

**THE LONDON ATTACKS:
TRAINING TO RESPOND IN A
MASS TRANSIT ENVIRONMENT**

HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGENCY
PREPAREDNESS, SCIENCE,
AND TECHNOLOGY
OF THE
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THE LONDON ATTACKS: TRAINING TO RESPOND IN A MASS TRANSIT ENVIRONMENT

Tuesday, July 26, 2005

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS,
SCIENCE, AND TECHNOLOGY,
Washington, D.C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 9:04 a.m., in Room 210, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Peter King [chairman of the subcommittee] presiding.

Present: Representatives King, Simmons, Rogers, Pearce, Reichert, McCaul, Dent, Pascrell, Thompson, Dicks, Harman, Norton, and Etheridge.

Mr. KING. [Presiding.] Good morning. The Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness, Science and Technology will come to order.

We thank our witnesses who came to be with us here today.

The attacks in London the last several weeks have been a vivid wakeup call to all Americans and to all freedom-loving people around the world about the threat we face from international terrorism, specifically the threat we face to our mass transit systems.

Throughout the world, mass transit systems have long been a target of terrorists attacks, but, again, in many ways, it took the recent attacks on London to remind us of such brutal reality.

Algerian extremists set off bombs in subways in Paris in 1995 and 1996. Palestinian terrorists have carried out suicide bombings on Israel's buses. Al-Qa'ida terrorists killed 191 people and wounded hundreds more by detonating 10 bombs on Madrid's commuter trains in 2004, Chechnyan terrorists killed 40 people by bombing the Moscow subway in 2004. And the first terrorist use of a chemical weapon by a Japanese terror group occurred in 1995 when they released sarin gas in the Tokyo subway. And, again, the events of the last several weeks make it clear that the threat continues.

Mass transit is public and used by millions of people daily. I know in my city of New York we have 3 to 4 million people a day on the New York City subway system, and there are almost 500 subway stations, and that does not even include the many suburban trains and routes coming into New York City.

Because of the size and openness and the highly networked character of mass transit, there are no obvious checkpoints like those at airports to inspect passengers and parcels. Passengers are

strangers, promising attackers anonymity and easy escape. And attacks on mass transit, the circulatory systems of urban areas, can cause widespread fear to really disrupt economic activity and kill or injure large numbers of people.

Addressing transit security is complicated by the nature and scope of mass transit. More than 6,000 agencies provide mass transit services, such as bus, subway, ferry and light rail—more than 26 million Americans on a daily basis. And to remain competitive, transit agencies must offer convenient, inexpensive and quality service.

The deployment of metal detectors, X-ray machines, explosive detection devices, enhanced searches of passengers and baggage, which of course are accepted now at airports, cannot be transferred easily to subway and/or bus stops. Delays would be enormous and the costs would be extremely large and mass transit could in fact grind to a halt.

But that does not mean that we should not be doing more to increase security. It is difficult and it is vulnerable, but it does not mean we should stand back and do nothing more.

To the contrary, mass transit systems can develop many effective countermeasures to make attacks more difficult, increase the likelihood of detection, minimize casualties and disruption and reduce panic.

Many measures involve only modest expense. Improving liaison with state and local first responders, conducting vulnerability and security assessments, establishing emergency management plans, instituting preventive controls, holding tabletop exercises and full-scale drills, and putting in place procedures to handling bomb threats and left or suspicious objects are not particularly costly undertakings.

Just this weekend, in fact, I met a retired New York City police officer who mentioned the possibility—I am going to ask this of the MTA witnesses today—of allowing retired police officers to ride free on mass transit. Certainly, in New York City, there are thousands and thousands of retired police officers in their 40s and 50s, all of whom are still armed and well trained. To have them on mass transit every day would, in effect, be at a cost of maybe \$150 a month. You would be getting the service of a fully trained police officer.

These are things that I think should be looked into. A lot of this, certainly the others I mentioned, have been done already before the London attacks.

But also, it is important to realize that there are calls for new and costly programs, and some of them may well be necessary. But what I do not want to do is to repeat over the next several months, the next year in response to the London attacks, are many of the mistakes we made after 9/11 where a lot of good money was thrown at programs which turned out not to work.

And also it is important to realize that federal assistance for mass transit has been considerable since September 11, 2001, and this does not include the substantial sums that state and local governments and transit agencies have not made available for transit-related security purposes over the past several years.

We need to ensure that the hundreds of millions and potentially billions of dollars that remain in the pipeline for transit and other homeland security needs are used most effectively. We need to quicken our pace implementing transit security enhancements, but we must be careful not to rush the process to the extent that we will repeat the kind of wasteful spending that we saw in the first responder programs after 9/11.

And in that context, we have to ensure that these funds are used to achieve clear, measurable and risk-based standards of preparedness benchmarks, not just feel-good items that may sound good but not necessarily increase safety. So we have to have more technology, we have to have more training, and we have to ensure that whatever we spend our money on has a reasonably good chance of being effective and getting the job done.

Over the past several years, beyond funding, both the Department of Homeland Security and the Department of Transportation have provided invaluable technical assistance to transit agencies in conducting vulnerability assessments and drafting emergency response plans and have offered specialized training and exercises for mass transit personnel.

The purpose of our hearing today will be precisely on those activities as they relate to training to respond to terrorist attacks in a mass transit environment, which present unique challenges that we must be ready to meet.

We have to ensure that no stone is left unturned. At the same time, we do not want to be, again, throwing good money after bad. We have to find out what works and what does not, where more research should be done, where there should be more technological advances made, and that really is what we look forward to hearing from our witnesses today.

So we are fortunate to have some of our top national experts here. I thank you for being here. I look forward to your testimony. I look forward to the questioning from both sides of the aisle.

And with that, I recognize the ranking member of the subcommittee, the gentleman from New Jersey, Mr. Pascrell.

Mr. PASCRELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for giving the committee a chance to explore emergency response training for transit employees and emergency responders nationwide.

Many on this committee, on both sides of the aisle, have spoken loudly and repeatedly over the last few years for greater prioritization to be assigned to transit security. And the recent heartbreaking events in London have certainly brought this issue to the forefront in our own minds.

Our hearts go out to the victims and their families. England has been a stalwart ally in the global war on terrorism. They will find no better friend than the United States as it continues to recover from these tragic attacks.

At home these attacks provide a grim reminder of the terror that can easily be carried out on American rail systems. For anybody who has ever taken the train, this comes as no surprise.

The United States rail sector must cooperate closely with the Department of Homeland Security to identify vulnerabilities in our U.S. rail system and to apply countermeasures. Importantly, our nation's transit employees and emergency responders must have

the training they need, they personnel they require and the funding they depend upon to maintain at least a baseline level of readiness.

My fear is at this time that the federal government is failing to provide appropriate assistance in those three regards. According to a transit security survey by the American Public Transportation Association, necessary rail and transit security measures nationwide are at approximately \$6 billion.

This includes investment needed for such vital items as cameras. Need I say the significance in London of those cameras. Communications systems, need I remind us where we were on 9/11 on interoperability. And also the operational costs of training and additional personnel.

Yet over the last 3 years, the federal government has spent \$256 million to improve rail and transit security. Amazingly, the Senate has just voted to cut rail and transit grants by one-third. Figure that out. This is an amazing breach of responsibility and intelligence, in my mind.

During this same timeframe, however, we spent \$12 billion for aviation security. So that is \$10 per passenger on airlines; one penny per passenger on the number of folks that use the ferry, the bus, the train, the light rail, as the chairman pointed out just a few moments ago. I think that this is a misguided approach.

New Jersey transit, for example, in my state, is enormously serious about maintaining its security throughout its systems and has taken the necessary steps to address vulnerabilities. Since 9/11, New Jersey transit has expanded its uniform police force by more than 70 percent, provided awareness and safety training to front-line employees, issued passenger and employee safety advisories, began serving as first responders at transit facilities in light of the new demands on local police units and is now collaborating with the New Jersey State Police to improve patrolling onboard those trains, in stations and around those facilities.

However, with only 209 police officers, 6 explosive-detecting canine teams to protect and secure more than 3,000 buses, 600 trains, serving \$750,000 weekday passengers, New Jersey transit neither has the resources nor the budget to address these additional security concerns.

And I might say, Mr. Chairman, it is the same in all the transit systems that I have reviewed in this country. New Jersey transit is not alone. I am sure our witnesses today from New York, LA and the Washington metro authorities can elaborate further on that point.

I look forward to hearing from each of our witnesses today to learn the level of training that should be taking place and to see what degree transit workers are involved and the training with first responders. Training and personnel remain two of the biggest transit security needs, and I suspect that as we move forward on this topic, it will become more and more clear that there is simply not enough dedicated funding for mass transit security.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for bringing us together today.

Mr. KING. Thank you, Mr. Pascrell.

The witnesses in our first panel today are Mr. Robert Jamison, Deputy Administrator of the Federal Transit Administration, and

Mr. Tim Beres, the Director of Preparedness Programs Division, Office for Domestic Preparedness, Office of State and Local Government Coordination and Preparedness in the Department of Homeland Security.

And we will lead off with Mr. Beres.

STATEMENT OF TIMOTHY BERES

Mr. BERES. Thank you, Chairman King, Ranking Member Pascrell and members of the committee. My name is Tim Beres, and I serve as director of Preparedness Programs Division within the Office of State and Local Government Coordination and Preparedness, the Office for Domestic Preparedness.

Mr. KING. Can I interrupt for 1 second? If you can try to keep your statements to 5 minutes, we will certainly make your full statement part of the record. Thank you.

Mr. BERES. Absolutely.

ODP's mission is to provide assistance and support to our state and local emergency prevention and response partners. We achieve this objective through financial assistance, training, exercise and technical assistance programs. A number of these programs directly support prevention and preparedness activities related to our nation's transit systems.

To be sure, our role is part of a larger federal effort to secure our nation's various transportation systems, including aviation security, maritime security and surface transportation security.

I am pleased to be joined by Robert Jamison from the Federal Transit Administration. We will discuss his agency's important role in securing our nation's transit systems.

Since the tragic events of September 11, 2001, the Department has awarded approximately \$8.6 billion in assistance through the State Homeland Security Grant Program and the Urban Areas Security Initiative, of which funding can be applied to the purchase of equipment for the prevention, detection and response to attacks on transit systems. These funds can also be used to support exercises that test state and local emergency prevention response to terrorist events, as well as training designed to develop proficiency in preventing and respond to terrorist acts.

ODP has administrative authority over a number of DHS transit security programs. We have designed these programs working in conjunction with our DHS and other federal partners, like FDA, to focus programmatic decisions and funding allocation decisions based on a more robust risk-based methodology.

To this end, we recently announced the award of more than \$134 million under the fiscal year 2005 Transit Security Grant Program. This year's program also places a strong emphasis on prevention and detection relative to improvised explosive devices.

Transit systems selected for funding under the fiscal year 2005 Transit Security Grant Program must conduct a risk assessment and use this data to create a security and emergency preparedness plan that specifically identifies how the transit agency intends to address any shortfall in improvised explosive device or other prevention detection or response capabilities identified in the assessment.

In addition, the transit agency is eligible for the 2005 grants and must also participate in a Regional Transit Security Working Group. The purpose of the group is to develop a regional transit security strategy, which is intended to integrate individual agency needs into a regional perspective in order to holistically address identified transportation security vulnerabilities.

In addition to providing financial assistance, ODP also provides extensive technical assistance to ensure that state and locals can more effectively develop their security programs and expend federal homeland security resources in an effective manner.

As part of this overall effort in this area, ODP has developed the Mass Transit Technical Assistance Program to provide mass transit agencies with a risk management instrument to make resource allocation decisions. Our technical assistance can also assist states, urban areas and eligible transit systems to organize and form their Regional Transit Security Working Groups and develop and manage their regional transit security strategy.

From March 2004 through November 2005, ODP will support 11 exercises specifically involving mass transit and transportation systems. Of these, ODP provided direct support in either the planning or the execution for eight of the exercises. The remaining three exercises were conducted with the Department of Homeland Security funds.

These exercises were conducted in a number of locations across the country, including the National Capital Region and New York City. And since 2002, ODP has directly supported 413 preparedness exercises across the country. And our latest data indicated that states are using their fiscal year 2004 State Homeland Security Grant Program and Urban Area Security Initiative funds to support 1,198 exercise-related projects from planning of an exercise to overtime costs associated with the actual conduct of an exercise.

In New York City, ODP provided direct support to Operation Transit SAFE, a full-scale exercise in May of 2004 that simulated terrorist scenarios involving the detonation of two explosive devices, each placed in a small backpack on the northbound and southbound Metropolitan Transportation Authority subway trains at the Bowling Green station in Lower Manhattan.

Among the preeminent needs of the emergency prevention and response community is training. Through a number of different course levels as well as delivery methods, ODP offers a wide array of courses for a broad spectrum of public safety disciplines. To meet these needs, ODP's Training Division offers 50 planning, response and incidence management courses specific to the disciplines that would respond to a transit/rail incident as part of a larger WMD terrorism curriculum.

These courses build the foundation for all types of responses. An example of this is the prevention of and response to suicide bombing incidents.

In addition, ODP, in partnership with the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center, is developing a suite of intelligence training courses for state and local responders.

The State and Local Government Coordination and Preparedness Citizen Corps Program is also engaging citizens in the transit safety and security of their community. In Washington D.C., the Metro

Citizens Corps is one example of how this community effort can work.

The transit police assigned to Washington D.C.'s subway system launched the Metro Citizen Corps on December 1, 2004. Metro transit police officers, metro employees and a group of area residents have already participated in specialized training with their local jurisdictions, participate in day-long interactive coordination train-the-trainer sessions.

In closing, ODP has and will continue to provide significant resources and support to secure the nation's transit systems.

Thank you, and I would be happy to answer any questions you have.

[The statement of Mr. Beres follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF TIM BERES

Chairman King, Ranking Member Pascrell, and Members of the Committee, my name is Tim Beres, and I serve as Director of the Preparedness Programs Division within the Office of State and Local Government Coordination and Preparedness' Office for Domestic Preparedness (ODP). The Preparedness Programs Division includes a Transportation Infrastructure Security Division, which administers a number of programs specifically designed to enhance transit and passenger rail security. I am pleased to appear before you today to discuss our efforts to secure our Nation's transit and passenger rail systems.

ODP has provided significant support to our Nation's emergency prevention and response community since its establishment in 1998. As a component of the Office of State and Local Government Coordination and Preparedness, ODP's mission is to provide assistance and support to our State and local emergency prevention and response partners. We achieve this objective through financial assistance programs, including the State Homeland Security Grant Program and the Urban Areas Security Initiative (UASI), as well as the Law Enforcement Terrorism Prevention Program. Our role is much broader, though, than providing financial assistance. We also administer training, exercise and technical assistance programs. A number of these programs directly support prevention and preparedness activities related to rail and mass transit systems. To be sure, our role is part of a larger Federal effort to secure our Nation's various transportation systems, including aviation security, maritime security and surface transportation security.

Financial Assistance Programs

Since the tragic events of September 11, 2001, the Department of Homeland Security has awarded more than \$250 million in grants specifically for transit security. In FY 2003, under the UASI Transit System Security Grant Program, ODP awarded \$67.8 million to nineteen transit systems for security enhancements. Funding allocation decisions were based solely on ridership, which at the time was the only reliable risk factor. In FY 2004, ODP provided an additional \$49.7 million to twenty-five major transit systems for security enhancements under the UASI. For these funds, the Department added the additional criteria of track mileage to ridership to make final funding allocations.

In recognition of the need to secure our Nation's critical infrastructure sector, including mass transit and the transportation systems, the Administration proposed consolidating multiple stove-piped programs (Port Security, Rail/Transit Security, Intercity Bus, Trucking Industry Security and Buffer Zone Protection) into a Targeted Infrastructure Protection Program (TIPP). The request included \$600 million for TIPP, which would allow the Department the flexibility to allocate preparedness grants to the highest risk infrastructure sites, including to our high risk transit operations, based upon the most recent threat information, rather than attempting to create numerous specific programs with a level of funding that may prove to be too little or too much given the risk environment.

ODP recently announced an additional amount of more than \$134 million under the FY 2005 Transit Security Grant Program (TSGP). The overarching goal of this program is to create a sustainable, risk-based effort for the protection of regional transit systems and the commuting public from terrorism, especially explosives and non-conventional threats that would cause major loss of life and severe disruption. This year's program also places a strong emphasis on prevention and detection relative to improvised explosive devices (IEDs), as well as chemical, biological, radio-

logical, and nuclear agents. Of the \$134 million, \$107,900,000 was awarded for security enhancement for rail transit systems; \$22,357,076 for security enhancements for intra-city bus systems; and \$3,887,161 for ferry systems security.

Under the FY 2005 TSGP program, the Department distributed rail security funds using a more robust risk-based formula. The formula for rail transit funding was based on several factors, including ridership, track mileage, the number of stations, and threat, as well as service to a defined UASI jurisdiction. Likewise, the formula for intra-city bus funding was based on ridership and location within a UASI jurisdiction. The funds dedicated to ferry system security were distributed through a competitive process, but eligible applicants were determined based on ridership and a location within a UASI jurisdiction.

Throughout the program development and application process, ODP has worked closely with a number of governmental and non-governmental agencies to ensure an appropriate level of subject matter expertise and to solicit feedback from our Federal, State and industry partners. We have worked collaboratively with several DHS agencies, including officials from the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), the Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Directorate (IAIP), the United States Coast Guard (USCG), and the Science and Technology Directorate (S&T), as well as the Department of Transportation's Federal Transit Administration (FTA) and Federal Railroad Administration (FRA). We have also worked closely with State transportation officials from New Jersey, New York, and Washington, DC, and with industry groups, including the Association of American Railroads and the American Public Transportation Association.

Further, a major focus of the FY 2005 TSGP is to establish and sustain a risk-based, regional planning process to ensure that transportation security priorities are addressed in a systematic, risk-based manner. To this end, a key enhancement to the FY 2005 TSGP is the requirement that transit agencies receiving funds through the program work with the states, urban areas and other transit systems in their defined region to develop a Regional Transit Security Strategy (RTSS). As the owners and/or operators of infrastructure that is vital to the well being of the states and urban areas they serve, it is imperative that transit system security efforts be incorporated into, and reflective of, regional preparedness planning efforts.

Transit systems selected for funding under the FY 2005 TSGP must conduct a risk assessment and use this data to create a Security and Emergency Preparedness Plan (SEPP) that specifically identifies how the transit agency intends to address any shortfall in IED or other prevention, detection, and response capabilities identified in the needs assessment. In addition, the transit agencies eligible for the FY 2005 TSGP must also participate in a Regional Transit Security Working Group (RTSWG) for the purpose of developing the RTSS. The RTSS—or Regional Transit Security Strategy—is intended to integrate individual agency needs into a regional perspective in order to holistically address identified transportation security vulnerabilities. The Department requires that all working groups include representation from the applicable state(s) and urban area(s) served by the transit systems receiving funds, and it is strongly recommended that other transit agencies not eligible to receive funds through the FY 2005 TSGP, but whose systems intersect with those of the grant recipients, also participate in the RTSWG process. In addition, for transit systems whose operations intersect with those of Amtrak in the Northeast Corridor and in Chicago, a representative of Amtrak must be included in the RTSWG, and close coordination with Amtrak on the expenditure of funds for security enhancements at shared facilities must occur.

It is the Department's intent that that RTSS serve as the integration point between the individual, risk-based SEPPs, and the overall security goals and objectives of the region. Therefore, the RTSS must demonstrate a clear linkage to the applicable state and urban area homeland security strategies developed or currently being revised. The SEPPs and the RTSS will serve as the basis on which funding is allocated to address regional transit security priorities, and the vehicle through which transit agencies may justify and access other funding and resources available on a region-wide basis through the UASI program. The RTSS should identify the overall vision of regional transit preparedness with specific goals and objectives essential to achieving the vision. The RTSS will serve as an overarching strategy for the region with mode-specific goals and objectives as they relate to Planning, Organization, Equipment, Training, and Exercises (POETE). Given the focus of this year's program, each RTSS must also specifically address current and required detection and response capabilities relative to IEDs, as well as chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear prevention, detection and response capabilities, and the actions necessary to address any gaps. In a similar fashion, our FY 2005 Homeland Security Grant Program application kit and guidance requires each jurisdiction to

conduct one FSE utilizing an IED. We are strongly encouraging States to incorporate a mass transit component into the exercise scenario.

ODP will work with an interagency Strategy Review Board (SRB) consisting of representatives from DHS Directorates and Offices (such as IAIP, TSA, and USCG), and representatives of other federal agencies (such as the FTA) to evaluate the strategies and make recommendations for approval or enhancement. Further, as the expenditure of funds is tied to approval of the strategies, ODP has set a goal of completing all review steps (including routing and approval notification) within 10 business days of receipt of the RTSS.

While the TSGP provides support and assistance to State, local, and in some cases, private companies, the FY 2005 Intercity Passenger Rail Security Grant Program provides funds and technical assistance to Amtrak for a risk assessment and security enhancements. Under this program, ODP awarded \$7.1 million to Amtrak. Of these funds, \$6,373,730 is for grants for security enhancements along Amtrak's Northeast Corridor and at its hub in Chicago, Illinois. These represent the most highly travel passenger routes in the Nation. An additional \$726,270 will be used to provide technical assistance in the development of a risk-based assessment of Amtrak's Northeast Corridor and Chicago area operations. This assessment will help Amtrak identify and prioritize needs for security countermeasures, emergency response capabilities, and management of security enhancements.

In order to promote the regionally-based approach to preparedness and security, the expenditure of these funds by Amtrak is contingent upon having an updated Security and Emergency Preparedness Plan, which is a comprehensive plan that provides written policies and procedures to guide activities for homeland security and emergency preparedness. Amtrak must also coordinate its funding allocation decisions with the RTSSs being developed in the National Capital Region, Philadelphia, New York, Boston, and Chicago. To facilitate this coordination, Amtrak is required to provide a representative to the Regional Transit Security Working Groups responsible for the development of the RTSS in these urban areas.

Further, it should be noted that since September 11, 2001, the Department has awarded more than \$8.3 billion in assistance through the State Homeland Security Grant Program and the UASI, of which funding can be applied to the purchase of equipment for the prevention and detection of attacks on transit systems. These funds can also be used to support exercises that test State and local emergency prevention and response to terrorist events, as well as training designed to develop proficiency in preventing and responding to terrorist acts. Data from the FY 2004 Biannual Strategy Implementation Report, which captures how States are spending their homeland security funds, indicate that 23 States directed more than \$34 million toward transit-related security projects. Further, initial FY 2005 data from 39 States indicate that they plan to devote more than \$5.7 million for transit security-related projects.

