[House Hearing, 109 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE MARITIME TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ACT
=======================================================================
(109-27)
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
COAST GUARD AND MARITIME TRANSPORTATION
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON
TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
JUNE 29, 2005
__________
Printed for the use of the
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure
_____
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COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE
DON YOUNG, Alaska, Chairman
THOMAS E. PETRI, Wisconsin, Vice- JAMES L. OBERSTAR, Minnesota
Chair NICK J. RAHALL, II, West Virginia
SHERWOOD L. BOEHLERT, New York PETER A. DeFAZIO, Oregon
HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina JERRY F. COSTELLO, Illinois
JOHN J. DUNCAN, Jr., Tennessee ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of
WAYNE T. GILCHREST, Maryland Columbia
JOHN L. MICA, Florida JERROLD NADLER, New York
PETER HOEKSTRA, Michigan ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey
VERNON J. EHLERS, Michigan CORRINE BROWN, Florida
SPENCER BACHUS, Alabama BOB FILNER, California
STEVEN C. LaTOURETTE, Ohio EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas
SUE W. KELLY, New York GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi
RICHARD H. BAKER, Louisiana JUANITA MILLENDER-McDONALD,
ROBERT W. NEY, Ohio California
FRANK A. LoBIONDO, New Jersey ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland
JERRY MORAN, Kansas EARL BLUMENAUER, Oregon
GARY G. MILLER, California ELLEN O. TAUSCHER, California
ROBIN HAYES, North Carolina BILL PASCRELL, Jr., New Jersey
ROB SIMMONS, Connecticut LEONARD L. BOSWELL, Iowa
HENRY E. BROWN, Jr., South Carolina TIM HOLDEN, Pennsylvania
TIMOTHY V. JOHNSON, Illinois BRIAN BAIRD, Washington
TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania SHELLEY BERKLEY, Nevada
SAM GRAVES, Missouri JIM MATHESON, Utah
MARK R. KENNEDY, Minnesota MICHAEL M. HONDA, California
BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania RICK LARSEN, Washington
JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas MICHAEL E. CAPUANO, Massachusetts
JIM GERLACH, Pennsylvania ANTHONY D. WEINER, New York
MARIO DIAZ-BALART, Florida JULIA CARSON, Indiana
JON C. PORTER, Nevada TIMOTHY H. BISHOP, New York
TOM OSBORNE, Nebraska MICHAEL H. MICHAUD, Maine
KENNY MARCHANT, Texas LINCOLN DAVIS, Tennessee
MICHAEL E. SODREL, Indiana BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky
CHARLES W. DENT, Pennsylvania BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
TED POE, Texas RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri
DAVID G. REICHERT, Washington ALLYSON Y. SCHWARTZ, Pennsylvania
CONNIE MACK, Florida JOHN T. SALAZAR, Colorado
JOHN R. `RANDY' KUHL, Jr., New York
LUIS G. FORTUNO, Puerto Rico
LYNN A. WESTMORELAND, Georgia
CHARLES W. BOUSTANY, Jr., Louisiana
VACANCY
(ii)
SUBCOMMITTEE ON COAST GUARD AND MARITIME TRANSPORTATION
FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey, Chairman
HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina BOB FILNER, California, Ranking
WAYNE T. GILCHREST, Maryland Democrat
PETER HOEKSTRA, Michigan CORRINE BROWN, Florida
ROB SIMMONS, Connecticut GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi
MARIO DIAZ-BALART, Florida JUANITA MILLENDER-McDONALD,
DAVID G. REICHERT, Washington,Vice- California
Chair MICHAEL M. HONDA, California
CONNIE MACK, Florida ANTHONY D. WEINER, New York
LUIS G. FORTUNO, Puerto Rico BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
CHARLES W. BOUSTANY, Jr., Louisiana BRIAN BAIRD, Washington
DON YOUNG, Alaska JAMES L. OBERSTAR, Minnesota
(Ex Officio) (Ex Officio)
(iii)
CONTENTS
TESTIMONY
Page
Bone, Craig E., Director of Port Security, United States Coast
Guard.......................................................... 3
Jackasta, Robert, Executive Director of Border Security and
Facilitation, Office of Field Operations, United States Customs
and Border Protection.......................................... 3
PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED BY WITNESSES
Bone, Craig E................................................... 24
Jackasta, Robert................................................ 30
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE MARITIME TRANSPORTATION SAFETY ACT
----------
House of Representatives,
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure,
Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime
Transportation, Washington, D.C.
The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:00 a.m. in room
2167, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Frank LoBiondo
[chairman of the committee] presiding.
Mr. LoBiondo. Good morning. The Subcommittee on Coast Guard
and Maritime Transportation will come to order.
The Subcommittee is meeting today to oversee implementation
of the maritime transportation security measures required by
the Maritime Transportation Security Act. At this time last
year, the Subcommittee held two hearings to review the
implementation of the final regulations that carried out the
maritime security measures under MTSA. Today, U.S. facilities
and vessels must operate under an approved plan that includes
measures to enhance security on-site and to identify and ensure
the availability of security measures to deter transportation
security incidents and the threat of such incidents.
I want to applaud the Coast Guard for working so closely
with the maritime sector to put these plans in place before the
July 1st deadline. Nearly one year after these regulations went
into effect, I am looking forward to hearing more about the
status of these port security regulations as well as the
Department's other efforts to secure our ports and our maritime
transportation system.
Following the events of September 11th, the Coast Guard has
been designated as the lead Federal agency responsible for
securing America's maritime transportation system and the
Congress adopted the MTSA. That Act established the framework
upon which the Coast Guard and other partner agencies within
the Department of Homeland Security are building the national
maritime security strategy.
While some of the components of this national strategy are
in place, I am extremely concerned at the lack of progress on
many others, including completion of the now long overdue
National Maritime Transportation Security Plan, a long-range
vessel tracking system the Transportation Worker Identification
Card and the secure systems of the transportation program.
Under the MTSA, the Coast Guard is required to develop
systems to target and track vessels as they operate in U.S.
waters and on the high seas. The Coast Guard has implemented
the Automatic Identification System to provide information on
vessel movement in 12 major ports and expects to expand the
system in the future. However, much less progress has been made
toward developing a system to track vessels at greater
distances from the shore, which I think is extremely essential
to our policy and our ability to protect ourselves.
I look forward to the hearing testimony this morning
regarding the Coast Guard's current efforts to develop a
domestic long range vessel tracking system and to work with the
International Maritime Organization to plan and implement a
system internationally.
I understand that the Department is currently carrying out
a pilot program to test a prototype of the Transportation
Worker Identification Credential, we call this the TWIC plan.
TSA is issuing prototype TWIC cards in a handful of ports
nationwide, including the ports on the Delaware River. This
program will improve the security by employing the use of
biometric information to prevent unauthorized persons from
accessing secure areas in our ports and onboard vessels.
I hope that the witnesses can provide the Subcommittee with
some insight into how this pilot program is going.
The Subcommittee also remains concerned about the
Department's efforts to improve cargo security. The MTSA
requires the Department to investigate and develop methods,
programs and technologies to better inspect vessels and cargo,
to detect explosives and radiological, nuclear, chemical and
biological weapons carried aboard vessels and in cargo, and to
improve seals and tracking sensors fastened to cargo
containers.
