast Guard. We
work very closely with them. And that smart technology and the
actual technology used in scanning, screening and even
targeting is the responsibility of that agency and it is best
that they actually respond to that for the record, and I know
that the department has indicated that they would respond to
specific questions like that. What I will tell you, though, is
they were working more closely than ever with CBP, both in
identification, upfront, of the cargos, through the Advanced
Notice of Arrival System, as well as working with them in the
National Targeting Center where the containers and the cargos
are screened and targeted.
We have people also with Customs that work in our
intelligence center so that the Customs personnel are privy to
all intelligence and threat information in their targeting
scheme and ability. Also, the results of our International Port
Security Program, where we assess, through port visits at
foreign countries, the risks and the threats are built into
their targeting system based on our reports. So you have an
integrated approach, but the lead, again, for that particular
system and integration and assessment of that, before it
arrives and also when it is at the port, is in Customs. We have
the water-borne leg of that, if you look at it, meaning Customs
helps us identify that threat and risk and then on the water,
we work to address that, again, in an inter-agency forum, those
cargos, before they arrive, if need be or at the port, itself.
Mr. Castle. Let me sort of go off on a different tangent. I
guess either of you can answer this, but I worry about we are
doing in the United States, but I realize it is so, that almost
virtually, a lot of the shipping which we are going to see is
going to be from outside of the United States into the United
States. And you mentioned in your testimony about the different
ports you look at in foreign countries, et cetera, but I think
the foreign port security issues are really important,
particularly those who have less available resources. I imagine
in some countries it is almost non-existent. I don't know what
your inspections are showing, but I can't imagine that in some
of the third world countries where we might have some shipping
there is a lot of security going on. Is there anything being
done with respect to international maritime security, for
example, some sort of an international regulatory body or
anything of that nature? And have we considered tying
international security into trade agreements or any other way
of enforcing this so that we can be more comfortable in terms
of what is happening in those countries as they start to load
containers and bring them into the United States?
Rear Admiral Bone. Yes. In fact, the International Maritime
Organization is directly involved in this. Our international
ship and port security code mirrors the MTSA code with regard
to security, so security both for their facilities, their
vessels and even the individuals moving through the system, and
qualifications for security officers are inclusive and already
are in place. In fact, that is what our international port
security visits do. We look and assess whether or not they are
implementing the international code that has been put in place
and if they don't, in which case we have had a number. As I
said in my testimony, we have visited 44. We have found 36 of
them to be in compliance. The other ones actually receive a
demarche from the State Department, at which point in time it
informs them that they have not met the requirements of ISPS
and as such, the U.S. will be taking actions with regard to
vessels that visit that port.
Vessels that go to those ports and continue trade have to
move themselves to a higher maritime security level that
involves increased security while they are in the port, as well
as there is increased targeting of their cargos automatically
by Customs and Border Protection, as well as us. Vessels that
comply with that, again, receive increased level of attention
upon arrival and if we believe there is a significant threat,
they can be basically denied entry. The vessels that don't
actually carry out those activities, we board those offshore.
Those that don't carry out those activities are denied entry
into the United States.
Mr. Castle. But it is a continuing quest. You mentioned
there is 140 countries you want to do by 2008. You have done
44, so you still obviously have a number more to go.
Rear Admiral Bone. Yes, sir.
Mr. Castle. So we won't have a final answer for a couple
more years.
Rear Admiral Bone. Yes, sir. Mr. Congressman, but over 75
percent of the cargos, we targeted both the high risk as well
as those which--
Mr. Castle. The high production.
Rear Admiral Bone. --present the highest amount of cargo.
And again, that helps us, again, to target where do you put
your resources? One of the comments earlier was, we know we
can't do everything, so how do you best assess that risk, look
at the highest risk regions and address those first or those
highest flow areas so that if we do, God forbid, have a
security incident within, we can identify and clear more
quickly--
Mr. Castle. Right.
Rear Admiral Bone. --those which are legitimate and not
hamper their commerce flow.
Mr. Castle. And my final question is to Mr. Hatfield. Bring
me up to date, if you can, on your time line for TWIC and what
is happening during the sustainment phase and if you consult
with the private sector, I mean we have it in the Wilmington
Port and they seem to like it, but they seem to see some
logistic problems and that is to be expected, obviously. But I
think it is very important that TSA stay on top of that to make
the corrections that I would imagine that the usage of
information technology probably changes month by month, if I
had to guess.
Mr. Hatfield. Indeed, sir.
Mr. Castle. So can you bring us up to date on that whole
TWIC business?
Mr. Hatfield. Indeed. And of course elemental to any time
line is the fact that we are looking to deliver against the
requirements of the Maritime Security Transportation Act. And
that is a key driver in all of this. The time line, as I had
mentioned in my statement, we have completed three of the four
phases that we have broken this into and direct to the
question, we are in the drafting process right now for the
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking. That is an effort that we are
conducting jointly with the Coast Guard. We have built upon all
of our experience through the prototype, through the technical
evaluation, the early planning, to make sure that we have
industry input, that we have our stakeholders represented and
of course, they will have ample opportunity once that NPRM is
released to comment on it before it goes into its final phase.
What does all that mean to implementation? Well, we had
senior representatives testify or brief members of Congress
last year and they presented a very aggressive time line,
speculating perhaps October of this year. I can say that that
was a very aggressive speculation and I don't know that that is
possible under any scenario. If you look at the NPRM process,
and of course there are other elements, the fact that it is a
fee-based system requires additional work, additional time in
crafting the system. The review for OMB, itself, is two 90-day
periods. That is six months of review unless they decide to or
agree or volunteer to shorten their section of it.
So we have TSA finishing up the draft, presenting it to
the Department, who will then clear it for review by OMB and
then we have the public comment periods, too. So all of that
said, your best case scenario, if you do the math, it adds up--
it heads towards 12 months and that is not a speculation on how
long it will take, it is just sort of a cataloging of the
various steps in this final process. But the good news is we
are in the final process and if I could have a moment just to
mention, because you asked about specifically the Delaware
River/Bay area, the involvement of the stakeholders, the
involvement of our prototype partners and those who were
involved during the technical evaluation and the planning, I
know that we have gotten kudos and received praise for our
inclusiveness during that planning and the kind of double edge
to that is, with all that inclusiveness we get a more valid
product and I think that is really important at the end of the
day, but that takes more time and so that is just one of those
contextual pieces that in each of these steps we have sought to
be extremely inclusive and not be dictatorial or take a
government knows best position, but in fact, really reach out
because one of our key objectives is to facilitate commerce and
if we overburden them, we won't be facilitating them.
Mr. Castle. Thank you. I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. LoBiondo. Thank you, Mr. Castle. Congresswoman
Schwartz.
Ms. Schwartz. Thank you. As I said in my opening remarks, I
would like to just explore a little bit of the position on the
proposed L and G liquefied natural gas terminal for Port
Richmond, in particular, so I just want some background. You
know this as well. I know you may want to call on someone else,
so I guess it is mostly questions for Admiral Bone. As I
understand it, in November 2005 the Coast Guard did complete
some preliminary review about security assessment for the
proposed L and G facility in New Jersey, in Logan Township, New
Jersey, and concluded that for you to do the appropriate
security measures, you were able to conclude that you had, I
guess, enough resources to accommodate two to three L and G
carriers per week, which, I guess, is what they were proposing.
Could you speak to what it would mean if, in fact, if we did--
if an L and G facility went into Port Richmond, if we saw more
carriers than that, does that mean you would not be able to
assess the--be able to, I almost used the word guarantee, but I
think that that is actually too strong a word, but to be able
to provide the security that is necessary. And basically, in
just your preliminary judgment about assessing, one of our deep
concerns, of course, is not only the number of carriers, but
the density of population when you go further up the Delaware.
We are looking at 1.2 million people that live in
Philadelphia, probably more than that if you are looking at the
number of people who come in during the day, during the course
of the day who work or come into Philadelphia for other
reasons, you are talking about maybe a million and a half
people to protect several times, many times a week; whether
that is, in fact, at all practical; whether you would be able
to make some, any kind of assessment at this point that you
could provide some security on that. So could you speak to how
prepared we might be to handle such a facility?
Rear Admiral Bone. Well, first off, the specifics of--there
is a process, a very comprehensive process that is looked at.
