    [House Hearing, 109 Congress]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                             [H.A.S.C. No. 109-14]

                                    HEARING

                                       ON

                       NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT

                              FOR FISCAL YEAR 2006

                                      AND

                  OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED PROGRAMS

                                   BEFORE THE

                          COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

                            HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                           ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS

                                 FIRST SESSION

                                   __________

                         READINESS SUBCOMMITTEE HEARING

                                       ON

         MILITARY SERVICES' REQUIREMENT ON RECONSTITUTION OF EQUIPMENT

                                   __________

                                  HEARING HELD

                                 APRIL 6, 2005

    [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TONGRESS.#13

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                             READINESS SUBCOMMITTEE

                        JOEL HEFLEY, Colorado, Chairman
    JOHN N. HOSTETTLER, Indiana          SOLOMON P. ORTIZ, Texas
    WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina      LANE EVANS, Illinois
    JIM RYUN, Kansas                     GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi
    J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia            NEIL ABERCROMBIE, Hawaii
    JEFF MILLER, Florida                 SILVESTRE REYES, Texas
    MIKE ROGERS, Alabama                 VIC SNYDER, Arkansas
    JOE SCHWARZ, Michigan                ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania
    CATHY McMORRIS, Washington           SUSAN A. DAVIS, California
    JOHN M. McHUGH, New York             JIM MARSHALL, Georgia
    HOWARD P. ``BUCK'' McKEON,           KENDRICK B. MEEK, Florida
        California                       MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam
    ROBIN HAYES, North Carolina          TIM RYAN, Ohio
    ROB SIMMONS, Connecticut             MARK UDALL, Colorado
    JEB BRADLEY, New Hampshire           G.K. BUTTERFIELD, North Carolina
    CANDICE MILLER, Michigan
    TRENT FRANKS, Arizona
                      Lynn Bope, Professional Staff Member
                     Ryan Vaart, Professional Staff Member
                              Paul Lewis, Counsel
                           Mary Ellen Fraser, Counsel
                         Lindsay Young, Staff Assistant
                         Sarah Gelinas, Staff Assistant

                                C O N T E N T S

                                  ----------

                         CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS
                                      2005

                                                                       Page

    Hearing:

    Wednesday, April 6, 2005, Fiscal Year 2006 National Defense
      Authorization Act--Military Services' Requirement on
      Reconstitution of Equipment....................................     1

    Appendix:

    Wednesday, April 6, 2005.........................................    27
                                  ----------

                            WEDNESDAY, APRIL 6, 2005
    FISCAL YEAR 2006 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT--MILITARY SERVICES'
                   REQUIREMENT ON RECONSTITUTION OF EQUIPMENT
                  STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

    Hefley, Hon. Joel, a Representative from Colorado, Chairman,
      Readiness Subcommittee.........................................     1
    Ortiz, Hon. Solomon P., a Representative from Texas, Ranking
      Member, Readiness Subcommittee.................................     2

                                   WITNESSES

    Christianson, Lt. Gen. Claude V., Deputy Chief of Staff, G-4,
      U.S. Army......................................................     3
    Holtz-Eakin, Douglas, Director, Congressional Budget Office......     7
    Hugel, Rear Adm. Mark A., Deputy Director, Fleet Readiness
      Division, U.S. Navy............................................     6
    Huly, Lt. Gen. Jan C., Deputy Commandant for Plans, Policies, and
      Operations, U.S. Marine Corps..................................     4
    Wetekam, Lt. Gen. Donald J., Deputy Chief of Staff for
      Installations and Logistics, U.S. Air Force....................     5

                                    APPENDIX

    Prepared Statements:

        Christianson, Lt. Gen. Claude V..............................    41
        Hefley, Hon. Joel............................................    31
        Holtz-Eakin, Douglas.........................................    88
        Hugel, Rear Adm. Mark A......................................    53
        Huly, Lt. Gen. Jan C.........................................    74
        Ortiz, Hon. Solomon P........................................    36
        Wetekam, Lt. Gen. Donald J...................................    65

    Documents Submitted for the Record:

        CBO Estimates of Potential Needs Compared with Funding chart.   127
        CBO and Service Estimates of Costs Related to Equipment
          Stress and Loss chart......................................   129
        Maintenance and Replacement Activities in CBO's Bottom-Up
          Method chart...............................................   128
    Questions and Answers Submitted for the Record:

        Ms. Davis (Susan)............................................   137
        Mr. Hayes....................................................   136
        Mr. Hefley...................................................   133
        Mr. Miller...................................................   137
        Mr. Reyes....................................................   135
        Dr. Schwarz..................................................   136
        Mr. Taylor...................................................   136

    FISCAL YEAR 2006 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT--MILITARY SERVICES'
                   REQUIREMENT ON RECONSTITUTION OF EQUIPMENT

                                  ----------

                      House of Representatives,
                           Committee on Armed Services,
                                       Readiness, Subcommittee,
                              Washington, DC, Wednesday, April 6, 2005.
        The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:08 p.m. in
    room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Joel Hefley
    (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

     OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOEL HEFLEY, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
               COLORADO, CHAIRMAN, READINESS SUBCOMMITTEE

        Mr. Hefley. The committee will come to order, and please be
    seated, gentlemen.
        I apologize, first of all, for being a little tardy here. I
    was in the Terrorism Subcommittee hearing dealing with a
    subject that was very important to me. So I just am running a
    little late, and I hate to do that.
        I want to welcome you to this afternoon's subcommittee
    hearing on resetting or reconstitution of military equipment
    returning from Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) or Operation
    Enduring Freedom (OEF).
        This is the subcommittee's second hearing on this topic;
    the first was held in October of 2003. Much of the testimony at
    that time indicated that there was not enough information yet
    to determine the cost of reset. Today, we do know more. Through
    emergency supplemental funding, the military services have
    received approximately $9 billion for reset cost. The fiscal
    year 2005 emergency supplemental has a request for
    approximately $9.8 billion for reset requirements. Although
    these figures are large, there are more bills to come. We will
    most likely see those bills in a fiscal year 2006 emergency
    supplemental.
        A structured reset program requires time, facilities, spare
    parts, trained workers, contractors, forward deployed
    maintenance workers and full funding that includes both
    operation and maintenance of procurement dollars. It is not
    clear to me if the reset programs are fully funded. I have
    asked the director of the Congressional Budget Office to be
    present today in order to decipher the different methods that
    can be used to calculate reset costs. Reset is a priority and a
    must-pay bill. Congress must understand how each of the
    services has determined the size of the bill and managing
    implementation.
        I also intend to explore today to what extent factors other
    than money limit reset. Do we have the spare parts? Are there
    adequate facilities both at home and in the theater? And the
    most challenging factor, time; how much time will it take?
        Not surprisingly the Army and Marine Corps have the most
    significant challenges. The current operational tempo
    (OPTEMPO), combined with the aging fleet and significant combat
    losses challenge the Army and the Marine Corps ability to
    sustain operational availability. I expect to learn today what
    actions the Army and the Marine Corps are taking to meet this
    challenge.
        I would like to gain a better understanding of the
    difference between reset and recap, two important programs in
    the Army. I would also like to better understand the Marines
    cross-leveling of equipment as a means to make up equipment
    shortfalls.
        I would like to now turn to Mr. Ortiz, the Ranking Member,
    to see if he has any opening remarks.
        Mr. Ortiz.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Hefley can be found in the
    Appendix on page 31.]

       STATEMENT OF HON. SOLOMON P. ORTIZ, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
             TEXAS, RANKING MEMBER, READINESS SUBCOMMITTEE

        Mr. Ortiz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I join you in welcoming
    our distinguished witnesses, and I look forward to hearing the
    testimony on this important readiness issue.
        Before I begin, I would like to first express my thanks and
    appreciation to our military personnel for all the sacrifices
    they make in providing for our defense.
        I would like also to recognize the support of the many
    dedicated government service civilians and private individuals
    who work hard to help maintain the readiness of our armed
    forces. We cannot fight and win without them, and I thank them
    for their dedicated service to our national defense.
        Mr. Chairman, our armed forces have been engaged in combat
    operations for over three years now, and the stress of this
    continuous combat is clearly evident on our military's
    equipment. Increased usage rates, environmental conditions and
    heavier armor are wearing out our ground and air equipment as
    much as five times faster than peacetime. This problem is only
    made more difficult by the Department of Defense's (DOD)
    requirement to reconfigure equipment to meet its goals of
    transformation.
        While I have been pleased to see the effort that the
    service has put into meeting these challenges, I am very
    concerned by the growing backlog of expenses that have not been
    requested by the Department's fiscal year 2006 budget for the
    supplemental budget request. By Congressional Budget Office's
    (CBO) estimates, this growing mountain of worn-out equipment
    could cost as much as $18 billion to repair or replace. This is
    an enormous shortfall, and surely it will have an effect on our
    ability to respond to continuances in the future.
        I hope the officers on our panel today, who have the very
    difficult job of managing this emerging problem, will be able
    to explain to you how they plan to overcome this funding
    shortfall.
        One final point I would like to make before I close this
    about the defense: Our defense industrial base, the depots that
    repair all of this damaged and worn-out equipment are carrying
    a tremendous workload. At this point, I see little surge
    capacity remaining in our depots to meet emerging requirements.
        The current conflicts have demonstrated that we must have
    the ability to surge our industrial base and sustain that rate
    over the long term. I hope our witnesses will take this
    opportunity to comment on the defense industrial base and how
    they plan to ensure our depots are strong and fully equipped to
    meet the needs of our troops in the field.
        I, again, welcome our witnesses, and I thank you for your
    courage. Thank you, sir.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Ortiz can be found in the
    Appendix on page 36.]
        Mr. Hefley. Thank you very much, Mr. Ortiz.
        Let me introduce the witnesses and ask any of them if you
    have an opening statement and if you would like to summarize
    that.
        Without objection, all witnesses' written statements will
    be made a part of the record.
        First is Lieutenant General C.V. Christianson, Deputy Chief
    of Staff, G-4, United States Army. Second is Lieutenant General
    Jan Huly, Deputy Commandant for Plans, Policies and Operations
    of the Marine Corps. Third is Lieutenant General Donald
    Wetekam, Deputy Chief of Staff Installation of Logistics,
    United States Air Force. Fourth is Rear Admiral Mark Hugel,
    Deputy Director of Fleet Readiness Division of the United
    States Navy. And finally, Mr. Douglas Holtz-Eakin, Director of
    the Congressional Budget Office.
        Lieutenant Christianson, are you the kick-off guy here?

     STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. CLAUDE V. CHRISTIANSON, DEPUTY CHIEF OF
                         STAFF, G-4, U.S. ARMY

        General Christianson. Yes, sir.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Ortiz,
    distinguished members of the committee. Thanks for the
    opportunity to appear before you today to talk about the work
    we are doing to reconstitute our Army's equipment.
        Fundamental to our Army's ability to meet future threats is
    the absolute requirement that we rapidly return our equipment
    to an effective level of readiness upon return from operational
    employment.
        Over the past 3 years, the Army has deployed over 40
    percent of its equipment to Operations Iraqi and Enduring
    Freedom. Currently, we have about 15 percent of our equipment
    in the forward area. The increased operating tempo of our
    deployed equipment, combined with the harsh environment and an
    aging fleet plus significant combat losses challenges us to
    sustain readiness at the tip of the spear.
        As an example, Army helicopters experience usage rates
    roughly twice their peacetime rates. Tanks and other track
    vehicles are being used at roughly five times their peacetime
    rates, and our truck fleet is operating at three to five times
    what we would consider normal peacetime rates. This readiness
    challenge can only be met with a structured, formal, fully-
    funded program to reset the equipment when it returns from the
    operational area, complimented by a long-term program to ensure
    we can sustain the readiness of our systems over their entire
    lives.
        We feel we have developed a comprehensive approach to
    providing our forces with ready and capable equipment. Even in
    the midst of this conflict, our approach ensures that, first of
    all, the forward commanders have the combat power they need,
    while minimizing the load on the strategic transportation
    system. Second, that returning units will be rapidly returned
    to an operationally ready condition, prepared for whatever
    mission comes their way. Third, as we are able to draw down our
    forward forces, that we can reset that equipment that we have
    kept in the operational area. Fourth, that our Army
    prepositioned stocks (APS), our APS equipment, is brought back
    to readiness condition for its mission as soon as it is able to
    be redeployed. And last, that we have in place a long-term
    program to sustain the operational readiness of our all
    critical systems over their lives.
        Mr. Chairman, on behalf of the soldiers, their families and
    our professional civilians, we greatly appreciate the support
    of the Congress, and especially this committee, in addressing
    our needs. Your support has given us a solid foundation upon
    which we are building a stronger, more relevant and ready
    force. We appreciate your support, and I look forward to
    answering your questions this afternoon. Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of General Christianson can be
    found in the Appendix on page 41.]
        Mr. Hefley. Thank you.
        General Huly.

    STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. JAN C. HULY, DEPUTY COMMANDANT FOR PLANS,
              POLICIES, AND OPERATIONS, U.S. MARINE CORPS

        General Huly. Chairman Hefley, Congressman Ortiz,
    distinguished members of the committee, it is my privilege to
    report to you any actions taken to date to reset the Marine
    Corps as well as our future reconstitution efforts. These
    actions are critical to ensuring we are prepared to meet
    today's operational challenges while maintaining good
    stewardship of our Nation's treasure. I recognize that this is
    only possible with your continued support while we remain at
    war.
        There are a myriad of programs ongoing to reconstitute the
    Marine Corps. Our forces preparing for combat and forward
    deployment are using their equipment three to six times higher
    than normal. This increases the cost of operations and
    maintenance beyond what was originally budgeted. Additionally,
    our gear is being damaged by enemy action and worn down in the
    harsh desert environment. These effects increase maintenance
    and create a toll that frequently renders economical repair not
    feasible after being used in Iraq and Afghanistan. Repairing,
    replacing and redistributing this equipment among units
    rotating in and out of theaters of operation are some of our
    highest priorities.
        Our prepositioning programs have once again proven their
    strategic utility by helping to close rapidly and sustain
    reinforcements in combat. We are recovering from using these
    extensively for Operation Iraqi Freedom, but we face some
    challenges, two of our three Maritime Prepositioning Squadrons
    (MPS) have been reconstituted and will complete a scheduled
    maintenance cycle in the next one to two years. Equipment and
    supplies from the third squadron have been downloaded and used
    for current requirements in Iraq. We are planning to
    reconstitute this squadron and our Norway prepositioned
    equipment as soon as possible, and have identified the
    replacement of our ground equipment as an area where our fiscal
    year 2005 supplemental request will be applied.
        While our analysis of requirement costs continue, we are
    confident that our supplemental request, when combined with
    those additional items presented at the behest of the Congress,
    is what we need to continue to fight the global war on terror
    (GWOT) while continuing to modernize the force, where
    practical.
        Added to supplemental funding requests, the Marine Corps is
    internally funding essential warfighting equipment through an
    urgent-needs process that allows us to fulfill requests and
    provide to marines and sailors rapidly the equipment they need
    to conduct combat mission in operations Enduring and Iraqi
    Freedom. This process of satisfying urgent requests is directly
    tied to lessons learned on the modern battlefield; enables us
    to bypass the normal development procurement process and
    aggressively pursue improved armor, counter-improvised
    explosive device (IED) equipment, medical packages, rifle and
    night-vision optics, and other important items that can be
    quickly placed in the hands of troops conducting operations.
        In September 2004, in order to meet the current enduring
    challenges of the changing nature of the war, the Commandant
    improved numerous structural changes to our operational forces;
    bringing these improvements to fruition will require the
    continued support of this committee in supplemental and
    additional items as we begin the extensive phases of
    recruiting, equipping, building and training these additional
    marine units.
        In closing, I would like to again thank the members of the
    committee for their continued support of the Marine Corps and
    for the opportunity to discuss our current readiness and its
    inextricable link to our resource requirements. Marines'
    accomplishments are a direct reflection of your continued
    support and commitment to maintaining our Nation's
    expeditionary warfighting capability. I look forward to
    answering your questions.
        [The prepared statement of General Huly can be found in the
    Appendix on page 74.]
        Mr. Hefley. General Wetekam.

    STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. DONALD J. WETEKAM, DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF
            FOR INSTALLATIONS AND LOGISTICS, U.S. AIR FORCE

        General Wetekam. Chairman Hefley, Congressman Ortiz and
    distinguished members of the committee, I thank you for the
    opportunity to appear today.
        It is my privilege to report on our reconstitution efforts,
    our successes in this area and our challenges for the future.
        The Air Force is organized, trained and equipped to meet
    expeditionary commitments through our Air Expeditionary Force
    (AEF) concept. We have sized our logistics support system to
    meet those AEF requirements, along with maintaining a surge
    capability. Our experiences to date in Operations Enduring
    Freedom and Iraqi Freedom have largely confirmed the fact that
    our logistics system is capable of meeting those requirements.
    We have experienced many successes throughout OEF and OIF. We
    have flown over 270,000 sorties, opened 36 bases and supported
    as many as 31,000 airmen within the Central Command area of
    responsibility. Our airmen have been busy and successful.
        Of course these successes are not the result of internal
    Air Force efforts alone. Congressional help was and remains key
    to providing the funding necessary for protecting our forces,
    replenishing and replacing equipment lost in combat, and
    reconstituting critical capabilities.
        No success comes without challenges, especially in a combat
    environment involving multiple locations worldwide. The cost of
    resetting the force continues to increase with each passing
    year of the global war on terrorism. As we face these
    challenges, we thank you for your continued support. I offer my
    written comments for the record and look forward to our
    discussion on this important topic.
        [The prepared statement of General Wetekam can be found in
    the Appendix on page 65.]
        Mr. Hefley. Admiral Hugel.

     STATEMENT OF REAR ADM. MARK A. HUGEL, DEPUTY DIRECTOR, FLEET
                     READINESS DIVISION, U.S. NAVY

        Admiral Hugel. Chairman Hefley, Congressman Ortiz, and
    distinguished members of this committee, thank you for the
    invitation to come and spend time discussing the reconstitution
    of our military equipment returning from Operations Iraqi
    Freedom and Enduring Freedom.
        Through your support, the Navy has been able to repair and
    replace equipment utilized to support United States operations
    in theater and maintain the level of readiness forecasted by
    our budget programming models.
        Before I address fleet reconstitution, I would like to
    share a snapshot of what our Navy is doing today. We currently
    have 93 ships and 38,000 sailors forward deployed worldwide in
    support of the global war on terror, including the Carl Vinson
    Carrier Strike Group and the Bonhomme Richard Expeditionary
    Strike Group.
        The Navy Ashore component has proven critical to continuing
    ongoing and combined operations with extensive medical,
    construction and other combat support and combat service
    support to the Marine Corps and Army ground elements. In
    addition, we have recently participated in operation non-
    focused items (NFI) assistance, which provided sustained relief
    to South Asian tsunami victims, demonstrating our surge
    capability and the value of seabasing in both responsiveness
    and access.
        Testimony today addresses three areas of fleet readiness.
    The first is maritime readiness, which covers the maintenance
    approach that we are applying to the increased wear on our
    ships and submarines involved in the global war on terror.
        Our ship maintenance budget during this period reflects the
    proper balance of readiness which directly contributes to the
    combined power of our forward presence forces and our ability
    to surge assets as required by the fleet response plan. Due to
    the increased operational tempo associated with the global war
    on terror, we have been experiencing some increase in the war-
    related maintenance, and we have been successfully able to
    address those challenges through using supplemental funding.
    Similarly, in the aviation area, we have sufficient
    supplemental funds each fiscal year to fund equipment
    reconstitution for our aircraft supporting OIF and OEF. Our
    aviation and maritime depot maintenance programs have been able
    to fund and execute necessary maintenance and repair actions to
    provide a surge-ready force while maintaining the appropriate
    workload balance between public- and private-sector industrial
    base. Additionally, we are finding and implementing innovative
    process improvements to assure that our maintenance is being
    delivered effectively and efficiently.
        Finally, my testimony addressing our success in
    reconstituting our naval ground forces, in particular our naval
    construction force, allowing continued level of sustained
    support for the Marine Corps and Army ground forces in Iraq,
    Kuwait and Afghanistan. Again, the financial support of the
    budget supplemental process allows the Navy to maintain our
    current readiness levels while still accomplishing the emerging
    wartime missions as they occur.
        In closing, I would like to thank you for your continued
    support of our Navy. Your efforts have been critical in
    allowing the Navy to sustain an unprecedented level of current
    readiness and to be prepared to surge when called upon.
        I would like to thank the committee for offering me this
    opportunity, and I stand ready to answer questions.
        [The prepared statement of Admiral Hugel can be found in
    the Appendix on page 53.]
        Mr. Hefley. Mr. Holtz-Eakin.

