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2006 DOD COUNTERNARCOTICS BUDGET: DOES IT DELIVER THE NECESSARY SUPPORT?

TUESDAY, MAY 10, 2005

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE, DRUG POLICY,
AND HUMAN RESOURCES,
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM,
Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:33 p.m., in room 2247, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Mark E. Souder (chairman of the committee) presiding.

Present: Representatives Souder, Cummings, Ruppersberger, and Norton.

Staff present: Marc Wheat, staff director and chief counsel; David Thomasson and Pat DeQuattro, congressional fellows; Malia Holst, clerk; Tony Haywood, minority counsel; and Teresa Coufal, minority assistant clerk.

Mr. SOUDER. Good afternoon. The subcommittee will come to order. I want to thank you all for coming to this very important hearing that continues our series of hearings reviewing the President’s National Drug Control Budget and Strategy for 2006. Today we focus on the counterdrug responsibilities of the Department of Defense.

Due to the jurisdictional responsibility of this subcommittee, we pay very close attention to the drug supply and interdiction initiatives contained within the President’s National Drug Control Strategy and Budget. Our oversight activities evaluate departmental authorizations, appropriations, as well as the efficiency and effectiveness of the departmental efforts.

The President’s budget request for 2006, now before Congress, asks for approximately $12¼ billion for counterdrug initiatives. The President’s Drug Strategy has requested that nearly $900 million be appropriated to the Department of Defense through its Office of Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict.

This budget request does not include the wartime supplemental requests that will fund the efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq in 2006. For fiscal year 2005, the Department of Defense received an additional $315 million in supplemental funds for counternarcotics efforts in Afghanistan. However, it is too early to speculate what additional counterdrug funding requests will be presented to Congress in fiscal year 2006 for the Defense Department’s commitments to support the war on drugs.
The subcommittee remains committed to the efforts of the U.S. governmental agencies that combat the devastating effects of illegal drug usage within this country. According to the Center for Disease Control's preliminary estimates for 2003, over 25,000 Americans died of drug-related causes.

To put this in perspective, we have never lost this many Americans annually to a post-World War II military or terrorist campaign. This staggering statistic is significant when we consider that we have lost over 1,500 brave Americans in Iraq since Operation Iraqi Freedom began, accounting for less than 3 percent of those lost to drugs over the same time period. We have lost more Americans to drugs than were killed in all the terrorist acts to date. Therefore, it is vitally important that we maintain vigorous efforts to control the sources of supply for narcotics and to interdict them before reaching the United States.

The explosion of heroin production and trafficking in Afghanistan has caused some to believe that the Defense Department's counterdrug efforts in that country have been too little and too late. As the President's Drug Strategy Report notes, "If all of Afghanistan's opium were converted to heroin, the result would be 582 metric tons of heroin. By comparison, Colombia and Mexico combined produced roughly 22 metric tons of pure heroin in 2003, more than enough to satisfy U.S. consumption."

In 2004, United Nations opium poppy survey reflected that Afghanistan produced over 80 percent of the world's heroin. If the situation in Afghanistan is not reversed, the destabilizing effects of the drug trade there could reverse all of our gains in that country since 2001. It takes little imagination to understand that a thriving drug trade in Afghanistan is financing narco-terrorist forces, able to threaten the government in Afghanistan and threaten the region. Here in the target market for illegal drugs, we may also see a rise in the number of heroin-related deaths, and even more deaths among European nations.

What the subcommittee hopes to learn today, in order to reverse the deadly trends we are already seeing in Afghanistan, whether DOD needs to refocus its priorities on the destruction of stockpiled drugs and drug processing facilities, support aerial and drug eradication of opium, and interdict precursor chemicals necessary for drug production. These efforts are essential for Afghanistan to be firmly set on the road to democracy and away from corruption, tyranny, and terrorism.

While the subcommittee believes that DOD has needed to step up its counterdrug efforts in Afghanistan, we have equally significant concerns about DOD's continuing commitment to its responsibilities in the Western Hemisphere. In November 1989, Congress passed the DOD Authorization Act of 1990, in which Congress directed the Department of Defense to serve as the single lead Federal agency for detection and monitoring of aerial and maritime transit of illegal drugs into the United States, in support of the counterdrug activities of the Federal, State, local, and foreign law enforcement agencies. DOD accomplishes this task by providing airborne and ground based detection in areas of known drug smuggling activities.
However, DOD's level of effort to fulfill this responsibility is evidenced by the sharp reduction in aerial support to the Source and Transit Zones. According to records maintained by the Joint Interagency Task Force South, maritime patrol hours have dropped drastically due to the U.S. Navy's reduction of authorized P-3 flight hours in the Transit Zone. For example, Transit Zone naval maritime patrol aircraft hours decreased from 5,964 hours in 2002 to 4,634 hours in 2003 to only 1,741 hours in 2004, a drop of 71 percent in the Transit Zone in only 2 years.

In the Source Zone, the Navy's signal-intelligence capable P-3's provided only 403 hours in 2004, a drop of 35 percent from 2001 levels, while the U.S. Air Force E-3 AWACS flew a total of 81 hours for all of calendar year 2004. If we were to rely just on the U.S. Navy and Air Force assets in the Source Zone, we would have had planes in the air less than 9 percent of the time last year.

The continual degradation of the Tethered Aerostat Radar System (TARS) is a further example of concern with respect to DOD's counterdrug commitment in the Western Hemisphere. The U.S. Air Force, which took over control of TARS from the U.S. Customs Service in 2000, has reduced the number of TARS radar sites from 14 to 8. This has left the United States nearly blind to air and marine smuggling activities along the entire Gulf Coast, stretching from the east coast of Texas to the southern tip of Florida, and from the eastern coast of Florida to Puerto Rico.

I personally inspected this dangerous lack of coverage in the Gulf of Mexico when we visited Custom and Border Protection's Air and Marine Operations Center in March of this year. The lack of any radar feed for the entire Gulf area highlighted just how vulnerable we are to air and marine intruders transiting the region into the United States.

In 1989, when Congress authorized DOD to support Federal, State, local, and foreign law enforcement agencies, the Interagency counterdrug assets and programs were not yet capable of primary detection and monitoring duties. However, the world has changed since then. The most obvious change happened in 2004 when Congress created the Department of Homeland Security.

Within the Department of Homeland Security, the Customs and Border Protection houses the combined air and marine assets of the legacy Customs Service and the U.S. Border Patrol. Similarly, the U.S. Coast Guard has a full inventory of vessels and aircraft capable of armed takedowns of vessels carrying contraband. Less obvious is the maturation of the counterdrug capabilities within the Department of Homeland Security. Even though the Department of Homeland Security operates aged aircraft and vessels, they account for the majority of the aerial and marine patrols responsible for the majority of seizures in the Source and Transit Zones.

The subcommittee recently was made aware of the DOD-drafted amendments to the fiscal year 2006 DOD authorization bill that were prepared for the White House Office of Management and Budget and they are very troubling. One amendment would effectively place DOD as the lead agency for detection and monitoring of aerial and marine transit of illegal drugs outside of the Western Hemisphere.
We have already seen how DOD support in the Western Hemisphere has declined over years. A second amendment would allow “Funds available to the Department of Defense for drug interdiction and counternarcotic activities may be used by the Secretary of Defense for detecting, monitoring, interdicting terrorists, and other transnational threats.” This language would allow DOD to take funding Congress set aside for DOD’s counternarcotics responsibilities and use those funds for missions that may be wholly unrelated to its counternarcotics commitments.

The drug interdiction capabilities within the Department of Homeland Security and the Department of Justice compels Congress to reevaluate the counterdrug roles and responsibilities of U.S. Government agencies. The fundamental questions the subcommittee needs to ask this panel are: One, has the appropriated DOD counterdrug efforts yielded tangible results in our efforts to stop the increase of poppy cultivation in Afghanistan? Two, have the current commitments of DOD to engage in two separate conflicts hampered their ability to support the Nation’s counterdrug efforts in this hemisphere? Three, do DOD counterdrug assets and capabilities provide services unique only to military requiring larger operating costs? Four, have we appropriately designed a Joint Interagency structure that promotes DOD supporting law enforcement efforts? Five, is it still appropriate for DOD to be the lead Federal agency for detection and monitoring of drug shipments in the transit zone, or should this responsibility and funding be instead transferred to the Department of Homeland Security?

Today we have a panel of very experienced witnesses to answer these and other questions posed by the subcommittee. From the Office of the Secretary of Defense we have the principal operator of DOD’s counterdrug budget, Ms. Marybeth Long, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict. From USNORTHCOM we have Colonel John Nelson. From USCENTCOM we have Deputy Director of Operations. From USSOUTHCOM we have the Deputy Director Captain Ed Turner. From the Office of National Drug Control Policy we have Mr. Lennard Wolfson, Assistant Deputy Director of the Office of Supply Reduction.

We thank all of you for coming and appreciate that very much. It was Captain Stahlman from CENTCOM. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Hon. Mark E. Souder follows:]
Opening Statement
Chairman Mark Souder

"2006 DoD Counternarcotics Budget: Does It Deliver the Necessary Support?"

Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy
And Human Resources
Committee on Government Reform

May 10, 2005

Good afternoon; I want to thank you all for coming to this very important hearing that continues our series of hearings reviewing the President’s National Drug Control Strategy and FY 2006 Budget proposal. Today we focus on the counterdrug responsibilities of the Department of Defense.

Due to the jurisdictional responsibility of the Subcommittee, we pay very close attention to drug supply and interdiction initiatives contained within the President’s National Drug Control Strategy and Budget. Our oversight activities evaluate departmental authorizations, appropriations, as well as the efficiency and effectiveness of the departmental efforts. The President’s budget request for 2006, now before Congress, asks for approximately $12.5 billion dollars for counterdrug initiatives. The President’s Drug Strategy has requested that nearly $900 million be appropriated to the Department of Defense (DoD) through its Office of Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict.

This budget request does not include the wartime supplemental requests that will fund the war efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan in 2006. For FY 2005, the Department of Defense received an additional $315 million in supplemental funds for counter-narcotics activities in Afghanistan. However, it is too early to speculate what additional counterdrug funding requests will be presented to Congress in FY 2006 for the Defense Department’s commitments to support the war on drugs.

The Subcommittee remains committed to the efforts of the United States Governmental agencies that combat the devastating effects of illegal drug usage within this country. According to the Center for Disease Control’s preliminary estimates for 2003, over 25,000 Americans died of drug-related causes. To put this in perspective, we have never lost this many Americans annually to a post-World War II military or terrorist campaign. This staggering statistic is significant when we consider that we have lost over 1,500 brave Americans in Iraq since Operation Iraqi Freedom began, accounting for less than 3 percent of those lost to drugs over the same period of time. We have lost more Americans to drugs than were killed in all terrorist acts to date. Therefore, it is vitally important that we maintain vigorous efforts to control the sources of supply for narcotics and to interdict them before reaching the United States.

The explosion of heroin production and trafficking in Afghanistan has caused some to believe that the Defense Department’s counterdrug efforts in that country to have been too little and too late. As the President’s Drug Strategy Report notes, “If all of Afghanistan’s opium were converted to heroin, the
result would be 582 metric tons of heroin. By comparison, Colombia and Mexico combined produced roughly 22 metric tons of pure heroin in 2003, more than enough to satisfy U.S. consumption."

The 2004 United Nations opium poppy survey reflected that Afghanistan produced over 80% of the world’s heroin. If the situation in Afghanistan is not reversed, the destabilizing effects of the drug trade there could reverse all of our gains in that country since 2001. It takes little imagination to understand that a thriving drug trade in Afghanistan is financing narco-terrorist forces, able to threaten the government in Afghanistan and threaten the region. Here in the target market for illegal drugs, we may also see a rise in the number of heroin-related deaths, and even more death among European nations.

What the subcommittee hopes to learn today, in order to reverse the deadly trends we are already seeing in Afghanistan, whether DoD needs to refocus its priorities on the destruction of stockpiled drugs and drug processing facilities, support aerial and ground eradication of opium, and interdict precursor chemicals necessary for drug production. These efforts are essential for Afghanistan to be firmly set on the road to democracy and away from corruption, tyranny, and terrorism.

While the Subcommittee believes that DoD has needed to step up its counternarcotic efforts in Afghanistan, we have equally significant concerns about DoD’s continuing commitment to its responsibilities in the Western Hemisphere. In November 1989, Congress passed the DoD Authorization Act of 1990, in which Congress directed the Department of Defense to serve as the single lead federal agency for detection and monitoring of aerial and maritime transit of illegal drugs into the United States, in support of the counternarcotic activities of Federal, State, local and foreign law enforcement agencies. DoD accomplishes this task by providing airborne and ground based detection in areas of known drug smuggling activities.

However, DoD’s level of effort to fulfill this responsibility is evidenced by the sharp reduction in aerial support to the Source and Transit Zones. According to records maintained by Joint Interagency Task Force South, maritime patrol aircraft (MPA) hours have dropped drastically due to the U.S. Navy’s reduction of authorized P-3 flight hours in the Transit Zone. For example, Transit Zone naval marine patrol aircraft patrol hours decreased from 5,964 hours in 2002 to 4,634 hours in 2003 to only 1,741 hours in 2004, a drop of 71% in only two years.

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The continual degradation of the Tethered Aerostat Radar System (TARS) is a further example of concern with respect to DoD’s counternarcotic commitment in the Western Hemisphere. The U.S. Air Force, which took over control of TARS from the U.S. Customs Service in 1992, has reduced the number of TARS radar sites from 14 to 8. This has left the U.S. nearly blind to air and marine smuggling activities along the entire Gulf Coast (stretching from the east coast of Texas to the southern tip of Florida) and from the eastern coast of Florida to Puerto Rico. I personally inspected this dangerous lack of coverage in the Gulf of Mexico when we visited Customs and Border Protection’s Air and Marine Operations Center in March of this year. The lack of any radar feed for the entire Gulf area highlighted just how vulnerable we are to air and marine intruders transiting the region into the United States.

In 1989 when Congress authorized DoD to support Federal, State, local, and foreign law enforcement agencies, the Interagency counternarcotic assets and programs were not yet capable of primary
detection and monitoring duties. However, the world has changed since then. The most obvious change happened in 2002 when Congress created the Department of Homeland Security. Within the Department of Homeland Security the Customs and Border Protection (CBP) houses the combined air and marine assets of the legacy Customs Service and the U.S. Border Patrol. Similarly, the U.S. Coast Guard has a full inventory of vessels and aircraft capable of armed take downs of vessels carrying contraband. Less obvious is the maturation of the counterdrug capabilities within the Department of Homeland Security. Even though the Department of Homeland Security operates aged aircraft and vessels, they account for the majority of the aerial and marine patrols responsible for the majority of the seizures in the Source and Transit Zones.

The Subcommittee recently was made aware of DoD-drafted amendments to the FY06 DoD authorization bill that were prepared for the White House Office of Management and Budget for that are very troubling. One amendment would effectively place DoD as the lead agency for detection and monitoring of aerial and maritime transit of illegal drugs outside of the Western Hemisphere (we have already seen how DoD support in the Western Hemisphere has declined over time). A second amendment would allow “Funds available to the Department of Defense for drug interdiction and counter-drug activities may be used by the Secretary of Defense for detecting, monitoring, interdicting terrorists, and other related transnational threats.” This language would allow DoD to take funding Congress set aside for DoD’s counterdrug responsibilities and use those funds for missions that may be wholly unrelated to its counter-narcotics commitments.

The drug interdiction capabilities within the Department of Homeland Security and the Department of Justice compels Congress to reevaluate the counterdrug roles and responsibilities of the U.S. governmental agencies. The fundamental questions the Subcommittee needs to ask this panel are:

1) Has the appropriated DoD counterdrug efforts yielded tangible results in our efforts to stop the increase of poppy cultivation in Afghanistan?

2) Have the current commitments of DoD to engage in two separate conflicts hampered their ability to support the nation’s counterdrug efforts in this hemisphere?

3) Do DoD counterdrug assets and capabilities provide services unique only to the military requiring larger operating costs?

4) Have we appropriately designed a Joint Interagency structure that promotes DoD supporting law enforcement efforts?

5) Is it still appropriate for DoD to be the lead federal agency for detection and monitoring of drug shipments in the transit zone – or should this responsibility and funding be instead transferred to the Department of Homeland Security.

Today we have a panel of very experienced witnesses to help answer these and other questions posed by the Subcommittee. From the Office of the Secretary of Defense we have the principal operator of DoD’s counterdrug budget, Ms. Marybeth Long, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict (SOLIC). From Joint Task Force North, USNORTHCOM, we have the Director of Plans, Colonel John D. Nelson. From USCENTCOM, we have the Assistant Operations Officer, Captain Jim Stahman. From USOUTHCOM we have Deputy Director for Current Operations, Captuin Ed Turner. From the Office of National Drug Control Policy we have Mr. Lennard Wolfson, Assistant Deputy Director of the Office of Supply Reduction. We look forward to your testimony and insight into this very important topic of DoD counterdrug support.
Mr. Souder, I would now like to yield to Mr. Cummings for an opening statement.

Mr. Cummings, Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for holding today's important hearing on the President's fiscal year 2006 budget request for counternarcotics programs within the Department of Defense.

Our Nation's military plays a vital role in many aspects of our Nation's drug control strategy.

In the area of supply reduction, the military provides essential support for interdiction and eradication efforts both internationally and domestically.

Much of the funding the Defense Department receives for counterdrug activities supports interdiction efforts aimed at keeping illicit drugs produced in Colombia and other Andean region nations from reaching the United States. Nearly all of the cocaine consumed in the United States and most of the heroin consumed on the East Coast originates in Colombia. Throughout the transit zone and at our borders, the military provides critical support to Federal, State, and local law enforcement to help identify and stop drug traffickers, as well as possible terrorist threats.

Since the toppling of the Taliban regime in response to the 9/11 attacks, Afghanistan has become a major focus of U.S. interdiction and eradication efforts. Income derived from the illicit Afghan opium trade supported the Taliban and al Qaeda prior to 9/11. Today, narcoterrorism, fueled by the Afghan opium trade, represents the single greatest threat to the stability and the longevity of Afghanistan's fledgling democracy. The military support of interdiction and eradication missions within Afghanistan and throughout Central Asia are key to our efforts to counteract the recent explosion in Afghan opium cultivation and production.

The military supports similar missions in every part of the world where drugs and narcoterrorism pose significant threats. But funding for Defense Department counterdrug activities also supports essential demand reduction programs to reduce drug use within the military and military communities, in addition to providing vital tactical, technical, and material support to domestic law enforcement and community prevention programs.

The President's fiscal year 2006 budget request proposes to devote $896 million to counterdrug efforts within the Department of Defense. These efforts are centrally coordinated by the Office of Counternarcotics, with oversight from the Office of Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict.

