[House Hearing, 109 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
DEEPWATER IMPLEMENTATION
=======================================================================
(109-24)
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
COAST GUARD AND MARITIME TRANSPORTATION
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON
TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
JUNE 21, 2005
__________
Printed for the use of the
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure
_____
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON: 2006
22-503 PDF
For Sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office
Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800; (202) 512-1800
Fax: (202) 512-2250 Mail: Stop SSOP, Washington, DC 20402-0001
COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE
DON YOUNG, Alaska, Chairman
THOMAS E. PETRI, Wisconsin, Vice- JAMES L. OBERSTAR, Minnesota
Chair NICK J. RAHALL, II, West Virginia
SHERWOOD L. BOEHLERT, New York PETER A. DeFAZIO, Oregon
HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina JERRY F. COSTELLO, Illinois
JOHN J. DUNCAN, Jr., Tennessee ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of
WAYNE T. GILCHREST, Maryland Columbia
JOHN L. MICA, Florida JERROLD NADLER, New York
PETER HOEKSTRA, Michigan ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey
VERNON J. EHLERS, Michigan CORRINE BROWN, Florida
SPENCER BACHUS, Alabama BOB FILNER, California
STEVEN C. LaTOURETTE, Ohio EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas
SUE W. KELLY, New York GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi
RICHARD H. BAKER, Louisiana JUANITA MILLENDER-McDONALD,
ROBERT W. NEY, Ohio California
FRANK A. LoBIONDO, New Jersey ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland
JERRY MORAN, Kansas EARL BLUMENAUER, Oregon
GARY G. MILLER, California ELLEN O. TAUSCHER, California
ROBIN HAYES, North Carolina BILL PASCRELL, Jr., New Jersey
ROB SIMMONS, Connecticut LEONARD L. BOSWELL, Iowa
HENRY E. BROWN, Jr., South Carolina TIM HOLDEN, Pennsylvania
TIMOTHY V. JOHNSON, Illinois BRIAN BAIRD, Washington
TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania SHELLEY BERKLEY, Nevada
SAM GRAVES, Missouri JIM MATHESON, Utah
MARK R. KENNEDY, Minnesota MICHAEL M. HONDA, California
BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania RICK LARSEN, Washington
JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas MICHAEL E. CAPUANO, Massachusetts
JIM GERLACH, Pennsylvania ANTHONY D. WEINER, New York
MARIO DIAZ-BALART, Florida JULIA CARSON, Indiana
JON C. PORTER, Nevada TIMOTHY H. BISHOP, New York
TOM OSBORNE, Nebraska MICHAEL H. MICHAUD, Maine
KENNY MARCHANT, Texas LINCOLN DAVIS, Tennessee
MICHAEL E. SODREL, Indiana BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky
CHARLES W. DENT, Pennsylvania BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
TED POE, Texas RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri
DAVID G. REICHERT, Washington ALLYSON Y. SCHWARTZ, Pennsylvania
CONNIE MACK, Florida JOHN T. SALAZAR, Colorado
JOHN R. `RANDY' KUHL, Jr., New York
LUIS G. FORTUNO, Puerto Rico
LYNN A. WESTMORELAND, Georgia
CHARLES W. BOUSTANY, Jr., Louisiana
VACANCY
(ii)
SUBCOMMITTEE ON COAST GUARD AND MARITIME TRANSPORTATION
FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey, Chairman
HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina BOB FILNER, California, Ranking
WAYNE T. GILCHREST, Maryland Democrat
PETER HOEKSTRA, Michigan CORRINE BROWN, Florida
ROB SIMMONS, Connecticut GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi
MARIO DIAZ-BALART, Florida JUANITA MILLENDER-McDONALD,
DAVID G. REICHERT, Washington,Vice- California
Chair MICHAEL M. HONDA, California
CONNIE MACK, Florida ANTHONY D. WEINER, New York
LUIS G. FORTUNO, Puerto Rico BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
CHARLES W. BOUSTANY, Jr., Louisiana BRIAN BAIRD, Washington
DON YOUNG, Alaska JAMES L. OBERSTAR, Minnesota
(Ex Officio) (Ex Officio)
(iii)
CONTENTS
TESTIMONY
Page
Allen, Vice Admiral Thad W., Chief of Staff, United States Coast
Guard, accompanied by Gregory L. Giddens, Deputy Program
Executive Officer for the Integrated Deepwater System, United
States Coast Guard............................................. 3
PREPARED STATEMENT SUBMITTED BY A MEMBER OF CONGRESS
Filner, Hon. Bob, of California.................................. 35
PREPARED STATEMENT SUBMITTED BY THE WITNESS
Allen, Vice Admiral Thad W...................................... 21
DEEPWATER IMPLEMENTATION
----------
Tuesday, June 21, 2005
House of Representatives, Committee on
Transportation and Infrastructure, Subcommittee
on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation,
Washington, D.C.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:00 a.m., in
Room 2167, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Frank A.
LoBiondo [chairman of the committee] presiding.
Mr. LoBiondo. Good morning. The Subcommittee on Coast Guard
and Maritime Transportation will come to order. The
Subcommittee is meeting today to hear testimony on the
Deepwater Implementation. We will proceed directly, as we
normally do, with my statement and Mr. Filner's statement.
The Subcommittee is meeting this morning to continue its
oversight of the Deepwater program and to review the revised
implementation schedule that was submitted to Congress earlier
this month.
The Subcommittee has repeatedly requested the Coast Guard
provide detailed information on the changes that the re-
baselining will make to the number and nature of assets that
will be acquired under Deepwater, the total cost of the
program, and the program's delivery schedule. And while I am
pleased that the Coast Guard has finally provided Congress will
an out-year projection for the Deepwater program, I do have
several concerns and questions concerning the information
submitted.
The most recent ``plan'' is actually four plans. Two
different proposed funding streams are presented, each with two
different mixtures of vessels and aircraft and estimates of
total project costs. While this certainly presents a wealth of
information on several possible courses of action, it does not
include any recommendation or prioritization among the four
presented options for acquiring new assets under the Deepwater
program, and I think that this is a problem.
When we required the Coast Guard to develop and submit a
re-baseline plan to Congress, we envisioned it as a blueprint
to guide the program to the future. Instead, I am now concerned
that the four plans we received, with their broad ranges and
number of assets that will be acquired and the total costs of
the program combined with the uncertainty of several funding
proposals, leaves us without any real direction once again.
I am interested in hearing more about the CIP Plus funding
stream that was outlined in the most recent plan. CIP Plan
calls for the reallocation of funding from other sources within
the Department of Homeland Security to support the legacy asset
maintenance and upgrades. This Subcommittee has been and
continues to be extremely concerned by the rapid deterioration
of the Coast Guard's legacy assets, and I am happy to hear that
the Coast Guard is considering steps to address this pressing
problem while maintaining designated funding for new asset
acquisition.
