[House Hearing, 109 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
THE FUTURE OF NASA
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
JUNE 28, 2005
__________
Serial No. 109-19
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Science
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.house.gov/science
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______
COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE
HON. SHERWOOD L. BOEHLERT, New York, Chairman
RALPH M. HALL, Texas BART GORDON, Tennessee
LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas JERRY F. COSTELLO, Illinois
CURT WELDON, Pennsylvania EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas
DANA ROHRABACHER, California LYNN C. WOOLSEY, California
KEN CALVERT, California DARLENE HOOLEY, Oregon
ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland MARK UDALL, Colorado
VERNON J. EHLERS, Michigan DAVID WU, Oregon
GIL GUTKNECHT, Minnesota MICHAEL M. HONDA, California
FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma BRAD MILLER, North Carolina
JUDY BIGGERT, Illinois LINCOLN DAVIS, Tennessee
WAYNE T. GILCHREST, Maryland RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri
W. TODD AKIN, Missouri DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois
TIMOTHY V. JOHNSON, Illinois SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas
J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia BRAD SHERMAN, California
JO BONNER, Alabama BRIAN BAIRD, Washington
TOM FEENEY, Florida JIM MATHESON, Utah
BOB INGLIS, South Carolina JIM COSTA, California
DAVE G. REICHERT, Washington AL GREEN, Texas
MICHAEL E. SODREL, Indiana CHARLIE MELANCON, Louisiana
JOHN J.H. ``JOE'' SCHWARZ, Michigan DENNIS MOORE, Kansas
MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas
VACANCY
VACANCY
C O N T E N T S
June 28, 2005
Page
Witness List..................................................... 2
Hearing Charter.................................................. 3
Opening Statements
Statement by Representative Sherwood L. Boehlert, Chairman,
Committee on Science, U.S. House of Representatives............ 9
Written Statement............................................ 10
Statement by Representative Bart Gordon, Ranking Minority Member,
Committee on Science, U.S. House of Representatives............ 10
Written Statement............................................ 14
Statement of Representative Ken Calvert, Chairman, Subcommittee
on Space and Aeronautics, Committee on Science, U.S. House of
Representatives................................................ 15
Written Statement............................................ 16
Statement of Representative Mark Udall, Ranking Member,
Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics, Committee on Science,
U.S. House of Representatives.................................. 17
Written Statement............................................ 17
Prepared Statement of Representative Ralph M. Hall, Member,
Committee on Science, U.S. House of Representatives............ 18
Prepared Statement of Representative Curt Weldon, Member,
Committee on Science, U.S. House of Representatives............ 19
Prepared Statement of Representative Jerry F. Costello, Member,
Committee on Science, U.S. House of Representatives............ 20
Prepared Statement of Representative Russ Carnahan, Member,
Committee on Science, U.S. House of Representatives............ 20
Prepared Statement by Representative Sheila Jackson Lee, Member,
Committee on Science, U.S. House of Representatives............ 20
Prepared Statement by Representative Al Green, Member, Committee
on Science, U.S. House of Representatives...................... 22
Witness:
The Honorable Michael D. Griffin, Administrator, National
Aeronautics and Space Administration
Oral Statement............................................... 23
Written Statement............................................ 24
Discussion
Timetable for Information...................................... 34
Budget Firewalls............................................... 36
Returning to Flight............................................ 39
The Centrifuge................................................. 39
Financial Management........................................... 39
Aeronautics.................................................... 40
Hubble Space Telescope......................................... 41
The Iran Nonproliferation Act.................................. 42
Center Workforce............................................... 46
FFRDC.......................................................... 48
Safety and Risk................................................ 48
Voyager and CEV................................................ 49
Life Science Research.......................................... 50
Space Grant Programs........................................... 50
Lessons Learned From the International Space Station........... 56
Workforce...................................................... 57
Manned Space Flight vs. Unmanned Space Flight.................. 58
Debris Hazards................................................. 60
The Value of Humans on the Moon................................ 60
Strategic Decision-making...................................... 60
The Role of HBCs............................................... 60
Launch Vehicle Determination................................... 61
U.S. Preeminence in Space...................................... 63
Appendix 1: Answers to Post-Hearing Questions
The Honorable Michael D. Griffin, Administrator, National
Aeronautics and Space Administration........................... 66
Appendix 2: Additional Material for the Record
Review of President's FY 2006 Budget, Statement by Michael D.
Griffin, NASA Administrator.................................... 78
THE FUTURE OF NASA
----------
TUESDAY, JUNE 28, 2005
House of Representatives,
Committee on Science,
Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:05 a.m., in Room
2318 of the Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Sherwood L.
Boehlert [Chairman of the Committee] presiding.
hearing charter
COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
The Future of NASA
tuesday, june 28, 2005
10:00 a.m.-12:00 p.m.
2318 rayburn house office building
Purpose:
On Tuesday, June 28, 2005 at 10:00 a.m., the Committee on Science
will hold a hearing on the future of the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA). NASA Administrator Michael D. Griffin will be
the sole witness. The hearing will examine Administrator Griffin's
guiding philosophy and plans for NASA's programs in human space flight,
space science, Earth science, and aeronautics, as well as plans for the
Agency's workforce, organization, and infrastructure. The hearing will
set the stage for the Committee's action the following day on the NASA
authorization bill.
Overarching Questions:
1. What are Administrator Griffin's priorities and how does he
plan to maintain a balanced portfolio of science, aeronautics,
and exploration programs?
2. What is the status of NASA's plans to define the final
configuration of and research agenda for the International
Space Station? What is the status of NASA's plans for returning
the Space Shuttle to flight and for retiring it at the end of
the decade?
3. What is the status of NASA's plans to define the Vision for
Space Exploration, including accelerating the Crew Exploration
Vehicle and selecting launch vehicles?
4. How does Administrator Griffin intend to ensure the Agency
has the appropriate size and skill mix in its workforce, as
well as the facilities and infrastructure necessary to support
the Agency's goals?
Overview:
Dr. Michael D. Griffin was sworn in as NASA's 11th Administrator on
April 14th. Administrator Griffin takes the reins of the Agency at a
crucial time, when NASA faces significant issues in nearly every facet
of the Agency's operations. Since taking office, Administrator Griffin
has moved swiftly to begin tackling critical issues in many key areas.
He has been personally involved in reviewing plans for returning the
Shuttle to flight later this year. He has directed a team to undertake
a study, to be completed in July, to define the final configuration of
the Space Station, its research agenda, and to develop plans to
continue Space Station following the retirement of the Shuttle, which
he has stated will be in 2010. He has directed another team to
undertake a study, to be completed in July as well, to better define
plans for NASA's exploration program, including accelerating the Crew
Exploration Vehicle (CEV) to minimize the gap after the Shuttle is
retired in 2010 and defining the launch vehicle options for missions
back to the Moon. Griffin has also made several significant
organizational and personnel changes, including removing many key
managers at headquarters and realigning the reporting structure for
NASA's field centers so they report directly to him.
Looking forward, Administrator Griffin will have many critical
decisions to make over the next year. He will need to install a new
management team to replace those leaving their posts, and key decisions
will be made as to what the focus and responsibilities of the various
field centers will be and what facilities at those field centers are
necessary to implement the Agency's goals. So far, Griffin has
indicated a strong preference for giving the field centers more
responsibility to manage programs and rebuild the expertise resident
within the government.
Over the next year, Administrator Griffin will have many
programmatic and technical issues to address. He will have to decide,
once the Shuttle has flown a couple of times, whether the Agency should
move forward with a Hubble servicing mission. Griffin will have to
decide whether to recommend a Shuttle-derived launch vehicle or use
existing rockets for heavy lift missions to the Moon, a recommendation
to be made jointly by the Administrator and the Secretary of Defense.
He will also have to decide how to pay for increased costs on several
programs, such as the recent cost increase on the Webb telescope, while
maintaining a balanced portfolio of exploration, science, and
aeronautics programs.
On the policy side, NASA and the Administration are still working
out proposed legislative changes to the Iran Nonproliferation Act
(INA), which currently prohibits the U.S. from purchasing or bartering
for Soyuz capsules and Progress vehicles for the Space Station. Without
a legislative proposal, it's difficult to know whether Congress would
approve the change in law, but if the current law is not amended, the
U.S. would not be able to have a permanent presence on the Space
Station, at least not until the CEV was available. NASA is reportedly
developing plans on how they would proceed with the station if the law
is not changed, should that situation arise.
Issues:
Shuttle Return-to-Flight
Administrator Griffin's first priority has been to review NASA's
progress in preparing the Space Shuttle for return-to-flight. He has
personally participated in several technical reviews in preparation for
the launch. Shortly after becoming Administrator, he postponed a
planned Shuttle launch in May because of technical concerns with the
Shuttle's External Tank and to provide additional time to complete some
of the analysis. The launch is now scheduled for July 13th.
The Stafford-Covey Return-to-Flight Task Group, created to oversee
NASA's implementation of the Columbia Accident Investigation Board's
(CAIB) return-to-flight recommendations, has approved all but three of
the CAIB's 15 return-to-flight recommendations. The three remaining
items relate to developing an adequate tile repair capability,
completing an analysis of potential sources of debris that could harm
the Shuttle, and hardening the Shuttle against potential debris damage.
The Stafford-Covey panel is scheduled to hold its final meeting on
Monday, June 27th and will then provide NASA with its final results and
recommendations.
Griffin will ultimately make the final decision on whether the
Shuttle is ready to launch. The launch window extends from July 13th
through to July 31st. The next launch window occurs in September.
Planning for Human Space Flight: Shuttle Transition and CEV
Acceleration
Administrator Griffin has indicated that he will take a different
approach in developing the missions to return astronauts to the Moon.
He has created a new Office of Program Analysis and Evaluation (PA&E)
and charged it with developing two critical plans for NASA's human
space flight programs: one to examine options for how to configure the
Space Station to conduct the research NASA must do to enable human
exploration in deeper space, to minimize the number of Shuttle flights
necessary to finish putting the station together, and to ensure the
Shuttle can retire by the end of 2010.
The second planning effort involves developing the strategy for how
to return astronauts to the Moon and possibly to Mars, including how to
accelerate the development of the Crew Exploration Vehicle to minimize
the gap between the retirement of the Shuttle and the first flight of
the CEV, when the U.S. will not have its own capability of putting an
astronaut into space. Both studies will be completed this summer in
time to aid key Agency and Congressional decisions.
Administrator Griffin has set a goal to accelerate the Crew
Exploration Vehicle (CEV) so it is ready as close to 2010 as possible
to minimize any gap. Griffin has also directed that the CEV be designed
to fly to the Space Station, a requirement that had not been set
previously. NASA recently awarded contracts to two industry teams to
begin preliminary design work for the CEV. Later this year, NASA is
expected to release updated specifications and plans for accelerating
the CEV. A key decision will be the selection of the launch vehicle for
the CEV program.
Webb Telescope Cost Increase
Recently NASA announced that the cost of the James Webb Space
Telescope, one of NASA's highest priority space science programs, was
expected to increase by approximately $1 billion to a total of $4.5
billion. Under current plans, the mission is scheduled to be launched
in 2011. NASA has convened a science panel and an engineering panel to
review the mission, focusing on options to control costs and perhaps
scale back the program. The panels' reports and recommendations are due
to be completed later this summer. Any increases in cost will likely
have to be borne by the science program. Both NASA and the scientific
community will face tough choices as the options for dealing with Webb
telescope become clear and a decision on whether NASA should conduct a
Hubble servicing mission nears.
Workforce and Institutional Issues
The reduction in aeronautics funding proposed in the fiscal year
2006 budget request would require the elimination of 1,100 civil
service jobs at NASA centers, although NASA has also said that there
will not be any layoffs in 2006. In addition, NASA officials insist
that there are no plans to close any NASA centers. Also, the retirement
of the Space Shuttle in 2010 will require NASA to address the size and
skill mix of a significant segment of the workforce at some centers.
Work on the CEV and other elements of the mission to the Moon will
significantly help offset the loss of Shuttle work, but some jobs and
skills may still need to be eliminated. NASA may be able to help
affected employees take advantage of training, retraining, and job
placement programs to help the transition.
How to ``right size'' NASA, its facilities, and its workforce, and
ensure NASA has the necessary skill mix, are among the issues Griffin
and Congress will have to face.
Iran Nonproliferation Act Limits Use of the Space Station
NASA faces a legal hurdle, the Iran Nonproliferation Act (INA),
that could affect utilization of the Space Station after April 2006.
The U.S. is totally dependent on Russian Soyuz capsules for crew
rescue, and without access to Soyuz capsules, Americans will not be
able to stay on Space Station for long duration missions. U.S.
astronauts will still be able to visit the Space Station using the
Shuttle and will be able to continue construction of the station, but
the Shuttle is not capable of remaining docked to the Space Station
long enough to provide a crew rescue capability. NASA policy prevents
astronauts from being aboard the Space Station if there is no rescue
capability. Russia is currently providing capsules under an agreement
that was grandfathered into the INA. However, Russia fulfills its
obligation under that agreement in April 2006 and will no longer
provide capsules or other services without payment.
The INA prohibits the U.S. from purchasing or bartering for
services from Russia in connection with the International Space Station
unless the President certifies that the Russians are not proliferating
nuclear or certain missile technologies to Iran--a certification the
President is highly unlikely to make. NASA has no known alternative
plans for providing a crew rescue capability beyond buying such
services from the Russians, until the CEV is available.
The matter is currently the subject of an interagency review, and
the Administration is expected to send up a legislative proposal to
amend the INA as early as next month. However, it is unclear how
Congress would react to such a proposal with Iran being such a focus of
attention in foreign policy. The International Relations Committee
shares jurisdiction with the Science Committee over the INA, so any
legislative effort would involve both committees. If Congress fails to
amend the INA, the U.S. would not be able to use the Soyuz as a rescue
vehicle or to use Russian Soyuz and Progress vehicles to ferry
astronauts and cargo, respectively, to and from the Space Station. NASA
has begun the process of developing contingency plans for the Space
Station in the event that an exception in INA is not made for whatever
reason. Without access to Soyuz, U.S. astronauts could be there as long
as the Shuttle is docked, and thus could continue to utilize the
station as long as the Shuttle is flying, but only on short-term
visits. After the Shuttle is retired they would not be able to be there
at all until the Crew Exploration Vehicle is available.
The Future of the Hubble Space Telescope
Two days after the President's speech announcing the Vision for
Space Exploration in January of 2004, NASA announced that it would not
use the Shuttle to conduct further servicing missions to the Hubble
Space Telescope. Then-Administrator Sean O'Keefe cited Shuttle safety
concerns as the primary reason for his decision. Widespread criticism
led NASA to explore the possibility of a robotic servicing mission. A
December 2004 report from the National Research Council, however,
concluded that a robotic servicing mission was not likely to succeed in
the time available. In the fiscal year 2006 request, NASA requested
funds only for a de-orbit mission (to ensure that Hubble re-enters from
orbit without posing danger to populated areas).
During his April 2005 confirmation hearing, however, Administrator
Griffin pledged to revisit the decision after the Shuttle returns to
flight and its risks are better understood following the post-Columbia
modifications. He also directed NASA engineers to resume planning for a
Shuttle servicing mission so they could move forward expeditiously if
needed. Work on more advanced space telescopes, such as the Space
Interferometry Mission and the Terrestrial Planet Finder, is being
deferred in order to preserve the option to service Hubble and provide
for its safe de-orbit.
Aeronautics Research, Wind Tunnels and Workforce
Over the last decade, funding for NASA's aeronautics budget has
declined by more than 50 percent, to about $900 million. For fiscal
year 2006, NASA proposes a relatively small decrease ($54 million, or
about six percent) in aeronautics research and development compared to
2005. The proposed five-year budget projection for aeronautics
contemplates substantial funding reductions (20 percent) for
aeronautics research, together with significant cutbacks in its civil
service and contractor workforces. Civil service personnel and
infrastructure costs account for much of the aeronautics budget,
largely because of the expenses involved in the operation and
maintenance of NASA's 31 wind tunnels. Specifically, the aeronautics
program receives only six percent of NASA's total budget, yet it
employs more than 20 percent of the entire NASA workforce and is
responsible for 40 percent of all of NASA's infrastructure costs.
NASA commissioned a study last year from RAND, which concluded that
NASA should continue to operate 29 of its 31 wind tunnels. RAND
estimated the annual operating cost of all 31 tunnels to be $125-$130
million. RAND argued that while some of the tunnels were not well used
now, they offered capabilities that could be needed in the future and
that would be hard to replicate if the tunnels were shut down. RAND
also argued that while some questions that once needed to be solved
with wind tunnels could now be answered through computer simulation,
many critical questions still required wind tunnels. It also said that
wind tunnel data were sometimes needed to develop computer simulation
software.
The Committee held a hearing on aeronautics earlier this year and
the House appropriations bill restores the cuts to the fiscal year 2006
budget. In addition, the appropriations bill includes a legislative
provision directing the Administration to develop a national
aeronautics policy to guide NASA's aeronautics research program.
Balancing Science and Exploration
The President's Vision for Space Exploration provides the human
space flight program with a clear set of goals to guide its programs.
Many applaud the Administration for providing clear direction for the
human space flight program, but it has also made others nervous,
particularly in the science community, that the Vision will require a
disproportionate amount of NASA's funding and that valuable science
programs will suffer.
In the past, Congress has a played an important role in ensuring
that a balance exists between science and human space activities.
However last year, because of the uncertainty surrounding the
implementation of the Vision and the unknown costs of the return-to-
flight costs for the Shuttle, Congress provided an unprecedented level
of authority to transfer funding between appropriations accounts. The
effect of this authority was to remove the ``wall'' between science and
human space activities.
Administrator Griffin has stated that the Vision is not intended to
undermine other core functions of the Agency, such as aeronautics,
space science, and Earth science, but it is not yet clear how NASA will
maintain a balance between science and human space activities within
its projected budget.
Organizational and Personnel Changes
Administrator Griffin has moved quickly in making key personnel and
organizational changes. First, he announced that the directors for each
of NASA's field centers would report directly to him, instead of
through the Associate Administrators. Next, he informed three of the
four Associate Administrators (human space flight, science, and
exploration) of his intent to reassign them to other positions within
the Agency. The fourth Associate Administrator (for aeronautics) has
decided to step down. Additional personnel changes are expected over
the next several months as Griffin begins to install his own management
team. An important issue is how quickly he will be able to fill key
slots to completely staff his management team.
FY 2005 Operating Plan Update
On May 11, Administrator Griffin submitted an updated Operating
Plan for fiscal year 2005. The plan provides the first complete picture
of how NASA is prioritizing its funding for 2005. The plan fully funds
the $762 million increase above the appropriated amount for 2005 for
returning the Shuttle to flight and provides the full $291 million
appropriated to begin planning for a Hubble servicing mission, as well
as re-programs over $500 million in cost increases for several
programs, most notably to cover costs for the Mars Reconnaissance
Orbiter, scheduled for launch this August, and the New Horizons mission
to Pluto set to launch in January 2006. The plan also fully funds
Congressionally-directed items, as adjusted for the rescission.
Administrator Griffin has said that his overarching philosophy in
finding offsets is to eliminate lower-priority programs rather than
reducing all programs in the face of budget difficulties. To do so, he
must set clear priorities within the budget that has been allocated. To
pay for the increases included the Operating Plan NASA is considering a
two-year delay in the Mars Science Laboratory to 2011. To pay for the
2005 costs to prepare for a possible Hubble servicing mission, NASA
will defer work on several advanced space telescopes, such as the Space
Interferometry Mission (SIM) and the Terrestrial Planet Finder. NASA is
also reviewing plans for its nuclear systems program, Project
Prometheus. NASA has indefinitely deferred the Jupiter Icy Moons
Orbiter (JIMO) and will focus on higher priority and more near-term
needs for nuclear power, such as for use as a power source on the
Moon's surface. A summary of NASA's Operating Plan changes is in the
Appendix.
Chairman Boehlert. The Committee will come to order.
It is a great honor and pleasure to welcome Dr. Michael
Griffin this morning in his first appearance before this
committee as NASA Administrator. Dr. Griffin appeared before us
many times as a private citizen, and he has long served this
committee as a trusted advisor. The announcement of his
nomination was greeted in these precincts with something close
to glee, and we have not been disappointed.
Mike has taken on his duties with gusto and with candor. In
fact, it would be easy to paint Mike as a Don Quixote-like
figure, lost in his books. Mike does not realize that idealism
has dimmed, and he suits up and wanders about NASA, righting
old wrongs, questioning old varieties, and rescuing programs in
distress.
But there is an essential difference between Administrator
Griffin and the man of La Mancha. The errors Dr. Griffin is
battling are real, and the results are consequential rather
than comic.
Indeed, much is riding on Dr. Griffin's tenure at NASA.
Each and every NASA program is facing fundamental questions.
What will the CEV look like, and what will we do on the Moon?
What kind of aeronautics research will NASA pursue and at what
facilities? Will NASA continue to have a robust Earth science
program? What is the future of the Hubble and Webb telescopes?
What will be done about the Iran Nonproliferation Act?
And those are just a few of the basic issues. In fact, more
than two years after the President announced his Vision for
Space Exploration, NASA can barely give a definitive answer to
a single question about its programs. That is not, believe it
or not, criticism of NASA. The Agency is rethinking its
activities, and the answers will take time. Moreover,
Administrator Griffin wisely sent some of his teams working on
the answers back to the drawing board. But it is important to
remember that we are pretty much flying blind right now. We
expect to have the first answers about the human space flight
program some time in July. And NASA will have to answer the
most fundamental question about its current manned programs
this week, when it determines whether to return the Shuttle to
flight. As yesterday's Stafford Covey deliberations indicated,
that is a close question. And I am ready to abide by any
decision Administrator Griffin makes.
But even as NASA wrestles with these thorny issues,
congress needs to move ahead with authorizing legislation. The
bill that Chairman Calvert and I introduced yesterday provides
a framework for moving forward, ensuring that Congress has the
information it needs to make more detailed policy calls in the
years ahead.
I look forward to working with all of the members of this
committee as we move the bill forward to enactment over the
next several months.
There are two matters on which the bill is crystal clear:
first, that we should move ahead with returning to the Moon by
2020; and second, that human space flight programs cannot
become the sole mission of the Agency. Figuring out how to
balance those goals will be no easy task, but it is essential.
Part of the answer is ensuring that the Shuttle is indeed
retired no later than 2010. But it will take more than that to
ensure that NASA continues to have vibrant and productive
aeronautics, Earth science, and space science programs,
programs that are not evaluated in terms of the vision but on
their own terms for their own contributions.
I look forward to working with Administrator Griffin, who
also wants to see a balanced and multi-mission NASA. And so I
look forward to hearing from the Administrator on his latest
thoughts this morning. If things don't go well, he can just
write us off as one more windmill he has to tilt with today.
Thank you.
Mr. Gordon.
[The prepared statement of Chairman Boehlert follows:]
Prepared Statement of Chairman Sherwood L. Boehlert
It is a great honor and pleasure to welcome Mike Griffin this
morning in his first appearance before this committee as NASA
Administrator. Dr. Griffin appeared before us many times as a private
citizen and he has long served this committee as a trusted advisor. The
announcement of his nomination was greeted in these precincts with
something close to glee.
And we have not been disappointed. Mike has taken on his duties
with gusto and with candor. In fact, it would be easy to paint Mike as
a Don Quixote-like figure: lost in his books, Mike does not realize
that idealism has dimmed, and he suits up and wanders about NASA,
righting old wrongs, questioning old verities and rescuing programs in
distress.
But there's an essential difference between Administrator Griffin
and the Man of LaMancha: the errors Mike is battling are real, and the
results are consequential rather than comic.
Indeed, much is riding on Mike's tenure at NASA. Each and every
NASA program is facing fundamental questions: what will the CEV look
like and what will we do on the Moon? What kind of aeronautics research
will NASA pursue and at what facilities? Will NASA continue to have a
robust Earth science program? What is the future of the Hubble and Webb
telescopes? What will be done about the Iran NonProliferation Act?
And those are just a few of the basic issues. In fact, more than
two years after the President announced his Vision for Space
Exploration, NASA can barely give a definitive answer to a single
question about its programs.
That is not, believe it or not, a criticism of NASA. The Agency is
rethinking its activities, and the answers will take time. Moreover,
Administrator Griffin, wisely, sent some of the teams working on the
answers back to the drawing board. But it's important to remember that
we are pretty much ``flying blind'' right now. We expect to have the
first answers about the human space flight program some time in July.
And NASA will have to answer the most fundamental question about
its current manned programs this week, when it determines whether to
return the Shuttle to flight. As yesterday's Stafford-Covey
deliberations indicated, that is a close question, and I am ready to
abide by any decision Administrator Griffin makes.
But even as NASA wrestles with these thorny issues, Congress needs
to move ahead with authorizing legislation. The bill that Chairman
Calvert and I introduced yesterday provides a framework for moving
forward, ensuring that Congress has the information it needs to make
more detailed policy calls in the years ahead. I look forward to
working with all the Members of this committee as we move the bill
forward to enactment over the next several months.
There are two matters on which the bill is crystal clear. First,
that we should move ahead with returning to the Moon by 2020, and
second that human space flight programs cannot become the sole mission
of the Agency.
Figuring out how to balance those goals will be no easy task, but
it is essential. Part of the answer is ensuring that the Shuttle is
indeed retired no later than 2010.
But it will take more than that to ensure that NASA continues to
have vibrant and productive aeronautics, Earth science and space
science programs--programs that are not evaluated in terms of the
Vision, but on their own terms, for their own contributions. I look
forward to working with Administrator Griffin, who also wants to see a
balanced and multi-mission NASA.
And so I look forward to hearing Administrator Griffin's latest
thoughts this morning. If things don't go well, he can just write us
off as one more windmill he had to tilt with today.
Thank you.
Mr. Gordon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to welcome not only Dr. Griffin, but also our
audience today. I think the number of folks that are here
indicate the significance of this hearing, and I am sure there
are many more that are watching elsewhere. So welcome everyone.
And as usual, I want everyone to know that I concur with my
Chairman and his statement, and we are on board in most ways--
and in sync in our direction for NASA.
