[House Hearing, 109 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
THE NATIONAL TRAINING PROGRAM:
IS ANTI-TERRORISM TRAINING FOR FIRST
RESPONDERS EFFICIENT AND EFFECTIVE?
=======================================================================
JOINT HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGENCY
PREPAREDNESS, SCIENCE,
AND TECHNOLOGY
with the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON MANAGEMENT, INTEGRATION, AND OVERSIGHT
of the
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
JUNE 23, 2005
__________
Serial No. 109-25
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TONGRESS.#13
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/
index.html
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
26-612 WASHINGTON : 2007
_____________________________________________________________________________
For Sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office
Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800; (202) 512�091800
Fax: (202) 512�092250 Mail: Stop SSOP, Washington, DC 20402�0900012007
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Christopher Cox, California, Chairman
Don Young, Alaska Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Lamar S. Smith, Texas Loretta Sanchez, California
Curt Weldon, Pennsylvania, Edward J. Markey, Massachusetts
Christopher Shays, Connecticut Norman D. Dicks, Washington
Peter T. King, New York Jane Harman, California
John Linder, Georgia Peter A. DeFazio, Oregon
Mark E. Souder, Indiana Nita M. Lowey, New York
Tom Davis, Virginia Eleanor Holmes Norton, District of
Daniel E. Lungren, California Columbia
Jim Gibbons, Nevada Zoe Lofgren, California
Rob Simmons, Connecticut Sheila Jackson-Lee, Texas
Mike Rogers, Alabama Bill Pascrell, Jr., New Jersey
Stevan Pearce, New Mexico Donna M. Christensen, U.S. Virgin
Katherine Harris, Florida Islands
Bobby Jindal, Louisiana Bob Etheridge, North Carolina
Dave G. Reichert, Washington James R. Langevin, Rhode Island
Michael McCaul, Texas Kendrick B. Meek, Florida
Charlie Dent, Pennsylvania
______
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS, SCIENCE, AND TECHNOLOGY
Peter T. King, New York, Chairman
Lamar S. Smith, Texas Bill Pascrell, Jr., New Jersey
Curt Weldon, Pennsylvania Loretta Sanchez, California
Rob Simmons, Connecticut Norman D. Dicks, Washington
Mike Rogers, Alabama Jane Harman, California
Stevan Pearce, New Mexico Nita M. Lowey, New York
Katherine Harris, Florida Eleanor Holmes Norton, District of
Dave G. Reichert, Washington Columbia
Michael McCaul, Texas Donna M. Christensen, U.S. Virgin
Charlie Dent, Pennsylvania Islands
Christopher Cox, California (Ex Bob Etheridge, North Carolina
Officio) Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
(Ex Officio)
______
SUBCOMMITTEE ON MANAGEMENT, INTEGRATION AND OVERSIGHT
Mike Rogers, Alabama, Chairman
Christopher Shays, Connecticut Kendrick B. Meek, Florida
John Linder, Georgia Edward J. Markey, Massachusetts
Tom Davis, Virginia Zoe Lofgren, California
Katherine Harris, Florida Sheila Jackson-Lee, Texas
Dave G. Reichert, Washington Bill Pascrell, Jr., New Jersey
Michael McCaul, Texas Donna M. Christensen, U.S. Virgin
Charlie Dent, Pennsylvania Islands
Christopher Cox, California (Ex Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Officio) (Ex Officio)
(II)
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
STATEMENTS
The Honorable Peter King, a Representative in Congress from the
State of New York, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Emergency
Preparedness, Science and Technology........................... 1
The Honorable Bill Pascrell, Jr., a Representative in Congress
from the State of New Jersey, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee
on Emergency Preparedness, Science and Technology.............. 2
The Honorable Mike Rogers, a Representative in Congress From the
State of Alabama, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Management,
Integration, and Oversight..................................... 18
The Honorable Kendrick B. Meek, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Florida, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on
Management, Integration, and Oversight:
Oral Statement................................................. 4
Prepared Statement............................................. 5
The Honorable Christopher Cox, a Representative in Congress From
the State of California, and Chairman, Committee on Homeland
Security....................................................... 21
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Mississippi, and Ranking Member, Committee on
Homeland Security.............................................. 7
The Honorable Charlie Dent, a Representative in Congress From the
State of Pennsylvania.......................................... 30
The Honorable Norman D. Dicks, a Representative in Congress From
the State Washington........................................... 25
The Honorable Bob Etheridge, a Representative in Congress from
the State of North Carolina.................................... 28
The Honorable Sheila Jackson-Lee, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Texas........................................ 31
The Honorable Michael McCaul, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Texas............................................. 32
The Honorable Dave G. Riechert, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Washington........................................ 34
The Honorable Christopher Shays, a Representative in Congress
From the State Connecticut..................................... 27
The Honorable Rob Simmons, a Representative in Congress from the
State of Connecticut........................................... 24
WITNESSES
Panel I
The Honorable Raymond W. Kelly, Commissioner, Police Department,
City of New York:
Oral Statement................................................. 8
Prepared Statement............................................. 11
Panel II
Mr. Steven Edwards, Director, Maryland Fire and Rescue Institute,
Testifying on behalf of: North American Fire Training
Directors:
Oral Statement................................................. 45
Prepared Statement............................................. 47
Sheriff Patrick D. McGowan, Chairman, Weapons of Mass Destruction
Committee, National Sheriff's Association:
Oral Statement................................................. 49
Prepared Statement............................................. 51
Captain Jack Reall, National Fire Academy Board of Visitors:
Oral Statement................................................. 58
Prepared Statement............................................. 60
Mr. Shawn Reese, Analyst in American National Government,
Government and Finance Division, Congressional Research
Service:
Oral Statement................................................. 36
Prepared Statement............................................. 38
Dr. Van D. Romero, Vice President, Research and Economic
Development, New Mexico Institute of Mining and Technology:
Oral Statement................................................. 62
Prepared Statement............................................. 65
FOR THE RECORD
Additional Questions to the Witnesses
Responses From Dr. Van Romero.................................... 73
Responses From Mr Raymond W. Kelly............................... 75
THE NATIONAL TRAINING PROGRAM:
IS ANTI-TERRORISM TRAINING FOR FIRST
RESPONDERS EFFICIENT AND EFFECTIVE?
----------
Thursday, June 23, 2005
House of Representatives,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness,
Science, and Technology,
with the
Subcommittee on Management, Integration,
and Oversight,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:04 a.m., in
Room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Peter King
[chairman of the subcommittee] presiding.
Present: Representatives King, Linder, Shays, Cox, Rogers,
Pearce, Simmons, Davis, Dent, McCaul, Reichert, Pascrell, Meek,
Thompson, Dicks, Norton, Jackson-Lee, Christensen, and
Etheridge.
Mr. King. [Presiding.] The Subcommittee on Emergency
Preparedness, Science and Technology and the Subcommittee on
Management, Integration and Oversight will come to order. The
subcommittees are meeting today in joint session to hear
testimony on the efficiency and effectiveness of the national
training programs and terrorism training for first responders.
Before we start, I would like to commend Bill Pascrell, the
Ranking Member of the Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness
and Mike Rogers and Kendrick Meek, the Chairman and Ranking
Member, respectively, of the Subcommittee on Management,
Integration and Oversight for their leadership on homeland
security issues. Let me again pay a special debt of thanks to
my Ranking Member, Bill Pascrell, who has really gone out of
his way to make sure this is a bipartisan, common effort as we
work toward securing our homeland security.
I especially want to thank them for the willingness to hold
a joint hearing to examine the effectiveness of the Department
of Homeland Security's terrorism preparedness and training for
first responders.
Without a doubt, effective antiterrorism training is
essential to success in the war on terror. It is simply
imperative that our nation's first responders, both public and
private, learn to mesh the skills necessary to prevent, to
prepare for and respond to and recover from acts of terrorism,
especially those involving weapons of mass destruction.
Training first responders, estimated to number over three
million, will be a major feat. At a minimum, these first
responders need to learn new antiterrorism protocols,
procedures and nomenclature.
In March 2004, for example, the Secretary of Homeland
Security released a national incident management system, NIMS
as it is commonly referred to, to establish standardized
processes and procedures that first responders at all levels of
government must use during emergencies involving multiple
jurisdictions. To be effective, every first responder at all
levels of government must learn a common language and set of
procedures. If training every first responder with respect to
NIMS isn't daunting enough, how about training every first
responder to use state-of-the-art radiological protection
equipment, decontamination tanks, fire hazard suits, and other
homeland security technologies.
To address these and other daunting challenges, the
Homeland Security Act and the President's Homeland Security
Directive 8 gave the Office of Domestic Preparedness, ODP,
responsibility for coordinating federal terrorism preparedness
training of first responders. Again, this is no easy task.
Besides ODP, other components of the Department of Homeland
Security such as the Federal Emergency Management Agency and
other federal departments and agencies, including the
Departments of Defense, Health and Human Services and Justice
offer first responder training courses. Is ODP effectively
coordinating such training both inside and outside the
departments? Presumably, with so many courses, there must be
duplication and redundancy. What is ODP doing, if anything,
about this problem?
To further complicate this already complicated situation,
many state and local governments, academic institutions and
professional organizations also provide training to first
responders. Because of this fact, ODP has entered into
strategic partnerships and cooperative agreements with several
of these training entities. Several of our witnesses can shed
light on these relationships and these partnership agreements.
Are the state and local academic and professional training
entities working with ODP to sufficiently utilize their
expertise? Is the current national training program training
enough responders in a timely manner? If not, why and what can
be done about it?
So I want to thank the witnesses for being here today. I
will now recognize the gentleman from New Jersey, the Ranking
Member, Mr. Pascrell.
Mr. Pascrell. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
The mission of the Department of Homeland Security to
secure the nation from acts of terror obviously gives it
primary federal jurisdiction for providing counterterrorism
training to federal, state and local emergency responders. This
is serious business. But the fact remains that training
programs are varied and dispersed across the federal realm.
Numerous federal agencies, among which are the Departments of
Defense, Health and Human Services, Justice and Transportation
all maintain terrorism training for state and local personnel.
Does this result in a confusing terrain for first responders?
Well, it results in a confusing terrain for us. That does not
say that first responders are confused.
Is there potential redundancy in the patchwork of programs
that exist? And are there diverging concentrations and variable
competencies in the courses given? The National Strategy for
Homeland Security issued in July 2002 states that the nation
must develop interconnected and complementary homeland security
systems that are reinforcing, rather than duplicative, and that
ensure essential requirements are met.
So thank you, Chairman King and Chairman Rogers, for
holding the hearing on this critical issue. Today's hearing is
the beginning of a comprehensive review by our subcommittee on
the nation's varied first responder training programs. We will
explore whether these programs are at time duplicative in
nature; whether there exists a lack of coordination and
possible redundancy; and ultimately if the programs are really
a truly effective tool for emergency responders and personnel.
We all know that our first responders, the firefighters,
the law enforcement, EMS providers, are the first ones to
arrive at the scene of any major incident and they are the last
ones to leave, the last ones to leave. Have we met this
necessary threshold that I spoke of a few moments ago? The
current system of training may not be the best model for this
goal.
Today, we will hear from actual first responders and
training providers at the state and local level. It is fitting
that we have actual first responders before us today. I
compliment our Chairman, and I say this in back of him as well
as in front of him, because we have committed ourselves, this
subcommittee, to listen to the first responders first before we
act. I think that is critical, Mr. Chairman. We cannot have a
top-heavy situation here because we will blow it in the
Congress, no question about it. We will waste a lot of money
doing it.
I want to take a moment to publicly acknowledge
Commissioner Kelly for the fine work he has done in New York
City and for all the courtesies, Commissioner, you extended to
our team when we came there for the day-long program in New
York City. First, I want to thank you. We all understand that a
vast array of vulnerabilities exist on our soil. You have
spoken to that many times and about that many times. To simply
put it, our first responders need to receive the proper
training to respond to any and all possible disaster.
Earlier this year, the committee approved legislation to
speed up the flow of funding to local first responders and
ensure that funding is targeted to those communities most at
risk.
So Mr. Chairman, thank you for having the hearing. I am
anxious to hear from our witness.
Mr. King. Thank you, Mr. Pascrell.
The gentleman from Alabama, Chairman of the Subcommittee on
Management, Integration and Oversight.
Mr. Rogers. Thank you, Chairman King.
First of all, I would like to join in welcoming our
witnesses and thank them for taking time out of their busy
schedules to be here today.
Second, Mr. Chairman, I would like to say I appreciate the
opportunity to join you in co-chairing this series of hearings
in this subcommittee and the Subcommittee on Management,
Integration and Oversight.
Today, we will hear from some of the leading providers of
terrorism preparedness training for first responders. We will
discuss the effectiveness of Federal counterterrorism training
programs and also hopefully discuss ideas as to how we can
improve these programs.
At our next meeting, we hope to talk with federal training
officials themselves and learn more about their ongoing efforts
to meet our growing training needs. The issue of first
responder training is of special interest to me. In my home
town of Anniston, Alabama we have the Center for Domestic
Preparedness, or CDP, which is operated by the Department of
Homeland Security. This important facility is one of the
nation's leading all-hazards training centers for dealing with
weapons of mass destruction.
Unlike many other training facilities, CDP provides first
responders with hands-on specialized training, including the
use of live agent chemical training. CDP is also a member of
the National Domestic Preparedness Consortium. I am pleased to
see one of CDP's partners from the New Mexico Institute of
Mining and Technology is with us today.
Just down the road from the CDP is the Noble Training
Center. This facility is also operated by DHS and is the only
facility in the United States dedicated to training
professionals to respond to natural disasters and acts of
terrorism. The Noble Training Center trains approximately 3,000
professionals each year in subjects including radiological
incidents, emergency response and disaster preparedness. We
need to ensure that vital training centers such as the CDP and
Noble have the support they need from Washington.
At the same time, it is important that we coordinate these
training programs to safeguard taxpayer dollars. Many Federal
departments and agencies provide counterterrorism training
programs. The Department of Homeland Security alone has at
least five agencies that provide training. According to the
Congressional Research Service, some of these training programs
cover the same subject matter. This situation raises a number
of management coordination issues which we hope to address
today.
I also hope we will hear from witnesses as to their views
regarding the Department's training and what more DHS can do to
improve the coordination and delivery of these programs.
I thank you, Mr. Chairman, and yield back.
Mr. King. Thank you, Chairman Rogers.
The gentleman from Florida, Mr. Meek.
Mr. Meek. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to thank our witnesses also for being here, and my
colleagues for their leadership in having this important joint
meeting.
I will be very brief in my opening statement because I
believe that it is important that we hear from these first
responders.
I would ask all of our panelists, including panel I and
panel II, to be as truthful and blunt as possible to tell us
what we need to know versus what we may want to hear as it
relates to our efforts to make sure you first responders get
trained. The Management, Integration and Oversight Subcommittee
is for the first time in the history of the House, compared to
the last session, in a standing committee to make sure that we
are hitting the bull's eye or close to bull's eye every time we
are using federal dollars and making sure the department has
both the motivation and the direction it needs to make sure
that we protect every American and make sure every first
responder has the equipment and training that they need to
carry out their mission.
So I look forward to hearing your testimony. I look forward
to the members asking questions and your response to them to
the best of your ability, to help us move in the direction we
need to move in. We most appreciate it.
Mr. Chairman, I will enter my opening statement and any
additional comments for the record.
Prepared Opening Statement of the Honorable Kendrick Meek, a
Representative in Congress From the State of Forida, and Ranking
Member, Subcommittee on Management, Integration, and Oversight
In this joint hearing of the Management, Integration and Oversight,
and the Emergency Preparedness Subcommittees, I want to thank both
Chairman Rogers and Chairman King, for calling today's hearing to look
at the effectiveness and efficiency of first responder training
programs administered and funded by the Department of Homeland
Security.
Fire, law enforcement, and emergency medical teams could easily
find themselves on the front lines after a terrorist incident. They
need and deserve the most effective and comprehensive training that the
government can give them. We need to make sure that the kind of
training they receive before an incident will allow them to save lives,
restore calm, and reduce losses. I know that in Florida, first
responders are an important part of holding together communities in the
wake of natural disasters.
I also know it is necessary to make sure taxpayer dollars are used
in the most effective way possible. In our oversight capacity, we must
make sure that that the hundreds of millions of dollars spent each year
are spent wisely. What are taxpayers getting for their money? Are first
responders actually getting the core competencies they need to respond
to a terrorist attack?
While the Department of Homeland Security has adopted standards for
some types of first responder equipment, it has failed to create rules
and regulations that provide the necessary and basic guidance that
first responders need to make sure that they are able to operate
effectively in the event of a terrorist incident. To carry out its
mission of safety and security to this nation, the Department must
provide training and support for states and local jurisdictions to
prevent, plan for, and respond to terrorism. If the Department fails to
give flexible, comprehensive training guidelines to first responders,
it can't fulfill that mission.
Therefore, before we begin to discuss possible duplication, overlap
or other inefficiencies in current training, we must first ask the
basic questions: what kind of training is needed? Where are the
millions of taxpayer dollars being spent? Are jurisdictions duplicating
efforts? What can be done to streamline training?
I want to thank the witnesses who will testify today. I look
forward to hearing from Commissioner Kelly, who will discuss the
training models used in New York City. I look forward to hearing from
Mr. Edwards and Mr. Reall. These gentlemen can tell us about the
training necessary to fulfill their special roles of reducing loss of
life and lessening property destruction. And of course, as a former
State Trooper, I look forward to hearing from Sheriff McGowan. I look
forward to hearing from Mr. Reese of CRS. His work on training programs
and the issues raised by federal efforts has provided a roadmap for
this Committee.
Again, thank you for calling this hearing and I look forward to
working with you to find the best way to meet the important training
needs of our first responders.
Mr. King. Without objection. I thank the gentleman.
The Chairman of the full committee, Mr. Cox.
Mr. Cox. Thank you to both Chairmen and both Ranking
Members for convening this important hearing.
I would also like to welcome and thank our witnesses for
appearing today before this joint subcommittee hearing.
Especially I would like to welcome Ray Kelly, who is already
seated before us. He is the Commissioner of the New York City
Policy Department. He has been and remains very much in the
frontlines of the war on terrorism. I cannot think of anyone
better prepared to help us address the questions of proper
training in our battle with terrorists.
Training is one of the Department of Homeland Security's
most important missions. Our nation's first responders at all
levels of government need targeted and effective training to
develop and hone the specialized skills they need to fulfill
their new homeland security responsibilities. Anything less is
simply unacceptable.
Training our nation's first responders, however, is an
enormous task. There are more than one million firefighters in
the country; 800,000 law enforcement officers; and another
840,000 EMTs, emergency medical technicians and paramedics. As
a result, when it comes to first responder training, as well as
so many other Homeland Security responsibilities, we have to
make choices. We have to focus our resources in this case on
training those first responders most at risk and on the most
significant threats that our populations face.
We also must ensure that to the maximum degree possible,
terrorism preparedness training includes the prevention of
terrorism. We must never fail to take advantage of
opportunities to stop terrorists in the first place, even as we
rightfully prepare for the worst. We also must make sure our
federal house is in order when it comes to first responder
training programs. The Homeland Security Act designates the
Office for Domestic Preparedness, now the Office of State and
Local Government Coordination and Preparedness, as the primary
agency for coordinating federal terrorism preparedness
training.
Unfortunately, coordinating federal antiterrorism training
for first responders is easier said than done. At least seven
federal departments, including the Department of Defense, the
Department of Energy, the Department of Health and Human
Services and the Department of Transportation offer hundreds of
training courses. Even within DHS itself, the Office of State
and Local Government Coordination and Preparedness has no
monopoly on training. The Directorates for Emergency
Preparedness and Response, Information Analysis and
Infrastructure Protection, and Border and Transportation
Security each train first responders.
This patchwork of programs creates opportunities for
duplication, inefficiency and confusion. Even with all of these
federal training programs, state and local governments,
academic institutions and professional organizations still
provide the vast majority of training of first responders,
including in partnership with DHS.
I look forward, Mr. Chairman, to hearing the testimony of
these training partners today with respect to the Department of
Homeland Security's programs. How effective are they? Is the
department doing enough to leverage the existing state,
regional and local training infrastructure? Does the department
certify non-federal training courses in a timely manner? Are we
training first responders in the most efficient way possible?
I want to thank all of our witnesses for being with us
today. I look forward to your answers to these and other
questions about first responder antiterrorism training.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I yield back my time.
Mr. King. Thank you, Chairman Cox.
The Ranking Member of the full committee, Mr. Thompson from
Mississippi.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you very much, Mr. King and the Ranking
Member.
I would like to welcome our witnesses to the hearing this
morning.
I am very pleased that we are holding this hearing today on
first responder training programs. So far in Congress, this
committee has held hearings on and approved legislation to
reform the grantmaking process for first responder homeland
security programs. Hopefully, we will soon conference that bill
with the Senate and funding will start reaching the local
levels where it is needed most. We now have an opportunity to
conduct oversight on other aspects of preparing our first
responders.
Our nation's first responders, whether they are law
enforcement, firefighters or EMS providers, are the first line
of defense in the war on terrorism. We must do all we can to
ensure that they have the training necessary to prevent,
prepare for and respond to acts of terrorism.
Today, we hold the first of two hearings on first responder
training programs. As we move forward with our oversight, we
must ensure that the current training programs are meeting the
needs of our first responders, and that the only way to do that
is to listen to the first responder training community. There
are several important issues and questions that must be raised
about the current composition of our first responder training.
We must consider whether existing training programs are as
efficient as they should be in order to get the most bang for
our buck. We must ensure that the training programs are
delivering the training that is needed in the most proficient
way possible.
Related to the efficiency is the effectiveness of these
training programs. The first responder community has existing
training facilities at the state and local level. Our national
training programs should utilize these state and local
facilities to the maximum extent possible. I am very concerned
about the lack of coordination among training programs and
providers within DHS, as well as other federal training
partners.
A final area of concern that I have is the lack of training
standards. The department has adopted several standards for
equipment, but none for training. In many cases, these
standards exist, but the department has not taken the step of
adopting standards for training. Our witnesses today should be
able to address these issues and shed light on where there is
need for improvement in our national training programs for
first responders.
Our first responders must have the best training available,
delivered in the most efficient manner possible. It is the
least we can do to those who help and put their lives on the
line to protect us. I look forward to hearing from all our
witnesses.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Mr. King. Thank you, Mr. Thompson.
Other members of the committee are reminded that opening
statements may be submitted for the record. We are pleased to
have two distinguished panels of witnesses before us today on
this topic. Let me remind the witnesses that their entire
written statements will appear in the record. We also ask that
you strive to limit your testimony to five minutes. We will
allow the entire panel to testify before questioning any of the
witnesses.
Our first panel today is Ray Kelly, the Commissioner of the
New York City Police Department. It is a personal privilege to
have Commissioner Kelly here today because I do not think
anyone exemplifies the struggle of first responders in the war
against terrorism than Commissioner Ray Kelly. Ray Kelly was a
combat veteran of Vietnam. He is a retired Colonel in the
United States Marine Corps. He was a New York City police
officer for more than 30 years. He was Under Secretary of the
Treasury. He was Commissioner of Customs. He was Police
Commissioner back in the early 1990s and then came back in as
Police Commissioner in 2002, the first Police Commissioner in
the history of New York to serve two nonconsecutive terms.
Ray Kelly has I believe made the New York City Police
Department a model in the fight against terrorism. As Bill
Pascrell mentioned, last month the subcommittee went to New
York. We spent a good amount of time with Commissioner Kelly
both at his headquarters and also at the antiterrorism unit
which is set out in one of the outer boroughs which is
dedicated to fighting terrorism. I am sure Commissioner Kelly
will detail much of this in his opening statement, but it
really is I think a model for the rest of the country.
Also if I could mention on a personal note, Commissioner
Kelly talks about the fact, actually he does not talk about it,
but his resume will list the fact that he has degrees from
Manhattan College, St. John's Law School. He has a master's
from NYU and a master's from Harvard. What he does not mention
is that he and I both attended St. Teresa's Grammar School on
44th Street in Woodside. I think that the Dominican nuns
probably taught him a lot more than they taught me, as the
Ranking Member just said, obviously.
Also on another personal note, not to overpersonalize this,
but my father was a member of the NYPD for over 30 years. He
was actually head of the Physical School at the New York Police
Academy and one of his trainees was Ray Kelly. Again, both the
Dominican nuns and my father taught Ray Kelly a lot better than
I was ever taught, which is why he has attained so much.
With that, let me just ask Commissioner Kelly in
testifying, thank you for your appearance here today, Ray. It
is a pleasure and a privilege. Thank you.
STATEMENT OF HON. RAYMOND W. KELLY, COMMISSIONER, POLICE
DEPARTMENT, CITY OF NEW YORK
Mr. Kelly. Thank you very much, Chairman King, Chairman
Cox, Chairman Rogers, members of the subcommittees. Thank you
for the opportunity to testify.
I want to also take this opportunity to thank the members
who visited New York earlier this month to see first-hand the
extensive counterterrorism training and preparation the Police
Department and New York City has undertaken. We greatly
appreciated the time each of you spent with us and your
constant support of the department's efforts to defend the
city. That includes the recent House legislation to distribute
future homeland security funding based on risk.
Is national antiterrorism training for first responders
efficient and effective? That is the question posed by this
hearing. Certainly, that training has benefited the New York
City Police Department's counterterrorism programs immensely.
With the help of the training and expertise offered by the
Department of Homeland Security, we have built up a powerful
deterrent to terrorism. That includes sending our officers to
the Center for Domestic Preparedness in your district, Chairman
Rogers. In fact, they enjoy their time in Anniston quite a bit
and we have difficulty getting them back.
Building upon the unmatched size and experience and skill
of the department's own workforce, we have also expanded upon
the foundation laid with DHS support to establish one of the
premier counterterrorism training centers in the nation, in
Brooklyn which you visited. In addition to our own corps of
over 36,000 police officers, we have delivered training through
that center to members of the New York City Fire Department,
the Metropolitan Transportation Authority Police Department,
the New York State Police, the Nassau, Suffolk, Westchester and
Rockland County Police, as well as police departments from
Connecticut, Maryland, Minnesota, Virginia and even Canada.
We train members of the U.S. Coast Guard and Park Police.
We have brought in dozens of private security professionals
from hotels, banks and other institutions to train them in
better ways to protect their facilities. In all, over 130,000
training days have been hosted in our regional training center
since 2002.
We have also leveraged DHS support to expand the protection
of critical infrastructure throughout the region. We have
created the Threat Reduction and Infrastructure Protection
Program, or TRIPS, as we call it, based upon the DHS model, and
applied it to New York. We have divided critical infrastructure
in to five categories and assigned a team of detectives to
cover each one. These investigators visit facilities throughout
the city, identifying vulnerabilities and developing
comprehensive protection plans with site managers to prevent
attacks.