And each port, if you have seen one port, you have seen one
port. Each port has its own unique characteristics, its own
challenges regarding safety and security and the same thing is
true about facility locations, and this process, again, is a
national process in which each of the captain of ports, and I
am assuming you know your local captain of port who is here
today, who would be involved in that process, in identifying
each one of those risks.
What I would say is it involves an assessment of the
transit, as well as the facility, itself. It is a very
comprehensive process and it takes into account all the other
operations that take place in the port and the risks associated
with them, whether or not we collectively, and not just the
Coast Guard, can meet the requirements needed to provide for
the safe and secure operations of the facility as well as the
transit, safe and secure transit of that vessel. I don't know
the specifics of this port, so I would be presumptuous to even
make a statement on it. What I will say is that this is not
unique in the United States, to look at liquefied natural gas
or individuals intent to expand liquefied natural gas, and the
Coast Guard has looked at this very seriously and again looking
at both the safety and security.
And I can assure you that the facility and the safe
operation, secure operations that won't be approved by the
Coast Guard, a plan wouldn't be approved by the Coast Guard and
forwarded for consideration unless it, in fact, the Coast Guard
was, in fact, assured we could provide for that and that is the
commitment that I can give you with that regard. And even when
we do put some forward, we say we could do this provided these
factors are all put in place. That includes Coast Guard and
other resources involved; it is not exclusive. It is looked at
as an entire system and the whole system has to be in place to
be safe and secure, for cargoes in particular, a hazard like L
and G.
Ms. Schwartz. Well, and again, I don't know if this is
going to go forward. There is quite a bit of opposition for a
number of reasons, but I certainly do look forward to working
locally with the Coast Guard here and doing that kind of
assessment and your willingness to say it just can't be done,
you know, it can't be secure. That is a possibility, I assume,
as well. There can always be resources, but it also may not be,
but there also may be just too great a risk, as well. That is a
possibility in making that kind of assessment, I assume.
Rear Admiral Bone. That is always a possibility, yes,
ma'am.
Ms. Schwartz. So I look forward to your commitment to
working on that assessment and making that kind of judgment.
Let me ask generally, because of your broader responsibility,
do you ever look at--rather than just looking at each site in
and of itself, consider doing some determinations ahead of
time? So basically saying these are locations where we might be
able to accommodate a facility more safely, so we are not just
looking at the oil industry or private sector or actually in
the case of Philadelphia, PGW saying, working with the private
sector, here is where we want to put it and then we respond.
Because, in fact, we do have serious energy needs in this
country and we do want to do more to end our reliance on
foreign oil, so we are looking for alternatives. L and G might
be a part of that, certainly in the northeastern corridor, and
yet we tend to just respond to particular proposals and might
there be another alternative, which is basically to say here is
a facility, there is a low population, we could provide
security here. Why doesn't somebody come into this location
rather than always looking to respond to a proposal that comes
up?
Rear Admiral Bone. Right. Well, the natural response to
that is offshore and offshore facilities are inclusive in that,
but those even bring challenges, themselves, in other words to
ensure the security of that facility, as you become dependent
upon it, the further offshore you have it, the more complicated
the resource base is, so that presents a level of complexity. I
tell you, it is a private business and if you--what you are
looking at is where to place something which is a hazardous
environment, you know, that you are looking at in particular.
Well, the oil and chemical industry might be equally interested
as the L and G or a nuclear power plant or other business
entities, you know, and just start identifying for one
particular mode or industry over another is not the business of
government, I don't think.
Ms. Schwartz. Okay.
Rear Admiral Bone. I mean, and we haven't really been
charged.
Ms. Schwartz. You may be right. These are private
enterprises.
Rear Admiral Bone. At least we haven't been charged.
Ms. Schwartz. But it is interesting to think about,
actually, sort of being a little more proactive, saying here is
where we know it would be safer to do such a thing, so it is
interesting to consider as we move forward.
Rear Admiral Bone. I think your point is on track. I think
what we have tried to do in identifying the criteria, we have
identified those criteria which make it more difficult.
Ms. Schwartz. Yes.
Rear Admiral Bone. And then you have to overcome those
obstacles. And so if somebody looks at what is being
considered, they will look at what they have to overcome and
again, the more complex you make it, again, further up river,
so to speak, that you move something, then there is more
challenges, more infrastructure that you are going to pass.
There is going to be more population centers and I agree that
in general, especially if it is places where other activities
are involved and it is not just an industrial base or a farming
area, it does create increased risk and increased challenges
for those responsible for providing security for it if it is
put in place.
Ms. Schwartz. That is pretty close to saying it is a good
idea, so I will leave it at that. I kind of agree with that, so
I will declare victory and move on, exactly, which is great. So
my only other question would be just related more broadly to
the security plans that you require of every facility along the
Delaware River and I know you review those plans and assessed
them. Do you feel, at this point, that those are adequate? Do
you have some concerns about whether your own determination
that it be facilities, just waterfront property is adequate?
Are there other facilities you feel that we ought to be, that
use the river or nearby, that ought to also have security plans
and should we be looking more broadly at other major,
particularly oil and chemical facilities, that we would want
them to make sure that they not only have plans, but that you
reviewed them, that they meet the appropriate requirements?
Rear Admiral Bone. Well, one, we have, in fact, examined
and found in compliance all the facilities that remain in
operation that are required under the MTSA, and the issue isn't
so much new plans, it is like anything else. You can put a plan
together but now you have to implement it and you have to do it
consistently. So it is the lapse of security with regard to
those facilities that we have to keep from having occur. And we
provide regular exercises and spot checks and random checks of
those facilities and we have found facilities noncompliant, you
know, not meeting their plan and have taken actions, either in
some cases, actually shut down the facility because the
security violation is so poor; in other cases, maybe limit
cargo transfer or operating in a particular portion of the
facility until it is overcome. But those normally, again, are
implementation of the plan.
For other facilities in the port, the MTSA and the
subcommittee and Congress basically put forth the authority
within the Captain of the Port to identify other requirements
as may be deemed necessary, but may not meet the threshold of
those facilities' security plans and the training and
requirements of the people at those facilities and all of those
requirements that surround that, as for example, in marinas or
other locations. But those are very specific, usually security
driven events, increased threat in a particular segment where
these other facilities other exist and then a captain of port
can implement with, again, the State, the local government, as
well as the industry, the actions that is necessary to prevent
or provide protection for that area.
Ms. Schwartz. Okay. So I just--you mentioned two things and
I will just conclude on this, is that it is not just the plans,
it is actually having the training, the people who are involved
knowing really what is in that plan, being prepared to
implement those plans should they need to, and communicating
with others. I think there is a group that meets on a regular
basis. I actually visited with them here on the Delaware River,
who really do meet each other, know each other and share plans
and should an incident occur, be able to communicate with each
other. That is one of things that we hear all the time, the
ability to communicate across jurisdictions, across geographic
areas, I mean to be able to know what each others' plans are
and to be trained to implement those plans, as it is critical,
the plans on the books, so I am glad that you are paying
attention to and I think it is important for you to pay
attention to those pieces, as well, not just the written plans
in a drawer somewhere.
Rear Admiral Bone. Well, I think your point on the area
maritime security committees and their efforts, again, is, as I
said in my testimony, this is Federal, State, local, industry,
public and private sector responsibilities and it is done not
just at the local level, but also on the national level. The
National Maritime Security Advisory Committee provided input to
the TWIC process and looked at international security issues,
as well, and has advised us as we go forward and continues to
do so with future regulatory efforts or policy changes.
Ms. Schwartz. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. LoBiondo. Congressman Andrews.
Mr. Andrews. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Rear Admiral, in your
testimony you mentioned that there are approximately 25,000
containers a day come into the United States, or I believe it
is in the committee's preparatory material, and there is a
process by which there is an intelligence analysis of which one
of those containers should be prescreened when they are loaded
at ports outside the United States and that is a product of the
intelligence work of a number of agencies.
On a scale of one to ten, ten being perfect and zero being
terrible, what is your degree of confidence in the quality of
work of that intelligence process in determining which
containers should be prescreened before they come to the United
States?
