[House Hearing, 109 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
NOAA HURRICANE FORECASTING
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
OCTOBER 7, 2005
__________
Serial No. 109-26
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Science
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.house.gov/science
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______
COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE
HON. SHERWOOD L. BOEHLERT, New York, Chairman
RALPH M. HALL, Texas BART GORDON, Tennessee
LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas JERRY F. COSTELLO, Illinois
CURT WELDON, Pennsylvania EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas
DANA ROHRABACHER, California LYNN C. WOOLSEY, California
KEN CALVERT, California DARLENE HOOLEY, Oregon
ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland MARK UDALL, Colorado
VERNON J. EHLERS, Michigan DAVID WU, Oregon
GIL GUTKNECHT, Minnesota MICHAEL M. HONDA, California
FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma BRAD MILLER, North Carolina
JUDY BIGGERT, Illinois LINCOLN DAVIS, Tennessee
WAYNE T. GILCHREST, Maryland RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri
W. TODD AKIN, Missouri DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois
TIMOTHY V. JOHNSON, Illinois SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas
J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia BRAD SHERMAN, California
JO BONNER, Alabama BRIAN BAIRD, Washington
TOM FEENEY, Florida JIM MATHESON, Utah
BOB INGLIS, South Carolina JIM COSTA, California
DAVE G. REICHERT, Washington AL GREEN, Texas
MICHAEL E. SODREL, Indiana CHARLIE MELANCON, Louisiana
JOHN J.H. ``JOE'' SCHWARZ, Michigan DENNIS MOORE, Kansas
MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas
VACANCY
VACANCY
C O N T E N T S
October 7, 2005
Page
Witness List..................................................... 2
Hearing Charter.................................................. 3
Opening Statements
Statement by Representative Sherwood L. Boehlert, Chairman,
Committee on Science, U.S. House of Representatives............ 14
Written Statement............................................ 15
Statement by Representative Bart Gordon, Ranking Minority Member,
Committee on Science, U.S. House of Representatives............ 15
Written Statement............................................ 22
Statement by Representative Vernon J. Ehlers, Chairman,
Subcommittee on Environment, Technology, and Standards,
Committee on Science, U.S. House of Representatives............ 23
Written Statement............................................ 23
Statement by Representative Charlie Melancon, Member, Committee
on Science, U.S. House of Representatives...................... 24
Written Statement............................................ 25
Prepared Statement by Representative Jerry F. Costello, Member,
Committee on Science, U.S. House of Representatives............ 26
Prepared Statement by Representative Eddie Bernice Johnson,
Member, Committee on Science, U.S. House of Representatives.... 26
Prepared Statement by Representative Russ Carnahan, Member,
Committee on Science, U.S. House of Representatives............ 26
Prepared Statement by Representative Sheila Jackson Lee, Member,
Committee on Science, U.S. House of Representatives............ 27
Witnesses:
Brigadier General David L. Johnson (ret.), Assistant
Administrator for Weather Services; Director, The National
Weather Service, National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce
Oral Statement............................................... 28
Written Statement............................................ 30
Biography.................................................... 41
Mr. Max Mayfield, Director, NOAA Tropical Prediction Center/
National Hurricane Center
Oral Statement............................................... 41
Written Statement............................................ 43
Biography.................................................... 53
Discussion
Lessons Learned................................................ 53
Communication With Emergency Management Officials.............. 54
Directing Hurricanes........................................... 62
Communication With Emergency Management Officials (cont.)...... 64
Hurricane Multi-decadal Cycle.................................. 65
Funding for Hurricane Research................................. 66
Local Forecasts................................................ 67
Evacuation Decision............................................ 67
Hurricane Liaison Team......................................... 68
Facilities and Equipment....................................... 70
Long-Term Outlook.............................................. 70
Timeline....................................................... 71
Five-Day Forecasts............................................. 73
Rebuilding New Orleans......................................... 74
Communicating With Media....................................... 75
Concluding Remarks............................................. 83
Appendix 1: Answers to Post-Hearing Questions
Brigadier General David L. Johnson (ret.), Assistant
Administrator for Weather Services; Director, The National
Weather Service, National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce.................... 86
Mr. Max Mayfield, Director, NOAA Tropical Prediction Center/
National Hurricane Center...................................... 108
Appendix 2: Additional Material for the Record
Hurricane Liaison Team (HLT) Briefing, August 28, 2005........... 118
NOAA HURRICANE FORECASTING
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FRIDAY, OCTOBER 7, 2005
House of Representatives,
Committee on Science,
Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:00 a.m., in Room
2318 of the Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Sherwood L.
Boehlert (Chairman of the Committee) presiding.
hearing charter
COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
NOAA Hurricane Forecasting
friday, october 7, 2005
10:00 a.m.-12:00 p.m.
2318 rayburn house office building
Purpose:
On October 7, 2005 at 10:00 a.m., the House Science Committee will
hold a hearing on hurricane forecasting by the National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). The Committee is holding the hearing
to better understand the prediction of hurricanes and the outlook for
the remainder of the 2005 hurricane season.
The Committee plans to explore several overarching questions:
1. What are the different responsibilities of the National
Hurricane Center and local weather forecast offices when a
tropical storm or hurricane threatens the United States?
2. What were the timelines of Katrina and Rita progressing
from tropical depressions to major hurricanes and when were
warnings issued to the public and to federal, State, and local
officials? Was there any difference in how the National Weather
Service forecast and issued warnings for these two major
hurricanes?
3. What is the outlook for the remainder of the 2005 hurricane
season and for the next five to 10 years? Are we in a period of
increased hurricane frequency and/or intensity? If so, what is
the likely cause of this increase?
4. What can be done to improve prediction of hurricanes, both
in the short-term and in the long-term?
Witnesses:
Brigadier General David L. Johnson (ret.), Director of NOAA's National
Weather Service.
Mr. Max Mayfield, Director of the National Weather Service's National
Hurricane Center.
Background:
What Are Hurricanes?
The terms ``hurricane'' and ``typhoon'' are regionally specific
names for a strong ``tropical cyclone.'' A tropical cyclone is the
generic term for a low-pressure weather system over tropical or sub-
tropical waters with organized thunderstorm activity. Tropical cyclones
with maximum sustained surface winds of less than 39 mph are called
``tropical depressions.'' Once the tropical cyclone reaches winds of at
least 39 mph, it is called a ``tropical storm'' and assigned a name. If
winds reach 74 mph then the storm is called a ``hurricane'' in the
Atlantic Ocean or a ``typhoon'' in the Pacific Ocean. Typically, the
more intense a tropical cyclone is, the less area it covers. Hurricane
Katrina was unusual in that it both was very intense and very large
(400 miles across).
The United States utilizes the Saffir-Simpson hurricane intensity
scale to give an estimate of the potential flooding and damage to
property given a hurricane's estimated intensity. The scale is
summarized in Appendix A.
How Hurricanes Are Forecast
In the United States, the Atlantic hurricane season is from June 1
to November 30. The National Weather Service (NWS), which is part of
the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) in the
Department of Commerce, has responsibility ``to provide weather,
hydrologic, and climate forecasts and warnings for the United States,
its territories, and adjacent waters, for the protection of life and
property and the enhancement of the national economy.'' The National
Hurricane Center in Miami, which is part of NWS, monitors and forecasts
tropical storms and hurricanes in the Atlantic and Northeast Pacific
oceans.
The National Hurricane Center (NHC) compiles data about ocean
temperature, wind speed and direction, barometric pressure, and other
factors and enters that data into computer models to forecast
hurricanes. This data is obtained from satellites, ocean buoys and
radars. Also, a large amount of data comes from sensors dropped by
``hurricane hunter'' airplanes as they fly into the storms. Hurricane
hunters are flown by the Air Force and NOAA out of Keesler Air Force
Base in Mississippi and MacDill Air Force Base in Florida. The planes
are modified to carry weather instruments to measure wind, pressure,
temperature and dew point and to drop instrumented sensors into
hurricanes. When a storm is within three days of potential landfall,
hurricane hunters fly into the storm once every six hours.
When tracking a tropical storm or hurricane, the NHC issues
official forecasts and warnings every six hours. As a storm nears
landfall, the forecasts are updated more frequently. The information
goes out to the public via the Internet (http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/) and
through NOAA Weather Radio. NOAA Weather Radio is a nationwide network
of radio stations broadcasting continuous weather information from
nearby National Weather Service offices. Every six hours, the NHC also
provides (via conference calls and the Internet) ``technical discussion
products'' tailored to federal, State, and local emergency managers and
decision-makers. Local weather forecast offices use the information
from the NHC to provide advisories tailored to their region. An example
of a tailored hurricane advisory from the New Orleans weather forecast
office is provided in Appendix B. Whenever a hurricane threatens U.S.
territory, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) activates the
Hurricane Liaison Team (HLT). This team consists of federal, State and
local emergency managers, NWS meteorologists and computer specialists
who help the NHC rapidly exchange information with federal, State and
local emergency managers. The HLT works directly out of the NHC in
Miami. For Hurricane Katrina, the HLT was activated on Wednesday,
August 24.
Timeline of Hurricane Katrina and Hurricane Rita and NWS Warnings to
Federal, State and Local Officials
Hurricane Katrina made landfall on the southeast corner of
Louisiana at 6:10 am Central Daylight Time (CDT) on Monday, August 29
as a Category 4 storm (maximum sustained winds of 145 mph) that was
unusually large, measuring approximately 400 miles across. At 5:00 pm
(CDT) on Friday, August 26, 56 hours before Katrina made landfall, the
National Weather Service forecast the storm hitting near New Orleans as
a Category 4 or 5 hurricane. NWS was very accurate with its forecast
and the final landfall location was only 20 miles off from Friday's
forecast. Since meteorological conditions that affect the track and
intensity of the storm were relatively stable, NWS was especially
accurate in forecasting Katrina.
Between 7:00 and 8:00 pm CDT on Saturday August 27, 35 hours before
landfall, the Director of the National Hurricane Center called State
officials in Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama. At 7:00 am on Sunday,
August 28, NWS advisories stated that Katrina was a ``potentially
catastrophic'' storm. A more detailed description of Katrina's
development from tropical storm to hurricane and the associated
warnings are provided in Appendix C.
Hurricane Rita made landfall near Port Arthur, TX around 2:30 am
CDT on Saturday, September 24 as a Category 3 storm (maximum sustained
winds of 120 mph) and measuring 170 miles across. At 4:00 pm CDT on
Tuesday, September 20, the National Weather Service began warning that
northwestern regions of the Gulf of Mexico should prepare for a major
hurricane.
Hurricane Katrina and Hurricane Rita Compared to Previous Major Storms
While Hurricane Katrina was over the Gulf of Mexico, NOAA measured
winds reaching 175 mph, making it the strongest hurricane ever measured
in the Gulf of Mexico. By the time it hit the Gulf Coast, Katrina's
winds decreased to 145 mph, down to a Category 4 level but still a very
strong storm. There have been three previous Category 5 storms (1935
Labor Day storm, Florida Keys; 1969 Camille, Mississippi; and 1992
Andrew, south Florida) to hit the U.S. and six previous Category 4
storms (2004 Charley, 1989 Hugo, 1961 Carla, 1960 Donna, 1957 Audrey,
1954 Hazel) to hit the U.S. The last major storm affecting New Orleans
was Hurricane Betsy in 1965, during which winds hit 125 mph before
equipment failed. Hurricane Camille (August 1969) was also a major hit
but made landfall east of the city and was a more compact storm than
either Betsy or Katrina. Hurricane Katrina was unusual in that it was
both very intense and large.
Typically, major hurricanes begin in the eastern Atlantic ocean
near Cape Verde in western Africa, providing forecasters many days to
track, study, and warn of the storms before they threaten U.S. coasts.
Since records have been kept, 85 percent of major Atlantic hurricanes
have originated from the eastern Atlantic. However, this year all nine
tropical depressions that developed intro hurricanes did not form until
the systems were west of 55 degrees longitude (near Barbados),
providing forecasters only a couple of days to study the storms and
citizens less time to prepare their homes.
The last time such a large percentage of hurricanes formed in the
western Atlantic was in 1969, when 10 of 12 hurricanes formed west of
55 degrees latitude. That was the year Hurricane Camille struck New
Orleans. Scientists can determine after the fact that the factors
favoring quick formation of hurricanes in the Caribbean are a
combination of favorable wind patterns and sea surface temperatures,
but scientists cannot predict these patterns ahead of time.
Outlook for Future Hurricanes
Hurricane Rita was the 13th named storm of the 2005 hurricane
season. Typically the month of September is the peak month for
hurricane activity. Through November 30 (end of hurricane season), NOAA
expects seven to 10 additional named storms, of which one to three
could be major hurricanes of Category 3 strength or higher. The chance
of one of those major hurricanes making landfall somewhere in the U.S.
is 21 percent. However, it is difficult to predict exactly where a
hurricane would hit because the path of a hurricane is primarily
determined by day-to-day weather patterns. Historically, weather
patterns in October push tropical storms north from the Caribbean and
back out to sea, decreasing the chances that the Gulf Coast will be hit
by another hurricane. However, there is still a chance that the Gulf
could see another storm this year.
Most scientists agree that the Atlantic Ocean is currently in a
period of increased hurricane activity, which is part of a natural 25-
to 40-year cycle known as the ``Atlantic multi-decadal signal,'' a
shift in the sea surface temperatures in the Atlantic. Warmer sea
surface temperatures combined with optimal wind conditions cause more
tropical depressions to develop into hurricanes. Scientists are unsure
of the cause of the natural temperature and wind shifts in the
Atlantic. The last period of high tropical Atlantic activity was 1920-
1966. The average number of hurricanes in a warm period is 10 per year,
while the average number of hurricanes in a cold period is six storms
per year. Today, many more people live in hurricane prone areas than
during the last period of high tropical activity, meaning that today's
storms will affect more people and cause more damage than historical
storms. Appendix D contains more detail on the Atlantic multi-decadal
signal and hurricane frequency.
While most scientists agree that the current increase in hurricane
frequency is not due to global climate change, over the next 50 years
hurricane intensity (not frequency) could increase as ocean
temperatures rise. Also, two recent studies have shown some evidence
that current hurricane intensity has slightly increased since 1970. The
first study, published in Nature in July, looked at the North Atlantic
Ocean and found that hurricane intensity has increased 50 percent in
the past 50 years.\1\ The second study, published in Science in
September, looked globally at all oceans and found that the number of
Category 4 and 5 hurricanes has nearly doubled each decade since 1970,
while the total number of hurricanes has remained constant.\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ K.A. Emmanuel, Nature, 436, 686 (2005)
\2\ P.J. Webster, G.J. Holland, J.A. Curry, H.R. Chang, Science
309, 1844 (2005)
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Improving Hurricane Forecasts
In 1954, the NHC first issued one-day forecasts of hurricanes.
Since 1964, the NHC has provided three-day hurricane forecasts. In
2003, the forecasts were extended to include five-day predictions.
Appendix E contains examples of the five- and three-day forecasts for
Hurricane Katrina. Today, a three-day forecast is as accurate as those
issued for a two-day prediction in the late 1980s. While NHC has
significantly improved the forecast of where a hurricane is likely to
go, the forecasts of hurricane intensity have not improved at the same
pace.
NOAA currently supports research in its own labs and provides
grants to universities to try to improve hurricane forecasts. Other
agencies that support this type of research include the National
Science Foundation and the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration. The most useful information to researchers comes from
taking observations from hurricane hunter airplanes and ocean buoys
during a real hurricane, which can be used to develop new forecasting
models. As Congress debates supplemental spending and regular agency
budgets, some experts think an additional hurricane hunter airplane
equipped with research sensors would help researchers improve computer
models of hurricane intensity. (Also, NOAA lost some facilities during
Hurricane Katrina and may require additional funding to rebuild those
facilities.)
Witness Questions:
The witnesses were asked to address the following questions in
their testimony.
1. What are the different responsibilities of the National
Hurricane Center and local weather forecast offices when a
tropical storm or hurricane threatens the United States?
2. What were the timelines of Katrina and Rita progressing
from tropical depressions to major hurricanes and when were
warnings issued to the public and to federal, State and local
officials? Was there any difference in how the National Weather
Service forecast and issued warnings for these two major
hurricanes?
3. What is the outlook for the remainder of the 2005 hurricane
season and for the next five to 10 years? Are we in a period of
increased hurricane frequency and/or intensity? If so, what is
the likely cause of this increase?
4. What can be done to improve prediction of hurricanes, both
in the short-term and in the long-term?
Appendix C: Hurricane Katrina and Hurricane Rita Timelines
Hurricane Katrina
4:00 pm CDT Tuesday August 23: First public advisory
of Tropical Depression Twelve.
7:00 am CDT Wednesday August 24: FEMA activated the
Hurricane Liaison Team.
10:00 am CDT Wednesday August 24: Tropical Depression
Twelve develops into Tropical Storm Katrina over the Bahamas.
2:30 pm CDT Thursday August 25: Tropical Storm
Katrina develops into Hurricane Katrina, located 15 miles off
the coast of Ft. Lauderdale, FL.
5:30 pm CDT Thursday August 25: Hurricane Katrina
makes landfall as a Category 1 hurricane on the southeast coast
of Florida. As it passes over Florida it weakens back down to a
tropical storm and moves into the Gulf of Mexico.
4:00 am CDT Friday August 26: After passing over
Florida, Katrina regains hurricane status over the Gulf of
Mexico.
5:00 pm CDT Friday August 26: Every NWS warning
beginning Friday evening, 56 hours before landfall, showed
Hurricane Katrina making landfall in southeastern Louisiana as
a Category 4 or 5 hurricane.
10:00 am CDT Saturday August 27: At 44 hours before
landfall, the NWS issued a hurricane watch including New
Orleans. A hurricane watch advises of possible hurricane
conditions, with the objective of providing 36 hours notice.
The watch for Katrina surpassed that objective by eight hours.
4:00 pm CDT Saturday August 27: At 42 hours before
landfall, the hurricane watch was extended to Mississippi and
Alabama.
7:25 pm CDT Saturday August 27: Max Mayfield
(Director of the National Hurricane Center) called Gov. Blanco
of Louisiana.
7:35 pm CDT Saturday August 27: Max Mayfield called
Bill Filter, Chief of Operations for Alabama Emergency
Management Agency.
7:45 pm CDT Saturday August 27: Max Mayfield called
Gov. Barbour of Mississippi.
8:00 pm CDT Saturday August 27: Max Mayfield called
Mayor Nagin of New Orleans.
10:00 pm CDT Saturday August 27: At 32 hours before
landfall, the NWS issued a hurricane warning that included New
Orleans. A hurricane warning advises that a hurricane will
likely hit, with the objective of providing 24 hours lead time.
The watch for Katrina surpassed that objective by eight hours.
Every NWS warning beginning Saturday evening, 32 hours before
landfall, stated that ``Preparations to protect life and
property should be rushed to completion'' and predicted coastal
storm surge of at least 15 to 25 feet.
7:00 am CDT Sunday August 28: Every NWS warning
beginning 23 hours before landfall, began with the headline
indicating that Hurricane Katrina could be ``Potentially
Catastrophic.'' Due to the advanced warning provided by NWS, a
mandatory evacuation was put in place for New Orleans on Sunday
morning (24 hours before landfall) and the President declared a
state of emergency on Sunday, meaning that Louisiana could use
federal resources before the hurricane hit. Typically, the
President waits until after an event.
Hurricane Rita
10:00 pm CDT Saturday September 17: First public
advisory of Tropical Depression 18.
6:00 am CDT Sunday September 18: FEMA activates the
Hurricane Liaison Team.
4:00 pm CDT Sunday September 18: Tropical Depression
18 develops into Tropical Storm Rita.
10:00 pm CDT Sunday September 18: Hurricane and
tropical storm warnings issued for southern Florida.
10:00 pm CDT Monday September 19: Rita is predicted
to strengthen to a Category 2 hurricane before hitting Florida.
10:00 am CDT Tuesday September 20: Rita elevated to a
Category 1 hurricane.
1:00 pm CDT Tuesday September 20: Rita elevated to a
Category 2 hurricane as it moves over Florida.
4:00 pm CDT Tuesday September 20: At 82 hours before
landfall, NWS warns that ``all indications are that Rita as an
intense hurricane will be approaching the Texas Coast in about
three days.''
10:00 pm CDT Tuesday September 20: NWS warns that
Rita could reach Category 4 status by Wednesday evening.
1:00 am CDT Wednesday September 21: Rita elevated to
a Category 3 hurricane.
6:00 am CDT Wednesday September 21: Rita elevated to
a Category 4 hurricane.
10:00 am CDT Wednesday September 21: At 64 hours
before landfall, NWS states that ``interests in the
northwestern Gulf of Mexico should monitor the progress of
dangerous Hurricane Rita. . .Rita is extremely dangerous
category four hurricane. . .some additional strengthening is
forecast during the next 24 hours and could reach category five
intensity in the central Gulf of Mexico.''
4:00 pm CDT Wednesday September 21: At 58 hours
before landfall, Rita elevated to a Category 5 hurricane.
Hurricane and tropical storms watches are posted for Louisiana
and Texas.
11:00 am CDT Thursday September 22: At 39 hours
before landfall, Rita downgraded to a Category 4 hurricane.
Hurricane and tropical storms warnings issued for Texas and
Louisiana.
10:00 am CDT Friday September 23: At 16 hours before
landfall, Rita predicted to hit early Saturday morning as
either a Category 3 or 4 hurricane. Rita is expected to come
ashore as ``a dangerous hurricane.''
2:30 am CDT Saturday September 24: Rita makes
landfall in extreme southwest Louisiana as a Category 3
hurricane (with top winds of 120 mph).
7:00 am CDT Saturday September 24: Rita downgraded to
Category 2 hurricane.
10:00 am CDT Saturday September 24: Rita downgraded
to Category 1 hurricane.
1:00 pm CDT Saturday September 24: Rita downgraded to
a tropical storm.
8:00 pm CDT Saturday September 24: Rita downgraded to
a tropical depression. Last NHC advisory.
Chairman Boehlert.Thank you for being here today at this
long awaited hearing. We had hoped to have this hearing back in
September but we postponed it twice, once because Hurricane
Ophelia was developing and once to give the chance for the
Select Committee to get started with its investigation.
I participated in the Select Committee's hearing and I made
clear then that the Science Committee retained all of its
jurisdiction and interest in this subject and that we would be
rescheduling our hearing today and that is why we are here
today. Unfortunately, because of the Energy Bill on the Floor,
my attendance today will be intermittent, but my focus will
not. And incidentally, that is calling the attention of so many
of our colleagues because of the significance of the bill on
the Floor.
The National Weather Service is probably the agency we
oversee that has the most impact on the every day lives of our
constituents, and we want to make sure we do everything we can
to make sure it is in top form. Based on its recent performance
trialed by water one might say, I do not think we have too much
to worry about when it comes to the Weather Service. Let me
repeat what I said at the Select Committee's hearing. The
National Weather Service performed magnificently in tracking
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita and in providing information
before, during, and after the hurricanes made landfall. Max
Mayfield was the indispensable man in the lead up to the storms
and we owe the entire staff of the National Weather Service a
debt of gratitude and that comes with all the sincerity that I
can command.
The men and women of the Weather Service and the men and
women of the Armed Forces who fly into hurricanes to get data
on storms get no special perks if they have had a rough couple
of days or a bad season. They have to be ready for the next
storm.
I was talking the other day to Deputy Secretary Sampson of
the Commerce Department and he had just been down to visit the
National Hurricane Center. He said that morale at the center
was suffering because the staff felt so saddened that Katrina
had produced such suffering. That speaks volumes about the kind
of people we have working for us down there.
In all reality, all the Weather Service can do is provide
the best information they can, which in the case of Katrina
happened to be especially accurate because conditions were
ideal for monitoring the storm. In short, the Weather Service
can lead officials to information but they cannot make them
think or act, I might add. Now that does not mean of course
that nothing can be improved, we will want to see and hear
today about any steps the Weather Service is taking to ensure
that Federal, State, and local officials are receiving the
information that the Weather Service is putting out. But it is
not the Weather Service's job and it can't be to ensure that
others are heeding its warnings.
So I hope we will not be asking our witnesses today
questions that fall beyond their purview. I also hope that we
can ask questions beyond rehearsing the prelude to the most
recent storms. We should be looking for information about the
rest of the hurricane season, it is not over yet, about what is
behind the increased frequency and intensity of hurricanes. And
most important, about what tools the National Weather Service
needs to continue to improve its ability to forecast and track
storms. If nothing else, the horrifying events of recent weeks
have underscored the value of the National Weather Service. We
need to work together to make sure that the Weather Service can
provide the best information possible.
With that, it is my pleasure to recognize the distinguished
Ranking Member, Mr. Gordon of Tennessee.
[The prepared statement of Chairman Boehlert follows:]
Prepared Statement of Chairman Sherwood L. Boehlert
I want to thank everyone for being here today at this long awaited
hearing. We had hoped to have this hearing back in September, but we
postponed it twice--once because Hurricane Ophelia was developing and
once to give the Select Committee a chance to get started with its
investigation.
I participated in the Select Committee's hearing, and I made clear
then that the Science Committee retained all its jurisdiction--and
interest--in this subject and that we would be rescheduling our
hearing. And that is why we are here today.
Unfortunately, because of the Energy Bill on the Floor, my
attendance today will be intermittent, but my focus is not. The
National Weather Service is probably the agency we oversee that has the
most impact on the everyday lives of our constituents, and we want to
do everything we can to make sure it is in top form.
Based on its recent performance--trial by water, one might say--I
don't think we have too much to worry about when it comes to the
Weather Service. Let me repeat what I said at the Select Committee's
hearing: the National Weather Service performed magnificently in
tracking Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, and in providing information
before, during and after the hurricanes made landfall. Max Mayfield was
the indispensable man in the lead-up to the storms, and we owe the
entire staff of the National Weather Service a debt of gratitude.
The men and women of the Weather Service and the men and women of
the armed forces who fly into the hurricanes to get data on storms get
no special perks if they've had a rough couple of days or a bad season.
They have to be ready for the next storm.
I was talking the other day to Deputy Secretary Sampson of the
Commerce Department, and he had just been down to visit the National
Hurricane Center. He said that morale at the Center was suffering
because the staff felt so saddened that Katrina had produced such
suffering. That speaks volumes about the kind of people we have working
for us down there.
For in reality, all the Weather Service can do is provide the best
information they can--which in the case of Katrina happened to be
especially accurate because conditions were ideal for monitoring the
storm. In short, the Weather Service can lead officials to information,
but they can't make them think. Or act, I might add.
Now that doesn't mean, of course, that nothing can be improved.
We'll want to hear today about any steps the Weather Service is taking
to ensure that federal, State and local officials are receiving the
information that the Weather Service is putting out. But it's not the
Weather Service's job, and it can't be, to ensure that others are
heeding its warnings. So I hope we won't be asking our witnesses today
questions that fall beyond their purview.
I also hope that we can ask questions that go beyond rehearsing the
prelude to the most recent storms. We should be looking for information
about the rest of the hurricane season, about what is behind the
increased frequency and intensity of hurricanes, and most important,
about what tools the National Weather Service needs to continue to
improve its ability to forecast and track storms.
If nothing else, the horrifying events of recent weeks have
underscored the value of the National Weather Service. We need to work
together to make sure that the Weather Service can provide the best
information possible. Thank you.
Mr. Gordon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And let me concur with your comments and certainly your
compliments to the Weather Service and the team they have put
together.
This hearing today is vitally important. We have recently
been reminded of both the power of weather and weather
prediction and I look forward to exploring these topics. Over
the years, we have spent billions of dollars on the Weather
Service to improve our capacity to predict the weather. We do
it not simply because it is good science, but because we can
save lives if we provide accurate warnings for severe weather
events. We have also spent hundreds of billions of dollars on
homeland security. We do it to enhance our capacity to stop
terrorist attacks and to mobilize our nation's forces in cases
of catastrophic incidents, whether by terrorists or by natural
disaster.
The goal of both of these sets of expenditures is to keep
Americans secure and to come to their aid when they most need
it. In the last few weeks, it appears that one of these systems
worked and one of these systems failed. And failure has
consequences. In this case, some of those who died, and we do
not yet know how many, they died because the Federal Government
did not get there in time. As Walter Maestri, the Emergency
Management Chief of the Louisiana Jefferson Parish put it,
``The cavalry did not arrive.''
Information regarding the power of Hurricane Katrina went
right to the top. One of our witnesses here today conducted
briefings that included President Bush, Secretary Chertoff, and
Under Secretary Brown. May I have the first chart?
The other witness heads an agency which has placed an
employee inside the nerve center for the Federal Government's
response to catastrophic events, Homeland Security Operations
Center.
Chart 2. As the graph on the screen demonstrates, Secretary
Chertoff is the head of that center and information is supposed
to flow up to the secretary from its work and also to President
Bush. So the information from the Weather Service was flowing
to our emergency response leaders through two paths, and yet
our Government seemed taken by surprise. FEMA Head, Michael
Brown said on CNN on August 31 and I quote, ``I must say, this
storm is much bigger than anyone expected.''
Is it possible that the Weather Service simply wasn't being
articulate about the nature of the threat posed by Katrina? I
do not think that to be true, but we have a chance today to
confirm it. Apparently, one of our witnesses didn't think it
was true either. Mr. Mayfield, according to the St. Petersburg
Times story on August 30 based on an interview with Max
Mayfield in Chart 3 and I will quote that. ``On Sunday night,
Mayfield was so worried about Hurricane Katrina that he called
the Governors of Louisiana, Mississippi, and the Mayor of New
Orleans. On Sunday, he even talked about the forces of Katrina
during a video conference call to President Bush at his ranch
in Crawford Texas.'' ``I just wanted to be able to go to sleep
that night knowing I did all I could do,'' said Mr. Mayfield.
On Sunday, Mr. Mayfield conducted his regular presentation
to the Hurricane Liaison Team/FEMA conference call. According
to Mr. Mayfield's press account and the government's records,
the President and Secretary Chertoff and Undersecretary Brown
were on the calls either Saturday or Sunday and we know from
other sources that President Bush and Chertoff were both on the
line on the August 28 briefing.
On the screen is a photograph released by the White House
of the President participating in this video conference. On the
screen in front of the President is Max Mayfield and over Mr.
Mayfield's shoulder is an image of a powerful storm.
In an article printed in the September 4 Times Picayune of
New Orleans, Mr. Mayfield said reacting to the claims by some
that the storms surprised them in its veracity and
consequences, Chart 5, and I quote, ``We were briefing them way
before landfall. It is not that this is a surprise. We had
advisories that the levee could be topped. I kept looking back
to see if there was anything else we could do, could have done,
and I just don't know what it would be.''
So I hope today in your testimony, Mr. Mayfield, you can
address whether anything else has come to your mind that could
have been done to get the attention of our emergency response
leaders.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Gordon follows:]
Prepared Statement of Representative Bart Gordon
Thank you Mr. Chairman.
This hearing today is vitally important. We've recently been
reminded of both the power of weather and weather prediction, and I
look forward to exploring these topics.
Over the years, we've spent billions of dollars on the Weather
Service to improve our capacity to predict the weather. We do it not
simply because it is good science, but because we can save lives if we
provide accurate warnings of severe weather events.
We have also spent hundreds of billions of dollars on homeland
security. We do it to enhance our capacity to stop terrorist attacks
and to mobilize our nation's forces in cases of catastrophic
incidents--whether by terrorism or by natural disaster.
The goal in both sets of expenditures is to keep Americans secure
and to come to their aid when they most need it.
In the last few weeks, one of these systems worked and one of these
systems failed. And failure has consequences--in this case some of
those who died, and we do not yet know how many, they died because the
Federal Government did not get there in time. As Walter Maestri, the
Emergency Management Chief for Louisiana's Jefferson Parish put it:
``the cavalry didn't arrive.''
The information regarding the power of Hurricane Katrina went right
to the top. One of our witnesses here today conducted briefings that
included the President, Secretary Chertoff and Under Secretary Brown.
The other witness heads an agency which has placed an employee
inside the nerve center for the Federal Government's response to
catastrophes: the Homeland Security Operations Center (HSOC).
As the graphic on the screen demonstrates, Secretary Chertoff is
the head of that center and information is supposed to flow up to the
Secretary from its work and also to the President.
So the information from the Weather Service was flowing to our
emergency response leaders through two paths and yet our government
seemed taken by surprise.
FEMA head Michael Brown said on CNN on August 31, ``I must say,
this storm is much bigger than anyone expected.''
Is it possible that the Weather Service simply wasn't being
articulate about the nature of the threat posed by Katrina? I don't
think that to be true, but we will have a chance today to confirm it.
Apparently one of our witnesses didn't think it was true. Mr.
Mayfield. According to a St. Petersburg Times story on August 30, based
on an interview with Max Mayfield:
``On Saturday night, Mayfield was so worried about Hurricane
Katrina that he called the Governors of Louisiana and
Mississippi and the Mayor of New Orleans. On Sunday, he even
talked about the force of Katrina during a video conference
call to President Bush at his ranch in Crawford, Texas.''
``I just wanted to be able to go to sleep that night knowing
that I did all I could do,'' Mayfield said.
On Sunday Mr. Mayfield conducted his regular presentation to the
Hurricane Liaison Team/FEMA conference call. According to Mr.
Mayfield's press account and government records the President,
Secretary Chertoff and Under Secretary Brown were on calls either
Saturday or Sunday and we know from other sources that the President
and Chertoff both were on line for the August 28 briefing.
On the screen is a photo released by the White House of the
President participating in this video teleconference. On the screen in
front of the President is Max Mayfield and over Mr. Mayfield's shoulder
is an image of a powerful storm: Hurricane Katrina.
In an article printed in the September 4 Times Picayune of New
Orleans Mr. Mayfield said, reacting to the claims by some that the
storm surprised them in its ferocity and consequences.
``We were briefing them way before landfall.. . . It's not like
this is a surprise. We had the advisories that the levee could be
topped. I keep looking back to see if there was anything else we could
have done, and I just don't know what it would be.''
I hope in your testimony Dr. Mayfield you can address whether
anything else has come to mind that you could have done to get the
attention of our emergency response leaders.
Thank you Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Boehlert. Thank you very much.
Dr. Ehlers.
Mr. Ehlers. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
In the last six weeks, two of the strongest hurricanes ever
recorded in the Gulf of Mexico hit the Gulf Coast region.
