[House Hearing, 109 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
MANAGEMENT CHALLENGES FACING THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON MANAGEMENT, INTEGRATION, AND OVERSIGHT
of the
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
APRIL 20, 2005
__________
Serial No. 109-12
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Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
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Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/
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COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Christopher Cox, California, Chairman
Don Young, Alaska Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Lamar S. Smith, Texas Loretta Sanchez, California
Curt Weldon, Pennsylvania, Vice Edward J. Markey, Massachusetts
Chairman Norman D. Dicks, Washington
Christopher Shays, Connecticut Jane Harman, California
Peter T. King, New York Peter A. DeFazio, Oregon
John Linder, Georgia Nita M. Lowey, New York
Mark E. Souder, Indiana Eleanor Holmes Norton, District of
Tom Davis, Virginia Columbia
Daniel E. Lungren, California Zoe Lofgren, California
Jim Gibbons, Nevada Sheila Jackson-Lee, Texas
Rob Simmons, Connecticut Bill Pascrell, Jr., New Jersey
Mike Rogers, Alabama Donna M. Christensen, U.S. Virgin
Stevan Pearce, New Mexico Islands
Katherine Harris, Florida Bob Etheridge, North Carolina
Bobby Jindal, Louisiana James R. Langevin, Rhode Island
Dave G. Reichert, Washington Kendrick B. Meek, Florida
Michael McCaul, Texas
Charlie Dent, Pennsylvania
______
SUBCOMMITTEE ON MANAGEMENT, INTEGRATION AND OVERSIGHT
Mike Rogers, Alabama, Chairman
Christopher Shays, Connecticut Kendrick B. Meek, Florida
John Linder, Georgia Edward J. Markey, Massachusetts
Tom Davis, Virginia Zoe Lofgren, California
Katherine Harris, Florida Sheila Jackson-Lee, Texas
Dave G. Reichert, Washington Bill Pascrell, Jr., New Jersey
Michael McCaul, Texas Donna M. Christensen, U.S. Virgin
Charlie Dent, Pennsylvania Islands
Christopher Cox, California (Ex Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Officio) (Ex Officio)
(II)
C O N T E N T S
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Page
STATEMENTS
The Honorable Mike Rogers, a Representative in Congress From the
State of Alabama, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Management,
Integration, and Oversight..................................... 1
The Honorable Kendrick B. Meek, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Florida, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on
Management, Integration, and Oversight......................... 2
The Honorable Christopher Cox, a Representative in Congress From
the State of California, and Chairman, Committee on Homeland
Security....................................................... 3
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Mississippi, and Ranking Member, Committee on
Homeland Security.............................................. 4
The Honorable Charlie Dent, a Representative in Congress From the
state of Pennsylvania.......................................... 52
The Honorable Sheila Jackson-Lee, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Texas........................................ 65
The Honorable Michael McCaul, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Texas............................................. 54
The Honorable Dave G. Riechert, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Washington........................................ 50
WITNESSES
Mr. Clark Kent Ervin, Director, Homeland Security Initiative, The
Aspen Institute
Oral Statement................................................. 38
Prepared Statement............................................. 40
The Honorable James S. Gilmore, III, Chairman, National Council
on Readiness and Preparedness
Oral Statement................................................. 35
Prepared Statement............................................. 37
The Honorable Asa Hutchison, Chairman of the Homeland Security
Practice, Venable, LLC
Oral Statement................................................. 32
Prepared Statement............................................. 34
Mr. Norman Rabkin, Managing Director, Homeland Security and
Justice, Government Accountability Office,
Oral Statement................................................. 20
Prepared Statement............................................. 22
Mr. Richard L. Skinner, Acting Inspector General, Office of
Inspector General, Department of Homeland Security
Oral Statement................................................. 5
Prepared Statement............................................. 7
MANAGEMENT CHALLENGES FACING THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
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Wednesday, April 20, 2005
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Management,
Integration, and Oversight,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:03 a.m., in
Room 2261, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Mike Rogers
[chairman of the subcommittee] presiding.
Present: Representatives Rogers, Reichert, McCaul, Dent,
Cox, Meek, Jacksn-Lee, Pascrell, and Thompson.
Mr. Rogers. [Presiding.] The hearing will come to order.
I would like to first thank all of our witnesses for taking
the time out of their full schedules to be with us today. I am
looking forward to the testimony and your answers to various
questions.
We are holding this hearing to review the major management
challenges facing the Department of Homeland Security. We also
will consider what steps need to be taken to improve the
overall management of the Department and its programs.
The Department is just over 2 years old, and it is the
third largest department in the Federal government.
When it was stood up in March 2003, the Department
inherited 180,000 employees and 22 separate agencies. Many of
these agencies had their own separate systems for personnel,
procurement, budgeting and communications.
Today, we will hear from the Department's Office of
Inspector General and the Government Accountability Office on
audits and reviews they recently conducted of the Department's
major management challenges.
We will also hear from the Department's former
Undersecretary for Border and Transportation Security and the
former Inspector General, as well as the Chairman of the
Gilmore Commission regarding their views and recommendations on
the Department's management functions.
One issue of special interest is how we ensure that the
Department is fully coordinating its training efforts to
support our first responders and firefighters. In my hometown
of Anniston, Alabama, we have the Center for Domestic
Preparedness, which is supported by the Department's Office of
Domestic Preparedness. Just a stone's throw away, we have the
Noble Training Center operated by the Department's Federal
Emergency Management Agency. Those facilities provide
invaluable training to first responders.
We need to ensure that Federal officials in Washington are
talking to each other so that these and other centers get the
support they need to provide adequate constituent services.
I look forward to hearing from our witnesses, what they
think about the current organization of our training within the
Department of Homeland Security and what more the Department
can do to improve the coordination and delivery of training
programs.
And, once again, I want to thank the witnesses for joining
us, and the Chair now recognizes the Ranking Member, my
colleague from Florida, Mr. Meek.
Mr. Meek. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I am excited, just
as you are, about this morning's hearing.
At this moment in time, the Department of Homeland Security
stands at important crossroads. Since the Department was
established over 2 years ago, DHS is doing a better job of
keeping our country secure. But when it comes down to homeland
security, better is just simply not enough.
This hearing serves as a great opportunity to discuss the
management challenges at the Department. The experiences of the
witnesses are fresh, and we are looking forward to their
testimony.
Mr. Ervin was engaged in auditing the Department just a few
months ago, which produced the first airport screener report in
2003.
Secretary Hutchinson was still the head of the Border and
Transportation Security doctrine in February.
And both Mr. Skinner and Mr. Rabkin are actively engaged in
auditing DHS right now.
I continue to stress the importance of your testimony
today. However, I cannot continue to stress the importance of
your testimony today for the committee to execute its oversight
responsibilities. We need people like you to come before this
committee and to be not only truthful but very blunt, if I can
add that.
We need to hear from you, Mr. Ervin, on how the Department
responded when the report was produced, that there were
problems in airport screening performance.
We need to hear, Mr. Hutchinson, what steps that TSA took
to address those issues that were identified in that September
2003 report.
We need to understand from you, Mr. Skinner, why, despite
the actions TSA may have taken to address the September 2003
report, screening performance still remains poor. Assuring that
the skies are secure is a vital national security issue and
deserves the kind of attention that we are giving it this
morning.
Secretary Chertoff testified before this committee about
his plans to move into a second stage of evaluation of DHS. If
DHS, the Department of Homeland Security, is ever to be able to
become the department that the Congress wanted it to be and the
American people deserve, we would have to take a constant focus
of oversight.
So I look forward to hearing the witnesses, and I want to
thank you and commend you for coming before us this morning.
Thank you so very much.
Mr. Rogers. The gentleman yields back.
The Chair now recognizes the chairman of the full
committee, Mr. Cox, from California.
Mr. Cox. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank
both you and the Ranking Member for convening this
extraordinarily expert panel of witnesses to help us today
address the fundamental question of the management challenges
facing the Department of Homeland Security.
I would also like to welcome our witnesses. Thank you for
the time, energy and preparation that you have devoted to not
only today's hearing but these questions themselves over a long
period of time.
It has been roughly 2 years since the Department of
Homeland Security was asked to accomplish the largest
reorganization of the Federal government in more than half a
century. It is either the third or the second largest cabinet
department, depending on how you do the accounting; 180,000
employees, $40 billion budget and critically, for purposes of
today's hearing, 22 legacy components but each had different
daily missions prior to the creation of DHS.
Together, they are now possessed of a mission no less than
protecting our nation against another terrorist attack. These
are big challenges but DHS has made significant strides in its
department-wide integration effort.
For example, the Department has reduced 22 different Human
Resource servicing centers to 7. We have gone from 8 payroll
systems to 2. Where once there were 19 financial management
service providers, now there are 8. And personal property
management systems have been cut from 22 to 3.
But integrating the legacy components into a single,
efficient and cost-effective department remains a formidable
challenge, and what is at stake is more than improved back-
office functions. This kind of integration is essential to
supporting the new counterterrorism mission of this Department.
The management challenges have been highlighted in a number of
recent reports that our witnesses will address today.
The specifics of these reports vary, but they all
consistently point to the need for the Department to establish
a comprehensive integration strategy tied to clear and
measurable benchmarks to progress and centered upon the key
homeland security missions of the Department.
With these challenges in mind, the new Secretary of the
Department of Homeland Security, Mike Chertoff, has initiated,
as we all know, a 90-day review of the Department's policies,
programs and operations. They are examining exactly the sort of
issues that our witnesses will highlight today. We look forward
to working with Secretary Chertoff as part of our DHS
authorization process to ensure that the Department overcomes
the obstacles that remain in achieving an overarching,
comprehensive management integration strategy for the
Department.
Again, thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thanks to our
witnesses. I look forward to learning a great deal this
morning.
Mr. Rogers. The gentleman yields back.
The Chair now recognizes the Ranking Member of the full
committee, the gentleman from Mississippi, Mr. Thompson, for
any statement he may have.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
And I welcome our witnesses to the hearing this morning.
The one thing that I am excited about is, as most of you
know, we now have oversight responsibility. So unlike being a
select, we now have at least the authority to look and try to
point us in the right direction, pat us on the back when we are
doing good and do some other things when you are not doing so
good. So we are happy to have you.
Mr. Ervin, I am glad to see you again. Unfortunately,
sometimes when we do our job well, we lose it. But,
nonetheless, I am convinced that this country will be better
because you did the honorable thing in what you were charged
with.
As we know, the Department of Homeland Security was created
to be the focal point in the fight against terrorism. When the
Department was first established it was understood that a
government reorganization of this magnitude would require
overcoming significant challenges and difficult obstacles.
Americans have a very personal stake in seeing the
Department be successful in fulfilling its mission. Our
nation's security depends on it.
The witnesses we have before us today are among the most
knowledgeable of the state of the Department. While the
Department has made substantial strides to enhance our nation's
security, it has many outstanding challenges that still have
not been addressed.
Repeatedly, Mr. Ervin, Mr. Skinner, GAO and this very
committee have identified structural problems within the
Department and gaps in our security apparatus. GAO alone has
issued more than 100 reports that have identified problems in
immigration enforcement, border protection and lax cargo
security as DHS enters its third year of existence and
Secretary Chertoff undertakes this top-down review.
This committee has a vital role to play in ensuring
accountability from the highest levels of Department.
Identifying and systematically addressing organizational and
management changes must be top priority for the President on
down.
If this is one message that has to be taken away from this
hearing, it is the Department is not getting the job done of
protecting America's security. We have to do it right.
I have a stack of GAO and other reports to my left here
that if we will just take them for what they are worth and
implement them, the Department would be much better off and
this country would be far safer.
In addition, there are over 125 congressionally mandated
deadlines that have not been fulfilled, I am concerned about
it. The Secretary has been made aware of this last week. There
is a letter that is some 5 weeks overdue raising the issue of
overdue reports to Congress. And from a management and
oversight responsibility, we cannot really do our job unless
the Department fulfills its responsibilities.
So I am happy to have the people who know before us today.
I look forward to their testimony, Mr. Chairman, and I look
forward to helping keep America safe. Thank you.
Mr. Rogers. I thank the gentleman.
The other members are reminded that their statements may be
submitted for the record later in the day.
We are pleased to have this distinguished panel with us
today, and first the Chair would like to recognize Mr. Richard
Skinner, Acting Inspector General, Department of Homeland
Security, for your testimony.
Mr. Skinner?
STATEMENT OF RICHARD SKINNER, ACTING INSPECTOR GENERAL, OFFICE
OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND
Mr. Skinner. Good morning. Thank you for the opportunity to
be here, especially with such a distinguished panel. I have
provided the committee with a written statement for the record.
I will try to summarize it here very briefly.
In December 2004, our office issued its annual report on
the major management challenges facing the Department. The
report covers a broad range of issues. First, I would like to
talk about the issue of integration.
We have reported that structural and resource problems
continue to inhibit progress in certain support functions. Most
of the critical support personnel are distributed throughout
the components and are not directly accountable to the
functional line of business chiefs, such as the Chief Financial
Officer or the Chief Information Officer. We are concerned that
these officers may not have sufficient resources or authority
to ensure that Departmentwide goals and their respective
functions are addressed appropriately or that available
resources can be marshaled to address emerging problems.
The Secretary as you say, is examining selected operations
in what he refers to as a second-stage review. The review will
cover where the Department has been, where it is headed and
what changes, if any, need to be made.
Second, I would like touch upon some program challenges
with regards to border security. We reported that the
Department must address security concerns identified in the
Visa Waiver Program. The program enables citizens of 27
countries to travel to the U.S. for tourism or business for 90
days or less without obtaining a visa. These travelers are
inspected at a U.S. port of entry, but they have not undergone
the more rigorous background investigations associated with
visa applications.
We also reported weaknesses that allowed ABC to twice
smuggle depleted uranium into the country in seagoing cargo
containers. The Department has since enhanced its ability to
screen the targeted containers for radioactive emissions by
deploying more sensitive technology at seaports, revising
protocols and procedures and improving training of personnel.
We are following up as we speak on those actions.
The Coast Guard also faces significant problems in
improving and sustaining its readiness mission. It suffers from
declining experience levels among its personnel and reported
that sustaining its mission is at risk due to cutters and
aircraft that are aging or are obsolete, resulting in operating
restrictions.
With regards to transportation security, as you know, our
undercover test of screener performance in late 2003 revealed
that improvements are needed in the screening process to ensure
that dangerous, prohibited items are not carried into the
sterile areas of heavily used airports. We attributed the test
failures to four areas that needed improvement: training,
equipment and technology, policy and procedures, and management
and supervision.
We recently completed a follow-up review of screener
performance at the same airports. We just issued our report
this week. We began our review at the end of November of 2004
and completed our field work in early February 2005. Our test
showed no overall improvement, leading us to believe that
significant improvements in performance may not be possible
without greater use of technology.
Finally, I would like to highlight the Department's
administrative challenges. With regard to financial management,
the Department does not have a consolidated financial
management system. This, coupled with staffing constraints and
accounting deficiencies that it inherited from its legacy
agencies, contributes to the Department's inability to produce
accurate, timely, and meaningful financial statements. It may
take years for the Department to develop a consolidated system
free of material weaknesses, which will produce financial data
that managers can rely on to guide their decisions.
With regards to contract management, there are seven
procurement shops outside the direct control of the Chief
Procurement Officer. These seven procurement shops negotiate
their own contracts, which represent about 80 percent of the
Department's $11 billion in planned obligations for this year,
2005. Until the procurement functions are consolidated or
brought under the control of the Chief Procurement Officer,
accountability will continue to be murky, and opportunities for
efficiencies will continue to be lost.
With regards to grant management, although the Department
has made progress in improving the delivery and oversight of
grant funds, questions linger whether grants are risk based,
whether grant funds are being spent wisely, and whether the
billions being awarded or invested are having a measurable
impact on our ability to protect against and respond to another
terrorist attack.
With regard to Human Resource management, the Department
faces the formidable challenge of designing and implementing a
new pay for performance personnel system. This system will have
a significant and profound effect on the Department's culture
and personnel. The design phase of this system is essentially
complete. Implementation, which will take at least 4 years,
begins in January 2006. Getting employees to accept changes in
a way in which they are evaluated, paid, and classified is not
going to be an easy task.
With regards to information security, the Department's
organizational components have not yet fully aligned their
respective security programs with departmental policies and
procedures. The Department must inventory and accredit its
systems, formalize the reporting structure between the CIO and
the organizational components, and develop a verification
process to ensure that all information security weaknesses have
been identified.
In conclusion, I would like to point out that the
Department recognizes these challenges and has been responsive
to and implemented a number of our recommendations. The
Department anticipates that the results of its ongoing
initiatives should enable it to report significant progress
next year.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my remarks. I will be happy to
answer any questions you or the committee may have.
[The statement of Mr. Skinner follows:]
Prepared Statement of Richard L. Skinner
Good morning Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:
I am Richard L. Skinner, Acting Inspector General for the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Thank you for the opportunity to
be here today to discuss the work of the Office of Inspector General
(OIG) regarding major management challenges facing DHS.
During its first two years of existence, DHS worked to accomplish
the largest reorganization of the federal government in more than half
a century. Creating the third largest Cabinet agency with the critical,
core mission of protecting the country against another terrorist
attack, presented an inordinate number of challenges to the
department's managers and employees. The Government Accountability
Office (GAO) noted that successful transformations of large
organizations, under even less complicated situations, could take from
five to seven years. While DHS has made great strides toward improving
homeland security, it still has much to do to establish a cohesive,
efficient, and effective organization.
Based on our work, as well as assessments by Congress, GAO, and DHS
itself, the OIG identified ``major management challenges'' facing the
department. These challenges, included in the department's Performance
and Accountability Report issued on November 15, 2004, are a major
factor in setting our priorities for audits and inspections of DHS
programs and operations. As required by the Reports Consolidation Act
of 2000, we update our assessment of management challenges annually.
Our latest major management challenges report covers a broad range
of issues, including both program and administrative challenges. A copy
of that report is provided for the record. In its response to the
report, the department recognized the challenges and the potential
impact the challenges could have on the effectiveness and efficiency of
its programs and operations if not properly addressed. The department
anticipates that the results of initiatives to address the challenges
during FY 2005 should enable it to report significant progress next
year.
Before I discuss the challenges and the details of our work, I
believe it is important that we give credit to the thousands of
dedicated, hard working DHS employees who are genuinely committed to
securing our homeland and making the department a model for the entire
federal government. No one here can deny that our nation is more secure
today than it was prior to September 11, 2001.
I also wish to point out that the department has been responsive to
and implemented a number of the recommendations made by our office. We
look forward to establishing a positive working relationship with the
new Secretary, and continuing the momentum toward building an
effective, efficient, and economical homeland security operation--one
that is free of fraud, waste, and abuse.
BORDER SECURITY
A primary mission of DHS is to reduce America's vulnerability to
terrorism by protecting the borders of the U.S. and safeguarding its
transportation infrastructure. Within DHS, these responsibilities fall
to the Border and Transportation Security (BTS) Directorate.
Two organizations within BTS are responsible for enforcing the
nation's immigration and customs laws. Customs and Border Protection
(CBP) inspects visitors and cargoes at the designated U.S. ports of
entry (POE), and secures the borders between the POE. CBP's primary
mission is to prevent terrorists and terrorist weapons from entering
the U.S., while also facilitating the flow of legitimate trade and
travel. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) is the investigative
arm of BTS that enforces immigration and customs laws within the U.S.
While CBP's responsibilities focus on activities at POEs and along the
borders, ICE's responsibilities center on enforcement activities
related to criminal and administrative violations of the immigration
and customs laws of the U.S., regardless of where the violation occurs.
Additionally, CBP and ICE have employees assigned outside the U.S. to
enhance the security of our borders.
In December 2004, the Heritage Foundation recommended merging CBP
and ICE and eliminating the Border and Transportation Security
directorate. According to the Foundation, the merger would bring
together all of the tools of effective border and immigration
enforcement--inspectors, border patrol agents, special agents,
detection and removal officers, and intelligence analysts--and realize
the objective of creating a single border and immigration enforcement
agency. Eliminating BTS would remove a middle management layer allowing
the combined CBP-ICE to report directly to the Secretary via the Deputy
Secretary. On January 26, 2005, Chairman Collins asked our office to
study this proposal and to report our conclusions and recommendations
in 180 days. We are in the midst of our field work now and expect to
meet this deadline.
The third organization within BTS which plays a major role in
protecting the borders of the U.S. and safeguarding its transportation
infrastructure is the Transportation Security Administration (TSA).
TSA's primary security improvements have focused on aviation, with the
hiring of over 60,000 passenger and baggage screeners, installation of
electronic passenger and baggage screening technology at the nation's
airports, and expansion of the Federal Air Marshals program, which is
located now in ICE.
Other organizations within BTS have border security related
responsibilities as well, such as the US-VISIT Program Office and the
Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC). The US-VISIT Program
Office is responsible for the development and fielding of the U.S.
Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology (US-VISIT) program,
DHS' entry-exit system. It coordinates the integration of two
fingerprint systems: DHS' Automated Biometric Identification System
(IDENT) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation's (FBI) Integrated
Automated Fingerprint Identification System (IAFIS). FLETC, another BTS
component, provides career-long law enforcement training to 81 federal
partner organizations and numerous state, local, and international law
enforcement agencies.
And, the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS),
although not organizationally housed within BTS, plays an important
part in DHS border security. USCIS is responsible for reviewing and
approving applications for immigration benefits. While not a law
enforcement agency, USCIS ensures that only eligible aliens receive
immigration benefits and identifies cases of immigration benefit fraud
and other immigration violations that warrant investigation.
As expected, DHS faces several formidable challenges in securing
the nation's borders. Our audit and inspection program has attempted to
address some of the challenges, including: developing effective visa
issuance programs; tracking the entry and exit of foreign visitors;
and, preventing terrorist weapons from entering the United States.
Visa Issuance Programs
As the Heritage Foundation's report aptly pointed out, our nation's
homeland security does not stop at America's geographic borders. DHS
faces international challenges in protecting our borders, too.
Provisions in the visa issuance process and other programs to promote
international travel create potential security vulnerabilities, which
may allow terrorists, criminals, and other undesirables to enter the
U.S. undetected.
For example, DHS must address security concerns identified in the
Visa Waiver Program (VWP). The VWP enables citizens of 27 countries to
travel to the U.S. for tourism or business for 90 days or less without
obtaining a visa. These travelers are inspected at a U.S. POE, but they
have not undergone the more rigorous background investigations
associated with visa applications. In an April 2004 inspection, we
reported our concerns regarding the exclusion from the US-VISIT program
of travelers under the VWP. In September 2004, BTS began requiring that
travelers from VWP countries enroll in the US-VISIT program, and
renewed its efforts to conduct required country reviews.
However, DHS continues to experience problems in identifying and
detecting aliens who present lost or stolen passports from VWP
countries at ports of entry. Shortcomings in procedural and supervisory
oversight permitted some aliens presenting stolen Visa Waiver Program
passports to enter the United States even after their stolen passports
were reported, watch-listed, and detected. New information on lost and
stolen passports provided by Visa Waiver Program governments was not
routinely checked against U.S. entry and exit information to determine
whether the stolen passports have been used to enter the U.S. In
addition, there was no formal protocol for providing information
concerning the use of stolen passports to ICE for investigation and
apprehension of the bearer.
Problems with lost and stolen passport are complicated by the lack
of international standardization in passport numbering systems that can
result in a failure to identify mala fide travelers using stolen Visa
Waiver Program passports - even when the theft has been reported and
the information is available in DHS lookout systems. This occurs
because stolen passports are reported using the passports' inventory
control numbers (ICNs), which are entered into the lookout systems.
However, when inspectors routinely enter just the passports' issuance
numbers into the lookout systems and do not match the reported stolen
ICNs, the result is undetected stolen passports. While we applaud BTS'
efforts to promote a change in the International Commercial Aviation
Organization standard to a one-number passport system, it will take
years once the new standard is adopted for the two-number passports to
be removed from service. Interim measures are needed to reduce this
vulnerability. In response to these concerns, BTS is conducting
systematic reviews of admission records to check for previous uses of
newly-stolen passports.
