    [House Hearing, 109 Congress]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

       INTERRUPTING NARCO-TERRORIST THREATS ON THE HIGH SEAS: DO WE HAVE
                           ENOUGH WIND IN OUR SAILS?

    =======================================================================

                                    HEARING

                                   before the

                       SUBCOMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE,
                        DRUG POLICY, AND HUMAN RESOURCES

                                     of the

                                  COMMITTEE ON
                               GOVERNMENT REFORM

                            HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                           ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS

                                 FIRST SESSION

                                   __________

                                 JUNE 29, 2005

                                   __________

                               Serial No. 109-99

                                   __________

           Printed for the use of the Committee on Government Reform

      Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/
                                   index.html
                          http://www.house.gov/reform

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                         COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM

                         TOM DAVIS, Virginia, Chairman
    CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut       HENRY A. WAXMAN, California
    DAN BURTON, Indiana                  TOM LANTOS, California
    ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida         MAJOR R. OWENS, New York
    JOHN M. McHUGH, New York             EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York
    JOHN L. MICA, Florida                PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania
    GIL GUTKNECHT, Minnesota             CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York
    MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana              ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland
    STEVEN C. LaTOURETTE, Ohio           DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio
    TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania    DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois
    CHRIS CANNON, Utah                   WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri
    JOHN J. DUNCAN, Jr., Tennessee       DIANE E. WATSON, California
    CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan          STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts
    MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio              CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland
    DARRELL E. ISSA, California          LINDA T. SANCHEZ, California
    GINNY BROWN-WAITE, Florida           C.A. DUTCH RUPPERSBERGER, Maryland
    JON C. PORTER, Nevada                BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
    KENNY MARCHANT, Texas                ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of
    LYNN A. WESTMORELAND, Georgia            Columbia
    PATRICK T. McHENRY, North Carolina               ------
    CHARLES W. DENT, Pennsylvania        BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont
    VIRGINIA FOXX, North Carolina            (Independent)
    ------ ------

                        Melissa Wojciak, Staff Director
           David Marin, Deputy Staff Director/Communications Director
                   Rob Borden, Parliamentarian/Senior Counsel
                           Teresa Austin, Chief Clerk
              Phil Barnett, Minority Chief of Staff/Chief Counsel

       Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources

                       MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana, Chairman
    PATRICK T. McHenry, North Carolina   ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland
    DAN BURTON, Indiana                  BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont
    JOHN L. MICA, Florida                DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois
    GIL GUTKNECHT, Minnesota             DIANE E. WATSON, California
    STEVEN C. LaTOURETTE, Ohio           LINDA T. SANCHEZ, California
    CHRIS CANNON, Utah                   C.A. DUTCH RUPPERSBERGER, Maryland
    CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan          MAJOR R. OWENS, New York
    GINNY BROWN-WAITE, Florida           ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of
    VIRGINIA FOXX, North Carolina            Columbia

                                   Ex Officio

    TOM DAVIS, Virginia                  HENRY A. WAXMAN, California
                         J. Marc Wheat, Staff Director
                               Malia Holst, Clerk
                         Tony Haywood, Minority Counsel

                                C O N T E N T S

                                  ----------
                                                                       Page
    Hearing held on June 29, 2005....................................     1
    Statement of:
        Utley, Ralph, Acting U.S. Interdiction Coordinator; Admiral
          Dennis Sirois, Assistant Commandant for Operations, U.S.
          Coast Guard; Admiral Jeffrey J. Hathaway, Director, Joint
          Interagency Task Force South; Charles E. Stallworth II,
          Acting Assistant Commissioner, Office of Air and Marine
          Operations, U.S. Customs and Border Protection; and Thomas
          M. Harrigan, Chief of Enforcement Operations, Drug
          Enforcement Agency.........................................    13
            Harrigan, Thomas M.......................................    43
            Hathaway, Admiral Jeffrey J..............................    27
            Sirois, Admiral Dennis...................................    21
            Stallworth, Charles E., II,..............................    37
            Utley, Ralph.............................................    13
    Letters, statements, etc., submitted for the record by:
        Cummings, Hon. Elijah E., a Representative in Congress from
          the State of Maryland, prepared statement of...............     9
        Harrigan, Thomas M., Chief of Enforcement Operations, Drug
          Enforcement Agency, prepared statement of..................    45
        Hathaway, Admiral Jeffrey J., Director, Joint Interagency
          Task Force South, prepared statement of....................    29
        Sirois, Admiral Dennis, Assistant Commandant for Operations,
          U.S. Coast Guard, prepared statement of....................    23
        Souder, Hon. Mark E., a Representative in Congress from the
          State of Indiana, prepared statement of....................     5
        Stallworth, Charles E., II, Acting Assistant Commissioner,
          Office of Air and Marine Operations, U.S. Customs and
          Border Protection, prepared statement of...................    39
        Utley, Ralph, Acting U.S. Interdiction Coordinator, prepared
          statement of...............................................    17

       INTERRUPTING NARCO-TERRORIST THREATS ON THE HIGH SEAS: DO WE HAVE
                           ENOUGH WIND IN OUR SAILS?

                                  ----------

                            WEDNESDAY, JUNE 29, 2005

                      House of Representatives,
    Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and
                                       Human Resources,
                                Committee on Government Reform,
                                                        Washington, DC.
        The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:12 p.m., in
    room 2247, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Mark Souder
    (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
        Present: Representatives Souder, McHenry, Cummings, Brown-
    Waite, and Norton.
        Staff present: Marc Wheat, staff director and chief
    counsel; David Thomasson and Pat DeQuattro, congresional
    fellows; Malia Holst, clerk; and Tony Haywood, minority
    counsel.
        Mr. Souder. The subcommittee will come to order.
        Good afternoon and thank you all for coming. Today we are
    going to examine how drugs make their way through the transit
    zone prior to arriving in Mexico for shipment into the United
    States.
        Let me begin by conveying my intense displeasure and
    frustration with the manner in which USSOUTHCOM has worked with
    Congress and our subcommittee. Similar to the treatment
    Congress receives from USCENTCOM, Southern Command has avoided
    responding to congressional oversight of its counterdrug
    responsibilities. The subcommittee asked five simple questions
    for the record after a subcommittee visit to USSOUTHCOM's
    headquarters in January.
        The answers to these simple questions were known by the
    Department of Homeland Security agencies months ago, yet
    USSOUTHCOM has not chosen to share these answers with
    Congress--perhaps the decision was to wait until 6 months after
    today's hearing before transmitting the answers to the
    subcommittee questions, perhaps we will never get the answers.
    This lack of cooperation, combined with the commitment to
    control rather than support Interagency counterdrug efforts
    leads me to question DOD's drug interdiction motivations.
        That said, this hearing may serve to change the course of
    future drug funding to enable the execution of transit zone
    drug interdiction operations. But let me say that the big
    picture in the transit zone is disturbing. For the first time,
    our actionable intelligence exceeds our interdiction
    capabilities in the transit zone. In other words, the Federal
    Government knows of specific boatloads of drugs heading north
    that we cannot intercept because of the lack of interception
    assets in the Caribbean and the Eastern Pacific.
        The intelligence breakthrough is a recent development
    resulting from the very successful Operation Panama Express, an
    interagency intelligence-driven program managed by the
    Departments of Justice and Homeland Security. Due to this
    impressive intelligence cuing, the Joint Interagency Task Force
    [JIATF], South now has improved insight into where, when, and
    how much cocaine will be smuggled through the transit zones.
    All of our Federal agencies need a special ``well done'' from
    Congress for record cocaine seizures in 2004. The hearing today
    is not meant to criticize, but rather look to improve on major
    successes in U.S. drug interdiction efforts.
        Before I detail some more of these concerns, let me just
    add, I have been going through this testimony the last couple
    of days, part of our frustration, not just here with SOUTHCOM,
    with CENTCOM, and multiple other agencies, is we understand
    everybody's intense budget pressures and OMB has put tremendous
    pressures on every agency. Those of us, like myself, who
    supported efforts in Afghanistan, in Iraq understand that the
    military is stretched very thin.
        But we represent the taxpayers. Appropriations come from
    this body and are dependent upon having accurate facts upon
    which to make those appropriations decisions; it is not an
    executive branch decision. We cannot make intelligence
    decisions without correct information. It may mean we just do
    not have enough money to do all this.
        But that is what we are hired to do. And if we cannot get
    adequate information, we do not know how best to allocate anti-
    drug resources and what our tradeoffs are; how many are dying
    in this area. How can we do that if we do not have adequate
    data.
        In most cases and in most agencies, bluntly put, we have
    not found the problem with the individual agencies. The
    question is what kind of systemic problem do we have right now
    sitting on information being released to Congress because many
    people perceive that releasing the information to us may lead
    to increased spending, or pressures for spending, or be used
    for partisan advantage. The fact is, I am a partisan for this
    administration and I cannot get the adequate data, not only in
    narcotics, but in agency after agency, and there is a building
    frustration that I have vented already this morning at the
    White House.
        While the accomplishments of Panama Express should not go
    unnoticed, our asset shortfalls in the transit zone raise
    serious concerns about our ability to interdict known smuggling
    events. On May 10, 2005 this subcommittee held a hearing
    entitled, ``2006 DOD Counternarcotics Budget: Does It Deliver
    the Necessary Support?'' In the hearing, Marybeth Long, Deputy
    Assistant Secretary of Defense for Counternarcotics, testified
    that, ``The Navy's problem with the P-3s, which affects not
    only the Department's counternarcotics assets, but the
    availability of maritime patrol aircraft worldwide, has been
    well documented and discussed.''
        Regrettably, the Navy failed to properly anticipate the
    inevitable fate of an old airframe employed primarily in a
    corrosive, salty air environment. The Navy's P-3 replacement is
    not projected to begin service until 2012, with an uncertain
    date for employment in counterdrug activities in the transit
    zone.
        Through the insistence of the U.S. Interdiction Coordinator
    and the JIATF-South commander, DHS has stepped up maritime
    patrol aircraft flight hours to backfill the loss of DOD
    assets. With DHS taking on a bigger role in transit zone
    interdiction operations, I would like to focus our discussion
    today on the following five topics that will affect future
    counterdrug operations in the transit zone.
        First, while I support the increased transit zone flight
    hours flown by the Coast Guard and Homeland Security's Air and
    Marine Operations [AMO], I question whether the extra hours are
    sustainable and am interested in the costs for the increased
    operational tempo. According to JIATF-South figures, AMO flew a
    total of 578 hours in the transit zone in calendar year 2003.
    Now we are told that AMO has increased this figure to over 800
    hours per month in 2005.
        Similarly, the Coast Guard has also significantly increased
    their flight hours to meet the loss of Navy P-3 counterdrug
    flight hours. Like the Navy, both the Coast Guard and AMO fly
    old airframes that have finite lives. The increase of flying
    hours significantly impacts the agency's ability to operate in
    the future. Yet only the Coast Guard has an improved
    comprehensive modernization plan that addresses these future
    shortfalls.
        Second, Section 124 of Title 10 states, ``The Department of
    Defense shall serve as the single lead agency of the Federal
    Government for the detection and monitoring of aerial and
    maritime transit of illegal drugs into the United States.'' The
    language for this law was framed in the National Defense
    Authorization Act of 1990-91. Federal law enforcement's ability
    to engage in counterdrug operations has significantly matured
    since 1989, when this legislation was passed.
        Since then, DOD's responsibilities have changed, and
    Congress formed the Department of Homeland Security, combining
    the Federal law enforcement agencies that currently supply the
    bulk of the aviation and maritime assets deployed in the
    transit zone. Consequently, I believe that it is now time that
    the Department of Homeland Security should take on the primary
    responsibility for counterdrug detection and monitoring from
    the Department of Defense.
        Third, the push to make the Joint Task Force North a Joint
    Interagency Task Force, another JIATF, will potentially place
    DOD as an overseer of domestic law enforcement interdiction
    programs. Lack of unity within the interagency has allowed DOD
    to take the lead in areas that have traditionally been
    accomplished by law enforcement agencies. Therefore, it is
    imperative that DHS and the Interagency should become more
    involved in the future JIATF process.
        In order to have an effective joint interagency program,
    Federal law enforcement agencies must be willing to man JIATF
    South and any future JIATFs with employees capable of filling
    critical command and operations specialist positions.
    Conversely, the JIATFs must provide administrative and
    logistical incentives for Federal law enforcement agencies to
    assign qualified employees to their locations.
        Fourth, the transit zone, like the southwest border, lacks
    a strategic, comprehensive, layered, interagency plan that
    incorporates the operational demands of post-September 11th
    operations and the recent actionable intelligence improvements.
    Without a national interdiction plan, agency roles and
    responsibilities are not properly delineated resulting in a
    haphazard way of requesting national air and marine assets.
        The U.S. interdiction coordinator laid the groundwork for
    this strategy by forming the Interdiction Planning and Asset
    Group. Unfortunately, the latest report for Interdiction Asset
    Requirements is out of date and does not truly reflect the
    current enhanced intelligence capabilities, nor does it take
    into account a post-September 11th environment.
        Fifth, DHS air responsibilities, like airspace security,
    potentially take flight hours away from transit zone
    operations. Currently, it is unclear which DHS agency will be
    responsible for airspace security in the National Capitol
    Region and special security events. Both DHS candidates for the
    responsibilities are the major transit zone asset providers;
    namely, the U.S. Coast Guard and the Office of Air and Marine
    Operations. If the current air assets in the National Capitol
    Region were diverted to counterdrug operations in the transit
    zone, DEA and DHS could perform interagency interdiction
    operations in places like Guatemala, where increasing amounts
    of cocaine land from transit zone maritime and air smuggling
    ventures.
        Today we have a panel of very experienced witnesses to help
    answer these and other questions posed by the subcommittee. We
    are pleased to welcome Mr. Ralph Utley, Acting U.S.
    Interdiction Coordinator at DHS; Admiral Dennis Sirois, we have
    met many times and I stumble over your name each time, U.S.
    Coast Guard's Assistant Commandant for Operations; Admiral
    Jeffrey Hathaway, Director, Joint Interagency Task Force South;
    Mr. Charles Stallworth, Customs and Border Protection's Acting
    Assistant Commissioner for the Office of Air and Marine
    Operations; and Mr. Thomas Harrigan, Drug Enforcement
    Administration's Chief of Enforcement Operations.
        We look forward to your testimony and insight into this
    important topic.
        [The prepared statement of Hon. Mark E. Souder follows:]