Dr. Griffin, you have come to the job of Administrator with
impressive technical credentials and a wealth of experience. I
want to wish you well. I look forward to working with you to
ensure that the United States maintains a strong and robust
civil space and aeronautics program.
I count myself among the supporters of the Exploration
Initiative. I believe that the long-term goals for human space
flight program proposed by the President makes sense. At the
same time, I must say that I am concerned about where NASA is
headed and about the large number of unanswered questions that
remain almost 18 months after the President announced his
Exploration Initiative.
And let me elaborate for a minute on some of those
unanswered questions. For example, what is the overall
architecture for achieving the President's exploration goals?
That is, where are we going, how are we going to get there,
what are we going to do when we get there, how long will it
take, and how much will it cost?
Last year, we were told that there was a rigorous process
underway involving 11 concept exploration and refinement teams
from industry and academia working with NASA to answer these
questions. Now we are being told that the process is no longer
relevant. Instead, a small internal NASA team has been tasked
with coming up with an exploration architecture by some time in
July.
Another set of questions. What is the Crew Exploration
Vehicle going to do? How are we going to acquire it? And what
will it cost? Last year, we were told that there was a rigorous
process to develop a ``System of Systems'' concept for the CEV
and associated launch vehicles, incorporating a ``spiral
development'' acquisition approach.
Now we are being told that the planned CEV acquisition
approach is no longer relevant and that a new approach is being
taken in order to accelerate the CEV, but there is no way of
knowing, at this point, how much it will cost to accomplish the
accelerated program.
What is the International Space Station going to be used
for, and what is it going to look like? Last year, we were told
that the International Space Station research program was being
restructured to more closely align it with the Exploration
Initiative and that Congress would be given the restructured
plan last fall.
Now we are being told that the entire ISS program content
is once again being restructured and that it will be later this
summer before we will know what those plans are. And we hear
that our international partners are very concerned about the
impact on their plans from NASA's restructuring.
And what is the priority of the nuclear power and
propulsion system in the President's Exploration Initiative?
For the last several years, we were told that the most
appropriate demonstration of the Project Prometheus space
nuclear technology would be the scientific probe to Jupiter's
moons, called the JIMO mission.
Now we are being told that the JIMO mission is essentially
dead, that Project Prometheus is being restructured, and that
the main Project Prometheus activity at present appears to be
transferring money from NASA to DOE's Office of Naval Reactors.
Last year, we were told that it was important to undertake
the whole series of exploration systems research and technology
development projects at a cost of more than $700 million in
fiscal year 2005 alone.
Now we are being told that the funding for many of those
proposed projects has been put on hold. Now I could go on, but
I hope my point is clear. Almost 18 months after the President
announced his Exploration Initiative, basic questions are still
unanswered, and much of what Congress was told last year is no
longer valid.
Yet in the absence of needed information, Congress is being
asked to support the exact funding levels for exploration
proposed in the fiscal year 2006 NASA budget request, almost
$3.2 billion, and to cut other non-exploration programs in
order to free up funds for the initiative.
That is, we are being asked to make a ``trust me'' vote on
NASA's funding requests, and I might add that is what the
previous Administrator not only asked but demanded and
received, and you see where we are.
Dr. Griffin, you have only been on the job for about two
months, and you cannot be held accountable for anything that
had gone on at the Agency prior to your arrival. At the same
time, given all of the changes you have made to the exploration
program since you became NASA Administrator, it would seem that
you have concluded that none, or rather not all of more than $2
billion allocated for NASA's exploration system program since
January 2004, has been wisely spent.
And that is troubling, because even $100 million of that
exploration system's funding could make a significant
difference in the health of NASA's aeronautics program or
NASA's Earth science program.
Yet the reality is that under the President's plan, those
other programs may increasingly become bill payers for the
Exploration Initiative in coming years, and the healthy balance
that should exist between all of NASA's core missions will be
lost. That is certainly going to be the case if NASA continues
cutting NASA's--or if the Administration continues cutting
NASA's out-year funding profile in the upcoming fiscal year
2007 request as it did in the fiscal year 2006 request, while
at the same time attempting to hold on to the President's
milestones for his Exploration Initiative.
Unfortunately, the results of that approach are already
evident. Some 2,500 current NASA employees are at risk of
losing their jobs. Scientific missions are being canceled,
deferred, or cut, and NASA's aeronautics approach--or program
is on a path of becoming ``irrelevant'' in the words of one of
the recent witnesses before this committee.
In addition to being a waste of human capital and
infrastructure built up at NASA over the last forty years, I
believe such actions will make it increasingly difficult to
sustain support for NASA's budget in coming years as the
Agency's focus is narrowed and the overall fiscal situation
facing the Nation becomes worse. I hope we can avoid such an
outcome, but I think it will require a course of correction
within NASA and the White House if that is to succeed.
Now, Mr. Griffin, what does all of this mean? Let me tell
you. You remember very well a few years ago when we had a
number of votes at a time when we had a tough--we had world-
record budget deficits, we had a lot of needs here on Earth,
and the question was: ``Should we continue with the
International Space Station?'' And after a number of votes, by
only one vote did the Space Station succeed.
Now what I am afraid that we are going to see is, at a time
when we have even worse deficits, even more needs on Earth, we
are going to see a series of attempts to take money out of
Mission to Mars and put it here on Earth. And as we do this,
and it is not going to be tomorrow, it is going to be in the
next three or four years, during that same period of time, I am
afraid that we are going to see a cannibalization of other
programs in NASA. We are going to see a lot of long-term
employees with expertise and core missions within the centers
to be lost.
And so the situation then could very well be, at this
point, and whatever it might be in three or four years, we have
those same kind of votes. The--we decide that money, rather
than going to Mars, ought to be placed in schools or veterans
or something else on Earth, while at the same time, we have
already undermined our existing programs. Well, then do we say,
``Well, NASA now is not relevant in even more ways, and there
are even more cuts.'' That is my concern.
And so I also have a suggestion. And let me tell you what
my suggestion is. I am taking a little more time than I
normally do, maybe going back to some previous times, because
you haven't been to see me yet, and so I want to have--take
this opportunity to let you know.
Here is what I think that we need to do.
If we are planning on going to Mars in the year 2030, or I
guess it is 2035 or beyond, then rather than 30 years, it might
be 31 years. I don't think we are any worse off, and we might
save a lot of money. What I would hope you would do is go
forward with those things we know that need to be done. We have
got to return-to-flight. We have got to get this Crew
Exploration Vehicle going. We need to go ahead and look for
the--a heavy payload type of lift. We have got to do those
things, but let us slow down in terms of restructuring NASA
until we--until you answer those questions that are out there.
Let us take this year to try to find out what are those
programs outside the exploration mission that really are
important. Let us have some priorities there. Let us be sure
that we are not going to have this start-stop approach any
longer. I think we will save money. I think it would be the
best thing for NASA, and I hope that you will give that some
consideration.
And thank you for your indulgence, Mr. Chairman. I guess I
am reclaiming lots of time that I yielded early in the past.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Gordon follows:]
Prepared Statement of Representative Bart Gordon
Good morning. I want to join the Chairman in welcoming Dr. Griffin
to today's hearing.
Although Dr. Griffin has testified before this committee on
previous occasions, this will be the first time we will have a chance
to hear from him in his capacity as NASA Administrator.
Dr. Griffin, you come to the job of Administrator with impressive
technical credentials and a wealth of experience. I want to wish you
well, and I look forward to working with you to ensure that the United
States maintains a strong and robust civil space and aeronautics
program.
I count myself among the supporters of the exploration initiative--
I believe that the long-term goals for the human space flight program
proposed by the President make sense. At the same time, I must say that
I am concerned about where NASA is headed, and about the large number
of unanswered questions that remain almost 18 months after the
President announced his exploration initiative.
Let me elaborate for a minute on some of those unanswered
questions. For example, what is the overall architecture for achieving
the President's exploration goals--that is, where are we going, how are
we going to get there, what will we do when we get there, and how long
will it take and how much will it cost?
Last year, we were told that there was a rigorous process underway
involving 11 Concept Exploration and Refinement teams from industry and
academia working with NASA to answer those questions. Now we are being
told that that process is no longer relevant--instead, a small internal
NASA team has been tasked with coming up with an exploration
architecture by sometime in July.
Another set of questions: What is the Crew Exploration Vehicle
going to do, how are we going to acquire it, and what will it cost?
Last year, we were told that there was a rigorous process to develop a
``System of Systems'' concept for the CEV and associated launch
vehicles, incorporating a ``spiral development'' acquisition approach.
Now we are being told that the planned CEV acquisition approach is
no longer relevant, and that a new approach is being taken in order to
accelerate the CEV--but that there ``is no way to know'' at this point
how much it will cost to accomplish that accelerated program.
What is the International Space Station going to be used for, and
what is it going to look like? Last year, we were told that the
International Space Station research program was being restructured to
more closely align it with the exploration initiative--and that
Congress would be given that restructured plan last fall.
Now we are being told that the entire ISS program content is once
again being restructured, and that it will be later this summer before
we know what the new plans are. And we hear that our International
Partners are very concerned about the impact on their plans of NASA's
latest restructuring.
What is the priority of nuclear power and propulsion systems in the
President's exploration initiative? For the last several years, we were
told that the most appropriate demonstration of Project Prometheus's
space nuclear technologies would be a scientific probe to Jupiter's
moons, the so-called JIMO mission.
Now we are being told that the JIMO mission is essentially dead,
that Project Prometheus is being restructured, and that the main
Project Prometheus activity at present appears to be transferring money
from NASA to DOE's Office of Naval Reactors.
Last year, we were told that it was important to undertake a whole
series of Exploration Systems Research and Technology development
projects at cost of more than $700 million in FY 2005 alone.
Now we are being told that the funding for many of those proposed
projects has been put on hold. I could go on, but I hope my point is
clear. Almost 18 months after the President announced his exploration
initiative, basic questions are still unanswered. And much of what
Congress was told last year is no longer valid.
Yet in the absence of needed information, Congress is still being
asked to support the exact funding levels for exploration proposed in
the FY 2006 NASA budget request--almost $3.2 billion--and to cut other
non-exploration programs in order to free up funds for the initiative.
That is, we are being asked to make a ``faith-based'' vote on
NASA's funding request.
Dr. Griffin, you have only been on the job for about two months,
and you cannot be held accountable for anything that had gone on at the
Agency prior to your arrival. At the same time, given all the changes
you have made to the Exploration program since you became NASA
Administrator, it would seem that you have concluded that not all of
the more than $2 billion allocated for NASA's Exploration Systems
program since January 2004 has been wisely spent.
That's troubling, because even a $100 million of that Exploration
Systems funding could make a significant difference to the health of
NASA's aeronautics program or NASA's Earth science program.
Yet, the reality is that under the President's plan, those other
programs may increasingly become bill payers for the exploration
initiative in coming years and the healthy balance that should exist
between all of NASA's core missions will be lost. That is certainly
going to be the case if the Administration continues cutting NASA's out
year funding profile in the upcoming FY 2007 budget request as it did
in the FY 2006 request while at the same time attempting to hold on to
the President's milestones for his exploration initiative.
Unfortunately, the results of that approach are already evident:
Some 2,500 current NASA employees are at risk of losing their jobs;
scientific missions are being canceled, deferred, or cut; and NASA's
aeronautics program is on a path to becoming ``irrelevant,'' in the
words of one of the recent witnesses before this committee.
In addition to being a waste of the human capital and
infrastructure built up at NASA over the last 40 years, I believe such
actions will make it increasingly difficult to sustain support for
NASA's budget in coming years as the Agency's focus is narrowed and the
overall fiscal situation facing the Nation worsens. I hope we can avoid
such an outcome, but I think it may require a course correction within
NASA and the White House if we are to succeed.
Well, we have a lot to talk about today. I again want to welcome
you to this morning's hearing, Dr. Griffin, and I look forward to your
testimony.
Chairman Boehlert. The spirit of cooperation.
The Chair is pleased to recognize the distinguished
Chairman of the Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics, Mr.
Calvert of California.
Mr. Calvert. And in the spirit of brevity, Mr. Chairman, I
will be very brief.
Today, we welcome NASA's 11th Administrator, Dr. Mike
Griffin, and his first appearance before this committee.
Tomorrow, we will mark up the first NASA authorization bill in
a number of years in the Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics,
which I am certainly happy to Chair. And I am very hopeful that
we will be able to get this bill through the House of
Representatives before the August work period where we can go
into conference with the United States Senate.
Dr. Griffin, you are certainly a breath of fresh air for
NASA, and we are really looking forward, as you can tell, to
working with you to build a better and stronger NASA together.
As you know, we are beginning a second space age, as I like
to put it. The first space age was born in the Cold War. The
second space age will feature space exploration while achieving
synergy with commercial, civil, national security space
programs. Doctor, you are in a place to lead us in the second
space age, and we will work together to build a better NASA.
For NASA to develop an overall grand strategy, we must have
a strategy for NASA's aeronautics research and technology as
well as a multi-year plan for NASA's science programs that
parallel NASA's vision for space exploration. Once we have well
defined mission strategies, NASA will be able to move forward
more effectively and efficiently in its core areas.
As you know, I plan on visiting all of the NASA centers in
this Congress, and so far I have visited Kennedy Space Center.
I plan to be at the Jet Propulsion Laboratory on July 3 to
observe the climax of Deep Impact program as it collides with a
comet, and for the first time, we will have a good look inside
a comet. This will be an exciting evening.
At each of these centers, I have been impressed with the
enthusiasm, dedication, and the technical skills of the
workforce. I spoke with a number of workers who were preparing
the Space Shuttle for return-to-flight, processing components
of International Space Station, conducting life science
research, and testing experimental vehicles. This NASA
community is comprised of a talented workforce with skills that
America cannot afford to lose.
I believe that Mike Griffin is the right person to lead
this talented workforce in a direction to benefit our nation
and to enhance our competitiveness globally. Administrator
Griffin said in a speech last week, ``My feet are firmly
grounded in reality, but I am also grounded in the idea that we
need to change some of the definition of reality.''
I look forward to working with you as we change the
definition of reality and work into this second space age, and
I certainly welcome your testimony today.
And I yield back the balance of my time.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Calvert follows:]
Prepared Statement of Chairman Ken Calvert
Today, we welcome NASA's 11th Administrator, Dr. Michael Griffin,
in his first official appearance as Administrator before the House
Science Committee. Tomorrow, we will mark up the first NASA
Authorization in a number of years in the Subcommittee on Space and
Aeronautics, which I chair. I am very hopeful that we will be able to
get our bill through the House of Representatives before our August
district work period.
Dr. Griffin is a breath of fresh air for NASA and we are really
looking forward to working with him as we build a better and stronger
NASA together. We are beginning a ``Second Space Age.'' The first space
age was born of the Cold War. This Second Space Age will feature space
exploration while achieving synergy with the commercial, civil and
national security space programs. Dr. Griffin is now in place to lead
us in this Second Space Age as we work together to make a better NASA.
For NASA to develop an overall grand strategy, we must have a
multi-year plan for NASA's aeronautics research and technology as well
as a multi-year plan for NASA's science programs that parallel NASA's
Vision for Space Exploration. Once we have well-defined missions and
strategies, NASA will be able to move forward more effectively and
efficiently in all its core areas.
I plan to visit all the NASA centers this Congress and so far, have
visited the Kennedy Space Center and Dryden Flight Research Center. I
plan to visit the Jet Propulsion Laboratory on July 3, to observe the
climax of the Deep Impact program as it collides with a comet and we
have our first look inside a comet. At each of these centers, I have
been impressed with the enthusiasm, dedication and technical skills of
the workforce. I spoke with a number of the workers who are preparing
the Space Shuttle for the Return-to-Flight, processing components of
the International Space Station, conducting life-science research, and
testing experimental vehicles. This NASA community is comprised of a
talented workforce with skills that America cannot afford to lose.
I believe that Mike Griffin is the right person to lead this
talented workforce in a direction to benefit our nation and to enhance
our competitiveness globally. As Administrator Griffin said in a speech
last week, ``my feet are firmly grounded in reality, but I am also
grounded in the idea that we need to change some of the definition of
reality.''
I look forward to working with Administrator Griffin as we change
the definition of reality and move into this Second Space Age.
I welcome Dr. Griffin to testify today.
Chairman Boehlert. Thank you very much, Mr. Calvert. And
thank you for the leadership you are providing in the
Subcommittee during a very important time for the Agency.
Mr. Udall.
Mr. Udall. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good morning, Dr.
Griffin.
I am going to hopefully--put myself in the same spirit as
my chairman, Mr. Calvert, and be brief.
If I could, Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask for unanimous
consent to include my entire statement in the record.
Chairman Boehlert. Without objection.
Mr. Udall. Dr. Griffin, I think it may be a bit of a
cliche, but I think it is worth saying that NASA is at a
crossroads, and this is the focus that we want to have at this
hearing is how we balance all of these competing interests. The
President has given us a new long-term vision for human space
flight. I support that vision, but I am not sure how all of
these aspirations, as I just said, fit into the budget that has
been provided to NASA.
Congressman Calvert, Congressman Gordon, and Congressman
Boehlert talked about the aeronautic side of NASA. I have
concerns based on what we have heard recently from non-
government witnesses, and looking at the President's budget, I
think those concerns are worth considering. That is one of the
reasons I introduced, along with a group of bipartisan
supporters, H.R. 2358, the Aeronautics R&D Revitalization Act,
which I would like to see incorporated into the NASA
reauthorization.
The concerns I have also heard from the fundamental biology
and microgravity research communities, as well as from
commercial organizations, and about what we are going to do in
the areas of Earth and space science, I think, are worth
hearing. And I look forward to your testimony today in that
regard.
As I close, I do want to thank you for your willingness to
start preparing for a Shuttle servicing mission to the Hubble
space telescope, contingent, of course, on a successful return-
to-flight of the Space Shuttle. It is one of the most
significant space laboratories ever launched, and I believe we
should continue to utilize it to its fullest capacities as long
as it remains productive.
So again, Doctor, it is a tremendous opportunity to have
you here. Thank you for your service. And I look forward to
hearing your testimony and engaging further with you in the
question and answer period.
Mr. Chairman, I would yield back any time I have remaining.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Udall follows:]
Prepared Statement of Representative Mark Udall
Good morning and welcome, Dr. Griffin. I look forward to working
with you in the months ahead, and I wish you all the best as you
shoulder your new responsibilities.
While it can sound like a bit of a cliche to say that NASA is at a
crossroads, I think it nonetheless is an accurate description of the
current situation.
The President has given NASA a new long-term vision for its human
space flight program--one that I support. At the same time, it's not at
all clear that the President's aspirations fit the budget that has been
provided to NASA.
And one result of that mismatch is that the highly productive
balance that has existed between NASA's space science, Earth science,
aeronautics, and human space flight activities is at risk of being
seriously damaged.
The evidence of the stresses on NASA's non-exploration programs is
all around us.
At a recent hearing before the Space Subcommittee, there was
unanimity among all of the non-government witnesses that NASA's
aeronautics programs have been negatively impacted by the budget cuts
of recent years and that the President's proposed five-year budget for
aeronautics will significantly worsen the situation.
That is one of the reasons I and a bipartisan group of co-sponsors
introduced H.R. 2358, the Aeronautics R&D Revitalization Act, which I
would like to see incorporated into the NASA Authorization.
The situation facing NASA's Earth-Sun Systems program is no better.
The Science Committee heard compelling testimony from a panel of
respected experts that bluntly concluded that the Nation's Earth
observations program is at risk. And we have heard about productive
missions being threatened with termination due to budgetary shortfalls.
In addition, although we have not yet had a Space Station oversight
hearing, I and my staff have been hearing from the fundamental biology
and micro-gravity research community, as well as from commercial
organizations.
Their message is the same.
For more than 15 years, NASA has been telling them that there would
be a place for their research on the ISS. Now however, it appears that
the budgetary demands of the exploration initiative are going to cause
NASA to break those long-standing commitments.
While all of this has been going on, the unfortunate fact is that
18 months after the President first announced his exploration
initiative, specifics on NASA's plans are still hard to come by. That
concerns me, especially given the fact that the specifics we do have
from NASA concern cuts to NASA's non-exploration programs.
I hope that Dr. Griffin will be able to shed some light on what
NASA's plans are for both exploration and for NASA's other core
missions, as well as for its workforce. We will need that information
if we are to do our oversight jobs properly, and I think enough time
has passed for us to be justified in asking for specifics.
Finally, before I close, I would just like to express my
appreciation to Dr. Griffin for his willingness to start preparing for
a Shuttle mission to service the Hubble space telescope, contingent of
course on a successful return-to-flight of the Space Shuttle.
As you know, Hubble is one of the most significant space
observatories ever launched, and I believe that we should continue to
utilize it to its fullest as long as it remains scientifically
productive.
Mr. Chairman, today's hearing is an important one for this
committee, and I look forward to hearing from our witness. Thank you.
Chairman Boehlert. Thank you very much.
How is that for a warm welcome?
Dr. Griffin. Very interesting.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Hall follows:]
Prepared Statement of Representative Ralph M. Hall
Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding this hearing on the future of
NASA. On the eve of the Subcommittee markup of the NASA Authorization
bill, it is useful to hear what the Administrator of the space agency
thinks about the future of the organization.
Dr. Griffin, I would like to congratulate you on your new position
as the 11th Administrator of NASA. You have a challenging task ahead,
but I know that you are more than capable of leading this agency into a
bright and exciting future. I am already pleased with the direction you
have been going since taking the position on April 14.
When President Bush announced the new Vision for Space Exploration
in January 2004, I was excited to see that NASA had a new direction and
focus for the future. Our ventures into space not only keep America at
the forefront of exploration and innovation, but they also are vital to
our economy and our national security. This new Vision sets America on
a course toward the Moon and Mars, and we should embrace this dream and
work to make it a reality.
The money that we put into NASA grows exponentially when we
consider the scientific and technological spin-offs that space
exploration provides. Experiments conducted on the Space Shuttle and
International Space Station expand health research and move us toward
cures for some of our most threatening diseases. Microgravity
experiments in the 1990s led to advances in antibiotics to fight
infections. These experiments also unlocked secrets to protein growth
that produced medicines to treat patients who have suffered from
strokes and to prepare them for open-heart surgery. Americans suffering
from osteoporosis also benefit from bone-density experiments conducted
on the International Space Station in microgravity environments. These
tests accelerated the clinical trials of a drug that is expected to be
on the market soon. From the development of MRI technology to
microchips, the scientific partnerships between NASA and American
universities and companies ensure our nation's viability, increase our
nation's competitiveness, and help drive our economy.
A few weeks ago, I had the opportunity to meet with the astronauts
who will be returning to flight next month on the Shuttle. Returning
the Shuttle to flight is the first step toward meeting the goals of the
Vision, and it helps America fulfill its promise to our international
partners to complete the International Space Station. I know that NASA
has made progress toward making the Shuttle as safe as possible, and I
am pleased that the Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB)
approves of many of the changes the Agency has made.
Retiring the Shuttle in 2010 and moving to a newer, safer vehicle
is a welcome goal. As contractors develop the new Crew Exploration
Vehicle for human space flight, we need to make sure that a viable crew
escape system for our astronauts is incorporated into the design of the
spacecraft. As we implement the new space vision, I will work to ensure
that NASA fulfills this priority and minimizes the risks for our brave
men and women who fly our space missions. Our hopes and dreams ride
with them, and we must do all we can, at whatever cost is necessary, to
ensure their safety.
Dr. Griffin, thank you again for coming to Capitol Hill today to
tell us of your plans for NASA. I look forward to working with you and
your staff to reach these goals together and move America toward its
destiny in space.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Weldon follows:]
Prepared Statement of Representative Curt Weldon
Mr. Chairman, Mr. Ranking Member, and Administrator Griffin, I
appreciate the opportunity to submit my testimony for the record.
First, I would like to officially congratulate Administrator
Griffin on his new position and thank him for taking the time to come
to Capitol Hill and address the Committee's questions and concerns. I
look forward to working with him to create a stronger more viable NASA.
I also look forward to the Shuttle's possible Return-to-Flight
later this month. I trust the Administrator's experience and expertise
will enable him to make the right decisions about the safety of the
Shuttle's launch while taking into account the recommendations set
forth by the Stafford Covey Return-to-Flight Task Group (SCTG).
I do support NASA's desire to further explore space and recognize
the immeasurable value in learning more about our solar system, but I
would be remiss if I did not voice my concerns over the projected costs
of the President's Vision for Space Exploration. I am concerned that
too much of our precious resources and funding will be diverted away
from other NASA programs in favor of space exploration.
As a senior Member of this committee, over the past several years,
I have witnessed the decrease and now elimination of funds for
rotorcraft research. As an aggressive supporter of rotorcraft funding
and research, I am greatly concerned that this important program is
being neglected. NASA has cut aeronautics research by half between 1998
and 2003 and requested zero dollars for its rotorcraft research
programs for FY03-FY06.
I am truly concerned about what will happen to the U.S. Aeronautic
industry if the Federal Government continues to ignore rotorcraft
funding. As you know, the U.S. aerospace industries are highly reliant
on technologies enabled by NASA research. Aerospace business markets
today make it difficult for companies to invest huge sums in high-risk,
long-term R&D activities. The consequences of insufficient research and
development investment are already being felt. There is a direct
relationship between the viability of federal aeronautics R&D conducted
by NASA, the future of the U.S. aeronautics and transportation
industry, and economic growth.
I fear that our country's neglect of rotorcraft could pave the way
for other nations to surpass the United States in development of a
technology with the potential to change the way we travel. To this end,
I have established the Center for Rotorcraft Innovation (CRI), which
will provide a single, coordinated, national focus within industry and
academia for cooperation with the government on rotorcraft. CRI will
focus on emerging and unmet national needs in rotorcraft operations and
technology, and will function as a venue where the public and private
sectors can work together for the sake of the American rotorcraft
industry.
In my opinion, the establishment of future rotorcraft technology,
systems and infrastructure is also critical to promote national
security, and emergency response. The war in Iraq clearly demonstrates
how precious helicopter assets are to Americans in harms way for the
purpose of emergency evacuation, combat and logistical support.
