[House Hearing, 109 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
METHAMPHETAMINE EPIDEMIC
ELIMINATION ACT
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON CRIME, TERRORISM,
AND HOMELAND SECURITY
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
ON
H.R. 3889
__________
SEPTEMBER 27, 2005
__________
Serial No. 109-61
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary
Available via the World Wide Web: http://judiciary.house.gov
______
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COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, Jr., Wisconsin, Chairman
HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois JOHN CONYERS, Jr., Michigan
HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina HOWARD L. BERMAN, California
LAMAR SMITH, Texas RICK BOUCHER, Virginia
ELTON GALLEGLY, California JERROLD NADLER, New York
BOB GOODLATTE, Virginia ROBERT C. SCOTT, Virginia
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio MELVIN L. WATT, North Carolina
DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California ZOE LOFGREN, California
WILLIAM L. JENKINS, Tennessee SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas
CHRIS CANNON, Utah MAXINE WATERS, California
SPENCER BACHUS, Alabama MARTIN T. MEEHAN, Massachusetts
BOB INGLIS, South Carolina WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts
JOHN N. HOSTETTLER, Indiana ROBERT WEXLER, Florida
MARK GREEN, Wisconsin ANTHONY D. WEINER, New York
RIC KELLER, Florida ADAM B. SCHIFF, California
DARRELL ISSA, California LINDA T. SANCHEZ, California
JEFF FLAKE, Arizona CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland
MIKE PENCE, Indiana DEBBIE WASSERMAN SCHULTZ, Florida
J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia
STEVE KING, Iowa
TOM FEENEY, Florida
TRENT FRANKS, Arizona
LOUIE GOHMERT, Texas
Philip G. Kiko, General Counsel-Chief of Staff
Perry H. Apelbaum, Minority Chief Counsel
------
Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security
HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina, Chairman
DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California ROBERT C. SCOTT, Virginia
MARK GREEN, Wisconsin SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas
TOM FEENEY, Florida MAXINE WATERS, California
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio MARTIN T. MEEHAN, Massachusetts
RIC KELLER, Florida WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts
JEFF FLAKE, Arizona ANTHONY D. WEINER, New York
MIKE PENCE, Indiana
J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia
LOUIE GOHMERT, Texas
Michael Volkov, Acting Chief Counsel
Elizabeth Sokul, Special Counsel for Intelligence
and Homeland Security
Jason Cervenak, Full Committee Counsel
Bobby Vassar, Minority Counsel
C O N T E N T S
----------
SEPTEMBER 27, 2005
OPENING STATEMENT
Page
The Honorable Howard Coble, a Representative in Congress from the
State of North Carolina, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Crime,
Terrorism, and Homeland Security............................... 1
The Honorable Robert C. Scott, a Representative in Congress from
the State of Virginia, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on
Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security........................ 2
WITNESSES
The Honorable Mark Souder, a Representative in Congress from the
State of Indiana
Oral Testimony................................................. 5
Prepared Statement............................................. 7
The Honorable Mark Kennedy, a Representative in Congress from the
State of Minnesota
Oral Testimony................................................. 16
Prepared Statement............................................. 17
Mr. Joseph T. Rannazzisi, Deputy Chief, Office of Enforcement
Operations, U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration
Oral Testimony................................................. 18
Prepared Statement............................................. 20
Mr. Barry M. Lester, Ph.D., Professor of Psychiatry and Human
Behavior and Pediatrics, Brown University Medical School
Oral Testimony................................................. 26
Prepared Statement............................................. 28
APPENDIX
Material Submitted for the Hearing Record
Prepared Statement of the Honorable Robert C. Scott, a
Representative in Congress from the State of Virginia, and
Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland
Security....................................................... 47
Prepared Statement of Freda S. Baker, Deputy Director, Family and
Children's Services, Alabama State Department of Human
Resources...................................................... 49
Prepared Statement of Laura J. Birkmeyer, Chair, National
Alliance for Drug Endangered Children, and Executive Assistant
to U.S. Attorney, Southern District of California, United
States Department of Justice................................... 55
Publication entitled ``The Meth Epidemic in America, Two Surveys
of U.S. Counties: The Criminal Effect of Meth on Communities,
The Impact of Meth on Children, submitted by the National
Associatino of Counties (NACo)................................. 62
Letter from A. Bradford Card, Legislative Liaison, National
Troopers Coalition to the Honorable Mark Souder and the
Honorable Elijah Cummings...................................... 74
Letter from Donald Baldwin, Washington Director, Federal Criminal
Investigators Association to the Honorable Howard Coble........ 75
Letter from Chuck Canterbury, National President, Grand Lodge
Fraternal Order of Police (FOP) to the Honorable Mark Souder... 76
Letter from William J. Johnson, Executive Director, National
Association of Police Organizations, Inc....................... 78
Prepared Statement of the Therapeutic Communities of America
(TCA).......................................................... 79
Prepared Statement of the Food Marketing Institute (FMI)......... 80
Prepared Statement of the American Council on Regulatory
Compliance..................................................... 82
Article entitled ``The Mexican Connection,'' Steve Suo, June 5,
2005, The Oregonian, submitted by the Honorable Robert C. Scott 85
Article entitled ``More potent supply of meth wipes out success
against home labs,'' Steve Suo, September 25, 2005, The
Oregonian, submitted by the Honorable Robert C. Scott.......... 95
Letter from various medical and psychological researchers to the
Subcommittee................................................... 100
Additional Prepared Statement of Dr. Barry M. Lester, Professor
of Psychiatry & Human Behavior and Pediatrics, Brown University
Medical School................................................. 107
METHAMPHETAMINE EPIDEMIC
ELIMINATION ACT
----------
TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 27, 2005
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism,
and Homeland Security
Committee on the Judiciary,
Washington, DC.
The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 4:02 p.m., in
Room 2141, Rayburn House Office Building, the Honorable Howard
Coble (Chair of the Subcommittee) presiding.
Mr. Coble. Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. We welcome
you all to this important hearing to examine the national
epidemic of metham----
Meth--I did it without stumbling yesterday--with meth
abuse; and specifically, H.R. 3889, the ``Meth Epidemic
Elimination Act,'' a bipartisan proposal which was introduced
by Representative Souder, our friend from the heartland, and
the Chairman of the full Judiciary Committee of the House.
In the last few years, the problem of meth abuse has grown
dramatically from what was typically characterized as a local
or a regional problem to a problem of national dimension. Some
contend that meth is now the most significant drug abuse
problem in the country, surpassing marijuana.
The impact of meth abuse is complicated by the
dangerousness of the drug, the ease of production, the toxicity
of the drug itself, the production byproducts, exposure of
children to the drug when present in locations where meth is
produced, the environmental cost of meth labs, and the
significant strain of law enforcement resources resulting from
enforcement and clean-up actions.
The National Association of Counties recently published a
survey that revealed that 60 percent of responding counties
stated meth was their largest drug problem. Sixty-seven percent
reported increases in meth-related arrests.
Most of the meth found in the United States is produced by
Mexico-based and California-based Mexican traffickers using
superlabs. The rapid spread of meth, however, also can be
attributed to the proliferation of small, toxic laboratories
which have had a dramatic impact on communities across the
nation.
No longer are these labs limited to what are termed ``mom
and pop labs,'' but now have become more sophisticated and
organized production and distribution outlets; causing more and
more law enforcement resources to be used to dismantle such
operations and then to clean up the labs. As a result, local
law enforcement agencies are strained by the sheer number of
these labs and the accompanying clean-up costs.
Meth labs also have been linked to significant instances of
child abuse. Children face specific dangers from inhalation,
absorption, or ingestion of toxic chemicals or contaminated
food that may result in respiratory difficulties, chemical
burns, or ultimately, death. Between 2000 and 2003, more than
10,000 children were affected by meth manufacturing.
Approximately one in ten children tested positive for meth. And
of those, children less than 6 years of age were twice as
likely to test positive, as were children between the ages of
seven and 14.
In San Diego, for example, more than 400 children have been
taken into protective custody in the past 12 months. More than
95 percent of these children come from homes where there was
meth use and trafficking.
The meth problem has significant consequences for the
environment as well. The production of one pound of meth
releases poisonous gas into the atmosphere, and creates 5 to 7
pounds of toxic waste. Many laboratory operators dump the toxic
waste down household drains, in fields and yards, and onto
rural roads. In 2004, the DEA administered over 10,000 State
and local clandestine laboratory clean-ups at a cost of
approximately $17.8 million.
Given the spread of meth abuse, and the near-crisis impact
on local communities and law enforcement, there is no question
that something must be done to resolve the problem, and done
now.
I want to commend my colleagues; the Chairman, Chairman
Sensenbrenner; Representative Souder; Representative Kennedy,
from the northern tier; and others who have worked so
diligently on this issue and recently introduced H.R. 3889, a
bipartisan proposal which represents a good first step to
addressing the problem. We are looking forward to hearing from
our distinguished panel of witnesses.
And I am now pleased to recognize the distinguished
gentleman from Virginia, the Ranking Member of this
Subcommittee, the Honorable Bobby Scott.
Mr. Scott. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I'm pleased
to join you in convening the hearing on Methamphetamine
Epidemic Elimination Act. Unfortunately, I am not able to join
you in supporting the bill in its present form.
In the last 15 to 20 years, meth abuse has grown to what
some now refer to epidemic proportions in parts of this
country. We've been making efforts in Congress for years to
address the meth problem. The Subcommittee on Crime held six
field hearings on production, trafficking, and use in 1999, in
Arkansas, California, New Mexico, and Kansas. Testimony was
received from numerous witnesses, including former addicts,
family members of victims of meth-related violence, law
enforcement professionals, prevention and addiction treatment
professionals.
Despite what we heard about the need for treatment and
family support to get people out of meth's grip and back on
track, the basic approach of Congress has been to increase the
number of severe mandatory minimum sentences. Yet, the fact is
that this approach clearly has not worked to stem the tide of
meth. In fact, there's no evidence to suggest that it ever
will.
Evidence shows that treatment works to stem addiction and
abuse. Recently, in an open letter to the news media and
policymakers, 92 researchers and treatment professionals stated
that, and I quote:
``Claims that meth users are virtually untreatable, with
small recovery rates, lack foundation in medical research.
Analysis of drop-out, retention and treatment, and
reincarceration rates, and other measures of outcome in recent
studies indicate that meth users respond in an equivalent
manner as individuals admitted for other drug abuse problems.
Research also suggests that the need to improve and expand
treatment offered--Research also suggests the need to improve
and expand treatment offered to meth users.''
Drug courts have proven especially successful in the case
of meth treatment as an alternative to the ``get tough''
approach. An Orange County, California, Superior Court drug
court program is an example of a program that has effectively
addressed the meth problem. The court requires a minimum of an
18-month treatment program in which a graduate must be drug-
free for at least 6 months, have stable living arrangements,
and be employed or enrolled in school.
This has shown to have a significant retention rate, with a
much lower recidivism rate than you would expect for drug
users. Nonetheless, time and time again, Congress has responded
to this serious problem primarily with more and harsher
mandatory minimums.
In the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Congress established a
5-year mandatory minimum for 10 grams of pure meth or 100 grams
of meth mixture, and a 10-year minimum for 100 grams. In 1999,
Congress heightened the sentencing for ``ice.'' Then again, in
1996, Congress responded to the still growing problem with even
tougher mandatory minimums, by cutting in half the quantities
of the substance that would trigger the 5- and 10-year
mandatory minimums.
In the meanwhile, the epidemic has grown exponentially,
despite these ever increasing punitive measures passed by
Congress. And States, unfortunately, have taken a similar
approach: enacting harsher and harsher penalties, putting more
and more emphasis on law enforcement. Yet they have had no more
success than Congress with this approach.
And a recent series of articles in the Oregonian newspaper
reflected the frustrating results of this approach in Oklahoma.
And Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to place this article
in the record.
Mr. Coble. Without objection.
Mr. Scott. The article pointed out that while Oklahoma had
great success in slashing the number of home meth labs through
vigorous law enforcement, it failed to curb meth use. They
found that in place of local labs, a massive influx of meth
made by Mexican superlabs--where tons of the predicate, the
precursor chemicals, can be obtained--had come into their
locality. And this they found was cheaper and better quality
than the locally made stuff.
Despite the clear evidence that increasing penalties do not
stem the spread or impact of meth, and despite the evidence
that treatment does significantly decrease the problem, the
response in this bill, yet again, is to increase mandatory
minimum sentences even more.
This bill would further lower the threshold amount of meth
that triggers harsh mandatory minimums. The main problem with
this approach is that it will actually make meth more
available. This is because lowering the quantity threshold of
triggering mandatory minimums will cause Federal prosecutors to
concentrate even more on low-level offenders that are now being
left to the States to prosecute. This will simply mean that we
will be sentencing the same low-level offenders with longer
sentences, including those who are tied up in conspiracy and
attempt laws which punish bit players the same as kingpins.
This is what we have seen with the so-called crack
epidemic, where we are seeing that over two-thirds of those
sentenced for crack are low-level offenders--generally, addicts
dealing to supply their habit. And now, here we go in what Yogi
Berra would say is ``deja vu all over again.''
So Mr. Chairman, I look forward to the testimony of our
witnesses. And I hope that they will enlighten us on proven
ways to stem this problem; rather that simply doing what we
always do: put low-level addicts in prison longer, while the
problem continues on. I yield back.
Mr. Coble. I thank the gentleman from Virginia. And we have
been joined by the distinguished gentleman from Massachusetts,
Mr. Bill Delahunt. Bill, good to have you with us as well.
It is the practice of the Subcommittee, gentlemen, to swear
in the witnesses, if you all will stand and raise your hands.
[Witnesses sworn.]
Mr. Coble. Let the record show that each of the witnesses
answered in the affirmative. You may be seated.
Today we have four distinguished witnesses before us, and
we appreciate your attendance. And we appreciate, those in the
audience, your attendance as well.
Our first witness is the Honorable Mark Souder.
Representative Souder serves the Third Congressional District
in the State of Indiana. He was first elected to the Congress
in 1994. He currently serves as Chairman of the Government
Reform Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human
Resources.
Prior to serving in Congress, Representative Souder worked
for former U.S. Senator Dan Coates for 10 years. Last week,
Representative Souder introduced H.R.3889, after conducting
extensive hearings on the meth abuse issue.
Our second witness is the Honorable Mark Kennedy.
Representative Kennedy serves the Sixth Congressional District
of the State of Minnesota, and was first elected to the
Congress in 2000. He is currently a Member of the
Transportation and Infrastructure Committee and the Financial
Services Committee.
Prior to serving in Congress, Representative Kennedy had a
successful 20-year business career. And he also dedicated
himself to meth abuse issues, and played a critical role in the
formulation of the bill before us, H.R.3889.
Our third witness is Joseph Rannazzisi, the Deputy Chief of
the Office of Enforcement Operations at the Drug Enforcement
Administration. Mr. Rannazzisi is also assigned the position of
Acting-Deputy Assistant Administrator of the Office of
Diversion Control. In this capacity, he oversees the office's
effort to protect--detect and investigate the diversion of
pharmaceutical controlled substances.
Previously, he served as assistant special agent in charge
at the DEA Detroit field office, and as section chief of the
dangerous drugs and chemicals section, where he coordinated
clandestine laboratory enforcement operations worldwide. He
received a B.S. in pharmacy from Butler University, and a J.D.
from the Michigan State University.
Our final witness today is Dr. Barry Lester, professor of
psychiatry and human behavior at Brown University School of
Medicine. Dr. Lester is also director of the Brown Center for
the Study of Children at Risk, and the Infant Development
Center. He is currently a member of the National Institutes of
Health's National Advisory Council on Drug Abuse, and the
Family Treatment Drug Court Steering Committee.
Previously, Dr. Lester worked as an assistant professor of
pediatrics at the Harvard School of Medicine. He earned his
undergraduate degree at Boston University, and his Ph.D. from
the Michigan State University.
And as I said earlier, gentlemen, good to have you all with
us. And I want to apologize in advance. I must attend a Coast
Guard homeland security briefing at five o'clock at the
Transportation Committee, so I will be departing then. But do
not mistake my departure for lack of interest in this very
important subject. And I will follow up what I missed in the
interim subsequently.
Gentlemen, we adhere to the 5-minute rule here. And your
first 4 minutes, you will see a green light in the panel before
you. An amber light will then appear, advising you that you
have 1 minute to go. At the end of that 5 minutes, then Mr.
Scott and I will call the U.S. marshal to haul you into--I'm
kidding you. [Laughter.]
But if you could, adhere to that red light. When the red
light appears, that is your indication that the 5 minutes have
elapsed. We have read your written testimony, and will
reexamine it.
Again, we're delighted to have you all with us to address
problems surrounding this very, very serious encounter that we
face every day. And Mr. Souder, we will start with you.
TESTIMONY OF THE HONORABLE MARK SOUDER, A REPRESENTATIVE IN
CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF INDIANA
Mr. Souder. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And first, greetings
from Indiana, where we buy your wonderful North Carolina
furniture--that is, whatever isn't made in China--and also,
supply you with basketball players, so you can look respectable
in North Carolina. [Laughter.]
Mr. Coble. Well, now, if the gentleman will suspend--and I
won't penalize your time--the furniture, I hope, came from my
district, the furniture capital of the world--or at least, it
was last month.
Mr. Souder. I thank the Chairman, and I thank you and
Ranking Member Scott and Members of the Subcommittee for
inviting me to testify on behalf of the Methamphetamine
Epidemic Elimination Act. I believe this is a vital first step,
a bipartisan step, and I hope the Subcommittee and the full
Committee will support its passage.
I could fill my whole time thanking different Members, but
first I'd like to thank Chairman Sensenbrenner of the full
Committee, and you, Chairman Coble, for co-sponsoring this bill
and the assistance of your staff in putting this together. I'd
also like to thank Majority Whip Roy Blunt for his co-
sponsorship, and Representative Mark Kennedy and Representative
Darlene Hooley for providing much of the content of this bill
and for their consistently strong leadership on the House floor
on meth issues; as well as the four co-chairs of the
Congressional Meth Caucus, Representative Rick Larsen,
Representative Ken Calvert, Representative Leonard Boswell, and
Representative Chris Cannon, for their and their staffs'
assistance and support. And to every other Member who has co-
sponsored this bill, I express my deep appreciation.
I don't have to tell you, and I'm not going to get into the
details of the meth threat, but as Chairman of the Government
Reform Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, we've held ten
hearings since 2001, not only in Washington, D.C., but rural
Arkansas, Ohio, Indiana, suburban and urban Minnesota,
California, Hawaii, and urban Detroit. There are regional and
local variations of the problem, but one thing remains
constant: it's almost unique in its combination of cheapness,
ease of manufacture, and devastating impact on the user and the
community.
There are three aspects we need to make sure that we look
at when we're looking at these types of things. First, meth
presents a unique challenge to Federal, State, and local law
enforcement. It's toxic. It ties up local law enforcement, and
causes lots of money to be spent in clean-up.
Secondly, the damage this drug causes is not confined to
the addict. It's terrible effects on everyone around the user,
particularly children. California did the first child abuse law
related to this; and child welfare agencies said 40 percent of
child welfare in Saint Paul, Minnesota. We heard that it, from
a standing start, in 12 months, went from zero to 80 percent of
the kids in child protection were from meth parents.