Also, through the FY 2005 Buffer Zone Protection Program, the Department has made more than \$90 million available for the protection of critical infrastructure and key resources. Under this program, we know that States are eligible to receive more than \$5 million to assist in enhancing security at 102 sites in the transportation sector.

The 103 sites in the transportation sector can be further broken down as follows:

- Bridges: 47 sites
- Busing: 2 sites
- Ferries: 4 sites
- Railways: 18 sites
- Tunnels: 11 sites
- Mass Transit (subways): 21 sites

The BZPP funds will greatly enhance preparedness and protection efforts at our Nation's most critical infrastructure and key resources, including those within the Nation's transportation system.

Technical Assistance

In addition to providing financial assistance, ODP also provides extensive technical assistance (TA) to ensure that States and localities can more effectively develop their security programs and expend Federal homeland security resources in an effective manner. Technical assistance is a process of providing help to resolve a problem and/or create innovative approaches to prevention, response, and recovery. TA seeks to provide state and local jurisdictions with assistance that can accomplish one or more of the following objectives: identify a problem; address an identified problem; address items in a corrective action plan (CAP) from a completed exercise; and, fill "gaps" between equipment, training and exercise programs.

TA deliveries may take a variety of forms that can be combined or modified to meet the specific needs of each requesting state/local jurisdiction. As part of its overall effort in this area, ODP has developed a Mass Transit TA Program to specifically address the unique security challenges facing transit systems.

To support the FY 2005 TSGP, ODP is providing TA designed to assist states, urban areas and eligible transit systems organize and form their RTSWG, develop their RTSS and effectively manage the implementation of the strategy through the FY 2005 TSGP and other available resources. This assistance includes workshops and a facilitated strategy development session.

In addition, for those transit systems that need assistance in conducting the required system-wide risk assessment necessary for development of the SEPP, ODP's Mass Transit TA program also offers an ODP Technical Assistance Team to support the agency with a risk-based prioritization assessment. The overall risk assessment process includes implementing the ODP Special Needs Jurisdiction Tool Kit, which allows mass transit agencies to identify and prioritize security countermeasures and emergency response capability needs based on terrorist threats and relative risk as determined by both national and local authorities. This process enables agencies to:

1. Prioritize security countermeasures and emergency response capability needs based on terrorist threats and risk;
2. Develop a road map for future mass transit agency funding allocations for terrorist attack risk reduction; and,
3. Prepare for future Federal funding requirements.

To date, ODP has completed comprehensive risk assessment deliveries for seven (7) major transit systems, including the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, New Jersey Transit, the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority, and the Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority. ODP is currently providing this assistance to an additional twelve (12) agencies, including the Chicago Transit Authority (CTA).

In addition, lessons learned from its application nationwide are being used to identify other areas of needs and drive the development of additional assistance programs through a spiral development process. For example, ODP is currently piloting a new TA program with New Jersey Transit, a major transit system in the Northeast. Once fielded, this program will assist transit agencies with development of continuity of operations plans, a major area of need identified in the risk assessments conducted to date.

Exercises:

From March 2004 through November 2005, ODP will have supported 11 exercises involving mass transit systems. Of these, ODP provided direct support in either the planning or the execution for eight of the exercises. The remaining three exercises were conducted with the State's Department of Homeland Security funds. These exercises have been conducted in a number of locations across the country, including the NCR and New York City.

All exercises were conducted using the Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP). ODP has implemented the HSEEP to provide a means to assess terrorism prevention, response, and recovery capabilities at the Federal, State, and local levels. HSEEP is a threat- and performance-based exercise program that provides common doctrine and policy for the planning, conduct, and evaluation of exercises. In an attempt to standardize the language and concepts that have been adopted and utilized by various agencies and organizations in the exercise planning process, the HSEEP doctrine was designed to ensure consistent use of standard terminology and processes throughout all exercises.

For example, in September 2004, a Command Post Exercise (CPX) was conducted, which simulated multiple terrorist bombing attacks, a bubonic plague outbreak, extreme heat, and rolling blackouts. The CPX was held at more than thirty command centers and involved hundreds of command personnel throughout the NCR. The exercise involved 700 players and 350 observers, including Federal, State, and local agencies. Participating Federal agencies included the FBI, the Federal Protective Service, the Pentagon Force Protection Agency, the U.S. Capitol Police, and the U.S. Supreme Court Police. The DC, Virginia, and Maryland Emergency Management Agencies were involved, as well as the DC Metropolitan Police Department. Additionally, surrounding counties from Virginia and Maryland were involved. In addition to these Federal, State and local agencies, Baltimore Gas & Electric, Dominion Virginia Power, and the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority participated in this exercise. The participants' actions were guided by NCR CPX guidance procedures, participating agencies' plans, policies, and procedures, and ODP's HSEEP guidelines.

In New York City, ODP provided direct support for the Operation Transit SAFE Full-Scale Exercise in May 2004. This simulated terrorist scenario involved the detonation of two explosive devices, each placed in a small backpack on northbound and southbound Metropolitan Transportation Authority (MTA) subway trains at the Bowling Green Station in lower Manhattan. Over 500 responders participated, including local EMS providers and medical centers. In addition to multiple New York City agencies, the FBI, the Greater New York Chapter of the American Red Cross, the Salvation Army, and Con Edison participated as well. The participants' actions were guided by the Operation SAFE Planning Team, emergency operations plans, the New York City Office of Emergency Management, and ODP's HSEEP guidance.

ODP is currently working with FTA and TSA to examine ways to leverage exercise programs already developed and funded by these agencies, and to ensure coordination of our efforts.

Training:

Among the preeminent needs of the emergency prevention and response community is training. Through a number of different course levels (awareness, operations, planning, and management) as well as delivery methods (classroom, web instruction, etc.), ODP offers a wide array of courses for a broad spectrum of public safety disciplines.

To meet these needs, the Training Division offers fifty planning, response, and incident management courses specific to the disciplines that would respond to transit/rail incidents as part of a larger WMD/terrorism curriculum. These courses build the foundation for all types of responses whether man-made or natural. Examples of these are: Incident Response to Terrorist Bombings (awareness level); Incident Response to Terrorist Bombings (operations level); and Prevention of and Response to Suicide Bombing Incidents. These courses are designed to prepare emergency responders to perform effectively and safely during bombing incidents at all locations of an incident scene. The courses include detailed instruction on IEDs, explosive materials, and explosive effects, and comprehensive training on critical response actions during pre- and post-detonation operations. Extensive field training, including explosives effects demonstrations, are included.

In addition, these courses address actions that emergency responders can take to prevent and/or deter terrorist attacks involving energetic materials. All of these courses include train-the-trainer programs to assist in sustaining and multiplying the effectiveness of deliveries throughout the nation. These examples are offered to multiple disciplines [Law Enforcement (including Transit Police), Emergency Medical Services, Fire Service, HazMat, Public Works, and public Safety Communications]. In addition, ODP, in partnership with the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC), is developing a suite of Intelligence training courses for state and local responders. This suite of courses will present information to include intelligence gathering, the intelligence process (including data mining), types of intelligence, channels of communication, intelligence networks, and security of information and documentation of intelligence information.

In FY 2004, building upon its existing capacity and capability, ODP awarded more than \$33 million under the Competitive Training Grant Program (CTGP). Fourteen training programs were selected through a competitive, peer-panel review process which identified innovative training programs to address six issue areas designated by ODP as areas for increased attention. These areas were identified based on a trend analysis of the State Homeland Security Strategies submitted to ODP earlier in FY 2004. This analysis sought to identify shared training gaps among the 56 U.S. States and Territories.

One of these awards was for the Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority (MTA). Under this award, MTA, in conjunction with the American Public Transportation Association (APTA), is developing a turn-key curriculum for private and non-sworn transportation security staff to prevent and respond to acts of terrorism involving Weapons of Mass Destruction. Examples of specific topic areas within the curriculum are: Principles of Security and Counter-Terrorism in Public Transportation; Physical Security in Public Transportation; Security Surveillance in Public Transportation; and Threat Analysis, Assessment, and Identification. The MTA project is an example of coordination, uniting county supervisors, elected officials, the LA Sheriff's Department, and union representation behind the common goal of enhanced terrorism prevention and preparedness specifically for mass transit security. Once completed, this curriculum will be distributed nationwide through APTA and ODP to all state and local public transportation agencies.

In FY 2005, ODP issued a second Competitive Training Grant Program solicitation. Under the FY 2005 solicitation applicants again submitted proposals based on issue areas identified in State Homeland Security Strategies and more recently com-

pleted Initial Strategy Implementation Plans (ISIPs) provided by the States and territories. Of the six issue areas identified from the State Strategies and ISIPs, one focused on transit security: Training to enhance the transit systems' (rail, bus, ferry) capacity to prevent and/or manage the consequences of terrorist attacks.

We are currently reviewing the findings and recommendations of the CTGP peer review panels held this month and plan to announce proposals selected for funding in the coming weeks. We will keep this Committee posted on these selections and provide additional information as it becomes available.

Citizen Corps:

SLGCP's Citizen Corps program is engaging citizens in the transit safety and security of their community. The Washington, D.C. Metro Citizen Corps is one example of how this community effort can work. Transit police assigned to Washington D.C.'s subway system launched the Metro Citizen Corps on September 1, 2004. Metro Transit Police officers, Metro employees and a group of area residents who have already participated in specialized training within their local jurisdictions participate in day-long interactive coordination Train-the-Trainer sessions. The citizen trainers are known as area Community Emergency Response Team (CERT) coordinators and are from the District of Columbia, Virginia and Maryland. CERT, a Citizen Corps program partner, educates people about disaster preparedness for hazards that may impact their area and trains them in basic disaster response skills. Using the training learned in the classroom and during exercises, CERT members can assist others in their neighborhood or workplace following an event when professional responders are not immediately available to help.

The D.C. CERT program was the first regional partner to participate in the training. Through the program, Metro Transit Police train Metro Citizen Corps volunteers in a number of different areas, including rail safety, system evacuation routes, and tunnel walks. They also receive information on the location of emergency trip stations and how to access them in case of an emergency. Already more than 60 citizens, all regular commuters, have gone through the training.

SLGCP's Citizen Corps program is also exploring a nationwide partnership with the Department of Transportation's *Transit Watch* program. *Transit Watch* is a nationwide safety and security awareness program designed to encourage the active participation of transit passengers and employees in working together to maintain a safe transit environment. It provides information and instructions to transit passengers and employees to ensure that they know what to do and whom to contact in the event of an emergency in a transit setting. The *Transit Watch* Toolkit containing a downloadable CD, fact sheet and other materials is available at no-charge on the Transit Watch website at <http://transit-safety.volpe.dot.gov/Security/TransitWatch/default.asp>.

Conclusion:

In closing, ODP has and will continue to provide significant resources and support to secure our Nation's passenger and transit systems. The system-wide plans under development will help identify and address key security needs to make our Nation's transit system safer and function effectively. The Department, working alongside our Federal, State, and non-governmental partners, will continue our tireless efforts to ensure the safety of the commuting public and the transit sector.

Thank you for the opportunity to provide information on the important work that the Office for Domestic Preparedness is undertaking to secure our Nation's passenger and rail transit systems.

Mr. KING. Thank you, Mr. Beres.
Mr. Jamison?

**STATEMENT OF ROBERT JAMISON, DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR,
FEDERAL TRANSIT ADMINISTRATION, UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION**

Mr. JAMISON. Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today on behalf of the Federal Transit Administration regarding the security of America's transit systems and, in particular, the critical role of training and emergency preparedness.

We are all dismayed by the recent tragic and despicable acts of violence in London. Our hearts go out to the victims, their families

and their countrymen who, stood shoulder to shoulder with America in the wake of September 11.

July 7 was a grim reminder of how difficult it is to balance economic prosperity, our freedoms and our security.

Mass transit systems are essential to the freedom of movement that American cherish and enjoy. Every workday, transit and commuter rail systems move more than 14 million passengers in the United States. To do that effectively, transit must be open and accessible.

The very characteristics of public transit systems that make them convenient and reliable also make providing effective security an ongoing challenge. Therefore, even as we continue to improve the security of our Nation's transit systems, we must not lose sight of the need to improve our ability to respond to emergencies in order to save lives and minimize injuries.

Immediately following September 11, FTA undertook an aggressive nationwide security program. With the assistance of national and international security experts, FTA identified and has focused on three important priorities: public awareness, employee training and emergency preparedness.

Reports from both Madrid and London confirm that our focus is well-founded. Although opportunities to improve U.S. transit security still exist, we know that capital expenditures alone are not enough to assure security.

Perimeter fencing, securing yards, tunnels and bridges, and even extensive use of security cameras did not and would not have prevented either the London or Madrid attacks. The fact is: good transit security is grounded in operations.

Since September 11, the use and effectiveness of public awareness messages has significantly increased. Nevertheless, in most transit systems, there is still room for improvement. In addition to its important role of reporting suspicious activity and unattended bags, the public must be familiar with the operation of emergency exit doors, understand emergency evacuation procedures for each location on their route, and be prepared to facilitate a prompt and effective emergency response.

FTA will be focusing its efforts in the future on improving the standard public awareness templates to help local transit agencies incorporate this important information. In addition, we are developing standard protocols for the content and frequency of security announcements for each Homeland Security threat level.

The actions taken by transit employees in the critical moments immediately after an attack or an emergency can significantly reduce the severity of injuries and the number of deaths that result. Therefore, there is simply no substitute for transit employee training that builds the skills to prevent, detect and respond to security threats. These skills can be acquired through rigorous emergency planning, emergency drills and testing, and extensive training.

Since September 11, over 77,000 transit employees from across the Nation have received FTA-funded security-related training. We will continue to focus on expanding the reach of important new training in the latest international counterterrorism techniques, operational protocols for chemical and biological agents, and terrorist activity recognition and reaction.

While transit employee training is essential, there is no substitute for a good emergency response plan that has been tried and tested by the full array of emergency responders in the community. To assist in building those relationships and developing community-wide response plans, FTA, in conjunction with Office for Domestic Preparedness, has sponsored 18 “connecting communities” forums.

These forums brought together transit, law enforcement, fire, medical, city and county officials for 3 days of regional planning and response exercises. In fact, I was pleased to participate with Congressman Reichert at our forum in Seattle when he served as the sheriff of King County, Washington.

In addition, to date, 77 transit agencies have conducted full-scale emergency response drills funded by the Federal Transit Administration. FTA is currently updating its guidance on how to conduct emergency drills based upon the results of those drills. In addition, we plan to provide follow-up grants to conduct more full-scale drills.

While we know that there is no substitute for practicing emergency response drills in an operating environment, we continue to look for ways to improve and practice skills more frequently at a lower cost than full-scale community drills. Therefore, FTA has piloted web-based emergency drills in Boston, Portland, Seattle, San Francisco, Rock Island, Illinois and Montgomery County, Maryland. This new approach will provide transit agencies with new tools for conducting tabletop drills more effectively, efficiently and affordably.

Mr. Chairman, thanks in large measure to the efforts of the Nation’s transit operators, transit is more secure and better prepared to respond to emergencies than it has ever been. FTA will continue to support transit agencies throughout the Nation by providing security-related training for transit employees, materials and guidance to educate transit passengers and improve the emergency response planning and procedures.

I appreciate the opportunity to testify today, and I will be pleased to answer any questions and to go into more detail about our programs and policies. Thank you.

[The statement of Mr. Jamison follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ROBERT D. JAMISON

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today on behalf of the Federal Transit Administration (FTA) regarding the security of America’s transit systems and in particular the critical role of training and emergency preparedness.

We are all dismayed by the tragic and despicable acts of violence in London on July 7 and July 21. Our hearts go out to the victims, their families, and their countrymen who stood shoulder-to-shoulder with America in the wake of September 11. July 7 was a grim reminder of how difficult it is to balance economic prosperity, freedoms, and security.

Mass transit systems are essential to the freedom of movement that Americans cherish and enjoy. They permit large numbers of people to travel rapidly and efficiently between home, work, and other activities on a daily basis. To do that effectively, transit must be open and accessible.

Every workday, transit and commuter rail systems move more than 14 million passengers in the United States. In two weeks, transit and commuter rail systems carry more passengers than Amtrak carries in a year. In a single month, transit and commuter rail systems carry more passengers than U.S. airlines carry in a year. On a daily basis, 700,000 to 800,000 people take the Long Island Rail Road,

Amtrak, NJTransit, and the New York City subways into Penn Station, and a similar number use Metro North Railroad and the New York City subway through Grand Central Terminal.

- Prior to their destruction on September 11, the World Trade Center and Fulton Street subway stations handled over 380,000 people each day—the equivalent of the entire population of Miami, Sacramento, or Pittsburgh.
- In 2004, 251 million trips were taken on Washington DC's Metrorail.

The very characteristics of public transit systems that make them convenient and reliable, also make providing effective security an ongoing challenge. Each year, more than 2.7 billion passengers use over 1,000 stations to access America's heavy rail stations. Although passenger screening devices similar to those used in airports have been successfully tested in locations with limited access points and relatively few passengers, the widespread application of current passenger screening devices on mass transit—even on heavy rail—is unrealistic. During peak periods in New York's Penn Station, for example, more than 1,500 people per minute would have to be screened to maintain current levels of mobility and access. Therefore, even as we continue to improve the security of our Nation's transit systems, we must not lose sight of the need to improve our ability to respond to emergencies in order to save lives and minimize injuries.

FTA and America's Transit Systems

America's public transportation is provided by more than 6,000 locally governed and operated transit systems. These systems range from very small bus-only operations in small and rural communities, to very large multi-modal systems in urban areas that may combine bus, light rail, subway, and commuter rail operations.

The Federal Transit Administration provides capital funding to States and urbanized areas to develop new and extensions to existing public transportation systems, and to improve and maintain existing systems. Smaller urbanized areas with less than 200,000 population, may use FTA formula funds for limited support of their operations. However, FTA does not have regulatory authority over the day-to-day operations of transit agencies.

Historically, FTA has shaped the practices of transit agencies through its training programs, the development of best practices and guidance, and by conducting research that is critical to the industry. Since September 11, we have used all of these techniques to significantly influence the security practices of transit agencies.

Response to September 11

Immediately following September 11, 2001, FTA undertook an aggressive nationwide security program and led the initial Federal effort on transit security. With the creation of the Transportation Security Administration in 2001 and the Department of Homeland Security in 2003, lead responsibility for the Federal Government's activities in the area of public transit security now rests by statute with DHS. DOT recognizes that DHS has primary responsibility for transportation security, and that DOT plays a supporting role, providing technical assistance and assisting DHS when possible with implementation of its security policies, as allowed by DOT statutory authority and available resources. While TSA is the lead federal agency for ensuring the security of all transportation modes, as part of its own authority, FTA conducts non-regulatory safety and security activities, including safety and security related training, research, and demonstration projects.

With the assistance of national and international security experts, FTA identified and has focused on three important priorities: employee training, public awareness, and emergency preparedness, and we continue to work with our DHS partners in all of these areas.

FTA's initial response included conducting threat and vulnerability assessments in 37 large transit systems, 30 of which carry almost 90 percent of all transit riders. These assessments, conducted with the full cooperation and support of every transit agency involved and at no cost to the transit agencies, formed the basis of our security efforts. The assessments considered the entire transportation system and network in each area, not just the physical assets of one mode or site. Each assessment identified high risk and high consequence assets; evaluated security gaps; made recommendations to reduce security risks to acceptable levels; educated transit agencies on threat and vulnerability analysis; and reviewed agencies' emergency response plans, particularly their degree of coordination with emergency responders throughout the region.

Based on these assessments, FTA sent technical assistance teams to 46 transit agencies, and will begin four additional technical assistance visits in the next few months. These teams help transit agencies strengthen their security and emergency preparedness plans; implement immediate operational security improvements; and offer tailored assistance based on threat assessments. The results have also been

utilized by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to assess the relative risks and requirements in the transit environment. Further, as part of a \$3 million program involving 83 transit agencies, FTA funded emergency response drills conducted in conjunction with local fire, police, and other emergency responders.

In 2002, to help guide transit agency priorities, FTA issued its Top 20 Security Action Item List to improve transit safety and security operations, particularly with regard to employee training, public awareness, and emergency preparedness. Since that time, the implementation of these action items by the 30 largest transit agencies has been one of four core accountabilities of every FTA senior executive, and I am pleased to report that FTA has achieved its goals in this area every year.

In addition, to address concerns identified through its threat and vulnerability assessments, FTA developed and disseminated standard protocols for responding to chemical or biological incidents in rail tunnels and transit vehicle environments. More recently, FTA has developed Security Design Considerations for use by transit agencies as they design or redesign infrastructure, communications, access control systems, and other transit system components. Important considerations include designing stations for easy detection, so people cannot leave objects hidden out of sight; separating public and private spaces in facilities, so that access to controls and equipment can be restricted; and designing facilities for easy decontamination and recovery operations. FTA is incorporating security design as a component of the New Starts development and evaluation process.

Since 9/11, FTA has also significantly improved its ability to communicate with transit agencies. We now utilize a voice system known as Dialogics to communicate security messages verbally to the general managers and security chiefs at the 30 largest transit agencies. This system, which requires an affirmative acknowledgment that the message has been received, has been utilized extensively by both DHS and FTA in recent weeks. In addition, we maintain and utilize the capability to communicate electronically with the general managers and security chiefs of the 100 largest transit agencies.

We recognize that good intelligence must be America's first line of defense against terrorism, and FTA has worked diligently with our partners to improve intelligence sharing in the transit industry. FTA funded and worked with the American Public Transportation Association to create the Surface Transportation Information Sharing and Analysis Center (ST-ISAC), which is used by transit agencies throughout the country to obtain and share intelligence information that is specific to the industry. This system provides two-way communication between the intelligence community and the transit industry, as well as transit-specific intelligence analysis. The ST-ISAC is located at the Transportation Security Operations Center, TSA's 24/7 communications center that provides real time data on potential threats throughout all modes of transportation. In addition, FTA worked with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to enable transit agencies to participate on their local or regional FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF), giving nearly all of the 30 largest transit agencies access to real-time intelligence information regarding their community and the ability to contribute information they may have regarding threats to their own operations.

Response to London Attacks

In response to the London terror attacks, transit agencies across the country implemented "Orange Alert" protective measures, even before the threat level was officially raised. This quick response was a direct result of the extensive work done in identifying best practices, developing security-related guidance, and working collaboratively to plan and test emergency response procedures.

Among the specific protective measures implemented by the 30 largest transit agencies immediately following the London attacks were:

- Deployment of bomb-sniffing dogs to patrol transit stations;
- More frequent reminders to passengers about how to identify and report suspicious activities and behaviors;
- Deployment of transit police to the local police department command center; and
- Deployment of additional transit agency staff and law enforcement personnel to increase patrols and visibility in public areas.