So in closing, I would just like to again reiterate my
disappointment that this important program has consistently suffered
major funding cuts. I ask that the Administrator provide me with
information on his vision for the future or Aeronautics funding,
specifically Rotorcraft within NASA. In the meantime, I will continue
to use my position as a senior member of this committee and Vice-
Chairman of the Armed Services and Homeland Security Committees to
advocate and fight for increased federal rotorcraft and aeronautics
dollars. Thank you for you time.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Costello follows:]
Prepared Statement of Representative Jerry F. Costello
Good morning. I want to thank Administrator Griffin for appearing
before our committee to discuss the FY06 Budget for NASA. Today's
hearing serves as an opportunity for oversight of certain departmental
programs. My colleagues on the Science Committee and I have been
calling for the Administration to establish a vision for the space
program even before the Space Shuttle Columbia tragedy. Last year, when
the President announced his space exploration initiative, I was pleased
we were setting long-term goals for our nation's human space flight
program. However, a year later many of NASA's plans and organizational
arrangements for implementing the initiative are in flux. I am
concerned that NASA is proceeding aggressively on the implementation of
the President's exploration initiative and is making fundamental
changes in its priorities without providing Congress with more
specifics as we consider the FY06 budget request for NASA. While the
Administration continues to bolster this initiative and state it is
affordable under the budgetary plan developed by NASA, NASA's track
record on the credibility of its cost estimates over the last several
years is at best mixed. The President's proposal will have a high price
tag and it should not come at the cost of our commitment to our
children, our veterans, our seniors, and our other important domestic
priorities. We currently have over a half-trillion dollar deficit and
the case is going to have to be made to this committee and the American
people why this proposal should be supported in the face of that
deficit.
In last year's FY05 Omnibus, the appropriators gave NASA a great
deal of latitude to determine the allocation of the funds appropriated
to it, with the understanding that the appropriations committees would
review that allocation as part of the standard Operation Plan process.
I realize it is too early to draw definitive conclusions about NASA's
performance on the exploration initiative because most of its efforts
over the last year have been focused on developing requirements and
``roadmaps'' and restructuring its organization. Yet, the all of these
efforts are still unclear at this point. Since Administrator Griffin
has indicated that he intends to significantly reshape NASA's human
exploration-related program and has suspended or terminated many of the
exploration-related planning activities that were underway when he
became Administrator, I am concerned NASA's commitment to building the
Agency's core foundation of aeronautics and aerospace research and
development as well as its missions of exploration are overlooked.
I welcome the Administrator and look forward to his testimony.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Carnahan follows:]
Prepared Statement of Representative Russ Carnahan
Mr. Chairman and Mr. Ranking Member, thank you for hosting this
hearing, and Mr. Griffin, thank you for joining us today to discuss the
future of NASA. I am very interested in hearing your testimony.
Many on this committee have been paying attention to NASA's
budgetary decisions and what these choices mean for the long-term
direction of the Agency. In particular, I look forward to hearing your
perspective on how or if NASA will be able to balance the President's
space exploration agenda with the Agency's traditional multi-mission
approach.
We are pleased to have you with us for the first time and I look
forward to this morning's hearing.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Jackson Lee follows:]
Prepared Statement of Representative Sheila Jackson Lee
Chairman Boehlert, Ranking Member Gordon,
I want to thank you for organizing this important hearing to
discuss The Future of NASA. I want to welcome Dr. Griffin, the new NASA
Administrator and thank him for coming before this committee this
morning. NASA faces a watershed moment after having endured a
tremendous tragedy in the Columbia disaster and now trying to map its
future with a return to the Moon and manned exploration of Mars.
Unfortunately, while I wholeheartedly support the work of NASA, I
am deeply concerned that the President's budget does not meet all the
needs for future space exploration as we move forward in this new
century. A lack of necessary budget authority makes the job for a new
Administrator much more difficult and brings in to question the true
vision for NASA. As I have stated before, this Administration has made
many bad budgetary choices, which continue to push us further into a
huge deficits and mounting debt during the last four years. In
addition, the President has proposed a highly questionable plan for
Social Security along with an uncertain military future in Iraq that in
conjunction with proposed $1.6 trillion tax cuts will result in less
funds being available for vital agencies such as NASA.
I have been supportive of President Bush's Vision for Space
Exploration because I firmly believe that the investment we make today
in science and exploration will pay large dividends in the future.
Similarly, I do not want to put a cap on the frontiers of our
discovery, NASA should aim high and continue to push our nation at the
forefront of space exploration. However, I find it hard to be more
supportive of the President's plan, when I have no real specifics as to
what this plan will entail. Large missions of this sort require
detailed planning and as a Members of Congress we deserve to know how
exactly the President's plan proposes to accomplish its objectives so
that we can set out the proper resources and provide the necessary
oversight. In addition, the President stated that the fundamental goal
of his directive for the Nation's space exploration program is ``. .
.to advance U.S. scientific, security, and economic interests through a
robust space exploration program.'' I could not agree more with that
statement; unfortunately, this President's own budget does not meet the
demands of his ambitious agenda. One year after the Administration laid
out a five-year funding plan for NASA that was intended to demonstrate
the affordability and sustainability of the exploration initiative, the
Administration submitted a budget proposal for 2006 that would reduce
that funding plan by $2.5 billion over the next four years. For
example, in 2006, the Administration is seeking $546 million less than
it said would be needed for NASA in 2006 in the five-year funding plan
that accompanied last year's request. In fact 75 percent of the $2.5
billion shortfall will fall to NASA's science and aeronautics programs.
This kind of under-funding for vital programs is unacceptable. Again,
it is even more alarming because the President has not provided a
detailed plan as to how he intends to accomplish his space exploration
agenda; certainly draining money from the budget will not help that
cause. I hope Administrator Griffin will be able to shed some light on
the vision of NASA with the current budget shortfalls.
My greatest concern at this point is that we may not allocate
enough money or resources to ensure the safety of all NASA astronauts
and crew. After the Columbia disaster, safety must be our highest
priority and it is worrisome that there is not a noticeable increase in
funding to address all safety concerns. Presently, NASA is working
towards a resumption of Space Shuttle flights, with the date for such a
launch in uncertainty at this point. However, once NASA returns the
Shuttle to flight status, it is then supposed to begin the task of
figuring out how to retire the Space Shuttle fleet in 2010 while
continuing to fly the Shuttle safely up to the very last flight. I am
concerned that pressure to retire the Shuttle by a fixed date to free
up resources for other activities, coupled with the need to fly up to
28 Shuttle flights to assemble the Space Station, could--if not handled
properly--lead to the types of schedule and budgetary pressures that
were cited by the Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) as
contributing to the Columbia accident. I hope this concern is paramount
at NASA as we move forward in the future.
As Members of this committee know, I have always been a strong
advocate for NASA. My criticism of the President's budget and its
relation to the vision for NASA is intended only to strengthen our
efforts to move forward as we always have in the area of space
exploration and discovery. NASA posses an exciting opportunity to
charter a new path that can lead to untold discoveries. As always I
look forward to working with the good men and women of NASA as we push
the boundaries of our world once again.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Green follows:]
Prepared Statement of Representative Al Green
Chairman Boehlert and our Ranking Member, Mr. Gordon, I appreciate
the opportunity that you have provided us to speak to the newly
appointed Administrator of NASA, Dr. Michael Griffin. First and
foremost, Administrator Griffin, let me extend my congratulations.
As a Member of the Science Committee, I have had the distinct
pleasure of following NASA's progress as it has moved towards its
Return-to-Flight mission scheduled in mid to late July. I have also
followed NASA while it has re-defined itself behind President Bush's
Vision for Space Exploration. Let me reiterate my support for NASA.
With Johnson Space Center only moments away from the 9th
Congressional District of Texas, I must admit that NASA is an entity
near and dear to the interest of my district. I remember the ebullience
that our nation felt when Neil Armstrong walked on the Moon in 1969.
Our young people need to witness similar achievements that will drive
them into advanced careers in science, engineering, and math, and I
truly believe that the Vision for Space Exploration will be one giant
step towards that goal.
I am however concerned with such a focused approach because NASA
has successfully accomplished a broad mission including aeronautics,
Earth science, and additional space research programs that do not
revolve around this Vision for Space Exploration. I must say I am
cautious about NASA's return-to-flight because of the inherent risks to
our brave astronauts. As we eagerly await the return-to-flight mission,
I am seeking the assurance that NASA has done everything in its power
to ensure the safety of its crews. The Vision for Space Exploration is
a superior ambition, however we cannot afford another devastating
accident that leads to setbacks and losses of life.
Now that you have had two months in your position as Administrator,
I look forward to hearing your vision for NASA. More specifically, I
would like to learn how you intend to balance and restructure NASA in a
way that continues all of its important missions and accomplishes an
aggressive research and exploration agenda that makes the safety of our
astronauts a top priority.
Chairman Boehlert. Mr. Administrator, as both Mr. Gordon
and I noted in our opening statements, many fundamental
questions facing NASA remain to be answered. Let me go through
a list of pending items that we reviewed at the February
hearing with then Acting Administrator Gregory. For each of
these, I would like you to tell me and the Committee when we
will get the answer to the question. You may have mentioned
some of these in your testimony, but I would like to go through
the list, nonetheless, to create a single place in the record
we can all go back to to measure our progress.
The research--can you tell me when you are going to have
the research agenda for the International Space Station and its
proposed final configuration?
Wait. Make a statement first.
Dr. Griffin. No, sir. I wanted to take your questions. You
were----
Chairman Boehlert. Are you sure? I----
Dr. Griffin. No, that is fine, sir.
Chairman Boehlert. All right. Fine.
Can I repeat that? I will go through the list.
Dr. Griffin. Please do.
Chairman Boehlert. The first one, you have got that, right?
The--when do you plan to have the research agenda for the
International Space Station and its proposed final
configuration? I will do them one by one and let you respond.
Dr. Griffin. Okay. Oh, I am sorry.
We are reworking the research agenda of the Space Station,
as has been pointed out. We are looking at--the question is
difficult to answer, because, in part, it ties up with how much
research on the Station do we want to do while we are trying to
build and finish developing it.
As was pointed out in your earlier statement, or someone's
earlier statement, we must retire the Shuttle by 2010. We must,
as soon as possible thereafter, deploy the CEV, the Crew
Exploration Vehicle, which will replace the Shuttle and which
will be our means of ferrying astronauts back and forth. And
so, to some extent, the research that we would do on the Space
Station, if we were otherwise unconstrained, must take a back
seat to getting the necessary systems online to allow us to
develop and utilize the Station.
I can't specifically give you an answer as to when we will
have the research agenda for the Station fully defined.
Chairman Boehlert. Can you hint?
Dr. Griffin. Yes. Yes, sir, I can hint.
I made a couple of notes on this. We are trying to
rebalance the portfolio. The high-priority areas are going to
be space radiation health and shielding, advanced environmental
control and monitoring, advanced EVA activities and the support
of those, human health encounter measures, life support
systems, medical care for exploration, and human factors,
medical research with human subjects and microgravity
validation of the environmental control and life support
systems.
We expect to refine those as a result of the Shuttle and
Station Configuration Options Team examination that is underway
today. Within the next few weeks, we will be briefing,
discussing configuration options within the Administration, and
then, in short order, with you here on Capitol Hill, with this
committee and with others.
Our uncertainty today--so I--so in a briefer answer to your
question, I would say later this summer. Later this summer.
Chairman Boehlert. Later this summer.
Dr. Griffin. The situation that we find ourselves in that
results in this lack of full definition is that, as we sit here
today, the one thing we are certain of is that we cannot fly 28
Shuttle flights to assemble the Station and still retire the
Shuttle by 2010. There are not 28 flights available in our
manifesting sequence, if we wish to retire by 2010. Therefore,
what we are looking at is a redefined program of Shuttle
flights that we can execute with a high degree of confidence
over the next five years. And that necessarily results in
replanning the research agenda.
Chairman Boehlert. You know, I was so anxious to get to
these questions, we all are, that I neglected to give you the
opportunity for an opening statement. We want to welcome you
with open arms before this committee and give you the chance to
share with us some of your thoughts before we proceed with the
questions.
So the Floor is yours, Mr. Administrator.
STATEMENT OF HONORABLE MICHAEL D. GRIFFIN, ADMINISTRATOR,
NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION
Dr. Griffin. Well, thank you, Chairman Boehlert. I am--I
will just make a few brief remarks, and then I believe I will
enter into the record this statement as well as the more--
longer, more formal statement.
I do want to thank you for inviting me to appear before
you. As both you and Ranking Member Gordon have pointed out, I
have been here many times before as a private citizen. I have
forged, I think, excellent working relationships with this
committee, and I certainly hope that that won't change in
testifying before you in a new capacity as NASA Administrator.
And we do have many challenges to overcome. We need to work
closely with this committee and the entire Congress to carry
out the President's vision for exploration and our other
programs. You have many--you have raised many questions. I have
made significant changes in the last 21/2 months that I and my
staff believe are necessary to get us on the right track. And I
look forward to answering as many of the questions that Ranking
Member Gordon and yourself have raised today as I possibly can.
So with that introduction, let me enter, if I might, this
oral statement into the record. Your staff and you can pursue
it at your leisure, and with your permission, then, we can move
directly to your questions, which I will try to answer as----
Chairman Boehlert. Well, without objection, so ordered.
Your entire statement will be made part of the permanent record
for our perusal, quite frankly, close examination.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Griffin follows:]
Prepared Statement of Michael D. Griffin
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, thank you for this
opportunity to appear today to discuss NASA's plans for the future as
represented in the President's FY 2006 budget request for NASA.
On January 14, 2004, President George W. Bush announced the Vision
for Space Exploration. The President's directive gave NASA clear
objectives as well as a new and historic focus. The fundamental goal of
this directive for the Nation's space exploration program is ``. . .to
advance U.S. scientific, security, and economic interests through a
robust space exploration program.'' In issuing this directive, the
President committed the Nation to a journey of exploring the solar
system and beyond, returning humans to the Moon, and sending robots and
ultimately humans to Mars and other destinations. He challenged us to
establish new and innovative programs to enhance our understanding of
the planets, to ask new questions, and to answer questions as old as
humankind. NASA embraced this directive and began a long-term
transformation to enable us to achieve this goal.
In June 2004, the President's Commission on Implementation of the
United States Space Exploration Policy, led by E. C. ``Pete'' Aldridge,
Jr. (the Aldridge Commission), reported its findings and
recommendations to the President. The Aldridge Commission emphasized
the crucial role that technological innovation, national and
international partnerships, and organizational transformation must play
if we are to implement the President's vision for an affordable and
sustainable space exploration program. NASA is committed to making the
necessary transformation to achieve the Vision for Space Exploration.
On December 21, 2004, the President signed a new national policy
directive that establishes guidelines and implementation actions for
United States space transportation programs and activities to ensure
the Nation's continued ability to access and use space for national and
homeland security, and civil, scientific, and commercial purposes. NASA
will play a significant role in implementing this directive, fostering
and enabling the development of space transportation capabilities for
human space exploration beyond low-Earth orbit with the Crew
Exploration Vehicle (CEV), consistent with the goals of the Vision for
Space Exploration.
The President demonstrated his commitment to the Vision for Space
Exploration by making it a priority in his FY 2005 budget request, and
Congress responded positively by providing funding for NASA at the
level requested by the President. The President has reaffirmed his
commitment to the Vision by again making it a priority in his FY 2006
budget request in a very challenging budget environment. The $16.46
billion requested for NASA reflects an increase of 2.4 percent over FY
2005.
While today's hearing concerns the President's FY 2006 budget
request for NASA, I must also use this opportunity to update the
Committee regarding the difficult choices that need to be made in
executing NASA's FY 2005 budget, and my guiding philosophy in dealing
with these challenges.
A detailed FY 2005 Operating Plan update was recently provided to
all of the Committees in Congress which oversee NASA. With this FY 2005
Operating Plan update, NASA is fully funding--within our FY 2005
budget--the $762 million increase for returning the Space Shuttle
safely to flight, consistent with the recommendations from the Columbia
Accident Investigation Board (CAIB), over $400 million in
Congressionally-directed items, $291 million for Hubble servicing, and
over $500 million in necessary programmatic cost increases, notably to
cover cost growth in several space science missions, including the Mars
Reconnaissance Orbiter, scheduled to be launched this August, and the
New Horizons mission to Pluto set to launch in early January 2006.
Identifying offsets needed to fund these items has created some
difficult choices for the Agency. Given a choice, I generally favor
eliminating lower-priority programs rather than reducing all programs
in the face of budget difficulties, because this allows for the more
efficient execution of the programs which remain. Thus, we must set
clear priorities to remain within the budget which has been allocated.
Allow me to be as clear as possible on what the impact of these
costs means to other programs. The Agency has adopted a ``go-as-you-
can-pay'' approach toward space exploration. Several NASA missions and
activities will need to be deferred or accomplished in other ways in
order to ensure adequate funding for the priorities of the President
and the Congress in FY 2005. NASA cannot do everything that we, and our
many stakeholders, would like to accomplish. Several missions will have
to be delayed, deferred, or canceled in order to pay for the missions
where the priorities were set by the President and Congress. We have
tried to be sensitive to the priorities of the affected research
communities, and have listened carefully to their input. For example,
we seek to impart a new balance among planetary science, Earth science,
solar physics, and astronomy within the overall science program by
revisiting our Mars exploration program strategy and mission sequence
and the schedule for advanced space telescopes such as the Space
Interferometry Mission (SIM) and Terrestrial Planet Finder (TPF).
NASA Priorities
Over the past year, NASA has made great strides in implementing the
Vision for Space Exploration and meeting other national priorities:
Shuttle Return-to-Flight--We are making final
preparations for the Space Shuttle return-to-flight planned for
mid-July.
International Space Station--The ISS began its fifth
year of continuous human presence on-orbit.
Exploring Our Solar System and the Universe--The Mars
rovers, Spirit and Opportunity, have exceeded all expectations
and made unprecedented discoveries; the Cassini/Huygens mission
is providing stunning views of Saturn and Titan; the Genesis
mission, despite its hard landing, has returned primordial
samples from space; new missions have been launched to Mercury
and to comets; and amazing discoveries continue with Hubble,
Chandra, and Spitzer.
Laying the Groundwork for the Future--We awarded
initial contracts in preparation for a major milestone in 2008
with the mapping of the Moon in unprecedented detail by the
Lunar Reconnaissance Orbiter (LRO).
Aeronautics--We are continuing to execute a portfolio
of focused, results-oriented technology demonstrations of next-
generation aircraft along with aviation safety, security, and
airspace systems. NASA, with its industry partners, recently
demonstrated the feasibility of significantly reducing the
sonic boom from supersonic aircraft, and, last November, NASA's
hypersonic X-43A demonstrated that an air-breathing engine can
fly at nearly 10 times the speed of sound.
Earth Science--We have completed deployment of the
Earth Observing System and are supporting investments in the
Global Change Science and Technology Program and the next
generation Earth observing satellites for numerous
applications, including improved weather forecasts, earthquake
prediction, resource management, and other hazard warnings.
NASA's Proposed FY 2006 Authorization Bill
On June 17, 2005, NASA transmitted its proposed FY 2006
Authorization Bill to the Congress. I look forward to working closely
with the House Science Committee and Senate Commerce Committee this
year to enact this important legislation.
Through NASA's proposed FY 2006 Authorization Bill we are
requesting a set of critical tools and authorities to implement the
Vision for Space Exploration consistent with the recommendations of the
Aldridge Commission. The provisions requested are an integral
complement of critical tools and authorities that will better equip
NASA to address the challenges we face in implementation of the Vision
for Space Exploration.
As the United States implements the Vision for Space Exploration,
the Administration recognizes the value of effective cooperation with
Russia to further our space exploration goals. At the same time, it is
essential that we appropriately maintain U.S. nonproliferation policy
and objectives in our relationship with Russia. Such a balanced
approach must include the Iran Nonproliferation Act of 2000 (INA),
which contains certain restrictions that complicate cooperation with
Russia on the International Space Station (ISS), and will also have an
adverse impact on cooperation with Russia on our future space
exploration efforts related to human space flight.
Over the last several months, NASA has been participating in an
interagency coordination process related to INA in an effort to develop
a solution to this issue that would provide NASA with needed
flexibility while still meeting our nation's nonproliferation
objectives. The interagency group has proposed a legislative solution
in the form of an amendment to the INA, which sustains the Act's
nonproliferation core, while allowing for continued NASA-Russian
cooperation on the ISS and human space flight endeavors.
It is expected that this approach will be delivered to Congress in
the very near future. To that end, the Administration looks forward to
working with Congress to ensure that the Vision for Space Exploration
is able to succeed while remaining fully consistent with broader U.S.
national security and nonproliferation goals.
In the Authorization bill, we are also requesting authority to
award prizes through Centennial Challenges. With this authority the
Agency will award prizes to stimulate innovation in basic, advanced,
and applied research; technology development; and, through prototype
demonstrations that have the potential for application for the
aeronautics and space activities of NASA. Instead of soliciting
proposals for a contract or grant, Centennial Challenges will identify
a challenge, the prize amount to be awarded for achieving that
challenge, and a set of rules by which teams will compete for that
prize. Centennial Challenges will help NASA meet technology challenges
while encouraging creativity and innovation in the private sector,
particularly in exploration.
NASA is placing a new emphasis on building an agile workforce, with
the right mix of permanent civil servants, other-than-permanent civil
servants, and contractors. As a result, we are seeking a set of
critical workforce management tools needed as the Agency engages in a
major transformation and restructures itself to achieve 21st Century
goals. Specifically, the Agency is seeking the authority to re-hire
annuitants without a salary offset to accommodate short-term emergency
or critical program needs; the ability to offset the expense of short-
term health care coverage for employees who are involuntarily separated
from the Agency and request extended coverage (as currently authorized
by law); provide incentives for permanent employees who voluntarily
convert to a time-limited appointment to minimize the need for other,
less desirable workforce reshaping actions; and provide additional
hiring flexibilities under collaborative research activities to further
enhance our partnerships.
Furthermore, NASA seeks the ability to realign real property assets
with Agency missions by expanding the current enhanced-use lease
authority beyond the current two center pilot projects, and allowing
NASA to retain the proceeds from the sale of real and personal
property.
Lastly, the proposed legislation requests intellectual property,
financial management, and administrative improvements to support NASA's
mission.
Affordability and Sustainability
In his February 2nd State of the Union Address, the President
underscored the need to restrain spending in order to sustain our
economic prosperity. As part of this restraint, it is important that
total discretionary and non-security spending be held to levels
proposed in the FY 2006 Budget. The budget savings and reforms in the
Budget are important components of achieving the President's goal of
cutting the budget deficit in half by 2009, and we urge the Congress to
support these reforms. The FY 2006 Budget includes more than 150
reductions, reforms, and terminations in non-defense discretionary
programs, of which three affect NASA programs. The Agency wants to work
with the Congress to achieve these savings.
To achieve the Vision for Space Exploration, NASA is proceeding, as
directed by the President, to plan and implement a sustainable and
affordable, integrated robotic and human exploration program,
structured with measurable milestones, and executed on the basis of
available resources, accumulated experience, and technology readiness.
Last year, we provided a long-range roadmap through 2020 to outline
this program:
The Space Shuttle will be retired by 2010. Prior to
its retirement, it will be utilized primarily for the assembly
of the ISS. Our top priority will be to make each flight safer
than the last one.
The new CEV and its associated launch system will
transport crews on exploration missions, and will also be
capable of ferrying astronauts to and from the Space Station.
The CEV will be developed in the latter part of this decade and
deployed operationally as soon as possible. The CEV will
conduct missions in Earth orbit, including missions to the ISS,
but its primary mission will be to support exploration of the
Moon and other destinations.
Robotic missions will continue to increase our
understanding of our home planet and will continue the
exploration of the solar system, traveling to the Moon and Mars
in anticipation of later human visits, as well as to other
destinations such as Mercury, Saturn, Pluto, asteroids, and
comets. Observatories will be deployed to search for Earth-like
planets and habitable environments around distant stars, and to
explore the universe to understand its origin, structure,
evolution, and destiny. The President's Budget requests
increased funding for these areas over the coming years, with
Science investments growing from 33 percent to 38 percent of
the Agency's total budget.
Human explorers will return to the Moon, possibly as
early as 2015--with the CEV as the first core element of a new
exploration architecture. Major development of the other
elements in the exploration architecture will commence later
this decade and will accelerate upon the retirement of the
Space Shuttle. These exploration elements will include launch
vehicles, in-space transfer systems, lunar landers, and surface
habitation systems. Critical research and technology investment
decisions will be guided by the development requirements of
these elements.
These human and robotic explorers will enable our exploration and
scientific plans. A recent report released on February 3, 2005, by the
National Research Council, entitled Science in NASA's Vision for Space
Exploration, states, ``Exploration done properly is a form of science.
Both robotic spacecraft and human space flight should be used to
fulfill scientific roles in NASA's mission to explore.'' To that end,
NASA has initiated an Exploration Systems Architecture Study (ESAS),
which will provide the analytical support for a number of key near-term
decisions for NASA, the White House, and Congress. The ESAS is a 90-day
study that is examining many of the larger questions associated with
the Vision for Space Exploration. Some of the topics the ESAS is
reviewing include the requirements for returning to the Moon and
extending human exploration to Mars, as well as possibilities for
accelerating the development of the Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV).
This team is expected to complete its work in July and we will keep
Congressional Committees informed as this study effort progresses.
This study effort will focus on four primary areas:
Complete assessment of the top-level CEV requirements
and plans to enable the CEV to provide crew transport to the
ISS and to accelerate the development of the CEV and crew
launch system.
Definition of top-level requirements and
configurations for crew and cargo launch systems to support the
lunar and Mars exploration programs.
Development of a reference lunar exploration
architecture concept to support sustained human and robotic
Lunar exploration operations.
Identification of key technologies required to enable
and significantly enhance these reference exploration systems,
and a re-prioritization of near-term and far-term technology
investments.