However, this secure systems of transportation program
authorized under MTSA exist in name only. The Department has
not taken steps to establish this important program. The
Subcommittee continues to be very active in the oversight of
the Maritime homeland security.
I thank the Coast Guard for its continued presence before
the Subcommittee. And I welcome the witnesses from the U.S.
Customs Border Protection. I am disappointed that the
Transportation Security Administration has declined an
invitation to appear before the Subcommittee. Last year, the 9/
11 Commission challenged the Congress to significantly increase
its oversight to homeland security. The Subcommittee will
continue active oversight of the Department's implementation of
MTSA, including completion of the National Maritime
Transportation Security Plan, enhanced identification
credentialing of maritime transportation workers, and a long
range vessel tracking program.
Again, I want to thank the witnesses for coming this
morning, and I look forward to their testimony.
Mr. Simmons. do you care to make any remarks?
Mr. Simmons. Simply to thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding
this important oversight meeting. I yield back.
Mr. LoBiondo. Okay. Mr. Filner is on his way. He said it
was okay for us to get started, so if he wants to make any
comments when he comes in, we will certainly allow this.
Right now I would like to introduce our witnesses. We have
Rear Admiral Craig Bone, who is Director of Port Security for
the United States Coast Guard, and Mr. Robert Jacksta,
Executive Director of the Border Security and Facilitation
Office of the Field Operations of the United States Customs and
Border Protection.
Admiral Bone, it is great to see you again. Thank you for
being here and please proceed.
TESTIMONY OF REAR ADMIRAL CRAIG E. BONE, DIRECTOR OF PORT
SECURITY, UNITED STATES COAST GUARD; ROBERT JACKSTA, EXECUTIVE
DIRECTOR OF BORDER SECURITY AND FACILITATION, OFFICE OF FIELD
OPERATIONS, UNITED STATES CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION
Admiral Bone. Thank you, sir.
Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman. It is great to see you again,
sir, and distinguished members of the Committee.
I am Rear Admiral Craig Bone, Director of Port Security and
the Coast Guard's Marine Safety, Security and Environmental
Protection Director. Today I intend to discuss the Coast
Guard's role to secure our ports and waterways and ensure the
safe and efficient flow of commerce.
The Coast Guard's overarching security goal is to prevent
terrorist attacks against our ports and waterways. Doing so
requires a risk-based approach to identify and intercept
threats, ideally before they reach our shores. We do that by
conducting layered, multi-agency security operations nationwide
while strengthening the security posture and reducing the
vulnerability of our ports with a particular focus on our
Nation's militarily and economically strategic ports.
Our Nation's maritime transportation system spans 26,000 of
commercial navigable waterways. It accounts for $800 billion of
freight trade each year, and is used by 78 million recreational
boaters. A maritime terrorist attack on this system, with its
associated ripple effects throughout our trade and commerce
could have a devastating impact on our Nation's economy.
Protecting this system is a significant challenge for the
Department of Homeland Security, the Coast Guard and our other
maritime stakeholders. We accomplish this through partnerships
with other Federal, State and local agencies as well as the
maritime industry.
Since trade is global and terrorism is global, we knew it
was necessary to build a global security regime. Our domestic
and international efforts focused on the implementation of MTSA
and the international ship and port security code, or ISPS
code. We collaborated with 147 other countries at the
International Maritime Organization to build a new and
substantial security code that applies to all vessels and port
facilities around the world. These international requirements
mirror the domestic standards set forth in MTSA. Both the MTSA
regulations and the ISPS code went into effect together on July
1st, 2004.
To complement the new security standards, we worked in
parallel with the International Standards Organization, or ISO,
to develop the ISPS code implementation guide. This guide is
meant to aid countries complying with the standards. I am
pleased to report excellent initial success. Approximately only
one out of every 100 foreign-flagged vessels that we inspect in
the U.S. require us to take major port-State control action to
correct security deficiencies.
We seek to obtain transparency of what and who moves
through the maritime domain with accountability. The IMO and
the ISO have been key allies in developing requirements and
practical standards that lead to consistency, greater
compliance and risk reductions. We verify reported compliance
and implementation by conducting vessel offshore boardings,
examinations and foreign port visits.
Implementation has been a big challenge to all stakeholders
involved with 9,000 U.S.-flagged vessels, 3,200 U.S. facilities
and 8,000 foreign vessels that trade in the U.S. I am pleased
to report the MTSA compliance rates for both vessels and
facilities are near 99 percent across the board. This was due
in large measure to the collaboration and excellent
relationship Coast Guard captains of ports have at the local
level, working with the area maritime security committees.
I also note that as required by MTSA, we have also
established an international port security program that works
in concert with other Federal agencies to identify foreign
countries posing potential security risks to the international
maritime transportation system. To date, we have visited 27
countries. Two of all 27 countries we visited have not properly
implemented the ISPS code. Five additional countries are
currently on our port security advisory list, because they have
not reported their compliance to the IMO or the Coast Guard.
The long term challenge is ahead for all of us. MTSA and
the ISPS code provided the framework for our Nation's maritime
security. But additional capability and capacity is needed by
the agencies and industry to ensure we can best protect our
maritime interests and respond to threats and terrorist events.
To make maritime domain awareness protection and response
systemic, we have acted on lessons learned. We have identified
efforts needed, both domestically and internationally, and many
of these require extensive interagency and industry
coordination. This inventory of projects we refer to as
America's Maritime Shield. They will improve how we execute the
national maritime strategy. They represent our next wave of
improvements to strengthen maritime security. Included are
improved maritime domain awareness, improved identity security,
improved underwater detection and response, complete supply
chain cargo security and improved training for personal and
vehicle-borne improved explosive devices as well as a counter-
terrorism response.
I thank you for this opportunity to testify today, and I
will be pleased to answer any questions at the appropriate
time, sir.
Mr. LoBiondo. Thank you, Admiral Bone.
Mr. Jacksta, thank you for being here. Please proceed.
Mr. Jacksta. Good morning, Mr. Chairman and distinguished
members of the Subcommittee. Thank you for this opportunity to
update the Subcommittee on U.S. Customs and Border Protection's
effort to strengthen maritime security.
CBP, as the guardian of the Nation's borders, safeguards
the homeland foremost by protecting the American public against
terrorists and instruments of terror, while at the same time
enforcing the laws of the United States and fostering the
Nation's economic activity through lawful trade
Mr. LoBiondo. Excuse me, Mr. Jacksta, is your microphone
on?
Mr. Jacksta. Yes.
Mr. LoBiondo. Okay. Just a weak one. Maybe you can pull it
a little bit closer. Thank you.
Mr. Jacksta. My remarks today will focus on advanced
electronic cargo information, Customs-Trade Partnership Against
Terrorism, CT-PAT, the container security initiative, non-
intrusive technology and the implementation of the Maritime
Transportation Security Act. Automation, electronic information
and technology are critical tools that facilitate the progress
we continue to make with regard to securing in maritime cargo
and increasing security against the terrorist threat.
All information on cargo enroute to the United States is
analyzed in advance of loading the container, based on
available intelligence and historic trade information. This
review takes place at our national targeting center, the
container security initiative ports and CBP's ports of entry.