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita left a wake of devastation and
destroyed the homes and disrupted the livelihoods of countless
Americans. My prayers continue to go out to the victims of
these horrible events.
Experts agree that the Atlantic Ocean is in a natural
period of increased tropical storm activity. The last time were
in an active period like this was 1920 to 1966. Obviously,
these are very long-term cycles. However, today many more
people live in hurricane-prone areas. To help prepare and
respond better in the future, it is urgent for us to understand
the forecasting of Katrina and Rita and what future hurricane
seasons may hold. In that vein, I am pleased that Chairman
Boehlert organized today's hearing about NOAA's hurricane
forecasting.
As the Chairman of the Environment and Technology and
Standards Subcommittee, I am proud of the National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration's Weather Service. The Weather
Service, in particular through its National Hurricane Center in
Miami, Florida, did an excellent job forecasting Katrina and
Rita. Weather Service employees worked countless long hours to
ensure that federal, State, and local officials and the public
have the most accurate and up to date information about
dangerous weather events. I applaud their hard work and look
forward to learning more about how they do it. And I also am
very anxious to find out how we can possibly alert the public
anymore than has already been done to make certain the public
responds and doesn't take it for granted.
I yield back.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Ehlers follows:]
Prepared Statement of Representative Vernon J. Ehlers
In the last six weeks, two of the strongest hurricanes ever
recorded in the Gulf of Mexico hit the Gulf Coast region. Hurricanes
Katrina and Rita left a wake of devastation and destroyed the homes and
disrupted the livelihoods of countless Americans. My prayers continue
to go out to the victims of these terrible events.
Experts agree that the Atlantic Ocean is in a natural period of
increased tropical storm activity. The last time we were in an active
period like this was 1920-1966. However, today many more people live in
hurricane-prone areas. To help prepare and respond better in the
future, it is urgent for us to understand the forecasting of Katrina
and Rita and what future hurricane seasons may hold. In that vein, I am
pleased that Chairman Boehlert organized today's hearing about NOAA's
hurricane forecasting.
As Chairman of the Environment, Technology, and Standards
Subcommittee, I am proud of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration's (NOAA) National Weather Service. The Weather Service,
in particular through its National Hurricane Center in Miami, Florida,
did an excellent job forecasting Katrina and Rita. Weather Service
employees work countless long hours to ensure that federal, State and
local officials, and the public, have the most accurate and up-to-date
information about dangerous weather events. I applaud their hard work
and look forward to learning more about how they do it.
Chairman Boehlert. Thank you very much, Dr. Ehlers.
Mr. Wu.
Mr. Wu. As Ranking Member of the Environment, Technology,
and Standards Subcommittee, I would like to begin by yielding
time to one of my several good friends who were affected by
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, in this case, Mr. Melancon, the
gentleman from Louisiana.
Mr. Melancon. Thank you, Mr. Wu, I appreciate it.
As you all know, my district suffered catastrophic losses
and damage, lots of lives during Hurricane Katrina. It is hard
to relate in words the situation that Katrina left behind. The
challenges to rebuilding and putting the South Louisiana area
back together again are complex and the progress will be slow.
The loss of life, livelihood, homes and communities defy
description but the courage and the resilience of the people of
South Louisiana is all evident. We have taken a mighty blow
from Mother Nature and we are stunned, but we are still
standing and we are going to recover from this and restore our
communities but we have a long and hard road ahead. The Federal
Government must work with the State and local governments to
rebuild our communities, our livelihoods, and the natural and
manmade structures that protect us from these storms.
We have heard criticism of the Government's response at all
levels. In the midst of all this finger pointing, however, I
think it is important that we highlight the many local
officials who took care of their people when the network to
support them collapsed. If not for the efforts of these heroes,
many people would not have been evacuated and many of those who
did not evacuate would not have survived. My constituents are
not interested in partisan bickering or Monday morning
quarterbacking. They need their immediate needs addressed and
they need to have help to rebuild their lives.
As federal officials, we need to ensure the Federal
Government is ready to respond rapidly to future situations
where citizens are victimized by natural or manmade disasters.
State and local governments cannot be expected to provide
sustained response and assistance from within a vast devastated
area. The Federal Government is the only organization with the
resources to provide the type of emergency assistance our
citizens need.
We can learn from some of the federal agencies that did
perform well, such as the National Weather Service and the U.S.
Coastguard. The National Weather Service worked cooperatively
with State and local officials and with the media to get
information out to the public. Their forecasts were accurate
and their warnings were clear. Without these forecast and
warnings and the lead time they provided, we would not have
been able to evacuate as many people as we did and the loss of
life would have been much greater. Their performance emphasizes
the need for Congress to ensure that this agency stays
adequately funded.
To the American people and my fellow Members on this
committee, I thank you. You have reached out to me and my
district these past days and your generosity has not gone
unnoticed. Rest assured with your help, Louisianans will
survive. We will rebuild and our state will be strong again.
On behalf of my constituents, I thank you, Mr. Mayfield and
the other employees of the Hurricane Center and the National
Weather Service for your fine work. I am anxious to work with
my colleagues on the Committee to ensure that NOAA has the
resources it needs to continue to improve hurricane
forecasting. Additionally, I would also want to ensure that
NOAA's other branches have the resources they need to help us
rebuild our coastal wetlands and our fisheries.
On behalf of the people of Louisiana and I would believe on
behalf of the people of the entire Gulf Coast, I thank you.
With that, I yield back my time.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Melancon follows:]
Prepared Statement of Representative Charlie Melancon
As you all know, my district suffered catastrophic damage and
tragic loss of life due to Hurricane Katrina. It's hard to relate in
words the situation that Katrina left behind. The challenges to
rebuilding and putting South Louisiana back together again are complex
and the progress is slow. The loss of life, livelihood, homes, and
communities defies description.
But, the courage, resilience, and strength of Louisiana's citizens
is also evident. We have taken a mighty blow from Mother Nature and
we're stunned, but we're still standing. We are going to recover from
this and restore our communities, but we have a long hard road ahead.
The Federal Government must work with the State and local governments
to rebuild our communities, our livelihoods and the natural and the
man-made structures that protect us from these storms.
We've heard criticism of the government response at all levels. In
the midst of all this finger-pointing, however, I think it is important
that we highlight the many local officials who took care of their
people when the network to support them collapsed. If not for the
efforts of these heroes, many people would not have evacuated and many
of those who did not evacuate would not have survived.
My constituents are not interested in partisan bickering or Monday-
morning quarterbacking. They need their immediate needs addressed and
they need help to rebuild their lives. As federal officials, we need to
ensure the Federal Government is ready to respond rapidly to future
situations where citizens are victimized by natural or man-made
disasters. State and local governments cannot be expected to provide
sustained response and assistance from within a vast devastated area.
The Federal Government is the only organization with resources to
provide the type of emergency assistance our citizens need.
We can learn from some of the federal agencies that did perform
well--the National Weather Service and the U.S. Coast Guard are two
examples.
The National Weather Service worked cooperatively with State and
local officials and with the media to get information out to the
public. Their forecasts were accurate, and their warnings were clear.
Without these forecasts and warnings, and the lead time they provided,
we would not have been able to evacuate as many people as we did and
the loss of life would have been much greater. Their performance
emphasizes the need for Congress to ensure that this agency stays
adequately funded.
To the American people and my fellow Members on this committee--
thank you. You have reached out to me and my district these past days
and weeks and your generosity has not gone unnoticed. Rest assured,
with your help, Louisianians will survive; we will rebuild; and our
state will be strong again.
On behalf of my constituents; thank you Dr. Mayfield, and the other
employees of the Hurricane Center and the National Weather Service for
your fine work. I am anxious to work with my colleagues on the
Committee to ensure that NOAA has the resources it needs to continue to
improve hurricane forecasting. Additionally, I would also want to
ensure that NOAA's other branches have the resources they need to help
us to rebuild our coastal wetlands and our fisheries.
Thank you, and I yield back my time.
Chairman Boehlert. Thank you very much for those heartfelt
remarks and I think we all identify with them.
And without objection, all other Members will be able to
offer opening statements at this juncture in the record.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Costello follows:]
Prepared Statement of Representative Jerry F. Costello
Good morning. I want to thank the witnesses for appearing before
our committee to examine hurricane forecasting by the National Oceanic
and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). The devastating affects of
hurricanes are familiar to all of us. In the wake of Hurricanes Katrina
and Rita, it is important to gain a better understanding of the
prediction of hurricanes and determine what can be done to improve
prediction of hurricanes, both in the short-term and the long-term.
Within the NOAA, the National Weather Service (NWS) and the
National Hurricane Center (NHC) predicted the severity of Hurricane
Katrina and issued multiple warnings for the Gulf Coast as early as 5
pm on Thursday, August 25th. By late Sunday night, early Monday
morning, August 29th, the National Hurricane Center issued an advisory
stating ``coastal storm surge flooding of 18 to 22 feet above normal
tide levels. . .locally as high as 28 feet.. . .Some levees in the
greater New Orleans could be overtopped.'' This is not an instance
where science failed us. The science of hurricane prediction has
increased dramatically with observational work and research done by
NOAA.
For decades FEMA, the Army Corp of Engineers, academics and other
federal, State and local agencies have performed simulations and
analyses to determine the affect of a hurricane on the New Orleans
area. These analyses overwhelming concluded that should a Category 3,
or higher, hurricane strike New Orleans, the result would be
catastrophic flooding, loss of property and life with or without a
levee breach. Simple overtopping of the levees alone was predicted by
the Red Cross to result in between 25,000-100,000 lives.
Hurricane Katrina revealed that despite billions of dollars in
emergency response preparation and a complete overhaul of the federal
domestic security system embodied in the Department of Homeland
Security, Americans are not secure today from the ravages of nature.
Thus, within this chaos, one thing is clear; this disaster was not the
fault of the NOAA or their sub-components the NWS or the NHC. The
aftermath was not due to a failure of science to predict. The aftermath
was a failure of emergency response to act on sound engineering,
oceanographic and atmospheric science that predicted that Katrina could
be devastating and the Gulf region in particular, New Orleans, because
the city sits below sea level and is dependent on levees and pumps to
keep the water out.
I thank the witnesses for their testimony and look forward to
hearing what the outlook is for the remainder of the 2005 hurricane
season and for improving hurricane predictions in the short- and long-
term.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Johnson follows:]
Prepared Statement of Representative Eddie Bernice Johnson
Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member.
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita devastated thousands of lives in New
Orleans, southern Louisiana, Mississippi, and other parts of the
Southeast.
I am anxious to hear about how NOAA and the National Weather
Service predict hurricanes and how we as legislators can remove
barriers so that you can do your important work to the best of your
ability.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Carnahan follows:]
Prepared Statement of Representative Russ Carnahan
Mr. Chairman and Mr. Ranking Member, thank you for hosting this
hearing.
I am pleased that the Science Committee is taking this very
important step to exercise its oversight role, particularly after such
horrific natural disasters have occurred. We owe it to the American
public to do everything possible to make sure this type of tragedy
never happens again.
After reviewing the written testimony of our witnesses it is clear
to me that NOAA, the National Weather Service and the National
Hurricane Service did an outstanding job predicting the course of
Hurricane Katrina and the ensuing devastation that followed. To prevent
another Katrina, we must equip the National Hurricane Center and keep
it as strong as it is today. But, we must also look outside this
committee and revisit many of the policies promoted by the Bush
Administration, reform FEMA and ensure that funds directed toward
emergency management are held accountable.
General Johnson and Dr. Mayfield, we are pleased to have you with
us and I look forward to hearing your testimony.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Jackson Lee follows:]
Prepared Statement of Representative Sheila Jackson Lee
Mr. Chairman, let me first thank you for holding this important
hearing on hurricane forecasting.
It was about five weeks ago that we first heard reports of a
hurricane building in the Atlantic Ocean and heading towards our coast.
We had heard this warning many times before, but the size and the scale
of this one was different. There hasn't been a hurricane this big and
this powerful in decades, and it was heading toward one of the most
vulnerable cities in the country. We have since witnessed the awesome
destructive power Mother Nature still commands over mankind. Few could
have imagined the immense devastation and human suffering Katrina would
bring to our shores.
If there is something positive we can take from this disaster,
however, it will be our collective national resolve to never allow this
to happen again. While this event is still fresh in our memories, we
must learn from what we did wrong, strengthen what we did right and
strive to find new ways to ensure the safety of the citizens of this
country.
On the forefront of this effort, of course, are the fine people of
the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. Their state-of-
the-art forecasting, detection and tracking systems saved hundreds, if
not thousands of lives this past month. Their accuracy in the
forecasting of Katrina was outstanding, and very impressive in Rita as
well. Questions remain to be answered regarding what the proper
response to NOAA's warnings should have been, but it is very apparent
that in the case of Rita and Katrina, NOAA performed extremely well,
and we commend them for that.
NOAA's impressive performance in this instance, however, serves
only to further emphasize the need for more work in the area of
hurricane forecasting. We can't ever expect to conquer Mother Nature,
or turn back hurricanes with the press of a button. In the wake of this
disaster, however, we need to constantly be asking each other ``What
more could we have done?''
The Committee posed some very difficult questions for our
distinguished panel, that I hope we can explore today. I hope those
questions are appropriately addressed, with special attention to what
can be done to improve forecasting of hurricanes in the future.
Thank you very much for being here today. I am sure this hearing
will be very productive, and I look forward to hearing the testimony
from the panelists as well as from my fellow colleagues.
Chairman Boehlert. Let me welcome our two distinguished
visitors, Brigadier General David L. Johnson, who is Director
of the NOAA National Weather Service; and Mr. Max Mayfield, who
is the Director of NOAA's Tropical Prediction Center and
National Hurricane Center. And let me say to both of you
gentlemen, I can speak, I think, for my colleagues of all
persuasions from all regions of the country, we appreciate the
magnificent performance of your people in this tragic incident
and we are so proud of what you do and do so well.
The purpose of this hearing, though, is not to give you
additional pats on the back, well deserved though they are. It
is to go forward and to try to determine what more you might
need, what assistance we might be able to provide. But I stress
my strong, personal feeling that you have been magnificent in
the performance of your job. I cannot say that about every
other official at every level of government but I can say it
about you two and all the people that you represent. Thank you.
With that, our first witness, General Johnson, Director of
the National Weather Service. General, the Floor is yours.
STATEMENT OF BRIGADIER GENERAL DAVID L. JOHNSON (RET.),
ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR FOR WEATHER SERVICES; DIRECTOR, THE
NATIONAL WEATHER SERVICE, NATIONAL OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC
ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
Mr. Johnson. Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, I
am David Johnson, the Assistant Administrator for Weather
Services at NOAA and Director of the National Weather Service.
Thank you very much for inviting me here today to discuss
NOAA's role in forecasting and warning the public about
hurricanes. And Mr. Chairman, I would like to thank you
personally and all of the Members of the Science Committee for
your leadership in this area and for your support last year
when you provided funding to get us seven additional buoys and
provide dollars for the Air Force Reserve to put some urgently
needed instrumentation on their airplanes. They are working
towards getting me one airplane for the '06 season and then
additional airplanes after that.
I am accompanied by Max Mayfield, my Director of the
National Hurricane Center. He will be focusing on Hurricane
Katrina and Rita, communicating our forecasts, as well as the
outlook for the future. I will be focusing on our role in
hurricane tracking and forecasting, as well as, ongoing and
future research efforts.
NOAA's forecast and warnings for Hurricane Rita and Katrina
pushed the limits of state-of-the-art hurricane prediction and
our current continuous research efforts including observations,
modeling, and expanded computational resources at NOAA and in
partnership with other federal agencies lead to our current
predictive capabilities and improved ways of describing
uncertainty in prediction. But NOAA's work does not stop there.
NOAA assesses damage from storms and evaluates waterways to
assist dredging operations, reopening our nation's ports and
waterways impacted by the storms. NOAA also assesses the impact
to area fisheries, supports hazardous materials containment and
abatement efforts, and we provide environmental data critical
for post storm recovery operations.
The mission of the National Weather Service is to issue
weather, water, and climate forecasts for the protection of
life and property and the enhancement of the economy. Nowhere
is that more evident than in the hurricane program. Various
components of the National Weather Service play important roles
in the overall hurricane forecasting and warning process and
the National Hurricane Center within the NWS has been the
centerpiece of our nation's Hurricane Forecast and Warning
Program for 50 years.
The National Hurricane Center, ably led by Max Mayfield, is
responsible for predicting the path and intensity of the storm,
issuing coastal hurricane watches and warnings, and describing
broad impacts to the areas impacted, including projected storm
surge levels.
After each hurricane season, your Weather Service
undertakes an effort to improve how we can communicate our
information more clearly. For example, after the 2004 season,
we focused on how to improve the communication of uncertainty.
Again this year, we have several experimental products on our
website for review. We will do a hot wash after this season to
see how we can do our job better.
Local National Weather Forecast Offices and River Forecast
Centers also play a critical role in this process. They use
their local expertise to refine National Hurricane Center
advisories and provide specific detailed information about
storm impacts from the hurricane to their local forecast area
of responsibility.
Weather forecast office staffs have detailed knowledge of
the local terrain and impacts and provide this information
through direct interaction with local emergency managers via
their local forecast products and messages. This detailed
information is used by local emergency managers in their
evacuation and other preparedness decisions.
Using a combination of atmospheric and ocean observations
from satellites, aircraft, and all available surface data over
the ocean, NOAA conducts experiments to better understand
internal storm dynamics and interactions between a hurricane
and the surrounding atmosphere and oceans. Through greater
understanding of the physical processes in advanced hurricane
modeling, NOAA continually improves models for predicting
hurricane intensity and track. These numerical modeling
improvements, once demonstrated, are then transitioned into
operations. Our track forecasts have shown consistent
improvement; however, we have not seen a comparable improvement
in our intensity forecasts.
From a scientific point, the gaps in our capabilities fall
into two broad categories. First, our ability to measure and
assess the current state of hurricane and its environment doing
that analysis, and second, our ability to predict the
hurricane's future state, that is the forecast. We need to
enhance our observation network. Many of the enhancements
required to improve hurricane analyses particularly over the
data sparse ocean areas will be addressed through such programs
as the Global Earth Observation System of Systems or GEOSS, a
ten-year international endeavor of which the United States is a
member and NOAA a key participant.
Predicting hurricane intensity remains an acute challenge.
Even though we knew conditions were favorable for the storms to
intensify, we do not know why the storm underwent its rapid
intensification once it passed the Florida Peninsula and
reentered the gulf. We are now at the point in improving
intensity forecasts that we were at a decade ago with the track
forecast. Our 2005 version of our high resolution model
improved some of the intensity forecasts over the current
statistical models when we run them on last year's 2004
hurricanes. So we have potential there.
To advance hurricane prediction, especially hurricane and
size forecasts, NOAA is developing the Hurricane Weather and
Research Forecasting System. The Weather Service works with the
research community to incorporate advanced model physics into a
hurricane model which integrates the physical interactions of
the atmosphere, land, and oceans into a single model. Our goal
here is to couple an advanced wave model with a dynamic storm
surge model to better predict coastal impacts of waves and the
storm surge.
Mr. Chairman, while there are no quick fixes, we are very
optimistic that we will continue to make advances in our
operational forecast of tropical cyclone intensity, wind
structure, size and rainfall in the near future.
So in conclusion, the government's ability to observe,
predict, and respond quickly to storm events is critical to
public safety. At NOAA, we will continue our efforts to improve
hurricane track and intensity forecasting including wind, storm
surge, and rainfall amounts. We will also continue to provide
the technical tools and planning expertise to states and local
governments to help mitigate future natural disasters and
provide our assistance for response and recovery.
With that, sir, I am happy to answer any questions you may
have.
[The prepared statement of Brigadier General Johnson
follows:]
Prepared Statement of Brigadier General David L. Johnson
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, I am General David L.
Johnson, Assistant Administrator for Weather Services at the National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) in the Department of
Commerce. Thank you for inviting me here today to discuss NOAA's role
in forecasting, and warning the public about hurricanes, as well as
NOAA's essential role and activities following landfall.
The devastation along the Gulf Coast from Hurricane Katrina and
Hurricane Rita is like nothing I have witnessed before. It is
catastrophic. Words cannot convey the physical destruction and personal
suffering in that part of our nation. However, without NOAA's forecasts
and warnings, the devastation and loss of life would have been far
greater.
NOAA's forecasts and warnings for Hurricane Katrina and Hurricane
Rita pushed the limits of state-of-the-art hurricane prediction. In
partnership with DOD, NASA, NSF, and other federal agencies, the long-
term continuous research efforts, including observations, modeling, and
expanded computational resources have led to NOAA's current predictive
capabilities and improved ways of describing uncertainty in prediction.
But NOAA's work does not end there. NOAA assesses damage from storms
and evaluates waterways to assist dredging operations, allowing our
nation's ports and waterways impacted by the storm to open. NOAA also
assesses the impact to the areas' fisheries, supports hazardous
materials containment and abatement efforts, and provides necessary
data critical for post storm recovery operations.
The Role of the National Weather Service in Tracking, Forecasting and
Communicating the Threats of Hurricanes
The mission of the National Weather Service (NWS) is to issue
weather, water and climate forecasts and warnings for the protection of
life and property and the enhancement of the national economy. Nowhere
is that more evident than in the hurricane program. Various components
of the NWS play important roles in the overall hurricane forecasting
and warning process. The National Hurricane Center (NHC) within the NWS
has been the centerpiece of our nation's hurricane forecast and warning
program for 50 years. The mission of the NHC is to save lives, mitigate
property loss, and improve economic efficiency by issuing the best
watches, warnings, and forecasts of hazardous tropical weather and by
increasing the public's understanding of these hazards.
NHC tropical cyclone forecasts are issued at least every six hours,
more frequently during landfall threats, and include text messages as
well as a suite of graphical products depicting our forecasts and the
accompanying probabilities and ``cone of uncertainty,'' as it has
become known. The NHC is responsible for predicting the path and
intensity of the system, issuing coastal hurricane watches and
warnings, and describing broad impacts to the areas impacted, including
projected storm surge levels.
Local National Weather Service Weather Forecast Offices (WFO) also
play a critical role in this process. The WFOs use their local
expertise to refine NHC advisories and provide specific, detailed
information about the impacts from the hurricane to their local
forecast area of responsibility. Weather forecast staff have detailed
knowledge of the local terrain and impacts, and provide this
information through direct interactions with local emergency managers
and via their local forecast products and messages. This detailed
information is used by local emergency managers when making their
evacuation and other preparedness decisions. The effects of hurricanes
can reach far inland and it is the responsibility of the local WFO to
issue inland hurricane and tropical storm warnings and describe the
local impacts here as well. These inland impacts include flood and
flash floods as well as tornadoes.
Tracking and Forecasting Hurricane Katrina
Hurricane Katrina began as a tropical depression near the
southeastern Bahamas on Tuesday, August 23, 2005. The National
Hurricane Center accurately predicted it would become a Category 1
hurricane before making landfall near Miami. The storm deluged
southeast Florida with 16 inches of rain in some places, causing downed
trees, flooding, and extended power outages as it passed across the
southern portion of the state.
Once Katrina re-emerged into the Gulf of Mexico, NOAA hurricane
forecasters correctly predicted re-intensification of the storm.
Katrina intensified more quickly and became stronger than initially
predicted. Within nine hours, Katrina intensified from a tropical
storm, with winds of 70 miles per hour, to a Category 2 storm with 100
mile per hour winds.
As you can see in the graphic below, our forecast track from Friday
night (August 26), about 56 hours before landfall, had the storm
curving northward and headed directly toward southeastern Louisiana and
Mississippi. The projected path of Katrina aimed directly at southeast
Louisiana, and the prediction was for Katrina to make landfall as a
Category 4 hurricane. The actual track would deviate little from this
and subsequent forecasts for the rest of Katrina's approach. On
average, NOAA forecasts of where Katrina would go were more accurate
than usual, with all of the forecast tracks during the last 48 hours
lining up almost directly on top of the actual track. This forecast
beats the Government Performance and Results Act goal established for
NOAA hurricane forecasts this year.
At 10:00 am Central Daylight Time (CDT) Saturday morning, August
27, the National Hurricane Center posted a hurricane watch for
southeast Louisiana, including the city of New Orleans. The hurricane
watch extended eastward to Mississippi and Alabama that afternoon. A
hurricane watch means hurricane conditions are possible in the
specified area, usually within 36 hours. Messages from the National
Hurricane Center highlighted the potential for this storm to make
landfall as a Category 4 or Category 5 storm.
Tracking and Forecasting Rita
Rita began as a tropical depression at 10:00 pm CDT Saturday,
September 17, 2005, east of the Turks and Caicos Islands north of the
Caribbean. The National Hurricane Center accurately predicted the
center of the storm to pass just south of the Florida Keys as a
hurricane on Tuesday, September 20, and predicted it to become a major
hurricane as it moved over the warm waters of the Gulf of Mexico.
Hurricane Rita continued to intensify in the Gulf of Mexico and became
a Category 5 hurricane at 4:00 pm CDT Wednesday, September 21 with
winds of 165 miles per hour.
On Thursday, September 22, approximately two days before landfall,
the forecast track was shifted eastward to just west of the Louisiana/
Texas border. Rita's actual track would deviate little from this and
subsequent projections. As Hurricane Rita neared landfall, the National
Hurricane Center accurately predicted its decrease in intensity.
Hurricane Rita made landfall as a Category 3 storm just east of Port
Arthur, Texas, near the Texas/Louisiana border.
Storm Surge
Storm surge has caused most of this country's tropical cyclone
fatalities, all too vividly evident in the past several weeks, and
represents our greatest risk for a large loss of life in this country.
Following Hurricane Camille in 1969, NOAA established a group that
developed and implemented a storm surge model called SLOSH (Sea, Lake,
and Overland Surges from Hurricanes). The SLOSH model calculates storm
surge heights resulting either from historical, hypothetical or actual
hurricanes. SLOSH incorporates bathymetry and topography, including bay
and river configurations, roads, levees, and other physical features
that can modify the storm surge flow pattern. Comprehensive evacuation
studies, conducted jointly by the Federal Emergency Management Agency
(FEMA), the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, NOAA, and State and local
emergency managers, are based on the simulated surges computed by
SLOSH.
The National Hurricane Center introduced storm surge forecasts for
the Gulf Coast in public advisories at 10:00 pm CDT Saturday--32 hours
prior to Katrina's landfall in Louisiana. The initial forecast (10:00
pm CDT, Saturday, August 27) for storm surge was predicted at 15 to 20
feet, locally as high as 25 feet, and that forecast was updated the
following morning to a range of 18 to 22 feet, locally as high as 28
feet, when the forecast intensity for landfall was increased. ``Large
and battering'' waves were forecast on top of the surge. In addition,
the 4:00 pm CDT public advisory issued by the National Hurricane Center
on Sunday, August 28, stated that some levees in the greater New
Orleans area could be overtopped. Actual storm surge values are being
determined at this time.
Storm surge values for Rita were also issued well in advance of
landfall. At 10:00am CDT on September 22, 40 hours before landfall, the
National Hurricane Center predicted a storm surge of ``. . .15 to 20
feet above normal tide levels, along with large and dangerous battering
waves, can be expected near and to the right of where the center makes
landfall.'' While exact levels of the surge are still being determined,
the damage from the surge was similar to damage witnessed in
Mississippi and Louisiana with Katrina.
In the case of Hurricane Katrina, there have been news reports that
Max Mayfield, the Director of the National Hurricane Center, notified
FEMA that the New Orleans' levees would be breached. In fact, he did
not say this. He indicated in his briefings to emergency managers and
to the media the possibility some levees in the greater New Orleans
area could be overtopped, depending on the details of Katrina's track
and intensity. This possibility was also indicated in the National
Hurricane Center advisory products and local weather office Hurricane
Local Statements and has been discussed at conferences and briefings
with emergency managers, media, and the public for many years.
Communicating Our Forecasts
The FEMA/NWS Hurricane Liaison Team (HLT), established in 1996,
coordinates communications between NOAA and the emergency management
community at the federal and State levels. Membership consists of FEMA
Hurricane Program Managers and Disaster Assistance employees as well as
National Weather Service meteorologists and hydrologists. The Hurricane
Liaison Team is activated by FEMA, at the request of the Director of
the National Hurricane Center, or his or her designee. The HLT is
activated a few days in advance of any potential U.S. hurricane
landfall. Once activated, FEMA hosts the daily HLT audio or video
conference calls. FEMA invites State and local emergency managers in
the potential impact area to participate in these calls. The National
Hurricane Center, as an invited participant, opens each call by
providing an updated forecast. After consulting with our local weather
service offices and the National Hurricane Center, emergency managers
make evacuation and other preparedness decisions. The HLT provides an
excellent way to communicate with the large number of emergency
managers typically impacted by a potential hurricane. This is a
critical effort to ensure emergency managers and first responders know
what to expect from the hurricane.
The reported evacuation rate during Hurricane Katrina of near 80
percent, however, far exceeds the 25-50 percent rates usually noted.
This large evacuation saved many lives and did not happen by accident.
Rather, it resulted from a long working relationship and open
communication between NOAA, the emergency management community at all
levels, and the media. This collaboration is especially close and
complementary during a hurricane threat. For example, since the 1970s,
NOAA has been delivering and updating thousands of storm surge
simulations it generates for the entire vulnerable coast from Texas to
Maine long before any specific event. These simulations are the basis
for the evacuation plans and storm-specific decisions made by the
communities there. In addition, NOAA provides real-time storm surge
information.
I believe the high evacuation rate for Katrina was also due to the
broad distribution and diverse formats of National Weather Service text
and graphical forecast and warning products, the 471 media interviews
conducted by NHC staff, the more than 2.3 billion ``hits'' the National
Weather Service forecast products received on our public website, and
the interactions of local National Weather Service offices and the
National Hurricane Center with emergency managers in the days prior to
landfall. For Hurricane Rita, National Hurricane Center staff provided
935 media interviews. In addition, National Weather Service web
activity, as supported by NOAA's web-mirroring project, registered over
2.9 billion ``hits'' during Hurricane Rita.
On Saturday evening, August 27, Max Mayfield personally called the
Chief of Operations at the Alabama Emergency Management Agency, as well
as the Governors of Louisiana and Mississippi and the Mayor of New
Orleans, to communicate the potential meteorological and storm surge
impacts from Hurricane Katrina.
NOAA Aircraft Support Efforts
NOAA Aircraft, the W-P3 Orions and the Gulf Stream IV ``Hurricane
Hunters,'' provided essential observations critical to the National
Hurricane Center forecasters and supplement U.S. Air Force Reserve
Command's 53rd Weather Reconnaissance Squadron flights. A specialized
instrument flown on one of the W-P3s, the Stepped Frequency Microwave
Radiometer (SFMR), provided essential hurricane structure and surface
wind data to hurricane forecasters for both hurricanes. The Military
Construction Appropriations and Emergency Hurricane Supplemental
Appropriations Act, 2005 (P.L. 108-324) provided $10.5M to the Air
Force to outfit the complete fleet of Hurricane Hunters with this
instrument, the first of these additional units should be available
during the 2006 Hurricane Season.
The Military Construction Appropriations and Emergency Hurricane
Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2005 also provided funding to NOAA for
seven hurricane buoys, which NOAA deployed this past year in the
Caribbean, the Gulf of Mexico, and the Atlantic. These new buoys
provided us with critical information during this active hurricane
season.
NOAA's Activities After Hurricane Katrina's and Hurricane Rita's
Landfall
Immediately following Hurricane Katrina's second landfall, and also
following Hurricane Rita's landfall, several NOAA ships and aircraft
were tasked with assisting in the hurricane response. Our aircraft flew
damage assessment flights using a sophisticated digital camera to
collect imagery to assess damage. Over 10,000 high-resolution images
were collected by NOAA aircraft for the areas impacted by Hurricanes
Katrina and Rita. These images are assisting emergency managers and
other agencies in recovery operations and long-term restoration and
rebuilding decisions. They are also publicly available on NOAA's
website to allow those displaced by the storms to view their homes and
neighborhoods via the Internet.
It is also NOAA's responsibility to assess the damage to the
commercial fishing industry in those sections of the Gulf of Mexico. We
are working closely with each of the impacted State resource agencies
and commercial entities to assess the storm's impacts to the longer-
term social and economic viability of local fishing communities. NOAA
employees also are assisting recovery efforts by working with other
federal agencies in planning, organizing, and conducting oil spill and
hazardous material response and restoration in the impacted areas of
the Gulf.
NOAA vessels are tasked with surveying critical ports and waterways
for depths, wrecks and obstructions for navigational safety. NOAA
Navigation Response Teams were on the scene before both hurricanes hit
to survey for hazards and help the U.S. Coast Guard and the Army Corps
of Engineers re-open waterways to commercial and emergency traffic. Our
ships use highly specialized hydrographic equipment to survey near
shore and mid-water areas to assess potential obstructions to
navigation caused by Hurricane Katrina, and Rita. The efforts of these
NOAA ships are critical to rebuilding the Gulf's economic
infrastructure by enabling vessels of all sizes to pass safely through
these waterways thereby allowing emergency materials, oil, and
commercial goods to make it to their destinations.
Outlook for the Future
Today is October 7; to date we have had seventeen tropical storms,
nine of which have become hurricanes, five of those have been major
hurricanes at Category 3 or stronger. We believe we will continue to
have an active season, with a total of l8-21 tropical storms. We
believe this heightened period of hurricane activity will continue due
to multi-decadal variance, as tropical cyclone activity in the Atlantic
is cyclical and tied to fluctuations in sea surface temperatures and
other characteristics of the coupled ocean-atmosphere system. The
1940's through the 1960's experienced an above average number of major
hurricanes, while the 1970's into the mid-1990's averaged fewer
hurricanes. The current period of heightened activity could last
another 10-20 years. The increased activity since 1995 is due to
natural fluctuations/cycles of hurricane activity, driven by the
Atlantic Ocean itself along with the atmosphere above it. The natural
cycles are quite large with 3-4 major hurricanes a year on average
during active periods and only about 1-2 major hurricanes annually
during quiet periods, with each period lasting 25-40 years.
Current and Future Research Efforts
Through greater understanding of physical processes and advanced
hurricane modeling, NOAA continually improves models for predicting
hurricane intensity and track, in collaboration with federal partners,
academic researchers, and commercial enterprises. These numerical
modeling improvements, once demonstrated, are transitioned into
operations.
NOAA is focused on improving the forecasting of hurricane
frequency, track, and intensity as well as predicting hurricane impacts
on life and property. We depend on numerous critical research
activities inside and outside NOAA. Our track forecasts have shown
continued improvement. However, we have not seen a comparable
improvement in our intensity forecasts.