In addition, I am pleased to report that DHS and FTA worked cooperatively for the benefit and safety of transit riders across the Nation. FTA provided input to DHS in the development of a DHS/FBI Joint Advisory regarding recommended measures for mass transit and passenger rail systems. DHS and FTA also consulted on the alert timing, level, and actions; utilized shared communication systems to reach out immediately to our transit agency partners; and met jointly with transit agency leaders via teleconference.

As you know, the prevention of attacks like those in London will be grounded in useful intelligence that is promptly shared with local officials. Unfortunately, little intelligence was available prior to those attacks.

Although opportunities to improve U.S. transit system security still exist, we know that capital expenditures alone are not enough to assure security. Perimeter fencing, securing yards, tunnels, and bridges, facial recognition technology, and even extensive use of security cameras did not and would not have prevented either the London or Madrid attacks.

The fact is, good transit security is grounded in operations. Reports from both Madrid and London confirm that our focus on public awareness, employee training, and emergency preparedness is well-founded. In light of that knowledge, I would like to share some additional information about our efforts in these three areas, and our plans for the coming year.

Public Awareness

Originally, many people were concerned that efforts to share security-related information with the riding public would generate fear and depress ridership. As a result, early efforts to increase public awareness, including FTA's Transit Watch campaign materials, were general in nature, telling passengers to be on the lookout for suspicious individuals or activities. Over time, however, experience and research have indicated that people feel more secure and are more capable of responding if they receive more specific security-related information.

As a result, transit agencies now focus their public awareness efforts on the specific actions that passengers should take. For example, one widely used public education campaign, originally developed by the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority, instructs passengers to ask, "Is That Your Bag" if they see an unattended bag or package. Another campaign, using the tag line "See Something, Say Something," tells passengers how to contact transit officials if they see something that seems out-of-place. Public awareness campaigns have also begun to focus more specifically on emergency evacuation procedures.

Since September 11, the use and effectiveness of public awareness messages has significantly increased. Washington Metro has been a leader in ensuring that detailed emergency evacuation information is more widely and openly disseminated to transit riders and the general public. Nevertheless, in most transit systems, there is still room for improvement to ensure that the public is familiar with the operation of emergency exit doors, understands the emergency evacuation procedures for each location on their particular route, and is prepared to facilitate a prompt and effective emergency response.

FTA will be focusing efforts to improve standard public awareness templates to help local transit agencies incorporate this important information. In addition, FTA is developing standard protocols for the content and frequency of security announcements for each Homeland Security threat level. Further, security and emergency preparedness messages are being developed in a variety of languages in an effort to better communicate with the diverse community of transit riders.

Employee Training

Transit employees are America's first line of defense and will be our first responders in the event of a terrorist attack or other emergency on a transit system. The actions taken in the critical moments immediately after an attack or an emergency can significantly reduce the severity of injuries and the number of deaths that result. Therefore, there is simply no substitute for security awareness and emergency response training for transit employees. We must rely on—and cultivate—human capabilities to prevent, detect, and respond to security threats.

The 400,000-plus transit employees throughout America are the "eyes and ears" of our most important security system. Transit employees travel the same routes, maintain the same facilities, and see the same people every day as they go about their duties. They are in the best position to identify unusual packages, suspicious substances, and people who are acting suspiciously. But they need to develop an understanding of what to look for and skills in how to respond. These skills can be acquired through rigorous emergency planning, regular emergency testing and drills, and extensive training.

FTA has developed and delivered guidance and security courses through the National Transit Institute (NTI), the Transportation Safety Institute (TSI) and Johns Hopkins University (JHU). Since September 11, over 77,000 transit agency employees from across the Nation have received security-related training. Among the newest training courses now being offered are:

- **Terrorist Activity Recognition and Reaction.** This course incorporates the latest in international counter-terrorism techniques to provide training to

frontline transit employees. To date, over 4,200 transit employees from 28 of the 30 largest transit agencies have taken this training.

- **Strategic Counter-Terrorism for Transit Managers.** This course provides counter-terrorism management training to transit managers and transit security officials. It offers an effective approach to security planning and the tactical deployment of law enforcement personnel. The course will be delivered to the 30 largest transit agencies beginning in August 2005.

- **Chemical/Biological Detection Protocols.** This course will provide agency-specific information for operations control personnel and train operators on chemical and biological incident management. The course is also slated for delivery to the 30 largest transit agencies beginning in August 2005.

Despite widespread success and the significant numbers of transit agency employees who have received training, we recognize that hurdles, such as overtime costs and shift coverage, can negatively affect the ability of transit agencies to take advantage of the free training opportunities that are available through FTA. Therefore, we are working with transit stakeholders to identify strategies that will permit as many frontline employees as possible to be trained.

Emergency Preparedness

While transit employee training is important, there is no substitute for a good emergency response plan that has been tried and tested by the full array of emergency responders in a community. However, the threat and vulnerability assessments conducted after September 11 suggested that most transit agencies had not even established working relationships with other emergency responders.

To assist in building these relationships and developing community-wide response plans, FTA sponsored 18 Connecting Community Forums. These forums brought together transit, law enforcement, fire, medical, and city/county officials for three days of regional planning and response exercises. FTA will work with DHS's Office of State and Local Government Coordination and Preparedness and Transportation Security Administration to hold ten additional Connecting Community Forums in the coming year that are customized to address weaknesses in those particular communities. Two of the forums will be held in conjunction with small and/or rural transit agencies.

To date, 77 communities have conducted full-scale emergency response drills funded by FTA. One important condition of these grants was that the drills include the participation of local and regional police, fire and emergency response agencies. There is no doubt that the safety and security of our communities is significantly enhanced when public transportation systems are linked to police, fire, medical and other emergency response agencies. Community-wide planning, emergency response drills, and unified emergency command centers make this critical link effective. FTA is currently updating its guidance on how to conduct emergency drills based on the results of the drills held to date. In addition, we plan to provide additional grants to transit agencies to conduct full-scale drills.

While we continue to believe that there is no substitute for practicing emergency response skills in an operating environment, we continue to look for ways to improve and practice skills more frequently and at a lower cost than full-scale community drills. Therefore, FTA has also piloted web-based emergency drills in Boston (MBTA), Portland (Tri-Met), Seattle (Sound Transit), San Francisco (BART), Rock Island, IL (Metrolink), and Montgomery County, MD (Ride On). This approach will provide transit agencies, particularly small and rural agencies, with a tool for conducting tabletop drills more effectively, efficiently, and affordably.

Conclusion

Mr. Chairman, the Nation's transit operators have responded admirably to the new threat environment. Thanks to their efforts, transit is more secure and more prepared to respond to emergencies than it has ever been. FTA will continue to support transit agencies throughout the Nation by providing security-related training for transit employees, materials and guidance to educate transit passengers, and improved emergency response planning and procedures.

I appreciate the opportunity to provide this important update on transit safety and security, and look forward to working with you to keep Americans safe and moving on public transportation.

Mr. KING. Thank you, Mr. Jamison.

Thank you, Mr. Beres.

I have a multipart question, which I think the parts are all related.

Both Homeland Security and the Department of Transportation do provide federal funding for mass transit, including anti-terror activities. I would like to know, one, what is the level of coordination between the two departments? Is there a memorandum of understanding between the two departments? If you can tell, how much money has been awarded since 9/11 which would be related to antiterrorism as far as mass transit?

Also, if you can tell, the extent of money that would be available to state and local governments to be used on mass transit which is not specifically allocated to mass transit. What I mean is money, for instance, just in the grant system, \$6 billion to \$8 billion that is available out there. Is there anything to prevent local municipalities from using that money for mass transit, and to what extent do they request assistance for mass transit, and to what extent are those requests denied?

Also, I ask on a somewhat related matter, since you have oversight of mass transit security, in view of what happened in London with the shoot-to-kill policy, are there any guidelines coming from the federal government toward local and state police entities regarding what to do with terrorist suicide bombers on mass transit systems?

I will address the questions to the two of you.

Mr. BERES. Thank you, Chairman King.

We have awarded approximately \$8.6 billion since September 11, all of which could be used for transit security. As you know, this funding goes out to the states and/or designated Urban Area Security Initiative jurisdictions and may have the ability to allocate those funds for prevention, protection, response or recovery activities that they see fit within their jurisdictions based on an overall state or Urban Area Security Initiative homeland security strategy that they have. So that funding has been available to establish security and protective measures within those jurisdictions.

Also, since September 11 and prior to the Madrid bombings, we started allocating some funding directly to the transit systems, which has become approximately \$256 million, specifically for transit systems since 9/11.

And we have worked very closely with FTA on the coordination of these programs, the redesign of the transit programs this year to take a more regional and collaborative approach, use the activities that they have done in the past as far as the assessments that they have requested, metro transit agencies to do to make sure that we are not duplicating the efforts that have already been done and to make sure that those can feed in directly to our programs and to make sure that the types of things that are allowable to be used are similar and work with what FTA and the policies that they are looking at across their programs and are consistent with those.

Mr. KING. Mr. Jamison?

Mr. JAMISON. Yes. Let me try to address most of your questions in the order that you presented them.

First on coordination, I think it is pretty evident by our testimony today that we have been working very closely with the Office for Domestic Preparedness in coordinating our training and emer-

gency preparedness forums as well as a lot of our security-related training.

We do have an overarching MOU with DHS, and we are very close to signing a transit annex. However, I do not think we need a piece of paper to work in close collaboration since London. We have specifically been in close collaboration with the Department of Homeland Security in the response to London and the raising and lowering of the threat level, and we continue to work closely with them.

I do think it is a valid point, though, that we need to continue to make sure that we have one plan and that we coordinate our resources to have the maximum input in the transit environment, and we are working very hard to do that.

From your second point about funding availability, separately from the funding that DHS has provided, the Federal Transit Administration has provided approximately \$25 million worth of technical assistance drill grants and other guidance and assistance materials to transit agencies.

From an eligibility standpoint, with our formula in urban capital programs, which have a 1 percent safety and security requirement, that equates to about \$36 million a year that is required to be spent on safety and security. And the programs are eligible for capital expenditures, and these programs are over \$4 billion. If security capital is prioritized by the transit agency, they can use those funds for that purpose.

And, finally, on the tragic incident in London, the shooting incident, I do not have enough information to comment on that specifically, but I think one thing is very apparent: That is underscores the importance of good training from our security forces and from our first-line responders.

We have put a lot of focus into a terrorist recognition and response course that we are providing to the transit industry that helps transit agency employees identify suspicious behavior, know how to confront suspicious behavior, know how to report suspicious behavior and know how to react to suspicious behavior. And I think that event underscores the importance of good training in our system.

Mr. KING. Mr. Pascrell?

Mr. PASCRELL. Yes.

Mr. Beres, the Department has stated several times, and you have stated today, that billions of dollars have been available for rail and transit security because states could have used their state homeland security grant funds for transit security. But you and I both know that states have to use most of those funds, and history is there, to meet the urgent training and equipment needs of police, fire fighters and paramedics.

Given this situation, isn't it a little disingenuous to claim that billions of dollars have been made available for transit security when you and I both know that states really had no choice but to spend this money really on first responders?

So what you are doing, in my estimation, and I would like your opinion, is telling communities they have to choose between first responders or transit with the very money that you talked about. I would like to hear your answer.

Mr. BERES. Those programs, sir, are designed to take a holistic approach to preparedness to prevent any attack from occurring, whether it is in a transit system, on a bus or the building, in the street, to be able to protect critical assets within jurisdictions as local areas determine those being critical assets, be able to respond across the system to any type of event that should occur and able to recover should any event occur.

We asked each state and urban area to do a risk assessment to determine how they should allocate their funds and come up with a strategy. Parts of those assessments were obviously transit infrastructures within those urban areas, and then they had the ability to take a look at their preparedness programs from a holistic view to determine where they should allocate their assets based on their risk approach and their risk assessments.

And they had the ability to allocate protection measures within those transit agencies as they saw fit or invest in response if they felt that protective measures within those transit agencies were not the best way to mitigate the risk at the time or other prevention measures, including developing fusion centers and sharing information across their agencies or with other state agencies.

Mr. PASCARELL. Mr. Beres, you know that we provide money directly to the ports of this country. Why don't we do the same thing to the transit systems throughout the United States of America? Then we would know we know what our vulnerabilities are. Then we would know where the money is going and if it is properly spent. Why don't we do that way?

Mr. BERES. Well, we have recognized, sir, obviously, that we do need to allocate some direct resources to the transit agencies in this country, and we have done that, actually, prior to the Madrid bombings and since then; that is, a total of \$256 million in direct assistance to transit authorities, but—

Mr. PASCARELL. In the last 3 years.

Mr. BERES. Right, understanding that those are still part of a larger operational whole within a community and one asset within those communities in which the overall preparedness look from an urban area or a state should take into account how they are going to respond if something should occur in the transit system or anywhere else.

Mr. PASCARELL. Mr. Jamison, are you satisfied with the collaboration with the DHS on the strategy that you outlined before? And when is the plan really going to be sent to the Congress of the United States that was supposed to be to the Congress by April 1 of this year?

Mr. JAMISON. As for the specifics of the delivery date, I would have to defer to the Department of Homeland Security, which is in the process of finalizing that plan. I will say that we have been pleased with the amount of input that we have been able to provide, the collaboration and the new focus, I should say, especially after London. Specifically DHS has sought out our knowledge and our understanding of the industry, as well as the programs and guidance that we developed, and is incorporating this into the security plan.

Mr. PASCARELL. What is the Department of Transportation's role in the transportation security system?

Mr. JAMISON. I think we play the important role of making sure that we are funneling information to the Department of Homeland Security so that they understand the industry and they can utilize our expertise. The Federal Transit Administration in particular, as you know, is primarily a grant-making agency. However, we have historically developed training programs for the industry on a broad variety of topics, we have developed guidance and best practices on a broad variety of topics, and we have conducted research that is critical to the industry.

We will continue to play those roles in transit security in collaboration with DHS. In particular, we continue to make sure that we are informing DHS of our knowledge of the industry as they make prioritization decisions across the modes of transportation on security funding.

Mr. KING. Mr. Simmons?

Mr. SIMMONS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And thank you, gentlemen, for your testimony and for your day-to-day work trying to secure our homeland and in this particular instance our friends and neighbors who ride on the mass transit systems, to include my daughter who rides mass transit from Brooklyn to Manhattan twice a day, 5 days a week. So I thank you for your work.

I chair the Intelligence and Information-Sharing Subcommittee, so I would like to focus a little bit on the topic of intelligence. And I noticed, Mr. Beres, that on page 8 of your testimony you state that the ODP is developing a suite of intelligence training courses for state and local responders by including information on intelligence gathering, data mining, types of intelligence, channels of communication, et cetera, et cetera, and I certainly welcome that activity. I think the more intelligence training our people have, the better off we are going to be.

I also agree with a statement that Mr. Jamison made on page 4 that capital expenditures alone are not enough to assure security. Clearly, in London, there were cameras, there were all sorts of security devices, capital expenditures were made. It was inadequate to prevent those attacks, and I remind my colleagues that the Great Wall of China was a terrific capital expenditure when it came to homeland security. So was the Maginot Line for that matter, more recent capital expenditure. But neither the Great Wall of China nor the Maginot Line worked.

So we have to be smarter. Yes, we have to make some capital expenditures, but we also have to develop those intelligence capabilities that give us forewarning so that we can prevent these attacks in the first place. I mean, we can spend an infinite amount of money training for attacks on the assumption that they are going to occur, but if we can prevent them, then that is the best of all worlds.

And, Mr. Jamison, you made the statement that prevention of attacks like those in London will be grounded in useful intelligence. Unfortunately, little intelligence was available prior to those attacks.

For both of you, from the standpoint of prevention, from the standpoint of intelligence warning to prevent attacks, how can we do better? What more can we do? Where should we be focusing? It

would seem to me that a relatively modest expenditure of money for prevention and intelligence capability would save us a huge expense of cleaning up the mess after the fact.

Mr. JAMISON. I guess I will take it first.

Congressman I agree with your comment that intelligence is critical in that transit security, as we learned from London, is definitely dependent on good intelligence as well as good training and emergency preparedness and public awareness.

You know, I am not an intelligence expert but I do realize the importance of getting good information to transit security officials, so they are able to develop a strategy and deploy their security forces, explosion detection forces and other response techniques and preparedness techniques based on the threat that they know they are going to be facing.

We focused on that early at DOT. We helped fund and develop a transportation ISACs Information Sharing and Analysis Center, that allowed us to put transit experts into a private confidential setting to interpret intelligence information and get it to the transit industry.

We also focused on making sure that all the transit agencies were represented on their local JTTFs FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force, the ones that had not been able to participate in get on those forums. I am pleased to say that that flow of information has gotten much better extremely. But I am going to rely on the intelligence experts to tell me what we need to do to get better and more accurate intelligence.

Mr. BERES. I have got to agree with your comments 100 percent. I believe if something has occurred, it is too late. We are cleaning up and trying to mitigate the damage after that. We need to make sure that we have the ability to prevent something from occurring so that we do not have to get into the response and recovery mode afterwards.

I think we have an opportunity, and we have tried to press this through our grant programs, to harness our state and local partners that are out there, whether they are law enforcement officials, fire fighters, departments of transportation, other public works people who are on the ground every single day, in communities, within transit agencies, to have the ability to notice things that are out of place or wrong, take them to a place within their local community, be it a terrorism early warning group or an intelligence fusion center, and then share that information across the country back up to the Department of Homeland Security or to the JTTFs within those communities also.

And we are working very hard to provide training to state and local public safety officials and others to notice what is out of place and the types of things to look for and also develop, as I mentioned earlier in my testimony, a suite of intelligence analyst courses so when that information reaches a fusion center at a state and local level the Department and the FBI and others have confidence in the training that those analysts have so that the analysis is good and solid analysis when it comes back up to us so that we can have the consistency in that information.

Mr. KING. Gentleman from North Carolina?

Mr. ETHERIDGE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Gentlemen, you have both talked about this whole issue of how you are working together to coordinate your public awareness campaigns. Let me ask this question: To what extent does FTA and DHS coordinate their public awareness campaigns?

It follows on this very same thing, if you are not preparing and making people aware, then you are going to be cleaning up. So to what extent are you coordinating?

Mr. JAMISON. Well, let me take that. First of all, early on, after we—

Mr. ETHERIDGE. And let me ask you to go one step farther as you are doing it. In addition to that, if you are not coordinating, then aren't we sending a mixed message and people are not really sure what is going on?

Mr. JAMISON. Let me respond to your second point first. I think it is very important that we have one message as the federal government, and that we do not duplicate programs unless there is a need to have several different delivery mechanisms to have an impact.

Early on, we recognized the need for public awareness after we completed 37 vulnerability assessments across the nation's largest transit agencies and early that public awareness—quite honestly we learned a lot of this from our colleagues in London—that effective public awareness campaigns are very important. So we developed a national strategy, a template for the "Transit Watch" program that we sent out to all the transit agencies in the country. It allowed them to use a standard template for posters, for messages on the PA announcement, for advertisements, and so forth and so on.

And as we started working with DHS and with the Office for Domestic Preparedness, they recognized that we had gone a long way and they built upon our programs without recreating programs. I think that is a good example of the way we need to move forward on all of our programs, recognizing the work that has been done, the strengths and weaknesses of our federal partners and continuing to work together to improve transit security.

Mr. ETHERIDGE. To what extent are you coordinating, though, that is my question. I mean, if I walked out on the street and I stopped someone coming off the subway or somewhere else and I asked that question, what kind of answer would I get?

Mr. JAMISON. I do not understand exactly what you are asking me. We are coordinating very closely to make sure that the funding requirement or the eligibility for funding that is available to roll out public awareness training and those types of activities is in coordination with DHS. Each individual transit agency takes our guidance and takes the funding that is developed by DHS and customizes that for their, a unique operating environment, their unique locations, their unique evacuation plans, and then rolls that out.

Quite honestly, we have learned a lot from the transit agencies that have been on the cutting edge of that, and we continue to bring that information in to the national headquarters level, refine it and get it out to the other transit agencies so that they can learn from the experience of the nation as a whole.

Mr. ETHERIDGE. Mr. Beres?

Mr. BERES. Just to reiterate Mr. Jamison's comments, that they have developed a program that we did not go back and redevelop. They put it out there amongst the transit agencies, we reference that in our grant guidance and other publications that we have out, that funds may be used to implement those programs so they can tailor their awareness campaigns as they see appropriate, as Mr. Jamison mentioned. And that is how the coordination works.

A great benefit is obviously us not going back and reinventing the wheel on something that has already been created by FTA but leveraging our resources that we have at the state and local level to help implement the things that have already been done at that level.

Mr. ETHERIDGE. Do we have any kind of assessment measure to know what kind of results we are getting?

Mr. JAMISON. Actually, we are going to try to do a lot more work in that area, but I must say that the Federal Transit Administration 3 years ago put together a top 20 checklist of priority items that we felt transit agencies need to conduct in order to improve their security level, and we held our managers accountable for making sure that those were implemented at the largest agencies across the nation.

Public awareness is high on that list, and every month we double check and make sure that we still have effectiveness in each of those areas. As I mentioned in my—

Mr. ETHERIDGE. Well, my question is, are we doing an assessment to know how the dollars are being spent, and are we getting the results for the dollars we are spending? You know, we do it to public schools, it is called a test.

Mr. BERES. Right. We have been developing through Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8, a series of target capabilities that each jurisdiction must be able to meet, and the tests that we will end up doing will be performance-based series of exercises to determine how well they are working to meet their prevention capabilities, their response capabilities and others.

Even during this time right now, before those capabilities have been completed, we do have specific guidance in our Homeland Security Exercise Evaluation Program where when we do exercises within a transit agency, that we evaluate all the different capabilities primarily in this case full response, one of which would be how the public evacuation plans and those things work during the exercise themselves, which would have a direct effect on some of the public awareness.

Mr. ETHERIDGE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Feedback on this I think is so critical because you are talking about life and death, and prevention is the critical piece of it. It gets to be what Mr. Simmons said earlier, you know, you can prevent it up-front, but you never know how well you are doing unless you do some kind of assessment into where you are coming out.

Thank you, and I yield back.

Mr. KING. I thank the gentleman for his line of questioning.

The gentleman from New Mexico, Mr. Pearce?

Mr. PEARCE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Beres, to continue the line of questioning by Mr. Etheridge there, exactly how are you going about setting up this yardstick, this assessment tool?