NASA is also currently examining alternative configurations for the
Space Station that meet the goals of the Vision and the needs of our
international partners, while maintaining safety as our highest
priority. In May 2005, we initiated the Shuttle/Station Configuration
Options Team (SSCOT). This team is conducting a 60-day study of the
configuration options for the ISS and assessing the related number of
flights needed by the Space Shuttle before it retires no later than the
year 2010. The scope of the Shuttle/Station Configuration Options Team
study spans ISS assembly, operations, and use and considers such
factors as international partner commitments, research utilization,
cost, and ISS sustainability. This team is expected to complete its
work in June, with those results integrated into the ongoing
Exploration Systems Architecture Study (ESAS).
NASA Priorities in the FY 2006 Budget Request
The President's FY 2006 budget request for NASA reaffirms the
funding strategy outlined above. NASA's FY 2006 request endeavors to
provide a balanced portfolio of programs to meet the needs of our
national priorities in aeronautics and civil space. It maintains focus
on key priorities, milestones, and schedules for the Vision introduced
in the FY 2005 budget.
To support the Administration's goal of reducing the deficit,
NASA's budget was reduced $0.5 billion in FY 2006 below the level
planned in the 2005 budget for FY 2006. In addition, returning the
Shuttle safely to flight will cost $0.4 billion more in FY 2006 than
previously estimated. To address these and other items, we proposed a
budget that provided $0.4 billion (11 percent) less for Exploration
Systems than previously planned for, $0.3 billion (five percent) less
in Science, $0.1 billion (11 percent) less in Aeronautics, and $0.2
billion (four percent) more in Space Operations. These changes were not
easy, but in the end, we made the decisions to protect the priorities
outlined above.
Science
The FY 2006 budget request of $5.5 billion for the Science Mission
Directorate will support 55 missions in orbit, 26 in development, and
34 in design phase. By 2010, the Science budget will increase by 23
percent over current levels.
The FY 2006 budget includes $858 million for Mars and Lunar robotic
exploration. The Mars rovers, Spirit and Opportunity, have far exceeded
all goals with their unprecedented discoveries and longevity. Last
year, the rovers found definitive evidence of an ancient body of water
on the Red Planet, and they continue to gather data more than a year
after their successful landing. We recently awarded contracts for six
instruments to be flown on the 2008 LRO that promises unprecedented
mapping of the Moon's surface. The 2008 LRO will be the first step in
revolutionizing our understanding of the Moon, in much the same way
that our Mars missions have transformed our understanding of Mars. As
mentioned earlier, to simplify the management chain-of-command among
mission directorates, our FY 2005 Operating Plan update transfers
management responsibility for the Lunar Exploration program, including
LRO, to the ESMD. This will help to maximize the exploration and
science benefits of this important program.
The budget also includes $218 million to maintain competitive
efforts for the Explorer Program, $56 million for the Beyond Einstein
program to study the universe, $234 million for studying the Sun in the
Living With a Star program, and $136 million for competitive
opportunities in the Earth System Science Pathfinder program. With our
international partners, we also continue to add to the constellation of
Earth-observing satellites that monitor our planet while extending our
reach and presence further into the solar system. NASA launched Aura to
look back at Earth and give us a better picture of our atmosphere and
changing climate, and the entire Earth Observing System continues to
return trillions of bytes of information about our dynamic Earth. In
the future, NASA plans to develop a ``sensor-web'' to provide timely,
on-demand data and analysis to users who can enable practical benefits
for scientific research, national policy-making, economic growth,
natural hazard mitigation, and the exploration of other planets in this
solar system and beyond.
NASA will continue to expand its exploration reach with an armada
of existing and new space observatories operating in many different
wavelengths and looking at different parts of our exotic universe. The
three ``Great Observatories''--Hubble, Spitzer, and Chandra--will
continue to bring wondrous images to our eyes and exciting new
scientific discoveries. Missions such as Kepler will provide a new
understanding and knowledge of the planets orbiting stars far from our
solar system.
This budget also includes $372 million to continue developing the
James Webb Space Telescope for a 2011 launch and provides $93 million
in development funds for the Hubble Space Telescope. This investment in
the Hubble, together with the synergistic use of the other two Great
Observatories, and combined with the greatly increased capability of
ground-based assets and the emergent science of optical interferometry,
will ensure many years of new scientific discoveries.
NASA's decision in January 2004 not to service the Hubble Space
Telescope was a very difficult one, given the Hubble's record of
spectacular successes. That decision was made at a time when
significant uncertainty remained regarding the technical solutions and
risks associated with return-to-flight. After the two successful Space
Shuttle flights needed to achieve our return-to-flight objectives, NASA
will have learned a great deal more regarding the risks and operations
of the vehicle than was known when the previous decision was made. I am
committed to reassessing this earlier decision after return-to-flight,
based on the relative risks to the Space Shuttle as well as the costs
and benefits to our nation's astronomy program. As a result, we are
continuing our efforts to preserve the option for a Shuttle servicing
mission for Hubble. Consistent with this ongoing activity, NASA's FY
2005 Operating Plan update has fully funded the $291 million identified
in the Conference Report accompanying the FY 2005 Consolidated
Appropriations bill and has consolidated the funding and management
responsibility within the Science Mission Directorate. NASA will use
the balance of the FY 2005 funds to maintain options for HST servicing
and de-orbit. NASA has also begun the analysis of how a de-orbit module
for the Hubble Space Telescope could be added to the manifest of such a
Space Shuttle servicing mission. I will make a decision regarding a
Shuttle servicing mission for Hubble following the success of the first
two Return-to-Flight missions. In the interim, the Agency will keep all
stakeholders apprised as this work progresses. NASA remains committed
to a world-class, affordable program of space-based astronomy.
Preparing for Exploration
The FY 2006 budget request of $3.2 billion for the ESMD includes
$753 million for continuing development of the CEV, the vehicle that
will serve as the core element for future exploration beyond Earth
orbit. The CEV promises safer travel for astronauts into space,
continuing U.S. human access to space after retirement of the Shuttle.
The CEV will first conduct missions in Earth orbit, but its primary
mission will be to support exploration of the Moon and other
destinations. Our earlier plans called for operational deployment of
the CEV not later than 2014. However, we are now seeking programmatic
alternatives to allow development of the CEV to be completed as soon as
possible. Acceleration of the CEV program will be accomplished by down-
selecting to a single contractor sooner than originally planned, and by
deferring other elements of the Exploration Systems Research and
Technology plan not required for the CEV or for the early phases of
human return to the Moon.
The first CEV missions to Earth orbit will include docking with the
ISS. NASA's Exploration Systems Mission Directorate will be responsible
for developing and acquiring both crew and cargo services to support
the International Space Station, and funds have been transferred to
that Directorate. We plan to leverage our nation's commercial space
industry to meet NASA's needs for ISS cargo logistics and potentially
crew support.
Going forward, the Agency will need a launch system for the CEV,
one which does not at present exist. Two possibilities exist by which
we might obtain such a vehicle. The first is to develop a launch system
derived from Shuttle components, specifically the SRB with a new upper
stage. The second option is to upgrade the proposed heavy-lift versions
of EELV with a new upper stage. As NASA Administrator, I must be a
responsible steward of our funds, and a key aspect of the Agency's
analysis of alternatives will be to capitalize on existing technical
and workforce assets in a cost-effective and efficient way. NASA's goal
is to develop a CEV capable of operating safely soon after the
retirement of the Space Shuttle.
The FY 2006 budget request included $919 million (a 27 percent
increase) for Exploration Systems Research and Technology (ESR&T) that
will enable designs for sustainable exploration; though, as mentioned,
elements of that program will now be deferred to accelerated the CEV.
Other ESR&T elements include $34 million for a revamped technology
transfer program and $34 million for the Centennial Challenges prize
program. The Agency continues to seek the support of the Congress for
authorization to enable larger prize awards.
This budget also includes $320 million for a restructured
Prometheus Nuclear Systems and Technology Theme for space-qualified
nuclear systems. The technology and capabilities being developed by the
Prometheus Nuclear Systems and Technology Theme are critical for
enabling the power and propulsion needs of the Vision for Space
Exploration. As part of the Agency's effort to define an Exploration
Systems Architecture, NASA will examine alternative nuclear systems,
including surface nuclear power, nuclear thermal, and nuclear electric
systems. NASA will restructure Prometheus for space-qualified nuclear
systems to support human and robotic missions with clear priorities
focused on near-term needs. We expect to make program decisions to
focus our nuclear technology efforts on our highest priorities for
near-term applications as part of the Exploration Architecture study,
to be completed this summer. In addition, the FY 2006 budget request
provides $806 million for Human Systems Research and Technology, which
has been restructured so that its programs are now linked directly to
exploration requirements for human missions to the Moon, Mars, and
beyond.
Aeronautics Research
NASA's FY 2006 request for the Aeronautics Research Mission
Directorate is $852 million, a significant portion of the government's
overall investment in aeronautics research. To make the most of this
investment, NASA's technical expertise and facilities for aeronautics
research are becoming more focused and results-oriented. NASA's current
aeronautics research is focused on enhancing the public good. NASA is
also working to maintain a strong basic aeronautics research program
and to establish a series of far-reaching objectives, each of which, if
enabled, could significantly transform civil aeronautics. The results
from the basic research, technology development, and demonstrations
achieved by NASA's Aeronautics efforts will be transitioned for use by
both Government and industry. The President's FY 2006 request increased
the vital research of the Aeronautics program in Aviation Safety and
Security and in Airspace Systems. These two priority programs are fully
funded to ensure timely results critical to meeting national goals.
NASA works closely and constructively with other Executive Branch
agencies to enhance our nation's aeronautics capability. In this vein,
NASA, along with the Departments of Defense, Homeland Security,
Commerce, and Transportation, is a principal member of the interagency
Joint Planning and Development Office (JPDO), which was chartered by
the Century of Aviation Revitalization Act to oversee research and
technology efforts for the Next Generation Air Transportation System.
NASA is working closely with industry consortia and other government
agencies to develop advanced aircraft demonstrations, such as those
that would expand the capabilities of high-altitude, long-endurance,
unmanned aerial vehicles, which could have numerous commercial,
scientific, and homeland security applications.
At this time, NASA is also working with other U.S. Government
departments and agencies and industry to assess its facilities for
aeronautics research. NASA will need to consider the possibility of
closing some under-utilized aeronautics facilities, while modernizing
some others to become state-of-the-art facilities.
As we move forward, a broader national dialog on aeronautics R&D
goals may be appropriate as we enter the second century of aviation.
These discussions should include a range of stakeholders and customers,
including the Congress. This process could lead to a national consensus
for aeronautics R&D goals.
Education
NASA's FY 2006 budget request includes $167 million for the Office
of Education to support programs in science, technology, engineering,
and math education. NASA will establish clear goals, metrics, and
monitoring capabilities for its education initiatives in the coming
months to ensure that these funds will achieve the greatest benefit.
Space Shuttle and International Space Station
The FY 2006 budget request of $6.8 billion for the Space Operations
Mission Directorate (SOMD) reflects the first step in the Vision for
Space Exploration: returning the Space Shuttle safely to flight and
resuming flight operations. Going forward, all SOMD expenditures will
be consistent with the retirement of the Space Shuttle by 2010, while
maintaining operational safety of flight throughout the program. The FY
2006 budget includes $4.5 billion for the Space Shuttle program. The
budget also provides $1.9 billion for the ISS. NASA currently is
examining configurations for the Space Station that meet the goals of
the Vision for Space Exploration and needs of our international
partners, while requiring as few Shuttle flights as possible to
complete assembly.
A key element in the future of the ISS program is the purchase of
alternate cargo transportation services to supplement the Space
Shuttle, and the development of new crew transportation capabilities to
replace Shuttle when it retires. Because the ESMD has the mission to
develop and acquire such crew and cargo capabilities for the ISS and
beyond, I have transferred management responsibility for the activities
and budget of ISS Cargo/Crew Services to ESMD from SOMD, as stated in
the May update to NASA's FY 2005 Operating Plan. The budget request
before the Congress provides $160 million for these services in 2006.
As a top Return-to-Flight (RTF) priority, NASA has made dozens of
changes to the External Tank (ET) design to reduce both foam and ice
debris from shedding during ascent. These changes include an improved
bipod design that now excludes using foam and a new design for the area
around the liquid oxygen feed line bellows. Each of these changes
incorporates electric heaters to eliminate an unacceptable debris risk
to the Orbiter caused by ice buildup on the ET. The new designs are
presently installed on the ET for Discovery's flight (STS-114) and will
be included on all those to be used in the future.
We have also made more than 100 major modifications and upgrades to
Discovery and its supporting systems, including new cabling and wiring
for sensors placed in the wing leading edge of each wing, a digital
camera for monitoring any debris impacting the underside of the
Orbiter, and a boom extension for the Shuttle's robotic arm that will
enable us to inspect nearly all the outside areas of the Orbiter's
Thermal Protection System after achieving orbit. Additionally,
technicians at KSC have installed the redesigned Forward Reaction
Control System Carrier Panels and the Reinforced Carbon-Carbon Nose
Cap. Technicians have also installed 88 new sensors in the leading edge
of each wing, of which 66 will measure acceleration and impact data and
22 will measure temperature profiles during Discovery's ascent to
orbit. These data will be down-linked to the ground to be used as a cue
for pointing to areas in the thermal protection system needing further
inspection by the boom mounted sensor system. These are just several of
the extensive changes we have made to the hardware to mitigate the
effects of debris shedding from the External Tank. Discovery and its
propulsion elements are now at the launch pad undergoing the final
tests and checks required prior to launch, currently scheduled to occur
not earlier than July 13, 2005.
Transforming NASA
The CAIB was clear in its assessment that the lack of open
communication on technical and programmatic matters was as much a cause
of the loss of Columbia as the shedding of the foam. We have understood
and embraced this assessment, and are absolutely and completely
committed to creating an environment of openness and free-flowing
communication by continuing to assess our leadership practices.
For the last three decades, NASA and the Nation's human space
flight program have been focused on the development and operation of
the Space Shuttle and the Space Station. In its final report, the CAIB
was very forthright in its judgment that these goals are too limited to
justify the expense, difficulty, and danger inherent in human space
flight, given the limitations of today's technology. The CAIB was
equally forthright in calling for a national consensus in the
establishment of a program having broader strategic goals. The Vision
for Space Exploration proposed by the President is that program, and
NASA has embraced this new direction. But to effect these changes, NASA
must engage in a major transformation--taking the capabilities we have
throughout the Agency and restructuring them to achieve these 21st
Century goals. This is an enormous challenge, but we have begun to
transform our entire organization to foster these changes and to
enhance a positive, mission-driven culture.
Embracing Competition--NASA is embracing competition
as a way to elicit the best from NASA's Centers, industry, and
academia. The Agency is using competitive processes to
encourage more cost-effective, innovative solutions to the
scientific and technical challenges presented by the Vision.
Over the past year, competitive selections in exploration have
demonstrated increased collaboration between NASA's Centers and
industry and academia. The engine of competition is the primary
force behind the American economy, the greatest the world has
ever known, and we plan to make greater use of this engine than
has been the case at NASA in the past. NASA plans to pursue
appropriate partnerships with the entrepreneurial and
commercial space sector to the maximum practical extent.
The Role of the Centers--While competitive processes
are crucial to maintaining NASA at the ``cutting edge'' of
science and technology, we must acknowledge that the NASA
Centers and other federal research and development laboratories
exist, and have existed for decades, precisely because
industrial competition does not serve to accomplish all of our
national goals. In order to accomplish the national goals set
forth by the President and Congress, NASA must set realistic
priorities within limited resources. NASA Centers will have an
important role in definition of the architecture and
requirements for exploration beyond low-Earth orbit, and for
the systems engineering and integration functions used in
building the systems of that architecture. We will continue to
assess the skill-mix that we require, the number of people we
require, their location, and how we are organizing ourselves to
fulfill our obligations to the President and Congress. To begin
to create some of the workforce flexibility necessary for the
future, NASA has offered voluntary separation incentives
(buyouts) to employees in positions identified with excess
competencies. To the extent that NASA's workforce needs
revitalization, NASA is proposing legislative initiatives to
the Congress as part of the Agency's draft FY 2006
Authorization Bill. Congress's enactment of the NASA
Flexibility Act of 2004 is also helping the Agency toward that
end, and additional authorities will provide even more aid in
managing the Agency's workforce.
Improved Decision-making--NASA recently transformed
its organizational reporting in order to provide more
integrated decision-making. NASA field Center Directors now
report directly to the Administrator, and I am drafting a
position description for a new Associate Administrator who will
manage the internal activities of the Agency. The Office of
Education reports directly to the Director of Strategic
Communications, who is also in charge of Public Affairs,
External Relations, and Legislative Affairs, in order to
provide a more integrated picture of what NASA is doing and can
do for its stakeholders and public. NASA's new Office of
Program Analysis and Evaluation has been created in order to
provide analyses and assessments for strategic planning and
budgeting decisions, independent cost estimates, evaluation of
projects at major milestones, and feedback from the Centers on
their capabilities and work climate. This is to ensure that the
acquisition strategies, if done as planned, are executable,
have exit and entrance criteria, contain clear approval
milestones, and involve independent reviews.
Improving Financial Management--For the past two
years, NASA has received a disclaimer of audit opinion on its
annual financial statements due largely to two issues--
financial system conversion, and accounting for property, plant
and equipment, and materials and supplies. In FY 2003, NASA
converted the 10 separate NASA Center accounting systems and
the associated 120 subsidiary systems, along with over 12 years
of historical financial data, into a single integrated agency-
wide core accounting system. Problems associated with this
conversion have been greater than expected and are taking
longer than expected to correct. I regard improvement of NASA's
financial management as one of my priorities.
Capital Asset Management--The management of NASA's
capital assets, valued at $37.6 billion (83 percent of NASA's
assets on the balance sheet), is a significant challenge for
the Agency. Historically, the management systems to provide
proper valuation and tracking of assets have not been
sufficient to meet the rigors of review without significant
compensating controls and manual effort. Another challenge we
are facing is that the costs of many facilities that could be
deemed ``national assets'' were being born as direct charges to
our projects causing an unequal competitive base among our
field centers. Through the Integrated Asset Management (IAM)
project we are steadily creating the proper controls to provide
tracking and valuation needed to account for the many types of
assets that exist within NASA. Realistically, the successful
completion of the IAM project will take time. We are validating
the requirements for asset management methods to ensure they
comply with audit requirements while we simultaneously update
existing tracking systems to modern platforms. For our
``national assets'' we plan to create a new funding structure
aimed at ensuring the Centers have a chance to compete on an
equal footing. Placing the national asset funding in a
separate, carefully managed account will help create a level
playing field and encourage broad scale use. A great deal of
attention is being placed on asset management to ensure that
the new methods and systems we devise provide a robust and
enduring solution to the challenges the Agency has faced in
resolving this significant issue.
The Nation's Future in Exploration and Discovery
The aftermath of the tragic loss of the Space Shuttle Columbia on
February 1, 2003, brought us to a watershed moment in the American
civil space program. Choices had to be made. The President has put
forth a choice, a strategic vision for the space program. That vision
has been enunciated with exceptional clarity, and has been subjected to
considerable public debate for over a year. While differences of
opinion exist, the President's proposal has attained broad strategic
acceptance. As a nation, we can clearly afford well-executed vigorous
programs in robotic and human space exploration, Earth science, and
aeronautics research.
For America to continue to be preeminent among nations, it is
necessary for us to be the preeminent space-faring nation. It is
equally true that great nations need allies and partners in this
journey. That is what the Vision for Space Exploration is about.
As President George W. Bush said, ``We choose to explore space
because doing so improves our lives and lifts our national spirit. So
let us continue the journey.''
Dr. Griffin. Thank you.
Discussion
Timetable for Information
Chairman Boehlert. Let me continue on with my series of
questions on when.
When do you expect that we will have some report on the
number of flights the Space Shuttle will make before its
retirement, the purpose of those flights, and the expected date
of the final flight?
Dr. Griffin. Again, sir, later this summer.
Chairman Boehlert. Later this summer we are going to be in
the August recess, so----
Dr. Griffin. No. Okay, we will be discussing--we are
examining--as I sit here, a team of bright and dedicated
engineers with substantial experience in the business and on
Space Station, in particular, are looking at all of the
available options by which we might complete the assembly of
the Space Station consistent with our obligations to our
partners and our research agenda while remaining within the
requirement to retire the Shuttle by 2010. I just mentioned
that there will not be available 28 flights, and so we must
work with less, and we must make some determination as to what
amount of work is left over for the new system to complete.
We will be--we are close to the end of that exercise.
During the month of July, we will be discussing those
alternatives within the Administration, and as soon as we can
do so, with your committee and other Members of Congress.
Chairman Boehlert. So is it fair to say the September time
frame would be a----
Dr. Griffin. Absolutely not later than that, sir.
Chairman Boehlert. All right. Thank you very much.
And when might we have a description of the means, other
than the Space Shuttle, that might be used to ferry crew and
cargo to the International Space Station?
Dr. Griffin. Again, in that same time frame, because that
depends upon the results of a parallel study on exploration
systems architecture, and I think you know that the President
has required that the so-called Crew Exploration Vehicle, which
will provide the fundamental building block for returning
astronauts to the Moon, must also be capable of ferrying
astronauts to and from the Space Station. And so again, later
this summer----
Chairman Boehlert. That same time frame for a description
of the launch vehicle for a CEV?
Dr. Griffin. Absolutely, yes, sir.
Chairman Boehlert. All right. And now this one is a sticky
wicket, but the plan for the operation of the International
Space Station in the event that the Iran Nonproliferation Act
of 2000 is not amended.
Dr. Griffin. That will take longer. If--we are in--for the
Administration, we are planning to seek recommendations for
that act to allow us to utilize the Station together with our
Russian partners. If that act is not amended, then, at present,
the only plan we really have for utilizing the Space Station
would be while the Space Shuttle is docked at the Station. At
times other than that, after 2006, the United States would not
be able to keep astronauts----
Chairman Boehlert. April 2006 you are saying?
Dr. Griffin. April 2006. That is correct, sir. So if the
act is not amended and NASA would not be able to have U.S.
astronauts on board the Station, other than when the Shuttle is
there.
Chairman Boehlert. And the Shuttle can be there a couple of
weeks?
Dr. Griffin. A couple of weeks.
Chairman Boehlert. All right. A description of any heavy-
lift vehicle the Administration intends to develop, the
intended uses of that vehicle, and whether the decision to
develop that vehicle has undergone, or is undergoing, an
interagency review.
Dr. Griffin. All of the architecture that we intend to put
forward this summer will undergo interagency review. That is an
unequivocal statement. For heavy-lift vehicles capable of
returning us to the Moon, I have made no secret of the fact
that I believe a Shuttle-derived architecture wherein we retire
the orbiter and utilize the remaining elements of the Shuttle
structure, the engines, the tanks, the rocket boosters, will
provide us a 100 metric ton class payload capability. And the--
but from where we are today, that is the shortest path to such
a capability.
Chairman Boehlert. Of the intended purpose of lunar
missions and the architecture for those missions?
Dr. Griffin. And sir, later this summer, certainly not
later than September. That is a study that is ongoing. And I
realize--I fully respect Mr. Gordon's remarks, and yours, that
it has been now almost 18 months since the President's
announcement of the vision for exploration and that it might
well be said that we owe you, and have owed you for some time,
those plans and those architectures. I do take responsibility
for that.
Chairman Boehlert. Well, it is an agency in transition. We
understand that.
Dr. Griffin. It is in transition, and we do not believe
that the problem needs to be as complicated as some have said,
and we are--we have been working since I arrived, and we are
working today in order to be able to provide you with those
top-level plans, architectures, approaches, and budgets later
this summer.
Chairman Boehlert. Well, one of your great skills is your
ability to take complicated matters and provide some
simplification, and we are looking forward to that.
How about the project goals for Project Prometheus?
Dr. Griffin. I have--if I have an ability to simplify
things, it is because I must to remain within my own
limitations, but thank you.
Project Prometheus is extremely important. The utilization
of nuclear power in space for electric power and propulsion has
no stronger advocates than I, and I know that this committee
knows that, because I have said that in prior testimony.
However, in a world of limited resources, as I looked at our
program going forward, I could not justify placing as the first
goal of Project Prometheus, the development of a nuclear
electric propulsion system to send a scientific mission to
Europa. There are--that mission was at $11 billion and counting
for cost estimates before we got off the drawing board, and I,
in the face of competing priorities, simply could not endorse
that. Moreover, the nearest term need that we have for nuclear
capability in space will be surface power on the Moon in the
middle or toward the end of the next decade.
So to the extent that we wish to devote resources to
exploring Europa, and I do, and we will be submitting such a
program, I chose not to link the exploration of Europa with the
development of nuclear electric propulsion to do so. And to the
extent that I believe in the importance of nuclear power and
propulsion in space, and I do, I have chosen to devote our
early resources to the development of lunar power--sorry,
surface power for lunar missions.
Chairman Boehlert. Let me, before turning to Mr. Gordon,
whose indulgence I appreciate, but these are really consensus
questions.
Dr. Griffin. I understand, sir.
Chairman Boehlert. And we are all searching.
The final thing is when might we expect a plan for managing
the cost overruns for the James Webb Space Telescope?
Dr. Griffin. Again, sir, I was apprised of those potential
cost overruns last month. Within 48 hours of having been so
apprised, we, at NASA, chartered a special team to review those
costs with the action to reduce them where possible or where
they are real, to recognize them and to replan the rest of the
program around them. The James Webb Space Telescope is the
centerpiece of our astronomy program going forward, no question
about it, but we need to make sure that we have an executable
program with realistic dates. When we have that information,
again, not later than the end of this summer, I will bring it
to this committee.
Chairman Boehlert. It is very apparent that you have a lot
of busy days ahead, and we don't expect you to wave a magic
wand and perform miracles, but I hope you can appreciate the
desire on the part of this committee, on both sides, to get
answers to some of these basic questions that guide us as we go
forward with charting the course for the future of NASA.
Dr. Griffin. Sir, I could not more fully understand and
appreciate the need to do that. And I--we are with you in this
search for answers. And as rapidly as we can provide responsive
and reasonably complete answers, this committee will have them.
Chairman Boehlert. Thank you very much.
Mr. Gordon.
