[House Hearing, 109 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
THE NATIONAL PREPAREDNESS SYSTEM: WHAT ARE WE PREPARING FOR?
=======================================================================
(109-12)
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, PUBLIC BUILDINGS AND EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON
TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
APRIL 14, 2005
__________
Printed for the use of the
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure
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21-700 WASHINGTON : 2005
_____________________________________________________________________________
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COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE
DON YOUNG, Alaska, Chairman
THOMAS E. PETRI, Wisconsin, Vice- JAMES L. OBERSTAR, Minnesota
Chair NICK J. RAHALL, II, West Virginia
SHERWOOD L. BOEHLERT, New York PETER A. DeFAZIO, Oregon
HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina JERRY F. COSTELLO, Illinois
JOHN J. DUNCAN, Jr., Tennessee ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of
WAYNE T. GILCHREST, Maryland Columbia
JOHN L. MICA, Florida JERROLD NADLER, New York
PETER HOEKSTRA, Michigan ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey
VERNON J. EHLERS, Michigan CORRINE BROWN, Florida
SPENCER BACHUS, Alabama BOB FILNER, California
STEVEN C. LaTOURETTE, Ohio EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas
SUE W. KELLY, New York GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi
RICHARD H. BAKER, Louisiana JUANITA MILLENDER-McDONALD,
ROBERT W. NEY, Ohio California
FRANK A. LoBIONDO, New Jersey ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland
JERRY MORAN, Kansas EARL BLUMENAUER, Oregon
GARY G. MILLER, California ELLEN O. TAUSCHER, California
ROBIN HAYES, North Carolina BILL PASCRELL, Jr., New Jersey
ROB SIMMONS, Connecticut LEONARD L. BOSWELL, Iowa
HENRY E. BROWN, Jr., South Carolina TIM HOLDEN, Pennsylvania
TIMOTHY V. JOHNSON, Illinois BRIAN BAIRD, Washington
TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania SHELLEY BERKLEY, Nevada
SAM GRAVES, Missouri JIM MATHESON, Utah
MARK R. KENNEDY, Minnesota MICHAEL M. HONDA, California
BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania RICK LARSEN, Washington
JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas MICHAEL E. CAPUANO, Massachusetts
JIM GERLACH, Pennsylvania ANTHONY D. WEINER, New York
MARIO DIAZ-BALART, Florida JULIA CARSON, Indiana
JON C. PORTER, Nevada TIMOTHY H. BISHOP, New York
TOM OSBORNE, Nebraska MICHAEL H. MICHAUD, Maine
KENNY MARCHANT, Texas LINCOLN DAVIS, Tennessee
MICHAEL E. SODREL, Indiana BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky
CHARLES W. DENT, Pennsylvania BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
TED POE, Texas RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri
DAVID G. REICHERT, Washington ALLYSON Y. SCHWARTZ, Pennsylvania
CONNIE MACK, Florida JOHN T. SALAZAR, Colorado
JOHN R. `RANDY' KUHL, Jr., New York
LUIS G. FORTUNO, Puerto Rico
LYNN A. WESTMORELAND, Georgia
CHARLES W. BOUSTANY, Jr., Louisiana
VACANCY
(ii)
Subcommittee on Economic Development, Public Buildings and Emergency
Management
BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania, Chairman
JIM GERLACH, Pennsylvania ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of
KENNY MARCHANT, Texas, Vice-Chair Columbia
CHARLES W. DENT, Pennsylvania MICHAEL H. MICHAUD, Maine
JOHN R. `RANDY' KUHL, Jr., New York LINCOLN DAVIS, Tennessee
DON YOUNG, Alaska JULIA CARSON, Indiana
(Ex Officio) JAMES L. OBERSTAR, Minnesota
(Ex Officio)
(iii)
?
CONTENTS
TESTIMONY
Page
Buckman, Chief John, Past President, International Association
of Fire Chiefs, Fire Chief, German Township, Indiana........... 22
Gruber, Corey, Associate Director, Office for Domestic
Preparedness, Department of Homeland Security.................. 5
Jamieson, Gil, Director, National Incident Management System
Integration Center, Department of Homeland Security............ 5
Liebersbach, David E., President, National Emergency Management
Association, Director, Division of Homeland Security and
Emergency Management, State of Alaska.......................... 22
Mascelli, Armond, Vice President of Domestic Response, American
Red Cross...................................................... 22
Salle, Captain John P., International Association of Chiefs of
Police......................................................... 22
West, Dewayne, Vice Chairman, Emergency Management Accreditation
Program Commission, and President, International Association of
Emergency Managers, Director of Emergency Management, Johnson
County, North Carolina......................................... 22
PREPARED STATEMENT SUBMITTED BY A MEMBER OF CONGRESS
Oberstar, Hon. James L., of Minnesota............................ 127
PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED BY WITNESSES
Buckman, Chief John............................................. 30
Gruber, Corey................................................... 43
Jamieson, Gil................................................... 55
Liebersbach, David E............................................ 63
Mascelli, Armond................................................ 68
Salle, Captain John P........................................... 131
West, Dewayne................................................... 136
SUBMISSIONS FOR THE RECORD
Mascelli, Armond, Vice President of Emergency Response, American
Red Cross:
NRP Fact Sheet American Red Cross.............................. 74
Public Preparedness, A National Imperative Symposium Report.... 75
(v)
THE NATIONAL PREPAREDNESS SYSTEM: WHAT ARE WE PREPARING FOR?
----------
Thursday, April 14, 2005
House of Representatives, Subcommittee on Economic
Development, Public Buildings and Emergency
Management, Committee on Transportation and
Infrastructure, Washington, D.C.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:00 p.m., in
Room 2167, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Bill Shuster
[chairman of the subcommittee] presiding.
Mr. Shuster. The Subcommittee will come to order. I'd like
to welcome the subcommittee to this important oversight hearing
entitled, "The National Preparedness System: What are We
Preparing For?"
Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, the Nation has
been focused on its ability to prevent, prepare for, and
respond to the next terrorist attack. However, well before the
attacks of that terrible day, the Federal Government, in
partnership with responders nationwide, was working to ensure
that should an attack happen, we would be prepared to deal with
the consequences.
For example, FEMA was developing and delivering courses on
dealing with weapons of mass destruction, especially those
involving hazardous materials. The Department of Defense was
providing specialized training to National Guard units
nationwide; a terrorism annex was added to the Federal Response
Plan; A government-wide agreement about who would do what in
the event of a disaster; and the Office For Domestic
Preparedness was providing assistance to first responders to
train and equip to deal with the crisis of terrorism. These
actions were on top of those efforts being undertaken to help
prepare communities for the natural disasters they face every
day.
What was missing before 9/11 was not a government-wide
interest in preparing for disasters of all types, but the
consensus that this preparation needed to occur in a
coordinated and comprehensive manner. Then, as now, the debate
carried on over the question of what is the best way to prepare
for all the disasters that we will face as a Nation.
Some argued that preparing for and responding to natural
and accidental disasters is very different than preparing for
terrorism, and therefore must occur on a separate track.
Others, including this committee, advocate the position that
while certain characteristics of each disaster may differ, the
general framework is the same regardless of the disaster, and
therefore the preparation and response should be coordinated.
In releasing Homeland Security Presidential Directives 5, 7
and 8, the President established the framework for such a
system and a roadmap for achieving it. Collectively, these
directives require the creation of a National Preparedness
System, one that establishes a national preparedness goal,
outlines the targeted capabilities required to meet that goal,
lays out the tasks necessary to reach the targeted
capabilities, establishes a common incident command system to
utilize these capabilities to the greatest potential, and then
puts together an operational plan for how all of these parts
come together when they are needed, the National Response Plan.
It is my belief that preparing for national and man- caused
hazards are not competing interests. If we create a system that
looks at all the hazards that the Nation will face, identify
universal capabilities that are needed in various scenarios,
establish minimum preparedness levels, and provide guidance to
communities on how to reach those preparedness levels, and
support so that they may do so, then we will have truly created
a National Preparedness System.
The large question that remains: What exactly are we
preparing for? With the creation of these foundational
documents, we must ask: Do these documents create an all-
hazard system that will allow communities to cross prepare for
the many disasters they will face. Or have we become so focused
on terrorism that we've lost sight of the hazards we are most
likely to face.
For example, the Department is using 15 planning scenarios
as a basis for all of its preparedness documents. Twelve of
fifteen are terrorism and only two are natural disasters. Why
the disparity? By only including two natural disasters, are we
truly preparing for all the challenges we face?
The biggest risk we run in failing to adequately address
this issue is the creation of a false sense of security that we
are prepared for the next disaster. By focusing on how much we
have spent to prepare the Nation since 9/11, we run this very
risk. The question should not be how much have we spent, but
how are we spending it and are we doing so in a way that truly
prepares us?
There are two additional issues I would like to raise.
First, this new preparedness system will require a whole host
of new documents, including planning standards and assessments.
Will these be building on what is already out there or are
States going to have to start all over again? Second, I was
very surprised not to see any mention of mitigation in any of
these preparedness documents, despite the fact that it is the
one way of preparing that we know will save lives, property,
and money.
I am very interested to hear from today's witnesses who are
both on the front line of preparing for a disaster and in the
back room ensuring that we are prepared to do so, all experts
in their field, who can shed light on these as well as many
other issues that are out there.
With that, I would like to recognize the ranking member,
Ms. Norton from the District of Columbia, for an opening
statement if she wishes.
Ms. Norton. Thank you very much, Chairman Shuster. I am
going to read part of my statement, if you will, and submit the
rest for the record.
I want to commend you, Mr. Chairman, on the name of this
hearing: The National Preparedness System: What are We
Preparing For? I'm on two other committees, of course, who
appropriately have been focused on preparing for terrorism, the
Select Committee on Homeland Security and the Committee on
Government Reform, and one can understand why the country since
9/11 has been in the throes of all the start-up and train-up
work that would be required.
I want to associate myself with your remarks, though, Mr.
Chairman, about the all-hazards approach for preparing for
whatever hazard comes to us. If you ask a firefighter whether
there is any difference between a hazard when a building
explodes, for example, because of a gas leak, or when it
explodes because it has been hit by a terrorist bomb or some
other device, and I have asked about this, indeed I have just
come from a Homeland Security hearing where firefighters were
testifying, he will tell you absolutely not. And what you are
doing, Mr. Chairman, is refocusing us, rebalancing us so that
we understand what firefighters and other first responders are
likely to face.
The chances are overwhelming that they will face some
natural disaster of the kind they have faced every day, God
willing. So we cannot let 9/11, for all its horror and tragedy,
distract us from keeping our people safe against the most
likely hazards they will face. So I very much appreciate this
hearing, Mr. Chairman.
I note that the two Chairs of the committees who have been
particularly involved, our own committee and the Committee on
Government Reform are now also on the Select Committee on
Homeland Security. So that might also help us achieve balance.
As we are all aware, following the terrorist acts in
Oklahoma City and New York increased emphasis, efforts, and
resources have been put into developing a consolidated,
comprehensive national preparedness and response plan. I note
that we are examining the status and direction of national
preparedness today when the National Response Plan, which seeks
to "integrate Federal Government domestic prevention
preparedness response and recovery plans into one all-
discipline all-hazards plan," is to be totally implemented.
When the Office of State and Local Government Coordination
and Preparedness at DHS began working on these initiatives,
initially the process got off to a rough start. Many
stakeholders, including State, local and preparedness- related
organizations were not sufficiently included in the process.
Over time, it appears that the process has become more open,
yet a number of questions remain.
