[House Hearing, 109 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
CYBER SECURITY: U.S. VULNERABILITY
AND PREPAREDNESS
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
SEPTEMBER 15, 2005
__________
Serial No. 109-25
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Science
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.house.gov/science
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______
COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE
HON. SHERWOOD L. BOEHLERT, New York, Chairman
RALPH M. HALL, Texas BART GORDON, Tennessee
LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas JERRY F. COSTELLO, Illinois
CURT WELDON, Pennsylvania EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas
DANA ROHRABACHER, California LYNN C. WOOLSEY, California
KEN CALVERT, California DARLENE HOOLEY, Oregon
ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland MARK UDALL, Colorado
VERNON J. EHLERS, Michigan DAVID WU, Oregon
GIL GUTKNECHT, Minnesota MICHAEL M. HONDA, California
FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma BRAD MILLER, North Carolina
JUDY BIGGERT, Illinois LINCOLN DAVIS, Tennessee
WAYNE T. GILCHREST, Maryland RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri
W. TODD AKIN, Missouri DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois
TIMOTHY V. JOHNSON, Illinois SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas
J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia BRAD SHERMAN, California
JO BONNER, Alabama BRIAN BAIRD, Washington
TOM FEENEY, Florida JIM MATHESON, Utah
BOB INGLIS, South Carolina JIM COSTA, California
DAVE G. REICHERT, Washington AL GREEN, Texas
MICHAEL E. SODREL, Indiana CHARLIE MELANCON, Louisiana
JOHN J.H. ``JOE'' SCHWARZ, Michigan DENNIS MOORE, Kansas
MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas
VACANCY
VACANCY
C O N T E N T S
September 15, 2005
Page
Witness List..................................................... 2
Hearing Charter.................................................. 3
Opening Statements
Statement by Representative Sherwood L. Boehlert, Chairman,
Committee on Science, U.S. House of Representatives............ 13
Written Statement............................................ 14
Statement by Representative Bart Gordon, Minority Ranking Member,
Committee on Science, U.S. House of Representatives............ 14
Written Statement............................................ 16
Statement by Representative W. Todd Akin, Member, Committee on
Science, U.S. House of Representatives......................... 19
Statement by Representative Pete Sessions of the State of Texas,
32nd District.................................................. 20
Prepared Statement by Representative Jerry F. Costello, Member,
Committee on Science, U.S. House of Representatives............ 17
Prepared Statement by Representative Eddie Bernice Johnson,
Member, Committee on Science, U.S. House of Representatives.... 17
Prepared Statement by Representative Russ Carnahan, Member,
Committee on Science, U.S. House of Representatives............ 18
Witnesses:
Mr. Donald ``Andy'' Purdy, Jr., Acting Director, National Cyber
Security Division, Department of Homeland Security
Oral Statement............................................... 20
Written Statement............................................ 22
Biography.................................................... 30
Mr. John S. Leggate, Chief Information Officer and Group Vice
President, Digital & Communications Technology, BP Plc., United
Kingdom
Oral Statement............................................... 31
Written Statement............................................ 33
Biography.................................................... 39
Financial Disclosure......................................... 40
Mr. David E. Kepler, Corporate Vice President of Shared Services
and Chief Information Officer, The Dow Chemical Company
Oral Statement............................................... 41
Written Statement............................................ 42
Biography.................................................... 45
Financial Disclosure......................................... 46
Mr. Gerald S. Freese, Director of Enterprise Information
Security, American Electric Power
Oral Statement............................................... 46
Written Statement............................................ 48
Biography.................................................... 50
Financial Disclosure......................................... 51
Mr. Andrew M. Geisse, Chief Information Officer, SBC Services,
Inc.
Oral Statement............................................... 51
Written Statement............................................ 53
Biography.................................................... 56
Financial Disclosure......................................... 57
Discussion....................................................... 58
Appendix: Answers to Post-Hearing Questions
Mr. Donald ``Andy'' Purdy, Jr., Acting Director, National Cyber
Security Division, Department of Homeland Security............. 80
Mr. John S. Leggate, Chief Information Officer and Group Vice
President, Digital & Communications Technology, BP Plc., United
Kingdom........................................................ 91
Mr. David E. Kepler, Corporate Vice President of Shared Services
and Chief Information Officer, The Dow Chemical Company........ 94
Mr. Gerald S. Freese, Director of Enterprise Information
Security, American Electric Power.............................. 97
Mr. Andrew M. Geisse, Chief Information Officer, SBC Services,
Inc............................................................ 100
CYBER SECURITY: U.S. VULNERABILITY AND PREPAREDNESS
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THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 15, 2005
House of Representatives,
Committee on Science,
Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:00 a.m., in Room
2318 of the Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Sherwood L.
Boehlert [Chairman of the Committee] presiding.
hearing charter
COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Cyber Security: U.S. Vulnerability
and Preparedness
thursday, september 15, 2005
10:00 a.m.-12:00 p.m.
2318 rayburn house office building
1. Purpose
On Thursday, September 15, 2005, the House Science Committee will
hold a hearing to examine the extent of U.S. vulnerability to cyber
attacks on critical infrastructure such as utility systems, and what
the Federal Government and private sector are doing, and should be
doing, to prevent and prepare for such attacks. The hearing will also
examine what duties should be given to the new Assistant Secretary for
Cyber Security and Telecommunications at the Department of Homeland
Security.
2. Witnesses
Mr. Donald ``Andy'' Purdy is Acting Director of the National Cyber
Security Division at the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Prior
to joining DHS, he served as senior advisor for Information Technology
Security and Privacy to the President's Critical Infrastructure
Protection Board.
Mr. John Leggate is the Chief Information Officer at BP Inc. (formerly
known as British Petroleum). In addition, he is Chairman of the Chief
Executive Officers' Roundtable on Digital and Cyber Infrastructure
Security at the industry organization Business Executives for National
Security.
Mr. David Kepler is Corporate Vice President of Shared Services and
Chief Information Officer of The Dow Chemical Company. In addition, he
leads the Chemical Sector Cyber Security Information Sharing Forum, an
industry association.
Mr. Gerald Freese is the Director of Enterprise Information Security at
American Electric Power, one of the largest electric utilities in the
United States. He has also been active in the North American Electric
Reliability Council-coordinated development of cyber security standards
for the energy industry.
Mr. Andrew Geisse is the Chief Information Officer of SBC Services Inc.
(formerly Southwestern Bell Corporation), the largest
telecommunications carrier in the United States.
3. Overarching Questions
How do critical infrastructure sectors depend on
public and private information systems? What are the possible
consequences for these sectors of disruption or attack on their
information systems? What steps are being and should be taken
to secure these systems?
What are the most critical responsibilities of the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in cyber security for
critical infrastructure sectors, and what are the most urgent
steps the new Assistant Secretary for Cyber Security and
Telecommunications should take?
In what areas are current cyber security technical
solutions for critical infrastructure sectors inadequate? Where
is further research needed to mitigate existing and emerging
threats and vulnerabilities? How should federal agencies, such
as DHS, the National Science Foundation (NSF), the National
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), and the Defense
Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), and academic
researchers work with industry to define priorities and support
research in these areas?
4. Issues
Is the U.S. adequately protecting critical information systems and is
the U.S. able to detect, respond to, and recover from a cyber attacks
on critical infrastructure?
While industry and the Federal Government have increased their
focus on cyber security in recent years, vulnerabilities remain, and
many experts believe the U.S. needs to do more. An informal survey by a
business group early this year found that in the telecommunications,
energy, chemical, and transportations industries, executives estimated
that 20 to 35 percent of their revenue depends directly on the
Internet. Yet despite the crucial role of information technology, the
vulnerabilities in information technology systems are myriad . About 10
new entries are added each day to the National Vulnerability Database
(maintained by the National Institute of Standards and Technology),
which contains about 12,000 entries describing vulnerabilities in
commonly used information technology products. (Statistics about
attacks on critical infrastructure are hard to obtain because such
attacks are often not reported.)
Is there are clear line of responsibility within the Federal Government
to deal with cyber security?
When DHS was formed in 2002, cyber security responsibilities (other
than research and development) were assigned to the Assistant Secretary
for Infrastructure Protection. Ever since, industry representatives
have repeatedly expressed concern that cyber security has been a
distant second to physical security in DHS's critical infrastructure
protection activities and that the lack of a high-level official
dedicated to cyber security has meant that the Department has failed to
devote attention and resources to cyber security. In May 2005, the
Government Accountability Office (GAO) found that DHS was having
trouble with a number of its cyber responsibilities, including
developing national cyber threat and vulnerability assessments and
government/industry contingency recovery plans for cyber security,
establishing effective partnerships with stakeholders, and achieving
two-way information sharing with these stakeholders. (The summary of
this report is included in Attachment A.) In response to Congressional
and industry concerns, the Secretary of Homeland Security created in
July the new position of Assistant Secretary for Cyber Security and
Telecommunications to bring a higher profile to this area and high
level attention to these problems. The position has not yet been
filled.
Are private companies doing enough to secure their information systems?
To what extent are they coordinating with each other and the Federal
Government on cyber security?
The record is mixed. For many companies, it can be difficult to
quantify the risks associated with their dependence on information
systems and hence difficult to justify investment in cyber security. In
other cases, the relevant cyber security technologies may not be
available. In many industries, companies have undertaken cyber security
activities within industry organizations to set standards, share best
practices, and work with information technology companies to improve
the security of information systems and increase their cyber security
options. (The companies testifying have generally been leaders in
taking cyber security seriously.) In some cases, cyber security work
has been hampered by the problems in the Federal Government described
above. Industry groups have indicated that they do not yet trust the
processes for sharing sensitive information related to their cyber
security with the government and have not yet been convinced of the
value of information and services DHS would provide in return.
What should the priorities be for federal cyber security research and
development programs? Is funding for these programs adequate?
Recommended areas for federal cyber security research in general
were outlined in the recent report\1\ of the President's Information
Technology Advisory Committee (PITAC) and include monitoring and
detection technologies, software quality assurance processes,
authentication techniques, mitigation and recovery technologies, and
metrics, benchmarks, and best practices. The PITAC report recommended
substantial increases in funding at the National Science Foundation
(NSF), DHS, and the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA).
(Currently, funding for cyber security research programs at NSF and the
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) is well below the
levels authorized in the Cyber Security Research and Development Act.)
The Cyber Security Industry Alliance, an association of cyber security
software, hardware and services companies, the Internet Security
Alliance, an association of information security users from sectors
such as banking, insurance, and manufacturing, and the Information
Technology Association of America, a trade association of the
information technology industry, have all also publicly recommended
increased federal funding for cyber security research and development.
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\1\ The President's Information Technology Advisory Committee
released their report, Cyber Security: A Crisis of Prioritization, on
March 18, 2005. It is available on line at http://www.nitrd.gov/pitac/
reports/20050301-cybersecurity/cybersecurity.pdf.
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5. Brief Overview
Critical infrastructure\2\ sectors include electric
power generation and transmission, oil and gas production and
distribution, communications, chemicals, food production,
banking and finance, transportation systems, and water
processing systems. These sectors are increasingly dependent on
information systems to administer business operations (such as
billing and supply chain management) and to monitor and control
physical operations (such as manufacturing processes and
distribution systems).
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\2\ As defined in the USA PATRIOT Act (P.L. 107-56), critical
infrastructure is ``systems and assets, whether physical or virtual, so
vital to the United States that the incapacity or destruction of such
systems and assets would have a debilitating impact on security,
national economic security, national public health and safety, or any
combination of those matters.'' This definition is used broadly
throughout the Federal Government.
As reliance on information technology grows, the
number of ways that critical infrastructure systems can be
interfered with and the extent of disruption or damage that can
be created via such interference is also growing. In addition,
the potential impact of a combined physical and cyber attack on
a critical facility--e.g., using disruption of information
systems to interfere with response and recovery after an
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explosion--would be severe.
Some cyber security products and techniques (such as
firewalls, intrusion detection systems, and virus-protection
checks) can be used to safeguard many types of standard
information systems (e.g., protecting billing systems and
customer databases). However, specialized information
technology products are often used to manage and control
critical infrastructure facilities. These process control
systems often use customized or older hardware and software and
have different performance requirements and hence may require
specialized security solutions and strategies.
In May 2005, GAO assessed the DHS role in cyber
critical infrastructure protection and found that DHS was
having trouble with a number of its cyber responsibilities,
including developing national cyber threat and vulnerability
assessments and government/industry contingency recovery plans
for cyber security (including a plan for recovering key
Internet functions), establishing effective partnerships with
stakeholders, and achieving two-way information sharing with
these stakeholders.
In response to stakeholder and Congressional concerns
that DHS needed to make information security, particularly
information security for critical infrastructure sectors, a
higher priority, the Secretary of Homeland Security announced
in July 2005 that the Department would create a new position of
Assistant Secretary for Cyber Security and Telecommunications.
This new position will have responsibility for identifying and
assessing the vulnerability of critical telecommunications
infrastructure and assets, providing timely and usable threat
information, and leading the national response to cyber and
telecommunications attacks.
In information technology systems, new
vulnerabilities and new threats emerge regularly and spread
quickly. Cyber security research programs supported by the
Federal Government and the private sector develop tools that
provide security in the current environment, as well as produce
the defenses against the next generation of cyber security
risks. Following passage of the Cyber Security Research and
Development Act in 2002, funding for National Science
Foundation programs in this area has increased; however, at the
same time the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency funding
for unclassified research in cyber security has dropped
significantly. Other federal cyber security research and
development programs exist, particularly at DHS and at the
National Institute of Standards and Technology, but these are
relatively small.
6. Background
Critical Infrastructure Sectors and Information Security
Critical infrastructure, as defined in the USA PATRIOT Act, is
``systems and assets, whether physical or virtual, so vital to the
United States that the incapacity or destruction of such systems and
assets would have a debilitating impact on security, national economic
security, national public health and safety, or any combination of
those matters.'' Examples of critical infrastructure include electric
power generation and transmission, oil and gas production and
distribution, communications, chemicals, agriculture and food
processing, banking and finance, transportation systems, and water
processing systems. Because of its vital role in the U.S. security,
economy, and quality of life, the elements of the U.S. critical
infrastructure are a potential target for terrorists, who could use
physical or cyber attacks to interfere with, disrupt, damage, or
destroy important facilities and capabilities.
Industry is increasingly dependent on information technology for
both business operations and process controls, and many of these
information systems directly use, or are accessible through, public
systems (e.g., the Internet) and technologies (e.g., Wi-Fi and common
operating systems). Yet the Internet was not designed with security in
mind.
Control systems (systems that run manufacturing and distribution
facilities) raise different security issues than do the business/
administrative systems. It is harder to shut the control systems down
to make changes in software or hardware because doing so means shutting
down an industrial operation, such as chemical manufacturing or
electricity generation. In addition, the control systems operate
equipment that represents a major capital expense and that is replaced
or upgraded less frequently than are business systems. As a result,
security fixes to control systems often require retrofitting, rather
than just waiting for equipment to be replaced. Finally, while business
systems (for activities like billing) are relatively similar across
industries, the control systems generally use specialized protocols and
configurations specific to a particular industry. As a result,
customized security solutions and strategies, including specialized
testing, need to be developed.
Industry responses to cyber vulnerability has depended on: (1) the
type of information systems used in the sector, (2) how clear the risks
associated with cyber attacks are, (3) what the value and return on
investment in cyber security would be, (4) the availability of relevant
cyber security technologies, and (5) (sometimes) what governmental
action has been taken or is perceived as having the potential to be
taken. For example, the financial and banking industries were very
aggressive in adopting information security technologies, due in part
to the fact that technologies to protect information and communications
(the primary need in this area) have been a focus of cyber security
development efforts for a long time because the extent of the
vulnerability was very clear.
In other industries, there are a variety of cyber security-focused
activities underway. In the electric power industry, the North American
Electric Reliability Council (an industry coordination group) recently
developed and adopted an interim cyber security standard that outlines
minimum requirements needed to ensure the security of electronic
exchange of information needed to support grid reliability and market
operations; work on a permanent standard is underway. In addition,
Congress has focused attention on cyber security as a key element of
ensuring electric reliability and drinking water safety. The
Environmental Protection Agency has worked with the industry on
understanding how their water processing facilities depend on
information systems and what risks that creates.
The chemical sector has developed a Chemical Sector Cyber Security
Program, which is building on existing cooperative industry groups to
carry out cyber security-specific activities. A sector-wide cyber
security strategy was organized in 2002, and activities currently
underway include work on establishing management practices, guidelines,
and standards, on information sharing, and on encouraging accelerated
development of improved security technologies. In addition, the
chemical sector companies involved with the program support legislation
that will establish national security guidelines for chemical
facilities, require companies to conduct site vulnerability assessments
and implement security plans, and create strong enforcement authority
to help ensure facilities and systems are secure.
In addition to specific cyber security activities, all critical
infrastructure sectors have Information Sharing and Analysis Centers
(ISACs), which provide a forum for companies to exchange, analyze and
disseminate information about vulnerabilities, threats, and incidents
in a trusted environment. (The establishment of ISACs was mainly a
response to Presidential Decision Directive 63 (issued in 1998), which
encouraged industry to form such groups. Each ISAC has a different
structure and relationship with the government, depending on the
specific industry's needs, history, and regulatory environment.) In
general, discussion of cyber security issues are considered an
important element of ISAC-based interactions, and cross-sector
discussions of cyber security issues are coordinated by the information
technology sector's ISAC.
Department of Homeland Security Cyber Security Activities and
Responsibilities
Cyber security activities at DHS are carried out in two
directorates: the National Cyber Security Division (NCSD), located in
the Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Directorate, is
responsible for operational cyber security; and the Science and
Technology Directorate is responsible for cyber security research and
development programs.
Operational Cyber Security at DHS
After the recently completed department-wide Second Stage Review,
the Secretary of Homeland Security has proposed and begun to implement
a number of organizational changes, including the creation of an
Assistant Secretary for Cyber Security and Telecommunications position.
This office will be responsible for identifying and assessing the
vulnerability of critical telecommunications infrastructure and assets,
providing timely and usable threat information, and leading the
national response to cyber and telecommunications attacks. (To date,
the NCSD has reported to the existing Assistant Secretary for
Infrastructure Protection; going forward, the new Assistant Secretary
will be parallel to this position.\3\ )
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\3\ The new Assistant Secretary for Cyber Security and
Telecommunications will be Presidentially appointed, but not Senate
confirmed. The new position was announced on July 13, 2005, but as of
the date of this hearing an appointment had not yet been made.
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The responsibilities of the NCSD are defined by several documents,
including the National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace, Homeland Security
Presidential Directive 7 (HSPD-7) on Critical Infrastructure
Identification, Prioritization, and Protection,\4\ the Interim National
Infrastructure Protection Plan, and the National Response Plan. In
FY06, $73 million was requested for NCSD, a $6 million increase from
the level appropriated for FY05. The NCSD's mission, as defined in
HSPD-7, includes analysis, warning, information sharing, vulnerability
reduction, mitigation, and aiding national recovery efforts for
critical infrastructure information systems.\5\ Currently, within these
broad goals, three areas of particular concern and focus for NCSD in
the area of critical infrastructure protection are (1) strategies to
improve the resiliency of the Internet against disruption, (2)
improving the security of control systems, and (3) improving software
assurance (trying to move from patch management to systems that
emphasize security as software is being developed).
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\4\ Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7 (HSPD-7) on Critical
Infrastructure Identification, Prioritization, and Protection is
available on line at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/12/
20031217-5.html.
\5\ To meet its responsibilities from HSPD-7, as well as other
national strategies and plans, NCSD has defined for itself six core
goals: (1) establish a National Cyber Security Response System to
prevent, detect, respond to, and reconstitute rapidly after cyber
incidents; (2) work with public and private sectors to reduce
vulnerabilities and minimize the severity of cyber attacks; (3) promote
a comprehensive national awareness program to empower American
businesses, the general workforce, and the general population to secure
their own parts of cyberspace; (4) foster adequate training and
education programs to support the Nation's cyber security needs; (5)
coordinate with the intelligence and law enforcement communities to
identify and reduce threats to cyberspace; and (6) build a world-class
organization that aggressively advances its cyber security mission and
goals in partnership with its public and private stakeholders.
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One of the most important activities of NCSD is coordination with
the private sector on efforts to reduce vulnerabilities and minimize
the severity of cyber attacks. Information sharing is necessary to
ensure awareness of vulnerabilities, and ways to mitigate
vulnerabilities, awareness of threats and attack methods, and
preparedness for response and recovery. Companies are expected to be a
source of information about what problems they are experiencing and
what solutions have been effective, while the government (primarily via
DHS) is expected to be a source of information about threats. Both
government and industry acknowledge that information sharing needs to
be improved. Industry has been reluctant to share sensitive information
incidents. In addition, it has been unclear whether DHS has developed
the policies or attracted the expertise to ensure the confidentiality
of sensitive information and to provide reliable analysis and feedback
about threats and potential solutions.
A variety of activities are underway in the NCSD to carry out its
mission. These include the U.S. Computer Emergency Readiness Team (US-
CERT), which was established in 2003 as a partnership between DHS and
the public and private sectors. US-CERT is responsible for analyzing
and reducing cyber threats and vulnerabilities, disseminating cyber
threat warning information, and coordinating incident response
activities. Another key NCSD activity is organizing exercises to test
preparedness and response plans for cyber attack. The next such
exercise is scheduled for November 2005 and will include public and
private sector participants, including companies from the energy,
financial, and transportation sectors.
Cyber Security Research and Development at DHS
Research and development related to cyber security are the
responsibility of the DHS Science and Technology Directorate. In FY06,
$16.7 million was requested for the cyber security programs in the
Science and Technology Directorate, a $1.3 million decrease from the
level appropriated for FY05. Specific programs focus on improving the
security of Internet communication protocols and developing
technologies to enhance the cyber security of critical infrastructure
sectors, including of process control systems. Support and coordination
is also provided for the collection of large-scale data sets about
network behavior that researchers can use to better understand problems
with networks and design potential solutions. Testbeds are also a
critical element of DHS Science and Technology Directorate cyber
security programs. They provide support for and participate in the NSF-
funded Defense Technology Experimental Research (DETER) testbed
(described below). They also work with the Department of Energy (at
Sandia and Idaho National Laboratories) to support a control systems
testbed, which is critical for design and verification of security
technologies for control system applications. Since these systems often
operate with real-time consequences and continuously or almost
continuously, any security solution must be designed for the
configuration in which the equipment and software is used and
rigorously tested in realistic situations.
Cyber Security at Other Government Agencies and Interagency
Coordination
Operational Cyber Security
Each critical infrastructure sector is associated with a lead
government agency. For some sectors (e.g., chemicals, transportation
systems, information technology and telecommunications), the lead
agency is DHS, but for many other sectors, another agency is the lead
(e.g., the Department of Energy for the electric power and oil and gas
sectors, the Environmental Protection Agency for water treatment
facilities, the Department of the Treasury for banking and finance, and
the Department of Agriculture for the food sector). However, HSPD-7,
the 2003 Presidential Directive that designated the lead agencies, also
clearly articulated that DHS would continue to maintain an organization
to serve as a focal point for the security of cyberspace. For example,
DHS, the Department of Defense (DOD), and the Department of Justice co-
chair the interagency National Cyber Response Coordination Group. In
addition to coordinating with other agencies on the cyber security of
critical infrastructure facilities, DHS also works with the Office of
Management and Budget, which has significant responsibilities for the
security of the Federal Government's information systems.
Cyber Security Research and Development Programs
Significant cyber security research and development programs are
underway in a variety of federal agencies, including the National
Science Foundation (NSF), the National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST), and the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
(DARPA). The programs at NSF and NIST were authorized by the Cyber
Security Research and Development Act (P.L. 107-305).
At NSF, cyber security research is conducted under the auspices of
the Cyber Trust program, which supports projects designed to make
networked computer systems more predictable, more accountable, and less
vulnerable to attack and abuse. This program is funded at $65 million
in FY05, and the projects supported cover a wide variety of information
security areas. Critical infrastructure applications are included; in
August 2005, NSF provided funding to a new center at the University of
Illinois to perform research to support the design, construction and
validation of a secure cyberinfrastructure for the next-generation
electric power grid. (Both the Department of Energy and DHS have
pledged to collaborate with NSF to fund and manage this effort.)
Another relevant project is the Cyber Defense Technology Experimental
Research (DETER) testbed, which provides an experimental environment in
which government, academic, and industry cyber security researchers can
safely analyze and measure attacks and develop attack mitigation and
confinement strategies. (DHS also provides some funding for DETER.)
These research and testbeds projects also have educational elements, as
the laboratories supported by those funds become centers of expertise
in information systems for critical infrastructure and train the
personnel that critical infrastructure companies and information
technology companies need to improve the security of critical
infrastructure sector applications. In addition to its cyber security
research programs, NSF also supports cyber security education
activities, including scholarships and curriculum development (these
programs received $16 million in FY05).
At NIST, cyber security activities are centered in the Computer
Security Division, which was funded at $19 million in FY05. The
division's activities include developing standards, metrics, tests,
guidelines, and validation programs related to information security and
studying and raising awareness of information technology risks,
vulnerabilities, and protection requirements. NIST also has specific
responsibilities under the Federal Information Security Management Act
of 2002 for developing standards for federal information systems
security and supporting federal agencies' cyber security efforts. An
example of a recent NIST cyber security project (supported by DHS) is
the August 2005 launch of the National Vulnerability Database, which
contains about 12,000 entries describing vulnerabilities in commonly-
used information technology products. (About 10 new entries are added
each day.) The database integrates all publicly available U.S.
Government vulnerability resources and is designed to provide
references to industry resources.
A number of other agencies, mainly in DOD, have cyber security
research and development activities. The DOD activities focus mainly on
specific information assurance requirements related to DOD's military
and intelligence missions. The Department of Energy's programs are
focused primarily on applications related to the energy and electric
power sectors (as in the work on control systems testbeds at Department
of Energy laboratories described above).
All of these programs are coordinated through the National Science
and Technology Council's (NSTC's) Interagency Working Group on Critical
Information Infrastructure Protection Research and Development. In
response to recommendations from the President's Information Technology
Advisory Committee, this interagency group has recently been
reformulated to report to both the NSTC Subcommittee on Infrastructure
and its Subcommittee on Networking and Information Technology Research
and Development. This group has recently begun work on defining top
cyber security research and development needs and mapping those needs
against current federal activities.
7. Witness Questions
Questions for Mr. Andy Purdy:
How do critical infrastructure sectors depend on
public and private information systems? What are the possible
consequences for these sectors of disruption or attack on their
information systems? What steps is DHS taking to help these
sectors secure their systems?
How does DHS work with the critical infrastructure
sectors to gather and communicate information about threats,
risks, and solutions related to cyber security?
In what areas are current cyber security technical
solutions for critical infrastructure applications inadequate?
Where is further research needed to mitigate existing and
emerging threats and vulnerabilities? How is DHS working with
industry and academic researchers to define priorities for and
support research in these areas? How does DHS coordinate these
efforts within DHS and with other federal agencies, such as
NSF, NIST, and DARPA?
Questions for Mr. John Leggate:
How does the energy sector depend on public and
private information systems? What are the possible consequences
for the energy sector of disruption or attack on its
information systems? What steps is BP taking to secure its
systems?
What are the most critical responsibilities of DHS in
cyber security for the energy sector and what are the most
urgent steps the new Assistant Secretary for Cyber Security and
Telecommunications should take?
In what areas are current cyber security technical
solutions for the energy sector inadequate? Where is further
research needed to mitigate existing and emerging threats and
vulnerabilities? How should federal agencies, such as DHS, NSF,
NIST, and DARPA, and academic researchers work with industry to
define priorities for and support research in these areas?
Questions for Mr. David Kepler:
How does the chemical sector depend on public and
private information systems? What are the possible consequences
for the chemical sector of disruption or attack on its
information systems? What steps is Dow taking to secure its
systems?
What are the most critical responsibilities of DHS in
cyber security for the chemical sector and what are the most
urgent steps the new Assistant Secretary for Cyber Security and
Telecommunications should take?
In what areas are current cyber security technical
solutions for the chemical sector inadequate? Where is further
research needed to mitigate existing and emerging threats and
vulnerabilities? How should federal agencies, such as DHS, NSF,
NIST, and DARPA, and academic researchers work with industry to
define priorities for and support research in these areas?
Questions for Mr. Gerald Freese:
How does the electric power sector depend on public
and private information systems? What are the possible
consequences for the electric power sector of disruption or
attack on its information systems? What steps is American
Electric Power taking to secure its systems?
What are the most critical responsibilities of DHS in
cyber security for the electric power sector and what are the
most urgent steps the new Assistant Secretary for Cyber
Security and Telecommunications should take?
In what areas are current cyber security technical
solutions for the electric power sector inadequate? Where is
further research needed to mitigate existing and emerging
threats and vulnerabilities? How should federal agencies, such
as DHS, NSF, NIST, and DARPA, and academic researchers work
with industry to define priorities for and support research in
these areas?
Questions for Mr. Andrew Geisse:
How does the communications sector depend on public
and private information systems? What are the possible
consequences for the communications sector of disruption or
attack on its information systems? What steps is SBC taking to
secure its systems?
What are the most critical responsibilities of DHS in
cyber security for the communications sector and what are the
most urgent steps the new Assistant Secretary for Cyber
Security and Telecommunications should take?
In what areas are current cyber security technical
solutions for the communications sector inadequate? Where is
further research needed to mitigate existing and emerging
threats and vulnerabilities? How should federal agencies, such
as DHS, NSF, NIST, and DARPA, and academic researchers work
with industry to define priorities for and support research in
these areas?
Attachment A
Critical Infrastructure Protection: Department of Homeland Security
Faces Challenges in Fulfilling Cyber Security Responsibilities
Government Accountability Office Report GAO-05-434
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05434.pdf
Excerpt: Results in Brief
As the focal point for critical infrastructure protection, DHS has
many cyber security-related roles and responsibilities that are called
for in law and policy. These responsibilities include developing plans,
building partnerships, and improving information sharing, as well as
implementing activities related to the five priorities in the national
cyberspace strategy: (1) developing and enhancing national cyber
analysis and warning, (2) reducing cyberspace threats and
vulnerabilities, (3) promoting awareness of and training in security
issues, (4) securing governments' cyberspace, and (5) strengthening
national security and international cyberspace security cooperation. To
fulfill its cyber security role, in June 2003, DHS established the
National Cyber Security Division to serve as a national focal point for
addressing cyber security and coordinating the implementation of cyber
security efforts.
While DHS has initiated multiple efforts, it has not fully
addressed any of the 13 key cyber security-related responsibilities
that we identified in federal law and policy, and it has much work
ahead in order to be able to fully address them. For example, DHS (1)
has recently issued the Interim National Infrastructure Protection
Plan, which includes cyber security elements; (2) operates the United
States Computer Emergency Readiness Team to address the need for a
national analysis and warning capability; and (3) has established
forums to foster information sharing among federal officials with
information security responsibilities and among various law enforcement
entities. However, DHS has not yet developed national threat and
vulnerability assessments or developed and exercised government and
government/industry contingency recovery plans for cyber security,
including a plan for recovering key Internet functions. Further, DHS
continues to have difficulties in developing partnerships--as called
for in federal policy--with other federal agencies, State and local
governments, and the private sector.
DHS faces a number of challenges that have impeded its ability to
fulfill its cyber CIP responsibilities. Key challenges include
achieving organizational stability; gaining organizational authority;
overcoming hiring and contracting issues; increasing awareness about
cyber security roles and capabilities; establishing effective
partnerships with stakeholders (other federal agencies, State and local
governments, and the private sector); achieving two-way information
sharing with these stakeholders; and demonstrating the value DHS can
provide. In its strategic plan for cyber security, DHS has identified
steps that can begin to address these challenges. However, until it
effectively confronts and resolves these underlying challenges, DHS
will have difficulty achieving significant results in strengthening the
cyber security of our nation's critical infrastructures, and our nation
will lack the strong cyber security focal point envisioned in federal
law and policy.
We are making recommendations to the Secretary of Homeland Security
to strengthen the Department's ability to implement key cyber security
responsibilities by completing critical activities and resolving
underlying challenges.
DHS provided written comments on a draft of this report (see app.