Further, DHS must address issues identified with its visa security
program, under which DHS stations officers at U.S. embassies and
consular offices overseas to review visa applications and perform other
law enforcement functions. Because of limited resources, BTS used
temporary duty officers in its pilot effort who often did not have the
required background or training, including language skills, to perform
effectively as visa security officers. For example, nine of the ten
temporary duty officers who served or are serving in Saudi Arabia did
not read or speak Arabic. This limits their effectiveness and reduces
their contribution to the security of the visa process. In response to
our report, BTS advised that it would stop using temporary duty
officers and begin using permanently assigned officers at its visa
security offices; develop a staffing model to ensure only qualified
officers serve in these positions; and, develop a training program for
visa security officers. While BTS agreed with us in principle regarding
the need for language training, BTS officials said that because of
funding concerns, it could provide language training only ``as
necessary and to the extent possible.''
As a result, the full intelligence and law enforcement value that
visa security officers could add to the existing inter-agency country
teams has not been achieved. In response to our report, DHS advised
that it has developed a near-term plan for deploying visa security
officers for FY 2005 and was planning for additional deployments.
With respect to international travelers, two major border security
challenges confront the department: the divergence in the biometric
systems used to identify travelers; and, the substantial differences in
the levels of scrutiny given to different classes of travelers.
Biometric Systems
We have all seen the glaring deficiencies of name-based lookout
lists. For every known terrorist there are many innocent people with
the same name. And for every name, there are variants and misspellings.
Biometric identifiers are the only reliable and practical way to tell
people apart.
The FBI uses ten rolled fingerprints in the IAFIS to document
criminal activities. The former INS, now within DHS, used only two
index finger prints to create retrievable records for travelers in its
Automated Biometric Identification System (IDENT). As reported, the two
systems have not yet been integrated, so some travelers are run through
one system--and then sometimes the other--at ports of entry. The CBP
agents are required to check both systems when illegal aliens are
apprehended.
The international standards for passports are developed through
ICAO. The United States is one of several countries whose citizens are
not fingerprinted routinely for licenses or identification cards. In
the past, the U.S. has lobbied ICAO to use facial recognition rather
than fingerprints as the required primary biometric identifier in
passports. Public accounts suggest that the experiments to date using
facial recognition (at Logan Airport, among others) yielded meager
results. At our borders, meanwhile, we increasingly rely upon
fingerprint scans to tell people apart. The difficulties in achieving
international consensus on this subject are daunting. Far more obvious,
however, is the fact that the United States cannot afford to implement
both biometric capabilities at each port of entry, it must settle on
one. We--the United States Government--need to decide soon which
biometric is the most reliable. Then we need to apply that standard to
our own identity and travel documents, as well as for foreign
travelers. We cannot do this in a vacuum, however. We need
international cooperation to establish a global standard.
Levels of Scrutiny
The second challenge relates to the inconsistent levels of scrutiny
to which travelers are subjected. Everyone knows that some non-
immigrants need visas, but others do not. Less well known is that some
do not even require passports. Immigrants, some of whom spend little
time in the U.S., receive medical examinations and background checks,
but non-immigrants, some of whom remain here legally for many years, do
not.
Usually, travelers from visa waiver countries do not require visas
but, depending on the claimed purpose of their trip, they sometimes do.
Most citizens of Canada and Mexico do not need visas or passports to
enter the United States. We do not always record their names, or check
them against our databases, though we do check their automobile license
plates at land POEs. During FY 2002, 104 million visa-exempt Mexicans
constituted 24 percent, and 52 million visa-exempt Canadians
constituted 12 percent, of all admissions.
U.S. citizens reenter the country with the least scrutiny of all,
and frequently require no passport. Foreign travelers who can
successfully pretend to be Americans get the same special treatment, as
documented by the GAO in its May 2003 report, ``Counterfeit Documents
Used to Enter The United States From Certain Western Hemisphere
Countries Not Detected'' (03-713T).
The US-VISIT system screens only non-immigrants with visas, or
visitors using the provisions of the Visa Waiver Program. According to
fiscal year 2002 statistics, the approximately 15 million VWP visitors
accounted for three percent of U.S. admissions, while 19 million
travelers with nonimmigrant visas accounted for five percent. In
essence, US-VISIT screens fewer than nine percent of the people
entering the United States. In our review of the implementation of US-
VISIT at land POEs, issued in February 2005, we noted that at land
borders, where travelers with visas or using the VWP are a rarity, the
percentage of crossers screened by US-VISIT is very small: less than
three percent.
No one designing a border security system from the ground up would
create such a hodge-podge of processes with so many potential security
gaps. If we are to be serious about border security, we will need to
rationalize our border crossing processes. People are not always who
they claim to be, and terrorists and criminals will try to assume
whichever false identity will get them the least scrutiny as they enter
and depart our country.
Tracking the Entry and Exit of Foreign Visitors
Keeping track of people entering and leaving the U.S. is necessary
to prevent terrorism, narcotics smuggling, and illegal alien smuggling,
as well as to enforce trade laws and collect revenue, all while
facilitating international travel. Over the next five years, DHS will
invest billions of dollars to modernize the passenger processes and
systems inherited from the legacy agencies, including the US-VISIT
system. Concerted efforts are now being made to realign certain
operations and systems within the newly created DHS.
However, DHS did not analyze or re-examine its strategy, processes,
technology, and organization for the overall federal passenger
processing requirements before proceeding with US-VISIT. Further, DHS
did not have an overall modernization acquisition strategy for the
legacy Customs, INS, TSA, or the Animal and Plant Health Inspection
Service (APHIS) systems related to passenger processing. An acquisition
strategy based on a re-engineered vision of how DHS will process
international travelers, in alignment with the department's enterprise
architecture, should result in better and more definitive contract
requirements.
We recommended that BTS initiate a business process reengineering
effort to establish a clear vision of the overall federal operations
that will be used to clear people entering and leaving the U.S. Based
on those results, BTS should work with the Chief Acquisition Officer
(CAO) and Chief Information Officer (CIO) to develop an overall
departmental acquisition strategy for passenger information technology
systems. BTS advised that it plans to initiate a business process
reengineering effort, and develop an overall department acquisition
strategy in coordination with the CAO and CIO.
Finally, in a report issued in June 2004, we raised concerns about
the Secure Electronic Network for Travelers Rapid Inspection (SENTRI)
program. This program permits pre-screened and enrolled low risk
travelers to enter the U.S. from Mexico in designated lanes with
minimal inspection by CBP officers, thereby avoiding the lengthy
waiting times in the regular inspection lanes. The SENTRI program is
open to both U.S. citizens and certain non-citizens. We determined that
the program is generally achieving the two basic objectives for which
it was established: accelerating the passage of participating travelers
through land ports of entry; and, maintaining border integrity,
security, and law enforcement responsibilities.
However, we noted inconsistencies in the way land ports of entry
applied eligibility criteria for criminal offenses, financial solvency,
and residency, and approved or denied applications. In addition, we
noted weaknesses in the procedures by which SENTRI system records are
kept current, and how alerts are disseminated to CBP officers. Taken as
a whole, our findings indicate weak program management that could
jeopardize the program's integrity and border security. In response to
these concerns, CBP has moved to merge all of its trusted travelers
programs and centralize the enrollment process to standardize
enrollment procedures and criteria.
Preventing Terrorist Weapons from Entering the U.S.
Since September 11, 2001, CBP's priority mission is detecting and
preventing terrorists and terrorist weapons from entering the U.S. A
major component of its priority mission is to ensure that oceangoing
cargo containers arriving at seaports of entry are not used to smuggle
illegal or dangerous contraband. To test controls over importing
weapons of mass destruction, ABC News was successful twice at smuggling
depleted uranium into the country. On September 11, 2002, ABC News
reported that a steel pipe containing a 15-pound cylinder of depleted
uranium was shipped from Europe to the U.S. undetected by CBP. On
September 11, 2003, ABC News reported that the same cylinder was
smuggled--again undetected--to the U.S. from Jakarta, Indonesia.
In the first smuggling event, ABC News reported that a steel pipe
containing a 15-pound cylinder of depleted uranium, which was shielded
with lead, was placed in a suitcase and accompanied by reporters by
rail from Austria to Turkey. In Istanbul, Turkey, the suitcase was
placed inside an ornamental chest, which was crated and nailed shut.
The crate containing the suitcase was placed alongside crates of huge
vases and Turkish horse carts in a large metal shipping container, and
then loaded onto a ship, which left Istanbul. Based on data contained
in the Automated Targeting System, the crate was targeted as high-risk
for screening by the U.S. Customs Service. ABC News broadcast on
September 11, 2002, that Customs failed to detect the depleted uranium
carried from Europe to the United States.
During the second smuggling event, ABC News placed the same
cylinder of depleted uranium into a suitcase, and then placed the
suitcase into a teak trunk. The trunk, along with other furniture, was
loaded into a container in Jakarta, Indonesia, and then transshipped to
the U.S. from Tanjung Pelepas, Malaysia. This shipment, which was
targeted as high-risk for screening and subsequently inspected by CBP
personnel, was then allowed to proceed from the port by truck.
In a classified September 2004 report, we cited several weaknesses
that occurred at the time of the two incidents, which made the
container inspection process ineffective. The protocols and procedures
that CBP personnel followed at the time of the two smuggling incidents
were not adequate to detect the depleted uranium. CBP has since
enhanced its ability to screen targeted containers for radioactive
emissions by deploying more sensitive technology at its seaports,
revising protocols and procedures, and improving training of CBP
personnel.
We are currently conducting a follow-up audit on the issue of
radiation detection. The audit will determine to what extent CBP has a
complete and workable plan for deploying and effectively operating
radiation portal monitors at major U.S. seaports, and how the new
technologies that CBP is deploying will impact operations at the ports.
TRANSPORTATION SECURITY
DHS faces significant challenges in ensuring the security of the
nation's transportation systems. TSA and the Coast Guard spearhead the
department's transportation security efforts. While TSA has made
progress in implementing the Aviation and Transportation Security Act
(ATSA) and securing the nation's airways, improvements are still needed
in aviation, rail, and transit security. Similarly, the Coast Guard has
made progress in securing the nation's maritime transportation system
but the deteriorating condition of its aircraft and cutter fleets
places its current and future mission performance at risk.
Aviation Security
The success of TSA in fulfilling its aviation security mission
depends heavily on the quality of its staff and the capability and
reliability of the equipment to screen passengers and cargo to identify
terrorists and terrorists' weapons, while minimizing disruption to
public mobility and commerce.
Providing qualified and trained personnel has been a substantial
challenge for TSA. ATSA mandated that the TSA hire and train thousands
of screeners for the nation's 429 commercial airports by November 19,
2002. As a result, TSA hired over 60,000 screeners. Our undercover
tests of screener performance, about which we first reported in 2004,
revealed that improvements are needed in the screening process to
ensure that dangerous prohibited items are not carried into the sterile
areas of heavily used airports, or do not enter the checked baggage
system. We attributed the test failures to four areas that needed
improvement: training; equipment and technology; policy and procedures;
and, management and supervision. TSA agreed with our recommendations
and took action to implement them, particularly in the areas of
training, policies and procedures, and management practices. We
recently completed a follow-up review of screener performance at the
same airports. We began our review at the end of November 2004 and
completed our fieldwork in early February 2005. Despite the fact that
the majority of screeners with whom our testers came in contact were
diligent in the performance of their duties and conscious of the
responsibility those duties carry, the lack of improvement since our
last audit indicates that significant improvement in performance may
not be possible without greater use of new technology.
We recommended in our previous report that the TSA administrator
aggressively pursue the development and deployment of innovations and
improvements to aviation security technologies, particularly for
checkpoint screening. TSA is currently testing several such
technologies, including backscatter x-ray, Explosive Trace Detection
(ETD) portals, and document scanners. We encourage TSA to expedite its
testing programs and give priority to technologies, such as backscatter
x-ray, that will enable the screening workforce to better detect both
weapons and explosives.
Furthermore, TSA has come under criticism for not moving quickly
enough to address the vulnerability of the nation's air traffic to
suicide bombers. The 9-11 Commission recommended that TSA and the
Congress must give priority attention to improving the ability of
screening checkpoints to detect explosives on passengers. As noted
above, TSA is in the process of testing several of these technologies,
including backscatter x-ray, vapor detection, and document scanner
machines, to address concerns regarding detection of explosives on
individuals. Pending the testing and deployment of these advanced
technologies, TSA instituted a process of more extensive pat-down
procedures to find explosives hidden on a traveler. Since travelers and
interest groups protested the use of these more thorough examination
procedures, they have already been refined by TSA. We are currently
reviewing the implementation of these procedures to ensure they are
strictly followed, as well as TSA's process for responding to passenger
complaints.
Rail and Transit Security
While TSA continues to address critical aviation security needs, it
is moving slowly to improve security across other modes of
transportation. More than 6,000 agencies provide transit services
through buses, subways, ferries, and light-rail to about 14 million
Americans. Terrorist experiences in Madrid and Tokyo highlight
potential vulnerabilities in transit systems. Recently, several
congressional leaders expressed concern that the federal government has
not responded strongly enough to the threat to public transit.
Furthermore, the 9/11 Commission reported that over 90 percent of the
nation's $5.3 billion annual investment in TSA goes to aviation, and
that current efforts do not reflect a forward-looking strategic plan
systematically analyzing assets, risks, costs, and benefits so that
transportation security resources can be allocated where the risks are
greatest in a cost effective way. TSA's FY 2005 budget still focuses
its resources on aviation.
TSA has lead responsibility for coordinating the development of a
transportation sector plan, which it plans to complete later this year.
TSA, however, has not finalized the memoranda of understanding with
various Department of Transportation agencies to determine how it will
coordinate work in the future. We are evaluating TSA's actions to
assess and address potential terrorist threats to the mass transit
systems of U.S. metropolitan areas.
Maritime Security
The Coast Guard's willingness to work hard and long hours, use
innovative tactics, and work through partnerships in close inter-agency
cooperation has allowed it to achieve mission performance results.
However, to improve and sustain its mission performance in the future,
the Coast Guard faces a significant barrier in overcoming the
deteriorating readiness of its fleet assets. The Coast Guard faces
three major barriers to improving and sustaining its readiness to
perform legacy missions:
1. The lack of a comprehensive and fully defined performance
management system impedes the Coast Guard's ability to gauge
its performance, allocate resources effectively, and target
areas for improved performance.
2. The workload demands on the Coast Guard will continue to
increase as it implements the Maritime Transportation Security
Act of 2002 (MTSA). This complex work requires experienced and
trained personnel; however, the Coast Guard has suffered from
declining experience levels among its personnel in recent
years.
3. Sustaining a high operating tempo due to growing homeland
security demands--such as added port, waterway, and coastal
security patrols--will tax the Coast Guard's infrastructure,
particularly its aging cutter and aircraft fleet.
The lack of a comprehensive and fully defined performance
management system impeded the Coast Guard's ability to gauge its
performance, allocate resources effectively, and target areas for
improved performance. The Coast Guard has yet to define a performance
management system that includes all the input, output, and outcomes
needed to gauge results or target performance improvements, balance its
missions, and ensure the capacity and readiness to respond to future
crises or major terrorist attacks. For example, for search and rescue,
the number of mariners in distress saved is a good indicator of
outcome. However, resource hours under-represent the effort put into
this mission by omitting the many hours of watch standing at stations.
Without more complete information, the Coast Guard has limited ability
to identify and target cost effective improvements to its mission
performance.
The workload demands on the Coast Guard will continue to increase
as it implements the MTSA. Under MTSA, the Coast Guard must conduct
risk assessments of all vessels and facilities on or near the water;
develop national and area maritime transportation security plans; and,
approve port, facility, and vessel security plans. This complex work
requires experienced and trained personnel, presenting a major
challenge for the Coast Guard, which suffers from declining experience
levels among its personnel. Since the Coast Guard largely relies on
experienced senior personnel to coach and train junior personnel and
new recruits on the job, mission performance is at risk.
In addition to implementing MTSA, growing homeland security demands
the agency, such as added port, waterway, and coastal security patrols,
result in a continued high operating tempo. Sustaining this high
operating tempo will be a major challenge for Coast Guard personnel and
will tax its infrastructure, especially its aged cutter and aircraft
fleet. The Coast Guard reported that sustaining its mission is at risk
due to cutters and aircraft which are aging, technologically obsolete,
or those which require replacement and modernization. Currently, the
Coast Guard is experiencing serious cracking in the hulls of the 110-
foot cutters and engine power loss on the HH-65 Dolphin helicopters,
resulting in operating restrictions. These problems adversely affect
the Coast Guard's mission readiness and ultimately mission performance.
Maintaining and Replacing Deepwater Assets.
In June 2002, the Coast Guard awarded a $17 billion contract to
Integrated Coast Guard Systems to maintain and replace its Deepwater
assets. This contract called for replacing or modernizing, by 2022, all
assets used in missions that occur more than 50 miles offshore,
including approximately 90 cutters and 200 aircraft as well as assorted
sensors and communications systems. According to the Coast Guard, the
greatest threat to its missions continues to be the operational
capability of its legacy aircraft, cutter, and small boat fleet. These
assets are aging and are more expensive to maintain. In some instances,
the Coast Guard is experiencing difficulty maintaining and upgrading
existing critical deepwater legacy assets including the HH-65, HH-60,
HC-130 aircraft, and its coastal patrol boat fleets.
As an example, the number of in-flight loss of power mishaps
involving the HH-65 helicopter grew from about a dozen annual mishaps
before September 11, 2001, to more than 150 in FY 2004, requiring the
immediate re-engining of the entire HH-65 fleet. The Coast Guard
recently accelerated its acquisition of the Multi-Mission Cutter
Helicopter under development by the Integrated Deepwater System
acquisition project, in addition to initiating engine replacement for
its HH-65 helicopter fleet. Also, in 2003, the Coast Guard experienced
676 unscheduled maintenance days for its cutters--a 41 percent increase
over 2002. This was the equivalent of losing the services of over three
and a half cutters. These lost cutter days include the coastal patrol
boats, which are suffering from accelerated hull corrosion and breached
hull casualties.
INTEGRATING THE DEPARTMENT'S COMPONENTS
Integrating its many separate components into a single, effective,
efficient, and economical department remains one of DHS' biggest
challenges. To help meet this challenge, DHS established an Operational
Integration Staff to assist departmental leadership with the
integration of certain DHS missions, operational activities, and
programs at the headquarters level and throughout the regional
structure.
Much remains to be done in integrating DHS programs and functions.
We have reported that structural and resource problems continue to
inhibit progress in certain support functions. For example, while the
department is trying to integrate and streamline support service
functions, most of the critical support personnel are distributed
throughout the components and are not directly accountable to the
functional Line of Business (LOB) Chiefs such as the Chief Financial
Officer, Chief Information Officer, Chief Human Capital Officer, Chief
of Administrative Services, and Chief Procurement Officer.
In August 2004, the Secretary and Deputy Secretary directed the DHS
LOB chiefs to design and implement systems to optimize functions across
the entire department. The LOB chiefs were instructed to develop
Management Directives to guide the department's management of those
business functions, too. The Directives were to be built on a concept
of ``dual accountability,'' where both the operational leadership and
the LOB chiefs are responsible for the successful preparation of the
Directives and their implementation. This concept has been described as
a ``robust dotted line'' relationship of agency or component functional
heads to the LOB chiefs for both daily work and annual evaluation. In
October 2004, the Secretary signed Final Management Directives to
institutionalize the arrangements before FY 2005. In addition, the
department's Management Council signed charters for each LOB, which
establish a formal governance and advisory board structure to ensure
that the objectives and intent of the Directives are executed.
While the concept underlying the Management Directives may work in
some environments, we are concerned that the DHS LOB chiefs may not
have sufficient resources or authority to ensure that department-wide
goals and challenges in their respective functions are addressed
effectively, efficiently, or economically--or that available resources
can be marshaled to address emerging problems. These concerns were
heightened by the department's experience this past fiscal year in
reorganizing the former Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS)
and the U.S. Customs Service into three new bureaus--Immigration and
Customs Enforcement (ICE), Customs and Border Protection (CBP), and
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS)--referred to as the
``tri-bureaus''--and the consolidation of accounting services for many
small programs outside of DHS into ICE. Since the department and ICE
did not prepare a thorough, well-designed plan to guide the transition
of accounting responsibilities, ICE fell seriously behind in the
performance of basic accounting functions, such as account
reconciliations and analysis of abnormal balances. The pervasiveness of
errors in ICE's accounts prevented completion of audit work at ICE for
the FY 2004 DHS financial statement.
Additionally, the department faces a structural problem in its
financial management organization. The bureaus control most of DHS'
accounting resources, but the DHS Chief Financial Officer (CFO) has
responsibility for DHS' consolidated financial reporting, which is
dependent on those resources. Although coordination mechanisms are in
place, the monitoring controls at the DHS CFO's level are insufficient
to ensure the accuracy of consolidated financial information. The
seriousness of these material weaknesses and reportable conditions at
DHS demands strong oversight and controls.
Similarly, creating a single infrastructure for effective
communications and information exchange remains a major management
challenge for DHS. We reported in July 2004, that the DHS CIO is not
well positioned to meet the department's IT objectives. The CIO is not
a member of the senior management team with authority to strategically
manage department-wide technology assets and programs. No formal
reporting relationship is in place between the DHS CIO and the CIOs of
major component organizations, which hinders department-wide support
for central IT direction. Further, the CIO has limited staff resources
to carry out the planning, policy formation, and other IT management
activities needed to support departmental units. These deficiencies in
the IT organizational structure are exemplified by the CIO's lack of
oversight and control of all DHS' IT investment decision-making, and a
reliance instead on cooperation and coordination within DHS' CIO
Council to accomplish department-wide IT integration and consolidation
objectives.\1\ The department would benefit from following the
successful examples of other federal agencies in positioning their CIOs
with the authority and influence needed to guide executive decisions on
department-wide IT investments and strategies.
In this regard, the Secretary is reexamining selected operations in
what he refers to as a ``second stage review.'' The review will cover
where DHS has been, where it's headed, and what changes, if any, need
to be made.
We will be monitoring and evaluating the progress made in each LOB
area very closely, not only during FY 2005, but also for years to come.
INFORMATION SECURITY
The DHS Chief Information Officer (CIO) oversees the information
security program. The CIO has developed an Information Security Program
Strategic Plan to provide the foundation for an agency-wide,
consolidated information security program. The DHS Chief Information
Security Officer (CISO) developed the Information Security Program
Management Plan, which is the blueprint for managing DHS' information
security program. At the same time, the CISO developed an Information
Security Risk Management Plan, which documents DHS' plan to develop,
implement, and institutionalize a risk management process in support of
its information security program. Based on our review of these plans,
DHS has an adequate structure, blueprint, and process to implement and
manage its information security program.
Our office performs a yearly review of the DHS information security
program as required by the Federal Information Security Management Act
of 2002 (FISMA). During our FY 2004 review, we noted that DHS made
significant progress over the last two years to develop, manage, and
implement its information security program. However, DHS'
organizational components have not fully aligned their respective
security programs with DHS' overall policies, procedures, or practices.
Factors which have kept the department from having an effective
information security program include: lack of a system inventory; lack
of a formal reporting structure between the CIO and the organizational
components; lack of a verification process to ensure that all
information security weaknesses have been identified; and, all of the
department's major information systems have not been certified and
accredited.
Overall, DHS is on the right track to create and maintain an
effective information security program. However, the department and its
components still have much work to do to get to the point where DHS has
a mature information security program.
INTELLIGENCE
Under the Homeland Security Act of 2002,\1\ the department is
responsible for receiving, integrating, and coordinating the sharing of
federal information to help ensure border security and protect the U.S.
from terrorist threats. Specifically, the Homeland Security Act of 2002
gave DHS significant responsibility to coordinate the sharing of
information to protect the U.S. from terrorist threats. The law
requires that the DHS Under Secretary for Information Analysis and
Infrastructure Protection (IAIP) consult with the Director of Central
Intelligence and other appropriate intelligence and law enforcement
elements of the federal government to establish collection priority and
strategy for information relating to threats of terrorism against the
U.S.\2\ Additionally, the law directs the IAIP Under Secretary to
review, analyze, and make recommendations to improve the policies and
procedures governing the sharing of law enforcement, intelligence,
intelligence-related, and other information relating to homeland
security.\3\.