To help us conduct these assessments, we have enlisted the
support of the Cooper Union, one of the foremost schools of
engineering in the nation. Its expertise is well known and bomb
blast analysis and mitigation strategies. We meet with Cooper
Union experts routinely to help ensure that we devise the most
secure solutions possible, which we then share with the private
sector.
In addition, with DHS support we have trained approximately
12,000 of our officers in more advanced chemical, biological
and radiological response. This critical instruction, otherwise
known as COBRA Cohort training, was made possible thanks to
close collaboration between the department and the Office of
Domestic Preparedness. As a result, we were able to take
immediate steps to better protect New York City from the
imminent threat of a terrorist attack involving weapons of mass
destruction.
The department's Regional Training Center, our TRIPS
program, and COBRA Cohort training are all prime examples of
how we have capitalized on DHS initiatives, adopting and
enhancing national training models to fit New York. The result
is that New York City has never been better prepared to defend
itself from a terrorist attack.
Still, all of our preparations come at a steep price, about
$178 million per year to maintain our daily counterterrorism
and intelligence activities. I want to emphasize these are
ongoing operational costs to defend the city. In addition,
there are the opportunity costs involved in our reassignment of
1,000 police officers to counterterrorism duties. While the
federal government provides vital assistance for training,
equipment and overtime, we still have huge expenses to cover.
For example, the government allows us to redirect a portion
of homeland security funds to offset overtime costs incurred
during periods of national orange alert. Last year, there was a
total of 111 national orange alert days, an unusually high
number, most of which came after the discovery that al-Qa'ida
has targeted key U.S. financial institutions. In 2003 by
comparison, there were 72 days of orange alert, but for the
Police Department protecting a city in the crosshairs like New
York is a year-round venture.
Even considering an unusual year like 2004, we were still
left with 254 days during which to maintain a high-visibility
deterrent, mostly out of our own overtime budget. While today's
hearing is focused on training for first responders, I also
believe we need to place equal, if not greater, funding
emphasis on first preventers. By that, I mean additional
resources for the analysts and intelligence operatives who can
alert us to a terrorist attack in the making, and also our
ongoing operational costs that I mentioned previously.
Last August, the Police Department foiled a plan by
hometown Muslim extremists to bomb the Herald Square subway
station in midtown Manhattan. We arrested those suspects just a
week before the Republican National Convention, with the help
of a confidential informant we had developed in the community.
We continue to put a lot of resources into the field to protect
New York against another attack. In the future, I believe we
will require more and better intelligence as we did in the
Herald Square case to stop terrorist plots in the making.
The terrorists, too, are working hard to improve their
operational capability, and we have to stay ahead of them.
Accordingly, we need federal funding to support a comprehensive
program of developing investigative skills that includes both
analytical and operational personnel, certainly for the larger
U.S. cities that are being targeted.
What kind of initiative would this include? As is the case
with first responder training, we need the federal government's
expertise to train qualified intelligence analysts and
investigators for the Police Department. We need support to
sharpen our analysts' skills in conducting link analysis and
terrorist group identification, improving their ability to
identify intelligence gaps faster and hone-in quickly on what
we need to know.
Instruction of our investigative personnel in debriefing
skills. The Police Department with its own limited budget has
already begun to develop these analytical and investigative
capacities. We have hired a cadre of trained civilian
intelligence analysts to take raw information gathered from
informants and undercover agents in the field and translate it
into valuable real-time reporting for our commanders. Again, we
are doing all of this out of our own pocket right now. We want
to do more of it and do it better with the federal government's
support and expertise.
Some may question the federal government's obligation to
support these local activities, or even the Police Department's
right to carry them out. In response, I would draw an analogy
to the national fight against the illegal drug trade. With so
much ground to cover, local police agencies must play an
integral part in supporting the effort to stem the flow of
narcotics across national borders and into our cities. That
includes the development of undercover drug agents and
intelligence specialists. Far from competing with federal
counterparts, these local assets are an indispensable force
multiplier. We must take the same multi-pronged approach when
it comes to rooting out terrorists.
One final issue: The Police Department needs the ability to
self-certify the training courses we develop internally to meet
the needs to a unique urban environment like New York. Self-
certification would allow us to save valuable time in
delivering vital new training otherwise spent on the DHS grant
approval process. I want to emphasize that under self-
certification, the department will continue to work closely
with DHS and the Office of Domestic Preparedness in upholding
training standards that are second to none. In fact, the
precedent already exists in the creation of our advanced COBRA
Cohort training curriculum.
Defending a vast nation against terrorism is an infinitely
complex challenge, yet it is one the Police Department is
positioned to help our federal government carry out, but we
must have adequate resources to do the job. We must have
federal funding for first responders and preventers alike and
the authority to expedite their training, and we must hurry.
Thank you again for this opportunity to testify. I look
forward to any questions you might have.
[The statement of Mr. Kelly follows:]
Prepard Statement of Raymond W. Kelly
Chairman King, Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Pascrell, Ranking
Member Meek and Members of the Committees, thank you for this
opportunity to testify.
Before I begin, I want to thank Chairman Cox and Chairman King for
visiting New York recently to observe some of our facilities first
hand. I would also like to thank them for shepherding through
legislation that recently passed in the House. Homeland Security
funding must be distributed based upon one criterion, and one criterion
only: the risk posed by terrorism. This legislation would move Homeland
Security Grant programs in that direction.
In the meantime, I am encouraged that the House Committee on
Appropriations has directed that the distribution of State Homeland
Security Grants be based upon threat, once a minimum distribution has
been allocated to each state. This, too, is a step in the right
direction. But I would encourage the Congress to restore the almost
$400 million cut that was made to homeland security money to be made
available to state and local governments in the coming year.
To turn to the topic at hand, ``Is National Anti-Terrorism Training
for First Responders Efficient and Effective?'' Certainly, that
training has benefited the Police Department's counter-terrorism
programs immensely. With the help of the training and expertise offered
by the Department of Homeland Security, we have built up a powerful
deterrent to terrorism.
While today's hearing is focused on training for first responders,
I also believe we need to place equal, if not greater funding emphasis
on ``first preventers.'' By that I mean additional resources for the
analysts and intelligence operatives who can tip us off to a terrorist
attack in the making.
Let me start by providing some context. New York City has been the
prime target of terrorists since the early 1990's. In 1993, Islamic
militants drove a rental truck packed with explosives into the basement
garage of the World Trade Center, intent on bringing down at least one
of the towers. The explosion resulted in the loss of innocent life,
serious injury and considerable damage to a portion of the tower.
Between 1993 and 2001 there were conspiracies to destroy the Holland
and Lincoln Tunnels, the George Washington Bridge, the United Nations
and the main Federal building in lower Manhattan, as well as a plot to
bomb the subway system. The subway plot was foiled at the last minute
by the New York City police officers who broke down the door of two
Palestinians who were putting the finishing touches on the device.
Those conspirators are in federal prison.
After al-Qa'ida failed to bring down the Twin Towers in 1993, they
waited patiently and tried again eight years later. Their philosophy is
to return to the same place over and over, until they accomplish their
evil goal. However, the threat did not stop when the two towers of the
World Trade Center, and the many other buildings in that complex, came
crashing down on September 11th. In February of 2003, an al-Qa'ida
operative named Iyman Faris was in New York City on a mission to
destroy the Brooklyn Bridge. He is the same man who fought alongside
Osama Bin Laden, who engaged in a battle which included the wholesale
slaughter of Russian prisoners, and who helped supply al-Qa'ida
fighters with sleeping bags, airline tickets, cash and cell phones.
Nearly two years after the destruction of the World Trade Center, Iyman
Faris was in New York City conducting surveillance on the bridge. Faris
abandoned his plan and reported back to his handlers that it was not
possible to target the bridge because of our increased security
measures. He, too, is presently serving time in federal prison.
The highly visible security that the New York City Police
Department had in place on the Brooklyn Bridge, in addition to the
unseen protection, paid off in the Faris case. Faris was not the last
of the militant operatives, however, actively plotting attacks against
New York City since September 11th. Shortly before the Republican
National Convention last year in New York City, our detectives arrested
two, homegrown jihadists who were plotting to attack the Herald Square
subway station at 34th Street and Sixth Avenue. We arrested those
suspects with the help of a confidential informant we had developed in
the community. This heavily traveled, midtown-Manhattan station sits in
front of the Macy's flagship store and is also located one block away
from the site of the Republican National Convention at Madison Square
Garden. These two individuals are awaiting trial.
We continue to put a lot of resources into the field to protect New
York against another attack. But in the future, I believe we will
require intelligence like we did in the Herald Square case to stop
terrorist plots in the making. We need federal funding to support a
comprehensive program of intelligence capability that includes both
analytical and operational personnel, certainly for the larger U.S.
cities that are being targeted. What kind of initiatives would this
include?
As is the case with first responder training, we need the federal
government's expertise to train qualified intelligence analysts and
operatives for the Police Department.
We need that support in the following ways.
One: Sharpening the analysts' skills in conducting link analysis
and terrorist group identification.
Two: Improving their ability to identify intelligence gaps faster
and hone in quickly on what we need to know. And,
Three: Instruction of our investigative personnel in debriefing
skills.
The Police Department, within its limited budget, has already begun
to develop these analytical and investigative capacities. For example,
we are identifying and monitoring extremists who are willing to
perpetrate or provide material support for acts of terror. We have also
hired a cadre of trained civilian intelligence analysts to take raw
information gathered from informants and undercover agents in the field
and translate it into valuable, real-time reporting for our commanders.
Again, we are doing all of this out of our own pockets right now. We
want to do more of it, and do it better, with the federal government's
support and expertise.
Some may question the government's obligation to support these
activities, or even the Police Department's right to carry them out. In
response, I would draw an analogy to the national fight against the
illegal drug trade. With so much ground to cover, local police agencies
must play an integral part in supporting the effort to stem the flow of
narcotics across national borders and into our cities. That includes
the development of undercover drug agents and intelligence specialists.
Far from competing with federal counterparts, these local assets are an
indispensable force multiplier. We must take the same multi-pronged
approach when it comes to rooting out terrorists.
Our measures include dedicating one thousand police officers
exclusively to counter-terrorism duties. We created a new Counter
Terrorism Bureau, the first of its kind for a big city police
department. We assigned over 250 officers to that Bureau, including the
posting of 120 detectives the Joint Terrorist Task Force (JTTF) with
the FBI. That compares to 17 detectives assigned to the JTTF on
September 11th.
We dramatically expanded the role of our Intelligence Division. We
are conducting around-the-clock threat assessments, and integrating
this real-time information into daily decisions about where to place
resources and personnel. We brought in outstanding individuals from
outside the Department to lead our intelligence and counter-terrorism
functions. They have decades of CIA, counter terrorism and national
security experience.
Drawing upon the unmatched size, experience, and skill of the
Police Department's own workforce, we have also expanded upon the
foundation laid with Department of Homeland Security (DHS) support to
establish one of the premier counter-terrorism training centers in the
nation in Brooklyn, which you visited. We staffed that center with
police officers who speak Farsi, Urdu, Arabic, and Pashto among other
strategic languages. They help us monitor global intelligence. We also
hired a cadre of trained civilian analysts to scrutinize and
investigate intelligence data. We have established a new intelligence
liaison program, assigning New York City detectives to 7 cities in 5
foreign countries to enhance our relationships with the police agencies
of other nations.
At home, we are engaged in extensive training, and we are
conducting drills on a daily basis. We send our Hercules teams,
comprised of specially trained officers with heavy weapons, to make
unannounced visits to sensitive locations. They are there to respond to
a terrorist incident and to disrupt the kind of surveillance we know
al-Qa'ida undertakes. We also regularly conduct something we call
Sampson drills, involving teams of up to 100 officers at a time,
including snipers, who can be dispatched quickly to any given location
in the city.
Under Operation Nexus, our detectives meet with small business
owners and suppliers who might unwittingly be used to provide material
support to terrorists. They include businesses involved in everything
from selling construction explosives, to laboratory equipment, scuba
gear, and specialized rental equipment. We ask them to report any
anomalies in purchases of goods and services. The Police Department has
also held briefing sessions for various segments of the public who may
come in contact with terrorist plotters. For example, we briefed real
estate agents on exactly what al-Qa'ida tells its operatives to look
for in renting an apartment, and with doormen and building security so
that they can more keenly observe their surroundings.
With the commencement of the war in Iraq, we launched a heightened
security program called ``Operation Atlas'' to protect New York City
from possible reprisal. Given the ongoing terrorist threat, Operation
Atlas remains in place today. It brings together all of the core
elements of the Police Department: patrol, specialized units, Counter
Terrorism, and our Intelligence Division in a coordinated defense of
New York City. Checkpoints are established periodically at key
locations into and out of Manhattan. We have increased our protection
of subways and commuter ferries, as well as critical infrastructure.
Looking more closely at our training initiatives: we offer a
Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Device Checkpoint (VBIED/CP) course
targeted to local, state, and federal law enforcement. This is a four-
day course designed to provide both classroom and hands-on instruction
concerning vehicle borne explosive recognition. During the first phase
of instruction, the student is provided with techniques and methods of
proper vehicle inspection during checkpoints at high profile events
and/or critical infrastructure locations. The second phase of
instruction provides hands-on experience in vehicle searches.
Instruction and training includes the various methods of explosive
concealment in a variety of vehicles and proper interviewing techniques
of occupants of suspicious vehicles. Students learn how to use
technology and assets that are presently available.
Our Regional Infrastructure Protection Course (RIPC) is an
introductory level course intended to equip members of the law
enforcement community with the skills required to deter, detect, and
identify potential terrorist activity. This course also introduces the
student to the principles of risk assessment (an examination of the
vulnerabilities associated with the infrastructure of a facility),
basic methods of security, and the major components of a municipality's
critical infrastructure.
In addition to classroom instruction, two days of field exercises,
which include an actual assessment of a facility, are conducted at the
Regional Training Center. After assessing the facility, a written
assessment is prepared and the class presents their findings in detail.
Subcourses include the Introduction to Terrorism, Theory of Physical
Security, Access Control/Biometrics/Closed Circuit Television, Fire
Protection Systems, Heating-Ventilation-Air Conditioning (HVAC)
Systems, Physical Barriers, Utilities, and Marine Terminal and Seaport
Security.
On the other end of the spectrum, we offer a one-day Weapons of
Mass Destruction Operations Course. This introductory level course is
intended to equip members of the law enforcement community with the
rudimentary skill-set required to identify, detect, and prevent a
terrorist attack involving a weapon of mass destruction. This course
also introduces the officer to the concepts associated with operations
within a hostile chemical or biological environment that result from a
potential release of a weapon of mass destruction by a terrorist or a
terrorist organization.
One of the more extensive courses we provide at our Counter
Terrorism Division Regional Training Center (RTC) is the Counter
Terrorism Investigator's course. This is a five-day investigations
level course intended to equip members of the law enforcement community
with the skills required to deter, detect, and identify potential
terrorist activity, and when necessary, respond to a potential
terrorist attack. Our students do not sit in a classroom all day--we
provide dynamic field exercises, including simmunitions drills (the use
of simulated ammunition that looks, feels and sounds like the ``real
thing''), an ``active shooter'' scenario, room clearing, cornering and
vehicle stops, which are conducted at our Urban Training Center.
This training is focused on the tactics employed by terrorist
organizations so that law enforcement personnel have the tools required
to address the threat proactively and safely. It includes courses in
Introduction to Terrorism, Domestic Terrorism, International Terrorism,
Transnational Crime/Traditional Crimes that Fund Terrorism, Fraudulent
Documents, Developing Legal Issues, Weapons of Mass Destruction, Crime
Scene Preservation, Improvised Explosive Devices, Suicide Attacks/Truck
Bombs, Interview and Interrogation, Introduction to Risk Assessment,
Case Development and Enhancement, and Cults/Fundamentalism/Extremist
Behavior.
We have provided instruction to our executive level staff including
a course in International Terrorism and the al-Qa'ida Network. It
provides an introduction to the methods used by a terrorist or a
terrorist group, specifically focusing on the al-Qa'ida network,
including the hierarchical structure, an introduction to the methods of
training, funding, and gathering intelligence, the operational phases
of a terrorist attack, and the process of target selection. This course
also examines traditional crimes that have been identified as the means
of funding terrorist organizations, including narcotics trafficking,
money laundering, currency counterfeiting, tax fraud, coupon fraud,
trademark infringement, illegal diamond/mineral smuggling, and
kidnapping. Finally, the course examines the behavioral indicators and
methodologies associated with the phenomenon of suicide attacks,
including self-sacrificing attackers, suicide bombers, and truck bombs.
Information obtained from a recent visit by NYPD personnel to Israel is
included in the presentation.
We have trained about 34,000 officers in Personal Protective
Equipment. Many of those officers have been trained in one or more of
our other counterterrorism courses. For example, about 32,000 police
officers and supervisors have been trained in the Citywide Incident
Management System (CIMS), which conforms with the National Incident
Management System (NIMS), and 24,000 have attended our ``In-Tac''
training.
In addition to our own corps of 37,000 police officers, we have
delivered training through our Regional Training Center in Brooklyn to
members of the New York City Fire Department; the Metropolitan
Transportation Authority Police Department; the New York State Police;
the Nassau, Suffolk, Westchester and Rockland County Police; as well as
police departments from Connecticut, Maryland, Minnesota, Virginia and
even Canada. We train members of the U.S. Coast Guard and the Park
Police. We have brought in dozens of private security professionals
from hotels, banks, and other institutions to train them in better ways
to protect their facilities. In all, over 130,000 training days have
been covered in the Regional Training Center.
Additionally, we have leveraged DHS support to expand the
protection of critical infrastructure throughout the region. We have
created the Threat Reduction and Infrastructure Protection program, or
TRIPS, based upon a DHS model, and applied it to New York. We have
divided critical infrastructure into 5 categories, and assigned a team
of detectives to cover each one. These investigators visit facilities
throughout the City and identify any vulnerabilities. To help us
conduct these assessments we have enlisted the support of The Cooper
Union, one of the foremost schools of engineering in the nation. We
meet with their experts routinely to help ensure we devise the most
secure solutions possible.
In addition, with DHS support, we have trained close to 12,000 of
our officers in more advanced chemical, biological, and radiological
response. This critical instruction, otherwise known as COBRA Cohort
training, was made possible thanks to close collaboration between the
Department and the Office of Domestic Preparedness. As a result, we
were able to take immediate steps to better protect New York City from
the imminent threat of a terrorist attack involving weapons of mass
destruction.
The Department's Regional Training Center, our TRIPS program, and
COBRA Cohort training are all prime examples of how we have capitalized
on DHS initiatives, adopting and enhancing national training models to
fit New York. The result is that New York City has never been better
prepared to defend itself from a terrorist threat. Still, all of our
preparations come at a steep price: about $176 million per year to
maintain our daily counter-terrorism and intelligence activities. I
want to emphasize: these are ongoing operational costs to defend the
city, not to mention the reassignment of 1000 police officers to
counter-terrorism duties.
One final issue. The Police Department needs the ability to self-
certify the training courses we develop internally to meet the needs of
a unique urban environment like New York. Self-certification would
allow us to save valuable time in delivering vital new training
otherwise spent on the DHS grant approval process. I want to emphasize
that under self-certification, the Department would continue to work
closely with DHS and the Office of Domestic Preparedness in upholding
training standards that are second to none. In fact, the precedent
already exists in the creation of our advanced, COBRA Cohort Training
curriculum.
Defending a vast nation against terrorism is an infinitely complex
challenge. Yet it is one the Police Department is perfectly positioned
to help our federal government carry out. But we must have adequate
resources to do the job. We must have federal funding for first
responders and preventers alike, and the authority to expedite their
training. And we must hurry.
Thank you again for this opportunity to testify. I look forward to
answering your questions.
Mr. King. Thank you, Commissioner Kelly.
I just have several questions. One, can you give us any
more details on the question of the certification as to the
assistance you are getting or the time which it takes for you
to get the approval on the certifications?
Mr. Kelly. The process now is essentially for us to give a
course in looking for certification. We have to go through the
state. We go to New York State. We fill out many forms. Those
forms and the curriculum are then forwarded to the DHS Office
of Domestic Preparedness. It can take a significant period of
time to get that certification accomplished.
What we are looking for is the ability, based on our
expertise and based on the quality of trainers that we have, we
would like to go to the state, get that authorization from the
state, and then commence training without going through the
Office of Domestic Preparedness process. Obviously, we leave
ourselves open for inspection and reporting to DHS, but that
gap or that period of time that it takes for us to go to DHS
can be very significant and slows down our ability to get
training out. Again, we have such a large police agency that
that delay can be significant to us. We want the ability to do
that training on a more localized basis so we can kind of
spread it out and get more people in our training universe.
Mr. King. Commissioner, you often say that besides first
response, you have to be first preventers. The level of
training given by the federal government, now adequate would
you say it is regarding first prevention as opposed to
responding?
Mr. Kelly. Well, I think it is minimal as far as prevention
is concerned, but I think as far as first responders are
concerned, I think it is good. Certainly all the reports that I
receive are that the training is very well done. The Consortium
members give very positive feedback. But as far as prevention
training is concerned, it really is minimal. It is diffused. As
I said in my prepared remarks, we would like to have a more
direct relationship, say, with the investigative agencies that
will enable to us to get some of this training, and also with
intelligence-gathering agencies. I think it would be helpful
certainly for the major cities like New York and four or five
other large cities in the U.S.
Mr. King. For the record, can you tell us how many members
there are on the NYPD?
Mr. Kelly. How many members?
Mr. King. Members, yes.
Mr. Kelly. We have an authorized strength of 37,038 police
officers. Right now, we are down a little bit below 36,000. We
will have a major hire in July to bring us up to the 37,000
number. We have another 15,000 civilian employees.
Mr. King. And you said I believe up to 1,000 focused on
antiterrorism?
Mr. Kelly. Correct. We have redeployed 1,000, or the full-
time equivalent of 1,000 police officers for counterterrorism
duties. They are in our Intelligence Division, our
Counterterrorism Division. Plus we take significant numbers of
officers from our patrol force every day and deploy them at key
locations, sensitive locations throughout the city. It is a
major undertaking for us.
Mr. King. Yesterday, I was at a briefing with Congressman
Simmons which was given by the Coast Guard. I am going a little
off-message here, but can you detail your level of cooperation
with the Coast Guard?
Mr. Kelly. We have an excellent relationship with the Coast
Guard. We have our personnel assigned to their Intelligence
Center in New York. We are very close. I have a very close
personal relationship with the Captain of the port. They have
deployed their resources throughout New York Harbor. I do not
think we could ask for anything more form the Coast Guard. They
are very responsive. Anytime we need them, they are always
there. They work very closely with our Harbor Unit.
Mr. King. As my time is just about up, I think I should
note for the record the personal stake you have in this, in
that literally you live at Ground Zero. Your apartment was
severely damaged at Ground Zero, so you really are literally on
the frontlines in every sense of the word.
Mr. Kelly. I live, you are right, about one block away. We
were out of our home for almost 3 months as a result of 9/11.
Mr. King. Thank you, Commissioner.
Mr. Pascrell?
Mr. Pascrell. Thank you for your service, Commissioner.
Mr. Kelly. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Pascrell. I am fascinated by your training of police
officers in New York in Farsi, Urdu, Arabic, and Pashto. I am
wondering if the federal agencies have assisted you in training
in terms of the languages of the folks we have to work with,
deal with, because this is part of your counter-intelligence
action. You cannot have counter-intelligence unless you can
speak the language of folks you are trying to watch and be
careful of. Are you getting the cooperation from the federal
government in this endeavor, or are you basically working on
your own?
Mr. Kelly. Yes. These are largely native speakers. In the
members of the department, we have a big and diverse workforce.
What we have done is taken individuals who claim to be able to
speak these languages and we have tested them. We sent them to
a private school. They are certified. So they are not being
trained by us. They have the ability to speak. What we have
done is stratify them or categorize what level they are at. We
have 460 certified linguists, as we call them. We have lent
them and have a memorandum of understanding with the Defense
Intelligence Agency. We have lent them to DIA. They have been
very supportive, but we do not receive any federal funds or
federal help in this program.
What we also have done is on our eligible list when someone
wants to come into the department, they fill out obviously lots
of forms. One of them is whether or not they have foreign
language capability. If they do, we have the ability to reach
down on the list and bring them up and appoint them ahead of
other people on the list. We have done that as well. So we have
at least 55 certified Arabic speakers in Pashto, Urdu, Hindi,
Farsi speakers, and Chinese dialects. And we are continuing to
mature that program.
Mr. Pascrell. One of the things that I was most fascinated
with in New York when we examined all of your operations and
looked at them carefully is your Counterterrorism Division. I
was very impressed with Mike Sheehan and his team,
understanding that your department is trying to sharpen its
skills in terms of conducting link analysis as we call it with
terrorist group identification. This is serious business.
So the New York City Police Department has trained its
personnel, some of those personnel in basically preventing
these things from happening, God forbid, and using a word which
we do not like to use in the Congress, ``espionage.'' I want to
just have your response to the question of how, what you can
tell us for the public, how do you see the counterterrorism
that has been conducted by federal agencies with regard to what
you are trying to do? Is there a cooperative link? Are you
doing this on your own? And how significant do you think this
is in preventing these murderers from having their way?
Mr. Kelly. It is a cooperative program. We work closely
with the FBI and with the CIA. We have over 100 investigators
with the Joint Terrorist Task Force in New York. I just want to
mention a little bit about Mike Sheehan, because we are very
fortunate to have him. Mike is our Deputy Commissioner of
Counterterrorism. He is a West Point graduate, a former Special
Forces officer and a member of President Bush I and President
Clinton's national security staff. So he has done a masterful
job in pulling a lot of these programs together.
It is a collaborative and cooperative effort. David Cohen,
who is our Deputy Commissioner for Intelligence, is a 35-year
veteran of the CIA. David has brought his tremendous expertise
and experience and contacts to bear on this effort. So it is
collaborative. We do work with the federal authorities closely.
We are not looking to supplant in any way what is going on. We
certainly could not and do not want to. We look to supplement
their activities. We do have some talented people. Again, I
think the language skills that you mentioned are a very
valuable tool for us.
I believe it has been effective. Just the case that I
mentioned before about the individuals who were plotting to
blow up the Herald Square subway station, that case was handled
by all New York investigators. Certainly, it was prosecuted
federally, but our Intelligence Division had done it. So I
think the program is effective. It is getting only more
effective. In my judgment, we have brought in very talented
analysts from the top schools, from the Kennedy School, from
Stanford, from the Fletcher School of Diplomacy. These are
quality people that we have doing analysis, taking information
and synthesizing and putting it together.
So I believe it is working. Again, we are doing it
certainly not in a vacuum. We are doing it with federal
authorities.
Mr. Pascrell. Commissioner, in conclusion, folks should
know that you are not only protecting New York City. You are
helping us protect this nation by work and pioneering many of
the things that we have been talking about here. I want to
thank you personally.
Mr. Kelly. Thank you, sir.
