THE NATIONAL PREPAREDNESS SYSTEM: WHAT ARE WE PREPARING FOR?

(109–12)

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BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, PUBLIC BUILDINGS AND
EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON
TRANSPORTATION AND
INFRASTRUCTURE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION

APRIL 14, 2005

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THE NATIONAL PREPAREDNESS SYSTEM:
WHAT ARE WE PREPARING FOR?

Thursday, April 14, 2005

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:00 p.m., in Room 2167, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Bill Shuster [chairman of the subcommittee] presiding.

Mr. SHUSTER. The Subcommittee will come to order. I'd like to welcome the subcommittee to this important oversight hearing entitled, “The National Preparedness System: What are We Preparing For?”

Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, the Nation has been focused on its ability to prevent, prepare for, and respond to the next terrorist attack. However, well before the attacks of that terrible day, the Federal Government, in partnership with responders nationwide, was working to ensure that should an attack happen, we would be prepared to deal with the consequences.

For example, FEMA was developing and delivering courses on dealing with weapons of mass destruction, especially those involving hazardous materials. The Department of Defense was providing specialized training to National Guard units nationwide; a terrorism annex was added to the Federal Response Plan; A government-wide agreement about who would do what in the event of a disaster; and the Office For Domestic Preparedness was providing assistance to first responders to train and equip to deal with the crisis of terrorism. These actions were on top of those efforts being undertaken to help prepare communities for the natural disasters they face every day.

What was missing before 9/11 was not a government-wide interest in preparing for disasters of all types, but the consensus that this preparation needed to occur in a coordinated and comprehensive manner. Then, as now, the debate carried on over the question of what is the best way to prepare for all the disasters that we will face as a Nation.

Some argued that preparing for and responding to natural and accidental disasters is very different than preparing for terrorism, and therefore must occur on a separate track. Others, including this committee, advocate the position that while certain characteristics of each disaster may differ, the general framework is the same regardless of the disaster, and therefore the preparation and response should be coordinated.
In releasing Homeland Security Presidential Directives 5, 7 and 8, the President established the framework for such a system and a roadmap for achieving it. Collectively, these directives require the creation of a National Preparedness System, one that establishes a national preparedness goal, outlines the targeted capabilities required to meet that goal, lays out the tasks necessary to reach the targeted capabilities, establishes a common incident command system to utilize these capabilities to the greatest potential, and then puts together an operational plan for how all of these parts come together when they are needed, the National Response Plan.

It is my belief that preparing for national and man- caused hazards are not competing interests. If we create a system that looks at all the hazards that the Nation will face, identify universal capabilities that are needed in various scenarios, establish minimum preparedness levels, and provide guidance to communities on how to reach those preparedness levels, and support so that they may do so, then we will have truly created a National Preparedness System.

The large question that remains: What exactly are we preparing for? With the creation of these foundational documents, we must ask: Do these documents create an all- hazard system that will allow communities to cross prepare for the many disasters they will face. Or have we become so focused on terrorism that we’ve lost sight of the hazards we are most likely to face.

For example, the Department is using 15 planning scenarios as a basis for all of its preparedness documents. Twelve of fifteen are terrorism and only two are natural disasters. Why the disparity? By only including two natural disasters, are we truly preparing for all the challenges we face?

The biggest risk we run in failing to adequately address this issue is the creation of a false sense of security that we are prepared for the next disaster. By focusing on how much we have spent to prepare the Nation since 9/11, we run this very risk. The question should not be how much have we spent, but how are we spending it and are we doing so in a way that truly prepares us?

There are two additional issues I would like to raise. First, this new preparedness system will require a whole host of new documents, including planning standards and assessments. Will these be building on what is already out there or are States going to have to start all over again? Second, I was very surprised not to see any mention of mitigation in any of these preparedness documents, despite the fact that it is the one way of preparing that we know will save lives, property, and money.

I am very interested to hear from today’s witnesses who are both on the front line of preparing for a disaster and in the back room ensuring that we are prepared to do so, all experts in their field, who can shed light on these as well as many other issues that are out there.

With that, I would like to recognize the ranking member, Ms. Norton from the District of Columbia, for an opening statement if she wishes.

Ms. Norton. Thank you very much, Chairman Shuster. I am going to read part of my statement, if you will, and submit the rest for the record.
I want to commend you, Mr. Chairman, on the name of this hearing: The National Preparedness System: What are We Preparing For? I'm on two other committees, of course, who appropriately have been focused on preparing for terrorism, the Select Committee on Homeland Security and the Committee on Government Reform, and one can understand why the country since 9/11 has been in the throes of all the start-up and train-up work that would be required.

I want to associate myself with your remarks, though, Mr. Chairman, about the all-hazards approach for preparing for whatever hazard comes to us. If you ask a firefighter whether there is any difference between a hazard when a building explodes, for example, because of a gas leak, or when it explodes because it has been hit by a terrorist bomb or some other device, and I have asked about this, indeed I have just come from a Homeland Security hearing where firefighters were testifying, he will tell you absolutely not. And what you are doing, Mr. Chairman, is refocusing us, rebalancing us so that we understand what firefighters and other first responders are likely to face.

The chances are overwhelming that they will face some natural disaster of the kind they have faced every day, God willing. So we cannot let 9/11, for all its horror and tragedy, distract us from keeping our people safe against the most likely hazards they will face. So I very much appreciate this hearing, Mr. Chairman.

I note that the two Chairs of the committees who have been particularly involved, our own committee and the Committee on Government Reform are now also on the Select Committee on Homeland Security. So that might also help us achieve balance.

As we are all aware, following the terrorist acts in Oklahoma City and New York increased emphasis, efforts, and resources have been put into developing a consolidated, comprehensive national preparedness and response plan. I note that we are examining the status and direction of national preparedness today when the National Response Plan, which seeks to “integrate Federal Government domestic prevention preparedness response and recovery plans into one all-discipline all-hazards plan,” is to be totally implemented.

When the Office of State and Local Government Coordination and Preparedness at DHS began working on these initiatives, initially the process got off to a rough start. Many stakeholders, including State, local and preparedness-related organizations were not sufficiently included in the process. Over time, it appears that the process has become more open, yet a number of questions remain.

First, while HSPD-8 allows a special emphasis to be given to terrorism, the National Preparedness System is supposed to be an all-hazards system. Many of the initiatives that support the EMPS, however, are heavily focused on terrorism and spend little or no effort preparing for natural disasters.

The chairman just noted that only two disasters, earthquakes and tornadoes, are included in the scenarios. What about hurricanes and floods, which are annual occurrences in our country, I am sorry to say?

This subcommittee is on record as a strong supporter of mitigation of hazards other than terrorism. For the past several years, we
have been trying to reauthorize the Predisaster Mitigation Program and to make sure that there is enough funding for the Hazard Mitigation Program. Mitigation is proactive. It is preventive. It is mitigation and prevention that saves lives, money, and property. It doesn't clean up after an event, it keeps an event from happening or helps us to prepare for events so that the harm is far less serious.

Moreover, in recent years, there has been a decline in support by the administration for mitigation programs and a reduction in funding, thus further diminishing its importance. This leaves a gap in our preparedness system. Many stakeholders have concerns about the new guidance that will be released with the NPS.

For example, will it build upon well-established industry standards or will they have to develop new plans and procedures? Further, funding is tied directly to compliance with new requirements, and many localities are concerned they will not have sufficient budgets or manpower to comply with the new mandates.

The President was granted broad authority to implement a National Preparedness System in the Homeland Security Act of 2002. Many of the actions taken by the administration to further these efforts have been done by executive order and presidential directive. These documents are not law and cannot supercede existing restrictions or existing authority. It remains unclear under what authority the President will impose the requirements of the NPS, and under what authority and circumstances he will invoke some of the authorities and procedures of a National Response Plan, especially when declaring an incident of national significance.

It is our responsibility to make sure that a National Preparedness System is effective, efficient, and that it appropriately balances potential threat and magnitude of all our hazards with the resources available to prevent, respond and recover from them, to quote from the statute in the plan.

Are we going in the right direction? Are we asking our communities to keep inventing the wheel? I hope we will explore these ideas today, and I look forward to the testimony of our witnesses. I thank them in advance for their testimony, and I thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Shuster. Thank you, Ms. Norton.

I ask unanimous consent that all our witnesses' full statements be included in the record. Without objection, so ordered.

Since your written testimony has been made a part of the record, the subcommittee would request you limit your summary to five minutes.

We have two panels of witnesses with us here today. We have two witnesses, both from the Department of Homeland Security, but who each have a very different and important role in our National Preparedness System.

Corey Gruber is the Assistant Director of the Office For Domestic Preparedness, which is part of the Office for State and Local Government Coordination and Preparedness, and Gil Jamieson is the Director of the National Incident Management System Integration Center.
Mr. SHUSTER. We will hear from both of our witnesses on this panel before opening for questions, and Mr. Gruber, you may proceed.

Mr. GRUBER. Mr. Shuster, Ms. Norton, my name is Corey Gruber, with the Department of Homeland Security, sir. It is my honor and pleasure to appear before you today to discuss in detail Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8 on national preparedness, the Interim National Preparedness Goal and the National Preparedness Guidance.

As you know, Mr. Chairman, the Department continues to aggressively implement HSPD-8. The President issued the directive in December 2003 in order to establish policies, procedures and goals to strengthen the Nation's preparedness to prevent and respond to terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies. Specifically, HSPD-8 calls for a domestic all-hazards preparedness goal that establishes measurable priorities and targets, creates mechanisms to improve delivery of preparedness assistance to State, local, and tribal governments, and outlines actions to strengthen their preparedness capabilities.

DHS consulted extensively with stakeholders from all levels of government, the private sector, and nongovernmental organizations to ensure the implementation was truly national, not solely Federal. DHS invited over 1,500 entities to comment, including 398 municipalities, 112 State agencies, and 94 national associations. The Department’s commitment to stakeholder engagement reflects the principle that preparedness and domestic incident management are shared national responsibilities.

HSPD-8 complements and supports HSPD-5 on management of domestic incidents.

Together, these directives establish a common approach to preparedness and response through NIMS, through the NRP, and through our National Preparedness Goal. The goal enables entities across the Nation to pinpoint capabilities that need improvement and sustain these capabilities at levels needed to manage major events using the protocols established by NIMS and NRP.

On March 31, 2005, DHS released the Interim Goal. The Goal reflects the Department’s progress to date and represents the first major step in transforming the way the Nation prepares and develops capabilities to prevent, respond, and recover from terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies. It will guide Federal, State, local, and tribal entities in determining how best to devote limited resources to most effectively and efficiently strengthen preparedness. It transforms the way we think about preparedness by defining agile and flexible capabilities that must be in place at all appropriate levels to prevent and respond to current and future threats and hazards. The Goal establishes measurable targets and priorities in a systematic approach for determining how prepared we are, how prepared we need to be, and how to prioritize efforts to close gaps.
To help achieve the Goal, DHS, in coordination and consultation with national stakeholders, has developed a set of detailed planning tools. These include the National Planning Scenarios, which illustrate the Nation's strategic risk in the form of the potential scope, magnitude, and complexity of representative major events; a comprehensive library of homeland security tasks, called the Universal Task List; and a compendium of 36 capability templates, called the Target Capabilities List. Every entity across the country will not be expected to develop and maintain every capability to the same level. These will vary based on risk, resource base and needs of different jurisdictions.

Over the coming months, DHS will continue to work with stakeholders to establish target levels and apportion responsibility for developing capabilities among levels of government. DHS will issue updated target levels in conjunction with the final National Preparedness Goal in October 2005.

In addition to the planning tools, the interim goal describes seven consensus national priorities. They fall into two categories: Overarching priorities that contribute to the development of multiple capabilities, and capability-specific priorities that build selected capabilities for which the Nation has the greatest need.

The overarching national priorities are: Implementing the National Response Plan and National Incident Management System, expanding regional collaboration, and implementing the interim national infrastructure protection plan. The capability-specific priorities are strengthening information sharing and collaboration, strengthening interoperable communications, strengthening chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and explosive detection, response, and decontamination, and, finally, strengthening medical surge and mass prophylaxis.

To help implement the goal and priorities, DHS and its partners will shortly issue National Preparedness Guidance, with specific step-by-step instructions on implementing the goal and for updating State and urban area homeland security strategies. DHS will hold regional roll-out conferences in the upcoming months for the Goal and Guidance, and deploy State-by-State training teams comprised of experienced senior State and local experts.

Building the right preparedness system for the Nation and achieving these target levels of capability will take time, and the full benefits will not come overnight. Many benefits have already been realized, such as the requirement and directive to establish a national exercise program and lessons learned system. More will be recognized shortly, such as a streamlined process for determining needs, a clear role for stakeholders in shaping the system, and a more realistic picture of where we now stand in terms of national preparedness and where to make the most cost effective investments with homeland security dollars.

In summary, our approach to implementing the guidance of the President and Congress has centered on two key principles: First, that preparedness and domestic incident management are shared national responsibilities; and, second, that our strategic analysis must be risk based, considering current and emerging threats, our potential vulnerabilities, and the consequences of major events that pose the greatest potential threat to our national interests.
We live in a world transformed by September 11, 2001. The 9/11 Commission wrote that a rededication to preparedness is perhaps the best way to honor the memories of those we lost that day. The publication of the goal brings us a significant step closer to fulfilling this pledge.

Mr. Chairman and members, thank you for your continuing support in this transformational effort, and I look forward to answering your questions.

Mr. SHUSTER. Thank you, Mr. Gruber.

Mr. Jamieson, you may go ahead and proceed.

Mr. JAMIESON. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. Good afternoon. And good afternoon to other members of the subcommittee. My name is Gil Jamieson, and I am the Acting Director of the National Incident Management System Integration Center. Because the National Response Plan and the NIMS are inextricably linked, the Undersecretary For Emergency Preparedness and Response, Michael Brown, has asked me to coordinate implementation of the NRP both within FEMA and across the Nation. It is my pleasure to be with you here today.

Everyday there are events in the United States that require action by emergency responders. Whether those responders come from different parts of the same local jurisdiction or from State and Federal agencies, they need to be able to work together effectively. In Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5, management of domestic incidences, the President directed the Secretary of Homeland Security to develop a new approach to domestic incident management based on the National Incident Management System and the National Response Plan.

The NIMS, released by the Department in March of 2004, established standard incident management practices, protocols and procedures that will allow responders to work together more effectively. The NRP, or the National Response Plan, released by the Department on January 6, 2005, uses the comprehensive framework of NIMS to provide the structure and mechanisms for the coordination of Federal support to State and local tribes.

The NRP development process included extensive coordination with Federal, State, local, and tribal agencies, nongovernmental organizations, private sector entities, and the first responder and emergency management communities across the country. Many State and local associations, including the International Association of Chiefs of Police, the International Association of Fire Chiefs, the National Association of Counties, the Fraternal Order of Police, the National Emergency Management Association have issued press releases announcing and praising the completion of the National Response Plan.

The National Response Plan incorporates best practices from a wide variety of incident management disciplines to include fire, rescue, emergency management, law enforcement, public works, and emergency medical services. Mr. Chairman, the NRP is an all-discipline and an all-hazard plan. Both the NRP and the NIMS reflect the recommendation of the 9/11 Commission and the intentions of Congress as expressed in the intelligence reform bill. The NRP applies to all actual and potential incidences of national significance.
All major disasters and emergencies under the Stafford Act are incidences of national significance.

The NRP uses and builds on the emergency support function structure that was a proven and successful element of the former Federal response plan. To ensure full integration and consistent approach to domestic incident management, a new joint field office fully incorporates and replaces the traditional concept of a disaster field office. The Homeland Security Operations Center serves as a 24/7 hub for coordination within the Department, to include coordination with FEMA’s National Response Coordination Center and our Regional Response Coordination Centers.

The Homeland Security Operations Center also maintains 24/7 coordination with external components, including the National Counterterrorism Center and the Bureau’s Strategic Information and Operations Center.

The NRP includes processes for coordination between the principal Federal official, the joint field office, the Homeland Security Operations Center, and the Interagency Incident Management Group, or IIMG, at the headquarters level. The NRP integrates and rolls the responsibilities of all Federal departments and agencies, and was crafted to ensure that nothing in the plan alters or impedes the ability of Federal, State, local, or tribal governments or agencies to carry out their responsibilities under their own specific authorities.

During the months of April and May, the Department will host seven one-day NRP seminars across the country. In fact, we held our first workshop here yesterday in Washington, D.C. for our partners and stakeholders in the national capital regions. These events will help educate Federal, State, and local incident managers on the provisions of NRP, the concept of operations, the operational framework, and how this new approach will improve domestic incident management and response capabilities across the Nation.

FEMA’s Emergency Management Institute led the development of an on-line independent study course to provide NRP awareness, that is IS 800, Mr. Chairman, and had previously developed NIMS awareness training, IS 700. These courses provide an extraordinary opportunity to build an understanding of the NIMS and the NRP, and to date 140,000 folks have completed these courses on line.

The NRP is being implemented through a three-phase process. Phase I and II provide opportunities for departments and agencies and organizations to modify training, designate staffing of NRP organizational elements, and become familiar with the NRP structures, processes, and protocols, modify their existing interagency plans to align with the NRP, and to conduct the necessary training.

The Department will be working closely with our Federal interagency partners on several implementation actions, including the development of standard operating procedures. The SOPs will help ensure that the NRP is executed in an efficient and consistent manner. Over time, the standard operating procedures will become the basis for field operations guides and specific job training for anyone expected to perform under the National Response Plan.

During the third phase, the Department will conduct assessments of the NRP, coordinating structures, processes, and protocols. And at the end of this period, we will conduct a review and
make some recommendations to the Secretary on what is working and what needs to be modified and changed.

Today is a very important day, and Congresswoman Norton, I note it is an important day not just for opening day of the Washington Nationals, but today is also the day that the NRP becomes fully effective. Up to this point, we have been operating on the Interim National Response Plan. Today, it becomes effective. So the domestic terrorism concept of operations plans and the Federal radiological emergency response plan are superceded and the NRP is fully operational and ready to be implemented, if necessary.

HSPD-5 called for the establishment of a single comprehensive approach to domestic incident management. Together the NIMS and the NRP provide a more efficient and effective way for the Nation to prevent, prepare for, respond to, and recover from any emergency. This is accomplished by the elimination of duplicative and sometimes conflicting Federal plans, and a clear articulation of the relationship that should exist between Federal, State, and local concerning the prevention, preparedness and response elements.

I would like to thank members of the committee for the opportunity to testify today, and I too look forward to your questions that you may have.

Mr. Shuster. Thank you, Mr. Jamieson. I am going to start off the questioning with Mr. Gruber.

We have heard from a number of stakeholders that this is not a National Preparedness System, it is not comprehensive, because it does not fully account or address nonterrorism events. How would you address that?

Mr. Gruber. Let me talk a little first about the scenarios and the reason they were selected and how they were used. The concept that the scenario working group used was to select the minimum number of scenarios that covered the spectrum of threats and hazards, to use those to define specific tasks and then to develop capabilities.

We used a planning methodology that is, in fact, and we state that in the National Preparedness Goal, an all-hazards approach. It is called capabilities-based planning. It is designed to develop agile and flexible capabilities that are designed to meet any threat or hazard.

We selected that set of scenarios with, as you pointed out, twelve attack scenarios for two reasons. One, everyone that participated on the scenario working group has extensive experience with natural hazards given the 40 or more disaster declarations we have every year. We had a great body of experience and knowledge about natural hazards and man-made accidents. So we benefited from that.

We used these WMD attack scenarios because we understand these are some of the areas where the Nation is least prepared. So that was part of the reason why they were a focus of this effort. For the natural hazards, we have great experience and actuarial data. We benefit from the experience of our responders. Some of those have regulated requirements. So that was the reason we took that approach to the planning scenarios that we used.

We developed from that a comprehensive task library of over 1,700 tasks. Some of those, for example, like performance and man-
agement, obviously apply to any threat or hazard you would face. So, again, the scenarios were benchmarks, but we believe the capabilities and tasks cover the full range of hazards, including natural hazards.

Mr. SHUSTER. When you use the term risk when determining the capabilities, is that also determining how the funding is going to be allocated, when you look at the allocation of funds?

Mr. GRUBER. Yes, sir. As, obviously, the Secretary has testified, and he testified as recently as yesterday, he talked about using this strategic mix of looking at the threats and hazards, looking at specific vulnerabilities, and looking at the consequences. Our directive, Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8, specified that we needed to look at the magnitude and scope of the events. And, of course, the National Strategy for Homeland Security told us to look at the events that posed the greatest threat to our population, to our property, and to our way of life.

So those are all part of a risk-managed system that the Secretary again has clearly stated will be the driving force for how we apportion resources.

Mr. SHUSTER. It seems to me, though, when I hear folks from DHS talk you are focusing on terrorism and not on the other risks, and I'm concerned about that, that that is where the focus is, when over the last, well, since FEMA has been created, there has been something like 1,300 or 1,400 disasters, and only four of them have been terrorism. I certainly don't downplay the risk of terrorism, but the reality is we are going to have a hurricane that is going to damage or decimate some town or region of the country next year, and the probability is great that we will have that happen.

Mr. GRUBER. Yes, sir, that's an excellent point. Again, I think if you look at the list of our target capabilities, you will see that they are broad operationally stated templates that apply across that range of hazards.

For example, we have a template for planning, for all-hazards planning. We have a template for interoperable communications. Those apply regardless of the threat or hazard. So we think, even though this suite of scenarios reflected these 12 attack scenarios, that the output, both in that task library that is going to help us with our training and exercise events, and ultimately those 36 capabilities, do adequately cover the whole range of threats and hazards that our Department and State and local responders are responsible for.

Mr. SHUSTER. The other question I have is the National Preparedness System requires a State to possess 36 target capabilities, I believe it is. Will the Department guarantee a minimum level of funding to States? Because with 50 States, I have to believe they are all at different levels of the funding that they have.

Mr. GRUBER. The Secretary has talked about that, and there is a baseline of funding that is proposed, and I know Congress is making a determination about what is appropriate. Again, what we are doing is not a funding formula. We are trying to provide planning tools to State governors, to homeland security advisers and emergency managers that are going to allow them to do three things. One is to achieve the integration we all know we need and is part of the protocols in the NPR and NIMS; secondly, to achieve
the interoperability that is very important for all these threats and hazards; and then, finally, to make the most cost effective investments we can to get the most out of our homeland security dollars and to get that ability to provide dual use, that it serves requirements for threats and hazards.

Mr. SHUSTER. At some point are you going to require States, I mean these are the capabilities you must have? I think that is a big concern of the States, that the Federal Government is going to say you must have this and you must have that.

Mr. GRUBER. Yes, sir. In the statement, I mentioned that one of the most important tasks we have left to do, and that is why this is called an Interim Goal, is we have to work with the community, as we have done up to this point, to begin to determine what are the appropriate base-line capabilities; what are the right structures. Because, as I said, jurisdictions and States differ in terms of their risk and in terms of their resource base.

One of the reasons why we strongly advocate, and I hope other panelists will as well, this approach with expanded regional collaboration, is to make sure we are drawing from the resource pool of the broadest area. Because all the threats and hazards we have talked about, regardless of whether they are terrorism or natural hazards, have no respect for a jurisdiction’s boundary. They are going to be regional and national events.

So our approach again was to make sure that these capabilities can be drawn from a regional area through mutual assistance, or an assistance compact to provide the support we need.

Mr. SHUSTER. When will you finalize the target capabilities list?

Mr. GRUBER. By the 1st of October of 2005. And we will work again. We can always do better, but we have worked very hard. We made a commitment to the Secretary when we started this process that we would strive mightily to make this a model of cooperation and consultation. We have worked hard, and we have had great advice and counsel from our stakeholders when we have not done that correctly.

So we are going to work very hard on this next set of establishing these target levels of capability to get the input from the people that have to make the decisions about applying these resources, and that is at the State and local level.

Mr. SHUSTER. Thank you.

Ms. Norton.

Ms. NORTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Gruber, I want to see if I can understand how natural hazards fit into the risk analysis that I’m working on frankly in my other committees. Yes, I heard Judge Chertoff testify yesterday, and as you know, we are in the process of authorizing the first Homeland Security bill and there is a lot of concern about the distribution of funds. I realize that is not your bailiwick, but everyone agrees that a risk analysis is necessary.

The Senate is going through that process even in advance of us, but also right now simultaneously. Judge Chertoff testified that there should be a risk analysis. And he, helpfully, broke that word down so that it wasn’t so much jargon. He said it is consisting of threats—I’m trying to recall—vulnerability and consequences. And good lawyer that he is, he gave an example; that the bridge down
the street from him, there might be a terrorist attack on it, and the consequences of that could be very severe. But using this formula, threat and vulnerability, it would probably not be considered a substantial risk to guard against.

I don’t have the slightest idea of how, what your office is doing fits into this risk analysis, particularly given the fact that every jurisdiction will get some funds. But there is a tremendous push, I certainly am among those who are pressing for these funds to be distributed on a risk basis, so that there would be some objective formula against which to measure how a majority of the funds are to be allocated.

Could you, by way of example or somehow make me understand how the hazards analysis that you certainly would be doing right in conjunction, indeed at the very same agencies would be involved? I’m thinking of the Coast Guard. Here is an example of an agency that I would bet 99 percent of its time has to do with pulling people out of the water, or whatever you do to make sure that things are well and good at home. But they are learning for the first time that there may be an attack on us.

So whoever is working with the Coast Guard on what the risk is will also have to go through, according to Judge Chertoff, this notion of threat, vulnerability and consequence. If you could give me an example of how that would work on your side of the fence, it would be very helpful to me.

Mr. Gruber. Yes, ma’am. I think you made two important points: One is that it is not one entity that is going to formulate our understanding of risk. It has to be a partnership. And, in fact, we are working very closely with the Coast Guard, for example, on our targeted infrastructure protection programs, on the port security grants, because we have to have the benefit of their experience both with, again, natural hazards, with oil spills, with security for ports, and that is all helping us to understand risk.

We rely on our partners within the Department that have responsibilities for making those determinations using a variety of information, as you well know: Population, population density, law enforcement cases that are underway. But, of course, most importantly, we have an advantage for natural hazards in that we have great volumes of actuarial data and experience every year, as you pointed out, with perhaps 40 disaster declarations every year.

So the advantage is that we have, I think, a very good understanding of probabilities, frequency, seasonality of natural hazards, where we don’t have the same advantage with these terrorist threats. And so as we look at understanding risk, we always have to understand that one set of risks is a morally neutral nonadaptive problem, meaning natural hazards. The other way we look at risk is through something that is perpetrated by a human architect, that is an adaptive threat.

So as we make determinations about risk, we have to deal with both of those events, and that all has to weigh into our calculations. So we work with all our partners in the Department, we work with our community, our constituents at the State and local level, and the rest of the interagency to help us make those determinations.
Ms. Norton. What you are saying is both kinds of risks are to be included in, let us say, what the final number is. What the final funding number is. All I can say is I do not think there is wide understanding of that.

For example, parts of the Midwest or the far west people think are not as vulnerable. In fact, if you look at the intelligence, New York City gets mentioned over and over and over again. But in almost none of the discussion we are having in Homeland Security is there any discussion of the money going for anything except the terrorist risks.

Now, maybe there is a separate pot of money, but it says to me you may be in a flood area where there are no nuclear facilities or where you may be land locked. And we know how al-Qaeda works. It wants to do maximum damage somewhere. But you may indeed be in some kind of floodplain. And when we are distributing money, we will take into account that risk along with the risk of a terrorist event. Is that the way it is going to happen?

Mr. Gruber. Ma'am, you have pointed out the problem and you have also talked about the solution. Yes, you were right in the fact that there are different components of funding that go out to the community; the Fire Act Grant, emergency management grants that are distributed to help communities address problems that are not particularly related to terrorism but that we can get dual use out of for both those kind of risks.