However, I would be happier to hear that the Coast Guard
and the Administration have committed to this funding approach.
I think that is a key word, committed to the approach. I hope
that is something that we will hear today.
Now is the time to make the tough decisions that will guide
the completion of this essential program. While I appreciate
the Coast Guard's long and hard labor to get this information
approved by the Department and Office of Management and Budget,
which has not always been as cooperative as we would have
liked, I still have concerns about the long-term adequacy.
I hope that the witness testimony today will address these
important issues, and I thank the Admiral for appearing before
this Subcommittee.
Mr. Filner.
Mr. Filner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for
raising those issues. I agree with you, and I have some
additional questions or concerns of my own.
I think that Deepwater may be in deep trouble. This project
is very ambitious. The theory was, as I understood it, that the
Government would lay out the mission and program requirements,
and the contractor would build a system of systems that would
provide the best value. The best value. Not the lowest cost,
but the best value.
The Coast Guard and their system integrator, Lockheed
Martin, spent $49 million to convert eight 110-foot patrol
boats to 123-foot patrol boats, only, as we have learned, to
find out that the ships had major structural problems, and they
should build new patrol boats instead. That is $49 million that
is now not available to buy new equipment.
And it doesn't look like the program has learned from that
lesson. The revised Deepwater plan to include system
requirements to meet post-9/11 challenges proposes, for
example, to rebuild the HH-65 helicopters and C-130 aircraft,
instead of buying new aircraft.
As I said earlier, Deepwater was supposed to be about
buying cutters and aircraft that are the best value for the
Government. Cost of a particular asset, as I understand, was
only to be about 15 percent of the weighted factors when making
that decision. Now decisions are being made entirely on the
lowest cost, so that the Government would end up manufacturing
old aircraft instead of buying new, more capable assets. When
the Deepwater modernization project is completed, the Coast
Guard will have eight HH-65 helicopters and C-130 aircraft that
are over 40 years old. I am told that is the oldest of any
Coast Guard in the world.
What appears to be happening is, as the Coast Guard adds,
for example, new ship system requirements to cutters, OMB says
that the total program cost can't increase, so the Coast Guard
must cut costs from aircraft modernization and the total number
of cutters purchased. So we are changing, apparently, Deepwater
from a program to modernize the Coast Guard with new equipment
to a program that buys too few new ships and keeps the old
aircraft.
Mr. Chairman, I think Deepwater is in deep trouble, and the
Administration isn't giving the Coast Guard the support that we
would like and that they need. The Administration is not
committed to giving the men and women of the Coast Guard, who
risk their lives everyday to save others, the best equipment
that is available. Instead, they are forcing the Coast Guard to
fulfill all of their future missions based on the budget
restraints of today.
We learned just at last week's hearing that the current
fleet of Coast Guard cutters and aircraft are just not up to
the job; they are having mechanical problems, interdicting only
15 percent of the cocaine, for example, that enters the United
States. If we had that percentage for WMDs in the future, we
are not going to last too long. Given the direction of
Deepwater, I doubt that the Coast Guard, in fact, will be any
more effective once the modernization project is completed.
Mr. Chairman, like you, I remain committed to the Deepwater
program. However, given the direction of this program in our
post-9/11 world, I am not exactly convinced yet that the Coast
Guard of the future will be able to meet the challenges that we
face in our future.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. LoBiondo. Thank you, Mr. Filner.
We are very pleased that the Chair of the Intelligence
Committee and distinguished Congressman, Peter Hoekstra, is
with us.
Peter, do you care to make any opening statements?
Mr. Hoekstra. No. I am all set. Thank you.
Mr. LoBiondo. Thank you.
Mr. Coble, I know you are just walking in. We are going
through some opening statements concerning Deepwater. Would you
like to share any words of wisdom with us early on?
Mr. Coble. Good to be here, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. LoBiondo. Okay. Thank you.
We are very pleased today to have our witnesses, Vice
Admiral Thad Allen, the Chief of Staff of the United States
Coast Guard, and accompanying him is Mr. Gregory Giddens, the
Deputy Program Executive Officer for Integrated Deepwater
System for the United States Coast.
Admiral Allen, thank you for being here. Please proceed.
You need to kick on your microphone.
TESTIMONY OF VICE ADMIRAL THAD W. ALLEN, CHIEF OF STAFF, UNITED
STATES COAST GUARD, ACCOMPANIED BY GREGORY L. GIDDENS, DEPUTY
PROGRAM EXECUTIVE OFFICER FOR THE INTEGRATED DEEPWATER SYSTEM,
UNITED STATES COAST GUARD
Admiral Allen. Good morning, Mr. Chairman. It is a pleasure
to be here and discuss what is arguably the most important
acquisition project the Coast Guard has undertaken probably in
its history. I would like to make a few brief remarks and then
offer a formal statement for the record, if that is okay, sir.
If I were to describe the overall budget goals for fiscal
year 2006 for the Coast Guard, it would be three: to continue
to recapitalize Coast Guard assets, and the Deepwater project
is all about that; to implement our maritime security strategy
for homeland security; and to generally improve mission
performance with both AC&I and operating dollars.
We have a revised Deepwater plan that has been based on a
comprehensive program gap analysis that attempts to do three
things: one is to modify original assets to improve post-9/11
capabilities; to retain, upgrade, and convert aviation legacy
assets as part of that final mix; and adjust the program
delivery schedule to maximize operational effectiveness.
The revised plan ensures cutters and aircraft will be
equipped with the right systems and right capabilities. Those
capabilities include: interoperable network-centric command-
and-control systems, essential for maritime domain awareness;
increased speed and integrated weapons systems; helicopter use
of force and vertical insertion capability; improve fixed-wing
aircraft for long-range surveillance and transport; enhanced
anti-terrorist and force protection capabilities; and
detection-and-defense systems for chemical, biological, and
radiological threats.
As a result, Deepwater cutters and aircraft equipped with
these new capabilities can be employed and leveraged far beyond
the operational limitations of the original assets. Together
with recent advancements in maritime domain awareness,
intelligence effectiveness, and our homeland security partners,
Deepwater assets will enable us to close existing operational
shortfalls and execute the full range of homeland security and
national defense missions more effectively. We will also reduce
risk in the maritime domain and improve the safety and
readiness of all platforms through sustainment, modernization,
and conversion of aging legacy assets.
Mr. Chairman, as you know, between March and May of this
year we have been constructively and tirelessly engaged with
the Congress and the Administration to provide a revised
Deepwater implementation plan that provides sufficient detail
regarding asset delivery schedules and still recognizes the
uncertainty of out-year funding levels. We believe the final
number of assets will, at a minimum, be sufficient to meet
homeland security and Coast Guard performance goals.