       STATEMENT OF DOUGLAS HOLTZ-EAKIN, DIRECTOR, CONGRESSIONAL
                             BUDGET OFFICE

        Mr. Holtz-Eakin. Mr. Chairman, Congressman Ortiz, and
    members of the committee, the Congressional Budget Office is
    pleased to have the chance to be here today to discuss the cost
    of additional equipment stress. As the committee is well aware,
    the United States has maintained a substantial force presence
    in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the result has been that many
    hundreds of thousands of pieces of equipment are in need of
    repair or replacement.
        The heart of the CBO's work in this area is summarized in
    the chart which you have in front of you and which is on the
    poster, which shows our estimates of the cost of equipment
    stress in this area. As the written statement details, we take
    two approaches to estimating these costs. Given the absence of
    complete and comprehensive data, we take a top-down approach
    which broadly attempts to assess the additional costs by
    looking at faster depreciation due to higher operational tempo.
    And the second approach is a bottoms-up approach, which for
    each piece of equipment would directly measure costs associated
    with sustainment, restoration, recapitalization or replacement.
    But uncertainty is associated with both approaches, but the
    results indicate that, for 2005, there is a range of $7 to $8
    billion in additional costs associated with the higher
    operational tempo and that, over the window from 2003 to 2005,
    this higher cost ranges from somewhere in the vicinity of $18
    to $21 billion. If one goes back over that period, as the
    statement provides the details for, we can see a range of $3 to
    $5 billion in funds dedicated to this task, and as a result,
    there is an accrued unpaid liability there of somewhere in the
    vicinity of $13 to $18 billion for excess costs in excess of
    funding.
        The distribution of these costs across services is unequal.
    Because of the larger presence of the Army, about 60 percent of
    these costs are associated with Army equipment; 20 percent in
    our estimates are associated with Air Force aircraft; and the
    remaining 20 percent are split between the Navy and the Marine
    Corps, with the latter predominating.
        The CBO's estimates are quite similar to those produced by
    the services themselves. Their estimate is about $13 billion,
    and the percentage distribution in cross services is similar as
    well.
        Looking forward, to the extent that the United States
    maintains the same presence in these areas in fiscal year 2006
    and assuming that the operational tempo is diminished somewhat
    next year, one could estimate that these costs will occur in
    the range of $6 to $7 billion for FY 2006.
        Now I would close our remarks in emphasizing the
    uncertainty associated with these estimates. In either
    approach, the top-down or the bottom-up approach, our
    particular estimates could be either too high or too low. In
    the top-down approach, it could be the case that adding an
    additional intensive year of usage does not, in fact, mean that
    the lifetime has been reduced in proportion to that intensity.
    Maybe their peacetime rates are much lower than one would
    expect the equipment to be used at, or in the other direction,
    we could understate the cost by not directly factoring in the
    harsh conditions in which the equipment are operated.
        More generally, under both approaches, an enormous amount
    of data is required to do it exactly right. In the absence of
    that data, we adopted an approach of trying to bracket the
    approach with two different analytic constructs and by using
    analogies where we did not have direct evidence on these costs.
        We thank you for the chance to be here today and look
    forward to answering your questions.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Holtz-Eakin can be found in
    the Appendix on page 88.]
        Mr. Hefley. Thank you very much.
        We keep getting testimony that a lot of the equipment is
    going to be left over there, simply is not going to come back,
    and you testified to that here. Is that because of the level of
    use of the equipment or the harsh environment, or both? Is this
    equipment that, if it was here in the United States, would be
    repaired and put back into service? The Navy always operates in
    a harsh environment of salt water, and now we are operating on
    the ground in sand. Is that what is causing this? Or is it, you
    feel, that just bringing it back and then having to repair it
    and bring it up to standards would simply not be economic?
        General Christianson. There are really two reasons, Mr.
    Chairman, why we have decided to leave equipment in the area of
    responsibility (AOR).
        First is that some of that equipment is special equipment,
    for example, all of the vehicles that had armor plating added
    to them we left over there so that we could maximize the level
    of force protection. In addition, there is some special
    communications gear. There is gear over there that we have put
    in the theater that allows us to detect explosives. There is
    gear in the theater that allows us to jam frequencies and do
    other kinds of things that we do not have a lot of, so we do
    not want to keep rotating it back and forth. So, primarily, we
    are leaving equipment there that gives the soldiers and the
    forward members of the military the kind of capabilities they
    need to execute the warfight.
        The second reason that we would leave equipment over there
    is to take some of the load off the strategic distribution
    system. Instead of sending things back and forth, the more we
    can leave in theater, the easier it is for us to work on the
    strategic system; plus, it is more rapid for the people to
    transition from one unit to the next if a lot of the equipment
    stays there. So those are the two fundamental reasons.
        The second part of your question is, do we intend to fix
    that? Absolutely, we do. We concur with the CBO findings that
    there is a workload out there that we have not yet identified
    because we do not know when it is going to come back. But when
    it does come back, we will put it through the same process that
    we are doing for the equipment that is coming back with the
    units today.
        General Huly. Sir, in the Marine Corps, we have those same
    concerns with the equipment, and the same rationale added to
    those. We believe we are saving in transportation costs by not
    bringing some of the equipment back, even though we possibly
    could, but to just leave it in place over there and then just
    redistribute what we need within the Continental United States
    (CONUS).
        Some of the equipment over there is one of a kind, so it
    just makes sense to leave it there and get the maximum use out
    of it, and we replace it only as necessary. And some of the
    equipment is just not worth the effort to bring it back; it is
    in such a shape of disrepair that it just makes sense to leave
    it there.
        Mr. Hefley. Mr. Ortiz.
        Mr. Ortiz. At what point do you know that some of this
    equipment that you just cannot bring back has to be replaced
    and buy new equipment? And the period of time that it takes to
    replace this equipment?
        General Christianson. Congressman, actually, we are finding
    out some of that right now. As units have come back with their
    equipment, there is a percentage of their equipment that cannot
    be repaired. It is just too costly to be repaired, and we have
    to replace it. In the cases where we have production lines
    going, you should see that come to you as a procurement
    requirement.
        In those cases where we do not have any production
    capacity, where we are not making the item anymore. For
    example, the Bradley, you will see that come to you in recap
    requirements to turn that chassis, that hull of a tank or a
    Bradley back into a new piece of equipment at the latest
    standards.
        And we have some planning factors we use on how many are
    what we call wash out, in other words, how many are worn out so
    badly that they cannot be repaired and they need to be
    replaced. And I have some of those numbers here.
        In the case of aviation, we are anticipating about three
    percent of our helicopters will never be replaced, they are
    just too beat up. Tracks, about two percent. But the biggest
    number is wheeled vehicles, and we estimate about 12 percent of
    our wheeled vehicles, when they come back, cannot be repaired
    and have to be replaced. So those are the planning factors we
    are using.
        In terms of the timing of when they come back, that is a
    tough question because we rely on the forward commander to
    determine whether or not they need those capabilities forward.
    So in the case of up-armored humvees, I do not anticipate up-
    armored humvees coming back for a long, long time until our
    forestructure is drawn down to the point where we do not need
    as many as we do today. So that vehicle is going to be the last
    coming back. So it is a reset requirement that sits out there,
    as the CBO indicated. We just do not know when we are going to
    actually fix them, so it is very difficult for us to anticipate
    programming those dollars.
        Admiral Hugel. Sir, we have recently undertaken an
    initiative to establish repair and replacement facilities in
    theater. And as you probably know because you have been there,
    the operating forces get the equipment in their hands, they get
    comfortable with it, and by golly, they are going to use it.
    And it is just the case of having the one in your hand. It is a
    process for us to get them to evaluate that equipment, to turn
    it in, to get a new piece of gear, and then we evacuate that
    piece of equipment to a location, generally either in the rear
    with our foreservice support group in theater, or we evacuate
    it back to Kuwait, so we can get a good analysis of it. And I
    do not have to tell you because you have been there, but you
    have seen some of the equipment. It is just not equipment that
    you would want to bring back and operate with in the United
    States. Perhaps the turn signals might not work on it. Perhaps
    the speedometer does not work. It is just nothing that will
    ever prove worthwhile for us to repair and replace back here
    again, but it meets the purposes for over there, and it just
    makes good sense to keep it in theater for as long as we
    possibly can.
        General Wetekam. Sir, if I might for the Air Force.
        Our situation is a little different. We do rotate most of
    our equipment. In terms of our aircraft, we do rotate those,
    and so they receive depot-level maintenance, et cetera, back
    here at their normal depots.
        A lot of that is true also for our ground support
    equipment. The major exception are vehicles and some of our
    specialized mobility handling equipment. Even prior to 9/11, we
    had five War Reserve Material (WRM) sites established in
    theater with contract support, and so while we have had to plus
    up those contracts for support of additional equipment that we
    have put in theater, we do have in-theater support for a lot of
    that stuff.
        Admiral Hugel. Congressman, as you know, the Seabees we
    have on the ground have similar ground support equipment as our
    Marine Corps brethren. We have folks there to do maintenance on
    that equipment on the ground. And as long as that equipment is
    economically feasible to maintain, then we are going to keep it
    maintained and bring it home with us when the time comes. When
    it is just not economically feasible to do the repairs anymore,
    then we will abandon it in place, but we do not see very much
    of that.
        Mr. Ortiz. I just have one more question, Mr. Chairman.
        You know, given the current state of the equipment and the
    condition of the equipment, what would happen, God forbid, if
    there is an unforeseen crisis somewhere in the area? You know,
    we have Lebanon, Syria. We have Iran. We have Iraq. Some of the
    equipment is not worthy. Can we respond to another unforeseen
    crisis with what we have?
        General Huly. Sir, for the Marine Corps, we have
    approximately 25 percent of our aviation assets of our total
    assets in the inventory, and about 30 percent of our ground
    equipment in Iraq and Afghanistan right now.
        We have sufficient storage. We have two maritime
    prepositioned squadrons worth of equipment that we have not
    touched and we have fenced, so to speak. And they are forward
    deploy, one in the Mediterranean and one in the Pacific region,
    so that if we needed to respond to a crisis, we would have a
    maritime prepositioned squadron worth of equipment.
        Added to that, we still have equipment with our
    organizations in the Continental United States that we are
    swapping around, cross-leveling to get back to the units as
    they rotate. So I believe that we have sufficient assets, more
    than sufficient assets, to be able to respond to a crisis.
        Is it necessarily the equipment that we are going to want--
    that we are going to actually need in the next crisis? I will
    tell you, for instance, right now, we do not have a lot of up-
    armored vehicles, humvees, for instance, in the Continental
    United States because as fast as the industrial base can
    produce them, we are shipping them directly into the theater.
    If something were to break out that we needed armored humvees
    again in a different location, we would have to look at either
    another source of supply for those or actually sharing what we
    have elsewhere. But overall, I think we are in good shape to
    respond to any crisis that develops, that we certainly are
    anticipating might be a potential.
        General Christianson. As you know, we have prepositioned
    sets; we have a set in Korea that is pretty much land-bound in
    Korea if something were to happen there. We also had put, about
    two years ago, a Flotilla, a one-by-one brigade, aboard ship
    that has got some strategic flexibility and can move. So we do
    have some prepositioned assets.
        And the 4th Infantry Division and the 101st are just
    finishing their reset coming back. If something were to happen
    and it was important enough, we would probably hold units in
    the current operation to use those organizations to respond if
    we had to.
        So we have got about 15 percent of our combat equipment
    forward positioned in Iraq. The rest of it remains here. About
    a third of that is going to reset. The rest of it is ready to
    go. So there would be some difficult decisions, but we have the
    capability to respond.
        Mr. Ortiz. My time is up, thank you so much.
        Mr. Hefley. Mr.Taylor.
        Mr. Taylor. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        First of all, I want to say I am honored that these
    gentlemen are here today. I regret that we could not have