Budget Firewalls
Mr. Gordon. First of all, let me say, Mr. Chairman, thank
you for getting those questions on the record. I think it is
important for us to, in our mission of oversight, and quite
frankly, I say that we haven't done as good a job of oversight
as we should have in the past, because we haven't gotten those
kinds of answers. And I think, Dr. Griffin, your suggestion of
September is realistic and reasonable. You have got a lot to
review. But I will also point out, that is only a few days
before the beginning of the fiscal year, which is again why I
would suggest that there not be major redefining of NASA and of
some of the goals there until you have a chance to get through
this. So I would hope that you keep that in mind.
And let me move forward with my questions.
Dr. Griffin, in my opening statement, I mentioned a number
of changes that have been made to NASA's exploration program
since you arrived. I did that not to question your decisions
but to make the point that a lot is in flux within NASA's
exploration program. And a lot of what Congress and the
industry was told last year is no longer relevant.
Unfortunately, NASA has a history of such changes. The Space
Station program seemed to change almost every year since its
initiation in the mid-1980s, and I understand you are now
considering restructuring it again. In 1994, NASA announced its
single stage to orbit launch vehicle program with much fanfare.
A few years later, the program was canceled before the X-33
test vehicle even flew.
Then NASA announced that it was instead going to initiate
the space launch vehicle within the goals of developing a next-
generation reusable launch vehicle and other advanced
technologies. A few years later, NASA canceled the space launch
initiative and said that its new plan was to build an Orbital
Space Plane. Well, the Orbital Space Plane program last year
was also canceled.
Then last year, NASA announced its plan to develop a Crew
Exploration Vehicle, using a spiral development approach. This
program apparently, the CEV program, is being restructured and
the acquisition approach changed. And many other changes are
apparently being made to the exploration program. That may be
the best thing to do, and I think it probably is, Dr. Griffin,
but given NASA's record, it is hard to take that on faith.
So, Dr. Griffin, you are not going to have a lot of room to
maneuver when it comes to the budgets, which you will likely
see over the next few years. So how do you plan to ensure that
your exploration program is not subject to the same errant
changes that we have seen from NASA in the past? In other
words, what are you going to do differently? And also, do you
feel that it is necessary to set up firewalls? Or what are you
going to do in these tough budget times to stop poaching into
other areas of NASA's budget? Or do you think that is
necessary? And is it inevitable that will happen?
Dr. Griffin. Let me answer the last question first, sir, if
I might.
I don't believe that we are allowing the manned space
flight program to poach onto other areas. I have committed,
often and publicly, that I intend to, want to, and will protect
NASA's science program from the demands of human space flight,
and frankly, vice versa. If the James Webb Space Telescope
overruns, it is the problem of the astronomy folks, not the
Shuttle folks. They have their own problems.
Mr. Gordon. Do you see setting up firewalls or what, other
than just good faith? And how do you intend to try to do that?
Dr. Griffin. Well, I don't think, sir, that we need legal
firewalls, because the preservation of flexibility, in the
event of an emergency, is always important, as, for example, in
recovering returning to flight from Columbia, we--NASA did not
receive a supplemental as we did in the Challenger--the
aftermath of the Challenger disaster. And so, if we were to
return-to-flight, there was no alternative but to reprogram
funds. And this committee, and others, were very helpful in
allowing us to do that.
So I think the avoidance of----
Mr. Gordon. There was a process----
Dr. Griffin. Pardon, sir?
Mr. Gordon. There was a process there----
Dr. Griffin. There was.
Mr. Gordon.--that allowed you to meet those emergencies.
Dr. Griffin. And I would use that process again. So I would
rather avoid legal restrictions on flexibility, and I would
rather rely on working with this committee to establish the
correctness and the utility of the decisions that are being
made. You mentioned that you didn't want to appear to be
questioning my decisions. On the contrary, sir, I think you
should. If I make decisions that cannot stand up to the light
of day, I think they should be questioned.
Mr. Gordon. Well, we may do that in September once we hear
them.
Dr. Griffin. Yes, sir.
You asked what we will be doing different.
First of all, I hope never again to let the words ``spiral
development'' cross my lips. That is an approach to acquisition
for large systems, very relevant to DOD acquisition
requirements, but I have not seen the relevance to NASA, and I
have preferred a much more direct approach, and that is what we
will be recommending and implementing.
What else will be different? I hope that you will see, as
we bring it forward, a very straightforward plan to replace the
Shuttle and a very straightforward architecture for lunar
return. That, on the face of it, will seem to you that if we
are to do these things that the approach being recommended is a
logical, clean, simple, straightforward approach.
We--you mentioned, sir, in your opening remarks, the--
postponing the arrival date at Mars in order that we can do the
proper things now, and I agree. The money that is being spent
that is being tagged with exploration initiative funding in
these early years is really, almost entirely, for the
completion of the Space Station and for the development of the
Crew Exploration Vehicle. That is what is being done with the
money that is being provided. And in fact, we need all of it
that we can get in order that we not have, in my view, a
strategically undesirable gap between the retirement of the
Shuttle and brining online the CEV.
I don't think it is too soon to undertake the redefinition
of what we are doing in NASA that you have mentioned. I don't
think we need a year to take a deep breath, because in the
course of that year, we would be spending a lot of money. There
are many things, which were on the table when I walked in the
door at NASA, that needed to be reexamined, and I felt,
honestly, sir, that the soonest that we could do that and stop
spending money in directions that we felt were unprofitable and
unpalatable, the soonest that I could do that would be none too
soon.
We have submitted to this Congress the--a revised operating
plan for 2005. We will be putting forward a budget amendment
for fiscal year 2006 to reflect some of these changes in
priorities.
Chairman Boehlert. Thank you very much.
Mr. Calvert.
Mr. Calvert. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Returning to Flight
Obviously, the hot topic on the news today is returning to
flight. And last evening, there was a report that indicated
there were some problems but that they anticipate returning to
flight soon. I just thought we would ask your current
assessment of the plans to return the Shuttle to flight. And do
you still anticipate that we will be able to do that launch on
July 13?
Dr. Griffin. Let me start with the end.
Yes, sir. We have several days of slack available between
today and launch on July 13. We look like we are in pretty good
shape there. We have a flight readiness review, the formal
flight readiness review, tomorrow and Thursday, which I will be
attending. In fact, I will be leaving this evening for Kennedy
Space Center. I have participated in every technical review
that was appropriate for me to do since coming on board as
Administrator. And I believe I have acquired a pretty good
picture of where we are with respect to the technical
requirements to return-to-flight. I have been tremendously
impressed with the work that the team has done in executing
those improvements, and I think, based on what I know now, we
are ready to go. The flight readiness review for the next
couple of days will either uncover an exception to that
statement or will endorse it. And we will all see.
Mr. Calvert. That is good to hear.
The Centrifuge
One of the questions that you answered indicated an obvious
situation that we are not going to be able to fly the 28
Shuttle missions that were anticipated to finish the
International Space Station to some degree that some folks
would like to happen. I was wondering, with regard to the
Centrifuge, when do you see the future of that, and are we
going to be able to move forward with human exploration without
performing that research that the Centrifuge was to provide? Or
is there another way to get that Centrifuge up there?
Dr. Griffin. Well, the--in the fullness of time, there is
always a way to get anything up there. The Centrifuge
accommodation module was--is being considered as to whether or
not it should be flown, given the focus of Station research on
the effects on the human organism of microgravity. Centrifuge
can't, of course, accommodate a human. It can accommodate
tissue or small animals for fundamental, cellular-based, life
science research. That sort of research at the cellular level
is not directly applicable and would not be for many years to
problems of flying humans on voyages back to the Moon or Mars.
And so in that sense of reorienting the Station's mission to
focus on human exploration rather than fundamental life science
research, the Centrifuge accommodation module is in----
[inaudible].
Financial Management
Mr. Calvert. One other question I have that--I know that
you have only been there a couple of months, but as you know,
for the last three of the four years, NASA has been unable to
produce auditable financial statements. Auditors have
highlighted a number of weaknesses with NASA's financial
statements, as you know. So what is your assessment, so far, of
this situation, and what do you have in mind to fix it?
Dr. Griffin. The situation is deplorable. It is
unacceptable that NASA cannot meet the standards for financial
acumen to which it holds its contractors. We--I was apprised of
this during my preconfirmation visits here on the Hill and
scarcely a week has gone by that I have not been reminded of
it. We have provided additional personnel and additional
budgetary resources to address the issue. We have, in fact,
invited leading financial management experts from other federal
agencies to review our plans and have incorporated their
suggestions. I have empowered the CFO to execute these plans
and take actions that should produce a long-term financial
health of the Agency.
We are trying to--we have three core priorities that we are
trying to achieve. The first exercise is to generate a clean
opinion from our auditors, just to simply know where all our
money is and have our auditors agree that we do. With regard to
developing our budget, we want to resolve issues of how we
control our funding distribution, how we should standardize our
financial data structure, and how we are going to standardize
our budget formulation process. And finally, we need to
standardize our management reporting methodology and financial
management metric. We--our major challenges are to reconcile
the fund balance with treasury accounts, to provide an
auditable evaluation of our property plant and equipment and
environmental liabilities, and to improve our financial data
integrity and compliance with the Federal Accounting Standards
board and OMB and Treasury requirements.
We know the challenge in front of us. We are getting the
best external and internal help that we can to execute it. I
take it very seriously.
Mr. Calvert. Thank you, Doctor, and I look forward to
working with the Chairman to have, maybe, a hearing about this
later on and be more specific on this problem.
Dr. Griffin. Yes, sir.
Chairman Boehlert. Thank you very much.
Mr. Udall.
Mr. Udall. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Dr. Griffin, if we could, I would like to focus on the
aeronautics side to the equation and also ask you a couple of
questions about Hubble.
Aeronautics
As I mentioned in my opening statement, there has been a
steady drumbeat of task force reports and testimony that make a
compelling case that NASA's aeronautics program is at serious
risk. The five-year funding trend contained in the President's
2006 budget, I think, could render the aeronautics side of the
equation irrelevant. Could you just comment, as the NASA
Administrator, on what you are planning to do, if anything, to
reverse that decline?
Dr. Griffin. Well, the President's budget for aeronautics
is what it is. And what I am committed to do is utilizing that
budget in the most effective way possible. I absolutely believe
in the importance of aeronautics for NASA and for this nation,
and I understand that we have stakeholders in industry, in DOD,
with the FAA, and even internally within NASA, all of whom to
which the aeronautics program is of first rank.
I think we need to focus our efforts going forward more
than they have been. I think NASA does its best when our
aeronautics programs are focused around key technical
demonstrations, which are of a groundbreaking nature. We have
had much in the aeronautics community, which is of a business-
as-usual, keep-funding, keep-programs-alive nature, and I am
looking to restructure. I have been, in fact, one of the
voices, noting that the last time the Nation had a strategic
plan in aeronautics, it was issued by the Office of Science and
Technology Policy, and the date it carried was 1982. I have the
report. I am in full support of this committee's and the
House's recommendation that we have a new aeronautics strategy.
Mr. Udall. Do I hear you say, then, that you more
aggressively promote the aeronautics side of the NASA mission?
Dr. Griffin. Within the context of the President's budget,
I absolutely will. I am a strong supporter of our aeronautics
program. I think we need to be looking at what we can do with
almost $1 billion in funding rather than complaining constantly
that it isn't enough.
Mr. Udall. But if I could, I would ask you, and I think you
would have a lot of support on the Committee, to push for
additional funding. I think the flat-line trend puts us further
behind the eight ball, and it is my opinion that the results,
the economic return, on the aeronautic side, is equal to that
of the space side. Could we count on you to push for--within
the context of your responsibilities, additional funding, at
least to keep pace with inflation?
Dr. Griffin. Sir, my first priority will be to
effectively--to utilize effectively the money that we are
given. I will be working with this committee and other
executive agencies to do that.
Mr. Udall. Let me turn--and I think this conversation will
continue, if I might conclude in that way----
Dr. Griffin. Sure.
Mr. Udall.--because I do think the aeronautics side is
crucial across the whole series of fronts.
Hubble Space Telescope
Let us turn to Hubble. Again, I want to thank you for your
willingness to revisit the Hubble policy. I know you have asked
a team out at Goddard to start planning for such a mission.
Could you talk about what they are doing? And then would you
talk about your comment that after the first two successful
return-to-flight missions, and I am going to presume, as we all
do here, that these are going to be successful return-to-flight
missions, what are the criteria you are going to use to decide
whether to proceed with the Hubble servicing mission?
Dr. Griffin. There are some detailed test objectives to be
accomplished on these flights that have to do--that do affect
our ability to execute Hubble Servicing Mission 4, SM-4, as it
is known. They have to do with available crew time for EVA,
other EVA guidelines, use of the manipulator arm for tile
inspections. What we do with regard to those procedures, they
need to be worked out before we can fully commit--before I
could responsibly commit to you that we should undertake the
servicing mission. What I have said in prior testimony and in
public remarks is that by this fall, when we have completed
those two missions, we will know those answers. And if those
answers are favorable, then I will recommend that we execute
Hubble Servicing Mission 4 with the Shuttle and restore the
Hubble to health and to a stable orbit for, you know, the next
half dozen years or more.
Mr. Udall. Doctor, do you have any cost estimates on the
Hubble servicing mission and any sense of how much might be
funded by the science account in the fiscal year 2006?
Dr. Griffin. I don't have those estimates currently, no, I
am sorry. We can provide those to you for the record. I have
also not looked at, yet, the structure of what that mission
might consist. Much of the cost depends on the assumptions that
go into the mission, and we have not flown--all of the missions
we have flown of that vein beforehand, of course, were prior to
the loss of Columbia, and we need to think through how we would
intend to do this mission.
Chairman Boehlert. The gentleman's time has expired.
Let me ask you, Mr. Administrator, and come closer to the
microphone, because we are anxious to hear what you have to
say.
Dr. Griffin. Oh, I am sorry.
Chairman Boehlert. Is it still the operative plan within
NASA, as you undergo this strategic review in your workforce,
that there will be no layoffs, at least until 2007, if then?
Dr. Griffin. I believe that is where we are at present.
Chairman Boehlert. Okay. Thank you very much.
Mr. Rohrabacher.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
And I would like to welcome the new Administrator. Thank
you very much.
The Iran Nonproliferation Act
Let me note that our Chairman compared you to the man from
La Mancha, which I found very disturbing, Mr. Chairman. In
fact, after considering that of the four top NASA executives,
that all four of them are leaving, will be gone shortly, I
think that we should compare you more to Conan the Barbarian
rather than the man from La Mancha. So--but we--but our
governor in California has already secured himself that
designation. So we will be searching for an appropriate title
that will exemplify your Administration.
Let me note that you have started very, very well. And you
have been bold. You have been making decisions. You have been
setting up a process in order to make the decisions that can't
be made now. And you can count on all of us here on both sides
of the aisle to be working with you.
A little disagreement with my--with the Ranking Member. I
would suggest that you actually take as much money from the
Mars part of the program and spend it on meeting the current
challenges. Spending money too soon in such a long-term project
as going to Mars, spending money would be wasteful rather than
trying to meet the challenges we have now and then using new
technology in the years ahead, rather than trying to develop
technology today for something that may not be applicable
because of changes in the future.
I would like to specifically talk to you right now about,
and get your reaction to, something that I see as your ultimate
short-term challenge, and you mentioned it in terms of the
Shuttle and the Space Station. And the greatest impediment to
you, which I can see, of actually meeting that challenge of
making sure that the Space Station project is finished and
reaches its potential, and plus our--that we know about in
terms of the limitations of the Shuttle. And I guess what I am
talking about is the Iran Nonproliferation Act. And let me
note, Mr. Chairman, that I was very deeply involved in the
wording of the Iran Nonproliferation Act in dealing with this
particular challenge that we face right here. And I will say
that it was a worthy effort at the time to make sure that we
pressured the Russians not to participate in the developing of
a nuclear facility in Iran. That strategy has, however, not
worked. Clearly, it has not worked. Unfortunately when the
Nonproliferation Act was put into place in the year 2000, both
during the Clinton Administration and during this
Administration, what needed to happen was some type of an
overture to the Russians that would give them an alternative.
Neither Administration did its job in the past, and now you,
after two months as being leader of NASA, are faced with this
very serious time period when we have to make decisions and we
have to move forward and decisions have to be made.
And so you aren't to blame. I would put the blame on the
Clinton Administration as well as the Bush Administration for
not doing this, but now we have got this decision to make.
Do you believe, and you have background with--but we know
that the Defense Department has been able to work with the
Russians all along, even with the Nonproliferation Act. Do you
believe that we should now shift into more of a policy with
NASA that is more like what you have in the Department of
Defense and just realize that the Nonproliferation Act is not
working and Space Station has got to be completed?
Dr. Griffin. Well, yes, sir, broadly speaking, I do support
that. And as I said earlier, the Administration is just
releasing, I, in fact, signed today jointly with Secretary of
State Rice, a letter to this committee requesting that we do
amend the act. It is worthy of note that it is, today, possible
for the Defense Department, through its contractors, to buy
Russian engines for Defense Department purposes, but if we
would seek to use one of those engines to support the
International Space Station program, it would not be possible
under the act, and--as it exists today, and that is an
interesting----
Mr. Rohrabacher. Well, you need not be burdened with things
that were so weighty, let us say, as the Nonproliferation Act,
which was not, as I say, followed through on. It was not
handled correctly by those who preceded you, as well as the
rest of the Administrations, both the Clinton and Bush
Administrations. Is there any other way out that you see?
Dr. Griffin. Other than an amendment of the Act, no, sir.
As I pointed out earlier, the only approach that we can take
would be to cease buying Progress and Soyuz services from
Russia and to restrict our astronaut time on the Space Station
to periods when the Shuttle is present.
I would also point out that while, you know, we have
alliances and differences with Russia, that among the best
things to have come from our space program over the last 15
years is the space cooperation that we have enjoyed with
Russia. And if the act is not amended, that will come to a halt
in April of 2006.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Well, it was a worthy goal. We tried, Mr.
Chairman, to make sure that we used all of the leverage we had,
including space cooperation with the Russians to try to get
them out of this nuclear power plant down in Iran. It did not
work. There is no reason for us not to be realistic, and I
applaud you and the Administration now for being realistic,
although I think the Administration shares a great deal of
blame for bringing us to this point.
Dr. Griffin. Well, sir, none of us like this position. And
the fact is that for the next several years, as the Space
Station development and its partnership go forward, the United
States is in the position where we cannot effectively utilize
the Space Station without our Russian partners. This strategic
dependence, in a critical area, is why I have spoken up so
strongly since coming into this new position for narrowing the
gap between Shuttle retirement and Crew Exploration Vehicle
deployment. That is why I have subordinated other important
priorities within NASA to that priority, because I believe--I
absolutely believe that it is strategically essential that the
United States have its own access to space, dependent upon no
other nation.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Boehlert. Thank you. And without objection, the
letter to the Chair and the Committee, signed by Secretary Rice
and you, Mr. Administrator, will be put in the record at this
juncture.
[The information follows:]
Chairman Boehlert. In effect, it says that within the
Administration, a proposed amendment is still being vetted, and
we can anticipate something in the short-term. So thank you.
Dr. Griffin. I think the details of the wording, that is
correct, but with the broad principle that we need an
amendment. I believe that is accepted.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Thank you.
Dr. Griffin. Thank you, sir.
Chairman Boehlert. Mr. Honda.
Mr. Honda. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And welcome, Mr. Griffin. It is good seeing you again.
Dr. Griffin. It is good to see you, sir.
Center Workforce
Mr. Honda. A lot of the questions I wanted to ask were
asked already. And I think your responses were clear and very
forthright, and I appreciate that.
And I look forward to September where we get more
information from you in terms of what the timeline on the
calendar is going to look like for our programs.
The previous Administrator had set up the budget in such a
way that it appeared that our different centers would be
operating as if they were R&D outsourced agencies. And I heard
you say that--and I read that you had said that you are
changing the direction and trying to retain the core competence
of those engineers and scientists that we have at these centers
so that they can do what we do best and what NASA's mission has
been set out in--originally.
Understanding that and seeing that and looking at the
proposed budget for NASA for 2006, what is it in the budget
that you see right now that needs to be revisited or looked at
in terms of policy refinement in our budget for authorization
so that you can move forward with the mission that you laid out
and that you see that needs to be done in the near future? Not
only the mission, but also in terms of how we are going to be
able to maintain the staffing that we currently have without
compromising our core competencies and the direction that you
would like to take NASA.
Dr. Griffin. Yes, sir. I feel like I am becoming repetitive
with this answer, but we have yet another team of senior folks
within NASA----
Mr. Honda. I remember that. Yeah.
Dr. Griffin.--who are looking at exactly the question you
raised of how do we need to restructure our fiscal year 2006
plans in order to preserve core competencies within the NASA
centers. Those results, also, will be available within the next
few weeks. In fact, we must have them within that time in order
to present--prevent other undesirable actions.
Philosophically, there are--there is probably no one you
will have before you who is a stronger supporter of the broad
principles of competition and industrial capability than I. I
have run businesses, which had to make money. I have been an
entrepreneur.
But all of that said, federal research centers and
laboratories are not operating businesses. They don't exist for
that purpose. They exist to make investments on behalf of the
American people that it has been determined by the Congress are
necessary to be made. And they don't operate, and should not
operate, on the principles of short-term gain or next quarter
profitability. So we will not be running our NASA federal
centers as if they were our outsourced laboratories for R&D. We
will be making strategic assignments of missions--mission areas
and work to those centers in order to preserve the core
competencies that we feel we have to have going forward to
execute NASA's science missions, the vision for exploration,
and aeronautics.
They won't be, necessarily, the exact same missions that we
had been performing in the past or even are performing today.
During my round of center visits, including to Ames and other
aeronautic centers, I have pointed out that in fairness, the
research centers, as opposed to the mission and flight
operation centers, the research centers should be on the
cutting edge of change. They should be on the very edge of the
frontier of what it means to be doing research and development
for space and aeronautics. Just as today we no longer have
manufacturers who produce slide rules, today we may well not
need every wind tunnel that exists within NASA. But the role of
research within NASA, to keep this Nation on the cutting edge
of space and aeronautics technology development, cannot be
denied, and it is uniquely NASA's, and I support it totally.
FFRDC
Mr. Honda. Thank you, Mr. Chair. If I may, a quick
question.
Then have you reached any conclusions about the
recommendation to convert centers to alternative structures,
such as the FFRDC?
Dr. Griffin. I have worked at NASA centers, and I have
worked at FFRDCs. Both are excellent investments, in my
opinion, of federal tax dollars. I do not fundamentally see any
gain to be achieved by having NASA convert federal centers to
FFRDCs, and the doing of so--such--so doing would, in fact,
create pension and retirement system liabilities that I don't
believe this Congress is prepared to take on in the current
budget environment.
Mr. Honda. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And just as a personal
comment, this program and these projects have been in such
turmoil in the last few years that a lot of these--being
repeated, and if we are talking about Don Quixote de La Mancha,
he had more than one or two windmills he had to hit, and
sometimes it looked like the same ones. And I think that
people's lives and people's projects that are affected
sometimes require repetition for the--to replace the kinds of
sentiments that had been growing for these past few years, and
I, for myself, do appreciate your leadership.
Chairman Boehlert. The gentleman's time has expired.
Mr. Honda. Thank you.
Dr. Griffin. Thank you, sir.
Chairman Boehlert. Dr. Ehlers.
Mr. Ehlers. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Safety and Risk
Let me first say, Mr. Administrator, how pleased I am that
you are in this position. NASA is at a very crucial juncture,
and you are the type of person and have the right background to
solve the multitude of problems that we have been talking about
this morning, and I appreciate your willingness to take on this
almost impossible task.
I would like to join my colleagues who have expressed their
support for the Hubble servicing mission. I won't go into a lot
of details on that, but I would simply point out we have done
it several times before with far less safety concerns than we
are facing right now, and we completed the missions safely.
I worry, frankly, and this is not just relating to the
Hubble repair mission, that we have become so safety conscious
after the Columbia accident that we may be needlessly
eliminating our space exploration efforts. We have to
recognize, as American people, you cannot guarantee absolute
safety, but I think at this point, you are certainly very close
to exceeding the safety standards that every American has when
they enter their automobile and drive through traffic in this
country. They don't stay at home because there might be an
accident. And similarly, I don't think you should stay on the
ground, or your astronauts should stay on the ground, because
there might be an accident. They recognize full well, and I
have discussed this with them the risks involved. They
understood that full well when they became test pilots, the
many who have served in that capacity. And I suspect we are
going in a direction where we are trying to make our
spacecrafts safer than the test aircrafts that they flew in the
past. So I just--I am just urging some common sense and not an
atmosphere of fear that I think has pervaded a lot of--that has
infected a lot of people since the Columbia accident.
I certainly hope you are able to do the Hubble repair
mission and, of course, do it as safely as possible, but not be
Earth-bound by it by fear of what might happen.
Voyager and CEV
The second point I would like to make is Voyager I, which I
think has reached a very crucial juncture in its voyage. And I
understand that there is some talk of terminating that
particular mission. You, of course, can't terminate Voyager I.
It is still going to be out there transmitting the data, but
that, for financial reasons, we are not going to continue
recording the data. I, once again, would plead with you to keep
that effort going. It seems foolish to wait all of these years
for it to reach the--and then somebody pull the plug. So I
hope--and I would be happy to work with you and I am willing to
try to help you identify other things that could be cut
instead. But I plead with you to keep Voyager I going. And--I
shouldn't say that. It is going to keep going, but keep
collecting data, and even if we may have to slow down the
analysis for financial reasons, at least collect it and let
future generations of scientists have that information.
My final point is I think the highest priority you have,
other than these two aspects, is development of the Crew
Exploration Vehicle. And I think when you mentioned earlier the
need for research, that is clearly an area where we need, I
think, some very new ideas, some very basic, fundamental
research, to try to come up with new approaches, particularly
if we are hoping to travel to Mars some time in the future. We
have to develop better propulsion systems. And the CEV is a
golden opportunity to really look at some new ideas that have
developed since the Shuttle was developed. And so I wish you
well in that. And I really think you were correct when you say
it is a very high priority. I think it has to be your highest
priority, other than the various satellites that are out there
now.
I would appreciate any comments or reaction you might have
to any of these points.