Mr. Chairman, the Coast Guard's 2006 budget includes $966
million for Deepwater, a 33 percent increase over last year's
appropriations. This investment will make critical important
contributions to our ability to defend this Nation from
terrorist attack and execute all Coast Guard missions more
effectively. I urge this Committee and the Congress to support
the President's full request for Deepwater funding.
Mr. Chairman, if I could, just one added piece of
information, because I know it is of personal interest to you.
Yesterday afternoon the Commandant signed the order that will
have the fishing vessel TEXAS removed from Gardner's Basin in
Atlantic City.
Glad to be here today, sir.
Mr. LoBiondo. Thank you. That is very good news.
Mr. Filner, go ahead and start off.
Mr. Filner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Admiral, for being here today. As I said in my
opening statement, it appears--and I will give you some
specifics to deal with--that there seems to be a fixed budget
for a system that needs to, in fact, improve its operational
requirements after 9/11. So we have to trade off, it seems,
requirements for numbers in that situation.
For example, your national security cutter, you have added
requirements to that for homeland security. Has that increased
the cost? And what does that do for the numbers involved?
Admiral Allen. Yes, sir, added capability does come with a
cost. We are in the process right now of negotiating
engineering change proposals with our contractors. Most
specifically, we are looking at three areas of enhanced
capability that are absolutely required in a 9/11 environment
for those cutters. The first one is the secure compartment for
the handling of intelligence information, radically needed in a
post-9/11 environment; the second is upgrade to the weapons
system, 57 millimeter gun and the mounts associated with that.
And as we negotiate these engineering change proposals and
define how much they are going to cost, there will be a cost
increase. There is money reserved in the budget for that that
is unobligated at this time, and we are actively negotiating
that with ICGS at this time, sir.
Mr. Filner. So you are saying you don't need to cut the
numbers of the force in any given category?
Admiral Allen. Sir, if you are referring to the range of
NSCs that are in the plan that is between six and eight, the
notion there is, as we deliver these cutters and bring them
online, we need to understand what kind of performance they
bring in the operating environment as we look at the final
force structure. We are allowed under the plan a range of
cutters from six up to eight.
I think as we bring the first NSC online and test its
operational effectiveness, we will get a better view on how
much more capable that cutter is than the one it is replacing
and can make a better decision. At the end, the Coast Guard
feels that, if we need it, we need to go to the high end, which
is the eight cutters, but we need to demonstrate that in terms
of performance as the assets are delivered, sir.
Mr. Filner. It looks like, to me, when you look at the
ranges that you had for not only the NSC, but the offshore
patrol cutters, the patrol boats, the CAS aircraft, the range
is less than we had thought before 9/11. But you are going to
increase all your older aircraft. It doesn't sound to me that a
21st century Coast Guard to meet the 21st century post-9/11
world is being kept here. You have fewer assets and they are
older. How does that increase your capability?
Admiral Allen. Sir, if I could make two comments in regard
to that. First of all, when the acquisition was started and the
contract was awarded in 2002, it assumed a baseline funding
level of $500 million a year. That was extremely constraining
at the time, and as we have added capability and taken a look
at the forestructure, we have to have different types of assets
with different types of capability. And we have been successful
in raising the funding level for Deepwater.
That said, as you raise capability and the assets become
more expensive, you have to make tradeoffs within the funding
stream that is available that brings the best value to the
Government, and that is what we are trying to do. Even if we
were to have all new assets, it would be highly improbable we
would have the amount of funding in one year to fund all of
those platforms. So you have to sequence these things and trade
them off, and that is what we have been trying to do since the
start, sir.
Mr. Filner. Well, that is what worries me, that the
tradeoff that you are talking about is shortchanging our
security. That is, it seems to me that you should say what we
need, and then see if we can fund it, not to fit an amount of
money and then you decide what capability we are going to get.
It just seems to me, after 9/11, that that is not the way the
Coast Guard in the new Department of Homeland Security should
be working.
I mean, I look at some of the threats that we talk about,
whether it is, say, a high explosives ship attack on a cruise
ship or a tanker. I am not sure our coastal communities are
well protected against that. I also wonder about the fact that
the Deepwater project is aimed at operations, by definition,
more than 50 miles offshore, and yet the terrorist threat is
probably a lot closer. So how are we going to protect the
United States against these kind of terrorist attacks in our
ports, our coastal communities, when you are dealing with
Deepwater, by definition?
Admiral Allen. Yes, sir. You can well make the claim that
maybe we had a branding issue at the start. We said Deepwater,
but what we are really referring to is long-range of mobile
assets that can move up and down the coast or off the coast.
These are assets that are not tethered, as opposed to search
and rescue stations and short-range helicopter that operates
from a fixed base and are basically fixed in an area of
operation. We have Deepwater assets operating very close to
shore in the Aleutian Islands, where there is nothing else
there.
So what we are trying to create is a series of mobile
assets that can be employed where we need them to counter the
highest risk in the area of responsibility that our operational
commanders are charged with. And what we are also trying to
look at is systems performance. It is not just the asset
itself, it is the maritime domain awareness, it is the
intelligence that drives it, it is queuing up actionable
intelligence so our units can respond to it.
It is not just one asset, it is the accumulation of the
assets and their capabilities together that produce systems
performance that is the basis of the acquisition. And through
layered defense we can, and have, increased the security of the
Country. We can always do better and there are never enough
assets, so you have to kind of go to a risk-based decision
method on how you are going to apply those assets. But it is
the system that we are trying to produce, sir.
Mr. Filner. All right. Well, I guess I feel good that the
Aleutians are protected. But I still have a lot of problems
with our own ports, one of which I represent.
I will come back to this, Mr. Chairman. Thanks.
Mr. LoBiondo. Mr. Hoekstra, questions for Admiral Allen?
Mr. Hoekstra. Just a couple of questions.
I am wondering, I guess the Appropriations Committee and
the Homeland Security bill only had $500 million in it, and one
of the reasons for that occurring was that the plan coming from
the Coast Guard that was going to request the $966 was delayed
in getting over to the Appropriations Committee. Can you
explain why the delay? I know Deepwater has been something you
have been working on for a while. And what the impact would be
if you only get $500 million this year?
Admiral Allen. Yes, sir. There was a serious discussion
inside the Administration about the uncertainty of funding
streams in the future and needing to understand what would
happen under various funding scenarios with the revised plan,
so that when the plans came up there would be, whether you want
to call it trade space or flexibility to handle potential
constraints in the future. That is what we were negotiating.
As a result of that, as was referred to earlier, there are
four different scenarios that assume two different time frames
and two different funding levels. That was hammered out within
the Administration to be able to portray a viable course of
action that would produce this capability for the Country under
different funding streams as a risk mitigator.
Mr. Hoekstra. And what is the impact if you only get $500
million this year, instead of the $966?
Admiral Allen. It would be considerable. It would result in
descoping, moving of ship design schedules to the right, and
significant delay in bringing that capability onboard which the
Country needs.
