    [House Hearing, 109 Congress]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

      DIGGING UP THE FACTS: INSPECTING THE BIG DIG AND THE PERFORMANCE OF
      FEDERAL AND STATE GOVERNMENT IN PROVIDING OVERSIGHT OF FEDERAL FUNDS

    =======================================================================

                                    HEARING

                                   before the

                                  COMMITTEE ON
                               GOVERNMENT REFORM

                            HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                           ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS

                                 FIRST SESSION

                                   __________

                                 APRIL 22, 2005

                                   __________

                               Serial No. 109-29

                                   __________

           Printed for the use of the Committee on Government Reform

      Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/congress/house
                          http://www.house.gov/reform

                                     ______

                        U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
    21-590                      WASHINGTON : 2005
    _____________________________________________________________________________
    For Sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office
    Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov  Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800; (202) 512�091800
    Fax: (202) 512�092250 Mail: Stop SSOP, Washington, DC 20402�090001

                         COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM

                         TOM DAVIS, Virginia, Chairman
    CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut       HENRY A. WAXMAN, California
    DAN BURTON, Indiana                  TOM LANTOS, California
    ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida         MAJOR R. OWENS, New York
    JOHN M. McHUGH, New York             EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York
    JOHN L. MICA, Florida                PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania
    GIL GUTKNECHT, Minnesota             CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York
    MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana              ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland
    STEVEN C. LaTOURETTE, Ohio           DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio
    TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania    DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois
    CHRIS CANNON, Utah                   WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri
    JOHN J. DUNCAN, Jr., Tennessee       DIANE E. WATSON, California
    CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan          STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts
    MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio              CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland
    DARRELL E. ISSA, California          LINDA T. SANCHEZ, California
    GINNY BROWN-WAITE, Florida           C.A. DUTCH RUPPERSBERGER, Maryland
    JON C. PORTER, Nevada                BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
    KENNY MARCHANT, Texas                ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of
    LYNN A. WESTMORELAND, Georgia            Columbia
    PATRICK T. McHENRY, North Carolina               ------
    CHARLES W. DENT, Pennsylvania        BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont
    VIRGINIA FOXX, North Carolina            (Independent)
    ------ ------

                        Melissa Wojciak, Staff Director
           David Marin, Deputy Staff Director/Communications Director
                          Rob Borden, Parliamentarian
                           Teresa Austin, Chief Clerk
              Phil Barnett, Minority Chief of Staff/Chief Counsel

                                C O N T E N T S

                                  ----------
                                                                       Page
    Hearing held on April 22, 2005...................................     1
    Statement of:
        Amorello, Matthew J., chairman, Massachusetts Turnpike
          Authority; John MacDonald, chairman, board of control,
          Bechtel/Parsons Brinckerhoff, accompanied by Morris Levy,
          senior vice president, Parsons Brinckerhoff, Inc., and
          Keith S. Sibley, P.E., program manager, Central Artery/
          Tunnel Project, Bechtel/Parsons Brinckerhoff; and George J.
          Tamaro, partner, Mueser Rutledge Consulting Engineers......    70
            Amorello, Matthew J......................................    70
            MacDonald, John..........................................    80
            Tamaro, George J.........................................    94
        Gribbin, D.J., Chief Counsel, Federal Highway Administration,
          accompanied by Stanley Gee, Administrator, Massachusetts
          Division, Federal Highway Administration; Kenneth Mead,
          Inspector General, U.S. Department of Transportation; and
          Tom Reilly, attorney general, Commonwealth of Massachusetts    14
            Gribbin, D.J.............................................    14
            Mead, Kenneth............................................    22
            Reilly, Tom..............................................    44
    Letters, statements, etc., submitted for the record by:
        Amorello, Matthew J., chairman, Massachusetts Turnpike
          Authority, prepared statement of...........................    75
        Davis, Chairman Tom, a Representative in Congress from the
          State of Virginia, prepared statement of...................     4
        Gribbin, D.J., Chief Counsel, Federal Highway Administration,
          prepared statement of......................................    16
        Lynch, Hon. Stephen F., a Representative in Congress from the
          State of Massachusetts, prepared statement of..............     9
        MacDonald, John, chairman, board of control, Bechtel/Parsons
          Brinckerhoff, prepared statement of........................    82
        Mead, Kenneth, Inspector General, U.S. Department of
          Transportation, prepared statement of......................    26
        Reilly, Tom, attorney general, Commonwealth of Massachusetts,
          prepared statement of......................................    46
        Tamaro, George J., partner, Mueser Rutledge Consulting
          Engineers, prepared statement of...........................    96

      DIGGING UP THE FACTS: INSPECTING THE BIG DIG AND THE PERFORMANCE OF
      FEDERAL AND STATE GOVERNMENT IN PROVIDING OVERSIGHT OF FEDERAL FUNDS

                                  ----------

                             FRIDAY, APRIL 22, 2005

                              House of Representatives,
                                Committee on Government Reform,
                                                        Washington, DC.
        The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2 p.m., in the En
    Banc Courtroom, Moakley Courthouse, Boston, MA, Hon. Tom Davis
    (chairman of the committee) presiding.
        Present: Representatives Davis of Virginia, and Lynch.
        Also present: Representative Capuano.
        Staff present: Teresa Austin, chief clerk; Sarah D'Orsie,
    deputy clerk; Brian Stout, professional staff member; John
    Hunter, counsel; Drew Crockett, deputy director of
    communications; and Krista Boyd, minority counsel.
        Chairman Tom Davis. Good afternoon. A quorum being present,
    the committee will come to order. We are conducting this field
    hearing in Boston today to assess the status of the Central
    Tunnel/Artery Project, or the Big Dig, one of the largest and
    most expensive Federal highway projects in the history of the
    United States.
        My colleague and good friend and member of this committee,
    Congressman Stephen Lynch, requested that this congressional
    committee convene a hearing here in Boston to witness firsthand
    the steps being taken to address the outstanding concerns and
    issues in terms of safety and cost associated with the Big Dig.
        As this project nears completion, it is vital that we
    assess the lessons learned here in Boston and determine how to
    prevent such cost growth and improve oversight and coordination
    in the future. These are significant areas of concern to the
    Committee on Government Reform, and indeed to the entire
    Nation, as we seek solutions to increased urban congestion
    throughout the country.
        It is imperative for the Federal Government, which often
    pays 80 percent of the major highway projects, to play a role
    to ensure that taxpayer dollars, whether Federal or State, are
    being used effectively. In addition, the increase in the number
    of projects and the rapidly growing competition for both
    Federal and State funding demand that major transportation and
    infrastructure projects be managed efficiently and cost
    effectively, so we are able to fund the many needs we have
    across the Nation.
        It is for these important reasons that we decided to come
    to Boston today and hold this important hearing. I am pleased
    that Congressman Lynch is with us this morning, and I also want
    to welcome Congressman Capuano to this field hearing as well.
    And I would ask unanimous consent that he be allowed to sit
    here as a member of the committee and ask questions. And, Mike,
    we appreciate you being here as well.
        I don't need to remind anyone here about the traffic and
    related highway safety problems of the Central Artery in the
    1980's that led to the planning for this massive project.
    Preliminary designs began in the 1980's, and construction
    commenced in 1991.
        As with all State highway projects such as this, the
    Federal Highway Administration is responsible for protecting
    the Federal funding of this project. As part of the
    Metropolitan Highway System, the Massachusetts Turnpike
    Authority has given construction and operational authority for
    this project.
        The figures associated with the Big Dig are staggering. The
    nature and scope of the project, the time involved in planning
    and construction, and the cost overruns and safety concerns are
    unparalleled. What began in 1980 as a $2 billion project grew
    to $8 billion in 1995, and the Authority currently estimates
    the project cost to be $14.625 billion.
        Upon completion, scheduled for later this year, the project
    will encompass 7.8 miles of highway, with 161 lane miles of
    pavement, 3 interstate tunnels, over 200 bridge structures, and
    6 major interchanges. So it comes close to $2 billion a mile.
        While it is hard to imagine another federally funded
    project--public works project of this magnitude, there is a
    growing need nationwide to plan, build, and support major
    highway and infrastructure improvements. It is, therefore,
    vital for us to learn what happened here in Boston and
    implement procedures that will ensure against cost overruns of
    highway projects and assure the safety and confidence of the
    traveling public that utilizes those highways.
        Certain steps have already been undertaken as a result of
    the problems associated with the Big Dig. Congress now requires
    initial financial plans and annual updates to be submitted and
    approved by the U.S. Department of Transportation for all
    projects costing over $1 billion.
        These financial plans for the mega projects must identify
    project costs and financial resources to implement and complete
    the planned project. Annual updates must report actual cost and
    revenue performance in comparison to original estimates and
    revision of estimates.
        This process has been implemented. The Woodrow Wilson
    Bridge Project, which is the Potomac River crossing northern
    Virginia, which I represent, and Maryland. Right now that is on
    schedule and under budget.
        I hope that this hearing will give us an accurate picture
    of the current status of the Big Dig and the efforts to remedy
    the tunnel leaks, which has been learned from this mega
    highway--what else has been learned, and implementation of
    safeguards for other federally funded projects.
        Now, we have assembled an impressive group of witnesses
    today. We will hear from the Federal Highway Administration,
    the U.S. Department of Transportation Inspector General, the
    Commonwealth of Massachusetts, the attorney general of the
    Commonwealth of Massachusetts, the Massachusetts Turnpike
    Authority, the overall management consultant for the project
    hired by the Massachusetts Highway Department, and a safety
    engineer who evaluated the project.
        I want to thank our witnesses for appearing before the
    committee, and I look forward to their testimony.
        I now yield to Mr. Lynch.
        [The prepared statement of Chairman Tom Davis follows:]

        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T1590.001

        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T1590.002

        Mr. Lynch. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First, I would like to
    begin by thanking you for convening this hearing, and also it
    was necessary for me to get the agreement of our ranking
    member, Henry Waxman, and I appreciate you coming here to
    Boston.
        This committee is the Committee on Government Reform. And
    as the name suggests, it is the continuing problems that we
    have encountered on the Central Artery/Tunnel Project that
    brings us here today. Very simply, this committee is charged
    with asking the tough questions, and using the powers that are
    afforded to this committee, and to the Congress, to determine
    where the shared responsibilities lie in completing and
    maintaining this project in a manner that meets the high
    standards that taxpayers and toll payers expect.
        In a national regulatory context, we also seek to ensure
    that the systemic problems that resulted in cost overruns are
    not allowed to happen again. There is frequent criticism of
    partisan bickering in Congress that sometimes hampers our work.
    And, in fairness, I must confess that sometimes that criticism
    is warranted and well deserved.
        However, I must say that my experience on this committee,
    under the leadership of Chairman Tom Davis, the gentleman from
    Virginia, has been a shining exception to that rule. In my
    brief tenure on the committee, we have conducted investigations
    of the Boston Office of the FBI and their involvement with
    organized crime, we continue to investigate the U.N.'s
    complicity in the Iraqi Oil for Food scandal, we are
    investigating contract irregularities with Halliburton in the
    Middle East, and most recently steroid abuse in Major League
    Baseball and professional sports.
        And through it all, I have seen Chairman Davis has
    personally gone to great lengths to maintain a level of
    fairness and to encourage the work of all members together,
    regardless of their political affiliation. So, again, my
    thanks.
        Chairman Tom Davis. Thank you. If you want to take more
    than your 5 minutes, you are doing real well. [Laughter.]
        Mr. Lynch. Well, he wrote this, so--[laughter]--not at all.
    Turning to the difficulties of the Central Artery Project, as
    somebody who literally grew up in the construction industry, I
    have taken a natural interest in this project. Let me state at
    the outset that I do not for a moment discount the colossal
    scale of this undertaking, which is, again, as the chairman has
    said, the largest and most complex construction project in the
    history of the United States.
        And also, I fully and personally appreciate the pride and
    skill of the men and women of the building trades who built it.
    I have enormous pride in them, and I am not questioning their
    work.
        And I am mindful, most of all, of the memories of workers
    who actually gave their lives on this project, men like John
    Hegarty, an old friend from Savin Hill, in the neighborhood, in
    the Savin Hill section of Dorchester, a proud member of Pile
    Drivers Local 56, who left a wife and young children; men like
    Fook Choi Kan, who was a union carpenter from Springfield, who
    also died on this project; and Lonnie Avant, a member of Local
    4 Operating Engineers from Roxbury, who on all accounts was
    considered a true gentleman and someone who took great pride in
    his work.
        And men like my young friend, Frank Shea, of south Boston,
    who was an accomplished boxer and a Golden Glove champ, who
    lived by the simple truth that there was honor in hard work.
    Those gentlemen were reflections of what was and is best about
    America.
        There were common threads that ran through each of their
    lives. They, like their parents, Irish, Asian, African-
    American, by their labor they found dignity in their work, and
    that has been an enduring truth in this country.
        It is also directly related to America's sense of shared
    sacrifice and our willingness, as citizens, to support projects
    like this, that probably benefit future generations more than
    they benefit us today, not simply to reduce the length of a
    traffic jam or cut our morning commute time, but because we
    hope that our work can become our legacy, to improve the lives
    of future generations. And as noble as that may sound, it takes
    more than good intentions to build that legacy, as this project
    has shown.
        I think the best example of how quickly good intentions can
    succumb to failure is the story of greed following national
    need during World War II. The people of this Nation were bound
    to a unified cause because of the attacks on Pearl Harbor, and
    they rallied to superhuman acts during World War II.
        And yet as the country grappled with logistics of the war
    effort, terrible examples of waste and mismanagement and abuse
    in our defense contractor practices threatened that effort
    until Senator Harry Truman and the members of the Truman
    Commission investigated the causes of those deficiencies and
    that waste and got the war production effort back on track.
        The risk then was not just in wasted tax dollars but in
    lost lives, shoddy materials, and missed deadlines in delivery.
    Then, Senator Truman got in his car and went around the country
    visiting installations and talking with the people working for
    defense contractors. He knew that the key to reform--true
    reform--would be found where the work was actually occurring.
        And so now we are here today in the spirit of that earlier
    effort, and it is my hope, with at least a small fraction of
    the clarity and the sense of mission that Senator Harry Truman
    brought to his work.
        Why is this as important as the earlier investigations? Our
    transportation system is the key to our economic stability, and
    we have just approved in the House a brand-new $285 billion
    transportation bill. This Nation will continue to undertake
    huge public works projects, but, whether large or small, the
    taxpayer deserves value for each dollar spent.
        This project was and is a courageous endeavor of
    breathtaking ambition--make no question about it--an effort
    that was equal to the people who have built it. And we are
    trying to--what we are trying to do here is preserve the legacy
    of this monumental effort and bring it back into
    respectability, and that can only happen when all the parties
    are held accountable and share in that responsibility.
        I have followed the chronology of this project from its
    inception to today, and I must say through all of its twists
    and turns and conflicts and mediations I have yet to find a
    single example when the interests of the taxpayers and of
    ordinary citizens have prevailed. Well, we are hoping in this
    hearing that will change.
        If we reexamine how we got to this place, and take note, as
    the chairman has said, of lessons learned from our experience,
    if we work together thoughtfully and in good faith to find a
    way to ensure that the public is a partner in this effort, we
    can restore dignity to this project, and we can protect the
    people's interests from this day forward.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
        [The prepared statement of Hon. Stephen F. Lynch follows:]