    included the Guard and the Reserve because I think an important
    component that we are missing today is that the overwhelming
    preponderance of Guard and Reserve equipment that has gone to
    Iraq stayed in Iraq, and so we are looking at a portion of the
    problem, but the biggest portion, if you are looking for the
    problem, is what the Guard and Reserve left behind, and I think
    that is a fair assessment.
        I would like to ask a few questions in particular of the
    Air Force. I am troubled by the Administration's acknowledged
    plan to terminate the C-130J program, particularly in light of
    every trip that I have taken to Iraq, it is pretty apparent
    that we are flying the wings off of the C-130's that are in the
    region. A lot of those are E models, I am told, and a lot of
    those the Air Force has already scheduled to retire at the end
    of this conflict. So I would like your thoughts on that, what
    is being taken to address that.
        I would like to hear what your different Guard and Reserve
    components are telling you. I know the Marine Corps Reserve has
    been extremely active in Iraq, I know the Army Reserve and Army
    National Guard have been extremely active over there. I am sure
    you have called up the seabee reserve to serve over there, and
    so my hunch is that a lot of the equipment that was dedicated
    to them--and I know for a fact that, when the 90th Engineers
    came back to Mississippi after their tour in Iraq, they left
    every stick of equipment they had behind. So we have now been
    through a hurricane season that, thank goodness, did not hit
    Mississippi, but was only 60 miles away. The folks we were
    counting on their stateside mode to help reopen the roads and
    get electricity to the people and fix bridges; they did not
    have a stick of equipment last August and September when the
    hurricanes hit many parts of the states adjacent to us.
        And last, I would like to turn this back to the Marines and
    the Army.
        I am happy that this committee is doing, I think, a lot of
    work toward resolving the armored humvee problem; we still have
    a lot to do. Just last week, a couple of Mississippians were
    horribly injured, one losing two legs; but all present
    acknowledged that had it not been for the fully-armored humvee,
    that those two soldiers probably would have lost their lives.
        It is something I should have seen myself, but thank
    goodness someone else was smart enough to point it out to me.
    Almost all of our vehicles in theater have flat bottoms. When a
    mine detonates underneath that flat bottom vehicle, it is much
    like a flat-bottom boat hitting a wave; the reaction is very
    severe. You are catching the full pressure of that detonation.
    It throws the vehicle up. In the case here, the humvee was
    thrown over 10 yards I am told.
        I am told that in some parts of the world, and particularly
    the South Africans, in responding to the landmines that they
    were encountering during their wars, they went back and
    redesigned many of their urban fighting vehicles to have a V-
    bottom. Much like a V-bottom boat, it slices and diffuses that
    force. In fact, I am told the Russians were probably very good
    at this and that most of the vehicles they used in Bosnia had a
    V-bottom. And when their vehicles would hit a landmine, it blew
    the tires off, but the people inside the vehicle walked away
    from it.
        What is being done as we reconstitute to be a little bit
    smarter? And I have got to admit, I am one of the ones that
    fought very hard for the up-armored humvees, but maybe it is
    time to look beyond that to some sort of an urban fighting
    vehicle that incorporates a V-bottom so that we find ourselves
    with fewer young people that are in Walter Reed because of
    their legs blown off as a result of that flat bottom.
        So I know it is three questions, the C-130J, sir, the talk
    about your Guard and Reserve equivalents and their equipment
    shortages, and what are we doing as far as looking at the next
    generation of fighting vehicles and responding to the landmine
    problem that we are encountering in Iraq?
        General Wetekam. Sir, if I may, I will start with the C-
    130J briefly.
        The Department of Defense has indicated that we are going
    to review the production decision on the 130J within the
    Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). The 130J is really part of a
    larger issue, and that is the theater lift issue, and what do
    we need and what is our current capability and what is our
    current fleet telling us?
        The production termination decision was made almost
    coincidentally with the discovery that our C-130E and early age
    model fleet was not as robust as we thought it was. Essentially
    the problem with the center wing box that was discovered almost
    at the same time. And so what we are really doing is looking at
    the entire theater lift issue, the C-130 fleet as a whole. The
    130J obviously has to be a part of that solution as we
    determine really what part of the 130E model and H model fleet
    are going to be available to us, what it takes to reconstitute
    that fleet. And so that will be--that is being looked at
    currently.
        General Huly. Just for the record, so we do not get lost in
    the shuffle; the Marine Corps is also into the C-130Js. Our C-
    130J requirement and solution is different than the United
    States Air Force's. We received some 33, I believe, of the C-
    130Js out of a fleet of about 51 we were anticipating. Recent
    funding decisions got us cut off for the procurement of those
    last 18, but we think that that funding is being put back in so
    we can ultimately get our requirement of the C-130Js. But to
    us, the C-130J version that we are getting is a great aircraft,
    and we look forward to its service for many years in the
    future.
        Mr. Taylor. General, to that point, I had the good fortune
    to meet one of your flight crews in Kuwait just last week, and
    they had been up most of the night refueling other planes. And
    he was extremely proud of the performance of the plane. What he
    did request--and I am going to pass this on to you--is the
    program to replace the fuel pods can be moved along, apparently
    they took the pods off some older models and stuck them on the
    newer planes. He felt like it was in the works. If there is
    anything this committee can do to move that along, I am asking
    for your thoughts on that.
        General Huly. Sir, I am going to take that question for the
    record, and I will get back to you on that, to exactly what the
    status of that is. I know it is in the works, but I want to
    give you the exact scoop.
        [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
    beginning on page 136.]
        General Christianson. Sir, let me address first of all the
    equipment that we left behind, particularly for the Guard and
    the Reserve forces.
        The Army has developed a force generation model of which
    will put our Reserve components of one in five or one in six
    years, and what the intent is that for one year out of that
    five or six year cycle they would be ready for deployment. The
    challenge we have right now, particularly with the Guard, is
    with their homeland security and their state missions, the
    suite of equipment they must have in their unit to do that
    mission you just mentioned for the Mississippi Guard, we have
    not yet identified this. We will identify that, and we will
    fill those units with that equipment. So even coming out of a
    deployment like the one we came out of now, we are obligated to
    provide the equipment to those organizations to execute those
    state missions. And then as they come into that one year
    window, then we give them all the equipment they need to
    execute their full-mission suite. That process was not in place
    when the first rotations came back, as you know. So most of the
    Guard and Reserve units, engineer in particular, transportation
    units in the Reserve had to leave almost all of their main
    equipment in country, and it is still there being used every
    day. So we have that challenge to address that.
        Our intent is to handle the Guard, the Reserve and the
    active forces exactly the same. The rotational model is one in
    three years for active, one in five for the Army Reserve, and
    one in six for the National Guard. That is the intent. Now we
    did not get there right away with these forces, so we still
    have some work to do, but at the strategic level, we are going
    to maneuver the equipment to give the units the capability to
    be able to handle their mission sets.
        General Huly. As far as the Reserve equipment for the
    Marine Corps goes, we are doing our best to cross-level once
    our Reserve levels get back; 95 percent of all of our Reserve
    units have seen combat in either Afghanistan or Iraq. And as
    they return, we are providing them with what equipment we have
    got and replacing the equipment that has been damaged or
    destroyed, looking for industrial base opportunities where that
    is needed. And we are also trying to, as you pointed out, be a
    little bit smart in what we are replacing in anticipation of
    our future requirements. We are looking for those opportunities
    and vehicles to get better armor on them, underneath armor. We
    have taken some of our humvees, as you know, and armored them
    up better on the bottom so that they can withstand a certain
    quantity of a landmine or an explosive charge placed underneath
    them. That does not get all of the support that we want under
    there, and we are looking forward to the next generation of
    vehicles, but have not decided on which one to procure yet.
        Admiral Hugel. Congressman, our active components are an
    integrated fighting force; we prepare the units and first
    units; we marry those two up. Right now the equipment is in
    use. About half of the equipment is Reserve equipment; the
    other half is active equipment, but all of the equipment is
    being treated and maintained the same way, and it is as a
    result of this close integration of the reservists into our
    construction battalion (CB) battalion.
        General Christianson. And Congressman, if I could address
    the question of armor protection for our forces forward given
    the environment they are in, particularly in regard to the
    humvee and its flat bottom, really I think the vehicle of
    choice over there is the stryker, which does not have the same
    type of bottom and is much more protective for the forces, over
    800 armored security vehicles--which is a special vehicle
    designed much like the South African vehicle you mentioned.
        And third, we have purchased some of the sport utility
    vehicle (SUV) 31s from South Africa, and those who are the most
    exposed for this kind of damage are using those vehicles over
    there. So we have taken those vehicles right now, and we look
    to the future and what kind of land vehicle are we going to
    have. In the Army's case, the tactical truck system, how it
    looks is going to be driven much by what we learn here, and the
    last point that I would leave is still the vehicle that we are
    not going to go away from is the heavy armored vehicle, so we
    do not see any intent in the future that the Army is going to
    get rid of any tanks or Bradleys. But they all need to provide
    the level of force and protection that I think both you and I
    would like to have.
        Mr. Taylor. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Hefley. Mr. Snyder.
        Dr. Snyder. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I want to pursue this a little bit about the Guard and
    Reserve forces, if I might. About a year and a half ago, when
    the 39th Brigade left Arkansas, I went out one of the days when
    they were loading up the equipment on rail cars, it was like
    the biggest use of rail and moving of equipment since World War
    II through Arkansas, and it was just rail car after rail car.
    And so they moved all that stuff with them. And now they have
    come back, and most of them are now back in Arkansas or
    Oklahoma.
        So General Christianson, can you explain to me kind of the
    trail now that is going to happen in terms of if I am General
    Morrow in Arkansas and I am trying to figure out how to replace
    this equipment that is either worn out or some left behind, so
    who does the adjutant general go to? Does that come directly
    through you or--walk me through that, if you would, please.
        General Christianson. It is going to be a centrally
    controlled program. The Army Materiel Command effective 1
    October this year will be completely in charge of this program.
    We will work directly with the Army National Guard, G-4, my
    equivalent on the Army Guard side, directly with the State
    maintenance officer and the units in the organization.
        What the unit commander should expect is for the equipment
    they have brought back with them, it should go through the same
    reset program that all of the active forces have gone through,
    no difference. The timing may be different. Where it is done is
    going to be controlled by Army material command. So a lot of it
    is going to be done locally, but some of it will require
    repairs that will have to go to the depot or will have to go to
    some kind of a higher level organization.
        So our intent is to leverage the combat supplies management
    system (CSMS), the mates, all of the technical capability the
    Guard has, but to leverage all that in the context of a unified
    national program with a single standard. So no one is going to
    get something back at a lower standard that comes out of this
    program. That is our intent.
        Dr. Snyder. So requests from the Guard or the Army Reserve
    not come through you, or do they? They eventually get to you?
        General Christianson. Yes, sir. They will come to me from
    the National Guard, the bureau itself here in Washington, and
    then we will bring that all together. And then Army Material
    Command is kind of the coordinator of the national program who
    will ensure that all of this work is distributed right and that
    the standards have been--they obtain the same level of
    productivity and standards coming out.
        Dr. Snyder. I have not talked to the folks back home about
    this issue yet, but as you know, the concept of the enhanced
    brigades came up so we could take certain units and make sure
    they got the equipment they needed, and I think that probably
    has worked reasonably well, but these are the folks that did
    get some help with getting equipment several years ago, but
    they have now gone overseas. And I think there is some fear
    that perhaps now they will be behind getting that replaced. Is
    that a reasonable fear to have?
        General Christianson. The enhanced brigades are also going
    to be modularized as they go through this reset process. They
    will come out of this reset process looking different than they