Mr. BERES. We have been working on this for quite some time now, working with our federal partners and our state and local partners to identify first the universe of tasks that are required across the government, state and local levels, to handle prevention and response and recovery aspects and protection pieces. And then we have put those tasks into what we call 36 universal capabilities, 36 different capabilities that we believe jurisdictions must have to be able to prevent, respond or recover to incidents.

Mr. PEARCE. So are we measuring those things now?

Mr. BERES. What we are doing right now is putting the final—

Mr. PEARCE. Are we measuring those things now?

Mr. BERES. We are measuring the majority of those things right now through our Homeland Security Exercise Program. We are putting the final touches on some of our—

Mr. PEARCE. So you actually go out and assess them. Mr. Etheridge was on point. Do you go out and assess those in our communities and why not?

Mr. BERES. At the request of—actually, all of our dollars when state and locals are doing an exercise using any of our funds, they must use our homeland security exercise evaluations.

Mr. PEARCE. You are talking about exercises, and the two of us are talking about assessment, and I am asking do you assess them in the communities right now? Do the communities know anything about it?

Mr. BERES. I think we are—

Mr. PEARCE. Our office submitted to you about 4 months ago to Mr. Corey Gruber in ODP a certified community preparedness initiative that we went to a local university that does homeland security training. We thought that measurement tools were pretty critical too and assessment was pretty critical for the first responders. And your people have been sitting on that over there for 4 months. Meanwhile, you are preparing a duplicate thing, and people like Mr. Etheridge and myself find some level of frustration that we are not moving anywhere.

Mr. Jamison, as far as the transit security grants, you have got about \$250 million out there, about 4 percent. Four percent has been utilized. The 4 percent that has been utilized, do you have a team that goes around and looks at the money that has been spent to see if it has been spent properly?

Mr. JAMISON. Actually, we do not.

Mr. PEARCE. You know, we wasted \$239 million on the northern border and the southern border from cameras that did not work, cameras that would not put in. So what verification do you intend as a department to go in and make sure this money is not squandered like the last \$239 million that supposedly went for security cameras?

Mr. JAMISON. First of all, I agree with your point that we must make sure that capital expenditures are made from a risk assessment standpoint, that funds are provided based on the threat environment, and also that transit-agencies have the operational re-

sources and the necessary maintenance and operations plans to make them effective.

However, you are referring to the Department of Homeland Security Grant Program, so I will defer to my colleague, Tim, on the follow-up on how—

Mr. PEARCE. Tim, are you all the ones that oversee the Transit Security Grant Program of \$250 million?

Mr. BERES. We are. And we have a monitoring program that we go out after the projects have been implemented to go out and determine—

Mr. PEARCE. Is this the same monitoring program that was used by ICM?

Mr. BERES. That was not a program that we managed in our office, and I am not familiar with their monitoring protocol.

Mr. PEARCE. But you have been out and you have seen the cameras working?

Mr. BERES. As those projects are finished, yes, sir, we would go out and monitor those projects to make sure that what they said they were going to spend the money on was spent accordingly and that those are functional.

Mr. PEARCE. Mr. Jamison, there has been a great stir about an overall strategic plan. Why don't we just mirror the plan that the European countries use, Britain or any of the ones that have had attacks?

Mr. JAMISON. I think that the knowledge that we gain from international attacks is pulled into the plan. All of the strategy that we discussed—

Mr. PEARCE. No, I am asking, why don't we just mirror the plans that they have in place? Surely, they have got strategic plans in place, don't they?

Mr. JAMISON. We have pulled a lot of the components—

Mr. PEARCE. Not you all, the British. Do they have a plan?

Mr. JAMISON. I understand. We have pulled several components of British transit security best practices into the guidance that we provided and we will continue to do that. And I think we need to make sure that we follow up in a few weeks with the British and determine what new measures that they are taking, because they have dealt with this many more times than we have in the United States.

Mr. PEARCE. You both have mentioned the importance of protecting against IEDs. Are you familiar with the blocking mechanism that we are using in Iraq right now?

Mr. JAMISON. I am not specifically familiar with it.

Mr. PEARCE. Well, we have an mechanism that will block the signal that is used to trigger an IED, and neither one of you are aware of it.

Mr. BERES. No, I have heard of it.

Mr. PEARCE. Heard of it. Are you, as an agency, actively engaging in it? If you are going to protect from IEDs, it seems like it would be a long way along the trek to having a blocking mechanisms on our train.

Mr. Chairman, our time has expired. Thank you.

Mr. KING. Gentleman from the state of Washington, Mr. Dicks?

Mr. DICKS. I am still trying to understand the administration's position, and I know my friend from New Jersey has already talked about this, but you are saying that \$8.6 billion has been appropriated for the Urban Area Security Initiative and the State Homeland Security Grant Program and that can be used for transit security. Is that correct?

Mr. BERES. That is correct.

Mr. DICKS. How much of it has been used for transit security?

Mr. BERES. When we ran our last numbers that we were looking at, I believe, in fiscal year 2004, it was approximately \$25 million of that money had been used specifically for transit security items and somewhere around—I believe, actually, that was the total—about \$20 million in fiscal year 2004 and \$5 million out of the initial plans for using fiscal year 2005 funds related specifically to transit security.

Mr. DICKS. 2004 was, what did you say again?

Mr. BERES. About \$20 million, sir.

Mr. DICKS. Now, the American public transportation survey says that \$6 billion is needed. Certainly, the Fed's cannot fund all of that, but is \$25 million enough?

Mr. BERES. Well, I am not familiar with that study or what pieces they were looking at in that study. I think what you have to look at too is the totality of the \$8.6 billion and how it is being used in the communities for overall response, prevention and recovery activities, not just those specific to security enhancements at transit agencies. We have also, as I mentioned earlier, dedicated \$256 million specifically for transit security enhancements.

Mr. DICKS. Is that through the Transit Security Grant Program?

Mr. BERES. Yes, sir.

Mr. DICKS. And that is part of the Urban Area Security Initiative?

Mr. BERES. It is.

Mr. DICKS. We have a number of \$142 million in transit security grants, rail and ferry in fiscal year 2005 to major metropolitan transit authorities throughout the United States.

I guess the point I am trying to get to is, the people who looked at this think we are not doing enough, and what is the position of the Department? I guess now with the Transit Security Grant Program—but it actually only goes to the largest cities, right?

Mr. BERES. It goes to the highest threat urban areas.

Mr. DICKS. So the other communities would have to take part of their first responder money and then use that for transit security, because they would not have another source of funding, would they?

Mr. BERES. If they had a major transit system within their area, but the 25 largest and highest risk transit agencies are within those high threat urban areas.

Mr. DICKS. Now, I also understand that there was a major study—I am trying to find it here—there was a major study that was supposed to be done in April—oh, here it is. On April 5, 2005, Deputy Homeland Security Secretary Michael Jackson wrote the committee to report that the national transportation security strategy that was required to be completed and submitted to Congress before April 1, 2005 was not going to be finished.

One of the reasons Deputy Jackson stated for the missed deadline was the need for further collaboration with the Department of Transportation. Given the events over the last 2 weeks, we believe that this strategy should be created sooner rather than later. Can you give us the status of this particular report?

Mr. BERES. That report is not being directly managed through my office. I will be happy to go back to the Department and find out what the status is for the committee, but I do not have any knowledge right now of what the status of that report is.

Mr. DICKS. Now, I also understand that there have been meetings between the Department of Homeland Security and the Department of Transportation, and you have signed a memorandum, and the memorandum stated that the Department of Homeland Security has the lead for transportation security. Is that correct?

Mr. BERES. That is correct.

Mr. JAMISON. That is correct.

Mr. DICKS. What is the Department of Transportation's role in transportation security? None whatsoever? It is all Homeland Security?

Mr. JAMISON. Well, as I mentioned before, I think we play a very valuable role in providing industry information, secondary information and specific knowledge to our individual modes. We need to make sure we feed that information into Homeland Security, as they use that information to prioritize threats, vulnerabilities and consequences across the transportation modes.

We have been very heavily involved in providing input into the strategy that you mentioned earlier. We are awaiting the finalization of that by the Department of Homeland Security as well, but we play a very vital role in that area.

Mr. DICKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. KING. Thank you, Mr. Dicks.

And the other gentleman from the state of Washington, Sheriff Reichert?

Mr. REICHERT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Good to see you, Mr. Jamison.

Mr. JAMISON. Good to see you.

Mr. REICHERT. I have to come at this again, as I do just about every homeland security hearing from the street level and where the rubber meets the road or cops hit the street, so to speak.

Everything you have said are words that we have heard before: Cops across the country, law enforcement agencies, sheriffs' offices, police departments. I really appreciate the holistic point of view, I think that is certainly a way to go. We have to have a strategy. We should have studies, we have to have training, we have to have equipment, working groups and exercises and strategies, and all those words sound good. But, again, when it gets down to doing the job, cops want action and that is part of what is lacking.

You know, just a few weeks ago, Commissioner Kelly of NYPD and the sheriff from Minneapolis-St. Paul testified that they are using resources from both of their police departments, and New York is an example that is certainly by far an extreme example, but they are spending \$178 million a year of their own money on homeland security.

Pre-September 11 they had 12 officers assigned to counterintelligence and intelligence work within their city. Now, they have over 1,000. All of those officers, some, are spread across the world in other countries to gather intelligence not only on things happening in their city, in their airports but also in their transit system.

They feel like I think most law enforcement agencies like the federal government's let them down. I mean, it is good, again, to be trained.

Brian Jenkins said, "Cops are it. We are going to win this at the local level." According to Commissioner Kelly, we are protecting national interests here. We are doing a job for the national government, for the security of this nation.

My point is that at some juncture here the Department of Homeland Security has to step up and say, "Local government cannot afford to provide bodies, personnel." Everything else is there for us, but for NYPD to put out \$178 million and 1,000 police officers and take them from duties that they were involved in before in fighting crime in that city is wrong. I need some federal assistance from the federal government.

For my sheriff's office in Seattle, to take 5 people out of 1,100 employees, we are happy to do it, we want to protect this country, but we need help in providing personnel, especially when it comes to the metro systems, which we are responsible for in the Seattle area, the King County Sheriff's Office.

Can you respond to future plans to help us in providing personnel for the analysis of intelligence, prioritization of intelligence, assigning risk and threat and providing personnel to help protect our metro systems and our transit systems?

Mr. BERES. Yes, sir. The Department views this in obviously all of homeland security as a shared responsibility between the federal government and the local units of government that has law enforcement responsibility operationally to prevent an activity from occurring within their own jurisdictions. And what we have done is allow some of our funds to be used, a certain percentage of our funds to be used to pay for overtime and back bill for participation on terrorism early warning groups—

Mr. REICHERT. I hate to interrupt for just a second. You saw what happened in London. It was the first responders who were there to respond to those bombings in London, and that is the kind of help we need.

Mr. BERES. Yes, sir. The Department right now has not looked at using any of our grant funds for any hiring programs at this point, but—

Mr. REICHERT. Would you be willing to do that, examine that possibility, please?

Mr. BERES. I will take that back, absolutely.

Mr. REICHERT. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. KING. Gentleman from Texas, Mr. McCaul?

Mr. MCCAUL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And this has been touched on before, but we have \$250 million in transit security grants that have been authorized, but only 4 percent have been drawn down of that \$250 million. We also have

about \$8.2 billion in homeland security grants, and yet 70 percent of that funding remains in the pipeline.

Some would argue we need to, in the Congress, appropriate more money for this purpose. It seems to me, given these figures, that the money is there, it is just not being drawn down and spent properly. Would you care to comment on that?

Mr. BERES. I believe that the draw-down figures do not give an accurate picture of activity on those grants. They are an easy number to look at because they are very valuable. It is like looking at your checking account and what is in and what is out, but it does not show precisely what obligations have been made on those funds and what outlays have been made on those funds.

It could very well be that funding has been laid out for certain pieces of equipment that is out there that has not been received or was received and damaged and they are sending it back, they have not paid the invoices. Having worked in federal assistance programs for the past 11 years, generally what you see are the draw-downs on funds are not made till the end of the grants anyway. And these are 2-year grants, so generally you see those draw-downs occur at the very end.

The other part of this is that much of the funding can be allowed for exercises and training and for planning, which could occur over a 2-year period, and they would draw-down that funding as they acquired those costs and attended training or conducted exercises.

Mr. McCAUL. Mr. Jamison, you care to comment?

Mr. JAMISON. I think it is just very important that as we embark on capital spending and as we prioritize those funds, that we make sure that we spend them in the correct manner, as the chairman indicated earlier. We must make sure we get the most out of that money and make sure that we have the operational resources to support capital spending. And I think that is some of the delay that you have seen in spending those funds, as people try to understand and implement—on very different systems across the country—individual counterterrorism and countermeasures to make their systems more secure.

Mr. McCAUL. And so in a sense these numbers may be a little bit misleading is what you are saying. Do you believe that the amount appropriated is sufficient for our transit security needs at this critical time in our history?

Mr. BERES. I believe the secretary was before the full committee yesterday, and I will echo what his words were on this issue, which is anything that—the funding that should be appropriated should give the Department the maximum amount of flexibility to allocate the funds based on risk. And taking a look at risk, whether it is transit or ports, other places, people and all the other different things, and I believe that is the way we should look at this issue of having flexibility in allocating the funding.

Mr. McCAUL. My second question has to do with the analysis of what happened in Madrid and now recently in London. Typically, an organization will draw down lessons learned to better protect if, God forbid, it happens or there is a threat in our country.

What are the lessons learned from these two bombings that Homeland Security has taken? And, secondly, what technologies are we looking at? I know in the London subway they have cam-

eras, surveillance cameras. Are we looking at something along those lines?

Mr. BERES. Many of the requests for use of our funds have revolved around the use of cameras and close-circuit television. We are in the London subways. I know we are looking at lessons learned. In London, there is a joint contact group that is headed up by the Executive Director of our office that works with the British government on all things that are preparedness. We will end up taking those lessons learned as appropriate and putting those into our guidance and training and exercise program, as those become available and as we see where they fit in our vast array of programs that we have.

Mr. MCCAUL. Well, of course time is of the essence at this point. I would hope that you could do that rather quickly. And of course Madrid, I think, would provide some guidance as well.

Mr. BERES. Agreed.

Mr. JAMISON. And I will comment on that very quickly. We continue to look back at Madrid and we have been looking at London and will continue to look at London to make sure we are pulling that information into guidance that we prepare for the transit agencies.

Lessons learned from Madrid: they did not have a lot of measures in place that London had in place, including a public awareness campaign and good training for a lot of their front-line employees. You know, London had those things in place. They are one of the best prepared subways in the world. However, even the CCTV closed circuit television and some other technologies did not prevent the attack.

And I think that reinforces the point that we have got to make sure that we have got our operational personnel security trained, and we focus on good intelligence to make sure that we can direct that detection capability to the places that we need to deploy it. Also, to make sure that our passengers are helping us pinpoint suspicious activity, and that we are prepared to respond in case something happens. And we continue to work those areas, and we will continue to follow up.

Mr. MCCAUL. Well, thank you. I see my time has expired.

Mr. KING. Thank you, Mr. McCaul.

The time for the questioning of the first panel has expired, and the line of questioning has ended. However, I agree with Mr. Pascrell, I will ask one final question without opening up a second line of questioning.

This really follows what Mr. McCaul was saying. On the question of technology research, apart from just looking at lessons learned from London and Madrid, it has become obvious through the testimony and through the questioning that mass transit is so different from aviation, it is a much larger problem in many ways.

What are you doing as far as technology research to find out what will work? We cannot put cameras in every station, everywhere in the country, we cannot use everything that is being suggested. But what are you doing to find out, as far as through technology research, to find out where we can get the best results from the best type of new technology and what are you doing in that regard?

Mr. BERES. I know our Directorate of Science and Technology is working on all different types of detection technologies and other types of technologies that would help in the detection and protection of critical assets. I would defer and like to take that question back to the Department to get back to you on the specific things that they are working at and provide that back to the committee.

Mr. KING. I would appreciate if you would go back and have them get the information as soon as possible to us. Thank you.

Mr. DICKS. One of the realities is we are facing these suicide bombers, and when you are looking at this, I mean, from a technology perspective, it would be interesting for the committee to know what specifically we are looking at to deal with suicide bombers.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. KING. Thank you.

Mr. Jamison?

Mr. JAMISON. You know, we must continue to pursue screening technologies, chemical-biological sensors, surveillance techniques, intrusion detection technology, automatic vehicle locators so that we can track our equipment. And we have conducted research in chem-bio sensors and intrusion detection, those types of surveillance activities, but I must reiterate, as we continue to pursue that, security is hugely operational; London has told us that.

We must continue to focus on training, even as we pursue those technologies, and make sure that when we do have an event that we can respond and continue to train. But we continue to pursue research in those areas.

Mr. KING. Thank you, Mr. Jamison.

I want to thank the witnesses, Mr. Beres, Mr. Jamison, for their testimony. It was very informative, very responsive. So thank you for your time, thank you for what you are doing for our country.

The witnesses are excused, and we ask the second panel to come forward.

Mr. BERES. Thank you.

Mr. JAMISON. Thank you.

Mr. KING. Thank you very much.

I would like to welcome all of our witnesses to the second panel and thank you for your appearances here today.

We have Chief Polly Hanson, Metro Transit Police Department, Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority; Chief Bill Morange, deputy executive director, director of security, New York State MTA; Mr. Paul Lennon, director of intelligence and emergency preparedness management, L.A. County Metropolitan Transportation Authority; and Mr. Christopher Kozub, associate director, National Transit Institute.

I would like to ask Chief Hanson if she would go first.

And, again, I would ask all the witnesses if they could possibly keep their statements to 5 minutes or less, and we will certainly incorporate the full testimony as part of the record.

Chief Hanson?

**STATEMENT OF POLLY HANSON, CHIEF OF METRO POLICE,
WASHINGTON METRO AREA TRANSIT AUTHORITY**

Chief HANSON. Thank you, Chairman King and members of the committee. Good morning, and thank you for asking WMATA, which is the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority here in Washington, D.C., to testify this morning.

I am Polly Hanson, chief of the Metro Transit Police.

By way of background, WMATA was created in 1967 as an interstate compact agency through enactment of legislation by the Congress and the Commonwealth of Virginia, state of Maryland, District of Columbia. Each day we move 1.2 million trips on our rail and bus systems. We are the second largest subway system and fifth largest bus system in the United States. We are widely recognized as being critical to the operation of the federal government.

Over 150,000 federal employees, about 45 percent of the region's federal employees, participate in our MetroCheck Program, and nearly half of all Metrorail stations serve federal facilities. Approximately 10 percent of Metro's daily ridership uses stations next to the Capitol and the Pentagon.

The Metro Transit Police was established in 1976. We are the nation's only non federal tri-state police force. We have an authorized strength of 400 sworn transit police officers and 101 special police officers, like guards. Our purpose is to prevent crime, protect Metro's customers, employees, facilities and revenues, enforce laws, ordinances and rules and regulations.

As the largest transit provider for the National Capital Region, Metro takes its responsibility in homeland security with the seriousness its demands. WMATA's approach to transit security involves a partnership between employees, customers and the transit police and other police departments in the region and the federal government. Our training initiatives designed to enhance both WMATA and the region's emergency preparedness reflect these partnerships.

Just this spring, we launched a new training initiative entitled, "Managing Metro Emergencies." The training was devised and developed in response to the Madrid bombings as well as a recent series of service disruptions that forced thousands of customers to evacuate the Metrorail system. The "Managing Metro Emergencies" course is providing approximately 1,500 regional law enforcement, fire and rescue, Department of Transportation and WMATA personnel with enhanced training for mitigating, evacuating, transporting and recovering from a major service disruption in our system and was funded with Regional Urban Area Security Initiative ODP funds.

WMATA also intends to use a portion of its fiscal year 2005 Department of Homeland Security Bus Transit Grant allocation towards the development of an anti-terror training initiatives focused on bus operators, and all the local and regional bus operators that feed into WMATA's bus systems will be invited to participate.

We have an emergency response facility that opened in 2002. It is the only transit facility of its kind in the nation that is available 24 hours per day, 7 days a week to train emergency personnel. It includes a mock train tunnel that allows regional emergency responders to train for disasters'smoke/fire, collisions.

WMATA's emergency management team has trained over 2,000 federal, local, state emergency personnel each year, and it was awarded the APTA Innovation Award in 2004.

We continue to be an active participant in various regional exercises. We have sponsored a series of tabletop exercises with key regional players, the federal agencies, as part of our effort to enhance continuity of operations following the September 11, and WMATA also participates in regional drills and exercises sponsored by DHS, the Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments and other local jurisdictions in the NCR.

I note, Mr. Chairman, that your subcommittee also has jurisdiction over science and technology issues, and you have brought up those issues today. I would like to take a moment to tell you about some of our initiatives.

We continue to serve as test bed for the federal government and a model for the country on transit security initiatives. We have a chemical detector system, commonly known as PROTECT. It has become a model for other transit agencies across the nation. Working with federal partners at DHS and DOT, WMATA continues to train and provide technical assistance on the PROTECT system to anybody interested. And that is just not here in the United States but our partners around the world.

We are actively engaged with the Department of Homeland Security in efforts to leverage advances by PROTECT, maybe with toxic industrial chemicals and other emergency and emerging applications in chem, bio and explosive detection areas.

In January of this year, the Metro Transit Police and TSA collaborated to enhance security at Metro stations during the presidential inauguration. It was the first time a partnership like this happened. We had the use of federal screeners with explosive trace detection gear, and canine teams from all over the United States supplemented our teams of canine officers to enhance the security of our system.

And some of the lessons learned and SOPs developed will be made available to other transit properties and applied to other transit special events across the country.

We are also working with DHS on expanding the application and training of personnel in the area of behavioral assessment screening. I think it is now called SPOT, and this is training provided by TSA.

We have a long-standing productive relationship with FTA on a wide range of emergency preparedness initiatives. The FTA has provided WMATA and other transit agencies with technical assistance, support for continuity of operations planning, emergency drills, ongoing security forums and research conducted through the Volpe Center and the Transportation Safety Institute.

In the case of training, the relationship is a two-way street with WMATA providing FTA with in-kind instructional support.

A critical component toward ensuring that all training we conduct with our employees, first responders and federal government raises the region's emergency preparedness level is all to constantly engage our customers. We have increased public announcements to our customers. Our recent campaign is, "See it, Say it"—we hand these out at Metro stations—and, "Is that your bag," that was de-

veloped after Madrid, which was noted by then former Department of Homeland Security Undersecretary Hutchinson as an effective tool for raising passenger awareness.

We are also conducting open houses at rail stations where transit police and our Safety and Communications Department hand out literature, disseminate emergency preparedness and safety brochures and also expand upon emergency procedures that can be found at our web site.