Further, the NTC provides tactical targeting and analytical
research support for CBP field offices and remains the single
point of reference for CBP anti-terrorism efforts. As the
Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism has evolved, we
have steadily added to the rigor of this volunteer industry-
partnership program. In order to join CT-PAT, a participant
must commit to increasing its supply chain security to meet
minimal supply chain security criteria.
Perhaps most importantly, participants also make a
commitment to work with their business partners and customers
throughout the supply chains to ensure that those businesses
also increase their supply chain security. By leveraging the
influence of importers and others on different participants in
the supply chain, CT-PAT is able to increase the security of
United States-bound goods to the points of origin. That is, to
the point of stuffing the container. This reach is critical to
the goal of increasing supply chain security. In addition, CBP
has published the CT-PAT strategic plan, clearly articulating
the program's goals and strategies and complete CT-PAT human
capital plan, which addresses recruitment, training and
workload issues.
To meet our priority mission of preventing terrorists and
terrorist weapons from entering the United States, CBP has
partnered with other countries on our container security
initiative, CSI. Almost 26,000 sea containers arrive and are
offloaded at United States seaports each day. In fiscal year
2004, that equated to 9.6 million containers. Because of the
sheer volume of the sea containers traffic and the
opportunities it presents to terrorists, containerized shipping
is uniquely vulnerable to terrorists' exportation.
Under CSI, which is the first program of its kind, we are
partnering with foreign governments to identify and inspect
high risk cargo containers at foreign ports before they are
shipped to our seaports and pose a threat to the United States.
Today, CSI is operational at 37 ports.
Non-intrusive inspection technology is another cornerstone
in our strategy. Technologies deployed to our Nation's ports of
entry include large-scale x-ray and gamma imaging systems, as
well as a variety of portable and handheld technologies to
include our recent focus on radiation detection technology. Our
non-intrusive technologies are viewed as force multipliers that
enable us to examine or screen a larger portion of legitimate
trade.
CBP is also moving quickly to deploy nuclear and
radiological detection equipment to our ports of entry. CBP is
initiating the deployment of radiation portal monitors in the
maritime environment with the ultimate goal of screening 100
percent of all containerized imported cargo for radiation.
Additionally, CBP has deployed personal radiation detectors in
quantities necessary for ensuring that there his 100 percent
coverage at primary, the first port of contact.
Finally, CBP is committed to internationalizing core
elements of CT-PAT and CSI programs. The World Customs
Organization, WCO, has worked cooperatively to develop an
internal framework of standards governed by customs to customs
relationships and customs to business relationships.
The recent adoption of the World Customs Organization
framework of standards and facilitation will strengthen our
mutual efforts to secure trade against terrorists and the
terrorist threat. I believe CBP has demonstrated and will
continue to demonstrate our leadership and commitment to the
maritime security efforts, and we anticipate that working with
our sister agencies under the Department of Homeland Security
we will further these efforts.
Thank you again for the opportunity to testify. I will be
happy to answer any questions you may have.
Mr. LoBiondo. Thank you very much.
Mr. Filner, thank you and the floor is yours.
Mr. Filner. I apologize for being late, Mr. Chairman. And
thank you for scheduling this hearing and I thank the panel for
being here.
Obviously we are coming up to the first anniversary for the
facilities and vessels in the United States to be operating
under Coast Guard approved security plans. And of course, it is
time now to see how our security has improved.
I would like to focus on a couple of issues with the panel
first. What benchmarks are there to help us determine whether
or not the security plans are in fact making our facilities and
vessels more secure? And second, I would like to look at
maritime security from the perspective of, I think what Sheriff
Reichert and I talked about in a previous hearing, and I will
just call it community policing, as applied to the Coast Guard.
That is to what extent is the Coast Guard developing the kinds
of relationships with the community that would allow better
identification of maritime security threats?
Obviously to implement Coast Guard security plans, marine
terminal operators have had to install, for example, fencing
and entry gates at terminals across the United States. Do we
know to what extent have these measures decreased the amount of
theft and pilferage at terminals? If televisions or containers
are being stolen, I doubt that the security plans are adequate
to prevent WMD from being smuggled in or out of that terminal.
We all know that cities around the United States have been
implementing what we call community policing plans over the
past decade. They are getting police officers out of their cars
and having them walk streets and visit businesses and know the
residents. They get to know all these people and they know when
something looks out of place.
In contrast, it seems to me that Coast Guard facilities are
restricting access to their facilities. The coastal communities
only know Coast Guard personnel from watching them from afar as
they patrol the waters. In the past, recreational boaters and
commercial fishermen got to know Coast Guard personnel when
they conducted safety exams on their boats to make sure they
had enough life preservers.
Now, the Coast Guard has asked the boating and fishing
communities to be their eyes in the water and to let them know
when they see suspicious activities. However, when the Coast
Guard stops the recreation or fishing vessel for an exam, they
often board them with weapons. What we have seen in the
intelligence community pre-9/11 was an over-dependence on
technology and not enough emphasis on human intelligence that
is based on these kinds of personal relationships.
What I am worried about, I think, is that the Coast Guard
is going to close itself off in its facilities and become over-
reliant on these technologies to monitor waterways, rather than
having Coast Guard personnel develop personal and ongoing
relationships with our communities. Another component of this
might be the Coast Guard's rotation policy for its personnel.
When Admiral Collins joined the Coast Guard, most personnel
spent their whole careers in a single Coast Guard district.
They knew the business leaders, the marina operators and the
fishermen. Coast Guard personnel knew the waters and could
identify when something looked out of place, because many of
them had even grown up in these local areas.
However, once the Coast Guard centralized job assignments,
personnel were transferred all over the United States from one
tour to the next. It is difficult to develop the kind of
personal relationships needed for homeland security if you are
only there for three years.
I hope we can comment on these concerns. Mr. Chairman, I
look forward to working with you to make sure that we have the
safest security possible in our Nation's coastal communities.
Mr. LoBiondo. Thank you, Mr. Filner.
Admiral Bone, I would like to start with some questions for
you. First, I was recalling fondly our little trip back to the
Coast Guard station and was wondering if that may be in the
Coast Guard training library yet.
Admiral Bone. It could have made the video, yes, sir.
[Laughter.]
Mr. LoBiondo. Thank you.
Admiral Bone, the MTSA required the Department of Homeland
Security to develop a National Maritime Transportation Security
Plan to prevent and respond to security incidents in the
maritime transportation sector. Last year's Intelligence Reform
Act required the National Maritime Transportation Security Plan
to be submitted by April 1st of 2005. Can you give us any idea
of where the plan is in the Administration's review process and
when it will be released? Then I have some follow-ups to that.
Admiral Bone. Yes, sir. Yes, Mr. Chairman. The plan is
actually undergoing final review, and it will be provided for
interagency review in July. That is our schedule.
Originally the plan was going to be completed December
2005, and as you indicated, there was a change that directed it
to be completed by April. What is inclusive in that plan is
related to another security plan, however, when we look at the
infrastructure recovery plan, the Marine Infrastructure
Recovery Plan, it is also required. That's a piece of the
National Maritime Security Plan.
Deputy Secretary Jackson indicated in order to complete
these simultaneously that we would need several more months in
order to complete both, since you want them also in parallel.
One applies to the other. So we in fact again, in July we will
have it completed for interagency review and expect it to go
forward from there.