Rear Admiral Bone. Well, what I will tell you is that every
bit of information that is available to the Customs and Border
Protection and to the National Targeting Center that I visited,
I am convinced it is vetted, examined and that they, in fact,
are doing everything in their power and using every source
available to them to target the containers that present the
highest risk and to work in an inter-agency effort in order to
address that threat. So it is overseas as well as at sea and
here in the United States.
Mr. Andrews. So is it an eight, is it a nine? What is it?
Rear Admiral Bone. Well, I would say it is a ten for what
they know.
Mr. Andrews. Okay.
Rear Admiral Bone. What I would offer, is that doesn't
mean, I don't want to imply that it is perfect. I don't want to
imply that our intelligence systems are perfect and I don't
want to imply that there aren't individuals with intent to try
to find any gaps in it, but I can tell you that the level of
effort that is being given across all agencies to work
collectively to not--to thwart that and actually identify those
is--
Mr. Andrews. Yes. I don't doubt that the effort is there,
there is no question about that. What suggestions might you
make to improve the process? And again, that is with no
disrespect to those trying to run it. Where are we deficient in
terms of developing more powerful intelligence?
Rear Admiral Bone. Well, in one of the areas that we are
working, the international environment and again, also with
Customs, is with both long range identification tracking as
well as notice of arrival and departure. And in those notices
of arrival and departure, the information being required for
vessels before they depart the port so that, again, it allows
more time for analysis and assessment, inclusive, as well as of
the crews, of where it came from, where it is going to, the
cargo, itself, who manufactures it, et cetera, Customs looks
at--again, it is better for Customs to answer, give a specific
answer to this kind of question, but I can assure you that
there is, in fact, an international effort to improve both the
notification and the tracking. Again, the ability to screen
when a target--you want to be able to identify those things
which you have a high level of confidence in and screen those
out from those that you have a lower level of confidence in.
And the long range identification tracking system will allow us
to track a vessel up to 2,000 miles offshore.
Mr. Andrews. We are very pleased with one of our local
companies here in Camden that Mr. LoBiondo and I have both
worked with, led by a gentleman named Jacob Baines, has
developed software that helps in that identification process.
We are happy that one of our local industries is participating
in that. What percentage, obviously without compromising any
intelligence information, what percentage of the 25,000
containers that come into the country in any given day are
screened and inspected before they are loaded at a foreign
port?
Rear Admiral Bone. I don't--again, because I don't do that,
Customs and Border Protection does that, they would have to
give you that.
Mr. Andrews. Okay. In your testimony you talk about
radiological screening which is taking place at the Ports of
New York and New Jersey and in Long Beach in California. Are
those the only two ports where there is radiological screening
today?
Rear Admiral Bone. Again, I know that there is radiological
screening in other ports. Again, specifically where that--there
is screening being done, not just in the ports, but offshore,
as well, on vessels and in foreign ports. It would be better
that I provide an answer for the record on that.
Mr. Andrews. What technological capability do we have to do
radiological screening before a vessel gets to port? Here is
the scenario I worry about. Terrorists load a dirty bomb onto a
container on a vessel and the vessel arrives at the Port of New
Jersey and New York and we are able to detect the presence of
the dirty bomb and five seconds later it detonates. How
defective are we and what technology exists to detect the
presence of the dirty bomb before it ever gets to the port?
Rear Admiral Bone. Again, there is, in fact, efforts under
way, in foreign ports, as well, that Customs has worked
internationally and again, they should talk to the specificity
regarding that versus we don't--we again don't have that
responsibility. It is a core responsibility. We do have
technology that we utilize offshore and again, part of this is,
just as you said, it is based on the targeting, based on the--
Mr. Andrews. Is the technology based upon boarding the
vessel or is it based upon some aerial observation of the
vessel?
Rear Admiral Bone. The technology--there is multiple levels
of technology and actually going into detail about that
technology wouldn't be in the best interest of the government.
Mr. Andrews. Okay, I understand.
Rear Admiral Bone. But there is, in fact, a layered set of
technologies in order to detect that type of a threat.
Mr. Andrews. If terrorists put a chemical weapon in a
container and sailed it into a United States port today, do we
have any technology that would detect it?
Rear Admiral Bone. Yes, there is some technology that could
detect it.
Mr. Andrews. Is it deployed?
Rear Admiral Bone. There is deployed technology that could
detect it provided, again, what you have to have is
identification of it. You know, we don't--you don't go and try
to inspect or examine every container, but if there is
intelligence provided on it, there is an ability to respond to
it. One of the things that has been put in place that brings
both--all agencies' assets, it is called Maritime Operations
Threat Response--
Mr. Andrews. Yes.
Rear Admiral Bone. --capability, MOTR, as it is referred
to, and its capability is when a threat is either identified or
a terrorist or some piracy event were to take place, regardless
of where it is, the capabilities within the U.S. government are
brought together to respond to that, including the DoD. This
isn't limited--
Mr. Andrews. I understand.
Rear Admiral Bone. --to the Coast Guard.
Mr. Andrews. Are there technological capabilities that
could, in a non-invasive way, detect the presence of a chemical
weapon? That is to say, through a UAV or some other mechanism?
Rear Admiral Bone. I am not sure that I could give you an
accurate testimony.
Mr. Andrews. One final question. And I don't mean this in
any way to be critical, but I think it is an observation. From
what you just told me, it sounds like we still very much have
an intelligence-based protective system here, that we have a
system that is really based upon good collection of human
intelligence that gives you good leads on which ships to
interdict, board and inspect, is that correct?
Rear Admiral Bone. Well, it is intelligence and
assessments. I mean, the assessments have been made--
Mr. Andrews. I understand.
Rear Admiral Bone. --of the manufacturers, assessments have
been made of ports and their systems, assessments are made of
ships and the carriers and their historical records. There are
assessments made of countries and their, you know, whether the
country even has legal authority, you know, and has a mechanism
to provide security in their system.
Mr. Andrews. Is it fair to say that the principal line of
defense against a weapon of mass destruction being brought into
an American port is the quality of our intelligence?
Rear Admiral Bone. No, again, there is counter-
proliferation efforts underway every day. We have our members
in our armed services that are engaged in that overseas. It is
not purely intelligence. There are actions being taken every
single day to detect and intercept and to screen, not just
those, again, that are targeted, but even randomly, so I
wouldn't limit it to intelligence and make that kind of a
statement.
Mr. Andrews. Rather than limited, I said principal source
of defense.
Rear Admiral Bone. It is the principal mechanism that we
use, it is not--it is the principal mechanism, I think it is
true and we refer to Maritime Domain Awareness, like I said, is
looking at everything and it is the analysis of that to
identify where is it that you address and also, even what you
are trying to protect, you know. You look at the conveyance is
one thing, like you said. The execution is another. We
understand that terrorists want to kill as many people as
possible, so we look at that entire layer of security that
needs to be in place, not just overseas, but because it isn't
necessarily foolproof in one location and we know everyone has
to work together and we look at that full layer and the ability
to detect and intercept anywhere along, from the manufacturer
to the delivery source.
Mr. Andrews. I appreciate your answers very much. I would
just say to the Chairman that I listened to the Chairman's
opening statement and I appreciate his customary courtesy in
expressing his concerns about the delay in issuing these
regulations executed in this plan. I would just echo what he
said, that I am a bit concerned that the sense of urgency that
we ought to have about the gravity of this threat is not where
it ought to be and I appreciate the work of the subcommittee
and shall we say, increasing that sense of urgency and I would
lend my voice in support to the Chairman as he continues that
effort. Thank you.
Mr. LoBiondo. Thank you, Congressman Andrews. Admiral Bone,
sort of following right up on that with the Maritime
Transportation Security Act required the development of the
National Maritime Transportation Security Plan. When will the
plan be submitted to Congress?
Rear Admiral Bone. I can tell you that the plan has
completed inter-agency review and is going through a final
review at the Department of Homeland Security, so I can't give
you an exact date or time, but I can tell you it is in its
final stages. I don't have--I can't--
Mr. LoBiondo. I understand. It is a little frustrating for
us just not to have any--
Rear Admiral Bone. I think what is important is the
Strategy, you know, provides where you need to work and areas
of emphasis. The plan identifies specifically what inter-agency
responsibilities have and what you will see in the plan are
many of the efforts that you already see underway, as well as
identification and maybe this leads to Congressman Andrews'
concerns of the areas where we know we have more work to do.