First, while HSPD-8 allows a special emphasis to be given
to terrorism, the National Preparedness System is supposed to
be an all-hazards system. Many of the initiatives that support
the EMPS, however, are heavily focused on terrorism and spend
little or no effort preparing for natural disasters.
The chairman just noted that only two disasters,
earthquakes and tornadoes, are included in the scenarios. What
about hurricanes and floods, which are annual occurrences in
our country, I am sorry to say?
This subcommittee is on record as a strong supporter of
mitigation of hazards other than terrorism. For the past
several years, we have been trying to reauthorize the
Predisaster Mitigation Program and to make sure that there is
enough funding for the Hazard Mitigation Program. Mitigation is
proactive. It is preventive. It is mitigation and prevention
that saves lives, money, and property. It doesn't clean up
after an event, it keeps an event from happening or helps us to
prepare for events so that the harm is far less serious.
Moreover, in recent years, there has been a decline in
support by the administration for mitigation programs and a
reduction in funding, thus further diminishing its importance.
This leaves a gap in our preparedness system. Many stakeholders
have concerns about the new guidance that will be released with
the NPS.
For example, will it build upon well-established industry
standards or will they have to develop new plans and
procedures? Further, funding is tied directly to compliance
with new requirements, and many localities are concerned they
will not have sufficient budgets or manpower to comply with the
new mandates.
The President was granted broad authority to implement a
National Preparedness System in the Homeland Security Act of
2002. Many of the actions taken by the administration to
further these efforts have been done by executive order and
presidential directive. These documents are not law and cannot
supercede existing restrictions or existing authority. It
remains unclear under what authority the President will impose
the requirements of the NPS, and under what authority and
circumstances he will invoke some of the authorities and
procedures of a National Response Plan, especially when
declaring an incident of national significance.
It is our responsibility to make sure that a National
Preparedness System is effective, efficient, and that it
appropriately balances potential threat and magnitude of all
our hazards with the resources available to prevent, respond
and recover from them, to quote from the statute in the plan.
Are we going in the right direction? Are we asking our
communities to keep inventing the wheel? I hope we will explore
these ideas today, and I look forward to the testimony of our
witnesses. I thank them in advance for their testimony, and I
thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Shuster. Thank you, Ms. Norton.
I ask unanimous consent that all our witnesses' full
statements be included in the record. Without objection, so
ordered.
Since your written testimony has been made a part of the
record, the subcommittee would request you limit your summary
to five minutes.
We have two panels of witnesses with us here today. We have
two witnesses, both from the Department of Homeland Security,
but who each have a very different and important role in our
National Preparedness System.
Corey Gruber is the Assistant Director of the Office For
Domestic Preparedness, which is part of the Office for State
and Local Government Coordination and Preparedness, and Gil
Jamieson is the Director of the National Incident Management
System Integration Center.
TESTIMONY OF COREY GRUBER, ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR, OFFICE FOR
DOMESTIC PREPAREDNESS, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY; AND GIL
JAMIESON, DIRECTOR, NATIONAL INCIDENT MANAGEMENT SYSTEM
INTEGRATION CENTER, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Mr. Shuster. We will hear from both of our witnesses on
this panel before opening for questions, and Mr. Gruber, you
may proceed.
Mr. Gruber. Mr. Shuster, Ms. Norton, my name is Corey
Gruber, with the Department of Homeland Security, sir. It is my
honor and pleasure to appear before you today to discuss in
detail Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8 on national
preparedness, the Interim National Preparedness Goal and the
National Preparedness Guidance.
As you know, Mr. Chairman, the Department continues to
aggressively implement HSPD-8. The President issued the
directive in December 2003 in order to establish policies,
procedures and goals to strengthen the Nation's preparedness to
prevent and respond to terrorist attacks, major disasters, and
other emergencies. Specifically, HSPD-8 calls for a domestic
all-hazards preparedness goal that establishes measurable
priorities and targets, creates mechanisms to improve delivery
of preparedness assistance to State, local, and tribal
governments, and outlines actions to strengthen their
preparedness capabilities.
DHS consulted extensively with stakeholders from all levels
of government, the private sector, and nongovernmental
organizations to ensure the implementation was truly national,
not solely Federal. DHS invited over 1,500 entities to comment,
including 398 municipalities, 112 State agencies, and 94
national associations. The Department's commitment to
stakeholder engagement reflects the principle that preparedness
and domestic incident management are shared national
responsibilities.
HSPD-8 complements and supports HSPD-5 on management of
domestic incidents.
Together, these directives establish a common approach to
preparedness and response through NIMS, through the NRP, and
through our National Preparedness Goal. The goal enables
entities across the Nation to pinpoint capabilities that need
improvement and sustain these capabilities at levels needed to
manage major events using the protocols established by NIMS and
NRP.
On March 31, 2005, DHS released the Interim Goal. The Goal
reflects the Department's progress to date and represents the
first major step in transforming the way the Nation prepares
and develops capabilities to prevent, respond, and recover from
terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies. It
will guide Federal, State, local, and tribal entities in
determining how best to devote limited resources to most
effectively and efficiently strengthen preparedness. It
transforms the way we think about preparedness by defining
agile and flexible capabilities that must be in place at all
appropriate levels to prevent and respond to current and future
threats and hazards. The Goal establishes measurable targets
and priorities in a systematic approach for determining how
prepared we are, how prepared we need to be, and how to
prioritize efforts to close gaps.
To help achieve the Goal, DHS, in coordination and
consultation with national stakeholders, has developed a set of
detailed planning tools. These include the National Planning
Scenarios, which illustrate the Nation's strategic risk in the
form of the potential scope, magnitude, and complexity of
representative major events; a comprehensive library of
homeland security tasks, called the Universal Task List; and a
compendium of 36 capability templates, called the Target
Capabilities List. Every entity across the country will not be
expected to develop and maintain every capability to the same
level. These will vary based on risk, resource base and needs
of different jurisdictions.
Over the coming months, DHS will continue to work with
stakeholders to establish target levels and apportion
responsibility for developing capabilities among levels of
government. DHS will issue updated target levels in conjunction
with the final National Preparedness Goal in October 2005.
In addition to the planning tools, the interim goal
describes seven consensus national priorities. They fall into
two categories: Overarching priorities that contribute to the
development of multiple capabilities, and capability-specific
priorities that build selected capabilities for which the
Nation has the greatest need.
The overarching national priorities are: Implementing the
National Response Plan and National Incident Management System,
expanding regional collaboration, and implementing the interim
national infrastructure protection plan. The capability-
specific priorities are strengthening information sharing and
collaboration, strengthening interoperable communications,
strengthening chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and
explosive detection, response, and decontamination, and,
finally, strengthening medical surge and mass prophylaxis.
To help implement the goal and priorities, DHS and its
partners will shortly issue National Preparedness Guidance,
with specific step-by-step instructions on implementing the
goal and for updating State and urban area homeland security
strategies. DHS will hold regional roll-out conferences in the
upcoming months for the Goal and Guidance, and deploy State-by-
State training teams comprised of experienced senior State and
local experts.
Building the right preparedness system for the Nation and
achieving these target levels of capability will take time, and
the full benefits will not come overnight. Many benefits have
already been realized, such as the requirement and directive to
establish a national exercise program and lessons learned
system. More will be recognized shortly, such as a streamlined
process for determining needs, a clear role for stakeholders in
shaping the system, and a more realistic picture of where we
now stand in terms of national preparedness and where to make
the most cost effective investments with homeland security
dollars.
In summary, our approach to implementing the guidance of
the President and Congress has centered on two key principles:
First, that preparedness and domestic incident management are
shared national responsibilities; and, second, that our
strategic analysis must be risk based, considering current and
emerging threats, our potential vulnerabilities, and the
consequences of major events that pose the greatest potential
threat to our national interests.
We live in a world transformed by September 11, 2001. The
9/11 Commission wrote that a rededication to preparedness is
perhaps the best way to honor the memories of those we lost
that day. The publication of the goal brings us a significant
step closer to fulfilling this pledge.
Mr. Chairman and members, thank you for your continuing
support in this transformational effort, and I look forward to
answering your questions.
Mr. Shuster. Thank you, Mr. Gruber.
Mr. Jamieson, you may go ahead and proceed.
Mr. Jamieson. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. Good afternoon. And
good afternoon to other members of the subcommittee. My name is
Gil Jamieson, and I am the Acting Director of the National
Incident Management System Integration Center. Because the
National Response Plan and the NIMS are inextricably linked,
the Undersecretary For Emergency Preparedness and Response,
Michael Brown, has asked me to coordinate implementation of the
NRP both within FEMA and across the Nation. It is my pleasure
to be with you here today.
Everyday there are events in the United States that require
action by emergency responders. Whether those responders come
from different parts of the same local jurisdiction or from
State and Federal agencies, they need to be able to work
together effectively. In Homeland Security Presidential
Directive 5, management of domestic incidences, the President
directed the Secretary of Homeland Security to develop a new
approach to domestic incident management based on the National
Incident Management System and the National Response Plan.
The NIMS, released by the Department in March of 2004,
established standard incident management practices, protocols
and procedures that will allow responders to work together more
effectively. The NRP, or the National Response Plan, released
by the Department on January 6, 2005, uses the comprehensive
framework of NIMS to provide the structure and mechanisms for
the coordination of Federal support to State and local tribes.
The NRP development process included extensive coordination
with Federal, State, local, and tribal agencies,
nongovernmental organizations, private sector entities, and the
first responder and emergency management communities across the
country. Many State and local associations, including the
International Association of Chiefs of Police, the
International Association of Fire Chiefs, the National
Association of Counties, the Fraternal Order of Police, the
National Emergency Management Association have issued press
releases announcing and praising the completion of the National
Response Plan.
The National Response Plan incorporates best practices from
a wide variety of incident management disciplines to include
fire, rescue, emergency management, law enforcement, public
works, and emergency medical services. Mr. Chairman, the NRP is
an all-discipline and an all-hazard plan. Both the NRP and the
NIMS reflect the recommendation of the 9/11 Commission and the
intentions of Congress as expressed in the intelligence reform
bill. The NRP applies to all actual and potential incidences of
national significance. All major disasters and emergencies
under the Stafford Act are incidences of national significance.
The NRP uses and builds on the emergency support function
structure that was a proven and successful element of the
former Federal response plan. To ensure full integration and
consistent approach to domestic incident management, a new
joint field office fully incorporates and replaces the
traditional concept of a disaster field office. The Homeland
Security Operations Center serves as a 24/7 hub for
coordination within the Department, to include coordination
with FEMA's National Response Coordination Center and our
Regional Response Coordination Centers.
The Homeland Security Operations Center also maintains 24/7
coordination with external components, including the National
Counterterrorism Center and the Bureau's Strategic Information
and Operations Center.
The NRP includes processes for coordination between the
principal Federal official, the joint field office, the
Homeland Security Operations Center, and the Interagency
Incident Management Group, or IIMG, at the headquarters level.
The NRP integrates and rolls the responsibilities of all
Federal departments and agencies, and was crafted to ensure
that nothing in the plan alters or impedes the ability of
Federal, State, local, or tribal governments or agencies to
carry out their responsibilities under their own specific
authorities.
During the months of April and May, the Department will
host seven one-day NRP seminars across the country. In fact, we
held our first workshop here yesterday in Washington, D.C. for
our partners and stakeholders in the national capital regions.
These events will help educate Federal, State, and local
incident managers on the provisions of NRP, the concept of
operations, the operational framework, and how this new
approach will improve domestic incident management and response
capabilities across the Nation.
FEMA's Emergency Management Institute led the development
of an on-line independent study course to provide NRP
awareness, that is IS 800, Mr. Chairman, and had previously
developed NIMS awareness training, IS 700. These courses
provide an extraordinary opportunity to build an understanding
of the NIMS and the NRP, and to date 140,000 folks have
completed these courses on line.
