[House Hearing, 109 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
NEW TECHNOLOGIES IN RAILROAD SAFETY AND SECURITY
=======================================================================
(109-15)
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
RAILROADS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON
TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
APRIL 28, 2005
__________
Printed for the use of the
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure
_____
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COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE
DON YOUNG, Alaska, Chairman
THOMAS E. PETRI, Wisconsin, Vice- JAMES L. OBERSTAR, Minnesota
Chair NICK J. RAHALL, II, West Virginia
SHERWOOD L. BOEHLERT, New York PETER A. DeFAZIO, Oregon
HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina JERRY F. COSTELLO, Illinois
JOHN J. DUNCAN, Jr., Tennessee ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of
WAYNE T. GILCHREST, Maryland Columbia
JOHN L. MICA, Florida JERROLD NADLER, New York
PETER HOEKSTRA, Michigan ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey
VERNON J. EHLERS, Michigan CORRINE BROWN, Florida
SPENCER BACHUS, Alabama BOB FILNER, California
STEVEN C. LaTOURETTE, Ohio EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas
SUE W. KELLY, New York GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi
RICHARD H. BAKER, Louisiana JUANITA MILLENDER-McDONALD,
ROBERT W. NEY, Ohio California
FRANK A. LoBIONDO, New Jersey ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland
JERRY MORAN, Kansas EARL BLUMENAUER, Oregon
GARY G. MILLER, California ELLEN O. TAUSCHER, California
ROBIN HAYES, North Carolina BILL PASCRELL, Jr., New Jersey
ROB SIMMONS, Connecticut LEONARD L. BOSWELL, Iowa
HENRY E. BROWN, Jr., South Carolina TIM HOLDEN, Pennsylvania
TIMOTHY V. JOHNSON, Illinois BRIAN BAIRD, Washington
TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania SHELLEY BERKLEY, Nevada
SAM GRAVES, Missouri JIM MATHESON, Utah
MARK R. KENNEDY, Minnesota MICHAEL M. HONDA, California
BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania RICK LARSEN, Washington
JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas MICHAEL E. CAPUANO, Massachusetts
JIM GERLACH, Pennsylvania ANTHONY D. WEINER, New York
MARIO DIAZ-BALART, Florida JULIA CARSON, Indiana
JON C. PORTER, Nevada TIMOTHY H. BISHOP, New York
TOM OSBORNE, Nebraska MICHAEL H. MICHAUD, Maine
KENNY MARCHANT, Texas LINCOLN DAVIS, Tennessee
MICHAEL E. SODREL, Indiana BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky
CHARLES W. DENT, Pennsylvania BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
TED POE, Texas RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri
DAVID G. REICHERT, Washington ALLYSON Y. SCHWARTZ, Pennsylvania
CONNIE MACK, Florida JOHN T. SALAZAR, Colorado
JOHN R. `RANDY' KUHL, Jr., New York
LUIS G. FORTUNO, Puerto Rico
LYNN A. WESTMORELAND, Georgia
CHARLES W. BOUSTANY, Jr., Louisiana
VACANCY
(ii)
SUBCOMMITTEE ON RAILROADS
STEVEN C. LaTOURETTE, Ohio, Chairman
THOMAS E. PETRI, Wisconsin
SHERWOOD L. BOEHLERT, New York CORRINE BROWN, Florida
JOHN L. MICA, Florida NICK J. RAHALL II, West Virginia
SPENCER BACHUS, Alabama JERROLD NADLER, New York
JERRY MORAN, Kansas ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey
GARY G. MILLER, California BOB FILNER, California
ROB SIMMONS, Connecticut ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland
TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania EARL BLUMENAUER, Oregon
SAM GRAVES, Missouri LEONARD L. BOSWELL, Iowa
JON PORTER, Nevada JULIA CARSON, Indiana
TOM OSBORNE, Nebraska PETER A. DeFAZIO, Oregon
MICHAEL E. SODREL, Indiana JERRY F. COSTELLO, Illinois
LYNN A. WESTMORELAND, Georgia, EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas
Vice-Chair JAMES L. OBERSTAR, Minnesota
DON YOUNG, Alaska (ex officio)
(ex officio)
(iii)
CONTENTS
TESTIMONY
Page
Chipkevich, Robert J., Director of Railroads, Pipelines, and
Hazardous Materials Investigation Department, National
Transportation Safety Board.................................... 8
Collins, Daniel M., President, Operation Respond Institute,
accompanied by James Boone, Vice President, and Gerald Lynch,
Executive Director of Regional Information Sharing System...... 145
Hamberger, Edward R., President, Association of American
Railroads...................................................... 131
Hill, Jeremy, Senior Vice President, Union Switch and Signal
Company........................................................ 145
Pickett, William D., President, Brotherhood of Railroad
Signalmen...................................................... 131
Rader, Thomas, President, Colorado Railcar Manufacturing........ 145
Samuels, Dr. John, Vice President, Operation Planning Support,
Norfolk Southern............................................... 131
Strang, Jo, Deputy Associate Administrator for Railroad
Development, Federal Railroad Administration................... 8
PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Costello, Hon. Jerry F., of Illinois............................. 180
Johnson, Hon. Eddie Bernice, of Texas............................ 206
Menendez, Hon. Robert, of New Jersey............................. 209
Oberstar, Hon. James L., of Minnesota............................ 212
PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED BY WITNESSES
Chipkevich, Robert J............................................ 156
Collins, Daniel M............................................... 168
Hamberger, Edward R............................................. 182
Hill, Jeremy.................................................... 194
Pickett, William D.............................................. 209
Rader, Thomas................................................... 219
Samuels, Dr. John............................................... 231
Strang, Jo...................................................... 244
SUBMISSIONS FOR THE RECORD
Chipkevich, Robert J., Director of Railroads, Pipelines, and
Hazardous Materials Investigation Department, National
Transportation Safety Board, response to a question from Rep.
Menendez, National Transportation Safety Board public hearings. 75
Samuels, John, Vice President, Operation Planning Support,
Norfolk Southern, response to a question from Rep. Menendez,
type of laser.................................................. 143
Strang, Jo, Deputy Associate Administrator for Railroad
Development, Federal Railroad Administration:
Response to a question from Rep. Menendez, Accident/Incident
Details...................................................... 14
Response to a question from Rep. Menendez, Cirumstances in
other Incidents for 2004, and type person involved by
decending frequency.......................................... 21
Response to a question from Rep. Menendez, Positive Train
Control...................................................... 71,73
Response to a question from Rep. Miller of California,
crashworthiness research on tables in passenger cars......... 83
Response to a question from Rep. Johnson, rail infrastructure.. 118
Response to a question from Delegate Norton DHS and rail
security..................................................... 123
Response to a question fred Rep. Sodrel, rail passenger
fatalities................................................... 129
ADDITION TO THE RECORD
Ohio Rail Development Commission, James Seney, Executive
Director, statement............................................ 256
NEW TECHNOLOGIES IN RAILROAD SAFETY AND SECURITY
----------
Thursday, April 28, 2005
House of Representatives, Committee on
Transportation, Subcommittee on Railroads and
Infrastructure, Washington, D.C.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:05 a.m., in
Room 2167, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Steve LaTourette
[chairman of the subcommittee] presiding.
Mr. LaTourette. Good morning. The hearing of the Railroad
Subcommittee will come to order.
I want to welcome all of our members and our witnesses here
today, the first meeting of the Railroad Subcommittee in this
Congress, and especially the new members of our Subcommittee
that I want to speak briefly about, and hopefully they will
join us a little bit later.
On the Republican side, our new Vice Chair is Lynn
Westmoreland of Georgia. Lynn, I understand, has quite a
background in contracting and construction, and I am sure he is
going to be a valuable resource to the Subcommittee as we move
forward with our discussion of rail in America.
Next, Mike Sodrel of Indiana. I am told that Mike's family
started in the transportation and logistics business back in
1867. So it looks like Mr. Sodrel has transportation in his
blood, and I know that he is also going to be a great asset to
the Subcommittee and we welcome him aboard.
Also joining us as a new member is Tom Osborne of Nebraska.
The sports fans in the audience will probably recognize Tom.
Before coming to Congress, he played professional football for
the Washington Redskins and San Francisco 49ers, and of course
he also served as head coach of the Nebraska Cornhuskers for 25
years, where he enjoyed winning seasons every year. We are
happy to have Tom with us as well.
Today's hearing is on the subject of new technologies in
railroad safety and security. According to data published by
the Federal Railroad Administration, railroad safety has
improved significantly over the past two decades. The latest
statistics show that the overall accident rate has decreased 16
percent between 2000 and 2003. The rate of employee injuries
has declined nearly 21 percent during that same period, and
railroad employees have an injury rate lower than many other
heavy industries. Working on the railroad is a difficult and
often physically demanding job, and so I want to give credit to
our railroad employees who strive to make safety a top
priority.
Today we are going to hear testimony about new technologies
in railroad safety, some of which are already yielding benefits
to railroad employees, freight carriers, and the traveling
public. In particular, we want to hear about some of the new
technologies being developed by the FRA such as Positive Train
Control and the signal systems being developed in Europe by
Union Switch and Signal. I would be grateful to hear any
comments regarding these technologies from the fellows in the
front lines, the Brotherhood of Railroad Signalmen.
This hearing is not just about infrastructure, it is about
rail transportation. I have heard several positive comments
regarding a new generation of self-propelled railcars, and hope
that we will hear details from Colorado Railcar.
A couple of housekeeping items before I yield to our
distinguished Ranking Member. I want to ask unanimous consent
to allow all members to have 30 days to revise and extend their
remarks and to permit the submission of additional statements
and materials by the witnesses. So ordered, without objection.
And then I am also advised that later during the hearing
Ms. Norton of the District of Columbia may join us. Although a
member of the full Committee, she is not a member of the
Subcommittee, and would ask unanimous consent that she be
permitted to participate in today's hearing. Without objection,
so ordered.
And lastly, our distinguished Ranking Member, our regular
distinguished Ranking Member, Ms. Brown of Florida is
unavoidably detained in other parts of the world and will not
be with us today. But we are lucky and honored to have with us
Mr. Menendez from New Jersey to fill in ably for her.
At this time it is my pleasure to yield to you for any
comments you may wish to make.
Mr. Menendez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am happy to sit in
for our distinguished Ranking Member who, as you said, is
unavoidably detained. I am happy to be a member of the Rail
Subcommittee in this session of Congress.
However, I am not terribly happy about the status of rail
safety and security in this country. I know our witnesses are
here today to talk about new technologies that will make our
trains safer and more secure, and I look forward to hearing
what they have to say. But I would also like to see this
Subcommittee hold a hearing on rail safety oversight,
particularly in light of a number of recent accidents and the
series of Pulitzer Prize winning articles in the New York Times
last year regarding the cozy relationship between the Federal
Railroad Administration and Union Pacific.
An Inspector General report from December brought to light
a number of disturbing questions about FRA's regulatory
oversight process and whether that process is sufficient to
ensure public safety. I think this Subcommittee is exactly the
right place to address that, but I think we are long overdue
since we have not had a true rail safety oversight hearing in
almost three years. However, that is for another day.
Today, we are here to discuss how technology can better
protect the people that work, ride, or live alongside our
Nation's railways. This is an extremely important issue for me
since my district is tightly packed with freight and passenger
rail lines, including the Northeast corridor. If you add in
subways, light rail, and commuter railroads, there are millions
of people on the rails everyday in this country and we have not
been spending nearly enough to ensure their safety.
That is why I introduced the Rail and Public Transportation
Security Act earlier this year, which provides over $10 billion
to address critical operating and capital needs for Amtrak,
freight rail, and public transportation security, including
$300 million for research, development, and field testing of
new technologies.
In addition, my bill includes a welded rail and tank car
safety improvement program that was developed in response to
the derailment in Minot. The recent tragedy in South Carolina
also shows us how seriously we need to take tank car safety and
how we have to make a serious Federal commitment in order to
protect people from both accidental and malicious disasters.
I am amazed that the Federal Government has not made this
investment already. Rail systems are extremely vulnerable to
terrorists attack, as shown by last year's attacks in Madrid.
In fact, since September 11, there have been over five times as
many attacks on public transportation targets than on
airplanes.
I would ask my colleagues to imagine what we would have
done, what action we would have taken if the Madrid train
bombings had occurred in our homeland on our soil. What
immediate investments would we be ready to make? What urgent
action would we be willing to take? The new technologies we
will hear about today are a first step towards that action, but
we need to do more and we need to do it sooner rather than
later.
I thank the witnesses for being here today. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman, for holding this hearing.
Mr. LaTourette. I thank the gentleman very much.
We have been joined by some additional members at this
time. I see the distinguished Chairman of the Aviation
Subcommittee, Mr. Mica of Florida, has joined us and he has
also brought guests, which we thank you very much for swelling
the audience. It would be my pleasure to yield to you, Mr.
Mica, for any observations you would like to make.
Mr. Mica. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate your
recognizing my guests. I have students from the Geneva Academy
in Central Florida in the 7th congressional district, and
several other voting age constituents, and I am always pleased
to see them here and welcome them. But I want to also thank
you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing today, and also for
your focus on new technologies and railroad safety and security
issues. I think you have a great list of panelists.
The rail industry is facing some very serious challenges. I
spoke with a group yesterday and liability is certainly one of
the challenges that they face, along with others. But also
providing new systems for safety which will provide less
exposure for accidents and for the challenges that they face in
providing a cost-effective alternative to paving over our
country and providing a good means of moving commodity,
freight, and other goods through our communities.
There are also challenges we know now by attempts to move
hazardous and other materials through some of our communities.
We need to find ways to assist them to move those much-needed
items through our communities, including even basic things like
chlorine which we rely on for safe water supplies to our local
municipalities and other water systems that need those
chemicals.
So we face a number of challenges. I think this hearing
will enlighten us as to what the Federal Railroad
Administration and others have done to come up with new safety
techniques. We will also hear recommendations I think that are
necessary from the industry.
Finally, I am excited, I think you have got some folks from
Colorado Railcar. I have taken a great interest in getting the
United States into producing technologies that will take some
of the cars off of our roads or at least give us some
alternatives, and actually manufacture once again in the United
States some of the essential equipment for the future.
So, again, I thank you. I look forward to hearing from the
panelists. And I again welcome our guests.
Mr. LaTourette. I thank the gentleman. Ms. Johnson of
Texas, any remarks?
Ms. Johnson. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, Ranking
Member, for holding this hearing. It is my first one on this
Subcommittee and it is an important one to me because, as we
know, our Nation's transportation system is the backbone of our
economy and our way of life. Every day various modes within the
Nation's transportation system transports millions of people
and tons of goods throughout the country. So critically
important to this equation is the role of secure freight and
passenger rail systems.