I didn't want to imply that we solved everything and we
don't have much more to do in the way of screening, in the way
of technology, in the way of Maritime Domain Awareness and even
in our tactics, but I can assure you that that plan does
identify it and that the agencies are working collectively on
those. We are not waiting for the approval, no more than the
ports didn't wait for the National Strategy to begin their
efforts working to secure the ports. And I would say the key is
the plan is out there. Now, how are we going to go about
executing that plan and those responsibilities? And I think
when you see--when the plan actually comes before Congress, you
will be familiar both with the areas that are being worked, but
also you will be able to identify those gaps and hopefully,
then, the same support you have with MTSA on, as the Coast
Guard and CBP and TSA and the other agencies undertake their
efforts to close those gaps.
Mr. LoBiondo. Well, as I think maybe Mr. Castle indicated
in one of his statements, we have so many areas of concern for
transportation security, but this committee deals with maritime
and with 750 billion or so dollars to the Gross Domestic
Product, a lot of our economy at risk and there are a number of
us who have repeatedly said that we are not satisfied with the
emphasis that has been put on maritime anti-terrorism or port
security in terms of an overall product delivered. Not that
there aren't many good people that are working on this, but
there is a point at which our patience wears pretty thin. If we
were to ever have an incident, we have to be able to answer,
you know, why we didn't do something sooner and we want to give
the proper amount of time to allow for a thorough product to be
delivered, but there is a limit to that.
Rear Admiral Bone. I understand.
Mr. LoBiondo. Along a different line, the Maritime
Transportation Security Act also requires the development of a
long range vessel tracking system, which many of us believe is
extremely crucial. Can you comment or give us the status of
negotiation with our international partners to develop
standards and criteria for these systems?
Rear Admiral Bone. Yes. We are actually hopeful that in May
of this year that IMO will adopt the long range identification
tracking system requirements and actually put them into place.
And again, the implementation will be over a period of time as
with any of our regulations, but by the adoption of that, that
would allow for the U.S. government to go forward and institute
domestic regulations that match the international standard. And
the U.S. is moving forward to have that adopted in May of this
year.
Mr. LoBiondo. Okay, thank you. Mr. Hatfield, you talked a
little bit about the TWIC card and some of the delays and you
explained some of that. In relation to the TWIC card, can you
comment, will--when this is finally developed and implemented,
will a maritime worker who is issued a TWIC card be able to use
that card at all U.S. ports?
Mr. Hatfield. Let me answer that by first describing the
prototype which is really providing us that roadmap for where
we go from here, and in the prototype, interoperability is a
key component of that, the ability to grant those privileges,
access privileges to a cardholder so that that individual may
access various facilities and by making sure that that
privilege granting authority is defined and is vested in the
appropriate hands. So yes to your question, it will be
interoperable if it follows the same course as the prototype
and we expect it will, and to when it will be implemented, we
are prepared to implement it following the successful
promulgation of the rule, and we are in that process right now.
I would like to say we are further along in that process
than we are, but we are in that process and we are working with
due haste to get the draft cleared out of TSA, present it to
the department so that it can then go to OMB and I think we are
hopeful, as you are, that OMB may be able to do it in less than
the allotted 90 days for that first review and we will see how
that proceeds. But I cataloged those steps that are necessary,
not that you need me to explain the process, but a swift
execution of each of those steps, including public comment in
our processing and integration of those comments will get us to
the point where we can forward and implement. And that is
important to be compliant with the law.
Mr. LoBiondo. That is good news. We have had testimony at
previous hearings raising a lot of concern that there are
different requirements at different ports and that this is not
necessarily the TWIC card, but just with overall security
requirements, and this can be very confusing and challenging
for folks to understand if they are required to do something at
one port but not required to do it at another port and how does
this all come together? We are hopeful that this can be--we can
have some basic standards that everyone knows they have to
adhere to.
Mr. Hatfield. It will make uniform an important part of
this access security. It will still, though, vest that
authority and that policy making opportunity to local facility
managers to tailor the policies and procedures for accessing
their site, but it provides all of the operators, in its
current iteration, the opportunity to have a common use tool so
that they have that interoperability and then can build their
own site-specific plans around that.
Mr. LoBiondo. Thank you. Admiral Bone, the Department of
Homeland Security has created several university-based centers
of excellence to study security related matters. Unfortunately,
no center of excellence for Maritime Domain Awareness has been
put together or established or looked at. I think that is one
of the really critically important issues for the future on an
overall total picture. Would you care to comment on what sort
of information and/or analysis could such a center produce and
if the center right here, let us say at Rutgers, what that
might be able to offer to the Coast Guard?
Rear Admiral Bone. I think that first off, especially in
Maritime Domain Awareness, where we are trying to integrate all
technologies, all capabilities, both those current and those
future that are yet to come about, and the integration of
sensor technologies, that an academic forum is a great place in
order to provide input into that process. And just as DHS has
identified other centers of excellence, as you have indicated,
MDA would be, I agree, I generally agree that that would be a
prime area to look towards, as well.
I met earlier with a gentleman who has some technology and
I know is going to testify later, or is scheduled to testify
later on radar systems and high frequency systems, HF frequency
systems and we need to look at, again, all systems, all
capabilities and that includes information systems. That
includes existing marine exchange systems, you know, why
completely replace everything that is good, that is already in
place? Why not best utilize that technology, that capability
which exists and I think that with our home port product, we
have an opportunity to do that. Just by example, in the
university where people have fresh minds and some of our best
ideas come out of our lieutenant commanders who come from
graduate school and the lieutenants, we implement internally
and I think it is a great idea.
Mr. LoBiondo. Thank you. Do any of my colleagues have any
follow-up?
Ms. Schwartz. I just had one or two questions, if I may,
thank you. Just to understand, Admiral, when you said that this
card, the TWIC will have, let me understand, it will have some
basic elements that will be consistent across all facilities,
all ports, but then they could add on, each port authority
could add on additional elements? Does that mean each card
which, as the Chairman said, would you just be--
Mr. Hatfield. Let me take another run at that for--
Ms. Schwartz. Yeah.
Mr. Hatfield. --elimination.
Ms. Schwartz. Because you said both things, that it was
consistent and then you also said that each port could, or each
authority could actually add some of its own elements. Is that
adding on elements or is it actually changing it so they won't
be interoperable?
Mr. Hatfield. No. The card itself is designed and as
deployed in the prototype, was spec'd to contain the complete
number of technologies, a magnetic stripe, a proximity chip, a
smart card chip, to the bar code and a linear bar code. So by
having all of those components, we address the need to be
compatible with legacy systems, the existing access control
systems that are in these 3200 identified facilities today, but
we also provide state-of-the-art technology going forward so
that as they upgrade their systems, as they--we have spec'd
access control systems, by the way, to be compatible with the
highest technology features of that card. So it can be used
today in the most basic mag stripe, just like you run your
credit card through the reader and it can go all the way up to
the great potential offered by the smart card technology. So
that is the range of flexibility we have to be compatible with
site-specific technology and then when I talk about a facility
being able to add privileges so they can say that this truck
driver who currently only goes to Long Beach and San Diego, has
got to take a long haul to Portland, he can be identified and
granted privileges to access Portland. Of course, I use the
West Coast by default because I am from Oregon, but I could
come up with an analogy for the East Coast, as well.
Ms. Schwartz. Okay. Just so the technology, so it can
actually be used in each of these facilities, it is not adding
additional elements or criteria.
Mr. Hatfield. No, the card architecture is fixed--
Ms. Schwartz. Okay.
Mr. Hatfield. --but it is designed in a way to provide
ultimate flexibility, again, to make sure it can be used today.
We don't want to invent the technology of the future and then
have to catch up to it.
Ms. Schwartz. Thank you for that clarification. Thank you.
Mr. LoBiondo. Mr. Castle? Mr. Andrews? Admiral Bone, Mr.
Hatfield, I thank you very much. This will conclude the first
panel. We will take a five minute break and let the second
panel set and then we will proceed.
[Recess]
Mr. LoBiondo. We will now reconvene the hearing and move to
our second panel. We have three panel members who are with us
today. We would like to welcome Lisa Himber, who is the Vice
President of Maritime Exchange for the Delaware River and Bay
Authority; Dr. Scott Glenn from the Institute of Maritime and
Coastal Services at Rutgers University; and William Boles, who
is the Director of Security for the Port of Wilmington. Ms.
