[House Hearing, 109 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
THREAT CONVERGENCE ALONG THE BORDER: WILL DRUG TRAFFICKING TECHNIQUES
PROVIDE SOME ANSWERS?
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE,
DRUG POLICY, AND HUMAN RESOURCES
of the
COMMITTEE ON
GOVERNMENT REFORM
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
JUNE 14, 2005
__________
Serial No. 109-96
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Government Reform
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/
index.html
http://www.house.gov/reform
______
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COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM
TOM DAVIS, Virginia, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut HENRY A. WAXMAN, California
DAN BURTON, Indiana TOM LANTOS, California
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida MAJOR R. OWENS, New York
JOHN M. McHUGH, New York EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York
JOHN L. MICA, Florida PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania
GIL GUTKNECHT, Minnesota CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York
MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland
STEVEN C. LaTOURETTE, Ohio DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio
TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois
CHRIS CANNON, Utah WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri
JOHN J. DUNCAN, Jr., Tennessee DIANE E. WATSON, California
CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts
MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland
DARRELL E. ISSA, California LINDA T. SANCHEZ, California
GINNY BROWN-WAITE, Florida C.A. DUTCH RUPPERSBERGER, Maryland
JON C. PORTER, Nevada BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
KENNY MARCHANT, Texas ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of
LYNN A. WESTMORELAND, Georgia Columbia
PATRICK T. McHENRY, North Carolina ------
CHARLES W. DENT, Pennsylvania BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont
VIRGINIA FOXX, North Carolina (Independent)
------ ------
Melissa Wojciak, Staff Director
David Marin, Deputy Staff Director/Communications Director
Rob Borden, Parliamentarian/Senior Counsel
Teresa Austin, Chief Clerk
Phil Barnett, Minority Chief of Staff/Chief Counsel
Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources
MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana, Chairman
PATRICK T. McHenry, North Carolina ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland
DAN BURTON, Indiana BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont
JOHN L. MICA, Florida DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois
GIL GUTKNECHT, Minnesota DIANE E. WATSON, California
STEVEN C. LaTOURETTE, Ohio LINDA T. SANCHEZ, California
CHRIS CANNON, Utah C.A. DUTCH RUPPERSBERGER, Maryland
CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan MAJOR R. OWENS, New York
GINNY BROWN-WAITE, Florida ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of
VIRGINIA FOXX, North Carolina Columbia
Ex Officio
TOM DAVIS, Virginia HENRY A. WAXMAN, California
J. Marc Wheat, Staff Director
Nicholas Coleman, Professional Staff Member/Counsel
Malia Holst, Clerk
Richard Butcher, Minority Professional Staff Member
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Hearing held on June 14, 2005.................................... 1
Statement of:
Passic, Gregory, Director, Office of Drug Interdiction,
Customs and Border Protection.............................. 29
Placido, Anthony, Assistant Administrator for Intelligence,
Drug Enforcement Agency.................................... 14
Torres, John P., Deputy Assistant Director, Office of
Investigations, Immigration and Customs Enforcement........ 36
Utley, Ralph, RADM, USCG Ret., Acting Director, Office of
Counternarcotics Enforcement, Department of Homeland
Security................................................... 6
Letters, statements, etc., submitted for the record by:
Cummings, Hon. Elijah E., a Representative in Congress from
the State of Maryland, prepared statement of............... 57
Passic, Gregory, Director, Office of Drug Interdiction,
Customs and Border Protection, prepared statement of....... 31
Placido, Anthony, Assistant Administrator for Intelligence,
Drug Enforcement Agency, prepared statement of............. 16
Souder, Hon. Mark E., a Representative in Congress from the
State of Indiana, prepared statement of.................... 4
Torres, John P., Deputy Assistant Director, Office of
Investigations, Immigration and Customs Enforcement,
prepared statement of...................................... 38
Utley, Ralph, RADM, USCG Ret., Acting Director, Office of
Counternarcotics Enforcement, Department of Homeland
Security, prepared statement of............................ 9
THREAT CONVERGENCE ALONG THE BORDER: WILL DRUG TRAFFICKING TECHNIQUES
PROVIDE SOME ANSWERS?
----------
TUESDAY, JUNE 14, 2005
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and
Human Resources,
Committee on Government Reform,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:02 p.m., in
room 2203, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Mark E. Souder
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Present: Representatives Souder, Gutknecht, and Cummings.
Staff present: Nicholas Coleman, professional staff member
and counsel; David Thomasson and Pat DeQuattro, congressional
fellows, Malia Holst, clerk; Tony Haywood, minority counsel;
Richard Butcher, minority professional staff member; and Teresa
Coufal, minority assistant clerk.
Mr. Souder. The subcommittee will come to order. Good
afternoon, and thank you all for coming. Today we will explore
Federal law enforcement's ability to identify, interdict, and
apprehend drug smuggling operations along our Nation's borders.
This mission requires a comprehensive, unified, multiagency
effort, with a clear plan that dismantles the organizations
responsible, not just for smuggling drugs but also illegal
aliens, terrorists, and weapons into this country. We have
fallen short of this objective for many reasons but I would
like to address five of them here.
Reason No. 1 involves the organizational decision to split
the investigative and inspection functions at the Customs and
Border Protection [CBP], and Immigrations Customs Enforcement
[ICE]. By splitting the two functions, the Department has
limited their capacity to conduct enforcement operations in
areas leading up to the border, at the border, and beyond the
border. This unhealthy split has been exasperated by an extra
layer of bureaucracy over ICE and CBP, namely the Directorate
of Border and Transportation Security.
Second, it seems that all Federal agencies engaged in drug
enforcement have developed or are in the process of developing
their own individual intelligence programs complete with intel
centers that serve that agency's needs. While I support intel
operations at these agencies, too many centers lead to
duplication of effort and stovepiped computer systems that lack
the ability to communicate with other existing systems. One
example of this type of duplicative efforts can be found at
Fort Bliss in El Paso, TX. The Border Patrol Field Intelligence
Center [BORFIC], and the DEA-run El Paso Intelligence Center
[EPIC], have taken up residence at the same military
installation. BORFIC is responsible for providing daily reports
to the Border Patrol headquarters and field managers throughout
the United States. Additionally, they search for potential
terrorist threats along the U.S.-Mexican border. EPIC, on the
other hand, concentrates primarily on drug movement,
immigration violations, to include all the United States and
the Western Hemisphere where drug and alien movements are
directed toward the United States. While both focus on similar
targets, they have developed separate databases of violators
rather than sharing the information and making it available to
users from one central database.
Third, we lack a strategic, comprehensive, layered
interagency plan to address border security. The DHS Under
Secretary for Border and Transportation Security [BTS] is
currently evaluating the merits of a border strategy that will
involve the opening of yet another operational intelligence
center called the Border Interdiction Support Center [BISC].
The BISC concept would supposedly warehouse and disseminate for
intelligence derived from the interagency efforts at
interdicting people, weapons, and narcotics along the southwest
border. But the agencies that would be involved in BISC, like
DEA, ICE, and CBP, all seem to have a different idea of what
the BISC would do.
The perceived need to create the BISC underscores the
Nation's lack of a coherent interagency plan to address border
security. On May 12, 2005, the Government Reform Committee held
a hearing to examine DHS management of border security.
Commissioner Bonner informed the committee that CBP has a
strategic Border Patrol plan but failed to disclose the details
of a border strategy. The subcommittee has been told that a
border plan has been submitted by CBP but is now held up at
BTS. We need to do better.
Fourth, DHS has failed to fund the Office of
Counternarcotics Enforcement as Congress intended. Currently
the funding level for 2006 remains the same as 2005; funds are
controlled by the chief of staff, not the director; and the
director continues to be employed by the Transportation
Security Agency. The office is supposed to coordinate DHS drug
interdiction efforts at the land borders, on the seas, and in
the air. The law assigns specific responsibilities to the new
director including oversight of DHS counterdrug activities and
the submission of reports to Congress. Without sufficient funds
and independence, however, the office simply cannot carry out
these responsibilities.
Finally, poor organizational structure and funding, lack of
intelligence coordination, and a cohesive border strategy have
not only hurt our ability to stop drug smuggling along the
border, but also the smuggling of people, terrorists, and
weapons. Our failure to identify and prosecute transportation
groups that provide aliens with tools needed to illegally enter
our country calls into question our ability to control our
Nation's borders. It is my hope that Congress and the Federal
law enforcement agencies will work to improve our ability to
shut down the smuggling organizations involved in criminal
enterprises along the border.
Today we have a panel of very experienced witnesses to help
answer these and other questions posed by the subcommittee.
From the Office of Counternarcotics Enforcement we have the
Director, Admiral Ralph Utley. From the Drug Enforcement
Administration we have the Assistant Administrator for
Intelligence, Mr. Anthony Placido. From Customs and Border
Protection, we have the Director of the Office of Drug
Interdiction, Mr. Gregory Passic. And from Immigration and
Customs Enforcement [ICE], we have the Deputy Assistant
Director of the Office of Investigations, Mr. John Torres. We
look forward to your testimony and insight into this important
issue.
[The prepared statement of Hon. Mark E. Souder follows:]
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Mr. Souder. Before proceeding, I want to ask unanimous
consent that all Members attending today have 5 legislative
days to submit written statements and questions for the hearing
record, and any answers to written questions provided by the
witnesses also be included in the record. And, without
objection, it is so ordered.
I also ask unanimous consent that all exhibits, documents,
and other materials referred to by Members may be included in
the hearing record, and that all Members be permitted to revise
and extend their remarks. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Our first and only panel is composed of the four gentlemen
that I mentioned. And, as you know, as an oversight committee
it is our standard practice to ask all our witnesses to testify
under oath. So if you will each stand and raise your right
hands.
[Witnesses sworn.]
Mr. Souder. Let the record show that each of the witnesses
responded in the affirmative.
Thank you very much for coming today for this important
hearing as we continue to look for the most effective border
strategies that we can have, particularly as we see terrorism,
drug trafficking, and human trafficking all start to merge
together and will continue to merge even more closely over
time.
We will start with you, Admiral Utley.
STATEMENT OF RALPH UTLEY, RADM, USCG Ret., ACTING DIRECTOR,
OFFICE OF COUNTERNARCOTICS ENFORCEMENT, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND
SECURITY
Admiral Utley. Good afternoon, Chairman Souder,
distinguished members of the panel, my name is Ralph Utley and
I am the Acting Director of the Office of Counternarcotics
Enforcement for the Department of Homeland Security and Acting
U.S. Interdiction Coordinator. It is my privilege to appear
before you to discuss drug trafficking and its impact on our
borders. And I would ask that my written statement be entered
into the record.
The Office of Counternarcotics' goal is to lead a unified
departmental effort to prevent and deter illegal drugs from
coming into the United States.
Today's hearing on threat convergence along the border: How
does drug trafficking impact our borders, is central to this
goal. My core mission is to coordinate policy and operations
within the Department and between the Department and other
Federal departments and agencies with respect to stopping the
entry of illegal drugs into the United States.
Before I discuss the borders, I would like to share with
you some results of last year's interdiction efforts in the
transit zone. In fiscal year 2004, the Department of Homeland
Security in cooperation with the interagency removed over 225
metric tons of drugs that were headed to the United States. The
U.S. Coast Guard had an exceptionally banner year for fiscal
year 2004, seizing over 109 metric tons in the transit zone.
Through June 1st of this year, the U.S. Coast Guard has seized
over 81 metric tons of cocaine. Much of this interdiction was
supported by CBP assets.