Ms. Norton. So people should understand that is coming out of a different pot.

Mr. Gruber. Well, it is all integrated now in this one-stop shop in the provision of the grant funding.

Ms. Norton. Yes, but it is a different—that is a much more complicated thing to do, frankly. We thought it was complicated enough to try to do a risk assessment for terrorism, now when you put into the equation that the assessment must, and we certainly on this subcommittee believe it certainly must include these natural hazards, all I can say is I do not envy you, but I do not think that is well understood. And I think it should be better understood and people would not be so afraid they are not going to get any money because they are not in New York City and they are not in Washington, D.C.

Mr. Gruber. May I just mention, Ma'am? You pointed out a very good point, and I only alluded to it in the statement. We have, I think, a very comprehensive communications and outreach program to help. If we are not communicating that message, and to do a better job, we have three regional conferences that we will be conducting.

Ms. Norton. Mr. Gruber, I think the problem is with the Congress. It is not the first responders who are saying I am not going to get any money. I am hearing it from my colleagues sitting on my committees and in the Senate, who keep pointing out that there could—I mean, I heard a Member talk about a shopping mall, a Senator talk about a shopping mall, their biggest shopping mall. Hey, the last time I heard, the shopping mall ought to take care of the shopping mall and terrorist events at the shopping mall. I do not think that is the business of the United States Government.
You see how out of hand the thinking on this is? If he were to focus, though, on natural disasters there, I think he would have a better chance.

Let me ask why mitigation against hazards, other than terrorism is not included in the NPS? Everybody talks about prevention and nobody does anything about it?

Mr. GRUBER. Again, ma’am, it may not be spelled out in the specificity that we need, and we can make those corrections as we improve these documents, but in fact, it is a component of some of our grant programs. There are other programs that are being developed that will address mitigation and prevention from the perspective of mitigation for building codes and fire hazards, but also prevention in terms of buffer zone protection for particular facilities, chemical facilities and others.

So that is a component of the grant offerings, and you have made a good point. If we haven’t spelled it out adequately in our current version of the Goal, then we need to correct that by the time we publish the final Goal.

Ms. NORTON. I wish you would take another look at that.

Mr. GRUBER. Yes, ma’am.

Ms. NORTON. Could I ask you to take another look at something else? And here I put on my legal hat.

I want to commend the President for the action he took under executive order, but I am very, very concerned, given the fact that we have a Federal republic and a separation of powers, that we could have a national emergency, and if we are working only under this executive order and presidential directives, I am wondering if you can assure us that Federal emergency response authorities, like yourself, would have the authority to legally require local authorities to take certain kinds of actions.

Now, you may be the prototype for what to do, because we have had hazards all along, but there have been so many of these presidential directives, I wonder if your counsel has looked closely at that issue so that we will not have somebody saying I do not think the national government has the authority to do this or that.

Mr. GRUBER. I would have to defer to Mr. Jamieson to answer that.

Mr. JAMIESON. Congresswoman, I can assure you, and the whole National Response Plan is, as is the National Incident Management System, built on the notion that we are going to respond and we are going to find the lowest level of governance that we can find, the incident commander. All of the resources that would be coming down, all of the support that would be available through the National Response Plan are there to support the incident commander. There is absolutely no intent in any of our plans, even the catastrophic supplement to the National Response Plan, to erode the prerogatives of State and local government.

Ms. NORTON. I am talking about something like an incident of national significance. We haven’t had anything like that until after 9/11. All I am asking is, have lawyers scrubbed that so that somebody says, oh, my God, here is the Federal Government telling somebody at the State and local they must do that, but local statutes say this? That could get real complicated, by simply declaring the President may do this.
Again, here is this committee ready to do what is necessary, but one wonders whether or not you would meet some Federal problem.

Mr. JAMIESON. Let me talk about the issue.

Ms. NORTON. I am not talking about resources now. I am talking about whether or not anyone has looked at this incidence of national significance, which could be a hazard of a kind we have had for some time and covering large sections of the country, or it could be a terrorist event.

Mr. JAMIESON. The incident of national significance is described in the National Response Plan and in Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5, there are five conditions that the President has delegated to the Secretary of the Department. But the incident of national significance is putting in motion the coordination mechanisms of the National Response Plan. It does not, for instance, trigger the Stafford Act in and of itself.

There are conditions, as you know, for the natural disaster portion of this where we have to get a request coming up from local government, from the State and the governor asking for disaster assistance. So the incidence of national significance finding, what it is doing is putting in motion the coordination mechanisms to make sure that all the moving parts are now coordinated and understood.

It is allowing us to set up a joint field office. It is allowing us to put in motion the authorities of the other Federal departments and agencies. But it is not, it is not a trigger, in and of itself, for any of that Federal assistance. It is just putting the Federal Government in a forward mobilized posture so that we can respond when these requests, when this situation assessment comes up from the incident commander.

Ms. NORTON. Thank you very much.

Mr. Chairman, I know you want to go on now. I just wanted to let you know, Mr. Chairman, when there was that incident at the Pentagon Postal Service, I would have to ask you to have your counsel look at it, because we have Virginia coming back and saying only the Department of Health of Virginia could do certain things, like order that—what is the medicine that is given, Cipro be given. And all we have to do is substitute a natural disaster for that and you can see what I mean.

I did not have any indication that there was something that we had in hand at the Federal level that we could do. As you know, there was no proper coordination there at all. Thank you very much.

Mr. SHUSTER. This Stafford Act, the States and localities have to be overwhelmed before the Federal role comes in. Did the Federal Government step in to that incident at the Pentagon?

Ms. NORTON. No, but the coordination that Mr. Jamieson is talking about did not occur as he said should occur. Because he is saying it is just a coordination mechanism. If so, and if that was a test, it certainly did not work.

Mr. JAMIESON. Obviously, there are ongoing reviews for that situation at the State and also at the Federal level, but I am quite comfortable characterizing it. I think the communication there was not as good as it could have been, and we need a better commu-
nication to the State and local authorities in terms of what the situation was and what the appropriate response was.

Mr. Shuster. Who makes the decision to activate the NRP, National Response Plan?

Mr. Jamieson. If there is a disaster declaration that is coming in, a disaster declaration, in and of itself, would constitute an incident of national significance. But if another Federal agency, EPA, who may be dealing with a hazardous material spill is out there, and they are saying it is escalating, this event is going, another Federal agency can go to the Secretary of the Department and ask for assistance, which would connote an incident of national significance.

So any of those four circumstances that are spelled out, and I do have those and I can provide those for the record, Mr. Chairman, as opposed to going through them here. But the important point that I want to emphasize is that that designation itself of an incident of national significance is not serving as a trigger for any of the other authorities that the Federal agencies have. There are conditions and criteria that need to be met under Stafford, there are conditions under the national contingency plan, there are conditions of the Bureau in terms of threats that they have to deal with.

So what they are doing, as signatories to the National Response Plan, they are saying they are going to bring their authorities, but they are going to organize themselves within the construct of this National Response Plan. So it is a far more coherent and coordinated effort than it has been.

Mr. Shuster. If something would occur here on Capitol Hill, that becomes a tricky problem because now turning the authority over to the executive branch, under the Constitution there is a separation there. How would something like that work; like the anthrax scare we had here?

Mr. Jamieson. Well, there are constitutional issues there, and I will try not to speak to them, but on a very practical standpoint if there was a suspicious person who had a baggage that looked like it was a bomb or whatever it might be, local law enforcement and the Capitol Hill police are going to respond to that. What they are also going to do is contact the Bureau in the Strategic Information Operations Center. And there is going to be no hesitation whatsoever in terms of the Bureau coming in there and determining what the situation is.

There then, automatically, the Bureau’s operation center is notifying the Department of Homeland Security. And if that situation escalates, then an incidence of national significance can be declared. We will go out and merge with the joint operations center that the Bureau establishes. But at the same time, if it turns into nothing; that there is nothing in the suitcase, it is just a suspicious character, then there would obviously not be that designation.

But I think the key point is that that designation of an incident of national significance, nobody is waiting for that. We are forward marching out there in terms of the Bureau’s deployment, the Capitol Police’s deployment to investigate the case and the situation that they have. If it does escalate, what we are saying by the National Response Plan, is we are putting together a common mecha-
nism so that the Bureau, the Department, EPA, if necessary, HHS, if they are required, we are going to come together and fight as one team. That is what the National Response Plan does. It provides that coordination structure.

Mr. GRUBER. Mr. Chairman, could I just add that we would be remiss if we did not mention that just a week ago we completed the TOPOFF for top officials, exercise, the third exercise of its kind that we had done. One of the most important objectives of that exercise was, in fact, to put the National Response Plan into action, to be able to test it. We did that with the State of New Jersey and the State of Connecticut.

So we are confident that we will have many lessons that get to Congresswoman Norton’s points about the relationship with the States and local jurisdictions that will help us better understand how to apply these protocols.

Mr. JAMIESON. If I may, Mr. Chairman, to that point, one of the areas that was really discovered during the exercise itself, and creatively so, was why was there not a declaration in one of these instances. Well, quite frankly, the answer to that question is that there was not a request from the State and local government for a declaration under the Stafford Act.

So we are always going to be deferring to the State and local interests to make sure we are not unilaterally riding over their capabilities and that they need us.

Mr. SHUSTER. I think that is very important that you are paying attention to their situation and their thoughts.

I want to now recognize Mr. Dent.

Mr. DENT. Mr. Chairman, I think you started to answer this, but I will ask the question anyway. I attended that TOPOFF exercise up in New Brunswick at the Robert Wood Johnson Hospital, and for the seemingly biological attack on North Central Jersey. And as I understood it, the Stafford Act, it was not possible to implement the Stafford Act because of that incident, the TOPOFF; is that correct?

Mr. JAMIESON. No, it is not a correct characterization of that. We have authority under the Stafford Act to declare—

Mr. DENT. A major disaster declaration.

Mr. JAMIESON. A major disaster declaration is a different issue. There is not provision for a major disaster declaration within the Stafford Act. But there is provision in the Stafford Act for an emergency declaration that can be made that would permit us to do anything we need to do to save lives and protect property. The authority, however, on that biological event is that that clearly is an HHS lead on that, so it would be HHS using their authority to respond to that particular incident.

Mr. DENT. So the answer then is, you could not, under the Stafford Act, declare that incident a major disaster declaration?

Mr. JAMIESON. We could not have declared it a major disaster declaration without a request coming up from the governor. Then, if there were collateral issues associated with that, in other words you do not want the Department going in under Stafford on a biological event when it is clearly an HHS lead. But if there were collateral issues coming up associated with that, a need for temporary
housing assistance or what have you, we could do what we needed to do under our emergency authorities of Stafford.

Mr. DENT. Okay. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SHUSTER. Ms. Norton?

Ms. NORTON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Just one more question.

Mr. Gruber, in your testimony, you spoke of the many partners with whom you were working, State, local, tribal, private sector, and nongovernmental. I really have a question about that.

It occurs to me that private industry has a huge incentive on its own to move probably well in advance of some of us. They, for example, are in touch, have long been in touch with their counterparts in Europe and in the Mid East and in South America. It occurs to me they know a lot more about some of this than any of us in the Federal Government and that they may be some distance ahead of us, at least in some valuable respects.

I wonder whether these standards and tasks, capabilities that you are in the process of developing are consistent with existing industry standards, such as the Emergency Management Accreditation Program. I note, for example, that my own city is one of only four jurisdictions that have this EMAC certification, yet this comes out of private industry.

Can we do better than that, or are we trying to meet that standard?

Mr. GRUBER. Ma'am, that is an excellent question, and MFPA 1600 or Emergency Management Accreditation Association is an excellent model. Former Secretary Ridge was a great proponent of EMAP, as is Secretary Chertoff.

We have been talking to EMAP program staff. Just yesterday, Gil and I were at the rollout for the NIMS/NRP talking with Tom Lockwood about a collaboration to look at that, because it is a great model for us to use. We certainly don't want to reinvent something when we have a proven standard that has been well tested and validated. Of course, we will look and adopt where we have a great standard to use. We want to capitalize on that.

Ms. NORTON. I certainly want to encourage consistency between what I understand to be very highly regarded industry standards and Federal Government standards, and I hope you read off of their playbook, because I know people who answer to stockholders and have their own private resources at stake have had an incentive that perhaps none of us have had. I would hate to see us going and inventing our own wheel, except insofar as we are tailoring what we do to the special circumstances of the public sector.

Mr. GRUBER. Ma'am, if I might add, I am sure you will hear a lot more about TOPOFF in the future, but our recent experience with TOPOFF3, if my numbers serve me right, that we had about 156 corporations or businesses that participated in TOPOFF3. This was unprecedented.

One of the things we learned from that was exactly the point you made, that in terms of agility and speed of decisionmaking, there are plenty of lessons we could learn from those participants. And we have businesses that were playing from the corporate level. Their CEOs were participating during the course of that week. So,
I am confident, as we go through all the data from the exercise, that there will be some great lessons for us to adopt as well.

Ms. NORTON. Thank you very much.

Before I came to Congress, I served on the board of three Fortune 500 companies, and I do not for a moment think that they were not prepared, they were worldwide, to deal with whatever they had to deal with. So I urge us to look closely at what industry has done.

Thank you very much.

Mr. SHUSTER. Mr. Dent.

Mr. DENT. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.

I serve on the Homeland Security Committee, and I just left a few hearings today dealing with H.R. 1544, the Smarter Funding For First Responders Act, which tends to allocate our first responder dollars out on a risk assessment or vulnerability basis as opposed to a greater minimum or straight population criteria.

Could you just give me your thoughts and perspectives on that legislation? Is that compatible or dovetail with what you are advocating here today?

Mr. GRUBER. Well, obviously there are great discussions underway, sir. It would probably be inappropriate for me to comment on that because I know there is still a dialogue underway. But you raise a great point, and that is the Secretary, of course, has affirmed every time he has testified to that.

We have to look at that, as he calls it, a strategic mix of threat, vulnerability and consequence, as the best means to ensure that we allocate our resources and make the most cost-effective investments with our homeland security dollars, and get the most payoff, the most leverage from those in terms of whether it is terrorist events or natural hazards.

So we are committed. Again, we are not—what we are talking about with HSPD-8 is not a funding formula, it is really a way to help decisionmakers make smarter and more informed decisions about their capability investments.

Mr. DENT. Finally, I know I mentioned TOPOFF a few moments ago. I apologize for not being here to hear your opening testimony. Were you actively involved in TOPOFF exercises in Connecticut or New Jersey?

Mr. GRUBER. Both of us were.

Mr. DENT. You were on site?

Mr. GRUBER. No, sir, I was in the master control center here in Washington.

Mr. DENT. Okay. You were both down here in Washington for that exercise?

Mr. JAMIESON. Yes. I was here in Washington also and actively involved in the advanced distance learning exercises that led up to that for both NRP and the NIMS.

Mr. DENT. Are you permitted to comment on what your thoughts and perspectives were on how that exercise has gone? I know there will be a lot of review and analysis of what occurred, but can you give us any preliminary indication of how you felt that exercise went?

Mr. GRUBER. I think he will talk about the plan. I can just give you some background on the overall exercise.
Mr. JAMIESON. Yes, the exercise did do the National Response Plan. I think it is important that when we comment here, these exercises are important to tell us what we don't know, what is working well and what is not working well.

What did come out of that is the fact that the National Response Plan stood tall. It worked. The coordination mechanisms that were there, the fundamental underpinnings of the National Response Plan worked very well. Are there issues that need to be worked on to improve communication awareness in terms of these core national structures and how they work better, what the connection points are to State and local governments? Absolutely. But from a systemic standpoint, and from the concept of operations of the National Response Plan, it worked very well.

Mr. DENT. Just my own comment to you, just as an observer, it seemed like the real success of that whole operation was not what occurred during those few days of the actual exercise, but all the planning that led up to it.

Mr. JAMIESON. Yes, I agree.

Mr. DENT. That hopefully you would find out from those 3 or 4 days that here is your plan, and then you can just kind of look back on the process, what you could do better. But I think the success was just going through the exercise, all the steps that were required. I was impressed by all the numbers of people—just at the hospital—I only saw one little piece of the puzzle and, I was just impressed by the level of detail, professionalism of all the people involved and how well orchestrated and planned this was. Just the number of people involved was just overwhelming in the private sector, the hospitals and from the various departments.

Mr. JAMIESON. I appreciate those remarks.

Mr. GRUBER. I might just add in terms of context—and, again, these are preliminary numbers because, as you can well imagine, we had literally hundreds of data collectors out there at every part in this exercise. So we are talking about file cabinets full of information that we got. But our preliminary numbers, we are looking at somewhere in the neighborhood of 23,000 people that participated in this exercise. That doesn't include the people we reached through our collaborative Web tools and the distance learning that Gil talked about.

Mr. DENT. It is very impressive. Thank you.

Mr. SHUSTER. I have one more question. The Homeland Security Presidential Directive-8 specifically excludes broader law enforcement efforts to prevent terrorism. But in the NIMS, the national preparedness goal, the target capabilities list and universal task list include activities such as heightened inspection, improved surveillance and security operations, deterrence operations, activities that seem to fall squarely within that exclusion category.

How do you sum that up? How do you justify that?

Mr. JAMIESON. I can do that, sir. HSPD-8 obviously talks about that in the context of some portions of that that are exclusively the domain of other departments and agencies. So the whole process of development. For example, we formed the senior steering committee to help guide us through the course of this implementation of HSPD-8.
The Department of Justice was a member of the senior steering committee. We are working with the Department of Justice, the Bureau, other elements of the Intelligence Community, all—what we have to do is make sure that the capabilities we are developing support their mission requirements as well and support what State and local officials have told us are very high and urgent needs that they have in terms of information-sharing and collaboration in the intelligence arena as well.

So while we fully understand what the directive told us to do, and we are staying in our lane, we also understand we have an obligation to support our partners.

Mr. Shuster. Thank you.

Before you leave, I would just like to say I think you are on the right track. I think you have done a good job. I know the timetable is very tight. I am especially impressed with NIMS and the NRP. But I think that there is more work to be done on the national preparedness goal, especially, I think, it needs to be comprehensive. At this point I don’t believe it is comprehensive. We would like to—I would like to and this committee would like to help you move forward on that. I think, as I said, you are moving in the right direction.

Again, thank you very much for being here, and you are excused.

Mr. Gruber. Thank you, sir.

Mr. Jamieson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Shuster. We are going to have to go into a recess here. That second panel can—well, you can take your seats or just relax. We are going to have to go vote. It is going to probably be about 25 minutes to half an hour we will be on the floor. I apologize for that. I guess that is the hazards of having to vote and pass laws. So we will be back at around 3:30, my good guess. Thank you.

[Recess.]

Mr. Shuster. I will call the meeting back to order. I was off by about 15 minutes. I am sorry about that.

I will welcome the second panel today, which is comprised of a number of State and local officials as well as representatives from the NGO sector, each of whom individually on behalf of their respective organizations has significant responsibilities during disasters of all types.

Joining us today are Mr. David Liebersbach. How is that?

Mr. Liebersbach. Great.

Mr. Shuster. President of the National Emergency Management Association, as well as being the director of the State of Alaska’s Division of Homeland Security and Emergency Management; Chief John Buckman, representing the International Association of Fire Chiefs, as well as being the fire chief of German Township, Indiana; Captain John Salle—

Mr. Salle. Salle, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Shuster. Pronounce it again.

Mr. Salle. Salle.

Mr. Shuster. Thank you—representing the International Association of Chiefs of Police; Mr. Armond—

Mr. Mascelli. Mascelli.

Mr. Shuster. My Italian is not very good—Mascelli, vice president of emergency response for the American Red Cross; Mr.
Dewayne West, who is here wearing several hats as vice chairman of the Emergency Management Accreditation Program, president of the International Association of Emergency Managers, and as the director of emergency management for Johnston County, North Carolina.

Welcome to you all.

Since your written testimony has been made part of the record, the subcommittee would request that all witnesses limit their oral testimony to 5 minutes, and there will be time for questions after the witnesses have offered their prepared remarks.

We are going to start with Mr. West, because I understand you have a flight to catch.

So go ahead, Mr. West.

TESTIMONY OF DEWAYNE WEST, VICE CHAIRMAN, EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT ACCREDITATION PROGRAM COMMISSION, PRESIDENT, INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF EMERGENCY MANAGERS, DIRECTOR OF EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT, JOHNSON COUNTY, NORTH CAROLINA; DAVID E. LIEBERSBACH, PRESIDENT, NATIONAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATION, DIRECTOR, DIVISION OF HOME- LAND SECURITY AND EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT, STATE OF ALASKA; CHIEF JOHN BUCKMAN, PAST PRESIDENT, INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF FIRE CHIEFS, FIRE CHIEF, GERMAN TOWNSHIP, INDIANA; CAPTAIN JOHN P. SALLE, INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF CHIEFS OF POLICE; AND ARMOND MASCELLI, VICE PRESIDENT OF EMERGENCY RESPONSE, AMERICAN RED CROSS

Mr. WEST. Thank you, Chairman Shuster.

I appreciate the opportunity to speak to you this afternoon and to talk about some recent Federal preparedness initiatives. I am Dewayne West, vice chairperson of the Emergency Management Accreditation Program Commission, commonly known as EMAP, and director of Johnston County's emergency management program, and have currently had the pleasure of serving as president for the international association. But today I am wearing the EMAP Commission hat, which is the governing board of the only national assessment and accreditation process for local and State emergency management.

EMAP is a nonprofit accrediting body dedicated to the improvement and excellence in public sector emergency management. On behalf of the EMAP Commission, thank you for the opportunity to be part of the committee's examination of the work done to date on HSPD-5 and HSPD-8.

We recognize that significant work has been accomplished in these areas. The National Response Plan, while still being implemented, is a step in the right direction to strengthen coordination of response activities across Federal agencies.

With the potential to improve Federal response and assistance, the National Incident Management System, or NIMS, is a positive step as well to address the need for a more consistent approach to incident management. While many State and local governments already use an incident management system, EMAP assessments
have confirmed the need for greater consistency in the use of and terminology within incident management.

We note, however, that there appears to be gaps in the coordination across HSPD-5 and 8 projects, the question being how core concepts of one document work with the features of the other.

Because assessment, benchmarking, and continuous improvement in comprehensive preparedness and emergency management are EMAP's focus and mission, my comments today will be largely directed towards HSPD-8 implementation activities.

EMAP, the Emergency Management Accreditation Program, started as a concept in the late 1990s when State and local emergency managers, with support from their Federal partners, identified the need for national standards and a consistent assessment methodology for State and local government emergency management.

EMAP assesses a jurisdiction's system for dealing with natural and human-caused disasters and has conducted baseline assessments using its national standards in 35 States and territories. In my comments today, I will touch on a couple of areas related to the National Preparedness Goal and Target Capabilities List, or TCL, and our concerns about potential impacts of this initiative as it is currently outlined.

First and perhaps most directly, if the expectation is that HSPD-8 materials, the Target Capabilities List, National Preparedness Goal and planning scenarios, will provide a comprehensive assessment of preparedness, we would simply say, no, that objective or expectation has not yet been achieved.

Next I encourage you to seek ways to ensure that proposed solutions support progress in balance with the burden that they impose on your constituents at the local and State level.

There are several points at which we are concerned that HSPD-8 implementation activities assume a start-from-scratch approach to preparedness. There are multitudes of State and local plans, procedures and programs throughout the Nation, and as we have communicated to colleagues at DHS, an attempt to recreate all of them would not be a wise or effective use of time and resources.

For our communities and States and, therefore, the Nation, to be prepared for a terrorist attack, the foundation for preparedness must be strengthened rather than distracted. A strong foundation that includes hazard identification and a multidisciplinary, multiagency approach to resource management, planning, communications, training, exercising and public education must be supported and strengthened to ensure preparedness. This foundation is vital, whether the community experiences spring flooding or a radiological dispersal device. It is these foundation capabilities that are evaluated through the EMAP standards and process.

The fact that the Federal Government has created a large Department of Homeland Security may foster somewhat of a misconception that I am sure you are aware of from your work with State and local leaders. While there are departments and individuals at the State and local levels who handle prevention, preparedness, response and recovery functions, and there may even be a few new offices or positions labeled "homeland security," there is no substantial new bureaucracy available to handle the increased
workload and requirements of evolving and demanding Federal homeland security initiatives. These are by and large the same people and the same offices, retasked or multitasked, as those responsible for emergency management, law enforcement, public safety or emergency response.

We ask that this reality be understood and that you seek to improve preparedness in ways that build on existing capabilities, filling gaps and strengthening systems rather than reinventing the wheel. We are concerned that promulgation of HSPD-8 compliance requirements will occur before the potential for duplication and dilution of existing State and local practices and plans have been considered.

We suggest that our Federal agency partners focus first on the seven national priorities outlined in the National Preparedness Goal, and encourage State and local governments to evaluate capabilities in these areas of urgent need using the Target Capabilities List as a tool. Then we need to make sure that both the capabilities in these areas are coordinated and dovetailed with existing plans and systems. On this key issue, we hope DHS understands that it does not need to create an entirely new preparedness assessment methodology, but it can and should do what makes sense, and that is to build upon existing standards and assessment processes such as EMAP, using State and local governments throughout the country.

Again, thank you for the opportunity to talk with you for your help in building stronger and more sustainable preparedness capabilities.

Mr. SHUSTER. Thank you, Mr. West. Feel free any time you have to excuse yourself, go ahead. We appreciate your being here. Sorry we didn’t get this started earlier.

Next, Mr. Liebersbach, you may go ahead and proceed.

Mr. LIEBERSBACH. Thank you, Chairman Shuster, for allowing me the opportunity to testify before your committee.

I am Dave Liebersbach, director of the Alaska Homeland Security Emergency Management, but today I am here as president of NEMA, whose members are the directors of emergency management for the 58 States and territories and the District of Columbia.

I have three issues that I bring before you today to discuss regarding the state of our Nation’s preparedness: organization of the preparedness system; development of the National Response Plan or requirements for State and local governments; and development of the Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8 on preparedness and our concerns for the timelines and requirements.

On our Nation’s preparedness system, last year DHS proposed creation of a one-stop shop for homeland security funding, which led to some preparedness grants to be moved to the newly created Office of State and Local Coordination and Preparedness. Some preparedness functions were also moved out of FEMA.

While many of these changes have improved some of the Nation’s preparedness functions, changes that separate preparedness functions once in FEMA from FEMA’s response and recovery function will complicate and compromise our Nation’s ability to respond to and recover from disasters.
Preparedness means personnel, planning, training and exercise for all aspects of a disaster. Preparedness functions cannot be isolated from response and recovery because they are linked together. As Congress and DHS review the organization and functions of the Department, we ask that preparedness not be separated from emergency response and recovery functions.

Additionally, as the fiscal year 2005 funding has been proposed, NEMA has been working alongside the Office of State and Local Coordination and Preparedness to ensure that the all-hazards intent of the Emergency Management Performance Grant Program, the EMPG, is not changed with the creation of the one-stop shop. EMPG is the only all-hazard source of Federal funding for State and local emergency management capacity building.

Integrating the EMPG funding into the homeland security grant program has resulted in a bureaucratic grant system where none existed previously. Only half of the Nation’s emergency managers serve as the State administrative agency, which receives all the homeland security grants for disbursement. This has caused significant delays and financial hardship for State and local emergency management agencies. NEMA hopes to work in partnership with Congress and DHS to resolve these issues in the coming year to ensure swifter grant awards in fiscal year 2006. Specifically, we ask Congress to decouple EMPG funds from the homeland security grant program.

National Response Plan. NEMA supports the National Repose Plan released by DHS as the comprehensive all-hazards tool for domestic incident management across the spectrum of prevention, preparedness, response and recovery.