Himber, if you would please proceed.
TESTIMONY OF LISA HIMBER, VICE PRESIDENT, MARITIME EXCHANGE FOR
THE DELAWARE RIVER AND BAY; DR. SCOTT GLENN, INSTITUTE OF
MARINE AND COASTAL SERVICES, RUTGERS UNIVERSITY; AND WILLIAM
BOLES, DIRECTOR OF SECURITY, PORT OF WILMINGTON
Ms. Himber. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and good morning,
members of Congress. As the chairman said, I am Lisa Himber and
I am Vice President of the local maritime exchange, which is a
non-profit maritime related trade association. In addition, I
also serve as vice chair of the National Maritime Security
Advisory Committee and I am a member of the local area maritime
security committee. This morning I am going to briefly discuss
the National Strategy for Maritime Security, the Transportation
Worker Identification Credential and the importance of expanded
information sharing between the private and public sectors to
improve and enhance Maritime Domain Awareness.
Let me start by saying that the commercial maritime
industry strongly supports the core concept behind the National
Strategy for Maritime Security, that is, to align Federal
security programs into a comprehensive national effort. Since
9/11 we have made great strides in protecting our homeland.
Certainly, individual port operators have implemented
significant improvements and Congress and DHS agencies have
established myriad new programs designed to mitigate threat.
Yet, in many respects the only visible effect of these efforts
is to make it more difficult and costly to process vessels,
cargos and crews arriving at U.S. ports.
It is our hope that the National Strategy will bring some
focus into the various individual initiatives. While the NMSAC,
as a committee, did not evaluate the National Strategy for
Maritime Security as a whole, members are working to address
some of the individual components of the strategy. Currently,
for example, we are working to develop a network of subject
matter experts in the various industry sub-sectors of
individuals upon whom DHS can call for advice and guidance.
This will help DHS with one of the key results anticipated by
the strategy and that is to assure continuity of the maritime
transportation system in the aftermath of an incident.
However, the primary work of the NMSAC has been undertaken
with regard to the TWIC program. Having been involved in the
program since even before the August 2002 launch of the East
Coast pilot, my organization and its membership is keenly
interested in the successful deployment of the TWIC. In
addition, the NMSAC also elected to make TWIC the number one
priority on its agenda in recognition of the national
importance of this program. Last May the NMSAC presented DHS
with a full set of recommendations for TWIC implementation.
In the first phase of the TWIC program, and you have heard
about the planning phase, we believe that TSA did everything
right. Yet, in the years--as the years pass, there has only
been slow progress and many participants have become
disheartened. Some have abandoned the program altogether.
Though we continue to believe in the TWIC concept, we are
uncertain about its viability as currently envisioned and as an
immediate suggestion, we believe that TSA and Coast Guard
should develop a rule which reflects ongoing dialog with its
industry partners. We believe it is imperative that those who
work in and around the Nation's ports and who understand the
environment must be involved in the decisions that are made
with respect to the program.
NMSAC has not yet received a response from TSA to the
recommendations we presented last spring, however we are
expecting a briefing in the not-too-distant future. In addition
to the TWIC, the National Maritime Security Strategy, the Port
Security Grant Program, presidential directives and other
communications have all highlighted the need for enhanced
information sharing as critical to both incident prevention and
response.
Maritime exchanges throughout the U.S. have been concerned
with effective information sharing for nearly 150 years and we
strongly support programs which capitalize on available
information to meet a variety of missions. One example is the
recent effort between the Coast Guard and the CBP to simplify
electronic crew and passenger manifesting through a single
program which meets the requirements of both agencies. There
are several other opportunities to improve awareness while at
the same time reducing costs for both the private and public
sectors. For example, the Coast Guard and industry can and
should work more closely together to implement a national real-
time vessel monitoring program.
Private organizations are also well positioned to help
captains of the port or local CBP port directors add local
electronic message centers, distribution lists and other
functionality to existing community information system. This
would complement the work that the Coast Guard has already
undertaken on its home port program, yet would relieve local
Coast Guard personnel from administrative tasks, thereby
freeing resources for security, search and rescue,
environmental protection and other critical missions.
Other examples include expanded sharing of electronic
information moving between public and private sector trading
partners. We believe there are any number of additional
opportunities to share information that is necessary to meet
both security and commercial goals and we look forward to
continuing to work with the Coast Guard and other DHS agencies
to explore projects designed to meet the dual goals of
facilitating commerce while at the same time improving homeland
security. And I thank you for the opportunity to speak today
and would be happy to answer any questions you may have.
Mr. LoBiondo. Thank you very much. Dr. Glenn.
Mr. Glenn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Congressman Castle,
Congressman Andrews, Congresswoman Schwartz for giving me this
opportunity to testify in the potential for Compact High
Frequency Radars to contribute to port security through
improved Maritime Domain Awareness. My name is Scott Glenn. I
am a professor of Marine and Coastal Sciences at Rutgers
University. I have been involved in the transition of new
research technologies to national security applications since
the Cold War. Today I will report on the rapidly expanding
technology of Compact High Frequency Radars. I will briefly
summarize what they are, how they could support Coast Guard
missions at present status and what we need to do to go from
here.
First, what is a high frequency or HF radar, as they are
known? HF radars operate at very low power in FCC approved
windows located between the AM/FM radio bands. Like all radars,
when an antenna transmits a signal, that scatters off of
targets and a second antenna receives the scattered signal. By
placing the radar near the salty water's edge, HF radars take
advantage of a radio's wave's ability to travel, as a ground
wave, over the horizon and if they follow the curvature of the
earth over the horizon, they can see targets that are beyond
line of sight.
The two main targets for scattering at HF are surface waves
and surface vessels. The larger returns are from the surface
waves; we use those to map surface currents. The smaller
returns from the hard targets are used to map vessel locations.
Traditionally, HF radars aim their receivers using long linear
rays hundreds or even thousands of meters long that must be
deployed on isolated, straight flat beaches, a difficult real
estate negotiation near most population centers. Compact HF
radars overcome this limitation using the direction finding
ability of circular antenna rays that fit on a single post.
Today, over 95 percent of the world's HF radars are the
compact design, manufactured by a U.S. company, CODAR Ocean
Sensors. Okay, how can this technology support the Coast Guard
mission? Networks of Compact HF Radars, deployed onshore or
even on buoys, can increase Maritime Domain Awareness through
improved wide-area vessel surveillance and simultaneous
environmental data collection. Over the horizon, HF radars
provide a layered surveillance capability, bridging the
coverage gap between line of sight microwave radars covering
the near shore and global satellite systems that cover the open
ocean.
Wide-area surveillance systems identify the location of all
vessels within an operational area. By tracking vessel
behaviors and comparing this information to the voluntary AIS
network, we can improve the targeting of specific vessels for
intervention well before they enter the port. Because
intervention requires putting Coast Guard personnel to sea, up-
to-date knowledge of the environmental conditions are required
to minimize risks to safety. In the event of an incident, real-
time environmental data is required to queue response teams for
search and rescue efforts and to minimize further environmental
impacts.
Okay, what is the present status of HF radar technology?
Rutgers has maintained a continuously operating network of
Compact HF Radars for surface current mapping and wave
monitoring since 1999. In test demonstration projects with
Rutgers, real-time current maps were shown to improve Coast
Guard search and rescue response and NOAA's Safe Sanctuary's
oil spill response. Recently, the administrator of NOAA wrote a
letter to the Assistant Commandant in response to the Coast
Guard outlining ways in which the two agencies collaborate in
the development of a national HF radar network. I request that
this letter be included in the written record.
Rutgers and CODAR Ocean Sensors have partnered in similar
demonstration of Compact HF Radars for vessel tracking,
conducting and HF--constructing an HF radar test bed at Sandy
Hook, New Jersey. The dual use capability, combined with the
lower cost and risk of a distributed network of compact radars
that are both robust to counter-measures, has attracted
research funding from the Office of Naval Research, the Counter
NarcoTerrorism Project Office and the Department of Homeland
Security. These projects have demonstrated the capability and
are now focused on testing hardware enhancements to further
improve performance.