The NRP is being implemented through a three-phase process.
Phase I and II provide opportunities for departments and
agencies and organizations to modify training, designate
staffing of NRP organizational elements, and become familiar
with the NRP structures, processes, and protocols, modify their
existing interagency plans to align with the NRP, and to
conduct the necessary training.
The Department will be working closely with our Federal
interagency partners on several implementation actions,
including the development of standard operating procedures. The
SOPs will help ensure that the NRP is executed in an efficient
and consistent manner. Over time, the standard operating
procedures will become the basis for field operations guides
and specific job training for anyone expected to perform under
the National Response Plan.
During the third phase, the Department will conduct
assessments of the NRP, coordinating structures, processes, and
protocols. And at the end of this period, we will conduct a
review and make some recommendations to the Secretary on what
is working and what needs to be modified and changed.
Today is a very important day, and Congresswoman Norton, I
note it is an important day not just for opening day of the
Washington Nationals, but today is also the day that the NRP
becomes fully effective. Up to this point, we have been
operating on the Interim National Response Plan. Today, it
becomes effective. So the domestic terrorism concept of
operations plans and the Federal radiological emergency
response plan are superceded and the NRP is fully operational
and ready to be implemented, if necessary.
HSPD-5 called for the establishment of a single
comprehensive approach to domestic incident management.
Together the NIMS and the NRP provide a more efficient and
effective way for the Nation to prevent, prepare for, respond
to, and recover from any emergency. This is accomplished by the
elimination of duplicative and sometimes conflicting Federal
plans, and a clear articulation of the relationship that should
exist between Federal, State, and local concerning the
prevention, preparedness and response elements.
I would like to thank members of the committee for the
opportunity to testify today, and I too look forward to your
questions that you may have.
Mr. Shuster. Thank you, Mr. Jamieson. I am going to start
off the questioning with Mr. Gruber.
We have heard from a number of stakeholders that this is
not a National Preparedness System, it is not comprehensive,
because it does not fully account or address nonterrorism
events. How would you address that?
Mr. Gruber. Let me talk a little first about the scenarios
and the reason they were selected and how they were used. The
concept that the scenario working group used was to select the
minimum number of scenarios that covered the spectrum of
threats and hazards, to use those to define specific tasks and
then to develop capabilities.
We used a planning methodology that is, in fact, and we
state that in the National Preparedness Goal, an all-hazards
approach. It is called capabilities-based planning. It is
designed to develop agile and flexible capabilities that are
designed to meet any threat or hazard.
We selected that set of scenarios with, as you pointed out,
twelve attack scenarios for two reasons. One, everyone that
participated on the scenario working group has extensive
experience with natural hazards given the 40 or more disaster
declarations we have every year. We had a great body of
experience and knowledge about natural hazards and man-made
accidents. So we benefited from that.
We used these WMD attack scenarios because we understand
these are some of the areas where the Nation is least prepared.
So that was part of the reason why they were a focus of this
effort. For the natural hazards, we have great experience and
actuarial data. We benefit from the experience of our
responders. Some of those have regulated requirements. So that
was the reason we took that approach to the planning scenarios
that we used.
We developed from that a comprehensive task library of over
1,700 tasks. Some of those, for example, like performance and
management, obviously apply to any threat or hazard you would
face. So, again, the scenarios were benchmarks, but we believe
the capabilities and tasks cover the full range of hazards,
including natural hazards.
Mr. Shuster. When you use the term risk when determining
the capabilities, is that also determining how the funding is
going to be allocated, when you look at the allocation of
funds?
Mr. Gruber. Yes, sir. As, obviously, the Secretary has
testified, and he testified as recently as yesterday, he talked
about using this strategic mix of looking at the threats and
hazards, looking at specific vulnerabilities, and looking at
the consequences. Our directive, Homeland Security Presidential
Directive 8, specified that we needed to look at the magnitude
and scope of the events. And, of course, the National Strategy
for Homeland Security told us to look at the events that posed
the greatest threat to our population, to our property, and to
our way of life.
So those are all part of a risk-managed system that the
Secretary again has clearly stated will be the driving force
for how we apportion resources.
Mr. Shuster. It seems to me, though, when I hear folks from
DHS talk you are focusing on terrorism and not on the other
risks, and I'm concerned about that, that that is where the
focus is, when over the last, well, since FEMA has been
created, there has been something like 1,300 or 1,400
disasters, and only four of them have been terrorism. I
certainly don't downplay the risk of terrorism, but the reality
is we are going to have a hurricane that is going to damage or
decimate some town or region of the country next year, and the
probability is great that we will have that happen.
Mr. Gruber. Yes, sir, that's an excellent point. Again, I
think if you look at the list of our target capabilities, you
will see that they are broad operationally stated templates
that apply across that range of hazards.
For example, we have a template for planning, for all-
hazards planning. We have a template for interoperable
communications. Those apply regardless of the threat or hazard.
So we think, even though this suite of scenarios reflected
these 12 attack scenarios, that the output, both in that task
library that is going to help us with our training and exercise
events, and ultimately those 36 capabilities, do adequately
cover the whole range of threats and hazards that our
Department and State and local responders are responsible for.
Mr. Shuster. The other question I have is the National
Preparedness System requires a State to possess 36 target
capabilities, I believe it is. Will the Department guarantee a
minimum level of funding to States? Because with 50 States, I
have to believe they are all at different levels of the funding
that they have.
Mr. Gruber. The Secretary has talked about that, and there
is a baseline of funding that is proposed, and I know Congress
is making a determination about what is appropriate. Again,
what we are doing is not a funding formula. We are trying to
provide planning tools to State governors, to homeland security
advisers and emergency managers that are going to allow them to
do three things. One is to achieve the integration we all know
we need and is part of the protocols in the NPR and NIMS;
secondly, to achieve the interoperability that is very
important for all these threats and hazards; and then, finally,
to make the most cost effective investments we can to get the
most out of our homeland security dollars and to get that
ability to provide dual use, that it serves requirements for
threats and hazards.
Mr. Shuster. At some point are you going to require States,
I mean these are the capabilities you must have? I think that
is a big concern of the States, that the Federal Government is
going to say you must have this and you must have that.
Mr. Gruber. Yes, sir. In the statement, I mentioned that
one of the most important tasks we have left to do, and that is
why this is called an Interim Goal, is we have to work with the
community, as we have done up to this point, to begin to
determine what are the appropriate base-line capabilities; what
are the right structures. Because, as I said, jurisdictions and
States differ in terms of their risk and in terms of their
resource base.
One of the reasons why we strongly advocate, and I hope
other panelists will as well, this approach with expanded
regional collaboration, is to make sure we are drawing from the
resource pool of the broadest area. Because all the threats and
hazards we have talked about, regardless of whether they are
terrorism or natural hazards, have no respect for a
jurisdiction's boundary. They are going to be regional and
national events.
So our approach again was to make sure that these
capabilities can be drawn from a regional area through mutual
assistance, or an assistance compact to provide the support we
need.
Mr. Shuster. When will you finalize the target capabilities
list?
Mr. Gruber. By the 1st of October of 2005. And we will work
again. We can always do better, but we have worked very hard.
We made a commitment to the Secretary when we started this
process that we would strive mightily to make this a model of
cooperation and consultation. We have worked hard, and we have
had great advice and counsel from our stakeholders when we have
not done that correctly.
So we are going to work very hard on this next set of
establishing these target levels of capability to get the input
from the people that have to make the decisions about applying
these resources, and that is at the State and local level.
Mr. Shuster. Thank you.
Ms. Norton.
Ms. Norton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Gruber, I want to see if I can understand how natural
hazards fit into the risk analysis that I'm working on frankly
in my other committees. Yes, I heard Judge Chertoff testify
yesterday, and as you know, we are in the process of
authorizing the first Homeland Security bill and there is a lot
of concern about the distribution of funds. I realize that is
not your bailiwick, but everyone agrees that a risk analysis is
necessary.
The Senate is going through that process even in advance of
us, but also right now simultaneously. Judge Chertoff testified
that there should be a risk analysis. And he, helpfully, broke
that word down so that it wasn't so much jargon. He said it is
consisting of threats--I'm trying to recall--vulnerability and
consequences. And good lawyer that he is, he gave an example;
that the bridge down the street from him, there might be a
terrorist attack on it, and the consequences of that could be
very severe. But using this formula, threat and vulnerability,
it would probably not be considered a substantial risk to guard
against.
I don't have the slightest idea of how, what your office is
doing fits into this risk analysis, particularly given the fact
that every jurisdiction will get some funds. But there is a
tremendous push, I certainly am among those who are pressing
for these funds to be distributed on a risk basis, so that
there would be some objective formula against which to measure
how a majority of the funds are to be allocated.
Could you, by way of example or somehow make me understand
how the hazards analysis that you certainly would be doing
right in conjunction, indeed at the very same agencies would be
involved? I'm thinking of the Coast Guard. Here is an example
of an agency that I would bet 99 percent of its time has to do
with pulling people out of the water, or whatever you do to
make sure that things are well and good at home. But they are
learning for the first time that there may be an attack on us.
So whoever is working with the Coast Guard on what the risk
is will also have to go through, according to Judge Chertoff,
this notion of threat, vulnerability and consequence. If you
could give me an example of how that would work on your side of
the fence, it would be very helpful to me.
Mr. Gruber. Yes, ma'am. I think you made two important
points: One is that it is not one entity that is going to
formulate our understanding of risk. It has to be a
partnership. And, in fact, we are working very closely with the
Coast Guard, for example, on our targeted infrastructure
protection programs, on the port security grants, because we
have to have the benefit of their experience both with, again,
natural hazards, with oil spills, with security for ports, and
that is all helping us to understand risk.
We rely on our partners within the Department that have
responsibilities for making those determinations using a
variety of information, as you well know: Population,
population density, law enforcement cases that are underway.
But, of course, most importantly, we have an advantage for
natural hazards in that we have great volumes of actuarial data
and experience every year, as you pointed out, with perhaps 40
disaster declarations every year.
So the advantage is that we have, I think, a very good
understanding of probabilities, frequency, seasonality of
natural hazards, where we don't have the same advantage with
these terrorist threats. And so as we look at understanding
risk, we always have to understand that one set of risks is a
morally neutral nonadaptive problem, meaning natural hazards.
The other way we look at risk is through something that is
perpetrated by a human architect, that is an adaptive threat.
So as we make determinations about risk, we have to deal
with both of those events, and that all has to weigh into our
calculations. So we work with all our partners in the
Department, we work with our community, our constituents at the
State and local level, and the rest of the interagency to help
us make those determinations.
Ms. Norton. What you are saying is both kinds of risks are
to be included in, let us say, what the final number is. What
the final funding number is. All I can say is I do not think
there is wide understanding of that.
For example, parts of the Midwest or the far west people
think are not as vulnerable. In fact, if you look at the
intelligence, New York City gets mentioned over and over and
over again. But in almost none of the discussion we are having
in Homeland Security is there any discussion of the money going
for anything except the terrorist risks.
Now, maybe there is a separate pot of money, but it says to
me you may be in a flood area where there are no nuclear
facilities or where you may be land locked. And we know how al-
Qaeda works. It wants to do maximum damage somewhere. But you
may indeed be in some kind of floodplain. And when we are
distributing money, we will take into account that risk along
with the risk of a terrorist event. Is that the way it is going
to happen?
Mr. Gruber. Ma'am, you have pointed out the problem and you
have also talked about the solution. Yes, you were right in the
fact that there are different components of funding that go out
to the community; the Fire Act Grant, emergency management
grants that are distributed to help communities address
problems that are not particularly related to terrorism but
that we can get dual use out of for both those kind of risks.