Mr. King. Chairman Rogers?
Mr. Rogers. I thank the Chairman.
Commissioner Kelly, you made reference earlier in your
statement that many of your officers are sent to Anniston,
Alabama and the Center for Domestic Preparedness for training
and you have a hard time getting them back home. I can
understand that. Not only is it beautiful, we have some great
country cooking in Alabama.
Do you know how many of your officers you send each year to
the Center for Domestic Preparedness for training,
approximately?
Mr. Kelly. I would say we have sent at least 600.
Mr. Rogers. Per year?
Mr. Kelly. No, I would say total. Again, we look at where
the spots are. There are, as you know, different locations
throughout the country. It depends on our availability. It
depends on the availability of the responders. But I would say
at least 600 cumulatively since those schools opened. Maybe now
we are averaging about 150 or 200 a year.
Mr. Rogers. What are some of the techniques that your
officers find most appealing about training at the Center? Is
there something in particular that is most effective for you
and something else that is least effective or interesting to
you?
Mr. Kelly. The training is very well done. It is done very
professionally. As you mentioned in your statement, Mr.
Chairman, live agents are available at the facility at
Anniston. I know that in New Mexico, I think the large
explosive devices are examined closely. I know our bomb squad
is very impressed with the training that goes on there. In
Nevada, it seems to be more focused on perhaps dirty bombs or
radiation challenges for us.
So I can tell you, though, that everybody who goes, the
feedback that I have had comes back with very high reviews of
the quality of the training.
Mr. Rogers. You made reference in your statement to
spending $178 million a year on training.
Mr. Kelly. Yes, sir, on counterterrorism.
Mr. Rogers. Counterterrorism. One of the problems I have
found, as you know, is that training at the Center for Domestic
Preparedness, is free. They pay no tuition. The room and board
is free. If you can send your officer or your firefighter or
other first responder, it is free. One of the practical
problems that we have run into as I have moved around and
talked with folks in your line of work is, while the training
is free, you still have to replace that officer while they are
off on patrol. Many of these officers are the very people who
are in the Guard and Reserve and are also serving overseas, so
many of these departments are already short-handed. What are
the costs to you to participate in these programs that maybe
you are not having reimbursed?
Mr. Kelly. There are certainly overtime costs. Many of the
people that we send are in our emergency service unit. We would
like to have a bigger emergency service unit. We just cannot
afford to do it. We are down several thousand police officers
from where the department was in 2000 because of budgetary
constraints. So when we send people to training, we oftentimes
have to backfill with an officer on overtime. For us being a
big department, the largest in the country, it amounts to
several million dollars over a year.
Mr. Rogers. Is that reimbursable?
Mr. Kelly. No, that is not reimbursable.
Mr. Rogers. There are no Federal funds?
Mr. Kelly. Not for that cost, no, sir.
Mr. Rogers. Okay. You talked a little bit about self-
certification. I would like to know more about what you are
looking for. Is this a certification that you would like to get
authority from ODP to do yourself?
Mr. Kelly. We would like to do it in certain areas that are
perhaps not trained at the Consortium level, we would like to
get the ability to do self-certification. As I mentioned to
Chairman King before, we may want to train, let's say on
surveillance techniques. We have people coming in from other
agencies, as well as our own people, in order for us to get
funding to do that we go through the state. We apply to the
state. The state then takes our paperwork and sends it to the
Office of Domestic Preparedness and it can be a long period of
time. We think that certain things that we do and do well, that
we would like to be able to certify that training and avoid the
long delay that results from the process.
Mr. Rogers. These are programs outside the Consortium's
areas?
Mr. Kelly. Yes.
Mr. Rogers. For example at CDP, we have train-the-trainer.
Mr. Kelly. Right.
Mr. Rogers. So you are talking about something separate
from that?
Mr. Kelly. Yes. I am talking about something separate.
Mr. Rogers. Thanks very much. I appreciate it.
Mr. King. Mr. Meek?
Mr. Meek. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Commissioner, thank you for your testimony.
We do have a bill that we have passed already out of the
House, which was this first responder bill, H.R. 1544. We asked
the General Accounting Office to really look at are we getting
what we need to get out of training. The Department of Homeland
Security does not have a set curriculum to where their goals
and objectives as they relate to overall security of the
homeland. We spent about $180 million in first responder
training in the 2005 year. Without a system of tracking and
evaluating first responder training, I am trying to figure out
and I know this committee would like to know, how do we know
that we are training the men and women we need to train to be
able to, as the Chairman speaks of, prevent, but to also
respond?
You have a regional training location I believe and we know
that there is one in Alabama and there are a couple more around
the country. Do you believe that the Department of Homeland
Security should have training standards? That is one question.
Two, you know that you have basic law enforcement standards
that have to be met for an individual to be a sworn law
enforcement officer. We send federal agents to Georgia to get
that, and then they train them, specializing in their
department. I would like to hear your response to that.
Mr. Kelly. I believe we should have standards. The
Department of Homeland Security should have standards and
attempt to have a consistency in training throughout the
country. I can tell you that we use many of the skills that our
officers receive on a very regular basis in New York City
because of the size of the city and the activities that go on
there. So we are using a lot of the skills, so in a way we are
able to judge the effectiveness of the training almost on a
daily basis in New York.
But yes, sir, I agree that there should be some consistency
and there should be some across-the-board standards.
Mr. Meek. Commissioner, has the department approached you,
the Office of Domestic Preparedness, about what they should be
doing and how they should be training first responders
throughout the country? Have you been a part of an advisory
group with the department to have such a thing that you have
heard of?
Mr. Kelly. I am not aware of any formal group that performs
that function, but we have a lot of interaction with ODP, so I
believe on an informal basis there is a lot of give and take
and a lot of discussion as to what the training should be.
Mr. Meek. I personally believe that this is important
because as we start to look at the Department of Homeland
Security, as we start to build the Department of Homeland
Security, 22 legacy agencies coming together under one mission
to protect the homeland, it is very, very important that we
have outcome measures. I am hoping that our leadership here,
even though we have sent a bill over to the Senate, that
possibly that we can just as members of this committee, hearing
what the Commissioner has said, to move forth in sending a
letter to the GAO to hopefully get them started on giving us
some direction.
Because what they would do is go out to speak with first
responders, speak with the department, talk about where we have
duplication. Training is good, but duplication and not
expanding the minds and the skills of our first responders
could end up hurting us in the long run and we could very well
skim over something.
One other question as it relates to sharing and mutual aid.
Is there any training going on here in the United States as far
as you are concerned about how agencies of other jurisdictions
can work together, not only in the prevention of a terrorist
attack, but post-terrorist attack? Do we have the kind of what
you may call cross-pollination among leadership of these
special units to be able to respond to an attack? Have you seen
or heard of, or do you provide that in your regional training
facility?
Mr. Kelly. On the law enforcement level, we have a lot of
interaction with surrounding jurisdictions, but we are the
biggest jurisdiction around and we have 8.1 million people in
New York City. Regionally, we work with Nassau County, Suffolk
County. They are part of our Joint Terrorist Task Force. We
work with New Jersey, Westchester County and Bergen County on
law enforcement issues.
Now, as far as first responder and mutual aid, in the Fire
Department I know they have a very active program as well. I am
not really equipped to speak about it, but I know that that is
something that they work on. But law enforcement, the regional
approach is something that perhaps we need more work on in the
New York area, but we do have a fair amount of integration on
the Joint Terrorist Task Force and communication with the
surrounding jurisdictions.
Mr. Meek. Thank you, Commissioner.
Mr. King. Chairman Cox?
Mr. Cox. Thank you very much. Again, welcome.
Mr. Kelly. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Cox. We really enjoyed the time that we spent with you
as a committee up in New York City. I want to join everyone
here once again in commending you and the city and the Mayor
for all that you are doing in every single one of these areas.
The training, of course, is the piece we are focused on
today. I want to get my arms around this problem of multiple,
potentially redundant and inconsistent training programs that
are operated directly or indirectly by the federal government.
What we in this committee look at in terms of funding levels
for the federal piece is about $195 million a year for the
training. We want to make sure that we are getting our money's
worth.
I have heard you testify and respond to questions thus far
that from your standpoint it is not efficient to always ship
your people off to some other distant locale. You have to find
a way to pay for their replacement, and sometimes that is
overtime, so it is a very expensive way of doing business. I
would like to explore whether or not there isn't some way to
tap into expertise that New York City already possesses or is
in the process of acquiring so that the trainers' concept can
be taken still further and we can train a lot more men and
women without making them all leave their duty posts, or at
least leave the city.
How much of that do you think that we can do? I just look
at the FEMA compendium of federal terrorism training for state
and local audiences. It lists over 200 courses. There has got
to be a lot of duplication or inconsistency in there. We have
the trade group, the Training Resources and Data Exchange
focused on trying to identify those. From your standpoint, are
we spending our money wisely or are we in some ways causing
duplication and overlap and inefficiency by making people
travel to other places and a lot of different places to get
training that maybe could be consolidated?
Mr. Kelly. Yes, I think there probably is potential there
for consolidation. It is difficult for me to talk about it
because, as I say, the feedback that we have had has been all
positive as far as sending people out to the Consortium
schools, but most likely there is a possibility of
consolidation as to the way you send people.
The point that you made, Mr. Chairman, about being able to
do some regional training, I certainly support that. I like the
concept of training the trainers, sending the trainers back,
and having us do it on a local level. It saves us time and it
is going to enable us to reach more people more quickly.
To a certain extent, we do that. We would like to do more
of it. Any way that we can do that on perhaps on the
certification level, where we can do even some of the core
training that is going on in some of these other locations, I
think that should be explored. But in terms of quality, we like
the quality that we are getting at the Consortium schools. I
want to emphasize that, but perhaps there is potential there
for us to take that structure and do it at a more local level.
Mr. Cox. What has been your experience with certification,
with trying to get your own courses certified?
Mr. Kelly. As I said before, ultimately we can do it, but
it takes a long time.
Mr. Cox. Specifically, have you had anything approved by
DHS?
Mr. Kelly. We have had approvals. Again, I spoke about the
Cohort COBRA training which worked very well for us. We wanted
to do that before the Republican National Convention. DHS was
very cooperative in that regard. We had that course certified
and they worked with us and we were able to train 12,000 of our
police officers. COBRA stands for chemical, biological and
radiological response training. We did that in a smoke
environment. We did it with a subway car. They were very
helpful in that regard, and we did receive federal funding to
enable us to do it. That is an example that worked very well as
far as collaboratively and cooperatively getting a
certification done quickly.
Mr. Cox. The reason I ask this question is I am looking at
data that tells me that there have been 23 requests to ODP for
additions to the list of eligible federal terrorism training
courses. Of those requests nationwide, thus far only three have
been approved. There have been 115 requests for
institutionalization by state administrative agencies or state
training point of contacts. Of those 115 requests received for
institutionalization, three have been approved.
So I do not know why there are so many denials or so much
work in progress, but I just want to find out from your
standpoint where the city has a lot more that it wants to do
here that it is looking forward to.
Mr. Kelly. Those numbers surprise me. My belief is that we
had several certifications that were granted, but it just took
an extended period of time. So those numbers are a surprise to
me.
Mr. Cox. I am actually happy to hear that. I am glad that
this experience that seems to be described by these statistics
is not New York City's experience.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. King. Thank you, Mr. Cox.
Mr. Thompson?
Mr. Thompson. Thank you very much.
Mr. Commissioner, you gave us significant food for thought
on how to do it right. I just wish we could get DHS to adopt
the New York model and we would be further along.
Do you agree that while DHS provides standards for
equipment, that they should promulgate the standards for
training?
Mr. Kelly. I think that would be helpful. I think to a
certain extent they do, but perhaps it has to be better
clarified and more clearly published.
Mr. Thompson. So you see the need to have some national
standard for training?
Mr. Kelly. Yes, sir.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you.
In your experience with DHS on getting reimbursed for funds
expended in whatever program, do you have any knowledge of how
long that normally takes to get reimbursed for any eligible
program that is under DHS?
Mr. Kelly. Well, the reimbursement process is a protracted
one. We have to go through the state, which is problematic as
well. We are applying through the state. The money comes
through the state. It is both a federal and a state issue. I
think for us sometimes the money is held up with the state as
well. But reimbursement seems to take sometimes a significant
period.
Mr. Thompson. Do you have a guesstimate of how long that
normally takes?
Mr. Kelly. I hear that from our Office of Management and
Budget, outside of the Police Department, because the
reimbursement does not come directly to the department. It
comes through the City of New York. So I do not have a specific
time, but there is kind of a steady lament that it takes an
extended period of time to get reimbursed. There is a belief
that there is money in the pipeline that is not spent, when in
actuality what it is is money that just simply has not been
reimbursed in a timely fashion. But that is what our budget
people say.
Mr. Thompson. One of the comments we hear quite often is
that if cities without the resource capacity perhaps as New
York, expend the money, if there is an inordinate amount of
time between when the money comes back, it puts them in a bind.
Mr. Kelly. Yes, sir.
Mr. Thompson. Obviously, New York might have enough reserve
to make up the difference. Call the Congressman, right? I hope
you understand my question.
Mr. Kelly. I do. I understand it. Yes, sir. Certainly, for
smaller cities, it can be an issue. I believe it is an issue
for New York as well, but as I say it does not impact directly
on the Police Department. It is the overall budget of the city.
Mr. Thompson. To what extent have you utilized the federal
training facilities for your department?
Mr. Kelly. When you say ``federal training,'' again we
talked about the Consortium located in Anniston, New Mexico, in
Nevada, LSU and Texas. We send most of our people to either
Anniston, New Mexico or to Nevada. I believe we have sent a few
people, a small number to FLETC in Georgia, but generally
speaking those are the facilities that are people use.
Mr. Thompson. Your comment to us is that you are satisfied
with the training they receive at those facilities?
Mr. Kelly. Yes, sir. I am satisfied with the quality of the
training, yes, sir.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you.
Mr. King. Mr. Simmons?
Mr. Simmons. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Commissioner.
Mr. Kelly. Yes, sir.
Mr. Simmons. As somebody who was born and raised in New
York City, but then moved to Connecticut, I want to tell you
what a great job you are doing. It makes me proud to see what
the NYPD is doing before, during and after 9/11. I think the
challenges you face are extraordinary, as are the challenges of
probably half a dozen of our biggest cities, but New York in
particular because New York is a target. New York is a city of
diverse population, massive diverse population, so there are
many challenges there.
I want to focus on three parts of your testimony. The first
part was your reference to first preventers as opposed to first
responders. We tend to think in terms of what do we do if. That
is after the fact. The concept of a first preventer is how do
we prevent the incident from taking place in the first place.
If we could have prevented 9/11, 3,000 people would be alive
today.
Secondly, your reference to the Intelligence Division and
all the terrific things that your Intelligence Division is
doing. I support that and I share the views of some of my
colleagues who think that the New York Police Department has
moved faster to respond in this area than certain components of
our federal government. I congratulate you on that.
And then the third piece has to do with vehicle-borne
improved explosive devices, to which I would add ship-borne
because New York City is surrounded by substantial bodies of
water.
What I would like to do is back up a little bit and tell
you something that I did about a year ago when I was in New
York City. I went to the New York Public Library. I know there
is a lot of controversy over libraries. I went to the New York
Public Library and asked for their records on the subway system
and underground railroads. I discovered after a few minutes of
inquiry that I could access very substantial documents in the
New York Public Library detailing particularly the underground
railroad system. I think their collection there is probably one
of the best in the city, but also substantial engineering
records and documentation on the subway system.
So my question is this. New York is an old city. It is a
city with historic structures like the Brooklyn Bridge. Many of
the documents relative to those structures, which can be
targets, are available to the public in public places like
libraries. What mechanism do you use to tip off the
Intelligence Division is somebody is accessing those records,
if any? Do you have a mechanism for that at all?
Mr. Kelly. We do not.
Mr. Simmons. Should we consider that? I know this is a
difficult question and you may want to postpone your response,
but it certainly bothers me. If we are going to be first
preventers, we have to use a little imagination to figure out
what the bad guys are after. We know they are after the
Brooklyn Bridge. That has been demonstrated. There may be some
other targets. And then where are they going to learn about
those targets? What I am suggesting is there is a lot of
information publicly available in public places like public
libraries. How do you intersect with those entities, if at all?
Mr. Kelly. I guess the answer is with great difficulty. We
do not, and again there is so much information available on the
Internet where there really is no potential way of keeping
records of who gets certain information. So I guess it is just
the free and open society that we live in that causes us this
concern. I cannot think of any reasonable, practical way of
controlling flows of information.
I know that we looked at information on the transit system.
We looked at it on the Internet, I should say. We looked it up
when this issue surfaced a few years ago, and actually, it is
interesting you should mention, on the Brooklyn Bridge, because
there is an awful lot of specific information that is just
publicly available and you can get it on the Internet without
going into a library, without someone seeing your face or
presenting a card. So I think it is just a reality of the world
that we live in. I cannot think of a practical way, quite
frankly, of addressing it.
Mr. Simmons. I will just follow on with an additional
comment or question. As the Chairman of the Intelligence and
Information Sharing Subcommittee, this is an issue that we
wrestle with as well. We certainly support civil liberties and
civil rights, but my daughter lives in Brooklyn. She crosses
the bridge twice a day. I would hate to think that she might
die because somebody got some details on the bridge to blow it
up out of a public place and we had no way of knowing that.
Information sharing, you say you are getting no money from
the feds, at least not directly. Are you getting intelligence
or other types of information sharing from the federal
government?
Mr. Kelly. Yes, we are. We are getting it through our
presence on the Joint Terrorism Task Force. We are getting it
directly with the Central Intelligence Agency on appropriate
matters. So we are sharing information. We would always like
more. There is always that little jousting that goes around
about certain issues, but generally speaking we are sharing
information. I want to stress that it is a two-way flow. We are
gathering information and we are forwarding it to the federal
government as well.
Mr. Simmons. Thank you for your testimony and your service.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing.
Mr. Kelly. Thank you, sir.
Mr. King. Mr. Dicks?
Mr. Dicks. Commissioner, I want to welcome you and commend
you on your efforts to create this Intelligence Division. When
did this happen? When did you do it actually?
Mr. Kelly. We have always had an Intelligence Division,
``always'' being for many, many years in the New York City
Police Department. What we did was focus a part of the
Intelligence Division on the issue of terrorism.
Mr. Dicks. When did that happen?
Mr. Kelly. It happened post-9/11. It happened at the
beginning of this Administration, Mayor Bloomberg's
Administration, starting in January of 2002.
Mr. Dicks. Again, how many people do you have in the
counterterrorism part of the Intelligence Division?
Mr. Kelly. We have a Counterterrorism Bureau which has 250
people, and we have an Intelligence Division that has about 500
people in it. We have in each of our precincts and subunits we
have an intelligence officer who is part of that Intelligence
Division. And then we have part of the Intelligence Division
that focuses just on counterterrorism issues.
Mr. Dicks. This has been pretty successful? In your
testimony, you point out several situations where your people
found information, acted on it, and were able to be first
preventers.
Mr. Kelly. Yes, sir.
Mr. Dicks. How many other police departments? I mean, you
know pretty much what is going on around the country. Do any
other police departments have a similar counterterrorism
entity?
Mr. Kelly. I think similar in concept, not in size, of
course. We are the largest police department by far in the
country, but there are efforts in this area in other major
police departments throughout the country.
Mr. Dicks. Now, as you said, you got no money from the
federal government in creating this counterterrorism entity. Is
that correct?
Mr. Kelly. That is correct, yes, sir.
Mr. Dicks. Do you think you should have gotten some
support? Do you think that would be helpful if the federal
government provided help in this area?
Mr. Kelly. Sure. We would appreciate it, but again this is
kind of new territory. Police departments have not done this in
the past, so I understand there may be some lag I this regard.
But I think it is worthy of examination for the federal
government to come in and see where they might help.
Mr. Dicks. I think this is a big force multiplier for our
intelligence effort. I spent 8 years on the Intelligence
Committee here in the House of Representatives and one of the
things we worried about was the fact that down at the state and
local level, you need to get this information, but if you do
not have an entity that is out there working to gather this
information, and I am glad you brought in some top intelligence
people and are working on the language issues. To me, I think
this is something that would help our entire intelligence
effort in our major cities. We already have the Urban Areas
Program, of some special concern, but it would seem to me that
this is a way to help prevent an incident from occurring.
There is no doubt in my mind that the FBI, the
Counterterrorism Center, all these different entities would
benefit by having your professional people who are in
coordination with them, giving them information. It seems to me
this is something we ought to really look at as a way to
enhance our intelligence side of the equation.
Mr. Kelly. Yes, sir. I agree.
Mr. Dicks. But it gets down to money, as we found out in
this homeland security issue. There is never enough money to do
all these things, but this one, it seems to me, if you can
prevent these incidents from happening, this is something that
we ought to really seriously consider doing.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. King. Thank you, Mr. Dicks.
Mr. Shays from Connecticut?
Mr. Shays. Thank you.
Mr. Kelly, your folks during the Republican Convention did
an awesome job. They were polite. They were courteous. They
were extraordinarily competent, the firemen and-women as well.
It was one of the more impressive times that I have felt and
seen public officials do their job in what was a really
difficult and challenging circumstance.
Mr. Kelly. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Shays. I would like to know what you feel the public
has a right to know and how you decide that. For instance, if
you have been told by the federal government that there is a
possible terrorist threat in your city; you have been told to
look out for radiological material, that there might be a so-
called ``dirty'' bomb. And you have been told in what venue it
might occur. What responsibility do you have? How do you
decide? And who decides? Does the Mayor decide? Do you decide?
Is it a combination?
Mr. Kelly. That is a difficult question. I think we have a
bias towards informing the public, putting information out, but
you can do great harm. You can make a high-regret decision, as
it is called, by putting out information when it lacks
specificity. So I think you have to look at the source, if you
can determine the source, the general credibility of the
threat; the specificity of the threat; and make a determination
as to when this information goes forward. Ultimately, the Mayor
would be the one who would make a decision on something very
serious and widespread.
Mr. Shays. This committee has weighed-in in I think a very
constructive way. It has weighed-in in saying that the
allocation of dollars should be based on risk and need, rather
than based on population. You have answered obviously to the
question that you agree.
I would be interested if you would pass judgment on
something else this committee weighed-in on. We basically have
said that we want the warning system to be more than just
colors; that we want it to be more specific; we want it to be
able to say when it can where the risk is; and we also want
there to be information provided to people as to how they might
respond to that risk. I am not talking in great specific
detail, but in other words instead of saying we are at code
orange or we are code yellow, we want to define ``yellow'' and
we want to define ``orange'' to folks so they have a better
idea of what it means.
What is your sense of that?
Mr. Kelly. Yes, I think I would agree. The problem is that
intelligence does not come in neat packages and it lacks
specificity. As I say, we usually do not know the credibility
of the source. So you get information that says something bad
is going to happen. It lacks specificity.
Mr. Shays. Let me ask you this, then. What is the value of
telling someone that we are in code orange when they do not
know what the heck it means?
Mr. Kelly. Well, this is something that I think is being
debated now by the Department of Homeland Security. I think
they are trying to come up with a system that is more specific,
is more helpful. But this was done early on, after 9/11. I
think it was a valid attempt to have a system in place to alert
the public and it may have outlived its usefulness now. I think
it is an emerging belief that you can feel in government. But
we do not have as yet, as far as I know, on the drawing board a
system that is more effective.
Mr. Shays. But what we did do more recently is we, the
federal government in conjunction with the communities, for
instance when we thought there was a threat to financial
institutions, instead of making this broad, sweeping warning,
we said financial institutions appear to be a target and we are
paying closer attention to that. That makes sense, does it not?
Mr. Kelly. Yes. Last August, that is what happened and I
think that was the appropriate thing to do then.
Mr. Shays. Thank you, sir.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. King. Mr. Kelly, isn't New York City always in code
orange?
Mr. Kelly. We are at higher level of alert. The system came
in after we went to a higher level and we maintain that higher
level, so it is kind of a shorthand way of saying that is what
we are doing. But after 9/11, New York put in a lot of
additional security and we have maintained that. So saying we
are at code orange is a shorthand way of saying that is what we
are doing.
Mr. King. The gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. Etheridge?
Mr. Etheridge. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Commissioner, thank you for being here with us this
morning.
Let me follow that one up for just a moment because I
think, only for just a follow-up, because I think in terms of
many of us who have been somewhat concerned about the codes
because if you live in rural North Carolina or rural mid-
America and the code goes up, what it tends to do, I think, and
I would be interested in your comments, is to develop a level
of cynicism. Pretty soon, people pay no attention to what the
codes are because, number one, it does not affect them; and
number two, they are not moving around. I think it bleeds into
other areas.
I think the example of the banking institutions or
financial institutions are a good example that we probably
ought to pay a lot more attention to as we look at this code. I
would be interested in your additional comments on that,
because you are out there where the rubber meets the road.
Mr. Kelly. I agree, but the intelligence information was
such that it focused directly on financial institutions. So you
are able to do that. That is what I said, most of this
information when it comes down the pike lacks specificity. In
this case, we had very specific information focusing on
financial institutions, so I think it was done in an
appropriate fashion last August. I think we now need a more
sophisticated way of doing it.
Mr. Etheridge. Having said about the information coming
down, let me ask a little different way a question that was
asked by Congressman Dicks a little earlier. You have talked
about, and I commend you for what you are doing in New York
because I do think New York and some of our major cities are
still on a high level of targeting.
You mentioned in your testimony that you would like for the
federal government to support, to train qualified intelligence
analysts and operatives for the police department. My question
is this, do you think other cities ought to be doing some of
the same things, and in the process of that, as you do it in
New York?
Mr. Kelly. I think major cities, large cities.
Mr. Etheridge. As you do it in New York, are you sharing
that with other jurisdictions, your fire, your rescue, the
other first responders who are part of that? As you gather that
data, how does that get to them?
Mr. Kelly. When it is appropriate, yes we do.
Mr. Etheridge. And it goes up the line to Homeland Security
and back to you, and you share that data?
Mr. Kelly. Yes. Yes, sir. Are you talking about
intelligence information we gather?
Mr. Etheridge. Yes.
Mr. Kelly. We have a process, a system where we would go to
the FBI or to Homeland Security when appropriate.
Mr. Etheridge. Okay. And then that is shared with local
jurisdictions within the New York region?
Mr. Kelly. When it is appropriate, yes, sir.
Mr. Etheridge. Okay. Let me shift to another question, if I
may. You talked about, and I think it is impressive that you
talk about training the trainer. I think that is one that I
first ran into in education that works very effectively when it
is followed with guidelines and procedures. Given the vastness
of America and the differences from New York to other rural
areas across this country, as people and things move, the risk
to America can be different, but it can be the same because
many of the people who wound up creating all the problems on 9/
11 came to New York from areas that were not anywhere near as
well-occupied as the city.