Other DHS agencies also set records in interdiction during
2004. U.S. Customs and Border Protection seized over 905 metric
tons of marijuana, 26 metric tons of cocaine, and 1.3 metric
tons of heroin bound for the United States. U.S. Immigration
and Customs Enforcement [ICE] was involved in the investigative
efforts and apprehension of over 712 metric tons of marijuana,
150 metric tons of cocaine, and 1.3 metric tons of heroin, and
1 metric ton of methamphetamines that were headed for the
streets of the United States.
The majority of these drugs were destined for the southwest
border where they would have consequently entered California,
Arizona, New Mexico, and Texas. To combat drug trafficking
along U.S. borders, my office is committed to working with our
Mexican and Canadian Government copartners. Only with open
communication and binational cooperation can this be done. The
Department is actively engaged with Mexican law enforcement
officials through the Senior Law Enforcement Plenary and the
Binational Interdiction Working Group. The Department is also
working with Canadian law enforcement officials through the
Integrated Border Enforcement Teams. It is through these venues
that bilateral ties are strengthened and the United States has
a better chance of collectively interdicting drugs.
OCE continues to work with the existing intelligence and
operations centers along the border to ensure that adequate
counterdrug resources are applied to the problem. In addition,
OCE continues to coordinate policy within the Department of
Homeland Security to streamline departmental and interagency
operations.
In addition to streamlining operations, we must make sure
that information is being disseminated vertically up and down
within the Department so that policies and intelligence can
support operational units in the field. We also need to fuse
and exploit all information that we learn across the country so
that when a CBP agent in Arizona learns of a new smuggling
method, that information is fed to our intelligence analysts,
incorporated where appropriate into our strategy to combat
smuggling, and disseminated across the Department and
interagency to others focused on the same problem.
Our focus must extend beyond the Department itself. We must
review and make use of information coming from the intelligence
community, and we must play an active role in providing
operational feedback to the intelligence community. Sharing
information across the Federal Government is critical if we are
to succeed. To that end, I am committed to making sure that our
law enforcement and intelligence partners across the Federal
Government have appropriate access to the Department's
information and analysis to the maximum extent possible under
law, while at the same time protecting the privacy rights and
civil liberties of Americans. By the same token, we must sit as
full partners at the table with full access to information from
the intelligence community.
Finally, we must inform and communicate with our State,
local, tribal, and private sector partners. As information
comes in, we need to ensure it is disseminated to the right
people in a way that can be used to strengthen their effort and
contribute effectively to ours.
Very shortly, I will be providing to the counternarcotics
community a national interdiction command and control plan and
the interdiction planning guidance. These documents will help
organize U.S. resources that are committed to counter the drug
threat along our border. My office is also drafting a
department-wide counterdrug policy that will outline the
current counterdrug resources of the Department of Homeland
Security and will address intelligence-driven operations and
initiatives to ensure that maximum results are achieved from
all DHS counterdrug effort.
OCE has taken steps to actively engage in the intelligence
community; specifically, we have engaged with the National
Counterterrorism Center, Joint Terrorism Task Force, El Paso
Intelligence Center, National Drug Intelligence Center, Defense
Intelligence Agency, and the Central Intelligence Agency's
Crime and Narcotics Center. Our goal is to serve as a conduit
between DHS and the counterdrug community as we respond to our
congressional mandate to track and sever the connection between
drugs and terror.
In closing, the ability to stop the flow of drugs into the
United States is necessary for national security and public
safety. By aggressively enforcing our existing laws and working
transparently to better fuse intelligence, we seek to deter
drug traffickers and terrorist organizations who threaten our
way of life.
I would like to thank Mr. Chairman and members of this
committee for this opportunity to appear, and I look forward to
answering your questions.
Mr. Souder. Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Admiral Utley follows:]
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Mr. Souder. Mr. Placido.
STATEMENT OF ANTHONY PLACIDO, ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR FOR
INTELLIGENCE, DRUG ENFORCEMENT AGENCY
Mr. Placido. Chairman Souder, members of the subcommittee,
thank you very much for this invitation to testify today. On
behalf of DEA Administrator Karen P. Tandy, I thank you for
your continued support of the men and women of the Drug
Enforcement Administration.
As the former Regional Director for DEA's Mexico Central
American Division, Special Agent in Charge of the New York
Field Division which borders on Canada, and a 25-year veteran
of the agency, I am acutely aware of the challenges at our
borders. Securing our borders requires extraordinary
coordination among and between American law enforcement and
intelligence organizations as well as robust cooperation with
our foreign counterparts.
With that, let me begin with a few words about DEA's
foreign program and our worldwide drug flow prevention
strategy. The DEA, in conjunction with other U.S. agencies, has
launched an innovative multiagency strategy to significantly
disrupt the flow of drugs and chemicals before they reach our
borders. The plan is to attack the key vulnerabilities and
supply, communications, and transportation systems of these
drug trafficking organizations by executing sustained,
sequential operations based on predictive intelligence. We have
already deployed our foreign area support or FAS teams to
Afghanistan, and hope to go forward with at least one prototype
operation in Latin America by August 2005. Our goal is to build
on the successful model we have established in the interagency
Operation Panama Express.
While DEA attempts to use its extensive foreign presence
and operational capabilities to provide defense in depth to
disrupt the flow of drugs before they reach our borders, we
also recognize that the southwest border is the primary arrival
zone for the vast majority of illicit drugs that are smuggled
into the United States. DEA is committed to working
cooperatively with the Department of Homeland Security which
has primary jurisdiction for border security.
Combining DEA's extensive foreign capabilities with DHS's
efforts at the border is essential to enhancing the Nation's
border security. The strategic partnership between DEA and DHS
is particularly important in our efforts to control the
southwest border with Mexico.
During President Fox's administration, DEA participated in
numerous successful bilateral law enforcement operations with
Mexico. Notable drug kingpins such as Benjamin Ariano Felix,
Osiel Cardenas, Armando Valencia, Miguel Cartanterro, Alcid
Ramon Mogania, and Alpino Contero Moras have been arrested as a
result of these joint efforts. These operations and others show
real promise. Unfortunately, they have not been mounted on a
scale that is commensurate with the magnitude of the problems
we face from Mexico.
The single largest impediment to enhancing our progress
against drug trafficking from Mexico is corruption. DEA has
highly productive, longstanding relationships with Government
of Mexico counterparts. Unfortunately, officials of
unquestionable integrity and remarkable courage must too
frequently contend with a system that is fraught with
bureaucratic inefficiency and corruption. This makes it
extremely difficult and sometimes very dangerous for our
counterparts to do their jobs. These factors and the geographic
proximity to the United States will continue to make Mexico an
attractive staging area for drug smuggling and transnational
crime.
The Government of Mexico and DEA have scored a series of
major blows against drug cartels. Unfortunately, all of the
major Mexico-based drug trafficking organizations continue to
operate at some level. Some have become even more dangerous as
the pressure has ignited turf wars along the southwest border.
Drug-related violence in Mexico has expanded beyond intergang
warfare to include slayings of politicians, journalists, prison
employees, and police. This activity further undermines
confidence in the Government of Mexico and has the potential to
spill over onto the U.S. border. Intelligence sharing and
cooperation are vital to combating transnational crimes, and
these efforts must begin at home.
The El Paso Intelligence Center [EPIC], founded in 1974 is
an interagency organization and it is the oldest and most
important intelligence-sharing initiative. EPIC is a national
center that is specifically focused on the southwest border. I
recently met with Mr. Passic from the Bureau of Customs and
Border Protection and DEA officials from the southwest border,
the Caribbean, and Mexico. The unanimous consensus of this
group was that EPIC is an important tool and that it can and
must do more to promote enhanced border security.
EPIC is uniquely positioned to provide consolidated
interagency intelligence support required to protect our
borders. Working with our interagency partners at EPIC, I
believe we can bring a new era of cooperation into reality. The
result will be significant enhancements in the ability of all
agencies to use intelligence to inform and drive operations and
investigations and, most importantly, to protect the Nation
from the scourge of transnational crime.
Mr. Chairman, at this point I ask that my full written
statement be entered into the record, and I will be glad to
answer your questions.
Mr. Souder. Thank you very much for your testimony.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Placido follows:]
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Mr. Souder. Mr. Passic.
STATEMENT OF GREGORY PASSIC, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF DRUG
INTERDICTION, CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION
Mr. Passic. Thank you very much, Chairman Souder, and
members of the subcommittee and staff, for inviting us to your
hearing today. I hope that we can address the points you have
raised in your statement. I think they are all important things
that we are working on, but we need to be able to do in a
better fashion, portray to you what we are trying to do and how
we can work together to achieve the results that we are all
looking for.
The southwest border is a very significant part of our job.
It is also a major challenge to national interdiction efforts.
I have a chart I would like to maybe show you, and I don't mean
to bring this up to just put numbers in front of you, but
Customs and Border Protection is very, very busy on the drug
account. As you can see, last year we actually seized about
100-plus tons of drugs.
One of the better things that happened when Customs and
Border Protection was created, we have one face at the border,
we have one person who can represent the commissioner's wishes
with our partners. We can sit down and we can talk about
strategies and ideas, and it is not as complicated as it used
to be.
I would like to point out, though, that most of those
seizures resulted from what we call cold hits. We would welcome
an opportunity to have better intelligence to our front line.
What we like to see is what we refer to as smart intelligence.
We would like to have intelligence that would direct us to
seize drugs that come from trafficking groups that are under
investigation. We would like to provide to ICE and DEA critical
evidence in their drug cases, the means of sometimes getting
extraditions of major traffickers. Nothing is more worthless,
in my humble opinion, than a load of dope that doesn't belong
to anybody. It does remove drugs from getting to the market,
but we want to have more impact than that.
We also would like to--Mr. Placido mentioned EPIC and other
intelligence programs that DEA has. We see them as a primary
partner. They are the best repository of drug intelligence in
this government, and we need to do a better job of connecting
with them.
We appreciate DEA's efforts in the past 60 days to include
us in their programs, to actually ask us what we need on the
border, to participate with them in making EPIC, the Drug
Fusion Center, and other vital drug intelligence programs work.
And you are absolutely right: We don't need more, we need less;
we need concentrated, we need better, and we need teamwork on
the drug intelligence account.
We would also like to see better eyes and ears on the
border. I mean, it is a tough job standing at that border and
actually stopping drugs. We do the best we can, but we feel
that we could do a better job if we had better intelligence on
the staging areas in Mexico, if we could do more to help our
ICE and DEA counterparts and the other interdiction members of
the community to seize drugs before they get into Mexico.
Mexico is a tremendous black hole for all of us. Once it gets
into that bottom part of Mexico, it is tough. The next shot we
have at it is at the border.
And along those same lines, I think the engagement of our
Mexican counterparts is absolutely critical. If we have had a
hole in our defense--and Mr. Placido mentioned that, because of
the corruption factor down there, it has been hard getting the
level of counterparts that really we could do joint operations
with. We see some promise. This week the Mexicans have actually
started kicking doors in and chasing some of the major
traffickers out of their safe havens along that northern
border. And we support that effort. We laud them for trying and
tackling the tough guys that have been hard to get to in the
past.
We also would like to work with DEA and ICE and others to
somehow get beyond the word ``cooperation.'' It kind of drives
me crazy, to be honest with you. We should be using the word
``collaboration.'' We should know what each other's role is,
and we should complement each other's role and we should
strengthen and add to that. A mere exchange of ideas is not
going to take you where you want to go as far as effectiveness
on that southwest border.
And we see positive signs of that happening. There is a lot
of energy in the community right now addressing the issues you
brought up. And I think that if we can somehow use that energy
to, in your efforts--and I have to laud you for--I have been a
drug warrior for 37 years. I started buying dope as a cop, and
I spent 15 years in the Beltway drug war, and I have seen
interest go up and down. I know your interest is real in your
subcommittee, and you are trying to help us. And I think that
we need to do that together. I think that law enforcement
counterparts sitting at the table with your help can somehow
focus that energy that is out there right now. And I haven't
seen it for 4 or 5 years, but it is back.