Apart from examining the adequacy of the President's proposed funding for DOD counterdrug programs, this hearing will address questions about the effectiveness of the Pentagon's counterdrug efforts and the extent to which the military recognizes and treats counternarcotics as a high-priority mission. Key questions include:

Are resources being diverted from counterdrug efforts in the transit zone, resulting in reduced surveillance of drug trafficking targets bound for the United States?

Should the military assume a larger, more direct role in interdicting and eradicating opium in Afghanistan, or would this alienate the Afghan public and compromise counterterrorism missions that depend upon Afghan intelligence and cooperation?
Is there tension between the counterterrorism and counter-narcotics missions or are they truly complementary?

How do we measure the effectiveness of these programs in the context of a National Drug Control Strategy that states as its “singular goal” reducing drug use in the United States?

As you know, Mr. Chairman, I have expressed deep concerns about the shift of emphasis within the President’s overall drug budget request.

The President has proposed deep cuts for demand reduction programs and programs that support drug enforcement at the State and local level. Safe and Drug-Free Schools and the High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas program are glaring examples. Even within the President’s request for the Department of Defense, this trend appears, as the National Guard’s Drug Demand Reduction program is slated for a sharp cut.

Meanwhile, the President proposes substantial increases for international supply reduction efforts that, despite yielding record seizures and eradication estimates, have demonstrated no impact on the availability or price of drugs in the United States.

Mr. Chairman, the President’s 2005 National Drug Control Strategy emphasizes “balance” and states that program effectiveness will be the basis for drug budget funding decisions. Unfortunately, testimony from our previous hearings on the President’s drug budget have cast doubt on the credibility of both of these themes in the strategy.

Today’s hearing offers an opportunity to examine another important area of the Federal drug control budget and I thank you for your close attention to this subject.

Finally, let me say this. Whatever our views on the President’s budget and the direction of the National Drug Control Strategy, we deeply appreciate the efforts and the sacrifice of the men and women of the U.S. armed forces. We are grateful for their devotion to the many missions they perform to keep America and its people safe.

With that, Mr. Chairman, I look forward to the testimony of our witnesses and I yield back.

[The prepared statement of Hon. Elijah E. Cummings follows:]
Opening Statement

Representative Elijah E. Cummings, D-Maryland-7
Ranking Minority Member
Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources
Committee on Government Reform
U.S. House of Representatives
109th Congress

Hearing on “2006 DoD Counternarcotics Budget: Does It Deliver the Necessary Support?”

May 10, 2005

Mr. Chairman,

Thank you for holding today’s important hearing on the President’s FY 2006 budget request for counternarcotics programs within the Department of Defense.

Our nation’s military plays a vital role in many aspects of our nation’s drug control strategy.

In the area of supply reduction, the military provides essential support for interdiction and eradication efforts both internationally and domestically.

Much of the funding the Defense Department receives for counternarcotics activities supports interdiction efforts aimed at keeping illicit drugs produced in Colombia and other Andean region nations from reaching the United States. Nearly all of the cocaine consumed in the United States and most of the heroin consumed on the East Coast originates in Colombia. Throughout the transit zone and at our borders, the military provides critical support to federal, state, and local law enforcement to help identify and stop drug traffickers, as well as possible terrorist threats.

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The military supports similar missions in every part of the world where drugs and narco-terrorism pose significant threats. But funding for Defense Department counternarcotics activities also supports essential demand reduction programs to reduce drug use within the military and military communities, in addition to providing vital tactical, technical, and material support to domestic law enforcement and community prevention programs.

The President’s FY 2006 budget request proposes to devote $896 million to counternarcotics efforts within the Department of Defense. These efforts are centrally coordinated by the Office of Counternarcotics, with oversight from the Office of Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict.

Apart from examining the adequacy of the President’s proposed funding for DoD counternarcotics programs, this hearing will address questions about the effectiveness of the Pentagon’s
counterdrug efforts and the extent to which the military recognizes and treats counternarcotics as a high-priority mission. Key questions include:

- Are resources being diverted from counterdrug efforts in the transit zone, resulting in reduced surveillance of drug trafficking targets bound for the United States?

- Should the military assume a larger, more direct role in interdicting and eradicating opium in Afghanistan, or would this alienate the Afghan public and compromise counterterrorism missions that depend upon Afghan intelligence and cooperation?

- Is there tension between the counter-terrorism and counternarcotics missions or are they truly complementary?

- How do we measure the effectiveness of these programs in the context of a National Drug Control Strategy that states as its “singular goal” reducing drug use in the United States?

As you know Mr. Chairman, I have expressed deep concerns about the shift of emphasis within the President’s overall drug budget request.

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Mr. Chairman, the President’s 2005 National Drug Control Strategy emphasizes “balance” and states that program effectiveness will be the basis for drug budget funding decisions. Unfortunately, testimony from our previous hearings on the President’s drug budget have cast doubt on the credibility of both of those themes in the Strategy.

Today’s hearing offers an opportunity to examine another important area of the federal drug control budget and I thank you for your close attention to this subject.

Finally, let me say that, whatever our views on the President’s budget and the direction of the National Drug Control Strategy, we deeply appreciate the efforts and the sacrifice of the men and women of the U.S. armed forces. We are grateful for their devotion to the many missions they perform to keep America and its people safe.

I look forward to the testimony of our witnesses and I yield back my remaining time.

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Mr. SOUDER. Mr. Ruppersberger.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. A lot has been said. I think basically the bigger picture is that we know we are at war, No. 1, and we need to support the war fighter. We also are at war with terrorism, and that is another issue that we are dealing with. But if you look at the statistics, I think you will find that drugs probably are our worst enemy in the world. For example, in the United States of America, more violent crime, about 85 percent of all violent crime that is committed is drug related.

Now, the majority of these drugs come other parts of the world, and we need to refocus and we need the team effort that we have in Iraq and Afghanistan that we know is working well. And I am not just talking about the military. The NSA, CIA; the whole team effort. I think we need to refocus on that teamwork approach.

Right now, I think the evidence shows the majority of the drugs that come to this country come through Mexico. I believe that is the U.S. Northern Command’s jurisdiction. Now, if we could put the same emphasis on Mexico with that teamwork approach that we do in Iraq and Afghanistan, our country would be a lot better off. We have not focused in that regard, and it is important that we continue to refocus our priorities and where our money is going to go.

My final concern is the issue of the narco-terrorist. The bad guys say in Mexico—and I am focusing on Mexico now, Northern Command—are the ones that are getting the people across our borders illegally are the ones that are dealing with the drugs. They are, I am sure, the same people that an al Qaeda will go to in order to get the people that we don’t want in our country, the cells that concern us for our national security, and we haven’t put enough emphasis in that regard.

Now, unfortunately, I have another hearing on national security downstairs, but I would hope that this issue could be addressed, the focus of a team approach—the DOD, which includes, NSA, CIA, the military—and hope that we could refocus our efforts as it relates to drugs with respect to Mexico. We know a lot of the drugs come from Colombia and other parts of South America, but they are coming through in Mexico, and we have not done the job that we need to do.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SOUDER. Thank you very much. We appreciate each of you coming. As each of us have said, we appreciate the contributions of the military, and we know we are multitasking everybody, and we can feel it in our own districts.

The question is that to be able to do all these tasks, we need to know what in fact we are doing and which things are being shorted. And if things are being shorted, then we need to be told, as Congress, look, this is what we are being shorted and we either need to spend the money or acknowledge we are shorting them. We don’t expect people to do three things simultaneously without adequate funding, and that is really part of what we are trying to figure out and how to prioritize in our budgets and why we are having the budget hearings.

We are going to start with Marybeth Long.
First, I need to swear everybody in. I forgot that. Let me do that first.

[Witnesses sworn.]

Mr. SOUDER. Let the record show that each witness responded in the affirmative.

I also ask unanimous consent that all Members have 5 legislative days to submit written statements and questions for the hearing record, and that any answers to written questions provided by the witnesses also be included in the record. Without objection, it is so ordered.

I also ask unanimous consent that all exhibits, documents, and other materials referred to by Members may be included in the hearing record, and that all Members may be permitted to revise and extend their remarks. Without objection, it is so ordered.

We are going to start with Marybeth Long, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict for the Department of Defense. Thank you very much for joining us.

STATEMENTS OF MARYBETH LONG, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY, SPECIAL OPERATIONS AND LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE; COLONEL JOHN D. NELSON, DIRECTOR OF PLANS, JOINT TASK FORCE NORTH, U.S. NORTHERN COMMAND; CAPTAIN EDMUND TURNER, DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS, U.S. SOUTHERN COMMAND; CAPTAIN JIM STAHLMAN, ASSISTANT OPERATIONS OFFICER, U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND; AND LENNARD WOLFSON, ASSISTANT DEPUTY DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF SUPPLY REDUCTION, OFFICE OF NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL POLICY

STATEMENT OF MARYBETH LONG

Ms. LONG. Thank you very much, Chairman Souder, Representative Cummings, Representative Ruppersberger. I want to thank you first on behalf of the Department of Defense for the opportunity to come here today to discuss our counternarcotics programs and activities for fiscal year 2006. The leadership and, in fact, the valued support that your committee and subcommittee give us, quite frankly, are critical to us being able to maintain not only what we are doing, but what we hope to do in the future as part of our counterdrug efforts. And specifically, Mr. Chairman, I know that you are in particular dedicated to this cause, and we thank you.

As you know, the Department spends a tremendous amount of resources on its counterdrug programs and activities, and these fall into three general areas. The first is our obligation to reduce the amount of drugs that come into our country; second, we need to contribute to force readiness by our aggressive counternarcotics and drug testing programs within the military; and, third, we believe it is our obligation to assist other countries in developing their capacities and their resources to interdict the drugs in their countries so that they never reach our shores. In doing that, the Department, for fiscal year 2006, has requested $895 million in order to continue these programs and activities.

I am told that there are those who believe that the Department of Defense is either unwilling or unable to perform its counter-
narcotics obligations and responsibilities, and I am here to tell you today that those individuals are mistaken. I will give you five data points in which I will substantiate my assertion.

First, last year, JIATF-South, the joint International Operation Center down in Key West, FL, which I believe many of you have visited, interdicted more cocaine than ever before, approximately 200 metric tons, which represents about a 43 percent increase over the previous year. But I don’t think the JIATF-South success should be measured solely in metric tons of cocaine, any more than I believe the Department’s commitment to the counterdrug effort should be measured in the number of ships or planes that on any particular day are operating in that AOR.

The Department has been consistent in its support to Colombia. It sends troops and Marines to Colombia to train and work with the Colombians in interdicting the drugs in that country. In addition, overwhelmingly the infrastructure, funds, and personnel at JIATF-South belong and are contributed by the Department of Defense.

In fiscal year 2006, in fact, the Department of Defense, out of its internal budget, added $40 million, in a time of war in Afghanistan and Iraq, toward augmenting the fight in Colombia and providing our Colombian colleagues, who are doing so well there in the counternarcoterrorist fight.

Likewise, although there are problems with the P–3 that all of you are aware of—and these are problems in the entire P–3 community—the Department has been diligent in seeking other ways to fill the P–3 gap by using other resources for the MPA problem. And I am going to be defer to Captain Edmund Turner to give you details on those gap fillers.

And, finally, as you are aware, the National Guard last year, despite an incredible up tempo, supporting our forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, increased their aviation hours by over 600 hours in support of domestic law enforcement.

Turning just a moment to our domestic support. A total of about $200 million of our budget request will be for domestic support programs. As you are well aware, most of those programs are executed through JTF-North out of El Paso, TX, in conjunction with the National Guard. I recently had the opportunity to go to El Paso and meet with JTF-North and visit with the Guard, and I believe, Mr. Chairman, that you are correct that, in particular, the Guard’s efforts toward demand reduction and their outreach toward schools and those who may be less fortunate and involved in drug programs at a very grassroots level are important.

JTF also works closely with the Mexico. In particular, we provide literal training to the Mexican forces. In addition, our domestic programs include classified information systems to the HIDTA, which we think are integral to our support of State and local law enforcement.

The southwest border is not the only place where drugs are crossing into our country. The northern border is another area of critical concern. JTF-North and the National Guard are both working with the Canadians in order to enhance our cooperation toward all smuggling events across that border.
On the southwest border, as in our other borders, smugglers transport drugs, criminals, illegal aliens, arms, and cash. They take advantage and exploit the openness of our society and pose a threat to our way of life. Other countries suffer the same problem, and we are attempting to engage those countries, particularly Colombia and Afghanistan, in helping them interdict those smuggling events so that the drugs that are leaving their country never reach our borders.

Our programs are focused on providing assistance to those democracies where the drug networks are or support threats to democratic institutions and free societies, such as Colombia, and in our request approximately $429 million will go toward these international counternarcotics programs worldwide.

I gave you a brief outline of our SOUTHCOM efforts, with a focus on JIATF-South. As you know, SOUTHCOM does much more in its AOR, and I will again defer to Captain Turner to provide you with additional details on that.

In the Central Command area of operations, you are correct that we have a huge explosion of poppy growth, and this has raised fears that not only is that heroin exploding for the normal consumers that are Russia and Europe, but that there is so much opium coming out of Afghanistan that at some point it will reach our shores. That is my fear.

In addition, the moneys gained from the opium production out of Afghanistan I believe are directly contributing to insurgent terrorists and other efforts to subvert the democracy there and pose a direct threat to our coalition forces in Afghanistan. To that end, President Bush and President Karzai have made fighting drug trafficking a priority in Afghanistan, as have we.

In fiscal year 2006, we will build upon our efforts that were funded last year through the supplemental and assist the Afghans in building their capacity to address this threat. The Department will provide substantial counternarcoterrorism support to the infrastructure of the police, in particular, training and equipment, and logistic support to those facilities and teams that are supported by the United Kingdom, as lead country, as well as those that are being led currently by our sister law enforcement agency, EDEA.

To date, the Department has been responsible for the only U.S. trained counternarcotic interdiction force in Afghanistan. The Department funded, financed, and actually provided the training of the National Interdiction Unit, which now is currently approximately 130 people in Afghanistan. That unit is being led successfully by the DEA, and I will defer to Captain Stahlman from CENTCOM to provide you with additional details on those efforts.

Since July 2004, our coalition forces have reported at least 21 events in which they have come across drugs or drug paraphernalia in the course of their normal duties and disposed of those drugs. In addition, those do not count the times when our forces are encountering drugs in the company of provincial reconstruction teams [PRTs] when those drugs or individuals were turned over to local Afghan authorities.

In short, the intelligence packages that are developed CFC-Alpha, Combined Forces Command-Afghanistan, in conjunction with our CIA, DEA, and U.K. colleagues, have formed the founda-
tion of the Interdiction Unit’s successes to date, not only the National Interdiction Unit, which is working with the DEA, but the Special Narcotics Force led by the United Kingdom.

One note in particular. Afghanistan is a complex and difficult situation, and, like the drug problem in the United States, it is absolutely critical that the Inter-Agency cooperate and integrate its efforts. The Department of Defense cannot succeed in Afghanistan if every other department likewise does not succeed. Our sister agencies—the State Department, the DEA, USAID providing alternative livelihoods, United Kingdom, and the Afghans themselves—are absolutely critical to our efforts there. Without the support of President Karzai, and without the alternative livelihood and economic resources that are to be made available to Afghans as an alternative to drug production, we will all fail.

In the Pacific Command AOR, the Department will bolster well established counternarco efforts, particularly those in Southeast Asia, where the United States and Asian partners face challenging combinations of terrorism, narcotics trafficking extremism, and a serious need for increased maritime security. Currently, PACOM and JIATF-West—which, as you know, was moved last year from California to Honolulu—are focusing their operations on the more mature programs that we have operating out of Thailand, but are also developing new programs in nations of interest such as Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines.

In Europe and in the African AORs, the Department will increase its cooperation and information exchange with new and old allies in Europe to become more effective in these theaters of operation. We are also developing a Trans-Saharan initiative that is designed to train and equip the military, Coast Guard, and other partner nations interdiction in that area.

Integral to our efforts are the intelligence and technological support that the budget that you provide us allows us to develop. A total of approximately $139 million of the moneys that we are requesting are for intelligence programs to collect, process, analyze, and disseminate information required for counternarcoterrorism operations. I believe, Mr. Chairman, you are aware of the Pulsed Fast Neutron Analysis that we have in Texas, which may very well be the first nonintrusive interdiction effort that may have applications for our sister customs and border agencies worldwide. Likewise, the Athena project is a revolutionary integration of maritime radar and other capabilities that we believe will be applicable to increase maritime security worldwide.

Again, the basic nature of smuggling threat mandates the need for actionable intelligence, and the Department is working hard to develop and increase our capabilities in this area.

In conclusion, on behalf of the Department, I appreciate your continued support of our counternarcotics programs, in particular your support for our Afghan and Colombian programs. If it were not for the support and for the leadership of this committee, we would not have made the advances that I believe we have made particularly in Colombia over the last years.

I stand by and look forward to answering your questions.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Long follows:]
STATEMENT BY
MARY BETH LONG
DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR COUNTERNARCOTICS
BEFORE THE
UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM
109th CONGRESS
STATEMENT FOR THE RECORD MAY 10, 2005

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE COUNTERNARCOTICS BUDGET
INTRODUCTION

Chairman Souder, Representative Cummings, distinguished members of the Committee, it is my pleasure to appear before you today to discuss the Department of Defense’s counterdrug budget for Fiscal Year 2006. I appreciate the support you give these programs and value your continued leadership.

My office, the Office of Counternarcotics, with oversight from the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict and the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, is the single focal point for the Department’s counternarcotics activities, and as such is responsible for ensuring that the Department develops and implements a focused counternarcotics program with clear priorities and measured results. Consistent with applicable laws, authorities, regulations, and funding, the Department of Defense works to ensure that sufficient forces and resources are allocated to the counternarcotics mission to achieve our goals.

As you are aware, illegal drug use exacts a heavy toll on American society every year. It accounts for billions of dollars in direct and indirect costs including health care costs, lost revenue due to crime, social welfare costs and lost productivity. While cocaine continues to be the most serious drug threat, heroin, synthetic drugs, methamphetamines, and marijuana are also serious concerns. The Department of Defense Counternarcotics offices does, and will continue to, consider reducing the flow of illegal drugs into this country, and doing our part to reduce drug use in America as our highest priorities.

Each year, the Department of Defense expends a great deal of time, effort, and resources to reduce drugs crossing our borders; to contribute to force readiness by eliminating drug use by military members; and to assist other nations to join us in this battle, as well as address this terrible problem in their own country. These activities require integrated efforts across all U.S. government agencies at all levels, as well as coordination and funding from the foreign countries that we assist so that drugs are stopped before arriving at our borders.

In Fiscal Year 2006, the Department requested $895.7 million for CN efforts.