My question is, as we provide the oversight, I would be
interested in your comments on how Homeland Security overall
training integrates with the smaller departments where you only
have one, two, three, four, five or a lot of volunteers in some
cases, because that is just as important in some cases to New
York City where you have an awful lot of people in place, and a
sophisticated system. To me, that is where I think a lot of our
vulnerabilities still lie. I would be interested in your
comments.
Mr. Kelly. I think in that case, you are talking about
training, it has to be done on the state level. The states have
to make a determination as to who is appropriate in the state
to receive that sort of training. I hear what you are saying is
we need listening posts everywhere because any piece of
information can prove of value gathered in North Carolina, and
of value to New York, for instance. We understand that. So we
need a system to get that information.
I think to a certain extent the FBI has created that. We
now have a Joint Terrorist Task Force component in every one of
their offices, ever SAC office in the country, and 56 of them
have a Joint Terrorist Task Force. They are certainly in North
Carolina as well. But in terms of training, I think the
training for that has to be done at a state level and the state
is going to have to make a determination as to who should be
involved in it because there are finite resources.
Mr. Etheridge. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. King. Thank you, Mr. Etheridge.
The gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. Dent?
Mr. Dent. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Good morning, Mr. Commissioner.
I am fascinated by your Intelligence Division and what you
have done up there in New York. I guess my principal question
is this. What is it that your detectives are doing in those
cities overseas? I am pleased that you have them over there.
What are they able to discover or learn that we are maybe not
receiving from our federal intelligence officials who may be
based overseas? I would like to learn a little bit more about
that.
Mr. Kelly. Again, as I said before, we are not looking to
supplant anybody. We are looking to supplement.
Mr. Dent. I understand.
Mr. Kelly. New York, of course, has been attacked
successfully twice in the last 12 years. We are looking for any
bit of information we can get that gives a leg up in New York.
They have gotten some front row seats to major investigations
that are ongoing. For instance, our detective in Tel Aviv, if
there is an event, a suicide bombing, he is there within the
hour. He gives us very specific information. He works very
closely with the Israeli authorities. We have real-time
information that comes back to New York that day. You are not
getting that from other agencies.
In the Madrid bombing case, it took place on March 11,
2004. That day, we had, and it happened to be the same
investigator from Tel Aviv, we had him in Madrid. We found out
how the bombs had been constructed, where they were put
together. We put a tactical approach in place that same day or
12 hours later around our transit facilities, at our subway
stops for instance, to be on the lookout for that type of
activity.
That is the kind of real-time information that we are
getting from our people overseas.
Mr. King. Will the gentleman yield for a moment?
Commissioner Kelly, were you there before or after the FBI
in Madrid?
Mr. Kelly. We happened to be there that day. We dispatched
someone that day. We also had a team there the next day from
the U.S. that we sent. But we feel we are in the crosshairs, so
as I say we are looking for any bit of information. These
detectives, they are charged with the responsibility of asking
the New York question. Is New York somehow involved directly or
indirectly in the event that happened there or an investigation
that is ongoing there?
Mr. Dent. Okay. And how do you determine what cities you
selected to place your detectives?
Mr. Kelly. Obviously, we need a receptive environment. We
need a law enforcement entity that is going to accept us and
have us work closely with them. So that is part of it. There
are certain locations we are concerned about, obviously Canada
being our neighbor to the north. We have the famous case of
Ahmed Ressam who came through the State of Washington in 1999.
He was in Montreal and then went over there. He as the
Millennium bomber. So Canada is an area that we look to get
information from. The UK, we have detectives there. They have
been very supportive and worked very, very closely with us.
That is an area of concern. London looks an awful lot like New
York in many ways. It has a very complex, big underground
transit system. We want to be there. Tel Aviv, of course, is an
area of concern to us.
So we look at locations where we think it is going to be
helpful for us and then we talk to those governments, and if
they are receptive, then so be it.
Mr. Dent. Thank you, Mr. Commissioner. I do understand what
you are doing there is supplemental, complementary to what our
intelligence agencies are doing. I just am very, very impressed
by your department and have been for many, many years, by the
level of sophistication and preparedness that you have provided
to the citizens of your city and to this country over the
years. Thank you.
Mr. Kelly. Thank you, sir.
Mr. King. Ms. Jackson-Lee, a former New Yorker.
Ms. Jackson-Lee. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.
With that spirit, I want to thank Commissioner Kelly. We
have found opportunity to work together over a number of years
in the capacities that you have served the nation. Might I add
my appreciation for your service and the hard knocks that you
have taken in the course of that service. There are many of us
that appreciate very much what you are doing.
And this hearing, let me thank the Ranking Members and the
Chairman of this committee and as well the Ranking and Chairman
of the full committee.
I am going to offer some anecdotal stories and really going
to focus on law enforcement.
Mr. King. Would the gentlelady just yield for one moment.
The procedure we are going to follow, Mr. Rogers is going to go
over and vote now. There is only one vote on, so we can try and
keep the hearing going.
The gentlelady from Texas?
Ms. Jackson-Lee. I thank the Chairman very much.
Texas has a unique situation, so let me pose these
questions quickly. One, I would like just a general question of
are we doing enough. You may have answered it, but I would like
to hear, are we doing enough, particularly in light of the plan
that we are supposed to offer about interrelatedness in terms
of a plan of the first responders, this 2002 reported plan that
the Homeland Security is supposed to have in terms of the
interrelatedness of first responders having a plan of how they
work together.
The other question is that you spoke earlier of your wish
to authorize self-certification by states in certain emergency
preparedness disciplines. If all states are able to self-
certify, how would you address the need for coordination of a
nationwide methodology?
My last point, down on the southern border, you may have
heard of the intense violence around Nuevo Laredo, which is on
the Mexican side, and Laredo. A lot of that has to do with drug
trafficking and drug cartels, but I always know that where
there are drugs and money there is the potential for terrorism.
So law enforcement that may be dealing with drugs needs to
understand terrorism.
The other component is self-law enforcement. I mean that by
groups like the Minutemen, who are intruding themselves into
the process that may cause some difficulties. Would you comment
on the need for enhanced training in light of the frustration
of Americans that generate the creation of groups like the
Minutemen and do you find them necessary and effective, if we
can be more effective in our training and our resources for our
law enforcement and our firefighters, of course, who are not in
the midst of fighting battles, but they are certainly in the
midst of saving lives.
Mr. Kelly. I think it is a question of resources. Having
been the Customs Commissioner, I have some experience with the
border. We were short of resources, certainly, when I was there
and I think that is probably still an issue, although I think
it has gone up somewhat in head count. There is no longer a
Customs Service. There is Customs and Border Protection now. It
has merged with Border Patrol.
But I think it probably still is an issue of resources.
There are probably not enough people down there and that is why
you get the frustration of the public trying to get involved. I
think we need a major investment in protecting our borders. You
need the people to do it. There are no gimmicks involved. You
need an investment in having sufficient resources to do it.
Ms. Jackson-Lee. And you would substitute the people for
the Minutemen?
Mr. Kelly. Yes, absolutely. You substitute professional
full-time employees for volunteers.
As far as the self-certification and coordination is
concerned, by asking for self-certification I certainly do not
want to diminish the role of the Department of Homeland
Security. That is where the coordination comes in. That is
where the oversight comes in. As was mentioned before, national
training standards are perhaps needed. So I think that is how
you address the issue of having some overarching coordination
and control of what is going on.
Ms. Jackson-Lee. With that, I yield back.
I thank you very much.
Mr. King. The gentleman from Texas, Mr. McCaul?
Mr. McCaul. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First, I want to say how much I enjoyed the visit up to
Ground Zero and the visit with you personally. I thank the
Chairman for setting up that codel up to New York. I learned a
lot about the impressive operation that you have up there, that
first and foremost.
Mr. Kelly. Thank you.
Mr. McCaul. Since we have votes, I am going to get right to
the questions. That is, I worked in the Justice Department with
the Joint Terrorism Task Force. I know the model. I am not a
believer that one size fits all in the federal government; that
you can use a cookie cutter approach to everything across the
nation.
I want to get your thoughts on how that is operating in New
York. I know we talked a little bit about that, the model in
general; that there may be some elements of discussion with
regard to how it applies in New York.
Secondly, your coordination with the National
Counterterrorism Center, is it working effectively and if not
what needs to be done to make this work so that we get that
information to the state and local level?
Mr. Kelly. We do have coordination with the National
Center. Again, it has been changing. It had some different
configurations in there, but we do have coordination. We get it
through the FBI. We also have it directly through our
Intelligence Division. So I do not see a major issue there. We
are all learning as we go along. I think there are certainly
people of goodwill there who want to cooperate with us; see us
as a value-added; that we are getting information and
information should go upstream and we are doing that. We are
working to improve that.
Mr. McCaul. Okay. And with respect to the Joint Terrorism
Task Forces, is that model working in New York or how can that
be improved?
Mr. Kelly. We have a discussion up there. I think ideally
we should have a model that looks like the Drug Enforcement
Task Forces, where you have a marbleized approach where
everyone is in one entity, where you have supervisors, if you
recognize supervisors, they are in supervisory positions
irrespective of their agencies.
What you have now is in essence an FBI entity with members
of the Joint Terrorist Task Force appended to it, added on in
their own structure, unlike the Drug Enforcement Task Force
where you have integration, where you have supervisors from
various agencies supervising personnel from different agencies.
Mr. McCaul. Are you talking about the HIDA program, is that
what you are referring to?
Mr. Kelly. HIDA is obviously information sharing, but HIDA
does have a more integrated approach. I point to the Drug
Enforcement Task Force, I think it has worked. It is a model
that has worked for many years and works well in New York. The
Joint Terrorist Task Force I think is effective, but ideally we
should have more integration.
Mr. McCaul. I think that is something that this committee
should take a look at. I appreciate your time here today.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. King. Commissioner Kelly, if we can impose on you, I
believe there is only one more member on our side who has
question to ask, Sheriff Reichert, who had been the Sheriff of
King County in the State of Washington. He went over to vote,
so he can come back to ask questions.
I am going to call the committee to be in recess until
Chairman Rogers comes back, and then it will be Congressman
Reichert and then you will be excused.
Mr. Kelly. Yes, sir.
Mr. King. If you could just hang on for another 10 or 15
minutes.
The committee stands in recess.
[Recess.]
Mr. Rogers. [Presiding.] If I could reconvene this.
At this time, the Chair recognizes the gentleman from
Washington, Mr. Reichert, for any questions he may have.
Mr. Reichert. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First of all, thank you for your service. I was the sheriff
of King County in Seattle up until January 3rd, so I am missing
the role that you play in a much larger scale.
I have to say that I had the opportunity to attend national
executive classes over my 8 years as sheriff in Seattle with
some members of the New York Police Department. And I would,
again, echo my colleague's comments about the professionalism,
commitment to duty and compassion they have to serve the
public. And they are just the highest caliber people. So I
thought you might appreciate hearing that.
I just want to touch on a couple of quick things and not
hold you too much longer. I know you have a busy schedule also.
When you talk about national standards, national training
standards, how do you see those standards being developed
across the nation? What kind of a process, in your opinion,
might be used to help develop those standards?
Mr. Kelly. I think a process would have to be driven by the
Department of Homeland Security. I don't think it is that
complicated. I think you can reach general consensus on best
practices, but it has to be controlled and you have to have
kind of a coalescing entity. And I would say Homeland Security
can do that. You might have a conference of first responders?I
think it would be easy to pick out the appropriate people to go
to a conference like that. I don't think it is difficult to do,
put it that way. And I think you kind of know them when you see
them. It is just a question of doing it.
Mr. Reichert. So you see the National Sheriffs' Association
having a role in helping to set those standards?
Mr. Kelly. Sure. I think certainly it would be appropriate
to ask them to participate, yes.
Mr. Reichert. We, in Seattle, participated in TOPOFF, which
was quite an expensive exercise, and I know that you have
participated in similar training exercises. What is the role of
the federal government as far as their financial role, I should
say. I know what their role is in helping to come in and
develop the scenario, et cetera. But financially, how does it
impact your police department, your city, your police
department's budget and do you get any financial help from the
federal agencies in pulling off one of these exercises?
Mr. Kelly. Well, we do not get financial help, quite
frankly. Let me take that back. There are some. TOPOFF
obviously is the major one mandated by Congress. We do get some
money through our Office of Emergency Management to run some
exercises, but we do a lot of our own training and a lot of our
own exercises, our own agency exercises without any federal
funding.
So we are doing it. Would we like money? Sure, but we are
still getting it done. But there are major exercises in New
York City, multi-agency exercises in which we do get federal
money. I think there is money from FEMA that helps in that
regard. That money for the most part comes through our Office
of Emergency Management.
Mr. Reichert. What percentage of your budget do you suppose
that you now spend on homeland security efforts?
Mr. Kelly. We spend about $178 million a year. That is our
estimate for counterterrorism. That would be both overtime and
straight time, you might say opportunity costs, salary of
people who are doing that sort of work. We have about a $3.5
billion a year budget.
Mr. Reichert. Did the city give you an increase of $178
million in your budget to address these issues?
Mr. Kelly. No, sir.
Mr. Reichert. I knew that would be your answer.
[Laughter.]
We had a similar experience in Seattle.
So the $178 million came from somewhere. What did you have
to give up with your Police Department? What services did you
have to cut in order to come up with $178 million?
Mr. Kelly. That is a good question. Obviously, if you have
people doing a certain function, they are not doing the normal
patrol function or investigative function. We are down, as a
snapshot of where we are now in the department, we are down
5,000 police officers from where we were in October, 2000, plus
we have this 1,000 redeployed for counterterrorism. So when you
say ``where does it come from,'' the 5,000 of course comes from
all over the organization, as the 1,000 does as well. You have
fewer people on patrol, fewer people doing normal
investigations, fewer people doing traffic control.
Mr. Reichert. So some of it is paid because of salary
savings through the 5,000 vacancies that you have.
Mr. Kelly. The 5,000 vacancies that we have are not
vacancies. The headcount has been reduced, the authorized
strength, but not by 5,000. It was reduced less than that. We
have attrition, significant attrition. It is complicated, but
we had a lot of hires in the mid-1980s. We had those hires
because of layoffs in the 1970s. We waited until the 1980s to
do it. But now you can retire in 20 years in the New York City
Police Department, so we have historically consistent
attrition, but it is large numbers. So we attrition down and we
hire up.
We have right now in the Police Academy, we have 1,700
recruits in our Police Academy class. They will graduate next
month. We will hire another 1,600, well actually we are going
to hire them before they graduate. So we are meeting the needs
of the department based on a 37,038 authorized headcount. When
you look back to October of 2000, the headcount was over
40,000. So the authorized headcount was reduced because of the
budget problems that the city is facing.
Mr. Reichert. I have follow-up questions, but I see my time
has expired, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. King. [Presiding.] Thank you, Mr. Reichert.
Mr. Kelly, thank you very much for your testimony today. It
is, as always, a tremendous addition to the committee.
Any further comment, Mr. Rogers?
Mr. Rogers. I would just say that the City of New York is
fortunate, and our nation is fortunate, to have you in this
capacity, and I appreciate your making the time to be here. It
has been a great benefit to me, and I know the rest of the
committee as well.
Mr. Kelly. Thank you very much, sir.
Mr. King. The witness is excused. Thank you.
Mr. Kelly. Thank you, sir.
Mr. King. I will call the second panel please.
I thank each of the witnesses on panel two for being here
today. In the interest of time, we will get right to the
testimony.
I recognize Shawn Reese, Analyst in American National
Government and Government Finance Division of the Congressional
Research Service. Mr. Reese?
STATEMENT OF SHAWN REESE
Mr. Reese. Chairman King, Chairman Rogers, and members of
the subcommittees, I would like to thank you for this
opportunity to appear before you today to discuss federal
counterterrorism training.
My summary presents a brief overview of federal
counterterrorism training aimed at illustrating the range of
such training offered by the federal government. My summary
also presents areas that may merit oversight to assess whether
such training programs are appropriate in scope or possibly
redundant. I also have two visual aids that I think they are
going to set up now to present, which are examples of DHS and
federal government counterterrorism entities. It is not
comprehensive.
Federal counterterrorism training programs are varied and
are provided by numerous federal agencies, among which are the
Departments of Defense, Energy, Homeland Security, Health and
Human Services, Justice, and Transportation, and the
Environmental Protection Agency. Each department or agency
provides counterterrorism training, targeting specific
categories of recipients such as federal, state and local
government personnel, emergency responders, and private and
public critical infrastructure personnel.
The mission of the Department of Homeland Security to
secure the nation from terrorist attacks gives it primary
federal responsibility for providing counterterrorism training
to federal, state and local emergency responders. Additionally,
Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8, National
Preparedness, requires the DHS Secretary, in coordination with
appropriate federal departments and agencies, to establish and
maintain a comprehensive national training program. The
national program is to identify standards and maximize the
effectiveness of existing federal preparedness programs.
The Department of Homeland Security comprises numerous
agencies, offices, institutes and partners that provide
counterterrorism training. DHS training is provided by such
facilities as the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center, the
National Fire Academy, the Noble Training Center and the
Emergency Management Institute. Additionally, DHS administers
training programs provided by the National Domestic
Preparedness Consortium and the Training Resources and Data
Exchange Group.
The Office for Domestic Preparedness, which has primary
responsibility within DHS for preparing for potential terrorist
attacks against the United States, is the principal DHS agency
providing counterterrorism training to states and localities.
Now I would like to briefly discuss possible policy
questions concerning counterterrorism training for
congressional oversight. In the evolution of counterterrorism
training, a number of questions have arisen with regard to
possible duplication of training programs. The questions and
possible approaches might be of interest as you continue your
oversight of counterterrorism training. As you know, CRS takes
no position with respect to any of the possible approaches
mentioned.
The first question is the potential duplication of DHS
training. Within DHS, the Office for Domestic Preparedness and
the Federal Emergency Management Agency administer training
programs at the state and local level and at national training
institutes such as the Emergency Management Institute and the
National Fire Academy. The Office for Domestic Preparedness
administers training through such entities as the National
Domestic Preparedness Consortium.
Some training programs offered by the Emergency Management
Institute, the National Fire Academy and the Consortium have
subject matter that is similar such as incident management,
homeland security planning, hazardous material response,
emergency operations and weapons of mass destruction response.
Because of the possible similarity of the training programs,
some might argue for the need to consolidate or coordinate
training offered by DHS.
Section six of H.R. 1544, Faster and Smarter Funding for
First Responders, proposes an evaluation by the Government
Accountability Office. If Congress were to find undesirable
redundancy in DHS training, it could require DHS to establish a
board or task force to review training and recommend
coordination or other steps to reduce potential duplication. If
Congress were to determine a need to consolidate DHS training,
it could require the Department of Homeland Security to conduct
a review of its counterterrorism training and develop a plan to
consolidate it. This approach, however, might be seen as
impractical due to the training FEMA provides state and local
emergency managers that is specific to natural disasters; the
specific training the National Fire Academy provides
firefighters; and the training that the Office for Domestic
Preparedness provides to law enforcement personnel.
The second and final policy question I would like to
address is the potential duplication of federal
counterterrorism training. Again because of rapid evolution of
training programs offered by different federal departments and
agencies, there may be a duplication of certain types of
training. For example, the Departments of Homeland Security and
Health and Human Services and the Environmental Protection
Agency all offer training related to responding to hazardous
material incidents. Congress could ask the Government
Accountability Office to undertake an evaluation of all federal
counterterrorism training programs, similar to its request to
GAO to evaluate DHS training.
Finally, Congress might direct the federal departments and
agencies that provide counterterrorism training to establish an
interagency task force or board to review their training.
Presently, Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8 requires
DHS to coordinate training with other federal departments and
agencies as part of its administration of the national training
program. This approach, however, could result in turf disputes
and federal agencies attempting to protect training programs
and the funding associated with them.
In summary, federal counterterrorism training programs are
varied and are provided by numerous federal agencies. Because
of this, there may be a potential for duplication among the
federal government or specifically within DHS.
Thank you, Chairman King and Chairman Rogers. I would
welcome any questions you or the subcommittee may have.
[The statement of Mr. Reese follows:]
Prepared Statement of Shawn Reese
Chairmen King and Rogers, and the Members of the Subcommittees, I
would like to thank you for this opportunity to appear before you today
to discuss federal counter-terrorism training. My statement presents a
brief overview of federal counter-terrorism training aimed at
illustrating the range of such training offered by the federal
government. The statement also presents areas that may merit oversight
to assess whether such training programs are appropriate in scope or
possibly redundant.
Overview
Federal counter-terrorism training programs are varied and are
provided by numerous federal agencies, among which are the Departments
of Defense, Energy, Homeland Security, Health and Human Services,
Justice, and Transportation, and the Environmental Protection Agency.
Each department or agency provides counter-terrorism training targeted
to such specific categories of recipients as federal, state, and local
government personnel, emergency responders, and private and public
critical infrastructure personnel.
The programs train individuals to prepare for, respond to, and
recover from terrorist attacks. Some of the training programs, such as
those of the Departments of Transportation (DOT) and Energy (DOE), and
the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), are designed for personnel
working in critical infrastructure sectors. Other programs, such as
those of the Departments of Defense (DOD) and Homeland Security (DHS),
are intended for personnel who are not identified with specific
critical infrastructure. Instead, DOD and DHS provide training for
government personnel, emergency responders, and medical professionals
who would respond to a terrorist attack, regardless of location or
target. The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) provides
training specifically to medical personnel, but this training is not
targeted to specific critical infrastructure. Instead, HHS provides
training that prepares medical personnel to respond to any disaster,
but especially to terrorist attacks using biological, chemical, and
radiological weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The Department of
Justice (DOJ) provides training specifically for federal, state, and
local law enforcement personnel. Most of these federal departments and
agencies provide training in conjunction with private and public
educational institutions, federal laboratories, and federal research
and development centers.
The mission of DHS to secure the nation from terrorist attacks
gives it primary federal responsibility for providing counter-terrorism
training to federal, state, and local emergency responders.\1\ Other
departments and agencies provide counter-terrorism training, but their
programs focus either on specific critical infrastructure sectors, such
as energy and transportation, or on specific emergency responders, such
as HHS training for medical personnel and DOJ training for law
enforcement personnel. DHS provides training to a wide range of
critical infrastructure personnel, law enforcement and other emergency
responders, government (federal, state, and local) personnel, and
medical personnel.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ P.L. 107-296, Sec. 101(b).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Homeland Security Presidential Directive--8 (HSPD8), issued
December 17, 2003, requires the DHS Secretary, in coordination with the
HHS Secretary, the Attorney General, and other appropriate federal
departments and agencies, and in consultation with state and local
governments, to establish and maintain a comprehensive national
training program. The national training program is to assist federal,
state, and local governments in meeting the Interim National
Preparedness Goal,\2\ which was released in March 2005.\3\ The national
training program is to identify standards and maximize the
effectiveness of existing federal preparedness programs. Additionally,
HSPD-8 directs federal departments and agencies to include private
organizations and entities in the accreditation and delivery of
preparedness training.\4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ U.S. Department of Homeland Security, The Interim National
Preparedness Goal (Washington: Mar. 2005), available at [http://
www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/display?content=4420], visited June 20, 2005.
\3\ Office of the President, Homeland Security Presidential
Directive--8: National Preparedness, (Washington: Dec. 2003), available
at [http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/12/20031217-6.html],
visited June 20, 2005.
\4\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
HSPD-8 also requires the DHS Secretary to develop and maintain a
system to collect, analyze, and disseminate lessons learned, best
practices, and information from exercises and training events, and
establish procedures to improve national preparedness. DHS has
developed what it calls the Lessons Learned Information System (LLIS),
which provides best practices and information from exercises and
training. LLIS, however, does not provide information on how training
is coordinated within DHS, or among federal departments and
agencies.\5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ For further information on LLIS, see [http://www.llis.gov].
Department of Homeland Security
DHS comprises numerous agencies, offices, institutes, and partners
\6\ that provide counter-terrorism training for federal, state, and
local government personnel. DHS training is provided at such facilities
as the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC), National Fire
Academy (NFA), Nobel Training Center (NTC), and Emergency Management
Institute (EMI). FLETC is an interagency law enforcement center that
provides training for federal law enforcement agencies. The Federal
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) administers EMI, NTC, and NFA
training activities. NFA trains fire and emergency response personnel
to enhance their abilities to respond to fires and related emergencies.
EMI is a training program consisting of resident and non-resident
courses aimed at enhancing emergency management practices. NTC is the
national center for health and medical education in disaster, including
acts of terrorism.\7\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ See the list later in the statement.
\7\ U.S. Department of Homeland Security, ``Working with DHS,''
available at [http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/display?theme=82], visited
Oct. 27, 2004.
Office for Domestic Preparedness. The Office for Domestic
Preparedness (ODP), which has the primary responsibility within DHS for
preparing for potential terrorist attacks against the United States,\8\
is the principal DHS agency providing counter-terrorism and WMD
training to states and localities. ODP provides terrorism and WMD
training through DHS training institutions and partners. ODP training
partners include the Training and Data Exchange Group (TRADE), the
National Domestic Preparedness Consortium (NDPC), federal departments,
and private and professional organizations.\9\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ P.L. 107-296 (Homeland Security Act of 2002), Sec. 430(d).
\9\ Department of Homeland Security, Office for Domestic
Preparedness, ``Training Overview,'' available at [http://
www.ojp.usdoj.gov/odp/training.htm], visited Oct. 27, 2004.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
ODP training is designed to meet the varying needs of its training
audiences. It includes reaching multiple emergency responder
disciplines through training at the awareness, performance, planning,
and management levels. ODP uses a variety of approaches that include
traditional classroom methods, train-the-trainer, Web-based training,
and video tele-conferencing.\10\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\10\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Trade. TRADE is a federal interagency group that provides training
to state and local emergency responders and reviews member courses for
consistency, avoidance of training duplication, and the use of up-to-
date training methods. TRADE members include the following:
United States Fire Administration's (USFDA) National
Fire Academy (NFA);
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI);
Department of Justice (DOJ);
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA);
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA);
Department of Energy (DOE);
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS);
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC);
Emergency Management Institute (EMI); and
Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC).\11\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\11\ Ibid.
National Domestic Preparedness Consortium. NDPC is composed of
federal training facilities and academic institutions which provide
training to emergency responders in different locations in the United
States. NDPC members include:
Center for Domestic Preparedness (CDP), at Anniston,
Alabama;
Academy of Counter-Terrorist Education (ACE), at
Louisiana State University (LSU);
National Emergency Response and Rescue Training Center
(NERRTC), at the Texas Engineering Extension Service (TEEX),
Texas A&M University (TAMU);
Energetic Materials Research and Testing Center
(EMRTC), at New Mexico Institute of Mining and Technology
(NMIMT); and
National Center for Exercise Excellence (NCEE), at
Nevada Test Site (NTS).\12\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\12\ Ibid.