At the same time, we also completed the area maritime
security plans as well as the vessel and facility security
plans if you look at it from a tiered structure. We also wanted
to ensure that the National Maritime Security Plan also serves
as the sector plan under the transportation specific security
plans. As you can see, there are multiple plans required of us,
some with MTSA and some under HSPD-13 and HSPD-7.
Mr. LoBiondo. So if I am understanding you correctly, part
of what you are doing in putting this together is also to, when
it is released, to be able to tell us how this plan will be
integrated into the multi-sector National Transportation
Security Plan?
Admiral Bone. Yes, sir, in fact, it actually represents
that sub-sector plan under the transportation security plan,
maritime sector.
Mr. LoBiondo. Have you already begun to implement any of
the measures that will be part of the plan once it is
finalized?
Admiral Bone. Yes, sir, and that is why when we look at the
area maritime security plans, although this is a national
capstone document, like a national response plan, that does not
keep us from working, again, at the areas and at the local
level in order to address security now. We knew we couldn't
wait for a national plan to begin that.
So all of your area maritime security plans have been
completed, as well as all the vessel and security plans, which
again, support that area maritime security plan.
Mr. LoBiondo. Will the implementation of the plan lead to
changes in existing vessel and facility plans or other already
established MTSA programs?
Admiral Bone. I am not aware of any at this time, sir, but
I will get back for the record if there are.
[The information received follows:]
There are no immediate changes in store for MTSA vessel and
facility plans. However, those plans are subject to a
regulatory requirement for ongoing review and revision. The
National Maritime Security Plan may suggest mitigation
strategies that could have an impact on maritime security
practices and protocols. These strategies may affect vessels
and facility owners' plans, such as passenger security measures
for ferries and the sharing of up-to-date reserve cargo
handling capability information and data with the Government to
support the restoration of cargo flow in the aftermath of a
Transportation Security Incident (TSI). Although MTSA-regulated
facility and vesel plans may not be immediately affected, the
NMSP exercise program could address issues associated with the
restoration of cargo flow and communications at the national
level. Lessons learned from these and other national level
exercises may generate recommendations for improvements and
corrective actions that could affect the content or construct
of the MTSA system of maritime security plans and programs.
Mr. LoBiondo. Okay. We look forward to receiving this and
we will already be talking about, after today, about setting up
a schedule so that we can have an opportunity to deal with
that.
I just have a minute or so left, but I am going to defer to
Mr. Filner.
Mr. Filner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you gentlemen for being here with us. I wonder if,
Admiral, you might comment on one of the points I raised about
what we will call community policing, that is access of course
restricted as if it were a military installation, isolation
from the public, location policy which takes people away from
being in one community, boarding recreational vehicles with
weapons. In the post-9/11 world, we have to move in that
direction.
But are you concerned about moving too far? Because we need
the community. We need those on the waters as our eyes and
ears. We want them to be part of us and not in isolation. So I
wonder, where do we find that balance?
Admiral Bone. Representative Filner, I can't agree with you
more that we need those people. In fact, we seek them out
through America's Waterways Watch Program and our Coast Guard
Auxiliary has engaged them. We do have military facilities, we
are a military organization and we do have force protection
issues and we do provide security at our facilities, the same
as other DOD military facilities. But that in no way should
restrict our access, as you indicated, to the public in
carrying out our duties.
Our people have been armed prior to 9/11, conducting
boardings, law enforcement boardings that you are talking
about. But in addition, our auxiliary are not armed. Quite
often, they are the people that most often do our boating
safety exams that you see on recreational vessels.
But I can tell you that through the Area Maritime Security
Committee, there is probably more engagement than ever before,
with the community as a whole, including marinas, than we ever
had before. I don't know where the perception is, but if it is
in a particular area, I would be of interest to know it, so
that we can see if we can address it, sir.
Mr. Filner. How about the rotation policy?
Admiral Bone. The rotation policy is, when you look at it,
it is kind of a double-edged sword. You want the people to
bring the new approaches and ideas in and you want the
experience, the breadth of experience and in not every port can
you receive that experience to move in the organization. You
want people that, for example, not all vessels operate, all
types of vessels or all types of facilities are in one
location. So you don't want to minimize a person's ability to
develop your skills and their competencies and capabilities,
and at the same time, I agree, you want some continuity.
So what we look at is a rotation, and not everyone rotates
at once, obviously. So there is continuity. We also have
increased our civilian billets at many of those units and
civilianized those billets so there will be long term
continuity.
Mr. Filner. Do any of your Coast Guard have a say in if
they want to stay at a location longer? Are they required to
rotate?
Admiral Bone. When you indicated there are three years,
there are people that have been in geographic areas for fifteen
to twenty years. Not everyone rotates. But I would say that
opportunity or that look to rotate or have another assignment,
and it could be an assignment within the same geographic area,
someone could move from one position to another and still have
a job rotation. You can do that internally within a command,
but you can also do it within command within a geographic area
and garner that same interest of continuity that you are
looking for.
Mr. Filner. In the post-9/11 world, we moved to the so-
called Patriot Act, which strongly limits a lot of the
privacies and freedoms we had taken for granted. The Coast
Guard becomes something else. We have to move, obviously, in a
direction. But let us not go overboard, if I may use that
expression, in reaction to 9/11, because we become something
that we don't want to be as a nation, whether it is losing our
freedom or losing our close relationship with the Coast Guard.
Admiral Bone. I agree with you.
Mr. Filner. My other point I made was effective measurement
of how effective we are. That is, we have implementation of
security plans, for example. But can we measure what effect
this has had? Have we identified weaknesses? Are we trying to
measure whether thefts have been prevented? How do we do that?
Admiral Bone. That is a good point. I think there are
multiple ways you can measure. One way is looking at changes.
When longshoremen are basically trained and looking, trained to
look for those anomalies and are actually providing that
information to you at different points, that is a change that
is significant. There is a measure with our field intelligence
support teams where they are receiving information just as you
said, from the public, but also from the mariners themselves
and the facility workers of unusual activity or vessels
loitering in and around the facility.
I can tell you that our largest problem with facilities has
in fact been access control. We believe that improved
credentialing will assist in that.
I have talked to the insurance companies to identify to
what degree is the pilfering or theft taking place in the port
versus out of port. It is clear in the view of the insurance
companies that the problem lies outside the port area, and in a
sense that it has improved since 9/11. I asked them for
statistics, they said they haven't done the analysis, but they
in fact have a confidence that since MTSA has been put in place
and the increased security following 9/11 that that has
improved significantly. They just have not done the total
analysis yet.
Mr. Filner. Just one more point if I may, Mr. Chairman. The
first item you mentioned is longshoremen, that they know what
is going on. We had a discussion, or several discussions when
the security committees were set up, there was no guaranteed
representation for the longshoremen. I was just wondering, has
that changed? Are you bringing in these people who know the
ports the best?
Admiral Bone. I can speak from experience from New York,
myself. The longshoremen in fact were trained, I think, you had
the national, you had the New York Maritime Association
actually training longshoremen and people at the facility
themselves. And the labor leaders were in fact very positive
that they wanted to be a force in place to prevent any actions
of terrorism.
Mr. Filner. But we did not add them as required members of
the security committees, did we?
Admiral Bone. I would have to look, myself.
Mr. Filner. Would you look into that, please. Thank you,
Mr. Chairman.
Admiral Bone. We could.