And I'd also like, with your permission, Mr. Chairman, to
introduce the county survey that showed that it was the number
one problem--their association survey--into the record, along
with statements from two experts on the impact of meth on
children that were provided to my Subcommittee in July.
Mr. Coble. Without objection.
Mr. Souder. The third major point is the meth threat is not
confined to small local labs, but extends well beyond our
borders to the superlabs controlled by large, sophisticated
Mexican drug trafficking organizations and the international
trade in pseudoephedrine and other precursor chemicals fueling
those superlabs.
As Mr. Scott mentioned, you can't just push one, or you'll
go over to the other. You have to have a combination strategy.
Any legislation that tries to deal with the meth threat must
address all these critical aspects.
After meeting with Chairman Wolf, who after reading a
couple of amendments on the House floor said, ``Let's see if we
can do something in combination, tie it to the appropriations
bills, because we know they have to pass the Senate, and we
need to take some meth action this year.'' After meeting with
him and a bipartisan group of nearly 20 other Members in my
office who are deeply concerned about this, we worked with my
Subcommittee, with the meth caucus, as well as your Committee
and other authorizing Committees to come up with this package.
It includes the following four basic categories: First,
close a number of loopholes in Federal regulation of meth
precursor chemicals, such as pseudoephedrine, including a per-
transaction sales limit; import and manufacturing quotas, to
ensure no oversupply leads to diversion. Mexico is pouring in
huge amounts over what they need; regulation of the wholesale
spot market.
A second is, require reporting of major meth precursor
exporters and importers, and would hold them accountable for
their efforts to prevent diversion to meth production.
Three, toughen Federal penalties against meth traffickers
and smugglers--has nothing to do with possession; only
possession with intent to traffic.
Four, apply environmental regulations to those who harm the
environment and endanger human health through meth lab
operation.
Each of these are vital. But we need to remember, we did
not address two things. We do not address the issue of
pseudoephedrine or similar chemical products that should be
added to Schedule V. I have personal reservations with this,
but this bill is silent on this, and it could be in combination
with that or not.
Secondly, we did not include any significant new grant
programs for State and local agencies to deal with meth. I
believe we need to do more in treatment. I believe we need to
do more in multiple areas. This is the Judiciary Committee.
You're not in the grant business. And we need to look at how to
do more; as we do drug treatment, how to make some of that
targeted toward meth. That I agree with, but this isn't the
bill to do that.
I yield back the balance.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Souder follows:]
Prepared Statement of the Honorable Mark E. Souder, a Representative in
Congress from the State of Indiana
Chairman Coble, Ranking Member Scott, and Members of the
Subcommittee, thank you for inviting me to testify in support of H.R.
3889, the ``Methamphetamine Epidemic Elimination Act.'' I believe this
bipartisan bill is a vital first step in our renewed fight against the
scourge of methamphetamine trafficking and abuse, and I hope the
Subcommittee and full Committee will support its passage.
I would probably fill my entire five minutes if I tried to thank
each of the Members and staff who helped with this legislation, so I
will have to mention only a few. First, I'd very much like to thank
Chairman Sensenbrenner of the full Committee, and you, Chairman Coble,
for cosponsoring the bill and for the assistance your staff provided in
putting it together. Next, I'd like to thank Majority Whip Roy Blunt
for his cosponsorship; Rep. Mark Kennedy and Rep. Darlene Hooley for
providing much of the content of this bill, and for their consistently
strong leadership on the House floor on meth issues; and the four co-
chairs of the Congressional Meth Caucus, Rep. Rick Larsen, Rep. Ken
Calvert, Rep. Leonard Boswell, and Rep. Chris Cannon, for their and
their staff's assistance and support. And to every other Member who has
cosponsored the bill, I express my deep appreciation.
I don't have to tell any of you how serious a threat meth is for
our communities; pick up almost any newspaper or magazine these days
and you can read about it firsthand. As chairman of the Government
Reform Committee's Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy and
Human Resources, I have held ten hearings on the meth epidemic since
2001, not only in Washington, D.C., but in places as diverse as rural
Arkansas, Ohio, and Indiana, suburban Minnesota, island Hawaii, and
urban Detroit. There are regional and local variations on the problem,
of course, but one thing remains constant everywhere: this is a drug
almost unique in its combination of cheapness, ease of manufacture, and
devastating impact on the user and his or her community.
There are three aspects of the meth epidemic that I believe need to
be emphasized as Congress considers this and related legislation.
First, meth presents unique challenges to federal, state, and local law
enforcement. The small, clandestine meth labs that have spread like
wildfire across our nation produce toxic chemical byproducts that
endanger officers' lives, tie up law enforcement resources for hours or
even days, and cost tremendous amounts of money to clean up. That,
combined with the rise in criminal behavior, child and citizen
endangerment, and other effects, have made meth the number one drug
problem for the nation's local law enforcement agencies, according to a
study released over the summer by the National Association of Counties,
which I'd like to enter into the record.\1\
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\1\ National Association of Counties (NAoC) survey, ``The Criminal
Effect of Meth on Communities,'' July 5, 2005.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Second, the damage this drug causes is not confined to the addict
alone; it has terrible effects on everyone around the user,
particularly children. Another survey by the National Association of
Counties found that 40 percent of child welfare agencies reported an
increase in ``out of home placements because of meth in the past
year.'' \2\ This abuse unfortunately includes physical and mental
trauma, and even sexual abuse. 69 percent of county social service
agencies have indicated that they have had to provide additional,
specialized training for their welfare system workers and have had to
develop new and special protocols for workers to address the special
needs of the children affected by methamphetamine.\3\ With your
permission, Mr. Chairman, I'd like to introduce the Association's
survey into the record, together with the statements of two experts on
the impact of meth on children, which were provided to my subcommittee
in July. They illustrate how community health and human services, as
well as child welfare services such as foster-care, are being
overwhelmed as a result of meth.\4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ Ibid.
\3\ Ibid.
\4\ Statements of Laura J. Birkmeyer, Chair, National Alliance for
Drug Endangered Children, and Director, National Methamphetamine
Chemicals Initiative; and Freida S. Baker, MSW, Deputy Director, Family
and Children's Services, Alabama State Department of Human Resources;
presented to the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy and
Human Resources, July 26, 2005.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Finally, the meth threat is not confined to the small, local labs,
but extends well beyond our borders to the ``super labs'' controlled by
large, sophisticated Mexican drug trafficking organizations, and the
international trade in pseudoephedrine and other precursor chemicals
fueling those super labs. Three-quarters or more of our nation's meth
supply is controlled by those large organizations, and over half of our
meth comes directly from Mexico. With your permission, I'd also like to
introduce an excellent group of articles from the Oregonian newspaper
that detail the international aspects of the meth trade.\5\
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\5\ ``The Mexican Connection,'' and ``Mexico's Math Problem Adds Up
to a U.S. Meth Problem,'' Steve Suo, the Oregonian, June 5, 2005.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Any legislation that tries to deal with the meth threat must
address these critical aspects, and we have tried to do that in this
legislation. We began the process of drafting the bill several months
ago, when Chairman Frank Wolf of the Appropriations Committee's
Science-State-Justice-Commerce Subcommittee approached me on the House
floor and offered his assistance in passing anti-meth legislation.
After meeting with him and nearly twenty other Members who are deeply
concerned about the meth epidemic, I asked my subcommittee staff, after
consultation with staff for the Meth Caucus Members, as well as the
relevant authorizing committees, to assemble a package of proposals
that would enjoy strong, bipartisan support. That package ultimately
became this bill.
I've attached a detailed section-by-section analysis to my written
statement for your review, so I will briefly mention the highlights of
the bill. Among other things, the Act would:
close a number of loopholes in federal regulation of
meth precursor chemicals such as pseudoephedrine, including a
per-transaction sales limit; import and manufacturing quotas to
ensure no oversupply leads to diversion; and regulation of the
wholesale ``spot market'';
require reporting of major meth precursor exporters
and importers, and would hold them accountable for their
efforts to prevent diversion to meth production;
toughen federal penalties against meth traffickers
and smugglers; and
apply environmental regulations to those who harm the
environment and endanger human health through meth lab
operation.
Each of these steps is vital to our success in the fight against
meth, and I hope that the Subcommittee and the full Committee will
support them.
Finally, I'd like to say a word or two about two key issues not
addressed in the bill. First, we did not address the issue of whether
pseudoephedrine and similar chemical products should be added to
Schedule V of the federal Controlled Substances Act. The Schedule V
issue is already dealt with by the Combat Meth Act (H.R. 314 / S. 103),
and thus there was no need for us to include it in our legislation. I
myself have some concerns about the Schedule V approach, which I
believe may have unintended consequences for consumers, retailers, and
the health care system. However, I look forward to working with Mr.
Blunt and other supporters of that legislation to see if we can forge a
workable solution.
Second, we did not include significant new grant programs for state
and local agencies to deal with meth, nor did we attempt to amend or
revise existing grant programs. I do believe that Congress must address
the question of how best to help our beleaguered state and local law
enforcement, child welfare, and treatment and prevention agencies deal
with this incredibly destructive and expensive drug threat. That issue
is very complex, however, and will require extensive review by the
authorizing committees before it can be resolved.
Mr. Chairman, every one of us, regardless of where we come from,
has a stake in the outcome of this fight. We have to stop the meth
epidemic from spreading, and we need to start rolling it back. I
believe that H.R. 3889 will be an important step in that process. Thank
you again for the opportunity to testify here today, and I would be
happy to answer any questions that you and the other Members may have.
ATTACHMENT
Mr. Coble. I thank the gentleman from Indiana.
The gentleman from Minnesota, Mr. Kennedy.
THE HONORABLE MARK KENNEDY, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM
THE STATE OF MINNESOTA
Mr. Kennedy. Chairman Coble, Ranking Member Scott----
Mr. Coble. Mr. Kennedy, if you would suspend just a minute,
we've been joined by the gentleman from Florida, Mr. Feeney,
and the distinguished gentleman from Ohio, Mr. Chabot.
Mr. Kennedy. And the Members of the Committee, I'd like to
thank you first of all for holding this hearing on a very
important issue, the Methamphetamine Epidemic Elimination Act.
I'd also like to thank Chairman Sensenbrenner and Chairman
Souder for his interest in this.
This bipartisan legislation, sponsored by Representatives
Souder, Sensenbrenner, Blunt, and myself and others, is one of
the most significant pieces of legislation that has been
offered to respond comprehensively to the scourge of
methamphetamine.
Mr. Chairman, our communities face many challenges, from
keeping our kids safe in our neighborhoods to the war on
terrorism; but few have such immediate consequences as we face
with meth. For years, meth's threat has been underestimated. It
is now clear to almost everyone that meth threatens lives,
safety, and health, at great cost to all of us.
A recent study by the University of Illinois conveyed
shocking stories of 10-year-old children becoming surrogate
parents to their younger siblings, as their parents cycled
through day-long highs, often accompanied by psychotic
symptoms, followed by crashes and days of sleep. According to
the Illinois study, the children of alcoholics were said to
have a thunderstorm of problems, but the children of meth
addicts suffer a tornado of trauma. They are at an
extraordinary level of risk of mental health and substance
abuse disorders.
Parents making the drug in their homes have exposed their
children to toxic fumes and the danger of explosions or fires.
Some ask their children to steal items needed for making of
meth, or to stand guard, armed with a gun, looking out for
police and other authorities.
Mr. Chairman, I have often spoken about the tragic story of
a young girl named Megan, from a beautiful town in my home
State of Minnesota. Megan got started on meth when she was in
seventh grade, at the age of 13. One of her friends offered her
the drug and, in her words, she liked meth so much that she
knew she would do it again and again.
Well, when she became--when she couldn't afford her
addiction, she, like so many other female addicts, was
exploited into becoming a prostitute to pay for the meth she
craved every second of the day. After hitting bottom at age 18,
Megan has managed to pull her life together now, after the 5
years that meth stole from her. But she has too much company in
her treatment and addiction programs.
About one in five of those treated for methamphetamine use
in the State of Minnesota are 17 years old or younger. As
Members of Congress, in the face of so much suffering, we have
an obligation to act. This bill brings together a number of
proposals made by many of my colleagues to fight this
devastating scourge.
I am pleased that H.R.3889 includes provisions I drafted to
increase criminal penalties on meth pushers, to target the
international superlabs that are the source of so much of this
poison, and language from my Clean Up Meth Act to assist
communities in dealing with the environmental destruction from
meth production.
Mr. Chairman, I thank you for holding this hearing here
today. I'd like to thank again the witnesses who agreed to come
to speak about the ravages of methamphetamine. I urge the swift
passage of this important legislation. Doing so will send a
strong signal that Congress is serious about fighting the
scourge of meth.
We must send a signal to the pushers of this poison that
they are not welcome in our communities. Most importantly, we
must send a signal to the law enforcement officers who wake up
every morning to protect our families that we stand with them
in the fight against drugs, and will work to give them every
tool they need to be successful.
Mr. Chairman, I ask for my full statement to be made part
of the record, and yield back the remainder of my time.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Kennedy follows:]
Prepared Statement of the Honorable Mark Kennedy, a Representative in
Congress from the State of Minnestora
Chairman Coble, Chairman Sensenbrenner, Ranking Member Scott,
Members of the Subcommittee, I'd like to begin by thanking you for
holding this hearing on H.R. 3889, the Methamphetamine Epidemic
Elimination Act.
This bipartisan legislation, sponsored by Reps. Souder,
Sensenbrenner, Blunt and myself is one of the most significant pieces
of legislation that has been offered to respond comprehensively to the
scourge of methamphetamine.
Mr. Chairman, there are 128 members in the Congressional Caucus to
Fight Methamphetamine; these members represent districts all across
this country.
They know that methamphetamine is no longer a western problem or a
rural problem; it is a problem that has infiltrated every corner of
virtually every Member's district in this country.
Mr. Chairman, our communities face many challenges, from keeping
our kids safe in our neighborhoods to the war on terrorism.
But few have such immediate consequences as we face from meth. For
years, meth's threat was underestimated. It is now clear to almost
everyone: meth threatens lives, safety and health, at great cost to all
of us.
A recent study by the University of Illinois conveyed shocking
stories of 10-year-old children becoming surrogate parents to their
younger siblings as their parents cycled through days-long highs, often
accompanied by psychotic symptoms, followed by crashes and days of
sleep.
This study provided shocking evidence of the devastating effect of
meth on our children. The children of alcoholics were said to have
``thunderstorm'' of problems, but the children of meth addicts suffer a
``tornado'' of trauma. They are at an extraordinary level of risk of
mental health and substance abuse disorders.
Parents making the drug in their homes exposed their children to
toxic fumes and the danger of explosions or fires. Some asked their
children to steal items needed for making the drug or to stand guard,
armed with a gun, looking out for police or other authorities.
Mr. Chairman, I've often spoken before about the tragic story of a
young girl named Megan from a beautiful town in my home state of
Minnesota.
Megan got started on meth when she was in the 7th grade at the age
of 13.
One of her friends offered her the drug, and in her words, she
liked meth so much that she knew she would do it again and again.
But when she couldn't afford her addiction, she, like too many
other female addicts, was exploited into becoming a prostitute to pay
for the meth she craved every second of the day.
After hitting rock bottom at the age of 18, Megan is managing to
pull her life back together now after the 5 years meth stole from her.
But she has too much company in her treatment and addiction
programs: about one in five of those treated for methamphetamine use in
the state of Minnesota are 17 years old or younger.
As Members of Congress, in the face of so much suffering, we have
an obligation to act.
The Methamphetamine Epidemic Elimination Act brings together a
number of proposals made by many of our colleagues to fight this
devastating scourge.
This legislation provides increased regulation of methamphetamine
precursors, particularly pseudoephedrine; important tools to control
the international superlabs; enhanced criminal penalties against
methamphetamine kingpins and manufacturers; and greater attention to
the environmental impact of domestic clandestine methamphetamine
production labs.
I have worked with Representative Darlene Hooley of Oregon on many
of the significant criminal penalties in this legislation in our bill,
H.R. 3513, the Solutions to Limit the Abuse of Methamphetamine, or
SLAM, Act.
We both believe that we must make sure that traffickers in meth are
too scared by the prospect of long prison sentences to ever try to push
this poison on our kids again.
Additionally, I can tell you from the experience of law enforcement
in my home state of Minnesota, and in many other states dealing with
the meth problem, local law enforcement spends roughly 80 percent of
its time fighting small meth labs that produce only 20 percent of the
meth on our streets. However, they lack the tools and resources to go
after the source of the other 80 percent of the meth, international
super labs.
Mr. Chairman, H.R. 3889 includes language I offered in an amendment
to the FY06 State Department Authorization Act that was supported by
the House International Relations Committee and 423 members of the
House.
This language will bring some of the same weapons to bear on the
international superlabs that produce methamphetamine that have proven
successful and effective in controlling other natural drugs like heroin
and cocaine.
This language serves to update, in an important way, our foreign
policy to recognize the emergence of methamphetamine and other
manufactured drugs.
Mr. Chairman, I thank you for holding this hearing here today, and
I'd like to again thank the witnesses who agreed to come to speak about
the ravages of methamphetamine.
I urge the swift passage of this important legislation.
Doing so will send a strong signal that Congress is serious about
fighting the scourge of meth.
We must send a signal to the pushers of this poison that they are
not welcome in our communities.
Most importantly, we must send a signal to the law enforcement
officers who wake up every morning to protect our families that we
stand with them in the fight against drugs and will work to give them
every tool they need to be successful.
Thank You.
Mr. Coble. Mr. Rannazzisi and Dr. Lester, you two have been
placed in the bull's eye of the target, because both these guys
beat the red light. So the pressure is on you. [Laughter.]
Mr. Rannazzisi, it's good to have you with us, sir.
TESTIMONY OF JOSEPH T. RANNAZZISI, DEPUTY CHIEF, OFFICE OF
ENFORCEMENT OPERATIONS, U.S. DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION
Mr. Rannazzisi. Thank you very much, sir. Chairman Coble,
Ranking Member Scott, and distinguished Members of the House
Judiciary Committee, Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and
Homeland Security, on behalf of the Drug Enforcement
Administration's Administrator, Karen P. Tandy, I appreciate
your invitation to testify today regarding the DEA's efforts to
combat the manufacture and distribution of methamphetamine and
its precursor chemicals, in H.R.3889, the ``Methamphetamine
Epidemic Elimination Act.''
Methamphetamine has swept across the country, and its
devastating consequences are being felt throughout this nation
by innocent children and adults, governmental agencies,
businesses, and communities of all sizes. Methamphetamine found
in the United States originates from two general sources,
controlled by two distinct groups.
Mexico-based and California-based drug trafficking
organizations control superlabs, and produce the majority of
methamphetamine available in this country. The second source
for methamphetamine comes from small toxic labs, which
supplement the supply of this drug in the United States. Though
these labs produce relatively small amounts of methamphetamine
and are generally not affiliated with major drug trafficking
organizations, they have an enormous impact on local
communities, especially in rural areas.
A precise breakdown is not available, but current drug and
lab seizure data suggests that roughly two-thirds of the
methamphetamine used in the U.S. comes from larger labs,
increasingly outside of the U.S., and that approximately one-
third of the methamphetamine consumed in this country comes
from the small toxic labs.