        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T1590.003

        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T1590.004

        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T1590.005

        Chairman Tom Davis. Thank you very much.
        Mr. Capuano.
        Mr. Capuano. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First of all, thank
    you for allowing me to sit with you and to share some time with
    you. Welcome to Boston. Actually, welcome back to Boston.
        Chairman Tom Davis. Thank you.
        Mr. Capuano. And, again, I would echo everything Mr. Lynch
    said about your tenure, both in this chairmanship and as a
    human being. I find you to be one of the most fair and
    honorable people in Congress, and I am pleased and honored to
    sit here for a few minutes with you.
        Chairman Tom Davis. Thank you.
        Mr. Capuano. As far as today's hearings go, there are only
    a couple of things that I am deeply interested in. I am the
    least interested person here in the headlines that are going to
    be in tomorrow's papers or in tonight's news, because I think
    that's part of the problem with this particular project is too
    many people interested in too many headlines and not enough
    people interested in the facts and the realities of the
    project.
        First of all, as everything I understand, and I am going to
    ask every single witness today to answer the question, as I
    understand it today, the project is safe. And everything I have
    read, everything I have heard from everybody involved has
    indicated that it is safe, but I want to hear it from every
    person who testifies here today.
        No. 2, the project is working. I took it to get here today.
    My expectation is that many of you took it to get here today
    and will take it as you leave. And if you didn't take it, I
    would suggest that you do. The project, though not complete, is
    working.
        It is doing what it was promised to do, which is to ease
    traffic flow, improve our environment, and improve the quality
    of life in greater Boston, and hopefully to set an example of
    the kinds of construction projects that are wanted across this
    country to improve the quality of life in other especially
    older cities.
        As far as what we learned from this project, my hope is
    that we learn a couple of things. No. 1 is that we know that
    this project will continue to be safe. That is the top
    priority, that it continues to be safe tomorrow, next week,
    next month, and in the next generation.
        I would hope that over time, maybe not today but over time
    we learn on issues of accountability--who is responsible for
    what, how much, and hopefully none of that will go to the
    taxpayers. But I think that will be part--it will clearly be
    part of the discussion today, and it will take a while to work
    all those things out.
        I also want to hear some of the lessons that we have
    learned from this project, both on a State level and on a
    Federal level. I have been involved in major construction
    projects in the past, and every time you do one you learn
    something.
        This project, as you have heard, is the biggest project in
    the history of the country. There are lots of lessons that have
    been learned, and hopefully they will allow us to improve our
    process in the future, again, both on a State and on a Federal
    level.
        And, finally, I want to make sure that the costs relative
    to this project don't have a negative impact on, No. 1,
    taxpayers; and, No. 2, on future projects.
        I was a former mayor of a city close to Boston,
    Summerville, and during that time when I was mayor I personally
    experienced projects in Summerville that were stopped or
    delayed because the financing on this project sucked up every
    single dollar the State had.
        That was unacceptable, and the solution was a few years ago
    the Congress passed basically a rule or a regulation, a law,
    that said the State must have minimum spending on projects in
    Massachusetts other than the Big Dig. To my knowledge, that is
    still working. That is still in place and still being adhered
    to.
        I want to make sure that the future costs of this project
    don't lead to the same results, both on maintenance and in
    completion. Everything I have heard thus far on completion I
    think we are in good shape. Obviously, maybe we will hear
    different today, but that also goes for maintenance. It doesn't
    do us any good if the maintenance costs of this project are
    100-fold what we expect, so that they suck up future dollars.
        I know that the House just passed a bill, as Mr. Lynch
    mentioned, that for Massachusetts will mean $5.1 billion. It
    means 7,500 new jobs--40,000 jobs but 7,500 new jobs per year
    every year for the next 5 years.
        Now, I happen to think that is the way government should
    work, both for the jobs and economic aspects of it, even for
    the transportation aspect of it. And I don't want those jobs
    jeopardized by the concerns of this project.
        Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to be with you
    today. Thank you for the opportunity to sit here with you. And,
    again, I hope you enjoy your brief time here in Boston.
        Chairman Tom Davis. Well, thank you very much.
        Members will have 7 days to submit opening statements for
    the record, and we are going to recognize our first panel. We
    have Mr. D.J. Gribbin, who is the Chief Counsel for the Federal
    Highway Administration. Mr. Gribbin is accompanied by Mr.
    Stanley Gee, the Administrator of the Massachusetts Division of
    the Federal Highway Administration.
        Joining Mr. Gribbin and Mr. Gee is the Inspector General of
    the Department of Transportation, the Honorable Kenneth Mead,
    whose office plays a vital role in promoting the effectiveness
    of and preventing waste, fraud, and abuse in departmental
    programs and initiatives.
        And we are also pleased to have the Honorable Tom Reilly,
    the attorney general for the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, who
    has been tasked with leading the current cost recovery efforts.
    We appreciate your being here, too, Mr. Attorney General.
        It is the policy of this committee we swear everyone before
    you testify. So if you could just rise with me and raise your
    right hands.
        [Witnesses sworn.]
        Chairman Tom Davis. Thank you.
        Your entire statements are in the record.
        Mr. Gribbin, we will start with you and move straight on
    down. And thank you, once again, for being with us up here.

      STATEMENTS OF D.J. GRIBBIN, CHIEF COUNSEL, FEDERAL HIGHWAY
      ADMINISTRATION, ACCOMPANIED BY STANLEY GEE, ADMINISTRATOR,
    MASSACHUSETTS DIVISION, FEDERAL HIGHWAY ADMINISTRATION; KENNETH
    MEAD, INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION; AND
      TOM REILLY, ATTORNEY GENERAL, COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

                       STATEMENT OF D.J. GRIBBIN

        Mr. Gribbin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, members
    of the committee, thank you again for the opportunity to
    testify today on issues concerning the Boston Central Artery/
    Tunnel Project.
        I have asked, as you mentioned, Mr. Chairman, Stan Gee, who
    is Federal Highways' Massachusetts Division Administrator, to
    join me today. Stan is our point person on this project, and he
    has been overseeing it since the year 2000.
        The Central Artery/Tunnel Project is 96 percent complete,
    and substantial completion is scheduled by October of this
    year. This $14.6 billion project has been the largest, most
    expensive, and most complex highway project in U.S. history.
    This ambitious project will provide countless benefits to the
    city of Boston in the way of enhancing safety, easing traffic
    congestion, providing acres of open park land to city
    residents, and reconnecting communities severed by the old
    elevated highway.
        In my time here today, I will touch on three issues--the
    safety of the tunnel, the recent problems with leaks, and the
    cost of the project. First, I wish to take this opportunity to
    restate Federal Highways' conclusion that the Central Artery,
    including the tunnels that are part of this project, is safe
    for public travel. We will not compromise on safety. Safety is
    the Department of Transportation's top priority, and I agree
    with Mr. Capuano that we need to ensure that this project will
    continue to be safe into the future.
        Second, one of the most recent areas of concern with the
    project involves water intruding into the tunnels. This water
    is causing two types of leaks. The most serious of these leaks
    occurred on September 15, 2004, when a slurry wall panel was
    breached, allowing a substantial amount of water to enter into
    the northbound tunnel of I-93 for a few hours.
        In response to this incident, Federal Highway Administrator
    Mary Peters requested an independent Federal highway
    engineering assessment of all tunnel leaks. The Federal
    Highways' tunnel leak assessment team issued its interim report
    on March 23rd of this year.
        The team reports that the project is appropriately
    addressing the tunnel leaks. The September 15 breach appears to
    be isolated to a discrete section of the tunnel and is
    primarily the result of poor quality control during
    construction. It is not a result of a defective design.
        The contractor responsible for this section of the tunnel
    has successfully installed an interim repair, has submitted a
    design for a permanent fix, and has agreed that repairs will be
    made at their expense, not at the public's.
        The MTA is reviewing plans for the permanent repair, and
    Federal Highways will approve plans for the repair once we are
    satisfied that it provides for a structure that is sound,
    durable, watertight, and relatively maintenance free. We will
    also assess the degree to which the repair disrupts nearby
    structures and the traveling public.
        As a result of the September 15 breach, emphasis has been
    placed on the second kind of leak in the tunnels. Federal
    Highways' leak report noted that the project continues to
    manage the tunnel leak sealing efforts in a very methodical
    way. As of April 13 of this year, almost 1,100 leak sealings
    have been performed, and it is estimated that the project is on
    track to have all of the low-level leaks sealed by October.
        Once again, the cost of this work is the responsibility of
    the mainline tunnel contractors, not the taxpayers. Federal
    Highways will continue to monitor these efforts, and will issue
    a report upon completion of all repairs.
        Finally, perhaps the most publicly criticized aspect of the
    Central Artery/Tunnel Project has been its dramatic cost
    escalation. Federal Highways has worked closely with Inspector
    General Mead and his office to ensure Federal Highways'
    oversight practices and procedures to avoid similar
    occurrences. Together we have been able to create a framework
    for major project oversight that will serve us well for the
    remainder of this project and for future major projects.
        Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, thank you for this
    opportunity to testify. I will be pleased to answer any
    questions you may have at the appropriate time.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Gribbin follows:]

        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T1590.006

        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T1590.007

        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T1590.008

        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T1590.009

        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T1590.010

        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T1590.011

        Chairman Tom Davis. Thank you very much.
        Mr. Mead.

