[House Hearing, 109 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
THE INVESTIGATION OF THE WORLD TRADE
CENTER COLLAPSE: FINDINGS,
RECOMMENDATIONS, AND NEXT STEPS
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
OCTOBER 26, 2005
__________
Serial No. 109-28
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Science
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.house.gov/science
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______
COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE
HON. SHERWOOD L. BOEHLERT, New York, Chairman
RALPH M. HALL, Texas BART GORDON, Tennessee
LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas JERRY F. COSTELLO, Illinois
CURT WELDON, Pennsylvania EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas
DANA ROHRABACHER, California LYNN C. WOOLSEY, California
KEN CALVERT, California DARLENE HOOLEY, Oregon
ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland MARK UDALL, Colorado
VERNON J. EHLERS, Michigan DAVID WU, Oregon
GIL GUTKNECHT, Minnesota MICHAEL M. HONDA, California
FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma BRAD MILLER, North Carolina
JUDY BIGGERT, Illinois LINCOLN DAVIS, Tennessee
WAYNE T. GILCHREST, Maryland RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri
W. TODD AKIN, Missouri DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois
TIMOTHY V. JOHNSON, Illinois SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas
J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia BRAD SHERMAN, California
JO BONNER, Alabama BRIAN BAIRD, Washington
TOM FEENEY, Florida JIM MATHESON, Utah
BOB INGLIS, South Carolina JIM COSTA, California
DAVE G. REICHERT, Washington AL GREEN, Texas
MICHAEL E. SODREL, Indiana CHARLIE MELANCON, Louisiana
JOHN J.H. ``JOE'' SCHWARZ, Michigan DENNIS MOORE, Kansas
MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas
VACANCY
VACANCY
C O N T E N T S
October 26, 2005
Page
Witness List..................................................... 2
Hearing Charter.................................................. 3
Opening Statements
Statement by Representative Sherwood L. Boehlert, Chairman,
Committee on Science, U.S. House of Representatives............ 21
Written Statement............................................ 22
Statement by Representative Brad Miller, Member, Committee on
Science, U.S. House of Representatives......................... 23
Written Statement............................................ 23
Statement by Representative Vernon J. Ehlers, Chairman,
Subcommittee on Environment, Technology, and Standards,
Committee on Science, U.S. House of Representatives............ 25
Written Statement............................................ 26
Prepared Statement by Representative Jerry F. Costello, Member,
Committee on Science, U.S. House of Representatives............ 27
Prepared Statement by Representative Eddie Bernice Johnson,
Member, Committee on Science, U.S. House of Representatives.... 27
Prepared Statement by Representative Russ Carnahan, Member,
Committee on Science, U.S. House of Representatives............ 28
Prepared Statement by Representative Sheila Jackson Lee, Member,
Committee on Science, U.S. House of Representatives............ 28
Prepared Statement by Representative Dennis Moore, Member,
Committee on Science, U.S. House of Representatives............ 29
Panel I:
Ms. Sally Regenhard, Chairperson, Skyscraper Safety Campaign
Oral Statement............................................... 29
Written Statement............................................ 31
Panel II:
Dr. William Jeffrey, Director, National Institute of Standards
and Technology (NIST)
Oral Statement............................................... 33
Written Statement............................................ 35
Biography.................................................... 48
Ms. Nancy McNabb, Director, Government Affairs, National Fire
Protection Association
Oral Statement............................................... 49
Written Statement............................................ 51
Biography.................................................... 55
Dr. James R. Harris, President, J.R. Harris and Company; Member,
American Society of Civil Engineers
Oral Statement............................................... 55
Written Statement............................................ 56
Biography.................................................... 60
Mr. Glenn Corbett, Assistant Professor of Fire Science, John Jay
College of Criminal Justice; Member, NIST National Construction
Safety Team Advisory Board
Oral Statement............................................... 62
Written Statement............................................ 64
Biography.................................................... 65
Mr. Henry L. Green, President, International Code Council
Oral Statement............................................... 66
Written Statement............................................ 69
Biography.................................................... 75
Discussion....................................................... 75
Appendix 1: Answers to Post-Hearing Questions
Dr. William Jeffrey, Director, National Institute of Standards
and Technology (NIST).......................................... 96
Ms. Nancy McNabb, Director, Government Affairs, National Fire
Protection Association......................................... 113
Dr. James R. Harris, President, J.R. Harris and Company; Member,
American Society of Civil Engineers............................ 116
Mr. Glenn Corbett, Assistant Professor of Fire Science, John Jay
College of Criminal Justice; Member, NIST National Construction
Safety Team Advisory Board..................................... 121
Mr. Henry L. Green, President, International Code Council........ 124
Appendix 2: Additional Material for the Record
Statement by The American Institute of Architects................ 138
Letter to Chairman Boehlert from James A. Thomas, President, ASTM
International, dated January 11, 2006.......................... 149
An Analysis of the NIST Report on the Collapse of the World Trade
Center Towers for potential recommendations and impacts on ASTM
standards, prepared on behalf of ASTM International by Vytenis
Babrauskas, Fire Science and Technology Inc.................... 151
Letter to Chairman Boehlert from Ron Burton, Vice President for
Advocacy and Research, Building Owners and Managers Association
International (BOMA), dated October 26, 2005................... 184
BOMA Comments on NIST Recommendations Contained in the Report on
the WTC Disaster............................................... 186
Statement by James G. Quintiere, Professor, Department of Fire
Protection Engineering, University of Maryland................. 191
Statement by Jake Pauls, CPE, Consulting Services in Building Use
and Safety, dated October 26, 2005............................. 193
Fireproofing Blown Off Twin Towers, article by Michelle Garcia,
The Washington Post, Wednesday, April 6, 2005.................. 194
Staircases in Twin Towers Are Faulted, article by Jim Dwyer, The
New York Times, April 6, 2005.................................. 195
3-Year Federal Study of 9/11 Urges Rules for Safer Towers,
article by Jim Dwyer and Eric Lipton, The New York Times,
Wednesday, June 22, 2005....................................... 197
9/11 Firefighters Told of Isolation Amid Disaster, article by Jim
Dwyer and Michelle O'Donnell, The New York Times, September 9,
2005........................................................... 200
BUILDING SAFETY: Directing the Herd: Crowds and the Science of
Evacuation, article by John Bohannon, Science, October 14, 2005 204
THE INVESTIGATION OF THE WORLD TRADE CENTER COLLAPSE: FINDINGS,
RECOMMENDATIONS, AND NEXT STEPS
----------
WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 26, 2005
House of Representatives,
Committee on Science,
Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to call, at 11:09 a.m., in Room
2318 of the Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Sherwood
Boehlert [Chairman] presiding.
hearing charter
COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
The Investigation of the World Trade
Center Collapse: Findings,
Recommendations, and Next Steps
wednesday, october 26, 2005
11:00 a.m.-1:00 p.m.
2318 rayburn house office building
Purpose
On October 26, 2005, at 11 a.m., the House Committee on Science
will hold a hearing on the key findings and recommendations of the
National Institute of Standard and Technology's (NIST) investigation
into the collapse of the World Trade Center (WTC), how building and
fire code organizations plan to implement the recommendations contained
in that report, and what barriers exist to the development and adoption
of stronger building and fire codes.
Witnesses
The following witnesses will address the Committee:
Panel I:
Ms. Sally Regenhard, Skyscraper Safety Campaign (SSC), New York, NY.
The SSC represents families and survivors of the WTC disaster and
supports stronger codes and practices for buildings and first
responders.
Panel II:
Dr. William Jeffrey, Director, National Institute of Standards and
Technology.
Ms. Nancy McNabb, Director of Government Affairs, National Fire
Protection Association (NFPA). NFPA standards are extensively
referenced in the NIST recommendations on the WTC collapse.
Dr. James R. Harris, American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE). ASCE
standards are extensively referenced in the NIST recommendations on the
WTC collapse.
Mr. Henry L. Green, President, International Code Council (ICC). The
ICC is an association of State and local code officials, building
mangers, and other parties that collectively maintain the International
Building Code (IBC), the most widely used model building code in the
U.S. Many of NIST's recommendations reference the IBC.
Mr. Glenn Corbett, Assistant Professor of Fire Science, John Jay
College of Criminal Justice, New York, NY. Mr. Corbett is a member of
NIST's National Construction Safety Team Advisory Board.
Overarching Questions
The hearing will address the following overarching questions:
1. What are the most important findings and recommendations of
the World Trade Center Investigation report?
2. Are the NIST recommendations framed appropriately so that
they can be adopted into national model building codes?
3. What are the prospects for the adoption of the
recommendations by the code organizations? What is NIST doing
to promote this process? What are the possible impediments to
their adoption?
4. What lessons were learned from this investigation that
could be applied to improve future investigations of building
failures?
Background
On September 11, 2001, terrorists crashed two fuel-laden Boeing
767s into World Trade Center (WTC) Tower 1 and Tower 2. While both 110-
story buildings withstood the initial impact, the subsequent fires
weakened the already damaged columns at the periphery and core of the
towers, both of which collapsed. More than 25,000 people were safely
evacuated from the towers, however 2,749 people were killed in the
disaster. World Trade Center 7, a 47-story office building located
adjacent to WTC 1 and 2, was damaged during the disaster and collapsed
later that same day.
Immediately following the attack, the Federal Emergency Management
Agency (FEMA) and the American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE) began
planning a building performance study of the WTC. The week of October
7, as soon as the rescue and search efforts ceased, an ASCE team under
contract with FEMA known as the Building Performance Assessment Team
(BPAT) went to the site and began their assessment of why the buildings
had failed. This was to be a brief effort, as the study team consisted
of experts who generally had volunteered their time. In January 2002,
FEMA asked the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) to
take over the next phase of the investigation of the collapse
essentially to build upon the BPAT recommendations and conduct a more
thorough investigation of the events leading to the collapse.
The Science Committee held two hearings in 2002 on the WTC
collapse, one on March 6 and the other on May 1. The March 6, 2002,
hearing focused on how the Federal Government investigates catastrophic
building failures, and what had been learned from the collapse of the
WTC 1, 2 and 7. Concerns raised at the hearing included the lack of any
specific federal authority, protocols, or funding for investigations of
this kind. Concerns were also raised regarding the timing of the BPAT
deployment (almost a month after the towers fell), its access to the
site and building records, premature disposal of evidence, and FEMA's
lack of regular communication with the public about the investigation.
The BPAT released its report at the May 2002 hearing. The hearing
also reviewed plans for NIST to begin a more comprehensive
investigation in view of the criticisms of FEMA, and provided a forum
to discuss proposed legislation to give NIST the authorities necessary
to conduct such an investigation. The BPAT report highlighted potential
reasons for why the two towers, almost identical in design, performed
differently under the stresses of the disaster. It also identified
critical features that enabled so many to evacuate, and the design
elements that may have played a role in the collapse and prevented
people above the impacts from being able to exit the buildings.
However, witnesses commented that, without a more sophisticated
analysis of the evidence, no conclusions could be drawn that could be
used to recommend improvements in building and fire codes to prevent
future loss of life.
Also at the May 2002 hearing, the witnesses commented favorably on
draft legislation being prepared by the Science Committee, based on the
authorizing legislation for the National Transportation Safety Board
(NTSB) to enhance NIST's existing authority to investigate building
failures. On May 9, 2002, the National Construction Safety Team Act
(NCST--H.R. 4687) was introduced by Congressman Sherwood Boehlert and
Congressman Anthony Weiner. The NCST was signed into law on October 1,
2002. Under the Act, NIST is authorized to appoint a national
construction safety team to determine the causes of a building's
failure, evaluate the technical aspects of evacuation and emergency
response, and ``recommend, as necessary, specific improvements to
building standards, codes, and practices based on the findings,'' and
propose any research needed to improve building safety and emergency
response procedures.'' The law gives NIST subpoena power to ensure that
it has access to all evidence to support an investigation, but the
results of such investigations cannot be used as evidence in any
subsequent litigation.
On August 21, 2002, NIST announced the appointment of a national
construction safety team to investigate building and fire safety in WTC
1, 2, and 7. The project was funded through FEMA, and cost $16 million.
Building and Fire Codes
Building and fire codes are established and enforced by State and
local governments, which generally base their codes on national model
codes that are written by private non-profit standards development
organizations (SDOs). These organizations are generally are made up of
members--individuals and groups--that have an interest in construction.
Generally make their money through membership payments and selling
their codes.
Building and fire codes and standards are technical descriptions of
constructions, materials, installations, equipment, or practices
designed to achieve specific results, such as safety or strength.
Standards are very specific guidelines that describe single elements of
construction or safety. For example, a ``fire rating'' is a standard
that describes the amount of time a construction element such as a beam
can be exposed to a typical fire before it breaks or fails. Other
examples of building standards include hallway or stairwell widths
deemed necessary to evacuate a certain number of people in a certain
amount of time, or the type of steel needed for a beam to support a
certain amount of weight. NIST does not write building or fire codes,
but does participate in the discussions and provides technical guidance
to the standards development organizations.
The most widely-used model building code in the U.S. is the
International Building Code (IBC). It is currently the basis of the
codes in 45 states and the District of Columbia. The IBC is developed
and owned by the International Code Council (ICC). The ICC's members
consist of State and local building code officials, building owners and
managers, and private sector participants from construction and other
industries. ICC's members are concerned with safety, but also with cost
and other economic considerations, and these are reflected in the
outcomes of the code meetings. The IBC is regularly updated in a
deliberative, committee-driven process that takes about eighteen
months. The deadline for submitting proposed changes to the IBC, which
begins the next eighteen-month cycle, is March 24th, 2006.
The National Fire Protection Association (NFPA), which develops
many standards related to fire safety, recently produced an alternative
model building code, NFPA 5000. Experts say that implementing NFPA 5000
may be more expensive than the IBC but may result in a greater level of
safety. NFPA's membership is different from that of the ICC, with
strong representation by fire protection officials and fire equipment
manufacturers. NFPA 5000 has not been widely adopted, but individual
NFPA standards are widely used in fire codes.
The NIST Investigation
NIST's Building and Fire Research Laboratory (BFRL) carries out
research in fire science, fire safety, structural, mechanical, and
environmental engineering. It is the only federal laboratory dedicated
to research on building design and fire safety.
The goals of the NIST WTC investigation of the WTC disaster were to
investigate the building construction, the materials used, and the
technical conditions that contributed to the outcome of the WTC
disaster to serve as the basis for:
Improvements in the way buildings are designed,
constructed, maintained, and used;
Improved tools and guidance for industry and safety
officials for safer buildings and better coordination in
emergencies;
Recommended revisions to current building codes,
standards, and practices, and
Improved public safety.
The specific objectives were to:
1) Determine why and how WTC 1 and WTC 2 collapsed following
the initial impacts of the aircraft;
2) Determine why the injuries and fatalities were so high or
low depending on location, including all technical aspects of
fire protection, occupant behavior, evacuation, and emergency
response;
3) Assess what procedures and practices were used in the
design, construction, operation, and maintenance of WTC 1, 2;
and
4) Identify areas in current building and fire codes,
standards, and practices that warrant revision.
To meet these goals, NIST assembled a team of in-house experts and
outside specialists, totaling about 200 people. The team compiled and
reviewed tens of thousands of documents, photographs, and films,
interviewed over a thousand people who had been on the scene or who had
been involved with the design, construction, and maintenance of the
WTC; analyzed 236 pieces of steel taken from the wreckage; performed
laboratory tests, and performed computer simulations of the sequence of
events that happened from the instant of the aircraft impact to the
initiation of collapse for each tower. In addition, NIST held several
public meetings in New York City to report on the status of the
investigation and solicit comments and additional information that
might further the investigation.
In September, 2005, NIST released its draft Final Report of the
National Construction Safety Team on the Collapse of the World Trade
Center Towers for public comment. A copy of the executive summary of
the report is attached. This report summarizes the findings of the
investigation and includes thirty recommendations to improve the safety
of tall buildings, occupants, and emergency responders. NIST will
publish its final report within the next two weeks.
NIST Findings
The NIST investigation confirmed and expanded upon several of the
findings by the initial FEMA BPAT study. When built, WTC 1 and WTC 2
were unlike any other skyscrapers in existence at the time, both in
terms of their height and innovative structural features. These
consisted of a ``frame-tube'' system of exterior columns on the four
faces of the towers, linked to a core of columns by light-weight
trusses that supported the floors. In spite of their innovative design,
WTC 1 and 2 met or exceeded the requirements of the New York City
building codes.
The NIST investigation determined that although the aircraft did
considerable damage to the principal structural components of WTC 1 and
2, the towers were inherently robust, and would have remained standing
were it not for the dislodged fireproofing which exposed the central
columns to the multi-floor fires. In each tower, a different
combination of impact damage and heat-weakened structural components
contributed to the abrupt structural collapse. The fire safety systems
in WTC 1 and 2 met or exceeded current practice at the time the towers
fell, but played no safety role on September 11th because the water
supplies and electrical systems were damaged by the aircraft impact. In
WTC 1, the aircraft destroyed all escape routes, and 1,355 people were
trapped in the upper floors when the building collapsed. In WTC 2 where
evacuation had already commenced, about 3,000 got below the impact zone
before the second plane crashed. One stairwell remained passable for a
short period of time and eighteen people evacuated through the impact
zone. The remaining 619 people perished. WTC 2 collapsed before WTC 1
because the aircraft did significantly more damage to the central
columns and the fires were concentrated on the East side of the
building, rather than moving around as they did in WTC 1.
Major Issues Addressed in the NIST WTC Recommendations
NIST's recommendations fall into eight groups:
Increased Structural Integrity,
Enhanced Fire Resistance of Structures
New Methods for Fire Resistance Design of Structures
Improved Active Fire Protection
Improved Building Evacuation
Improved Emergency Response
Improved Procedures and Practices, and Education and
Training.
These recommendations include many references to specific SDOs to
modify or, in some cases, completely overhaul those standards that
apply to building construction, evacuation, testing, and fire safety.
NIST's recommendations also refer to less specific audiences such as
building managers, building occupants, property developers, and first
responders to develop procedures and best practices to protect building
occupants.
The following highlights some of the key issues referenced by NIST
in its recommendations:
Increased Structural Integrity
The NIST investigators found that the existing methods of
calculating the effect of wind and other stressors on tall towers
produced markedly different results among the different tests, leading
them to question whether these tests had a basis in fact and needed to
be re-designed. NIST's report also focuses on the concept of
``progressive collapse,'' where the weakening of one structural element
contributes to the weakening of others. NIST raises the question of
whether the current practice of testing individual building components
such as columns and floor trusses gives an accurate estimate of the
resilience of an entire building assembly to fire, wind, and other
stressors. NIST recommends that a ``structural frame'' approach to fire
resistance ratings be developed by the structural standards groups such
as ASCE. However, progressive collapse is not well understood, and it
may take time for these groups to produce a standard and describe the
appropriate tests against which to judge whether structures are prone
to progressive collapse.
The recommendations pertaining to structural integrity and design
are directed largely at ASCE-7, and specifications developed by the
American Concrete Institute (ACI) and the American Institute of Steel
Construction (AISC), as well as NFPA, and urge that the latest version
of these standards and specifications be adopted by the ICC and NFPA
into their model building codes.
Improved Fire Resistance of Structures and Fire Protection
Over the years, across the United States, there has been a gradual
reduction in rigor of building codes of fire rating requirements, i.e.,
how long something such as a steel column can remain exposed to a fire
before breaking or deforming. There has also been a decrease in the
compartmentalizing requirements for working and living spaces. Large
compartments in buildings allow more air to flow to fires and allow
fires to spread faster. Large compartments, however, means more floor
area, more tenants, and more rent for the building owner. A lower fire
rating requirement allows the use of lighter and less material in
construction. The loosening of these restrictions has been compensated
for by increasing requirements for sprinkler systems, which have been
shown to be effective in quenching typical office fires. On September
11th however, the sprinkler systems were disabled, and even in typical
fires, sprinkler systems do not always work. NIST recommends greater
redundancy in sprinkler systems, and more compartmentalization to
restrict air flow to fires. These recommendations apply to several
standards developed by NFPA.
The reduction in fire ratings has also been compensated by the use
of spray-applied fire resistive materials (SFRM) on structural
components. This was the foam that was applied to the columns and
trusses of WTC 1 and 2 as fireproofing. After the 1993 WTC terrorist
bombing, it was recommended that the spray-on fire protection on the
steel components of the towers be thickened. NIST emphasizes that, were
it not for the dislodging of the fireproofing from the structural steel
when the aircraft flew into the towers, WTC 1 and 2 would likely have
withstood the subsequent fires. The foam on WTC 1 and 2 was shaken or
blown off around the cores and peripheral columns on several floors in
both Towers on September 11th, meaning the columns reached critical
temperatures much faster then they would have normally. NIST recommends
that the performance of this type of fireproofing needs to be better
understood, particularly its response to shock, aging, and method of
application, and new coatings should be developed.
NIST notes in its report that both the IBC and NFPA 5000 model
building codes have since changed their fire rating requirements for
buildings over 420 feet from two hours to four. The report also says,
however, that the technical basis for fire ratings is not strong,
particularly since the typical contents of offices, and construction
materials, have changed in the last 100 years. NIST recommends a
comprehensive review by all fire-related SDOs of fire testing
procedures to ensure that fire ratings are meaningful. Structural fire
resistance is closely tied to the outcomes of work on the structural
frame approach for large buildings, which NIST advocates in its report
while recommending an extensive re-evaluation by national building code
committees (ICC and NFPA) of the dynamics of fire, evacuation, and
emergency response for skyscrapers to determine what fire ratings are
needed for tall buildings. In the case of re-evaluating the tests steel
and concrete assemblies, this could be an expensive proposition. A
typical full-scale fire test costs $30,000 or more per test, and to
validate a new test, experimental tests must to be run several times.
It is not clear who should be conducting these tests.
Full Evacuation of Large Buildings
After the 1993 terrorist bombing of the WTC site, it took four
hours to evacuate everyone from WTC 1 and WTC 2. The standard
evacuation plan for skyscrapers does not usually anticipate such a mass
egress: fire-related evacuation plans assume that occupants ``evacuate
in place'' to higher and lower floors while first responders fight the
fire. Although this approach may change as a result of the events of
September 11th, it may still be the most practical and safe procedure
for typical skyscraper fires. Skyscraper elevators in the U.S. are not
generally fireproof, nor are they intended to be used for mass
evacuation. Full evacuation via stairwells takes a long time. On
September 11th, with all elevators out of commission, it would have
taken hours for firefighters to ascend to the affected floors to fight
the fires, or assist survivors down the stairs. This fact has provoked
some re-thinking of how elevators should be designed and used for
emergency purposes.
WTC 1 and 2 had three stairwells each, centered at the core of the
buildings. When the aircraft crashed, these stairs were destroyed. The
NIST investigation found that about six percent of the people in the
towers had health problems or disabilities that made taking the stairs
difficult. Overall, it was found, people evacuate buildings twice as
slowly as generally thought. NIST recommends structural hardening of
elevators for use in large-scale emergencies, and that stairwells be
spaced further apart, although it does not say by how much. NIST also
recommends that stairwells should be widened to allow more people to
descend as well as to allow counter flow from first responders going up
the stairs. Most of the recommendations apply to NFPA 101, and the
National Model Building and Fire Codes of the ICC.
Communications and Emergency Response
For the approximately 1,000 emergency responders on the site on
September 11th, this was the largest disaster they had ever
experienced. Communications networks at the site were destroyed, and
portable communications devices such as walkie-talkies and cellular
phones were overwhelmed as dozens of first responders attempted to talk
at the same time. Walkie-talkies performed inadequately, or otherwise
failed to function inside the steel-concrete construction of the
towers. There was no inter-operability between the New York Police
Department and the New York Fire Department equipment. Although there
had been significant upgrades to the fire monitoring and communications
infrastructure in the WTC Complex after the 1993 terrorist bombing,
incident command centers established inside the two towers by first
responders were still unable to provide a sufficient assessment of the
situation, or monitor and relay information to other first responders
at the site for proper coordination of their activities. First
responders commented later that viewers watching the disaster on
television had a better grasp of the scope and nature of the crisis
than did anyone at the WTC site.
NIST's recommendations on improved emergency response apply mostly
to NFPA standards, but also extend to the Department of Homeland
Security, and state and local jurisdictions, and first responders. NIST
emphasizes that systems need to be effective for large-scale
emergencies and able to function in ``challenging radio frequency
environments.'' NIST also states that better procedures are needed for
integrating information from multiple sources and coordinating a
unified response among different agencies and departments.
Additional Issues
Follow-up funding is limited
In many instances, NIST has recommended research and testing to
determine whether and how changes in building codes should be made. It
is not clear this effort will receive the commitment for funding it
requires. In order to implement many of NIST's recommendations, a lot
of research and collaboration with SDOs and stakeholders will have to
be done to provide a scientific and technical basis for the standards
changes needed to meet those recommendations. NIST requested $2 million
in additional funds for FY 2006 for codes and practices for buildings
and first responders, but the FY 2006 appropriation has not yet been
finalized. If adequate funding for NIST's research efforts is not
provided, it is unclear what progress will be made on implementing
those recommendations that need scientific research to be implemented.
Future building investigations
It is unclear what role NIST will play in investigating future
building failures. FEMA received heavy criticism at the Science
Committee hearing March 6, 2002, for shortcomings in the way in which
it conducted the investigation of the collapse of the World Trade
Center. The passage of the National Construction Safety Team Act was
supposed to address these shortcomings by creating the authority to
investigate building failures at NIST and providing NIST with subpoena
power to obtain whatever evidence it needed to complete investigations.
However, in the years since September 11th, although several building
failures have occurred, Hurricane Katrina being the most recent event
causing structural failures, NIST has not invoked the NSTC Act to
launch investigations, but rather has been called in under another
agency: FEMA in the case of Katrina. NIST does not have a source of
funding dedicated to pay for such activities and is apparently
reluctant to act independently. Outside observers note that NIST is a
research institution and may not be culturally suited to conduct
investigations as does the NTSB, upon which the NCST Act was based, or
the Chemical Safety and Hazards Investigation Board.
Questions for the Witnesses
Ms. Sally Regenhard, Skyscraper Safety Campaign
I invite you to open the hearing with a five-minute statement that
outlines the views of the Skyscraper Safety Campaign on the
investigation, its findings and the next steps that should be taken.
Dr. William Jeffrey, Director, National Institute of Standards and
Technology
In your testimony, please briefly describe the most important
findings and recommendations of the NIST investigation of the World
Trade Center collapse and answer the following questions:
1) What specific steps is NIST taking to ensure that its
recommendations are incorporated into model and local codes?
What barriers has NIST confronted or does it expect to confront
as part of that process and how do you plan to overcome those
barriers? What past successes can NIST draw on as part of this
effort?
2) Some experts have criticized the recommendations--some
arguing that they are too general and therefore hard to
translate into codes, and others arguing that they are too
detailed and will needlessly increase building costs. How do
you respond to these criticisms?
3) What lessons have you learned in carrying out this
investigation that could be applied to future investigations,
including the ones being undertaken in the wake of Hurricane
Katrina?
Ms. Nancy McNabb, Director of Government Affairs, National Fire
Protection Association (NFPA)
In your testimony, please briefly describe the process by which
NFPA writes codes and answer the following questions:
1) Does NFPA support the recommendations of the NIST study?
Why or why not?
2) What specific steps will NFPA be undertaking to determine
whether and how to incorporate the NIST recommendations into
its codes? How long should that process take? What will be the
greatest barriers in the process?
3) What specific actions should NIST be taking to help code
organizations incorporate its recommendations? Are the
recommendations framed in a way that facilitates their adoption
by code organizations or are they too general or too specific?
Dr. James R. Harris, American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE)
In your testimony, please briefly describe the process by which
ASCE writes codes and answer the following questions:
1) Does ASCE support the recommendations of the NIST study?
Why or why not?
2) What specific steps will ASCE be undertaking to determine
whether and how to incorporate the NIST recommendations into
its codes? How long should that process take? What will be the
greatest barriers in the process?
3) What specific actions should NIST be taking to help code
organizations incorporate its recommendations? Are the
recommendations framed in a way that facilitates their adoption
by code organizations or are they too general or too specific?
Mr. Henry L. Green, President, International Code Council (ICC)
In your testimony, please briefly describe the process by which ICC
writes codes and answer the following questions:
1) Does ICC support the recommendations of the NIST study? Why
or why not?
2) What specific steps will ICC be undertaking to determine
whether and how to incorporate the NIST recommendations into
its codes? How long should that process take? What will be the
greatest barriers in the process?
3) What specific actions should NIST be taking to help code
organizations incorporate its recommendations? Are the
recommendations framed in a way that facilitates their adoption
by code organizations or are they too general or too specific?
Mr. Glenn Corbett, Assistant Professor of Fire Science, John Jay
College of Criminal Justice, New York, NY
1) What are the most important findings and recommendations of
the NIST World Trade Center Investigation report?
2) Some experts have criticized the recommendations--some
arguing that they are too general and therefore hard to
translate into codes, and others arguing that they are too
detailed and will needlessly increase building costs. What is
your view of these criticisms?
3) What are the prospects for the adoption of the
recommendations by the code organizations? What should NIST and
the code and standards groups be doing to promote this process?
4) What lessons were learned from this investigation that
could be applied to improve future investigations of building
failures?
Attachment
Chairman Boehlert. Good morning. This hearing is open, and
we are pleased to welcome back one who strayed from the fold,
Mr. Weiner of New York, who was a very valued Member of this
committee, and has gone onto other pursuits, but still,
fortunately, within the Congress of the United States. Mr.
Weiner, welcome back.
I want to welcome everyone to this important hearing, the
Committee's third on the tragic collapse of the World Trade
Center. But it won't be our last. I want to promise and perhaps
warn everyone at the outset that this committee will be closely
monitoring the followup to the National Institute of Standards
and Technology report on the events of September 11.
That means we will be watching what NIST does, what other
federal agencies do, and what the code writing organizations
do. We are obviously not technical experts, but we will be
making sure that their recommendations are considered fully and
thoroughly, that NIST is doing everything necessary to back up
those recommendations, and that any decisions are fully
justified by the facts.
The issues raised in NIST's report go far beyond a single
horrific terrorist incident, and indeed, beyond terrorism as a
phenomenon. The report raises fundamental questions about what
we know about the behavior of buildings and their contents,
what we know about the behavior of individuals in emergencies,
and about whether buildings are well enough designed for any
large emergency. This is not about making every building strong
enough to survive a plane crash.
That said, NIST's conclusion that the Trade Center
buildings could have survived even the massive insult of a
plane crash if the fireproofing had remained in place, is at
once both chilling and promising, chilling because the massive
loss of life was not inevitable, promising because it is an
indication we can do more to protect lives in the future.
This committee will be asking hard questions of all of our
witnesses today, to make sure we do take all reasonable steps
to protect lives. We will be looking into whether NIST's
recommendations are written in a way that will facilitate the
adoption by code groups. It appears that they do not. We will
be probing whether code groups are prepared to fully and fairly
review the recommendations. On that, while the initial
indications in today's testimony are promising, the jury
necessarily is still out.
But our tough questions should not obscure the debt of
gratitude we owe to NIST. NIST took seriously the mandate from
this committee, and Mr. Weiner, I want to thank you for your
assistance in that, and the Nation gave it in the National
Construction Safety Team Act, and assembled an impressive group
of experts that produced a comprehensive and impressive report.
But our focus now has to be on whether everyone is doing enough
to translate the report into specific, concrete steps that will
prevent future tragedies.
The protection of life is the highest responsibility of
public officials, and our hearing today is about that
responsibility, just as much as any hearing on the military or
homeland security would be. But the process in this case is far
more complex, because of the way it involves the private sector
and every level of government. But complexity is not an excuse
for inaction.
Before I turn to the minority, I want to give a special
welcome to Bill Jeffrey, who is making his first appearance
before this committee. I say first public appearance, because
Dr. Jeffrey has long been a valued advisor to this committee in
his work at the Office of Science and Technology Policy,
someone we have admired for his intelligence, open-mindedness,
and candor.
We could not be more delighted with his appointment as the
Director of NIST, and we very much look forward to continuing
to work with him. Hopefully, after today, he will still feel
that way about us. This isn't, perhaps, the topic any of us
would have chosen for his maiden hearing, but there is none of
greater importance, and this hearing underscores the importance
of NIST and its need for greater funding. But I won't get
started on that subject now; we have more than enough to deal
with today.
And I also want to welcome back someone who has been so
invaluable to this committee as counsel, Sally Regenhard,
Chairperson of the Skyscraper Safety Committee. She is
emotionally and intellectually involved in our proceedings in
so many different ways, and she has been a source of strength
and inspiration to us, and she is dogged in her determination,
and I commend her for that. People will often ask me, ``When
you go to Washington, I bet you meet with lobbyists.'' And I
say ``Sure, I meet with lobbyists. Every single day. Lobbyists
are people who advocate for something.'' And there is one of
the best lobbyists in this town today in Sally Regenhard. What
she is advocating for involves the protection of life.
So, with that, let me turn to Mr. Miller for any statement
he might care to make, and then we will have our first panel of
one, Ms. Regenhard.
[The prepared statement of Chairman Boehlert follows:]
Prepared Statement of Chairman Sherwood L. Boehlert
I want to welcome everyone to this important hearing, this
committee's third on the tragic collapse of the World Trade Center, but
probably not our last. I want to promise (and perhaps warn) everyone at
the outset that this committee will be closely monitoring the follow-up
to the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) report on
the events of September 11.
That means we will be watching what NIST does, what other federal
agencies do, and what the code writing organizations do. We are
obviously not technical experts, but we will be making sure that the
recommendations are considered fully and thoroughly, that NIST is doing
everything necessary to back up those recommendations, and that any
decisions are fully justified by the facts.
The issues raised in NIST's report go far beyond a single, horrific
terrorist incident, and indeed beyond terrorism as a phenomenon. The
report raises fundamental questions about what we know about the
behavior of buildings and their contents, what we know about the
behavior of individuals in emergencies, and about whether buildings are
well enough designed for any large emergency. This is not about making
every building strong enough to survive a plane crash.
That said, NIST's conclusion that the Trade Center buildings could
have survived even the massive insult of a plane crash if the
fireproofing had remained in place is at once both chilling and
promising--chilling because the massive loss of life was not
inevitable; promising because it is an indication we can do more to
protect lives in the future.
We could not be more delighted with his appointment as the Director
of NIST, and we very much look forward to continuing to work with him.
Hopefully, after today, he will still feel that way about us. This
isn't perhaps the topic any of us would have chosen for his ``maiden''
hearing, but there is none of greater importance. And this hearing
underscores the importance of NIST, and its need for greater funding.
But I won't get started on that subject now; we have more than enough
to deal with today. Mr. Gordon.
Mr. Miller. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to join
Chairman Boehlert in welcoming everyone to this morning's
hearing.
On the surface, today's topic may sound dry and technical.
However, what we are talking about here really is saving lives.
The sole purpose of the National Construction Safety Team Act
is to save lives by investigating and understanding building
collapses, and then improve building codes, emergency response,
and evacuation procedures.
The National Institute of Standards and Technology's,
NIST's, World Trade Center investigation and their
recommendations are the first real result of the Act. The NIST
report is a good first step, but really a lot remains to be
done. We need to know what is required to translate these NIST
recommendations into improved buildings and emergency response
and evacuation procedures. Those changes will improve public
safety, and otherwise, we would have nothing to show, except
another government report sitting on a shelf. That is going to
require continued oversight by this committee as the process
moves forward.
I also encourage the witnesses to give us their assessment
of the work that NIST has done during the last two years, and
what they think could be improved. And I want to mention that I
am not only interested in the subject from the Science
Committee perspective, but also how it relates to the Terrorism
Risk Insurance Act, TRIA, which is now pending before the
Financial Services Committee, and whether we should consider
the NIST recommendations as part of private sector
preparedness, and how that affects TRIA.
Now, I would like to yield the balance of my time to a
former Member of the Science Committee, Anthony Weiner. Mr.
Weiner has no small interest in NIST's work on the World Trade
Center investigation, both as a Member from New York City, but
also, he was the co-author, along with Chairman Boehlert, of
the National Construction Safety Team Act.
Mr. Weiner, welcome back.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Miller follows:]
Prepared Statement of Representative Brad Miller
I want to join Chairman Boehlert in welcoming everyone to this
morning's hearing.
On the surface, today's hearing topic may sound dry and technical.
However, what we're really talking about is saving lives. The sole
purpose of the National Construction Safety Team Act is to save lives
by investigating and understanding building collapses and then improve
building codes, emergency response and evacuation procedures.
The National Institute of Standards and Technology's (NIST) World
Trade Center (WTC) investigation and recommendations are the first case
of implementation of the Act. The NIST report is a good first step, but
much work remains to be done. We need to know what is required to
translate the NIST recommendations into improved building codes, and
emergency response and evacuation procedures. It is these changes that
will improve public safety, otherwise we will have nothing more than
another government report sitting on a shelf. This will also require
continued oversight by the Science Committee as the process moves
forward.
I'm also encourage the witnesses to give us their assessment of
what NIST has done during the past two years and what they feel could
be improved. I also want to mention that I'm not only interested in
this subject from a Science Committee perspective, but also how it
relates to Terrorism Risk Insurance from my work on the Financial
Services Committee.
Now I would like to yield the balance of my time to a former Member
of the Science Committee, Anthony Weiner. Rep. Weiner not only has a
parochial interest in the NIST's WTC investigation, but he was a co-
author, with Chairman Boehlert, of the National Construction Safety
Team Act.
Mr. Weiner. Thank you, Mr. Miller. I appreciate it, and
thank you, Mr. Chairman, for continuing to keep the effort
alive that was one of the ones that emerged after September 11
that truly drew consensus in this Congress. I want to welcome
back, also, Sally Regenhard, who if it was the Boehlert-Weiner
Bill, it really should have been the Boehlert-Weiner-Regenhard
Bill, because she acknowledged and called all of our attention
to the notion that we all agree upon now, that before September
11 and until the passage of this legislation, there was no
effort by government to do any kind of forensic examination of
why buildings collapse, how we make them stronger, and how we
make sure that they never happen again.
That is just one of the things I think we agree upon at
this point. We also agree, and from learning, from reading the
report and from hearing the stories of those that were inside,
and those that were engaged in the largest civic rescue in our
nation's history, there were some tragic flaws in the design of
the World Trade Center. There were also some remarkable design
achievements that allowed the buildings to stand despite
remarkable stress.
But we also, after getting the report back now, I think
there is an emerging consensus on a couple of other issues as
well. One is that the study doesn't go far enough. The study
doesn't include the level of specificity that would truly make
the report a handbook for those seeking to come up with
building codes in the future. The City of New York is involved
in something it hasn't done in a generation, which is rewriting
its building codes. If I were to send this report to the City
of New York, and they wanted to go to a reference and say,
well, how do we follow up on the NIST recommendation that we
improve standards for fire resistance testing. Is there a
standard in this report? And the answer is no. If they want to
follow up on the NIST recommendation that fire protection and
suppression redundancy be built into buildings, is there a
specific standard that they can take from this report? The
answer is no. So, I think that we have fallen short, NIST has
fallen short of making this a true reference manual for future
protection of big buildings. And for those of us in New York
City and other big cities, and frankly, even medium sized
cities that are building buildings of greater than twenty
stories, it falls short.
And I also think something else. You know, we in government
have a certain tolerance for the slow pace of things. This took
too long. It took too long for NIST to produce a report that
really doesn't get us anywhere past the 50 yard line here. We
are not in the Red Zone. We are not getting close to the place
that we need to be. And I am prepared to introduce legislation,
hopefully with the support of this committee and its great
chairman, to say okay, let us take the next step. Let us take
these general recommendations. Let us take the general forensic
examination that was done on the World Trade Center. Let us
take the general propositions that are suggested herein. Let us
assume they are correct, but let us take the next step. Let us
produce a document that truly has some fairly specific
standards. Let us incentivize, but not require--I don't believe
we should have a Federal Buildings Department--that
incentivizes cities, states, and localities to adopt these
things, and also, allows families, allow legislators when
considering things like TRIA or building codes in Skokie,
Illinois or Brooklyn, New York, to have a reference guide that
they can use. Only then will the true goals of our original
legislation have been fulfilled, and I think that that is
something that we should point towards in the future.
And I thank you again, Mr. Chairman, for allowing me to sit
in. I want to thank all of the professionals at NIST. Mr.
Jeffrey, I am sure by now you have gotten to know the Chairman.
You and I haven't gotten to know one another. I am sure you
have gotten to know Members of this committee. You would be
wise to get to know Sally Regenhard very well, because whether
you would like to or not, you are going to have a very big file
with her name on it, and she has shown us one thing, you know,
for those of us that have lost loved ones, there are many ways
that people express their grief. The way Sally Regenhard and
many of her friends and neighbors have expressed their grief is
by making sure that there are no such disasters like this again
in the future, and doing everything we can to prevent it. That
is something that Chairman Boehlert and I are committed to. I
know the professionals at NIST are committed to that. Now we
have to go and finally get that job done.
And I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Boehlert. Well, welcome back, and just let me say
how pleased I am that you are finally getting to meet Dr.
Jeffrey, because to know him is to like him, but more
importantly, to know what he is all about and his mission and
his approach to the job is to know he is determined to follow
through, as we are.
This is just another hearing. This is not the final chapter
in a drama about a horrific incident. We are determined to
follow through, as is Dr. Jeffrey and the people at NIST
working with the National Institute of Building Sciences. This
is, by no means, the final chapter. This is another chapter,
but we are determined to go forward working together, and we
welcome you back as part of the team.
With that, let me present the first witness, and I--Dr.
Ehlers.
Mr. Ehlers. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate you
calling this hearing, and am very pleased to see the results
that have been achieved. It is a little known facet of NIST
responsibilities to do this sort of thing, and I am very
pleased with the work they have done. And I think is providing
a very strong base on which to build for the future.
I want to thank all our witnesses for coming here today. In
particular, I want to congratulate Dr. Jeffrey, the new NIST
Director, on his first appearance before this committee, and on
NIST's latest Nobel Prize for Physics, announced this month to
Dr. Jan Hall, a former colleague from my days as a researcher
at NIST's Joint Institute for Laboratory Astrophysics, better
known as JILA at the University of Colorado. And I have known
Dr. Hall for years, and he is certainly deserving of this
honor. This increases Nobel Prizes to three, demonstrating that
NIST continues to be a world leader in research and theoretical
work. I might also add that now that a physicist is heading the
organization, I expect the output of Nobel Prizes will
increase, and so, I will leave that to you as a challenge. I
also wanted to congratulate Mr. Henry Green, a resident of my
home State of Michigan, on his prestigious new position as
President of the International Code Council, and I have had the
pleasure of meeting with Mr. Green, and I am very impressed
with him and his ability. I look forward to great things from
him and his work on that Council.
The National Construction Safety Team Act, which originated
in this committee, gave NIST specific authorities necessary to
complete the monumental task of understanding the collapse of
the World Trade Center towers. Today's hearing will give the
Science Committee the chance to learn about NIST's findings and
recommendations, and obtain comments from the witnesses about
these recommendations and the process by which they will be
implemented.
The publication of the NIST report may signal the end of
the investigation itself, but it launches a new phase in that
process which I hope will result in safer buildings. NIST's
recommendations indicate that there are opportunities to make
buildings safer and more resilient to fires and other
incidents, to improve evacuation routes and procedures, and to
improve emergency response. However, the task of amending the
building codes is in the hands of the private sector and the
State and local officials. NIST's role now becomes technical
advisor to the code development process. Congress needs to
understand this process, and must support the research and
testing required if any of NIST's recommendations are to become
common practice. Congress also needs to understand what
challenges may exist in implementing NIST's recommendations.
Finally, I hope we hear from NIST about how it plans to use the
National Construction Safety Team Act in the future, because I
am certain we will have other occasions that this has to be
called into action.
I want to thank NIST for the good work that you have done.
Keep this up as we continue to work together to make buildings
safer, both during and after disasters. I will have to
apologize, because I will be in and out of this committee
meeting, mostly out, because I have two other committee
meetings simultaneously, and we are marking up bills, so my
presence is required for votes. And I apologize to the Members
testifying, the witnesses testifying, and also to the Chairman,
but I will be here as much as I can.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Ehlers follows:]
Prepared Statement of Representative Vernon J. Ehlers
Thank you, Chairman Boehlert.
I want to thank all our witnesses for coming here today. In
particular, I want to congratulate Dr. William Jeffrey, the new NIST
Director, on his first appearance before this Committee, and on NIST's
latest Nobel Prize for Physics, announced this month to Dr. Jan Hall, a
former colleague from my days as a researcher at NIST's Joint Institute
for Laboratory Astrophysics (JILA) at the University of Colorado. This
increases NIST's Nobel Prizes to three, demonstrating that NIST
continues to be a world leader in research and theoretical work. I also
want to congratulate Mr. Henry Green, a resident of my home State of
Michigan, on his prestigious new position as President of the
International Code Council (ICC).
The National Construction Safety Team Act (NCST), which originated
in this committee, gave NIST specific authorities necessary to complete
the monumental task of understanding the collapse of the World Trade
Center Towers. Today's hearing will give the Science Committee the
chance to learn about NIST's findings and recommendations, and obtain
comments from the witnesses about these recommendations and the process
by which they will be implemented.
The publication of the NIST report may signal the end of the
investigation itself, but it launches a new phase in a process that I
hope will result in safer buildings. NIST's recommendations indicate
that there are opportunities to make buildings safer and more resilient
to fires and other incidents, to improve evacuation routes and
procedures, and to improve emergency response. However, the task of
amending the building codes is in the hands of the private sector and
state and local officials. NIST's role now becomes technical advisor to
the code development process. Congress needs to understand this
process, and must support the research and testing required if any of
NIST's recommendations are to become common practice. Congress also
needs to understand what challenges may exist in implementing NIST's
recommendations. Finally, I hope we hear from NIST about how it plans
to use the National Construction Safety Team Act in the future.
Thank you to NIST for the good work you've done. Keep this up as we
continue to work together to make buildings safer both during and after
disasters.
Chairman Boehlert. Well, now that you are making some
admissions, in the interest of full disclosure, while we are
all very proud of that Nobel Prize in physics for NIST, in the
interest of full disclosure, Dr. Ehlers is a physicist, and so,
he is particularly proud.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Costello follows:]
Prepared Statement of Representative Jerry F. Costello
Good morning. I want to thank the witnesses for appearing before
our committee to discuss the findings and recommendations of the
National Institute of Standard and Technology's (NIST) investigation
into the collapse of the World Trade Center (WTC).