STRATEGY AND POLICY

The Department uses its counternarcotics resources as effectively and efficiently as possible to achieve national and Department counter-narcotics priorities. We focus on programs that use military-unique resources and capabilities to advance the priorities of the President’s National Drug Control Strategy, as well as to support the Department’s defense priorities, including the war on terrorism and the Department’s Security Cooperation Guidance.
It is our policy to employ military unique resources to execute the drug detection and monitoring and other programs in support of these priorities. In general, we use our resources to support 1) Department of Defense drug demand reduction activities; 2) counternarcotics detection and monitoring missions; and 3) permissive counternarcotics support to domestic and host nation law enforcement and/or military forces.

Our four primary mission areas reflect these priorities. These mission areas are:

- **Demand Reduction**: Drug testing, treatment, and outreach to American citizens and Department personnel.
- **Domestic Support**: Active duty and National Guard counternarcotics support to domestic law enforcement, the Southwest Border and parts of the transit zone, and to Mexico.
- **International Support**: Detection and monitoring efforts; intelligence support and analysis; equipment, training, and infrastructure for participating nations; and focusing on the source and transit zones and other Presidential priorities.
- **Intelligence and Technology Support**: SIGINT collection and processing, intelligence support and analysis, and CN technology efforts supporting our other activities.

The Department’s request of $895.7 million for the Counternarcotics Central Transfer Account (CTA) will continue to fund a wide array of unique and effective programs under this framework. An outline of those programs and budget allocations for them follow.

**Demand Reduction**

The Department has budgeted over $128 million in support of our demand reduction activities. A total of $19.4 million is programmed for the Young Marines and the National Guard State Plans and Service outreach programs, with an additional $102.7 million for the continued support to the Department of Defense Demand Reduction Programs. The Department’s demand reduction programs include drug testing for active duty military, National Guard, Reserve personnel, and Defense Department civilian employees; drug abuse prevention/education activities for military and civilian personnel and their dependents; and drug treatment for military personnel.

Because illegal drug use continues to be prevalent in our society, and because drug use is incompatible with military security-sensitive and dangerous duties, the Department set a goal in 2002 of reducing the amount of drug use in the military population by 10
percent in two years, and 25 percent in five years, using 2000 as a baseline. In this period, the percentage of active duty personnel drug tests that returned positive results for illicit drugs dropped from 1.26% in 2003 to 0.62% in 2004; putting the Department of Defense on its way to meeting the goal for drug positive tests. The Department’s established policy is to randomly test all military members and designated civilian employees at a minimum rate of one test per year per member. Our policy also calls for mandatory consequences for military members who knowingly use drugs.

With the increased exposure by our deployed troops in Afghanistan to opiates, last year the Department promulgated a demand reduction policy directing all military members deployed to Afghanistan for more than 60 days to be included in the theater’s 100% random testing program. As of January 2005, no service members in Afghanistan have tested positive for heroin.

**Domestic Support**

A total of $199.1M from our FY 2006 budget supports federal, state, and local drug law enforcement agencies’ (DLEAs) requests for domestic operational and logistical support, including the Department’s CN support to Mexico. This represents approximately a quarter of our FY2006 budget request (excluding demand reduction funding). Since 1989, domestic law enforcement agencies have requested military support for their respective counter-narcotics operations. This support has historically included interdiction of cocaine, marijuana, and methamphetamines coming into the United States; interdiction of cash proceeds exiting the United States; interdiction of illegal drugs transiting the United States; identification and destruction of domestic marijuana (growing primarily in California, Kentucky, Hawaii, West Virginia, Tennessee, Oregon, and Washington); destruction of methamphetamine labs; and the identification and arrest of drug manufacturers, traffickers, and distributors.

Of this total, $152.7 million will support the National Guard State Plans supporting domestic law enforcement efforts and the counter-narcoterrorism schools. The National Guard continues to prove itself as an exceptional partner to law enforcement in domestic counternarcotics missions that require military-unique skills, including air/ground reconnaissance, intelligence analysis, and training for law enforcement agencies.

The southwest border has historically been the primary entry point for the flow of drugs into the United States, and is vulnerable to a broader range of trans-national threats. The Department, along with the inter-agency, is working to counter those threats. Most recently, our office has undertaken discussion with the various agencies, including law enforcement in El Paso to engage them, through Joint Task Force –North (JTF-N), in discussions concerning the leveraging and more efficient use of CN dollars supporting cross border and state efforts to stop the flow of narcotics from Mexico. In addition, we
are working with the National Guard and NORTHCOM to satisfy an ONDCP request to better coordinate and integrate this support in marijuana production states. This coordination will help prioritize and deconflict Title 10, Title 32, and other federal, state, and local helicopter support for this year’s marijuana eradication missions.

Approximately $33 million is programmed for the southwest border domestic detection and monitoring efforts provided by tethered aerostats. The Tethered Aerostat Radar System (TARS) provides dedicated radar surveillance of the US Southwestern Border, giving a low-altitude, small target surveillance capability - critical for the detection and monitoring of aircraft with trafficking profiles in eight sites.

Another $14 million is for Domestic Operational Support, such as US Northern Command (NORTHCOM) counternarcotics support to DLEAs on the southwest border, as well as support to Mexico. Working closely with USNORTHCOM and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense (ASD(HD)), this support is managed through JTF-N in El Paso, Texas. JTF-N provides active duty and reserve personnel for engineering support, aerial and ground reconnaissance, transportation, logistics, translation, communications, and intelligence. These counternarcotics activities provide excellent training in real world situations and contribute to our domestic security.

In terms of our support to Mexico, the Department provides training and support to Mexican military counternarcotics forces. The training, currently focused on Mexican Navy littoral operations, is conducted in the United States through formal schools and mobile training teams deployed to selected sites in Mexico. We continue to seek to expand our relationship and types of training (to include riverine tactics and operations, communications, logistics, aircraft operation and maintenance, intelligence, search and rescue, and medical training) that we provide to the Mexican military counternarcotics forces.

Finally, the Department is committed to improving information sharing between the Department of Defense and law enforcement agencies in support of counternarcotics objectives. We are installing classified computer systems and networks in High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area intelligence centers, operated by National Guard intelligence analysts. Active duty and Reserve personnel also play an integral role in arrival zone detection and monitoring, cross-agency intelligence fusion, and the development of actionable intelligence.

**International Support**

On our Southwest and other borders, smugglers transport drugs, illegal aliens, arms and carry cash. In doing so, they exploit the openness of our society, and pose a threat to our way of life. Similarly, the overlap of threats along our southwest border is a problem elsewhere in the world. Engaging other nations to address the problem benefits
our nation both directly and indirectly. Our support to other countries is designed to assist them in building their capacity to combat drugs themselves, so that they can stop drugs in their country before the drugs move to our shores. In addition, our programs are focused on providing assistance to democracies where drug networks are, or support, threats to democratic institutions and free economies, such as Colombia.

In our request, $429.1M will fund counter-narcoterrorism programs in the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM), and U.S. European Command (EUCOM) Areas of Responsibility (AORs) to detect, interdict, disrupt or curtail activities related to the cultivation, processing or transport of illegal drugs; and to building our partners’ capacity to join us in this effort.

In the SOUTHCOM AOR, the Department will focus its efforts and funding in Colombia, the heart of the narcoterrorist problem in the region. Funding for programs in the SOUTHCOM AOR is $368.1 million in FY06, which represents over 85% of the Department’s international CN support. The vast majority of the world’s coca is grown in Colombia, and nearly all of the cocaine consumed in the United States is produced and shipped from Colombia. This coca is primarily grown in remote areas of Colombia where there has been little government control. Colombian narcoterrorists receive the majority of their funds from protecting, “taxing” and engaging in this illegal drug trade. These narcoterrorists seek to overthrow the freely elected Colombian government, the oldest democracy in Latin America.

Department of Defense support to this effort has been unfailing. In fact, last year this office successfully secured an additional $40 million for the counternarcotics support it provides to Colombia during the Department’s internal review of the proposed FY2006 budget. This additional funding sustains the commitment the Department has made to working with President Uribé and the Colombian military. The aggressive leadership of President Uribé offers Colombia a unique window of opportunity to preserve Colombian democracy. Colombia is regaining control of areas long held by narcoterrorists. The Colombian military has made exceptional progress in fighting drug trafficking and terrorism while improving respect for human rights.

In recent fiscal years, the Congress provided expanded authority to support our Colombian efforts, as well as increased the cap on military and civilian personnel serving in Colombia. The expanded authority will expire at the end of FY 2006. Such support from Congress has been crucial to leverage our resources both against narcotics and terrorism, and we are requesting the expanded authority be continued.

In addition to our support for Colombia, the Department is by far the largest contributor of funds and personnel to the Joint Inter-Agency Task Force (JIATF) South. Last year, JIATF South had a fifth straight “record year” in cocaine disruptions,
interdicting over 222 metric tons of cocaine and 6 tons of marijuana. On the street, these drugs would be worth over $4.3 billion. Interagency and international staff cooperation continues to be the cornerstones for JIATF South’s success.

Moreover, the Department of Defense continues to provide a steady number of detection and monitoring assets in the source and transit zones, and we have been attempting to increase these assets. The Navy’s problem with the P-3s, which affects not only the Department’s counternarcotics assets, but the availability of maritime patrol aircraft worldwide, has been well documented and discussed. The Department continues to provide contracted surveillance aircraft performing maritime patrol missions, and is continuing to fund additional use of UK assets to cover the gaps in maritime coverage. In recent months, the Department has recently returned the E-3 AWACS to the region. In addition, the number of Navy ships steaming in the transit zone has remained stable.

In the Central Command area of operation, the huge explosion of poppy growth has raised fears that the heroin which currently is destined for Europe and Russia will someday find its way to the United States. Furthermore, terrorists and extremists in Afghanistan and its neighboring countries are exploiting illicit drugs trade to support their activities. Both President Bush and President Karzai have made fighting drug trafficking a priority as it threatens coalition forces, as well as the fledgling Afghan democracy.

The Department has programmed $27.8 million in FY2006 for its support to efforts in the CENTCOM AOR. We have not requested all the funding required for Afghanistan counternarcotics support in the FY 2006 budget, but rather will request supplemental funding for this effort. The Administration will assess the resources needed to support the Department’s on-going counternarcotics efforts in the CENTCOM AOR in the context of our broader efforts in the region, including the Global War on Terror.

The Department of Defense in FY 2006 will continue our efforts from last year to assist the Afghans in building their capacity to address this threat. The Department will provide substantial counter-narcoterrorism supporting infrastructure, training and equipment for the Afghan police and the United Kingdom and Drug Enforcement Administration-mentored Afghan counter-narcoterrorism interdiction units. In other Central Asia and the Middle East countries, the Department will expand its counter-narcoterrorism support to curb the transit of illicit drugs through international smuggling corridors.

An early example of the benefit of our efforts thus far is the successful March 15, 2005 raid in Afghanistan. US military forces inserted, extracted, and secured six Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) officers and 36 Afghan narcotics police (equipped and trained by the Department) in a successful operation against three labs located in Nangahar province, one of the primary sources of Afghan opium. Furthermore, to work with this newly-minted Afghan interdiction force, DEA requested the Department
provide support to an enhanced, surge capability that will put rotating teams of DEA agents (known as the DEA Foreign Advisory Support Teams (FAST) officers) in country to work with their Afghan counterparts. We are providing a base of operations for the FAST Teams while in the US, where they can continue to train, and providing the FAST Team members with transportation to Afghanistan. The Department provided the training and equipment for the Afghan force working with DEA.

In addition, in response to a State Department (INL) request, the Department is assisting the Afghan Border Police by providing specialized training, equipment, and facilities. Our current efforts have focused along the areas bordering Pakistan as a significant amount of narcotics trafficking from Afghanistan crosses that border. Increased security capacity-building along the Pakistan border also will benefit Coalition forces and the Afghan government by providing a means by which cross border violence from extremist and anti-government forces can be addressed. And the government of Afghanistan would benefit greatly from the capacity to collect revenue during traffic stops along these same routes.

In the Pacific Command AOR, the Department will bolster well-established counter-narcoterrorism efforts – particularly in Southeast Asia where the U.S. and its Asian partners face a challenging combination of terrorism, extremism, drug trafficking, and a serious need for increased maritime security. In FY 2006, efforts are funded at $27.3 million, to include the costs of Joint Inter-Agency Task Force West. Currently, PACOM and JIATF West are focusing their efforts against drug related international criminal organizations. The Department of Defense will expand its operations from the already mature programs in Thailand to new countries of national interest, such as Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines. Examples of such expansion are PACOM-supported national level intelligence fusion centers that will be operational in June 2005 in Jakarta, Indonesia and Manila, Philippines. PACOM will next establish smaller interagency fusion centers linked to these national centers. When this network matures, partner nations will have a greater capacity to deal with formidable drug and other smuggling organizations.

In Europe and Africa ($8.5 million), the Department will increase its cooperation and information exchange with our old and new allies in Europe to become more effective in counter-narcoterrorist activities that threaten our mutual national security. One of these efforts is our support to Azerbaijan to improve maritime security and intelligence collection and integration on the Caspian Sea. It is also developing a Trans-Saharan initiative designed to train and equip military, Coast Guard, and other partner nation interdiction units in the region. Finally, EUCOM is planning of Gulf of Guinea initiative to improve partner nation maritime detection and monitoring capability.
Intelligence and Technology Support

A total of $139.6M will be used for intelligence programs to collect, process, analyze, and disseminate information required for counter-narcoterrorism operations. The basic nature of the smuggling threat mandates the need for actionable intelligence if the Department is to be effective in detection, monitoring and interdiction operations. The Department will continue to provide critical intelligence support to national policies designed to dismantle narcotics trafficking and international terrorist organizations benefiting from the drug networks. These intelligence support programs make use of unique Defense capabilities, systems, skills, and expertise, and directly support the National Drug Control Strategy.

A total of $87.7 million is designated for counter-narcoterrorism intelligence support and analysis; $25.8 million is for signals intelligence (SIGINT) collection and processing; $12.2 million is for Service and SOCOM command and control programs; and $13.9 million is for meeting new technology requirements.

Use of new technology continues to be instrumental in combating narcoterrorist activities. We have developed some exciting new technologies, such as the Pulsed Fast Neutron Analysis, the non-intrusive inspection of the considerable tractor trailer traffic in El Paso, TX. This system will allow the speedy pulls of trailers through a neutron beam to detect threats including drugs, explosives, chemical weapons, and nuclear materials. The Athena maritime domain awareness portal is a unique system in its integration of radar and other input, creating an integrated maritime domain awareness network to identify threats to the United States.

LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS

While not pure budget issues, the Department has requested expansion and extension of its two major counternarcotics authorities in Fiscal Year 2006, Section 1004, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991, as amended\(^1\) and SEC. 1033 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998, as amended\(^2\). Section 1004 expires at the end of Fiscal Year 2006 and enables the Department of Defense to assist the counter-drug activities of any other department or agency of the Federal Government or of any State, local, or foreign law enforcement agency. Approval of this proposal would extend current authorities five more years.

We have also requested expansion and extension of our Section 1033 which allows the Department to provide non-lethal equipment and supplies to the Governments of Peru, Colombia, Afghanistan, Bolivia, Ecuador, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. We seek to extend 1033 for 5 more years and an increase in the authority from $40 million to $80 million, as well as other authorities.
Finally, the Department requested authority to leverage counternarcotics funds and resources to also detect, monitor and interdict terrorists. After the attack on the United States on September 11, 2001, the intelligence community and the Department of Defense focused on the need to leverage our resources and authorities to address any and all threats to our national security, while integrating intelligence, military and law enforcement approaches to these problems. The Department’s detection and monitoring activities, by their nature, disrupt narcotics traffickers and terrorist groups by helping to interdict these threats. This new authority would allow the Department to give full effect to the intent of Congress, and provide flexibility for Department to use its resources, capabilities, and structures designed to address the drug threat, to detect, monitor, and interdict terrorist threats as well.

CONCLUSION

On behalf of the Department, I appreciate your continued support of our counternarcotics initiatives, particularly those in Colombia and in Afghanistan. By your support of our activities, as well as the funding and authorities you provide, you are our staunchest ally in this fight against narcoterrorism. I would like to thank you, Chairman Souder, Representative Cummings, and the Members of the Committee for the opportunity to discuss these issues with you. I look forward to answering your questions.


Mr. Souders. Thank you very much.

Our second witness is Colonel John Nelson, Director of Plans, Joint Task Force North, U.S. Northern Command. Thank you for being with us.

STATEMENT OF COLONEL JOHN D. NELSON

Colonel Nelson. Thank you, Chairman Souder, Ranking Member Cummings, members of the subcommittee, thank you for this opportunity to testify regarding U.S. Northern Command's efforts to support civilian law enforcement agencies in the fight against drug trafficking and other transnational threats.

Support to law enforcement is an important element in U.S. Northern Command's mission to deter, prevent, defeat, and mitigate threats to the homeland, because it has direct applicability to the global war on terror.

Transnational threats include international terrorism, narcotics trafficking, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and organized crime. Terrorists are known to use drug trafficking conveyances, smuggling networks, and money laundering to achieve their goals and fund their activities. As U.S. Northern Command supports law enforcement agencies in the fight against drugs, we want to ensure that our efforts are focused on the nexus between terrorist organizations and drug trafficking.

U.S. Northern Commands supports the global war on terror right here at home by providing military unique capabilities to support civilian law enforcement agencies. By doing this, we support not only the National Defense Strategy with terrorist interdiction support, but also the National Drug Control Strategy by simultaneous providing drug interdiction support.

The lynchpin of U.S. Northern Command's counterdrug efforts is the support provided by Joint Task Force North. Established in 1989 as Joint Task Force–6, Joint Task Force North was transformed and redesignated in September 2004. The mission of JTF-North is to coordinate military support to law enforcement agencies and enhance interagency synchronization in order to deter and prevent threats from entering the homeland. Its area of operation runs from border to border and coast to coast, but focuses primarily on the approaches to the homeland.

The support provided by JTF-North includes more than 50 different missions that can be broadly grouped into three categories: intelligence support, operational support, and theater security cooperation.

Intelligence support includes employing military intelligence analysts to develop operational intelligence products that can be used across the interagency for early cuing, warning, and interdiction operations. A supporting effort is training and collaboration between DOD and law enforcement intelligence analysts, consistent with intelligence oversight requirements, to ensure seamless coverage within the operating area.

JTF-North has intelligence liaison personnel with the El Paso Intelligence Center, the Border Patrol Field Intelligence Center, and, most notably, at the U.S. Embassy in Mexico City. These intelligence professionals provide a real-time link between JTF-North
and key centers of intelligence in North America in order to develop situational awareness for early cueing and warning.

Operational support includes detection missions using a variety of sensors that are unique to DOD in order to improve a supported law enforcement agency's ability to detect, monitor, and interdict transnational threats. Construction of roads, bridges, and fences, as well as installing area lighting to improve the ability of law enforcement officers to move, identify, and respond to threats crossing the border are also part of this mission category.