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\1\ Public Law 107-296 (Nov. 25, 2002), codified at 6 USC 101 et
seq.
\2\ 6 USC 121 (d)(10).
\3\ 6 USC 121 (d)(8).
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However, the role and responsibilities of IAIP for intelligence
collection, analysis, and dissemination has been abated with the
creation of the Terrorist Threat Integration Center under the Director
of Central Intelligence and the Terrorist Screening Center under the
Director of the FBI. Creation of the new Director of National
Intelligence position makes the DHS intelligence coordination role even
more uncertain, calling for prompt clarification of federal lines of
authority in this area.
PREPAREDNESS
To date, our office focused on examining the programs and
mechanisms that enhance preparedness at the federal, state, and local
levels of government, including the utility of IAIP data on port
security grant award decisions. In its December 2004 report, the
Heritage Foundation recommended consolidating DHS critical
infrastructure protection and preparedness, as well as state, local,
and private coordination efforts, under an Undersecretary for
Protection and Preparedness. According to the Foundation, consolidating
these disparate efforts would provide the DHS Secretary with a stronger
platform from which to lead national efforts, determine priorities,
identify critical vulnerabilities, work with state, local, and private
sector entities on securing those vulnerabilities and preparing for
attacks, and make grants to help get the job done and to induce
cooperation. Again, on the surface, this proposal appears to have
merit. However, since we have not studied the implications of this
proposal, we are not in a position to address the pros and cons of such
a consolidation. Nevertheless, we do have reservations about separating
FEMA's preparedness functions from its response and recovery
responsibilities. Disaster preparedness, response, and recovery are
intricately related, each relying on the other for success. This
proposal should be carefully studied before it is put into practice.
Also, the Department just completed TOPOFF3, said to be one of the
largest incident response exercises in the world, involving three
nations and over 10,000 participants. Our office monitored the exercise
here and at two venues in New Jersey and Connecticut. The after-action
reports are not final. It is important that we learn from these
exercises and put the lessons to work in new preparedness strategies
and exercises as quickly and aggressively as possible.
Infrastructure Protection
One of the significant challenges facing the new DHS Secretary is
the need to base the department's business decisions, such as its grant
awards, on information relating to nationally critical infrastructure
and key assets. We learned from two surveys completed in 2004 and a
more recent review of DHS' Port Security Grant program issued in
January 2005, that the department lags in integrating critical asset
data and its ``preparedness'' initiatives into its business decisions.
We concluded in 2004, too, that if IAIP did not produce a condensed
list of most sensitive critical assets other elements within DHS would
be at risk of failing to direct their grant resources toward national
critical infrastructure protection and preparedness. This concern
materialized in port security grant awards: administrators designed and
operated the program as a sector-specific grant program and conducted
at least three rounds of grants, totaling $560 million, without
definitive national priorities for securing the seaport infrastructure
of the nation. Poor integration of critical asset information meant
that port security grant award decisions were made without sufficient
information about our national priorities. DHS components need to
strengthen their working relationships with IAIP, which has primary
responsibility within DHS for critical asset identification,
prioritization, and protection. The department's investments in new
technologies, systems, and grant-making programs must reflect national
priorities as determined by IAIP's risk management activities.
A lack of coordination between the Science and Technology
Directorate (S&T) and other DHS components slowed S&T's long-term plan
to invest in threat vulnerability and risk assessment tools, too. S&T
is required to coordinate with other executive agencies, particularly
those within DHS, to: (1) develop an integrated national policy and
strategic plan for identifying and procuring new technologies; (2)
reduce duplication and identify unmet needs; and, (3) support IAIP in
assessing and testing homeland security vulnerabilities and possible
threats. TSA, the Coast Guard, and IAIP have developed risk assessment
tools and performed analyses of critical infrastructure. It is critical
for the S&T to have a clear understanding of the terrorist threat
picture facing the nation and the current technical capabilities and
ongoing research and development initiatives of other DHS elements. To
be effective, it must be able to prioritize its investment decisions,
and avoid duplicating technology initiatives by other DHS components,
especially in the area of risk assessment. To that end, the extent that
the Secretary oversees these efforts and makes intra-agency
coordination a reality, will determine his effectiveness in ensuring
that DHS' investments are adequately matched to risk.
We are seeing signs that IAIP is becoming more involved in risk
assessment activity and grant decision-making across the department as
agencies are increasingly seeking assistance from IAIP. S&T has
intensified efforts to obtain terrorist threat information from IAIP
and incorporate it into S&T's selection of new technologies. The Coast
Guard is working closer with IAIP on maritime risk assessments and
programs. Grant officials signaled their intention to consult IAIP and
make better use of critical infrastructure information in future rounds
of port security grants.
The Secretary needs to ensure that this progress continues and
becomes a regular part of DHS's business decision-making. DHS
components must share information, assimilate data to better coordinate
risk management activities, and subscribe to a single concept of
national priorities and interests. These actions are the foundation of
solid business judgments now and in the future. Without this
leadership, DHS risks having multiple, confusing, and possibly
conflicting sources of priority for its investments.
CONTRACT MANAGEMENT
DHS obligated about $13 billion to procure goods and services
during FY 2003 and 2004. In addition to the challenge of integrating
the procurement functions of its component organizations, DHS must
provide contract management to the departmental components, which came
into the agency without accompanying procurement staff. These
components include the Science & Technology Directorate, the
Information Analysis & Infrastructure Protection Directorate, the
Office of State and Local Government Coordination and Preparedness,
U.S. VISIT, and other offices.
DHS formed the Office of Procurement Operations (OPO) to provide
procurement support for these components. But, the office has
insufficient staff to manage over $2.5 billion in procurements.
Therefore, DHS contracted with other federal agencies to provide the
contract management support needed while it addresses the resource
issues in OPO. However, providing consistent contract management
throughout DHS remains a formidable challenge. The OPO developed and
negotiated with its customer organizations a staffing plan that would
bring OPO's staffing level to 127 by the end of FY 2005. The cost of
these positions would be reimbursed by customer organizations through
the Working Capital Fund.
DHS' efforts to provide a sufficiently detailed and accurate
listing of its procurement information proved difficult. While DHS has
migrated all of its procurements under the umbrella of one
comprehensive reporting system, the department still lacks sufficiently
detailed and validated data to manage the procurement universe and
ensure accurate or consistent reporting.
While the DHS organizational components face continuing challenges
in contract management, they have made some progress. For example, the
Transportation Security Administration (TSA) relies extensively on
contractors to accomplish its mission, although it provided little
contract oversight during its first year of operation. As a result, the
cost of some of those initial contracts ballooned. For example, TSA
improperly administered one of these contracts as cost-plus-percent-of-
cost and paid at least $49 million in excessive profit to the
contractor. In 2004, however, TSA began implementing policies and
procedures to provide adequate procurement planning, contract
structure, and contract oversight.
Several other components of the department have large, complex,
high-cost procurement programs under way that need to be closely
managed, too. For example, CBP's Automated Commercial Environment
project will cost $5 billion, and the Coast Guard's Deepwater
Capability Replacement Project will cost $17 billion and take two-three
decades to complete. Further, the department recently awarded a $10
billion contract for the development of a system to support the United
States Visitor and Immigrant Status Indication Technology (US-VISIT)
program to track and control the entry and exit of all aliens through
U.S. air, land, and sea ports of entry. It is anticipated that this
program will be implemented over the next ten years. Also, TSA's
managed information technology services contract will cost over $1
billion.
We will continue to review these major procurements. Recently,
Secretary Chertoff expressed concerns regarding the vulnerability of
DHS procurements to fraud, waste, and abuse. At his request, the OIG
and Office of the Chief Procurement Officer are working together to
develop a report detailing procurement integrity vulnerabilities and
recommendations for reducing those vulnerabilities. In addition to this
endeavor and our efforts to review major procurements on an ongoing
basis, we plan to systemically assess the effectiveness of internal
controls and project management at each organizational component to
assure that major acquisitions are well thought out and well managed.
FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT
DHS continues to face significant financial management challenges,
with some of the most critical at ICE. DHS' Chief Financial Officer is
well aware of these challenges and is working to address them, although
he has had limited resources to deal with these issues. DHS also faces
a major challenge in implementing the Department of Homeland Security
Financial Accountability Act, which requires that an audit of internal
controls over DHS' financial reporting be performed next year.
Summary of the FY 2004 Financial Statement Audit Report
FY 2004 was the first full year of operation for the Department.
Because the financial statement auditor, KPMG LLP, was able to perform
more audit procedures compared to FY 2003 additional material
weaknesses surfaced. Unfortunately, KPMG was unable to provide an
opinion on the Department's FY 2004 statements. This disclaimer of
opinion was due to circumstances at ICE, the inability to complete
audit procedures over certain costs and budgetary transactions at the
Coast Guard, the lack of reconciliations for intra-governmental
balances, and the accelerated reporting deadline of November 15th that
prevented an extension of audit procedures.
ICE presented the Department with the most critical problems. ICE's
financial reporting environment underwent significant change in FY
2004. Its legacy agency, the Immigration and Naturalization Service,
and the former U.S. Customs Service, were reorganized into three
bureaus: ICE, Customs and Border Protection (CBP), and Citizenship and
Immigration Services (CIS). ICE experienced significant budget
difficulties during the year due at least in part to the late
preparation of agreements to reimburse it for costs incurred on others'
behalf. In FY 2004 ICE became the accounting services provider for
several other Department components, as well as supporting its own and
CIS' accounting needs. ICE also experienced significant staff turnover.
As a result, it fell seriously behind in basic accounting functions,
such as account reconciliations, analysis of material abnormal
balances, and proper budgetary accounting. The auditors observed a void
in the financial management infrastructure at ICE that would likely
continue to jeopardize the integrity of DHS' financial reporting until
the fundamental issues of internal control, including proper staffing
and oversight, were addressed. We are continuing to review the
circumstances leading to these problems, and the effects they have had
on ICE operations.
KPMG was unable to complete audit procedures over certain costs and
budgetary transactions at the Coast Guard due to the accelerated
deadlines. The Coast Guard factors significantly in many of the
material weaknesses identified in the auditors' report. These material
weaknesses made it much more difficult for both the Coast Guard and the
auditors to complete the audit by the deadline.
The Department had significant out-of-balance conditions with other
federal entities, which were not reconciled; therefore, it could not
support certain balances on its own books. The most significant out-of-
balance conditions existed at ICE. A lack of resources in the OCFO
prevented the accountant responsible for intra-governmental
reconciliations from researching and reconciling these differences in a
timely manner during the year and at year-end.
The financial statement audit had to be completed three months
earlier than the prior year due to the accelerated reporting deadline
of November 15th. The Department had little time to focus on correcting
deficiencies from KPMG's last report before it was subjected to another
financial statement audit. To have a high likelihood of meeting an
accelerated reporting deadline successfully, the Department's internal
controls needed to be much better. The Department entered this audit
with seven material weaknesses and seven other reportable conditions
related to financial reporting.
Material Weaknesses and Other Reportable Conditions
KPMG identified 10 material weaknesses in internal control at DHS
in FY 2004 related to:
oversight;
ICE;
financial statement preparation;
system security;
fund balance with Treasury;
property, plant and equipment;
operating materials and supplies;
accounts payable and disbursements;
budgetary accounting; and
intra-governmental; and,
intra-departmental balances.
The auditors noted three additional reportable conditions related
to deferred revenue, environmental liabilities, and custodial activity
at CBP.
The most critical material weaknesses dealt with the need for
additional technical resources to support the CFO in his financial
reporting and oversight responsibilities, and the void in ICE's
financial management infrastructure. The CFO has obtained additional
resources for his office through hiring and a contractor. He has
assured us that steps are underway to address the financial management
issues at ICE. A new budget director at ICE was recently designated.
Additional Challenges in the Upcoming Year
The Department of Homeland Security Financial Accountability Act
requires that an annual audit of the Department's internal control over
financial reporting be performed beginning next year. Recently, OMB
revised its Circular A-123, Management's Responsibility for Internal
Control, which the Department is using to prepare for this audit.
However, the success of this effort will require time given the
Department's limited resources, its already significant number of
material weaknesses, and the additional documentation and monitoring
procedures that must be put in place.
Revenue Collection
Annually, CBP collects more that $22 billion in duties, excise
taxes, fines, penalties and other revenue. CBP has had an active
program to monitor trade compliance, but in the face of critical
homeland security responsibilities, counter-terrorism activities have
begun to claim a higher share of border resources. CBP faces a
challenge in protecting trade revenue and enforcing trade laws at a
time when the terrorist threat demands much more from CBP's border
resources.
CBP is responsible for collecting user fees from air passengers
arriving in the U.S. These fees are designed to pay for the costs of
inspection services provided by CBP (which now includes the former INS
and the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) inspection
processes). Between FYs 1998 and 2002, the former U. S. Customs Service
collected $1.1 billion from the airlines. Now that CBP's inspection
workforce has expanded to include the former INS and APHIS inspection
services, it is important that CBP ensure that revenues collected are
accounted for and are adequate to cover the costs of services provided.
CIS generates more than $2 billion in revenues through collection
of application fees from non-citizens seeking entry into the U.S. In
fulfilling its mission, CIS processes millions of actions and requests
that are documented in paper files. The systems that track these
applications are non-integrated, and many are ad hoc. Deferred revenue
is a financial measure of pending applications and is material to DHS'
financial statements. The challenge for CIS is to move from paper based
and non-integrated processes to an integrated case management system.
GRANTS MANAGEMENT
DHS inherited a variety of grant programs, which provide money for
disaster preparedness, prevention, response, and recovery. Significant
shortcomings have been identified in many of these programs in the
past. The potential for overlap and duplication has grown as the number
of grant programs has grown. In an effort to achieve better
coordination, the Office for Domestic Preparedness and Office of State
and Local Coordination were consolidated into the Office of State and
Local Government Coordination and Preparedness (SLGCP). That office now
manages most of DHS' preparedness and first responder grant programs.
The consolidation represents progress toward the one-stop shop that
states and local jurisdictions have long sought.
In developing and implementing a national program to enhance the
capacity of state and local agencies to respond to incidents of
terrorism, DHS has integrated numerous distinct, yet related,
preparedness grant initiatives and programs into a single program under
the auspices of SLGCP. Under the $2.6 billion fiscal year 2005 Homeland
Security Grant Program, SLGCP consolidated the application process and
administration of six programs: State Homeland Security Program, Urban
Areas Security Initiative, Law Enforcement Terrorism Prevention
Program, Citizen Corps, Emergency Management Performance Grants, and
Metropolitan Medical Response System Program Grants.
However, much work remains to be done. In March 2004, we issued An
Audit of Distributing and Spending ``First Responder'' Grant Funds,
OIG-04-15. The report identified problems at the state and local level
that were causing grant fund distribution and spending to be slow. The
problems included too many large grant programs that had to be
processed in too short a time by inadequate state and local staffing, a
lack of federal guidance on preparedness standards, complex and time-
consuming state and local planning processes, and burdensome state and
local procurement and grant approval processes. These problems were
verified by work done by GAO and the Department's Homeland Security
Advisory Counsel Task Force.
The Department has taken action to implement the recommendations in
our March report and to respond to GAO and task force concerns. Efforts
are under way to identify and disseminate best practices, including how
states and localities manage legal and procurement issues that affect
grant distribution. SLGCP has established a new Homeland Security
Preparedness Technical Assistance Program service to enhance the grant
management capabilities of state administrative agencies. Also, DHS
established a password protected web site, Lessons Learned Information
Sharing, which allows states, local governments, and first responder
organizations to share best practices.
In addition, SLGCP has improved grantee reporting requirements.
Beginning in fiscal year 2004 and continuing in fiscal year 2005,
states are required to submit Initial Strategy Implementation Plans
which show how planned grant expenditures are linked to larger
projects, which in turn support specific goals and objectives in the
state homeland security strategy. In addition to these plans, SLGCP
requires states to submit biannual strategy implementation reports
showing how the actual expenditure of grant funds is linked to strategy
goals and objectives.
In response to our recommendation that the Department accelerate
the development of federal guidelines for first responder capabilities,
equipment, training, and exercises, SLGCP is developing a standardized
Weapons of Mass Destruction awareness training program and national
performance standards for assessing domestic preparedness capabilities
and identifying gaps in those capabilities. Homeland Security
Presidential Directive-8 called for a new national preparedness goal
and performance measures, standards for preparedness assessments and
strategies, and a system for assessing the nation's overall
preparedness. DHS issued an Interim National Preparedness Goal on April
1, 2005. This goal is a product of a capabilities-based planning
process that led to the identification of core capabilities that the
nation and its states, communities, and citizens need to possess. By
mid-April 2005, DHS plans to issue detailed instructions on how
communities can use this goal to manage federal preparedness
assistance.
For FY 2006, states and urban areas are to update their Homeland
Security Preparedness strategies to reflect seven national priorities
in order to receive continued federal preparedness assistance. These
priorities include: (1) implement the National Incident Management
System and National Response Plan; (2) expand regional collaboration;
(3) implement the Interim National Infrastructure Protection Plan; (4)
strengthen information sharing and collaboration capabilities; (5)
strengthen interoperable communications capabilities; (6) strengthen
capabilities for detection, response, and decontamination of chemical,
biological, radiological, nuclear, or explosive materials; and, (7)
strengthen medical surge and mass prophylaxis capabilities. For FY
2007, states and urban areas will need to revise their Homeland
Security Preparedness strategies to align with the Final National
Preparedness Goal in order to receive further federal preparedness
assistance. DHS plans to issue the Final National Preparedness Goal and
a target capabilities list, updated to include the target levels of
capabilities, on October 1, 2005.
Finally, in response to our reporting that a formal grant
monitoring system was lacking, DHS updated its grant-monitoring
guidance in fiscal year 2004 and established new monitoring goals.
According to the guidance, at least one office file review and one on-
site visit should be completed for each state each fiscal year. In
addition, the requirements for Initial Strategy Implementation plans
and biannual strategy implementation reports, discussed earlier, should
improve monitoring. As of September 2004, SLGCP filled 138 staff
positions, as compared with 63 filled positions at the end of fiscal
year 2003. That should help alleviate the staffing shortages, which
contributed to DHS's inability to conduct frequent grantee monitoring.
Although SLGCP has program management and monitoring responsibility
for its grants, it relies on the Justice Department's Office of the
Comptroller for grant fund distribution and assistance with financial
management support. In the department's 2004 financial statement audit
report, the independent auditors noted that SLGCP management was not
actively involved in the financial reporting of its activities and had
not obtained a thorough understanding of the control activities over
its financial reporting process performed by the Justice Department. As
a result, SLGCP lacks assurance that the processing of its financial
activities coincides with its business operations, are reported
accurately, and controlled properly.
We are currently conducting audits of individual states' management
of first responder grants, state and local governments' first responder
grant spending, and analyzing the effectiveness of DHS' system for
collecting data on state and local governments' risk, vulnerability and
needs assessments. We are also continuing our audits of FEMA's disaster
relief programs as well as beginning an audit of the Urban Area
Security Initiative grants.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. I will be
pleased to answer any questions you or the members may have.
Mr. Rogers. Thank you, Mr. Skinner.
The Chair now recognizes Mr. Norman Rabkin, Managing
Director of Homeland Security and Justice issues for the
Government Accountability Office, for your statement.
Mr. Rabkin?
STATEMENT OF NORMAN RABKIN, MANAGING DIRECTOR, HOMELAND
SECURITY AND JUSTICE, GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE
Mr. Rabkin. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Meek, I appreciate the
opportunity to be here this morning to talk about the
management challenges. My statement, the full statement, and my
summary are going to echo a lot of what you just heard. So I
think the consistency of the message is a message in itself.
I would like to address two topics. First, why GAO has
designated DHS' transformation as a high-risk area, and,
secondly, the specific management challenges that the
Department faces.
GAO designated DHS' transformation as high risk in January
2003, even before the Department opened its doors, for three
reasons. First, DHS was going to combine 22 agencies with over
170,000 employees carrying out a wide variety of missions,
ranging from law enforcement and border security to biological
research, computer security, disaster mitigation, et cetera.
Secondly, DHS was going to inherit a broad array of
operational and management challenges from those legacy
agencies.
And, finally, DHS' national security mission was of such
importance that the failure to effectively address its
management challenges and program risks could have serious
consequences.
Since our 2003 designation of DHS' transformation as high
risk, DHS leadership has provided a foundation for maintaining
critical operations while undergoing transformation. DHS has
worked to protect the homeland and secure transportation and
borders, it has funded emergency preparedness improvements and
emerging technologies, it has assisted law enforcement
activities against suspected terrorists, and it has issued its
first strategic plan.
However, despite real and hard-earned progress, when we
reconsidered our high-risk areas earlier this year, we
concluded that DHS still had significant challenges to overcome
in all of its management areas. Therefore, we continue to
believe that implementation and transformation of DHS is still
high risk.
Here is a summary of the specific management challenges
that we think DHS has to overcome. First, it has to keep a
departmentwide focus on management issues. One way to do this
is by having a chief management position that is elevated at a
Deputy Secretary level.
DHS has to integrate the varied management processes,
systems and people. Last week, we reported that while DHS has
made some progress in these efforts, its transformation would
be aided if it had overall goals and a timeline to guide it and
if it gave its Business Transformation Office the
responsibility and authority to implement the integration
strategy.
In the area of strategic planning, we have just completed
our evaluation of DHS' strategic planning process and its
development of its first strategic plan, and we expect to issue
that report in the next couple of weeks.
In the area of human capital management, DHS' system
includes many proven principles and concepts, but DHS has
considerable work ahead to define the details of that system,
to begin to implement it and then to evaluate how well it is
working.
Regarding financial management, DHS continues to work to
acquire and deploy an integrated financial enterprise solution,
a costly and time-consuming project that has proven quite
challenging for many other agencies.
In the area of information technology, DHS has developed an
enterprise architecture to guide its IT investments and a
structure for managing those investments. However, it still
needs to focus on ensuring that it manages specific major IT
investments and acquisitions, like US-VISIT and ACE, according
to these plans and procedures.
In terms of acquisition management, the Department faces
the challenge of holding its various procurement organizations
accountable for complying with procurement policies and
regulations and ensuring that taxpayer dollars are well spent.
Finally, in the area of research and development, DHS has
not yet completed a strategic plan to identify its goals and
priorities and to propose timelines and expected funding levels
to guide the implementation of that strategy.
Overcoming these challenges will be critical to better
enable the Department to succeed in its efforts to lead the
implementation of the President's homeland security strategy.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement, and I will be
glad to answer questions as well.
[The statement of Mr. Rabkin follows:]
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE
HOMELAND SECURITY
Overview of Department of Homeland Security Management Challenges
Statement of Norman J. Rabkin
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:
I appreciate the opportunity to appear before this subcommittee to
address management challenges facing the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS). The department plays a major role in the protection of
the homeland against terrorist and other threats. In addition to
managing its own affairs, the department also has a key role in
implementing the National Strategy for Homeland Security and
coordinating the larger homeland security efforts of the entire nation,
to include other stakeholders in the federal, state, local, and private
sectors. While GAO has conducted numerous reviews of specific DHS
mission areas--including border and transportation security,
information analysis and infrastructure protection, emergency
preparedness and response, and defending against catastrophic threats--
my statement is limited to overall management issues. These generally
cut across many if not all of the DHS agencies and mission areas. In my
testimony today, I will address two topics:
Why has GAO designated DHS's transformation as a high-
risk area?
What specific management challenges does the
department face?
This testimony continues GAO's long-standing efforts to provide
Congress with information on homeland security strategies and programs.
In February of last year, we testified on the desired characteristics
of national strategies, and whether various strategies--including the
National Strategy for Homeland Security--contained those desired
characteristics.\1\ In March of last year, we summarized strategic
homeland security recommendations by GAO and selected congressionally
chartered commissions.\2\ In July of last year, we reported on GAO
recommendations to DHS and the department's progress in implementing
such recommendations.\3\ In January of this year, we provided a
comprehensive report on DHS and other federal agency efforts and
challenges related to implementing the National Strategy for Homeland
Security.\4\ And just last month in March, we reported on DHS progress
in management integration.\5\ Together, these baseline efforts are
intended to aid congressional oversight in assessing the effectiveness
of federal homeland security activities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ GAO, Combating Terrorism: Evaluation of Selected
Characteristics in National Strategies Related to Terrorism, GAO-04-
408T (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 3, 2004).