In an effort to combat methamphetamine, the DEA
aggressively targets those who traffic in and manufacture this
dangerous drug, as well as those who traffic in the chemicals
utilized to produce it. We have initiated and led successful
enforcement efforts focusing on meth and its precursor
chemicals, that have dismantled and disrupted high-level
methamphetamine traffic organizations, as well as dramatically
reduced the amount of pseudoephedrine illegally entering our
country.
We are also working with our global partners to target
international methamphetamine traffickers, and have forged
agreements to pre-screen pseudoephedrine shipments to ensure
that they are being shipped to legitimate companies for
legitimate purposes.
As a result of our efforts and those of our law enforcement
partners in the U.S. and Canada, we have seen a dramatic
decline in methamphetamine superlabs in the U.S. This decrease
is largely a result of DEA's enforcement successes against
suppliers of bulk shipments of precursor chemicals; notably,
ephedrine and pseudoephedrine. Law enforcement has also seen a
huge reduction in the amount of pseudoephedrine, ephedrine, and
other precursor chemicals seized at the Canadian border.
We are also working closely with our State and local law
enforcement partners to assist in the elimination of the small
toxic labs that have spread across the country. The DEA
administers the clean-up of the majority of meth labs seized in
this country, with approximately 10,000 last year alone.
In an effort to further streamline the clean-up process and
reduce costs, with the assistance of the Community Oriented
Policing program, ``COPS,'' in fiscal year 2004 we joined the
Kentucky state police in initiating a container program. This
container program has further reduced clean-up costs, and we
plan to expand the program to other States during fiscal year
2006.
More than any other controlled substance, methamphetamine
trafficking endangers children through the exposure of drug
abuse, neglect, physical and sexual abuse, toxic chemicals,
hazardous waste, fire, and explosions. We are providing
assistance to methamphetamine's victims through our Victim
Witness Assistance Program. Through this program, the DEA's
goal is to ensure that all endangered children are identified,
and that the child's immediate safety is addressed at the scene
by appropriate child welfare and health care providers.
In an effort to provide further information to America's
youth about the dangers of methamphetamine, last month DEA
launched a new website entitled ``justthinktwice.com.'' This
website is devoted to and designed by teenagers to give them
the hard facts about methamphetamine and other illicit drugs.
The DEA also monitors State legislation aimed at combatting
methamphetamine. It has noted the success experienced by some
States in reducing the number of small toxic labs within their
borders. The Administration strongly supports the development
of Federal legislation to fight methamphetamine production,
trafficking, and abuse.
Effective Federal legislation would include an individual
purchase limit of 3.6 grams for transactions for retail sales
of products containing pseudoephedrine; elimination of the
blister pack exemption for pseudoephedrine products, thus
requiring all products containing this substance to be subject
to Federal law regardless of the packaging; and to prevent
diversion of pseudoephedrine shipments for illegal use, a
requirement that importers of pseudoephedrine request and
receive approval from the DEA if there is a change to the
shipment's original purchaser.
Thank you for your recognition of this important issue and
the opportunity to testify today. I'll be happy to answer any
questions you may have. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Rannazzisi follows:]
Prepared Statement of Joseph T. Rannazzisi
Chairman Coble, Representative Scott, and distinguished members of
the House Judiciary Committee--Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and
Homeland Security, on behalf of the Drug Enforcement Administration's
(DEA) Administrator, Karen Tandy, I appreciate your invitation to
testify today regarding the ``Methamphetamine Epidemic Elimination
Act.'' I am pleased to testify here today.
OVERVIEW
Methamphetamine's devastating consequences are felt across the
country by innocent children and adults, governmental agencies,
businesses and communities of all sizes. More commonly known as
``meth,'' this highly addictive stimulant can be easily manufactured
using ``recipes'' available over the Internet and ingredients available
at most major retail outlets. While meth used to be associated only
with a few outlaw motorcycle gangs (OMG), the use and manufacturing of
this deadly substance is now a national problem. Today, few communities
in the United States have not been impacted by methamphetamine.
In an effort to combat methamphetamine, the DEA aggressively
targets those who traffic in and manufacture this dangerous drug, as
well as those who traffic in the chemicals utilized to produce it. We
have initiated and led successful enforcement efforts focusing on meth
and its precursor chemicals. Every day the DEA works side by side with
our federal, state and local law enforcement partners to combat the
scourge of meth. Last spring, DEA Administrator Tandy directed DEA's
Mobile Enforcement Teams (MET) to prioritize methamphetamine
trafficking organizations during their deployments. These and other
initiatives have resulted in tremendously successful investigations,
that have dismantled and disrupted high-level methamphetamine
trafficking organizations, as well as dramatically reduced the amount
of pseudoephedrine illegally entering our country.
In addition to our enforcement efforts, the DEA is combating this
drug by administering the cleanup of labs across the country, providing
assistance to the victims of methamphetamine and educating communities
on the dangers of this drug. The DEA also monitors state legislation
aimed at combating methamphetamine and has noted the success
experienced by some states in reducing the number of small toxic labs
within their borders. Additionally, the Administration supports the
development of Federal legislation to fight methamphetamine production,
trafficking and abuse. Any such legislation should of course balance
law enforcement needs with the need for legitimate consumer access to
widely used cold medicines.
METHAMPHETAMINE IN THE U.S.
Methamphetamine is a synthetic central nervous system stimulant
that is classified as a Schedule II controlled substance. It is widely
abused throughout the United States and is distributed under the names
``crank,'' ``meth,'' ``crystal,'' and ``speed.'' Methamphetamine is
commonly sold in powder form, but has been distributed in tablets or as
crystals (``glass'' or ``ice''). Methamphetamine can be smoked,
snorted, injected or taken orally. The clandestine manufacture of
methamphetamine has been a concern of law enforcement officials since
the 1960's, when OMGs produced their own methamphetamine in labs and
dominated distribution in the United States. While clandestine labs can
produce other types of illicit drugs such as PCP, MDMA, and LSD,
methamphetamine has always been the primary drug manufactured in the
vast majority of drug labs seized by law enforcement officers.
STATE APPROACHES TO CONTROL METHAMPHETAMINE
As was discussed in the Interim Report from the National Synthetic
Drugs Action Plan, the only two states that had enacted legislation
from which we had reliable data at the time, were Oklahoma and Oregon.
During April 2004, Oklahoma enacted the first and at that time, the
most far-reaching state law restricting the sale of pseudoephedrine
products. To date, over forty States have enacted or proposed various
laws to restrict the sale of pseudophedrine products. This law made
pseudoephedrine a Schedule V Controlled Substance in Oklahoma.
Provisions of this law included: limiting sales of both single-entity
and combination pseudoephedrine products to pharmacies; requiring
pseudoephedrine products to be kept behind the pharmacy counter; and
requiring the purchaser to show identification and sign a log sheet.
Oklahoma's law was noted in the National Synthetic Drugs Action
Plan and was the first of many similar proposals introduced in State
legislatures this past year. The Interim Report of May 2005 again noted
Oklahoma's law, as well as Oregon's approach. In October 2004, Oregon
adopted a similar approach to Oklahoma's model through a temporary
administrative rule. Oregon, unlike Oklahoma, allowed combination
pseudoephedrine products--those containing pseudoephedrine plus other
active medical ingredients--to be sold at stores other than pharmacies,
provided that the products were kept in a secure location. At the time
of the Interim Report's release, only four months of data from Oregon
were available for review. This review showed an approximate 42 percent
reduction in the number of labs seized from the same months in the
prior year. A review of 12 months worth of data from Oklahoma showed a
51 percent reduction in lab seizures (April 2004 through March
2005).\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ p.6, Interim Report.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Interim Report noted that, even with the stabilization in
methamphetamine laboratory numbers observed nationally, no states with
consistently significant numbers of methamphetamine labs have seen the
reductions in lab numbers that Oklahoma and, to a lesser but still
significant extent, Oregon had seen. The Interim Report stated that,
with the available data--a year's worth of data from Oklahoma, four
months of data from Oregon, and several years worth of national data--
strongly suggested that Oklahoma's and Oregon's state-level approaches
were probably primary reasons for the dramatic reduction in the number
of small toxic labs (STL) in Oklahoma, as well as smaller reductions in
Oregon. It should also be noted that since the release of the Interim
Report, Oregon has enacted legislation that made pseudoephedrine a
Schedule III Controlled Substance.
Since the release of the Interim Report, the seizure of meth labs
in Oklahoma has continued to remain at low levels, with a total of 115
meth labs being seized from April through July 2005.\2\ The seizure of
these 115 labs is significantly less than the seizures reported in
Oklahoma during this same time period in 2004 (261) and 2003 (423).
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\2\ Oklahoma Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, August 2005.
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Furthermore, the State of Oregon has recently enacted legislation
that classifies pseudoephedrine as a Schedule III Controlled Substance.
This law is not scheduled to fully go into effect until July of 2006,
so data does not yet exist to draw any conclusions as to its
effectiveness.
METHAMPHETAMINE THREAT ASSESSMENT AND TRENDS
Methamphetamine found in the United States originates from two
general sources, controlled by two distinct groups. Most of the
methamphetamine in the United States is produced by Mexico-based and
California-based Mexican drug trafficking organizations. These drug
trafficking organizations control ``super labs'' and produce the
majority of methamphetamine available throughout the United States.
Mexican criminal organizations control most mid-level and retail
methamphetamine distribution in the Pacific, Southwest, and West
Central regions of the United States, as well as much of the
distribution in the Great Lakes and Southeast regions. Mexican midlevel
distributors sometimes supply methamphetamine to OMGs and Hispanic
gangs for retail distribution throughout the country.
Asian methamphetamine distributors (Filipino, Japanese, Korean,
Thai, and Vietnamese) are also active in the Pacific region, although
Mexican criminal groups trafficking in ``ice methamphetamine'' have
supplanted Asian criminal groups as the dominant distributors of this
drug type in Hawaii. OMGs distribute methamphetamine throughout the
country, and reporting indicates that they are particularly prevalent
in many areas of the Great Lakes region, New England, and New York/New
Jersey regions.
The second source for methamphetamine comes from STLs, which
supplement the supply of methamphetamine in the United States Initially
found only in the most Western States, there has been a steady increase
and eastward spread of STLs in the United States. Many methamphetamine
abusers quickly learn that the drug is easily produced and that it can
be manufactured using common household products found at retail stores.
For approximately $100 in ``materials,'' a methamphetamine ``cook'' can
produce approximately $1,000 worth of this poison. Items such as rock
salt, battery acid, red phosphorous road flares, pool acid, and iodine
crystals can be used as a source of the necessary chemicals. Precursor
chemicals such as pseudoephedrine can be extracted from common, over-
the-counter cold medications, regardless of whether it is sold in
liquid, gel, or pill form. Using relatively common items such as mason
jars, coffee filters, hot plates, pressure cookers, pillowcases,
plastic tubing and gas cans. A clandestine lab operator can manufacture
meth almost anywhere without the need for sophisticated laboratory
equipment.
Widespread use of the internet has facilitated the dissemination of
technology used to manufacture methamphetamine in STLs. This form of
information sharing allows wide dissemination of these techniques to
anyone with computer access. Aside from marijuana, methamphetamine is
the only widely abused illegal drug that is capable of being produced
by the abuser. Given the relative ease with which manufacturers are
able to acquire ``recipes'' and ingredients, and the unsophisticated
nature of the production process, it is not difficult to see why this
highly addictive drug has spread across America.
STLs produce relatively small amounts of methamphetamine and are
generally not affiliated with major drug trafficking organizations.
However, STLs have an enormous impact on local communities, especially
in rural areas.
A precise breakdown is not available, but current drug and lab
seizure data suggests that roughly two-thirds of the methamphetamine
used in the United States comes from larger labs, located outside the
United States, and that approximately one-third of the methamphetamine
consumed in this country comes from the small, more toxic laboratories.
BATTLING METHAMPHETAMINE AND ITS PRECURSOR CHEMICALS
As a result of our efforts and those of our law enforcement
partners in the U.S. and Canada, we have seen a dramatic decline in
methamphetamine super labs in the U.S. In 2004, 55 super labs were
seized in the United States, the majority of which were in California.
This is a dramatic decrease from the 246 super labs seized in 2001.
This decrease is largely a result of DEA's enforcement successes
against suppliers of bulk shipments of precursor chemicals, notably
ephedrine and pseudoephedrine. Law enforcement has also seen a huge
reduction in the amount of pseudoephedrine, ephedrine, and other
precursor chemicals seized at the Canadian border.
More than any other controlled substance, methamphetamine
trafficking endangers children through exposure to drug abuse, neglect,
physical and sexual abuse, toxic chemicals, hazardous waste, fire, and
explosions. An appalling example of methamphetamine-related abuse was
discovered by the DEA in Missouri during November 2004. During an
enforcement operation targeting a suspected methamphetamine laboratory
located in a home, three children, all less than five years of age,
were found sleeping on chemical-soaked rugs. The residence was filled
with insects and rodents and had no electricity or running water.
Ironically, two guard dogs kept by the ``cooks'' to fend off law
enforcement were also found: clean, healthy, and well-fed. The dogs
actually ate off a dinner plate.
Since being implemented in 1992, the DEA has enhanced its Victim
Witness Assistance Program, and each of our Field Divisions now has a
Victim/Witness Coordinator to ensure that all endangered children are
identified and that the child's immediate safety is addressed at the
scene by appropriate child welfare and health care providers.
Assistance has also been provided to vulnerable adults, victims of
domestic violence, and to customers and employees of businesses such as
hotels and motels where methamphetamine has been produced or seized.
We also provide training on drug endangered children to federal,
state, and local law enforcement and to national, state and local
victim organizations. The DEA serves as a resource for child protective
service and school social workers, first responders, mail carriers, and
utility company personnel, all of whom may come in contact with labs
and victims. To provide the public with current information on
methamphetamine and drug endangered children, the DEA participates in
numerous local, state, and national conferences and exhibits. The issue
of victim services is included as part of our Basic Agent Training, and
also is presented to our management across the country.
We have continued to investigate, disrupt and dismantle major
methamphetamine trafficking organizations through the Consolidated
Priority Organization Target (CPOT) list and our Priority Target
Organization (PTO) investigations. The DEA is also significantly
involved in the Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task program (OCDETF)
and we continue to work with state and local law enforcement agencies
across the country to combat methamphetamine. Additionally, in March
2005, Administrator Tandy directed the DEA's MET teams to prioritize
methamphetamine trafficking organizations during their deployments.
In an effort to provide further information to America's youth
about the dangers of methamphetamine, on August 30, 2005, the DEA
launched a new website entitled ``justthinktwice.com.'' This website is
devoted to and designed by teenagers to give them the hard facts about
methamphetamine and other illicit drugs. Through this website, the DEA
is telling teens to ``think twice'' about what they hear from friends,
popular culture, and adults who advocate drug legalization. Information
is also provided regarding the harm drugs cause to their health, their
families, the environment, and to innocent bystanders.
The DEA also continues its work to ensure that only legitimate
businesses with adequate chemical controls are licensed to handle bulk
pseudoephedrine and ephedrine in the United States. In the past seven
years, over 2,000 chemical registrants have been denied, surrendered,
or withdrawn their registrations or applications as a result of DEA
investigations. Between 2001 and 2004, DEA Diversion Investigators
physically inspected more than half of the 3,000 chemical registrants
at their places of business. We investigated the adequacy of their
security safeguards to prevent the diversion of chemicals to the
illicit market, and audited their recordkeeping to ensure compliance
with federal regulations.
The DEA is also working with our global partners to target
international methamphetamine traffickers and to increase chemical
control efforts abroad. The DEA has worked hand in hand with our
foreign law enforcement counterparts and have forged agreements to pre-
screen pseudoephedrine shipments to ensure that they are being shipped
to legitimate companies for legitimate purposes. An example of our
efforts in this area is an operation worked with our counterparts from
Hong Kong, Mexico and Panama, which prevented approximately 68 million
pseudoephedrine tablets from reaching ``meth cartels.'' This
pseudoephedrine could have produced more than two metric tons of
methamphetamine.
COMMENTS REGARDING THE ``METHAMPHETAMINE EPIDEMIC ELIMINATION ACT''
As you can see, the DEA has known and has been working on the meth
crisis for many years. We appreciate Congress' interest in this issue,
and, without endorsing the specific legislative language of the bill,
would like to offer some general observations regarding the
``Methamphetamine Epidemic Elimination Act.''
Title I--Domestic Regulation of Precursor Chemicals
This title repeals the federal ``blister pack'' exemption; reduces
the federal per-transaction sales threshold for pseudoephedrine,
ephedrine, and phenylpropanolamine products from 9 grams to 3.6 grams;
and clarifies the law to include derivatives of each of these
chemicals. The section also extends the Attorney General's existing
authority to set import and production quotas, expands the existing
penalties for illegal production and importation, and seeks to address
a gap in our existing regulatory control system for imports and exports
of pseudoephedrine.
As the Committee knows, the Administration strongly supports the
development of Federal legislation to fight methamphetamine production,
trafficking, and abuse. Effective Federal legislation would include an
individual purchase limit of 3.6 grams per transaction for retail sales
of over-the-counter products containing pseudophedrine; elimination of
the blister pack exemption for pseudoephedrine products, thus requiring
all products containing this substance to be subject to Federal law
regardless of packaging; and, to prevent diversion of pseudoephedrine
shipments for illegal use, a requirement that importers of
pseudoephedrine request and receive approval from the DEA if there is a
change in the shipment's original purchase. Additional controls on
pseudoephedrine, however, must always be balanced against legitimate
consumer access to affected products. A number of States have
approached this challenge in different ways, taking into account their
individual law enforcement and consumer access needs. As referenced
above, early data indicate that several States which have done this
through individual legislative and regulatory initiatives appear to
have seen real and sustained reductions in the number of
methamphetamine labs in their states. Denying methamphetamine cooks the
ability to gather the ingredients they need, while balancing the need
of law abiding citizens to be able to access these commonly used cold
products, is an approach that works. We look forward to working with
Congress.
Title II--International Regulation of Precursor Chemicals
This title would require additional reporting requirements for
importers of ephedrine, pseudoephedrine, or phenolpropanolamine by
requiring them to file additional information about the chain of
distribution of imported chemicals. It also would place an additional
reporting requirement on the State Department to identify the 5 largest
exporters of major methamphetamine precursor chemicals, and the 5
largest importers that also have the highest rate of meth production or
diversion of these chemicals to the production of meth. This title
would incorporate these countries into the annual international
counternarcotics ``certification'' process, and would make many forms
of foreign assistance contingent on the President's certification that
these countries are ``fully cooperating'' with the U.S. in enforcing
chemical controls. (For chemical control efforts, the bill reverts to
the stricter standard in effect before the 2002 certification cycle,
after which the President designates only those countries that have
``failed demonstrably'' to cooperate.) Finally, the legislation would
require the State Department's Bureau for International Narcotics and
Law Enforcement Affairs to provide assistance to Mexico to prevent the
production of methamphetamine in that country and to encourage Mexico
to stop the illegal diversion of meth precursor chemicals.
We have serious concerns about these provisions. As you know, the
Administration already reports on some of the information this language
would require in the annual International Narcotics Control Strategy
Report. Although we agree that diversion of precursor chemicals is a
serious problem and that the annual counternarcotics ``certification''
process should do more to account for the actions of our foreign
counterparts with respect to chemical control, we believe that there
are more appropriate and plausible ways to achieve this overall goal.