The third JTF-North mission category, theater security cooperation, made significant progress with Mexico last year through the export of a maritime basic intelligence course to the Mexican Navy. This effort was in addition to JTF-North's continuing membership in the U.S.-Mexico Bilateral Interdiction Working Group.

Our relationship with Canada is developing and strengthens with each collaborative engagement as part of our work with the Integrated Border Enforcement and Intelligence Teams. JTF-North also performs cooperative efforts with Canada through Project NORTHSTAR.

U.S. Northern Command is particularly proud of its efforts in cooperation with Mexico. These include counterdrug personnel in the Office of Defense Coordination. Mobile Training Teams form a substantial element of our theater security cooperation efforts with fiscal year 2006 funding of approximately $2.4 million requested. These teams assist the Mexican military with tasks such as maintenance, training, repairs on aircraft, night vision equipment, counterdrug sensor packages, and ex-Knox class frigates in order to improve their national capacity to defeat transnational threats before they attempt to enter our homeland.

Another USNORTHCOM effort in conjunction with the National Guard Bureau is to support the Air and Maritime [sic] Operation Center through Air National Guard radar surveillance operators who provide detection and tracking data and forward to law enforcement agencies air tracks suspected of smuggling activities across U.S. borders.

I would like to emphasize that in most U.S. Northern Command support activities, we are not the primary Federal agency. Our job is to support civilian law enforcement agencies based on the support requested. We believe that our relationship with our interagency partners are excellent and growing. An important element in these relationships is JTF-North as U.S. Northern Command's agent for coordination with border-focused civilian agencies. With a 15-year track record of success, and expanded mission into an organization focused on all transnational threats, it is postured to take the next step with increased interagency collaboration to secure the Nation.

Again, thank you for this opportunity to describe U.S. Northern Command's support activities with regard to interdicting terrorist and drug traffickers. We are proud of the efforts of our men and women in military uniform, our civilian employees, and our civilian law enforcement partners working together to protect our borders against drug trafficking and other transnational threats to our Nation.

[The prepared statement of Colonel Nelson follows:]
STATEMENT OF

COLONEL JOHN D. NELSON, USA
DIRECTOR, PLANS AND POLICY
JOINT TASK FORCE NORTH

BEFORE THE HOUSE GOVERNMENT REFORM COMMITTEE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE, DRUG POLICY & HUMAN RESOURCES

10 May 2005
Chairsman Souder, Ranking Member Cummings, and Members of the Subcommittee:

Thank you for this opportunity to testify regarding U.S. Northern Command’s (USNORTHCOM) efforts to support civilian law enforcement agencies in the fight against drug trafficking and other transnational threats. Support to law enforcement is an important element in USNORTHCOM’s mission to deter, prevent, defeat, and mitigate threats to the homeland, because it has direct applicability to the Global War on Terror (GWOT). The FY04 National Defense Authorization Act authorizes Department of Defense counterdrug task forces, such as Joint Task Force North, to support civilian law enforcement agencies conducting counterrorism activities. As we broaden our focus, we assist many federal, state, and local agencies to enhance national security and defend America.

Transnational threats include international terrorism, narcotics trafficking, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and organized crime. Terrorists are known to use drug trafficking conveyances, smuggling networks, and money laundering to achieve their goals and fund their activities. USNORTHCOM supports law enforcement agencies in the fight against drugs, we want to focus our efforts on the nexus between terrorist organizations and drug trafficking. USNORTHCOM supports the global war on terrorism right here at home by providing military unique capabilities to support civilian law enforcement agencies. By doing this, we support not only the National Defense Strategy with terrorist interdiction support, but also the National Drug Control Strategy, by simultaneously providing drug interdiction support.

My prepared testimony will address two areas: (1) how U.S. Northern Command is organized and funded to conduct support to civilian law enforcement, and (2) how U.S. Northern Command enhances joint interagency cooperation.

U.S. Northern Command’s law enforcement support operations consist of several major components. The first is headquarters operations for
USNORTHCOM (Project Code 5110). This consists of the activities necessary to plan, coordinate, and monitor execution of counterdrug support activities, such as developing strategies and plans, coordinating with the Joint Staff, Office of the Secretary of Defense, law enforcement and other agencies, and our partner nations.

The lynchpin of USNORTHCOM's counterdrug efforts is the support provided by Joint Task Force North. Established in 1989 as JTF-6, JTF-North was transformed and re-designated as JTF-North in September 2004. The mission of JTF-North is to coordinate military support to law enforcement and enhance interagency synchronization in order to deter and prevent threats from entering the homeland. Its area of operations runs from border to border and coast to coast, but focuses on the approaches to the homeland.

Within the current program-budget, FY06 funding for JTF-North activities is approximately $10.3 million (Project Code 5111). This consists of Military Support to Civilian Law Enforcement Agencies throughout CONUS in support of the National Defense Strategy and Homeland Security Strategy to combat terrorism, as well as the National Drug Control Strategy. This support includes more than 50 different missions that can be broadly grouped into three categories: (1) Intelligence Support, (2) Operational Support, and (3) Theater Security Cooperation.

Intelligence support includes employing military intelligence analysts to develop operational intelligence products that can be used across the interagency for early cueing, warning, and interdiction operations. A supporting effort is training and collaboration between DOD and law enforcement intelligence analysts, consistent with intelligence oversight requirements, to ensure seamless coverage within the operating area. JTF-North has intelligence liaison personnel with the El Paso Intelligence Center, Border Patrol Field Intelligence Center, and most notably, at the U.S. Embassy in Mexico City. These intelligence professionals provide a real-time link between JTF-North and key centers of intelligence in North"
America in order to develop situational awareness for early cueing and warning. Most recently, our intelligence personnel have been preparing products in support of Operation WINTER FREEZE and the Arizona Border Control Initiative, which supports detection, and deterrence of cross-border illicit trafficking. They work hand-in-hand with their law enforcement counterparts, fostering a mutually supporting relationship.

Operational support includes detection missions using a variety of sensors that are unique to the DOD in order to improve a supported law enforcement agency’s ability to detect, monitor, and interdict transnational threats. Construction of roads, bridges, and fences as well as installing area lighting to improve the ability of law enforcement officers to move, identify, and respond to threats crossing the border are also a part of this mission category.

In addition to assisting the law enforcement agencies that request such support, JTF-North’s operational and intelligence support missions provide military training opportunities for the Title 10 and National Guard forces that conduct them. JTF-North recruits units to volunteer for these missions, soliciting forces from all services, both active and reserve components. Unit commanders volunteer because of the realistic training opportunity and gratification from conducting a homeland defense mission.

The third JTF-North mission category, Theater Security Cooperation, made significant progress with Mexico last year through the export of a Maritime Basic Intelligence Course to the Mexican Navy. This effort was in addition to JTF-North’s continuing membership in the U.S.-Mexico Bilateral Interdiction Working Group.

Our relationship with Canada is developing and strengthens with each collaborative engagement as part of our work with the Integrated Border Enforcement and Intelligence Teams. JTF-North also performs cooperative efforts with Canada through Project NORTHSTAR.
U.S. Northern Command is particularly proud of its efforts in cooperation with Mexico. These include counterdrug personnel in the Office of Defense Cooperation, with FY06 funding of $245 thousand (Project Code 5112). A substantial element of our Theater Security Cooperation efforts is the conduct of Mobile Training Teams with FY06 funding of approximately $2.4 million (Project Code 9203). These teams assist the Mexican military with tasks such as maintenance, training, and repairs on equipment such as aircraft, night vision equipment, counterdrug sensor packages, and ex-Knox class frigates.

Another USNORTHCOM effort is support to the Air and Marine Operations Center. With FY06 funding of approximately $2 million (Project Code 9499), this consists of Air National Guard radar surveillance operators to provide detection and tracking data and forward to law enforcement agencies air tracks suspected of smuggling activities across U.S. borders.

I would like to emphasize that in most of USNORTHCOM's support activities we are not the primary federal agency; our job is to support civilian law enforcement agencies based on the support requested. We believe that our relationships with our interagency partners are excellent and growing. An important element in these relationships is JTF-North as USNORTHCOM's agent for coordination with border-focused civilian agencies. With a 15-year track record of success, and expanded mission into an organization focused on all transnational threats, it is postured to take the next step with increased interagency collaboration to secure the Nation.

Again, thank you for this opportunity to describe USNORTHCOM's support activities with regard to interdicting terrorists and drug traffickers. We are proud of the efforts of our men and women in military uniform, civilian employees, and our civilian law enforcement partners, working together to protect our borders against drug trafficking and other transnational threats to our nation.
Mr. SOUDER. Thank you very much.
Our third witness is Captain Edmund Turner, Deputy Director for Current Operations, U.S. Southern Command. Thank you very much for being here.

STATEMENT OF CAPTAIN EDMUND TURNER

Captain TURNER. Good afternoon, Chairman Souder. Thank you for allowing me a few minutes to make some opening comments.

We at U.S. Southern Command are fully committed to meeting DOD's responsibility in the fight against drugs and narcoterrorists. As specified in Title X, U.S. Code Section 124, we fulfill our role in the National Counterdrug Strategy as lead in detection and monitoring. We accomplish this through close interagency coordination, by supporting law enforcement interdiction, and building long-lasting security capabilities in partner nations.

Our programs cover the entire SOUTHCOM area responsibility, including Central and South America and the Caribbean Basin. Our principal command agent in the planning and execution of the detection and monitoring effort, as you know, is Joint Inter-Agency Task Force South, or JIATF-South. JIATF-South is a model organization for multiservice, multiagency, and multinational support to the counterdrug mission. Their operations in conjunction with USSOUTHCOM deliver an integrated approach to meeting DOD missions in the war against drugs and narcoterrorists.

Successfully executing these counterdrug missions would not be possible without the fiscal resources you provide. USSOUTHCOM is planning on receiving a total of $350 million from DOD's central transfer account in fiscal year 2005 to fund our principal CD activities. In fiscal year 2006 we have requested about $368 million.

As you are aware, in the transit zone of the Eastern Pacific, Central America, and Caribbean, we conduct daily interdiction major surge counterdrug operations. As for the source zone, we continue to promote military cooperation that focuses on improving partner nation capabilities. In addition to providing counterdrug training teams to vetted units in our partner nations, we provide a variety of assistance focused on operational, logistics, and communication self-sustainment.

Colombia is the source of 90 percent of the cocaine and approximately 45 percent of the heroin entering the United States. For Colombia, the granting of expanded authorities was an important recognition that no meaningful distinction can be made between the terrorists and the drug traffickers in our region.

In concert with U.S. Department of State and several agencies, we continue to provide a full range of support to the Colombian government, its security forces, and its people. This includes training and equipping of both military and police, as well as assisting the Ministry of Defense in the development of modern budget and logistics organizations.

I would like to emphasize that all of our training, planning, and assistance programs operate under strict rules of engagement that prohibit U.S. service members from participating directly in combat operations in those countries. At times, measures of effectiveness are difficult to gage. However, over the past year we have seen very encouraging results. Transit zone disruptions, as you have
mentioned, which include maritime and air seizures and mission aborts increased from 156 metric tons in calendar year 2003 to 222 metric tons in calendar year 2004, an increase of over 43 percent. In 2004, Colombian security forces captured nearly 180 metric tons of cocaine and cocoa base. Between the transit zone disruptions and the seizures of Colombian security forces, this equates to over 400 metric tons of cocaine that did not make it to the streets of the United States.

Additionally, the security situation in Colombia has greatly improved: homicides have decreased 16 percent, the lowest homicide rate in Colombia since 1986; robberies have decreased by 25 percent; kidnappings are down by 46 percent; terrorist attacks have decreased by 44 percent nationwide in Colombia. We are encouraged by Colombia’s success and recognize that they are at a critical point in their history, which is central to our counternarcoterrorist fight.

With the assistance of the U.S. Government and under the leadership of President Uribe, the government of Colombia continues to build on their military and social successes. The government of Colombia has established a security presence of all of its 1,098 municipalities, arguably for the first time in their history. Colombia is an example of an establishing democracy that we must continue to support.

In summary, we continue to press forward successfully in our fight against narcoterrorists and the drug trade. Despite the decrease in some asset allocations to U.S. Southern Command due to global priorities, we continue to leverage all available resources to accomplish our mission. We continue to derive benefits from mature command and control network, effective information sharing infusion, and a robust logistical infrastructure that is the backbone of our detection and monitoring capability.

In conclusion, I would like to thank you for the opportunity to highlight the critical counternarcoterrorism work done by the men and women of U.S. Southern Command for U.S. national security, as well as regional security and stability in the partner nations. I look forward to your questions, sir.

Mr. Souder. Thank you very much.

Next question is Captain Jim Stahlman, Assistant Operations Office of U.S. Central Command.

STATEMENT OF CAPTAIN JIM STAHLMAN

Captain Stahlman. Chairman Souder, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you in support of the President’s fiscal year 2006 Department of Defense counternarcotics request and to discuss Central Command’s role in support of the counternarcotics effort in Afghanistan.

U.S. Central Command provides support to the government of Afghanistan and to the Department of State’s Embassy Kabul Counternarcotics Implementation Action Plan in construction of the foundation of an Afghan capacity to fight the destabilizing influence of a narcotics trade.

In the fiscal year 2004 supplemental budget initial CN funding was provided by Congress which accelerated Central Command’s and the Department of State’s ability to develop this Afghan coun-
ternarcotics capacity. In just 10 months, CENTCOM has committed these funds to provide training to the National Interdiction Unit of the Afghan Counternarcotics Police to provide additional helicopter lift capacity for Afghan and Coalition CN units, and to begin construction of infrastructure for border control.

In coordination with the Department of Justice, DOD has commenced construction of a training and operations facility for DEA foreign advisory support teams, FAST teams, and has provided pre-deployment training at Fort Benning, GA for five DEA FAST teams, including 32 personnel en route to Afghanistan.

The fruits of these foundational labors are showing on the ground in Afghanistan. Over 100 NIU CN police have been trained and equipped, with 30 more in the training pipeline. We have contracted two MI–8 HIP helicopters and associated air crew and maintenance personnel to provide internal Afghan CN airlift capacity, and are refurbishing three more helicopters.

CENTCOM has established a dedicated CN intelligence fusion cell embedded in the Combined Forces Command Afghanistan intelligence organization. Military and DEA liaison officers have been exchanged and are standing watch in the CFCA Operation Center in Bagram, and the DEA Operation Center in Kabul.

CENTCOM has tested and implemented mission planning and coordination mechanisms which synchronize the CN efforts of the government of Afghanistan, United Kingdom, Department of State, DEA, and CENTCOM forces. When U.S. military support is required, DEA knows how to get it.

This initial investment showed tangible results on March 15th with the execution of the first NIU counternarcotic operation on three drug labs in Nangarhar Province, one of the primary sources of Afghan opium. Target selection and development and planning support were provided by the CN intelligence fusion cell. The operation was supported on the ground by DEA FAST team advisors. Helicopter lift to and from the operation was provided by the combined effort of both DOD contracted MI–8s and CENTCOM helicopter assets. In extremist defensive support and medical assistance was immediately available from CENTCOM assets.

This first effort results in the destruction of 2 metric tons of brown opium, 15 kilos of high-grade white opium, as well as the collection of a significant amount of legal evidence.

CENTCOM continues to support Afghan CN operations. Since March 15th, the NIU has conducted three additional missions. The MI–8s have provided over 100 additional flight hours of CN lift support. The CENTCOM intelligence fusion cell provides daily analysis of potential CN targets and mission analysis for planned targets. Biweekly coordination conferences sponsored by the embassy and supported by CENTCOM synchronize the overall CN effort.

Since March 2005, all formal requests to CENTCOM for CN airlift support have been met, to include use of C–17s and C–130’s to provide transport for the Afghan Special Narcotics Force. CENTCOM is leaning forward to support this critical effort.

I look forward to your questions. Thank you.
STATEMENT OF

CAPT James E. Stuhlman, USN

Assistant Director

Operations/USCENTCOM

BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM SUBCOMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE, DRUG POLICY AND HUMAN RESOURCES

ON 2006 DOD COUNTERNARCOTICS BUDGET

MAY 10, 2005
Chairman Souder, Congressman Cummings, and members of the Committee:

I. INTRODUCTION

USCENTCOM currently has about 19,000 Coalition forces deployed in Afghanistan as part of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). This total includes some 17,300 U.S. and about 1,700 coalition personnel from seventeen (17) nations. All are commanded by Combined Forces Command – Afghanistan (CFC-A), which assures unity of effort with the U.S. Ambassador in Kabul and manages the military-to-military relationship with the Governments of Afghanistan, Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and the NATO International Security Assistance Force (ISAF).

While significantly diminished in 2004, threats to stability in Afghanistan come from three groups namely the Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin (HiG), al Qaeda and remnants of the Taliban. While each is fading, these enemies continue a robust propaganda effort and plot attacks against the Afghan government as demonstrated by the activity over that last 6 weeks. As ever, the enemy remains patient, hidden and dangerous. Continued development of effective Afghan security institutions and a viable political structure are keys to reducing the enemy’s ability to reappear in strength.

During the past year, USCENTCOM and CFC-A focused their efforts on defeating the insurgents and terrorists, building Afghan security institutions, de-legitimizing Afghan warlords, disarming and demobilizing irregular Afghan militias, and countering Afghanistan’s growing drug trade. While our 2004 priorities were directed toward the first three categories, evolving conditions in Afghanistan necessitate that militia disarmament and counternarcotics support will become increasingly important in the near term.
In 2005, the UK leads an accelerating international assistance effort for Afghanistan’s counternarcotics program. The Department of State’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL) leads U.S. national efforts that partner with this UK-led program with U.S. forces in Afghanistan in strong support. Unchecked expansion of poppy cultivation and the drug trafficking culture that accompanies it poses a clear threat to Afghan stability. In support of interagency counternarcotics efforts, USCENTCOM established a Counternarcotics Branch in our Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG) to better coordinate Department of Defense support to national efforts. During 2004, CFC-A delivered $73 million in DoD supplemental funding toward programs to support Afghan police, border security, and Counternarcotics Police (CNPA) equipment and training.

CENTCOM continues counternarcotics support programs and extends assistance to build the Afghan infrastructure and security sector capacity to defeat the counternarcotics threat. Our efforts will be earnest, yet our expectations must be realistic. There will be no quick fix to Afghanistan’s counternarcotics challenge. Success will require patience, persistence, and the knowledge that successful counternarcotics programs take time, while unsuccessful ones rush to failure. CENTCOM and CFC-A fully support DoS/INL’s Long Term Strategy for Afghanistan, which calls for the reduction of poppy cultivation to pre-Taliban levels (less than 74,000 ha.) by 2008. Armed with this knowledge, we can help the Afghans achieve their counternarcotics objectives at a pace that will not jeopardize stability, or fuel the popular unrest that could give Afghan insurgents a second wind.
II. OPERATIONAL SUPPORT

USCENTCOM continues to provide operational support to counternarcotics operations in Afghanistan within existing authorities and capabilities. Counternarcotics operations are primarily an Afghan responsibility. USCENTCOM forces have primary missions of providing security, defeating terrorists and countering insurgents. Where resources are available, USCENTCOM forces provide intelligence and mobility support to counternarcotics operations such as the Afghan Special Narcotics Force (ASNF), the Afghan National Interdiction Unit (NIU) and other elements of the Government of Afghanistan.