Office for Domestic Preparedness Training Partners. In addition to
TRADE and NDPC, ODP has cooperative agreements with other federal
agencies, private industry, academic institutions, and professional
organizations that provide training to federal, state, and local
emergency responders. These partners include the following:
Community Research Associates;
U.S. Army Dugway Proving Ground;
International Association of Fire Fighters;
U.S. Navy's Naval Postgraduate School;
National Sheriff's Association;
General Physics Corporation at Pine Bluff Arsenal;
Science Applications International Corporation;
George Washington University;
Michigan State University;
International Association of Campus Law Enforcement
Administrators; and
International Association of Chiefs of Police.\13\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\13\ U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office for Domestic
Preparedness, ``Training Overview,'' available at [http://
www.ojp.usdoj.gov/odp/training.htm], visited Oct. 27, 2004.
Department of Defense
The majority of the Department of Defense's (DOD) terrorism-related
training courses are dedicated to military personnel. DOD's expertise
and range of training facilities related to chemical, biological,
radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) weapons, however, offer a limited
selection of training programs that are available to non-DOD personnel.
Most of these programs are intended for medical and technical personnel
who could be called upon to respond and treat casualties following an
incident involving CBRN weapons. Several of the training courses are
provided with the joint sponsorship of the American Red Cross. DOD
provides counter-terrorism training to non-DOD personnel at the
following:
U.S. Army Medical Research Institutes for Chemical and
Infectious Diseases, Aberdeen Proving Ground in Maryland, and
Dugway Proving Ground in Utah;
Clara Barton Center for Domestic Preparedness,\14\
U.S. Army Pine Bluff Arsenal in Arkansas;
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
14 Aministered by the American Red Cross and funded through the
Department of Defense.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Armed Forces Radiobiology Research Institute, in
Bethesda, Maryland; and
Joint Interagency Training Center, in San Diego,
California.
Department of Energy
The Department of Energy (DOE) provides technical assistance and
training to states for public safety officials of appropriate units of
local government and Indian tribes through whose jurisdictions DOE
plans to transport spent nuclear fuel or high-level radioactive
waste.\15\ DOE's Office of Environmental Management trains emergency
responders for shipments to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP), and
also provides training through the Transportation Emergency
Preparedness Program (TEPP). Twenty-three states \16\ have received
approximately $30 million in training since 1988 to prepare for
radioactive waste shipments to the WIPP near Carlsbad, New Mexico. The
TEPP has provided technical assistance and training to emergency
responders in 34 states \17\ in the past two years. In FY2002, DOE
provided $5.8 million for training to the states along its major
transportation corridors. DOE estimates that it has trained 16,200
responders since FY1999.\18\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\15\ Section 180(c) of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, 42 U.S.C.
10101.
\16\ AL, AZ, CA, CO, GA, ID, IL, IN, IA, KY, LA, MI, NE, NV, NM,
OH, OR, SC, TN, TX, UT, WA, WY.
\17\ AL, AR, AZ, CA, CT, DE, GA, ID, IL, IN, IA, KY, LA, MD, MI,
MO, NE, NV, NJ, NM, NH, NY, NC, OH, OR, PA, SC, TN, TX, UT, VA, WA, WV,
WY.
\18\ U.S. Department of Transportation, Office of National
Transportation, Corrine Macaluso, ``Office of Civilian Radioactive
Waste Management,'' memorandum, Feb. 5, 2004.
Environmental Protection Agency
To carry out its water sector responsibilities, EPA has established
a Water Security Division within the Office of Ground Water and
Drinking Water. This division works with drinking water and wastewater
utilities, states, tribes, and other stakeholders to improve the
security of these utilities and improve their ability to respond to
security threats and breaches. Among its responsibilities and
activities, the Water Security Division provides security and anti-
terrorism-related technical assistance and training to the water
sector.
EPA's Water Security Division generally does not perform the
training itself; it delivers training at locations across the country
through stakeholder organizations and other federal partners.\19\ EPA
has sponsored training on a variety of security topics, including
courses to help community water systems prepare vulnerability
assessments and emergency response plans, as required by the
Bioterrorism Act (P.L. 107-188).\20\ EPA has entered into an
interagency agreement with the Office of Domestic Preparedness (ODP)
within DHS, under which ODP has provided emergency response training
for medium and large drinking water utilities, first responders, and
local elected officials.\21\ To assist smaller drinking water utilities
not covered by the Bioterrorism Act, EPA has provided funding to the
National Rural Water Association to deliver security training.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\19\ Organizations that provide security training include
professional associations, such as the American Water Works Association
(AWWA), the Water Environment Federation (WEF), and the National Rural
Water Association (NRWA). Congress has provided some grant funds to
these organizations, through EPA, to support their water security
training activities.
\20\ Title IV of the Bioterrorism Act (42 U.S.C. 300i) amended the
Safe Drinking Water Act to require each community water system serving
more than 3,300 individuals to conduct an assessment of the system's
vulnerability to terrorist attacks or other intentional acts to disrupt
the provision of a safe and reliable drinking water supply. These
drinking water systems must submit a copy of the assessment to EPA. The
act also requires these systems to prepare emergency response plans
incorporating the results of the vulnerability assessments no later
than six months after completing the assessments. All utilities covered
by the act were to have completed vulnerability assessments by June 30,
2004. The last statutory deadline for systems to complete emergency
response plans was December 31, 2004.
\21\ Because most water and wastewater utilities are municipally
owned, EPA has made an effort to involve locally elected officials in
first responder training courses.
Department of Health and Human Services
Counter-terrorism training programs supported by the Department of
Health and Human Services (HHS) are aimed at a variety of public health
and health care providers, individuals who provide ancillary health
services such as laboratory testing, and researchers who study health
effects from, or countermeasures to, biological, chemical and
radiological agents. Training programs have a variety of intended
purposes, including assuring the ability to recognize and treat victims
of terrorist events, protecting workers and others from infection or
contamination while care is rendered, protecting critical health care
assets and maintaining electronic and other lines of communication
during catastrophic events, assuring competent laboratory services, and
assuring that certain assets such as radioactive materials or
biological organisms are secured against potential misuse.
All of the HHS agencies listed below have responsibility for
funding and administering specific training programs and assets.
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. CDC is the agency
primarily responsible for the public health response to terrorism and
other public health emergencies. Most extramural training programs at
CDC have been coordinated across centers and offices by the CDC Public
Health Practice Program Office (PHPPO). CDC also supports intramural
training of public health professionals through its Epidemiology
Program Office (EPO). According to a reorganization called the CDC
Futures Initiative, existing PHPPO and EPO training activities are
redistributed to several new organizational units within CDC.\22\ CDC-
funded training programs are developed and delivered in a variety of
ways. CDC is entirely responsible for some programs. Others are
developed and delivered in conjunction with state and local health
departments and academic centers, although some are developed by these
entities with CDC funding but little direct input otherwise.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\22\ See U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention, Futures Initiative Home Page, at
[http://www.cdc.gov/futures/default.htm].
Health Resources Services Administration. The Health Resources and
Services Administration (HRSA), through its Bureau of Health
Professions, provides support for training and placement of health care
and public health workers in order to alleviate shortages and
maldistributions of these workers.
HRSA also administers the National Bioterrorism Hospital
Preparedness Program, a program of grants to states to prepare
hospitals and supporting health care systems to deliver coordinated and
effective care to victims of terrorism and other public health
emergencies. As part of their application for funding, states must
include a written proposal for providing relevant training for hospital
and health care personnel to assure readiness in their states.\23\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\23\ For more information on education and training components of
the HRSA National Bioterrorism Hospital Preparedness Program, see
presentation of Teri Spear before the meeting of the HHS Secretary's
Council on Public Health Preparedness, May 3-4, 2004, available at
[http://www.hhs.gov/asphep/presentation/040503presentationlist.html].
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Following the terrorist attacks of 2001, HRSA has provided annual
grants to academic institutions through a new Bioterrorism Training and
Curriculum Development Program for training in recognition and
treatment of diseases related to bioterrorism for health care providers
in training and on the job.
Food and Drug Administration. The Food and Drug Administration
(FDA) assures the safety and efficacy of human drugs and vaccines,
medical devices, and animal drugs, and the safety of certain foods and
cosmetics.
FDA provides training for its own employees and for state, local,
and tribal regulatory personnel at no cost through its Office of
Regulatory Affairs ``ORA University.'' \24\ Relevant training courses
for terrorism preparedness include those geared toward implementation
of new regulations for food and drug safety in the Public Health
Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002, P.L.
107-188. Formats include Web-based and classroom instruction, video
tele-conferences, and a library of training materials.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\24\ FDA, ORAU Home Page at [http://www.fda.gov/ora/training/
course_ora.html].
Department of Justice
The Department of Justice (DOJ) enforces the law to help ensure
public safety against foreign and domestic terrorist threats, by
conducting federal investigations and prosecutions of persons suspected
of unlawful activities. DOJ also sponsors and provides assistance to
state and local law enforcement agencies. Listed below are several of
these training programs.\25\ While some of them are not directly
related to counter-terrorism, they are listed because they may convey
the knowledge and skills to law enforcement personnel that could
advance investigations of terrorist activities and responses to
terrorist incidents. Among the programs are those related to special
weapons and tactics, criminal intelligence, money laundering, computer
crime, and crisis response and management. Some programs are provided
directly by DOJ entities--the Federal Bureau of Investigation; the
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives; and the National
White Collar Crime Center. Others are sponsored by DOJ, through the
Bureau of Justice Assistance, and provided by nonprofit law enforcement
organizations.\26\ DOJ training includes:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\25\ Short descriptions of these programs and courses are available
on a Web-accessible ``law enforcement training database'' and search
engine maintained by the Bureau of Justice Assistance. See [http://
bjatraining.aspensys.com].
\26\ The nonprofit law enforcement organizations include the
Institute for Intergovernmental Research, the International Association
of Chiefs of Police, the Oklahoma Regional Community Policing
Institute, and SEARCH (a multi-state consortium dedicated to improving
criminal justice record systems).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
State and Local Anti-Terrorism Training;
WMD Hazardous Material Evidence Collection;
Crisis Management;
Crisis Negotiation;
Law Enforcement Response to Terrorism;
Multi-Agency Incident Management for Law Enforcement
and Fire Service;
Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Terrorists;
Terrorism and Explosive Seminars;
Criminal Intelligence Systems;
Foundations of Intelligence Analysis;
White Collar Crime and Terrorism;
Cyber and Computer Crime; and
Basic LAN and Advanced Internet Investigations.
Department of Transportation
Rail and bus transit systems are identified as critical
infrastructure because they provide transportation for many Americans
in densely populated urban areas and serve key economic, financial, and
governmental centers of the nation. They move over 14 million
passengers daily, and in one month they transport more passengers than
U.S. airlines move in a year. Since these systems are operated in an
open environment, they are high-risk, high-consequence targets for
terrorists. Rail transit subways travel under key government buildings,
business centers, and harbors.\27\ Rail and bus transit systems travel
along fixed routes with frequent scheduled stops, and aviation-type
passenger screening procedures may not be practical because of the
large volume of daily passengers.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\27\ U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Transit
Administration, ``Safety and Security: FTA Transit Security,''
available at [http://transit-safety.volpe.dot.gov/Security/
Default.asp], visited Nov. 18, 2004.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Federal Transit Administration. Within the Department of
Transportation, the Federal Transit Administration (FTA) is responsible
for providing counter-terrorism and homeland security training to
transit system personnel. FTA provides security guidance to transit
system operators, and it has instituted a five-point security
initiative to assist transit systems in preparing for and responding to
terrorist attacks. In addition to training, FTA provides assistance to
transit system agencies with on-site readiness assessments, technical
assistance, and regional forums for emergency responders, and grants
for terrorism drills.\28\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\28\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
FTA is also working with the transit industry to identify critical,
high-risk assets and operations and to develop security strategies for
these critical assets. The strategies will address training, providing
technical assistance, sharing best practices, and testing new security
technology.\29\ FTA's counter-terrorism training courses are available
to transit system administrators, operators, managers, and emergency
responders.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\29\ Ibid.
Possible Questions for Congressional Oversight
The primary stakeholders in responding to terrorist attacks, and
thus the recipients of counter-terrorism training, are federal, state,
and local governments; private and public medical systems; and critical
infrastructure administrators. In the evolution of counter-terrorism
training, a number of questions have arisen with regard to possible
duplication of training programs. The questions and possible approaches
might be of interest as you continue your oversight of federal counter-
terrorism training. CRS takes no position with respect to any of the
possible approaches listed.
Potential Duplication of Department of Homeland Security Training.
Within DHS, ODP and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)
administer training programs at the state and local levels, and at
national training institutes. At the national level, FEMA administers
the Emergency Management Institute (EMI) and the National Fire Academy
(NFA). ODP does not directly administer any training institute; but it
provides guidance and funding to training institutes that are part of
the National Domestic Preparedness Consortium (NDPC), described earlier
in this statement.
Some training programs offered by EMI and NFA have subject matter
similar to training provided by NDPC training institutes, such as
incident management, homeland security planning, hazardous material
incident response, emergency operations, and WMD response. Because of
the possible similarity of these training programs for state and local
first responders, some might argue for a need to consolidate or
coordinate training offered by these two separate DHS agencies.
FEMA's firefighting training provided by the NFA, however, focuses
primarily on the needs of local fire departments, whereas NDPC provides
some training primarily focusing on law enforcement. Some of the
training that is tailored to a specific profession such as law
enforcement or firefighting would not seem to be redundant. Basic or
introductory training such as incident management or WMD response,
however, may not be specifically tailored for a single profession or
type of first responder. The possible redundancy of training and the
potential consolidation of training may be policy questions that the
committee may choose to address through oversight of DHS's role in
providing assistance to states and localities. Possible approaches
include:
Government Accountability Office (GAO) Evaluation of Training. The
House Committee on Homeland Security could ask GAO to undertake an
evaluation of DHS counter-terrorism training programs. The evaluation
could review ODP and FEMA training curricula, individual courses,
intended and actual trainees, and training facilities. After conducting
a review of these courses, GAO might be able to identify any
duplication of training and possible options for consolidating or
coordinating this training. This option would give the committee
additional tools for oversight of the programs. H.R. 1544 (as
reported), Section 6, proposes this evaluation. This option, however,
would require the committee to work with GAO to set a mutually
acceptable scope and time for the study.
Coordination of Department of Homeland Security Training. If the
committee were to find undesirable redundancy in training programs, it
could direct DHS to be more attentive to coordinating the counter-
terrorism training programs administered by ODP and FEMA. DHS could
possibly establish a board to review the ODP and FEMA training
programs, and to recommend coordination or other steps to reduce
duplication.
Consolidation of Department of Homeland Security Training. If the
committee were to find a need to consolidate DHS training programs, it
could direct DHS, through statutory or conference language, to conduct
a review of its training programs and develop a plan to consolidate its
training. This consolidation might involve the removal of similar
programs provided by ODP and FEMA to ensure there is no redundancy. If
Congress did not consider this consolidation adequate to ensure against
redundant or uncoordinated DHS training, it could also direct DHS to
consolidate all counter-terrorism training under one agency. ODP might
be directed to assume the responsibility for administering not only its
training, but also the training FEMA provides first responders through
EMI and NFA. Some would argue this is a logical choice since ODP is
responsible for administering the funding to states and localities that
assist them in receiving this training. This option, however, might be
seen as impractical due to the training EMI provides state and local
emergency managers that is specific to natural disasters, and the
specific training NFA provides firefighters. FEMA historically has
administered training programs for emergency managers and firefighters,
whereas ODP has administered law enforcement focused training.
Potential Duplication of Federal Counter-Terrorism Training.
Because of the rapid evolution of counter-terrorism training programs
offered by different federal departments and agencies, there may be a
duplication of certain types of training provided to federal, state,
and local government personnel, emergency responders, and critical
infrastructure facility personnel. For example, DHS, HHS, and EPA all
offer training related to responding to hazardous materials incidents.
It is possible that training provided by DHS, DOD, DOJ, DOT, EPA,
and HHS to first responders is not coordinated, and that a federal
effort should be made to ensure these federal entities provide
coordinated, non-duplicative training. The following possible oversight
approaches might assist the committee as it continues its oversight
effort concerning federal counter-terrorism training.
Government Accountability Office Evaluation of Training. Congress
could ask GAO to undertake an evaluation of all federal counter-
terrorism training programs, similar to its request for a GAO
evaluation of DHS training (H.R. 1544, Section 6). GAO could be asked
to review individual courses, training curricula, training audiences,
and training facilities. After conducting a review of these courses,
GAO might be able to identify any duplication of training and possible
alternatives for consolidating or coordinating this training. This
option would require Congress to work with GAO to set a mutually
acceptable scope and time for the evaluation.
Interagency Task Force. Congress might direct, through statutory
and conference language, the federal departments and agencies that
provide counter-terrorism training to establish an interagency task
force to review their counter-terrorism programs. Because of the lead
role DHS provides in counter-terrorism training, Congress could
consider directing DHS to chair the task force. Once the training has
been reviewed, the task force could be directed to coordinate and
consolidate the training as necessary. This option, however, could
result in ``turf'' disputes and federal departments and agencies
attempting to protect training programs and the funding associated with
them.
Mr. King. Thank you, Mr. Reese, for your testimony.
Actually, before we go on to the other witnesses, I want to
thank all of you for your patience in sitting here this
morning. The first panel went on longer, then we had the vote,
which also further delayed things. So I really want to tell you
we do appreciate it.
The Chair now recognizes Mr. Steven Edwards, Director of
the Maryland Fire and Rescue Institute.
Mr. Edwards?
STATEMENT OF STEVEN EDWARDS
Mr. Edwards. Good morning. My name is Steven Edwards. I am
currently the Director of the Maryland Fire and Rescue
Institute at the University of Maryland, College Park. Thank
you for listening to my comments this morning, as I welcome the
opportunity to speak before this committee.
As an emergency services educator and trainer, the process
and end result of preparing the nation's first responders to
deal with weapons of mass destruction and terrorism is
paramount. Firefighters and emergency medical personnel have to
be properly trained and equipped to deal with these emerging
threats, in addition to their regular duties. The core subject
matter, as well as the delivery system, must ensure that there
is a comprehensive national strategy that best serves the
general population, as well as the first responders.
Unfortunately, this just does not exist.
Shortly after the events of 9/11, many leaders in the fire
service organizations and state and local fire training
academies looked forward to working with the Office of Domestic
Preparedness to receive guidance as well as national standard
curriculum to ensure each state and locality was prepared to
respond as necessary. What we have received to date is little
or no training curriculum, minimal communication and an
antiquated training delivery system.
We sit bewildered as to why ODP would ignore established
training systems at the state and local level. Prior to the
events of 9/11, ODP established a Federal Training Consortium
of five schools to deliver terrorism response-level training.
Only these selected schools could participate in the system and
you had to be invited by ODP to be a part of this group.
Amazingly, after 9/11 when the entire world changed and intense
training in terrorism response to unprecedented levels was
required, ODP kept the same system in place.
An existing network of public safety training academies has
served the needs of the nation's first responders for decades.
These academies are found at the state and local level and have
experienced and highly qualified instructors. Each of the 50
states has a state fire training organization. Collectively,
the state fire training academies train over 800,000 students
each year in an array of emergency services training programs.
Hundreds of millions of dollars in infrastructure, faculty and
support personnel have been invested in these academies over
the years.
As an example, the Maryland Fire and Rescue Institute has
trained emergency responders for 75 years. Imagine our dismay
and the dismay of our entire Fire Service in our state to have
such a system ignored by the Office of Domestic Preparedness.
Last year in correspondence to ODP, I requested our state be
allowed to share in and teach selected ODP terrorist and
response training courses. This request was denied by ODP.
Interestingly, at the same time our institute was not
deemed appropriate to teach ODP courses at the local level, we
were training the United States Secret Service on fire
procedures for the protection of the President. DHS and ODP
have instructed state fire academies they can use federal funds
to develop terrorism response training curriculum in their own
respective states. Actually, this makes little sense. What is
needed is a comprehensive national training strategy for
terrorism response training courses, not 50 states going their
own separate directions with training course material.
Regarding the cost of programs to the taxpayer and the
efficiency with which they are delivered by ODP, Congress
should be concerned and examine more closely the ODP
methodology for administering training programs. For example,
the ODP Training Consortium can fly in three instructors from
Texas to teach a course in Maryland, where I can have an
instructor walk from his or her second-floor office down to our
classroom at the academy and teach the same course if it was
available. It does not take an accountant to figure out which
method is more costly.
The ODP method of training course delivery simply does not
take advantage of existing training resources at the state and
local level. My state and others attempt to deliver training
courses as close to the students as possible and to reduce
costs and increase flexibility with regard to class schedules.
Much of the nation's fire service is volunteer-based, and they
need to attend training courses on nights and weekends since
they work their regular jobs during the week. All state fire
academies understand this and work to provide training when the
audience is most available. Unfortunately for the hundreds of
thousands of volunteers who need training, the ODP Consortium
teaches their programs Monday to Friday during normal work
hours.
In February of 2005, the International Association of Fire
Chiefs at a summit that was conducted in Washington, D.C. and
attended by 16 major national fire and rescue associations. The
summit grew out of frustration and concern regarding a number
of issues at DHS. At this historic summit, five goals were
agreed upon including ``to ensure the most effective
utilization of training resources, the Department of Homeland
Security should be required to work more closely with the
National Fire Academy, national fire service organizations
providing fire service-related training, and state and local
fire training academies regarding the use of curriculum and the
delivery system for terrorism response training.''
In April of 2005, the Congressional Fire Service National
Advisory Council, which includes almost 50 fire service
organizations, met and approved the summit recommendations by
way of unanimous resolution. The issue of access to ODP
training curriculum and delivery of programs is a major concern
of the entire fire service within the United States. Failure to
recognize the qualifications of state and local instructors and
work with such a proven system is a lost opportunity.
A partnership needs to be developed where ODP works with
state and local training academies to delivery needed terrorism
response training in a format best suited for the success of
the students. The state and local training academies are
structured to deliver training in an efficient manner and do
this where the response personnel live and work, in conjunction
with other training priorities. It is clear that there needs to
be a better system. State and local fire training academies are
committed to working with the new leadership in the Department
of Homeland Security to review current terrorism response
delivery systems and make improvements where warranted. We
simply want our students to be prepared to the highest extent
possible.
Thank you.
[The statement of Mr. Edwards follows:]
Prepared Statement of Steven T. Edwards
Good Morning, my name is Steven Edwards. I am currently the
Director of the Maryland Fire and Rescue Institute at the University of
Maryland at College Park. I also serve as the Chair of the
Congressional Fire Service Institute National Advisory Committee,
Chairman of the Board of the Safety Equipment Institute, and I am the
immediate past President of the North American Fire Training Directors,
among other state and local appointments. Previous to these positions I
served with the Prince George's County Fire Department for 25 years,
retiring as Fire Chief. Thank you for listening to my comments this
morning as I welcome the opportunity to speak before this committee.
As an emergency services educator and trainer the process and the
end result of preparing the nation's first responders to deal with
weapons of mass destruction and terrorism is paramount. Firefighters
and emergency medical personnel have to be properly trained and
equipped to deal with these emerging threats in addition to their
regular duties. The course subject matter as well as the delivery
system must ensure that there is a comprehensive national training
strategy that best serves the general population as well as the first
responders. Unfortunately, this just does not exist.
Within the Department of Homeland Security training and
preparedness for terrorism response has been centralized within the
Office of Domestic Preparedness (ODP) and the Office of State and Local
Government Coordination and Preparedness. Shortly after the events of
9-11 many of the leadership of fire service organizations and state and
local fire training academies looked forward to working with ODP to
receive guidance as well as national standard curriculum to ensure that
each state and locality was prepared to respond if necessary. What we
have received to date is little or no training curriculum, minimal
communication, and an antiqued training delivery system. We sit
bewildered as to why ODP would ignore established training systems at
the state and local level.
Prior to the events of 9-11, ODP established a federal training
consortium of five schools to delivery terrorism response level
training. Only these selected schools could participate in this system
and you had to be invited by ODP to be a part of this group. Amazingly,
after 9-11, when the entire world changed and intense training in
terrorism response to unprecedented levels was required, ODP keep the
same system in place. The issue is not with the training programs of
the ODP consortium schools or the quality of what they present, which
for the most part is good. The issue is simply that this current system
is inefficient, ineffective, and does not take advantage of existing
training systems and networks.
America's fire service consists of over 30,000 fire departments
staffed by approximately 1.2 million career and volunteer firefighters.
The fire service responds to over 22 million emergencies each year and
provides a number of emergency services to the public. There is no
question that in the event of a terrorism event that the fire service
will be called upon to respond in the first critical moments and
provide valuable life saving services. Fire departments have attempted
to greatly improve upon their ability to respond to these types of
events and have made substantial progress since 9-11, in spite of the
inadequate attempts of ODP to provide essential training services on a
broad scale.
An existing network of public safety training academies has served
the needs of the nation's first responders for decades. These academies
are found at the state and local level and have experienced and highly
qualified instructors in fire and rescue, emergency medical services,
law enforcement, corrections, and others. I will restrict my comments
to fire and rescue training academies, but I know that other public
safety disciplines share my concerns.
Each of the fifty states has a state fire training organization.
Collectively the state fire training academies train over 800,000
students each year in an array of emergency response training programs.
Hundreds of millions of dollars in infrastructure, faculty and support
personnel have been invested in these academies over the years. The
state fire training academies are represented by the North American
Fire Training Directors (NAFTD). This group meets on a regular basis to
review and discuss issues of concern to them. Over the past four years
nothing has been discussed more than the issue of how can we get ODP to
work more effectively with our training systems.
The Maryland Fire and Rescue Institute (MFRI), instructs over
30,000 fire, rescue, and emergency medical service students each year.
Our main training facility is located in College Park and we have six
regional training centers strategically located throughout the state.
MFRI has over 60 full time faculty and staff and over 600 field
instructors who work on a part time basis to instruct classes as
needed. MFRI has trained emergency responders for 75 years. Imagine our
dismay and the dismay of the entire fire service in our state to have
such a system ignored by ODP. Last year in correspondence to ODP, I
requested that our state be allowed to share in and teach selected ODP
terrorism response training courses. This request was denied by ODP.
Interesting that at the same time our Institute was not deemed
appropriate to teach ODP courses at the local level, we were training
the U.S. Secret Service, in fire procedures for the protection of the
President.
State fire academies have been instructed that they can use federal
funds to develop terrorism response training curriculum in their state.
ODP has established a review system to approve these courses. Our
experience has been that this system is burdensome and a very lengthy
process. The course reviews are conducted by the consortium schools,
which in my opinion have no incentive to encounter more courses that
they may have to compete with. Actually, this process makes little
sense. What is needed is a comprehensive national training strategy for
terrorism response training courses, not fifty states going their own
direction with training course material. ODP could learn from many
other federal agencies such as the National Fire Academy, the Emergency
Management Institute, and others. When they develop a training course
it is immediately handed off to the states to teach in a coordinated
manner, with results returned for accountability purposes. This is an
efficient system that serves the best interest of all first responders.