III). In brief, DHS agreed that strengthening cyber security is central
to protecting the Nation's critical infrastructures and that much
remains to be done. In addition, DHS concurred with our recommendation
to engage stakeholders in prioritizing its key cyber security
responsibilities. However, DHS did not concur with our recommendations
to identify and prioritize initiatives to address the challenges it
faces, or to establish performance metrics and milestones for these
initiatives. Specifically, DHS reported that its strategic plan for
cyber security already provides a prioritized list, performance
measures, and milestones to guide and track its activities. The
department sought additional clarification of these recommendations.
While we agree with DHS that its plan identifies activities (along with
some performance measures and milestones) that will begin to address
the challenges, this plan does not include specific initiatives that
would ensure that the challenges are addressed in a prioritized and
comprehensive manner. For example, the strategic plan for cyber
security does not include initiatives to help stabilize and build
authority for the organization. Further, the strategic plan does not
identify the relative priority of its initiatives and does not
consistently identify performance measures for completing its
initiatives.
As DHS moves forward in identifying initiatives to address the
underlying challenges it faces, it will be important to establish
performance measures and milestones for fulfilling these initiatives.
DHS officials (as well as others who were quoted in our report)
also provided detailed technical corrections, which we have
incorporated in this report as appropriate.
Chairman Boehlert. The Committee will come to order.
Before we proceed with today's hearing, the Committee must
first dispense, very briefly, with some administrative
business.
I recognize Mr. Gordon to offer a request regarding
Democratic subcommittee membership.
Mr. Gordon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
By direction of the Democratic caucus of the Science
Committee, I ask unanimous consent to ratify the election of
Representative Dennis Moore of Kansas to the Subcommittee on
Research, thereby filling one of the existing Democratic
vacancies.
Chairman Boehlert. Without objection, so ordered.
That concludes the Committee's organizational business.
And we will now proceed with the hearing.
And incidentally, I can't imagine any hearing any place on
this Hill, including what our colleagues in the Senate are
doing with the Roberts nomination, that exceeds the importance
of the topic being discussed here today. And I am so
appreciative of the witnesses who have agreed to share with us
and enlighten us on a very important subject matter. And I want
you to know how much we welcome your appearance, because you
are facilitators. We learn from you. We like to think all
Members of Congress, we are all alike. We like to think we have
got all of the answers. We don't even know some of the
questions. But I do know this, that cyber security is
critically important. And what we are about today takes us
further down the path of dealing in a responsible way with this
very important subject.
So I want to welcome everyone to this morning's hearing on
cyber security, a subject that has long been the focus of the
Science Committee.
The Nation has been making progress in developing ways to
fend off and respond to cyber attacks. For example, federal
agencies have been implementing our Cyber Security Research and
Development Act, and when I say ``our,'' I say it proudly. That
is the result of this committee's work, albeit at funding
levels significantly below what we would wish, and quite
frankly, what is needed.
Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff, responding to
calls from industry and the Congress, has created the position
of Assistant Secretary for Cyber Security. But as our witnesses
today will make clear, we still have a very long way to go. We
still pay inadequate attention to cyber security research
operations in both the government and private sector. We
shouldn't have to wait for the cyber equivalent of Hurricane
Katrina to realize that we are inadequately prepared to
prevent, detect, and respond to cyber attacks. And a cyber
attack can affect a far larger area at a single stroke than can
any hurricane. Not only that, given the increasing reliance of
critical infrastructures on the Internet, a cyber attack could
result in deaths as well as in massive, massive disruption to
our economy and daily life.
There is another lesson we should take from Katrina beyond
the need to prepare for real dangers that have not been
recently experienced, and that is not to focus exclusively on
terrorism. Cyber attacks could occur from any number of sources
and motivations, even from error, not just from foreign or
domestic terrorists who would do us harm.
So our goal this morning is to help develop a cyber
security agenda for the Federal Government, especially to
provide assistance for the new Assistant Secretary. I never
want to sit on a special committee set up to investigate why we
were unprepared for a cyber attack. We know we are vulnerable.
It is time to act.
And I look forward to hearing from our witnesses and the
guidance that they might give us to do just that.
With that, I am pleased to recognize my partner, my
colleague, my friend, Mr. Gordon from Tennessee.
[The prepared statement of Chairman Boehlert follows:]
Prepared Statement of Chairman Sherwood L. Boehlert
I want to welcome everyone to this morning's hearing on cyber
security, a subject that has long been a focus of the Science
Committee.
The Nation has been making progress in developing ways to fend off
and respond to cyber attacks. For example, federal agencies have been
implementing our Cyber Security Research and Development Act, albeit at
funding levels significantly below what we would wish. Homeland
Security Secretary Michael Chertoff, responding to calls from industry
and the Congress, has created the position of Assistant Secretary for
Cyber Security.
But as our witnesses today will make clear, we still have a very
long way to go. We still pay inadequate attention to cyber security
research and operations in both the government and private sector.
We shouldn't have to wait for the cyber equivalent of a Hurricane
Katrina--or even and Hurricane Ophelia might serve--to realize that we
are inadequately prepared to prevent, detect and respond to cyber
attacks.
And a cyber attack can affect a far larger area at a single stroke
that can any hurricane. Not only that, given the increasing reliance of
critical infrastructures on the Internet, a cyber attack could result
in deaths as well as in massive disruption to the economy and daily
life.
There's another lesson we should take from Katrina beyond the need
to prepare for real dangers that have not been recently experienced.
And that is not to focus exclusively on terrorism. Cyber attacks could
occur from any number of sources and motivations--even from error--not
just from foreign or domestic terrorists.
So our goal this morning is to help develop a cyber security agenda
for the Federal Government, especially for the new Assistant Secretary.
I never want to have to sit on a special committee set up to
investigate why we were unprepared for a cyber attack. We know we are
vulnerable, it's time to act.
I look forward to hearing our witnesses' guidance on how to do just
that.
Mr. Gordon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
As usual, I want to concur with your remarks, particularly
in context to the urgency and the seriousness of this issue.
Today's hearing has two important purposes: to assess the
progress in improving the security of computer systems on which
critical industries rely, and to explore why progress has been
so slow.
Networked information systems are key components of many of
the Nation's critical infrastructures, including electrical
power distribution, banking, finance, water supply, and
telecommunications.
Computer system vulnerabilities persist worldwide, and the
initiators of random cyber attacks that plague the Internet
remain largely unknown.
But we know that many international terrorist groups now
actively use computers and the Internet to communicate, and
they are clearly capable of developing or acquiring the
technical skills to direct a coordinated attack against
networked computers in the United States.
The disruptions and economic damages that could result from
a successful cyber attack to one or more of our critical
infrastructures could be substantial. And damage to water
supply systems or to the chemical processing plants, for
example, could also create life-threatening consequences.
Following the events of 9/11, ensuring that security of
critical infrastructure has become a national priority, but
progress in securing the cyber infrastructure has simply been
too slow.
A presidential directive from the Clinton Administration,
PDD-63, instituted policies and established a new organization
to improve the Nation's ability to detect and respond to cyber
attacks, including mechanisms to improve communications between
the public and the private sectors regarding cyber security
matters. Subsequently, the new Department of Homeland Security
was charged to be the government's focal point for cyber
security.
And yet, in a report released this summer, GAO found that
the Department of Homeland Security has not yet developed
national cyber threat and vulnerability assessments or
government/industry contingencies to recovery plans for cyber
security. This is simply not good enough.
Recent events make all too clear that inadequate recovery
plans, either by design or execution, have dire consequences
for the citizens' health and well being. Inaction can be an
enemy just as lethal as terrorists.
GAO stressed that to be successful in meeting its
responsibilities, the Department will need to achieve
organizational stability for cyber security activities,
including the elevation of its function within the Department.
In addition, GAO indicates the Department must work to
develop effective partnerships with stakeholders, and then
achieve two-way information sharing with those stakeholders.
Today, we have an opportunity to hear from some of those
stakeholders about what is being done within their industry
sectors--to improve cyber security, where they now stand, and
what could be done to accelerate progress.
I am interested in hearing about their relationship to and
interactions with the Department of Homeland Security and in
their views on how the government can be more effective in
achieving the overall goal of cyber security for critical
infrastructures.
We need to understand what the fundamental impediments are
to securing cyberspace and to take appropriate action to
overcome them.
And let me just conclude by saying this. As I was reviewing
the briefing material for this hearing, it is inevitable that
you look at it in context to Katrina. And some might say,
``Well, the financial services, you know, if a bank in New
Orleans or electrical power or a telecommunication outfit has
several pipes that burst and they are flooded, well, you know,
at least an inconvenience, but the private sector will come in
and, through competition, will take care of those customers.''
But what if all of the banks, what if all of the power
systems go out of order? Well, it goes beyond just being a
regional concern. It becomes a national concern. It means
heartache and distraughtness for those individuals there, but
for the American public, it means a big bill. We are spending
$200 billion or more to clean up the mess from Katrina.
You know, I don't want to see, as the Chairman said, you
know, I don't want to be here at a hearing later on saying,
``What went wrong? And how can we improve this thing?'' I mean,
the fact of the matter is that when the price of gas is stable,
you know, nobody is really complaining, but when it spikes up
and again, this is a private sector matter--but when it spikes
up, the public says, ``Where are the bums in Washington? What
are you doing?''
Well, you know, we want to get in front of this. And quite
frankly, after four years of Homeland Security working on this
problem, we are not where we need to be, and we are not where
we should be. I hope that this will be an impetus today to
change that and to move that forward.
And so with that, Mr. Chairman, I again join you in
welcoming these witnesses. This is an important hearing, and I
look forward to moving forward with it.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Gordon follows:]
Prepared Statement of Representative Bart Gordon
Today's hearing has two important purposes: To assess progress in
improving the security of computer systems on which critical industries
rely and to explore why progress has been so slow.
Networked information systems are key components of many of the
Nation's critical infrastructures, including electric power
distribution, banking and finance, water supply, and
telecommunications.
Computer system vulnerabilities persist worldwide, and the
initiators of random cyber attacks that plague the Internet remain
largely unknown.
But we know that many international terrorist groups now actively
use computers and the Internet to communicate, and they are clearly
capable of developing or acquiring the technical skills to direct a
coordinated attack against networked computers in the United States.
The disruptions and economic damages that could result from a
successful cyber attack to one or more of our critical infrastructures
could be substantial. And damage to water supply systems or to chemical
processing plants, for example, could also create life threatening
consequences.
Following the events of 9/11, ensuring the security of critical
infrastructures has become a national priority, but progress in
securing the cyber infrastructure has simply been too slow.
A presidential directive from the Clinton Administration, PDD-63,
instituted policies and established new organizations to improve the
Nation's ability to detect and respond to cyber attacks, including
mechanisms to improve communication between the public and private
sectors regarding cyber security matters. Subsequently, the new
Department of Homeland Security was charged to be the government's
focal point for cyber security.
And yet, in a report released this summer, GAO found that the
Department of Homeland Security has not yet developed national cyber
threat and vulnerability assessments or government/industry contingency
recovery plans for cyber security. This is simply not good enough.
Recent events make all too clear that inadequate recovery plans,
either by design or execution, have dire consequences for the health
and well being of our citizens. Inaction can be an enemy just as lethal
as terrorists.
GAO stresses that to be successful in meeting its responsibilities,
the Department will need to achieve organizational stability for cyber
security activities, including an elevation of this function within the
Department.
In addition, GAO indicates the Department must work to develop
effective partnerships with stakeholders, and then achieve two-way
information sharing with these stakeholders.
Today, we have an opportunity to hear from some of the stakeholders
about what is being done within their industry sectors to improve cyber
security, where they now stand, and what could be done to accelerate
progress.
I am interested in hearing about their relationship to and
interactions with the Department of Homeland Security and in their
views on how the government can be more effective in achieving the
overall goal of cyber security for critical infrastructures.
We need to understand what the fundamental impediments are to
securing cyber space and to take appropriate action to overcome them.
Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you for calling this hearing, and I
look forward to our discussion with the panel.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Costello follows:]
Prepared Statement of Representative Jerry F. Costello
Good morning. I want to thank the witnesses for appearing before
our committee to examine the current state of cyber security, how
various critical infrastructure sectors depend on information systems,
and what is and should be done to secure these systems. In addition, I
am pleased today's hearing will also explore the respective roles of
the Federal Government and private sector with respect to cyber
security.
Certain socio-economic activities are vital to the day-to-day
functioning and security of the country; for example, transportation of
goods and people, communications, banking and finance, and the supply
and distribution of electricity and water. Domestic security and our
ability to monitor, deter, and respond to outside acts also depend on
some of these activities as well as other more specialized activities
like intelligence gathering and command and control of police and
military forces. A serious disruption in these activities and
capabilities could have a major impact on the country's well-being.
Even before the terrorist attacks of September 2001, concerns had
been rising among security experts about the vulnerabilities to attack
of computer systems and associated infrastructure. Yet, despite
increasing attention from Federal and State governments and
international organizations, the defense against attacks on these
systems has appeared to be generally fragmented and varying widely in
effectiveness. Concerns have grown that what is needed is a national
cyber security framework--a coordinated, coherent set of public- and
private-sector efforts required to ensure an acceptable level of cyber
security for the Nation.
While industry and the Federal Government have increased their
focus on cyber security in recent years, vulnerabilities remain,
despite passage of the Cyber Security Research and Development Act. The
bill authorized $903 million over five years for new federal programs
to ensure that the U.S. is better prepared to prevent and combat
terrorist attacks on private and government computers. The legislation
was developed following a series of post-September 11, 2001 Science
Committee hearings on the emerging cyber terrorist threat and the lack
of a coordinated U.S. response. Despite this legislative and
programmatic initiative, our computer and communications networks, upon
which the country's economic and critical infrastructures for finance,
transportation, energy and water distribution, and health and emergency
services depend, are still among the Nation's vulnerabilities.
Valid concerns remain that the U.S. is still not appropriately
organized and prepared to counter and respond to cyber security.
Multiple federal agencies, as well as institutions of higher education
and the private sector, have critical roles to play; yet, no enactment
of or planning for the National Strategy has occurred and coordination
is was lacking among agencies as they developed their research and
development budget requests for FY 2006. The absence of a clear
advocate for cyber security at the Department of Homeland Security,
coupled with the multiple senior DHS cyber security officials leaving
the department sends a clear signal to Congress that the National Cyber
Security Division does not have enough authority to work effectively
with the private sector. I am aware that legislation has been proposed
to elevate the head of the cyber security office to the assistant
secretary level to give cyber security more visibility within DHS and
to allow higher level input to national policy decisions, and consider
this a positive step in the right direction.
I again thank the witnesses for being with us today and providing
testimony to our committee.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Johnson follows:]
Prepared Statement of Representative Eddie Bernice Johnson
Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member, I am pleased that the Science
Committee is discussing our nation's cyber security today.
I appreciate each guest being here today. You all are uniquely
qualified to speak about how well our infrastructure and policies are
set up to handle disruptions or attacks on critical information
systems.
Every year, the world relies more heavily on information
technology. We view our banking accounts over the Internet, we apply
for loans on-line, we even pay our bills on-line. We manage our
prescriptions on-line, and there's not much today we DON'T do on-line.
We hear of small- and large-scale breaches in the security of our
on-line information. One situation that comes to mind is of a large
bank that had to contact all of its members because sensitive financial
information had become insecure.
Congress needs to exert leadership in the area of cyber security.
Our current system contains a patchwork of programs that represents
neither an efficient nor effective coordinated federal effort.
I am interested to hear from today's witnesses how we can improve
our current efforts in this critical area.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back and reserve the balance of my
time.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Carnahan follows:]
Prepared Statement of Representative Russ Carnahan
Mr. Chairman and Mr. Ranking Member, thank you for hosting this
hearing. Mr. Purdy, Mr. Leggate, Mr. Freese, Mr. Kepler, and Mr.
Geisse, thank you for joining us today to discuss the future cyber
security of our nation. I am very interested in how we can improve this
critical infrastructure and our nation's security.
In May 2005, the GAO released a report entitled ``Critical
Infrastructure Protection: Challenges in Addressing Cyber Security.'' I
hope that you will touch on some of the issues raised in this report
and suggest potential options to ensure the security of our cyber
infrastructure. Information sharing lapses between the public and
private sectors is one of the most critical areas raised by the GAO
study. It is my hope that today's hearing will help us understand
opportunities for improvement.
We are pleased to have you with us and I look forward to hearing
your testimony.
Chairman Boehlert. Thank you very much, Mr. Gordon, for
those very well thought out and well reasoned arguments.
Once again, as so frequently occurs on this committee,
there is not strong disagreement. There is strength in the
compatibility of our views as we go forward on a very important
subject.
Part of the problem is over at the Roberts hearing there
are probably 200 press people. You know how this announcement
of a hearing on cyber security is greeted outside the Committee
room? With a muffled yawn, ``Oh, what is cyber security?'' This
is a very important topic.
So let me, once again, express to all of you my deep and
personal appreciation for your willingness to be guides for
those of us sitting on this side of the witness table.
And Mr. Purdy, please relay to the Secretary our
appreciation for the fact that he has announced the creation of
the Assistant Secretary for Cyber Security position. I would
hope that would be filled in a timely manner. I know attention
is diverted in this critical period, in the aftermath of
Katrina. All of the resources of the Federal Government, on the
domestic side, are focused on that, understandably so. But that
soon will be over. We are on the way to recovery and rebuilding
one of the most important areas of the country.
Now we have got to get on with the job of cyber security.
And I will say to my friends down in the Administration,
particularly those who have the heavy responsibility of working
for OMB, the Office of Management and Budget, that I would
remind them that we passed the Cyber Security Research and
Development Act in 2002. It wasn't yesterday. It wasn't last
month. It wasn't last year. It was 2002.
But unfortunately, we don't control the purse strings. So
we can determine the seriousness of the problem. We can provide
direction in authorizing funds to address the problem in a
comprehensive and meaningful way, but we don't control the
purse strings. The appropriators, our colleagues on the
Appropriations Committee, do. The people developing the budget,
the people at OMB, do. And they better get a message from this
hearing: this is a priority subject and it better get the
priority attention it deserves, including within DHS and within
the entire Executive Branch and the Legislative Branch of
government.
Now with that, let me introduce our panel of very
distinguished witnesses: Mr. Donald Purdy, Acting Director,
National Cyber Security Division, the Department of Homeland
Security; Mr. John Leggate, Chief Information Officer and Group
Vice President, Digital & Communications Technology, BP; Mr.
David Kepler, Corporate Vice President of Shared Services and
Chief Information Officer, the Dow Chemical Company; Mr. Gerald
Freese, Director of Enterprise Information Security, American
Electric Power.
And for the purpose of an introduction, the Chair is
pleased to recognize Mr. Akin.
Mr. Akin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And I really appreciate this opportunity to introduce a
native son of the Show Me State, Andy Geisse, the Chief
Information Officer of SBC. Andy grew up in my hometown in St.
Louis, earned a Bachelor's degree in economics and mathematics
from the University of Missouri, Columbia, and an MBA from
Washington University also in St. Louis.
And he has had a long and illustrious career with SBC
Communications, starting back in 1979 where he began as
Assistant Manager in the comptroller's department of SBC's
predecessor corporation, Southwestern Bell. He then held a
variety of information technology, sales, and strategic
marketing positions, including serving as the Director for
Wireless Product Development for Southwestern Bell Mobile
Systems, and Vice President and General Manager for
Southwestern Bell Mobile Systems' Oklahoma and West Texas
regions.
In 1995, he moved to Santiago, Chile, and served as Vice
President and Chief Executive Officer of VTR Cellular. He later
became President of the Board of STARTEL Communications, the
first nationwide cellular company in Chile. SBC has interests
in both companies.
In January of 1998, Andy moved to New York as President and
General Manager of SBC's Cellular One upstate New York
subsidiary. Later, he moved and became Vice President of
Enterprise and OSS Systems for SBC and its subsidiaries located
in California. In October of 1999, Andy was appointed Senior
Vice President, Enterprise Software Solutions, responsible for
cooperate-wide software solutions where he relocated again to
San Antonio, Texas. And boy, the mileage is piling up here,
Andy.
SBC Communications is an important and valued corporate
citizen of St. Louis and Missouri. It has been a distinct
pleasure working with the fine employees of SBC to ensure the
citizens of my District receive excellent telecommunications
services.
On behalf of Chairman Boehlert and other Members of this
fine committee, welcome to Congress, Andy. Thank you.
Chairman Boehlert. Wow. That is quite an introduction. You
know what I learned from that? It is an experience in upstate
New York that makes you a very valued member for this panel.
Mr. Akin. He has got something for everybody, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Boehlert. Thank you very much, Mr. Akin.
And I ask unanimous consent that our colleague, Mr.
Sessions of Texas, be permitted to sit in on this hearing. He
is a very valuable Member of the entire Congress and one who is
deeply and personally interested in the matter before the
Committee. Mr. Sessions, do you have anything you would care to
say?
Mr. Sessions. Mr. Chairman, thank you so much. It is good
to be back over here. I have been gone from the Science
Committee now for seven years.
Mr. Chairman, one might assume, after Mr. Akin and myself,
that it is an Andy Geisse Day in Congress, but I wanted to take
just a moment. He has been properly introduced by the gentleman
from Missouri. Mr. Geisse and I have known each other for 22
years, during which time I have known Andy and his family.
During the service that I spent some two years as Vice Chairman
of the Cyberscience Research and Development Subcommittee for
Homeland Security, I counted on Andy to provide information to
me, background information that would help me to better serve
not only this nation, but also that committee. And I am very
happy that SBC has chosen to send Mr. Geisse up here. He is a
dear friend, and I think he will add a lot to today's hearing.
And I want to thank you for allowing me to sit with you and
the Members of this committee.
I yield back the time.
Chairman Boehlert. Thank you very much, Mr. Sessions. I do
appreciate it.
Now to our witnesses. And the rule here is essentially the
same as in most Committees. We ask that you try to summarize
your opening statement in five minutes or thereabouts. And I am
usually offended when I make that announcement, because we have
very distinguished witnesses who have so much to offer and to
ask them to capsulize their thinking in 300 seconds or less is
sort of unrealistic. And so the Chair is not going to be
arbitrary. You are the only--part of the only panel we will
have before us today, and you all have so much value to add to
our knowledge base. So I would ask that you be guided by the
lights, not directed by the lights.
With that, Mr. Purdy, you are first up.
STATEMENT OF MR. DONALD ``ANDY'' PURDY, JR., ACTING DIRECTOR,
NATIONAL CYBER SECURITY DIVISION, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND
SECURITY
Mr. Purdy. Good morning, Chairman Boehlert and
distinguished Members of the Committee. My name is Andy Purdy.
I am the Acting Director of the Department of Homeland
Security's National Cyber Security Division.
I am delighted to appear before you to share the work of
NCSD and those with whom we are partnering to secure our
national cyberspace and critical infrastructure.
Pursuant to President Bush's Homeland Security Presidential
Directive 7 (HSPD-7), our Infrastructure Protection Office
developed the National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) to
serve as a guide for addressing critical infrastructure and key
resource protection. It sets forth a risk management framework
for public and private sector stakeholders to work together to
identify, prioritize, and conduct vulnerability assessments of
critical assets and key resources in each sector. It also
includes the identification of interdependencies of critical
assets and key resources both within and across sectors as well
as providing priority protective measures that owners and
operators of such assets should undertake to secure them.
DHS recognizes that more than 85 percent of the critical
infrastructure is owned by the private sector and that the
development and enhancement of public-private partnership is
paramount to securing our nation's assets.
As such, private sector-led sector coordinating councils
are being established to work with their appropriate sector-
specific agency via the government coordinating councils, which
represent the government agencies that have a role in
protecting their respective sectors.
Our Division was created in response to President Bush's
National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace as a national focal
point for cyber security. Given today's interconnected
environment and the Department's integrated risk-based approach
to critical infrastructure protection, our mission is to work
collaboratively with public, private, and international
entities to secure cyberspace and America's cyber assets. To
meet that mission, we developed a strategic plan that is
closely aligned with the Strategy, HSPD-7, the National
Infrastructure Protection Plan, and the Cyber Annex to the
National Response Plan.
To carry out our mission and related responsibilities, we
have identified two overarching priorities: to build an
effective National Cyberspace Response System, and implement a
cyber risk management program for critical infrastructure
protection.
A core component of our first priority is the US-CERT
Operations Center that is a partnership between the Department
and the public and private sectors to address cyber security
issues. It provides a national coordination center that links
public and private response capabilities to facilitate
information sharing and coordinated response to help maintain
the continuity of our nation's cyber infrastructure.
We worked with the Department of Defense and the Department
of Justice to form the National Cyber Response Coordination
Group that is the principle interagency mechanism to prepare
for and respond to cyber incidents of national significance
that was formalized in the Cyber Annex to the National Response
Plan.
An important element of our response system is our ability
to address the global nature of cyberspace. Implementation of
our international cyber security strategy and its related
outreach and collaboration objectives is well underway. Such
international cooperation contributes to our overall global
situation awareness and incident response capabilities in an
area in which information moves at Internet speeds and
traditional borders do not apply.
To advance the second priority of cyber risk management, we
have incorporated a risk management approach aligned with the
interim NIPP into its effort to better assess the threat and
reduce the risk to our national cyberspace. Risk management
includes risk assessment based on threat, vulnerabilities, and
consequences as well as efforts to reduce the risk by
addressing vulnerabilities before an attack occurs and
mitigating and managing the consequences of a cyber attack that
does occur.
Regarding reducing risk, our sector-specific
responsibilities within the Department, among others, including
the information technology sector, which we are the lead for,
and the telecommunications sector, which our partner agency,
the National Communications System, is responsible for.
The NIPP also includes a cross-sector cyber responsibility
for us.
In addition to our specific responsibilities, there are
three major components of our risk mitigation approach.
First, we have established the Internet Disruption Working
Group with the National Communications System to address the
resiliency and recovery of Internet functions in the case of a
major cyber incident. The Department of Treasury and the
Department of Defense are also engaged, and the working group
is acting to extend the partnership to representatives in the
private sector as well as international stakeholders.
Next, the interdependency between physical and cyber
infrastructures is hardly more acute than in the use of control
systems as integral operating components of many of our
critical infrastructures.
Interestingly, these control systems are implemented with
remote access, open connectivity, and connections to open
networks, such as corporate intranets and the Internet. These
make critical infrastructure assets more automated, more
productive, more efficient, more innovative, but they also may
expose many of those physical assets to physical consequences
from cyber-related threats.
The third major component of our effort is the Software
Assurance Program. Defects in software can be exploited to
launch critical cyber attacks, and we have developed a
comprehensive software assurance framework that addresses
people, process, technology, and acquisition through the
software development process.
I hope we have the opportunity in the questions to discuss
our cyber R&D agenda and our relationship with the Science and
Technology Director to fund those. We are committed to
achieving success in our goals and objectives, but we cannot do
it alone. We will continue to work with government and the
private sector to leverage the efforts of all so we, as a
Nation, are more secure in cyberspace and in our critical
infrastructures.
Again, thank you for the opportunity to testify before you
today, and I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Purdy follows:]
Prepared Statement of Donald (Andy) Purdy, Jr.
Good morning Chairman Boehlert and distinguished Members of the
Committee. My name is Andy Purdy, and I am the Acting Director of the
Department of Homeland Security's National Cyber Security Division
(NCSD). I am delighted to appear before you today to share with you the
work of the NCSD and those with whom we are partnering to secure our
national cyberspace and critical infrastructure. In my testimony today,
I will provide an overview of NCSD, our operating mandates, our mission
and goals, our priorities, and the programs in which we are engaged to
meet those missions and goals.
DHS and Critical Infrastructure Protection
Over the course of the past several months Secretary Chertoff
conducted a systematic evaluation of the Department's operations. On
July 13th, Secretary Chertoff announced his six point agenda for the
path ahead for the Department. As part of this agenda, the Secretary
announced several Departmental organizational changes. Among these was
the creation of a new Preparedness Directorate which would house a
newly created office of the Assistant Secretary for Cyber Security and
Telecommunications. Currently, cyber security is addressed by the NCSD,
one of four divisions in the Office of Infrastructure Protection (IP),
located within the Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection
Directorate.
In December 2003, President Bush issued Homeland Security
Presidential Directive 7: Critical Infrastructure Identification,
Prioritization, and Protection (HSPD-7), which established a national
policy for federal departments and agencies to identify and prioritize
United States critical infrastructure and key resources and to protect
them from terrorist attacks. Among other things, HSPD-7 identified
17\1\ critical infrastructure and key resource sectors and assigned
responsibility for each to a Sector Specific Agency (SSA), with DHS
serving as the overall program coordinator.
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\1\ The NIPP identifies the following Critical Infrastructure
Sectors and Key Resources: Food and Agriculture; Public Health and
Health Care; Drinking Water and Wastewater; Energy; Banking and
Finance; National Monuments and Icons; Defense Industrial Base;
Information Technology; Telecommunications; Chemical; Transportation
Systems; Emergency Services; Postal and Shipping; Dams; Government
Facilities; Commercial Facilities; Nuclear Reactors, Materials, and
Waste.
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Additionally, HSPD-7 set forth how DHS should address critical
infrastructure protection, including ``summary of activities to be
undertaken in order to: define and prioritize, reduce the vulnerability
of, and coordinate the protection of critical infrastructure and key
resources.'' \2\
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\2\ Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7, December 17, 2003;
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/12/20031217-5.html.
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To meet this mandate, IP developed the National Infrastructure
Protection Plan (NIPP), a plan that is to serve as the guide for
addressing critical infrastructure and key resource protection. It sets
forth a risk management framework for public and private sector
stakeholders to work together to identify, prioritize, and conduct
vulnerability assessments of critical assets and key resources in each
sector. It also includes the identification of interdependencies of
critical assets and key resources both within and across the sectors,
as well as providing priority protective measures that owners and
operators of such assets should undertake to secure them. Recognizing
that more that 85 percent of the critical infrastructure is owned and
operated by the private sector and that the development of public-
private partnership is paramount to securing our nation's assets,
private sector-led Sector Coordinating Councils (SCCs) are being
established to work with their appropriate SSA via Government
Coordinating Councils, which represent the government agencies that
have a role in protecting the respective sectors.
Currently, the office of Infrastructure Protection is finalizing
the NIPP and it is expected to be released later this year. This
finalized document will refine the public-private partnership model and
a process for protecting our critical infrastructures from physical or
cyber attack or natural disasters.
DHS and Cyber Security
In June 2003, in response to the President's National Strategy to
Secure Cyberspace and HSPD-7, the Department of Homeland Security
created the NCSD as a national focal point for cyber security. The
national strategy established the following five national priorities
for securing cyberspace:
Priority I: A National Cyberspace Security
Response System
Priority II: A National Cyberspace Security
Threat and Vulnerability
Reduction Program
Priority III: A National Cyberspace Security
Awareness and Training Program
Priority IV: Securing Government's Cyberspace
Priority V: National Security and
International Cyberspace
Security Cooperation
Given today's interconnected environment and DHS's integrated risk-
based approach to critical infrastructure protection, NCSD's mission is
to work collaboratively with public, private, and international
entities to secure cyberspace and America's cyber assets. To meet that
mission, NCSD developed a Strategic Plan that establishes a set of
goals with specific objectives for each goal, and milestones associated
with each objective. The Strategic Plan goals, which are closely
aligned with the Strategy, HSPD-7, the NIPP, and the Cyber Annex to the
National Response Plan, are as follows:
1. Establish a National Cyberspace Response System to prevent,
detect, respond to, and reconstitute rapidly after cyber
incidents;
2. Work with public and private sector representatives to
reduce vulnerabilities and minimize severity of cyber attacks;
3. Promote a comprehensive awareness plan to empower all
Americans to secure their own parts of cyberspace;
4. Foster adequate training and education programs to support
the Nation's cyber security needs;
5. Coordinate with the intelligence and law enforcement
communities to identify and reduce threats to cyberspace; and
6. Build a world class organization that aggressively advances
its cyber security mission and goals in partnership with its
public and private stakeholders.