While the tragic events of September 11, 2001 have forced
us to take a hard look at how we secure our various modes of
transportation, rail security remains a significant challenge.
According to GAO, a number of positive steps have been taken by
rail stakeholders to bolster the Nation's rail security since
that time, such as performing risk assessments, emergency
drills, and developing security plans. However, one only needs
to turn to the news or pick up a local newspaper to realize
that our Nation's rail systems still remain extremely
vulnerable to the possibility of terrorist attacks that could
jeopardize countless lives and cause serious economic
disruption. For example, on June 28th of last year two freight
trains carrying chlorine gas collided in my State killing three
people. Only one of the dead was aboard; the others died as a
result of gas drifting over a residential neighborhood over a
mile away. Further, we must never forget the horrific Madrid
train bombings last year that left 200 commuters dead and 1,500
wounded.
These incidents and countless others highlight the unique
challenges and risks associated with the rail system. So while
I am heartened by GAO's findings, more work remains to be done,
particularly in resources invested toward surface
transportation concerns. I feel strongly that as policymakers
we must revive our resolve to approach rail security challenges
with a sense of urgency. To do otherwise only serves to further
compromise the safety of the American public. According to the
Mineta Institute, globally, surface transportation systems were
the target of more than 195 terrorist attacks from the 1997
through the year 2000.
As I close, I want to thank our witnesses that have come
before us to testify this morning. I look forward to your
testimony. I am particularly interested in learning more about
the latest security innovations, the level of coordination
among rail stakeholders, and what we as a body may do to
further assist them to help bolster freight and passenger
security efforts. So thank you again, Mr. Chairman, for this
hearing.
Mr. LaTourette. I thank the gentlelady very much. In a
moment I will yield to Mr. Miller, Westmoreland, and Osborne
for comments they would like to make. But I see we have been
lucky enough to be joined by the distinguished Ranking Member
of the full Committee. And so this must be an important hearing
if Mr. Oberstar is here.
Mr. Oberstar, I would yield to you for any observations you
would like to make.
Mr. Oberstar. Mr. Chairman, all of your hearings are
important ones. But when it comes to safety, whether in rail,
or aviation, or highways, maritime, it gets my attention. And
it is a very promising initiative on your part to explore in
the context of a hearing new technologies that may improve both
safety and security. But I think to deal with the issue fully,
we need to go beyond technology.
We have seen in recent years there is an increase in rail
accidents, not an alarming increase, but an increase that gets
my attention and that of the National Transportation Safety
Board and the Federal Railroad Administration. There were over
3,100 accidents in 2004. That was up from just under 3,000 in
2003, 2,700 accidents in 2002. The trend is in the wrong
direction. And then we had the catastrophic accident in
Graniteville, South Carolina, that the NTSB said was a result
of improperly lined switches. The IG at the Department of
Transportation said that the trend of rail safety data
indicates improperly lined switches are the second leading
cause of rail accidents and the principal cause of accidents
resulting from human error.
Technology helps, technology is vitally important, but in
the end, people make these decisions. Properly trained people,
properly experienced people can avoid accidents with the right
technology. The IG Report in February of this year on Safety
Findings and Recommendations at the FRA show that serious
safety problems have been present for all four of our major
railroads, and that despite an increase in the civil penalties
that FRA has assessed on those railroads.
But the IG also highlights prior audit report
recommendations that the Federal Railroad Administration has
failed to implement. The IG's 2002 report recommended that FRA
make greater use of inspection results developed in the Safety
Assurance and Compliance program. Now the RSAC was initiated
many years ago, almost a decade ago. It initially had good
results. But if the recommendations from RSAC are not
implemented, then they do not do any good, there is not a life-
saving benefit.
Now I am very encouraged that at the outset of your tenure
as Chairman of the Subcommittee you are putting this spotlight
on safety. I hope that it will not be a momentary event, that
this will be followed up with further inquiries suggested by
the information we will receive in the course of today's
hearing. I have read the testimony in advance. If my time
permits, I will have some questions about various elements.
Just recently, for example, the problems with Acela, the
rotor brakes that have demonstrated slim, spider-like cracks
that have migrated into major failures raise questions about
the underlying technology--was the metal cast properly, at the
proper temperature, was it cooled properly in the sequential
cooling that is necessary to ensure that bubbles do not develop
in the interior of the casting.
I am reminded of the disaster of United Airlines DC-10 over
Iowa, when the rotor in the tail engine, the titanium block
into which the fan blades are inserted, catastrophically
failed. One hundred and ten people lost their lives. It was a
miracle that pilot was able to bring that aircraft down; it had
lost all hydraulics. That was because of a number of failures
that started with the casting of that titanium block.
Now, we have 131 rotors in the Acela that have failed, for
a combination of reasons perhaps going back to the original
design specifications, but also the subsequent inspection and
perhaps over-ambitious five-year life schedule for those rotor
brakes, and perhaps also, as some are suggesting, our design
specification of a railcar that is twice as heavy as European
railcars where this technology originated.
If our Federal Railroad Administration is not being
vigilant on these matters and is not looking at these matters
in depth and is not following up on them, then this Committee
has a responsibility to do it. And you have made a good start
today, Mr. Chairman, and I thank you very much.
Mr. LaTourette. I thank the gentleman very much. I would
tell the distinguished Ranking Member it is our intention to
have a rather vigorous schedule of hearings, working with you
and Ms. Brown and Chairman Young, and the Acela rotor issue
will be the subject of a hearing occurring on May the 11th and
we will explore that issue in detail.
Mr. Miller, anything you care to say?
Mr. Miller. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Rail safety is
extremely important in my district because of the increase in
California we are going to experience in freight movement. My
district seems to be the largest gateway for trade in the
country. We have both the Long Beach and the L.A. harbors that
all those ships are coming into each year, and about $250
billion worth of cargo either comes through my district or most
of my district via train or truck. It is very problematic.
We are looking by 2020 at about two and a half to three
times the amount of trains we experience today will be
basically impacting our districts. We have a tremendous problem
with at-grade crossings. Most of my communities, which really
surprised me, over the last eight or ten years have pretty much
been up in arms and trying to be proactive about the issue of
the amount of impact that they face trying to cross those at-
grade crossings, whether it is trucks trying to deliver goods,
or people trying to get back and forth to work or take their
kids to school.
Rail safety is becoming a huge issue. We just recently, on
January 26th, in Glendale had a Metrolink train that slammed
into an SUV killing 11 people. It also clipped a northbound
Metrolink train, which could have been very disastrous. In
April of 2002, we had 3 people killed and 260 people were
injured in Placentia, in my district, when a freight train
missed a light and ran into a commuter train. And in June 2003
we had a runaway train in Commerce that went through my
district and it destroyed six houses. It was a miracle that
nobody really was injured in that accident. But what that has
done is brought an acute awareness of the situation we face in
California. Rail safety is absolutely something that has to be
addressed.
In California, about $802 billion worth of goods are
shipped from our State each year. That is either going on a
truck or most of it is going on a train, especially through the
central part of the United States. So we have a challenge with
increased freight movement and we need to be ready to deal with
the issue as it increases, and safety is something that is
paramount. I trust that our economy is going to continue to
grow, that nothing will happen to that. And if it does, and I
believe it will, we are also going to be increasing the amount
of freight and goods that are going to be moved.
So I am looking forward to the testimony today, and I am
glad you are here. Welcome.
Mr. LaTourette. I thank you, Mr. Miller.
Coach Osborne and Mr. Sodrel, you missed the glowing
introductions I gave of you at the beginning of this hearing.
We would like to get to the witnesses, but if there are brief
comments you would like to make. Mr. Osborne, first to you? Mr.
Sodrel?
Mr. Sodrel. I would just like to thank the witnesses for
coming here today. I spent my professional life in highway
transportation, so I will be getting an education on rail,
although I have a brother-in-law, retired UTU conductor and
several friends who were engineers that started out on the old
Louisville-Nashville railroad years ago. So I thank the
witnesses for being here, and I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. LaTourette. I thank the gentleman.
Today's hearing is comprised of three panels. The first
panel has Ms. Jo Strang, the Deputy Associate Administrator for
Railroad Development at the Federal Railroad Administration,
and also Bob Chipkevich, who is the Director of Railroads,
Pipelines, and Hazardous Materials Investigations Department at
the National Transportation Safety Board. We thank both of you
for coming. We have received your written observations and we
look forward to your testimony.
Ms. Strang, welcome. We will start with you.
TESTIMONY OF JO STRANG, DEPUTY ASSOCIATE ADMINISTRATOR FOR
RAILROAD DEVELOPMENT, FEDERAL RAILROAD ADMINISTRATION; BOB
CHIPKEVICH, DIRECTOR OF RAILROADS, PIPELINES, AND HAZARDOUS
MATERIALS INVESTIGATION DEPARTMENT, NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION
SAFETY BOARD
Ms. Strang. Thank you. Mr. Chairman and members of the
Subcommittee, I very much appreciate the opportunity to appear
before you today, on behalf of Secretary Mineta and Acting
Administrator Robert Jamison, on the subject of new
technologies in railroad safety. I would appreciate your
submitting my full statement for the record; I plan to
summarize it.
I supervise the Federal Railroad Administration's research,
development, and demonstration efforts, so I pay a great deal
of attention to new technologies in safety. Prior to this, I
supervised the National Transportation Safety Board's rail and
rail transit accident investigations, so I am familiar with the
consequences of railroad safety problems.
Safety is our top priority, and the promise that technology
holds to improve safety is compelling. Recent statistics show
that the industry as a whole is getting safer, but the spate of
recent accidents shows that we still have room to improve, and
we must accelerate the rate of progress.
In general, the safety trends on the Nation's railroads are
favorable. The data for calendar year 2004 show that since 2003
total rail accidents and incidents are down slightly, and
employee casualties are down about 8 percent.
However, not all trends are positive. Improvements in the
rate of train accidents have slowed, and bad accidents continue
to occur. FRA is committed to improving this record, and we are
focusing on ways to prevent, eliminate, or minimize the harm
resulting from train accidents. I will focus my testimony on
new technologies that hold great promise to improve rail
safety.
Track defects accounted for 34 percent of derailments over
the last five years. FRA has an active research program for
developing and deploying enhanced track inspection systems as a
preventative approach to reducing track accidents. I will
describe some of the key systems that FRA is currently
developing.
This is a picture of a crack in a joint bar. First, is an
automated joint bar inspection system. Current joint bar
inspection practices rely mostly on visual inspection and, in a
few cases, hand mapping with ultrasonic probes. These methods
are time-intensive and prone to human error. FRA is developing
an automated photo inspection system that will identify cracks
in joint bars.
This is a picture of the completed joint bar inspection
system. Our initial tests showed that a prototype system
mounted to a rail vehicle and operated at 30 miles per hour was
able to detect all cracked bars identified by visual
inspection, as well as additional cracks undetected by the
human eye.
Internal rail defects due to fatigue remain a serious
problem which has been exacerbated by recent trends in
increasing freight axle loads. Internal defects can be
identified only by specialized ultrasonic or induction
measurement cars that still cannot be operated at more than 10
miles per hour. Defects in the web or the base of the rail are
also extremely difficult to detect.
So far I have only talked about the parts of the rail you
can see. But we also need a way to inspect the subgrade, or the
part beneath the track. FRA has identified ground-penetrating
radar as a promising technology for finding poor track
conditions that are hidden below the surface, and is working on
developing a prototype system which will produce quantitative
indices of track subsurface conditions. Once the prototype is
completed, it will be installed on FRA's T-18 car for field
testing in the spring of 2006.
Collisions and overspeed derailments must also be
prevented. PTC is an advanced train control technology that can
prevent train collisions with automatic brake applications. It
also provides for automatic compliance with speed restrictions
and enhanced protection of roadway workers.
FRA's final rule enabling Positive Train Control became
effective in March 2005. The rule is a performance standard for
a system railroads may choose to install, but does not require
it to be installed. FRA is promoting the implementation of PTC
by sponsoring development of technologies through partnerships
with States and railroads, and by helping to provide NDGPS, a
satellite-based navigation aid.
FRA is also working on projects in Illinois, Michigan,
Wisconsin, and Alaska. A significant challenge for FRA and the
railroads in developing all such systems is to lower the cost
of implementation.
A fundamental technology for enabling the implementation of
PTC systems is a network of reference stations that monitors
GPS and transmits correction signals to an unlimited number of
users, known as the Nationwide Differential Global Positioning
System, or NDGPS. Any NDGPS receiver can then use these signals
to improve the accuracy and integrity of GPS. When complete,
there will be dual coverage throughout the United States to
ensure the signals are always available.
GPS has an accuracy of about 36 meters. Since parallel
railroad tracks are only 4 meters apart, GPS accuracy does not
meet our needs. Basic NDGPS improves the accuracy to 1 to 2
meters. Similarly, the GPS system takes two to four hours to
recognize that a satellite is out of tolerance and to notify
the users. This is referred to as ``time-to-alarm integrity.''
Basic NDGPS improves the time-to-alarm integrity to six
seconds. So, if a GPS satellite malfunctions, the NDGPS system
eliminates the bad satellite from the position solution within
six seconds, preventing any disruption to railroad operations.
While we are trying to find ways to protect against
derailments and collisions, we also need to protect train
occupants now. In contrast to European and Asian rail systems,
traffic on the U.S. rail system is dominated by private freight
traffic. FRA continues to address the crashworthiness of
passenger equipment and passenger and crew protection through
our crash test program.
Computer models have been developed to simulate a variety
of passenger rail car crash scenarios. These models, combined
with the results of crash tests and field investigations of
passenger train accidents, are being used to develop strategies
for increasing occupant protection.
FRA is now testing components of structural crash
worthiness for passenger rail equipment. We have completed both
designs and test of the crush zone design for coaches. The
results from the impact tests show that crash energy management
design has superior performance over conventional equipment
design.
I would like to show a few videos now. The first one is a
single car impact test. The first clip you will see is
conventional equipment with no modification.
[Video presentation.]
Ms. Strang. You can see the result of the impact. Clearly,
there would be loss of survival of space. The car was crushed
severely.
In the next clip, you will see a crash energy modified
system which FRA has developed. By using design components to
modify the energy, survival space remains much better
preserved.
[Video presentation.]
Ms. Strang. The next video will show two cars coupled
together and using crash energy management. In a conventional
train-to-train coupling, the lateral forces force the train out
of alignment and you get the typical accordion type of
derailment that you have seen. This keeps the train cars in
line with each other so that they are less likely to derail.
[Video presentation.]