[The information received follows:]
Longshoremen are not required members of the security
committees. The regulations for Area Maritime Security
Committees, however, state that the committee will be composed
of members having an interest in the security of the area and
who may be selected from various groups, one of which is
maritime industry, including labor.
Mr. LoBiondo. Okay, thank you, Mr. Filner.
Mr. Reichert.
Mr. Reichert. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Welcome. The Maritime Transportation Security Act created a
requirement that workers entering a secure area in our ports
had a Transportation Worker Identification Card. The port of
Seattle, which has jurisdiction over SeaTac International
Airport and the seaport near downtown Seattle has created a
viable biometrics based access system for the 20,000 plus
employees who work in the airport. Because this port operates
both the airport and the seaport, they are extending many
features of the airport access system to the seaport. To date,
the seaport of Seattle has invested over $5 million for this
biometrics system.
Currently there is a lack of Federal guidance in
establishing these cards. I am sure other ports are also in the
process of developing these cards. Do you know if there is an
effort by the Department of Homeland Security and the Coast
Guard and others to implement management standards?
Admiral Bone. Yes. The Transportation Security
Administration has the lead for the Transportation Worker
Identification Card, which would in fact incorporate air,
surface and maritime requirements for the credential itself, in
other words, what needs to be on the identification credential
and also for the requirements for issuance.
The Coast Guard is actually working, since November 2004,
with TSA in order to do this. Again, the Department of Homeland
Security has determined TSA to be the lead agency for this in
that there are 12 million people impacted by the TWIC card. The
maritime group represents about 300,000 when you look at ships
and facilities. But we are basically poised to move forward
when that standard is set, and in fact the TSA has indicated
that they expect the proposed rulemaking in 2006. That is their
timetable for that.
We share concerns that have been raised with regard to the
timeliness of this effort, and we are working with them as
closely as we can to assist them in any way we can to get this
moved forward for the maritime environment. Again, we don't own
all the different modes in this regard.
Mr. Reichert. Right. Some time in 2006, though is the
target date.
Admiral Bone. Say again?
Mr. Reichert. Is there a target date, you said, sometime in
2006?
Admiral Bone. Yes, end of fiscal year 2006, which would be
September 2006.
Mr. Reichert. Another question. The Maritime Transportation
Security Act created a grant program to help our ports perform
security enhancements. These grants have proven very effective
in my home ports of Seattle and Tacoma. My question involves
how these funds are allocated to each port. How does the
Department of Homeland Security determine how to allocate port
security grants to each port? Do you know?
Admiral Bone. Yes. Actually it is first done at the Captain
of the Ports of the Federal Maritime Security Coordinator's
level. The identification, working with the area maritime
security committees, when you identify your vulnerabilities and
your gaps, you look at what do you need in your system. What
happens is industry puts their proposals forward, they are
initially vetted at that level so that you want to make sure
they are going to be effective.
It is then put forward to a national level. And the
national level looks at not just the local but the regional and
national impacts. It is a risk-based formula that is used
across ODP, IAIP, CBP, all agencies, TSA, working together to
look at this risk-based approach, looking at vulnerability,
threat, and consequence. That is what you determine, of the
critical ports in this case, that have been identified this
year, the 66 critical ports that have economic and military
significance. Those ports then are determined, those ports are
able to put the grants in and those are then evaluated on a
national level and a determination is made based on, again,
value, impact of this proposal against the risk that is being
proposed.
Mr. Reichert. The House of Representatives recently passed
a first responder's bill that focuses those monies toward first
responders on a threat basis and a risk basis. You are involved
in the intelligence gathering process also, across the Nation,
involved with some of the joint analytical centers and
terrorism task force centers around the world. We have those in
Seattle. You are involved in that process?
Admiral Bone. Yes. We are actually a full member of the
intelligence community. As such, we have access to all the
intelligence, available intelligence, whether it is national or
international, working with CIA, FBI, NSA, all the major FBI.
We have people in the JTTFs, personnel that are assigned
liaison with the JTTFs. We have established 30 field
intelligence support teams that basically support the area
maritime security committees and the Federal maritime security
coordinators. If you know where your threat is, then you move
your assets based upon the threat.
They also work directly with the JTTFs and the local law
enforcement to make sure that we are working collectively and
not duplicating efforts. In other words, by example, in New
York, we might have State assets in one location and Federal
assets in another, city assets in another location, to maximize
the effectiveness, based upon the threat.
Mr. Reichert. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I see my time has
expired.
Mr. LoBiondo. I thank you, Mr. Reichert.
Mr. Higgins?
Mr. Higgins. No questions, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. LoBiondo. Mr. Coble, Master Chief?
Mr. Coble. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, it is good to have you all with us. He calls me
affectionately Master Chief. I was never a master chief,
unfortunately. But I like the title.
It is good to have both of you with us. Mr. Jacksta, let me
put a question to you, a multi-faceted question, if I may. The
Maritime Transportation Security Act, as you all know, requires
the Secretary to establish a secure system of transportation
program, but no such program has yet been established. Admiral,
either you or Mr. Jacksta, when will this program be
established?
Mr. Jacksta. Well, sir, basically we are working on it
right now, with the World Customs Organization just
establishing and agreeing on standards for supply chain. We are
working to first of all begin looking at the supply chain from
when the container is actually stuffed, with who is putting the
goods into the container, making sure that we measure that
responsibility. We seal the container with a seal where we can
verify that the goods have been put in and that no one else has
had access to the container.
Then we have a system of information where we gain the
information, we run it against our automated targeting systems
to make a decision whether there is a concern or a threat. At
37 locations today, the container is moving through a CSI port,
which allows us to once again, our officers overseas to
evaluate the container if there is a concern, we can request
the examination of that container.
We are also working with the importers, the shipping
industry, through the CT-PAT program to make sure that there is
a consistent and uniform way of securing the goods, to make
sure that no one can compromise
Mr. Coble. You are sort of getting into my second question,
Mr. Jacksta. When do you think the program will be online?
Mr. Jacksta. Sir, I would like to say, I think we are
online with a number of our changes today, through the CT-PAT
program, through the CSI program, working to develop a seal
that is a secure seal. So I think there are a number of
initiatives that are already started and are actually moving
forward.
Mr. Coble. Like I say, you accelerated ahead of me, you
were sort of reading my mind and my next question. Let me jump
into that now.
Cargo security is largely overseen by U.S. Customs and
Border Protection. However, numerous Federal agencies have some
responsibility over securing the transport of cargo through the
maritime domain, as you have just pointed out. Let me walk you
through, here is my multi-faceted question, Mr. Jacksta. From
the moment that a cargo container is brought into a foreign
port until that container is offloaded at a U.S. port, what
responsibilities does Customs and Border carry out to secure
the maritime cargo supply, A, and B, what are the Coast Guard's
responsibilities with regard to container security? And
Admiral, you can weigh in on that.
What efforts are taken by other DHS agencies and other
Federal agencies? Are these responsibilities well defined, or
do they overlap? That is to say, is there duplication, as is
oftentimes the case with the Federal Government? And how are
these efforts and requirements integrated for a vessel operator
who is pulling into a U.S. port?