    did when they went into this operation. They are going to look
    just like the Army modular brigade construct, it will be no
    different. If it is a heavy brigade. It will look the same as
    all other heavy brigades, so when it comes out of this process,
    as its equipment is reset, it will be issued the right kind of
    equipment to meet those requirements. I can take for the record
    the timeline to know when 39th is actually going through its
    modularity window because that will give you and the Adjutant
    General (AG) a picture, a window of when they should come out
    of this looking like the new organization.
        Dr. Snyder. That is all right. You do not need to take that
    for the record. I was using them as an example. Thank you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Hefley. Mr. Hayes.
        Mr. Hayes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        General Wetekam, you referred earlier to the Quadrennial
    Defense Review. I want to ask you about the mobility
    capabilities study; very very much concerned about the issue of
    C-130's, we grounded a bunch of them at Pope. They had to move
    one of the 45th National Guard planes to back field. Does the
    Mobility Capability Study take into account the
    recapitalization and reconstitution issues that you mentioned
    in your testimony on page four?
        General Wetekam. Sir, it takes into account those issues to
    a degree, but it is not at the heart of the Mobility Capability
    Study (MCS).
        What we expect out of the MCS--and of course, it is not
    produced yet--it is essentially a range, if you will, of forces
    that will be required, depending on the contingencies. I
    certainly share your concerns relative to the existing C-130J
    fleet.
        In addition to Mobility Capability Study, Air Mobility
    Command and the program office, the C-130 program office, are
    working hard right now to assess what the data, the new data is
    really telling us with regards to the condition of the C-130's,
    the older 130's that have the center wing box problems you
    referred to, sir.
        Mr. Hayes. Well, the data is telling us it is a bad
    problem. I think what you are going to find, when you look more
    closely, with the grounded birds and wing boxes, it is worse
    than we think, and we very badly need to get into spending
    money on the new Js.
        And when you answered the question for Congressman Taylor,
    you mentioned a wing box. Did you say it is better or worse
    than we first thought, or did I misunderstand that?
        General Wetekam. It is worse than we first thought. We had
    initially established a limit at 45,000 equivalent baseline
    hours, at which we restricted--put flight restrictions on those
    aircraft, but continued to operate them. What we found out in
    recent months is that 45,000 equivalent baseline hours is the
    point at which we actually need to ground the aircraft, and we
    have moved that restriction limit back to 38,000. So it is
    worse than we thought it was until a few months ago when we got
    essentially new data as we have worked more with the center
    wing boxes. It is not getting better; it is going in the wrong
    direction.
        Mr. Hayes. You are confirming what we had feared.
        The MCS study was due at the end of March; now it comes out
    at the end of April. I am pretty sure we use that as another
    way of letting folks up here know what the situation is. At
    Pope, we have got 31 aircraft grounded, seven or eight limited
    flying status, 20 percent of the fleet, 84 of which are on
    active duty on restricted weight capabilities. We have just got
    to keep hammering the fact that recapitalization, that is
    keeping our young men off the ground in Iraq and Afghanistan
    and increasing safety.
        Talk at length about the continued, not just procurement as
    it is now outlined--and hopefully, we have corrected the
    initial oversight in the budget for continuing production.
    Speak to that, and then speak to the issue of what really we
    need, and that is more C-130Js than was initially projected.
    And anyone else that would like to speak in the range of
    whoever uses them, I would love to have your comments for the
    record. We need those aircraft badly.
        General Wetekam. Yes, sir. Essentially, the production for
    the Marine Corps 130's is kind of bridging, if you will, the
    production gap until the department can fully assess the
    impact, as referred to earlier.
        Mr. Hayes. There is a study underway, and I am sure you are
    probably aware of it, but I know there is a request, and that
    is, the amount of money that is being spent, we are way past
    the point of diminishing returns. We are spending money on
    aircraft that may fly for a limited amount of time; some that
    will never fly again. We need to transfer those tax dollars
    into new aircraft with availability and capabilities that are
    full time, not limited on weight. So again, any comments on
    that? And I yield back my time after that answer.
        General Wetekam. Sir, I just say that I share your concerns
    with aging aircraft, 130's are a big part of that, but we have
    other fleets as well, as you are certainly aware, that are in
    the same boat. Our KC-135 fleet, which averages about 43 years
    of age----
        Mr. Hefley. Do not lose focus. If we can get them on the C-
    130's, then obviously have answered on the 15s and the KC-135s
    and so on. You are right. Let's give the people some airplanes,
    you know?
        General Wetekam. Yes, sir.
        Mr. Hefley. Dr. Schwarz.
        Dr. Schwarz. General Wetekam, we are not picking on you,
    sir, but let's talk about A-10s. My understanding is that there
    are about 200 A-10s Guard, Reserve and Active left in the
    inventory; is that about correct?
        General Wetekam. Sir, I believe it is slightly higher than
    that. I can tell you in just a moment what the total number is.
        We have a total, total inventory including trainers of 357
    active and on-guard Reserve.
        Dr. Schwarz. That is a lot better than I thought. The plan
    is to upgrade, refit, refurbish. What part of that fleet to
    keep them active and in the inventory, my understanding, until
    maybe the year 2018, 2020?
        General Wetekam. Sir, I will have to take that for the
    record and provide you an accurate assessment. We do have
    upgrade plans for the A-10, but I do need to be sure what
    portion of the fleet and what the projected service life is.
        [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
    beginning on page 136.]
        Dr. Schwarz. I feel about the A-10 the way my friend Mr.
    Hayes feels about the C-130J. I have a vested interest in it.
    There is an A-10 base in my district, but that A-10 squadron
    has flown in every operation this country has been involved in
    for the past 15 or 18 years, including the first Gulf War,
    Kosovo, the southern no-fly zone, Iraqi Freedom, and they are a
    superb outfit.
        Then I speak with my friends who are both retired and
    active officers in the Army and the Marine Corps. When you talk
    about plans the Air Force might have to take the A-10 out of
    the inventory and replace it with another close air support
    aircraft, they are unhappy campers.
        So my interest is, and the assurance, that I want, if you
    can possibly give me, is that keeping the A-10's in the
    inventory active and in support of our Marine Corps and Army
    troops on the ground is--that is the plan, that is ongoing.
        General Wetekam. Yes, sir. We have long-term plans for the
    A-10. We will, as I said for the record, provide you with the
    detailed force structure laid out for the outyears. But we
    certainly share the Army and the Marine Corps' enthusiasm for
    the A-10 as well. It has been a great performer for us.
        [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
    beginning on page 136.]
        Dr. Schwarz. Thank you very kindly, General. I would yield
    back my time right now. I have another question later.
        Mr. Hefley. Mr. Reyes.
        Mr. Reyes. Thank you, gentlemen and thank you for being
    here.
        The first question I have, on the occasions that I have had
    to visit in theater, we have been told various things about how
    fast the equipment is wearing out. Is it accurate that the
    equipment is wearing out five times faster than we anticipated
    because of the harsh environment?
        General Christianson. I am not sure that it is accurate
    that it is wearing out five times faster. I think it is
    accurate we are using it five times more than we would in
    peacetime operation, training operations. How much wear is
    being done kind of depends a little bit on the equipment.
        As I mentioned earlier, with wheeled vehicles that we have
    added a lot of extra armor to, so it is carrying extra weight.
    I believe they are wearing out much faster.
        What we are finding out on the aircraft--when we have come
    back for those aircraft that we have completely reset--that
    there is not as much wear as we thought. Part of that is
    because I believe our soldiers learned from Desert Storm and
    took actions as part of these operations to avoid some of the
    damages we saw on those helicopters during Desert Storm.
        The same thing has been applied to some of our ground
    systems. We have better filtration systems. The maintenance
    checks and services the soldiers are doing forward, I think,
    have helped to help alleviate some of the wear. Not the usage.
        The usage is five times higher than normal. But the wear
    depends on other things. As I mentioned, we are not seeing that
    in the stuff we are resetting right now, with the exception of
    wheeled vehicles, which I think are wearing out at a higher
    rate than our other equipment.
        Mr. Reyes. In that same vein, what are the lessons that we
    have learned? Is somebody in a position to not only evaluate
    but to make recommendations and maybe implement changes to
    either our logistics system or the design of the vehicles that
    are wearing much faster? What is being done in that area?
        General Christianson. Exactly what you said is what is
    happening. We are taking the lessons learned and applying them.
    The lessons learned after Desert Storm were applied primarily
    to aviation and paid huge dividends in this operation.
        The aircraft that came back out of this last operation, as
    I mentioned, the wear and tear was much less than we thought.
    In addition, other lessons that are learned are being applied
    during the RESET. So if we are able to put improved
    capabilities on those helicopters, better screening systems for
    dust, better capabilities for cleaning. We are doing that as
    part of the RESET program.
        Better training for the soldiers, what extra steps should
    you take in this kind of environment when you are operating?
    Those are also lessons that are being applied every day at the
    point of the sphere. So we are doing exactly that.
        I think where we see the results is in the equipment
    forward. So even though the equipment is being used at a much
    higher rate than normal, we are seeing readiness rates that are
    94, 95 percent almost across the fleet. With aviation, almost
    all of our aviation fleets are well above the Army standard in
    the deployed area despite their high usage. So I think they are
    applying many of the lessons.
        Mr. Reyes. What about some of the information that we get
    that parts are taking a long time, vehicles are deadlined for
    parts and are down an inordinate amount of time.
        What do you know about that? What are you doing about that
    and where are we today about that?
        General Christianson. In the two and a half years that we
    have been in operation over there, there have been significant
    changes to the way the supply distribution system works. As you
    know, there is--there are a lot of items that are moving by
    ground and it is a long ways, so we have used a lot of repair
    time, a lot of time just waiting for supplies to be delivered.
    But today I can report that for those items that are ordered
    and delivered by air, the turn-around time is 18 days on
    average over there.
        The biggest problem we are having is the distribution
    locally, because when it gets up into Iraq and then gets out to
    the forward operating basis, those distribution runs are all
    made in coordination with all of the maneuver forces. They take
    into consideration the security environment, as you can well
    imagine.
        But we are getting good turn-around times in supply.
    Eighteen days is very, very good. Now this is compared to
    almost twice as long a year and a half ago. So we are doing
    very, very well.
        The other indication that the repair part situation is good
    is on aviation. We have very few helicopters that are down
    waiting for repair parts. We have about 10 percent of our
    helicopters that are in a phased maintenance. After so many
    hours, they bring them in for a phase maintenance. I think this
    is also indicative of a good supply system and lessons learned
    and applied in this operating environment. We are watching it
    every day. We watch the supply turn-around times every single
    day.
        Mr. Reyes. Are these--excuse me, go ahead, General.
        General Huly. Sir, in the Marine Corps, perhaps in the
    early stages of the campaign, there might have been some supply
    problems or some delays. But I have heard of no reports of any
    recently and readiness rates don't bear out that they have got
    a problem.
        Our readiness, like the Army's, is way into the 90 percent
    for our ground vehicles. So I think they have got the supplies.
    They have got the maintenance capabilities to keep things
    running. Our aviation rates over there as well remain high.
    This is because we do have the forward in store supplies and
    the maintenance effort over there.
        Conversely, however, though, our maintenance on the CONUS-
    based aircraft is declining. It is declining at the expense,
    because we are putting the effort into keeping things forward
    deployed. That is where the emphasis is right now.
        Mr. Reyes. Mr. Chairman, can I ask one quick follow-up by
    way of documentation? I was going to ask, are there reports
    that can give us a comparison of how things were early on in
    this conflict versus where they are today? Could we get copies
    so we could take a look at them?
        General Christianson. Congressman, I will take that for the
    record, and I will give you some background. We track that all
    the time.
        I wanted to add one thing that I forgot that is very
    important. In the last couple of years, one of the things, one
    of initiatives that we have taken that has paid huge dividends
    is we now have satellite connectivity to the very forward edge
    of the battlefield for logisticians.
        So before where we take several days for a request for a
    repair part to get back here to the United States, today it is
    happening in less than half a day. That makes a huge difference