        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T4892.001

        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T4892.002

        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T4892.003

        Mr. Souder. As I mentioned earlier, I am going to turn the
    gavel over to our committee's vice chairman after the initial
    statements because I have a markup going on in another
    committee and several floor votes; I will be kind of in and out
    of this hearing. I will take all the statements with me to make
    sure I read it and will be doing plenty of followup. You always
    can be assured to hear from our office, probably more than you
    want many times.
        Mr. Cummings, do you have an opening statement?
        Mr. Cummings. It will be very brief, Mr. Chairman. Mr.
    Chairman, I want to thank you for holding this hearing to
    examine the efforts to interdict illicit drug shipments bound
    for the United States by way of maritime smuggling routes.
        Southwest border States are primary points of entry for
    major illicit drug threats, such as Colombian and Peruvian
    cocaine, South American and Mexican heroin, Mexican
    methamphetamines, and Mexican and Colombian marijuana. Before
    drugs from South America reach the border, however, they must
    be transported to the United States through maritime transit
    zones, which encompass the Caribbean, the Gulf of Mexico, the
    eastern Pacific Ocean.
        The majority of drugs are transported by sea, by commercial
    means, including high speed, go-fast boats capable of carrying
    up to 2 tons of cocaine. The detection and apprehension of
    these vessels represents a difficult challenge for the Untied
    States and international interdiction agencies and requires the
    synergistic use of actionable intelligence, interagency
    communication, and assets and personnel capable of amounting an
    effective response.
        The Department of Defense is the lead agency for detecting
    and monitoring aerial and maritime transit of illegal drugs
    through the transit zone into Puerto Rico and the Virgin
    Islands and across the U.S.' southwest border into the mainland
    United States. Based at the Naval Air Station in Key West, FL,
    Joint InterAgency Task Force South conducts counter illicit
    drug trafficking operations to detect, monitor, and handoff
    suspected illicit trafficking targets, promotes security,
    cooperation, and coordinates country team and partner nation
    initiatives in order to defeat the flow of illicit traffic.
        In addition to DOD, the agencies that participate in the
    JIATF-South are the Drug Enforcement Administration, U.S.
    Customs and Border Patrol, Defense Intelligence Agency, and the
    Federal Bureau of Investigations. Cooperation and intelligence
    sharing among these agencies through JIATF-South and in other
    contexts is critical to U.S. efforts to stop illegal drugs
    before they reach our southern border and ports of entry
    through the country.
        Today's hearing offers a very valuable opportunity to hear
    from key officials in agencies that play a vital role in U.S.
    interdiction efforts concerning their successes, remaining or
    emerging challenges, and the need for additional or upgraded
    resources.
        With that said, I want to welcome all of our witnesses and
    thank all of them for their appearance here today. I look
    forward to the testimony. Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
        [The prepared statement of Hon. Elijah E. Cummings
    follows:]

    [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T4892.004

    [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T4892.005

    [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T4892.006

    [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T4892.007

        Mr. Souder. Thank you, Mr. Cummings. Mr. McHenry, do you
    have any opening comments?
        Mr. McHenry. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I certainly
    appreciate you all being here today. I look forward to the
    panel discussion and your testimony.
        I think it is important that we look at the resources we
    have. This is not a moment to necessarily rap you on the
    knuckles. It looks as if we have had increased intelligence-
    gathering operations and we actually have more intelligence to
    deal with, and so we have a better opportunity to catch drug
    traffickers in the process. We want to make sure that you have
    the resources and infrastructure in place so that we can
    actually catch those bad guys when we have the opportunities.
    And so I look forward to hearing your testimonies and your
    ideas in this regard.
        I certainly appreciate your making the time to be here
    before us. I am sure, looking at you and looking at your
    backgrounds, you have done this a few times before and it
    certainly is as exciting as it always is. So thank you so much
    for being here and we hope to keep you awake for the remainder
    of the hearing. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Souder. Thank you.
        I ask unanimous consent that all Members have 5 legislative
    days to submit written statements and questions for the hearing
    record. That any answers provided by the witnesses also be
    included in the record. And without objection, it is so
    ordered.
        I also ask unanimous consent that all exhibits, documents,
    and other materials referred to by Members may be included in
    the hearing record, and that all Members be permitted to revise
    and extend their remarks. Without objection, it is so ordered.
        As an oversight committee, it is our tradition to swear all
    the witnesses. So if you will each stand and raise your right
    hand.
        [Witnesses sworn.]
        Mr. Souder. Let the record show that each of the witnesses
    responded in the affirmative.
        I am now going to turn the hearing over to our
    distinguished vice chairman, Mr. McHenry. I will be in and out
    depending on how the voting is going.
        Mr. McHenry [presiding]. Mr. Utley, you may proceed.