The NRP comes as a result of Federal, State and local government partnership. NEMA was actively involved in the State and local working group that reviewed drafts of the NRP and proposed changes as the NRP was developed by the Department.

The process used for developing the NRP initially was not an easy road. State and local governments had no input into the early version of the NRP, which led to significant outcry from the emergency preparedness community when the draft was released. NEMA commends DHS for listening to the concerns we have with the initial process and then adapting the process in progress. NEMA calls on Congress to ensure that DHS continues to maintain consultation with stakeholders as they develop critical national policy and implementation strategies.

A key component of the NRP requires State and local governments to update their emergency response plans to reflect the new National Response Plan. However, no dedicated Federal funding is provided to update these plans. At a time when all resources are taxed to meet the new threat environments, State and local governments are forced to utilize current funding streams to address additional new mandates.

On HSPD-8, another critical component to improving the Nation’s preparedness was the release of the Homeland Security Presidential Directive-8 on national preparedness. NEMA supports efforts to develop national preparedness goals and accompanying standards that help the Nation to work towards common levels of preparedness.
HSPD-8 is another process where NEMA is assisting with input in developing the system, yet we continue to have concerns regarding the process and the final product. The opportunity to impact real change is limited due to the rigid timelines required of DHS. Increased State and local government involvement in the national preparedness guidance, metrics on performance, adoption of the goal, and implementation, must be a critical component of the Federal Government’s objective with HSPD-8 if the process is to avoid a situation similar to what initially occurred at the time of the NRP.

There are five other areas regarding HSPD-8 that must be addressed as the National Preparedness Goal moves forward. One, only 3 of the 15 national planning scenarios are not terrorist attacks. Changing the focus of preparedness to weigh heavily on terrorism could hamper the ability of State and local governments to respond to the wider range of all hazardous events which have a higher likelihood of occurrence.

Two, development of HSPD-8 and the guidance for implementing the new National Preparedness Goal must take into account existing standards programs such as the EMAP.

Three, timelines for implementation of HSPD-8 are very tight and must be seriously considered, reconsidered for not only practical application, but also for buy-in for the personnel and stakeholders who will be required to implement the goal.

State and local governments will be required to conduct comprehensive assessments and update their statewide homeland strategies by the end of the current year in order to be available for fiscal year 2005 Federal preparedness assistance funds. That is a mere 6 months to accomplish these major tasks.

Four, baseline funding for emergency management capability or capacity building to ensure national preparedness against all hazards must be maintained.

Finally, five, mutual aid must be considered a critical component of State and local preparedness, as evidenced by last year’s hurricanes. The Emergency Management Assistance Compact enabled 38 States to provide assistance in the form of more than $15 million in human, military and equipment assets to over—and over 800 personnel to support the impacted States for over 85 days of continuous response operations.

In conclusion, as we continue to build national preparedness efforts through the Department of Homeland Security, we must not forget about the need for a balanced all-hazards approach.

Thank you for the opportunity to testify on behalf of NEMA.

Mr. Shuster. Thank you.

Chief Buckman, go ahead and proceed.

Chief Buckman. Chairman Shuster, I am John Buckman, Chief of the German Township Volunteer Fire Department in Evansville, Indiana. I appear today on behalf of the International Association of Fire Chiefs in my role as a past president of that organization. I am also a member of the State, Tribal and Local Working Group for the Department of Homeland Security that since August of 2003 has been involved in reviewing the development of the new national preparedness system.
On December 17, 2003, the President issued HSPD-8, which purpose is to strengthen the preparedness of the United States by creating a national all-hazards preparedness goal for facilitating cooperation among all levels of government.

The IAFC is generally supportive of the national preparedness system that has at its core a new partnership between all levels of government, including the private sector. I represent the IAFC in the development of the NF process and would like to commend the DHS staff for their diligent work to address the concerns of first responders. This system represents a new philosophy on the part of Federal, State, tribal and local governments and the private sector, with roles and responsibilities clearly defined for each. All of these stakeholders must embrace their new roles and responsibilities in order to make this system truly effective.

The IAFC strongly supports a number of specific priorities in the Interim National Preparedness Goal, including strengthening interoperable communications capabilities. The lack of interoperable communications is one of the greatest threats to our public safety. At both Oklahoma City and the Pentagon, incident commanders had to use human runners to communicate with each other. The 9/11 Commission report details how the lack of interoperability communications proved fatal for 343 firefighters in the World Trade Center towers.

I would urge the members of this committee to support legislation to set a certain date for clearing the 700 megahertz spectrum for public safety use.

We also support the implementation of NIMS and the National Response Plan and expanding regional collaboration. The NIMS is a multidisciplinary document that provides direction, organization and control to any agency responding to a disaster, not just police and fire.

The NIMS/NRP provide a badly-needed template for Federal, State, local and tribal government to coordinate their response to a disaster. By using the NIMS and NRP, local jurisdictions can work together to develop regional mutual aid agreements.

We also support strengthening information-sharing between the Federal, State and local governments. DHS should develop a system to communicate instantly with the fire chief in times of threat or increased risk to our community. The local fire department, the local fire chief must have better information to prepare for the threats that they face.

I would like to raise a few issues about the National Preparedness System for the committee’s consideration. One of the most critical aspects of the National Preparedness System is its focus on, or what may be a lack of focus on, an all-hazards response.

While the firefighters responded to acts of terror against the World Trade Center in 1993, Oklahoma City in 1995, the horrendous events of 9/11, 2001, we also responded to numerous major accidents and natural disasters each and every day in the intervening years. To be truly effective, the National Preparedness System must be designed to address the response by all agencies to these events.

Unfortunately, only 2 of the 15 National Planning Scenarios are for natural disasters, planning and funding for training and organi-
zational structure will be impacted by this limitation. Ideally these scenarios would include tornadoes, wildfires and flooding. Without the inclusion of all types of hazards, the National Preparedness System will be biased towards terrorism response and run the risk of being inadequate for dealing with more frequent natural disasters.

In addition, the National Preparedness Policy and guidance documents should be written so that they could be easily understood by the firefighter in the field.

The IAFC believes that fire chiefs and other senior fire officials should be appointed to positions within the Office of Homeland Security and in other key positions within the Department to ensure that the fire service continues to be involved in the development of the National Preparedness System. An example where the fire service is missing is at the Homeland Security Operating Center. We have a table of managers from a variety of organizations, but the fire service is not there. The fire service is one of the first responders to a disaster, and we are not sitting at the table where a Federal policy will be decided and implemented.

The IAFC would also encourage the Office of State and Local Government Coordination Preparedness to consult with the national—with the United States Fire Administration and other agencies. USFA will conduct most of the training of the fire service on NIMS and NRP, and it collects data that will play an important role in the National Preparedness System.

Mr. Chairman, the United States Fire Administrator Dave Paulison needs to be intimately involved. In 2002, we asked that the U.S. Fire Administrator be at the assistant secretary level. We have never accomplished that. But we believe that the Fire Administration and the needs of the fire service, because of the position of our Fire Administrator, are not always being adequately addressed.

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, thank you again for holding this hearing. The National Preparedness System is in its formative stage and will require congressional and public support to become a reality.

Thank you.

Mr. SHUSTER. Thank you, Chief.
Next up, Captain Salle.
Mr. SALLE. Salle.
Mr. SHUSTER. Salle, sorry.

Mr. SALLE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, members of the subcommittee. On behalf of the International Association of Chiefs of Police, I am pleased to join you here this afternoon to discuss the National Preparedness System and its application to the threats posed to our community, whether they are posed by terrorists or by natural hazards or major accidents.

As you may know, the IACP, with more than 20,000 members in over 100 countries, is the world’s oldest and largest association of law enforcement executives. Founded in 1893, the IACP has dedicated itself to the mission of advancing the law enforcement profession and aiding our members in their efforts to protect the citizens they serve.
Over the past 3 years, the IACP has worked very closely with a number of Federal agencies, including the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of Justice and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. This work has been done to ensure that the needs, capabilities and concerns of the Nation’s law enforcement agencies were taken into consideration as our Nation responded to the menace of terrorism.

For the past 32 years, I was privileged to serve as a member of the Oregon State Police. Upon my retirement in February of this year, I was the director of the Oregon State Police Office of Public Safety and Security. In addition to that function, I served as the deputy director for the Oregon Office of Homeland Security. In addition to those functions, I have the privilege to be a part of the Department of Homeland Security's State, Local and Tribal Working Group. Through this working group, the IACP has been intimately involved in the development of the NIMS, National Incident Management System, and the NRP and various components of Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8.

This group, this State, Local and Tribal Working Group, has been meeting on a consistent basis for the past 2 years. Its membership consists of a number of national organizations, and in the interest of time, it is in the written testimony, and I will refrain from listing all of those organizations.

But as you examine that roster, you can certainly tell that the working group encompassed a wide variety of public safety agencies. This ensured that our efforts were well balanced and represented the concerns of many disciplines.

As a result of this balance, the working group was able to incorporate the views of actual practitioners into the drafts of national policies that have been developed. In this fashion, we have worked closely with DHS to ensure that the policy documents they have produced are comprehensible, not being overly prescriptive in dictating a one-size-fits-all approach to State, local, public and tribal safety agencies.

Through my participation in this group, and in my experience with the Oregon State Police, I witnessed that the coordinated Federal policies implemented as a result of HSPD-5, 7 and 8 have indeed resulted in a significant increase in cross-discipline planning, training and exercising. In addition, noticeable progress has been made in equipping public agencies with interoperable communications equipment. It is important to note that these efforts on the Federal, State, tribal and local level, although somewhat focused on terrorism, are creating a level of preparedness that applies to any hazard.

Simply put, if first response agencies plan together, train on a common command and control structure, and jointly exercise those capabilities, the creation of a better, more unified response to any catastrophe or hazard is inevitable.

The next step in this critical process is combining the National Response Plan and the NIMS with a national credentialing and equipment typing protocol. In this way we can assure that Federal, State, tribal and local public safety agencies not only have the proper command and communications structure in place, but that all components will be properly trained and equipped.
For example, under this scenario, a SWAT team or a bomb squad could travel to the next city or region, assume the appropriate function within the existing incident command system, set to work in a terrorism situation or in any situation requiring the skills set that they bring. At the same time, because of national credential and equipment typing protocols, the incident commanders would know exactly what capabilities and assets this unit provides.

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, I believe that for the last 3 years, we have made significant progress at our efforts to integrate and coordinate the activities of tens of thousands of Federal, State, local and tribal public safety agencies that operate within the United States. But it is important to remember that we are far from finished. The policies that have been crafted to date are dynamic, living works that will improve over time with lessons learned and the establishment of best practices. The IACP firmly believes that the benefits to be gained through the establishment of common command and communications that will allow for a coordinated, collective response to disasters, whether natural or manmade, make these efforts extremely worthwhile.

Thank you.

Mr. Shuster. Thank you, Mr. Salle.

Next, Mr. Mascelli.

Mr. Mascelli. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your gracious invitation to testify at this hearing.

Mr. Shuster. Will you pull your microphone a little closer to you.

Mr. Mascelli. My name is Armond Mascelli, and I am vice president for domestic emergency response for the Red Cross. In the interest of time and priority attention, I will limit my remarks to the role of the Red Cross in prepared disaster response and some related concerns and recommendations, the National Incident Management System, the National Response Plan and the National Preparedness Goal.

Chartered by Congress in 1905, the Red Cross provides a unique community-based network to support all-hazard disaster preparedness and response throughout the United States and within your district on an everyday basis. As a key member of the first responder community with expertise in meeting human needs caused by disasters, the Red Cross is integrated into State and local government disaster planning, exercises and response efforts. While systems and strategies are important, the public is our client to whom we ultimately direct our services.

Mr. Chairman, this hearing is timely as the Red Cross has completed the TOPOFF 3 exercise. We have participated in all three TOPOFF exercises to date. While we remain concerned that the overall exercises have not yet addressed the long-term human needs of disaster victims, TOPOFF 3 did effectively test the critical role that the Red Cross plays in enhancing the Nation’s disaster preparedness and response capabilities under the National Response Plan.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to take a moment to elaborate on our work with the Department of Homeland Security and other Federal agencies during the development of the National Response Plan and the National Incident Management System, or NIMS.
As for NIMS, we believe it can be an effective tool for communicating, a consistent nationwide approach for governments at all levels, the private sector and nongovernmental organizations. NIMS has the potential to foster greater efficiency and effectiveness within the disaster community to prepare for and to respond to and recover from domestic incidents.

Building on Red Cross responsibilities under the old Federal Response Plan, we are actively engaged in policy decisions with the Department of Homeland Security throughout the development of the National Response Plan. A comprehensive list of our roles in the National Response Plan is respectfully submitted for the record. Specifically, the Red Cross serves as a primary agency for mass care, which involves a provision of food, emergency shelter, first aid, welfare or inquiry information and the bulk distribution of emergency relief items.

The Red Cross also serves as a support agency to the Department of Health and Human Services for public health and medical services. This involves providing blood, blood products in coordination with the American Association of Blood Banks, and also the provision of mental health and disaster health services.

We have also undertaken and expanded function under the National Response Plan with respect to public information to help disseminate accurate and timely information to those affected during an incident.

Under the National Response Plan’s Catastrophic Incident Annex, the Red Cross is responsible for providing mass care during an incident that results in extraordinary levels of mass casualties or severe population disruptions.

In short, we are partnering with the Department of Homeland Security to move beyond the day-to-day and annual natural disasters to address scenarios previously unimaginable.

To fully execute our responsibilities, the Red Cross developed the Mass Care Catastrophic Planning Initiative, which outlines a three-phased strategy to address individual community catastrophic disaster mass care planning, preparedness and capacity building. During phases 1 and 2, the Red Cross can help establish the necessary mass sheltering and feeding plans in the 30 largest United States Metropolitan Statistical Areas, which cover the 50 Urban Area Security Initiative cities designated by the Department of Homeland Security. In phase 3 we can initiate the necessary activities to enhance and sustain the systems and measures established during the first 2 years.

While we welcome the challenge of this important role, we remain concerned that unlike other signatories of the National Response Plan, the Red Cross is not included in any Federal budget request submitted to Congress. The Red Cross has the expertise, experience, and commitment and organizational structure to implement the Mass Care Catastrophic Planning Initiative, but it is not the responsibility of the charitable public to fund the responsibilities associated with the National Response Plan Catastrophic Annex the government requires and the American public will need.

We believe that an immediate investment by our Federal partners now will sharply reduce both the level of potential human suffering and the expenditure of significant government resources.
postincident. The Red Cross must have adequate levels of funding for catastrophic planning activities to fully execute our responsibilities under the National Response Plan.

We remain a willing partner and welcome the challenge of our expanded role in the National Response Plan. We will continue to work closely with the Department of Homeland Security as it conducts its 1-year review and implementation plan of the National Response Plan, and will continue to work closely with the Department of Homeland Security as it undertakes its National Response Plan 4-year review and reissuance cycle.

With respect to the National Preparedness Goal, we commend the work of the Department of Homeland Security as it creates effective public policy stemming from Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8, in particular the development of the standardized approach to preparedness that assesses needs and defines priorities.

Recognizing the experience of the Red Cross, our president and chief executive officer Marty Evans was named in November by the Department of Homeland Security to the Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8 Senior Steering Committee.

This past July the Red Cross, Department of Homeland Security, George Washington University, Homeland Security Policy Institute and the Council for Excellence in Government partnered to convene a symposium of recognized leaders in disaster preparedness, response and recovery. A copy of the symposium report for the subcommittee’s review is respectfully submitted for the record.

Undoubtedly enabling the public to know what to do in a disaster event will lessen the burden that the first response community and government at all levels will require. Limiting preparedness to operational capability, thereby excluding public preparedness, runs counter to the July 2002 National Strategy for Homeland Security, which affirms that homeland security is a shared national responsibility with the American people. Accordingly, we have strongly recommended during the development of the goal that public preparedness be thoroughly addressed. To our delight, the vision outlined in the Interim National Preparedness Goal now includes the general public as an active participant to achieve risk-based target levels of capabilities.

Additionally, the American Red Cross urged the inclusion of nongovernment organizations in the National Preparedness Goal as partners with government in developing homeland security capabilities. Nongovernment organizations are now repeatedly listed throughout the Interim National Preparedness Goal. Through our numerous memorandums of understandings, affiliations and other strategic partners, the American Red Cross looks forward to helping integrate and leverage the nongovernment organization community in implementation of the goal.

In conclusion, we value the close relationship and partnership with our government partners, and we appreciate your continued interest in these very important issues. Like the other panel members, I stand ready to answer any questions you may have.

Thank you.

Mr. SHUSTER. Thank you very much.
My first question is about the National Preparedness System as it is currently set up. I think I heard, and I read your testimony, there is a mixed bag in there, about the—is it adequately comprehensive to help prepare for all hazards? So I would like each of you to briefly—do you think it is comprehensive enough, and where does it fall short? Like I said, be brief, if you could, so that I could get an answer from each of you.

Mr. Liebersbach. Mr. Chairman, Dave Liebersbach.

I think that one place that it does fall short, as has been mentioned before, is there is no reference to mitigation. There is reference to prevention, which is a very terrorist-centric reference. The one place that it is applicable in natural disasters, of course, is wildfires, as we are familiar with Smokey the Bear and fire prevention. But there is no mitigation in the National Response Plan.

I think the second piece of the National Response Plan that I have some concern about, and a lot of us do, is that it is primarily a National Response Plan for Federal agencies, and not at this point truly a National Response Plan. I think it is working its way there, and we have made that point fairly strongly, and we are being heard better that the national capability is there. It has just not been completely integrated like it needs to be done. That is why we encourage both Congress and DHS to continue to have the Department include State and local stakeholders in the development and the revisions of this plan to make sure it does become truly a national plan.

Mr. Shuster. Thank you.

Chief Buckman.

Chief Buckman. I think he mentioned the mitigation aspect. That has been a significant debate within our State, Tribe and Local Working Group because mitigation seemed to be one of those words that we used to use, but now we don’t want to use. But we have missed a significant portion of providing protection for critical infrastructure, which is different than prevention activities. So I think that is probably the biggest thing that is missing.

Mr. Shuster. Mr. Salle.

Mr. Salle. Mr. Chairman, I think my best response to that is I, as I have testified, was as an Oregon State Police officer for—

Mr. Shuster. Can you talk into the mike a little more?

Mr. Salle. As an Oregon State Police officer a lot of years, the last 3 years I have a better idea of what my brothers in the emergency management business do and how they do it. I could go right down the row of disciplines that are involved in this arena.

As I testified, there is planning going on, exercising going on, joint training going on. The bottom line is, I think, as the question that is posed, as is currently set up, is it adequate? It is more adequate than it was. It will be more adequate in the future than it is today.

Thank you.

Mr. Shuster. Mr. Mascelli.

Mr. Mascelli. Yes, briefly, I can understand some of the emphasis on the terrorism, the WMD types of focus, basically new territory in many cases, and a lot of unknowns, and the sort—the need to sort that out—gets smarter on that.
I would hope that as that comes about, there is an evolution and there is a balance in terms of the right way. I am not sure what that balance is between the day-to-day natural events that we face and also the terrorism, the WMD events.

Mr. Shuster. That is of the things I am concerned about, is it comprehensive enough? I don’t believe it is at this point. I hope, as you have said and as Mr. Salle said, it gets better as we move on, because FEMA has been around for 25 or so years. They have responded to 13- to 1,500 natural disasters. Only four of them have been terrorism. I think, again, we have to focus on terrorists to a degree, but there are a lot of other things going on out there.

That brings me to the—did any of you participate officially or unofficially in the creation of the 15 planning scenarios? You can each answer that, starting with Mr. Liebersbach.

Mr. Liebersbach. Mr. Chairman, Dave Liebersbach.

I know we did not participate in the creation of those scenarios. We gave some pretty adamant input after they came out. I think when they first came out, there was only one that was aimed at natural hazards, and we did get an additional one put in, but we weren’t involved officially or unofficially.

Mr. Shuster. Your association was not involved at all?

Mr. Liebersbach. No.

Mr. Shuster. All right. Mr. Buckman.

Chief Buckman. Mr. Chairman, John Buckman.

I would basically second what Mr. Liebersbach said, that, no, the International Association of Fire Chiefs was not invited to participate.

It was pretty obvious to me, when I read the first draft, that it was written by people who had not been in the field. It was written by nonpractitioners, that is what I define them as; that they received an assignment and they wrote it, but they did not have any idea what reality was.

Mr. Shuster. Mr. Salle.

Mr. Salle. Mr. Chairman, International Association of Chiefs of Police did not participate in the drafting of those.

Mr. Mascelli. Yes, sir. We were provided copies of the scenarios and on several occasions iterations providing comments back on them.

Mr. Shuster. What do you think the mix should be on the 15 training centers? Should we have more, 20 scenarios and 5 more for natural disasters? Would anybody care to comment on that?

Chief Buckman. Well, Mr. Chairman—John Buckman. I am not sure that there is a number. But I think that we sometimes—we may be losing sight of the fact that all disasters begin and end locally, and that all disasters begin small and, depending on the size, quickly escalate to something that could be more than State or local, or could be local or regional, could be State or even Federal. And that is where we—I think that we have a potential for losing the funds to do the training, because we have spread it out over so many instead of narrowing it down to a fewer number.

Mr. Shuster. All right. Mr. Liebersbach.

Mr. Liebersbach. Mr. Chairman, Dave Liebersbach again.

I don’t know that I have a magic number for the number, but it needs to be better balanced.
Mr. SHUSTER. What natural disasters do you think we need to include in there?

Mr. LIEBERSBACH. Well, we haven’t addressed tornadoes. A big one that recurs annually and is the largest annualized loss for economics in this country is flooding, and nowhere in there we brought flooding in. Now, it doesn’t always have the dynamics of a hurricane, but in terms of annualized loss over 20-year, 10-year, 5-year periods, both in my State and across the United States, that is the largest costs to the American people.

Mr. SHUSTER. What do you think about Mr. Gruber’s statement that they have focused on terrorism because there has been so much training on these other areas? It doesn’t seem to be the way that you want to look at it.

Mr. LIEBERSBACH. My concern is there is a lot of focus on those other areas, the all-hazards. I think we have done a lot there.

My concern is we are not going to be able to maintain. I honestly believe—and I won’t say it is necessarily the association’s position, but it is Dave Liebersbach’s position that if the hurricane scenario of September 2004 that occurred in the Southeastern U.S., the first 5 years from now, we will fail the way we are going, because the success of that response of that hurricane season was based on the programs that had come before the legacy created in the all-hazards and the true work of all-hazards and what was left over.

As we are moving forward, that legacy is going to drop if we don’t pay attention to dealing with that. We were very close to the edge when these hurricanes were going on, and Mount St. Helens began to have a seismic swarm up there, and we have a 6.7-plus earthquake right in Southern California right in the middle of that. As it turns out, neither became problems, but that would have pushed the Federal system to its limits in terms of response, if not over.

Mr. SHUSTER. As the folks in DHS continue to tell us that they are listening, I know they have listened to State and local views.

Mr. SALLE. I can’t answer that across the spectrum. I can speak to the State, Local and Tribal Working Group that did a huge amount on NIMS and NRP over the last 2 years, and our answer was yes. Our input was solicited and listened to. Had it not been, we certainly would have some iteration of an NRP that doesn’t look like it looks today.

I think—

Chief BUCKMAN. Chief, from the International Association of Fire Chiefs, we would agree that they have listened, they have responded. We haven’t won everything we have asked for, but they have been reputable in giving us reasons why they would not and could not do what we asked.

Mr. MASCHELLI. I have to agree with that. Looking at the first draft of the preliminary response plan and then the successive drafts, you can now tell each draft that they were getting better at soliciting local input into—and there is a marked difference between the first and the final draft.

Mr. LIEBERSBACH. Mr. Chairman, Dave Liebersbach.

I will agree with my colleague in the NRP after the first draft came out, as my testimony said, they were responsive in listening
to us on that. I have concern—and we have concern that this is not happening with HSPD-8.

One of the reasons is the compressed timeline that DHS is being driven under. I think, needs to be looked at pretty hard to when we get our product. Well, it is better to be approximately right than precisely wrong, and we are moving fast, but we may be moving fast up the wrong ladder.

Mr. Shuster. How much more time do you think you need to adequately respond?

Mr. Liebersbach. I would have to get back to you on that, Mr. Chairman. I would have to talk to my membership, who has been more intimately involved in working with HSPD-8 representing NEMA. But the feedback I get back from them is that two things are happening. The compressed timeline is not allowing for an adequate look at all the needs that need to be looked at. Because they are in such a rush, they are not taking into account and have been unable to take into account what is already there to address this. We are beginning to duplicate and recreating the wheel in a lot of cases that is already out there.

Mr. Shuster. That is a concern, reinventing the wheel instead of taking what is already out there, existing standards, and incorporating them into the plan, system. Do you feel that they are trying to reinvent the wheel in many cases, or is that just something that happens just on a few things?

Mr. Liebersbach. Well, under HSPD-8, I think in many things they are that way, and I have read letters and gotten nice responses, but the effectiveness of what is really happening is changing—again comes to this compressed timeline. They are directed to get things to the President, the directive, so obviously they are driven to do that and have very little time to take into account, what we, on the ground, whether it is state and/or local, are trying to get back to them about the reality of what is needed out there on the front line.

Mr. Shuster. Can you get your association, your members to give us some specifics on what they think that they haven’t listened to or how they are trying to reinvent the wheel in certain cases?

Mr. Liebersbach. Yes, I think we can.

Mr. Shuster. I appreciate that.

Anybody else care to share the views of your association, where the members believe they are trying to reinvent the wheel or they are incorporating existing standards or programs into the system?

Mr. Salle. Again, Mr. Chairman, I can speak to my non-across-the-spectrum work that we have done with the DHS, but that was one of the issues that has been alluded to with the initial draft of the NRP, was that, you know, you are asking this country and every emergency manager out there to recreate their plan. So this will not work.

And, again, the response was, well, apparently you folks are right, so you tell us how to do it and provide input, and that is what we did. Beyond that, I am not aware of a situation on behalf of IACP.

Mr. Shuster. Chief, do you have any comments on that?

Mr. Buckman. No.
Mr. SHUSTER. That is straightforward enough. I know I do not have any other questions, and Ms. Norton did not make it back, unfortunately. I know she had some other business that she had to attend to.

Seeing there are no further questions, first I will ask unanimous consent for members to be permitted to submit their statements in the record.

Without objection, so ordered.

I would also like to thank again each of you for coming here today and spending your time. It has been very informative. These committee hearings are to educate us as we move forward and try to figure out what is really happening in the real world out there. A lot of times we are getting sometimes a different story. As I said to the folks that were here from Homeland Security, the Department of Homeland Security, I think they have done a good job. I know the time frame has been short, but I still think there needs to be some work done to improve it.

With that, I ask unanimous consent that the record of today’s hearing remain open until such time as all the witnesses have provided answers to any questions that may be submitted to them in writing; and unanimous consent that during such time as the record remains open that additional comments offered by individuals or groups may be included in the record of today’s hearing.

Without objection, so ordered.

Again, I want to thank you all very much for traveling here. Sorry we took so long today, but thanks again. Appreciate it. And the hearing is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 4:38 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
National Preparedness System: What Are We Planning For?

Statement of Chief John M. Buckman III
German Township Volunteer Fire Department

Presented to the


Of the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure

U.S. House of Representatives

April 14, 2005
Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee, I am John M. Buckman III, Chief of the German Township (IN) Fire Department. I appear today on behalf of the International Association of Fire Chiefs (IAFC), in my role as a past president of that organization. I am also a member of the State, Tribal and Local Working Group for the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) involved in reviewing the development of several of the documents that comprise the new national preparedness system.