To meet these goals, NCSD is organized into four operating branches
to address the various aspects of the risk management structure: (1)
U.S. Computer Emergency Readiness Team (US-CERT) Operations to manage
the 24-7 threat watch, warning, and response capability that can
identify emerging threats and vulnerabilities and coordinate responses
to major cyber incidents; (2) Strategic Initiatives Branch to manage
activities to advance cyber security in critical infrastructure
protection, control systems security, software development, training
and education, exercises, and standards and best practices; (3)
Outreach and Awareness Branch to manage outreach, cyber security
awareness, and partnership efforts to disseminate information to key
constituencies and build collaborative actions with key stakeholders;
and (4) Law Enforcement and Intelligence Branch to coordinate and share
information between these communities and NCSD's other constituents in
the private sector, public sector, academia, and others, and also to
coordinate interagency response and mitigation of cyber security
incidents. Together, these branches make up NCSD's framework to address
the cyber security challenges across our key stakeholder groups and
build communications, collaboration, and awareness to further our
collective capabilities to detect, recognize, attribute, respond to,
mitigate, and reconstitute after cyber attacks.
Cyber Security Priorities: Response and Risk Management
The Strategy, HSPD-7, and the NIPP provide NCSD with a clear
operating mission and national coordination responsibility. To carry
out this mission and its related responsibilities, NCSD has identified
two overarching priorities: to build an effective national cyberspace
response system and to implement a cyber risk management program for
critical infrastructure protection. Our focus on these two priorities
and related programs addresses the overarching NIPP Risk Management
methodology and establishes the framework for securing cyberspace today
and a foundation for addressing cyber security for the future.
Priority 1--Cyber Incident Management: A National Cyberspace Response
System
A core component of NCSD and our effort to establish a National
Cyberspace Response System is the US-CERT Operations Center. US-CERT
was established in September 2003 as a partnership between DHS and the
public and private sectors to address cyber security issues. Building
upon an initial partnership with the Computer Emergency Response Team
Coordination Center (CERT/CC) in Carnegie Mellon University's Software
Engineering Institute, US-CERT now provides a national coordination
center that links public and private response capabilities to
facilitate information sharing across all infrastructure sectors and to
help protect and maintain the continuity of our nation's cyber
infrastructure. The overarching approach to this task is to facilitate
and implement systemic global and domestic coordination of deterrence
from, preparation for, defense against, response to, and recovery from
cyber incidents and attacks across the United States, as well as from
the cyber consequences of physical attacks or natural disasters.
US-CERT has four major programs of activity. First, US-CERT is
DHS's 24-7-365 cyber watch, warning, and incident response center, and
it provides coordinated response to cyber incidents, a web portal for
secure communications with private and public sector stakeholders,
including critical infrastructure owners and operators, a daily report,
a public website (http://www.us-cert.gov/), and a National Cyber Alert
System, which provides timely, actionable information to the public on
both technical and non-technical bases. Second, US-CERT conducts
malicious code analysis, provides malware technical support, and
conducts cyber threat and vulnerability analysis. Third, US-CERT
manages a situational awareness program and an Internet Health and
Status service used by 50 government agency computer security incident
response teams. Fourth, US-CERT manages programs for communication and
collaboration among public agencies and key network defense service
providers. In line with NCSD's close working relationship with NCS, US-
CERT works closely with the National Coordinating Center for
Telecommunications (NCC) to address and mitigate cyber threats
including response and recovery. US-CERT also maintains a presence in
the HSOC to ensure coordination throughout DHS.
As noted, NCSD has initiated a number of activities specifically to
assist federal agencies in protecting their cyber infrastructure. NCSD
established the Government Forum of Incident Response and Security
Teams (GFIRST) to facilitate interagency information sharing and
cooperation across federal agencies for readiness and response efforts.
GFIRST is a group of technical and tactical practitioners of security
response teams responsible for securing government information
technology systems. The members work together to understand and handle
computer security incidents and to encourage proactive and preventative
security practices. The purpose of the GFIRST is to:
Provide members with technical information, tools,
methods, assistance, and guidance;
Coordinate proactive liaison activities and
analytical support;
Further the development of quality products and
services for the Federal Government;
Share specific technical details regarding incidents
within a trusted U.S. Government environment on a peer-to-peer
basis; and
Improve incident response operations.
GFIRST meets on a regular basis and held its first annual
conference in April 2005 with more than 200 participants from Federal,
State, and local governments. The conference was a major success for
US-CERT, and GFIRST has established further lines of communications
across organizations. The technical workshops and speakers stimulated
many technical interchanges regarding cyber first responder activities.
In another step forward, GFIRST held its first classified threat
briefing with DHS Office of Information Analysis (IA), the Central
Intelligence Agency, Department of Defense, and National Security
Agency in June 2005.
US-CERT utilizes a secure collaboration platform, the US-CERT
Portal, to support cyber information sharing and collaboration among
the GFIRST community, and other cyber and critical infrastructure
communities, such as the ISACs. The US-CERT Portal is being integrated
into the Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN) and bridges the
gap between the Government Coordinating Councils, the Sector
Coordinating Councils, ISACs, and other private critical infrastructure
information-sharing entities.
In addition to GFIRST, NCSD worked with the Department of Defense
(DOD) and the Department of Justice (DOJ) to form the National Cyber
Response Coordination Group (NCRCG) to provide a Federal Government
approach to coordinated cyber incident response. NCSD created a Cyber
Annex to the recently issued National Response Plan (NRP)\3\ that
provides a framework for responding to cyber incidents of national
significance. As such, the Cyber Annex formalized the NCRCG as the
principal federal interagency mechanism to coordinate preparation for,
and response to, cyber incidents of national significance. The co-
chairs of the NCRCG are DHS/NCSD, DOJ, and DOD. An additional 13
federal agencies with a statutory responsibility for and/or specific
capability toward cyber security, including the intelligence community,
comprise the membership. NCSD serves as the Executive Agent and point
of contact for the NCRCG. The NCRCG has developed a concept of
operations (CONOPS) for national cyber incident response that will be
examined in the National Cyber Exercise, Cyber Storm, to be conducted
by NCSD in November 2005, with public and private sector stakeholders.
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\3\ http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/display?theme=15&content=4269
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The NCRCG is also reviewing capabilities of federal agencies from a
cyber defense perspective to better leverage and coordinate the
preparation for and response to significant cyber incidents. This
effort will entail the following components:
Mapping the current capabilities of government
agencies related to cyber defense relative to detection and
recognition of cyber activity of concern, attribution, response
and mitigation, and reconstitution;
Identifying capabilities within the government that
US-CERT should leverage to maximize interagency coordination of
cyber defense capabilities;
Performing a gap analysis to identify the surge
capabilities for possible leverage by, or collaboration with,
the US-CERT for cyber defense issues in order to detect
potentially damaging activity in cyberspace, to analyze
exploits and warn potential victims, to coordinate incident
responses, and to restore essential services that have been
damaged; and
Consider establishing formal resource sharing
agreements with the other agencies per the cyber defense
coordination needs identified through the process identified
above.
An important element of a National Cyberspace Response System is
our ability to address the global nature of cyberspace. Implementation
of NCSD's international cyber security strategy and its related
outreach and collaboration objectives is well underway, as we
participate in bilateral and multilateral outreach efforts and have
established cooperative programs with key allies and countries of
interest. Such international cooperation contributes to our overall
global situational awareness and incident response capabilities in an
area in which information moves at Internet speed and traditional
borders do not apply.
With our efforts, accomplishments, and on-going programs, NCSD has
made significant progress in managing cyber incidents and has taken
substantial strides toward building a National Cyberspace Response
System. We know there is more to do, and we are enhancing and evolving
our readiness and response programs to further our efforts and address
this dynamic environment.
Priority 2--Cyber Risk Management: Assessing the Threat and Reducing
the Risk
NCSD incorporated a risk management approach aligned with HSPD-7
and the resulting interim NIPP into its effort to better assess the
threat and reduce the risk to our national cyberspace. Risk management
includes risk assessment based on threat, vulnerabilities, and
consequences, as well as efforts to reduce the risk by addressing
vulnerabilities before an attack occurs, and mitigating and managing
the consequences of a cyber attack that does occur. The NIPP risk
management framework entails work with the intelligence community, law
enforcement, and the private sector to better understand the cyber
threat and a collaborative partnership between the private sector and
Federal, State, and local governments looking at people, cyber, and
physical assets to identify and prioritize those assets, assess
vulnerabilities, and coordinate the protection of critical
infrastructure and key resources.
With regard to assessing the threat, NCSD collaborates with the law
enforcement and the intelligence communities in a number of ways. DHS
assisted in the coordination of cyber-related issues for the ``National
Intelligence Estimate (NIE) of Cyber Threats to the U.S. Information
Infrastructure.'' The resulting classified document issued in February
2004 details actors (nation states, terrorist groups, organized
criminal groups, hackers, etc.), capabilities, and intent (where
known). In addition, NCSD has infused cyber requirements into the
Standing Information Needs (SINs) and Priority Information Needs (PINs)
for the intelligence community and continues to collaborate with them
through IA to characterize cyber threats for accuracy. Finally, the
NCRCG includes law enforcement and intelligence agencies and has
working groups addressing botnets and attribution issues.
The private sector is also a resource for threat and risk related
information, and NCSD works with its industry stakeholders to gather
and communicate that information. The US-CERT Internet Health Service
enables US-CERT to gather information from private sector resources
regarding vulnerabilities, network attacks, and malicious code activity
and provide that information to federal agencies. In addition, NCSD has
identified preparedness and response as a key area of joint public-
private effort and is working with the critical infrastructure sectors
to identify attack/threat scenarios against which proactive protective
measures can be taken and response plans can be developed. And, DHS
utilizes the ISACs and critical sector elements of the HSIN to obtain
and share cyber security information.
With regard to reducing the risk, DHS's SSA responsibilities under
the NIPP include the Information Technology (IT) Sector and the
Telecommunications Sector. Specifically, NCSD coordinates the IT
Sector, and the National Communications System (NCS), another of the
divisions in the IP directorate, coordinates the Telecommunications
Sector. Reflecting the increasing convergence between these two
communications sectors in today's market, NCSD and NCS work together
closely to coordinate all efforts to protect the Nation's critical
cyber systems and the telecommunications transport layer.
The NIPP includes a cross-sector cyber responsibility for NCSD in
addition to its IT Sector responsibility. The cross-sector
responsibility is the collaborative effort between DHS/NCSD and the
SSAs to ensure that deployed cyber elements have been secured in an
appropriate and consistent manner across sectors. NCSD is responsible
for providing cyber guidance to all sectors assisting them in
understanding and mitigating cyber risk (including cyber infrastructure
vulnerabilities) and in developing effective and appropriate protective
measures. This guidance includes contributing cyber elements to the
NIPP, reviewing the cyber aspects of the respective Sector Specific
Plans (SSPs), and delivering cyber Critical Infrastructure Protection
(CIP) training to SSAs to help them enhance the cyber aspects of their
SSPs.
To implement these two NIPP Cyber elements, NCSD works with the
Information Technology Information Sharing and Analysis Center (IT-
ISAC) and the newly established Information Technology Sector
Coordination Council (IT-SCC), as well as with the SSAs, ISACs and
emerging SCCs in the other sectors.
In addition to NCSD's specific NIPP responsibilities, there are
three major components to our cyber risk mitigation approach: the
Internet Disruption Working Group (IDWG), the Control Systems Security
Program, and the Software Assurance Program.
Protection of critical cyber assets goes hand-in-hand with
protection of critical telecommunications assets; accordingly, NCSD and
NCS are working closely together to collaborate on issues related to
threats, identification of critical cyber assets, vulnerability and
risk assessments, and development of appropriate protective measures
that could be recommended for implementation by owners/operators.
Within the NIPP framework, NCSD and NCS established the Internet
Disruption Working Group (IDWG) in December 2004 to address the
resiliency and recovery of Internet functions in case of a major cyber
incident. The Department of Treasury and the Department of Defense are
also engaged, and the working group is acting to extend the partnership
to representatives from the private sector as well as international
stakeholders. The IDWG reflects the convergence of telecommunications
and information technology sectors in today's environment and the
emergence of Next Generation Networks (NGN) that will compose the
Internet of the future. An initial focus of the working group is to
identify near-term actions related to situational awareness,
protection, and response that government and its stakeholders can take
to better prepare for, protect against, and mitigate nationally
significant Internet disruptions.
The interdependency between physical and cyber infrastructures is
hardly more acute than in the use of control systems as integral
operating components by many of our critical infrastructures. ``Control
Systems'' is a generic term applied to hardware, firmware,
communications, and software used to perform vital monitoring and
controlling functions of sensitive processes and enable automation of
physical systems. Specific control systems used in the various critical
infrastructure sectors include Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition
(SCADA) systems, Process Control Systems (PCS), and Distributed Control
Systems (DCS).
Examples of the critical infrastructure processes and functions
that control systems monitor and control include energy transmission
and distribution, pipelines, water and pumping stations,
telecommunications, chemical processing, pharmaceutical production,
rail and light rail, manufacturing, and food production. Increasingly,
these control systems are implemented with remote access, open
connectivity, and connections to open networks such as corporate
intranets and the Internet. These sophisticated information technology
tools are making our critical infrastructure assets more automated,
more productive, more efficient, and more innovative, but they also may
expose many of those physical assets to physical consequences from new,
cyber-related threats and vulnerabilities.
To assure immediate attention is directed to protect these systems,
NCSD established the Control Systems Security Program to coordinate
efforts among Federal, State, and local governments, as well as control
system owners, operators, and vendors to improve control system
security within and across all critical infrastructure sectors. As part
of this Program, NCSD developed a Control Systems Strategy that
incorporates five highly integrated goals to address the issues and
challenges associated with control systems security. As such, our
control systems activities support NCSD's overall efforts to address
cyber security across critical infrastructure sectors over the long-
term, as well as the US-CERT's capability in the management, response,
and handling of incidents, vulnerabilities, and mitigation of threat
actions specific to critical control systems functions. NCSD also
recognizes the significant attention being paid to PCS and SCADA
security by various industry organizations in developing encryption
standards, cryptography, modeling, and other tools to improve cyber
security of control systems.
NCSD also established the US-CERT Control Systems Security Center
(CSSC) in partnership with Idaho National Laboratory (INL) and other
Department of Energy National Laboratories\4\ in June 2004. The CSSC is
involving other partners from control systems industry associations,
universities, control systems vendors, and industry experts. Since its
establishment, the CSSC has made considerable progress and some of its
major accomplishments include:
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\4\ Idaho (INL), Pacific Northwest (PNNL), Los Alamos (LANL),
Argonne (ANL), Sandia (SNL), Savannah River (SRNL)
Established the US-CERT CSSC assessment and incident
response facility located at INL and a US-CERT Support
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Operations Center for Control Systems;
Established relationships with more than 25 potential
industry partners and completed several agreements that
established initial assessment, analysis, and vulnerability
reduction plans within various industry sectors;
Created the Critical Infrastructure Cyber Consequence
Matrix to determine the industries of most concern, and a list
of specific sites from the National Asset Database where
Control Systems could cause a negative consequence due to
failure or attack;
Created a quantitative control systems cyber risk/
decision analysis measurement methodology; and,
Established the Process Control System Forum (PCSF)
(in partnership with DHS's Science and Technology Directorate)
with industry, academia, and government to accelerate the
development of technology that will enhance the security,
safety, and reliability of Control Systems, including legacy
installations.
At the same time that the telecommunications and financial sectors
have increased their dependence on information systems overall for
information flows, service provision, and financial transactions, the
energy, chemical, nuclear, food and agriculture, transportation, and
water sectors have become increasingly dependent on process control
systems for their critical operations. To more fully utilize the Matrix
for analysis on the nature of consequences of attacks on the various
sectors for risk management purposes, more information is needed about
how these various sectors are using process control systems and the
subsequent interdependencies.
Future FY05 and FY06 activities for NCSD's Control Systems Security
Program include efforts to:
Develop a comprehensive set of control systems
security assurance levels for owners and operators;
Sponsor government/industry workshops to increase
awareness among control systems owners and operators of
potential cyber incident impacts and vulnerabilities;
Develop, populate, and validate control systems
security scenario assessment tools to provide response teams a
web-based application to assess impacts;
Assess a minimum of three core systems and provide
solutions to vulnerabilities and recommendations to protect
against cyber threats; and
Develop the US-CERT CSSC web page for information
exchange.
The third major component of NCSD's cyber risk management program
is our Software Assurance Program. Software is an essential component
of the Nation's critical infrastructure (power, water, transportation,
financial institutions, defense industrial base, etc); however, defects
in software can be exploited to launch cyber attacks as well as attacks
against the critical infrastructure. NCSD developed a comprehensive
software assurance framework that addresses people, process,
technology, and acquisition throughout the software development
lifecycle.
As part of the shared responsibility approach to cyber security,
DHS is working to achieve a broader ability to routinely develop and
deploy trustworthy software products. As such, DHS is shifting the
security paradigm from ``patch management'' to ``software assurance''
by encouraging U.S. software developers to raise the bar on software
quality and security. In collaboration with other federal agencies,
academia, and the private sector, we are:
Sponsoring the development of a repository of best
practices and practical guidance for the software development
community;
Developing a software assurance common body of
knowledge from which to develop curriculum for education and
training;
Examining recommendations from the Networking and
Information Technology Research and Development (NITRD),
Software Design and Productivity (SDP), and High Confidence
Software and Systems (HCSS) coordination groups and
anticipating greater direct engagement with them in the future.
Facilitating discussions with industry and academic
institutions through Software Assurance Forums;
Collaborating with NIST to inventory software
assurance tools and measure effectiveness, identify gaps and
conflicts, and develop a plan to eliminate gaps and conflicts;
Completing the DHS/Department of Defense co-sponsored
comprehensive review of the National Information Assurance
Partnership (NIAP) \5\ with the draft report to be published in
September 2005; and
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\5\ The National Information Assurance Partnership, established in
August of 1997, is a joint effort between NIST and NSA to provide
technical leadership in security-related information technology test
methods and assurance techniques. NIAP uses the Common Criteria to
evaluate and certify commercial off the shelf (COTS) products. There
has been much discussion in past years on the effectiveness (time and
cost) of the NIAP process. As a result, the National Strategy to Secure
Cyberspace recommended an independent review of the program be
conducted to make recommendations for its improvement.
Promoting investment in applicable software assurance
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research and development.
DHS will seek to reduce risks by raising the level of trust for all
software, minimizing vulnerabilities and understanding threats. DHS
will collaborate with government, industry, academic institutions, and
international allies to achieve these software assurance objectives.
Another important cyber element of national infrastructure
protection is the proliferation of the Internet in our society and
daily lives. To mitigate the risks inherent in the rapidly growing user
base and increasing usage, NCSD is engaged in a cyber security
awareness program that leverages a variety of partners including the
National Cyber Security Alliance, the Multi-State ISAC, and the Federal
Trade Commission, among others, to reach out to the home user, K-12,
small business, and higher education audiences to raise the American
public's awareness of cyber risks and security measures.
Research and Development for Cyber Security and Critical Infrastructure
Protection
Cyber-related research and development (R&D) is vital to improving
the resiliency of the Nation's critical infrastructures. This difficult
strategic challenge requires a coordinated and focused effort from
across the Federal Government, State and local governments, the private
sector, and academia to advance the security of critical cyber systems.
A critical area of focus for DHS is the development and deployment
of technologies to protect the Nation's cyber infrastructure, including
the Internet and other critical infrastructures that depend on IT
systems for their mission. Two components within DHS share
responsibility for cyber R&D, with the Science & Technology (S&T)
Directorate serving as the primary agent responsible for executing
cyber security R&D programs. NCSD has responsibility for developing
requirements for DHS' cyber security R&D projects.
The S&T Directorate's mission is to conduct, stimulate, and enable
research, as well as to develop, test, evaluate, and transition
homeland security capabilities to federal, State and local operational
end-users. The goals of the DHS S&T Directorate's Cyber Security R&D
program are to:
Perform R&D aimed at improving the security of
existing deployed technologies and to ensure the security of
new emerging systems;
Develop new and enhanced technologies for the
detection of, prevention of, and response to cyber attacks on
the Nation's critical information infrastructure; and
Facilitate the transfer of these technologies into
the national infrastructure as a matter of urgency.
NCSD supports the overall DHS R&D mission by identifying areas for
cyber innovation and coordinating with S&T. NCSD collects, develops,
and submits cyber security R&D requirements to provide input to the
federal cyber security R&D community and specifically to inform the DHS
S&T Directorate's cyber security research priorities.
DHS S&T's Cyber Security Research and Development Center is
currently working on several projects that support the recommendations
of the National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace, while addressing the
vulnerabilities of critical systems and infrastructures. The major
areas are:
Working with industry to develop secure routing
protocols for the core of the Internet.
Development of a cyber security test bed for
researchers and developers.
Establishment of a large database of anonymized data
collected from the Internet to support research on new cyber
security tools and techniques.
Partnering with the government of Canada on a joint
experiment involving the handheld BlackBerry data devices for
secure communications between first responders.
Funding research on understanding and countering
emerging Internet threats.
Funding small business innovative research in the
development of new cyber security products.
Coordination with the Institute for Information
Infrastructure Protection (I3P) on the development of new
technologies for securing SCADA systems and networks and
analyzing the economics of cyber security.
To support and document cyber security R&D initiatives across the
Federal Government, NCSD participates in the Cyber Security and
Information Assurance Interagency Working Group (CSIA IWG), co-chaired
by S&T and the Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP).
Participants include the National Science Foundation (NSF), the Defense
Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), the National Institute of
Standards and Technology (NIST) and many others. By reporting to both
the Infrastructure Subcommittee and NITRD, the CSIA IWG is positioned
to coordinate cyber security and information assurance R&D across
agencies, while ensuring that the security of critical infrastructures
is emphasized. The CSIA IWG is currently completing the Federal Cyber
Security and Information Assurance R&D Plan.
Moving Forward
In connection with the National Infrastructure Protection Plan,
efforts are underway to assess cyber threats, reduce vulnerabilities
and identify significant interdependencies. These efforts will be fully
implemented as the SSAs implement their portion of the NIPP. In
partnership with NCS and other agencies, we are working through the
Internet Disruption Working Group to address the resiliency and
recovery of Internet functions in the case of a major cyber incident.
We have established a Control Systems Security Program to address core
operating systems of critical infrastructure sectors. And, we are
working with the government, private sector, and academia to promote
the integrity and security of software. We continue to enhance our
cyber incident readiness and response system, and we coordinate with
our private sector stakeholders to provide protective guidance to our
stakeholders through US-CERT. We are conducting a major exercise later
this year to test the Cyber Annex to the National Response Plan.
Through this effort, we will pull together appropriate entities in the
Federal Government, State governments, and appropriate private sector
stakeholders to test our capabilities and, subsequently, to improve our
incident management process.
We are committed to achieving success in meeting our goals and
objectives, but we cannot do it alone. We will continue to meet with
industry representatives, our government counterparts, academia, and
State representatives to formulate the partnerships needed for
productive collaboration and leverage the efforts of all, so we, as a
nation, are more secure in cyberspace and in our critical
infrastructures.
Again, thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today. I
would be happy to answer any questions you may have at this time.
Biography for Donald A. (Andy) Purdy, Jr.
In October 2004, Donald A. (Andy) Purdy, Jr. was appointed by
Secretary Ridge as the Acting Director of the National Cyber Security
Division (NCSD) for the Department of Homeland Security, within the
Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection (IAIP) Directorate.
The IAIP Directorate identifies and assesses a broad range of
intelligence information concerning threats to the people and
communities of the United States and to protect the critical
infrastructure systems vital to our national security, governance,
public health and safety, economy, and national morale.
The NCSD's mission, in cooperation with public, private, and
international entities, is to secure cyberspace and America's cyber
assets. The key components of this mission involve: (1) implementation
of the National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace and the DHS Strategic
Plan; and (2) implementation of priority protective measures to secure
cyberspace and to reduce the cyber vulnerabilities of America's
critical infrastructures.
Prior to joining the Department, Mr. Purdy worked on assignment to
the White House as Deputy to the Vice Chair and Senior Advisor for IT
Security and Privacy to the President's Critical Infrastructure
Protection Board (PCIPB) working on the development of the National
Strategy to Secure Cyberspace. With the PCIPB, Purdy worked in the
areas of cyber crime, privacy protection, government procurement and
maintenance of more secure products and systems, security of the
financial sector's information systems, and in promoting information
sharing in industry sectors such as health care and finance. In April
2003, Mr. Purdy came to the Department where he worked on the cyber
tiger team to help design and launch the NCSD in June 2003. Following
that he served as Acting Director until Amit Yoran was appointed
Director in the Fall of 2003.
Immediately prior to his assignment to the White House staff, Mr.
Purdy served as Chief Deputy General Counsel and later as Acting
General Counsel for the U.S. Sentencing Commission. The Sentencing
Commission is charged with promulgating and updating the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines for individuals and organizations, and for
providing counsel to the Congress and others about federal sentencing
practices and policies. At the Sentencing Commission Mr. Purdy served
as a member of the senior management team and provided legal,
strategic, administrative, and ethical advice to the Chair and
Commissioners, Staff Director and Unit Chiefs.
Mr. Purdy graduated from the College of William and Mary and the
University of Virginia Law School. After receiving his law degree,
Purdy served as an Assistant Attorney General in Missouri, and then as
Senior Staff Counsel to the U.S. House of Representatives Select
Committee on Assassinations' investigation of the assassination of
President Kennedy. He subsequently served as an Assistant U.S. Attorney
in Philadelphia where he concentrated on investigating and prosecuting
white collar crime. Following his service as a federal prosecutor, Mr.
Purdy returned to Washington, D.C. to serve as Counsel to the U.S.
House of Representatives Committee on Standards of Official Conduct
(Ethics).
Mr. Purdy then moved to investigative work in network news, working
as an Associate Producer for the NBC News magazines First Camera and
Monitor, and then as the Producer for News and Politics for the CBS
News broadcast NIGHTWATCH. Subsequently, while at the Sentencing
Commission, Mr. Purdy was detailed to Capitol Hill where he worked as
Counsel to the U.S. Senate Impeachment Trial Committee for the
impeachment trial of then-chief federal judge Walter Nixon of
Mississippi.
Mr. Purdy lives in Bethesda, Maryland, with his wife Robin Fader,
an Emmy Award winning television and commercial producer, and their
daughter, Alexandra, who is 10 years old and has a certified black belt
in Tae Kwon Do.
Chairman Boehlert. Thank you very much, Mr. Purdy.
Mr. Leggate.
STATEMENT OF MR. JOHN S. LEGGATE, CHIEF INFORMATION OFFICER AND
GROUP VICE PRESIDENT, DIGITAL & COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY, BP
PLC., UNITED KINGDOM
Mr. Leggate. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you,
distinguished Members.
My name is John Leggate. I am CIO for BP, and this morning,
I also represent BENS, which is Business Executives for
National Security in the U.S., a large organization whose
interest, of course, is improving the nature of business and
its dependency on the Internet.
By way of context, also, BP happens to be the biggest
provider of oil and gas in the United States. So, in fact, in
our normal business, we take the whole issue of national
security as a very, very fundamental part of what we do for the
United States.
Anyway, going on from that, this topic, as you said, Mr.
Chairman, has actually been in our minds for some time. It has
been around, and I think what I would like to do here is point
to two things just to simply portray a little bit more of why
this is so important today and a few ideas on the way forward
above and beyond what is said here.
Almost by stealth since the fail of the dot-com era
companies have actually been moving towards the Net
progressively. We have done survey work, and our most recent
survey would say, in the energy sector, the chemicals and
transport sector, up to 30 percent of their revenues come from
work done on the Internet today in the United States. In a
sense, the dependency is very clear and growing.
And the second point, after Mr. Purdy's point, the nature
of business automation regarding running process plants,
refineries, and chemical plants are now moving to a place where
they look simply like regular computers. They are not different
systems anymore. And the capacity for these systems then to be
impaired is quite important. In fact, with time, we see a
bigger growth in what we call machine-to-machine information
flow than simply humans on the Internet, per se. I mean, today,
in the world, I think at any point in time, 200 million people
are on the Internet with a billion possible connections going
on.
So moving on from that to say this is a big issue. The
thing that I would note, it isn't simply cyber security but the
confluence of cyber and physical security in the Internet.
Solving the cyber issue doesn't solve the reliability or the
vulnerability of the Internet. There are number of points in
the world which are well disclosed where big nodes come
together. There are critical points that you can find. If you
choose to scan the Internet, you will see these today where it
all comes together. And of course, it is--that becomes another
big issue as to who is in charge. How should we secure or
harden these particular environments?
So another area to think about in all of this conversation
is making sure we touch on the edges on the nature of the
physical distribution of the Internet. Now you might say,
``What are companies doing for themselves in the space, because
clearly they should be self-reliant?'' And we are pretty well.
But in a sense, what we do control, if you like, is the last
mile, the mile into our premises. But the millions of miles of
Internet, we have no control over and no say-so on its
deliverability or its resilience. So all of this traffic is
heading to a place where it is almost out of reach of the
businesses, but because of economic pressures, efficiency, and
almost an always-on environment which we demand nowadays, the
job is on.
So that broadly says that the problem is real. It is big
and probably getting bigger with time. And the dimensions are
not well aware with policy makers. In my job, I travel around
most of the world, and I would say the same level of lack of
knowledge of the dependency of real business, if you like,
world trade is now coming to the Internet.
Look at the United States where we have eight channels of
principle critical national infrastructure and trace it all
back, most of it ends up somewhere back on the Internet. So if
you look through energy, transportation, aviation, it all
comes, to some point, to some degree, to the Internet.
And then to look forward more optimistically say what there
is to do, I would offer there are two areas to think about. One
is fixing what we have. And we have heard from Mr. Purdy
various endeavors to do that. I would only add to his remarks
and say what business would look at isn't simply the risk
envelope but the consequences. Within a major corporation, as
in BP, the number of attempts or events per day that come into
the system is between a half million and a million attempts on
the Internet. Of those, only a handful really matter to the
company.
And the issue is how do you screen out the knives on the
Internet and get to the issues that actually ultimately take
out business and make it quite difficult. So working with that,
certainly businesses want to become more aligned with
activities of the agencies to bring forward the notion of risk
management and consequences into this conversation so that the
money is spent wisely on the right priorities. Because you can
imagine, you could do a ton of research across a large
landscape and not nail the problem.
So the question is how do you converge the issue in the
near-term, in the course of 2006, 2007, and 2008 to put this
into a much better state? So that is one aspect of the way
forward.
I think the other aspect of the way forward is really a new
conversation, and I will call it mixed generation Internet, not
Internet 2, which is basically in the scientific domain, but
looking 20 years out. Most of all, of the United States to
start a conversation that moves us to the next generation, if
you like, of public utility, i.e., in order so business can
progress. Already, in my travels to the Far East, countries
like South Korea and Japan are talking of moving to IPv6, and
so we are going to end up, at some stage, with different
initiatives in different geographies but no one really holding
the game plan, the overall strategic intent, or I would call
it, technology development map, even the governments. Who gets
to say in such a complex world?
So from my point of view, let me summarize and say the
issue is real. We should not be distracted into the near-term
issues alone, but also take the position, I think, through this
committee to discuss what is the nature of the strategic intent
for the future that ensures world trade carries on in the way
it is.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Leggate follows:]
Prepared Statement of John S. Leggate
BUSINESS CONCERNS FOR THE INTERNET
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE
The Internet is rapidly becoming the backbone of the world economy.
This is particularly true for the United States where the use of the
Internet underpins many aspects of the U.S. economy and national
critical infrastructure (e.g., energy, water, transportation). Given
this fundamental dependency on its continuous availability, the public
Internet must be better protected, managed and controlled. In the
longer-term, the U.S. should take a leadership role in creating the
next generation Global Internet.