Mr. Jacksta. What I can do is, I will start it off, sir,
with the responsibility that first of all, we have a number of
voluntary programs out there that we work with the industry,
the importers, the exporters and the shipping industry. With
that, when a container arrives at a port overseas, one of the
first things that is required is that before that container can
be put on that vessel, we have to receive information regarding
what is in that container. That information allows us to run
our automated targeting system and our rules to identify if
there is anything that is a concern or if any recent
intelligence has come out that would help us make a decision on
whether an examination needs to take place.
So we review the manifest information before that container
gets on that vessel. If there is a concern, we look at it, we
work with the host governments. This is a cooperative effort
where we need to work on the international side of the house to
make sure that when there is a concern, that it actually gets
addressed overseas.
We also are working with our CT-PAT program, and anybody
who is involved with this program is required to put a seal on
the container at the time of stuffing, which is extremely
important, because it makes sure that the container is not
being compromised. When the vessel, we work very closely with
the Coast Guard, and the vessel, when it is arriving at our
ports of entry, we have some concerns or new intelligence, we
work to develop a plan to make sure that that container is
identified, that when it comes off the vessel we do the
appropriate examinations. And if necessary, working with the
Coast Guard, a decision can be made, not actually to allow that
vessel in until we know more about the container itself.
So before the container is actually put on the vessel,
while it is enroute and before it is released by Customs-Border
Protection, we are reviewing the information. We have
technology at the ports of entry through our radiation portal
monitors that allow us to determine whether there is any type
of threat in the radiological area. And there is also the
systems, what we call our x-ray systems, our VACUS systems,
that allow us to basically take pictures and view the images of
containers and the goods in the containers before they are
released.
So it is a comprehensive, layered approach that we try to
work very closely with TSA in the seaport environment.
Mr. Coble. Admiral, do you want to weigh in on this?
Admiral Bone. I just offer that HSPD-13 in fact is being
developed that identifies very explicitly the responsibility of
different agencies, as Mr. Jacksta mentioned, and kind of
describes how that process works so there isn't overlap, so
there is clarity of responsibility. And again, that is one of
the plans that is going to be completed.
I just offer that we do have responsibility with regard to
the vessels as well as from the time through its transit and
when it is on that facility, a MTSA facility. We do have
responsibility for securing and safety of that cargo, not just
the security but also the safety of that cargo.
And I think that is where our international code and our
standards and our verification, both with our foreign port and
our examinations which we do jointly when there is a CSI, so
that we look at the full measure of security, as well as the
examinations and boardings that are conducted offshore, by our
offshore, our legacy assets, and then again at the facility
examinations inshore to look for any anomalies.
Mr. Coble. I thank the gentleman. Mr. Chairman, I guess my
point is, I would like to avoid duplication, but I would rather
have duplication to preclude an omission if it comes to that. I
thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. LoBiondo. Thank you, Mr. Coble. Mr. Diaz-Balart?
Mr. Diaz-Balart. No questions at this time, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. LoBiondo. Mr. Mack?
Mr. Mack. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Maybe I will try to make this a little more simple for me.
In the State of Florida, we have a number of ports. Just to
give you an example, when I travel, let's say, with my
children, I have a five-year old little girl and a two-year old
little boy. When we go to the airport, a lot of times my two-
year old little boy is wanded down at the airport.
So my question is, do you feel like we have the same
strength of security in our ports that we do at our airports?
And then, which I don't think we do, but I want to hear from
your perspective. And I believe that earlier you said there
were 9.6 million containers, roughly, that come in. What
percentage of those are being checked?
And specifically, how do you think the security of our
ports should be funded? I think we have in some cases a funding
discrepancy on who is responsible for that funding.
Mr. Jacksta. I think I will start off with first of all,
the question that is always asked is exactly how many
containers are examined that arrive at our ports of entry. I
would like to begin that, first of all, sir, all freight
containers that are arriving at our ports of entry are screened
by an electronic fashion, where we get the information, we
review the manifest, and based on intelligence, based on
previous history, based on information provided by other
agencies, a decision is made whether an examination should take
place or not.
Mr. Mack. But most of those, the manifests are filled out
by the people who are loading or responsible for loading the
containers, correct?
Mr. Jacksta. Yes, sir. The information that is provided is
provided by the members that are responsible for creating the
manifests and responsible for shipping the goods. So the
information is not perfect, but it is fairly accurate in most
cases.
With that, when we do the screening, if there is a decision
that is made that there is something unusual or we need to take
a look at it, we do screening through our VACUS system, our
imaging systems that we have out there. We have about 167 of
them at various ports of entry throughout the country.
Basically, the current rate of examination is approximately
5.4 percent of the containers that are arriving at our ports of
entry go through either a VACUS imaging system or are actually
de-vanned, in other words, we take the goods entirely off the
container to take a look at the container. Those are containers
that are either identified through our automatic targeted
system as a risk or containers that we randomly select for
examination.
Admiral Bone. With regard to security in the ports versus
the airports, I agree with you. I think the vulnerability of
airports is much different than the vulnerability of a port,
accessibility and controls, moving in and out of an airport,
whereas on the waterway, the accessibility and mobility of
entities, both from an external but also from an internal
threat, like a Kohl type incident, a small boat that is
engaged, or an individual who comes aboard a high-speed ferry.
So yes, our challenges are greater. But I think also our
resources collectively are also greater. The key to this is
pooling those resources collectively together at the Federal,
State, local and industry level.
I think the difficult thing to decide is to what degree,
whose responsibility is it? Is it a Federal, State, or local
responsibility for protection and response and recovery, and to
what degree is that at those layers, as well as industry's
responsibilities? That is what Congress, I think, has spent a
lot of time doing.
I wouldn't touch the funding issue, because that is not my
business to decide how to pay for it, I don't think. I do know
it is a challenge. I appreciate the challenge associated with
it, and I also appreciate the challenges industry has with
being, staying afloat at the same time they in fact have to
carry out these security changes.
As I said, our challenges are many. We want to address the
most critical, the highest risk, the highest consequence ones
first, and then it is Congress' and others, the public's
determination, if it is worth pursuing the others.
Mr. Mack. Mr. Chairman, for us in Florida, in particular
the port of Everglades, you have the seaport, the airport, a
lot of petroleum reserves, and downtown all in one very small
location. I just think that this topic of port security is one
that I know the Chairman and I know this Committee has been
working on.
But we really have to do more. Because the people who want
to cause harm to this Country are going to look for our
vulnerabilities. They have proven to be sneaky. So they are
going to try to find ways around systems. I just hope that we
will continue to work towards a funding solution and also to
make sure that our ports are safe.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. LoBiondo. Thank you, Mr. Mack.
I can understand, Admiral Bone, your reluctance on the
funding issue. But Mr. Mack, I will tell you, I am not
reluctant to say that I don't think we have received nearly
enough funding for our port security issues or nearly enough
attention. Heaven forbid we ever have an incident at one of our
ports and will see the level of awareness rise significantly
and probably the funding follow. Our hope through hearings like
this is to make sure that we can keep an incident from
happening by keeping the process moving along. But you are
right on the mark with your questions about where we stand.
Mr. Filner, round two.
Mr. Filner. Also, Mr. Mack, I agree with everything you
said. San Diego, where I represent, it is the exact same thing,
we will throw in a few nuclear carriers and nuclear subs, and
it is pretty bad as far as the percentage of stuff that is
inspected. So thank you for your comments.