Ms. Strang. You could see at the end, this is an overhead,
how the cars remained together instead of being out of
alignment.
The next video is a train-to-train collision. We have
planned another test in February, we hope, of this year that
will have all crash energy modified cars, and we will be able
to see what will happen.
[Video presentation.]
Ms. Strang. I would like to invite anybody on this
Committee if you would like to see the next crash test.
I would also like to point out that Metrolink, a commuter
railroad in California, is working with us to deploy crash
energy management systems in their next purchase.
FRA is also actively addressing the crash worthiness of
freight locomotives. Participants include the passenger and
freight railroads, rail labor organizations, and locomotive
builders.
I have additional videos if time permits. Thank you, and I
will be happy to answer your questions.
Mr. LaTourette. I thank you very much. I think, before we
go to Mr. Chipkevich, one of us did have a question. That
second train-to-train, was it 30 miles an hour?
Ms. Strang. It was 26.4.
Mr. LaTourette. It was 26.4. Thank you very much.
It is now my pleasure, Mr. Chipkevich, to ask you for your
observations. Just again, without objection, all of the
witnesses full statements will be made part of the record of
this hearing and I would ask you to summarize your remarks as
best you can. Thank you.
Mr. Chipkevich. Thank you. Thank you, Chairman LaTourette
and members of the Subcommittee. I want to thank you for the
opportunity to testify today on behalf of the National
Transportation Safety Board on an important rail safety issue,
Positive Train Control.
The NTSB has been investigating train collision and over-
speed accidents for over 35 years and issued our first
recommendation related to this issue after a 1969 head-on
collision between two Penn Central commuter passenger trains in
Darien, Connecticut. The Safety Board in 1970 recommended that
the Federal Railroad Administration study the feasibility of
requiring a form of automatic train control at points where
passenger trains are required to meet other trains.
Since 1970, the Safety Board has issued numerous safety
recommendations related to positive train separation. Our most
recent safety recommendation was issued in 2001, following a
collision between three Conrail freight trains in Bryan, Ohio.
The trains were operating in fog, when a faster moving train
missed a signal and hit the rear-end of a train that had slowed
because of the poor visibility. A third train, coming in the
opposite direction, struck the two derailed trains. The Safety
Board has recommended that the FRA facilitate actions necessary
for the development and implementation of Positive Train
Control systems that include collision avoidance, and require
implementation of Positive Train Control systems on main line
tracks, establishing priority requirements for high-risk
corridors such as those where commuter and intercity passenger
trains operate.
This safety recommendation was reiterated to the FRA after
a Burlington Northern Santa Fe freight train collided head-on
with a Metrolink passenger train in Placentia, California in
2002.
In the past six years, NTSB has investigated 38 accidents
where Positive Train Control is a safety issue. Causal factors
have been attributed to train crew mistakes and failure to
operate trains in accordance with operating rules. Human factor
causes have included fatigue, sleep-apnea, use of medication,
reduced visibility, and distractions such as cell phone use.
Further, FRA accident data show that for 2003 and 2004 human
factor causes to head-on, rear-end, and side collision
accidents were about 91 percent.
NTSB is currently investigating five accidents involving
freight train collisions. As a result of a collision between
two trains in Macdona, Texas, on June 28, 2004, a tank car
filled with chlorine was breached, resulting in three
fatalities and a significant public evacuation. NTSB will
examine whether Positive Train Control could have prevented the
Macdona accident and another accident that occurred in
Graniteville, South Carolina, on January 6, 2005. After the
Graniteville accident, a switch on the main track was found in
the open position to a siding. As a result of this accident, a
tank car filled with chlorine was breached, resulting in nine
fatalities.
Progress on Positive Train Control has been slow. This
safety issue has been on the NTSB's list of Most Wanted
Transportation Safety Improvements since 1990. Notwithstanding
the slow progress on Positive Train Control, the FRA has issued
standards to address modern electronic systems and emerging
technology in the signal and train control arena. The final
rule should provide safety-critical standards that equipment
must meet for use in Positive Train Control systems, but it
will not provide interoperability standards that need to be
addressed when equipment operated by different railroads is
used on the same track. The FRA, the Association of American
Railroads, and the Illinois Department of Transportation are
funding the North American Joint Positive Train Control Project
to help address equipment and operational issues that occur
when different railroads use the same track.
Positive Train Control systems can prevent human factor
caused accidents, and the NTSB will continue to urge
implementation of PTC systems through our accident
investigations and the attention of our list of Most Wanted
Transportation Safety Improvements.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify.
Mr. LaTourette. I thank you very much for not only your
testimony, but summing it up before the red light came on. That
was very nice of you. I appreciate that.
Ms. Strang, I think you answered this question in your
testimony, but I just want to be clear. When you were talking
about Positive Train Control systems, the rulemaking that the
FRA is currently undergoing, it is my understanding that you
said the rulemaking would make those systems optional and the
intention is not to make them mandatory at this time.
Ms. Strang. That is correct. The rule was published on
March 7, 2005, as a final rule. It is an operational standard,
if you will. It just sets the conditions and requirements for
Positive Train Control systems, but it does not mandate it.
Mr. LaTourette. Ms. Strang also, the passenger
survivability in a crash is influenced by a number of factors--
standees in a coach, for instance, can become projectile,
harming or killing other passengers; the location of the crash
also matters as to whether it is in an urban center where
medical attention is more readily available or a rural setting.
Is the FRA considering all of those factors as you look at
passenger survivability?
Ms. Strang. Yes. Actually, in 1999 we issued comprehensive
standards on passenger crashworthiness that included emergency
preparedness and egress types of standards, so that we would
have available windows and doors that function well in an
emergency and people can exit. We continue to work on passenger
crashworthiness and survivability through the American Public
Transportation Association, their passenger requirements group,
that sets the industry standards for public transit. These can
then be incorporated into the next revision of the passenger
crashworthiness rule.
Mr. LaTourette. It is my understanding, though, that your
rulemaking may not include an examination of interior materials
such as padding, is that right?
Ms. Strang. No. We have done fire testing, and we have also
done injury testing at tables.
Mr. LaTourette. Right. That was one of my questions I
think, the whole issue of whether
Ms. Strang. Actually, table design is important. We have
done tests where we took different types of tables and looked
at how their edges were and how they were fixed. They are
popular with commuters.
Mr. LaTourette. Mr. Menendez, in his opening remarks,
correctly called upon the issue of tank car safety. Can you
tell us a little bit about what the FRA is doing relative to
tank cars?
Ms. Strang. Sure, I would be delighted to. FRA is currently
undertaking tank car research that resulted from the Minot,
North Dakota, accident in 2002. We are working with the Volpe
National Transportation Systems Center and the AAR Tank Car
Committee to do several things.
One, we have to understand how tank cars fail when they are
in a derailment. So we are doing a three-phase model that
includes a physics model, a kinematics model, using finite
element analysis, and then we will validate the model. Once we
have a better understanding of how tank cars fail in
derailments and collisions, we will be able to address the
structural concerns through design.
Mr. LaTourette. Later in the hearing when Mr. Pickett
testifies, he expresses concern that the visual inspection of
the track is sometimes conducted at too high of speeds. During
your testimony, I think I wrote down that it was your feeling
that 30 miles an hour was a safe speed. I believe in his
testimony, I think he is proposing a limit of 15 miles an hour.
Could you share your view on that?
Ms. Strang. Certainly. The 30 miles per hour was with a
high-speed automatic photographic system, not a human eye. I do
not believe the human eye is designed to detect small cracks at
30 miles an hour.
Mr. LaTourette. And so what about his observation that he
will make later that 15 miles an hour is more appropriate?
Ms. Strang. It seems reasonable to me. But I am not on the
regulatory side of things.
Mr. LaTourette. Okay. Thank you very much. Mr. Menendez?
Mr. Menendez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Ms. Strang, in your testimony you say that the data for
2004 shows that the total accidents and incidents are down 3.9
percent from 2003. However, the data that I have seen from the
FRA website, which is the same data that Mr. Oberstar referred
to in his statement, show that the total number of accidents is
increasing. It showed that highway-rail incidents also
increased from 2003 to 2004, and that the only other statistic
that improved is something labeled ``other incidents.''
Ms. Strang. It depends on which--there are a lot of
different categories.
Mr. Menendez. I have not gotten to my question yet.
Ms. Strang. Oh, I am sorry.
Mr. Menendez. So my question is, if we extracted out the
accident category alone, what would the number be?
Ms. Strang. I do not have that number with me, but I can
provide it to you. I do know that collisions have increased.
But the total train accident/incident rate has decreased. But I
will provide those to you.
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Mr. Menendez. Would you extract the accident category alone
and then let the Committee know?
Ms. Strang. Absolutely.
Mr. Menendez. Thank you. What is the ``other incidents``
category?
Ms. Strang. Other incidents are things like cows on the
track, or an object that is there. It is not something that is
normal.
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Mr. Menendez. Okay. Positive Train Control has been on the
NTSB's list of Most Wanted Transportation Safety Improvements
since 1990. Why did it take the FRA 15 years to issue a final
rule on PTC?
Ms. Strang. That is a very good question. And since I am
not on the regulatory side of things, I cannot answer. But I
can have somebody provide the answer to you for the record.
Mr. Menendez. If you would, I would appreciate it.
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Mr. Menendez. Since you are not on the regulatory side, you
are going to give me the same answer to one of my other
questions, but I am going to ask it so that you get me an
answer. You cite human factors as one of the causes at the very
outset of your testimony. So I would also like to know when you
have investigated 38 railroad accidents where PTC could have
prevented or mitigated an accident, despite that it will save
lives, the rule that you issued in March is voluntary and not a
requisite for railroads. I would like to get an answer as to
why the regulators did not insist on something that can be
life-saving at the end of the day and dramatically reduce the
number of incidents. So if you would get that for us as well.
Ms. Strang. Yes, sir.
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Mr. Menendez. Do you know about dark territory, is that
something you can answer?
Ms. Strang. I know what it is.
Mr. Menendez. Okay. What can you answer for me?
Ms. Strang. I can answer questions about technology.
Mr. Menendez. Technology, okay. Let me move on to something
else then.
Mr. Chipkevich, when an accident occurs it is critical that
the community, the railroad industry, its workers, and in some
cases the victims are provided timely and accurate information
identifying what caused the accident and what measures parties
involved in the accident should take to prevent similar
accidents from occurring in the future. How long does it take
the NTSB to conduct an accident investigation? And why did it
take you over two years to investigate and issue
recommendations on the deadly accident in North Dakota? Why did
it take you over three years to investigate and issue
recommendations on the CSX freight tunnel derailment and fire
in the Howard Street tunnel?
Mr. Chipkevich. It is primarily the workload and the staff
resources that we have had to be able to address and do the
accident investigations. There was significant work in the
Howard Street tunnel accident investigation we did because
there was no clear-cut cause that we could identify for that
accident. So we did extensive testing and additional work that
did take an extended period of time in that particular
accident.
Mr. Menendez. So, in other words, if you had a greater
staffing capability, we would truncate the time and get the
results quicker, and we would get action, hopefully, quicker on
that?
Mr. Chipkevich. Yes, sir, that would help.
Mr. Menendez. How many hearings has the NTSB held since
2000, public hearings?
Mr. Chipkevich. I can provide that for the record. We held
a public hearing, we finished the last two days on the Macdona
accident where we had a board of inquiry taking testimony from
12 witnesses. We had also had a public hearing in the rail area
on the Minot accident investigation. But I would certainly be
glad to provide that information.
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Mr. Menendez. My information is it is only one. Now you
have had some things called symposiums, but those are not
public hearings. I would like to know the number so that we can
respond to it in the future.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. LaTourette. I thank the gentleman. Mr. Miller?
Mr. Miller. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Ms. Strang, where does the FRA stand on the use of control
coaches after the recent fatal crash of Metrolink? Would it not
be safer to use a locomotive on the front of the train? I
understand that Amtrak has even converted some old locomotives
into control cars. They removed the diesel motor and use the
space to basically carry baggage. A working locomotive is
placed at the other end of the train to power it. Is this not a
safer setup than lightweight control cars?
Ms. Strang. That is a good question. Actually, we are
conducting a study on that now. There is some debate over the
Glendale incident, whether or not it could have been made worse
by a locomotive because they are heavier and it adds mass to
the crash. Those are all things that we are considering
carefully, and we should be publishing a study by the end of
the year.
Mr. Miller. Okay. Can you give us some more details
concerning what the FRA is doing on tank car safety.
Ms. Strang. Actually, we have several things we are doing
on tank car safety. One of them deals with emergency responders
and making sure that they get emergency response information as
quickly as possible. We are working through the emergency
responder community, Railinc Operation Respond, and others to
provide better communications infrastructure to get information
to emergency responders that is accurate as quickly as we can,
because the first several minutes of the emergency response are
very critical.
We are looking at tank car research that I talked about on
the kinematics modeling, where we will be looking at tank car
design to make tank cars more puncture-resistant and less
likely to have any kind of failure during a collision or
derailment.
We are also looking at a spray-on coating that is known as
"Dragon Shield" that has got the capability of self-sealing if
it gets punctured, and it also adds impact resistance.
Mr. Miller. They have recently included tables in passenger
cars. I know you did a study on that. I have heard that really
is dangerous and that it creates a less safe situation. What is
your finding on that?
Ms. Strang. It can be. The way that the table is fastened
to the floor and the edges of the table, and whether or not
they are resistant or flexible, really make a difference. So we
have done tests on table configurations and expect to have
standards and recommendations on how tables should be affixed.
Tables are very popular with commuters. They like them a lot.
So most commuter railroads like to have them.
Mr. Miller. When are your studies going to be released, do
you have any idea on that?
Ms. Strang. We have conducted the tests on the tables, and
I believe a report will be coming out later this year. But I
can get back to you with the expected date.
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Mr. Miller. Thank you. I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. LaTourette. I thank you. Ms. Johnson?
Ms. Johnson. Thank you very much. In the accident in South
Carolina, it raised a number of questions about Dark Territory.
Has there been some technology that has been used to maybe deal
with Dark Territory?
Ms. Strang. Actually, there have been several things. First
of all, we issued something called a broad agency announcement,
which is a funding mechanism, looking for people to come to us
with proposals on how to cure this problem. So we are looking
for ways that we can make sure that switches are in the correct
position even in dark territory and that appropriate alerts can
be given to the train crews and others.
Ms. Johnson. You indicated that most of the accidents are
caused by human factors. Can you name others that have been
prominently noted?
Ms. Strang. I am sorry. I am not sure I understand your
question.
Ms. Johnson. You indicated that most of the accidents are
caused by human factors. Has there been some observation that
makes the human factors more common, and if so, has there been
the application of any technology that can solve that, or are
you still looking?