An inter-agency group coordinated by the Department of State, with the
Department of Justice taking the lead in drafting, has also been
addressing the problem of how to take better account of synthetic drugs
and precursor chemicals in the certification process. We would like the
opportunity to consult with the Committee as we address some of the
same difficult issues you face in attempting to evaluate chemical
commerce and countries' chemical control efforts.
In October 2004, the Administration released the National Synthetic
Drugs Action Plan. In doing so, we proclaimed the seriousness of the
challenges posed by methamphetamine--along with other synthetic drugs
and diverted pharmaceuticals--and our resolve to confront those
challenges. Part of the Action Plan specifically recognized the move of
large labs outside the United States requires that we offer assistance
to strengthen anti-methamphetamine activities. This, in turn, requires
working with other countries known to suppling methamphetamine
producers with illicit pseudoephedrine. A Synthetic Drugs Interagency
Working Group (SD-IWG), co-chaired by the ONDCP and the Department of
Justice, was directed to oversee implementation of the Action Plan and
to report to the ONDCP Director, Attorney General, and Secretary for
Health and Human Services six months after the document's release. In
the Interim Report, dated May 2, 2005, the SD-IWG responded to this
portion of the Action Plan:
China (particularly Hong Kong) has been a significant
source of pseudoephedrine tablets that have been diverted to
methamphetamine labs in Mexico. The United States and Mexico
have obtained a commitment by Hong Kong not to ship chemicals
to the United States, Mexico, or Panama until receiving an
import permit or equivalent documentation and to pre-notify the
receiving country before shipment.
The United States has made significant progress in
assisting Mexican authorities to improve their ability to
respond to methamphetamine laboratories. The DEA has played a
role by providing diversion and clandestine lab cleanup
training courses for Mexican officials (both Federal and
State).
In conjunction with our joint efforts, Mexico this
year began to impose stricter import quotas for
pseudoephedrine, tied to estimates of national needs and based
on extrapolations from a large population sample. Additionally,
distributors have agreed to limit sales of pseudoephedrine to
pharmacies, which in turn will sell no more than approximately
nine grams per transaction to customers.
These developments stand as a model for the next steps to be taken
with the limited number of manufacturers who produce bulk ephedrine and
pseudoephedrine. Our efforts are, and will continue to be, focused on
the primary producing and exporting countries for bulk ephedrine and
pseudoephedrine: China, the Czech Republic, Germany, and India. Some of
these efforts are not new, but involve a long-term commitment, using
the tools at the Administration's disposal, to engage with foreign law
enforcement and regulatory counterparts in these countries and to
replicate the steps taken with Hong Kong and Panama. These steps
include improving the sharing of information on pseudoephedrine
shipments with other countries, thus preventing their diversion--
especially to Mexico.
Under existing Federal law, the DEA must be notified if an
ephedrine or pseudoephedrine product is destined for, or will transit
through, the United States. But the legal and regulatory tools to limit
imports and after-import distribution are relatively crude. Moreover,
the prevailing interpretation of the 1988 United Nation's Convention
that controls chemicals allows most finished pharmaceutical products
containing pseudoephedrine in combination with other ingredients to be
shipped in international commerce without pre-notification--a wide-open
loophole that continues to be exploited by drug traffickers. The U.S.,
along with our Mexican and Canadian counterparts, has been working to
gain international support for voluntary international cooperation to
pre-notify shipments of these products; our efforts are being channeled
through the drug control commission of the OAS (``CICAD'').
Title IV--Enhanced Environmental Regulation of Methamphetamine By-
Products
This title would give additional authority to the Transportation
Department and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to enforce
environmental regulations against meth cooks who cause toxic pollution
with meth by-products. In addition, this title would clarify existing
law in light of the recent Eighth District Court of Appeals decision in
United States v. Lachowski to allow the Federal government to seek
restitution for environmental cleanup costs on persons involved in meth
production and trafficking.
While the Administration cannot comment on the specific proposals
in this title, the environmental costs associated with meth production
have long been a concern of the DEA. In FY 1988, the DEA's Hazardous
Waste Disposal Program was established to assist our Special Agents in
the management of the chemicals, waste and contaminated equipment
seized at clandestine drug laboratories. Funding for this program was
initially provided through the Asset Forfeiture Fund. In 1998, the DEA
began receiving funding from the Community Oriented Policing (COPS)
program, and DEA Appropriated Funds in FY 1999, to support the cleanup
of clandestine drug laboratories seized by state and local law
enforcement. Together with the Asset Forfeiture Fund, these funding
sources continue today.
Today, when a federal, state or local agency seizes a clandestine
methamphetamine laboratory, EPA regulations require the agency to
ensure that all hazardous waste materials are safely removed from the
site. To facilitate the removal of these materials, the DEA awarded the
first private sector contracts in 1991for hazardous waste cleanup and
disposal. This program promotes the safety of law enforcement personnel
and the public by using qualified companies with specialized training
and equipment to remove hazardous waste seized at clandestine drug
laboratories. These contractors provide response services to DEA, as
well as state and local law enforcement officials nationwide. These
contracts serve communities by removing the source-chemicals that may
pose threats to the public, which also helps to protect the
environment.
Since the DEA first began using contractor services in the early
1990s, the number of cleanups has skyrocketed, though the average cost
per cleanup has greatly decreased. The average cost per cleanup during
the initial contract was approximately $17,000. During FY 2002, the
average cleanup cost dropped to approximately $3,300, and currently,
the average cost per cleanup is approximately $2,000.
To further reduce the cost of lab cleanups, in FY 2004, the DEA,
with assistance provided by COPS, joined the Kentucky State Police to
establish a pilot, clandestine lab ``container program'' in Kentucky.
The program allows trained Kentucky law enforcement officers to safely
package and transport hazardous waste from the clandestine laboratory
sites to a centralized secure container that meets all hazardous waste
storage requirements. The waste is subsequently kept in the container
until it can be removed by a DEA contractor. The container program has
streamlined the laboratory cleanup process by enabling law enforcement
officials to manage small quantities of seized chemicals more quickly
and efficiently. As of the third quarter of FY 2005, the average cost
of cleanup in this project was approximately $350. The DEA is currently
working to expand this program to several other states.
CONCLUSION
Methamphetamine continues to take a terrible toll on this country.
To combat this poison, the DEA is attacking methamphetamine on all
fronts. Our enforcement efforts are focused not only on the large-scale
methamphetamine trafficking organizations distributing this drug in the
U.S., but also on those involved in providing the precursor chemicals
necessary to manufacture this poison. The DEA is well aware of the
importance of controlling the precursor chemicals necessary to produce
methamphetamine and is working with our international counterparts to
forge agreements to control the flow of these chemicals
We are also working closely with our state and local law partners
to assist in the elimination of the small toxic labs that have spread
across the country. The DEA's Hazardous Waste Program, with the
assistance of grants to state and local law enforcement, supports and
funds the cleanup of a majority of the laboratories seized in the
United States. The DEA has also taken an active role in the Victim
Witness Assistance Program to assist methamphetamine's victims
educating communities about the dangers of meth and other illicit
drugs.
Thank you for your recognition of this important issue and the
opportunity to testify today. I will be happy to answer any questions
you may have.
Mr. Coble. Thank you, sir. We've been joined by the
distinguished gentlelady from California, Ms. Waters. Ms.
Waters, good to have you with us.
Ms. Waters. Thank you.
Mr. Coble. Dr. Lester.
TESTIMONY OF BARRY M. LESTER, PH.D., PROFESSOR OF PSYCHIATRY
AND HUMAN BEHAVIOR AND PEDIATRICS, BROWN UNIVERSITY MEDICAL
SCHOOL
Mr. Lester. Chairman Coble, Chairman Sensenbrenner, Ranking
Member Scott, Members of this Subcommittee, we're in a similar
situation today with methamphetamine as we were in the mid-
1980's with what became known as the cocaine epidemic. During
that time, there was legitimate concern for the welfare of
children born cocaine-exposed. Based on poor information, there
was a rush to judgment that led to an overreaction by society
that had negative consequences for women and children.
Many women were prosecuted; children were removed from
their biological mothers; and families were broken up. As a
result, the number of children in foster care reached an all-
time high in the mid-1990's. Many children suffered emotional
problems from multiple foster care placements. And this is what
led to the 1997 passage of the Adoption and Safe Families Act,
requiring permanent placement within 12 months of a child being
removed from his or her biological mother.
After 20 years of research, we learned that the effects of
cocaine were not nearly as severe as initially feared. In fact,
when factors like other drugs and poverty are controlled, the
effects are subtle. We're talking about three or four IQ
points, slight increases in behavior problems. In fact, these
effects are not very different from those of cigarette smoking
during pregnancy.
We also learned that while there are most definitely drug-
using women that are inadequate parents, there are also drug-
using women who are competent parents, and that with treatment,
families can be kept together.
Our understanding of addiction has also changed in the past
20 years. We know more about addiction as a disease, as a
medical mental health issue, and a disease that can be treated.
It's a complex disease with multiple mental health co-
morbidities, so that women who use drugs also tend to have
other mental health problems.
So the bad news is that addiction is complex and requires
serious treatment dollars. The good news is that it is
treatable, and if we take a treatment-oriented rather than a
punitive approach, we can reduce the problem of drug addiction
in the country. I don't see the treatment approach in this
legislation.
We learned some real hard lessons as the cocaine story
unfolded. And I'm concerned that we're making the exact same
mistakes with methamphetamine that we made with cocaine, as
suggested by recent media coverage, by the punitive nature of
this bill, and the absence of treatment dollars.
Methamphetamine is a stimulant like cocaine. Research on
the effects of prenatal methamphetamine exposure on child
outcome are just beginning. The only longitudinal study that's
being done so far is our NIH study. And so far, what we're
finding is very similar subtle effects to the effects we saw
with cocaine. Again, to give you a context for this: not very
different than women who smoke cigarettes during pregnancy.
Does this mean it's harmless, or that it's okay for women
to use meth during pregnancy, or that we should not treat the
women or the children? Of course not. Drug use of any kind
should be discouraged during pregnancy, and treated. We know
from previous research that even these smaller effects can turn
to larger deficits, if the parenting environment is not
adequate. And it is also possible that there are drug effects
that don't show up until children get to school.
What we need here is a more balanced approach, and one that
will get at the root causes of drug addiction. Sending more
people to prison for longer periods of time is not the answer.
Our knowledge base is still evolving, and will continue to do
so. But we know enough now to fight addiction with treatment
and keep families together if possible.
So here are some specific suggestions. We need a national
consensus on how to deal with issues like maternal drug use
that does justice to state-of-the-art knowledge in research and
treatment and demonstrates a fair and unbiased attitude toward
women with addiction and their children.
We need to improve access to treatment; develop and
coordinate multidisciplinary treatment programs with
interconnected services based on the needs of women, mothers,
and children. Models of methamphetamine treatment are based on
adult male models. There are no treatment models designed to
meet the specific needs of women, pregnant women, or mothers.
For example, we know from the cocaine experience that it
doesn't do any good to tell a poor mother with four kids in tow
that she has six different appointments in six different
locations, without providing transportation and babysitting.
We need to develop systematic prevention efforts, both
treatment and education. And this includes education to prevent
the onset or continuation of drug use and treatment to prevent
future problems due to drug use.
And we need to develop family treatment drug courts, with
the goal of keeping custody or reunification whenever possible.
Drug courts are a way of providing a ``treatment with teeth''
approach that includes rewards for compliance with treatment
and sanctions for non-compliance with treatment.
In Rhode Island, we have a program called ``VIP''--it
stands for ``Vulnerable Infants Program''--which includes a
family treatment drug court. We say ``vulnerable'' to imply
that these children are somewhat fragile, but not damaged. And
of course, they are VIPs; they're very important people.
This is a voluntary ``treatment with teeth'' program that
has already been successful. We have reduced the length of stay
of drug-exposed babies in the hospital; increased the number of
infants who are going home with their biological mothers, hence
reducing the number in foster care; and increased the number of
children being reunified with their biological mothers. We
should consider waiving punishment for clients who agree to,
and comply with, treatment.
In sum, we have made tremendous gains in our understanding
of addiction and treatment in the past 20 years. We have the
opportunity to keep families together today in ways that were
not possible only a few years ago. I am very optimistic about
our ability to reduce addiction and save future generations of
children through treatment. It would be not only a missed
opportunity, but also a step backward, to put all of our eggs
in the punishment basket. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Lester follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dr. Barry M. Lester
Chairman Coble, Chairman Sensenbrenner, Ranking Member Scott,
Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify
on H.R. 3889, the Methamphetamine Epidemic Elimination Act.
We are in a similar situation today with methamphetamine as we were
in 20 years ago during the cocaine epidemic. During that time, there
was legitimate concern for the welfare of children exposed to cocaine
in the wbomb. But based on insufficient or inaccurate information,
society rushed to judgment--an over-reaction that had negative
consequences for women and children. Many drug-addicted women were
prosecuted and children were removed from their care. Families split
up. As a result, by the mid 1990s, the number of children in foster
care reached an all-time high to over 500,000. Many of these children
suffered emotional problems from multiple foster care placements. This
lead to the 1997 passage of the Adoption and Safe Families Act, or
ASFA, requiring permanent placement of a child within 12 months of
being removed from his or her biological mother.
After 20 years of research, we learned that the effects of cocaine
are not nearly as severe as initially feared. In fact, when factors
like other drugs and poverty are controlled, the effects are subtle--IQ
lowered by 3 to 4 points, a slight increase in behavior or attention
problems. These effects are similar to those caused by cigarette
smoking during pregnancy. Scientists also learned that while there are
most definitely drug users who are inadequate mothers, there are also
drug users who are competent mothers who, with treatment, can care for
their children.
Our understanding of addiction has also changed in two decades. We
know more about addiction as a disease--a medical condition that can be
treated. Addiction is a complex disease with multiple mental health co-
morbidities; Women who use drugs also tend to be depressed and anxious
and may have even more severe mental health problems. So the bad news:
Addiction is complex. The good news: Addiction is treatable. We can
reduce the problem of drug addiction in the country. I don't see
treatment addressed in this legislation.
We learned some hard lessons since the cocaine story unfolded. I am
concerned that we are on the verge of making the same mistakes with
methamphetamine that we made with cocaine, as suggested by sensational
media coverage, the absence of federal treatment dollars--and the
punitive nature of this bill.
Methamphetamine is a stimulant like cocaine and produces similar
effects on neurotransmitters in the brain. Research on the effects of
prenatal methamphetamine exposure on child outcome is just beginning.
To my knowledge, my current research into the prenatal effects of
methamphetamine is the only such project funded the national Institutes
of Health. Children in our study are still infants. So we can't measure
all the affects of this drug. But, so far, we are seeing the same kind
of subtle changes with methamphetamine that we saw with cocaine.
Again--to put this in context--not very different than what you'd see
with cigarette smoking.
Does this mean methamphetamine is harmless? Is it acceptable for
women to use the drug during pregnancy? Of course not. And we know from
previous research--including research with cocaine-using mothers--that
even small neurobehavioral effects can turn to larger deficits if
parenting is not adequate.
What we need is a balanced approach--one that will attack the root
causes of drug addiction. Sending more people to prison for longer
periods of time is not the answer. We know enough now to fight
addiction with treatment and, if possible, keep families together.
Here are some specific suggestions:
Develop a national consensus on how to deal with
maternal drug use that draws on current research and tested
treatment strategies--and demonstrates a fair and unbiased
attitude towards drug-addicted women and their children.
Improve access to treatment and develop coordinated
treatment programs with interconnected services based on the
needs of women, mothers and children. Models of methamphetamine
treatment are based on adult male models. None are designed to
meet the specific needs of women, pregnant women or mothers.
For example, we know from the cocaine experience that it does
no good to tell a poor mother with four kids in tow that she
has six different appointments in six different locations
without providing transportation or baby-sitting.
Develop systemic prevention efforts. This includes
education to prevent onset or continuation of drug use as well
as treatment to prevent future problems due to drug use.
Develop Family Treatment Drug Courts with the goal of
keeping custody or reunification whenever possible. Drug Courts
are a way providing a ``treatment with teeth'' approach that
includes rewards for compliance with treatment and sanctions
for noncompliance with treatment. In Rhode Island, we have a
program called VIP (Vulnerable Infants Program) which includes
a Family Treatment Drug Court (FTDC). Vulnerable is meant to
imply that these children are somewhat fragile but not damaged
and of course they are Very Important People. This is a
voluntary ``treatment with teeth'' program that has been
successful. We have reduced the length of stay of drug-exposed
babies in the hospital, increased the number of infants who are
going home with their biological mothers (hence reducing the
number in foster care) and increased the number of children
being reunified with their biological mothers. We should
consider waiving punishment for clients who agree to and comply
with treatment.
In sum, we have made tremendous strides in 20 years when it comes
to understanding drug addiction and treatment. We have the opportunity
to keep families together today in ways that were not possible only a
few years ago. I am very optimistic about our ability to reduce
addiction and save future generations of children through treatment. It
would be not only a missed opportunity, but a major step backward, to
put all of our eggs in the punishment basket.
Mr. Chairman, thank you again for the opportunity to testify here
today. I would be happy to answer any questions.
Mr. Coble. Thank you, Dr. Lester. And thanks to each of you
for your testimony. Gentlemen, we impose the 5-minute rule
against ourselves as well, so if you all could keep your answer
as terse as possible it would enable us to move along.
Mark--We've got two ``Marks.'' Mr. Souder, you touched on
this very briefly, but I want to revisit it. The Talent-
Feinstein proposal listed pseudoephedrine as a Schedule V drug
under the Controlled Substances Act, and restricts monthly
sales to individuals. Why did you not include it in your bill?
Mr. Souder. We tried to deal with the question of blister
packs and quantity purchase. We're silent on that. That way, it
could be merged with this. But let me say what my personal
opinion is; which does not necessarily represent the group of
sponsors on the bill, because it's silent on this subject.
Meth, unlike crack and other things, has not covered the
whole country. Even in my district, it's in the rural areas and
some of the small towns, but not in the city of Fort Wayne, of
200,000, or in Elkhart, of 45,000. It's nowhere near the East
Coast. It may get there as it moves east, and it may go into
the cities.
But it means that shutting down pseudoephedrine products,
cold medicines, for everybody in the United States doesn't make
much sense, in my opinion. Certainly, in rural areas where they
don't have pharmacies in a lot of the grocery stores, in
effect, you'll pull all the profitability of the grocery stores
out and you'll shut them down. In these little markets in New
York City and in Los Angeles, in big cities, you take all the
cold medicines out. That's part of the profit of these stores,
and you're depriving consumers when they don't have a meth
problem.
Now, I believe that you should get at it at the wholesale
level. Where you see it go up, we should try to address that.
But I believe we're taking a big stick to whack a problem that
is isolated--growing; it's a threat; but if we need to do that,
if it becomes national, then we do it. I don't favor it at this
point, and I think we need to look for something that's a more
complex, diversified approach, than a simplistic answer.
Mr. Coble. All right, thank you, Mark.