If I may with that, Mr. Jacksta, when I listened to the
President last night, you wouldn't know that there was anything
wrong in Iraq, that we had not made any errors or that our
troops were subject to such risks. Everything was fine. And you
guys, I don't think you have to say everything is fine. Tell us
what is the problem. Because you lose credibility when there is
knowledge that is different than what you are saying.
Let me just make two points, if I may on the CT-PAT system
that you referred to. According to the GAO, the Department has
not confirmed whether most of the importers have actually
tightened their security, or whether thousands of high-risk
containers were inspected overseas. They say that 9,000
applications from importers have been submitted for CT-PAT,
5,000 have been accepted. However, you have only verified that
597 were implementing the required security measures.
So when are we going to know that all of them who are
participating in this system are actually complying with your
directives?
Mr. Jacksta. Sir, you asked a question of challenges that
we face. This is clearly one of the challenges that we faced
when we established the CT-PAT program. It grew fairly quickly,
which was good, because it is a voluntarily program and
companies wanted to participate and work with the Government to
establish security protocols.
And based on that, we made a commitment that we would go
out there and verify that what they were telling us through
their security profiles was accurate and that they were
complying with what they said. To get started, we needed to
bring personnel on board. And initially when the GAO report
that you are referring to was done, we only had somewhere in
the area of about 35 people on board working on this
initiative.
As a result of this, we have taken an initiative, and today
we have over 70 employees that are currently going out there,
traveling around the world to verify what these companies are
saying is true. Our goal is that by the end of this calendar
year that we have 157 employees working on the CT-PAT program
to ensure that we are visiting the locations and verifying what
they say in their security profiles.
What I think is important to note, sir, is that we
currently have about 600 verifications done. We hope to have
1,500 by the end of this calendar year, and then hopefully by
the end of next fiscal year, we will have close to 3,000
companies that will have had one of our supply chain
specialists visit and actually verify that the information that
the company provided us is accurate.
So it is one of our challenges. We are making every effort
to get the people on board so that we can go out there and
verify that the companies that are participating in this
program are truly in compliance.
Mr. Filner. Again, I wish you guys would be more clear. If
you add up the number of years it is going to take before you
investigate all, the 5,000 that have been accepted, 9,000 want
to be, and you are only up in three years to what did you say,
3,000? Hello? I don't have a lot of confidence. You have 70
people out in the whole world looking at these 5,000?
I don't have the confidence that you are trying to, I guess
in your tone, provide. But I think you should be saying, look,
these are the challenges, help us meet those challenges, not
tell us how everything is fine. Because everything is not so
fine. People have said over and over again, we have to be 100
percent correct, and the terrorist only has to be right once.
But when you leave half or two-thirds of our potential of
the CT-PTA people that haven't even been verified, I don't have
a lot of confidence that you have enough resources to do this
job. I am not questioning your commitment or your attempt. I am
saying, be honest with us so we can get you the resources that
you need to do the job. Just like I wish the President would--
you know, what resources you need to do the mission successful
and he says everything was fine.
So let me just make the same point on another issue, and
that is, that you mentioned also the high risk containers and
the program to inspect them you outlined earlier in answer to
another question. But apparently, again according to a GAO
report, containers have already been loaded and shipped in many
cases before you have scanned them in the way you have told us
about in the foreign port. In fact, some of the host countries
have declined to conduct the inspections.
So we have a certain percentage leaving the port before
they are even going through this thing that you have such high
confidence in. I am not sure that I like the fact that a
container that has not been inspected may have a WMD in it and
can go off as it gets to our port.
So again, what are the exact problems and what do you need
to deal with it?
Mr. Jacksta. One of the issues, again, a challenge that we
have to face is that we have to work very closely with the
foreign government, because our officers are in a foreign port,
we have to make sure that when a shipment is targeted for
examination that we can ensure that that shipment goes through
a VACUS image or actually has the goods taken off. I think what
we have done, once again, a new program that was developed and
is continuing to evolve is we continue to work with the various
governments to ensure that when we target a container for
examination that it is examined. That at times can be a
challenge.
What I will tell you and commit to you is that based on the
information that we have regarding the container, if it is a
threat or a real concern to us, we have the authority to just
not load that container and give a no-load message that tells
the carrier that he is not allowed to ship that container until
examination takes place. So once again, this is a challenge
that we do have, that we are continuing to try to address with
the foreign governments.
I think at the World Customs Organization, the recent
adoption of the standards that have been achieved, that we work
together in partnership, both through customs and the industry,
to make sure that when a container is identified by a
government for examination that it takes place.
So I think the recent agreement will help us get to that
point.
Mr. Filner. Well, again, I am not getting a lot of
confidence here. I think there are governments that have not
put those scanners in or refused to put them in. There are
again containers leaving the port before you even get there. So
again, I just wish you had more quantitatively let us know
about that so we can, as we want to do, provide the resources
to make us safe. That is all, and I just don't think you all in
the Administration have got to say everything is going right.
We don't expect everything to happen overnight, but we do
expect to know the real problems so we can help correct them.
We see this as a partnership. If you are not giving us all the
information, then we can't help as much as we would like.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. LoBiondo. Thank you, Mr. Filner.
For Admiral Bone or Mr. Jacksta, just a follow-up. The MTSA
implementation with the final regulations to implement the
requirements of MTSA went into effect one year ago. Has the
Coast Guard and the Department identified additional port
security measures not specifically authorized by MTSA that
remain to be implemented?
Admiral Bone. I can identify one of the areas that we know.
When you talk about the merchant mariners credentialing and the
TWIC card, again, as we discussed earlier, that still remains
and we actually need a legislative change proposal in order to
effectively execute that merchant mariner credentialing
process, that would allow the biometrics to be used and allow
us to basically keep someone from receiving a merchant
mariner's document that is in fact a security risk.
We still have some work to do in that area specifically.
Mr. LoBiondo. Admiral Bone, for you, I am sure you know and
we are all painfully aware that the design and funding of the
Deepwater program has received considerable attention recently,
and we have some serious questions and I think problems. I
would like you to comment on what is your take, will the effect
of the delay in the implementation of the first response cutter
program be on the Coast Guard's readiness to carry out vessel
inspections, interceptions and other port and coastal waterway
security missions?
Admiral Bone. I can only tell you that my experience has
been that you don't want to board these ships in the port. You
don't want to have it in your own back yard. We need to have
cutters, aircraft and communications systems that will allow us
to intercept these vessels offshore, or any threat that
presents itself in an offshore environment, and not in a near
shore environment, if at all possible.
Those legacy assets in fact do need replacement. And if we
don't have replacement, then their availability will be limited
and therefore, something that may have been needed to be out on
scene may in fact be in repair. So if your readiness is at
risk, then your shield basically of security is also at risk.
It is a serious issue and something that why, in fact, we are
requesting the full $966 million that the President's budget
identifies.
Mr. LoBiondo. I wish we collectively could do a better job
of having everyone understand what the implications are if we
are not able to keep on track with this critical program. It is
discussed in sort of abstract terms sometimes, and it has some
very real world applications which could give us huge problems
if we are not able to bring this together. So thank you.
Mr. Reichert, second round?
Mr. Reichert. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Have you participated in the Top Off exercises?
Admiral Bone. I did not participate in the Top Off exercise
that was recently held, but I have had close to that experience
in the past.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Reichert. I had experience as the sheriff in Seattle to
participate in Top Off II. I just wondered if the Coast Guard--
I know in that exercise the Coast Guard was not a part of that
exercise.