From a scientific standpoint, the gaps in our capabilities fall
into two broad categories: first, our ability to measure and assess the
current state of a hurricane and its environment (analysis), and
second, our ability to predict a hurricane's future state (the
forecast).
Many of the enhancements required to improve hurricane analyses,
particularly over the data-sparse ocean areas, will be addressed
through such programs as the Global Earth Observation System of Systems
(GEOSS), a 10-year international endeavor of which the United States is
a member and NOAA, NASA, and USGS are key participants.
Using a combination of atmospheric and ocean observations from
satellites, aircraft, and all available surface data over the oceans,
NOAA, NASA, NSF and other federal agencies conduct experiments to
better understand internal storm dynamics and interactions between a
hurricane and the surrounding atmosphere and ocean. Much of NOAA's
improvement in tropical cyclone forecasting is attributed to advances
in Numerical Weather Prediction (NWP). In collaboration with many
scientists and developers in the domestic and international operational
NWP centers, the NOAA Environmental Modeling Center develops state-of-
the-art numerical modeling systems. Predicting hurricane intensity
remains one of our acute challenges. For example, even though we knew
conditions were favorable for the storms to intensify, and we forecast
strengthening, there was some error for both storms in the intensity
forecast for the eastern Gulf due to their rapid intensification.
Through our NWP advancements, our 2005 version of our high-resolution
model improved some intensity forecasts over the statistical models
when run on several 2004 Atlantic storms. To advance hurricane
prediction, especially hurricane intensity and size forecasts, NOAA is
developing the Hurricane Weather and Research Forecasting (HWRF)
system. The HWRF system uses a collaborative approach among the
research community and will apply advanced model physics as HWRF
couples the atmosphere, land, and ocean into an integrated model. Our
goal is to couple an advanced wave model with a dynamic storm surge
model to better predict coastal impacts of waves and storm surge.
We have increased our efforts to transfer research into operations.
The United States Weather Research Program (USWRP) Joint Hurricane
Testbed (JHT) was formed in late 2000. The mission of the JHT is to
facilitate the transfer of new technology, research results, and
observational advances of the USWRP, its sponsoring agencies, the
academic community, and the private sector for improved operational
tropical cyclone analysis and prediction.
While there are no quick fixes, we are very optimistic that we will
continue to make advances in operational forecasts of tropical cyclone
intensity, wind structure, size, and rainfall in the near future.
Conclusion
The government's ability to observe, predict, and respond quickly
to storm events is critical to public safety. We must now look ahead to
post-storm redevelopment strategies for communities impacted by
Katrina, Rita and future storms, to help manage and anticipate these
extreme events. NOAA has the expertise in coastal management and hazard
mitigation, and is committed to working with our partners to reduce the
Nation's vulnerability to hurricanes and other coastal storm events. It
is critical that we work to protect and restore natural features along
the Gulf Coast, such as dunes, wetlands, and other vegetated areas that
offer protection against coastal flooding and erosion.
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita will not be the last major hurricanes
to hit a vulnerable area, and New Orleans is not the only location
vulnerable to a large disaster from a land-falling hurricane. Houston/
Galveston, Tampa Bay, southwestern Florida, the Florida Keys,
southeastern Florida, New York City/Long Island, and New England, are
all especially vulnerable. And New Orleans remains vulnerable to future
hurricanes.
In partnership with NASA, NSF, and other agencies, NOAA we will
continue efforts to improve hurricane track, intensity, rainfall and
storm surge forecasting. NOAA will also continue to provide technical
tools and planning expertise to States and local governments to help
mitigate future natural hazards and provide our assistance for response
and recovery efforts.
With that, I'll be glad to answer any questions Members may have.
NOAA National Hurricane Center
Hurricane Katrina Forecast Timeline
TUESDAY, AUGUST 23, 2005
1600 CDT: Katrina forms as a Tropical Depression 12, near Nassau in the
Bahamas. Tropical Depression 12 Advisory 1 issued: ``A TROPICAL STORM
OR HURRICANE WATCH MAY BE REQUIRED FOR PORTIONS OF SOUTHERN FLORIDA
LATER TONIGHT.''
WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 24, 2005
0400 CDT: The National Hurricane Center's five-day forecast puts the
projected path of Katrina in the southeast Gulf of Mexico (as the
system is still a tropical depression in the central Bahamas).
0700 CDT: Katrina is elevated to a Tropical Storm.
1000 CDT: Tropical Storm Katrina Advisory 4 is issued: ``. . .A
TROPICAL STORM WARNING AND A HURRICANE WATCH HAVE BEEN ISSUED FOR THE
SOUTHEAST FLORIDA COAST. . .''
THURSDAY, AUGUST 25, 2005
1430 CDT: Katrina is elevated to a Category 1 Hurricane.
1730 CDT: Katrina makes landfall in Florida as a Category 1 Hurricane.
WEDNESDAY/THURSDAY, AUGUST 24/25:
Hurricane Liaison Team conference calls were conducted both days,
and included Florida emergency managers, FEMA Headquarters (FEMA HQ),
and Region IV.
FRIDAY, AUGUST 26, 2005
0200 CDT: Katrina entered the Gulf of Mexico as a Tropical Storm.
0400 CDT: Katrina is elevated to a Category 1 Hurricane.
1000 CDT: Hurricane Katrina Advisory Number 12 is issued: ``KATRINA IS
A CATEGORY ONE HURRICANE ON THE SAFFIR-SIMPSON SCALE. SOME
STRENGTHENING IS FORECAST DURING THE NEXT 24 HOURS. . .AND KATRINA
COULD BECOME A CATEGORY TWO HURRICANE ON SATURDAY.''
1015 CDT: Hurricane Liaison Team Coordination Audio Conference with FL.
1030 CDT: Katrina is elevated to a Category 2 Hurricane. Hurricane
Katrina Advisory Number 13 is issued: ``. . .KATRINA RAPIDLY
STRENGTHENING AS IT MOVES SLOWLY WESTWARD AWAY FROM SOUTH FLORIDA AND
THE FLORIDA KEYS. . .KATRINA IS MOVING TOWARD THE WEST NEAR SEVEN MPH.
. .AND THIS MOTION IS EXPECTED TO CONTINUE FOR THE NEXT 24 HOURS. .
.RECENT REPORTS FROM AN AIR FORCE RESERVE UNIT HURRICANE HUNTER
AIRCRAFT NOW INDICATE MAXIMUM SUSTAINED WINDS ARE NEAR 100 MPH. . .WITH
HIGHER GUSTS. KATRINA IS NOW A CATEGORY TWO HURRICANE ON THE SAFFIR-
SIMPSON SCALE. SOME STRENGTHENING IS FORECAST DURING THE NEXT 24 HOURS.
. .AND KATRINA COULD BECOME A CATEGORY THREE OR MAJOR HURRICANE ON
SATURDAY.''
1100 CDT: Hurricane Liaison Team Coordination Video Conference with
FEMA HQ, Region IV, FL, AL, and GA.
1600 CDT: Hurricane Katrina Discussion Number 14 is issued: ``. . .THE
MODELS HAVE SHIFTED SIGNIFICANTLY WESTWARD AND ARE NOW IN BETTER
AGREEMENT. THIS HAS RESULTED IN THE OFFICIAL FORECAST TRACK BEING
SHIFTED ABOUT 150 NMI WEST OF THE PREVIOUS TRACK. . .HOWEVER. .
.PROJECTED LANDFALL IS STILL ABOUT 72 HOURS AWAY. . .SO FURTHER
MODIFICATIONS IN THE FORECAST TRACK ARE POSSIBLE. KATRINA IS EXPECTED
TO BE MOVING OVER THE GULF LOOP CURRENT AFTER 36 HOURS. . .WHICH WHEN
COMBINED WITH DECREASING VERTICAL SHEAR. . .SHOULD ALLOW THE HURRICANE
TO REACH CATEGORY FOUR STATUS BEFORE LANDFALL OCCURS.''
1615 CDT: Hurricane Liaison Team Coordination Audio Conference with FL.
2200 CDT: Hurricane Katrina Discussion Number 15 is issued: ``THE
OFFICIAL FORECAST BRINGS THE CORE OF THE INTENSE HURRICANE OVER THE
NORTH CENTRAL GULF OF MEXICO IN 48 HOURS OR SO. IT IS WORTH NOTING THAT
THE GUIDANCE SPREAD HAS DECREASED AND MOST OF THE RELIABLE NUMERICAL
MODEL TRACKS ARE NOW CLUSTERED BETWEEN THE EASTERN COAST OF LOUISIANA
AND THE COAST OF MISSISSIPPI. THIS CLUSTERING INCREASES THE CONFIDENCE
IN THE FORECAST.''
SATURDAY, AUGUST 27, 2005
0400 CDT: Katrina is elevated to a Category 3 Hurricane. Hurricane
Katrina Advisory Number 16 is issued: ``KATRINA BECOMES A MAJOR
HURRICANE WITH 115 MPH WINDS. . .SOME STRENGTHENING IS FORECAST DURING
THE NEXT 24 HOURS. . .RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT DATA AND SURFACE
OBSERVATIONS INDICATE THAT KATRINA HAS BECOME A LARGER HURRICANE. . .''
Hurricane Katrina Discussion Number 16 is issued: ``DUE TO THE
DECREASING SPREAD IN THE MODELS. . .THE CONFIDENCE IN THE FORECAST
TRACK IS INCREASING.''
1000 CDT: Hurricane Katrina Advisory Number 17 is issued: ``A HURRICANE
WATCH IS IN EFFECT FOR THE SOUTHEASTERN COAST OF LOUISIANA EAST OF
MORGAN CITY TO THE MOUTH OF THE PEARL RIVER. . .INCLUDING METROPOLITAN
NEW ORLEANS AND LAKE PONCHARTRAIN. . .A HURRICANE WATCH WILL LIKELY BE
REQUIRED FOR OTHER PORTIONS OF THE NORTHERN GULF LATER TODAY OR
TONIGHT. INTERESTS IN THIS AREA SHOULD MONITOR THE PROGRESS OF KATRINA.
. .SOME STRENGTHENING IS FORECAST DURING THE NEXT 24 HOURS. . .AND
KATRINA COULD BECOME A CATEGORY FOUR HURRICANE. . .'' Hurricane Katrina
Discussion Number 17 is issued: ``. . .IT IS NOT OUT OF THE QUESTION
THAT KATRINA COULD REACH CATEGORY 5 STATUS AT SOME POINT BEFORE
LANDFALL. . .''
1015 CDT: Hurricane Liaison Team Coordination Audio Conference with FL.
1100 CDT: Hurricane Liaison Team Coordination Video Conference with
FEMA HQ, Region IV and VI, FL, LA, MS, AL, and GA.
1600 CDT: Hurricane Katrina Advisory Number 18 is issued: ``THE
HURRICANE WATCH IS EXTENDED WESTWARD TO INTRACOASTAL CITY LOUISIANA AND
EASTWARD TO THE FLORIDA-ALABAMA BORDER. A HURRICANE WATCH IS NOW IN
EFFECT ALONG THE NORTHERN GULF COAST FROM INTRACOASTAL CITY TO THE
ALABAMA-FLORIDA BORDER. A HURRICANE WARNING WILL LIKELY BE REQUIRED FOR
PORTIONS OF THE NORTHERN GULF COAST LATER TONIGHT OR SUNDAY. INTERESTS
IN THIS AREA SHOULD MONITOR THE PROGRESS OF KATRINA.'' Hurricane
Katrina Discussion Number 18 is issued: ``THE INTENSITY FORECAST WILL
CALL FOR STRENGTHENING TO 125 KT AT LANDFALL. . .AND THERE REMAINS A
CHANCE THAT KATRINA COULD BECOME A CATEGORY FIVE HURRICANE BEFORE
LANDFALL.''
1615 CDT: Hurricane Liaison Team Coordination Audio Conference with FL.
1925 CDT: Louisiana Gubernatorial Briefing: Max Mayfield, Director of
NOAA's Tropical Predication Center/National Hurricane Center provides a
briefing to Kathleen Babineau Blanco.
1935 CDT: Max Mayfield, Director of NOAA's Tropical Predication Center/
National Hurricane Center provides a briefing to Bill Filter, Chief of
Operations, Alabama Emergency Management Agency.
1945 CDT: Mississippi Gubernatorial Briefing: Max Mayfield, Director of
NOAA's Tropical Predication Center/National Hurricane Center provides a
briefing to Haley Barbour.
2000 CDT: New Orleans Mayoral Briefing: Max Mayfield, Director of
NOAA's Tropical Predication Center/National Hurricane Center provides a
briefing to Ray Nagin.
2200 CDT: Hurricane Katrina Advisory Number 19 is issued: ``. .
.DANGEROUS HURRICANE KATRINA THREATENS THE NORTH CENTRAL GULF COAST. .
.A HURRICANE WARNING ISSUED. . .AT 10 PM CDT. . .0300Z. . .A HURRICANE
WARNING HAS BEEN ISSUED FOR THE NORTH CENTRAL GULF COAST FROM MORGAN
CITY LOUISIANA EASTWARD TO THE ALABAMA/FLORIDA BORDER. . .INCLUDING THE
CITY OF NEW ORLEANS AND LAKE PONCHARTRAIN. . .PREPARATIONS TO PROTECT
LIFE AND PROPERTY SHOULD BE RUSHED TO COMPLETION. . .COASTAL STORM
SURGE FLOODING OF 15 TO 20 FEET ABOVE NORMAL TIDE LEVELS. . .LOCALLY AS
HIGH AS 25 FEET ALONG WITH LARGE AND DANGEROUS BATTERING WAVES. . .CAN
BE EXPECTED NEAR AND TO THE EAST OF WHERE THE CENTER MAKES LANDFALL. .
.HEAVY RAINS FROM KATRINA SHOULD BEGIN TO AFFECT THE CENTRAL GULF COAST
SUNDAY EVENING. RAINFALL TOTALS OF FIVE TO 10 INCHES. . .WITH ISOLATED
MAXIMUM AMOUNTS OF 15 INCHES. . .ARE POSSIBLE ALONG THE PATH OF
KATRINA.'' Hurricane Katrina Discussion Number 19 is issued: ``. .
.DESPITE THESE CHANGES IN THE INNER CORE. . .THE BOTTOM LINE IS THAT
KATRINA IS EXPECTED TO BE AN INTENSE AND DANGEROUS HURRICANE HEADING
TOWARD THE NORTH CENTRAL GULF COAST. . .AND THIS HAS TO BE TAKEN VERY
SERIOUSLY.''
1500-2230 CDT: Media pool operated; TPC/NHC provided 12 television and
two radio interviews. In addition, TPC/NHC participated in 51 telephone
briefings or media contacts on August 27th.
SUNDAY, AUGUST 28, 2005
0040 CDT: Katrina is elevated to a Category 4 Hurricane.
0100 CDT: Hurricane Katrina Special Advisory Number 20 is issued: ``. .
.KATRINA STRENGTHENS TO CATEGORY FOUR WITH 145 MPH WINDS. . .''
0400 CDT: Hurricane Katrina Discussion Number 21 is issued: ``THE
SPREAD IN THE MODEL TRACKS ALONG THE NORTHERN GULF COAST IS AT MOST 90
MILES. . .SO CONFIDENCE IN THE OFFICIAL FORECAST IS RELATIVELY HIGH.''
0615 CDT: Katrina is elevated to a Category 5 Hurricane.
0700 CDT: Hurricane Katrina Advisory Number 22 is issued: ``. .
.KATRINA. . .NOW A POTENTIALLY CATASTROPHIC CATEGORY FIVE HURRICANE. .
.HEADED FOR THE NORTHERN GULF COAST. . .MAXIMUM SUSTAINED WINDS ARE
NEAR 160 MPH. . .WITH HIGHER GUSTS. KATRINA IS A POTENTIALLY
CATASTROPHIC CATEGORY FIVE HURRICANE ON THE SAFFIR-SIMPSON SCALE. SOME
FLUCTUATIONS IN STRENGTH ARE LIKELY IN THE NEXT 24 HOURS.''
1000 CDT: Hurricane Katrina Advisory Number 23 is issued: ``. .
.POTENTIALLY CATASTRPHIC HURRICANE KATRINA. . .EVEN STRONGER. . .HEADED
FOR THE NORTHERN GULF COAST. . .REPORTS FROM AN AIR FORCE HURRICANE
HUNTER AIRCRAFT INDICATE THAT THE MAXIMUM SUSTAINED WINDS HAVE
INCREASED TO NEAR 175 MPH. . .WITH HIGHER WIND GUSTS. . .HURRICANE
FORCE WINDS EXTEND OUTWARD UP TO 105 MILES FROM THE CENTER AND TROPICAL
STORM FORCE WINDS EXTEND OUTWARDS UP TO 205 MILES. . .COASTAL STORM
SURGE FLOODING OF 18 TO 22 FEET ABOVE NORMAL TIDE LEVELS. . .LOCALLY AS
HIGH AS 28 FEET ALONG WITH LARGE AND DANGEROUS BATTERING WAVES. . .CAN
BE EXPECTED NEAR AND TO THE EAST OF WHERE THE CENTER MAKES LANDFALL.
Hurricane Katrina Discussion Number 23 is issued: ``. . .HURRICANE
FORCE WINDS ARE FORECAST TO SPREAD AT LEAST 150 N MI INLAND ALONG PATH
OF KATRINA. CONSULT INLAND WARNINGS ISSUED BY THE NATIONAL WEATHER
SERVICE FORCAST OFFICES. . .''
1015 CDT: Hurricane Liaison Team Coordination Audio Conference with FL.
1100 CDT: Hurricane Liaison Team Coordination Video Conference with
FEMA HQ, Region IV and VI, FL, LA, MS, AL, GA, TX.
1300 CDT: Hurricane Katrina Advisory Number 23A is issued:
``SIGNIFICANT STORM SURGE FLOODING WILL OCCUR ELSEWHERE ALONG THE
CENTRAL AND NORTHEASTERN GULF OF MEXICO COAST.''
1600 CDT: Hurricane Katrina Advisory Number 24 is issued: ``KATRINA IS
MOVING TOWARD THE NORTHWEST NEAR 13 MPH. . .AND A GRADUAL TURN TO THE
NORTH IS EXPECTED OVER THE NEXT 24 HOURS. ON THIS TRACK THE CENTER OF
THE HURRICANE WILL BE NEAR THE NORTHERN GULF COAST EARLY MONDAY.
HOWEVER. . .CONDITIONS ARE ALREADY BEGINNING TO DETERIORATE ALONG
PORTIONS OF THE CENTRAL AND NORTHEASTERN GULF COASTS. . .AND WILL
CONTINUE TO WORSEN THROUGH THE NIGHT. . .KATRINA IS A POTENTIALLY
CATASTROPHIC CATEGORY FIVE HURRICANE ON THE SAFFIR-SIMPSON SCALE. SOME
FLUCTUATIONS IN STRENGTH ARE LIKELY UNTIL LANDFALL. KATRINA IS EXPECTED
TO MAKE LANDFALL AT CATEGORY FOUR OR FIVE INTENSITY. WINDS AFFECTING
THE UPPER FLOORS OF HIGH-RISE BUILDINGS WILL BE SIGNIFICANTLY STRONGER
THAN THOSE NEAR GROUND LEVEL. . .SOME LEVEES IN THE GREATER NEW ORLEANS
AREA COULD BE OVERTOPPED.''
1615 CDT: Hurricane Liaison Team Coordination Audio Conference with FL.
2200 CDT: Hurricane Katrina Advisory Number 25 is issued: ``A HURRICANE
WARNING IS IN EFFECT FOR THE NORTH CENTRAL GULF COAST FROM MORGAN CITY
LOUISIANA EASTWARD TO THE ALABAMA/FLORIDA BORDER. . .INCLUDING THE CITY
OF NEW ORLEANS AND LAKE PONCHARTRAIN. PREPARATIONS TO PROTECT LIFE AND
PROPERTY SHOULD BE RUSHED TO COMPLETION.''
MONDAY, AUGUST 29, 2005
0200 CDT: Hurricane Katrina is downgraded to a Category 4.
0400 CDT: Hurricane Katrina Advisory Number 26 is issued: ``EXTREMELY
DANGEROUS CATEGORY FOUR HURRICANE KATRINA MOVING NORTHWARD TOWARD
SOUTHEASTERN LOUISIANA AND THE NORTHERN GULF COAST. . .SOME
FLUCTUATIONS IN STRENGTH ARE LIKELY PRIOR TO LANDFALL. . .BUT KATRINA
IS EXPECTED TO MAKE LANDFALL AS A CATEGORY FOUR HURRICANE.''
0600 CDT: Hurricane Katrina Advisory Number 26A is issued: ``KATRINA
REMAINS A VERY LARGE HURRICANE. HURRICANE FORCE WINDS EXTEND OUTWARD UP
TO 120 MILES FROM THE CENTER. . .AND TROPICAL STORM FORCE WINDS EXTEND
OUTWARD UP TO 230 MILES.''
0610 CDT: Hurricane Katrina makes landfall in southeastern Louisiana as
a Category 4 hurricane.
0800 CDT: Hurricane Katrina Advisory Number 26B is issued: ``. . .THE
CENTER OF HURRICANE KATRINA WAS LOCATED...ABOUT 40 MILES SOUTHEAST OF
NEW ORLEANS LOUISIANA AND ABOUT 65 MILES SOUTHWEST OF BILOXI
MISSISSIPPI. . .MAXIMUM SUSTAINED WINDS ARE NEAR 135 MPH. . .WITH
HIGHER GUSTS. KATRINA IS AN EXTREMELY DANGEROUS CATEGORY FOUR HURRICANE
ON THE SAFFIR-SIMPSON SCALE. WEAKENING IS FORECAST AS THE CIRCULATION
INTERACTS WITH LAND TODAY. . .COASTAL STORM SURGE FLOODING OF 18 TO 22
FEET ABOVE NORMAL TIDE LEVELS. . .ALONG WITH LARGE AND DANGEROUS
BATTERING WAVES. . .CAN BE EXPECTED NEAR AND TO THE EAST OF THE CENTER.
STORM SURGE FLOODING OF 10 TO 15 FEET. . .NEAR THE TOPS OF LEVEES. .
.IS POSSIBLE IN THE GREATER NEW ORLEANS AREA. SIGNIFICANT STORM SURGE
FLOODING WILL OCCUR ELSEWHERE ALONG THE CENTRAL AND NORTHEASTERN GULF
OF MEXICO COAST.''
1000 CDT: Hurricane Katrina makes a second landfall at the LA/MS border
as a Category 3 hurricane.
1015 CDT: Hurricane Liaison Team Coordination Audio Conference with FL.
1100 CDT: Hurricane Liaison Team Coordination Video Conference with
FEMA HQ, Region IV and VI, LA, MS, AL, FL, TX.
1615 CDT: Hurricane Liaison Team Coordination Audio Conference with FL.
TUESDAY, AUGUST 30, 2005
1000 CDT: Katrina is downgraded to a tropical depression with winds of
35 mph, 25 miles south of Clarksville, TN. The final TPC/NHC advisory
is issued at this time; the Hydrometeorological Prediction Center
assumes inland public advisories.
WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 31, 2005
2200 CDT: Hurricane Katrina has dissipated; remnants absorbed by a
front in southeast Canada.
NOTES:
Timeline highlights the major aspects of NOAA's
Tropical Prediction Center/National Hurricane Center (TPC/NHC).
All advisories (graphic and text) are available on the Katrina
archive page: http://www/nhc.noaa.gov/archive/2005/KATRINA/
shtml?
Storm surge is a consistent concern and associated
threat with any land-falling hurricane, especially a major
hurricane.
Hurricane Liaison Team Coordination calls included
the State emergency management officials for the states listed;
calls with the State of Florida included both local and State
emergency management officials.
For Katrina (including for Florida) NOAA's Tropical
Predication Center/National Hurricane Center provided a total
of 471 television and radio interviews, through their media
pool or via telephone.
Biography for David L. Johnson
David L. Johnson serves as the Assistant Administrator, National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) for Weather Services
(National Weather Service). Johnson heads the Nation's weather service
and is responsible for the day-to-day management of NOAA's domestic
weather and hydrology operations.
Prior to joining NOAA, Johnson served as the U.S. Air Force
director of weather. He retired from the Air Force as a brigadier
general, after a 30-year military career. As Director of Weather, he
was one of ten directors at the Headquarters Air Force, Air and Space
Operations, and was responsible for developing doctrine, policy,
requirements and operational organizations to support Air Force and
Army operations worldwide. He also served as one of NOAA's military
deputies.
Notably, he organized, trained and equipped forces for the war in
Afghanistan and the war in Iraq, and managed a steady flow of accurate
and focused environmental information to battlefield commanders. He was
a key advisor in the development of the National Polar-orbiting
Environmental Operational Satellite System (NPOESS).
Johnson's career is marked by his strong management and fiscal
capabilities. During his time as Director of Weather, he led a massive
re-engineering effort that revised the organizational structure,
training and operations of the 4,000-person career field. Under
Johnson's steady hand, retention of weather-career airmen and officers
grew to 97 percent, up from 74 percent previously.
Johnson guided the planning, programming and budgeting process
implementation at the highest levels in the Air Force and in the
Department of Defense. He has a world-wide perspective, having served
in leadership positions on the Joint Staff with planning portfolios in
Europe/NATO and Asia/Pacific. He secured funding for a new facility for
the Air Force Weather Agency to house collection, analysis, modeling
and career-field supervision functions.
Prior to his service as the Director of Weather, Johnson flew
fighter, transport and special operations aircraft. He has over 3,800
flying hours including 78 combat sorties. Johnson commanded airdrop and
air/land operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina and was deputy commander of
the Joint Task Force for Operation Support Hope in Rwanda. He was
selected for early promotion three times.
Johnson is an honor graduate from the University of Kansas with a
degree in geography, and earned his Master's degree in human relations
from Webster's University. He is a graduate of the National War
College, Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs at Syracuse
University, and from the Paul Nitze School of Advanced International
Studies at Johns Hopkins University.
Chairman Boehlert. Thank you very much, General.
Mr. Mayfield.
STATEMENT OF MR. MAX MAYFIELD, DIRECTOR, NOAA TROPICAL
PREDICTION CENTER/NATIONAL HURRICANE CENTER
Mr. Mayfield. Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, I
am Max Mayfield, the Director of the Tropical Prediction Center
and National Hurricane Center which is a part of the National
Weather Service at NOAA. Thank you for inviting me here today
to discuss NOAA's National Weather Service role in forecasting
and warning the public about hurricanes.
The catastrophic devastation along the Gulf Coast from
Hurricane Katrina is like nothing I have ever witnessed. Words
cannot convey the physical destruction and the personal
suffering in that part of our nation. However, without NOAA's
National Weather Services forecasts and warnings, the loss of
life could have been far greater.
Hurricane Katrina began as a tropical depression near the
Southeast Bahamas on Tuesday, August 23rd. The National
Hurricane Center's tropical cyclone forecasts were routinely
issued every six hours with intermediate updates as necessary
and included text and graphical products. The National
Hurricane Center accurately predicted Katrina would become a
Category 1 hurricane before making landfall near Miami.
Chairman Boehlert. Sorry for the interruption.
Mr. Mayfield. That is okay.
Chairman Boehlert. We are just getting these buzzers now.
You conclude your opening statement and then we will have to
take a recess and go to the Floor and vote and we will be back
shortly thereafter.
Mr. Mayfield. Thank you.
Once Katrina emerged into the Gulf of Mexico, the National
Hurricane Center forecast correctly predicted a re-
intensification of the storm. Within nine hours, Katrina
intensified from a tropical storm to a Category 2 hurricane. It
later reached Category 5 status. Our forecast track from
Saturday morning, August the 27th, about two days before
landfall, had the storm curving northward and heading directly
towards Southeast Louisiana and Mississippi. And the prediction
was for Katrina to make landfall as a Category 4 hurricane. The
actual track would deviate little from this and subsequent
forecasts for the rest of Katrina's approach.
The intensity forecast would also prove to be very good. At
10:00 a.m. central daylight time, Saturday, August 27th, the
National Hurricane Center posted a hurricane watch for
Southeast Louisiana, including the City of New Orleans. We
issued additional watches and warnings for Louisiana to the
Florida panhandle soon thereafter. After reaching Southeast
Louisiana, Katrina made final landfall along the Louisiana/
Mississippi border on Monday morning as a Category 3 hurricane.
I should also briefly mention the tracking forecasting on
Hurricane Rita. Rita began as a tropical depression on
Saturday, September 17th over the Atlantic east of the Turks
and Caicos Islands. The National Hurricane Center accurately
predicted the center of the storm to pass just south of the
Florida Keys as a hurricane on September 20 and predicted it to
become a major hurricane as it moved over the warm waters of
the Gulf of Mexico. Later, Rita, just like Katrina,
strengthened to Category 5 status. On Thursday, approximately
two days before landfall, the forecast track was shifted
eastward to just west of the Louisiana/Texas border. Rita's
actual track would deviate little from this and subsequent
projections. The National Hurricane Center accurately predicted
Rita would weaken before landfall but still come ashore as a
Category 3 hurricane.
It is critical that we effectively communicate our forecast
information to everyone. The Hurricane Liaison Team is a
partnership between the National Weather Service and FEMA. The
team is a cadre of federal, State, and local emergency managers
and National Weather Service meteorologists and hydrologists.
As tropical systems threaten the United States, the HLT deploys
at the request of the National Hurricane Center to assist in
coordination efforts. The team's mission is to support
hurricane response operations through the rapid exchange of
critical information between the National Hurricane Center and
emergency managers at all levels. Once activated, FEMA hosts
and facilitates audio and national video conference calls. On
these calls, FEMA advises State and local emergency managers in
the potential impact area to participate.
The National Hurricane Center is an invited participant and
opens each call providing an updated forecast. The Hurricane
Liaison Team provides an excellent way to communicate with the
large number of emergency managers potentially impacted by an
approaching hurricane. After consulting with our local weather
service offices and the National Hurricane Center, emergency
managers make evacuation and other preparedness decisions.
The media is also an essential partner and helps us get the
information widely distributed to the public. The media
provided an invaluable service to the people of the impacted
Gulf Coast by communicating National Hurricane Center forecasts
and warning information about Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. In
addition, National Weather Service web activity as supported by
NOAA's premiering project registered over 2.3 billion hits
during Katrina and 2.9 billion hits during Rita.
Today is October 7, hopefully on the downside of this
year's hurricane season. To date, we have had 19 tropical
storms, 10 of which have become hurricanes and five of those
have been major hurricanes of a Category 3 or stronger. This
season has already been one of the most active on record and we
still have another seven weeks to go. We believe the heightened
period of hurricane activity that we are in will continue due
to multi-decadal variations, because tropical cyclone activity
in Atlantic is cyclical and tied to fluctuations in sea surface
temperatures. For example, the 1940's through the '60s
experienced an above average number of major hurricanes while
the '70s into the mid-'90s averaged fewer hurricanes. The
current threat of heightened activity could last another 10 to
20 years. These natural cycles are quite large in amplitude
with an average of three to four major hurricanes per year in
active periods and only one to two major hurricanes annually
during the quiet periods with each period lasting 25 to 40
years.
While we must focus our energy on addressing the impacts of
Hurricane Katrina, we also need to look at the future. Katrina
will not be the last major hurricane to hit a vulnerable area.
And New Orleans is not the only location at risk to a large
disaster from a hurricane. Galveston/Houston, Tampa Bay,
southwestern Florida, the Florida Keys, southeastern Florida,
New York City and Long Island, and believe it or not, New
England are especially vulnerable. And of course, New Orleans
will be hit again by a hurricane some day.
At NOAA, we will continue our efforts to improve our
hurricane track, intensity, precipitation and storm surge
forecasting and work with our partners to ensure the best
possible outcome during future hurricane events.
With that, I will be glad to answer any questions from the
Members of the Committee.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Mayfield follows:]
Prepared Statement of Max Mayfield
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, I am Max Mayfield,
Director of the Tropical Prediction Center/National Hurricane Center.
The National Hurricane Center is a part of the National Weather Service
(NWS), of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) in
the Department of Commerce. Thank you for inviting me here today to
discuss NOAA's role in forecasting, and warning the public about
hurricanes, as well as NOAA's essential role and activities following
landfall.
The devastation along the Gulf Coast from Hurricane Katrina is like
nothing I have witnessed before. It is catastrophic. Words cannot
convey the physical destruction and personal suffering in that part of
our nation. However, without NOAA's forecasts and warnings, the
devastation and loss of life would have been far greater.
NOAA's forecasts and warnings for Hurricane Katrina pushed the
limits of the state-of-the-art of hurricane prediction. Our continuous
research efforts at NOAA, and in partnership with other federal
agencies, have led to our current predictive capabilities and improved
ways of describing uncertainty in prediction. But NOAA's work does not
end there. NOAA does extensive work assessing damage from storms and
evaluating waterways to assist dredging operations, to open our
nation's ports and waterways impacted by the storm. NOAA also assesses
the impact to the areas' fisheries, supports hazardous materials
containment and abatement efforts, and provides necessary data critical
for post storm recovery operations.
Tracking and Forecasting Hurricane Katrina
The National Hurricane Center (NHC) within the NWS has been the
centerpiece of our nation's hurricane forecast and warning program for
50 years. The mission of the NHC is to save lives, mitigate property
loss, and improve economic efficiency by issuing the best watches,
warnings, and forecasts of hazardous tropical weather, and by
increasing the public's understanding of these hazards.
NHC tropical cyclone forecasts are issued every six hours and
include text messages as well as a suite of graphical products
depicting our forecasts and the accompanying probabilities and ``cone
of uncertainty,'' as it has become known. Hurricane Katrina began as a
tropical depression near the southeastern Bahamas on Tuesday, August
23. The National Hurricane Center accurately predicted it would become
a Category 1 hurricane before making landfall near Miami. The storm
deluged southeast Florida with 16 inches of rain in some places,
causing downed trees, flooding, and extended power outages as it passed
across the southern portion of the state.
Once Katrina re-emerged into the Gulf of Mexico, NOAA hurricane
forecasters correctly predicted re-intensification of the storm.
Katrina intensified more quickly and became stronger than initially
predicted. Within nine hours, Katrina intensified from a tropical
storm, with winds of 70 miles per hour, to a Category 2 storm with 100
mile per hour winds.