Last year, Metro Transit Police launched a Metro Citizens Corps Program that provides Metro-specific training ranging from rail safety and emergency preparedness and response to identification of terrorist activity. It builds on a citizen corps program. The participants come from Citizen Emergency Response Teams already organized in the District, Maryland and Virginia.

We appreciate the important contributions training provides towards enhancing our emergency preparedness and response capabilities, but, however, we realize there is always room for improvement. And we will continue to seek opportunities to communicate more effectively with our customers, reinforce SOPs with all employees and work with our many partners in the National Capital Region and our own operations and public safety personnel to refine, expand upon the progress achieved to date. I am here and happy to answer any questions you may have, sir.

[The statement of Chief Hanson follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF POLLY L. HANSON

Chairman King and Members of the Committee, good morning and thank you for asking WMATA to testify at this hearing. I am Polly Hanson, Chief of the Metro Transit Police Department (MTPD) for the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (WMATA).

Background on WMATA and MTPD

By way of background, WMATA was created in 1967 as an Interstate Compact agency through enactment of legislation by the U.S. Congress, and by the Commonwealth of Virginia, the State of Maryland, and the District of Columbia. The Metro System was designed to serve the constituencies of the National Capital Region, including employees of the federal government, the residents of the region, the citizens of our nation who come to Washington to do business with the federal government, and the millions of people who visit from throughout the world.

Since the mid 1960's, there has been dramatic growth and change in the National Capital Region. As population and employment in this region has skyrocketed, the demands on and expectations of WMATA have also grown exponentially. Each day we provide 1.2 million trips on our rail and bus systems. We are the second largest subway system and fifth largest bus system in the United States. Metro is widely recognized as being critical to the operation of the federal government. Over 150,000 federal employees (45 percent of the region's federal employees) participate in the Metrochek program. Nearly half of all Metrorail stations serve federal facilities, approximately 10 percent of Metro's daily ridership uses stations next to the Capitol and Pentagon.

The Metro Transit Police Department was established in 1976. MTPD is the nation's first non federal tri-state transit police force. We have authorized strength of 400 sworn transit police officers and 101 special police officers. Our purpose is to prevent crime, protect Metro's customers, employees, facilities and revenues and enforce laws, ordinances, rules and regulations.

WMATA's Regional Emergency Preparedness Training Initiatives

As the largest transit provider for the National Capital Region, Metro takes its responsibility in homeland security with the seriousness it demands. WMATA's approach to transit security involves a partnership between employees, customers, the transit police and other public safety departments in the region, and the federal government. Our training initiatives designed to enhance both WMATA and the region's emergency preparedness reflect these partnerships.

Just this spring, Metro Transit Police launched a new training initiative entitled “Managing Metro Emergencies.” The training was devised and developed in response to the Madrid bombings as well as a recent series of service disruptions that forced thousands of customers to evacuate the Metrorail system. The “Managing Metro Emergencies” course is providing approximately 1,500 regional law enforcement, fire and rescue, department of transportation and WMATA personnel enhanced training for mitigating, evacuating, transporting and recovering from a major service disruption in our system. WMATA also intends to use a portion of its FY05 Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Bus Transit Grant allocation towards the development of an anti-terror training initiative focused on bus operations. All the local and regional bus operators that feed into WMATA’s bus systems will be invited to participate.

WMATA’s Emergency Response Training Facility opened in 2002, and is the only transit facility of its kind in the nation that is available 24 hours per day, seven days a week to train emergency personnel. The facility includes a mock train tunnel that allows regional emergency responders to train for disasters such as smoke/fire, collisions and potential terrorist incidents in a transit/tunnel environment. WMATA’s emergency management team trains an estimated 2000 federal, state and local emergency personnel each year. The facility was awarded the American Public Transportation Association’s Management Innovation Award for 2004.

WMATA also continues to be an active participant in various regional exercises. WMATA sponsored a series of table top exercises with all key regional players, including federal agencies, as part of our effort to enhance continuity of operations planning (COOP) following the September 11, 2001 attacks. WMATA also participates in regional drills and exercises sponsored by the DHS, the Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments and various local jurisdictions in the National Capital Region.

Leveraging Federal Partnerships in Technology Development and Security Procedures

I note Mr. Chairman that your subcommittee also has jurisdiction over science and technology issues and would like to take a moment to also discuss our training initiatives associated with our partnerships with the federal government in emerging detection technologies that are applicable to the transit environment.

WMATA continues to serve as a test-bed for the federal government and model for the country on new transit security initiatives. Metro’s chemical detector system, commonly referred to as “PROTECT,” has become a model for other transit agencies across the nation and around the world. The early warning data flowing from PROTECT is fully integrated into our Operations Control Center and the data and live images can also be accessed at safe zones for use by incident commanders in the region responsible for responding to an event. Federal partners who worked with WMATA in the development of the PROTECT system include the Departments of Justice, Energy, Transportation and Homeland Security. Working with our federal partners, WMATA continues to offer training and technical assistance on the PROTECT system to interested transit systems in the United States and around the world. WMATA is actively engaging the Department of Homeland Security in efforts to leverage the advances obtained by the PROTECT program to other emerging applications in the chemical, biological and explosive detection areas.

In January of this year, Metro Transit Police and Department of Homeland Security’s Transportation Security Administration (TSA) collaborated to enhance security at Metrorail stations and on trains during the days surrounding the presidential inauguration. The partnership with TSA, which included the use of federal screeners equipped with explosive trace detection gear and canines teams supplementing Metro’s teams of officers and explosive detection canines, performed without a hitch and is being applied to other special events across the country. We are also working with DHS on expanding the application and training of personnel in the area of behavior assessment screening of passengers in a transit environment. In accordance with HSPD-5: Management of Domestic Incidents, Metro Transit Police officers have been NIMS/ICS trained and certified, and we have started to expand the training to key management and operations personnel.

WMATA also has a long standing productive working relationship with the Federal Transit Administration (FTA) on a wide range of emergency preparedness initiatives linked to training and exercises. The FTA has provided WMATA and other transit agencies technical assistance and support for continuity of operations planning (COOP), emergency drills, ongoing security forums and research coordinated through the Volpe Center, and emergency training through the Transportation Safety Institute. In the case of training, the relationship has been a two-way street, with

WMATA providing the FTA with in-kind instructional support for rail safety and emergency management courses.

Public Awareness/Education Campaigns

A critical component towards ensuring that all the training we conduct with our employees, first responders and federal government raises the region's emergency preparedness level is to also constantly engage our customers. WMATA has increased public announcements to our customers, stressing the need to be attentive to their surroundings. Our recent public outreach efforts include campaigns known as, "See it, Say it" and "Is that your bag?" which was cited by former Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Under Secretary Hutchinson as an effective tool for raising passenger awareness and involvement in the transit environment. We are also conducting monthly "Open Houses" at rail stations during the morning rush hour. During these events, officials from the Metro Transit Police and our safety and communications departments are on hand to answer questions from customers as well as distribute emergency preparedness/safety brochures and expanding upon emergency evacuation procedures that can be found at our web site: www.wmata.com.

Last year, Metro Transit Police launched a Metro Citizens Corps program that provides Metro-specific training ranging from rail safety and emergency preparedness and response to identification of terrorist activity. Citizen participation initially consists of Citizen Emergency Response Teams (CERT) already organized in the District of Columbia, suburban Maryland and Northern Virginia.

In 2003, WMATA, the American Red Cross of the National Capital Area, the Department of Homeland Security and the Federal Transit Administration co-sponsored a new national program designed to provide vital emergency preparedness information to the millions of American citizens who ride the subways, commuter trains and buses each day. The program, a partnership that also includes the American Public Transportation Association (APTA) features the distribution of "**T**ogether We Prepare" brochures to customers of transit systems.

Conclusion WMATA appreciates the important contribution training provides towards enhancing our emergency preparedness and response capabilities and will continue to seek opportunities to work with our many partners in the National Capital Region to refine and expand upon the progress achieved to date. I would be happy to answer any questions posed by the Committee.

Mr. KING. Thank you very much, Chief Hanson, for your testimony.

Our next witness is Chief Bill Morange. I will just add a personal note. Before going to the MTA, he was in the NYPD for 39 years. He was actually chief of patrol on 9/11.

As I understand, as you were coming out of the Battery tunnel, the second jet went into the south tower, almost directly overhead. So you certainly have on-the-ground experience and real-life experience.

And with that, Chief Morange, I will ask for your testimony.

STATEMENT OF WILLIAM MORANGE, DEPUTY EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR/DIRECTOR OF SECURITY STATE OF NEW YORK

Chief MORANGE. Thank you, sir.

Good morning, Chairman King and members of the subcommittee. My name is William A. Morange, and I am the deputy executive director and director of security for the New York State Metropolitan Transportation Authority.

I appreciate this opportunity to discuss what the MTA has done and continues to do in light of 9/11, the Madrid incident in 2004 and the most recent events in London to train to respond to terrorists and other emergency incidents in our vast transportation system.

Before I address the specifics of the topic at hand, permit me to tell you a little bit about the MTA. As you may know, the MTA is

the largest multi-modal transportation provider in the Western Hemisphere and is comprised of several operating entities: the MTA New York City Transit, MTA Long Island Rail Road, MTA Long Island Bus, the MTA Metro-North Railroad, MTA Bus Company and the MTA Bridges and Tunnels.

We provide some 8 million subway, rail and bus rides each day in a 4,000 square mile, 14 counties, 2-state metropolitan region, using 8,577 subway and commuter rail cars operating over 2,058 miles of track and over 6,000 buses covering in excess of 3,200 route miles. Our grand total of 2.4 billion rides a year accounts for approximately one-third of all transit rides taken in the United States. In addition, our 7 bridges and 2 tunnels carry approximately 900,000 vehicles a day.

I know that you have my remarks for the record, so I would like to just tell you a little bit about myself and also how we have become prepared in the MTA.

As you well know, as you said, Chairman, I was the chief of patrol for the New York City Police Department on 9/11, and 6 weeks prior to 9/11, we had a tabletop exercise that was done by the Office of Emergency Management, which was held in 7 World Trade. And the scenario called for the closing down of Manhattan. And all of us old chiefs looked at one another and said there is no way that we will ever close down Manhattan.

Well, 6 weeks later, as you said, Mr. Chairman, when the second plane hit, I came out of the Battery underpass, and I thought the second building exploded and I said on the air, "Car 5, the second building has exploded." And my driver at that time, who was my son, turned to me and said, "No, it did not." He said, "I seen the nose come through." And we were showered with all kinds of debris and all.

But later on that day, after we moved our command post 4 times, we wound up at Pier 40 uptown, and we closed down Manhattan from Canal Street down. And it hit me like a ton of bricks that that was one I thought we would never see and we wound up closing down Manhattan.

And I found out on that day how important the transportation industry is in our country, because we had to get people out of Manhattan, and we also needed equipment to come in to help in the rescue, which later on turned into recovery. And I found out that we were able to get equipment from New York City Transit, from Metro North and also from Long Island Railroad to bring in heavy duty equipment so that we could move a lot of the debris.

We were also looking for ways to take people out of Manhattan, and we were using buses to take people out of Manhattan into Upper Manhattan. We were putting people on the Long Island Railroad, onto Metro North to make sure that they left the city.

The reason why I talk about the drill that happened 6 weeks prior was that a lot of senior leadership was lost on the day of 9/11, and I know there were a lot of reports come out about different things that were done and some things that might have been wrong with communications and all, but everything worked that day because everybody knew one another. And they knew one another because of their first names, because they were used to going

to drills because we have done drills before, and they were used to talking to one another and they knew from other agencies.

You know, at one time, one would say that the New York City Police Department was an entity of itself; it had 40,000 people. On that day, everybody molded together and worked together and that is what it is all about.

Also, in the MTA, we make it a point that all of our chiefs along the right-of-ways and all get involved with all the OEMs, they do drills with all of the counties that our right-of-ways go through, and we get to know all of the other responders. It is probably the most important part of any response to any incident is that people get to know who one another is.

And I still say to this day that because of the way we prepared prior to 9/11 some things did work. There were things out there that really did work, and people have said it was probably one of the biggest rescue missions that there ever was. But, again, like I say, people were working along with one another.

And also I know we were talking earlier about the importance of all of our technology and all, but I really feel that the most important technology that is out there right there today is the human element. And it is very important that our customers and that our employees are fully made aware of their surroundings. And that is something that falls on us and that we have to continually make sure that we put out ad campaigns, that we talk to our employees.

In the MTA, in New York State, we have give out pamphlets to all our employees, to the 66,000 employees, telling them what to look for. We have the See Something, Say Something Program, which in that program it started in early 2002. We have all kinds of advertisements on our vending machines. We have it on the Web site. We continually make announcements on the trains. We put posters all around. We do “seat” drops on the commuter rails.

And it is something that we constantly change. Every 6 months we look for a different way of displaying our “See Something, Say Something.” And it works because our calls for suspicious packages have gone up tremendously since the start of this program.

And also we have changed many ways with our employees. Like, we have track workers that used to go out and just look for safety issues, and we would tell them, “You go out and look for?you know what belongs on those tracks, we do not know what belongs on those tracks. We want you to go out and look out and let us know what you see is different, and we will respond.” We increased our canine units by—we had no dogs whatsoever before 9/11, and now we have 25 explosive detection canines.

Just to give you some of the facts about the MTA?

Mr. KING. If you could, sir, wrap it up, because we have other witnesses.

Chief MORANGE. Since 9/11, the MTA has spent over \$240 million on a series of operating and capital initiatives and enhanced security across the MTA system. We hired 200 additional MTA police officers, we hired 200 additional bridge and tunnel officers. We incurred \$35 million in MTA overtime, police overtime, and also we have spent over \$100 million in capital projects of our own money.

[The statement of Chief Morange follows:]

REMARKS OF WILLIAM A. MORANGE

Good Morning Chairman King and members of the Subcommittee. My name is William A. Morange, and I am the Deputy Executive Director and Director of Security of the New York State Metropolitan Transportation Authority (MTA.)

I appreciate this opportunity to discuss what the MTA has done and continues to do in light of 9/11, the Madrid incident in 2004 and the most recent events in London, to train to respond to terrorist and other emergency incidents in our vast transportation system.

Before I address the specifics of the topic at hand, permit me to tell you a bit about the MTA. As you may know, the MTA is the largest multi-modal transit provider in the Western Hemisphere and is comprised of several operating entities:

- MTA New York City Transit (NYCT)
- MTA Long Island Rail Road (LIRR)
- MTA Long Island Bus (LIBus)
- MTA Metro-North Railroad (MNR)
- MTA Bus Company (MTABus)
- MTA Bridges and Tunnels (B&T)

We provide some 8 million subway, rail and bus rides each day in a 4,000 square mile, 14 county, two-state metropolitan region, using 8,577 subway and commuter rail cars operating over 2,058 miles of track and over 6,000 buses covering in excess of 3,200 route miles. Our grand total of 2.4 billion rides a year accounts for approximately one-third of all transit rides taken in the United States. In addition, our 7 bridges and 2 tunnels carry approximately 900,000 vehicles a day.

The events of September 11th were certainly traumatic for our region and our system. We were front and center at Ground Zero, with three separate subway stations directly serving the World Trade Center site and with hundreds of local and express buses disembarking passengers at the perimeter of the complex. It is safe to suggest that more than 80% of the Trade Center's 50,000 workers took one or more MTA services to get to work each day.

But as tragic as the day was for New Yorkers and the nation, there was one overwhelmingly positive outcome on 9/11 for the MTA and for ALL our customers and employees. Despite the fact that our Cortland Street 1&9 station was completely destroyed by the collapse of the twin towers; that four other stations were completely put out of service for as much as a year after the tragedy, and; that Church and West Streets, major north- and south-bound local and express bus routes were blocked by massive amounts of debris, not a single MTA customer or employee was killed or seriously injured in or on our system that day.

Why, you may ask? Was it simply luck? Perhaps in part, but much of the answer lies in the MTA's long abiding commitment to preparing for emergencies. Our operating agencies have traditionally done more than simply writing volumes of emergency operating and response plans that sit on shelves. For many years, they have taken part in realistic multi-agency, multi-modal *drills* of those plans several times a year.

On 9/11 in accordance with our plans and our drills, our subways whisked tens of thousands of riders from the virtual center of the World Trade Center site to safe locations north and south. Our buses carried hundreds of thousands of evacuees off Manhattan island. Our railroads transported shocked commuters safely to their homes and returned with dedicated rescue workers who had no other way to get into the City to help. Our bridges and tunnels played not only key evacuation roles, but, in the case of the Brooklyn Battery Tunnel, became the lifeline for emergency personnel and rescue equipment heading *toward* the scene.

Some of those activities had been anticipated in previous emergency drills—though admittedly not on as large or dramatic a scale. Nonetheless, the experience, lessons learned, and perhaps most importantly, the *relationships* forged in those exercises certainly saved lives that day.

Since 9/11 we actually had a real life opportunity to test what we do on a regional scale and our preparation once again proved to be invaluable to protecting our customers and employees. When the lights went out on August 14th, 2003, we—along with our partners in emergency preparedness throughout the region—were able to execute the safe evacuation of over 400,000 subway and rail customers from both underground and elevated parts of our system. We are proud that there were also no customer or employee injuries in those instances—a truly amazing feat in that the entire service region I described earlier was affected.

What I'd like to do is take you through what each of our agencies did prior to 9/11—and continue to do—on a regular basis to prepare for emergencies in terms of both physical drills—with hundreds of participants—and *table-top* drills. I would then like to wrap up by describing what we have done to involve and educate our

customers about how to prepare for potential emergency situations, something we believe is key to their safety.

New York City Transit (NYCT)

NYCT is the largest member of the MTA family, operating over 8,000 subway and 46,000 bus trips a day within the City of New York. NYCT's Office of System Safety (OSS) oversees/coordinates four emergency drills annually: two for the Dept. of Subways; one for the Dept. of Buses, and; one for the Staten Island Railway. This just happens to be the same number of drills that were conducted pre-9/11. Only the size and scope of those drills may have changed a bit.

Depending on the type of drill, participants hail from other parts of the MTA transportation family (i.e. the MTA PD, the LIRR, LIBus and MNR); the New York City Police Department (NYPD), the New York City Fire Department (FDNY), the Emergency Medical Service (EMS) and the Office of Emergency Management (OEM).

Drills are conducted at key locations throughout the system, including at support facilities such as our Coney Island Rail Yard and at the MTA's Transit Museum where a decommissioned station and more than a dozen old subway cars provide true-to-life underground conditions.

After each event, OSS produces a series of "lessons learned," "critiques" and "follow-ups" that are tracked, corrected and incorporated into the next exercise.

Finally, in addition to performing emergency drills, all key NYCT operating employees are provided ongoing formal "eyes and ears" training; fire protection and evacuation training; and Dupont Safety training. To date, some 45,000 employees have been through these courses and personnel are rotated through that training on a regular basis.

Long Island Rail Road (LIRR); Metro-North Railroad (MNR) & Long Island Bus (LIBus)

While Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) regulations require one full-scale drill annually, the LIRR conducts a minimum of four major full-scale emergency preparedness exercises/drills annually, including one in New York's Pennsylvania Station, the busiest railroad station in the country. Likewise, Metro-North Railroad conducts a number of drills during the year, including one in Grand Central Terminal.

Like those at NYCT, the carefully crafted emergency scenarios require emergency responders to demonstrate skills in communications, fire fighting, rescue, extrication, hazardous material and first aid.

Since the LIRR operates in three of NYC's five boroughs (Manhattan, Brooklyn and Queens) as well as the counties of Nassau and Suffolk on Long Island, drills include a variety of players, most notably sister agency MTA LIBus, but also other members of the MTA family, including the MTA PD and NYCT. Other participants include the NYPD, the FDNY, NYC EMS as well as a host of county, village and town Police, Fire and Emergency Medical Services throughout Nassau and Suffolk.

Metro-North, which serves two of NYC's five boroughs (Manhattan and the Bronx) as well as Westchester, Orange, Rockland, Dutchess and Putnam counties in New York and Fairfield and New Haven counties in Connecticut, conducts its own drills with a similar mix of NYC agencies, as well as county, village and town police and emergency service personnel from both New York and Connecticut.

Railroad emergency preparedness training is conducted at a number of locations: The LIRR uses Penn Station, its Hillside maintenance facility, field sites throughout Long Island and the Nassau County Fire Academy. Two retired LIRR railcars at the Fire Academy also help provide commuter railroad-focused training to federal and state law enforcement agencies such as the FBI and the NYS Police.

All major LIRR & MNR terminals, such as Flatbush/Atlantic Ave Terminal, Jamaica Station, Grand Central Terminal, 125th Street, New Haven, as well as shop/yard facilities in New York and Connecticut have Emergency Action Plans that factor into the exercises and drills.

In addition to MTA-sponsored full-scale exercises, both railroads and LIBus participate in numerous tabletop, functional and full-scale emergency response and counter-terrorism exercises hosted by local emergency response agencies and county OEMs throughout their service areas.

Beyond drills and table-top exercises, both the LIRR and MNR provide ongoing training sessions for their own train crews as well as emergency responders from the NYPD, FDNY and EMS officials in the counties they serve. The LIRR is also intimately involved in the Penn Station Emergency Response Committee and the Penn Station Security Task Force which are comprised of operations, law enforcement and safety representatives from the LIRR, Amtrak and New Jersey Transit

and representatives from the NYPD, FDNY, NYC OEM as well as State and Federal agencies.

As is the case with NYCT, both railroads' exercises include extensive and formal critique/debriefing sessions that may, in fact, result in practice tabletop scenarios that test out new changes in procedures and protocols.

MTA Bridges and Tunnels

MTA B&T operates 7 bridges and 2 tunnels *within* the City of New York. The most notable of those facilities include the nation's longest suspension bridge, the Verrazano Narrows Bridge, as well as the Brooklyn Battery Tunnel and the Queens Midtown Tunnel, two of the busiest in the world. All told those facilities carry approximately 900,000 vehicles a day.

Prior to 9-11 B&T exercises largely supported the NYPD's own mobilization exercises. Up to that point, one of its biggest preparations was drilling the regional disaster recovery plan for Y2K. But B&T was also part of major Special Events planning, such as for the NYC Marathon, which begins on the Verrazano Bridge. Those plans always included emergency contingencies that were practiced in pre-event drills.

On 9-11, B&T's traffic and emergency response effort was transformed dramatically as the Towers collapsed.

The Brooklyn Battery tunnel, itself engulfed in dust and debris, became the site of a major evacuation effort, as more than 500 customers were rescued by B&T personnel. Shortly thereafter 287 abandoned vehicles were removed from the Manhattan-bound tubes in order to allow emergency vehicles to pass.