This committee has held two hearings in 2002 on the WTC collapse
that focused on how the Federal Government investigates catastrophic
building failures and the lessons learned from the collapse. Concerns
raised at the hearing included the lack of any specific federal
authority, protocols, or funding for investigations of any kind. As we
have learned from the catastrophic damages of Hurricane Katrina,
coordination among federal agencies is critical for gauging our
preparedness and responding to national disasters. In order to address
these concerns, it is my understanding that NIST issued a draft report
for public comment that summarizes the findings of the investigation
and includes thirty recommendations to improve the safety of tall
buildings, occupants, and emergency responders. However, for NIST's
plans to be effective, they must be implemented by standards organized
and adopted by State and local authorities that set building codes and
standards. I want to know how NIST intends to implement its research
and recommendations for improved building codes, emergency response and
evacuation procedures.
I welcome our witnesses and look forward to their testimony.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Johnson follows:]
Prepared Statement of Representative Eddie Bernice Johnson
Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member.
The events of September 11, 2001, changed our lives forever. That
day changed how we Americans prepare ourselves against terrorism.
Building codes and safety regulations play a critical role during a
disaster--natural or otherwise. Smart construction can mean the
difference between life and death.
During an attack, the weight of collapsing building materials and
heat of fire challenge even the best building designs.
The National Institute of Standards and Technology has come today
to report on its findings and recommendations following its
investigation into the collapse of the World Trade Center.
I hope today's discussion will underscore this key report and help
the Committee understand how building and fire code organizations plan
to implement the recommendations contained in that report.
I would like to extend a warm welcome to our witnesses today. Thank
you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Carnahan follows:]
Prepared Statement of Representative Russ Carnahan
Mr. Chairman and Mr. Ranking Member, thank you for hosting this
important hearing.
I am eager to learn more about the National Institute of Standards
and Technology report recommendations. The World Trade Center collapse
was a horrific episode for our nation and this report is another
appropriate measure that revisits the events and permits us to learn
from the tragedy.
Building safety and emergency evacuation are issues that go well
beyond the subject of terrorism. This terrible hurricane season is
demonstrating all too well the effect natural disasters have on man-
made structures and our communities.
I represent a congressional district in St. Louis City that runs
south along the Mississippi river. Our region is near the New Madrid
earthquake center, which struck the area from 1811 to 1812. These
sequences are the most powerful earthquakes ever to have been felt on
the North American continent. The New Madrid Fault System remains a
threat to our region, and thus, I am eager to learn more about the
steps our community needs to take to better prepare our structures for
a possible earthquake.
To the multiple witnesses that appear before us today, thank you
for your time and your efforts. I look forward to hearing your
testimony.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Jackson Lee follows:]
Prepared Statement of Representative Sheila Jackson Lee
In looking at what are the next steps in terms of building codes
and building structures and integrity, we must unfortunately review
what took place on that dreadful day know as September 11th. Like most
building collapses, these events were the result of a combination of
factors. While the buildings were able to withstand the initial impact
of the aircraft, the resulting fires that spread through the towers
weakened support columns and floors that had fireproofing dislodged by
the impacts. This eventually led to collapse as the perimeter columns
were pulled inward by the sagging floors and buckled. According to
reports, each aircraft severed perimeter columns, damaged interior core
columns and knocked off fireproofing from steel as the planes
penetrated the buildings. The weight carried by the severed columns was
distributed to other columns. Subsequently, fires began that were
initiated by the aircraft's jet fuel but were fed for the most part by
the building contents and the air supply resulting from breached walls
and fire-induced window breakage. These fires, in combination with the
dislodged fireproofing, were responsible for a chain of events in which
the building core weakened and began losing its ability to carry loads.
The floors weakened and sagged from the fires, pulling inward on the
perimeter columns. Floor sagging and exposure to high temperatures
caused the perimeter columns to bow inward and buckle--a process that
spread across the faces of the buildings which as a result caused the
entire structure to collapse.
As a Member of the Committee on Homeland Security, I am very
interested in hearing the testimony of our witnesses today. While there
have been many theories, no one really knows when, where and if another
terrorist attack will take place. It is due to this uncertainty that we
must do our best to be prepared in all possible aspects of homeland
security. It is my understanding that the September 20, 2005 report
released by NIST includes a detailed technical analysis of the root
causes of the building failures as well recommendations to improve the
safety of tall buildings, occupants and emergency responders. I believe
these recommendations fall into eight categories of thirty
recommendations. Loosely categorized these are: 1) increased structural
integrity, 2) enhanced fire resistance of structures, 3) new methods
for fire resistance design, 4) improved active fire protection, 5)
improved building evacuation procedures, 6) improved emergency
response, 7) improved procedures and practices in the design,
construction and operation of buildings; and 8) upgrading the
education/training of building and fire safety professionals. In
closing, I look forward to the statements and recommendations of our
witnesses as they lay out a road map as to how to protect our nation's
structures.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Moore follows:]
Prepared Statement of Representative Dennis Moore
More than four years after the devastating terrorist attacks of
September 11, 2001, we still remember too well the horrible images of
that morning: the citizens of New York and Washington D.C. running in
fear and confusion from the site of the attacks, firemen and other
safety personnel bravely ushering men and women out of harms way, and
the skeletal remains of the Twin Towers silhouetted against the bright
September sky.
Within hours of the attacks themselves, the Twin Towers collapsed,
killing thousands of individuals trapped inside.
While there were many factors that contributed to the catastrophic
loss of human life our country suffered on 9/11, an issue that demands
careful scrutiny by this committee is the circumstances that
contributed to the collapse of the Towers themselves.
As co-chair of the Congressional Hazards Caucus, ensuring that our
buildings are properly designed and constructed to handle destructive
forces, whether they are terrorist attacks, hurricanes, or tornadoes is
of utmost importance to me.
I appreciate the willingness of the panel to share their opinions
with the Members of the Science Committee on the findings of the
National Institute of Standard and Technology's (NIST) report on the
collapse of the World Trace Center and look forward to working with you
in the future to ensure the continued safety and security of not only
our buildings, but of the American people.
Chairman Boehlert. Now, with that, and no further opening
statements, let me present, welcome back to the Committee, Ms.
Sally Regenhard, Chairperson of the Skyscraper Safety
Committee. Ms. Regenhard, the floor is yours, and she will have
a very interesting statement, and so much of the commentary in
her statement will lead us to provide questions to the panel
that will follow.
So, Ms. Regenhard, the floor is yours.
Panel I:
STATEMENT OF SALLY REGENHARD, CHAIRPERSON, SKYSCRAPER SAFETY
CAMPAIGN
Ms. Regenhard. Okay. Thank you. Good morning, Chairman
Boehlert and Members of the House Science Committee. It is
truly an honor and a privilege to address you today.
I must first begin by thanking Chairman Sherwood Boehlert
and this committee for listening with compassion and concern to
the families of the victims of 9/11. When we first came here in
March and May of 2002, we were desperately seeking leadership
for an investigation of what happened to our loved ones on 9/
11. We had sought this on the local level in New York City, but
found no one to help us answer the painful questions regarding
what happened to our loved ones in the World Trade Center on
that dreaded day of infamy.
Chairman Boehlert and the Science Committee, you have
redeemed our belief in the system, and renewed our faith in the
process of representative government in our beloved country,
and for this, we profoundly thank you. The families of the
victims as well as the American public remain in your debt for
your efforts in authorizing a WTC investigation through the
National Construction Safety Team Act.
I must also begin by thanking NIST for interacting with us
on a regular basis over the past three years, via conference
calls and meetings, with myself and my SSC co-chair, Monica
Gabrielle, who is out of the country and cannot be here today.
I know that it has not always been easy to deal with me and
with other victims' families, but I appreciate the tolerance
and respect shown to us by NIST. I also appreciate the vast
technical research abilities of this organization and the
enormous task of embarking upon the WTC investigation.
In totality, however, while some very valuable results were
achieved, the overall mode and findings of the investigation
was not what I had hoped for. I had certain hopes regarding
NIST in the investigation, but I and others were somewhat
disillusioned regarding what NIST was willing and able to do. I
had hoped for more specific and comprehensive recommendations
that could easily be translated into code reform and change,
but this was not the case. The recommendations, I feel, are
very general and lack specifics. I feel that the vagueness of
the language was influenced by a need for political correctness
and a general reluctance or an inability to investigate, use
subpoena power, lay blame, or even point out the deadly
mistakes of 9/11 in the World Trade Center.
The following are five areas of concern of the Skyscraper
Safety Campaign, and these concerns have been compiled by input
from my professional advisors, as well as my own experience
during the last four years.
The first area of concern is the role of the Port Authority
of New York and New Jersey and its exemptions from immunities
and codes. The failure of the NIST investigation to
comprehensively examine what role these immunities played in
the design, construction, maintenance, and ultimate collapse of
the World Trade Center, is of great concern to me.
Secondly, the lack of more intense emphasis on the
fireproofing issues, the premature disposal of the steel
evidence, the heavy reliance on computer modeling for the fire
testing, and the reluctance to focus on cause, blame, and
resultant implications are troubling to us.
Number three, the reliance on the voluntary cooperation of
key figures in the investigation to provide needed information,
putting the WTC chief structural engineer on the payroll to
facilitate his involvement in the investigation, utilizing
researchers to the exclusion of true investigators going into
the field to obtain evidence is also problematic to me. On this
last point, I want to note that I have been married to an NYPD
detective sergeant for over 30 years, and I can recognize an
investigation when I see one. I feel the inherent character of
the NIST as a research rather than an investigative agency was
a factor in this situation.
Number four, the lack of focus on evacuation issues of the
World Trade Center, such as the remoteness of the exits, the
behavior of fleeing persons in the stairwells, and the
avoidance of first person accounts of stairwell evacuation, and
the length of time it took to evacuate the building was a
shortcoming.
Finally, the relative secrecy of the investigation and the
withholding of all materials and documents used by NIST to
arrive at the study's conclusions is very disturbing. These
materials should be made available to professionals to further
study and to analyze, and to question and verify the findings
according to the scientific method. And they should not be
locked away in the National Archives or anywhere else. I
certainly hope that I could call on the Science Committee to
help unlock this information for the American public in the
future.
In conclusion, for these and for other reasons, I feel that
government must take a larger role in developing stronger codes
and standards for building and public safety, by being a true
resource to the code industry. Government representatives
should be part of code writing groups, to provide advice and
guidance, and to help develop standards and practices. As it
stands now, it is largely a battle of the do-gooders, like me
and the Skyscraper Safety Advisors, versus the business
interests, in a never-ending conflict regarding public safety.
The NIST investigation should not be an end. It should be just
the beginning of a new era, in which we see the real and
meaningful role that government must play in the safety and
wellbeing of the American people. In addition to the laudable
creation of the National Construction Safety Team Act, this
participation can be an additional legacy for the innocent
victims of 9/11, including my beautiful son, Probationary
Firefighter Christian Michael Otto Regenhard, whose godmother
is holding his picture here today. He continues to be the
inspiration for the work and the accomplishments of the
Skyscraper Safety Campaign.
I thank you all for this opportunity to speak to you today.
God bless you all in your work.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Regenhard follows:]
Prepared Statement of Sally Regenhard
Good morning Chairman Boehlert and Members of the House Science
Committee. It is truly an honor and a privilege to address you today. I
must first begin by thanking Chairman Sherwood Boehlert and this
committee, for listening with compassion and concern to the families of
the victims of 9/11. When we first came here in March and May of 2002,
we were desperately seeking leadership for an investigation of what
happened to our loved ones on 9/11/01. We had sought this on the local
level in NYC, but found no one to help us answer the painful questions
regarding what happened to our loved ones in the WTC on that dreaded
day of infamy.
Chairman Boehlert and the Science Committee redeemed our belief in
the system, and renewed our faith in the process of representative
government in our beloved country, and for this, we profoundly thank
you. The families of the victims, as well as the American public,
remain in your debt for your efforts in authorizing a WTC Investigation
through the National Construction Safety Team Act.
I must begin by thanking NIST for interacting with us on a regular
basis over the past three years, via conference calls and meetings,
with myself and my SSC co-chair, Monica Gabrielle, who is out of the
country, and cannot be here today. I know it has not always been easy
to deal with me and other victims' families, but I appreciate the
tolerance and respect showed by NIST. I also appreciate the vast
technical research abilities of this organization, and the enormous
task of embarking upon the WTC Investigation.
In totality however, while some very valuable results were
achieved, the overall mode and findings of the investigation was not
what I had hoped for. I had certain hopes regarding NIST and the
investigation, but I and others were disillusioned regarding what NIST
was willing and able to do. I had hoped for more specific and
comprehensive recommendations that could easily be translated into code
reform and change, but this is not the case. The recommendations are
very general and lack specifics. I feel that the vagueness of the
language was influenced by political correctness and a general
reluctance or inability to ``investigate,'' use subpoena power, ``lay
blame,'' or even point out the deadly mistakes of 9/11 in the WTC.
The following are five areas of concern for the Skyscraper Safety
Campaign: (While I have an understanding of these issues in concept,
for answers to specific, technical questions, I would like to confer
with two of my technical advisors who are with me here today.)
1) The role of the Port Authority of NYNJ and its' exemptions
from immunities and codes. The failure of the NIST
Investigation to comprehensively examine what role these
immunities had in the design, construction, maintenance and
ultimate collapse of the WTC is of great concern to me.
2) The lack of more intense emphasis on fireproofing issues,
premature disposal of steel evidence, the heavy reliance on
computer modeling for fire testing, and the reluctance to focus
on cause, blame, and resultant implications are troubling.
3) The reliance on the voluntary cooperation of key figures in
the investigation to provide needed information; placing the
former WTC chief structural engineer on the payroll to
facilitate his involvement in the investigation, utilizing
researchers to the exclusion of true investigators going into
the field to obtain evidence is problematic to me. On this last
point, I have been married to a NYPD detective sergeant for
over 30 years, and I can recognize an Investigation when I see
one. I feel the inherent character of NIST as a research rather
than investigative agency was a factor in this situation.
4) The lack of focus on evacuation issues of the WTC such as
remoteness of exits, behavior of fleeing persons in the
stairwells, and the avoidance of first person accounts of
stairwell evacuation, and length of time it took to evacuate
the building was a shortcoming.
5) The relative secrecy of the investigation, and the
withholding of all materials and documents used by NIST to
arrive at the study's conclusions is very disturbing. These
materials should be made available to professionals for further
study and analysis, to question and/or duplicate the findings,
according to the scientific method, and should not be locked
away in the National Archives or anywhere else. I hope I can
call on the Science Committee to unlock this information for
the American public.
In conclusion, for these and other reasons, I feel that government
must take a larger role in developing stronger codes and standards for
building and public safety. Government representatives should be part
of code writing groups, and help to develop standards and practices. As
is stands now, it is a battle of the ``do-gooders'' like me and the
Skyscraper Safety Advisors vs. business interests, in a never ending
conflict regarding public safety. The NIST investigation should not be
an end; it should be just the beginning of a new era in which we see
the real and meaningful role that government must play in the safety
and well being of the American people. In addition to the laudable
creation of the National Construction Safety Team Act, this
participation can be an additional legacy for the innocent victims of
9/11, including my beautiful son, Probationary Firefighter Christian
Michael Otto Regenhard, who continues to be the inspiration for the
work and accomplishments of the Skyscraper Safety Campaign. Thank you
for this opportunity to speak today. God bless you all.
Chairman Boehlert. Thank you very much, and you continue to
be an inspiration to this committee.
Let me point out that now, the witnesses that will follow.
I hope you are going to be able to remain to listen to their
testimony, and to listen to the questioning. I think you are
absolutely correct in pointing out that I think it is a shared
interest in being more specific, rather than vague, in the
report, but NIST, I think, has done an outstanding job, and
NIST correctly, as you identified in your testimony, is not an
investigative agency. It is a research agency. I have found
NIST to be most cooperative, but we are going to hold their
feet to the fire, and we are going to make certain they follow
through in their recommendations.
So, I think, hopefully, some measure of comfort will come
to you from the statement of Dr. Jeffrey and his expressed
determination to follow through on this. And I think you will
be interested in what some of other witnesses have to say.
These are people with whom you are familiar. And finally, I
just hope it is not the do-gooders versus the business
interests. I think we have got to have a partnership here. It
is good business to make buildings safer, and that does good in
the process. So, we will all work together. Thank you very
much.
Ms. Regenhard. Thank you very much.
Chairman Boehlert. The second panel today consists of Dr.
William Jeffrey, Director of the National Institute of
Standards and Technology; Ms. Nancy McNabb, Director of
Government Affairs, National Fire Protection Association; Dr.
James R. Harris, President, J.R. Harris and Company, Member,
American Society of Civil Engineers; and Mr. Glenn Corbett,
Assistant Professor of Fire Science, John Jay College of
Criminal Justice, Member of NIST National Construction Safety
Team Advisory Board; and for the purpose of an introduction of
our final witness, I call on our distinguished colleague, Mr.
Schwarz of Michigan.
Mr. Schwarz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is not frequently
that I have the opportunity to introduce a constituent to his
testifying before this committee, but in this case, Mr. Henry
L. Green not only serves as President of the Board of Directors
for the International Code Council, but as an expert in his
field, and as a constituent of mine from Delta Township, which
is just outside of Lansing, Michigan. In 1989, Mr. Green was
appointed Executive Director of the Bureau of Construction
Codes and Fire Safety for the Michigan Department of Labor and
Economic Growth. Henry, they keep changing the names of the
departments. That was what it was when I was in the State
senate. He has worked in the Bureau for more than 20 years,
serving as Building Inspector, Chief of the Barrier Free Design
Division, Chief Building Inspector, and as Deputy Director
before assuming his current role. He also serves on the
Building Officials Code Administration, BOCA, Board of
Directors, serving as President in 1997.
Mr. Chairman, Mr. Green is eminently qualified to testify
before this committee, and I am equally delighted that he is
here and a constituent of mine from mid-Michigan, from the 7th
District. Actually, he is from Spartan Country, not Wolverine
Country, but we will forgive him for that.
Chairman Boehlert. Mr. Green would join us at the table,
and thank you very much for that eloquent introduction. I have
had the pleasure of meeting Mr. Green, and I want to welcome
you here. I want to welcome all of you here, and I want to
thank you for being resources for this committee. I
particularly want to welcome Dr. Jeffrey in his maiden public
appearance before the Science Committee, in his present
capacity.
Dr. Jeffrey, the floor is yours. And I would say to all our
witnesses, we would ask that you try to summarize your opening
statement in five minutes or so. We are not going to be all
that arbitrary, but that will allow more time for questions and
interaction between the panel and the Members. Dr. Jeffrey, the
floor is yours.
Panel II:
STATEMENT OF DR. WILLIAM JEFFREY, DIRECTOR, NATIONAL INSTITUTE
OF STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY
Dr. Jeffrey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and also thank you
for your warm welcome remarks.
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, I am pleased to
testify on the NIST investigation of the World Trade Center
disaster. With your permission, I have a written statement for
the record, along with our final report.
Chairman Boehlert. Without objection, so ordered. All the
statements in their entirety will be part of the official
record.
Dr. Jeffrey. And I will now summarize our work to date and
our plans for the future. We announced this investigation
saying it would be thorough, open, and result in meaningful
recommendations.
It was thorough. NIST was able to acquire and test enough
steel from the buildings to have confidence in our findings. We
acquired more than 7,000 photos and 150 hours of videotape. We
interviewed nearly 1,200 survivors and first responders, and we
gained access to key information about the building's design
and construction.
It was also open. We sought public comment on our plans
even before we began the investigation. We held numerous
briefings for the public, published reports on our progress,
and solicited comments. We sought input from an advisory
committee of outside experts. We established a special liaison
with the families of victims, and communicated regularly with
the relevant organizations in New York City. This was no
academic exercise. We were charged with developing meaningful
recommendations, and we have done that. Using the
recommendations from this investigation to make improvements in
the way people design, maintain, and use buildings has just
begun. NIST is working vigorously with the relevant communities
to turn the recommendations into action.
The direct link between the terrorist-initiated airplane
attacks, the ensuing fires, and the collapse of the towers was
established through extensive testing, analyses, and computer
modeling. Here, you see a model of the aircraft as it enters
Tower 1, and the damage that was inflicted as debris and jet
fuel spread over multiple floors. These models helped us to
estimate the internal damage to the structure and fireproofing
that was not visible in photos and videos taken from the
outside.
The egress capacity required by the current building codes
is based on evacuating a single floor, not an entire building.
Fortunately, the towers were only one third to one half of full
capacity that morning, allowing 87 percent of the occupants to
evacuate. Had the buildings been full, with about 20,000
occupants each, roughly 14,000 people may have lost their
lives. Radio communications were a problem due to three
factors: first, the challenging radio frequency environment
posed by buildings; second, the scale of operations that
overwhelmed the available frequencies and exceeded the limits
of the communication protocols; and third, the difficulty of
transmissions between different organizations.
The recommendations we have made call for specific actions.
We made our recommendations as specific as we could,
identifying the parties that need to help take the next steps.
The recommendations do not prescribe specific systems,
materials, or technologies. Instead, NIST encourages
competition among alternatives that can meet performance
requirements. Within these recommendations, NIST has identified
37 specific national model codes, standards, practice
guidelines, or regulations that merit consideration through an
open and consensus-driven process.
NIST's response plan consists of three parts. First, the
building and fire safety investigation. And today, we are
releasing the final version of 43 reports documenting this
investigation, and plan to release draft reports in the spring
documenting our investigation of WTC 7. Second, our research
and development program, and third, a dissemination and
technical assistance program to facilitate adoption of the
proposed changes.
As part of this effort, NIST is aggressively working with
the model building code organizations and others representing
State and local officials to facilitate this process. Among
other things, NIST has held a major conference to focus
attention on getting action on these recommendations. We have
contracted with the National Institute of Building Sciences to
turn the appropriate recommendations into draft code language
for submission to the national model code developers, and we
have assigned a staff member responsibility for following up on
each and every recommendation.
Past NIST investigations have resulted in substantive
improvements in building safety. For example, improvements to
manufactured homes were made following our work on Hurricanes
Andrew and Camille. Improvements in construction safety and
inspection resulted from NIST's investigation of an apartment
building under construction in Connecticut. There are many more
examples of NIST's investigations resulting in improvements to
building safety, and we will do everything possible to add the
WTC investigation to this list.
Thank you for your support and this opportunity to update
the Committee.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Jeffrey follows:]
Prepared Statement of William Jeffrey
Mr. Chairman, and Members of the Committee, I am William Jeffrey,
Director of the National Institute of Standards and Technology. I am
pleased to appear today and testify on the building and fire safety
investigation of the World Trade Center disaster carried out by the
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST).
NIST announced its building and fire safety investigation of the
World Trade Center (WTC) disaster on August 21, 2002.\1\ This WTC
Investigation was then conducted under the authority of the National
Construction Safety Team (NCST) Act, which was signed into law on
October 1, 2002.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ NIST is a nonregulatory agency of the U.S. Department of
Commerce. The purposes of NIST investigations are to improve the safety
and structural integrity of buildings in the United States and the
focus is on fact finding. NIST investigative teams are required to
assess building performance and emergency response and evacuation
procedures in the wake of any building failure that has resulted in
substantial loss of life or that posed significant potential of
substantial loss of life. NIST does not have the statutory authority to
make findings of fault or negligence by individuals or organizations.
Further, no part of any report resulting from a NIST investigation into
a building failure or from an investigation under the National
Construction Safety Team Act may be used in any suit or action for
damages arising out of any matter mentioned in such report (15 USC
281a, as amended by P.L. 107-231).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The goals of the investigation of the WTC disaster were:
To investigate the building construction, the
materials used, and the technical conditions that contributed
to the outcome of the WTC disaster after terrorists flew large
jet-fuel laden commercial airliners into the WTC towers.
To serve as the basis for:
-- Improvements in the way buildings are designed,
constructed, maintained, and used;
-- Improved tools and guidance for industry and safety
officials;
-- Recommended revisions to current codes, standards,
and practices; and
-- Improved public safety.
The specific objectives were:
1. Determine why and how WTC 1 and WTC 2 collapsed following
the initial impacts of the aircraft and why and how WTC 7
collapsed;
2. Determine why the injuries and fatalities were so high or
low depending on location, including all technical aspects of
fire protection, occupant behavior, evacuation, and emergency
response;
3. Determine what procedures and practices were used in the
design, construction, operation, and maintenance of WTC 1, 2,
and 7.
4. Identify, as specifically as possible, areas in current
building and fire codes, standards, and practices that warrant
revision.
APPROACH
To meet these goals, NIST complemented its in-house expertise with
an array of specialists in key technical areas. In all, over 200 staff
contributed to the investigation. NIST and its contractors compiled and
reviewed tens of thousand of pages of documents; conducted interviews
with over a thousand people who had been on the scene or who had been
involved with the design, construction, and maintenance of the WTC;
analyzed 236 pieces of steel that were obtained from the wreckage;
performed laboratory tests that measured material properties, and
performed computer simulations of the sequence of events that happened
from the instant of aircraft impact to the initiation of collapse for
each tower.
Cooperation in obtaining the resource materials and in interpreting
the results came from a large number of individuals and organizations,
including The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey and its
contractors and consultants, Silverstein Properties and its contractors
and consultants, the City of New York and its departments, the
manufacturers and fabricators of the building components, the companies
that insured the WTC towers, the building tenants, the aircraft
manufacturers, the airlines, and the media.
The scarcity of physical evidence that is typically available in
place for reconstruction of a disaster led to the following approach:
Accumulation of copious photographic and video
material. With the assistance of the media, public agencies and
individual photographers, NIST acquired and organized nearly
7,000 segments of video footage, totaling in excess of 150
hours and nearly 7,000 photographs representing at least 185
photographers. This guided the Investigation Team's efforts to
determine the condition of the buildings following the aircraft
impact, the evolution of the fires, and the subsequent
deterioration of the structure.
Establishment of the baseline performance of the WTC
towers, i.e., estimating the expected performance of the towers
under normal design loads and conditions. The baseline
performance analysis also helped to estimate the ability of the
towers to withstand the unexpected events of September 11,
2001. Establishing the baseline performance of the towers began
with the compilation and analysis of the procedures and
practices used in the design, construction, operation, and
maintenance of the structural, fire protection, and egress
systems of the WTC towers. The additional components of the
performance analysis were the standard fire resistance of the
WTC truss-framed floor system, the quality and properties of
the structural steels used in the towers, and the response of
the WTC towers to the design gravity and wind loads.
Conduct simulations of the behavior of each tower on
September 11, 2001, in four steps:
1. The aircraft impact into the tower, the resulting
distribution of aviation fuel, and the damage to the
structure, partitions, thermal insulation materials,
and building contents.
2. The evolution of multi-floor fires.
3. The heating and consequent weakening of the
structural elements by the fires.
4. The response of the damaged and heated building
structure, and the progression of structural component
failures leading to the initiation of the collapse of
the towers.
For such complex structures and complex thermal and structural
processes, each of these steps stretched the state of the technology
and tested the limits of software tools and computer hardware. For
example, the investigators advanced the state-of-the-art in the
measurement of construction material properties and in structural
finite element modeling. New modeling capability was developed for the
mapping of fire-generated environmental temperatures onto the building
structural components.
The output of the four-step simulations was subject to
uncertainties in the as-built condition of the towers, the interior
layout and furnishings, the aircraft impact, the internal damage to the
towers (especially the thermal insulation for fire protection of the
structural steel, which is colloquially referred to as fireproofing),
the redistribution of the combustibles, and the response of the
building structural components to the heat from the fires. To increase
confidence in the simulation results, NIST used the visual evidence,
eyewitness accounts from inside and outside the buildings, laboratory
tests involving large fires and the heating of structural components,
and formal statistical methods to identify influential parameters and
quantify the variability in analysis results.
Combination of the knowledge gained into probable
collapse sequences for each tower,\2\ the identification of
factors that contributed to the collapse, and a list of factors
that could have improved building performance or otherwise
mitigated the loss of life.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ The focus of the Investigation was on the sequence of events
from the instant of aircraft impact to the initiation of collapse for
each tower. For brevity, this sequence is referred to as the ``probable
collapse sequence,'' although it includes little analysis of the
structural behavior of the tower after the conditions for collapse
initiation were reached and collapse became inevitable.
Compilation of a list of findings that respond to the
first three objectives and a list of recommendations that
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
responds to the fourth objective.
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
Objective 1: Determine why and how WTC 1 and WTC 2 collapsed following
the initial impacts of the aircraft.
The two aircraft hit the towers at high speed and did
considerable damage to principal structural components (core
columns, floors, and perimeter columns) that were directly
impacted by the aircraft or associated debris. However, the
towers withstood the impacts and would have remained standing
were it not for the dislodged insulation (fireproofing) and the
subsequent multi-floor fires. The robustness of the perimeter
frame-tube system and the large size of the buildings helped
the towers withstand the impact. The structural system
redistributed loads from places of aircraft impact, avoiding
larger scale damage upon impact. The hat truss, a feature atop
each tower which was intended to support a television antenna,
prevented earlier collapse of the building core. In each tower,
a different combination of impact damage and heat-weakened
structural components contributed to the abrupt structural
collapse.
In WTC 1, the fires weakened the core columns and
caused the floors on the south side of the building to sag. The
floors pulled the heated south perimeter columns inward,
reducing their capacity to support the building above. Their
neighboring columns quickly became overloaded as columns on the
south wall buckled. The top section of the building tilted to
the south and began its descent. The time from aircraft impact
to collapse initiation was largely determined by how long it
took for the fires to weaken the building core and to reach the
south side of the building and weaken the perimeter columns and
floors.
In WTC 2, the core was damaged severely at the
southeast corner and was restrained by the east and south walls
via the hat truss and the floors. The steady burning fires on
the east side of the building caused the floors on that side to
sag. The floors pulled the heated east perimeter columns
inward, reducing their capacity to support the building above.
Their neighboring columns quickly became overloaded as columns
on the east wall buckled. The top section of the building
tilted to the east and to the south and began its descent. The
time from aircraft impact to collapse initiation was largely
determined by the time needed for the fires to weaken the
perimeter columns and floor assemblies on the east and the
south sides of the building. WTC 2 collapsed more quickly than
WTC 1 because there was more aircraft damage to the building
core, including one of the heavily loaded corner columns, and
there were early and persistent fires on the east side of the
building, where the aircraft had extensively dislodged
insulation from the structural steel.
The WTC towers likely would not have collapsed under
the combined effects of aircraft impact damage and the
extensive, multi-floor fires that were encountered on September
11, 2001 if the thermal insulation had not been widely
dislodged or had been only minimally dislodged by aircraft
impact.
NIST found no corroborating evidence for alternative
hypotheses suggesting that the WTC towers were brought down by
controlled demolition using explosives planted prior to
September 11, 2001. NIST also did not find any evidence that
missiles were fired at or hit the towers. Instead, photographs
and videos from several angles clearly showed that the collapse
initiated at the fire and impact floors and that the collapse
progressed from the initiating floors downward, until the dust
clouds obscured the view.
Objective 2: Determine why the injuries and fatalities were so high or
low depending on location, including all technical aspects of fire
protection, occupant behavior, evacuation, and emergency response.
Approximately 87 percent of the estimated 17,400
occupants of the towers, and 99 percent of those located below
the impact floors, evacuated successfully. In WTC 1, where the
aircraft destroyed all escape routes, 1,355 people were trapped
in the upper floors when the building collapsed. One hundred
seven people who were below the impact floors did not survive.
Since the flow of people from the building had slowed
considerably 20 minutes before the tower collapsed, the
stairwell capacity was adequate to evacuate the occupants on
that morning.
In WTC 2, before the second aircraft strike, about
3,000 people got low enough in the building to escape by a
combination of self-evacuation and use of elevators. The
aircraft destroyed the operation of the elevators and the use
of two of the three stairways. Eighteen people from above the
impact zone found a passage through the damaged third stairway
(Stairwell A) and escaped. The other 619 people in or above the
impact zone perished. Eleven people who were below the impact
floors did not survive. As in WTC 1, shortly before collapse,
the flow of people from the building had slowed considerably,
indicating that the stairwell capacity was adequate that
morning.
About six percent of the survivors described
themselves as mobility impaired, with recent injury and chronic
illness being the most common causes; few, however, required a
wheelchair. Among the 118 decedents below the aircraft impact
floors, investigators identified seven who were mobility
impaired, but were unable to determine the mobility capability
of the remaining 111.
A principal factor limiting the loss of life was that
the buildings were only one-third to one-half occupied at the
time of the attacks. NIST estimated that if the towers had been
fully occupied with 20,000 occupants each, it would have taken
just over 3 hours to evacuate the buildings and about 14,000
people might have perished because the stairwell capacity would
not have been sufficient to evacuate that many people in the
available time. Egress capacity required by current building
codes is determined by single floor calculations that are
independent of building height and does not consider the time
for full building evacuation.
Due to the presence of assembly use spaces at the top
of each tower (Windows on the World restaurant complex in WTC 1
and the Top of the Deck observation deck in WTC 2) that were
designed to accommodate over 1,000 occupants per floor, the New
York City Building Code would have required a minimum of four
independent means of egress (stairs), one more than the three
that were available in the buildings. Given the low occupancy
level on September 11, 2001, NIST found that the issue of
egress capacity from these places of assembly, or from
elsewhere in the buildings, was not a significant factor on
that day. It is conceivable that such a fourth stairwell,
depending on its location and the effects of aircraft impact on
its functional integrity, could have remained passable,
allowing evacuation by an unknown number of additional
occupants from above the floors of impact. If the buildings had
been filled to their capacity with 20,000 occupants, however,
the required fourth stairway would likely have mitigated the
insufficient egress capacity for conducting a full building
evacuation within the available time.
Evacuation was assisted by participation in fire
drills within the previous year by two-thirds of survivors and
perhaps hindered by a Local Law that prevented employers from
requiring occupants to practice using the stairways. The
stairways were not easily navigated in some locations due to
their design, which included ``transfer hallways,'' where
evacuees had to traverse from one stairway to another location
where the stairs continued. Additionally, many occupants were
unprepared for the physical challenge of full building
evacuation.
The functional integrity and survivability of the
stairwells was affected by the separation of the stairwells and
the structural integrity of stairwell enclosures. In the impact
region of WTC 1, the stairwell separation was the smallest over
the building height--clustered well within the building core--
and all stairwells were destroyed by the aircraft impact. By
contrast, the separation of stairwells in the impact region of
WTC 2 was the largest over the building height--located along
different boundaries of the building core--and one of three
stairwells remained marginally passable after the aircraft
impact. The shaft enclosures were fire rated but were not
required to have structural integrity under typical accidental
loads: there were numerous reports of stairwells obstructed by
fallen debris from damaged enclosures.
The active fire safety systems (sprinklers, smoke
purge, fire alarms, and emergency occupant communications) were
designed to meet or exceed current practice. However, with the
exception of the evacuation announcements, they played no role
in the safety of life on September 11 because the water
supplies to the sprinklers were damaged by the aircraft impact.
The smoke purge systems, operated under the direction of the
fire department after fires, were not turned on, but they also
would have been ineffective due to aircraft damage. The
violence of the aircraft impact served as its own alarm. In WTC
2, contradictory public address announcements contributed to
occupant confusion and some delay in occupants beginning to
evacuate.
For the approximately 1,000 emergency responders on
the scene, this was the largest disaster they had even seen.
Despite attempts by the responding agencies to work together
and perform their own tasks, the extent of the incident was
well beyond their capabilities. Communications were erratic due
to the high number of calls and the inadequate performance of
some of the gear. Even so, there was no way to digest, test for
accuracy, and disseminate the vast amount of information being
received. Their jobs were complicated by the loss of command
centers in WTC 7 and then in the towers after WTC 2 collapsed.
With nearly all elevator service disrupted and progress up the
stairs taking about two min. per floor, it would have taken
hours for the responders to reach their destinations, assist
survivors, and escape had the towers not collapsed.
Objective 3: Determine what procedures and practices were used in the
design, construction, operation, and maintenance of WTC 1 and WTC 2.
Because of The Port Authority's establishment under a
clause of the United States Constitution, its buildings were
not subject to any state or local building regulations. The
buildings were unlike any others previously built, both in
their height and in their innovative structural features.
Nevertheless, the actual design and approval process produced
two buildings that generally were consistent with nearly all of
the provisions of the New York City Building Code and other
building codes of that time that were reviewed by NIST. The
loads for which the buildings were designed exceeded the New
York City code requirements. The quality of the structural
steels was consistent with the building specifications. The
departures from the building codes and standards identified by
NIST did not have a significant effect on the outcome of
September 11.
For the floor systems, the fire rating and insulation
thickness used on the floor trusses, which together with the
concrete slab served as the main source of support for the
floors, were of concern from the time of initial construction.
NIST found no technical basis or test data on which the thermal
protection of the steel was based. On September 11, 2001, the
minimum specified thickness of the insulation was adequate to
delay heating of the trusses; the amount of insulation
dislodged by the aircraft impact, however, was sufficient to
cause the structural steel to be heated to critical levels.
Based on four standard fire resistance tests that
were conducted under a range of insulation and test conditions,
NIST found the fire rating of the floor system to vary between
3/4 hour and two hours; in all cases, the floors continued to
support the full design load without collapse for over two
hours.
The wind loads used for the WTC towers, which
governed the structural design of the external columns and
provided the baseline capacity of the structures to withstand
abnormal events such as major fires or impact damage,
significantly exceeded the requirements of the New York City
Building Code and other building codes of the day that were
reviewed by NIST. Two sets of wind load estimates for the
towers obtained by independent commercial consultants in 2002,
however, differed by as much as 40 percent. These estimates
were based on wind tunnel tests conducted as part of insurance
litigation unrelated to the Investigation.
RECOMMENDATIONS
The tragic consequences of the September 11, 2001, attacks were
directly attributable to the fact that terrorists flew large jet-fuel
laden commercial airliners into the WTC towers. Buildings for use by
the general population are not designed to withstand attacks of such
severity; building regulations do not require building designs to
consider aircraft impact. In our cities, there has been no experience
with a disaster of such magnitude, nor has there been any in which the
total collapse of a high-rise building occurred so rapidly and with
little warning.
While there were unique aspects to the design of the WTC towers and
the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, NIST has compiled a list
of recommendations to improve the safety of tall buildings, occupants,
and emergency responders based on its investigation of the procedures
and practices that were used for the WTC towers; these procedures and
practices are commonly used in the design, construction, operation, and
maintenance of buildings under normal conditions. Public officials and
building owners will need to determine appropriate performance
requirements for those tall buildings, and selected other buildings,
that are at higher risk due to their iconic status, critical function,
or design.
The topics of the recommendations in eight groups are listed in
Table 1. A complete listing of the 30 recommendations is provided in
Appendix A. The ordering does not reflect any priority.
The eight major groups of recommendations are:
Increased Structural Integrity: The standards for
estimating the load effects of potential hazards (e.g.,
progressive collapse, wind) and the design of structural
systems to mitigate the effects of those hazards should be
improved to enhance structural integrity.
Enhanced Fire Endurance of Structures: The procedures
and practices used to ensure the fire endurance of structures
should be enhanced by improving the technical basis for
construction classifications and fire resistance ratings,
improving the technical basis for standard fire resistance
testing methods, use of the ``structural frame'' approach to
fire resistance ratings, and developing in-service performance
requirements and conformance criteria for sprayed fire-
resistive material.
New Methods for Fire Resistant Design of Structures:
The procedures and practices used in the fire resistant design
of structures should be enhanced by requiring an objective that
uncontrolled fires result in burnout without local or global
collapse. Performance-based methods are an alternative to
prescriptive design methods. This effort should include the
development and evaluation of new fire resistive coating
materials and technologies and evaluation of the fire
performance of conventional and high-performance structural
materials.
Improved Active Fire Protection: Active fire
protection systems (i.e., sprinklers, standpipes/hoses, fire
alarms, and smoke management systems) should be enhanced
through improvements to design, performance, reliability, and
redundancy of such systems.
Improved Building Evacuation: Building evacuation
should be improved to include system designs that facilitate
safe and rapid egress, methods for ensuring clear and timely
emergency communications to occupants, better occupant
preparedness for evacuation during emergencies, and
incorporation of appropriate egress technologies.
Improved Emergency Response: Technologies and
procedures for emergency response should be improved to enable
better access to buildings, response operations, emergency
communications, and command and control in large-scale
emergencies.
Improved Procedures and Practices: The procedures and
practices used in the design, construction, maintenance, and
operation of buildings should be improved to include
encouraging code compliance by non-governmental and quasi-
governmental entities, adoption and application of egress and
sprinkler requirements in codes for existing buildings, and
retention and availability of building documents over the life
of a building.
Education and Training: The professional skills of
building and fire safety professionals should be upgraded
though a national education and training effort for fire
protection engineers, structural engineers, architects,
regulatory personnel, and emergency responders.
The recommendations call for action by specific entities regarding
standards, codes and regulations, their adoption and enforcement,
professional practices, education, and training; and research and
development. Only when each of the entities carries out its role will
the implementation of a recommendation be effective.
The recommendations do not prescribe specific systems, materials,
or technologies. Instead, NIST encourages competition among
alternatives that can meet performance requirements. The
recommendations also do not prescribe specific threshold levels; NIST
believes that this responsibility properly falls within the purview of
the public policy setting process, in which the standards and codes
development process plays a key role.
NIST believes the recommendations are realistic and achievable
within a reasonable period of time. Only a few of the recommendations
call for new requirements in standards and codes. Most of the
recommendations deal with improving an existing standard or code
requirement, establishing a standard for an existing practice without
one, establishing the technical basis for an existing requirement,
making a current requirement risk-consistent, adopting or enforcing a
current requirement, or establishing a performance-based alternative to
a current prescriptive requirement.
NEXT STEPS
We have strongly urged that immediate and serious consideration be
given to these recommendations by the building and fire safety
communities in order to achieve appropriate improvements in the way
buildings are designed, constructed, maintained, and used and in
evacuation and emergency response procedures-with the goal of making
buildings, occupants, and first responders safer in future emergencies.
We are also strongly urging building owners and public officials to
(1) evaluate the safety implications of these recommendations to their
existing inventory of buildings and (2) take the steps necessary to
mitigate any unwarranted risks without waiting for changes to occur in
codes, standards, and practices.
We are urging state and local agencies to rigorously enforce
building codes and standards since such enforcement is critical to
ensure the expected level of safety. Unless they are complied with, the
best codes and standards cannot protect occupants, emergency
responders, or buildings.
I have assigned top priority for NIST staff to work vigorously with
the building and fire safety communities to assure that there is a
complete understanding of the recommendations and to provide needed
technical assistance in getting the recommendations implemented. We
have identified specific codes, standards, and practices affected by
each of the recommendations in its summary report for the WTC towers
and already begun to reach out to the responsible organizations to pave
the way for a timely, expedited consideration of the recommendations.
Toward this end, we held a conference September 13-15, 2005 that was
attended by over 200 people, including all of the major standards and
codes development organizations.
We have also awarded a contract to the National Institute of
Building Sciences (NIBS) to turn many of the recommendations into code
language suitable for submission of code change proposals to the two
national model code developers.
In addition, we will implement a web-based system so that the
public can track progress on implementing the recommendations. The web
site will list each of the recommendations, the specific organization
or organizations (e.g., standards and code developers, professional
groups, state and local authorities) responsible for its
implementation, the status of its implementation by organization, and
the plans or work in progress to implement the recommendations.
We are releasing the final versions of the 43 reports on NIST's
investigation of the WTC towers, totaling some 10,000 pages, today. Our
current plans are to release next spring an additional five reports as
drafts for public comment on the investigation of WTC 7.
Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you and the Committee again for
allowing me to testify today about NIST's building and fire safety
investigation of the World Trade Center disaster. I would be happy to
answer any questions at this time.
Appendix A. List of Recommendations
Group 1. Increased Structural Integrity
The standards for estimating the load effects of potential hazards
(e.g., progressive collapse, wind) and the design of structural systems
to mitigate the effects of those hazards should be improved to enhance
structural integrity.
Recommendation 1. NIST recommends that: (1) progressive
collapse be prevented in buildings through the development and
nationwide adoption of consensus standards and code provisions,
along with the tools and guidelines needed for their use in
practice; and (2) a standard methodology be developed--
supported by analytical design tools and practical design
guidance--to reliably predict the potential for complex
failures in structural systems subjected to multiple hazards.
Recommendation 2. NIST recommends that nationally accepted
performance standards be developed for: (1) conducting wind
tunnel testing of prototype structures based on sound technical
methods that result in repeatable and reproducible results
among testing laboratories; and (2) estimating wind loads and
their effects on tall buildings for use in design, based on
wind tunnel testing data and directional wind speed data.
Recommendation 3. NIST recommends that an appropriate
criterion be developed and implemented to enhance the
performance of tall buildings by limiting how much they sway
under lateral load design conditions (e.g., winds and
earthquakes).
Group 2. Enhanced Fire Endurance of Structures
The procedures and practices used to ensure the fire endurance of
structures be enhanced by improving the technical basis for
construction classifications and fire resistance ratings, improving the
technical basis for standard fire resistance testing methods, use of
the ``structural frame'' approach to fire resistance ratings, and
developing in-service performance requirements and conformance criteria
for sprayed fire-resistive materials.
Recommendation 4. NIST recommends evaluating, and where needed
improving, the technical basis for determining appropriate
construction classification and fire rating requirements
(especially for tall buildings)--and making related code
changes now as much as possible--by explicitly considering
factors including:
timely access by emergency responders and
full evacuation of occupants, or the time required for
burnout without local collapse;
the extent to which redundancy in active fire
protection (sprinkler and standpipe, fire alarm, and
smoke management) systems should be credited for
occupant life safety;
the need for redundancy in fire protection
systems that are critical to structural integrity;
the ability of the structure and local floor
systems to withstand a maximum credible fire scenario
without collapse, recognizing that sprinklers could be
compromised, not operational, or non-existent;
compartmentation requirements (e.g., 12,000
ft2 \1\) to protect the structure, including
fire rated doors and automatic enclosures, and limiting
air supply (e.g., thermally resistant window
assemblies) to retard fire spread in buildings with
large, open floor plans;
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\1\ Or a more appropriate limit, which represents a reasonable area
for active firefighting operations.
the effect of spaces containing unusually
large fuel concentrations for the expected occupancy of
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the building; and
the extent to which fire control systems,
including suppression by automatic or manual means,
should be credited as part of the prevention of fire
spread.
Recommendation 5. NIST recommends that the technical basis for
the century-old standard for fire resistance testing of
components, assemblies, and systems be improved through a
national effort. Necessary guidance also should be developed
for extrapolating the results of tested assemblies to
prototypical building systems. A key step in fulfilling this
recommendation is to establish a capability for studying and
testing the components, assemblies, and systems under realistic
fire and load conditions.