As you can see in the graphic below, our forecast track from
Saturday morning, August 27, about two days before landfall, had the
storm curving northward and headed directly toward southeastern
Louisiana and Mississippi. The projected path of Katrina aimed directly
at southeast Louisiana, and the prediction was for Katrina to make
landfall as a Category 4 hurricane. The actual track would deviate
little from this and subsequent forecasts for the rest of Katrina's
approach. On average, NOAA forecasts of where Katrina would go were
more accurate than usual, with all of the forecast tracks during the
last 48 hours lining up almost directly on top of the actual track.
This forecast beats the Government Performance and Results Act goal
established for NOAA hurricane forecasts this year.
At 10:00 am Central Daylight Time (CDT) Saturday morning, August
27, the National Hurricane Center posted a hurricane watch for
southeast Louisiana, including the city of New Orleans. The watch
extended eastward to Mississippi and Alabama that afternoon. A
hurricane watch means hurricane conditions are possible in the
specified area, usually within 36 hours. Messages from the National
Hurricane Center highlighted the potential for this storm to make
landfall as a Category 4 or Category 5 storm.
Predicting hurricane intensity remains a challenge. Even though we
knew conditions were favorable for the storm to intensify, there was
some error in the intensity forecast for the eastern Gulf due to its
rapid intensification. While we accurately predicted the intensity at
landfall, there is still more work to be done in improving intensity
prediction, especially for rapidly intensifying or rapidly weakening
storms.
Storm Surge
Storm surge has caused most of this country's tropical cyclone
fatalities, all too vividly evident in the past two weeks, and still
represents our greatest risk for a large loss of life in this country.
Following Hurricane Camille in 1969, NOAA established a group that
developed and implemented a storm surge model called SLOSH (Sea, Lake,
and Overland Surges from Hurricanes). The SLOSH model calculates storm
surge heights resulting either from historical, hypothetical or actual
hurricanes. SLOSH incorporates bathymetry and topography, including bay
and river configurations, roads, levees, and other physical features
that can modify the storm surge flow pattern. Comprehensive evacuation
studies, conducted jointly by the Federal Emergency Management Agency
(FEMA), the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, NOAA, and State and local
emergency managers, are based on the simulated surges computed by
SLOSH.
The National Hurricane Center introduced storm surge forecasts for
the Gulf Coast in public advisories at 10:00 am CDT Saturday--32 hours
prior to Katrina's landfall in Louisiana. The initial forecast (10:00
am CDT, Saturday, August 28) for storm surge was predicted at 15 to 20
feet, locally as high as 25 feet, and that forecast was updated the
following morning to a range of 18 to 22 feet, locally as high as 28
feet, when the forecast intensity for landfall was increased. ``Large
and battering'' waves were forecast on top of the surge. In addition,
the 4:00 pm CDT public advisory issued by the National Hurricane Center
on Sunday, August 28, stated that some levees in the greater New
Orleans area could be overtopped. Actual storm surge values are being
determined at this time.
I know there have been recent news reports that I notified FEMA
that the New Orleans' levees would be breached. In fact, I did not say
that. What I indicated in my briefings to emergency managers and to the
media was the possibility that some levees in the greater New Orleans
area could be overtopped, depending on the details of Katrina's track
and intensity. This possibility was also indicated in our advisory
products.
Communicating Our Forecasts
The FEMA/NWS Hurricane Liaison Team (HLT), which is activated at
NHC a few days in advance of any potential U.S. hurricane landfall,
coordinates communications between NOAA and the emergency management
community at the federal and State levels. The HLT was established in
1996. After consulting with our local weather service offices and the
National Hurricane Center, emergency managers make evacuation and other
preparedness decisions. The HLT provides an excellent way to
communicate with the large number of emergency managers typically
impacted by a potential hurricane. This is a critical effort to ensure
emergency managers and first responders know what to expect.
The media is our most essential partner and helps us get the
information to the public. Without the media, it would be very
difficult to get the information as widely distributed. The media
provided an invaluable service to the people of the impacted Gulf Coast
by communicating National Hurricane Center forecast and warning
information about Hurricane Katrina. From Thursday, August 25, through
Katrina's landfall in Mississippi on Monday, August 29, NOAA's Tropical
Prediction Center/National Hurricane Center provided a total of 471
television and radio interviews, through their media pool or via
telephone.
On Saturday evening, August 27, I personally called the Chief of
Operations at the Alabama Emergency Management Agency, as well as the
Governors of Louisiana and Mississippi and the Mayor of New Orleans, to
communicate the potential meteorological and storm surge impacts from
Hurricane Katrina. In addition, the National Hurricane Center web
activity, as supported by NOAA's web-mirroring project, registered 900
million hits during Katrina.
NOAA Support Efforts
NOAA is focused on improving the forecasting of hurricane
frequency, track, and intensity as well as predicting hurricane impacts
on life and property. Using a combination of atmospheric and ocean
observations from satellites, aircraft, and all available surface data
over the oceans, NOAA conducts experiments to better understand
internal storm dynamics and interactions between a hurricane and the
surrounding atmosphere and ocean. Through greater understanding of
physical processes and advanced hurricane modeling, NOAA continually
improves models for predicting hurricane intensity and track, in
collaboration with federal partners, academic researchers, and
commercial enterprises. These numerical modeling improvements, once
demonstrated, are transitioned into operations at the National
Hurricane Center.
NOAA Aircraft, the W-P3 Orions and the Gulf Stream IV, provided
essential observations critical to the National Hurricane Center
forecasters and supplement U.S. Air Force Reserve Command's 53rd
Weather Reconnaissance Squadron flights. A specialized instrument flown
on one of the W-P3s, the Stepped Frequency Microwave Radiometer (SFMR),
provided essential hurricane structure, surface wind and rain rate data
to hurricane forecasters right up to and following landfall in
Louisiana and Mississippi. The Military Construction Appropriations and
Emergency Hurricane Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2005 (P.L. 108-
324) provided $10.5M to the Air Force to outfit the complete fleet of
Hurricane Hunters with this instrument, the first of these additional
units should be available during the 2006 Hurricane Season.
The Military Construction Appropriations and Emergency Hurricane
Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2005 also provided funding to NOAA for
seven hurricane buoys, which NOAA deployed this past year in the
Caribbean, the Gulf of Mexico, and the Atlantic. Those new buoys
provided us with critical information during this active hurricane
season.
NOAA's Activities After Hurricane Katrina's Landfall
Immediately following Hurricane Katrina's second landfall, several
NOAA ships and aircraft were tasked with assisting in the hurricane
response. Our aircraft flew damage assessment flights using a
sophisticated digital camera to collect imagery to assess damage. Over
5,000 high-resolution images collected by NOAA aircraft are assisting
emergency managers and other agencies in recovery operations and long-
term restoration and rebuilding decisions.
It is also NOAA's responsibility to assess the damage to the
commercial fishing industry in that section of the Gulf of Mexico. We
are working closely with each of the impacted State resource agencies
and commercial entities to assess the storm's impacts to the longer-
term social and economic viability of local fishing communities. NOAA
employees also are assisting recovery efforts by working with other
federal agencies in planning, organizing, and conducting oil spill and
hazardous material response and restoration in the impacted areas of
the Gulf.
NOAA ships are tasked with surveying critical ports and waterways
for depths, wrecks and obstructions for navigational safety. NOAA
Navigation Response Teams were on scene before the hurricane hit to
survey for hazards and help the U.S. Coast Guard and the Army Corps of
Engineers re-open waterways to commercial and emergency traffic. The
THOMAS JEFFERSON, a highly specialized hydrographic survey ship
equipped with multi-beam and side scan sonar and two 28-foot launches
for near shore and mid-water surveys will be surveying the entrances to
Pascagoula and Gulfport, Mississippi. Another NOAA ship, the NANCY
FOSTER, is outfitted with survey technology and is presently conducting
wreck and obstruction surveys in Mobile Bay, Alabama. The efforts of
these NOAA ships are critical to rebuilding the Gulf's economic
infrastructure by enabling vessels of all sizes to pass safely through
these waterways thereby allowing emergency materials, oil, and
commercial goods to make it to their destinations. Other NOAA ships and
aircraft are assisting directly with the recovery effort by providing
fuel, communications, and supplies to NOAA facilities as well as
temporary office space for local emergency responders.
Outlook for the Future
Today is September 21, near the historical peak of the hurricane
season. To date we have had fifteen tropical storms, seven of which
have become hurricanes, four of those have been major hurricanes at
Category 3 or stronger. We believe we will continue to have an active
season, with a total of l8-21 tropical storms. We believe this
heightened period of hurricane activity will continue due to multi-
decadal variance, as tropical cyclone activity in the Atlantic is
cyclical. The 1940's through the 1960's experienced an above average
number of major hurricanes, while the 1970's into the mid-1990's
averaged fewer hurricanes. The current period of heightened activity
could last another 10-20 years. The increased activity since 1995 is
due to natural fluctuations/cycles of hurricane activity, driven by the
Atlantic Ocean itself along with the atmosphere above it and not
enhanced substantially by global warming. The natural cycles are quite
large with on average 3-4 major hurricanes a year in active periods and
only about 1-2 major hurricanes annually during quiet periods, with
each period lasting 25-40 years.
While we have made significant progress in hurricane forecasting
and warnings, we believe we have more work to do. From a scientific
standpoint, the gaps in our capabilities fall into two broad
categories: first, our ability to assess the current state of a
hurricane and its environment (analysis), and second, our ability to
predict a hurricane's future state (the forecast). Finally, we would
like to improve public preparedness.
Conclusion
The government's ability to observe, predict, and respond quickly
to storm events is critical to public safety. We must also now look
ahead to post-storm redevelopment strategies for communities impacted
by Katrina and future storms to help manage and anticipate these
extreme events. NOAA has the expertise in coastal management and hazard
mitigation, and is committed to working with out partners in reducing
vulnerability to hurricanes and other coastal storm events. It is
critical that we work to protect and restore natural features along the
Gulf Coast, such as dunes, wetlands, and other vegetated areas that
offer protection against coastal flooding and erosion.
While we must focus our energy on addressing the impacts of
Hurricane Katrina, we also need to look to the future. Katrina will not
be the last major hurricane to hit a vulnerable area, and New Orleans
is not the only location vulnerable to a large disaster from a land-
falling hurricane. Houston/Galveston, Tampa Bay, southwest Florida,
Florida Keys, southeast Florida, New York City/Long Island, and believe
it or not, New England, are all especially vulnerable. And New Orleans
remains vulnerable to future hurricanes.
At NOAA we will continue our efforts to improve hurricane track,
intensity, and storm surge forecasting, as well as provide technical
tools and planning expertise to states and local governments.
With that, I'll be glad to answer any questions Members may have.
NOAA National Hurricane Center
Hurricane Katrina Forecast Timeline
TUESDAY, AUGUST 23, 2005
1600 CDT: Katrina forms as a Tropical Depression 12, near Nassau in the
Bahamas. Tropical Depression 12 Advisory 1 issued: ``A TROPICAL STORM
OR HURRICANE WATCH MAY BE REQUIRED FOR PORTIONS OF SOUTHERN FLORIDA
LATER TONIGHT.''
WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 24, 2005
0400 CDT: The National Hurricane Center's five-day forecast puts the
projected path of Katrina in the southeast Gulf of Mexico (as the
system is still a tropical depression in the central Bahamas).
0700 CDT: Katrina is elevated to a Tropical Storm.
1000 CDT: Tropical Storm Katrina Advisory 4 is issued: ``. . .A
TROPICAL STORM WARNING AND A HURRICANE WATCH HAVE BEEN ISSUED FOR THE
SOUTHEAST FLORIDA COAST. . .''
THURSDAY, AUGUST 25, 2005
1430 CDT: Katrina is elevated to a Category 1 Hurricane.
1730 CDT: Katrina makes landfall in Florida as a Category 1 Hurricane.
WEDNESDAY/THURSDAY, AUGUST 24/25:
Hurricane Liaison Team conference calls were conducted both days,
and included Florida emergency managers, FEMA Headquarters (FEMA HQ),
and Region IV.
FRIDAY, AUGUST 26, 2005
0200 CDT: Katrina entered the Gulf of Mexico as a Tropical Storm.
0400 CDT: Katrina is elevated to a Category 1 Hurricane.
1000 CDT: Hurricane Katrina Advisory Number 12 is issued: ``KATRINA IS
A CATEGORY ONE HURRICANE ON THE SAFFIR-SIMPSON SCALE. SOME
STRENGTHENING IS FORECAST DURING THE NEXT 24 HOURS. . .AND KATRINA
COULD BECOME A CATEGORY TWO HURRICANE ON SATURDAY.''
1015 CDT: Hurricane Liaison Team Coordination Audio Conference with FL.
1030 CDT: Katrina is elevated to a Category 2 Hurricane. Hurricane
Katrina Advisory Number 13 is issued: ``. . .KATRINA RAPIDLY
STRENGTHENING AS IT MOVES SLOWLY WESTWARD AWAY FROM SOUTH FLORIDA AND
THE FLORIDA KEYS. . .KATRINA IS MOVING TOWARD THE WEST NEAR 7 MPH. .
.AND THIS MOTION IS EXPECTED TO CONTINUE FOR THE NEXT 24 HOURS. .
.RECENT REPORTS FROM AN AIR FORCE RESERVE UNIT HURRICANE HUNTER
AIRCRAFT NOW INDICATE MAXIMUM SUSTAINED WINDS ARE NEAR 100 MPH. . .WITH
HIGHER GUSTS. KATRINA IS NOW A CATEGORY TWO HURRICANE ON THE SAFFIR-
SIMPSON SCALE. SOME STRENGTHENING IS FORECAST DURING THE NEXT 24 HOURS.
. .AND KATRINA COULD BECOME A CATEGORY THREE OR MAJOR HURRICANE ON
SATURDAY.''
1100 CDT: Hurricane Liaison Team Coordination Video Conference with
FEMA HQ, Region IV, FL, AL, and GA.
1600 CDT: Hurricane Katrina Discussion Number 14 is issued: ``. . .THE
MODELS HAVE SHIFTED SIGNIFICANTLY WESTWARD AND ARE NOW IN BETTER
AGREEMENT. THIS HAS RESULTED IN THE OFFICIAL FORECAST TRACK BEING
SHIFTED ABOUT 150 NMI WEST OF THE PREVIOUS TRACK. . .HOWEVER. .
.PROJECTED LANDFALL IS STILL ABOUT 72 HOURS AWAY. . .SO FURTHER
MODIFICATIONS IN THE FORECAST TRACK ARE POSSIBLE. KATRINA IS EXPECTED
TO BE MOVING OVER THE GULF LOOP CURRENT AFTER 36 HOURS. . .WHICH WHEN
COMBINED WITH DECREASING VERTICAL SHEAR. . .SHOULD ALLOW THE HURRICANE
TO REACH CATEGORY FOUR STATUS BEFORE LANDFALL OCCURS.''
1615 CDT: Hurricane Liaison Team Coordination Audio Conference with FL.
2200 CDT: Hurricane Katrina Discussion Number 15 is issued: ``THE
OFFICIAL FORECAST BRINGS THE CORE OF THE INTENSE HURRICANE OVER THE
NORTH CENTRAL GULF OF MEXICO IN 48 HOURS OR SO. IT IS WORTH NOTING THAT
THE GUIDANCE SPREAD HAS DECREASED AND MOST OF THE RELIABLE NUMERICAL
MODEL TRACKS ARE NOW CLUSTERED BETWEEN THE EASTERN COAST OF LOUISIANA
AND THE COAST OF MISSISSIPPI. THIS CLUSTERING INCREASES THE CONFIDENCE
IN THE FORECAST.''
SATURDAY, AUGUST 27, 2005
0400 CDT: Katrina is elevated to a Category 3 Hurricane. Hurricane
Katrina Advisory Number 16 is issued: ``KATRINA BECOMES A MAJOR
HURRICANE WITH 115 MPH WINDS. . .SOME STRENGTHENING IS FORECAST DURING
THE NEXT 24 HOURS. . .RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT DATA AND SURFACE
OBSERVATIONS INDICATE THAT KATRINA HAS BECOME A LARGER HURRICANE. . .''
Hurricane Katrina Discussion Number 16 is issued: ``DUE TO THE
DECREASING SPREAD IN THE MODELS. . .THE CONFIDENCE IN THE FORECAST
TRACK IS INCREASING.''
1000 CDT: Hurricane Katrina Advisory Number 17 is issued: ``A HURRICANE
WATCH IS IN EFFECT FOR THE SOUTHEASTERN COAST OF LOUISIANA EAST OF
MORGAN CITY TO THE MOUTH OF THE PEARL RIVER. . .INCLUDING METROPOLITAN
NEW ORLEANS AND LAKE PONCHARTRAIN. . .A HURRICANE WATCH WILL LIKELY BE
REQUIRED FOR OTHER PORTIONS OF THE NORTHERN GULF LATER TODAY OR
TONIGHT. INTERESTS IN THIS AREA SHOULD MONITOR THE PROGRESS OF KATRINA.
. .SOME STRENGTHENING IS FORECAST DURING THE NEXT 24 HOURS. . .AND
KATRINA COULD BECOME A CATEGORY FOUR HURRICANE. . .'' Hurricane Katrina
Discussion Number 17 is issued: ``. . .IT IS NOT OUT OF THE QUESTION
THAT KATRINA COULD REACH CATEGORY 5 STATUS AT SOME POINT BEFORE
LANDFALL. . .''
1015 CDT: Hurricane Liaison Team Coordination Audio Conference with FL.
1100 CDT: Hurricane Liaison Team Coordination Video Conference with
FEMA HQ, Region IV and VI, FL, LA, MS, AL, and GA.
1600 CDT: Hurricane Katrina Advisory Number 18 is issued: ``THE
HURRICANE WATCH IS EXTENDED WESTWARD TO INTRACOASTAL CITY LOUISIANA AND
EASTWARD TO THE FLORIDA-ALABAMA BORDER. A HURRICANE WATCH IS NOW IN
EFFECT ALONG THE NORTHERN GULF COAST FROM INTRACOASTAL CITY TO THE
ALABAMA-FLORIDA BORDER. A HURRICANE WARNING WILL LIKELY BE REQUIRED FOR
PORTIONS OF THE NORTHERN GULF COAST LATER TONIGHT OR SUNDAY. INTERESTS
IN THIS AREA SHOULD MONITOR THE PROGRESS OF KATRINA.'' Hurricane
Katrina Discussion Number 18 is issued: ``THE INTENSITY FORECAST WILL
CALL FOR STRENGTHENING TO 125 KT AT LANDFALL. . .AND THERE REMAINS A
CHANCE THAT KATRINA COULD BECOME A CATEGORY FIVE HURRICANE BEFORE
LANDFALL.''
1615 CDT: Hurricane Liaison Team Coordination Audio Conference with FL.
1925 CDT: Louisiana Gubernatorial Briefing: Max Mayfield, Director of
NOAA's Tropical Predication Center/National Hurricane Center provides a
briefing to Kathleen Babineau Blanco.
1935 CDT: Max Mayfield, Director of NOAA's Tropical Predication Center/
National Hurricane Center provides a briefing to Bill Filter, Chief of
Operations, Alabama Emergency Management Agency.
1945 CDT: Mississippi Gubernatorial Briefing: Max Mayfield, Director of
NOAA's Tropical Predication Center/National Hurricane Center provides a
briefing to Haley Barbour.
2000 CDT: New Orleans Mayoral Briefing: Max Mayfield, Director of
NOAA's Tropical Predication Center/National Hurricane Center provides a
briefing to Ray Nagin.
2200 CDT: Hurricane Katrina Advisory Number 19 is issued: ``. .
.DANGEROUS HURRICANE KATRINA THREATENS THE NORTH CENTRAL GULF COAST. .
.A HURRICANE WARNING ISSUED. . .AT 10 PM CDT. . .0300Z. . .A HURRICANE
WARNING HAS BEEN ISSUED FOR THE NORTH CENTRAL GULF COAST FROM MORGAN
CITY LOUISIANA EASTWARD TO THE ALABAMA/FLORIDA BORDER. . .INCLUDING THE
CITY OF NEW ORLEANS AND LAKE PONCHARTRAIN. . .PREPARATIONS TO PROTECT
LIFE AND PROPERTY SHOULD BE RUSHED TO COMPLETION. . .COASTAL STORM
SURGE FLOODING OF 15 TO 20 FEET ABOVE NORMAL TIDE LEVELS. . .LOCALLY AS
HIGH AS 25 FEET ALONG WITH LARGE AND DANGEROUS BATTERING WAVES. . .CAN
BE EXPECTED NEAR AND TO THE EAST OF WHERE THE CENTER MAKES LANDFALL. .
.HEAVY RAINS FROM KATRINA SHOULD BEGIN TO AFFECT THE CENTRAL GULF COAST
SUNDAY EVENING. RAINFALL TOTALS OF FIVE TO 10 INCHES. . .WITH ISOLATED
MAXIMUM AMOUNTS OF 15 INCHES. . .ARE POSSIBLE ALONG THE PATH OF
KATRINA.'' Hurricane Katrina Discussion Number 19 is issued: ``. .
.DESPITE THESE CHANGES IN THE INNER CORE. . .THE BOTTOM LINE IS THAT
KATRINA IS EXPECTED TO BE AN INTENSE AND DANGEROUS HURRICANE HEADING
TOWARD THE NORTH CENTRAL GULF COAST. . .AND THIS HAS TO BE TAKEN VERY
SERIOUSLY.''
1500-2230 CDT: Media pool operated; TPC/NHC provided 12 television and
two radio interviews. In addition, TPC/NHC participated in 51 telephone
briefings or media contacts on August 27th.
SUNDAY, AUGUST 28, 2005
0040 CDT: Katrina is elevated to a Category 4 Hurricane.
0100 CDT: Hurricane Katrina Special Advisory Number 20 is issued: ``. .
.KATRINA STRENGTHENS TO CATEGORY FOUR WITH 145 MPH WINDS. . .''
0400 CDT: Hurricane Katrina Discussion Number 21 is issued: ``THE
SPREAD IN THE MODEL TRACKS ALONG THE NORTHERN GULF COAST IS AT MOST 90
MILES. . .SO CONFIDENCE IN THE OFFICIAL FORECAST IS RELATIVELY HIGH.''
0615 CDT: Katrina is elevated to a Category 5 Hurricane.
0700 CDT: Hurricane Katrina Advisory Number 22 is issued: ``. .
.KATRINA. . .NOW A POTENTIALLY CATASTROPHIC CATEGORY FIVE HURRICANE. .
.HEADED FOR THE NORTHERN GULF COAST. . .MAXIMUM SUSTAINED WINDS ARE
NEAR 160 MPH. . .WITH HIGHER GUSTS. KATRINA IS A POTENTIALLY
CATASTROPHIC CATEGORY FIVE HURRICANE ON THE SAFFIR-SIMPSON SCALE. SOME
FLUCTUATIONS IN STRENGTH ARE LIKELY IN THE NEXT 24 HOURS.''
1000 CDT: Hurricane Katrina Advisory Number 23 is issued: ``. .
.POTENTIALLY CATASTROPHIC HURRICANE KATRINA. . .EVEN STRONGER. .
.HEADED FOR THE NORTHERN GULF COAST. . .REPORTS FROM AN AIR FORCE
HURRICANE HUNTER AIRCRAFT INDICATE THAT THE MAXIMUM SUSTAINED WINDS
HAVE INCREASED TO NEAR 175 MPH. . .WITH HIGHER WIND GUSTS. . .HURRICANE
FORCE WINDS EXTEND OUTWARD UP TO 105 MILES FROM THE CENTER AND TROPICAL
STORM FORCE WINDS EXTEND OUTWARDS UP TO 205 MILES. . .COASTAL STORM
SURGE FLOODING OF 18 TO 22 FEET ABOVE NORMAL TIDE LEVELS. . .LOCALLY AS
HIGH AS 28 FEET ALONG WITH LARGE AND DANGEROUS BATTERING WAVES. . .CAN
BE EXPECTED NEAR AND TO THE EAST OF WHERE THE CENTER MAKES LANDFALL.
Hurricane Katrina Discussion Number 23 is issued: ``. . .HURRICANE
FORCE WINDS ARE FORECAST TO SPREAD AT LEAST 150 N MI INLAND ALONG PATH
OF KATRINA. CONSULT INLAND WARNINGS ISSUED BY THE NATIONAL WEATHER
SERVICE FORECAST OFFICES. . .''
1015 CDT: Hurricane Liaison Team Coordination Audio Conference with FL.
1100 CDT: Hurricane Liaison Team Coordination Video Conference with
FEMA HQ, Region IV and VI, FL, LA, MS, AL, GA, TX.
1300 CDT: Hurricane Katrina Advisory Number 23A is issued:
``SIGNIFICANT STORM SURGE FLOODING WILL OCCUR ELSEWHERE ALONG THE
CENTRAL AND NORTHEASTERN GULF OF MEXICO COAST.''
1600 CDT: Hurricane Katrina Advisory Number 24 is issued: ``KATRINA IS
MOVING TOWARD THE NORTHWEST NEAR 13 MPH. . .AND A GRADUAL TURN TO THE
NORTH IS EXPECTED OVER THE NEXT 24 HOURS. ON THIS TRACK THE CENTER OF
THE HURRICANE WILL BE NEAR THE NORTHERN GULF COAST EARLY MONDAY.
HOWEVER. . .CONDITIONS ARE ALREADY BEGINNING TO DETERIORATE ALONG
PORTIONS OF THE CENTRAL AND NORTHEASTERN GULF COASTS. . .AND WILL
CONTINUE TO WORSEN THROUGH THE NIGHT. . .KATRINA IS A POTENTIALLY
CATASTROPHIC CATEGORY FIVE HURRICANE ON THE SAFFIR-SIMPSON SCALE. SOME
FLUCTUATIONS IN STRENGTH ARE LIKELY UNTIL LANDFALL. KATRINA IS EXPECTED
TO MAKE LANDFALL AT CATEGORY FOUR OR FIVE INTENSITY. WINDS AFFECTING
THE UPPER FLOORS OF HIGH-RISE BUILDINGS WILL BE SIGNIFICANTLY STRONGER
THAN THOSE NEAR GROUND LEVEL. . .SOME LEVEES IN THE GREATER NEW ORLEANS
AREA COULD BE OVERTOPPED.''
1615 CDT: Hurricane Liaison Team Coordination Audio Conference with FL.
2200 CDT: Hurricane Katrina Advisory Number 25 is issued: ``A HURRICANE
WARNING IS IN EFFECT FOR THE NORTH CENTRAL GULF COAST FROM MORGAN CITY
LOUISIANA EASTWARD TO THE ALABAMA/FLORIDA BORDER. . .INCLUDING THE CITY
OF NEW ORLEANS AND LAKE PONCHARTRAIN. PREPARATIONS TO PROTECT LIFE AND
PROPERTY SHOULD BE RUSHED TO COMPLETION.''
MONDAY, AUGUST 29, 2005
0200 CDT: Hurricane Katrina is downgraded to a Category 4.
0400 CDT: Hurricane Katrina Advisory Number 26 is issued: ``EXTREMELY
DANGEROUS CATEGORY FOUR HURRICANE KATRINA MOVING NORTHWARD TOWARD
SOUTHEASTERN LOUISIANA AND THE NORTHERN GULF COAST. . .SOME
FLUCTUATIONS IN STRENGTH ARE LIKELY PRIOR TO LANDFALL. . .BUT KATRINA
IS EXPECTED TO MAKE LANDFALL AS A CATEGORY FOUR HURRICANE.''
0600 CDT: Hurricane Katrina Advisory Number 26A is issued: ``KATRINA
REMAINS A VERY LARGE HURRICANE. HURRICANE FORCE WINDS EXTEND OUTWARD UP
TO 120 MILES FROM THE CENTER. . .AND TROPICAL STORM FORCE WINDS EXTEND
OUTWARD UP TO 230 MILES.''
0610 CDT: Hurricane Katrina makes landfall in southeastern Louisiana as
a Category 4 hurricane.
0800 CDT: Hurricane Katrina Advisory Number 26B is issued: ``. . .THE
CENTER OF HURRICANE KATRINA WAS LOCATED. . .ABOUT 40 MILES SOUTHEAST OF
NEW ORLEANS LOUISIANA AND ABOUT 65 MILES SOUTHWEST OF BILOXI
MISSISSIPPI. . .MAXIMUM SUSTAINED WINDS ARE NEAR 135 MPH. . .WITH
HIGHER GUSTS. KATRINA IS AN EXTREMELY DANGEROUS CATEGORY FOUR HURRICANE
ON THE SAFFIR-SIMPSON SCALE. WEAKENING IS FORECAST AS THE CIRCULATION
INTERACTS WITH LAND TODAY. . .COASTAL STORM SURGE FLOODING OF 18 TO 22
FEET ABOVE NORMAL TIDE LEVELS. . .ALONG WITH LARGE AND DANGEROUS
BATTERING WAVES. . .CAN BE EXPECTED NEAR AND TO THE EAST OF THE CENTER.
STORM SURGE FLOODING OF 10 TO 15 FEET. . .NEAR THE TOPS OF LEVEES. .
.IS POSSIBLE IN THE GREATER NEW ORLEANS AREA. SIGNIFICANT STORM SURGE
FLOODING WILL OCCUR ELSEWHERE ALONG THE CENTRAL AND NORTHEASTERN GULF
OF MEXICO COAST.''
1000 CDT: Hurricane Katrina makes a second landfall at the LA/MS border
as a Category 3 hurricane.
1015 CDT: Hurricane Liaison Team Coordination Audio Conference with FL.
1100 CDT: Hurricane Liaison Team Coordination Video Conference with
FEMA HQ, Region IV and VI, LA, MS, AL, FL, TX.
1615 CDT: Hurricane Liaison Team Coordination Audio Conference with FL.
TUESDAY, AUGUST 30, 2005
1000 CDT: Katrina is downgraded to a tropical depression with winds of
35 mph, 25 miles south of Clarksville, TN. The final TPC/NHC advisory
is issued at this time; the Hydrometeorological Prediction Center
assumes inland public advisories.
WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 31, 2005
2200 CDT: Hurricane Katrina has dissipated; remnants absorbed by a
front in southeast Canada.
NOTES:
Timeline highlights the major aspects of NOAA's
Tropical Prediction Center/National Hurricane Center (TPC/NHC).
All advisories (graphic and text) are available on the Katrina
archive page: http://www/nhc.noaa.gov/archive/2005/KATRINA/
shtml?
Storm surge is a consistent concern and associated
threat with any land-falling hurricane, especially a major
hurricane.
Hurricane Liaison Team Coordination calls included
the State emergency management officials for the states listed;
calls with the State of Florida included both local and State
emergency management officials.
For Katrina (including for Florida) NOAA's Tropical
Predication Center/National Hurricane Center provided a total
of 471 television and radio interviews, through their media
pool or via telephone.
Biography for Max Mayfield
Max Mayfield has served as the Director of NOAA's Tropical
Prediction Center, National Hurricane Center, which is part of NOAA's
National Centers for Environmental Prediction/National Weather Service
since 2000 and has been a NOAA employee since 1972.
Mr. Mayfield is a Fellow of the American Meteorological Society
(AMS) and has presented invited papers at several scientific meetings
and lectured in several World Meteorological Organization (WMO)
sponsored training sessions, as well as provided numerous interviews to
electronic and print media.
In 1996, he was awarded the Francis W. Reichelderfer Award from the
AMS for exemplary performance as coordinator of hurricane preparedness
presentations by the National Hurricane Center to emergency
preparedness officials and the general public. He received an
Outstanding Achievement Award at the 2000 National Hurricane Conference
for the development of an innovative approach to expand the educational
opportunities to State and local officials in hurricane preparedness,
and was awarded the Richard Hagemeyer Award at the 2004
Interdepartmental Hurricane Conference for his contributions to our
nation's Hurricane Warning Program. Also in 2004, Mr. Mayfield was
presented the Governor's Award by the National Academy of Television
Arts and Sciences' Suncoast Chapter. This Emmy Award is given to
someone who has made extraordinary contributions to television and who
is not otherwise eligible for an Emmy.
Mr. Mayfield has been recognized by the Department of Commerce with
Gold Medals for his work during Hurricanes Andrew and Isabel, with a
Silver Medal during Hurricane Gilbert, and was awarded a National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration Bronze Medal for the creation of
a public/private partnership in support of disaster preparedness for
the Nation.
He is the current Chairman of the WMO's Regional Association--IV
Hurricane Committee which consists of 26 members from the international
community. He has played a key role in forecast and service
improvements at the National Hurricane Center.
Mr. Mayfield is married, has three children, and resides in Miami,
Florida.
Chairman. Boehlert. Thank you for your testimony.
We will have to recess briefly to allow Members to go to
the Floor to vote. We have two votes so we will presumably be
gone 15 to 20 minutes. We will reconvene as soon as the vote is
over.
[Recess.]
Discussion
Mr. Ehlers. [Presiding] We will call the hearing to order.
We thank the gentlemen for their testimony. We will begin the
questioning period. Five minutes per Member for questions and
answers. And because there are quite a number of Members here
and I know they are anxious to have their questions answered,
we will attempt to stick to the five minute rule as much as
possible and I will try to be ruthless. And the Ranking Member
laughs.
Lessons Learned
General Johnson, based on lessons learned from Katrina and
Rita is the National Weather Service going to change anything
about the way you communicate forecasts and warnings to
federal, State, and local officials?
Mr. Johnson. Thank you for the question, Mr. Chairman.
At the end of each hurricane season, we do a pretty
extensive hot wash. We go through and review all of our
procedures and----
Mr. Ehlers. Could you explain for the record what a hot
wash is?
Mr. Johnson. Yes, sir. We get people who participate in
communicating those threats, those warnings, those watches to
the American public. We get media, we get emergency managers,
we get people from the Hurricane Center all together and say
how could we better communicate?
I appreciate very much Mr. Melancon's characterization of
us as accurate and clear this year but I believe, sir, that
there is always room for improvement. And last year, we had a
pretty unprecedented significant season, probably a better
word, in five land falling hurricanes. And at the end of last
year, we decided that we needed special emphasis on the
communication of uncertainty. I think you remember, sir, the
assertion of the skinny black line. We wanted to address
uncertainty so we redoubled our efforts on uncertainty. At the
end of this season, sir, we will go through and review all of
our procedures and see if there is a better way to----
Communication With Emergency Management Officials
Mr. Ehlers. Okay. The question then is, to my understanding
there is no mechanism in place for NOAA and the Hurricane
Center to confirm that officials at agencies such as FEMA and
other State and local agencies have received all the national
and local hurricane forecasts issued by the Weather Service.