                       STATEMENT OF KENNETH MEAD

        Mr. Mead. Yes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thanks for holding
    this hearing today, and Congressmen Lynch and Capuano. This is
    the most expensive public highway project in U.S. history,
    actually. But it is extremely important to the Commonwealth, to
    the entire northeast, indeed to U.S. interstate commerce.
        I should say, as the chairman alluded to in his opening
    remarks, that the lessons learned on this project have just had
    a huge impact on the oversight approach of the Federal
    Government, as well as on the highway bill that is now pending
    before the Congress. And the lessons learned have already had a
    very positive impact on major construction and other multi-
    million dollar projects.
        The chairman mentioned the Wilson Bridge, which crosses the
    Potomac--Virginia, Maryland, and D.C. That project is
    actually--I think it is a little bit under budget, it is
    certainly on target, and that project--we are really all I
    think very proud of the progress that project is making.
        It has also been applied to--the lessons learned on the
    Central Artery have also been applied to other projects like
    the Sound Transit/Light Rail Project in Washington State. It is
    the largest transit project in the country at this time.
    Trentabono in Puerto Rico, and it will have impact on the other
    major projects, such as the Bay Bridge Project in California,
    which is experiencing some problems.
        And I dare say it will probably have an impact on the
    Chicago O'Hare Airport runway expansion program. So I think
    this one will go down in history.
        Our office has been reviewing this project since about
    1991, well before my time. And we are now finding ourselves
    reviewing the 2004 finance plan. We can't approve this plan,
    though, until, among other things, they have in place a
    credible time table to fix the leaks, know approximately how
    much they will cost to fix, and who will pay.
        The project's troubled history of delays and cost increases
    is well known. The Central Artery was to be finished initially
    in December 1998; the new completion date is September/October
    2005. It is almost 7 years later. Their price tag moved from
    $2.6 billion in the beginning to today's $14.6 billion, and
    that estimate of $14.6 has been holding now for 2 or 3 years.
    And I certainly hope it doesn't change.
        Congress has, with respect to the Central Artery Project,
    taken the unprecedented step of actually capping the amount of
    money that the Federal Government would have going to it, and
    it is for the reasons that Congressman Capuano alluded to.
        Four months ago, our testimony to a State legislative
    committee here in Boston detailed two kinds of leaks on the I-
    93 tunnels. The taxpayers ought not to have to pay for the
    repairs to these leaks, regardless of whether the project
    manages to come in at $14.6 billion on the button or even under
    $14.6 billion. The taxpayers should not have to pick up the tab
    here.
        Mr. Gribbin outlined the two types of leaks. One is the
    slurry wall leak. This became a public concern last September
    15 when a panel breached, and I think you had 300 gallons per
    minute coming out of that, so that was a pretty big leak. That
    breach was, as he pointed out, caused by a series of
    construction errors.
        Actually, those construction errors were documented when
    the wall was built, but they were not corrected. Since then,
    inspections have found a total of 102 defective or leaking
    slurry wall tunnels. The numbers change daily, but this is--so
    this is as of about April 1.
        There is about 1,900 wall panels, to give you a frame of
    reference, so 102 of them they found a problem with. Here is
    the breakdown on the types of problems. Two of them need major
    repairs, 33 of them need what I would call moderate repairs,
    and 67 of them need only patching; 10 of them have been
    repaired, but the Authority has not approved the repair yet.
        So we have 400 of about 1,900 odd wall panels that still
    need to be inspected. That is about 20 percent. So I would like
    to see that get done.
        Now, the Massachusetts Turnpike Authority is going to have
    to decide soon on how to repair the wall panels with the worst
    defects. There are three suggested methods. One is to install a
    steel plate over the hole, a second does the same thing, but
    adds a reinforced concrete, and a third requires rebuilding the
    wall.
        The Authority faces the challenge of selecting one without
    being perceived by the public as picking just the most
    expedient method. I think that is very important, given this
    entire affair. A permanent, lasting fix to the walls ought to
    be the paramount concern, and obtaining the most cost-effective
    one at this point I think is probably secondary.
        The second type of leak is found up at the roof wall
    joints, and these are worrisome because they have long-term
    maintenance implications. The number changes constantly as the
    leaks--as you seal one leak with the grout--I guess they are
    called grout injections, you seal one and the water goes down
    all over and you get two more leaks. And that is why you see
    these numbers keep fluctuating so dramatically.
        Last summer, for example, there were more than 700 roof
    wall joint leaks. As of April 1, there were 662. More than
    4,500 of the 9,000 odd roof wall joints still have to be
    reinspected for leaks. All of the roof wall joints have been
    inspected once, so now they are on the second round of
    inspections, and we still have 4,500 to check out.
        We don't know yet the full cost of repairing all of the
    leaks. A consultant assessment of the cost is due next month, I
    think in the middle of the month. And, again, the Authority has
    said that its contractor is going to pay to fix the leaks. We
    are not entirely confident of this.
        According to the Authority, contractors have already been
    paid $7 million for leak repairs, and they estimate they will
    have to be paid--have to pay another $10 million. We are
    concerned that the costs and payments related to leak and water
    problems may significantly exceed the $17 million.
        And these payments may actually go back further in time
    than we thought. Certainly, they go back through all of 2004.
    They may go back for several years prior to that as well.
    Taxpayers may have already paid for some of them. Now these
    costs, if already paid, will have to be recovered.
        I would like to turn now to the cost recovery program. The
    cost recovery program that we now have in place for the Artery
    will be helpful in returning some leak-related payments to the
    project. Maybe all of them. The previous efforts on cost
    recovery here, though, have been anemic.
        In December, we recommended that the State form a
    bipartisan commission that was independent of the Authority to
    investigate the leaks and that this Commission would work with
    the attorney general. Well, the Commission wasn't recreated,
    but the Authority recently transferred its cost recovery
    program to the attorney general's office.
        We see this as an improvement, as a positive step, because
    it served to remove the program from their project management
    structure, where it was hampered by all kinds of role
    conflicts, especially with Bechtel/Parsons Brinckerhoff, who
    was a partner of the Artery, who is responsible for quality
    assurance and portions of the project design, and who has been
    paid nearly $1.9 billion for its work.
        So we know the attorney general, Mr. Reilly. We have talked
    several times on the phone. I know he has his work cut out for
    him, and we wish him the very best. But he has to not only look
    at the cost recovery issue for the leaks; he has to look for
    cost recovery for the entire project, for things that have
    nothing to do with the leaks, but have to do with change orders
    that have already been paid.
        In fact, the cost of the leaks are only a modest portion of
    the cost recovery effort. Let me give you a frame of reference.
    Over the life of this project, there have been over $2 billion
    in contract change orders. A significant portion of these are
    claims by contractors for work they claim is beyond the scope
    of the original contract, or for work that they did because
    they felt they encountered significant problems that they had
    not expected.
        As of February 28 of this year, there were over 3,600
    unresolved contractor's claims for over $400 million. That is a
    large piece of change.
        We are currently reviewing the 2004 finance plan, as I said
    before. By law, we must determine whether that plan contains
    reasonable estimates for cost schedules and funding sources,
    before the Department decides whether to release I think it is
    about $81 million remaining in Federal funds.
        And we won't be in a position to do that until more
    information is known about the extent of the leaks, which means
    all of the inspections have to be done, and a cost has to be
    attached to them. And we would like a reasonable estimate as to
    what it is going to take to dispose of them.
        And I think I would just like to close by starting out
    where I began, to say that there have been some important
    lessons learned in this project. The last project finance plan
    we reviewed from the Central Artery, it is--I tell people as I
    go around the country and speak that it was probably among the
    best in the country.
        I know the Wilson Bridge project used the improvements that
    the Central Artery had made in its finance plan, and there has
    been a lot of other lessons learned. And hopefully we can get
    this project done, no more cost overruns, we can get the leaks
    resolved, and move on.
        And, again, thank you for holding the hearing, Mr.
    Chairman.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Mead follows:]

        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T1590.012

        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T1590.013

        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T1590.014

        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T1590.015

        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T1590.016

        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T1590.017

        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T1590.018

        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T1590.019

        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T1590.020

        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T1590.021

        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T1590.022

        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T1590.023

        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T1590.024

        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T1590.025

        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T1590.026

        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T1590.027

        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T1590.028

        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T1590.029

        Chairman Tom Davis. Thank you very much.
        We will now hear from the Commonwealth's attorney general.
    Mr. Reilly, thank you for being with us.

                        STATEMENT OF TOM REILLY

        Mr. Reilly. Mr. Chairman, thank you. And Congressman Lynch
    and Congressman Capuano, thank you for being here as well.
        Mr. Chairman, I also want to thank you for your courtesy in
    scheduling my testimony this afternoon. I have submitted
    written testimony, so I will not repeat that at this point.
    There are a couple of points I do want to pick up on.
        Ken Mead is right; we do have our work cut out for us in
    this endeavor in taking over cost recovery. Let me tell you why
    we agreed or actually volunteered for this task. This
    represents--and the importance all of you have noted--it is a
    very important project. It represents an enormous investment on
    the part of the Federal and State governments and to
    transportation improvements, not just for the city of Boston
    but also for this entire region.
        But it is more than transportation. Any one of you that has
    been over the Zakim-Bunker Hill Bridge realize it is a
    magnificent structure, a wonderful introduction into a great
    city. And it is my hope that we will get to a point where we
    will all be proud of this project and appreciate what has been
    done here.
        But we are not there yet; there are serious problems. And
    getting from the problems to the promise of a future of this
    project is why we stepped in. There were suggestions at the
    time of a commission; I did not agree with that approach. Cost
    recovery is going to go one of two ways. It is either going to
    be a negotiated settlement, or it is going to end up in
    litigation. Commissions don't litigate; commissions really
    don't negotiate. So we decided that we would step in.
        Also, Mr. Chairman, I take this responsibility, and to
    Congressmen and the Federal Government, I take this
    responsibility very seriously. We want to demonstrate to you
    that we can do the job that you expect of us, and we will try
    and are committed to doing that.
        Let me just bring you up to date very quickly as to where
    we are. Currently, we are reviewing 134 issues for cost
    recovery. The major ones--and Ken Mead spoke on the leak issues
    in the I-93, and clearly there has been poor construction. But
    our focus is not just on the construction companies; our focus
    is on Bechtel. They were hired to do a particular job, in terms
    of oversight, in terms of design. And our focus is on them.
        There is a lot of focus and a lot of attention paid to the
    slurry walls. We are equally concerned with the wall and the
    roof joint with the continuing leaks. We are not confident with
    the approach that has been taken in terms of grouting, filling
    those leaks and those holes with--by grouting. You cannot--in
    our estimation, you cannot grout your way out of this problem.
        We are concerned that this may not be solvable in the--for
    a permanent solution, and we may have on our hands a very long-
    range maintenance problem for the project. And certainly we
    will have to take some time to find out, if that is true, what
    is the cost and who is going to pay.
        Again, we believe that the responsibility, the ultimate
    responsibility, is not with the taxpayer--the ultimate--the
    Federal Government or the State government. The ultimate
    responsibility lies Bechtel. Waterproofing is a major issue
    throughout the project.
        Again, Bechtel was responsible for the concept for the
    entire project, and concerns have been raised about the choice
    of materials and design of certain of the waterproofing
    details. Again, we see that as the responsibility of Bechtel.
        There is a serious matter involving the so-called Honeywell
    contract, which is a communications system throughout the
    project for alert to any problems in the systems. Again,
    Bechtel has a role in this.
        There are roadway problems with pavement, causing not only
    regrinding but also repavement. That has been so-called--people
    went through it in the early stages of so-called rollercoaster
    effect. Again, we see that as the responsibility ultimately of
    Bechtel.
        Last, there are problems with the water treatment system on
    Spectacle Island for the treatment of environmental waste. It
    is not functioning properly. Again, we see ultimately the
    responsibility--there is a lot of focus and a lot of
    fingerpointing back and forth, but ultimately we see the
    responsibility being with Bechtel.
        In the end, our goal is to recover as much money as we can
    for taxpayers, both Federal and State, and to make sure that
    when all is said and done we got what we paid for.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for being here in
    Boston.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Reilly follows:]