Recommendation 6. NIST recommends the development of criteria,
test methods, and standards: (1) for the in-service performance
of sprayed fire-resistive materials (SFRM, also commonly
referred to as fireproofing or insulation) used to protect
structural components; and (2) to ensure that these materials,
as-installed, conform to conditions in tests used to establish
the fire resistance rating of components, assemblies, and
systems.
Recommendation 7. NIST recommends the adoption and use of the
``structural frame'' approach to fire resistance ratings. This
approach requires that structural members--such as girders,
beams, trusses and spandrels having direct connection to the
columns, and bracing members designed to carry gravity loads--
be fire protected to the same fire resistance rating as
columns.
Group 3. New Methods for Fire Resistant Design of Structures
The procedures and practices used in the fire resistant design of
structures should be enhanced by requiring an objective that
uncontrolled fires result in burnout without partial or global (total)
collapse. Performance-based methods are an alternative to prescriptive
design methods. This effort should include the development and
evaluation of new fire-resistive coating materials and technologies and
evaluation of the fire performance of conventional and high-performance
structural materials.
Recommendation 8. NIST recommends that the fire resistance of
structures be enhanced by requiring a performance objective
that uncontrolled building fires result in burnout without
partial or global (total) collapse.
Recommendation 9. NIST recommends the development of: (1)
performance-based standards and code provisions, as an
alternative to current prescriptive design methods, to enable
the design and retrofit of structures to resist real building
fire conditions, including their ability to achieve the
performance objective of burnout without structural or local
floor collapse: and (2) the tools, guidelines, and test methods
necessary to evaluate the fire performance of the structure as
a whole system.
Recommendation 10. NIST recommends the development and
evaluation of new fire-resistive coating materials, systems,
and technologies with significantly enhanced performance and
durability to provide protection following major events.
Recommendation 11. NIST recommends that the performance and
suitability of advanced structural steel, reinforced and pre-
stressed concrete, and other high-performance material systems
be evaluated for use under conditions expected in building
fires.
Group 4. Improved Active Fire Protection
Active fire protection systems (i.e., sprinklers, standpipes/hoses,
fire alarms, and smoke management systems) should be enhanced through
improvements to design, performance, reliability, and redundancy of
such systems.
Recommendation 12. NIST recommends that the performance and
possibly the redundancy of active fire protection systems
(sprinklers, standpipes/hoses, fire alarms, and smoke
management systems) in buildings be enhanced to accommodate the
greater risks associated with increasing building height and
population, increased use of open spaces, high-risk building
activities, fire department response limits, transient fuel
loads, and higher threat profile.
Recommendation 13. NIST recommends that fire alarm and
communications systems in buildings be developed to provide
continuous, reliable, and accurate information on the status of
life safety conditions at a level of detail sufficient to
manage the evacuation process in building fire emergencies; all
communication and control paths in buildings need to be
designed and installed to have the same resistance to failure
and increased survivability above that specified in present
standards.
Recommendation 14. NIST recommends that control panels at
fire/emergency command stations in buildings be adapted to
accept and interpret a larger quantity of more reliable
information from the active fire protection systems that
provide tactical decision aids to fireground commanders,
including water flow rates from pressure and flow measurement
devices, and that standards for their performance be developed.
Recommendation 15. NIST recommends that systems be developed
and implemented for: (1) real-time off-site secure transmission
of valuable information from fire alarm and other monitored
building systems for use by emergency responders, at any
location, to enhance situational awareness and response
decisions and maintain safe and efficient operations; and (2)
preservation of that information either off-site or in a black
box that will survive a fire or other building failure for
purposes of subsequent investigations and analysis. Standards
for the performance of such systems should be developed, and
their use should be required.
Group 5. Improved Building Evacuation
Building evacuation should be improved to include system designs
that facilitate safe and rapid egress, methods for ensuring clear and
timely emergency communications to occupants, better occupant
preparedness regarding their roles and duties for evacuation during
emergencies, and incorporation of appropriate egress technologies.
Recommendation 16. NIST recommends that public agencies, non-
profit organizations concerned with building and fire safety,
and building owners and managers develop and carry out public
education and training campaigns, jointly and on a nationwide
scale, to improve building occupants' preparedness for
evacuation in case of building emergencies.
Recommendation 17. NIST recommends that tall buildings be
designed to accommodate timely full building evacuation of
occupants due to building-specific or large-scale emergencies
such as widespread power outages, major earthquakes, tornadoes,
hurricanes without sufficient advanced warning, fires,
explosions, and terrorist attack. Building size, population,
function, and iconic status should be taken into account in
designing the egress system. Stairwell capacity and stair
discharge door width should be adequate to accommodate
counterflow due to emergency access by responders.
Recommendation 18. NIST recommends that egress systems be
designed: (1) to maximize remoteness of egress components
(i.e., stairs, elevators, exits) without negatively impacting
the average travel distance; (2) to maintain their functional
integrity and survivability under foreseeable building-specific
or large-scale emergencies; and (3) with consistent layouts,
standard signage, and guidance so that systems become intuitive
and obvious to building occupants during evacuations.
Recommendation 19. NIST recommends that building owners,
managers, and emergency responders develop a joint plan and
take steps to ensure that accurate emergency information is
communicated in a timely manner to enhance the situational
awareness of building occupants and emergency responders
affected by an event. This should be accomplished through
better coordination of information among different emergency
responder groups, efficient sharing of that information among
building occupants and emergency responders, more robust design
of emergency public address systems, improved emergency
responder communication systems, and use of the Emergency
Broadcast System (now known as the Integrated Public Alert and
Warning System) and Community Emergency Alert Networks.
Recommendation 20. NIST recommends that the full range of
current and next generation evacuation technologies should be
evaluated for future use, including protected/hardened
elevators, exterior escape devices, and stairwell descent
devices, which may allow all occupants an equal opportunity for
evacuation and facilitate emergency response access.
Group 6. Improved Emergency Response
Technologies and procedures for emergency response should be
improved to enable better access to buildings, response operations,
emergency communications, and command and control in large-scale
emergencies.
Recommendation 21. NIST recommends the installation of fire-
protected and structurally hardened elevators to improve
emergency response activities in tall buildings by providing
timely emergency access to responders and allowing evacuation
of mobility impaired building occupants. Such elevators should
be installed for exclusive use by emergency responders during
emergencies. In tall buildings, consideration also should be
given to installing such elevators for use by all occupants.
The use of elevators for these purposes will require additional
operating procedures and protocols, as well as a requirement
for release of elevator door restrictors by emergency response
personnel.
Recommendation 22. NIST recommends the installation,
inspection, and testing of emergency communications systems,
radio communications, and associated operating protocols to
ensure that the systems and protocols: (1) are effective for
large-scale emergencies in buildings with challenging radio
frequency propagation environments; and (2) can be used to
identify, locate, and track emergency responders within indoor
building environments and in the field. The Federal Government
should coordinate its efforts that address this need within the
framework provided by the SAFECOM program of the Department of
Homeland Security.
Recommendation 23. NIST recommends the establishment and
implementation of detailed procedures and methods for
gathering, processing, and delivering critical information
through integration of relevant voice, video, graphical, and
written data to enhance the situational awareness of all
emergency responders. An information intelligence sector\2\
should be established to coordinate the effort for each
incident.
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\2\ A group of individuals that is knowledgeable, experienced, and
specifically trained in gathering, processing, and delivering
information critical for emergency response operations and is ready for
activation in large and/or dangerous events.
Recommendation 24. NIST recommends the establishment and
implementation of codes and protocols for ensuring effective
and uninterrupted operation of the command and control system
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
for large-scale building emergencies.
Group 7. Improved Procedures and Practices
The procedures and practices used in the design, construction,
maintenance, and operation of buildings should be improved to include
encouraging code compliance by nongovernmental and quasi-governmental
entities, adoption and application of egress and sprinkler requirements
in codes for existing buildings, and retention and availability of
building documents over the life of a building.
Recommendation 25. Non-governmental and quasi-governmental
entities that own or lease buildings--and are not subject to
building and fire safety code requirements of any governmental
jurisdiction--should provide a level of safety that equals or
exceeds the level of safety that would be provided by strict
compliance with the code requirements of an appropriate
governmental jurisdiction. To gain broad public confidence in
the safety of such buildings, NIST further recommends that as-
designed and as-built safety be certified by a qualified third
party, independent of the building owner(s). The process should
not use self-approval for code enforcement in areas including
interpretation of code provisions, design approval, product
acceptance, certification of the final construction, and post-
occupancy inspections over the life of the buildings.
Recommendation 26. NIST recommends that state and local
jurisdictions adopt and aggressively enforce available
provisions in building codes to ensure that egress and
sprinkler requirements are met by existing buildings. Further,
occupancy requirements should be modified where needed (such as
when there are assembly use spaces within an office building)
to meet the requirements in model building codes.
Recommendation 27. NIST recommends that building codes should
incorporate a provision that requires building owners to retain
documents, including supporting calculations and test data,
related to building design, construction, maintenance and
modifications over the entire life of the building.\3\ Means
should be developed for offsite storage and maintenance of the
documents. In addition, NIST recommends that relevant building
information should be made available in suitably designed hard
copy or electronic format for use by emergency responders. Such
information should be easily accessible by responders during
emergencies.
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\3\ The availability of inexpensive electronic storage media and
tools for creating large searchable databases make this feasible.
Recommendation 28. NIST recommends that the role of the
``Design Professional in Responsible Charge'' \4\ be clarified
to ensure that: (1) all appropriate design professionals
(including, e.g., the fire protection engineer) are part of the
design team providing the standard of care when designing
buildings employing innovative or unusual fire safety systems,
and (2) all appropriate design professionals (including, e.g.,
the structural engineer and the fire protection engineer) are
part of the design team providing the standard of care when
designing the structure to resist fires, in buildings that
employ innovative or unusual structural and fire safety
systems.
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\4\ In projects involving a design team, the ``Design Professional
in Responsible Charge''--usually the lead architect--ensures that the
team members use consistent design data and assumptions, coordinates
overlapping specifications, and serves as the liaison to the
enforcement and reviewing officials and to the owner. The term is
defined in the International Building Code and in the ICC Performance
Code for Buildings and Facilities (where it is the Principal Design
Professional).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Group 8. Education and Training
The professional skills of building and fire safety professionals
should be upgraded though a national education and training effort for
fire protection engineers, structural engineers, and architects. The
skills of the building regulatory and fire service personnel should
also be upgraded to provide sufficient understanding and the necessary
skills to conduct the review, inspection, and approval tasks for which
they are responsible.
Recommendation 29. NIST recommends that continuing education
curricula be developed and programs should be implemented for
(1) training fire protection engineers and architects in
structural engineering principles and design, and (2) training
structural engineers, architects, fire protection engineers,
and code enforcement officials in modern fire protection
principles and technologies, including fire-resistance design
of structures, and (3) training building regulatory and fire
service personnel to upgrade their understanding and skills to
conduct the review, inspection, and approval tasks for which
they are responsible.
Recommendation 30. NIST recommends that academic, professional
short-course, and web-based training materials in the use of
computational fire dynamics and thermostructural analysis tools
be developed and delivered to strengthen the base of available
technical capabilities and human resources.
Biography for William Jeffrey
William Jeffrey is the 13th Director of the National Institute of
Standards and Technology (NIST), sworn into the office on July 26,
2005. He was nominated by President Bush on May 25, 2005, and confirmed
by the U.S. Senate on July 22, 2005.
As Director of NIST, Dr. Jeffrey oversees an array of programs that
support U.S. industry and science with measurement research, standards,
technology, and technical assistance that strengthen the Nation's
innovation infrastructure and competitiveness. The goal is to improve
manufacturing, services, trade, safety and security, and quality of
life. Operating in fiscal year 2005 on a budget of about $858 million,
NIST is headquartered in Gaithersburg, Md., and has additional
laboratories in Boulder, Colo. NIST also jointly operates research
organizations in three locations, which support world-class physics,
cutting-edge biotechnology, and environmental research. NIST employs
about 3,000 scientists, engineers, technicians, and support personnel.
An agency of the U.S. Commerce Department's Technology Administration,
NIST has extensive cooperative research programs with industry,
academia, and other government agencies. Its staff is augmented by
about 1,600 visiting researchers.
Dr. Jeffrey has been involved in federal science and technology
programs and policy since 1988. Previous to his appointment to NIST he
served as Senior Director for homeland and national security and the
Assistant Director for space and aeronautics at the Office of Science
and Technology Policy (OSTP) within the Executive Office of the
President. Earlier, he was the Deputy Director for the Advanced
Technology Office and Chief Scientist for the Tactical Technology
Office with the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA).
While at DARPA, Dr. Jeffrey advanced research programs in
communications, computer network security, novel sensor development,
and space operations.
Prior to joining DARPA, Dr. Jeffrey was the Assistant Deputy for
Technology at the Defense Airborne Reconnaissance Office, where he
supervised sensor development for the Predator and Global Hawk Unmanned
Aerial Vehicles and the development of common standards that allow for
cross-service and cross-agency transfer of imagery and intelligence
products. He also spent several years working at the Institute for
Defense Analyses performing technical analyses in support of the
Department of Defense.
Dr. Jeffrey received his Ph.D. in astronomy from Harvard University
and his B.Sc. in physics from the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology.
Chairman Boehlert. Thank you very much, Doctor. Thank you
very much, Dr. Jeffrey. Ms. McNabb.
STATEMENT OF MS. NANCY MCNABB, DIRECTOR OF GOVERNMENT AFFAIRS,
NATIONAL FIRE PROTECTION ASSOCIATION
Ms. McNabb. Good morning, Chairman Boehlert, and Committee
Members. My name is Nancy McNabb, and I am Director for
Government Affairs for NFPA, the National Fire Protection
Association, headquartered in Quincy, Massachusetts. I am an
architect licensed in the great State of New York, and was
formerly the Assistant Director for Code Development and
Interpretation there. I appreciate the opportunity to address
the Committee this morning regarding the report of the National
Construction Safety Team on the collapse of the World Trade
Center towers. Dr. Jeffrey and his team at the NIST labs have
done outstanding work.
NFPA is a 109-year-old private, nonprofit organization
whose mission is to reduce the burden of fire and other hazards
on the quality of life. We achieve that mission by advocating
consensus, codes, and standards, research, training, and
education. We have approximately 79,000 members that come from
80 nations around the world.
I am here today to affirm our support for the efforts of
NIST regarding their report. In most cases, resolution and
implementation of their recommendations will be a long-term
process. We have provided the Committee with copies of our
detailed responses to the NIST study, portions of which I will
speak to today.
The NIST report, the second issued under the authority of
the National Construction Safety Team Act, shows that NIST is
committed to providing a high level of scientific data and a
set of recommendations for future consideration by codes and
standards developers. NFPA is pleased to see the work effort of
NIST resulting in positions on many controversial and sometimes
unpopular subjects. However, the need to conduct more research
in numerous areas is clear.
The loss of the World Trade Center complex represents an
unusual set of building performance circumstances, both
independent and interdependent. Fundamental questions, such as
why did each tower remain standing after the initial impacts,
what factors influenced the collapse of the two towers, and
what features either allowed so many occupants to escape, or
prevented occupants from escaping, now have some answers. Other
difficult and anguishing questions, such as what was the fate
of mobility-impaired occupants, and why were the local
communication systems overwhelmed, and did this prevent or
delay evacuation warnings to the first responders, at least now
have some explanation.
In June of 2002, when the intensive three-year Federal
Building and Fire Safety Investigation of the World Trade
Center Disaster was initiated, our President and CEO, Jim
Shannon, testified at a public hearing held in New York City
that outlined the NIST objectives for their work plan,
investigation approach, and intended outcomes. It would have
been easy for the Federal Government to simply say this was a
one time extreme event, or we do not or cannot design buildings
for, or learn anything new from such extraordinary events. But
that would be contrary to how the U.S. conducts its business,
and how NFPA identifies needs and emerging issues for the
development of new and improved safety codes and standards. Let
me assure you that NIST has accomplished a great deal with
their studies, analyses, and recommendations.
Even those skeptics and critics of NIST and its report in
the end chose to submit constructive comments. The National
Construction Safety Team Federal Advisory Committee, who
provided guidance to NIST during the investigation, the
engineers and scientists from NIST who provided support to this
effort, and the group of private organizations who served as
contractors to NIST on various aspects of the project, are to
be commended. They have provided a convincing amount of
evidence, rigorous analyses, hypotheses, and confirmation.
One critical test of effectiveness of the World Trade
Center study will be what will happen with the 30 specific
recommendations in the final report. Some of them have already
been implemented in several NFPA codes. This was possible
because of the open approach that NIST took with the
investigation. In particular, Dr. Sunder's commitment to
provide public briefings, opportunities for input during media
briefings and open meetings, and making critical information
available on the NIST World Trade Center website. While some
changes have been made, it is important to note that it is
likely that after a thorough and detailed analysis of the final
recommendations, there may not be sufficient data, detail, or
compelling evidence to promulgate a change to a particular
safety code or standard.
For example, the ongoing debate about whether building
regulations should address events associated with normal
building hazards or more extreme events such as hostile acts
and explosions, and what category of buildings should have
these unique measures imposed upon them, will have to be
settled before consensus is reached on many of the
recommendations and findings.
Because of this study, NFPA codes and standards have been
changed to include a number of things. A few are hourly fire
resistance ratings of three and four-hour duration for tall
buildings, requirements for wider stairs to address counterflow
issues based on occupant load, and integration of performance-
based design options. A number of long-term initiatives are
also underway to address other subjects, including the
protocols used to evaluate the performance of building
structural systems under fire conditions. Although NIST has not
indicated that the current procedures are inadequate, a review
of the test methods and structural system evaluations is
warranted.
One recommendation that should receive a high priority is
the consideration for elevator use in high rise emergency
evacuations. NIST has led the effort in this area, with
participation from the private sector, to establish the
circumstances and criteria for making this a reality. And
again, I have given you some of NFPA's comments on NIST's
report, and a list of the changes already affected by NFPA.
Beyond this, several of the recommendations refer to
specific identification and quantification of multiple threats
or hazards. This implies the need for risk and hazard analyses,
and the utilization of performance-based design techniques.
Overall, NFPA supports these concepts for building and fire
regulations. However, the design of buildings, the assessment
of the existing building stock, and the preparation of
emergency response plans, must be an integral part of our
collective mindset.
While NFPA recognizes the benefits of risk and hazard
analyses and performance-based design, we note that many of the
tools and data necessary to do this on a routine basis are not
yet available, nor are they sufficiently understood by all the
parties that routinely make decisions about building
construction, occupant safety, and emergency responder
operations. We have to make sure that those who live or work in
a high rise, those who design and construct a high rise, and
those that come to our aid in a high rise, are aware of the
limitations of our technology, procedures, and codes.
While it is too early to establish the lessons learned from
the report, we have made a significant start. We have much yet
to be done. Before we arrive at an appropriate best practices
that will advance the level of safety in the built environment,
more evaluation is necessary.
I can assure you that NFPA will continue to be thorough in
reviewing, evaluating, and implementing those NIST
recommendations that are directed at the broad issue of public
and first responder safety. After the comprehensive study that
NIST has provided to us, to learn nothing and do nothing would
be delinquent.
Likewise, it would be unthinkable if the private sector
fails to act with due regard for these recommendations, and if
our government institutions, such as the General Services
Administration, fail to recognize the opportunities to develop
new building safety enhancements. NIST has provided us with a
public service and a tremendous resource. It will be up to all
of us to make certain that we do not waste this unique
opportunity to ask ourselves new questions, learn lessons, and
develop better building safety codes and standards.
Thank you again for allowing me the opportunity to present
the views of NFPA this morning. I will be happy to answer any
questions you may have.
[The prepared statement of Ms. McNabb follows:]
Prepared Statement of Nancy McNabb
Good morning Chairman Boehlert and Ranking Member Gordon and
Committee Members. My name is Nancy McNabb and I am the Director for
Government Affairs for NFPA (the National Fire Protection Association)
headquartered in Quincy, Massachusetts. I am a licensed architect and
was formerly the Assistant Director for Code Development and
Interpretation for the State of New York. I appreciate the opportunity
to address the Committee this morning regarding Report of the National
Construction Safety Team on the Collapse of the World Trade Center
Towers. Dr. Shyam Sunder, Dr. William Grosshandler and their teams at
the NIST labs have done outstanding work.
NFPA is a 109-year-old, private, non-profit organization whose
mission is to reduce the burden of fire and other hazards on the
quality of life. We achieve that mission by advocating consensus codes
and standards, research, training and education. We have approximately
79,000 members that come from 80 nations around the world.
I am here today to affirm our support for the efforts of NIST
regarding their report. In most cases, resolution and implementation of
their recommendations will be a long-term process. We have provided the
Committee with copies of our detailed responses to the NIST study,
portions of which I will speak to today.
On September 11, 2001, we witnessed the most terrible acts of
violence ever committed in our country. The destruction of the WTC
towers, the large loss of life of building occupants and first
responders demands answers from the Federal Government. The first
effort directed at this loss included the Building Performance Study
(BPS) that was conducted by FEMA. NFPA participated as a team member in
order to contribute to the collection, observation and recommendations
process surrounding the sequence of events and triggering mechanisms
that resulted in the catastrophic building failures and loss of so many
lives.
The FEMA study, completed in just eight months, established a
series of preliminary observations including credible theories,
hypotheses and a likely sequence of events that led to the progressive
collapse of WTC 1, 2 and 7. As thorough as the FEMA BPS report was,
almost every preliminary recommendation needed additional study. This
committee recognized the need to take action and passed the National
Construction Safety Team Act under Public Law 107-231 (NCSTA) in 2002
authorizing the National Institute of Standards and Technology, NIST,
as the responsible agency. Congress selected the premier government
scientific institution that has the capability, resources and the
capacity to conduct complex building loss investigations.
The report, the second issued under the authority of the NCST,
shows that NIST is committed to providing a high level of scientific
data and a set of recommendations for future consideration by codes and
standards developers. NFPA is pleased to see the work effort of NIST
resulting in positions on many controversial and sometimes, unpopular
subjects. However, the need to conduct more research in numerous areas
is clear.
The loss of the WTC complex represents an unusual set of building
performance circumstances, both independent and interdependent.
Fundamental questions such as why did each tower remain standing after
the initial aircraft impacts, what factors influenced the collapse of
the two towers and what features either allowed so many occupants to
escape or prevented occupants from escaping now have some answers.
Other difficult and anguishing questions such as what was the fate of
mobility impaired occupants, and why were the local communication
systems overwhelmed and did this prevent or delay evacuation warnings
to the first responders, at least now we have some explanation.
In June of 2002, when the intensive, three year Federal Building
and Fire Safety Investigation of the World Trade Center Disaster was
initiated, our President and CEO, Jim Shannon, testified at a public
hearing held in New York City that outlined the NIST objectives for
their work plan, investigation approach, and intended outcomes. It
would have been easy for the Federal Government to simply say ``This
was a one time, extreme event,'' or ``We do not, nor cannot design
buildings for, or learn anything new from such extraordinary events,''
but that would be contrary to how the U.S. conducts its business and
how NFPA identifies needs and emerging issues for the development of
new and improved safety codes and standards. Let me assure you that
NIST has accomplished a great deal with their studies, analyses and
recommendations.
Even those skeptics and critics of NIST and its report in the end
chose to submit constructive comments. The NCST Federal Advisory
Committee, who provided guidance to NIST during the investigation, the
engineers and scientists from NIST who provided support to this effort,
and the group of private organizations who served as contractors to
NIST on various aspects of the project are to be commended. They have
provided a convincing amount of evidence, rigorous analyses, hypotheses
and confirmation.
One critical test of the effectiveness of the WTC study will be
what will happen with the 30 specific recommendations in the final
report. Some of them have already been implemented in several NFPA
codes. This was possible because of the open approach that NIST took
with the investigation. In particular, Dr. Sunder's commitment to
provide public briefings, opportunities for input during media
briefings and open meetings and making critical information available
on the NIST WTC website. While some changes have been made, it is
important to note that it is likely, that after a thorough and detailed
analysis of the final recommendations, there may not be sufficient
data, detail or compelling evidence to promulgate a change to a
particular safety code or standard.
For example, the on-going debate about whether building regulations
should address events associated with normal building hazards, or more
extreme events such as hostile acts and explosions, and what category
of buildings should have these unique measures imposed on them, will
have to be settled before consensus is reached on many of the
recommendations and findings.
Because of this study, NFPA codes and standards have been changed
to include:
Integration of performance-based design options.
Retroactive requirements for installation of
automatic sprinkler systems in high rise buildings.
Hourly fire resistance ratings of three-hour and
four-hour duration for tall buildings.
Integration of the structural frame approach when
determining fire resistance ratings.
Requirements for wider stairs to address counterflow
issues based on occupant load.
Mandates for the Installation of stair descent
devices for persons with mobility impairments.
A number of long-term initiatives are also underway to address
other subjects including the protocols used to evaluate the performance
of building structural systems under fire conditions. Although NIST has
not indicated that the current procedures are inadequate, a review of
the test methods and structural system evaluations is warranted.
One recommendation that should receive a high priority is the
consideration for elevator use in high rise emergency evacuations. NIST
has led the effort in this area with participation the private sector
to establish the circumstances and criteria for making this a reality.
Exhibit A provides you with NFPA's comments to NIST's NCSTAR1
Report; Exhibit B contains a summary of changes already effected by
NFPA because of the NIST study, or that are in progress at some level.
Beyond this, several of the recommendations refer to specific
identification and quantification of multiple threats or hazards. This
implies the need for risk and hazard analyses, and the utilization of
performance-based design techniques. Overall, NFPA supports these
concepts building and fire regulations. However, the design of
buildings, the assessment of the existing building stock, and the
preparation of emergency response plans, must be an integral part of
our collective mind set.
While NFPA recognizes the benefits of risk and hazard analyses and
performance-based design, we note that many of the tools and data
necessary to do this on a routine basis are not yet available. Nor are
they sufficiently understood by all parties that routinely make
decisions about building construction, occupant safety and emergency
responder operations. We have to make sure that those who live or work
in a high rise, those who design and construct a high rise and those
that come to our aid in a high rise are aware of the limitations of our
technology, procedures and codes.
While it is too early to establish the lessons learned from the
report, we have made a significant start. We have much yet to be done.
Before we arrive at an appropriate ``best practices'' that will advance
the level of safety in the built environment more evaluation is
necessary.
I can assure you that NFPA will continue to be thorough in
reviewing, evaluating and implementing those NIST recommendations that
are directed at the broad issue of public and first responder safety.
After the comprehensive study that NIST has provided to us, to learn
nothing and do nothing would be delinquent.
Likewise, it would be unthinkable if the private sector fails to
act with due regard for these recommendations, and if our government
institutions, such as the General Services Administration, fail to
recognize the opportunities to develop new building safety
enhancements. NIST has provided us with a public service and a
tremendous resource. It will be up to all of us to make certain that we
do not waste this unique opportunity to ask ourselves new questions,
learn lessons and develop better building safety codes and standards.
Thank you again for allowing me the opportunity to present the
views of NFPA this morning. I will be happy to answer any questions you
may have.
Biography for Nancy McNabb
Nancy McNabb is the Director Government Affairs for the National
Fire Protection Association (NFPA) at their Government Affairs Office
in Washington, DC. She is responsible for working with congressional
and federal agencies as well as allied organizations to promote the
NFPA mission about fire and life safety. Ms. McNabb joined NFPA in
September 2001 as the regional manager, building code central field
office, located in Dallas, TX.
Before joining NFPA, McNabb was a service coordinator for Building
Officials and Code Administrators (BOCA) International, where she
facilitated code adoptions, conducted trainings on code
interpretations, and represented the organization at legislative
hearings. Previously, she served as a staff architect for BOCA, working
with building officials in New York State and providing member services
throughout the region. Nancy was also Assistant Director for code
development and code interpretation for the New York State Department
of State, codes division.
McNabb holds a Master's degree in architecture in structures and a
Bachelor's of science degree in architecture from the University of
Illinois at Champaign/Urbana, as well as a Bachelor's degree in fine
arts from Bradley University. She is a registered architect in New York
and Pennsylvania.
Chairman Boehlert. Thank you very much. I couldn't agree
more with you. To learn nothing and do nothing would be
delinquent. I can assure you this committee will not be
delinquent.
Dr. Harris.
STATEMENT OF DR. JAMES R. HARRIS, PRESIDENT, J.R. HARRIS &
COMPANY
Dr. Harris. Good morning. I am pleased to appear on behalf
of the Structural Engineering Institute of the American Society
of Civil Engineers as you consider these recommendations made
by the National Institute of Standards and Technology, arising
from their study of the events at the World Trade Center.
ASCE/SEI has a robust program of national voluntary
standards produced under a consensus process accredited by the
American National Standards Institute. Changes in some of our
standards are already underway that address a few of NIST's
recommendations, and we plan to give each recommendation that
is pertinent to the scope of our standards careful
consideration.
My name is James Harris. I am President of a structural
consulting firm in Denver, Colorado. I have long been involved
in the development of standards for structural engineering
practice here in the U.S. as well as internationally. I have
chaired the ASCE/SEI committee that prepares the standard ASCE
7 Minimum Design Loads for Buildings and Other Structures for
the last three editions. I am also a member of the American
Concrete Institute Committee that prepares the standard for the
design of building structures, and the American Institute of
Steel Construction Committee that prepares the standard for the
design of steel buildings.
ASCE/SEI commends NIST for their thorough study and for the
thought-provoking findings and recommendations. We also commend
the Congress for providing the funding for this worthwhile
study. Even though the first lesson of September 11 is to
direct resources to prevention of such attacks, we see
important lessons from this tragedy for improving the
performance of buildings in emergencies that are more ordinary
than the attacks of September 11.
ASCE supports careful consideration of all of NIST's
recommendations by the broad community that develops standards
and building codes for this country. NIST's study built upon
and extended the work of the Building Performance Study Team
that ASCE formed and FEMA supported immediately after the
tragedy, and which produced their report in 2002.
The detail of NIST's study commands respect, and the events
at the World Trade Center, as well as at the Pentagon that day
demand our attention. The standard ASCE 7 has long included
provisions for, or guidelines for resistance to progressive
collapse in its commentary. We look forward to improving the
technology for assessing such resistance in the process of
building design. We will also participate with interested
stakeholders in addressing the extent to which such properties
should become mandatory requirements.
ASCE is close to issuing a draft for public comment of a
standard for wind tunnel testing that will address some aspects
of NIST's second recommendation. More work on building a wind
resistant infrastructure is needed, as shown by recent
hurricanes, and we urge the Congress to fund the recently
authorized National Windstorm Mitigation Program. ASCE and the
Society of Fire Protection Engineers are issuing a new edition
of their joint standard on calculation methods for structural
fire protection. ASCE is also preparing a new standard for
blast loading on building structures, and we are participating
in the panel being formed by the National Institute of Building
Sciences that will look into implementation of all of the NIST
recommendations.
We do see some risks if NIBS or NIST elect to bypass the
standards upon which building codes rely by submitting changes
directly to the major model building codes. Although the
standards process takes considerable time, it builds a
consensus of all affected stakeholders. A risk to be considered
is backlash if change proposals are made without the necessary
broad consensus. Some of the recommendations will need
considerable refinement on the thorny issue of dividing the
population of buildings into classes for which certain new
requirements will apply.
Some of the other recommendations will require considerable
time to develop a knowledge base in the affected professions.
We see the NIBS panel as an important vehicle to coordinate
actions in a fashion to avoid negative concerns. We also
believe that NIST should continue their studies. More
information is needed on the performance of fire insulation
under various environments, and on the various fire scenarios
that would be used in performance-based design of structures
for fire resistance.
In conclusion, we welcome the opportunity to further the
improvement of building safety, and we caution that the work to
come will take more time than might seem necessary, now that
the major study by NIST has been completed.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Harris follows:]
Prepared Statement of James R. Harris
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:
Good morning. My name is James Harris, and I am pleased to appear
on behalf of the Structural Engineering Institute of American Society
of Civil Engineers (ASCE/SEI)\1\ as you examine ``The Investigation of
the World Trade Center Collapse: Findings, Recommendations, and Next
Steps'' in light of the release of findings and recommendations of the
National Institute of Standards and Technology investigation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ ASCE, founded in 1852, is the country's oldest national civil
engineering organization. It represents more than 139,000 civil
engineers in private practice, government, industry, and academia who
are dedicated to the advancement of the science and profession of civil
engineering. ASCE carried out Building Performance Assessments of the
World Trade Center, the Pentagon and the Murrah Federal Building, and
its technical assessments following earthquakes, hurricanes, and other
natural disasters. The New Orleans levee technical group includes
representatives appointed by the ASCE Geo-Institute and ASCE Coasts,
Oceans, Ports, and Rivers Institute. ASCE is a 501(c) (3) non-profit
educational and professional society.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The events at the World Trade Center in New York City on September
11, 2001, were the worst building disasters in the history of the
United States. The National Institute of Standards and Technology
conducted a building and fire safety investigation of the disaster
under the authority of the National Construction Safety Team Act (15
USC 7301 et seq.). As a result of its WTC Investigation, on June 23,
2005 NIST issued a draft report with recommendations, and invited
public comments on June 23, 2005.
ASCE/SEI supports a thorough review and deliberation of all of the
NIST Recommendations and looks forward to further discussions
clarifying the situations to which the NIST Recommendations should
apply.
ASCE/SEI believes that engineers must avoid over-optimistic
reassurances about building safety, and agrees that increased efforts
should be focused on preventing terrorist attacks. That said, the 30
recommendations presented by NIST within eight categories address a
range of issues that we at ASCE/SEI think require serious discussion.
Many of the recommendations were presented by NIST as ``changes to
codes and standards,'' which some may interpret to mean that the
painstaking process of developing consensus code and standard
provisions should be unreasonably accelerated. We believe that the
consensus process, which is already underway at ASCE/SEI for some of
the concerns NIST has raised, is essential so that all aspects of an
issue can be considered. All of the issues deserve further
consideration in that community.
In the view of ASCE/SEI, at least some of the NIST recommendations
will require development of new technologies and close examination of
their effects upon the practice. At the same time, the existing codes
and standards processes that are already in place, both in and outside
ASCE/SEI, provide appropriate mechanisms for advancing several of these
discussions. Ultimately, the implementation of these recommendations
will require the development of appropriate thresholds and bounds for
their application. ASCE/SEI looks forward to taking an integral role in
clarifying the application of these recommendations.
In fact, some of the NIST recommendations follow actions previously
initiated by ASCE/SEI. For example, with respect to Recommendation #2,
ASCE/SEI is close to issuing a Wind Tunnel Testing standard and
anticipates opening it for public comment. With respect to
Recommendation #9, ASCE/SEI has been working with the Society of Fire
Protection Engineers, and has already prepared a draft to update ASCE/
SEI/SFPE 29-99 (Standard Calculation Methods for Structural Fire
Protection), by incorporating performance-based fire resistant design.
With regard to Recommendation #27, we look forward to engaging ASCE's
professional practices committee for comment and guidance, though our
initial reaction is that it may not be necessary or beneficial to all
parties for the Engineer of Record to retain all documents for all
time; our preliminary view on document retention is that the owner
should retain the drawings.
ASCE/SEI favors the development of tools to assist engineers in
addressing the issue of progressive collapse (Recommendation #1). The
development of a consensus document providing multiple approaches to
mitigating progressive collapse would benefit the profession by
providing concepts and techniques upon which to build. It is worth
noting that GSA requirements have already advanced technology for
evaluating progressive collapse. In general, ASCE/SEI prefers a
building-specific and/or owner-specific approach to mitigating
progressive collapse rather than a code-mandated requirement.
However, also with respect to Recommendation #1, the ASCE/SEI
reserves judgment on whether and how to develop standardized software
to evaluate the susceptibility of a particular structural system to
progressive collapse. Not all buildings are at risk of being exposed to
the type of events commonly associated with initiating progressive
collapse. This NIST recommendation needs study of its application and
its effect upon the profession because of the various design thresholds
involved. When considering possible causation events, other, non-
structural, solutions are sometimes effective. Having said that, we
look forward to discussing who would develop and maintain the potential
software, who would distribute it and who would take responsibility for
training the profession in its use.
ASCE/SEI agrees that designing for fire performance of structures
(Recommendations #4-7) needs to be discussed within the broad
engineering profession, and is interested in taking an active role in
supporting studies examining these recommendations. A draft has been
prepared and we would welcome NIST's input in furthering the
development of this standard. The concept embedded in Recommendation #8
of treating fire as a load case for structural design will necessitate
assumption concerning fire protection systems. Their historical
performance will need to be included in the discussions along with the
technical and economic impact.
ASCE/SEI feels that some of the NIST recommendations need further
clarification and discussion. ASCE/SEI would like a clearer description
of the rationale and motivation for developing limit state criteria in
Recommendation #3. It is possible that serviceability, perception of
motion issues, and existing seismic criteria on drift may satisfy this
recommendation. While much of Recommendation #25 appears to ASCE/SEI to
be reasonable, the concept of certification of ``as-designed or as-
built'' safety needs additional discussion and understanding. Without
further understanding of the envisioned intent of this recommendation,
its implementation may face numerous technical, economic, and
authoritative hurdles. Improving safety in existing buildings, as
directed in Recommendation #26, is certainly a laudable goal and one
that ASCE/SEI supports. While the existence of as-built drawings would
assist in the rehabilitation of existing structures as specified in
Recommendation #26, a requirement for the retention of a broad range of
documents would not improve the safety or performance of structures.
Lastly, the roles of various professionals within a project will change
and vary from project to project. The assignment of roles and
responsibilities is an issue best handled by the contract documents
rather than codes and standards, as proposed in Recommendation #28.
ASCE also supports Recommendations #29 and #30 which call for
increased continuing professional development for engineers and the
curriculum be expanded strengthen the base of available technical
capabilities and human resources. It is essential that practicing civil
engineers remain current with issues and advancements in technology.
ASCE supports the attainment of a Body of Knowledge for entry into the
practice of civil engineering at the professional level. The Body of
Knowledge prescribes the necessary depth and breadth of knowledge,
skills, and attitudes required of an individual entering the practice
of civil engineering at the professional level in the 21st Century.
Establishing innovative solutions to protect public health and safety
requires coordination, training and sustained research and development.
We are particularly encouraged by the recommendations pertaining to
education and we enthusiastically support continuing education of the
profession. However, specific issues, such as cross-training of fire
and structural engineering professionals, need to be clarified in
further discussions.
Our profession is responsible for protecting the public to the best
of our abilities and to seek new technologies to help us meet that
charge. In order to do that, we feel it is important to draw a
distinction between advancing the technology through the development of
various tools, such as consensus documents on progressive collapse and
fire-structure interaction, and potentially adversely affecting the
profession by imposing regulations and restricting the engineers'
freedom to develop the best solution for each individual building and
the embedding of mandatory provisions in building codes.
While not every NIST recommendation may be ready for enactment as
is, ASCE/SEI is moving forward with discussion of the issues and their
implications for structural engineering practice, and looks forward to
working closely with NIST to clarify the application of these
recommendations.
NIST Recommendations Referenced:
Recommendation 1. NIST recommends that: (1) progressive collapse should
be prevented in buildings through the development and nationwide
adoption of consensus standards and code provisions, along with the
tools and guidelines needed for their use in practice; and (2) a
standard methodology should be developed--supported by analytical
design tools and practical design guidance--to reliably predict the
potential for complex failures in structural systems subjected to
multiple hazards.
Recommendation 2. NIST recommends that nationally accepted performance
standards be developed for: (1) conducting wind tunnel testing of
prototype structures based on sound technical methods that result in
repeatable and reproducible results among testing laboratories; and (2)
estimating wind loads and their effects on tall buildings for use in
design, based on wind tunnel testing data and directional wind speed
data.
Recommendation 3. NIST recommends that an appropriate criterion should
be developed and implemented to enhance the performance of tall
buildings by limiting how much they sway under lateral load design
conditions (e.g., winds and earthquakes).
Recommendation 4. NIST recommends evaluating, and where needed
improving, the technical basis for determining appropriate construction
classification and fire rating requirements (especially for tall
buildings greater than 20 stories in height)--and making related code
changes now as much as possible--by explicitly considering factors
including:
timely access by emergency responders and full
evacuation of occupants, or the time required for burnout
without local collapse;
the extent to which redundancy in active fire
protection (sprinkler and standpipe, fire alarm, and smoke
management) systems should be credited for occupant life
safety;
the need for redundancy in fire protection systems
that are critical to structural integrity;
the ability of the structure and local floor systems
to withstand a maximum credible fire scenario without collapse,
recognizing that sprinklers could be compromised, not
operational, or non-existent;
compartmentation requirements (e.g., 12,000
ft2) to protect the structure, including fire rated
doors and automatic enclosures, and limiting air supply (e.g.,
thermally resistant window assemblies) to retard fire spread in
buildings with large, open floor plans;
the impact of spaces containing unusually large fuel
concentrations for the expected occupancy of the building; and
the extent to which fire control systems, including
suppression by automatic or manual means, should be credited as
part of the prevention of fire spread.
Recommendation 5. NIST recommends that the technical basis for the
century-old standard for fire resistance testing of components,
assemblies, and systems should be improved through a national effort.
Necessary guidance also should be developed for extrapolating the
results of tested assemblies to prototypical building systems.
Recommendation 6. NIST recommends the development of criteria, test
methods, and standards: (1) for the in-service performance of spray-
applied fire resistive materials (SFRM, also commonly referred to as
fireproofing or insulation) used to protect structural components; and
(2) to ensure that these materials, as-installed, conform to conditions
in tests used to establish the fire resistance rating of components,
assemblies, and systems.
Recommendation 7. NIST recommends the nationwide adoption and use of
the ``structural frame'' approach to fire resistance ratings.
Recommendation 8. NIST recommends that the fire resistance of
structures should be enhanced by requiring a performance objective that
uncontrolled building fires result in burnout without local or global
collapse.
Recommendation 9. NIST recommends the development of: (1) performance-
based standards and code provisions, as an alternative to current
prescriptive design methods, to enable the design and retrofit of
structures to resist real building fire conditions, including their
ability to achieve the performance objective of burnout without
structural or local floor collapse: and (2) the tools, guidelines, and
test methods necessary to evaluate the fire performance of the
structure as a whole system.
Recommendation 25. Non-governmental and quasi-governmental entities
that own or lease buildings and are not subject to building and fire
safety code requirements of any governmental jurisdiction are
nevertheless concerned about the safety of the building occupants and
the responding emergency personnel. NIST recommends that such entities
should be encouraged to provide a level of safety that equals or
exceeds the level of safety that would be provided by strict compliance
with the code requirements of an appropriate governmental jurisdiction.
To gain broad public confidence in the safety of such buildings, NIST
further recommends that it is important that as-designed and as-built
safety be certified by a qualified third party, independent of the
building owner(s). The process should not use self-approval for code
enforcement in areas including interpretation of code provisions,
design approval, product acceptance, certification of the final
construction, and post-occupancy inspections over the life of the
buildings.
Recommendation 26. NIST recommends that State and local jurisdictions
should adopt and aggressively enforce available provisions in building
codes to ensure that egress and sprinkler requirements are met by
existing buildings. Further, occupancy requirements should be modified
where needed (such as when there are assembly use spaces within an
office building) to meet the requirements in model building codes.
Recommendation 27. NIST recommends that building codes should
incorporate a provision that requires building owners to retain
documents, including supporting calculations and test data, related to
building design, construction, maintenance and modifications over the
entire life of the building. Means should be developed for offsite
storage and maintenance of the documents. In addition, NIST recommends
that relevant building information should be made available in suitably
designed hard copy or electronic format for use by emergency
responders. Such information should be easily accessible by responders
during emergencies.
Recommendation 28. NIST recommend that the role of the ``Design
Professional in Responsible Charge'' should be clarified to ensure
that: (1) all appropriate design professionals (including, e.g., the
fire protection engineer) are part of the design team providing the
standard of care when designing buildings employing innovative or
unusual fire safety systems, and (2) all appropriate design
professionals (including, e.g., the structural engineer and the fire
protection engineer) are part of the design team providing the standard
of care when designing the structure to resist fires, in buildings that
employ innovative or unusual structural and fire safety systems.
Recommendation 29. NIST recommends that continuing education curricula
should be developed and programs should be implemented for training
fire protection engineers and architects in structural engineering
principles and design, and training structural engineers, architects,
and fire protection engineers in modern fire protection principles and
technologies, including fire-resistance design of structures.
Recommendation 30. NIST recommends that academic, professional short-
course, and web-based training materials in the use of computational
fire dynamics and thermostructural analysis tools should be developed
and delivered to strengthen the base of available technical
capabilities and human resources.
Biography for James R. Harris
Experience
Jim is well versed in structural engineering practice and research.
He has designed or evaluated hundreds of structures ranging from
dwellings to high-rise buildings including industrial facilities, long
spans, buildings in the highest seismic zones, excavation bracing, pile
and pier foundations, vibration issues, and renovations of historic
buildings. This background spans nearly all types of construction and
structural materials and includes responsibility for management of all
design disciplines. His experience includes six years of full-time
research. His research has focused on the loading and response of
structures, particularly earthquake and snow loadings. A second focus
is on improving the formulation and use of engineering standards. He
has written over 30 reports and journal articles on the results of his
research and practice. He is an active member of several committees
that produce national standards for structural engineering practice.
Education
Ph.D., University of Illinois, 1980, Structures and Foundations
MSCE, University of Illinois, 1975, Structures
BSCE, University of Colorado, 1968, Structures
Registration
Colorado: Professional Engineer #11118
California: Civil Engineer #34192; Structural Engineer #2640
Idaho: Professional Engineer #10309
Missouri: Professional Engineer #E-22713
Ohio: Professional Engineer #52667
National Council of Engineering Examiners Record #8449 (currently
inactive)
Professional Employment
1984- J.R. Harris & Company, Principal, Denver
1981-84 Structural Consultants, Inc., Principal, Denver
1975-81 National Bureau of Standards, Center for Building
Technology, Research Structural Engineer, Gaithersburg, MD
1973-75 University of Illinois, Graduate Research and Teaching
Assistant
1969-73 Zeiler and Gray, Engineer and Associate, Denver
1968-69 Ken R. White Company, Engineer, Denver
Awards
Structural Engineering Institute of the American
Society of Civil Engineers, Walter P. Moore, Jr., Award, 2002.
Building Seismic Safety Council of the National
Institute of Building Sciences, BSSC Honor Award, 1997.
Colorado Engineering Council, Certificate of Honor,
1997.
U.S. Federal Emergency Management Agency Outstanding
Public Service Award, 1986.
U.S. Department of Commerce Bronze Metal Award for
Superior Federal Service, 1981.
District of Columbia Council of Engineering and
Architectural Societies National Capital Award for Special
Achievement, 1981.
University of Colorado Department of Civil
Engineering Ketchum Award for outstanding graduating senior,
1968.