Ms. Norton. So people should understand that is coming out
of a different pot.
Mr. Gruber. Well, it is all integrated now in this one-
stop shop in the provision of the grant funding.
Ms. Norton. Yes, but it is a different--that is a much more
complicated thing to do, frankly. We thought it was complicated
enough to try to do a risk assessment for terrorism, now when
you put into the equation that the assessment must, and we
certainly on this subcommittee believe it certainly must
include these natural hazards, all I can say is I do not envy
you, but I do not think that is well understood. And I think it
should be better understood and people would not be so afraid
they are not going to get any money because they are not in New
York City and they are not in Washington, D.C.
Mr. Gruber. May I just mention, Ma'am? You pointed out a
very good point, and I only alluded to it in the statement. We
have, I think, a very comprehensive communications and outreach
program to help. If we are not communicating that message, and
to do a better job, we have three regional conferences that we
will be conducting.
Ms. Norton. Mr. Gruber, I think the problem is with the
Congress. It is not the first responders who are saying I am
not going to get any money. I am hearing it from my colleagues
sitting on my committees and in the Senate, who keep pointing
out that there could--I mean, I heard a Member talk about a
shopping mall, a Senator talk about a shopping mall, their
biggest shopping mall. Hey, the last time I heard, the shopping
mall ought to take care of the shopping mall and terrorist
events at the shopping mall. I do not think that is the
business of the United States Government.
You see how out of hand the thinking on this is? If he were
to focus, though, on natural disasters there, I think he would
have a better chance.
Let me ask why mitigation against hazards, other than
terrorism is not included in the NPS? Everybody talks about
prevention and nobody does anything about it?
Mr. Gruber. Again, ma'am, it may not be spelled out in the
specificity that we need, and we can make those corrections as
we improve these documents, but in fact, it is a component of
some of our grant programs. There are other programs that are
being developed that will address mitigation and prevention
from the perspective again of mitigation for building codes and
fire hazards, but also prevention in terms of buffer zone
protection for particular facilities, chemical facilities and
others.
So that is a component of the grant offerings, and you have
made a good point. If we haven't spelled it out adequately in
our current version of the Goal, then we need to correct that
by the time we publish the final Goal.
Ms. Norton. I wish you would take another look at that.
Mr. Gruber. Yes, ma'am.
Ms. Norton. Could I ask you to take another look at
something else? And here I put on my legal hat.
I want to commend the President for the action he took
under executive order, but I am very, very concerned, given the
fact that we have a Federal republic and a separation of
powers, that we could have a national emergency, and if we are
working only under this executive order and presidential
directives, I am wondering if you can assure us that Federal
emergency response authorities, like yourself, would have the
authority to legally require local authorities to take certain
kinds of actions.
Now, you may be the prototype for what to do, because we
have had hazards all along. but there have been so many of
these presidential directives, I wonder if your counsel has
looked closely at that issue so that we will not have somebody
saying I do not think the national government has the authority
to do this or that.
Mr. Gruber. I would have to defer to Mr. Jamieson to answer
that.
Mr. Jamieson. Congresswoman, I can assure you, and the
whole National Response Plan is, as is the National Incident
Management System, built on the notion that we are going to
respond and we are going to find the lowest level of governance
that we can find, the incident commander. All of the resources
that would be coming down, all of the support that would be
available through the National Response Plan are there to
support the incident commander. There is absolutely no intent
in any of our plans, even the catastrophic supplement to the
National Response Plan, to erode the prerogatives of State and
local government.
Ms. Norton. I am talking about something like an incident
of national significance. We haven't had anything like that
until after 9/11. All I am asking is, have lawyers scrubbed
that so that somebody says, oh, my God, here is the Federal
Government telling somebody at the State and local they must do
that, but local statutes say this? That could get real
complicated, by simply declaring the President may do this.
Again, here is this committee ready to do what is
necessary, but one wonders whether or not you would meet some
Federal problem.
Mr. Jamieson. Let me talk about the issue.
Ms. Norton. I am not talking about resources now. I am
talking about whether or not anyone has looked at this
incidence of national significance, which could be a hazard of
a kind we have had for some time and covering large sections of
the country, or it could be a terrorist event.
Mr. Jamieson. The incident of national significance is
described in the National Response Plan and in Homeland
Security Presidential Directive 5, there are five conditions
that the President has delegated to the Secretary of the
Department. But the incident of national significance is
putting in motion the coordination mechanisms of the National
Response Plan. It does not, for instance, trigger the Stafford
Act in and of itself.
There are conditions, as you know, for the natural disaster
portion of this where we have to get a request coming up from
local government, from the State and the governor asking for
disaster assistance. So the incidence of national significance
finding, what it is doing is putting in motion the coordination
mechanisms to make sure that all the moving parts are now
coordinated and understood.
It is allowing us to set up a joint field office. It is
allowing us to put in motion the authorities of the other
Federal departments and agencies. But it is not, it is not a
trigger, in and of itself, for any of that Federal assistance.
It is just putting the Federal Government in a forward
mobilized posture so that we can respond when these requests,
when this situation assessment comes up from the incident
commander.
Ms. Norton. Thank you very much.
Mr. Chairman, I know you want to go on now. I just wanted
to let you know, Mr. Chairman, when there was that incident at
the Pentagon Postal Service, I would have to ask you to have
your counsel look at it, because we have Virginia coming back
and saying only the Department of Health of Virginia could do
certain things, like order that--what is the medicine that is
given, Cipro be given. And all we have to do is substitute a
natural disaster for that and you can see what I mean.
I did not have any indication that there was something that
we had in hand at the Federal level that we could do. As you
know, there was no proper coordination there at all. Thank you
very much.
Mr. Shuster. This Stafford Act, the States and localities
have to be overwhelmed before the Federal role comes in. Did
the Federal Government step in to that incident at the
Pentagon?
Ms. Norton. No, but the coordination that Mr. Jamieson is
talking about did not occur as he said should occur. Because he
is saying it is just a coordination mechanism. If so, and if
that was a test, it certainly did not work.
Mr. Jamieson. Obviously, there are ongoing reviews for that
situation at the State and also at the Federal level, but I am
quite comfortable characterizing it. I think the communication
there was not as good as it could have been, and we need a
better communication to the State and local authorities in
terms of what the situation was and what the appropriate
response was.
Mr. Shuster. Who makes the decision to activate the NRP,
National Response Plan?
Mr. Jamieson. If there is a disaster declaration that is
coming in, a disaster declaration, in and of itself, would
constitute an incident of national significance. But if another
Federal agency, EPA, who may be dealing with a hazardous
material spill is out there, and they are saying it is
escalating, this event is going, another Federal agency can go
to the Secretary of the Department and ask for assistance,
which would connote an incident of national significance.
So any of those four circumstances that are spelled out,
and I do have those and I can provide those for the record, Mr.
Chairman, as opposed to going through them here. But the
important point that I want to emphasize is that that
designation itself of an incident of national significance is
not serving as a trigger for any of the other authorities that
the Federal agencies have. There are conditions and criteria
that need to be met under Stafford, there are conditions under
the national contingency plan, there are conditions of the
Bureau in terms of threats that they have to deal with.
So what they are doing, as signatories to the National
Response Plan, they are saying they are going to bring their
authorities, but they are going to organize themselves within
the construct of this National Response Plan. So it is a far
more coherent and coordinated effort than it has been.
Mr. Shuster. If something would occur here on Capitol Hill,
that becomes a tricky problem because now turning the authority
over to the executive branch, under the Constitution there is a
separation there. How would something like that work; like the
anthrax scare we had here?
Mr. Jamieson. Well, there are constitutional issues there,
and I will try not to speak to them, but on a very practical
standpoint if there was a suspicious person who had a baggage
that looked like it was a bomb or whatever it might be, local
law enforcement and the Capitol Hill police are going to
respond to that. What they are also going to do is contact the
Bureau in the Strategic Information Operations Center. And
there is going to be no hesitation whatsoever in terms of the
Bureau coming in there and determining what the situation is.
There then, automatically, the Bureau's operation center is
notifying the Department of Homeland Security. And if that
situation escalates, then an incidence of national significance
can be declared. We will go out and merge with the joint
operations center that the Bureau establishes. But at the same
time, if it turns into nothing; that there is nothing in the
suitcase, it is just a suspicious character, then there would
obviously not be that designation.
But I think the key point is that that designation of an
incident of national significance, nobody is waiting for that.
We are forward marching out there in terms of the Bureau's
deployment, the Capitol Police's deployment to investigate the
case and the situation that they have. If it does escalate,
what we are saying by the National Response Plan, is we are
putting together a common mechanism so that the Bureau, the
Department, EPA, if necessary, HHS, if they are required, we
are going to come together and fight as one team. That is what
the National Response Plan does. It provides that coordination
structure.
Mr. Gruber. Mr. Chairman, could I just add that we would be
remiss if we did not mention that just a week ago we completed
the TOPOFF for top officials, exercise, the third exercise of
its kind that we had done. One of the most important objectives
of that exercise was, in fact, to put the National Response
Plan into action, to be able to test it. We did that with the
State of New Jersey and the State of Connecticut.
So we are confident that we will have many lessons that get
to Congresswoman Norton's points about the relationship with
the States and local jurisdictions that will help us better
understand how to apply these protocols.
Mr. Jamieson. If I may, Mr. Chairman, to that point, one of
the areas that was really discovered during the exercise
itself, and creatively so, was why was there not a declaration
in one of these instances. Well, quite frankly, the answer to
that question is that there was not a request from the State
and local government for a declaration under the Stafford Act.
So we are always going to be deferring to the State and
local interests to make sure we are not unilaterally riding
over their capabilities and that they need us.
Mr. Shuster. I think that is very important that you are
paying attention to their situation and their thoughts.
I want to now recognize Mr. Dent.
Mr. Dent. Mr. Chairman, I think you started to answer this,
but I will ask the question anyway. I attended that TOPOFF
exercise up in New Brunswick at the Robert Wood Johnson
Hospital, and for the seemingly biological attack on North
Central Jersey. And as I understood it, the Stafford Act, it
was not possible to implement the Stafford Act because of that
incident, the TOPOFF; is that correct?
Mr. Jamieson. No, it is not a correct characterization of
that. We have authority under the Stafford Act to declare--
Mr. Dent. A major disaster declaration.
Mr. Jamieson. A major disaster declaration is a different
issue. There is not provision for a major disaster declaration
within the Stafford Act. But there is provision in the Stafford
Act for an emergency declaration that can be made that would
permit us to do anything we need to do to save lives and
protect property. The authority, however, on that biological
event is that that clearly is an HHS lead on that, so it would
be HHS using their authority to respond to that particular
incident.
Mr. Dent. So the answer then is, you could not, under the
Stafford Act, declare that incident a major disaster
declaration?
Mr. Jamieson. We could not have declared it a major
disaster declaration without a request coming up from the
governor. Then, if there were collateral issues associated with
that, in other words you do not want the Department going in
under Stafford on a biological event when it is clearly an HHS
lead. But if there were collateral issues coming up associated
with that, a need for temporary housing assistance or what have
you, we could do what we needed to do under our emergency
authorities of Stafford.
Mr. Dent. Okay. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Shuster. Ms. Norton?
Ms. Norton. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Just one
more question.
Mr. Gruber, in your testimony, you spoke of the many
partners with whom you were working, State, local, tribal,
private sector, and nongovernmental. I really have a question
about that.
It occurs to me that private industry has a huge incentive
on its own to move probably well in advance of some of us.