III. ENABLEMENT SUPPORT

USCENTCOM’s strategy for fighting drug production and trafficking in the AOR is based in enabling partner nation governments’ to address drug problems of their own accord. The Supplemental Appropriation for FY04 was entirely committed to this end. In FY05, given favorable Congressional consideration, USCENTCOM will continue and expand these projects to give the Government of Afghanistan and surrounding nations the means and capabilities to disrupt narco-trafficking organizations in their respective nations.

a. Infrastructure Development — Afghanistan’s decades of conflict left the infrastructure devastated. Governmental offices are no exception to this rule. Surveys of the counternarcotics police structure, including the Counternarcotics Police of Afghanistan (CNPA), the Afghan National Police (ANP), the Afghan Border Police (ABP), and the Afghan Highway Police (AHP) indicate that all lack sufficient facilities to function properly. In FY04, using supplemental appropriations, USCENTCOM embarked on
projects to redevelop police infrastructure as it relates to counternarcotics forces. To that end, 12 Highway Police headquarters, 6 ANP headquarters, and 2 Border Police headquarters are being built. In addition, one border crossing point is under construction. FY05 continues many of these projects and begin a host of new projects with the overall goal of providing capable facilities for counternarcotics police agencies. Questions have been raised over the wisdom of counternarcotics funding applied to border police crossing points. Clearly, Afghanistan has a porous border. Current border crossing point plans include major, high-speed avenues of ingress/egress from the country. These crossing points, in conjunction with planned Border Police outposts in more remote smuggling areas, will not seal the country’s borders. However, these projects are a necessary starting point for border control. Absent these crossing points, illicit materials will continue to freely move in and out of Afghanistan.

b. CN Police Training – Germany is the lead nation for law enforcement reform under the Bonn II accords. USCENTCOM does, however, provide support to security forces and police training working in concert with the State Department’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement. In FY04, supplemental appropriations provided training for 100 National Interdiction Unit (NIU) officers. These officers now operate in conjunction with DEA FAST teams. One hundred NIU officers have graduated with one additional course underway at this time. In FY05, NIU training will culminate in a 200 officer force. Additionally, a sub-training block on narcotics will be included in training for the ANP, AHP and ABP. This training is still in a conceptual stage with many details to be fleshed out. Finally, DOS and DOD have entered into an agreement to leverage the capabilities of the Office of Military Cooperation, Afghanistan and INL to further
enhance police mentoring in the field. CENTCOM is currently developing the execution plan for this action.

c. Police Mobility — As you are aware, the terrain in Afghanistan presents unique challenges to any type of operation. Absent a well developed road network, helicopters are the only efficient means for counternarcotics enforcers to reach their operational areas. In FY04, using supplemental appropriations, DoD provided two leased MI-8 helicopters to support Afghan counternarcotics forces. In addition, DoD let contracts to refurbish three additional MI-8s, one for the ASNF and two for the Ministry of the Interior. In FY05, given requested supplemental appropriations, DoD will continue this mobility program providing additional leased fixed-wing and rotary wing aircraft and planning for refurbishment of additional aircraft.

d. Police Equipment — Counternarcotics law enforcement agencies are new to Afghanistan. These agencies lack even the most basic equipment for officers to operate. As such, in FY04, using supplemental appropriations, USCENTCOM purchased non-lethal equipment for these forces including cold/wet weather gear, gloves, boots, scarves and protective vests. Much of this equipment is already in country and has been distributed to Afghan counternarcotics police.

e. Border Police Communications – The Border Police concept of operations is to place company outposts in remote areas with platoons patrolling forward along remote borders. Given the terrain, this presents serious communications problems. To address these problems, USCENTCOM committed $9 million to establish a communications architecture to support the Border Police.
f. Information Sharing – USCENTCOM is committed to assisting law enforcement counter drug forces in developing appropriate targets. To that end, USCENTCOM committed $4M from FY04 Supplemental Appropriations to form a counternarcotics intelligence support architecture. This is a two pronged project. The first prong – already complete and operating – is a counternarcotics intelligence cell at CFC-A. The cell is manned with six DoD contractors and representatives from DEA, the United Kingdom, the Office of Naval Intelligence and DIA. The second prong will consist of an intelligence fusion center at the Afghan Ministry of the Interior. This cell will be manned by two DoD contractors who will assist the MOI in developing its own counternarcotics intelligence capability.

IV. CONCLUSION

Progress toward a safe and democratic Afghanistan has been steady and significant. That progress faces challenges from the threat of illegal drugs, that crowds out legitimate enterprise and undermines institutions. USCENTCOM understands the depth of the Afghan opium problem and stands ready to support lead nations and agencies in their efforts to work with the Government of Afghanistan to stem this illicit economy. Addressing the narcotics problem in Afghanistan requires a synergy of public information, law enforcement, eradication, economic development, and interdiction of illegal drugs. Where appropriate and within the existing capabilities and authorities, USCENTCOM will support these endeavors.
Mr. SOUDER. Thank you very much.

Our last witness is Mr. Lennard Wolfson, Assistant Deputy Director for Supply Reduction, Office of National Drug Control Policy. Thank you for coming.

STATEMENT OF LENNARD WOLFSON

Mr. WOLFSON. Chairman Souder, I am honored to appear before you today to discuss the fiscal year 2006 DOD counternarcotics budget.

The President’s Drug Control Strategy details the policies and programs designed to meet the goal of reducing drug use in the United States. That is clearly our objective. It is not to run programs, it is to achieve the end result of reducing drug use in the United States. In this context, the Department of Defense plays a critical role in the Strategy by disrupting the market for illegal drugs and also through an internal demand reduction program that has made a tremendous difference within the Department of Defense.

The fiscal 2006 request from the Department of Defense, almost $900 million, will continue to fund an array of effective programs that support the National Strategy. Moreover, they are vital to achieving the National Strategy. DOD provides essential planning, command and control, communication, intelligence, and integrated op functions that are the core of national counterdrug interdiction efforts. But DOD does not act alone. DOD contributions are complemented with the special resources and capability of U.S. law enforcement and also our allies.

Put in this context, DOD’s unique capabilities cannot be replicated by any other department or agency. No organization in the world can conduct the integrated intelligence planning and operations like the U.S. Department of Defense. No other U.S. agency has the breadth of staff with the specialized capabilities. Highlighting this is the DOD-funded and principally staffed Joint Inter-Agency Task Force South, JIATF-South.

As indicated already, JIATF-South seized a record amount of cocaine this last year, but that doesn’t tell the whole story. They have been seizing huge amounts of cocaine every year for the last 10 or 15 years. They are just getting better and better at it each year.

More so, JIATF-South is not just a center managed by DOD and having interagency and international participation. It is a national asset and it works. The unique cadre of dedicated, motivated, and effective intelligence, planning, and operational staff focus on stopping the movement of cocaine toward the United States.

Most important, they just don’t do the mission, they achieve results, outstanding results. And that is what it is all about, to achieve the results of our National Drug Control Strategy. We don’t just want programs, we don’t just want funding, we want operational results like JIATF-South and DOD are achieving.

In Colombia, DOD has trained police, military, and also that is achieving results. As indicated already, a lot of drugs seized in Colombia, but also the DOD-trained Colombian military has been transformed from a defensive-minded military of 1999 into a force capable of launching sustained and successful offensive operations
throughout the country against the FARC narcoterrorists. This is a dramatic change in just a few years.

In regard to Afghanistan, DOD is also playing a vital role in the overall strategy, interfacing with Afghans, Department of State programs, DEA, other Federal agencies, and also our coalition partners. The administration and also the Afghans’ plan really involves five pillars: deterring poppy cultivation and heroin trafficking, justice and law enforcement programs, eradication, alternative livelihoods, and interdiction. In many ways, DOD is participating effectively in support of each one of those programs, although one can argue DOD is not the lead for any one of them.

In conclusion, while at war in Iraq and Afghanistan, DOD has remained committed to the counternarcotics mission and continues to achieve real results. Moreover, DOD’s efforts cannot be replaced. The efforts are critical in reducing the amount of illicit drugs entering the United States and also in denying millions of dollars of illicit drug profits that could find their way into narco or into terrorist hands. Efforts in Afghanistan, cocaine transit zone, detection and monitoring and interdiction programs, intelligence programs, training of Colombian military and police, domestic support to law enforcement all contribute directly to disrupting the market for illegal drugs. All are critical elements in implementation of the National Drug Control Strategy.

Most importantly, DOD is simply not funding and executing programs, they continue to deliver results, and we would expect 2006, when funded, would be no different that we would expect results. Especially in the Western Hemisphere against the cocaine threat, DOD programs, as requested in the 2006 budget request, should continue to provide the critical element for reducing cocaine availability in the United States.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to your questions.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Wolfson follows:]
Statement by Lennard J. Wolfson
Assistant Deputy Director for Supply Reduction
Office of National Drug Control Policy

Before the House Committee on Government Reform
Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy and Human Resources
Chairman Mark Souder, 109th Congress

“Securing America from Drugs and Terrorism”
May 10, 2005

Chairman Souder, Ranking Member Cummings, and distinguished members of the Subcommittee: Thank you for the opportunity to testify on the Fiscal Year 2006 DoD Counternarcotics Budget and its support to the National Drug Control Strategy.

Whether represented by an Air Force E-3 AWACS tracking a drug-trafficking aircraft over Colombia; by a U.S. Navy frigate launching a Coast Guard Law Enforcement Detachment to board a cocaine-carrying fishing vessel deep in the Eastern Pacific; or a U.S. Army Special Forces sergeant instructing members of the Colombian National Police CD strike force (the *Junglas*) to use explosives to destroy a cocaine processing lab; or a U.S. Army warrant officer in his Blackhawk piloting Afghanistan counternarcotics police to destroy an opium lab in Nangarhar—the Department of Defense plays a critical role in the President’s strategy of disrupting the market for illegal drugs.

The Department of Defense provides the essential command and control, planning, communications, intelligence, and international partnerships that are the core of the National Task Forces (Joint Interagency Task Forces). DoD’s contributions are complemented by the authorities, competencies, and resources of U.S. law enforcement and our allies. The Department of Defense’s unique capabilities cannot be replicated by any other department or agency. No force in the world can run the integrated intelligence and planning operations like DoD; no other agency has the staff or its unique capabilities.

DoD-led units, principally the Joint Interagency Task Force-South (JIATF-S), seized a record amount of cocaine in 2004, more than 200 metric tons (mt) in the Transit Zone, compared to 156 mt in 2003. In Colombia, DoD-trained *Junglas* special operations forces destroyed well over 150 cocaine HCl labs, thwarting the production of vast amounts of cocaine, and seizing, in 2004, more than 70 mt of cocaine. Furthermore, in Colombia, DoD training and support have helped transform a defensive-minded army into a force capable of launching sustained offensive operations in remote areas that were traditionally under control of the FARC. These operations, dubbed Plan Patriota, have allowed the Government of Colombia to regain control over thousands of miles of territory, while hindering narcoterrorist groups’ access to drug mobility corridors. As an example, early last year the DoD-trained Colombian Army CD Brigade launched a commando raid detaining a senior FARC leader, Anayibe Rojas Valderrama a.k.a.
“Sonia,” marking the first time the Colombian Army has been able to deliver a significant blow to the FARC deep in their own territory. “Sonia” has since been extradited to the U.S. on cocaine trafficking charges.

This success has not come without challenges to the system. We closely review the disposition of DoD and partner nation Maritime Patrol Aircraft (MPA) deployments. The Navy’s reduction in the size of its worldwide P-3 fleet has significantly reduced DoD’s long range MPA capacity, which includes their ability to dedicate assets to counterdrug detection and monitoring operations. Meanwhile, the British recently reduced their Nimrod fleet by 25 percent, cutting the number of aircraft from 21 to 16. Furthermore, the Dutch retired their entire P-3 fleet, which further reduced overall MPA capacity in the Transit Zone.

Better intelligence on drug traffickers’ activity and several interagency initiatives have helped fill some gaps in long-range MPA capacity. DoD arranged free lodging for British Nimrod crews at the Forward Operating Location (FOL) in Curacao, so as to offset their deployment costs and delay a planned reduction in Nimrod MPA hours. DHS Customs and Border Protection (CBP) added 400 flight hours per month to JTF-South operations in the Transit Zone; the Coast Guard increased dedicated HC-130 hours and has an MPA CD gap initiative in their FY 06 budget that requests more hours and a more robust forward-deployed HC-130 maintenance capability at the Forward Operating Location in Comalapa, El Salvador, which will significantly increase Transit Zone HC-130 on-station time. USAF E-3s have also recently returned to the theater, which has allowed CBPs P-3 AEW aircraft to return to MPA missions, and retired Dutch P-3s will eventually be replaced by Fokker 60s. Finally, we are also hopeful that the Canadian military will make periodic MPA deployments to the Caribbean.

DoD is playing an important role in supporting the Administration’s Afghan CN strategy and works with State (INL), DEA, other Federal agencies and our Coalition partners to ensure there is an economy of effort. The Administration’s plan leverages DoD’s capabilities to compliment and reinforce the efforts of other agencies and the overall CN strategy.

While making an impact in Afghanistan is not predicated solely on DoD, the military contribution is very important. Afghanistan and U.S. poppy eradication and voluntary crop reduction are crucial to reducing funds that may support narco-traffickers and terrorists, and these efforts are funded principally by the Department of State. DOJ and DEA have vital roles, and if provided adequate funding, can make a significant impact. DoD support to both is valuable, as is planning and intelligence.

U.S. counternarcotics programming is set out in a five-pillar plan that offers incentives through alternative livelihoods, combined with strong disincentives in the form of forced eradication, law enforcement, and interdiction, while a robust public information campaign helps spread President Karzai’s message warning Afghans to stay out of the opium business. All of these U.S. anti-drug efforts are intended to simultaneously produce results while we build the Afghan government’s capacity to conduct its own counternarcotics efforts.

Whenever possible, our military supports the U.S. Government’s CN Strategy against opium cultivation and opium/heroin production and trafficking. In the last year, DoD’s contributions to
this strategy have been significant. DoD, in support of INL, is assisting the Afghan Border Police with specialized training, equipment, and facilities focusing on the border with Pakistan. Additionally, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers will oversee the construction of headquarters facilities for the Border Police and for the National Highway Police. At other major crossing points, DoD is assisting the Government of Afghanistan to improve border drug transit points along routes to Iran, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan. These facilities will allow for a greater law enforcement presence, improved security, and reduced drug trafficking along these major routes.

Expanding the Afghan government’s interdiction capabilities, so that its operations can result in criminal prosecutions, is essential to the overall success of the CN Strategy. Using Fiscal Year 2004 funding, DoD, in support of law enforcement, funded the ongoing training and equipping of a specialized National Interdiction Unit (NIU), an element of the Afghan Counternarcotics Police. This newly developed capability consists of approximately 100 trained officers and will work closely with the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA). DoD is also constructing a base of operations that will provide spaces for housing, feeding, and additional training of these officers and provide enhanced surge capability that will put rotating teams of DEA agents in country to work with their Afghan counterparts. DoD’s Combined Forces Command-Afghanistan (CFC-A) will support the NIU with airlift, in-extremis close air support, and emergency medical evacuation if needed. U.S. Central Command is preparing to provide aerial transportation support for up to four interdiction operations per month. In addition to this support, DoD has leased two MH-53s for use by interdiction forces and Afghan police and DoD is in the process of refurbishing two Afghan-owned helicopters. The helicopters will be used to form an Afghan police transportation unit for the interdiction force and other police actions. A training program to build the pilot, maintenance capacity and base of operations will be provided with DoD funding and support. While pilots and maintenance crews are being trained, DoD has budgeted for contractors to provide this service.

In Afghanistan, U.S. troops are authorized to conduct military operations against drug trafficking targets when those military operations support our stability mission in Afghanistan. If our troops come across drugs or drug producing equipment during the conduct of other military operations, they are authorized to take action against those targets and report all drug related discoveries. Since July 14, 2004, there have been 19 reported instances of U.S. military forces encountering drugs in the course of military operations and either destroying or transferring the drugs to the appropriate Afghan authorities. Nine of those instances were in January 2005.

More recently, on March 15, U.S. military forces provided insertion, extraction and security support to six DEA agents and 36 Afghan narcotics police in a successful operation against three labs located in Nangarhar province, one of the primary sources of Afghan opium. Significantly, DEA agents, U.S. military forces and Afghan police planned, rehearsed and, finally, successfully executed this effort resulting in significant evidence collection by the DEA and the destruction of two metric tons of brown opium, 15 kilograms of high-grade white opium, as well as associated chemicals. The 36 Afghan narcotics police who participated were equipped and trained by DoD contractors and using DoD funds.
DoD also provides support to the United Kingdom-trained Afghan interdiction force, the Afghan Special Narcotics Police (ASNF). Since last summer, the ASNF has seized and destroyed no less than approximately 81 metric tons of opium, 70 heroin labs, and 28 metric tons of precursor chemicals, and has detained numerous drug traffickers. In coordination with the U.K., DoD continues to provide the ASNF with equipment, including night vision goggles. In addition, DoD is financing the refurbishment of an additional MI-8 helicopter to compliment the U.K.-refurbished MI-8s used by this force.

To improve the flow of information between intelligence and law enforcement organizations, DoD established counter-narcoterrorism Intelligence Fusion Centers (IFCs) within Combined Forces Command-Afghanistan (CFC-A) and the Afghan Ministry of Interior. Intelligence packages developed in part by the CFC-A cell have been used in several successful interdiction operations, including those of the ASNF. The cell is working closely with other U.S. Government agencies, such as the Department of State and DEA, as well as our U.K. partners. The Afghan center will not only house counternarcotics information in support of interdiction and prosecution, but will support police operations against insurgent and other illicit activities. This database will be the first step in reconstructing Afghanistan’s criminal justice records which were destroyed by the last two decades of war. In Fiscal Year 2005, we will continue to support this effort and expand its capability.