The IAFC represents the leaders and managers of America’s fire and emergency service. America’s fire and emergency service reaches every community across the nation, protecting urban, suburban, and rural neighborhoods. Nearly 1.1 million men and women serve in more than 30,000 career, volunteer, and combination fire departments across the United States and respond to 22 million calls each year. The fire service is the only entity that is locally situated, staffed, and equipped to respond to all types of emergencies. Members of the fire service respond to natural disasters such as earthquakes, tornadoes, and floods as well as to man-made catastrophes, both accidental and deliberate, such as hazardous materials incidents and acts of terrorism. As such, America’s fire service is an all-risk, all-hazard response entity.

The National Preparedness System

On December 17, 2003, the president issued Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8 (HSPD-8) to strengthen the preparedness of the United States by creating a national domestic all-hazards preparedness goal for facilitating cooperation among all levels of government. This document represents the first time that the federal government has attempted to establish a truly comprehensive, all-hazards national preparedness system. These documents represent the start of a necessary change in attitude on the part of federal, state, tribal and local governments that require us to examine our ability to prepare for, prevent and respond to disasters across all spectrums.

The national preparedness system is composed of six basic documents. The first, the National Preparedness Goal (NPG), sets a national vision for the preparedness system and establishes readiness priorities, targets, and metrics. The second set of documents is the National Planning Scenarios, a set of fifteen plausible scenarios describing terrorist attacks and natural disasters, which identify a broad range of prevention and response requirements. The third document, the Universal Task List (UTL), is derived from the scenarios, and provides the specific tasks that federal and non-federal agencies may have to perform in an emergency. The Target Capabilities List (TCL) is the fourth document, which identifies 36 areas that federal, state, local, and tribal entities will be expected to develop and maintain. The fifth and sixth documents were developed at the direction of HSPD-5, which was signed on February 28, 2003. The National Response Plan (NRP) establishes an all-discipline, all-hazards, single, comprehensive framework for federal, state, tribal, and local entities to use in managing a response to a domestic incident. The final document, the National Incident Management System (NIMS), establishes standardized operating procedures, protocols, and processes that federal, state, tribal, and local responders will use to coordinate and conduct response actions. Of these documents, the NRP and NIMS have been released, as has the Interim National Preparedness Goal, executive summaries of the National Planning Scenarios, and drafts of the TCL and UTL.

The IAFC is generally supportive of the national preparedness system that has at its core a new partnership between all levels of government and the private sector. DHS solicited our participation in developing these documents. I have represented the IAFC in that process. I would like to commend the DHS staff for diligently working to address the concerns of first responders. I also would like to recognize my fellow members of the public safety community, who took the time to participate in this effort. It is extremely important that actual emergency response practitioners participate in this process in order to develop a workable national preparedness system that will ensure the safety of the American people.
General Comments upon the National Preparedness System.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to share some general thoughts with you about the national preparedness system before addressing specific concerns.

One of the most critical aspects of the national preparedness system is that it focuses on an all-hazards response approach. While the fire service responded to acts of terror against the World Trade Center in 1993, Oklahoma City in 1995, and the horrendous events of September 11, 2001, we also responded to numerous major accidents and natural disasters in the intervening years. Just last year, four hurricanes ripped through the state of Florida taxing the resources of that state and its neighbors. To be truly effective, the national preparedness system must be designed to respond to all of these events, not just an act of terrorism.

The national preparedness system also represents a major shift in philosophy. The system includes roles and responsibilities for all levels of government – federal, state, tribal, local, and even private stakeholders. State, tribal, and local governments have to recognize that they are part of a larger system, and that a single agency cannot handle major national incidents by themselves. Federal agencies must also recognize the need to not only work with each other, but also with their state, tribal and local partners. All of the stakeholders in the national preparedness system must embrace their new roles and responsibilities in order to make this system truly effective. The IAFC supports the focus on a truly national plan that is inclusive of all stakeholders.

Specific Priorities in NPG

In general, the IAFC supports the priorities listed in the Interim National Preparedness Goal. I would like to highlight four of them as being issues of particular importance to the fire service.

We support the “overarching priority” of implementing the NIMS and NRP. The NIMS will provide a consistent template for federal, state, tribal, and local entities to work together in responding to a disaster. The fire service was a leader in establishing the Incident Command System, which serves as a model for the NIMS. We have been using this system for decades, and we believe that it is important for law enforcement and other public safety entities to adopt this system. Similarly, the NRP provides a framework for federal, state, tribal, and local agencies to work together to respond to a crisis. The uniform nationwide adoption of these documents will prevent confusion during a crisis, when coordination is paramount.

We also support the “overarching priority” of expanding regional collaboration. The IAFC is a leader in calling for the use of mutual aid agreements and assistance compacts. It is only by working together through formal agreements that local jurisdictions can be prepared for any incident. No single fire department can afford all of the equipment that it will need to respond to large incidents and disasters, nor should every department be subjected to a “one size fits all” model. Mutual aid agreements are necessary for local jurisdictions to know who has what response capabilities and how the forces will respond to actual incidents. In addition, these agreements promote training across jurisdictions to better prepare for a future disaster.

The IAFC also supports the “capability-specific” priority of strengthening information sharing and collaboration capabilities. I would like to emphasize that the federal government must share intelligence with the fire service, as well as law enforcement. In the event of a terrorist attack, the fire service likely will arrive on the scene at the same time or earlier than the local law enforcement. We must know what we are dealing with. It would be even better to know what threats are out there ahead of time, so we can prepare for them. There is a need to develop a system to communicate instantly with the fire chief in times of threat or increased risk to our community. The IAFC can play a role in
helping to design an information-sharing system that gets the right information to fire chiefs in a manner that safeguards security.

Finally, the IAFC strongly supports the “capability-specific” priority of strengthening interoperable communications capabilities. The lack of interoperable communications is one of the greatest threats to public safety. At both Oklahoma City and the Pentagon, the incident commanders had to use human runners to communicate. The 9/11 Commission’s report details how the lack of interoperable communications proved fatal for 343 firefighters in the World Trade Center Towers. I would like to urge the members of this committee to support funding for the DHS’s SAFECOM program, and legislation to set a date certain for clearing the 700 MHz spectrum for public safety use.

Challenges to the National Preparedness System

The IAFC supports the new national preparedness system. However, I would like to raise a few issues about the system for the committee’s consideration.

For the new national preparedness system to be implemented, the federal government will have to provide tools such as matrices, decision making models and checklists. Not every community is as sophisticated as National Capital Region, New York or Los Angeles. The federal government must provide guidance on how smaller communities can adapt to the new system. In order for the national preparedness system to work, it must be implemented effectively everywhere.

Also, an all-hazards approach must be used to implement the national preparedness system. Of the 15 National Planning Scenarios, only two (major earthquake and major hurricane) are natural disasters. In the cases where scenarios could be either caused by terrorism or by accident, they are being presented as acts of terrorism, which limits their effectiveness. The limitation of natural disasters as a National Planning Scenario will impact planning and training funding in the future. Ideally, the planning scenarios would examine the effects of tornadoses, wildfires, and major floods in determining the UTL and TCL. If the HSPD-8 process is biased too heavily toward terrorism response, it runs the risk of being inadequate for dealing with more frequent natural disasters. The state, tribal, and local jurisdictions will not adopt a system that does not meet their needs, and the whole HSPD-8 process would become simply an academic exercise.

DHS must continue to solicit feedback from the fire service, law enforcement and other first responders. DHS is currently in the process of rolling out a system that will need to be constantly reviewed and revised. The national preparedness system cannot be a top-down system, where bureaucrats in Washington determine the policy. Local first responders must continue to be involved as these documents are revised. In addition, the IAFC believes that fire chiefs and other senior fire officials should be appointed to positions within the office of the Secretary of Homeland Security and in key positions throughout the department. The fire service must be represented at these levels to ensure that the HSPD-8 documents can be easily understood by the firefighter in the field.

The IAFC also would encourage the Office of State and Local Government Coordination and Preparedness to consult with other agencies in the department as it implements the national preparedness system. The United States Fire Administration (USFA) should be deeply engaged in this process. Unfortunately, it is not. Last year, Congress tasked USFA with completing a needs assessment for the fire service as part of the reauthorization of the Assistance to Firefighters (FIRE) Grant program. The TCL should incorporate the findings of this needs assessment and other fire service data that USFA regularly collects. In addition, USFA runs the National Fire Academy, which is the premier national institution for training fire service leadership. USFA will play a major role in training the fire service in the NIMS and NRP, and it should be included in the implementation of the national preparedness system.
Finally, the IAFC believes that mitigation strategies must be addressed as part of the national preparedness system. Many basic mitigation strategies, such as hardening buildings to prevent damage from terrorist attack, earthquake or windstorm, will play a critical role in protecting the public from harm in the event of a disaster. The federal government has a number of programs, including the USFA's fire prevention programs and the National Earthquake Hazard Reduction Program, which engage in mitigation activities. These activities must be incorporated into the national preparedness system.

**Conclusion**

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, I would like to thank you again for holding this hearing. The national preparedness system is in its formative stage, and will require congressional and public support to become a reality.

I am happy to answer any of your questions.
Statement

Of

Corey Gruber

Director
Office for Policy Initiatives and Analysis
Office of State and Local Government
Coordination and Preparedness

Before
the
Subcommittee
on
Economic Development, Public Buildings
and Emergency Management
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure

United States House of Representatives

April 14, 2005
Washington, D.C.
Chairman Shuster, Congresswoman Norton and Members of the Subcommittee, my name is Corey Gruber, and I serve as the Director of the Office of Policy Initiatives and Analysis of the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) Office of State and Local Government Coordination and Preparedness (SLGCP). On behalf of all of us at DHS, it is my honor and pleasure to appear before you today to discuss in detail Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8 (HSPD-8): National Preparedness, the Interim National Preparedness Goal (Interim Goal), and the Interim National Preparedness Guidance (Interim Guidance).

As you know, Mr. Chairman, the Department has continued aggressive implementation of HSPD-8 to improve our national preparedness. HSPD-8 establishes policies, procedures, and goals that strengthen our Nation’s preparedness to prevent, deter, respond to, and recover from terrorist attacks, major disasters and other emergencies. The significance and anticipated national impact of HSPD-8 provides the context in which to develop major program initiatives and provide specific guidance to Federal departments and agencies, States, local jurisdictions, and tribal governments.

On March 31, 2005, DHS released the Interim Goal after months of coordination and review with our partners in the Federal government, State, local, and tribal governments, and the private and non-governmental sectors. The publication of the Interim Goal fulfills a key requirement of HSPD-8 and represents the first major step in transforming the way the Nation plans, trains, exercises, allocates resources, and develops capabilities to prevent and respond to terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies.
On December 17, 2003, President George W. Bush issued HSPD-8. As previously stated, HSPD-8 establishes policies to strengthen the preparedness of the United States to prevent and respond to threatened or actual domestic terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies by: requiring a domestic all-hazards preparedness goal that establishes measurable priorities and targets; establishing mechanisms to improve delivery of Federal preparedness assistance to State, local, and tribal governments; and outlining actions to strengthen the preparedness capabilities of Federal, State, local, and tribal governments. HSPD-8 defines preparedness as the existence of plans, procedures, policies, training, and equipment necessary at the Federal, State, and local level to maximize the ability to prevent, respond to, and recover from major events.

All levels of government must be adequately prepared for a wide spectrum of major events that will exceed the capabilities of any single entity or jurisdiction. Such hazards require a unified and coordinated national approach to planning and to domestic incident management. To address this need, Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5 (HSPD-5): Management of Domestic Incidents and HSPD-8 establish national initiatives that develop a common approach to preparedness and response. The initiatives are the National Incident Management System (NIMS), the National Response Plan (NRP), and the National Preparedness Goal (Goal). The Goal will enable entities across the Nation to pinpoint capabilities that need improvement, and sustain these capabilities at levels needed to manage major events using the protocols established by the NRP and NIMS. To ensure that these initiatives are successfully coordinated, SLGCP will continue to collaborate closely with the NIMS Integration Center in development and implementation of the Goal.
The Interim National Preparedness Goal (Interim Goal)

As required in HSPD-8, the Goal will include readiness targets, priorities, standards for preparedness assessments and strategies, and a system for assessing the Nation’s overall level of preparedness. The Interim Goal reflects the Department’s progress to date to develop each of those elements in coordination with other entities.

The Interim Goal will guide Federal, State, local, and tribal entities in determining how best to devote limited resources to most effectively and efficiently strengthen preparedness for terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies. The Interim Goal is based on our collective assessment of strategic risk, and is supported by analysis of threats, consequences and vulnerabilities. This risk-based approach to preparedness is highlighted in the Interim Goal’s vision statement, which is: “To engage Federal, State, local, and tribal entities, their private and non-governmental partners, and the general public to achieve and sustain risk-based target levels of capability to prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from major events in order to minimize the impact on lives, property, and the economy.”

The Interim Goal is not a catalogue of equipment requirements to be met or training courses to be completed. Rather, the Interim Goal transforms the way we think about preparedness by defining capabilities that must be in place, at appropriate levels, to prevent and respond to current and future threats and hazards. The Interim Goal identifies measurable targets and priorities to guide the Nation’s planning, and provides a systematic, capabilities-based approach
for determining how prepared we are, how prepared we need to be, and how we should prioritize efforts to close the gap.

Furthermore, the Interim Goal recognizes that preparedness is a shared national responsibility. Cooperation and partnership across Federal, State, local, and tribal governments, as well as the private sector, non-government organizations, and the public are essential. A collaborative approach to strengthening preparedness encourages State, local, and tribal governments to develop and maintain risk-based target levels of capabilities that align with national priorities, while enabling the Nation to accurately measure our progress and ensure accountability.

The Interim Goal will remain in effect until superseded by the “final” Goal. DHS will continue to lead an effort with input from Federal, State, local, tribal, private sector, and non-governmental entities to define target levels of capability and apportion responsibility for these levels and/or their components among levels of government and groups, or “Tiers,” of jurisdictions. The final Goal, updated to include the target levels of capabilities, will be issued on October 1, 2005.

The Capabilities-Based Planning Tools

DHS, in coordination and consultation with its Federal, State, local and tribal partners, has developed a set of detailed planning tools in order to develop readiness targets and achieve the Goal. These tools are the National Planning Scenarios, the Universal Task List (UTL), and the
Target Capabilities List (TCL). Together, these tools provide a consistent way for entities across the Nation to work together to achieve the Goal.

The suite of fifteen National Planning Scenarios, developed by a Federal interagency group, illustrates our strategic risk and is representative of the potential scope, magnitude, and complexity of major events and the related impacts that the Nation should prepare for. “Major events” are defined in HSPD-5 as high-impact events that require a coordinated and effective response by a combination of Federal, State, local, tribal, nongovernmental, and/or private sector entities in order to save lives and minimize damage, and provide the basis for long-term community and economic recovery. The Planning Scenarios were used to assist in the development of the UTL.

The UTL can be best viewed as a library or menu of homeland security tasks. After an extensive review by national stakeholders, the first version of the UTL was released on August 31, 2004. It identifies tasks that need to be performed at all levels of government to prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from a range of major events, such as those defined in the National Planning Scenarios. The principle purpose of the UTL is to guide the design, development, conduct and evaluation of training and exercise events. We will use this library of tasks to design and evaluate training and exercises, ensure consistent objectives, and develop required task proficiency. Following UTL development, DHS, with stakeholder input, identified those tasks that were critical. A task was deemed critical if failure to perform it effectively during a major event would result in an increase in the loss of lives or serious injuries, or would
jeopardize the ability to accomplish mission-level outcomes associated with that task. Critical tasks provided the foundation for development of target capabilities.

As the heart of the Goal, the TCL provides guidance on the specific capabilities that Federal, State, local, and tribal entities will be expected to develop and maintain. Every entity will not be expected to develop and maintain every capability to the same level. The emphasis will be on developing prevention, response, protection and recovery capabilities through the pooling of regional resources. The specific capabilities and levels of capability will vary based upon the risk and needs of different types of entities. Over the coming months, DHS will continue to work with Federal, State, local, tribal, private sector, and non-governmental subject-matter experts to update the TCL, including identifying target levels of capability, for re-issuance with the final Goal on October 1, 2005.

National Preparedness Priorities

Ultimately, the Goal is an overarching statement of strategic intent. It demonstrates our national will to establish and sustain overall readiness against current and future threats. But the Goal does much more than propose a desired "end state" of preparedness. It provides unified strategic direction centered on specific priorities as the best way to build a national preparedness system that is strong, anticipatory, and focused on the areas of greatest need.

DHS established the national priorities in consultation with homeland security stakeholders, based on review of national strategies, Homeland Security Presidential Directives, and State and
Urban Area Homeland Security Strategies. The priorities fall into two categories: overarching priorities that contribute to the development of multiple capabilities, and capability-specific priorities that build selected capabilities for which the Nation has the greatest need. These national priorities will be updated or refined over time, based on progress towards achieving the Goal and changes in the strategic homeland security environment.

The overarching national priorities are:

- Implementing the NIMS and NRP,
- Expanding Regional Collaboration, and
- Implementing the Interim National Infrastructure Protection Plan.

The capability-specific priorities are:

- Strengthening Information Sharing and Collaboration capabilities,
- Strengthening Interoperable Communications capabilities,
- Strengthening CBRNE Detection, Response, and Decontamination capabilities, and finally,
- Strengthening Medical Surge and Mass Prophylaxis capabilities.

Building the right preparedness system for the Nation and achieving target levels of capabilities will take time, and the full benefits will not come overnight. But some benefits will be recognized immediately, such as: streamlined processes for determining needs and framing requests for assistance; a clearer voice for State and local stakeholders in shaping the system; and a more realistic picture of where we now stand in terms of national preparedness, and where we need to go.
How We Got Here

HSPD-8 requires the Secretary of Homeland Security to coordinate HSPD-8 implementation with “the heads of other appropriate Federal departments and agencies and in consultation with State and local governments.” DHS has consulted extensively with stakeholders from Federal, State, local, and tribal agencies throughout HSPD-8 implementation to ensure that development of the planning tools and Interim Goal is truly national – not solely a Federal – effort.

To begin this effort, DHS formed a Senior Steering Committee to review and oversee progress and products to obtain executive level input and “top down” guidance to keep initiatives on track and ensure the products integrate into a unified national preparedness system. Representatives from the Federal government, as well as State, local, and tribal entities continue to serve on the HSPD-8 Senior Steering Committee.

DHS also convened three Integrated Concept Teams (ICTs) drawn from organizations in DHS, other Federal departments and agencies, and State, local, and tribal governments with significant roles as providers or recipients of Federal preparedness assistance. The Integrated Concept Teams provided initial input on addressing HSPD-8 requirements for strategy development and resource coordination; a national system for training, exercises, and lessons learned; and assessing and reporting on the Nation’s overall preparedness.

In developing the Interim Goal, DHS coordinated and sought the input of experts and agencies throughout the country and across all levels of government. Over the course of Interim Goal development, over 1,500 organizations were invited to comment, including Federal, State, local,
and tribal agencies, the private and non-profit sectors, and national professional associations. This number includes 398 municipalities, 112 State agencies, and 94 national associations. The most recent national review of the Interim Goal was conducted in the last half of February 2005 during which DHS received approximately 475 comments.

DHS also recognized the need for input from and approval of the broader homeland security community on the UTL and TCL. DHS twice brought together over 350 representatives of Federal, State, local, and tribal agencies to provide input and feedback on the development of the UTL and the TCL. At both workshops, stakeholders were able to directly provide feedback and input to DHS team members. The frank and candid feedback of these national stakeholders was invaluable, and helped us to make course corrections and deliver effective planning tools that will transform the way we approach preparedness.

DHS requested and received input and feedback on the UTL and the TCL using innovative means to reach the broadest national audience. Two avenues proved exceptionally effective: the Office of Domestic Preparedness (ODP) Secure Web Portal and the DHS Lessons Learned and Information Sharing network. Stakeholders with appropriate credentials were able to access the Portal and/or the Lessons Learned and Information Sharing network to access and review current drafts of documents and planning tools. These two avenues proved to be a highly effective means to quickly secure national input.
The Interim National Preparedness Guidance (Interim Guidance)

As a companion to the Goal, DHS and its partners will soon issue the Interim National Preparedness Guidance (Interim Guidance) which will provide detailed information, instructions and examples to assist entities in implementing the Interim National Preparedness Goal and applying the Capabilities-Based Planning tools. The Interim Guidance is currently under final review prior to its official release. It will include step-by-step instructions for determining how prepared entities are, how prepared they should be, and how to frame requests and allocate resources in order to fill the gaps. The Interim Guidance also will provide detailed instructions and templates for updating State and Urban Area homeland security strategies and assessments in order to reflect the objectives of the Goal and the national priorities. Grantees will be required to certify these updates by the end of Fiscal Year 2005. These updates will help inform their Fiscal Year 2006 grant applications for federal preparedness assistance from DHS.

Roll-Out and Implementation Assistance

DHS will hold three regional roll-out conferences in the upcoming months to orient national stakeholders to the Interim Goal and Interim Guidance. These roll-out conferences are being coordinated with the NIMS Integration Center to coincide with NRP roll-out events. During the roll-out conferences, DHS officials will discuss the Interim Goal and Interim Guidance in detail, outline Fiscal Year 2005 requirements for grantees, and solicit candid feedback from stakeholders.
We recognize that these initiatives will entail many changes, and that implementation cannot happen overnight. In order to facilitate implementation, DHS will also deploy state-by-state training teams throughout the summer. These teams, which will be comprised of experienced State and local members, will meet with officials and stakeholders to explain planning methodologies and application of planning tools, answer questions, and solicit additional feedback. This outreach will augment traditional methods of assistance offered by DHS, such as Technical Assistance, Distance Learning, and Information Bulletins.

Conclusion

In summary, our approach to implementing the guidance of the President and Congress has centered on two key principles: first, that preparedness is a shared national responsibility, and second, that our strategic analysis must be risk-based, considering current and emerging threats, our potential vulnerabilities, and the consequences of major events that pose the greatest potential threat to our national interests in terms of the impact on lives, property, and the economy. We live in a world transformed by the attacks on September 11, 2001. The 9/11 Commission wrote “a rededication to preparedness is perhaps the best way to honor the memories of those we lost that day.” The publication of the Interim Goal brings us a significant step closer toward fulfilling this pledge. Our dedication to achieving the Goal is as critical to our Nation’s security and freedom as those many moments in our Nation’s history when Americans did more than they were asked and left our great country stronger and more secure. Mr. Chairman and Members, thank you for your continuing support in this transformational effort.
Statement

Of

Gil Jamieson

Acting Director of the National Incident Management System (NIMS) Integration Center

Before the Subcommittee on Economic Development, Public Buildings and Emergency Management Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure

United States House of Representatives

April 14, 2005
Washington, D.C.
National Response Plan (NRP)
April 14, 2005
Written Testimony for the Record
House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee

Introduction
Good afternoon, Chairman Shuster and members of the Subcommittees. My name is Gil Jamieson and I am the Acting Director of the National Incident Management System (NIMS) Integration Center in the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Because the National Response Plan (NRP) and the NIMS are inextricably linked, the Under Secretary for Emergency Preparedness and Response Michael Brown asked me to coordinate the implementation of the NRP, both within FEMA and across the Nation. It is my pleasure to be here with you today to update you on the NRP.

Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD-5)
Every day there are emergencies in the United States that require action by emergency responders. Whether those responders come from different parts of the same local jurisdiction or from State and Federal agencies, they need to be able to work together effectively. They need to be able communicate with each other, and they need to be able to depend on each other. In Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD)-5, Management of Domestic Incidents, the President directed the Secretary of Homeland Security to develop a new approach to domestic incident management based on a National Incident Management System and a National Response Plan.

The NIMS, released by the Department in March 2004, established standard incident management processes, protocols, and procedures that will allow responders to work together more effectively. The NRP, released by the Department on January 6, 2005, uses the comprehensive framework of the NIMS to provide the structure and mechanisms for the coordination of Federal support to State, local, and tribal incident managers and for exercising direct Federal authorities and responsibilities.

The NRP standardizes Federal incident management actions by integrating existing and formerly distinct processes. It is applicable to all Federal departments and agencies that may be requested to provide assistance or conduct operations during actual or potential “Incidents of National Significance.”

Development of the NRP
The NRP development process included extensive coordination with Federal, State, local and tribal agencies, nongovernmental organizations, private-sector entities, and the first-responder and emergency management communities across the country.
Through the Office of State and Local Government Coordination, the Department coordinated the development of the NRP with numerous State, local, and tribal entities and associations. Many of the State and local associations, including the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP), the International Association of Fire Chiefs (IAFC), the National Association of Counties (NACo), the Fraternal Order of Police (FOP), and the National Emergency Management Association (NEMA), issued press releases announcing and praising the completion of the NRP.

After the Homeland Security Council Principals Committee approved the NRP on November 18, 2004, the Plan was signed by 29 Federal departments and three partner organizations (American Red Cross, Corporation for National and Community Service, and National Voluntary Organizations Active in Disaster). On January 6, 2005, the Secretary of Homeland Security formally announced the completion of the NRP and the NRP was made available to the public through the DHS website.

Overview of the NRP
The NRP incorporates best practices from a wide variety of incident management disciplines to include fire, rescue, emergency management, law enforcement, public works, and emergency medical services. The NRP is an all-discipline, all-hazards plan that provides the structure and mechanisms for the coordination of Federal support to State, local, and tribal incident managers. The NRP fully incorporates the Federal Response Plan (FRP), the U.S. Government Interagency Domestic Terrorism Concept of Operations (CONPLAN), and the Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan (FRERP). As the core operational plan for national incident management, the NRP establishes national level coordinating structures, processes, and protocols that will be incorporated into certain existing Federal interagency plans (such as the National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan (NCP)) that are designated to implement specific authorities and that are used to respond to thousands of incidents each year. Both the NRP and the NIMS reflect the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission and the intentions of Congress, as indicated in the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act, through effective and on-going coordination Federal efforts to prevent, prepare for, and respond to acts of terrorism or other emergencies.

The NRP provides the seamless integration of crisis and consequence management as mandated by HSPD-5. It builds on the proven structures of the FRP to create a broader, more comprehensive, more robust plan. It is a plan that is suited to address the full spectrum of 21st century threats.

The NRP addresses prevention and preparedness as well as response and recovery. The NRP incorporates all of the FRP capabilities for providing Federal support to States and local jurisdictions and for implementing the authorities for major disasters and emergencies set out in the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, as amended (42 U.S.C. 5121 et seq.). The NRP builds on those capabilities to use the same coordination mechanisms to coordinate response to the full range of domestic incidents as mandated by HSPD-5.
The NRP applies to all actual and potential "Incidents of National Significance." All major disasters and emergencies under the Stafford Act are Incidents of National Significance. The NRP bases the definition of "Incidents of National Significance" on situations related to the following four criteria set forth in HSPD-5:

1. A Federal department or agency acting under its own authority has requested the assistance of the Secretary of Homeland Security.

2. The resources of State and local authorities are overwhelmed and Federal assistance has been requested by the appropriate State and local authorities. Examples include:
   - Major disasters or emergencies as defined under the Stafford Act; and
   - Catastrophic incidents

3. More than one Federal department or agency has become substantially involved in responding to an incident. Examples include:
   - Credible threats, indications or warnings of imminent terrorist attack, or acts of terrorism directed domestically against the people, property, environment, or political or legal institutions of the United States or its territories or possessions; and
   - Threats or incidents related to high-profile, large-scale events that present high-probability targets such as National Special Security Events (NSSEs) and other special events as determined by the Secretary of Homeland Security, in coordination with other Federal departments and agencies.

4. The Secretary of Homeland Security has been directed by the President to assume responsibility for managing a domestic incident.