Regarding the cost of the programs to the taxpayer and the
efficiency in which they are delivered by ODP, there are many
questions. For example, the ODP training consortium can fly in three
instructors from Texas to teach a course in Maryland, or I can have an
instructor walk from his/her second floor office down to the classroom
at our academy and teach the same course if it were available. It does
not take an accountant to figure out which method is more costly. The
ODP method of training course delivery simply does not take advantage
of existing training resources at the state and local level.
My state and others attempt to deliver training courses as close to
the students as possible to reduce costs and to increase flexibility
with regard to class schedules. Much of the nation's fire service is
volunteer based and they need to attend training courses on nights and
weekends, since they work their regular job during the week. All state
fire academies understand this and work to provide training when the
audience is most available. Unfortunately for the hundreds of thousands
of volunteers who need to be trained, the ODP consortium teaches their
programs Monday to Friday during normal work hours.
All state fire training academies keep historical records of who is
trained within their state. It is important that these records are
available for certification and legal purposes. Since ODP does not work
with the state systems we have no way of knowing who has been trained
by ODP in our various states. Better coordination on this issue would
improve this system for the benefit of the students and have training
records maintained in an appropriate data base.
Most of the state fire academy curriculum and instructors meet
national certification and accreditation standards reviewed and
verified by independent third party organizations, such the National
Professional Qualifications Board, the International Fire Service
Accreditation Service, and the American Council on Education among
others. I am not aware of the standard to which ODP instructors and
contractors are evaluated to in order to maintain quality in their
instructional process. In the past ODP has stated that their courses
``address complex subjects and often require specialized facilities or
equipment'' and therefore cannot be taught at the state and local
level. I strongly disagree with this assertion and since their system
for qualifying instructors appears to be less than what the state and
local fire training academies utilize, I do not see how they came to
this conclusion. Effective in 2004, ODP does allow state and local
hazardous materials instructors to teach their awareness level courses
without further qualification.
In February of 2005, the International Association of Fire Chiefs
(IAFC) led a summit that was conducted in Washington DC and attended by
sixteen of the major national fire and rescue associations. This summit
grew out of frustration and concern regarding a number of issues at
DHS. At this historic summit five goals were agreed upon, including:
``To ensure the most effective utilization of training resources,
the Department of Homeland Security should be required to work more
closely with the National Fire Academy, national fire service
organizations providing fire service related training, and state and
local fire training academies regarding the use of curriculum and the
delivery system for terrorism response training.''
In April of 2005 the Congressional Fire Service Institute National
Advisory Committee met and approved the summit recommendations by way
of a unanimous resolution. The CFSI National Advisory Committee
consists of over fifty national fire service related organizations. The
issue of access to ODP training curriculum and delivery of programs is
a major concern of the entire fire service within the United States.
The current ODP strategy of having a few limited training schools
is inefficient and is simply not capable of delivering training courses
in large volumes. Failure to recognize the qualifications of state and
local instructors and work with such a proven system is a lost
opportunity.
In April of 2005 after a meeting with Mr. Matt Mayer, Acting
Director of the Office of State and Local Government Coordination and
Preparedness action was initiated to address some of the above noted
concerns. He has agreed to develop a process whereby state and local
academies, with the concurrence of their State Administrative Agency,
may request standardized curriculum for courses identified by SLGCP for
institutionalization. This is a good start, but it needs to be followed
up on and actually implemented. The state and local fire training
academies anxiously await review of this process.
A partnership needs to be developed whereby ODP works with the
state and local training academies to deliver needed terrorism response
training in a format best suited to the success of the students. The
state and local training academies are structured to deliver training
in an efficient manner and can do this where the response personnel
live and work, in conjunction with other training priorities. It is
clear that there needs to be a better system. The state and local fire
training academies are committed to work with the new leadership at the
Department of Homeland Security to review the current terrorism
response delivery system and make improvements where warranted. We
simple want our students to be prepared to the highest extent possible.
Mr. King. Mr. Edwards, thank you for your testimony. You
have certainly given us something to think about.
Now, Sheriff McGowan, Chairman of the National Sheriffs'
Association, Weapons of Mass Destruction Committee.
Sheriff McGowan?
STATEMENT OF PATRICK McGOWAN
Sheriff McGowan. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee,
I would like to thank you for the opportunity to appear today
to present to you an overview of the National Sheriffs'
Association contributions to our nation's homeland security.
I am Sheriff Pat McGowan, Hennepin County Sheriff from
Minneapolis, Minnesota. I have been in law enforcement for over
30 years and am currently Chair of the National Sheriffs'
Association Weapons of Mass Destruction Committee.
NSA has been providing sheriffs and other criminal justice
practitioners with resources, technical assistance, information
and opportunities for professional development since its
inception in 1940. In 1999, 2 years prior to the 9/11 attacks
on our nation, the NSA, using funds provided by the Office for
Domestic Preparedness, initiated an executive-level WMD event
preparedness prevention and response training program.
Since that time, NSA and ODP have developed a close working
relationship to ensure effective training in the areas of
community partnerships, jail evacuation and first responder
training. We are pleased with the progress we have made in
developing appropriate courses and greatly appreciate the
outreach that ODP has undertaken to ensure that our nation's
sheriffs receive the training they require to protect our
country and to prevent terrorist activities.
I am proud to say NSA has maintained its position at the
forefront of the War on Terrorism. As a result, sheriffs across
the country have been able to provide training for their
command staff, a variety of other first responders, and members
of their local communities for several years. As each community
and its responders refine their preparedness skills and their
response capabilities, our country becomes stronger.
Each of our programs addresses a critically important
sector and dramatically enhances the preparedness of our
citizens and emergency responders. Whether NSA conducts a
course in a large urban area or in a small rural community,
participants find that the information and training that they
receive is both timely and relevant to their circumstances.
Focus groups composed of individuals according to their
knowledge and expertise provide initial guidance for course
structure and content. Their initial input has guided the NSA
as it has developed a framework for each course. But as the
scope and direction of national security initiatives have
changed, the NSA has been equally quick to respond. The
original WMD executive course, for example, which focused on
WMD awareness, has been completely updated and now focuses on
managing the event. This new course focuses more upon
prevention and preparedness, echoing the requirements of HSPD
8.
NSA programs have been developed to have the maximum impact
possible at both the local and national levels. The executive-
level program was our first program developed to train and
prepare sheriffs, staff, and executives of other agencies for a
WMD event. In the period between 1999 and 2003, this training
was delivered to over 6,000 sheriffs and other members of the
emergency response community in 38 states. Feedback on this
course has been extremely positive. This program is unique in
that it provides opportunity for law enforcement executives to
examine and then modify their jurisdiction's emergency plan in
the context of the most up-to-date information across a broad
range of subjects.
It directs executives to identify, cultivate and document
roles and responsibilities within their own agency and in
cooperation and coordination with other first responder
agencies. Executives are then able to identify threats,
vulnerabilities and resources within their own jurisdictions
more easily. The NSA recognized that whenever a WMD or
terrorist incident may occur, local first responders, along
with their citizens, will provide the initial response to this
event.
Their level of preparation will dictate the effectiveness
of the initial response. Later, the degree to which citizens
and responding agencies are able to mutually support one
another will shape the successful outcome of any response. The
NSA community partnership and awareness training develops a
dynamic partnership between citizens and responding agencies.
Since its first pilots were completed in 2003, the course has
trained nearly 1,700 participants from jurisdictions all across
our nation. This program helps to increase community awareness
of the risks and hazards posed by weapons of mass destruction.
The results of this program have been striking. Personnel
from a variety of public safety agencies have started working
in cooperation with citizens from all sectors, civic and
business leaders, teachers, senior citizens and representatives
of the faith-based community. Thanks to these new partnerships,
many potential hazards and new resources have been discovered.
The NSA jail evacuation course has been designed to address the
needs of small and large jails in rural and urban jurisdictions
and to prepare them to evacuate in the event of a terrorist
attack or WMD event, while at the same time ensuring the safety
of their respective communities.
The specific challenges posed by jail evacuations have
attracted the attention of DHS, ODP and out nation's sheriffs.
Since 2003 when pilots for this program were first developed,
participants from all regions of the country have received
training. Forty programs have been conducted over the past 13
months; participants have included officials from state and
federal prisons, private detention facilities, police
departments, fire and rescue and emergency managers. Thirty-two
more programs are scheduled prior to Thanksgiving, 2005.
The NSA First Responder Program focuses on actions required
in the initial phase of a response, that crucial 15 to 30
minutes that elapses between the occurrence of the event and
response by the first responder teams. With an emphasis on
safety and teamwork, participants learn that actions taken in
the first moments of an incident set the stage for future
success or failure. This program is currently awaiting final
approval from ODP, but a long waiting list has already been
compiled.
Inquiring agencies include the United States Secret
Service, TSA, FBI, our country's military, as well as our
international law enforcement colleagues in Ontario and
Toronto. In this course, instruction and tabletop exercises,
coupled with practical exercises, prepare participants to train
members of their own agencies.
Members, since NSA began conducting counterterrorism
training in 1999, we have learned many lessons. Our goal is to
ensure our training reflects the best practices, incorporates
national standards where appropriate, is realistic, and is
flexible to address the various needs of each community.
In conclusion, I would like to say that the National
Sheriffs' Association has always taken a leading role in
providing counterterrorism training across the country and that
we have been doing so long before 9-ll. The effectiveness and
relevance of NSA training initiatives can be verified by the
current demand for our training programs, as well as our course
evaluation data. The continued level of interest shown by
agencies and organizations both within the United States and
from the international community further confirms our success.
I want to thank the committee for the opportunity to be
here today and to discuss the effectiveness of antiterrorism
training and to share NSA's experience and successes. I am
happy to answer any questions that you may have.
[The statement of Mr. McGowan follows:]
Prepared Statement of Sheriff Patrick D. McGowan
Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee: Thank you for the
opportunity to appear before this distinguished panel to present to you
an overview of the National Sheriffs' Association's contributions to
our nation's homeland security.
The National Sheriffs' Association (NSA) believes that the Office
of Sheriff is one of our nation's most vital institutions. Sheriffs
throughout the country interact with citizens and a wide variety of
other agencies, at many levels. Their influence and impact upon the
country cannot be understated.
There are 3,087 sheriffs across the country representing both rural
and urban jurisdictions. Many of them have influence over hundreds of
square miles, while others serve in very densely populated cities.
The National Sheriffs' Association is a non-profit organization,
chartered in 1940. Since its inception, the organization has
consistently dedicated itself to raising the level of professionalism
among sheriffs, their deputies, and others in the field of criminal
justice and public safety so that they may perform their jobs in the
best possible manner, in service to the people of their communities.
In support of that mission, NSA provides sheriffs and other
criminal justice practitioners with resources, technical assistance,
information, and opportunities for professional development. Through
its annual conferences, NSA also provides valuable opportunities for
networking and interacting with our fellow criminal justice
professionals. The NSA is committed to the quest of continually
enhancing the services it provides to sheriffs, law enforcement
personnel, and the public safety community.
In 1999, the NSA using funds provided by the US Department of
Homeland Security, Office for Domestic Preparedness initiated an
Executive Level WMD event preparedness, prevention, and response
training program. In the years that followed, the success of this
initial course led to the development of additional programs: Community
Partnership Training, Jail Evacuation Training, and First Responder
Training were each conceived and designed to fill gaps in our nation's
preparedness training.
Since that time, NSA and ODP have developed a close working
relationship to deliver training to our Nation's first responder
community. NSA firmly believes that ODP's training program is making
significant inroads into the training needs of the first responder
community, particularly the sheriffs. We are pleased with the progress
that ODP has made in developing appropriate courses and greatly
appreciate the outreach that ODP has undertaken to ensure that our
Nation's sheriffs receive the training they require to prevent
terrorist activities and protecting our country.
Close, open, and creative communication between ODP and the NSA has
led to the development of programs that are well suited to the
challenges facing our country. With collaboration from ODP, NSA has
been able to ensure that as the nature of the threats evolve and
change, the training offered by NSA evolves as well, allowing sheriffs
the opportunity to meet those new challenges head on.
The support of the federal government through the ODP has allowed
the NSA to maintain its position at the forefront of the war on terror.
Sheriffs across the country have been able to train their command
staff, a variety of first responders, and members of their local
community for several years. As each community and its responders
refine their preparedness skills and their response capabilities, our
country becomes stronger.
There is more to be done, and the National Sheriffs' Association is
more than ready to take up the challenge!
BACKGROUND
The National Sheriffs' Association has taken a leading role in the
nation's fight against terrorism. The Homeland Security and Weapons of
Mass Destruction programs at NSA have been designed to respond flexibly
to the needs of jurisdictions and communities across the country.
The programs developed by the National Sheriffs' Association were
developed in response to the many requests from sheriffs across the
nation. The NSA recognized that if specific sectors of the population
were adequately prepared, then a coordinated and mutually supportive
response would likely occur, resulting in a more effective and
efficient outcome.
Each program addresses a critically important sector and
dramatically enhances the preparedness of citizens and emergency
responders, should a terrorist event occur in their community, or in a
nearby community.
Whether NSA conducts a course in a large urban area, or in a small
rural community, participants find that the information and training
that they receive is both timely and relevant to their circumstances.
In an ever-changing world, we constantly need to provide new
information, raise new questions, and address unique circumstances, if
we are truly going to prepare the Nation.
The NSA's Homeland Security and WMD training initiatives began in
April 1999 after the association received a $250,000 grant to develop
an Executive Level Training Curriculum for Sheriffs, and to conduct
pilot that training in five locations.
In May 2000, the Association received another $600,000 award to
conduct an additional 14 training programs.
In September 2001, $700,000 was awarded for the continuation of
this project through October 2002, including funds to conduct an
additional 10 WMD Incident Risk and Crisis Communication training
sessions.
In October 2002, $2 million was awarded, extending the project
through September 2003.
In January 2003, the project scope was expanded to include 3 new
training programs:
(1) Jail Evacuation Planning Program, which initially conducted
4 pilot projects. Predicated on the success of these pilot
programs, NSA started delivering regular training in May 2004;
(2) Community Partnerships & Awareness Program, which also
conducted 4 pilot projects and began offering trainings in May
2004.
(3) First Responder: Train-the-Trainer Program, which is
currently in the course development stage, with trainings
anticipated to begin in June 2005.
In October 2003, NSA $2 million was awarded to continue the project
through September 2004. And In October 2004, $3 million was awarded for
continuation of the WMD training programs through September 2005.
Introduction to NSA Homeland Security Training Program Initiatives
NSA training has been developed with the practical needs of law
enforcement and first responder agencies and personnel in mind. Focus
groups, composed of individuals invited to participate, according to
their knowledge and expertise, provided initial guidance for course
structure and content.
Focus group input guided the NSA as it developed a framework for
each course, and then provided a context for its selection of Subject
Matter Experts (SMEs). The SME team was then tasked with the
development of course content and delivery strategies.
The NSA was often fortunate to obtain the services of SMEs, who are
national and international leaders in their fields. And because of the
expertise of these individuals, NSA has been able to provide cutting
edge, up-to-the-minute information in such areas as Explosives and
Booby Traps (First Responder Course) and NIMS (First Responder, Jail
Evacuation, and Managing the Event--A Leadership Guide for All-Hazard
Events) as a direct result of the caliber of SME retained by the NSA.
Upon completion, each course draft was presented in a series of
pilot programs, which were utilized to fine-tune program material and
delivery. The programs were then released, and the NSA began delivering
training to Sheriffs' jurisdictions across the country began.
NSA training programs have been specifically designed to provide
up-to-date information to participants. They demand participation in a
range of activities, bringing this new information to life, as
scenarios and table-top exercises tailored for the host jurisdiction
are undertaken in both cooperative groups and individual settings.
Cooperative group activities encourage immediate partnering between
agencies, and foster long-term networking within the jurisdiction.
Activities designed for the individual demand that each participant
consider the current status of their agency. Actions necessary to
improve the prevention and response capabilities of the agency are then
determined, laying the foundation for focused action once participants
return to their agencies and communities.
As the scope and direction of national security initiatives
changes, the NSA has been quick to respond. The original WMD Executive
Course for example, which focused on WMD awareness, has been completely
updated, and now focuses on Managing the Event--A Leadership Guide for
All-Hazard Events. This new course focuses more upon prevention and
preparedness, echoing the requirements of HSPD #8.
The Community Partnerships program has gradually reshaped itself to
help launch Neighborhood Watch and Citizen Corps programs in
communities where these initiatives have not yet been implemented.
Features of the NSA Homeland Security Initiatives Training Programs
The constituency of the National Sheriffs' Association provides a
single platform from which training and information initiatives may be
launched across the country, penetrating every state, and almost all
jurisdictions. The office of Sheriff serves as a central agency within
each jurisdiction that is able to marshal the resources of other law
enforcement and responding agencies, as well as the resources and
energies of the citizens.
NSA programs have been developed to have the maximum impact
possible at both local and national levels.
Thus, the WMD Executive Program (now Managing the Event--A
Leadership Guide for All-Hazard Events) was developed first, in order
to prepare Sheriffs, their command staff, and executives of other
agencies for a WMD or all-hazard event. This broad-based program
fosters organization at a local, jurisdictional level. It also provides
each jurisdiction's leaders with the necessary skills and knowledge to
move their community's prevention and response programs forward in a
way that reflects current federal government initiatives (e.g. NIMS
implementation).
Armed with new information, our nation's sheriffs soon began asking
for additional and specialized training which would include the
handling of jail inmates, and citizen awareness.
Managing the Event--A Leadership Guide for All-Hazard Events provides a
solid foundation for specialized training, designed for specific
enforcement and community sectors. The Jail Evacuation program,
Community Partnerships program, and the First Responders program were
the result.
Each focused upon a sector of the overall national response plan
that had thus far been ignored or poorly served. Each was designed to
mobilize its target audience, leading to new levels of preparedness,
new awareness directed towards prevention, and a new capacity for
effective and efficient response in the event of an incident.
The NSA now provides four training programs for the nation's
Sheriffs. These programs are:
1. Managing the Incident--A Leadership Guide to All-Hazard
Events
2. Community Partnerships and Awareness
3. Jail Evacuation
4. First Responder Train-the-Trainer
1. Managing the Incident - A Leadership Guide to All-Hazard Events
``I am enthusiastic about this program. Sheriff Oxley of Monmouth
County, NJ should be commended for taking a proactive approach on this
important initiative,'' said Sheriff Ferrell.
``The bottom line is cooperation and mutual aid which we will talk
about all day. One person or one agency can't do it all. Sheriff Oxley
saw the value and importance up front.''
The National Sheriffs' Association's WMD Executive Course was
designed to prepare Sheriffs to plan, equip and train their agencies to
respond effectively to a terrorist incident. In the period between 1999
and 2003, the training was delivered to over 6,000 Sheriffs and other
members of the emergency response community, in 38 states.
IN 2004, the NSA and ODP agreed to completely revise the program.
The result was Managing the Event--A Leadership Guide for All-Hazard
Events. Four pilots of the new program have been delivered (training
225 participants), and the course is now scheduled for ODP review in
July 2005.
Feedback on the new course has been extremely positive, and
numerous demands for this new course are already being received by the
NSA office.
Managing the Incident--A Leadership Guide to All-Hazard Events,
focuses upon the needs of law enforcement executive staff. In 2004, an
advisory group composed of Sheriffs from large and small jurisdictions
convened in order to identify shortcomings in existing WMD courses. The
course which evolved from this beginning took as its primary objective
the training of law enforcement executives to recognize and effectively
deal with terrorist and all-hazard events.
The program is unique. It provides opportunity for law enforcement
executives to examine and then modify their jurisdiction's emergency
plan in the context of up-to-date information across a wide range of
crucial subjects.
The program includes instruction and activity-based learning
whereby:
Participants will receive an update on the latest WMD
information. This topic is ever-changing, and correct and
timely information is crucial to effective planning and
response.
It is important, should a terrorist or all-hazard
event occur, each responding agency knows its duties,
responsibilities, and limitations. The program allows
executives to identify, cultivate, and document roles and
responsibilities within their agencies, and in cooperation and
coordination with other agencies, thus enhancing the efficiency
of response.
Executives identify threats, vulnerabilities and
resources within their own jurisdictions. The extent to which
an agency has completed this task is the extent to which a
successful resolution of an all-hazard or terrorist event may
be obtained.
Communications, including media issues, are carefully
studied by participants. Such subjects as, responding to the
media, Public Information Officer (PIO) hiring and training,
and communications with citizens, are introduced. Various
activities allow participants to actively experience the
demands of this element of an overall response, allowing them
to better develop a response plan suitable for their
jurisdiction's requirements.
Gathering, analyzing and sharing information with the
proper agencies is a vital component to the success of our
nation's ongoing war on terrorism. Managing the Incident--A
Leadership Guide to All-Hazard Events provides information on
these processes, and it links law enforcement executives to the
nation's network of intelligence agencies.
A regularly updated overview of the National Incident
Management System (NIMS) as it applies to law enforcement
executives responding to terrorist acts and all-hazards events
is provided. Funding options are also discussed, making it
possible for law enforcement executives to build upon plans
with additional training, and crucial equipment.
2. Community Partnerships and Awareness Training
``This was very informative with regards to the ability of private
citizens to actually assist with a WMD or just an area wide
emergency.''
The NSA recognized that, should an all-hazard or terrorist incident
occur in a community, local first responders and local citizens will
have to deal with the situation themselves. Their level of preparation
will dictate the effectiveness of the initial response. Later, the
degree to which citizens and responding agencies are able to mutually
support one another will shape the successful outcome of an event.
The NSA Community Partnerships and Awareness Training develops a
dynamic partnership between citizens and responding agencies. The
program also serves to initiate Neighborhood Watch programs in
communities where the program may not have been activate. Other
programs, such as Citizen Corps, VIPS, and CERT, are also introduced as
important factors in each community's overall preparedness.
Since its first pilots were completed late in 2003, the course has
trained almost 1,700 participants from jurisdictions across the nation.
Unique elements of the program include:
Law enforcement agencies are trained to independently
continue this training in their jurisdictions, at future
community meetings.
Increased community awareness of the risks and hazards
posed by Weapons of Mass Destruction. Training intended to
provide sufficient information for citizens to tentatively
identify agent types, and to respond accordingly, is also
provided.
Building of a Community Resources Database (CRD) is
initiated. The CRD may be used as a supplement to existing
local emergency databases, or which may serve as the primary
community resource or citizen database, and may be utilized in
the event of a terrorist attack.
Initiation of collaborative partnerships that can be
activated in times of crisis.
Development of a community mobilization plan, to be
activated in an emergency situation.
Practical experience of response options possible
during an emergency situation via a table-top exercise.
Establishment of an on-going planning and training
processes for community preparedness.
All course attendees receive an interactive Weapons of
Mass Destruction CD, which may be referenced in order to
broaden their knowledge, and which may be used at future
community meetings.
The program initiates a community-wide Neighborhood
Watch program, which now contains anti-terrorism training as
well as anti-crime elements, should this program not exist
already within the community.
The results of this program have been striking. Personnel from a
variety of law enforcement and response agencies work in cooperation
with citizens representing a broad cross-section of the community--from
civic and business leaders, to teachers and senior citizens, to
representatives of the faith community.
Arising from these new partnerships were hazards and resources
previously unrecognized by the Sheriff's office or other response
agencies. During one program, for example, citizens expressed their
concern over a large dam, situated in an adjoining state that would
devastate their community if ruptured. The Sheriff's office and other
responding agencies were thus able to add this hazard to their list for
immediate and close attention.
At another training, a clergyman revealed that, situated below his
church, there was a fully equipped fall-out shelter, which he was
currently using for storage. The clergyman, it was discovered, was the
only person aware of this facility, which had been constructed during
the Cold War, and then forgotten. He offered the facility to the
Sheriff for use as a Command Post, should it ever be required.
3. Jail Evacuation
Although we routinely work on evacuation plans for natural
disasters, we have done virtually nothing in the areas covered by this
class. It has opened my eyes to a whole new field of concern; we need
to take extensive preparatory measures.''
The NSA Jail Evacuation Course has been designed to address the
needs of small and large jails in rural and urban jurisdictions,
preparing them to evacuate in the event of a terrorist attack or an
all-hazards event. The specific challenges posed by jail evacuation
have attracted the attention of DHS, ODP and the nation's Sheriffs.
Since 2003, when pilots for the program were first delivered, 2,274
participants from jurisdictions in all regions of the country have
received training. 40 programs have been conducted over the past 13
months. 62 jurisdictions, 241 counties, as well as officials from
prisons, private detention facilities, and Police Departments, Fire &
Rescue and Emergency managers have attended. The course has also been
hosted by the Departments of Corrections in two states. 32 more
programs are scheduled prior to Thanksgiving 2005.
When examining the NSA Jail Evacuation program, it should be noted
that:
This program started due to the numerous requests from
sheriffs who had recognized the need to develop plans for
evacuating inmates, staff, visitors, etc. from their jails in
the event of an all-hazards event, or a direct attack on the
facility, or in the event that the jail is close to a primary
terrorist target.
Jails meet or exceed terrorist target criteria - They
contain high concentrations of people, and they are the most
expensive government buildings to construct. An attack or all-
hazard event could kill or injure many individuals, and destroy
or render uninhabitable a crucial facility.
In the event of uncontrolled mass escape or release,
dangerous inmates may be freed to again prey upon a vulnerable
civilian population. A properly prepared jail evacuation plan,
developed as attendees take part in the program, minimizes
these effects.
Most inmates currently housed in jails are of a pre-
trial status, and therefore presumed innocent. Jails without an
evacuation plan are vulnerable to legal processes which may
result in massive liabilities. In the past, facilities not
having planned and practiced for fires have lost large
lawsuits. The outcome of this course is that attendees are able
to develop an evacuation plan appropriate for the unique
requirements of their own facility.
Captured terrorists are often detained in local jails.
This taxes existing (and already strained) resources, and also
increases the likelihood that the facility itself may become a
target for an attack.
The program has also provided the first WMD and all-
hazard planning and information material to be obtained by some
jurisdictions and counties.
Jails, and the specific challenges that evacuation of a jail
presents both jail administrators and the general community, have
received little attention. Currently, the NSA Jail Evacuation program
is unique, providing essential training that prepares jail personnel to
respond to a hazardous event. The safety and well-being of each
community and its citizens are maximized by the training and planning
guidelines provided by the program.
4. First Responder
``This was one of the best classes I've attended in a long time.''
The NSA First Responder Program focuses on the actions required in
the initial phase of a response--the crucial fifteen to thirty minutes
that elapses between occurrence of the event, and response by incoming
emergency teams. With an emphasis on safety and teamwork, participants
learn that actions taken in the first moments of a CBRNE incident set
the stage for success.
The NSA First Responder program recently completed its third and
final pilot. A total of 79 participants from across the country,
representing law enforcement personnel as well as such agencies as Fire
Departments and the military, received training as the pilot programs
were delivered.