Despite commitments in three wars, Iraq, Afghanistan and the global war on terror, DoD remains committed to the war on drugs and their efforts have made a real difference in reducing the amount of drugs from entering the United States and denying millions in drug proceeds from getting into terrorist groups hands. DoD’s ability to do this reflects upon the perseverance and dedication of the men and women in the armed services and we are all truly grateful for their efforts.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE BUDGET BREAKDOWN

(Budget Authority in Millions)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Drug Resources by Function</th>
<th>2004 Final</th>
<th>2005 Enacted</th>
<th>2006 Request</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intelligence</td>
<td>$125.316</td>
<td>$134.381</td>
<td>$128.421</td>
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<tr>
<td>Interdiction</td>
<td>499.867</td>
<td>431.841</td>
<td>468.550</td>
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<tr>
<td>Investigations</td>
<td>49.521</td>
<td>49.213</td>
<td>46.720</td>
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<tr>
<td>Prevention</td>
<td>110.782</td>
<td>120.141</td>
<td>122.345</td>
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<tr>
<td>State and Local Assistance</td>
<td>146.732</td>
<td>147.151</td>
<td>107.690</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treatment</td>
<td>6.680</td>
<td>5.511</td>
<td>5.668</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>$953.255</strong></td>
<td><strong>$906.522</strong></td>
<td><strong>$895.741</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Drug Resources by Decision Unit     |            |              |              |
| Counter-narcotics Central Transfer Account | $880.255  | $906.522   | $895.741     |
| Afghanistan Supplemental Account    | 73,000     | -           | -            |
| **Total**                           | $953.255   | $906.522    | $895.741     |

| Drug Resources Personnel Summary    |            |              |              |
| Total FTEs (direct only)            | 1,405      | 1,421        | 1,421        |

| Information                         |            |              |              |
| Total Agency Budget (Billions)      | $441.7     | $402.6       | $419.3       |
| Drug Percentage                     | 0.2%       | 0.2%         | 0.2%         |

2006 Request

- The department’s FY 2006 Central Transfer Account request of $895.7 million reflects price growth of $18.7 million and a program decrease of $29.4 million from the FY 2005 enacted amount of $906.5 million. The department’s FY 2006 counter-narcoterrorism budget will continue to fund, within fiscal constraints, an array of effective programs that support the Strategy’s and department’s goals.

  - **Demand Reduction ($128.0 million)**: A total of $19.8 million is for the National Guard State Plans and Service outreach programs, and the Young Marines outreach program, and $108.2 million is for the continued support of DoD Demand Reduction programs.
- **Domestic Support ($199.1 million)**: Of this amount, $152.7 million is for the portion of the total National Guard State Plans that supports domestic law enforcement efforts and the counter-narcoterrorism schools; $14.1 million is for Domestic Operational Support, such as NORTHCOM counter-narcoterrorism support to DEAAs and Title 10 National Guard translation efforts; and $32.3 million is for Tethered Aerostats.

- **Intelligence, Technology and Other ($139.6 million)**: A total of $87.7 million is for counter-narcoterrorism intelligence support and analysis; $25.8 million is for SIGINT collection and processing; $12.1 million is for Service and SOCOM command and control programs; and $13.9 million is for CN Technology efforts.

- **International Support ($429.1 million)**: Funding of $177.5 million supports operations in U.S. Central Command, U.S. Southern Command, U.S. Pacific Command, and U.S. European Command AORs, including Section 1033 support. Resources of $180.7 million are for detection and monitoring platforms and assets; and $70.9 million is for AOR Command and Control support, including operations of Joint-Interagency Task Forces West and South.
Mr. SOUDER. I thank you all.

I am going to try to divide up the questions a little bit, because basically if you look at this, Northern Command basically has our borders, Central Command is Afghanistan and the regions in that zone, Southern Command has Colombia and the South American and transit zone regions, Secretary Long is overseeing from the Department of Defense all the different operations, and Mr. Wilson is over at the ONDCP trying to interrelate this with our overall National Drug Control Strategy.

First, let me kind of lay this statement out, because I want to acknowledge that, in fact, we have been doing well among seizures, and we should congratulate everybody who is doing well among seizures. Mr. Cummings has raised something that we are hearing on the floor in an increasing pressure from Members of Congress, which is why, if we are seizing all this, haven’t we seen a change in supply and haven’t we seen a change in price and haven’t we seen a change in purity, of which we have offered a number of things.

Director Walters said a number of years ago we were turning a corner, and if we didn’t see a turn soon, we have major, major problems—that would be basically next year—that we seem to have learned what we didn’t know. In other words, there may have been stockpiles, but the question is that we seem to be seizing more because we didn’t realize how much there was.

The question is are they also producing more or did we just not realize how much they were producing, which becomes a relevant question in the sense of—which many Members of Congress have asked at this subcommittee year after year—is are the seizures just a form of bad debts that the drug dealers take as a writeoff? In other words, they figure we are going to get 5 percent. If we move that to 6 percent, they just increase the amount they are growing. Or, in fact, are we getting to some kind of a point where we come to that tipping point that increased seizures put us over the top.

Now, the reason I say all this is because my questions are going to be more on the difficult side, not praising those who have been doing the interdiction. Because I appreciate that we are doing the interdiction, but the fact is that we are being told that right now we have more actionable intelligence than we have the ability to respond to, which is a unique thing that we did not hear in this committee in the past few years. In other words, we have now learned that we can see the drugs coming into the United States and we are not stopping them, as opposed to ignorance was bliss before—they were coming in and we couldn’t see them. And part of my opening statement was trying to reflect that knowledge, that our intelligence and knowledge of what is coming.

Furthermore, as we try to sort through this different process, it appears that in spite of reductions at least in the transit zone of intelligence and in spite of holes in intelligence, much of this actionable intelligence is coming from one small agency, Panama Express, and that is what is providing a lot of our interdictions; it is not all these other operations that we have been talking about today. And that presents a challenge because it means that when we look at this governmentwide, our interdictions may be up, but it may be disguising actual cutbacks for whatever reason.
So let me first start in the Western Hemisphere with Colombia in particular. I am going to diverge from where my questions were originally going to go and let me ask Captain Turner this question. You, in your statement, had quite a bit about extraditions and how important extraditions are in Colombia and how we have made progress, talking about things are in the public record.

We now have people from our State Department and other people in Colombia who have been picked up dealing, and the Colombians are saying they should be treated under Colombian law. This is going to be discussed in general. I have supported the military position that we have to be careful about not exposing our guys to all sorts of harassment in countries around the world. Yet how are we going to continue this extradition policy with the Colombians if the Colombians see Americans dealing on their soil and then aren’t held accountable by Colombian law? Could you elaborate any on that thought? And Secretary Long too.

Captain TURNER. I appreciate the question, sir; it is a good one. Those instances you talk about are presently under investigation, and that is about as much as I know. I know as much as you do, sir, I think on as far as where that is, and I can't tell you anymore than that. Regarding extradition, that is really out of my bounds as far as an operator. Those get into policy issues that I can’t really answer for you, sir.

Mr. SOUTER. Secretary Long, do you know anything on how we are going to approach if people in American armed forces violate? We had a little bit of this in Okinawa, but in our area here, in narcotics, it is really going to complicate our extradition life if we tell countries they have to extradite to the United States, but we won’t allow American citizens who have been drug trafficking on their soil to be prosecuted.

Ms. LONG. Thank you. I am going to refrain from commenting on any specific instances, as you well know, that are under criminal investigation, but I think it is important to point out several things. While there have been some recent unfortunate instances of military and other personnel in Colombia who were engaged or apparently engaged in activity, these have been the exception over a very long period of time.

So to compare them, as some in Colombia want to do, with the extradition procedures that they have with the United States for long-term, high level narcotics terrorists I believe is inappropriate; and I think, from a policy perspective, that we should refrain from drawing those parallels. They are inappropriate.

To the extent that I am aware, these are individual allegations of some low level involvement, they do not in any way rise to the very high level, very complex and well negotiated positions the U.S. Government and the Colombians have taken, which is that those at the highest level of the FARC and the other threats to the Colombian democracy will be extradited, when appropriate and extradition is requested by the U.S. Government.

That is not the case in these instances, and I would fear discussing them in terms of that, and I feel fairly assured that whatever problems we may have in our countries in which we operate, they will not rise to that level, sir.
Mr. SOUDER. We may have followup questions as we find the extent of it. I understand the basic principal, and it certainly would not be compared to the primary cartel leaders. At the same time, we extradite more than just cartel top guys.

In the Western Hemisphere—maybe, Secretary Long, you could start—given the increased demands of the Department and some reluctance, of which you have been a champion of keeping the Department more aggressively involved in narcotics, but how do you see the Department of Defense role on things like the aerostats and other things? Do you believe more of that ought to be transferred over to the Department of Homeland Security? Clearly, we are looking at pressure in Iran; we are looking at pressures in Korea, all around the world. Is it realistic to expect the Department of Defense to continue as the lead agency in a lot of providing this intelligence?

Ms. LONG. I think, sir, that while some people have taken the position that the Department was reluctant to engage in counterdrugs, that is clearly not the case now. In fact, NORTHCOM, under the very fine leadership of that combatant commander, as well as the Secretary, are absolutely committed, particularly in North America, in our home, of making sure that we do everything—and that means everything possible—to protect the American citizens not only from the drugs that are coming across our shores, but from all transnational threats.

And one of the things I think the Department has discovered perhaps post-September 11th, as the rest of the Government has discovered, is that the traditional stovepipes and separation of military, law enforcement, and who does what where aren't going to fulfill that task in the way that we are going to need to have it fulfilled.

In pursuance of that, the Department has reached out and is working very closely, I believe, with the Department of Homeland Security, our own Department of Homeland Defense, with DEA, with law enforcement in attempting to come together with an absolutely integrated approach to securing our borders not only from a narcotics perspective, but from a homeland security and defense perspective.

To the extent that any of those functions, once integrated, are more appropriately law enforcement functions, I think it is absolutely appropriate that those functions be headed by the appropriate law enforcement agency; and to the extent that those are national security and functions that are militarily unique, I think they should remain with the Department of Defense.

But I guess my point would be I don't think the Department is looking for a turf battle. I think what we are looking for is the best integrated approach, and that we are willing and looking forward to working with our law enforcement partners to get the right mix.

Mr. SOUDER. I am not interested in a turf battle either. I am interested in assigning whose turf it is on.

Captain Turner, has the Department of Defense or SOUTHCOM requested additional money for the aerostats in the area that we are completely blind on the Gulf or on the eastern side of Florida?

Captain TURNER. As any agency would attest, more resources would be better. Of course that would be the case. With the inte-
grated systems that we have, the ROTH—the Relocatable Over-
the-Horizon Radar—in conjunction with the ground-base radar pro-
grams that we have developed within the partner nations which we
are actually working to sustain over time so that the partner na-
tions can take over. The integration of that system and with the
sharing ability that we have put in place, the architecture that we
are putting in place is creating a fusion of effort.

Certainly resources could be provided for that we could work, but
we want to concentrate, from my perspective and SOUTHCOM’s
perspective, try to get to the threat as far away from our shores
as possible. So we have concentrated more to the south of that to
intercept those particular threats as far south as we can, and that
is our particular goal, sir.

Mr. SOUDER. Well, let me see the chart up there. And I want to
say up front Congress bears part of this responsibility because they
did not give adequate funding for the aerostats at different points.

My question at this point is you can see where it was as it moved
to the Department of Defense. The fact is while we have multiple
ways of tracking ways and different things, we can see where the
planes are and we can see our gaps in the system. Those gaps are
public because it is unclassified information that is in front of you.

We have charts that have been shown at our hearings that show
the drugs flowing from Colombia over in the Cancun area of Mexico
and the eastern side, and you see all this red, and we see it coming
up the northern border. But part of the reason we don’t see any
arrows coming up the Gulf Coast is we don’t have the slightest
idea, and you can’t publish a chart that shows where the drugs are
going if you don’t have an idea whether any planes or boats are in
that area, because we can see them and then they are gone.

So the question is repeated, have you requested additional money
for aerostats? And if not, why not? And what do we need to do to
close some of that gap? Not to mention the fact that I had one of
the heads of BP Petroleum tell me that they are looking in that
area south of New Orleans and east toward the panhandle of Flor-
da, out 100 miles, as possibly the biggest oil find, bigger than
Saudi Arabia. We are going to have all those oil derricks out there
and we don’t know what is going on in that area.

And the question is are we going to request something? Is there
going to be something? If the Department of Defense is going to
take the lead, this becomes a huge homeland security question as
well, with the all the oil derricks out there. And the question is if
the Department of Defense isn’t going to request it, then why
shouldn’t it be over in the Department of Homeland Security, be-
cause somebody has to request something.

Ms. LONG. Mr. Chairman, if I might interrupt for just one mo-
ment.

Mr. SOUDER. Yes, Secretary.

Ms. LONG. I believe NORTHCOM has some interesting insights
on this issue, and then I can close the loop.

Mr. SOUDER. Yes, I guess actually it is more NORTHCOM in this
case, once you get up to aerostats. I apologize for that.

Captain TURNER. But, sir, if I could, before we transit——

Mr. SOUDER. You are going to have it out when it is out 100
miles.
Captain Turner. Yes, sir.

Mr. Souder. But who is going to have it at the border?

Captain Turner. What this does not show is the ROTH coverage that we have as well. If you are going to make this chart really complete, I believe it would have to show all our radar capabilities, which would include the ROTH, which is significant.

Mr. Souder. I have to say, though, that when I have gone to the areas and you are watching, that may be true and either one or two things is happening: either agencies aren’t sharing intelligence, which is another problem, or, in fact, it covers part of that, but not the zone that we have. Because in the Joint Intelligence Centers which are kind of known entities, the fact is that we are blind in some areas; we aren’t in the places and we lose them. We have ways to pick them up again, but we spend a lot more money trying to pick them up again than it would take to not lose them.

Colonel Nelson. Mr. Chairman, to address your question about TARS from a NORTHCOM perspective, that is part of the U.S. NORTHCOM AOR. It is actually a NORAD managed system; it is part of our binational arrangement with Canada, U.S. Northern Command through continental air defense region, and Tyndall Air Force Base receives those feeds from the Tethered Aerostat Radar Systems.

Department of Defense has directed that we maintain status quo, and we have planned on maintaining the system until such time as we desire to upgrade to a system called the wide area surveillance system, to increase our coverage at low, slow flyers below 2000 AGL. It is more reliable, not necessarily relied upon good weather conditions.

As you are probably well aware, during high wind situations we have to take the tethered aerostat system down, so that also presents gaps in seams as well. So we believe that the solution long-term is the wide area surveillance system to provide better coverage for the area in question.

Mr. Souder. And what is the timetable for that?

Colonel Nelson. Right now, I know it is programmed, but I will have to get the specifics on that for you.

Ms. Long. Mr. Chairman, if I might add, as you well know, years ago when the Department took over the Tethered Aerostat Radar System, there were various times in its development when it was considered that the system in its entirety be provided to the homeland defense, and it is my understanding that the homeland defense did not have the funding nor the expertise in order to maintain the systems and, in fact, had contemplated in their assumption of the system actually turning it back over to the Air Force and having the Air Force assist them with the system, which didn’t seem to make much sense from a taxpayer and national security perspective.

I can tell you, sir, that even in the last months, as part of a homeland defense, homeland discussions of our overall air and maritime awareness picture for the United States, we have reexamined the Tethered Aerostat Radar Systems as part of this overall framework which NORTHCOM is advocating, looking at even the possibility of upgrading, making tweaks to the system while we are waiting for the other system to come online.
I don’t have a timeframe for you, but it is something that we are painfully aware of, as well as we are painfully aware of that with the increased derricks and oil gas activity in the Gulf, maybe even the traditional radar system isn’t going to be sufficient because we end up with so many bogeys, if you will, with planes and helicopters flying into those platforms.

So we are taking a look at it from a defense perspective and working with homeland defense and homeland security to make sure that where we know there are gaps—and these are gaps, you are absolutely right, sir—that we are working to address them.

Mr. Souder. And we have looked at ROTHR radar in different places—South America has been my most exposure to that—there are different things you are looking for for long-haul flights and short-haul hops; what the altitude is, what the speed is, very precise information as they near the border. It is a little different than when we have the entire Caribbean with which to catch them.

It is a whole other thing when they are about to come into the United States and we want to know precisely where they are landing, what altitude they are, how fast they are coming, because they are headed to local law enforcement. It is not a theoretical person coming in somewhere from Colombia, it is a very precise thing we are trying to nail. And, also, while they do try to fly in stormy weather, the fact is that if you can’t get an aerostat up, it is also harder to move these small planes around, and they become more conspicuous when they are landing because there is less activity in many of those areas because the same thing that makes it difficult for the aerostat makes it difficult for small planes. Not to say that drug guys aren’t going to try to hop that, or terrorists, obviously, whenever we are dealing with it.

And I want to make it clear, as will become clear in my questions and in my past comments it is certainly true, Department of Homeland Security I am not always pleased that they don’t divert from narcotics as well. So it isn’t a given place where it is going to be better for narcotics having the resources, which agency should have the resources. What we want is an agency that isn’t going to divert them, is going to understand that homeland security is a part of this, but narcotics are a key part.

Captain Turner, if you could talk a little bit about the P–3 hours, because P–3s also serve actionable intelligence, in addition to broader intelligence, and our ability to interdict as it moves. I don’t think we have any disagreement that the farther away we can get the drugs, if we can eradicate it, that is our first choice, if we can get it before.

But as it moves closer to us, we need to have higher odds of interdicting, because now it is basically a skate, it is a skate the eradication, it is a skate the transit inside Colombia; it is now headed to the United States. And the Navy has played an absolutely critical role in having adequate resources over time to act on the actionable intelligence, and yet that is where we have seen the declines in this transit zone.

Could you address some of that and how you intend to make up for some of these gaps of the things that we now see moving toward ups?
Captain Turner. Yes, sir. Certainly, the loss of the legacy aircraft, the P–3—and it is a legacy aircraft, and that is predominantly why we have seen such a decrease in its numbers, but that is worldwide. It is an MPA platform that has seen its best time, and we have realized that from across the DOD spectrum, that the P–3 has been radically cut in deployment across the globe. And the Navy is aggressively working for replacement of that aircraft.

In the meantime, we have addressed our concerns with inter-agency partners, the customs, of course, the custom P–3s, as well as looking for other assets that can support that internationally, deployment of Nimrods is very important to us, as well as looking for other sources perhaps at some other platform that could fill that gap.

This is a constant concern on our end, and we work very closely with the interagency aspect—whether it is Coast Guard, Customs, and the international community—to help with this concern. But this is a legacy aircraft that was on its way out, and the Navy is working to replace that particular aircraft.

Mr. Souder. You said it is system-wide. If you were to compare the execution orders of last year and this year, what percentage reduction would we see in DOD aviation assets dedicated to the counterdrug mission in the Western Hemisphere?

Captain Turner. Well, you are looking at one platform, sir, and there are many platforms out there that are just as important. For instance, the AWACS was mentioned earlier. The numbers that were given representative of the AWACS we just got back in SOUTHCOM deployment in support of the CDX order that we have. AWACS just came back into our theater at the end of November. Thanksgiving was its first deployment date. That was one aircraft. So the numbers that you see for 2004 reflect only 1 month of activity.