They, for example, are in touch, have long been in touch with
their counterparts in Europe and in the Mid East and in South
America. It occurs to me they know a lot more about some of
this than any of us in the Federal Government and that they may
be some distance ahead of us, at least in some valuable
respects.
I wonder whether these standards and tasks, capabilities
that you are in the process of developing are consistent with
existing industry standards, such as the Emergency Management
Accreditation Program. I note, for example, that my own city is
one of only four jurisdictions that have this EMAC
certification, yet this comes out of private industry.
Can we do better than that, or are we trying to meet that
standard?
Mr. Gruber. Ma'am, that is an excellent question, and MFPA
1600 or Emergency Management Accreditation Association is an
excellent model. Former Secretary Ridge was a great proponent
of EMAP, as is Secretary Chertoff.
We have been talking to EMAP program staff. Just yesterday,
Gil and I were at the rollout for the NIMS/NRP talking with Tom
Lockwood about a collaboration to look at that, because it is a
great model for us to use. We certainly don't want to reinvent
something when we have a proven standard that has been well
tested and validated. Of course, we will look and adopt where
we have a great standard to use. We want to capitalize on that.
Ms. Norton. I certainly want to encourage consistency
between what I understand to be very highly regarded industry
standards and Federal Government standards, and I hope you read
off of their playbook, because I know people who answer to
stockholders and have their own private resources at stake have
had an incentive that perhaps none of us have had. I would hate
to see us going and inventing our own wheel, except insofar as
we are tailoring what we do to the special circumstances of the
public sector.
Mr. Gruber. Ma'am, if I might add, I am sure you will hear
a lot more about TOPOFF in the future, but our recent
experience with TOPOFF3, if my numbers serve me right, that we
had about 156 corporations or businesses that participated in
TOPOFF3. This was unprecedented.
One of the things we learned from that was exactly the
point you made, that in terms of agility and speed of
decisionmaking, there are plenty of lessons we could learn from
those participants. And we have businesses that were playing
from the corporate level. Their CEOs were participating during
the course of that week. So, I am confident, as we go through
all the data from the exercise, that there will be some great
lessons for us to adopt as well.
Ms. Norton. Thank you very much.
Before I came to Congress, I served on the board of three
Fortune 500 companies, and I do not for a moment think that
they were not prepared, they were worldwide, to deal with
whatever they had to deal with. So I urge us to look closely at
what industry has done.
Thank you very much.
Mr. Shuster. Mr. Dent.
Mr. Dent. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
I serve on the Homeland Security Committee, and I just left
a few hearings today dealing with H.R. 1544, the Smarter
Funding For First Responders Act, which tends to allocate our
first responder dollars out on a risk assessment or
vulnerability basis as opposed to a greater minimum or straight
population criteria.
Could you just give me your thoughts and perspectives on
that legislation? Is that compatible or dovetail with what you
are advocating here today?
Mr. Gruber. Well, obviously there are great discussions
underway, sir. It would probably be inappropriate for me to
comment on that because I know there is still a dialogue
underway. But you raise a great point, and that is the
Secretary, of course, has affirmed every time he has testified
to that.
We have to look at that, as he calls it, a strategic mix of
threat, vulnerability and consequence, as the best means to
ensure that we allocate our resources and make the most cost-
effective investments with our homeland security dollars, and
get the most payoff, the most leverage from those in terms of
whether it is terrorist events or natural hazards.
So we are committed. Again, we are not--what we are talking
about with HSPD-8 is not a funding formula, it is really a way
to help decisionmakers make smarter and more informed decisions
about their capability investments.
Mr. Dent. Finally, I know I mentioned TOPOFF a few moments
ago. I apologize for not being here to hear your opening
testimony. Were you actively involved in TOPOFF exercises in
Connecticut or New Jersey?
Mr. Gruber. Both of us were.
Mr. Dent. You were on site?
Mr. Gruber. No, sir, I was in the master control center
here in Washington.
Mr. Dent. Okay. You were both down here in Washington for
that exercise?
Mr. Jamieson. Yes. I was here in Washington also and
actively involved in the advanced distance learning exercises
that led up to that for both NRP and the NIMS.
Mr. Dent. Are you permitted to comment on what your
thoughts and perspectives were on how that exercise has gone? I
know there will be a lot of review and analysis of what
occurred, but can you give us any preliminary indication of how
you felt that exercise went?
Mr. Gruber. I think he will talk about the plan. I can just
give you some background on the overall exercise.
Mr. Jamieson. Yes, the exercise did do the National
Response Plan. I think it is important that when we comment
here, these exercises are important to tell us what we don't
know, what is working well and what is not working well.
What did come out of that is the fact that the National
Response Plan stood tall. It worked. The coordination
mechanisms that were there, the fundamental underpinnings of
the National Response Plan worked very well. Are there issues
that need to be worked on to improve communication awareness in
terms of these core national structures and how they work
better, what the connection points are to State and local
governments? Absolutely. But from a systemic standpoint, and
from the concept of operations of the National Response Plan,
it worked very well.
Mr. Dent. Just my own comment to you, just as an observer,
it seemed like the real success of that whole operation was not
what occurred during those few days of the actual exercise, but
all the planning that led up to it.
Mr. Jamieson. Yes, I agree.
Mr. Dent. That hopefully you would find out from those 3 or
4 days that here is your plan, and then you can just kind of
look back on the process, what you could do better. But I think
the success was just going through the exercise, all the steps
that were required. I was impressed by all the numbers of
people--just at the hospital--I only saw one little piece of
the puzzle and, I was just impressed by the level of detail,
professionalism of all the people involved and how well
orchestrated and planned this was. Just the number of people
involved was just overwhelming in the private sector, the
hospitals and from the various departments.
Mr. Jamieson. I appreciate those remarks.
Mr. Gruber. I might just add in terms of context--and,
again, these are preliminary numbers because, as you can well
imagine, we had literally hundreds of data collectors out there
at every part in this exercise. So we are talking about file
cabinets full of information that we got. But our preliminary
numbers, we are looking at somewhere in the neighborhood of
23,000 people that participated in this exercise. That doesn't
include the people we reached through our collaborative Web
tools and the distance learning that Gil talked about.
Mr. Dent. It is very impressive. Thank you.
Mr. Shuster. I have one more question. The Homeland
Security Presidential Directive-8 specifically excludes broader
law enforcement efforts to prevent terrorism. But in the NIMS,
the national preparedness goal, the target capabilities list
and universal task list include activities such as heightened
inspection, improved surveillance and security operations,
deterrence operations, activities that seem to fall squarely
within that exclusion category.
How do you sum that up? How do you justify that?
Mr. Jamieson. I can do that, sir. HSPD-8 obviously talks
about that in the context of some portions of that that are
exclusively the domain of other departments and agencies. So
the whole process of development. For example, we formed the
senior steering committee to help guide us through the course
of this implementation of HSPD-8.
The Department of Justice was a member of the senior
steering committee. We are working with the Department of
Justice, the Bureau, other elements of the Intelligence
Community, all--what we have to do is make sure that the
capabilities we are developing support their mission
requirements as well and support what State and local officials
have told us are very high and urgent needs that they have in
terms of information-sharing and collaboration in the
intelligence arena as well.
So while we fully understand what the directive told us to
do, and we are staying in our lane, we also understand we have
an obligation to support our partners.
Mr. Shuster. Thank you.
Before you leave, I would just like to say I think you are
on the right track. I think you have done a good job. I know
the timetable is very tight. I am especially impressed with
NIMS and the NRP. But I think that there is more work to be
done on the national preparedness goal, especially, I think, it
needs to be comprehensive. At this point I don't believe it is
comprehensive. We would like to--I would like to and this
committee would like to help you move forward on that. I think,
as I said, you are moving in the right direction.
Again, thank you very much for being here, and you are
excused.
Mr. Gruber. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Jamieson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Shuster. We are going to have to go into a recess here.
That second panel can--well, you can take your seats or just
relax. We are going to have to go vote. It is going to probably
be about 25 minutes to half an hour we will be on the floor. I
apologize for that. I guess that is the hazards of having to
vote and pass laws. So we will be back at around 3:30, my good
guess. Thank you.
[Recess.]
Mr. Shuster. I will call the meeting back to order. I was
off by about 15 minutes. I am sorry about that.
I will welcome the second panel today, which is comprised
of a number of State and local officials as well as
representatives from the NGO sector, each of whom individually
on behalf of their respective organizations has significant
responsibilities during disasters of all types.
Joining us today are Mr. David Liebersbach. How is that?
Mr. Liebersbach. Great.
Mr. Shuster. President of the National Emergency Management
Association, as well as being the director of the State of
Alaska's Division of Homeland Security and Emergency
Management; Chief John Buckman, representing the International
Association of Fire Chiefs, as well as being the fire chief of
German Township, Indiana; Captain John Salle--
Mr. Salle. Salle, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Shuster. Pronounce it again.
Mr. Salle. Salle.
Mr. Shuster. Thank you--representing the International
Association of Chiefs of Police; Mr. Armond--
Mr. Mascelli. Mascelli.
Mr. Shuster. My Italian is not very good--Mascelli, vice
president of emergency response for the American Red Cross; Mr.
Dewayne West, who is here wearing several hats as vice chairman
of the Emergency Management Accreditation Program, president of
the International Association of Emergency Managers, and as the
director of emergency management for Johnston County, North
Carolina.
Welcome to you all.
Since your written testimony has been made part of the
record, the subcommittee would request that all witnesses limit
their oral testimony to 5 minutes, and there will be time for
questions after the witnesses have offered their prepared
remarks.
We are going to start with Mr. West, because I understand
you have a flight to catch.
So go ahead, Mr. West.
TESTIMONY OF DEWAYNE WEST, VICE CHAIRMAN, EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT
ACCREDITATION PROGRAM COMMISSION, PRESIDENT, INTERNATIONAL
ASSOCIATION OF EMERGENCY MANAGERS, DIRECTOR OF EMERGENCY
MANAGEMENT, JOHNSON COUNTY, NORTH CAROLINA; DAVID E.
LIEBERSBACH, PRESIDENT, NATIONAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT
ASSOCIATION, DIRECTOR, DIVISION OF HOMELAND SECURITY AND
EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT, STATE OF ALASKA; CHIEF JOHN BUCKMAN, PAST
PRESIDENT, INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF FIRE CHIEFS, FIRE
CHIEF, GERMAN TOWNSHIP, INDIANA; CAPTAIN JOHN P. SALLE,
INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF CHIEFS OF POLICE; AND ARMOND
MASCELLI, VICE PRESIDENT OF EMERGENCY RESPONSE, AMERICAN RED
CROSS
Mr. West. Thank you, Chairman Shuster.
I appreciate the opportunity to speak to you this afternoon
and to talk about some recent Federal preparedness initiatives.
I am Dewayne West, vice chairperson of the Emergency Management
Accreditation Program Commission, commonly known as EMAP, and
director of Johnston County's emergency management program, and
have currently had the pleasure of serving as president for the
international association. But today I am wearing the EMAP
Commission hat, which is the governing board of the only
national assessment and accreditation process for local and
State emergency management.
EMAP is a nonprofit accrediting body dedicated to the
improvement and excellence in public sector emergency
management. On behalf of the EMAP Commission, thank you for the
opportunity to be part of the committee's examination of the
work done to date on HSPD-5 and HSPD-8.
We recognize that significant work has been accomplished in
these areas. The National Response Plan, while still being
implemented, is a step in the right direction to strengthen
coordination of response activities across Federal agencies.
With the potential to improve Federal response and
assistance, the National Incident Management System, or NIMS,
is a positive step as well to address the need for a more
consistent approach to incident management. While many State
and local governments already use an incident management
system, EMAP assessments have confirmed the need for greater
consistency in the use of and terminology within incident
management.