Dr. Lester, let me put a three-part question to you. How
successful are drug treatment programs for meth abuse, A? What
types of drug treatment programs work and what types do not
work, B? And finally, C, how addictive is meth, as compared to
other drugs?
Mr. Lester. There are methamphetamine programs that are
successful. Probably, the best well-known one is called the
``Matrix'' program, which was developed out in California. I
think the problem with all of the methamphetamine programs,
including Matrix, is that they were pretty much developed on
adult male models. So again, they don't deal with special
populations like women and mothers, and certainly pregnant
women.
So I think the ideal situation would be to take some of the
models that have been developed for cocaine and methamphetamine
and reorganize them for special populations. And I think we
also need to get them combined with family treatment drug
courts; what would be, you know, a whole package to go.
What types of programs work? The kinds of programs that
work are programs that are comprehensive, that are family
based--in other words, that treat the whole family. You know,
for example, if you treat the mother and put her back in the
home where her husband or her boyfriend is using, that's not
going to do any good.
They have to be comprehensive, and treat the mental health
co-morbidities that go along with substance abuse. So
comprehensive programs are critical. And the programs that do
not work are the kind of one-shot, you know, just going after
one aspect of the problem, and ignoring everything else.
Mr. Coble. How about the addictive? Is it more addictive
than other drugs, or how does it compare with other drugs?
Mr. Lester. It's more psychologically addictive than a lot
of other drugs. It's not necessarily physiologically addictive.
I mean, it's psychologically addictive like cocaine, maybe even
a bit more, depending on the nature of the user.
Mr. Coble. Thank you, sir.
I think I have time for one more question. Mr. Rannazzisi,
what tools would assist the DEA in increasing enforcement
actions against the larger meth traffickers and the Mexican
superlabs?
Mr. Rannazzisi. Well, there's a variety. Again, we're
treating these cases just like we treat normal drug cases.
We're going after the larger organizations. That being said,
since there's two components here, we're looking at both the
small labs, trying to deal with that, and also the large
Mexican organizations.
We have the CPOT program, and we're targeting these large,
major organizations, these principals that are running these
drug organizations, through that program. However, you know,
again, we have to go back to what we need legislatively.
I think that the Administration, through Secretary Leavitt,
AG Gonzales, and Mr. Walters from ONDCP, laid out what we need
legislatively to help us along with this case: the 3.6-gram
limit on purchases; the elimination of the blister pack
exemption that, you know, has been dogging us for years now;
and also, removal of the chemical spot market loophole.
The chemical spot market loophole is, basically, killing
us. What happens is, in the spot market, if an importer brings
drugs--an importer sets up to import a certain amount of
pseudoephedrine, say, for two or three companies. He gets
permission from DEA. Over a 15-day period, we give him
permission for those particular downstream customers.
Now, when the drugs come in, or the pseudoephedrine comes
in, at that point in time, if he loses one of those customers,
he could sell it to anybody, and DEA is not aware of it. That's
the spot market loophole. It could go to any distributor,
anywhere in the U.S. So what we're asking for is to close up
that loophole. That's the tools we need.
Mr. Coble. Thank you, sir. My time has expired.
The distinguished gentleman from Massachusetts, Mr.
Delahunt.
Mr. Delahunt. Yes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to
compliment the DEA for the good work that they do. I also want
to compliment my colleagues, Mr. Kennedy and Mr. Souder. I know
that their commitment is outstanding in terms of dealing with
this particular issue.
Let me tell you what my problems are. I don't see anything
about treatment in here. Okay? Secondly, we've been down the
road before of mandatory sentences. I think it was you, Mr.
Kennedy, that alluded to sending messages. We've been sending
messages.
I think it should be by now conclusive evidence that just
simply enhancing penalties is in no way going to reduce the
trafficking in a particular controlled substance. You know, in
1988, there was legislation. I think that was the year that
created the 5- and 10-year minimum mandatories. In 1996, I
believe it was--the threshold amount was reduced. We're going
back to do the same thing again.
You know, I'm convinced that if we're going to do something
significant and substantial, we have to look at the treatment
paradigms, and make some choices in terms of our funding.
There's no reference in the legislation about treatment. I
mean, the demand--you've got to attack this on the demand side.
Deterrence, I'm not saying that we don't have to have
penalties. Clearly, we have to have significant sanctions. But
we've been down that route. And now we have an epidemic. We
didn't have the epidemic in 1988 and 1996. Now it's an
epidemic, as described in the title of this bill.
There is a program, I understand, out in Orange County that
requires a minimum of an 18-month treatment program, and
whoever graduates from it must be drug free for a period of 180
days, must be employed, must have his or her act together.
What about Professor Lester's observation about there are
some successful programs dealing with adult males now, and
expanding that to all different subsets of the addict
population? Congressman Souder.
Mr. Souder. May I respond?
Mr. Delahunt. Please.
Mr. Souder. Several things. First off, this is--we're doing
a series of meth bills and a series of amendments. These are
different appropriations. This is the Judiciary Committee. It
has to be targeted to judiciary things. To go on Frank Wolf's
Appropriations Subcommittee, which is where this may be
attached, it had to be relevant to that appropriations bill;
therefore, it doesn't address that.
I believe this does not add mandatory minimums. In fact, we
changed it to make sure we held bipartisan support. We did
lower the thresholds because meth--unlike crack and unlike
heroin, these people are producing and selling simultaneously.
It's a different type of a drug than anything else we're
dealing with.
Now, in the treatment question, first off, I don't disagree
that we need to do more. And we need to be looking at the
Labor-HHS bill to address that. We need to be targeting things
inside that on meth. Charlie Curie, the head of SAMHSA, was in
my district. We've met with different treatment providers.
I strongly disagree with the statements--some of them--
earlier; I agree with some of the conclusions. There is no
adult male meth treatment. He's talking about cocaine and
heroin. I don't think he's got that much experience with meth.
The Matrix model isn't working in meth. They're trying to
get it to work, but you have the mom, the dad, their whole
group. There's not like an enabler, a support group, to put
them back.
We need to be targeting funds in HHS, and drug treatment
funds. We need to increase drug courts. We've heard that drug
courts work because if you have a law and enforcement, then
they'll go to treatment. And we need to make sure there are
treatment dollars there.
This is a law enforcement bill. We need to look at how to
take this Matrix model where--you know one other problem? In
these rural areas, they can't do the Matrix model because they
don't have enough dollars to pay a staff-level person who's
experienced enough even to test the Matrix model in these mom-
and-pop labs.
I don't disagree with you at all on treatment. I support
more dollars for treatment. I support legislation for that.
I've co-sponsored legislation for that. That's not what this
is.
Mr. Delahunt. Just reclaiming my time for 1 minute, you
know, what concerns me is that a bill would come from this
Committee with these mandatory minimums, and nothing will
happen on the treatment side. What I would suggest to you, in
terms of expanding your base of support, that there be an
omnibus bill to be presented to the Committee, including and
implicating treatment.
Whether the Matrix program works or not, I don't know. But
I do know this. Okay? By cutting the threshold amounts, it's
the same thing as expanding the minimum mandatory sanction. And
it hasn't worked. It just won't work.
You know, mandatory treatment--mandatory treatment--should
be a concept that I would suggest should be introduced into
this kind of legislation; rather than just simply a mandatory
minimum prison sentence. Mandatory treatment is something that
I dare say would receive widespread support.
Yes, you do need those triggers, and you need those
sanctions. Oftentimes, people will not come voluntarily to
these potential treatment programs unless there is some sort of
coercion. But that's the direction we ought to be going in.
Mr. Coble. I thank the gentleman.
The distinguished gentleman from Florida, Mr. Feeney.
Mr. Feeney. I thank the Chairman. And I want to
congratulate my colleagues, Congressman Souder and Congressman
Kennedy, for tackling a major national problem that seems to be
expanding very rapidly.
One question I have for any of the panel is related to the
demographics. On page 3 of our memorandum, the Members here
have an indication that, of the Federal offenders, something
like 60 percent of the offenders are white, 33 percent are
Hispanic, and only 2 percent are African American. Do you have
any explanations or theories as to the disproportionately high
level of Caucasians and disproportionately low level of African
Americans that have been convicted of Federal offenses?
Mr. Souder. If I can take a quick stab at that, based on
our regional field hearings, I've asked the same question in
multiple locations across the country. It appears that it is in
the rural areas where you see the mom-and-pop labs, which are
the easiest ones to arrest because they tend to blow up their
families, tend to pollute the rivers. So they come into law
enforcement quicker than those who are from the superlabs and
the crystal meth--they tend to be disproportionately white. The
rural areas are disproportionately white. They start off in a
motorcycle gang, spread into the community, and are heavily
white.
When you see the superlab organizations come in, even in
the rural areas, they're predominantly Hispanic; but they're
still selling meth. It's predominantly a rural, and
increasingly a suburban, phenomenon.
Omaha and Minneapolis/Saint Paul are the two big cities
that have been hit. I asked the U.S. Attorney and the State
Director in Minneapolis, when we were up there in Saint Paul at
Congressman Kennedy's request, why we didn't see meth in the
African American community. And he said because the traditional
distribution methods are with cocaine in the major cities, and/
or heroin; not meth.
But in one neighborhood in Minneapolis, one of the
distribution groups moved over to meth. And in that area, in 3
months, 20 percent of the people arrested in that community--
the whole community--were meth, because that one neighborhood
switched over, because the local gang realized they could cut
out the Colombians and just work with the Mexican superlabs
with meth.
That's why I believe this is a potential epidemic that's
going to destroy Los Angeles, Chicago, Detroit, Boston, and
other cities, if it gets into the larger urban communities.
Even in my home town of Fort Wayne, which is 230,000, we
have had one lab, and around it--we are fifth-largest in the
nation, but it hasn't come into the city because the
distribution network is cocaine and heroin.
Mr. Feeney. Doctor? And by the way, could you address--I
asked the question based on ethnic demographics, but I'd also
be interested based on economic demographics. Are we largely
talking about, you know, poor people? Or is this an exotic, you
know, drug in the Wall Street and Hollywood----
Mr. Lester. Sure you want to know? I can only speak from
our ongoing NIH study. In that study, the places where we're
doing this research are Oklahoma, Iowa, southern California,
and Hawaii. And the demographics that we're seeing are pretty
much what you described: very, very few black; mostly Caucasian
and Hispanic.
We're looking into that because we don't, you know, quite
understand it. What we've been hearing is that a lot of it is
cultural; that for some reason, you know, cocaine seems to be--
you know, cocaine seems to be confined to, you know, black,
inner-city, poverty populations; and meth seems to just be more
popular with--not so much strictly poverty, but a lot of blue-
collar workers, a lot of, you know, farm people, factory
workers. And not necessarily poor; it's working people.
Mr. Feeney. Okay, Doctor. But what do you think of Mr.
Souder's theory? He's got a very good control group of African
Americans. His theory is that it's--based on the evidence that
he's heard--is that the use disparity is because of the
distribution networks; and once you infiltrate the distribution
network of the traditional cocaine users, that the African
American community--this problem will mushroom as well.
Mr. Lester. We haven't seen that. What we've heard is that,
for whatever cultural reasons, the inner-city African Americans
don't like it. They just--they prefer cocaine.
Mr. Feeney. Well, let's hope that's true. Finally, either
for my good friend----
Mr. Lester. Why would you hope that's true?
Mr. Feeney.--Mr. Kennedy or Mr. Souder, on the 10th
amendment issue, I have concerns about federalizing every
crime. This doesn't actually add any new crimes; although it
does lower some of the thresholds. Is that right?
Mr. Kennedy. It does lower the thresholds. Where we give
the ability to add an additional penalty is when they're using
these expedited entry programs coming in from Mexico; which is
distinctly a Federal issue.
Mr. Feeney. The import-export I have no problem with.
Mr. Kennedy. So we want to make sure that we're keeping
commerce going back and forth between Mexico and America,
Canada and America. So when they use those sort of, you know,
``You're clean, we'll let you through quicker,'' and then bring
meth in, we want them to have an extra penalty. And I think
that is a Federal role.
Mr. Feeney. I'm out of time. It's up to the Chairman, Dr.
Lester.
Mr. Coble. I didn't see the red light. The distinguished
gentleman from Virginia.
Mr. Scott. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Dr. Lester, do I
understand that you treat pregnant women that may be drug
addicted with meth?
Mr. Lester. Well, in Rhode Island, we don't have much meth;
so mostly, we treat cocaine users. We are seeing some of the
meth users in our other studies.
Mr. Scott. Well, in the other studies, I assume your
interest is to reduce the drug use, just a straight--that's
your interest. And in that interest, what is the medical
protocol to reduce the drug use? Is it to turn the pregnant
woman over to the police, or to start a prevention treatment
protocol?
Mr. Lester. This is not a treatment study, so what we're
doing is looking at the effects of prenatal methamphetamine
exposure on the development of the children. So we're not
providing treatment.
Mr. Scott. Well, what would be the protocol to deal with
the problem?
Mr. Lester. Well, the protocol that we would use would be
the one that we're using in Rhode Island for the cocaine using
mothers, which is our VIP program, where we identify the
patients in the hospital, present the voluntary treatment part
to them and lay out a treatment plan, and then develop a
treatment plan and get them to sign up for it. And if they do,
then they get to either keep their baby or, if the baby has
already been removed, they get reunified.
Mr. Scott. But the focus with the goal of reducing drug use
would be treatment, not incarceration?
Mr. Lester. Oh, absolutely. No, I mean, the whole idea
would be that if you can reduce the addiction, then you're
going to reduce the need for drugs, right? And also, you know,
since we work with children, our firm belief is that you would
then prevent children from growing up in drug environments, and
perhaps reduce the prevalence of drug users in the next
generation.
Mr. Scott. Thank you. Mr. Rannazzisi, for 5 grams of crack
cocaine you get 5 years mandatory minimum. To get the 5 years
mandatory minimum, you've got to get up to 500 grams of powder.
Is that right?
Mr. Rannazzisi. Yes, I believe that's correct; five and
five, yes.
Mr. Scott. Is there any evidence that people use powder
rather than crack cocaine because of the disparity in
sentencing where you can get probation versus 5 years mandatory
minimum?
Mr. Rannazzisi. I don't necessarily if our users use the
statutory minimums as a deterrent. I think it's their personal
choice, whatever drug they want to use.
Mr. Scott. Right. And the fact that you can get probation
for one or 5 years mandatory minimum doesn't really enter into
the calculation. They're both illegal. So you did not reduce
the incidence of crack use by having a draconian 5-year
mandatory minimum sentence; did you?
Mr. Rannazzisi. Putting it that way, I guess not.
Mr. Scott. Okay. Let me ask you another question. You were
talking about 3 grams of meth to trigger the Federal mandatory
minimums in this bill?
Mr. Rannazzisi. I just briefly read the bill, and I believe
that was 3 grams, yes.
Mr. Scott. Okay.
Mr. Rannazzisi. Three-point-five.
Mr. Souder. It's intent to distribute; not for usage.
Possession doesn't do it; it's intent to distribute.
Mr. Scott. Well, if you've got it and you've got friends,
you pretty much can--have you got a problem, if you've got
somebody with a requisite amount, busting them for
distribution, if they've got friends and they kind of use it
together?
Mr. Rannazzisi. I believe that would be up to the U.S.
attorney to make that decision.
Mr. Scott. How much is a weekend's worth of meth? How much
does that cost, and how many grams is it? If somebody just
wanted to get high over the weekend, how much would they be
buying?
Mr. Rannazzisi. Well, that would be up to the user. You
know, usually, they buy in grams or half-grams. It's usually
three to five hits per gram. And it just depends. Remember,
methamphetamine keeps you high, or keeps you up, a lot longer
than cocaine does; so, you know, depending on the user, how
long he's used it, he could be up for--you know, two or three
hits could keep him up all day, maybe into the next day. It
just depends on the user and the tolerance of the user for the
drug.
Mr. Scott. For a user, 3 grams, how long would that last? I
mean, would it be a month's worth?
Mr. Rannazzisi. No, it wouldn't be a month's worth.
Probably--probably, two, three, maybe 4 days, if he's a regular
user, and if he's not sharing.
Mr. Scott. Wait a minute. Three grams would be a couple of
days worth?
Mr. Rannazzisi. Three, maybe 4 days, yes. It depends on how
many hits he's taking. It depends on the amount he's using for
one hit.
Mr. Scott. Well, we're just kind of getting a ball park
figure to know what the trigger is for the mandatory minimums.
My time is up. We're going to have another round, I believe.
So, thank you.
Mr. Coble. The distinguished gentlelady from California,
Ms. Waters.
Ms. Waters. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I'd like to
thank our panelists for being here today, and my colleague, Mr.
Souder, for his interest in this area.
I don't know if you know, Congressmen, about all that we've
been through with crack cocaine and mandatory minimum
sentencing. In addition to the mandatory minimum sentencing,
the conspiracy laws that work hand-in-hand have jailed an awful
lot of folks in the black community, a lot of women who happen
to be the mates or girlfriends of guys who get caught up in
possession and sale of crack cocaine.
What's troublesome about crack cocaine is young people, 19
years old, who have never committed a crime before, who come
from good families, who--you know, at the wrong place, the
wrong time, the wrong crowd--with 5 grams of crack cocaine, end
up in prison under mandatory minimum sentencing laws. And of
course, the number of years increases with the amount in
possession. And these young people, once they do 5 years in
Federal penitentiary, probably will never work again. It's hard
to get their lives together. Mandatory minimum sentencing has
been devastating on the African American community.
I hear questions being asked about, ``Why don't they use
meth?'' It's kind of a strange question, and I'm trying to
figure out what that means. But the fact of the matter is, we
have gone through heroin, PCP, crack, now meth. And meth is
being talked about as the most devastating drug in the Midwest,
with the whites, I suppose, falling prey to this devastation.
The fact of the matter is, whether it is crack or meth, you
know, we have a drug problem in America, and it's not going to
be solved with mandatory minimum sentencing. As a matter of
fact, we exacerbate poverty and family separation and
devastation to communities with these kinds of penalties.
What we don't want to talk about is the cost of dealing
with drug addiction and the fact that we need treatment
programs and we need a bevy of people who are trained, social
workers who are trained, to be assigned to families, to keep up
with them while they complete their treatments and see them
into mainstream.
But that's just too much for us to talk about. And even
though you say that treatment is dealt with in other places
where it's more appropriate and they have the jurisdiction, and
you come here to talk about trying to do something on the
criminal justice side, I submit to you that those of us who
have been working with the Sentencing Commission and who have
been working--I hold a workshop every year with the
Congressional Black Caucus. And I have brought in hundreds of
folks who have been the victims of mandatory minimum
sentencing.
Judges don't like it. They hate it. I've written to every
Federal judge who has responded, you know, ``It's a problem
that Congress created for us, and you need to do something
about it.''
So I can't in any way be helpful or supportive of anything
that increases mandatory minimum sentencing. I'm very, very
supportive of getting tough on superlabs, getting tough on
incorrigible individuals who are intent on production--and I
think there are some ways to do that--clearly identified as
criminals.
But most of these young people, you're going to find,
whether it's in Idaho or any of these other places, that end up
in these parties or barns that go on all night with the use of
meth, are not really criminals. And they need help, and they
need treatment programs.