Mr. Hoekstra. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. LoBiondo. Mr. Baird?
Mr. Baird. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Admiral, for your service. I am privileged to
represent the Colombia River region, and I want you to know
that your folks out there at the mouth of the river do a great
job under difficult conditions.
I have been a long-time supporter of Deepwater, but I also
have a concern about the need for more rapid craft,
particularly craft that can obtain the go-fast boats that are
in the field. I understand you have the helicopter intercept
program and the sharp-shooting, but one of our concerns has
been that we believe there is a need for higher speed boats to
operate in the literal zone and out in more open sea, in fact,
for several days, and have the speed and flexibility to capture
the go-fast kind of boats. I wonder what your thoughts are on
that as an adjunct to the Deepwater mission.
Admiral Allen. Well, there are two component parts to that,
one is the over-the-horizon boats that are going to be deployed
with our cutters, capable of speeds that can intercept the go-
fast boats from a mobile deployable base, if you will. From
fixed base in the United States, if that were a threat out
there, we are in the process of selecting a responsible medium
that will have the speed and capability to deal with the go-
fast threat also.
But, as you said, the real trump card in this whole thing
is airborne use of force, putting a helicopter overhead with
the ability to use warning shots and disabling fire. But we
think we have a pretty good portfolio of either ship-launched
or shore-launched boats that will be able to counter that
threat, especially when the Deepwater assets are deployed with
over-the-horizon boats and the long-range prosecutors and the
short-range prosecutors.
Mr. Baird. When you refer to over-the-horizon boats, can
you discuss that a little bit?
Admiral Allen. These are boats that will be deployed off of
the offshore patrol cutter the national security cutter that
are capable of operating independently from the vessel at
distances away, that are faster than the vessel themselves,
that are capable of intercepting go-fast boats. If you team
that with aircraft helicopter capable of airborne use of force,
it is a fairly potent package, and we know from our history in
the Transit Zone right now that airborne use of force and even
over-the-horizon boats down there are effective in stopping go-
fast boats.
Mr. Baird. Can you describe the characteristics of the
over-the-horizon vehicles?
Admiral Allen. So I wouldn't make a mistake, I would offer
to provide that for the record. But they offer significant
speed advantage over the cutters.
Mr. Baird. Okay. Could you have one of your staff brief us?
I would be interested in talking to you about this.
Admiral Allen. Happy to brief you, sir.
Mr. Baird. Because I think there is a significant gap in
the vessels currently at your disposal, and would be interested
in talking to you.
Admiral Allen. We have a stepping type of a capability from
responsible smalls that are currently at our stations after 9/
11 clear up to the deployable boats from the cutters. We would
be happy to give you a brief about that spectrum, sir.
Mr. Baird. That would be terrific. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. LoBiondo. Mr. Coble?
Mr. Coble. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral, good to have you with us today. Mr. Filner put a
question to you regarding a terrorist attack. Let me extend
that a minute, Admiral. Let us assume that intelligence
indicates that a particular ship en route to a U.S. port is a
terrorist threat. Describe what the Coast Guard's role would be
versus the Navy's role (a); and, (b) how does the revised
Deepwater system allow you to deal with this potential threat,
as compared to your legacy fleet.
Admiral Allen. Yes, sir, very happy to do that. The basic
way to deal with a threat from the start is maritime domain
awareness, and maritime domain awareness has several components
. We tend to think of it as sensors or maybe intelligence, but
it is a spectrum of information that allows you to deal with
and have knowledge about conveyance in the maritime
environment.
If I would take a hypothetical example of a ship that is
nearing the United States as a potential threat on board, the
potential cues that the Coast Guard could receive would be some
type of intelligence source from overseas; we could get
information from tracking systems; we could get information
from vessel sightings. But it would come to our attention that
a vessel is out there and we could identify it.
In addition, following the events of 9/11, we issued a
regulation requiring 96-hour advanced notice of arrival. The
vessel then provides us their intentions, what port they are
going to enter, and we have time to do an analysis on both the
vessel, the crew, and the cargo to see if it might prove any
threat. If it did--and right now we our acting authority is
under law enforcement, as opposed to Title X DOD operations--we
could plan a response to that. And recently we have done
responses very far offshore, up to 1,000 miles if we think we
need to do that, and sometimes that is with the cooperation of
the flag states who are willing to cooperate with us.
If it appears that the threat out there is something that
would exceed the Coast Guard's capabilities, we would be in
active negotiation with the Department of Defense on what the
right mix and response to that should be. And if it appeared
that we had the ability to declare hostile intent on the part
of that vessel or that threat that is approaching the United
States, DOD would be employed to defeat that threat at the
farthest distance offshore. That could be a Coast Guard unit
with support from the Navy or it could be a Navy unit with
support from the Coast Guard under recent protocols that we
have negotiated with U.S. Northern Command and the Department
of Defense. But there is an active negotiation, and what you
want to do is put the right capability on the threat to defeat
it as far offshore as you can, sir.
Mr. Coble. Well, how does the revised Deepwater system
improve?
Admiral Allen. I can give you a good scenario, sir. First
of all, you have a cutter underway, say, 100 miles offshore
doing fisheries patrol, when they are alerted that you have a
threat that is, say, 1,000 miles offshore. First of all, with
the increased maritime domain awareness and command-and-control
capabilities that are on the upgraded cutters and the new
cutters, we will be able to transmit what is called a common
operating picture. That is a display of all the vessels in the
area, including identifying information. And the common
operating picture is both on a classified and non-classified
system, so you are able to put out the picture and creak the
threat environment out there.
Secondly, as you are moving in to do the operations,
because we now have put in secret internet protocol routers on
all the ships enables us to have classified chat rooms, if you
will. And if you remember trying to pass voice communications,
try and find somebody to give you guidance during a breaking
operations, we now have a virtual chat room set up where people
can be talking all the time.
In a recent case for drug interdiction down in the Transit
Zone, what would normally take 15, 30 minutes for a fast-
breaking case to obtain a statement of no objection for warning
shots and disabling fire was done in six minutes over a
classified chat room. So what you are doing is you are
increasing your ability to sense what is going on out there,
you are increasing your ability to know what is going on in
your environment, and you are rapidly increasing your ability
to communicate in a covered system, sir.
Mr. Coble. Thank you, Admiral.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. LoBiondo. Mr. Gilchrest.
Mr. Gilchrest. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Welcome, Admiral and Mr. Giddens. So it sounds like as a
result of this whole--Deepwater started how many years ago, the
concept, six, seven, eight years?
Admiral Allen. You were chairman, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Gilchrest. It started some time ago. And as a result of
the concept of Deepwater and the tragedy of 9/11, the Coast
Guard and an individual Coast Guard vessel has become more
technologically advanced and that individual cutter has become
more versatile with its ability to manage the Nation's
fisheries, to respond to a drug interdiction or a terrorist
alert, or any one of a number of other things that have
happened?