We note, however, that there appears to be gaps in the
coordination across HSPD-5 and 8 projects, the question being
how core concepts of one document work with the features of the
other.
Because assessment, benchmarking, and continuous
improvement in comprehensive preparedness and emergency
management are EMAP's focus and mission, my comments today will
be largely directed towards HSPD-8 implementation activities.
EMAP, the Emergency Management Accreditation Program,
started as a concept in the late 1990s when State and local
emergency managers, with support from their Federal partners,
identified the need for national standards and a consistent
assessment methodology for State and local government emergency
management.
EMAP assesses a jurisdiction's system for dealing with
natural and human-caused disasters and has conducted baseline
assessments using its national standards in 35 States and
territories. In my comments today, I will touch on a couple of
areas related to the National Preparedness Goal and Target
Capabilities List, or TCL, and our concerns about potential
impacts of this initiative as it is currently outlined.
First and perhaps most directly, if the expectation is that
HSPD-8 materials, the Target Capabilities List, National
Preparedness Goal and planning scenarios, will provide a
comprehensive assessment of preparedness, we would simply say,
no, that objective or expectation has not yet been achieved.
Next I encourage you to seek ways to ensure that proposed
solutions support progress in balance with the burden that they
impose on your constituents at the local and State level.
There are several points at which we are concerned that
HSPD-8 implementation activities assume a start-from-scratch
approach to preparedness. There are multitudes of State and
local plans, procedures and programs throughout the Nation, and
as we have communicated to colleagues at DHS, an attempt to
recreate all of them would not be a wise or effective use of
time and resources.
For our communities and States and, therefore, the Nation,
to be prepared for a terrorist attack, the foundation for
preparedness must be strengthened rather than distracted. A
strong foundation that includes hazard identification and a
multidisciplinary, multiagency approach to resource management,
planning, communications, training, exercising and public
education must be supported and strengthened to ensure
preparedness. This foundation is vital, whether the community
experiences spring flooding or a radiological dispersal device.
It is these foundation capabilities that are evaluated through
the EMAP standards and process.
The fact that the Federal Government has created a large
Department of Homeland Security may foster somewhat of a
misconception that I am sure you are aware of from your work
with State and local leaders. While there are departments and
individuals at the State and local levels who handle
prevention, preparedness, response and recovery functions, and
there may even be a few new offices or positions labeled
"homeland security," there is no substantial new bureaucracy
available to handle the increased workload and requirements of
evolving and demanding Federal homeland security initiatives.
These are by and large the same people and the same offices,
retasked or multitasked, as those responsible for emergency
management, law enforcement, public safety or emergency
response.
We ask that this reality be understood and that you seek to
improve preparedness in ways that build on existing
capabilities, filling gaps and strengthening systems rather
than reinventing the wheel. We are concerned that promulgation
of HSPD-8 compliance requirements will occur before the
potential for duplication and dilution of existing State and
local practices and plans have been considered.
We suggest that our Federal agency partners focus first on
the seven national priorities outlined in the National
Preparedness Goal, and encourage State and local governments to
evaluate capabilities in these areas of urgent need using the
Target Capabilities List as a tool. Then we need to make sure
that both the capabilities in these areas are coordinated and
dovetailed with existing plans and systems. On this key issue,
we hope DHS understands that it does not need to create an
entirely new preparedness assessment methodology, but it can
and should do what makes sense, and that is to build upon
existing standards and assessment processes such as EMAP, using
State and local governments throughout the country.
Again, thank you for the opportunity to talk with you for
your help in building stronger and more sustainable
preparedness capabilities.
Mr. Shuster. Thank you, Mr. West. Feel free any time you
have to excuse yourself, go ahead. We appreciate your being
here. Sorry we didn't get this started earlier.
Next, Mr. Liebersbach, you may go ahead and proceed.
Mr. Liebersbach. Thank you, Chairman Shuster, for allowing
me the opportunity to testify before your committee.
I am Dave Liebersbach, director of the Alaska Homeland
Security Emergency Management, but today I am here as president
of NEMA, whose members are the directors of emergency
management for the 58 States and territories and the District
of Columbia.
I have three issues that I bring before you today to
discuss regarding the state of our Nation's preparedness:
organization of the preparedness system; development of the
National Response Plan or requirements for State and local
governments; and development of the Homeland Security
Presidential Directive 8 on preparedness and our concerns for
the timelines and requirements.
On our Nation's preparedness system, last year DHS proposed
creation of a one-stop shop for homeland security funding,
which led to some preparedness grants to be moved to the newly
created Office of State and Local Coordination and
Preparedness. Some preparedness functions were also moved out
of FEMA.
While many of these changes have improved some of the
Nation's preparedness functions, changes that separate
preparedness functions once in FEMA from FEMA's response and
recovery function will complicate and compromise our Nation's
ability to respond to and recover from disasters.
Preparedness means personnel, planning, training and
exercise for all aspects of a disaster. Preparedness functions
cannot be isolated from response and recovery because they are
linked together. As Congress and DHS review the organization
and functions of the Department, we ask that preparedness not
be separated from emergency response and recovery functions.
Additionally, as the fiscal year 2005 funding has been
proposed, NEMA has been working alongside the Office of State
and Local Coordination and Preparedness to ensure that the all-
hazards intent of the Emergency Management Performance Grant
Program, the EMPG, is not changed with the creation of the one-
stop shop. EMPG is the only all-hazard source of Federal
funding for State and local emergency management capacity
building.
Integrating the EMPG funding into the homeland security
grant program has resulted in a bureaucratic grant system where
none existed previously. Only half of the Nation's emergency
managers serve as the State administrative agency, which
receives all the homeland security grants for disbursement.
This has caused significant delays and financial hardship for
State and local emergency management agencies. NEMA hopes to
work in partnership with Congress and DHS to resolve these
issues in the coming year to ensure swifter grant awards in
fiscal year 2006. Specifically, we ask Congress to decouple
EMPG funds from the homeland security grant program.
National Response Plan. NEMA supports the National Repose
Plan released by DHS as the comprehensive all-hazards tool for
domestic incident management across the spectrum of prevention,
preparedness, response and recovery.
The NRP comes as a result of Federal, State and local
government partnership. NEMA was actively involved in the State
and local working group that reviewed drafts of the NRP and
proposed changes as the NRP was developed by the Department.
The process used for developing the NRP initially was not
an easy road. State and local governments had no input into the
early version of the NRP, which led to significant outcry from
the emergency preparedness community when the draft was
released. NEMA commends DHS for listening to the concerns we
have with the initial process and then adapting the process in
progress. NEMA calls on Congress to ensure that DHS continues
to maintain consultation with stakeholders as they develop
critical national policy and implementation strategies.
A key component of the NRP requires State and local
governments to update their emergency response plans to reflect
the new National Response Plan. However, no dedicated Federal
funding is provided to update these plans. At a time when all
resources are taxed to meet the new threat environments, State
and local governments are forced to utilize current funding
streams to address additional new mandates.
On HSPD-8, another critical component to improving the
Nation's preparedness was the release of the Homeland Security
Presidential Directive-8 on national preparedness. NEMA
supports efforts to develop national preparedness goals and
accompanying standards that help the Nation to work towards
common levels of preparedness.
HSPD-8 is another process where NEMA is assisting with
input in developing the system, yet we continue to have to
concerns regarding the process and the final product. The
opportunity to impact real change is limited due to the rigid
timelines required of DHS. Increased State and local government
involvement in the national preparedness guidance, metrics on
performance, adoption of the goal, and implementation, must be
a critical component of the Federal Government's objective with
HSPD-8 if the process is to avoid a situation similar to what
initially occurred at the time of the NRP.
There are five other areas regarding HSPD-8 that must be
addressed as the National Preparedness Goal moves forward. One,
only 3 of the 15 national planning scenarios are not terrorist
attacks. Changing the focus of preparedness to weigh heavily on
terrorism could hamper the ability of State and local
governments to respond to the wider range of all hazardous
events which have a higher likelihood of occurrence.
Two, development of HSPD-8 and the guidance for
implementing the new National Preparedness Goal must take into
account existing standards programs such as the EMAP.
Three, timelines for implementation of HSPD-8 are very
tight and must be seriously considered, reconsidered for not
only practical application, but also for buy-in for the
personnel and stakeholders who will be required to implement
the goal.
State and local governments will be required to conduct
comprehensive assessments and update their statewide homeland
strategies by the end of the current year in order to be
available for fiscal year 2005 Federal preparedness assistance
funds. That is a mere 6 months to accomplish these major tasks.
Four, baseline funding for emergency management capability
or capacity building to ensure national preparedness against
all hazards must be maintained.
Finally, five, mutual aid must be considered a critical
component of State and local preparedness, as evidenced by last
year's hurricanes. The Emergency Management Assistance Compact
enabled 38 States to provide assistance in the form of more
than $15 million in human, military and equipment assets to
over--and over 800 personnel to support the impacted States for
over 85 days of continuous response operations.
In conclusion, as we continue to build national
preparedness efforts through the Department of Homeland
Security, we must not forget about the need for a balanced all-
hazards approach.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify on behalf of NEMA.
Mr. Shuster. Thank you.
Chief Buckman, go ahead and proceed.
Chief Buckman. Chairman Shuster, I am John Buckman, Chief
of the German Township Volunteer Fire Department in Evansville,
Indiana. I appear today on behalf of the International
Association of Fire Chiefs in my role as a past president of
that organization. I am also a member of the State, Tribal and
Local Working Group for the Department of Homeland Security
that since August of 2003 has been involved in reviewing the
development of the new national preparedness system.
On December 17, 2003, the President issued HSPD-8, which
purpose is to strengthen the preparedness of the United States
by creating a national all-hazards preparedness goal for
facilitating cooperation among all levels of government.
The IAFC is generally supportive of the national
preparedness system that has at its core a new partnership
between all levels of government, including the private sector.
I represent the IAFC in the development of the NF process and
would like to commend the DHS staff for their diligent work to
address the concerns of first responders. This system
represents a new philosophy on the part of Federal, State,
tribal and local governments and the private sector, with roles
and responsibilities clearly defined for each. All of these
stakeholders must embrace their new roles and responsibilities
in order to make this system truly effective.
The IAFC strongly supports a number of specific priorities
in the Interim National Preparedness Goal, including
strengthening interoperable communications capabilities. The
lack of interoperable communications is one of the greatest
threats to our public safety. At both Oklahoma City and the
Pentagon, incident commanders had to use human runners to
communicate with each other. The 9/11 Commission report details
how the lack of interoperability communications proved fatal
for 343 firefighters in the World Trade Center towers.
I would urge the members of this committee to support
legislation to set a certain date for clearing the 700
megahertz spectrum for public safety use.
We also support the implementation of NIMS and the National
Response Plan and expanding regional collaboration. The NIMS is
a multidisciplinary document that provides direction,
organization and control to any agency responding to a
disaster, not just police and fire.
The NIMS/NRP provide a badly-needed template for Federal,
State, local and tribal government to coordinate their response
to a disaster. By using the NIMS and NRP, local jurisdictions
can work together to develop regional mutual aid agreements.
We also support strengthening information-sharing between
the Federal, State and local governments. DHS should develop a
system to communicate instantly with the fire chief in times of
threat or increased risk to our community. The local fire
department, the local fire chief must have better information
to prepare for the threats that they face.
I would like to raise a few issues about the National
Preparedness System for the committee's consideration. One of
the most critical aspects of the National Preparedness System
is its focus on, or what may be a lack of focus on, an all-
hazards response.