Shouldn't there be some sort of confirmation mechanism that you
get affirmation or confirmation from these folks that they got
the message, that they are going to act on it? Is there
anything you can do along that line?
Mr. Johnson. I will defer to Max on the specific operation
of the Hurricane Liaison Team. But the weather forecast offices
also communicate with local emergency managers and we
participate in for example the Louisiana Emergency Operations
Center and actually have people positioned in that facility to
facilitate the communications of that environmental
information. So we routinely provide discussion in trying to
further the understanding of the message at different intervals
always at the six hour intervals when the hurricane center
issues.
Mr. Ehlers. Mr. Mayfield, would you expand on that? And
also if it appears useful, do you have intermediate reports
between the six hour reports? I would appreciate your comments
on this.
Mr. Mayfield. Right. The National Hurricane Center takes
the big picture and we routinely issue a five-day forecast
every six hours. When we have watches and warnings in effect,
we will go to a two or three-hour cycle, depending on how close
it is and how well defined it is on radar. If there is
something unexpected in the track or intensity, we will do what
we call a special advisory and we did that, we certainly did
that a few times on both Katrina and Rita. So there is a
continual flow of information from the hurricane center and as
General Johnson said, it is really important, too, to get down
to those local decision-makers. And the local weather forecast
offices do a tremendous amount of handholding with the
commanders in their local area. They are under their area
responsibility.
Mr. Ehlers. Now do you get confirmation from everyone that
they have received the message and the warning?
Mr. Mayfield. They are actually talking to them. I mean
these are actually telephone----
Mr. Ehlers. Do you do some sort of a role call to make sure
they are actually on the phone and listening?
Mr. Mayfield. That is for the local office, I am not sure
how they do that but I--we can find out about that. But the
National Hurricane Center, we are indeed an invited participant
on those Hurricane Liaison Team briefings. And FEMA
headquarters, as far as I know, they do not take an individual
role call but they do take an office role call. In other words,
they will--when I come in, I will hear them say, you know, it
is the hurricane center on line, FEMA Region 6, FEMA Region 4,
Louisiana Emergency Operating Center are you on line? So they
at least do that, yes, sir.
Mr. Ehlers. And when you come back two hours later, do they
report at all what they have done to----
Mr. Mayfield. I do not listen--I do not participate on that
part.
Mr. Ehlers. Okay.
Mr. Mayfield. We are there to provide the, you know, the
best forecast we can.
Mr. Ehlers. Yeah.
Mr. Mayfield. And then often I will do that and then I will
go back to work.
Mr. Ehlers. All right. My time has expired.
I will turn to the Ranking Member, Mr. Gordon.
Mr. Gordon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I think with all the information, it is on the public
record now, it has become pretty evident of two things. One,
that the Weather Service did an excellent job in predicting the
hurricane and in the accuracy of doing so. I think we also know
that FEMA and the Federal Government did not react well. And I
am trying to find where was that disconnect. And so, Mr.
Mayfield, I am wondering whether that in addition to the
accuracy of the forecast there was also adequate information
about the consequences of the hurricane. And as you know, we
have asked you to bring your briefing materials from the August
28 briefing with President Bush and Secretary Chertoff. And if
you would present that to us at this time, we would appreciate
it.
Mr. Mayfield. I would be glad to if we can get that--okay.
This is exactly what--these are the briefing slides that I used
on that Sunday, August the 28th briefing, you know, from the
National Hurricane Center. And I do not have a transcript but I
am pretty sure I will be very, very close and the briefing I
would give today would be very close to the briefing I gave
before, although probably a little condensed version here.
That first slide, I showed just to demonstrate the--or make
sure they knew the size of the hurricane and not only is it
well defined but it is not a small hurricane, it is a very,
very large hurricane. The next slide, please.
That was a visible picture. This one is an infrared and
very, very distinct eye. When you have that, you always have a
powerful hurricane and, in fact, this was a Category 5
hurricane. And I said that not only is this a Category 5
hurricane like Andrew, but there is a big, big, difference. And
the difference is that it is a much larger hurricane than
Andrew was.
And I also made a comparison to Hurricane Lily back in 2002
that struck Louisiana. Lily had been a Category 4 hurricane in
the middle of the Gulf of Mexico. It weakened down to a
Category 1 hurricane. There was a big difference. With Lily, we
had a very, very small eye. We call it a pinhole eye. And when
you have those small eyes like that, typically they just do not
persist for very long. And I did say that given this more
typical sized eye, we really do not expect significant
weakening like Lily did. The wise thing to do here would be to
prepare for a Category 5 hurricane.
The next slide is a water vapor loop and we were also
showing animations of these I might add on the video
teleconference. And I show this one just to talk about the
future motion. There was a trough coming in from the west that
was eventually going to turn this up more to the north and
eventually northeast. And the computer models differed somewhat
on when that turn will occur and it makes a big, big difference
whether it happens, you know, right at landfall, or before
landfall, or well inland there. And what I would have said was
that no one can tell you exactly, you know, where Katrina's
going to make landfall but again I emphasized it was a large
hurricane and wherever it made the actual landfall, it was
going to impact a very large area.
Then the next slide is--this is a Hurrevac slide and that
is a software program actually developed by a former Weather
Service employee paid for by FEMA after he retired and this is
a really nice package here that you can animate this, you can
do all types of displays here. And I would not have taken the
time to--I mean they use this--we show this at every single
briefing we give but for your information, that red area there
that you see, the bright red from Morgan City, Louisiana over
to the Florida/Alabama border, that was where the coastal
hurricane warning was in place. We had tropical storm warnings
and hurricane watches on either side of that. And then you can
see the forecast track of the center of the hurricane and we
always and General Johnson mentioned there, we do not like to
poke attention to that skinny black line. We have that cone of
uncertainty based on our previous 10-year forecast errors
showing where the center of the hurricane can be. And when I
showed this, I said that this is not just a coastal event, the
strong winds, the heavy rains, the tornadoes will spread well
inland. But--and I am also sure that I said this, I want to
make absolutely clear that the greatest potential for large
loss of life is also from the storm surge. And that transitions
over to the next slide.
This is a storm surge simulation from the actual forecast
that was available at that time. This went along with the 11:00
a.m. eastern daylight time advisory and this was for that
noontime eastern daylight time Hurricane Liaison Team briefing.
And I think you can see Lake Pontchartrain there and certainly
the Mississippi coastline and much of the Louisiana coastline.
The colored areas are areas that are indeed inundated from that
specific forecast. Now again, we are doing this every six hours
based on the most recent forecast but the point here is that
those, the light greens and the yellows, those were all storm
surge valves of over 20 feet. And I would have explained the
circulation around the eye of the hurricane goes
counterclockwise so that means that we would have northerly
flow over Lake Pontchartrain. And I did say that no one can
tell you with absolute confidence if the levees would be
overtopped but it was obviously a very grave concern there. And
I also would have said that if the track had shifted a little
bit to the west or to the left there, it would have been even
worse than on our current forecast track there. I really do not
want anyone to think that we could give a perfect forecast.
And then the last two very quickly here, the storm surge in
Mobile. This showed seven to eight feet of surge there. I was
concerned that we had that much with Hurricane George in 1998
and that was only a Category 2 hurricane. So I did not know for
sure if the storm surge model really did justice to that. Wind
speed also, I asked that that be run a little further to the
east. And the next to the last slide there, this actually
shifted the track, I believe 15 to 30 miles to the east and
this gave us 10 to 11 feet of storm surge even up into the
northern portion of Mobile Bay, Dolphin Island, portions of the
Gulf Shores. Most of the Gulf Shores are under water. So those
are the exact slides that I shared on that Sunday briefing.
This was a FEMA conference call and they invited the
Hurricane Liaison Team to participate. This was a daily call
and it was held during Katrina. Every day it was held at noon
eastern time.
Mr. Gordon. At noon. And when did Katrina actually hit the
City of New Orleans with its maximum force?
Mr. Mayfield. Well the first landfall there on the mouth of
the Mississippi and south of Buras, Louisiana was about 7:10
a.m. on Monday morning, the 29th and then by the time it made
the final landfall near the Louisiana/Mississippi border, that
would have been about 10:00 or 11:00 a.m., so shortly before
that.
Directing Hurricanes
Mr. Rohrabacher. Okay, all right. Thank you very much. Mr.
Chairman, first of all let me apologize.
I have a mark up in another committee, International
Relations Committee that I will have to attend afterwards. This
has been so enlightening already and I hate to miss the rest of
the questions but let me just proceed with a few of my own.
Let me note, these photographs and the tracking that NOAA
and the National Weather Service forecasts have been utilizing
are based on space based assets that this committee has
supported over the years and have given the American people a
tremendous leverage in terms of preventing the death and
destruction from hurricanes like this. And I want to pat us on
the back, Congress on the back for actually doing their job in
terms of providing this type of technology and also a pat on
the back for the National Weather Service and NOAA for the
terrific job that they did in this and in other weather based
dangers that we faced during my two decades of service here in
Congress. You have always done a terrific job and this is yet
another example.
Where we seem to have had a breakdown as we have indicated
by the Ranking Member's comments that there may have been some
sort of breakdown somewhere on the governmental level outside
of the knowledge base but in terms of the coordination base. I
would not put that all on the Federal Government; however, I do
believe that the President by the time of this briefing at noon
had already talked to the Major of New Orleans and asked that
people be evacuated and that the efforts on the part of the
people in charge at that level of government, did not move
forward with the type of speed that was consistent with the
danger that was being explained. So although let us just say
whether it is the local level or the national level, there
needs to be better coordination on both sides.
And this is not towards you folks but it just appears that
there is not an emergency plan. We have got an emergency
warning system but we do not have an emergency plan that is in
place that you go this is Step 1, 2, 3, 4 and this is what has
happened. Now much of that has to be done at the local level
but the Federal Government could have or our FEMA directors
could have had that plan in place to be working with the local
officials and said are you now on Stage 2, Stage 3, Stage 4.
That obviously did not happen especially considering the 2,000
buses that were parked in New Orleans rather than used for
evacuation purposes.
There has been a lot of talk about whether or not these
hurricanes while we cannot, you know, everybody says you can
talk about the weather, you cannot do anything about it. I have
actually seen some reports and some in Scientific American and
other magazines suggesting that in the future we might be able
to direct the path of hurricanes and what do you guys have to
say about that?
Mr. Mayfield. You know that question has been around for a
long, long time if man can, you know, mitigate the hurricanes
and it is very difficult to get some people to understand both
the size and the tremendous power of a hurricane. And you know,
nature can do a lot of things on its own. The United States
Government used to have a program called Project Storm Fury
where we would see, we would fly the NOAA hurricane hunter
aircraft through the hurricane, seed silver iodide on the
outside of the eye wall of the hurricane with the intent being
to weaken----
Mr. Rohrabacher. Well, before my time totally runs out, let
me ask you specifically.
Mr. Mayfield. Sure.
Mr. Rohrabacher. We have already, you know, seen what
science can do to alert us and give us emergency signs of these
hurricanes to understand they are coming. Do you think in 20
years from now we will be able to use space-based assets
perhaps to warm the water or cloud seeding to actually help
direct the path of a hurricane to prevent the type of landfall
that we just had in Katrina?
Mr. Mayfield. Well, it is great to have a vision to do
something like that but I am a very pragmatic type of guy and I
am certainly not going to hold my breath for that.
Mr. Ehlers. The gentleman's time has expired.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Yeah, could I ask unanimous consent to
have the general answer that question for less than a minute?
Mr. Johnson. Yes, sir. There is a massive amount of energy
in a hurricane and I think the efforts of man will be a very
small infinitesimal amount of the----
Mr. Rohrabacher. Thank you very much, General.
You now have told us that we--to alter the course of that
hurricane, we are going to have to all learn how to pray, I
think. Thank you very much.
Mr. Johnson. A higher power, yes, sir.
Mr. Ehlers. I suspect that is good advice. As a physicist,
I can tell you that you could explore 120 megaton bombs in that
and the hurricane would not even notice it so, a very
depressing thought.
On that cheery note, we will turn to the gentleman from
Colorado, Mr. Udall.
Communication With Emergency Management Officials (cont.)
Mr. Udall. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to also extend my gratitude to the panel for your
presence here today and your compelling and enlightening
testimony.
I intend to yield to the Ranking Member, Mr. Gordon, but I
did want to just remind all the Committee Members here in the
audience that in my district which includes the City of Boulder
where we are fortunate to have a NOAA facility which is a
tremendous asset. I cannot think of a harder working cohort of
people and I want to pay tribute to them and the good work they
do and the role they play in weather forecasting, as well as,
the climate studies that are undertaken in Boulder.
So thanks again to the panel. With that, I would like to
yield the remaining amount of my time to the gentleman from
Tennessee, Mr. Gordon.
Mr. Gordon. Thank you, Mr. Udall.
Once again, Mr. Mayfield, you have been mentioned a variety
of times, thank you for your service to the country, thank you
for that powerful presentation.
Let me ask you, you told them to prepare for a Category 5.
Is that correct in that presentation?
Mr. Mayfield. That is correct.
Mr. Gordon. Did you explain or did they understand the
consequences of a Category 5? Did you explain that to them?
Mr. Mayfield. Those briefings, Congressman, are not--you
know, it is really not the time to, you know, to teach a course
in meteorology 101 but they, the folks on that, the emergency
management folks on that conference call certainly should
understand what a Category 5 hurricane can do.
Mr. Gordon. And though just a short time before that,
through that PAM exercise, they had a chance. It was not a five
but a four so you would know what was going on there.
So would you tell us, then, would you describe what are the
consequences to that region for a Category 5?
Mr. Mayfield. Well you have to deal with all the hazards of
the hurricane. The first is the storm surge. It is a dome of
water that comes in near to where the center makes landfall.
Very unique set of circumstances there in Louisiana that it is
just so low lying and of course the city itself being like a
bowl and much of the city below sea level. That has always been
a concern with a storm surge in that area.
Number two, of course, are the strong winds and the winds
were, you know, a Category 4 or 5 hurricane can do tremendous
wind damage. And we have also learned over the years that the
winds are stronger aloft. We put a statement in our advisories
on Sunday saying that being that the windows could be blown out
in, you know, high rise structures. Then you have to worry
about the rainfall. And this is a team effort. We have the
rainfall experts within NOAA, the Hydro Meteorological
Prediction Center. And I did not mention this earlier but they
actually were on those Hurricane Liaison Team briefings with us
every day. I would do the basic meteorology and then they would
chime in on the rainfall forecast. And then, of course, the
fourth main hazard would be the tornadoes that can spread well
inland and can be well removed from the eye of the hurricane.
Mr. Gordon. Thank you, sir.
As I quoted earlier, Michael Brown said, ``I must say, this
storm is much bigger than anyone expected.'' Was it bigger than
you expected and bigger than you predicted?
Mr. Mayfield. We briefed routinely and then in every
advisory we issued, we would give the size. Are we, you know,
differentiating between the size of the hurricane and the
intensity? There is a difference. You can have a large powerful
hurricane or a large weak hurricane or a small powerful
hurricane or small, you know, weak hurricane so those are two
different things. I am not sure exactly what Mike Brown meant
by that if he--I suspect he meant it was, you know, an extreme
event. I am not sure he really meant large in terms of size,
but that I will think you will have to ask him what he actually
meant from that.
Mr. Gordon. Thank you, Mr. Udall.
Mr. Bonner. [Presiding] I believe the Chair controls the
time but the gentleman from Minnesota has another appointment
so I would now recognize Mr. Gutknecht.
Hurricane Multi-decadal Cycle
Mr. Gutknecht. I thank the Chair.
Mr. Mayfield, I would like to switch gears for just a
minute because we have heard from some other experts and I
would like to hear it right from the top guns here. That we may
expect more hurricanes this year and we are in a hurricane
cycle where we may see more. First, a simple question, how many
more hurricanes should we expect this year?
Mr. Mayfield. I wish I could tell you for sure about that.
I cannot be exact. Our seasonal forecasters were calling even
back in early August 18 to 21 named storms, we have already had
19. We were calling for nine to 11 hurricanes and we have had
ten. And we were calling for five to seven major hurricanes and
we have had five. I think the best way I could answer that, if
you go back the last 40 years or so, we typically averaged two
or three named storms in October and November. I would like to
say we could count Stan and Tammy on that but I really do not
think we can. I think a reasonable expectation would be for
another two to three named storms. One or two of those might be
hurricanes. I think one of the important things is that and I
just checked on this. If you go back to 1995 when this active
period began, we have had eight major hurricanes in the month
of October, two major hurricanes in the month of November so we
are averaging, you know, one major hurricane per year in
October and November in this active period.
Mr. Gutknecht. Now you have just touched on this and I am
sorry, I had an agricultural hearing and a markup and some of
us are in and out and that does not mean that it is not
important, but can you talk a little bit about those cycles? I
mean, we hear about that on the news. Where do you think we are
in the cycle and how long will it last?
Mr. Mayfield. Well we have got some not very good news
here. These cycles, you know, will go 10 to 30 or 40 years and
you can go well back in the record books here to look at these
cycles. And if, for example, the '50s and '60s indeed were
very, very active with a lot of major hurricanes. And we need
to remember that most of the loss of life and most of the
damage occurs from these major hurricanes, Categories 3, 4, and
5 on the Saffir-Simpson Hurricane Scale. Then in 1995, somebody
seems to have thrown a switch here and it has really gotten
active. We have had a tremendous number of major hurricanes.
And the research meteorologists unfortunately are telling us
that this active period will very likely last another 10 or 20
years or more.
Mr. Gutknecht. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Bonner. Thank you.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from North Carolina, Mr.
Miller.
Funding for Hurricane Research
Mr. Miller. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I agree with Mr. Gordon that certainly NOAA's performance
was probably the best one we had in the Federal Government.
General Johnson, when you count your life's blessings,
count the fact that there was never a moment on National
television that President Bush said to you, Johnny, you are
doing a heck of a job. You all certainly did a much better job
than other agencies of the Federal Government. But I am very
concerned about our continued ability to do a good job and to
do a better job. And certainly there seems to be room for
improvements in the technology, in the science forecasting even
if we do not look to that millennial day when we can actually
control hurricanes, we certainly could do better in forecasting
their exact path, their intensity, their rainfall, the inland
flooding that they cause.
General Johnson, the difference between the House and the
Senate budget for NOAA is $1 billion. What would the House
budget due to NOAA's ability to improve upon the science or
even maintain what you have, to maintain or improve the buoy
system, to improve upon science? I understand that the
scientists at NC State by the way did a better job of
forecasting the path and intensity of the storm because they
are using more advanced methodology. General Johnson, what
would that budget difference due to NOAA's ability to improve
or even keep what you got?
Mr. Johnson. I have had the opportunity to look at the
House mark and the Senate mark at a very conceptual level.
Mr. Miller. I sort of thought that would get your
attention, yeah.
Mr. Johnson. Yes, sir. There is a significant different
there and we are anxiously awaiting the conference and what
really comes out of that. There is always an opportunity to do
better and to improve. And I think in my opening statement, we
talked about observations, opportunities in modeling, and my
written statement I highlight some of those as well.
I appreciate the support in the Science Committee overall
and right now we are anxiously awaiting what comes out of that
to see how we can continue to serve the American public with
accurate and timely advise and forecasts like we have been.
Mr. Miller. What are your feelings, Mr. Mayfield?
Mr. Mayfield. If I could just say one thing and I need to
say this very carefully for the folks who were impacted. In
both Katrina and Rita, to some extent, we were fortunate
because they were both major hurricanes, in fact, Category 5
hurricanes well before they made landfall. You know, if you
look at all the storms and hurricanes that hit the United
States, only about 20 percent of them are major hurricanes,
Category 3, 4, and 5, yet that 20 percent causes over 80
percent of the damage. Most major hurricanes become major
hurricanes by going through some rapid intensification cycle
that we simply do not understand yet. And both Katrina and Rita
did this rapid intensification fortunately well, you know, away
from that landfall point. If that rapid intensification had
happened right at the time of landfall, in other words, people
are going to bed preparing for let us say a Category 1 or 2
hurricane and then if they, you know, awaken to a Cat 4, I
would not be sitting here today I suspect.
Anyway, we do need help especially with that rapid
intensification.
Local Forecasts
Mr. Miller. You would be testifying before the Government
Reform Committee rather than the Science Committee.
Mr. Mayfield, in my state, you said someone threw a switch
in 1995. My district, not just my state, but my district and,
in fact, my house has been affected by Fran and Floyd. And the
great bulk of the damage has been inland flooding, tornadoes.
It has been a local forecast that would be most helpful in
preparations and in response. How important or what is the
current status of our ability to do local forecast and how will
the proposal to cut the number of the local offices from I
think 122 to maybe 20 or 30, how will that affect your ability
to do the local forecasting?
Mr. Johnson. Let me take that one.
Mr. Miller. Okay.
Mr. Johnson. We are constantly looking at opportunities to
improve the way we provide products and services. And one of
the things that I am looking at is our concept of operations.
We have 122 weather forecast offices and 13 river forecast
centers that provide services for America. I am looking at
economies and efficiencies in how can we best provide those
products and services. There is no proposal to cut the number
of offices at this time. We are looking at how we can use the
resources we have and be good stewards of the taxpayers
dollars. So there is no proposal out there to cut numbers of
offices.
Evacuation Decision
Mr. Bonner. The gentleman's time has expired.
I will reclaim my time and I want to express as others
have. I would be remiss if I did not. As someone who lives in
Mobile, Alabama and since last September with Hurricane Ivan,
has experienced the good fortune of relying on both of you two
gentlemen and the many men and women who work with you, our
thanks for the great job you all do and for the service you
render our entire country in terms of giving us adequate
warning that a storm is imminent.
I would like to go back to a question I think Mr. Gordon
raised, but others have as well, and that deals with the issue
of shelters. Because we experienced during Hurricane Ivan and
we certainly did during Hurricane Dennis where the Governor of
our State, Bob Riley ordered a mandatory evacuation of Mobile
County, Alabama and the coastal area of Baldwin County and
turned both lanes of I-65 northbound, the first time we had
done that. It was successful in terms of evacuating a lot of
people. Fortunately for us in Alabama, Dennis veered a little
bit to the right, unfortunately for our friends in Florida, but
as a result, we had a good lesson on evacuation.
But General Johnson, Mr. Mayfield, is there ever a time
when a community, a state, or the Federal Government should
encourage people to stay in an area when a Category 4 or a
Category 5 storm is coming. Using New Orleans as an example,
should any official of government have recommended that people
stay in a city with a Hurricane 4 or a Hurricane 5 coming into
that city?
Mr. Johnson. The role of the National Weather Service is to
provide that accurate timely and focused information. We refer
to our colleagues over in Emergency Management side on
evacuation decisions and whether they should shelter in place.
We do work with them in the off season to see how much time
would be required and available. That is part of the hot wash
at the end because evacuations from certain areas take much
longer than others depending on the infrastructure but I would
defer to them.
Mr. Mayfield. And that doesn't mean we do not care about
those things. I mean it is a real team effort, the Nation's
Hurricane Warning Program, you know, it consists of the
forecasters, the emergency management, the community, and the
media. The media is a big part of this. And we certainly care
about that and our message has been so consistent in urging
every individual, every family, every business, and every
community to develop that hurricane plan and know what to do.
But as General Johnson said, the roles are defined. And our
role is to provide the best forecast that we possibly can.
Mr. Bonner. But even with your role, you still have a
wealth of knowledge. Mr. Mayfield if you had been in New
Orleans watching TV, the reports that your office and that you
in fact were the one that was on national TV recommending,
would you have stayed in that city?
Mr. Mayfield. I think that I would hope that the mayors and
the governors were not telling me how to forecast and I am sure
they would appreciate me not telling them how to evacuate.
Mr. Bonner. The next question goes to the gentlelady from
California, Ms. Woolsey.
Hurricane Liaison Team
Ms. Woolsey. Thank you very much.
First of all, congratulations for both of your agencies for
providing--using federal funds. And we have to take credit for
that. We invested in the right thing so that you had weather
service. Information that was timely, accurate, and focused.
And thank you, thank you. It proves, I believe, that we can
achieve our goals. When there is a will, there is a way. And
now I think we have the opportunity to know how your good
information was used. So I have a couple questions about that.
Mr. Mayfield, I know you do not keep a log of who is on the
daily Hurricane Liaison Team, the HLT, on the calls, but would
you say there is good participation or there was by the State
and local folks on these calls in general? Could you tell? Did
you know?
Mr. Mayfield. I am not sure if you were in here,
Congresswoman, but as far as I know, FEMA does not take, you
know, an individual role call but they do and I mean I am
talking about these daily video teleconferences now. I mean,
there is a lot of additional coordination. But they do have a
role call of offices. In other words, they would come and ask,
``hurricane center, are you on line? FEMA Region 6, are you on
line? Mississippi EOC, are you on line?'' They would do that so
that information I would think would be available from FEMA. I
did not take role though.
Ms. Woolsey. Okay. Well, we have used this process for a
long time now and you know so much more know than we ever knew,
you know, in previous--in years passed. So would you say this
process has provided a good forum of information or an exchange
between the various levels of government or is there a way that
you would suggest changing the process based on the post
hurricane season and get local government more involved?
Mr. Mayfield. Congresswoman, you know if there is anything
that we could have done differently or better on our end, I
assure you that I want to know exactly what that is. I can tell
you that FEMA sponsored a briefing, the noontime video
teleconference involving the Hurricane Liaison Team. That was
done the same way in Hurricane Katrina that it was done in all
the hurricanes, all four of those hurricanes that hit Florida
last year, and done exactly the same way with Hurricane Rita.
That process did not change.
Ms. Woolsey. But should it go lower to get the local folks
more involved?
Mr. Mayfield. Oh, you are asking should the local folks be
on that video teleconference?
I have absolutely no objection to that. If I could give you
my own opinion on that, this is a big picture of sort of the
real big picture, the overview. The locals, I think are best
served by that handholding going on in their local community by
the local National Weather Service offices. Right before every
forecast is issued from the National Hurricane Center, we have
a hurricane hot line call with all of our potential impacted
local Weather Service forecast offices, the river forecast
centers, the rainfall forecasters of the Hydro Meteorological
Prediction Center, the tornado forecasters and the Storm
Prediction Center. The Department of Defense is online. They
would be Norfolk, Jacksonville, Pensacola, and others. NASA is
on that line. So we do a tremendous amount of coordination. And
those local forecasters, you know, in the local communities,
they know everything we do right before the advisory goes out.
And then they turn around and do that handholding with the
local emergency management and other officials. And I know
these folks in Slidell and in Mobile and I have known them for
years and I know that they did their job. If there is something
else that could have been done, I am sure they will want to
know that too.
Ms. Woolsey. Okay, thank you very much. Thank you.
Facilities and Equipment
Mr. Ehlers. [Presiding] The gentlewoman's time has expired.
General Johnson, were any of your vital facilities or
equipment damaged or destroyed in Katrina and Rita? If so, what
is the status of those facilities today and what are you doing
to maintain capabilities in the short-term?
Mr. Johnson. Yes, sir. We had some significant damage to
facilities. We had a back up plan in place so that when we lost
power in the Slidell office for example, the Mobile office
picked up those requirements. I was down there yesterday, Mr.
Chairman, checking out how operations were going and there is
some roof damage and some other things that we need to address.
I know we lost services of a couple of buoys, some NOAA weather
radios, those kinds of things, sir, and we are in the process
of assessing those right now.
Mr. Ehlers. Do you have the resources to do--to make these
repairs and get back on line during the rest of the hurricane
season?
Mr. Johnson. Sir, with the start of the fiscal year and a
continuing resolution I am going through an assessment right
now and we are looking forward to the '06 ability to get an
infusion of funds to address those.
Mr. Ehlers. All right.
Long-Term Outlook
Mr. Mayfield, I am interested in a little futurism here.
What is the future outlook with respect to both hurricane
frequency and intensity during the next 50 to 100 years? Do you
have any--and I know that is very long-term but what factors
contribute to the frequency and intensity and what do you see
developing that could have an impact on both frequency and
intensity?
Mr. Mayfield. Well, I would like to jump right to the
bottom line but I will hold that for a little bit. One of the
biggest correlations that we have with hurricane activity in
the Atlantic is the sea surface temperatures. And just as the
sea surface temperatures have cycles of warm and cold, warm and
cold, so does the hurricane activity so I cannot tell you with
any certainty what the future will hold other than these cycles
will very, very likely continue. Ten to 40 year cycles are
active and then, you know, followed by inactive periods there.
But this is important, too. We need to remember that you do
not have to be in an active period to have that one powerful
hurricane. And 1992 was well below the average number of storms
and hurricanes. This was not in a warm period, it was--we only
had six storms that year, only four of those were hurricanes,
but yet we had that one little hurricane called Andrew. So no
matter what period we are in, active or inactive, the bottom
line from my perspective is that we need to be prepared. We
need to have those hurricane plans in place. And everyone down
to that individual taking that personal responsibility needs to
know what to do before the next one comes.
Mr. Ehlers. So in other words, the frequency follows
certain cycles but there is no relationship between intensity
and frequency?
Mr. Mayfield. No, there is, I am sorry, sir. I did not
understand that. Yeah, in the active periods, we do tend to
have more major hurricanes so that obviously is a concern. I
was just trying to say that even in the inactive periods you
can still have that----
Mr. Ehlers. Right, okay. But there is some correlation
between frequency and intensity. Okay.
And much of it is related then to the cycling of the
surface temperatures in the gulf and in the western Atlantic.
Is that correct?
Mr. Mayfield. Right. We typically look at our main
development region, the tropical Atlantic, the Caribbean and
part of the Gulf of Mexico.
You know, you can correlate a lot of different things with,
you know, the activity and that sea surface temperature is one
of the best things that we have.
Mr. Ehlers. Well at least you have not tried to correlate
it with full moons which seemed to be the favorite thing people
like to correlate things with.
My time has expired. We recognize the gentlewoman from
Texas, Ms. Sheila Jackson Lee.
Timeline
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Let me thank the Chairman and the Ranking Member for what I
think is both a vital and timely hearing, and allow me to thank
both General Johnson and Mr. Mayfield for, I know a grateful
America for the existence of NOAA but also its technology. For
that reason, allow me for a line of questioning that again may
take you over the timeline that I view is so very crucial to
the component of saving lives.
Backtrack for me again if you would, the time that you
began to assess Hurricane Katrina. And I may interrupt you and
forgive me only because I have a series of questions and I know
my time is short. So when I look at sort of the end of August,
how far back did you begin tracking Hurricane Katrina?
Mr. Mayfield. Well we were tracking the disturbances, the
tropical waves come off the coast of Africa every three or four
days just like clockwork all through the hurricane season and
we were tracking a tropical wave that really did not form. It
became a depression on Tuesday, the 23rd of August. I asked for
activation of the Hurricane Liaison Team to start on the 24th.
It was activated at 7:00 a.m. on Wednesday, the 24th, became a
storm on the 24th, and then it became a hurricane just before
it made landfall on the 25th near Miami.
Ms. Jackson Lee. And it was what category at that point?
Mr. Mayfield. A Category 1 hurricane when it made landfall
there. And it became at Cat 1 just an hour or two before
landfall.
Ms. Jackson Lee. A measure or two.
At that time, were you on any kind of large conference
calls with all necessary parties including the President or his
representatives starting at that point?
Mr. Mayfield. I honestly do not remember when the President
was on it except I know for a fact that he was on that Sunday,
August the 28th as it was in the Gulf of Mexico. I do not
remember and quite honestly some time ago on the video
teleconference monitor will have nine or more little pictures
there and it may say the White House or it may say, you know,
Louisiana Emergency Operations Center and I really cannot see
exactly who is there in each of those offices. But the video--
well on Wednesday the 24th, we had a telephone conference call
with FEMA and by the time it hit Florida there on the 25th, we
had the video teleconferences going daily at noontime. And I am
sorry but I cannot tell you exactly, you know, which
individuals were on there.
Ms. Jackson Lee. But you know that he was on on the 28th,
which was that Sunday?
Mr. Mayfield. That is correct.
Ms. Jackson Lee. And were local officials on as well?
Mr. Mayfield. The local officials were not on but the
States, Texas, Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, Florida, and
Georgia emergency operation centers were on that big picture.
Again, that the big picture called there on that video
teleconference. Of course FEMA headquarters facilitated the
call and then FEMA Region 4 out of Atlanta, Georgia and FEMA
Region 6 out of Denton, Texas.
Ms. Jackson Lee. How much guidance do you give as you are
providing the science of these Cats 1, 2, 3, and 4, and 5? How
much direction can you give to FEMA or how much direction are
they seeking from you as partly the agency dealing with natural
disasters, the National FEMA as opposed to State emergency
agencies?
Mr. Mayfield. Well, a fair question but the roles are
defined here and our role is to provide the best forecast that
we can. So we would be reporting, I would be briefing on, you
know, the current location and strength of the hurricane, the
future track of the hurricane, the future intensity forecast,
the potential storm surge, rainfall, tornado activity. Our role
is to provide the best, you know, weather information that we
possibly can.
Ms. Jackson Lee. But at some point, the human factor must
play in where somebody takes a deep breath to say guys this is
a Cat 5, we have got to move. I am sure sometimes in the course
of conversation that happens. Is that correct?
Mr. Mayfield. Well, we certainly said that this was a Cat
5, you know, when it became a Cat 5 and I did, I mean, I firmly
believe that people understood the potential that this
hurricane held.
Ms. Jackson Lee. General, let me ask you this. With the
work that you have done, my understanding is that there is a
difference of $1 billion between the Senate's mark and the
House mark as it relates to NOAA. This Committee has always
been a strong advocate of funding for NOAA but it baffles me as
to what you will do with that shortfall.
And then let me raise this with you. Clearly as Mr.
Mayfield, said there is a point where there is an exasperation
or an exasperated voice saying, you know, this is a Cat 5 and
you are speaking to I call it level folk that are at the level
of State government but the Federal Government is there. Do we
need to legislate, if you will, a stronger role for NOAA as it
relates to the interaction between agencies like FEMA because
we all know that despite the local responsibility and the state
in natural disasters when NOAA is on the line saying with its
refined science there is a Cat 5, somebody at the top level
should act. In the case of Hurricane Katrina, it is well known
that they did not act. Do we need to provide some greater
cohesion so that the Federal Government can be working more
effectively together and get people out and save lives. But I
ask that question in the cut in your seemingly proposed cut in
the dollars that are going to you this time around.