          STATEMENTS OF RALPH UTLEY, ACTING U.S. INTERDICTION
     COORDINATOR; ADMIRAL DENNIS SIROIS, ASSISTANT COMMANDANT FOR
      OPERATIONS, U.S. COAST GUARD; ADMIRAL JEFFREY J. HATHAWAY,
       DIRECTOR, JOINT INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE SOUTH; CHARLES E.
    STALLWORTH II, ACTING ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER, OFFICE OF AIR AND
      MARINE OPERATIONS, U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION; AND
       THOMAS M. HARRIGAN, CHIEF OF ENFORCEMENT OPERATIONS, DRUG
                           ENFORCEMENT AGENCY

                        STATEMENT OF RALPH UTLEY

        Mr. Utley. Representative McHenry, Ranking Member Cummings,
    distinguished members of the committee, I am honored to appear
    before you today as the Acting U.S. Interdiction Coordinator. I
    also serve as the Acting Director of the Office of
    Counternarcotics Enforcement in the Department of Homeland
    Security.
        We have achieved record levels for transit zone cocaine
    interdiction, vessel seizures, and arrests in each of the past
    2 calendar years. Specifically, in the transit zone, we have
    removed 210 metric tons of cocaine bound for the United States
    in 2003 and 248 metric tons in 2004. Cocaine seizures and
    removals in 2004 were approximately twice the seizures and
    removals of 1999. Those record levels of removals have occurred
    while our Nation is fighting two wars overseas and has taken on
    new duties to stop terrorists from entering the United States.
    The credit for these achievements goes to the entire
    counterdrug community who is working closer together and
    synergistically attacking the traffickers where they are most
    vulnerable. Let me discuss a few of the key factors that have
    improved interdiction.
        First, the Department of Defense's leadership through Joint
    Interagency Task Force South has been key. In addition, the
    rest of the U.S. interdiction community has invested in this
    Task force which is producing great dividends. For more than 15
    years the counterdrug community has worked to build this Task
    Force which has become a worldwide model for joint interagency
    and international cooperation. There have been many changes
    along the way, the most recent being the establishment of the
    Joint Operating Area. The Joint Operating Area has improved
    synergy, unity of command, and operational efficiency. Joint
    Interagency Task Force South now has total responsibility for
    the primary south to north drug trafficking threat vectors from
    South America. Establishing the Joint Operating Area makes
    sense, and I applaud those who made it happen.
        We have long realized the value of actionable intelligence.
    For years, our ships and aircraft patrolled vast expanses of
    ocean, usually without the benefit of good intelligence. Today
    our forces often have real-time, actionable intelligence so
    that they may narrow their focus and improve their probability
    of detection. The intelligence community, working in close
    concert with the law enforcement investigators, has made
    remarkable strides toward understanding trafficking
    organizations, patterns, and activities.
        In particular, Operation Panama Express, a combined OCDETF
    task force with representatives from the Departments of
    Justice, Homeland Security, and Defense, has become a model of
    interagency partnering. Panama Express-led investigations are
    developing intelligence leads that support more interdictions.
    JIATF-South has become a full partner with founding members
    FBI, ICE, and DEA. At the same time, interdictions are leading
    to the successful prosecutions of both maritime transporters
    and higher level drug traffickers. Enhanced drug intelligence
    has allowed interdictions, investigations, and prosecutions to
    support each other like never before.
        In years past, when we successfully detected a smuggling
    vessel, we often could not stop them or find the drugs. Today,
    front-line interdictors have better equipment and capability.
    The Coast Guard's armed helicopters and over-the-horizon boat
    programs have dramatically improved end-game results. The
    French and British helicopters are also now armed, and the U.S.
    Navy, in conjunction with the Coast Guard, is working to arm
    their sea-based helicopters. We have also improved boarding
    tactics and equipment that increase the odds of finding drugs
    on fishing vessels.
        We do not stop with a successful interdiction. In fact,
    interdiction directly supports new investigations and
    prosecutions. Under the leadership of the Justice Department,
    traffickers are being convicted with stiff sentences which in
    turn facilitates better intelligence and awareness as to how
    the traffickers are operating.
        The support provided by our international partners is also
    critical to transit zone interdiction successes. JIATF South
    has full-time liaisons from 10 countries in the hemisphere and
    communicates and coordinates transit zone operations directly
    with host nations operations centers. Currently, France and the
    United Kingdom deploy and use their surveillance aircraft,
    armed helicopters, and surface ships in counterdrug missions.
    The British NIMROD, a highly capable four-engine, long-range
    maritime surveillance aircraft, has been especially effective
    in detecting and tracking drug smuggling vessels. Our Dutch
    allies continue to provide strong support in the Caribbean. The
    Canadian government is working with the U.S. Southern Command
    and Joint Interagency Task Force South to coordinate future
    Canadian P-3 aircraft deployments to the Caribbean.
        This committed international and interagency effort is
    essential to transit zone operational success. International
    cooperation also has been critical in eliminating seams that
    traffickers once exploited. The United States now has 26
    maritime bilateral agreements that have put the smuggler on the
    defensive. The smugglers now have less time to react to and
    avoid law enforcement, and we are able to board in time to find
    contraband and evidence to support prosecutions.
        Maritime patrol aircraft [MPA], are key to transit zone
    interdiction operations. MPA are currently the only persistent
    wide-area surveillance platform that we can covertly detect,
    monitor, and track smugglers and support maritime end-game
    operations. In calendar year 2004, MPA participated in 73
    percent of the cocaine removal events from noncommercial
    maritime conveyances in the transit zone. In the fourth quarter
    of last year, these figures rose to 91 percent.
        Last year we suffered from a reduction in long-range MPA
    capability. Available MPA flying hours were significantly
    reduced due to unexpected wing corrosion in the U.S. Navy's P-3
    fleet and the withdrawal of Netherlands P-3s from the
    Caribbean. Today the situation has improved. Customs and Border
    Protection P-3 hours have been funded to allow a 400 hour per
    month increase to transit zone operations; the Coast Guard has
    several initiatives in the President's fiscal year 2006 budget
    that will significantly increase C-130 hours in support of
    JIATF-South; and the U.S. Air Force has deployed E-3s to
    support the Air Bridge Denial program, freeing CBP aircraft for
    maritime patrol operations; DOD is supporting British NIMROD
    operations in Curacao; the U.S. Navy has improved the
    operational on-station time of their P-3s; and DOD is working
    to add Canadian Auroras to the effort. Looking forward, we need
    strong support from all of the force providers, and I am
    encouraged that they will deliver.
        Let me conclude by saying that we must sustain the pace of
    these past 2 years and find ways to increase pressure on the
    traffickers. I have placed a priority on seeking alternatives
    that will further increase protection, monitoring, tracking,
    and interdiction capabilities in the transit zone. The USIC
    will continue to engage the entire interdiction community and
    find innovative and aggressive ways to improve our capabilities
    and operational effectiveness. We will support those strategies
    and operations that are working and keep the pressure on all
    fronts. We will continue to asses our efforts and report our
    progress to Congress.
        Thank you very much, and I look forward to answering your
    questions.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Utley follows:]

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        Mr. McHenry. Gentlemen, just to let you all know, your full
    testimony will be entered into the records. Going forward, if
    we could try to stick with about a 5-minute time limit and you
    can summarize your testimony and hit the highlights.
        Mr. Utley, my apologies for not giving you that guidance
    before. We certainly appreciate your testimony. I just want to
    make sure that the other gentlemen are aware of it as well so
    we can get to questions. Thanks so much.
        Admiral Sirois.

                   STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL DENNIS SIROIS

        Admiral Sirois. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and distinguished
    Members. It is an honor to represent the Coast Guard men and
    women before you here today. I do have a written statement that
    I would like to summarize very shortly.
        The Coast Guard's counterdrug mission is the interdiction
    and seizure of illegal drugs in the transit zone. Although the
    Coast Guard seizes annually almost 54 percent of all cocaine
    seized by Federal agencies, this record could not have been
    attained without our interagency partners and international
    partners and the specific competencies each one of those
    agencies bring. Working closely with our interagency and
    international partners, we provide a continuous, coordinated,
    sustained law enforcement presence in the 6 million square mile
    transit zone and maritime approaches to the United States.
        In fiscal year 2004, the Coast Guard and our partners
    seized or removed over 350,000 pounds of cocaine from the
    illegal drug trade, plus 108,000 pounds were lost to smugglers
    due to jettisoning. This includes the seizure of the fishing
    vessel LINA MARIA and its load of 33,000 pounds of cocaine, the
    Coast Guard's single event record to date. I would like to note
    that as of today the Coast Guard has seized 191,933 pounds of
    cocaine, again working with our great interagency partners.
        STEEL WEB is the Coast guard long-range strategy to advance
    the national goal of attacking the economic basis of the drug
    trade and is an important part of the coordinated,
    comprehensive interagency effort supporting the National Drug
    Control Strategy supply reduction goal. This comprehensive
    approach to drug interdiction is summarized in three pillars:
    First, effective presence, which is a strong and agile presence
    informed by intelligence and law enforcement information;
    second, a regional engagement with the interagency and
    international law enforcement partner nations which has
    resulted in 26 bilateral agreements and a number of combined
    operations with these countries; and third, an end-game must
    exist. The phenomenal success of our HITRON helicopters in
    stopping the go-fast threat is key, but the smugglers are
    flexible and adaptive. To have an effective end-game, the Coast
    Guard must obtain and field the latest technologies, and
    develop new techniques to counter this ever changing threat.
        What is troubling to the Coast Guard is the recent House
    Budget recommendation for the Coast Guard. Any reduction in
    Deepwater funding jeopardizes the Coast Guard's integrated
    recapitalization strategy by not providing adequate funding to
    recapitalize or modernize the Coast Guard's aging and obsolete
    cutters, aircraft, and command and control, information, and
    surveillance and reconnaissance systems while sustaining legacy
    assets in the interim. At a minimum, the recommended funding
    levels will delay delivery of new assets. If held to the House
    recommended funding levels, operational capacity will go away
    faster than it can be replaced, and this resource problem will
    persist. If held to the $500 million funding level, the Coast
    Guard cannot complete necessary legacy asset sustainment which
    is necessary to reverse the downward trend in readiness and
    availability of our assets.
        The Coast Guard appreciates your support over the years and
    we ask for your continued support as our funding is discussed.
    We are working our assets and our crews harder than ever, and
    the wear is beginning to show. The President addresses capacity
    and capability improvements for the Coast Guard in his budget
    request which includes maritime patrol hours for counterdrug
    operations, which I ask you to support. Deepwater, our plan for
    major asset recapitalization has never been more relevant, and
    I ask for your funding support for the President's request.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        [The prepared statement of Admiral Sirois follows:]

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        Mr. McHenry. Thank you, Admiral.
        Admiral Hathaway.

                STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL JEFFREY J. HATHAWAY

        Admiral Hathaway. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Cummings,
    good to see you both again. I am Rear Admiral Jeff Hathaway. I
    have the honor of presently serving as Director of JIATF-South,
    the Joint InterAgency Task Force South in Key West, FL. I am
    here representing U.S. Southern Command and, more importantly,
    the 450 men and women that comprise Joint Interagency Task
    Force South, which I will add, I truly have become a believer
    that it is the best of joint DOD interagency and international
    cooperation that I have seen and, quite frankly, a great
    example of good governance.
        Chairman Souder mentioned that in 1991 DOD was given the
    lead for detection and monitoring in the transit zone. I would
    submit I believe that was a very good decision on the part of
    the Congress to cause that to happen. What it did was it
    brought core competencies from DOD into the counterdrug game.
    They are just as germane today as they were then. JIATF-South's
    heartbeat is driven by three core competencies that are DOD
    core competencies.
        The first one is the ability to fuse vast amounts of all
    source intelligence. We have built the systems primarily on a
    DOD background, we have the analysts, most of them DOD but lots
    of them from our interagency partners, most of which are
    represented at the table with me. Most importantly, that
    backbone allows us to fuse, analyze, and push that intelligence
    out in a tactically actionable way so that it can be used.
        No. 2 is, again a core competency of DOD, to exert command
    and control across vast distances. Our joint operating area is
    42 million square miles. It is only DOD systems that have
    allowed us to fuse together DOD assets, U.S. interagency
    assets, and our international partners into one team and be
    able to talk with them real-time and to coordinate across those
    vast distances. Again, as germane today as it was many, many
    years ago.
        And finally, again a core competency of DOD, is deliberate
    planning. We brought deliberate planning to the counterdrug
    game. We are able to synchronize operations in a way that the
    Department of Defense has been able to do for years and years.
    Again, we make that work for us on a daily basis.
        We have put together in JIATF a standard operating
    procedure. Everyone leaves their own standard operating
    procedure at the door when they become part of the JIATF team.
    Everyone was part of building today's current operating
    procedure and it continues to renew itself on a daily basis.
    This weekend was a great example. We had intelligence from one
    of our allies, I cannot mention the country, we were able to
    use that information, fuse it with some of our technical
    reporting, and it cued us to a Sao Tomean vessel, a small West
    African country. Sao Tome finally refuted the claim of registry
    for that country.
        But most importantly, we were able to take a Dutch frigate
    working for JIATF at the time with a U.S. Coast Guard law
    enforcement detachment on board, move them into an intercept
    position, hand the case over to the Coast Guard, board the
    vessel, with the special intelligence we had, it allowed the
    Coast Guard to very quickly find the secret compartment on
    board, find 1.8 tons of drugs, seize the drugs, arrest the
    crew, and it all happened within our standard operating
    procedures.
        Everyone knew exactly what was going to happen across the
    interagency, across DOD, with our international partners. It
    happens every day. Unity of command, a common vision, and unity
    of effort is what we strive for in JIATF.
        Finally, I know this hearing is all about level of effort
    in the transit zone. I will be very honest with you, I look at
    this as a cup half full at this point. Last year, I will be
    very honest, we saw 331 go-fast cases, most of them in the
    Western Caribbean. Three years ago my predecessors could not
    have sat here and told you that we had the granularity of
    intelligence to know that we had that number of go-fast
    smuggling events. Mr. Cummings, you said each one of those
    carries about two tons. That is exactly right. The fact of the
    matter is, out of those 331, we only interdicted slightly less
    than 100. Out of those we interdicted, three out of four we
    were actually able to stop. Do we want to do better across this
    table? Absolutely. Do we have the resources today across the
    administration? I think we are working on them. So from a cup
    half full, we know where the enemy is, we know where we have to
    go to engage him, and all of us I know want to do that more
    robustly.
        Let me just say that our counterdrug ship is sound, it is
    well-built, it has the right mix of crew, they are well-trained
    and motivated, and they are making the best use of the wind
    that they have in their sails today. But we are very confident
    that we could make even more effective use of greater winds, if
    they come. Thank you very much.
        [The prepared statement of Admiral Hathaway follows:]

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        Mr. McHenry. Thank you, Admiral Hathaway.
        Mr. Stallworth.

                 STATEMENT OF CHARLES E. STALLWORTH II

        Mr. Stallworth. Good afternoon. Mr. Chairman, Ranking
    Member Cummings, and distinguished members of this
    subcommittee, it is my honor to appear before you today to
    discuss U.S. Customs and Border Protection interdiction efforts
    in the transit zone. My name is Charles Stallworth and I am the
    acting Assistant Commissioner for the CBP's Office of Air and
    Marine Operations. In the interest of time, I would like to
    summarize my prepared remarks which have been submitted for the
    record.
        CBP is the Nation's unified border agency and as such is
    responsible for interdicting all people and conveyances that
    seek illegal entry. Our priority mission is preventing
    terrorists or terrorist weapons from entering our country, and
    includes our efforts to close our borders to illegal activity
    such as the smuggling of people and drugs. We do this while
    simultaneously enhancing the legal movement of people and
    trade. Our strategies reflect the operational reality that for
    the purpose of the border security the threats are converged
    and have converged.
        AMO supports these homeland security and counterdrug
    efforts with more than 1,000 personnel who support and employ
    our fleet of advanced aircraft, marine vessels, and sensors. We
    tie this system of systems effort together at our Air and
    Marine Operations Center in Riverside, CA. Created by the 1994
    National Interdiction Command and Control Plan, the NICCP, AMOC
    is a home to the Department of Homeland Security's common
    operational picture for air.
        Our contribution in interdiction in the transit zone
    continues to increase. Since January 1, 2004, CBP is the single
    largest contributor of on-station flight hours in an effort
    that includes the U.S. Navy, U.S. Coast Guard, the U.S. Air
    Force, and our international allies. From a contribution of 200
    hours per month in recent years to a commitment of more than
    600 hours per month, averaging over 700 hours per month this
    year, CBP's fleet of dedicated P-3 aircraft continue to score
    impressive interdictions against a maritime threat, made
    possible because of the outstanding cuing and intelligence
    support that we have heard about here earlier, most of it
    contributed by our interagency partners.
        We support this effort with a capable but aging fleet of P-
    3 aircraft that is increasingly costly and difficult to
    maintain. We are rapidly approaching a decision point in the
    lives of these aircraft. Specifically, to maintain this level
    of effort in the transit zone, we will either have to
    significantly overhaul these planes or replace them altogether.
    In the interim, we are trying to make them as effective as
    possible by equipping them with sensors that will help boost
    the detection in maritime surface targets at greater ranges.
        Throughout our 2003 departure from the U.S. Customs
    Service, our 2004 tenure as U.S. Immigration and Customs
    Enforcement, and our move in 2005 in integration with CBP, the
    men and women of CBP's AMO have continued to deliver
    interdiction results against the drug trade and other threats
    to our borders. On behalf of them and our Commissioner Robert
    C. Bonner, thank you for your support and interest in our
    mission.
        I would be pleased to answer your questions when the time
    comes.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Stallworth follows:]

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        Mr. McHenry. Thank you, Mr. Stallworth.
        Mr. Harrigan.

                    STATEMENT OF THOMAS M. HARRIGAN

        Mr. Harrigan. Good afternoon, sir. Chairman McHenry,
    Ranking Member Cummings, on behalf of the Administrator of the
    DEA Karen Tandy, I wish to thank you for your continued support
    for the men and women of the Drug Enforcement Administration as
    well as the opportunity to testify today to discuss drug
    trafficking throughout the transit zones. As DEA's Chief of
    Enforcement Operations, I am acutely aware of the challenges we
    face in combating drug trafficking organizations throughout the
    region.
        DEA's primary function as an investigative law enforcement
    agency is to identify and dismantle the world's most
    significant drug trafficking organizations. DEA's role in
    interdiction efforts is crucial since the intelligence gained
    from these operations often provides information needed to
    unveil the depth and magnitude of a drug trafficking
    organization's abilities and intentions. Law enforcement,
    intelligence, and interdiction agencies all play an integral
    role in disrupting the most sophisticated drug trafficking
    operations.
        As you know, most of the major illegal drugs abused in the
    United States are produced in Latin America. While production
    levels have generally declined over the last few years,
    traffickers continue to use a variety of smuggling methods to
    move their product out of Latin America, including maritime and
    air conveyances. When focusing on those drugs destined for the
    United States, two general corridors stand out--Mexico/Central
    America and the Caribbean.
        Historically, Colombian drug traffickers have utilized the
    Mexico-Central American corridor as well as the Caribbean
    corridor as a transshipment route to smuggle cocaine and heroin
    into the United States. Cocaine is smuggled into Mexico via
    maritime, land, and air conveyances, and over the years
    Colombian traffickers have exploited the Caribbean corridor for
    their smuggling purposes as the region provides them with
    increased flexibility and anonymity because of its vast
    geographic territory, numerous law enforcement jurisdictions,
    and fragmented investigative resources.
        Through interagency collaboration, DEA has taken part in
    developing a multifaceted investigative strategy that is
    designed to combat the trafficking problem by employing a
    coordinated regional attack on the entire trafficking
    organization simultaneously, from the sources of supply in
    Colombia, to the transportation cells in the Caribbean
    corridor, to the distribution cells throughout the United
    States, and finally on to their financial operations. Perhaps
    no better operation exemplifies the level of the interagency
    cooperative effort evident in both corridors as the Panama
    Express. Panama Express represents a multi-agency Organized
    Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force [OCDETF], investigation that
    began in the mid-1990's with personnel from DEA, ICE, JIATF,
    FBI, IRS, and the U.S. Coast Guard. JIATF-South, in particular,
    utilizes the information shared to better direct air and naval
    assets toward the goal of interdicting vessels smuggling
    cocaine through the transit zones.
        The multi-agency El Paso Intelligence Center [EPIC], also
    participates in sharing information that increases the
    effectiveness of Panama Express. By passing real-time,
    actionable intelligence information on smuggling operations to
    JIATF-South, transit zone interdictions can be made more
    precise. As Assistant Administrator for Intelligence Anthony
    Placido testified to this committee on June 14, 2005, the
    cooperative efforts of EPIC, JTF-North, the U.S. Customs and
    Border Protection's Air and Maritime Operations Center, and
    JIATF-South contribute greatly to our interdiction
    effectiveness.
        In conclusion, drug trafficking organizations today have
    the capacity to overwhelm the defenses of individual nations.
    These traffickers have adopted a global approach to their
    operations, consequently amassing billions of dollars in
    illicit profits, weakening national economies and democratic
    institutions, spreading violence and destruction, and producing
    some of the most powerful and corrupting organizations in the
    world.
        The DEA recognizes that interagency cooperation and
    coordination is fundamental to increasing the efficiency of our
    operation in the transit zones. The DEA is committed to
    maintaining an effective relationship with its partners in
    domestic and international law enforcement, as well as its
    operational counterparts in other agencies. Having said this,
    we must and will continue to synchronize the resources and
    capabilities of operational enforcement agencies to
    collectively put forth the strongest effort to combat drug
    trafficking in the transit zones.
        Chairman McHenry, Ranking Member Cummings, I thank you once
    again for the opportunity to testify and look forward to
    answering any questions you may have. Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Harrigan follows:]