\2\ GAO, Homeland Security: Selected Recommendations from
Congressionally Chartered Commissions and GAO, GAO-04-591 (Washington,
D.C.: Mar. 31, 2004).
\3\ GAO, Status of Key Recommendations GAO Has Made to DHS and Its
Legacy Agencies, GAO-04-865R (Washington, D.C.: July 2, 2004).
\4\ GAO, Homeland Security: Agency Plans, Implementation, and
Challenges Regarding the National Strategy for Homeland Security, GAO-
05-33 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 14, 2005).
\5\ GAO, Department of Homeland Security: A Comprehensive and
Sustained Approach Needed to Achieve Management Integration, GAO-05-139
(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 16, 2005).
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My comments are based on our wide-ranging, completed, and ongoing
work, and our institutional knowledge of homeland security and various
government organizational and management issues. We conducted our work
in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Summary
GAO designated DHS's transformation as high-risk in January 2003,
based on three factors. First, DHS faced enormous challenges in
implementing an effective transformation process, developing
partnerships, and building management capacity because it had to
transform 22 agencies into one department. Second, DHS faced a broad
array of operational and management challenges that it inherited from
its component legacy agencies. Finally, DHS's failure to effectively
address its management challenges and program risks could have serious
consequences for our national security. As we reported earlier this
year, the implementation and transformation of DHS remains high-
risk.\6\ Overall, DHS has made some progress, but significant
challenges remain to transform DHS into a more effective organization
with robust planning, management, and operations while maintaining and
improving readiness for its highly critical mission to secure the
homeland. Failure to effectively carry out its mission continues to
expose the nation to potentially serious consequences.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ GAO, High-Risk Series: An Update, GAO-05-207 (Washington, D.C.:
Jan. 2005).
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DHS faces a number of specific management challenges to improving
its ability to carry out its homeland security missions. Among these
challenges are ensuring departmentwide focus on management issues
through the establishment of a Chief Operating Officer or Chief
Management Officer position; coordinating its varied management
processes, systems, and people through the development of an
overarching management integration; improving strategic planning;
effectively managing strategic human capital; strengthening its
financial management infrastructure; developing a comprehensive
strategic management framework that addresses key information
technology disciplines; properly managing acquisitions; and
coordinating research and development among its components and with
other entities.
Background
In an effort to increase homeland security following the September
11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the United States, President Bush issued
the National Strategy for Homeland Security in July 2002 and signed
legislation creating DHS in November 2002.\7\ The strategy set forth
the overall objectives, mission areas, and initiatives to prevent
terrorist attacks within the United States, reduce America's
vulnerability to terrorism, and minimize the damage and assist in the
recovery from attacks that may occur. The strategy also called for the
creation of DHS. The department, which began operations in March 2003,
represented a fusion of 22 federal agencies to coordinate and
centralize the leadership of many homeland security activities under a
single department.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296 (Nov. 25,
2002).
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Although the National Strategy for Homeland Security indicated that
many federal departments (and other nonfederal stakeholders) will be
involved in homeland security activities, DHS has the dominant role in
implementing the strategy. The strategy identified six mission areas
and 43 initiatives.\8\ DHS was designated the lead federal agency for
37 of the 43 initiatives.\9\ In addition, DHS had activities underway
in 40 of the 43 initiatives.\10\ In addition, DHS has the dominant
share of homeland security funding. Figure 1 shows the proposed fiscal
year 2006 homeland security funding for federal departments and
agencies, with DHS constituting about 55 percent of the total.
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\8\ The six mission areas are Intelligence and Warning, Border and
Transportation Security, Domestic Counterterrorism, Protecting Critical
Infrastructures and Key Assets, Defending Against Catastrophic Threats,
and Emergency Preparedness and Response. Each of these has several
initiatives. For example, under the Border and Transportation Security
mission area, the initiatives include ensuring accountability in border
and transportation security, creating smart borders, and reforming
immigration services.
\9\ The strategy itself, or subsequent Homeland Security
Presidential Directives, designated lead agencies for most of the
initiatives. In some cases, agencies shared leadership.
\10\ For a more complete analysis of the strategy's mission areas,
initiatives, lead agencies, and implementation, see GAO-05-33.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2956.001
GAO Designated DHS's Transformation As High-Risk
The November 2002 enactment of legislation creating DHS represented
a historic moment of almost unprecedented action by the federal
government to fundamentally transform how the nation protects itself
from terrorism.\11\ Rarely in the country's past had such a large and
complex reorganization of government occurred or been developed with
such a singular and urgent purpose. This represented a unique
opportunity to transform a disparate group of agencies with multiple
missions, values, and cultures into a strong and effective cabinet
department whose goals are to, among other things, protect U.S.
borders, improve intelligence and information sharing, and prevent and
respond to potential terrorist attacks. Together with this unique
opportunity, however, came a significant risk to the nation that could
occur if the department's implementation and transformation was not
successful.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\11\ Pub. L. No. 107-296 (Nov. 25, 2002).
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GAO designated DHS's transformation as high-risk in January
2003based on three factors.\12\ First, DHS faced enormous challenges in
implementing an effective transformation process, developing
partnerships, and building management capacity because it had to
effectively combine 22 agencies with an estimated 170,000 employees
specializing in various disciplines--including law enforcement, border
security, biological research, computer security, and disaster
mitigation--into one department. Second, DHS faced a broad array of
operational and management challenges that it inherited from its
component legacy agencies. In fact, many of the major components that
were merged into the new department, including the Immigration and
Naturalization Service, the Transportation Security Administration,
Customs Service, Federal Emergency Management Agency, and the Coast
Guard, brought with them at least one major problem such as strategic
human capital risks, information technology management challenges, or
financial management vulnerabilities, as well as an array of program
operations challenges and risks. Finally, DHS's national security
mission was of such importance that the failure to effectively address
its management challenges and program risks could have serious
consequences on our intergovernmental system, our citizen's health and
safety, and our economy. Overall, our designation of DHS's
transformation as a high-risk area and its inclusion on the 2003 High-
Risk List was due to the failure to transform the diverse units into a
single, efficient, and effective organization would have dire
consequences for our nation.
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\12\ GAO, High-Risk Series: An Update, GAO-03-119 (Washington,
D.C.: Jan. 2003); and Major Management Challenges and Programs Risks:
Department of Homeland Security, GAO-03-102 (Washington, D.C.: Jan.
2003).
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Since our 2003 designation of DHS's transformation as high-risk,
DHS leadership has provided a foundation for maintaining critical
operations while undergoing transformation. DHS has worked to protect
the homeland and secure transportation and borders, funded emergency
preparedness improvements and emerging technologies, assisted law
enforcement activities against suspected terrorists, and issued its
first strategic plan. According to DHS's performance and accountability
report for fiscal year 2004 and updated information provided by DHS
officials, the department has accomplished the following activities as
part of its integration efforts:
reduced the number of financial management service
centers from 19 to 8,
consolidated acquisition support for 22 legacy
agencies within 8 major procurement programs,
consolidated 22 different human resources offices to
7, and
consolidated bank card programs from 27 to 3.
As described in the next section, despite real and hard-earned
progress, DHS still has significant challenges to overcome in all of
its management areas. It is because of these continuing challenges that
we continue to designate the implementation and transformation of DHS
as high-risk.\13\
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\13\ GAO, High Risk Series: An Update, GAO-05-207 (Washington,
D.C.: Jan 2005).
DHS Management Challenges
DHS faces a number of management challenges to improving its
ability to carry out its homeland security missions. Among these
challenges, which are discussed in more detail in the following
sections, are
providing focus for management efforts,
monitoring transformation and integration,
improving strategic planning,
managing human capital,
strengthening financial management infrastructure,
establishing an information technology management
framework,
managing acquisitions, and
coordinating research and development.
Providing Focus for Management Efforts
One challenge that DHS faces is to provide focus on management
efforts. The experience of successful transformations and change
management initiatives in large public and private organizations
suggests that it can take 5 to 7 years until such initiatives are fully
implemented and cultures are transformed in a substantial manner.
Because this timeframe can easily outlast the tenures of managers,
high-performing organizations recognize that they need to have
mechanisms to reinforce accountability for organization goals during
times of leadership transition.
Focus on management efforts needs to be provided at two levels of
leadership. The first level is that of the political appointees in top
leadership positions. These leaders are responsible for both mission
and management support functions. Although DHS has been operating about
2 years, it has had two Secretaries, three Deputy Secretaries, and
additional turnover at the Undersecretary and Assistant Secretary
levels. The problem of turnover in top leadership is not unique to DHS.
The average tenure of political leadership in federal agencies--
slightly less than 3 years for the period 1990-2001--and the long-term
nature of change management initiatives can have critical implications
for the success of those initiatives. The frequent turnover of the
political leadership has often made it difficult to obtain the
sustained and inspired attention required to make needed changes.
Similarly, the recent turnover in DHS's top leadership raises questions
about the department's ability to provide the consistent and sustained
senior leadership necessary to achieve integration over the long term.
Another level for focus on management efforts is those leaders
responsible for day-to-day management functions. As we have reported, a
Chief Operating Officer (COO)/Chief Management Officer (CMO) may
effectively provide the continuing, focused attention essential to
successfully completing these multiyear transformations in agencies
like DHS.\14\ At DHS, we have reported that the COO/CMO concept would
provide the department with a single organizational focus for the key
management functions involved in the business transformation of the
department, such as human capital, financial management, information
technology, acquisition management, and performance management, as well
as for other organizational transformation initiatives.\15\ We have
also recently testified that a COO/CMO can effectively provide the
continuing, focused attention essential to successfully complete the
implementation of DHS's new human capital system, a large-scale,
multiyear change initiative.\16\
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\14\ On September 9, 2002, GAO convened a roundtable of government
leaders and management experts to discuss the COO concept and how it
might apply within selected federal departments and agencies. See GAO,
Highlights of a GAO Roundtable: The Chief Operating Officer Concept: A
Potential Strategy to Address Federal Governance Challenges, GAO-03-
192SP (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 4, 2002).
\15\ GAO, The Chief Operating Officer Concept and its Potential Use
as a Strategy to Improve Management at the Department of Homeland
Security, GAO-04-876R (Washington, D.C.: June 28, 2004).
\16\ GAO, Human Capital: Observations on Final DHS Human Capital
Regulations, GAO-05-391T (Washington, D.C.: March 2, 2005), and GAO,
Human Capital: Preliminary Observations on Final Department of Homeland
Security Human Capital Regulations, GAO-05-320T (Washington, D.C.: Feb.
10. 2005).
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The specific implementation of a COO/CMO position must be
determined within the context of the particular facts, circumstances,
challenges and opportunities of each individual agency. As the agency
is currently structured, the roles and responsibilities of the Under
Secretary for Management contain some of the characteristics of a COO/
CMO for the department. According to Section 701 of the Homeland
Security Act, the Under Secretary for Management is responsible for the
management and administration of the Department in such functional
areas as budget, accounting, finance, procurement, human resources and
personnel, information technology, and communications systems.\17\ In
addition, the Under Secretary is responsible for the transition and
reorganization process and to ensure an efficient and orderly transfer
of functions and personnel to the Department, including the development
of a transition plan.
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\17\ Other responsibilities of the Under Secretary for Management
under section 701 include financial management, procurement, human
resources and personnel, information technology and communications
systems, facilities and property management, security, performance
measurements, grants and other assistance management programs, internal
audits, and maintenance of immigration statistics.
Monitoring Transformation and Integration
While the protection of the homeland is the primary mission of the
department, critical to meeting this challenge is the integration of
DHS's varied management processes, systems, and people--in areas such
as information technology, financial management, procurement, and human
capital--as well as in its administrative services. The integration of
these various functions is being executed through DHS's management
integration initiative. The success of this initiative is important
since the initiative provides critical support for the total
integration of the department, including its operations and programs,
to ultimately meet its mission of protecting the homeland. Last week,
we released a report on DHS's management integration efforts to date as
compared against selected key practices consistently found to be at the
center of successful mergers and transformations.\18\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\18\ GAO, Department of Homeland Security: A Comprehensive and
Sustained Approach Needed to Achieve Management Integration, GAO-05-139
(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 16, 2005).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Overall, we found that while DHS has made some progress in its
management integration efforts, it has the opportunity to better
leverage this progress by implementing a comprehensive and sustained
approach to its overall integration efforts. First, key practices show
that establishing implementation goals and a timeline is critical to
ensuring success and could be contained in an overall integration plan
for a merger or transformation. DHS has issued guidance and plans to
assist its integration efforts, on a function-by-function basis
(information technology and human capital, for example); but it does
not have such a comprehensive strategy to guide the management
integration departmentwide. Specifically, DHS still does not have a
plan that clearly identifies the critical links that must occur across
these functions, the necessary timing to make these links occur, how
these critical interrelationships will occur, and who will drive and
manage them.
Second, it is important to dedicate a strong and stable
implementation team for the day-to-day management of the
transformation, a team vested with the necessary authority and
resources to help set priorities, make timely decisions, and move
quickly to implement decisions. In addition, this team would ensure
that various change initiatives are sequenced and implemented in a
coherent and integrated way. DHS is establishing a Business
Transformation Office, reporting to the Under Secretary for Management,
to help monitor and look for interdependencies among the individual
functional integration efforts. However, this office is not currently
responsible for leading and managing the coordination and integration
that must occur across functions not only to make these individual
initiatives work but also to achieve and sustain the overall management
integration of DHS.
To address this challenge, we recommended, and DHS agreed, that it
should develop an overarching management integration strategy and
provide its recently established Business Transformation Office with
the authority and responsibility to serve as a dedicated integration
team and also help develop and implement the strategy.
Improving Strategic Planning
Effective strategic planning is another challenge for DHS. We have
previously identified strategic planning as one of the critical success
factors for new organizations. This is particularly true for DHS, given
the breadth of its responsibility and need to clearly identify how
stakeholders? responsibilities and activities align to address homeland
security efforts. Without thoughtful and transparent planning that
involves key stakeholders, DHS may not be able to implement its
programs effectively. In 2004, DHS issued its first departmentwide
strategic plan. We have evaluated DHS's strategic planning process,
including the development of its first departmentwide strategic plan,
and plan to release a report on our findings within a few weeks. This
report will discuss (1) the extent to which DHS's planning process and
associated documents address the required elements of the Government
Performance and Results Act of 1993 (GPRA) and reflect good strategic
planning practices and (2) the extent to which DHS's planning documents
reflect both its homeland security and nonhomeland security mission
responsibilities.
Managing Human Capital
Another management challenge faced by DHS is how to manage its
human capital. Our work in identifying key practices for implementing
successful mergers and transformations indicates that attention to
strategic human capital management issues should be at the center of
such efforts. DHS has been given significant authority to design a new
human capital system free from many of the government's existing civil
service requirements, and has issued final regulations for this new
system. We have issued a series of reports on DHS's efforts to design
its human capital system.\19\ First, we found that the department's
efforts to design a new human capital system was collaborative and
facilitated the participation of employees from all levels of the
department, and generally reflected important elements of effective
transformations. We recommended that the department maximize
opportunities for employees? involvement throughout the design process
and that it place special emphasis on seeking the feedback and buy-in
of front line employees in the field. Second, we found that DHS's human
capital management system, as described in the recently released final
regulations, includes many principles that are consistent with proven
approaches to strategic human capital management. For example, many
elements for a modern compensation system--such as occupational
cluster, pay bands, and pay ranges that take into account factors such
as labor market conditions--are to be incorporated into DHS's new
system. However, these final regulations are intended to provide an
outline and not a detailed, comprehensive presentation of how the new
system will be implemented. Thus, DHS has considerable work ahead to
define the details of the implementation of its system, and
understanding these details is important to assessing the overall
system.\20\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\19\ GAO, Human Capital: Preliminary Observations on Proposed DHS
Human Capital Regulations, GAO-04-479T (Washington, D.C.: February 25,
2003); Posthearing Questions Related to Proposed Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) Human Capital Regulations, GAO-04-570R (Washington,
D.C.: March 22, 2004); Additional Posthearing Questions Related to
Proposed Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Human Capital
Regulations, GAO-04-617R (Washington, D.C.: April 30, 2004); Human
Capital: DHS Faces Challenges in Implementing Its New Personnel System,
GAO-04-790 (Washington, D.C.: June 18, 2004); and Human Capital: DHS
Personnel System Design Effort Provides for Collaboration and Employee
Participation, GAO-03-1099 (Washington, D.C.: September 30, 2003).
\20\ GAO, Human Capital: Preliminary Observations on Final
Department of Homeland Security Human Capital Regulations, GAO-05-320T
(Washington, D.C.: Feb. 10, 2005).
Strengthening Financial Management Infrastructure
DHS faces significant financial management challenges.
Specifically, it must address numerous internal control weaknesses,
meet the mandates of the DHS Financial Accountability Act,\21\ and
integrate and modernize its financial management systems, which
individually have problems and collectively are not compatible with one
another. Overcoming each of these challenges will assist DHS in
strengthening its financial management environment, improving the
quality of financial information available to manage the department day
to day, and obtaining an unqualified opinion on its financial
statements.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\21\ Pub. L. No. 108-330 (Oct. 16, 2004).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
DHS's independent auditors were unable to issue an opinion on any
of the department's financial statements for fiscal year 2004. This was
a substantial setback in DHS's financial management progress,
compounded by continued challenges in resolving its internal control
weaknesses. The number of material internal control weaknesses at the
department has increased from 7 as of September 30, 2003 to 10 as of
September 30, 2004. With the passage of the Department of Homeland
Security Financial Accountability Act (the Accountability Act), DHS is
now subject to the Chief Financial Officers Act of 1990 (the CFO Act)
\22\ and the Federal Financial Management Improvement Act of 1996
(FFMIA).\23\ The Accountability Act also requires that in fiscal year
2005 the Secretary of Homeland Security include an assertion on
internal controls over financial reporting at the department, and in
fiscal year 2006 requires an audit of internal controls over financial
reporting. We will continue to monitor the steps DHS is taking to meet
the requirements of the Accountability Act as part of our audit of the
consolidated financial statements of the United States government.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\22\ Pub. L. No. 101-576 (Nov. 15, 1990).
\23\ Division A, Section 101(f), Title VIII, of Public Law 104-208
is entitled the Federal Financial Management Improvement Act of 1996.
FFMIA requires the major departments and agencies covered by the CFO
Act to implement and maintain financial management systems that comply
substantially with (1) federal financial management systems
requirements, (2) applicable federal accounting standards, and (3) the
U.S. Government Standard General Ledger at the transaction level.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
We reported in July 2004 that DHS continues to work to reduce the
number of financial management service providers and to acquire and
deploy an integrated financial enterprise solution.\24\ At that time,
DHS reported that it had reduced the number of financial management
service providers for the department from the 19 providers at the time
DHS was formed to 10. DHS planned to consolidate to 7 providers.
Additionally, DHS hired a contractor to deploy an integrated financial
enterprise solution. This is a costly and time consuming project and we
have found that similar projects have proven challenging for other
federal agencies. We will therefore continue to monitor DHS's progress
on overcoming this serious challenge.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\24\ GAO, Financial Management: Department of Homeland Security
Faces Significant Financial Management Challenges, GAO-04-774
(Washington: D.C.: July 19, 2004).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Establishing an Information Technology Management Framework
DHS has recognized the need for a strategic management framework
that addresses key information technology disciplines, and has made a
significant effort to make improvements in each of these disciplines.
For example, DHS is implementing its information technology (IT)
investment management structure, developing an enterprise architecture,
and has begun IT strategic human capital planning. However, much
remains to be accomplished before it will have fully established a
departmentwide IT management framework. To fully develop and
institutionalize the management framework, DHS will need to strengthen
strategic planning, develop the enterprise architecture, improve
management of systems development and acquisition, and strengthen
security. To assist DHS, we have made numerous recommendations,
including (1) limiting information technology investments until the
department's strategic management framework is completed and available
to effectively guide and constrain the billions of dollars that DHS is
spending on such investments; (2) taking appropriate steps to correct
any limitations in the Chief Information Officer's ability to
effectively support departmentwide missions; and (3) ensuring the
department develops and implements a well-defined enterprise
architecture to guide and constrain business transformation and
supporting system modernization. The development of this framework is
essential to ensuring the proper acquisition and management of key DHS
programs such as U.S. Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology
(US-VISIT), Automated Commercial Environment, and Secure Flight.\25\ To
this end, we have recently reported on key management challenges and
weaknesses for each of the programs that an effective DHS-wide
framework for managing systems investments would be instrumental in
addressing.\26\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\25\ For information about the challenges these programs face, see
GAO, Homeland Security: Some Progress Made, but Many Challenges Remain
on U.S. Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology Program, GAO-
05-202 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 23, 2005); Information Technology:
Customs Automated Commercial Environment Program Processing, but Need
for Management Improvements Continues, GAO-05-267 (Washington, D.C.:
Mar. 14, 2005); and Aviation Security: Secure Flight Development and
Testing under Way, but Risks Should Be Managed as System Is Further
Developed, GAO-05-356 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 28, 2005).
\26\ GAO, Department of Homeland Security: Formidable Information
and Technology Management Challenge Requires Institutional Approach,
GAO-05-702 (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 27, 2004).
Managing Acquisitions
Our work has indicated that managing acquisitions is also a major
management challenge for DHS. The department faces the challenge of
structuring its acquisition organization so that its various
procurement organizations are held accountable for complying with
procurement policies and regulations and ensuring that taxpayer dollars
are well-spent. In addition, the department has in place a number of
large, complex, and high-cost acquisition programs, such as US-VISIT
and the Coast Guard's Deepwater program, which will need to be closely
managed to ensure that they receive the appropriate level of oversight
and that acquisition decisions are made based on the right level of
information. For example, we reported in March 2004 that the Deepwater
program needed to pay more attention to management and contractor
oversight in order to avoid cost overruns.\27\ We have also reported on
contract management problems at the former Immigration and
Naturalization Service, now a part of DHS, and TSA.\28\ We will issue a
report at the end of the this month that addresses (1) areas where DHS
has been successful in promoting collaboration among its various
organizations, (2) areas where DHS still faces challenges in
integrating the acquisition function, and (3) the department's progress
in implementing an effective review process for its major, complex
investments.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\27\ GAO, Contract Management: Coast Guard's Deepwater Program
Needs Increased Attention to Management and Contractor Oversight, GAO-
04-380 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 9, 2004).
\28\ GAO, Contract Management: INS Contracting Weaknesses Need
Attention from the Department of Homeland Security, GAO-03-799
(Washington, D.C.: Jul. 25, 2003) and Transportation Security Agency:
High-Level Attention Needed to Strengthen Acquisition Function, GAO-04-
544 (Washington, D.C.: May 28, 2004).
Coordinating Research and Development
DHS also faces management challenges in coordinating research and
development (R&D). Our work has recently found that DHS has not yet
completed a strategic plan to identify priorities, goals, objectives,
and policies for the R&D of homeland security technologies and that
additional challenges remain in its coordination with other federal
agencies. Failure to complete a strategic plan and to fully coordinate
its research efforts may limit DHS's ability to leverage resources and
could increase the potential for duplication of research. In addition,
DHS faces challenges with regard to its use of DOE laboratories. These
challenges include the development of a better working relationship
through better communication and the development of clear, well-defined
criteria for designating the DOE laboratories to receive the majority
of DHS's R&D funding. Moreover, DHS faces the challenge of balancing
the immediate needs of the users of homeland security technologies with
the need to conduct R&D on advanced technologies for the future.\29\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\29\ GAO, Homeland Security: DHS Needs a Strategy to Use DOE's
Laboratories for Research on Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical
Detection and Response Technologies, GAO-04-653 (Washington, D.C.: May
24, 2004).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Similarly, conducting R&D on technologies for detecting,
preventing, and mitigating terrorist threats is vital to enhancing the
security of the nation's transportation system. In our report on the
Transportation Security Administration's (TSA) and DHS's transportation
security R&D programs, we found that although TSA and DHS have made
some efforts to coordinate R&D with each other and with other federal
agencies, both their coordination with the Department of Transportation
(DOT) and their outreach to the transportation industry have been
limited.\30\ For example, officials from the modal administrations of
DOT, which continue to conduct some transportation security R&D, said
they had not provided any input into TSA's and DHS's transportation
security R&D project selections. Consequently, DOT's and the
transportation industry's security R&D needs may not be adequately
reflected in TSA's and DHS's R&D portfolios. Therefore, we recommend
that TSA and DHS (1) develop a process with DOT to coordinate
transportation security R&D, such as a memorandum of agreement
identifying roles and responsibilities and designating agency liaisons
and (2) develop a vehicle to communicate with the transportation
industry to ensure that its R&D security needs have been identified and
considered. DHS generally concurred with our report and its
recommendations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\30\ GAO, Transportation Security R&D: TSA and DHS Are Researching
and Developing Technologies, but Need to Improve R&D Management, GAO-
04-890 (Washington, D.C.: Sep. 30, 2004).