Mr. Ehlers. The gentlewoman's time has expired. Please give
a brief answer.
Mr. Johnson. Ma'am, we are an important part of the team
and weather service characterizes the storm and provides that
accurate timely information. We also pay very much attention to
the National Hurricane Center that takes that very big picture
and takes the larger view. The local weather forecast offices
translate that view into specific local topography, bathymetry,
and specific events. You know, characterizing, you know, where
the effects are going to be held. We also in the messages that
we put out through NOAA weather radio and all of our
communication techniques and capabilities, emphasize paying
attention to your local emergency manager because they are an
important part of the team as well.
Right now, I am hopeful that the Conference Committee will
find a good accommodation and take care of the requirements for
NOAA and the Weather Service and allow us to continue to do the
job that we are capable of doing.
Five-Day Forecasts
Mr. Ehlers. The gentlewoman's time has expired.
Question for either one of you, you can decide who is to
answer. But you have introduced a five-day hurricane track
prediction, where as I recall last year you were doing three-
day. What has your experience been so far and I am curious why
do you believe the data has improved sufficiently you can now
give accurate five-day reports and do you plan to continue to
do that or have you discovered some weaknesses?
Mr. Mayfield. Mr. Chairman, we really do listen to our
users. You know, most coastal states now have a yearly
hurricane conference. We have a national hurricane conference,
we have interdepartmental hurricane conference. There are a lot
of venues that allow customers to, you know, share with us what
they would like. And that five-day went well into effect here
in 2003, I believe after a couple of years of testing. And that
was actually stated as a requirement by the United States Navy.
And, you know, we cannot produce a product with taxpayer money
and just give it to a few chosen people. With the public/
private partnership we have when we create our product, we make
that available to, you know, anyone and everyone.
The feedback that I have gotten on the five-day has been on
the most part very positive though the truth is a five-day
forecast is as accurate as the three-day forecast was just 15
or so years ago. We put out on our graphical products a cone.
That cone at the extended periods of four and five days is
very, very large because we have these large areas. But for
most people, for the public, the only thing I ask is that if
you are within that large cone at those extended time periods,
just start thinking about what you might do if the hurricane
continued to head toward your community. Most people do not
need that four- and five-day lead time there but there are some
users, NASA if the Space Shuttle is on the launch pad or the
Navy with all their aircraft carriers in Norfolk for example
and they have to get people back from shore leave and get the
ships ready and underway and away from the coast before the
arrival, you know, of high seas and storm force winds. So there
are some customers who indeed make very good use of that four-
and five-day forecast.
Rebuilding New Orleans
Mr. Ehlers. And may I ask both of you, do you have any
involvement in the rebuilding of New Orleans? Are you making
any recommendations? What is your relationship with the local
officials on that?
Mr. Johnson. Sir, NOAA is actively involved in restoration,
clearing the shipping channels to allow the port to reopen,
looking at the ecosystems and what needs to be done to restore
those. Your weather service continues to provide information on
post-Katrina, the Rita impacts, as well as, the daily forecast
to all the people who are down there working. And sir, they are
paying attention to the forecast. So, yes, sir, we are actively
involved at all levels of NOAA.
Mr. Ehlers. It would be nice also if you could persuade
them not to rebuild in areas below sea level but I will leave
that to your discretion.
My time has nearly expired. Mr. Davis?
Mr. Davis. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for
recognizing me. I will not make a large speech.
But I think as we observed what happened with the hurricane
that came through the gulf, perhaps tells all of us in
Congress, as well as, those who live in the area and certainly
NOAA that we need to make a serious visit to the predictions.
Obviously, the ability that you have and a way to protect those
who live in an area where the hurricanes often frequent in the
gulf or other areas in Florida.
I represent an area that is in Tennessee. Obviously, we get
a goodness many times from the hurricanes because we get
rainfall that comes in that helps our farmers have the rainfall
that is needed. But also coming with those many times are
tornadoes that are spawned from the high winds and as a result
of that, we have small footprint of damage and destruction that
was observed in a large footprint across the gulf--down the
road would be the wooly warm would be dark on one or the other
or all the way through would mean a rough winter. The thickness
on the bark of a tree or where a wasp or a hornet would hang
their nest, how low in the trees it would be.
Obviously, we have greatly expanded and improved upon
predicting the weather and how forceful, how almighty it can
be, how damaging, and how harmful it can be. And it is my hope
that those of us who serve in Congress realize that continued
funding for the predictability of weather that will save lives
is certainly a homeland security issue to us. I do believe that
people throughout this nation today have had a taste of the
damage of the hurricane for a reason. The lesser amongst us who
lived along the coast in Alabama, Mississippi, and New Orleans
have been displaced because their economic conditions would not
permit them to rebuild or did they live in an area where they
could move to a family. And as a result of that, we have seen
evacuees throughout this nation be dislodged from their home. I
do not believe there is a state in this nation that has not
accepted evacuees. Those who have lost their homes and
everything that they have and the ability even to survive and
in many cases, the retirees, their small Social Security check
that can help them have some means of living in many cases to
them what would appear to be almost a foreign country moving
from their home in the gulf inland to states all across this
nation. I think all of us have felt and have been made aware of
and can see the damage that has occurred.
So it is my hope that those of us here in Congress realize
that it is our responsibility as a nation to be sure that we
adequately fund the weather predictors which is NOAA and that
we do not cut dollars in that area. I applaud the efforts, I
applaud the accuracy of the agency that has provided us with a
safety net in many cases for those to escape. That happened
when Rita visited the area of Texas and we saw lesser at least
personal harm done to those.
Having said that, I would yield the remainder of my time to
a Ranking Member with permission from the Chairman to
Representative Bart Gordon from Tennessee.
Communicating With Media
Mr. Gordon. I thank my friend from Tennessee.
There is a variety of things that we do not know but I
think a couple of things that we do know is that it is
unfortunately inevitable that there will be another catastrophe
of this magnitude or worse whether it is by force of nature or
force of man. And the other thing that we know is that on the
federal, State, and probably local level, our governments did
not serve us as well as they should and we would hope for them
to do. So it is important that we look at what went right, look
at what went wrong, try to make preparations for the future to
get the wrongs to the right. I think in doing that, it is
important that we have transparency. I think it is also
important that we have an independent commission that will
review the various information and try to make non-partisan,
non-bias suggestions. But again to do that, it has got to be
transparent.
And so I want to get a few things on the record because I
am confident that in trying to do the right thing we will have
this independent commission later. So General, if you would,
let us see, would you put up the memo, please?
General, just again, just for the record, I cannot speak to
the truth or not of this. This was on a blog supposedly leaked
from NOAA staff. It is concerning a memo that went out on
Thursday, the 29th of September 2005 from a Jim T-e-e-t, is
that how you pronounce that, his name?
Mr. Johnson. I believe so, sir.
Mr. Gordon. Okay. And you can tell me whether this is
accurate. ``Good day all. I have been informed that any request
for an interview with a national media outlet reporter must now
receive prior approval by DOC, Department of Commerce. Please
ensure everyone on your staff is aware of this requirement. Any
request for an interview requires that the following
information to be forwarded to me immediately so this process
may begin. The name of the reporter and their affiliation,
their deadline, the contact number, the name of the individual
being requested for the interview, the purpose of the
interview, additional background information about the
interview subject, and expertise of the requested interviewee
on the subject. The request will be forwarded through NWS, NOAA
to DOC. However, the individual to be interviewed ultimately
will be determined by DOC.''
Is that an accurate memo?
Mr. Johnson. Sir, I would say that memo did go out. It is,
in fact, a----
Mr. Gordon. That is fine. This was what I wanted to know
whether that was accurate so it was not just something very----
Mr. Johnson. No, sir. It is a statement of a long standing
policy. The term now is an unfortunate choice of----
Mr. Gordon. I think it is also unfortunate that as we try
to have transparency and find out what went wrong that
apparently members of your organization have to go through some
type of a buffer. I think that is unfortunate, too but let me
continue to try to get some things on the record here.
I want to note that we asked on this side for several
things that we have not been delivered. We have requested for
the reports in whatever form they may take that are produced by
NOAA employee who works at the NOAA desk in the Homeland
Security Operations Center. My understanding is the Department
of Homeland Security is raising objections to this request as
are counsel at the department. So I want to deliver a formal
request for those documents today and they will be given to
you. Go ahead, Leigh Ann.
This letter also asks that the department make available to
our staff the person who was assigned to the HSOC desk so that
we may interview that person. We asked that earlier but again
there has been national security objections hinted in the
refusals. General Johnson, I hope you will do all you can to
shake these things loose. It is silly to think that there is
anything referred to in NOAA's work on Hurricane Katrina that
could in any way compromise national security.
Further, I ask that two letters be entered into the record.
I have written to the White House asking for the transcript of
the HLT briefing the President participated in. I also asked
for the names of any White House staff who communicated with
NOAA regarding Katrina.
In the second letter, you will see that I have asked FEMA
to release any reports they maintain of the HLT briefing from
August 27 and August 28. I have not received any sort of
response to either letter. [See Appendix 2: Additional Material
for the Record.]
Now General, my interest is not playing a game of got you.
It is trying to do legitimate oversight. As we said, this is
going to happen again in some way or the other. We need to be
prepared. My wife and daughter live here in the District and I
suspect that a variety of your employees, maybe your family,
Members here today have family here. It is very likely that
this region could be one of those hit with a catastrophe, more
likely the man kind than the natural kind. So it is very
important that we again learn our lessons, try to prepare. This
is a matter of life and death.
Thank you, General.
[The information follows:]
Concluding Remarks
Mr. Ehlers. The gentleman's time has more than expired. I
was generous in giving him extra time because as a Ranking
Member he is entitled to a closing statement. That may not have
been a wise decision but we appreciate your efforts to get at
some of these issues.
Just a quick question to wrap it up and then I will have a
closing statement. I would like to ask you is there anything
that you need from the Congress, anything that the Congress
could do that would help you do a better job forecasting and
warning about hurricanes. In other words, do you in your
experience of the past few years of this, has anything come to
mind where we are getting in the way rather than helping the
process?
Mr. Johnson. Sir, in my opening oral testimony I thanked
you and the Committee for your support after last year. The
oral remarks also talked about modeling and observing and we
can always do a better job. I am anxious for the Air Force to
get the sensors modified and airplanes up to speed. And I look
forward to the '06 budget, as well as the other activities that
can help support us overall. We are very appreciative of what
you have already done.
Mr. Ehlers. Thank you.
Mr. Mayfield, do you have anything to add?
Mr. Mayfield. No. We certainly appreciate everything that
you have done. And those buoys that the Congress helped us get
at the end of last year have been very, very, very useful
already in several storms and hurricanes already. And we
certainly will appreciate the additional support here as we
continue to improve.
Mr. Ehlers. Well thank you.
And I would like to just make a few closing comments along
the lines of Mr. Rohrabacher and Mr. Davis pointing out how far
we have come. We often neglect that, but I must say as I
watched this unfold on my own TV screen, I could not help but
marvel at the changes from my childhood. I grew up on the
plains of Minnesota and we used to have what we called cyclones
then not tornadoes. No warning whatsoever. Everyone just
watched the sky and when it got bad enough, you headed for the
basement. And sometimes you miscalculated. Some real tragedies
occurred as a result. Today, we have tremendous warning systems
for hurricanes, floods, tornadoes and particularly the
satellites. And we often hear complaints from the public about
wasting our tax money, et cetera. I think this is a good
example of good use of tax money. Obviously it costs much, much
more to run the National Weather Service relatively speaking
than it did 40 years ago, but I would maintain that investments
in science such as we are doing in this case have a very good
rate of return. I am certain that the lives saved even property
damage averted as a result of the work that you do and that you
have done not just in forecasting but making us aware of the
dangers of nature, the tax money has more than paid for itself
and the extra information provided in particularly in the
saving of lives. And I think that is a very important point to
note.
I also would comment there was some comment made earlier
about the lack of funding for NOAA and what happens in the
budget. Unfortunately, NOAA frequently in the past has been the
target of what we politely here call earmarks in which money is
diverted from a good cause such as the Weather Service or other
areas and assigned to some other cause which in the eyes of the
earmarked is more appropriate and more important. I think it is
time that the Congress and the Nation wake up and realize NOAA
is really important. This is not a little pork barrel that
people can dip into and move the pork somewhere else. The work
you do is extremely important to the livelihood of our nation,
particularly in agriculture and shipping but in other ways as
well and we certainly appreciate what you have done.
I hope that the new satellites we are putting up are going
to help you even more and do a better job. The new
supercomputers which this committee has initiated the funding
for will help you do a more accurate reporting and forecasting.
I think if you hold a similar hearing ten years from now, I do
not expect to be here but I am sure that my successors will
find even more astonishing results and even better forecasting
in the future.
So I want to thank you for being here today, for testifying
before the Committee. It has been a highly educational hearing.
And you have given this committee a lot to consider about the
role of NOAA in hurricane prediction. If there is no objection,
the record will remain open for additional statements from the
Members and for answers to any follow up questions the
Committee may ask of the panelists. Without objection so
ordered. The hearing is now adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:30 p.m., the Committee was adjourned.]
Appendix 1:
----------
Answers to Post-Hearing Questions
Responses by Brigadier General David L. Johnson (ret.), Assistant
Administrator for Weather Services; Director, The National
Weather Service, National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce
Questions submitted by the Majority
Q1. What are the various notification systems the National Weather
Service uses to disseminate weather warnings and information? For each
notification system, please explain how Federal, State and local
government officials receive the information. For each level of
government (Federal, State and local), please explain how the National
Weather Service (including its local weather forecast offices) confirms
that government officials received emergency messages. Do these
procedures change in case of an ``incident of national significance''
declared by the Department of Homeland Security?
A1. National Weather Service (NWS) warnings are distributed through a
vast dissemination network. These systems include NOAA Weather Radio
All Hazards (NWR), which can reach anyone in the area who has a NWR
receiver; NOAA Weather Wire Service; Emergency Managers Weather
Information Network (EMWIN); Internet; local paging systems to
emergency managers; high-speed direct communications with users of
large volumes of weather data (i.e., commercial meteorological firms)
connected by landlines (Family of Services), by satellite broadcasts
(NOAAPORT), or both. The media uses one or more of these feeds to
receive the information and then rebroadcast it. Federal, State, and
local officials typically receive weather warnings and information from
different combinations of the above systems. Some officials also obtain
information from the private sector.
These dissemination systems do not have a mechanism in place to
verify the user received the message. However, each state emergency
operations center has a direct feed from the NOAA Weather Wire Service,
paid for by the NWS, to help ensure NWS warnings and other information
are received by emergency managers. The State emergency managers then
redistribute the data and information, as appropriate, to local
emergency managers. Government officials also typically receive
messages from several systems (listed above). During major weather
situations, many NWS offices or regional headquarters send a
meteorologist to State emergency operations centers, or place phone
calls to these centers to ensure emergency managers have the most
current information and interpretation possible.
These procedures do not change for an ``incident of national
significance.''
Q2. For each notification system described in the answer to question
one, please explain how often the National Weather Service and its
local forecast offices test the systems to make sure they are working.
Are the notification systems redundant to such a degree that no
significant communications capability would be lost if any one of the
notification systems fails to function during a severe weather event?
A2. Each local weather forecast office tests the NOAA Weather Radio All
Hazards (NWR) Network in its local area once a week to ensure the
system is operating. Other dissemination systems are monitored
continuously at the National Weather Service Telecommunication Gateway
and any communications outages are addressed immediately.
If a NWR transmitter becomes inoperable, messages are not
transmitted to the NWR receivers. NOAA is working to further increase
the reliability of NOAA Weather Radio All Hazards (NWR) transmitters to
allow operation in adverse conditions, when normal communications
systems can fail. Nearly $5M in funding provided to NOAA in the FY 2006
hurricane supplemental will be used to provide backup electrical power
for NOAA Weather Radios and Automated Surface Observing Sites in
coastal areas. Not only is NWR network reliability important,
increasing the number of individuals who own NWR receivers is also
critical. NOAA works with the private sector to promote the use of NWR
receivers and recently worked with FEMA and the Department of Education
to distribute 16,000 NOAA Weather Radios to public schools across the
country. Also, with $1M in additional funding provided in the
supplemental, NOAA will expand the NWS Weather Wire Satellite
Communication System to improve communications capability at coastal
Weather Forecast Offices for timely transmission of weather warnings to
the public and the media.
One benefit of having multiple dissemination systems is redundancy.
If one method is non-operational, others still disseminate important
information. However, this strategy is successful only when recipients
have access to multiple dissemination systems. Redundancy is one of the
items stressed in the National Weather Service StormReady program, to
ensure communities and emergency managers can receive warnings and
information different ways. Communities can receive NWS and emergency
messages through NWS dissemination systems which include NOAA Weather
Radio All Hazards (NWR), which can reach anyone in the area who has a
NWR receiver; NOAA Weather Wire Service; Emergency Managers Weather
Information Network (EMWIN); Internet; local paging systems to
emergency managers; and via commercial meteorological or communication
(e.g., phone) companies.
Q3. What are NOAA's back-up procedures during severe storms if a
radar, buoy, or entire local weather forecast office is destroyed or
cannot communicate? Please explain the circumstances that would trigger
back-up procedures. Were any back-up procedures triggered during
Hurricanes Katrina or Rita? If so, please explain what happened and
what NOAA is doing to fix any damage.
A3. The National Weather Service (NWS) has robust backup procedures in
place to ensure continuity of operations. The NWS radar network was
designed to provide radar coverage for the contiguous United States to
ensure radar coverage for severe weather, including hurricanes. Should
a radar fail, adjacent radar stations and other observation systems
provide sufficient coverage. Other observation systems, such as
satellites and surface observation stations, provide a sufficient level
of coverage to assist meteorologists in the forecast and warning
function. NOAA operated WSR-88D radars have an operational availability
of 99.1 percent.
NOAA/NWS recently added connection to four Federal Aviation
Administration Terminal Doppler Weather Radars--Orlando, FL; West Palm
Beach, FL; New Orleans, LA; and Houston, TX--in hurricane-prone areas
as another mechanism to ensure weather radar data are available to
forecasters. During both Hurricanes Katrina and Rita all radars
remained operational, providing data to the local weather forecast
offices.
NOAA/NWS buoys have redundant wind sensors and barometers that
provide data if the primary instrument fails. Several of the large
buoys, including three in the Gulf of Mexico and the seven new buoys
deployed with FY04 Hurricane Supplemental funds have a complete second
operational system on board that serves as a back-up. Should a buoy
suffer catastrophic damage, which rarely occurs, NOAA maintains a
network of large buoys which provide some overlapping coverage.
Further, other weather observation systems (for example satellites and
hurricane reconnaissance flights) also provide coverage. Repairing
buoys is a high priority but depends on ship availability. NOAA fixes
damaged buoys within the Atlantic Hurricane Basin as quickly as
possible, usually within a few months. NOAA/NWS can also provide manual
backup should an automated surface observing system fail at a Weather
Forecast Office (WFO) or major airport.
During Hurricane Katrina, the NWS implemented backup coverage for
the New Orleans, Louisiana; Lake Charles, Louisiana; and Jackson,
Mississippi offices when communications to and from the offices were
lost due to an MCI/communications backbone failure. The FY 2006
Hurricane Katrina/Rita Emergency Supplemental provides NOAA $1M to
improve (harden) hurricane-prone WFOs communication capabilities via
backup satellite communications. The NWS offices in Mobile, Alabama;
Houston, Texas; and Huntsville, Alabama assumed forecast and warning
responsibility for the area normally covered by the New Orleans, Lake
Charles, and Jackson offices, respectively. During Hurricane Rita, the
NWS implemented backup operations for the Lake Charles, Louisiana WFO
when the office lost its communications just after landfall. The backup
service was provided by the WFO in Houston, Texas.
Q4. In your testimony you mentioned that at the end of each hurricane
season NOAA leads a ``hot wash'' to review all of its hurricane
procedures with emergency managers and weather forecasters. Please
provide the following information about the annual hot wash:
Q4a. Who from Federal, State, and local government agencies
participates in the annual hot wash? Who from the private sector
participates? Do you solicit input and/or participation from non-
governmental organizations and the public?
Q4b. What is the process for selecting participants?
Q4c. What is the process for reviewing and prioritizing
recommendations that result from the hot wash?
Q4d. What is the process for providing resources, if needed, for
implementing priority recommendations?
Q4e. What ``hot wash'' recommendations were made in the last three
years? Which of these recommendations have been implemented and which
have not been implemented? If applicable, please explain why
recommendations were not implemented.
A4a,b,c,d,e. Answer: The ``hot wash'' (a colloquialism for a series of
agency-directed reviews) is a review and analysis of the past hurricane
season and occurs on many levels. The first is an internal NOAA
examination of operations and procedures to see what went well and
where improvements could be made. The second is the Interdepartmental
Hurricane Conference, an internal Federal Government review, which
includes NOAA, the Department of Defense, the Federal Emergency
Management Agency, NASA, the National Science Foundation, and others.
And finally, a National Hurricane Conference is conducted which
includes all levels of government, as well as emergency managers,
private sector meteorologists, and media representatives. Participation
in the National Hurricane Conference is open to everyone. Local Weather
Forecast Offices also conduct more informal analyses of hurricane
operations and work with their local emergency management counterparts
to identify best practices and where improvements in the overall
hurricane program can be made.
Attached are summaries of the recommendations from the NOAA review
and the Federal Government review for the past three years (included as
Appendix 1 and 2, respectively). It is a high priority for NOAA and the
NWS to implement as many of the recommendations as possible for the
next hurricane season using existing resources and follow normal
funding request procedures if necessary.
Q5. Is the ability to forecast marine wave height and wind speed
important for predicting storm surge and inland flooding? If so, please
explain why. What are the current capabilities of NOAA to forecast
marine wave height and wind speed? Does NOAA require additional
observational equipment to improve wave forecasts?
A5. Storm surge predictions are based on the size of the storm, the
strength of the winds and the bathymetry of the ocean. Predicting the
size and strength of the storm remains most critical to storm surge
prediction. Winds push water ahead of the storm, causing the water
level to rise along the shoreline. The stronger the wind and the larger
the wind field, the larger the storm surge will be. Waves are also
driven by surface wind speed. NOAA's operational numerical computer
wave model (WAVEWATCH) provides predictions of wave height for NOAA
forecasters to use as they prepare storm surge forecasts. Wave
predictions from the WAVEWATCH model at 24 hours are accurate to within
about 11/4 feet during the summer and about 21/2 feet on average during
the stormy winter months. The WAVEWATCH model will eventually be
coupled to the Hurricane Weather Research and Forecasting Model to
provide an advanced storm surge model. Battering coastal waves also
push water up along the coastline. In fact, the battering waves that
were on top of the storm surge were responsible for the extensive
damage along North Carolina during Isabel and the catastrophic damage
along the Northern Gulf of Mexico coastline during Katrina. $2.5M was
provided in the FY 2006 hurricane supplemental to accelerate storm
surge forecasting, which includes improvements to the Sea Lake and
Overland Surges from Hurricanes (SLOSH) model.
Additional observations, such as those planned under the Global
Environmental Observation System of Systems (GEOSS), will help improve
model predictions. NOAA is working with the National Aeronautics and
Space Administration to develop new observing technologies, such as a
scanning radar altimeter. When flown on the NOAA P-3 aircraft, this new
technology can provide valuable information as was demonstrated during
Hurricane Rita. Data from the instrument were used to help measure
significant wave height and transmit that information directly the
National Hurricane Center.
Inland flooding associated with hurricanes is generally due to
freshwater flooding from hurricane-related rainfall, not wind driven
storm surge or waves. With funding provided in the FY 2006 hurricane
supplemental ($2.5M), we are accelerating the development of new
localized flood-forecast products and services for hurricane-prone
states.
Q6. What is the status of all marine buoys in the Caribbean and Gulf
of Mexico? According to an article in the Miami Herald on October 9,
2005, the National Hurricane Center needs 13 additional marine buoys
($250,000/buoy) to improve its hurricane forecasts. Why has NOAA not
requested funding for additional buoys?
A6. All of the marine buoys in the Caribbean and Gulf of Mexico are
operational. NOAA used funding from the Military Construction
Appropriations and Emergency Hurricane Supplemental Appropriations Act,
2005 (P.L. 108-324) to deploy seven buoys in the Gulf of Mexico,
Caribbean Sea and Atlantic Ocean. These buoys provided critical data to
help forecasters accurately track and predict the intensity and path of
hurricanes during the 2005 hurricane season. With incorporation of the
eight buoys provided in the FY 2006 hurricane supplemental, NOAA
believes the current configuration is adequate. Additional
observations, are also being planned under the Global Earth Observation
System of Systems (GEOSS) to further improve predictions.
Q7. According to an article in the Miami Herald on October 9, 2005,
older dropwindsondes fail at least half the time in strong winds but it
would only cost $1 million to fully upgrade to newer, more resilient
dropwindsondes. What are the failure rates for old and new
dropwindsondes in high winds? When will NOAA's old supply of
dropwindsondes be depleted such that the agency will only rely on newer
dropwindsondes? If NOAA has known that it would only take $1 million to
upgrade the dropwindsondes, why didn't NOAA fix this problem sooner?
A7. Failure of older dropsondes in high winds occurs primarily in the
very lowest level winds (about 500 feet altitude), when wind speeds
exceeded 100-112 miles per hour. NOAA worked with the National Center
for Atmospheric Research and the Air Force Reserve Command to test an
updated dropsonde in 2004 that performed more reliably in these high
wind situations. These new dropsondes were mass produced by the primary
vendor (Vaisala) and used for most of the 2005 hurricane season.
Preliminary indications are that the new dropsondes performed in 2005
as well as they did in the tests in 2004, with no failures reported in
high winds. However, we are still evaluating their performance to
ascertain whether these new dropsondes have any limitations of their
own. NOAA has only 220 of the older dropsondes in stock which will be
used before the next hurricane season.
Q8. For the past five years, what is the annual number of Doppler
radar failures due to lightning strikes? Where did these failures occur
geographically? What is the justification for not pursuing the $3.5
million fiber optic solution for protecting Doppler radars from
lightning strikes? What lightning protection projects has NOAA
completed or is NOAA planning to complete in lieu of the fiber optic
solution? What has been or is predicted to be the cost of those
projects?
A8. On average, 25 of 158 operational WSR-88D radar systems have been
damaged, apparently due to lightning strikes, annually during the last
five years (17 in 2005; 33 in 2004; 27 in 2003; 34 in 2002; and 12 in
2001). Radars in all areas of the contiguous United States have
received lightning damage; this type of damage is not any more or less
prevalent in any one geographical location. Radar towers are usually
the tallest structure in the local area, making them a likely target
for lightning strikes. NOAA operated WSR-88D radars have an operational
availability of 99.1 percent. The average time to repair a radar is
about 6.5 hours.
Recognizing early in the program that radars are susceptible to
lightning strikes, NOAA/NWS took aggressive action to make the radars
more robust. We focused on actions that would have the most immediate
and largest payback. NOAA/NWS has completed several lightning
mitigating projects as part of sustaining engineering and retrofit
actions:
(1) Stocking lightning sensitive spare parts at field sites
and in a ``lightning kit'' maintained at our logistics centers,
to reduce radar down time due to awaiting parts delivery.
(2) A retrofit of the grounding grid at radar sites in 1993-
1998 ($1.9 million) greatly reduced lightning susceptibility
and reduced the number of lightning-damaged radar parts by an
estimated 50 percent.
(3) Surge protection devices were added to the radar shelters
in three different projects ($732,000).
(4) Replacement of aging copper communication lines with fiber
optic communication lines which are less susceptible to
lightning damage/interruption in 2004-2005 ($1.6 million).
(5) Preventative maintenance inspections have been refined to
mitigate lightning impacts.
(6) Depot-level engineering visits to the occasional sites
that appear to have an unusual susceptibility to lightning have
corrected a number of small issues and subsequently reduced the
occurrences of lightning induced damage. A visit of this type
was conducted at the Miami WSR-88D last year after we noticed
an anomalously high number of lightning failures. Since the
engineering team visit, there have been no lightning failures.
(7) Transition power maintenance systems were installed in
1998-2003 ($45.3 million). These systems enable the ``ride
through'' of commercial power outages until engine generator
power becomes available and they condition the commercial power
to eliminate ``spikes'' due to nearby lightning strikes. These
features reduce the likelihood of lightning induced radar
damage.
(8) A National Severe Storm Laboratory study in 2000 showed
the current radome lightning rod configuration is the most
effective design.
These initiatives have been very effective and made the radars more
resilient under lightning conditions. It is important to note that it
is not possible to make the radars lightning proof against a direct
strike. However, we are taking all steps necessary to mitigate the
effects of lightning. On those occasions when radars fail due to a
direct lightning strike, the adjacent radars are positioned to provide
backup coverage.
Q9. Please provide a funding history, including number of full-time
employees, for the Hurricane Research Division for the past twenty
years.
A9. The first table below summarizes the funding history of the
Hurricane Research Division for the past twenty years. Non-base support
includes other NOAA support received through funded proposals to
Hurricane Research Division scientists through projects such as the
Joint Hurricane Testbed. Non-base support also includes extramural
support from other federal agencies, including the National Aeronautics
and Space Administration and the Federal Emergency Management Agency.
The second table summarizes Hurricane Research Division staff history
broken into FTEs and cooperative institute (CI)/contract personnel.
NOAA conducts hurricane research not only at HRD, but also at its
Geophysical Fluid Dynamics Laboratory and Environmental Modeling
Center. Through its hurricane research program, NOAA develops new
technologies for observing hurricanes, further improves its models for
predicting hurricane track and intensity, and provides critical
assistance to forecasters at the National Hurricane Center. All
together, these efforts resulted in the vast track improvements over
the past 20 years.
Q10. According to an article in the Miami Herald on October 10, 2005,
Hurricane Research Division scientists use sensors called Airborne
Expendable Bathythermographs to measure the temperature of the ocean
down to 1,000 feet. But, researchers can't get the data to forecasters
because they need to develop software to use the data (estimated
software cost is $200,000). Is this characterization accurate, and if
so, why has NOAA not provided the funding for the software development?
A10. The October 10, 2005 Miami Herald article is correct per se, in
that software needs to be developed to get the data to forecasters;
however the article is inaccurate in its implication that NOAA has
neglected to fund software development as there is no current
operational requirement for the observations/data from the ocean
probes. The ocean probes used were acquired from the Navy surplus by
the Hurricane Research Division (HRD) for use in research missions. The
HRD maintains software to process and quality-control these data for
research purposes. After these data are collected and processed for
quality control, they are sent to NOAA's operational modeling center to
determine utility of the data.
Q11. When does NOAA plan to completely upgrade all 102 stations in the
weather balloon observation network? What is the failure rate for
weather balloons and what could be done to reduce the failure rate?
A11. NOAA oversees 102 upper air stations in the United States and
throughout the Caribbean. Our FY 2006 operating plan supports the
upgrade of 78 of those sites, which are scheduled to be upgraded by the
end of Fiscal Year 2010.
During the period of October 2004 through October 2005, 98 percent
of launches have reached the minimum successful height of 400 hecto
Pascals* (standard is 90 percent), and 66 percent of launches have
reached 10 hecto Pascals* (standard is 60 percent). The system is
meeting the NWS performance requirements. (*Hecto Pascals is a standard
of pressure measurement used by the National Weather Service. At 10
hecto Pascals, the balloon is at a height of approximately 100,000
feet.)
Q12. NOAA has acknowledged that some hurricane research software still
runs on old computers because the software has not been converted to
run on newer machines. Are there plans to update the software to run on
newer computers? If so, when will that update be completed? If not, why
not?
A12. The Hurricane Research Division manages a 4-5 year information
technology (IT) strategy to upgrade and replace all IT equipment in
order to meet NOAA's IT security requirements. NOAA completed the third
year of this strategy in 2005 and we have replaced or upgraded our
complete network infrastructure, most of our servers, and 67 percent of
our desktop computers. Our strategy calls for completion of the server
and desktop upgrades in 2006, and completing the software update in
2007. All of our processing software runs on our recently upgraded UNIX
servers, and we currently are upgrading some of the software that will
run on the aircraft to process and quality control observations in real
time to run under LINUX (Aircraft Operations Center's preferred
operating system). Last year, the Aircraft Operations Center provided a
LINUX server for HRD to use and we are purchasing a new LINUX server
this year to accommodate this transition. NOAA is working to streamline
and upgrade the SATCOM data transfer from the aircraft to the ground as
part of our strategy to provide more data from the aircraft to our
operational partners. As part of this upgrade we are working to define
requirements for data transfer and quality control of the data to
ensure the IT infrastructure on the aircraft meet all NOAA's needs.
Questions submitted by the Minority
Q1. For Hurricane Katrina, the weather forecasting offices that were
in the main path of the hurricane were the New Orleans forecast office
in Slidell, LA; the Mobile forecast office in Mobile, AL; Jackson, MS;
and Lake Charles, LA. For Hurricane Rita, Houston, TX and Lake Charles,
LA were in the main path of the storm.
According to NOAA's daily Incident Coordination Center reports for
Katrina, at least four other local offices were at-the-ready or engaged
to provide backup for these offices--Shreveport, LA; Huntsville, AL;
Houston, TX; and Tallahassee, FL. For Rita, it appeared to be the Fort
Worth, TX WFO acting as the backup office.
The Southern Region Headquarters also provided additional
personnel to the local forecast offices, the State emergency operations
centers, and coordinated the backup plan and response for the offices
in the hurricane path.
It appears NWS met its goal of maintaining continuity of weather
forecasting capabilities overall for the affected areas during these
hurricanes even as some of the local offices were experiencing
communication and other equipment failure problems. It appears NWS had
a good internal preparation and response plan.
What is your assessment of the performance of the NWS internal
preparation and response plan for these storms? What changes, if any,
are you considering to further improve the procedures for maintaining
continuous NWS forecasting capabilities during hurricanes? What is the
current status of the impacted NOAA offices and equipment damaged by
these two storms?
A1. The National Weather Service (NWS) plans for continuity of forecast
and warning operations worked well during Hurricane Katrina. Our
procedures worked well but we are working to address some technical
issues, such as phone line failures, to make these systems even more
robust during natural disasters.
The National Data Buoy Center (NWS), the National Coastal Data
Development Center (NESDIS), and the National Marine Fisheries Service
(NMFS) laboratory located at John C. Stennis Space Center in Bay St.