        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T1590.030

        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T1590.031

        Chairman Tom Davis. Well, thank all of you for being here,
    and for the testimony, some of which is in the record and
    wasn't discussed here.
        Mr. Mead, let me start with you. You said we have 3,600
    claims for change orders that came through, basically?
        Mr. Mead. Yes, sir.
        Chairman Tom Davis. Now, when these change orders came
    through, were they agreed to by whoever was administering the
    project, or did they just decide to make the change and resolve
    later who was going to pay for it and how it was going to--and
    who was to blame?
        Mr. Mead. All of the above. One of the problems with this
    project is that things that are now in dispute as to whether or
    not the Commonwealth ought to get money back that they already
    paid many years ago. I think there was a haste to pay some of
    these things, and now we still have a very large number
    outstanding.
        I would just--some of these things just went unattended for
    many, many years, and now Attorney General Reilly has a task of
    trying to recover the cost of these things.
        Chairman Tom Davis. He has to pick up the pieces.
        Mr. Mead. Yes, sir.
        Chairman Tom Davis. Well, you--Mr. Mead, you said it was
    about $400 million in these change orders roughly.
        Mr. Mead. There's $400 million, sir, just pending now that
    still have to be resolved.
        Chairman Tom Davis. Payment doesn't resolve it? The fact
    that these people were paid doesn't resolve it, in other words.
    There is----
        Mr. Mead. Well, it----
        Chairman Tom Davis. Was it paid under protest, or how did
    that work?
        Mr. Mead. Well, they would just pay it, and there would be
    no protest. And now people are raising a protest, and saying,
    ``We never should have paid this. This was somebody else's
    fault.''
        Chairman Tom Davis. Can you elaborate on that, Mr.----
        Mr. Reilly. Yes, this is a big----
        Chairman Tom Davis. I have never heard of that before.
        Mr. Reilly. Well, there is a lot of things we haven't heard
    of before, and there is a lot of lessons to be learned.
        Chairman Tom Davis. I was a government contracts attorney
    for 20 years. I was a general counsel for a $1 billion company,
    and we worked with the government a lot. And it was resolved or
    you didn't get paid. That is the way it used to work with us.
    Sometimes you would do the work, but they would hold the money
    until--you are telling me they paid this up front and then are
    trying to resolve it later?
        Mr. Reilly. One of the big----
        Chairman Tom Davis. Either one of you.
        Mr. Reilly. One of the major problems here is that there
    was no cost recovery for a period of 10 years. This should have
    been done in a timely fashion.
        Chairman Tom Davis. I understand.
        Mr. Reilly. An ongoing fashion. Deal with the problem when
    it comes up, and decide who is going to be paid and for what,
    and some of the quality assurances. That wasn't done and----
        Chairman Tom Davis. Who would make the decision to pay?
    Would it have been Federal Highways? Would it have been the
    State? Was it a low-level person? I mean, obviously you are
    trying to get the mission accomplished. You have the bulldozers
    out there, or the drillers, or whatever.
        They say they need to get paid, but who would make the
    decision to pay versus saying, ``Let us see if we should make
    this change?'' I mean, at what level was that done? Was that
    done Federal or State or--can you explain that to me?
        Mr. Mead. I would say that first inside the Artery there is
    a great deal of closeness between the Artery and its project
    consultant, Bechtel/Parsons Brinckerhoff. It was almost a
    partnership, and I think there was some failures there.
        At the Federal level, I have to candidly say that I think
    the Feds dropped the ball as well. There was very little
    oversight. I think the Feds were thinking that there was a
    great deal of oversight going on inside the project, and the
    project was thinking everything is going fine. But the Federal
    Government learned a lot of hard lessons from this, Mr. Davis.
        Chairman Tom Davis. If the money is recovered at this
    point, the money that is recovered, who does it go to? Does it
    go to Federal Highways? Does it go to the State? Can somebody--
    --
        Mr. Reilly. Most of it--at least 60 cents on the dollar--
    goes to the Federal Government. It is Federal money.
        Chairman Tom Davis. It will be shared basically in
    proportion----
        Mr. Mead. It will be a shared project.
        Mr. Reilly. In proportion with the investment that was made
    in the project. Most of that money is Federal money, at least
    60 cents on the dollar, maybe a bit more.
        Mr. Mead. I think, though, that a lot of that money might
    find its way back to the Commonwealth, because a lot of that
    money came to the Commonwealth as part of its annual
    apportionment.
        Chairman Tom Davis. OK. So it is Federal money. And
    depending how it was apportioned, it could be returned to the
    State.
        Mr. Mead. Yes.
        Chairman Tom Davis. Or to the Federal Government, or
    whatever. But there is a lot on the table.
        Mr. Mead. Yes, sir.
        Chairman Tom Davis. General Reilly, do you have any idea
    how much money is on the table at this point?
        Mr. Reilly. At this point, there has been a lot of
    speculation, a lot of numbers thrown out there. I am
    uncomfortable with doing that. We have----
        Chairman Tom Davis. You set an expectation level when you--
    --
        Mr. Reilly [continuing]. And we have given assurances, and
    we will give assurances to you. This will be fact driven. We
    will make decisions based upon facts. When we have numbers that
    we believe we can prove in court, then we will inform--if you
    want to be notified, and the Congressman wants to be notified--
    and I know the Federal authorities, they will be----
        Chairman Tom Davis. That is fine.
        Mr. Reilly [continuing]. They will be notified when we have
    hard numbers that we can back up.
        Chairman Tom Davis. I guess the last question before my
    time runs out--we may do a second round, because I think we all
    have a lot of questions as we go through this. Is there a
    statute of limitations problem with any of this, that money
    might have been paid off in the past, it probably shouldn't
    have been paid off, but the statute has run on our ability to
    get it back?
        Mr. Reilly. In some cases----
        Chairman Tom Davis. That is a possibility.
        Mr. Reilly [continuing]. There are problems. There are
    problems with people being gone. It is with memories, it is
    with documents, it is with statute of limitations.
        Chairman Tom Davis. The usual.
        Mr. Reilly. On the other end of it, we have just got to
    work our way through those problems and get the best possible
    result that we can. But if there is a lesson to be learned
    here, cost recovery should have been taken on an on-time basis.
        Chairman Tom Davis. Right. And I think you have heard the
    Woodrow Wilson Bridge project is going along, because of some
    of the mistakes made here. We are not replicating those
    mistakes in other parts of the country. I think from the
    committee's perspective, we would be interested as you move
    through to see if there are statute issues, things that might
    have fallen through because of timeliness and stuff, not to
    basically point a finger at anybody, but just to understand
    this. Historically, I think that is important for us moving
    ahead.
        But we appreciate your cooperation in this. I am going to
    recognize Mr. Lynch.
        Mr. Mead. Mr. Chairman, if I might just, given your
    background, I think you can relate to this point really
    quickly. You asked Attorney General Reilly for, you know, does
    he have a sense of what the magnitude of cost recovery would
    be, and he I think quite properly----
        Chairman Tom Davis. He said what I would have said.
        Mr. Mead. Yes. And when I was a lawyer would say, too. But
    you should know that up until a couple years ago, this is a
    $14.6 billion project. The total amount of cost recovery up
    until 2 years ago was roughly $30,000.
        Chairman Tom Davis. There is a lot of money on the table. I
    got you. Thank you very much.
        Mr. Mead. I hope so.
        Chairman Tom Davis. Thank you very much.
        Mr. Lynch.
        Mr. Lynch. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Gribbin, I just wanted to followup very quickly with
    you. You answered rather forthrightly that you thought the
    tunnels were safe. When we heard from the two construction
    experts--Mr. Lemley and Mr. Tamaro--at the State hearing, they
    answered in a similar fashion, but they conditioned that
    response by saying, ``The tunnels were safe for now.''
        They also said that if proper maintenance were not--was not
    conducted, and proper repairs not done in a timely fashion,
    then an unfair--or an unsafe condition could arise. Do you--is
    that condition unstated in your answer?
        Mr. Gribbin. I mean, our answer would be, first, as part of
    the September 15 incident, we created a leak assessment task
    force that did the interim report that I mentioned in my
    statement. At that point in time, our experts went through the
    tunnel and found it to be safe. We will continue, however, to
    monitor the leaks, to monitor the injections on the leaks, and
    we will be doing a final report once the project is complete.
        And this project is still under construction from our
    standpoint. And so we will--this project is perfectly safe to
    be used. I don't think we are going to project forward into the
    future too far until we finish our report, which will be done
    after the project is completed.
        Mr. Lynch. Right. All I am saying is you have at least--
    right now you have 102 flaws that they have noted, a couple of
    them serious, 33 of them No. 2's as they say, moderate
    deficiencies, and then 67 light ones. I am just concerned
    about----
        Mr. Gribbin. That is correct.
        Mr. Lynch. And not only that, but the patch that is on E-
    045, which is the burst panel, that is a temporary patch, so--I
    am just concerned about the completeness of your answer,
    whether or not you think that, if we don't have proper
    maintenance and repairs in a timely fashion, that there could
    be an unsafe condition that arises.
        Mr. Gribbin. The assessment that we made was that the patch
    was appropriate. It is a temporary patch, but clearly
    appropriate to protect the integrity of that wall in the tunnel
    until a permanent patch can be made. But why don't I let Stan,
    since he is the engineer here, add to that answer.
        Mr. Gee. Sure. To answer your question, Congressman, there
    have not been any discoveries of additional breaches of the
    type of September 15. So we are confident now that the tunnel
    is safe. The temporary repair is holding. We have recommended
    they go to a permanent repair as soon as they can.
        For the long-term safety, we are recommending they do a
    tunnel--they create a tunnel inspection program similar to what
    we do for bridges. I think you are all familiar with the
    National Bridge Inspection Program that requires a periodic
    review of bridges. Well, we are going to institute--we have
    recommended, and will follow through, that the tunnel create an
    inspection program for the long-term safety.
        Mr. Lynch. Thank you. Inspector General Mead, I want to say
    how pleased I am with the work you have done on this, and you
    have been very helpful. I do note in your report this--for the
    record, ``The Impact of Water Leaks on the Central Artery/
    Tunnel Project and Remaining Risks,'' by the Honorable Kenneth
    Mead, Friday, April 22.
        You note that in your inspection you originally testified
    back in December that it was an open question whether the
    September breach was a one-of-a-kind event or a harbinger of
    systemic problems in the tunnel walls. And, however, based on
    the results of the Authority's inspections to date, it is clear
    in our opinion that the wall panels leaks are systemic and are
    not centered in just one contractor's section, as was
    originally suggested.
        That failure occurred 5 years ago. I am sorry. The wall was
    constructed 5 years ago. The defects sat latent 5 years ago.
    For that 5 years, Bechtel had a responsibility to inspect. For
    that whole 5 years, we never were informed of, even though they
    had the information in their possession, they never informed
    the public, and we never found out about this latent defect.
        The fact that there is another 101 defective slurry wall
    panels that have been found, and the problems are more
    systemic, as you say, are there suggestions that you would make
    in terms of the approach that should be taken in order to
    guarantee the structural integrity of the tunnel? Not only in
    the short term, but in the long term as well?
        Mr. Mead. Well, I, too, have never had any question that
    the tunnel is safe, and it has integrity, and it will be safe
    for travel, and so forth. But I do think this leak situation,
    and the magnitude of it, does need to be resolved. And, yes, I
    do have a suggestion.
        The first thing we need to do is we need to complete all
    these inspections, both the slurry walls and the roof wall
    joints. Then, we need to have a credible process for deciding
    how to fix them. You can already hear in this hearing that
    there is going to be some controversy about the fix. I think it
    is incredibly important that the public perceive that the fix
    is the right one.
        Mr. Lynch. I just want to--just for the sake of this--
    follow up on this question, sometimes a picture is worth 1,000
    words. Leah, I don't know how you turn the lights down a little
    bit. I just want to show you, a lot of people have seen the
    flooding, the water on the street. But I want to go to Slide B2
    if we could. These are pictures of the breach that occurred
    back on September 15.
        I don't know if you can see that very well. There is sort
    of a waterfall thing going on there. That is the breach. And,
    notably, I wanted to bring your attention to the clock on this.
    This is midnight, basically, on September 16. This wall
    breached between 2 and maybe 3 and 5 o'clock I think on the
    15th.
        So this has been running. This actually burst, let us see,
    a number of hours, at least--let us see, I am not sure of my
    timing on the original breach. I think it was 8 or 9 hours
    previous to this picture being taken. So this is after the wall
    panel was taken apart.
        Based on what you see here, and I can only imagine what the
    actual force of this spout of water out onto the interstate
    highway, by the way, which was being used by traffic traveling
    at, let us just say, 55 miles an hour. Do you have any sense on
    the safety aspect of this, you know, given the fact that now
    you have had an opportunity to see what the breach actually
    involved?
        Mr. Mead. Well, obviously, if you had a lot of breaches
    like that, you would have a safety problem. I mean, you would
    need a boat. But I think there is two walls--there is two
    panels where we have defects that are classified as serious,
    and there is 30 others, 30 odd others where I think the problem
    is moderate. It needs to be fixed, so it doesn't become
    serious.
        Maybe you would like to speak to that.
        Mr. Gee. Yes. You know, on that particular situation, the
    State Police shut down the lane, so it wasn't a danger in terms
    of traffic flooding. In that particular situation, they had it
    sectioned off. There was one lane of traffic that was allowed
    to pass through. When the water was emptied, it was restored to
    full operation.
        The other leak that goes all the way through the wall is
    the size of a tennis ball. OK? It is no longer leaking. It has
    actually been temporarily fixed. All of the other leaks that we
    have do not--are indentations or gouges in the wall, and this
    is a----
        Mr. Lynch. Are inclusions--is that included as well?
        Mr. Gee. Excuse me?
        Mr. Lynch. Are there inclusions?
        Mr. Gee. Yes.
        Mr. Lynch. Yes.
        Mr. Gee. Yes. The foreign material, like dirt or whatever,
    that was mixed in----
        Mr. Lynch. That fell into the slurry during construction.
        Mr. Gee. Right. And when we poured the concrete, they
    filled up the hole. My point is that those other ones don't go
    all the way through. This wall is almost 4 feet thick. So the
    other moderate defects--also, most of the--if many of the--let
    us see, I think very few of these defects, the numbers you--are
    wet, are actually leaking. These are defects that have foreign
    material in there, but they are not leaking water.
        The last point I wanted to make is that these--the moderate
    ones, as the Inspector General has mentioned, these are defects
    that have inclusions that may be more than a foot deep. OK? But
    the wall is almost 4 feet. That is why I can say that there is