Professional Society Membership
American Concrete Institute; Fellow
American Consulting Engineers Council
American Institute of Steel Construction
American Society of Civil Engineers
American Society for Testing and Materials
American Welding Society
Coalition of American Structural Engineers
Earthquake Engineering Research Institute
International Association for Bridge and Structural
Engineering
International Conference of Building Officials
The Masonry Society
National Society of Professional Engineers
National Trust for Historic Preservation
The Post Tensioning Institute
Structural Engineers Association of Colorado
Professional Committees and Activities (current)
American Concrete Institute: Member, Committee 318,
Standard Building Code, and subcommittees on Seismic Provisions
and on Safety, Serviceability, and Analysis
American Institute of Steel Construction: Member of
Task Committees on Seismic Provisions, Emeritus Member of
Specification Committee; Former Chair, Committee for the Design
for Blast Resistant Steel Buildings
American Society of Civil Engineers: Chairman,
Committee for Minimum Design Loads for Buildings and Other
Structures (ASCE 7); formerly Chairman, Task Committee on
Earthquake Loads
American Society of Civil Engineers: Member,
Executive Committee for Codes and Standards Activities Division
of the Structural Engineering Institute
American Society of Civil Engineers: Member, core
team for the Pentagon to study building performance in the wake
of the September 11, 2001, attacks
Applied Technology Council: Member, Board of
Directors
Building Seismic Safety Council: Member, Provisions
Update Committee, Technical Subcommittee on Structural Design;
Code Resource Support Committee; formerly chair of committee
that produced 1985 edition of NEHRP Recommended Provisions
(first edition), plus activity on several other technical
subcommittees
International Standards Organization, Chair of U. S.
Technical Advisory Group for TC 98, Bases for the Design of
Structures
Mid-American Earthquake Engineering Research Center:
Member, Executive Advisory Board (Chair 2002-3)
Portland Cement Association: Member, Concrete
Technology Advisory Council
Structural Engineering Institute of ASCE: member of
Board of Governors
Structural Engineers Association of Colorado:
Chairman, Committee on Seismic Standards and Member, Committee
on Snow Loads; President, 1990
The Masonry Society: Member, Board of Directors
Chairman Boehlert. Thank you very much. Mr. Corbett.
STATEMENT OF PROF. GLENN P. CORBETT, ASSISTANT PROFESSOR OF
FIRE SCIENCE, JOHN JAY COLLEGE OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE
Mr. Corbett. Thank you, Chairman Boehlert. Chairman
Boehlert and Members of the House Committee on Science, my name
is Glenn Corbett. I want to thank you for the opportunity to
testify again before you concerning NIST and the World Trade
Center disaster investigation. Before I discuss the
investigation, I would first like to extend my thanks to you,
Chairman Boehlert, and the House Science Committee, for
initiating the creation of the National Construction Safety
Team Act, and shepherding it through Congress to final approval
by President Bush. The American public is the beneficiary of
this critical legislation, and will reap the benefits of your
labors through the savings of lives and the construction of
safer buildings.
Additionally, I must also note that although I am a Member
of the Federal Advisory Committee to the National Construction
Safety Team, I do not speak on their behalf. My testimony
represents only my own opinions. I recommend that the House
Committee on Science review the annual reports of the NCST
Advisory Committee for details on their perspective.
Over three years have passed since NIST began its
investigation into the World Trade Center disaster. We now have
come to the conclusion of this $16 million effort of a search
for answers about what happened in the twin towers. The
investigation has taken much longer than anticipated, including
the fact that the World Trade Center Building Number 7
investigation will likely not be completed until next summer.
Although NIST has done quite a bit of work and has amassed
many thousands of pages of useful research, I feel that the
investigation has fallen far short of what is needed. From the
beginning, I had hoped for a true investigation with a tight
set of specific recommendations at the conclusion, that could
be immediately passed to our national code writing groups and
trade associations. Instead of passing a blazing torch of
detailed recommendations, this lengthy marathon race has
resulted in NIST giving our model code writing groups only a
handful of flickering embers that, although generally good in
principle, are entirely too vague. The model code writing
groups now have to wait even longer while NIST hires an outside
organization to prepare a set of recommendations that actually
can be assimilated into our construction codes.
During the course of the WTC investigation, I have had
serious concerns about some of the findings and conclusions
that NIST has drawn. Other individuals, including some people
on the Federal Advisory Committee, have also had concerns.
While this hearing is not the appropriate place to debate
technical issues, I would suggest that a more formal mechanism
be developed to officially address comments from the public.
Such a protocol should include the technical basis for which
NIST rejects or accepts the content of a public comment.
Overall, I have been disappointed by the lack of
aggressiveness that has characterized not only the World Trade
Center investigation, but the Rhode Island Station Nightclub
investigation as well. Instead of a gumshoe inquiry that has
left no stone unturned, I believe the investigations were
treated more like research projects, in which they waited for
information to flow to them. In both investigations, they were
reluctant to use the subpoena given to them under the NCST Act.
To some extent, this lack of assertiveness was likely the
result of legal opinions given to NIST by staff attorneys.
Recently, this situation was greatly amplified by NIST's
reluctance to respond to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita under the
banner of the NCST Act. I suggested to NIST that they assemble
an NCST team for Katrina before it struck the Gulf Coast. They
actually sent a handful of people a week after Katrina hit, and
only recently sending a much larger group of researchers to the
area. Curiously, they have decided not to respond under the
NCST Act.
To their credit, NIST has brought many talented people to
the WTC investigation. They have expended a tremendous amount
of effort, compiled a great deal of technical data, pushed the
technical limits of computer models, and identified the general
areas of concern where improvements in safety regulation and
practice are called for. They are to be commended for their
extraordinary research efforts, given the immensity of the
project.
With respect to the 30 recommendations that NIST has
developed, despite being vague, they are areas of significant
importance. I feel the following particular ones deserve
greater attention. These recommendations concern enhanced
structural fire resistance, redundancy for fire protection
systems in tall buildings, enhanced egress capabilities,
including dealing with stairwell counterflow, remoteness of
exits, and full building evacuation capacity, hardened
elevators for egress, as well as robust communication
capabilities for emergency responders.
Where do we go from here with regard to the World Trade
Center? The ball is in NIST's court, and it is up to them, with
their contractor, to quickly whittle the desirable but too
general recommendations into well-defined code language that
can be quickly moved through the model code review process. I
strongly encourage them to be bold, use their best engineering
judgment, and come up with clear and concise code language.
High rise fire safety and safety in general is held in the
balance.
When I look to the future of the NCST Act, sadly, I find it
necessary to recommend that serious consideration be given to
finding a new agency to implement the Act. I don't think that
NIST is the right place for the NCST. Their nonaggressiveness,
their absence of investigative instinct, and the palatable lack
of interest they have shown in the Act has brought me to this
conclusion. NIST is an organization of exceptional scientists
and engineers, not detectives.
Short of creating an entirely new Construction Safety Team
Board, I would recommend that serious consideration be given to
moving the NCST to the U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard
Investigation Board. They are a close fit. They investigate
explosions and chemical disasters in and around structures.
They deal with many of the same code writing bodies that NIST
deals with, including some of the organizations represented on
this panel today. More importantly, they are solely an
investigative agency that issues recommendations. Perhaps their
purview could be expanded to include the NCST Act.
In conclusion, I want to again thank you, Chairman
Boehlert, and the House Committee on Science, for taking the
leadership role in creating the NCST Act. The fact that it has
drawn the attention of many people sitting here today, and the
organizations included on this panel today from the safety and
construction fields, is a testament to its importance.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Corbett follows:]
Prepared Statement of Glenn P. Corbett
Chairman Boehlert and Members of the House Committee on Science: My
name is Glenn Corbett. I want to thank you for the opportunity to
testify before you concerning NIST and the World Trade Center disaster
investigation. Before I discuss the investigation, I would like first
extend my thanks to you, Chairman Boehlert, and the House Committee on
Science for initiating the creation of the National Construction Safety
Team Act and shepherding it through Congress to final approval by
President Bush. The American public is the beneficiary of this critical
legislation and will reap the fruits of your labors through the saving
of lives and construction of safer buildings.
Additionally, I must also note that although I am a member of the
Federal Advisory Committee to the National Construction Safety Team, I
do not speak on the committee's behalf. My testimony represents only my
opinions. I recommend that the Committee on Science review the annual
reports of the NCST Advisory Committee for details on their
perspective.
Over three years has passed since NIST began its investigation into
the World Trade Center disaster. We have now come to the conclusion of
this $16 million effort search for answers about what happened in the
twin towers. The investigation has taken much longer than anticipated,
including the fact that the World Trade Center (building) 7
investigation will likely not be completed next summer.
Although NIST has done quit a bit of work and has amassed many
thousands of pages of useful research, I feel that the investigation
has fallen far short of what is needed. From the beginning, I had hoped
for a true investigation with a tight set of specific recommendations
at the conclusion that could immediately be passed to our national
code-writing groups and trade associations. Instead of passing a
blazing torch of detailed recommendations, this lengthy marathon race
has resulted in NIST giving our model code-writing groups a handful of
flickering embers that although are generally good in principle are
entirely too vague. The model code-writing groups now have to wait even
longer while NIST hires an outside organization to prepare a set of
recommendations that can actually be assimilated into our construction
codes.
During the course of the WTC investigation, I have had serious
concerns about some of the findings and conclusions that NIST has
drawn. Other individuals, including some people on the federal advisory
committee, have also had concerns. While this hearing is not the
appropriate place to debate technical issues, I would suggest that a
more formal mechanism be developed to officially address comments from
the public. Such a protocol should include the technical basis for
which NIST rejects or accepts the content a public comment.
Overall, I have been disappointed by the lack of aggressiveness
that has characterized not only the World Trade Center investigation
but the Rhode Island Station Nightclub investigation as well. Instead
of a ``gumshoe'' inquiry that left no stone unturned, I believe the
investigations were treated more like research projects in which they
waited for information to flow to them. In both investigations, they
were reluctant to use the subpoena power given to them under the NCST
Act. To some extent, the lack of assertiveness was the likely the
result of the legal opinions given to NIST by staff attorneys.
Recently, this situation was greatly amplified by NIST's reluctance
to respond to hurricanes Katrina and Rita under the banner of the NCST
Act. I suggested to NIST that they assemble a NCST team for Katrina
before it struck the Gulf Coast. They actually sent a handful of people
a week after Katrina hit, only recently sending a larger group of
researchers to the area. Curiously, they have decided not to respond
under the NCST Act.
To their credit, NIST has brought many talented people to the WTC
investigation. They have expended a tremendous amount of effort,
compiled a great deal of technical data, pushed the technical limits of
computer models, and identified the general areas of concern where
improvement in safety regulations and practice are called for. They are
to be commended for their extraordinary research efforts, given the
immensity of the project.
With respect to the 30 recommendations that NIST has developed--
despite being vague, they are areas of significant importance--I feel
the following particular ones deserve greater attention. These
recommendations concern enhanced structural fire resistance; redundancy
for fire protection systems in tall buildings; enhanced egress
capabilities including dealing with stairwell counterflow, remoteness
of exits, and full building evacuation capacity; hardened elevators for
egress; and robust communications capabilities for emergency
responders.
Where do we go from here with regard to the World Trade Center? The
ball is in NIST's court, and it is up to them (with their contractor)
to quickly whittle the desirable but too general recommendations down
into well-defined code language that can be quickly moved through the
model code review process. I strongly encourage them to be bold, to use
their best engineering judgment, and come up with clear and concise
code language. High-rise safety is held in the balance.
When I look to the future of the NCST Act, sadly I find it
necessary to recommend that serious consideration be given to finding a
new agency to implement the Act. I don't think that NIST is the right
place for the NCST. Their non-aggressiveness, their absence of
investigative instinct, and the palatable lack of interest they have
shown in the Act have brought me to this conclusion. NIST is an
organization of exceptional scientists and engineers, not detectives.
Short of creating an entirely new National Construction Safety Team
Board, I would recommend that serious consideration be given to moving
the NCST to the U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board.
They are a close fit: they investigate explosions and chemical
disasters in and around structures. They deal with many of the same
code-writing organizations that NIST deals with, including some of the
organizations represented on this panel today. Most importantly, they
are solely an investigative agency that issues recommendations. Perhaps
their purview could be expanded to include the NCST Act.
In conclusion I want to again thank you, Chairman Boehlert, and the
House Committee on Science for taking the leadership role in creating
the NCST Act. The fact that it has drawn the attention of many people
and organizations from the safety and construction fields is a
testament to its importance.
Biography for Glenn P. Corbett
Glenn P. Corbett is an Assistant Professor of Fire Science at John
Jay College of Criminal Justice in New York City, an Assistant Chief of
the Waldwick, New Jersey Fire Department, and a Technical Editor of
Fire Engineering magazine. He also serves as a member of the Federal
Advisory Committee to the National Construction Safety Team at NIST.
He was formerly the Administrator of Engineering Services for the
San Antonio, Texas Fire Department.
Chairman Boehlert. Thank you very much, Mr. Corbett. Mr.
Green.
STATEMENT OF HENRY L. GREEN, PRESIDENT, INTERNATIONAL CODE
COUNCIL (ICC)
Mr. Green. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and good morning to you
and the distinguished Members of this committee. It is indeed a
pleasure to be here today to discuss the role of building codes
and standards in the protection of the public through enhanced
measures in building safety. I am Henry Green, President of the
International Code Council, and immediate past chair of the
National Institute of Building Sciences Board of Directors.
Through my testimony today, I hope to not only discuss how
the NIST recommendations can be employed in improving building
safety across the country, but also to leave you with a broader
understanding of the International Code Council and its role in
protecting the public health, safety, and welfare by creating
better codes and standards to make for better buildings and
safer communities.
ICC, as you may be aware, is the product of a consolidation
of three regional code organizations, who came together at the
urging of public and private sector interests seeking a single
set of nationally uniform model codes for use in this country.
As a result, the ICC now provides states and local government
with a single set of codes upon which to base commercial and
residential building standards for the safety of the public. It
has also given the federal sector a platform upon which to
transition from the government developed standards to voluntary
standards, as directed by OMB Circular A-119 and the National
Technology Transfer and Advancement Act of 1995.
Today, virtually all states and localities using a model
code adopt codes developed and maintained through a
governmental consensus process facilitated by the International
Code Council. The codes bind together hundreds of building
standards developed by voluntary sector standard developers,
including many of those on this panel, and NFPA, ASTM, ASCE,
ASHRAE, and others. The codes provide the administrative and
technical language necessary for meaningful and consistent
adoption and code enforcement and results in the protection of
the public's health, safety, and welfare.
Because we are all focused on disaster response, I would
like to take a moment, if I may, to address concerns regarding
the construction codes and standards as they relate to the
recent disaster resulting from Hurricanes Katrina and Rita and
now, Wilma. As demonstrated in the hurricane that struck
Florida over a year ago, and from earlier high wind events that
have caused devastation in the United States, we have learned
that compliance with codes and standards provide benefits in
securing the safety of the public in the built environment, as
well as reducing mitigation costs in recovery following these
events.
ICC has worked with both federal and State agencies in
assisting in the recovery and rebuilding efforts in the Gulf
region, and is establishing a resource office in the Gulf
region to assist in the rebuilding efforts. When codes and
standards are used effectively, we know that for every dollar
spent in prevention, we gain a residual of $3 to $5 in savings
in recovery efforts.
The Committee requested a brief discussion or understanding
of the process of ICC, of how ICC facilitates all interests,
interested parties in the preparation and the development of
the international codes. While I would enjoy today to give you
an exhaustive explanation of that process, I am sure you
wouldn't sit through it, so we will forego that. My extended
testimony does, however, speak to, more to the point, for your
reference. My oral remarks, may it suffice to say that our
processes both predate and is consistent with the principles
embodied in NTTAA and the OMB A-119, as well as internationally
accepted practices, or principles in consensus development. As
with any democratic process, like that which guides this body,
it is deliberative, exhaustive in examination, time-consuming,
and requires much more care and attention. The result is an
abiding respect for both the process and the resulting quality
and confidence the codes, in the codes that our members
produce.
I would like to proceed to the questions that have actually
been posed by this panel, and respond to those. Does ICC
support the recommendations of the NIST study? Events such as
the structural failure of the World Trade Center shake to our
core our faith in science, engineering standards, and means of
ensuring building safety that we use to protect our lives, our
property, and our economy. The ICC has worked with NIST in
examining the collapse of the World Trade Center and the
development of recommendations for reform of the Nation's
building and fire codes and standards.
We have acted in support of the NIST recommendations by
empanelling technical committees of member experts to
prioritize the recommendations and prepare specific proposals
that will be addressed by our code development process. Also in
support of the recommendations, ICC responded to NIST requests
for review of the document, the draft report, earlier with
extensive comments directed at assessing NIST, assisting NIST
in the clarity of its discussion and findings.
The majority of NIST recommendations on the subject of
codes and standards do apply to the international building
code. Again, I would reference you to my pre-filed remarks for
a summary of our specific remarks on the NIST report. It should
be noted that the questions posed by the committee is focused
on new construction and significant renovation of existing
buildings. As we focus on code reform, we should not ignore the
needs to address the safety of ongoing use of our massive base
of existing building stock.
What specific steps will ICC be undertaking to determine
whether and how to incorporate the NIST recommendations into
the codes? Some of the steps associated with the NIST
recommendations, we have already begun. As a result of the
World Trade Center attacks, the ICC formed an ad hoc committee
on terrorist resistant buildings. The committee, made up of
code officials, engineers, architects, and other building
professionals, is looking at the NIST work and other research
in response to new threats that we know now have to perpetually
address.
In addition, we have charged our permanent Code Technology
Committee to specifically prioritize the NIST recommendations,
and to prepare them as code change proposals. In the two days
just before this hearing, our Code Technology Committee has
been meeting with the National Institute of Building Sciences
to coordinate the work in developing and preparing proposals
based upon the NIST recommendations.
As to timing, the next code development cycle begins with a
deadline of March 24, 2006, for any interested party to submit
code changes. Through a multi-stage process of technical
committee examination, two public hearings, and two stages of
public notice and comment, final action on those proposals in
the fall of 2007 will yield the 2007 supplement to the 2006
international building code. This process is repeated every 18
months, resulting in a new edition of the code every three
years, and a new supplement in each interim.
The most significant barrier to adoption, as with any code
change proposal, is having technical documentation for the
membership to review the consideration of specific code changes
and the advanced use of formal and informal processes of
discussion and review, to fully vet and analyze each proposal.
What specific actions will NIST be taking to help
organizations incorporate its recommendations? It is our view
that NIST and other federal agencies already do participate in
the code development processes through submission of and
advocacy of code changes. This participation both adds to the
quality of the review of all proposed changes, and helps the
agencies to achieve their program goals, as directed by both
executive and legislative branches of the government. This sort
of federal interagency coordination is precisely what is
necessary for NIST to advance the recommendations of the WTC
report.
The NIST recommendations do not need to be reframed in a
manner that is consistent with the statutory construction of
the ICC codes. In the simplest terms, the probability of a code
change being accepted or eventually incorporated is dependent
on the degree to which the existing code is changed, first, and
life-cycle cost impact associated with the change, availability
of any required new technology, and support infrastructure for
the technology, impacts on various trade, labor, and
manufacturing interests, and product--and impacts on the
interests of advocacy groups. This process is quite similar to
what you use here in this legislative body to develop law and/
or other regulations.
ICC has recommended to NIST that it further partner with
interested and affected parties in the development of codes and
standard proposals, as opposed to taking up the effort alone,
and assuming others will take the lead. In addition, ICC has
also stressed to NIST that without their involvement and
leadership in this process, there are two probable outcomes:
either nothing can be done to implement the WTC findings in
codes and standards; or multiple and varied interests will each
use the findings to their own advantage, resulting in multiple
and varied non-uniform code and standards proposals, that will
be much more difficult and time-consuming.
With that said, there are some certainties associated with
the process. Changes that are not enforceable, and require
specific products or materials by name, are not likely to be
accepted, nor are the changes that reference codes and
standards that have not been fully completed. We at ICC applaud
the work of Congress and support of Congress in this matter,
such that was conducted by NIST. We encourage continued support
for such work by Congress, and increased collaboration by the
public and private sectors in enhancing public performance and
safety.
Finally, I would like to quote one section out of the NIST
report that I think is really focused on the issue of codes and
standards. ``Rigorous enforcement of building codes and
standards by State and local agencies, well-trained and
managed, is critical in order for standards and codes to ensure
the effective level of safety. Unless they are complied with,
the best codes and standards cannot protect occupants and
emergency responders or buildings.''
Thank you again for the opportunity to speak today, and I
would be pleased to answer any questions that you might have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Green follows:]
Prepared Statement of Henry L. Green
Good morning Mr. Chairman and distinguished Members of the
Committee. It is a pleasure to be here today to discuss the role of
building codes and standards in protecting the public through enhanced
measures in building safety.
I am Henry Green, President of the International Code Council
(ICC). Through my testimony I hope to discuss how the NIST
recommendations can be employed in improving building safety across the
country, as well as leave you with a broader understanding of how ICC
is protecting health, safety and welfare by creating better buildings
and safer communities. Certainly the subject of today's hearing and the
ICC's mission is well-aligned. Aside from my elected position with ICC,
I also serve as the Director of The Bureau of Construction Codes and
Fire Safety for the State of Michigan.
I am participating in today's hearing to specifically address the
implementation of the lessons learned from the world trade center (WTC)
collapse. In more general terms my comments also apply to and stress
the need for increased collaboration between Federal, State and local
government in the development, adoption and implementation of codes and
standards to enhance the safety and performance of new and existing
buildings.
As a matter of background, I have been involved with building codes
and standards development, adoption, implementation and enforcement
issues at the international, national, State and local level for almost
30 years, serving not only ICC but such organizations as the National
Institute of Building Sciences (NIBS), of which I serve as Past
President. Briefly, before I speak to the questions the Committee has
asked me to address, I will lay a foundation for a better understanding
of ICC's responses to those three specific questions.
State and local government have relied on nationally recognized
model codes, and the standards referenced in those codes, as a basis
for their building construction regulations for almost 100 years.
Initially many State and local government agencies wrote their own
``home grown'' provisions but over time they began to rely more and
more on one of four regional model codes (the BOCA National Code, the
ICBO Uniform Code and SBCCI Standard Code and the National Building
Code of the American Insurance Association). The AIA ceased maintenance
of its model code almost 30 years ago and just recently the three other
model code organizations merged to form the International Code Council
(ICC). The merger of the three regional organizations came at the
urging of public and private sector interests seeking a single
nationally uniform model building code developed through a voluntary
consensus process. The development of one family of model codes by the
ICC, which in turn reference standards from hundreds of building
standards developers such as ASCE, ASME, and ASTM, has provided State
and local government with a single national consolidated family of
model codes upon which to base commercial and residential building
construction and fire safety regulations. It has also given the federal
sector a platform upon which to transition from government developed
standards to voluntary standards, as directed by OMB Circular A-119 and
the National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act of 1995.
Today the majority of State and local agencies adopt building and
fire codes developed and maintained through the governmental consensus
process facilitated by the ICC. Think of these model codes as a
coordinated set of provisions that bind separate and distinct building
component standards so they can fully address the technical and
administrative aspects of building safety and performance. In most
states I-Code based building codes are required and enforced as a
function of State-level authority. In others, such as Tennessee,
Maryland, Colorado and Illinois, the authority to adopt and enforce
codes primarily resides with local government, and in those states most
all local governments adopt ICC model codes to guide residential and
commercial construction.
In parallel to the events leading up to the formation of the ICC
and development of the ICC codes, the federal executive and legislative
branches of government established the groundwork for the federal
sector to increasingly base their building regulations on nationally
recognized model building codes as opposed to writing their own unique
provisions. As a matter of national policy, established through OMB
Circular A-119 and the NTTAA, all federal agencies are encouraged to
use codes and standards developed in the voluntary sector and, equally
important, to participate in the voluntary sector code and standards
development processes. This policy eliminates the duplication of effort
and conflict in application that occurred when federal agencies
developed and maintained unique government standards. This policy also
enhances voluntary sector standards development by infusing those
processes with the experience and resources of federal agencies such as
NIST.
This federal policy also saves time and money and ensures
consistency between public and private sector construction. Such
consistency is important to designers, contractors, manufacturers, and
other entities doing business with both the private and public sectors.
Consistency is also imperative where the structure in question is a
private sector facility that is leased to a federal agency. Such a
facility must concurrently satisfy federal as well as State and local
building requirements. Most importantly, federal sector use of
voluntary sector codes and standards allows for public-private
partnerships that can bring the result of building research and
experience to bear on revision and enhancement to those codes and
standards. Such is the case with the NIST investigations associated
with the WTC.
In summary, what not too long ago was a ``crazy quilt'' of
differing federal, State and local requirements, each supported by
separate and distinct educational and other programs, has become a
tapestry with a singular foundation that involves public and private
sector interests and allows for unique federal, State and local threads
without compromising the quality of the fabric of the tapestry.
As we are all focused on disaster response I would also like to
take a moment to address concerns regarding construction codes and
standards as they relate to the recent disasters resulting from
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. As demonstrated in the hurricane that
struck Florida last year and from earlier high wind events that have
caused devastation in the U.S., we have learned that compliance with
codes and standards provides benefits in securing the safety of the
public in the built environment, as well as reducing mitigation costs
in recovery following these events.
ICC has pledged to work with both federal and State agencies in
assisting in the recovery and rebuilding efforts in the Gulf region. We
believe our effort will assist in providing a higher level of safety
not only from such devastating events as hurricanes but in prevention
of fires and other situations that plague our built environment. When
codes and standards are used effectively, we know that for every dollar
spent in prevention we gain a residual of three dollars in savings in
recovery cost.
We will be providing a resource office in the Gulf Region to assist
in the rebuilding efforts by furnishing local governmental and code
officials with the resources they need to assure the reconstruction is
completed to a standard that will assist in minimizing damage and
recovery cost.
Given our experience and the working relationship we maintain with
federal agencies, we would like to expand our relationship and further
develop safety provisions for the protection of America's citizens.
In addition to responding to the questions regarding the NIST WTC
report that the committee put to the ICC it was asked that in my
testimony I provide the committee with a brief description of the code
development process used by the membership of the ICC to build and
maintain each of the 14 model codes, and with an understanding of how
and where the model codes are adopted by authorities having
jurisdiction over the adoption and enforcement of regulations impacting
building design, construction and maintenance.
The widespread national application of the IBC and other ICC codes
is due in large part to the recognition of respect for the voluntary
consensus process by which the codes are developed. They are developed
in a democratic process with input and advocacy from both private and
public sector building and fire safety interests and any other
interested or affected party. ICC's governmental consensus process
adheres to the guiding principles at the national and international
level for development of consensus documents. These principles--
openness, transparency, balance of interest, due process, consensus and
process of appeals are embodied in the governmental consensus process.
The uniquely notable quality of the governmental consensus process is
that it leaves final determinations on code provisions in the hands of
public safety officials, who, like myself, are charged with
representing the public interest and have no commercial interest
associated with the outcome the process.
In this process any interested party can submit a change to the
codes or request that a new code be developed. All submittals are
published and made available for public review. All submittals are then
published and made available for written comment and discussed at
nationally noticed public hearings. At the first public hearing a
committee of balanced interests listens to all testimony, reviews all
information submitted on each proposal, then votes to recommend
approval, rejection or approval with modification. If any party at the
hearing disagrees with the committee recommendation the process
provides for action by those at the hearing to make and democratically
act on a proposal for a substitute motion.
The results of the first hearing, both the committee recommendation
and any substitute assembly action are published and disseminated in
print and electronic form. Anyone can then submit a public comment on
those results and provide documentation supporting a different outcome.
The committee recommendation and additional public comment is again
published and becomes the basis for the agenda of a final action
hearing at which time the proposed changes and public comment are
considered. At the final action hearing the final vote on code content
is made by public safety officials, which, not unlike the legislative
and regulatory processes used to establish federal law and regulations,
is made by Federal, State and local government representatives who
represent the public-at-large.
The IBC and other ICC codes are used by Federal, State and local
government to ensure building safety through the adoption,
implementation and enforcement of these codes. Nearly every federal,
State and local agency that enacts building codes has adopted the IBC
as the basis for jurisdictionally controlled building laws and
regulations. Jurisdictional adoption occurs through legislative or
regulatory action that cites or directly incorporates the IBC and may
also include amendments that specifically tailor the code to the needs
of the adopting agency or jurisdiction. For instance, the U.S.
Department of State adopts the IBC as a basis for U.S. Embassy
construction worldwide but then adds provisions to address security
needs unique to a U.S. diplomatic facility.
States such as Michigan, Minnesota, Maryland, Washington, New York,
Oregon, North Carolina and Utah have authority in the executive branch
of government to develop and adopt a state-wide building code and do
so, again with amendments that tailor the IBC to address unique
geographic and climatic issues and differing legal and administrative
environments. In states without authority to adopt state-wide codes, or
where local governments are not required to adopt the state code, the
state adopts codes for state-owned buildings and leaves regulation of
private sector construction to local government. This is the case in
states such as Tennessee, Colorado and Illinois with local government
having the authority to adopt codes and Maryland that has a state code
but does not have preemptive authority to mandate local government
action to adopt and enforce the code. Just as is the case with state
adoption, local adoption is effected through local elected bodies or
regulatory agencies.
Subsequent to adoption, the IBC is used to ensure building safety
through a number of mechanisms, each of which are focused on ensuring
that the requirements of the code are actually adhered to in the
construction of the building. Adoption of the code can be viewed as
establishing a speed limit for highway travel. Though the limit is set,
it is meaningless unless the limit is posted and enforced to ensure
traffic safety. So too, federal, State and local agencies have ways to
ensure code compliance and, as a result, building safety. Note that the
IBC not only contains design and construction requirements but also a
number of administrative criteria associated with inspection to ensure
compliance in the field.
In the case of an agency that adopts the IBC and is also the
building owner--such again as the U.S. Department of State, or State or
local government agency responsible for State or local owned
construction--the adopting agency enforces the code and typically does
so as a function of the contracting process that governs the building
design and construction. The contractor is responsible for compliance
and may be subject to inspection from the authorizing governmental
agency, may be subject to inspection by other third parties or may be
allowed to self-certify compliance with penalties assessed in the
future if non-compliance is verified.
For private sector construction, building safety is ensured through
a review of the building plans and specifications for code compliance
by the applicable State or local agency, inspection of the building for
code compliance during construction, a final occupancy inspection and
continued monitoring and evaluation of selected issues during the life
of the building.
Now, to the questions the Committee asked that I address.
Does ICC support the recommendations of the NIST study? Why or why not?
Events such as the structural failure of the World Trade Centers
shake to our core our faith in the science, engineering, standards and
means of ensuring building safety that we use to protect our lives, our
property and our economy. The ICC, from the beginning of this
investigation, has supported the work of NIST in examining the collapse
of the WTC and the development of recommendations for reform of our
nation's building and fire codes and standards. The NIST investigation,
even as it was in process, began providing the building industry with
information which has been used to develop and implement new criteria
in building codes and standards. Last year, as the membership of the
ICC began the process of evaluating code change proposals for
publication in the 2006 edition of the codes, a proposal emanating from
early understandings of the collapse was put forward, thoroughly
evaluated, discussed and approved. The IBC now requires buildings of
420 feet and higher to be constructed with structural components having
at least a three-hour fire resistance rating; the previous requirement
was a two-hour fire resistance rating for structural components. These
increased requirements match the changing conditions we face in
providing for building and fire safety and address the public will to
afford higher levels of security and protection. In making these
changes it is also important to protect the integrity of the public
deliberation inherent in maintaining the democratic development of
voluntary consensus. We have begun to infuse post-WTC concerns into the
code, and, as I will speak to in addressing the committee's other
questions, the ICC has acted in support of the NIST recommendations by
empanelled technical committees of member-experts to prioritize the
recommendations and form them into specific proposals that can be
addressed by our code development process. In addition, we are working
with other groups, such as the National Institute of Building Sciences
in efforts to assess the WTC findings and to effectively develop
proposals for change to the code.
Also in support of the recommendations ICC responded to NIST's
request for review of its draft report earlier with extensive comments
directed at assisting NIST with the clarity of its discussion and
findings. The majority of NIST recommendations on the subject of codes
and standards do apply to the IBC. These are noted below with a brief
indication of how ICC gauges their potential applicability.
NIST calls for more rigorous enforcement of codes.
ICC believes a more appropriate term than enforcement is
compliance. Enforcement is a means to achieve the goal of safe
buildings, something embodied in compliance. There are other
ways to secure compliance such as incentives or labeling that
not only ensures the goal is reached but can secure results
above and beyond simple enforcement of minimum codes and
standards.
NIST calls for well trained and managed staff and
educational programs. ICC agrees and feels that NIST and other
federal agencies can and should become more active in working
with the private sector to develop and deploy programs that
would strengthen the resources that support code compliance.
NIST suggests an increased focus in structural issues
from a design, construction, and operations and maintenance
standpoint. The IBC, and referenced standards therein such as
those from ASCE, provide a basis for measuring and expressing
structural performance and ensuring some agreed minimum level
of structural integrity in buildings.
NIST suggests an increased focus in the fire
resistance of structures and methods to evaluate and determine
their performance with respect to fire. The IBC, and referenced
standards therein such as those from ASTM, provide a basis for
measuring and expressing building performance from the
standpoint of fire resistance and ensuring some agreed minimum
level of performance.
NIST suggests increased consideration of performance
based criteria as an alternate to prescriptive criteria. The
IBC addresses this in two ways. In establishing minimum
prescriptive criteria the IBC establishes a basis to evaluate
alternative approaches to performance equivalency. The IBC also
references the ICC building performance code, a stand-alone
code that is completely performance-basis oriented. It is
notable that NIST staff has been involved in the development of
this performance-based code.
NIST suggests development and use of new materials,
coatings, barriers and other technology. The IBC addresses this
by allowing acceptance of alternative materials and methods of
construction when they are certified to perform at least as
well as items specifically allowed in the IBC. Equivalency is
based on evaluation reports developed through engineering
analysis prepared by entities approved by the authority
enforcing the code. As new certified materials become more
commonplace standards are proposed and adopted to specifically
address criteria for their application and use.
NIST recommends improvements in active fire
protection systems. The IBC and referenced standards therein,
such as those by NFPA, provides a basis for review and
incorporation of such improvements.
NIST recommends improvements in building egress and
evaluation. As I have discussed, the IBC provides a basis for
review and incorporation of such improvements.
NIST recommends improvements to emergency response,
building access, communications and central controls. The IBC
provides a basis for review and incorporation of such
improvements.
On the basis of the WTC investigation NIST has made a number of
recommendations to improve building safety. The IBC provides a basis to
address and take action on proposals for these recommendations and,
through adoption as previously noted, ensure their widespread
implementation throughout the U.S. In this manner the NIST work on the
WTC report can have a significant impact on future building design and
construction.
It should be noted that the question posed by the committee is
focused on the IBC, which is used to guide new construction and
significant renovations to existing buildings. There is also a need to
address the safety of the on-going use of our massive base of existing
buildings. Through the ICC, safety requirements for these buildings are
addressed through documents such as the ICC International Existing
Buildings Code (IEBC) and ICC International Fire Code (IFC). Through
the NFPA these issues are addressed in the Life Safety Code and the
National Fire Code. Jurisdictional use of these codes, coupled with
incentive programs to foster enhancement to existing buildings, can
address building safety where it may not be possible to legislate
renovation.
What specific steps will ICC be undertaking to determine whether and
how to incorporate the NIST recommendations into its codes? How long
should that process take? What will be the greatest barriers in the
process?
Some of the steps associated with taking action on the NIST
recommendations, as I have discussed, we have already begun. As a
result of the WTC attacks and the need to consider code changes to
address terrorism-related issues in the built environment, the ICC
formed an Ad Hoc Committee on Terrorism Resistant Buildings. The
committee--made up of code officials, engineers, architects and other
building professionals--is looking at the NIST recommendations as well
as other research related to responding to new threats that we now have
to perpetually address. In addition, at the annual assembly of our
membership last month, the ICC charged our permanent Code Technology
Committee with a corresponding assignment to specifically prioritize
the NIST recommendations and to prepare those recommendations as
proposals for the deliberate review of our code development process. In
the two days just before this hearing our Code Technology Committee has
been meeting with the National Institute for Building Sciences to
coordinate work in developing and preparing proposals based on the NIST
recommendations.
For the next code development cycle any recommendations to revise
the IBC and other ICC codes can be submitted by any party, including
NIST staff or parties with whom NIST participates, on or before March
24, 2006. The recommended changes, as discussed, need to provide
specific language and citations to amend the code and need to be
accompanied by supporting documentation. It is our view that the
information gathered and analysis conducted by NIST on the WTC collapse
would prove instrumental in development of changes and supporting
documentation.
As to the standards referenced in the IBC, NIST would have to take
similar action with each standards developer based on individual
procedures and deadlines.
The timeframe associated with the next cycle of the ICC code
development process is from March 24, 2006, at which time proposed
changes are due as noted above, to October 4, 2007 with the completion
of the final action hearing. The result of this process will yield the
2007 supplements to the 2006 editions of each code. This process is
repeated every 18 months, resulting in a new edition of the codes each
three years and a new supplement each interim.
More details on this process are covered in a PowerPoint
presentation presented and discussed with NIST staff earlier this year.
The objective of ICC's initiative with NIST staff, in advance of
release of the WTC report, was to advise NIST of the full extent of the
public process or code amendment so that NIST could begin to develop a
strategy for implementing the WTC report recommendations in parallel to
completion of the report. In this way it was hoped NIST could develop
specific codes and standards proposals prior to the March 2006
deadline. One such suggestion was for NIST to not only take the lead in
development of proposed changes to the IBC and other ICC codes but also
to parallel that activity by submitting those changes to federal
agencies and key State and local government for early consideration for
action.
The most significant barrier, as with any code change proposal, is
having technical documentation for the membership to review in
consideration of specific code change proposals, and the advance use of
formal and informal processes of discussion and review to fully vet and
analyze each proposal.
What specific actions should NIST be taking to help code organizations
incorporate its recommendations? Are the recommendations framed in a
way that facilitates their adoption by code organizations or are they
too general or too specific?
NIST, as well as a number of other federal agencies, do already
participate in the code development process through submission of and
advocacy for code changes. This participation both adds to the quality
of the review of all proposed code changes and helps the agencies to
achieve their program goals as directed by both executive and
legislative branches of government. For instance the U.S. Department of
Energy has submitted changes to the IBC in the past to more fully
address the structural and fire resistance aspects of buildings
associated with certain radiation-related processes. This will
specifically help address DOE interests as a building owner as well as
the general public. This sort of federal interagency coordination is
precisely what is necessary for NIST to advance the recommendations of
the WTC report through ICC's code development process, as well as the
code and standards development of other providers of voluntary
consensus standards. Another example is participation by the Consumer
Product Safety Commission in realization that the ICC codes are
effective vehicles to achieve CPSC's public safety goals where they may
not have otherwise have rule-making authority.
As I've discussed, the recommendations are not written in a way
that facilitates direct adoption and do need to be reframed in a manner
that is specific to the desired result, consistent with the statutory
construction of the ICC codes, and presented in a manner that provides
citation to each section and subsection of the code that is directly or
collaterally impacted by the proposal; not too much unlike the manner
in which legislation this panel reviews must be framed to be consistent
with the standing body of our U.S. Code. The prospects of the adoption
of any recommended change to the IBC or other ICC codes cannot be
addressed without seeing the details of the particular change. The
nature of the process to develop codes and standards within the
voluntary sector, in allowing for participation by all interested and
affected parties, ensures full due consideration with respect to all
views and variables.
In the simplest terms, the probability of a code change being
accepted and eventually incorporated into the IBC or other ICC codes
and maintained in federal, State and local adoption of those codes is
dependent on the degree to which the existing code is changed, first
and life cycle cost impacts associated with the change, availability of
any required new technology and support infrastructure for that
technology, impacts on various trade, labor and manufacturing
interests, and impacts on the interests of advocacy groups, among other
factors. In this manner the effects on the process are quite similar to
what the legislative or executive branches go through in considering
laws or regulations that impact U.S. industry, public interests, the
economy and the environment.
The ICC has recommended to NIST that, as the degree of revision
associated with changes to the codes and standards increases, NIST
should consider partnering with interested and affected parties in the
development of codes and standards proposals as opposed to taking up
the effort alone or assuming others will take the lead. In addition ICC
has also stressed to NIST that without their involvement and leadership
in this process there are two probably outcomes; either nothing will be
done to implement the WTC findings codes and standards, or multiple and
varied interests will each use the findings to their own advantage
resulting in multiple, varied and non-uniform codes and standards
proposals that will be much more difficult and time consuming to sort
out, address and eventually agree upon.
With that said, there are some certainties associated with the
process. Changes that are not enforceable or require specific products
or materials by name are not likely to be accepted, nor are changes
that reference standards that have not been fully completed.
As an association comprised building regulatory and construction
industry professionals who come together to establish model codes for
use by the public and private sectors, the ICC is focused on building
and fire safety. The ICC codes provide a platform and foundation for
achieving improved building safety. The process for their revision and
enhancement is open to all and affords NIST and all others the
opportunity to take the results of research, investigations and studies
and have them, through the wide adoption of the ICC codes, put into
practice.
We at ICC applaud all the work supported by Congress, such as that
conducted by NIST. We encourage continued support for such work by
Congress and increasing collaboration by the public and private sectors
in enhancing building performance and safety.
Thank you again for the opportunity to speak with you today. I will
be pleased to answer any questions you have or provide additional
information you may need.
Biography for Henry L. Green
In 1989 Henry L. Green was appointed Executive Director of the
Bureau of Construction Codes and Fire Safety. Henry has worked in the
Bureau for more than twenty years serving as a building inspector,
Chief of the Barrier Free Design Division, Chief Building Inspector and
as Deputy Director before assuming his current role.
As Executive Director, Henry provides management and oversight for
construction and fire safety programs in the state of Michigan. These
program responsibilities include the development and implementation of
construction codes and standards, fire fighter training, building, and
fire inspection programs, public fire safety education, and the state
fire marshal.
Additionally, Henry serves as Project Director for the Michigan
Timely Applications and Permit Service (MiTAPS), an on-line processing
system for permits and licenses issued by the State of Michigan, and
serves as President of the International Code Council Board of
Directors, an organization of which he is a founding member.
Henry has also served on the Building Officials and Code
Administrators (BOCA) Board of Directors for ten years, serving as
President in 1997. He also serves as a member of the Board of Directors
of the National Institute of Building Sciences, recently completing a
term as Chairman of the Board of Directors in 2004.
Over the years, Henry has been recognized nationally and
internationally as a proponent for developing and implementing building
and fire safety initiatives and codes. In 1990, the Automatic Fire
Alarm Association (AFFA) named Henry ``Man of the Year'' for his
contributions to life safety as Chairman of the BOCA Ad Hoc Committee
for Fire Protection. AFFA acknowledged, ``under his fine leadership,
the committee developed numerous code changes to the BOCA National
Building and Fire Prevention Codes. . .and significantly improved life
safety in both new and existing construction.''
In 1998, Henry received the ``Distinguished Service to Government''
award from the Building Industry Association of Southeastern Michigan
and was awarded the Walker S. Lee Award in recognition of outstanding
service to BOCA International in 1999.
In addition to serving the state of Michigan, Henry has
participated in national and international code forums representing
building code officials at World Organization of Building Officials
conferences in Hong Kong and Australia.
A life-long resident of Lansing, Michigan, Henry serves as a member
of the Trustee Ministry and Building Construction Committee at his
church, Union Missionary Baptist Church. He is a former President of
the Woodcreek Parent Teacher Association and served on the Waverly High
School Parents Advisory Committee.
He, and his wife Angela, are the parents of two grown sons, William
and Jason.
Discussion
Chairman Boehlert. Thank you very much, Mr. Green. As all
of you have observed, we have been rudely interrupted by a call
of the House. The Speaker doesn't check first with the Science
Committee to see how we are doing in our proceedings before
determining whether or not we are going to be voting. So, we
are going to have to take a recess for about 20 minutes, while
we answer the call of the House. It is my understanding that
there will be two votes, and on this vote, there are exactly
six minutes and 41 seconds left for us to get over to the
Capitol.
I will just leave you with a couple of thoughts before we
come back and begin the questioning in earnest. I think, Mr.
Corbett, you asked the most profound question of the moment.
Where do we go from here? And that is our determined effort, to
determine where we go from here, and how we get there. I would
point out that Dr. Jeffrey didn't direct the study or conceive
it. He inherited it, and he is the new guy on the block, and we
have got to deal with that fact of life.
Secondly, I would point out that if you look at the report,
some observers might say it is bold and comprehensive. Others
might charge that it is vague. I think it is a little bit of
both, and where it is bold and comprehensive, we have to seize
upon the direction and guidance given us. Where it is vague, we
have to flesh out some of the details, and get a little more
specificity. And that is what we are going to direct our
questioning to, as we return from this rude interruption.
And I will let the Speaker know that you all share my view
that he rudely interrupted this proceeding. With that, let us
adjourn for 20 minutes.
[Recess.]
Chairman Boehlert. We will start again. Members will be
drifting back from the floor activity. Understandably, our
focus will be on the report, and particularly, Dr. Jeffrey,
your commentary will be welcome. Doctor, several of the
witnesses have implied, and Mr. Green and Mr. Corbett have
stated quite explicitly, that NIST recommendations are not
presented in a specific enough form to fully inform the code
writing process. This is obviously a very serious matter, and
we recognize that. I am sure you do, too.
Let me ask you a series of questions, and then, I will shut
up and listen to your response. Why did NIST choose to present
its recommendations in this fashion, and why have you only now
contacted NIBS, the National Institute of Building Sciences,
and when will NIBS' document be completed, and to what extent
will NIST review the document, and finally, and very
importantly, will NIST be making specific recommendations to
the ICC prior to March, because if they don't come prior to
March, well, that just adds more time to the whole process?
So, I know it is a tall order. I have asked those
questions, and I see you furiously taking notes. And let me,
once again, acknowledge the fact that I recognize that you
didn't direct this study. You inherited it. But you are the guy
on the block now, and you are the point man, and we have a high
regard for you, and we want to work cooperatively with you, but
we want to do as much as we can to eliminate vagueness and
concentrate on specificity.
The floor is yours.
Mr. Jeffrey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I did inherit this, but I am very proud of what I
inherited. I think the NIST team, and working with the outside
experts, have done a phenomenal job on this.