Ms. Strang. There are technical solutions to human factor
accidents. As Mr. Chipkevich mentioned, Positive Train Control
is one of them. Basically, if you are relying on a person that
does not have a redundant backup system, technology is probably
going to provide the best solution. So we are looking at ways
to improve switch position indicators, because that is the
second-leading cause of accidents, and also track inspection
information that can be gathered through better technologies.
Track causes are the second-leading cause of train accidents.
Ms. Johnson. What is the infrastructure like with the
rails, tracks?
Ms. Strang. Well, do you mean how much is there?
Ms. Johnson. Well, what is the age? Do they need some type
of attention or repair or change?
Ms. Strang. Okay. The railroad has been around for a long
time, 180 years, so there are various ages of track and rail
components throughout the system. Railroads have made a lot of
efforts to improve the strength, or the poundage, of the rail,
going up to a heavier weight, up to 136 pounds, as they have
increased axle loads. And it is a combination, I believe
probably Dr. Samuels will talk about it a little more, that it
is a combination of heavy axle loads and heavy rail that are
needed to provide safe transportation.
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Ms. Johnson. I am curious, because it seems to me that we
are hearing more and more about rail accidents, and I was
trying to see if there was a way in which to focus in on the
common cause and if there was some technology or an improvement
of the infrastructure or whatever to see if they could be
avoided.
Ms. Strang. I think there is. I believe some of the things
we discussed today will go towards reducing those accidents as
soon as we can get them deployed and out in use.
Ms. Johnson. Thank you very much.
Mr. LaTourette. I thank the gentlelady.
Ms. Strang, before I yield to Mr. Graves, for the benefit
of the record and maybe some in the audience, could you just
tell us what Dark Territory is.
Ms. Strang. Dark territory is territory on a railroad that
does not have a signal system, so you usually rely on track
warrants or a paper system to control the operation of the
train.
Mr. LaTourette. Thank you very much. Mr. Graves?
Mr. Graves. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
What I am curious about, and you barely touched on it in
your written testimony with some of the private initiatives
being undertaken, I am interested in the electronic train
management system, which is an overlay system that the BNSF is
in the middle of. Can you talk to me about an overlay system,
how that works? Can you also tell me how involved you are in
that, and also where we are in that process as far as
development goes?
Ms. Strang. Sure. Okay. There are a number of efforts
underway in the private sector. BNSF has the ETMS, or
Electronic Train Management Systems; CSX is using
Communications-Based Train Management, CBTM; the Alaska
Railroad is pursuing another system. In the private sector, not
a government partnership like the North American Joint Positive
Train Control Program, BNSF's project is the furthest along.
An overlay system is a non-vital system that uses a
communications base to control trains. It has an office
segment, a communications part, equipment on the locomotive,
and wayside detectors. BNSF's project is 130 miles in Illinois,
I think it is around Beardstown. They began their project a
couple of years ago; right now, they are at phase two of a
three-phase test. So they are running trains with the train
control system turned on under a waiver from FRA. FRA has been
involved in helping them test in all phases of it. We actually
have a test monitor that is out there riding trains with them
all the time. We are also doing a human-machine interface study
with them, where we are looking at the human aspect of their
interface with the system.
Mr. Graves. What do you mean by non-vital, you said non-
vital?
Ms. Strang. "Non-vital" means that it is an overlay. The
existing train control components are all still there: they are
not taken away.
Mr. Graves. Talk to me about cost. Are these not a little
bit less complex?
Ms. Strang. They are less costly than a vital system in
some ways; they are new. Because you do not have a vital
system, some of the testing requirements are a little bit less,
and the component communications part of it costs much less.
Mr. Graves. But there are, and I guess what I was getting
at as much as anything else, there are a lot of things out
there besides just what you all are doing, that the private
industry is doing a lot to try to alleviate some of their
accidents and doing some of the things that are going on, too.
Ms. Strang. That is correct.
Mr. Graves. So there is a pretty heavy initiative going on?
Ms. Strang. That is correct.
Mr. Graves. Thank you.
Mr. LaTourette. Thank you, Mr. Graves. Ms. Norton?
Ms. Norton. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate
the opportunity to sit with this Subcommittee. Of course, I am
a member of the full Committee.
I am sure that all of you are aware that as we speak there
is a hearing going on which I think really says a great deal to
us, should send a message to us about Federal inaction post-9/
11 on rail and freight.
The District of Columbia, one jurisdiction, unable to see
any action by the Federal Government, but also seeing freight
carrying hazardous substances going within four blocks of the
Capitol of the United States and throughout heavily congested
neighborhoods, took action on its own and passed a law and said
you have got to reroute that stuff. The Railroad Administration
said, well, we do when there is a big event in the District of
Columbia such as on the Mall. But of course when Congress is in
session and the rest of that is going on, we had no evidence
that had been done.
Some of us tried to get hearings. We wrote to Secretary
Ridge and tried to get information. No information. The judge
indicated that perhaps this thing could be negotiated and the
information could be shared with the District and they would be
able to understand that something had been done. The Government
did not want to do that.
So the judge looked at it and the judge must have said the
equivalent of is this it, because here you had a Federal
District Court judge ruling against the railroad in this
instance, although everybody thought it was a slam dunk on
interstate commerce grounds. The judge found when there is a
gap in the law and the Federal Government sits there and takes
no action, then it must mean that a local jurisdiction can
move.
Many of us in the Congress had thought that the better way
would be to look at dangerous freight traveling throughout the
United States and to try to look at all the options to try to
in fact see what could be done. And as far as I can tell, the
Railway Administration, the Department of Homeland Security
have taken no action whatsoever. This is post-9/11, when
everybody is rushing to take action to shore up various modes
of transportation. We are talking about the transportation that
most people use--rail, and of light rail, subways, and the
rest.
Yesterday at the markup of the Homeland Security
Authorization, there were two provisions--one was report
language, and one was a provision actually added. One had to do
with passenger trains, to say, that would require DHS,
presumably you to do what can only be called the basics, to
take what you have learned, and I know that there is great deal
of consultation and work that has been done with the railroads,
and disseminate what best practices should be post-9/11.
And the other was something that of course we have already
done with air travel, and that is to take what you know and
disseminate it to operators of trains so that they know how to
prepare employees and the public to understand what to look
for. Now here we are four years after 9/11 and we are asking
part of our Government that regulates trains to do these
basics.
On freight, there is probably going to be report language
on matters like pre-notification, for example, of local
jurisdictions when hazardous substances come through. Our own
Fire Department here in the District of Columbia, you would
think that if you did not notify anybody you would be notifying
the EMSes, said, when the council bill was being shepherded
through, he did not have a clue as to what was coming through
so that he could at least be alerted in case something
happened. There may be language on setting protocols for
effective communication between the authorities and operators,
training for employees so that they know what to do, the kind
of training that has taken place with respect to air travel.
I simply would like your response about the inaction of DHS
on trains, especially freight and passenger, especially when
compared with a great deal of action that has been taken within
DHS, TSA, et cetera, with air travel, and especially
considering large numbers of people who use rail travel and the
extent to which our country is dependent upon the transport of
dangerous toxic substances.
No one wants to stop it from happening, but, again,
unrebutted testimony that one car right here in the national
capital, one car successfully attacked could emit gases that
would travel 14 miles throughout the entire region, causing
100,000 deaths within a half hour if the wind is going in the
right direction. That is what caused a local jurisdiction to
move. And you are going to see, if there is continued Federal
inaction, you are going to see people popping up all over the
United States saying I am not going to sit here and wait for
something to happen.
So I would simply like to take this opportunity to get your
response to what has happened here in the District of Columbia,
and to ask you what you intend to do to begin to take the kind
of action for trains and freight post 9/11 that we have seen in
air travel.
Ms. Strang. Thank you. We are not part of the Department of
Homeland Security or the Transportation Security Administration
that has the lead in this effort. We are taking numerous steps
to make---
Ms. Norton. Is this the Railway Administration?
Ms. Strang. This is the Federal Railroad Administration.
Ms. Norton. Well, the Federal Railroad Administration has a
very heavy lead in what I am asking you about.
Ms. Strang. We do, but it is through the Toxic Inhalation
Hazard Project that is managed by the Office of Safety. I will
be very happy to get a response for you from them. It is not
something that I have expertise in.
[The information received follows:]
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Ms. Norton. Mr. Chairman, I just want to say in closing,
you see the answer was, duh. When I think Mr. Quinn was Chair
of this Subcommittee, the Railway Administration was before us
and I sat in on a hearing. This was before South Carolina. And
in the process of examining someone like yourself from the
Railway Administration, I asked the Chairman if before the end
of the year he would agree that the Railway Administration
would provide a plan, particularly given the considerable work
they had already done, to the Chairman. Then Chairman Quinn
went on record and said I want it, and I want it before the end
of the year.
And Mr. Chairman, as you take over the chairmanship of this
Subcommittee, I want you to know that no such plan has come
forward.
I think it is a clear and present danger to our country.
And I think, frankly, that what is happening on freight and
passenger travel is more of a security risk today than what we
might expect on air travel, because we at least have begun to
take preventative actions there and we see no consistent
preventative action on the part of the Railway Administration
and others who should be involved. Thank you very much, Mr.
Chairman.
Mr. LaTourette. I thank the gentlelady very much. I will
check with the staff as to what that status was last year and
be happy to follow up with the FRA.
Just a couple of observations. On a personal level, my fear
has always been when we create these parallel universes, that
is, a Federal Rail Administration and a Department of Homeland
Security that seems to be like an octopus, we have several
poorly funded agencies all running around in different
directions rather than dealing with what I consider, and I know
the gentlelady when she was the distinguished Ranking Member of
our last Subcommittee assignment, consider an all-hazards
approach.
You also get silly regulations, such as the folks that
thought up why do we not take off the hazardous material
warning labels on tanker cars, so that nobody knows, especially
the firefighter who is first on the scene, that he or she is
actually there to clean up chlorine, so that we can trick the
terrorist. I think that is an example of something stupid. And
lastly, I hope that the District of Columbia's action is not
replicated across the country. I have difficulty finding out
why the judge was able to find it not at odds with the commerce
clause, and we can have an honest disagreement about that.
But I think the gentlelady's points are well taken, that we
have spent a lot of time making sure that terrorists cannot
take over airplanes, we have spent precious little time dealing
with train travel in this country.
There is a vote on. Mr. Sodrel, do you think that you have
less than five minutes of questions, or should we recess and
come back? It is your pleasure.
Mr. Sodrel. We are about to vote. I guess I could ask the
questions and get answers in writing, if necessary.
Mr. LaTourette. If that is suitable with you. And that
brings up something Mr. Menendez has asked me to do as well,
and that is ask unanimous consent that all members of the
Subcommittee have the same 30 days which we had under the
previous unanimous consent request to submit additional
questions to this and the remaining panels, and we would
appreciate the answers when you can get them to us. Thank you
very much.
That being said, there is a vote on the House floor. We
will stand in recess and return immediately after the vote.
[Recess.]
Mr. LaTourette. We are going to bring the Subcommittee back
into order. The good news is I think this vote we just had on
the House floor may be the last for a while. There seems to be
a problem with the vote count on the Budget Resolution. So I
think we are good to go for not only the rest of this panel,
but also the other two panels. So, hopefully, we will not be
interrupted.
Before we left, Mr. Sodrel, you were kind enough to say
that you might want to submit the questions. But we have held
the first panel back, so fire away.
Mr. Sodrel. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. You know, in the
highway industry we have statistics that we use on accidents.
There are accidents, incidents, then there are DOT reportable
accidents. DOT reportable would be ones where the vehicle is
towed, it cannot be driven away on its own; you have an injury
or a fatality. I have heard that the accidents are up, and I
have heard that the accidents are down on the railroad.
So my question is, how many deaths do you have per
passenger mile traveled on railroads? How does that compare
with intercity motorcoach, or air travel, or private
automobile, or some other standard where you have deaths per
passenger mile? Do we know? And if we do not, if you can get
the answer, I would appreciate it.
Ms. Strang. I think I do. I just need to look to see if I
have got it.
Mr. Sodrel. I just occurs to me, we kill somewhere north of
40,000 people a year in automobiles. It seems to me that
railroad travel
Ms. Strang. Over the past five years, there have been 22
passenger fatalities. So the rate is very low. But I will have
to get back to you with the actual rate per million passenger
miles.
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Mr. Sodrel. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. LaTourette. I thank you very much. And again, subject
to the questions that Mr. Menendez had where you were going to
supply some additional information, and also the unanimous
consent request we made a little bit earlier, there may be
additional questions coming your way from other members of the
Subcommittee or from members of the Subcommittee that were
here. We would appreciate your timely response.
Also, when Ms. Norton was here, we will follow up at a
staff level here on the Subcommittee relative to what Mr. Quinn
may have asked of the FRA during the last Congress. But if you
could sort of poke around the agency and if you can figure out
what it is he was looking for and let us know, we would
appreciate that as well.
So we thank you, and you go with our thanks.
It is now time to hear from our second panel. Our second
panel is comprised of Mr. Edward Hamberger, who is the
President of the Association of American Railroads; Dr. John
Samuels, who is the Vice President of Operation Planning
Support for Norfolk Southern; and Mr. William Pickett, who is
the President of the Brotherhood of Railroad Signalmen. I thank
you all for coming. We have received all of your written
testimony. If you could summarize your testimony to the best of
your ability, we would appreciate that.
Mr. Hamberger, you are on.
TESTIMONY OF EDWARD R. HAMBERGER, PRESIDENT, ASSOCIATION OF
AMERICAN RAILROADS; JOHN SAMUELS, VICE PRESIDENT, OPERATION
PLANNING SUPPORT, NORFOLK SOUTHERN; WILLIAM D. PICKETT,
PRESIDENT, BROTHERHOOD OF RAILROAD SIGNALMEN
Mr. Hamberger. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the
opportunity to participate in your first hearing as Chairman of
the Railroad Subcommittee. And I would like to echo Mr.
Oberstar's opening comments, that it is indeed very appropriate
that the first hearing focus on railroad safety and security. I
would like to make a few brief opening remarks and then
transfer my time to Dr. Samuels to go into a little bit more
detail on some of the new technologies emerging.
I would like to also thank the Committee for the leadership
and vision it has shown during the reauthorization of TEA-21.
There is no more vexing safety problem faced by railroads than
that posed by grade crossing accidents and trespassers. We
would like to thank the Committee for its strong support for
increased funding for the Section 130 Grade Crossing Safety
Program, and we ask you to continue to demonstrate such support
in conference with the Senate.