SUMMARY OF THE ISSUE
The growth of Internet use has been nothing short of
extraordinary.\1\ Almost by stealth since the dot com collapse,
governments, public bodies and large and small scale businesses have
been transformed to operate with the Internet as a core piece of
business infrastructure. Businesses from all over the world have found
the Internet to be a cost effective and reliable business tool. Indeed,
in the last few years, in addition to conventional business
transactions, many of the controls systems (SCADA) that support
national and public utilities are adopting the Internet as a core data
transport method.\2\ This has resulted in businesses and societies
becoming critically dependent on the continuous operation of the
Internet.\3\
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\1\ Lazarus Research Group
\2\ Internet Security Systems
\3\ Jupiter Research
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Businesses have moved from dial-up and dedicated point to point
leased lines to committing mission critical digital traffic to operate
on the Internet, yet with no practical alternative to maintain business
continuity. However, the Internet is mostly run by groups of diverse
academic and non-profit organizations which operate via loose
consensus. Many governments have apparently not yet fully grasped that
national and international economies and their citizens are now
dependent on this network of networks--i.e., the global communications
backbone.
In its current operation the Internet has well known physical and
logical security weaknesses both nationally and globally. What is not
truly known is the potential business impact of these weaknesses on the
U.S. and the world economy. Continued operation is presumed, but is in
no way guaranteed. This is compounded by the poor understanding of
dependency/interdependencies between companies and critical
infrastructures supporting nations/regions.
Global competition has driven the need for ever increasing levels
of productivity and innovation from businesses and this has driven the
demand for cheaper and more ubiquitous communications. The nature of
the architecture of the Internet has allowed it to carry an ever
increasing variety of services, with ever decreasing costs. These
forces are driving applications, services and business processes from
every sector onto the Internet. Businesses that fail to exploit these
cost and performance advantages are at a competitive disadvantage.
Today, at moment there are some 200 million individuals active on
the Internet. By the end of 2005, at least one billion people will have
access to its enormous resources.\4\ Also there are as many automated
systems--including SCADA systems, CCTV, pipelines, electricity grids,
e-mail servers, inventory systems and medical monitoring devices. These
systems often communicate over the Internet without human intervention.
This machine-to-machine communication is growing dramatically and could
supplant interactive use by people in a few years.\5\
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\4\ Meta Research
\5\ ZDNet Research
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In 2004, $6.9 trillion of the $55.6 trillion of worldwide trade was
directly transacted over the Internet.\6\ Of the remaining trade there
was a significant proportion that relied on supporting activity using
the Internet for communication--including specification queries,
logistics and links between internal processes within companies. Even
financial institutions use the Internet for many routine electronic
funds transfers.\7\ Significantly, in 2004 and in the U.S. alone, 14.8
million high tech jobs relied directly on the Internet.\8\
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\6\ Forrester Research, Inc.
\7\ Forrester Research, Inc.
\8\ University of Texas-Austin
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In the past there have been attempts to address the issues of
security, operational stability and reliability but with limited
success. For example, work conducted by the President's Commission on
Critical Infrastructure Protection (PCCIP) nearly ten years ago, raised
vulnerabilities that are apparently yet to be addressed.\9\ It set a
goal of a reliable, interconnected, and secure information system
infrastructure by the year 2003. Is the context and sense of urgency
different today?
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\9\ PCCIP Report 1997
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This paper explains why the context is now so very different. In
the '80s and early '90s companies were not using the Internet in
anything like the same way or to the same scale as they do today.
Private networks were the common means of communication. The companies
providing Internet infrastructure were justified in treating identified
weaknesses as rather academic and with little economic importance.
However, things have changed and in ways that often only businesses
directly using the Internet can articulate.\10\ Companies can, and do,
take security measures to protect the systems they run and the services
directly under their immediate control. But they can do little, to
protect the external network infrastructure on which they rely or even
engage in a meaningful dialogue about fundamental performance
expectations. Previous work in evaluating risks to the Internet has
almost entirely focused around a dialogue between supply-side
telecommunications/IT companies and government.\11\ We therefore only
have half the picture, knowledge of interdependency between supply and
demand-side for Internet services clearly needs to be shared.
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\10\ See Appendix.
\11\ National Security Technology Advisory Committee (NSTAC) and
the National Infrastructure Assurance Council (NIAC).
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Even more troubling is that many demand-side organizations do not
realise how dependent they are on the Internet. Corporations have
become linked to the Internet in ways that are not always easily
discerned. For example, a major corporation that depends on a third
party's logistical services may be surprised to learn that their
supplier communicates internal orders and status using the Internet, or
that an electric utility they depend upon has moved its process control
network to run over the Internet.
These cascading dependencies all too quickly create `domino
effects' that are not obvious to the corporate customer or to the
policy-maker. They are usually only discovered during unplanned outages
when capabilities begin to degrade or fail in unexpected ways, or are
discovered during widely-based crisis management exercises. Businesses
and governments can plan for expected failures. But even the best
prepared organizations and corporations may be woefully inadequate in
responding to complex, low probability, high impact failures. If a
large scale Internet outage or significant reduction in performance
were to occur, the unexpected effects on whole sets of industries,
utilities and enterprise could have surprisingly large economic and
societal impacts.
Whether the failure of the Internet arises through error, a worm-
writers experiment, or more directed physical or cyber attacks,
vulnerabilities exist and this is a real and present risk. Recent
reports about ``Cyber attack'' attempts being developed and the posting
of hacker tools with directions on some of the extremist's websites may
be warning signs.
BROADER CONTEXT
It is worth recalling that the Internet was set up as a government
sponsored project, with the U.S. Government as the primary customer and
`anchor tenant.' Its creation was a bold and dramatic step-out that
went on to evolve into a remarkable resource that has significantly
exceeded the wildest imaginings of its creators. As a result it is
being used far beyond anything envisaged in the original designs.
Since its creation, the Internet has developed rapidly in scale,
but its technical design has progressed more through steady incremental
evolution than through any step change. The ``grass roots'' and
academically-based standards setting process of the Internet
Engineering Taskforce (IETF) has had great success. However, the down-
side of this consensus approach is that entity wide coordination and
alignment is difficult to achieve and step changes are difficult to
implement. Internet standards setters are a community of interest and
as such they share interests, but they do not share goals and
timescales in the way that a project with a clear mandate does.\12\
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\12\ Drawn from I-space theory. Max Boisot, INSEAD.
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This diversity of interest has been compounded by the loss of the
primary customer, i.e., the U.S. Government, driving operational
performance requirements, since they have started to use alternative
infrastructures for extra critical services. Instead of a single
`anchor tenant,' the Internet now has countless customers drawn from
many governments, corporations and individual users and is thus driven
by a very diverse range of agendas, without a clear priority setting
process. This will further slow change and adaptation to the new and
emerging context of Internet use.
The question we need to ask is whether incremental change will be
sufficient to address the current physical and digital integrity
weaknesses. The current deficiencies on the Internet may well be filled
by tactical repairs, but the potential gap of predictable demand for
high volume traffic with high quality services and the intractable
vulnerabilities will require a more radical approach. Arguably the
risks we are seeing, illustrated by spreading worms and viruses and
underlying common mode weaknesses in technologies and physical
infrastructure are systemic and systematic in nature.\13\ Systemic and
systematic risks can only be addressed through coordinated rather than
isolated action. A fact well illustrated by other complex systems such
as vaccination statistics and epidemiology in the medical world and in
the risk management intervention required in national and global
banking systems.\14\ Many of these risks have no geographic or country
boundaries--impact and influence is global.
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\13\ Illustrated by work from the Cooperative Association for
Internet Data Analysis (www.caida.org).
\14\ Drawn from standard epidemiology texts and banking risk texts
and the opinions of banking regulators.
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The widespread globalization of the Internet also introduces a
further development complexity. Scores of countries now have
fundamental interests in its evolution and some are even orchestrating
local step-changes in technology.\15\ However, no country has yet felt
able to propose fundamental change on a global basis. Within the U.S.,
the Internet is seen in many quarters as the starting point for the
National Information Infrastructure (NII). Around the world, there is
growing recognition that the set of NIIs (assuming each country commits
to developing one) should be compatible with each other in an--as yet--
undefined way. Who should take the lead in ensuring this compatibility?
There is clearly an important role for government leadership in framing
this strategic agenda--with strong collaboration with commerce and
business.
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\15\ For example, the broad introduction of IPv6 in Korea and
Japan.
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In practice, the technical scope of the Internet already goes
beyond that defined as ``Internet services.'' Ultimately, the
communication pathways must enter the user's machine/other digital
devices, pass through layers of software and end up in applications
programs. The computer industry, along with the many vendors of
computer-related equipment, must play a role in determining how this
aspect of the Internet will evolve and therefore form part of the
supply-side. A key to the success of the Internet is to ensure that the
interested parties have an equitable way of participating in its
evolution, including participation in its evolving standards process
and technology roadmap. A proper role for governments would be to
oversee this process to make sure that it meets the wide spectrum of
public and industry needs.
Yet further complexity and dependency is being introduced by a new
breed of service providers who are offering services that will continue
to supplant alternative networks. Telephony (through Voice Over IP),
television, radio and almost all forms of communication are migrating
to the Internet or including the Internet as a key component in the
communication path.
CONCLUSIONS ON CURRENT POSITION
There are no clear accountabilities or guarantees for
the continuity of operation of the Internet. Even weaknesses
known about for some time have not yet been addressed.
A significant and growing proportion of the world
economy is dependent on the Internet.
The Internet is currently subject to technical and
geopolitical risk and therefore not only the U.S. economy, but
economies worldwide, are at risk.
The U.S. Government itself is no longer fully
dependent on the Internet, as it has alternative networks at
its disposal for critical services. Thus the Internet has moved
from having a single `anchor tenant' to a diverse community of
stakeholders without a voice in the operational performance
expectations of the current Internet.
New technologies and emergent Internet uses, such as
Voice Over IP and widespread control system connectivity, are
increasing dependency and compounding the risk.
OPTIONS ON THE WAY FORWARD
We would consider a two-pronged approach, to address both the
immediate risk and the strategic opportunity:
1. Short-Term
To address immediate concerns a series of in-depth and as necessary
classified studies, workshops and truly cross-sectoral exercises should
be held to allow businesses (that deliver critical aspects of national
infrastructure--e.g., energy, transportation and financial) and
governments to share critical information under the Protected Critical
Infrastructure Information (PCII) Program. The goal of this work would
be to map the business reliance upon the Internet against known areas
of risk and develop a priority plan to focus actions that are necessary
for increasing its robustness and integrity.
The work could start with the scope of the U.S. economy in a global
context. Interdependency should then dictate that it be extended in the
first instance to other countries from the G8 and EU.
2. Medium-Term
There is a need to create the next generation Internet in a form
that would be able to handle the emerging demands of business, civil
societies and governments. This would include the technical design
necessary to meet physical and logical diversity and resilience. In
addition, the program should include the development of a Global
Internet Management Framework that addresses broad policies and
standards, clarity of operational accountabilities, and technology
roadmaps. The goal should be to assure the performance and digital
integrity of the new Global Internet, in terms of resilience to
physical and cyber-security risks, supplier commercial failure, and
broader geopolitical risks.
We believe the U.S. should take a leading role in this proposed
global initiative.
Thank you for the opportunity to express the views of the business
community. I look forward to continuing our conversation as our CEO
roundtable at BENS (Business Executives for National Security)
progresses. We look forward to contributing to the actions that we
propose.
APPENDIX
Business Criticality Data
Having recognized the potential for serious negative impact on the
U.S. critical national infrastructure in the event of a significant
interruption of Internet service, a group of concerned business people
carried out an informal survey of key sector companies in early 2005.
The graph below shows the findings from that survey, indicating the
level of dependency these sectors have on the Internet.
Biography for John S. Leggate
As CIO of BP, John Leggate is responsible for the development of
BP's digital capability--its related systems, technology, business
processes and business opportunities--across the company's global
operations, Exploration and Production, Refining and Marketing and
Trading.
John was elected a Fellow of the Royal Academy of Engineering in
July 2005. He was also honored as Commander, The Most Excellent Order
of the British Empire (CBE) by the Queen in her 2004 New Year's Honour
List. This is in recognition of an outstanding contribution and
leadership of the international digital technology agenda.
A chartered engineer, a graduate of Glasgow University and a Fellow
of the IEE, began his career in marine consultancy and nuclear energy
before joining BP Exploration in 1979. During the 1980-90s he held
posts of increasing responsibility in the management and operating of
BP's North Sea oil and gas assets.
In 1998, he was appointed President of BP's Azerbaijan
International Operating Company, in which capacity he was tasked to
manage BP's interests in the unfolding geopolitical and economic debate
that centered on crude oil export routes from the Caspian Sea.
John has a particular interest in leadership, the management of
high-performance teams and organizational change.
He is married with two children, lives in London and travels widely
on behalf of the company.
Chairman Boehlert. Thank you very much, Mr. Leggate.
Mr. Kepler.
STATEMENT OF MR. DAVID E. KEPLER, CORPORATE VICE PRESIDENT OF
SHARED SERVICES AND CHIEF INFORMATION OFFICER, THE DOW CHEMICAL
COMPANY
Mr. Kepler. Thank you, Chairman Boehlert and Ranking Member
Gordon, for allowing me to share my thoughts on this important
topic.
Mr. Chairman, before I begin, our thoughts and prayers go
out to the millions of Americans, including many of our 7,000
employees, on the Gulf Coast who have lost so much from
Hurricane Katrina.
The importance of information infrastructure for
communications and emergency response in a national crisis has
never been more apparent.
I am Dave Kepler, Corporate Vice President of Shared
Services and Chief Information Officer of the Dow Chemical
Company, the world's largest chemical and plastics producer.
I am also here as Chairman of the Executive Board of our
Industry Cyber Security Program. Our mission is to understand,
prior-itize, and coordinate our efforts to address cyber
security risks.
Today, I would like to discuss the role of information
technology in our sector, describe the cyber security threats
we face, and highlight what is being done to address these
threats. I will also suggest areas where I think government can
help.
With $109 billion in exports, the chemical industry is the
largest exporter in the U.S. economy. We employ one million
Americans and are one of the largest private industry investors
in research and development. Our products help keep the water
we drink safe, increase productivity of agriculture, enable
medical innovations, and are essential to homeland defense and
the war on terror.
It is in our nation's interest to have a competitive
chemical industry. Information technology is key in maintaining
that competitiveness. At Dow, information technology is fully
integrated into all aspects of our business, and advanced
technology is used to secure our facilities. We rely on the
automation and integration of our processes to drive
productivity, quality, and safety.
The Internet is a valuable communications tool essential to
public safety and emergency response. For example, when all of
the phone service was disrupted from the hurricane, Dow was
able to use the Internet and Internet-based phones to
communicate with our people in the region.
In 2004, chemical industry executives conducted an industry
vulnerability assessment. We concluded that, unlike an attack
on other critical infrastructures, a security breach from cyber
would not cause cascading impact across the chemical industry.
However, we believe the highest concern for our industry is the
potential of a combined physical and cyber attack.
There are three specific areas for concern in the chemical
industry.
One, using information on shipments, product inventory, or
sites to construct a physical attack. That is why Dow has set
in place practices, policies, and technologies to protect
critical plant systems and corporate networks.
Two, using false identity to acquire chemicals for improper
use. Our company counters this threat by pre-identifying and
verifying customers.
Three, gaining inappropriate access to systems to cause
isolated disruptions. At Dow, operating practices and
authentication technologies are continuously being upgraded to
restrict access based on roles and clearances.
Our company has conducted a comprehensive cyber security
risk analysis, and we have used the Sandia National Lab's
methodology for assessing vulnerabilities for our sites and
manufacturing facilities. Dow has developed a cyber security
management plan, and we continue to test and upgrade our plans
in all areas of security.
But we cannot address cyber security threats alone.
Security of the communications and Internet infrastructure is
beyond any one sector's control. Protecting these vital assets
from a significant attack, whether physical, cyber, or a
combination, is of utmost importance.
So what role does government play?
The Department of Homeland Security must contend with the
real threat of attacks by people, organizations, or nations
intent on causing significant disruptions to our economy and
way of life. Protecting communications in the event of a
national emergency must be a priority along with threat
monitoring and modeling, authentication methods and information
protection. We must understand how to prevent attacks, what is
needed to defend against attacks, and how to recover
infrastructure from a catastrophic failure. Department of
Homeland Security resources and R&D efforts must be dedicated
to the big picture.
In closing, we are encouraged by the Department's work to
provide--the work with the private sector to reduce
vulnerabilities and minimize the severity of cyber attacks. But
more needs to be done to share and protect relevant information
across all sectors and government. Government crisis management
and disaster recovery plans must include industry
participation, coordinated emergency response, and ongoing
monitoring, and managed recovery efforts with government and
industry together are critical.
Thank you, and I will be happy to answer any questions at
the end.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Kepler follows:]
Prepared Statement of David E. Kepler
Thank you Chairman Boehlert and Ranking Member Gordon for allowing
me to share my thoughts on this important topic.
Mr. Chairman, before I begin, our thoughts and prayers go out to
the millions of Americans, including many of our 7,000 employees on the
gulf coast who have lost so much from Hurricane Katrina.
Our number one priority is the safety and well-being of our
employees and the communities impacted by this disaster. We are
committed to safely returning our facilities to full operation and
contributing to the recovery efforts. The importance of information
infrastructure for communications and emergency response in a national
crisis has never been more apparent.
I'm Dave Kepler, Corporate Vice President of Shared Services and
Chief Information Officer of The Dow Chemical Company. Dow is the
world's largest chemical and plastics producer with annual sales of
over $40 billion serving customers in markets such as: food,
transportation, health and medicine, personal and home care, and
building and construction.
I am also here as the Chairman of the Executive Board of the
Chemical Sector Cyber Security Program. This effort was established in
2002 to coordinate the sector's activity and to align with the U.S.
Government's National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace. The program's
mission is to understand the risks we face as a sector and coordinate
and prioritize our efforts to reduce those risks. Leadership for this
program is provided by the chemical industry's leading CIOs, and
leverages expertise from existing organizations: chemical trade
associations, the Chemical Industry Data Exchange, and the Chemical
Sector Information Sharing and Analysis Center.
The five strategic elements of the program are:
Broad support and participation throughout the sector
Engagement with government to ensure effective
measures to secure cyberspace
Identification and reduction of infrastructure
vulnerabilities to guard against cyber attacks and speed
recovery from incidents
Establishment of management practices and guidance to
support overall sector cyber security
Ongoing coordination with technology providers,
government and academia to accelerate development of improved,
cost-effective solutions.
The program produced comprehensive cyber security guidance which
was built into the Responsible Care Security Code in 2004.
Implementation of the Responsible Care Security Code is mandatory for
all members of the American Chemistry Council and has also been adopted
by the Synthetic Organic Chemical Manufacturers Association.
Our sector continues to work closely with the Department of
Homeland Security, standards bodies such as the National Institute of
Standards and Technology (NIST) and industry organizations such as
Instrumentation Systems and Automation (ISA) to share the latest best
practices and to develop new standards to defend against cyber attacks.
Today, I would like to discuss the role of information technology
in our sector, describe the cyber security threats we face and
highlight what is being done to address these threats. I will also
suggest areas where the government can help.
Let me begin by outlining the importance of our sector to our
nation's economic well-being and security--enabling 25 percent of our
nation's GDP. With $109 billion dollars in exports, the chemical
industry is the largest exporter in the U.S. economy. We employ one
million Americans and are one of the largest private industry investors
in research and development. Our industry makes modern life possible,
from plastics to pharmaceuticals, from cars to clothing. Our products
help keep the water we drink safe, increase productivity of
agriculture, and enable medical innovations that prevent and treat
disease. Our industry is also essential to homeland defense and the war
on terror--making products that go into bullet-resistant vests, night
vision goggles and stealth aircraft.
Our industry's safety culture and history of cooperative voluntary
initiatives, partnerships with local, State and Federal Government
agencies, and strong support for research and development, position us
well to address new security challenges. For example, the industry
joined forces to develop the American Chemistry Council's Responsible
Care Security Code--building upon long-standing industry safety and
emergency response programs.
All aspects of security are integrated into the Security Code
including physical plant security, transportation security, as well as
cyber security. Implementation of the Responsible Care Security Code is
mandatory for all American Chemistry Council members leading to over $2
billion in investments to improve security and preparedness across our
industry.
Cyber security has been on our radar screen long before the tragic
events of 9/11. At Dow, for example, we have had policies and practices
in place for securing our information assets for many years. These
cover the use of the Internet, integration of systems, and automation
of manufacturing control. The emergence of a significant terrorist
threat with the events of 9/11 added urgency and focus to our efforts.
It was this event that prompted the establishment of the Chemical
Sector Cyber Security program.
It's in our national interest to have a competitive chemical
industry, and information technology is key in maintaining that
competitiveness. At Dow, information technology is fully integrated
into all aspects of our business--research and development,
manufacturing, accounting, logistics and sales to name just a few. We
also use information technology to interact with government agencies
and to report our regulatory compliance. Advanced technology is also
being leveraged to secure our facilities and the distribution of our
products. We rely on automation and integration of our processes to
drive productivity, quality, and safety.
At Dow, approximately 15 percent of our orders are via the
Internet, and nearly all of our customers use the Internet to learn
about our products, track orders, and get technical support. The
Internet is also a valuable communications tool--essential to public
safety and emergency response. For example, in the aftermath of Katrina
when all phone service was disrupted, Dow was able to use Internet
based phones to communicate with our facilities in the region.
In 2004, chemical company executives conducted an industry-level
vulnerability assessment to determine the potential impact of cyber
security threats. We concluded that, unlike an attack on other critical
infrastructures, a cyber security breach would not cause cascading
impact across the chemical industry.
We believe the higher concern for our industry is the potential of
a combined physical and cyber attack or the criminal use of illegally
obtained information.
There are three specific areas of concern for the chemical
industry:
1. Using information on shipments, product inventory, or sites
to construct a physical attack. That's why Dow has set in place
policies, practices and technologies to protect the linkage of
critical plant systems with corporate networks.
2. Using false identity to acquire chemicals for improper use.
Our company counters this threat by pre-identifying and
verifying our customers before electronic orders.
3. Gaining inappropriate access to systems to cause isolated
disruptions. At Dow, operating practices and authentication
technology is continuously being upgraded to restrict what
people can do based on roles and clearances.
For obvious reasons, I cannot get into all we do to protect
ourselves, but here are some additional steps that Dow has taken to
combat these threats.
Addressing people, process and technology, we have:
Developed a company-wide cyber security management
plan that includes incident management and business continuity.
Completed a comprehensive cyber security risk
analysis based on the ISO information security standard, ISO/
IEC 17799.
Used the U.S. Government Sandia National Labs
methodology for assessing vulnerability of our sites and
manufacturing facilities--including a review of physical,
process, and cyber vulnerabilities.
We continue to test and upgrade our plans in all areas of security.
Although much has been done within the chemical sector, we cannot
address cyber security threats alone. Security of the Nation's
telecommunications and Internet infrastructure is beyond any one
sector's control. Protecting the Nation's critical communication and
information infrastructure from a significant attack, whether physical,
cyber, or combined, is of the utmost importance.
So, what role should the government play? While there are many
issues impacting secure computing today such as random hacking and the
e-mail virus of the day, the Department of Homeland Security must
contend with the real threat of attacks by people, organizations or
nations--intent on causing significant disruption to our economy and
way of life. Targeted attacks that could have a major economic or
social impact must be the priority as well as protecting our
communications capability in the event of a national emergency.
Department of Homeland Security resources and research and
development efforts should be dedicated to addressing these `big
picture' threats to benefit all sectors and improve our national
security. Threat monitoring and modeling, better methods for
authenticating identity, and information protection should be research
priorities. Efforts should include understanding how to prevent
attacks, what resources and tools are needed to defend against attacks,
and what it would take to reconstitute our information technology
infrastructure in the event of a catastrophic failure.
We are encouraged by the Department's work with the public and
private sectors to reduce vulnerabilities and minimize the severity of
cyber attacks. But, more needs to be done around the sharing and
protection of relevant information across all critical sectors and
government. Finally, government crisis management and disaster recovery
plans must include industry participation. As witnessed in the
aftermath of Katrina--coordinated emergency response, ongoing
monitoring, and managed recovery efforts with government and industry
are critical.
We believe continued and expanded cooperation between our critical
sector, the Department of Homeland Security and other government
agencies as well as information technology providers is vital to reduce
vulnerabilities and enhance preparedness.
Any efforts to improve cyber security must:
Start and end with the commitment to be a risk-based,
outcome-focused program. DHS must focus on the real threat of
criminal attacks by people, organizations or nations.
Recognize that cyber security is an integral part of
overall security, and build upon the work to date of the
chemical sector security programs such as the Responsible Care
Security Code and the Chemical Sector Cyber Security Program.
Recognize the high degree of integration of the
chemical sector with other critical infrastructure sectors, as
well as the importance of our industry to our homeland defense
and economic security.
In closing, we are committed to ensuring the security of our
company and to taking a leadership role in improving overall security
across our industry. Information sharing and continued cooperation
between our sector and the Department of Homeland Security is critical.
Above all else, efforts must be focused on those threats of greatest
impact and concern to our national security, while addressing the
unique needs of each sector.
Thank you and I'd be happy to answer any questions.
Biography for David E. Kepler
D.E. (Dave) Kepler is Corporate Vice President of Shared Services
and Chief Information Officer (CIO) of The Dow Chemical Company. In
this capacity, Kepler has global responsibility for Customer Service,
Information Systems, Purchasing, Six Sigma, Supply Chain and Work
Process Improvement. He is also a member of the Office of the Chief
Executive (OCE).
Kepler joined Dow in 1975 in the Western Division Computer and
Process Systems group. After progressive Commercial and Information
Systems roles throughout the United States, Canada and the Pacific, he
was named Director of Chemicals and Plastics Information Systems in
1993. In 1995, Kepler assumed additional responsibility as Director of
Global Information Systems Applications. He was appointed Vice
President and CIO in February 1998, and in 2000, assumed the role of
Corporate Vice President of eBusiness. In 2002, Kepler undertook
commercial responsibility for the Advanced Electronic Materials
business and further expanded his role the following year, adding
responsibility for Global Purchasing and Supply Chain. Kepler assumed
his most recent role in January 2004.
Kepler serves on the Board of Directors of the U.S. Chamber of
Commerce. He is a member of the American Chemical Society and the
American Institute of Chemical Engineers. In addition, he leads the
Executive Committee of the Chemical Sector Cyber Security Program.
Locally, Kepler serves on the Board of Directors for the Midland
Community Cancer Services and Alden B. Dow Museum of Science and Art.
He was the 2004 United Way of Midland County Campaign Chair.
Kepler received a Bachelor's degree in chemical engineering from
the University of California at Berkeley.
Chairman Boehlert. Thank you very much, Mr. Kepler.
Mr. Freese.
STATEMENT OF MR. GERALD S. FREESE, DIRECTOR OF ENTERPRISE
INFORMATION SECURITY, AMERICAN ELECTRIC POWER
Mr. Freese. Mr. Chairman and distinguished Members of this
committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you
today.
My name is Gerry Freese, Director of Enterprise Information
Security at American Electric Power. I am also here
representing the North American Electrical Reliability Council
in Princeton, New Jersey.
AEP is the largest provider of electricity in the country
with over five million customers in 11 states, and I am
responsible for information security for all corporate and
operational systems and networks, including those used in the
operation of the bulk power system.
Before I address the three questions posed to the
presenters, I would like to preface my remarks.
In the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, we have seen the
suffering and the unprecedented devastation in Louisiana and
Mississippi. We have seen the confusion and chaos when
essential services were no longer functioning. We have seen how
critical infrastructure can be destabilized and destroyed when
links are broken in its complex chain of multiple
interdependencies. Whether the cause is a natural disaster or a
terrorist attack, the impact on people and the economy is
horrendous.
Critical infrastructure industries, by virtue of their
interdependencies, have a responsibility to work across all
sectors, and this includes the Federal Government, to mitigate
risk, ensure service continuity and an expeditious recovery in
the event of a natural or manmade disaster.
This hearing is timely in its intent to explore means to
expand the cooperation and collaboration between the private
and public critical infrastructure sectors.
Now for responses to the three questions.
For the first question, the electricity sector has, in many
cases, developed its own telecommunications network for
conducting electricity operations, but it is steadily becoming
more reliant on public networks. The electric sector uses these
public networks for many functions with the net result that its
interfaces with the telecommunications sector have become more
numerous and complex. Both sectors are working together to
better understand their levels of operational integration and
in ways the vulnerability in either of these sectors impacts
the other.
Because of these complex and critical interdependencies, it
is fairly clear that serious damage or disruption of
telecommunications could seriously undermine the operation and
reliability of the electricity infrastructure. Accordingly, the
electric sector has taken some decisive steps to secure the
cyber and physical resources and will continue to invest in
comprehensive and effective security measures. We have interim
cyber security standards in place right now and are working
diligently to move through the approval process for a
permanent, more expansive critical infrastructure protection
standard.
The final product will strengthen cyber security across the
electric sector and lay the groundwork for greater
collaboration between industry and government.
In response to the second question, the electric industry
views government entities, such as DHS and DOE, as partners in
sector cyber security. In fact, we have worked extensively with
DHS, DOE representatives, the National Labs, and others to try
and identify areas of focus for good security and determine
means to carry out what we all see as primary responsibilities
for national security.
We believe the office of the Assistant Secretary for Cyber
Security and Telecommunications should focus on several
specific areas covering private and public sector cooperation.
These areas center on greater awareness of critical
infrastructure interdependencies, information sharing between
government and the private sector, and true, non-prescriptive
partnerships. I would be happy to elaborate on those three
points in the question-and-answer period, if it is possible.
As to the third question regarding possible research and
development opportunities, the electric sector is interested in
continuing to work closely with DOE on the work being done at
the Idaho National Lab. We believe it holds great promise as
one of the best and most efficient means of stimulating
research and developing technical solutions to the present
cyber security problems. DOE and DHS have provided leadership
and support on this initiative, and the electricity industry is
committed to its success.
Regarding inadequacies of the electric sector security
solution, the present electric infrastructure has been built
over many years and various types of process control systems
produced by a diverse set of vendors. These legacy systems are
a large part of the reason that new technology security
solutions cannot be more widely deployed across the industry.
The long-term solution to this is to begin a process of
rebuilding the old infrastructure with the ultimate goal of
replacing it with next-generation equipment and technology. The
new infrastructure would be based on greater levels of security
and reliability with enhanced design recognition of the
interdependencies between the electric and telecommunications
sectors.
Work is already underway in this area. The
Telecommunications and Electric Power Interdependencies Task
Force is exploring the next generation of public networks and
how the electricity sector will be able to use these networks
of the future through the employment of more sophisticated
encryption technology and other security measures.
Cyber security is evolving rapidly, and all of us working
in the discipline are tirelessly seeking more effective
solutions for protecting our critical assets and systems. We
appreciate your interest in this topic and welcome your
assistance in helping us to ensure our critical infrastructures
are protected, secure, and reliable.
Thank you for your attention.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Freese follows:]
Prepared Statement of Gerald S. Freese
Mr. Chairman and distinguished Members of this committee, thank you
for the opportunity to appear before you today. My name is Gerry
Freese. I am the Director of Enterprise Information Security for the
American Electric Power Company in Columbus, Ohio. AEP is the largest
supplier of electricity in the country, with over five million
customers in 11 states. I am responsible for information security for
all of AEP's corporate and operational systems and networks, including
those used for the operation of the bulk electric system.
My reason for being here today is to talk about the cyber security
needs and activities of the entire electricity sector, one of North
America's most critical infrastructures. During my career, I have
worked with numerous industry-wide committees addressing the growing
need for increased security for information and cyber systems. This
need is underscored by the sheer expanse and diversity of the
electricity sector, which is made up of large and small entities,
publicly, privately, and government owned and operated. Through
industry groups and as individual companies, we have always placed
great emphasis and the highest priority on the need to protect our
information systems and effectively secure the data residing on them.
Before I address the three questions posed to the presenters by the
Committee, I want to make two points.
First, our industry has long-term and positive working
relationships with federal agencies, including the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) and the Department of Energy (DOE). We value
these relationships and want to work collaboratively to improve them
even further. The recent recognition from DOE and DHS of the
Electricity Sector Coordinating Council (ESCC) is a positive step. We
firmly believe the relationships between federal agencies and the
industry are working well because both the electricity sector and the
federal agencies recognize the value in jointly addressing issues. Both
the industry and government recognize the difficulties posed by
prescriptive mandates and overly rigid rules and regulations that
stifle creative solutions to problems.