In terms of the first question, why were they couched in
this fashion, this level of specificity? The actual detailed
recommendations are in the end of the summary report, Chapter
9, and so I hope everybody takes a look at that. That is where
there is a little bit more detail on them. But the real trade-
off is we aimed for performance-based. As I am fairly new to
the codes and standard setting organizations, I have learned to
appreciate the process as they go forward. And this is very
much of a give and take. It is a consensus-building. It is a
very open, consensus-built process, and the point is to try to
put forward the guidance as to what needs to get done. And I
believe that the NIST recommendations do a very, very good job
of defining the what in terms of the recommendations.
The specifics of the how is where you now need to do the
tradeoffs between different organizations, different vested
interests, and the whole process of how the standard setting
organizations and the code model organizations define this is
this give and take between the different vested interests from
the builders, developers, engineers, public safety----
Chairman Boehlert. I am going to interrupt you here, and--
--
Mr. Jeffrey. Sure.
Chairman Boehlert. But just let me, I mean, do you disagree
with what Mr. Green said, specifically, the recommendations are
not written in a way that facilitates direct adoption. And how
can you have give and take on vagueness?
Mr. Jeffrey. I believe that the recommendations are
specific in terms of the performance, but we now need to go
through this consensus process of turning those into the
specific language that the code developers can use in their
national model codes. And this is that step of, now, using the
National Institute of Building Sciences, and working with these
organizations to address those very concerns. That is the next
step, and we are working with them. In the process of being
very open, I was very pleased to hear several of the witnesses
talk about actually starting this process during the
investigation itself, as some of the recommendations started to
become apparent.
And so, I think that it is at the appropriate level of
detail now, as I believe Mr. Green also stated, that if we
over-specified them, they would also have a higher risk of
rejection. So, it is that delicate balance of trying to do the
consensus. In terms of the timeline, we are very much committed
to meeting the requirements as appropriate. For example, right
now, what we are going through is all of the recommendations,
with NIBS and with others, to identify those codes where we can
get the language in place to meet the March 2006 deadline.
Chairman Boehlert. So, you are personally committed to that
March deadline.
Mr. Jeffrey. Absolutely. Some of the recommendations, as
has been pointed out in the documents and by some of the
witnesses, require more work in terms of some of the research
and development, and so, what we are trying to do is separate
those with NIBS, to identify those that can go forward very
quickly, those that require a little bit more detail, in terms
of the research.
Chairman Boehlert. So, when is NIBS going to be ready, and
you are going to have their report, you are going to evaluate?
What is the timeline there?
Mr. Jeffrey. It is going to be actually more of an ongoing
process where we would expect that as a lot of the language
becomes available, they are going to be submitting these. As I
said, there is going to be a set by March 2006. I will actually
defer to the expert here, Shyam Sunder, who ran the
investigation, and is running the NIBS contract, on is there a
specific final deliverable and a date. I am not trying to put
you on the spot, Shyam.
Chairman Boehlert. Well, come on up and identify yourself
for the purposes of the record.
Mr. Sunder. I am Shyam Sunder. I am Deputy Director of the
Building and Fire Research Laboratory, and lead investigator of
the----
Chairman Boehlert. We will provide seats, if you would like
to have a seat. You know, we don't want you----
Mr. Jeffrey. You are more generous than I am, so----
Mr. Sunder. Thank you.
There are--we will prioritize the recommendations, so that
those that are ready for the March deadline will go to the
March deadline, and those that are ready for the next three
year cycle, which would be a deadline six to eighteen months
after that, we would go for that. But the people on our
committee, the NIBS committee, do represent the organizations
around this table. So, we have official representatives from
those organizations.
Chairman Boehlert. All right. Let me ask some of the other
witnesses. Mr. Green, Mr. Corbett, let us go down the line.
What is your reaction to what he said? Is that good enough?
Mr. Green. Well, we are committed to working with them and
NIST to make sure that they have in line for March code changes
that are appropriate, to the degree that we can get through
after we prioritize. I think that once that is accomplished,
getting it in the context of submission for code language is
somewhat easy, because we will have the experts working with
them at NIBS to put it in that context. That is what we need to
do.
The language that is used in the report is not here is how
you would put it in the code body, and that is why we have the
people sitting at the people with them. So, I am confident that
we can get through this process, albeit we may not get through
all of the recommendations, but those that we can get through,
we will have them ready for March.
Chairman Boehlert. Mr. Corbett, what do you say?
Mr. Corbett. I am glad to hear that they are committed to
March. I think everyone recognizes that the code development
process is a long one to begin with, and if we could have
truncated this somehow, and got that process of recommendation,
preparation, started during the investigation itself. Because
some of these, I think, are kind of no-brainers. I mean, there
are things that we could have been doing perhaps a year and a
half ago.
Chairman Boehlert. Yeah, but as you said so eloquently,
where do we go from here? So, we can't re-create what----
Mr. Corbett. Right, right.
Chairman Boehlert.--is already----
Mr. Corbett. Well, I think----
Chairman Boehlert.--behind us.
Mr. Corbett. I think, you know, from my perspective, if
they are committed to a March timetable, I mean, that is a
pretty quick turnaround, I would think. I mean, from my
perspective. As far as having so many people involved here. I
mean, NIBS is bringing 15 or 20 people into this process here,
so----
Chairman Boehlert. But--let me ask you--and I will get to
Dr. Harris and Ms. McNabb.
Mr. Corbett. Yeah.
Chairman Boehlert. My red light is on, so I will go to Mr.
Miller in a second, but are you comforted by what Dr. Jeffrey
is saying in his testimony now, in his response to these
questions? Do you feel that we are on-course and we are going
to be timely with specific recommendations, and there is enough
time before March to have that so-called give and take he is
referring to, and that we are going to produce something worthy
of note?
Mr. Corbett. Yeah. As I said, I think I had hoped that it
would have been a lot sooner, but I mean, this is a commitment
they have made, and I appreciate that. I think it is telling,
also, that the NFPA and ICC both have made changes years ago,
on some of these things we are talking about today. I mean, the
fact is that this investigation has gone beyond what even the
code groups themselves have done on their own. So, I think that
is--we have got to shorten this process for the future.
Chairman Boehlert. Dr. Harris or Ms. McNabb, do you have
any comment? Microphone.
Mr. Harris. Sorry. I am comforted by what Dr. Jeffrey says,
and if you recall, the last thing I said was, this process is
going to take a long time. And let me tell you why I said that.
In February of 1970 or '71, there was a significant earthquake
in the San Fernando Valley of Southern California, and it
demonstrated that buildings built according to the then most
current building codes and standards would not perform well in
what could only be considered a moderate earthquake at the
time. That got the attention of several federal agencies. They
commissioned some studies to essentially realize that finding,
and make recommendations that building codes and standards
needed to be brought up to the state of knowledge, if you will,
that existed in the research community. That process took about
a quarter of a century.
The knowledge base wasn't intended to be expanded, per se,
just get that knowledge base into mandatory requirements and
codes and standards. It happened in several stages. There were
things that did occur within three years of that event in
interim updates to some building codes. About six years later,
there was an act of Congress that was passed, the Earthquake
Hazard Reduction Program. That took some time. Even following
that, there was another major milestone in about 1988 in the
building codes, and another one in 1997. It takes a long time
to incorporate some of these changes. Now, some of the ones are
very narrow scope detailed, and I think you may see action on
them beginning in March. That is fine.
Some of them, like the one I happen to be the most
concerned with, number one, increasing the structural integrity
in buildings, and providing resistance to progressive collapse.
That is not an easy nut to crack. In fact, there, we probably
even need more basic knowledge. And so, it is going to take a
long time before everything that NIST has uncovered and
recommended is addressed, and it will not all happen in one
fell swoop.
Chairman Boehlert. Ms. McNabb.
Ms. McNabb. Yes. NFPA has already made a number of changes
to our codes and standards, as a result of the NIST
investigation. We don't really need the NIBS process, because
our process is a consensus one. We bring together all the
stakeholders in our process, so it is not just the enforcers
who are making the final decision. It is, you know, the users
of the buildings, the laborers, the insurers, the design
professionals. We have nine categories of stakeholders that
participate in our process. We have the technical expertise.
And after the NIST investigation began, we set up a High
Rise Safety Advisory Committee to look at high rise safety, and
to be ready for the NIST report, because we recognized that it
is really society's role to take the recommendations, the
science, and set the thresholds, and determine which buildings
should these recommendations apply to, and to weigh that and
balance the risk and the safety as it is.
Were we frustrated that the recommendations were not more
specific? In some cases, yes, because the other investigation
that we were familiar with was the Station Nightclub
investigation, and that investigation done by NIST was much
more specific than that World Trade Center investigation. So,
we feel that they could have been more specific in some cases,
but again, you know, just by its very nature, the
investigation, the largest building failure investigation, I
think, is going to come up with some science that needs to be
studied and thought about, and all the viewpoints need to be
brought in. And that is what we are doing.
Chairman Boehlert. Well, it is good to know that we are
moving forward on several fronts, but we are impatient,
understandably. A lot of people are impatient, understandably,
and a lot of people want action as quickly as possible. And I
am reminded of another issue, acid rain, which is one of my pet
concerns, and people kept calling for more studies, more
studies, more conversation, more give and take. And I remember
Governor Kean, at the time, who ironically headed the 9/11
Commission, Governor Kean saying if all we do is continue to
study the problem, we will end up with the best documented
environmental disaster in history.
So, I think we are all very anxious to get going with some
degree of specificity, with something that is tangible, that we
can get a hold of, and we appreciate the fact that some of
these things are going to be time-consuming, but time is a
wasting. With that, Mr. Miller.
Mr. Miller. Thank you.
I understand that building codes are designed to be a
balance between risk and cost. If something is a serious risk,
we will expect people to pay money to provide against that
risk, to incur expense to provide against that risk. But if
something is a real remote possibility, we will be less
inclined to do that.
Dr. Jeffrey, I was struck by your testimony and by Ms.
McNabb's about whether NIST recommendations for building codes
should apply to every building, every commercial building the
same. Most of the discussions about our terrorism risk have
assumed that there is some possibility that there would be
truly a random attack on any garden variety commercial building
in America, but the most likely targets are what homeland
security has called iconic buildings, buildings of high
symbolic value. The World Trade Center. The Pentagon, obviously
both of those. The John Hancock Center. The Empire State
Building. Dr. Jeffrey, I have practiced law for a while, in a
garden variety six story office building in the North Hills
area of Raleigh called the Landmark Center. It was Class B
space. That was fine. I had kind of a Class B law practice. Why
on Earth would you expect the Landmark Center on Six Forks Road
in Raleigh to have the same standards of preparation against
terrorist attack that the John Hancock Center would have?
Mr. Jeffrey. Thank you, Mr. Miller. Actually, the actual
building codes that get adopted are at the State and local
level. First, you know, that is part of the political process
within the State and local governments as to what is
appropriate for that specific setting.
Secondly, in the report, NIST does recommend that the
owners of the iconic buildings, much like the ones you have
mentioned, may want to view a higher level of preparedness than
the average--the report specifically does not try to recommend
that every building in the Nation be able to survive an attack
with a fully loaded 747. And so, it does try to make that
distinction, and calls out the iconic buildings separately.
Mr. Miller. Should that be something dealt with by--that
sliver of commercial properties, that are the most likely
terrorism targets, should those be dealt with by Congress,
rather than leaving that to local building codes?
Mr. Jeffrey. I am not sure that I am actually qualified to
respond to where the State and local versus federal roles
should plan.
Mr. Miller. All right. Well, Ms. McNabb, what is your
thought on this? Do you think that the Landmark Center ought to
have essentially the same standards applied to it that apply to
the John Hancock Center?
Chairman Boehlert. Let me interrupt here. Now, I won't take
this from your time, but you know, this is not just about
terrorist attack. It is about wind, it is about fire, it is
about a whole bunch of other things that may not involve any
terrorist activity, but we know we don't know enough, and I am
not quite certain we know what we don't know, but we know we
don't know a hell of a lot, and with that, Dr. Jeffrey----
Mr. Miller. Mr. Chairman, could you diagram that sentence
for me? Ms. McNabb. Dr. Jeffrey, did you want to respond now?
Mr. Jeffrey. No, I will wait.
Mr. Miller. Okay. Ms. McNabb.
Ms. McNabb. I don't think you can make a building terror-
proof, and I don't think that you can have a code that, you
know, sets forth terror-proof regulations, because by
definition, terror is finding out what people have planned for,
and then doing something above and beyond that to scare them or
hurt them. So, I don't think that that is reasonable. I do
think that there--that after 9/11, we see that it is important
to set the threshold for some buildings differently. And even,
I will say, high rise construction has progressed so much that,
you know, what we used to think of as a high rise now is, has
gone very, very high. And so, maybe it is time to think about
different thresholds for tall buildings.
That, I think, is part of what we want to do when we bring
all of the players. Perhaps, it is not just a threshold for how
high the building it is or how iconic the building is, but
where it is located in terms of the urban fabric, that is, that
surrounds it. So, those are all things that we need to take
into consideration, and unfortunately, catastrophes are what we
respond to, rather than common sense. I mean, we could be
moving forward on this on a regular basis, but people's
attention isn't on it regularly, even though the science
progresses, and we learn more about how to provide elevators
for tall buildings, and we learn more about different
technologies that can help us construct buildings. We don't
move along on the safety as quickly, I think.
Mr. Miller. Okay. It is striking to me that there does not
appear to be a sense of urgency in the private sector about
agreeing upon a standard for private sector preparedness, of
what is expected of them. The 9/11 Commission devoted all of
about a page and a quarter to private sector preparedness, but
essentially said it should be the law of civil liability,
negligence, and insurance considerations, and underwriting. It
should be financial incentives that moves American business to
take steps, care, that are appropriate to the risks they face.
And suggest further industry standards, which it seems NIST
might very well be part of.
The initial estimate of the insurance loss from 9/11 was
$40 billion. It turned out to be $32 billion. The difference
was all liability claims, that Congress' compensation for
victims made compensation contingent upon waiving liability
claims. So, everyone except the passengers on the airplanes, of
their families, waived the liability claims, because those were
very uncertain claims, given how stunned the Nation was by 9/11
and the very idea that we should have anticipated that and
provided against it, something that seemed beyond our
imagination. It won't be beyond our imagination the next time.
I would think American business, that commercial real
estate, would be pushing hard for an industry standard, some
standard that makes very clear what should be expected of them,
not just so they can do the right thing, and so that they will
not go to bed thinking that people died when people could have
lived if they had something different. But for the simple,
pragmatic reason that they will have a defense to a negligence
claim to show that they met the standard of care that was
expected of them, that there was an honest standard. But in
this hearing, and in other discussions in other committees,
there seems to be no such urgency. Do any of you have any, do
you sense that there is an urgency, and if not, why not?
Ms. McNabb.
Ms. McNabb. We have a standard, NFPA 1600, on emergency
preparedness, that encourages the public and private sector to
come together and ask themselves a series of questions. And I
think that is the kind of thing that works, because you and
your facility, if it is located, and I believe it is being used
in New York City, you look at what the hazards are in your
building, what the population is, what the context is, and you
answer a series of questions, and then you plan for those. You
provide, you know, your employees with what they need, the
information they need, places to go if it is a biochemical
event. Places to go if it is fire, if it is, you know, and if
follows through and allows them to plan for different kinds of
emergencies. So, it is out there, and it is being used and
adopted.
Mr. Miller. Mr. Corbett.
Mr. Corbett. I will just add that I testified before the 9/
11 Commission on this specific issue, and I think,
unfortunately, they missed the mark as far as the other piece
of it. We have talked--she just mentioned NFPA 1600, which
deals with the people side of preparedness for issues of
terrorism, things like that. But what, really, they missed was
the need for some kind of document, some kind of ruler to
measure the level of protection provided for iconic buildings,
with specific regard to terrorism, because the code groups have
up until this point not developed anything, and I applaud the
ICC, because they actually did create a committee to address
those issues. ASCE has a committee on blast-resistant design,
but you are right. There has been no rush to have at least,
again, not a requirement, but at least a set of guidelines or a
ruler that you can measure a building against to say yes, this
building is well prepared for a terrorist attack, versus one
that perhaps is not. Thank you.
Chairman Boehlert. Thank you. Dr. Jeffrey, does NIST have
any estimates of the costs of implementing the recommendations,
and were costs a factor in making their recommendations, and do
you think cost should be a factor in determining whether to
adopt the recommendations?
Mr. Jeffrey. Thank you. Cost was not a factor in making the
recommendations. These were, again, performance-based. Part of
the process of having all of the different groups represented,
including the building operators, the engineers, the
architects, the standard setting organizations, is for us not
to specify that specific solution, but for those trade-offs to
be made, and to try to find the best approach. And then,
depending upon the situation, some of the expenses may be more
justified than others. It is much along the lines of the
sentence that was trying to be parsed. There has got to be a
risk-based approach to this, and for some situations, some of
the requirements may make more sense than others. But that is
part of what this next step is.
Chairman Boehlert. Ms. Regenhard made some recommendations
about making a lot of the information more available to the
public at large relating to the investigation.
One, do you think she is on to something, and two, why
aren't more of the deliberations available for public
consumption, and three, I would be anxious to hear what the
other witnesses on the panel would say about if she thinks that
recommendation about making publicly more information
available?
Mr. Jeffrey. Thank you. We are actually committed to make
publicly available as much of the evidence from the
investigation as we can. A portion of the evidence we received
from third parties is protected under nondisclosure agreements,
and we are actually going back to those parties to try to
figure out exactly how much of that we can release legally.
In addition, a lot of the photographers have material that
is copyrighted, and so, we are working with them to try to make
sure that we have the proper, appropriate copyright protections
in place, as that data gets released. And also, a lot of the
interviews that were taken, we are going through all of that
information to redact out any of the information that might be
able to identify the individual, to protect their personal
privacy. But as we go through that process, we are going to be
releasing a vast amount of that data.
Chairman Boehlert. Let me ask the other panel members. What
do you think about that? I mean, should we have more
information publicly available for review and examination and
comment and response? Mr. Corbett.
Mr. Corbett. Definitely. The answer is yes to that. That
has been one of my concerns on the advisory committee, is that
for example, all the information dealing with the first person
accounts, the interviews that NIST had conducted, at one point,
there was discussion about destroying that information. No
decision had been made, but that was a possibility at one
point, and I think now, NIST has basically said at this point,
it won't be destroyed, but we are still not sure how it is
going to be disclosed. And I think for the benefit of myself
and other people that are, weren't part of the investigation,
that we are kind of on the outside looking in. This is critical
information for them for other research they are doing also.
But also, to verify the conclusions, the findings, and of
course, the recommendations that were, that come about. So,
critically important to get that information, as much of it
that can be given.
Unfortunately, I think this is an issue with the Act that
NIST ended up in a position of having to sign agreements with
various entities to not disclose this information, but again,
this is diametrically opposed to that whole open process that
we have talked about so many times here today, and also three
years ago.
Chairman Boehlert. Well, you know, proprietary information,
I suppose I can understand that, but if the information is
subpoenaed, if you ask for information, saying ``please come
forward and give us all the information you have,'' and they
say, ``well, we will sign this nondisclosure agreement.'' Why
would anybody sign a nondisclosure agreement unless there are
instances, clearly, where you can understand the need for that.
Mr. Corbett. Totally understandable, and I think this is a
critical, critical issue that you have brought up, because this
was certainly an issue for the World Trade Center
investigation, was certainly an issue for the Rhode Island
Nightclub investigation, because the Rhode Island Nightclub
investigation, in my opinion, was effectively shut down because
they had access to virtually information in the first place,
the witnesses that were there that day, because the Rhode
Island Attorney General told them they couldn't have it, and
NIST really from, I would imagine from their legal staff,
decided that it wasn't possible for them to have open hearings,
to solicit information, to issue subpoenas for that
information, and that is critical. It is critical to this Act,
and it was critical to what happened with these investigations,
and----
Chairman Boehlert. Well, yeah. There is always a balancing,
delicate balance in there----
Mr. Corbett. There is, and I have no qualms about
proprietary information and personal information. That is not
at issue here. But it affected, especially, that Rhode Island
investigation, because a lot of the accounts that are recorded
in the investigation report are from the Providence, Rhode
Island Journal, the newspaper. They are newspaper accounts. So,
why didn't we have access to people that actually were there,
like the Rhode Island Attorney General, and I think that these
whole legal clouds that have been over these investigations are
particularly troubling.
Chairman Boehlert. Anybody else care to comment? Ms.
Jackson Lee.
Ms. McNabb. I think the more----
Chairman Boehlert. Or excuse me, Ms.----
Ms. McNabb. I think the more sunshine on the process, the
better it is. I think that in general, in America, there is
sort of a disconnect between the science and the application of
the science, and knowing information, and then, knowing then
what should be done with that information.
In Katrina, for example, I mean the last NOAA reports that
we had when they were talking about wind speeds, and what was
going to happen. It was hard to get people to understand the
implications of the science, and they started saying things
like dogs and cats will be living together and it is going to
shake buildings. The more science that NIST can give us, and
the more information that we have, I think the better off it
will be for the public, because they will understand that
building regulations don't just come out of a vacuum and from
the building police, that there is a reason for, perhaps,
raising the cost of construction, or perhaps making some trade-
offs, or doing things differently.
Chairman Boehlert. In almost all cases, more information,
rather than less, is desirable if you are reviewing and serious
about making recommendations to prevent something in the future
from happening.
Did you want to add something?
Mr. Jeffrey. Just a short statement, that we are absolutely
committed to that. We agree with that. I think the entire
process that we have tried to follow has been as open as
possible, as described. The number of open meetings, the number
of comments received. And we are committed to trying to release
as much of the data as we legally can, and so, we know, we
approve and agree with the statements.
Chairman Boehlert. Ms. Jackson Lee.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I have been on this committee a sufficient
number of years to remember the hearings that we had
immediately after 9/11 to discuss a number of elements,
including the question of the building safety and security, but
also, a number of other issues dealing with interoperability
and science, that could have been affected, particularly in the
area dealing with fire protection. So, I am gratified that we
are now here for a hearing that has to do with a report that
has been rendered.
I am interested in the testimony of Ms. Regenhard. Are you
able to come to the table, or answer any questions? I would be
delighted to have you--let me. And let me thank you, first of
all, for your testimony, and accept my tardiness because I was
flying in on a late flight. But I thought this hearing was
important enough for me to be able to come and to assess the
testimony, and to hear from you as well.
You made, I think, a very potent point, which is that there
was a sensitivity that the NIST study was not detailed enough,
that it seemed to have some political ramifications. They may
not have been on the ground, and many of us have been to Ground
Zero. I serve on the Homeland Security Committee, as many of
the Members of this Science Committee does, and we have a very
visual sense of the need.
Can you share with us what more you would want, would have
wanted NIST to do, or where were the political correctness
issues that you think really didn't do the appropriate, or did
not give the appropriate response?, particularly as you have
faced a personal loss in the loss of your son, and you have my
deepest sympathy?
Ms. Regenhard. Thank you very much.
First of all, I just want to preface my comments with
saying I often introduce myself in the way that I am basically
just a little mother from the Bronx, and really, that is what I
am, and I am not a technical person. However, I do have, over
the last four years, you know, the input from my wonderful
technical advisory panel, which represents some excellent,
excellent people in the academic fields, and certainly, you
know, in structural engineering, fire protection, architecture,
and evacuation specialists.
So--but to get back to your question, you know, political
correctness. I have seen, and the other families of the victims
have seen the aftermath of 9/11 to be somewhat definitely
flavored by political correctness in many, many ways, in so
many ways. But certainly, with the NIST investigation, I mean,
I understand that it is a wonderful organization of scientists,
and scientists are not trained to be like NYPD detectives.
There is a professional and academic way that these kinds of
organizations deal with one and with other entities. And you
have other professional people in that investigation that
should have been really interrogated, such as the Port
Authority, such as their building plans. You know, the Port
Authority never turned over their building plans until there
was an article about it in the front page of the New York Times
condemning them, or not condemning them, but accusing them of
really not coming forward. That is one of the examples. People
like the chief structural engineer for the first World Trade
Center, you know, his work should have been investigated,
because after all, he was responsible for the design of that
building, and the subsequent, and yet, instead of that, he was
sort of dealt with in a friendly basis, and he was actually put
on the payroll to explain his plans and all that.
So, there were these very, you know, maybe because I am a
layperson, I can't understand why these entities that should
have been scrutinized and investigated were sort of taken in
and became part of the investigation. You know, that is just
one of the examples of where the families were really, really
deeply concerned about that. And also, the avoidance of certain
things that were not politically correct, like the avoidance of
blaming anyone for anything. I mean, we all teach our children
to obey the law, and to respect authority, and not to break any
laws, but yet, when we have this investigation of the, I would
say the needless deaths of nearly 3,000 people, no one is to be
blamed. It is handled so gingerly. I mean, there is a reason
why nearly 3,000 people are dead, and I feel the majority of
them needlessly, but yet, the approach of these investigations
is very, very tentative, and no one wants to put anyone on the
line, and no one wants to look into what was the effect of the
Port Authority immunities from building and fire codes?
If someone said to me what are the two major grievous
examples of what went wrong on 9/11 in those buildings? I would
say the two things are the Port Authority exemptions and
immunities from New York City building and fire codes, and the
wholesale failure of the FDNY radio communications, and the
wholesale failure of the Emergency Management System of the
City of New York and the Port Authority. And these are the crux
of the matter. This is the bottom line. Yet, these are the
issues that were, you know, skirted around and, you know,
tiptoeing through the tulips, instead of--and still, today, I
have to fault both the 9/11 Commission and the NIST
investigation for not taking a stand, for not saying that in
our country, no building should be above the law, especially
the Port Authority buildings that were the tallest and largest
buildings in the world, that at that time, was built to contain
the largest number of people in the world, and yet, those
buildings were allowed to be exempt and immune from building
and fire codes, essentially above the law, and now, we are
allowing the Port Authority to do the same thing all over
again.
The new World Trade Center and the memorial, and every
single building down there on that property will be just as
exempt and immune from every single New York City building and
fire code as the first one. That is an abomination. That is a
sin. That is an outrage against humanity. And you know, I am
sorry to get emotional. I expected the NIST investigation and
the 9/11 Commission to take a stand on that, but you know what,
it is only the average Joe Q. Citizen. When we break the law,
we have to pay the consequences, but when we have these huge
organizations breaking the law, I feel they are not held to the
same standard as an average citizen, and that hurts.
Chairman Boehlert. Thank you very much.
Ms. Regenhard. Thank you. I am sorry. I am talking too
much. I am sorry.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you very much for giving us that
testimony. Mr. Chairman, I would hope that in the course of
this review, that Dr. Jeffrey of NIST and others who are
representing the fire protection community, Mr. Green, who has
several ideas about being able to self-code or self-improve
your buildings against wind and others, the Katrina story that
I understand that you shared with us, can respond to her
inquiry about building codes and immunity. That seems to be an
indictment of the report from the very start, and I hope we
will have an opportunity to review that, and I hope Mr. Jeffrey
will have an opportunity to respond to that indictment.
Chairman Boehlert. Thank you. The----
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you.
Chairman Boehlert.--gentlelady's time has expired.
I would report that we anticipated, in developing the
legislation that authorized the report and everything, we
anticipated that there would be a reluctance on the part of
some to provide information. There would be inertia. And that
is why we gave subpoena power to NIST, to go in and get the
information, and it was not NIST's role to assign blame. It is
NIST's role to investigate, to determine what went wrong, to
make recommendations on how to go forward, and that is what we
are determined to work cooperatively with Dr. Jeffrey and the
NIST people, to make certain it happens the way we want it to
happen, and that we don't drag our feet, or we don't issue a
report, and sort of say gee, we did a great job. We have this
report, and have it not as specific as we would like, or there
be a lack of follow through.
And quite frankly, Congress has a responsibility, too. We
have got to conduct more meaningful oversight hearings. It is
all well and good for Congress to pass legislation, and then
put out our press releases, and say boy, we passed this
legislation dealing with an important problem facing the people
of the Nation we are privileged to represent, and then go on to
the next thing. We have got to pause now and then, and look
back and say, is it working as intended? How can we make sure
it works more effectively?
And that is why we are having this hearing today. This
isn't the first hearing or the second hearing, it is the third
hearing, and we are going to have more. And we are not ignoring
Ms. Regenhard and her group. They are very valuable resources
for this committee, and we listen to them, and we want to work
cooperatively with them, but we want to work cooperatively with
everybody.
So, let me ask you, talking about our responsibility, Dr.
Jeffrey. In your testimony, you haven't discussed what actions
should be taken by the Federal Government in response to your
recommendations. It seems there are a number of steps, not only
relating to the General Services Administration, but to the
agencies that run R&D and education programs, including FEMA
and NSF, and NIST itself. What should the Federal Government be
doing? Is NIST going to put out any formal document on this,
and how are you going to work with the other federal agencies
on these matters?
Mr. Jeffrey. Thank you, sir.
There are a number of actions that need to be taken. As I
mentioned earlier, there are a number of research and
development programs, for example, that are sure to come out in
this report. In fact, the report actually highlights where some
of those R&D efforts are. And you know, a lot of them fall
under NIST to try to execute. We have made a plug for the
last--probably the last couple of days I can make this plug, we
have got a program in the FY '06 President's budget to try to
address some of those R&D programs, and I am hoping Congress
looks kindly on that, so we can start to address some of those.
Chairman Boehlert. No, continue. But how about some of the
other agencies?
Mr. Jeffrey. On the other agencies, we need to get
together. We have not done that yet. There are some of the
recommendations that involve, especially some of the education
programs. We have been working a lot with the private sector on
that. We need to bring in some of the other parts of the
Federal Government that we have not yet done.
Chairman Boehlert. Because you know what happens. You know,
you all march down the, you develop your budget, and then, you
march down to OMB, and say this is what we want. This is what
we can justify. Here is the documentation. And then, the cuts
start happening, particularly in the R&D area, and because that
is longer range, and we have got to deal with the issue of the
moment.
So, we are going to be helpful to you, with respect to
NIST's particular budget, and quite frankly, what an
embarrassment the way Congress treated you last round. This
round, we are going to treat you better, and we are determined
to see that. You got all friends here, but some of these other
people, we have got to convince, or don't even know what the
hell NIST stands for. But you have got to talk to some of the
other agencies, and have some specific recommendations on what
they should be doing, and we want to follow through with you on
that, to make sure we keep on their tails, so to speak.
Mr. Jeffrey. Absolutely, and I would be very happy to
follow up with you and your staff on that.
Chairman Boehlert. All right. Now, I think it is fair to
say that NIST is making some pretty far-reaching, perhaps even
revolutionary suggestions here, particularly with regard to
full building evacuation. All of you, perhaps understandably,
are hedging your bets at best, in your testimony as to whether
the recommendations would find their way into code. Is your
general sense that NIST's approach makes sense? Do these
recommendations have applicability beyond terrorism, to more--
and I think they should and do--to more routine problems
encountered in the field, including natural disasters?
Let me go down the panel, and ask who wants to respond
first to that? Dr. Harris.
Mr. Harris.--able to make these recommendations. The
solution to the terrorism problem is not to really make
buildings stronger. It is to keep airplanes and things like
that out of buildings. This event has created a tragic
misconception, I think, in the minds of the public, that
buildings actually perform better than typical buildings really
will perform. The public believes that when a big airplane
flies into a building, what happens is what happened at the
World Trade Center and at the Pentagon, that is, the plane
disappears into the building, and there is a hole. Smoke begins
to come out, and after a while, some portion, or maybe all of
the building collapses. That is not what happens when you fly a
big airplane into most buildings. What happens is----
Chairman Boehlert. They do know that the building was
structurally sound. It was the insulation, the foam that was
blown off, and----
Mr. Harris. That is correct. What happens with most
buildings is, in fact, a portion or maybe all of the building
collapses immediately. Their recommendation number one
addresses that. But the addressing it is not to make it safe
for an airplane. It is to make it safe for a satchel bomb, or
perhaps, a car bomb outside. There are completely different
issues, all right.
But that is--the real value of the study is we do need to
think about that. When we get into this question of iconic
buildings, there is not just going to be one dividing line, I
do not believe. We are going to have something for the next
World Trade Center, certainly. There will be something for the
City Hall in Denver, Colorado, for example. I had----
Chairman Boehlert. Well, how about Mr. Miller's six story
building in Raleigh, because----
Mr. Harris. And Mr. Miller's six story building probably
will not be affected by that recommendation, at least in my own
opinion, it probably would not. And that is not because I
invest in real estate or construction. It is just I don't think
it will be. But there will be a gradation, and that is what is
going to take time to come to, as well as, on that particular
issue, the technical substance of how you do it is going to
have to take some time, too. There is no one magic recipe
there. I would want to get on the record something I had meant
to say earlier, and commend the General Services Administration
for the leadership they have been taking on that issue of
progressive collapse, with the construction of new federal
courthouses, where they are taking that issue very seriously.
And I would like to make one other comment, while I have
the mike. And that is I saw that recommendation number 25
actually does respond to the issue raised by Ms. Regenhard of
the Port Authority having an exemption. It is an important
recommendation here that needs to be carefully considered.
There are all sorts of legal ramifications about how you
implement this, so it is not going to come quickly, either. But
I think the pressure of your bully pulpit, and Congress in
general, bringing to light the issue of various entities having
these exemptions, and how you go about fulfilling the promise
that I am trying to build something as good as the code would
require. How do you go about that? That is something for, I
think, all of us to focus. It is----
Chairman Boehlert. Just let me read into the record. It
won't take me long. The recommendation number 25, because it is
very pertinent. ``Nongovernmental and quasi-governmental
entities that own or lease buildings, and are not subject to
building and fire safety code requirements of any governmental
jurisdiction should provide a level of safety that equals or
exceeds the level of safety that would be provided by strict
compliance with the code requirements of the appropriate
governmental jurisdiction. To gain broad public confidence in
the safety of such buildings, NIST further recommends that as
designed and as built, safety be certified by a qualified third
party, independent of the building owner or owners. The process
should not use self-approval for code enforcement in areas
including interpretation of code provisions, design approval,
product acceptance, certification of the final construction,
and post-occupancy inspections over the list of the
buildings.'' That is a pretty good recommendation, I think.
Mr. Corbett, Mr. Green, do you want to comment on this?
Mr. Green. Well, from my perspective, I think that we
should encourage, if not more strongly encourage, states to
establish standards for buildings in their areas where they may
not have code enforcement.
Chairman Boehlert. But does this approach make sense to
you?
Mr. Green. It does make sense, but the value of having a
governmental entity have that oversight, I think, adds value to
the safety in the building. I am not so sure I am sold on this
third party element. I would rather see that the third party
would be a governmental entity that has some enforcement
responsibility, to assure that the building does comply. I
don't want to suggest before this committee that it is not
appropriate to have third party involvement, but you are
assured at a greater level when you have governmental
involvement for oversight to compliance.
Chairman Boehlert. What do you say, Mr. Corbett?
Mr. Corbett. I agree totally. I might also make a couple
notes, that the word governmental is missing from
recommendation number 25. The Federal Government, State
government, local government. The word government isn't in
there. So, that is a whole group of buildings out there that
are not, obviously, subject as we stand today, with local and
State regulations, and I would point out, it is ironic that you
mentioned GSA before, because I know GSA actually has
participated in the code development process, and actually, to
my understanding, was stating an opposition of proposals for
wider stairs in high rise buildings. So, it is kind of ironic
that on one hand, you know, we are not--they do not have to
comply with the code, but on the other hand, are able to
participate in the process that affects other buildings. So----
Chairman Boehlert. Government has a way of doing that.
Mr. Corbett. But I do, I agree totally with Mr. Green that
my own opinion that I would have, I would prefer that
recommendation 25 not look for a third party, but look for
that, again, that local government or State government,
whatever it is, to review and to inspect and to oversee the
nongovernmental and quasi-governmental entities.
Chairman Boehlert. I don't think we have legal authority.
But government is in the habit of saying don't do as I do, do
as I say. Any other comment on that, before I go to Dr. Ehlers?
Ms. McNabb, did you have something?
Ms. McNabb. Yes. In terms of the recommendation 25, I think
it is a good recommendation. We support it. In fact, the NFPA
comments were to include government, but understanding that
that is a matter of Constitutional law, and perhaps, that is
why NIST recommended the third party, is that is an easy way of
dealing with that issue, related to the Constitution.
In terms of full building evacuation, to go back to your
earlier question, I think that it is inevitable that after 9/
11, even though it is not required, that building occupants may
want to do a full building evacuation or drills in the event of
an emergency. NFPA has a pamphlet on this, but we think that it
should be looked at, because full building evacuation could
result from things like a bomb threat, from things like a power
failure, not necessarily terrorism. So, it is something that I
think needs to be studied, and it is a good recommendation.
Chairman Boehlert. Thank you very much. Dr. Ehlers.
Mr. Ehlers. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I apologize for
missing much of the hearing, but we still have one of my
markups going on, and I will have to dash over there shortly.
On the issue of evacuation, I was amused in thinking about
this and the relationship with NIST, but when I spent a year at
JILA in Boulder, Colorado, as you know, there are a lot of
mountaineers in that area, including in JILA. I went into one
of my colleague's offices one day, and he is up on the ninth
floor of JILA, and saw this 150-foot coil of rope there, and I
said oh, going climbing later? He says no, no. That is my
emergency escape route. And he was dead serious. If anything
happened down below, he was going to just rappel out the
window, and go on down.
Dr. Jeffrey, I have a question for you, that there
apparently has been some controversy or criticism of NIST that
they did not invoke the NCST, and did not send their NCST team
down, as part of investigative team, to the Gulf Coast after
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, but instead, used your standard
authority for that. And the criticism has been that you haven't
exercised your leadership role in the federal investigation of
the damage to--hurricane-related damage to the buildings in
that area. And I would just like to get on the record a
response to this. Why did NIST choose not to invoke the
National Construction Safety Team Act when deploying these
teams? And how has NIST interacted with other federal agencies
that are on the ground in the Gulf Coast states? And why are
you not leading the effort on building safety investigations?
Mr. Jeffrey. Thank you, sir. The authorities that NIST has
to do investigation are essentially the tools in our toolbox.
And we are going to use the best tool, the most appropriate
tool, for whatever investigation we need to do. And for the
Hurricane Katrina and Gulf Coast areas, we have got authorities
that are actually broader than the NCST, and more appropriate
for the kinds of investigations that we need to do.
For example, we had a reconnaissance team go down there,
and a lot of the things that were identified, in terms of
further investigation, includes not just buildings, but
includes other components of the infrastructure, for example,
water, and sewage plants. It includes bridges, tunnels, et
cetera, that are not covered under the NCST. In addition, we
are going to learn a lot from buildings that have not just
failed, but buildings that were damaged, which again, is not
covered under the NCST. So, we are applying exactly the
authorities that we think we need to to try to get the job
done.
In terms of leadership, from day one, we have been working
with FEMA as part of their emergency response, as part of the
National Response Plan. Within the first week, we had a person
go there, a roofing expert go down with a group of 23
volunteers to Mobile, Alabama, to look at roofing. We sent out
a team, as I mentioned just a second ago, in terms of
reconnaissance, to try to look through the Gulf region, and we
have now got three teams that are under NIST coordination that
are made up of 16 different private and government
organizations of experts, that are going around the Gulf
region, doing detailed assessments now.
So, we believe that we have been very aggressive in the
teams that we have sent down there, and using the appropriate
authorities to get as broad a view of the situation as
possible.
Mr. Ehlers. Thank you. Does anyone else wish to comment on
that issue? Mr. Corbett.
Mr. Corbett. Yes, thank you. I commented on this during my
testimony, and I still believe the NCST would have been useful
down there, especially given the fact that the problems we have
had with the World Trade Center investigation, you know,
securing evidence, getting evidence early on. I mean, we were
very heavily reliant on computer models to tell us what
happened to the Twin Towers, because we lacked that physical
evidence, because there wasn't an Act when the Trade Center was
hit.
And I really believe that I would have preferred to have a
much more aggressive paratrooper type response from this, with
reconnaissance teams to figure out what are the buildings we
have got to study, you know. The Act, I believe, does include
provisions for investigating building disasters that had the
potential for a large life loss. It doesn't have to be, my
understanding that it has to have lives lost in the building.
So, I just--I would have hoped that we could have done under
the Act. I understand that they have other authorities to do
that work, but I had always hoped that NCST would skip to that
same level as the NTSB, in terms of public recognition, public
understanding of what, you know, what we are looking for.
Mr. Ehlers. Dr. Jeffrey, let me just ask, couldn't you have
done both? Couldn't you have sent down an NCST team to
investigate those areas where they needed that type of
authority, and used the standard teams in other areas, where
they needed their authority?
Mr. Jeffrey. They are the same people. I mean, we have got
the same technical experts, and it is actually transparent. As
long as they have the authorities to do the job, and at any
time that they need additional authorities, we will find those
additional authorities within our legal limits, to provide them
that. But it is the same people. It is the same technical
experts.
Mr. Ehlers. And did you at all invoke the authorities under
the NCST?
Mr. Jeffrey. Not for Hurricane Katrina. As the broad scope
of what the investigation is actually fits better under other
existing NIST authorities.
Mr. Ehlers. But weren't there some instances, as Mr.
Corbett is mentioning, where you should have used the authority
of the NCST?
Mr. Jeffrey. The authorities that we have got would cover a
lot of the situations. The unique authority that the NCST would
provide us is essentially the ability to legally require a
release of documentation. We have not reached a situation where
that has been an issue for the Hurricane Katrina situation.
If, at some point, we need subpoena authority, and it fits
under the legal guidelines of the NCST, we will, without
hesitation, use that authority.
Chairman Boehlert. Thank you. The gentleman's time has
expired. I thank all of you for being resources for this
committee. I will end, Mr. Corbett, by answering your question.
Where do we go from here? We are going to--eternal vigilance.
We are going to keep on top of this. We developed the whole
legislation to make possible this investigation. We are going
to keep on it.
Dr. Jeffrey, we fully expect you and your team at NIST, we
compliment you for all the good work you have done. You have
got a lot more to do, and we want to follow very closely your
interaction with NIBS, and we want to make sure you get
recommendations with specificity to the ICC before March. There
are a lot of things we want to make sure of, and so, this is
not the end of the process. We are somewhere in the middle of
the process. We are going to go forward.
And Ms. Regenhard and the people on your committee, we
thank you for all that you have done. We are sorry that this
work was necessary, but it is, and we are going to do it to the
best of our ability.
Thank you all very much. This hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 1:45 p.m., the Committee was adjourned.]
Appendix 1:
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Answers to Post-Hearing Questions
Responses by William Jeffrey, Director, National Institute of Standards
and Technology (NIST)
Questions submitted by the Majority
Q1. In your testimony you described how a staff member at NIST had
been assigned to each of NIST's recommendations to ensure that they are
carried out. Please provide the Committee with a list of the
recommendations that call for an explicit code or standard change, a
brief description of the steps in the process of changing these codes
and standards, where NIST is in this process, and the code and
standards groups with whom NIST is working on each recommendation.
A1. Please see attachment A which identifies the affected codes and
standards by each of the WTC recommendations. NIST is currently
pursuing action on each of the WTC recommendations with an emphasis on
meeting the March 24 deadline for the International Building Code.
Q2. In her testimony, Ms. McNabb said that the recommendation related
to elevators may be one of the most important. Do you agree? How
difficult would that be to codify and implement? Can you give the
Committee a sense of what specific next steps you would take to
evaluate that recommendation and what additional information you would
need and from whom?
A2. NIST agrees that improved building evacuation overall should be a
priority. Buildings should be improved to include system designs that
facilitate safe and rapid egress, methods for ensuring clear and timely
emergency communications to occupants, better occupant preparedness for
evacuation during emergencies, and incorporation of appropriate egress
technologies. Recommendations 16, 17, 18, 19, and 21 address these. The
use of occupant evacuation and fire service elevators in emergencies is
a key element of these recommendations. Further, Recommendation 20
recommends that the full range of current and next generation
evacuation technologies should be evaluated for future use, including
protected/hardened elevators, exterior escape devices, and stairwell
descent devices, which may allow all occupants an equal opportunity for
evacuation and facilitate emergency response access. As part of the
implementation process for the WTC report recommendations, the American
Society of Mechanical Engineers is addressing the use of elevators for
occupant evacuation and fire service use.
Q3. How many people does NIST have working on WTC investigation-
related projects now that the main part of the investigation is
wrapping up? Will the Hurricane Katrina investigation take resources
away from WTC follow-up?
A3. NIST has over 20 members of its staff continuing to work on WTC
investigation-related projects as part of its overall WTC response
plan, which includes a research and development program and a
dissemination and technical assistance program. A key part of this
effort is promoting implementation of the WTC recommendations. NIST
staff continue to work vigorously with the building and fire safety
communities to assure that there is a complete understanding of the WTC
recommendations and to provide needed technical assistance in getting
them implemented. The Hurricane Katrina assessment will not take
resources from the WTC investigation follow-up.
Q4. In your testimony, you said that NIST's recommendations are
achievable within ``a reasonable period of time.'' How long will that
be? Will NIST set some benchmarks to guide its activities to promote
implementation?
A4. NIST is committed, working through the various building code
organizations, to meeting the March deadline of the next code
development cycle of the International Code Council with as many of the
recommendations as appropriate and possible. I have assigned top
priority for NIST staff to work vigorously with the building and fire
safety communities to assure that there is a complete understanding of
the recommendations and to provide needed technical assistance in
getting them implemented. We have identified specific codes, standards,
and practices affected by each of the recommendations in the summary
report for the WTC towers and already begun to reach out to the
responsible organizations to pave the way for a timely, expedited
consideration of the recommendations. We also have awarded a contract
to the National Institute of Building Sciences (NIBS) to convene a
panel of building code experts to turn appropriate recommendations into
code language suitable for submission of code change proposals to the
two national model code developers.
The timeline for achieving the recommendations is governed by the
established development cycle for each of the impacted national
standards, codes, practice guidelines or regulations. For example, the
model codes follow a three-year development cycle with the next edition
due in 2009. The IBC also will issue a supplement in 2007 based on code
change proposals submitted by March 2006. The next edition of ASCE 7, a
key standard, is due in 2010. Many other standards have an ad hoc
development cycle.
Working in partnership with NIBS, NIST will target the IBC's 2007
supplement as well as the 2009 editions of the model codes. In
addition, NIST will work with ASCE and the other standards developers
to target their appropriate next edition.
In carrying out this work, NIST recognizes that not all of the
recommendations will have an impact on model building codes. Many will
impact standards that are referenced in model codes. Others will impact
stand alone standards used in practice but not referenced in model
codes. A few will impact practices, including education and training,
that don't have any impact on codes and standards. In many cases, a
standard will need to be developed before the recommendation can be
implemented in the model codes.