Nothing is more important to the Nation's freight railroad
than the safety of their employees, customers, and the
communities in which we operate. That is demonstrated by the
scope and intensity of the industry's safety efforts. These
efforts have resulted in dramatic improvements in railroad
safety.
Since 1980 the train accident rate has been reduced by 65
percent, and the employee casualty rate has declined by 78
percent. Last year, 2004, in fact was the safest in history in
terms of both the number of employee casualties and the
employee casualty rate.
Let me try to address Congressman Sodrel's comments and Mr.
Oberstar's. Mr. Oberstar is, in fact, correct that the absolute
number of accidents has gone up in 2004 over 2003, but the rate
of accidents, the rate as measured in million train miles, has
gone down slightly. Similarly, while the number of highway-rail
incidents has gone up, the incident rate, as measured in terms
of million train miles, is the lowest on record, and that rate
does not take into account the fact that highway traffic has
also been increasing.
We work continuously to improve all aspects of rail safety,
including that related to hazardous materials. Railroads move
about 1.8 million carloads of hazardous material annually, and
99.998 percent reach their destination without a release due to
an accident. Rail hazmat accident rates are down 90 percent
since 1980.
We work continuously to assist communities in preparing
emergency response plans, we provide emergency training for
emergency responders, work with tank car owners, users, and
builders to improve tank car safety, and work with rail labor
to try to identify ways to improving operating safety.
The source of much of our past success and a critical
foundation for future gains is the implementation of new and
improved technology. The industry funds an extensive research
and testing program centered at the Transportation Technology
Center in Pueblo, Colorado, which we operate under contract to
the FRA. It is widely considered to be the finest rail research
and test facility in the world, and the crash tests that you
saw the tapes of from Ms. Strang's testimony were actually
performed at Pueblo at TTCI. And I would echo her invitation to
this Subcommittee to visit Pueblo either independently or as
part of the next crash test in February.
Let me now turn over two minutes and fifty-three seconds to
Dr. John Samuels to testify on behalf of the AAR about some of
the advances in rail technology. He is senior Vice President,
Operations Planning and Support with Norfolk Southern, and just
as importantly, serves as Chairman of the industry's Railway
Technology Working Committee.
Mr. LaTourette. Dr. Samuels, thank you very much for
coming. The last time I saw you you gave a presentation that
included coefficient of frictions and yaws and things like
that. Maybe if you could dumb it down for me today, I would
appreciate it very much.
[Laughter.]
Mr. LaTourette. But thank you for coming.
Mr. Samuels. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is a privilege to
be here today with you. I would like to talk a little bit about
the science behind safety in railroading.
Those of us in the scientific community that have dedicated
our lifetime to making railroads safer for everyone appreciate
the time we are going to have to talk to you about some of our
advanced technologies. Time does not permit me to cover the
wide variety of things we are doing, and I echo what Ed said,
but I certainly would personally love to be out at TTCI when
you and your Committee visit TTCI to be able to take you
through all the good things that we are doing in terms of
improving railroad safety.
Let me start at the beginning, though, for today. The first
slide I want to show you is a slide that shows the wheel-rail
interface. You might think it is interesting that I would show
this slide. But in my mind this is the most important slide to
understand if you want to understand the foundations of safety
on railroading.
You can see from this slide, which is a cross-sectional
view of a wheel-rail interface, the red area is the wheel, the
blue area is the rail. You notice it is labeled ``vertical
force'' and ``lateral force.'' There are two major forces that
we must contend with and control in railroading to control the
safety of the environment, and that is those two forces. You
will see from this slide also that we have above rail programs
called Advanced Technology Safety Initiative, ATSI, which is
from this interface upward into the railcar, including the
wheel set and the suspension system, and then we have a similar
set of initiatives from the rail down, which is called
Performance Based Track Standards. Today, I am going to give
you a view of the most advanced technologies we are working
with and the reasons why we are working with those.
I bring to your attention first this cross-section of a
piece of rail. What we really have at this interface is this
rail in interfacing with the wheel does so, and I am going to
put just a dime on the top of the rail surface here. All the
stresses generated by the railcar go through an area the size
of a dime. And in railroading today the stresses that go
through there is 36,000 pounds per wheel set, on average.
So we put the weight of approximately seven large SUVs
through that dime into the rail infrastructure. And through the
life of the assets, both the wheel and the rail, what we need
to do is to control, believe it or not, that contact patch. One
of the challenges of engineering science in railroading is to
make sure that patch, when it starts out with new wheels and
new rails and is the size of a dime, stays the size of a dime.
Because if that contact patch varies or gets smaller, the
stress goes up exponentially that is transmitted from the wheel
to the rail. It is very important to do that.
Now you see this cross-sectional rail. When we wear a rail
out the ultimate wear-out rate depends on the strength of the
rail and the entire track system. But this is a piece of rail
that is at the condemning limit and is worn out. You can see
that the geometry of the head is very much different than a
brand new piece of rail. In a rail's life between brand new and
this condition, we continuously monitor the rail and we look
for things that will cause that rail to fail. And I am going to
cover some of the latest technologies both from a rail
standpoint and a wheel standpoint.
On the next slide I would like to show you what we are
trying to prevent. This slide is a picture of a fractured
wheel. So let us talk about the wheel up for just a moment.
This is a fractured wheel set. This is a real wheel that broke
on our railroad. We did a complete metallurgical analysis of
this wheel and it turns out in the metallurgical analysis that
a small crack initiated at a defect in the casting. This wheel
was about 12 years old when this occurred. So these wheels can
stay out a great length of time before a crack initiates. There
is a whole body of science on crack initiation and growth. In
this particular case, the crack over time perpetuated to the
point where the stress at the wheel-rail interface that was
transmitted up into the wheel caused the crack to grow to a
point where the wheel failed.
One of the sciences we are trying to look at is, and it has
been brought to your attention here, that many of these cracks
that first initiate and grow cannot be seen by the human eye.
And so no matter how hard you inspect these from a human
standpoint, you cannot find them. So I want to tell you a
little bit about the science we are using to get to the vital
few areas where the human being really does not help that much
any more and we have to use science.
On the next slide, I portray for you the latest in laser
acoustic testing. Now, let us keep it simple, like you said.
What we have here is the diagram and in the upper left is a
cross-section of a wheel. The little rectangle above it is a
laser. It is a similar image on the right-hand side except you
can see the little piece of a crack there that is growing at
the surface of the wheel. The principle involved here is very
simple: if these cracks grow and perpetuate through the wheel
and ultimately fail, how can we find the crack before the
failure occurs. What we do is we hit the wheel with a laser,
the laser creates a mechanical pulse through the wheel.
The image down below on the left shows a very strong return
signal to the transducer, which says that the wheel is sound.
The image on the right down below shows that the initial
pulsing of the wheel with the laser was dispersed,
significantly increasing that there is a crack in the wheel. So
we are using this technology, which is brand new, by the way,
to look at better ways of finding cracks in the wheel.
On the next slide is our demonstration project at TTCI. To
impinge the laser on the wheel and then to get the reflected
sound, you have to follow the wheel as the railcar rolls by the
transducer. So we have actually built a prototype system where
we have a carriage that does the laser impingement and follows
with the transducers as the wheel rolls over the rail, because
we cannot find these things productively and efficiently unless
we do it dynamically as the car rolls. And so we are working on
this technology.
While we are still speaking about the wheel, let us talk
about this patch the size of a dime. If a wheel wears non-
uniformly, that patch can get very small at the contact point.
Now the picture on the right shows a wheel that is worn to what
we call a hollow. That is a natural phenomena, the wheel is
softer than the rail. And so in railroading the wheel does
prematurely wear out.
But what we need is technologies that will allow us to
watch the wheel wear-out and pick the wheel off the car and
remove before any accident occurs because of that geometry. The
picture in the lower left-hand side shows a hollow wheel riding
on a rail. If you look closely, you can notice that when the
wheel is hollowed only a piece of the wheel contacts the rail.
That creates a contact patch that is about one-quarter of the
size of a dime, which increases the stress state of the
railroad and can cause potential damage and failure of
components.
Now, how do we find hollow wheels? If we put human beings
under the rail cars when they are stationary, it is very labor
intensive and, quite frankly, in all kinds of weather and
conditions it is very difficult to do. We are using new
technology here. In the left-hand picture in this chart you see
a bunch of lasers and laser cameras. In the lower right-hand
picture with the red diagnostics, you see that what we do is we
shine a laser on a wheel on a train going 50 miles an hour over
this detector.
The laser image is captured on cameras digitally and we
rotate that image in three dimensional space, and within
milliseconds we do a complete dimensional check of the wheel
while the train is going over the detector at 50 miles an hour.
And this development is now being put in place on railroads and
will be used to watch wheels as they wear out.
We also have, on the next slide, a train going over what we
call a wheel impact detector. This is some transducers in the
track that measure the vertical force that the wheel exerts on
the track all around its circumference. We can pick out heavy
hitting wheels that cause excessive stresses and route those
cars to the car shop for wheel removal before they do damage or
cause a derailment.
Also on this slide you can see some boxes there in the
lower left-hand side. That is an acoustical detector. While we
are checking the vertical impact load of the wheel, we can also
check whether the bearing is going bad. Right now on the
railroad every 20 miles we have an infrared detector that looks
at heat for a bearing going bad. Sometimes that is too late.
And so what we try and do is find bearings before they fail.
This is an acoustical detection system. Here is the frequency
which we have correlated to defects in the wheel. And so we
will just play one of these to show you what it sounds like.
[Audio presentation.]
Mr. Samuels. Now, if you have not heard that lately, that
is a cupsball on the wheel. That says that the wheel bearing
has a fretted surface that is beginning to fail. We can find
through these sounds, believe it or not, bearings that are on
their way to failure but nowhere near failing. And so we can
take them out of service early.
On the next slide what I am showing you is that we have now
put these detectors I have told you about into a network of
detectors in the United States. All railroads have a standard
detector design. We have deployed these detectors nationwide
and we are in the process of gathering all this data and
putting it into one computer and accumulating it by rail car,
by wheel, by axle.
And so what we have in the next two to three years is we
will have a system in place to actually watch rail cars wear
out over their lifetime, understand the stresses that they
cause at the wheel-rail interface, that contact patch, and
control those forces.
Finally, I would just like to talk about one thing above
the topper rail. If you look at the wheel rail interface, a lot
of the forces that are transmitted, are transmitted on curves.
I will show you the worn rail, and this comes from a curve,
because the geometry is very different.
We have recently developed top of rail lubrication, which
is an inert material that is put on the top of the rail. As you
can see on the upper right hand side, you only put a mono-layer
of this lubricant on the rail. It changes the coefficient of
friction, and Mr. Chairman, you said, I love coefficient of
friction, as you know. It actually has been found to cut the
lateral forces on curves by 40 percent. That is being
perfected.
The next slide is just some data that shows you that in
taking gauge widening on the rail, the actual spreading of the
rails, which can cause derailments if it is not controlled, in
actually looking at that, we have data over a year's period to
show that when you lubricate the top of rail and change the
coefficient of friction, we have actually gauge widening that
has occurred on a very severe curve and in coal territory in
West Virginia.
Then finally, I would just like to say that we are
multiplying the scientific effect of these various detectors,
by taking what we learn from this laser acoustics in the wheel
that I just showed you, and we are looking at rail, as you see
here.
Here, this rail has a vertical split or crack in it. A
human being inspecting the track could not find this crack. But
what we are doing is, we are perfecting that laser acoustics,
so we can run down the track and find that accurately, every
time. That is just some of the advance science that we are
using to improve railroad safety. Thank you very much.
Mr. LaTourette. Dr. Samuels, thank you very much, that was
a very good use of Mr. Hamberger's two minutes and 54 seconds.
[Laughter.]
Mr. LaTourette. Mr. Pickett, thank you for coming, and we
look forward to hearing from you.
Mr. Pickett. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the
Committee. It is an honor for me to testify today on new
technology and rail safety. It is a subject that is of great
concern to this country and to all of our the employees on the
Nation's railroads.
Throughout our entire existence, the BRS and other rail
unions have dedicated themselves to making the railroad work
place safer, not for just rail workers, but also for the public
at large.
The rail industry is moving more freight with fewer
employees than at any time in the history of railroading.
Through mergers and the railroad management's never-ending
quest to eliminate workers, railroad staffing levels are at an
all-time low, and in some crafts, the numbers continue to drop.
Those railroad employees that are left are working longer
hours, and for many days at a long stretch at a time. A 12 to
16 hour day is not unusual for a railroad worker, and in many
cases, it is the norm.
On March 7th of this year, the Federal Railroad
Administration issued the Final Rule for the Development and
Use of Processor-Based Signal and Train Control Systems. With
this Final Rule, FRA is issuing a performance standard for the
development and use of processor-based signal and train control
systems. The rule also covers system which interact with
highway-rail grade crossing warning devices.
I want to say personally that this change is a great step
in rail technology. Signal systems currently in use today are
designed to protect the safety and integrity of the railroad's
operations on a section of track that provides for broken rail
protection, track defects, track obstructions, proper switch
and derail alignment protection, route integrity protection,
and protection against train collisions.
Signal systems are designed to mitigate the dangers caused
by human error and acts of vandalism or terrorism. Clearly, it
is in the best interest of the railroad and the local residents
to have the protection of a signal system.
A good example of the benefits of a signal system can be
seen when we look back to January 6th of this year. The
derailment that many of us have talked about today happened in
Graniteville, South Carolina, which the preliminary
investigation has indicated was a result of an improperly
aligned switch. Nine people died, 318 needed medical attention,
and 5,400 residents within a one mile radius of the crash site
were forced to evacuate.
The segment of the track where the accident occurred was
called Dark Territory. A basic signal system would have
prevented this accident. A switch monitoring device would have
noted that the hand throw switch was not properly aligned, and
the train would have had a stop signal.
The BRS does not believe that improper planning by the
railroads and their failure to properly maintain a signal
system can be reasons for the FRA to grant a waiver request to
increase the amount of non-signal territory in our Nation's
railroads.
Positive train control systems are just one facet of the
signaling revolution that is occurring. Many current signal
systems benefit from the changing technology. We must work to
ensure that any new technology that the railroad industry
contemplates to implement, that the proper risk analyst and
proper steps are taken to make sure that the new devices
introduced do not create more new hazards than we eliminate.
The rail unions consider it equally important to provide
advanced training and education to improve the skills of the
professional men and woman that install the safety devices on
our rail systems.
In addition to craft-specific training, security training
must be mandated. While some rail carriers might claim progress
in this area, I have talked to too many workers who are not
receiving any training, or might be allowed to watch some video
that tries to be a one-size-fits all.
The railroads transport the most toxic and dangerous
materials in the country. Most every freight train in the
United States transports some types of hazardous material. The
train crews are given very limited training in understanding
what to do in case of a hazardous material leak or explosion.