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        Mr. McHenry. I thank the panel for your opening statements.
    At this time, I would like to recognize Ranking Member Cummings
    for his series of questions.
        Mr. Cummings. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. First of
    all, I want to thank all of you for your efforts in what you do
    everyday to make our world a safer world.
        I want to go to you, Admiral Hathaway, and something that
    you said that I just found very interesting. When you were
    talking about the resources needed and the fast boats, you said
    we are working on it. I am just wondering, explain exactly the
    process. In other words, we know about a certain number of fast
    boats, we cannot catch up with them.
        Can you just elaborate a little bit on that, and then tell
    me what resources you would need to get to the level that you
    would like to. It sounds like there may be a level of
    frustration. I am trying to picture this fast boat going past
    me and I am not able to catch up with it. I am just wondering
    what is it that we need.
        Admiral Hathaway. The greater intelligence that we have
    today, and much of that comes from the Panama Express operation
    that has been described to you by some of my colleagues, gives
    us better knowledge on departure times, departure locations of
    drug movements. Many of those are interdicted by host nations,
    primarily Colombian forces, and many, many are not.
        We do not have precise data that allows us to track those
    vessels, these go-fast vessels that sometimes move at 30, 40
    knots depending on weather conditions. What we need is to put
    eyes on them and we have to have surface assets to get in place
    to be able to effect an interdiction.
        Not having perfect knowledge, you need some sort of
    maritime patrol aircraft to find the target, you need a surface
    asset and most ideally equipped with an armed helicopter to
    stop that asset so that it can be compelled to have law
    enforcement come on board and to find out if, in fact, they are
    committing an illegal act. Because of the great knowledge that
    we have, we know that there are many events that occur that we
    are not able to physically get either the aircraft or surface
    assets on scene. We have a terrific track record of being able
    to effect an end-game, get what we call in JIATF a disruption,
    either seize the drugs or cause the drugs to be jettisoned,
    they never get to a world market. That is great news. That is
    the cup half full. But we also know that the level of
    information and detail that we have today would allow us to do
    better.
        What would it take, quite frankly, today is a greater level
    of aircraft support, maritime patrol aircraft, as we call it,
    persistent coverage in those areas. What we have to do today is
    I have to go at risk. In order to go after intelligence in one
    area, I have to vacate another area of the ocean, quite
    frankly, most often. We go where we have the best intelligence
    and I can make the best use of the assets that I have. I think
    working collaboratively we have come up with estimates of what
    it would take to be able to interdict certain percentages of
    drugs. We do not have a national goal in terms of what we
    should be doing in the transit zone; we try to do the best that
    we can with what we have. But we also have some very good
    estimates of what it would take to perform even better. What I
    do know is we can make much greater and effective use of the
    assets that we have assigned to us today than we could have 5
    or 6 years ago.
        Mr. Cummings. How many would you estimate that we are
    missing, the go-fast boats?
        Admiral Hathaway. Well, sir, our estimates are, as I said
    in my opening statement, I used as an example the interagency
    documented 331 go-fast events in 2004 through our primary
    operating area. Most of those were transiting in the Western
    Caribbean but some were in the Eastern Pacific, some were in
    the Eastern Caribbean. Out of those, we actually were able to
    put eyes on about 93 of those, and three-quarters of those we
    were actually able to get an interdiction, which meant people
    were arrested, drugs were disrupted and were taken out of the
    system.
        Mr. Cummings. So we know pretty much that drugs are on
    those boats?
        Admiral Hathaway. The intelligence we have is, yes, they
    were drug movements.
        Mr. Cummings. Just one other question. Do you think that
    the administration's budget request is sufficient for you to
    accomplish what you want to accomplish? I wish the people in my
    neighborhood could understand the difficulty that you all have.
    Because a common question that I am asked in my neighborhood,
    which is only about an hour away from here in the inner-city of
    Baltimore, is that we don't have any boats, no planes. People
    have this feeling, because they do not know, they think that
    this is a very easy task to keep the drugs from coming in. I
    try to explain it to them as best I can that there are a lot of
    folks who are trying to get these drugs in. So what you are
    telling me then is that we have a whole slew of fast boats
    coming through at one time. That is a major, major problem; am
    I right? You just said you had to take resources from one place
    and take them over to the other. So I imagine that if they had
    some kind of coordinated effort, there would be a real big
    problem.
        Admiral Hathaway. Well the effort that we have in
    coordinating what we have----
        Mr. Cummings. I am talking about if these drug smugglers
    had a coordinated effort.
        Admiral Hathaway. What we do know about the transportation
    industry is there is a vague amount of coordination amongst a
    variety of those who transport drugs through our primary joint
    operating area. The fact of the matter, if you have 331 go-fast
    events, that is slightly less than one per day moving through
    our joint operating area. Trying to figure out whether it is
    leaving from Venezuela, the North coast of Colombia, the west
    coast of Colombia, or out of Panama is the trick. The
    intelligence we have allows us to do a much better job at that.
        It is a vast, vast area and obviously we could do a better
    job. My job is to make the most effective operation out of what
    we have. And we are very proud of the effectiveness that we do
    have given the level of assets that we have. The
    administration's budget takes us another step down the road,
    quite frankly. Cooperation with our international partners, our
    traditional allies, we know that some of these drugs are coming
    over to Europe, has never been better. I think they are going
    to step up to the plate in even greater numbers, although they
    suffer from some of the same problems that U.S. military does
    in that the high usage rate of their assets is causing them in
    many cases to have to retire them earlier than they hoped for.
    That has been the case with the Navy P-3 aircraft, for example,
    which was a backbone for a long time for JIATF-South maritime
    patrol ops.
        As it has been pointed out, the Coast Guard and CBP have
    been able to step up to the plate. DOD has been able to provide
    E-3s, our most sophisticated AWACS aircraft that I will be able
    to use in air bridge denial operations over Colombia and free
    up Customs and Border Protection P-3 domes to move into the
    maritime world. So we will be able to plus-up a very capable
    asset in the maritime world while the Air Force takes over the
    air bridge denial role for us, which is very good.
        Mr. Cummings. Thank you.
        Mr. McHenry. Thank you, Mr. Cummings. If I may take my time
    now. Admiral Hathaway, I want to continue with Mr. Cummings
    line of thought here. You said 331 known go-fast events, that
    is known. Those are actually hard numbers that we are aware of
    of these events. Of those, 238 were not detected. Now can you
    describe the difference between known and not detected? We know
    that it is leaving Venezuela, we cannot detect that it has left
    Venezuela. Can you explain the measurement tool there?
        Admiral Hathaway. The interagency group that documented
    those 331 cases have a level of reliability that they adhere to
    that a smuggling event occurred, each one of those 331, it is
    more than single source reporting. In many cases, we may not
    have even known the event was occurring until after the drugs
    arrived but sources told us that, in fact, the drugs arrived.
    So that is where we get the 331 number. It is intelligence.
        Not detected means that we never saw those events as they
    occurred. We never had laid eyes on them in a detection and
    monitoring mode. I never had the opportunity to be able to----
        Mr. McHenry. So you know they arrived, for instance, you
    know they arrived or you know they departed, the two events you
    know.
        Admiral Hathaway. Correct.
        Mr. McHenry. Maybe I am not directing this in the right
    way, but Mr. Cummings had this line of questioning to you and I
    thought it was interesting. Maybe Mr. Stallworth or if anyone
    else would like to chime in. So you know that it left, or you
    know that it arrived, and perhaps some you knew both that it
    left and that it arrived, and others you just knew one side or
    the other. All right. Now you said 93 detected. That means you
    saw it move; which is it left, it is in transit, it arrives. So
    93 you saw in transit, detected. Of those 93, you caught 73.
    Pretty good when you actually see it move. OK.
        First, let us commend you on actually having good
    intelligence. If it is 331, there had to be many more out
    there. Now that is another question. But it seems to me that if
    you are detecting 331 events yet you are only seeing in action
    93 move, we have a real issue of actually seeing it move. I may
    be new around here, but it seems like a very basic concept that
    something is missing. Is it boats, is it airplanes, is it
    technology; what is the problem?
        Mr. Utley. May I jump in on that because I own the data
    base. It is a CCDB, consolidated counterdrug data base. The
    point that Admiral Hathaway was making is that we have a pretty
    good idea that this event took place because we knew it left
    and we knew it arrived, but we might not know, I am going to
    reiterate what Admiral Hathaway said, that the event took place
    until after it took place. So there is another dimension and it
    is a time dimension in there, that had he known he may have
    been able to do something.
        Mr. McHenry. This sounds like back to the future, time
    travel.
        Mr. Utley. Well, not really. It is actually just a matter
    of a lot of times you do not know about an event until after it
    has taken place. I guess that is what I am trying to say.
        Mr. McHenry. What I am asking for is this is an opportunity
    to say what are we missing. Admiral Sirois, I certainly
    appreciate your stepping forward and saying the Coast Guard may
    need some better equipment to compete with the go-fast. I
    certainly appreciate you stepping forward on that. Mr.
    Stallworth, you mentioned aircraft, we have to make a decision
    on are we going to keep repairing these aircraft or are we
    going to move forward with technology. I appreciate that