In the ensuing months, as many as 30 dump trucks an hour transported debris from the site. All this was handled in a very coordinated fashion with the NYPD and NYC OEM due to previously established exercise relationships.

B&T has since conducted over twenty emergency preparedness drills. Many have been full scale multi-agency (MTA PD, NYPD, FDNY, MTA, OEM) exercises that have tested preparedness; response; inter-agency cooperation; perimeter security; Improvised Explosive Device (IED) mitigation; Hazardous Materials Spills, and; decontamination.

B&T also participated in a state-wide exercise, conducted by the NYS Public Service Commission, designed to evaluate the NYS emergency load reduction program.

As with its sister agencies in the MTA family, B&T is singularly focused on providing its employees with both formal and informal training opportunities that provide a safe and secure working environment. In that vein, B&T has also been fully engaged in Dupont Safety training since 1996.

Other MTA-Wide Emergency Preparedness Activities

Certainly, as you've heard from me today, we're committed to aggressively training and drilling our employees for potential emergencies. But over the past three and a half years we've also focused on making sure that our *customers* are aware of how they should respond in certain situations.

Through the creation of the widely recognized "*If You See Something, Say Something*" customer information campaign, we've informed our customers about being vigilant and in the process have enlisted their help by giving them an outlet to report suspicious activities: 1-888-NYC-SAFE. Since 2002, we've produced print ads, 10,000 posters a year and are in the process of producing a See Something, Say Something radio ad. Public response has been extremely positive and we have shared our materials with dozens of transit systems and municipalities around the country and the globe.

Over the last year—and in direct response to the lessons learned from the Madrid bombings—we both customized our ads to focus on packages left in transit vehicles and produced Customer Train Evacuation Brochures and internet-based evacuation videos that show how to properly evacuate subway and commuter railroad cars in an emergency. Over 6,000 printed copies of this information were posted on our subway and rail cars and we made both the printed material and videos available to our customers on our website, www.mta.info. In addition, we've made hundreds of these videos available to local police departments, community groups and the general public since February.

This year as a supplement to the more formalized training of our operating personnel, we also produced 65,000 Employee Safety Guides for all our employees that tells them what to look for and how to react in emergencies.

There is no question about the MTA's commitment—philosophically and organizationally—to doing whatever we can to be prepared for emergency situations, be they large or small. We believe that the current aggressive schedule of emergency drills that we conduct each year helps in the effort to protect our customers and our em-

ployees and to give them the peace of mind necessary to continue to go about their daily routines.

Thank you and I look forward to any questions you may have.

Mr. KING. Thank you.
Director Lennon?

**STATEMENT OF PAUL LENNON, DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE
AND EMERGENCY, PREPAREDNESS MANAGEMENT, LOS
ANGELES COUNTY METROPOLITAN TRANSIT AUTHORITY**

Mr. LENNON. Thank you, Chairman King and Congressman Pascrell and members of the subcommittee for providing the Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority an opportunity to discuss the key role that training plays in effectively responding to a terrorist attack on mass transit property.

On January 26, 2005, a tragic rail incident occurred in the Los Angeles area. The accident was the deadliest passenger rail incident in the United States since 1999, killing 11 and injuring over 180 individuals. That accident, it would be later be found, was caused by a deranged individual and not a terrorist, but its effects were just as devastating as the attacks the rocked London on July 7, 2005.

The response to the January 26th train disaster by the City of Los Angeles, my agency, Metro, the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department and the Los Angeles Police Department and Fire Department units, the City of Glendale's first responders and numerous other emergency first-responders was immediate, positive and overwhelming. Within 5 minutes the first triage unit was set up and a host of other support services were put into place only moments later.

The reason I cite the January 26th rail accident is simple: The tragic event provides a vivid illustration, which is fresh in my mind and those of my fellow transit security colleagues, that training to respond to a terrorist attack is vital. In fact, to ensure a rapid and effective response in the event of a terrorist attack on one of our rail cars, our buses or one of our hundreds of stations or facilities in Los Angeles County, training is not merely an option, it is mandatory.

We trained at my agency to make mistakes, so we do not make mistakes when our exercises go from the comfort of a tabletop drill to a real world terrorist attack.

The key elements of our agency's program focuses on preparing to respond and preparing to prevent. First, we are focused on enhancing our interaction and coordination with our security partners at the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department and with all other law enforcement and first responder agencies with jurisdiction within Los Angeles County.

We can have the largest security force with the most modern equipment, but if they are not seamlessly communicating, coordinating and controlling our security and first responder assets, then we are not exercising command over any given threat. In point of fact, the lack of such coordination wd not do proper justice to the talent and technologies that are brought to play under such scenarios.

With respect to my comment that we prepare to respond, it is for this reason that the LACMTA has a robust training program that conducts major interagency threat-focused security exercises. Our training regimen includes both tabletop and very realistic, on-ground simulations and exercises.

The “real-world” on-ground simulations we conduct are tests of each agency’s first-response personnel and their training for their adequacy and ability to interface with other peer groups. The findings and result of these exercises are shared in the post-exercise critiques and debriefings, involving all the agencies that participated. These critiques, in turn, provide valuable lessons learned which are used to enhance the training of personnel of the agencies involved and to identify new needs, technologies and equipment that would be of benefit to agencies in dealing with actual threats.

In terms of preparing to prevent a terrorist incident, we are very cognizant of the critical role our employees play. They are our eyes, ears and voice in our nation’s war against terrorism. We share the goals and tenets of the “System Security Awareness for Transit Employees” training course that was developed by the Federal Transit Administration and the National Transit Institute at Rutgers University. That excellent course, crafted in 2002, provided a very professional program to provide training and relevant materials to transit operators and other front-line employees.

To effectively educate our employees at the LACMTA, we have also borrowed the best practices from some of the top transit systems in North America. New York Metropolitan Transportation Authority’s “See Something, Say Something” Program is but one example. The Washington Metropolitan Transportation Authority’s commitment to raise public and employee awareness of possible terrorist threats is yet another fine example of a program with an appropriate focus.

The LACMTA has provided training for over 9,000 of our employees in situational awareness. This encompasses the who, what, why, where and how of dealing with unattended packages and suspicious behaviors.

Our agency has also involved our law enforcement and security teams in a highly visible program of public engagement in which our deputy sheriffs move in, and through, our stations, trains and buses, making our customers aware of their presence through personal contact.

We recognize that to conduct such comprehensive employee training and public awareness programs entails major costs, both in terms of labor and materials. Yet, the LACMTA views these programs as a proper investment in its employees as well as a major hardening effort by our agency against possible terrorist threats.

When the attacks on London’s mass transit system occurred on the 7th and 21st of this month, our previous and ongoing training regimen gave us, and will continue to give us, the capability to initiate an immediate and forceful response. That response is in place today on our expansive rail and bus networks even as I share this testimony with you.

Protecting a service area that spans 1,433 square miles is no simple task for the employees of the LACMTA. The fact that they have the training and know-how in responding to a possible ter-

rorist incident gives them the confidence to assure the general public that all possible measures are being undertaken to protect their welfare.

Thank you for providing me the opportunity to share this information on behalf of the LACMTA with members of this distinguished subcommittee.

[The statement of Mr. Lennon follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF PAUL J. LENNON

Thank you Chairman King, Congressman Pascrell and Members of the subcommittee for providing the Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority (LACMTA) an opportunity to discuss the key role training plays in effectively responding to a terrorist attack on a mass transit property.

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We train at my agency to make mistakes, so we do not make mistakes when our exercises go from the comfort of a table-top drill to a real world terrorist attack.

Today I would like to share with members of this subcommittee several of the training techniques that the LACMTA has successfully used to prepare ourselves for a terrorist attack, like that which struck London earlier this month or earlier attacks on mass transit properties in Moscow and Madrid.

The key part of our agency's training program focuses on preparing to respond and preparing to prevent.

First, we are focused on enhancing our interaction and coordination with our security partners at the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department and with all other law enforcement and first responder agencies with jurisdiction within Los Angeles County. We can have the largest security force, with the most modern equipment, but if they are not seamlessly communicating, coordinating and controlling our security and first responder assets, then we are not exercising command over any given threat.

In point of fact, the lack of such coordination does not do proper justice to the talent and technologies that are brought to play under such scenarios.

With respect to my comment that we prepare to respond, it is for this reason that the LACMTA has a robust training program that conducts major interagency threat-focused security exercises. Our training regimen includes both table-top and very realistic, on-ground, simulations and exercises.

These exercises involve, in some cases, as many as thirty agencies that are focused on multiple threats. These exercises anticipate responses to individual or groups of terrorists, weapons of mass destruction, explosives and combinations thereof. Such exercises are always played out initially with a table-top exercise, where all the potential agency players and representatives are given insight into not only the threat faced, but also the role they will be expected to play.

The "real-world" on-ground simulations we conduct are tests of each agency's first-response personnel and their training for their adequacy and ability to interface with other peer groups. The findings and result of these exercises are shared in the post-exercise critiques and de-briefings, involving all the agencies that participated. These critiques in turn provide valuable lessons learned which are used to enhance the training of personnel of the agencies involved and to identify new needs, technologies and equipment that would be of benefit to agencies in dealing with actual threats.

In terms of preparing to prevent a terrorist incident, we are very cognizant of the critical role our employees play. They are our "eyes, ears and voice" in our nation's war against terrorism.

We share the goals of the "System Security Awareness for Transit Employees" training course that was developed by the Federal Transit Administration and the National Transit Institute at Rutgers University. That excellent course, crafted in 2002, provided a very professional program to provide training and relevant materials to transit operators and other front-line employees.

To effectively educate our employees at the LACMTA we have also borrowed the best practices from some of the top transit systems in North America. New York Metropolitan Transportation Authority's "See Something?. . . Say Something!" program is but one example. The Washington Metropolitan Transportation Authority's commitment to raise public and employee awareness of possible terrorist threats is yet another fine example of a program with an appropriate focus.

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Our agency has also involved our law enforcement and security teams in a highly visible program of public engagement in which our deputy sheriffs move in, and through, our stations, trains and buses, making our customers aware of their presence.

We recognize that to conduct such comprehensive employee training and public awareness programs entails major costs, both in terms of labor and materials. Yet, the LACMTA views these programs as a proper investment in its employees as well as a major "hardening" effort by our agency against possible terrorist threats.

If one mind-set permeates the LACMTA's security posture it is a pro-active attitude to properly train our security personnel, our front-line employees and the general public.

When the attacks on London's mass transit systems occurred on the 7th and 21st of this month our previous and ongoing rigorous training regimen gave us and will continue to give us the capability to initiate an immediate and forceful response. That response is in place today on our expansive rail and bus network, even as I share this testimony with you.

Protecting a service area that spans 1,433 square miles is no simple task for the employees of the LACMTA. The fact that they have the training and know-how in responding to a possible terrorist incident gives them the confidence to assure the general public that all possible measures are being undertaken to protect their welfare.

Thank you for providing me the opportunity to share this information, on behalf of the LACMTA, with members of this distinguished subcommittee.

Mr. KING. Thank you, Mr. Lennon. I appreciate your testimony. Now, Mr. Kozub.

**STATEMENT OF CHRISTOPHER KOZUB, ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR,
NATIONAL TRANSIT INSTITUTE**

Mr. KOZUB. Good morning, Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee. I would like to thank you for the opportunity to participate in this hearing and share some thoughts and insights.

I am Christopher Kozub, the associate director at the National Transit Institute for the Workplace Safety and Security Program. As the chairman said, the testimonies will be entered, so instead of going laboriously through mine word for word, I am simply going to highlight a few points that I think complement some of the other testimonies you may have heard today.

As Deputy Administrator Jamison pointed out, much of security, while technology is a key component of it, is operations based. There are three things that we, as a resource to the FTA and to other modal agencies as well as system agencies within DHS, have clearly recognized.

Employee training is one of the center points of any good system security program. Employees need to be trained, as some of the other panelists have observed, to participate in a number of these

systemwide programs. To encourage passengers and customers to report things that they see, whether it is an unattended package or suspicious behavior, requires them to report that information to an employee. Employees must be trained how to assess and analyze that information in order to effectively forward it on through the proper channels into law enforcement.

Employees then themselves need to be trained on how to observe and properly report information that is suspicious in nature so that it can be followed up and investigated upon.

And, ultimately, if prevention measures do not work, they need to be trained on how to effectively handle an incident, respond to it appropriately, as they are truly, while not trained to the degree of a law enforcement or fire and rescue personnel, they are the first person on the scene representing that agency and must take actions within the first few seconds and minutes to help shape and model the outcome of that incident so that when trained law enforcement and fire people do show up that the incident can be handled in a much more expeditious and safe fashion.

We at NTI have been working with the FTA closely these past several years since 9/11 to put forth a number of training programs. Chief Morange from New York mentioned a pamphlet that they hand out. We, working with the FTA, have provided the transit industry close to a half million security pamphlets targeted at employee awareness and information of what is suspicious, what should be reported and what should be followed up on.

We also have facilitated, either directly or through agencies such as those represented here today, the training of employees. We have reached through those training efforts 73,000 employees. While that number is something to make note of, the unfortunate reality is it only represents 20 percent of the total workforce of frontline employees within the transit industry. We have a lot more training to do, the agencies have a lot more training to do to effectively reach the majority if not all of the workforce out there putting service on the street.

We have also worked outside of our direct relationship with the FTA with other modal agencies and other agencies within DHS. Working initially under the direction of the FTA, we produced a training program targeted at DOT, or Transportation employees. This effectively has helped reach close to 20,000 employees who are out there working on the highways and bridges. After all, transit, 60 percent of it, is being delivered in a bus, operates on these very roads, bridges and tunnels.

Another effort that we have undertaken, working with initially with the Washington State ferry system that is the largest system in the country but then eventually other systems and the Coast Guard, we have modified our programs to reach to the ferry and similar maritime sectors to effectively train over 1,000 people, not including the entire workforce of Washington State ferries in system security awareness.

Lastly, we have worked closely with Amtrak, several freight railroads and most of all TSA within DHS who has funded this effort to produce a program that will deliver system security awareness to freight and passenger railroads of the country. Again, many of our commuter railroads operate, are operated by or on the same in-

frastructure that is operated and controlled by freight railroads and/or Amtrak. To this date, Amtrak has used this program to reach over half of their 20,000 employees.

So along with what we have done in the transit traditional sector, those sectors such as highways and freight and Amtrak, which are all part of our transit and transportation system, we have reached effectively over 100,000 employees simply with the facilitated training effort that we have put forth.

What we have noticed, however, and while drills are being conducted through federally funded efforts and systems such as those represented on the panel here with me today, have done very good local efforts to coordinate their training and their response plans. There is no national effort to establish competencies or standards for an emergency responder to respond to a transit incident.

We, for many decades, have had national standards, codes and even regulations promulgated by such agencies, such as the FAA on what are the minimum competencies and training standards to respond to an aviation incident. We still do not have any national effort or standard put forth to do that on the transit or surface transportation side.

In the events that happened this past month, the International Association of Fire Chiefs referenced the document put out by the U.S. Fire Administration, a study course entitled, "Emergency Response to Terrorist Incident." Unfortunately, when we reviewed that course, there were only three very insignificant references to transit in the entire course.

I use that example because I think it clearly illustrates the lack of national recognition to the fact that emergency responders, unless partaking in the programs that are done at the local effort, do not have the training resources and are not aware of the competencies that need to be there on how to handle what is potentially some of the biggest mass casualty incidents that they may encounter in their entire career.

In closing, I would just like to make a simple comment. One of the words that are often used is system security. System security in transit is very critical, because system security needs to look at the entire system. What Madrid taught us is that simple security efforts such as law enforcement around major terminals is not enough. It needs to be every outlying station, every park-and-ride facility, every point of entry on a system needs to have equal protection if the system is going to be protected.

Similarly, there has been much discussion about cameras and other technology. While all technology should be reviewed, should be researched for its application into this sector and into this industry, true security will happen in a systemic fashion; meaning, training of employees, alertness and diligence of passengers, good, solid law enforcement efforts within the transit agency and the community, coordinated efforts with other community responses, as well as the application and implementation of technology.

I would like to thank you again for the opportunity to participate here and welcome any questions.

[The statement of Mr. Kozub follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF CHRISTOPHER A. KOZUB

Good morning, Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to speak with you today and share some insights on the security of the United States' transit systems, and specifically the importance of emergency preparedness and response training for transit employees and emergency responders.

My name is Christopher Kozub, and I am the Associate Director for Workplace Safety and Security at the National Transit Institute (NTI) at Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey. Although the recent, tragic events in London have once again brought the issue of transit system security to the forefront of media headlines and American minds, NTI has served the safety and security training needs of transit agencies and their employees for a number of years. Under the direction of the Federal Transit Administration (FTA) and in partnership with transit system management and labor organizations, NTI has been steadfastly focused on developing and delivering security training materials since the attacks of September 11th. It is NTI's overall mission to provide training and education in support of public transportation and quality of life in the United States. When this quality of life is threatened, we must reevaluate our actions and precautions, not only in awareness and prevention measures, but in our reactions and response to terrorist threats and incidents.

Collectively, the nation's transit systems are responsible for providing a reliable, efficient, and rapid commute for 14 million passengers daily. Their biggest responsibility and priority however, must always be the safety and security of those passengers and the employees who are delivering this service. When transit's infrastructure and operations are threatened or attacked, as it was twice in London this month, the desired effect to disrupt commerce, instill fear, and bring a bustling, thriving region to a grinding halt, is achieved. Unfortunately, the London incidents are merely the latest in a series of attacks on the world's transit systems.

- On March 20, 1995, Tokyo subway riders, at the height of the morning rush hour, were targeted in a deadly nerve gas attack by a doomsday cult, killing a dozen people, including two frontline employees and injuring approximately 5,000 more. The first indication that anything was wrong was when passengers began to experience watering eyes and difficulty breathing—classic symptoms of exposure to the tasteless, colorless, and odorless Sarin agent that was used in the attack. Unfortunately, the two employees were killed when trying to remove the agent dispersal device. Neither one had received any training related to security awareness or incident response.
- On October 17, 1995, eight people died and more than 200 were injured when a terrorist detonated a bomb on the Paris Metro. In the investigation police found the remains of a six pound cooking gas canister that had been filled with explosives and screws—to serve as shrapnel.
- On February 6, 2004, an explosion in a Moscow Metro rail car killed 39 people and wounded 129 others, again during the morning rush hour. As with the most recent London bombings, the explosive device was thought to have been stored in a backpack or briefcase.
- On March 11, 2004, a coordinated series of ten explosions aboard four packed commuter trains in Madrid killed 191 people and injured over 1,500 others. The attacks were carried out by terrorists boarding the system at outlying stations, deploying their device laden packages on the trains, and exiting before the predetermined time of detonation. This incident clearly illustrated that in order to secure a rail or transit system, security measures must be implemented and maintained system-wide.
- On July 7, 2005, the London Transit system was attacked by four suicide bombers. Three of the devices were detonated on separate trains deep in the tubes of London's Underground. The fourth was detonated over 30 minutes later on a double-decker bus. In total 56 people, including the four attackers, were killed and 700 others were injured.
- Two weeks later on July 21, 2005, another four attacks were attempted on London's transit system in which only one person was injured, but the system, and to a great extent London, were crippled for a considerable amount of time.

This list obviously, does not include all of the hundreds of lesser bombings and attacks that have occurred against rail and bus transit systems throughout the world over the past ten years. While the following table shows the total number of surface transportation terrorist attacks for each year since 1995, including injuries and fatalities, it should be noted that the ratio of injuries and fatalities per incident is significantly higher for transportation targets than most other terrorist targets

combined. This fact continues to make surface transportation systems, particularly transit operations, attractive targets for terrorist attacks.

Terrorist attacks against surface transportation targets:

| | 1995 | 1996 | 1997 | 1998 | 1999 | 2000 | 2001 | 2002 | 2003 | 2004 | Total |
|------------|-------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|--------|
| Incidents | 12 | 10 | 7 | 106 | 49 | 73 | 104 | 159 | 64 | 96 | 680 |
| Injuries | 5,313 | 256 | 156 | 553 | 231 | 355 | 695 | 846 | 580 | 1041 | 10,026 |
| Fatalities | 67 | 69 | 21 | 232 | 35 | 36 | 328 | 200 | 168 | 416 | 1,572 |

Source: MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base

THE IMPORTANCE OF HUMAN CAPITAL

Ironically, in an industry such as transit, which is seemingly burgeoning with technological ideas and investments, it is interesting to see how many reports, interviews, and testimonies regarding the referenced events, validate the limitations of employing currently-available security technology within the transit operating environment. Additionally, post-incident information often reveals the critical importance of the frontline employee in minimizing the impact of an incident. This was clearly proven on September 11th when PATH system employees quickly loaded and dispatched trains from the World Trade Center station.

While we should not abandon research and deployment of new technologies, we need to recognize what has been proven to work here and now: employee training.

- Encouraging passengers to report suspicious activity often relies on employees receiving and forwarding that information. This requires employees to be trained on how to assess this information and pass it forward through proper channels.
- Preventing attacks relies on an alert and diligent workforce that can identify and react properly to suspicious activity and threats.
- The outcome of an effective emergency response is often contingent on what frontline employees do or don't do in the first few minutes of an incident.

The FTA has clearly recognized this and has directed NTI and other resources to develop a number of courses and materials to better prepare employees for these responsibilities. This training focuses on improving their ability to observe, recognize, and report suspicious objects and activities, and being more cognizant of pre-attack activities. Heightened awareness of their on-the-job surroundings, and a familiarity with the warning signs of potential threats, will lead to increased security and safety on our nation's transit systems.

These materials have been developed through partnerships that bring transit system management, safety and security experts, organized labor, trade associations, and the FTA together to ensure that everyone's concerns and issues are being addressed. The FTA and NTI have also considered the various methods utilized by each transit system to train their employees and have produced a range of materials in a variety of formats. This approach has led to the development of materials that can be used for instructor-lead training and interactive, computer-based training. These efforts are complimented by the production and distribution of videos and reference materials.

A number of transit systems have also recognized this and are utilizing NTI's materials to provide employee training. Since September 11, 2001, almost 73,000 transit employees at more than 530 transit agencies have been trained. This includes 51,000 employees who work for the top 30 systems which are located in the most densely populated regions of the country. Agencies such as Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority (MBTA), Northeast Illinois Regional Commuter Railroad Corporation (METRA), San Francisco Municipal Railway, Denver Regional Transit District and New Jersey Transit have made comprehensive efforts to train the majority of their frontline employees.