    not a structural integrity problem; it is a quality control
    issue as was pointed out.
        Mr. Mead. Now, you know, we have 400 of these panels of
    these--that still have to be inspected. And what is very
    troubling about this whole matter is that they knew that there
    was a problem, and it wasn't fixed. And that this happened so
    many years ago, and now there is a second one. Plus, they found
    these problems with almost 100 panels.
        I would hope that this teaches us a lesson that there is
    something broken in the quality assurance process. And I hope
    that the remaining 400, when they get done with those
    inspections, they don't--that it doesn't turn up other
    problems.
        Mr. Lynch. I am going to--I know I have taken more than my
    time. My concern is this, Mr. Gee, and maybe you can address it
    at a later time. These defects are latent, just like the--this
    was a latent defect until it burst. These walls are 3\1/2\ feet
    thick. We shouldn't have water spouting through a wall 3\1/2\
    feet thick. We shouldn't have a hole the size of a tennis ball
    through a wall 3\1/2\ feet thick.
        And in my estimation, we shouldn't have traces of water
    filtering through a concrete wall 3\1/2\ feet thick. And the
    reason it was designed to be 3\1/2\ feet thick is we need that.
    We need that thickness to retain the soil and the water
    pressure behind it.
        And all I am saying is that these inclusions that are
    treated so lightly by many are actually, over the long term,
    threatening the structural integrity of those panels, not of
    the tunnel itself but of those lateral panels that are holding
    back the soil.
        OK. The last question I have--I know I am over----
        Chairman Tom Davis. Can I just follow on to that? I will
    give you your last question. You said they knew about this. I
    mean, the contractor knew about this. Did State or Federal
    inspectors know about this, too?
        Mr. Mead. Well, it is not clear--it is----
        Chairman Tom Davis. Or should they have known about it?
        Mr. Mead. Oh, yes, they should have known about it. We also
    know, though, sir, that Bechtel/Parsons Brinckerhoff, whose job
    it was to do quality assurance, knew about it. But they did not
    require its correction. And the paper trail that we traced
    down, it ends at problem identification. And there is no
    followup documentation that we were able to find.
        Chairman Tom Davis. Why do you think that is?
        Mr. Mead. I don't----
        Chairman Tom Davis. Is there any possibility of collusion
    here, that everybody is just so close here they are losing
    things?
        Mr. Mead. I think, at best, sloppiness.
        Chairman Tom Davis. At best.
        Mr. Mead. At best, it is sloppiness.
        Chairman Tom Davis. It could be collusion.
        Mr. Mead. Yes. And, you know, what the taxpayers want here
    is they want a wall panel that meets the specifications that
    were originally designed.
        Chairman Tom Davis. So do the drivers.
        Mr. Mead. And that is going to be tough to do now.
    [Laughter.]
        That is right. The drivers that have to go through there.
        Chairman Tom Davis. Thank you.
        Mr. Mead. Yes, sir.
        Chairman Tom Davis. Mr. Lynch, one more question.
        Mr. Lynch. Just one last piece, and we are going to let Mr.
    Capuano finally say something. The inspections that we are
    talking about here--and I know we have a technical panel coming
    up behind us--but is this with non-destructive testing? Are we
    doing pulse echo? What are we--is this just visual detection of
    defects, or are we actually scanning these walls with, you
    know, pulse echo or ultrasound or--how are we detecting these
    panel defects so far?
        Mr. Gribbin. I am going to volunteer Mr. Gee for that
    question. [Laughter.]
        Mr. Lynch. OK. That is a question for--that is called a
    question for the next panel.
        Mr. Gee. We are doing--all of those are being done now. The
    initial screening is visual, OK, but when there is a question
    of a defect, all of the methods that you describe, non-
    destructive as well as actual picking away, is the inclusion of
    the material, the foreign material is being done, too.
        Mr. Lynch. But it requires some other indication before you
    do that, right?
        Mr. Gee. Yes.
        Mr. Lynch. So you are not doing that with every single
    panel in the tunnel. You are not going through with non-
    destructive testing, making sure there is no flaw, no defect or
    deficiency within the panel.
        Mr. Gee. Yes. At this point in time, the inclusions are
    obvious in terms of visually seeing those. OK? And if there is
    a leak, obviously you will see a wet wall.
        Chairman Tom Davis. Mr. Capuano.
        Mr. Capuano. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Gentlemen, I am going to ask you precisely the question I
    said I was going to. I know that some of you addressed it, but
    I want to make sure I hear it again. Based on what you know
    today, understanding that things can change tomorrow, but based
    on what you know today, is the tunnel safe today?
        And on the presumption, I would imagine, Mr. Gribbin, I had
    heard before that you had suggested a national bridge-like
    inspection for this tunnel, which will be the first tunnel in
    America, if I understand, that would be on such an inspection.
    And I hope and presume and will do everything I can to assist
    you to make sure that gets enacted.
        But on the presumption that ordinary maintenance and
    everything gets done, which to me that is a presumption, that
    every bridge I drive over has ordinary maintenance--on the
    presumption that ordinary maintenance gets done, is there any
    reason to suspect today that these tunnels will be unsafe in
    the near or distant future? Mr. Gribbin.
        Mr. Gribbin. There is no reason to believe that these
    tunnels will be unsafe in the near or distant future. We have
    had a good number of experts looking at this, and all of them
    have concluded the same thing.
        Mr. Capuano. And that today they are safe to your
    knowledge?
        Mr. Gribbin. That is correct.
        Mr. Capuano. Mr. Gee.
        Mr. Gee. Yes. I have nothing to add to that. That is true.
    That is my opinion also.
        Mr. Capuano. Mr. Mead.
        Mr. Mead. Yes. As I said before, the structural integrity
    of the tunnel I have no problems with. I think it is safe for
    the traveling public. I do think, though, that a very
    compelling case could be made that when you consider all the
    circumstances here that every one of these wall panels ought to
    be scanned.
        It is going to cost some more money. But given what has
    happened here, given that picture, given the fact that this was
    a latent defect that nobody saw until, I mean, once the thing
    was built, they identified the problem, did nothing, I want to
    make sure that there is no others out there like that.
        So I would go to the expense of scanning every one of the
    panels in this tunnel before we put this to bed.
        Mr. Capuano. Mr. Attorney General.
        Mr. Reilly. Congressman, my understanding is that the
    tunnel is safe. But there is a bottom line here, and the bottom
    line is that there is too much water coming into this tunnel,
    far more water than anyone anticipated. We also know that in
    the winter months there is more leakage than at other times of
    the year. And, you know, the last time I checked, winter comes
    every year here, and it comes harsher in some years than
    others.
        Now, with that water in the tunnel, at places it shouldn't
    be and in amounts it shouldn't be, we have--there is a
    maintenance problem, and in terms of driving conditions, yes,
    it is not a good situation until we get to the bottom of this,
    find out what is causing the leakage, what is causing the
    water, and correct it.
        So is it safe? Yes. But let us get to the bottom of it.
        Mr. Capuano. But to your knowledge at the moment, the
    tunnel is safe, and there is no reason to suspect----
        Mr. Reilly. Oh, yes.
        Mr. Capuano [continuing]. That it won't be safe for the
    near future.
        Mr. Reilly. What you have heard--and, again, I am not an
    engineer, but all of the information I have had, it is
    structurally sound, it is safe, but there is too much water
    coming into that tunnel.
        Mr. Capuano. Thank you. Mr. Inspector General, first of
    all, I want to thank you for coming today. I also want to thank
    you for the assistance you have given both in this project and
    other projects with my office and me personally. And for those
    of you who don't know, the Inspector General is a son of
    Massachusetts. He is a proud product of us, and I am very
    pleased that he is back home today for a little while.
        Mr. Inspector General, in your written report, and I think
    you also said in your comments, you had suggested an
    independent commission for this, and I had agreed with you. And
    I just want to know, in your perfect world, if you were the
    emperor of the universe tomorrow, right this minute, would you
    still stand by an independent commission?
        Mr. Mead. I am very encouraged by the fact that Attorney
    General Reilly has stepped up the Commonwealth to a place to
    control. I ought to say, to begin with, why--we came up with
    this idea of the independent commission. Why did we come up
    with it? Well, I am not a real good student maybe of
    Massachusetts politics.
        But I did--I could see that the Massachusetts Turnpike
    Authority, which is--has this huge project and isn't part of
    your State Department of Transportation. First of all, that was
    kind of unusual. And the Massachusetts Turnpike Authority had a
    cost recovery effort set up inside itself, and I thought that
    was kind of strange because the Massachusetts Turnpike
    Authority itself may have been some--may bear some of the
    responsibility for the problems here.
        In addition, their consultant, their partner, was the one
    that the cost recovery effort, or a large part of it, was
    directed against. We came up with the idea of the commission,
    sir, because it seemed to us that it needed to be defanged of
    politics. And it was our idea that, if you had a commission
    that was bipartisan, they could work with the attorney general,
    who is endowed with these enforcement powers, and proceed.
        The decision was made that the attorney general, who has
    the legal authority, who has the skill set in his office--and
    we wish him well. I support the effort. We will continue to
    coordinate. And we were just trying to break a log jam by
    pushing the independent commission.
        That is a long-winded way of saying I am not wedded to the
    idea of an independent commission.
        Mr. Capuano. Mr. Inspector General, I am a student of
    Massachusetts politics. [Laughter.]
        And I supported, and I still support, the concept of an
    independent commission. But I want to make it clear, it is not
    because of a lack of confidence in the attorney general or his
    office. I think they do a great job of everything that I am
    aware that they do. I think they will do a good job on this.
        My concern is the future. Everybody in this room knows the
    attorney general is more than likely to run for Governor, and I
    wish him well. And everybody in this room knows that I thought
    about running for Governor and decided that Washington needs me
    more. [Laughter.]
        So I don't--I am not trying to hide anything here, and I am
    not trying to play footsies about it. My concern is in a couple
    of months, or a year, or 2 years, whenever the attorney
    general's office comes up with whatever findings they have on
    any of these issues, it is going to be the middle of a
    gubernatorial campaign.
        At this very moment, I myself am personally aware of only--
    I haven't done a whole full-blown research--two news articles
    already where the Governor himself or his people have already
    attacked the attorney general and his process when the attorney
    general hasn't done anything yet except begin the process. He
    has already been attacked on political--my opinion, politically
    motivated purposes.
        And my concern is exactly what you repeat throughout your
    entire testimony, your written testimony, is the main aspect
    here is to restore public confidence. And as a student of
    Massachusetts, and probably international politics, when
    politics is involved--and I am a politician, there is a place
    and time for it--public confidence goes out the door.
        And when the time comes, if the attorney general does
    everything perfectly correctly, and comes up with the perfect
    answer, no matter what he comes up with, it is going to be
    subject to political second-guessing and headline-grabbing. So,
    for me, I still support the independent commission, because I
    want politics out of this once and for all.
        Mr. Mead. Yes. I did think also--and I didn't say this in
    my response--another thought that went through our minds on the
    independent commission is what happens if it turns out that
    cost recovery is not possible, given some of the factors that
    Chairman Davis alluded to.
        An independent commission, in our heads at the time, the--
    that would have taken--it would have made it so that the
    expectations of success wouldn't have carried a political
    implication if it was bipartisan. And I still think it is a
    very hard road on cost recovery. And you've waited many, many
    years on some of the claims that are--Mr. Reilly is going to be
    pursuing here.
        And that is going to be a very hard road to tow. That is
    why I say, Mr. Reilly, I wish him well. [Laughter.]
        Mr. Capuano. Thank you. I see that my time is up. Thank you
    very much.
        Chairman Tom Davis. Thank you. Well, I am not a student of
    Massachusetts politics, but I won my first election here to the
    Freshman Council at Amherst College. I was elected that, and
    then I was elected president of the Young Republicans and that
    ended my career in politics in Massachusetts. [Laughter.]
        Mr. Capuano. You should have stayed. You could have been
    Governor. [Laughter.]
        Chairman Tom Davis. I hope everybody works together on
    this, regardless. Mr. Reilly, I am sure you will work with the
    Governor's office. I mean, this is--this really rises above
    politics at this point. There has been--so many bad things have
    happened to this, whatever our views, we just need to pull
    together.
        But let me ask you this. Your MOU with the Turnpike
    Authority ends in 2006, is that right?
        Mr. Reilly. Yes.
        Chairman Tom Davis. And this is all not likely to be
    finished by that time. Obviously, you want to tie up as many
    loose ends as you can. What is the strategy to tying up the
    loose ends after that? Just to renew it?
        Mr. Reilly. That is the end of my term, and I did not feel
    that it was appropriate to bind anyone else. I have accepted
    this responsibility. Someone else would decline it, and I
    understand that.
        Chairman Tom Davis. And obviously you would love to wrap it
    up, but I doubt it. You know, if it happens, then--you don't
    think there will be a problem in renewing, though, do you, with
    whoever your successor is?
        Mr. Reilly. No, I don't. But I should tell you what our
    strategy is, and we have shared it with everyone. The
    termination of the leaks and how we go about this and who pays
    for it and who has responsibility in finding a solution is
    going to go a long way.
        We have indicated that if we get by that point, we are
    willing to enter into negotiation for a global settlement for
    all of the cost recovery efforts, if we get beyond that. If we
    do not, the likelihood would be litigation, which would be
    costly and very time-consuming. So, you know, I am not ruling
    out that these matters can be resolved.
        The reason we stepped up here is I think you need, I think
    the American people need, the taxpayers need Massachusetts'
    decisions. A decision in an office and someone that is willing
    to accept responsibility for those decisions, and then what
    will come will come, and we will accept that. But that is what
    we are trying to be about.
        We are trying to get into a point where we can make
    decisions, good decisions, fact-based decisions. And I agree
    with you that this is beyond politics. This is far beyond and
    far too important for politics. It involves the future of this
    State in terms of not just the immediate project but other
    projects that are coming down the road. I take that
    responsibility very seriously.
        We will work in a bipartisan fashion, both the Federal and
    State officials, and with the Governor's office. You want
    results, and we are going to try to give you those results. And
    then people can measure them at the end.
        Chairman Tom Davis. Sure. Let me ask another question. The
    individuals who approved the payments--I think, Mr. Mead, we
    talked about how close everybody was up here. The contractors
    were close to the people that were overseeing it, and how
    really outside the box--how unusual it is for people to just