Okay, what needs to be done in the next two years to pilot
a vessel tracking system? We are at the point where today's
challenges are shifting towards the integration of existing
components into a real time operational system. A collaborative
government/academic/industry partnership that contributes
existing expertise and leverages existing infrastructure is a
proven transition path. These necessary tasks are readily
outlined and known academic and industry groups are available
to work on them. International partners, in particular, the
Norwegian military, are willing to contribute both money and
expertise.
The Coast Guard has been asked by Congress to meet many
needs within two-year timeframes. The best place to address one
of these is Sandy Hook, where Rutgers maintains an active test
bed operated by a collaborative team of the top U.S. experts in
this technology. This test bed has been offering year-round
real time, 24 hour-a-day service since 2001 and it is the most
extensive test bed in the world using this latest technology.
The Coast Guard is in a strong position to make this investment
and we at Rutgers stand ready to assemble the team and the
technology within a center of excellence to demonstrate this
capability. Thank you.
Mr. LoBiondo. Thank you, Dr. Glenn. Mr. Boles.
Mr. Boles. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, members of the
committee. My name is William Boles. I am the Security Manager
and the Facility Security Officer at the Port of Wilmington,
Delaware. In March of 2002, in conjunction with the Maritime
Exchange, the Port of Wilmington volunteered to test the TWIC
card. We stated that we would give the card the full test and
we use it as our primary access card, unlike a lot of other
facilities. A few months later, we had an East Coast TSA TWIC
Team working with us to identify a process to develop a secure
ID card that would meet legitimate security needs and
legitimate maritime needs. Within a year, the team leader left
the project and a whole new team emerged. In fact, over the
past two years it has been a revolving door of TSA teams. The
communication and cooperation that has always been a part of
this project from the first team was no longer there. In the
past two years there was little feedback on our ideas and
suggestions and Port stakeholders were basically left to
respond to the decisions made by the TSA.
The second phase of the TWIC card started on July 23, 2003
at the Port of Wilmington. We evaluated three different
technologies, the magnetic stripe, the linear barcode and a
contact version of the ICC chip. These are described in my
written testimony. Over 3,800 technology evaluation TWIC cards
were issued at the Port of Wilmington between July 23, 2003 and
June 30, 2004.
The stakeholders were originally advised that the TWIC
project would flow from one phase to the next. It didn't. The
Tech Eval phase officially ended on October 20 of 2003 and a
prototype phase at the Port of Wilmington started on June 1 of
2005. The Port of Wilmington continued to use the Tech Eval, or
the technology evaluation phase TWIC card during this 21-month
period so our customers, tenants and employees would not have
to get an interim card and then switch back again to the
prototype phase card when that phase started.
The TSA gave us continuing support of the Tech Eval card
until June 30 of 2004, but it ended abruptly. At this point, we
were forced to issue a second type of ID card. We kept using
the Tech Eval phase TWIC card as a main access control card
even through the implementation of our facility's security plan
on July 1, 2004, in addition to the interim card that we were
now issuing and it numbered about 200 at that point. As you can
well imagine, this caused administrative and access control
problems for our port tenants, customers and employees.
On June 1, 2005 the prototype TWIC cards started being
issued at the Port of Wilmington. Actually, enrollment started
on that date. The first problem we had was that our security
consultants couldn't get useful technical information from the
Bearing Point people, who were assigned to the project by the
TSA, about the TWIC card so we could correct our access control
system software and to make the TWIC card work, and to find the
proper readers. The prototype card issuance went very slowly in
the beginning due to the fact that the card would not work
without the readers and software corrections.
Once the readers were installed, interest began to grow in
this new TWIC card. As of today, well over 1,600 individuals
have been enrolled at the Port of Wilmington. There are also
about 100 interoperable TWIC cards that work in our control
system. These cards were created or obtained at the Maritime
Exchange or Holt Terminals in Gloucester City, New Jersey.
I would like to close by making a few points. The Port of
Wilmington is completely committed to the TWIC card.
Notwithstanding the up and downs with our tenants, customers
and employees, we now have a card that works, and everyone at
the Port of Wilmington has noticed. We have a card that works
in multiple facilities and with multiple levels of security. We
can count on the fact that any TWIC card holder who comes to
our gate has been vetted against a Terrorist Watch List. But
with this reality, I would like to point out what I believe are
two missed opportunities by the TSA in this prototype phase.
Number one is Canadian truck drivers. The Port of
Wilmington is serviced by over 700 Canadian truck drivers from
some of the largest trucking companies in Canada. I see this as
a missed opportunity to have this card recognized by Customs
and Border Protection at the Canadian border. The other missed
opportunity is biometric readers. There is biometric
information on the TWIC card and at the Port of Wilmington they
missed a chance to test the biometric features of this card in
a seaport setting.
As you see in my testimony, it was a failure with the ICC
chip during the technical evaluation phase after that phase
ended and we see this as a missed opportunity to see what
fingerprint readers would have worked best in this environment.
Finally, my key request is to take this opportunity to
appeal for continued support of this prototype phase TWIC card
through the implementation date. This request is not only for
the Port of Wilmington, but also for the Maritime Exchange Holt
Terminals in Gloucester City, New Jersey. If you look at the
final paragraph of my written testimony, you will see that the
Port of Wilmington and Holt Terminals are now working together
to better utilize this ID card. As we found out after the Tech
Eval TWIC card phase ended, there may still be lessons learned
about this card.
I thank you for the opportunity to speak about the TWIC
card experience at the Port of Wilmington.
Mr. LoBiondo. Thank you, Mr. Boles. Mr. Castle.
Mr. Castle. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank you all for
your testimony. I want to focus on this whole TWIC business a
little bit because it is a little bit disconcerting, and I will
start with you, Ms. Himber, because just reading your
testimony, and you also said this, I think. I don't know if you
said it word for word the same way, but we believe TSA should
develop a rule that involves the full participation of industry
as partners in the process. The draft of the rule has been
completed in the form of NMSAC recommendations. Is that, I
mean, that comes from the point of view of where you come from,
to a degree, obviously, but is that your only concern about
this in terms of how to improve TWIC? Are there other things
that you have observed or whatever and this is from, I guess,
your judgment that heck, there is a private sector here that
can help with this, as well, is where you are coming from?
Ms. Himber. Well, the regulatory process is one of the
concerns. There are other concerns regarding the technical and
implementation processes. The comment that I made in the
document here was specific to the implementation of the
rulemaking. As a pilot location, we put together a working
group of Delaware River Port stakeholders and we were able to
provide input and suggestions to TSA during the course of the
pilot program. Concurrent with that or subsequent to that last
year, we, as the National Security Advisory Committee, also
worked very diligently to put recommendations on paper that
could hopefully begin to start some dialog that we believed
just simply hadn't happened yet. There are several concerns as
far as the implementation of the program that still remain
outstanding that we have not seen answers to.
Mr. Boles mentioned some specifically about how to
incorporate foreign drivers, and I would add to that foreign
seafarers, into the program. We still don't know whether TSA
plans to issue a standard or to manage a program, although the
MTSA clearly requires that they manage a program. We don't know
what the background check processes will be, the waivers and
appeal processes, and we don't know whether our workers are
going to have to have an employer or other sponsor in order to
obtain a card. These are large questions that we don't believe
have had any dialog. There has been a lot of one-way
communication from industry to TSA, but these are the types of
things that I am referencing.
Mr. Castle. You raise a lot of questions. Let me go to Mr.
Boles first and I may come back to both of you. Mr. Boles, sort
of the same question, in a way, in looking at your testimony, I
mean, some of your team leaders left the project, which I
didn't totally understand. I don't know if it was a negative or
just happened or whatever it may be, and then you critique some
of the programs in terms of the bar code, the ICC chip, et
cetera, which you seemed to do fairly well. And then there are
some other issues that you raised in your oral testimony, and
then some concerns, I think, with the providers, the corporate
providers and some of the information, the scanners and that
kind of thing. What is your view of where we are with the whole
TWIC program at this place? I mean, my impression is at the end
that you feel a lot of these problems have been straightened
out and now we are doing better, but has this advanced as
rapidly as it should? Has everybody in the government and in
the private sector been as responsive as they should? Are we
lagging behind? You know, what kind of mark would you give this
after the time that you have dealt with it, because I think it
is an important program and I am concerned that we are not
doing all that we should do, which is--the value of a hearing
like this, maybe you will give us all a list of things we
should be going back and paying attention to?