Admiral Allen. That is absolutely correct, sir. The ability
to sense what is going on, have rapid communications, to
understand and have quicker relationships with the higher
echelon of command not only helps defeat terrorist threats, but
absolutely enhances operations related to migrant smuggling,
fisheries, and counter-drug operations, search and rescue,
environmental protection, all of our missions.
Mr. Gilchrest. You told Mr. Coble that you could respond to
a potential terrorist threat 1,000 miles offshore. First of
all, is that a Coast Guard response, is it coordination with a
Navy ship that might be in the area, helicopters, C-130s? And
the potential to know that that might be a terrorist operation
going on board a vessel that is 1,000 miles offshore, is that
because of better coordination with host countries from where
these ships leave, or industry that puts cargo on these ships,
or the manifests of the captain?
Admiral Allen. It is all of those things, and that is
really what constitute maritime domain awareness. As I said
earlier, it is not just sensors that are fused together to tell
you what is out there, it is taking a look at cargo
information, information on crews, information on the history
of the flag, the owners of the cargo and so forth, in
cooperation with our
Mr. Gilchrest. That is extraordinary. I am just curious how
has that been coordinated, or how are you in the process of
coordinating all of that kind of data and get that cooperation
with the shippers, with the host country? Is that being worked
through the IMO or is it being worked through the State
Department in some other facet?
Admiral Allen. Internationally it is being worked through
IMO. A lot of the protocols and reporting requirements are as a
direct result of our efforts at IMO. A lot of it has to do with
the legislation that was recently passed in the Maritime
Transportation Security Act. A lot of it has to do with our
great partnerships we have inside DHS right now with Customs
and Border Protection that operates a national targeting center
out by Dulles Airport that takes a look at that manifest data
and is able, through pattern analysis, be able to cue us to
certain things. And we have done that.
Mr. Gilchrest. So instead of the Coast Guard being more
focused on terrorism and some of the other roles that the Coast
Guard plays, whether it is search and rescue of fisherman in
the Aleutians or drug detection, which you mentioned, I guess
either in the Caribbean or the Gulf of Mexico, which a number
of years ago you were allowed to actually shoot at those fast
boats, do you feel that the Coast Guard's mission in those
areas has improved as a result of these actions with Deepwater
and the terrorism legislation and things like that, or at least
have not diminished?
Admiral Allen. I believe that the capabilities we are
putting into our assets in a post-9/11 environment through the
Integrated Deepwater System have significantly improved our
ability to react to any mission.
Mr. Gilchrest. And so?
Admiral Allen. Moving beyond that, how you employ those
assets within an area of responsibility, which is the
responsibility of the district commanders and the area
commanders, you have to go through a risk-based decision-making
process--I was the Atlantic area commander on 9/11--and you
have to make those decisions of how to deploy your assets. But
you also have to look at the performance that you are getting
out of your system.
We have been able to dramatically improve our drug seizures
in the last couple of years without a significant amount of
hours put down there because we have better intelligence,
better sensors, better command-and-control capability that
allow us to execute those statements of no objections for
warning shots and disabling fire to take down those go-fast
boats.
Mr. Gilchrest. But you could be hurting if, somewhere along
the line, we don't make up that $400 million deficit.
Admiral Allen. We urge you to support the President's
request, sir.
Mr. Gilchrest. Thank you very much, Admiral.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. LoBiondo. Mr. Reichert.
Mr. Reichert. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Good morning.
Admiral Allen. Morning, sir.
Mr. Reichert. One of the interests I have has always been
in partnership.
Admiral Allen. Yes, sir, it does, on two accounts. Number
one, I think the contract has already demonstrated
extraordinary flexibility and allowed us to generate a program
gap analysis on post-9/11 requirements and then include the
capabilities that we require in a revised mission needs
statement and revised Deepwater plan. Embedded in that plan,
and always has been embedded in that plan, is a series of
technological refreshments when necessary and upgrades of
assets as they end their service life.
Now, the timing of those refreshments and upgrades has
changed as the plan has changed, and we have had to move some
of those assets to the left, if you will, because of the
deterioration of our current assets. But the current contract,
as it stands right now, has flexibility both for requirements
and technological refresh.
And I would ask Mr. Giddens to comment further, if he would
care to.
Mr. Giddens. Yes, sir. Even when we established the first
Deepwater contract, it was at that point a long-term
recapitalization of Coast Guard capabilities and capacities at
that time, even as we were in the source selection, at a 20-
year plus effort. So we knew from the beginning we had to
establish flexibility in the acquisition strategy to
accommodate change. Whether that change was driven by varying
mission demands on the Coast Guard or other external factors,
we established from the beginning a systems approach with the
acquisition strategy to allow that flexibility to respond to
the Nation's and the Coast Guard's needs.
Mr. Reichert. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. LoBiondo. Mr. Fortuno.
Mr. Fortuno. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I just have a couple questions, Admiral. Welcome. Some
questions regarding HH-65 helicopter. I would like you to give
us an update on the re-engining of project for said
helicopters.
Admiral Allen. I am pleased to do that. At this point we
have five helicopters that have been re-engined. We have a
full-up operating air station at Atlantic City, New Jersey. We
have a helicopter for training purposes at Mobile, and we are
in the process of producing helicopters for the roll-out. The
current planned air station to get the next set of helicopters
is Air Station Savannah.
We currently have 13 helicopters that are under upgrades at
our depot level facility in Elizabeth City, North Carolina. We
are also testing a business case to start a second line at a
commercial facility in Columbus, Mississippi, and are doing
analysis on whether or not, based on the cost and the schedule
impacts, whether it would behoove us to open up that second
line. We are on schedule right now to complete the re-engining
by February 2007. And it is the highest priority of the
Commandant right now to complete this re-engining.
Mr. Fortuno. Okay. Are there any other modifications
planned for the HH-65s?
Admiral Allen. In the near-term, our focus has been on
safety and reliability and improving the engine performance. We
have had problems with what they call torque splits, and that
is uneven matching of the engine performance that requires the
pilots actually to simulate the loss of an engine and take
action to preserve the aircraft. We are, through the re-
engining, attempting to improve the safety and reliability.
Under the larger Deepwater solution, there is a plan to
evolve the H-65 into a multi-mission cutter helicopter by
looking at the landing gear, the tail rotor, and some other
equipment on board that will make it more shipboard capable,
more capable of airborne use and vertical insertion. However,
just with the re-engining itself and the safety and reliability
improvements that we gain, plus the increased power, we were
able to use these aircraft before they are converted to multi-
mission cutter helicopters for airborne use, of course.
Mr. Fortuno. Would you say that once the re-engining
program is completed, that the safety issues with the HH-65s
will be pretty much taken care of?
Admiral Allen. They will be, safety and reliability. After
that, then we need to look at how you enhance capability as
that asset is integrated into the Deepwater family of assets.