News of the effectiveness and relevance of this program has begun
to spread by word of mouth, and the NSA office is currently receiving
inquiries from a variety of federal and state agencies, as well as from
NSA members. A waiting list is currently filling, as the program awaits
final ODP review. Inquiring agencies include the US Secret Service, TSA
(Transportation Safety Admin), FBI, the US Navy, US Marines, US Air
Force, and an international inquiry from Canada's Chatham Kent Police
Service (Ontario), and the Toronto Police Service Intelligence Support.
This course was specifically designed to rapidly and efficiently
train a large number of people across the country. Course instruction
and table-top exercises coupled with practical exercise, prepare
participants to train the members of their own agency to:
Perform an assessment of the building and perimeter of
the building.
Focus on potential facility security vulnerabilities,
and prepare a documented pre-planned response. (CIRP mission
folder is placed on CD for emergency use.)
Safely approach an incident, take command, and
anticipate the needs of a rapidly escalating Hazmat incident
using Unified Command.
Set perimeters, set isolation zones, communicate safe
routes of travel to other responders, protect evidence,
apprehend suspects, and begin protective actions and plan for
rescue, mass decontamination, and staging areas.
Identify booby traps, improvised explosive devices
(IEDs), & secondary devices.
Implement searches for explosive devices.
Identify and protect evidence for use in prosecutions.
Utilize NIMS-recommended strategies to respond to an
all-hazard or terrorist event. Transfer control from one level
of command to the next, up to and including a federal response.
The course reviews IC100, IC200 (encouraging participants to
complete online exams upon return to their agency), and
required documentation of the incident at each level of
command.
Respond to an all hazards incident, stressing areas of
crowd control, perimeters, and evacuations.
Identify resources available through mutual aid, state
and federal agencies.
Take care of themselves by teaching stress inoculation
and reduction, which is a factor that may affect responders
during and/or after a stressful situation or event.
Provide a resource disk with over 600 resource
documents, publications, websites, and book titles for the
trainer.
Lessons Learned
The NSA has learned that a variety of training approaches maximize
the ability of any community or agency to respond with efficiency and
effectiveness to an all-hazard event: The lessons learned may be
applied by a specific training agency, or they may be considered by
those responsible for the National Training Program. Lessons learned by
the NSA include
1. Train trainers--If the training offered by an organization
prepares participants to train members of their community or agency,
then the effect of the training provided is compounded.
2. Develop courses that involve participants from a variety of
agencies in activities specific to their own community's unique
circumstances. The networking that develops from such experiences can
take on a life of its own, greatly enhancing the partnerships required
for effective prevention and response.
3. Specifically target training to address the needs of specific
groups within law enforcement agencies, response agencies, and within
the general community.
4. Use membership organizations as major training partners. These
organizations are able to readily communicate with their constituents
across the nation. This provision allows for efficient notification of
program availability, and it also permits a smooth vehicle for
participant feedback. The effectiveness of the NSA's communication
machine provides a model for this approach.
5. Develop programs using a consultative approach--Initial
development should be characterized by focus groups composed of
ultimate participant representatives. This maximizes the ability of
course developers to provide meaningful and relevant training.
6. Utilize subject matter experts well-versed in their fields.
Search out leaders and innovators currently working in and contributing
to their discipline. This ensures cutting edge and up-to-date content.
7. Incorporate jurisdiction/agency-specific activities and
exercises--This immediately enhances prevention and response
capability, and contributes long- term to the community's development
of a viable and effective response plan.
Challenges
The National Sheriffs' Association recognizes the following
challenges in future years. These include:
1. Ensuring that sufficient federal funding is continued, thereby
allowing training of law enforcement agencies, response agencies, and
the training of citizens across the nation, to continue uninterrupted.
2. Reflect the current federal governments drive to develop methods
and approaches that encourage agencies to train, plan and work
together. The NSA will continue to explore means by which it might
continue to foster combined NSA training of such agencies as the Secret
Service and military with law enforcement personnel.
3. Maintaining and strengthening the partnership between the
Department of Homeland Security and the Office of Domestic
Preparedness, and the National Sheriffs' Association. To date, this
partnership has led to the development and implementation of crucial
training in jurisdictions across the country, with the end result being
communities today are better prepared to prevent or respond to an all-
hazards event or a terrorist attack.
Conclusion
The National Sheriffs' Association has taken a lead role in
providing training for its own member sheriffs across the country.
However, sheriffs' offices have served as a center from which NSA
programs have been delivered to a wider audience consisting of other
(local, state, and federal) law enforcement agencies, other first
responder agencies (such as fire departments and EMS Services), state
and federal agencies, the military, and our civilian population.
NSA's Weapons of Mass Destruction Committee in cooperation with the
NSA Training Division have identified specific flaws in the nation's
existing training infrastructure Where train-the-trainer was not
appropriate, the NSA's focus upon establishment of long-term projects
directed towards better preparing agencies and communities to respond
to an all-hazard event provided a powerful model for future course
development.
The effectiveness of NSA training initiatives to date can be
clearly seen in course evaluation data. A further demonstration of the
relevance of NSA training programs may be verified in the current
demand for training programs being delivered across the country. The
level of interest shown by agencies and organizations both within the
United States, and from the international community, furthers confirms
our success.
Mr. King. Mr. McGowan, thank you for your testimony and for
your service.
The Chair now recognizes Captain Jack Reall of the National
Fire Academy Board of Visitors. Captain Reall?
STATEMENT OF JACK REALL
Captain Reall. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, committee members.
I am Jack Reall, Captain of the Columbus, Ohio Fire
Division and President of the Columbus Firefighters Union. I am
a member of the National Fire Academy Board of Visitors. I have
also instructed first responders in every jurisdiction
represented by these two committees.
I am here before you today to offer testimony on the status
of homeland security training and its impact on my members and
colleagues. DHS funding provides opportunities all over the
country in a variety of formats. However, it is generally
divided into two specific areas: national training facilities
and state and local grants. National training facilities
provide high-quality and high-impact training opportunities,
but they have some efficiency issues. The Noble Training
Facility in Anniston, Alabama offers a unique training
environment utilizing chemical-bioterror live agents. The
Nevada test site utilizes radiological facilities to create
real-world scenario-based environments that would be unfamiliar
to most first responders. The Tunnel in West Virginia also
offers environmental issues that have only been experienced at
the World Trade Center and are usually not able to be recreated
for training.
Although each of these facilities and the others I did not
mention have benefits to first responders, their impact is
minimal. Why? Because most of the first responders do not have
access to these facilities. Staffing concerns at home inhibit
our ability to attend these worthwhile sessions. Even though
these programs are free, they cause considerable costs to our
jurisdictions that eliminate opportunities. Even if our
firefighters and paramedics took their own vacation time to
attend these facilities, many localities would be hard-pressed
to allow for the leave due to the increased cost of staffing.
Less than .05 percent of my members has participated in
training at any of the national facilities.
The National Fire Academy is another story. They have a
longstanding relationship with the state and local training
academies and stretch the dollars as far they possibly can.
They have the added benefits of being able to share training
development initiatives with local training academies and give
a synergistic effect to every dollar being spent.
However, even the National Fire Academy has drawbacks.
Again, they have the same staffing issues as the other national
facilities. They also focus much of their impact on the
management aspect of the Fire Service. Not that this is bad. We
are all well aware that effective management will result in
better performance even at the lowest level. However, our
firefighters responding every day to tens of thousands of
emergencies nationwide need to be directly impacted by homeland
security dollars. The National Fire Academy offers a cost-
effective and useful indirect impact of these monies.
State and local grants to provide training are also an
opportunity for many of our first responders. However, they are
not consistent in quality or in curriculum. Many of these
courses do not meet nationally accepted criteria or consensus-
based standards. Additionally, many of these grants are
misadministered by state agencies, and without adequate
intervention by the Office of Domestic Preparedness
inconsistencies arise that inhibit training.
As an example, I have instructed structural collapse rescue
techniques to first responders throughout the nation and
overseas. I have developed the curriculum and mechanism for
training Ohio's first responders. I utilized the same exact
program for another state. Inconsistencies with administration
of ODP and DHS funding mechanisms have caused Ohio's state
agency administering these funds to deny the training to first
responders, while the other state has funded eight classes in
90 days. These inefficiencies lead most firefighters to believe
there is no overall strategy for the effective utilization of
these funds.
It is apparent to me that the over-emphasis on grant
processes and guidelines has caused us to get the process
right, but yet lose the progress. My observations are that
regardless of the mechanism, too little training is making its
way to the frontline firefighters and first responders. Too
much emphasis is placed on special retraining programs and
niche opportunities, while tens of thousands of firefighters
continue to put their lives on the line every day with little
or no additional training on homeland security issues.
Quality and consistency of those training programs that are
offered and provided through a federal funding mechanism are
across the spectrum. Much of the state and local grants, state
pass-through funding and UASI grants are over-utilized for
everyday law enforcement operations, with little left over for
other members of the first responder community.
As a union president, I make an attempt to absolve the
stereotype of just being the naysayer who identifies problems.
I try to offer solutions to every problem. My recommendations
are based on what I feel has worked for my members. The last
WMD training that all of our firefighters participated in was
the 120 Cities Training Program provided as part of the Nunn-
Lugar-Domenici Act. Since then, we have had sporadic
participation in WMD training for first responders. I felt this
program worked because it brought quality, consistent, high-
impact training to us. Our staffing impact was minimized due to
the fact that our firefighters were still available should a
catastrophic event occur. We also did not have to backfill for
travel days and allocate resources for shift changes to allow
for out-of-town training.
This was the most effective type of training for the
dollars spent. It is much more effective to pay for travel and
lodging of a few instructors versus the travel and lodging of
many students. Most businesses have utilized this method for
training employees for years. This training should be
administered nationally and delivered locally. This assures
consistency in quality. It also allows for a broad overview of
effectiveness of the training.
Firefighters and other first responders nationwide would be
able to be evaluated on the effectiveness of the training every
day, rather than just an annual exercise in one area of the
country involving a few hundred responders. By utilizing this
method of training for the majority of the programs and
opportunities also allows for a more quick, concise and
accurate determination that funding is being provided to the
first responder groups that need it most.
I ask that you consider my thoughts and recommendations
when providing direction for future funding of national
training programs through the use of taxpayer money. Every
taxpayer in the nation contribute to this revenue source.
Therefore, every responder to those taxpayers should be
afforded the training programs.
Just as a side note, my state program is one of the 115
institutionalized courses that have not been approved. It has
been waiting for quite some time.
I appreciate the opportunity to speak to all of you. Thank
you.
[The statement of Mr. Reall follows:]
Prepared Statement of Jack Reall
Good Morning Gentleman and Gentle ladies,
I am Jack Reall, Captain in the Columbus, Ohio, Fire Division and
President of the Columbus Fire Fighters Union.
I am here before you today to offer testimony on the status of
Homeland Security Training and its impact on my members and colleagues.
DHS Funding provides opportunities all over the country in a variety of
formats. However, it is generally divided into two specific areas;
National Training Facilities and State and Local Grants.
National Training Facilities provided high quality and high impact
training opportunities, but they have some efficiency issues. The Noble
Training Facility in Anniston, Alabama offers a unique training
environment utilizing chem-bio terrorist live agents. The Nevada Test
Site utilizes radiological facilities to create a real-world scenario-
based environment that would be unfamiliar to most first responders.
The Tunnel in West Virginia also offers environmental issues that have
only been experienced at the World Trade Center and are usually not
able to be recreated for training. Although each of these facilities,
and the others I did not mention, has benefits to first-responders,
their impact is minimal. Why?. . .because most of our first responders
do not have access to these facilities. Staffing concerns at home
inhibit our ability to attend these worthwhile sessions. Even though
these programs are free, they cause considerable costs to our
jurisdictions that eliminate opportunities. Even if our fire fighters
took their own vacation time to attend these facilities, many
localities would be hard pressed to allow for the leave due to
increased costs of staffing. Less than one-half of one percent of my
members has participated in training at any of the national facilities.
The National Fire Academy is another story. They have a long-
standing relationship with State and Local Training Academies and
stretch the dollars are far as they possibly can. They have added
benefits of being able to share training development initiatives with
local training academies and give a synergistic effect to every dollar
being spent. However, even the National Fire Academy has drawbacks.
Again, they have the same staffing issues as the other National
Facilities. They also focus much of their impact on the management
aspect of the Fire Service. Not that this is bad. We all are aware that
effective management will result in better performance at even the
lowest level. However, our firefighters responding every day to tens of
thousands of emergencies nationwide need to be directly impacted by our
Homeland Security dollars. The National Fire Academy offers a cost-
effective and useful indirect impact of these monies.
State and Local Grants to provide training are also an opportunity
for many of our First Responders. However, they are not consistent in
quality and in curriculum. Many of these courses do not meet nationally
accepted criteria or consensus-based standards. Additionally, many of
these grants are mis-administered by State Agencies and without
adequate intervention by the Office of Domestic Preparedness,
inconsistencies arise that inhibit training. As an example, I have
instructed Structural Collapse Rescue techniques to first responders
throughout the Nation. I developed the curriculum and mechanism for
training Ohio's First Responders. I utilized the same exact program for
another state. Inconsistencies with administration of ODP and DHS
funding mechanisms have caused Ohio's State Agency administrating these
funds to deny the training to First Responders while the other state
has funded 8 classes in 90 days. These inefficiencies lead most
firefighters to believe that there is no overall strategy for the
effective utilization of these funds.
``It is apparent to me that the overemphasis on grant processes and
guidelines has caused us to ``get the process right, yet lose the
progress.''
My observations are that, regardless of the mechanism, too little
training is making its way to the frontline firefighters and first
responders. Too much emphasis is placed on specialty training programs
and niche opportunities, while our tens of thousands of firefighters
continue to put their lives on the line everyday with little or no
additional training on Homeland Security Issues. Quality and
consistency of those training programs that are offered and provided
through our Federal Funding mechanism are across the spectrum. Much of
the State and Local Grants, State ``pass-through'' funding and UASI
grants are over utilized for everyday law enforcement operations with
little left over for other members of the first responder community.
As a Union President, I make an attempt to absolve the stereotype
of just being the naysayer who identifies problems. I try to offer
solutions to every problem. My recommendations are based on what I feel
has worked for my members. The last WMD training that all of our
firefighters participated in was the 120 Cities training provided as a
part of the Nunn-Luger-Dominici Act. Since then, we have had sporadic
participation in WMD training for first responders. I felt this program
worked because it brought quality, consistent, high-impact training to
us. Our staffing impact was minimized due to the fact that our
firefighters were still available should a catastrophic event occur. We
also did not have to backfill for travel days and allocate resources
for shift changes to allow for out of town training. This was the most
effective type of training for the dollar spent. It is much more
effective to pay for the travel and lodging of a few instructors versus
the travel and lodging of many students. Most businesses have utilized
this method for training employees for years. This training should be
administered nationally and delivered locally. This assures consistency
and quality. It also allows for a broad overview of the effectiveness
of the training. Firefighters and other first responders nationwide
would be able to be evaluated on the effectiveness of the training
everyday, rather than just with an annual exercise in one area of the
country involving a few hundred responders. By utilizing this method of
training for the majority of the programs and opportunities also allows
for a more quick, concise, and accurate determination that funding is
being provided to the first responder groups that need it most.
I ask that you consider my thoughts and recommendations when
providing direction for future funding of National Training Programs
through the use of taxpayer money. Every taxpayer in the Nation
contributes to this revenue source, therefore every first responder to
those taxpayers should be afforded these training programs. Thank you.
Mr. King. Thank you very much, Captain Reall.
And now for the purpose of introducing our next witness, I
recognize the gentleman from New Mexico, Mr. Pearce.
Mr. Pearce. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I request unanimous
consent to introduce Dr. Romero.
Mr. King. Without objection.
Mr. Pearce. I would like to introduce Dr. Romero, who is
Vice President for Research and Economic Development at the New
Mexico Institute for Mining and Technology. It is one of the
leading scientific institutions in the nation and is located in
the Second District of New Mexico, which makes it even better.
In his capacity as Vice President, Dr. Romero oversees the
university's homeland security programs, including the Playas
Training Center, the International Law Enforcement Academy, and
the Antiterrorism Assistance Program. Dr. Romeo also leads the
university's research on explosions and incendiary devices,
which explains why he has trouble getting on airlines these
days.
Dr. Romero is also the immediate past Chairman of the
National Domestic Preparedness Consortium that coordinates
first responder training in the area of weapons of mass
destruction. The Playas Training Center was simply just a
concept that Dr. Romeo was integrally involved in. It is a
mining town that had been vacated. It has all the components of
a regular town.
Mr. Romero several years ago saw the potential and
encouraged New Mexico Tech to buy that town from the mining
company. Now, we are holding homeland security training
exercises there. Just during Memorial Day, I had an interesting
visit and watched a full-scale project there. Dr. Romero's
leadership in coordinating university expertise with the
Department of Homeland Security has contributed greatly to our
first federal first responder training programs. We look
forward to hearing Dr. Romero's testimony.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. King. Dr. Romero?
STATEMENT OF VAN ROMERO
Mr. Romero. Mr. Chairman and Mr. Pearce, thank you very
much.
Mr. Chairman, Ranking Members, members of the committee and
my fellow colleagues, I testify before this panel today as a
member of the community that played an active role in homeland
defense issues well before there was a Department of Homeland
Security. I currently serve as the Research Vice President at
New Mexico Tech, which is one of our nation's leading explosive
research institutes. Prior to becoming Vice President, I was
the Director of the University Explosives Research Program.
During that time, I worked with others to initiate the National
Domestic Preparedness Consortium, NDPC, to coordinate first
responder training in the area of weapons of mass destruction
and served as the Chairman of the Consortium from 2001 to 2005.
As a result of the Oklahoma City bombing, the NDPC was
formally recognized by the administration and Congress. This
tragic event illustrated that first responders needed
additional preparedness to deal with WMD. NDPC was formed by
incorporating the specific areas of expertise in WMD from each
Consortium member. The Consortium gives the government the best
and brightest researchers from top-notch research institutions.
The concept of the NDPC is simple: train the trainer. The
Consortium enhances and underpins training programs at our
nation's state and local levels to prepare for and respond to
events of terrorism involving weapons of mass destruction.
The first step taken by NDPC was to develop courses to
augment the basic training received by first responders. Next,
the Consortium began to deliver these courses to first
responder communities, both on our campus and in their home
cities. In fact since 1998, the Consortium is responsible for
risk-based training being delivered to over 600,000 first
responders from all 50 states, the District of Columbia and our
four U.S. territories.
These courses were developed and reviewed in coordination
with other federal agencies including the Center for Disease
Control and Prevention, the Department of Energy, the
Department of Management Institution, the Environmental
Protection Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigations, the
Federal Emergency Management Agency, the National Fire Academy
and the Public Health Service, among others, all selected by
the Office of Domestic Preparedness. This has resulted in
courses that consistently receive strong positive reviews from
the first responder community.
Having been active for the past eight years, we have
learned a number of important lessons. I would like to discuss
with you a few of the lessons that we have learned since the
formation of the NDPC.
The first lesson to be learned is that education is an
important component of training. This is vastly different from
military training that is designed to prepare warfighters for
known threats and relies on predetermined courses of action.
Enemy actions are anticipated and countermeasures are practiced
during training. We must avoid the shortcoming of training of
first responders by only training them to respond to the last
attack. Today's threats require more education than training.
If the first responders are educated to understand the possible
threats and the ability of existing technology to deal with
these threats, they have a better chance to modify their
actions to address unforeseen attacks.
Further, the time available for the training of first
responders is limited compared to that of the warfighter.
Currently, it is estimated that there are five million first
responders that require various levels of counterterrorism
education. The vast majority of these students require only a
short awareness course that can be provided at their workplace.
The NDPC has developed and instituted a model that can be
scaled up to address the need to train five million first
responders and meet the challenge.
Second, first responder programs need to focus on
prevention as well as response, as you have heard today.
Because of events like 9/11 and Oklahoma City, we tend to
fixate on preparing first responders to respond to an event.
While this is an important mission for these programs, it
should not be the only mission. First responders are in the
community every day and if properly trained they have the
ability to recognize potential terrorist activity.
For example, one first responder, a fireman, that attended
an NDPC course on explosive devices recognized the ingredients
of a bomb during a routine call in New Jersey. Based on his
findings, the FBI was called in and the tenant of the apartment
was taken into custody. This simple act may have stopped a
terrorism attack. First responders learn these with hands-on
training of the type that they receive today from the National
Domestic Preparedness Consortium. I believe that through
education, other examples of interdiction have occurred and
occur every day at our ports, our borders and within our cities
and countryside.
Third, we must have consistent training in standards to
address our nation's training needs. It is vitally important
that our first responders in Miami have the same basic
knowledge as our first responders in Seattle. As we develop
solutions to WMD problems, it is essential that the entire
country benefit. Firemen, policemen and EMS personnel need to
have the same basic knowledge skills. First responders need to
plan and train together because they will respond together.
Consistency is best achieved via a single source of training.
Fourth, most of the training needed is at the awareness
level and can fit into current training programs that exist for
the first responder community as exemplified by those who
testified with me today. The vast number of existing delivery
mechanisms for this group dictates that a large number of
courses are best suited to deliver the required training, hence
the dilemma. To be effective, you need to have one consistent
message, and to be efficient you need to have multiple sources
to deliver the message.
The Office of Domestic Preparedness, in conjunction with
the National Domestic Preparedness Consortium, has developed a
system that addresses this dilemma. NDPC courses are developed
via a rigorous review process and are required to meet
standards. Instructors also are reviewed and meet the NDPC
standards. Technical-level courses are delivered by subject
matter experts and on a train-the-trainer basis. Courses at the
awareness level are designed to be delivered in the field by
personnel that have taken the technical-level courses. This
ensures consistency, while providing multiple delivery sources.
In my opinion, the nation can achieve first responder
training that is both effective and efficient by establishing
national standards, focusing training on response as well as
prevention, minimizing the number of delivery sources for
technical-level training, and maximizing the number of delivery
sources for awareness-level training. At New Mexico Tech, we
have been involved in supporting our nation's defense since
World War II. At that time, we developed a proximity fuse which
was used to defeat suicide bombers that were attacking our
Pacific Fleet. We used technology to beat suicide bombers 50
years ago and I am convinced that we can use technology to
defeat them now.
But developing the technology is only the first step. The
technology will be useless if first responders are not trained
to use it. An effective and efficient antiterrorism assistance
program for first responders will ensure that we maximize our
country's resources to defend our homeland.
Thank you, and I will be happy to answer any questions.
[The statement of Mr. Romero follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dr. Van Romero
Mr. Chairmen, Ranking Members, Members of the Committee and my
fellow colleagues:
I testify before this panel today as a member of the community who
has played an active role in homeland defense issues well before there
was a Department of Homeland Security. I currently serve as the
Research Vice President at New Mexico Tech, which is one of our
nation's leading explosives research institutions. Prior to becoming
the Research Vice President, I was the Director of the University's
Explosives Research Programs. During that time, I worked with others to
initiate the National Domestic Preparedness Consortium (NDPC) to
coordinate First Responder Training in the area of weapons of mass
destruction (WMD) and served as the chairman of the consortium from
2001 to 2005.
As a result of the Oklahoma City bombing, the NDPC was formerly
recognized by the Administration and the Congress. This tragic event
illustrated that first responders need additional preparation to deal
with WMD. The NDPC was founded by incorporating the specific area of
expertise in WMD of each member in the consortium. The consortium gives
the government the best and brightest researchers from these top-notch
research institutions.
The concept of the NDPC is simple: train the trainers. The
Consortium enhances and underpins training programs at the national,
state and local levels to prepare for and respond to events of
terrorism involving weapons of mass destruction, including Biological,
Nuclear/Radiological, Incendiary, Chemical and Explosive (BNICE)
devices.
The first step taken by the NDPC was to develop courses to augment
the basic training received by First Responders. Next the Consortium
began to deliver these courses to the First Responder community, both
on our campuses and in their home cities. In fact, since 1998 the
Consortium has provided risk-based training to over 600 hundred
thousand First Responders from all 50 States, the District of Columbia
and the four US territories.
These courses were developed and reviewed in coordination with
other federal agencies including the Center for Disease Control and
Prevention (CDC), the Department of Energy (DOE), the Emergency
Management Institute (EMI), the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA),
the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA), the National Fire Academy (NFA) and the
Public Health Service (PHS), among others, all selected by the Office
of Domestic Preparedness (ODP). This has resulted in courses that
consistently receive strong, positive reviews from the First Responder
Community.
Having been active over the past eight years, we have learned a
number of important lessons, and I would like to discuss with you a few
of our ``lessons learned'' since the formation of the NDPC.
The first lesson to be learned is that education is an important
component of training. This is vastly different from military training
that is designed to prepare war fighters for known threats and relies
on predetermined courses of action. Enemy actions are anticipated and
counter-measures are practiced during training. We must avoid a
shortcoming of training for first responders by only training them to
respond to the last attack. Today's threats require more education than
training. If first responders are educated to understand the possible
threats and the ability of existing technology to deal with the
threats, they have a better chance to modify their actions to address
unforeseen attacks.
Further, the time available for the training of first responders is
limited compared to that for war fighters. Currently, it is estimated
that there are five million first responders that require various
levels of counter-terrorist education. The vast majority of these
students require only a short awareness course that can be provided at
their place of work. The NDPC has developed and instituted a model that
can be scaled up to address the need to train five million first
responders and meet that challenge.
Second, First Responder programs need to focus on prevention, as
well as response. Because of events like 9/11 and Oklahoma City, we
tend to fixate on preparing First Responders to respond to an event.
While this is an important mission for these programs, it should not be
the only mission. First Responders are in the community every day and,
if properly trained, have the ability to recognize potential terrorist
activity. For example one First Responder that attended an NDPC course
on explosive devices recognized the ingredients of a bomb during a
routine call in New Jersey. Based on his findings, the FBI was called
in and the tenant of the apartment was taken into custody. This simple
act may have stopped a terrorist attack. First responders learn these
things with hands-on training of the type they receive today from the
NDPC. I believe that through education, other examples of interdiction
have occurred and occur every day--at our ports, borders, within our
cities and countryside.
Third, we must have consistent training standards to address our
national training needs. It is vitally important that our First
Responders in Miami have the same basic knowledge as our First
Responders in Seattle. As we develop solutions to WMD problems it is
essential that the entire country benefit. Firemen, police and EMS
personnel need to have the same basic knowledge. First Responders need
to plan and train together because they will be responding together.
Consistency is best achieved via a single source of training.
Fourth, most of the training need is at the awareness level and can
fit into current training programs that exist for the First Responder
community as exemplified by those testifying with me today. The vast
numbers and existing delivery mechanism for this group dictates that a
large number of sources are best suited to deliver the required
training. Hence the dilemma, to be effective you need to have one
consistent message and to be efficient you need to have multiple
sources delivering the message.