The NRP uses and builds on the Emergency Support Function (ESF) structure that was a proven and successful element of the FRP. The NRP included 12 basic ESFs. The NRP retained these ESFs with some expansion and modification to the initial ESFs and the addition of three new ESFs to address perceived gaps and to provide greater synergy with emergency operations plans in many states. The three new ESFs are ESF 13 – Public Safety and Security to address the non-criminal investigative law enforcement functions; ESF 14 – Long Term Community Recovery and Mitigation; and ESF 15 – External Affairs. Two ESFs were expanded to provide greater synergy between response and recovery activities: ESF 3 – Public Works and Engineering, now includes the FEMA Public Assistance programs; and ESF 6 now addresses Mass Care, Housing and Human Services, rather than isolating the mass care response elements. ESF 11 now addresses Agriculture and Natural Resources, significantly broadening the FRP focus of ESF 11 – Food. ESF 5, led by FEMA, now addresses Emergency Management instead of the more limited scope of Information and Planning. This new, broadened scope for ESF 5 addresses the broad range of emergency management capabilities needed to ensure efficient implementation of the NRP, including overall management and coordination, logistics, finance and planning activities.

The NRP Support Annexes also provide new and expanded capabilities and coordinating structures. Of particular note is the Financial Management Annex, which includes a
Memorandum of Understanding for Federal Mutual Aid. This provides the operational underpinning for the important new concept of Federal-to-Federal support embedded in the NRP. The International Coordination Annex, for the first time, provides clear procedures for addressing cross-border issues and international coordination during domestic incidents. The Private Sector Annex puts forth guiding principles and procedures for engaging with private sector partners, for information sharing and for coordination regarding critical infrastructure and key resources. The Public Affairs, Science and Technology, Tribal Relations, Volunteer and Donations Management, and Worker Safety and Health annexes each address critical capabilities needed to prevent, prepare for, respond to and recover from the full spectrum of threats facing the Nation.

The Incident Annexes address contingency or hazard situations requiring specialized application of the NRP. The Incident Annexes describe the missions, policies, responsibilities, and coordination processes that govern the interaction of public and private entities engaged in incident management and emergency response operations across a spectrum of potential hazards. These annexes are typically augmented by a variety of supporting plans and operational supplements. The Incident Annexes address: Biological, Catastrophic, Cyber, Nuclear Radiological, Oil and Hazardous Materials, Terrorism Law Enforcement and Investigative situations.

The Catastrophic Incident Annex describes the processes used to implement one of the key concepts of the National Response Plan – that of pro-active Federal Support to Catastrophic Incidents. By spelling out the processes and including an agreed upon definition of a Catastrophic Incident, the NRP provides a consistent planning assumption for use by State and local jurisdictions.

In addition to building on the proven structures of the FRP, the NRP fully incorporates the DHS coordinating elements introduced in the initial National Response Plan. These include the concept of the Principal Federal Official (PFO), the Homeland Security Operations Center (HSOC), the Interagency Incident Management Group, and the Joint Field Office (JFO).

To ensure full integration and a consistent approach to domestic incident management, the JFO fully incorporates and replaces the role of the FEMA Disaster Field Office. The HSOC provides the umbrella to include the National Response Coordination Center and the Regional Response Coordination Centers.

The NRP includes processes for integrating the Principal Federal Official with the Joint Coordination Group at the JFO and providing coordination with the HSOC and the IIMG at the headquarters level.

A critical element of the plan is the pre-incident coordination for prevention, which includes the full integration of the Intelligence Community as a major partner in the plan. The NRP addresses the coordination of information regarding terrorist threats as well as the activation and deployment of various special teams to conduct prevention, preparedness, response, and recovery activities.
The NRP integrates the roles and responsibilities of all Federal departments and agencies and was crafted to ensure that nothing in the plan alters or impedes the ability of Federal, State, local or tribal departments or agencies to carry out their specific authorities. In accordance with HSPD-5 and other relevant statutes and directives, the U.S. Attorney General has lead responsibility for criminal investigations of terrorist acts. All elements of the CONPLAN were incorporated into the base NRP and the Terrorism Incident Law Enforcement and Investigation Annex. The Department of Justice and the FBI were primary partners in the development of all aspects of the NRP.

Rollout of the NRP
To ensure effective implementation, DHS is conducting a national rollout effort to promote support for and understanding of the NRP. The NRP rollout strategy is comprised of a coordinated series of training and awareness activities for NRP stakeholders, including Federal departments and agencies, State, local, tribal and private sector partners. It includes a DHS NRP website, online awareness level training, a one-hour Emergency Education Network NRP distance learning broadcast, a toll-free information line, standardized briefing materials, brochures, fact sheets, the formation of a Speaker’s Bureau to provide workshops and presentations for NRP partners, and an initial round of one-day workshops in seven key cities during the Spring.

FEMA’s Emergency Management Institute (EMI) led the development of on-line, independent study course to provide NRP awareness training. The course, IS-800 National Response Plan, An Introduction was posted on line immediately following the public announcement of the NRP. EMI had previously developed IS-700 National Incident Management System, An Introduction. These courses provide an extraordinary opportunity to build awareness and understanding of the NIMS and the NRP. To date, more than 100,000 people have completed NIMS and NRP online training courses and more than 13,000 hardcopies of the NRP have been distributed to partners and stakeholders.

During the months of April and May, the Department will host seven one-day NRP seminars across the country. In fact, we held our first workshop yesterday here in Washington, DC for our partners and stakeholders in the National Capital Region. These events will educate Federal, state, and local incident managers on the key provisions of the NRP, the concept of operations, the operational framework, and how this new approach will improve domestic incident management and response capabilities in their communities and across the nation. While each event will accommodate several hundred attendees, it is important to recognize that these events are the first step in an ongoing education process, and additional events and meetings will be planned for other cities in the future.

Implementation of the NRP
As established within the Plan, the NRP will be implemented through a three-phase process during this first year. The phased implementation schedule began on December 15 through a memo from the DHS Secretary to the partner departments and agencies. The NRP will be implemented in the following phases:
Phase I- Transitional Period (0 to 60 days): This 60-day timeframe provided a transitional period for departments and agencies and other organizations to modify training designate staffing of NRP organizational elements, and to become familiar with NRP structures, processes, and protocols. **Day 60 was February 13, 2005.**

Phase II- Plan Modification (60 to 120 days): This second 60-day timeframe provided departments and agencies the opportunity to modify existing Federal interagency plans to align with the NRP and conduct necessary training. Today marks the day that the Initial NRP, the FRP, the CONPLAN, and FRERP are superseded and the NRP is fully implemented. **Day 120 is today, April 14, 2005.**

Phase III- Initial Implementation and Testing (120 days to one year): Beginning today, the Plan is to be fully implemented. During this phase, DHS will conduct systematic assessments of NRP coordinating structures, processes, and protocols. At the end of this period, DHS will conduct a one-year review to gauge the Plan’s effectiveness in meeting the objectives of HSPD-5 and will make recommendations to the Secretary on necessary revisions. **The one-year date is December 15, 2005.**

As I just outlined, the NRP became fully operational today. To ensure that we met this goal, the Department has been working closely with our Federal interagency partners on several implementation actions. These implementation actions included the development of Standard Operating Plans (SOPs). The SOPs will help to ensure that the NRP is executed in an efficient and consistent manner. Over time, these SOPs will provide the basis for the development of Field Operations Guides and job-specific training for anyone expected to perform a job under the NRP. The Federal interagency implementation group will also develop recommendations for FEMA and other Federal agencies regarding additional NRP training needs and metrics for evaluating the NRP during this first year of implementation.

**Integration of NIMS and NRP**

HSPD-5 called for the establishment of a single, comprehensive approach to domestic incident management. Ensuring that all levels of government across the Nation have the capability to work efficiently and effectively together, using a national approach to domestic incident management, requires a comprehensive and integrated approach to implementing both the NRP and the NIMS. The NIMS Integration Center is working to synchronize the NIMS and NRP compliance requirements and timeframes so that Federal departments and agencies only need to modify their plans and processes once to accommodate both the NIMS and the NRP. The NRP is a specific application of the NIMS, to be used when providing Federal support to State and local incident managers and for exercising direct Federal authorities and responsibilities.

**Closing**

Together, the NIMS and the NRP provide a more efficient and effective way for the nation to prevent, prepare for, respond to, and recover from any emergency. This is possible because of the elimination of duplicative, and sometimes conflicting, federal
plans. The NRP creates a better relationship between Federal, State, and local
prevention, preparedness, and response elements. Over time, our use and experience with
the NRP will lead to significant efficiencies of efforts and resources. I would like to
thank the Members of the Subcommittees for the opportunity to testify and I am prepared
to answer any questions that you may have.
DAVID E. LIEBERSBACH
PRESIDENT, NATIONAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATION
AND DIRECTOR, ALASKA DIVISION OF HOMELAND SECURITY AND EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT

TESTIMONY
BEFORE THE
HOUSE TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE SUBCOMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, PUBLIC BUILDINGS, AND EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT
ON
PREPAREDNESS SYSTEM OVERSIGHT
THE UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

APRIL 14, 2005

Introduction
Thank you Chairman Shuster, Ranking Member Norton, and distinguished members of the Committee for allowing me the opportunity to provide you with a statement for the record on the nation’s preparedness oversight system. I am Dave Liebersbach, President of the National Emergency Management Association and Director of the Alaska Division of Homeland Security and Emergency Management. In my statement, I am representing the National Emergency Management Association (NEMA), whose members are the state emergency management directors in the 50 states and the U.S. territories. NEMA’s members are responsible to their governors for emergency preparedness, homeland security, mitigation, response, and recovery activities for natural, man-made, and terrorist caused disasters.

Our Nation’s Preparedness System
Since the creation of Department of Homeland Security (DHS), our nation’s preparedness system has undergone some significant changes. DHS officially placed preparedness for terrorism and all-hazards under one overarching Department while asserting an all-hazards focus with integration of the Office for Domestic Preparedness and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) into DHS in early 2003. The National Strategy for Homeland Security cited that “the responsibility of providing homeland security is shared between federal, state, and local governments and the private sector…Cost sharing between different levels of government should reflect the principles of federalism.”

Last year, the Secretary of DHS proposed to create a “one stop shop” for homeland security funding that lead to some preparedness grants being moved to the newly created Office for State and Local Coordination and Preparedness and some preparedness functions being moved out of FEMA. Congress affirmed this proposal in language included in the FY 2005 Appropriations bill for the Department of Homeland Security. While many of these changes have improved some of the nation’s preparedness functions, NEMA is extremely concerned that any further changes that separate preparedness from the response and recovery functions that were once in the legacy agency of FEMA will unnecessarily complicate and compromise our nation’s ability to respond to and recover from
disasters. Preparedness means personnel, planning, training and exercise – for all aspects of a disaster. Preparedness functions cannot be isolated from response and recovery because they are inextricably linked together. Such separation could lead to fractionized response and undue loss of life and property. As Congress and DHS review the organization and functions of the Department, we ask that preparedness not be further separated from emergency response and recovery functions.

Additionally, as the FY 2005 funding has been processed, NEMA has been working alongside the Office of State and Local Coordination and Preparedness (OSLCP) to ensure that the all-hazards intent of the Emergency Management Performance Grant Program (EMPG) is not changed with the creation of the “one stop shop” for preparedness funding, since EMPG is the only all-hazards source of federal funding for state and local emergency management capacity building. OSLCP is looking at ways to improve the program also in coordination with NEMA. However, because DHS is a new Department with a new and developing financial management system the changeover has not been without significant delays in the amount of time that it takes for states to get their funding. In fact, homeland security funding including EMPG is processed through the legacy Department of Justice system that was used before the Office for Domestic Preparedness was transferred into DHS. Additionally, integrating EMPG funding into the homeland security grant program means that in more than half of the states, another layer of bureaucracy is added because only half of the nation’s emergency managers serve as the state administering agency (SAA). In these cases, it takes even longer for emergency management agencies to access the EMPG funding once it is awarded. This has a domino effect as delays are then experienced by local governments that receive EMPG monies. NEMA has received reports of situations in which county emergency management programs were on the verge of shutting their doors because they had expended their match funds while federal funding continued to lag. In most states, EMPG funds were not received until 6 months into the federal fiscal year. NEMA hopes to work collaboratively with Congress and OSLCP to resolve these issues in the coming year to ensure swifter grant awards in FY 2006. Specifically, we ask that Congress de-couple the Emergency Management Performance Grant which is an all-hazards, 50/50 match program from the homeland security grant program which is terrorism focused with different and longer-term requirements.

National Response Plan
NEMA supports the release of the National Response Plan (NRP) by DHS as the comprehensive, all-hazards tool for domestic incident management across the spectrum of prevention, preparedness, response, and recovery. The NRP comes as a result of a federal, state, and local government partnership, in addition to private sector coordination and NEMA supports the final product. The plan supersedes the former Federal Response Plan, the Initial National Response Plan, the Concept of Operations Plan, and the Federal Radiological Response Plan as a requirement of both the DHS Act and Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5 on Management of Domestic Incidents. NEMA was actively involved in a state and local working group that reviewed drafts of the NRP and proposed changes as the NRP was developed by the Department for over a year. NEMA was fortunate to have Oklahoma’s Director of Emergency Management, Albert Ashwood, represent the association on the work group.

The final plan is not all that different from plans that state and local governments have in place that recognize and organize the nation’s response through emergency support functions (ESFs). The new
NRP obviously describes response within the context of the Department of Homeland Security. The NRP is already being put into practice, as Principal Federal Officials (PFOs) have been appointed to disasters that have occurred in the last six months. These PFOs have been integrated into emergency response to represent the Secretary of Homeland Security during a disaster. The NRP allows for ease in bringing more federal assets and resources to bear when state and local governments become overwhelmed during major disasters, such as last year’s hurricanes in the Southeast and the Alaska wildfires.

The process used for developing the NRP initially was not an easy road. Early on in the creation of DHS and as the 22 agencies came together in the Department to organize the nation’s preparedness against all-hazards, the initial work on the plan did not include state and local government or even cross-Departmental input for the initial plan. The first draft plan was developed in a vacuum that did not recognize the existing state and local response plans that have been used very effectively over the years in every type of disaster or emergency that has occurred in this country. State and local governments had no input into the early version of the NRP which lead to significant outcry from the emergency preparedness community when the draft was released. States are often called “the laboratories of democracy” because of the innovative concepts and practices that are developed to address unique challenges, and these practices are often adapted for federal governmental implementation. Yet, the lessons that were learned by state and local governments, who had emergency response plans in place to address all-hazards emergency management, were initially ignored. NEMA commends DHS for listening to the concerns we had with the initial process and then adapting the process in progress. NEMA calls on the Congress to ensure that DHS continues to maintain consultations with stakeholders as they develop critical national policy and implementation strategies that include roles and responsibilities for stakeholders like emergency management.

A key component of the NRP requires state and local governments to update their emergency response plans to reflect the new National Response Plan. However, no dedicated federal funding is provided towards updating these plans. Similarly, federal funding is not available for state and local government emergency responders, who are required to adopt and train responders on the new National Incident Management System (NIMS). NIMS is the companion operating system to the NRP intended to ensure common protocol and response to incidents. At a time when all resources are taxed to meet the new threat environment, state and local governments must utilize current funding streams to address new mandates, while potentially eliminating or scaling back other critical programs and priorities to meet this need. Essentially, the federal requirements could mean that some state and local priorities may fall through the cracks in a time when all preparedness activities are essential. NEMA calls on the Congress to address these mandates on state and local government in order to meet federal government requirements.

HSPD-8
Another critical component to improving our nation’s preparedness was the release of Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8 (HSPD 8) on National Preparedness, which was released on December 17, 2003. Even before September 11, 2001, NEMA called on the federal government to address national preparedness standards for planning, training, equipment and communications to develop common approaches between the federal, state, and local governments. NEMA is supportive
of efforts to develop a national preparedness goal and accompanying standards so we as a nation are working toward common levels of preparedness.

HSOPD 8 is another process where NEMA has been asked to assist with input in developing the system; however we continue to have concerns regarding the process and the final product. NEMA participates on the DHS Senior Interagency Steering Committee on HSPD-8 as well as several other HSPD-8 working groups, but has found that the opportunity to impact real change is limited due to rigid timelines required of DHS. Consistent and increased state and local government involvement in the national preparedness guidance, metrics on performance, adoption of the goal, and implementation must be a critical component of the federal government’s objective with HSPD 8. If state and local governments and emergency responders are not included and the process is contractor driven or federally driven, we will end up with a situation similar to what initially occurred with the NRP and have to start over from scratch in order to get buy-in from the stakeholders that this program impacts the most.

The cornerstone of our nation’s emergency preparedness has been preparedness against all hazards and threats regardless of the cause. On a daily basis, the highest probability threat is that of a natural disaster or other man-made incident like a hazardous materials incident. HSPD 8 states that, “to the extent permitted by law, federal preparedness assistance will be predicated on the adoption of statewide comprehensive all-hazards preparedness strategies.” Yet, the national planning scenarios include only three scenarios of the fifteen are not terrorist attacks. The directive calls for “threats and hazards that present the greatest risk.” Changing the focus of preparedness to weigh so heavily on terrorism could severely hamper the ability of state and local government capabilities to respond to a wide range of events with a higher likelihood of occurrence such as natural disasters, non-traditional disasters like the Columbia Space Shuttle explosion, Mad Cow disease, West Nile virus, civil unrest, and hazardous material incidents. Increased homeland security focus must be viewed as an enhancement to our basic emergency management capacity. Our system for public safety and homeland security must be mutually supportive and nimble enough to address any hazard.

Additionally, the development of HSPD 8 and the guidance for implementing the new National Preparedness Goal must take into account existing standards programs, such as the Emergency Management Accreditation Program (EMAP) and the National Fire Protection Association 1600 Standard on Emergency Management. Other emergency response disciplines also have standards programs in place to address preparedness as well. We cannot afford to start from scratch and recreate the all standards for preparedness. We must utilize these existing and trusted systems that emergency responders currently rely upon.

Further, the timelines for implementation of HSPD 8 are very tight and must be seriously reconsidered for not only practical application but also for the buy-in of the personnel and stakeholders who will be required to implement the goal at the state and local level. The National Preparedness Goal was released on April 1, 2005, yet state and local governments will be required to conduct comprehensive assessments and update their statewide homeland security strategies by the end of the current fiscal year in order to be eligible for FY06 federal preparedness assistance funds. That’s a mere six months to accomplish these major tasks while also updating their emergency response plans to reflect the NRP.
and continuing to implement the Homeland Security Grant Program. Again, there is no new federal funding that is available for addressing these strategies for national preparedness. We cannot afford to meet these mandates with existing programs like the Emergency Management Performance Grant program which is already experiencing a $264 million shortfall. As stated previously, states have less than six months to address the federal mandates.

NEMA strongly supports maintaining baseline funding for emergency management capacity building to ensure national preparedness against all hazards and maintenance of the nation’s mutual aid system. As the Administration proposes to shift funding formulas for preparedness through HSPD 8, NEMA asks that you consider the mutual aid given during last year’s hurricanes as the interdependencies of the nation’s emergency management system were tested through the Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC). The state-to-state mutual aid compact enabled 38 states to provide assistance in the form of more than $15 million in human, military, and equipment assets and over 800 personnel to support the impacted states for over 85 days of continuous response operations. The nature of the nation’s mutual aid system vividly shows the need for all states to have appropriate capabilities to respond to disasters of all types and sizes. Additionally, resources are needed to build emergency response capabilities on a national basis and to ensure the system can handle the demand of natural disasters and other emergencies no matter where they occur. EMPG is the only means to support this assistance that can be offered by other states in the face of disaster through adequate preparedness. EMPG ensures all states have funding to develop and maintain a base level capacity that can be utilized by other states for mutual aid.

CONCLUSION
As we continue to build national preparedness efforts through the Department of Homeland Security, we must not forget about the all-hazards approach that saves lives and prevents economic devastation in our communities on a daily basis. NEMA strongly supports efforts to define our nation’s preparedness and to develop standards for preparedness, with appropriate input from stakeholders and recognition of current systems that are already working. State and local governments must have adequate funding and reasonable timeframes to address federal mandates and most importantly, we cannot afford to eliminate baseline emergency preparedness funding for emergency management. I thank you for the opportunity to testify on behalf of NEMA and appreciate your partnership. I hope we can work together to ensure that the nation is prepared for any disaster, regardless of cause.
Transportation and Infrastructure Subcommittee on
Economic Development, Public Buildings, and
Emergency Management

Hearing on:

“National Preparedness System: What Are We Planning For?”

Testimony of

Armond Mascelli
Vice President, Domestic Response
American Red Cross

Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee for your gracious invitation to testify at this hearing. I am pleased to appear before you today to discuss the national preparedness system and the role of the American Red Cross in disaster response. My name is Armond Mascelli and I am Vice President of Domestic Response for the American Red Cross at national headquarters here in Washington, D.C.

For more than 123 years, the mission of the Red Cross has been to help Americans prevent, prepare for, and respond to emergencies. Chartered by Congress in 1905 to provide a system of disaster response and to mitigate suffering caused by disaster, it continues to meet this mandate today. We have a long and proven track record of immediate response to major disasters, both natural and manmade. Over the past year, the Red Cross responded to more than 70,000 disasters ranging from single house fires to the devastating southeastern hurricanes. At the same time, the Red Cross continues to aggressively prepare for the possibility of another terrorist attack on American soil.

Governed by volunteers and supported by community donations, the Red Cross is a nationwide network of nearly 900 chapters, eight regional service areas and 36 blood services regions dedicated to saving lives and helping people prevent, prepare for and respond to emergencies. Led by 1 million volunteers and 36,000 employees, trains nearly 12 million people in lifesaving skills and keeps U.S. military families connected worldwide. Operating a single system, the Red Cross is the largest supplier of blood and blood products to more than 3,000 hospitals across the nation and also assists victims of international disasters and conflicts at locations worldwide.

The Red Cross provides a unique community based network to support all-hazard disaster preparedness and response in your districts, to your constituents, each and every day. As a key member of the first response community with expertise in meeting the human needs associated with disasters, we are integrated into state and local government agency disaster planning, exercises and response efforts. While systems and strategies are important, the American public is our client to whom we ultimately direct our services.
TOPOFF 3 Exercise
Mr. Chairman, this hearing is timely as the Red Cross just completed the TOPOFF 3 exercise with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and other federal, state and local government partners as well as our private sector partner. We have participated in all three TOPOFF exercises. During this latest, more than 600 of our employees and volunteers, 32 chapters in CT and NJ, as well as two Blood Divisions, two Blood Services Regions, the National Testing and Reference Laboratory and one National Testing Laboratory actively participated. We used this exercise to test and ultimately strengthen our organization’s capacity for an effective, coordinated response to large-scale natural and manmade disasters. While we remain concerned that overall, exercises have not addressed the long-term human services needs of disaster victims, TOPOFF 3 did effectively test the critical role the Red Cross plays in enhancing the nation’s disaster preparedness and response capabilities under the National Response Plan (NRP).

National Incident Management System and the National Response Plan
We were pleased to work with DHS and other federal agencies during the development of the NRP and the National Incident Management System (NIMS). The significance of these documents cannot be understated as they encompass the core of how we will work collaboratively to assist our nation and its people in need. We believe NIMS is a comprehensive system to execute a consistent nationwide approach for governments at all levels, the private sector and non-governmental organizations. NIMS will foster greater efficiency and effectiveness within the disaster community to prepare for, respond to, and recover from domestic incidents.

Building on our responsibilities under the Federal Response Plan, we were actively engaged in the policy discussions with DHS throughout the NRP’s development. The majority of our policy and operational issues were integrated into each of the components of the final NRP—the Base Plan, Appendices, Emergency Support Functions, and the Incident and Support Annexes. A comprehensive list of our Primary Agency, Support Agency and Cooperating Agency roles in the NRP is respectfully submitted for the record. Specifically, the Red Cross serves as Primary Agency for mass care (ESF #6) responsible for the provision of food, shelter, emergency first aid, disaster welfare information, and bulk distribution of emergency relief items.

Before, during and after disasters strike, our emergency shelter services for disaster victims includes the use of pre-identified shelter sites in existing structures, creation of temporary facilities or the temporary construction of shelters, and use of similar facilities outside the disaster-affected area should evacuation be necessary. Feeding services are provided to disaster victims and emergency workers through a combination of fixed sites, mobile feeding units, and bulk distribution of food. Red Cross disaster welfare information services provide timely, accurate and verified information regarding individuals residing within the affected disaster areas. Information is collected and provided to immediate family members outside the affected area through identified systems. Disaster welfare information is also provided to aid in reunification of family members within the affected area who were separated at the time of the disaster.
The Red Cross also serves as a Support Agency to the Department of Health and Human Services for Public Health and Medical Services (ESF #8), providing blood in coordination with AABB Inter-organizational Task Force on Domestic Disasters and Acts of Terrorism, mental health services, and disaster health services. We have also undertaken an expanded function under the NRP within external affairs (ESF #15) to help disseminate accurate and timely information to those affected during an incident to help better protect themselves. Ultimately our activities in the NRP focus on meeting the human needs associated with disasters.

The Client Assistance Network

Of course none of our disaster services can be provided without effective partnerships. Perhaps this is best illustrated in the development of the Coordinated Assistance Network (CAN). CAN was created to ease the burden on those seeking assistance following a disaster. The Red Cross joined six other prominent national and regional agencies that share a common vision to shape the future of disaster relief. Arising from the lessons learned during the September 11, 2001 response, this partnership focuses on how clients are served, not just be one agency, but by an entire system of relief agencies.

From a client perspective, a disaster victim can visit any one of the participating agencies, tell his/her story, provide required documentation, and—with his/her permission—have that information shared automatically with the partner agencies that are able to help them. From an agency perspective, CAN provides the framework to make casework management easier and more efficient than ever. Through a secure, web-based system, an agency can instantly review the client’s specific situation and the services received—in real time—helping provide better service to the client, eliminate duplication of benefits, and measurably lessen the burden for each participating agency.

I am pleased to report CAN was deployed during last year’s hurricanes and work in six pilot cities is beginning and will focus on the development of inter-agency service delivery models and the technology to support such collaboration.

Catastrophic Incident Annex and Supplement

Under the NRP’s Catastrophic Incident Annex/Supplement (CIA/S), the Red Cross is responsible for the provision of mass care during an incident that results in extraordinary levels of mass casualties or severe population disruption. We are partnering with DHS to move beyond the day to day and annual natural disasters to address scenarios previously unimaginable. To fully execute our responsibilities, the Red Cross developed the Mass Care Catastrophic Planning Initiative which outlines a three-phased strategy to address catastrophic disaster mass care planning. During phases I and II, the Red Cross will use its expertise in mass care planning and operations coupled with its extensive partnerships, cooperation and coordination with federal, state and local emergency management officials to establish the necessary mass sheltering and feeding plans in the 30 largest U.S. Metropolitan Statistical Areas which cover the 50 Urban Area Security Initiative cities designated by DHS. In Phase III, we will initiate the necessary activities to enhance and sustain the systems and measures established during the first two years. Implementation is based on two objectives:
Develop and test catastrophic disaster mass care response plans that will address the needs of 300,000 people for 90 days. The activities under this objective focus on developing the resiliency of local communities so they are less dependent on external assistance. Specific attention is paid to vulnerability and capacity assessments; facility identification; mass care personnel identification and training; operations planning; security assessment and planning; and inter-agency coordination. The plans will address actions to be taken by the area directly affected by the disaster, as well as the adjacent metropolitan areas that will be providing evacuation and mass care support. It will force communities to look at mass care in a more comprehensive, integrated way reaching beyond their local borders on a scale previously not envisioned.

Create and support a nationwide network for mass care planning and response. The activities under this objective focus on the development of back-up systems to fill the gaps in local response capabilities. Specific attention will be paid to developing a national mass care cadre system; the deployment and support of the CAN client information sharing system; development of a national database of sheltering and feeding facilities; relief supplies and equipment acquisition; and national coordination.