Dr. Griffin. Sir, with regard to to the preservation of
operating satellites, we are--we have heard the voice of the
community and the Congress in this topic. We are doing a fresh,
top-down review on what satellites will be kept in operation
and which ones will not. And I assure you that I also think it
is rather dumb to be turning off Voyagers I and II.
Nonetheless, you will hear our final answers on that a little
bit later this year.
With regard to the priority of the CEV, in my view, it is
right behind--it is my number two priority, after flying the
Shuttle safely in the remaining years of its operation. So I
support your remarks.
Mr. Ehlers. Thank you.
Chairman Boehlert. Thank you very much.
The gentleman's time has expired.
Mr. Miller.
Mr. Miller. Thank you.
Life Science Research
Administrator Griffin, I am pleased to see you here. A
couple of years ago, the investigation into the Shuttle
disaster concluded that one of the problems was that NASA had
contracted out too much expertise, that there was not the
nucleus of expertise in-house at NASA, that they needed to be
at each other's elbows to do the job that they needed to do. I
asked Sean O'Keefe if he embraced that finding, since it did
appear to be contrary to deviate from the Administration's
orthodoxy about contracting out, and I never got an answer,
although, when he got through not answering, the light was red.
So I am very pleased to have heard you embrace that idea that
we do need to maintain that nucleus of expertise within NASA
and that you will push for that in future budgets.
I do have a couple of questions about other programs. You
did say earlier that you thought that there was not an
immediate need for life science research into longer-term human
travel into space, because we aren't going to do it right away.
But what is going to be the effect of a break in research in
that? If we don't have continuous research, how easy is it
going to be to pick back up after having essentially stopped
the life science and the biomedical research that we had been
doing and need to do at some point before we do longer-term
space travel?
Dr. Griffin. Well, sir, in response to that question, I
believe the answer is fairly obvious to any of us who have ever
been grad students in our lives. Most of the kind of research,
fundamental research that we talk about is done in universities
or in programs where universities are part. And it will, if we
are not able to fund all of the work in fundamental life
science, the researchers who were doing it will go elsewhere to
other occupations, other research endeavors that are being
funded, and we will have to put the program back together
later.
Mr. Miller. Okay.
Dr. Griffin. That is just a fact. But I cannot responsibly
prioritize microbiology and fundamental life science research
higher than the need for the United States to have strategic--
its own strategic access to space.
Mr. Miller. Well, I am not happy with that answer, but it
was an answer.
Dr. Griffin. Yes, sir. And I am sorry, I am not happy with
it either, but I don't know what else to do.
Space Grant Programs
Mr. Miller. One additional question about this space grant
program. It is hard not to look at NASA's request and
Congress's appropriations and not come to the conclusion that
Congress values the space grants program more highly than NASA
does. I think Congress, in fiscal year 2003, appropriated
$24,100,000 for the space grant program. The request the next
year from NASA was $19,100,000, and it kind of goes on every
year. What is your take on the space grant program? Do you
support that program? Do you think it is important in providing
the kind of flow of expertise that we need? Is there something
we ought to be doing instead of the space grant program?
Dr. Griffin. I would have to take that question for the
record, sir. I am actually not familiar with the program, and
in the two and one-half months I have been on board, have not
had the opportunity to become so. So we will take a look at it,
and I will get you a responsive answer, but it will have to be
for the record.
Mr. Miller. Okay. Thank you.
Information for the Record
The National Space Grant College and Fellowship Program (Space
Grant) continues to be a critical component in our education portfolio,
particularly with regard to addressing workforce needs of both NASA and
the national aerospace industry. Our experience is that the Space Grant
program also has been very effective in developing a national network
of affiliated organizations, now comprised of over 550 colleges and
universities, 80 industry affiliates, 40 government affiliates, and 180
non-profit and other educational organizations. This network is a
critical strategic element for preserving and cultivating our future
workforce expertise in disciplines needed for future space exploration.
The focus of NASA education is best presented in terms of its three
major strategic outcomes: (1) Strengthening NASA's and the Nation's
future science, technology, engineering and mathematics (STEM)
workforce; (2) Attracting and retaining students in STEM disciplines
through a progression of educational opportunities for students,
teachers and faculty; and (3) Engaging Americans in NASA's mission
through partnerships and alliances.
The Space Grant Program has and is expected to continue to assist
NASA in achieving these outcomes in several ways:
Student Pipeline: Program fellowships and
scholarships support an average of 2,200 students each year of
which 21 percent are under-represented minorities and 43
percent are women; the research component involves over 5,000
students each year; and, the higher education component
involves over 20,000 students each year.
Faculty Competitiveness: The research infrastructure
building effort contributes to the development of faculty
through the travel grants, seed research grants, release time,
and research collaborations with NASA Centers and industry.
Pre-service Education: The pre-college efforts focus
on enhancing the knowledge of students and teachers through
teacher preparation and development, curriculum development
informed by NASA content, and dissemination activities.
Student Research: The fellowships and scholarships
emphasize student internships and research experiences and
mentoring components, with consortia reporting an average of
1,500 collaborative efforts each year with NASA Centers and
with industry.
Under-represented and Under-served Participation: 20
percent of the over 550 academic affiliate organizations are
minority-serving institutions. Additionally, over 20 percent of
the Space Grant fellowships and scholarships are awarded to
under-represented minorities.
Elementary and Secondary Participation: The pre-
college component places an emphasis on teacher preparation and
development. Each consortium is directed to align pre-college
components with the state's STEM standards and existing state
systemic reform efforts.
Informal Education: The public service component
emphasizes promoting an understanding of STEM disciplines
through the dissemination of NASA content (materials and
information), and the stimulation of an interest in STEM
disciplines and the NASA mission through public service
activities.
We look forward to sustaining this program with a focus on
alignment to NASA strategic education outcomes in the areas of
workforce, pipeline, and public benefit. With our increased emphasis on
partnerships and alliance, we value the many now long-standing
affiliations, which have developed through Space Grant over the last 18
years and look to build on those relationships.
Chairman Boehlert. Mr. Hall.
Mr. Hall. I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
It is not necessary that I be happy. It is probably not
possible when I hear all of these suggestions that we are going
to have 28 or 38 missions by 2030, or even talk about our new
vehicle by 2010. I think about George Burns, at the age of 100,
saying he didn't buy green bananas. So I don't think it is
going to happen really quick, but I am glad to see you with
your hand on the throttle. And we--a lot of us are very happy
to see him reach down into the maze of men and women that could
be considered for this to see you come up with it. I am not
sure you are going to make it, but I am pretty sure that I am
going to be trying to help you and support you.
Dr. Griffin. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Hall. And Congressman Rohrabacher referred to you as
the man from La Mancha. I guess the areas that you are battling
are real, however. We know they are, and the results are
consequential, rather than comical. You have a lot of work to
do and some very difficult things to change. I just--you have--
you know, for one thing, the trip to Mars, you are faced with
the Will Rogers look-alikes throughout this country who say
they are less interested in going to Mars than they are of
being able to make a trip to the grocery store. And that is a
pretty--thing that most people can relate to, but the hard and
cold facts are we need to go to Mars. We have to go to Mars for
a lot of reasons. And this group--these--we--it is obvious that
we are aware of those reasons and are pretty supportive of
them.
We know that NASA wrestles with all of these thorny issues,
that we have got to move ahead with authorizing legislation to
keep you going. And the bill that Chairman Calvert and I
introduced just yesterday, I think, provides a framework for
moving forward and ensuring that Congress has the information
it needs to make a more detailed policy because in years ahead
you are going to have to make and be having to lead.
I think that on safety--this hasn't been talked about very
much here today, but I know it is on everyone's mind. We--as
you know, we had $15 million set aside. We had requested that
and had been set aside to study for the future safety of the
astronauts themselves, and I understand that you all have
handled that and that you--that either under the previous
Administration, or your Administration, have been working for
safety with full plating with the hulls of some of the birds we
have and space suits and other survival equipment, that that
has been wrapped into that and going in the future planning
that I have asked you about so many times. So you know pretty
well, and because it is still a fragile mission, you know the
reason I am asking them, and you know the question I am going
to ask, and you can just answer it without me asking it, but to
make it a little easier for you, I would like to get it on
record. This is your first appearance here, official appearance
here, as the Administrator. You have been here many times
before, but you know I am concerned, as we all are, about crew
safety, and I know that you have down-selected the Crew
Exploration Vehicle to two contractor teams, is that correct?
Dr. Griffin. That is correct, sir.
Mr. Hall. And in their proposals, did they address crew
safety as an issue? And if so, how? And if not, will this be
included in future iterations of these contracts themselves?
Dr. Griffin. Oh, crew safety has been addressed, and as we
go forward to a further down-select early next year to a single
contractor to build the CEV, we will absolutely make certain
that crew safety is a top priority.
Mr. Hall. But you are underway, and you are of record, and
you are giving leadership in that thrust?
Dr. Griffin. In every possible way that I can, sir.
Mr. Hall. Because wouldn't you hate to be Administrator,
and would we hate to be Members of Congress, if we had another
tragedy and we weren't already traveling that road to get that
type of operative procedure for our future astronauts?
Dr. Griffin. Sir, we are endeavoring with our plans and
designs for the new Crew Exploration Vehicle to make it as safe
as we can, as simple as we can, and have it as soon as we can.
Mr. Hall. Until 2010, and then have the module in that bird
that would be an escape vehicle.
Dr. Griffin. Well, we would hope there would be an escape
system for launch aborts and things like that. Yes, there will
be.
Mr. Hall. I thank you. And I thank you for what you have
done. And I thank you for the way you are doing it. And I
admire you for the way you are doing it.
I yield back my time.
Dr. Griffin. Thank you, sir.
Chairman Boehlert. The gentleman yields back four seconds.
Mr. Green.
Mr. Hall. Well, let me finish then.
Chairman Boehlert. Mr. Green.
Mr. Green. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And I also thank you, as well as the Ranking Member, for
this opportunity to visit with our outstanding head of our
space program.
I will tell you, sir, that as you sit there alone, that
table looks very large. Normally, we have several people there
at the table, but it appears to me that you are up to the task,
and I compliment you.
I would like to segue from Congressman Hall's comments
about crew safety to another area of crew safety. It is my
understanding that the Columbia Accident Investigation Board
gave us 15 recommendations that were to be adhered to, or
should be adhered to before we return to space flight. I
understand that 12 of the 15 have been met, but we have three
that are outstanding. Those three include the debris issue,
which was a key issue with reference to the demise of Columbia,
repair tools, and repair techniques. Mr. Bill Parsons has said
that the space--return to space right now bears an acceptable
risk. And my question has to do with this term ``acceptable
risk'', given that we still have the debris issue, we still
have the repair tools and repair techniques, and we are looking
at a launch window of possibly early July, July 13 through July
31. Will you please comment on the term ``acceptable risk''?
Dr. Griffin. Yes, sir. I believe that Mr. Parsons was
commenting on the acceptable risk of returning the Shuttle to
flight in terms of the corrections and improvements that have
been made after the loss of Columbia to address the causes of
that loss. Now I have--as I said earlier, I have participated
in every significant technical review that has been held on
this topic since I was nominated to this office.
Let me give you my assessment, if I might.
We have--and our independent advisors from outside have
agreed, we have tremendously reduced--we believe that we have
tremendously reduced the amount of debris, which is shed, or
will be shed, by the external tank on this next Shuttle
mission, as compared to all prior Shuttle missions. Now we
believe that. This is a test flight. These next two flights are
test flights. It needs to be fully understood that they carry
the risk of test flights, because we cannot--we simply do not
have the capability to assess the efficacy of our improvement
without returning to flight. But we believe it is much
improved.
So when we say ``acceptable risk'', we mean that the risk
of an accident due to debris, which was the approximate cause
of the Shuttle Columbia loss, has been reduced to a level that
is consistent with other risks associated with the Shuttle
space flight system. And there are many.
Mr. Green. Just as a quick follow-up, will we have repair
tools and repair techniques available to us prior to the next
launch?
Dr. Griffin. No, sir, we will not. We--those three
recommendations in the Columbia Accident Investigation Board's
report were, of course, well intended and serve as admirable
goals. The ideal state would be to have no debris coming from
the tank. We have not been able to achieve that. The ideal
state would be to have repair tools and repair techniques,
which could deal with a flaw in the tile, the Shuttle's entry
heat system, heat protection system once we are on orbit. We
don't know how to do that. We have spent quite a lot of money
on it. Some have estimated hundreds of millions of dollars
trying to comply with that recommendation. We don't know how to
do it. So at this point, we must say that we have reduced the
level of risk due to debris damage to an acceptable level, in
Mr. Parsons' words the other day, or we must say that we don't
want to fly the Shuttle again because we do not have a better
technical approach to dealing with it than the one we have put
forward.
Mr. Green. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back the
balance of my time.
Chairman Boehlert. Thank you. You are generous: two
seconds.
Mr. Administrator, when you say ``debris,'' are we talking
foam now or foam and ice?
Dr. Griffin. Broadly speaking, foam and ice. If you wish to
make it more specific, then I--everything that I have learned
in the past two and one-half months causes me to believe that
we have reduced the risk of damage from foam debris to a
negligible level. Okay. That will not be a factor. And again,
we cannot back that assertion up without a test flight, but we
are going into the flight of STS-114 with the belief that foam
debris risk is not a significant factor.
Chairman Boehlert. What about the risk of ice?
Dr. Griffin. We have greatly reduced the risk of damage by
falling ice, in particular by putting a feedline--a heater on
the locks, forward locks feedline bellows. There are other
spots on the external tank and its propulsion system where ice
can accumulate and from which it can be liberated and strike
the orbiter. We believe that risk is minimal. Well, we believe
it is well less than one in 100 based on our analyses, but it
is not zero. And----
Chairman Boehlert. But it would lead you to conclude the
acceptable risk?
Dr. Griffin. The--we have concluded that it is an
acceptable risk in comparison to other risks, which we assume
when we fly the Shuttle.
Chairman Boehlert. Thank you very much, Mr. Administrator.
Mr. Sodrel.
Mr. Sodrel. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you,
Administrator Griffin, for being here this morning.
I know there are various kinds of risks to astronauts. One
certainly is trauma, which the question has been asked here.
The other is longer-term. I have got an e-mail here I would
like to read to you from a constituent in my District and ask
your comment.
It says in order to ensure the safe return of astronauts
from exploration missions, we must have effective
countermeasures and an autonomous support system. This requires
an aggressive basic and applied research program in flight
aboard the International Space Station and on the ground. It is
particularly compelling because the countermeasures that are
available today will not adequately protect our astronauts. In
fact, I understand the longest--that the astronauts that spent
the longest time in orbit experienced both muscle deterioration
and loss of bone density. But anyway, it says, in short, that
we must maintain orbital science and grant research and apply
them directly to exploration missions. I wonder if it had had
any significant impacts on space life scientists has been the
denying of funding of proposed research that received high
acclaim and peer review. We scientists believe the values and
principles encompassed within peer review. The process needs to
be upheld by all research agencies, including NASA.
So I guess first, my first question is how much weight is
given to peer review? And the second part is what are we doing
with regard to protecting the astronauts long-term?
Dr. Griffin. Well, with regard to the role of peer review
in selecting science experiments, it remains unchanged within
NASA and absolutely follows the guidelines that your
constituent is suggesting. However, the purpose of peer review
is to determine which experiments, in comparison to other
suggestions, are worth doing and ultimately to help us with
prioritizing our overall research agenda. But there will always
be more good ideas that could be suggested for funding and
would pass the peer review process than we have the budget to
support. And so at some point, there must be a cut-line
established below which we simply can't afford to fund those
priorities.
Now that does not make them without a value, but it does
mean that we don't have the money to support them. We must
choose. We must choose whether minimizing a strategically
significant gap in space access to the United States is more
important or less important than doing the kind of research of
which, you know, your constituent speaks.
I have been very clear in my choice that the most important
priority facing us, as we conduct our program of human space
flight, is to fly the Shuttle safely. The next most important
thing is to bring online its replacement. It, in my view,
serves no purpose to conduct even very high quality research
into human space life sciences unless we are flying humans. And
if we have a long and strategically significant gap in such
human space flights, I think we have got the priority order in
the wrong way. But with all due respect to your constituent, I
do understand the priority choices, which must be made, and I
have made mine.
Mr. Sodrel. So you feel like we are doing enough to protect
the astronauts in the long-term, as well as the short-term?
Dr. Griffin. I believe we must eventually do more to
protect astronauts in the long-term, but at present, we are not
conducting long-term flights.
Mr. Sodrel. Thank you.
I yield back the balance of my time.
Chairman Boehlert. Ms. Johnson.
Ms. Johnson. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Lessons Learned From the International Space Station
I apologize for being late. I had an engagement I couldn't
change, and I might have missed a great deal of your testimony,
but welcome, and I read about your beginning. And I would like
to--well, over the years, I have touted the space program as
being one of the most successful research programs in our
history with both treatment and commercial items.
What did we learn from the International Space Station?
Dr. Griffin. Well, ma'am, that is a very broad question. We
have learned much from the International Space Station so far
and have a significant amount to go. Some specific things that
we have learned, I have often said that one of the best
benefits of the program has been the enduring quality of the
international partnership which has developed. We have learned
to work with other nations in space and to find ways to resolve
differences and make the program work. We have learned a
tremendous amount about assembling and integrating large
structures in space and sustaining them for years at a time,
frankly, through some pretty severe difficulties following the
loss of Columbia. It is the goal of this Administration, it is
my goal, to put us on the path to a lunar return and the
establishment of a lunar outpost and missions to Mars. We will
not be able to execute those missions without learning how to
sustain operations in space for months and years at a time, and
a place where we can learn to do that is the Space Station.
Workforce
Ms. Johnson. Thank you. A year ago, as we were listening to
testimony, one of the urgent things was making sure that we had
the talent in-house, the numbers available to do the work.
Have--and I noticed you have gotten rid of a lot of people.
Have you brought new ones on?
Dr. Griffin. Ma'am, we haven't gotten rid of a lot of
people. I am not sure we have gotten rid of anyone. I have
reassigned some senior managers from existing roles in the
Agency, or will be reassigning them, to other roles within the
Agency, if they choose to accept those roles. I am in the
process of assembling a management team that I feel I can most
efficaciously work with as we go forward, as I think you would
expect of any senior manager. We are looking very closely
across the Agency at how we preserve the core competencies that
we need within the government.
Ms. Johnson. You have ended your associations primarily
with private industry as well as universities, and most
especially with universities. I thought we were attempting to
attract and prepare staff for the future. What was the
rationale for that? I know you said you want to do it in-house,
but I am just trying to----
Dr. Griffin. Ma'am, we have not ended our associations with
universities and private industry by any stretch of the
imagination. Eighty percent, or more, of NASA's budget is
outsourced and will continue to be so.
Ms. Johnson. Okay. I am reading the wrong material.
When you go to--what--I understand that the--in getting to
Mars, it is going to be a journey, so it is going to probably
take a while. What do we need to do before you start to go to--
other than raise a lot of money, what--you are going to use
what you have learned from the International Space Station.
What else do we need to do, and what are we looking for?
Dr. Griffin. We need to develop a replacement for the
Shuttle, which is capable of flying to the Moon and later on to
Mars. We need to develop--to redevelop a heavy-lift launch
vehicle, something in the 100 metric ton class. We need to gain
broad operational experience going to and living on the Moon
for significant periods of time before it would be wise, in my
opinion, to take the step to Mars. We need to develop space
nuclear power and propulsion systems in order that we can go to
Mars and remain there in effective ways.
Ms. Johnson. Do you feel----
Dr. Griffin. Those are the broad categories of things that
I think are important.
Ms. Johnson. Okay. Do you feel that you have now--or you
have your eye on the appropriate skills to bring in-house for
that?
Dr. Griffin. Yes, ma'am, I do. I think NASA has most of the
critical skills it needs to acquire and maintain in order to
execute this mission, and where we don't have them, we know
what to do to get them.
Chairman Boehlert. The gentlelady's time has expired.
Ms. Johnson. Thank you very much. I appreciate it, Mr.
Chairman. Good luck, and I will try to be of support.
Dr. Griffin. Thank you.
Chairman Boehlert. Thank you.
Mr. McCaul.
Mr. McCaul. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Manned Space Flight vs. Unmanned Space Flight
Dr. Griffin, it is an honor to have you here today. You
certainly have a challenge in front of you that I agree with
the Committee. You are doing a great job getting started, and I
wish you well.
I have about 15,000 NASA employees and contractors on the
Houston end of my District. I have been through the Johnson
Space Center. It is very impressive. Most of the questions have
already been asked, but I do want to ask a more fundamental
question, and that is I support the President and his vision,
space exploration to the Moon and Mars and beyond. But there
are those critics who say that we shouldn't take the risk and
that we should do that with unmanned vehicles. And I was hoping
that you could possibly articulate or advocate why it is
important for us to engage and have manned space flights to the
Moon and Mars and beyond as opposed to unmanned space flights.
Dr. Griffin. Well, sir, I think both are important, and I
have spent significant portions of my career in both pursuits.
But let me answer your question as to why I believe it is
important.
I believe that if the United States is to be the world's
preeminent nation going forward in the 21st century and the
centuries beyond, that it must be preeminent in space, exactly
as was the case centuries ago when small island nations or
other small nations, such as Britain, Portugal, had dominant
roles in the global structure of their day because of their
maritime preeminence.
Space is--mastery of the art of space flight, both human
and robotic, is the most important thing that America can do to
assure that we will always be a great nation, in my opinion.
When one looks at that, there are broad regimes of activity.
There are activities that we undertake today in low-Earth
orbit, both human and robotic, and they are very significant.
Beyond low-Earth orbit, the next places that we can go are
the Moon, Mars, and the near-Earth asteroids. If we don't go
there, eventually other nations will, and eventually may not be
too long. I have pointed out in other testimony that since we
last flew our own people in space on our own machines, two
other nations have done so. I do not find that acceptable.
Space will be explored and exploited by humans. The question is
which humans from where and what language will they speak. It
is my goal that Americans will be always among them.
Mr. McCaul. I thank you for your eloquent testimony.
I yield back the balance of my time.
Chairman Boehlert. Ms. Jackson Lee.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Welcome, Dr. Griffin. It is a pleasure to
engage you, and I thank the Chairman and the Ranking Member for
this very crucial hearing. I hope we will have an opportunity,
as I might imagine you would like, for members to engage on a
regular basis. I, frankly, believe that we have to be a team if
we are going to be successful.
I consider the astronauts brave and patriotic Americans
willing to risk their lives on behalf of American excellence
and at the directions of the Commander in Chief. I don't
believe one astronaut would tell you that they are not willing
to accept this mission or any other mission. And that is why I
believe it is crucial for the executive, in this instance, you,
but even more crucial for this body, which is considered part
of the people's house, closest to the people of the United
States, to be diligent, technically and philosophically, on
this question of space exploration. Now I happen to be a very
strong supporter of human space exploration, including the
mission to the Moon. But at the same time, my neighbors are
astronauts. My neighbors are the Johnson Space Center. My
neighbor was Ron McNair, who attended church in my
Congressional District, and his wife, a friend, and still a
very zealous and wonderful supporter of NASA's mission.
So I pointedly ask a number of questions that you have
already asked and answered, and I have reviewed your testimony,
and I, too, apologize for being at another meeting. But I do
want to probe more extensively your very forthright recognition
that we don't have the tools or the techniques that we would
totally like to have as it relates to space debris, and I think
space debris is anything. It is the foam, or as I understand,
any amount of debris that you encounter in going into space.
Can you calculate--this question has--might be considered asked
and answered, but I think we need to hear it more times than
not, where you place this risk, this acceptable risk, as
compared to the advantages or the importance of space
exploration. Might you also give us the vision of the NASA
Administration and the President of the extent of human
involvement in the space exportation in the mission to the Moon
and the presence of humans on the Moon, the advantage of their
presence on the Moon? I am trying to give you a series of
questions so that you can answer them.
The other point that I want to acknowledge, and I think I
understand this, I want to applaud the bringing in-house of
technical and planning and strategic decisions for NASA,
meaning that you are looking for the world's best scientists,
the Nation's best scientists in dealing with decisions in-
house, and I think that is absolutely imperative. One of the
questions--one of what I glean from the Gehman Administration
is the line of command. Who was telling whom to do what? Can
you tell me, is that where you are trying to go to make sure
that strategic decisions, whether it is on safety or otherwise,
are within the bounds of NASA? And if you are going that
direction, I am with you.
Let me conclude in this direction.
I hope that you will join us and encourage this committee
to hold a full, extensive hearing on the question of safety.
And I am going to ask you. I would like you to just answer that
yes or no in your answers, of the importance of this committee
having oversight, being an investigatory mold to be helpful on
the question of safety, safety on human space shuttle, but
safety as well in the International Space Station, which I
think is extremely important as a scientific tool for what it
has done for America.
And lastly, this question of training in-house. I hope that
we can work together on our Hispanic-serving and historically
black colleges. I would like to work with NASA on direct
programs generating physicists, chemists, biologists, and
others that can be directed toward your institution who happen
to be from the minority community.
And I thank you for your presence, and I hope you can
summarize my questions.
Dr. Griffin. I will try. Thank you.
Debris Hazards
With regard to debris hazards and being all encompassing
with--in our definition of debris whether it is on ascent or
while we are on orbit, yes, you are right. Orbital debris
might--what we call MMOD for micrometeroid and orbital debris
hazard, is one of the more significant hazards to space flight
in the Shuttle. And when I spoke earlier of reducing our ascent
debris hazard down to a level consistent with other risks, this
was one of the other risks. Going forward, in order to make
space flight as safe as possible, the best thing we can do is
to continue with the protocols we are already implementing
regarding minimizing--absolutely minimizing the generation of
new orbital debris. And then the other factor is in the
replacement vehicle for the Shuttle, the CEV, we must have a
design which is, as much as possible, robust in the face of
orbital debris, and that is a significant concern that I have.
The Value of Humans on the Moon
Now humans on the Moon I think is quite significant. I have
never heard it put better than Norm Augustine in his report in
1990 where he pointed out that an instrumented payload on the
top of Mount Everest simply did not have the same value as
Tenzing and Hillary ascending that mountain. Others have tried
to come up with similar approaches, but I think Mr. Augustine
put it best. The value of humans on the Moon is the value that
we bring anywhere we go. The ability to make broad judgments,
to make big picture assessments, to decide what details are
important and what ones are not important so that we can deploy
our robotic assistance on the proper tasks.