The Office ODP in conjunction with the NDPC, has developed a system
that addresses this dilemma. NDPC courses are developed via a rigorous
review process and are required to meet standards. Instructors are also
reviewed and must meet the NPDC standards. Technical level courses are
delivered by subject matter experts and train the trainer based.
Courses at the awareness level are designed to be delivered in the
field by the personnel that have taken the Technical level courses.
This insures consistency while providing for multiple delivery sources.
It is my opinion the Nation can achieve First Responder training
that is both effective and efficient by:
(1) Establishing National standards for all First Responder
programs;
(2) Focusing training programs on both response and prevention;
(3) Minimizing the number of delivery sources for technical
level training; and
(4) Maximizing the number of delivery sources for awareness
level training.
At New Mexico Tech, we have been involved in supporting our
nation's defense since World War II. At that time we helped develop the
proximity fuse, which was used to defeat suicide bombers that were
attacking our Pacific Fleet. We used technology to defeat suicide
bombers 50 years ago and I am convinced that we can use technology to
defeat them now. But developing the technology is only the first step.
The technology will be useless if First Responders are not trained to
use it. An efficient and effective anti-terrorism training program for
First Responders will ensure that we maximize our country's resources
to defend our homeland.
Thank you, I would be happy to address any questions the members
may have on this important issue.
Mr. King. Thank you, Dr. Romero.
Before we start the questions, without objection I would
ask that the charts of Mr. Reese be made a permanent part of
the record.
Mr. Meek?
Mr. Meek. Very quickly, because I know that we are under
time restraints, I just want to tell our panelists we
appreciate your testimony here today and that all of the
information will be placed into the record. Like our first
panel, we know that we have, some people say in the country we
have New York City and then we have the rest of the
environment. Through unfortunately sacrifice and loss of life,
New York City has gone through an experience like no other
city. What I was speaking to in the first panel, my questions
were mainly along the lines of what is happening in the rest of
the universe? What is happening with all of the first
responders? And how can you move towards uniformity?
I have had an opportunity to go over your testimony and I
heard you, I was in the anteroom there for a minute, when you
all were talking about how we do need to come together. So I
want to let you know that it did not fall on deaf ears. We have
the subcommittees here that will have to carry out action. We
have already in H.R. 1544, but we have to do more. That is just
the beginning. The more we find duplication, prioritized money
that is being spent in other areas of training, it will help us
to be able to have the resources to do what we need to do to
resolve some of the issues that many of you have brought to our
attention.
Mr. Chairman, thank you.
Mr. King. Thank you, Mr. Meek.
I think it is really a point well taken. The more we look
into these issues, we realize how different parts of the
country have different problems. The last thing we need is
duplication because every dollar that is spent the wrong way is
really a dollar wasted and a dollar that could be used to save
human life.
With that, Chairman Rogers?
Mr. Rogers. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Edwards, I start with you, speaking of duplication. You
made reference in your remarks to 50 different state programs
that you are having to deal with. What did you mean? I did not
understand exactly what you were making reference to.
Mr. Edwards. Each state has a state fire training
organization. Some are attached to universities and colleges.
Some are part of state government. Some are a freestanding
board or commission and may work directly for the Governor's
office. But each state has a state fire training organization
that coordinates and works with the local fire departments in
that state to provide training. Collectively, the 50 states are
training about 800,000 students per year.
Mr. Rogers. This is separate and apart from first responder
training that we are providing in the Consortium of schools or
Consortium of institutions like the Center for Domestic
Preparedness? This is separate and apart from that?
Mr. Edwards. Yes. These are state agencies in most cases.
What our issue is, we would like to be able to work more
closely with ODP and take advantage of some of that curriculum.
The Consortium schools do a great job. There is no question
about that. We use them in our state. The problem is one of
capacity in the system. You cannot have five schools train the
nation's 1.2 million firefighters.
Mr. Rogers. That brings me to the second thing I wanted to
visit. I represent a very rural, relatively poor congressional
district. Most of the fire protection that we have, and for
that matter first responder protection, is volunteer units. It
is not practical for many of these people to leave their jobs
and go away for a week or two weeks of training at CDP. And
this goes also to Mr. Reall's comments.
If we were to provide funding that allowed for backfill of
these employees, not only within sheriffs' departments and
police departments, but for other employers, do you think this
would be a practical way to make sure that training is extended
to these volunteer units? Or do we need to look at more
aggressive outreach programs where we are sending trainers out
to these volunteer units? Or is it the train-the-trainer
concept?
I am looking at both of you to give me a response.
Mr. Edwards. Just some comments on that. I think in most
states the system is there. We are training, and I am speaking
for states with a fire and rescue service, not law enforcement
and others, but the system is already there. The system has
been in place for decades. The problem is there is no
communication and there is no working relationship with ODP in
the state and fire training academies. If there was, and like I
say, we requested to share in the curriculum to be able to use
their already-developed curriculum that has been paid for by
the federal dollar and for work with ODP to tell us what
instructor requirements will be necessary, what course
requirements and how we could deliver that. We were turned out.
I do not understand that at all.
Mr. Rogers. The state training programs you are making
reference to are paid for with Federal dollars?
Mr. Edwards. Paid for with what?
Mr. Rogers. Did you say the state training programs are
paid for with Federal dollars?
Mr. Edwards. No, the training courses that are developed by
the Consortium are paid for with federal dollars. We just want
to have access to them so we can deliver within our system and
deliver training where the firefighters live and work.
Particularly with volunteers, they cannot travel large
distances to receive training programs. In the State of
Maryland, we operate six regional training centers that are
fully staffed regional training center to provide training out
where the firefighters are at.
We just need help with the curriculum. I have not even
asked for any money. All I want is to be able to share the
curriculum, to know what the requirements are, to train fire
and rescue personnel and report that back to DHS. As an
example, the National Fire Academy, EMI, and the NIMS
curriculum, when they develop a course it is immediately
handed-off to state and local fire handed off to state and
local fire training academies and they teach it. They assist in
teaching it. With ODP, they do not allow state fire academies
to teach their curriculum. That has caused a huge problem.
Mr. Rogers. Captain Reall, what is the best way for us to
go about this? Is it to backfill resources or is it more
aggressive outreach and communication--the kind of
communication Mr. Edwards is making reference to?
Captain Reall. I think that there is a combination of best
ways. If you are looking for the cheapest way, if you are
looking for the most effective way in terms of retention, there
are combinations of ways depending on what you consider the
best way. I would say that a combination of those two things. A
more aggressive outreach, like the Doctor said, a more
aggressive outreach for those lower-level courses has got to be
done. We are not getting that out there. But backfill costs to
allow people to attend those special opportunities that are
great, like the CDP.
Mr. Rogers. How effective is the train-the-trainer
component of what we do?
Captain Reall. It has been very effective for at least fire
and EMS education for decades. I guess from my perspective, I
am looking to fix this program for my next 15 years of my
career. I am not at the end of it. I am in the middle of it. I
have to get this fixed so that I do not have a problem for the
rest of my career.
Mr. Rogers. And your number one fix would be what? What
would you want this committee to take away from your comments?
Captain Reall. I would like to have more cooperation
between ODP and the training mechanisms that are out there
right now, whether you consider it self-certification or
whatever it might be, but I think we are all saying the same
thing. We have to get that stuff out there to our first
responders.
Mr. Rogers. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. King. Congressman Pearce?
Mr. Pearce. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Romero, you discussed awareness training versus the
maximizing of awareness training and minimizing technical
training. Mr. Edwards is saying that we ignoring state and
local programs. Can you discuss the relationship between those
two concepts and ODP's choices?
Mr. Romero. Yes, Mr. Pearce, Mr. Chairman.
There is, as I stated, a need to get out into the community
and deliver at the local level the awareness-level training,
but you need to have experts delivering that training. All of
us know that first responders have very specific, very tough
questions when they attend these classes. If we do not have
people who are very knowledgeable in the training that they are
delivering, they will not be listened to. So from the
Consortium's standpoint, we look to bring people from the
various training academies to the Consortium classes and give
them that expertise so that they can go back home and deliver a
consistent message.
Again, we have point sources for the very technical-level
training, like the Center for Domestic Preparedness where you
are actually exposed to real live agents. That does not occur
anywhere in the country. So take people there, make them
experts, and then let them go back to their home jurisdictions
and train as many people as they can.
Mr. Pearce. How do you avoid other duplicities in the
Consortium and its approach?
Mr. Romero. The Consortium was formed to span the
waterfront if you will with WMD. We have heard today that
Nevada Test Site focuses on radiological and nuclear. New
Mexico Tech focuses specifically on explosive devices because
we are the explosive experts. At the Center for Domestic
Preparedness, it is the chemical aspect of WMD. At LSU, they
focus on the biological and at Texas A&M they focus on the
coordination, command and control.
So the Consortium members themselves span the waterfront to
try and cover all aspects of WMD so that people who come to the
courses then have all of that expertise, and again can go home
and be the local expert.
Mr. Pearce. And that is the concept you are referring to,
education versus training. We educate them; they then go and
train. Is that correct?
Mr. Romero. That is correct, Mr. Pearce. We make them the
experts and then they go home. At New Mexico Tech when a
student takes our course, they can actually receive two hours
of college credit in chemical engineering that can be
transferred to any university in this nation. That is the level
of education that we are providing them.
Mr. Pearce. Tell me a little bit about how many people you
all have trained at New Mexico Tech and basically how that then
has filtered out through the nation.
Mr. Romero. We currently train on the order of about 400
students a week in our courses. To date, we have trained 13,000
trainers. Those trainers in turn have gone out and trained an
additional 130,000 first responders from across the nation. So
we are currently betting a multiplying factor of about 10 to 1.
There is a little bit of a lag because as we train more and
more people, it takes a while before their numbers start coming
back to us.
Mr. Pearce. Mr. Edwards, do you have any comments on this
whole line of thought we have been talking about here?
Mr. Edwards. A couple of comments. One is the concept of
training the trainer is very good as long as they work within a
system. Individuals attend the Consortium classes at the school
sites. Then they come back and we do not know who they are
training. I maintain all the training records for the State of
Maryland fire and rescue personnel and historical database. We
have over 600,000 student records. You cannot just send someone
to a 2-week course and send them back and have them just start
training ad hoc within the existing system.
That is why I am saying there needs to be better
coordination at the state and local level with ODP to develop a
partnership and develop a system that works for everybody, not
just sending people to a school for 2 weeks and going back and
saying they are an expert. They are most likely not an expert
in that regard, and they need to work within a system to
provide that training so it is structured and it is what the
departments need and it is done in a timely and cost-effective
manner.
Mr. Pearce. If they are not coming home as experts, are
they capable at least of creating the awareness, that is the
awareness that Dr. Romero mentioned? And is that such a big
deal in your eyes, simply the awareness of how short we are of
skills?
Mr. Edwards. I guess some of them are and some of them are
not. I know in our state, we have state statutes that you have
to be certified to be an emergency services instructor. A lot
of people who attend these Consortium schools are not
recognized as instructors in the State of Maryland, so they can
go to these courses and come back, but due to state law they
are not allowed to teach in the fire and rescue environment.
That is what I mean by having these systems work together and
have the synergy of all the systems for the betterment of the
fire and rescue service as one system, not a bunch of separate
systems spread out all over the country.
Mr. Pearce. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My time has expired. I
thank you.
Mr. King. Mr. Reichert?
Mr. Reichert. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First, I would like to take this opportunity to welcome my
good friend Sheriff McGowan from Minnesota, actually the
President of the major country sheriffs' association at one
time, and he and I were members of that organization up until
last year, the National Sheriffs' Association. So welcome,
Sheriff.
I agree with my colleague from Florida. We need to do a lot
more. We passed the first responders bill last month, I think
it was. The purpose of that is to un-jam the logjam of monies
that have been held up for training and equipment. The training
and equipment is all well and good, and you have talked about
some of the pitfalls and some of the weaknesses in the training
across the country. But there are other costs I would guess
that are associated with the training that we have not even
really touched on.
I wonder, Sheriff, first if you could comment on just
around the homeland security issue and training and the
management of training, what are the costs to your agency?
Sheriff McGowan. First off, every time you send somebody
out to go to training, as was mentioned before by Commissioner
Kelly, you have to take that person off the street. If they are
holding a critical job or they are in a critical position,
somebody has to be hired to backfill them. And when you
backfill a person, you are taking him normally off of a day off
for somewhere like that and you are paying him time-and-a-half.
So you are actually spending in one day of training three times
of what your costs are.
Also, once we train people, I think Representative, one of
the things that we fail to realize is how do we make use of
that training when it comes back to us? That is the critical
component. How do we make use of that? How is it going to
protect our country? How is it going to make us safer and more
responsive? That is where I come to is if I could ask you
ladies and gentlemen for any assistance, please let us use
money to backfill our positions where we are providing
assistance at a federal level to help.
I have personnel signed up to the terrorism task forces. I
do not get reimbursement for that. That means we go without a
position. I go without somebody to answer a rape call or a
robbery call, a murder call, a person that is in distress. From
major county sheriffs and major city chiefs, National
Sheriffs', I am sure the firefighters are the same way. Please
allow us to backfill where we have given people to supplement
the national effort. That is absolutely critical for us.
Mr. Reichert. I thought that might be your answer.
Would anyone else on the panel like to address that
question? I would assume that in the fire business, you would
have the same experience.
Captain Reall. I would agree with that. We are often asked
how much of our budget goes towards homeland security. I would
say all of it because that is what we do. It does matter if it
is a fire caused by terrorist activity or natural disaster or
whatever, we are doing it every day. We are providing
intelligence to our partners in law enforcement. We have for
years.
I was a little bit distressed to find out that we only get
intelligence back from the police commissioner when it is
deemed appropriate. From our perspective, how many drug labs
are shut down from intervention from paramedics or firefighters
when they go to an emergency call because somebody is having
trouble breathing, and then they notify the law enforcement
agency. We need that kind of communication going back and
forth.
Mr. Reichert. It certainly has to be a team effort.
Just again to touch on some of the other issues associated
with this topic, you can be trained, and I think someone made
this statement, but when you come back is it worthwhile and
does it apply. But you can also be trained and then you need to
be retrained and you need to be updated in training. How do you
manage that within your organizations? You have to manage the
training records of your employees. Does that take additional
resources and personnel? Anyone on the panel.
Mr. Edwards. If I can just comment on that. That is a very
serious issue. We train about 30,000 students a year at the
Maryland Fire and Rescue Institute, University of Maryland. A
lot of that training is training people who need
recertification. They need to be kept current with skills. That
is a very expensive part of our training program. In addition
to that, with volunteer service, you have a lot of people who
enter and leave the service, so you are constantly training and
retraining people because you have attrition. The same is in
the career service as individuals retire and you have to train
new employees to take their place.
The ability to train, that is why I believe their needs to
be a national training strategy developed. There needs to be
standard national training objectives that we can work toward.
And then that system needs to be put out in the state and local
departments for the training to take place in thousands of
points throughout this country, with the results reported back
in a way of not only having the initial training, but the
recertification training with that so we know we are training
to a certain standard and we are not just developing our own
standard or each state having their own separate standard. We
need a national standard program.
Mr. Reichert. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. King. Thank you, Mr. Reichert.
Our lease on this room is about to expire. Fortunately,
everyone has had a chance to ask their questions. I really want
to thank all the members of the panel for your testimony.
I would just mention to Sheriff McGowan that my
understanding of H.R. 1534, the legislation we passed last
month, does allow reimbursement for backfilling. It still has
to work its way through the Senate.
Sheriff McGowan. Mr. Chairman, may I ask, is that going to
be for personnel that we put into terrorism task forces? Is
that going to allow me to backfill my position? Because, Mr.
Chairman, everything that we go to today, what Commissioner
Kelly talked about which you spent a lot of time on, it all
starts with information. You talked a lot about prevention
earlier. Prevention starts from information. That information
does not come from across the pond somewhere else to us. It
comes from within a local community. It is local officers
establishing and knowing what is going on in their communities.
We become part of an intelligence center, but for me to put
people over there to ensure that we have coordination not only
with my agency, but with other police departments, with federal
agencies, with state law enforcement, we need to have that
information center or intelligence center. If we cannot put
people over there and get the money back for them, it is going
to come to, because I will explain to you in my agency.
I have about 800 men and women that work for me. I only get
funded to 95 percent. So at any given time to meet my budget, I
have to keep 40 vacancies. When I start subtracting out bodies
going to different places, that is an additional vacancy that I
do not have a man or woman to answer a call, to investigate a
crime, to work on a prevention program at a local level. That
is why, please, it is so critical. And from everywhere that I
have been involved in at the national level, this is the number
one concern that I hear from colleagues of mine around the
country.
Mr. King. We have to end on that because of the time. It is
my understanding of H.R. 1544 that is applies to terrorism
prevention. Again, we will have to work that through and work
closely with you on it as it is interpreted.
With that, on behalf of Chairman Rogers, I want to thank
all the members. I thank all the panelists. I especially want
to thank the Ranking Members for their cooperation in putting
this together.
The members of the committees may have some additional
questions for the witnesses. We would ask if you would respond
to those in writing. The hearing record will be held open for
10 days.
Without objection, the committee stands adjourned.
Thank you very much.
[Whereupon, at 12:57 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
For the Record
ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS TO THE WITNESSES
Dr. Van Romero Responses to Questions
Congressman Pearce: We heard a lot of discussion regarding the need
for ODP to increase its cooperation with the local jurisdictions during
the testimony. From the Consortium view point, will this solve the
problems that were discussed?
Response from Dr. Van Romero:
Increased cooperation and communication is always a good idea, but
both cooperation and communication are two way processes. A number of
the problems discussed have been addressed by ODP via the State Point
of Contacts. It appears to me that there is a break between the state
and local jurisdictions. For example, there was a lot of discussion
about the lack of funds to pay for overtime when a First Responder is
away at training. This is simply not true. ODP has authorized states to
provide funds to local jurisdictions for overtime to backfill positions
that are vacated due to training out of the funds ODP provides to the
state. Obviously, the state and local jurisdictions are not coordinated
on this issue.
A concern was expressed that students that return from the
Consortium courses do not train others. Very meticulous records are
kept on the number of First Responders that are trained by participants
in the Consortium courses. Some participants have trained over 1000
fellow First Responders in their home jurisdictions. However, it is
true that there are a number of participants that never train their
colleagues. These participants should not be sent to the Consortium
courses. The selection criterion however, is between the local
jurisdiction and the State Point of Contacts. They need to do a better
job of selecting the participants for the courses.
It was also stated that ``Unfortunately for the hundreds of
thousands of volunteers who need to be trained, the ODP consortium
teaches their programs Monday to Friday during normal work hours''.
This again is not true. Consortium courses that are delivered in local
jurisdictions are routinely delivered during off hours and on week-
ends. The Consortium works with the State Point of Contacts to deliver
the courses to their specification. If a jurisdiction wants a course
delivered during off hours, all they have to do is work with the State
Point of Contact to arrange it with the Consortium.
I could point out other misconceptions, but that would simply be
``piling on''. The point is yes, there needs to be better cooperation
and communication, but it appears that the link that most needs
improvement is the link between local jurisdictions and the State Point
of Contact.
In reference to your letter dated July 8, 2005, below are answers
to your questions regarding my testimony to the Subcommittee on
Emergency Preparedness, Science and Technology and the Subcommittee on
Management, Integration and Oversight joint oversight hearing entitled
``The National Training Program: Is Anti-Terrorism Training for First
Responders Efficient and Effective?'' on Thursday, June 23, 2005.
Please let me know if you require additional information.
(1) What is the role of the National Domestic Preparedness
Consortium members in the Office for Domestic Preparedness process for
approving requests from States and Urban Areas to provide terrorism
preparedness training to their personnel using homeland security grant
funding?
Response: Training allocations for resident and mobile training
courses are established by ODP for each State/Territory based upon
risk. The specific choice/approval of participants for resident courses
and venues for mobile training is determined by the State/Territory
training point of contact within the state administrative agency. If a
participant cancels prior to a scheduled course, a replacement is
chosen from a list that is pre-approved by the State/Territory training
point of contact.
(2) Of fiscal year 2004 funding from the Office for Domestic
Preparedness, what percentage has been spent by the Energetic Materials
Research and Testing Center (EMRTC) at the New Mexico Institute of
Mining and Technology on course materials, instructor salaries: travel
costs, lodging, meals, administrative costs, overhead, and other costs?
Response: Fiscal year 2004 funding was awarded effective October 1,
2004 and will run through September 30, 2005. Therefore, we only have
actual expenditures for FY 2004 funds through June 2005. Below is a
breakdown of these expended funds as requested.
10/01/2004--06/30/2005 (present)..
Description....................... Actual Percent of Total
Course Materials & Training $2,657,918.66 25.58%
Support..........................
Instructor Costs.................. 3,845,371.08 37.01%
Participant Lodging, Meals, & Air 3,169,019.91 30.50%
Fare.............................
Administrative Costs.............. 101,963.14 0.98%
Overhead.......................... 564,811.58 5.44%
Equipment......................... 50,150.82 0.48%
Total............................. $10,389,235.19 100.00%
(3) What types of off-site training courses does EMR TC provide
within the State and local jurisdictions, and to what extent are State,
local, or private entities utilized by EMRTC to provide such mobile
training?
Response: The current ODP Homeland Security training strategy
designates the State/Territory as the source for awareness level
training. This capability is promulgated to the States/Territories via
train-the-trainer programs for execution at State/Territory designated
training academies and established training venues. Trainers that have
been to train-the-trainer Consortium courses are provided support
material so they can deliver the course in their home jurisdiction
utilizing local infrastructure and capabilities.
Specialty and advanced ODP/NDPC training which requires specific
equipment and/or facilities are delivered by NDPC instructors to the
State/Territory at their request. Specifically, EMRTC instructors
deliver specialized, advanced ``mobile'' training at the request of the
State/Territory training point of contact within the state
administrative agency. These courses are delivered at the locations
specified by the State/Territory training point of contact.
Raymond W. Kelly Responses to Questions
Question 1.: Is the New York City Police Department expected to
provide National Incident Management System (NIMS) training to its
personnel in time to meet the implementation deadlines during fiscal
years 2005 through 2007? How have the National Training Program and
homeland security grant assistance helped in meeting NIMS requirements?
What are the obstacles and potential solutions to training law
enforcement personnel on new incident command procedures?
The NYC Office of Emergency Management, with the approval of the
Department of Homeland Security, created the Citywide Incident
Management System (CIMS) for use by New York City in place of the
National Incident Management System (NIMS). This system is fully
compliant with the NIMS incident command structure in terms of roles,
responsibilities, terminology and procedures. CIMS will enable New York
City emergency response agencies to coordinate activities with federal,
state and local agencies. In addition, CIMS recognizes the unique size,
structure, needs and capabilities of New York City's emergency response
agencies and incorporates them into the CIMS protocol. All uniformed
members of the NYPD from the rank of Police Officer through Bureau
Chief have received one-day of CIMS training and NYPD will provide this
training to future hires. This will meet the implementation deadlines
for fiscal years 2005 and 2007. DHS grant assistance has enabled the
City to conduct this training without impacting the Department's daily
patrol strength.
Question 2.: How may terrorism prevention, preparedness, and
response training provided by the Department of Homeland Security be
better designed and delivered to account for the unique needs of the
New York City Police Department?
Terrorism prevention, preparedness and response training provided
by DHS has increased readiness to respond to terrorist incidents,
particularly those involving a component. For example, NYPD has worked
with the Center for Domestic Preparedness (CDP) to create two key
training courses: The Law Enforcement Protective Measures (LEPM)
course, which was utilized to provide Chemical, Ordinance, Biological
and Radiological (COBRA) Operations-level training to approximately
12,000 members of the NYPD and the WMD Law Enforcement Threat, Hazard
Recognition and Emergency Actions Training (THREAT), a course that
enables all NYPD COBRA-trained personnel to meet the annual training
standards mandated by the Occupational Safety and health Administration
(OSHA). The development of these courses was expedited by the full-
time, on-site assignment of a CDP representative directly to NYPD. This
CDP representative was instrumental in obtaining DHS certification for
these courses, a requirement under grant funding rules. There is a need
for a representative from the DHS Office of Domestic Preparedness (DHS/
ODP) Urban Area Security Initiative Working Group to be based in New
York City to serve in the same role. This would enhance the ability of
NYPD to develop and certify courses in disciplines under the control of
ODP in a timely manner. It is important that training development
process has the flexibility to respond quickly to evolving terrorist
tactics and technological developments. The presence of DHS/ODP
representatives capable of assisting NYPD in the self-certification of
training courses will serve this important goal.
The partners in the DHS training consortium have tremendous
expertise in first responder training. In addition to first responder
training, however, the focus of NYPD continues to be the development of
the skill sets required to become effective ``first preventers.'' NYPD
seeks to train our personnel to identify and apprehend terrorist
operatives prior to an attack, during the surveillance, planning and
preparation phases. Therefore, greater focus must be placed on the
development and implementation of training in disciplines such as
surveillance and counter-surveillance techniques, the development and
utilization of confidential informants, and intelligence analysis and
analytical writing.
Question 3.: Which types of terrorism preparedness courses are most
appropriately provided at Department of Homeland Security training
centers as opposed to NYPD facilities?
DHS provides many specialized training courses across the country
that have been attended by NYPD personnel. Some of these courses are
best delivered at their present locations. For example, the ``WMD
Technical Emergency Response Training'' course provided at the Center
for Domestic Preparedness, located in Anniston, Alabama, and the
``Response to Terrorist Bombing'' and ``Prevention and Response to
Suicide Terrorism'' courses provided at the Energetic Material Research
and Testing Center, located in Socorro, New Mexico, cannot be
duplicated at NYPD facilities. The ability to expose the student, in a
controlled, tactically sound and intrinsically safe learning
environment, to weaponized chemical agents and high yield explosive
devices make the training experience unique to these facilities. It
simply would not be practical to conduct this type of training within
the confines of New York City.
Training courses that are not site specific, however, could be
exported to an NYPD facility through the ``train the trainer'' concept.
Qualified NYPD instructors can be trained by DHS personnel at an NYPD
facility. The NYPD instructors obtain certification and required
training material from DHS and can then act as force multipliers by
delivering the training to the general NYPD training population at an
NYPD facility. This method has been used in the past with instructors
and courses from the Center for Domestic Preparedness, the Bechtel
Nevada WMD Training Program and LSU National Center for Biologic of
Counter Terrorism Education. This system produces savings, not only in
travel expenses, but also in travel time. This directly impacts
readiness, since more members can be trained at a cost of fewer days
off patrol. This is more cost effective and efficient and produces the
ability to train large numbers of NYPD personnel. All DHS training
courses that are not site-specific should be made available to NYPD in
this manner. The on-site presence of representatives would further
enhance the process and would enable the Department to rapidly certify
the courses and meet the parameters and standards required to utilize
DHS grant funding to deliver the training.