And the real thrust of both of our helicopter programs, both
the H-60 and H-65, is to make them airborne use of force
capable and capable of vertical insertion. Against that larger
discussion of a system performance, that, combined with the new
cutters and our small boat interceptors, is a potent package
for dealing offshore with threats.
Mr. Fortuno. Thank you, Admiral.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Filner. I think what Mr. Fortuno wanted to know is if a
Congress member would be able to fly in the aircraft when all
this is done.
Admiral Allen. I am aware that due to the flight
restrictions imposed until the re-engining occurs, that we are
restricted from carrying VIPs.
Mr. Filner. Thank you.
Mr. LoBiondo. Mr. Diaz-Balart.
Excuse me, Mr. Taylor, welcome. Are you ready? Do you want
to wait? Okay.
Mr. Diaz-Balart?
Mr. Diaz-Balart. Admiral Allen, we have talked a lot about
the congressional mandate which resulted in the Coast Guard
submitting the Capital Investment Plan that included a complete
funding projection and acquisition schedule beyond the first
five fiscal years. What I am interested in hearing about is,
given the uncertainties in projecting legacy asset sustainment
costs and out-year acquisition costs, do you intend to
reallocate the program's long-term cost projections each year?
Admiral Allen. That is the basic business model that was
established within the four plans. What it calls for, as you
may be aware of, is a certain amount of money that would be
dedicated to new assets and then a secondary amount of money
that would be available for legacy asset sustainment and
upgrades. The difference in the two plans is one focuses on
locking in the funding level for the new assets; the second one
assumes that within an investment level there would be legacy
asset sustainment, the difference being that in the first one
you would make year-to-year decisions based on other funding
priorities about how much money could be allocated into legacy
asset sustainment. That is the difference in the two plans,
sir.
Mr. Diaz-Balart. Also, when will decisions be made about
which of the four options the service intends to follow? And
unless my guess is wrong, you are going to be getting this
question tomorrow, too.
Admiral Allen. Yes, sir. Well, quite frankly, the Coast
Guard, in order to do its mission, would like the maximum
capability and the maximum forestructure we can buy. What you
have is a high level plan that is focused on $24 billion in 25
years and then graduated steps down from that, which would be
coping mechanisms to deal with unknown out-year funding
streams. I am sure the Commandant would like to be at the
higher end of that, at the 24/25 level. As you back off from
that, then you have to make risk-based decisions regarding the
assets themselves, the condition of the assets, the performance
of the new assets you are bringing online.
As we bring the NSC on board or the FRC or the OPC, I think
we need to, through operational tests and evaluate, assess
their impact on performance. We may be able to achieve some
forestructure reductions if these units are that capable in
covering certain parts of the ocean, as we discussed earlier,
but that is going to have to play out. We have established an
envelope that would give us what we need, and we are going to
try to drive the capability we need. But a lot of those
decisions will be taken year-to-year on what is available
against other priorities, sir.
Mr. Diaz-Balart. Are you going to be able to take the
decisions year-to-year indefinitely? I mean, at some point
don't you have to come down on a particular plan?
Admiral Allen. Well, sir, if you noticed, after a five-year
period, after around 2011, to get the programs funded within
the required time frames, there is more money put on legacy
assets, depending on which plan you look at, or new production.
Again, the focus right now is on system performance and seeing
how these assets, once they are brought online, contribute to
the overall performance as one asset to the system and better
inform what the ultimate fleet size needs to be. We also need
to take into account total ownership cost; not only the
acquisition cost, but the increased cost of operating these
vessels, and that will also come into play, sir.
Mr. LoBiondo. Mr. Taylor, are you prepared to start at this
point?
Mr. Taylor. Admiral, I am curious. Being from the area
where a lot of the ships are going to be built, I was
obviously, as were a lot of my constituents, a bit disappointed
when I believe Chairman Rogers had some questions that he felt
were unanswered and therefore was holding up a good portion of
the funding. My question is what were the questions that he had
of you, and do you feel like they have been sufficiently
answered?
Admiral Allen. Well, I think the questions had to do with
details on the asset delivery schedule and the cost per year.
We believe we provided all of that. There are some issues that
they have been interested in. One of them is regarding the
truncation of the 123 conversion program, where the future is a
fixed-wing aircraft. We provided issue papers to them in
briefings to their staffs. We think we have been responsive to
that, and we look forward to collaborating in achieving the
President's budget.
Mr. Taylor. I am curious. I also, with several of my
colleagues, get to serve on the Armed Services Committee, and I
really have noticed a difference. The Navy almost always has a
major program in play and, therefore, you have an institutional
history of young guys starting off lieutenants working big
programs, working their way up to admiral and are in pretty
good position to justify by the time that comes.
It struck me that the Coast Guard has not had a major
acquisition program, other than a few icebreakers, since the
late 1960s, early 1970s, when the 378s were built. I am just
curious, did the Coast Guard find themselves at a disadvantage
not having any institutional memory as to how do you go make a
pitch for that money?
Admiral Allen. I think we do have institutional memory and
have had shipbuilding programs, albeit not on the scale of
Deepwater nor the complexity of Deepwater. I think it is safe
to say
Mr. Taylor. Certainly not of this scale, right.
Admiral Allen. I think it is safe to say this is a
precedent-setting acquisition for the Coast Guard, and maybe
for the Country. But the people that are populating our program
offices and working on these things do have a history of
working in programs of acquisition. I have myself. The real
paradigm shift
Mr. Taylor. Where were you in 1968, Admiral?
Admiral Allen. Where was I in 1968?
Mr. Taylor. Yes.
Admiral Allen. I was in the U.S. Coast Guard Academy.
Mr. Taylor. All right.
Admiral Allen. But following the production of the 378s, we
built our 270-foot medium endurance class, we have had two very
successful procurements of large and medium buoy tender
projects, we had a very successful program on our 47-foot motor
lifeboats barrier launch on responsible medium. So there is
continuity of experience and corporate knowledge in the Coast
Guard regarding project management and acquisition.
But as I said, I think anybody probably grant you that the
Deepwater program, in its complexity and scope, is something
that is unprecedented, but we are bringing the best and
brightest to bear on it that we have.
Mr. Taylor. I hate to throw a monkey wrench into this mix,
because I have seen, unfortunately, over at Armed Services, how
the Navy, by changing the game plan and moving the goal post on
the DDXs I think put that program in jeopardy. But I am
curious, and I have got to ask as a citizen and a taxpayer,
given the huge price and increase in the price of fuel since
this program started,--I know you have worked towards
minimizing maintenance, I know you have worked towards
minimizing crew size--to what extent has fuel efficiency been a
factor in this next generation of cutters?
Admiral Allen. Well, we are always looking for a best
value, especially in the density of the propulsion plants that
we are buying. I think that is of a technical nature. I am
going to throw it over to Greg Giddens, the program officer,
and let him take a stab at it.