Strategic Decision-making
With regard to our strategic decision-making in NASA, yes,
we are refining our--in fact, our--what we call our strategic
management handbook, as I speak, trying to simplify our chain
of command and make our decision processes more transparent and
more specific.
If you decide to hold a hearing on safety of space flight,
whether Shuttle or International Space Station, you may count
on me to be a strong supporter of that hearing, and I look
forward to working with you on it.
The Role of HBCs
Regarding the development of in-house capability for our
scientific and engineering staff, I welcome, with open arms,
efforts to engage Hispanic or historically black colleges and
universities, as I do all of our colleges and universities. We
are, as a nation, facing a crisis, clear and documented in our
ability to entice young people to embark on careers--on
technical careers: science, mathematics, engineering, all
branches of those. Our--in many cases, in our graduate
institutions, foreign enrollment surpasses domestic enrollment,
and the problem is that they go back home. They don't stay
here. We need to address this. I have--I could not more
strongly support that.
Chairman Boehlert. Thank you very much.
Mr. Feeney.
Mr. Feeney. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Launch Vehicle Determination
And Dr. Griffin, I want to join the chorus of the members
of the Committee to welcome and congratulate you to the
Administration head at NASA. I have been very impressed by your
background, been very impressed by the fact that you hit the
ground running. Even though you came from the outside, you had
in your mind a very visionary way of taking a complete
inventory of NASA's resources and capabilities and
opportunities and challenges long before you were appointed by
President Bush. And I have been, frankly, amazed at how
quickly, dispensing with any need for on-the-job training, you
have stepped forward. You have reorganized both personnel and
mission. You have made some very critical, decisive judgments
that are going to be criticized by a lot of us. But you have
done so with a sort of confidence and the level of expertise
and background that gives me confidence that we are exactly
doing what we need to be doing. And there are going to be 535
visions for NASA in Congress. And the fact of the matter is, we
are going to have to rely on you to bring those together on
behalf of the people of the United States. And I have complete
confidence in your ability to do that job.
I was especially delighted to hear you say that priorities
one and two for your term involve human space flight, because,
while there are lots of priorities in science, microbiology for
example, as mentioned earlier, all of these are important, but
prioritizing is the job that you have to do and the budgetary
folks have to do. And the truth of the matter is, there are a
lot of places that can do research. There are a lot of
universities. There are a lot of foundations. There are a lot
of private sector folks, but there is only one place that can
move Americans into low, middle, and high-Earth orbit and to
explore the solar system, and for now, that is the Federal
Government.
I join Dana Rohrabacher and others in hoping that, with
respect to low-Earth orbit, NASA gets out of the business
pretty quickly. We have commercial-viable options that can do
that. But for now, return to the International Space Station by
the Shuttle and then, number two, the CEV are clearly, in my
view, the most important priorities, and you have got them
right. And I congratulate you.
With respect to the new CEV, and by the way I want to thank
you for trying to find a way to shorten the window. The
original proposal talked about a window from 2010 to 2014 where
we would have no capability as a Nation to send humans into
space. And you determined what that CEV ought to look like, and
you have to select the type of vehicles for launch. The CEV is
an important thing to design, as Ralph Hall talks about, in a
safe way, the heavy-lift obligation for, not just people, but
equipment, the supplies needed to go to the Moon and
potentially to Mars someday, the ability to go back and forth
to the Shuttle. For reasons of safety, reliability, scheduled
costs, the development of the Shuttle-derived vehicles, I
think, had some real opportunities, and you have expressed a
clear preference for those Shuttle-derived launch vehicles.
On the other hand, back in December, you had the
President's space transportation policy, which had a
presumption, as I understand it, in favor of the use of the
evolved expendable launch vehicles. I wonder if you could tell
us how those presumptions, yours versus the transportation
policy organization, how you expect them to be resolved, who
you expect to be involved in the decision-making, what sort of
considerations ought to be a factor into that, and also, what
sort of capabilities we want the CEV to have that may combine
the usage, ultimately, of both the EELV and the Shuttle-derived
opportunities.
Dr. Griffin. Thank you, sir.
Let me answer the last question first, I think.
We have, within NASA, looked extensively at all of the
means that we might bring to bare for the two major--or I would
say the three major categories of things that we launch. And
those three categories are science missions, which go on
expendable launch vehicles, and then we will be requiring a
Shuttle replacement, the CEV and its associated launch system.
And then finally to go to the Moon, as I have indicated before,
we need capability in the 100 metric ton class.
I am, of course, aware of the space transportation policy
that you mentioned. The--I don't believe that that
transportation policy creates a presumption of the use of one
system or another. What it requires NASA and the DOD to do is
to coordinate on their requirements in an effort to achieve the
most efficacious----
Mr. Feeney. If I may interrupt.
Dr. Griffin. Yes, sir.
Mr. Feeney. DOD has a presumption here at a minimum, don't
they?
Dr. Griffin. I have not yet had an opportunity--I have
spoken with General Lord, head of U.S. Space Command, and
General Lord was quite clear that he understands and agrees
with my stated preference of--for NASA to pursue a Shuttle-
derived solution. He would like us to launch our expendable
vehicle traffic on DOD systems as much as possible, and with
that, we concur. NASA has no desire to spend extra money
developing systems that already exist. But where systems don't
exist, then we need to look at the lowest cost and highest
reliability, safest path forward, and that is what we are
doing.
Chairman Boehlert. The Chair would like to recognize the
ever patient Dr. Schwarz.
Here is the situation on the Floor. We have a series of
votes, and they are eight minutes and 46 seconds to go. Dr.
Schwarz, you will get your two cents in, and----
Mr. Schwarz. How about 46 seconds worth?
Chairman Boehlert. All right. Go to it.
U.S. Preeminence in Space
Mr. Schwarz. Okay. This is a--just lob a softball up there,
but I think people would like to know, as we talk about other
nations and consortia who have programs, perhaps not as
ambitious as ours to go to a Jovian moon, but other programs,
what are the other countries and other consortia who you would
consider our competition in these enterprises, because I think
that is not commonly known, and people should know who the
competition is out there and why we, perhaps, if not have
fallen behind, have fallen back from our previous lead?
Dr. Griffin. Yes, sir. We--the United States has partners
in its space endeavors, and it has competitors. And in many
cases, just as in industry, the partners and competitors are
the same people. We ally or we compete on different ventures,
according to what we perceive our needs to be. Our chief
competitors for preeminence in space are Russia, the European
Space Agency, the Chinese, who are coming along quite nicely,
and the Indian Space Agency is making strong initiatives. We
partner with any and all of those nations in various venues,
and I expect that to continue in the future. But we also
compete with them. And it is, again, my goal to see to it that
America is always in the lead in that competition. That matters
greatly to me.
Dr. Schwarz. Thank you, Dr. Griffin.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Boehlert. Thank you. And Mr. Administrator, we
want to help you achieve that goal. Let me say, in your maiden
appearance before this committee as Administrator, you have
appeared many, many times before and have been an invaluable
resource to us, quite successful. I appreciate the candor of
your responses to the many questions. I appreciate your trying
to give us some guidance as to when we might expect further
answers to specific questions. I think it has been a very
productive hearing. I hope you share that view. We are partners
in this endeavor. We want to make it work.
Dr. Griffin. I do share that view, sir. If I could just
have one more moment.
We need your help. We do need to work together. We need the
help of this committee and this Congress in carrying out our
mission. We need your help with an authorization request and
with relief on the Iran Nuclear Nonproliferation Act, pardon
me. We cannot be successful without you, and we know that.
So thank you for having me here today.
Chairman Boehlert. Of the cynic society, I just want to
tell you, we are from the Congress. We are here to help.
This meeting is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:05 p.m., the Committee was adjourned.]
Appendix 1:
----------
Answers to Post-Hearing Questions
Responses by Michael D. Griffin, Administrator, National Aeronautics
and Space Administration
Questions submitted by Representative Bart Gordon
Q1. Do you intend to pursue competitive procurements for all of the
required elements of the exploration program, or are you planning to
use sole-source agreements or other non-competitive means for some of
the elements? If the latter, which elements will not be competitively
procured?
A1. We anticipate full and open competition on all the elements of the
exploration program except where competition may not be safe or
feasible. In those cases, we will utilize sole-source agreements as
necessary. Final decisions will be part of formal Acquisition Strategy
Meetings.
Currently, the only sole-source procurement we are planning
involves those parts of the Crew Launch Vehicle (CLV) that are derived
from existing Shuttle hardware. Also, we plan to use in-house
capabilities extensively to develop technologies for the Crew
Exploration Vehicle (CEV) and lunar sortie missions.
Competitions are currently planned for the CEV, the CLV Upper
Stage, and crew and cargo services to and from the International Space
Station. The CEV currently has two contractors in phase 1 of a two-
phase program with a competitive down select scheduled for spring 2006.
It should be noted that the Acquisition Strategy for the
Constellation Program is still a work-in-progress and details could
change, but this reflects our current baseline.
Q2. What exploration capabilities do you intend to develop in-house at
NASA, and which ones do you plan to have industry develop? How did you
go about making those decisions?
A2. NASA considers many factors when determining which tasks will be
retained in the Agency and which will be performed by contractors.
These factors include criticality to fulfilling the Vision, available
Agency workforce, existing talent pools, future developments in the
marketplace, and budget and schedule concerns. The capabilities that we
will keep ``in-house'' are those that are considered core NASA
capabilities, such as Systems Engineering and Integration and many
technology capabilities as well. For example, the Liquid Oxygen, Liquid
Methane engine will be developed primarily at NASA Centers, with NASA's
Glenn research center leading the activity. This will be done to
invigorate the technology capabilities at our NASA Research Centers and
to utilize our civil service work force.
We will go to industry for many other capabilities. Goods and
services provided by industry will be competitively procured. For
example, NASA will work in partnership with a contractor team to
develop new space suit capabilities for the CEV and lunar exploration
vehicles.
Q3. Under what circumstances, if any, do you envision using U.S. funds
to pay non-U.S. companies or organizations for exploration-related
technologies, products, or services instead of by means of no-exchange-
of-funds cooperative agreements with non-U.S. space agencies?
A3. NASA will pursue opportunities to cooperate with its international
partners, as the President directed us to do in the Vision for Space
Exploration. We plan to purchase transportation services from our
partners in support of the International Space Station if commercial
capabilities are not available when needed. We are seeking
international cooperation on the lunar robotic precursor missions and
potentially with lunar surface systems such as rovers, habitats, and
power, systems but no firm plans or agreements are yet in place.
Under the U.S. Federal Acquisition Regulations, it is possible that
foreign firms with unique capabilities could compete and win some NASA-
sponsored contracts and grants for exploration-related activities. In
such cases, NASA would first explore whether the proposed activities
could be accomplished on a cooperative no-exchange of funds basis with
NASA's foreign government counterpart as an alternative to funding a
foreign firm.
Q4. You have talked about accelerating the Crew Exploration Vehicle
[CEV] and its launch vehicle, as well as starting development of a
heavy lift booster to launch cargo. How do you plan to reconcile those
desires with the realities of the exploration program's current five-
year budget plan? Are you prepared to defer work on other parts of the
exploration initiative to accelerate the CEV and heavy lift booster? If
so, what activities would you defer? Or would you get the money from
somewhere else? And if so, where?
A4. The Exploration Systems Architecture Study (ESAS) team has
identified our architecture for the development of the CEV, the Crew
Launch Vehicle (CLV), and initial lunar landing sorties. To meet the
challenge of accelerating the CEV and all of its associated systems,
and to provide adequate resources for this priority, ESMD's technology
programs were carefully assessed as part of the Exploration Systems
Architecture Study (ESAS). ESMD can currently afford this acceleration,
with no new funding sources from outside the Directorate. This can be
accomplished by shifting funds from lower-priority or longer-term
technology needs, including a total of $785 million in FY 2006,
including $292 million reflected in the FY 2006 budget amendment and
$493 million identified as a result of actions taken in the FY 2005
Operating Plan September update. We have been able to shift funding
from Research and Technology projects that were more focused on future
capabilities that are not required for near-term objectives. For
example, closed loop life support systems funded by ESMD have been
deferred in the near term, because they are not required by the early
lunar sortie missions. As we begin to focus on long-duration lunar
outposts, funding for closed-loop life support systems and other
essential technology will be increased at the appropriate time to
support those missions.
Q5. NASA recently decided to phase out the involvement of the
consultant Behavior Sciences Technology (BST) after just 16 months of
what was expected to be a three-year campaign. BST was brought in as a
result of the findings in the Columbia Accident Investigation Board
(CAIB) report that focused on the role that the NASA culture played in
creating the environment that contributed to the Shuttle accident.
Why has the contract been canceled?
Do you believe that no more work is needed to improve
the NASA culture? If so, why?
A5. The BST effort was reviewed by the Office of Program Analysis and
Evaluation in cooperation with the Office of Institutions and
Management. Working in collaboration, those offices defined the
refocused effort that is being implemented after consultation with the
Office of the Administrator. We feel NASA has benefited from the
activities involved in this effort. After significant experience with
the BST contract and dedicated work at several field centers, we
decided to place internal focus on those parts of the BST culture
change effort, which offered the most significant benefits while
curtailing other aspects.
While we did find many aspects of the BST activities to be
beneficial, there was never an expectation that culture could be fixed
like a machine. Attention to safety and strong internal communications
is an on-going, continuous effort. NASA is dedicated to pursue this
effort in the most efficient and effective manner possible. Similarly,
there are many different ways we can improve our ability to consider
alternative views and make effective, informed decisions. With our
Strategic Management Handbook, we are setting up a streamlined set of
Councils that will facilitate informed decisions by senior leaders. The
leaders and members of the councils will be responsible and accountable
for those decisions. With the new Office of Program Analysis and
Evaluation, NASA is ensuring that there are internal checks and
balances built into the decision-making process.
Q6. You have stated your firm intention to terminate the Space Shuttle
program in 2010.
Q6a. How do you respond to the concern that setting such a strict
deadline creates the same kind of schedule pressure that the Columbia
Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) identified as a contributing factor
to the Shuttle accident?
A6a. NASA will not be driven by schedule pressure to fly the Shuttle
when it is not ready to fly, even if that means fewer flights prior to
retirement.
Q6b. Two alternatives to a hard deadline are (1) to firmly define how
many Shuttle launches are needed and then operate the Shuttle until
those launches are completed--however long that might be; or (2) to
operate the Shuttle until a replacement means of crew transport has
been developed. What do you see as the pros and cons of each of these
approaches?
A6b. NASA conducted a study to re-evaluate the Space Shuttle mission
plans for completion of the International Space Station in light of the
February 2004 Vision for Space Exploration, in particular, the number
of Shuttle flights required by FY 2010. The Station-Shuttle analysis
has become the basis for the number of remaining flights to be planned
for the Shuttle program. Shuttle costs exceed $4 billion per year to
operate, and retiring the Shuttle is a key source of funds for
developing exploration systems. Extending Shuttle operations for a
finite or indefinite period would correspondingly defer exploration
goals, given current resource constraints.
The Vision for Space Exploration calls for the Space Shuttle to be
retired by 2010 with its primary focus being to complete assembly of
the International Space Station. NASA has developed a proposed plan to
execute this mission and meet our international partner obligations
using eighteen Space Shuttle flights over the next five years.
NASA is also pursuing alternative means of crew and cargo access to
the International Space Station in the post-Shuttle era, including
soliciting crew and cargo services from potential commercial providers.
In addition, our international partners have, or are developing, a
number of vehicles to provide crew and cargo access to the
International Space Station, including the Russian Soyuz (crew) and
Progress (cargo), the European Space Agency's Automated Transfer
Vehicle (cargo), and the Japanese H-2 Transfer Vehicle (cargo). The
Crew Exploration vehicle will also be capable of servicing the
International Space Station.
Q7. How many flights of the Space Shuttle were budgeted for in the
five-year budgetary plan (FY 2006-2010) for the Space Shuttle that was
submitted as part of the FY 2006 NASA budget request? How was the Space
Shuttle five-year budget estimate arrived at?
A7. There was a great deal of uncertainty associated with the outyears
of the FY 2006 budget request for Shuttle. NASA was still working
toward Return-to-Flight, and had not yet addressed all issues raised by
the Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB). In addition, NASA had
not yet determined how many times the Shuttle was going to fly before
its retirement in 2010. The President's FY 2006 Budget request stated,
``NASA is examining configurations for the Space Station that meet the
needs of both the new space exploration vision and our international
partners using as few Shuttle flights as possible.'' The five-year
budget estimate was an estimate, based on the Shuttle budget in the FY
2005 budget request.
Questions submitted by Representative Mark Udall
Q1. You have said that you plan to revisit the possibility of a
Shuttle mission to service Hubble because after the Shuttle completes
two successful Shuttle return-to-flight missions, the Shuttle will then
be ``essentially a new vehicle.'' If that is so, it sounds as though no
extensive ``recertification'' of the Shuttle [as called for by the
Columbia Accident Investigation Board] would be required if the
decision was made to fly the Shuttle for a year or so past the proposed
2010 retirement date. Is that an accurate assessment? If not, what
would still need to be recertified?
A1. All the Criticality 1 systems and subsystems on the Space Shuttle
have been assessed against the 2010 retirement date and found to be
within their hardware certification limits. Certification assessments
for certain lower criticality hardware will continue through 2006.
Consistent with the policy direction given in the Vision for Space
Exploration, the Space Shuttle program has not assessed any
certification activity that may be required to continue flying past
2010.
Q2. NASA plans to place some of its Earth observing sensors on
spacecraft built by other agencies instead of building its own
satellites. For example, NASA plans to put Landsat-type sensors on the
first NOAA-DOD NPOESS satellite instead of launching a dedicated
Landsat spacecraft.
Q2a. What is the status of the NPOESS program? How easy is it going to
be to add Landsat sensors to the first NPOESS?
A2a. NASA is a partner in the NPOESS program. The NPOESS development is
governed by the NPOESS Executive Committee (ExCom) which has members
from the Department of Commerce, the Department of Defense and NASA.
Official NPOESS Program status should be obtained from the host agency
for NPOESS; the Department of Commerce.
The complexities of manifesting a Landsat-like sensor on the NPOESS
have been analyzed in coordination with NASA, the NPOESS IPO and the
NPOESS prime contractor, Northrop Grumman Space Technology. Analysis
indicates that accommodating a Landsat-like sensor on the NPOESS
spacecraft would entail significant technical challenges.
Q2b. To what extent are you concerned that the government may be
following a strategy of ``putting all your eggs in one basket'' with
respect to Earth observations research and operations?
A2b. We have a diversified approach to Earth observations, research,
and applications. We have other partnerships for measurements not
destined for NPOESS. We are pursuing a four-partner approach for ocean
altimetry among NASA, CNES, NOAA, and EUMETSAT with the intent that the
research agencies (NASA, CNES) will build the ocean surface topography
mission, NOAA and EUMETSAT (the operational agencies) will operate it,
and then NOAA and EUMETSAT will continue ocean altimetry measurements
via inclusion in their future operational satellite systems.
Reducing risk to long-term data continuity is the principal reason
for seeking to acquire selected Earth observations through NPOESS. The
NPOESS Preparatory Project (NPP), built by the Goddard Space Flight
Center (GSFC) with instruments provided by GSFC and the IPO, will serve
as both a risk reduction for the NPOESS project and also provide
climate data. NPOESS is the next generation series of polar weather
satellites, whose continuous operation is secured via multiple copies
and flight-ready or on-orbit spares. NASA research satellites, on the
other hand, because they are research missions, tend to be one-of-a-
kind, with limited or no on-orbit redundancy or stand-by copies on the
ground. The idea is to migrate measurements that have proven their
value in NASA research missions to NPOESS operational systems so their
continuity is assured. The challenge is in this transition phase where
the operational system taking on the key measurements is itself a new
system. NPOESS is a `block change' upgrade of the NOAA-operated, NASA-
built POES series that have comprised the civilian polar-orbiting
weather satellite system for many years. NASA is staying in the Earth
observation business, continuing its role of creating new Earth
observation technologies and research.
Q2c. What if NPOESS runs into cost or technical problems--has NOAA
committed to you that it will keep the Landsat sensors on NPOESS no
matter what?
A2c. The NPOESS management structure is governed by the NPOESS
Executive Committee (ExCom) which has members from the Department of
Commerce, the Department of Defense and NASA. The manifest of a
Landsat-like sensor on the NPOESS platform and the resulting NPOESS
implementation strategies and contingencies will be governed by the
NPOESS Executive Committee.
Q3. The American Geophysical Union (AGU) released a statement in May
that concluded that NASA's Earth and space science programs are ``at
risk.'' The statement said, ``There are indications that Earth and
space sciences have become a lower priority at NASA'' and that NASA's
FY 2006 budget plan reduces science research by $1.2 billion over the
next five years relative to the previous plan. Is the AGU correct in
its assessment? What is your response to the statement?
A3. While the FY 2006 President's budget shows a smaller rate of
increase in the budget for NASA's Science Mission Directorate, these
programs are still growing significantly. The overall NASA science
programs budget runout shows a 24 percent increase from FY 2006 through
FY 2010, at which science will grow from 33 percent to approximately 38
percent of the NASA budget, enabling the Science Missions Directorate
to continue to support 55 operational missions, 26 missions in
development, and 34 in formulation.
Q4. On page 2 of your testimony, you state that NASA ``has adopted a
`go-as-you-can-pay' approach toward space exploration.'' The 1990
Augustine Commission used the same phrase to describe its approach to
human exploration beyond low Earth orbit, but it meant something very
different from what NASA's current approach seems to be. The Augustine
Commission defined science as NASA's highest priority and stated that
human exploration beyond low Earth orbit [or ``Mission from Planet
Earth'' as they termed it] should only be funded after the other core
missions of the Agency such as space and Earth science were adequately
funded, and that the pace of the human exploration initiative should be
determined by how much extra funding was made available. Do you agree
with the Augustine Commission's definition of ``go-as-you-can-pay''? If
not, how would you define it and why shouldn't NASA follow the approach
recommended by the Augustine Commission?
A4. While NASA strives to stay within budget and ensure adequate
support for Earth and space science, as called for by the Augustine
Commission, NASA's mission has changed since 1990. On January 14, 2004,
President George W. Bush announced the Vision for Space Exploration.
This bold initiative places a renewed emphasis on human exploration of
the solar system while continuing to ensure a balanced portfolio of
scientific research. Implementation of the Vision for Space Exploration
will be enabled by scientific discovery and will enable new compelling
scientific opportunities. In addition, the Vision offers an opportunity
to stimulate mathematics, science and engineering in America's grade,
undergraduate and graduate studies programs.
Q5. NASA officials indicated to us earlier this year that substantial
job cuts were assumed in the budget projections contained in your FY
2006 budget. Specifically, we were told that the number of budgeted
civil service full time equivalents (FTEs) will drop by almost 2,500
over the next year and a half.
Do you still anticipate that level of personnel cuts?
If so, what are the details of those cuts by Center
and by discipline?
If not, what is your current best estimate, and why
has it changed?
A5. The NASA workforce has been impacted by significant budget
reductions in our aeronautics programs, cancellation of programs, and
investment changes to the research and technology portfolio of the
Exploration Systems Mission Directorate. We have taken specific actions
to try to alleviate this problem. For example, starting in November
2004, NASA implemented employee buyouts to rebalance the workforce and
in January 2005 established hiring guidelines to emphasize filling
vacancies from within the Agency. We are also making significant
changes that will help ensure that NASA's Centers have a productive
future. Contractors will continue to play a key role, but we need to
ensure that the Federal Government maintains the in-house intellectual
core capacity to sustain NASA's exploration, science and aeronautics
missions. Our goal is to ensure that NASA Centers are productive
contributors to the Agency's agenda and that we have the people and
tools necessary to accomplish the long-term goals of space exploration.
With that in mind, we will be making changes at Headquarters as well.
In September, NASA initiated an Institutional Requirements Review
(IRR) the scope of which includes corporate G&A, corporate service
pools, and all Headquarters-based operations. Our goals are to keep
corporately funded requirements within overall corporate budget
guidelines, reduce the total workforce at Headquarters commensurate
with its appropriate role and overall size of the Agency, and
consolidate required personnel at the Headquarters building. We aim to
(1) gain operational efficiencies; (2) align ourselves to a management
model that has Headquarters in charge of architecture, strategy,
policy, compliance, and general management with field Centers executing
programs and projects; and (3) set an example for the rest of the
Agency of the willingness of Headquarters to make hard decisions that
benefit NASA in the long run.
Assuming we can achieve additional buyouts in the next few months
and redirect some of our in-house capacity to performing core
activities related to exploration, science, and aeronautics missions,
NASA has approximately 950 civil servants in the field without program
coverage in FY 2006.
We will continue to address this problem and structure the
workforce to ensure the success of the exploration vision, as well as
NASA's other missions in science, aeronautics, education, space
operations and exploration. However, changes to our skill mix and,
therefore, the workforce will be required.
The NASA Office of Human Capital continues to work with center
management on the workforce strategies. We will continue to identify
center work assignments based on our strategic planning for the
exploration systems. We are in the planning stages of offering a final
buyout program to employees.
If we are unable to cover all of the NASA civil service positions,
NASA is planning to conduct a Reduction in Force (RIF). Our Office of
Human Capital is working with human resource offices at the centers to
ensure readiness for a RIF, should it become necessary. However, a RIF
is a last resort, and we will exhaust all other reasonable
possibilities before undertaking such an action.
With changes to NASA's mission, it is important that we manage our
workforce issues to ensure that we have the right skill mix to
successfully execute the vision for space exploration and maintain the
important work in other areas such as our aeronautics, space operations
and science portfolios. We will have an integrated, Agency-wide
approach to human capital management.
Questions submitted by Representative Brian Baird
Q1. Last year, the Exploration Systems Mission Directorate (ESMD)
issued contracts to firms from the Explorations Systems Research and
Technology and Human Systems Research and Technology programs. In
April, NASA announced it was ``indefinitely deferring'' the expected
Broad Agency Announcement for these two programs. The Agency promised
``additional insight into our revised plans.''