DEA is looking at a strategy that actually enhances our
ability to get into transportation groups. Their drug flow
prevention strategy is something that we would like to support.
ICE is also looking at the money side, which I think is an
often ignored part of our drug problem, is the cash going back
to these organizations that continue to cause us problems.
But I would just like to summarize that we have--our drug
initiatives are still pretty strong. We would not like to leave
you with the impression that we have, because of the war on
terrorism, that we have abandoned this field. We feel that the
Arizona initiative, that the America Shield, or even our
container security initiative of checking containers before
they are shipped here helps us interdict drugs. The better
technology we get and deploy on that border, the better job we
can do.
Thank you once again for inviting me and us. And my written
testimony will also be entered, and be happy to entertain any
questions you might have.
Mr. Souder. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Passic follows:]
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Mr. Souder. Mr. Torres.
STATEMENT OF JOHN P. TORRES, DEPUTY ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, OFFICE
OF INVESTIGATIONS, IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT
Mr. Torres. Good afternoon, Chairman Souder, and members of
the subcommittee. Thank you for the opportunity to address you
today to discuss the efforts of U.S. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement [ICE] in the fight against drug smuggling.
As the largest investigative arm of the Department of
Homeland Security, ICE is responsible for identifying and
eliminating vulnerabilities at our Nation's border. Our agency
seeks to prevent terrorist acts and criminal activity by
targeting the people, money, and materials that support
terrorists and criminal organizations.
The 2005 National Drug Threat Assessment produced by the
National Drug Intelligence Center [NDIC] makes it clear that
the southwest border is the center of gravity for most drugs
smuggled into the United States. Also, Mexican drug trafficking
organizations are playing a growing role in both the smuggling
into and the distribution of drugs within the United States.
Despite, or possibly as a result of successes in controlling
methamphetamine precursor chemicals in the United States and
Canada, production of methamphetamine in Mexico appears to be
increasing. ICE investigators are focused on attacking the
organizations that are responsible for the illicit movement of
people, money, and materials across our Nation's borders. All
smuggling, no matter what the commodity is involved, represents
a vulnerability to our Nation's security.
The core of ICE's contributions to the national drug effort
is our investigations which focus on attacking transportation
networks and the illicit proceeds derived from all smuggling.
Several recent investigative milestones demonstrate ICE's
successful focus on disrupting and dismantling smuggling
organizations. In November 2004 and February 2005, Gilberto and
Miguel Rodriguez Orejuela, founding members of the Cali Cartel,
were extradited to Miami from Colombia as a result of an ICE-
led investigation that is one of the longest and most
successful organized crime drug enforcement task force
investigations ever conducted. The Rodriguez Orejuela brothers
are the highest-level narcotic traffickers ever to be
extradited from Colombia to the United States. The criminal
indictments that resulted in their extradition also included
criminal forfeiture counts that target $2 billion in proceeds.
In a preemptive effort, ICE's dedicated resources to
investigating, disrupting, and dismantling those organizations
that smuggle drugs into Mexico prior to their entry into the
United States through OCDETF's Operation Panama Express, agents
from ICE, DEA, and the FBI are providing tactical intelligence
to interdictors, principally the U.S. Coast Guard. This
practice has continued to result in significant seizures of
cocaine destined to the United States through Mexico. While
Operation Panama Express is often referred to as a transit zone
operation, we also see it as an important contributor to our
southwest border effort. Every ton of bulk cocaine seized from
a go-fast boat has a force-multiplying effect by eliminating
the need to interdict that cocaine at the southwest border.
As this committee is well aware, ICE and one of our legacy
agencies, the U.S. Customs Service, has been a leader in
successfully investigating the economic proceeds of crime since
the Money Laundering Control Act was passed in 1986. Since the
creation of ICE, our financial investigations have evolved into
a systemic focus that identifies vulnerabilities that cut
across the spectrum of criminal activities.
Operation Wire Cutter is a prime example of how ICE agents
have been able to apply a systemic approach to money laundering
and work cooperatively with our foreign law enforcement
counterparts to attack methods used by criminal enterprises to
launder their illicit proceeds. Operation Wire Cutter, a 3-year
OCDETF investigation, resulted in the arrest of 41 individuals
and the seizure of $7\1/2\ million, 755 kilograms of cocaine,
6\1/2\ kilograms of heroin, and 205 pounds of marijuana. It
should also be noted that this marked the first time that a
money broker was extradited from Colombia to the United States.
The focus today on our work on the southwest border should
not be taken to minimize the smuggling threats in other areas.
On our northern border we have seen a continuing growth in the
smuggling of Canadian-produced marijuana into our country and,
in some cases, the smuggling of cocaine from the United States
into Canada. The northern border drug threat also includes
ecstasy and methamphetamine precursors such as ephedrine. ICE
and other DHS agencies have worked in partnership and with our
Canadian law enforcement partners through Integrative Border
Enforcement Teams [IBETs] to identify and attack organized
smuggling groups that operate along the northern border.
Like the border with Mexico, smuggling organizations
operating along our northern border are increasingly
sophisticated and are involved in smuggling drugs, aliens,
commercial merchandise, and currency in both directions.
In conclusion, I want to assure the subcommittee that
investigating, disrupting, and dismantling drug smuggling
organizations remains at the core of what ICE agents are
focused on in order to secure our borders in furtherance of our
Homeland Security mission. By eliminating the infrastructure
exploited by smugglers, whether they smuggle drugs, people, or
other contraband, border security is enhanced. ICE is dedicated
and committed to this mission. We look forward to working with
this committee to enhance our abilities to accomplish this
mission.
I thank you again for inviting ICE to speak with you today,
and I will be glad to answer any questions you may have at this
time.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Torres follows:]
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Mr. Souder. I thank you each for your testimony. I am--we
don't have our clock here, so I am going to start with some
questions and I will yield to Mr. Gutknecht, and when Mr.
Cummings is here, I'll yield to him as well.
I have lots of different questions, so it's hard to know
where to start. I want to make it clear to any--to all of you,
that the agents involved in the field are who we pay tribute
to. I mean any kind of criticisms we're having on
organizational structure, how best to effect this, is not
criticism of individual agents who are doing their best every
day on the front lines. And I know it's hard to pull a large
bureaucracy together, and especially multiple large
bureaucracies; and we have been unsuccessful historically and
now Congress is saying, ``faster, faster, faster.''
But Mr. Torres, with all due respect, part of my
frustration is that in your testimony you say there was an
agreement between ICE and CBP to enhance the work of both
organizations, and that prior to these guidelines there was
little or no coordination between the agencies before the
creation of DHS, which is certainly true. But what in the world
are two divisions of an agency doing negotiating an agreement?
I mean, the fundamental question here is that most Americans
thought, probably idealistically, that when we merged DHS that
there would be a joint mission, that there would be top-down
review of how to be effective. Now we are hearing there is
another review going of how to make this more effective. Not
like it is two entities negotiating as to how best to trade
information, but rather a systemic, integrated firm.
Now, my concern is not whether CBP or ICE is the better.
Absolutely, both are needed. And not only do you need a picket
fence, you need a flexible fence, in effect, that moves in both
directions beyond the border. We need detention and removal.
Some people are concerned about merging the two because we are
going to forget the historic INS function, which is, I don't
think, going to happen right now in the environment of the
United States, that suddenly we are going to forget the INS,
the legacy INS function.
What we are trying to figure out is how in the world can we
devise an agency here inside the DHS that then can work with
DEA. You have the Defense Department looking about standing up
a NORTHCOM with another intelligence center on the border with
JITF 6, the legacy JITF 6, whatever they come up with along the
border, if we have any Guard and Reserve people to train along
the border, but trying to figure out how to pull this all
together. But one of the initial steps has to be some kind of a
more effective organization inside DHS before we even get into
kind of moving the rest.
Now, let me start with a couple of questions related to the
organized smuggling enterprises. It was--and let me start with
a very particular. I mean to me, drugs have the biggest death
consequence in the United States, 20,000 minimum, 30,000 a
year. Terrorism is probably--if you take it over the last few
years, has been 3,000 to 3,300 total in the United States. But
there you have the risk of a catastrophic amount of people
losing their lives.
And then the third is our illegal immigrants; to the degree
you have murderers or others come across the United States who
aren't involved in drugs or terrorism, you have a certain risk
too. But basically a lot of these are the same people and the
same organizations. And certainly the vulnerability whether--if
you can smuggle drugs across, you can smuggle nuclear parts. If
you can smuggle people across, you can smuggle drugs or nuclear
parts there. And to some degree, there is a merging of this.
And we are looking at a number of different pieces of
legislation to look at this.
Now, let me ask a series of questions based off of yet what
seems like a nonborder issue but is directly related to, in my
opinion, a border.
In Elkhart County, IN, in my district, the prosecutor has
taken down two green card operations; in Allentown in my
district, they have taken one, because we have relatively low
unemployment and lots of illegals are coming in. We also see a
small percentage of those, but a percentage of those with
narcotics and a small percentage of those are in watch groups
in my district, all of whom come across the border somewhere in
the United States.
I also had a wedding reception the other week--and I raised
this to Director Chertoff--one lady telling me that she had
four--four people had stolen her Social Security number, and
she couldn't get a credit card because four other people had
her Social Security number. Then a doctor sat down at the same
table, whose entire group had their Social Security number
stolen and used; that, because basically if people are going to
apply for jobs, they are going to need a Social Security
number, and if they have a Social Security number with a
picture, then the employer can't do anything about it as long
as there is a Social Security card and a picture.
Now, what it suggests to me is there are fairly large
operations going on here that when I go down to the southwest
border, and no matter which of the agencies I work with,
clearly we are looking at people as they are coming in. As you
mentioned, the Coast Guard is interdicting before they get into
Central America. Once it gets into Mexico we kind of lose it;
it pops back up in the border. By then the question is, are
they going to go through with just kind of an illegal immigrant
violation at a regular border crossing, in which case we will
detain them and send them back and then they will come through
again; or if they have a criminal record, we will detain them;
or they will move in between the different areas. That as you
look at this pattern, particularly in between the different
areas--and now correct me if any of you feel this statement is
incorrect--that those who have other criminal intents or
criminal records are more likely to move through a nonport of
entry, because at a port of entry they are more likely to get
caught, to be screened and therefore detained or sent back.
So if you have a criminal record, other than illegal
immigration, the odds are you are going to move either in
eastern California, somewhere in east or west Arizona, or in so
many holes in Texas. In which case that, if that is true, do
any of you disagree with that statement that if you were a
high-risk person, probably a point of entry isn't where you are
going to head across? And that we all know and can see with the
eyes, anybody who goes to the southwest border, that these
people are not likely to walk up in groups to the desert, with
up to 100 miles across, without having some kind of vehicle
designated in advance to pick them up, that somebody is out
there waiting for them. That, furthermore, we full well know
they are directing them along the way. That--in multiple ways,
whether it be in a course of the path, whether it be where
there is water, whether it is a Blackhawk is coming and you had
better hide for a while, abandoned loads of dope that we find
because we got tipped off or heard that there were Border
Patrol vehicles up ahead. That then, when somebody picks them
up, who is renting the vans? Who is putting the ads in Central
America?
I mean, I've heard testimony at this subcommittee and over
at Homeland Security where they said it is $8,000 to $12,000 to
get a 7-day guarantee into the United States or you get your
money back--if you are from Mexico, a little more if you are
from Central America--testified from DHS from Mr. Garcia that
it was substantially higher for Middle Easterners, but around
$30,000. That that means somebody is advertising, like a travel
agency down in Central and South America; that somebody is
arranging the vans; that somebody is providing the Social
Security numbers; that somebody has probably got a job list
where they are headed.