Second, our industry continues to have concerns about the security
of information after it is provided to the government. The electric
infrastructure is one of the most critical infrastructures servicing
the Nation and allowing us to maintain our way of life. Certain
technical, architectural and operational aspects and details must be
kept secure so they will not be inadvertently disclosed to those who
would try to disrupt or destroy our social, political or economic
fabric. We believe the Critical Infrastructure Information (CII)
approach meets most of the needs for critical information protection
but have been frustrated by an evident lack of progress in fully
implementing this important safeguard.
I will now respond to the three questions posed by the committee.
In response to the first question, the electricity sector has, in many
cases, built its own telecommunications networks but is steadily
becoming more reliant on public networks as well. The electricity
sector uses the public networks for many functions including customer
service and information exchange via the Internet. It also uses the
Internet and the public networks for a limited amount of telemonitoring
of the electrical system, although this varies by individual electric
company. The interdependencies between the telecommunications sector
and the electricity sector are numerous and complex. Because of these
complex and critical interdependencies, serious damage or disruption of
the telecommunications infrastructure would seriously undermine the
operation and operability of the electricity infrastructure. Both
sectors are working together to better understand their criticality and
the ways that vulnerabilities in either of these sectors impacts the
other.
Securing the extensive, distributed and critical electric power
infrastructure is a huge responsibility that the electricity industry
takes very seriously. We have already taken decisive steps to secure
our cyber and physical resources and will continue to invest in
comprehensive and effective security measures. We have interim cyber
security standards in place and are working diligently to move through
the approval process a permanent, more expansive Critical
Infrastructure Protection (CIP) standard. The permanent standard will
strengthen cyber security across the electricity sector and lay the
groundwork for greater collaboration between the industry and
government.
In response to the second question, DHS can assist the electricity
sector in cyber security by continuing its support of security
activities like Carnegie Mellon's Computer Emergency Readiness team.
DHS also has been very supportive of other information sharing
activities, which adds value to our industry's security initiatives.
Another more recent example is the Process Control Security Forum. This
group is made up of several key industry sectors that use process
control systems and includes government representatives, academics, and
vendors. The forum is working to develop design guidelines for the next
generation of more secure control systems and is looking at what can be
done to improve existing systems. As the forum continues to make
progress, the possibility of seed money from DHS should be considered
to stimulate the implementation of the ideas and concepts developed.
Another way that DHS can assist the electricity sector is by
helping coordinate research initiatives taking place in cyber security.
Many of the most prestigious institutions in America are engaged in
research and development in this area. The missing element that hinders
real progress is an overall coordination plan to avoid competition for
funding and duplication of effort. The coordination should extend
beyond the borders of the United States because a number of other
countries such as Australia, Canada, Great Britain, and Japan have also
made cyber security a top priority.
The third question focused on current inadequacies in security and
possible research and development opportunities. The electricity
industry is interested in continuing to work closely with DOE on the
work being done at the Idaho National Laboratory. We believe it holds
great promise as one of the best and most efficient means of
stimulating research and developing technical solutions to the present
shortfalls in cyber security. DOE and DHS have provided leadership and
support on this initiative and the electricity industry is committed to
its success. Again, DHS should coordinate this work with other projects
in this topic, both domestically and internationally.
The present electric infrastructure has been built over many years
with various types of process control systems produced by a large
number of vendors. The long-term solution to present inadequacies is to
build out the old infrastructure with the next generation of
technologies and equipment. The new infrastructure will be based on
greater levels of security and reliability, enhanced design, and
recognition of the interdependencies between the electricity sector and
the communications sector. Very interesting work is already taking
place in this area. The Telecommunications and Electric Power
Interdependencies Task Force is exploring the next generation of public
networks and how the electricity sector will be able to use these
networks of the future through the employment of more sophisticated
encryption and other security measures.
The cyber security arena is evolving rapidly and all of us working
in the field find it to be an exciting and stimulating professional
challenge. Operational and security technologies are changing quickly.
We appreciate your interest in the topic and welcome your assistance in
helping us to ensure that our critical infrastructures are protected
and secure well in the future. Thank you for your attention.
Biography for Gerald S. Freese
Gerald Freese is the Managing Director of Enterprise Information
Security at American Electric Power. He is responsible for defining,
developing and executing all information security programs to
effectively protect AEP data and systems, including critical digital
control systems. He is responsible for regulatory compliance and
critical infrastructure protection for cyber security, and has been
instrumental in the development of cyber security standards for the
energy industry. Gerald Freese is a recognized security and
infrastructure protection expert who brings a powerful combination of
leadership, domain experience, technological vision and strategy
development to American Electric Power. He is the company's primary
data security architect, and a strong proponent of industry and
government partnerships for critical infrastructure protection.
Prior to accepting a position at American Electric Power, Mr.
Freese was the Director of Security Intelligence at Vigilinx, Inc.,
where he developed an early warning and data analysis process to
identify computer-based threats and attack profiles. He has authored in
depth analytical papers on cyber-activities relative to geopolitical
threat environments and has testified before congress on critical
infrastructure interdependencies and control system security. Mr.
Freese is a retired naval Cryptologic Officer with extensive experience
in computer security and information warfare. He has held other
leadership positions in the information technology industry with Perot
Systems and General Dynamics Advanced Information Systems.
Mr. Freese is a Certified Information Systems Security Professional
(CISSP). He holds a Bachelor's degree from State University of New York
(Albany), and a Master's degree in Information and Telecommunications
Systems from Johns Hopkins University in Baltimore, Maryland.
Chairman Boehlert. Thank you very much.
Mr. Geisse. After that wonderful introduction by Mr. Akin,
I want to make sure we hear you.
STATEMENT OF MR. ANDREW M. GEISSE, CHIEF INFORMATION OFFICER,
SBC SERVICES, INC.
Mr. Geisse. It doesn't go against my five minutes, does it?
Okay. Thank you, Chairman Boehlert, Ranking Member Gordon,
other Members of the Committee. And I would like to thank
Congressmen Akin and Sessions for that unexpected and kind
introduction.
I am pleased to represent SBC Communications on this panel
focused on cyber security within critical industries.
SBC has a long history of providing reliable communication
services. We provide voice and data communication services as a
local exchange carrier in 13 states. We also provide services
nationally as a long distance provider, data services provider,
and Internet services. We have a national wireless presence
with BellSouth in Cingular Wireless, and we recognize the
importance of our nation's critical communications
infrastructure and the role that it plays for the security of
the United States and its citizens. Integrity and reliability
of our networks have been cornerstones of the communications
industry.
At SBC, we implement both physical and cyber security
measures that protect both our customer-serving networks as
well as our internal information systems networks. Physical
security measures include things like guard services, card key
IDs, visible badge policies, video monitoring, and in special
cases, biometric type security.
Information security, though, begins with the employee, and
it begins as being part of our code of business conduct that
every employee has to read and sign off on each year. We
segment our internal network connections from our external
network connections using various security technologies to
ensure the integrity of our networks. We keep our internal core
business network separate from the general employee network,
and we use virus protection software, of course, on all of our
PCs as well as our e-mail servers.
Proactive vulnerability scanning is a key part of our
strategy, and it is something that we do on a daily basis. SBC
maintains close ties to government agencies responsible for
national security. We work closely with them on a daily basis
to receive and share security-related information. Examples are
the National Security Telecommunications Advisory Council, the
National Coordinating Center Telecom Information Sharing and
Analysis Center, Infragard, and the National Security
Information Exchange.
Continued government focus on security standards and
collaborative support organizations is seen positively by SBC;
providing research assistance, grants, and funds to focus the
information technology industry to work towards security
standards and best practices is absolutely necessary. It is
important that the government provides to the critical
industries that are part of our infrastructure the best
practices that they learn from their own cyber security
agencies.
Society in the 21st century is rapidly changing with
increasing reliance on information technologies. Users expect
that they be mobile and that they have access to the Internet
and e-mail wherever they are. Providing secure services in the
environment becomes increasingly important and challenging.
Federal programs could help educate and assist consumers to
understand their roles and responsibilities in a connected
world.
As recognized by the Department of Homeland Security, the
Nation is dependent on the critical infrastructure of
communications, banking and finance, power, food, health,
information technology, and others. A disruption to any
component of those affects the whole infrastructure. Securing
against disruptions of any component is a best interest of all
of us.
The communication industry is also increasingly dependent
on application and information technology vendors to ensure the
products they provide are of the highest quality and integrity.
Software and hardware that does not meet industry standards or
best practices require additional efforts and expense to meet
its expected function. Vendors that provide software or
hardware with security vulnerabilities that must be continually
monitored, reviewed, patched drain on a company's resources and
a liability to companies that must ensure the integrity of
their own systems, data, and services.
As a result, cyber security must become a priority in the
creation of new information technologies. To date, security
components are often an afterthought. I mean, you can look at
cellular and Wi-fi when they first came out in the ability to
intercept calls, clone phones, and data snooping where they
could occur.
Internet protocol-based services wrestle constantly with
the need to traverse the same network paths where unscrupulous
persons may have the ability to interfere, impede, or intrude
on the service itself. IP-based services must find new ways to
protect the content of each packet that is carried and
delivered in the shared Internet world. SBC is committed to
work with the information industry to help build the next
generation of Internet-based voice and video and data services
securely.
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, your assistance
to focus industry attention on cyber security is greatly
appreciated. We encourage the Department of Homeland Security
to continue to support research grants and assistance that
focus on national cyber security, to support industry
organizations and government agencies that create security
standards and best practices, to continue to provide early
warnings of security events through various government
agencies, and to make sure that the government-identified
security best practices are shared with our private, critical
infrastructure industries.
I would like to add that you make sure that our laws carry
serious penalties for cyber security issues and that the
instigators are prosecuted to the full extent of the law. It
must become a major crime. It is no longer just kids playing
with computers. It is a real threat and the attacks are
serious.
Thank you for the opportunity to appear here today. The
work you are doing is critical to our future as a nation. Cyber
terrorism is a real threat, and we must stay diligent.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Geisse follows:]
Prepared Statement of Andrew M. Geisse
Thank you, Chairman Boehlert, Ranking Member Gordon and Members of
the Committee.
I am pleased to represent SBC Communications on this panel focused
on cyber security within our nation's critical industries.
SBC has a long history of providing reliable communication
services. SBC provides voice and data communications services as a
local exchange carrier within thirteen states and nationally with long
distance, data and Internet services. We also have a national wireless
presence in Cingular Wireless in a partnership with BellSouth. We
recognize the importance of our nation's critical communication
infrastructure and the role it plays for the protection of the United
States and its citizens. Integrity and reliability of our networks have
been historic cornerstones of the communications industry.
As society becomes more and more dependent on information
technology, cyber security must be a priority to protect the services
provided by those same resources.
How does the communications sector depend on public and private
information systems?
SBC well understands the strong connection between communications
security and information technology, or what is commonly referred to as
cyber security.
Behind the networks that move voice and data, are many
applications, private networks, and computing resources. These
resources support the operations, administration, maintenance, and
provisioning services of our telecommunications infrastructure. These
information systems and networks provide SBC and other carriers the
ability to manage this complex industry supporting the dial tone and
Internet connections that we have all come to expect as a part of our
daily lives. Securing these cyber resources to ensure the integrity and
availability of communications networks is a role that SBC takes
seriously, as part of its corporate culture.
SBC uses many vendor products within its information technology
infrastructure. In that regard, SBC is dependent on vendor product
development in the private sector and delivery of private sector
services and materials to support the information technology services
of the infrastructure. In this manner, SBC relies on vendors to
incorporate cyber security best practices, standard interfaces, and
administrative tools within their products. SBC is also reliant on
vendors to ensure their software products can be patched easily to
prevent existence of long-term vulnerabilities.
In support of the private sector, SBC provides managed security
services as a product offering. These types of services include: risk
reviews and analysis, firewall installation and monitoring, and
firewall and intrusion prevention/detection reseller for other vendor
products.
For the consumer space, SBC's Internet Services organization
through our relationship with Yahoo! provides security tools to our
Internet Services customers as part of their Internet experience. In
this manner, SBC supports cyber security to the consumer so they can
better protect their home information technologies, which in turn
provides less problems to the shared Internet space.
Other areas where SBC has focused on consumer cyber security is as
a founding member of the Internet NOC Hotline, which connects key U.S.
and International ISPs. SBC is also a founding member of the Global
Infrastructure Alliance for Internet Security.
An area where SBC would recommend government focus is on the
education of the consumers regarding cyber security matters. End users
must recognize they are part of the interconnected world. When end-
users do not understand how virus and worm propagation can impact their
home PCs, the result is a negative effect at the Internet level. This
impact is caused through a variety of malicious activities, including,
SPAM e-mails and bot-networks. Educational awareness programs should
advise users on anti-virus protection and identity theft protection.
What steps is SBC taking to secure its systems?
At SBC, we implement physical and cyber security measures that
protect both our customer-serving network facilities and our internal
information services. Physical security measures include guard
services, card key technologies, visible badge policies, video
monitoring, and, in special cases, bio-metric technologies.
Information security begins with a cyber security policy that is
part of our Corporate Code of Business Conduct. We segment our internal
network connections from external networks using various security
technologies to ensure the integrity of our network. We keep our
internal core business networks separate from the general employee
network. Virus protection software is deployed as standard on desktops
and e-mail servers. Pro-active vulnerability scanning is performed
constantly to identify potential areas of risk.
SBC maintains close ties to government agencies responsible for
national security. We work closely with them on a daily basis to
receive and share security related information. Examples are the
National Security Telecommunications Advisory Council (NSTAC), National
Coordinating Center Telecom Information Sharing and Analysis Center
(NCC Telecom ISAC), Infragard, and the National Security Information
Exchange (NSIE).
Internally, SBC has several organizations dedicated to the security
of our assets. Organizations such as our National Security/Emergency
Preparedness organization, our Asset Protection organization, and our
Corporate Information Security organization, work to protect our
customers information and services, our employees, and our internal
networks and data on a daily basis.
Our SBC Labs business unit works closely with technology vendors,
academic communities, and government standards organizations, to
partner and share information on new technologies. Cyber security
standards are always a priority in future service and technology
development and a focus of our internal auditing organization as well
as external security audits.
Continued Government focus on security standards and collaborative
support organizations is seen positively by SBC. Providing research
assistance, grants, and funds to focus the information technology
industry to work towards security standards and best practices is
necessary. It is important that the Government provides to the critical
infrastructure industries the learnings and best practices that its
cyber security agencies learn.
Legislation should not always be necessary to bring industry
attention to technical priorities. However, providing research
assistance, grants, and funds to focus the information technology
industry to work towards security standards and best practices is
necessary.
What are the possible consequences for the communication sector of
disruption or attack on information systems?
Society in the 21st century is rapidly changing with increasing
reliance on information technologies. Users' expectations are that they
be mobile and have instant access to the Internet and their e-mail.
Providing secure services in this environment becomes increasingly
important and challenging. Federal programs could help educate and
assist consumers to understand their roles and responsibilities in a
connected world.
To illustrate: Consider how often people stop for gas and use a
payment card at the pumps for convenience. The payment card
transactions must be carried efficiently, reliably, and securely across
communications networks. This is to ensure the gas vendor, the payment
card vendor, and the customer are all satisfied that the transaction
occurred to everyone's expectation.
The networks, the applications, and the information systems that
are necessary to complete transactions of this nature are part of our
society on a daily basis. Cyber security is necessary to ensure the
integrity of those transactions. Disruptions within the communications
sector can impact these, and other, daily activities.
Consider the impact of disrupted or unreliable communications to
everyday needs, including how patients obtain collaborative health care
between multiple providers and locations. Communications plays ever
increasing importance to health industries, emergency first responders,
911 services, law enforcement, banking, power, and other parts of our
society that serve critical functions.
With the growing use of wireless technologies, we must recognize
that those wireless systems still rely on an underlying physical
transport, use of back-end systems and applications that may
interconnect with other carriers. As we have recently witnessed in New
Orleans and the Gulf Coast, if the supporting infrastructure is
disrupted, communication fails. A cyber disruption could cause similar
impacts as a physical disruption.
While we recognize that other critical infrastructure industries
are reliant on the communications industry to provide the network and
communication services, we also recognize that we, as an industry, are
reliant on those other industries. We require industries such as
electricity and gas, banking and finance, health, and government, to
also function securely and without disruption to ensure the integrity
of our communications infrastructure.
As recognized by the Department of Homeland Security, the Nation is
dependent on the critical infrastructure of communications, banking and
finance, power, food, health, information technology and others. A
disruption to any component affects the whole infrastructure. Securing
against disruptions to any component is in the best interest of all.
In what areas are current cyber security technical solutions for the
communications sector inadequate? Where is further research needed to
mitigate existing and emerging threats and vulnerabilities?
The communications industry is also increasingly dependent on
application and information technology vendors to ensure the products
they provide are of the highest quality and integrity. Software and
hardware that does not meet industry security best practices and
standards require additional efforts and expense to meet its expected
function. Vendors that provide software or hardware with security
vulnerabilities that must constantly be monitored, reviewed, and
patched, are a drain on a company's resources and a liability to
companies that must ensure the integrity of their systems, data, and
services.
SBC works diligently with software vendors that provide the
foundation of the information technology infrastructure to ensure
necessary software security patches are installed to protect our
complex environment. Continued focus from the Federal Government on
industry standards for secure information technology products is
appreciated and desired. This will help to ensure that better security
and quality is an objective of the software, network and computer
hardware industries.
NIST (National Institute of Standards and Technology) is one
example of a collaborative organization that has been helpful in
promoting information security requirements through its various
research and standards efforts. We, as a business, look to leverage
those standards as potential baselines in our efforts and are glad to
see vendors meet such useful guidelines.
How should federal agencies, such as DHS, the National Science
Foundation, the National Institute of Standards and Technology, and the
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, and the academic researchers
work with industry to define priorities for and support research in
these areas?
Cyber security must become a priority in the creation of new
information technologies. To date, security components for information
technologies often appeared to be an afterthought. Examples of this can
be seen in early versions of cellular and Wi-Fi technologies, where
calls could be intercepted, cell phones cloned, and data snooping could
occur.
Internet Protocol (IP) based services wrestle constantly with the
need to traverse the same network paths where unscrupulous persons may
have the ability to interfere, impede, or intrude on the service
itself. IP based services must find new ways to protect the content of
each packet that is carried and delivered in this shared Internet
world.
We have all seen that virus and worm attacks have risen over the
past several years. Research focus on how to prevent the distribution
of malicious content through virus, worms, and e-mail should be a high
priority for all industries that use the Internet for communications
and business. The ability to detect and remove unwanted data content
and attacks as it progresses through the network is more desirable than
expecting each end device to have the same ability to protect itself
from its neighbors on the networks.
Admittedly, security requirements interfere with convenience of the
product or service offered. However, we need cyber security and
software development standards that insist new technologies embrace
security as part of their evolution and development. In this way,
society as a whole benefits through improved assurance of integrity,
reliability, service, and subsequent reduced resource costs to support
those services.
SBC is committed to work with the information industry to build the
next generation of Internet-based voice, video and data communications,
securely.
What are the most critical responsibilities of the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) in cyber security for the communications sector
and what are the most urgent steps the new Assistant Secretary for
Cyber Security and Telecommunications should take?
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, your assistance to focus
industry attention on cyber security is greatly appreciated. We
encourage the Department of Homeland Security to continue:
to support research grants and assistance that focus
on National cyber security,
to support industry organizations and government
agencies that create security standards and best practices,
to continue to provide early warnings of security
events, through various government agencies,
and to make sure the security best practices that
various critical government agencies develop are shared with
our critical infrastructure industries.
I would like to add that you should make sure our laws carry
serious penalties for cyber security issues and that the instigators
are prosecuted to the full extent of the law. It must become a major
crime. It is no longer just kids playing with computers. The attacks
are serious.
Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today. The work
you are doing is critical to our future as a nation. Cyber terrorism is
a real threat and we must stay diligent.
Biography for Andrew M. Geisse
Andy Geisse, Chief Information Officer, is responsible for
Information Technology, Payroll and Billing Operations for SBC
Communications, Inc. and its subsidiaries. He was appointed to this
position in October 2004 and is located in San Antonio, Texas.
Andy began his telecommunications career in 1979 with Southwestern
Bell Telephone Company as Assistant Manager for the comptrollers
department. He then held a variety of information technology, sales,
and strategic marketing positions for Southwestern Bell and SBC
Communications Inc. Andy served as Executive Director, Wireless Product
Development for Southwestern Bell Mobile Systems and Vice President and
General Manager for Southwestern Bell Mobile Systems' Oklahoma and West
Texas regions.
In 1995, he moved to Santiago, Chile, and served as Vice President
and Chief Executive Officer of VTR Cellular. He later became President
of the Board of STARTEL Communications, the first nationwide cellular
company in Chile. SBC had interests in both companies.
In January 1998, Andy moved to New York, as President and General
Manager of SBC's Cellular One upstate New York subsidiary. Later that
year, he became Vice President Enterprise and OSS Systems for SBC and
its subsidiaries, located in San Ramon, California. In October 1999
Andy was appointed Senior Vice President, Enterprise Software
Solutions, responsible for corporate-wide software solutions.
Andy grew up in Minneapolis, Minnesota, and St. Louis, Missouri. He
earned a Bachelor's degree in Economics and Mathematics from the
University of Missouri-Columbia and a M.B.A. from Washington University
in St. Louis. He and his wife, Jane, have four children.
Discussion
Chairman Boehlert. Thank you very much, and thank all of
you.
You know, one of the dangers of a hearing dealing with a
sensitive subject like this is that we provide fire for tabloid
trash. And I darn sure don't want to go to my supermarket
checkout counter next week, and I do the grocery shopping
incidentally, and read a headline that says, you know,
``Science Committee Warns Cyber Katrina Imminent.''
Now having said that, and taking that risk, using DHS's own
color-coding system, I would say the threat is, at a minimum,
at best, yellow, and perhaps even orange.
My question to all of you is do you think collectively,
one, the private sector gets it and understands the full
dimensions and implications, and two, the government
understands the full dimensions and potential implications?
Let me ask each of you. Mr. Geisse?
Mr. Geisse. Yes, Chairman Boehlert.
I believe the private sector understands it is critical,
and I also do believe the government does as well.
But I think it is sometimes an afterthought in the sense
that it is more of a technology issue and it is not only a
technology issue. It is truly a part of our critical
infrastructure and something that we have to be focused on as a
country.
Chairman Boehlert. Mr. Freese.
Mr. Freese. I think both the government and the private
sector understand the issues. I see some basic fundamental
problems, though, in addressing these issues as a combined
force. Just as I referred to in my comments, information
sharing with DHS has got to be extremely frustrating for them.
They ask for information on critical infrastructure assets. We
can't provide that, because there is no way that they can
protect that information. It stalls the whole process.
Chairman Boehlert. So it is very necessary for the
government and the private sector to cooperate, but you don't
have the confidence----
Mr. Freese. Absolutely.
Chairman Boehlert.--that the information you share, and
that is very important information to determine vulnerability
and response capability. You are concerned about providing
that, because you are concerned about the security of sharing
proprietary information--all right.
Mr. Freese. That is correct, Mr. Chairman.
And that has been going on for a couple of years now.
Chairman Boehlert. Well, we are going to change it.
Mr. Kepler.
Mr. Kepler. Yes, I think industry has put the time into
this thing and understands the risks-based approach. The
concern I would have is that there is a lot of problems in
cyber security and are we focused on getting the right
solutions for the major issues so at the end you can work on
everything and not be effective in anything. And I think we
really have to be focused on the major, national impacts as a
first wave of fixing things.
Chairman Boehlert. Mr. Leggate.
Mr. Leggate. I would say, in my experience, that most
boards get it. Most boards who run serious companies understand
their dependency, in this age, on this whole digital
environment. So that, I think, is done.
Whether small businesses understand the services that they
need for everyday transactions, I am not sure about that.
On the government level, I would say in the United States,
maybe--who understand entirely departmentally the issue. Where
the challenge comes, I think, is to put this into practical
action in a timely way and to then set a set of priorities
become of--almost a national plan to do things very quickly in
a focused way, not across a whole landscape, but just nail the
big issues. And to me, that is where the gap is.
Chairman Boehlert. Yes. And let me ask, and one of the
lessons learned from Katrina is diffused responsibility.
Everybody's responsibility tends to be no one's responsibility.
Where would you suggest the focal point should be? I am
encouraged, as I hope you are, that the Secretary has announced
the creation of an Assistant Secretary for Cyber Security and
Telecommunications. Would that be the focal point? I mean,
there is somebody that has to be sort of at the center of
coordinating all of these activities. You can't have 14 people
the center of coordination, because they don't coordinate
amongst themselves.
Where would you suggest that be?
Mr. Leggate.
Mr. Leggate. Well, I would separate the notion of
coordination from accountability. So coordination is a fine
thing to do, and done well is good. But where do we look for
the ultimate accountability for the service level we get from
the Internet? To whom do we look of that? And so I think big
steps to go forward to improve coordination, but I do think at
some level we must actually break through into accountabilities
that isn't visible today.
Chairman Boehlert. Mr. Kepler.
Mr. Kepler. Yes. I think information technology is
pervasive, so the idea that you would have a focused effort on
cyber security, we think, is exactly correct. But to John
Leggate's point is that when you think about emergency
response, you think about physical securing of critical
infrastructure. Those also have Internet impacts. So the--you
can't separate all of these things in the Departments and have
them link together. You have to have coordination but then
recognition that these bodies really have to work together to
come with--come up with common capabilities to, you know,
defend, protect, and respond.
Chairman Boehlert. Mr. Freese.
Mr. Freese. I agree. I think the coordination, I think,
should lie at that new position's role. But again, and I may
sound like a broken record here, but if there is going to be a
coordination point, there has to be representation, and strong
representation, from the private sector to assist in that
coordination, because I have seen too many times in the past,
it looks like a good thing to do from an overall perspective,
but it is not focused to where it really needs to be.
Chairman Boehlert. Mr. Geisse.
Mr. Geisse. Well, I think you brought up a good point, Mr.
Chairman. I think we have lots of agencies focused on cyber
security, but we don't have a single, real focal point. And
maybe by the Department of Homeland Security setting this up,
it should help do that.
Chairman Boehlert. So I would take it that your reaction is
the same as mine: the welcoming of the announcement by the
Secretary that we are going to have a new Assistant Secretary
for Cyber Security and Telecommunications, the sooner the
better.
Mr. Geisse. Yes, sir.
Chairman Boehlert. But that is progress. We are moving in
the right direction.
The red light is on for me. And I have got to practice what
I preach, so I have got to shut up and now recognize Mr.
Gordon.
Mr. Gordon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And because we do have that red light, in all due respect,
I would like for you to try to be crisp in your answers. And
let me tell you, I want to ask each of our industry sector
representatives to tell me what they think about how vulnerable
your sector might be to a serious, focused, cyber attack; what
could be the consequences of that attack for your industry; and
what role would you suggest for Homeland Security or other
parts of the Federal Government in trying to help you develop a
plan and also more preferably, avoid that, and then if there is
something that happens, the recovery?
And while you are thinking about that, let me quickly ask a
question for Mr. Purdy.
Mr. Purdy, I recognize you are just recently been appointed
the Acting Director of the agency, and so all of the either
omissions or, probably more likely, the low priority that the
agency has placed toward cyber security over the last four
years can't be laid at your feet. But it seems like your
testimony mostly was a litany of things you want to do or you
are starting to do and that, really, the only plans are really
just a framework document. This is concurred by the General
Accounting Office, which had a report this summer that said the
DHS has not yet developed national cyber threat and
vulnerability assessments or government industry contingency
recovery plans for cyber security. And so my really simple
question is, when do you estimate these assessments and
recovery plans will be in place?
Mr. Purdy. Well, attempting to comply with your request
that we be succinct, let me say that I am proud to associate
myself with the activity of the Department of Homeland Security
since it was set up. I worked on the National Strategy to
Secure Cyberspace on the White House staff and then came over
to the Department to help set up this agency, and I have been
Acting Director since October of last year.
We have made tremendous progress in building our watching
warning capability----
Mr. Gordon. Yes, and I don't mean to be disrespectful, but
I said one simple question. When do you estimate that these
assessments and recovery plans will be in place?
Mr. Purdy. We have a couple different levels. The
fundamental response to attacks is the ESF-2, is the
communications piece, which is we have a close partnership with
NCS and NCSD, that is in place. It is operational. There is a
long history of the communications----
Mr. Gordon. Was it in place when the General Accounting
Office did their report this summer?
Mr. Purdy. Yes, it was.
Mr. Gordon. Well, they didn't seem to think it was in
place.
Mr. Purdy. Well, reading the entire GAO report, there is a
recognition of tremendous progress we have made----
Mr. Gordon. Recently.
Mr. Purdy.--in a number of places.
Mr. Gordon. Right. Recently.
Mr. Purdy. And the ESF-2 is a long-standing product of a
public/private partnership with the private sector that has
stood the test of time, and we are proud to be associated with
that. The actual assessment of risk is part of the National
Infrastructure Protection Plan. The base plan will be out later
this year, and each individual sector is working on
developing----
Mr. Gordon. You said the base plan. That will still just be
the framework?
Mr. Purdy. Yeah, the federal plan, the more detailed
guidance of----
Mr. Gordon. But again, I just had a very simple question.
When do you estimate these assessments and recovery plans will
be in place?
Mr. Purdy. There are two different elements. There is the
assessment and there is recovery.
Mr. Gordon. Okay.
Mr. Purdy. The National Infrastructure Protection Plan is
part of the assessment. We are also, within the Information
Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Division, doing a risk
assessment of cyber that is one of the priority efforts to fuse
intelligence, to map the threat against the risk. So that is
going to be ready very soon. The National Infrastructure
Protection Plan, the risk assessment piece, will be early next
year as to when that part of the assessment is completed.
Mr. Gordon. Right. Thank you. I just didn't want to take
time from these other folks.
Now, if you could, I would like to hear about your sectors.
Mr. Leggate. Okay. Let me speak for that.
I answer your question in--although it is a simple
question, in two ways.
The first one is today, 2005, I will take a point in time
in 2007 or 2008. So given we are still in the process of
migration from private networks to the Internet, the
consequences would be moderate in the near-term, because we
haven't fully migrated to the new way. I would suggest to you
that by 2007 and 2008, this is the tipping point when most the
business will run that way. And at that point, I would suggest,
it might be catastrophic.
Mr. Gordon. And is there a role for the United States
Federal Government to play in helping you avoid catastrophe or
to recover from it if it did occur?
Mr. Leggate. I think, absolutely, going back to the
Chairman's remarks about setting up a new post within the
Department, I think the issue is to make progress and retain
focus to put things in place in the near time frame rather than
taking five or six years to move to a better place.
Mr. Kepler. Yes, if you take the first point, which is what
I do believe is a major risk or consequence here, if
communications, both voice and the Internet, is the key
vulnerability in my mind and risk. If communication stops,
commerce stops. And if communications isn't there, you can't
recover. So really, looking at a major catastrophic failure in
communications is really the real critical issue, in my mind,
around cyber security. And so when you approach that, what are
the major risk areas for that to happen we will have to
address, and not only recover and response, but part of
addressing with risk is containment and mitigation. So when we
have those risks, we do see parts of the infrastructure fail,
but we can't have it cascade and completely fail. So how do you
contain those failures is something that we need to work on,
and that needs to be collectively done between the government
and industry to model those threats and to come up with
response positions.
Mr. Freese. From the electric sector, it measures very well
with what he is saying. The telecommunications infrastructure
and the electric infrastructure are very closely matched. A
problem with telecommunications will impact the electric
control systems, in most cases. If I look at it strictly from
an electric company--or electric sector perspective, we are
vulnerable to an undetermined extent based on the number of
utilities that are in the country and the number--the amount of
information that is shared even between utilities is very
scarce. I can say if we have network security in place, if we
have our communications security in place, we are all right.
But I don't know how many of the companies are in that
situation. I would say the government can assist with that by,
as I mentioned, keeping the R&D programs with the Idaho
National Lab, Pacific Northwest National Lab, Sandia in place,
and working on cyber solutions that we need now. I mean,
research and development for long-term solutions is great, but
we have some pressing issues now.
Mr. Geisse. I guess I would add, for the communications
industry, it is very similar to the other industries with one
exception. We keep our network, general purpose type network
for our customers, independent and separate of the Internet
network to try to prevent that sort of issue to begin with.