A1. The Exploration Systems Mission Directorate did issue contracts
last year for Exploration Systems Research and Technology but none for
Human Systems Research and Technology. The Broad Agency Announcement
planned for 2005 was canceled in anticipation of the change in
direction being outlined by new Administrator Michael Griffin.
Q1a. In issuing these contracts, NASA was hoping to attract interest
from non-traditional sources. In many cases, these are smaller firms
that have a harder time with uncertainty in funding and planning than
the usual government sources.
Does NASA intend to honor the contracts that it has already
signed?
A1a. The Exploration Systems Research and Technology projects have been
realigned to support the Exploration Systems Architecture Study's
(ESAS) recommended requirements including accelerated development of
the new Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV), the Crew Launch vehicle (CLV)
and the lunar lander. This realignment has resulted in a focused and
phased, requirements driven Research and Technology program in which
some projects are curtailed, some modified or delayed, and some added.
On going projects are streamlined to deliver technology capabilities
when needed to meet the accelerated development schedules for the CEV,
launch systems and lunar lander. In FY 2005, 80 tasks and activities
are being discontinued since they do not directly support ESAS
architecture or schedule requirements. NASA, however, is continuing to
investigate innovative procurements for commercial resupply of crew and
cargo to the ISS and encouraging other innovative approaches
(Centennial Challenges) to assist our exploration objectives.
Q1b. What steps is the Agency taking for the disposition of these
contracts?
A1b. The first step was to notify Congress via the FY 2005 Operating
Plan September update, which included the modifications. The next step
is to provide affected contractors with termination notices following
consideration by the Committees of the Operating Plan. NASA will also
provide the contractors with two months of FY 2006 funding for closeout
costs. Additional closeout costs will be negotiated on a case-by-case
basis.
Q1c. What is your timetable for the disposition of those contracts?
A1c. Notification of effected contractors is projected by late-October.
Q1d. When are we likely to know NASA's intentions to resume
procurements in these programs?
A1d. ESMD does not anticipate any new Broad Agency Announcements in
these programs. Our future research will be directed, with the
intention of focusing our efforts and funding on near term technologies
designed to accelerate the development of the crew exploration vehicle
and lunar sortie missions. Much of this directed research will be at
NASA Centers. Industry and universities will provide capabilities and
expertise that is not resident at the NASA Centers.
Questions submitted by Representative Sheila Jackson Lee
Q1. Dr. Griffin, as a long-time supporter of NASA, my greatest
priority at this point is safety. The Columbia Accident Investigation
Board led by Admiral Gehman was able to determine the cause of the
accident and was a solid first step in establishing new safety
procedures for future space exploration missions. Since last year, I
have called for such a commission to be formed to investigate safety
aboard the International Space Station. Will you support the formation
of such a commission?
A1. I share your passion for conducting NASA's space and aeronautics
missions safely and let me assure you that we do not take for granted
the health or safety of our astronauts and pilots who are needed to
help us explore humankind's remaining frontiers. After the
investigation of the Columbia accident, our stakeholders challenged us
to address each recommendation provided by the Columbia Accident
Report. You may be familiar with the extensive planning undertaken by
the Shuttle program to address its cited deficiencies since the
overwhelming share of public scrutiny was focused on the Shuttle's
return-to-flight. Much less apparent, but nonetheless just as
important, were the lessons that NASA wove into the fiber of many other
programs across all our centers. The International Space Station
drafted its own implementation plan for supporting the continuation of
flight of the ISS entitled, NASA's Implementation Plan for
International Space Station Continuing Flight. This document, available
at http://www.nasa.gov/pdf/
110883main-Station-CFT-Rev2.pdf,
demonstrates NASA's commitment to the application of lessons learned
from the Columbia Accident Investigation Board recommendations and
observations in support of safe continuing flight of the International
Space Station.
The Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel (ASAP) is my source of expert
consultation on safety matters as well as a representative of our
external stakeholders. In order to assure that ASAP is satisfied with
the approaches we are taking to ensure safety; we have methodically
provided its members with copies of the plan at each step of its
iteration. NASA briefed the ASAP about the plan during its development.
Consistent with your request for a review of safety aboard the ISS, I
have asked Vice Admiral Joe Dyer, Chairman of the Aerospace Safety
Advisory Panel (ASAP), to review the ISS plan again independently, and
to verify that this important program has properly implemented the CAIB
findings into its own planning. As you know, the ASAP is an independent
group of industry and non-NASA government leaders and safety experts
that advises me Administrator on safety matters with an emphasis on
human space flight. Congress originally chartered this panel after the
Apollo fire, and the panel has been effective over the years in helping
NASA focus on safety related design, operational and cultural issues. I
have asked Admiral Dyer to complete his review by the end of the
calendar year, and I look forward to sharing the results of his study
with you and your staff.
Q2. I am especially concerned to learn that the Stafford-Covey Return-
to-Flight Task Group, the independent oversight panel chartered by NASA
to certify that the 15 safety recommendations of the Columbia Accident
Investigation Board are met, has stated that three of these
recommendations remain incomplete in advance of a proposed July launch.
Will you delay the launch to make certain that the problems faced by
Columbia have been completely resolved?
A2. NASA's Return-to-Flight process has been guided by the fifteen
Return-to-Flight recommendations of the Columbia Accident Investigation
Board and the Space Shuttle program's own internally generated ``raise
the bar'' actions. NASA's implementation of the Board's Return-to-
Flight recommendations has been independently assessed by the Return-
to-Flight Task Group. NASA's overall Return-to-Flight progress has been
documented in the periodically updated Implementation Plan for Space
Shuttle Return-to-Flight and Beyond.
On August 17, 2005, the Return-to-Flight Task Group released its
Final Report. In it, the Task Group unanimously closed out all but
three of the Board's Return-to-Flight recommendations. The Task Group
could not reach consensus on whether NASA's actions fully met the
intent of three of the Board's most challenging recommendations:
External Tank Thermal Protection System Modifications (3.2-1), Orbiter
Hardening and Impact Tolerance (3.3-2) and Thermal Protection System
On-Orbit Inspection and Repair (6.4-1). The Task group noted NASA had
made substantial progress relative to these recommendations, and
emphasized that, ``The ability to fully comply with all of the
[Board's] recommendations does not imply that the Space Shuttle is
unsafe.'' The first two Return-to-Flight missions, STS-114 and STS-121,
will provide the data and flight experience needed to address the
remaining open issues in these recommendations. This work will be
documented in future updates to the Implementation Plan.
NASA made the decision to proceed with the launch of STS-114 on
July 26, 2005 based on Return-to-Flight Task Group's assessment, the
totality of improvements made to the Space Shuttle system during
Return-to-Flight, and the vetting of all these improvements through a
rigorous and multi-layered engineering review process.
Post-flight analysis of STS-114 indicated that, except for one
event, the thermal protection system on the External Tank performed
within expected parameters. Most of the small foam shedding events that
were observed with the upgraded imagery and sensor capabilities
developed during Return-to-Flight posed little or no threat to the
Orbiter. The one event of concern was the loss of an approximately one-
pound piece of foam from the area of the External Tank's liquid
hydrogen protuberance air load (PAL) ramp. NASA commissioned two teams
(one lead by the Space Shuttle propulsion manager, the other an
independent ``Tiger Team'' reporting directly to the Associate
Administrator for Space Operations) to analyze these foam loss events
and recommend any forward work that would have to be done prior to the
launch of the next mission, STS-121.
As of September 2005, NASA is reviewing flight opportunities for
future missions given the effects of Hurricane Katrina (which caused
extensive damage to the area around the External Tank manufacturing
facility near New Orleans) on ongoing foam loss troubleshooting and
normal processing activities. NASA is targeting the May 2006 launch
window as the next opportunity to launch STS-121.
Q3. It has come to my attention that the NASA Education Office has
been merged into the Strategic Communication Office. How will this
affect NASA's education program? Furthermore, how will this affect
NASA's assistance and work with minority serving institutions?
A3. As directed by the NASA Administrator, the Office of Education is
now part of the Strategic Communications component at NASA
Headquarters. Under the direction of the Chief of Strategic
Communications, the Office of External Relations, the Office of
Legislative Affairs, the Office of Public Affairs, and the Office of
Education are now working more closely than ever regarding our regular
and ongoing communications with our stakeholder communities. This
ensures that more timely and consistent information is provided to the
distinct stakeholder communities serviced by each office. Specifically,
the Office of Education, its functions, and all programs previously in
place remain intact. Program operations under the Chief of Strategic
Communications will have no adverse affect on NASA's assistance to and
work with the minority serving institutions (MSIs). NASA's education
programs will continue to provide opportunities for MSI faculty and
students to participate in the Agency's research and education
programs.
Q4. NASA officials indicated to us earlier this year that substantial
job cuts were assumed in the budget projections contained in your FY
2006 budget. Specifically, we were told that the number of budgeted
civil service full time equivalents (FTEs) will drop by almost 2,500
over the next year and a half.
Do you still anticipate that level of personnel cuts?
If so, what are the details of those cuts by Center
and by discipline?
If not, what is your current best estimate, and why
has it changed?
A4. The NASA workforce has been impacted by significant budget
reductions in our aeronautics programs, cancellation of programs, and
investment changes to the research and technology portfolio of the
Exploration Systems Mission Directorate. We have taken specific actions
to try to alleviate this problem. For example, starting in November
2004, NASA implemented employee buyouts to rebalance the workforce and
in January 2005 established hiring guidelines to emphasize filling
vacancies from within the Agency. We are also making significant
changes that will help ensure that NASA's Centers have a productive
future. Contractors will continue to play a key role, but we need to
ensure that the Federal Government maintains the in-house intellectual
core capacity to sustain NASA's exploration, science and aeronautics
missions. Our goal is to ensure that NASA Centers are productive
contributors to the Agency's agenda and that we have the people and
tools necessary to accomplish the long-term goals of space exploration.
With that in mind, we will be making changes at Headquarters as well.
In September, NASA initiated an Institutional Requirements Review
(IRR) the scope of which includes corporate G&A, corporate service
pools, and all Headquarters-based operations. Our goals are to keep
corporately funded requirements within overall corporate budget
guidelines, reduce the total workforce at Headquarters commensurate
with its appropriate role and overall size of the Agency, and
consolidate required personnel at the Headquarters building. We aim to
(1) gain operational efficiencies; (2) align ourselves to a management
model that has Headquarters in charge of architecture, strategy,
policy, compliance, and general management with field Centers executing
programs and projects; and (3) set an example for the rest of the
Agency of the willingness of Headquarters to make hard decisions that
benefit NASA in the long run.
Assuming we can achieve additional buyouts in the next few months
and redirect some of our in-house capacity to performing core
activities related to exploration, science, and aeronautics missions,
NASA has approximately 950 civil servants in the field without program
coverage in FY 2006.
We will continue to address this problem and structure the
workforce to ensure the success of the exploration vision, as well as
NASA's other missions in science, aeronautics, education, space
operations and exploration. However, changes to our skill mix and,
therefore, the workforce will be required.
The NASA Office of Human Capital continues to work with center
management on the workforce strategies. We will continue to identify
center work assignments based on our strategic planning for the
exploration systems. We are in the planning stages of offering a final
buyout program to employees.
If we are unable to cover all of the NASA civil service positions,
NASA is planning to conduct a Reduction in Force (RIF). Our Office of
Human Capital is working with human resource offices at the centers to
ensure readiness for a RIF, should it become necessary. However, a RIF
is a last resort, and we will exhaust all other reasonable
possibilities before undertaking such an action.
With changes to NASA's mission, it is important that we manage our
workforce issues to ensure that we have the right skill mix to
successfully execute the vision for space exploration and maintain the
important work in other areas such as our aeronautics, space operations
and science portfolios. We will have an integrated, Agency-wide
approach to human capital management.
Q5. When do you expect the first humans to set foot on Mars? What is
that estimate based on, and can that be done within a NASA budget that
is flat or at best keeping pace with inflation? If so, how?
A5. When the President unveiled the Vision for Space Exploration on
January 14, 2004, he announced a plan to extend human presence across
the solar system and beyond. NASA's exploration architecture lays out
our plans for developing launch, transportation, landing and habitation
systems that will enable a return to the Moon by 2018, followed by
sustained human presence on the Moon while preparing for later Mars
missions. This architecture will be affordable and will institute a
``go as you can afford to pay'' budget approach. We're not far enough
along in the planning to say exactly when the first human flight to
Mars will be, however we will already have much of the architecture,
including the heavy lift vehicle, a versatile crew capsule and
propulsion systems, needed to get there. In addition, experience from
missions to the Moon will lay the groundwork for using Martian
resources. A lunar outpost, just three days away from Earth, will
provide us with the needed practice of ``living off the land'' that
will be required for the longer missions to Mars.
Question submitted by Representative Michael E. Sodrel
Q1. Administrator Griffin, in your answer to my question as to whether
or not NASA was doing enough to ensure astronaut health in long-term
missions, you stated that NASA will need to do more in the future, but
NASA was not endeavoring to have long-term human flight at this time.
Shortly after answering my question, you referenced the
Administration's goal of visiting Mars. If I am not mistaken, flight to
Mars will take years just to traverse the distance. While I can
understand why many resources will be committed to developing a vehicle
capable of distance flight, I would hope engineering plans would also
seek to alleviate or mitigate physical stress on the human flight crew.
When placed in zero gravity for extended periods, tremendous physical
changes take place in the human body such as accelerated skeletal
aging, muscle atrophy and inexplicable biochemical signaling
disturbances that lead to anemia and immune dysfunction in crew.
Vigorous life science research will be necessary to assist engineers in
solving such problems involved in long-term human flight. Would you
agree that maintaining a life science program at NASA is essential to
obtaining stated goals of NASA and the President?
A1. Four types of missions are currently planned for NASA: 1) Long
duration, up to six months in Low Earth Orbit; 2) short duration, 9-14
day missions to the Moon starting in 2018; 3) longer duration stays (up
to six months) on the Lunar surface, and 4) a long duration mission to
Mars later in the century. Physiological changes develop in astronauts
in microgravity and become more profound on extended duration missions.
Current research is directed toward the validation of
countermeasures protecting human health on the International Space
Station (ISS). Medical standards for addressing the affects of space
flight are being developed, as are prototypes of medical care. Also
critical, environmental health and radiation protection research is
being conducted on ISS and in the Brookhaven National Laboratory
facility. Significant resources are directed toward developing life
support technology and autonomous medical care without which longer
missions such as Mars will not be possible.
NASA Life Sciences has provided significant contributions to our
understanding of the physiological changes and human adaptation to
microgravity. ISS continues to provide invaluable data on the exposure
of humans to microgravity and the time course of these changes,
information which is also needed for Mars. The National Space
Biomedical Research Institute has been created to address space
physiology, psychosocial issues, and medicine, and to link with the
Johnson Space Center and other members of the Space Life Sciences
community to address these issues. Obviously, NASA will also continue
to rely on the contributions of the National Institutes of Health
research in relevant areas.
Appendix 2:
----------
Additional Material for the Record
Prepared Statement of Michael D. Griffin
Review of President's FY 2006 Budget
Thank you, Chairman Boehlert, Ranking Member Gordon and Members of
the Committee for inviting me to appear before you for today's hearing.
You have invited me to appear before your committee as a private
citizen on several past occasions to discuss our nation's space
program. Today, I'm testifying before you in a much different
capacity--as NASA Administrator. When I previously appeared before you,
I would use phrases such ``they (meaning NASA) should do X or Y.'' I
now need another choice of pronouns. We at NASA have a lot of work to
do. We have many challenges to overcome. We need to work closely with
this committee and the entire Congress in carrying out the many
challenges before us, and we will need your help in this great
endeavor.
In your invitation, you asked me to address my guiding philosophy
and plans for setting priorities for NASA's programs in human space
flight, space science, Earth science, and aeronautics, as well as its
workforce and infrastructure. That's a tall order for a five minute
summary, so this might take a little longer.
The Science Committee has already received testimony this year from
NASA's Deputy Administrator, Fred Gregory, concerning NASA's FY 2006
budget request, you've held focused hearings on NASA's aeronautics R&D
and Earth science programs, and few weeks ago your committee held the
first-ever Congressional hearing with a live feed from astronaut John
Phillips onboard the International Space Station. I will try to focus
my testimony today on my guiding philosophy and priorities, and will
update the Committee on where we are and where we are going. It has
been a busy time for me personally as well as for the entire NASA team.
We have a lot of work ahead of us.
In presenting the Vision for Space Exploration last year, the
President defined a focus for our nation's space program in a journey
of exploration that will be carried out over the next several decades.
In heading down this path, the first steps we take are critically
important, and decisions need to be made in a timely manner.
The first step is to return the Space Shuttle to flight, and to fly
each mission thereafter as safely as possible. This is my top priority
as NASA Administrator. Last week I participated in an engineering
review of the risk to the Shuttle due to foam and ice debris, which we
believe to have been greatly mitigated since the loss of Columbia. I
met with the Stafford-Covey Return-To-Flight Task Group this morning to
hear the concerns of the panel members. Given the level of complexity
of the issues involved, we need their point of view. We need these
complex issues to be discussed openly and accurately.
Tonight, I leave for Kennedy Space Center for the Flight Readiness
Review of the STS-114 mission with the Space Shuttle Discovery
commanded by USAF Colonel Eileen Collins. At this review, the NASA team
will determine if we're ready to fly when the next launch window opens
in mid-July. I look forward to a healthy, open dialogue about Space
Shuttle safety issues and NASA's ability to return the Space Shuttle to
flight. Members of the Science Committee are invited to Kennedy Space
Center for this launch, but let me caution everyone involved that the
entire NASA Space Shuttle team has a lot of hard work to do, and many
things can happen between now and the date of launch.
Following a safe return-to-flight, we will turn our sights to the
construction of the International Space Station and, after its
completion, the retirement of the Space Shuttle by 2010. To this end, a
team of experts within NASA are investigating a range of realistic ISS
configuration and Shuttle manifest options before we retire the Shuttle
in 2010. I met again with the team earlier this morning, and I hope to
present NASA's proposed plan for the ISS configuration and Shuttle
manifest to you and our international partners later this summer. Let
me emphasize to everyone that this is a proposal that requires further
discussion. I visited with many of our partners a few weeks ago during
the Paris Air Show. We shared with each other our thoughts on the
International Space Station and other areas of cooperation in space
exploration. I look forward to continuing an open dialogue with our
international partners on how best to use the Space Station as a
testbed for future space exploration activities, and how to realize
tangible benefits from the fruits of this research.
Even as a testbed, the Space Station will not answer all of the
questions that need to be answered before we begin to explore the Moon
and Mars. However, if a problem occurs on the Space Station, the crew
is only a few hours away from a safe return to Earth, while they will
be three days away when on the Moon, and many months away from home
during the long journey to Mars.
The loss of the Space Shuttle Columbia has made us acutely aware
that one of the major impediments in fully utilizing the Space
Station's capabilities is that we need a more robust logistics
capability for crew and cargo than the United States or our
international partners have readily available or on the drawing board.
For this reason, we plan to leverage our nation's commercial space
industry to meet NASA's needs for ISS cargo logistics and possibly crew
support. I spoke in some depth on this topic at last week's Space
Transportation Association breakfast about my guiding philosophy in
dealing constructively with the emerging commercial space industry. I
want to thank Congressmen Hall and Calvert for taking part in that
event.
To meet the need for crew rescue support for the Space Station,
NASA will require the help of this committee in helping to resolve
certain restrictions placed on cooperation with Russia in the Iran
Nonproliferation Act of 2000. This Administration recognizes the value
of effective cooperation with our international partners on the Space
Station. At the same time, we must appropriately respect and maintain
our nation's nonproliferation objectives. Over the last several months,
NASA has participated in an interagency coordination process and is
proposing a legislative solution in the form of an amendment to the
Iran Nonproliferation Act of 2000 that would provide NASA with the
necessary flexibility while maintaining our nation's nonproliferation
objectives.
If a solution is not found, we believe that U.S. astronauts will
need to cease maintaining permanent presence aboard the Space Station
in April 2006, in accordance with previous agreements between NASA and
Russia concerning crew rescue support for the ISS using the Russian
Soyuz vehicle. We do not believe this situation was the intent of
Congress back in 2000, but this is the consequence we are facing today.
I also should note that NASA did not plan to rely so extensively on the
Russian Space Agency in carrying out the Space Station program, but
this is the situation in which we find ourselves today. The
Administration expects to deliver this proposed legislative solution to
the Congress in the very near future. We will need this committee's
help in dealing with these restrictions.
In the future, I believe that we need to ensure that the United
States does not find our space program so heavily reliant on others.
Toward this end, NASA must accelerate the development of the Crew
Exploration Vehicle, which will be capable of ferrying our astronauts
to and from the Space Station, and of conducting voyages to the Moon
and Mars. We have a team of some of the best engineers and managers
drawn from across the Agency looking at ways to accelerate the
development of the Crew Exploration Vehicle, and we hope to soon share
with the Congress our plans for the overall space exploration
architecture, the CEV, and the transportation system needed to launch
it.
Another major initiative underway concerns how we as an Agency
consisting of ten field centers plan to organize our workforce and
facilities to carry out our exploration, aeronautics, and science
missions. Having visited all of the NASA centers within the past few
weeks, I firmly believe that more authority should be delegated to
program managers at these centers, while NASA headquarters should focus
on policy, budget, and program executive functions. Frankly, NASA
headquarters staffing has grown too large over the last several years.
Another of the things I realized during my tour of NASA's field
centers is that some outdated facilities need to be modernized, closed,
or mothballed. We will conduct a study, across the Agency, to determine
which facilities belong in which category. This analysis of our assets
will require close coordination with our DOD, FAA, and industry
stakeholders.
NASA is facing difficult choices in balancing the needs of the
Agency's civil servant workforce with the missions the Agency conducts
on behalf of the Nation along with the budget available. We have not
yet decided whether any involuntary layoffs of NASA's civil servants
will be needed in the future, beyond those already announced at Langley
Research Center due to an A-76 competition. Thus, we are conducting an
assessment of the Agency in organizing the work to be done and
workforce needs. I plan to have interim answers in the coming weeks,
but this will be a difficult problem for the next several years. As a
team, we are trying to be sensitive in balancing the needs of the
workforce, NASA's mission requirements, and our budget constraints. I
hope to keep NASA's workforce and the Congress informed as much as
humanly possible.
However, I need to be straightforward with all concerned. NASA
cannot afford everything on its plate today. We must set clear
priorities and remain within the budget NASA has been allocated. We are
taking a ``go-as-you-can-afford-to-pay'' approach toward space
exploration, but at several field centers, NASA has a gross mismatch
between the work to be done, the size of the civil service workforce,
and the budget available. We are working through these issues and
trying to consult everyone as much as possible, but difficult decisions
will be required, and these decisions must be made in a timely manner.
Another set of major, upcoming decisions that we at NASA need to
address concern how best to manage several space astronomy missions
under development. Congress has been clear in its priorities for the
Agency. NASA is making plans for a servicing mission to the Hubble
Space Telescope, but we need to complete two successful Shuttle test
flights before we can assess the relative risks of another Shuttle
mission to the Hubble. This assessment should be completed this fall.
At the same time, we are conducting an assessment of significant cost
growth purported for the James Webb Space Telescope, a high priority
mission under development within NASA's astronomy portfolio. I have
called for a special review of the program to report back in late July.
In the meantime, we have decided that NASA will accept the European
Space Agency's offer to launch the Webb Space Telescope spacecraft on
an Ariane V rocket as their contribution to the overall mission.
However, the problems facing both of these space telescopes
jeopardize the budgets for other advanced astronomy and space physics
missions currently under formulation. Again, NASA simply cannot afford
everything on its plate.
Another priority is the acceleration of the Crew Exploration
Vehicle. In order to accelerate development of the CEV and its
associated launch vehicle, while keeping within NASA's budget
guidelines, NASA will need to defer the development of some other space
exploration-related technologies, ISS research, and space nuclear
systems that are only needed after the CEV comes on-line in the post-
2010 timeframe.
Within the Science Mission Directorate, NASA is seeking a better
balance in how priorities are set between Earth and space science
missions. NASA has a robust science agenda--with 55 missions in orbit,
26 missions in development--including the Lunar Reconnaissance Orbiter
to map the Moon's surface in great detail--and 34 missions in the
design phase. However, due to cost growth and the extended life on
several missions, NASA will need to defer some missions.
One of those missions which we hope to extend is the Tropical
Rainfall Measuring Mission (or TRMM), a research satellite which has
exceeded our expectations in being used operationally with hurricane
forecasts. NASA is working closely with NOAA, the Japanese Government,
and others in the interagency process to determine the legal
liabilities and safety measures necessary in extending this mission.
NASA and NOAA need to continue to work closely together, especially in
transitioning NASA-developed sensors, research, and other capabilities
to operations. Likewise, NASA also needs NOAA's operational sensors to
enable further Earth Science research.
In aeronautics research, NASA needs to focus its technical
expertise and facilities on results-oriented programs for our nation.
The Administration supports the call for the development of a national
aeronautics policy in H.R. 2862, the FY 2006 appropriation bill for
NASA that recently passed the House of Representatives. NASA must work
closely with a broad range of stakeholders and customers, including the
Congress, Defense Department, and FAA in developing this national
aeronautics policy. But again, I need to be straightforward with you.
This policy needs to set clear, realistic priorities to focus NASA's
limited resources, and not simply be a laundry list of unrelated
projects.
To conclude, I would like to note that next week our nation will
celebrate our Independence Day, a day of fireworks and celebration.
That same day, NASA satellite operators working on the Deep Impact
mission will be hard at work trying to create their own fireworks
display, 80 million miles from Earth, by smashing a small spacecraft
into the comet Temple 1 at 23,000 miles per hour to discover what's
inside. It's a difficult mission. . .even for rocket scientists.
The men and women of NASA appreciate the risks our nation is
willing to make for the noble purpose of exploration and science.
Meriwether Lewis observed in his journal two hundred years ago on July
4th, 1805: ``We all believe that we are now about to enter on the most
perilous and difficult part of our voyage, yet I see no one repining;
all appear ready to meet those difficulties which wait us with
resolution and becoming fortitude.''