Importance of Focusing on Management Issues
Given the dominant role that DHS plays in securing the homeland, it
is critical that DHS be able to ensure that its management systems are
operating as efficiently and effectively as possible. While it is
understood that a transformation of this magnitude takes time and that
DHS's immediate focus has been on its homeland security mission, we see
the need for DHS to increase its focus on management issues. This is
important not only to DHS itself, but also to the nation's homeland
security efforts, because, in addition to managing its own
organization, DHS plays a larger role in managing homeland security and
in coordinating with the activities of other federal, state, local, and
private stakeholders. This larger DHS role presents its own unique
challenges.
For example, DHS faces the challenge of clarifying the
role of government versus the private sector. In April 2002, we
testified that the appropriate roles and responsibilities
within and between the levels of governments and with the
private sector are evolving and need to be clarified.\31\ New
threats are prompting a reassessment and shifting of long-
standing roles and responsibilities. These shifts have been
occurring on a piecemeal and ad hoc basis without the benefit
of an overarching framework and criteria to guide the process.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\31\ GAO, Homeland Security: Responsibility and Accountability for
Achieving National Goals, GAO-02-627T (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 11,
2002).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As another example, DHS faces a challenge in
determining how federal resources are allocated to non-federal
stakeholders. We have long advocated a risk management approach
to guide the allocation of resources and investments for
improving homeland security.\32\ Additionally, OMB has
identified various tools, such as benefit-cost analysis, it
considers useful in planning such as capital budgeting and
regulatory decisionmaking.\33\ DHS must develop a commonly
accepted framework and supporting tools to inform cost
allocations in a risk management process. Although OMB asked
the public in 2002 for suggestions on how to adjust standard
tools to the homeland security setting,\34\ a vacuum currently
exists in which benefits of homeland security investments are
often not quantified and almost never valued in monetary
terms.\35\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\32\ GAO, Homeland Security: Key Elements of a Risk Management
Approach, GAO-02-150T (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 12, 2001); and Homeland
Security: A Risk Management Approach Can Guide Preparedness Efforts,
GAO-02-208T (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 31, 2001).
\33\ OMB Circulars A-11 and A-94.
\34\ OMB, 2003 Report to Congress on Combating Terrorism
(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 2003).
\35\ OMB Circular A-11.
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As a final example, DHS faces a challenge in sharing
information among all stakeholders. DHS has initiatives
underway to enhance information sharing (including the
development of a homeland security enterprise architecture to
integrate sharing between federal, state, and local
authorities). However, our August 2003 report noted that these
initiatives, while beneficial for the partners, presented
challenges because they (1) were not well coordinated, (2)
risked limiting participants? access to information, and (3)
potentially duplicated the efforts of some key agencies at each
level of government.\36\ We also found that despite various
legislation, strategies, and initiatives, federal agencies,
states, and cities did not consider the information sharing
process to be effective.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\36\ GAO, Homeland Security: Efforts to Improve Information Sharing
Need to be Strengthened, GAO-03-760 (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 27, 2003).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
A well-managed DHS will be needed to meet these larger homeland
security challenges. As DHS continues to evolve, integrate its
functions, and implement its programs, we will continue to review its
progress and provide information to Congress for oversight purposes.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. I will now be
pleased to respond to any questions that you or other members of the
subcommittee have.
GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments
For further information about this testimony, please contact Norman
J. Rabkin at 202-512-8777.
Other key contributors to this statement were Stephen L. Caldwell,
Wayne A. Ekblad, Carole J. Cimitile, Ryan T. Coles, Heather J. Dunahoo,
Kimberly M. Gianopoulos, Randolph C. Hite, Robert G. Homan, Casey L.
Keplinger, Eileen R. Larence, Michele Mackin, Lisa R. Shames, and Sarah
E. Veale.
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Mr. Rogers. Thank you, Mr. Rabkin.
The Chair now recognizes the Honorable Asa Hutchinson,
Chairman of the homeland security practice at Venable, LLC, and
the former Undersecretary of Border and Transportation Security
at the Department Homeland security and one of our former
colleagues.
It is good to have you here, Mr. Hutchinson, and the Chair
now recognizes you for your statement.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE ASA HUTCHINSON, CHAIRMAN OF THE
HOMELAND SECURITY PRACTICE, VENABLE, LLC
Mr. Hutchinson. Chairman, Mr. Meek, it is a pleasure to
appear before you today. I have appeared before you a number of
times as Undersecretary at the Department of Homeland Security,
and I always appreciate the courtesies you have extended and
also the leadership you have provided on the important issues
of security of our nation.
As you know, I am now in the private sector and perhaps
that lends me a little bit more freedom as I make my remarks
before this committee. And after investing over 2 years of my
public career in helping shape the new department, I am pleased
to continue my involvement in homeland security as head of the
Homeland Security Group at Venable.
Today, I will comment on the organizational structure of
homeland security, and the focus of this hearing is very timely
in view of the 90-day review of Secretary Chertoff on
organizational changes that may be needed in order to more
effectively address the risks we face.
I compliment Secretary Chertoff on this approach. It
reflects the need for a review but does not make changes simply
in reaction to perceived shortcomings within the Department.
First, with the 22 agencies making up the new department,
Congress wisely gave broad latitude to the administration in
reorganizing the functions and missions of the old entities. A
new mission was mandated and old structures were ill-equipped
to accomplish the objectives of integration, information
sharing and security. The changes have been tough, as change
always is. The 180,000 men and women of Homeland Security
should receive the thanks of the American people for their
determination to successfully set up the new department.
As a result of the statutory flexibility given to the
Secretary in reorganizing the 22 agencies, notable differences
between the Homeland Security Act and the current structure of
the Department are noticeable. For example, the Bureau of
Border Security is established in Section 442 of the act but
those functions are organized as the Immigration and Customs
Enforcement Agency. At some point, and I know the committee is
working on this, the Congress may wish to conform the
authorizing legislation to the reality of the Department.
Second, I would offer the following areas that should be
considered in the reorganization review of the Department.
First, strengthening the Policy Office of the Secretary. The
Policy Director at the departmental level should be elevated to
an Assistant Secretary position or Undersecretary level to
enhance the ability of the Secretary to forge policy changes
and to drive those changes within the executive branch.
The second area I would address is that the formation of a
Screening Coordination Office should be expedited. This office
is set forth in the President's 2006 budget submitted to
Congress. It is important to prevent further stovepiping of the
programs that are brought together in the Screening
Coordination Office. This can only be done by implementing some
coordination oversight role at the departmental level in
anticipation of the approval of such office in the 2006
appropriation process.
So, first, I would certainly urge Congress to adopt the
president's creation of the Screening Coordination Office that
will integrate many of the stovepipe functions in the
Registered Traveler Program, the Transportation Worker
Identification Credential Program and others. And then,
secondly, I would certainly urge Congress to support a movement
toward this, even prior to the adoption of the budget.
Thirdly, in the change, I would encourage enhancing the
role of the Chief Information Officer by raising the Office to
be a direct report to the Secretary or Deputy Secretary. The
integration of the information technology systems is critical
and must have the immediate support of the highest levels of
the Department. Direct access of the CIO to the Secretary is
essential in driving this important mission.
Fourthly, I would urge that the Department move forward
with the creation of the regional leadership structure for the
Department with a pilot region being created this year. The
regional team would enhance relationships with local
governments, be prepared to manage and coordinate responses to
any terrorist incident and to be more effective in monitoring
homeland security grant spending.
And let me just say I have an interest in Arkansas these
days, as always, and from an Arkansas perspective the funds
that are given by the Department should be used effectively
with accountability, but the concept that all the Federal money
should go to high-risk areas is short-sighted. There needs to
be a robust base level of funding in every area of the country.
And I think that is important, and a regional concept will help
provide the accountability, help coordinate the spending of the
homeland security funds and also to make sure it is targeted
base level of funding plus the higher risk areas.
And of course, finally, the regional concept would help
oversee regional planning in homeland security exercises.
These are items that I think and would hope the Department
will consider and Congress will look at supporting to increase
the security and effectiveness of our homeland security
efforts.
Thank you very much.
[The statement of Mr. Hutchinson follows:]
Prepared Statement of the Honorable Asa Hutchison
Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee, it is my privilege to
appear once again before the Congress but in a new capacity. I have
appeared before this Committee a number of times as Undersecretary at
the Department of Homeland Security and I appreciate the courtesies you
have always extended and for your leadership on the challenges we face
as a nation and as a government.
As you know I am now in the private sector and as a citizen I have
more freedom to comment on our security challenges. After investing
over two years of my public career in helping shape the new Department,
I am pleased to continue my involvement in homeland security as head of
the Homeland Security Group at Venable LLP This firm had the wisdom and
foresight to build an inter disciplinary group of professionals to help
educate and guide the business community through the new world of
homeland security and I am delighted to have joined such a team.
Today, I will comment on the organizational structure of DHS and
the focus of this hearing is very timely in view of the 90 day review
of Secretary Chertoff on organizational changes that may be needed in
order to more effectively address the risks we face. I compliment
Secretary Chertoff on this approach. It reflects the need for review
but does not make changes simply in reaction to perceived shortcomings
within the department
First, with the 22 agencies making up the new Department, Congress
wisely gave broad latitude to the Administration in reorganizing the
functions and mission of the old entities. A new mission was mandated
and old structures were ill equipped to accomplish the objectives of
integration, information sharing and security. The changes have been
tough, as change always is, but the 180,000 men and women of homeland
security should receive the thanks of the American people for their
determination to successfully set up the new Department. As a result of
the statutory flexibility given to the Secretary of Homeland Security
in reorganizing the 22 agencies there are notable differences between
the Homeland Security Act and the current structure of the department.
For example, the Bureau of Border Security is established in Section
442 of the Act but those functions are organized as the Immigration and
Customs Enforcement Agency. At some point Congress may wish to conform
the authorizing legislation to the reality of the department.
Second, I would offer the following areas that should be considered
in the reorganization review of the department:
1. Strengthening the policy office of the Secretary. The policy
director at the departmental level should be elevated to an
Assistant Secretary position or Undersecretary level to enhance
the ability of the Secretary to forge policy changes and to
drive those changes within the executive branch.
2. Expedite the formation of the Screening Coordination Office
that is set forth in the President's 2006 budget submission to
Congress. It is important to prevent further stove-piping of
the programs brought together in the Screening Coordination
Office. This can only be done by implementing some coordination
oversight role at the department level now in anticipation of
the approval of such office in the 2006 appropriation process.
3. Enhance the role of the Chief Information Officer by raising
the office to be a direct report to the Secretary and Deputy
Secretary. The integration of the information technology
systems is critical and must have the immediate support of the
highest levels of the department. Direct access of the CIO to
the Secretary is essential in driving this important mission.
4. Move forward with the creation of regional leadership for
the Department with a pilot region being created this year. The
regional team would enhance relationships with local
governments; be prepared to manage and coordinate responses to
any terrorist incident; and to more effectively monitor
homeland security grant spending; and finally to oversee
regional planning and homeland security exercises.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify today and I would be happy
to respond to any questions.
Mr. Rogers. Thank you, Mr. Hutchinson.
The Chair now recognizes the Honorable James Gilmore, III,
Chairman of the National Council on Readiness and Preparedness
and former Governor of the Commonwealth of Virginia.
Welcome, and we look forward to your statement.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE JAMES S. GILMORE III, CHAIRMAN,
NATIONAL COUNCIL ON READINESS AND PREPAREDNESS
Mr. Gilmore. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chairman, Mr. Meek, thank you for the opportunity to be
here today, particularly with my good friend, the chairman,
Chris Cox.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for being here today.
Let me just say a few things. You will find my remarks
extended in the record that I have asked to be placed into the
record. You will find that they do some description of the work
that has been done by the Commission but it is focused on the
organizational aspects, touches on the intelligence sharing
aspects, the need for enterprise solutions as opposed to just
the rifle shot type of tasks by individual agencies, the need
for a risk-based analysis in order to direct and focus money,
the need for an overall culture of homeland security and the
focus on civil liberties.
Let me, if I could, expand on several of the key points.
Like Congressman Hutchinson, Secretary Hutchinson, I am now in
private business. I Chaired the Commission for this Congress,
the advisory panel that you established for a period of 5
years. It was established at the beginning of 1999. We actually
published two reports and completed a third prior to the 9/11
attack.
I was Governor of the State of Virginia during the time of
attack and therefore was involved with the response across the
river in Virginia at the Pentagon. Following that, we did two
additional reports as well, and you will find that these
reports dealt with the risk assessment, the way that you are
supposed to structure and handle the nation's response by way
of a structure and organization of developing homeland
security, the issues of intelligence concerns, specific areas
on how to develop a national strategy, the focus on stovepiping
and intelligence sharing and then finally some type of
visionary approach of what we are supposed to be doing here in
Homeland Security.
If you would like to look at those reports, you will find
them on the RAND Corporation Web page, rand.org, with the
search window being Gilmore Commission.
Let me just add a few additional points in the remaining
few minutes that I have. Number one, I think that the
Department has got to focus on a more thorough plan. They have
put forward some good plans, but if I were to add a suggestion
to them for improvement it would be to do a plan thorough
enough so the states and locals, which must be folded into this
process on a national plan, have a feel for how they are
supposed to spend money.
Asa suggested an approach on that, but I think at some
point we have to really try to understand how we are supposed
to spend money. The states and local do not fully appreciate
that yet.
And you have to be able to fold in the private sector,
which I am trying to do, by the way, through the INCORP
organization, USA Secure and other private organizations that I
am trying to develop in order to give vehicles for private
people to participate.
Secondly, the simple truth is that vulnerability in this
country is not threat, and that is a challenge, because we have
focused almost entirely upon vulnerability in our
communications to the American people. Threat is instead the
intentions and capabilities of the enemy. That is all it is.
And so we have to try to understand that better, and that
means a greater focus on intelligence and making sure that the
Department has access to good intelligence, which we hope that
these reforms now will give the Secretary an opportunity to
have. Because unless he knows what the capabilities of the
enemy are, what they might want to do, then at that point you
are trying to protect everything, which means, of course, as we
know, you protect nothing.
Third of all, let me just remark, in terms of organization,
I certainly applaud Secretary Chertoff in his effort at this
point to look more toward risk-based type of assessment and
spending of money. I think that is the right approach, and it
is different from the old approach, and I think that it will be
better.
Organizationally, when I was both Commonwealth Attorney and
Attorney General of the State of Virginia, I reorganized both
of those departments, and it was from the point of view of
trying to develop direction of what needed to be accomplished
instead of just simply taking old structures and having them do
the same things over and over again. This is what we mean by an
enterprise-based type of approach.
Fourthly, public communication, and I would say public
education. I think we could do more of that. Right now we are
not really putting the terrorist threat into a very good, I
think, perspective for the American people. They are puzzled as
to what to expect and what to fear or what to be concerned
about or what to be confident of, and I think that we need to
have an opportunity for greater public communication.
A policy office which has been recommended by different
groups, which I think that Secretary Chertoff is thinking
about, might help to develop the better message, which, by the
way, cannot be a message that says we are going to protect
everything and that one attack by the enemy means the end of
the Republic. It just does not, and we need to find a way to
get that communication out so that we are not misleading the
American people about what we are trying to accomplish and the
accomplishments we are doing.
And, five, the civil freedoms issue. This has been alluded
to in many places. A Privacy Office has been set up in the
Department, but it is mostly about data and privacy security. A
new department is coming out of the White House, a new group to
really focus on civil freedoms. I think it is essential that
this be done. Otherwise, we just are not going to be able to
win this battle if we give up the issue of civil liberties and
civil freedoms in this country.
And so now I will close by congratulating the people in the
Department. I think that in setting up a new structure our
Commission always believed it was going to be a heartbreak and
a difficulty and a challenge and maybe divisionary of the real
goals and mission. I think that they have labored very mightily
in new structures and new efforts under good leadership, and I
am confident that under the leadership of Secretary Chertoff
that it will even be more refined and focused and better in the
future.
[The statement of Mr. Gilmore follows:]
Prepared Statement of the Honorable James S. Gilmore, III
Introduction
Chairman Rogers, Mr. Ranking Member Meek, and members of this
Subcommittee on Management, Integration, and Oversight. Thank you for
the opportunity to appear today to discuss the evolution of management
issues within the Department of Homeland Security. This is timely. Both
the Department and our national efforts to improve the safety and
security of the nation have reached a pivotal crossroads.
I bring three perspectives today. From 1999 to 2003, I Chaired the
Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism
Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction, the only national commission to
transcend both the pre and post 9-11 environments. Also, I was the
Governor of one of the three states viciously attacked on 9-11 and
finally, as Governor I understand the phenomenal challenges of
organizational management under a charged atmosphere of politics and
perception.
I will begin today by underscoring, that in the broadest of terms,
we have much to celebrate in terms of the progress made at the federal,
state and local levels and with the private sector and our citizens
since 9-11. Have we been perfect. No. But we did not have perfect
conditions under which to change our national priorities and create the
Department following the 9-11 attacks.
I believe, however, that we are at the logical point where scrutiny
is needed and is appropriate to chart a clearer path that will empower
future progress, free from the ambiguity that has begun to creep into
our national efforts. This is essential if we are to continue the
forward momentum needed to keep America safe.
There are four key challenges that the Department of Homeland
Security and its new Secretary must overcome in the days ahead.
First. What is the right organization for the Department. There was
great debate in the Executive Branch, Congress, media and elsewhere in
developing the legislation that provides the basis for DHS's structure.
The end result is the structure of the Department--not its mission
became the overriding theme of much of the debate. Consequently, then
Secretary Ridge and his team were forced to implement a design by
Committee. Unfortunately less attention was given to ensuring more
flexibility in what I would offer has been one of the most rapidly
evolving public policy issues in recent memory. There was no road map
for our national journey in the post 9-11 World and our zeal to address
all the twists and turn along the way may have kept us from solidly
establishing the desired destination.
Second. Information and intelligence sharing--whether internal to
the Department among major components or sub-components and with
external stakeholder groups is essential for success. The Department is
a series of stovepipes. That is not necessarily all bad IF and the
operative word is IF there is a culture and structure within the
Department that promotes and instills internal and external sharing of
information and intelligence in a logical pattern with defined
objectives between and beyond these stovepipes. Clearly one of the key
issues highlighted by the Gilmore Commission and re-stated by the 9-11
and the Robb-Silverman Commissions is having the sound business rules
and practices in-place to promote sharing of information and
intelligence. Sometimes the desire for the latest technological tool
pre-empts the more basic discussion of who needs what, what is the best
way to get it to them and how do we ensure quality of information--not
quantity of information is the driving factor.
Third. The Department must be focused on enterprise solutions that
actively engage local and state governments and the private sector in
their implementation. Much of the Departments efforts since 9-11 has
been in trying to conceptualize, develop and implement protective
measures for facilities, communities, sectors and the nation--and doing
much of it by themselves. There has been state, local and private
sector engagement--but not in a holistic manner that will achieve
optimal progress. A good parallel is the nation's interstate
transportation system. If the federal government were responsible for
designing and building every bridge, exit ramp and mile of federal road
then we would not have the system that is in-place today. A deliberate
system was put in-place that the federal government would facilitate
the creation of broad goals and standards and it has been up to states
and communities to construct the national federal aid road system.
Federal level conceptualization--state and local implementation.
Finally, the Department is but one component of a national effort.
Unfortunately they get the blame for anything negative related to
homeland security. Homeland security is more than terrorism. Homeland
security is more than physical impacts. Homeland security is more than
a department or profession.
Homeland security must be a culture of managing risk. The Gilmore
Commission said repeatedly that our efforts to prevent and deter and
respond and recover must focus on all hazards and do so in a manner
that balances the likelihood of each relative to the others. But
creating a comprehensive risk management approach across all federal
agencies and with states, communities and the private sector is beyond
the Departments purview. They are a new bureaucracy operating on a
playing field with larger, more mature and powerful federal
organizations. This is not right or wrong. It just is.
Addressing cultural change, beyond the Department, will impact how
Congress will monitor and oversee, how the Homeland Security Council in
White House will coordinate and adjudicate and how states, communities
and the private sector will implement. Our first National Strategy for
Securing the Homeland was good for its point in the effort. It must be
updated to reflect the phenomenal advances since 9-11 and the issues
that have emerged since it was published. A solid and updated National
Strategy should drive the Departments organization--and those of other
federal departments and agencies as a matter of fact as they implement
their responsibilities for homeland security--not the other way around.
Mr. Chairman if I had one point that I would ask be remembered
today it is this. We cannot keep micro-managing the Department if it is
going to succeed. Homeland security is not the department--clearly DHS
is an integral component but this is a shared responsibility. Let me be
clear I am not implying that it should not have oversight. DHS must be
held accountable by this Congress, the President, the nations
Governor's, local officials, corporate CEO's and ultimately the
American people. Let's focus less on telling them how to do their job
and more on defining and articulating what there job is in relation to
the other government and private sector players as part of a culture of
homeland security. Constant micro directed adjustments will not produce
momentum--it will only add to confusion.
I am convinced, based on my discussions around America that DHS has
talented doers and leaders in its ranks capable of accomplishing great
things. The Department needs our guidance and suggestions on the what
needs to be done--but given the level of professional competence of its
employees I believe they have achieved a level of maturity needed to
decide how to best specifically organize to accomplish the mission. We
do not tell battlefield commanders how to fight a War--we give them the
guidance on the objectives and parameters--they do the rest.
In closing let me say that the number one objective that DHS, any
other federal, state and local organization should seek to achieve as
we seek to secure our homeland is the preservation of civil liberties.
The debate should not be about blocks on an organizational chart. It
should be what is the mission and what are the parameters that will
guide the accomplishment of that mission and how do we do so in a
manner that preserves our civil liberties and strengthens the values of
our democracy.
Thank you and I look forward to the Subcommittee's questions.
Mr. Rogers. Thank you, Governor Gilmore.
The Chair now recognizes the Honorable Clark Kent Ervin,
Director of the Homeland Security Initiative at the Aspen
Institute and former Inspector General of the Department of
Homeland Security, for any statement you might have.
STATEMENT OF CLARK KENT ERVIN, DIRECTOR, HOMELAND SECURITY
INITIATIVE, THE ASPEN INSTITUTE
Mr. Ervin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Mr. Ranking Member,
members of the subcommittee. Thank you very much for this
opportunity to testify on the major management challenges
facing the Department of Homeland Security.
This being relatively early in the new year, the new
presidential term and the tenure of the new leadership team at
DHS, now is a good time to assess what the Department has
achieved in its first 2 years of operation and what remains to
be done to secure the homeland.
Like my colleagues, I am sure, as I speak to various
audiences around the country, I am often asked whether the
nation is safer than we were on 9/11. The good news is that the
answer to that question, in my judgment, is an unequivocal yes.
Since America was attacked on 9/11 by means of airplanes, it is
not surprising that the greatest strides have been made in the
area of aviation security.
Today, for example, cockpit doors are hardened, some pilots
are armed, the number of air marshals covering flights has been
significantly increased, airports are better protected, and,
generally, airport screeners are better trained and more
sensitized to the critical role that they play as a key line of
defense against would-be terrorists.
But the bad news is that whether we are safer today than we
were 4 years ago is not the only question, and, in that scheme
of things, it is not really the most important question. Seems
to me that the key questions are: Are we as safe as we need to
be, are we as safe as we can be, and are we as safe as we think
we are? The answer to all these questions, I am afraid, is no.