After 9/11, each railroad was required to develop and
implement security plans. The Transportation Security
Administration has apparently approved most of the plans on the
railroads. The problem is that the employees have never been
brought into the loop.
The bottom line is that the TSA and the railroads must
promptly begin an intense training program to educate and
prepare railroad employees to recognize potential terrorist and
safety security risks.
In addition to training, we must also ensure that workers
who report and identify a security risk will not face
retribution or retaliation from their employers. A rail worker
should not have to choose between doing the right thing on
security and his or her job.
If Congress considers rail security legislation, it must
address this problem, by strengthening the current whistle
blower protections. Over three and-a-half years have passed
since 9/11, yet amazingly little has been done to secure our
Nation's transportation network, especially in rail.
Sufficient resources have not been allocated. Common sense
requirements have not been imposed. Too often, employees and
their unions have never been enlisted in the process. Amtrak
alone requires $110 million in one-time security upgrades.
One way that we can improve the infrastructure inspection
is to direct the Secretary to issue rules requiring that no
visual track inspection be conducted from a vehicle traveling
at a speed of more than 15 miles per hour.
The incorporation of a nationwide telephone notification
system would greatly improve safety for our Nation's grade
crossing signal system. This Nationwide telephone notification
system could also be used by anyone to report derailments or
other events that affect safety and security on the property.
The Transportation Security Administration is spending $4
billion this year on aviation security, an investment that we,
of course, support. But passenger rail and transit are being
left with just $10 million for their security.
There are over 100,000 miles of rail in the United States,
and 22,000 miles of it are used by Amtrak in 46 states and the
District of Columbia. New technology will not cure all that is
wrong in the rail industry. There is much to accomplish to make
the Nation's railroads safer for communities across the country
and for our rail employees.
Experience teaches us that it is Congress that must provide
the leadership to make safety a reality. I hope we can work
with you in seeing that the improved safety practices become a
reality. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. LaTourette. I thank you very much, Mr. Pickett. Your
last observations, I certainly share, and I suspect most of the
folks on the Subcommittee share. It occurs to me that we sort
of respond to something that happens. We spent a lot of money
making sure that terrorists cannot hijack planes. But once we
harden targets, they begin to look at other areas. I think you
are right to alert us to the issue of railroad security.
Dr. Samuels, I mentioned at the outset of this hearing, on
May 11th, we are going to be looking at what happened with the
Acela train and the disks that are under some scrutiny today.
Bombardier will be here and others to talk a little bit about
what is going on.
You talked about the new technology focusing on not only
deficiencies or rails wearing out, but you also mentioned that
the wheels are softer than the rails. So you are watching
wheels as they wear out. Is there a rule of thumb, life
expectancies for wheels on a rail car, or is it all different?
Mr. Samuels. It depends on a lot of different things,
obviously. But it is the percent of time that the car is
loaded. It is the number of miles that the car has. So it
basically is in miles more than it is in years. Depending upon
the load empty ratio, you can get a wheel that goes for
250,000, or you could get a wheel that goes for a half a
million miles.
The life expectancy normally on wheels is very long though,
in the time frame of 8 to 15 years. The rail that I showed you
here on tangent track could last 40 years, and on curves, it is
anywhere from 6 to 12 years.
So these assets have very long lives, and that is why it is
critical that we develop these dynamic monitoring systems to
make sure we understand the stresses that the car is imparting
on the rail, and know the condition of the rails, so that we
can put the appropriate amount of maintenance money into both
the rolling stock and the rail infrastructure, to keep that
contact patch at the size of a dime.
Mr. LaTourette. These monitoring devices that you have
outlined for us as part of the new technology, I saw the map of
the United States. Is there a spacing that they are going to be
every 100 miles, every 1,000 miles? How do you figure out where
they go?
Mr. Samuels. What we have done is this. I will take Norfolk
out as an example. We have done a complete analysis of the ton
miles on all of our routes, and where cars flow. We have looked
at the origin destination pairs. We are locating these
detectors to pick up the majority of cars that transit our
system.
In other words, what we are trying to do is make sure that
we get the maximum amount of cars over these detectors. Now
these detectors are not inexpensive. When you install these
detectors, you are talking about at least a half a million to
one million dollars per detector.
They are detectors that are meant to find defects before
they occur; in fact, so far before they occur, that the science
we are imparting on this is that we are going to find the
defect with this detector network. In other words, we are going
to track the car and watch a defect grow. Then we are going to
take the car out of service way before that defect ever becomes
a safety problem.
It is being integrated now. Each railroad is integrating
that advance data into their data systems that will
automatically route the cars to a car shop. This is going to
happen way before you have an incident with that defect.
Mr. LaTourette. You mentioned that the laser technology is
new and you showed us a picture of a split rail. I thought I
understood you to say that you are testing it so that it is 100
percent and you always find the split that you cannot find by
visual inspection. Is that still in the testing phase, or have
you ruled that out?
Mr. Samuels. No, it is still very much in the testing
phase. I do not want to give you the impression that we do not
ultrasonically test the rails today. We do. It is a very slow
process.
We have cars called generically Sperry cars, which the name
comes from the original company that started ultrasonic
testing. But we test the main line rails at least once or twice
a year. We have the mathematics to look at the number of
defects we find. If we find a lot of defects in a given stretch
of rail, we come back sooner to test that again.
So the testing frequency depends upon what you are
continuously finding. In that way, we continuously hone in on
those parts of the rail infrastructure that need to be changed
out.
Mr. LaTourette. Thank you, Mr. Samuels.
Mr. Pickett, I asked the woman from the FRA a little bit
about this portion of your testimony where you talk about cars
traveling no greater than 15 miles an hour for the inspection
of tracks. I would just ask you how it is that you arrived at
that as being the safe speed?
Mr. Pickett. The Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way is the
one who proposed that. That is one of the other unions that I
am here testifying on their behalf, also. But one of the things
that we are seeing is the visual testing, not the testing of
where the electronic devices are used. They normally are used
at 30 miles per hour.
Mr. LaTourette. I also read recently that in India, the
Indian rail has a signalmen's college. I would ask you, you
mentioned training. I think you indicated that you did not
think some of the training, and particularly security training,
was where you and your membership thought it would be.
Can you discuss a little bit with us how signalmen are
trained in the United States, and if there is a technical
school where they go to, to learn the trade that they are to
embark on? How does a signalman get his or her training in the
United States today?
Mr. Pickett. Most training on the Class 1 railroads are
done on the property. They have their own signal schools set up
on each individual property.
The requirements to become a signalman got more and more
stringent because of the technology. A lot of the railroads are
asking for some background in electronics, or at least an
Associate's Degree in electronics.
But then that becomes a problem, because initially, our
people work out on the construction gangs. That means travel,
and a lot of people that are in technical are not willing to do
that.
But the training goes from Associate training, and on most
of the railroads, some of the Class 1s have what they call
advanced signal training, that the signal people go return to.
Mr. LaTourette. That leads to a follow-up. I think it was
yesterday, the full Committee marked up RIDE-21, which makes
available $60 billion over the life of the bill for new rail
infrastructure, and hopefully can help with some of the
capacity problems we have in the United States, as well as
looking at high speed rail opportunities.
Do you feel that there is a sufficient reservoir of
qualified rail work force to take us into this next century, or
do we need to do more?
Mr. Pickett. No, I feel that we are going in the wrong
direction for qualified people, especially with the next few
generations. There are a lot of retirements being faced in the
next 10 years. The hiring is going down in a lot of the crafts,
rather than up in the crafts for the people to get qualified.
Mr. LaTourette. I know in Ohio, we have an electric company
that is called First Energy. They come in and they indicate
that the average age of their electricians and linemen is about
55 or 56 years of age. Do you know what the average age of your
membership is?
Mr. Pickett. Our average age is 44 and one half.
Mr. LaTourette. Okay, thank you very much.
Mr. Menendez?
Mr. Menendez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I want to thank
the witnesses.
Mr. Hamberger, I want to ask you this. I heard what you
said, but I do not understand how we reconcile what you said
with the number of accidents that have gathered national
attention, from a series of Union Pacific accidents in Texas,
to the BNSF accidents in California, to the deadly accident
involving Norfolk Southern's train in Graniteville, South
Carolina.
How do you reconcile your assertion? I heard about track
mileage and all that. But I am looking at actual hard numbers
of accidents. So how do you reconcile your assertion that rail
safety is improving, when the FRA data shows an increase in
accidents, if you look at from 2002 to 2004, of 380 more
accidents?
Mr. Hamberger. Yes, Mr. Menendez, thank you for that
opportunity to clarify. I have that data in front of me, as
well. The point I was trying to make in my opening statement
was that the number of accidents has indeed increased, as you
so indicate.
But the rate of accidents, I think, is perhaps a better
measure of whether or not safety is improving or not improving.
That is, the more train miles you have moving, from a
statistical standpoint, there are going to be some accidents
that, when measured to page two of the data, indicate that when
measured as a percentage or the number of accidents per million
train miles that the rate, we should probably say it is about
the same.
It is 4.03 accidents per million train miles in 2003 and
4.01 per million train miles in 2004. So I think it is that
rate that really indicates whether or not safety is increasing,
rather than the actual number.
Mr. Menendez. I appreciate that categorization of it. When
we look at accidents by car in this country, we look at the
total number of accidents, period. We make judgments as to
whether we are moving towards greater success or failure by the
virtue of the number of accidents that we have.
I heard one of our colleagues suggest that comparison of
your success rate in the industry and accidents versus that of
automobiles. I am not quite sure that that is a fair
comparison, considering not only volume, but also the fact that
we use multiple lanes and a variety of other factors that go
into car traffic. It does not seem to me like we compare apples
and apples in that case.
I know that the industry wants to do this, because
obviously, it costs it money, consequences, and reputation and
all of that. So I assume that there are good efforts, in
addition to all the technology things that are being done. But
I hope we deal with the work force side, as well, to help you,
as an industry, achieve what should be some mutual goals.
Let me ask you specifically, the title of the hearing is
also about rail security. In that context, what has the rail
industry done specifically to improve security, and what have
you done to work with the workers in terms of rail security
training? How do you get your rail security alerts, as an
industry?
Mr. Hamberger. Again, thank you for the opportunity. It is
a bit of a rambling answer coming, I am afraid. We began in
September of 2001, immediately after the 9/11 incidents,
recognizing that the material that we haul is, in fact,
hazardous.
So we quickly put together five different critical action
teams that take a look at all aspects of the operations of the
railroad, focusing one of those on the transportation of
hazardous materials.
We realized very quickly, that we needed help in this
regard, and we contracted with a local group called EWA,
comprised primarily of former military and civilian
intelligence officers. They came in and worked with us to take
a look at the rail network the way they were trained, and the
way they thought that a terrorists would look at the network.
They brought with them best practices from the intelligence
community. In December of 2001, we came up with four levels of
alert, prior to Secretary Ridge coming up with his five. We
identified and implemented immediately about 50 different ways
of operating.
For example, leading up to that point, we had been trying
to make our operations more transparent for our customers. We
let them dial in and find out where their shipment is. We
realized that that was not very secure, and that anyone had
access to that information. So we cut back and made that much
more difficult for those who do not have the right to know, to
try to tap into that.
Then at each level of alert, we have a very specific set of
actions that we will take; for example, posting guards at fuel
depots. We have reached out and are working with local police
forces, the National Guard. When we went into Iraq, the
National Guard helped protect and guard about 17 bridges around
the country.
We are the only industry that I am aware of that on our
nickel has somebody sitting, a badge to sit, 24/7, at the
National Joint Terrorism Task Force Intelligence Desk at the
FBI, as well as at the intelligence desks out here in Herndon,
that TSA and DHS run.
These are people under contract to us. They are at top
secret level, and they are sitting there, hoping to help the
intelligence community interpret data that they pick up, the
so-called chatter. It also is a two-way street.
Mr. Menendez. So primarily, it is informational.
Mr. Hamberger. It is based on intelligence.
Mr. Menendez. It is reactive to a potential incident.
Mr. Hamberger. It is based on intelligence. That is
correct.
Mr. Menendez. But it is not proactive in the context that
you have done certain hardening?
Mr. Hamberger. No, that is not correct. We have certainly
done that, as well. For example, we have made it much more
difficult to approach the yards. I get e-mails every day, rail
fans around America, saying, you know, you are not letting me
take pictures of trains. That is what I like to do.
So that is something we have also been proactive in.
Certainly, here in D.C., working with the Capitol Police,
working with the D.C. police, working TSA, CSX has spent
millions of dollars on intrusion detection devices and other
high tech applications to make this particular corridor much
harder and a hardened asset.
Mr. Menendez. If I may, Mr. Chairman, very briefly, Mr.
Pickett, rail security as it is viewed from rail workers, what
do you think needs to be done?
Mr. Pickett. They need to be trained. I mean, a lot of the
stuff that Mr. Hamberger talked about, it is the first I have
heard about it. I did not know they had any type of thing. Most
of the workers in the rail industry will tell you the same
thing; that they are not aware of any type of training that is
going on for the security.
Mr. Menendez. These are the people who are obviously out
there in the system.
Mr. Pickett. They are out on the property every day.
Mr. Menendez. Why do you not do that, Mr. Hamberger?
Mr. Hamberger. Well, I guess I would disagree,
respectfully, with that characterization. The individual
companies, in fact, have made security part of the daily safety
briefing. There have been briefings on what to look for, for
the operators of the locomotive. If they see anything unusual,
they are to report that back to the dispatch center, back to
the train master. They are not punished for doing that.
As far as the fact of the hazardous materials that we
handle, there have been years and years of training as to how
to respond to that. You do not want the operator of the
locomotive to get out and be the emergency responder. You want
the team that is trained to be the emergency responder to be
the first on the scene to know how to handle and respond to
some HAZMAT spill. So I guess I respectfully disagree with
that.
Mr. Menendez. Well, I have some additional questions, and I
do not want to belabor the time. I do have one for Dr. Samuels.
I have two quick ones. Is it a helium or neon laser that you
are using, or some other form of laser?
Mr. Samuels. No, I do not know the exact power source
generation of the laser that we are using.
Mr. Menendez. If you could let us know, I would like a
verification of it.
Mr. Samuels. Okay, I will do that.
[The information received follows:]
Dr. Samuels: Congressman Menendez the type of laser that is used
in the detection device I mentioned is a Class IV 800 mili-joules light
yang laser.
Mr. Menendez. Lastly, is there any technology that you are
using, since we talked about rail safety, in your ambient of
what you are doing for the association as it relates to rail
security, that you are providing or studying right now?