In March we got our second AWACS. What this has allowed is that in support of air bridge denial program, we can put an AWACS up for that and redirect the Customs aircraft that were completing that mission to support the MPA deficiencies that we have. So it is an efficiency of assets and resources that we are working with here.

Mr. Souder. So I interpret your question—to paraphrase Mark McGuire—you are not here to talk about the past, what you are saying is that lots of drugs got through last year, but this year you are going to do more because you have the AWACS?

Captain Turner. Well, sir, it was a record year last year, so——

Mr. Souder. Not a record year for percentage. In other words, percentage of what we saw we got less. What we got was——

Captain Turner. Are you talking about the intel aspect of this?

Mr. Souder. Yes. In other words, we saw last year more than we ever saw before and got less of a percentage of what we got. We got more, but that is like saying a baseball player got 100 hits and the next year he got 150 hits, but 1 year he had 300 at bats and the next year he had 500 at bats. He had 500 chances to get it, he got 150, but that means your batting average has dropped.

And I am not criticizing the men and women of the armed forces, I am just saying what we see—as a practical matter, what we know on the streets is that more must be coming in because we are
interdicting more and the price and purity isn't, and the ONDCP is saying that drug use is down somewhat.

So if drug use is down, price and purity are there—drug use at least in marijuana is down—that we have some kind of a mismatch in the numbers. And part of the question is if everything was going this great, we wouldn't need the AWACS back there. Clearly, we had them diverted. What we are trying to establish is in the multitasking of missions, when you move AWACS away, when assets that are older are declining, you can't have it both ways. You can't say we are covering everywhere in the world with less and an equal amount. We made certain decisions in the United States that we were going to move AWACS and other things to higher priority targets. In that period we did the best we could in narcotics. And now we are moving those assets back because we don't need them in another place. Isn't that what you just said?

Captain Turner. Well, sir, we are getting our AWACS, but it is the first time since September 11th that we have gotten AWACS back, and that is a true statement, yes, sir. And what we are also seeing is the intel infrastructure that we have put in place, the assets that we are putting toward intel, the collection of the intel information, the analysis of the information is giving us a better product; and it is right, we are seeing more now, and that is because of many years of building to this point. Also, we have more DOD assets in there. EP–3, EC–130, C–26, CSS, ARL, these are all assets that we are now, from a DOD perspective, putting into the fight, and we are seeing more, yes, sir.

Mr. Souder. And what we are in effect saying is that, to some degree, if we are seeing more, we want to get it, and how can we get precise as we get more intelligence to try to—because in the Navy we also have a fundamental question of, in addition to the air assets, are water assets, which are critical in our ability to execute. Have you seen a change in any of the oilers, other types of assets that the Navy Department uses to assist?

Captain Turner. No, sir. That has been pretty steady state. We have been receiving the requested amount of surface assets and we are pretty much steady state as far as our maritime assets go. What you have seen is a depreciation in one particular asset, and that is the P–3, is the concern.

Mr. Souder. And you don't have the numbers for how much it went down?

Captain Turner. Of the P–3? What numbers you stated are true.

Mr. Souder. OK, thank you.

Let me move briefly to Captain Stahlman for Central Command, and once again, Secretary Long, if you have comments. I have a couple of kind of fundamental questions.

You stated in your testimony that there were three different groups that were threats to stability in Afghanistan. How do you think these different groups are funded? In other words, as these groups exist and as groups that exist to destabilize Afghanistan, since they don't seem to have much of another economy and since we shut down the finances, isn't it logical to assume that the heroin is likely to be their fundamental funding source?

Ms. Long. Yes, Mr. Chairman. Actually, we have spent a considerable amount of time in the last months developing intelligence,
and I think it has come to support in many respects what appears to be a common sense conclusion: that when you have an economy that is upwards of 60 percent, either directly or indirectly, narcotics-driven, that anyone operating in the area in practically any kind of commercial transaction or activity is at least in some respects deriving if not direct benefit, indirect benefit from the sale of drugs.

The Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin, the HIG, as you are aware and the Taliban and some of the other terrorist organizations, we have been developing linkages between those organizations and narcotics organizations. Because we are an open forum, I will leave it at that. The ties with al Qaeda may be less strong, and we are still developing those, but importantly, and I think the point that you are attempting to make, warlordism and other insurgents or other anti-government groups are getting their funds and support from somewhere, and I think it is logical to conclude that they are at least in part narcotics-driven.

Mr. Souder. And I understood, Captain Stahlman, did you say the first raid was in March?

Captain Stahlman. The first raid for the NIU, their first operational mission was March 15th, yes, sir.

Mr. Souder. And what are we to do before March 15th?

Captain Stahlman. Sir, we were developing a capacity with the Afghans for the capability to do this. The U.K. was working with the Afghan special police units creating that capacity and essentially we had a new Afghani government in place in December, and these were the first organizations that were in there available to them under their forestructure to conduct these kinds of missions, sir.

Mr. Souder. We have somewhat of a policy difference here—I appreciate that the administration is evolving with this, but let me ask Mr. Wolfson do you agree with the basic thrust that seems to be out of the Defense Department and, to some degree, the State Department, as they approach Afghanistan, that before we arrest any inner-city kids in the United States, we ought to have an alternative development program and they ought to have jobs that are well paying, or do we treat American citizens different than we treat people overseas?

Mr. Wolfson. Clearly, the Afghan situation with the economy and the desperate situation after literally 20 years of destruction is a unique situation. Per capita income in Afghanistan is a little over $200 a year. The people are desperate. Clearly, there are some individuals that emphasize the essential need for alternative development before you enforce the rule of law.

Our view is there has to be a combined effort; you have to raise the deterrence, for instance, of eradication and blend that with an appropriate level of alternative livelihood. You can’t just go out there and suspect that you are going to ever, either with U.S. funding or international funding, find enough money to give everyone in Afghanistan a better job.

Mr. Souder. I don’t have them in front of me, but I am happy to look up and put into the record administration statements about how we view the Taliban and not cracking down on heroin. We didn’t say, by the way, Taliban, create a bunch of alternative devel-
opment, we said stop the heroin. And I am not arguing we don’t do alternative development, but 60 percent of minority males in many urban areas don’t have a job. That is roughly the same as Afghanistan. Different standard of living comparisons, but we don’t say we are not going to arrest somebody on the street corner until they have an alternative job in the United States.

And I am not arguing we shouldn’t do alternative development. What I am arguing is that Colombia, which has been heralded as a reasonably good example and a very tough neighborhood where I believe a 200-year democracy has been more or less destabilized by our drug habits in the United States and Europe, and you all are trying to train people who have had a history of a democracy—shaky democracy, but probably the most steady in that whole region—where they have a police department, they understand the difference between a police department and a defense department in Colombia. We are now going into a country where they have none of that and we are saying we are not going to eradicate until they have alternative development, until they have stood up their police department? I mean, this may take 50 years.

Now, I believe President Karzai is absolutely committed to trying to do what he can. Realistically, you know full well we don’t control the ground there, we own the ground there; that the DEA can’t go into operations without the military protecting them, the State Department can’t fly in there and eradicate without our military protecting them. They don’t have black hawks. Colombia has black hawks of their own; Colombia has trained military operations. And we need to train the Afghans as far as we can.

But, meanwhile, the standard with which we held the Taliban, who never allowed this much heroin, as the U.S. military allowed on our watch—the Taliban never allowed that. We yelled at them, we screamed at them, we said eradicate it. And when it came to our government, we say, well, it is complicated; we have to work this through; they need to have alternative crops. This used to be the bread basket of the world. They can plant other crops now.

The king told us multiple times in meeting with him in Rome and in Afghanistan that this area can grow other crops, it has grown other crops. They can’t make as much money with other crops. That is the problem. It isn’t that they need an alternative development; they need to grow wheat like they used to grow wheat, but they can’t get the same amount.

So what is the double standard in the United States? We tell kids, well, you can’t make as much at McDonald’s as you do selling cocaine, so until you can make as much in a job selling cocaine? They can grow other things. These fields that grow heroin can grow other things. There is a market for food. We are having to import food in.

I am seeing a disconnect with this, and part of it is we can’t tackle the heroin problem without the military. And I understand it is an awkward position for CENTCOM and our government to be flying around the country and to do that, but we have spent $343 million to eradicate 2 tons, to get rid of 2 tons, basically. That is a very costly rate. It is a start, and I want to applaud you on a start, but it has to go faster, and you can’t do it with three DEA agents
and a little tiny task force tackling the biggest heroin production in the world.

Then, in your testimony you talk about the money being spent in Azerbaijan. Why are we spending money in Azerbaijan? Because we screwed up in Afghanistan, now the heroin is moving across, leaving a path of destruction as it moves through Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan and into the Balkan region, where everybody realizes it is mostly going to go into Europe and probably squeeze more Colombian heroin back into the United States. This is a huge problem, and we have to, I believe, push at, at least, double, triple, quadruple the efforts you are going. I am not arguing that you haven’t made a start. I am still upset about the past, because it is there, and it isn’t a matter just going, hit a lab or two, it is hit the cotton-picking stockpile; not as an afterthought on a raid where you happen to see it, go find it and hit it.

Secretary Long.

Ms. LONG. I just want to correct what appears to be perhaps a misperception, and perhaps we have been less than diligent in explaining the administration's position. It certainly isn’t my understanding of the administration's position or the Department’s position that we are waiting to interdict drugs or make arrests until alternative livelihood or economic alternative programs are in place.

And in fact, the U.K., as lead nation, has been undertaking interdiction, and very successful ones, for some time now. And it did take longer than it should have for us to stand up the National Interdiction Unit, but it is stood up and operating.

One of the problems and the tensions that exists, sir, is that in a country like Afghanistan, where you don’t have a judicial system and no capability to arrest individuals, you are sort of in a catch-22 with interdiction activities. You can arrest the individuals and destroy the drugs, but when you don’t have a place to even put them or a system in which to put them, the effort becomes somewhat farcical at a certain state, and that is why we are attempting to develop all the prongs of the five aspects of the program that Mr. Wolfson pointed out in order to move these along in a coordinated and integrated manner.

On the issue, however, of interdiction, your point is well taken in that we need to interdict more. There is a problem with Afghanistan that is somewhat unique, and the king, as you pointed out, I think may have jumped over a slight issue which is unique to Afghanistan, and that is, unfortunately, during the Soviet occupation and thereafter, many of the farmers turned to opium and poppy growth eventually and, in fact, their rents and mortgages were based on poppy prices.

So they are in fact indebted to poppy, and, unfortunately, due to the 20 years of destruction, there are no alternative financial resources for them to substitute that debt. And with the war prices have increased, not only the prices of mortgages and rent, but food-stuff. So you have the farmer in a very vicious inflationary cycle, where if he plants wheat—and you are entirely correct that at one point this area in Central Asia was the bread basket—he will still starve because he can’t make his basic payments or feed his family.
That is not to say, sir, that eradication is not being pursued; it is. The State Department, as you well know, is pursuing eradication, and the Karzai government has been adamant and unfailingly supportive of all aspects of their counterdrug campaign, and we are supporting them the best we can. But it is somewhat complex, and we perhaps haven't done a good job and we were a little late getting started, as you pointed out, but I do believe that the mix that we are examining and working every day is the appropriate mix by moving forward with all of these prongs at the same time.

Mr. Souder. You raised a number of other issues. I think it is important to point out that the amount of heroin that came out since we removed the Taliban is more than 4 years previous. In other words, for your theory to be financially an explanation, the question is why was there so little production and why were there zero years under the Taliban, and it happened 1 year? A second part of that is to whom do they owe the debt, which is another fundamental question which means that basically we don’t control the ground. What you are saying is that the heroin poppy people control the ground because they can still enforce those debts, which any legal society would not honor because they are debts for peddling poison that murders people and based on a false premise. And if in fact we controlled the ground and destroyed the assets, and would 100 percent eradication, now you basically told me, what I got out of that was alternative development isn’t really the problem here, it is dealing to the degree, what percent that is at debt structure and an elimination of the drug lords who have a choke hold and are not going to be impressed that they are now growing wheat. It doesn’t change the debt question just by the fact that we are going to push alternative development, because we will never be able to retire that debt, the same holds true.

But it is interesting and it shows its complexity, but it addresses the question of we have to get control of the ground, and without getting control of the heroin, we are not going to get control of the ground because the equipment they are purchasing with which to shoot at the planes when we come in to eradicate, the equipment they are purchasing increasingly to shoot at us as we go try to destroy a stockpile now that we have the will to do so, is being bought with heroin money because they don’t have any other economy with which to buy it, and we have shut off their foundations. So we have to get at the core of the heroin problem or we cannot stabilize Afghanistan. And I understand it is a poor country and we have to understand that.

On the other hand, that doesn’t give them the right to ship more death out. We are going to have more death from the heroin coming out than we did on September 11th, and that is a tough statistic to handle, that there will be more deaths from the heroin coming out than happened on September 11th.

Ms. Norton.

Ms. Norton. Mr. Chairman, I very much regret that a groundbreaking in the District and another hearing made it impossible for me to hear these witnesses, because this is an important hearing and one I am particularly interested in, and I appreciate that you have called a hearing on this subject. I am terribly per-
plexed by it and hope to learn something from the testimony. I certainly will take the testimony with me. But I do have a question simply based on the explosion of poppy since we have occupied the country.

It looks like we have gone from an Afghanistan we found as a major supplier of terrorists to a major supplier of poppy and heroin. If history records that was a result of this heroic war, I think we will have only ourselves to blame. We had to do what we did, and America is grateful for what we did.

And the chairman asked, well, how come it exploded once we got there. Well, of course, the Taliban would probably cutoff your hands and everything else it could find. So we knew what kind of society they were looking in, so we were on notice that if we wanted to keep things anywhere close to where they were, we would have to try something very different in keeping with, of course, their culture, but with our democratic mores.

I am concerned that, on Homeland Security Committee, for example, the way we are approaching WMDs is we want to keep—we don’t talk about what happens when they get here, we talk about what we should be doing abroad to make sure the explosives on WMDs don’t get in cargo. Of course, when it comes to demand for drugs, we are long past the point, and really lays the basis for my question. I am very, very concerned that this word that is thrown around, narcoterrorism, is something we don’t know what we are talking about. We know that there is some illicit trade with people who would be committed to terrorism going on. We know that. We know that drug dealers often engage in other kinds of trades. That is their MO. You don’t have to have ties to al Qaeda to know where to sell the stuff.

So I am just very worried that all this word talk about narcoterrorism doesn’t have anything under it, because we certainly wouldn’t be looking at the same places we look for terrorists. These folks are out selling it, I am sure, in the way they sell drugs, wherever they can, and in places that we would not suspect.

The warlords are the functional equivalent of kingpins here. We always say we are trying to get them. We don’t do a very good job, but at least we know that you have to go at them or you don’t do anything. Very sensitive when you are talking about a foreign country, and one that we have very good relationships with.

My question really goes to whether or not we have even found our way to a military role here. That is not the kind of role we have traditionally played, but the chairman’s memo describes statistics that lead me to believe this issue is so out of control that we simply ought to face it and talk about a wholly different approach.

For example, if it is true that 87 percent of the world’s illicit opium this year comes out of Afghanistan, with a $2.8 billion return, 60 percent of the GDP of the country, I would say this is so far beyond us that it kind of looks like where we are in the inner-cities. You know, can we get rid of drugs in Harlem and Southeast Washington? Yes, if this were 50 years ago.

It has gone so far that so many other issues that impinge on it now, some of them the chairman has mentioned, you know, when the economy of inner-cities went, jobs go offshore, a new economy
set in, it was the drug economy. It looks like that is what happened here big time.

I have to ask you whether or not there is any way short of an explicit military role or, in the alternative—let me give the only other alternative I can think of, one akin to what we do. We pay farmers not to grow stuff. So the alternatives I see here is a much more explicit military role, on the one hand, or, on the other hand, real subsidies to the country so that, in fact, warlords and everybody else get some kind of legal tender, the rationale of which would be not only will this hold them in place until we perhaps get a real economy going there, but it will help us with the rest of the world who gets the 87 percent of this narcotics traffic that we have helped to create.

So I want to know if, with these figures, you see any alternatives besides a more explicit larger military role or a huge subsidy role of the kind that would hold the country until the economy got going.

Ms. LONG. With your permission, Representative Norton, I will take that on. I think that some of the questions that you point out are particularly insightful, and those are ones that we discuss practically everyday as we all get together and talk about the various roles that the Department, along with the other sister agencies, are playing.

I do think the Department plays a critical role in interdicting drug, monitoring and detecting drug movements into the Western Hemisphere, in particular the cocaine, which is our principal concern, coming out of Colombia. And as you pointed out——

Ms. NORTON. Where does the 87 percent go, by the way?

Ms. LONG. I beg your pardon?

Ms. NORTON. Where does all this opium go?

Ms. LONG. I think the 87 percent that you are referring to is the Afghan opium. Most of that actually goes to Europe and to Russia. Thankfully, thus far, my understanding from DEA is that not much, if any, of that opium has reached our shores, which brings me to my point. We can't abandon the effort in Afghanistan because, as the chairman pointed out, with such an explosion, the market being as it is, it is our great fear that eventually such a surplus may result in the opium products coming to the United States.

I think——

Ms. NORTON. Or going to terrorists, who then shop it around anywhere they can find.

Ms. LONG. That is correct, and are looking for easy means and illicit means of support because it is easier. And, as we all know, narcotics is a fast way to gain lots of money.

I think probably the answer is not to pay farmers. You might be well aware that was an approach that was applied by the Colombians and actually was advocated at one point by some of our colleagues in Afghanistan, and what was found was when you pay a farmer not to plant, he depends on that and may not be telling you that he is planting elsewhere, and what it actually ended up resulting in was some misrepresentations in the reporting and not a substantive decrease in the actual plantings. The Karzai government has been clear. Because of religious and other principles and moral
values that they share with us, they are adamant that not only will they not pay farmers not to plant opium and buy it, but, in fact, the illicit use of opium worldwide wouldn't lend itself to actual licit production and utilization of the opium out of Afghanistan, it is just too much.

I think——

Ms. NORTON. Nobody would plant it if you said don't—well, if you can't police it, I can understand it, but nobody would say plant it and then we are going to take it and do something. Are you suggesting plant it and then burn it or something? Because that is not what I was suggesting.

Ms. LONG. Well, the alternative would be plant it and not take it and allow the——

Ms. NORTON. Well, how about not planting it?

Ms. LONG. Well, actually, the U.K. also tried that, they paid farmers not to plant in Afghanistan. They have tried various approaches, and that also didn't work in that what the farmers did was not plant where it was easily ascertainable, and then plant in places that were further up in the hills; and the result was the increase that we are all seeing, at least in part.