And I think you also asked what do we do about it if that
happens, we have a very focused effort, something that we
constantly test and for disaster recovery. If we have a
disaster like that, how do we bring up a duplicate, for
example, network operations center. We have duplication
throughout our network to prevent it.
I think the government can help in a lot of ways. One is
hearings like this that put some focus on it are important. I
think doing R&D and research is important. But I also think,
from my own perspective, there are reasons for these attacks,
and you need to start treating them just like you are treating
terrorists and other things and actually go after them and
prevent it before it happens.
Mr. Gordon. Thank you very much.
Chairman Boehlert. Thank you very much.
The gentleman's time has expired.
And before I turn to the eloquent Mr. Akin, just let me
point out the private sector. All of your affiliations have
active lobbying efforts on Capitol Hill. And my experience with
lobbyists; they are very valuable assets. They provide
additional information to us, and hopefully we listen to both
sides of the story, but that you have got to attach a higher
priority to lobbying the Congress, our colleagues outside this
committee, who don't really understand the full dimensions of
this yet to, when you call on the Members, advocate for more
R&D, for example, into cyber security, for better coordination,
for more attention.
And so please carry that back to your hired guns, so to
speak. And I use that as a positive not a pejorative. But you
have got to focus on the importance of this subject. And
tomorrow's papers will come out. The evening news will come
out. Then this won't even be mentioned anyplace, because, as I
say, in most quarters it is greeted with a muffled yawn, and
yet we know, you know in your sharing with us, how important
this is and the potential impact it could have on our entire
economy.
So with that, let me turn to the always eloquent Mr. Akin.
Mr. Akin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I will try not to be too long in my eloquence here. I just
had a couple of quick questions.
And let me explain where I am coming from. I am also
serving on the Armed Services Committee, and one of the things
that the House is doing is trying to do a complete analysis of
where we are relative to defense and all. So my questions are
more directed toward a situation where somebody, even a major
nation state, might try to precipitate some coordinated attack
in this area.
So my first question is kind of a simple one. After
September 11, cell phones and phones became pretty much
inoperative. Was that because of the volume of traffic?
Mr. Geisse. I guess I will answer that one, Congressman
Akin.
Are you talking about specifically in New York?
Mr. Akin. Well, actually, here in DC, cell phones were
useless. You couldn't get a call or anything.
Mr. Geisse. I am not familiar with that, but my guess I
mean, the reality is of how those networks are designed, there
is a limited amount of frequency that you get from the Federal
Government for those networks, and as a result, a limited
number of calls you can do at any one time. And I imagine the
call volumes were way high that day.
Mr. Akin. So consequently, that would jam everything up?
Mr. Geisse. Well, I am sure there is a certain amount of
calls that would get through. But one of the things that we do
that you may not be aware of is for the Federal Government, in
an emergency like that, we reserve a certain amount of the
network for them, from a priority perspective for calls.
Mr. Akin. Okay. Now let us say that we are talking about
more this organized sort of attack type of situation. First of
all, just simply how vulnerable are we? And second of all, what
are some of the first things that you would do to try to
protect against that?
Mr. Geisse. As part of the co-chairs of the National Cyber
Response Coordination Group in Department of Defense, and their
representatives include those from the Office of the Secretary
and the Joint Task Force on Global Network Operations, we have
been doing tabletop exercises among the membership at the
National Defense University to make sure we have the
communication paths and processes in place to make sure we have
a coordinated government response to such attacks.
Mr. Akin. Anybody else want to take a shot at that?
Mr. Kepler. I would just say that when you get prepared for
the scenario you are talking about, you have to worry about
diversity before you start, so we would look at cell phones,
land lines, priority lines, multiple carriers, Internet
communications, so the whole concept, I think in this
environment, is diversity so you can respond over whatever
happens to be up at the time. That is the key point in my mind.
Mr. Akin. So you are saying have enough backup kinds of
systems that are going different ways that you could run things
a different direction?
Mr. Kepler. It is hard in scenario planning to target an
exact backup. That is why I think diversification of different
types of routing, circuitry, different methods, whether that is
satellite or whatever, are pretty key, because then you would
have to take out different types of infrastructure, which is a
challenge.
Mr. Geisse. I would like to add one thing, Congressman
Akin.
I know of at least one situation that is public, it was in
the private sector, where a cyber attack was used specifically
to gather information from a competitor, so they put out a
virus that basically the company didn't even know was there,
collected data, transmitted it back. And so I think that type
of attack that you bring up is very possible, and I think part
of it is we have to start getting proactive. We can't keep
sitting back and preventing after we see the worm, after we see
the virus. We have to start getting and creating technologies
that go out and prevent it before it ever happens.
Mr. Akin. Right. So now some of what we have got is going
to be software-related types of attacks. Some are going to be
just simple hardware things like, you know, an electromagnetic
pulse or something that is just simply blowing up a
communications hub or something, right? And so what you are
saying is a diversity of ways of moving information is probably
your best--and you are saying that we are making some progress
in that regard or that we still have--what is your--what would
you say would be our level of vulnerability? Could you just hit
the system in a couple of places and shut the country down or
would it be pretty hard to just pick several things to do?
Mr. Freese. From the communications perspective, as it
applies to electricity, you could shut down various areas and
regions. I don't think you could shut down the entire country.
That is a--that is kind of a misconception. You could take out
a significant region of power and communications, however.
Mr. Akin. From an electric grid point of view?
Mr. Freese. From an electric and a communications point of
view.
Mr. Akin. Yeah.
Mr. Freese. I don't think you would have an entire country
down from a telecommunications perspective from a localized
attack against a certain region.
Mr. Akin. Again----
Mr. Gordon. Would the gentleman yield? Ask him how long. He
is going to be down for how long?
Mr. Akin. Go ahead. Yeah.
Mr. Gordon. If you would. I mean, you say we would be down,
but for what period of time?
Mr. Freese. Well, that depends on a lot of different
things. It depends on what you have for backup communications.
Mr. Gordon. Are we talking minutes, hours, or days, or
weeks?
Mr. Freese. I would say, in some cases, hours, some cases,
days. He would be better to tell you how long it would take
telecommunications to come back up.
Mr. Akin. Yes. You can go ahead and respond.
Mr. Gordon. Thank you.
Mr. Geisse. Yes, sir.
From a communications perspective on a cyber attack, the
way we do our networks, it wouldn't affect the communications
network itself, because we keep it independent. But what it
does impact is the systems we use to monitor it, to provision
it, to make sure that we can keep the network up. And that is
why it is still extremely critical. And I think that Mr.
Leggate made a point earlier on that as the future goes on, and
more and more things run on the Internet itself, we more and
more vulnerable versus the separate networks that we have
today.
Mr. Akin. So to some degree, the lack of sophistication, if
you will, or the duplication, is giving us a lot more
protection than we would have in the future? That is a point
several of you have made then.
Yes. Well, I think my time has expired, and I don't want to
be excessively eloquent, so----
Chairman Boehlert. Well, all right. Fine. We will permit
you to be excessively eloquent.
But Mr. Purdy, you had your hand up.
Mr. Purdy. Yes. I just wanted to mention that in a major
situation, we have the critical infrastructure warning
information network that is a survivable network connecting our
Department with various critical sectors in the country,
including electricity, information technology, and
telecommunications, State Homeland Security Advisors, sector-
specific agencies, and resources in each critical
infrastructure, and we are building out that network to greater
connectivity over time.
Chairman Boehlert. When the warning is issued, hopefully
the message is not only heard but heeded. I would point out
that one of the agencies under the jurisdiction of this
committee is NOAA, which is the parent agency for the National
Weather Service, and if you are looking for bright lights in
the aftermath of Katrina, one of the bright lights is that the
National Weather Service, on five o'clock, on the Friday
preceding the Monday morning when Katrina actually hit land,
the National Weather Service put out an alert, a weather alert
that a category four or five hurricane was due to hit within 72
hours. That went to every emergency responder, every state
capitol, every major city, but some people didn't pay much
attention.
Mr. Honda.
Mr. Honda. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I appreciate this
opportunity.
There are two arenas I would like to just bring up, and it
has been touched upon a little bit. But one is, I represent
Silicon Valley, and in our valley, we house the backup data and
even the primary data of many businesses. Perhaps some of yours
are housed there. And maintaining both the integrity of and the
appropriate access to this data is essential for normal
operations. But in the event of not only a cyber attack, you
have made some comments in that arena and physical attack, but
coupled physical and cyber. I am not sure that that was
discussed very fully. And also a response on how we would be
responding to a natural disaster. And I bring that up, because
my valley is situated between the San Andreas Fault and the
Hayward Fault. And I am not sure that that kind of an incident
or occurrence has been thought of. And given Katrina, I think
that natural disasters we found that sometimes it creates a lot
of unintended consequences that we have to anticipate.
The other question is the information sharing and exchange,
that has always been something I have been concerned about
since 9/11. And in terms of cyber security and information
exchange, where are we in the Department of Homeland Security
in that effort? And I would like to know what the private
sector feels that we are, and what grade would you give the
Department of Homeland Security at this point in time? And then
I suspect that we are going to have a new Assistant Secretary
of Cyber Security. What advice would you give that person at
this point in time relative to information sharing?
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Kepler. Let me try to answer maybe a couple from my
view.
The one point you made, if you think of weather systems, we
are getting a lot better at modeling hurricanes. If you think
of earthquakes, we are getting better, but not nearly to the
sophistication. To other external threats, we don't have the
same type of modeling and predictive capabilities. So part of
the response is getting that predictive capability. So we
really need to think about that as we go forward and look at
strengthening that. That is one of my----
Mr. Honda. Does our--do we have a redundant system that
will accommodate all of those three areas?
Mr. Kepler. Well, there are just a couple of areas we are
talking about. One is the prediction so you can become better
prepared in stages. You go closer like you would. Another
activity is to have diversification of your infrastructure and
recovery protocols, so most major companies are positioned to
have recovery plans, crisis management plans in place. We have
corporate crisis management plans since the late '80s. When 9/
11 occurred, we actually invoked that. We weren't majorly
impacted, to one of the other points earlier, some of the small
businesses and structures that may not have that level of
sophistication.
I think it is also a challenge in terms of information
sharing, which is critical in protecting and responding. The
private sector is bound between antitrust laws and Freedom of
Information issues and sharing information. That, to me, is a
critical issue that we still need to balance on. So while you
are trying to address this thing, we can actually be non-
compliant with other laws. So how we really focus on that
information sharing is really a critical aspect of it.
Mr. Honda. Thank you.
Mr. Freese. I would like to add something about the natural
disasters response you were talking about.
Even during Katrina, there was some extensive physical
damage to the electric infrastructure, to the communications
infrastructure, and several others. Okay. And that is going to
happen regardless of what type of natural disaster you have
got. So what your main concern is, at that point, is making
sure that those problems don't cascade outside of the
immediately affected area. And I think it was true testimony to
everybody's professionalism down there that the electric sector
maintained power around the area. There were no cascading
failures. Communications was set up via the Internet and
temporary communications, so there are ways to do this. But I
don't see a really good way around the physical damage,
physical destruction of the infrastructure. That is very
difficult to have a backup to outside of the affected area.
Mr. Honda. And in the affected area, was there a
replacement system that took place of the current power, no pun
intended, not electrical power, because people were afraid----
Mr. Freese. No.
Mr. Honda.--of electrocution?
Mr. Freese. No, there was not. There were substations that
were damaged and put out of service. There were lines down.
That type of physical damage just takes time to repair. Now
there are ways of bringing temporary transformers in, those
types of--getting the lines back up, temporary lines run, but
that, of course, takes time and effort and significant funding.
Mr. Honda. Would wireless and satellite connections replace
that loss of----
Mr. Freese. From the communications perspective, yes.
Mr. Geisse. Yes. For example, in Hurricane Katrina, one of
the first things we did is send down--we call them ``cellular
on wheels.'' They are basically cell sites that are built into
a truck. We sent over 300 of those down there immediately for--
so that we could set up cellular service in Katrina.
Mr. Honda. Was that private sector strategy or was that
something----
Mr. Geisse. Private sector strategy.
Mr. Honda. And is that something that we should look at in
terms of the government's side?
Mr. Geisse. Well, I guess here is my answer because I think
your question is, as I understand, and it is well founded. I
mean, you know, we have had many disasters in California from
the fires down in LA to the mudslides to our own issues with
flooding and weather. And we have response units within our
company to go out and handle those types of situations so that
we can get service up and repaired as quickly as possible. And
it is not as simple as just dropping in a second system,
because really, in many cases, like, for example, the fires
down there, we had burned up wires that we had to go in and
replace and put up and running and working. I think what the
government can help on this, and I think it has been brought up
here several times, is start focusing this as a major issue and
that we are all prepared, as different industries, to work
together in a real disaster.
Mr. Freese. If I may just finish up with one thing about
the information exchange in DHS. As I mentioned earlier, that
has been a problem for the last few years, and I am not sure
that I understand exactly why, because DHS has a PCII program
developed and in place. This was essentially going to let
private industry present information to the government that
would be protected and would not be disclosed without the
private industry's permission. I am not sure where that stands
right now. If Mr. Purdy could give me an update on that
program, I would appreciate it.
Chairman Boehlert. Mr. Purdy, and then we will go. Mr.
Honda's time is expired. We are generous.
Mr. Purdy. Yes, the PCII program, which has been operating
under an interim rule since the time it went into effect, will
be subject to a final rule. It is under current consideration
by the DHS General Counsel, Phil Perry. We expect that revised
rule to come out momentarily. But in the meantime, we are
trying to facilitate information sharing, building on some key
legacy organizations, such as the NCC ISACs, the NCC generally,
but we have leveraged the source of information across the
federal agencies, so we get better information now, and now we
can share it. Plus, we have enhanced the information we get
from the intelligence and the law enforcement folks, and we can
put out targeted bulletins to the technical or non-technical
sector, to government or the private sector, that we don't
associate with the source of the information. So we can get
sensitive law enforcement-sensitive information, classified
information that we can turn into actionable guidance. In
addition, we are building a North American Incident Response
Group of private sector folks. We met last week in Silicon
Valley with a number of companies out there. We have a meeting
that is ongoing right now in Arlington with a number of
companies. We are trying to build that capability. The ISACs,
we met with the ISAC council with the Assistant Secretary
earlier this week. The sharing of information with the ISACs is
a fundamentally important thing.
In addition, there has been a robust sharing among ISACs
that is centered by the IT ISAC. We have our US-CERT secure
portal that has 2,000 private and governmental folks involved
in sharing information in a secure environment. We are going to
tie in that IT ISAC information sharing, because we believe it
is a combination of building trust, giving value, because we
have a major private sector retreat next week that the private
sector is hosting. We want to share what we know, what of that
do they want, and let us accelerate the mechanisms for getting
that information. Because folks, if they go to the effort or
decide whether to go to the effort to share information, it is
important to protect it, but it is also important for them to
think somebody cares about it, somebody uses it, and we provide
value back to the private sector. And we are committed to do
that.
Chairman Boehlert. Thank you very much, Mr. Purdy.
The Chair recognizes Dr. Bartlett.
Mr. Bartlett. Thank you very much.
Mr. Leggate, in your written testimony, you note that
businesses and governments can plan for expected failures. But
even the best prepared organizations and corporations may be
woefully inadequate in responding to complex, low-probability,
high-impact failures. If a large-scale Internet outage or
significant reduction in performance would occur, the
unexpected effects on whole sets of industries, utilities, and
enterprise could have surprisingly large economic and social
impacts. For the few moments that we have, I would like to
engage you in a discussion of the ultimate low-probability,
high-impact failure, and that is a nuclear EMP attack on our
country.
For several years, I have been concerned with this, and I
got legislation about three years ago to set up an EMP
Commission which acted for two years, chaired by Dr. Bill
Graham, Rumsfeld's deputy in his emerging ballistic missile
threat commission. They have now issued their report. Senator
John Kyl has, in the last few weeks, had a piece in the
Washington Post reflecting his concern for this. Newt Gingrich
and his colleague, Bill Forstchen, have written a fascinating
novel, which will be out next summer. I encourage you to read
that. It is called ``One Second After.'' They have done very
good research. It is quite accurate. Because even the level of
concern may be classified, I will only tell you that within the
Pentagon now, there is a growing concern for a nuclear EMP
attack.
The Russian generals can tell us things that I maybe cannot
tell you, because they would be classified, but the Russian
generals tell us that they have developed a nuclear EMP weapon
that will produce 200 kilovolts per meter, that a large weapon
detonated 300 miles high over the center of our country, Iowa
or Nebraska, would blanket the whole country, and at its
margins, would be 100 kilovolts per meter. The Russian generals
tell us that the 200 kilovolts per meter is several times the
level to which we tested. I cannot tell you to which we tested.
I think that is classified, but the Russian generals say that
that is several times the level to which we tested. And at the
margins, it is probably a couple of times to the level at which
we tested.
My question is what are we doing to prepare for an EMP
attack? The Commission, by the way, noted that this is one of a
few incidents that could, you know, and I am going to put their
caution in the common vernacular, it could end life as we know
it. What preparations are we making for this low-probability,
high-impact probability?
And I would like to ask Mr. Freese, if a failure of the
power systems resulted in the loss of our major transformers,
how long would it take to get a new one, and where would you go
to get a new one?
Mr. Freese. Okay. We have multiple sizes of transformers.
Some of them are readily available in spare parts.
Mr. Bartlett. But isn't it true, sir, that the larger ones
that we don't even make in this country----
Mr. Freese. Yes, sir. I----
Mr. Bartlett.--it would take you maybe 18 months to get
one----
Mr. Freese. Yes, sir.
Mr. Bartlett.--ordered from overseas?
Mr. Freese. I was going to mention that at the----
Mr. Bartlett. That is correct?
Mr. Freese. There are some major transformers that are not
made in this country, made in Europe and in Asia, and it would
take up to 18 months to get one sent over to the United States.
That is one at costs of several million dollars. And we,
frankly, don't have a lot of those spare parts laying around.
Mr. Bartlett. But you do have a few spare transformers?
Mr. Freese. Yes.
Mr. Bartlett. They are in the field?
Mr. Freese. Yes.
Mr. Bartlett. They are beside the transformer that if it
went out, you couldn't serve your customers. But an EMP attack
would take out both of them, would it not?
Mr. Freese. Yes, sir, it would.
Mr. Bartlett. I hope that my colleague, Dr. Ehlers, has an
opportunity to pursue this, because already our yellow light is
on.
But I want to ask each of you the level of concern in your
discipline about EMP attack and what you are doing.
Let me start with Mr. Purdy. What is your level of concern,
sir, and what are you doing about it?
Mr. Purdy. Well, this issue is concerned in the larger
context of the full potential threats to the telecommunications
infrastructure. The Department of Homeland Security is working
with the Department of Defense and Central Intelligence Agency
to ongoing assess the developments of the kinds of technology
you are talking about to consider the full range of these kinds
of threats against various sectors, including the use of EMP
and telecommunications electromagnetic disruptive effects.
Mr. Bartlett. Sir, when will you, because our time is very
short, when will you be able to tell us of our level of
vulnerability and your recommendations for what we do about it?
Just tell us when you will be able to tell us that.
Mr. Purdy. Well, we already made recommendations and
mitigative measures have been taken to enhance the equipment
providing greater protection in the event of an EMP threat.
Mr. Bartlett. My red light is on. Let me just make one
observation and ask if this is not correct.
We have SCADA systems and we have computers embedded in
those, and it is my understanding that we may not even know who
made those computers. And if we know, they may no longer be
available, there are so many of those that it would be
impossible to harden them, and that unless we are going to
replace all of those SCADA systems, we are going to remain
vulnerable to a pretty broad scale shutdown of our
infrastructure in the event of an EMP attack. That is correct?
Mr. Freese. Well, sir, I mentioned it earlier that our
electric infrastructure is made up of a lot of legacy systems
that don't support new technological security protections and
it will take, probably, a new generation of infrastructure to
completely eradicate those from the system. Right now, we are
working with obsolete equipment in a lot of cases.
Mr. Bartlett. I know my red light is on, Mr. Chairman. I
just want to note that although not one in 100 of our citizens
may know about nuclear EMP attack, I will assure you, sir, that
every one of our potential enemies knows all about it, and it
is in their open literature.
Thank you very much.
Mr. Akin. [Presiding] Thank you, Mr. Bartlett.
Mr. Miller.
Mr. Miller. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The 9/11 Commission said that private sector preparedness
for terrorism attack now must be regarded as part of the cost
of doing business, certainly for critical industries and any
kind of critical infrastructure. And you can no longer--no
industry that is part of our critical infrastructure can ever
claim again that a nuclear--that a, excuse me, terrorist attack
is not foreseeable. It must be foreseeable. Do all of you agree
with that?
Yes, sir.
Mr. Leggate. I would say the point you come to is the range
of scenarios that companies use to do their testing of their
systems that, in a sense, prior to 9/11, we wouldn't have
conceived----
Mr. Miller. Right.
Mr. Leggate.--events of this kind. But what we have to do
is learn from 9/11, learn from the tsunami----
Mr. Miller. Right.
Mr. Leggate.--New Orleans, and also from the bombing in
London, for example, which we have been involved in managing.
So each one creates a new set of situations, and then
companies, and I would make a plug for this, really have to
really run these scenarios hard and find out, I would call it
the disconnected pieces, the things that you wouldn't have
predicted that show up. And it also applies at the national
level as well. So there is enormous value in running these
scenarios. Then to find out the things that do fail well ahead
of time.
And number two, prepare your management teams, either at
the country level or the corporate level, to respond
effectively during difficult situations.
Mr. Miller. Okay. Yes, I agree with you. You can't just
respond to the things that have already happened. Be prepared
for things that we know can happen, because they have happened.
We really do need smart people lying awake at three o'clock in
the morning trying to figure out what could happen next and how
to be prepared for that.
The 9/11 Commission also said that we needed to develop
standards for preparedness in the private sector that does
provide for business continuity and mitigation, redundancy, and
that those kind of commonly understood standards, they praised
the standards developed by the American National Standards
Institute, ANSI, should become the standard of care for
purposes of legal liability. Is there anything like that in the
cyber field? Is there any kind of standard of care that is the
industry standard that is well understood this is what you do
to be prepared against a cyber attack?
Yes, sir.
Mr. Freese. Yes, sir. In the electric sector, we have the
North American Electric Reliability Council, twelve hundred
cyber security standards. These have been in place for almost
two years, and they provide a very, very solid best practices
approach to securing critical security systems and other
critical systems against cyber attack. It extends into business
continuity, disaster recovery, personnel issues, background
checks, network security, transmission security, and
communications security. So these are in place right now.
Mr. Miller. Okay. And Mr. Purdy, does the Homeland Security
Department embrace the finding of the 9/11 Commission that
there should be legal liability for the failure to prepare up
to the standard of care in industry?
Mr. Purdy. We have not taken a position on whether there
should be liability in that instance. What we are finding is
that the interpretation of the Sarbanes-Oxley statute,
requiring that the CEOs and Boards of Directors exercise due
care in their risk mitigation processes has led the CEOs to
fashion their risk mitigation strategies based on best
practices. NIST provides very substantial guidance on best
practices for information systems. The FISMA standards for
federal systems provides similar guidance, and we are working
with NIST on additional guidance along those areas.
Mr. Miller. Okay. The usual legal liability is for the
damages that would be foreseeable from a failure to abide by
the legal standard of care. Mr. Freese, for instance, in the
energy area in the electric grid, what would be the foreseeable
loss from a cyber terror attack that was foreseeable, should
have been foreseeable, and that the failure to abide by
industry standards had led to it?
Mr. Freese. Please rephrase the question for me.
Mr. Miller. Okay. I will admit that was a little garbled. I
will try that again.
What is a foreseeable loss, not just to a power company,
but from all of those who do business with it who depend upon
it for their power from a cyber security attack?
Mr. Freese. Well, it is going to be very significant. From
the electric sector, it is one of the primary critical
infrastructures in the country. There is virtually nothing that
doesn't use electricity. Businesses, the military, everything
uses electricity. If you have a major cyber attack that takes
out an entire region of the country, everyone is going to be
impacted within that region. I mean, there is--there are some
backup generators. There are backup power supplies, but
essentially, a lot of companies are going to take major losses,
financial losses, if there is a major outage that lasts any
period of time.
Mr. Akin. The gentleman's time has expired.
Mrs. Biggert.
Ms. Biggert. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Kepler and Mr. Freese, you both mentioned your work
with the National Laboratories on your critical infrastructure
protection efforts. Could you give us a little more detail
about your work with the Labs? And have they been helpful?
Mr. Kepler. Yes, I would be happy to do that.
To link the two discussions up here, from an American
Chemistry Council point of view, we have a concept called
``Responsible Care'' that we expect our members to subscribe
to. In that is a certain set of management practices of how you
approach all aspects of stewardship in your industry, including
security. And in that is embedded cyber security. With that,
these are management practices, and you need to establish
standards of how you do that in compliance. You don't want to
subscribe to exact solutions, because this is such a dynamic
area. So we have worked with organizations that have been
outlined, as well as international standards organizations, and
tried to build those in. For example, in plant vulnerability,
assessments and design is a great example. Just the corporate
management systems for how you put in place corporate
governance of security, including cyber security as well.
Ms. Biggert. Mr. Freese.
Mr. Freese. We have worked significantly with the Idaho
National Lab and Pacific Northwest National Lab on SCADA,
specifically. We are looking at encryption technologies,
encryption of control signals to prevent interception or
injection. We are looking at secure authentication. And this
is, again, this is trying to secure the current systems we have
now prior to any long-term R&D coming into fruition. There is a
SCADA testbed at the Idaho National Lab that is extremely
valuable. It can be used to solve a lot of problems with
information security, especially if it is coordinated with
the--they also have an energy infrastructure set up at Idaho
National Lab that has got end-to-end--well, for an example of
infrastructure for telecommunications and electricity, you can
do end-to-end testing, and you don't have to bother with piece
meal solutions. You can go and do an entire range of trial and
error. And I think those programs are extremely valuable, and
they are not made enough use of right now. And I think we
should expand the use of those, particularly in the SCADA
testbed. There is a lot of equipment that is used commonly by
many, many companies, and those would apply particularly well
to that particular test environment.
Ms. Biggert. Thank you.
And Mr. Purdy, you know, the Labs do have expertise in both
computers and the networks and the critical infrastructure
protections. To what extent is your Division working with the
National Labs and the U.S. research universities?
Mr. Purdy. One of the highest priority programs for NCSD is
our Control Systems Security Program. We funded it at over $11
million in 2005, and the President's budget proposes over $15
million in 2006. At the heart of that is our work with the
Idaho National Lab and the partnership with the other Labs and
partnership with the Department of Energy on their area of
responsibility, and the Science and Technology Directorate. So
that is a hugely significant area that we are working in close
partnership, not only with the Labs, but the key private sector
folks. We helped form, for example, the Process Control Systems
Forum, which is made up of hundreds of owners and operators. In
addition, NIST has an Advisory Group of owners and operators.
We are working with DOE to build the network of the control
systems owners and operators so that we get the shared
information on attacks and failures and that we can have a
continuous loop, but it has R&D aspects, incident response
aspects, and there are short- and long-term benefits to this
program.
Ms. Biggert. Thank you.
And then time for one more question to Mr. Freese again.
One aspect of cyber security is making sure that the
Internet and other information networks are up and running. And
isn't electricity critical to keeping the information networks,
like the Internet, operational? So if so, then cyber security
is critical to your core business of energy production and
distribution. But your core business also is critical to the
cyber security of other sectors of the economy and the Nation
as a whole. Is the energy sector giving equal attention to
cyber security and the protection of critical energy
infrastructure? Is one more important than the other or are
they the same? It seems like we have got the chicken and the
egg, which is going to be----
Mr. Freese. Yeah, it is kind of a chicken and the egg
situation. But I believe sincerely that the energy sector is
extremely aware of their responsibilities to the rest of the
country to provide communications, the Internet, all of those
things. We are--we have formed major industry groups to look at
security within the industry itself across the sector, physical
and cyber security, physical primarily to protect the cyber
assets. And we take that very seriously. And we understand that
there are these interdependencies that we are a primary part of
in a lot of areas in a lot of critical infrastructure sectors.
Ms. Biggert. Okay. Thank you.
My time has expired.
Mr. Akin. Ms. Johnson.
Ms. Johnson. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I ask unanimous consent to submit my entire statement to
the record and welcome this esteemed panel. And let me
apologize for having to----
Mr. Akin. Without objection, that will be entered in the
record.
Ms. Johnson. Thank you.
I apologize for having to dash out and come back.
And Mr. Geisse, welcome. I know two of your colleagues,
John Mumford, whom I served in the Texas Senate with on the
Finance Committee, and Mr. Whitacre that I have known for 20
some years. So welcome to this committee.
I have some questions that I am asking anyone to answer.
And maybe you have already answered, and if you have, just tell
me, and I apologize for asking again.
But what is known about the vulnerabilities of different
sectors of the economy that rely on networked information
systems, and to what extent can the seriousness of the threat
be quantified or prioritized?
Go ahead.
Mr. Purdy. The National Infrastructure Advisory Council, a
Presidential Advisory Group, made up of private sector
individuals, has done an assessment of the risk and threat to
the different critical infrastructure sectors and the
dependency of those sectors on each other. That is not
available for public dissemination. We are using that as part
of our process of identifying the cyber risk assessment as part
of our fusion of the intelligence vulnerability and
consequences information and in our work on developing
scenarios that I talked about in my testimony so that we can
understand what is necessary to mitigate the possibility of
those vulnerabilities being exploited, how are we going to
respond to those, and how are we going to reconstitute. And we
look forward to that being a strong public/private partnership.
Ms. Johnson. Thank you.
Anyone else?
Thank you very much.
Is the government sponsoring enough R&D in an effort to aid
the public sector with cyber security?
Yes.
Mr. Purdy. Let me answer the question this way.
The Federal Government, under HSPD-7, has coordinated,
under the leadership of the Office of Science and Technology
Policy, the President's Science Advisor, and the Science and
Technology Directorate. They will be issuing a national cyber
R&D plan in the very near future which will serve the benefit
of scoping out what needs to be done. They also had an
interagency group to identify and track what is happening and
what needs to be happening in cyber security. It is my hope
that as the articulation of what needs to be done and the
specific requirements are laid out, then those who feel that
the priorities aren't the right priorities or feel that the
resources aren't the right ones, then, perhaps, can suggest
where the extra emphasis and resources need to be placed.
Ms. Johnson. Do I have a little bit more time for another
question? I guess----
Mr. Akin. The gentlelady does have a minute and 43 seconds.
Ms. Johnson. Okay. Thank you.
There are two aspects of cyber security that I have concern
about, because of my constituency and because of Homeland
Security. One is that I have not met a person who is not
suspicious of all of their business being available through the
networks. And I would like some comment on that on just how
secure that is, and two, for terrorist attacks.
So I invite anyone to comment to see what we need to do or
what is the risk or what is real and what is imagined.
Mr. Kepler. On the second part, I think when you look at
the access to terrorism, this is a critical issue in terms of
the amount of information we want to provide in this country
versus how that information could be used against us. And
certainly, I mean, that is one of the public policy things that
needs to be addressed. What we want to do is be able to have an
open environment between the right people to make sure we can
assess threat. The challenge is once you start to look at those
vulnerabilities and make them public, they provide information
to our enemies as well. And the challenge we have is some
things that may not be related to terrorism directly can be
used as information to create attacks. And I think we have to
spend a lot of time on public policy and on research to figure
out how to segment those two issues and keep them balanced.
Ms. Johnson. Are you doing any kind of PR to allay the
fears of Americans who think that telephone companies and
everybody else snoop into their business by computer and
Internet?
Mr. Geisse. Telephone companies snooping?
Ms. Johnson. Anything wired, people think they can listen
to their conversations, get into their private business, look
at where they shop, all of that.
Mr. Geisse. Well, I think, you know, I will answer your
question in that your concern about terrorist attack, your
concern about information being available on the Internet are
real issues, and they are issues that industry has to
constantly be looking at to protect our customers' information,
which, for example, we do in the phone company religiously. I
mean, we take it very, very serious, our customer information
and protecting it, and are constantly looking for ways to
prevent attacks on that information.