Mr. Samuels. There is a lot of work going on in looking at
technological scans on what could possibly be used in terms of
rail security.
What we have done, and I echo what Ed Hamberger said, we
have had tried to educate our people as to how to be alert and
what to be alert for.
We have a lot of eyes. In the case of Norfolk Southern,
there are 28,000 people out there every day working. That is a
lot of eyes watching the railroad and watching what goes on.
So what we have tried to do is set up police emergency
numbers, police emergency desks. There are calls on safety and
security among our management team. I have personally been
trained in security matters. I went to this terrorism training
because I was deemed to be too nice a guy, and did not know how
terrorists think.
In formulating our plans on the railroad and our
educational processes, what we have tried to do is say, how
much prevention can we put in place by educating our people?
There are not 28,000 policemen. But there are 28,000 people
watching what goes on, and we have a mechanism to report what
they see.
There are a couple of specific technologies, if I might,
Mr. Menendez. We are working on one that would be a database
that would have within it the profile of all 1.5 million rail
cars operating on the system.
As the rail car would go by, it would match, through visual
imaging, and do not ask me what that means. As the car goes by,
it would match the visual image of the car with what is in the
database, to see whether or not, for example, a bomb has been
planted in the bottom of that rail car. That is something that
is being tested out in TTCI.
In addition, as Ms. Strang mentioned, there is research
going on for some sort of a liquid armor, that looks as though
it actually has self-sealing capabilities, if a breach did
occur. This obviously would have not only security, but safety
implications, as well. That research is being done at TTCI with
DHS funding.
Mr. Menendez. Thank you.
Mr. LaTourette. I thank you, Mr. Menendez. I have just one
quick follow-up question, Mr. Hamberger. I was surprised when
Ms. Norton was here, on this issue about the D.C. legislation
that is now in litigation. She opined that the fire chief from
the District did not have advance information of what kind of
traffic was going through his town.
I understand from my fire chiefs that there is, in fact,
technology and a program. I do not know if they subscribe to it
or somebody gives it to them free. But my fire chiefs in Ohio
indicate to me that they know when a train is coming through
town that has chlorine or some other substance, that maybe they
have got to perk up about. Am I wrong?
Mr. Hamberger. I think Mr. Collins probably should respond,
and the next panel can get into some more of the specifics. Let
me tell you what I think I know. That is that we do not provide
pre-notification on a train-by-train basis.
What we have agreed, and I will double check on this during
the break, it is our understanding that the fire chief has been
briefed, probably perhaps subsequent to his conversation with
Delegate Norton. But we believe that we have briefed the D.C.
fire chief.
I met this morning actually with a representative from the
International Association of Fire Fighters, who concurs with
our view, that with 1.8 million carloads of hazardous material
moving around the country, that most fire departments could not
deal with the blizzard of information. It would just overwhelm
them and become so commonplace that it would not, in fact, perk
their ears up.
Therefore, what we have offered, as an industry, is that we
would sit down with the appropriate emergency responders in a
community, to let them know what are the kinds of things that
come through their community, so that they can be trained on
those specific hazardous materials. But the pre-notification is
not on a train-by-train, car-by-car basis, because of the
overwhelming nature of it.
Mr. LaTourette. I thank you for that. The other comment I
would make is this. It is apparent from the questions by Mr.
Menendez and your conversation, Mr. Pickett, that there is a
disconnect between the organizations that represent railroad
employees and the railroads, at least as represented by you
today, about whether or not there has been security training.
I often find it to be more instructive, rather than for us
to have more hearings and find this out; maybe you could
initiate a conversation with Mr. Pickett and his fellow folks.
Mr. Hamberger. We have worked well together on other
issues, and I am sure we will reach out and talk on this one,
as well.
Mr. LaTourette. Well, I appreciate that very much. Is there
anything else?
Mr. Hamberger. If I might, just for the record, thank you
for your indulgence in letting us go a little bit longer in the
presentations.
Mr. LaTourette. I did not even notice. Thank you for
coming.
Mr. Hamberger. Thank you.
Mr. LaTourette. Our third and final panel today consists of
three witnesses. First will be Mr. Daniel Collins, who is the
President of the Operation Respond Institute. Second will be
Mr. Thomas Rader, who is the President of the Colorado Railcar
Manufacturing Company; and lastly, Mr. Jeremy Hill, who is the
Senior Vice President of the Union Switch and Signal Company.
I want to thank you all for coming. Thank you for your
patience as we got through our other two panels. We are anxious
to hear from you, and we will begin with you, Mr. Collins.
STATEMENTS OF DANIEL M. COLLINS, PRESIDENT, OPERATION RESPOND
INSTITUTE, ACCOMPANIED BY JAMES BOONE, VICE PRESIDENT, AND
GERALD LYNCH, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF REGIONAL INFORMATION
SHARING SYSTEM; THOMAS RADER, PRESIDENT, COLORADO RAILCAR
MANUFACTURING; JEREMY HILL, SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT, UNION SWITCH
AND SIGNAL COMPANY
Mr. Collins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. On behalf of the
carriers and emergency responders that support Operation
Respond, in partnership with the Federal agencies, I am honored
to provide the following testimony on new technologies for
railroad safety and security.
Accompanying me here today is Dr. James Boone, our Vice
President, and also Mr. Gerald Lynch, the Executive Director of
the Regional Information Sharing System, one of our strong law
enforcement partners.
Mr. Chairman, I would like to express the gratitude of the
Operation Respond Team for inviting us to participate in this
hearing. I would also like to acknowledge your acceptance to
serve on the Operation Respond International Steering
Committee, along with your esteemed colleague, the Honorable
Nick J. Rahall.
Operation Respond has been involved in developing software
products for first responders since 1995. We could not have
accomplished all that we have without the assistance of the
fire chiefs, the fire fighters, the National Volunteer Fire
Council, the chiefs of police, and the International Union of
Police Associations.
These response agencies, the Association of American
Railroads, and the American Public Transportation Association
have been there for us, time and time again, to fine tune our
products, and assist with dissemination and training.
Our software, Operation Response Emergency Information
System, is currently deployed in over 26,000 emergency response
agencies in the United States, Canada, and Mexico, reaching an
estimated one million responders.
The largest component of these installations is the RISS-
NET system. Mr. Lynch's organization thought so highly of the
OREIS software, that they placed it right next to the Amber
Alert System, inside of RISS.
The software OREIS provides a direct link to the software
user and the manifests of participating railroads. Responders
can obtain verification of hazardous materials contents of
leaking rail cars in less than one minute. Our goal is to make
sure the first responder is not the first victim.
All Class 1 railroads in the United States and Canada have
signed license agreements with Operation Respond. Also, many
regional and short line railroads participate, such as the
Alaska Railroad and Montana Rail Link.
Basically, Mr. Chairman, the freight railroads have stepped
up to the plate. They provide, through our secure software, all
the information they have on chemical contents to responders
along their routes.
If I may, Mr. Chairman, deviate here a second, this is not
pre-information that is supplied. This is live information that
is gained by the responder accessing the software, if and when
something happens. It is an exception based system that is
generated by a query by the responding agency that has our
software.
Now, Mr. Chairman, to address the topics specifically
mentioned in your letter requesting this testimony, we are
going to address three issues. On improved infrastructure
technologies, we believe responders to rail transportation
incidents often need help to confirm the exact incident
location and how best to reach it.
Railroad infrastructure landmarks are not always understood
by responders, and have led to responders wasting valuable time
finding trains. For example, a railroad milepost may not be
directly related to a mile marker located along a nearby
highway.
Operation Respond has found that a searchable database of
railroad features, designed to overlay on aerial and satellite
imagery and street maps, enables emergency responders to
quickly and reliably reach an incident site.
In fact, in 2004, under sponsorship from the Department of
Homeland Security, Operation Respond developed such a system,
an enhanced GIS and overlaid imagery system for the Department
of Homeland Security and Amtrak police. The project was a
highly focused effort along the Northeast Corridor, and it was
completed prior to both the Republican and Democratic
conventions.
Operation Respond believes that a cooperative effort with
some Federal funding can identify and develop a standardized
geospatial database of essential railroad features. The
benefits would include allowing carriers to determine the
appropriate response organizations in an emergency; assisting
railroad police and emergency operations desks to communicate
with public agency dispatchers; and last, to help those
responders locate trains in distress in a timely fashion.
The other issue is better emergency planning. Our approach
has been to improve emergency planning by bridging the gap
between the responders and the carriers. Through easy-to-use
software, complicated railroad data is simplified. So a 19 year
old volunteer fire fighter can quickly and easily obtain what
they need.
Also, I would like to introduce new technology that we have
been working on. Our goal is to turn the Operation Respond user
base, now 26,000 strong and growing, into a transportation
incident alert and messaging system. What we are working on
with the AAR and the individual carriers is the capability that
sends alerts and messages to those responders and to the
carriers' 24/7 operations desks.
These alerts or messages could be directly associated with
incidents or based on a potential threat, such as an explosive
device or a possible terrorist action.
Last is modern passenger coach technologies. Law
enforcement has been particularly interested in Operation
Respond passenger coach software. This component of OREIS
features passenger car and locomotive schematics, highlighting
emergency information, such as emergency windows and doors.
The law enforcement component views these schematics as a
very effective tool for dealing with on-board incidents. These
could range from identifying locations for hiding bombs and how
to approach an on-board hostage situation.
To conclude, Mr. Chairman, I have four recommendations.
Number one, all railroads should participate in Operation
Respond. I respectively request that this should be a voluntary
initiative.
Second, a national railroad infrastructure search engine
should be developed. The priority should be DOD routes,
hazardous material routes, AMTRAK, and commuter train routes.
Third, a national transportation incident alert and
messaging system needs to be developed. Operation Respond
software users are the ideal group to serve as the network
foundation.
Finally, while the OREIS software deployments are indeed
growing, the goal needs to be universal coverage. At the
present time, we are essentially half the way there.
Thank you again, Mr. Chairman, and when the questions are
ready, we will try to answer them.
Mr. LaTourette. Thank you very much, Mr. Collins. Mr.
Rader, welcome, and we look forward to hearing from you.
Mr. Rader. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I am here on behalf of
Colorado Railcar Manufacturing to talk a minute about emerging
technologies in passenger equipment.
We really have two emerging technologies to talk about. One
is the development of double-decker vehicles. The second is the
development of the U.S. DMU. I am going to focus primarily on
the U.S. DMU.
DMU stands for Diesel Multiple Unit. It simply means a car
which is self-propelled and has diesel engines underneath it.
It does not require a locomotive, and is capable of being
hooked together in multiple units to make various sizes and
types of train sets.
They are very common in Europe. There are thousands of them
operating throughout the world. It is a technology, however,
that has not been in the United States since the late 1960s.
The reasons are multiple, but one of the chief reasons, as
Joe Strang presented earlier, in 1999, there were new
regulations enacted that required stronger, safer passenger
cars.
On the other hand, there were no large orders, no transit
agency wanted to order a speculative order of a new self-
propelled car that had not been run anywhere.
My company decided that there was an opportunity here to
make a United States car that met United States regulations. We
went to the Federal Railroad Administration. We got wonderful
cooperation. We spent a year and a half working with them, and
the result was a U.S. DMU.
Why are we so interested in this? It is very simple. The
U.S. DMU uses 50 percent less fuel per passenger mile than a
locomotive-hauled train when it is being used in an appropriate
service. That is energy security. We are talking about trains
using millions upon millions less gallons of fuel per year.
Because we have a lighter train, but still build to the
regulatory safety standards, we can use less fuel and we can
use more modern engines. So we produce 68 percent less
pollutants or emissions per passenger mile. So instantly, we
can reduce the emissions from trains.
Because of the noise design and the size of the engine, we
actually produce 75 percent less noise. So these benefits are
very real when it comes to security and safety.
But interestingly, they do not typically cost millions of
dollars more. In point of fact, the operational cost savings
from a U.S. DMU, over the 30 year life of the car, is two to
three times the value of the car. So a $10 million train set,
over 30 years, will save as much as $35 million in operating
costs.
They are redundant systems. Unlike a locomotive that has
one large engine, they have two or more per train set. So they
are not blocking the track when you have an engine failure; and
if someone is capable of messing up, if you please, a system,
we can still get it off the track and get it home safely.
Lastly, in spite of all these other savings, it has another
great benefit in savings in infrastructure costs. We can reduce
infrastructure costs because we have shorter trains, so we need
shorter platforms. We have fewer cars because they are double
deck, so we need fewer maintenance bays and we need fewer
parking tracks. So all of these benefits come without any
increase in capital cost.
Thanks to the hard work of a member of your Committee, this
double deck car development is now in production, and will be
in operation in Florida, starting in the middle of July. It is
presently in completion, and will be going to TTCI for testing
in the whole month of June.
We invite you to come see it. It is a real opportunity for
us to maintain the safety level, the only self-propelled
vehicle in the world that meets United States' standards.
When you saw those crash pictures, I think it is very
important to understand, the first cars you saw do not meet the
current standards. Only the reinforced car met the current
standards. These cars meet the current standards.
When it is finally delivered, it will look like this, on
the next to the last one there. I want to thank you very much
for the opportunity to testify before the Committee.
Mr. LaTourette. Mr. Radar, thank you very much for coming.
We would like to identify the hard working members of our
Committee. So is that Mr. Mica you were talking about?
[Laughter.]
Mr. LaTourette. Mr. Hill, thank you for coming, and we look
forward to your testimony.
Mr. Hill. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman LaTourette,
Ranking Member Menendez, and Committee members, thank you for
the opportunity to present information on technologies that are
available today for increasing safety, security, and efficiency
of railroad operations.
Our company is part of Ansaldo Signal and the Finmeccanica
group of companies. As Union Switch and Signal, we have served
the rail industry in the control system business as a leader in
the development and deployment of technology throughout our 125
year history.
Development of new products for rail safety and security is
a primary focus of the Finmeccanica family of companies
throughout the world. We are headquartered in Pittsburgh,
Pennsylvania, with manufacturing facilities for our products in
Batesburg, South Carolina, and have many representative offices
throughout North America. We currently employ about 900 people
within the United States.
The rail safety solutions that I am presenting today are
currently available in our portfolio. They do provide improved
infrastructure inspection and security, positive train control,
and better operational planning and emergency coordination.
Let me first discuss our railroad track integrity system.
This system, which is based on a proven technology already in
service in North America, checks track integrity. That is a
broken or missing rail in dark or unsignaled territory.
It can incorporate switch point position detection, and
provide communication directly to a train or to a centralized
management center.
Many secondary lines are not equipped with train control
systems, as we have already heard. There are, in fact, 68,000
miles of Dark Territory in North America. Signal systems not
only control the flow of rail traffic, but they can also warn
an approaching train of a broken rail or improperly aligned
switch. Unfortunately, signal systems tend to be expensive and,
therefore, generally uneconomical on light density rail lines.