    approve these change orders and not really get resolved who was
    to blame and what was within the scope of work, and that kind
    of thing.
        We don't know yet if there is evidence of collusion. But is
    it possible, as we look back at these payments that were
    approved, is--if we find evidence of collusion or somebody
    acting in an ultravirus way of approving things they shouldn't
    have and money went out the door, that individuals could be
    held responsible who were in basically the State or Federal
    lines of authority?
        Mr. Mead. Yes. This project has been remarkably scandal-
    free from the standpoint of hard evidence of criminal activity
    at least to date. I think that this project, when it started, a
    lot of hard questions that should not--should have been asked
    were not asked. A lot of change orders were approved, that had
    the project been properly scoped to begin with, I don't think
    they would have--I don't think they would have occurred.
        I don't think the jury is in yet on whether--the extent
    of--that we might find malfeasance on this project. You know,
    the tail on this project of claims was--I mentioned the $400
    million. That is going to take some time to resolve, long after
    the project is complete.
        Chairman Tom Davis. I understand. General Reilly, would you
    agree? As you look at some of these--some of the approvals that
    were given early on for these change orders, you are going to
    be looking behind it. Are you going to be looking for evidence
    that maybe people were--I don't want to say on the take, but
    the closeness of the people involved in this, is that going to
    be a factor as you look at this?
        Mr. Reilly. Obviously, it will be a factor. But you have to
    bear in mind the very structure of this project, the way it was
    organized, integrated project management encouraged that type
    of----
        Chairman Tom Davis. Collegial.
        Mr. Reilly. Now, people did not think this thing through
    when they set up this structure, because now we are at the
    point where we are allocating and determining accountability
    and responsibility, and that is very difficult under the
    organizational setup. And if there are lessons to be learned,
    that is one of them. I am not sure you want to do this again on
    a project of----
        Chairman Tom Davis. Right.
        Mr. Reilly [continuing]. Of this magnitude. But, again,
    this is one of the things that we will have to deal with, but
    that is a lesson that should be learned.
        And the last thing, in terms of some of the liability
    limitations, in terms of capping that, the insurance situation
    in terms of the amount of insurance for a project of this
    magnitude, it is totally unacceptable. And we will be speaking
    to that down the road, and I am sure you are aware of it and
    you will want further briefings. But there are a lot of lessons
    to be learned.
        Chairman Tom Davis. Was that partly Federal responsibility,
    the fact that the insurance levels, the bonding was so low?
        Mr. Reilly. Well, I think on both--you know, it is a shared
    responsibility.
        Chairman Tom Davis. OK.
        Mr. Reilly. But there are insurance problems in terms of
    the amount; $50 million obviously is not sufficient. There is a
    gap in that because of the failure of Reliant. That is a
    problem. There are a lot of problems, but they need to be dealt
    with.
        Chairman Tom Davis. I understand.
        Mr. Reilly. And we are going to try to do it.
        Chairman Tom Davis. Thank you.
        Mr. Mead. And, you know, you asked about--this is not--this
    is not something I would characterize as collusion. I know you
    would be interested in this point. This project had an
    insurance program where they would bill the Federal Government
    for premiums, and it is an allowable expense under the Federal
    law to pay the premiums, a certain percentage of them.
        It turned out that after we were billed that the insurance
    company would notify the project that the premium for the
    period that we had paid for was not as high as had been billed.
    That they had--and that was an annual review they would do of
    the claims experience and they said, ``So the premium isn't as
    high.''
        And an arrangement was in place on this project where those
    premiums were retained and put in a trust account where they
    accrued interest. And the Federal Government was not aware of
    this particular arrangement.
        In effect, I think they had an insurance program in place
    here where we were paying premiums for insurance billings, and
    we should have been refunded a great deal of the money that was
    kept in a trust account. That wasn't evidence of collusion, but
    I think it was evidence of an impropriety.
        Chairman Tom Davis. Yes. I am sure the attorney general
    will look at that, among other things. Is that----
        Mr. Reilly. We will take whatever information that is----
        Chairman Tom Davis. OK.
        Mr. Reilly [continuing]. That we have, and then call it as
    we see it at the end.
        Chairman Tom Davis. OK. My last question--Mr. Gee, with the
    number of leaks and the type of leaks in a tunnel, with the
    engineering issues of this complexity, is it about normal? Is
    it more leaks than normal? Is it fewer leaks? I mean, how would
    you take a look at how it is complied from an engineering
    perspective and the construction basis, with what would be
    expected? I am not talking about the cost overruns. I am just
    talking about the performance.
        Mr. Gee. Well, I guess that answered two parts. As we
    talked about--the picture you saw here, we would not expect
    that to happen. That is clearly a problem, and that was a--I
    would characterize that as a construction defect.
        Chairman Tom Davis. That is a good answer, yes.
        Mr. Gee. A latent defect. [Laughter.]
        But we do expect some type of water to get in. When you
    build tunnels underwater, that is expected. The concern we
    would have in the long term is that water doesn't lie there and
    corrode the steel. That is when it becomes a problem.
        Through our research, we have indicated--and we use as a
    gauge about 1 gallon per minute per thousand feet of tunnel as
    a rough estimate of the amount of water that we would expect
    that wouldn't be a problem. But even that amount could be a
    problem if it is left to corrode the steel. OK? So it is not
    actually the number of leaks, but the amount of water that
    could penetrate the tunnel and sit and allow it to corrode the
    steel. That would be a concern.
        Chairman Tom Davis. And what you are saying is today--you
    think after you are through with everything you are going to
    probably render a decision that the tunnel is safe. But we
    don't want to be back here in 10 years looking at a $5 billion
    repair bill because of things that have corroded and----
        Mr. Gee. No. We would expect through a maintenance and
    inspection program that any water that does come through would
    be a minimal amount and would not cause any problems,
    corrosion-wise or safety-wise.
        Chairman Tom Davis. What are the maintenance costs for the
    tunnel? Do you have any idea?
        Mr. Gee. No. I really do not. That would be something that
    I think the next panel, the Turnpike Authority----
        Chairman Tom Davis. OK.
        Mr. Gee [continuing]. Would be able to answer.
        Chairman Tom Davis. Thank you very much.
        Mr. Lynch.
        Mr. Lynch. Just a followup, Mr. Gee. You said that you
    thought that this tunnel was placed under the National Bridge
    Inspection Program. Is it, or isn't it? I was told that it was
    earlier, but----
        Mr. Gee. No. What I--excuse me if I state something
    incorrectly, or misstate. We are proposing to institute a
    tunnel inspection program similar to our National Bridge
    Inspection Program.
        Mr. Lynch. OK.
        Mr. Gee. The bridges on this project are subject to the
    bridge inspection program.
        Mr. Lynch. Right. Right. But you were going to include the
    tunnel----
        Mr. Gee. Right.
        Mr. Lynch [continuing]. Which is not necessarily required,
    but under the circumstances is a good idea?
        Mr. Gee. Right. Actually, the Turnpike Authority has been
    proactive in helping us design such a program, because of the
    complexity of this project and the scale of the project.
        Mr. Lynch. OK. Thank you. Attorney General Reilly, can you
    give us a snapshot on--I understand this is ongoing litigation,
    so you can't really--I wouldn't want you to disclose anything
    that might undermine your negotiating position with respect to
    cost recovery cases that you took over from Judge Ginsburg.
        And I understand that for the first 8 years of this
    project--there was a cost recovery program instituted in 1994.
    And up until 2002, it had recovered a total of $35,000, is that
    what we are saying? $35,000?
        Mr. Mead. Yes, sir.
        Mr. Lynch. And we are at about--it was about----
        Mr. Mead. I was $5,000 off before. Let me correct the
    record. It was $35,000 not $30,000.
        Mr. Lynch. All right. And we are up to--on a project at
    that point that was $10.8 billion. So we had recovered $35,000.
        And then, Judge Ginsburg came in under the directorship of
    Mr. Amorello. Now you are taking the cases that were begun by
    the Judge, and also you are handling any other aspect of
    recovery that we might hope to succeed in.
        Mr. Mead. Yes, sir.
        Mr. Lynch. All right. Can you give us a--without, again,
    divulging any sensitive information regarding the liability of
    certain lawsuits, could you give us a snapshot of where we are
    today?
        Mr. Reilly. Yes. One lawsuit has been stayed that had to do
    with financial management. That lawsuit has been stayed.
        Mr. Lynch. Stayed on your part.
        Mr. Reilly. Stayed on our part.
        Mr. Lynch. In other words, you made a determination that it
    was not viable and you pulled back.
        Mr. Reilly. No. We made a determination to hold on that
    case to see where the overall effort goes.
        Mr. Lynch. OK.
        Mr. Reilly. There are other--some eight section design
    lawsuits that are in effect. Those are going forward. I think
    the first one is scheduled for trial later this year, but they
    will proceed on a regular basis.
        The strategy here is that we will either come to some
    resolution on the leak situation, both short term and long
    term, and allocate a dollar figure to that we believe is fair
    to both the Federal Government and the State government and the
    taxpayers, or this is headed for litigation, all of it,
    including the potential for additional lawsuits.
        But we are--we believe it is in everyone's interest to
    resolve this matter if we can, but with no expense to any
    taxpayers and to recover as much money as we can. What that
    time table will be, I can't promise you that, but----
        Mr. Lynch. OK.
        Mr. Reilly [continuing]. We would set a date on that,
    except that we are--we are proceeding with the leaks as No. 1.
    No. 2, we are setting up a structure for a global negotiation,
    if we get beyond this point. If it goes that way, it will go
    that way. If it doesn't, it is headed for litigation that will
    be very costly, and it will be long term.
        Mr. Lynch. All right. Well, that is in your hands, and it
    would be overreaching on my part to suggest how you might do
    it. But as an editorial comment, I would just like to say that
    settlement, if it were to occur, or the litigation were to
    occur, would depend greatly on the assessment of real damages
    within the tunnel and how much water we have in there and the
    prospective maintenance costs that we--the delta between what
    we should have had with the tunnel as it was advertised and
    what we end up with at the end of the day. That should be a
    factor in those settlements.
        And all I am saying is that there is a pretty good audit
    going on right now, and I would just--my own--and, again, I
    don't want to influence you, but I would not enter into any
    negotiations with these folks until we get all of that
    information.
        And, you know, based on what I have seen so far and the
    lack of willingness to negotiate in good faith, I would just
    say, you hang tough, and we are with you. And we realize that
    you didn't have to take on this case, and that you did it out
    of a spirit of good government and protecting the taxpayer.
        I have a bad feeling about this. I think that the numbers
    that we are seeing here for--you know, just counting heads down
    in that tunnel, the number of people that are fixing those--
    that are plugging those holes, and the number of leaks we have,
    and it didn't get any better this summer than it did last
    winter, I just think we have a whale of a problem down there.
        And I would just not want to settle short and then end up
    with a huge bill later on behalf of the--you know, the
    taxpayers of the Commonwealth.
        Mr. Reilly. I am in total agreement with you, Congressman.
    There will be no settlement, and there will be no detailed
    negotiations until we get the information that we need to make
    an assessment whether the problem has been fixed, to what
    extent it has been fixed, whether there are long-term
    maintenance, and what is that going to cost. And until we get
    to that point, we are not going far.
        We expect them to do the job that they were paid to do. And
    until they do that--there is an old saying, if you broke it,
    fix it.
        Mr. Lynch. Right.
        Mr. Reilly. Fix it, and step up and take responsibility for
    it, and pay for what you broke. And then we will move on. If we
    don't get to that point, then there will be no negotiations.
        Mr. Mead. Congressman Lynch, I would just like to
    supplement----
        Mr. Lynch. Sure.
        Mr. Mead [continuing]. Or amplify on something you said. In
    my statement, you will notice that we stress some cautionary
    notes about running to the bank with a $17 million estimate. I
    think that when we first started hearing about----
        Mr. Lynch. Now, let us--just for clarity, the $17 million
    is regarding leak----
        Mr. Mead. There was an earlier----
        Mr. Lynch [continuing]. Patching or waterproofing, right?
        Mr. Mead. Yes. And patching and--the early estimates were
    that, well, $7 million had been paid to fix leaks, and
    another--there might be another $10 million out there. And our
    testimony deliberately expresses some cautionary notes on
    taking that figure and running with it, and that is because, as
    you know, we have been working with the Artery and the
    Governor's office and the Federal Highway Administration to
    have Deloitte & Touche do an audit of the costs. They are
    reporting in mid-May.
        Now, I think a lot of people with these leaks--their frame
    of reference is somehow the month of September in 2004. But if
    we all remember, in 1997, the Artery set up a task force called
    the Waterproofing Task Force. There was a reason they did that
    in 1997. By the year 2000, that task force was called--there
    was a new task force, and this one was called the Leak Task
    Force.
        So we started out with a waterproofing one in 1997; in
    2000/2001, we had a leak task force. So the costs associated
    with this--the cautionary note I am raising here go back longer
    in time than we had initially thought.
        Mr. Lynch. Right. And, you know, I noted that in my notes,
    that in the reports we are reading at some point in time--and I
    am not sure what precipitated that--but the Waterproofing Task
    Force became the Leak Task Force. And, you know, it begs the
    question.
        One thing I wanted to ask both of you, it seems that in
    this long-term construction schedule--and this goes back--this
    is about 16 years that it spanned where we have had people
    actually on the site on this project. It was always my
    understanding that, well, on the average project, usually the
    completion of the job triggered the statute of limitations.
        But I understand, now that you are explaining it to me,
    that phases of this contract were completed years ago, and that
    the statute of limitations was too old on some of these--some
    of the aspects of this.
        It would make sense, don't you think, for Congress to have
    a special statute of limitations for work performed on long-
    term construction projects like this? Say, that they would go
    on beyond 8 years or 7 years, or some longer period of time
    that would not be properly addressed by the normal statute of
    limitations under contract law.
        Mr. Reilly. A couple of things on the State side, and it
    certainly is worth looking at on the Federal side. The State
    statute of limitations has been extended for this project. We
    expect that to be contested, and that is--that will be an
    issue. But, you know, this business should have been taken care
    of, and we are all dealing with something very late in the
    game.
        Mr. Lynch. Right.
        Mr. Reilly. And we shouldn't have to deal with the
    situation we are dealing with. But the State--on the State
    level, there is a State law that extended the statute of
    limitations to allow us to proceed.