Mr. Giddens. Good morning, sir. From all classes of cutters
that has been a factor in the design, from combining up a gas
turbine with diesels, the number of diesels that is needed to
meet the maximum speed, and then our ability to operate more
efficiently on one or two of those diesels. It is also a
factor, as I suggested, their competitive process determines
propulsion in power systems. They look for power density
against the weight to try to make sure we get the most
efficient engines that we can for their volume, as well as
their efficiency in terms of input-output, fuel intake versus
power output.
Admiral Allen. If I could add one comment, you almost have
to have a bias towards fuel efficiency for the national
security code and the OPC, which have a range of 12,000 and
9,000 miles, respectively.
Mr. Taylor. On your smaller vessels, I noticed just a few
years back, when the price of gasoline was fairly inexpensive,
there was a move on a lot of your smaller vessels away from
diesels and back towards outboards. How is that affecting your
operations? Do you find yourself having to cut back on
operating hours because of the shift? At the time I pointed out
to some people I thought it was kind of shortsighted.
Admiral Allen. Well, any reduction in operations we have in
the past weren't necessarily related to fuel cost, they were
related to larger budgetary issues and stressers on the Coast
Guard's operating base. In regards to small boat and cutter
operations, though, we have tried to rationalize those systems
over the years where, for instance, the boats that are
operating off of cutters, trying to migrate them where they are
using the same type of fuel the cutter does, rather than having
to carry gasoline.
But on the shore side, based on the requirements, they tend
to be gasoline-driven engines, so it kind of falls into two
camps, what you are trying to support from a cutter and what
you are trying to support from a shore station. And we have
tried to make those as consistent across those two separate
worlds of work as we can.
Mr. Taylor. What has it done to your operating cost as a
rule from your shore stations? Have you seen a doubling in your
fuel bills? And how do you respond to that?
Admiral Allen. Separate from the subject of the hearing at
hand today, there are extraordinary fuel costs that we are
dealing with this year. We have, in the operating side of the
budget, taken a look at how we can mitigate and mediate the
impact of those. We have got some extra resources through
supplemental funding and so forth. But we do have this year,
and are likely to have next year, a shortfall in energy funding
in the Coast Guard, and it is one of those issues where you
have to manage your base.
Mr. Taylor. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. LoBiondo. Admiral Allen, I want to talk a little bit
about the 110s.
Admiral Allen. Yes, sir.
Mr. LoBiondo. I think almost by anyone's standards they
have experienced unexpected levels of problems. In the schedule
for what we are proposing for Deepwater and where these 110s
come in, sort of at the end, I don't understand how we are
going to sustain the 110s and what the plan is by the Coast
Guard as we continue to experience higher failure rates.
Admiral Allen. Yes, sir. I would say following the H-65
challenge, which is our number one pressing safety and
reliability problem, I think following right behind that would
be the 110 issue, 123 conversion. Under the original Deepwater
plan, we had scheduled to an extension of the 110s to 123s as a
bridging strategy, not for a new asset.
This gets back to the constrained funding level, how you
have to operate in a portfolio over a number of years. It was
anticipated that we would go to the fast response cutter around
2018, and as a result of the experience we have had with the
110 to 123 conversions, we are attempting to accelerated the
FRC 10 years and bring that online by 2008, subject to
successful competition in the budget this year and follow on
years. What we try to do is remove the bridging requirement,
where we are having problems with the converted 123s both
structurally.
And they were only intended to replace 1998 type capability
in terms of their sensors, communications, and so forth, so
that ability to exert command-and-control have a common
operating picture and utilize Cypronet chat rooms is something
we will get in the FRC but is not present in a post-9/11 123.
So there are two things: one is sustainability of the hull
itself, the ability of those hulls to operate, but the second
one is the capability we put into them as a bridging strategy
doesn't reflect the true requirements we are going to need in a
post-9/11 environment, sir.
Therefore, the reason the FRC needs to move to the left and
probably--if you look at the priority of any shortfall that
exists in the $966 right now, it is to be able to complete the
design and build the first FRC, sir.
Mr. LoBiondo. Let me switch for a minute to the HC-130Js.
Admiral Allen. Yes, sir.
Mr. LoBiondo. Can you tell us a little bit about where we
stand with this? What is the cost of missionizing these? What
can they do without the upgrades? Where do we stand with this
whole situation?
Admiral Allen. Happy to do that, sir. We currently have six
C-130Js. They are operating out of an aviation program office
in Elizabeth City in North Carolina. That is not the permanent
home base, that is where we brought them on board and got them
operational. An APO is usually used to transition to the
permanent air station where they are going. Since we have got
the C-130, several things have happened.
First of all, we were appropriated $120 million to
missionize them and make them capable for Coast Guard use. We
had an unsuccessful first try with Lockheed Aero, where the
price to integrate the missionization of those aircraft into
the airframe was deemed too high by the Coast Guard. We have
gone back and asked ICGS for a more simpler solution and have
them basically giving us an estimate to cost at $120 million to
missionize those six aircraft.
What has been challenging for those aircraft is that we
have six and they are unique. They look like a C-130 on the
outside, but on the inside it is a totally different aircraft
in terms of the avionics and the computer systems that are in
there. They are not like the rest of our C-130s. And prior to
recent events, we were looking at whether or not C-130Js were
something that should remain in the Coast Guard inventory of
assets.
A couple of things have affected that. Number one, as you
may be aware of, the entire C-130 fleet around the world has
been impacted by the discovery of cracking in the wing boxes
that are producing problems and potential structural failures
in C-130s. We are in the process right now of waiting for a
service bulletin from Lockheed Martin that will allow us to
inspect these aircraft and find out whether or not we have true
problems. We have two types of C-130Hs, separated from the Js.
We have 1500 series. There are five of those, which are much
older than the 1700 series. These need to be inspected and we
need to ascertain the condition of the wing boxes before we
make a decision.
So what we are playing off is the six C-130s that are
unique, the need to missionize those, and then how they play
against the remaining C-130s we have in the overall fixed-wing
fleet and where we want to be at an end state for Deepwater.
The variable right now that we are waiting for is the Lockheed
Martin technical bulletin to allow us to assess the conditions
of those airframes. Then, after that, we are going to have some
decisions to make inside the Coast Guard about the disposition
of the C-130s and the overall makeup of the C-130 fleet that we
finally want in the Deepwater asset mix.
Mr. LoBiondo. What do you use them for now?
Admiral Allen. Right now, pending missionization, they are
used for logistics flight. And that does relieve the
requirement from other aircraft so they can be used for
maritime surveillance and other missions. So they are being
used and they are adding value to the Coast Guard right now.
They could add more value with proper radar workstations that
would allow them to be maritime patrol aircraft to help us go
out there and detect go-fast boats and so forth.
Mr. LoBiondo. Do you have any idea when you might hear back
from Lockheed what the time frame is to determine if they are
going to be able to do the upgrades with the resources that are
available?