Ms. Johnson. Thank you.
Would anybody else like to comment or do you think you are
saved by the bell?
Mr. Akin. The gentlelady's----
Ms. Johnson. My time is up.
Mr. Akin.--time is----
Ms. Johnson. Thank you very much.
Mr. Akin.--expired, and we have a vote on the House Floor,
but if Dr. Ehlers can go quickly, we can get that in, I think.
Mr. Ehlers. I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I will try to be pretty rapid.
First of all, to respond to my colleague who just asked the
question about telephone companies snooping. I grew up in
southwest Minnesota, a very small town, hand crank telephone on
the wall, a switchboard sitting downtown with an operator, and
I can tell you, she knew more about the business of everyone in
the town than anyone else did. So I suspect there is
considerably less snooping by telephone companies by
electronics than there was back then. But it is certainly a
worthwhile question to ask.
I would like to, first of all, just sitting here trying to
put this all in perspective, it seems to me that most of the
discussion has been about cyber security in the sense of
software, and that is, of course, a major concern. It is a
concern both in terms of industrial espionage, as it is called,
certainly a concern in terms of national security. But then
there is also the hardware factor, which was brought up by my
colleague from Maryland. And since we are both scientists,
maybe we have good reason for both worrying about the same
thing, namely the hardware security.
We have known about nuclear EMP for a long time. And I
happen to be a nuclear physicist and worked at Livermore for
one summer, years ago. And I never worried that much about it,
because, frankly, I thought mutually assured destruction was
pretty clear policy in that there is no benefit in any country
to set off a nuclear weapon far above another country knowing
that they, in turn, would have their systems destroyed. I do
worry about it much, much more now, and I think Dr. Bartlett's
fear is well founded in the sense that if you don't have a
country that can be counterattacked, and if your goal is to
disable your opponent as much as possible and to cause grief
and pain and terror, the EMP is a very good way to do it, if
you can manage to get the weapon and the launch vehicle. And I
think it is something we have to take very seriously. Mr.
Freese, I think you were a little optimistic in saying it would
only affect certain areas of the country, but it depends,
again, on the size of the weapon. We are not hardening our
equipment.
And I was struck by a phrase that Mr. Kepler offered
earlier that when communication stops, commerce stops. And I
would even extend that beyond that. When commerce stops, then
life is endangered and perhaps life stops, because with the
proliferation, and I have been worrying about this for about 10
years now. I never worried about it too much until the
proliferation of the Internet, but today, so much commerce is
done over the Internet. But also, the proliferation of
microprocessors and automobiles and everywhere else. And an EMP
would not only affect communications but also transportation.
How many of us would be able to drive our car after an EMP had
wiped out the processors? And there are some 250, typically,
microprocessors in the average American automobile today. How
would trucks be able to deliver a product? How would people get
food and water? I mean, this is really a doomsday scenario.
And Mr. Purdy, I hope that you and others are worrying a
great deal about this, because what we really need in place is
an infrastructure that, at least in an emergency basis, would
replace the infrastructure that we are becoming so dependent on
through our use of microprocessors, Internet, and so forth.
And I would like to give any of you time to react to my
comments. Maybe I am off base, and if so, I would like to hear
that. But if you could, briefly make a comment.
Mr. Kepler.
Mr. Kepler. Yes, Congressman.
I think one of the key issues as we talk about industry and
government relationship is understanding the roles and
responsibilities. It is probably not practical for companies to
go address that problem. That requires government from that
type of level, and that is my broader point is these major
issues need to be led by government in terms of how we address
in the sectors need to support. There are things the sectors
need to do, but there are things the government needs to do in
that environment.
Mr. Ehlers. If I may just interject. It seems to me your
role, however, is to try to harden your facilities so that you
can continue to operate.
Mr. Kepler. Absolutely, and that is why we need
diversification and structure. One point that has been brought
up is the idea that the older technology can't be replaced, and
that is true, but also the older technology is less vulnerable
to the newer threats. So it is a real delicate balance in terms
of putting this new technology in, because it is actually more
vulnerable because of its complexity and size. So that is why I
think we have got to be really careful of just putting
technical solutions in and not having the broad policy
understandings and risk balancing here.
Mr. Ehlers. That is precisely the point, and the policy has
to come from the Federal Government, but also the industry has
to be aware of the need to harden their facilities as much as
they can so at least emergency services can continue.
Mr. Kepler. We agree with that.
Mr. Ehlers. Mr. Purdy, do you have a comment?
Mr. Purdy. I will have to defer to National Communication
Systems on your follow-up question.
Mr. Ehlers. Any other comments?
I think everyone is eager to go vote, and I am as popular
as a skunk at the tea party at this point, so I will defer to
the Chairman and yield back.
Mr. Akin. No, you are very popular, Dr. Ehlers.
And--but your time has expired.
And now all of our time is expired, because we have got to
go vote.
We will leave the record open for five days for Members to
submit additional written questions for the witnesses.
And I want to thank the witnesses for your time and your
testimony. You are experts in your fields, and you have added
to our understanding, and we thank you.
And the Committee stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:00 p.m., the Committee was adjourned.]
Appendix:
----------
Answers to Post-Hearing Questions
Responses by Donald ``Andy'' Purdy, Jr., Acting Director, National
Cyber Security Division, Department of Homeland Security
Questions submitted by Chairman Sherwood L. Boehlert
Q1. Measuring Cyber Security
Q1a. How do you measure national cyber security?
A1a. National cyber security is a rapidly changing area in which a
dynamic market drives the continuous emergence of new technologies and
an evolving threat environment. As a result, measuring national cyber
security is an important but challenging goal.
Organizations, including all levels of industry, government, and
academia, do not necessarily have total network cognizance, which
prevents them from being able to measure their own level of security.
To create an assessment of national cyber security, an entity would
require accurate reporting from all organizations that rely on cyber
systems on their own individual networks. Until all organizations
achieve this, it will be very difficult to measure national cyber
security.
NCSD is working toward achieving greater situational awareness
through efforts with: federal agencies, such as federal agency network
monitoring; the private sector through interaction with Information
Sharing and Analysis Center (ISACs); and, international partners
through the international Computer Emergency Response Team
collaboration. Enhanced situational awareness will help to provide a
better estimation of the state of cyber security and identify methods
of measuring changes and improvement.
In addition, NCSD's responsibilities under the National
Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) for the IT Sector and cyber
guidance across the critical infrastructures, will involve working with
key governmental entities and the private sector to complete a sector
specific plan that when implemented will help to create a national
assessment of cyber risk, together with the prioritization of cyber
risk mitigation measures. Several critical infrastructure cyber
measures and metrics will be tracked across each sector based on the
Sample Cyber Measures and Metrics being developed for the NIPP.
The Counter-intelligence community also supports these efforts from
the perspective of cyber espionage threat assessments. Foreign
intelligence services are increasingly using cyber espionage as a means
for collecting sensitive information. We are developing methodologies
for identifying their cyber capabilities and for assessing, in more
precise form, the damage to national security that might be caused by
various cyber intrusion incidents.
Q1b. How do you determine if the Nation's level of cyber vulnerability
is being reduced?
A1b. In order to determine whether the Nation's level of cyber
vulnerability is being reduced, NCSD undertakes a risk management
approach that includes measuring threat, vulnerability, and
consequences.
There are a number of DHS initiatives underway that examine cyber-
related vulnerabilities in addition to physical risk and vulnerability
assessments. In coordination with the private sector, DHS is
identifying cyber vulnerability assessment best practices. This effort
began with an evaluation of various methodologies in use throughout the
public and private sectors. In addition, NCSD is working closely with
other DHS components to ensure that cyber aspects of threat,
consequence, and vulnerability analysis are consistently and
appropriately included in risk methodology efforts. These efforts
include the Risk Analysis and Management for Critical Asset Protection
(RAMCAP), the Vulnerability Identification Self Assessment Tool,
Comprehensive Reviews, and Site Assistance Visits.
NCSD is sponsoring several exercise initiatives that will enhance
U.S. preparedness in the event of a cyber incident and improve
communication, coordination, and procedures between DHS, other
government agencies, the public and private sectors, and with select
foreign partners. In February 2006, NCSD will conduct the National
Cyber Exercise: Cyber Storm, which will test federal response to a
cyber-related incident of national significance; examine state, federal
and international intra-governmental coordination; and emphasize
public/private cooperation and communications using the energy,
information technology, telecommunications and transportation sectors.
In addition to Cyber Storm, NCSD has also coordinated extensively with
and supported the creation of two regional partnerships in the Gulf
Coast and the Pacific Northwest consisting of public and private sector
entities. In each of these regions, NCSD has facilitated a tabletop
exercise designed to raise awareness of infrastructure
interdependencies and to identify ways to improve regional
preparedness. Collaboration with State/local government and private
sector companies has been instrumental in the success of our regional
efforts in the Gulf Coast and Pacific Northwest. Through direct
interaction and collaboration during exercises in these regions, NCSD
has developed significant partnerships with the public and private
sectors to better prepare for and become more capable of preventing,
responding to, and recovering from a major cyber incident.
Cyber exercises provide the environment to develop, coordinate,
rehearse, and refine key processes; integrate infrastructure protection
activities within other national-level plans; establish mechanisms for
coordination and information exchange; and identify interdependencies,
overlaps, and gaps so that all the critical infrastructure stakeholders
at every level are better prepared for and more capable of preventing,
responding to, and recovering from a major cyber incident, thereby
reducing exposure to cyber vulnerabilities.
Q1c. How do you decide what is ``secure enough''?
A1c. Determining a sufficient level of security is variable depending
on the specific needs of an organization and the specific assets
involved, their risk tolerance, and the availability of resources. By
following established set standards such as International Organization
for Standardization (ISO) 17799, an international security standard
that includes a comprehensive set of controls comprising best practices
in information security, as well as conducting risk assessments,
entities may determine their ideal security level. This determination
must be based upon the results of a risk assessment in which government
and the private sector respectively, can reasonably decide what level
of risk is acceptable or what areas need improvement and additional
effort. Entities will make the determination regarding whether or not
improvements and additional effort are necessary, based on availability
of resources concerning their risk assessments and acceptable levels of
risk.
Q1d. Are government mandates needed to increase the Nation's progress
on securing information systems and to get to ``secure enough''?
A1d. Government mandates would likely not increase the Nation's
progress on securing systems to reach a state of ``secure enough.''
This is largely due to the fact that a state of ``secure enough'' will
differ for each entity utilizing information systems and the fact that
it would be very difficult to formulate a mandate that enhances
security in a way that can evolve with the dynamic security and
technology environment. Each operating environment is different and
each entity, public or private, must determine what is needed to
continue their individual critical operations based on their distinct
environment. These case-specific needs will evolve over time.
A comprehensive awareness program to include the promotion of a
risk management approach, as well as accepted best practices and
standards, is a more effective tool for enhancing cyber security and
achieving a greater state of security. Under the NIPP framework,
metrics are being developed to improve the measurement of cyber
security across critical infrastructure sectors.
Q2. Information Sharing
Q2a. What information would Department of Homeland Security (DHS) find
most helpful to receive from critical infrastructure and information
technology companies? What do you, or would you, do with this
information, and how would you protect sensitive information?
A2a. Industry information can allow NCSD (in partnership with other
government entities and the private sector) to identify critical assets
and interdependencies, vulnerabilities, and problematic cyber incidents
and activity, assess cyber risk and prioritize measures to reduce
vulnerabilities and cyber risk, generally, and minimize the severity of
cyber attacks by timely warnings and by increased awareness and
outreach efforts to improve the cyber security of critical
infrastructures. DHS has established mechanisms, such as the Protected
Critical Infrastructure Information program (PCII), to encourage
industry to submit proprietary/sensitive information that will be
protected and exempt from public disclosure as determined by the PCII
program. In addition, entities may securely submit information through
the United States Computer Emergency Readiness Team (US-CERT) secure
website.
Industry and government can provide many forms of information that
are beneficial to NCSD. First, identification of cyber points of
contact within organizations allows the US-CERT to disseminate
information on cyber threats and vulnerabilities to the appropriate
parties. Second, industry reporting of any cyber incidents (e.g.,
worms, viruses, attacks, etc.) to the US-CERT provides NCSD the ability
to enhance cyber situational awareness across all sectors as well as to
provide alerts and warnings back to the public. In addition, of
particular importance from the private sector is information about
major impacts that affect critical infrastructure operations.
Third, the sharing of vulnerability assessment information with
NCSD, including methodologies used, consequences of loss, and
interdependencies, can assist NCSD in the identification of multi-
sector cyber vulnerabilities and in collecting best practices that can
be shared across sectors. Information on the cyber vulnerabilities the
private sector is most concerned about, tactics that might be used to
exploit these vulnerabilities, or the likelihood from their perspective
that these vulnerabilities could be exploited, will assist NCSD in
determining the state of cyber security for the IT Sector and the
Nation. Fourth, it is important for NCSD to receive information on
current protective measures, business continuity plans, and current
levels of resources applied to cyber security. Insight into this
information can enable NCSD to work even more effectively with industry
to address vulnerabilities and further enhance protective measures.
Fifth, NCSD is working with critical infrastructure owners and
operators, vendors, and other security partners to promote control
systems security. Information on control system architectures,
protective measures, metrics, and research and development will further
enhance NCSD's situational awareness and understanding of the state of
control systems security and the ability to provide protective measures
that are relevant and meaningful to the industry.
Q2b. Are you currently receiving the information you need? What are
the principal barriers to information sharing? Are changes in
legislation or regulations needed to overcome these barriers?
A2b. While NCSD does receive information from various stakeholders, we
believe that we can improve upon our current level of analysis with
more information. We continue to encourage companies, government
agencies, and others to share information as described above.
Perhaps the greatest barrier to private sector information sharing
with the government is concern about the possible release of shared
information to the public, either unintentionally or by legal statute,
such as the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). There is a concern that
the release of shared information by either means could potentially
lead to the exploitation of any disclosed vulnerabilities by malicious
actors, cause damage to corporate reputation, and/or result in legal
consequences.
DHS, through the PCII program office, is pursuing ways to make the
resulting program as effective as possible in furthering information
sharing between the public and private sectors by providing industry
protections and assurances through statutory exemption categories, as
afforded by Congress.
Q3. Response to Cyber Attacks
Q3a. If the information systems of a critical infrastructure company
were attacked today, is the U.S. prepared to detect the attack and
repel it or repair the systems quickly?
A3a. Approximately eighty-five percent of the information
infrastructure is owned and operated by the private sector;
consequently, the majority of response activities reside with the
private sector. In the case of attack on private sector infrastructure,
NCSD's role includes providing support to the private sector in the
form of warnings, incident response coordination, technical support,
and coordination with law-enforcement as warranted. In addition, NCSD's
US-CERT provides a national coordination center that links public and
private response capabilities to facilitate information sharing across
all infrastructure sectors and to help protect and maintain the
continuity of our nation's cyber infrastructure. US-CERT serves as a
24x7x365 cyber watch, warning, and incident response center, and
provides coordinated response to cyber incidents, a web portal for
secure communications with private and public sector stakeholders, a
daily report, a public website (http://www.us-cert.gov/), and a
National Cyber Alert System, which provides timely, actionable
information to the public on both technical and non-technical bases.
US-CERT also conducts malicious code analysis, provides malware
technical support, and conducts cyber threat and vulnerability
analysis. US-CERT works to advance relationships with infrastructure
owners and operators to confirm attacks and enhance coordinated
response activities.
In addition, if the attack rises to the level of a cyber incident
of national significance, the National Cyber Response Coordination
Group (NCRCG) will help to coordinate the federal response, including
law enforcement and the intelligence community, with that of the
private sector. NCSD co-chairs the NCRCG with the Department of Justice
and the Department of Defense. An additional thirteen federal agencies
with a statutory responsibility for and/or specific capability toward
cyber security, including the intelligence community, are members. NCSD
serves as the Executive Agent and point of contact for the NCRCG. As
directed by Homeland Security Presidential Directives 5 and 8, NCSD
helped to create a Cyber Annex to the National Response Plan (NRP)\1\
that provides a framework for responding to cyber incidents of national
significance. The Cyber Annex establishes the NCRCG as the principal
Federal Government cyber response body.
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The government is prepared to respond to major cyber incidents in
coordination with the private sector and is working to formalize
incident response coordination by ensuring that standard operating
procedures work in unison. NCSD is also working to facilitate, enhance,
and ensure public-private coordination during major cyber incidents.
Q3b. What about if it were an attack on the Internet?
A3b. As stated above, because approximately 85 percent of the
information infrastructure is owned and operated by private industry,
the majority of mitigation and restoration activity is borne by private
industry. In this regard, NCSD's US-CERT is enhancing relationships
with Internet owners, operators, and other associated industries to
aide in incident coordination and communications with all players to
facilitate rapid response to a significant cyber event or incident.
Specifically, the US-CERT maintains regular communications with the
Information Technology Information Sharing and Analysis Center (ISAC)
and the Telecommunications ISAC. Additionally, US-CERT has established
relationships with the Financial and Multi-State ISACs and is well
coordinated with the ISAC Council that includes ISACs from other
critical infrastructures. US-CERT is prepared to reach out and alert
those within the ISAC communities and affected infrastructure sectors
when necessary.
A large-scale attack on the infrastructure of the Internet may
constitute a cyber incident of national significance that would
activate the NCRCG. The NCRCG is also building a more robust
partnership with the IT sector, with Internet Service Providers, and
through NCSD's responsibilities for the cyber component of the National
Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) to enable a collaborative,
coordinated approach to attack mitigation and recovery.
The NCSD also co-chairs the Internet Disruption Working Group
(IDWG) with the National Communications Systems (NCS). The IDWG was
established by the NCSD and NCS to form a strategic partnership with
other key government agencies. Its focus is to identify and detail
actions that can be taken in the near-term to enhance Internet
resilience. An initial goal of the IDWG was to reach out to private
sector stakeholders. A one-day IDWG Forum was conducted on November 29,
2005 as an initial undertaking to bring subject matter experts together
around a common concern: Internet disruption and hardening with a focus
on gathering feedback on the most likely risk scenarios facing the
Internet infrastructure today. Emphasis was placed on discussing
immediate near-term needs and requirements for industry-government
coordination in preparation for or during an Internet disruption of
national significance. The IDWG will analyze outcome data from the
forum to develop near-term action plans for risk preparedness,
vulnerability mitigation, and response and reconstitution. Information
will be provided to the NCS, NCRCG and the US-CERT for consideration as
input to the update of the NRP/ESF-2 which is the overarching National
plan for communications recovery/reconstitution activities. Near-term
action plans are scheduled to be completed by the end of the 2nd
quarter, FY06.
Q3c. What role can and should DHS and other public and private
organizations play in these response activities?
A3c. Although the private sector owns and operates such a large part of
the information infrastructure, and that infrastructure represents a
critical national asset, response activities reside with both the
private sector and the government. DHS's role is to ensure the
coordination and effectiveness of government preparedness and response
efforts in partnership with the private sector.
US-CERT is the operational arm for DHS's coordinated cyber
preparedness and response and collaborates with affected parties to
assist with rapid response. US-CERT also builds situational awareness,
provides malicious code and vulnerability analysis, disseminates timely
alerts and warnings, participates in exercises, develops and refines
standard operating procedures, and provides training.
As discussed above, the Cyber Annex to the National Response Plan
(NRP), which provides a framework for responding to cyber incidents of
national significance, establishes the NCRCG as the principal Federal
Government response body. The NCRCG will engage the applicable private
sector entities to ensure both the feasibility and comprehensiveness of
the mitigation and recovery strategy.
Q3d. What are the barriers to DHS, companies, or other organizations
providing a quick, effective, and coordinated response?
A3d. NCSD views the current challenges to include clearly defined roles
and responsibilities for response activities. Delineating roles and
responsibilities between the public and private sectors with regard to
response is well underway. The US-CERT Concept of Operations (CONOPS)
provides federal agency reporting and coordination, while the NCRCG
CONOPS provides response to a cyber incident of national significance.
US-CERT and NCRCG continue to refine draft Standard Operating
Procedures (SOPS) to ensure systemization and coordination of response
actions. Also, as stated above, NCSD is working to facilitate, enhance,
and ensure public-private coordination during major cyber incidents.
NCSD's Cyber Storm exercise seeks to test whether in the event of
an incident, the public and private sectors are prepared to act in a
coordinated fashion. By examining homeland security cyber response and
recovery mechanisms, NCSD can evaluate the existing resources and
procedures to recommend improvements to information sharing, processes,
and policies for a more coordinated and robust national cyber incident
preparedness and response. Specifically, Cyber Storm will provide the
opportunity for the lead agencies in the Federal Government to examine
their SOPS and CONOPS in a controlled environment and make revisions
based on the outcome of the exercise.
Q4. Cyber Security R&D
Q4a. What are the biggest technology gaps, or areas where research and
development (R&D) are most needed, that you see in trying to protect
information systems across critical infrastructure sectors?
A4a. For cyber security research and development (R&D) within the
Department of Homeland Security, the Science and Technology (S&T)
Directorate coordinates with the National Cyber Security Division
(NCSD). NCSD collects, develops, and submits cyber security R&D
requirements to provide input for the S&T Directorate's cyber security
research priorities and to the federal cyber security R&D community.
The most significant technology gaps where R&D is needed to protect
information systems across critical infrastructure sectors fall into
three categories: (1) technologies that are applicable to standard
network-based information systems, [the Department of Homeland
Security's (DHS) Science and Technology (S&T) Directorate is addressing
some of these through existing and planned programs within the Cyber
Security portfolio]; (2) technologies that are applicable to
distributed control systems [the S&T Directorate is addressing these
issues through existing programs within the Critical Infrastructure
portfolio--see Q02935]; and (3) technologies that are relevant when
enterprise information systems are directly connected to distributed
control systems.
Technologies needing further R&D related to distributed control
systems are:
-- Efficient, intelligent, cross-domain intrusion detection
systems
-- Effective authentication and authorization technologies
-- Methods for testing and verification of solutions to
retrofit existing systems
-- Automated security assessments
-- Efficient, low-cost encryption technologies
-- Improved technologies for non-intrusive testing methods for
secondary (supervisory) instrumentation systems.
Improved technologies needing further R&D related to enterprise
systems connected to distributed control systems, but are not currently
commercially available are:
-- System-wide intrusion detection and prevention systems
-- Intelligent firewalls
-- Multi-level security systems
-- High-level auditing and reporting systems
The Federal Plan for Cyber Security and Information Assurance
Research and Development (CSIA R&D Plan) marks the Federal Government's
first step toward developing an agenda for the R&D listed above. The
Plan responds to significant drivers for improved federal cyber
security and information assurance R&D arising from current federal
priorities, as outlined in the 2005 report of the President's
Information Technology Advisory Committee (PITAC) and, additionally,
the following documents: the OSTP/OMB Memorandum on Interagency R&D
Priorities for FY 2007; Cyber Security: A Crisis of Prioritization, the
2003 National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace; and the 2002 Cyber
Security Research and Development Act (Public Law 107-305). The purpose
of the Plan is to provide baseline information and an initial technical
framework for a coordinated multi-agency R&D effort in cyber security
and information assurance. The Plan was developed by the Cyber Security
and Information Assurance Interagency Working Group (CSIA IWG) of the
National Science and Technology Council (NSTC). The CSIA R&D Plan has
been coordinated, and is consistent with the National Critical
Infrastructure Protection Research and Development Plan, developed by
OSTP and the S&T Directorate.
The CSIA IWG was established by the Subcommittee on Infrastructure
and the Subcommittee on Networking and Information Technology Research
and Development (NITRD). The purpose of the IWG is to coordinate
policy, programs, and budgets for cyber security and information
assurance (CSIA) R&D. This includes identifying and integrating
requirements, conducting joint program planning, and developing joint
strategies for the CSIA R&D programs conducted by agency members of the
Subcommittees. For the purposes of this document, CSIA includes
fundamental and applied R&D, technology development and engineering,
demonstrations, testing and evaluation, and education and training; and
``agencies'' refers to federal departments, agencies, directorates,
institutes, and other organizational entities.
The following federal agencies are represented on the IWG:
Department of Commerce:
-- National Institute of Standards and Technology
Department of Defense:
-- Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for
Science & Technology
-- Defense Information Systems Agency
-- Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
-- Departments of the Air Force, Army, and Navy
-- National Security Agency
-- Technical Support Working Group (joint with
Department of State)
Department of Energy
Department of Health and Human Services:
-- National Institutes of Health
Department of Homeland Security:
-- National Communications System
-- National Cyber Security Division
-- Science and Technology Directorate
Department of Justice
Department of State
Department of Transportation:
-- Federal Aviation Administration
Department of the Treasury
Central Intelligence Agency
Environmental Protection Agency
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
National Science Foundation
Q4b. What federal R&D programs exist in these areas and what are their
funding levels?
A4b. We refer you to the Federal Plan for Cyber Security and
Information Assurance Research and Development (CSIA R&D Plan) for a
consolidated list of R&D programs in the areas listed above, broken out
by federal agency. The Plan also includes detailed funding information
for each of the programs.
The federal agency funding information gathered during the CSIA
Plan process was pre-decisional and of varying granularity; it was
collected only to provide a preliminary indication of federal agency
spending emphases in cyber security and information assurance. Thus,
the baseline findings derived from this information should be viewed as
useful in the aggregate, but not a comprehensive source of detailed
investment data.
DHS's S&T Directorate and the Office of Science and Technology
Policy (OSTP) prepare an annual Critical Infrastructure Protection
(CIP) R&D Plan, as mandated by Homeland Security Presidential Directive
(HSPD)-7. The first of these plans is available to the public. It
specifically addresses and combines ongoing R&D activities and future
goals for both cyber and physical domains. This plan has been
thoroughly coordinated across multiple federal agencies and includes
input from the private sector, academia, and the national laboratories
through a series of facilitated technical workshops. The plan was
developed under the auspices of the Infrastructure Subcommittee of the
National Science and Technology Council (NSTC), overseen by OSTP. The
subcommittee further acts as an integrating mechanism for input and
planning efforts conducted by two interagency working groups, one
focused on physical security and one focused on cyber security, that
report to the Subcommittee.
Within the DHS S&T Directorate, the CIP and Cyber Security
portfolios have several programs linking cyber security research to
critical infrastructure protection:
Process Control System Forum (PCSF)--This forum was
established this year to accelerate the development of
technology that will enhance the security, safety, and
reliability of process control system (PCS) and supervisory
control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems. The Forum
provides a united venue for industry and government (including
DHS's S&T Directorate, DHS's National Cyber Security Division,
and other partners) to work together in evaluating, specifying,
developing, refining, and testing new technologies. The S&T
Directorate has expended $1.5M in FY 2004, and obligated
another $1.5M in FY 2005. In FY 2006, it is anticipated that an
additional $750K will be used to fund PCSF.
Control System Security Test Center (CSSTC)--In
collaboration with the Department of Energy (DOE) and its
resources and testing facilities, this program focuses on
developing procedures for enumerating the vulnerability of
process control systems to cyber attack and finding solutions
to correct these weaknesses. This is intended to be a close
private/public partnership effort with the critical
infrastructure industries that use and manufacture process
control systems. The CSSTC is run out of the National Cyber
Security Division; funding does not come from the Science and
Technology Directorate.
Linking the Oil & Gas Industry to Improve Cyber-
Security (LOGIC)--This public-private partnership is aimed at
reducing vulnerabilities in process control environments used
in the oil and gas sector by establishing a framework for
assessing risks, evaluating new technologies, and providing an
environment for collaborative cyber-security projects.
Currently in planning stages, this effort brings together
government and private sector stakeholders to identify a
working model for leveraging the collective resources of the
oil and gas sector, government agencies, and national
laboratories to improve process control system security. In FY
2006, the S&T Directorate intends to fund LOGIC and $500K.
Small Business Innovative Research (SBIR) Awards--In
FY 2004, 13 Phase I SBIR projects were awarded in the area of
process control system security. In FY 2005, Phase II SBIRs
were awarded to a subset of the Phase I performers, on the
following topics:
-- Advanced Security for SCADA Systems;
-- Protection of SCADA Systems Using Physics Based
Authentication and Location Awareness;
-- Improved Security Information Management for SCADA
Systems;
-- A Robust Secure Management System for SCADA/EMS
Operations; and
-- A Toolkit for Next Generation Electric Power SCADA
Security Protection and Research.
In SBIRs for SCADA/Process Control Security, the S&T Directorate
has committed/obligated approximately $3.75M for the Phase II efforts.
Questions submitted by Representative Bart Gordon
Q1. Earlier this year, GAO reported to Congress (GAO-05-827T) that the
Department of Homeland Security ``has not yet developed national cyber
threat and vulnerability assessments or government/industry contingency
recovery plans for cyber security, including a plan for recovering key
Internet functions.''
Q1a. What is the current status of progress toward developing national
cyber threat and vulnerability assessments, and by what date or dates
do you estimate such assessments will be completed?
A1a. As part of NCSD's participation in the development of the National
Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP), the NIPP Base Plan discusses
cyber security and the cross-sector cyber element of critical
infrastructure and key resources protection across all 17 critical
infrastructure sectors. It also highlights cyber security concerns in
an appendix that provides additional details on processes, procedures,
and mechanisms needed to achieve NIPP goals and the supporting
objectives for cyber security. The cyber security appendix specifies
cyber responsibilities for security partners, processes and initiatives
to reduce cyber risk, and milestones and metrics to measure progress on
enhancing the Nation's protection of cyber infrastructure.
The draft NIPP Base Plan was released for final review and comment
on November 2, 2005 and addresses the federal, State, territorial,
tribal, local, and private sector roles and responsibilities for
critical infrastructure protection. It will be completed in early 2006.
The 17 critical infrastructure and key resource (CI/KR) Sector-Specific
Plans (SSPs) will further detail risk reduction strategies related to
their respective critical cyber infrastructure. The SSPs will be
completed in 180 days after the publication of the NIPP Base Plan.
In addition to physical risk and vulnerability assessments, there
are a number of DHS initiatives underway that examine cyber-related
vulnerabilities. DHS, in coordination with the private sector, is
identifying cyber vulnerability assessment best practices. This effort
began with an evaluation of various methodologies from across public
and private sectors. NCSD is also working closely with other DHS
components to ensure that cyber aspects of threat, consequence, and
vulnerability analysis are consistently and appropriately included in
risk methodology efforts. These efforts include the Risk Analysis and
Management for Critical Asset Protection (RAMCAP), the Vulnerability
Identification Self Assessment Tool, Comprehensive Reviews, and Site
Assistance Visits. To achieve this objective, NCSD will:
1) Support the development of cyber components of RAMCAP.
2) Complete its evaluation of public and private sector
vulnerability assessment methodologies and document best
practices in Q1FY06 for integration into other efforts;
3) Integrate cyber issues and best practices into DHS risk
management and vulnerability assessment methods and tools
through ongoing and continued collaboration and coordination
with DHS entities as methods and tools are implemented; and
4) enhance understanding of the impact of cyber attacks by
analyzing the consequences (i.e., economic, human, physical) of
cyber attacks on critical infrastructure sectors by Q3FY06.
In addition, NCSD's US-CERT Control Systems Security Program and
the US-CERT Control Systems Security Center (CSSC) work to reduce
control system vulnerabilities in our critical infrastructure. The
Control Systems Security Program coordinates efforts among Federal,
State, and local governments, as well as control system owners,
operators, and vendors to improve control system security within and
across all critical infrastructure sectors by reducing cyber security
vulnerabilities and risk. The US-CERT CSSC coordinates control system
incident management, provides timely situational awareness information,
and manages control system vulnerability and threat reduction
activities. The US-CERT CSSC brings together government, industry, and
academia to reduce vulnerabilities, respond to threats, and foster
public/private collaboration. NCSD and the Control Systems Security
Program are also working with other DHS components to ensure that
control systems security is integrated into risk and vulnerability
assessment methodologies and tools designed for use across multiple
sectors.
Further, to reduce control system vulnerabilities in our critical
infrastructure, CSSC developed a draft cyber security protection
framework for identifying control systems security protection measures
and comparing them against existing security standards. The framework
provides a systematic methodology for assessing the cyber security
posture of control systems. It is designed to reduce the burden on
owners and operators by providing them with a means to select
protective measures that apply to their specific architecture and
operating environment and reduce their respective risk.