While the firefighters responded to acts of terror against
the World Trade Center in 1993, Oklahoma City in 1995, the
horrendous events of 9/11, 2001, we also responded to numerous
major accidents and natural disasters each and every day in the
intervening years. To be truly effective, the National
Preparedness System must be designed to address the response by
all agencies to these events.
Unfortunately, only 2 of the 15 National Planning Scenarios
are for natural disasters, planning and funding for training
and organizational structure will be impacted by this
limitation. Ideally these scenarios would include tornadoes,
wildfires and flooding. Without the inclusion of all types of
hazards, the National Preparedness System will be biased
towards terrorism response and run the risk of being inadequate
for dealing with more frequent natural disasters.
In addition, the National Preparedness Policy and guidance
documents should be written so that they could be easily
understood by the firefighter in the field.
The IAFC believes that fire chiefs and other senior fire
officials should be appointed to positions within the Office of
Homeland Security and in other key positions within the
Department to ensure that the fire service continues to be
involved in the development of the National Preparedness
System. An example where the fire service is missing is at the
Homeland Security Operating Center. We have a table of managers
from a variety of organizations, but the fire service is not
there. The fire service is one of the first responders to a
disaster, and we are not sitting at the table where a Federal
policy will be decided and implemented.
The IAFC would also encourage the Office of State and Local
Government Coordination Preparedness to consult with the
national--with the United States Fire Administration and other
agencies. USFA will conduct most of the training of the fire
service on NIMS and NRP, and it collects data that will play an
important role in the National Preparedness System.
Mr. Chairman, the United States Fire Administrator Dave
Paulison needs to be intimately involved. In 2002, we asked
that the U.S. Fire Administrator be at the assistant secretary
level. We have never accomplished that. But we believe that the
Fire Administration and the needs of the fire service, because
of the position of our Fire Administrator, are not always being
adequately addressed.
In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, thank you again for holding
this hearing. The National Preparedness System is in its
formative stage and will require congressional and public
support to become a reality.
Thank you.
Mr. Shuster. Thank you, Chief.
Next up, Captain Salle.
Mr. Salle. Salle.
Mr. Shuster. Salle, sorry.
Mr. Salle. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, members of the
subcommittee. On behalf of the International Association of
Chiefs of Police, I am pleased to join you here this afternoon
to discuss the National Preparedness System and its application
to the threats posed to our community, whether they are posed
by terrorists or by natural hazards or major accidents.
As you may know, the IACP, with more than 20,000 members in
over 100 countries, is the world's oldest and largest
association of law enforcement executives. Founded in 1893, the
IACP has dedicated itself to the mission of advancing the law
enforcement profession and aiding our members in their efforts
to protect the citizens they serve.
Over the past 3 years, the IACP has worked very closely
with a number of Federal agencies, including the Department of
Homeland Security, the Department of Justice and the Federal
Bureau of Investigation. This work has been done to ensure that
the needs, capabilities and concerns of the Nation's law
enforcement agencies were taken into consideration as our
Nation responded to the menace of terrorism.
For the past 32 years, I was privileged to serve as a
member of the Oregon State Police. Upon my retirement in
February of this year, I was the director of the Oregon State
Police Office of Public Safety and Security. In addition to
that function, I served as the deputy director for the Oregon
Office of Homeland Security. In addition to those functions, I
have the privilege to be a part of the Department of Homeland
Security's State, Local and Tribal Working Group. Through this
working group, the IACP has been intimately involved in the
development of the NIMS, National Incident Management System,
and the NRP and various components of Homeland Security
Presidential Directive 8.
This group, this State, Local and Tribal Working Group, has
been meeting on a consistent basis for the past 2 years. Its
membership consists of a number of national organizations, and
in the interest of time, it is in the written testimony, and I
will refrain from listing all of those organizations.
But as you examine that roster, you can certainly tell that
the working group encompassed a wide variety of public safety
agencies. This ensured that our efforts were well balanced and
represented the concerns of many disciplines.
As a result of this balance, the working group was able to
incorporate the views of actual practitioners into the drafts
of national policies that have been developed. In this fashion,
we have worked closely with DHS to ensure that the policy
documents they have produced are comprehensible, not being
overly prescriptive in dictating a one-size-fits-all approach
to State, local, public and tribal safety agencies.
Through my participation in this group, and in my
experience with the Oregon State Police, I witnessed that the
coordinated Federal policies implemented as a result of HSPD-5,
7 and 8 have indeed resulted in a significant increase in
cross-discipline planning, training and exercising. In
addition, noticeable progress has been made in equipping public
agencies with interoperable communications equipment. It is
important to note that these efforts on the Federal, State,
tribal and local level, although somewhat focused on terrorism,
are creating a level of preparedness that applies to any
hazard.
Simply put, if first response agencies plan together, train
on a common command and control structure, and jointly exercise
those capabilities, the creation of a better, more unified
response to any catastrophe or hazard is inevitable.
The next step in this critical process is combining the
National Response Plan and the NIMS with a national
credentialing and equipment typing protocol. In this way we can
assure that Federal, State, tribal and local public safety
agencies not only have the proper command and communications
structure in place, but that all components will be properly
trained and equipped.
For example, under this scenario, a SWAT team or a bomb
squad could travel to the next city or region, assume the
appropriate function within the existing incident command
system, set to work in a terrorism situation or in any
situation requiring the skills set that they bring. At the same
time, because of national credential and equipment typing
protocols, the incident commanders would know exactly what
capabilities and assets this unit provides.
In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, I believe that for the last 3
years, we have made significant progress at our efforts to
integrate and coordinate the activities of tens of thousands of
Federal, State, local and tribal public safety agencies that
operate within the United States. But it is important to
remember that we are far from finished. The policies that have
been crafted to date are dynamic, living works that will
improve over time with lessons learned and the establishment of
best practices. The IACP firmly believes that the benefits to
be gained through the establishment of common command and
communications that will allow for a coordinated, collective
response to disasters, whether natural or manmade, make these
efforts extremely worthwhile.
Thank you.
Mr. Shuster. Thank you, Mr. Salle.
Next, Mr. Mascelli.
Mr. Mascelli. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your gracious
invitation to testify at this hearing.
Mr. Shuster. Will you pull your microphone a little closer
to you.
Mr. Mascelli. My name is Armond Mascelli, and I am vice
president for domestic emergency response for the Red Cross. In
the interest of time and priority attention, I will limit my
remarks to the role of the Red Cross in prepared disaster
response and some related concerns and recommendations, the
National Incident Management System, the National Response Plan
and the National Preparedness Goal.
Chartered by Congress in 1905, the Red Cross provides a
unique community-based network to support all-hazard disaster
preparedness and response throughout the United States and
within your district on an everyday basis. As a key member of
the first responder community with expertise in meeting human
needs caused by disasters, the Red Cross is integrated into
State and local government disaster planning, exercises and
response efforts. While systems and strategies are important,
the public is our client to whom we ultimately direct our
services.
Mr. Chairman, this hearing is timely as the Red Cross has
completed the TOPOFF 3 exercise. We have participated in all
three TOPOFF exercises to date. While we remain concerned that
the overall exercises have not yet addressed the long-term
human needs of disaster victims, TOPOFF 3 did effectively test
the critical role that the Red Cross plays in enhancing the
Nation's disaster preparedness and response capabilities under
the National Response Plan.
Mr. Chairman, I would like to take a moment to elaborate on
our work with the Department of Homeland Security and other
Federal agencies during the development of the National
Response Plan and the National Incident Management System, or
NIMS.
As for NIMS, we believe it can be an effective tool for
communicating, a consistent nationwide approach for governments
at all levels, the private sector and nongovernmental
organizations. NIMS has the potential to foster greater
efficiency and effectiveness within the disaster community to
prepare for and to respond to and recover from domestic
incidents.
Building on Red Cross responsibilities under the old
Federal Response Plan, we are actively engaged in policy
decisions with the Department of Homeland Security throughout
the development of the National Response Plan. A comprehensive
list of our roles in the National Response Plan is respectfully
submitted for the record. Specifically, the Red Cross serves as
a primary agency for mass care, which involves a provision of
food, emergency shelter, first aid, welfare or inquiry
information and the bulk distribution of emergency relief
items.
The Red Cross also serves as a support agency to the
Department of Health and Human Services for public health and
medical services. This involves providing blood, blood products
in coordination with the American Association of Blood Banks,
and also the provision of mental health and disaster health
services.
We have also undertaken and expanded function under the
National Response Plan with respect to public information to
help disseminate accurate and timely information to those
affected during an incident.
Under the National Response Plan's Catastrophic Incident
Annex, the Red Cross is responsible for providing mass care
during an incident that results in extraordinary levels of mass
casualties or severe population disruptions.
In short, we are partnering with the Department of Homeland
Security to move beyond the day-to-day and annual natural
disasters to address scenarios previously unimaginable.
To fully execute our responsibilities, the Red Cross
developed the Mass Care Catastrophic Planning Initiative, which
outlines a three-phased strategy to address individual
community catastrophic disaster mass care planning,
preparedness and capacity building. During phases 1 and 2, the
Red Cross can help establish the necessary mass sheltering and
feeding plans in the 30 largest United States Metropolitan
Statistical Areas, which cover the 50 Urban Area Security
Initiative cities designated by the Department of Homeland
Security. In phase 3 we can initiate the necessary activities
to enhance and sustain the systems and measures established
during the first 2 years.
While we welcome the challenge of this important role, we
remain concerned that unlike other signatories of the National
Response Plan, the Red Cross is not included in any Federal
budget request submitted to Congress. The Red Cross has the
expertise, experience, and commitment and organizational
structure to implement the Mass Care Catastrophic Planning
Initiative, but it is not the responsibility of the charitable
public to fund the responsibilities associated with the
National Response Plan Catastrophic Annex the government
requires and the American public will need.
We believe that an immediate investment by our Federal
partners now will sharply reduce both the level of potential
human suffering and the expenditure of significant government
resources postincident. The Red Cross must have adequate levels
of funding for catastrophic planning activities to fully
execute our responsibilities under the National Response Plan.
We remain a willing partner and welcome the challenge of
our expanded role in the National Response Plan. We will
continue to work closely with the Department of Homeland
Security as it conducts its 1-year review and implementation
plan of the National Response Plan, and will continue to work
closely with the Department of Homeland Security as it
undertakes its National Response Plan 4-year review and
reissuance cycle.
With respect to the National Preparedness Goal, we commend
the work of the Department of Homeland Security as it creates
effective public policy stemming from Homeland Security
Presidential Directive 8, in particular the development of the
standardized approach to preparedness that assesses needs and
defines priorities.
Recognizing the experience of the Red Cross, our president
and chief executive officer Marty Evans was named in November
by the Department of Homeland Security to the Homeland Security
Presidential Directive 8 Senior Steering Committee.
This past July the Red Cross, Department of Homeland
Security, George Washington University, Homeland Security
Policy Institute and the Council for Excellence in Government
partnered to convene a symposium of recognized leaders in
disaster preparedness, response and recovery. A copy of the
symposium report for the subcommittee's review is respectfully
submitted for the record.
Undoubtedly enabling the public to know what to do in a
disaster event will lessen the burden that the first response
community and government at all levels will require. Limiting
preparedness to operational capability, thereby excluding
public preparedness, runs counter to the July 2002 National
Strategy for Homeland Security, which affirms that homeland
security is a shared national responsibility with the American
people. Accordingly, we have strongly recommended during the
development of the goal that public preparedness be thoroughly
addressed. To our delight, the vision outlined in the Interim
National Preparedness Goal now includes the general public as
an active participant to achieve risk-based target levels of
capabilities.
Additionally, the American Red Cross urged the inclusion of
nongovernment organizations in the National Preparedness Goal
as partners with government in developing homeland security
capabilities. Nongovernment organizations are now repeatedly
listed throughout the Interim National Preparedness Goal.