In addition, we will implement a web-based system so that the
public can track progress on implementing the recommendations. The web
site, which is already operational, will list each of the
recommendations, the specific organization or organizations (e.g.,
standards and code developers, professional groups, State and local
authorities) responsible for its implementation, the status of its
implementation by organization, and the plans or work in progress to
implement the recommendations. The web site is available at http://
wtc.nist.gov/recommendations/ and includes detailed information on the
work with NIBS. The web site will be updated with information on plans
and status by the end of January 2006.
Q5. In terms of how a building safety investigation should be
conducted, what are the three most important lessons derived from
NIST's experience with World Trade Center buildings?
A5. The experience gained from the WTC investigation will help NIST to
better plan and execute future investigations. Examples of the
challenges include:
The need to identify, collect, index, review, and
analyze massive amounts of data from external sources.
The need to model and validate extraordinarily
complex and multi-step physical and failure processes in large-
scale systems that required advancements in the state-of-the-
art and tested the limits of current commercial software.
The need to design first person interview protocols,
based on rigorous social science methods, which could be used
to draw definitive results and be generalized to make well
founded recommendations for improving evacuation and emergency
response procedures.
Q6. You testified that more data and research are needed to implement
some of NIST's recommendations. In your statement you said ``there is a
number of research and development programs, for example, that come out
in this report. In fact, the report actually highlights where some of
the R&D efforts are. . .a lot of them fall under NIST to try to
execute.'' Please summarize NIST's research plan based on the WTC
report recommendations.
A6. NIST has a number of on-going research and development projects as
part of its WTC response plan which address needs set forth in the WTC
report. These projects include:
Prevention of Progressive Collapse
Fire Resistance Design and Retrofit of Structures
Fire Resistive Coatings for Structural Steel
Fire Resistance of Uncoated Structural Steel with
Improved Thermal Properties
Fire Resistance of Building Partitions
Occupant Behavior and Egress
Emergency Use of Elevators
Equipment Standards for First Responders
Standard Building Information Models for
Vulnerability Assessment
Technologies for Building Operations in CBR Attacks
Cost-effective Risk Management Tools
In addition, NIST has on-going research in areas relevant to
building and fire safety. These include:
High Performance Construction Materials and Systems:
Enable scientific and technology-based innovation to modernize
and enhance the performance of construction materials and
systems.
Fire Loss Reduction: Enable engineered fire safety
for people, products, facilities; and enhanced firefighter
effectiveness with 50 percent reduction in fatalities.
Enhanced Building Performance: Provide the means to
assure buildings work better throughout their useful lives.
Q7. In written testimony submitted to the Committee, the American
Institute of Architects points to the lack of afire test facility in
United States--a facility large enough to test components of a tall
building--as a major shortcoming in the Nation's ability to improve
skyscraper safety. Is the maintenance and operation of large-scale fire
testing capability a NIST responsibility, or does it lie elsewhere in
the Federal Government or the private sector? How do you respond to the
AIA's comments?
A7. NIST agrees with AIA that fire testing of large building components
under load conditions is a vital need that is not available in the
United States at this time. Recommendation #5 recognizes this need by
stating ``A key step in fulfilling this recommendation is to establish
a capability for studying and testing the components, assemblies, and
systems under realistic fire and load conditions.''
As the Federal Government's principal fire research laboratory,
NIST maintains some of the country's best and most extensive fire
testing facilities. More than 400 fire experiments are performed each
year in the specially equipped, 27m (90 ft.) x 37m (120 ft.), Large
Fire Research Facility. However, this facility is not capable of
conducting fire tests under load conditions currently.
NIST has held discussions with the major fire testing laboratories
and the academic community to help define the requirements for such a
fire testing capability in the United States. In addition, NIST is
considering how its Large Fire Research Facility could be modified to
meet this national need.
Q8. Some critics argue that, since most fires that result in
fatalities occur in residential buildings, particularly homes, the
focus on skyscraper safety is a distraction from more common threats to
life and property. How do you respond to this criticism?
A8. We do not believe the focus of the NIST investigation into the
collapse of the buildings at the World Trade Center is a distraction
from the impact of or need to address the losses from residential
fires. NIST has an assigned responsibility to enable better fire safety
for people, products, and facilities; and to enhance fire fighter
effectiveness and continue to place a high priority on programs and
activities that impact the threats from residential fires. The U.S.
annual losses attributable to fire are nearly 3600 lives, 22,000
serious injuries, $10 billion in direct property loss, and $128 billion
total cost. NIST's fire research programs work to: enable safer and
more effective fire service operations through new technology,
measurement standards, and training tools; develop effective strategies
for cost-effectively reducing the Nation's fire losses (both human and
financial) by limiting fire growth and spread in and to residences;
provide the fundamental knowledge, algorithms, and measurement
techniques necessary for advancing engineered fire safety for people,
products, facilities, and first responders; and provide the
infrastructure necessary to facilitate the transfer of NIST-developed
technology into practice through participation with codes and standards
organizations, maintenance of the premier international research
bibliography and electronic data for the fire community, and the
development of laboratory facilities with a premium on accurate,
innovative and safe large-scale fire experiments.
Q9. Testimony submitted to the Science Committee by the Building
Owners and Managers Association (BOMA) calls for the development of
cost-benefit analyses on the implementation of NIST's recommendations.
Do believe this is a good idea? Why or why not? If so, what would NIST
do to develop these analyses?
A9. The NIST recommendations do not prescribe specific systems,
materials, or technologies. Instead, NIST encourages competition among
alternatives that can meet performance requirements. The
recommendations also do not prescribe specific threshold levels; NIST
believes that this responsibility properly falls within the purview of
the public policy setting process, in which the standards and codes
development process plays a key role. Cost-to-benefit would be an
inherent part of this process.
Only a few of the recommendations call for new requirements in
standards and codes. Most of the recommendations deal with improving an
existing standard or code requirement, establishing a standard for an
existing practice without one, establishing the technical basis for an
existing requirement, making a current requirement risk-consistent,
adopting or enforcing a current requirement, or establishing a
performance-based alternative to a current prescriptive requirement.
Q10. Attached is testimony submitted to the Committee from the
Building Owners and Managers Association (BOMA). Please review this
testimony and provide the Committee with comments on the issues that
BOMA raises on the recommendations.
A10. The review of the WTC recommendations contained in BOMA's
testimony was received and reviewed by NIST during the public comment
period for the draft WTC reports. Based on the comments, it appears
BOMA concurs with or is in general agreement with 11 of the 30
recommendations, did not have a comment on seven recommendations, was
concerned with six of the recommendations (e.g., due to cost or risk
justification), considered two recommendations to be vague, and
requested clarification or did not adequately understand four of the
recommendations.
In a few cases, BOMA cited a lack of history to suggest that tall
buildings face increased risk. First, the excellent safety record of
tall buildings that is cited by critics is based mostly on data from
roughly the past 30 years. Such historical statistics, however, do not
adequately capture rare design events due to a lack of data at the
tails of probability distributions. For example, buildings which have
useful lives of as much as 100 years are often designed for a 500-year
hurricane or a 2,500-year earthquake. Statistical data over, for
example, a 30- to 50-year period would not be able to adequately
capture the rare events that should be considered in design. Second,
the aim of design is to anticipate rare design events in a rational
manner. Unanticipated events have surprised the design community in the
past, most notably after the 1994 Northridge earthquake when safety
concerns were identified in a widely used type of steel building and
the industry had to improve building codes and standards for such
buildings. Third, for a given threat, the risks increase with building
height since the consequences of the threat become more severe with
height.
Some of the WTC recommendations were considered by BOMA not to be
adequately specific. The NIST recommendations do not prescribe specific
systems, materials, or technologies. Instead, NIST encourages
competition among alternatives that can meet performance requirements.
The recommendations also do not prescribe specific threshold levels;
NIST believes that this responsibility properly falls within the
purview of the public policy setting process, in which the standards
and codes development process plays a key role. The issue of
specificity will be resolved as part of NIST's ongoing efforts with
NIBS in support of model code changes (one of the NIBS building code
experts is a BOMA representative) and with standards organizations.
The basis for some of the WTC recommendations was not adequately
understood by BOMA. NIST is working actively with the standards, codes,
and industry organizations, including BOMA, to develop a shared
understanding of the basis for the recommendations and to provide
needed clarification and justification. The private sector inputs will
lead to requirements that are appropriate for adoption in standards and
codes.
In a few instances, BOMA suggests an incremental approach to
adopting the recommendations. NIST believes that strong industry
commitment to working such issues will lead to early implementation of
acceptable solutions.
Please see the answer to Question 9 that address cost concerns with
a few of the recommendations.
Questions submitted by the Minority
Q1. Dr. Jeffrey, what interactions and information has NIST shared
with the General Services Administration (GSA) about the findings of
its World Trade Center investigation. Could this information be useful
for the development of standards for federal buildings at risk such as
embassies?
A1. NIST has had several interactions with GSA on its WTC response
plan, including the WTC investigation. Most recently, six members of
the GSA staff attended the WTC Technical Conference held at NIST
September 13-15, 2005. GSA also is co-funding a multi-year research and
development project at NIST on emergency use of elevators. NIST has an
agreement with GSA to implement a demonstration project in a federal
building where protected occupant evacuation and fire service elevators
will be installed, meeting all of the proposed standards and code
requirements based on the WTC investigation. In addition, NIST is
working with GSA to collect occupant behavior data during evacuation
drills within GSA buildings. NIST has working relationships with GSA
and State Department staff on its research and development program to
prevent progressive collapse in buildings. Staff from these agencies
have participated in NIST workshops and provided reviews of draft
guidance documents.
Q2. Dr. Jeffrey, NIST believes that its recommendations are achievable
within a reasonable period of time. In your view, what is the shortest
time period that the NIST recommendations could be implemented?
A2. NIST is committed, working through the various building code
organizations, to meeting the March deadline of the next code
development cycle of the International Code Council with as many of the
recommendations as possible. I have assigned top priority for NIST
staff to work vigorously with the building and fire safety communities
to assure that there is a complete understanding of the recommendations
and to provide needed technical assistance in getting them implemented.
We have identified specific codes, standards, and practices affected by
each of the recommendations in its summary report for the WTC towers
and already begun to reach out to the responsible organizations to pave
the way for a timely, expedited consideration of the recommendations.
We have also has awarded a contract to the National Institute of
Building Sciences (NIBS) to convene a panel of building code experts to
turn appropriate recommendations into code language suitable for
submission of code change proposals to the two national model code
developers.
The timeline for achieving the recommendations is governed by the
established development cycle for each of the impacted national
standards, codes, practice guidelines or regulations. For example, the
model codes follow a three-year development cycle with the next edition
due in 2009. The IBC also will issue a supplement in 2007 based on code
change proposals submitted by March 2006. The next edition of ASCE 7, a
key standard, is due in 2010. Many other standards have an ad hoc
development cycle.
Working in partnership with NIBS, NIST will target the IBC's 2007
supplement as well as the 2009 editions of the model codes. In
addition, NIST will work with ASCE and the other standards developers
to target their appropriate next edition.
In carrying out this work, NIST recognizes that not all of the
recommendations will have an impact on model building codes. Many will
impact standards that are referenced in model codes. Others will impact
stand alone standards used in practice but not referenced in model
codes. A few will impact practices, including education and training,
that don't have any impact on codes and standards. In many cases, a
standard will need to be developed before the recommendation can be
implemented in the model codes.
In addition, we will implement a web-based system so that the
public can track progress on implementing the recommendations. The web
site, which is already operational, will list each of the
recommendations, the specific organization or organizations (e.g.,
standards and code developers, professional groups, state and local
authorities) responsible for its implementation, the status of its
implementation by organization, and the plans or work in progress to
implement the recommendations. The web site is available at http://
wtc.nist.gov/recommendations/ and includes detailed information on the
work with NIBS. The web site will be updated with information on plans
and status by the end of January 2006.
Q3. What specific plans does NIST have to inform local officials about
the safety implications of it recommendations?
A3. NIST has been and is reaching out to all communities involved in
building and fire safety. We have strongly urged that immediate and
serious consideration be given to these recommendations by the building
and fire safety communities in order to achieve appropriate
improvements in the way buildings are designed, constructed,
maintained, and used and in evacuation and emergency response
procedures--with the goal of making buildings, occupants, and first
responders safer in future emergencies.
We are also strongly urging building owners and public officials to
(1) evaluate the safety implications of these recommendations to their
existing inventory of buildings and (2) take the steps necessary to
mitigate any unwarranted risks without waiting for changes to occur in
codes, standards, and practices. We are urging State and local agencies
to rigorously enforce building codes and standards since such
enforcement is critical to ensure the expected level of safety. Unless
they are complied with, the best codes and standards cannot protect
occupants, emergency responders, or buildings.
NIST experts have been meeting with state and local officials over
the past year providing them with information on NIST's investigation.
In September, NIST held a conference attended by over 200 experts from
standards developing organization, state and local officials, fire
fighting organizations and builders. Throughout the course of our
investigation, NIST's work has received major media coverage--including
by media outlets followed closely by building, fire, and other
emergency preparedness and response officials.
Q4. Dr. Jeffrey, what will be the impediments to translating the NIST
recommendations to improvements to building codes and emergency
response and evacuation procedures?
A4. There are a number of features intrinsic to the building and fire
safety regulatory system in the United States that affect the speed and
outcome of the change process for codes, standards, and practices.
First, building and fire safety regulations,
promulgated and enforced by State and local jurisdictions, are
based on national model codes developed by private sector
organizations.
Second, the model codes adopt by reference standards
that are developed by a large number of private sector
standards development organizations.
Third, the process and schedule for consideration of
changes differ for each code or standard.
Fourth, changes to codes and standards are based on
the review and consensus approval of committees comprising a
spectrum of interests and perspectives.
The above process accommodates the inputs and concerns of a wide
range of groups--including architects, engineers, developers, owners,
operators, users, emergency responders, State and local regulatory
officials, policy-makers, and concerned citizens. Incorporating these
inputs into regulations is complex, but the system has evolved into one
that balances the sometimes contradictory desires of the various groups
while providing for public safety and welfare.
NIST has identified 37 specific national model codes, standards,
practice guidelines, or regulations impacted by its recommendations. We
have called on the various organizations for a timely consideration of
these recommendations. We have hosted a conference where every major
standards and code developer was represented, we have hired NIBS to
assist in converting the appropriate recommendations into draft code
language, and we are working with organizations representing local and
State authorities to assist in their adoption and enforcement.
Q5. Dr. Jeffrey, how much funding will NIST require to carry out its
follow-on duties in the area of research during the next three years?
A5. The President's Fiscal Year 2006 budget requested $2M for NIST to
carry out research to enable development and adoption of cost-effective
technical solutions to enhance safety and avoid major disasters through
improved first responder equipment, better evacuation and emergency
response procedures, and risk-sensitive national practices for building
safety. The FY 2006 Commerce, Justice, State and Science Appropriations
Act does not contain funding for this request.
Q6. Dr. Jeffrey, for two years the National Construction Safety Team
Advisory Committee has reiterated that successful implementation of the
National Construction Safety Team (NCST) Act is dependent upon the
creation of a NCST office funded at $2 million and the establishment of
a $2 million reserve fund. Why hasn't NIST acted upon these
recommendations in its budget request?
A6. NIST believes that it has responded appropriately to all
significant disaster events worthy of investigation. The President's
Fiscal Year 2006 budget requested $2M for NIST to carry out research to
enable development and adoption of cost-effective technical solutions
to enhance safety and avoid major disasters through improved first
responder equipment, better evacuation and emergency response
procedures, and risk-sensitive national practices for building safety.
The FY 2006 Commerce, Justice, State and Science Appropriations Act
does not contain funding for this request.
Q7. Dr. Jeffrey, the National Construction Safety Team (NCST) Advisory
Committee has recommended that the Act be invoked after any natural
disaster such as earthquakes, hurricanes and other windstorms, floods
and wildfires. Why didn't you invoke the Act after Hurricanes Katrina,
Rita and now Wilma? In their reports to Congress the Advisory Committee
has generally been critical that NIST has not invoked the Act more
often. Why do you disagree with the recommendations of the Advisory
Committee?
A7. NIST authorities are ``tools'' by which we can conduct an
investigation. We will always pick the best tool to get the job done.
In response to Hurricane Katrina, NIST is using authorities that are
broader than under the NCST Act and better fit the specific situation.
In addition to major buildings and residential structures, the
current effort involves key infrastructure facilities (electric power,
water and wastewater, oil and gas, and communication) and
transportation (ports, pipelines, bridges, roads, and airports) which
are not covered by the NCST Act.
Moreover, NIST is interested in assessing the performance not only
of facilities that ``failed'' but also those that sustained
``damage''--and hence not covered by the NCST.
In addition, NIST is assessing the damage not only to structures
but also other building systems (e.g., the roofing system, fire safety,
and HVAC) which are not specified in the Act.
Q8. Dr. Jeffrey, some of Ms. Regenhard's and Dr. Corbett's criticisms
of NIST's reluctance to use the full authority of the National
Construction Safety Team (NCST) Act are echoed by the NCST Advisory
Board. What is your response?
A8. NIST believes that it has used appropriately the authority of the
National Construction Safety Team Act. NIST has obtained all available
documents and evidence essential to carrying out a thorough and
credible technical investigation. NIST believes the findings from its
investigation are well justified on the basis of those documents and
evidence.
A large number of individuals and organizations provided materials
and documents, including the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey,
Silverstein Properties, the City of New York and its departments, the
manufacturers and fabricators of the building components, the companies
that insured the WTC towers, the building tenants, the aircraft
manufacturers, the airlines, the public (including survivors and family
members), and the media. NIST officials reviewed tens of thousands of
pages of documents, conducted interviews with over a thousand people;
and analyzed 236 pieces of steel that were obtained from the wreckage.
At no time was NIST reluctant to use the full authority of the NCST.
Answers to Post-Hearing Questions
Responses by Nancy McNabb, Director, Government Affairs, National Fire
Protection Association
Questions submitted by the Majority
Q1. In your testimony, you said that NIST takes some positions on
``controversial and sometimes unpopular subjects.'' What do you have in
mind? What should NIST do to make sure that controversy doesn't block
progress?
A1. I would point to subjects such as progressive collapse design, wind
tunnel testing and the recommendation to include fire protection
engineers on the design team. NIST has set an agenda for codes and
standards organizations and the private sector to determine how best to
manage change (if any) in all 30 areas. NIST can best serve as an
advisor to those groups and when necessary, fund research in the
private sector to establish additional information and possible
solutions.
Q2. In your testimony you stated that ``the need to conduct more
research in numerous areas is clear.'' What are the top three priority
areas where additional research and data are needed? Which specific
entities should be doing this research? Which recommendations are most
hampered by lack of data?
A2. Elevator Use: These criteria are very close to being finalized. The
reality is that elevator use is the only practical way to ensure timely
building evacuation in very tall (40-story) buildings. Additional
research may also benefit disabled occupants by providing equal access
to self evacuation capability in many types of multi-story buildings.
The current ASME/NIST research project, in which NFPA has been a
significant participant, has been underway since 2003.
Coordinated communication capabilities: This is an Achilles heel in
most major events including many high rise fires. Major natural
disasters also present communication challenges between the various
responding entities. Research groups: NFPA and IEEE.
Fire test procedures/materials: Reliability of the test procedures,
materials and field applications are all interrelated. Innovative
materials have potential use, but progress on all of these issues may
be stymied absent additional data demonstrating clear cost effective
advantages associated with such new materials or deficiencies with the
current materials and test methods. Research groups: FPRF/ASTM/UL
Q3. Building trade associations have raised concerns that the
implementation of some of the recommendations will be expensive. Which
of the recommendations do you believe will be most costly? Would these
costs be justified in terms of their expected outcomes?
A3. Building trade associations and building associations such as BOMA
are likely concerned that any change to building safety requirements
will increase cost. Short-term costs associated with building safety
should not be the prime concern. BOMA's tenants and the public at large
are a good barometer of how safe our buildings need to be and they do
not generally object to initial costs for providing long-term building
and life safety.
Q4. In written testimony submitted to the Committee, the American
Institute of Architects points to the lack of a fire test facility in
United States--a facility large enough to test components of a tall
building--as a major shortcoming in the Nation's ability to improve
skyscraper safety. Is the maintenance and operation of large-scale fire
testing capability a NIST responsibility, or does it lie elsewhere in
the Federal Government or the private sector? How do you respond to the
AIA's comments?
A4. The private sector should retain control and operation of the
largest fire test facilities. NIST may best work in a private/public
sector partnership role to assist with funding of expanded test
facilities at Underwriters Laboratories (UL) or Factory Mutual (FM) or
preferably both.
Q5. Testimony submitted to the Science Committee by the Building
Owners and Managers Association (BOMA) calls for cost-benefit analyses
to be developed on the implementation of NIST's recommendations. Do you
believe this is a good idea? Why or why not? If so, who should develop
these analyses?
A5. Cost-benefit forecasts for safety related issues are a no win
approach to changing codes, standards and protocols. As repeatedly
expressed by BOMA at federal, State and local hearings, their primary
concern seems to be initial construction costs rather than long tern
sustainability or safety of their tenants. Cost-benefit can almost
always be used to argue a change in any direction. It is NFPA's view
that cost benefit analyses should not be a primary consideration in the
debate for implementation of these potential changes.
Q6. Which recommendations do you think most require action by the
Federal Government, particularly with respect to research, and which
agencies should be responsible?
A6. At this point, it is NFPA's view that the private sector, with
funding from federal agencies (including NIST) are in the best position
to pursue the level of detail needed to move towards change.
Competition to develop better materials, methods and designs can be
driven by code-related change and social awareness; no one entity
should have a sole source advantage for building research.
Questions submitted by Democratic Members
Q1. Ms. McNabb, your organization has moved forward on a number of the
NIST recommendations. How have the NFPA code changes been greeted by
the user community--for example, states and localities and the building
industry?
A1. NFPA code changes have been met with mixed reaction by various
interest groups. For example, various groups, including the U.S.
General Services Administration (GSA) filed appeals against some of the
new changes such as the provisions to increase the stair width for
certain buildings. NFPA's Building Code has been met with resistance by
a number of jurisdictions and trade associations representing the
economic building owner interests. Many of these groups are designated
as ``Code Partners'' of the ICC thus they align themselves with
technical provisions that are more traditional and in many cases,
several years behind what the NFPA codes require. First responders and
tenant representatives have embraced NFPA code provisions as they
reflect the state of the art. The NFPA code development process ensures
broad representation for all of the construction community stakeholders
including first responders, tenant representatives and those designated
as ``code partners.''
Q2. Ms. McNabb, you mention that ``it is likely, that after a through
and detailed analysis of the final recommendations, there may not be
sufficient data, detail or compelling evidence to promulgate a change
to a particular safety code or standard.'' What is the timeframe for
this analysis? Also, which of the NIST recommendations do you think
most likely to fail this analysis?
A2. Some of the analyses will be complex such as Recommendation 1
concerning progressive collapse criteria. We believe that work will
take several years because it requires the development of a design
approach (supported by analytical tools and practical guidance) to
determine how much of a building's structural support system will be
lost and an expectation of how long the structure must remain standing.
The recommendations concerning fire test protocols will require
approximately two years of review. At present, the main concern seems
to be that ``the test procedures have been used for 90 years,'' the
implication being that we should be doing something different. There is
no obvious reason to change the fire test protocols; after thorough
study and review, we may determine that the status quo is acceptable.
Q3. Ms. McNabb, could you give us an idea of the follow-on work
required before we can arrive at an appropriate ``best practices'' for
the built environment?
A3. Best practices are always moving forward. In the last few years,
changes to the NFPA codes such as increases to hourly fire resistance
ratings for structural systems in high rise buildings, wider stairs and
provisions that have been in our codes for a longer time such as
requirements for automatic sprinkler retrofits in high rise buildings,
are all examples of best practices for the built environment that were
initially determined by NFPA technical committees.
Code changes such as greater use of elevators for building
evacuations by occupants and first responders will likely be ready for
consideration in the code change cycle within the next year. One issue
that must be addressed is that of liability. After decades of
indoctrinating building occupants that use of the elevator in a fire
emergency is prohibited, there will naturally be concerns about
reversing that message. Likewise, concerns related to elevator
equipment malfunction during emergency conditions must be overcome.
Mass notification systems discussed in Recommendations 22 and 23
will be a reality in 2006 when the technical provisions for these
systems have been proposed to be incorporated in the next edition of
NFPA 72, National Fire Alarm Code.
The largest obstacle to establishing best practices will be the
extent, if any, to which such code changes will affect the existing
building stock. Such implementations are often initially expensive or
technically infeasible. The U.S. General Services Administration (GSA)
could provide an example for the commercial building industry by
embracing this opportunity to include new building safety enhancements
in their construction plans and leasing agreements.
Answers to Post-Hearing Questions
Responses by James R. Harris, President, J.R. Harris and Company;
Member, American Society of Civil Engineers
Please note that these responses are, in general, confined to the
subject of structural engineering. Some of the recommendations made by
NIST concern subjects outside the expertise of civil and structural
engineers.
Questions submitted by the Majority
Q1. In her testimony, Ms. McNabb said that the recommendation related
to elevators may be one of the most important. Do you agree? How
difficult would that be to codify and implement? Can you give the
Committee a sense of what specific next steps you would take to
evaluate that recommendation and what additional information you would
need and from whom?
A1. Most of the issues surrounding this recommendation do not concern
structural engineering. The primary structural issue here is the
provision of strong shaft walls, and that is not particularly
difficult. Ms. McNabb may have been referring to protection of the
elevator and its controls from fire where it would be intended to use
the elevator to pass through stories with uncontrolled fire. This is a
phenomenon that should be tested to verify potential solutions before
any code requirement is implemented, but it is not, fundamentally, a
structural issue.
Q2. In your testimony, you suggested that codes are not necessarily
the best way to promote changes in practice. What is the problem with
using codes? What are the alternatives? What NIST recommendations
should be implemented through means other than codes?
A2. Codes are a useful and effective mechanism to assure a minimum
level of protection where proven technologies exist. However, they are
not particularly effective where the issue requires development of new
technology. I will use performance-based design for fire resistance as
an example. Here the codes can be used as an incentive, by allowing the
possibility for performance-based design, but the method will not be an
effective tool until several things happen: an extension of present
knowledge through targeted research, a critical mass of the profession
becomes properly educated and trained to implement the methods, and a
change in the legal climate to remove disincentives to this expansion
of professional practice. This will require changes in the basic
curriculum to educate engineers of the future as well as a broad
continuing education program to train practicing professionals.
The interaction of professional practice and tort law is a matter
of public policy that requires careful consideration before the
potential benefits of performance based fire design can be realized.
Prescriptive codes effectively shield structural engineers and
architects from tort, and the prescriptive codes for fire resistance do
deliver buildings with successful fire resistance in the vast majority
of cases. There is no incentive for engineers to become responsible for
fire safety and there is a major disincentive in the form of potential
liability for fire damage and injury in a building designed to a
performance standard. These obstacles need to be removed.
Q3. You testified that data and research are needed to implement some
of NIST's recommendations. What are the top three priority areas where
additional research and data are needed? Which specific entities should
be doing this research? Which recommendations are most hampered by lack
of data?
A3. From the structural engineering point of view three areas do stand
out: improving the general structural integrity of building (improve
the resistance to progressive collapse), improving the design of
structures to resist wind loads, and performance-based design for
structural response to fire. The research in the first area is likely
to be a long-term effort before tools are developed that will be usable
in routine design practice, but it is highly likely to bear fruit.
Structural connection details that are faster, better, cheaper can
readily be developed in a program of academic research, large scale
testing, and support of the creation of technical provisions in codes
and standards. The steel connection details for improved seismic
resistance that emerged from FEMA's SAC project are an example of what
can be done for a relatively small outlay (overall, this research
program will likely be larger, owing to the many different types of
construction that must be considered). Progressive collapse resistance
also needs a component of social science research in order to better
define the needs and our objectives. The second area will be enhanced
if funds are appropriated for the already authorized National Windstorm
Mitigation Program. Wind effects on buildings are a complex topic that
has long been shorted in the federal research budget. NIST's findings
and the hurricanes of the past two years should persuade the Federal
Government to be proactive in supporting wind research. The third area
requires close coordination between specialists in fire and structural
engineering in order to assure that the two professions are
communicating meaningfully, and the disincentives described in the
answer to Question 2 should be addressed before large research programs
here are funded.
Q4. You expressed a concern about the ``unreasonable acceleration'' of
the codes process. What's your concern? Do you see any indication of
that happening?
A4. The concern is that premature attempts to change building codes
without thorough vetting in the voluntary standards communities and
without compelling substantiation could create somewhat of a backlash
or stigma around these recommendations, which could ultimately delay
widespread implementation. Realize that the model building codes, and
the standards upon which they rely, are not developed by elected
governmental bodies operating on a simple majority vote. They are
developed in voluntary bodies that operate with a formal consensus
building procedure, which is necessary to generate the support in
industry for successful implementation of change, and significant
change requires significant time. In my opinion the objectives of the
NIBS panel should be to coordinate efforts among the many standards
developing organizations and to provide a forum for discussion of
issues across technical disciplines. For most of the issues of concern
in the structural engineering community it is premature to prepare
changes to model building codes.
Q5. Building trade associations have raised concerns that the
implementation of some of the recommendations will be expensive. Which
of the recommendations do you believe will be most costly? Would these
costs be justified in terms of their expected outcomes?
A5. In the long run those costs associated with construction,
maintenance, and economic use of facilities will far overrun the
initial costs of educating and training engineers, architects, and
building officials, although in the short run the latter costs will be
significant and will likely slow implementation. Reasonable resistance
to progressive collapse will not cost much for some structural systems,
while in others it will be very costly, which will change the relative
market share among competing products and systems for those structures
for which resistance to progressive collapse is deemed necessary. Such
changes are usually slow to come to fruition. The imposition of a limit
on lateral drift under wind (Recommendation Number 3) will increase the
cost of structural framing. Changes that affect the economic use of
space, such as the provision of larger egress paths (stairwells) can
impose very real costs. Some changes hold the potential for cost
savings, such as improved understanding of wind effects on buildings
and the use of a performance approach for design for fire resistance.
It is likely that the impact on construction cost for those items that
do increase the cost will be limited to a few percent of construction
cost. Where these kinds of change are applied equally to all competing
products in a market, the change may not be as slow.
Q6. In written testimony submitted to the Committee, the American
Institute of Architects points to the lack of a fire test facility in
United States--a facility large enough to test components of a tall
building--as a major shortcoming in the Nation's ability to improve
skyscraper safety. Is the maintenance and operation of large-scale fire
testing capability a NIST responsibility, or does it lie elsewhere in
the Federal Government or the private sector? How do you respond to the
AIA's comments?
A6. The lack of a facility large enough to test structural components
of practical size is not limited to tall buildings. Common components
of low-rise buildings suffer the same problem. Some private sector
furnaces in this country have closed due to a lack of economic demand.
Canada and Japan are examples of countries with larger facilities, and
those facilities are government facilities. That does not mean that a
government test facility is the only possible solution here, but at the
very least there will be a need for government support and incentives.
International cooperation should be explored.
Q7. Testimony submitted to the Science Committee by the Building
Owners and Managers Association (BOMA) calls for cost-benefit analyses
to be developed on the implementation of NIST's recommendations. Do you
believe this is a good idea? Why or why not? If so, who should develop
these analyses?
A7. Some aspects of limited cost analysis is commonly necessary to
persuade members of standards bodies to implement changes, however,
such analyses are rarely a rigorous economic study, especially on the
benefit side. It is not easy to assess the true cost of new technology
before implementation. Benefits are particularly difficult to predict.
The normal approach is to rely on the judgment of informed
professionals developed in a consensus building process. FEMA funded
one moderately large cost study in the early 1980's as the Nation was
considering the adoption of a new generation of provisions for seismic
safety in construction. A cost-benefit analysis on the same topic has
recently been completed at the request of the Congress. Requiring
formal cost-benefit analysis for every change is not typical in the
field of building codes and design standards, and it would probably
unduly slow implementation.
Q8. Which recommendations do you think most require action by the
Federal Government, particularly with respect to research, and which
agencies should be responsible?
A8. The bulk of the research described in the answer to Question 3 will
require federal funding. Among the agencies that I would expect to fund
such research are NSF, NIST, and FEMA. NIST has historically not been
able to fund significant external research in the building sciences
area, and FEMA's future role is not well defined as it adapts to its
incorporation inside DHS. Perhaps most importantly, the funding for
structural engineering research in the CMS (Civil and Mechanical
Systems) area of NSF is projected to be reduced by a mere pittance
compared to past levels. This situation must be reversed to see real
progress in developing the improvements recommended by NIST.
Q9. In your testimony regarding Recommendation #1 on progressive
collapse, you said that the recommendation needed further study of its
application and its effects upon the profession because of the various
design thresholds involved. Please explain what you mean by this, what
the major points of the study would be, and who should carry out this
work.
A9. NIST has tentatively proposed a definition of high-rise buildings
at 420 feet, which is apparently related to common limitations on
pumping water for fire suppression. There has been discussion of using
this same threshold for application of a requirement for resistance to
progressive collapse. It is not clear why the two topics need to be
correlated. There are many lower buildings that should probably have
such resistance. The General Services Administration has been requiring
a measure of resistance to terrorism attack and progressive collapse
for most federal courthouses built in the past several years, and the
Department of State has been doing the same for most of our new
overseas embassies, yet none of these buildings would be more than 420
feet tall. Considerations beyond occupancy and size, including
location, will likely be involved. A careful, and probably long, public
discussion is needed to achieve a comprehensive classification of
buildings for which this resistance is going to be required by law (as
opposed to being implemented by option of the owner). This discussion
should be supported by research in the social science, economic policy,
and insurance areas. Congress should lead at least some of this public
discussion, because the Federal Government is obviously spending
heavily in response to the September 11 attack, and improving our
resistance to other terrorist attacks should be guided in part by
intelligent approaches to limiting such outlays in the future.
Questions submitted by Democratic Members
Q1. Dr. Harris, what is the timeframe for your organization to act
upon the NIST recommendations? How long will it take for any ASCE code
revisions to occur?
A1. These recommendations will be a focus of our activities for several
years to come. We are in the process of collecting public comment on
our new standard for the use of wind tunnel testing in determining
design wind loads on buildings, which is responsive in part to a NIST
recommendation. In that process we have formed an ad hoc committee to
give specific consideration to making our new standard even more
responsive to that recommendation. We expect the standard to be
formally issued in 2006. We have just issued the 2005 edition of our
standard Minimum Design Loads for Buildings and Other Structures. This
standard defines basic wind loads, among other actions on structures,
and contains guidance for resistance to progressive collapse. The
committee will be reformed in 2006 as we prepare to issue anew edition
in 2010, and plans are already underway to focus specific task groups
on the NIST recommendations. Should specific items gather the necessary
consensus in time, we will be prepared to issue a supplement to our
2005 edition. While it is reasonable to predict that the 2010 edition
will have changes stimulated by the NIST recommendations, it is also
true that there will probably be continuing advancements in knowledge
and therefore in our standards for many years after that. We will also
plan to update our standard Structural Design for Fire Conditions as
more information about performance-based design is developed. We also
have a large number of technical committees that operate to advance the
state of knowledge in a many areas of interest to structural engineers,
and we will be encouraging such committees with a focus on structural
integrity and on wind loads to carefully review the research needs
implicit in the NIST recommendations.
Q2. Dr. Harris, ASCE believes that some of the NIST recommendations
need further clarification and discussion. What interaction did your
organization have with NIST during the course of its investigation and
while it was drafting this report? For example, did ASCE participate in
the public sessions that NIST held in the course of its investigations?
Since the report has been made public have you had any follow-up
conversation with NIST? Do you feel that NIST has been un-responsive to
your concerns?
A2. Recall that our World Trade Center Building Performance Study
issued in September 2002 as FEMA report 403 identified many issues
needing further study and served as a starting point for the NIST
study. Key members of our team behind FEMA 403 provided input as the
NIST program was being defined, and many ASCE/SEI members have been
involved with review of the NIST work at many stages. During this year
a select group from our Board of Governors had a day-long briefing from
the NIST leadership team in the spring, then an electronic update
shortly before the draft was issued as the conclusions were firmed. We
submitted comments on the draft during the summer, and we have had one
additional briefing as NIST has prepared strawman proposals for changes
to the International Building Code. It is worth repeating that we
believe NIST's study is well done and provides much to advance the
cause of public safety. NIST actively solicited our comments and has
listened carefully and respectfully.
Q3. Dr. Harris, one of the recommendations that ASCE strongly endorses
is continuing education. This seems an important recommendation as
structural materials and techniques have changed so dramatically over
the past twenty years. Currently, what type of courses does ASCE
sponsor for the continuing education of its members? I also noticed
from your biography that you are a certified Professional Engineer,
what does the National Society of Professional Engineers do in the area
of continuing education for its members? What sort of continuing
education courses do you think are needed?
A3. ASCE has an active continuing education program. Among the popular
courses for structural engineers currently being offered are:
Analysis and Preservation of Historic Bridges
Bridge Inspection
Bridge Rehabilitation
Cable-Stayed Bridges: Key Design, Construction, and
Management Issues
Connection Design for Steel Structures
Dam Safety and Rehabilitation
Design and Renovation of Wood Structures
Design and Strengthening of Shallow Foundations for
Conventional and Pre-Engineered Buildings
Design of Foundations for Dynamic Loads
Design of Metal Buildings: Avoid Pitfalls in
Specifying and Procuring
Design, Construction, and Renovation of Masonry
Structures
Designing Aluminum Structures
Earth Retaining Structures Selection, Design,
Construction and Inspection
Earthquake Induced Ground Motions
Fundamentals of Earthquake Engineering
Highway Bridge Design, Evaluation and Strengthening
Using LRFD
Joints, Bearings and Devices (JBDs)
Post Tensioning Construction and Design
Probabilistic Design
Progressive Collapse Mitigation: Practical Analysis
Methods & Proven Solutions
Security Risk Management Procedures: Countering
Terrorism and Other Threats
Seismic Design and Performance of Building Structures
Seismic Design of Highway Bridges
Structural Condition Assessment of Existing
Structures
Structural Design of Buildings and Industrial
Facilities for Bomb Blast Loads and Accidental Explosions
Structural Design of Industrial Facilities
Structural Design of Residential Buildings Using the
2003 International Residential Code
Structural Renovation of Buildings
Structural Vibration Analysis, Design and
Troubleshooting
Wind Loads for Buildings and Other Structures
We also have several popular Webinars, and we are planning a new
series of courses illustrating the new edition of ASCE 7 that we plan
to take to a large number of cities. I am not as familiar with the
continuing education program of NSPE, but it is my impression that
their continuing education can be divided into two general categories:
technical information for young engineers who are preparing for
licensing exams and less technical information for licensed
professionals, where the emphasis tends to be on ethics, professional
practice, and similar topics. I would be happy to forward a request for
information to NSPE so that you get more accurate information about
their programs, if you desire. With respect to changes in continuing
education for the future as influenced by the NIST recommendations, I
believe that analytical prediction of structural performance under fire
conditions is a subject that will be in great demand. More detail about
this subject is in our answer to the general questions for the record.
I would also like to point out that I am registered, not certified,
as a professional engineer by the State of Colorado, among others, and
registered as a structural engineer by the State of California. Our
profession encourages State governments to recognize that structural
engineering is a profession essential to protecting public safety, that
it requires highly trained specialists with substantial experience for
success in the endeavor to protect the public, and that these facts
justify separate licensure of structural engineers.
Answers to Post-Hearing Questions
Responses by Glenn Corbett, Assistant Professor of Fire Science, John
Jay College of Criminal Justice; Member, NIST National
Construction Safety Team Advisory Board
Questions submitted by the Majority
Q1. In her testimony, Ms. McNabb said that the recommendation related
to elevators may be one of the most important. Do you agree? How
difficult would that be to codify and implement? Can you give the
Committee a sense of what specific next steps you would take to
evaluate that recommendation and what additional information you would
need and from whom?
A1. Yes, I agree that the use of elevators for egress in very tall
high-rise buildings is an important recommendation. Several industry
meetings have been held and research has already been conducted on this
topic (some of it prior to September 11th, 2001). 1 would suggest that
NIST convene a summit to establish what, if any, ``research holes''
still exist and quickly fill them. I believe we could swiftly move
forward with a model code recommendation if NIST takes this proactive
stance.
Q2. If NIST had taken more of a ``detective'' approach to its work,
how might that have affected its recommendations?
A2. If NIST had taken a more ``detective'' approach, we may have
obtained more facts that are critical for gaining support for the code
recommendations. In addition, other code-related issues may have
surfaced.
Q3. In terms of how a building safety investigation should be
conducted, what are the three most important lessons derived from
NIST's experience with World Trade Center buildings?
A3. The NCST lessons of the WTC investigation (and the Station
Nightclub) are: quickly get to the scene of the incident, quickly
secure evidence (critical steel was lost at the WTC prior to enactment
of the NCST), swiftly establish an investigation plan, utilize a ``can-
do'' legal staff that aggressively gains access to information and
physical evidence, and move forward to the ultimate goal of the
investigation: specific recommendations to changes in codes and
practices.
Q4. The WTC report concludes that some recommendations require more
data and research to be implemented. What are the top three priority
areas where additional research and data are needed? Which specific
entities should be doing this research? Which recommendations are most
hampered by lack of data?
A4. In my opinion, the three priority areas are: 1). the development of
a new fire resistance protocol to replace the ASTM E-119 test standard,
2) the development of more robust fire-resistive coatings for steel
members, 3) the development of a reliable radio communications system
for emergency responders in high-rise and other ``problem'' locations.
While NIST could be a coordinator for such research, there are other
governmental and private sector organizations that should be involved.
In my opinion, the first two priority areas that I have identified
(fire resistance testing and fire resistive coatings) are the
recommendations most hampered by lack of data.
Q5. Building trade associations have raised concerns that the
implementation of some of the recommendations will be expensive. Which
of the recommendations do you believe will be most costly? Would these
costs be justified in terms of their expected outcomes?
A5. More often than not, new code provisions have a cost associated
with implementation. Some of the recommendations will likely be
expensive. Although I am not a structural engineer, it is my
understanding that the ``progressive collapse'' recommendation is one
of the most costly. Although that may be the case, the loss in terms of
lives of another progressive collapse like the WTC disaster or the
recent Madrid high-rise fire is totally unacceptable.
Q6. In written testimony submitted to the Committee, the American
Institute of Architects points to the lack of a fire test facility in
United States-a facility large enough to test components of a tall
building--as a major shortcoming in the Nation's ability to improve
skyscraper safety. Is the maintenance and operation of large-scale fire
testing capability a NIST responsibility, or does it lie elsewhere in
the Federal Government or the private sector? How do you respond to the
AIA's comments?
A6. I agree that a test facility that tests all components as a group
(similar to a facility in Great Britain) is desperately needed. Then
current ASTM E-119 test standard is not realistic and needs to be
replaced. Unfortunately, there is no incentive for the private sector
to develop such an expensive facility. Despite the fact that building
safety is a local government function, it would be inappropriate and
fiscally impossible for cities and states to fund such a facility. It
is only logical that the Federal Government assume such a
responsibility and locate the facility within NIST.
Q7. Testimony submitted to the Science Committee by the Building
Owners and Managers Association (BOMA) calls for cost-benefit analyses
to be developed on the implementation of NIST's recommendations. Do you
believe this is a good idea? Why or why not? If so, who should develop
these analyses?
A7. The use of a cost-benefit analysis is not currently utilized (to
any great extent) when preparing the hundreds of codes and standards
developed by the NFPA, ICC, and other groups. While I agree that such a
process could be desirable for all codes and standards, I do not
believe we should start with the WTC investigation. The use of a cost-
benefit analysis must first be debated on a national level, ensuring
that the public (typically left out of the current code development
process) has input into the decision of what is ``too costly.''
Q8. Which recommendations do you think most require action by the
Federal Government, particularly with respect to research, and which
agencies should be responsible?
A8. I believe that my response to Question 4 above answers this
question. I would add, however, that the radio communications issue is
one of great importance to emergency responders and crosses over
several lines of jurisdiction within the Federal Government. An serious
attempt must be made to take control of this issue and move it forward
to resolution.
Questions submitted by Democratic Members
Q1. What is your assessment of how well NIST has carried out its
duties under the National Construction Safety Team (NCST) Act? Do you
feel that NIST should invoke the ACT more often, for example should
NIST have invokes the Act to investigate Hurricane Katrina-related
infrastructure failures? Does NIST have clear criteria for when it
should invoke the National Construction Safety Team (NCST) Act? When
reading the comments of the NCST Advisory Committee I have the
impression that they are frustrated that NIST is not doing enough under
the authorities provided by the Act.
A1. I feel that NIST has not made a substantial effort to implement the
NCST and have shown little interest in it. While NIST has worked to
develop response criteria to establish when teams will be organized,
they have done little else. For example, they have not established an
NCST office within NIST and have not developed a detailed investigation
protocol manual for actual investigations. To my knowledge, they have
not published a list of actual potential team members (including
individuals from the private sector).
NIST should have responded to the Chicago E2 nightclub disaster of
2003, the Florida hurricanes and California wildfires of 2004, and most
certainly hurricane Katrina in 2005. These were all substantial
incidents where the NCST should have been deployed. All of them fall
within their own ``when to respond'' criteria.
It is critical that NIST respond to such disasters, and they use
the NCST to do it. The NCST provides two critical elements not
contained under other NIST authorities: the ability to investigate
without having to have local officials ask NIST to do it and requires
NIST to prepare code recommendations.
Q2. Mr. Corbett, you feel that NIST took to long to complete its
investigation. What do you think would have been a more reasonable
timeframe? Why do you think it took so long to complete the
investigation?
A2. NIST frequently moved their target completion dates further and
further back (the World Trade Center building 7 investigation is still
not complete). While this is somewhat understandable because of the
complexity of the investigation, a completion target of two and a half
years would have been more reasonable. From my perspective, it seems
that it took too long to get out of the starting gate, too long to get
to the actual investigation initiated. It also seems to be due to legal
problems as well. For example, some of the delay in the evacuation
investigation was due to problems in obtaining Institutional Review
Board (IRB) approval for the oral interviews.
Q3. Mr. Corbett, you are critical of the NIST recommendations for
being too vague. Would you give us some examples of where you see
problems? What should have been done differently?
A3. NIST should have begun developing code recommendations months ago.
The fact that they are now only hiring the National Institute of
Building Sciences to prepare them is inexcusable. I consistently
advocated for development of recommendations in ``tight'' code language
well over a year ago. For example, NIST should have easily been able to
come up with specific language for increasing minimum high-rise
stairwell widths and providing secondary water supplies for sprinkler/
standpipe systems in acceptable code text.
Q4. Mr. Corbett, you believe that NIST was not assertive enough in its
investigation and you lay the blame at NIST staff attorneys. How should
have NIST been more assertive? What leads you to believe it was bad
counsel by staff attorneys?