As part of this framework, the CSSC also has capabilities at Idaho
National Laboratory to perform vulnerability assessments of control
systems. The CSSC is working with commercial vendors and Department of
Energy (DOE) to complete assessments of three different control systems
to identify cyber vulnerabilities, reverse engineer exploits, and
provide solutions to secure vendor systems. A code-based analysis has
also been conducted in cooperation with a vendor/manufacturer to
identify possible vulnerabilities and recommendations to secure the
system.
The cyber security protection framework also leverages best
practices from industry for securing control systems against cyber
attacks and organizes them so the control systems community can
identify specific solutions to their security vulnerabilities. As part
of the framework, implementation tools, such as a ``self-assessment
tool,'' have also been developed to allow owners and operators of
industrial control systems to perform on-site self-assessments against
a database of categorized security requirements.
In addition, NCSD's Law Enforcement/Intelligence Branch has
multiple efforts underway in this area. For example, the Law
Enforcement/Intelligence Branch, in collaboration with the Homeland
Infrastructure Threat and Risk Assessment Center, (HITRAC), has created
a draft Domestic Cyber Risk Estimate to evaluate the threats emanating
from inside the U.S., to complement international threat assessments
completed by the intelligence community. HITRAC is comprised of subject
matter experts from the Office of Infrastructure Protection and the
Office of Intelligence and Analysis.
Q1b. What is the current status of progress toward developing
government/industry contingency recovery plans for cyber security,
including a plan for recovering key Internet functions, and by what
date or dates do you estimate such recovery plans will be completed?
A1b. DHS is confronting this security challenge through the work of the
Internet Disruption Working Group (IDWG), a partnership between the
NCSD and the National Communications System (NCS). To initiate the
substantive work of IDWG, the NCSD conducted a one-day IDWG Forum with
major public sector partners and subject matter experts in late
November 2005. Participants at the Forum will work to continue to
collaboratively work in identifying actions that can be taken in the
near-term to better protect against, respond to, and reconstitute
following an Internet disruption. Topics discussed included: risk
scenarios; path forward/near-term protective measures; key Internet
infrastructure components; path forward/near-term response; scope of
disruption analysis (or ``thresholds''); and path forward/near-term
response.
The IDWG will analyze outcome data to develop near-term action
plans for risk preparedness, situational awareness, vulnerability
mitigation, and response and reconstitution. Information will be
provided to the NCS, NCRCG, and the US-CERT for consideration as input
to the update of the National Response Plan (NRP)/Emergency Support
Function (ESF) #2, which is the overarching National plan for
communications recovery/reconstitution activities. Near-term action
plans are scheduled to be completed by the end of the 2nd quarter,
FY06. Action plans will be composed detailing near-term steps for
industry and government to increase Internet resiliency.
In addition, the Emergency Support Function #2, Communications, is
one of fifteen emergency support functions (ESF) maintained by the
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) as part of the Federal
Response Plan (FRP). The National Communications System (NCS) is
responsible for ESF #2, which ensures the federal telecommunications
support to federal, State and local response efforts following a
Presidentially declared major disaster, emergency or extraordinary
situation under the FRP. Because the Internet backbone is telecom-
based, NCS's expertise will help to promote the survivability of the
Internet and recovery after disruption. NCSD and NCS have agreed to
explore the need for possible recommendations to revise ESF-2 to ensure
that cyber is appropriately accounted for (with SOPs as appropriate).
Q2. The Critical Infrastructure Information (CII) program, which is
authorized by the statute creating the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS), is intended to protect cyber security related information
provided voluntarily to DHS by the private sector. In response to a
question at the hearing, you indicated that DHS has interim rules in
place for instituting the CII program.
Q2a. What is the current status of the CII program and by what date do
you estimate that the final rule for its implementation will be in
place?
A2a. The Department has synthesized the comments received and has
reviewed the operating experience with the program to date. The item
has a very high priority; however, DHS is committed to making sure that
the rule and the Program work effectively for the Department and
critical infrastructure owners/operators, and thus, the draft document
has been undergoing further refinement. In the meantime, based on its
operating experience, the PCII Program Office has already been
implementing changes in its operating procedures to respond to some of
the issues raised in the comments to make PCII more flexible/useful for
submitters. The editing process is nearing completion. Before going to
the Federal Register, the Rule must be submitted to OMB for interagency
coordination. The Department is committed to working to resolve any
issues that may arise there as quickly as possible. The rule will be
published as a Final Rule and DHS will continue to work with submitters
and government users to address implementation issues as they arise.
In addition to these efforts toward a Final Rule, approximately a
year ago, DHS' PCII Office implemented a way for companies to sign up
to submit protected critical infrastructure information to NCSD on a
recurring basis through the secure US-CERT Portal. Since then, NCSD has
been working toward a mechanism to enable companies to submit protected
information on an episodic basis, rather than having to pre-enroll.
This mechanism is scheduled to be implemented in early 2006.
Additionally, the Department has been working to establish a pilot with
the NCSD/US-CERT submissions to allow the submitter to request limited
dissemination of their information. This effort is expected to be
active in early 2006 as well.
Q2b. What are the principal concerns of the private sector thus far
regarding implementation of the CII program, and how is DHS responding
to these concerns?
A2b. One of the main concerns frequently expressed by the private
sector with respect to the PCII Program is dissemination of information
shared by the private sector. Several organizations have stated that
they would contemplate sharing cyber related information with NCSD if
dissemination of their information were limited to only NCSD. As a
result, NCSD has begun working with the PCII Program Office in
`piloting' the capability for an entity to submit CII information
directly to NCSD and request that information be limited in its
dissemination to only NCSD. We expect this pilot effort, consistent
with the interim final rule, to be operational shortly.
Q3. In his testimony, Mr. Freese indicated that the Process Control
Security Forum is doing good work in developing design guidelines for
the next generation of more secure control systems, and he suggested
the need for support from DHS for seed money to support the
implementation of ideas and concepts developed by the Forum.
What is your view of the value of the Process Control Security
Forum, and what is your response to Mr. Freese's suggestion?
A3. The Process Control Systems Forum (PCSF) is an industry lead group
comprised of many interest and working groups with the focus of
securing legacy and next generation control systems. The PCSF is
sponsored by the Department of Homeland Security's Science & Technology
(S&T) Directorate. The NCSD co-chairs the PCSF and supports the PCSF in
their mission to accelerate the design, development, and deployment of
more secure control and legacy systems currently embedded with our
nation's critical infrastructure. The NCSD Control Systems Security
Program's (CSSP) goal is to reduce the risk from a cyber attack to
control systems associated with our nation's critical infrastructure.
The NCSD CSSP provides recommendations for areas of research and
development (R&D) to the S&T Directorate as gaps and vulnerabilities
are identified in control system cyber security.
NCSD's CSSP is an active participant within the PCSF. The CSSP
leads several interest groups within the PCSF in order to inform and
receive comments on CSSP initiatives, such as the Control Systems
Security Framework and Self-Assessment tool and control systems
security focused standards. The value of the PSCF is its ability to
reach out to representatives of the critical infrastructure sectors,
such as chemical, water, energy, and telecommunications, which utilize
Process Control Systems (PCS) and Supervisory Control and Data
Acquisition (SCADA). The NCSD actively engages with the PSCF to reach
vendors and asset owners as part of its outreach efforts. More
recently, for example, the NCSD CSSP published the Hurricane Katrina
Control Systems Assistance Informational Paper, which provided guidance
for rebuilding and securely restarting control systems. The paper is
available on the PCSF website, as well as the NCSD US-CERT website.
Question submitted by Representative Eddie Bernice Johnson
Q1. I understand that the Secretary of Homeland Security created the
new position of Assistant Secretary of Cyber Security and
Telecommunications. Why has this position not yet been filled, and when
will it be filled?
A1. As with other key leadership positions, the Assistant Secretary for
Cyber Security and Telecommunications position requires a unique skill
set of managerial and substantive expertise and we are in the process
of reviewing the qualifications of several candidates. The Department
will move forward with the process of identifying a suitable nominee as
quickly as possible.
Answers to Post-Hearing Questions
Responses by John S. Leggate, Chief Information Officer and Group Vice
President, Digital & Communications Technology, BP Plc., United
Kingdom
Questions submitted by Chairman Sherwood L. Boehlert
Q1. Measuring Cyber Security
Q1a. How do you measure your company's cyber security?
A1a. We assess our capability to manage security vs. the risk, assessed
through a combination of assessment of threats against the company, the
potential weaknesses in systems and processes and the impact that such
exposures could have.
Q1b. How do determine if your company's level of cyber vulnerability
is being reduced?
A1b. The assessment approach stated above measures risk reduction
activities such as device patching and the relevance of such actions.
Q1c. How do you decide what is ``secure enough''?
A1c. The impact assessment, measuring financial and non-financial
impact (such as safety, environment, effect on society, regulatory
compliance and reputation) determines whether something matters to the
company. The likelihood of the event, assessed by threat intelligence
and effectiveness of controls determines how much action needs to be
taken.
Q1d. Are there specific metrics you use in evaluating the cyber
security of your company?
A1d. We use specific metrics relating to the effectiveness of
particular controls or the trend of threats. We have a scale used for
assessing impact for the most significant risks. (Broader concepts such
as value at risk have as yet proved illusory in the case of operational
risks).
Q1e. How should the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) determine if
the Nation is making progress?
A1e. Firstly, through risk assessment of security--what is at risk and
how well is it protected, the capabilities deployed, measured in the
form of skilled people, deployed security technologies and processes.
Secondly through the number of security events being reported.
Q1f. Are government mandates needed to increase the progress and get
to ``secure enough''?
A1f. The government should always avoid mandating specifics, as true
knowledge of the most appropriate control always exists within the
sector (no matter which sector). However, government should mandate
processes and actions that ensure that cross-sector risks are
identified and picked up and that sectors measure themselves against
their own standards.
Business Case for Cyber Security
Q1g. Within your company, how do you make the business case for the
costs associated with more secure information technology products? What
can the Federal Government do to help you make this case and make
investment in cyber security more attractive?
A1g. The security requirements for information technology products are
generally little more than the basics of good integrity, i.e., no
vulnerabilities. The addition of simple security measures like
frrewalls and anti-virus and next generation protection of data is just
good business. No special action is required outside normal good
business practice. The government need take no additional action.
Q2. Information Sharing
Q2a. What information would you find most helpful to receive from the
government (especially DHS) or from other companies when you are making
decisions related to what cyber security you need. When responding to
an attack or an incident?
A2a. Threat information about new risks and problems being encountered
in near real-time.
Q2b. What information have you been asked for by DHS that you feel
uncomfortable providing and why?
A2b. Detail of security events and known vulnerabilities. We have no
assurances as to the protection of our information, who has access to
it and how it will be used. Additionally we are concerned that there
will be demands put on the individuals dealing with the incident that
are no in the best interest of our company.
Q2c. What are the principal barriers to information sharing: Are
changes in the legislation or regulations needed to overcome these
barriers?
A2c. Simple trust between one person and another. It takes time to
build and needs processes to bed in before it works. Changes in process
such as a move from ISACs to central DHS actions was a backward step in
this fragile trust model. Government funding to help the information
sharing infrastructure is invaluable in getting over the lead time
between starting and seeing value (which is a barrier for company
funding).
Q3. Responding to Cyber attacks
Q3a. If the information systems of a critical infrastructure company
were attacked today, is the U.S. prepared to detect the attack and
repel it or repair the systems quickly?
A3a. It depends on the industry, the nature of the attack and the
company itself. Response would range from excellent to poor. As a whole
the U.S. Government would probably not be of much help in helping
critical infrastructure companies; however, the company themselves may
be prepared to handle the majority of attacks.
Q3b. What about if it were an attack on the Internet?
A3b. There is no coordinated response to an Internet attack. Recovery
would be by adhoc action and if unlucky could be catastrophic if the
impact spread across sectors. Lots of very good technical people work
on an adhoc basis but there is NO strategic plan or coordinated effort.
Q3c. What role can and should DHS and other public and private
organizations play in these response activities?
A3c. DHS itself can do little in the response, this has to be done by
the companies that own the infrastructure itself. DHS can help best in
analysis, preparedness and planning.
Q3d. What are the barriers to DHS, companies or other organizations
providing a quick, effective and coordinated response?
A3d. Poor planning and lack of understanding of interdependencies and
weak points but most of all TRUST. DHS has done little to foster trust
with the critical infrastructure companies.
Q4. International Cyber Security
Q4a. In your experience working with multiple Federal Governments on
cyber security, what notable differences exist between the approach of
the U.S. and that of other countries?
A4a. The U.S. approach is paradoxical, there seems to be good funding
in total but this is not integrated into a focused program. The lack of
continuity and lack of seniority in the cyber security part of DHS has
led to fragmentation of the program with many activities being started
but few big wins to point at. Cyber Security has taken a back seat
especially in R&D--DHS S&T is only spending about $15 million on cyber
security.
Q4b. Are other countries supporting activities that the U.S. should be
doing too?
A4b. Delivery of specifics such as practical solutions from funded
research, novel cyber-intelligence, and user-led security solutions
fora have all been seen to add great value in the programs of some
other countries.
Q5. What is the Department of Homeland Security doing to foster
private sector efforts in cyber security and what could the agency do
that it is not doing now?
A5. The ISACs presented a great opportunity for private sector
engagement, but DHS has programmatically eliminated independent ISACs.
The initiatives should be given focus and direction to have specific
rather than generic work programs.
Q6. Are effective practices procedures and technologies now available
to guard against the adverse impacts of cyberspace vulnerabilities?
A6. As we digitize more and more we need to have a significant
improvement in software engineering to create systems of adequate
integrity. This philosophy is still not present in the IT industry.
Q7. Are there shortcomings for particular critical infrastructure
areas?
A7. As traditional process control technologies such as SCADA/DCS
continue to integrate with Commercial Off The Shelf IT systems we see
vulnerabilities and threats being introduced into environments that
cannot be changed to deal with them. A new class of co-existing
security protection is required to address legacy systems until such
time as new, built-secure technologies can take their place.
Answers to Post-Hearing Questions
Responses by David E. Kepler, Corporate Vice President of Shared
Services and Chief Information Officer, The Dow Chemical
Company
Questions submitted by Chairman Sherwood L. Boehlert
Q1. Measuring Cyber security
How do you measure your company's cyber security?
How do determine if your company's level of cyber
vulnerability is being reduced?
How do you decide what is ``secure enough''?
Are there specific metrics you use in evaluating the
cyber security of your company?
How should the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
determine if the Nation is making progress?
Are government mandates needed to increase the
progress and get to ``secure enough''?
A1. Dow Chemical has a disciplined process to manage risk and address
cyber security in our company. The metrics established in this
framework allow us to analyze our effectiveness against priorities,
understand internal support for addressing these priorities, and
identify strengths and areas for improvement in our efforts. This
framework also provides a valuable mechanism to compare our own
priorities and self-assessments against those of peer companies. Our
processes are based on industry standards and best practices.
Today's world requires us to maintain constant vigilance and effort
to ensure our security. There is no foreseeable point where we as a
company can declare we are ``secure enough.'' We must continue to
assess our risk and vulnerabilities applying the necessary investments,
resources and management systems to effectively manage risk and
mitigate vulnerabilities on an on-going basis.
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) cannot be everything to
everyone. Instead, it is in our national interest for DHS to place a
priority and focus on cyber threats of significant consequence that
could interrupt our nation's critical information and communications
infrastructure or cause significant disruption to our economy. DHS
should be measured by how well they plan, defend, and respond to such
threats of national consequence.
Q2. Business Case for Cyber Security
Within your company, how do you make the business case for the
costs associated with more secure information technology products? What
can the Federal Government do to help you make this case and make
investment in cyber security more attractive?
A2. Information systems are critical to Dow Chemical's business
operations and are integral to the competitive advantage of our
company. Ensuring the reliability and security of our systems,
processes, and information is of the utmost importance. The business
case for cyber security is very simple for us. If our critical
information systems or manufacturing control systems are compromised,
our ability to conduct business is compromised. Investments are based
on impact to our current operations and stakeholders, not for benefit
return.
Q3. Information Sharing
What information would you find most helpful to
receive from the government (especially DHS) or from other
companies when you are making decisions related to what cyber
security you need. When responding to an attack or an incident?
What information have you been asked for by DHS that
you feel uncomfortable providing and why?
What are the principal barriers to information
sharing: Are changes in the legislation or regulations needed
to overcome these barriers?
A3. DHS should strive to provide specific information regarding pending
threats, likely attacks, and recommended response plans where possible.
Although understanding this is not always feasible, it is necessary to
have an ongoing, two-way dialogue with critical infrastructure sectors
on the current threat environment, likely trends, and potential
mitigation options.
We believe DHS has established programs, such as PCII, and
continues to revise theses programs as necessary to enable the
effective sharing of information from the private sector to DHS.
However, we believe DHS and the private sector communications need to
be protected in both directions to enable dialogue on highly sensitive
areas. PCII only protects information we submit, it does not promote
reverse sharing. An additional concern is the growing number of
requests from federal agencies outside DHS and State agencies for
security and proprietary sensitive information that could otherwise be
protected as PCII. If requested under broad authority granted by
various laws and statutes, the information would be considered
``independently obtained,'' and would not be protected under existing
DHS programs.
Further, even programs within DHS, such as protection of SSI, are
not consistent with PCII and do not offer equivalent protections.
Efforts must be taken to harmonize the protection of information within
DHS and across all governmental agencies to ensure that critical
security information is not compromised and that development of
important security information and sharing of such information is
encouraged. We believe that DHS should be empowered as the central
agency responsible for the protection of security sensitive and
proprietary sensitive information. Redundant requests from other
agencies should be limited, and if information sharing is required
across federal, state and local agencies, it must have the same level
of protections provided by PCII.
Q4. Responding to Cyber attacks
If the information systems of a critical
infrastructure company were attacked today, is the U.S.
prepared to detect the attack and repel it or repair the
systems quickly?
What about if it were an attack on the Internet?
What role can and should DHS and other public and
private organizations play in these response activities?
What are the barriers to DHS, companies or other
organizations providing a quick, effective and coordinated
response?
A4. The U.S. must be prepared to address high consequence cyber attacks
to our nation's critical information and communications infrastructure.
Research and development efforts need to be focused on how best to
anticipate and model, detect, defend, and respond to significant
interruptions to the Internet and communications infrastructure. More
needs to be done to focus attention on these high risk concerns--
ensuring adequate planning, resources, and management structure are in
place to respond to these high-risk scenarios. Less engagement in
security and reliability solutions is needed as this is being addressed
by marketplace forces.
Questions submitted by Representative Eddie Bernice Johnson
Q1. What is the Department of Homeland Security doing to foster
greater private sector efforts in cyber security and what could the
agency do that it is not doing now?
A1. DHS is currently initiating a number of projects they believe will
increase cyber security in the private sector. However, these efforts
are not well coordinated with the private sector and appear to lack
coordination within the agency itself. A chartered engagement with the
Chemical Sector's Security Program is needed to understand and address
the highest areas of risk to our country as it relates to the chemical
sector.
Q2. Are effective practices, procedures, and technologies now
available to guard against the adverse impacts of cyberspace
vulnerabilities? Are there shortcomings for particular critical
infrastructure areas?
A2. Speaking for the chemical industry, we have established the
Chemical Sector Cyber Security Program to create guidance and reference
procedures as well as best practices across our industry. For over
three years, this program has actively engaged to educate large and
small chemical companies and to build guidance into industry programs
such as the Responsible Care Security Code.
Although technology is improving, the current approach of releasing
software and infrastructure with security vulnerabilities that requires
patching later must be addressed. Information technology providers must
more thoroughly test their products for existing security threats and
apply necessary protections against anticipated future threats. The
market appears to be working--incenting companies to provide much more
secure software and systems. However, if this trend does not continue,
government intervention may be needed to ensure information technology
is fully developed and secured before being released into the
marketplace. Companies have the financial capability to address this,
and government sponsored R&D should not be required.
Answers to Post-Hearing Questions
Responses by Gerald S. Freese, Director of Enterprise Information
Security, American Electric Power
Questions submitted by Chairman Sherwood L. Boehlert
Q1. Measuring Cyber Security
Q1a. How do you measure your company's cyber security?
A1a. Measurement is most effective against a backdrop consisting of a
security policy and standards. Measurement is accomplished in several
ways, depending on the intended focus:
Compliance with internal security standards--measured
against metrics derived from self-imposed security requirements
(based on business drivers and best practices).
Compliance with regulatory requirements--measured
against externally generated security mandates (Sarbanes Oxley,
HIPAA, FERC, GLB, etc.).
Penetration testing--Tests technical security
architecture for vulnerabilities. Provides multiple levels of
security gap determinations and direction for remediation.
Q1b. How do you determine if your company's level of cyber
vulnerability is being reduced?
A1b. Using periodic scanning of networks, servers and workstation for
known vulnerabilities; ongoing compliance checks determine levels of
compliance with standards. Compliance checks rely on the use of
technical and process metrics developed through best practices or
regulatory requirements.
Q1c. How do you decide what is secure enough?
A1c. ``Secure enough'' is determined through analysis of several
variables; these are risk to business systems, regulatory requirements
and the level of security implemented in the technical architecture.
Q1d. How should DHS determine if the Nation is making progress?
A1d. DHS must continue to work toward comprehensive information sharing
with critical infrastructure industries. The NIPP is an excellent start
toward greater cooperation but the PCII program needs to be fully
implemented and socialized to be effective.
Q1e. Are government mandates needed to increase the progress and get
to ``secure enough?''
A1e. Critical infrastructure industries do not want government mandates
to increase security. Unfortunately, there is no way for the government
to effectively help protect critical infrastructure if its components
do not have some consistency in the level of risk-based protection they
have in place. I feel that at some point in the future, government will
step in and establish federal requirements. Hopefully they will do it
with full industry collaboration.
Q2. Business Case for Cyber Security
Q2a. Within your company, how do you make the business case for the
costs associated with more secure information technology products?
A2a. In several ways: Regulatory or legislative requirements; Risk
identification and mitigation; Cultivating strong executive support for
CI protection.
Q2b. What can the Federal Government do to help make this case?
A2b. The government can provide more pertinent, substantiated threat
information. They can also design financial assistance for selected
protective measures. These would have to be accomplished with extensive
collaboration with the private sector.
Q3. Information Sharing
Q3a. What information would you find most helpful to receive from the
government (especially DHS) or from other companies when you are making
decisions related to what cyber security you need? When responding to
an attack or an incident?
A3a. In question two, we discussed that there is a need for more
pertinent and substantiated threat information from the government.
When responding to an attack or incident, government sources, outside
of some law enforcement liaison, will probably be less timely than
commercial enterprises specializing in early warning and incident
response measures. Attacks or exploits, however, are threats come to
fruition. Initial government involvement in early warning and threat
analysis would go a long way toward better prevention or deflection of
these exploits.
Q3b. What information have you been asked for by DHS that you feel
uncomfortable providing? Why? What are the barriers to information
sharing? Are changes in legislation or regulations needed to overcome
these barriers?
A3b. On numerous occasions, federal and State DHS authorities have
asked us for information on our critical assets and on the protective
measures (physical and cyber) surrounding them. Without the PCII
program in place, we are very reluctant to provide that data, and have
repeatedly declined their requests. We cannot be sure under the current
situation of only partial implementation of the PCII program who will
have access to that data. Once PCII is fully established and
implemented, we will revisit information sharing and support the
effort. We are committed to doing all we can to help the government
protect our nation's critical infrastructure.
Q4. Responding to Cyber Attacks
Q4a. If the information systems of a critical infrastructure company
were attacked today, is the U.S. prepared to detect the attack and reel
it or repair the systems quickly?
A4a. While there are many companies that have successfully repelled one
or more major cyber attacks, many more have not and a good number could
not. Those that have the security technology and mature incident
response programs are usually well equipped to handle both directed and
general cyber attacks. Those that have few technical solutions in place
or that have poorly defined incident response procedures are often
victims of even the most well-known and preventable threats. So the
answer to this question must be qualified with an ``it depends on who
is attacked'' caveat. Overall as a country I believe we are not well
equipped to repel such attacks.
Q4b. What about if the attack were on the Internet?
A4b. If attacks are recognized quickly (very likely) and there are
preventive measures already in place and properly configured, responses
after a major Internet attack can probably effectively thwart
attackers. These measures range from network and system processes to
equipment/communication redundancy.
Q4c. What role can and should DHS and other public and private
organizations play in these response activities?
A4c. DHS should be providing the most up to date threat data available,
along with analysis of potential and actual cyber threats. In addition,
they should provide awareness information to companies that is
substantive, citing examples of attacks, providing recommended
solutions and adding real value to the knowledge base. To make this
more meaningful, DHS might want to make this a collaborative effort
with commercial companies that already have a large critical
infrastructure customer base.
Q4d. What are the barriers to DHS companies or other organizations
providing a quick, effective and coordinated response?
A4d. I can't speak for other companies, but regarding DHS, it needs to
staff its ranks with true cyber security experts and be willing to pay
the costs of their expertise. This does not mean hiring the standard
group of government contractors. It means recruiting individuals from
the commercial world that have industry credibility, can offer real
knowledge and experience and feel that protecting critical
infrastructure is a vital mission for our national security.
Q4e. What is DHS doing to foster greater private sector efforts in
cyber security, and what could the agency do that it is not doing now?
A4e. DHS seems to be addressing most of the right areas as evidenced by
the NIPP draft. They are also increasing involvement in industry
groups, making sure their message is being effectively communicating.
What they could add is accurate threat data and greater awareness of
the impact that cyber attacks can have on the infrastructure and
economy.
Q4f. Are effective practices, procedures and technologies now
available to guard against the adverse impacts of cyberspace
vulnerabilities? Are there shortcomings for particular critical
infrastructure areas?
A4f. Currently there are effective practices, procedures and
technologies available. And they will keep improving. The problem is
that these are not used consistently across all infrastructure
organizations. Unfortunately, with cyber security we're still only as
strong as our weakest link.
Answers to Post-Hearing Questions
Responses by Andrew M. Geisse, Chief Information Officer, SBC Services,
Inc.
Questions submitted by Chairman Sherwood L. Boehlert
Q1. Measuring Cyber Security
How do you measure your company's cyber security? How do you
determine if your company's level of cyber vulnerability is being
reduced? How do you decide what is ``secure enough''? Are there
specific metrics you use in evaluating the cyber security of your
company? How should the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) determine
if the Nation is making progress? Are government mandates needed to
increase the progress to get to ``secure enough''?
A1. There is no single metric or measurement that suffices to describe
a company's cyber security readiness. SBC proactively determines the
cyber security readiness of its environment through the use of internal
and external audit reviews, secure system management compliance,
application security compliance, routine scans to identify
vulnerabilities, and periodic component review within the
infrastructure. In addition, an annual assessment of deployed security
solutions is conducted based upon new or changing requirements and
conditions. SBC also has a team of IT Security professionals dedicated
to the protection of its internal cyber resources. A key metric for SBC
is the number of attempted and investigated intrusions within the
environment and the corrective actions taken to address them.
As a way to measure private companies' progress towards cyber
security, the Department of Homeland Security could use publicly
reported information, such as annual Sarbanes-Oxley disclosure reports.
Government mandates should not be necessary. The DHS could focus on
cyber security best practices and standards. Also helpful would be
tools so companies could measure their compliance towards those best
practices.
Q2. Business Case for Cyber Security
Within your company, how do you make the business case for the
costs associated with more secure information technology products? What
can the Federal Government do to help you make this case and make
investment in cyber security more attractive?
A2. SBC well understands the need for cyber security, within the
company infrastructure and as a service we can provide to users of our
data products. Business cases to support cyber security preparedness to
protect internal cyber resources must clearly define the risks to the
business, the security tools needed and processes required, and then
should be evaluated based on needs of the business. Most often,
business cases supporting cyber security are developed because of new
business opportunities, changing cyber technologies, new identified
vulnerabilities, growth of our environment, or new legislative
requirements.
Awareness of cyber security to the public can show a positive
impact to businesses that help support cyber infrastructure (i.e.,
Internet). The more people understand virus protection, anti-spam
tools, identity theft protection, and phishing risks, the better the
Internet-connected community and services can perform on their behalf.
Government education programs that could also be used within businesses
would help defray internal education costs.
Q3. Information Sharing
Q3a. What information would you find most helpful to receive from the
government (especially DHS) or from other companies when you are making
decisions related to what cyber security you need? When responding to
an attack or incident?
A3a. SBC would find it helpful if information from the DHS includes:
current cyber vulnerabilities, attack methods, and attack sources. The
most current information helps us prepare strategies to deal with new
sources of attack and new methods of attack. The same can be said when
responding to an incident. Understanding how an attack may occur and
from where allows SBC to better prepare defenses that could block
specific protocols or specific IP addresses.
Q3b. What information have you been asked for by DHS that you feel
uncomfortable providing? Why?
A3b. Information that SBC has been asked to share that has made us
uncomfortable includes items that we consider private within the
company and restricted to only employees with a need to know. Examples
include our private address spaces, server specifics (numbers, types,
versions, and locations), vendors used and security infrastructure
components. Typically, we are uncomfortable with sharing information
that could be used to allow specific, targeted attacks against SBC. We
also have an expectation from and an obligation to our customers to
keep their information private and secure. Release of customer
information to law enforcement should always follow the same strict
protocol as any other subpoenaed information.
Q3c. What are the principal barriers to information sharing? Are
changes in legislation or regulations needed to overcome these
barriers?
A3c. It has been our experience that the principal barriers to
information sharing between companies are; competition within an
industry, potential negative public perception if cyber security
intrusions occur, and the FOIA or other disclosure acts requiring
federal agencies to disclose meeting proceedings or information
provided.
Q4. Responding to Cyber Attacks
If the information systems of a critical infrastructure company
were attacked today, is the U.S. prepared to detect the attack and
repel it or repair the systems quickly? What about if it were an attack
on the Internet? What role can and should DHS and other public and
private organizations play in these response activities? What are the
barriers to DHS, companies, or other organizations providing a quick
and effective and coordinated response?
A4. I believe most large companies, especially those within the
critical infrastructure, understand cyber security is a part of doing
business within our Internet-connected world, today, and have taken
precautionary measures to detect and protect against attacks.
The Internet itself is constantly attacked. The Internet, by
definition, is a network of networks, and, as such, Internet service
providers have an ability to segment portions of the network to prevent
rampant abuse, if necessary.
Communications is the chief barrier to DHS' ability to coordinate a
rapid and coordinated response to Internet problems. To provide a
coordinated response, the DHS needs the ability to contact key Internet
providers to focus on the immediate attack. This is not unlike the
telecommunications requirement to have a National Security Emergency
Preparedness (NSEP) organization which focuses on national telco
events.
Questions submitted by Representative Eddie Bernice Johnson
Q1. What is the Department of Homeland Security doing to foster
greater private sector efforts in cyber security, and what could the
agency do that it is not doing now?
A1. SBC maintains close ties to government agencies responsible for
national security. We work closely with them on a daily basis to
receive and share security related information. The DHS is encouraged
to continue to support the efforts of the following: the National
Security Telecommunications Advisory Council (NSTAC), National
Coordinating Center Telecom Information Sharing and Analysis Center
(NCC Telecom ISAC), FBI's Infragard, and the National Security
Information Exchange (NSIE).
DHS support of public awareness and education programs focused on
cyber security would be a pro-active effort to help companies and the
public be more aware of cyber security and the role they play to
protect themselves.
Q2. Are effective practices, procedures, and technologies now
available to guard against the adverse impacts of cyberspace
vulnerabilities? Are there shortcomings for particular critical
infrastructure areas?
A2. SBC utilizes security technologies and practices to guard against
adverse cyber security vulnerabilities. We believe security tools and
practices exist for industries to protect themselves. Our challenge is
addressing new vulnerabilities as they appear. This requires
technologies and processes to continuously react to the ever-changing
environment. Consumers and industry must continue to hold vendors
accountable and to focus their efforts on providing products and tools
to meet cyber security best practices. Vendors need to recognize that
cyber security is an administrative intensive effort and tools are
needed to relieve this pressure.