While we welcome the challenge of this important role, we remain concerned that unlike the other signatories to the NRP, the Red Cross is included in no federal agency's budget request submitted to Congress. The Red Cross has the expertise, experience, commitment and organizational structure to implement this initiative but it is not the responsibility of the charitable public to fund the responsibilities associated with the NRP Catastrophic Annex/Supplement that the government requires and the American public will need.

While this initiative is national in scope, it is local in focus and aggressively engages the participation of local government agencies, volunteers and nongovernmental organizations to meet the sense of urgency prompted by the new requirements that the CJIS/A impose. We believe that an immediate investment by our federal partners now will sharply reduce the need for expenditure of significant government resources post incident. The Red Cross must have adequate levels of funding for our catastrophic planning activities to fully execute our responsibilities under the NRP.

We remain a willing partner, welcome the challenge that an expanded role under the NRP will bring and are enthusiastic about bringing our experience, resources, and partnerships to bear in support of the its implementation. Just as natural disasters are unpredictable, terrorist intentions can not be predicted. As such, we must view the NRP as dynamic document that must evolve within the emerging homeland security environment. We will continue to work closely with DHS as it conducts its one year review to assess the implementation process. We will also work closely as DHS undertakes its NPR four year review and reissuance cycle.

**National Preparedness Goal**

We commend the work of DHS as it creates effective public policy stemming from HSPD-8, in particular the development of a standardized approach to preparedness that assesses needs and defines priorities. Recognizing the experience and expertise of the Red Cross, our President and CEO Marty Evans was named in November by DHS to the HSPD-8 Senior Steering Committee.
As significant measures have been taken by government entities and private sector organizations to increase operational preparedness, the needs of the public must be included in developing policy to fully address national preparedness. In communities across the country, the Red Cross serves as a vehicle for the public to become engaged in making their communities safer from disasters. Building upon this experience, the Red Cross has collaborated extensively with DHS to help increase preparedness of the public—a critical component to all-hazards disaster preparedness and response.

This past July, the Red Cross, DHS, the George Washington University Homeland Security Policy Institute and the Council for Excellence in Government partnered to convene “Public Preparedness – A National Imperative,” a symposium of recognized leaders in disaster preparedness, response and recovery. The symposium identified the challenges and barriers to public preparedness and the needs and expectations of the public both during and after disaster. A copy of the symposium report for the subcommittee’s review is respectfully submitted for the record.

Undoubtedly, empowering the public to know what to do in the event of disaster will lessen the burden upon the first response community and government at all levels. Limiting preparedness to operational capability, thereby excluding public preparedness, runs counter to the July 2002 National Strategy for Homeland Security which affirms homeland security as a shared national responsibility with the American people. Accordingly, we have strongly recommended during development of the Goal that public preparedness be thoroughly addressed. To our delight, the vision outlined in the Interim National Preparedness goal now includes the general public as an active participant to achieve and sustain risk-based target levels of capabilities. The Red Cross stands ready to assist local, state, regional and federal partners within the disaster preparedness and response community move from theory to practice in implantation of the Goal’s vision.

Additionally, in recognition of the vital role they play in strengthening the preparedness of the United States we urged the inclusion of NGOs in National Preparedness Goal as partners with governmental and tribal entities in developing homeland security capabilities. NGOs such as the Red Cross bring additional resources that enable the governments at all levels to focus on other areas of preparedness and response.

NGOs are now repeatedly listed throughout the Interim National Preparedness Goal, including in the vision. Through our numerous memorandums of understandings, affiliations and other strategic partnerships, we look forward to helping integrate and leverage NGOs in the implementation of the Goal.

**Universal Task List and Target Capabilities List**

The Universal Task List (UTL) will provide a common language and reference point for all of agencies which respond to disasters. However, it does not mandate how a task is performed, only that it needs to be addressed. The Red Cross has worked closely with DHS to ensure that the tasks listed under #20, Mass Care (Sheltering, Feeding and Related Human Services) of the Goals’ corresponding draft guidance are reflective of the myriad challenges that must be planned.
for and executed in the mass care arena. Such a listing is required to successfully provide services after a major disaster.

We believe the current Target Capabilities List (TCL) included in the Goal is well conceived and includes practical competencies that government entities can reasonably be expected to develop and maintain. Specifically, we are pleased that citizen preparedness and participation has been included in the TCL. As previously described, the public is a vital component of all hazards preparedness. The addition of mass care, medical surge and volunteer management and donations show that DHS is recognizing the human needs associated with disasters. We look forward to using our community based experience and expertise to assist our government partners in strengthening their capacity to meet the public need.

In conclusion, we value the close relationship with our government partners and appreciate your continued interest in these important issues. Mr. Chairman, I stand ready to answer any questions the subcommittee may have.
NRP FACT SHEET
AMERICAN RED CROSS

• American Red Cross Listed as a Primary Agency:
  ➢ ESF #6 – Mass Care, Housing and Human Services

• American Red Cross Listed as a Support Agency:
  ➢ ESF #3 – Public Works and Engineering
  ➢ ESF #5 – Emergency Management
  ➢ ESF #8 – Public Health and Medical Services
  ➢ ESF #11 – Agriculture and Natural Resources
  ➢ ESF #14 – Long-Term Community Recovery and Mitigation
  ➢ ESF #15 – External Communications

• The American Red Cross Listed as a Cooperating Agency Under the NRP Support
Annexes:
  ➢ Financial Management
  ➢ International Coordination
  ➢ Private Sector Coordination
  ➢ Public Affairs
  ➢ Tribal Relations

• The American Red Cross Listed as a Cooperating Agency Under the NRP Incident
Annexes:
  ➢ Biological
  ➢ Catastrophic
  ➢ Nuclear/Radiological
From rural America to the suburbs to a busy metropolitan area, no one is immune to the effects of an unforeseen emergency, let alone a terrorist attack. Yet, the latest research indicates that only a fraction of Americans have taken the most basic steps to prepare themselves for a natural disaster or terrorist attack.

Among national leaders and experts in emergency preparedness, there is consensus that the time to act is now in order to get Americans more prepared. Yet, despite the urgency and the growing number of government leaders and nonprofit organizations now engaged in these efforts, the concept of individual preparedness is not a part of the social fabric. Too few citizens are taking it upon themselves to develop personal and family plans or to educate themselves about their communities' plans. The public remains largely disengaged in the very activity that could safeguard their health and safety.

To better understand the barriers to personal preparedness and to develop more effective ways of engaging the public, the American Red Cross, The George Washington University Homeland Security Policy Institute, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security and the Council for Excellence in Government formed a partnership to host “Public Preparedness: A National Imperative” in July 2004—a symposium designed to convene experts from across the country and gather a variety of perspectives. The symposium brought together leaders in disaster preparedness and response from government, the private sector, nongovernmental organizations and academia to identify the barriers to public preparedness and to begin a dialogue on possible solutions for quickly and effectively breaking through those barriers.

This report summarizes the thoughts of the experts and community leaders who are on the front lines of emergency preparedness every day. It is a compilation of the ideas expressed during the symposium and represents a vital first step in improving the public preparedness climate by hopefully serving as a catalyst for future discussion and action. The thoughts and ideas in this report should not be interpreted as having been agreed upon by all participants, as the symposium was not designed to generate consensus recommendations. The recommendations and best practices highlighted in this report can serve as an inspiration for future public preparedness initiatives by pointing to the next critical steps that must be taken by individuals, families and communities in order to create a more prepared America.
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Introduction

“We cannot secure America from inside the Beltway. Neither can we prepare
citizens from an office or a boardroom. Homeland security must be a priority
in every home, every city and every neighborhood across America.”

—Secretary Tom Ridge, U.S. Department of Homeland Security
About the Symposium

In July 2004, the American Red Cross, The George Washington University Homeland Security Policy Institute, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and the Council for Excellence in Government convened a symposium of recognized leaders in disaster preparedness and response from government, private sector, nongovernmental organizations and academia, many of whom have not had the opportunity to work together in a problem-solving forum before. Attendees took part in panel discussions and breakout sessions to define the barriers to public preparedness and to share insight on ways to engage the public. (A complete list of attendees and panel members is found in Appendix A. The agenda for the symposium is found in Appendix B.)

Primary objectives of the symposium were to:

• Define public preparedness.
• Identify barriers to engaging the public in preparedness activities.
• Develop recommendations and ideas for helping the public become more prepared.
• Identify best practices that help the public become more prepared.

About the Report

This report summarizes the themes and recommendations generated at the symposium. These themes and ideas will be considered by the Department of Homeland Security as it creates the "National Strategy for All Hazards Preparedness" under Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8 (HSPD8): National Preparedness (See Appendix D). This report will also be released directly to all participants, Congress, state legislatures and organizations involved in public preparedness, with the request that it be shared widely throughout their networks.
Key Recommendations
SUMMARY OF KEY RECOMMENDATIONS

Communications
- Define what public preparedness means.
- Teach the benefits of being prepared and consequences of not.
- Develop clear, compelling and easy-to-understand messages.
- Deliver realistic, audience-appropriate messages.
- Deliver messages using multiple messengers to reach different communities.

Disaster Preparedness and Response Operations
- Develop and communicate community prevention and readiness planning.
- Improve the ability of governments and first responders to work across jurisdictions.
- Develop and improve systems that allow information sharing before and during a disaster.
- Develop systems to allow for the sharing of best practices and success stories.
- Consider the establishment of benchmarks that allow communities to assess progress and set goals.
- Prepare for post-event community recovery.

Partnerships
- Establish enhanced relationships within the disaster preparedness and response community before a disaster occurs.
- Establish partnerships that draw on the strengths of the media, businesses, nonprofit and nongovernmental organizations.
Setting the Scene
SETTING THE SCENE

The symposium included two panel sessions, which were attended by all participants, and two breakout sessions. The goal of the panel sessions was to identify the current state of public preparedness. Panel members discussed the mindset of the American people and where preparedness fits into their priorities, as well as the existing operational environment in which responders work. Participants in the breakout sessions expanded on these topics, sharing expertise and experiences from the field. This process enabled attendees to work together to identify barriers to public preparedness, develop recommendations for overcoming barriers and share tangible best practices that are helping citizens prepare across the country. (A chart of best practices, which attendees were invited to fill out at the end of the symposium, is found in Appendix C.)

Although the focus of the symposium was on the needs and expectations of the public, discussions led to valuable insight on the needs of responders that can enable public preparedness. Related comments are interspersed throughout the report.
State of Public Preparedness Today

A variety of surveys have been conducted to assess the public’s receptivity to personal preparedness messages. All surveys generally demonstrate that, while some inroads have been made, there is more work to be done to achieve preparedness goals. Two such surveys were presented at the symposium.

The American Red Cross and the Council for Excellence in Government presented research data on the level of awareness that Americans have about preparing for disasters and the specific steps they have taken. This research will be presented throughout this section, as applicable.

The disaster preparedness and response community has made great strides in preparing for disasters. It has improved training, acquired equipment and developed plans for emergency response. Those plans, however, assume that the public knows its role and is ready to act appropriately. This is problematic, as research shows that only:

- 18% of Americans are aware of their state’s emergency plans1
- 19% of Americans are aware of their local emergency plans2
- About 50% of Americans are familiar with the disaster plan at their workplaces2
- About 50% of parents know the disaster plans of their children’s schools or day care centers2
- 34% of Americans have sought information about what to do in the event of a disaster or developed a plan for communicating with their families1
- 30% of Americans have taken a training class in civil preparedness, first aid or CPR1
- About 10% of American households have a family emergency plan, a disaster kit, and training in first aid and CPR2
- About 20% of Americans feel very prepared for a catastrophic event2

"It’s as if we have recruited a secret army and they haven’t gotten their orders. It’s such a secret, in fact, that the troops don’t even know they’re expected to serve...it’s our hope that continued discussion will allow us to emerge with a clear blueprint of the steps we need to take to markedly improve public preparedness.”

---Marsha Johnsen Evans, President and CEO, American Red Cross
"Americans say that they are ready, willing and able to help, but most are still not informed or prepared to prevent or respond to a terrorist attack."
—Patricia McGinnis, President and CEO, Council for Excellence in Government

The Gap between Public Concern and Public Action

Despite shortfalls in preparedness, Americans are aware that it is important to plan for disasters. They feel safer today than before September 11, but most believe that there will be another terrorist attack, and they believe that they have a direct hand in safeguarding the nation if one occurs.1 Top concerns are bioterrorism, chemical weapons and attacks on power plants and water facilities. Specifically, research indicates that:

- 76% of Americans believe that there will be another terrorist attack.1
- 50% of Americans think that the attack may be near where they live or work.1
- 84% of Americans agree that when all Americans are prepared for all types of disaster, it strengthens national security.2
- About 67% of Americans say that they would volunteer their time to get trained and prepare to help, but they do not know how.3

1The council presented data derived from national polls of citizens and first responders and town hall meetings that were conducted through the Homeland Security from a Citizen’s Perspective initiative in 2003.
2The Red Cross presented findings from a national survey of 1,001 adult Americans that was conducted in conjunction with Wirthlin Worldwide in 2004.
Challenges and Barriers
Communication Issues

Research indicates that Americans are willing to volunteer their time to get training and to help but most do not know how. The disaster preparedness and response community says that the information is available but is aware that it may not be visible, accessible or easily understood. In fact, 60% of first responders rate the communications between their agency and the citizens they serve as only somewhat effective. Symposium attendees cited the following communication-related issues as major challenges to overcome in order to educate the public about preparedness and engage citizens in preparedness activities.

- Terms used to discuss public preparedness are not well defined.
- "Public preparedness" means different things to different people—even within the disaster preparedness and response community. There are different ideas about:
  - Items that citizens should set aside.
  - Response actions they should be prepared to take.
  - Benchmarks to know when they are sufficiently prepared.

In their discussions, symposium attendees formed a basis for beginning to define "public preparedness." They recommended that the overall unifying message to all Americans be rooted in the concepts of personal responsibility and self-reliance. This message can promote the empowering idea that Americans can take steps to save their lives and those of their families and employees through the preparedness actions they take in advance.

The release of Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8 (HSPD8) on December 17, 2003, triggered the process to establish a national definition, goals and metrics for preparedness. The directive
calls for federal, state and local governments, and other external stakeholders to come together and establish measurable readiness priorities that appropriately balance the potential threat and magnitude of major disasters.

Yet symposium attendees noted that local communities still must tailor public preparedness messages to specific communities based on their location, possible targets in the area, and other factors. Participants recommended that the messages include sufficient specifics and action steps that enable citizens to be self-reliant during the first hours of an event. Empowering citizens to be more independent during the first 24 hours of a disaster will prevent them from overwhelming emergency personnel and 9-1-1 with calls and help them initially address less critical matters.

- Specific advice on how to be better prepared is not reaching the public and is not breaking through other information that is presented to them.

The information that is released to the public is vague, according to symposium attendees. Americans have been given only a general picture of preparedness, and they are asking for more specifics. In particular, they feel that they lack detailed information about:

- Procedures to prepare/respond (e.g., what items to have on hand to shelter-in-place).
- Why threat levels are raised and how they should respond.
- What suspicious activities are and how, when and to whom to report them.

"We are frustrated right now in America because we want to ask the public to do something (that will increase the national level of preparedness). And, we don’t know exactly what it is we want to ask of them."—Mike Corona, Sheriff, Orange County, California

"[Public preparedness] relieves some pressure from the first responders to concentrate on issues and not worry about the things that the average citizen should be and can be doing themselves. It frees our first responders up. And if people understand that they are playing a role in our security by solving problems on their own, they will appreciate and understand the need a little better."

—Alan McCurry, Chief Operating Officer, American Red Cross
Americans are savvy navigators of the Information Age, picking and choosing the messages to which they will pay attention and respond. Preparedness information, however, often gets lost in the stream of clutter because accessibility and use of the most effective channels varies across local, state and federal efforts. In particular, some symposium attendees expressed concern that messages about preparedness are:

- **Not user-friendly.**
  Some materials, such as lengthy and technical community emergency plans that can be downloaded online, are impractical for the area resident to understand and use.

- **Too long.**
  Too much general information is given—the public wants bite-sized, action-based specifics with rationale as to why they should do these things. For example, in addition to telling the public that they should have their personal identifications and medical information handy, they can be told that this is important because they may have to go to a mass immunization dispensing site where they will need this information.

- **Communicated through less effective messengers.**
  Some people distrust two of the disaster preparedness and response community’s most used voices—the federal government and the police. In many communities, people are more likely to pay attention to trusted community leaders (e.g., clergy, city council members, American Red Cross chapters). It is important to reach people where they work, live, play and pray, and through trusted, local sources/messengers.

- **Not compelling.**
  Messages about preparedness do not make it clear that lives may be at stake.
Audience Vulnerabilities, Attitudes and Priorities

Symposium attendees identified other barriers that prevent citizens from finding and using preparedness information. These include different life situations and personal circumstances that can limit access to information and resources about how to become better prepared. Competing day-to-day priorities rarely place preparedness efforts at the top of the list.

Research shows the most vulnerable groups include:
- Older Americans
- Those with no postsecondary education
- Those who are unemployed
- Lower-income families

Additionally, attitudes toward preparedness may also be a barrier. Some Americans say that they:
- Do not know where to get the information to prepare
- Are not concerned—being prepared is not necessary
- Feel they are already prepared, even if they are not
- Are too busy—they have no time to prepare
- Have not thought about preparedness at all
Coordination between Organizations in the Disaster Preparedness and Response Community

While not directly a public preparedness communication issue, symposium discussions often included issues related to disaster response operations, which is natural because public preparedness and disaster response operations are inextricably linked.

In addition to not being well known by the public, symposium attendees expressed that response plans may not be coordinated among different groups. In particular, plans that are developed and exercised by different local, state and national groups are not always linked to each other. As a result, the public may receive conflicting information about what to do and where to go for help.
Recommendations
In light of the identified challenges, symposium attendees brainstormed ways to break through barriers and motivate the public to take an active role in preparing for disasters. Overall, the recommendations were discussed primarily as directives for government at all levels as well as the stakeholders in disaster preparedness and response—including private businesses, nonprofits and nongovernmental organizations. Local organizations and community groups are a critical link for putting the recommendations into action.

**COMMUNICATIONS**

Public preparedness hinges on successful communication. The majority of the symposium was spent discussing issues related to defining, tailoring and positioning public preparedness messages.

"We all have a stake in emergency preparedness. But it’s important to define our roles and responsibilities in advance so we know what we need to be doing and, most importantly, how we should work together to do it."

—Susan Neely, Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs, U.S. Department of Homeland Security

According to symposium attendees, there should be a high level of consensus and a clear understanding among all members of the disaster preparedness and response community about the reasons why it is important for the public to be prepared for disasters, what "public preparedness" is and what the public is being asked to do. Once this is achieved, Americans will be able to complete and act upon sentences such as:

- "It is important for me to be prepared for a disaster because …"
- "To be prepared for disasters, I must know information about …"
- "To be prepared, I must know how to …"
- "I must have … readily available."
- "I know that I am prepared when I …"

A starting point at the national level is to refine the definition of "preparedness" in Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8.
"We have not yet defined the goal of what a well-prepared region might be in terms of business preparedness, public sector preparedness or public preparedness, and thus accomplished, we would then be able to assign priorities in the way that we assign our resources, financial and otherwise."

—George Wadenburg, Founding Chairman of Task Forces on Emergency Preparedness for the Greater Washington Board of Trade and the Community Foundation of the National Capital Region; Private Sector Senior Advisory Committee to the Homeland Security Advisory Council

(HSPD8): National Preparedness, which refers to "the existence of plans, procedures, policies, training and equipment necessary at the local, state and federal level to maximize the ability to prevent, respond to and recover from major events." Critical components missing from this definition are the individual citizens and their roles and responsibilities in preparedness.

Symposium attendees offered their thoughts on what might be folded into preparedness messages:

- More information could be provided on core procedures, such as how to shelter in place and how to create a family emergency plan/kit. Attendees felt that it is more efficient to teach citizens the specific actions that they may be called to take.

- Sheltering in place is a key teaching point. People's natural instincts are to flee and evacuate when there is a disaster. The preparedness message can acknowledge those instincts, explain what is meant by the term "shelter in place" or, more specifically, explain what to do if they are asked to "seal the room." The message could inform the public that they may be asked to stay where they are and emphasize why it is critical to their health and safety that they follow shelter-in-place instructions. Additionally, the preparedness message can assure the public that community prevention and readiness planning provides the option for extended shelter in place by making available necessary supplies, such as food and water. (See the Disaster Preparedness and Response Operations section for more information on community shielding.)

- The preparedness message can help manage the expectations of the public in the immediate hours after a significant emergency. Symposium attendees recommend that Americans be made aware that the government and services arms of the disaster preparedness and response community have limits to what they can do. The public should be encouraged to take on preparedness because they understand that these steps are the best things they can do to protect themselves and their families.
Managing expectations also means giving the public a realistic picture of what they may be asked to do in an emergency. For example, messages can inform them that they may not only be asked to shelter in place, but also, that they may be asked to do so for three or more days with the aid of community shielding plans.

Teach the benefits of being prepared and the consequences of not.

While working to define the message, it is important for stakeholders to also come up with an approach for how they will position information to elicit public buy-in and engage the public in preparedness activities. One effective approach is two-pronged, with messages that both:

- Promote self-empowerment and self-efficacy in order to motivate individuals to take responsibility for their own health and safety.
- Provide rationale for specific preparedness and response activities (why it matters) to validate and gain public support and adherence to them.

The consumer safety industry, led by nongovernmental organizations, such as the National Fire Protection Association and the American Safety Council, offers one good model to follow to put this approach into action. In motivating Americans to take precautions against various risks, consumer safety advocates:

- Increase awareness of a particular risk (e.g., death by car accident, home fire).
- Craft messages showing the public that they can mitigate the risk by their own actions (e.g., wearing a seat belt, installing smoke detectors).

Explain to the public the benefits and consequences of their action or inaction through compelling examples and messages. The disaster preparedness and response community can incorporate this proven process in communications with the public, as is currently being done as part of the Ready campaign and Citizen...
Corps efforts. These national programs also can serve as a catalyst for local efforts.

In addition to articulating risks and the power that the public has in mitigating them, a key point will be explaining the reasons why specific actions are called for in different disaster scenarios. It is not enough to tell the public that they should take a particular preparedness step. The information should be expanded to include the reasons and benefits for taking that step as well as the life-threatening consequences of not doing so.

Messages need to be audience-driven and tap into the motivations of specific audiences. Not everyone has the same reasons for doing things. It is important to recognize that the one-size-fits-all message is doomed to fail.

Additionally, tone—the mood created by language—will play an important part in motivating the public. Symposium attendees recommend that the tone of messages includes the following characteristics:

- **Show an appropriate level of concern and seriousness.** Any town is a potential target for a disaster so preparedness is imperative.
- **Be encouraging and hopeful.** The actions that citizens take to prepare will make a difference in their safety.
- **Be realistic.** Messages can acknowledge that preparedness is not achieved overnight—it is a long-term commitment.
- **Be empowering.** It is important for Americans to keep perspective and maintain a sense of confidence about their place in the world.

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the messages, but not so much that it saturates—and turns off—intentions to prepare.
Social marketing and communications experts are crafting clear-cut messages that are highly informative and appealing, and can be involved throughout communications development. While the Ready campaign is engaged in these efforts, more work can be done at all levels, from the community level on up.
Symposium attendees generated a basic list of actions, simply stated, that the public can take to prepare for disasters:
- Make emergency plans.
- Communicate plans with their families.
- Practice drills in schools and at workplaces.
- Attend preparedness training (e.g., first aid, CPR, fire prevention, safety).
- Volunteer (e.g., through Citizen Corps).
- Be informed about potential risks to your area and how to respond.

Develop realistic, audience-appropriate messages.

AUTHENTICITY OF MESSAGES is important. They can be tailored to meet the information needs and communication styles of different audiences within the American public. This includes persons from/with different:
- Racial/ethnic backgrounds
- Geographic locations
- Age groups
- Physical disabilities
- Mental/emotional disabilities
- Socioeconomic situations
- Professions
Social marketing and communications experts can research the
needs and preferences of each of these target audiences. They can help the disaster preparedness and response community synthesize the findings and use these findings to customize message points that will resonate as powerful calls to action within different communities.

State Farm Insurance, for example, has a partnership with The Children’s Hospital of Philadelphia, which seeks to determine how and why children are killed or injured in car crashes. Findings from this research, such as the significant benefits of using age- and size-appropriate child restraints, are converted into understandable messages for child caregivers. The research findings are delivered to safety advocates, pediatricians, child seat inspectors, legislators and others and are converted into messages that are appropriate for their specific audiences. For example, State Farm develops messages for their policyholders, as a customer service, to help them provide the best protection for their children in case of an unfortunate serious car crash.

Deliver the message using multiple messengers to reach different communities.

Authenticity of messengers is important and different messengers will be needed to reach different audiences. This is true for all communities, not just those that are “hard to reach.” Disaster preparedness and response groups can refer to the research on target audiences to determine what spokespersons exist within their communities who are trusted and respected. Leaders of community groups, such as civic- and faith-based organizations, for example, are often the trusted, reliable messengers who can help deliver preparedness messages and conduct related activities.

Other trusted, credible messengers that can help deliver preparedness messages and conduct related activities include:

- Community groups active in disaster response, such as the American Red Cross and other voluntary organizations.
• Health professionals (doctors and nurses).
• Teachers and school principals.
Disaster preparedness and response groups should consider that, often, the most powerful messengers are those who have experienced a disaster firsthand. Testimonials—true stories of loss and resilience—are a good way to enhance authenticity of messages and messengers. Personal lessons learned about disaster preparedness can motivate others to take action.
Children can also be effective messengers. They are a proven channel for influencing the behavior of their parents and caregivers by sharing and encouraging what they learn in school (e.g., recycling, the value of being physically active). Public preparedness can be added to the positive behaviors we teach our children.
Delivery of messages also involves creative marketing of usable information. Symposium attendees discussed putting simple preparedness phrases on refrigerator magnets and index cards, as well as publishing a quarterly newsletter on emergency preparedness issues. It is important to look beyond basic brochures and fact sheets to find creative solutions that are practical and appealing. Creative materials selection can help the public use the information before, during and after disasters.

Disaster Preparedness and Response Operations

While the emphasis was on public preparedness, discussions of ways to overcome communication barriers led naturally to some discussion of how procedures and operations within the disaster preparedness and response community might be improved to enable information sharing.
The Amber Alert program, which alerts law enforcement, the media and the public to cases of child abduction, is an established successful program. The program works because of the way in which the media disseminates the information and the fact that the public is highly engaged. Child abduction is an issue that most people feel passionately about and will do anything to stop.

**Improve the ability of governments and first responders to work across jurisdictions.**

Local and state governments must continue to assess their current operations and identify where their vulnerabilities lie. They can develop plans to work together and to share resources and personnel across jurisdictions, if needed. (For example, jurisdiction A needs to know that they can go to jurisdiction B, which has larger pump capacity, if they run out of water during a mass fire response.) Symposium attendees recommend that local and state governments clearly define the roles and responsibilities of their responders and how disasters will be handled if they cross city, county or state lines.

**Develop and improve systems that allow information sharing before and during a disaster.**

Systems can be put in place to allow better data gathering and information sharing by responders at all levels and across all jurisdictions. The systems can allow for communications so that local groups have access to national information and national groups can easily access local information. Response groups can use a variety of communication media, including radio and Internet, to allow continued communication if one system fails during a disaster. Systems can also be developed and implemented to share information quickly with the public during disasters. Response groups can exercise these systems by organizing and conducting communications-specific drills that focus on public affairs and public communications functions.