And if these young people end up in prison, with mandatory
minimum sentencing--and you're reducing it from five to three--
you're just creating another problem in our society for people
who cannot get a job, cannot get student loans, cannot get
section 8 programs. And they come back and they rob and they
steal and they survive.
So I would ask you to look at this again, and rethink
whether or not you want to deal with the mandatory minimum
sentencing in this way. I think there's some room to deal with
the precursors. I think there's some room to deal with the
border. I mean, you know, come in here and talk to me about
Vicente Fox, and what we're going to do with him and trade if
they don't do something about transporting these drugs across
the border from these superlabs in Mexico.
But to just, you know, talk about, you know, young people
who use this meth and get high, going to penitentiary, does not
do anything to make me believe that it's going to be helpful. I
yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. Gohmert. [Presiding.] Thank the gentlelady from
California.
Mr. Souder. Mr. Chairman, may I briefly comment on what the
bill says?
Mr. Gohmert. Do you have any objections?
[No response.]
Mr. Gohmert. All right, without objection, you may take 2
minutes.
Mr. Souder. Thank you. I appreciate the gentlelady's
concern. This deals with distribution. I know Congressman
Rangel, when he first did the crack cocaine mandatories, was
trying to get ahead of the curve with it in New York City and
elsewhere.
And you can argue about the power of crack, and whether
that worked, but meth is different. The users are the cookers.
We're talking here about home labs--home-type labs, not the
crystal meth. And it's not kids. For the most part, this
problem isn't kids. It's adults. And it is rural-wise, moving
toward the suburban and urban areas.
Ms. Waters. Where is your empirical data on all of this?
Mr. Souder. Oh, it's documented through drug court data,
through DEA data. If you go in the only cities where they've
had meth for 10 years, like Honolulu, it has moved into the
cities. And then it starts to look like any type of drug. But
they're having--but what's different about a mom-and-pop lab is
they're having to spend $300 to $400 in some apartment
complexes to fumigate it, once it hits the city, because it
endangers--the toxic chemicals endanger the next family coming
in.
This is different than other types of drugs, and we have to
understand it's going to take a different solution. I don't
believe the solution here, personally, is more mandatory
minimums for usage. I believe you do have to get into hardline
positions on distribution and get control of this.
Ms. Waters. But distribution is possession. So how much are
you talking about in possession in order to trigger these
reduced mandatory minimums?
Mr. Souder. It's also different than other drugs, because
you do not get off easy, in the sense of you start with a light
part--it's not something like marijuana, where you find casual
users; or even crack or cocaine, where you find casual users;
or heroin users, who can still function. Meth users tend to go
straight down on a line, unless they go cold-turkey off it.
It's different than other drugs.
Ms. Waters. No, I want to tell you, we heard this about
crack. It's supposed to be one hit, and you can never stop. So,
you know, as each of these drugs are introduced into our public
policy making, they're always described as one being more
terrible than the other. They're all terrible.
Mr. Souder. Oh, I agree----
Ms. Waters. They're all terrible.
Mr. Gohmert. We've lost the organizational flow here. Did
you yield? If you want to yield to the gentlelady from
California, then that's how it would have to be, because it was
your 2 minutes. But did you finish?
Mr. Souder. Yes.
Mr. Gohmert. Okay, next--all right, then the chair yields 5
minutes to Mr. Scott.
Mr. Scott. Thank you. Mr. Rannazzisi, in manufacturing and
distributing meth, how much of the price that the buyer pays is
actual production cost, as opposed to distribution cost? Is it
fair to say the cost of the product is de minimis in the
overall transaction?
Mr. Rannazzisi. I don't know, you're looking at $100--well,
between $80 and $100 a gram, we'll say. Okay? Usually, the
small labs are not making--you know, they're making an ounce.
They're usually about a half-ounce, but they could make up to
an ounce or two. It doesn't cost a lot to make the drug.
Actually, it's very cheap to make the drug, extremely cheap to
make the drug.
Mr. Scott. In the superlab, out of the $100, $80 to $100
you pay for the ounce, how much did they pay for product?
Mr. Rannazzisi. You mean--I'm sorry, the gram. Eighty to
$100 a gram.
Mr. Scott. Gram? Okay. Whatever--Okay, $80 to $100 a gram.
How much of that went to the actual product cost?
Ms. Waters. Five dollars.
Mr. Scott. Is it safe to say it's de minimis? I mean, it's
meaningless.
Mr. Rannazzisi. I wouldn't know. I wouldn't know to answer
that question. It depends on how much they're paying for their
materials, their raw materials.
Mr. Scott. Right.
Mr. Rannazzisi. Exactly.
Mr. Scott. And the raw materials, in the overall cost of
what you make, the overall cost of the materials would be
essentially de minimis. I mean, the real stuff is the
distribution, the risk of getting arrested, and all that.
That's what you're paying for: distribution, not manufacturing.
Is that right?
Mr. Souder. Mr. Scott, I agree with this: on the superlabs,
it's almost all distribution. On the mom-and-pop, the price
varies so much by area, and whether they're selling to their
friends. Sometimes they're just selling it to purchase more
materials to make it.
Mr. Scott. And with the mom-and-pop, they don't have the--
what do you have?--the savings in volume, because they've got
to buy the equipment. And if they just make a couple of ounces,
all of their equipment and setup is spread over just a few
ounces. Whereas, the superlab, that same cost would be spread
over pounds.
Mr. Souder. The other minimal thing that we've heard--we
haven't had a lot of meth addicts who've testified, but in
talking to some of them and having their testimony, they don't
appear to be able to hold a job shortly after becoming
addicted. It's a fairly downward cycle relatively rapidly. So
they try to replace income for their car, sometimes their house
payments, with the sale.
Mr. Scott. Now, we're aimed at true kingpins. And is it
true that the low-level guy caught up in the conspiracy will
get charged with the whole operation? So if you had a corner
guy, just passing it, and it's a million-dollar operation, he
will be charged with the whole million dollars; is that right?
Mr. Rannazzisi. Again, that's up to the United States
attorney that reviews the case.
Mr. Scott. Can he do it? He can do it; is that right?
Mr. Rannazzisi. The U.S. attorney would make that decision.
If he feels he has enough evidence to do that prosecution----
Mr. Scott. If he's got a multi-million-dollar operation,
everybody in the operation is on the hook to the multi-million-
dollar threshold; is that right?
Mr. Rannazzisi. Again, if the evidence proves that a person
is involved in the conspiracy and can be culpable for that
amount, the U.S. attorney makes that decision.
Mr. Scott. Culpable in the distribution, in the operation--
your little, low-level operator in a multi-million-dollar
operation. The fact is that when they say, ``How much were you
involved with?'' in terms for threshold purposes, it's the
whole ball of wax, all of it. Everybody gets charged with all
of it; isn't that right? Excuse me, may be charged, at the
discretion of the U.S. attorney.
Mr. Rannazzisi. At the discretion of the U.S. attorney.
Mr. Scott. Okay. So we know it's possible.
Mr. Rannazzisi. Yes, it is possible.
Mr. Scott. In terms of the import quotas for the chemicals,
who gets to set what the quota will be? How much actually gets
in?
Mr. Rannazzisi. Well, since this is new, I can only speak
for what we do as far as controlled substances. As far as
controlled substances go, raw materials, we look at the
national consumption.
Mr. Scott. Wait, wait a minute. Who is ``we''?
Mr. Rannazzisi. The Drug Enforcement Administration.
Mr. Scott. DEA?
Mr. Rannazzisi. Yes.
Mr. Scott. Not FDA?
Mr. Rannazzisi. The Drug Enforcement Administration.
Mr. Scott. Okay. There are legitimate uses for these
chemicals; is that right?
Mr. Rannazzisi. Absolutely. Yes.
Mr. Scott. Now, I mean, suppose the drug manufacturers, the
cold remedy people, want more. Who gets to decide whether or
not they can import the stuff?
Mr. Rannazzisi. Well, are we talking an aggregate quota?
They would have to provide justification for importing more.
They'd have to provide justification. As we're setting up a
quota system, justification has to--they have to provide
justification for us to determine what the quota amount will
be. They just don't give us a figure and we say, ``Okay.''
There's got to be some justification.
Mr. Scott. Well, if I could, Mr. Chairman, is this quota--
--
Mr. Gohmert. The Chair will yield an additional minute.
Mr. Scott. Thank you. Is this quota per transaction? I
mean, you just kind of make it up as you go along? Or is there
a national quota, that so much can come in? Or you kind of
regulate it piece by piece? How would that work?
Mr. Rannazzisi. I can only speak for controlled substances,
but when we have raw material quotas on controlled substances,
it changes year to year, depending on the legitimate need of
the----
Mr. Scott. Is this an aggregate quota for the country?
Mr. Rannazzisi. For the country, absolutely, yes.
Mr. Scott. Okay. And then who gets it? I mean, does Merck
get it, and Eli Lily can't get it?
Mr. Rannazzisi. For controlled substances we take each
individual company, each individual company that requests a
need for a particular raw material. And when we look at all the
companies together, that's how we determine the aggregate
amount.
Mr. Scott. And does Merck get what you allocated to them?
Suppose they say, ``Wait a minute, we can sell more than
that''?
Mr. Rannazzisi. Well, every year a quota is made, so every
year they have an opportunity to re-request additional quota
amounts. And I believe in the system we've built in where, if a
company does need additional amounts, we're able to grant that,
in some cases.
Mr. Scott. And if they have a complaint, like they feel
they weren't treated fairly, what remedy do they have?
Mr. Rannazzisi. They would again apply to DEA, and it would
go through our process of reconsideration.
Mr. Scott. And if DEA is obnoxious, what remedy do they
have?
Mr. Rannazzisi. I believe----
Mr. Scott. I mean, suppose----
Mr. Rannazzisi. I believe DEA is fairly----
Mr. Scott. No, suppose you've got two competing drug
companies and you've allocated more to one than the other. I
mean, can you go to court?
Mr. Rannazzisi. It goes through the regulatory process. And
there's a notice and comment period, and they can request a
hearing.
Mr. Scott. And so when the DEA says, ``Merck, no, you can't
get any more cold medicine,'' that's it?
Mr. Rannazzisi. Well, again, it goes through----
Mr. Scott. No remedy. Is there a remedy?
Mr. Rannazzisi. Yes, I believe there is a remedy. I believe
that's through the regulatory process, administrative process.
Mr. Scott. What about a lawsuit?
Mr. Rannazzisi. I'm sure that--everybody, I think, has that
opportunity to file a lawsuit, sir.
Mr. Gohmert. The gentleman's time has expired.
I did want to ask questions. I got in this afternoon. My
district has been hit by Hurricane Rita, and we were already
holding quite a few folks from Hurricane Katrina. But I did
want to ask, I mean, Texas has been restricting the numbers of
pseudoephedrine that an individual could get for some time now.
And I wondered if there was any empirical data that had been
gathered from States that had been restricting the purchases of
pseudoephedrine for a while.
Mr. Rannazzisi. Well, the only full-year data set we have
is from Oklahoma. And that was described in the interim report
for the National Synthetic Drugs Action Plan Strategy. Oklahoma
had approximately a 52 percent reduction, based upon their
restrictions, which was a straight Schedule V restriction.
It was kind of like a hybrid Schedule V, because in
Oklahoma you actually--there were three products--liquids, gel
caps, and liquid gel caps--that aren't affected by that law, so
they could be sold in the retail markets. Other than that, in
Oklahoma Schedule V, they're sold in pharmacies only.
Now, there's other States, such as Oregon who went through
the pharmacy board to create a regulation to make it similar to
Schedule V. But if I'm not mistaken, the combination products--
the single-entity products were Schedule V; the combination
products were not--were kept in pharmacies only. The
combination products were sold outside of the pharmacies. And I
believe that was changed later on.
In Iowa, it's all Schedule V. Even if you have a trace
amount of pseudoephedrine in the product, it's a Schedule V
product.
So as you see, all the States are operating differently.
Now, Oregon has shown a 42 percent reduction in the first 4
months of enactment, and that was in the interim----
Mr. Gohmert. When you say 52 percent in Oklahoma and 42
percent in Oregon, reduction, in such a short turnaround, what
is it? Fifty-two percent reduction in what?
Mr. Rannazzisi. In lab seizures, clan lab seizures, a 52-
percent reduction in clandestine lab seizures.
Mr. Souder. Mr. Chairman? Mr. Chairman?
Mr. Gohmert. Yes, sir.
Mr. Souder. When we first held a hearing, I had the
Oklahoma program come forth when it was brand new. I was
enthusiastic about this program. The fact is, Kansas doesn't
have such a program. They have Meth Watch, and they also
dropped. Indiana just did one that put it behind the counter,
but not Schedule V, and guess what? Meth labs have dropped
before the law was implemented.
The fact is that if you tackle this issue, and if you have
a combined effort in the community--through law enforcement,
through drug treatment, through prevention programs, through TV
and newspaper awareness--it's a drug that's so bad that you can
turn it around.
But over-reaction, which I believe is happening in some--
Mr. Scott put it into the record. The Oregonian is reporting
that they've had a rise now in meth in Oklahoma; only it's
first coming in with the superlab stuff.
But the second thing is, we all know the biggest problem in
drug trafficking is Internet. At least when it's going into a
local pharmacy, you can kind of see where it's coming up. You
can have the law enforcement come in, check it, figure out why
a pharmacy is doing it. If these people start ordering on the
Internet--and most of them will say they got the recipe on the
Internet--if they start ordering from Mexico and Canada, we'll
never find them. We won't have any control.
So what looks like a quick, short-term, 12- to 24-month
solution, I would argue, is causing greater problems down the
road. And I came through as an enthusiast for this initially.
Maybe that's where we'll have to go if the epidemic gets too
bad. But it's too quick of a political reaction to a complex,
difficult, multi-level problem.
Mr. Gohmert. I'd agree with you, except I do believe it is
an epidemic. As a district judge in Texas, I was constantly
sentencing people who were cooking or selling the results of
the cooks. And of course, when it was a hot cook, well, that
was a little easier to spot, because of the smell, and then
when it went to the cold cook--of course, you could also find
people after the explosions sometimes, in the hot cook. But the
cold cook made it harder to catch them.
But for someone who is already on the record--because I've
had to give my driver's license and everything else, just to
get the Sudafed so I don't snore at night when I take the
Sudafed and it opens up my sinuses--it's a real hassle to
somebody that's law-abiding, plays by the rules. But I know
those people that want it, they don't come in and turn their
driver's license in like I did, and have all that stuff written
down.
So I wasn't sure, from the law enforcement I've worked with
and was a judge for so many years and dealt with it, that
making honest, law-abiding people like me go in and have to be
restricted in what we can get, and also now have to give in
your driver's license, that it really made that much difference
to people that were determined to be criminal.
It is an epidemic. It does need additional enforcement. Of
course, some of the testimony I heard, if your neighbor is
mowing his lawn at 3 a.m., he's a suspect, even if you don't
smell the cook or whatever. [Laughter.]
That came up in one trial I was trying. If your neighbor is
mowing at three, you may want to let law enforcement know.
But anyway, I just hate to rush head-long into anything, if
it may sound like a good quick fix, when overall it may not
actually be what fixes the problem, to a multi-faceted problem.
Now, my time has expired, but if you'd care to address, any
one of you?
Mr. Rannazzisi. Well, I just want to say that if you look
at the States and what they've done, the States have tailored
their legislation to their needs, what they feel their law
enforcement needs. And it's all over the board.
We have some States that follow Federal legislation. We
have some States, like Oklahoma and Iowa, that have gone to the
extreme end. It's just a balance. We have to balance law
enforcement needs with the legitimate consumer needs.
I didn't say one thing, though. If I'm not mistaken, Kansas
was one of the States mentioned that was Meth Watch. I believe
they went to a Schedule V, as well.
Mr. Scott. If I could ask one other question?
Mr. Gohmert. The Chair yields to the gentleman from
Virginia.
Mr. Scott. Could you tell me how this bill would affect
convenience stores and drug stores?
Mr. Souder. What roughly happens is, in Indiana, after it
was originally proposed as a Schedule V--in a Schedule V, it's
got to be in a pharmacy. And in small towns, the grocery stores
don't have pharmacies. In fact, they're lucky if they have a
grocery store or a pharmacy any more, because it can't make
money. In Indiana, just going behind the counter, which means
you have more and more behind the counter--you have lottery
tickets, you have cigarettes, you have everything else--that
they've restricted--the practical implementation in the last 30
days has been they've gone from 120 alternative cold medicines
down to 20. They can't put them all behind the counter.
Furthermore, as it starts to ripple through, when you
realize it's only--even in a State like Oklahoma, it's not in
the big cities. And in States like Indiana, it's not in the
mid-sized cities. So you're restricting everybody in the cities
from their ability to get cold medicine because you have an
epidemic outside. But if you don't, they merely go to the
adjacent State. But if we restrict it at the States, they're
going to go to Canada and Mexico and the Internet.
The problem is the reason--with the Meth Caucus tomorrow,
we're having a roundtable summit. And my frustration with this
Administration is it takes every angle. It takes a law
enforcement angle. I'm proud of this bill, and I believe it's a
compromise. But we're also having ADMHA there tomorrow, we're
having NIDA there tomorrow, we need--the National Institute for
Drug Abuse, the Alcohol and Mental Health and Drug Substance,
ADMHA. We need to have them working on treatment programs.
We need to have the Safe and Drug Free School Program
looking at how to get the kids themselves involved in this. We
need to have our community programs talking about a community
effort. We need to be looking at every agency and how, when
this hits, to get ahead of the curve.
This is one we've seen march west to east, Hawaii to
California, going to the Midwest, now in upstate Pennsylvania,
in eastern North Carolina. It's coming. It's coming inside out.
It hit Dayton for the first time last week. And so we need to
get ahead of this comprehensively.
Mr. Scott. My question was what effect the bill would have
on drug stores and convenience stores.
Mr. Souder. The bill has no--has minimal effect. It
restricts the, basically, 48-count; gets rid of the blister
packs; gets it into a manageable form; starts to track the
wholesale spot market.
As Mr. Rannazzisi said, you look at this, and you're trying
to get the places where there are bulges in the market
addressed. We're trying to get the big amounts of
pseudoephedrine coming into the United States.
Mr. Scott. Well, I mean, you've testified that you're
trying--is this thing targeted? I mean, because it sounds like
the bill would apply where there's no problem and it would
create the administrative hassles whether there's a problem in
the area or not. Is that true?
Mr. Souder. What started this discussion was Mr. Coble's
question to me about Schedule V with my bill. This bill is
silent.
Mr. Scott. Well, my question--I don't know what Mr. Coble's
question was--was if you're running a convenience store or a
drug store or a grocery store, what difference would the bill
make?
Mr. Souder. Minimal. That's quantity sales.
Mr. Scott. Quantity?
Mr. Souder. For the individual retailer, all it does is
reflect quantity sales at that store. He's restricted if
somebody comes in with a big blister pack, wants more than 48
at a time, he's restricted. But it's not behind the counter;
it's not at a pharmacy. We're going at the wholesale national
level.
There is another bill moving that Senators Talent and
Feinstein have done in the Senate, that Congressman Blunt has
in the House, that could be married to this. And I was
expressing my opinions and concerns about that bill. This bill
is de minimis impact on an individual retailer, and de minimis
impact on people in Virginia and other parts.