And the question is that probably many of these same groups
are involved in multiple things. They are for-hire agencies.
To what degree do you--are you coordinating with the FBI
through OCDETF, with the DEA through their narcotics
intelligence efforts, through the ICE, through the Customs and
Border Patrol? To what degree are you looking at these systems,
which are probably doing--if 92 percent of the cocaine is
coming through these holes, what are we doing to catch that?
What are we doing with the human trafficking organizations?
In my bet, we're going to find a lot of them are the same
people financing this. And I'd appreciate some comments on
that. And do you need additional legislation, more penalties
for coyotes, more penalties for people who organize? What is
the approach of each of your agencies in looking at these
systems? And are you talking to each other about it?
Are we so stovepiped right at the border, stovepiped in
land and ICE investigations, stovepiped in DEA, stovepiped in
the FBI, that we aren't even kind of coordinating a
systematic--what I just outlined was probably a work force, an
international, a van rental that is--you know, they aren't
thinking, oh, this isn't in any jurisdiction, they are working
as an organized structure in between the borders. You don't
just randomly walk through 100 miles of desert unless you are
really stupid. And some people are, but most of them aren't.
Mr. Torres. Mr. Chairman, I would like to start responding
on behalf of ICE. I would like to give you one example of how
we are coordinating our efforts on the southwest border, and
that is with the Arizona Border Control Initiative along the
southwest border, mainly between the ports of entry on up
through the State of Arizona into Phoenix, and our precursor
operation with ICE, which was the Operation ICE Storm.
For example, we take a look at working in partnership with
the Border Patrol, with the CBP inspectors, and in many
instances with DEA and the FBI, with the level of violence that
we are seeing associated with human traffickers, human
smugglers, and drug traffickers.
Some of the results over the past year and a half--this is
an ongoing initiative that started a little over a year and a
half ago. We've interdicted over 7,000 aliens, presented over
300 defendants for prosecution for human smuggling violations,
recovered over 250 weapons. We have seen a dramatic drop in
human aliens/kidnapping-related crime from 82 percent down to
about 20 percent. And those are based on statistics from the
Maricopa County Sheriff's Department and the Arizona Police
Department.
What we do is we work hand in hand almost in a task force
environment down there, sharing intelligence and working leads
together. Whether we get a call somewhere across the country
that says there are people being held against their will in a
drop house in Arizona, we will work in concert with the FBI, if
necessary, with State and locals, to go rescue those people. In
many instances those, as you said, some of those organizations
are also moving drugs. And we are working closely with DEA, we
are working closely with Customs and Border Protection through
the Border Patrol agents to interdict and to focus on the
organizations.
ICE focuses on the investigations itself, and we take a
look at where there is displacement. When we received
intelligence that those organizations were moving outward,
either toward Las Vegas or Los Angeles International Airport,
we then focused our efforts in Los Angeles. Exactly as you were
saying, we focused on travel agencies, because those travel
agencies were bringing people into the United States or
providing some sort of money laundering operation for those
organizations. And we also had significant success in
dismantling those organizations in Los Angeles. I can't speak
on behalf of everyone at this table, but I would venture to
guess that most of them here would say that Arizona Border
Control Initiative has been very successful as an example of
how we are coordinating on the southwest border.
Mr. Placido. Chairman Souder, the Drug Enforcement
Administration takes a very systemic view of collaboration,
cooperation, at the interagency level. Let me give you just a
few examples of that.
Our foreign office in Mexico, which I recently ran, in our
office spaces are not only DEA personnel, but ICE and FBI
physically colocated and co-mingled. The El Paso Intelligence
Center since 1974 has been an interagency center designed to
bring together people at this level. Our Office of Special
Intelligence in the Special Operation Division at DEA are
interagency, and now the new OCDETF Fusion Center, all designed
to be interagency, and with the express purpose of doing
exactly what you are talking about: assuring that we collect
the right kinds of information, we maximize our efforts in
collection, and then get that information to the agency that
has primary jurisdiction for handling that matter.
I believe that what we really have is more of a problem in
execution than in strategy. We know what needs to be done; I
think that we just need to do this more fluidly and to really
recognize that this is an order of magnitude problem; that the
flow of drugs, chemicals, and other transnational crime coming
across that border is enormous. And the level of cooperation
that is required to combat it, given the resource constraints
that we have, particularly outside the United States, has to be
really maximized and optimized to get to the place that we all
want to be.
Thank you.
Mr. Passic. Just one short comment. We have the luxury of
being outside the cat-fight domain of the investigators and the
intel community, and that is where the rub comes in the Federal
drug war. And we are lucky in that we can sit down and we can
talk to ICE and DEA and the interdiction community about just
doing a better job. They don't have to worry about us competing
or having that overlapping jurisdictional problem that the rest
of the guys have to work with. So we do need that information
that you talked about, though, because when we pick up
somebody, especially at those inspection points inland, about
the only thing we can count on is a thumbprint. And we are
hoping that the OCDETF Drug Fusion Center, combining 32 Federal
databases, not just drug information, but all criminal data is
going to be in there to include identification of subjects. We
want to figure out a way to plug into that. We want to be able
to have our license plate readers not only on our points of
entry, but also in those inland inspections, automatically
query all of those databases so we know who we have and we can
make an apprehension and a detention.
Because the bottom line is, on that border we have to
have--there has to be some threat of arrest and incarceration.
There has to be some deterrence that has to be built into it.
The catch-and-release policy doesn't work very well, and we
recognize that. And we need that intelligence, we need more
prosecutors and investigators to do that.
Mr. Souder. Thank you. I will ask some probably written
detailed followup. And we may have to do something in
particular on the Arizona Border Initiative.
I asked Commissioner Bonner from the committee how many
people extra came through in Texas and California, because, for
example, I was there during--at the time of the Arizona Border
Initiative, and know that Texas was more or less stripped of
resources, as was much of California in the sense of
helicopters, planes, many agents; that also the numbers that
were--the number of people detained on the border daily across
that have been given to us by CBP didn't totally change much,
it just switched to Arizona.
That suggests there may have been a counter movement if you
don't have enough people on it. And I want to pursue that a
little bit more, because the third thing with that is what
actually happened to the people who we arrested, and did we in
fact get any of the systems? But we will followup more with
some written questions.
I yield to Mr. Cummings.
Mr. Cummings. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I am glad
you are holding this hearing this afternoon. And I apologize to
our witnesses. Ms. Norton and I were meeting with the Secretary
of State, Ms. Rice, and we ran a little bit over.
But again I thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this
important hearing to examine the efforts by the Department of
Homeland Security and the Drug Enforcement Administration to
address the narcotics smuggling as one among many serious
threats to Homeland Security both in northern and southern U.S.
borders.
Our outlook on border security has changed substantially
since the attacks of September 11th, as the independent
bipartisan National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the
United States noted in its July 2004 report on the September
11th terrorist attacks. And they said: In the decade before
September 11, 2001, border security encompassing travel, entry,
and immigration was not seen as a national security matter.
Public figures voiced concern about the war on drugs, the right
level and height of immigration problems along the southwest
border, immigration crises originating in the Caribbean and
elsewhere, and the growing criminal traffic in humans.
The immigration system as a whole was widely viewed as
increasingly dysfunctional and badly in need of reform. In
national security circles, however, only smuggling of weapons
of mass destruction carried weight, not the entry of terrorists
who might use such weapons or the presence of associated
foreign-born terrorists.
That is from their report, the 9/11 Commission.
Our heightened attention to terrorism and different
terrorist methods do not change the fact that some 20,000
Americans die as a result of drug abuse every year, nearly
seven times the number of lives lost on September 11th. It is
therefore critical that we not lose our focus on drugs when it
comes to protecting America's borders, and Congress has taken
steps to ensure that this does not happen.
To ensure that the attention to the counternarcotics
mission would not take a back seat to other priorities within
the component agencies of the new Department of Homeland
Security, Congress specifically provided that the Department's
primary mission would include the responsibility to monitor
connections between illegal drug trafficking and terrorism,
coordinate efforts to sever such connections, and otherwise
contribute to efforts to interdict illegal drug trafficking.
Congress has since established within DHS the Office of
Counternarcotics Enforcement to ensure a high profile for the
counterdrug mission within DHS and to facilitate coordination
of counterdrug intelligence among DHS component agencies and
between DHS agencies and outside governmental agencies.
Unfortunately, the President's fiscal year 2006 budget
request chooses not to fund DHS Counternarcotics Enforcement
Office. This is simply unacceptable in light of the threat that
illegal drugs pose and the fact that DHS is the lead Cabinet-
level agency for providing drug enforcement along our Nation's
borders.
According to the National Drug Intelligence Center's
National Drug Threat Assessment for 2005, the southwest border
States are primary points of entry for major illicit drug
threats such as Colombian and Peruvian cocaine, South American
and Mexican heroin, Mexican methamphetamine, and Mexican and
Colombian marijuana. The northern border States are primary
entry points for Canadian marijuana, southeastern heroin, and
ecstasy.
Given this reality, it is imperative that DHS component
agencies cooperate fully with each other and with DEA and other
sources of operational and intelligence support to interdict
drugs both at the borders and before they reach our borders and
shores in the transit zone.
Our witnesses hopefully will provide information along
those lines.
[The prepared statement of Hon. Elijah E. Cummings
follows:]
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Mr. Cummings. And to that end, Mr. Chairman, if I still
have a moment, I just want to go to Mr. Utley and just ask you
one quick question and then I know my time is probably up.
I am just wondering what kind of message, Mr. Utley, do you
think it sends when the President fails to include money in his
budget for your office, for what you are doing?
Admiral Utley. Well, the 2006 budget included $1.82 million
for the office that has been carved out to the chief of staff's
office. And I do have complete freedom with that. And it has
not--the working under the chief of staff's--well, under the
auspices of the chief of staff has not proven to be negative in
any way.
Mr. Cummings. I don't know if you know it, but it was the
legislation of this subcommittee, and in particular Mr. Souder
and the ranking member, myself, that created your position. And
we have been very concerned that position has not had the oomph
that we had intended it to have. As a matter of fact, when your
predecessor testified before us, I almost vomited to know how
weak the position was. And I just wanted to know where we are
today. I mean, you feel pretty good about it? Do you feel like
you are having some impact? Do people listen to you?
Admiral Utley. Oh, absolutely. As a matter of fact, I mean,
I meet with Commissioner Bonner and Mr. Garcia and the
Commandant of the Coast Guard on a monthly basis, and we
discuss all of these things. I have absolute access to these
individuals to talk about coordination and how we can make
things better, and I have access to the Secretary as well.
Mr. Cummings. The other week we had some testimony, I guess
maybe about a month ago, before our subcommittee about the
southwest border. And they made it sound like you could come
through--that the southwest border had holes like Swiss cheese.
And they talked about--what is the name of that group, the
group of, the--yeah, the Minutemen, the Minutemen. Them. And
they talked about, they provided some very interesting
testimony. And they made it sound like people were like coming
over the border in droves. And, you know, you can't help but
think as I listen to them, and we kind of hit on it in that
hearing, what they might be bringing with them and how porous
that border is with regard to drugs. And I was just wondering,
do you all see that as a major point of entry? And you all may
have testified to this already.
Admiral Utley. Well, generally, the conventional wisdom is
that cocaine comes through the ports of entry and marijuana
comes through between the ports of entry. I mean, that is
certainly not exclusive, but that's generally what it is. And
if you--I had the opportunity to follow the chairman on his
trip to the southwest borders. I have laid eyes on that
southwest border, and I understand how difficult that is to
maintain the line, as they say, in the Border Patrol.
Mr. Cummings. Did you think we need more Border Patrol?