        Mr. Lynch. All right.
        Mr. Mead. I would have to get back to you on the statute of
    limitations. But what was fundamentally wrong here is their
    closeness. Any project of this size--in fact, even smaller
    projects--there ought to be an independent part of the project
    that is watching.
        What you had here is you had a partnership between Bechtel/
    Parsons Brinckerhoff and the Artery management. And now the
    Commonwealth is trying to get recovery against Bechtel/Parsons
    Brinckerhoff, who has been partners all these years with the
    Commonwealth of Massachusetts.
        So I think that you needed to have more checkers in place
    from the beginning on all these change orders that we are now
    going back and saying, ``Well, should we have paid these or
    not?'' You should have had an apparatus in place then.
        Mr. Lynch. Right.
        Mr. Mead. That is a lesson learned. I don't want to keep
    coming back to the Wilson Bridge, but that is one of the things
    that the Wilson Bridge started doing right from day one. Well,
    not exactly from day one, but shortly after it got underway.
    And I know it costs the taxpayers a little bit of money to have
    some auditors around, but I think at the end of the day we will
    be very happy that we did so.
        Mr. Lynch. I agree. This integrated project organization,
    the IPO, that is sort of the source of a lot of problems that
    we are looking at today, under that--based on previous
    testimony in some of the pre-conference--prehearing
    conferences, it was Bechtel's responsibility to report to the
    Turnpike Authority.
        But since they were so close that in many ways that
    reporting was internal, because their organizations were
    blended. And there was no reporting to an independent--as you
    describe, an independent agent on behalf of the taxpayer. And I
    was mystified that there is no requirement that there be an
    independent agent there that gets reports on a monthly or
    biweekly basis, so that they can track the project on behalf of
    the taxpayer, because that is who is ultimately paying the bill
    here.
        And I am just wondering if there is any office or any
    structure that you are aware of that would allow us to provide
    that parallel reporting requirement, so that it is not all in-
    house. Either of you gentlemen.
        Mr. Mead. Well, no, I am not aware of an explicit such
    arrangement. I think perhaps there ought to be one. You do have
    the Federal Highway Administration.
        Mr. Lynch. Right.
        Mr. Mead. These people are getting taxpayer dollars. I
    mean, they are getting a lot of money from the Federal
    Government, and I don't think it is inappropriate to establish
    some reporting line. And you can go back in history on this
    project, and Bechtel/Parsons Brinckerhoff knew and did go and
    brief the head of the Central Artery about where the costs were
    headed on this project.
        Mr. Lynch. Right.
        Mr. Mead. And it sure would have been nice in--with the 20/
    20 hindsight we have today, if Bechtel/Parsons Brinckerhoff had
    come to my office at that time, or come to the Federal Highway
    Administration and said, ``This project is headed north to the
    neighborhood of $13 or $14 billion.''
        Mr. Lynch. Right.
        Mr. Mead. But that did not happen.
        Mr. Lynch. OK. Well, that is maybe something we can address
    in the regs with the Federal Highway Administration.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
        Chairman Tom Davis. Thank you. Mr. Capuano.
        Mr. Capuano. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Gentlemen, I would like to just pursue--I mean, one of
    the--I am not an engineer, and I know that the next panel is
    supposed to be a little bit more technically oriented, except
    for Mr. Gee. But nonetheless, the engineering parts are one
    thing, and that is what the attorney general is going to do
    over the next several months or years, try and determine who is
    responsible for what engineering issues.
        In the final analysis, though, let us assume that you find
    somebody is responsible for something. There has to be money on
    the table, and there has to be money to get. And in my limited
    experience, there is two places to go. No. 1 is holdbacks,
    money that was not paid to the contractors pending whatever
    negotiations you have. And No. 2 is to the surety bonds, which
    every major contract is supposed to have. I don't know if it is
    a regulation, but it certainly should have, never mind whether
    it is required or not.
        And I guess I have a couple of questions, and my guess is
    that they would be addressed both to Mr. Mead and Mr. Reilly,
    most importantly. Are you satisfied now that either there are
    enough holdbacks on this general project to address, if not
    every dollar, you know, the bulk of the--well, and I know that
    some of these--much of these costs haven't been estimated. But
    are you comfortable with the percentages?
        As I understand it right now, the Federal Government is
    just holding I think it is $81 million. That is 1 percent of
    the Federal dollars. So, in my mind, I mean, my uneducated
    mind, that is not enough. But it is what we have.
        And as I understand it--and, again, I would like to be
    corrected, I am not the insurance expert. But as I understand
    it--and I think, Mr. Attorney General, you just mentioned it,
    that Bechtel/Parsons Brinckerhoff only has $50 million, with
    $10 million not even necessarily there, probably more like $40
    million worth of insurance on this issue.
        And Modern Continental, which, first of all, doesn't exist
    anymore, but the company that has taken them over, I guess as I
    understand it, picked up their insurance, which is $252
    million, but that $252 million, as I understand it, may be
    subject to claims on Route 3, may be subject to claims in a
    Long Island project that may take up the whole thing, and
    probably other projects that Modern Continental is involved in.
        And I guess, No. 1, are you satisfied that the numbers of
    dollars that are available to settle these issues are there?
    And, No. 2, are you looking at both the surety bonds, the other
    contractors, not just Modern--that is the big one at the
    moment--the subcontractors, the manufacturers--I mean, we have
    items that were manufactured, both roofing materials that may
    or may not come under scrutiny, some of the computer and some
    of the software issues and some of the intelligent
    transportation issues, etc.
        And I guess for me, are you satisfied at the moment that
    the money is there on the table? Subject to debate and
    liability and lawsuits and negotiations, is it there for us to
    get?
        Mr. Reilly. I can't say that at this point. I can tell you
    right now there are serious questions on the insurance, on the
    amount of insurance, and there is a gap in that insurance
    because of the failure of Reliant. And that is a problem.
        In terms of what money will be available from what source,
    we are currently exploring that. But I can't represent to you
    right now that there is enough money that we are going--there
    is money that is being withheld by the project. Whether or not
    that will be--that will be enough in total to resolve these
    claims, I can't tell you that right now. I can tell you that we
    are looking at every source and every potential source.
        And as I said, and as--there are bottom lines in all of
    this, and, yes, there are problems with the setup and the IPO
    and all of that. But we feel, and we feel very strongly, that
    the ultimate responsibility here lies with Bechtel. And we
    intend to hold Bechtel accountable, and they have represented
    to the public that they are willing to accept responsibility
    for what they did, and let us see.
        Chairman Tom Davis. Will the gentleman yield? And I guess
    the question is that if the bond money isn't there, or if the
    money hasn't been held back, you can sue them directly,
    correct?
        Mr. Reilly. Pardon?
        Chairman Tom Davis. You could sue them directly and ask for
    the money back.
        Mr. Reilly. Yes.
        Chairman Tom Davis. You always have that option.
        Mr. Reilly. Yes. Yes.
        Chairman Tom Davis. And, of course, GSA or Federal Highways
    or anybody else always has the threat of debarment. There are a
    lot of--depending what you find, there are a lot of ways to get
    the money. It is not as easy as if we had the bond, as I think
    Mr. Capuano indicated. If you had the bond, or you were holding
    money back, it is a lot easier. But----
        Mr. Reilly. It is a lot easier.
        Mr. Davis [continuing]. We are not without having some
    remedies here.
        Mr. Reilly. We have some remedies, and I believe very
    strongly that it is----
        Chairman Tom Davis. Good question, though.
        Mr. Reilly [continuing]. In everyone's best interest to
    step up here and accept responsibility for what they did and
    pay for what needs to take place in terms of fixing this
    problem. I believe that, and we will see. They made those
    representations; we will see.
        Mr. Mead. I concur with the attorney general. There is a
    thing called a retainage, that the Artery does have some
    retainage accounts for some of these contractors. Like Modern
    Continental, there is a retainage account. My recollection is
    that there is $15 or $20 million in it. But that probably--I
    don't know how sufficient that is going to be.
        I do not believe in the case of Bechtel/Parsons
    Brinckerhoff that there is a retainage account. But the
    chairman is right; I mean, there is any number of different
    avenues for getting the money. The $81 million is what the feds
    owe the Commonwealth. You know, it is just money that is owed
    the Commonwealth. And by law, it will go to the Commonwealth
    when they get their finance plan in order, which I hope is
    soon.
        Mr. Capuano. I hope so as well. I understand that there are
    other routes to take, but we all know that those routes get
    more difficult, particularly when you are dealing with the
    largest general contractor, the one with the most questions, at
    the moment is bankrupt.
        And you are going to have to get in line, unless--I can't
    imagine we have a priority here somewhere that I am--and,
    again, I am not an expert in any of these things, but I am not
    aware that we would have any priority ahead of any other debtor
    or claimant against Modern Continental.
        And if they are gone, that is my biggest concern. I mean,
    that is why I asked about subcontractors and other contractors,
    especially, as I understand it, this particular--the major
    breach that we are talking about, the one that everybody likes
    to show on TV, that was Modern Continental.
        I understand they were the largest contractor on the
    project, and that is why--that is the main reason I asked the
    question is because, with them bankrupt, that adds a whole
    other layer of serious questions as to whether we will ever get
    the money, never mind the judgments.
        Yes, Mr. Gee.
        Mr. Gee. The only thing I would add is that on each
    contract they have a surety bond. So if they default on one, it
    might not affect the Route 3, because they have a separate bond
    on Route 3.
        Mr. Capuano. I understand. I guess maybe I wasn't clear,
    but one of my concerns is, for the sake of discussion--again, I
    am no expert, but it just strikes me that a $50 million--well,
    it is not a surety bond, but a de facto surety bond, on
    Bechtel/Parsons is pretty small for a company that made--
    correct me if I am wrong--in the $2 billion range, which, fine,
    if the project works, maybe they are entitled to $2 billion.
        But if you have $2 billion--I know that if a guy were
    building me a $2 billion house, I would want a little bit
    higher insurance rate than $50 million. And if that is all that
    is there, to me it is not whether they have it or not, it is
    how much.
        And I understand that the attorney general would be the one
    hopefully that will pursue our interest to determine how much
    is ours. But if he gets a settlement for--pick a number, $100
    million--if it is there in the surety, we don't have to go
    through the next rigmarole of trying to sue the individual
    company that may or may not have bank accounts. Who knows
    whether they are in Switzerland. I don't know any of those
    things.
        But we all know that if it is in a surety, it is a lot
    easier. And I know I, for one, am tired of this whole dance,
    and we all want it over. And when it gets time to get it over,
    I don't want to have to go through another 10 years of chasing
    the money. But I guess we are where we are, and that is why I
    wanted to ask those questions.
        Thank you.
        Chairman Tom Davis. Very good questions. Thank you all very
    much. I think this has been very illuminating for us.
        Mr. Lynch. May I ask one last question?
        Chairman Tom Davis. OK. Mr. Lynch wants the final question.
        Mr. Lynch. You know, it just kind of stuck in my head, you
    were describing--Inspector General Mead, you were describing
    this transaction where the Authority was overcharged for
    insurance, and they got a rebate back. They got the money from
    the Federal Government, right?
        Mr. Mead. I was----
        Mr. Lynch. Paid their insurance.
        Mr. Mead. Yes. The government----
        Mr. Lynch. Then, the insurance company says to them, ``You
    overpaid. Here is a chunk of money back.'' I don't know how
    much money that was. They put it in a trust account, and then
    you never said what they did with the money in the trust
    account.
        Mr. Mead. Right. In fact, they had this accounting
    technique--I think it is an accounting gimmick--where the
    actual cost of the Artery, say just hypothetically, was known
    to be $10 billion. But if there was $800,000 of interest in
    this account, they would deduct the $800,000 and say, ``Well,
    the project is only really costing $9.2 million instead of $10
    million.''
        Mr. Lynch. So it was a setoff. They are using it that way
    anyway.
        Mr. Mead. Yes. I mean, and later on, as I think Bechtel/
    Parsons Brinckerhoff notes in its testimony, they had to make
    an accounting adjustment where they had to reflect the fact
    that all of this money had accrued in this insurance trust.
        Mr. Lynch. Any idea how much money we are talking here?
        Mr. Mead. It might have been in the neighborhood of close
    to $800,000 or $900,000--$800 or $900 million.
        Mr. Lynch. $800 or $900 million?
        Mr. Mead. It might have been in that neighborhood.
        Mr. Lynch. You guys want to confer on that?
        Mr. Mead. It is not there now.
        Mr. Lynch. Right. No, no.
        Mr. Mead. I mean, they fixed it.
        Mr. Lynch. But----
        Mr. Mead. But I do think that it resulted in a fairly large
    accounting adjustment to reflect the change in the cost of the
    Artery--it might have been in the neighborhood--my recollection
    is it was around $1 billion.
        Mr. Lynch. Around $1 billion.
        OK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Tom Davis. Thank you, this panel, very much. It
    has been very illuminating for the committee, and I appreciate
    your time. We will take a 2-minute recess as we move to our
    next panel.
        [Recess.]
        Chairman Tom Davis. We have Chairman Matthew Amorello, who
    is the Massachusetts Turnpike Authority, the entity charged
    with overseeing the Big Dig. Thank you very much for being with
    us. We have John MacDonald, chairman of the Board of Control
    for Bechtel/Parsons Brinckerhoff, the management consultant for
    the project.
        Mr. MacDonald, you are accompanied, I understand here, by
    Mr. Morris Levy, the senior vice president at Parsons
    Brinckerhoff, and Keith Sibley, the program manager for the
    project. Thank you all for being with us.
        And we also have Mr. George Tamaro, who is a partner at
    Mueser Rutledge Consulting Engineers, and a former engineering
    consultant for the Big Dig. Mr. Tamaro's extensive experience
    in slurry wall technology and major infrastructure projects
    provides valuable insight to this committee's oversight
    efforts.
        It is our policy we swear everybody in before you testify.
    If you would rise with me, raise your right hands.
        Let me just identify the people in the back row who may be
    called on, so we can get your names on the record.
        Mr. Swanson. Mike Swanson, chief of operations and chief
    engineer for the Turnpike Authority.
        Chairman Tom Davis. Thank you.
        Mr. Lewis. Michael Lewis, project director for the CA/T
    project.
        Ms. Breen. Marie Breen, CA/T chief counsel.
        Mr. Wiley. Matt Wiley, former program manager.
        Chairman Tom Davis. Thank you.
        Mr. Lancellotti. Tony Lancellotti, former engineering
    manager.
        Chairman Tom Davis. OK. Thank you all for being with us.
    Now I am going to swear you in.
        [Witnesses sworn.]
        Chairman Tom Davis. Thank you very much.
        Mr. Amorello, we will start with you. You have a key role
    in this. If you need to take more than 5 minutes, we certainly
    understand. But your entire testimony is in the record.