At Union Switch, we have developed this new implementation,
which has the potential to dramatically improve security and
safety on these light density rail lines. The system is
relatively low cost, and could prevent a reoccurrence of
accidents, such as the tragic derailment in Graniteville, South
Carolina, earlier this year.
The second topic is positive train control. This system
also utilizes proven Union switch technology, which will be
deployed on the Alaska railroad for revenue service by summer
of the year 2007. Deployment will improve operational
efficiency, and prevent train-to-train collisions through the
use of GPS tracking and location determination, and on-train
operator enforcement.
In our terminology, this system is vital. That is, any
system failure automatically results in an overall known safe
state.
The third technology is the advanced speed enforcement
system. This system provides an improved level of safety. It
ensures that trains actually stop at red signals. The system
has been implemented on Amtrak in the Northeast Corridor, and
also on New Jersey transit commuter operations.
This technology, originally introduced in Scandinavia by
one of our Ansaldo Signal sister companies, can be implemented
in any territory, and is ideally suited to mixed traffic
operations.
We are also exploring a new technology called the Common
Operational Picture. Currently, railroad operations planners in
cities like Chicago and New Orleans plan inter-line operations
the same way they did when railroads were introduced, basically
with paper, telephones, and faxes.
Our Common Operational Picture would enable these personnel
to see on a geographically-oriented overview, all train
operations in these heavily-trafficked, congested areas. The
end result will be better planning, coordination, and a
reduction in the transit time of the Nation's freight in
heavily congested areas.
We are also working on an optimization traffic planner. As
you are aware, there areas in the Nation where railroads are
already at full capacity. Without the need for adding
additional infrastructure, this software-based tool plans
overall train operations in real time, taking operational
information on the railroad, such as track outages or defective
equipment into consideration, to provide the most optimum train
plan possible, based on established business objectives; for
example, maximizing overall railroad velocity.
The system has been in development at Union Switch for five
years, and although not currently deployed on any railroad, the
technology has been demonstrated, and we are anticipating
deployment on a Class 1 railroad in the near future.
Our civil advisor system was originally conceived for use
by 911 emergency responder dispatchers. The system provides
secure real-time train information and location on a
geographical information system map. Train locations are
displayed, relative to detailed highway and street information
and other physical infrastructure; for example, public
buildings, hospitals, stadiums, et cetera.
Most importantly, the system can provide information on
blocked highway crossings, and in the event of a railroad
emergency, it can provide additional information, such as train
manifest information, HAZMAT detail, and the correct emergency
responder contact information. The potential users are
enormous: 911 dispatchers, police, railroad and transit
agencies, Department of Defense, Homeland Security and
Transportation, the Federal Emergency Management, the Federal
Railroad and Transportation Security Administrations, to name a
few.
We look forward to the further implementation and
deployment of these technologies, and encourage your Committee
to enact the legislation necessary to establish the innovative
public/private partnerships, such as the Create Project in
Chicago, that will provide a mechanism for immediate
implementation for the benefit of the rail industry and the
public at large.
As always, one of the biggest challenges in deploying new
safety technology on rail systems continues to be funding.
Before I conclude, I would request permission for the document
I have submitted, detailing these new technologies to be
included in the record.
Mr. LaTourette. Without objection.
Mr. Hill. Once again, I would thank the Committee for the
opportunity to present today on behalf of Union Switch and
Signal and the railroad's signal and control systems supply
community. Thank you very much for your time and support. I
would be happy to answer questions that you may have, thank
you.
Mr. LaTourette. Mr. Hill, thank you very much for your
testimony. I am sure both Mr. Menendez and I will have
questions.
Mr. Rader, my first question would be to you. How fast do
your trains go?
Mr. Rader. The initial train that we have designed is 110
miles an hour.
Mr. LaTourette. It is my understanding that aside from the
good work that is going on in Florida, that you have also
introduced, or plan to introduce, or started to introduce, a
new fleet of cars up in the Alaskan railways. Is that right?
Mr. Rader. That is correct. They were just delivered. I got
a call yesterday in route to this meeting.
Mr. LaTourette. Can you tell us a little something about
the cars that were delivered yesterday, and what kind of
operation is going to be conducted up in Alaska?
Mr. Rader. Yes, they are double deck, full-length, glass
dome cars, the largest passenger cars in the world, and they
are designed for the luxury tourism market. The Alaska
railroad, well, let me see, I should know, I started it, in
1983, has been towing the cars behind their scheduled services
of the various cruise companies to Alaska.
They have now made sufficient profits from that operation
to reinvest in building their own luxury tour cars, and they
are entering the market. The combined operation of all of those
tour cars together has taken an operation that was losing
millions of dollars in 1983 on passenger service, and turned it
into one which has a substantial positive cash flow from
passenger service.
Mr. LaTourette. I am glad you mentioned that. There is sort
of a great myth in this country that you cannot turn a profit
with passenger rail service. I just heard you describe what is
going on in Alaska. I mean, should we be thinking about
separating passenger rail service from sort of the tourism
side, as opposed to the getting people to work side of things?
Mr. Rader. Yes, I think they are certainly two different
operations, two different markets, and must be approached
mentally differently. How one approaches that, I am not sure I
have the answer.
But the recognition is that, as an example, long distance
trains are not transit, but are really, I think, the tourism
kind that the Alaskan railroad has. Tourism supports the
essential transportation service. So the challenge we all know
is to make essential transportation pay for itself.
Mr. LaTourette. How many people can fit in one of your
cars?
Mr. Rader. The double-deckers upstairs are usually 90 to
120, and downstairs they are about 20 less. So they can fit 200
passengers comfortably.
Mr. LaTourette. Thank you very much.
Mr. Collins, can you give me a real world example of where
Operation Respond might have assisted in an emergency
situation?
Mr. Collins. Yes, Mr. Chairman, the first one that comes to
mind is an incident in Rochester, New York. It basically ended
up on a short line railroad, where the Rochester Fire
Department did not have access to that short line railroad's
database, but they had access to the CSX database.
They were able to go in and get the information on that
particular leaking tank car to help them understand what
chemicals they were dealing with in this incident in Rochester,
New York.
Similarly, in the Salt Lake City incident that just
happened out in Utah, where they had to evacuate 6,000 people
with the confusion over the chemicals, the Midvale Fire
Department actually queried on our system. They queried the
Union Pacific, the BNSF and the Utah Railway, the three that we
have in that jurisdiction, to obtain information on the
contents of those cars that were leading to the evacuation.
Last year, in 2004, on the freight railroad side, we had
over 1,800 queries of the system. Some of this is training and
some of this is testing, which is good, because it is
familiarizing people with how to use the system. But it also is
an indication of the concern by the communities over issues
that they need data on.
Mr. LaTourette. You mentioned, I think, that all seven
Class 1 railroads have voluntarily signed agreements with you.
What do you think the reach is of Operation Respond? That would
be part one of my question. Then two, do you also cover
commuter lines, such as Metro North in New York?
Mr. Collins. Yes, that is true for all the Class 1
railroads in Canada and the United States, and we recently
signed an agreement with the TFM in Mexico, although we have
not launched that service yet, until we get the full Spanish
version working.
The reach is going to be the reach of the full extent of
the Class 1 railroads. The example that I mentioned with the
short line situation, it is really the Class 1s that are
originating this hazardous materials.
They have the data. Even though they may pass it off to a
short line that is not in our system, the people that use our
software understand that they can query on all railroads, for
that matter, to find out what chemical they are dealing with.
Now with the passenger train side of things, I am very
pleased. Particularly along the Northeast Corridor, we have the
Virginia Railway Express. We have MARC. We have Amtrak. We have
the Long Island Railroad in New York. We have the New Jersey
Transit in New York. We have Metro North in New York. We have a
real solid base along the Northeast Corridor of all the
commuter operators that have joined our system.
We have several out west, as well. We have one in Toronto,
Go Transit, that is now in our system. There are several voids
there that we would like to fill. We have been working with
APTA on programs to try to encompass that particular industry.
Mr. LaTourette. Thank you very much.
Mr. Hill, I think you mentioned that your Advance Speed
Enforcement System is already deployed in the Northeast
Corridor. Is that right?
Mr. Hill. That is correct.
Mr. LaTourette. It is my understanding that most commuter
rail systems in the country have, I think they are called
wayside signals, which are basically traffic lights at the
site. But some of the higher speed corridors like the Northeast
Corridor, require cab signals, which are more expensive to
install. Does your system require the use of cab signals, or
can you use it without?
Mr. Hill. It can be used definitely without. It can be
installed without any other signaling infrastructure that would
be existent today. In the Northeast Corridor, we have deployed
it in conjunction with the cab signaling that is there. So you
have both continuous and what we call intermittent cab
signaling, which is the speed enforcement system.
But outside of the Northeast Corridor, generally on Class 1
and other operating railroads, there is very little cab
signaling deployed.
Mr. LaTourette. Lastly, with the Railroad Track Integrity
System that you talked about, I think it would be very
important to know if there is a missing track up ahead. Can you
tell us just a little bit about how that system works in
comparison to what we have in existence today?
Mr. Hill. Basically, the Track Integrity System is a
technology that was developed at Union Switch many years ago.
It was latent. We had not used it.
The system actually sleeps most of the time, and really is
woken up when a train would come along in Dark Territory. So it
is specifically for dark or unsignaled territory.
We have deployed this technology on a trial basis, as your
colleague, Mr. Graves, indicated, on the Burlington Northern
Santa Fe. There is a 50 mile test area there, where this
technology is being deployed.
Basically, as a train approaches, the technology wakes up.
It checks the track ahead, to make sure that there are no
broken or missing rails. Then the information is communicated
back to the locomotive, to indicate that everything is clear
ahead.
In that particular demonstration on the Burlington Northern
Santa Fe, they have already recognized or detected eight broken
rails in the period that the equipment has been installed. This
obviously can be a cause for major derailments.
Mr. LaTourette. How far ahead can it see? I mean, is it the
whole 50 miles that you have wired, or how does it work?
Mr. Hill. One particular track circuit of this technology
can reach nearly five miles. Over a 50 mile territory we would
have like 10, what we call track circuits, or individual
sections of track that we check.
Mr. LaTourette. Thank you very much.
Mr. Menendez?
Mr. Menendez. Thank you, in Mr. Hill's response to your
question, Mr. Chairman, I thought there was only one broken
rail around here.
Mr. LaTourette. That is one too many.
[Laughter.]
Mr. LaTourette. I want to thank all the panels. Mr.
Collins, let me ask you, based on the work you have done with
the industry to develop a Railroad Incident Location Program,
what would it take, if you have any estimates, for a national
program? What would it cost and how long would it take to
implement?
Mr. Collins. Okay, I would like to turn this over to Dr.
Boons, since he is running this program for us.
Mr. Boone. Thank you very much, Dan. This is a good example
of taking advantage of the technology changes that are going on
in the 911 arena and with the advent of the cellular telephone.
There is a great deal of activity, as I am sure all of you
on the Subcommittee know, going on to address locations, take
imagery at the county level, and do a great deal of work in
determining streets and roads. All of this is being done to
improve emergency response as a general matter.
One of the things that we believe can be done is to take
advantage of the excellent engineering data that the railroad
industry already has, as Mr. Hill described, literally locating
a lot of the major features that would be needed for a
responder to adequately match a highway mile post or a street
intersection with where to go to reach a railroad incident.
This is particularly important, as the railroads have done
an outstanding job in reducing grade crossings, which are the
traditional way to determine where rail and highway
intersections occur, and also locates where you are on the
railroad.
That is a long way around to say that a good deal of the
work is already underway by the emergency community, and a lot
of the data exists within the railroads themselves.
We think, with a cooperative program, recognizing the
security needs of the data itself, and the fact that it is
proprietary data and needs to be brought into a uniform format,
that over a period of four to five years, we do not think it
would be in excess of $30 million to $50 million to do the
entire Nation.
Now, having said that, not every piece of every railroad
needs to have high resolution imagery or needs to have the same
level of detail that you would have, for example, in
metropolitan New Jersey or along the shore in Ohio. But you
would want to have a practical way of doing this sufficient to
meet the needs of the 911 centers and the others who have to
literally figure out how do I locate where it is and then how
do I get to it.
Mr. Menendez. Thank you, I understand it is a response and
safety enterprise. Do you see any applications as it relates to
security?
Mr. Collins. I think in the testimony, I tried to address
the security side, and particularly our work with the passenger
train-carrying railroads, where the schematical presentations
of their equipment are contained within our software.
Then if there are incidents on board those particular
pieces of equipment, the responding law enforcement agencies
could obtain the data, even before they went into the car: the
width of the aisles, if there were incidents with windows,
understanding what the fabrication of the windows are; all
kinds of critical information they might need.
The SWAT teams, for example, might need this before they
went in and actually put their plan of action in place.
Mr. Menendez. Thank you, Mr. Collins.
Mr. Rader, based upon your presentation, you should be
selling like hotcakes.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Menendez. It sounds like you are on your way. I am just
wondering have you experienced, for example, in your double
deck cars, any challenges or any obstacles?
Mr. Rader. Certainly, we have. The biggest challenge we
face is, if you pick up a railroad specification today for new
cars, it will ask for five to ten years of railroad-proven
service. I do not have five to ten years of railroad-proven
service in a new car.
However, that is the wonderful thing about what Congressman
Mica has helped put together in Florida. We will have that
demonstration over the next two years. Then, yes, I think it
will go like hotcakes.
In fact, I think one of the real opportunities here, if you
look at the economics, the savings on these cars would
literally pay the principle and interest over the life of the
car, if you were financing it at Treasury rates.
Mr. Menendez. I have just one technical question for
myself. They are self-propelled, and you talked about how there
are different ones on different cars. What happens when, for
argument's sake, one goes out? Does it continue to self-propel
itself through the independent power?
Mr. Rader. Yes, they are independently controlled. That is
the joy of it. If one goes down, the computer on the adjoining
engine says, I am not hearing from my friend. I am in control,
and it takes over.
Mr. Menendez. Thank you very much.
Mr. LaTourette. I thank you, Mr. Menendez. I want to thank
this panel, and I want to thank all of the witnesses on all
three panels. I learned a number of things today, and I
appreciate your being willing to share with us. I want to thank
Mr. Menendez for filling in so ably for Ms. Brown, who
hopefully will be back with us next time.
As with the other panels, there may be some questions that
people may have that we will forward to you, and if you will be
so kind as to respond, we would appreciate that. There being no
further business to come before the Subcommittee, we stand
adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 1:05 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
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