Mr. Boles. Yes, I feel that way, exactly. This is an
extremely important program; that is why we volunteered to do
the work that needed to be done to get it through. I believe we
are about two years behind with the original implementation
date, when we first got involved in this back in 2002. That had
to do with the movement through the TSA and the different team
leaders and breakdown in communications and right now--
Mr. Castle. I am sorry. You said we are lagging by about
two years at this point?
Mr. Boles. Yes, from the original implementation date,
which was--I heard it mentioned earlier--was 2003, I believe I
was. And so now we are in 2006 and it looks like we are going
to be, from what I heard now, maybe in 2007 before the actual
implementation comes out. But through all those problems and
issues that we have dealt with, we actually do have a card that
works now and we are testing it and I guess we have different
levels of security to it. At the Port of Wilmington, the card
not only works in the main gate--we have other access points,
but it works in our administration building. We have several
different levels of access in our administration building. We
have tenants, Chiquita and Dole and it was Delaware, now
Magellan Terminals, who are very interested in this card
because they want to do an access card system for their own
facilities and they just happen to be in the Port of
Wilmington, but they are hesitant to take that step forward to
commit to this card with us because they just don't know where
it is going because of the lack of the progress for a while
there, although they see it moving now. As I said, everyone now
sees what it is capable of doing and they are very much behind
it, but they are just waiting to see what happens as far as our
sustainment period and if implementation occurs.
Mr. Castle. Is any other country doing this and if they
are, are any of them further along than we are? Can we draw
from other countries or is this just something that is almost
unique to the United States at this point, or are we so far
ahead that we are just the pioneers and you can't really draw
from anybody else?
Mr. Boles. I understand there is a program somewhat like
this in Canada I have not seen. I speak to a lot of the
Canadian truck drivers. I have not seen a card. The only thing
I have seen is the Fast Card and that is where I think we
missed a big opportunity. If you ever seen that Fast Card, the
Fast program that Customs and Border Protection has at the
Canadian border, it is basically a bar code and no photograph
or a bunch of information on it, whereas--
Mr. Castle. Do you think we could do this here? Sort of an
E-Z Pass?
Mr. Boles. From what I see, this card is capable of doing
most anything.
Mr. Castle. Okay. Do you both feel that the whole TWIC
program is ultimately worthwhile in that these problems that
you have faced already are starting to be resolved or can be
resolved even with the loss of the two years? Are we going down
a blind alley where people are just going to say this is
ridiculous, you know, why bother, you know, the thing is
ineffective; it works here, it doesn't work there? I mean, I am
a little concerned about the whole future of it. I don't mean
to lead you to a negative answer because I--this is a program I
want to see work. I want to see it be positive, but I worry
about some of the lags and the concerns that both of you have
expressed.
Mr. Boles. That is where I have asked the big favor that we
continue with the sustainment period because our tenants and
customers and the port stakeholders, themselves, if this
sustainment period ends abruptly again, and then we are talking
about another whole year before the actual implementation, it
is very likely that interest will just simply just go away in
this card and I don't know what could possibly happen. Someone
just thinking now we are just going to go through an
implementation that is going to die again, and that is what we
are trying to avoid by continuing to issue this card and use
the card and work with the card.
Gloucester City, apparently, is looking into taking this
card and using the potential of it into their hiring system. We
know that there is a possibility that we can do that with our
off-site ILA Longshoremen of Wilmington. We have our own people
pretty much included, but the ILA, who sometimes works,
sometimes don't, there are ways that we can address that, and
they are the type of things we look forward to doing once we
know for a fact that this card is going to stay with us.
Mr. Castle. Thank you. Ms. Himber, do you have a response
to that?
Ms. Himber. Yes, I continue to believe 100 percent in the
efficacy of this program. I think it is the only right answer
for the maritime sector and other transportation modes,
potentially, as well. I share your concerns about the delays.
In fact, I have been one of the most vocal people, I think, to
express those concerns at TSA leadership levels. Having said
that, do I think there are some opportunities to move along
more quickly? Yes. And I think that there may be opportunities,
again, with the TSA working with industry to move it along
faster and potentially, even more effectively than might be the
case when they do get to implementation. So yes, I think we
should continue to go down this road. I would hate to see this
work wasted. There are people who have already given up on it,
as I mentioned, the participants in California have said thank
you, it was very nice playing, but come back to us when you are
ready. I think that would be a mistake, to abandon it at this
point.
Mr. Castle. Okay, and I thank the entire panel and I yield
back, Mr. Chairman. I may have to leave before it is all over,
so I thank you.
Mr. LoBiondo. Thank you very much for joining us and thank
you for your valuable input.
Mr. Castle. Thank you, sir.
Mr. LoBiondo. We are going to invite you to all our
subcommittee meetings.
Mr. Castle. I am going to become a member of the
subcommittee.
Mr. LoBiondo. Okay. Ms. Schwartz.
Ms. Schwartz. I just appreciated that line of questioning,
actually, because I think it is gone so far in this and I think
your expression that you feel like this is an important tool
for you, is there anything else you want us to be saying to TSA
or other, I mean, you expressed some of the emotional--and some
of the specifics, but more specifically, you are saying move
more quickly, talk to you? I think that is what we were just
saying. I see labor is not at the table, but I know they had
some of the same concerns that you expressed about appeals
process, about who is covered, what information might be
included, but either now or have you written down very
specifically what you might want us to advocate on your behalf,
or do you feel like TSA has not heard that they need to hear in
order for us to get them to move more quickly and be more
responsive to your concerns?
Ms. Himber. I think, at least from the TWIC program office
staff, TSA has certainly heard our message and I think they
understand and I guess I would second Mr. Bole's comment, part
of the problem is, indeed, the rotating leadership within TSA.
I believe that that is a big, big part of what the delay has
been about. There may have been other reasons, information to
which I may not be privy, so we continue to try to relay the
message and the concern and any voice that could chime in,
particularly yours, would be helpful. Yes, we do need to answer
some of these key questions. Yes, we do need to get the program
moving sooner rather than later and we do need to discuss it
with the stakeholders before implementing any regulations.
Mr. Boles. Just to reiterate, the most important part from
my end is the continuance of the sustainment period. To give
you a little idea of how frustrating it can be dealing with TSA
sometimes is we started the sustainment period at the end of
September. I remember, like September 30, my TSA--my trusted
agent who does the enrollment for the TWIC card at the facility
walked into my office about 4:00 p.m.; she works until 4:30.
And she said I just got told to not come to work anymore and I
said this program is going to be sustained. She goes no, I
understand that it is not and if I come in tomorrow, I won't
get paid. Well, I started making phone calls, Mr. Schwartz, and
quite honestly, when Mr. Schwartz and other people on the TSA,
there is now good contact, good communications going on and I
understand the situation that they can be in sometimes, but she
left at 4:30. I was under the impression that I might not see
her again and that the program all of a sudden abruptly stopped
again and she called me about 4:50 and told me that she would
be in the next day, that she just got a call from her--the
company that she was working for had called her to say that
everything is okay, it is taken care of and I guess about five
minutes later I got a call from Mr. Schwartz stating that the
sustainment period, the papers had been signed, it was going to
actually go on. So it is a very last minute nerve wracking and
it is where our tenants and customers have gotten a little bit
frustrated.
I am one of the people that Lisa thinks I am an eternal
optimist and maybe I am. I have taken some bumps and bruises
from my boss because I have supported this program and it has
caused some issues and we would just appreciate if we could--if
it was going to be sustained--we knew pretty well in advance,
not half an hour after the program officially ended that it has
been sustained. That is the type of thing that becomes nerve
wracking and I have a tough time going upstairs and telling my
boss that I am not sure if we are going to have this card
tomorrow.
Ms. Schwartz. Okay. Maybe that is something that the
Chairman might want to consider, some conversation or
something--
Mr. LoBiondo. Would you yield for a second?
Ms. Schwartz. Yes.