    in the ability to support the forces. Because now the people
    who are back here supporting are able to respond rapidly. The
    last point I would make is we also have a supply capability in
    Kuwait.
        About 35 to 40 percent of the repair parts that are needed
    in Iraq are coming from that warehouse in Kuwait. So that
    shortens the supply pipeline significantly and helped us in
    turn-around time, but we will get you the information and you
    can see what happened.
        [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
    beginning on page 135.]
        Mr. Reyes. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Hefley. Mr. Miller.
        Mr. Miller. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to go
    back to the C-130 question, and particularly the wing boxes.
    Can you, in particular, General, talk about how many aircraft
    are currently affected by wing box cracks? Given the rate that
    we have seen over the last year with the problem, can you
    forecast what we may run into this year? I ask all this to go
    to the point of the company or companies that produces the wing
    boxes, do they have the capacity? Are they producing fast
    enough to be able to replace what needs to be done so that we
    don't run into a crisis in regards to replacing those parts.
        General Wetekam. Yes, sir. First off, the first part of
    your question is we have--and these numbers change, because as
    we operate aircraft they obviously move into that over 38,000-
    hour category and then the over 45,000 or 45,000-hour base line
    category.
        But my most current data is that we have 35 aircraft that
    are over 45,000 hours and so essentially are restricted from
    all operations at this point. In addition to that, there is
    another 56 aircraft, and this includes also C-130Hs, it is not
    just the E models, but some of the earlier H models. Fifty six
    aircraft that are in that restricted area where they can
    operate, but they have significant limitations on maneuvering
    and on carriage, weight carriage.
        I will take for the record what our projection is for the
    next year. There are a number of aircraft obviously that will
    be moving into those categories, and I will take that for the
    record.
        Relative to the production capacity, we think that it is
    about 36 per year, according to the manufacturer, 36 center
    wing boxes that could be produced. And so--but it is not just a
    case of producing the wing boxes, it is also a case of having
    the depot capacity then to replace the wing box. We couldn't do
    36 simultaneously, and we are still assessing that.
        So the wing box production capacity itself would seem to be
    adequate. But we haven't fully assessed what the depot capacity
    could be and how fast we could put those aircraft, particularly
    those 36 that are already in the--or the 35, rather, that are
    in the grounded category through the depot.
        Mr. Miller. Does the work actually have to be done at a
    depot. Can it be done privately?
        General Wetekam. Yes, sir. I say depot, but that could be
    either public sector depot. We do in C-130 work in both Ogden,
    Utah and Warner Robbins, Georgia. There are a number of private
    sector depots that do contract C-130 work and have in the past
    as well. I would suspect that it would be a combination of the
    two.
        Mr. Miller. I would hope, so because we have a facility in
    Crestview that does a lot of work. When I look at the numbers,
    I see that the private sector does--not that I am against
    depots at all, but it seems that they are turning out equipment
    faster within budget, and I want to make sure that we don't
    just force everything back into the depots to get the work
    done.
        General Wetekam. No, sir. In a situation like this, where
    we have an operational restriction, we would seek to repair it,
    you know, address it as quickly as we could, using whatever
    capacity is available.
        Mr. Miller. Very good. Thank you, sir.
        Admiral, can we go to the water for just a minute.
        Admiral Hugel. Yes, sir.
        Mr. Miller. You may have addressed it before I got here.
    But talking about the Kennedy and the plans to retire the
    carrier does, this cause a capability issue as we reconstitute
    our forces? What happens when the Kitty Hawk comes home to be
    retrofitted, you know, during that period of time?
        Admiral Hugel. In the near term, Kennedy was already
    planned to be in a maintenance period, and so we had enough
    other carrier strike group capability in place to continue to
    supply our six plus two carrier strike group rate, and that is
    in accordance with the fleet strike plan.
        We are looking now over the longer term to determine
    whether we will be able to continue supplying six plus two
    carrier strike group readiness or something less than that with
    Kennedy out of the mix.
        A piece of that work is understanding the--not only the
    capability that we need to have deployed but the presence that
    we need to have. Those two things, coupled together, to make
    sure that we are meeting the combatant command (COCOM)
    requirements forward.
        We are additionally looking at Kitty Hawk and the Kitty
    Hawk replacement. The plans are not finalized yet on replacing
    Kitty Hawk. So further study required there before we announce
    where we are going.
        Mr. Miller. You--I have heard the discussion, in regards,
    if I might, for just a second, Mr. Chairman. I know my time is
    out. In a 30-second nutshell, I have heard the term
    ``mothball'' used in regards to the Kennedy. What does that
    mean?
        Admiral Hugel. We have fundamentally two different kinds of
    things we do with a ship after we inactivate it, Congressman.
    One is to mothball the ship, basically to lay the ship up in a
    condition so that if we decide somewhere down the road we need
    to reactivate the ship, the systems have been dried out, the
    ship has been dehumidified so that rust and the deterioration
    of the hull life components doesn't get away from us. The other
    alternative is to scrap the ship, to cut it up, and that is a
    pretty final action.
        So mothballing or demobilizing the ship allows us to put
    the ship away, but to recover the ship if somewhere down the
    road we decide we need the ship back in the inventory.
        Mr. Miller. I understand when you--the reasoning, I guess,
    behind from a financial standpoint. But can you quasi-mothball
    something and turn it into a training carrier?
        Admiral Hugel. Quasi-mothballing means taking pieces of the
    ship completely out of action, sealing the compartments and
    locking it up. If we were to use a ship for a training asset
    you need to have access to the entire ship. If there is a flood
    in the ship, you need to get to wherever the problem might be,
    and so it is impractical to partially mothball a ship and
    continue to operate it, sir.
        Mr. Miller. Okay. I have got some other questions in that
    regard, but I will pass them too you.
        Admiral Hugel. Yes, sir.
        Mr. Hefley. Mrs. Davis.
        Ms. Davis. Thank you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman, thank you to you all for being
    here, and for your service, and particularly to General Huly.
    We miss you, and miss your service in San Diego.
        I wanted to turn just a second to what could be, I guess,
    the most personal of all readiness questions, having met with a
    group of Marines just a few days ago in San Diego, who were
    being treated at Balboa Hospital.
        One of their big concerns was that their weapons jammed,
    and that even despite their cleaning the weapons constantly,
    that they still are having a lot of problems, it is hard to get
    a replacement, and they also mentioned that they would like to
    have a side arm available to them so that when their weapons
    jammed that they have a backup.
        Could you tell me how you would respond to them when they
    make those requests, and what we are doing about that?
        General Huly. Ma'am, this is the first that I have heard of
    any weapons jamming in combat or in any training leading it to
    it. If it is so, it hasn't been a problem that has been brought
    to our attention. I am sure if they are saying it happened to
    them, then we will check it out. So I am going to have to take
    your question for the record. I will find out which units
    specifically and to see what the problems were.
        [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
    beginning on page 137.]
        Ms. Davis. Okay, I can help you with that. Thank you.
        General Huly. Thank you.
        Ms. Davis. And also I just wanted to ask then about the
    tracking of war-related expenses and equipment, do we do that
    separately or are all those war-related expenses tracked in one
    way and other military tracking expenditures are tracked
    another way. Do we separate those out or are they together?
        General Huly. I can speak for the Marine Corps in that we
    are capturing all of our war-related expenses and our costs
    separately at this time from our normal operating costs. We had
    a very good foundation of what our normal operating costs were
    preOIF and preOEF.
        We were pretty much able to capture what our costs were,
    not only for our own information and managing internally, but
    to be able to present it to the Congress and to the Department
    of Defense to be able to justify what it is that we are asking
    for. So, yes, ma'am, we do break them out separately.
        Ms. Davis. Is that true for all the services?
        General Christianson. Yes, ma'am. We have to track our
    expenses separately. I know that if an auditor came in to look
    they probably wouldn't think we are doing it as well as we
    should. But we are trying to keep them separate for many, many
    good reasons. We have to do that.
        General Wetekam. The true is for the Air Force as well,
    ma'am.
        Admiral Hugel. Yes, ma'am. Within the capability of our
    ability to distinguish an underway day for the war versus just
    being an underway for other reasons, we do try to distinguish
    those costs. Certainly we program in budget and predict with
    models that are tied to baseline requirements and then wartime
    requirements above that.
        Ms. Davis. Because, I am glad to hear that then because
    there was some question of whether or not DOD allowed that, but
    that is the way that you do that.
        It is my understanding that in 2004 the supplemental
    requested 2.8 billion addressed to equipment and wear and then
    2005 supplemental was about 12 billion for that purpose. Now
    that we are in 2006, if we have a pretty good idea about what
    those amounts are, if you are separating them out, then why
    don't we include those from your point of view in the 2006
    budget request, which will be separate from the supplemental?
        General Christianson. In accordance with the Office of the
    Secretary Defenses (OSD's) policy, the incremental costs of the
    war we put into the supplemental, the emergency supplemental
    request. The problem with trying to anticipate it, and we do
    the best we can when we build a supplemental requirement, is we
    are not exactly sure what is going to come back next year.
        If the security situation changes up or down, the units
    that were returned or the units we will send over will not be
    the ones that we currently are planning. So we could get a lot
    more equipment back. So, for example, if a security situation
    improves dramatically over the next six to eight months by the
    end of this calendar year, we could see a lot more of the
    equipment we have left behind returning here.
        If that happens, there will be a larger amount of RESET
    required next fiscal year than we are currently planning,
    because currently we know we are only planning for the units to
    come back that we think are going to come back.
        So we are kind of in a little bit of a time crunch. I know,
    Mr. Chairman, you had asked earlier, what is the resource that
    really drives all of this? Time is the resource that we really
    don't have any control over. So we--if the budget goes in and
    it has to be in by this time, and we have--we don't know what
    force structures will remain in theater until after that time,
    we have no choice but to ask for it in a supplement.
        Ms. Davis. Where do we factor in equipment for the Iraqi
    Army?
        General Christianson. Most of the equipment that I know--
    some of the equipment we have given the Iraqi Army. Some of our
    prepositioned trucks, for example, that are very old models
    that we don't want in the Army anymore. About 1,215 we gave to
    the Iraqi Army. We were compensated, recompensated from
    Coalition Provisional Authority (Iraq) (CPA) for that.
        Most of the other stuff that I know is being purchased
    commercially and is not equipment that the Army, at least in
    the Army's case, the Army is not giving them. It is outside the
    Army.
        Ms. Davis. Great. Thank you.
        Admiral Hugel, I was going to ask you just about the sea
    swapping and what we anticipate down the road. We know there
    are a lot of plusses of that, certainly, but the downside in
    terms of readiness--and if we don't have any more time, Mr.
    Chairman, I will stop. But that was a question that perhaps
    others haven't asked about.
        General Huly. Yes, ma'am, we have done sea swap pilots on
    the west, for a couple of West Coast ships now. We are
    embarking on sea swap pilots for ships based on the East Coast.
    We continue to learn from each of those sea swap exercises the
    upside and the downside, and there appear to be quite a few
    upside things.
        So I think when the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO)
    testified earlier on what the future force structure
    requirements in terms of number of ships might be, he mentioned
    sea swap as an issue and an effort that we are going to
    continue to explore. Depending on our success at employing sea
    swap, depending on how much of the fleet we can do sea swap
    with, we will eventually dictate the size of the force that we
    need because of the extra forward deployed operational
    availability we get from those platforms when we are able to
    swap crews back and forth.
        So far, we have learned many good lessons from sea swap.
    The East Coast ships will add to that collection.
        Ms. Davis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Hefley. Mr. Evans. Mr. Evans has some questions for the
    record. We will do that. Do any of--any of the rest of you have
    any questions for the record as well? We will do that.
        Are there any final questions or comments?
        If not, the committee stands adjourned.
        Thank you, gentlemen, very, very, much.
        [Whereupon, at 3:25 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
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                                A P P E N D I X