Unfortunately the number 73,000 only represents approximately twenty percent of the transit industry's total workforce. Consequently, a large number of frontline transit employees in this country still lack proper training and preparedness for preventing and/or responding to incidents. This is largely due, according to many transit systems, to a lack of funding. While the materials from NTI are provided to transit agencies free-of-charge, and a portion of the training is actually conducted by NTI instructors, also free-of charge, systems still need to pay employees to keep buses and trains moving while other employees participate in training. Unlike other sectors, "in-service training" in transit and other transportation modes is incongruent with keeping service on the street.

This training must also be conducted on an ongoing cycle. An employee can not be expected to effectively retain and apply information and skills which they are

only exposed to once. There must be a continuing process of frequent informational reminders and periodic refresher training to keep the material at the forefront of their thinking and thus carried out in their actions.

As such, while funding security technology research and deployment such as smart devices, chemical sensors, and cameras is important, a much greater emphasis and value needs to be placed on employee training and preparedness in order to effectively secure and safeguard the lives of transit passengers and employees.

NTI'S CONTINUING AND DIVERSIFIED ROLE IN SECURITY TRAINING

While continuing to focus on our primary commitment to the FTA and the safety and security of transit industry employees, NTI has enhanced these efforts by collaborating on additional projects that have built upon these experiences and effectively served a broader range of transportation employees.

- With an average of 60% of the nation's daily transit trips occurring on buses, NTI, under the direction of the FTA, developed a modified version of the system security course to address Department of Transportation (DOT) personnel. Currently 1,744 DOT employees from 15 different agencies have received this training. These deliveries, as well as the development of an interactive CD-ROM version of the DOT course, have been funded by the National Cooperative Highway Research Program of the Transportation Research Board, within the National Academy of Sciences. Additionally, 9,800; 7,435; 1,450; and 450 employees have been trained internally by the Texas, Washington State, New Jersey and North Carolina DOTs, respectively.
- Under heightened security concerns, the FTA and NTI assisted the Washington State Ferry (WSF) system in an effort to produce a comprehensive system security training program that included instructor-lead course material, a video, and an employee pocket guide. WSF then used these materials to train all of their vessel and terminal employees. Based on this project, NTI developed a training course for the rest of the ferry operations in the country. In compliance with the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 (MTSA) and specific portions of United States Coast Guard regulations currently in force for maritime security of vessels and maritime security of facilities, NTI has, to date, provided training in system security awareness to approximately 1,000 passenger vessel employees.
- Further adaptation of the NTI system security course occurred after being approached by Amtrak. With a need to train their 20,000 employees across the country in security awareness, Amtrak wisely decided to adopt the same program that was being used by a number of commuter rail systems throughout the country. With Amtrak and many of the commuter rail systems sharing much of the same infrastructure with freight railroads, the project grew to include the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA), the Association of American Railroads, and the American Short Line and Regional Railroad Association. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has funded this effort to produce a computer-based, security awareness training program that will provide a consistent baseline of security training for all freight and passenger rail employees throughout the country. The passenger component of this project was completed in January 2005 and Amtrak has used the material to train approximately 10,000 of their employees to date. The freight component is under final development and the completed project will be released in the near future.

These activities clearly illustrate that through prudent leadership by agencies such as the FTA and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Federal Government can produce quality and very cost-effective programs that will have near-term, positive effects on the safety and security of many modes of surface transportation. This is of particular significance given the continuing move toward intermodal networks.

Currently, NTI, the FTA and agencies within DHS are working on several new programs to continue this process:

- A course is being developed to better train and prepare transit system operations control center personnel in assessing and responding to reports of chemical, biological, and explosive attacks within rail system tunnels. The course will compliment the existing FTA guidance document "*Guidelines for Managing Suspected Chemical and Biological Agent Incidents in Rail Tunnel Systems.*" Argonne National Labs, a leading source of expertise on chemical and biological terrorism and author of the FTA guidance document, is working with NTI to develop and deliver the new course. Initial deliveries are scheduled to begin in August 2005.
- The FTA and NTI are also in the process of developing a series of training programs for transit employees on Incident/Emergency Management. These

courses and corresponding materials will incorporate the new, nationally adopted NIMS (National Incident Management System) model so that transit employees, along with their colleagues in emergency response, will be able to effectively work together during an incident. The first of these courses will focus on the concept of passenger management during an incident. This has been identified as a challenge and an issue at every transit system attack and accident. Employees who are responsible for the safety and security of passengers during an incident need a clear understanding of the various behavioral characteristics that they'll confront in an emergency so that they can most effectively direct them to safety.

- The FTA, TSA, and the Office of Domestic Preparedness (ODP) within the Department of Homeland Security have partnered with NTI to revise and deliver the FTA "Connecting Communities" forums. These forums were originally delivered in 17 cities to bring together transit systems and emergency responders. The revised program will incorporate the NIMS concept and will focus on a more substantive and facilitated discussion between the participants. The goal of these 12 workshops is to strengthen relationships between transit representatives and emergency response officers and develop an outline for a transit incident response plan. Among other aspects, this plan will include resource identification and availability, localized model response plans, and a proposed schedule for inter-agency, table-top and functional training exercises.

PREPARING EMERGENCY RESPONDERS FOR TRANSIT INCIDENTS

While programs such as the "Connecting Communities" forums are important steps in improving interagency planning and response, they are merely the beginning of a long-overdue effort within transit and more so, the emergency response sector, to improve training and preparedness.

Some agencies such as those represented by my distinguished colleagues have made great strides in developing programs with their local emergency services. Washington Area Metropolitan Transit Administration (WMATA) has created a life-safety center and training program to better prepare local, state and federal responders for incidents within the WMATA system. The Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transit Administration (LACMTA) has worked with the LA County Sheriff's office to train 200 of their officers in transit security and incident management concepts. A great many other agencies have and continue to conduct training drills to test the interoperability of their internal and external responders, resources, and procedures.

Quite often, response to a passenger rail or rail transit incident has been done from a "seat-of-the-pants" perspective, not through the application of skills and knowledge obtained through a comprehensive training program. Although some training efforts are being carried out at the local level, there has yet to be a national recognition of the need to identify minimum competencies and develop baseline training standards for this type of response.

As opposed to many of the facilities and operations that police and fire departments interact with, transit systems possess unique characteristics that may often contradict traditional response measures.

- The presence of potentially live third-rail or overhead catenary, poses a real and present danger to initial responders.
- Alternative fuel and hybrid buses present response challenges and safety hazards to responders
- Initial tactics for transit incidents may need to consider maintaining system operation so that people can be moved quickly away from the scene and then evacuated or the "shelter in place" concept as opposed to immediate mass evacuation.
- The large number of potential victims and ambulatory passengers at the scene may present the most significant challenge of the incident. This could be further compounded by the location of the incident: either in a tunnel or on a bridge.

Unfortunately, these command decisions can only be made by police and fire officers who have a clear understanding of a transit systems infrastructure and operation.

Aviation incidents, which also possess unique challenges and hazards to responders are often mass fatality, not mass casualty incidents, and therefore are quickly categorized as a recovery, not a rescue operation. Response measures for aviation incidents however have been addressed in a variety of national regulations, promulgated by the Federal Aviation Administration and standards put forth by the National Fire Protection Administration. In comparison, transit incidents which, as statistically proven, can result in hundreds if not thousands of injuries, therefore

demanding a faster, more coordinated rescue effort, have rarely been addressed through any national training effort.

Following the London attacks of July 7th, the International Association of Fire Chiefs (IAFC) issued a press release urging fire chiefs to review their response plans for transit emergencies. In the release the IAFC referenced the *Emergency Response to Terrorism Self-Study Course*, produced by the United States Fire Administration, as a noteworthy resource. Unfortunately, the current version of this course has only three, rather insignificant references to transit in the entire text, once again illustrating the lack of inclusion of transit in emergency preparedness training at the national level.

While, as DHS Secretary Chertoff observed, response to transit incidents is a local and state responsibility—because of the immediate need to triage and treat victims—the need to nationalize an effort to identify competencies and create standards for training still exists. Similar to what the FTA has done through NTI and other resources to serve the transit industry, a Federal agency, or agencies, needs to take on the responsibility to move this effort forward. Only when the dialogue on emergency responder preparedness and training for transit incidents is brought to the national level, will it become a priority for all transit systems and their respective response agencies.

In closing, the efforts put forth by the FTA have been some of the most effective and successful security prevention and incident response programs in any sector. These efforts need to continue not only in terms of developing new programs, but more importantly in the expanded delivery and implementation of existing materials and courses. Clearly, including transit employees as a key component of a system security program is a prudent measure that will present an invaluable return for a relatively minimal investment in initial and ongoing training. And while there have been, and continue to be, many effective, coordinated programs in emergency preparedness conducted at the local level, we as a nation, to paraphrase Robert Frost, have promises to keep and miles to go before we sleep.

I would like to thank the Subcommittee for the opportunity to share my insights and provide information on the current state of transit incident preparedness. I look forward to continuing to work with you and my colleagues to improve the safety and security of transit passengers and employees and the effectiveness of emergency responders in managing transit incidents.

Mr. KING. Thank you for your testimony, Mr. Kozub.

I will address my questions in the interest of time to the three law enforcement witnesses, and it is a four-part question. One is, in view of the suicide incidents in London and the shoot-to-kill policy, what steps, if any, are you taking in training your officers regarding suicide bombers?

Number two, if you can comment on the policy of random inspections which has been carried out in a number of localities, including the NYPD.

Thirdly, a point I mentioned before to encourage retired police officers who are well trained and are armed to travel mass transit by giving them passes to work back and forth. Many of these men and women are in their 40s and 50s and are well equipped and well trained.

And, finally, if you can turn it around, if you could get anything you needed from the federal government so that you could guarantee the money was being well spent, what would you be asking for the federal government to give you which it is not doing now?

We will start with Chief Hanson.

Chief HANSON. Well, in regards to suicide bombers, I think we have been working with local law enforcement, particularly the Capitol Police. In fact, we are having a training session today. I think the Capitol Police went over to Israel and really looked at some of the dynamics over there. We had worked with them earlier, particularly when we started bringing long guns into our system to develop procedures and we are reinforcing that now in light of London.

Mr. DICKS. What is a long gun?

Chief HANSON. A long gun is a weapon with a longer gun as opposed to hand gun. In our environment, there are MP5s, which could be qualified as a machine gun. A shotgun is a long gun, but it is? am I answering the question?

So we do have procedures and we are reinforcing those procedures today with local law enforcement colleagues.

In regard to random searches, we are going to New York on Thursday. We had examined and discussed this internally ourselves. We will be very interested in seeing how it is done in New York and seeing the application for WMATA.

What we do is we have a program here, we are local law enforcement. The police officers and sheriffs in the region that represent WMATA. There are six jurisdictions, Maryland, Virginia and the District of Columbia. The law enforcement officers in those regions are allowed to ride when in uniform and in casual clothes, and that applies to sheriffs too. So that really kind of leverages our numbers. We do not do the retired program, they are active police officers that are allowed to use our system.

On any given day, the Metropolitan Police have 300 people going to court, and the majority of those people are encouraged to ride the rails. We do training with local law enforcement, so they will well versed in the intricacies and challenges of operating in a transit environment.

And then in regards to what would we want, I think it is a variety of different things. Certainly, more funding for training, for equipment. I would like to see more done in technology.

Mr. KING. Mr. Morange?

Chief MORANGE. As far as suicide bombers, we instruct our officers, we also put out posters on what to look for, how people act nervous, what type of clothing they may be wearing, if someone's wearing heavy clothing in the warm weather, to look for loose-fitting clothing where they may be bulky underneath. We also put it in our pamphlet for all our employees so that they are continuously made aware of what they should be looking for.

As far as random searches, we have started the random searches last week. The public seems to be very happy with it. They feel comfortable with what we are doing right now. NYPD is doing it throughout the New York City transit system, and we are doing it on the commuter rails. And, again, like I say, the public is really in favor of it at this time.

As far as riding public transportation right now, all law enforcement personnel have passes to ride it. As far as retirees, I would bring that back to MTA for consideration.

And the last, as far as how the federal government other than funds, we would definitely be looking for the technology that is out there to let us know what kind of technology works, because right now a lot of vendors and all come up and tell you they have the best thing since whatever, and when you look at it, it does not work.

And that is one of the reasons why we do not want to just throw money right out there until we know what works, because we do not want to go back 2 years from now and have to change what

we already did. What we are looking for is what works, what is off the shelf and what is maintainable.

Mr. KING. Mr. Lennon?

Mr. LENNON. Thank you.

As far as suicide bombers, we have had the Israelis to come in here with the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department. There has been extensive training provided in recognition and reaction. We have also trained our employees on what to look for. So I think that program is?we started a program that looks really well focused with our employees and our law enforcement people. Again, the lessons of 7/7 and 7/21 will just reinforce those measures.

Random searches, we are probably also be setting up probably. We have already talked about this before this hearing about sending a team to New York City and also Boston for their experiences conducting random searches with regards to both the RNC and the DNC.

With regards to the use by off-duty police officers and retired police officers, that is something that has never come up in Los Angeles as an issue, and I think what we do have is a high use by uniform police officers and detectives using our transit systems, our commuter railroads and our existing bus and rail systems, but I will bring that back to my system study. And with our new mayor there, Mayor Villaraigosa, he may very much be interested in pursuing this with his colleagues in other communities.

As far as the?I will only echo what Bill has said to my right and Polly Hanson We were thoroughly overwhelmed with the types of technologies that were made available or could be made available to us with a very limited amount of funding that was made available to us.

We know what we want. We have conducted the assessments. We know exactly what we need across the board. We share, we are almost an incestuous industry. We talk. We talk about the applications, we talk about the equipment that is required. So we know how to spend the money, but, again, it is focused on we need more presence out there in terms of law enforcement. That is one key application, plus the technology.

One thing I think that we really need to focus on, and it is just a cap-off in terms of what I have already heard this morning with regards to my colleagues that were here before us, is that if there is one area that we need to focus on and that is involving the public in a much more holistic role on this particular thing. We have a tendency to think in terms of the transit systems and indeed the employees and our law enforcement as being the ones that are responsible for security.

Indeed, the persons that go, that are having the party this coming Saturday night think in terms of the people that are responsible for their security is the law enforcement. We need across the country, at a national level, at the local level, to involve the public. We almost have to have an Israeli focus on security. We have to involve the public beyond just the transit systems in making them aware and being part of the solution and not part of the problem. Thank you.

Mr. KING. Mr. Lennon.

The ranking member, Mr. Pascrell, has had to go to the floor.

Mr. Dicks?

Mr. DICKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Polly, I was very impressed with your tunnel and the fact that it is available for training and exercises. Is there another one in the country? Is that the only one?

Chief HANSON. It is the only one, sir, and we make it available to anybody that wants to. We have done the Marines, we have done the FBI, Joint Terrorism Task Force, we have done local police and fire fighters.

Mr. DICKS. Let me ask you, we were talking about the funding for this effort and that Transportation now has turned this over to Department of Homeland Security. Are you worried about that? Do you think you are going to get less money now because of this? Was the Federal Transit Administration a source of grants for these kind of safety projects?

Chief HANSON. The Federal Transit Administration supplies support in the way of training, the type of public outreach campaigns. The capital money that they give transit properties can be used for security initiatives.

Mr. DICKS. Can they still be used even after this new?

Chief HANSON. Well, because it is capital money that could be used for an upgrade of your security cameras, which has a dual purpose. But the fact of the matter is that accessing urban area security money that goes to regions and local states has been very difficult for transit properties.

Mr. DICKS. Well, how much have you gotten under this new program?

Chief HANSON. Well, I am going to be real honest and go back to September 11, before?

Mr. DICKS. Well, you should be.

Chief HANSON. Okay. Before the creation of the Department of Homeland Security, WMATA was the recipient of \$49 million, and that was from both Congress and the White House, and it was spent on things you could see and touch, intrusion alarm upgrades, canines, explosive detection equipment, personal protective equipment for our employees.

Since the creation of DHS and ODP's Transit Grant Program, WMATA will or has received about \$15 million, \$3.7 million in fiscal year 2003?

Mr. DICKS. So you got \$46 million before and now \$15 million since.

Chief HANSON. \$49 million.

Mr. DICKS. \$49 million before.

Chief HANSON. And \$15 million, including the money that we hope to get in fiscal year 2005.

Mr. DICKS. Yes.

Bill, what is your situation? How much did you get before DHS? what did you get recently?

Chief MORANGE. Well, just to give you a little rundown on the federal side, FEMA for our capital programs we received \$143 million. For ODP grants for 2003, we received \$27.7 million. In 2004, from ODP, we received \$14.1 million. And also in 2003, from ODP, for our MTA PD radio, we received \$6.6 million. In addition, from FTA, we received \$188,000 to perform drills.

Mr. DICKS. Paul?

Mr. LENNON. Prior to 9/11, we had a minimum amount of funding, primarily was focused on grants from the FTA, which was well received, but it was measured in the thousands of dollars. Since 9/11, we received approximately \$6.8 million in direct grants from the Office of Domestic Preparedness, Homeland Security monies, and we have received another like amount, about \$6.9 million in monies that came through the Office of Domestic Preparedness, through the states, shared grants for projects for Los Angeles County and Orange County to do additional exercises and things like that. So it is about half has been through the state and half has come directly from the federal government.

Mr. DICKS. Okay.

Mr. Kozub, you mentioned safety regulations, the FAA has it for workers involved in aviation but they do not have it for other forms of transportation. Who should do that? Who should have the responsibility for creating these rights in the federal government?

Mr. KOZUB. Right now, the FTA no regulatory authority over transit systems as a DOT modal agency unless there was a regrouping there. The reality is, I believe, in my?

Mr. DICKS. But Congress could give them the authority. Is that what you are suggesting?

Mr. KOZUB. I am not suggesting. I am saying that is a possibility. What I am suggesting from an operational perspective is working with many of the systems that I have worked with across the country there is a desire on the part of many of the systems to do the training. However, the local funding, as you brought up during the first panel, is often dissected between other local issues and priorities and priorities within the agency, such as cameras and other tangible capital equipment.

So quite often, unfortunately, the need to train employees, which has been shown time and again as a very effective security measure, is often put toward the bottom of the list. So whether it is done through a regulatory proposition through the FTA or another federal agency?

Mr. DICKS. Or just providing the money.

Mr. KOZUB. ?or simply providing the resources and the funding to do the job I think might be a more expeditious channel to go through.

Mr. DICKS. And nobody does that at this juncture.

Mr. KOZUB. To provide funding?

Mr. DICKS. Right.

Mr. KOZUB. Some of the agencies we have worked with have used some of their ODP or statewide DHS funding, but, no, there is no funding that I am aware of that.

Mr. DICKS. There is no dedicated source.

Mr. KOZUB. No.

Mr. DICKS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. KING. Thank you, Mr. Dicks.

Congressman Reichert?

Mr. REICHERT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I agree with a lot of what the panel has said this morning in regard to training communication coordination and working with the community. Sounds like community policing to me, and I think

that that worked rather well in King County when I was the sheriff in Seattle just a few months ago.

I would like to just go back and address a couple of comments made by some of the panelists. And thank you all for your service, by the way.

Mr. Morange, you say you hired 400 additional officers after September 11? 200 metropolitan and 200 bridges.

Chief MORANGE. Two hundred MTA police officers, and it was 260 additional bridge and tunnel officers, or peace officers.

Mr. REICHERT. Where did that money come from?

Chief MORANGE. That money came directly from the MTA.

Mr. REICHERT. Now, you talked about the grants, \$143 million, \$27 million, \$14.1 million, \$6.5 million, \$188,000. Any of that money go for personnel?

Chief MORANGE. No. All of that money went strictly for equipment intrusion, fencing, lighting, and the \$143 million is for capital construction.

Mr. REICHERT. Yes. And you had an additional 25 bomb dogs and handlers, right?

Chief MORANGE. That was all MTA.

Mr. REICHERT. Okay. And, Chief Hanson, since September 11, have you hired any additional officers because of the added responsibilities of homeland security?

Chief HANSON. I did apply for a COPS grant and got 10 police positions as a result of an analysis. We wanted to reduce the size of our beat area so that we could have people on six post assignments. I have had other increases that are directly related to other infrastructure improvements, such as increased number of garage spaces at WMATA, but besides the COPS grant, which is only partially paid for, all those are paid for by the local jurisdictions who pay for WMATA.

Mr. REICHERT. Did you receive the COPS grant?

Chief HANSON. Yes, I did, sir.

Mr. REICHERT. Is that grant still in effect today?

Chief HANSON. Yes, sir.

Mr. REICHERT. Did you apply for a similar grant today, do you know? Could you?

Chief HANSON. I do not believe so, sir.

Mr. REICHERT. Mr. Lennon, same question, have you hired additional police officers?

Mr. LENNON. Yes, sir, we have. Yes, we have. We have increased approximately 26 police officers, sheriff's deputies and put them to the system in the last 3 years. We have also put 110 fair enforcement officers, which are not post-certified, not peace officers, but to heighten the presence and focused on code enforcement, but their presence has been duly noted. So we have got about 135. We have increased staff to 135 but it has all been local money.

Mr. REICHERT. Local money.

Mr. LENNON. Yes, sir.

Mr. REICHERT. Thank you.

Mr. Kozub, you made a point to say that from a systems perspective, a systems approach to this problem of protecting our transit across the country, that every park-and-ride, every outlying station

and every tunnel must be protected. Does that part of that protection include people, personnel?

Mr. KOZUB. A big part of that protection includes the people and the personnel. As we have heard before, the customers, many times transit systems, whether a subway system, bus or rail, have repeat customers. The same people get on the same train or the same bus every morning. They are some of the best at observing and knowing if someone is acting a little suspiciously or if there is a package or some other presence there that is out of the norm.

The employees that work those regular routes and facilities are also very cognizant of what is normal and what is not normal. It is basic training and communication to these audiences that need to motivate them, to give them the confidence to report things, and it is also the cultural and system process within an agency itself that needs to have the follow up. You need to have the follow-up law enforcement within an agency that can follow up on these leads and do the traditional police work that needs to be done.

Mr. DICKS. I guess the final point I would like to make, and you have actually made it for me, as the sheriff in King County in my previous life, I struggled with the same problems that you are struggling with right now. We had responsibility, and have today, for the Metro system.

As we move forward in time, in the future, the difficulty in putting people and personnel in places that we know they are going to be needed to protect our transit systems across this country is going to become more and more difficult. The bottom line question is, how are we going to pay for that?

You do not have to answer that, I will just leave it like that. My time has expired.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. KING. Thank you, Congressman Reichert.

Mr. Etheridge?

Mr. ETHERIDGE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me thank you for being with us this morning in your testimony.