Through our numerous memorandums of understandings,
affiliations and other strategic partners, the American Red
Cross looks forward to helping integrate and leverage the
nongovernment organization community in implementation of the
goal.
In conclusion, we value the close relationship and
partnership with our government partners, and we appreciate
your continued interest in these very important issues. Like
the other panel members, I stand ready to answer any questions
you may have.
Thank you.
Mr. Shuster. Thank you very much.
My first question is about the National Preparedness System
as it is currently set up. I think I heard, and I read your
testimony, there is a mixed bag in there, about the--is it
adequately comprehensive to help prepare for all hazards? So I
would like each of you to briefly--do you think it is
comprehensive enough, and where does it fall short? Like I
said, be brief, if you could, so that I could get an answer
from each of you.
Mr. Liebersbach. Mr. Chairman, Dave Liebersbach.
I think that one place that it does fall short, as has been
mentioned before, is there is no reference to mitigation. There
is reference to prevention, which is a very terroristcentric
reference. The one place that it is applicable in natural
disasters, of course, is wildfires, as we are familiar with
Smokey the Bear and fire prevention. But there is no mitigation
in the National Response Plan.
I think the second piece of the National Response Plan that
I have some concern about, and a lot of us do, is that it is
primarily a National Response Plan for Federal agencies, and
not at this point truly a National Response Plan. I think it is
working its way there, and we have made that point fairly
strongly, and we are being heard better that the national
capability is there. It has just not been completely integrated
like it needs to be done. That is why we encourage both
Congress and DHS to continue to have the Department include
State and local stakeholders in the development and the
revisions of this plan to make sure it does become truly a
national plan.
Mr. Shuster. Thank you.
Chief Buckman.
Chief Buckman. I think he mentioned the mitigation aspect.
That has been a significant debate within our State, Tribe and
Local Working Group because mitigation seemed to be one of
those words that we used to use, but now we don't want to use.
But we have missed a significant portion of providing
protection for critical infrastructure, which is different than
prevention activities. So I think that is probably the biggest
thing that is missing.
Mr. Shuster. Mr. Salle.
Mr. Salle. Mr. Chairman, I think my best response to that
is I, as I have testified, was as an Oregon State Police
officer for--
Mr. Shuster. Can you talk into the mike a little more?
Mr. Salle. As an Oregon State Police officer a lot of
years, the last 3 years I have a better idea of what my
brothers in the emergency management business do and how they
do it. I could go right down the row of disciplines that are
involved in this arena.
As I testified, there is planning going on, exercising
going on, joint training going on. The bottom line is, I think,
as the question that is posed, as is currently set up, is it
adequate? It is more adequate than it was. It will be more
adequate in the future than it is today.
Thank you.
Mr. Shuster. Mr. Mascelli.
Mr. Mascelli. Yes, briefly, I can understand some of the
emphasis on the terrorism, the WMD types of focus, basically
new territory in many cases, and a lot of unknowns, and the
sort--the need to sort that out--gets smarter on that.
I would hope that as that comes about, there is an
evolution and there is a balance in terms of the right way. I
am not sure what that balance is between the day-to-day natural
events that we face and also the terrorism, the WMD events.
Mr. Shuster. That is of the things I am concerned about, is
it comprehensive enough? I don't believe it is at this point. I
hope, as you have said and as Mr. Salle said, it gets better as
we move on, because FEMA has been around for 25 or so years.
They have responded to 13- to 1,500 natural disasters. Only
four of them have been terrorism. I think, again, we have to
focus on terrorists to a degree, but there are a lot of other
things going on out there.
That brings me to the--did any of you participate
officially or unofficially in the creation of the 15 planning
scenarios? You can each answer that, starting with Mr.
Liebersbach.
Mr. Liebersbach. Mr. Chairman, Dave Liebersbach.
I know we did not participate in the creation of those
scenarios. We gave some pretty adamant input after they came
out. I think when they first came out, there was only one that
was aimed at natural hazards, and we did get an additional one
put in, but we weren't involved officially or unofficially.
Mr. Shuster. Your association was not involved at all?
Mr. Liebersbach. No.
Mr. Shuster. All right. Mr. Buckman.
Chief Buckman. Mr. Chairman, John Buckman.
I would basically second what Mr. Liebersbach said, that,
no, the International Association of Fire Chiefs was not
invited to participate.
It was pretty obvious to me, when I read the first draft,
that it was written by people who had not been in the field. It
was written by nonpractitioners, that is what I define them as;
that they received an assignment and they wrote it, but they
did not have any idea what reality was.
Mr. Shuster. Mr. Salle.
Mr. Salle. Mr. Chairman, International Association of
Chiefs of Police did not participate in the drafting of those.
Mr. Mascelli. Yes, sir. We were provided copies of the
scenarios and on several occasions iterations providing
comments back on them.
Mr. Shuster. What do you think the mix should be on the 15
training centers? Should we have more, 20 scenarios and 5 more
for natural disasters? Would anybody care to comment on that?
Chief Buckman. Well, Mr. Chairman--John Buckman. I am not
sure that there is a number. But I think that we sometimes--we
may be losing sight of the fact that all disasters begin and
end locally, and that all disasters begin small and, depending
on the size, quickly escalate to something that could be more
than State or local, or could be local or regional, could be
State or even Federal. And that is where we--I think that we
have a potential for losing the funds to do the training,
because we have spread it out over so many instead of narrowing
it down to a fewer number.
Mr. Shuster. All right. Mr. Liebersbach.
Mr. Liebersbach. Mr. Chairman, Dave Liebersbach again.
I don't know that I have a magic number for the number, but
it needs to be better balanced.
Mr. Shuster. What natural disasters do you think we need to
include in there?
Mr. Liebersbach. Well, we haven't addressed tornadoes. A
big one that recurs annually and is the largest annualized loss
for economics in this country is flooding, and nowhere in there
we brought flooding in. Now, it doesn't always have the
dynamics of a hurricane, but in terms of annualized loss over
20-year, 10-year, 5-year periods, both in my State and across
the United States, that is the largest costs to the American
people.
Mr. Shuster. What do you think about Mr. Gruber's statement
that they have focused on terrorism because there has been so
much training on these other areas? It doesn't seem to be the
way that you want to look at it.
Mr. Liebersbach. My concern is there is a lot of focus on
those other areas, the all-hazards. I think we have done a lot
there.
My concern is we are not going to be able to maintain. I
honestly believe--and I won't say it is necessarily the
association's position, but it is Dave Liebersbach's position
that if the hurricane scenario of September 2004 that occurred
in the Southeastern U.S., the first 5 years from now, we will
fail the way we are going, because the success of that response
of that hurricane season was based on the programs that had
come before the legacy created in the all-hazards and the true
work of all-hazards and what was left over.
As we are moving forward, that legacy is going to drop if
we don't pay attention to dealing with that. We were very close
to the edge when these hurricanes were going on, and Mount St.
Helens began to have a seismic swarm up there, and we have a
6.7-plus earthquake right in Southern California right in the
middle of that. As it turns out, neither became problems, but
that would have pushed the Federal system to its limits in
terms of response, if not over.
Mr. Shuster. As the folks in DHS continue to tell us that
they are listening, I know they have listened to State and
local views.
Mr. Salle. I can't answer that across the spectrum. I can
speak to the State, Local and Tribal Working Group that did a
huge amount on NIMS and NRP over the last 2 years, and our
answer was yes. Our input was solicited and listened to. Had it
not been, we certainly would have some iteration of an NRP that
doesn't look like it looks today.
I think--
Chief Buckman. Chief, from the International Association of
Fire Chiefs, we would agree that they have listened, they have
responded. We haven't won everything we have asked for, but
they have been reputable in giving us reasons why they would
not and could not do what we asked.
Mr. Mascelli. I have to agree with that. Looking at the
first draft of the preliminary response plan and then the
successive drafts, you can now tell each draft that they were
getting better at soliciting local input into--and there is a
marked difference between the first and the final draft.
Mr. Liebersbach. Mr. Chairman, Dave Liebersbach.
I will agree with my colleague in the NRP after the first
draft came out, as my testimony said, they were responsive in
listening to us on that. I have concern--and we have concern
that this is not happening with HSPD-8.
One of the reasons is the compressed timeline that DHS is
being driven under, I think, needs to be looked at pretty hard
to when we get our product. Well, it is better to be
approximately right than precisely wrong, and we are moving
fast, but we may be moving fast up the wrong ladder.
Mr. Shuster. How much more time do you think you need to
adequately respond?
Mr. Liebersbach. I would have to get back to you on that,
Mr. Chairman. I would have to talk to my membership, who has
been more intimately involved in working with HSPD-8
representing NEMA. But the feedback I get back from them is
that two things are happening. The compressed timeline is not
allowing for an adequate look at all the needs that need to be
looked at. Because they are in such a rush, they are not taking
into account and have been unable to take into account what is
already there to address this. We are beginning to duplicate
and recreating the wheel in a lot of cases that is already out
there.
Mr. Shuster. That is a concern, reinventing the wheel
instead of taking what is already out there, existing
standards, and incorporating them into the plan, system. Do you
feel that they are trying to reinvent the wheel in many cases,
or is that just something that happens just on a few things?
Mr. Liebersbach. Well, under HSPD-8, I think in many things
they are that way, and I have read letters and gotten nice
responses, but the effectiveness of what is really happening is
changing--again comes to this compressed timeline. They are
directed to get things to the President, the directive, so
obviously they are driven to do that and have very little time
to take into account, what we, on the ground, whether it is
state and/or local, are trying to get back to them about the
reality of what is needed out there on the front line.
Mr. Shuster. Can you get your association, your members to
give us some specifics on what they think that they haven't
listened to or how they are trying to reinvent the wheel in
certain cases?
Mr. Liebersbach. Yes, I think we can.
Mr. Shuster. I appreciate that.
Anybody else care to share the views of your association,
where the members believe they are trying to reinvent the wheel
or they are incorporating existing standards or programs into
the system?
Mr. Salle. Again, Mr. Chairman, I can speak to my non-
across-the-spectrum work that we have done with the DHS, but
that was one of the issues that has been alluded to with the
initial draft of the NRP, was that, you know, you are asking
this country and every emergency manager out there to recreate
their plan. So this will not work.
And, again, the response was, well, apparently you folks
are right, so you tell us how to do it and provide input, and
that is what we did. Beyond that, I am not aware of a situation
on behalf of IACP.
Mr. Shuster. Chief, do you have any comments on that?
Mr. Buckman. No.
Mr. Shuster. That is straightforward enough. I know I do
not have any other questions, and Ms. Norton did not make it
back, unfortunately. I know she had some other business that
she had to attend to.
Seeing there are no further questions, first I will ask
unanimous consent for members to be permitted to submit their
statements in the record.
Without objection, so ordered.
I would also like to thank again each of you for coming
here today and spending your time. It has been very
informative. These committee hearings are to educate us as we
move forward and try to figure out what is really happening in
the real world out there. A lot of times we are getting
sometimes a different story. As I said to the folks that were
here from Homeland Security, the Department of Homeland
Security, I think they have done a good job. I know the time
frame has been short, but I still think there needs to be some
work done to improve it.
With that, I ask unanimous consent that the record of
today's hearing remain open until such time as all the
witnesses have provided answers to any questions that may be
submitted to them in writing; and unanimous consent that during
such time as the record remains open that additional comments
offered by individuals or groups may be included in the record
of today's hearing.
Without objection, so ordered.
Again, I want to thank you all very much for traveling
here. Sorry we took so long today, but thanks again. Appreciate
it. And the hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 4:38 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
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