Louis, MS, sustained damage. The NWS Weather Forecast Office (WFO) in
Slidell, LA, was constructed to be able to withstand a Category 3
hurricane (with an internal room able to withstand a Category 5), and
sustained minimal damage from the storm. Power and communications were
quickly restored to the facility. NWS WFOs in Mobile, Lake Charles, and
Houston provided backup forecast and warning services while
communications were compromised.
Additional NOAA facilities/equipment which sustained damages
include the NMFS lab in Pascagoula, MS, and the Office of Marine and
Aviation Operations (OMAO) port office and warehouse, personal offices
co-located at Halter Marine, and the NOAA ship, OREGON 11, all located
in Pascagoula. Also, two NOAA lab facilities in Miami, FL, sustained
damage and two National Water Level Observation Network (NWLON)
stations are being replaced.
Ten NWS Automated Surface Observing Systems (ASOS) were impacted by
Katrina, mainly by loss of communications or power. Two systems were
destroyed; two systems sustained damage and continue to have
intermittent communications and power problems. The Doppler radar at
Slidell remained operational throughout the storm. Once communication
was restored, data were available to all users. Five buoys and four
Coastal Marine Automated Network (C-MAN) stations were damaged or
destroyed by the two storms. The buoys and one of the C-MAN stations
have been repaired. The offshore platforms containing the other three
C-MAN stations were demolished, and will be repaired. The FY 2006
Hurricane Katrina Supplemental provides funding to repair or replace
the ASOS and C-MAN stations that remain down. We are currently awaiting
local infrastructure restoration (restoration of commercial power and
communications to the area) before we can address these repairs.
Q2. How does the declaration of an Incident of National Significance
by the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) change
the operations of the National Weather Service with respect to regional
forecasting, participation in HLT conference calls, local forecasting
or the other standard operations of NWS for a hurricane?
How does the flow of information between NOAA and the Homeland
Security Operations Center (HSOC) at DHS change if an Incident of
National Significance is declared for a hurricane?
A2. The operations of National Weather Service (NWS) units do not
change when an Incident of National Significance is declared. Our
operation procedures are designed to ``automatically'' include incident
escalation. NOAA/NWS responds to similar situations whenever a
thunderstorm becomes severe or produces a tornado, or when a strong
winter storm develops. To keep up with the latest information, the NOAA
Watch Desk at the Homeland Security Operations Center (HSOC)
coordinates closely with the NOAA Incident Coordination Center (NOAA
ICC) or the appropriate NWS Regional Operations Center. Important
products such as watches, warnings and advisories especially for
significant meteorological events such as tornadoes, flash floods, and
blizzards--are automatically routed directly from the main NWS
communications center, the NWS Telecommunication Gateway, and
transmitted via e-mail to the NOAA Watch Desk. Additionally, for a
selected group of these products, such as tornado warnings, flash flood
warnings, hurricane forecasts and statements, information is sent
directly to the Department of Homeland Security Senior Watch Officer in
the HSOC.
Q3. The Slidell office managed to get a flash flood message out about
the levee breach in New Orleans at 8:14 am Central Daylight Time the
morning Hurricane Katrina made landfall. The office lost its
communication capability a short time later.
The top of the Bulletin has a line that reads: EAS Activation
Requested. What action does that request set into motion?
What systems would transmit this message and who would receive a
flash flood message of this type (e.g., the Emergency Operations Center
in Baton Rouge; the Region VI FEMA office; NWS Southern Regional
Headquarters)? Please trace the path of this message.
A3. Transmitting the message ``EAS Activation Requested'' initiates the
Emergency Alert System. The Emergency Alert System (EAS) is designed to
provide the President with a means to address the American people in
the event of a national emergency. Through the EAS, the President would
have access to thousands of broadcast stations, cable systems, and
participating satellite programmers to transmit a message to the
public. The EAS and its predecessors, CONELRAD and the Emergency
Broadcast System (EBS), have never been activated for this purpose. But
beginning in 1963, the President permitted State and local level
emergency information to be transmitted using the EBS (now EAS).
Once activated, the EAS, depending on the message, generates tone
alerts on radio stations, crawls or programming interruptions for
television broadcasts, and immediate retransmissions by
``intermediaries'' (e.g., private weather companies, television
stations, web-based organizations, etc.) to cell phones, e-mail
messages, Internet notifications, etc. The message is also immediately
broadcast on NOAA Weather Radio All Hazards (NWR). State Emergency
Operations Centers are equipped to receive these warning messages
through various methods, including NWR, Internet, Emergency Managers
Information Network (EMIN), and NOAA Weather Wire Service (NWWS).
NOAA's responsibility is complete once the message is transmitted; we
do not verify receipt of transmission.
The flash flood warning message was transmitted by the Slidell
Weather Forecast Office and routed immediately onto NOAA Weather Radio.
From there, the Emergency Alert System was activated, with the message
and EAS activation request reaching media within seconds. The message
was also transmitted through all other NWS dissemination systems,
including NOAA Weather Wire Service (NWWS), Emergency Managers Weather
Information Network (EMIN), NOAAPORT, Internet, Family of Services, and
others.
Questions submitted by Representative Eddie Bernice Johnson
Q1. What role does NOAA play in providing information to the Army
Corps of Engineers regarding the potential and magnitude of flooding
and storm surge that would factor into setting construction standards
for the New Orleans levee system? How often is this information
updated?
A1. NOAA's National Weather Service (NWS) runs the SLOSH (Sea, Lake,
and Overland Surges from Hurricanes) model in simulation studies to
estimate potential hurricane storm surge flooding. This work is done as
part of comprehensive hurricane evacuation planning. Data from these
model simulation studies are used, in addition to other relevant
information, to develop evacuation plans. NOAA/NWS also runs the SLOSH
model for post-storm analysis, using the exact track of the storm, to
help assess storm impacts.
The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) and FEMA are the primary
Federal agencies providing funding for these SLOSH simulation studies.
NOAA is responsible for running the simulations. The Atlantic and Gulf
coastlines of the United States, from Texas to Maine, can be divided
into 41 geographic regions, or basins. SLOSH updates are generated for
each of the 41 basins, including the New Orleans area, according to a
list of priorities established by the Interagency Coordinating
Committee on Hurricanes (ICCOH), of which the USACE, FEMA, and NOAA are
members. The ICCOH determines when the SLOSH model studies are updated,
and makes the request to NOAA. These NOAA simulations are used
primarily for evacuation studies and planning. NOAA conducted SLOSH
model simulation studies for the New Orleans area in 1989, 1994, and
2002. These studies are not done on a scheduled basis, but when levee
data or upgrades to the storm surge model physics warrant, and as
resources permit. SLOSH is used primarily by the USACE to support
evacuation studies and emergency response activities.
For engineering studies and flood protection structure design the
USACE uses NOAA wind fields and other storm meteorological data as well
as bathymetric map products to drive high resolution storm surge and
wave models.
At the request of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, NOAA's Office
of Oceanic and Atmospheric Research provides post-storm analysis of
wind fields to assist USACE post-storm analysis of storm surge modeling
and impact.
Appendix I
Federal Interdepartmental Hurricane Conference (IHC) Recommendations
57th IHC ACTION ITEMS (2002)
Recommendation: Amend NHOP to carry Internet address. Implemented.
Recommendation: Amend NHOP to reflect changes in tropical cyclone
breakpoints. Implemented.
Recommendation: Amend NHOP Appendices H and I when information is
received from NOAA/NWS. Implemented.
Recommendation: Amend appropriate sections of NHOP to reflect forecasts
extended to five days. Implemented.
Recommendation: Delete section A.1.7 of the NHOP. Implemented.
Recommendation: Add to Appendix L--Glossary section of NHOP.
Implemented.
Recommendation: NOAA/NWS will provide OFCM further details. Add product
to appropriate section of NHOP. Implemented.
Recommendation: The name Isidore be retired and suggest replacement
names Irving, Icaro, or Ike. Recommend the name Lili be retired and
suggest replacement names Lucy, Laura, or Lisette. Recommend the name
Kenna be retired and suggest replacement names Karina, Katherin, or
Kayla. IHC to forward suggestions to the RA-IV Hurricane Committee.
Implemented.
Recommendation: Update NHOP to reflect changes by AFWA. Implemented.
Recommendation: Amend NHOP to reflect changes from 53 WRS. Implemented.
58th IHC ACTION ITEMS (2003)
Recommendation: Amend the NHOP to add the GPS dropwindsonde splash time
to the TEMP DROP 62626 section. Implemented.
Recommendation: Amend NHOP for deployment of drifting buoys.
Implemented.
Recommendation: Amend NHOP to reflect replacement names for retired
storm names Fabian, Isabel, Juan and Lili. Implemented.
Recommendation: Ask the Navy to run the GFDN at 0, 6, 12, and 18Z out
to 126 hours. Implemented--FNMOC will increase the run frequency and
extend the forecast period of the GFDN, resources permitting.
Recommendation: Amend the 2004 NHOP to include approved recommended
changes from 53 WRS. Implemented.
59th IHC ACTION ITEMS (2004)
Recommendation: Have at least one of the two P-3s operationally
configured and available to respond within 24 hours to reconnaissance
taskings from 1 June through 30 November. The minimum operational
configuration for the P-3 includes the SFMR and the Airborne Vertical
Atmosphere Profiling System. Modify the 2005 National Hurricane
Operations Plan accordingly. Implemented.
Recommendation: Retire storm names Charley, Frances, Ivan, and Jeanne.
Implemented.
Recommendation: Ask SAB to continue to provide Dvorak satellite
classifications for tropical weather systems in the Atlantic, eastern
and central north Pacific basins. Implemented
Recommendation: Correct NHOP. Implemented.
Recommendation: Make the appropriate changes to NHOP section 5.5.4 to
allow the NRL P-3 to operate jointly with the other aircraft in the
effected airspace. Implemented.
Recommendation: Revise the Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) in the NHOP
Appendix F, as needed, to reflect changes in agency contacts and
approving officials for 2005. Implemented.
Recommendation: Update NHOP Table 6-2 and Appendices I and K.
Implemented.
Recommendation: During the 2005 Atlantic Hurricane Season, UBLOX
dropsondes are to be used in the eyewall of intense (Cat. 3-5)
hurricanes and in drop locations adjacent to land on any reconnaissance
or surveillance flights. GPS121 dropsondes should be used elsewhere to
deplete the current inventory of these sondes before becoming obsolete.
Adopted--Coordination is ongoing between TPC/HRD/AOC/53 WRS.
Recommendation: The OFCM should facilitate the identification of
engineering support necessary design, testing and replacement of
components of the GPS dropsonde. Action--The OFCM will facilitate the
development of an implementation strategy to pursue the development and
procurement of the next-generation dropwindsonde.
OPEN ACTION ITEM (from 56th IHC)
Recommendation: Amend Section 3.3 of the NHOP to reflect designation of
tropical and subtropical cyclones. Implemented.
Appendix 2
NOAA 2003 Hurricane Conference Action Items
Recommendation: Add the GPS dropwindsonde splash time to the TEMP DROP
62626 section. Implemented.
Recommendation: Identify simplest mechanisms to get P-3 the data to the
GTS. Implemented.
Recommendation: Attendees to make decisions regarding Tropical Cyclone
Wind Team for: what type of 34-, 50-, and 64-kt wind distribution
should be represented for tropical depressions, tropical storms, and
hurricanes; whether a wind team is needed, and whether the team charter
should be continued and why. Implemented.
Recommendation: Include three- to five-day tropical cyclone information
in the Offshore Waters Forecasts. Implemented.
Recommendation: NWS grids need to be consistent between coastal WFOs
and OPC. Implemented.
Recommendation: WFOs need to ensure consistent information when re-
issuing NHC products. Implemented.
Recommendation: Rerun the SLOSH model ``MOMs'' using larger storm wind
fields, farther west tracks, climatologically curved tracks, and for
time periods that extend well beyond the storm center's passage.
Implemented.
Recommendation: Redo the PC SLOSH version of the Chesapeake Basin used
by WFOs with these modifications. Implemented.
Recommendation: Make storm specific SLOSH output available to the field
offices 24 hours prior to landfall. Output from several runs with
tracks both to the left and right of the official forecast track, and
perhaps of different categories, would be valuable. Implemented.
Recommendation: Allow WFOs to run storm specific surge models locally.
Not Implemented--Computer resources not available locally, and
differing solutions could hamper preparedness actions.
Recommendation: Work in partnership with the academic sector to develop
a more sophisticated storm surge model. Implemented.
Recommendation: Work in partnership with the academic sector to develop
probabilistic methods of displaying storm surge forecasts. Implemented.
Recommendation: Work in partnership with the academic sector to develop
high resolution storm surge inundation mapping. Implemented.
Recommendation: When forecasting positions over land, decay the winds
according to model guidance. Implemented.
Recommendation: Reword Section 6.1.1 of NWSI 10-601 to clarify
requirements of offices designated as ``inland'' by regions, for
issuing and updating NPWs for Inland Tropical Storm/Hurricane Watch/
Warnings. Implemented.
Recommendation: An automated solution needs to be found so all approved
break points are handled by the NHC software and so in the future, it
correctly plots watches and warnings affecting the Chesapeake Bay area
on the NHC Web site. Implemented.
Recommendation: Develop a method for allowing local offices to correct
erroneous tropical issuances, bearing in mind this includes web based
products. Will be Implemented--Awaiting AWIPS software build to
establish a national standard map and removal process by product
cancellation.
Recommendation: NWS internet software should use FFA to paint flood
watch maps and NPW to correctly plot wind warnings/advisories during
tropical weather. A product should be developed to correctly plot
tropical weather flags. This would also solve the problem of automated
NOAA Weather Radio dissemination. Implemented, with modifications to
use other products at this time.
Recommendation: Could TPC issue a product that would include the
coastal county codes within the TC Watch and/or Warning areas, as well
as a simple line of text detailing the breakpoints of the watch/warning
area? This product could then be sent over AWIPS and used by the
appropriate WFOs to send to their CRS broadcast. Will be Implemented in
a future AWIPS software load.
Recommendation: Make surface data received at NHC from mobile platforms
available to the coastal WFOs through AWIPS. Implemented to the degree
possible--Supplemental/experimental wind information data from non-NOAA
sources will be accessible via the Internet, when possible.
Recommendation: Using input from TAFB, OPC and local WFOs, NHC
advisories should include a statement advising not just ``marine''
interests, but the public, to be alert for dangerous surf conditions
including rip currents. Implemented.
Recommendation: Once TPC commits to beginning an advisory package for a
new system, a DSA should always be issued to inform all users.
Implemented.
Recommendation: TPC should be more diligent to place additive
information below the $$. NWR automation software could also be
modified to search for key words and remove such from being broadcast.
NHC will make all efforts to place product ID information regarding on-
going storms at the bottom of the TWO. Implemented.
Recommendation: Determine if a national model/standardized gHLS format/
software should be developed for use by all WFOs. If yes, work towards
developing the national model/standard. A team approach might be most
effective to move this initiative along. Not Implemented--A national
implementation of a gHLS or some form of graphical hurricane hazard
representation will not take place for the 2004 season. OS21 talking
with regions about forming a team to look at implementation of some
form of graphical hurricane hazard product in 2005. Update of this team
will be made at the 2004 Hurricane Conference.
Recommendation: Initiating and receiving agencies should coordinate in
the formulation of best-track positions to avoid discontinuities or
discrepancies near the point of transfer. Implemented.
Recommendation: Expand TCU and TCE product header information to
associate these products with the particular tropical cyclone they
describe. Introduce MIATCUATx, MIATCEATx, MIATCUEPx, MIATCEEPx, where x
varies from 1-5 along with the associated tropical cyclone.
Implemented.
Recommendation: TPC and WFOs will complete their coordination on the
list of secondary breakpoints. When complete for a given year, TPC will
post the list on its web page in a manner similar to the standard
breakpoints. TPC will coordinate with OCWWS, NCO, and FSL to develop a
scheme for communicating via the WWA product breakpoint information
(e.g., county and lat/lon) for any site not on the standard and
secondary list. Implemented.
Recommendation: Change wording in last sentence of NWSI 10-601, 7.5 to
``The appropriate regions will ensure Tropical Cyclone Center(s) obtain
significant information (e.g., deaths and damages) from WFOs not
preparing formal post-storm reports.'' WFOs should clearly label those
reports which are unofficial in the PSH, Internet and other information
source outlets. Implemented.
Recommendation: Delete the definitions of ``advisory'' and ``hurricane
local statement'' from NWSI 10-604. Implemented.
Recommendation: For a well forecasted storm, such as Isabel, it would
appear the New York City OEM would usually be best served if the storm
that is handled in a non-tropical fashion during the watch phase
continued to be handled in a non-tropical fashion during its warning
stage. Similarly, tropical issuances should generally follow in the
warning phase, if initially introduced during the watch stage. However,
all things considered, the New York City OEM would generally opt for
tropical versus non-tropical issuances if the situation is a ``toss-
up.'' Implemented.
Recommendation: There needs to be a standard operating procedure to
address medium range tropical cyclone forecasting. Implemented.
Recommendation: Clarify the standard for handing off a tropical cyclone
from the TPC to the HPC. Implemented.
Recommendation: Change the National Hurricane Operations Plan (NHOP)
regarding deployment of drifting buoys. Implemented.
Recommendation: Initiate an annual Hurricane Liaison Team (HLT) review
of the past season's ``lessons learned'' and implement suggested ``best
practices'' prior to the beginning of the tropical season. Implemented.
Recommendation: Develop a comprehensive package of geographical
locations, pronunciations and tropical related impacts pertinent to
each coastal WFO. Provide the package to the detailed HLT prior to
arrival at NHC. Not Implemented--Eastern and Southern Regions will
provide WFOs and RFCs with templates for developing standardized
information guides, to include tropical-related impacts and
geographical pronunciations. Regions will complete guides prior to
beginning of 2006 season with the final guides available to TPC/NHC for
HLT activations.
Recommendation: Fabian, Isabel and Juan will be retired. Replacement
names to be decided at WMO RA-IV meeting. Implemented.
Recommendation: The Navy run the GFDN at 0, 6, 12, and 18Z out to 126
hours. Forward to IHC. Implemented.
NOAA 2004 Hurricane Conference Action Items
Recommendation: Change NWSI 10-601 to establish a ``Hurricane Eye-wall
Warning'' product with unique PIL and EAS code to be issued by WFOs for
landfalling tropical cyclones with distinct eye-wall and inner rainband
features with destructive winds. Implemented.
Recommendation: To increase the visibility of the inland hurricane
(wind) hazard, create a new PIL (IHW?) for Inland Hurricane (Wind)
Watches/Warnings to elevate/distinguish the watch/warning from the more
universal non-precipitation weather (NPW) PIL. Not Implemented--
Existing products must be more effectively used to communicate the
potential threats.
Recommendation: To better align terminology between the coastal and
inland watches/warnings, change the name for the (WFO issued) interior
watch/warning to ``Inland Tropical Storm/Hurricane Watch/Wanting.''
Implemented.
Recommendation: Regions will identify WFOs exempt from the requirement
of section 7.3.3.3 of NWSI 10-601. Implemented.
Recommendation: To better align NHC and WFO product issuance times,
change watch/warning criteria in NWSI section 7.3.2.2. to read: A watch
is valid up to 48 hours after the issuance time. The valid time (event
start and end times) is described in the watch headline. A warning is
valid up to 36 hours after issuance time. The valid time (event start
and end times) is described in the warning headline. Implemented.
Recommendation: To help direct customers to NWS WFO products that
emphasize tropical storm hurricane impacts over non-coastal areas, NHC
should include a general reference within the TCP product of wind
impacts occurring, or projected to occur, along coastal and inland
areas. Implemented.
Recommendation: Inland offices may issue HLS-type products using the
HLS when tropical cyclone conditions are expected within part or all of
the CWA. Implemented.
Recommendation: Reinstate language in 10-601 Section 7.1.2.2 to allow
WFOs to issue HLSs as needed to dispel rumors or to clarify tropical
cyclone related information for their CWA. Implemented.
Recommendation: Restructure NWSI 10-601 to encourage WFOs to write
single purpose HLSs, to emphasize a specific hazard which is imminent
and/or will have a potentially life-threatening impact, or to describe
a significant and critical change of short-term hazard impacts.
Implemented.
Recommendation: All HLSs should include at least one headline.
Implemented.
Recommendation: Allow WFOs the flexibility to issue Special Marine
Warnings on an as needed basis during tropical storm/hurricane watches.
Implemented.
Recommendation: Use the standard tropical storm symbol for subtropical
storms on the NWS unified surface analysis. This will be consistent
with warning headlines, which use the phrase ``. . .Tropical Storm
Warning. . .'' for subtropical storms in OPC/TPC high seas forecasts.
Implemented.
Recommendation: Decide method to provide required information in
header. Implemented.
Recommendation: OS21 will investigate requirements needed to expand the
product bins for NHC numbered products from 5 to 10. We will keep JTWC
in mind. Not implemented--Will be discussed at the 2005 NOAA Hurricane
Conference.
Recommendation: At least one of the two P-3s will be operationally
configured and available to respond within 24 hours to reconnaissance
taskings from 1 June through 30 November. The minimum operational
configuration for the P-3 includes the SFMR and the Airborne Vertical
Atmosphere Profiling System. Implemented.
Recommendation: Decide on a consistent and appropriate way of
indicating wind speeds for tropical cyclones in WFO text forecast
products. Implemented.
Recommendation: TPC should stop producing the gridded TCM. If the
current primary FSL hurricane wind tool does not work, the new generic
cyclonic wind tool could be used as backup. Implemented.
Recommendation: Allow TPC/NHC to declare Critical Weather Events.
Implemented.
Recommendation: TPC coordinate with DOD contacts to develop document.
Forward to Interdepartmental Hurricane Conference. Not implemented--
Recommendation withdrawn.
Recommendation: Meet with Executive members of the NHC Electronic Media
Pool to assess the scope of costs and impact on local operations;
explore means for resolving the problem in the public interest
(convenience and necessity). Realign or redefine resources and rules of
engagement, as necessary. Implemented.
Recommendation: Initiate a low-cost pilot project to demonstrate the
feasibility of a local (WFO) level II data archive. The Melbourne,
Miami, and San Juan offices will participate in the pilot project. TPC
will coordinate among the participating offices and ROC. Implemented.
Recommendation: Retire 2004 storm names at the annual WMO RA-IV
meeting. It is likely that Charley, Frances, Ivan, and Jeanne will be
retired. Implemented.
Recommendation: SAB continue to provide Dvorak satellite
classifications for tropical weather systems in the Atlantic, eastern
and central north Pacific basins. Implemented.
Recommendation: Determine best method to use NHC radius of maximum
winds in SPC tornado watches' ``Mean Vector'' line. Implemented.
Recommendation: Ensure revised NWS Hurricane Directives are annually
available to the field by June 1st. Implemented.
Recommendation: Include a landfall point in the TCM product. Both
Hurrevac and the TCM tool could be modified to incorporate this
additional point and improve the transition between water based points/
radii and land based points which have already taken land effects into
account in their radii. Not Implemented--TPC/NHC agrees to provide
guidance on landfall intensity during the Hurricane Hotline
Coordination calls.
Recommendation: Reiterate the need to NWS headquarters for ASOS backup
power to ensure no loss of data. Implemented.
Recommendation: Make a request to the observation branch of OCWWS to
upgrade the structural integrity of ASOS system in hurricane-prone
areas, making them more resistant to high winds. Implemented.
Recommendation: The need for a PSH in these circumstances should be
based on a stated need by TPC for the data, and not an all inclusive
directive which takes no notice of whether the data is actually needed
or useful. Implemented.
Recommendation: Due to possible urgency implied in a Tropical Cyclone
Update (TCU), it is requested that TPC, using the Hurricane
Coordination Hotline, alert WFOs and other users that a TCU is about to
be issued. Implemented.
Recommendation: Push SLOSH Rex files to WFOs via the AWIPS SBN. Not
Implemented--Action forwarded to TPC communications specialists in the
Technical Support Branch for comment and feasibility due to band width
limitations of SBN.
Recommendation: Port the SLOSH software to the LINUX environment and
implement it for operational runs on AWIPS. Not Implemented--A LINUX
version of this program already exists, but it runs rather slowly. TPC
will ask MDL (Will Shaffer's group) to work, as time and resources
permit, to improve the efficiency of the LINUX SLOSH display software,
with the intent to migrate eventually to AWIPS. WFO Miami and TPC will
investigate using an alternative data transmission mode via the AWIPS
FTP server.
Recommendation: WFOs need clarification on the convention that NHC will
use in the SLOSH runs to ensure appropriate interpretation of the
product. Implemented.
Recommendation: Make operational a probabilistic storm surge model
available to forecasters that can be relayed as information to
customers farther in advance than the current approximate 12-hour
practice. Implemented.
Recommendation: Make corrections to NHOP. Implemented.
2005 NOAA Hurricane Conference Action Items
Note: The 2005 NOAA Hurricane Conference occurred in December,
2005. The following recommendations came from that meeting and are
being addressed.
Recommendation: Discuss pros and cons of issuing tropical storm/
hurricane/typhoon warnings when conditions are expected over land, or
along the coast. Action--Change wording of first paragraph to ``along
the coast.'' Make parallel changes in NHOP if necessary.
Recommendation: Update the directives to formally extend lead time of
tropical cyclone watches to 48 or 60 hours. This will better support
evacuation orders provided by local emergency management. Action--No
action required.
Recommendation: Format the Repeat section of the Tropical Cyclone
Public Advisory in the current paragraph form or a list. Whatever
method is used, consistent formatting, words, dots, spaces is required.
Add wind gusts. Status--open.
1. TPC will not add gusts in the public advisory.
2. OS will provide documentation/examples on ``Repeat''
section inconsistencies to TPC.
3. TPC will take steps to ensure the ``Repeat'' section is
formatted consistently in the current narrative fashion.
Recommendation: Add storm identification numbers to the TCP. Action--
Accept Recommendation for TCP. TPC will also add storm identification
number to all TPC text products. A Public Information Statement will be
disseminated.
Recommendation: In 10-601, stipulate the use of English and metric
system measurements in the TCP. Recommend this include the storm
direction in km/hr, maximum sustained winds in km/hr and extent of
hurricane and tropical storm winds in km. Action--Section 1.1.3.3.a
already specifies when TPC should use metric units in the public
advisories. This section will be modified to delete the part about
``except when the United States is the only country threatened.''
Recommendation: Delete the breakpoint at Fort Walton Beach. Action--
Accepted. Fort Walton Beach will be deleted as a primary breakpoint,
but will be retained as a secondary breakpoint. Update NHOP.
Recommendation: Eliminate the Currituck Beach Light breakpoint, and
replace it with Duck, NC. Action--Accepted. ERH will provide latitude
and longitude of Duck breakpoint to OS21 and TPC. Update NHOP.
Currituck Beach Light will be retained as a secondary breakpoint.
Recommendation: Suggest substituting Card Sound Road Bridge as a
replacement break point. Card Sound Road Bridge is on the Miami-Dade/
Monroe county line and is a very tall bridge, well known by anyone in
our area. By having Card Sound Road Bridge, tropical cyclone watches
and warnings can then specify the entire south coast (Florida Bay
coast) of mainland South Florida in an appropriate manner (for
example--East Cape Sable to Card Sound Road Bridge). Action--Florida
City will be deleted as a primary breakpoint and will be retained as a
secondary breakpoint. Card Sound Bridge will become a primary
breakpoint. SRH will provide latitude and longitude of Card Sound
Bridge to OS21 and TPC. Update NHOP.
Recommendation: Provide SLOSH output (MEOWs) for east moving storms in
the Morehead City Basin. And include forward movements of 10 mph, 20
mph, and 30 mph as options available to choose from when selecting
storm variables. Action--This action will be prioritized with ICCOH
with respect to other basin restudies. When resources are available,
NHC will work with MDL, WFO Morehead City, and emergency managers to
test the Recommendations and incorporate those that are critical in the
next restudy of the Pamlico Basin.
Recommendation: Use zero (0) as the baseline water level during real-
time SLOSH runs, which would then provide output that is ``pure''
surge, and can be more easily inserted into WFO products, and conveyed
to the public. Action--TPC previously agreed to make the real-time
SLOSH runs at a 0 ft base tide level for the U.S. East Coast. TPC
accepts the Recommendation. Exceptions will be arranged by TPC and the
affected WFOs based on coordination during the, event.
Recommendation: Provide training material for real-time SLOSH runs.
Update SLOSH display manual to include clear explanation of tide datum
used for real-time runs, MEOWs and MOMs. Action--A Call for forecaster
attendance at the Train the Trainer course was provided to ERH and SRH
in November 2005. Additionally, written training material and distance
learning formats will be explored by the Warning Decision Training
Branch for the Tropical Cyclone Operations Course. ERH will work with
NHC and MDL concerning updates to the SLOSH display manual, to be
approved by NHC and MDL.
Recommendation: Based upon the work and Recommendations by the Tropical
Cyclone Extreme Wind Team, the conference needs to decide future
actions. Action--For the 2006 season implement Phase II as follows:
Add new VTEC Phenomenon Code EW,
Develop template for WARNGEN ready by 2006 season,
Change MND Product Type Line to Extreme Wind Warning,
Ensure Standard Format of 1St Bullet by all WFOs,
Use of the ``Go to the lowest floor'' Call to Action
at WFO discretion,
WFOs will follow guidance in Directive 10-601 section
7.2,
Issue a Public Information Statement in early 2006,
Make decision for experimental vice official product
addressed by Headquarters, and
Team to begin actions for Phase III.
Recommendation: Conference to decide the future direction the wind team
should pursue or disband the team. Action--The Wind Team should
continue into 2006 to address issues related to the usage of TPC's wind
speed probabilities product in WFO products.
Recommendation: Modify the TCV to allow local input so the counties in
question can be removed as conditions warrant. Action--The action was
subsequently overtaken by the next item. All WFOs to review the
existing ``county translation table'' and respond to Michelle Mainelli
(TPC) by 1 February 2006 if any changes are needed for 2006.
Recommendation: Consideration should be given to use ``Zone'' codes
versus ``County'' FIP codes in the TCV before it is even considered to
make the TCV official. Action--For 2006 the TCV will use Zone codes
instead of county codes, if the necessary software changes can be made.
Regions will coordinate with their WFOs and provide TPC with a list of
zone codes to include in the TCV by 1 February 2006.
Recommendation: Just as SPC issues watches for Severe Weather for
adjacent coastal waters, NHC needs to, at minimum, issue guidance as to
the appropriate Watches and/or Warnings that need to be taken
concerning coastal waters. In this era of heightened awareness and
coverage of Tropical events by the news media, a more structured
approach is required. STATUS: Closed (see next item).
Recommendation: There needs to be clarification in either 10-601,
granting specific area responsibility for warnings (by zone definition,
not just breakpoint), or in 10-310, which would grant the WFO authority
over tropical cyclone watches and warnings for coastal marine zones.
Note that granting WFO authority over coastal marine zones within 20 nm
may result in increased consultation with NHC, since there can be a
serious perception issue when warnings from coastal marine zones and
adjacent coastal land zones disagree. It is the opinion of this WFO
that the warnings and watches between a coastal land zone and an
adjacent coastal marine zone (within 20 nm) must agree. Implemented--
WFOs have full responsibility for watches and warnings in their coastal
waters, and will coordinate their issuance with TPC and adjacent WFOs.
NWS 10-310 2.3.5 will be clarified to reflect this policy.
Recommendation: To preserve the existing policy in 10-310, there needs
to be a choice to use the phrase Small Craft Should Remain in Port that
holds the active Small Craft Advisory VTEC in a continuation until the
tropical cyclone watch is upgraded to a warning. As a second less-
preferred item, we can require that Small Craft Advisories be
maintained if necessary (and headlines as such) until the tropical
cyclone watch is upgraded (if necessary) to a warning. Action--Issue
will be resolved through ongoing OS21 update of NWSI 10-310. Modify
appropriate directives.
Recommendation: Seek agreement from OPC leading to OPC and TAFB
products stating ``Maximum significant wave height XX ft. Some
individual waves much higher.'' Change marine directive as necessary.
Action--For year-round High Seas Forecasts from OPC, TAFB, and WFO
Honolulu, the following statement will be included in the synopsis
portion: ``Seas Given In Significant Wave Heights.''
Recommendation: Allow WFO forecast grids to more closely match TCM grid
output, even if it is in conflict with existing watches/warnings.
Implemented--WFO grids should match TCM gridded output.
Recommendation: NHC should be more judicious about and less apt to
issue watch/warning combinations. Action--None required. There will be
occasions when a Tropical Cyclone Warning/Hurricane Watch combination
is needed.
Recommendation:
1. Enlist the assistance of NHC/TPC and their associations
with the engineering/academic communities to aid NYC OEM
towards incorporating up-to-date information for residents of
high rise buildings. This then needs to be incorporated into
the official ``hurricane plan'' for NYC.
2. Address the ``canyon effect'' one would see down New York
City main Avenues, which we haven't yet seen with a landfalling
hurricane. Could this make a large difference in actual wind
speed and ultimate destruction potential?
3. As a result of this, ascertain if each residential building
in NYC should have its own ``hurricane plan'' detailing the
safe zones in that building, (e.g., . . .from the 3rd to the
8th floor hallways) and have this information delivered to all
tenants annually?
Action--WFO Upton will contact several organizations, such as the NOAA
Air Resources Laboratory, who have technical expertise in this area.
Recommendation: HPC generated forecast maps through Day 6 should
include remnants for tropical systems. Implemented.
Recommendation: Eliminate issuing separate products NPW/FFA except for
short fused warnings for inland areas. Action--Members of this
conference, led by David Manning, WFO Sterling, are tasked to write a
short white paper that recommends consolidation of the current suite of
WFO tropical cyclone products, including segmentation of the HLS, and
submit to OS21 by 1 February 2006.
Recommendation: Delete forecasting wind gust from cyclones after they
transition into an extra-tropical low. Action--OPC will check for user
feedback before any changes are made.
Recommendation: Improve hurricane local statements for clear headers,
place most important sections first, do not repeat the TCP advisory,
omit sections not needed, do not use headline ``updated Storm
Information,'' and the HLS does not need to have all sections. Will be
Implemented for 2006 Hurricane Season.
Recommendation: Make the HLS a segmented product in time for the 2006
season. Action--It is desired for HLSs to become segmented in 2006.