Admiral Utley. I think that the system of people,
infrastructure and technology is really the answer. And I think
that you probably talked to Chief Aguilar about that. And you
can't do one without the other. The answer is not green
shoulders, shoulder to shoulder across the line, I think it has
to be a holistic approach, and to include U.S. Attorneys, bed
space, things like that.
Mr. Cummings. Do you all think there are enough resources
down there? I'm talking about the southwest border. This is the
Congress, we're supposed to be allocating money. I'm just
curious.
Admiral Utley. Well, the President's budget asked for more
Border Patrol agents, so there are more resources going there.
And also, there is the America Shield Initiative, which has
support from the administration, that will bring this
technology to the southwest borders. Once again, it is not just
people, it's a combination.
Mr. Cummings. You realize we had legislation not very long
ago, an amendment to try to bring more members of the Border
Patrol and it was voted down by the Congress. Do you realize
that?
Admiral Utley. Yes, I do.
Mr. Cummings. Were you disappointed about that?
Admiral Utley. Well, like you said, it has to be a holistic
approach. In other words, it has to have a holistic approach
across the entire border. It's not just people.
Mr. Cummings. I got that piece. I'm asking you were you
disappointed about the fact that the Congress voted down more
members of the Border Patrol that would have been patrolling
that southwest border that you're talking about? You're our
guy, you're our guy in this operation. So I'm asking our guy,
the one whose position we created, were you disappointed? And I
realize there are other things that have to be done, but right
now I'm dealing by the way with this piece.
Admiral Utley. Well, anything that takes away with more on
the southwest border is, of course, disappointing.
Mr. Cummings. And so do you need more resources--I got that
piece, do you--I'm almost finished. Do you need more resources
with regard to this other piece that you talked about? You said
there are more pieces than just people, which I do agree. Do
you have the resources you need for that, for the other pieces?
Admiral Utley. It has not been fully developed yet. This is
one of these things almost like the analogy--any great
procurement, in other words, you come with an idea of what you
would like to have, set of requirements, but you don't know
what all the hardware is and what the best way to do it is. And
we are not far enough along to have that information and
present to Congress and say, this is what we need precisely. Do
you see what I'm saying?
Mr. Cummings. Yes. And so I take it that all of you must be
a little concerned, particularly after September 11th--or
greatly concerned about--I'm just talking about the southwest
border, I'll talk about the other one when I get to another
round on it, I guess--about the fact that this border is as
porous as it is. Is there anybody that feels comfortable that
it's OK?
Mr. Passic. Greg Passic from Customs and Border Protection.
Commissioner Barner, I believe, addressed our personnel
needs at the full committee hearing, but I know that we have
presented a package which is being looked at now by principals
in our Department and they're trying to figure out how to fit
that together. And I would be happy to get back to you about
how that is progressing and what enhancements we've asked for.
Mr. Cummings. What about you, Mr. Torres? I was asking, do
you, I take it, any of you all satisfied with the southwest
border at all? Do you feel comfortable with it?
Mr. Torres. Actually, we're looking at the southwest border
now to develop new ideas and innovative ways of addressing the
threat, whether it is the human smuggling threat or whether
it's the drug smuggling threat or whether it's an immigration
threat, so that we can leverage all resources, not just the ICE
resources, but resources within the Department and from State
and locals.
So if your specific question is, am I comfortable with the
southwest border? I would like to see more on the southwest
border, and that's why we're taking a look at different
opportunities to see how we can address that.
Mr. Cummings. Do you have a timetable?
Mr. Torres. Actually, the Department of Homeland Security
and ICE is participating in a southwest border strategy effort;
that's ongoing, I don't have a specific timetable for you.
Mr. Cummings. All right. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Souder. Thank you. I think the record needs to show
there is no budget item for your office. What you were
referring to was the fact that inside the administrative budget
of the agency, that you're inside the chief of staff and your
internal budgeting, they intend to spend $1.2 million.
Admiral Utley. That is correct.
Mr. Souder. But the budget is something that puts the
President's stamp of approval, it then gets locked by the
appropriations process. And in fact, when we went to the
Homeland Security debate, as we tried to formalize that in the
budget, the administration opposed that aggressively with
Chairman Rogers, he said he would continue to negotiate
through. And in fact, this office continues to be not funded in
the budget, but funded at the discretion of the chief of staff
and his internal budgeting, which is different than a Federal
budget that acknowledges that the office is there.
Admiral Utley. That's exactly right.
Mr. Souder. Also, I think it's important to note, because I
misspoke earlier and you clarified, that while most, other than
immigration, most illegal activity is concentrated between the
ports of entry, that is not true for the larger loads going
through trucks, tunnels and trains, which Mr. Placido, you had
in your detailed testimony where you talked about the cocaine.
Is it not true that most cocaine and precursors to
methamphetamines and others are moving in larger loads,
probably not on the backs of individuals or between the
borders, but rather through more major transit things? Not
through the human port of entry or even in between the borders
as much; you're seeing more of that in the tunnels, the trains
and mostly trucks. And Mr. Passic can maybe talk about that,
too.
Mr. Placido. Yes. It is a little more complex than that.
One of the things that we're all challenged with as we look at
drug seizures, particularly cocaine seizures that are seized in
transit. And we will see in a typical go-fast operation, the
seizure will be in metric tons, on a fishing vessel 5 tons, but
we know that the average seizures along the southwest border
are 50 to 100 kilos at that time. And so what happens is those
large loads are moving into Mexico, they're being staged. And
our adversary is very sophisticated and they're playing the law
of averages. They take very large loads into Mexico, break them
down and run them across. And we're fighting a veritable ant
army, if you will, as they cross and then it is reconsolidated
again for movement throughout the United States. So it is a
very sophisticated adversary that we're up against, sir.
Mr. Souder. Mr. Passic, Mr. Placido, in his testimony, said
there were like 40 tunnels. And these tunnels are amazing. They
often go from one company to another company across the border.
When you take one of those down, can you give an idea of the
scale of the volume that you're getting as opposed to when you
take down the individuals or even individuals who split up who
are bringing the loads across?
Mr. Passic. It goes back to the issue of intelligence and
investigations, why we are looking for our buddies here to help
us out there.
You need to develop intelligence on both sides of the
border, both in the staging areas and also where is the dope
going once it comes through, that's why controlled deliveries
are so important. I can't really tell you the magnitude or
percentage of drugs that comes through the tunnels, it is
significant.
Mr. Souder. But like when you get a case, it's not a kilo,
it's tons.
Mr. Passic. Yes. But you often only get the person that is
coming through the tunnel at that time. You don't get what went
through before, but we recognize that.
We will also agree that with cocaine and heroin shipments,
mostly from Colombia, we're looking at the ports of entry, at
vehicles coming through. Border Patrol is mostly marijuana
seizures.
Mr. Souder. Mr. Ruppersberger.
Mr. Ruppersberger. Sure. We sit here on a regular basis and
hear testimony, and I want to thank you all for what you do.
But it's very frustrating to look at how we put the drug
interdiction enforcement as a priority in this country.
We, right now in Iraq and Afghanistan, have some of our
best intelligence officers. We have joint task force working
together, Army, Navy, Marines, whatever, all coming together
and intel is a very strong component. We have right now in the
United States dealing with the issue of terrorism, the Joint
Terrorism Task Force that has the FBI, CIA, NSA, I think
Customs, Immigration, I believe DIA all working in the area of
terrorist threats, as we should. But then you look at what's
happened with respect to drugs; 85 percent, I think, of all
violent crime in the United States is drug related.
And what I see in my travels, and I just got back from
South America, but when I was in Chiang Mai and Thailand, I saw
there are very few DEA agents left. I see that the budgets are
getting lower and lower, and that we have not made the war on
drugs the same priority as we're making the war in Iraq and
Afghanistan. And I think this is a big mistake because they
both should be high priorities.
Now, when I just came back last week from Bogota, Colombia,
you see where the drugs are coming from. I think the leadership
there and the president is very courageous in that he is
telling the narcos and the FARK that we're going after you, we
have a drug program where they are either spraying or literally
pulling the coca plants out of the ground, and then getting the
people in poverty that are picking the plants and having them
plant something else. And I don't see that priority here.
I think one of my biggest concerns that I want to express
here today is about our intelligence capabilities regarding the
trafficking of drugs. Once they leave Mexico and Central
America and are on the way to us, the United States, I believe
there is a hole in our intelligence network that must be
closed, and I hope that additional cooperation between the
agencies--Mr. Passic, you mentioned today a couple of times
about how you would want to receive more intelligence. You
know, if you took some of the same resources and you put all
the disciplines that we have, you put the CIA, NSA, DEA, FBI,
Customs, Immigration, you put those resources, and you put them
in Mexico as an example and get the intelligence that's
necessary, we could make a difference. Right now, right now we,
I believe--and correct me if I am wrong--85 percent of all the
cocaine and most heroin is coming from Colombia is going
through Mexico, and you all are out there trying to do the best
you can, trying to talk about your strike forces and everything
else, and I need to know what your resources are. You can't sit
here, I guess, because you represent a certain agency and ask
for more money, but we're sitting here looking at what you're
doing and you're not getting the resources.
Now Mr. Passic, first thing, what type of intelligence
would you want to see? What do you need to help you do your job
in a better way?
Mr. Passic. Since you asked the question----
Mr. Ruppersberger. And I'd like the answer.
Mr. Passic. I'd like to try to give you the straight answer
here.
Drug intelligence is very fragmented, we're all responsible
for that, law enforcement, Congress, we all kind of watched it
go into 32 separate databases over the 25, 30 years I've been
here. One of the best things that happened to drug intelligence
after September 11th--and this was a congressional initiative,
Congress came up with this and gave law enforcement, the OCEDEF
program, $25 million to startup infusion of drug intelligence,
to take those 32 separate pots of intel and put them together
in a super computer. That includes not only the drug
intelligence, but it includes financial intelligence from
Treasury, it includes a lot of intelligence that we've been
collecting at great expense to the taxpayer over the last 30
years that we've never exploited or used correctly. I think
that was a step that Congress took that forced us to react to
it, I think it was a good step. I think the community needs to
continue to support that because if we can make this work, if
we can get in there and we can have one-stop shopping at some
place that has all of that intelligence with one query, not
having to hit 32 different databases, that's a major step
forward.
Mr. Ruppersberger. Let me ask you another issue, too--and
maybe anybody can answer this. Part of the reason I think
Mexico traffickers are doing so well in Mexico is because it's
a safe haven for them. It's because the corruption that
probably exists in certain arenas allows them to exist or it
wouldn't be there. What do we need to do to deal with the issue
of corruption from your opinion, anybody on the panel that has
the answer. Is it political, is it police, military? I mean,
it's multifaceted, and if we don't start focusing,
prioritizing, it's never going to stop. And it seems to me the
same people that are taking illegals over the border, taking
the drugs over the border, sure enough are taking al Qaeda
cells over the border, also.
Mr. Placido. Yes, sir. In one my former assignments between
2000 and 2002 I served as DEA's regional director for the
Mexico Central America Division. And I can tell you that under
the Fox administration during the last 5 years, we have seen an
amazing turnaround. We have probably had more success in terms
of disrupting and dismantling organizations in Mexico in the
last 5 years than we have in the last 50, but it's really a
drop in the bucket compared to what needs to happen.
You mentioned Mexico is a safe haven, and it is. Things
that we take for granted here in the United States, we talk
about forming task forces and relying on State and local and
tribal law enforcement to assist Federal authorities. In
Mexico, law enforcement frequently is not a source of
assistance; they are the criminal adversaries that we face,
they're the hired guns of the narcotic traffickers.
Mr. Ruppersberger. OK. So how do we deal with this? And
let's talk solutions.