Even in the area where the most time, attention and
resources have been invested, aviation security, serious
vulnerabilities remain, as you have heard. Just yesterday, in
fact, confirming my fears, the DHS Office of Inspector General
released a report indicating it is still far easier to sneak
guns, knives and explosives past the screener workforce than it
should be, and GAO is expected to release a report to the same
effect later this week.
As was alluded to by Mr. Skinner, as demonstrated so
graphically by an ABC news team, which managed to smuggle
undetected the same shipment of deplete uranium into two
different American ports on two different occasions, our ports
remain vulnerable to terrorist penetration. And as demonstrated
by an OIG report released in January, monies intended to secure
the ports have, on occasion, been directed to projects of
dubious value.
Despite the attack on a train station in Spain, in March of
last year, which Europe considerers to be its 9/11, relatively
little has been done in our country to secure mass transit and
rail transportation.
In the area of border security, the Department is to be
applauded for the progress that it has made on the US-VISIT
entry-exit biometrics-based immigration system. For the first
time in our history, we are moving toward keeping track of who
is entering our country through legal immigration channels and
where they are leaving when they are supposed to. But a
February OIG report points out most visitors who enter our
country by land do so from Mexico and Canada, and most of those
country's citizens are not subjected to US-VISIT.
And while the system has, to the Department's credit, been
extended to the busiest land crossings, it is perhaps even more
important that it be made operational as soon as possible at
the least busy and most remote border crossings since it is
there that terrorists are likeliest to try to enter. Moreover,
the exit feature is only in the pilot stage.
And, finally, as pointed out in a recent Justice Department
Office of Inspector General report, 99 percent of foreign
visitors to the United States do not have their fingerprint
checked against an FBI database that contains 47 million
prints, including those of non-American citizens suspected of
terrorism, because DHS and FBI biometrics system are not fully
interoperable.
Moving on to talk for a minute about critical
infrastructure, media reports from a few months ago noted that
the present version of the list contains things like municipal
golf courses and amusement parks that are obviously not
critical to the security of the United States and items that
are and should be on the list, like nuclear power plants and
oil and gas refineries, are not prioritized according to which
are most at risk of attack.
Two other quick things to note. With regard to intelligence
matters, I want to underscore what Governor Gilmore said about
the importance of that. I had concerns a year or so ago after
the creation of TTIC and TSC as to whether the Department would
have access to the intelligence that it needs to secure the
homeland. The recent Silberman-Robb Commission points out that
DHS itself does not always share information with its federal
and state and local partners. CIA and FBI continue, on
occasion, to keep information from DHS, and there was even a
quotation that DHS and the FBI cannot e-mail each other.
With regard to the Department's organization and finances,
it is critical, as you have heard already, that the CIO, the
CPO and the CFO have the ability to direct the work of their
nominal subordinates, their component counterparts. And it is
critical that the Department get a handle on both its
accounting practices and its financial spending so that we have
the money that we need to make the kinds of investments in
technology and equipment that had been alluded to here with
regard to closing the security gaps that we all know exist.
That said, I applaud Secretary Chertoff for the threat-
based, risk-based and consequences-based approach that he is
taking with regard to the Department, and I am very hopeful
that this new leadership team will make significant strides
with regard to homeland security.
Many thanks for this opportunity to testify.
[The statement of Mr. Ervin follows:]
Prepared Statement of Clark Kent Ervin
Mr. Chairman, Mr. Ranking Member, and Members of the Committee,
thank you for inviting me to appear today to share my thoughts with you
on the topic, Management Challenges Facing the Department of Homeland
Security.'' This being relatively early in the new year, the new
presidential term, and the tenure of the new leadership team at DHS,
now is a good time to assess what the department has achieved in its
first two years of operation and what remains to be done to secure the
homeland.
As I speak to various audiences, I'm often asked whether the nation
is safer than it was on 9-11. The good news is that the answer to that
question is an unequivocal yes. Since America was attacked on 9-11 by
means of airplanes, it is not surprising that the greatest strides have
been made in the area of aviation security. Today, cockpit doors are
hardened, some pilots are armed, the number of air marshals covering
flights has been significantly increased, airports are better
protected, and airport screeners are better trained and more sensitized
to the critical role that they play as the first line of defense
against would-be terrorists.
But, the bad news is that whether we're safer today than we were
four years ago isn't the only question. And, in the scheme of things,
it's not the most important question. The key questions are--are we as
safe as we need to be; are we as safe as we can be; and are we as safe
as we think we are. The answer to all these questions, sadly, is no.
Even in the area where the most time, attention, and resources have
been invested, aviation security, serious vulnerabilities remain. Just
yesterday, in fact, confirming my worst fears, the GAO and the DHS
Office of Inspector General released reports showing that, for all
their training and sensitization, screeners are still no better able to
detect guns, knives, and explosives concealed on passengers themselves
or hidden in passenger luggage than they were on 9-11.
As demonstrated so graphically by an ABC News investigative team
which managed to smuggle undetected the same shipment of depleted
uranium into two different American ports on two different occasions,
our ports remain vulnerable to terrorist penetration. And, as
demonstrated by a recent OIG report, monies intended to secure the
ports have on occasion been directed to projects of dubious value.
Despite, the attack on a train station in Spain in March of last
year, which Europe considers to be its 9-11, relatively little has been
done in this country to secure mass transit and rail transportation.
In the area of border security, the department is to be applauded
for the progress that it has made on the U.S. VISIT entry-exit
biometrics based immigration system. For the first time in our history,
we are moving toward keeping track of who is entering our country
through legal immigration channels and whether they are leaving when
they are supposed to. But, as a recent OIG report points out, most
visitors who enter our country by land do so from Mexico and Canada,
and most of those countries' citizens aren't subjected to U.S. VISIT.
And, while the system has been extended to the 50 busiest land
crossings, it is perhaps even more important that it be made
operational as soon as possible at the least busy and most remote
crossings, since it is there that terrorists are likeliest to try to
enter. Moreover, the exit feature is only in the pilot stage. Finally,
as pointed out in a recent report by the Justice Department's Inspector
General, 99% of foreign visitors to the United States do not have their
fingerprints checked against an FBI database that contains 47 million
prints, including those of non-American citizens suspected of terrorism
because the FBI and DHS/State Department biometric systems are not
fully interoperable.
And, shockingly, according to another recent OIG report, aliens
carrying stolen passports are usually permitted to enter the United
States, even when the department's Customs and Border Protection
inspectors are advised by ``lookouts'' posted in their computer systems
that the passports are stolen.
Of course, the foregoing comments relate solely to vulnerabilities
in border security that can be exploited by people who are attempting
to enter our country legally. So, it is to say nothing of the ease with
which millions of illegal aliens continue to enter our country, among
whom even the former DHS Deputy Secretary acknowledged in recent
congressional testimony could be operatives of Al-Qa'ida. It is
critical that the new leadership team at DHS make closing these various
security gaps the urgent national priority that it should be.
Another challenge is to complete the list of the nation's most
critical infrastructure. Media reports from just a few months ago
suggest that the present version of the list contains things like
municipal golf courses and amusement parks that are obviously not
critical to the security of the United States, and items that are and
should be on the list, like nuclear power plants and oil and gas
refineries, are not prioritized according to which are most risk of
terrorist attack.
A third challenge is ensuring that the department has access to the
intelligence it needs to protect the homeland. When I raised concerns
last year that the creation of the CIA-led Terrorist Threat Integration
Center and the FBI-led Terrorist Screening Center supplanted roles that
were to have been and should be played by DHS and, that as a
consequence, DHS would be marginalized, I was told that I didn't know
what I was talking about and I was assured that DHS would have access
to the information it needed. The recently released Silberman-Robb
report shows otherwise. The commission found that the CIA and the FBI
continue to keep information from DHS; that DHS and the FBI can't email
each other; and, even, that DHS itself doesn't always share information
with its federal, state, and local partners.
Finally, just a word about the department's organization, finances,
and contracting practices. Part of the reason why the department
remains so ineffective is that it is not yet fully integrated. To a
significant degree, it remains merely a collection of variously
dysfunctional components operating under a common name, logo, and
motto. The CFO, the CIO, and the CPO need to be given the authority to
hire, fire, and direct their nominal subordinates at the component
level. The department needs to take accounting and financial management
seriously, so that, for example, ICE, for lack of money, does not have
to prematurely release detained illegal aliens. And, to ensure that
there's adequate money to meet the nation's counterterrorism needs, the
department needs to put common sense contracting policies and
procedures in place like competitively bidding all contracts, deciding
on contract requirements itself and not relying on contractors
themselves to do so; not contracting with ``middle men'' contractors
who provide little or no services themselves; and not entering into
contracts where the contractor has an incentive to overcharge.
I want to end, happily, on an optimistic note. I applaud the
approach that the new Secretary of Homeland Security has taken. His
emphasis on analyzing programs and operations and policies and
procedures on a threat, risk, and consequences related basis, and then
allocating scarce homeland security related dollars accordingly, is
exactly the right direction in which to move. I have been impressed by
his strategic approach to homeland security, and he appears to be
serious about addressing the many problems that cry out for attention,
while duly respecting civil rights and civil liberties.
With that, thank you again for this invitation, and I look forward
to answering your questions.
Mr. Rogers. Thank you, Mr. Ervin.
I want to thank all on the panel for your statements. They
are very insightful and helpful.
I would like to start off with a couple of questions. I
noted what Mr. Rabkin had indicated was going to be the case, a
pretty uniform message from all of the panelists in that we
need to strengthen some of these Department heads
organizationally.
If we were to raise the CIO to an Undersecretary level or
the Policy Office, how long do you think it would take if we
were to implement the recommendations mostly outlined by Asa in
his statement to see a significant transformation and
enhancement of the management structure?
I will start with Mr. Skinner.
Mr. Skinner. I do not think it would take long at all. For
one thing, the Department does have the resources, but they are
at the component level. What is lacking now is the oversight
and the authority to direct those resources. So it is not going
to require major reorganization, per se. You could embed those
IT types in the components, but now they would have a direct
line reporting responsibility to the CIO as opposed to their
component heads. So it should not take long at all. You are not
talking about a major reorganization.
Mr. Rogers. So by that, you mean 6 months, 12 months?
Mr. Skinner. I would not want to speculate dealing with any
bureaucracy to get the message across, but, yes, I would say
within a year.
Mr. Rogers. Is there a particular area--and I would like to
get you all to give me your thoughts on that question, but
before I get your answer I would like for you to also think--is
there a particular area that you already see the kind of
management structure and strength of that chief officer that we
should replicate in these other departments? Or is it just non-
existent anywhere within the Department.
Let's go with Mr. Rabkin and then Asa.
Mr. Rabkin. We have talked about the concept of a Chief
Management Officer to provide focus, and I think that the
Department of Defense is moving in that direction, and it is
going to be done legislatively. And I think the committee ought
to consider whether it is appropriate to, through legislation,
direct the Department to move in the same direction.
While the time this would take to implement change based on
these changes might not be all that long, as Mr. Skinner
suggested, I think what we really have to worry about is the
inertia. There are a lot of changes that are being proposed at
the bottom and the middle of the organization and moving their
way up, and either because of inertia or because of all the
changes in the leadership of the organization, not many
decisions are being made.
So I would be concerned about having some continuity and
leadership to be able to ensure that the changes that are going
to be instituted, either administratively or legislatively,
would be able to bear fruit.
Mr. Rogers. Okay.
Asa?
Mr. Hutchinson. I believe there are some good examples in
the Department of success and management and leadership, one of
them being the US-VISIT Program, which I appreciate Clark Kent
Ervin mentioning in positive terms. This is where you set up a
strong program office that managed an at-risk program and have
been successful in it.
And I think that points up the greatest need for the
Department of Homeland Security is to have greater resources,
greater strength at the oversight level. And you can put it in
an Undersecretary of Management or a Deputy Secretary of
Management. You can put it in the CIO, you can put in a
Screening Coordination Office, but right now you have
extraordinarily strong stovepiped agencies. That is where the
strength is.
And as Congress looks at adding maybe 2,000 new border
patrol agents, do not do that without adding a higher level of
strength and capability for oversight. You have the American
Shield Initiative to add technology and integrate technology on
our borders. Well, you cannot implement a successful national
integrated program of surveillance and technology without a
strong program office to oversee that. And that is where the
needs are, and so it can be successful. We have done it in a
quick amount of time, but the resources have got to be brought
to that oversight departmental level to accomplish that
integration.
Mr. Rogers. Thank you.
Governor?
Mr. Gilmore. I think so far the comments have been
technical. For example, technology, we have always got to
remember that tech is only in service to policy. If you know
what you are trying to do, then you can figure out how to do
it. Same for management structures. If you know what you are
trying to do, you can figure out how to manage your way through
it. And I certainly think that the Congress would want to hear
from Secretary Chertoff as he goes through these management
analyses in order to figure out what to do.
I would second Mr. Hutchinson's view that things are
somewhat stovepiped. Certainly, if you take 22 preexisting
agencies, all of whom, many of whom--all of whom, I guess,
responded to some other secretary someplace and had been in
their niche for years and years and had been working very hard
to become more and more efficient, now all of a sudden you put
them someplace else, paired up with partners they have never
seen before, naturally, their tendency is going to be focus on
what they are doing.
I think that the goal of Homeland Security, which I think
they are headed for, is more enterprise concerns. What is it
that all these people can be made to partner together to do?
And that can be certainly done technologically and
managerially, but first you have to determine what your policy
goals are, and I think that that is in process.
Mr. Rogers. I see my time has expired.
I want to get back to you, Mr. Ervin, in a little bit, but
right now I would like to recognize my colleague from Florida,
the Ranking Member, Mr. Meek.
Mr. Meek. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I really appreciate the
written testimony, and, Mr. Secretary, I do want to get a copy
of your testimony, because I think you have put forth some
great ideas that we definitely need to consider.
We know that Secretary Chertoff is going through a second
phase of his 90-day review. How many of you have been a part of
or asked to give input to that review? Anyone?
Mr. Skinner. We are not officially part of the review, per
se, because, of course, as the IG, cannot be involved in an
operational sense, but we have had several meetings with
Secretary Chertoff and the Deputy Secretary where they have in
fact asked for our input as to areas that we think should be
addressed, for example, the issue of the placement of the CFO,
the CIO, and the issue of the integrity of procurement
programs, things of that nature.
So in that regard, we are participating. We have also
brought to his attention the reports that we have issued over
the last 2 years in which we have raised issues. And I am sure
he is going to be taking those into consideration as he goes
through this process.
Mr. Gilmore. If I could?
Mr. Meek. Go ahead, Governor.
Mr. Gilmore. Mr. Meek, if I could respond also. We
communicated with the Secretary and offered to bring over the
key leadership of our Commission, our 5-year Commission,
including our Executive Director, our Vice Chairman, our
Chairman, to brief him on the 5 years work. That meeting is in
fact scheduled for this week.
Mr. Hutchinson. And, likewise, I had a great opportunity to
visit with Secretary Chertoff before leaving the Department and
sharing these ideas with him, but I do want to second what
Governor Gilmore said in terms of Secretary Chertoff should be
given broad latitude in the recommendations. There are a lot of
different structures that can work. I have put forth some
ideas, but whatever he comes forward with I think is something
that can be made to work if we give it the resources that are
needed.
Mr. Meek. I have a couple of more questions, especially for
you, Secretary Hutchinson. The issue of the functions of the
Department and airport screening, it is an ongoing issue. We
were talking prior to the meeting, I mean, there is always a
news report about something getting through to screeners.
Following up on the 2003 report that Mr. Ervin put together for
consideration by the agency, what was the follow through on it
and what is left to be done?.
Mr. Hutchinson. Well, there was substantial follow through
on the first report, both from the GAO and the IG, and the
follow through was a very extensive retraining of the
screeners, retesting, trying to improve their ability to detect
these items. More red testing of the screeners' performance as
well. So those steps were taken.
And I think the most recent results that have been
discussed where there are still deficiencies in screener
performance, I think the conclusion is that you need to
continue to enhance training but you are going to have to move
to better technology as well. You are going to get to an
optimum result for the screeners, but the detection capability
sometimes is a deficiency of our technology.
And also the constraints of privacy. I think back to some
policy changes that we made while I was there really got an
uproar because of the intrusive nature of it. We have also a
backscatter technology that can do a real good job of detecting
more weapons that might be secreted onto an aircraft, but it is
very revealing in terms of invasion of privacy.
And so you have to make judgments there, and we are looking
at ways to screen that, to make it effective, not invade the
privacy but also accomplish the objectives.
Mr. Meek. What is important here is to make sure that we
are able to not only provide--I mean, in this process of
protecting the homeland and definitely airport security, there
has to be some sensitivity but also there will be some toes
stepped on along the way. We have two ways of doing this:
either now, while the waters are somewhat calm, or after where
we have made decisions in haste and they may not be the best
decisions.
And I think we are going through that process, and this is
a great opportunity for the Department to be able to change
some of the things we legislated in haste in trying to respond
to a gap.
Mr. Skinner, as you know, Reverend Joseph Dantica was a
Haitian gentleman who came through MIA Airport. He did the
right thing, he had a visitor's visa, he told the ICE officer,
or the inspection officer, Customs officer when he came into
the country that he was claiming political asylum due to the
fact that he was in Port-au-Prince and was helping U.N. troops.
The gangs were threatening his life. He left. They used his
church to observe these gangs. His medicine was taken.
Mr. Rangel and I asked Mr. Ervin and then it passed on to
you to do a review. You all responded back saying that you are
doing a review. Where is that review right now, because the
reason why I am asking the question is the fact that he tried
to do the right thing, and if he was just to leave the airport
and go to his home and then call the Department and say, ``Hey,
guess what, I want to stay.''
That is the wrong thing to do, and so what we are trying to
do, like the Governor mentioned, train the public on homeland
security and also train those who want to claim political
asylum or ask for political asylum when they come into our
country so that we can review them in the proper process, but
in this case he lost his life.
Mr. Skinner. Yes, Congressman Meek, you are absolutely
right. This is something that does merit a review, and we thank
you for bringing it to our attention.
In response to your request, we have in fact initiated an
investigation, which is currently ongoing. We are coming very
close to bringing that investigation to closure, and hopefully
within the next month to 2 months we should be able to produce
a report outlining the results of that particular incident, sad
as it may be, resulting in a death. We will be happy to provide
you a copy of the Public report or come up and brief you
personally once the report is finalized.
Mr. Meek. Thank you. I would appreciate both.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Rogers. Gentleman's time has expired.
The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from California, the
Chairman of our full committee, Mr. Cox.
Mr. Cox. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
This panel has given us an extraordinary number and breadth
of recommendations. I just want to go over some of them that I
think are salient, and make sure that we have a clear
understanding.
Mr. Hutchinson and Mr. Ervin both recommended, I believe,
that we strengthen the role of the CIO. Are we straight on
that? We had a hearing last week on some of the vulnerabilities
and the lack of achievement of milestones in the IT structure
at DHS.
Anybody else on the panel disagree with this, or is this
something that this subcommittee and the full committee ought
to be moving forward on?
Mr. Skinner?
Mr. Skinner. Congressman, we have reports in the past
raising this as an issue. I agree both with Mr. Hutchinson and
Mr. Ervin in their observations that the CIO does in fact need
to be elevated within the Department.
The IT transcends all of the Department's operations, and
someone needs to be in a management position to provide the
proper oversight and direction as to where we want to go as a
department.
Mr. Cox. Appreciate that.
Mr. Rabkin, you counseled us, if I can put it in the
vernacular, to look before we leap on our IT investments. We
have billions of dollars that we are investing in technology,
and you cautioned that we need to have a strategy as we go
forward with this. I think that is sound counsel.
And, Mr. Gilmore, you have told us in this hearing and
repeatedly in previous hearings that when it comes to
information sharing, and specifically intelligence, that you
can have all the IT you want, but if there is not a plan in
place to share, if you do not know what you are trying to
achieve, then technology is not a silver bullet. On the other
hand, if you know what you want to achieve, then the technology
solutions tend more to suggest themselves.
And, Mr. Ervin, you focused on this as well, on the need
for us to do a better job in sharing intelligence information.
We have in this committee, not always in our public hearings,
but in other ways that we collect information, been able to see
that this many years after September 11 and the creation of the
Department, we are now drifting away from the sharing culture
that everyone seemed to sign on to early on.
For IA within the Department of Homeland Security it is now
routinely difficult to get information from the FBI when they
are tracking terrorism that starts overseas and transits by air
or by sea. It lands here in America. Once it is in America it
becomes a fog. What can we do, and does anyone on this panel
want to make specific management recommendations to address
this problem of inadequate sharing of information between DHS
and FBI?
Mr. Ervin?
Mr. Ervin. Mr. Chairman, if I could say a word about that?
I am glad that you have focused on that, as I did in my
remarks.
I am hopeful, given Secretary Chertoff's experience and his
tendency to be very aggressive in interagency counsels from his
time at the Justice Department. I am hopeful that he will make
an urgent priority of talking to Director Negroponte in making
sure that going forward this new reorganization, this further
reorganization of the intelligence community, will not result
in further marginalization of DHS IA and that DHS has access to
the intelligence information that it needs.
I think it is terrific that DHS analysts are seated with
FBI and CIA personnel at these entities but it is clear from
the Silberman-Robb Commission, as I said, that proximity alone
is not sufficient. The information simply must be shared with
DHS, and, likewise, DHS must do a better job of sharing
information itself with the FBI, CIA, other Federal partners
and state and local partners.
Mr. Cox. Mr. Gilmore and Mr. Hutchinson.
Mr. Gilmore. Let me add this: When our Commission addressed
this managerial point, which we did for about a year, our
concern was that if the homeland security function were simply
placed on an equal basis with all the other players in the
government, that he would not have the superiority to change
culture. That is the challenge. At the end of the day, it is
hard to get a traffic cop over top of everything to direct the
different secretaries to play on the same team and to overcome
some of these stovepiping cultures that occur.
Nonetheless, if the Secretary of Homeland Security is
property empowered and told that he has in fact the authority
to go to his colleagues and suggest to them that they all need
to be on a team to break down some of these cultural barriers,
I think that it can happen even within the managerial structure
that exists today. But I think that he has to be empowered to
do that.
Mr. Cox. Mr. Hutchinson?
Mr. Hutchinson. Two things on that point.
First of all, I think we have primarily overcome the
cultural reluctance for sharing information. I think the
challenges are more technical in nature in making the systems
communicate and continuing to drive that sharing of
information.
I think also what has changed is the original concept, as
Governor Gilmore knows, which was that Homeland Security was
going to be the big dog in intelligence. It was going to be the
key recipient of the intelligence, analysis and communicator of
it, and that structure has changed. And so I think you have
to--it is on a different footing than it was when the
Department was created.
The one specific thing I would mention is that the key
sharing of terrorist-related information is through the Joint
Terrorism Task Forces all across this country where we have all
of the agencies participating. Homeland Security is
participating there. I think because of the role of Homeland
Security, it would be good if Homeland Security were given a
Deputy Director position in the JTTF. I think that would help
build that alliance with Justice Department and communicate in
the field that we are equal partners in this endeavor.
Mr. Cox. Thank you.
Mr. Chairman, I see that my time is expired.
Just in conclusion, I would like to congratulate Mr.
Skinner for bringing to our attention the need for us to settle
on a biometric for the various screening programs that the
Department of Homeland Security is administering.
And I would strongly suggest that we pursue a fingerprint
biometric as one that is more readily acceptable to the public,
that is a mature technology, and that prevents us from being an
early adopter which, as the virtual case file shows us, is
sometimes a problem. It is the broadest possible international
participation. All the police forces around the world tend to
keep this biometric, and it is the most easily integrated
database.
But my time has expired, and so maybe we will pursue that
in a subsequent round.
I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Rogers. Thank you. The gentleman's time has expired.
The Chair now recognizes the Ranking Member of the full
committee, the gentleman from Mississippi, Mr. Thompson.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And let me thank the members of the panel for a very
wonderful presentation.
Mr. Hutchinson, while you were Undersecretary--nice to see
you again, remember when we were together in another body--you
talked about the Arizona Border Control Initiative, and lately
we have been talking about this Minutemen militia, 400
volunteers.
How do we call that initiative a success when volunteers go
to that area because the borders are unprotected and all of a
sudden our Border Patrol dispatches 500 agents to that area to
compensate for it? What is your analysis of that situation?