Mr. LoBiondo. Based on what we have heard from the second
panel, we have already made a decision that there will be a
series of follow-up questions to be submitted to TSA in writing
with written responses requested, and depending on what those
responses are will depend on the subcommittee's next action of
either quickly pulling together a full focused hearing or--
there are some pretty disturbing things here, so yes, you are
absolutely right, we will be following up.
Ms. Schwartz. Well, you anticipated my request, so that is
great. I think that is a very appropriate action and I fully
support it, so thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. LoBiondo. Mr. Andrews.
Mr. Andrews. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank the witnesses
for their efforts and their testimony. Ms. Himber, on page two
of your testimony, you are talking about difficulties in the
practical applications of some regulations and you say, ``It is
clear that many of the Federal regulations promulgated under
various laws or presidential directives are simply
unenforceable. The U.S. Customs and Border Protection
requirement that information concerning all persons entering
the United States be provided to the agency in an electronic
format not less than 24 hours prior to arrival is an excellent
example.'' What is wrong with that requirement? Why shouldn't
we know at least 24 hours before someone enters one of our
ports who they are?
Ms. Himber. In general, there is nothing wrong with the
requirement. Where it becomes problematic, and why I use the
word unenforceable, is when you talk about--and then I use the
example in my document of the launch operator or the barge
operator who might be departing a U.S. port going out to a ship
for one purpose or another and then coming back into the United
States. They don't know 24 hours prior who the crew is going to
be. They may not know until 15 minutes prior to departing the
U.S. to ferries. They won't know who their passengers are and
they may or may not know who the crew members are. So that is
one example of where there needs to be a little bit of
tweaking.
Mr. Andrews. So perhaps the way to tweak that, and you do
suggest this later in your testimony, is some sort of frequent
flyer program where someone who frequently is involved in such
a trip could be cleared in advance and that person could be on
a list of people who would not have to be given the 24 hour
notice.
Ms. Himber. Right.
Mr. Andrews. That sounds pretty reasonable to me.
Ms. Himber. The other concern, and I am not purporting to
have the answer, but CBP is required to screen every person and
how you do that with the pleasure boats, I wouldn't begin to
presume, but they--or fishing boats or whoever, sightseeing
boats, so--
Mr. Andrews. That is obviously a different issue and
problem, but I did want to isolate on the shipping industry,
itself, though. So one problem we have identified and isolated
is where we have barge operators or other vessels that make
frequent trips in and out of U.S. waters or out of ports. Are
there any other problems for the shipping industry beside that
one? Would this rule?
Ms. Himber. With this there are, let me say, ongoing
questions. Most of the problems, since the regulation was
promulgated in April of 2005, we have worked through them. It
took some time and unfortunately, because of the nature of some
of the regulations being promulgated under security, the rule
is in place before you have answered all the questions, so it
was difficult, it was challenging, but we did get through it.
We are working through some additional concerns, but nothing at
this point that anybody would consider show stopping.
Mr. Andrews. Well, I think what we would be interested in
is if any of those questions yield other specific objections,
like the one I think you have already wisely have made about
the frequent passengers or frequent flyers. We would like to
hear them. And then, Mr. Chairman, I would ask if in your list
of follow-up questions if you could include a question to the
Coast Guard about the possibility of creating an exception--or
excuse me, it would not be the Coast Guard, it would be the
CBP--the possibility of creating an exception to this rule or
some kind of modification of the rule, as Ms. Himber has
suggested.
Mr. LoBiondo. We will ask.
Mr. Andrews. Thank you. I have no further questions.
Mr. LoBiondo. Okay. Thank you, Mr. Andrews. Dr. Glenn, in
your written testimony you stated that there are dual uses for
CODAR and can you explain what these dual uses are and how they
can be used for the Coast Guard in both the homeland security
and in search and rescue?
Mr. Glenn. Dual uses that we presently use them quite
extensively for current mapping around the U.S. We have a nice,
extensive network off New Jersey. It has been tested by the
Coast Guard and it has been shown to improve their search and
rescue capabilities. If we can keep this network operating on
something other than a scientist grant support, the Coast Guard
is ready to put that as a regular tool onto their SAROPS
planning tool. That is the first use and most well-developed
use.
The other thing that we track with the CODAR systems are
the vessels. This is a very high concern for Counter
NarcoTerrorism and for the Department of Homeland Security and
also the Office of Naval Research. The network is probably
going to be in place for current mapping alone; saving lives,
saving livelihoods and protecting the environment is a good
enough reason to deploy this network. What we are trying to do
at Sandy Hook is feed off of that network and use it for vessel
tracking so we don't have to install a second network, so one
network does dual use.
Mr. LoBiondo. What other natural resource management
response can be implemented with CODAR?
Mr. Glenn. One of the best examples of that is off the
California--State of California just invested $22 million in
putting the CODAR network across the whole State and the big
driver for that was beach protection. The economies of the
beach depend on the beach towns and the State, really, depend
on clean beaches, and by knowing what is in the water and where
it is going or if something washes up on the beach, where it
came from, is critical information to keep the beaches clean
and those economies going. And so that is one of the main uses
of the system. The New Jersey Department of Environmental
Protection is also very interested in how this can be used to
look at low-dissolve oxygen off of our coast. It helps them
decide where to sample, when to sample and when to put boats
out. And so just as we do Maritime Domain Awareness for the
Coast Guard, for vessel interdiction, we can do Maritime Domain
Awareness for our own environmental groups or scientists, like
myself, or fisheries groups that can then better respond to
what is going on with their more expensive boats.
Mr. LoBiondo. Low-dissolve oxygen?
Mr. Glenn. If you don't have a bubbler going in your fish
tank and there is a top on it, eventually all the oxygen goes
away and the fish die. The biggest example of that was in 1976
when there was a massive fish kill along our entire coast.
There are several regions of recurrent low-dissolve oxygen
along the New Jersey shelf and we have to worry about those
because they affect mostly the benthic organisms, the shellfish
that can't swim out of the way.
Mr. LoBiondo. Okay, thank you. Ms. Himber and Mr. Boles,
what you had to say about TWIC card was, I think, very helpful
and important. Just to reiterate a little bit, I would like,
since you know we are going to be doing some follow-up, could
you just, for my sake, restate what you believe the top three
challenges/problems are and/or questions that we need to focus
on getting an answer? What are your top three?
Ms. Himber. My first one, of course, is the schedule. I
would like to know why, you know, what is causing the delay and
what we can do between now and implementation to minimize
further delays. The second big question that I would ask and
really, it is several issues lumped into one question, what is
the status of the program as far as will it be government
managed? When can we expect answers? I guess the easiest way to
say it is when can we expect answers to the questions that we
have posed regarding the critical open questions surrounding
the program, such as waivers, background checks and appeals for
our nationals in the program?
Mr. LoBiondo. Mr. Boles?
Mr. Boles. I would add again the sustainment to
implementation for Wilmington and Gloucester City and the
Maritime Exchange, but also definitely on the background
checks. I work pretty closely with the union leadership and
that is an extreme concern of theirs and in addition to that,
as Lisa said, the appeal process outlined that. And the waiver
process, from what I heard, the waiver process in Florida was
used to grandfather employees at their seaports in good
standing. I always try to figure out how they eventually came
around to grandfathering in most of their employees and that is
how they ended up doing it, I understand.
Mr. LoBiondo. Okay, any follow-up from my colleagues? No.
One final question for Ms. Himber. As a member of the National
Maritime Security Advisory Committee, do you feel the committee
is being utilized in full potential and that its
recommendations are given full consideration by the Department
of Homeland Security?
Ms. Himber. Yes and no. We did a lot of good work and I
think particularly on the TWIC program. I am, you know,
disheartened that we haven't gotten a response yet. There have
been a couple of issues that have surfaced on the committee
agenda that we are continuing to explore as possible agenda
items. I think the committee will soon be, perhaps, more
effective than it is today, but having said that, it has been
in operation less than a year. It was ramped up and we met for
the first time in just March of last year, so I think some of
the members are kind of finding their way and we will put
together a list of agenda items that we believe can be of
distinct benefit to the DHS and we look forward to having that
opportunity and getting those kinds of responses to improve the
environment under which we all have to operate.
Mr. LoBiondo. Okay. I want to thank the panel very much.
This was extremely helpful. You can expect to continue to hear
from us and we appreciate and look forward to your continued
feedback. The subcommittee is now adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:24 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
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