Mr. Placido. Yes, sir. One of the things we have done with
great effect is our vetted unit initiative. We have pulled
together groups of police officers in Mexico, and the successes
that we have had are a direct result of this, who are given a
very rigorous background examination, polygraph examination,
urinalysis, and when they pass through that process, we end up
giving them specialized training and the tools to work with.
And these form the basis of our international cooperation; this
is the vehicle through which we're able to share very sensitive
information and advance U.S. interests.
But the problem is, on an order of magnitude, these are
very small units, and we can advance on a case-specific base--
--
Mr. Ruppersberger. Doesn't it have to start at the very
top, the president? Let's take an example of something that
works because you want to look at what works.
I was very impressed last week in Bogota, Colombia and we
met with the president and the head of narcotics. And it seems
to me that the United States and Colombia have done an
excellent job in removing the corruption and getting the right
people, creating a patriotic atmosphere for the Colombians. And
that the generals and the people involved in narcotics have
basically moved out with our help, the United States, a lot of
the corrupt people, and now they're able to do things they've
never done before. And I don't see that same type of situation
in Mexico. Do you agree with that or not?
Mr. Placido. It's difficult to say. I'll offer a personal
opinion here, and I have spent extensive time in both
countries.
I think the fundamental difference between Colombia and
Mexico is that the Colombians themselves have viewed the
narcotics problem as the engine fueling huge domestic problems
for themselves. They've made an internal decision to change. I
don't think that as a nation, Mexico is there yet.
Mr. Ruppersberger. And that means it starts at the top, and
it is part of our pressure, too.
One question that I have, Mr. Chairman, and I'll stop. What
resources do we need to start dealing with the issue in Mexico?
Is it money, is it our leadership putting the pressure on the
leadership in Mexico? I mean, bottom line, I think more and
more with Colombia's eradication, they're not going to ever
stop it, but they're moving somewhere. Do you agree that 85
percent of our cocaine comes from Mexico right now?
Mr. Placido. The official statistic, sir, has just gone
from 77 percent to 92.
Mr. Ruppersberger. There you go, it's even more. And how
about the heroin, at least 90 from the east coast, Mississippi
River east?
Mr. Placido. It's a significant amount.
Mr. Ruppersberger. If you were the President of the United
States and you knew, based on your background, tell me what you
need, the resources, to deal with corruption, to deal with this
problem in Mexico. Because then when it gets to our streets and
we have our police officers out there working and trying to
stop it and catch people, you take down one, two more come up.
Mr. Placido. Well, clearly, as an official of the
administration, I support the President's budget----
Mr. Ruppersberger. We're not asking about that, you covered
yourself there.
Mr. Placido. I understand. What I can tell you is that
there are great efficiencies that can be had from using the
resources that we already have at our disposal to greater
effect. And I think that we're seeing the beginnings of that
right now. I am very encouraged by some of the steps that were
taken immediately prior to this hearing to try and leverage
increased deficiencies from the resources we do have. I am not
prepared to sit here and tell you that we wouldn't like more
resources. The magnitude of the problem that we face from
Mexico is enormous.
Mr. Ruppersberger. I'm glad you gave that answer and you
covered the President, and whatever. Bottom line, the war
against drugs is hurting more Americans than the war right now
in Iraq and Afghanistan, and we have not put the resources in,
the budgetary money isn't there, and we haven't stepped up what
we need to do. And I would hope that a hearing like this will
at least come out with some solutions so that we, as Members of
Congress, can work in a bipartisan way with the administration
to make sure that they identify this is a serious problem, and
what we're doing now isn't going to solve it.
Mr. Cummings. Just 1 second. You just said something that I
just want to know what you meant by it. You said you were
pleased with the things that happened just before this hearing.
I just want you to clear that up, I don't know what that means.
Mr. Placido. Yes, sir. In the weeks leading up to this
hearing, and not because of this hearing, DEA has held a series
of meetings on what we're calling our Worldwide Drug Flow
Disruption Strategy. We met with ICE, CBP, Coast Guard the
intelligence community to try to pull together a strategy to
try and degrade our adversary's capability to get drugs to the
border. So that's very encouraging.
About a week prior to the meeting, Mr. Passic and I met,
and there currently are no CPB officials at EPIC, for example,
they weren't there before the reorganization, but we're working
together integrating CBP into EPIC and to bring them into the
OCEDEF fusion center. So there are some initiatives that are
underway right now that we're very optimistic are having to
bear fruit and really help bring greater efficiency than the
resources we already have, sir.
Mr. Souder. If I can followup one more on this with a
question from Mr. Ruppersberger on the fusion center. Mr.
Passic, given what I just heard from Mr. Placido, I take it
your office is looking at joining the fusion center, your
agency, CBP?
Mr. Passic. Yes, that is correct.
Mr. Souder. Mr. Torres, has ICE agreed to submit their data
to the fusion center?
Mr. Torres. That is actually being reviewed practically at
the cabinet level, looking at the different legal hurdles that
we have in submitting all our data that is in our system right
now. A couple of issues, one has to do with asylum data in our
immigration basis, and the other with a proprietary commercial
business administration that is owned actually by the companies
out there. So we're looking at those right now.
Mr. Souder. If those issues prove to be stumbling blocks,
couldn't most of the information be isolated from that? In
other words, rather than legal issues, block submitting case
management data as a whole going in, rather than isolate out
some?
Mr. Torres. I would have to get back with our technical
experts on that and give you an answer.
Mr. Souder. Because it doesn't do us any good to do fusion
centers if the other agencies don't fuse.
Mr. McHenry.
Mr. McHenry. I will defer at this moment.
Mr. Souder. Thank you. Ms. Norton.
Ms. Norton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think what you're
hearing from the committee in part reflects the fact that after
September 11th, there was some reason to believe that the
terrorist threat, in and of itself, would raise the priority
for effective ways to deal with drug trafficking on the one
hand, on the trafficking side and on the demand side, and I
think there is real disappointment that this has not happened.
It's easy enough to recognize that drug traffickers and
people just crossing the border would take the same routes. I'd
like to raise it to the next step, because if it's easy enough
for terrorists to figure out, as Mr. Souder said, why bother to
come in legally? I mean, isn't it kind of silly to bother to
come in legally if there are so many entryways, illegal
entryways that are so easy to manage, even for amateurs. And
these are people that tend to get to be professionals in what
they are doing rather quickly, whether it's flying a plane or
figuring out the best route across the border.
The next step, of course, is to figure out, if it's so easy
to cross the border, look at how easy it is to make money
trafficking in drugs. Boy, they've shut down al Qaeda and
perhaps done an effective job, as we understand, shutting down
the money routes, the known money routes.
A lot of folks, also amateurs, are making a lot of money
smuggling drugs, I mean, millions upon millions. So I'm
interested in specific connections between drug smuggling, drug
trafficking and terrorists. And not only terrorists themselves,
but again, you really don't have to be one of these rather able
terrorists, and they have shown themselves to have some
strategic ability, to figure out that--you might not even have
to get in the business yourself--there are already plenty of
folks who smuggle--to establish connections between those
folks, the same folks, by the way, so that one doesn't have to
look at nationality--but the same folks might be an even better
way, since the one thing that turns out to be fairly easy to do
is to get drugs across the border and to find people willing to
take risks to do so.
So my question is, to what extent are terrorists used in
the drug smuggling business? Have they yet found their way--God
knows I can't believe they won't, at some point--have they yet
found their way into the business, either directly, or using
the many agents they could find who are already in the
business, and to what extent is this occurring, and to what
extent do you know anything about whether it's occurring?
Admiral Utley. Well, part of the mandate that was set up by
this committee was to track a connection between terrorist and
counternarcotics, I'll tell you what I'm doing. First of all,
we have not found a direct connection by terrorist
organizations using counternarcotics to bring anything in the
United States. Now, of the CPOC targets, the consolidated
priority drug trafficking targets, 18 of those have a
connection, even if it is peripherally and it's outside of your
borders.
Now, what have we done to energize this? I've asked ENDIC,
and they are providing a study right now to determine in depth
what the association would be.
I have also energized the National Counterterrorism Center
to look at this as well, and the JTTF precisely with that. And
I have set up a division within the organization that I have
that is precisely looking at tracking, and if a connection is
found, severing a connection between drugs and terrorist.
So it's not--we've got an eye on it, I guess, and we've
engaged the right people in the intelligence community to take
a look at just exactly what you are asking.
Ms. Norton. One of the great criticisms of our intelligence
was that we didn't have human intelligence, we didn't have
people on the ground, we didn't have people trained in the
language and so forth. Well, you know I think we do have the
capability to have human intelligence, people who speak
Spanish. And it does seem to me pretty clear that unless one is
engaged in human intelligence, one cannot possibly know if this
is happening or be able to stop it before it becomes a real
phenomenon.
And again, I stress that if the whole point after September
is to be forehanded, the only question is, when will somebody
figure out that this is a fairly easy way to do it? So my
question is, do you believe that human intelligence should be
used? Is human intelligence being used on the other side of the
border, whether for straight out drug trafficking or for
finding these connections?
Mr. Placido. Yes, ma'am. A direct response to your
question, and with the support of this committee and the
Congress, the DEA operates approximately 80 offices in 63
countries around the world. About 10 percent of our work force
is overseas, and about a fifth of DEA's 5,000 informants that
are active at any given time are based outside of the United
States. So we are actively recruiting human source intelligence
around the globe.
And increasingly----
Ms. Norton. How about in Mexico and the Caribbean, in these
countries that are the most direct importers, Colombia--the
most direct importers to the United States? Do we have human
intelligence helping us to, on the ground, to figure out what
is happening?
Mr. Placido. Yes, ma'am. We do, in fact, have human
intelligence. The largest DEA presence outside the United
States is in Latin America, specifically in Mexico and
Colombia. And increasingly, we are working with our
counterparts in the intelligence community--DEA has made a move
to rejoin the intelligence community--to make sure when we are
debriefing sources about drug trafficking, that we're also
asking additional questions about terrorism. We're not trying
to expand our mandate, we are the only single mission agency in
the government dealing with drugs, but by taking 5 minutes
extra during a debriefing, we can ask additional questions and
get that information to the agencies that do have primary
jurisdiction for terrorism.
What I can tell you is that the interagency assessment of
the use of drug trafficking to fund terrorism, the assessment
is that the connection between drugs and terror is, quote,
infrequent and opportunistic, with the exception of the FARC
and the AUC in Colombia, and, to a lesser extent, also in Peru.
However, we're very concerned and we're trying to develop a
sense of warnings and indicators that would alert us to any
change as this develops.
Clearly we are very much dialed in to the possibility of
the southwest border being used as a route to move either
people or weapons of mass destruction into the country. It is,
however, counterintuitive to think that drug traffickers would
intentionally go into the WMD or terrorist business, as that
would likely invoke a response that would cut into their
profits. But we know that people don't always operate in
logical ways, and there are indicators, certain key
extraditions, arrests, murders must force certain traffickers
to operate in ways that are illogical.
In addition, we frequently see cover loads; there are
different rates to smuggle heroin and cocaine, and they will
commingle to try and get a better break on smuggling certain
commodities in. Substitute anthrax for heroin, and you can
unintentionally smuggle WMD into the country. It is a point of
real concern. And I think if one thing has changed since
September 11th, it's that while we don't want drugs to continue
to flow across our borders, we don't want any weapons of mass
destruction or terrorists. We've got a zero tolerance level.
Ms. Norton. Mr. Chairman----
Mr. Souder. Ms. Norton, can I followup with----
Ms. Norton. Yes.
Mr. Souder. Directly on the Mexico question. In the States
immediately crossing the U.S. border, DEA had pulled out from
some because of the danger to agents. Are you back in on most
of those across the border? What is our current status direct
along the border, as opposed to Mexico City and more inland?