Mr. Scott. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And Mr. Chairman, I'd
like a letter, testimony from the American Council on
Regulatory Compliance, in reference to the legislation, and one
from--and the other letter that I've cited from, signed by 92
professionals, suggesting that we need to focus on prevention.
Mr. Gohmert. If there is no objection.
[No response.]
Mr. Gohmert. I don't hear any down at either end. Okay.
Well, without objection, then, those will be entered into the
record.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix.]
Mr. Scott. Thank you.
Mr. Gohmert. Anything else?
Mr. Souder. Mr. Chairman?
Mr. Gohmert. Yes.
Mr. Souder. May I clarify one other thing from earlier?
That we have a safety valve in this matter of sentencing. For
people who aren't central to drug trafficking, it allows a
sentence beneath the mandatory minimum. You can't be charged as
a kingpin if you aren't the leader of the organization. That's
different than conspiracy. So kingpin is statured slightly
different than conspiracy. It also allows the sentence to be
negotiated if you turn in the higher-level person.
Mr. Gohmert. All right. And by the way, that 3 a.m. mowing,
it actually came out in a capital murder case, because the
whole ring was involved, and one of them they were afraid was a
snitch, and she was killed and stuffed in a 55-gallon drum. But
anyway, unpleasant stuff we're dealing with. And it is an
epidemic, and we appreciate your attention to that.
I do thank the witnesses for their testimony. This
Committee thanks you--or this Subcommittee. And we appreciate
all you're trying to do to help with the epidemic and the
problem.
And in order to ensure a full record and adequate
consideration of this important issue, the record will be left
open for additional submissions for 7 days. Also, any written
questions that a Member wants to submit should be submitted
within the same 7-day period.
This concludes the legislative hearing of H.R.3389 [sic],
the ``Methamphetamine Epidemic Elimination Act.'' I thank you
for your cooperation. This Subcommittee stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 5:31 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
----------
Material Submitted for the Hearing Record
Prepared Statement of the Honorable Robert C. Scott, a Representative
in Congress from the State of Virginia, and Ranking Member,
Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am pleased to join you in convening this
hearing on the ``Methamphetamine Epidemic Elimination Act.''
Unfortunately, I am not able to join you in supporting the bill in its
current form.
In the last 15 to 20 years, methamphetamine (Meth) abuse has grown
to what some now refer to as epidemic proportions in parts of this
country. We've been making efforts in the Congress for years to address
the meth problem. The Subcommittee on Crime held 6 (six) field hearings
on methamphetamine production, trafficking, and use in 1999, in
Arkansas, California, New Mexico, and Kansas. Testimony was received
from numerous witnesses, including former methamphetamine addicts,
family members of the victims of methamphetamine related violence, law
enforcement professionals, and prevention and addiction treatment
professionals. Despite what we heard about the need for treatment and
family support to get people out of meth's grip and back on track, the
basic approach of the Congress has been to increase the number and
severity of mandatory minimum sentences. Yet, the fact is that this
approach clearly has not worked to stem the tide of meth and the fact
that there is no evidence to suggest it ever will.
The evidence shows that treatment does work to stem meth addiction
and abuse. Recently, in an open letter to the news media and policy
makers, 92 researchers and treatment professionals stated that:
``Claims that methamphetamine users are virtually untreatable with
small recovery rates lack foundation in medical research. Analysis of
dropout, retention in treatment and reincarceration rates and other
measures of outcome, in several recent studies indicate that
methamphetamine users respond in an equivalent manner as individuals
admitted for other drug abuse problems. Research also suggests the need
to improve and expand treatment offered to methamphetamine users.''
Drug Courts have proven especially successful in the case of
methamphetamine treatment as an alterative to the ``get tougher''
approach. The Orange County, California, Superior Court Drug Court
Program is an example of a program that has effectively addressed the
methamphetamine problem. This court requires a minimum of an 18-month
treatment program in which the graduate must be drug free for 180 days,
have a stable living arrangement, and be employed or enrolled in a
vocational or academic program. This Drug Court has a 72 percent
retention rate, with 80 percent of the graduates not being rearrested
for drugs and 74 percent with no arrest for anything.
Nonetheless, time and again, Congress has responded to this serious
problem primarily with more and harsher mandatory minimums. In the
Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Congress established a 5 year minimum for
10 grams of pure meth or 100 grams of meth mixture and a 10 year
minimum for 100 grams of pure meth or 1 kilogram of meth mixture. In
the 1990 Crime Control Act, Congress heightened sentencing for ``Ice''
a particular form of Meth. Then again in 1996, Congress responded to
the still growing problem with even tougher mandatory minimums, by
cutting in half the quantities of the pure controlled substance and
mixture that would trigger the respective five and ten year mandatory
minimums.
In the meantime, as the epidemic has grown exponentially despite
these ever-increasing punitive approaches by the Congress, states have
taken a similar approach, enacting harsher and harsher penalties and
putting more and more emphasis on law enforcement. Yet, they have had
no more success than Congress with this approach. A recent series of
articles in The Oregonian newspaper reflected the frustrating results
of this approach in Oklahoma, and ask unanimous consent to place this
article in the record. The article pointed out that while Oklahoma had
great success in slashing the number of home meth labs through vigorous
law enforcement, it failed to curb meth use. They found that in place
of the local labs, a massive influx of meth made by Mexican
``superlabs,'' where tons of pseudoephedrine can be easily obtained,
had come into their locale, and that it was cheaper and better quality
than the locally made stuff.
Despite the clear evidence that increasing penalties does not stem
the spread or impact of meth, and despite the evidence that treatment
does significantly decrease the problem, the response in this bill, yet
again, is to increase mandatory minimum sentencing, even more. This
bill would further lower the threshold amount of meth that triggers
harsh mandatory minimum sentences. The major problem with this approach
is that it will actually make meth more available. This is because
lowering the quantity threshold for triggering mandatory minimums will
cause federal prosecutors to concentrate even more on low-level
offenders that are now being left to the states to prosecute. This will
simply mean that we will be sentencing the same low level offenders to
longer sentences, including those who are tied in through conspiracy
and attempt laws which punish bit players the same as kingpins. This is
what we have seen with the so-called crack epidemic, where we are
seeing that over \2/3\ of those sentenced for crack offenses are low
levl offenders, generally addicts dealing to supply their habit. And
now, her we go, in the words of Yogi Berra, with ``de ja vue all over
again.''
So, Mr. Chairman, I look for word to the testimony of our witnesses
with the hope that they will enlighten us on proven ways to stem this
problem, rather than simply doing what we always do--put more low level
addicts in prison longer, while the problem rages on. Thank you.
Prepared Statement of Freda S. Baker, Deputy Director, Family and
Children's Services, Alabama State Department of Human Resources
Prepared Statement of Prepared Statement of Laura J. Birkmeyer, Chair,
National Alliance for Drug Endangered Children, and Executive Assistant
to U.S. Attorney, Southern District of California, United States
Department of Justice
Publication entitled ``The Meth Epidemic in America, Two Surveys of
U.S. Counties: The Criminal Effect of Meth on Communities, The Impact
of Meth on Children, submitted by the National Associatino of Counties
(NACo)
Letter from A. Bradford Card, Legislative Liaison, National Troopers
Coalition to the Honorable Mark Souder and the Honorable Elijah
Cummings
Letter from Donald Baldwin, Washington Director, Federal Criminal
Investigators Association to the Honorable Howard Coble
Letter from Chuck Canterbury, National President, Grand Lodge,
Fraternal Order of Police (FOP) to the Honorable Mark Souder
Letter from William J. Johnson, Executive Director, National
Association of Police Organizations, Inc.
Prepared Statement of the Therapeutic Communities of America (TCA)
Therapeutic Communities of America respectfully requests that this
written statement become part of the official record for the hearing
held before the House Judiciary Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and
Homeland Security on September 27, 2005 on H.R. 3889, the
Methamphetamine Epidemic Elimination Act. TCA commends the Chairman and
the Committee for their leadership in holding a hearing on this
important issue.
METHAMPHETAMINE AND THERAPEUTIC COMMUNITIES
Therapeutic Communities of America (TCA), founded in 1975 as a non-
profit membership association, represents over 500 community-based non-
profit programs across the country dedicated to serving individuals
with substance abuse and co-occurring mental health problems. Members
of TCA are predominately publicly funded through numerous federal,
State, and local programs across multiple agency jurisdictions.
TREATING METHAMPHETAMINE ADDICTION
Therapeutic communities have been successful in helping many
addicted individuals, often thought to be beyond recovery, secure a way
out of self-destructive behavior. There is a misunderstanding,
mentioned several times during the hearing, that methamphetamine
addiction cannot be treated. Methamphetamine can and is being treated
successfully, both in TCA member programs and by other treatment
providers.
Historically, therapeutic communities have been extremely effective
at adapting their programs to provide effective treatment as drug use
trends change, and in this respect, the current methamphetamine
epidemic is no different. Therapeutic communities and other treatment
providers have found success in creating special protocols to deal with
the unique challenges that methamphetamine addicts present, while
treating them with the general population of patients addicted to other
drugs of choice. No less than Dr. Nora Volkow, the Director of the
National Institute of Drug Abuse, has noted that ``methamphetamine
addiction can be treated successfully using currently available
behavioral treatments.''
Counselors at several TCA member therapeutic communities that treat
a high volume of meth users have recorded long-term abstinence rates
for their patients of between 30-50%. These numbers are not much
different from typical long-term abstinence rates for treating alcohol
and other drugs. In the words of a clinician from a TCA member program,
``Overall success rates have been the same or better in our programs
after the meth wave came as compared to before. Meth users initially
experience some cognitive deficits, but otherwise there is not much of
a difference between them and other users.''
TCA RECOMMENDATIONS
While TCA strongly commends H.R. 3889's focus on methamphetamine
abuse, we believe that this bill could be greatly strengthened with
provisions providing for methamphetamine treatment funds. The 2002
National Survey on Drug Abuse and Health Report stated that only 18.2
percent of all Americans over the age of 12 needing treatment actually
received it. Along with enhanced law enforcement capabilities and
interdiction efforts, evidence-based treatment services provide a
valuable tool in fighting the growing methamphetamine epidemic.
Treatment funds are especially crucial because of the nature of the
meth epidemic--the drug is mostly present in rural communities, where
evidenced-based treatment services tend to be scarce or limited.
TCA also recommends that H.R. 3889 include a component that
encourages NIDA to undertake further research on effective modalities
for treating methamphetamine addiction. Lastly, TCA respectfully
requests that the Committee recognize the benefits of treatment as part
of the solution to eradicating the methamphetamine epidemic from our
communities, and strongly encourages the Judiciary Committee to work
with the relevant committees with jurisdiction over substance abuse
treatment to add provisions that support treatment to this important
piece of legislation.
Prepared Statement of the Food Marketing Institute (FMI)
INTRODUCTION
The Food Marketing Institute (FMI), on behalf of the nation's
supermarkets and grocery stores, appreciates the opportunity to provide
testimony to the House Judiciary Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism and
Homeland Security in response to the issue of methamphetamine abuse in
the United States and legislation that is designed to combat the
problem.
By way of background, FMI is a national trade association that
conducts programs in research, education, industry relations and public
affairs on behalf of its 1,500 member companies--food retailers and
wholesalers--in the United States and around the world. FMI's members
operate approximately 26,000 retail food stores with combined annual
sales of $340 billion--three quarters of all food retail store sales in
the United States. FMI's retail membership is composed of large multi-
state chains, regional companies and independent grocery stores. Our
international membership includes some 200 companies from 50 foreign
countries.
As reflected in our testimony presented by Joseph R. Heerens,
Senior Vice President, Government Affairs, Marsh Supermarkets, Inc.,
before the House Government Reform Subcommittee on Criminal Justice,
Drug Policy and Human Resources on November 18, 2004, the supermarket
industry fully understands the magnitude of the methamphetamine problem
here in America, and we also recognize the sad fact that legitimate
cough and cold products containing the ingredient pseudoephedrine (PSE)
are used to make methamphetamine.
According to law enforcement sources, legitimate PSE products
either purchased or stolen from retail stores account for approximately
20 percent of methamphetamine that is made domestically here in the
United States, whereas the lion's share of meth found in this country,
an estimated 80 percent, comes from foreign sources, primarily super
labs located in Mexico. Thus, it is FMI's view that to effectively
address the methamphetamine problem we need a comprehensive strategy
and partnership between law enforcement, regulatory agencies, OTC
manufacturers and the retail community.
SCHEDULE V--SUPERMARKET CONCERNS
The supermarket industry has serious concerns and misgivings over
recent initiatives that have been enacted into law at the state level
and pending federal legislation (S. 103-H.R. 314) that impose stringent
controls on precursor chemicals at the retail level. We are referring
to what is called the Oklahoma model that relegates PSE products to
Schedule V status. Under this approach, only retail stores that have a
pharmacy department are allowed to sell these OTC medications, and
these items must be kept behind the pharmacy counter.
Without question, Schedule V is very troublesome to our industry.
That's because an overwhelming majority of grocery stores doing
business in the United States don't have a pharmacy department and
would be precluded from selling PSE products. For those supermarkets
that do have a pharmacy department, store hours are quite different
from hours of operation in the pharmacy department. For example, while
supermarkets may be opened from 7:00 am to 11:00 pm, the pharmacy
department operates on an abbreviated schedule and may only be open
from 9:00 am to 9:00 pm weeks days, 9:00 am to 7:00 pm on Saturday and
11:00 am to 5:00 pm on Sundays. Thus, even though the grocery store is
open for business, if the pharmacy department is not open, or if the
pharmacist is not on duty, PSE product sales would not be permitted.
IMPACT ON CONSUMERS
The end result under the rigid Schedule V approach is a dramatic
reduction in consumer access to cough and cold medications depending
upon whether their local grocery store has a pharmacy department and
what hours the pharmacy department is opened on a particular day. For
consumers living in rural areas or in inner city communities, Schedule
V can create major hardships if the nearest pharmacy is 15 to 20 miles
from their home or if the person is elderly or poor and would have to
rely on public transportation in order to get to a pharmacy to purchase
PSE products.
FMI along with the National Consumers League (NCL) gauged consumer
opinion and views on sales restrictions of PSE products in a national
survey that was released in April of 2005. What the FMI-NCL survey
found is rather revealing. Forty four percent of the 2,900 adult survey
respondents felt that Schedule V would create a hardship for them,
while 62 percent said they did not believe that restricting sales of
PSE products to pharmacies is a reasonable measure for controlling meth
production. In stark contrast, the survey respondents were far more
receptive to less severe restrictions to Schedule V, such as placing
cough cold and allergy products behind a counter, not a pharmacy
counter, or placing them in a locked display case. Additionally, more
than 80 percent of the survey participants expressed support for
limiting the quantity of such products that individuals can purchase,
and 74 percent said it would be reasonable to restrict the age of
purchasers.
For the above mentioned reasons, FMI and our members cannot support
a Schedule V classification for cough and cold products containing
pseudoephedrine. Schedule V clearly poses significant problems for
consumers who have legitimate needs for these medications to treat
their allergies, coughs and colds. Schedule V means reduced consumer
access and hardship because their nearby grocery store, which they
visit 2.2 times per week, won't be allowed to sell these items. FMI
further suspects that Schedule V may mean higher prices as PSE products
move from self-service to behind the pharmacy counter, where the
pharmacist, a highly salaried professional, will be required to ask for
photo identification and have the customer sign a log book. While our
industry applauds the hard work of the law enforcement community in
their efforts against the methamphetamine plague, we do not believe
Schedule V is the right solution.
COMBAT METH ACT OF 2005 IS FLAWED
In terms of pending federal legislation, the Combat Meth Act of
2005 (S. 103) approved by the Senate on September 9, 2005, as part of
the FY 2006 Commerce/Justice Appropriations, FMI firmly believes that
this proposal is both deficient and flawed, and in need of significant
revisions. The following are the deficiencies and flaws that we see in
this legislation:
S. 103 fails to provide for a national standard
governing the sale of PSE products. Methamphetamine is a
nationwide problem that necessitates a national solution.
Regrettably, S. 103 allows states and well as localities to
establish different restrictions on the sale of PSE products,
making compliance by retailers more difficult and complicated.
The Combat Meth Act of 2005 does not exempt liquids
and gel caps even though every state Schedule V law regulating
the sale of PSE products exempts liquids and gel caps.
Unless the Combat Meth Act of 2005 is amended, it
will trigger a ``by prescription only'' requirement in as many
as 19 states. This would mean consumers would have to get a
prescription from their doctor in order to purchase PSE
products. As a result, a product that normally sells for about
$6.00 at retail will now cost close to $60 when you factor in
the physician office visit charge.
Moreover, the Schedule V provisions in S. 103 will
force grocery warehouses and distribution centers that handle
PSE products to apply for a Controlled Substances Registrant
license from the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA). This
will entail higher licensing fees and new regulatory burdens
for these facilities. Imposing Schedule V requirements and
costs on warehouses and distribution centers makes no sense
since these facilities are not a source of supply for meth
cooks.
S. 103 is too narrow. It only addresses 20 percent of
the problem in terms of domestic meth production resulting from
PSE products that have been obtained or stolen from retail
stores. S. 103 does nothing to address 80 percent of
methamphetamine that finds its way into the United States from
foreign countries.
The Combat Meth Act of 2005 dramatically and unfairly
reduces consumer access to cough and cold products by limiting
their sale to stores that have a pharmacy. PSE products would
have to be placed behind a pharmacy counter. Moreover, due to
space limitations in the pharmacy, retailers will not be able
to carry and offer for sale the wide variety of PSE medications
that consumers want or need, and because these products will be
behind the pharmacy counter, consumers will no longer have the
opportunity read and compare product labels.
The Combat Meth Act of 2005 limits purchasers to no
more than 7.5 grams within a 30-day period. This arbitrary
limit may be unfair to a family with allergy problems or a
parent with several sick children who has a legitimate need for
more than 7.5 grams within a 30-day period.
S. 103 is cavalier in its treatment of internet sales
and flea markets. The legislation allows but does not require
the Attorney General to promulgate regulations governing the
sale of PSE products over the Internet. Furthermore, S. 103 has
no provisions relating to flea markets which routinely sell PSE
products that in most cases have been stolen from retail stores
by organized theft gangs. Flea markets should be precluded from
selling PSE products unless these transient vendors have
written authorization or appropriate business records from the
manufacturer.
S. 103 allows stores without a pharmacy department to
sell PSE products under very limited circumstances. The
exemption process is so complicated and convoluted involving
both state and federal agencies. It is our view that very few
exemptions will be granted and they will not be granted in a
timely fashion.
The implementation dates for Schedule V are
unrealistic. For example, single ingredient PSE products would
be placed in Schedule V 90-days after enactment and retailers
would be required to maintain a log book. It is highly unlikely
that the Department of Justice (DOJ) would be able to
promulgate necessary regulations in 90-days to tell retailers
how to comply with the law.
FMI SUPPORTS METH EPIDEMIC ELIMINATION ACT
FMI wishes to express our industry's support for the Meth Epidemic
Elimination Act (H. R. 3889) that has been introduced by
Representatives James Sensenbrenner (R-WI), Mark Souder (R-IN),
Chairman Howard Coble (R-NC) and Roy Blunt (R-MO). Unlike the narrow
focus of the Combat Meth Act of 2005, this initiative seeks to address
the methamphetamine problem in a comprehensive manner. The legislation
is multi-faceted with provisions that would establish domestic as well
as international regulation of precursor chemicals while providing for
more severe penalties for methamphetamine production, possession or
trafficking.