We talked a lot about communications, understanding, listening. Let me ask each of you very quickly, Will, about this whole issue of interoperability. Obviously, first thing we want to do is prevent, but beyond that we ought to be able to communicate with first responders.

Share withy us, if you would, how interoperability between you folks and first responders, is that a problem? Have you solved it? Do you need help? Where are we in that process, because I think it is a critical piece, and it seems to pop up every time we have a major problem.

Would you talk to us about that for a moment?

Chief HANSON. Do you want me to go first, sir?

Mr. ETHERIDGE. Please.

Chief HANSON. Okay. WMATA and the metropolitan region, through COG, the Council of Governments here, has done a number of things. They have used Urban Area Security initiative ODP money to buy a cache of radios that can be accessed by both fleece and fire. There are SOPs that support that. That system does allow for interoperability at an incident, and they have been used several times for special events by both fleece and fire in this region.

This region was fortunate to participate in some federally supported projects. Originally, the project was called, "Agile," and now it is called, "Merge," so it does allow some interoperability with police departments in this region.

Recently, fire fighters received money from Urban Area Security Initiative money to improve their communication in the Metro by increasing the lines that are necessary for fire fighters or for police departments to go down in our system and still have communication, which I thin is important to note. Our environments are very different from being up on the street.

So while there might be interoperability for police and fire fighters above the street, the transit environment because of the concrete and underground there is a different dynamic but there have been efforts, there is technical assistance available from ODP, and I would encourage more money in areas like that, not just to make the recommendations but once the recommendations are made by ODP for the funding to be there, then to help regions or properties or transit police and local fire fighters to be able to obtain those recommendations.

Mr. ETHERIDGE. So you are not saying the communication is adequate currently.

Chief HANSON. I think that more can be done. I think in this particular region things have been done and things have been done with ODP Urban Area Security money.

Mr. ETHERIDGE. Mr. Morange?

Chief MORANGE. As you well know, in the MTA, in 1998, they merged the Long Island Railroad with the Metro North Police, so a lot of their communication was done via locomotive and conductors' frequencies. Now, presently, we are part of the NYSWN Program, which is the New York State Wireless System.

We are a pilot program, and we are looking all along the right-of-ways of improving our communication, and this system that once it is placed in was obtaining the frequencies and all, because the frequencies were not available. And now under the NYSWN Program, they are going to be made available to us. We are part of the pilot program. We have \$50 million of our money invested right now. And I feel that this is really going to be a positive for the entire transportation industry and the MTA.

As far as New York City, there are fiber optic cables and all and different systems that are in the tunnels so that they could communicate above grounds. They continually look to see where they can improve the system. I know the fire department uses it now. They are working on it along with the New York City Police Department to improve the communications there. They do look at the dead spots and they work on it from there.

Mr. ETHERIDGE. Mr. Lennon?

Mr. LENNON. Communications have always been a major priority for the citizens of Los Angeles and our emergency respond team has made sure that since we have built the Red Line tunnel, we have made sure that communications for both the Sheriff's Department and for the fire departments as well as for the LAPD has been of paramount importance and they can communicate below ground as well above ground.

Interoperability, I would characterize probably right now as being adequate for the situation. It can be enhanced, and I believe it is a priority, both for the fire and the police departments to do that.

Again, our exercises that we have conducted, multiagency exercises, have reinforced the need for always continually enhancing our communications.

Mr. KOZUB. On a national level, communications is basically a two-part problem. Communications from technology, as the chief just recognized, yes, there needs to be more emphasis placed on getting the equipment into the right hands so it can be used at the right time.

However, as Chief Morange pointed out, the successes that have been seen in past incidents have largely been due to interrelationships, not just technological capabilities but the preexisting relationships between the policy makers, decision makers that need to manage an incident, both from the transit side and the emergency services side.

So you need to look at both components, getting the right radios that can talk to each other, but you need to have training and drills and tabletops that can bring these people together hopefully before something would happen.

Mr. ETHERIDGE. So you develop relationships.

Mr. KOZUB. Exactly.

Mr. ETHERIDGE. Thank you. My time has expired.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. KING. The gentlelady from the District of Columbia?

Ms. NORTON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I very much appreciate your calling this hearing, because I think the American people want to see whether we are paying any attention to London and its possible effects here. So I think you have done a public service and particularly in hearing from this panel, which is straight from the ground where it counts.

The Washington Metropolitan Transit Authority, of course, here may be ahead of some others, perhaps not New York, I am not sure, but ahead of some other transportation systems, although I must tell you, to hear you testify about \$15 million since 9/11 was not very comforting, Chief Hanson.

Let me indicate that here there is an additional responsibility. There is the federal responsibility for 200,000 federal employees, that the federal government actually subsidizes to get them on the Metro every day because otherwise the roads would be so choked, you could not even get to the Capitol or to Washington. Now if of course something to the system which the federal government has encouraged to use, particularly given the large number of federal employees, we would be in very hot water.

I really have two questions. One is to try to straighten out this dedicated versus other more general funds, and the other has to do with thinking outside the box all together about public transit security.

Now, there was earlier testimony that everybody understands we are talking basically in dedicated funding about \$250 million. Then when you ask, okay, what kinds of things would dedicated funding be used for, training would be one, overtime, I understand, is an-

other. If you get to the word, "capital improvement," then you really stop me. That is such a huge expense that it seems to me once you decide to use money for that, you do not get to the other things.

Which brings me to the \$8.6 billion that we are told that you all would just go get it, it is there, and use for this purpose. Testimony earlier, \$25 million from the, I will call it, large emergency responder, I will pool those two sets of grants, in 2004 used for public transportation security, \$5 million, I understand, in 2005.

I am trying to find out what difference dedicated funding means and whether there is a reluctance given the concern about first responder funding to simply take money from first responder funding or whether it would matter to local jurisdictions to have a pot of money that they knew would be dedicated to that, they knew upfront and would be used for that. We had a major debate on interoperability here on the authorization proposal.

In New York, for example, continue to scream about first responder money. What difference does dedicated funding make or does it not make a difference? We have had dedicated funding for air security, we have had it for port security. Does it make any difference or do you think that the pot of money from the other set of grants could be used by major transportation systems just as well?

Could I hear from each of you on that?

Chief HANSON. I think dedicated funding is appropriate and necessary. I think that transit properties throughout the United States have had problems accessing regional, state, local, Urban Area Security Initiative money because there are competing priorities. It is a political process.

I think prior to London people do not get it when it comes to transit. I think people now understand their local responsibilities in relation to securing infrastructure. You certainly get it with your secure transit and other initiatives to improve the infrastructure security of vital corridors in this country. However, locally, I am not sure folks are really engaged. We are competing with other priorities that folks have locally.

I do think that there needs to be some tie-in, and the ODP threat risk vulnerability assessments are appropriate. You go get one, you have a list of priorities that have been outlined by the folks writing the check, and when you get dedicated funding that comes right to the transit property, you go down that list. And there are ways to ensure that it is being appropriately spent.

Ms. NORTON. Thank you.

Mr. Morange?

Chief MORANGE. Well, in New York, we continue to look for all types of funding and dedicated funding. As far as any grants, sometimes we would like that there are certain parameters that are put on how we can spend that money, and we would like to show that maybe there is another way that we can spend it and should be spending it.

I also believe that it is very important for the first responders, because that is one of our major weapons that we have against terrorism in our transit system.

So, again, when it comes to any type of funding, we continually go out to look for funding, but we would like some kind of way that maybe instead of having to spend it exactly the way, to show that maybe there is a way that it could be spent in another area where it would be just as good.

Ms. NORTON. For?

Chief MORANGE. For transportation, yes.

Ms. NORTON. For transportation funding.

Mr. Lennon?

Mr. LENNON. Yes. Thank you. There is no question about it, I agree with the people to my immediate right. We really do need a dedicated funding stream for transit. The way the money is being allocated to the states sets up circumstances of competing priorities here.

We are talking about first responder communities here that really do need the money, there is no question about it. But when you go west of the Mississippi, in the case of California and specifically Los Angeles, we have a very, very vocal first responder community, very, very Professional, et cetera, but the focus on public transportation isn't there in terms of the funding stream, albeit the people that use it, we have 1.3 million riders every day using our public transit.

But we will find, when the smoke clears, that the majority of the monies do not get to the transit system itself. It goes to the first responder communities. That is why it is imperative for us to have a dedicated funding stream to the transit systems to ensure that they get what they need.

Ms. NORTON. Mr. Kozub?

Mr. KOZUB. Thank you. As I mentioned before, dedicated funding is a very vital component to this. It is emergency responder training, and I have been in the emergency services and the fire service for 25 years myself. It is a very vital component, as I have identified in the past.

But one thing that cannot be ignored is training, not only initial training but continuing training for the frontline employees is very vital to that whole process. When the emergency responders get there, it is what has been done by those employees in the first few seconds and few minutes that is going to determine whether those fire and police units are on the scene for 2 hours or 2 days.

So we cannot look at the emergency response as just those showing up in uniform on dedicated vehicles. Emergency response happens from the minute and the second an incident happens and goes from there.

Ms. NORTON. Mr. Chairman, if I might ask one more question. It is a really thinking out of the box question. People rightly say, because it is the only analogy they can point to, how do you spend the kind of money that you spend on air travel and?we do not have that kind of money. I would be the first to agree with them.

The chairman asked about random searches. In a real sense, I think that describes the pitiful state of where we are on mass transit funding. It is not that you do not know what to do. You are doing all that you have at your disposal now.

But may I ask you whether you think at the federal level we should be encouraging our great entrepreneurial inventive private

sector to help us think through an entirely new approach for mass transit security, where you would put a problem to them? limited resources, 19 billion passenger rides every year? some of the people you would be talking to would be technology people, some of the people you would be talking to would simply be analytical people.

So the two-part question would be, help us think through technology that would be within our means that could help us protect mass transit where people have to go and come quickly.

And the other part of the question would be simply analytical: Even without the technology, the people who think about security, what are the best ways to in fact reinvent security on mass transit?

Do you think that that kind of proposition put out to the public, to security experts on the one hand, to people with technology on the other hand, would be the kind of federal leadership that would help you to solve the new problems that London and Madrid now present to you, essentially, as it is now to solve for yourselves?

Chief HANSON. Couple of things that I am thinking outside of the box. Science and technology and DHS should be doing that, and they should be leveraging those kind of opportunities and partnerships. Our PROTECT Program was taking military technology and seeing if that could work in a transit property, and it was very successful.

I agree with my colleague over here, there needs to be a list of standards and they cannot come out after you have bought all the equipment. It would help if there was a list of standards, and transit chiefs and transit properties have been asking for that for some time. There are a lot of snake oil salesmen. They see we have the money. They are calling every day wanting to sell us stuff. Somebody needs to do the evaluations to tell us what works and what does not.

And on a very low tech dimension, I would suggest that September is National Preparedness Month. Let's get serious about it. Our kids do fire drills in schools and why don't our businesses and the folks who use transit get serious about preparedness during that month and try another alternative way to get to work, really seriously look at planning at home and sheltering in place and the other kind of activities that if we are really serious about preparedness, we should be engaging in as a nation and a country.

I want to go back to Mr. Kozub whose training is absolutely fabulous. This video is dynamic. We just put it on our Intranet so all employees can access it. There are challenges in training operational employees. The emphasis has been on cops and fire fighters. Our operational employees are out there every day, and there is backfill overtime money for cops and fire fighters. There needs to be for our operational employees. It is very hard to take them out of the system? bus operators, train operators, custodians? to do the kind of training that Mr. Kozub has designed and is absolutely fabulous.

So some of those are things that I think would really help us get where we need to go.

Ms. NORTON. Mr. Morange?

Mr. KING. If I could just interrupt, Chief Morange. To follow up on what Chief Hanson said about using military-type equipment.

You also had some experience with that and it did not work out, as I recall.

Chief MORANGE. Well, presently, we have the PROTECT system in Grand Central Terminal and we have been trying that out. And we also are looking to take it over from DHS.

Mr. KING. Wasn't there a system proposed to you by the Army that did not work in New York?

Chief MORANGE. Well, the Army was something different. When I first came over, the Army was going to do some of the technology and all, but according to contracts and all, it just could not be done. But they talked about Lockheed Martin and other—Grumman and all that were involved in this type of technology, which we are looking into today. But we do, through DHS, use the PROTECT system, and we are also involved with New York City with the Biowatch Program.

But getting into technology and the young minds, this is the greatest country in the world, and there are a lot of young minds that are out there, and I think that that is something that we should all be looking to tap and see what is out there, what we can do, and it should come through, one agency where they are just looking at that technology for us.

As far as involving everyone, today, security is everyone's business, and it is evident by the way you go into any of these transportation systems today and you see something, say something, the eyes and ear programs, how they all work, how a lot of people are making a lot more calls, and it is our responsibility that we respond to all of these calls and do what is proper.

I mean, our employees, we have got 65,000 employees that we constantly tell them how important they are, "It does not matter what your assignment is in the system, you are very important to us." And I think what you say about as far as involving everyone, involving the business community and all, that is a great idea in addition to having all this technology looked at and what is out there.

Ms. NORTON. Yes, Mr. Lennon.

Mr. LENNON. I think my colleagues have really pretty much summarized it very, very adequately, but I think you raised the right question, and that was the question that we have been talking about for 2 years. The snake oil salespeople that Polly has talked about has been an anathema to us in the industry.

When you look at the technology that is in play right here at National Airport, it is the same technology that we used back in the seventies, shortly after I got out of the Marines. You came through after the federal sky marshals, the hijackings. It has been upgraded somewhat but we are still doing it, we are still queuing up to wait in line, to go through metal detectors. We are adding chemical detectors, we are talking about explosive detectors too. If we challenge the convention wisdom out there, as Bill has indicated, you get people focused on where we need to go with this.

Using transit as probably the ultimate beneficiary, we will come up with a solution within a year to 2 years. We have never challenged the public.

The other part, as I have already indicated, we need to really engage the public. We are doing everything that we can right now to

train our employees. We are heightening public awareness at the local level. We need to engage the national public with a national mindset of what they need to be doing. We need to be a seamless focus on counting terrorism right now.

Ms. NORTON. Yes, Mr. Kozub?

Mr. KOZUB. I am not going to repeat anything that has been said. I will just throw in one caveat. Technology is a good step. There needs to be more research. However, let's not forget that the PROTECT system in WMATA requires one of Chief Hanson's officers within a control room that if it is set off to respond appropriately. A camera is a very good tool that can view a variety of areas, but you need a human being sitting there, viewing the output of that camera and assessing and analyzing that information and making snap decisions to respond to it appropriately.

So while we need to look at exploring more technology, the research of it, the application of it, we also need to look at the human factor of all the technology and what is capable of one person or a group of people and a response and analytical perspective on a daily basis.

Ms. NORTON. Yes. Finally, I am not even suggesting that technology is the answer, because I am not sure. I am suggesting that I would want to find out. I would want to ask these folks who can now tell us about how, for example, to use?that did not take much. It did not take us very long to find out that if you had a cell phone, you can now use a cell phone to set off a bomb throughout the New York subway or the Metro system, and that is pretty low tech. They can do that. It seems to me the same kind of technology might be able to help us stop that.

But quite apart from that, I am also concerned?

Mr. KING. Can you wrap it up, because we have to go to?

Ms. NORTON. Yes. I am also concerned that there are other ways to approach mass transit. Ways that are very different from approaching air travel security need to be thought through, whether or not they involve technology.

Thank you very much.

Mr. KING. Thank the gentlelady.

And the ranking member of the full committee, gentleman from Mississippi, Mr. Thompson.

Mr. THOMPSON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and I, too, join the other members in saying that this is quite an interesting panel.

Couple questions. We heard the term, "no standards," technology not being what it is, can the three transit authorities tell me whether or not you have ever received a directive from DHS about technology in terms of what is applicable for transit security?

Chief HANSON. There are a variety of particulars that come out. We recently participated in something that ODP facilitated for us where trash cans are being tested. Many of us, the TSA requirement is to have bomb-containment cans or clear plastic, so we are very interested in ensuring that the products that we purchase with federal dollars do what they say they are going to do.

There are other information bulletins that they put out. What they really have done, though, is to look at what we are doing and recommend things that they know. They do in DHS have science

and technology as the directorate that I think could do more to advance. The recommendations are testing of some of the things that were discussed today and new technologies that are out there.

Chief MORANGE. We have met with DHS. We have talked about standards that other agencies are using amongst ourselves to find out what are the best practices that are out there. They also have been involved with us with doing certain pilot programs.

So it is a continuous effort of looking for what is out there, and we do get help from all agencies involved. I think it is not so much when we look at as far as receiving assistance and all. I think it is so much that all of us getting together, and I believe that is the most important part. We were down at the DHS. We did talk about explosive-detecting dogs, we talked about the trash containers. A lot of us brought up the fact that we did not feel that these trash containers were tested. We asked that they would be looked at. So we also bring back certain thing that we would like to see happen.

Mr. THOMPSON. Mr. Lennon.

Mr. LENNON. Yes, sir. The trash containers are the perfect example, I think, and probably the most prevalent example of what was recommended to us by TSA. They have a value, but what has to be conditioned in applying that value is where you place those trash barrels. Those barrels direct the explosion, a vertical plane, depending on the height of the ceiling, the fact that you are in a subway may or may not be the best place to put those barrels. We got the barrels through grant monies, I might add, and we are apply to our outdoor rail station because of what we have found in conducting our own tests.

Mr. THOMPSON. Well, I am glad you talked about that but one other question is, what if I told you that as of today, we have no transit security plan that has been presented to Congress, even though we require that a transit security be produced by April 2 of this year. And so whatever we are doing, it is based on what somebody thinks they should do. Because the Department has failed to meet the congressional mandate on producing a transit security plan for this country.

Chief HANSON. What I would say is that the transit properties have been required to put forward plans and are required to present them to the FTA during a triennial review or any other audit that is conducted because FTA provides capital funds. What I would also say is that transit properties were required to submit plans to ODP in order to qualify for the next round of urban area security or transit grant monies. So we have certainly developed plans and put them together and submitted them to the appropriate folks. I am not at liberty to discuss what happened after that, but we have done our part.

Mr. THOMPSON. And maybe I need to put the tail on the question to say, have you been consulted by the Department as to what a good transit security plan would include?

Chief HANSON. FTA actually brought a number of the people that are at this table together to discuss that, and many of us were a part of making recommendations as to what should be in those plans and then guidance was published by FTA outlining what things should be in the plan.

Mr. THOMPSON. But you have not seen the plan.

Chief HANSON. Well, I have put together my plan, and I have seen their recommendations for the plan. But many of us at this table were a part of suggesting what would be appropriate to be in the plan.

Mr. THOMPSON. Mr. Morange?

Chief MORANGE. I think it is like Chief Hanson said. We have submitted our plans, we have talked?and I really believe that putting together a transit plan is not as easy as it may seem because of the different variables that are in the systems. An also if you take the New York City transit system, I mean, it is 100 years old.

So, I mean, basic plans, yes, you could put in, but, again, you have to continually bring all of the transit agencies together so that they could share their best practices. And it is a continuous changing thing.

Mr. THOMPSON. Well, Mr. Lennon, I will put it to you, say, if you indulge me. I am not talking about your individual department plans, which obviously you have done a very credible job. What I am concerned about is the fact that we do not have a national transit security plan for America.

All of you have done your individual plans, but you run major operations yourself. And I am trying to get whether or not you have either been involved in helping DHS to do this soon to be produced transit security plan. Do you know of one in the works. Would you like to be included in consultation of such a plan?

I know what you do individually, but we are charged with doing it for all of America and we are yet to have it.

Mr. LENNON. Let me respond to that. We have been contacted by TSA when it first came into existence for copies about my security plan. I think they tapped into all the other major real transit systems and multimodal transit systems for copies of their plans. And that has been occurring for the past 2 years. We have shared our plan with the representatives from TSA when they touched down.

We know they have been looking at our plan. The feedback that they gave us, as Chief Hanson has pointed out, that they noted the uniqueness. So I know they have seen other plans. They have noted the uniqueness of our system but noted the commonalities in our plan that are similar to the chief here and the chief further on. And that is because of the FTA's role in developing standards.

So there are standards for a system security plan despite the anomalies and the differences amongst all of us. We all have plans in place. We drill to our plans.

If you tell me that would I like additional input into a national plan, most certainly, we would all welcome that, I think if nothing else, because I would like to see my plan as the role model, and so would Chief Hanson and so would Chief Morange. I think the communication is in place at our levels.

We focus less on the uniqueness of my system versus Chief Hanson's or Chief Morange's. What we do is we come together multiple times during the year, our staff does too, and we do it as a national level through the APTA conferences and through round tables that the FTA hosts. And we share our best practices as well as our plans.

I think we are at a very, very standard preparatory for response, too, at this point in time.

Mr. THOMPSON. Not to cut you off, but I think we just have been fortunate that we have had good people running transit authorities in this country..

Mr. LENNON. I agree.

Mr. THOMPSON. But our charge that we gave the Department is to come up with a plan for the country, and they have not done that.

Mr. Chairman, I think maybe part of this hearing is that we need to, since we had the secretary before us yesterday, remind him that the committee and Congress, for that matter is still waiting on this transit security plan for Americans, noting the fact that within each individual transit authority they already have their own, but I think we have to have some national standards.

Mr. KING. There is no doubt the plan is overdue. There is also no doubt that there is a strong bipartisan consensus on this committee that the plan should be put together as quickly as possible. I will certainly discuss it with Chairman Cox, and if Mr. Pascrell wants to discuss it, we can certainly submit a joint statement to the secretary to reemphasize the importance that we attach to that plan.

Mr. THOMPSON. Thank you.

Mr. KING. I thank the ranking member.

I want to thank all the witnesses for their testimony. In addition to everything else, you have shown how complex the issue is, you have shown how wide-ranging it is. In New York, I am somewhat reassured that we have gotten over \$190 million for the MTA in recent years, but I also realize the large job that is still out there. And if it is true in New York, it is true in Washington, it is true in Los Angeles, it is true everywhere in the country.

So this is an issue that requires, as the ranking member said, for Homeland Security to be directly involved, and thankfully we do have people such as yourselves at the local level.

I want to thank all of you for your testimony today, and, more importantly, for the job you do day in and day out, because, as Eleanor Holmes Norton said, you really are the troops that are on the front lines. We are in a war, you are on the front lines, you are doing a great job. We want to thank you for it.

And with that, members of the committee may have some additional questions for the witnesses, and we would ask you to respond to them if you would in writing. We will keep the record open for 10 days. And also I ask unanimous consent that a letter from the American Public Transportation Association be admitted into the record. Without objection, so ordered.

The subcommittee stands adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 11:43 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