    instead of like being in la la land and not actually taking on
    the meat of the issue, the center part of this is the
    interdiction part, the actual catching those people in action.
    I certainly appreciate the time issue. But it seems to me that
    if know it left and you know it arrived, where is it in the
    middle? What can we do to catch the middle? Am I making any
    sense to you all? Everybody seems quiet.
        Mr. Stallworth. Let me help you out a little bit here with
    the dynamics so you will understand a little bit better that it
    is not just a straight line, two points and it is a straight
    line between those. We have about 6 million square miles
    between us and the source. So we may know something is leaving
    Cartagena but you do not know necessarily what its destination
    is. So there is a little bit of time that you can use Colombian
    forces in their territorial waters to try and intercept that,
    find something that matches the description that you have. You
    may not have a direction, you may not know where it is going.
        Let me give you a little bit of the life of a logistics
    move of drug trafficking. We get intelligence from people that
    may know about the time that it is leaving, the method that it
    is going, etc. Sometimes you do not know when but you know what
    the name is. But sometime between its departure and its
    arrival, that is where you have to do a detection, monitor it,
    find out if it is the right one, sort it out, and then put
    something on the surface down there. We do not have airplanes
    with grappling hooks to reach down there and just pull a fast
    boat out of the water, so we have to get someone down there. So
    sometimes we will observe something but none of the good guys
    are in a position to catch it or intercept it. So now you give
    information out to those people that may be at the port that it
    is likely going to, etc. And at the same time, Admiral Hathaway
    has international forces and our own domestic forces that are
    out there positioned as best they can be geographically, none
    of them sitting still, some do sit still, but most with an area
    of operations to try and cutoff a corridor.
        So even if you knew, even with the 331, if you had time to
    do it, you are still going to have to sort through those. The
    numbers that he gave you, out of the 93 there were 73 that
    actually were real, it is just like being a policeman and there
    are speeders out there, here are 93 of them, how many are
    actually speeding. Well you can do that with an indicator. For
    us, you have to stop them, get inside, and then try and find
    it. These people are in business and their business is to get
    their product to market. It is very difficult for us, and that
    is why the cooperation is necessary throughout the interagency,
    both from the intelligence all the way through the
    investigation once you do catch someone, trying to feed the
    intelligence so that we can go back into the infrastructure and
    the organizations and the financial underpinnings of the drug
    trafficking.
        Mr. McHenry. OK. Admiral Sirois.
        Admiral Sirois. Mr. Chairman, I know you are looking for a
    solution, and I can give you a short-term and a long-term. The
    25 percent of the go-fast boats, and there is more than just
    go-fast, there are sailboats and merchant ships, fishing boats,
    but the 25 percent of the go-fast boats, if we had armed
    helicopters on every ship we could catch that 25 percent of the
    boats that we see go by. We have a plan that is in the budget
    to arm all Coast Guard helicopters so every ship will be
    deploying with an armed Coast Guard helicopter. So that will
    take care of that 25 percent. We hope to complete that over the
    next 3 to 4 years.
        Also in the Deepwater plan, many of our legacy assets are
    being upgraded--better sensors, better communications suites,
    our new Deepwater cutters, for many, it is 2, 3 years before
    they come off the waves, but we can leverage better
    capabilities on our old cutters that will provide Admiral
    Hathaway with better assets in the fight down in the transit
    zone.
        We have a large initiative, supported by the President, for
    maritime domain awareness, which is knowing what is going on
    out there, and it is an integrated network system of sensors,
    satellites, communications, unmanned aerial vehicles, all these
    things that will be networked in the system. When they come to
    full production that is when I think we are really going to
    show some successes in the transit zone.
        Mr. Harrigan. Sir, if I may followup also just to sort of
    close the loop I believe on this. To give you a little
    background, we keep alluding to Operation Panama Express and
    that is based upon we have a cadre of sources of informants
    throughout the region, throughout the transit and the source
    zones. We obtain information from these sources of information.
    It may not be specific but we go with it. Again, just solely
    based on any information they may have, they feed back to
    Panama Express, we then feed it to JIATF, and obviously JIATF
    does the best they can with the available resources they have.
        Mr. McHenry. I have gone significantly over my time. I
    guess that is the luxury of having the gavel at the moment. But
    I certainly appreciate you all going through this range of
    thought here. The idea of this hearing is to actually get ideas
    to help you do your jobs better. And I certainly appreciate
    your willingness to come forward and explain this process so we
    can look at ideas to actually do what we are supposed to be
    doing, and that is to give you all the resources to achieve
    those goals. That is why we have these hearings on a regular
    occasion is to keep driving that process forward.
        It seems to me that we need to make sure we have the
    resources and the technology in place so that we can actually
    do the job on the ground, in the water, and make this process
    easier for you. And if it is a question of resources, we would
    like to hear that. If it is a question of policy, we need to
    hear that too. That is the purpose of this committee.
        Furthermore, we actually had a hearing back in January I
    believe, Admiral Hathaway, and I think Chairman Souder had some
    questions that he submitted and is still looking forward to
    receiving your response from that. We are now about 5 months or
    6 months after that hearing, so we would like to hear from you
    on that.
        At this time I will yield to Mr. Cummings for a second
    round of questions, and yield the Chair to my good friend, the
    gentlelady from Florida, Ms. Brown-Waite.
        Mr. Cummings. Gentlemen, I want to reiterate that we do
    appreciate what you do. I want to just go on that subject of
    appreciation. Admiral Sirois, you just talked about bringing
    some new equipment to certain Coast Guard vessels; is that what
    you were saying?
        Admiral Sirois. Yes.
        Mr. Cummings. What did you say? Say that again, please.
        Admiral Sirois. Our legacy fleet, our older cutters, we are
    putting new sensors on them, communications suites so that they
    are more effective in the job they are doing.
        Mr. Cummings. OK. And when we interdict, how dangerous is
    it? What do we usually find with regard to weapons?
        Admiral Sirois. Fortunately, very few weapons. We do find
    them from time to time. Most of the time we find that the crews
    will dispose of the weapons before our boarding team goes
    aboard. It is pretty imposing to have a large Navy ship or
    Coast Guard ship in close proximity to a 50 foot boat and that
    presence there dissuades them.
        Mr. Cummings. So going back to what you said, Mr.
    Stallworth, the whole thing of timing. I take it that the
    timing is very significant in that if you get the information--
    in other words, I am not trying to figure out who your
    informants are, but I imagine sometimes they can have some
    difficulty getting the word to you all in a timely fashion. Is
    that a reasonable assumption?
        Mr. Stallworth. Sometimes. And I defer to the DEA on that.
        Mr. Harrigan. Absolutely. Yes. That is an accurate
    assessment.
        Mr. Cummings. And that can be a real problem.
        Mr. Harrigan. Absolutely.
        Mr. Cummings. So it could be some guy down at the docks
    somewhere and he sees something happening and then he has to go
    through 50 million changes, he has also got to protect his own
    safety and make sure he is safe and does not want to give away
    the fact that he is a source or he will not be a source very
    long. Is that reasonable?
        Mr. Harrigan. Yes, sir. It sounds like you could give the
    Panama Express briefing, to be quite honest. You hit the nail
    right on the head.
        Mr. Cummings. So then you get the word. But the interesting
    thing is it sounds like most of the time this information is
    pretty reliable. Is that safe to say? In other words, reliable
    that there are drugs on the vessels.
        Mr. Harrigan. Suffice it to say that the information that
    we receive is typically--again the cadre of sources that we
    have out there are fairly reliable, we have worked with them in
    the past, and they know exactly what to look for: the types of
    ship, the types of different maneuvers that they may employ,
    certain dock hands, that type of thing, sir. So this cadre of
    sources that we have are pretty well-versed in watching out for
    specific things.
        Mr. Cummings. OK. So I guess what I am trying to figure out
    is that let us say we see the go-fast boats and one of you all
    implied there are instances where we get there but maybe we do
    not have the necessary equipment at that moment. Was it you,
    Mr. Stallworth?
        Mr. Stallworth. Yes. There are a number of dynamics as
    opposed to doing operations on land and a policeman pulling you
    over to the side of the road. It is called the end-game. For
    us, we can detect a suspect vessel, but if we do not have
    anyone on the surface in a position to actually stop them, go
    inside the vessel, and then inspect to see if there is a
    concealed compartment or if there are drugs there, we do not
    know. Sometimes we will se an open boat, a fast boat, but there
    is no one in the region on the surface that is going to be able
    to take them down. We just have to document the fact that it is
    there and where it is and give information and a heads-up to
    the local authorities of the areas that it may go to.
        Mr. Cummings. Would any kind of aerial operation help with
    that, like helicopters or----
        Mr. Stallworth. Sure, if you had land-based helicopters
    that were on the islands, for instance, in the Caribbean. But
    you have a lot of water out there and the range of a helicopter
    and even the vessels that you put helicopters on have to be so
    close to that target vessel before the helicopter can take off
    because it has to have the ability to go out there, stop, if
    the vessel stops the helicopter has to stay there and monitor
    it until the ship or other surface assets get there. So there
    is a lot more to being successful with the end-game than just
    you see them, you know they have drugs, and now you got them.
    You actually have to catch them.
        Mr. Cummings. Were you going to say something, Admiral
    Sirois?