Symposium attendees also recommend a system for citizens to sign up with their local government or response group to receive emergency information and instructions through whichever channel they choose, including phones, cell phones and e-mail. The Arlington Alert System in Arlington County, Virginia, for example, uses the Roam Secure Alert Network to immediately contact county residents and
persons working in the county during emergencies. The system delivers electronic alerts and updates to e-mail accounts, cell phones, pagers, Blackberry devices and personal digital assistants (PDAs). Additionally, Arlington County Emergency Management personnel notify citizens who are registered for this service of emergency information using the Community Alert System.

Develop systems to allow for the sharing of best practices and success stories.

Best practices offer tangible examples of strategies and programs that have yielded successful results. A system could be established where local response groups can regularly share their best practices with each other, as well as with the federal government. The system can include names and phone numbers so that detailed information about how to implement similar programs and activities can be obtained from the source of the best practice, if needed. The federal government can glean lessons learned from the communities and incorporate them into their national strategies.

Consider the establishment of benchmarks that allow communities to...

Improving public preparedness takes time, but being able to measure progress along the way is critical. Disaster preparedness and response groups can help citizens set goals and assess their progress by establishing benchmarks that they can work to achieve and that will indicate to them their level of preparedness. These benchmarks could be based on specific preparedness steps, such as participating in CPR training or preparing a disaster supply kit. Benchmarks could also be developed at the local, state and national levels, being flexible to account for variations in location and...
risk factors (e.g., high-risk terrorist target areas, hurricane-prone areas). For communities with long-range plans, symposium attendees recommend assessing progress with benchmarks that include short-term deadlines. Local and state governments can look within their communities to determine if their citizens are more prepared, based on the achievement of specific preparedness steps, than they were 30 days prior or during another time interval that works for the community. Awards programs could be established to recognize communities and individuals that achieve benchmarks and meet deadlines.

Prepare for post-event community recovery.

In addition to preparing for disasters, it is important to prepare for recovery from them. Response groups at all levels may consider how to help promote economic recoverability and community stability after the event is over. In particular, they can make plans to take care of human services needs such as shelter and water, help businesses resume operations quickly and get citizens back to school and work. One way of doing this involves communicating with businesses on specific threats that could interrupt their operations during a disaster. A cyber security education and awareness campaign, for example, could be launched with information aimed at helping small businesses recover from cyber attacks.

Post-event exercises also could be used to identify effective ways to respond to long-term human services needs. The National Exercise Program, for example, serves as a framework for the design of response exercises at all levels but does not currently address how the long-term human services needs of disaster victims will be addressed. The program, which is established by Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8 (HSPD8), could be extended to explore the long-term effects of disasters on populations, geographic areas and local economies and implement related response exercises.
Plans could also be put in place to examine what resources will be needed in the aftermath of a disaster and how those resources will be supplied. Blood, for example, is one vital public health resource that must be available at all times. Preparations should be made to manage this—possibly through a national blood reserve—and other resources in order to ensure an adequate supply and efficient delivery to the public.

Symposium attendees shared other ideas for how disaster response operations might be improved to enable public preparedness. The ideas that were discussed are presented here in no order of priority:

- Identify community-specific networks and anchors that will facilitate community shielding preparation, coordination, and implementation. Service organizations, such as the American Red Cross and Citizen Corps, can facilitate this type of planning. Distribution and dissemination of Department of Homeland Security and community-specific information can be done through public sector channels like schools and private sector channels such as local shopping centers, which can serve as community preparedness clearinghouses.

- Regionalize the threat warning system. There is concern that the current color-coded system does not provide specific directions for what citizens and responders should do at each level in different parts of the country. If the system is adapted to other locations outside of Washington, DC, states would be able to communicate more detailed information about why threat levels are raised and what actions to take.

- Continue to use September as National Preparedness Month to heighten awareness about the importance of public preparedness and offer related activities and information.

- Establish an easy-to-use phone number, such as 3-1-1, for citizens at the local level to report homeland security threats.

- Institute civil defense drills in schools—an updated version of the type that was used in the 1950s. Students would be trained in age-appropriate exercises, and teachers would know how to respond to disasters in the school environment.
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the American Red Cross have each launched citizen preparedness campaigns to deliver messages about the importance of preparedness to the public. Both the DHS Ready campaign and the American Red Cross Together We Prepare campaign rely on multiple partners to maximize visibility of the information.

For instance, the U.S. Postal Service carries brochures on terrorism preparedness in every post office across the country and the Salvation Army distributes brochures in its stores as well as wherever they interact with communities.

The Yellow Pages phone book includes a section about terrorism preparedness, and nearly 1,000 American Red Cross chapters and Blood Services regions nationwide are partnering with communities to enable individuals to be better prepared for all kinds of disasters.

- Involve groups with special needs, such as the elderly and those with physical limitations, in the disaster preparedness and response planning process to ensure that their needs are met. Disaster preparedness and response planners, for example, can learn about the needs of the hearing-impaired community by collaborating with Project Access, a project of the Consumer Action Network, which is documenting the breakthroughs in and obstacles to access to response care and resources experienced by that community on September 11 and during other disasters.

- Allocate more resources and funding to volunteer organizations such as Citizen Corps. Disaster preparedness and response planners can create and train their communities on the concept of staging areas where volunteers can meet during a disaster and be dispatched to help, as needed.

- Develop plans to ensure that the nation's blood supply needs will be met during disasters, in part through the establishment of a National Blood Reserve.

- Establish relationships with local government representatives. Local and state responders can benefit from established relationships with their congressional representatives, including staffers who work on disaster preparedness and response issues. They can update them regularly on their community's state of preparedness and work with them to fulfill requests for personnel, equipment and information.

Partnerships

Enhancing relationships between members of the disaster preparedness and response community, in addition to establishing partnerships with the media, business and civic groups, among other organizations, is essential to strengthening public preparedness. Partnerships enable diverse groups to share critical information and
resources, thus expanding the ability of the disaster preparedness and response community to reach the public, increase public preparedness capabilities and improve incident response.

Establish enhanced relationships within the disaster preparedness and response community.

Members of the disaster preparedness and response community often meet each other for the first time during a disaster. A system could be established to enable relationships between nongovernmental organizations, private businesses, government and responders at all levels beforehand. Formal partnerships allow these groups to draw from each other’s strengths and lead to better communications and operations overall.

Establish partnerships that draw on the strengths of the media.

Potential partners identified by symposium attendees include:

Media

The media play an important role in improving public preparedness, and their involvement makes the public better informed. The media are interested in doing stories that teach the public how to prepare as well as those stories that examine how resources and tools are being used. Members of the disaster preparedness and response community, including government and nongovernmental organizations and response groups, could convene a working group with the media to identify salient, newsworthy preparedness topics and to explore what steps they can take in partnership to help the public prepare for disasters. This group could examine how to promote National Preparedness Month in September as well as how to promote safety and preparedness as a year-round priority. A
media campaign could be launched through which stories are released weekly or monthly, focusing on issues, such as fire, severe summer weather, severe winter weather and homeland security awareness.

Media members are generally willing to collaborate with each other. The Federal Communications Commission’s Security and Reliability Council, for example, is developing plans to enable media groups to share broadcast frequencies if communities lose power and signals are lost.

Additionally, reporters, editors and other media practitioners experience disasters personally, as well as professionally. They take seriously the public service they provide in communicating valuable health and safety information. Some are willing to donate time and resources, and response groups can work proactively with them to identify ways they can help the public prepare for disasters.

Businesses

Employers have the capacity to speak to their employees in a systematic way and over a long period of time. Response groups can work with the private businesses in their local communities to help them train their employees in lifesaving techniques and steps to ensure continuity of operations. They can post preparedness information in buildings, offer first aid and safety training, and create staff councils dedicated to developing workplace emergency plans and improving workplace preparedness. Labor unions are another employee-centered group that can help engage its members in preparedness activities.

Additionally, the disaster preparedness and response community can continue partnering with large businesses that sell goods related to disaster preparedness, such as Home Depot, Lowe’s, Wal-Mart and the American Red Cross online store. Retailers could offer already-assembled emergency preparedness kits to make it easier for the public to purchase the items they need, and they could offer discounts on specific items, such as batteries, flashlights and handheld radios.
Symposium attendees also explored the idea of offering tax incentives to companies that institute preparedness programs. They discussed tax incentives for states that achieve preparedness benchmarks and for citizens who demonstrate preparedness (e.g., creating a family emergency plan, having a disaster kit, completing training in first aid and CPR).

Nonprofit and nongovernmental organizations

Nonprofit and nongovernmental organizations are trusted and respected members of their communities. They also have a nationwide network that provides inroads into communities that may be difficult to reach. They could broaden the reach of preparedness messages by partnering with other responder, business and government organizations to share information and resources that are already available.

The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), for example, often partners with the American Red Cross to communicate health information. CDC is able to reach the public through the American Red Cross’s established and trusted local chapters. In turn, the American Red Cross is able to provide citizens with expert information.

Symposium attendees also recommended partnerships with:

- **Charitable organizations.** They can assemble emergency kits and donate them to the elderly and citizens with special needs.
- **Schools.** Preparedness activities can be folded into the curriculum—service projects can focus on preparing the community.
- **Civic groups.** Members of community service organizations and youth groups within schools, such as the Girl Scouts, Boy Scouts and Key Clubs, can serve as proactive information distribution networks and provide community service, such as volunteering to assemble emergency kits.
- ** Faith-based groups.** Churches, mosques and synagogues often respond to the call to help families and communities recover from disasters. They offer a network of support and resources.
• Entertainment industry. The disaster preparedness and response communities can benefit from their high visibility and resonance with the public.

• Organizations representing municipal and county governments. Local League of Cities and Association of Counties affiliates can assist with preparedness education and outreach efforts.
PREPAREDNESS IS A PARTNERSHIP

"No government entity, no organization, no information expert can replace individual responsibility."

—Secretary Tom Ridge, U.S. Department of Homeland Security
Keynoting the symposium, U.S. Department of Homeland Security Secretary Tom Ridge delivered an address that focused on the necessity of making preparedness a part of the daily routine of every American. Ridge emphasized the idea that the disaster preparedness and response community needs to embrace the public as one of its partners and that all of the partners in disaster preparedness and response are equally critical to national security. He called on all symposium attendees to take measures to promote public preparedness.

Part of the measures to promote public preparedness involves creating a sense of empowerment in Americans that they have a direct hand in the safety of their families, community and nation. It also involves drawing from the lessons of Americans for whom preparedness is a daily part of life, such as citizens who may be especially vulnerable to natural disasters or other emergencies. Their commitment to vigilance should be stretched across the United States and broadened to apply to all disasters—natural disasters and terrorist attacks.

Secretary Ridge cited the work of the Council for Excellence in Government, the American Red Cross, and the Ready campaign as a catalyst for making this happen. He also acknowledged volunteers and those collaborating with Citizen Corps as key strengths in preparing communities at the local level.
Conclusion

"I know no safe depository of the ultimate powers of the society but the people themselves; and if we think them not enlightened enough to exercise their control with a wholesome discretion, the remedy is not to take it from them, but to inform their discretion."

—Thomas Jefferson
As the title of this symposium reflects, public preparedness is a national imperative. While generating many valuable insights into the barriers to personal preparedness, the symposium also generated innovative solutions to overcome them. The symposium participants reached an overwhelming consensus that the time to act is now in order to get Americans more prepared. As symposium participants asserted, the importance of citizen preparedness must be shared widely by all types of messengers in towns, cities and states across the country. At the federal level, this report can be one of the many resources for the National Strategy for All Hazards Preparedness (HSPD8) and will help inform discussions related to its development.

The symposium sponsors, The American Red Cross, The George Washington University Homeland Security Policy Institute, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security and the Council for Excellence in Government, are committed to an ongoing partnership to bring about a more prepared American public and view the symposium as a vital first step in the process.
Appendix A: List of Symposium Attendees and Panel Members

Stephen P. Austin  
Fire Service Adviser  
Congressional Fire Services Institute  
Dr. Michael Barnett  
Fellow  
Office of Congressman Patrick J. Kennedy  
Ann Beachhouse  
Executive Director of Homeland Security  
U.S. Chamber of Commerce  
for Becker  
Vice President, Response  
American Red Cross  
John Buchanan  
Vice President for Government Affairs  
Northplan Fire Protection Association  
Brian Bradley  
Executive Vice President  
State Farm Insurance Company  
Michele Brennan  
Homeland Security Volunteer Coordinator  
Orlando City Corps Council  
Colonel Michael Brown  
Chief of Staff, 50th Regional Readiness Command  
U.S. Department of Homeland Security  
Ed Calca  
Senior Vice President for Technology and Operations  
Public Broadcasting Service  
Michael S. Carosa  
Sheriff and Coroner  
Osceola County (FL) Sheriff's Department  
Pete Castelli  
Deputy Director  
International Association of Emergency Managers  
Chief Carlos Castillo  
Director  
Miami-Dade (FL) Office of Emergency Management  
Paul Chandler  
Executive Director  
Homeland Security Dialogue Forum  
Frank J. Cilluffo  
Executive Director, Homeland Security  
Police Institute; Associate Vice President for Homeland Security, The George Washington University  
Barbara Coogan  
President  
Radio-Television News Directors Association  
Peggy Conlon  
President and Chief Executive Officer  
The Advertising Council, Inc.  
Scott Comer  
Vice President, Preparedness  
American Red Cross  
Chuck Comer  
Senior Vice President, Communications and Marketing  
American Red Cross  
Sydney Davis  
DC Community Activist  
Liz DiGregorio  
Citizen Corps Liaison to the White House  
Amanda Dooy  
Office of Homeland Defense  
U.S. Department of Defense  
Jerome DuVal  
Interim Executive Director  
Serve DC  
Mary Elcano  
General Counsel and Corporate Secretary  
American Red Cross  
Mark J. Johnson  
President and Chief Executive Officer  
American Red Cross  
Reena Evans  
CERT Manager  
Serve DC  
Carl Fellsco  
Vice President, Innovation and Public Engagement  
The Council for Excellence in Government  
Chris Floyd  
Emergency Services Director  
American Red Cross Florida Capital Area  
George W. Foreman  
Assistant to the Governor for Commonwealth Preparedness, Virginia  
Lee Frizzier  
Vice President, Government Accounts  
Neal Frazier  
Intergovernmental Affairs Coordinator  
Governor's Office on Service and Volunteerism  
John Caggiati  
Chief Researcher  
Sun Microsystems  
Brian A. Gallagher  
President and CEO  
United Way of America  
Michael Gandolphi  
Fellow, Homeland Security Policy Institute  
The George Washington University  
Russell W. Gardner  
Disaster Recovery Manager  
DC Emergency Management Agency  
Pietro Giglio  
Consultant  
Alfred P. Sloan Foundation  
The Honorable James S. Gilmore III  
Former Governor, Commonwealth of Virginia; Chairman, Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction  
Dr. Tom Gluesenkamp  
Market Development Manager  
Agilent Technologies  
Alan Goodman  
Executive Director, September 11th Recovery Program  
American Red Cross  
Justin Grenes  
Vice President  
Wrightline Worldwide  
Katherine Hansen  
Director of Corporate Partners  
The Council for Excellence in Government
Appendix A (cont.)
Appendix A (cont.)

Dr. Jerrold Post
Clinical Professor of Psychiatry and
Behavioral Sciences, GW University
Kathy Prendergast
Department of Homeland Security
Carolyn Prevot
Chief of Staff
American Red Cross
Deborah A. Price
Deputy Under Secretary, Office of Safe
and Drug Free Schools
U.S. Department of Education
Chief Les G. Redford
Human Services Branch
New York State Emergency
Management Office
Susan Remington
North Dakota Deputy Homeland
Security Coordinator and Deputy
Emergency Management Director
Judy Reyes Hancok
Executive Officer
American Red Cross
Scott Rider
Researcher
Hudson Security Institute
Ralph Roman
Director, Homeland Security
Harris Corporation
Jim Ryan
Group President
Grady
Dr. Gregory Saffoff
Associate Professor
University of Virginia
Michael Sage
Deputy Director, Office of Terrorism
Preparedness and Emergency Response
Centers for Disease Control and
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Dr. Andrew Salter
Director of the Cancer Program
Helene & Harry Grey Cancer Center
Heather Schaefer
Executive Director
National Volunteer Fire Council
Joel Schrader
Policy Advisor
Skip Seitz
Senior Vice President, Growth and
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American Red Cross
Stephen L. Sewell
Deputy Mayor, City of Tulsa,
Oklahoma
Lena Shane
Department of Homeland Security
Richard Sheehy
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GW Medical Center
Marc Short
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Office of State and Local Government
Coordination and Preparedness
Department of Homeland Security
Terry Sicilia
Executive Vice President, Programs and
Services
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Kerry L. Sleeper
Commissioner
Public Safety Department, Vermont
Jacqueline Smelling
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Arlington County, Virginia, Citizen
Corps
Deborah A. Spagnoli
Commissioner
U.S. Department of Justice
Suzanne E. Spalding
Minority Counsel and Staff Director
U.S. House of Representatives
Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence
Dr. Daryl Spitzer
President
International Association of Emergency
Managers
Fire Staff
National Director for Safety and Health
Building Trades
AFL-CIO
Claude Stout
Chair
National Deaf and Hard of Hearing
Consumer Advocacy Network
Laura Thomsen
Executive Director
American Society for Therapeutic
Radiology and Oncology
Dr. Timothy Tinker
Vice President
Wisconsin Communications
James K. Trawick
Director, Corporate Communications
Grainger
George Weadensburg
Founding Chairman
of Task Forces on Emergency
Preparedness for the Greater
Washington Board of Trade and the
Community Foundation of the National
Capital Region; Private Sector Senior
Advisory Committee to the Homeland
Security Advisory Council
William Webh
Executive Director
Congressional Fire Services Institute
Peter Weber
Chairman
Board of the Friends of Fire Corps
The Honorable Carl Weldon (R-PA)
Congressman, Seventh District
U.S. House of Representatives
Melba Werneth
Senior Policy Analyst
RAND Corporation
Theresa Wigger
Director, Legislative Affairs
American Association of Blood Banks
Dr. John W. Williams
Provost and Vice President of Health
Affairs
The George Washington University
Mary Wooley
President
Research America
Appendix B: Symposium Agenda • July 20, 2004 • Public Preparedness—A National Imperative


8–8:30 a.m. Continental breakfast available

8:30–9:00 a.m. Opening Remarks
• Marshall Johnson Evans, President and CEO, American Red Cross

8:50–9 a.m. Findings and Recommendations
At the People: Homeland Security from the Citizens’ Perspective
• Patricia McClenes, President and CEO, Council for Excellence in Government

9–10:15 a.m. Not If, But When: Defining the Issues
• Frank Ciculli, Associate Vice President for Homeland Security, The George Washington University, Moderator
• Janet Gilmore, Chairman, Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction
• Rep. Curt Weldon (R-PA), Vice Chair of Subcommitteee on Emergency Preparedness and Response
• Rep. Jane Harman (D-CA), Ranking Member, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
• George Foresman, Assistant to the Governor for Commonwealth Preparedness, Virginia
• Alan McCurry, Chief Operating Officer, American Red Cross

10:15–10:30 a.m. Break

10:30–11:40 a.m. Prepare Now... Prepare How: Setting Goals
• Susan Neely, Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs, Department of Homeland Security, Moderator
• Barbara Cochran, President, Radio-Television News Directors Association and Founders
• Peggy Currie, President and CEO, The Advertising Council
• George Wadensburt, Private Sector Senior Advisory Committee to the Homeland Security Advisory Council, Founding Chairmen of Task Forces on Emergency Preparedness for the Greater Washington Board of Trade and for the Community Foundation of the National Capital Region
• Brian Bagdan, Executive Vice President, State Farm Insurance Companies

12:15–1:30 p.m. Welcome
• John F. Williams, MD, EdD, Provost and Vice President for Health Affairs, The George Washington University

Keynote Speaker
• Honorable Tom Ridge, Secretary, Department of Homeland Security
Lunch at The George Washington University

1:45–3:30 p.m. Afternoon Breakout Sessions
Interactive format drawing upon the expertise of participants in the session

Before Disaster Strikes: Preparedness Breakfast Discussion Group
• Facilitator: Sue Mencer, Director, Office of State and Local Government Coordination and Preparedness, Department of Homeland Security

The Impacts—Prepare Now: During and After Disaster Discussion Group
• Facilitator: Michael Brown, Under Secretary for Emergency Preparedness and Response

Overview of National Response Plan and National Incident Management System
• Bob Shea, Operations and Response Division Director for the I-STAF, Department of Homeland Security

3:45–4 p.m. Report Out of Discussion Group Findings
• Alan McCurry, Chief Operating Officer, American Red Cross, Moderator

4–4:30 p.m. "Putting It All Together—The Path Forward"
• Marshall Johnson Evans
• Susan Neely
• Frank Ciculli

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Appendix C: Chart of Activities Being Conducted by Symposium Attendees

Variations on the symposium attendees on some of the activities in which they are involved or know about

Andrew Simon, MD
Chair, Nuclear/Radiological Response Task Force, American Society of Therapeutic Radiology & Oncology (ASTRO)
In Connecticut, we are piloting a project to have radiologists, oncologists, and experts in radiation exposure play a leadership role in their hospitals to establish a meaningful radiation exposure plan at each hospital. If successful, we will explore how this can be rolled out nationally. We will need education grants to help support this program if it does become a national effort. These grants would support education for radiation expenses and health care providers.

Daryl Lee Spiegel, CEM, TEM, TCFAI
President, International Association of Emergency Managers
The International Association of Emergency Managers (IAEM) uses LISTSERV so that individuals can communicate with their peers and subject matter experts. This is a free service, even to nonmembers of IAEM.

The Emergency Information Infrastructure Partnership (EIP) virtual form has a program (free for downloading) on standardized disaster messages. Use this resource to develop/distribute preparedness messages.

Michelle Beersman
Orlando Citizen Corps, Director, Homeland Security Volunteer Coordinator, City of Orlando
A full-day exercise focused on preparedness, response, recovery and mitigation, bringing together nontraditional partners.

Host: American Red Cross, Orlando Citizen Corps, Florida Interfaith Networking Disaster (FINID) and the Florida Emergency Management Office.

Honorable Nancy Harvey Steorts
Former Chair U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission, President & CEO, Nancy Harvey Steorts International
As an author of Safe Living in a Dangerous World, I have performed in a very concise and effective manner the major safety issues from homeland security to weather in a manner that shows the consumer/citizen how to effectively prevent injuries and possible death and thus be better prepared. Many of the noted safety issues can clearly correlate with what can be done in homeland security public preparedness. In my regularly scheduled television shows, I demonstrate what individual citizens need to do to be better prepared in using lots of “show and tell,” thus showing how knowledge and knowing what to do can make a difference in a life-and-death situation.

Amanda Ders
Director, Planning and Integration, Department of Defense, Office of Homeland Defense
Workplace preparedness for emergencies at Department of Defense installations that encourages preparedness activities in employees’ homes.

Joel Schrader
Deputy for Information & Intelligence, Kentucky Office of Homeland Security
We meet regularly with the press corps in our state to make sure the State Homeland Security Director can constantly make TV and radio appearances.

Les Radford
Chief, Human Resources, NYS EMO
New York State will hold a human resources conference on Oct. 22 and 23. Federal, state, and local governments will integrate with the Voluntary Organizations Active in Disaster (VOAD) and other NGOs and private sector partners.

Tim Lovell
Administrator, City of Tulsa Mayor’s Citizen Corps
Safe and Secure education and training program for businesses, neighborhoods and nonprofit organizations, which include assessments of vulnerabilities, planning, training (including CERT and neighborhood watch) and volunteerism.

McReady public education partnership at McDonald’s www.McReady.org

Carlos J. Casellas
Director, Miami-Dade Office of Emergency Management
Residential sheltering programs—currently focusing on providing storm shelters for low-income elderly. County Commissioners provide funding. CERT Teams install the shelters in neighborhoods.
Ruth B. Mascari
Deputy Director, MD Emergency Management Agency (MEMA)
Maryland Emergency Management Agency Public Information Office staff conducts annual media training for practicing members of State/DC media for understanding of emergency management issues, procedures, needs. This enhances media as a resource and partner to Maryland Emergency Management.

Legislation and implementation of interstate support through state enabling statute for each local jurisdiction to adopt—MD Emergency Management Assistance Compact (MEMAC) provides liability and monetary coverage for provision of resource (any resource) across county lines.

Levon Frazier
VP Public Sector, Nextel
Nextel formed emergency response teams to respond to declared emergencies. It also assists with field training exercises. Teams are comprised of more than 1,000 volunteers, 6,000 phones and deployable coverage units. Nextel is working with American Red Cross, Citizen Corps and Points of Light to provide volunteers affordable interoperable devices.

Michael Kleeman
Volunteer, ARCO/Bay Area & National
Bay Area Consortium for Emergency Preparedness (BACEP) is a multi-organizational consortium for preparedness training. Chaired by the American Red Cross of the Bay Area.
Alameda City Together We Prepared Program—20,000 (out of 72,000 people) trained by 2004.

Jacqueline Snelling
Chairman, Arlington County Citizen Corps Council
Arlington’s Citizen Corps Council includes representatives of specific sectors and target populations included in our planning (Disabilities, elderly, language, business, schools, faith) as a mechanism for outreach through those participating organizations.
We are implementing a neighborhood model for support of neighborhood education, communication and response through the Citizen Corps progress of CERT in Neighborhood Watch.

Joel P. Hinzman
Director of Federal Affairs, Oracle
We have numerous programs at Oracle to inform our associates and feel business needs to take the initiatives in linking employers with community resources.

Jennifer Livengood
VP, National Campaign, National Association of Broadcasters
Creating and distributing guidebooks to local radio and television stations nationwide. Such materials include preparedness tips for the stations (to help ensure they stay on the air) as well as tips the stations can share with their local communities in the form of PSA, newscasts, etc.
Promoting and distributing PSAs, b-roll and other educational materials with a preparedness message to television stations via satellite and radio stations via our Web site.

Jim Ryan
Group President, W. E. Greengrass, Inc.
Promote planning for national disasters to our 1.5 million customer base through our sales force, direct mail and the internet. We publish:
—Product and inventory lists for specific types of national disasters
—Other links and sources of information for national disaster training

Remiña Meléndez
Assistant District Attorney, Homeland Security, Department of Justice, Commonwealth of Puerto Rico
The Homeland Security Advisory designated by the Governor is the Secretary of Justice. All the preparedness and public awareness comes from the Emergency Management Agency (EMA). At this point we are in the process of consolidated all the efforts related to public preparedness within the Department of Justice. The EMA does a lot of media (TV, radio, etc.) in order to make the public aware of hurricane season, etc. However, we need to improve terrorism incident prevention and awareness.

Appendix C (cont.)

Subjects: National Preparedness

Purpose
(1) This directive establishes policies to strengthen the preparedness of the United States to prevent and respond to threats to domestic terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies by requiring a national system all-hazards preparedness goal, establishing mechanisms for improved delivery of Federal preparedness assistance to State and local governments, and outlining actions to strengthen preparedness capabilities of Federal, State, and local entities.

Definitions
(2) For the purposes of this directive:
(a) The term “all-hazards preparedness” refers to preparedness for domestic terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies.
(c) The term “Federal preparedness assistance” means Federal department and agency grants, cooperative agreements, loans, loan guarantees, training, and/or technical assistance provided to State and local governments and the private sector to prevent, prepare for, respond to, and recover from terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies. Unless noted otherwise, the term “assistance” will refer to Federal assistance programs.
(d) The term “first responders” refers to those individuals who in the first stages of an incident are responsible for the protection and preservation of life, property, evidence, and the environment, including emergency response providers as defined in section 2 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 101), as well as emergency management, public health, clinical care, public works, and other skilled support personnel (such as equipment operators) that provide immediate support services during prevention, response, and recovery operations.
(e) The terms “major disaster” and “emergency” have the meanings given in section 102 of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (42 U.S.C. 5122);
(f) The term “all-hazards preparedness-related exercises” refers to homeland security-related exercises that train and test national decision makers and utilize resources of multiple Federal departments and agencies. Such exercises may involve State and local first responders when appropriate.
(g) The term “national homeland security preparedness-related exercises” refers to homeland security-related exercises that train and test national decision makers and utilize resources of multiple Federal departments and agencies. Such exercises do not include those exercises conducted solely within a single Federal department or agency.
(h) The term “preparedness” refers to the existence of plans, procedures, policies, training, and equipment necessary at the Federal, State, and local level to maximize the ability to prevent, respond to, and recover from major events.
(i) The term “readiness” is used interchangeably with preparedness.
(j) The term “prevention” refers to activities undertaken by the first responder community during the emergency stages of an incident to reduce the likelihood or consequences of threatened or actual terrorist attacks. More general and broader efforts to deter, disrupt, or thwart terrorism are not addressed in this directive.
(k) The term “Secretary” means the Secretary of Homeland Security.