Mr. Hutchinson. Of the Minutemen Project?
Mr. Thompson. Well, the Arizona Border Patrol Project and
the fact that it was supposed to be a success. Then the
Minutemen go in and then we respond to the Minutemen coming in
by sending 500 people to that area.
Mr. Hutchinson. Well, I guess we would all like to view
success as being perfect, but I think success can also be
progress, and whenever you look at the fact that because of the
Arizona Border Patrol Initiative we increased our apprehensions
by 42 percent. To me that makes it a very successful program.
Now, does that mean that there is still not a problem there?
No, absolutely. We have to do more.
What we recognize is the challenge is greater than even the
resources that we devoted to the initiative. And so I was
delighted that the Department followed up by increasing again
the number of Border Patrol agents assigned to that project,
continuing to invest in technology and other solutions.
So it is an ongoing effort. I think what both the intel
bill has done, which called for thousands of new Border Patrol
agents, authorized, not funded, has been helpful, and of course
the public outcry and concern will I think demand additional
action and support for these efforts.
Mr. Thompson. Well, you lead me into my next question,
which is the fact that the intel bill calls for 2,000 Border
agents over the next few years annually, and we can only fund
210 in the president's budget. So is your testimony that we
need to fully fund the 210 agents that is identified in the 9/
11 bill?
Mr. Hutchinson. I think that we need to fully fund the
2,000 increase in the Border Patrol identified in the intel
bill over a period of years. I think its very difficult for an
agency to absorb that kind of increase immediately. And so I
think that needs to be funded over a period of time. I think
the Congress needs to debate how quickly that should be
accelerated and that time period. I think we need to move
forward with that increase as quickly as possible, because it
is necessary and very critical.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you.
Mr. Ervin, would you care to comment on that?
Mr. Ervin. Well, I support the notion of full funding for
this. I was disappointed that full funding was not sought for
it. Certainly, the issue of the borders cannot be solved by
personnel alone. It is a huge border, both in the South and in
the North, but it seems to me there needs to be more personnel
at the same time greater use of technology and we cannot afford
to scrimp with regard to either.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you. Another issue is this notion of
privatizing the security within TSA at the airports.
Mr. Skinner, I think you all have kind of looked at that.
There are some real problems with the management of TSA
identified in the San Francisco area, specifically, and the
fact that one of the private contractors has already come into
question as to the propriety of their practices. Have you all
started looking at that as an issue, moving from TSA to the
private employing of guards?
Mr. Skinner. No, Congressman, we have not. We have in fact,
however, included the private screening workforce in our
sampling as we did our penetration testing, and what we found
there is that the private sector does no better or no worse
than the Federal sector with regards to screening. But, no, we
have not focused on that issue, per se, as to whether there
should be a transition from public to private or private to
public.
Mr. Thompson. Well, the other issue maybe you can help me
on is, have we fully identified how many full-time DHS
employees we have versus contractors and who is supervising the
contractors within DHS? Have you all looked at that?
Mr. Skinner. I think we have marginally. I know we have not
done any assessment, per se, of the numbers that are required
within DHS to provide oversight or to manage the private
sector. I believe there are five airports that are being
managed in the private sector. We have not done anything in
that regard that would answer your question.
Mr. Thompson. If I might, Mr. Chairman, it is really more
looking at the Department as a whole, not within just TSA. We
have an inordinate number of contractors who are not employees
of DHS, and as I understand earlier testimony, to go to the
personnel system that we are talking about will take about 4
years. And within this 4-year period of time, if we are lucky,
we will still have a number of contractors working. Are we
getting, in your estimation, our money's worth with private
contractors versus DHS employees?
Mr. Skinner. Congressman, now that is something that we are
going to be looking at. As a matter of fact, we just initiated
a project within the last 30 days. We have tripled the staffing
in our procurement shop. We had not looked at procurement other
than two or three major contracts. In the last 30 days, we
realized when we were assessing what we wanted to do and where
we wanted to go in the next 2 to 3 years, we realized that the
Department spends 25 percent of its budget on contracts. We
could not operate without the support of contractors.
So what we have done is tripled our procurement staff from
6 to 18. We have a review underway right now looking at the
integrity of our procurement program throughout the Department,
and this will be an ongoing, long-term effort looking at how
the Department is managing its contracts, whether we are
getting our money's worth.
I know there are cases, for example, the Boeing contract
and the Pearson contract at TSA, sworded in its early years,
the Department did not provide the oversight that it should
have, and as a result, I think the costs were exorbitant and
wasteful.
The Department is now starting to tighten up considerably,
particularly in TSA. They have a very strong procurement
operation there now, but we want to take a look and see how
well it is in fact working. This is not something that we can
do in 3 months, 6 months, 9 months. This is something we need
to do over the next 2 to 3 years and produce reports as we
progress.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you.
Mr. Gilmore. I wonder if I might be able to answer Mr.
Thompson's previous question for just 30 seconds. Congressman,
it would seem to me that the policy decision is what is the
role and value of border security in the overall effort of
homeland security, and I think it is very significant. We are
placing so much of our money at--we are really talking about
ports of entry, legal ports of entry at airplane terminals, we
are talking about ports of entry at seaports, and we are
talking about ports of entry with illegal border crossings. And
that is really why we are looking at the border types of
issues.
So it is clear that it is important. And if it is, then I
think that it would be proper for the Department, with the
advice and guidance of the Congress, to make a policy decision
that it is important, and then I would not necessarily feel
like you have to have more money. There is a lot of money in
this Department.
Redeploy money. Require that the types of efficiencies that
are being discussed across the table be evaluated closely and
that value judgments be made on what kinds of monies are being
spent and then redeploy the money back where it belongs,
exactly where I think you are suggesting that it belongs,
Congressman.
Mr. Rogers. Gentleman's time has expired.
The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Washington, Mr.
Reichert, for any questions he may have.
Mr. Reichert. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Welcome, gentlemen, and thank you for your testimony. I
have to mention that I did have the opportunity to work with
Secretary Hutchinson a couple of occasions as I was sheriff in
Seattle--once as he was the Administrator of DEA and also in
his position in Homeland Security.
I want to take this down to the street level. That is where
I came from in my police experience. My Sheriff's office had
1,100 employees and just a $110 million budget, and it first
came into existence in 1852. Well, today, we still have
stovepipes and we still have silos, so that is going to be a
continual challenge that your organization has. I cannot
imagine bringing together 22 huge departments with 180,000 or
so employees.
We can talk about training, you can talk about equipment,
you can talk about technology, and these things you
havementioned in management, supervision and integrated systems
and consolidated financial systems and restructuring of
management, and those things are important, and as
administrators we need to talk about those things.
But a few weeks ago, we had another hearing and witnesses
testified about the reorganization the Department of Homeland
Security, and really what we heard from them was, there is no
leadership, there is no mission, there is no vision, there are
no goals, and they have low morale. And that was their focus.
And I think that sometimes we might lose the whole concept of
really how operations, in general, work, and that is employees
are the number one asset.
And somehow in breaking down those silos--and this is
editorializing just a little bit, some philosophical comments--
by really getting the employees involved in your restructuring,
reorganizing process and building your mission, you achieve
your vision and your goals through including your employees.
And I know that sounds like a pie-in-the-sky kind of idea with
as many employees as you have, but I think it is important.
The other thing that goes along with that is the mention of
public communication and education. I think that is so
critical. Coming from the Seattle area, our community is really
not very well up to speed on what the Department of Homeland
Security does, how they integrated and work with local law
enforcement, the FBI, DEA, ATF and others in our community. I
think it is important for you to get your message out, so to
speak.
I think there are some important things that you talked
about. Intelligence gathering is, in my opinion, number one. I
continually harp on this in each one of these meetings in
sharing not only between your agencies within DHS and CIA and
FBI but also with the locals. Asa Hutchinson mentioned that
JTTF is so important.
Here is a question for you: Secretary Hutchinson, you
mentioned that you thought a risk-based approach as far as
allocating monies could be short-sighted, and, Governor, you
were really focused on the risk-based analysis in allocating
finances and how they might be spent. We are having trouble
with that. There is money out there. In Washington State, $234
million, but only 27 percent of that has been spent.
So there seems to be a little bit of a disagreement there.
Did I read that right or are you really in line with each
other?
Mr. Hutchinson. I think we are probably in line with each
other. I think it is a matter of emphasis. What I said was that
the concept that all--so I would underline all--the federal
money should go to high-risk areas is short-sighted, because I
do believe there needs to be, first of all, risk-based
assessments and a risk-based allocation of the money.
But the fact is that there is a basic level of risk and
vulnerability in every area of the country. Whenever you look
at Nuradin Abdi being caught outside of Columbus, Ohio in a
traditionally rural area of the country, whenever you look at
the vulnerabilities that we have seen and the connections in
rural areas of the country, you have to have a base level of
response capability and homeland security everywhere in the
country.
So that is a risk base, but then the substantial bulk of
the money should be specifically allocated on threats and risk
and those assessments being done.
So my admonition is, let us not take all of the money and
say it has got to go to the high-risk urban areas. We have got
to have that base level of funding in even the rural areas of
the country.
Mr. Gilmore. Congressman, as I said I was Governor at the
time of the 9/11 attack, and I watched what happened that day
and helped to carry out what happened that day. And what
happened that day was done by police, fire, rescue, emergency
services, sheriff's offices, hospitals, people at the local
scene at the Pentagon, and it was even more true in New York,
and that is the heart of the matter. And our Commission has--if
there was one thing that we have preached in our Commission
over the 5 years it is the absolute essential nature of the
states and locals being folded in the national effort, which
means there has to be proper direction, there has to be proper
funding and proper training.
When we held our last committee meeting, I was invited to
go to Seattle, as a matter of fact, for a conference of all
local responders. It was a sudden spontaneous conference that
was held in Seattle to address the frustrations that they were
feeling.
Now, I think that under the good work of Pat Hughes and
others in the Department, much effort has been made to open up
those lines of communication between the Department and the
states and the locals.
But if I wanted to focus on one last point I want to
reemphasize, and, again, I think that Asa and I are pretty much
in agreement, if you determine through analysis and
intelligence that the enemy's capabilities and intentions might
strike a rural target, for example, agriculture, then you have
to begin to address that financially and with direction and
training and focus. You simply have to do that.
So I agree, I think it would be a mistake to just simply
take all the money and throw it into New York and Washington,
because that almost guarantees that the opposition with the
enemy will go elsewhere and do it in some other method. The key
is the threat is the intentions and capabilities of the enemy,
and that means that you have to really put a great deal of
focus on intelligence and analysis.
Mr. Reichert. Great. Thank you.
Mr. Rogers. Gentleman's time has expired.
The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Pennsylvania,
Mr. Dent, for any questions he may have.
Mr. Dent. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And I guess my question is to Governor Gilmore, and I think
you began to answer my question in your last statement. But
beginning in 1999 I know you served as the Chair of the
Congressional Advisory Panel that later became known as the
Gilmore Commission. You did an outstanding job in assessing the
capabilities of the Federal, state and local governments and
responding to the consequence of a terrorist attack. And I know
your panel released five reports. I think the last one was
released in December of 2003.
And I know that your Commission made 164 recommendations,
142 of which have been implemented by Congress and DHS. Could
you summarize what recommendations have been adopted, and of
those remaining recommendations, what would you encourage us to
consider?
Mr. Gilmore. Congressman, thank you, and I thought about
that as we had mentioned to the Congress the various numbers
and statistics. We are going to ask the RAND Corporation to do
up an actual matrix for the Congress. We have actually done
that in each of the books, but in terms of the implementation
we have not, and I think that we should prepare a matrix for
you, Mr. Dent, and others in the Congress, and we shall do
that.
The direct answer is that we suggested that there be a
structure for the establishment of a strategy. That has been
done. We suggested that there be a center for intelligence
gathering and intelligence communication to begin to eliminate
stovepiping. That became the TTIC. We suggested that there be
contacts with states and locals, which previous to 9/11
probably did not exist very much other than through perhaps
some effort through the JTTFs and others. That has improved
dramatically.
There should be a national planning process. That has
occurred, but still has further to go. We have suggested that
the civil freedoms and the privacy issues be focused on. It is
being begun now to address those kinds of issues, although
quite frankly there will be no substitute for the Congress in
this matter--zero, no substitute for the Congress in that
policy determination of civil freedoms and civil liberties.
We have suggested intelligence rules reforms like the old
reform rule that said that you could not recruit people who had
necessarily broken the law into intelligence organizations.
Silly rules like that, which now have been eliminated. These
are examples.
I think that if there is one place that we believe that we
need to go, once again it would be the places that I tried to
emphasize in my opening remarks, which is a sharper strategy
that gives better policy and spending direction and training
direction to the locals, integrated them into a complete team,
has a better focus on exactly what we are telling the American
people in terms of the context of terrorism within their daily
lives and not exaggerating it--not minimizing it but not
exaggerating it either--and the supreme focus on privacy and
civil freedoms. And we will try to get you something in writing
that is more of a matrix.
Mr. Dent. Finally, one of those recommendations of your
Commission was to establish a National Counterterrorism Center,
which of course is now a reality. Could you just share your
thoughts and views on the development of that center, how it is
progressing, what you envision for the future?
Mr. Gilmore. Well, the intention of it was to create some
actual physical place where you could force people from the
CIA, the FBI and the NSA and the others to actually sit
together and develop some sense of rapport between each other
and then to begin to break down the cultural problems.
The reason that we had recommended it was because of our
perception that the problem was less administrative than it was
structural and cultural. Intelligence organizations by their
very nature do not want to share anything, for heaven sakes,
and you have got to find some way to break that down. So that
was the goal.
It has been done but I do not think it is emphasized very
much. I do not know that it has been discussed very much. I
believe that as a matter of fact that you have seen a need for
more, and that is why they developed this National Intelligence
Director. Let's hope that he is given the appropriate power and
authority to make all the others play under his coaching and
that it will all come together.
Mr. Rogers. Gentleman yields back.
The gentleman from Texas, Mr. McCaul, is recognized for any
questions he may have.
Mr. McCaul. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to first welcome my former colleague, Clark Kent
Ervin. We both served under then Attorney General John Cornyn.
It is good to have you here today.
Mr. Ervin. Thank you, Congressman.
Mr. McCaul. I have two questions and I will try to be brief
because my time is limited. As a freshman, by the time they
usually get to you every conceivable question has already been
asked, so I hope I am not redundant.
First one has to do with the funding issue. I was at the
Houston Port Authority last week with Senator John Cornyn. He
has introduced a bill in the Senate, and we have one in the
House to make it more risk based. In my state, as in California
and New York, we rank in terms of funding per capita just about
dead last. And so that is obviously a big issue for some of
these states like my own that has the largest port in the
country and an international border.
And that is for you, Clark.
And if I could point my second question to Governor Gilmore
and to Secretary Hutchinson, and it has to do with the border.
I view probably the paramount mission of the Department of
Homeland Security as protecting the border.
Secretary Hutchinson, I know you had a lot of oversight in
that area. I worked in the Justice Department on
counterterrorism issues, I worked with the JTTFs. I testified
yesterday in support of the Patriot Act, which, by the way, if
that is sunsetted, the National Counterterrorism Center is
probably going to be dissolved, essentially, and so I think it
is very imperative. That is another issue for another day.
Currently, we have a situation on the border where 1.2
million people were arrested last year. The Border Patrol
estimates two to three more are getting in. That is about three
million people illegally. It is not so much those from Mexico
who come here to work as it is the ones other than Mexico. We
do not have the detention space to the lock them up and they
are given a notice to appear and they disappear into our
society. I think that is a serious threat to the United States.
It is the way Ramzi Yusef got in this country, the perpetrator
of the World Trade Center bombing.
I think something needs to be done. I sent a letter to the
Appropriations Committee with the support of 45 members to get
the funding that was authorized in the intelligence bill but
not yet appropriated. I would hope that it would be requested
at some point. I hope we can appropriate those dollars.
So I know those are two big issues, and I will just go
ahead and turn it over to all three of you in the interest of
time.
Mr. Ervin. Well, Congressman, thank you for that. As you
know, I am from Houston myself so I completely agree with what
you say about the importance of that particular port, and of
course that is true for all the major ports like that
throughout the country.
I want to associate myself with Governor Gilmore's last
comments, and that is I really do support the notion of a 100
percent threat-based, risk-based, consequences-based allocation
of scarce Homeland Security dollars. That is not to say,
though, that that money would wind up necessarily in urban
centers. As the Governor just pointed out, many of those
centers, if it is done on a threat basis, could well be in
rural areas given the nature of the threat, given the nature of
the vulnerability, and given the nature of the consequences.
Houston happens to be one area that is critical to the
infrastructure of the United States and happens to be a major
urban center, but to the extent there is any conflict between
the two, I think we need to do both.
With regard to port security grants, as you know, I am sure
there was a recent Office of Inspector General report pointing
out that port security grants were sometimes made to projects
of dubious value. It is critical that only the projects that
are of real counterterrorism value are funded since these
dollars are scarce.
Mr. McCaul. Thank you.
Mr. Hutchinson. In reference to the border, I think you
really captured the challenge, that it is not just simply a
matter of putting Border Patrol agents at the border. You also
have to increase the detention space, because if they apprehend
someone from Central America and they do not have the detention
space, they have to release them into society and they may not
appear in court.
And so you have to be able to have a comprehensive look at
our security, both in terms of detention space, resources for
processing through court when that is necessary and also
putting pressure, as appropriate, on the other nations to
receive the repatriation of these aliens that are apprehended.
And I believe that there is a point that you can get over
where it actually will start discouraging the illegal flow of
those, because they know that they will likely get apprehended.
Secondly, they are not going to be released. They are going to
be sitting in a detention cell until they are returned home.
That will discourage the flow.
And then, of course, the employer side is important to
reduce the strength of the magnet. We need comprehensive reform
and stronger resources for employers and employer sanctions to
stop that illegal flow.
Mr. McCaul. As the former Under Secretary who was over that
specific issue, would you support fully funding what was
authorized in the intelligence bill?
Mr. Hutchinson. Absolutely. I think it is the right
direction to go, that it needs to be fully funded, and
Congress, I hope, will do that.
McCaul. Thank you.
Governor Gilmore?
Mr. Gilmore. I think I would only add that I think that
there is a political debate going on in the country about
immigration and that still has to be resolved, probably by the
Congress, ultimately, as to what the proper policy is. But once
you have decided that policy, then you are in the business of
implementation.
And I agree that I think that emphasis should be placed on
Border Patrol. I know that the Department of Homeland Security,
Bob Bonner's office, is looking very closely at this issue,
both on the North and South borders.
In my private organization that I work with, I have worked
with Batel and CSC, and I know that they are just two of many
companies that are focused on the border issues and trying to
find private solutions to market to the Federal government.
These are going to involve personnel, they are going to involve
sensors, they are going to involve integrating all these kinds
of biometrics in order to actually begin to secure the borders.
Because as Asa points out, if you have 3 million people
coming across the border, it becomes a whole different problem
of how you are going to deal with them once they are in the
confines of the United States.
So probably controlling the borders better is ultimately
where this country is headed, and I believe that that would be
a good deployment of funding.
Mr. McCaul. And I agree that technology gives a more
comprehensive view and answer to the problem. Would you also
support funding what was authorized under the intelligence
bill?
Mr. Gilmore. Yes, sir, I would.
Mr. McCaul. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Rogers. The gentleman's time has expired.
The Chair recognizes the Ranking Member, Mr. Meek.
Mr. Meek. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Hutchinson, I wanted to ask you, because I know
that you have dealt with this quite a bit and now you are in
the private sector. What we are hearing time and time again in
these subcommittee meetings and even the full committee
meetings and when we served on the Select Committee last year,
there was an ever-changing face on the Department of Homeland
Security. Attrition is just--I mean, it will make you dizzy of
the names that go through senior management positions within
the Department.
What will slow down the attrition that we are experiencing
now? The reason why this is an issue is because as soon as we
start to get a policy maker--well, an administrator educated on
the politics of one of the largest departments in the Federal
government and they gain the knowledge, they are gone.
And I do not know if it is one or two things. Is it they do
not have the authority that they should have in certain
positions or they feel that they do not want to be in the
position when something happens here in the homeland? And that
is just a practical question I want to ask you as a manager, or
a past manager.
Mr. Hutchinson. Well, first of all, I think we ought to be
grateful as a nation that there are so many who take up the
mantel and are willing to serve in very tough positions and are
very dedicated to it, and there has never been a lack of
commitment or a lack of people who are willing to take on those
positions. And I think that speaks well of folks in law
enforcement but also in higher levels.
In terms of the turnover, I think it is fairly--obviously,
there is more pressure in the arena of homeland security than
other areas, and it is a pressure cooker environment. I was
there a little over 2 years and in the second term of an
administration there is natural change in leadership. Secondly,
there is probably a limited amount of time that somebody can
serve in those top positions in today's environment.
So I do not know that there is anything they can change
about that. I think we just ought to be grateful for those
people who are willing to take on that, and they are bringing
in the expertise that is needed.
Perhaps I can end with that, that that is probably a need
of the Department is to develop at both the political level and
the career level, a stronger culture of leadership in the
Homeland Security arena so that we can train people to fill
these positions so there is not a gap whenever someone does
leave.
Mr. Meek. Well, you have about three or four of the most
vital, I think, positions within the Department that are vacant
and acting. It's no reflection on you, Mr. Skinner, the IG is
outside the Department. But I am saying, just like the
information officer who came before us, he is on his way out,
and the Department has received an F as it relates to its IT
security, which we are trying do something about actively as
the Oversight Committee.
This is a great concern. Once in my life I was a state
trooper and if the Colonel changed every 8 months, it is hard
to be able to receive the kind of leadership vision that one
needs to, in my case, protect the highways and byways of
Florida. But in this case, it is protecting the homeland, and
that is the reason why I think that we have oversight and
accountability problems with our contractors.
Mr. Skinner is right. Contracting and procurement--well,
that end of the Department of Homeland Security is vital. It is
an agency of unique expertise and you need to be able to bring
individuals on quickly so it will be able to stand up. But the
accountability is just not there because the principals keep
changing.
Mr. Hutchinson. Congressman, you are right on target. I
think the only thing that can be addressed is that, one, we
need to train and have good quality people to fill these slots,
and, second, we need to fill them very quickly. The time that
is in transition is harmful to the movement of the agency, the
growth of it, the security of our nation. So these positions
need to be filled. That is partly the role of the
administration and partly the role of Congress to move them
through confirmation.
Mr. Meek. Do you think during your time there was there any
discussion about if someone was to be hired--I know that the
White House has a lot to do with the appointments of
Undersecretaries and Assistant Secretaries--some level of
commitment of service to the Department of Homeland Security, a
period of 2 years or greater?
You remember Congress and sometimes we even ask staffers
through that interview process, how long do you expect to be
here? Of course you cannot get them to tell a secret. But is
there any discussion there? Because this is not the average
job, in my opinion. These individuals receive the highest level
of security clearance when they come into these jobs and they
walk away with a great deal of knowledge. Not saying that they
are walking away and sharing that knowledge but to give away
that expertise is going to be counterproductive to what we are
trying to achieve here.
Mr. Hutchinson. Well, you look, the leadership of the
Department was established mid-term of the first Bush term, and
that leadership team carried on through into the second term.
So I think it is a natural transition. I think, again, we serve
at the pleasure of the President. There are times that you move
on, you just need to fill those positions quickly.
Mr. Meek. Okay. Thank you.
Mr. Rogers. Gentleman's time is expired.
I would like to go back to Mr. Rabkin. Earlier in your
remarks you talked about the need for restructuring management,
but you described that as high risk. What did you mean that
being high risk?
Mr. Rabkin. GAO evaluates all the Federal programs and
identifies every 2 years at the beginning of a Congress a list
of programs that we think are most vulnerable, susceptible to
fraud, waste, abuse, mismanagement of funds, et cetera--areas
that the Congress, that the executive branch, the American
people ought to focus on in terms of improving management, and
improving performance of the program.
And as I said, 2 years ago, we put the transformation of
DHS on that list because of the problems I outlined. When we
redid that list in January, we decided to keep this
transformation on. As we said when DHS started, transformations
of this magnitude take 5 to 7 years to work themselves out. In
the case of DHS, they are making progress, but they are nowhere
near where they need to be for us to consider them as not high
risk.