A4. NIST legal staff should have exhibited a more ``can-do'' attitude
to the WTC and Station Nightclub investigations. Instead of spending
time identifying all the roadblocks to getting information, NIST legal
staff should have spent more time establishing ways of legally getting
the information NIST needed. In addition, NIST should have used its
subpoena power, especially in the case of the Station Nightclub. NIST
relied almost exclusively on newspaper accounts of club survivors for
its ``investigation'' rather than actual interviews--totally
unacceptable.
Q5. Mr. Corbett, the NIST recommendations are just the first step in
the process. They have to be implemented by building code organizations
and adopted by states and localities. How do you see the process moving
forward? I understand that New York City is currently revising its
building codes, are they using the NIST report and recommendations in
this process?
A5. The process will move forward ever so slowly. The model code groups
and local jurisdictions (like NYC) need tight code language for
consideration, not material that they have to further refine. The model
code development process itself takes a long time as does the adoption
process by local governments. The fact NIST took so long to complete
the investigation (and continues to in the case of WTC 7) only extends
this timeline. The National Air Disaster Alliance has said: ``safety
delayed is safety denied.'' I think this statement is appropriate in
the case of the NCST WTC investigation.
Answers to Post-Hearing Questions
Responses by Henry L. Green, President, International Code Council
Questions submitted by the Majority
Q1. When is your committee that is prioritizing the NIST
recommendations going to complete its work? Will that committee then be
putting any of the recommendations into play for the upcoming ICC
review process? How is it determining priorities?
A1. The ICC has two committees at work on NIST/WTC related issues, the
ad-hoc committee on Terror Resistant Buildings (TRB) and the permanent
Code Technology Committee (CTC). These committees met together in early
December to continue coordination of activities in advance of the March
24, 2006 deadline for submission of code change proposals for the 2007
supplements to the 2006 editions of the I-Codes. Each of the two
committees will continue the process of preparing independent proposals
based on each committee's unique charter and in review of the NIST/WTC
recommendations. In early February the CTC will meet to formally
receive the recommendations of the TRB, and has scheduled to issue a
report on the consolidated work of the two committees in advance of the
March 24 deadline. As is addressed more fully in responses to questions
below, some of the NIST/WTC recommendations require preparation of
additional technological and economic assessments. In immediate
prioritization the committees are focused on those measures for which
documented supporting evidence is available by the March 24, 2006
deadline for the next code cycle.
Q2. In her testimony, Ms. McNabb said that the recommendation related
to elevators may be one of the most important. Do you agree? How
difficult would that be to codify and implement? Can you give the
Committee a sense of what specific next steps you would take to
evaluate that recommendation and what additional information you would
need and from whom?
A2. Full exploration of the technological feasibility and costs and
benefits of this recommendation are a priority. At this time, however,
it should be observed that it appears unlikely that cost/benefit
findings based on this recommendation will be available in advance of
the deadline for the next code development cycle. At present the CTC
awaits reporting from the American Society of Mechanical Engineers
(ASME) regarding the technological and economic issues associated with
this recommendation. Upon availability of findings from ASME, ICC's CTC
will be able to issue advice regarding the potential timing of a code
change proposal related to the use of elevators in occupant evacuation
and emergency response access.
Q3. In your testimony, you suggested that codes are not necessarily
the best way to promote changes in practice. What is the problem with
using codes? What are the alternatives? What NIST recommendations
should be implemented through means other than codes?
A3. My view in this respect is this, that the quality and value of
building codes is meaningless unless the enactment of these codes is
followed up by local and State code officials with the proper training,
equipment and action by these officials. Building codes, as uniformly
enforced, both ensure the public of an adequate minimum standard of
safety in any building they or their family may visit, and also provide
a level economic playing field for the construction and maintenance of
our personal and public facilities.
As I closed my testimony before the Committee, I share the emphasis
of the NIST/WTC report on recommendations on building regulations:
Rigorous enforcement of building codes and standards by State
and local agencies, well trained and managed, is critical in
order for standards and codes to ensure the expected level of
safety. Unless they are complied with, the best codes and
standards cannot protect occupants, emergency responders, or
buildings. NIST NCSTAR 1, Section 9.1, p. 202
Q4. How did the ICC determine that a three-hour fire rating was
appropriate in light of the NIST recommendations?
A4. The increase of the fire rating on structural systems for buildings
greater than 420 feet in height was adopted in final form by ICC's
membership at its final code action hearings held in September 2003,
and first became a requirement in the 2004 Supplement to the 2003
International Building Code. This action was taken in the early stages
of the NIST/WTC review, well before issuance of recommendations. This
significant change in the fire rating of structural systems of high-
rise structures was made with the understanding that it will impose
considerable additional expenses to the construction of new high-rise
buildings. In my view this change is not a product of new scientific
understanding; it is a result of our society's profound new realization
of the attractiveness of such structures to terrorist attack.
Q5. You say that recommendations related to specific products will
have trouble getting through. Have any been made?
A5. That observation I shared from generalized experience with ICC's
code process, but I am not aware of any WTC event inspired code change
proposals related to specific products. It should be noted that because
the NIST/WTC final report was issued well after the August 2004
deadline for code change proposals in the cycle just completed, we have
not yet received or acted upon code change proposals based on the
issuance of the final NIST/WTC report.
Q6. You testified that we need more data and research to implement
some of NIST's recommendations. What are the top three priority areas
where additional research and data are needed? Which specific entities
should be doing this research? Which recommendations are most hampered
by lack of data?
A6. In my view the top three areas of need for scientific research
relative to code regulations in conjunction with the recommendations of
the NIST report are:
1) A comprehensive scientific analysis of egress, fire ratings
and fire proofing for high-rise structures.
2) Specific technical and cost/benefit analysis, in
conjunction with ASTM International, of the serviceability of
elevator systems for fire event occupant egress and fire
services access for high-rise buildings.
3) Specific scientific investigation, in conjunction with the
American Society of Civil Engineers, of the cost and benefit of
enhanced structural provisions necessary to address structural
stability and progressive collapse.
Those questions most hampered by lack of data relate to fire event
egress; especially the technological potential and the cost/benefit
calculations of developing elevator systems designed to operate during
fire evacuation and fire suppression events.
Q7. Building trade associations have raised concerns that the
implementation of some of the recommendations will be expensive. Which
of the recommendations do you believe will be most costly? Would these
costs be justified in terms of their expected outcomes?
A7. It is clear that implementation of many of the recommendations
would significantly increase the cost of construction and operation of
new buildings, as well as reduce the percentage of leasable space in
new construction. It seems that the most expensive of the
recommendations relate to enhanced egress measures, especially
provisions for refuge floors and the construction and operation of
elevator systems that could be relied upon for occupant egress and fire
services access during fire events. Considerable additional
construction costs would also come with providing secondary water
systems for fire suppression and the additional complexity of
constructing enhanced structural systems to mitigate potential for
progressive collapse. Without new data presenting technical feasibility
and cost/benefit analysis, it is not possible to suggest the likely
outcome of a code change recommendation based on any of these measures.
Q8. In written testimony submitted to the Committee, the American
Institute of Architects points to the lack of a fire test facility in
the United States--a facility large enough to test components of a tall
building--as a major shortcoming in the Nation's ability to improve
skyscraper safety. Is the maintenance and operation of large-scale fire
testing capability a NIST responsibility, or does it lie elsewhere in
the Federal Government or the private sector? How do you respond to the
AIA's comments?
A8. It is important to observe, in context of this question, that the
NIST report conveys a clear understanding that the structural failures
of Tower 1 and Tower 2 were a result of the profoundly unique and
unprecedented conditions associated with terrorist attacks of September
11, 2001. In this respect the NIST report (page xli) summarizes:
The tragic consequences of the September 11, 2001 attacks were
directly attributable to the fact that terrorists flew large
jet-fuel laden commercial airliners into the WTC towers.
Buildings for use by the general population are not designed to
withstand attacks of such severity; building regulations do not
require building designs to consider aircraft impact. In our
cities, there has been no experience with a disaster of such
magnitude, nor has there been any in which the total collapse
of a high-rise building occurred so rapidly and with little
warning.
The AIA states in its testimony that:
The NIST report and recommendations raise powerful issues
about how best to achieve building safety and security. The AIA
encourages NIST to further investigate areas such as actual
building occupant loads and develop data on actual building
performance through additional testing of full-sized
components. NIST provides an ideal platform to investigate and
report fairly these issues. However, it will be necessary to
gather much more data to verify any change in the direction of
model building codes. The AIA continues to believe that the
best way to ensure that building codes protect the public is to
ensure that model codes are developed through an open consensus
based process. (AIA testimony, page 7)
The ICC concurs with the AIA that any NIST recommendation that
leads to a code change proposal should be considered through a
voluntary consensus based code and standards process and be accompanied
with data from a thorough scientific evaluation of the change in
materials, technology, building design or fire-resistance testing and
rating processes that are proposed. In assessing questions regarding
the responsibility for and the value of increased scaling of fire-
testing, as well as the capacity of present public and private sector
testing facilities to do such, it is imperative to frame the NIST
recommendations as specific proposals for change to present codes and
standards. At this writing the ICC is in receipt of a concept, or
``Strawman'' proposal prepared by NIST which suggests additional
consideration of scaling on fire resistance standards when test
specimens are less than 1/2 actual scale. In conducting real fire
testing for the WTC examination NIST found that the largest facility in
North America provided testing up to 30 feet; one-half of the size that
would have been necessary for full-scale testing. NIST has observed
that, worldwide, there may be only one or two facilities with furnaces
capable of testing connected structural elements, at designed load,
with up to 60 foot spans. Given our present understanding of the unique
character of the conditions under which such full-scale testing would
enhance the safety of high-rise buildings it may, as the AIA suggests,
be incumbent on the Federal Government to undertake to construct and
operate such a unique facility.
Q9. Testimony submitted to the Science Committee by the Building
Owners and Managers Association (BOMA) calls for cost-benefit analyses
to be developed on the implementation of NIST's recommendations. Do you
believe this is a good idea? Why or why not? If so, who should develop
these analyses?
A9. As a first measure the public safety benefit of any recommendation
must be clearly evidenced and supported, and the ICC welcomes the
results of the NIST/WTC report as significant science in the
consideration of improving the defensibility of our public structures.
At the same time it is necessary, in putting forward building code
changes based on those recommendations, to clearly understand the
economic consequences of each specific proposal. It is ICC's view that
NIST, along with all federal agencies with responsibilities impacting
the built environment, should be active participants in offering
building code amendment proposals, whether based on the NIST/WTC
report, or through the general course of involvement in operating in or
regulating the built environment. As with any code change participant
or advocate, this includes participation in the development of both the
scientific evidence supporting a change, and analyses of the economic
cost and public policy justification for the change.
Q10. Which recommendations do you think most require action by the
Federal Government, particularly with respect to research, and which
agencies should be responsible?
A10. As suggested in my testimony to the Committee, and my observations
regarding other follow-up questions, the ICC believes that federal
agency involvement in ICC's Governmental Consensus process is critical
in providing a full range of interests in the proposal of code change
recommendations, and in providing scientific and economic evidence that
allows for a fully considered debate on those recommendations. In this
manner the federal agency representatives participate, consistent with
federal policy guidance in OMB A-119 and the NTTAA, as colleagues in
the voluntary sector model code development and amendment process. This
participation should reach as well to all standards developing
organizations (SDOs) that maintain standards which have been identified
by NIST as addressed by the NIST/WTC report. These developers include
the American Concrete Institute, the American Institute of Architects,
the American Institute of Steel Construction, the American Society of
Civil Engineers, the American Society of Mechanical Engineers, The
Association of the Wall and Ceiling Industry, ASTM International, the
International Organization for Standardization, the National Fire
Protection Association, and Underwriters Laboratories. The work of each
of these SDOs is, as well, referenced in the International Codes. This
being said, recommendations 22, 23 and 24 of group 6 ``Improved
Emergency Response'' have direct and unique impact on the regulatory
responsibilities of the Department of Homeland Security and the Federal
Communications Commission, and would require consideration in federal
rule-making processes.
Questions submitted by Democratic Members
Q1. Mr. Green, the ICC recommends closer collaboration between
Federal, State and local governments on building code issues. What
needs to be improved?
A1. Consistent with the spirit and purpose of OMB Circular A-119 and
the National Technology and Transfer Act of 1995, U.S. federal agencies
need not only to look to the private sector for standards to utilize in
governmental application, but also to participate in these standards
development processes. Federal Government agencies do have a history of
participation in the Governmental Consensus Process utilized by ICC.
That participation should continue to grow along with the agencies'
growing reliance on ICC's model building codes both to guide federal
agency construction, as well as in facilitation of federal rule-
makings. Together with expanded participation in proposing and
advocating independent amendments to the model codes, the agencies
should actively coordinate the federal perspective on code changes that
will be considered in ICC's code development process, regardless of the
source of the proposal.
Q2. The ICC agrees with NIST's recommendations for continuing
education for building industry professionals. Currently what
professional development activities does ICC sponsor? What new
activities do you envision being developed in cooperation with NIST and
other federal agencies?
A2. Below is ICC's published training schedule for the coming year.
These programs are routinely attended by local, State and federal
officials with responsibilities in facilities construction or in
regulating the building environment.
Beyond putting forward these professional training programs
conducted by ICC's training professionals, and assistance to agencies
directly utilizing I-Codes in facilities construction, ICC's on-going
work with NIST and other federal agencies includes policy development
coordination with ICC's Federal Government relations staff.
A short list of ICC's collaborative work includes initiatives with
the Departments of Justice and Housing and Urban Development in
addressing elimination of barriers to building access and egress, and
providing HUD's Partnership for Advancing Technology in Housing (PATH)
with technical support on building regulations. ICC initiatives with
the Department of Commerce include work with the International Trade
Administration in hosting foreign delegations researching U.S.
standards, and similarly with NIST's Office of Standards Services. ICC
is working with the U.S. Chemical Safety Board in dissemination of
results from investigations of dust explosions, and in presentation of
CBC findings to codes and standards amendment processes. Collaboration
with the Department of Health and Human Services includes work with the
Centers for Disease Control on a program related to CDC's objective of
elimination of residential fire deaths by 2020.
Q3. Mr. Green, I understand that your organization just included a
general meeting. What were the general reactions to the NIST report by
your membership?
A3. It should be noted that the main focus of ICC's meeting in Detroit
in September, 2005 was the final action hearings on code change
proposals that were submitted in August 2004--well before the release
of either the draft or final NIST reports. As such no review of the
report was undertaken by the body at-large. I would observe, however,
that the membership welcomes the NIST/WTC report and recognizes that
some of its most significant recommendations, such as those addressed
in my responses to the other questions from the committee, will require
additional review, evaluation and findings from standards developers in
order to have complete information on technological feasibility and in
order to fully evaluate the cost/benefit balance of specific proposals.
As I discussed in my testimony, affirmative action was taken by the
Board of Directors in directing the ICC Code Technology Committee to
work with NIST and parties in order to prioritize the recommendations
and prepare specific code change proposals in advance of the March 24,
2006 deadline for submission to our next 18 month code change cycle.
Q4. Mr. Green, why do you feel that without NIST involvement and
leadership that either nothing will be done to implement their
recommendations or that they may be misinterpreted?
A4. It is my view that NIST has and continues to carry forward its
responsibilities effectively. NIST will have a critical role in
elaborating the intent and substantiation of its WTC recommendations
during discussion of code change proposals stimulated by the WTC
report. NIST's role will be crucial in ensuring that ICC's technical
committees and the membership at-large receive a full and accurate
interpretation and basis for the NIST recommendations. With the public
circulation of the NIST/WTC report, we do expect that a number of
additional interested and affected parties will use the report as the
foundation for specific code changes proposals. To further stimulate
this process NIST has already demonstrated leadership through the
issuance, in late November, of a set of ``Strawman'' model building
code change proposals which present the NIST/WTC recommendations in a
manner consistent with submissions for actual code change proposals.
The Strawman document is already being evaluated by ICC's TRB and CTC
committees in preparation of their report on the development of code
change proposals based on the NIST/WTC report.
Appendix 2:
----------
Additional Material for the Record
Statement of The American Institute of Architects
The American Institute of Architects is pleased to provide written
testimony for the House Science Committee's hearing on ``NIST's
Investigation of the World Trade Center Collapse.''
The AIA represents more than 76,000 licensed architects, emerging
professionals, and allied partners who are fully committed to the
highest professional standards in the design of the Nation's built
environment. As the AIA's public policies state, ``Architecture
profoundly affects people. The work of architects is essential to human
well being, and architects must embrace their ethical obligation to
uphold this public trust.''
This testimony is based on the AIA's public comments on NIST's
Final Report of the National Construction Safety Team on the Collapses
of the World Trade Center Towers. When NIST released its report last
June, the AIA invited its members to provide input to the Institute
about the draft report and recommendations. These comments reflect the
views expressed by the AIA's members.
The AIA cannot overstate the accomplishments of the NIST
investigating team and the substantial body of information they
gathered and organized in response to one of the worst catastrophes in
American history. The results are a definitive historical record of the
largest and most devastating building disaster ever. The AIA was
honored to participate in this process by having one of its members
serve on the National Construction Safety Team Advisory Committee.
Recognizing the superior design and performance of the twin towers
during an unprecedented terrorist attack, the data that the
investigating team compiled should not only help identify deficiencies
but also serve as a testament to the buildings' ability to stand long
enough after the attack to allow thousands of occupants to evacuate.
We owe it to the victims of the September 11 attacks, and to the
millions of Americans who use buildings every day, to ensure that our
built environment is safe, and that any changes to how we design and
construct buildings come about as the result of an open, deliberative
and rational building code and regulation development process.
The Investigation: Demonstrating the Robustness of the Towers
On September 11, 2001, the World Trade Center towers were subjected
to an almost unimaginable attack from hijacked, fuel-laden 767s flying
at such high speeds that one of the jets nearly broke apart in mid-air.
Following its Congressional authorization to investigate the
circumstances that contributed to the towers' collapse, NIST lauds the
success of the design, construction and materials for their exceptional
performance. The report finds that the buildings would have survived
the catastrophic event were it not for the fact that the aircraft
caused extensive damage to the buildings and their fire protective
systems (both passive and active), and ignited extensive fires that
were limited only by the amount of combustible material they could
reach.
The report presents, in its Executive Summary, the following
findings regarding the design, construction and materials of the
towers:
1. . . .the towers withstood the impacts and would have remained
standing were it not for the dislodged insulation (fireproofing) and
the subsequent multi-floor fires. The robustness of the perimeter
frame-tube system and the large size of the buildings helped the towers
withstand the impact. The structural system redistributed loads without
collapsing in places of aircraft impact, avoiding larger scale damage
upon impact.
2. The WTC towers likely would not have collapsed under the combined
effects of aircraft impact damage and the extensive, multi-floor fires
if the thermal insulation had not been widely dislodged or had been
only minimally dislodged by aircraft impact.
3. Since the flow of people from the building had slowed considerably
20 min. [sic] before the tower [WTC 1] collapsed, the stairwell
capacity was adequate to evacuate the occupants on that morning.
4. As in WTC 1, shortly before collapse, the flow of people from the
building [WTC 2] had slowed considerably, indicating that the stairwell
capacity was adequate that morning.
5. The fire safety systems (sprinklers, smoke purge, and fire
alarms,) were designed to meet or exceed current practice.
6. For the approximately 1,000 emergency responders on the scene,
this was the largest disaster they had even seen. Despite attempts by
the responding agencies to work together and perform their own tasks,
the extent of the incident was well beyond their capabilities.
7. . . .the actual design and approval process produced two buildings
that generally were consistent with nearly all of the provisions of the
New York City Building Code and other building codes of the time. The
loads for which the buildings were designed exceeded the code
requirements. The quality of the structural steels was consistent with
the building specifications. The departures from the building codes and
standards did not have a significant effect on the outcome of September
11.
8. On September 11, 2001, the minimum specified thickness of the
insulation was adequate to delay heating of the trusses; the amount of
insulation dislodged by the aircraft impact, however, was sufficient to
cause the structural steel to be heated to critical levels.
9. . . .in all cases [during NIST's testing of fire rated
assemblies], the floors continued to support the full design load
without collapse for over two hours.
10. The wind loads used for the WTC towers, which governed the
structural design of the external columns and provided the baseline
capacity of the structures to withstand abnormal events such as major
fires or impact damage, significantly exceeded the requirements of the
New York City Building Code and selected other building codes of the
day.
The North Tower. The first account of the performance of World Trade
Center 1 (the north tower) is found in Chapter 2 of NIST's final
report. Following a detailed description of the extent of damage, the
report states, ``Even with all this damage, the building still stood.''
Ignition of the building contents by the explosion of 10,000 gallons of
jet fuel is addressed in the account of WTC 1, which finds that the
ignition of the contents of the building and airplane caused a fuel-
controlled fire, creating an exposure that is not typical of any
condition that is considered when designing buildings.
The report finds that the aircraft impact virtually destroyed the
fire protection systems. The report states that the system was designed
to supply water to about eight sprinkler heads at one time, enough to
control the flames from as much as 1,500 square feet of burning
material. The water supply was likely sufficient to control fires up to
triple that size. However, the fires caused by the aircraft impact were
far larger than those envisioned by any imaginable fire protection
system.
The South Tower. World Trade Center 2 (the south tower) was subjected
to a similar event, but faced a number of factors that were distinct
from WTC 1. Those factors resulted in a larger overall fraction of the
occupants surviving, despite the fact that WTC 2 collapsed in a shorter
period of time. According to the report, within five minutes of the
impact on WTC 1, half of the occupants of WTC 2 had left their floors,
and the number of evacuees subsequently increased rapidly. Based on
their perception of events occurring in WTC 1, approximately 3,000
people in WTC 2 escaped in the 16 minutes between the aircraft impact
on WTC 1 and the impact on WTC 2.
The report goes on to state that WTC 2 ``swayed more than one foot
back and forth in each direction on the impact floors, about one-third
the sway under the high winds for which the building was designed.''
Nonetheless, just like WTC 1, WTC 2 absorbed the aircraft strike and
remained standing for nearly an hour. Similar to the circumstances of
WTC 1, jet fuel played a critical role in providing an extraordinary
ignition source to the fuel load in WTC 2, contributing to the ultimate
failure of the structural system.
The World Trade Center collapse provided the design and
construction industry with an opportunity to evaluate and reexamine its
processes and practices. Based upon the outstanding success of these
buildings under extraordinary circumstances, it is clear that the
design community can be trusted to create redundancies for typical
building emergency situations, that codes are developed in a manner
that provides sufficient input from all quarters to ensure adequate
life safety for typical emergency situations, and that no upgrading of
code requirements is warranted given the performance of these
buildings.
The Recommendations: Missed Opportunities
Although the report provides significant information regarding the
performance of the buildings, their occupants and the extraordinary
efforts of the responding emergency personnel, the AIA believes that a
number of the recommendations in the report are not supported by the
findings of the investigation. Other recommendations suggest reforms
that have already been addressed by the design and construction
industry or the model code organizations. The Appendix to this
testimony provides a detailed analysis of NIST's recommendations and
the AIA's responses.
At the same time, the AIA believes that the report misses
opportunities to make recommendations that would improve the
understanding of how buildings perform in extreme events. Developing
that understanding in order to protect building occupants must be a
fundamental mission of all organizations that work to create a better
built environment.
One such area is fire testing. NIST developed advanced fire
modeling techniques to evaluate the complex circumstances at the World
Trade Center, examining the spread of fire and its impact on structural
members. This may become an important tool for designing safer
buildings, although their ability to integrate known conditions into
the modeling currently used in the marketplace was a major problem even
for NIST when it evaluated the 2003 fire at the Station nightclub in
Rhode Island.
The AIA believes that improved fire testing is a vital need, and
opportunity, that must not be ignored. The Institute is therefore
troubled by the fact that there are no test facilities in the United
States that can accommodate the larger lengths or sizes of elements
such as those found in the twin towers. If the Federal Government is
truly committed to understanding the effects of such fire hazards on
the built environment, it is critical that it provide for adequate
testing facilities at home.
The AIA strongly encourages this committee to consider authorizing
funding to construct new testing facilities or retrofit existing
facilities that can address the full range of building conditions
present in the United States.
In addition, NIST should be encouraged to take advantage of its
position as the preeminent research facility in the United States to
examine innovative materials and processes and assure that they meet
the most rigorous of standards appropriate for their use. Performance
codes, which the AIA believes are the future direction for building
codes and regulations, are sorely in need of supporting information on
the actual performance of buildings and building systems. Without this
data, designers are left to make assumptions based on limited
resources.
Furthermore, the AIA believes that NIST should facilitate
opportunities to develop ``smart'' building systems that would better
advise first responders of actual building conditions and situations.
The current efforts to improve the use of elevators in an emergency are
an example of the dramatic changes that will take place to the guidance
provided to building occupants.
Building Codes: An Accountable and Comprehensive System
The major finding of the NIST report is that the design and
construction materials of the World Trade Center did not contribute to
the disaster; they performed exceptionally well. Despite this fact, the
report offers several recommendations that are not supported by the
investigation, nor are they backed by substantive research. In fact,
the premises of some of the statements appear to be in error.
For example, in section 9.1 (``Building Standards and Codes: Who is
in Charge?''), the report states, ``Very few members of the general
public and building occupants participate in [the code development]
process.'' Although this is true of most standards development groups,
including NFPA and IAPMO, it is not true for the International Code
Council's family of codes. State and local code enforcement officials
(building, fire, plumbing, electrical, etc.) are a driving force behind
code changes and have the controlling votes on all changes to ICC's
codes. These officials are public officials who represent their states,
counties and cities, and do not fall within any of the categories that
NIST lists as ``influencing the practices used in the design,
construction, operation, and maintenance of buildings in the United
States.''
The code enforcement community has been extraordinarily aggressive
in pursuing education and certification for their members. Many states
and local jurisdictions have worked diligently to assure the
credibility of their enforcement programs by requiring certification of
training obtained by their code enforcement officials.
The question of ``who is in charge'' regarding the development and
application of codes and standards is well established and recognized
by 45 states as the code official using the International Building
Code, and in 36 states as the code official using the International
Fire Code.
The AIA believes that State and local governments must retain the
authority to determine appropriate building regulations. The AIA does
not agree that the Federal Government is in a position to supplant the
voice or the rights of local and state jurisdictions by presuming to
speak for the public that is given the constitutional authority through
police powers to determine what is appropriate for building regulation
in their communities.
The fundamental challenge regarding codes and life safety today is
the lack of an understanding or an appreciation by users of the safety
features designed and built into modern buildings. This includes
building owners, managers, tenants and service providers who often
unintentionally subvert life safety features out of ignorance about how
they work. This was most evident in the Rhode Island nightclub tragedy,
where modifications that were made to the interior of the building and
the use of pyrophoric materials in the facility were both major
violations of the applicable codes. Had the owner or the user of the
space been more knowledgeable about the potential hazards associated
with such actions, that disaster would likely have been averted.
Conclusion
NIST has undertaken an extraordinary effort to investigate and
understand the consequences of the most devastating terrorist attack in
our nation's history. It should be reassuring to the public that the
report concludes that the World Trade Center towers were well within
the contemporary norms of design and construction, and that the
buildings were able to stand long enough to allow thousands of people
to escape.
But the terrible loss of life that day demands that we study the
results of this investigation closely to learn what the design and
construction professions have done right, and where improvements can be
made to better protect people in buildings.
The recommendations in the NIST report are useful guidelines
towards that end. However, the AIA believes that at times the
recommendations overlook measures and technologies that are already in
practice, or go in directions that are not supported by either the
investigation or scientific research.
The need to protect the health, safety and welfare of people who
use buildings is not a subject of debate. This is why the AIA requires
its members to adhere to the highest professional standards and take at
least eight hours of health, safety and welfare continuing education
classes each and every year throughout their careers in order to remain
members in good standing.
The NIST report and recommendations raise powerful issues about how
best to achieve building safety and security. The AIA encourages NIST
to further investigate areas such as actual building occupant loads and
develop data on actual building performance through additional testing
of full-sized components. NIST provides an ideal platform to
investigate and report fairly these issues. However, it will be
necessary to gather much more data to verify any change in the
direction of model building codes. The AIA continues to believe that
the best way to ensure that building codes protect the public is to
ensure that model codes are developed through an open, consensus based
process.
The AIA commends NIST for making education a focus of its efforts.
The AIA encourages the design and construction industry, and everyone
who uses buildings, to take advantage of opportunities to gain a
greater understanding of how buildings affect our lives and our
communities.
Appendix: Recommendations and Responses
The report states that NIST's recommendations (Section 9.2) are
based on:
1. Findings related to building performance, evacuation and emergency
response, and to procedures and practices used in the design,
construction, operation, and maintenance of the buildings;
2. Whether these findings relate to the unique circumstances
surrounding the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, or to normal
building and fire safety considerations (including evacuation and
emergency response);
3. Technical solutions that are needed to address potential risks to
buildings, occupants, and emergency responders, considering both
identifiable hazards and the consequences of those hazards; and
4. Whether the risks apply to all buildings or are limited to certain
building types (e.g., buildings that exceed a certain height and floor
area or that employ a specific type of structural system), buildings
that contain specific design features, iconic/signature buildings, or
buildings that house critical functions.
NIST's recommendations are broken down into eight groups. The AIA's
comments follow each recommendation.
Group 1: Increased Structural Integrity
Group 1 (Increased Structural Integrity) calls for improved
standards to enhance structural integrity for estimating load effects
of progressive collapse and wind.
Recommendation 1. NIST recommends that: (1) progressive collapse should
be prevented in buildings through the development and nationwide
adoption of consensus standards and code provisions, along with the
tools and guidelines needed for their use in practice; and (2) a
standard methodology should be developed--supported by analytical
design tools and practical design guidance--to reliably predict the
potential for complex failures in structural systems subjected to
multiple hazards.
Recommendation 2. NIST recommends that nationally accepted performance
standards be developed for: (1) conducting wind tunnel testing of
prototype structures based on sound technical methods that result in
repeatable and reproducible results among testing laboratories; and (2)
estimating wind loads and their effects on tall buildings for use in
design, based on wind tunnel testing data and directional wind speed
data.
Recommendation 3. NIST recommends that an appropriate criterion should
be developed and implemented to enhance the performance of tall
buildings by limiting how much they sway under lateral load design
conditions (e.g., winds and earthquakes).
AIA Response
It should be noted that nothing in the NIST report criticizes nor
questions the structural integrity of the World Trade Center towers and
their design. In fact, the report finds that the buildings were more
robust than would have been required by any code in force at the time
they were designed and constructed. NIST's report focuses on the
varying results they received when different consultants examined the
buildings' wind design. It is the lack of a consensus method for
evaluating buildings that NIST's recommendations address, not providing
additional requirements for the design of structures.
A recent article by Jesse Beitel and Nestor Iwankiw, Ph.D., P.E.,
from Hughes Associates, Inc., in SFPE's Fire Protection Engineering
(Summer 2005) documents a ``Historical Survey of Multistory Building
Collapses Due to Fire.'' The data in the article was taken from a NIST
survey performed in 2002 that focused on buildings four or more stories
tall. The survey covered the time period between 1970 and 2002 and
discovered a total of 22 buildings that had either full or partial
collapse. The article states, ``While the number of fire events may
appear low (average of one per year), these fire events are high-
consequence occurrences with respect to loss of life, injuries, and
economic costs.'' When examining those statistics, five of the fire
events were the result of the September 11 attacks, and 13 of the
buildings were four to eight stories tall. There were only three
``high-rise'' buildings that involved any collapse scenario.
The Beitel/Iwankiw article states:
Almost 60 percent (13/22) of the cases are in the 4-8 stories
range, with the remainder affecting much taller buildings. Six
collapses occurred in buildings over 20 stories, and three of
these were the WTC steel-framed buildings (1, 2, and 7). At
least four of these fire collapses had occurred during
construction or renovations of some kind, when the usual
expected architectural, structural and fire protection
functions were still incomplete or temporarily disrupted.
It is common knowledge that a construction site is an unsafe and
dangerous environment. Additionally, the research for this study does
not include any information determining whether the buildings conformed
to any code or standard. Based on NIST's own study, it appears that the
recommendation to increase structural integrity is due to fire events
in a total of four collapsed structures four stories or taller over a
32-year period. Assuming that one of the collapses is the Murrah
Federal Building in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, in which the collapse was
the result of a vehicle-borne explosive, this leaves a total of three
such fire events worldwide that resulted in collapse or partial
collapse of a high-rise building.
Group 2: Enhanced Fire Resistance of Structures
Group 2 (Enhanced Fire Resistance of Structures) recommends that
the procedures and practices used to ensure that the basis for
classification of fire resistance in buildings should be enhanced.
Recommendation 4. NIST recommends evaluating, and where needed
improving, the technical basis for determining appropriate construction
classification and fire rating requirements (especially for tall
buildings greater than 20 stories in height)--and making related code
changes now as much as possible--by explicitly considering factors
including:
timely access by emergency responders and full
evacuation of occupants, or the time required for burnout
without local collapse;
the extent to which redundancy in active fire
protection (sprinkler and standpipe, fire alarm, and smoke
management) systems should be credited for occupant life
safety;
the need for redundancy in fire protection systems
that are critical to structural integrity;
the ability of the structure and local floor systems
to withstand a maximum credible fire scenario without collapse,
recognizing that sprinklers could be compromised, not
operational, or non-existent;
compartmentation requirements (e.g., 12,000 ft2) to
protect the structure, including fire rated doors and automatic
enclosures, and limiting air supply (e.g., thermally resistant
window assemblies) to retard fire spread in buildings with
large, open floor plans;
the impact of spaces containing unusually large fuel
concentrations for the expected occupancy of the building; and
the extent to which fire control systems, including
suppression by automatic or manual means, should be credited as
part of the prevention of fire spread.
Recommendation 5. NIST recommends that the technical basis for the
century-old standard for fire resistance testing of components,
assemblies, and systems should be improved through a national effort.
Necessary guidance also should be developed for extrapolating the
results of tested assemblies to prototypical building systems.
Recommendation 6. NIST recommends the development of criteria, test
methods, and standards: (1) for the in-service performance of spray-
applied fire resistive materials (SFRM, also commonly referred to as
fireproofing or insulation) used to protect structural components; and
(2) to ensure that these materials, as-installed, conform to conditions
in tests used to establish the fire resistance rating of components,
assemblies, and systems.
Recommendation 7. NIST recommends the nationwide adoption and use of
the ``structural frame'' approach to fire resistance ratings.
AIA Response
Enhanced fire resistance was not an issue in the World Trade Center
collapse, as the buildings would have survived even the massive fires
caused by the aircraft had the planes not dislodged fire proofing
materials.
Recommendation 4 implies that structures should be designed for an
aircraft impact, which does not comport with NIST's findings. In fact,
the lead investigator for NIST has stated that it is far easier to
ensure that airplanes are not used as weapons against buildings than to
design for such an event. As noted earlier, the instances of structural
failure due to fire are extremely rare and, in a fully sprinklered
building, even rarer. These facts do not indicate a need for enhanced
levels of fire resistance in building design.
One of the concerns expressed with regard to construction methods
involves the application of spray-on fireproofing. This debate is not
new and has been well documented. It is of concern that, with such a
large focus in the report on the fire resistance of materials used in
the buildings, there is no mention of the appropriateness of test
standards such as ASTM E605-00 (Test Method for Thickness and Density
of Sprayed Fire-resistive Material (SFRM) Applied to Structural
Members) and ASTM E736 (Cohesion/Adhesion of Sprayed Fire-Resistive
Materials Applied to Structural Members), both of which are referenced
in the International Building Code, and thus presumably ``required by
code'' and enforced.
Similarly lacking is reference to, or a measure of the
appropriateness of, ASTM E759 (Effect of Deflection on Sprayed Fire-
Resistive Materials Applied to Structural Members), ASTM E760 (Effect
of Impact on Bonding of Sprayed Fire-Resistive Materials Applied to
Structural Members), ASTM E761 (Compressive Strength of Sprayed Fire-
Resistive Materials Applied to Structural Members), ASTM E859 (Air
Erosion of Sprayed Fire-Resistive Materials Applied to Structural
Members), or ASTM E937 (Corrosion of Steel by Sprayed Fire-Resistive
Materials Applied to Structural Members).
In recommendation 5, NIST suggests reevaluation of the ASTM E119
procedure. The AIA believes that a better approach would be to take the
research performed by NIST using recognized testing procedures to
explore how the large-scale testing compares with results obtained
using small-scale tests. The fact that the unrestrained assembly
outperformed the restrained assembly is still unexplained. It appears
that design is still taking place under the assumption that a
restrained assembly will outperform an unrestrained assembly.
NIST specifically refers to the AIA in recommendation 6, suggesting
that it is important ``to develop criteria, test methods and standards
for the `in-service' performance of spray-applied fire resistive
materials.'' NIST suggests that MasterSpec is the appropriate forum for
such activity. Architects in general, and MasterSpec in particular, do
not have that sole responsibility establishing such standards. Other
agencies or organizations develop standards, which are then included in
MasterSpec where appropriate as requirements for the construction of
buildings. Architects and specifiers often participate in the
development of standards, which is appropriate to assure the
applicability of the resulting standards. But it is the collaborative
development of standards that should be encouraged. With the lack of
specific direction on the use of the standards that even now are found
in building codes, it is unclear what NIST is recommending be done.
Lastly, recommendation 6 suggests adoption of a structural frame
approach to design throughout the United States. However, the
requirement for design of a structural frame has already been
accomplished by the adoption of the International Building Code in 45
states.
Group 3: New Methods for Fire Resistance Design of Structures
Group 3 (New Methods for Fire Resistance Design of Structures)
recommends that procedures used to design the fire resistance should be
enhanced by considering uncontrolled fires to burnout. This
recommendation suggests that new coatings and technology for evaluating
them be developed to enhance conventional and high-performance
structural materials.
Recommendation 8. NIST recommends that the fire resistance of
structures should be enhanced by requiring a performance objective that
uncontrolled building fires result in burnout without local or global
collapse.
Recommendation 9. NIST recommends the development of: (1) performance-
based standards and code provisions, as an alternative to current
prescriptive design methods, to enable the design and retrofit of
structures to resist real building fire conditions, including their
ability to achieve the performance objective of burnout without
structural or local floor collapse: and (2) the tools, guidelines, and
test methods necessary to evaluate the fire performance of the
structure as a whole system.
Recommendation 10. NIST recommends the development and evaluation of
new fire resistive coating materials, systems, and technologies with
significantly enhanced performance and durability to provide protection
following major events.
Recommendation 11. NIST recommends that the performance and suitability
of advanced structural steel, reinforced and pre-stressed concrete, and
other high-performance material systems should be evaluated for use
under conditions expected in building fires.
AIA Response
Recommendation 8 suggests consideration of designing to allow
``uncontrolled fires to burnout.'' Such circumstances may be a
consideration, but are not appropriate in most circumstances. Even
where there have been uncontrolled fires that caused a ``burnout,''
there is no evidence that current procedures are inadequate. In the
article by Beitel and Iwankiw, which uses NIST data, the rationale is
not present to warrant such a major change in building code
requirements.
Recommendation 9 reflects actions taken by both the ICC and the
NFPA in the development of performance code criteria. What is currently
lacking are the tools and background information on responses of
buildings and the performance of the elements within them for any given
event. The AIA believes that NIST could provide a significant resource
to the industry by examining actual fire scenarios more closely and
developing guidelines for understanding such events. With that kind of
data available, designers would be able to utilize a performance
approach to building safety that is informed by real world evidence.
The AIA questions the logic behind recommendations 10 and 11. The
report frequently expresses doubt about ``innovative'' design materials
and methods in its evaluation of the floor truss systems in the World
Trade Center. Yet those innovative floor framing systems performed as
anticipated and were proven to be adequate based on the tests that NIST
performed. Industry will continuously develop innovative materials and
systems, and the AIA believes that NIST can and should play a vital
role in encouraging them by facilitating more realistic testing that
would replicate actual construction.
Group 4: Improved Active Fire Protection
Group 4 (Improved Active Fire Protection) calls for enhancements to
sprinklers, standpipes, hoses, fire alarms and smoke management
systems, including redundancy.
Recommendation 12. NIST recommends that the performance and redundancy
of active fire protection systems (sprinklers, standpipes/hoses, fire
alarms, and smoke management systems) in buildings should be enhanced
to accommodate the greater risks associated with increasing building
height and population, increased use of open spaces, available
compartmentation, high-risk building activities, fire department
response limits, transient fuel loads, and higher threat profile.
Recommendation 13. NIST recommends that fire alarm and communications
systems in buildings should be developed to provide continuous,
reliable, and accurate information on the status of life safety
conditions at a level of detail sufficient to manage the evacuation
process in building fire emergencies, and that standards for their
performance be developed.
Recommendation 14. NIST recommends that control panels at fire/
emergency command stations in buildings should be adapted to accept and
interpret a larger quantity of more reliable information from the
active fire protection systems that provide tactical decision aids to
fireground commanders, including water flow rates from pressure and
flow measurement devices, and that standards for their performance be
developed.
Recommendation 15. NIST recommends that systems should be developed and
implemented for: (1) real-time off-site secure transmission of valuable
information from fire alarm and other monitored building systems for
use by emergency responders, at any location, to enhance situational
awareness and response decisions and maintain safe and efficient
operations; and (2) preservation of that information either off-site or
in a black box that will survive a fire or other building failure for
purposes of subsequent investigations and analysis. Standards for the
performance of such systems should be developed, and their use should
be required.
AIA Response
NIST's concerns about the redundancy of active and passive fire
protective systems are valid in circumstances where all such systems
may be rendered ineffective or inoperative. However, such circumstances
are extremely rare, as was the case in the unprecedented aircraft
attack on the World Trade Center. The ICC Performance Code for
Buildings and Facilities, NFPA's 101 Life Safety Code and 5000 Building
Code already include this approach to fire protection design in their
performance guidelines. Although the World Trade Center was not
designed for such complex circumstances, it nevertheless performed
remarkably well.
Recommendations 13, 14, and 15 include opportunities for
significant improvement in the performance of fire protection systems
by installing smart building devices. Where there is a reasonable risk
of natural or manmade hazards to a particular structure, every effort
should be taken to ensure the security of the facilities and protection
of the occupants.
Group 5: Improved Building Evacuation
Group 5 (Improved Building Evacuation) addresses communications
systems and the design of means of egress.
Recommendation 16. NIST recommends that public agencies, non-profit
organizations concerned with building and fire safety, and building
owners and managers should develop and carry out public education
campaigns, jointly and on a nationwide scale, to improve building
occupants' preparedness for evacuation in case of building emergencies.
Recommendation 17. NIST recommends that tall buildings should be
designed to accommodate timely full building evacuation of occupants
due to building-specific or large-scale emergencies such as widespread
power outages, major earthquakes, tornadoes, hurricanes without
sufficient advanced warning, fires, accidental explosions, and
terrorist attack. Building size, population, function, and iconic
status should be taken into account in designing the egress system.
Stairwell and exit capacity should be adequate to accommodate
counterflow due to emergency access by responders.
Recommendation 18. NIST recommends that egress systems should be
designed: (1) to maximize remoteness of egress components (i.e.,
stairs, elevators, exits) without negatively impacting the average
travel distance; (2) to maintain their functional integrity and
survivability under foreseeable building-specific or large-scale
emergencies; and (3) with consistent layouts, standard signage, and
guidance so that systems become intuitive and obvious to building
occupants during evacuations.
Recommendation 19. NIST recommends that building owners, managers, and
emergency responders develop a joint plan and take steps to ensure that
accurate emergency information is communicated in a timely manner to
enhance the situational awareness of building occupants and emergency
responders affected by an event. This should be accomplished through
better coordination of information among different emergency responder
groups, efficient sharing of that information among building occupants
and emergency responders, more robust design of emergency public
address systems, improved emergency responder communication systems,
and use of the Emergency Broadcast System (now known as the Integrated
Public Alert and Warning System) and Community Emergency Alert
Networks.
Recommendation 20. NIST recommends that the full range of current and
next generation evacuation technologies should be evaluated for future
use, including protected/hardened elevators, exterior escape devices,
and stairwell navigation devices, which may allow all occupants an
equal opportunity for evacuation and facilitate emergency response
access.
AIA Response
Recommendation 16, though well intentioned, misses a key element of
building safety. While ensuring proper egress during an emergency is
important, too many building owners, managers and occupiers fail to
prepare for emergencies before the fact. Examples of malfunctioning or
failed systems (such as burned out exit sign lights or fire doors that
are blocked by furniture or boxes) are routine, leaving occupants in
jeopardy. It is therefore just as important to educate users about
maintaining the many life safety elements in a building so that they
are functioning as designed when an emergency happens.
Recommendation 17 suggests wider stairwells and greater exit
capacity to accommodate regarding counter-flow from first responders.
This raises a concern about orderly and controlled egress. No research
is cited regarding the effect wider stairs may have, or the possibility
that evacuating occupants will simply fill the larger stairwell.
Faster-moving individuals will tend to pass slower people descending
the stairs, potentially leading to conflict and disruption of an
orderly egress process.
Regarding the distribution of exits, the current model codes
address the minimum remoteness issue. Had the stairs been more remote
from each other at the World Trade Center there is no guarantee that
even hardened stair enclosures would not have been totally
incapacitated had the aircraft impacted the buildings at or near the
more remote stair. Placing stairs further outside the core of buildings
reduces their level of hardening and leaves them more vulnerable to
abuse by the occupants of the building.
Recommendation 20 calls for hardening of elevators and stairway
enclosures as well as additional devices that aid egress.
Unfortunately, the hardening issue can be a catch-22. Although
hardening may help in maintaining an element's viability in certain
emergency situations, the hardened features may be difficult for
occupants to manage if they are damaged. Reports have emerged about
individuals caught inside elevators at the twin towers who used various
devices to escape by cutting their way through the drywall shaft. Would
that have been possible in a hardened shaft? Furthermore, the occupants
who discovered the single stair that remained partially open to the
upper floors in WTC 2 would not have been able to remove ``hardened''
debris and egress those stairs.
Technology for aids to egress are encouraged. However the most
promising development to assist egress in a tall building is a
functioning elevator system, as proven in WTC 2.
Group 6: Improved Emergency Response
Group 6 (Improved Emergency Response) recommends technical and
procedural changes to gain access to buildings and maintain effective
communications and command and control in large-scale emergencies
Recommendation 21. NIST recommends the installation of fire-protected
and structurally hardened elevators to improve emergency response
activities in tall buildings by providing timely emergency access to
responders and allowing evacuation of mobility-impaired building
occupants. Such elevators should be installed for exclusive use by
emergency responders during emergencies. In tall buildings,
consideration also should be given to installing such elevators for use
by all occupants.