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                 QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

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                       QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. HEFLEY

        Mr. Hefley. General Huly, of the various variables impacting the
    ability of your service to accomplish its reset requirements, which is
    the most difficult to manage or attain?
        General Huly. The most difficult variable impacting the Marine
    Corps' ability to accomplish resetting is maintaining an adequate
    inventory of equipment. This is because the Marine Corps must maintain
    sufficient assets in the Area of Responsibility (AOR) to fight the war
    while continuing to train for future deployments and maintain
    sufficient prepositioned assets to be ready to engage in future
    operations.
        The Marine Corps has had to take equipment from home stations,
    training schoolhouses, our Maritime Prepositioned Squadrons and Global
    Preposition Program (Norway) in order to supply deploying units. All of
    the equipment deployed in the AOR is undergoing use at a rate five to
    eight times greater than average peacetime utilization in a challenging
    environment. This has accelerated aging of those assets and our need to
    procure replacements equipment at a far faster rate just to stay even.
        We have employed cross-leveling of equipment across the Marine
    Corps to mitigate the effects of heavy equipment use/loss in the Global
    War on Terror (GWOT). Cross-leveling alone will not be sufficient to
    meet GWOT operational needs and maintain essential readiness over time.
        Mr. Hefley. Of the various variables impacting the ability of your
    service to accomplish its reset requirements, which is the most
    difficult to manage or attain?
        Admiral Hugel. The most challenging variables are the safety of our
    personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan, and transit time to rotate equipment
    to and from CONUS.
        Mr. Hefley. Of the various variables impacting the ability of your
    service to accomplish its reset requirements, which is the most
    difficult to manage or attain?
        General Wetekam. The Air Force faces a number of significant
    reconstitution challenges. The most difficult challenge facing the Air
    Force is recapitalizing and reconstituting our aging aircraft fleet. In
    the mid-1960's, our average fleet age was around 8\1/2\ years, by
    Desert Storm it had climbed to 17 years, and today's fleet average age
    is over 23 years.
        Managing and sustaining these aging airframes strains our resources
    and personnel as well as our supply systems. In addition, harsh
    operating environments and increased ops tempo lead to extensive wear
    and tear on aircraft systems. The sustained high demand for the
    capabilities provided by fleets comprised of primarily older aircraft
    continues to delay our ability to reconstitute while accelerating the
    need for re-capitalization. Also, critical to operating aging fleets is
    the cost to maintain and sustain them. Although there are no current
    constraints regarding our depot capacity, it is crucial that we
    maintain adequate levels of funding for Depot Purchased Equipment
    Maintenance (DPEM) and Contractor Logistics Support (CLS). We have seen
    a steady increase in the DPEM requirement with a comparable increase in
    DPEM funding which has grown from $1.6B in FY00 to $3.3B in FY04, and
    CLS funding which has grown from $1.8B to $2.5B in the same period.
        One program we developed to help address aging aircraft issues is
    the Fleet Viability Board (FVB). We chartered a recurring FVB to
    provide an unbiased assessment of fleet health. Along with the Fleet
    Viability Board assessments, we must continue to divest our oldest
    legacy aircraft to free resources for reinvestment in newer aircraft.
    This allows us to take advantage of new technology and increasing
    capabilities.
        Thank you for your continued support of the Air Force.
        Mr. Hefley. Of the services that have stay-behind or remain-behind
    equipment in Iraq or Afghanistan, how much of that equipment is likely
    to ever return for repair?
        General Huly. The Marine Corps recently conducted an assessment of
    the Demand on Equipment in theater. This assessment took into
    consideration actual and projected combat losses and heightened stress
    placed on equipment due to the OPTEMPO and environmental impact.
    Equipment that cannot be repaired in theater is transported from Iraq
    back to CONUS for evaluation and induction into the depot maintenance
    cycle. For equipment that is experiencing heightened usage, the
    objective is to rotate it systematically to replace tired equipment
    with fresh equipment before it becomes unserviceable/irreparable.
        To date, the USMC has had two ships sets of gear return to CONUS
    for replacement/refurbishment with three additional ships scheduled for
    return over the next several months. We continue to monitor equipment,
    the replenishment cycle, and will leverage opportune lift for air
    return of retrograde assets as well as surface return for ground
    equipment assets.
        We recognize the need to automate this decision process and are
    developing a tool that integrates equipment usage rates, combat losses,
    and cost factors from our operating forces, program managers, and our
    Marine Corps Logistics Command. This Total Life Cycle Management Tool
    will provide a mechanism from which future sound, prudent, mission-
    focused Marine Corps management decisions can be made regarding
    equipment maintenance and/or new acquisitions.
        Mr. Hefley. Of the services that have stay-behind or remain-behind
    equipment in Iraq or Afghanistan, how much of that equipment is likely
    to ever return for repair?
        Admiral Hugel. Unless the equipment is deemed beyond economical
    repair or suffers from extensive battle damage, we anticipate all of
    the equipment to return for servicing. Aviation Support Equipment in
    part due to quantity and size, is rotated via Maritime Prepositioning
    Force (MPF) ships as the Marine Air Wing (MAW) rotates into theatre.
    Aircraft are rotated back in keeping with their peace time established
    depot maintenance schedule. Seabee equipment is also rotated primarily
    through MPF ships.
        Mr. Hefley. Of the services that have stay-behind or remain-behind
    equipment in Iraq or Afghanistan, how much of that equipment is likely
    to ever return for repair?
        General Wetekam. Most equipment used by the Air Force is sustained
    under a maintenance concept that doesn't require it to return to the
    United States for repair. Air Force equipment is used, inspected,
    serviced and maintained at the location of use until the equipment is
    neither no longer necessary or has completed it's life cycle. If the
    equipment is no longer necessary and is still serviceable, it is
    reallocated to other valid users within the Air Force. If the equipment
    has reached the end of it's lifecycle, it is demilitarized (if
    necessary) and disposed of via established disposal processes. For that
    very small population of equipment items requiring return to the United
    States for repair, e.g., materiel handling equipment, selected
    communications-electronics equipment, etc., the Air Force returns that
    equipment to the government depot system or private sector contractors
    for repair and/or overhaul.
        Mr. Hefley. To what extent do you have the ability to perform depot
    maintenance in Iraq, Afghanistan or Kuwait?
        General Huly. Currently limited depot maintenance is being
    conducted in theater. The lack of infrastructure inhibits our ability
    to create this capability. However, the ability of CONUS based depots
    to respond to GWOT requirements remains high.
        The Marine Corps and the Army are partnering to leverage heavy
    maintenance support for ground vehicles in Iraq. The first facility to
    implement this partnership is the Army's HMMWV Service Center. The
    Service Center will provide preventive, corrective, and heavy
    maintenance support in several locations throughout the area. In
    addition to the HMMWV, 13 systems that are common to both the Marine
    Corps and Army have been identified as candidates for joint repair
    capability. Currently the Marine Corps units in theater have the
    resident maintenance capability and expertise to sustain its units up
    to depot level maintenance. We will continue to expand this partnership
    and leverage common repair facilities where at all possible.
        Marine aviation has a limited depot-like repair capability in the
    Iraq Theater. We have facilities in theater with depot artisans; this
    provides capabilities tailored to the requirements of the deployed
    rotary wing units (fixed wing depot capability is almost exclusively
    resident in CONUS). Complete full depot-level maintenance is not done
    in Iraq; as such work requires infrastructure and tools not available
    there. For example, we have artisans in theater that can conduct
    aircraft battle damage assessments and some associated repairs, as well
    as structural analysis and deep cleaning. Standard depot work such as
    complete rebuilding of components, however, cannot usually be done at
    these limited facilities. A Memorandum Of Agreement with the US Army
    has allowed us to leverage their depot-like capabilities in Afghanistan
    when required to support Marine aircraft detachments operating there.
        Mr. Hefley. To what extent do you have the ability to perform depot
    maintenance in Iraq, Afghanistan or Kuwait?
        Admiral Hugel. For Aviation Support Equipment, we maintain the
    ability to do emergent field depot maintenance and battle damage repair
    using flyaway depot artisans in theatre both ashore and afloat. Battle
    damage or emergent repairs that require extensive depot rework must be
    returned to CONUS. Normal peacetime scheduled depot level maintenance
    is performed only in CONUS. For Navy Seabee equipment, we do not
    perform depot level maintenance in Iraq, Afghanistan or Kuwait.
        Mr. Hefley. To what extent do you have the ability to perform depot
    maintenance in Iraq, Afghanistan or Kuwait?
        General Wetekam. The Air Force neither has nor requires physical
    depot capabilities in Iraq, Afghanistan or Kuwait. Depot maintenance is
    the heavy repair work that requires specialized equipment, facilities
    and skills not found within our deployed maintenance forces. As a
    result, the Air Force returns equipment requiring repair and/or
    overhaul to organic and contract depot repair facilities throughout the
    globe. On a selective basis, theater maintenance is complemented by
    deployable expeditionary depot maintenance support via Combat Logistics
    Support Squadron (CLSS) teams, Contract Field Teams (CFTs) and/or Depot
    Field Teams (DFTs).
        Mr. Hefley. To what extent do you have the ability to perform depot
    maintenance in Iraq, Afghanistan or Kuwait?
        General Christianson. We do not perform depot level maintenance on
    the equipment in theater. Rather, the U.S. Army Materiel Command (AMC)
    and its subordinate commands have established Forward Repair Activities
    (FRA) which provide a repair and return capability and a flexible
    response to urgent requirements, such as the application of Add-on
    Armor kits. Employees from our depots and commercial contractors
    perform the work at the FRAs. The FRAs are specialized and vary in size
    based upon the Warfighers' requirements. Supporting aviation, ground
    vehicles and electronic equipment, these FRAs are located in Kuwait,
    Afghanistan, and at three sites in Iraq.
        Mr. Hefley. What is the difference between the Army's RESET program
    and the Recapitalization program?
        General Christianson. The Army's Recapitalization program is depot
    repair, based on an extensive maintenance scope of work, that rebuilds
    our equipment to a near, zero time/zero mile condition. Through this
    effort, we extend the service life of our aging fleets. The result of
    the Recapitalization program is sustained system readiness through
    improved reliability and availability.
        The Army's Reset program is a series of actions to restore
    returning units to a desired level of combat capability. Returning
    equipment is repaired to address the damage inflicted by heavy usage in
    a desert environment. Some of this repair work is below depot level
    maintenance, accomplished in the unit motor pools or other maintenance
    facilities. Some equipment requires work that can only be accomplished
    with the skills and equipment available in depot facilities. The high
    operational tempo in theater places some equipment under great stress.
    In effect, a year operating within theater equates to five or six years
    of operation in peacetime for some equipment. To mitigate this
    accelerated aging of the fleets, we are applying the Recapitalization
    scope of work to the returning equipment in the worst condition. Reset
    also includes the procurement of new equipment to replace battle losses
    and equipment that is not economically repairable.
                                     ______