So I think what the international community has come up with is basically a better integrated effort: more participation by coalition members, including our allies; a stronger effort by the Karzai government; and a stronger effort by the actual region to attack the drug trade. It is critical—and I sense your frustration—to note that the Karzai government really has been in office for less than a year, and, in fact, their regional and their other elections are not even coming up until this fall.

They have made tremendous strides, I believe, in the last year, and I believe with the concerted effort of the integrated U.S. governmental entities that are working with the U.K.—the Italians, the Germans and other coalition partners—that the better effort is going to be the better integrated effort.

Ms. NORTON. Mr. Chairman, that is my question. All I can say is this jargon about integration still does not in fact say that there is a strategy. With all due respect, this country is hooked on opium, and I can only tell you if any sector, the way inner-cities, for example, are hooked on opium, once you get hooked on opium and opium money, the notion of extracting people from that—at least if our experience in this country is any example—is virtually impossible.

I see this, frankly, getting worse over the years, not getting better without some fresh strategy that looks at a country that is now so enshrouded in opium production that without a radical new approach, just us all working together to do good things we have already done—if that is going to be our approach, Afghanistan will look like the inner-cities of America, except they will be growing it instead of simply distributing it.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SOUDER. Thank you.

I wanted to comment briefly too that one thing about paying people not to grow wheat, for example, or corn as a legal substance, so what happens sometimes is when you pay them not to, they grow more of it, and that is likely what will happen here. As we come up with alternative development, as we pay them not to grow
it, other countries will start to grow it so they can be paid not to grow it. And it is a problem in the agriculture area of the United States, let alone worldwide.

I want to just make sure this is on the record. What I think personally is going to happen is that the world market can’t absorb much more heroin than it is, although they will market it, so they will warehouse it, and we will see 3 years of people coming up to hearings telling us what a great job we are doing of eradicating heroin in Afghanistan, and how we are doing such a wonderful job, and we have seen the amount of heroin poppy decline not because of anything we are doing, but because they have plenty of it.

So unless we go after the warehousing—and then 4 years from now we will see another surge of planting because we haven’t dealt with the fundamental question of if we see a poppy plant, we are going to eradicate it and talk later. An aggressive interdiction strategy, if we blow up the stockpiles, if we go after that—will send a message of aggressiveness, and then we need to work at how to help in alternative development and other areas.

Now, I have a couple of other questions for Mr. Wolfson. The National Interdiction Command and Control Plan is an interagency effort that ONDCP coordinates. Since September 11th, we have the whole rise of Customs and Coast Guard and DHS and a whole changed landscape. What is the status of the National Interdiction Command and Control Plan now, and what steps are you taking to ensure that the new plan is sufficiently comprehensive, and do you plan to issue it soon?

Mr. WOLFSON. Yes. Actually, we went through quite an evolution to make sure it met all the different needs. And, as you point out, there are competing requirements to make sure just the right level of counterterrorism is in there, just the right level of drugs are in there so that the correct latch-ups exist. We are at the point now where the final version is actually available, and I would estimate that it will actually be signed within the next couple of weeks.

Mr. SOUDER. Thank you. Also, in the General Counterdrug Intelligence Plan, the last time a thorough one was pulled together was under President Clinton, and you did an update in 2002 on the progress of the original plan. Are you working also to review that all-encompassing National Drug Counterdrug Intelligence architecture? We have passed legislation in Congress of concern about this. We are dealing with this, the seemingly proliferation of agencies that are collecting intelligence that will overlap with counterdrug intelligence.

Mr. WOLFSON. The existing plan and the steps forward are being reviewed. At this point I can’t tell you definitively what action is being taken, but clearly that document, the original document, in my recollection, just be 5 or 6 or 7 years old. It had something like 80 important issues that had to be addressed. Many of them were, but I think we are reviewing what should be the appropriate next steps.

Mr. SOUDER. Thank you.

I also wanted to come back again to Captain Turner. In the first quarter of 2005, what was the percent of air patrol hours provided by DOD compared to what was provided by Homeland Security, do you know?
Captain TURNER. I don't have that exact answer for you, sir. It was less.

Mr. SOUDER. Can you get us a particular for the record?

Captain TURNER. Yes, we will give you that.

Mr. SOUDER. Also, was this a decrease or increase over 2004, if you took it by quarter?

Captain TURNER. Are you talking about the ratio?

Mr. SOUDER. No. Ratio would be interesting, but I was more wondering you said you have the AWACS back, but in your air patrol hours will the first quarter of 2005 show the changes? And I didn't think about the percentage. Is there also a percentage? Would this alter the percentage too?

Captain TURNER. Yes, sir. And certainly with the AWACS back it does increase the Custom Border Patrol aircraft usage for MPA, as an MPA asset. And what I want to make clear is that it is an integrated effort. JIATF-South takes its resources and best puts them into the right mission mix, and that is why they are there.

And it is not a competing effort; we don't compete with Department of Homeland Security, DOD. This is a team effort that JIATF puts together and a coordinated effort that they take what they have, whether it be international Nimrods, Customs P–3s, Navy P–3s, Navy S–3 Vikings, whatever it is, the put those together to best support their mission, sir.

Mr. SOUDER. I wasn't really looking at it as competing. What I think the data is likely to indicate—and we would appreciate the supplemental data. There are two questions. If you take what you have been putting in as raw hours, what DHS agencies are putting in as raw hours, the DHS hasn't been substantially increasing. What has been happening is you have been decreasing. So we have seen a percentage flow over to DHS.

And part of the question is, Mr. Wolfson, as you see this shift, what are you proposing to do about it over in the drug czar's office from the supply interdiction question? Part of this may be because post-September 11th we had assets that left because we needed them in Iraq and Afghanistan, and none of us are going to put that many troops in harm's way and not have adequate intelligence. But on the other hand, if Iran or Korea changes 6 months from now, we are right back to where we were. What we have seen is a shift. In this plan that you have come out in a couple weeks, are you addressing that question? Also, you said that you are looking at an intelligence question. Is this one of the things you are looking at? Because this has been a rather significant switch in percentage of resources without increasing the resources at the Homeland Security side, but yet in creasing their percentage of the resources that are out there.

Mr. WOLFSON. Let me add some general comments and then I will try to answer your specific questions. Successful interdiction over what amounts to 6 or 7 or 8 million square miles of ocean and maybe 20 or 30 sovereign countries is terribly important.

We hope to have enough ships, enough aircraft to have blanket coverage that will be in the right place at every time when a drug shipment is moving. JIATF-South makes a every effective effort trying to move assets around to be at the right place based on cued intelligence. For this maritime problem, the cued intelligence is
critical. You mentioned earlier one source of cued intelligence. There are other sources that JIATF-South uses.

Regarding the specific assets, the way I would look at it is not based on any decision, budgetary decision at Department of Defense, but more based, as indicated earlier, by the fact that the P–3 asset themselves were just running out of available life expectancy. They had to cut back on P–3 hours. That was not really a budget decision, appropriation decision, it was the asset that had been used simply was not usable at the rate it was being used before for counternarcotics, or for any other purpose, for that matter.

What did occur is, as mentioned also, the maritime patrol portion of the entire problem—you have to have the cued intelligence, you have to get a ship and aircraft to the place where the target is expected to be, and then you also have to do an end-game. All three of those have to be done in increasingly more effective levels to increase seizures. The maritime patrol portion was always a complement of DOD’s P–3s, also, to some extent, DOD’s P–2s, and Customs P–3s.

And in some ways the Customs P–3s has a better sensor suites and in some ways can actually do some missions more effectively. Last year, my recollection is that DHS actually increased the Customs P–3 hours for counternarcotics. Clearly, Coast Guard has put more 130 maritime patrol hours on it, meaning the counterdrug mission.

So even though DOD went down, there is an aggregate of maritime patrol capability for counternarcotics in this vast transit zone that has been up to the task. Would we like more? Surely. But it has been up to the task.

Mr. SOUDER. This is one of the things that we have been battling over in the Department of Homeland Security Committee, what constitutes terrorism hours, what constitute drug hours, when the Coast Guard boats are pulled in, is the time steaming out into zone and steaming back counted as counterdrug hours or not?

Clearly, last year was better than the year before, but I am interested in seeing the numbers that you have that show that the net hours coming out of DHS that are specifically counterdrug related have increased that substantially to offset the P–3. Obviously, we have also had these discussions.

I remember now Speaker Hastert, when he headed this subcommittee, having discussions about what the military was going to do to replace the P–3s nearly 10 years ago. This isn’t something that we just came up and said, oh, this asset is declining, we suddenly have a problem. The question is you all are in charge of it. What was your proposal to replace the P–3, not just to sit and ring your hands and say, well, we don’t have the P–3? Who was responsible for saying—I mean, these assets were declining. Who was coming forth and saying here is what we are going to replace them with? As I asked the question about the aerostat, we know there are problems with the aerostat. The answer to the question of the replacement system is, well, maybe someday, we are not sure.

And when we see an asset declining over time, what it means is—and I want to grant this absolutely for the record because this absolutely needs to be praised—for a variety of reasons, the cooperation is a lot better. There is much less concern, when assets
are down, as to who gets particular credit for a particular thing. There is much more sharing of assets.

If somebody doesn’t have enough hours over here, all of a sudden it is not who is going to get there first and we are going to run two boats there, it is who has a boat that can run there. So partly adversity has helped with it. Second, we have become better. We should become better.

But the fact is that we are told that there is actionable drug things that we aren’t seizing, and, no, we can’t get all of them, but our goal should be to try to get as many of them as possible when we can see them, and this is a relatively new phenomena that has occurred that says now that we can see them and we are not getting them, and it should then be up to those who are in charge of the antidrug efforts to come to us and say this is what we need in order to do this. If, at the end of the day, we don’t have the appropriation dollars to do it and we say we can’t fund that because we have these priorities and the American people have to make a decision, we are going to let this many boats go through without putting the assets to them because that money can be used in other projects, we have to do that.

But if you aren’t telling us precisely what you need to interdict the assets, if you don’t come to us and say, look, here is what we need to try to do the aerostats, here is what we need to try to figure out how to seize these different boats, here is what we need to replace the P–3s—we are not going to have these P–3s.

Here is another aspect that is specific that we need in the drug war, because what will happen is, with all due respect, inside DOD, this is the challenge that Secretary Long has and that each of you has, that inside DOD, we are the poor little sister at the table. And when they are looking at designing a new platform in the military, counterdrugs are not the primary thing that they are looking at. And that comes back to the fundamental question of can the military really be in charge of this if what you are telling me is your assets that you use are depleting, that you can’t get inside the budget high enough priority to say what is going to replace it. Do we have to have an agency that is more focused, where the drugs aren’t the 20th priority, they are least in the top three?

On the other hand, you have the most assets. You have historically done this. I have tried to encourage you as much as possible to take the leadership back, but it isn’t enough of an answer to say, look, our assets are going down, we don’t have them. We have known that for a decade. The question is what are we doing about it.

Anybody have any comments on that you would like to address?

Captain TURNER. I know a little bit about the P–3 issue from Naval aviation. I am exposed to it in some degree. And it was a relatively quick phenomenon. When they established it, there was a long, very concentrated test and assessment done on the aircraft life, and that is where we took our hit. We took our hit when the final assessment came out on the aircraft. It was a year and a half ago, and they said we have to decrease the number of hours on that platform by almost 50 percent a month. So that was a massive decrease. And that decision happened over only a couple months.
The Navy has been working toward getting a replacement MPA aircraft for some time, as you described, and the P–3s were judged to be able to fill that gap even though there was going to be some decrease in their numbers, but not until they opened up the airplane and did that assessment did they determine that this aircraft is going to become dangerous to fly. So it was a relatively quick reaction on the DOD's part to cut back that.

We immediately, of course, went into the, OK, we have to replace that particular platform and capability with international support, Department of Homeland Security support. This is what we do. And that is only one aspect of the counterdrug mission down there. There is so much more than just the MPA asset that we deal with and what DOD brings to the table on this, and we have described a number of things that DOD principally brings to the table. We are talking about one asset.

And we realize in naval aviation, where the money had to go to, whether it is for F–18 ENFs by bringing up the MPA, that is where it went. That is an internal Navy decision and that is their prerogative. We are constantly engaged with the services to provide the capability that we require, and that is what we are going to continue to do.

Mr. SOUDER. I appreciate your comments, but I do think it is important to point out that as I have had the privilege to go with our people in multiple locations, both in the United States in interdiction zones and in the transit zones, this equipment is old. This is Vietnam War stuff in many cases, 1960’s plane. What you are telling me is we just discovered a year and a half ago that a plane built in the early 1960's is starting to wear out? That is ridiculous.

Captain TURNER. No, sir.

Mr. SOUDER. Or what you are saying is they are wearing out faster than you thought——

Captain TURNER. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOUDER [continuing]. Because somebody thought they were going to have new platforms 5 years ago, so they kept using these things at higher and higher intensity, more and more hours because we had multiple tasking. So the obsolescence that we passed some time ago, when they went in to check, they discovered that these things were basically dying, which we knew 10 years ago.

Now, the specific that you are referring to a year and a half ago is how much time they precisely had left and how dangerous they were to fly, but it doesn’t take too long flying in Colombia or in the transit zone or along our border in some of these planes to realize that many people would not get on that plane in the morning necessarily if they saw it at their airport.

What you all have done in the military has extended the life of this stuff through incredible people working with these planes through coming up with new types of stuff and take risks that average Americans wouldn’t take. But it isn’t a shock that all of a sudden you have to cut back the hours of these things. They are old. Some of them have been rehabbed and reclaimed to try to go into the drug war.

And we want to get you better and more equipment, but to do that there needs to be some specific requests and saying forthright,
look, we don’t have enough stuff here. And trying to come up with all kinds of explanations.

I am not arguing that you don’t do a great job with old assets that you are stitching together. The problem is, much like the Coast Guard, we can’t expect the Coast Guard to guard the port, be out in the middle of the Caribbean, by the way, catch every sailboat that turns over and every fishery, but with the same number of boats. We have to face it here, we either have to prioritize some of the missions, in which case we argue about prioritizing missions, or get them more boats.

Same thing with you all. If you have multiple missions and we need something to do the intelligence for the drug zone, we need to get the platforms to do it or we need to figure out the agency that is going to be responsible for that, get them the platforms, or acknowledge publicly that we can’t stop a big percentage of this stuff.

And then the question is—if I can make a last editorial comment—we doggone better not, well, cut back local and State law enforcement in the budget and get rid of Safe and Drug-Free Schools money, because if we aren’t going to be able, as Mr. Wolfson has eloquently said, to stop all this stuff, we better not be wiping out our local guys who are trying to stop it once it gets through.

With that little editorial comment, does anybody want to have—I very much appreciate your coming. It is not easy to come up, when you are struggling with so many different tasks in the budget, and defend and explain everything you are doing. Our job in this committee is to make sure the war on drugs and the efforts on narcotics do not get ignored as we are tackling other types of things.

As we all know, in the budget process these things go up and down, and 1 year it is gangs, another it is missing children, and then we are at war and then everything is terrorism. But the war on drugs is a constant, and we have to stay vigilant with it or it just overwhelms us, and then we spend 3 or 4 years trying to catch up.

Anybody have any closing comments you want to make?

Ms. LONG. On behalf of the panel, Mr. Chairman and your staff, I want to compliment you on your excellent efforts in this arena. The Department of Defense is committed to our counterdrug programs and our counterdrug operations, and I think the alternative view of some of the points you just raised are because the Department does have so many anti-smuggling, detection and monitoring, and intelligence, and infrastructure, communications—and all those things that we all know about—capabilities, that it is my job, quite frankly, as Deputy Assistant Secretary, to make sure that I leverage all the resources of the Department in an effective way in order to further this mission. It is an important mission.

I am painfully aware that every year that a greater number of people in the United States die from drug overuse or drug-related problems than were killed in the September 11th bombings, and you have both my support and the Secretary’s support in making sure the Department plays its role and that we continue giving you the adequate support and giving our sister agencies the support
that they deserve, they need, and they require to perform this function.

Thank you.

Mr. SOUDER. I thank all of you for your efforts, and I am sure we will continue to ask questions both formally for this hearing, some written questions, but also in the regular give and take, and I appreciate your coming today.

With that, the subcommittee stands adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 4:40 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

[Additional information submitted for the hearing record follows:]
August 15, 2005

The Honorable Mark E. Souder
Chairman
Subcommittee on Criminal Justice,
Drug Policy and Human Resources
Committee on Government Reform
U.S. House of Representatives
Rayburn House Office Building 8-377
Washington, DC 20515

Dear Chairman Souder:

Thank you for inviting a representative from the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) to testify on behalf of the Administration at your Subcommittee’s May 10, 2005 hearing entitled “2006 DoD Counternarcotics Budget: Does It Deliver the Necessary Support?” Please find enclosed answers to your questions for the written record. I hope they prove to be helpful in the work of the Subcommittee.

Thank you again for your dedication on the issue of drug control. I appreciate your valuable insights and perspectives. If ONDCP can be of further assistance, please contact the Office of Legislative Affairs staff at (202) 395-6602.

Respectfully,

Mark M. Campbell
Acting Assistant Deputy Director
Office of Supply Reduction
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM
SUBCOMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE, DRUG POLICY AND HUMAN
RESOURCES

“2006 DoD Counternarcotics Budget: Does It Deliver the Necessary Support?”

May 10, 2005

QUESTIONS FOR THE WRITTEN RECORD FOR THE OFFICE OF NATIONAL
DRUG CONTROL POLICY

1.

An updated version of the NICCP will be released shortly; it is currently in final interagency
coordination. This new document is mindful of the changes that have occurred since September
11, 2001 in protecting the homeland and fighting the war on terror. The NICCP incorporates the
interagency reorganization and the creation of the Department of Homeland Security.

Significantly, the NICCP addresses changes that occurred with the creation of the Joint
Operating Area (JOA) as well as HATF-South responsibility for the Transit Zone which has
resulted in better flow of information and more effective allocation of assets. Our interdiction
system has generated three record-breaking years of cocaine seizures in the Transit Zone.

To a great degree, the effectiveness of the U.S. Government’s interdiction effort is the result of
creative collaboration between different types of organizations: those in the military and
interdiction fields and those in Federal law enforcement.

2.

General Counterdrug Intelligence Plan (GCIP) initiatives, for the most part, have been
implemented. The interagency is nearing completion of many of the goals and milestones
established under the GCIP. Accordingly, funding for the Counterdrug Executive Secretariat
(CDX) will end October 1, 2005. Remaining CDX projects will be turned over to the lead
agency for sponsorship, program management, and funding.

The Counterdrug Intelligence Coordinating Group is developing options and recommendations
to align counterdrug coordination and information sharing structure and process with the new
intelligence structure. CDICG will meet in September 2005 to consider these options.