In expressing our industry's support for the Meth Epidemic
Elimination Act, we would urge the Subcommittee to make the following
changes:
Amend the bill to include strong federal pre-emption
language governing the sale the PSE products in order to
facilitate retailer compliance, or at the very least prohibit
local communities from implementing restrictions that are
different from sales restrictions that have been established by
a state.
Revise the legislation from a 3.6 gram per single
transaction to 6 grams per transaction.
Establish a ban on Internet sales of precursor
chemicals.
Prohibit flea markets from selling PSE products as
well as infant formula unless these transient vendors have
written authorization from the manufacturer.
FMI, on behalf of the nation's supermarket, appreciates the
opportunity to provide testimony on this important issue to the
Subcommittee.
__________
Prepared Statement of the American Council on Regulatory Compliance
The American Council on Regulatory Compliance is an association
especially established for small and mid-size manufacturers,
distributors and retailers of over-the-counter medicines and
preparations containing List I chemicals that are regulated by the US
Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA). Although this constitutes a very
diverse group of businesses both in size and activity, they
nevertheless share certain common regulatory concerns by virtue of
distributing these products.
Although many such businesses may be members of other associations,
no one single association addresses this situation in depth. The
commerce in these registered products serves the legitimate
requirements of millions of consumers. The American Council on
Regulatory Compliance and its members recognize and accept the
importance of regulating these products in order to assure proper use.
They support the state and federal government, and particularly the US
Drug Enforcement Administration in this important effort. Although this
effort involves concerns and continually changing issues to the
business community, it is essential that government and business
establish the maximum level of cooperation and communication.
THE ACRC COOPERATES WITH CONGRESS AND FEDERAL AGENCIES
The American Council on Regulatory Compliance is dedicated to
cooperating with the U.S. Congress, Federal regulatory and law
enforcement agencies, such as the Drug Enforcement Administration,
State and Local Authorities, and other organizations to help prevent
illegitimate use.
The ACRC encourages all members to improve training and compliance
activities and to establish constructive partnerships at all levels of
government. The association supports the following initiatives:
(1) Compliance training for Members;
(2) Assisting with education and compliance at the retail
level;
(3) Developing security and record keeping models;
(4) Implementing a system for screening orders and monitoring
sales.
(5) Promote understanding of laws and regulations.
``methamphetamine epidemic elimination act''
The ACRC supports the overall thrust and spirit of H.R. 3889 and
believes that it addresses a major problem of illicit Methamphetamine
use through import controls and increasing penalties for the illicit
production of Methamphetamine. However, there are provisions of the
bill that could be modified to improve and clarify the legislation.
Current law, Title 21, United States Code (21 USC), Section 971 (c)
(1), allows the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) to disqualify
customers of a List I Chemical Importer, if the List I Chemical may be
diverted to the clandestine manufacture of Controlled Substances. This
is achieved by providing written notice to the Importer. After the
Importer has given notice of their intent to import, they are not
permitted to continue the transaction. The Importer registrant is then
entitled, by written request, pursuant to 21 USC 971(c) (2) to an
administrative hearing within 45 (forty-five) days, to challenge the
DEA's allegations.
Currently, the law specifies that a challenge can only be made by
whom the order applies. Thus, there is a dispute as to whether the
wholesaler or downstream customer of the Importer can challenge DEA's
allegations against them. Heretofore, DEA, with the exception of
situations in which they have been challenged in District Court, have
not given ``standing'' to customers of the Importers. The new
legislation language codifies DEA's position of not giving ``standing''
to customers of the Importer. This procedure, and the current approach
taken by DEA, does not give the right of the accused to face their
accuser in an administrative hearing to challenge the DEA allegations.
The limited times, it seems, that DEA has been challenged by the
downstream customer, in lieu of the Importer registrant, appears to the
outsider, to have been mired in court actions, appeals and continued
objections by DEA.
Section 104 of H.R. 3889 (lines 6 through 10) seeks to place
ephedrine (EPH),
Pseudoephedrine (PSE) and Phenylpropanolamine (PPA) within the same
statute that currently applies to Schedule III-V Narcotic Controlled
Substances. (This could be modified to apply to the creation of a
special statute section for the listed chemicals PSE, EPH and PPA.)
The significant questions posed by the provisions of H.R. 3889 are:
Under what criteria will imported quantities of EPH,
PSE and PPA be determined?
Who will decide the legitimate use in the U.S. for
PSE, EPH and PPA--DEA or FDA?
Will convenience stores, which DEA classifies as
``gray market'' distributors, be entitled to continue
dispensing products that contain PSE, EPH and PPA?
Will retail restrictions be used by DEA to tabulate
retail quantities to limit imports?
The proposed legislation in lines 15-26 on page 7 and continued in
lines 1-20 on page 8 address only the right of Importers to have legal
standing. It does not address the needs of downstream customers of the
Importer registrants. If the Importer wishes not to challenge the
downstream customer, i.e. distributor or retailer, his customer has no
``standing''.
Section 105 defines the conditions by which an Importer registrant
must adhere, if their initial customer does not purchase the import
they originally requested. This language subjects the new customer, if
any, to the aforementioned scrutiny of possible denial, again based
upon only a challenge by the Importer registrant.
RECOMMENDATIONS
We do not dispute the need to control the Importation of Listed
Chemicals, especially
with majority of the problem being illegal importation. However,
the downstream customers of Importer registrants have no legal standing
to challenge DEA's allegations they are using listed chemicals PSE, EPH
and PPA illegitimately ``on the grounds that the listed chemical may be
diverted to the illegal or clandestine manufacture of a controlled
substance''. DEA has long held the opinion that convenience stores
selling cold remedies containing EPH, or EPH are not legitimate retail
distributors (``gray market'').
If not modified, certain provisions of this bill could be construed
to limit sales of legitimate cold remedies to small stores by
arbitrarily limiting imports to Distributor registrants that sell to
small retail establishments. In many administrative hearings, DEA has
used past retail sales history of cold products as evidence that the
store is engaged in the illegal diversion of pseudoephedrine, even if
the store increases retail sales in a legal manner.
Recent enactments of state law also pose a problem. Liquid gel cap
forms of listed chemical drug products that have been exempted from
Schedule V requirements under state law could be cumulatively
aggregated together in import quotas and applied against small retail
distributors. In such a case, retail establishments would not have
standing to protest arbitrary restrictions of their supply of
medications.
PROPOSED REVISIONS
1. EPH, PSE and PPA should not be subjected to the same statutory
scrutiny as controlled drugs in Schedule III-V Narcotics for purposes
of importation as proposed on page 7. There is sufficient legislation
currently in place under the provisions of 21 USC, Section 971 that
govern imports of listed chemicals.
2. Under the provisions of the proposed new section (d)(1) there are
no rights given to a registrant (distributor) or business exempted from
registration (convenience store). The only rights are given to the
Importer registrant to object to DEA's denial. Importer registrants
will be persuaded not to object to challenges, as they are now, for
future considerations in the marketplace.
3. Title 21, Section 971 should be amended in all proper places, by
the insertion of language to expand the rights of the customer of the
Importer registrant, which are the distributor, dispenser or business
exempt from registration (retail stores not registered as a pharmacy).
All rights of the customers of the Importer registrant should be
delineated, to provide for the expectations of all registrants to be
permitted to face their accuser.
Article entitled ``The Mexican Connection,'' Steve Suo, June 5, 2005,
The Oregonian, submitted by the Honorable Robert C. Scott
Article entitled ``More potent supply of meth wipes out success against
home labs,'' Steve Suo, September 25, 2005, The Oregonian, submitted by
the Honorable Robert C. Scott
Letter from various medical and psychological researchers
to the Subcommittee
Additinoal Prepared Statement of Dr. Barry M. Lester, Professor of
Psychiatry & Human Behavior and Pediatrics, Brown University Medical
School
Chairman Coble, Chairman Sensenbrenner, Ranking Member Scott,
Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify
on H.R. 3889, the Methamphetamine Epidemic Elimination Act.
We are in a similar situation today with methamphetamine as we were
20 years ago during the cocaine epidemic. During that time, there was
legitimate concern for the welfare of children exposed to cocaine in
the womb. But based on insufficient and inaccurate information, society
rushed to judgment--an over-reaction that had negative consequences for
women and children (1). Many women were prosecuted and children were
removed from their birth mothers. Families split up. As a result, by
the mid 1990s, the number of children in foster care reached an all-
time high of over 500,000. Many of these children suffered emotional
problems from multiple foster care placements. This lead to the 1997
passage of the Adoption and Safe Families Act, or ASFA, requiring
permanent placement of a child within 12 months of being removed from
his or her birth mother. Unfortunately, ASFA has been counterproductive
for families who could easily be reunited if they had access to
appropriate drug treatment and/or if they were not in jail for drug
related offenses.
After 20 years of research, we learned that the effects of cocaine
are not nearly as severe as initially feared (2). In fact, when factors
like other drugs and poverty are controlled, the effects are subtle--IQ
lowered by 3 to 4 points, a slight increase in behavior or attention
problems. These effects are similar to those caused by cigarette
smoking during pregnancy. Scientists also learned that while there are
most definitely drug users who are inadequate mothers, there are also
drug users who are competent mothers who, with treatment, can care for
their children. Families can be preserved.
We also learned that the ``cure'' of foster care can be worse than
the disease of addiction. University of Florida researchers (3) studied
two groups of infants born with cocaine in their systems. One group was
placed in foster care, the other with birth mothers able to care for
them. After six months, the babies were tested using all the usual
measures of infant development: rolling over, sitting up, reaching out.
Consistently, the children placed with their birth mothers did better.
For the foster children, being taken from their mothers was more toxic
than the cocaine.
It is extremely difficult to take a swing at ``bad mothers''
without the blow landing on their children. That doesn't mean we can
simply leave children with addicts--it does mean that drug treatment
for the parent is almost always a better first choice than foster care
for the child.
Our understanding of addiction has also changed in two decades. We
know more about addiction as a disease--a medical condition that can be
treated. Addiction is a complex disease with multiple mental health co-
morbidities; Women who use drugs also tend to be depressed and anxious
and may have even more severe mental health problems. So the bad news:
Addiction is complex. The good news: Addiction is treatable. We can
reduce the problem of drug addiction in this country. I don't see
treatment addressed in this legislation.
We learned some hard lessons since the cocaine story unfolded. I am
concerned that we are on the verge of making the same mistakes with
methamphetamine that we made with cocaine, as suggested by sensational
media coverage, the absence of federal treatment dollars--and the
punitive nature of this bill.
Methamphetamine is a stimulant like cocaine and produces similar
effects on neurotransmitters in the brain. Research on the effects of
prenatal methamphetamine exposure on child outcome is just beginning
(4). The National Toxicology Program, U.S. Department of Health and
Human Services, Center for the Evaluation of Risks to Human
Reproduction (CERHR), Expert Panel Report of 2005 on meth concluded
that
in terms of the potential adverse reproductive and
developmental effects of meth exposure, that ``studies that
focused upon humans were uninterpretable due to such factors as
a lack of control of potential confounding factors and the
issue of the purity and contaminants of the methamphetamine
used by the drug abusers.
To my knowledge, my current research into the prenatal effects of
methamphetamine is the only such project funded by the National
Institutes of Health (NIDA). Children in our study are still infants.
So we can't measure all the effects of this drug. But, so far, we are
seeing the same kind of subtle changes with methamphetamine that we saw
with cocaine (5). Again--to put this in context--not very different
than what you'd see with cigarette smoking.
In a recent open letter (attached), more than 90 medical and
psychological researchers, with many years of experience studying
prenatal exposure to psychoactive substances, outlined the science in
this area.
The use of stigmatizing terms, such as ``ice babies'' and
``meth babies,'' lack scientific validity and should not be
used. Experience with similar labels applied to children
exposed parentally to cocaine demonstrates that such labels
harm the children to which they are applied, lowering
expectations for their academic and life achievements,
discouraging investigation into other causes for physical and
social problems the child might encounter, and leading to
policies that ignore factors, including poverty, that may play
a much more significant role in their lives. The suggestion
that treatment will not work for people dependant upon
methamphetamines, particularly mothers, also lacks any
scientific basis.
Does this mean that methamphetamine is harmless? Is it acceptable
for women to use meth during pregnancy? Of course not. And we know from
previous research--including research with cocaine-using mothers--that
even small neurobehavioral effects can turn to larger deficits if the
parenting environment is not adequate. And, it is also possible that
there are drug effects that don't show up until children get to school
and higher-level brain functions get activated.
In terms of treatment, even a cursory examination of the data shows
that methamphetamine is not uniquely addictive, and that
methamphetamine abuse is treatable. The federal government's most
recent National Survey on Drug Use and Health found that 4.9% of
Americans have used methamphetamine at some point in their life. Only
.6%, however, have used it within the last year, and only .2% have used
it within the last month. Most people who use methamphetamine do not
become addicted and those who do become addicted can be treated. The
recent open letter by dozens of leading researchers notes:
claims that methamphetamine users are virtually untreatable
with small recovery rates lack foundation in medical research.
Analysis of dropout, retention in treatment and reincarceration
rates and other measures of outcome, in several recent studies
indicate that methamphetamine users respond in an equivalent
manner as individuals admitted for other drug abuse problems.
Research also suggests the need to improve and expand treatment
offered to methamphetamine users.
Disturbingly, this bill would lower the trigger thresholds for long
mandatory minimum sentences to amounts that methamphetamine addicts
typically possess. It seems designed to ensure that Americans with
substance abuse problems get long prison sentences instead of
treatment. What we need is a balanced approach--one that will attack
the root causes of drug addiction. Sending more people to prison for
longer periods of time is not the answer. We know enough now to fight
addiction with treatment and do much more to keep many families safely
together.
Here are some specific suggestions:
Develop a national consensus on how to deal with
maternal drug use that draws on current research and tested
treatment strategies--and demonstrates a fair and unbiased
attitude towards drug-addicted women and their children.
Urge states to enact legislation protecting mothers
who voluntarily seek drug treatment from having their children
taken away. Many mothers who want treatment are afraid to come
forward out of fear they will lose their children.
Improve access to treatment and develop coordinated
treatment programs with interconnected services based on the
needs of women, mothers and children. Models of methamphetamine
treatment are based on adult male models. Few are designed to
meet the specific needs of women, pregnant women or mothers.
For example, we know from the cocaine experience that it does
no good to tell a poor mother with four kids in tow that she
has six different appointments in six different locations
without providing transportation or baby-sitting.
Enact a federal grant program that encourages states
to develop treatment programs for women.and families
Develop systemic prevention efforts. This includes
education to prevent onset or continuation of drug use as well
as treatment to prevent future problems due to drug use.
Develop Family Treatment Drug Courts with the goal of
keeping custody or reunification whenever possible. Drug Courts
are a way providing a ``treatment with teeth'' approach that
includes rewards for compliance with treatment and sanctions
for noncompliance with treatment. In Rhode Island, we have a
program called VIP (Vulnerable Infants Program) which includes
a Family Treatment Drug Court (FTDC). Vulnerable is meant to
imply that these children are somewhat fragile but not damaged
and of course they are Very Important People. This is a
voluntary ``treatment with teeth'' program that has been
successful. We have reduced the length of stay of drug-exposed
babies in the hospital, increased the number of infants who are
going home with their biological mothers (hence reducing the
number in foster care) and increased the number of children
being reunified with their birth mothers. We should consider
waiving punishment for clients who agree to and comply with
treatment.
Sacramento County, California has pulled all of these
strategies together into a comprehensive, effective system for
coping with meth addiction and keeping families safely
together. As a program planner for child protective services in
that county recently told the authoritative trade journal Youth
Today:
We've got big meth issues in Sacramento County, but
they're not paralyzing anybody.
Enact legislation prohibiting health facilities that
receive federal funds from denying treatment to patients with
addition and dependency disorders because they have relapsed
and manifested the disease they are fighting. Many people with
diabetes cheat--use sugar, fail to stay on their diets yet they
are not denied insulin, thrown out of their treatment program,
and disconnected from the health care that can eventually help
them to control their disease. Similarly people with
hypertension who eat fatty foods and fail to exercise are not
thrown out of their treatment programs and do not have their
blood pressure medication taken away from them. Congress could
significantly improve health care and chances for long-term
recovery by ending this unique form of discrimination.
Mr. Chairman, I recognize that the focus of H.R. 3889 is to
``further regulate and punish illicit conduct relating to
methamphetamine'' and that other companion bills may address the
treatment and other research issues raised in my testimony. However, I
would ask that the official hearing record include a copy of the Final
Report of the Methamphetamine Interagency Task Force http://
www.ojp.usdoj.gov/nij/methintf/ as an existing comprehensive strategy
aimed at blending both criminal justice and public health approaches to
reducing methamphetamine use. While this Report originated in a
previous Administration, most if not all of the guiding principles,
findings, recommendations, and research priorities are still relevant
and may save Congress and the current Administration from reinventing
the wheel.
Specifically, I'm sure that the scientific community would endorse
the panoply of prevention, education and treatment initiatives outlined
in the report. I would give special emphasis to the following: (1)
Increasing treatment capacities in correctional facilities; (2)
conducting research on which treatment models work best in prison, in
drug court and in the community; (3) increasing research on medications
development and other treatments for meth, and (4) conducting research
on the effects of meth on pregnant women, treatment of exposed infants
and (5) evaluation of treatment programs for children and adolescents.
Additionally, I would appreciate it if you would include the
attached update highlighting NIDA research on methamphetamine
addiction.
In sum, we have made tremendous strides in 20 years when it comes
to understanding drug addiction and treatment. We have the opportunity
to keep families together today in ways that were not possible only a
few years ago. I am very optimistic about our ability to reduce
addiction and save future generations of children through treatment. It
would be not only a missed opportunity, but a major step backward, to
put all of our eggs in the punishment basket.
Mr. Chairman, thank you again for the opportunity to testify here
today. I would be happy to answer any questions.
REFERENCES
1. Lester, B.M., Andreozzi, L., Appiah, L. Substance Use During
Pregnancy: Time For Policy To Catch up With Research. Harm Reduction
Journal, 2004 Apr 20;1(1):5.
2. Lester, B. M., LaGasse, L. L., and Seifer, R. Cocaine exposure and
children: The meaning of subtle effects. Science. 1998;282:633-634
3. Wobie, K., Behnke, M., et. al., To Have and To Hold: A Descriptive
Study of Custody Status Following Prenatal Exposure to Cocaine, paper
presented at joint annual meeting of the American Pediatric Society and
the Society for Pediatric Research, May 3, 1998.
4. Wouldes, T., LaGasse, L., Sheridan, J., Lester, B. Maternal
Methamphetamine Use During Pregnancy and Child Outcome: What Do We
Know? N Z Med J. Nov 26;117(1206):U1180, 2004.
5. Lester, B., LaGasse, L, Smith, L. M., Derauf, C., Grant, P., Shah,
R., Arria, A., Huestis, M., ann Liu, J. Prenatal exposure to
methamphetamine and child development. Proceedings of the Community
Epidemiology Work Group. 2005;22:1-4
ATTACHMENT