        Admiral Sirois. Just that the area that we operate in, the
    transit zone, it is like finding a needle in a haystack.
        Mr. Cummings. All right. Thank you all.
        Ms. Brown-Waite [presiding]. The gentleman yields back his
    time.
        I have a question for Admiral Hathaway. I understand that
    the chairman and staff came down to visit you and see the
    operation and posed some followup questions. Those questions
    were submitted--the visit was January 13th, and the questions
    were submitted January 28th.
        Chairman Souder is much more patient than I would be. The
    questions were submitted in writing and then told that the
    questions would only be answered if they were under the
    chairman's signature. The bureaucracy in getting a Member of
    Congress' questions answered seems to me an offense. I find it
    offensive, I am sure the chairman found it offensive, and I
    would like to know why it takes 6 months to get some answers to
    some questions that a Member of Congress who Chairs this
    subcommittee asks.
        Admiral Hathaway. Madam Chairman, I certainly apologize for
    the tardiness of the answers to those questions. I have seen
    the questions, they were worked on diligently in JIATF, they
    were very good questions, and I will take back to the
    administration the subcommittee's dismay that they have not
    received the appropriate answers.
        Ms. Brown-Waite. Well, taking that back is real good, but
    the question is how many more 6 month periods are we going to
    have? I understand that the answers were actually submitted and
    then taken back this past Monday. Is that accurate?
        Admiral Hathaway. I am not sure exactly where the answers
    to the questions are within the administration in terms of the
    clearing process.
        Ms. Brown-Waite. Sir, I think the questions were directed
    to you.
        Admiral Hathaway. The original questions were directed to
    myself as the Director of Joint Interagency Task Force South.
        Ms. Brown-Waite. So therefore you are the administration,
    sir.
        Admiral Hathaway. Yes, ma'am. And as you know, at my level,
    when those questions are answered, they are ultimately
    transmitted to Congress but via my chain of command. And so I
    will find out where they are and certainly convey the dismay of
    the subcommittee. We will try to expedite getting those to you
    just as quickly as possible.
        Ms. Brown-Waite. I think perhaps even more interesting is
    why they were submitted and then withdrawn. I think an
    explanation needs to be given for that also. I believe in
    deadlines, sir.
        Admiral Hathaway. As do I, Madam Chairman.
        Ms. Brown-Waite. I do not think a 6-month delay is
    acceptable. So how about within 3 weeks, because you already
    will have had the questions for almost 6 months. So how about 2
    weeks? Could we have a commitment on that? I am sure those
    bureaucratic wheels can move a whole lot faster.
        Admiral Hathaway. I will certainly take that back and try
    to expedite getting the answers to you. And if this
    subcommittee desires those within 2 weeks, I will make sure
    that everyone is aware of that. I can promise you that.
        Ms. Brown-Waite. Thank you, sir. I have a couple of
    questions for the representative from DEA. First, thank you all
    for being here. I apologize I was not here earlier. It is very
    frustrating when you serve on the Veterans Committee and they
    simultaneously are holding a hearing and you run from hearing
    to hearing.
        I apologize, I did read part of the testimony though
    earlier in the day, but I apologize for not being here earlier.
    I want you to know that any other Members who are not here are
    facing the exact same situation of committee meetings being
    held simultaneously and/or constituents, because this is the
    time to visit Washington, DC, constituents being in their
    office. So I apologize for not being here sooner.
        Mr. Harrigan, I just have a question for you. Despite the
    good drug movement intelligence in the transit zone, we lack
    apparently similar knowledge in Mexico and Central America. So
    what agency has had the lead in developing logistic support
    bases that are located near the transit zones? And second, has
    DEA considered renewing operations in Guatemala?
        Mr. Harrigan. It is probably very good timing, ma'am. The
    Chief of Operations Mike Braun, who I am sitting here in place
    of, is actually in Guatemala as we speak meeting with
    Ambassador Hamilton and the president of Guatemala over that
    issue. So hopefully we will have our bases covered down in
    Guatemala.
        As far as the initial question, ma'am, you are correct. The
    problem when we see these go-fast boats and fishing vessels
    leave from the source countries, Colombia, Bolivia, Peru, once
    they get into Mexico/Central America, to be quite honest with
    you, we are not quite sure what happens. It is literally once
    it goes into Mexico they break these loads down to considerably
    smaller loads and it is almost like an army of ants coming
    across the Southwest border. I believe CBP puts estimates of
    seizures average about 20 kilos per seizure along the Southwest
    border.
        So we are in the process of developing, along with the
    other gentlemen here on the panel, DEA has a drug flow
    prevention strategy that we are turning into a plan. We are
    looking at targeting the vulnerabilities of these drug
    organizations and certain choke points where we will be able to
    identify them before they get to Mexico and Central America. It
    is certainly an issue.
        We have several offices in Mexico, ma'am, our main office
    in Mexico City, and we are doing what we can with the resources
    we have down there. We have a good relationship with the
    Mexican police, with some of the vetted units, and we are doing
    the best we can to try and identify those areas where these
    huge loads are coming into both Mexico and Central America.
        Ms. Brown-Waite. Let me ask you two other questions. First
    of all, were you with Customs before it was taken over by
    Homeland Security?
        Mr. Harrigan. No, ma'am. No. DEA, Department of Justice,
    yes.
        Ms. Brown-Waite. OK. We have heard about the tremendous
    success of the Panama Express intelligence cuing. Our reliance
    on this kind of intelligence sources should not be our only
    avenues of information on the drug trade. What other
    exploitable sources on this kind of information do you have in
    the transit zone operations area?
        Mr. Harrigan. Right now, ma'am, we rely almost exclusively
    on human intelligence. That is the bread and butter, to be
    quite honest with you. We have some great assets out there,
    whether they be technical in nature, but again, as Admiral
    Hathaway and Admiral Sirois alluded to earlier, we may have
    particular information they may be out in a particular zone,
    but it's like finding a needle in a haystack.
        So without human intelligence, it is an uphill battle. So
    it is with that human intelligence that we can perhaps sort of
    close the area a bit more for the JIATF and DOD assets to
    interdict those ships before they get to Mexico and Central
    America.
        Ms. Brown-Waite. So you are really relying a lot on the
    human intelligence?
        Mr. Harrigan. Absolutely.
        Ms. Brown-Waite. On a scale of 1 to 10, how reliable is the
    information that you get?
        Mr. Harrigan. It depends, obviously, on who it is coming
    from. But the success of Panama Express again is based on human
    intelligence and our sources in the area. So for the most part,
    if we get information, if it is gleaned through the Interagency
    folks, we take a hard look at it, as does every other agency
    sitting at this table, and we have a pretty good idea if there
    is a certain movement that is going to occur.
        Ms. Brown-Waite. One other question, and that is, does the
    DEA feel that the Joint Interagency Task Force South has
    optimized their airborne and maritime patrol efforts?
        Mr. Harrigan. I would have to defer, ma'am, to Admiral
    Hathaway. But we have an outstanding relationship. We have
    agents and intelligence analysts as well as support personnel
    assigned to JIATF-South. They have every request that has come
    from DEA, any tasking, it has always been acted upon. Other
    than that, I would really have no comment to that particular
    question.
        Ms. Brown-Waite. So you are not at liberty to say whether
    you believe that they have optimized the airborne and maritime
    patrol?
        Mr. Harrigan. I believe they have. I believe they have.
    From the information that we pass along to them, absolutely.
        Ms. Brown-Waite. OK. Is it true that about 90 percent of
    all drugs come into the U.S. through the Mexican border?
        Mr. Harrigan. Those are the estimates, ma'am. Right now,
    the IACM, Interagency Assessment of Cocaine Movement, put the
    figures in 2003 at approximately 77 percent of the cocaine
    coming into the U.S. transited Mexico/Central America, and they
    had the remaining 23 percent going through the Caribbean. In
    2004 there was tremendous movement, where estimates put it at
    92 percent of the cocaine coming from South America would
    transit the Mexico/Central America corridor, while 8 percent
    would transit the Caribbean. OK. Now again, these are estimates
    that this IACM put together.
        Ms. Brown-Waite. When I first moved to Florida, I moved to
    a coastal area and kind of the local chatter was that there was
    a lot of drug smuggling going on through the fishing boats,
    small fishing boats. Tell me, has that changed? Has it gotten
    better? Has it gotten worse? This is along the west coast of
    Florida.
        Mr. Harrigan. I will answer in part, ma'am, and then I will
    defer to perhaps Admiral Hathaway. Again, we have seen a
    decline over the last year or so of shipments going through the
    Caribbean. Again, they are simply estimates, nothing more,
    nothing less. We do see the vast majority of the drugs that are
    smuggled into the United States obviously come via maritime
    vessels, whether it be go-fast, whether it be containerized
    vessels, whether it be small fishing vessels. So based upon the
    IACM, we have seen a decline in the Caribbean.
        Ms. Brown-Waite. Thank you. Anybody else care to respond to
    that? Admiral Hathaway. Mr. Stallworth.
        Mr. Stallworth. Yes, ma'am. To answer your question
    specifically about the west coast of Florida, it is difficult
    to say specifically. What I can say is regionally in South
    Florida, especially with the post-September 11th Department of
    Homeland Security's efforts down there in south Florida, where
    the Coast Guard, Air and Marine Operations, and the Border
    Patrol essentially produce one flying schedule so we deconflict
    all of our assets and we utilize them in probably the most
    effective and efficient way possible with the assets that we
    have, and with some of the operations down there, which
    included taking back the Miami River which was a Joint
    Interagency, investigative, etc., State and local, and Federal.
        That operation has been I think very successful, and what
    happens is it has a tendency to impact the whole region. So
    when law enforcement and the Department got our act together
    down there and started acting in a cooperative manner, what we