Admiral Bone. There was a Top Off exercise recently in
Connecticut, Mr. Simmons can probably speak to it. But where
the Coast Guard in fact did have a lead responsibility is--I am
trying to remember the term now, basically served as the
Department of Homeland Security coordinator and lead
representative for the Department. And yes, there have been
exercises. There is a regularly scheduled exercise program,
including facility level programs as well as national level
programs that the Coast Guard, Customs and Border Protection,
TSA and the other agencies collectively are involved in. I
would say that that is a program which is included in the MTSA
that we are carrying out.
Mr. Reichert. Do you think that those programs are
beneficial for you in helping you identify the weaknesses that
we might have in your response?
Admiral Bone. I think definitely a perfect example is
lessons learned, such as, it may be much simpler to close a
port than it is to decide how to re-open and what would be true
impacts and regional and national impacts associated with that,
and who is involved in that decision making and the complexity
that that brings.
Mr. Reichert. So as you have analyzed it, Top Off exercises
or some of the other training exercises, is there any
legislation that you can think of, any way that we can help you
to address some of the weaknesses that you might have
identified in some of those exercises? If you don't have an
answer now to that question, you can answer for the record.
Admiral Bone. I think what the exercises help you do is
give focus to say, okay, are your screening methods proper, are
your communications effective. If they weren't, you reexamine
what it is you have. I would not come to you and say, I have a
problem, I would rather come to you with, here is the solution,
here is what we need. And I think that as you say, we are in
the early stages of this. But some of those areas that I
identified in America's maritime shield, the efforts that we
have ongoing, are directly reflective of what we have learned
in some of those events and exercises.
Mr. Reichert. Do you think that in some of the smaller
fishing boats, especially from my area I'm familiar with in the
Puget Sound, being subject to some of the same requirements as
the larger vessels, is that an issue that you see as a
challenge for the Coast Guard to address?
Admiral Bone. Yes. In fact, we look at legislation, at the
potential for legislation to move the Automatic Identification
System or the identification of vessels and their movement to a
lower threshold to include vessels 65 feet, all vessels that
are down to 65 feet. We are looking at that. We have not put
that forward at this time.
But we do understand that a Kohl type incident which could
be even a smaller vessel than that, has the potential, of
course, as the vessels get larger, they could carry more
explosives and therefore do more damage. But I think anything
that could move or be a transport mechanism, not just the big
ships and containers, but anything internally that moves within
the system, a lot of times we focus out instead of looking
within. We need to address those threats.
Someone may want to move somebody to a location, say you
have great security around your tunnels and your bridges. Well,
then, you get in a boat, you take the boat across, the truck
went across, they drop them off in a location, they get in the
vehicle from the small boat and off they go. We don't want to
have anything large come in or any vessel be used as a transit
method for bringing weapons of mass destruction, conventional
weapons or terrorists in any direction.
Mr. Reichert. So you mentioned you are considering
proposing some legislation, maybe in some areas that we might
be to help you in.
Admiral Bone. Yes.
Mr. Reichert. One last question. I am always curious as to
what agencies looked like pre-September 11th. I know what our
sheriff's office looked like and what our mission focus was.
But after September 11th, it changed. Maybe just give an
example of, and maybe if there is an increase in personnel
training, mission focus, your resources, those sorts of things,
I imagine you have changed a lot in the years since September
11th.
Admiral Bone. MTSA actually provided funding of the $101
million we have. We moved 800 more people into position,
basically, to work both as boarding and examination, but also
in the liaison position. Again, a lot of this activity involves
coordination, besides examinations. I think that what you found
is an organization that used to organize themselves and work in
partnerships with others on safety and environmental issues now
leveraging some of those same relationships and adding many
more additional in order to address the security portion of
this.
Our intelligence community alone has grown greatly as well.
In other words, if you don't know the threat then you can't
accurately place your assets. No different than a police chief
has to know where his high crime areas and where the crooks are
moving in order to move his assets into the proper location to
address it.
Mr. Reichert. I appreciate the work you are doing. I know
that you have made lots of progress, but there are lots of
things yet to come. We look forward to helping you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. LoBiondo. Thank you, Mr. Reichert. Mr. Diaz-Balart?
Mr. Diaz-Balart. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The MTSA and SOLAS both require that certain vessels
operating in U.S. waters be equipped with an operating
Automatic Identification System, AIS. AIS includes a position-
indicating transponder and an electronic charting or situation
display for accessing information made available by that
transponder system. The system allows the operator of a vessel
to identify the position and heading of their vessels but also
other vessels in the area. Also, it will allow shore-based
Coast Guard facilities to more easily monitor the location and
heading of those vessels in their area.
Two questions, if I may, Mr. Chairman. The AIS has been
traditionally seen as a safety system. However, since 9/11, is
that system now being viewed as an anti-terrorism tool, number
one. And number two is, is it unusual for technology that is
developed for commercial and safety missions of the Coast Guard
to also serve now as multi-mission purposes that include port
and waterway security? Those would be the two questions.
Admiral Bone. First, AIS, yes, early on was identified as a
safety system. But I can tell you, as early as 1998 even it was
being viewed as a potential security tool at the same time. It
just became of more import after 9/11.
I think that the issue of safety and security go hand in
hand. In fact, environmental protection goes hand in hand. We
look at our requirements both in the impacts of something as
having improved training, improved awareness. It cuts across
all of what the Commandant likes to talk about as the three-
legged stool of safety, security and environmental protection.
So our multi-mission, our examinations we look at together,
when we go aboard to look at a security boarding, we look at
the safety issues and the environmental issues at the same
time. I think that even whole construction vessels could be
identified as making them stronger and less likely susceptible
to a security incident.
So we look at the communications again, the capabilities
and the awareness. Having security officers onboard will also
improve the safety onboard.
Mr. Diaz-Balart. Mr. Chairman, if I may, just a couple more
questions.
Mr. LoBiondo. Go ahead.
Mr. Diaz-Balart. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
You mentioned in your testimony, sir, that the Coast Guard
will be increasing its presence in ports and coastal zones with
more people, boats, ships, your force structure. My question
is, where are those assets and personnel going to come from,
number one, and number two is, do you have enough personnel and
vessels and ships to really make an impact, significantly
increase your presence for port security and your myriad of
other, multiple missions?
Admiral Bone. Again, we have received $101 million and
again, included in that, we also have 80 small boats that have
been procured since 9/11. We have 14 coastal patrol boats and
crews. We have 500 personnel added to our small boat stations
and our command centers. That is an example of, in the budget
that Congress has actually provided us to increase our
capabilities.
Additionally, in this next year's budget, there is an
increase in funding for personnel associated that we are going
to be placing again at L&G facilities and to address, again,
additional crews to provide protection of the highest risk
arenas.
Mr. Diaz-Balart. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. LoBiondo. Thank you, Mr. Diaz-Balart.
Mr. Filner, do you have anything else? Mr. Reichert?
I would like to thank Admiral Bone and Mr. Jacksta for
being here today and for the work that you do and continue to
do in a very, very challenging but critically important area
for homeland security for the United States of America. We on
the Subcommittee will continue to try to be as vigorous as we
can and we look forward to hearing from you again soon.
We are adjourned. Thank you.
[Whereupon, at 11:17 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
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