Relationship to HSPD-5
(1) This directive is a companion to HSPD-5, which identifies steps for improved coordination in response to incidents. This directive describes the way Federal departments and agencies will prepare for such a response, including prevention activities during the early stages of a terrorism incident.

Development of a National Preparedness Goal
(4) The Secretary is the principal Federal official for coordinating the implementation of all-hazards preparedness in the United States. In cooperation with other Federal departments and agencies, the Secretary coordinates the
Appendix D (cont.)

preparedness of Federal response assets, and the support for, and assessment of, the preparedness of State and local first responders.

(5) To help ensure the preparedness of the Nation to prevent, respond to, and recover from threatened and actual domestic terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies, the Secretary, in coordination with the heads of other appropriate Federal departments and agencies and in consultation with State and local governments, shall develop a national domestic all-hazards preparedness goal. Federal departments and agencies will work to achieve this goal by:

(a) providing for effective, efficient, and timely delivery of Federal preparedness assistance to State and local governments;

(b) supporting efforts to ensure first responders are prepared to respond to major events, especially prevention of and response to threatened terrorist attacks.

(6) The national preparedness goal will establish measurable readiness priorities and targets that appropriately balance the potential threat and magnitude of terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies with the resources required to prevent, respond to, and recover from them. It will also include readiness metrics and elements that support the national preparedness goal including standards for preparedness assessments and strategies, and a system for assessing the Nation’s overall preparedness to respond to major events, especially those involving acts of terrorism.

(7) The Secretary will submit the national preparedness goal to me through the Homeland Security Council (HSC) for review and approval prior to, or concurrently with, the Department of Homeland Security’s Fiscal Year 2006 Budget submission to the Office of Management and Budget.

Federal Preparedness Assistance

(8) The Secretary, in coordination with the Attorney General, the Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS), and the heads of other Federal departments and agencies that provide assistance for first responder preparedness, will establish a single point of access to Federal preparedness assistance program information within 60 days of the issuance of this directive. The Secretary will submit to me through the HSC recommendations of specific Federal department and agency programs to be part of the coordinated approach. All Federal departments and agencies will cooperate with this effort. Agencies will continue to issue financial assistance awards consistent with applicable laws and regulations and will ensure that program announcements, solicitations, application instructions, and other guidance documents are consistent with other Federal preparedness programs to the extent possible. Full implementation of a closely coordinated interagency grant process will be completed by September 30, 2003.

(9) To the extent permitted by law, the primary mechanism for delivery of Federal preparedness assistance will be awards to the States. Awards will be delivered in a form that allows the recipients to apply the assistance to the highest priority preparedness requirements at the appropriate level of government. To the extent permitted by law, Federal preparedness assistance will be predicated on adoption of Statewide comprehensive all-hazards preparedness strategies. The strategies should be consistent with the national preparedness goal, should assess the most effective ways to enhance preparedness, should address areas facing higher risk, especially to terrorism, and should also address local government concerns and Citizen Corps efforts. The Secretary, in consultation with the heads of other appropriate Federal departments and agencies, will review and approve strategies submitted by the States. To the extent permitted by law, adoption of approved Statewide strategies will be a requirement in receiving Federal preparedness assistance at all levels of government by September 30, 2003.

(10) In making allocations of Federal preparedness assistance to the States, the Secretary, the Attorney General, the Secretary of HHS, the Secretary of Transportation, the Secretary of Energy, the Secretary of Veterans Affairs, the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, and the heads of other Federal departments and agencies that provide assistance for first responder preparedness will base those allocations on assessments of population concentrations, critical infrastructures, and other significant risk factors, particularly terrorist threats, to the extent permitted by law.

(11) Federal preparedness assistance will support State and local entities’ efforts including planning, training, exercises, interoperability, and equipment acquisition for major events as well as capacity building for prevention activities such as information gathering, detection, deterrence, and collaboration related to terrorist attacks. Such
assistance is not primarily intended to support existing capacity to address normal local first responder operations, but to build capacity to address major events, especially terrorism.

(12) The Attorney General, the Secretary of HHS, the Secretary of Transportation, the Secretary of Energy, the Secretary of Veterans Affairs, the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, and the heads of other Federal departments and agencies that provide assistance for first responder preparedness shall coordinate with the Secretary to ensure that such assistance supports and is consistent with the national preparedness goal.

(13) Federal departments and agencies will develop appropriate mechanisms to ensure rapid obligation and disbursement of funds from their programs to the States, from States to the local community level, and from local entities to the end users to derive maximum benefit from the assistance provided. Federal departments and agencies will report annually to the Secretary on the obligation, expenditure status, and the use of funds associated with Federal preparedness assistance programs.

Equipment

(14) The Secretary, in consultation with State and local officials, first responder organizations, the private sector and other Federal civilian departments and agencies, shall establish and implement streamlined procedures for the ongoing development and adoption of appropriate first responder equipment standards that support nationwide interoperability and other capabilities consistent with the national preparedness goal, including the safety and health of first responders.

(15) To the extent permitted by law, equipment purchased through Federal preparedness assistance for first responders shall conform to equipment standards in place at time of purchase. Other Federal departments and agencies that support the purchase of first responder equipment will coordinate their programs with the Department of Homeland Security and conform to the same standards.

(16) The Secretary, in coordination with other appropriate Federal departments and agencies and in consultation with State and local governments, will develop plans to identify and address national first responder equipment research and development needs based upon assessments of current and future threats. Other Federal departments and agencies that support preparedness research and development activities shall coordinate their efforts with the Department of Homeland Security and ensure they support the national preparedness goal.

Training and Exercises

(17) The Secretary, in coordination with the Secretary of HHS, the Attorney General, and other appropriate Federal departments and agencies and in consultation with State and local governments, shall establish and maintain a comprehensive training program to meet the national preparedness goal. The program will identify standards and maximize the effectiveness of existing Federal programs and financial assistance and include training for the Nation's first responders, officials, and others with major event preparedness, prevention, response, and recovery roles. Federal departments and agencies shall include private organizations in the accreditation and delivery of preparedness training as appropriate and to the extent permitted by law.

(18) The Secretary, in coordination with other appropriate Federal departments and agencies, shall establish a national program and a multi-year planning system to conduct homeland security preparedness-related exercises that reinforce identified training standards, provides for evaluation of readiness, and supports the national preparedness goal. The establishment and maintenance of the program will be conducted in accordance with section 901 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002. Federal departments and agencies that conduct national homeland security preparedness-related exercises shall participate in a collaborative, interagency process to designate such exercises on a consensus basis and create a master exercise calendar. The Secretary will ensure that exercises included in the calendar support the national preparedness goal. At the time of designation, Federal departments and agencies will identify their level of participation in national homeland security preparedness-related exercises. The Secretary will develop a multi-year national homeland security preparedness-related exercise plan and submit the plan to me through the HSC for review and approval.

(19) The Secretary shall develop and maintain a system to collect, analyze, and disseminate lessons learned, best practices, and information from exercises, training events, research, and other sources, including actual incidents, and establish procedures to improve national preparedness to prevent, respond to, and recover from major events. The Secretary, in coordination with other Federal departments and agencies and State and local governments, will identify relevant classes of homeland-security related information and appropriate means of transmission for the information.
Appendix D (cont.)

to be included in the system. Federal departments and agencies are directed, and State and local governments are requested, to provide this information to the Secretary to the extent permitted by law.

Federal Department and Agency Preparedness

(20) The head of each Federal department or agency shall undertake actions to support the national preparedness goal, including adoption of quantifiable performance measurements in the areas of training, planning, equipment, and exercises for Federal incident management and asset preparedness, to the extent permitted by law. Specialized Federal assets such as teams, stockpiles, and caches shall be maintained at levels consistent with the national preparedness goal and be available for response activities as set forth in the National Response Plan, other appropriate operational documents, and applicable authorities or guidance. Relevant Federal regulatory requirements should be consistent with the national preparedness goal. Nothing in this directive shall limit the authority of the Secretary of Defense with regard to the command and control, training, planning, equipment, exercises, or employment of Department of Defense forces, or the allocation of Department of Defense resources.

(21) The Secretary, in coordination with other appropriate Federal civilian departments and agencies, shall develop and maintain a Federal response capability inventory that includes the performance parameters of the capability, the timeframe within which the capability can be brought to bear on an incident, and the readiness of such capability to respond to domestic incidents. The Department of Defense will provide to the Secretary information describing the organizations and functions within the Department of Defense that may be utilized to provide support to civil authorities during a domestic crisis.

Citizen Participation

(22) The Secretary shall work with other appropriate Federal departments and agencies as well as State and local governments and the private sector to encourage active citizen participation and involvement in preparedness efforts. The Secretary shall periodically review and identify the best community practices for integrating private citizen capabilities into local preparedness efforts.

Public Communication

(23) The Secretary, in consultation with other Federal departments and agencies, State and local governments, and non-governmental organizations, shall develop a comprehensive plan to provide accurate and timely preparedness information to public citizens, first responders, units of government, the private sector, and other interested parties and mechanisms for coordination at all levels of government.

Assessment and Evaluation

(24) The Secretary shall provide to the President through the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security an annual status report of the Nation’s level of preparedness, including State capabilities, the readiness of Federal civil response assets, the utilization of mutual aid, and an assessment of how the Federal first responder preparedness programs support the national preparedness goal. The first report will be provided within 1 year of establishment of the national preparedness goal.

(25) Nothing in this directive alters, impairs, or impairs the ability to carry out, the authorities of the Federal departments and agencies to perform their responsibilities under law and consistent with applicable legal authorities and presidential guidance.

(26) Actions pertaining to the funding and administration of financial assistance and all other activities, efforts, and policies in this directive shall be executed in accordance with law. To the extent permitted by law, these policies will be established and carried out in consultation with State and local governments.

(27) This directive is intended only to improve the internal management of the executive branch of the Federal Government, and it is not intended to, and does not, create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity, against the United States, its departments, agencies, or other entities, its officers or employees, or any other person. —GEORGE W. BUSH
We need to make preparedness part of the daily life of all Americans.

—Secretary Tom Ridge, 2004
Chairman Shuster and Ranking Democratic Member Norton, thank you for calling this important oversight hearing to examine the status and direction of our National Preparedness System. Americans have had a steady history of preparing for civil defense and natural disasters. Following the terrorist incidents in the 1990's at Oklahoma City and the World Trade Center, and of course, the attacks on September 11th, there has been increased urgency to prepare for and respond to any disastrous incident, whether natural or man-made.

With the passage of the Homeland Security Act of 2002, the Administration has been tasked with various authorities and new responsibilities, including developing a comprehensive and consolidated National Preparedness System (NPS). The NPS derives its authority from Homeland Security Presidential Directives 5, 7, and 8 and is comprised of seven core national initiatives including: the National Incident Management System (NIMS), the National Response Plan (NRP), the National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP), the National Preparedness Goal (NPG), Capabilities-Based Planning Tools, Homeland Security Grant Program Guidance, and
National Preparedness Guidance. These initiatives are supposed to establish a comprehensive national system that will insure the response to all types of disasters is as efficient and effective as possible.

Although many thought that the Emergency Preparedness and Response Directorate (EPR) in DHS would be assigned the lead role in developing the National Preparedness System, it was assigned to the Office of State and Local Government Coordination and Preparedness (OSLGCP).

The process got off to a rough start when many stakeholders (including state, local and preparedness-related organizations) were not sufficiently included in the process. Over time, it appears that the process has become more open, however, a number of questions remain.

First, while HSPD-8 allows a special emphasis to be given to terrorism, the National Preparedness System is supposed to be an “all-hazards” system. Many of the initiatives that support the NPS, however, are heavily focused on terrorism and spend little or no effort preparing for natural disasters.

This Subcommittee has led the charge on showing the importance of mitigation against natural hazards. Since the creation of FEMA there have been more
than 1200 declared disasters – four of those have been terrorist incidents. However, the NPS seems to completely ignore mitigation. And, in recent years there has been a decline in support by the Administration for mitigation programs and reduction in funding, thus further diminishing its importance. This leaves a serious gap in our preparedness system. Mitigation is proactive and save lives.

Many stakeholders have concerns about the new guidance that will be released with the NPS. For example, will it build upon well-established industry standards or will they have to develop new plans and procedures? Further, funding is tied directly to compliance with new requirements and many localities are concerned that they will not have sufficient budgets or manpower to comply with new mandates.

Finally, the President was granted broad authority to implement a National Preparedness System in the Homeland Security Act of 2002. Many of the actions taken by the Administration to further these efforts have been done by Executive Order and Presidential Directive. These documents are not law and cannot supersede existing legal restrictions on Executive authority. It remains unclear under what authority the President will impose the requirements of the NPS and under what authority and circumstances he will invoke some of the authorities and procedures of the National Response Plan, especially when declaring an Incident of National Significance.
It is our responsibility to make sure that a National Preparedness System is effective, efficient and meets the National Preparedness Goal to prepare for and respond to all hazards, both natural and man-made. Are we going in the right direction? Are we asking our communities to keep reinventing the wheel? I hope to explore these issues today and I look forward to the witnesses’ testimony.
Statement of
Captain John Salle
On Behalf of The
International Association of Chiefs of Police

On the National Preparedness System

Before the
Subcommittee on Economic Development,
Public Buildings and Emergency Management
Committee on Transportation
and Infrastructure
U.S. House of Representatives

April 14, 2005
Good Afternoon, Mr. Chairman, Members of the Subcommittee:

On behalf of the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP), I am pleased to join you here this afternoon to discuss the National Preparedness System and its application to the threats posed to our communities, whether they are posed by terrorists, industrial accidents or severe weather events.

As you may know, the IACP, with more than 20,000 members in over 100 countries, is the world’s oldest and largest association of law enforcement executives. Founded in 1893, the IACP has dedicated itself to the mission of advancing the law enforcement profession and aiding our members in their efforts to protect the citizens they serve. Over the past three years, the IACP has worked closely with a number of federal agencies, including the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of Justice and the Federal Bureau of Investigation to ensure that the needs, capabilities and concerns of the nation’s law enforcement agencies were taken into consideration as our nation responded to the menace of terrorism.

For the past thirty-two years I was privileged to serve as a member of the Oregon State Police. At the time of my retirement in February, I was the Director of the Oregon State Police Office of Public Safety and Security. At this same time, I was also serving as the Deputy Director of the newly formed Oregon Office of Homeland Security.
In addition, for the past two years, I have had the opportunity to represent the IACP as a member of the Department of Homeland Security's State, Local and Tribal Working Group. Through this working group, the International Association of Chiefs of Police has been intimately involved in the development of the National Incident Management System (NIMS), the National Response Plan (NRP), and the components of Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD) 8 Preparedness.

The State, Local and Tribal Working Group has been meeting on a consistent basis for the past two years. Its membership consists of representatives from the National Sheriffs' Association, the Fraternal Order of Police, the National Native American Law Enforcement Association, the National Emergency Managers Association, the International Association of Emergency Managers, the International Association of Fire Chiefs, the National Volunteer Firefighters Coalition, the City of New York Emergency Management, the National Association of City and County Health Officials, the US Conference of Mayors, the National League of Cities, the National Association of Counties, the National Association of Towns and Townships, and the American Public Works Association. As you can tell from this membership roster, the working group encompasses a wide variety of public safety agencies that ensured that our efforts were well balanced and represented the concerns of many disciplines.

As a result of this balance, the working group was able to incorporate the views of actual practitioners into the drafts of the national policies that have been developed. In this fashion, we have worked closely with DHS to ensure that policy documents they have
issued are comprehensive while not being overly prescriptive in dictating a one-size-fits-all approach to state, local and tribal public safety agencies.

Through my participation in this working group and in my experience with the Oregon State Police, I have witnessed that the coordinated federal policies implemented as a result of Homeland Security Presidential Directives 5, 7 and 8, have resulted in a significant increase in cross-discipline planning, training, and exercises. In addition, noticeable progress has been made in equipping public safety agencies with interoperable communications equipment.

It is important to note that these efforts on the federal, state, tribal and local level, although somewhat focused on terrorism, are creating a level of preparedness that applies to any hazard. Simply put, if first response agencies plan together, train on a common command and control structure, and jointly exercise those capabilities, the creation of a better, more unified response to any catastrophe or hazard is inevitable.

The next step in this critical process is combining the National Response Plan and the National Incident Management System with a national credentialing and equipment typing protocol. In this way, we can assure that federal, state, tribal and local public safety agencies not only have the proper command and communication structure in place to operate effectively, but that all components will be properly trained and equipped. For example, under this scenario a SWAT team or a bomb squad could travel to the next city or region, assume the appropriate function within the Incident Command System, and be set to work in a terrorism situation or in any situation requiring the skills that they bring.
At the same time, because of national credential and equipment typing protocol, the incident commanders would know exactly what capabilities and assets this unit provides.

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, I believe that over the past three years, we have made significant progress in our efforts to integrate and coordinate the activities of the tens of thousands of federal, state, tribal and local public safety agencies that operate in the United States. But it is important to remember that we are far from finished. The policies that have been crafted to date are dynamic, living works that will improve over time from lessons learned and the establishment of best practices. It is also true that some jurisdictions, particularly those who have not previously utilized some type of Incident Command Structure response structure, will undoubtedly have a steeper learning curve than others, and this may lead to some frustration. However, the IACP firmly believes that the benefits to be gained through the establishment of common command and communication systems that will allow for a coordinated collective response to disasters, whether natural or man-made, make this effort extremely worthwhile.
Thank you Chairman Shuster, Ranking Member Norton, and distinguished members of the committee for allowing me the opportunity to provide you with a statement for the record on national preparedness and recent activities related to implementation of homeland security president directives 5 and 8.

I am Dewayne West, vice-chairperson of the Emergency Management Accreditation Program (EMAP) Commission and director of Johnston County, North Carolina, Emergency Management. I also am the current president of the International Association of Emergency Managers (IAEM). Today, I am representing the EMAP Commission, which is the governing board of the only national assessment and accreditation process for local and state emergency management. EMAP is a non-profit accrediting body dedicated to the improvement and excellence in public sector emergency management systems throughout the nation.

On behalf of the EMAP Commission, I want to extend our appreciation for the opportunity to be part of the committee’s examination of the work done to date on the National Response Plan, National Incident Management System, or NIMS, and the evolving National Preparedness Goal and related materials. Significant work has been undertaken and accomplished in all three of these areas, and we acknowledge the outstanding contributions and commitment of many agencies and individuals in these projects.

While still being implemented, the National Response Plan is a positive step in strengthening coordination of response activities across agencies within the federal government. The need for a more consistent approach to incident management throughout the nation, particularly given that mutual aid and other outside assistance is necessary in a large-scale or high-impact event, requiring enhanced operational interoperability, is addressed in the National Incident Management System (NIMS). While many state and local governments already use an incident management system, EMAP assessments have confirmed the need for greater consistency in use of and terminology in incident management. State and local governments throughout the nation already are moving to become familiar with and to incorporate NIMS in their plans, operational procedures, and training. EMAP is open to working with the NIMS Integration Center (NIC) on how to best evaluate compliance with key NIMS components in the future. However, we see some cause for concern across HSPD-5 and HSPD-8 implementation activities in that there continues to be gaps in coordination across these projects and integration of the core concepts of each with the others. Because assessment, benchmarking, and continuous improvement in
comprehensive preparedness and emergency management are EMAP’s focus and mission, my comments will be largely directed toward HSPD-8 implementation activities.

As background, EMAP was first envisioned in the late 1990s when state and local emergency managers, with support from federal partners, identified the need for national standards and a consistent assessment methodology to evaluate, strengthen, and benchmark progress of state and local governments’ systems for preparing for and responding to disasters, whether natural or human-caused. EMAP assesses a jurisdiction’s system for management and coordination of prevention, mitigation, preparedness, response and recovery activities for all hazards. That system encompasses all organizations, agencies, departments, entities, and individuals responsible for emergency management and homeland security.

EMAP uses a tough but scalable set of collaboratively developed national standards, the EMAP Standard, which is based on the NFPA 1600 Standard on Disaster/Emergency Management and Business Continuity Programs, combined with self-assessment, documentation, and independent peer review to provide a comprehensive assessment of a jurisdiction’s activities and capabilities for handling emergencies and disasters. To date, four states are fully accredited: Arizona, the District of Columbia, Florida, and North Dakota. Three additional jurisdictions are conditionally accredited (an interim step toward full accreditation): Jacksonville/Duval County (Fla.), Montana, and Pennsylvania. EMAP has conducted baseline assessments using its national standards in 35 states and territories.

In these comments, I will try to cover three main areas: the HSPD-8 implementation process, substance of the National Preparedness Goal and related documents, and concerns about potential impacts of these initiatives as currently outlined.

First, if the expectation is that the HSPD-8 materials -- the Target Capabilities List, National Preparedness Goal, and planning scenarios -- create or provide a comprehensive assessment of preparedness, then we would say that objective or expectation has not yet been achieved. It is difficult to discern from the materials available as of this date how or whether these documents will be woven together in a way that is useable by the state and local community of emergency managers and responders to provide a comprehensive assessment of preparedness.

Others can better recap the intent and full process associated with HSPD-8 national preparedness initiatives during the past year, and I imagine the members have received briefings from DHS staff. We have had concerns about process, some of it related to the volume of material generated by contractors and then offered for a quick turnaround review to selected state and local representatives. Workshops on target capabilities and critical tasks last fall generated a high degree of frustration among local, state, and federal participants. It seems that DHS has done a good job reshaping and refocusing after those meetings. Admittedly, the deadlines that the department has been asked to meet to create a national preparedness goal and assessment seem to be a source of difficulty. The scope of a national and comprehensive assessment is complex and huge and may not be one that can be rationally designed and implemented in the manner it was approached within a year and a half.

However, rather than process, I would like to focus on content and potential impact of the National Preparedness Goal and Target Capabilities List (TCL) and urge you to identify the objective and seek ways to ensure that proposed solutions support progress toward that objective in balance with the burden they will impose on your constituents at the local and state level.
The objective of these activities, as described in HSPD-8, is "to help ensure the preparedness of the nation to prevent, respond to, and recover from threatened and actual domestic terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies..." There are several points at which we are concerned that HSPD-8 implementation activities so far appear to assume a start-from-scratch approach to preparedness. There are multitudes of state and local plans, procedures, and programs. As we have sought to communicate to our colleagues at DHS, the objective should not be -- in fact, from a resource standpoint, cannot be -- to recreate all of them.

The capabilities-based planning approach employed by DHS has used 15 catastrophic disaster scenarios created by the department and/or its contractors. Two of the 15 involve natural disasters; the others are human-caused involving various chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosive incidents of large magnitude. These scenarios can be extremely useful in determining resource, planning, exercise and training, and procedures needs for catastrophic disasters. The foundation for preparedness must also be assessed and strengthened, however. A strong foundation that includes hazard identification and a multi-disciplinary, multi-agency approach to resource management, planning, communications, training, exercising and public education and information must be supported and strengthened to meet the needs of our communities. This foundation is put into use whether the community experiences spring flooding or a radiological dispersal device at a major sporting event, and it is these foundational capabilities that are evaluated through the EMAP standards and process.

There is concern in the emergency management community that focus on catastrophic scenarios only will replace focus on what is likely to happen in a given local jurisdiction and could frustrate local planners, responders, and leaders because of the daunting scale. As you know, state and local jurisdictions are regularly expected to respond quickly to changes in federal funding programs and initiatives. For example, state and local jurisdictions currently are trying to determine modifications that will be required to comply with NIMS. The fact that the federal government has combined numerous federal agencies into the U.S. Department of Homeland Security may allow for a misconception that I want to note, although I am sure you realize it from experience with your state and local leaders. At the local and state level, while there are departments and individuals who perform the functions associated with prevention, preparedness, response and recovery, and there may even be new offices or a few new positions labeled "homeland security", there is no substantial new bureaucracy available to handle the increased workload and requirements of evolving and demanding federal homeland security initiatives. These are, by and large, the same people and the same offices, retasked and/or multi-tasking, as those responsible for emergency management, law enforcement, public safety, or emergency response. Offices or directors of homeland security at the state and local level often have few staff and possibly retain responsibilities they held before the responsibilities of "homeland security" were conferred on them. This is not necessarily inappropriate; however, we ask that this reality be understood as you seek to improve preparedness in a way that builds on existing capabilities -- filling gaps and refining and strengthening systems rather than creating a host of new requirements or "reinventing the wheel". We are concerned that promulgation of HSPD-8 compliance requirements will occur before the potential for duplication, dilution, and other potential impacts on existing state and local practices and plans has been fully considered.

EMAP’s commission, volunteer assessors, and state and local users understand and support the need for stronger and better coordinated prevention, preparedness and response capabilities. Recognition of that need was the reason EMAP was created; it was of course made more urgent by the events of September 11, 2001. To strengthen preparedness, EMAP urges our federal partners to look for efficient and effective ways to strengthen the overall system for handling disasters and to address gaps in capabilities. Clarification of the intended use of the preparedness
goal and TCL is needed before they are tied to grant funding to help minimize the implication these materials require wholesale rewires of extensive and interrelated state and local plans and procedures throughout the nation. Focus on improving capabilities in areas directly impacting the stated national priorities could provide a manageable means of applying the target capabilities in a way that will have immediate positive effects on critical gaps while avoiding duplication with existing planning, training, and assessment activities.

Without careful clarification, it would seem that work toward compliance with existing national standards is likely to be supplanted by measurement against target capabilities, which are as yet still being refined. Existing standards would be supplanted not necessarily because of the proven value or meaning of the TCL but because the new measures will be required to receive homeland security grant funds. While the National Preparedness Goal makes reference to use of existing standards, it is as yet unclear how existing consensus-based standards will be integrated into any new national preparedness assessment methodology. We note that OMB Circular A-119, on Federal Participation in Development and Use of Voluntary Consensus Standards and Conformity Assessment Activities, notes a preference for use of existing standards. Our concern is that the expectation for wholesale use of metrics based on the TCL will conflict with state and local governments’ use of existing standards. This would cause uncertainty and distract emergency management throughout the nation from ongoing work to improve disaster preparedness/management capabilities and multi-agency and multi-disciplinary coordination.

We believe that the TCL can be beneficial if used narrowly to identify gaps in capabilities through exercises; however, we assert that blanket use of the TCL as compliance metrics for receipt of federal funds would be misguided at present. We ask that you and our federal agency partners consider focusing initially on the seven national priorities outlined in the National Preparedness Goal and encourage state and local governments to evaluate their activities and capabilities in these areas, which DHS has identified as gaps or urgent needs. The target capabilities and critical task materials generated in this project can be good tools for exercising and training to build strong capabilities and better plans in these areas, as we have suggested to DHS staff.

I also encourage you to assure DHS that it does not have to create an entirely new preparedness assessment methodology but that it can and should build upon existing standards and assessment methodologies, such as those used and applied by EMAP for the past four years to assess emergency management and preparedness programs across the nation.

Thank you again for the opportunity to talk with you and for your help in building stronger preparedness across the nation.