    did has really had an impact on the total of south Florida,
    both maritime and air.
        So I think the impact has been there. The focus on the
    Miami River project, and the focus in the other regions down
    there, the threat of mass migration from Cuba and other areas,
    has resulted in team work that has resulted in a much safer
    environment down there for south Florida. I think what you are
    seeing is just that.
        Ms. Brown-Waite. Thank you. Anyone else wish to comment?
    Yes?
        Admiral Sirois. The area along the coast we call the
    arrival zone, and that is the responsibility of CBP, Coast
    Guard, and many other State and local agencies. You mentioned
    the fishing fleet, certainly fishing fleet is suspect. I would
    have to ask my local folks in Florida what information they
    have, but any conveyance, and of course there are hundreds of
    thousands if not millions of boats in Florida, are
    opportunities.
        The problem off the coast of Florida or any coastal area is
    those small boats carry small amounts of drugs. That is why it
    is most important that what JIATF-South does is get the large
    loads. As difficult as it is to get the large loads, it is much
    easier to do that than get the small loads in close to home.
        Ms. Brown-Waite. Thank you. Mr. Cummings, I believe you
    have some questions?
        Mr. Cummings. I will be very brief, Madam Chairlady. I just
    was wondering, to you Admiral Hathaway, is there a diversion of
    assets when the code levels go up? In other words, are we
    seeing a movement with regard to trying to deal with other
    priorities, particularly after September 11th and what have
    you? And if there are, does that call for a movement of your
    forces? And how does that affect what you do? Do you follow me?
    Maybe somebody else can answer that too.
        Admiral Hathaway. Yes, sir. I will provide a comment and
    then I would turn to both my Coast Guard and my Customs and
    Border Protection colleagues. In the aftermath of the September
    11th attacks, there is no doubt that at JIATF-South both Coast
    Guard and what is now Customs and Border Protection assets were
    pulled back in fairly large numbers. Both of those
    organizations have matured greatly since that time.
        As security levels go up in the United States, our
    assessment today as today's JIATF-South Commander, is that both
    the Coast Guard and Customs and Border Protection are able to
    handle both missions almost simultaneously. I no longer see a
    wholesale movement of assets from those two Interagency
    partners away from JIATF-South. We are able to maintain our
    level of operations while both these organizations flex in
    their homeland security duties. That is my assessment from the
    JIATF-South perspective. But I will ask both of them for
    theirs.
        Admiral Sirois. After September 11th the Coast Guard did
    draw back many of its major cutters in close to our ports and
    shores. Since that time, with the administration's budget and
    the support of Congress, we have added hundreds of new boats
    and patrol boats to our inventory. Those boats are doing things
    along our coastal ports that the major cutters were doing after
    September 11th. So now if the threat level is increased, we are
    pretty much able, as Admiral Hathaway mentioned, to do that
    mission without calling cutters back from his mission.
        However, having said that, there are other things that we
    do that could cause us to pull back our cutters--mass migration
    from Cuba, mass migration from Haiti. All our cutters are
    multi-mission, so there are more things than the elevated
    Homeland Security threat alert level that could cause a
    disruption in the allocation of assets.
        Mr. Cummings. Anyone else? Mr. Stallworth.
        Mr. Stallworth. Yes, sir. From the perspective of CBP, our
    counterterrorism mission is just as important as our
    counternarcotics, you almost cannot separate them. The
    Commissioner of Customs has a defense in depth strategy that
    includes the transit zone. So we would look at the facts and
    what the issue is because we know that the threat vector can
    come from the South just like it can from the North. So the
    decision is based on the threat and the situation as it is.
    There would not be just an immediate withdrawal of assets.
        Mr. Cummings. To Admiral Hathaway, I was just sitting here
    thinking about all you have been through today. I would imagine
    that if I were trying to put together one of those Southwest
    Airlines commercials, this would be the ideal time for you--you
    just want to get away. [Laughter.]
        But I wanted to say, I hope you can understand the urgency.
    Believe me, I am not going to pile on; believe me. I understand
    Chairman Souder's concern about getting the information. I am
    assuming, based upon what you have said, that if it were up to
    you, and you do not have to answer this because I know you have
    a chain of command and all that kind of thing, that I guess we
    would have these answers.
        But I am just asking you, as the Chairlady has said, and I
    agree with her, that we only have a limited amount of time to
    operate in this Congress and we do have a sense of urgency.
    Sometimes the public may not believe that, but we do. We have a
    limited amount of time to get some things done.
        So I would hope that you would do the best you can. It is
    simply not good enough to say you will try. We kind of need
    answers. And if there are problems, you need to let us know. We
    are human beings and we understand problems.
        So I just could not leave this room without saying that to
    you because I want you to have a decent evening, and I really
    mean that. I have sat on the general committee for now 9\1/2\
    years and I have seen people come before this committee and
    leave just simply devastated. I do not want you to leave
    feeling that way, and I am saying that very sincerely. You all
    do so much for us and you affect all of our neighborhoods and I
    know you do the best you can with what you have.
        I know that when you are a military person there are
    certain things that you just do not say because there are
    chains of command and all that kind of thing. But I hope you
    will give it everything you have. I think the Chairlady asked
    for it in 2 weeks, if you could do that for us, please do that.
    And if for any reason that is in any way impossible, and I am
    sure it is not impossible, but if it is, please let us know. I
    hope that my statement helps you get through the evening. We
    thank you for your service, we really do. Thank you.
        Ms. Brown-Waite. And I thank Mr. Cummings for that
    question. One of the things that he said is I think he said he
    wants you to do the best you can with what you have. The reason
    why the chairman wanted those questions answered is to see what
    the shortfalls are, what additional equipment you need to
    better do your job to help interdict the drug trafficking to
    make our streets safer and our children safer. I do not think
    that there was any hidden agenda. It was not going to be a
    gotcha. It was how can we help you get better equipment, more
    equipment, whatever you need.
        Sometimes in any administration their priorities are not
    always the priorities of the Members of Congress. Like Mr.
    Cummings and the other members of this committee, I go home
    every weekend, I see the broken-hearted parents whose kids are
    hooked on drugs. I have taught in college the caseworkers who
    work with those who are addicted to drugs. I know the
    heartache. I know the broken families.
        So the chairman's intentions were to help you. As you know,
    the appropriations process is speeding along much quicker than
    ever before, and that was his goal, to help you get what you
    need, to make sure that what you got is a lot better to do your
    job better.
        Before we end the meeting, I would like to hear from
    everybody here on the panel, and I want to thank you for being
    here today. Do any of the agencies represented here today
    support the idea of a maritime oiler to refuel interdiction
    assets in the Eastern Pacific? How about if we start down here
    with Mr. Utley.
        Mr. Utley. I think it would be an excellent idea. It is
    having to do with the art of the impossible. Right now, the
    Navy does not have a spare oiler to donate to the Eastern
    Pacific, unfortunately, and it would be cost-prohibitive, it is
    somewhere around $25 million, to bring one out of mothballs.
        I will let some of my colleagues obviously talk about this,
    they have more granularity than I do. Approach other countries
    in the region, it is almost like a bridge too far away, with
    the Colombian ones in pretty bad shape, the Peruvian is in
    pretty bad shape, Chile is too far away. So, oh, yes, that
    would be really great. But it is the getting there that is very
    difficult.
        Ms. Brown-Waite. Thank you. Admiral Sirois.
        Admiral Sirois. Definitely. The number of days lost to
    cutters and Navy ships transiting back and forth to get fuel is
    troubling. I think last year one of our commanders estimated
    that in the Pacific we lost 100 patrol days because the ships
    were transiting back and forth.
        Ms. Brown-Waite. Thank you.
        Admiral Hathaway. In U.S. Southern Command, we have been
    working with our partner nations, as Mr. Utley noted, Peru,
    Columbia. We have been aggressively pursuing options other than
    U.S. assets.
        The frustration to me I can tell you, and this is the
    granularity of information we have today, that an on-scene day
    for one of our ships in the Eastern Pacific, whether it is
    Coast Guard, whether it is U.S. Navy, is worth about 100
    kilograms of cocaine seized. When we lose that ship off-
    station, that is an opportunity lost. As Admiral Sirois simply
    said, by some estimates we lost about 100 ship days last year
    because we had to send cutters and U.S. Navy ships to shoreside
    refueling.
        Ms. Brown-Waite. Thank you. Mr. Stallworth.
        Mr. Stallworth. Yes, ma'am. From the air and Marine
    operations perspective, we are the guys who go out there and
    detect them. We would like for somebody to be on the surface to
    do the end-game so that the time that we spend out there flying
    comes to fruition and we protect our neighborhoods. So I am in
    support of that.
        Ms. Brown-Waite. Thank you. Mr. Harrigan.
        Mr. Harrigan. Well, ma'am, that is a bit out of the area of
    DEA's expertise. But for what it is worth, I fully concur with
    my panelists. [Laughter.]
        Ms. Brown-Waite. You know, I am from New York and it is so
    good to hear a New York accent.
        Mr. Harrigan. How did you guess?
        Ms. Brown-Waite. Because I am from New York.
        I want to thank each and every one of you for being here.
    We appreciate your testimony and certainly look forward to
    having a copy of the response to the chairman. Like you, we are
    from the Government; we are here to help, we really are. I want
    to thank you all for being here.
        This meeting is adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 3:55 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
        [Additional information submitted for the hearing record
    follows:]

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