Mr. Rogers. Okay. Thank you.
Governor Gilmore, I am thinking about our first responders.
I understand and fully appreciate your emphasis on intelligence
and trying to assess threat, but I think we also all recognize
we have to have a baseline level of capability in responding in
the event of an attack.
Did your Commission come up with a report--or what was your
position on the level of first responder training that we have?
Is it adequate? How can we better improve it? What is the most
glaring inadequacy there?
Mr. Gilmore. Mr. Chairman, we address that continuously for
many years, be we think that the preparedness of the states and
locals, structurally and with their capabilities, is the key to
this. And, frankly, history has borne that out that that is the
key.
I think the heart of the training issue would be standards.
I think that to get the heart of training you have to ask
yourself, what are we training for and is there something
consistent across the country that we should be training people
to do. Train to what is really the question.
We, of course, took an all-hazards approach with our
Commission report. We believe that it was cost effective to the
Congress to think in terms of not only terrorist attack but
also hurricane, fire and flood, the theme which so effectively
works with the states now.
So I think that you have to address what is the threat?
What is it that we are training people to do? What should we
expect them to do? I would emphasize that culture and
management structures are everything in terms of getting ready
to go, and then at that point you can begin to implement with
proper equipment and the proper training.
Mr. Rogers. With the current structure that we have?
Mr. Gilmore. Well, no. I think that we do not yet have the
standards fully assessed as to what exactly the training
requirements ought to be. I am working with ANSI, the American
Standards Institute, to try to put together something that the
Congress could look at with respect to standards. But then
after that then I think we--no, I think it is very loose.
I think we have to address the block grants that are
presently going to the states which are in such a risk of
dripping down into pork barrel. The real question is, should it
be spent on training, what kind of training and to what
standards? And I think that that probably needs to be sharpened
up a great deal more, and then I think--but, look, you cannot
train somebody if you do not know what you are trying to train
for.
Mr. Rogers. Thank you.
And, Mr. Hutchinson, you talked about earlier when you made
your introductory remarks that now you are on the outside you
might be able to share a different perspective. We held a
hearing a month or so ago in this subcommittee about the
possible merger of ICE and Customs and Border Protection, and
uniformly we heard from everybody who testified before us that
merger was long overdue. And, frankly, we have heard from
others before and after that hearing that merger was long
overdue.
I read an article in preparation for that hearing that you
had made a clear statement that you were completely opposed to
that merger. Could you elaborate a little bit now that you are
on the outside? Are you still opposed to it and why?
Mr. Hutchinson. Absolutely and fundamentally I would be
opposed to it. I think that to merge ICE and CBP you would be
recreating the old INS with all the problems attendant to it.
You would have a 65,000 person agency with multiple missions,
with difficulty of oversight and I think that you have to have
integration between the agencies but you integrate by
facilitating the communication, by memoranda of understanding.
You do not do it by simply merging everything. We have to be
able to accomplish in Homeland Security integration without
simply making everything one uniform agency. That is the
objective, and that should be the test.
And so as has been pointed out, it takes 5 to 7 years for a
successful reorganization. We are trying to measure this
reorganization after 2 years. And, sure, there is some pain out
there, absolutely, and we need to address it and we need to do
better, but I think the original decisions were fundamentally
sound, and I think that to remedy this by the merging of those
two agencies would again recreate the old problems of the old
INS.
Mr. Rogers. All right. Thank you very much.
Mr. Reichert, did you have additional questions?
Mr. Reichert. Yes, sir. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Just one more question. Back to the border issue, I noticed
in the Washington Times there is a mention of 11 Mexican
nationals who were stopped by a local police officer, turned
over to Department of Homeland Security's Immigration and
Customs Enforcement Bureau and then released and told to come
back later for court. Of course, they did not appear.
At the same time, the Department of Homeland Security has
announced a national gang initiative focused on MS-13, 50,000
members involved in all kinds of drug trafficking and other
crimes, operating throughout South America and through this
country.
One of the comments made by an ICE spokesperson was that,
``We are committed to enforcing immigration law but do we go
after terrorists or gangs or do we go after day laborers?''
Anybody like to comment on the difficulty in trying to balance
the job that you have in this area?
Mr. Hutchinson. Well, you have two issues there. You have
the security of our nation, which obviously has to be the top
priority, but the other issue is the integrity of immigration
laws, and I think that is a fundamental purpose as well of the
Department of Homeland Security and US-VISIT Program. And so I
think that both objectives are important, but obviously the
higher priority is the security of our nation.
Mr. Gilmore. Congressman, I guess I would add that I, first
of all, would agree exactly with Asa with respect to security.
Remember there is a political issue still to be debated in the
nation, and that is the economic issues, that is your day
worker issue. You alluded to it. The country at some point has
to make up its mind what it is going to do with respect to
other economic issues and then it can go forward on the
enforcement side with a much more centrality of purpose, it
seems to me.
But that being said, I lean to the support of the border
initiatives. I believe you get control of your borders and you
know who is coming in and going out. And you do that
effectively and then you are okay on all those goals that you
raised. Border security will allow you to focus on all those
issues--the economic, the gangs, the drugs, the terrorists.
Mr. Ervin. I might just add one thing, Congressman, if I
might on that. I have alluded to this earlier. I think it is
absolutely critical that ICE get a handle on its financial
accounting and on its finances, that it get a handle on exactly
how much is coming in and how much is going out. Because ICE
was not able to do that last fiscal year, ultimately, there was
not enough money to continue to house illegal aliens. I think
that probably accounts for the scenario that you mentioned.
That, by the way, also is why I, too--I do not know that I
am opposed, I am going to keep an open mind about the notion of
a merger between ICE and CBP until the Office of Inspector
General completes the review that the Senate asked it to do,
but my inclination is not to support it because of the problems
like this that ICE has. CBP has its own problems, and like
Secretary Hutchinson, I am afraid that putting the two together
might just compound the problem rather than attempt to solve
it.
Mr. Reichert. Great.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Rogers. Thank you.
Earlier we talked about the first responders and the
Governor talked about the need to incorporate state and local
government officials. And Mr. Rabkin talked about integration
problems among the 22 agencies.
And I would like to ask anybody who would offer their
thoughts on this to share it with us--I agree, I think there is
an integration problem among the agencies. I think there is a
glaring problem of inadequate integration between Homeland and
the states and the local governments. Is that your opinion?
And, if so, what is the best way to remedy that?
Start with Mr. Skinner.
Mr. Skinner. When you say integration with the Department
of Homeland and the states, we are talking about?
Mr. Rogers. Going back to what Governor Gilmore was talking
about. They need to have a clear vision of what we are trying
to accomplish. What are we doing, if anything, to incorporate
their infrastructure into our larger Federal infrastructure?
Mr. Skinner. And I agree with Governor Gilmore
wholeheartedly. Our message has been a very poor message. In
the early going, I would say 2003 and into 2004, the Department
received billions of dollars, which they had to get out to the
states, and it was not afforded the opportunity to actually
plan on how these monies could be best spent. We dispersed the
money under these grant programs before we had the opportunity
to think about, well, what should our message be?
Just recently the Department has published some terrorist
goals, and they will be publishing later this month or early
next month, some guidelines which the states then can use, for
example, to prioritize how they should best use federal monies
to address different terrorist type threats--agriculture
threats, urban threats, landmark threats, things of that
nature.
That message then will help I believe the state and local
governments crystallize their vulnerabilities and decide where
best to invest its grant monies. And it also helps the
Department make better decisions on how the funds should be
dispersed, because now they will have a set of priorities,
goals, and objectives on how best to target that money.
It is not going to make everyone happy. There will be
losers, but there will be winners. It is not an issue of rural
areas versus urban areas, because we have to deal with threats
to both agricultural communities and the urban communities. But
I think we do need to address where is the risk and where
should those monies go, because we only have a finite amount of
money.
This year, for the first time, I think we will in fact have
a clear message. The first 2 years we did not have a clear
message at all. We simply identified very broad areas where we
could spend the money and, as a result, it was a spending spree
out there. When the states received their grants, or the
locals, I should say, some spent it wisely, some did not. We
are currently in the process of blanketing the country and
looking at how some of those monies were spent, so that we can
identify lessons learned, and make recommendations to the
Department on how it can improve its internal controls over its
grant programs.
Mr. Rogers. Now you say we have a poor message.
Mr. Skinner. Initially.
Mr. Rogers. See, I did not think we had a message at all
that they were receiving.
Mr. Skinner. The message was simply too broad. Here is
several billion dollars, we want to protect our homeland, and
you are allowed to spend them in these seven categories:
Training, exercise, equipment, things of that nature. I guess
you can call that a message, but it is not a very clear or
focused message.
Mr. Rogers. Asa?
Mr. Hutchinson. There is a requirement that before the
funds are dispersed each state has to have a homeland security
strategy and plan as to how they are going to spend that money,
and it is to be reviewed. So there are some priorities that are
set. I agree that there are problems that can be refined.
I would add that in my testimony I mentioned the regional
concept. I think when you are talking about partnerships, when
you are talking about improving our communication and messaging
with our state and local partners, that if we had regional
Directors and moved in that direction, that that would be a
tool that could be used to help us localize and communicate our
message more effectively.
Mr. Rogers. Excellent. Anybody else?
Mr. Rabkin?
Mr. Rabkin. Mr. Chairman, it is my sense that there is a
lot of communication taking place in both directions, but there
are some obvious things that the Federal government can do. We
have talked about providing money. Governor Gilmore has
mentioned about setting standards and doing that in a
cooperative way.
We have also made recommendations dealing with
interoperable communications, for example, where each of the
local units that would be responding, reacting to either a
disaster or a terrorist act, need to communicate with each
other to define the requirements for communications. The
federal government can play a role by stepping in and helping
to coordinate all that.
Mr. Rogers. Excellent.
Governor Gilmore?
Mr. Gilmore. I would only add, Congressman, some good news
here. There are a series of scenarios that have just come out
of Homeland Security and been sent down to the states, a series
of scenarios, which begins to give you a feel for what kinds of
challenges might have to be met. And that is pretty good. Now,
that is better.
And I might say, by the way, that since Secretary Chertoff
just arrived, that that scenario program was probably developed
under Governor Ridge's tutelage earlier, so he ought to
probably get some credit for that because it just came down the
pike. But that is the kind of thing we need to do, and that
means that you begin to minimize pork barrel and get your money
where it belongs, into a national strategy with some direction.
Mr. Rogers. My time has expired.
The Chair recognizes the Ranking Member.
Mr. Meek. Mr. Chairman, I think you have raised an
interesting point.
Governor Gilmore, you talked about in your opening
testimony of education as it relates to homeland security. And
I think it is worth just a little bit further discussion,
because I know at the state and local level that when municipal
governments think of homeland security they think of grant
opportunities. And I think that we may very well run into a
problem about how much money is going to the Department of
Homeland Security. I know that the budget will increase versus
decrease.
As you know, both chairmen of the committees in question on
the appropriations end saying that they were thinking about
taking a 2-year moratorium on earmarking projects within the
Appropriations Act by Members of Congress to fund local
programs.
Has this been a discussion? I have not had an opportunity
to read your work or the committee's work in talking about what
we should do, but what--and, Mr. Secretary, you can probably
respond to this too--what do you think we need to do as a
Federal oversight committee or as the Department of Homeland
Security in sending that message out that protecting the
homeland is more than a grant or a fire truck.
But even though that is important, do not get me wrong,
what are we doing now, what can we do in the future? Some of
that is needed, but it should not be the only reason why people
are coming to the table.
Mr. Gilmore. Is this addressed to me?
Mr. Meek. Yes.
Mr. Gilmore. I think I am sorry about that.
Mr. Meek. I was looking at you the whole time.
Mr. Gilmore. Yes, I know. I know. I was afraid maybe you
were.
I think that you have to get back to trying to decide what
you are trying to do and get that done with specificity and
then the Congress itself has a better feel for how you can
direct money, in what places you can place your money and in
what places it is not valuable.
You know, Congress might very well--if you had a real clear
picture about what was trying to be done, maybe an earmark
might actually be appropriate in border control, for example,
in some places like that.
But on the other hand, if the Congress people are
earmarking for things that do not fit within the national plan,
a national prioritization of the expenditure of money, then it
is just pork barrel. And I guess you can put as much money on
it as you want to to keep adding pork barrel, but at some
point, I imagine, the taxpayer will run out and you have to be
very effective.
So I would think there has to be a really good partnership
between the new administration at the Department and the
Congress to really come to an agreement as to what the
strategic value of money is and where the money has to be spent
in order to be most effective and then work together through
whatever processes the Congress has, like the budgetary
processes, to get that decision made. I hope that is responsive
to you.
Mr. Meek. Hold on before we go to you, Mr. Secretary.
I think, Governor, you are 110 percent right as it relates
to the Congress and I think even the Department, making sure
that we have some parental guidance. Because we can do it does
not mean necessarily that we should do it.
This is very, very important, because when you have these
cases of the $30,000 dealing with flowers and things of that
nature, I mean it really makes it--it hurts the culture that we
are trying to build now. Members of Congress are, I know I am,
getting better educated because we have a committee on the
topic that has oversight authority. Soon you are going to have
Members of Congress that you do not have to start from in the
beginning in genesis. We will be able to move on to further
chapters.
Mr. Secretary?
Mr. Hutchinson. I would just add, and I certainly agree
with the Governor and his comments, but if you put this
historically in perspective, after 9/11, particularly after the
Department was set up, you recall the funding level was
increased dramatically, but the criteria and the use of the
money was not changed any.
And then, secondly, when the money came to the Department
and we wanted to spend the money carefully in accordance to the
state plan, the pressure was, get the money out the door. The
money is not getting out the door, it is not being spent, and
the pressure has been constantly to get the money spent.
And so I think that we support your leadership with a
balanced message on that that, one, maybe we ought to look at
the criteria but then, secondly, we ought to be making sure
that we have those state plans in place and that we are
emphasizing the accountability side as much as the speed and
the process in that funding.
Mr. Meek. Mr. Chairman, I do not know if the Secretary--I
mean, my mom once told me that the game warden cannot be the
lead poacher--but I just want to say that I know that I was a
part of that chorus of members saying that. When you start
looking at what is in the Department and what is bottlenecked
and what is actually getting down to where it is supposed to
be, I think there was a chorus of members here saying that that
should happen.
Now we have gone through those growing pains, hopefully,
that we can start targeting these dollars.
I just want to add to the panel that the committee has done
something in my opinion, the chairman, also with the bigger
chairman on the full committee and Ranking Member. We have
resisted from earmarking projects even in our authorization
bills. Both sides have not put projects within that bill. So we
are trying to slow the roll a little bit as it relates to just
pushing not only projects but money out the door because they
are critical issues that are out there. We talked about border
officers, we are talking about checking containers, getting a
higher level there. There are some meat and potato issues that
we have to address.
So I just wanted to hear what was happening in the states
and the local level and are they thinking in those terms,
because I know that they are looking at cuts in other places,
and I know my cities are saying, ``Well, I think that is
Homeland Security,'' you know, the sidewalk, it is important.
So we have to watch ourselves there.
Mr. Chairman, thank you.
Mr. Rogers. Gentleman's time has expired.
We have been very blessed to have you here for these 2
hours. It has been very helpful.
We have had one more member come in and for these of you
who cannot stay for 5 more minutes, I would understand, but if
you could indulge us, I would like to recognize the gentlelady
from Texas, Ms. Jackson-Lee, for any questions that she may
have.
Ms. Jackson-Lee. Yes. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman,
for your indulgence and the committee and the Ranking Member.
Thank you very much.
This is a very important committee. We are in the midst of
markup in Judiciary, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member, and as
you well know, sometimes we do have responsibilities that are
overlapping.
I am delighted to see a fellow Texan, Mr. Ervin, and thank
him for his service. I think we should acknowledge at all times
when people are committed and dedicated to public service. We
may disagree with them but we should give full airing to the
vitality of their work.
And Governor Gilmore, of course, we have worked together,
and my colleague on Judiciary, he probably could attest to the
fact that I am legitimately delayed.
To the other gentlemen, thank you so very much.
Let me just say two points and then do directly--I am
trying to focus on a narrow aspect of what we are doing. I said
earlier, and Mr. Hutchinson has worked in the committee some
couple of sessions ago, that I am beginning to sense that
180,000 people is a very large managerial challenge. And so
many facets of it require a greater integration.
I just left Judiciary but also just left a Science
Committee hearing dealing with technology and NASA, and what I
am finding out is that Homeland Security probably more than any
other department in its responsibilities overlaps from Justice
to Health and Human Services. There is a great deal of overlap.
So integration is key to be able to eliminate redundancy.
If I can make one question, in as much as I know that I may
have missed the inquiries of my colleagues and I may be posing
some redundancy but I am quarreling with myself as a policy
maker on the size and whether or not we can ever integrate to
be safe.
The second point is a more narrow point, and that has to do
with what I have been hearing pronouncements and since we are
regular travelers through the nation's airports, who, by the
way, encounter members frequently, whether or not they are in
your congressional district. I have the Houston
Intercontinental Airport in my district, one of the largest in
the nation and certainly one of those very vulnerable sites.
But the point is, is that as we listen to the consumer side of
it, we are hearing different reports on the screeners. One
member has made a point of suggesting that we return to private
screeners because of a report that was given.
I do not think you can throw the baby out with the bath
water. I am willing to listen, but it seems to me if you have
an orderly system of people who are vetted, who are trained and
we are still on the training curve, if you will, does it make
sense now to return back to a system that clearly drove us
toward 9/11?
So those are questions of integration of this Department,
its largeness and its many facets that you all could respond
to.
Mr. Ervin, you know I am responding to you on the TSA, and
I am looking for the GAO--I did not look at my--thank you very
much. You know that I would love your report and assessment, if
you will, on these private screeners versus the staff that we
are now utilizing in the Transportation Security
Administration.
I thank both my colleagues and the Ranking Member for the
importance of this hearing, and I will continue to try to
grapple and get an answer about the largeness of this
Department.
Mr. Ervin. Well, I will start, Congresswoman, I suppose--
whomever you would like.
Ms. Jackson-Lee. Let me go with Mr. Hutchinson. I assume he
is going to take the larger point and then we thank you, Mr.
Ervin and Mr. Rabskin and Mr.--Rabkin--my glasses are not with
me this morning, thank you. I apologize to you.
Mr. Hutchinson. Thank you, Congresswoman.
In terms of the size of the Department, I think the key
issue is the centrality or the focused mission of the
Department, and I think that it is created with 22 agencies
that all have a major role in homeland security so it naturally
fits within the Department, and I think it is appropriate.
I think we should resist wholesale changes for a longer
period of time before we make judgments on whether there needs
to be some tinkering and some adjustments to it. That is my
judgment. It is certainly a challenge, but I think it is a
focused mission that has added great value to the security of
our nation.
Mr. Chairman, if I might, I do need to step out. So thank
you for your hospitality today and your leadership on this.
Mr. Rogers. Thank you for being here. It has been very
helpful.
Ms. Jackson-Lee. Thank you.
Mr. Rogers. Mr. Ervin?
Mr. Ervin. Just three quick things, Congresswoman, to talk
briefly about each of the areas that you mentioned. As far as
integration is concerned, of course it is difficult to
integrate an agency with 180,000 or so employees and 22
different components that are very different from each other.
But more than radical changes in the organizational structure
of the Department, I think, as I said in my testimony, simply
giving the Chief Financial Officer, the Chief Information
Officer and the Chief Procurement Officer at the headquarters
level the authority to hire, fire and otherwise direct the work
of their counterparts at the component level, would do more, it
seems to me, within the existing legal framework to make the
Department more integrated, point one.
Two, with regard to the screener report that was just
released yesterday by the Office of Inspector General, it is
disappointing that there has not been improvement since 2003 in
the ability of screeners, as shown by these tests to detect
these deadly weapons. That report, as you know, noted the
importance of equipment and technology, and there were three
kinds of equipment that were laid out and recommended in the
2003 report that I am hopeful the new leadership team will
embrace fully and with the support of the Congress deploy at
airports throughout the country.
Finally, on the notion of returning to the private screener
workforce, I would be opposed to that. Mr. Skinner said some
time ago that the results show that there is really no
difference in the ability of the five private airports and the
federalized airports in terms of their ability to detect these
deadly weapons.
And, further, as you know, there was recently a lawsuit
filed, and it is just a lawsuit, so we do not know whether it
is true, by someone who used to work at the San Francisco
Airport, which is another of the five privatized airports
alleging that there were problems there in the private sector.
It is so profit driven that Federal tests were compromised and
the training actually did not take place, even though it was
claimed to have taken place. So I would have real concerns
about that.
Ms. Jackson-Lee. Yes, sir.
Mr. Rabkin. Ms. Jackson-Lee, in terms of the performance of
screeners, we have issued recently two reports. One is
classified secret, one is classified as a security sensitive
report to the Transportation and Infrastructure Committee. We
intend to issue a public report in the next week or so, and we
are going through final deliberations with TSA on what we can
say in that public report.
But let me just say that there are issues beyond that
simple testing of how the screeners do with the red team for
the covert test. There are issues about how many screeners
there are at each airport, and how many there should be, there
are issues about how they interact with the public, there are
issues about the technology that they have, the training that
they have received, the time that they have to absorb this
training, et cetera. And we would urge that all these factors
be considered when reaching conclusions about their
performance.
Ms. Jackson-Lee. Governor?
Mr. Gilmore. Congresswoman, good to see you again, by the
way.
Ms. Jackson-Lee. Thank you.
Mr. Gilmore. Let me, if I could, answer two things very
quickly. Number one, in the last 10 days I have traveled to
California, Colorado and Houston. So I know very well about
going through TSA screening processes, and it is, I must say, a
very titillating experience.
I do not know. My impression is that it is not the people
or even their training, because I think they are doing probably
what they are trained to do, to tell you the truth. Probably
doing it pretty well. But the question is, what are they being
trained to do, and is the system really appropriate to provide
security and be respectful of people who go through and suspect
one more go-over on them would probably be productive. I could
talk to you more about that in detail.
The second is the more pertinent point. Our Commission
addressed your key issue in the year 2000 and that key issue
was how do you manage homeland security? How do you do it? And
we always understood that if you put together a department
which was an equal player with everybody else at HHS,
Department of Defense, Department of State, FBI and these other
equals, it was going to be very, very difficult for one person
to manage it all.
Now, to be sure, 22 agencies were thrown into it that all
have a homeland security component. By the way, they do things
sometimes that do not have anything to do with homeland
security. And that was a very big managerial challenge. We did
not actually think that it would work in the Department, but we
have a department and we have been supportive of trying to help
make that work.
I think there is no substitute for the maximum possible
authority of Secretary of Homeland Security to be able to
coordinate his fellows in government into an overarching
strategy.
Ms. Jackson-Lee. Chairman, my time is up. May I just say
this for the record, thanking both you and the Ranking Member.
To our surprise, this may be one of the more important
committees of this larger Homeland Security committee. I think
we have got to get a way that there is synergistic work. I am
not sure whether I am hearing from Governor Gilmore a redebate
on civil service versus his other approaches and deployment,
but I am hearing from him that we have got to give the
Secretary that kind of authority to sort of purge through and
find out a solution.
My last point, I hope we will hear from him again, meaning
the Secretary of Homeland Security, is that although we all can
support entities like Lockheed Martin and Covenant Aviation
Security, I heard two strong points.
We have not nailed down what that problem is. We do not
know whether or not it is training or technology. I think we
need to give TSA and the trained Federal employees which you
can closely vet and supervise, the resources, the training, the
numbers at the appropriate airport and the balanced training
dealing with civil liberties and civil rights before we make
any judgment as to whether or not we should move back to where
we came from. And I hope we will have an opportunity to review
this question more extensively.
I thank you, and I yield back.
Mr. Rogers. Gentlelady's time has expired.
Again, I want to thank all the witnesses. You have provided
very valuable testimony. Your insights and perspectives have
been very helpful to this committee.
There may be some additional questions that members have
that they would submit to you. We are going to hold the record
open for 10 days. If you could reply to those in writing if
they do have any questions I would appreciate that.
And with that, this committee stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:04 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]