Admiral Allen. Integrated Coast Guard Systems presented us
a proposal yesterday, and we are reviewing that and the price
attached to it now, and I can tell you right now it is the
Commandant's desire to make a decision as fast as we can on
that, sir. And as soon as there is anything available on that,
we will pass it on to you, sir.
Mr. LoBiondo. Thank you.
Mr. Filner?
Mr. Filner. Just one additional question, if I might. I
talked sort of in an abstract way and you answered abstract.
Let me just bring it down to the Port of San Diego, which I
represent.
Admiral Allen. Yes, sir.
Mr. Filner. There may be in the port at any one time two or
three cruise ships, two or three nuclear carriers, dozens of
destroyers and other craft. And in joint operations meetings
that I have been at, people say that the biggest terrorist
threat to that mixture there is as simple as a high speed
recreational vessel loaded with high explosives, like we saw in
the Kohl, for example. So what does Deepwater do to stop that
threat to the coastal ports that many of us represent here?
Admiral Allen. Well, I would give you a couple of
scenarios, sir. Based on the current Coast Guard planning for
securing this Country, we have different maritime security
levels we employ, and they are called MarSec I, MarSec II, and
MarSec III. We are continually at MarSec I right now, which
would roughly correspond to the yellow status of the threat in
the Country right now.
As those threat levels go up, we take more protective
action in our ports and harbors, up to and including bringing
large cutters close in to increase command-and-control,
maritime awareness, and our response capability. So at higher
threat levels, Deepwater assets can be employed in and around
ports and harbors to increase the layered protection there,
increase maritime domain awareness, and create a response
capability.
I can tell you, as the Atlantic commander on 9/11, I
immediately diverted larger cutters and actually put them into
ports just to make sure that we didn't have a problem that we
didn't know about. For instance, within five miles of New York
Harbor, I had three medium endurance cutters clear up to the
Statue or Liberty with their guns uncovered. You hope you never
have to do that again, but we have the capability to move these
assets around because they are floating command-and-control,
maritime domain awareness platforms.
Now, having said that, in the normal everyday life in the
Port of San Diego, we won't have a cutter sitting in the port,
because the threat level won't be that high. The answer there
then moves away from Deepwater and focuses on maritime domain
awareness, the standup of the new Coast Guard sector commands.
And I might add, the benchmark, the gold standard for
operations in a port is joint harbor operation center in San
Diego, where we have co-located with the Port Authority, the
Navy, and our terrorism force protection folks and the Border
Patrol to increase surveillance, including the radar out of
Point Loma importing that back, sir.
Mr. Filner. Thank you. I am still worried about that small
vehicle.
Admiral Allen. As are we, sir.
Mr. Filner. Thanks.
Mr. LoBiondo. Admiral Allen, on the 110s, since we are not
going to be pursuing the 110s to the 123s, House appropriators
have $89 or $90 million to be used for either vessel
acquisition or 110 sustainment. Which of these options do you
intend to pursue?
Admiral Allen. Sir, it is our desire to take any unused
money--and we don't know what the excess costs are regarding
the 123 conversions. There is $30 million for that particular
purpose in the budget right now. We know there are probably
going to be some excess costs associated with that, request for
equitable adjustment and so forth. But our desired position
would be to take all of the available money regarding patrol
boats and put it into the design and construction of the first
fast response cutter, number one priority of the Commandant,
sir.
Mr. LoBiondo. Different topic. On the fuel, does the Coast
Guard buy fuel on its own or in conjunction with the Navy for
economies of scale, or how does that work?
Admiral Allen. Works a couple of ways. Mostly, for the
large cutters, work off the Defense fuel contracts that we are
part of every year; down at the local levels we may have
contracts with local marinas. I could give you a more in depth
answer about how we do it, but it probably varies by region.
But for the very large cutters we work off the annual Defense
fuel contracts.
Mr. LoBiondo. Okay.
Mr. Taylor? Mr. Reichert?
Mr. Reichert. I have one more question. Approximately
Admiral Allen. Sir, I believe the question was how much
funding has the Coast Guard obligated against the $2 billion to
date, sir.
Mr. Reichert. Yes.
Admiral Allen. The answer is we obligated about 95 percent
of that. And as we sit here this morning, the unobligated
balance is about $105 million. That is broken down in the
following three elements: we are reserving $61 million for the
changes on the national security cutter that I mentioned
earlier that have to do with the construction of the skiff on
board it and the increases due to chemical, nuclear, and
biological detection capability; there is another $30 million
that is in reserve right now that I just spoke to Chairman
LoBiondo about that was reserved for the 123 conversions that
we would like to see applied to the fast response cutter; and,
finally, there is $14 million identified to be used on a covert
aircraft.
We are in the process of developing an operational
requirements document right now and we intend to execute the
solicitation for that test aircraft through the U.S. Air Force
Big Safari program, and we are working to best speed on that.
Again, the total is about $105 million.
Mr. Reichert. Thank you.
Mr. LoBiondo. Mr. Filner?
Admiral Allen, Mr. Hoekstra talked about this a little bit,
and that was in reference to the unfortunate scenario that we
proceed with the $500 million number, and not are able to raise
that, we know that it is devastating to the program, but can
you give us some details in terms of time delays? Does this
push us to a 40-year program if that were to be pushed out? Can
you give us some sense? You know, you talked about some of the
decisions in actual asset acquisition and upgrade, but I am
more interested in time line references from you, if you can.
Admiral Allen. Well, I will make a general comment and then
I will ask Greg Giddens to comment. One would find it hard to
imagine that you could build any more than one type of cutter
per year, if that, under this funding scenario, especially
given some of the legacy asset issues that we are dealing with.
I think almost everything would push to the right. We have a
national security cutter that is already under construction. We
are in the process of designing, but have not started, on the
OPC or the FRC.
So those would be very difficult decisions that would have
to be made and most likely would move them to the right. Then
what you get is it moves beyond a death spiral, where you are
trying to maintain legacy assets without the new ones there.
You probably are going to start seeing obsolescence and vessels
taken out of service with any capability replacement and a
complete performance gap while you work your way through it.
We would be glad to give you some scenarios for the record
and talk to the staff, but it would be significant, sir.
Greg, do you want to comment?
Mr. Giddens. Just to add, indeed, it would be significant.
It would push development efforts out to a year or two. If it
reset the baseline for Deepwater funding, it would put us at a
level that was a pre-9/11 level and create definite performance
gaps and capacity gaps. As Admiral Allen indicated, we would
likely have to decommission some of our assets.
Admiral Allen. It would probably question the viability of
the current contracting vehicle.
Mr. LoBiondo. Thank you.
Mr. Taylor? Mr. Filner? Mr. Reichert? No?
Well, Admiral, thank you very much. Good luck tomorrow.
That is an important one.
Okay, meeting is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:03 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]