Mr. Passic. Every office that we have along the border,
there are currently three, is back at its normal staffing
level. Periodically, the threat level has peaked and we've
moved people out. That has typically been for a couple of weeks
at a time when there is a specific threat. But more
importantly, I'd be glad to take you off line, some recent
developments in Mexico. They are very optimistic as far as
future cooperation. I just made some promises not to discuss
them in public at this point.
Mr. Souder. With that caveat, do you believe there has also
been progress made in the Cancun area in Yucatan Peninsula,
which also had great chaos?
Mr. Placido. That continues to be a major staging area for
drugs coming into the country. You will recall in, I believe,
2001 the former Governor of Quintana Roo, the State in which
Cancun is located, was arrested. He was involved in very high
level corruption for the Carrillo Fuentes organization
facilitating the flow of drugs into that area. That part of the
country still remains a very significant port of entry for
drugs that are coming from South America and being staged in
Mexico.
Ms. Norton. Mr. Chairman, I had no more questions. I do
want to say that you don't need to be an ordinary smuggler and
decide to go into WMD business, the weapons of mass destruction
business. I mean, these smugglers deal through intermediaries
so that nobody knows who is working for whom. And to the extent
that somebody gets a cut of somebody's business, the only way--
and gets into their business--they don't have to know it, which
goes back to my point about the only way you're going to know
it is it will be people on the ground, I mean, human
intelligence on the ground who will ferret out those
connections--I hope I don't sound like some movie that I
recently saw, because that is not what I had in mind.
But Mr. Chairman, I must say that I believe that, leave
aside terrorism and the need for human intelligence, I cannot
help but believe we would be doing a much better job in
combating trafficking of drugs, period, if we had more human
intelligence. But I have no sense of how much, how deeply it is
used, how much it is used. And I was pleased to hear what you
said.
But it just seems to me that, with what we believe human
intelligence can do, that if it were really being widely used
in the trafficking business, that we would have a much better
chance at knocking out large operators than we seem to be able
to do.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Ms. Watson. Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Souder. Thank you, Ms. Watson.
Ms. Watson. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate
your sensitivity to the issues that you have been bringing up
in our subcommittee.
And one element that seems to me completely missing from
this discussion is the role of the State Department in our
diplomatic service. And I don't think there is anyone here on
the panel that represents those areas, but let me just say this
and get it off my chest.
If we were truly to shut off this avenue and better secure
our southern border, we must do more to engage the Mexican
government and support them in efforts to improve the
administration of justice in our country. The combination of
Justice, Homeland Security and the State Department will send a
resolute and unified message to the drug cartel. It will also
cover all the different aspects of government necessary to
combat illicit drugs. But what really comes to mind is supply
and demand. Nations and States are financing their budget
through the sale of these illicit drugs. Now let me give you a
case in point and bring it closer to home.
I represent an area in southern California. It is very
simple for terrorists who are people who come over from Mexico
and fit the profile of what a person from Mexico should look
like. And there is no question in my mind that they're not
residing right in Los Angeles today.
I found a gun shop in my district that has been operational
for 15 years selling guns to foreign governments, to the
military, to the police. We've been trying to close it down.
They're out of compliance. So Mr. Torres, I called ATF and U.S.
Customs. I also put an amendment in the gang bill to increase
Border Patrol, to increase agents, because the word back to me
is we don't have enough people in the field to investigate and
to move any quicker.
So this hearing, Mr. Chairman, and the way it was written
it says to examine cooperation among agencies. Unless we can
all start working together, we're never going to--and have
enough staff, personnel out there--we're never going to get a
handle. Because as I look at the numbers there, and that's, I
guess, the amount that they were able to collect, think about
the drugs that come over the border, carried by ponies that
they can't touch. And I believe somebody sitting on the 40th
floor of corporate America is in cahoots because this is all
driven by money.
Now here is my question to anyone that wants to answer. How
can we get all of the agencies involved to cooperate? When I
give a call to ATF, to Customs, I want immediate turnaround
because I'm talking about something I know and see all the
time. The way it came to my attention was that there was a
demonstration by gangs in front of this shop. I wouldn't be
surprised if narcotics are moving in and out of there. And I
can't get anyone to really take action. And so they smuggle
over the border because there is a tremendous demand. I can't
get the police to investigate, I had the mayor out, I had the
councilman out and so on, but I can't get these agencies moving
because it's not a top priority.
So if we're looking at terrorism and the means to bring it
about, weapons of mass destruction, we need to look at a better
way that we cooperate among agencies, and when we give you a
tip, that you cooperate with us.
Mr. Torres, can you tell me why it has taken so much time
for U.S. Customs to get the guy out because he doesn't conform
to the local ordinances, and they tell me he has to break down
his weapons in a certain way? And I know the gang members know
how to put a gun at his head and say give us every weapon you
can. And the murders that go on in my district go on because
somebody cut the deal and didn't hold up their end of the
bargain in terms of drugs. So how can we cooperate, get you to
cooperate with other agencies?
Mr. Torres. I would be more than happy to meet with you to
get the specifics of the case so that we can refer that to our
office.
Ms. Watson. Please do. I mean, I've been on the phone since
March 5th.
Mr. Torres. And regarding the gangs, I can assure you the
gang enforcement is a top priority for us, as is narcotics
trafficking and human smuggling. So if there are violations----
Ms. Watson. We can't even close the violators down in my
district, can't even close him down.
Mr. Torres. We would definitely like to work with you and
get that information.
Ms. Watson. I'll see you outside the door.
Mr. Torres. Very well.
Mr. Souder. Any further questions?
Ms. Watson. No.
Mr. Souder. I wanted to followup on the border strategy
question, because one of the fundamental things is to try to
get a comprehensive border strategy. I wanted to ask Mr. Passic
and Mr. Torres whether the Border and Transportation Security
Directorate approve of your efforts to develop a border
strategy, or is it being blocked? Is it moving ahead? I believe
that Mr. Passic said you thought something was moving, and
hopefully in a couple of weeks. Are you feeling resistance in
the Department? What is taking so long?
Mr. Passic. No. I think when we initially were asked to
participate in this thing, we thought it was a great
opportunity. We want to turn those seizures, those numbers into
a gear that fits into a machine that impacts pain on
traffickers. And we saw this as a great opportunity to build in
an engine that included all of us instead of seven or eight
different engines puttering around as we often do. So we did
what you did; we went down to the border, we took a look at all
the operations, we came up with 11 action items that we thought
we could do a better job to include working with the Mexicans
on flights landing short of the border. And we put that list of
things we thought we could contribute on the plate of BTS with
our colleagues from ICE. And from what I understand one of the
holdups is, other elements have said geez, we'd like to throw a
couple of our ideas on that thing, too, to make it even more
meaningful. So from what I've heard, that's the hangup.
Admiral Utley can probably jump in there.
Admiral Utley. Basically this is an administration-driven
issue. The NSC, in conjunction with ONDCP, chairs an
international drug control policy coordinating committee, the
PCC. The administration, at the highest level, as in the
President, said we've got to get a handle on the southwest
border. The fact that there is as much narcotics coming through
here as they are indicates that it is pretty porous, and what
does it say for our controlling border?
Mr. Souder. They just discovered this the last month, or
the last 3 months ago or 10 years ago? With all due respect.
Admiral Utley. It was passed through the PCC to do this
perhaps the latter part of last year, latter part of last year.
And it came to be that the rose is pinned on BTS through CBP,
because that's who controls most of the southwest border.
DHS says, well, you know, having a drug control strategy,
an immigration strategy and a counterterrorism strategy doesn't
make a whole lot of sense, you probably ought to wrap it all
together. Through this PCC a sub PCC was stood up with USIC and
ONDCP as a lead to do the counternarcotics piece. There is no
obstruction in there; it is a coordinating thing because it's
larger than DHS. This strategy is coming through the White
House, may end up with NSPD. There is a good possibility of
this, but it has to be interagency, it has to be larger than
BTS and larger than CBP and larger than DHS. That's what is
taking--the core is being developed within DHS.
The interagency process is slower than we would all like it
to be, and no one is holding it up or holding it hostage; it's
the coordination mechanism that we're pushing, and we're
optimistic that we will have it sooner rather than later. I
know you're asking for a date, can't give you one.
Mr. Souder. How about if I ask you for this; since I'm in
my 11th year of Congress and have served on this subcommittee
since the start, when we started getting involved in narcotics,
when Bill Zeliff was chairman, and 11 years ago raised to a
previous administration in their first term about putting
together a southwest border strategy. Then General McCaffrey,
as ONDCP director, talked about when the speaker headed this
subcommittee and he talked about a Southwest border strategy.
How about we start with this; when is DHS going to have a date
for its southwest border strategy, and DEA going to have a date
for its southwest border strategy, and the DOD for its--and
then once you each get one, then we can maybe get them
together.
But if we never start with anybody getting one done, then
we don't have a way to integrate them. And where in the world
is ONDCP, since we have been asking them for 11 years for a
coordinated--now we have a southwest border HIDTA, it's not
like we don't have any strategy. What we don't have is an
integrated strategy.
But it seems to me that the new player at this, because you
have merged multiple agencies, is DHS. So that if you get a
date certain for a DHS southwest border strategy, then we can
put it together with the others, but if everybody is going to
wait until the next one gets done, this is what we've been
doing for over a decade since I've been here.
Admiral Utley. What you have outlined is exactly what's
going on. I probably didn't explain it as well as I should
have. The other agencies are putting together their
counternarcotics piece of this as well, and it will be melded
together. You're right, it doesn't have to be in series, it can
be in parallel, and that's what we're trying to do.
Mr. Souder. OK. Let me ask you about the Department of
Defense. They're proposing the possibility of changing JTF
North to A JATF, a joint agency operation. Do you feel DOD
should be the lead agency to provide command and control
support to counterdrug along the border?
First Mr. Utley, then Mr. Placido, Mr. Passic. Mr. Torres,
if you would have a comment on that, too.
Admiral Utley. I don't think it should be DOD-led. It
probably should be, I would say, DHS lead only because--I mean,
a huge player is going to be DEA. But what DOD brings to the
table is their pipes--and I'm talking about the things for
communication and for intelligence--and huge infrastructure in
knowing how to manage big things. And it's not--we would
certainly welcome help in this effort with DOD, but it should
not be DOD-led.
Mr. Souder. Mr. Placido, how does the DEA feel about it?
Mr. Placido. I would concur with Admiral Utley----
Mr. Souder. That it should be DHS-led or that it should not
be?
Mr. Placido. It should not be DOD-led. I reserve judgment
as to who should lead it. I don't think that necessarily should
be DEA. I think drugs are a subset of the southwest border, as
opposed to being the whole thing.
What I will say is that, while we've had very good success
with the Joint Interagency Task Force South, which is in Key
West south, and west in Honolulu, there are some fundamental
differences about what's being proposed along the southwest
border, not the least of which is that Mexico has--they're very
prickly about sovereignty concerns. And what JATF South and
JATF West can do may not be possible over the territory of
Mexico. Also, on the domestic side, as JATF North, if it were
stood up, would be in the United States, you would have a whole
series of issues with posse comitatus.
So I think they could be a very important partner in
supporting this thing, but they should not lead it.
Mr. Souder. Mr. Passic, do you agree?
Mr. Passic. Yeah, it's a law enforcement mission, not a
defense mission. There are elements of defense in there, and we
want to partner up with them, we don't want to discourage them
from integrating with us. But I'd just like to mention
something about the strategy.
When we looked at our components, that didn't stop us from
moving forward to implement them. We've already started down
the road doing that because we want to make sure that we're
doing the best we can with our organization right now as the
paperwork gets processed at higher levels.
But we would like to make things work that are there
better, and it should be a law enforcement function mission
led.