                        QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. REYES

        Mr. Reyes. Are there reports that can give us a comparison of
    readiness rates at the beginning of the conflict versus now?
        General Christianson. During the initial phase of the conflict, the
    Army experienced readiness rates below the DA Goal for some critical
    combat weapon systems. During this time, readiness was challenging
    because of the supply pipeline and theater distribution system in an
    immature theater. The theater is currently matured and many of the
    initial shortcomings have been resolved. For the past year, the Army
    has shown a positive trend in maintaining its critical combat systems
    (M1, M2/3, M109A6, MLRS, PATRIOT, AH-64, UH-60, OH-58D & CH-47D)
    resulting in exceeding the Department of the Army (DA) Goal (90 percent
    for ground and 75 percent for air) in the past six months for all
    systems except the AH-64 and CH-47 in the OIF/OEF theater of operation.
    Although the AH-64 and CH-47D trends are slightly below the Army goal,
    the materiel readiness did not hamper any operational missions. The
    Army has established Forward Repair Activities, Field Service
    Representatives and Contract Maintenance to assist in maintaining the
    combat weapon systems in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom in which
    track vehicles are being used at five times and aviation two to three
    times their peacetime OPTEMPO. The theater has the highest priority for
    CL IX repair parts and any systemic materiel or maintenance issues are
    discussed at the senior leaders' weekly HQDA VTC with the theater. We
    have made significant progress in filling supply requests by fielding
    satellite connectivity to the very forward edge of the battlefield for
    logisticians. Before this improvement, it took several days, on
    average, for a repair part request to be sent to CONUS. Today, it takes
    less than a half day. This has made a significant difference in the
    ability to support deployed forces. Additionally, the Army and DLA have
    established substantial supply facilities in Kuwait. Thirty-five to
    forty percent of repair parts requests required in Iraq are shipped
    from Kuwait. The emphasis on theater readiness, however, has hampered
    efforts to maintain readiness in non-deployed units. As RESET of
    returning units is conducted and depot level programs, to include
    RECAP, are conducted, the Army expects readiness in non-deployed units
    to also improve.
                                     ______

                       QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. TAYLOR

        Mr. Taylor. Status and thoughts on the program to replace fuel pods
    on the C-130.
        General Huly. The USMC is actively focused on rapidly upgrading the
    refueling pods to address the issues noted by Mr. Taylor. The refueling
    pods issues constituted a Part I deficiency identified during
    Operational Test and Evaluation. Currently (as of June 2005) five
    aircraft have the upgraded refueling pod system. Four of these aircraft
    are located at MCAS Miramar, and the other is the test aircraft at Pax
    River (VX-20). There is a detailed plan to perform this upgrade on all
    remaining aircraft; we expect to upgrade approximately two aircraft per
    month, which should complete the upgrades by June 2006.
                                     ______

                        QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. HAYES

        Mr. Hayes. You are confirming what we had feared. The MCS study was
    due at the end of March; now it comes out at the end of April. I am
    pretty sure we use that as another way of letting folks up here know
    what the situation is. At Pope, we have got 31 aircraft grounded, seven
    or eight limited flying status, 20 percent of the fleet, 84 of which
    are on active duty on restricted weight capabilities. We have just got
    to keep hammering the fact that recapitalization, that is keeping our
    young men off the ground in Iraq and Afghanistan and increasing safety.
        Talk at length about the continued, not just procurement as it is
    now outlined-and hopefully, we have corrected the initial oversight in
    the budget for continuing production. Speak to that, and then speak to
    the issue of what really we need, and that is more C-130Js than was
    initially projected. And anyone else that would like to speak in the
    range of whoever uses them, I would love to have your comments for the
    record. We need those aircraft badly.
        General Wetekam. As you know, the C-130 has proven to be one of the
    most effective air lifters in the Air Force since the first A model
    entered the inventory in the late 1950's to the current E, H and J
    models. It has been involved in every major conflict from Vietnam to
    Iraqi Freedom. The stated requirement for C-130 combat delivery intra-
    theater airlift is a minimum of 421 E/H equivalents, a mix of C-130 E,
    H and J model aircraft. In order to meet that requirement, the Air
    Force is currently modernizing the intra-theater fleet through the C-
    130 Avionics Modernization Program (AMP) and will continue to
    recapitalize the oldest most problematic C-130s with the C-130Js.
    Moreover, the Air Force, through the MCS and QDR, as well as the Joint
    Intra-theater Airlift Study, will refine the intra-theater airlift
    requirement and force mix for the total force.
                                     ______

                       QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY DR. SCHWARZ

        Dr. Schwarz. The plan is to upgrade, refit, refurbish. What part of
    that fleet will keep them active and in the inventory, my
    understanding, until maybe the year 2018, 2020?
        General Wetekam. The plan is to upgrade the entire A-10 inventory
    of 356 aircraft (203 active duty, 102 Air National Guard, 51 Air Force
    Reserve Component) with the A-10 Service Life Extension Program (SLEP)
    and Precision Engagement (PE).
        The A-10 SLEP extends the service life to 16,000 operational flight
    hours, supporting operations through the aircraft retirement in the
    2023 timeframe. The SLEP program is designed to increase the A-10
    service life through inspections and consolidated structural
    improvements such as repairs to cracks, removal of corrosion from fuel
    tanks and replacement of wing leading edges. Estimated cost for the
    SLEP program is about $2.1M per aircraft for FY05-FY11.
        Precision Engagement greatly enhances A-10 operations on the
    digital battlefield by improving aircraft avionics, integrating a
    tactical datalink: and a targeting pod, and adding J-series weapons
    capability (global positioning satellite guided weapons). This $322M
    program provides significantly greater combat capability for the A-10
    and completes in FY09. Precision Engagement upgraded aircraft are
    designated A-10C.
        The A-10 program also has $156M in FY06 through FY08 for system
    development and demonstration of an engine kit designed to improve
    engine performance. A decision to procure the engine kits ($1.8B) will
    be made during the FY08 POM cycle.
                                     ______

                       QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. MILLER

        Mr. Miller. Can you, in particular, General, talk about how many
    aircraft are currently affected by wing box cracks? Given the rate that
    we have seen over the last year with the problem, can you forecast what
    we may run into this year? I ask all this to go to the point of the
    company or companies that produces the wing boxes, do they have the
    capacity? Are they producing fast enough to be able to replace what
    needs to be done so that we don't run into a crisis in regards to
    replacing those parts.
        General Wetekam. As of 20 April 2005, there are 57 aircraft
    restricted and 31 aircraft grounded. Another four aircraft that
    experienced grounding center wing box cracks have been retired.
        Our forecast estimates 6 additional aircraft will reach the 45K
    Equivalent Baseline Hours (EBH) threshold and be grounded, and 12
    additional aircraft will reach the 38K EBH threshold and be restricted,
    in the next 12 months.
                                     ______

                 QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA

        Ms. Davis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, thank you to you all for being
    here, and for your service, and particularly to General Huly. We miss
    you, and miss your service in San Diego. I wanted to turn just a second
    to what could be, I guess, the most personal of all readiness
    questions, having met with a group of Marines just a few days ago in
    San Diego, who were being treated at Balboa Hospital.
        One of their big concerns was that their weapons jammed, and that
    even despite their cleaning the weapons constantly, that they still are
    having a lot of problems, it is hard to get a replacement, and they
    also mentioned that they would like to have a side arm available to
    them so that when their weapons jammed that they have a backup.
        Could you tell me how you would respond to them when they make
    those requests, and what we are doing about that?
        General Huly. We have queried numerous Marines currently deployed
    in theater and are not aware of any jamming issues with the Modular
    Weapon System (M16A4 or M4). No reports of weapons jamming have been
    received and no documentation of not being able to get replacements is
    available. The Army recently conducted a lubrication study with Marine
    Corps participation for small arms due to numerous claims that its
    existing lubricant was causing malfunctions due to the environment it
    was being employed in (sandy, dusty). This lubrication study found that
    the lubricant that is currently in use is, in fact, better than
    lubricants commercially available for weapons.
        The Marine Corps has had an issue with M9 service pistols jamming
    and an investigation into the cause of the jamming revealed the problem
    to be a magazine issue. The root cause of the M9 jamming was found to
    be a surface finish on some contracted magazines that had been issued
    and these magazines are being removed from the inventory and M9
    magazines are being replaced by an improved magazine with a better
    surface finish and improved feeding reliability.
        In reference to having a backup weapon available, Marines are not
    routinely issued secondary or ``backup'' weapons. Some key billets,
    which employ crew served weapons, are issued a secondary weapon because
    the primary weapon is not intended for use by or protection of an
    individual.