WFOs have the option to produce single-segmented or multi-segmented HLS
products. Eastern, Southern and Pacific Regions will work with selected
WFOs to provide examples of both formats. Regions and WSH will seek
customer input regarding segmented HLSs. Mark Tew, OS22, will work with
software developers to ascertain the level of effort required for HLS
segmentation, and provide a feasible implementation date as soon as
possible.
Recommendation: Require that ``New Information'' be the initial header
in all but the first HLS. Action--If used, ``New Information'' must be
the initial section header in the HLS.
Recommendation: Allow the flexibility to shorten the HLS to include
only the New Information header for life-threatening events within six
hours of occurrence. Action--Will be Implemented for 2006 Hurricane
Season.
Recommendation: Eliminate the requirement to include the entire CWA,
for Florida counties, in an HLS that affects a small portion of the
CWA. Recommendation from OS21: Rewrite in directive 10-601, section
7.1.2.2 to read (changes in italics):
7.1.2.2 Issuance Criteria. The following WFOs will issue HLSs when
their area of responsibility is affected by a tropical cyclone watch/
warning or evacuation orders. HLSs may also be issued as needed to
dispel rumors or to clarify tropical cyclone related information for
their CWA. Coastal WFOs have the option to include inland counties in
the HLS. WFOs also have the option to include or not include coastal
and inland counties not affected by a tropical cyclone watch or
warning. Action--Change 7.1.2.2 to read: The following WFOs will issue
HLSs when their zone areas of responsibility are affected by a tropical
cyclone watch/warning or evacuation orders. HLSs may also be issued as
needed to dispel rumors or to clarify tropical cyclone-related
information for their CWA. Coastal WFOs have the option to include
inland counties in the HLS. WFOs may exclude zones not affected by a
tropical cyclone watch or warning.
Recommendation: Require impact statements for both NPW and HLS, based
on life-threatening impacts of wind, surge, or inland flood. Emphasize
judicious use for each case. For wind, the lower limit should be
sustained Category 2 (96 mph or greater). Impacts for surge and inland
flood may be locally defined. Action--WFOs will have the option to
include strongly-worded impact statements in NPW and HLS products.
Judicious use is recommended, commensurate with the threat, to ensure
the continued effectiveness of such statements.
Recommendation: Make improving tropical related GHG formatters by next
hurricane season a top priority. Action--Recommendation accepted. OS21
will forward to FSL. FSL to ensure function to capture text from
previous HLS works correctly.
Recommendation: Tropical Storm/Hurricane Wind Impacts should be base
lined as a Cal 1To Actions-Tropical-Overrides
file in future IFPS builds. Action--Recommendation accepted. WFO
Slidell will forward files to OS21. OS21 will forward to FSL.
Recommendation: Pursue an agency effort which builds upon the work
undertaken at WFOs Miami and Melbourne to include enhanced wording
within the ZFP and CWT text products as generated by the GFE formatter.
Action--Accepted. Wind Team will coordinate the experimental use of
probabilistic wind information in the 2006 season. Team will make final
Recommendations for the ZFP, CWT, and PFM products.
Recommendation: Provide `Hurricane Hotlines' for inland office commonly
impacted by tropical systems. Action--SRH will submit a formal letter
for these inland WFOs to OS21.
Recommendation: NWS directives need to better define areas which are
included in NHC watches/warnings, and areas which are considered
inland, thereby falling under the realm of inland tropical cyclone
watches/warnings. Action--OS21 will form a team with representatives
from Southern, Eastern and Pacific Regions, and TPC, to address this
recommendation and the next, as well as associated issues.
Recommendation: To improve the delivery and clear communication of
local WFO tropical cyclone watch/warning information to customers in
their area of warning responsibility, change the headline in segmented,
VTEC ready, NPW products for coastal zones. This improvement would
extend to all local WFO issued NPWs for tropical storm/hurricane
watches and warnings that affect coastal zones. Action--See previous
item.
Recommendation: The NHC should provide appropriate error cone radius
numbers for each forecast time on TCM and possibly TCD products. Also,
NWS tropical web sections (WFOs, NHC, Regional and National HQ, etc.)
need to include a good, concise definition and explanation of the error
cone and how it should be used. This explanation should be non-
technical and geared more toward the public and EMC. Action--TPC/NHC
will modify their web page text description to include average error
values and a better definition of the cone of uncertainty.
Recommendation: TPC should produce an internal pre-TCM flat file just
before conference call time. This file would only be available to WFOs
and would give them an hour lead time on producing wind grids. If
necessary, WFOs can run the TCMwind tool if there are changes between
the preliminary pre-TCM flat file and the final version of the TPC
Tropical Cyclone Marine Forecast. Action--At conference call time, this
forecast information is typically available only in hard copy form on
an advisory composition worksheet. TPC/NHC will investigate the
possibility of using an electronic tablet to produce this worksheet, so
that a file containing the information can be transmitted to the WFOs
and the DOD, when available.
Recommendation: A simple solution to ``retiring'' Greek Alphabet names,
if necessary, is to have a floating alternate or secondary name list
available that could be placed into service if the primary Atlantic
Cyclone name list is exhausted. Named storms from the secondary or
alternate list that require retirement could easily be replenished
based on Recommendations from the WMO. Action--Recommendation accepted.
Will be proposed at the upcoming WMO RA-IV hurricane Committee meeting.
Recommendation: Add Pacific Region ASOS sites to be considered for
backup power. Action--Pacific Region will forward a list of ASOS sites
for consideration in this initiative.
Recommendation: Forward to IHC to request action completed by CARCAH,
USAF 53rd WRS and NOAA AOC prior to start of 2006 hurricane season.
Action--Recommendations accepted. Will be forwarded to IHC.
Recommendation: Forward to IHC to request action by Air Force prior to
start of 2006 hurricane season. For TP..10 KGWC WMO Fix Message.
Action--Recommendation Accepted.
Recommendation: Obtain input from the coastal forecast offices, and
deliver revised plan prior to start of 2006 hurricane season. Action--
Recommendation accepted.
Recommendation: Change Subtropical Cyclone Definition in Operational
Manuals. Action--Recommendation Accepted. Forward to IHC and WMO RA-IV
Hurricane Committee.
Recommendation: Standardize Post-Tropical Cyclone Reports:
1) In all issuances of the PSH, follow the existing format in
Instruction 10-601 unless and until the format is revised, in
particular providing only wind observations with at least gusts
of 34 kts or greater, wind speeds in kts, times in UTC,
anemometer heights, and sustained wind speed averaging
durations.
2) Create a team of TPC, WFO, and NWS Headquarters personnel
to agree upon the format of a more standardized PSH and to
recommend procedures and/or any software enhancements needed to
compose the product in the new format. This could be similar to
how WFOs input Local Storm Reports into AWIPS. Recommended
standardizations for the team to consider would include but are
not necessarily limited to the following:
a. Standardize the placement of key data values, more
specifically than just the order of major sections, to
facilitate automated parsing and conversion of the PSH
product for multiple uses.
b. If an instrument failed during the event, or if
data is otherwise incomplete, specify the time of the
last available observation and the reason for the data
outage (e.g., power failure, storm surge, capsized).
c. For unofficial and/or mobile observation sources,
provide the latitude and longitude of the listed
observation, if available.
3) Determine if it is possible for the National Data Buoy
Center (NDBC) to issue a PSH product or otherwise produce a
text product in the same format as the PSH. The product would
include similar information in the same format as WFO-issued
PSHs for each NDBC site with observed data satisfying the same
wind and/or pressure threshold criteria during the tropical
cyclone event.
Action--Recommendation (1) is already covered by existing policy.
Recommendations (2) and (3) accepted. Dan Brown, TPC, will draft a
proposed PSH template format and will forward to the Regions and NWS
Headquarters. OS21 will contact NDBC and make a request for them to
generate a product in a format consistent with the PSH when conditions
warrant.
Recommendation: Correct Offshore Forecast Tropical Cyclone Warning
information displayed on the NWS Watch/Warning/Advisory Web map.
Action--
1. Recommended that Warnings for offshore waters not be
displayed and a disclaimer/appropriate links be added to the
web page. OS21 will forward the Recommendation to the WWA Map
Team.
2. Michelle Mainelli will work with Bob Bunge and Leon Minton
to determine how existing warning information can be properly
displayed on the WWA Map.
Recommendation: (1) Request AXBT deployments (minimum of 12), using
present second-hand inventory, on each WP-3D tasked reconnaissance
mission. (2) Seek funding support to establish inventory of new,
reliable AXBTs. Action--Recommendation (1) accepted, and will be
forwarded to the IHC. The conference supports Recommendation (2).
Additional funds will be requested through the normal program funding
process and according to program priorities. Use of the AXBTs is
currently for research.
Answers to Post-Hearing Questions
Responses by Max Mayfield, Director, NOAA Tropical Prediction Center/
National Hurricane Center
Questions submitted by the Majority
Q1. In your testimony you explained that while progress has been made
forecasting hurricane tracks, there is much room for improvement in
forecasting hurricane intensity. Non-governmental experts have
suggested that the Federal Government could improve its ability to
forecast hurricane intensity by conducting additional observations and
research. Some of the additional activities suggested by these experts
include:
Q1a. Hurricane observation flights in the upper troposphere (current
flights do not go to that altitude);
Q1b. Improved numerical prediction models that include both ocean and
atmospheric observations; and
Q1c. More or improved observations of hurricane cores.
Do you agree that conducting the additional observations/research
listed above would likely lead to an improved ability to forecast
hurricane intensity in the short-term and/or in the long-term? If not,
why not?
A1a,b,c. Currently NOAA is pursuing all three of these activities to
improve forecasts of hurricane intensity and structure.
The NOAA Gulfstream-IV aircraft operates a high
altitude sampling of the upper troposphere surrounding
hurricanes as part of operational surveillance missions. We are
also conducting special research flights into the inner portion
of hurricanes including the upper regions in the eye of the
hurricane. NOAA has partnered with the National Aeronautics and
Space Administration (NASA) on three experiments over the past
seven years, the latest conducted this past summer, to obtain
high altitude aircraft observations of the inner core of a
number of hurricanes and tropical storms from the NASA DC-8 and
ER-2 aircraft. These observations, combined with those from the
NOAA P-3 aircraft, have provided numerous insights into storm
intensity and structure.
NOAA currently is developing a next generation
hurricane prediction system, the Hurricane Weather and Research
Forecasting system. The Hurricane Weather and Research
Forecasting system consists of (1) advanced high-quality
observations for both atmosphere and ocean; (2) advanced data
assimilation techniques; and (3) the next generation, coupled
air-sea-land prediction system with advanced representation of
physical processes. This model is in the testing stage with
implementation planned for 2007.
The NOAA P-3 aircraft operate in the core of the
hurricane at altitudes between 1,000-20,000 feet. These
aircraft have been used since 1976 to collect research and
operational data sets to improve our forecasts and
understanding of tropical cyclone track, intensity, and
structure. As a result of this research, a number of new
technologies, sampling strategies, and concepts have been
transitioned to operational use. The most recent of these is
the Stepped Frequency Microwave Radiometer (SFMR), which
provides surface wind estimates that are a direct measure of
the storm structure and intensity. We are in the midst of
transferring a new technology into operations, the airborne
Doppler radar, for use in initializing and evaluating the new
operational modeling system.
Q2. In your opinion, what other areas of additional research or
observations are needed to help understand and forecast hurricane
intensity in the short-term and in the long-term?
A2. Investing wisely in science and technology is the prudent approach
toward improving hurricane understanding and prediction. Observations
and research are essential for developing advanced operational
numerical systems. Research and operations are linked to achieve
improved understanding and prediction of hurricanes. Requirements to
better understand and forecast hurricane intensity include numerical
weather prediction model guidance of high resolution derived from
cutting edge science and advanced data assimilation, as well as a real-
time observing network of greater resolution and reliability,
especially over ocean areas for forecaster analysis and short-term
forecasts. The FY 2006 hurricane supplemental request included over
$31M in new investments to improve hurricane warnings and forecasts.
Ocean observations will be expanded by deploying 8 new buoys and re-
engineering dropwindsones. The completion of the new Hurricane Weather
and Research Forecasting System (HWRF) will be accelerated. The Global
Forecast System (GFS) will be enhanced to improve forecasts of
hurricane intensity (strength) and structure (size).
Q3. In your opinion, what are the five highest priority areas of
additional research or observations needed to improve hurricane
intensity forecasts and models in the short-term? Similarly, what are
the five highest priority areas to improve this capability in the long-
term? What are the estimated costs of implementing theses priority
areas? Why has NOAA not implemented research or observations in these
areas? Are there plans to move ahead with these activities?
A3. NOAA is working to address its five highest priority areas for both
short- and long-term research and observations needed to improve
hurricane intensity forecasts and models. These areas include:
1. Increase computational capacity to run sophisticated high
resolution numerical weather prediction models.
2. Research for more detailed representation of small scale
features in hurricanes and coupling of the wave and hurricane
prediction models.
3. Expand the current network of coastal and deep-ocean buoys.
4. Develop and deploy satellite sensors on NOAA geostationary
and polar-orbiting satellites that would significantly improve
wind force and vector measurements of hurricanes and severe
storms.
5. Add additional flight hours for the high altitude NOAA
Gulfstream-IV aircraft.
Hurricane modeling is necessary for studying storm dynamics and for
forecasting hurricane track, strength, and intensification. One of the
limiting factors in hurricane modeling in both the short- and long-term
is computational power. The development of higher resolution models
that provide more detailed representations of hurricanes is dependent
on having the computational power to run these higher resolution
models.
While the above list of priorities includes both short- and long-
term research goals, additional efforts in the long-term need to focus
research on: the effect of upper ocean processes on hurricane intensity
and structure; the role the atmospheric environment plays in hurricane
intensity and structure change (e.g., how very low humidity in the
lower troposphere or very strong vertical shear of the horizontal wind
affect hurricane intensity and structure); improving observations of
the inner core (eyewall) processes; the role of rain bands in hurricane
intensity and structure change; and developing and testing of new
advanced models that (1) provide a more detailed representation of the
inner-core dynamics of the storm and the interactions between the storm
with its environment and (2) provide an optimal forecast framework to
help quantify the uncertainty in the forecasts.
Through the Joint Hurricane Testbed, funded primarily through the
U.S. Weather Research Program, the National Hurricane Center has
devoted considerable time identifying the most pressing needs and
priorities. A complete list of program priorities can be found at
http://www.aoml.noaa.gov/hrd/Landsea/jht/
JHT-FFO-30June2004.pdf.
Sufficient resources for operations, research and observations have
been provided. We strive to continue to improve our products and
services, particularly hurricane intensity forecasting. NOAA continues
to implement research to operations and programming, planning and
budgeting activities have identified and include the necessary
resources to keep up with this demand. We appreciate your continued
support of the President's annual budget requests.
Q4. In developing a hurricane forecast, you use weather data collected
from a variety of sources, including NOAA satellites, radar, buoys,
hurricane hunters, etc. For each of these sources of weather data,
please briefly describe the nature of the data you receive and what
role it plays in developing a hurricane forecast. In addition, please
identify any weather data that is currently available to you from only
one source.
A4. There is a tremendous amount of Federal Government (and non-
Federal) data available on hurricanes. The sources and use of the data
are described below.
AIRCRAFT:
NOAA Gulfstream-IV
Deploys dropwindsondes, which measure pressure, wind speed, wind
direction, temperature and dew point, providing a vertical atmospheric
profile from wherever it is dropped by aircraft to sea surface. Data
are used to increase accuracy in numerical model predictions.
NOAA P-3
Deploys dropwindosondes; provides radar images, visual report of
sea surface and estimated surface winds, center position and pressure,
wind radii and maximum winds/intensity; Stepped Frequency Microwave
Radiometer (SFMR) provides surface wind data; Expendable
Bathythermograph (XBT) provides ocean temperature profiles. Some data
is used by the forecasters, in numerical model predictions, and used
extensively for research activities to increase accuracy and improve
physical understanding of ocean and marine interface. NOAA operates two
P-3 aircraft, and will purchase a third with funding from the FY06
hurricane supplemental.
U.S. Air Force Reserve C130-J
Deploys dropwindsondes; provides visual report of sea surface and
estimated surface winds, center position and pressure, wind radii and
maximum winds/intensity. Data is used by numerical models as well as
forecasters. The Military Construction Appropriations and Emergency
Hurricane Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2005 (P.L. 108-324) provided
the U.S. Air Force $10.5M to install SFMRs on its fleet of 10 C130-J
aircraft.
SATELLITES:
GOES--Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellites
Primary data is provided by GOES-10, GOES-12, and METEOSAT-7 (VIS,
IR, WV every 15-30 min). Interpretation of the satellite data provides
a classification and analysis of the tropical system and helps
determine the center of the storm and its intensity. Images, or
``pictures,'' from GOES allow everyone to see what the hurricane looks
like. It is these images that track the storms and are what is so
prominently shown by the media.
POES--Polar Orbiting Environmental Satellite
NOAA Polar Orbiting Environmental Satellites (POES) with the
advanced microwave sounding unit (AMSU) and the advanced very high
radiometer (AVHRR) provide: precipitation estimates, qualitative
estimates of storm intensity trends, sea surface temperatures, storm
center position, convective structure and atmospheric temperature/
humidity profiles.
Note: POES are not always over the storm since these satellites
orbit the globe; this is in contrast to the GOES which are stationary
relative to Earth surface.
Other Low-Earth Orbiting Satellites
The Defense Meteorological Satellite Program, using
the special sensor microwave/imagery (SSMI) suite of
instruments, provides information on ocean surface wind speed,
precipitation, sea surface temperatures, center position and
convective structure.
The National Aeronautics and Space Administration's
(NASA's) Tropical Rainfall Mapping Mission (TRMM) satellites,
using the TRMM microwave imager (TMI), provide precipitation/
rain rate, center position, convective structure, ocean surface
wind speed and sea surface temperatures.
NASA's OuikSCAT, using the SeaWinds scatterometer,
provides wind speed, wind direction, center location and wind
radii.
The NASA AQUA satellite mission uses the moderate
resolution imaging spectroradiometer, the advanced microwave
scanning radiometer and the atmospheric infrared sounder to
provide precipitable water, water vapor, sea surface
temperatures, center position, convective structure and
atmospheric temperature/humidity profiles.
European Research Satellite (ERS-2), using a wind
scatterometer and a radar altimeter, provides the National
Weather Service with wind speed and direction, storm center
location, wind radii and wave heights.
RADAR:
U.S. WSR-88D--Doppler NEXRAD network provides extensive data as the
storm approaches land. Wind speed data is available within 125 miles of
the coast and conventional reflectivity data is available out to 250
miles away from the radar.
UPPER AIR OBSERVATIONS:
Observations from soundings of the atmosphere are available from 10
U.S. stations along the Gulf Coast and Puerto Rico. These observations
(taken twice per day or every six hours when a hurricane is approaching
land) provide temperature, moisture, wind speed and direction from the
Earth's surface to as high as 10 miles. Data is also available from
other countries in the region covering Central and South America and
the Caribbean nations, although this data is not available as
consistently as data collected from U.S. sites.
BUOYS:
Drifting
Drifting buoys provide sea surface temperature and some wind speed
and direction data.
Moored
Moored buoys provide wind speed and direction, air and sea
temperature, barometric pressure, and wave height; and the newer buoys
provide wave direction. These buoys provide coverage for the Gulf of
Mexico, the Caribbean, and the Atlantic Coast. Specifically, NOAA
operates and maintains 12 moored weather buoys in the Gulf of Mexico,
three in the Caribbean, and 14 along the Atlantic Coast from Florida to
New York, all critical to the Atlantic hurricane program. Forecasters
use data from moored buoys operated and maintained by other federal,
State, local and private entities as well.
LAND-BASED SURFACE OBSERVING EQUIPMENT:
Automated Surface Observing System (ASOS)
This system measures temperature, wind speed/direction,
precipitation, present weather, cloud height, visibility, and
barometric pressure.
Private sector wind portable wind towers
These are portable towers, mostly deployed by universities involved
in hurricane research efforts. These data are used in post-storm
analysis. Data are usually temperature, wind speed/direction,
precipitation, present weather, and barometric pressure.
OIL PLATFORM OBSERVATION STATIONS:
Oil platform observation stations can provide data on temperature,
wind speed/direction, precipitation, and surface pressure.
SHIPS:
Data collected on ships can include temperature, wind speed/
direction, wave height, precipitation, present weather, cloud height,
visibility, and pressure.
TIDE GAUGES:
Tide gauges provide information on the level/height of the water.
This information is most useful for observing, not forecasting, storm
surge.
C-MAN:
C-MAN stations provide data on barometric pressure, wind direction,
speed and gust, and air temperature. Some C-MAN stations are designed
to also measure sea water temperature, water level, waves, relative
humidity, precipitation, and visibility.
COMPUTER MODELS:
The National Hurricane Center relies extensively on computer model
output from various numerical weather prediction centers. These data
provide guidance on the future track and intensity of tropical
cyclones. Other computer models used by the National Hurricane Center
help predict potential storm surge the storms could produce.
While some sources of data are unique, NOAA has backup or
contingency plans in place to continue the stream of essential data.
For example, there is overlapping WSR-88D (NEXRAD) radar coverage--if
one goes down, data is provided by an adjacent site; newer models of
data buoys have redundant sensors; and NOAA uses FAA Terminal Doppler
Radar data at coastal sites where data are available to provide another
layer of backup information.
Q5. If data from polar-orbiting weather satellites was not available
to you, how would that affect your ability to forecast hurricanes?
A5. Data from polar-orbiting weather satellites provides information
essential to computer model forecasts. This data is the only source
that provides information from over the oceans. Internal studies show
that lack of polar-orbiting satellite data would have a negative impact
on our forecasts, potentially reducing forecast accuracy by 15-20
percent.
Q6. If NOAA had a second Gulfstream jet for studying hurricanes, what
improvements could be made to NOAA's hurricane forecasting capability?
How long would it be before those improvements could be incorporated
into operational prediction models? How much would it cost to procure a
second jet and what funding would be required for annual operating
costs for a second jet?
A6. NOAA routinely operates the Gulfstream-IV (G-IV) aircraft twice a
day on successive 8.5 hour missions during hurricane season. Internal
studies show data provided by the current Gulfstream-IV jet have
improved track prediction by about 20 percent, primarily during the
hurricane watch/warning phase (when the storm is within a day or two of
landfall). A second jet would allow more missions to be flown. This
could be valuable during an active hurricane season when numerous
hurricanes threaten the United States and data from nearly continuous
flights would improve predictions.
A new Gulfstream jet, complete with essential equipment, would cost
approximately $80 million, assuming the aircraft is purchased under an
existing Air Force contract. We estimate that it would cost $5 million
per year in operating costs for crew, maintenance, dropwindsondes and
fuel.
Any single observational platform needs to be put into the proper
context with all other investments in observations. Currently the most
important observations needed to improve hurricane intensity and
structure forecasts come from the radars flown on NOAA's P-3s. The U.S.
Air Force will use funds from the FY 2005 hurricane supplemental to
install these Stepped Frequency Microwave Radiometer sensors on its
fleet of 10 aircraft, the first of which will be available late in FY
2006. The FY 2006 hurricane funding supplemental provided $9M for an
additional, equipped P-3 aircraft to improve observations of
hurricanes.
Q7. You have stated that today's average hurricane track forecast
errors are only 94 nautical miles, compared with average forecast
errors of 230 nautical miles in 1987. Have we reached the theoretical
limit of track forecasting with the 94 nautical miles error, or could
that error become smaller? If the error could be made smaller, what
resources (i.e., observing equipment, computers, research funding,
etc.) does NOAA need to improve track forecasting and what is the
estimated cost of those resources?
A7. While we may be nearing the theoretical limit of track prediction,
we continue to work to improve our track forecasts. Track
predictability depends on being able to predict larger scale
atmospheric conditions and, on average, we have been successful at
predicting the features that ``steer'' the hurricane. However, storms
like Wilma (when it was in the southern Caribbean) and Ophelia (when
stationary off the coast of Florida) highlight that we have room for
improvement when it comes to predicting tracks for the ``outlier''
storms that stall or take very erratic paths.
To improve track forecasts we must continue our research efforts
and computer modeling development. NOAA is currently developing a next
generation hurricane prediction system, the Hurricane Weather and
Research Forecasting (HWRF) system. We expect the improvements embodied
in the HWRF system will lead to reduced track forecast error. Funding
provided in the FY 2006 hurricane supplemental will accelerate the
completion of the HWRF system. Additional observations, such as those
planned under the Global Earth Observation System of Systems (GEOSS),
would also help in defining the conditions for hurricane predictions.
Q8. A recent article in the Miami Herald asserts that key countries in
the Caribbean are not launching weather balloons regularly, despite an
agreement with the United States to launch balloons, because the
countries did not have all the equipment the U.S. had promised. Would
additional funding or other actions help ensure that weather balloon
equipment is provided to Caribbean countries in a timely manner and
that the countries launch the balloons as needed?
A8. We face many different challenges when collecting meteorological
data. All required equipment and supplies have been provided to the
appropriate countries, in accordance with our agreements. During
Hurricane Wilma, four of the sites experienced system malfunctions
(hydrogen generator and/or tracking system), which have now been
corrected. Releasing weather balloons, using the tracking equipment,
and transmitting data back to the international data collection hubs is
the responsibility of each country. Issues such as local power,
communications, and maintenance are challenges that vary from country
to country, which has at times made it difficult to collect
meteorological data from balloon launches. While these data are
important and NOAA will do all it can to ensure the data are available,
dropwindsonde data from hurricane reconnaissance flights provide
similar types of data used by our hurricane forecasters and hurricane
models.
Q9. In your opinion, if additional funding were available for
hurricane forecasting, what are the five highest priority areas of
where additional resources would improve operational hurricane
forecasts and models?
A9. The highest priority for hurricane forecasting is to improve our
prediction of storm intensity. There are many components accompanying
that element, including continued improvements in track forecasts and
the prediction of the size of the windfield, as well as being able to
predict when and how quickly storms will intensify and how strong they
will become. Additionally, we need to develop a better understanding of
the uncertainty associated with our forecasts of storm intensity (in
particular rapid intensification of storms), as well as storm
structure/size. These priorities can be addressed through continued
research, increased development of our next generation operational
hurricane models, and additional observations, such as those planned
under the Global Environmental Observing System of Systems (GEOSS).
With funding provided in the FY 2006 appropriation, we will add four
new hurricane forecasters, who will also enhance operational hurricane
forecasts.
Additional priorities are provided in Joint Hurricane Testbed
Announcement of Opportunity at the following Internet site: http://
www.aoml.noaa.gov/hrd/Landsea/jht/
JHT-FFO-30June2004.pdf.
Q10. What is the difference between data received from hurricane
reconnaissance flights in NOAA's Gulfstream jet, NOAA's P-3 Orions, and
the Air Force's WC-130 cargo planes? What factors determine which
aircraft is flown to observe a storm? What factors determine how
frequently flights are made with each type of aircraft?
A10. The Gulfstream-IV jet is used to obtain data from the environment
surrounding the hurricane. These data are then assimilated into NOAA's
operational forecast system to better define the atmospheric conditions
and steering currents that influence the future track of the hurricane.
The data collected by the Gulfstream are also used to help forecasters
identify general conditions for storm intensification.
In contrast, the P-3s and the WC-130s provide data from inside the
hurricane, including windspeed, and hurricane eye positions, among
other vital information. The P-3s are equipped with research
instruments to help NOAA and other research scientists develop a better
understanding of the inner workings of hurricanes and help to develop
improved forecast capabilities, including hurricane intensity forecasts
predictions. The P-3s also serve as platforms for testing new observing
technologies, such as the Stepped Frequency Microwave Radiometer
(SFMR), which measures over-ocean wind speed and rain rate, and Global
Positioning System (GPS) dropsondes.
As outlined in the National Hurricane Operations Plan (NHOP), the
National Hurricane Center (NHC) requests aircraft reconnaissance data
through the Chief, Aerial Reconnaissance Coordination, All Hurricanes
(CARCAH). The CARCAH then allocates reconnaissance missions among the
U.S. Air Force Reserve Command and NOAA as appropriate. Typically, most
missions are carried out by the U.S. Air Force Reserve Command.
Q11. Do other missions for NOAA's P-3 Orions, such as air quality
research, interfere with the National Hurricane Center's hurricane
forecasting capabilities? If not, why not?
A11. Flight hours for the P-3 Orions are assigned in accordance with
NOAA's Marine and Aviation Operations Allocation Plan and coordinated
by NOAA's Aircraft Operations Center. In situations when there are
competing requests for P-3 usage, the National Hurricane Center has
priority access to the P-3 flights for hurricane reconnaissance. In
many cases we are able to conduct hurricane research on these
reconnaissance flights. Additionally, non-hurricane research missions
typically occur in areas that would allow the P-3s to be recalled to
MacDill AFB within the range of one flight, so they could be redirected
to conduct hurricane reconnaissance if needed. Further, the non-
hurricane research missions are usually flown in the early part of
hurricane season, to reduce the number of competing requests for P-3
flight time during the more active portion of the hurricane season. The
FY 2006 hurricane supplemental provides NOAA with an additional P-3
aircraft; this should help ensure adequate coverage.
United States Air Force Reserves' 53rd Weather Reconnaissance
Squadron maintains and operates a fleet of 10 C130-J aircraft to
conduct most hurricane reconnaissance missions and provide storm
location and data, including hurricane intensity. The Air Force will
use funding from the Military Construction Appropriations and Emergency
Hurricane Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2005 (P.L. 108-324) to
outfit its ``Hurricane Hunter'' aircraft with Stepped Frequency
Microwave Radiometer sensors beginning in late FY 2006. SFMR provides
meteorologists with critical data on the hurricane surface wind field,
and in particular the estimation of wind maxima, which has long been a
requirement of the Tropical Prediction Center/National Hurricane Center
(TPC/NHC).
Q12. Recent articles in the Miami Herald assert that ``in 2004 before
Hurricane Charley. . .weather balloon readings were missing from
countries all along its path, leaving hundreds of miles of the
atmosphere unmonitored.. . .Three coastal weather-observing stations
between the Florida Keys and northwest Florida were malfunctioning,
denying forecasters clues about ocean temperature and wind speed.'' Is
this assertion true and if so, why was this observation data
unavailable? Also, if the assertion is true, what was the impact on
forecasting Hurricane Charley?
A12. We have encountered some difficulties in obtaining weather balloon
releases within the Caribbean region from the countries with which the
United States has agreements due to issues such as local power,
communications, and maintenance. These problems are being addressed.
However, because there was nearly continuous aircraft reconnaissance
during Hurricane Charley, we do not believe the lack of data from these
sites impacted our forecasts. Our records indicate only one NOAA buoys
or Coastal-Marine Automated Network (C-MAN) sites was out of service
prior to the passage of Hurricane Charley. We believe lack of data from
this one site did not impact our forecasts.
Questions submitted by the Minority
Q1. What role do the local offices play in distributing and refining
the forecast for the hurricane prior to the storm and during the storm
versus the role of the Hurricane Center?
A1. Local Weather Forecast Offices (WFOs) play an important role by
providing more detailed forecasts for their area of responsibility. For
example, the National Hurricane Center provides a broad range of values
in its storm surge predictions; the WFOs refine those storm surge
predictions by identifying vulnerable areas and associating particular
values for the surge in those areas. Local WFOs also refine the timing
of the onset of hurricane conditions in their area, including
information on wind speed, storm surge, rainfall amounts and the
potential for tornadoes. The WFOs also coordinate with and brief local
emergency managers to ensure the managers have the latest information
available to make their preparedness and evacuation decisions.
Q2. The Hurricane Center participates in workshops and conferences
after the hurricane season with FEMA and State and local emergency
managers and other organizations. Does staff of the local forecast
offices also participate in these offseason activities? Why are
multiple annual workshops useful in maintaining skills in preparation
and response for hurricanes?
A2. Time and resources permitting, local weather forecast offices
participate in workshops and conferences. Multiple workshops provide
the opportunity to train more individuals than a single training
session. Our workshops are coordinated, to the greatest extent
possible, to allow emergency managers and National Weather Service
(NWS) forecasters from the same local area to attend the same session.
This creates a favorable learning environment, and builds/enhances
relationships in those local areas. Beginning in 2006, in partnership
with the Federal Emergency Management Agency, local weather forecast
offices will participate in training sessions for emergency managers on
how to use NWS products and how to interpret and understand NWS
predictions of storm surge. The emergency managers receiving this
training will then return to their offices, where they will train their
co-workers and other local officials. This method of training allows
for efficient use of funding and allows us to reach more local
officials than possible otherwise.
Questions submitted by Representative Eddie Bernice Johnson
Q1. How would you characterize the participation by State and local
emergency managers in the Hurricane Liaison Team conference calls?
The HLT process has been used for a long time now. Would you say
this process has provided a good forum for information exchange between
the various levels of government?
I understand the Hurricane Center participates in a series of
workshops and conferences after the end of the hurricane season. How
would you characterize the feedback regarding the HLT process in the
post-hurricane season from State and local government people?
A1. The Hurricane Liaison Team (HLT) conference calls serve as an
excellent coordination tool and an efficient use of time. State
emergency managers from potentially impacted locations participate on
the call listening to the weather briefing and then coordinating
emergency management activities. The HLT briefings provide an excellent
forum for the National Hurricane Center (NHC) to share meteorological
information with the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and
State Emergency Operations Centers, and also for the NHC to understand
the concerns of emergency managers. The National Hurricane Center has
received positive feedback in its participation in the Hurricane
Liaison Team, from workshops, the National Hurricane Conference, and
State hurricane conferences.
The NHC is an invited participant in the HLT video teleconference
briefings facilitated by FEMA. In addition to the NHC, FEMA typically
includes State emergency operations centers from the potential impact
areas and regional FEMA offices on the HLT briefings. The HLT briefings
do not usually include local emergency managers. Local emergency
managers have access to National Weather Service (NWS) warnings
distributed through a vast dissemination network including NOAA Weather
Radio All Hazards (NWR); NOAA Weather Wire Service; Emergency Managers
Weather Information Network (EMWIN); Internet; local paging systems to
emergency managers; high-speed direct communications with users of
large volumes of weather data (i.e., commercial meteorological firms)
connected by landlines (Family of Services), by satellite broadcasts
(NOAAPORT), or both. In addition there is close coordination that
occurs between the National Weather Service Weather Forecast Offices
and local emergency managers.
Appendix 2:
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Additional Material for the Record