Mr. Souder. Because one of the challenges, we will all be
awaiting to see whether, in fact, some of the rivalries between
the agencies and among the agencies can be kind of put to bed,
because you not only have yours, but you have the HIDTA, the
southwest border HIDTA, which presumably would be involved in
this. ATF--Ms. Watson was just talking about ATF is going to
get involved in certain of these violations, clearly ICE inland
in the investigations, air and Marine, wherever they are
located, are both all the way from Colombia up into the United
States. But I'll tell you, there is a level of frustration in
Congress that's building, that if it doesn't get organized
between the other agencies, DOD is just going to take it over.
They're bigger, they have more money, they have lots of
resources, you use a lot of their intelligence already.
We're seeing this in the security of the Capitol building,
that the question was, everything you just raised on the border
you would think would be doubled here in Washington, DC, yet
clearly since DHS doesn't have a clear internal policy as to
how we're supposed to be protected in this Capitol building,
and Secret Service is involved in this. And DOD, at the end of
the day it was an F-16 that came up over the Capitol building
that took command at the end of the day, that the posse
comitatus question can be addressed through Guard, it can be
addressed through how the risk is defined.
And I have been one, while trying to make sure the Defense
Department stays involved in the narcotics issue, for example,
in Afghanistan, where it's totally interrelated, to have some
concerns about the southwest border. And I believe that all you
agencies, if you get organized, should, in fact, be that, given
especially the problems with Mexico and their concerns about
the U.S. military, not that they would have any historic
concerns about the U.S. military in their territory, that it
would seem to be a law enforcement function.
But as you can tell each year, the votes for putting more
military on the border because of a frustration about the lack
of the law enforcement agencies to address it, the
effectiveness of the other JATFs, and who has the most
intelligence information and equipment, watching how we battled
through the 9/11 Commission report, and the strength of the DIA
and the intelligence in the military with that means that while
all this nice kind of intramural jockeying between the
different agencies and who's going to have control of what
along the border will get lost if DOD gets at the table because
you all just may get squished.
So speed is important here. I understand it's frustrating,
I understand that, but it's not like we haven't been waiting
for some time.
Do you have any questions, Ms. Watson, before we----
Ms. Watson. I have tremendous frustrations because, again,
representing a State from a State that's right on the edge of
the ocean, with all kinds of ports, we don't have the
resources, and they haven't come through the channel yet to
give us the kind of security that we need. And the reason why I
amended the bill on gangs where there's going to be a big
effort across the country to go after these gangs here in our
own land, I think that there is a tremendous threat on the
border.
Now, these self-professed volunteer border guards, the
vigilantes, are not the answer. And I really would like to see
military--I mean, during this time when we were trying to build
a network, we need our military with us. And I think military
and additional border guards, and maybe for just a period of
time, could do a lot to seal off that border, both from the
southern end of my State and the United States, and from the
ocean as well. And so this is a comment.
My frustration is that I don't see the working together of
all these agencies. I see it's the same as it was prior to
September 11th. People hold onto their turf, and in holding
onto their turf they allow for gaps in the chain. And I don't
feel any safer today, my people don't feel any safer today than
they did before we had the establishment of the Department of
Homeland Security. So unless we can do something dramatic where
the country can see that we really are serious about protecting
our borders, I think we drift, and we offer an opportunity for
the terrorists to really get a foothold.
And as I said before, I have no doubt that they're already
here. We've never found out the origin of anthrax, the mailing
of anthrax here. And while we are, you know, throwing money
into a deep dark hole, which shall remain anonymous, we're
suffering here at home.
And so I would hope that the various departments and
agencies could, when together, come up with a proposal that
says we're cooperating, we're using the intelligence that was
asked for by my colleague, and we're using every means we can,
and we're using DOD not to lead it, but to lend to your
efforts. We have to be serious about protecting our borders,
and we just need to do something immediately and dramatic to do
that. That's a comment.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And again, I want to
thank you for holding these hearings.
Mr. Souder. Thanks. And one of the great things about our
study hearings is we have had bipartisan support and aggressive
bipartisan support by people like Councilman Watson, who have
been active at the State level for some time. Elijah Cummings
in Maryland was a State legislator before he came here. Mr.
Ruppersberger was a prosecutor. And it's really great. And for
those of you who have worked in the drug area and all of a
sudden see bipartisan consensus again, it seems like we kind of
come and go on our focus on the drug war, and yet, because it
could be gangs for a while here, missing children over here or
Iraq over here, but the fact is it is a cause--every community
in the United States, 70, 85 percent of all crime, including
child support, is drug and alcohol related.
And it is something that everyday new people are exposed,
we just have to stay at it. And this new focus on the southwest
border is exploding. We are about to vote on CAFTA, which, to
many Americans sounds an awful lot like NAFTA, which to many
Americans they weren't really thrilled about. The
administration is very concerned about that vote, so it has
also heightened the border question. Clearly it's been in the
news a lot and the border question, and this is exploding. I
don't disagree that the President himself is extremely focused
on this for the first time in some time.
And now we need to move aggressively in trying to
coordinate the narcotics efforts on the border with the human
trafficking efforts on the border and the terrorism, because
what we all know is we shut down other financial opportunities,
they have to come up with their money in some different ways.
And the more skilled organizations are going to be the ones
that are going to survive. And they're going to wind up, if not
directly merging, at least have different divisions that are
successful in ways that move around it. And we have to get more
sophisticated as well.
Many Members are on the floor today concerned about what
the administration is doing in meth, and I want to insert in
the hearing record here the Mexican connection to the
methamphetamine problem in the United States from the Oregonian
newspapers by Steve Soul. He has raised repeatedly, the Mexican
government is now acknowledging that there is roughly now 150
tons of meth precursors, the pseudoephedrine coming across the
Mexican border, of which the testimony today suggests we're
getting maybe 20 million tons of that 150 million. The DEA and
Department of Homeland Security took down a huge bust in
Detroit that seems to have dented it coming through the north,
but now we're having it explode through the south, coming from
India and China and major manufacturing.
So when people talk about the meth problem, it's still
heavily a border problem because as the mom-and-pop labs are
starting to decline in the United States, there never were more
than 30 percent, we're seeing it substituted with the super lab
stuff, and once again we're right back to the border again. So
we clearly have to look as it as far as meth as well.
I had an additional question, it was directly related
because one of the things a number of us are working on in a
number of different committees right now is how to deal with
the smuggling operations. And Congressman Issa last week, when
Secretary Chertoff was testifying, said that the U.S. Attorney
in his area was not taking up some of the cases of the coyotes,
who are the smuggling operations. And maybe Mr. Torres, you
could directly answer this.
Do you see that in other jurisdictions as well? And is it
because the enforcement penalties aren't worth the effort for
the prosecution? Is it that there aren't that many cases? What
are you seeing in this kind of human smuggling, human
trafficking lack of going after some of these organizations?
What is the biggest need and what is the biggest way that we
can help?
Mr. Torres. One of the concerns that we've seen over the
years has been addressed in the form of a trafficking act that
was passed several years back, so it raised the penalties for
human trafficking. That did not correlate to human smuggling,
only to those that were being smuggled in the United States
through force, coerce or deceit, and then being held against
their will in the form of the title 181590 statutes for
trafficking.
When looking at smuggling, there is an opportunity to go
for an upward departure for enhanced penalties, only as that
relates to the potential serious injury or death of the people
being smuggled into the United States. And as you are aware,
what happens with that is you have to wait for someone pretty
much to be seriously injured or to be killed in the process of
being smuggled before you can actually use those enhancements,
as opposed to those penalties being higher than the standard 5-
year felony, of which may result in a 1 or 2-year Federal
sentence, depending on the crime.
If you're looking at the standard drivers over-the-road
smuggling on the southwest border, that happens quite
frequently, especially if you're looking to focus on smuggling
through the ports of entry or through the airports, then
they're forced to smuggle people over the road. And ultimately
what happens is you end up arresting a lower level person who
was a driver, who was driving a rented van or a lesser quality
type vehicle, and so you're really not working the
organization. That becomes a lower priority case for the U.S.
Attorney's Office to prosecute because it gets back to, well,
if you are going to prosecute a low-level coyote case, what
about the drug smuggling cases and what about the other Federal
crimes that are out there, bank robbery, etc?
So that is a particular issue in some areas, depending on
whether or not the area of the country that you are looking at
and whether the resources are there in the U.S. Attorney's
Offices, that is an issue that we see.
Mr. Souder. We appreciate your help as we move to
legislation that a number of us are working with and may, in
fact, become an administration position rapidly. And we want to
make sure we do this right. But if you can--it's been very
helpful the way you define how trafficking law is currently
applied, and what some of the difficulties that are. But if you
could also ask someone in your office and figure out who the
best people are to help us with the different legislation on
what the penalties should be on the human trafficking relating
to smuggling, what size groups, what you're seeing around the
United States, where it's being done and not done and what the
tradeoffs are that they're making, whether, in fact, some of
this may be related to we don't have enough space to put people
if we convict them, it may relate to not enough U.S. Marshals,
U.S. Attorneys.
In other words, you have to have a support system if you're
going to pass a law off, and we in Congress don't do that, we
pass the law but not the support system, and then force the
decision at the U.S. Attorney's Office.
Another relationship to that would be, do we have penalties
in human trafficking, i.e., smuggling in this case of large
groups, for the people who lease the vans, who provide the
jobs, who provide--the travel agencies that are providing the--
seeking the people in the community illegally. In other words,
rather than necessarily focus on picking on the poor individual
worker, can we have tougher penalties for the people that are
bringing them in in droves? And then actually, in my opinion,
work out a responsible immigration work permit policy. But what
good does it do to have a work permit policy if you don't have
control of the border, if people can make their green cards, if
people can get around this system, it won't do us any good to
change the immigration policy, because there is no motive to go
into a work permit if, in fact, you can get an illegal green
card and there is no penalty for it, or a minimal penalty, or
that we're so backed up nobody will take the case.
The other question I asked you, before the hearing started,
I want to put on the record that we would also like to work
with is the question that Congressman Reyes raised, which is
for non-Mexican illegals, when a Mexican comes across the
border, if they don't have criminal activity other than
violating immigration law, they're deported back to Mexico.
But if they are not from Mexico, the question is, what
happens to them? Are they out on their own recognizance? Do
they get detained, which is a matter of how many places detain?
And then do they make bond as you mentioned to me? And what is
the extent of this problem? At San Ysidro, when we got the
statistics there for the earlier part of this year--and while
we were there, they picked up Brazilians. What happens to the
Brazilians? You can't put them back to Mexico. That's not where
they're from. Eventually, we send them back. So do we release
them? We may have held them for a couple hours. And then, if we
release them, do we have statistics of how many actually come
nice and orderly to their deportation hearing? What about the
130 that came in from countries of interest, i.e., countries on
the terrorist list, who weren't on a watchlist so we released
them on their own recognizance? We didn't really have any
grounds, but clearly, there is a flaw in this system in the
sense of counting on them to self report, especially if while
they may not have been in our watchlist system, they may in
fact be an embedded person who is coming in. They may just be
somebody wanting a job, but they may in fact be an embedded
person. And we are so focused on Mexico that many of us have
totally forgotten that there is about 10 percent of the people
coming across the border who we can't immediately deport back
to Mexico. And what are we going to do with that? And that is
one of the things we are looking at in our legislation, too.
But thank you very much for being with us today and sharing
any additional information we want you to give to us. We may
have a few more written questions. It has been very helpful as
we continue to move for aggressive strategies, and hopefully
you will in your agencies even outstrip the enthusiasm of
Congress in trying to address the border enforcement. With
that, the subcommittee stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 4:02 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
[Additional information submitted for the hearing record
follows:]
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