Recommendation 22. NIST recommends the installation, inspection, and
testing of emergency communications systems, radio communications, and
associated operating protocols to ensure that the systems and
protocols: (1) are effective for large-scale emergencies in buildings
with challenging radio frequency propagation environments; and (2) can
be used to identify, locate, and track emergency responders within
indoor building environments and in the field.
Recommendation 23. NIST recommends the establishment and implementation
of detailed procedures and methods for gathering, processing, and
delivering critical information through integration of relevant voice,
video, graphical, and written data to enhance the situational awareness
of all emergency responders. An information intelligence sector should
be established to coordinate the effort for each incident.
Recommendation 24. NIST recommends the establishment and implementation
of codes and protocols for ensuring effective and uninterrupted
operation of the command and control system for large-scale building
emergencies.
AIA Response
Recommendation 21 largely duplicates recommendation 20. Existing
elevator technology recalls all elevators for emergency use. Whether
hardening is appropriate is a serious question; it has not been proven
to be appropriate or even desirable in those locations where it has
been attempted.
Group 7: Improved Procedures and Practices
Group 7 (Improved Procedures and Practices) addresses code
compliance by nongovernmental agencies, adoption of egress and
sprinkler requirements in codes for existing buildings and maintenance
of building documents over the life of the structure.
Recommendation 25. Non-governmental and quasi-governmental entities
that own or lease buildings and are not subject to building and fire
safety code requirements of any governmental jurisdiction are
nevertheless concerned about the safety of the building occupants and
the responding emergency personnel. NIST recommends that such entities
should be encouraged to provide a level of safety that equals or
exceeds the level of safety that would be provided by strict compliance
with the code requirements of an appropriate governmental jurisdiction.
To gain broad public confidence in the safety of such buildings, NIST
further recommends that it is important that as-designed and as-built
safety be certified by a qualified third party, independent of the
building owner(s). The process should not use self-approval for code
enforcement in areas including interpretation of code provisions,
design approval, product acceptance, certification of the final
construction, and post-occupancy inspections over the life of the
buildings.
Recommendation 26. NIST recommends that state and local jurisdictions
should adopt and aggressively enforce available provisions in building
codes to ensure that egress and sprinkler requirements are met by
existing buildings. Further, occupancy requirements should be modified
where needed (such as when there are assembly use spaces within an
office building) to meet the requirements in model building codes.
Recommendation 27. NIST recommends that building codes should
incorporate a provision that requires building owners to retain
documents, including supporting calculations and test data, related to
building design, construction, maintenance and modifications over the
entire life of the building. Means should be developed for offsite
storage and maintenance of the documents. In addition, NIST recommends
that relevant building information should be made available in suitably
designed hard copy or electronic format for use by emergency
responders. Such information should be easily accessible by responders
during emergencies.
Recommendation 28. NIST recommend that the role of the ``Design
Professional in Responsible Charge'' should be clarified to ensure
that: (1) all appropriate design professionals (including, e.g., the
fire protection engineer) are part of the design team providing the
standard of care when designing buildings employing innovative or
unusual fire safety systems, and (2) all appropriate design
professionals (including, e.g., the structural engineer and the fire
protection engineer) are part of the design team providing the standard
of care when designing the structure to resist fires, in buildings that
employ innovative or unusual structural and fire safety systems.
AIA Response
Recommendations 25 and 26 call for the adoption and use of codes.
The AIA has long advocated that every jurisdiction in the Nation, at
all levels of government, to use a modern building code that is
comprehensive, coordinated and contemporary. The AIA believes that the
ICC family of codes, in conjunction with the NFPA electrical code,
provide the ``bookshelf'' of codes that should be endorsed by all
legislative and quasi-legislative agencies for application on all
projects. Adoption of a single ``bookshelf'' of codes utilized by all
designers, builders and operators of buildings across the Nation has
been a long sought goal of the AIA to avoid confusion in the creation
of the built environment.
Recommendation 28 calls for the ``design professional in
responsible charge'' to assure that the appropriate professionals are
included on each design team. This is, and has been for a long time,
standard practice in this country and is demanded by the licensing
criteria in all states. There appears to be a presumption that fire
protection engineers and structural engineers are somehow excluded from
``innovative or unusual fire safety systems.'' It is most likely that
these designers are the ones who are proposing innovative solutions to
innovative designs. It would be unethical and unprofessional to fail to
include a fire protection engineer or structural engineer in such
projects.
Group 8: Education and Training
Group 8 (Education and Training) calls for the skills of building
and fire professionals to be upgraded through education and training of
fire protection engineers, structural engineers, and architects.
Recommendation 29. NIST recommends that continuing education curricula
should be developed and programs should be implemented for training
fire protection engineers and architects in structural engineering
principles and design, and training structural engineers, architects,
and fire protection engineers in modern fire protection principles and
technologies, including fire-resistance design of structures.
Recommendation 30. NIST recommends that academic, professional short-
course, and web-based training materials in the use of computational
fire dynamics and thermostructural analysis tools should be developed
and delivered to strengthen the base of available technical
capabilities and human resources.
AIA Response
Recommendations 29 and 30 call for education of members of the
design and construction industry. As the only professional organization
in the industry that holds its members to a standard of education
(accredited degrees) and continuing education (18 hours of continuing
education per year, of which at least eight must be related to health,
safety and welfare), the AIA applauds NIST's call to others in the
field to gain additional education.
However, education is only valuable if the information is readily
understood and can be incorporated into every-day practice. While
computational fire dynamics and thermostructural analysis tools may be
helpful in certain circumstances, they must be of use to those that
will make the decisions associated with fire resistance and fire
protection and design.
Statement by James G. Quintiere
Professor, Department of Fire Protection Engineering
University of Maryland
In my opinion, the WTC investigation by NIST falls short of
expectations by not definitively finding cause, by not sufficiently
linking recommendations of specificity to cause, by not fully invoking
all of their authority to seek facts in the investigation, and by the
guidance of government lawyers to deter rather than develop fact
finding.
I have over 35 years of fire research in my experience. I worked in
the fire program at NIST for 19 years, leaving as a division chief. I
have been at the University of Maryland since. I am a founding member
and past-Chair of the International Association for Fire Safety
Science--the principal world forum for fire research. I have followed
the investigation from onset of the incident, as I was about to teach
fire investigators at the ATF Academy (FLETC) in Georgia on the morning
of 9/11. I joined the SSC team of Sally and Monica after we mutually
discovered each other by speaking our concerns on the WTC collapse. I
have published in the area of the WTC incident, our students built a
scale-model of the fire on a floor of the North Tower, and I have
followed the NIST activities from before their special funding. I
assisted NIST early in 2002 in viewing photographs and video held by
the NY Times. I had wished for clear and complete analyses and evidence
to determine the full cause of the factors behind and the reasons for
the collapse of the WTC buildings, as they bear on the fire safety
design of current and future buildings. I am also concerned about the
lack of sufficient government support for fire research and its
implementation in fire safety design, codes and standards.
Concerns about the NIST Investigation
Scientists at NIST should be commended for their individual efforts
in rising to the occasion of the WTC investigation. NIST should be
commended for organizing an activity of this scale for the first time.
However, there are some issues of concern that I will summarize. All of
these have been submitted to NIST, but never acknowledged or answered.
I will list some of these.
1. Why is not the design process of assigning fire protection
to the WTC towers fully called out for fault? The insulation
thickness of the truss members varied from 0.5 inches at its
construction, changed to a specification of 1.5 inches in 1995,
and was taken on its face as 2.5 inches for the North tower
fire floors based on a PA report. This extraordinary range of
thicknesses bears an in depth investigation. Why were no
hearings held or witness testimonies heard on this critical
design process?
2. Why were not alternative collapse hypotheses investigated
and discussed as NIST had stated repeatedly that they would do?
Their current explanation for the collapse of the towers is
critically based on an assumption that the insulation was
removed from the steel in the path of the aircraft,
particularly the core columns. NIST does not show calculations
or experiments to satisfactorily confirm that the insulation
was removed in the core. As some large aircraft components went
directly through the buildings, and NIST indicates the others
were splintered on impact, can they explain why these small
splinters could still denude the steel?
3. Spoliation of a fire scene is a basis for destroying a
legal case in an investigation. Most of the steel was
discarded, although the key elements of the core steel were
demographically labeled. A careful reading of the NIST report
shows that they have no evidence that the temperatures they
predict as necessary for failure are corroborated by findings
of the little steel debris they have. Why hasn't NIST declared
that this spoliation of the steel was a gross error?
4. NIST used computer models that they said have never been
used in such an application before and are the state of the
art. For this they should be commended for their skill. But the
validation of these modeling results is in question. Others
have computed aspects with different conclusions on the cause
mechanism of the collapse. Moreover, it is common in fire
investigation to compute a time-line and compare it to known
events. NIST has not done that.
5. Testing by NIST has been inconclusive. Although they have
done fire tests of the scale of several work stations, a
replicate test of at least 1/4 of a WTC floor would have been
of considerable value. Why was this not done? Especially, as we
have pointed out to NIST that they may have underestimated the
weight of the furnishings in the North Tower by a factor of 3.
As fire effects on structure depend on temperature and time,
this likely longer burning time is significant in the NIST
analyses. Other tests of the trusses in the UL furnaces show
that the steel attains critical temperatures in short times,
and these temperatures correspond to NIST's own computation of
truss failure for a single truss. Why have these findings
seemingly been ignored in the NIST analyses?
6. The critical collapse of WTC 7 is relegated to a secondary
role, as its findings will not be complete for yet another
year. It was clear at the last NIST Advisory Panel meeting in
September that this date may not be realistic, as NIST has not
demonstrated progress here. Why has NIST dragged on this
important investigation?
On the Recommendations
The eight group-headings of the NIST recommendations are not
specific, as they cannot connect directly to their findings. Instead
they speak to developing, improving or advancing technology for safety
from fire. Hence, they really cry out for more research, technology
adaptation, and education with respect to fire. This is understandable
as the NIST role has been to be a leader in research, and a source of
new knowledge for codes and standards. The Science Committee and the
Congress should take note of the needs underlying the nature of these
recommendations. They are more a need for research to assist standards.
NFPA testified at the Hearing that the implementation of new
performance-based codes requires tools that have not yet been developed
and nor are there sufficient people to understand how to use them.
Congressman Boehlert pointed out to Sally Regenhard many are ``do-
gooders'' that serve on the standard committees, but few come to the
table with technical information that is needed for a full discussion.
This transfer of technical information for standards in fire safety is
only a role that government can effectively support. The Science
Committee should thoughtfully consider how that support could be
implemented.
I point out some alarming facts. The fire program at NIST received
a boost in the 1970's under the confluence of several forces: NSF
advancing $2 million per year for fire research, consumer product
safety legislation (CPSC), and the funding advanced by industry and
government agencies for fire research (about $ 2-3 million per year).
This funding has considerably dropped in real dollars. The NIST fire
program continues to survive by taking contracts from government and
the private sector that could otherwise support academic or private
industry. The extramural research program of NIST, inherited from NSF,
has shrunk from effectively $2 million to about $500k in 1970 dollars.
The NSF has defaulted a fire program to NIST so investigators in
academia have no program to turn to at NSF. The NASA microgravity
program had taken up the slack in fire research beginning about 1985,
but its current fire research budget has been decimated in a shift from
space station needed research to a Mars human flight program. The
Science Committee has oversight over NSF, NASA, and NIST. It should
investigate how it can best support the needed fire research.
NIST speaks to the need for education. I left NIST to contribute to
that goal. The U.S. produces about 50 fire protection engineers per
year when about 500 are really needed. If the fire service would
incorporate fire engineers this number would double. There is a big
lack of knowledge here, and it contributes to an infrastructure of fire
safety that is currently fraught with good intentions, special
interests, and ignorance. The Science Committee should recognize this
deficiency.
James G. Quintiere
The John L. Bryan Professor
Fire Protection Engineering
University of Maryland
Fireproofing Blown Off Twin Towers
Report Details 9/11 Collapse in N.Y.
By Michelle Garcia
Special to The Washington Post
Wednesday, April 6, 2005; Page A03
NEW YORK, April 5--The hijacked airplanes that struck the World
Trade Center hit with such force that the resulting explosions blew the
fireproofing off the steel columns, accelerating heat buildup and
weakening the structural core--contributing to the towers' eventual
collapse, according to a report issued Tuesday.
The process was hastened by fires outside that consumed the
buildings' face and caused the exterior columns to bow in, according to
the report.
Still, the study by the National Institute of Standards and
Technology concluded that no amount of fireproofing could have saved
the buildings.
Poor evacuation procedures, lack of communication and weak
staircases cost the lives of civilians and emergency workers at the
towers, as workers waited for directions and were slow to leave after
the Sept. 11, 2001, attack, the report said.
Only two of the 198 elevators in the towers survived the initial
explosions--forcing most survivors to escape down emergency stairwells,
which had suffered extensive damage. The report found that building
codes lacked requirements sufficient to protect the structure of
emergency stairwells.
Had such codes been in place, said S. Shyam Sunder, the lead
investigator of the Institute, ``there would have been greater
opportunity for people to evacuate.''
Another federal report issued Tuesday found that the economic
impact of the attacks was less than New York officials had originally
estimated. After the attacks, State and city officials said the loss of
tax revenue could approach $5.8 billion.
But the Government Accountability Office said the loss attributable
to the attacks was closer to $2.9 billion and cited the city's
recession, which had begun to take a toll before Sept. 11, for the rest
of the loss.
The institute's report on the building collapse was long awaited by
city officials. The institute based its analysis on extensive
interviews with about 1,000 survivors, computer modeling, recovered
steel and communications records.
The Institute will use the findings in the 3,000-page report to
formulate recommendations--expected for release in September--for
changes in national building codes for office towers. A spokesman at
the Port Authority of New York & New Jersey, which owned the World
Trade Center, said local and State officials will review the
recommendations and use them to guide reconstruction at Ground Zero.
``Whatever recommendations are adopted we will follow,'' said
authority spokesman Steve Coleman. ``Our engineering department has
oversight over the buildings [and] will ensure the codes are
followed.''
In the past, city safety codes for office buildings often were a
sort of informal compromise between safety and commercial imperatives.
In 1968, New York City officials drastically reduced the number of
required stairwells in skyscrapers, at the request of the real estate
industry, to increase the amount of available rental space.
New York was, in fact, fortunate that the attacks took place in the
morning, when most people had not yet reached their offices. If the
building had been fully occupied, the report found, a full evacuation
would have taken four hours and cost 14,000 lives.
The agency interviewed survivors and found that, although most had
participated in a fire drill, nearly one-half had never used the
stairwells in the buildings before the attacks. In fact, New York City
prevents the use of stairwells during fire drills.
``I've never heard of another jurisdiction having such a
prohibition,'' Sunder said.
Staircases in Twin Towers Are Faulted
By Jim Dwyer
The New York Times
April 6, 2005
The staircases in the twin towers--their number, location, and the
weak walls around them--emerged as critical factors in the deaths of
many of those killed in the Sept. 11 terrorist attack on the World
Trade Center, according to a federal safety report released yesterday.
The findings will be used to shape federal recommendations for
building-code changes across the country.
And after more than two years of intensive research, investigators
uncovered what they said was an elementary shortcoming in the trade
center towers: neither building had enough staircases to meet any of
the major building codes in the country, including New York City's.
For nearly every man and woman on the upper floors of the towers,
the lack of intact staircases meant that they could not get out after
the planes struck. Clustered in the centers of the buildings, those
staircases were encased in lightweight drywall that was immediately
destroyed. Sturdier walls around staircases that were remote from each
other ``might have provided greater opportunities for escape,'' said
the lead investigator, Shyam Sunder.
In a sobering lesson drawn from one of the day's great successes--
the escape of nearly everyone below the points of impact, about 14,000
people--the report said that it had taken about twice as long to go
down a single flight of stairs as had been projected by the current
engineering standards for tall buildings. The buildings were only half
full, investigators said, and if the attack had come at a time when
they were filled to occupancy, the evacuation would not have been
successful. Thousands more people were likely to have been trapped on
the stairs, Mr. Sunder said.
The report, issued by the National Institute of Standards and
Technology, also formally confirmed what had long been identified as a
significant failure on that day: the leaders of New York's Police and
Fire Departments did not coordinate their efforts that morning. The
investigation suggested that many of the rescuers died because they
simply did not know what was happening around them.
``A preponderance of evidence indicates that a lack of timely
information sharing and inadequate communications capabilities likely
contributed to the loss of emergency responder lives,'' the report
stated. It cited an interview with an unnamed firefighter who told the
investigators, ``If communications were better, more firefighters would
have lived.''
The findings were included in a draft final report from the
institute, a branch of the United States Commerce Department that was
given authority by Congress in 2002 to investigate the towers'
collapse, the evacuation and the emergency response.
The findings total some 10,000 pages, of which 3,400 were made
public yesterday. The remainder will be released later in the spring,
according to Mr. Sunder. The institute will make recommendations on
improvements in the areas it studied.
Building-code changes are decided by local governments, generally
using model codes developed by technical experts who work with the
insurance and real estate industries.
In a presentation yesterday at a Times Square hotel, Mr. Sunder
outlined the techniques used to project the sequence of events that led
to the collapse of each tower. Although each building was hit by
virtually identical planes, the south tower collapsed in 56 minutes and
the north tower in 102 minutes.
A combination of common factors shaped the course of events, he
said. The planes plunged through the exterior curtain of each building
and fragmented as they passed through the building, with parts emerging
on the other side. The impacts killed hundreds of people instantly. In
the north tower, American Airlines Flight 11, moving at 443 miles per
hour, took .685 seconds to pass through the building; in the south
tower, United Airlines 175, hitting at 542 miles per hour, passed
through in .58 seconds.
The impact changed tower structures in two critical ways, Mr.
Sunder said. First, of the 47 columns in the core of each building,
nine were either severed or badly damaged in the north tower, and 11 in
the south tower. Second, the impact dislodged the fireproofing that was
sprayed on the floors and the columns. As the fires ignited by the jet
fuel burned, the floors were weakened.
The floors played an important role in the structures, because they
connected the exterior supports--the pinstripe columns that gave the
towers their distinctive appearance--to the columns hidden in the cores
of the buildings. As the unprotected floors were weakened by fire, the
exterior columns bowed inwards, the investigators reported. In the
north tower, a photograph showed they had moved 55 inches off center a
few minutes before the collapse; in the south tower, they were 20
inches off center. As those columns became unstable, the building load
shifted, but the instability was too great and the cascade of collapse
began.
Much of the jet fuel burned outside the buildings in a fireball,
but enough remained inside to ignite the office furnishings and
building contents.
In its early phases, the investigation by the institute raised
serious questions about the adequacy of the original fireproofing
applied to the steel in the towers, and Mr. Sunder said those concerns
remained. But, he said, in the areas where the fires were most severe,
the amount of fireproofing that originally had been applied was
``moot'' because whatever had been there was knocked off by the planes.
Hundreds of people were trapped above the impact, on floors where
there was no immediate damage. This made escape routes an important
part of the agency's study.
During the design of the trade center, the Port Authority of New
York and New Jersey had decided to use a new version of the city
building code that did not require as many staircases as the earlier
edition. Instead of six staircases, including a specially reinforced
fire escape, the trade center had three stairs in each tower. The
investigators determined, though, that even the liberalized code
required a fourth staircase, to accommodate the more than 1,000 people
expected in the restaurant at the top of the north tower and at the
observation deck atop the south tower.
As an interstate agency, the Port Authority is not bound by local
building codes, but it had publicly pledged to ``meet or exceed'' the
city code in building the trade center. However, the institute
investigators determined that the Port Authority had not supplied
enough staircases.
``Once you go over 1,000 people on a floor, you need to have a
fourth stairway,'' said Richard W. Bukowski, a senior engineer with the
institute. A spokesman for the Port Authority said its engineers
believe that the findings are mistaken. New York City building
officials who reviewed the trade center plans, both in the 1960's and
after the 1993 terrorist bombing, had not raised any questions about
the missing staircase.
Glenn Corbett, a professor at John Jay College of Criminal Justice
and an adviser to the institute investigation, said he had asked about
the exits for the restaurant and the observation deck. ``Imagine what a
staircase in the right spot might have done for people that day,'' Mr.
Corbett said.
One of the documents included in yesterday's report showed that the
Port Authority was eager to cut down on the amount of space devoted to
stairs.
``The tower core should be redesigned to eliminate the fire towers
and to take advantage of the more lenient provisions regarding exit
stairs,'' wrote Malcolm P. Levy, the Port Authority's chief planning
engineer, who is now deceased.
In the impact area of the north tower, the three staircases were
about 70 feet apart and were destroyed immediately.
In the south tower, the plane hit on floors where the three
staircases were about 200 feet apart, and one of them survived at least
partially intact.
3-Year Federal Study of 9/11 Urges Rules for Safer Towers
By Jim Dwyer and Eric Lipton
The New York Times
June 22, 2005
After an exhaustive, three-year study of the collapse of the World
Trade Center, a federal panel will call for major changes in the
planning, construction and operation of skyscrapers to help people
survive not only terrorist attacks but also accidental or natural
calamities, according to officials and draft documents.
The recommendations, to be made public tomorrow, include a call for
a fundamental change in evacuation strategies for tall buildings: that
everyone should have a way out in an emergency, replacing the current
standard of providing evacuation capacity for a few floors near a fire
or emergency. The panel also called for sturdier elevators and
stairways, and found that current standards for testing fireproofing of
steel for tall buildings are flawed.
Taken together, the recommendations, by the National Institute of
Standards and Technology, are likely to open an intense national debate
over the costs of such changes and whether lessons for other
skyscrapers can reasonably be drawn from the extraordinary events of
Sept. 11.
The agency's proposals are not binding, but are meant to influence
the policies of cities and states across the country. Many of them have
become public in draft form during the three-year inquiry and have
prompted fierce lobbying or objections from prominent engineers,
building industry professionals, and the Port Authority of New York and
New Jersey, which built the trade center. While the agency has revised
certain aspects of its findings on what precisely happened at the trade
center, the package of recommendations makes it clear that the agency
has essentially held firm on its emphatic and demanding safety agenda
for the next generation of tall buildings in America.
S. Shyam Sunder, the engineer who oversaw the inquiry for the
agency, said the investigators worked to identify issues of ``safety
for the vast majority of buildings'' in fires, earthquakes, power
losses and sudden hurricanes. The costs of the changes are unknown, but
structural engineers suggested they would add two to five percent to
development costs of ordinary buildings.
The study disclosed that critical design benchmarks and code
standards used in the construction of the trade center--the time it
takes to walk down stairs, the distance separating stairways, and the
fire-resistance tests--turned out to have little relationship to the
experiences or needs of people inside the towers. These findings, Dr.
Sunder said, have broad application to buildings everywhere.
The investigation also found that most building codes do not
recognize that people on high floors are isolated and easily cut off
from help during an emergency.
The inquiry, conducted by more than 200 technical experts and
contractors working for the agency, amounts to a 10,000-page autopsy of
the trade center collapse. The report includes 25 pages of
recommendations, which will be released for the first time as a full
set in New York tomorrow.
``The whole purpose of the investigation was to make building
occupants and first responders safer in future disasters and to learn
whatever we could from what happened on 9/11,'' Dr. Sunder said. ``The
recommendations will be reasonable and achievable.''
In the United States, building codes are generally adopted by local
and State governments that use models developed by private groups like
the National Fire Protection Association, established by the insurance
industry, and the International Building Code Council, an organization
of government construction regulators. Those two groups have set up
committees to evaluate the recommendations.
``Will all the recommendations be accommodated verbatim in building
codes? I think the answer is no,'' said Mohammed M. Ettouney, a
principal at Weidlinger Associates, a New York-based structural
engineering firm that is doing the security-related design work on the
Freedom Tower planned for ground zero. ``But it will act as a lightning
rod for a debate that will now really get under way.''
The trade center towers, where 2,749 people died in the Sept. 11
attack, were only one-third occupied that morning. If the buildings had
been full, it is likely that 12,000 more people would have died because
of limited evacuation capacity, the investigation found.
Already, a proposal for wider exits--making it possible for people
to leave faster but reducing the amount of rentable space--has been
rejected by one major code-writing organization.
Others have suggested that it is folly to think different rules
might have forestalled the collapses.
``They are leading the public down the wrong path,'' said Jon
Magnusson, whose Seattle-based structural engineering firm, Magnusson
Klemencic Associates, is the descendant of the company that designed
the twin towers. ``They are saying we are going to fix the codes in
order to deal with Sept. 11th. The physics say that you can't do
that.''
Dr. Sunder says that is a mistaken reading of the investigation.
The agency, he said, does not suggest that buildings should be able to
stand up to airplane impacts. ``It is more cost effective to keep
terrorists away from airplanes, and airplanes away from buildings,'' he
said.
The trade center was built by the Port Authority, which is not
subject to any building codes. Despite promises by the Port Authority
to ``meet or exceed'' the New York City code, the federal investigation
found that the trade center had fewer exit staircases than required and
that the Port Authority never tested the fire resistance of the floors.
It also found no evidence that a rigorous engineering study supported
the authority's repeated public assertion that the towers could stand
up to the impact of a fully loaded commercial airliner.
In recent presentations, Dr. Sunder suggested that agencies that
are exempt from building codes, such as the Port Authority, should have
an independent party certify their compliance with codes, rather than
simply deciding for themselves.
The three-year, $16 million federal investigation was broken into
two primary parts. Using computers to reconstruct the attack, engineers
found that when the towers were struck, they redistributed load to
surviving columns. Once the fire weakened those remaining, extremely
stressed columns, whose fireproofing had been knocked off by the
planes, the structures collapsed, the report says.
That research found no flaw in the design of the towers that was a
critical factor in the collapse, Dr. Sunder said.
As the computer reconstruction of the towers proceeded, others
worked on a second inquiry: identifying weaknesses in building codes.
For example, investigators determined that if the towers had been
fully occupied, it would have taken about four hours for survivors to
exit, more than twice the time either tower stood and twice as long as
planners had estimated. That led to the call for changes in evacuation
planning.
At least some elevators in tall buildings should be built with more
robust shaft walls and with electrical systems that will not fail if
exposed to water, the report says, so that they can be used to evacuate
people who cannot descend long distances and to take firefighters to
high floors.
The investigation also raised hard questions about the usefulness
of a century-old furnace test that measures the fire resistance of
structural components. Last summer, the National Institute of Standards
and Technology arranged a furnace test of a 17-foot piece of steel and
concrete floor, the standard requirement at the time that the towers
were erected. The floor passed the test. However, the tower floors were
built not with 17-foot lengths of floor, but with 35- and 60-foot
lengths. When a 35-foot length was tested in the furnace, the floor
failed the fire-rating requirement.
The recommendations also say that tall buildings should be designed
to prevent ``progressive collapse,'' avoiding a cascade of failures
that can bring down a tower in seconds.
The study found that sprinklers, which can replace or reduce other
fire-protection systems, should have a redundant water supply or power
backups, to avoid being knocked out with one blow. Requirements for how
well spray-on fireproofing should adhere to the steel columns also must
be clarified, Dr. Sunder said.
The debate over integrating the proposals into building codes and
practices will undoubtedly be intense. Mr. Magnusson serves on the
special eight-member committee set up by the National Fire Protection
Association, along with Sally Regenhard, Chairwoman of the Skyscraper
Safety Campaign, who is one of the Nation's most vocal advocates for
tougher building codes. She and Monica Gabrielle, a co-founder of the
skyscraper campaign, lobbied Congress to finance the agency's
investigation and have demanded that the institute not dilute its
findings.
``We have to restore the public's perception of safety in
skyscrapers,'' said Ms. Regenhard, whose son, a probationary
firefighter, was killed in the attack.
The International Building Code Council moved last year to require
that towers taller than about 40 stories have three hours' worth of
fireproofing on structural elements, instead of two hours, but rejected
proposals that would require wider stairwells and reinforced concrete
or masonry walls in buildings over 25 stories.
The National Fire Protection Association, meanwhile, is expected to
act in August to require stairwells that serve 2,000 or more people to
be a foot wider than currently mandated, an official at the
organization said.
CORRECTION: A front-page article on Wednesday about a federal study
calling for major changes in skyscraper construction for safety in
light of the destruction of the World Trade Center misstated the name
of an organization of construction regulators. It is the International
Code Council, not the International Building Code Council.
9/11 Firefighters Told of Isolation Amid Disaster
By Jim Dwyer and Michelle O'Donnell
The New York Times
September 9, 2005
The firefighters had 29 minutes to get out of the World Trade
Center or die. Inside the north tower, though, almost none of them
realized how urgent it had become to leave.
They had no idea that less than 200 feet away, the south tower had
already collapsed in a life-crushing, earth-shaking heap. Nor did the
firefighters know that their commanders on the street, and police
helicopter pilots in the sky, were warning that the north tower was on
the edge of the same fate.
Until last month, the extent of their isolation from critical
information in the final 29 minutes had officially been a secret. For
three and a half years, Mayor Michael R. Bloomberg refused to release
the Fire Department's oral histories of Sept. 11, 2001. Under court
order, however, 12,000 pages were made public in August.
On close review, those accounts give a bleaker version of events
than either Mayor Bloomberg or former Mayor Rudolph W. Giuliani
presented to the 9/11 Commission. Both had said that many of the
firefighters who perished in the north tower realized the terrible
danger of the moment but chose to stay in the building to rescue
civilians.
They made no mention of what one oral history after another starkly
relates: that firefighters in the building said they were ``clueless''
and knew ``absolutely nothing'' about the reality of the gathering
crisis.
In stairwells or resting on floors, they could not see what had
happened or hear clearly stated warnings. Even after the south tower
fell, when few civilians remained in the lower floors of the north
tower, throngs of firefighters lingered in the lobby and near the 19th
floor as time ran down, the survivors said.
``That's the hard thing about it, knowing that there were so many
other people still left in that lobby that could have got out,''
Firefighter Hugh Mettham of Ladder Company 18 said.
Although no official summary specifies where the 343 firefighters
died in the rescue effort, a review by The New York Times of eyewitness
accounts, dispatch records and federal reports suggests that about 200
perished in the north tower or at its foot.
Of 58 firefighters who escaped the building and gave oral
histories, only four said they knew the south tower had already fallen.
Just three said they had heard radio warnings that the north tower was
also in danger of collapse. And some who had heard orders to evacuate
debated whether they were meant for civilians or firefighters.
`Not in My Wildest Dream'
``Not in my wildest dream did I think those towers were coming
down,'' said David Sandvik of Ladder 110.
The point made by both Mr. Giuliani and Mr. Bloomberg to the 9/11
Commission--that firefighters died because they delayed their own
departures while trying to save the lives of civilians and other
firefighters--is, in one sense, fully corroborated by the oral
histories.
Even so, measured against the waves of details in those accounts,
those valiant last-minute efforts explain just a fraction of the
firefighter deaths in the north tower, a small vivid thread running
through the broader fabric of the day.
No one in the Fire Department has tried to use the oral histories
to reconstruct the events that led to its human losses that day.
Although more than 500 interviews were conducted, just about 10 percent
of them involved people who had been inside the north tower. (No
firefighters in the south tower, which fell first, are known to have
survived its collapse.) Many who escaped from the north tower did not
give histories. Few follow-up questions were asked of those who did.
The ragged character of the records does not yield a clear
explanation for the isolation of the rescuers within the building, and
whether it was because of radio failure, a loss of command and control
or flaws in the Fire Department's management structure. Some
firefighters described receiving a radio message to evacuate; others
used strong language to characterize the communications gear as
useless.
Despite their spottiness, the oral histories fill out incomplete
chapters in the sprawling chronicle of what happened in New York that
morning, much of which took place far beyond the sight of television
cameras and their global audience.
Firefighters wondered aloud how they could have attacked a fire
reached at the end of a four-hour climb. They marveled at the decency
of office workers coming down the stairs, at the bellowing, dust-coated
chief on the sidewalk who herded the firefighters clear of the collapse
zone, at the voices of experience that brooked no hesitation.
The final moments of the department's senior leaders also rise from
the histories as a struggle to rescue dozens of firefighters trapped in
the Marriott Hotel after the south tower's collapse. As they worked,
the north tower crashed down, killing, among others, Chief of
Department Peter Ganci, First Deputy Commissioner William Feehan, and
Battalion Chiefs Ray Downey and Lawrence Stack.
Precisely 29 minutes earlier, at 9:59 a.m., the fall of the south
tower shook the north tower and stopped the slow, muscular tide of
rescuers. By then, the north tower firefighters had been on the move
for more than an hour. Each carrying about 100 pounds of gear, only a
few had climbed much higher than the 30th floor. Some recalled hearing
radio messages from individual firefighters who had made it as far as
the 40's.
The calamity next door--the collapse of one of the biggest
buildings in the world--was heard but not seen; felt but not
understood. The staircases had no windows. Radio communication was
erratic. Few firefighters even knew a second plane had struck the other
building.
From the street, Chief Ganci twice ordered firefighters to evacuate
the north tower, according to Chief Albert Turi, but it was not clear
who inside, if anyone, heard him. Even Chief Turi, standing a few feet
away, said it had not come over his radio.
Still, many decided to leave after hearing a rumor of a partial
collapse some floors above them, or because they assumed another plane
had hit.
On the 37th floor, Daniel Sterling, of Engine Company 24, had
stopped with firefighters from Ladder 5 and Engine 33--who did not
survive--when the building rattled. A moment later, Firefighter
Sterling said, Chief John Paolillo appeared.
``He thought there was a partial collapse of the 65th floor of our
building and that we should drop everything and leave,'' Firefighter
Sterling said.
`Get Up and Go, Go, Go'
A few floors below, around the 30th or 31st floor, Chief Paolillo
was spotted again. ``He was yelling, `Leave your equipment and just get
up and go, go, go,' like that,'' Lt. Brian Becker of Engine 28 said.
Chief Paolillo died.
The word to leave was passed to the 27th floor, where many
firefighters were resting, including Michael Wernick of Ladder 9. ``I
know that there was no urgency at that point trying to get out of the
building,'' he said.
``Do you think anyone around you was aware that the other building
collapsed?'' an interviewer asked.
``No,'' he replied.
One exception was Firefighter John Drumm with Engine 39, who said
that on the 22nd floor, he heard a transmission: ``Imminent collapse of
the north tower. Immediate evacuation.''
Then he made a point repeated in nearly every interview: ``From
what I saw on the way down, very, very few civilians were left.''
Firefighter Sterling said, ``There was nobody in the staircase on
the way down.''
Lieutenant Becker said, ``There were no civilians to speak of in
our stairway. There were a couple of stragglers being helped by
somebody or other.''
Probationary Firefighter Robert Byrne of Engine 24, working his
first fire, reached the 37th floor. ``I remember going up the stairs
took us over the hour,'' he said. ``Getting down the stairs took maybe
10 minutes, not even.''
Also on 37, Capt. John Fischer of Ladder 20 discovered that two of
his company had gone up ahead. ``He was screaming at them for them to
get back down,'' said Lt. Gregg Hansson of Engine 24, who was with
Captain Fischer. ``Then he went up to get them.'' Captain Fischer and
his men died in the collapse.
Firefighter William Green of Engine 6 was one of the few who said
he knew the other tower had fallen. On the 37th floor, ``someone opened
the door from the 36th floor and said Two World Trade Center just fell
down,'' he said. Over the radio, he heard ``Mayday, evacuate.''
Slowed by firefighters entering the staircase below him, he
switched sides. ``In hindsight, I think that's what saved my life,'' he
said.
He did not dawdle. ``Around the fourth floor, I passed this
civilian--he might have been 450 pounds,'' Firefighter Green said. ``He
was taking baby steps like this. I walked right past him like all the
other firemen. I felt like a heel when I'm walking past him, and I'm
thinking to myself, what does this guy think of me?''
Yet other chronicles show that a very heavy man in that location
was eventually dragged to safety by rescuers who included Firefighter
Pat Kelly of Rescue 18. Having helped move the man outside, Firefighter
Kelly was the only member of his squad to survive. He did not give an
oral history.
Elsewhere, crowds of firefighters lingered.
Lt. William Walsh of Ladder 1 said he heard a Mayday to evacuate
when he was around the 19th floor, but did not know that a plane had
struck the other building, much less that it had collapsed. As he
descended, he saw firefighters who were not moving.
No Rush to Get Out
``They were hanging out in the stairwell and in the occupancy and
they were resting,'' Lieutenant Walsh said. ``I told them, `Didn't you
hear the Mayday? Get out.' They were saying, `Yeah, we'll be right with
you, Lou.' They just didn't give it a second thought. They just
continued with their rest.''
Three court officers reported seeing as many as 100 firefighters
resting on the 19th floor minutes before the building fell, but they
were not questioned by the Fire Department.
Mayor Bloomberg, in a letter to the 9/11 Commission, wrote: ``We
know for a fact that many firefighters continued their rescue work
despite hearing Maydays and evacuation orders and knowing the south
tower had fallen.''
Asked to reconcile this statement with the oral histories, the city
Law Department cited the accounts of eight firefighters and said that
each of them surely had spread the word about the collapse of the other
tower. In fact, in six of those oral histories, the firefighters
specifically said they did not know the other building had fallen.
In the lobby, just yards from safety, survivors said that
uncertainty doomed many firefighters.
John Moribito of Ladder 10 said there were maybe ``40 or 50 members
that were standing fast in the lobby.'' Roy Chelsen of Engine 28 said,
``There were probably 20 or 30 guys down in the lobby mulling around.''
The interviewer asked, ``They weren't trying to get out?''
``They were just--no, no,'' Firefighter Chelsen recalled.
His officer, Lieutenant Becker said, ``There was chaos in the
lobby. It was random people running around. There was no structure.
There were no crowds. There was no--no operation of any kind going on,
nothing. There was no evacuation.''
Firefighters with Ladder 11 and Engine 4 came down together to the
lobby, but not all made it out. ``Everyone is standing there, waiting
to hear what's going to happen next, what's going on,'' Frank Campagna
of Ladder 11 said.
His company left, and a moment later, ``it came down on top of
us,'' Firefighter Campagna said. ``Four Engine obviously didn't make it
out. They were with us the whole time, so I'm assuming they were still
in the lobby at that time.''
The firefighters of Ladder 9 lingered briefly, and most were clear
of the building for less than a minute when it fell. Firefighter
Wernick remembered seeing two members of his company in the lobby,
Jeffrey Walz and Gerard Baptiste. They did not escape. The funeral for
Firefighter Baptiste, whose remains were identified this year, was held
on Wednesday.
A Figure Coated in Dust
Over and over, firefighters who had left the building in those
final minutes, bewildered by the sudden retreat, the ruined lobby, the
near-empty street, mentioned a chief covered in the dust of the first
collapse, standing just outside the north tower on West Street.
Some knew his name: Deputy Assistant Chief Albert Turi.
``He was screaming, `Just keep moving. Don't stop,' '' Firefighter
Thomas Orlando of Engine 65 recalled, adding, ``I still didn't know the
south tower collapsed.'' Chief Turi, he said, ``saved an awful lot of
people.'' The chief has since retired.
In blunt speech, free of the mythic glaze that varnished much 9/11
discourse, some firefighters wondered why an endless line of rescuers
had been sent to an unquenchable fire that raged 1,000 feet up.
``I think if this building had collapsed an hour later, we would
have had a thousand firemen in there,'' said Firefighter Timothy
Marmion of Engine 16, who carried a woman on a stretcher from the
staircase to an ambulance.
``If it would have collapsed three hours later,'' he said, ``we
would have had 10,000 firemen in those buildings.''
Had the buildings not fallen, the gear-laden firefighters would
have needed about four hours--almost as long as it takes to fly across
the country--to reach workers trapped on the high floors.
``We were just as much victims as everybody that was in the
building,'' Firefighter Derek Brogan of Engine 5 said.
``We didn't have a chance to do anything,'' he added. ``We didn't
have a chance to put the fire out, which was really all we were trying
to do.''
Aron Pilhofer provided computer analysis for this article.
BUILDING SAFETY: Directing the Herd: Crowds and the Science of
Evacuation
By John Bohannon
Science, Vol. 310, Issue 5746, 219-221
October 14, 2005
No skyscrapers are designed to be able to disgorge all their
occupants in a dire emergency like the attack on the World Trade Center
towers. Can they be made safer?
VIENNA, AUSTRIA--In the hour and 42 minutes that elapsed between
the first airplane strike on the World Trade Center (WTC) on 11
September 2001 and the collapse of both towers, more than 2000 people
failed to escape. Roughly 500 occupants are believed to have died
immediately upon impact, and more than 1500 trapped in upper floors
died in the aftermath. The toll might have been far worse, according to
studies presented here at the International Conference on Pedestrian
and Evacuation Dynamics on 28 to 30 September. Had the same attack come
when the towers were at their full capacity of 20,000 people each, says
Jason Averill, a fire safety engineer at the National Institute of
Standards and Technology (NIST) in Gaithersburg, Maryland, the
staircases would have quickly grid-locked, resulting in some 14,000
deaths.
No tall building is designed to be fully evacuated. Instead,
regulations typically require that a few floors be emptied, assuming
nothing worse than a localized fire. ``This has to change,'' says Shyam
Sunder, Deputy Director of NIST's Building and Fire Research
Laboratory, ``because in the lifetime of a building, there will be
situations where you've got to get everyone out.''
But getting everyone out of harm's way will require a deeper
understanding of the collective behavior of crowds, says Jake Pauls, a
veteran building safety consultant now based in Silver Spring,
Maryland. Researchers are ``just scratching the surface,'' says
Averill, although they have made leaps and bounds over the past few
years. Studies presented at the meeting offered a glimpse of how
evacuations could be conducted more safely.
Modeling mobs
Until recently, there was little science in emergency planning,
says Ed Galea, a fire safety engineer at the University of Greenwich,
U.K. That is changing as scientists try to capture the behavior of
crowds using computer simulations. A diverse effort is under way to
refine these models with real-world data. For example, a team led by
Jean Berrou, a computer scientist at the Maia Institute in Monaco, has
been secretly filming pedestrians in 10 different cities around the
world, analyzing nearly 1000 hours of video to measure different
cultural patterns of walking. For example, he says, ``pedestrians in
London are faster than those in New York.''
The goal is to find rules that individual pedestrians unconsciously
follow to navigate crowded spaces. ``What's amazing is that people
don't collide with each other more often on a typical city sidewalk,''
says Jon Kerridge, a computer scientist at Napier University in
Edinburgh, U.K. On a scale of microseconds, people negotiate priority
with cues transmitted through body language. ``If we can understand how
that works,'' he says, we might learn why certain geometries of
corridors and portals work better than others.
The next step is to understand how an emergency changes everything.
Researchers use a parameter called drive to define the level of
motivation people have to go from A to B. ``This is where things get
very difficult to model,'' says Kerridge, ``because we're talking about
innate, personal factors.''
Strange things happen when fear is added to the mix. Take the
paradox that the more urgently people want to leave a crowded room with
a narrow exit, the longer it takes to get out. That occurs in part
because of a breakdown in normal communications. Daniel Parisi and
Claudio Dorso, computer scientists at the University of Buenos Aires,
Argentina, have found that the optimum exit speed is a fast walk of
about 1.38 meters per second.
Such studies reveal that ``the fundamental unit of a crowd is not
the individual but the cluster,'' says Kerridge. This is because ``the
first thing we do in an emergency situation is look to each other for
support and information.'' But that response slows movement
dramatically. On a larger scale, people form groups similar to animal
herds in which individuals let the crowd do the navigating, often
passing right by exits within clear view.
Learning to predict and control these behaviors may save lives--and
not just in big buildings. The main killer when people mass is not
trampling, as is commonly thought, but ``crowd crush.'' When two large
groups merge or file into a dead end, the density makes it impossible
to fall down, says Pauls. But the accumulated pushing creates forces
that can bend steel barriers. ``The situation is horrible,'' he says:
``Suddenly everything goes quiet as peoples' lungs are compressed. No
one realizes what's happening as people die silently.'' Dangers like
these make designing architecture and procedures for evacuation like a
tightrope walk, says Pauls: ``You have to get people out fast, but
safely.''
Revisiting 9/11
Armed with these insights, two separate groups have been trying to
model the WTC evacuation to see what lessons can be learned. In 2002,
the U.S. Congress ordered NIST to investigate the WTC safety and
emergency response, and the U.K. government commissioned a team led by
Galea, which has paved the way for a larger study called HEED. ``This
was one of the largest full-scale evacuations of people in modern
times,'' says Galea.
To build a minute-by-minute chronology of the event, the NIST team
has conducted more than 1000 interviews with survivors by telephone,
and Galea's team is set to do up to 2000 face-to-face interviews next
year. One of the most surprising discoveries, says Galea, is the long
lag time between the first attack and the start of evacuation. Galea's
team found that although 77 percent of survivors began the egress
within five minutes of the impact, it took another hour for the next 19
percent to get going, and four percent stayed in their offices for over
an hour. ``In some cases people were more worried about saving their
computers,'' he says.
Both teams have incorporated these data into a model called EXODUS,
designed by Galea. When the NIST team used the model to play out the
WTC disaster with full occupancy, it estimated roughly 14,000 deaths,
most among those stuck on the stairs. This didn't surprise Pauls.
``Those stairs were not designed to handle a full evacuation,'' he
says. ``In fact, no tall building is prepared for it.'' Sunder says
NIST is pushing to include full evacuation for many tall buildings in
the next review of U.S. building codes in 2008. ``There is a lot of
resistance'' to requiring full evacuation capability even after the WTC
attacks because people ``believe that was a one-time-only event,'' he
says. But he notes that a building's typical lifetime is a century;
designers should be preparing for other ``extreme events'' like multi-
floor fires, earthquakes, and hurricanes.
Until the existing tall buildings are replaced with a new
generation, experts say, improvements will have to come through better
emergency procedures and retrofitting. For one, elevators should be
made usable during emergencies, says Sunder. WTC tower number 2 emptied
far more efficiently than tower 1 because its elevators were available
before it was hit by the second plane, the studies found. New elevator
systems that include independent power supplies and computers that
prevent them from opening on a burning floor will be available within a
few years, says Averill. Galea suggests another possible innovation:
adding sky bridges to create new escape routes linked to other
buildings. His simulation of a WTC evacuation with the towers linked by
a bridge was far more efficient.
Evacuation experts say they are continuing to look at all kinds of
evacuation backups, even far-out ones. For example, a pole system that
can be attached to the outside of buildings is being tested. By
strapping into a vest attached to the pole, people could slide down
safely using electromagnetic brakes. Another option: People could jump
into fabric tubes and bounce their way down to the bottom--although
this would likely cause friction burns. Even parachutes have been
proposed as a last chance resource.
``But really, the best thing we can do to make these buildings
safer,'' says Pauls, ``is to focus on the basics.'' That means better
stairs, elevators, and fire drills.