      STATEMENTS OF MATTHEW J. AMORELLO, CHAIRMAN, MASSACHUSETTS
    TURNPIKE AUTHORITY; JOHN MacDONALD, CHAIRMAN, BOARD OF CONTROL,
       BECHTEL/PARSONS BRINCKERHOFF, ACCOMPANIED BY MORRIS LEVY,
    SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT, PARSONS BRINCKERHOFF, INC., AND KEITH S.
     SIBLEY, P.E., PROGRAM MANAGER, CENTRAL ARTERY/TUNNEL PROJECT,
     BECHTEL/PARSONS BRINCKERHOFF; AND GEORGE J. TAMARO, PARTNER,
                  MUESER RUTLEDGE CONSULTING ENGINEERS

                    STATEMENT OF MATTHEW J. AMORELLO

        Mr. Amorello. That is great, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Chairman, I have a brief opening statement. I would
    like to read it into the record.
        Chairman Tom Davis. That would be great. Thanks for being
    with us.
        Mr. Amorello. Mr. Chairman, welcome to Massachusetts.
    Welcome home to Congressman Lynch and Congressman Capuano.
        My name is Matthew Amorello, and I am the chairman of the
    Massachusetts Turnpike Authority. I welcome this opportunity to
    appear before you to discuss the current management of the
    Central Artery/Tunnel Project and the steps we are taking to
    ensure that this project fulfills its promise to the citizens,
    taxpayers, and tollpayers of this region and the Nation.
        My mission upon taking office a little over 3 years ago was
    challenging, and I come here before you today to say that I
    believe we have met those challenges and continue to meet them
    on a daily basis. My first mission was to bring order and
    stability to a demoralized and chaotic Turnpike Authority.
        We have done that, and today's Turnpike Authority is a
    well-organized, efficient, and highly motivated public
    authority focused on delivering quality service to the people
    of Massachusetts in a cost-effective manner. In fact, Moody's
    Investor Service has said that the turnpike ``Board has shown
    strong commitment to rebuilding the Authority's financial
    position.''
        My second mission was to maintain the costs of this project
    and restore credibility to our financial management of the Big
    Dig. Again, I am pleased to report that we have accomplished
    these goals. This project, like all public projects, must be
    conducted in a transparent and forthcoming manner. I have made
    every effort since becoming chairman to ensure that our Federal
    and State partners and overseers have received all of the
    information they need, when they need it, in order to do their
    jobs effectively.
        The project's budget today is exactly the same as it was
    when I took office--$14.625 billion. I think it might be useful
    to briefly review where and how these funds were spent.
    Approximately $6 billion was for the extension of the I-90
    interstate, including the Ted Williams Tunnel and Four-Point
    Channel Tunnel, which now connect the Massachusetts Turnpike
    directly to Logan Airport and points north, diverting traffic
    away from downtown Boston. This part of the project has
    dramatically cut drive times to Logan and decreased traffic in
    the central corridor.
        Approximately $8 billion has been spent building the new
    tunnel and ramps from Charlestown and Interstate 93 to the
    Tobin Bridge and Route 1, the Zacamb Bridge, and the ramps
    connecting Sturrow Drive and Interstate 93, and, of course, the
    construction of the I-93 tunnels, which are still being
    completed beneath the city.
        This project has expanded capacity and eliminated a
    dangerous choke point for the motorists traveling through the
    city. It is expected to reduce carbon monoxide levels in the
    metropolitan Boston area by 12 percent, and has removed the
    elevated highway which for 50 years separated the city's
    financial and historic centers from its waterfront and several
    of its neighborhoods.
        In addition to holding the budget, we have taken several
    initiatives to protect this public investment, including the
    first meaningful effort in the history of the project to
    recover costs for design errors and omissions.
        My third mission was to ensure that the project did not
    lose sight of its primary objective--to replace the old,
    ineffective highway network, which threatened to destroy
    mobility and economic growth in the city and region, with a
    modern, safe, and efficient interstate highway system for those
    who live, work, or visit New England.
        I am pleased to report that we have opened almost every
    major component of this project to the public, who are now
    enjoying the benefits of this important investment. In 2003, we
    met three major milestones that marked the turning point toward
    completion of this project--the opening of the extension of
    Interstate 90, the opening of the Interstate 93 northbound and
    southbound tunnels. The entire project will reach substantial
    completion this fall.
        I note these achievements, because I understand this
    project is often in the news, and the news, as reported, is not
    very encouraging. It is sometimes easy to forget all of the
    positive steps we have taken over the past 3 years.
        The significant strides that have been made to set this
    project back on track, to keep faith with our Federal and State
    stakeholders, and to deliver on the promise of an urban
    interstate highway system, that when completed will be one of
    the marvels of this Nation's long and sustained effort that
    began with President Eisenhower over half a century ago,
    creating a national highway network second to none in the
    world.
        As you came to this chamber today, you no doubt noticed
    that the old elevated highway is gone. It is being replaced by
    the Rose Fitzgerald Kennedy Greenway--a magnificent public
    amenity above ground and a modern, efficient interstate highway
    underground.
        Let me now address two specific areas that are in the
    forefront of our current project oversight efforts. The first
    area concerns the issue related to leaks in the tunnels. The
    second concerns our efforts to establish a meaningful program
    for cost recovery.
        With respect to the issue of tunnel leaks, the first thing
    I need to emphasize is that the tunnels are operating well,
    and, Congressman Capuano, they are safe. Earlier this month we
    received a report from the Federal Highway Administration as
    part of that agency's independent and ongoing oversight of the
    project. Federal Highway affirmed what I have been consistently
    saying; the tunnels are safe and structurally sound.
        Slurry wall breach that occurred last September was an
    unacceptable result of poor workmanship and failed project
    oversight. The responsible parties are being held accountable
    by the Turnpike Authority, and they are undertaking to repair
    the slurry wall in an appropriate manner. After the September
    breach, I ordered an inspection of each of the 2,000 slurry
    wall panels in the I-93 tunnels, and I initiated a weekly
    update on the inspections and the identified defects in order
    to keep the public and our overseers informed.
        This thorough investigation of the entire slurry wall
    system was undertaken to ensure that any additional defects are
    identified and corrected. At our insistence, each contractor to
    date has taken responsibility for identified defects, and is
    correcting those defects at their own expense.
        The FHWA report notes the differences between slurry wall
    defects and the various low-level leaks that are largely
    attributable to the fact that this project is not yet complete.
    Federal Highways' report states, ``The project is adequately
    addressing the tunnel leaks. We have confidence in the plan
    that is being followed by the Turnpike Authority and project
    staff, and we can expect that the work will be completed as
    offered by the Massachusetts Turnpike Authority.''
        Based on some media reports, public perception has been
    that the low-level leaks at the roof wall joints were
    ``discovered'' after the September 15 breach. This is false and
    has unfortunately confused two very different issues. On the
    evening news in the Boston area, we routinely see video of the
    September 15 slurry wall breach and hear talk of hundreds of
    leaks, leaving the impression that there were hundreds of
    issues like the breach, which is not true.
        As I have said, the two breaches and more minor slurry wall
    defects are absolutely unacceptable, and the contractors must
    fix them at their own expense. With respect to low-level leaks,
    they are part of an ongoing construction, and contractors have
    been sealing them, doing injection grouting for some 4 years.
        The FHWA report's first finding states that chronic low-
    level leaks were noted and expected to some degree due to the
    depth of the tunnel, and the sealing of all leaks is expected
    to be completed later this year.
        I want each of you to be assured that I have insisted that
    project staff and consultants spare no effort to ensure that
    all water infiltration issues are identified and resolved to my
    satisfaction and the satisfaction of the Federal Highway
    Administration as promptly as possible. We are insisting upon a
    high level of attention to detail and quality control, as
    expected by FHWA, in the resolution of these issues. And we
    will continue to be completely transparent with the public and
    our Federal and State partners and overseers as we undertake
    this work.
        We are currently inspecting the entire tunnel system for
    possible points of water infiltration, something that is part
    of our historic ongoing inspection protocol. I have with me
    today the project director, Michael Lewis; the turnpike's chief
    engineer/chief operating officer, Michael Swanson; his deputy
    chief engineer, Helmet Ernst; and John Christian, the technical
    advisor to the Massachusetts Turnpike Authority Board of
    Directors, along with the project chief counsel, Marie Breen
    and other turnpike senior staff, in order to respond to more
    detailed questions that you may have on this subject.
        There are many misunderstandings and false assumptions
    associated with the number and nature of the leaks that we will
    be happy to address in more detail.
        The second area I would like to discuss today is our effort
    to take meaningful steps toward cost recovery. When I became
    chairman, the project had a weak record in recovering costs. I
    moved quickly to correct that. First, I hired the National
    Academy of Engineering from Washington to provide me with an
    objective study and report on the overall status of the
    project.
        Next, I established an independent cost recovery team to
    begin an unprecedented effort to identify areas ripe for cost
    recovery and to take action. Led by a retired Massachusetts
    Judge, this cost recovery team built a strong foundation for
    this ongoing effort.
        The team's work was fully supported by the Turnpike
    Authority, and if I may quote from the team's final report to
    the Federal Highway Administration, ``Massachusetts Turnpike
    Authority Chairman Amorello created the independent team to
    hold the design professionals and construction managers of the
    Big Dig accountable for costs caused by their errors or
    omissions. He backed us up with a substantial budget, which
    gave us the ability to hire world-renowned engineers to assess
    the work and uncover deficiencies, and to hire the legal
    firepower to aggressively prosecute lawsuits.''
        Today, those cost recovery efforts are being ably led by
    our State's chief law enforcement officer, Attorney General Tom
    Reilly. The transition from our cost recovery team to the
    attorney general this February was the right thing to do, once
    a proper foundation was laid.
        I have come to recognize that with a project of this size
    and notoriety, many will second-guess these efforts. But this
    project needs cost recovery oversight by an individual and an
    office of irrefutable independence with the clout to back up
    their work. That is why it was so important to transfer the
    responsibility for cost recovery to the attorney general.
        I believe that Attorney General Reilly's leadership and
    commitment will bear substantial fruit for the taxpayers and
    restore public confidence and our efforts to ensure that we are
    getting what we paid for. He has, and will continue to have,
    our full cooperation with his ongoing efforts.
        Like each of you, I am a public servant, and I take my
    responsibilities very seriously. The work we do will be judged
    in the short term by the motoring public, but it will also be
    judged by the history and by our children and grandchildren.
        I am keenly aware of the obligation to close out this
    project in a way that ensures the delivery of a high-quality
    product that captures full value for our public funding
    agencies, and I am also aware of the generational
    responsibility we have to ensure that this project is completed
    to a standard that will stand the test of time.
        I can assure you that we are working and will continue to
    work day and night to fulfill our responsibilities in this
    regard. We are here today to respond to any questions you may
    have, and I thank you for the courtesy and allowing me this
    opportunity to make an opening remark.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Amorello follows:]

        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T1590.032

        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T1590.033

        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T1590.034

        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T1590.035

        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T1590.036

        Chairman Tom Davis. Thank you very much.
        Mr. MacDonald.

                      STATEMENT OF JOHN MacDONALD

        Mr. MacDonald. Good afternoon. Thank you for the
    opportunity to appear before the committee. I am John
    MacDonald. And since mid-2001, I have been chairman of the
    Bechtel/Parsons Brinckerhoff Joint Venture. With me, Morris
    Levy, my fellow board member from Parsons Brinckerhoff, has
    been with the board since its inception. And on my left, Keith
    Sibley, who has been with the project since 1988, and has been
    our project program manager since mid-2004.
        In my written statement, I have addressed broad topics of
    interest to this committee, including B/PB's responsibilities
    as management consultant on the Big Dig, the history of project
    costs, and our work with the State to accurately estimate and
    control costs. For the next few minutes, I will focus on
    leakage in the I-93 tunnels and the implications for project
    quality, cost, and schedule.
        As much as half of the water intrusion in the tunnels is
    simply precipitation that enters through openings that remain
    while construction continues. Part of the genius behind the
    original concept of the Big Dig was allowing construction to
    progress while keeping the Central Artery open to the huge
    daily traffic flows.
        And until construction ends and the tunnels are fully
    sealed later this year, water will continue to enter down
    uncovered traffic ramps and through manholes and utility
    conduits. Even so, these tunnels already conform to industry
    norms for water intrusion in completed tunnels. And when
    construction is finished, the I-93 tunnels will surpass these
    norms.
        Only a small percentage of roof wall joints in the I-93
    tunnel shows signs of low-level leaks. We and the MTA
    understood that sealing such seeps would be a normal part of
    the construction process, and that grouting is the industry
    standard practice for sealing these leaks.
        Today, 13 crews are injecting wet locations with high-tech
    grout. The Federal Highway Administration reported this month
    that the process for sealing seeps is effective and should be
    continued through completion of construction in late September.
    Construction contractors who built the tunnel sections
    undertook the responsibility, as part of finishing their job.
    They, and not the taxpayers, will pay for the cost of the
    grouting program.
        Last September an 8-inch hole opened in the I-93 northbound
    tunnel, temporarily flooding two lanes of traffic and closing
    one lane during rushhour before being plugged that evening.
    This wall breach reached--resulted from a series of
    construction contractor errors compounded by inadequate
    oversight.
        We inadvertently missed an opportunity to direct the
    contractor to correct the specific wall problem earlier. We
    have publicly acknowledged our responsibilities, and we will
    pay our fair share of the costs of the permanent repair. We
    have worked closely with the MTA and the contractor to identify
    and analyze permanent repair options. A decision is pending by
    the MTA.
        We are also working vigorously to avert similar problems
    through extensive physical inspection of the tunnel walls and
    thorough review of our records. In fact, we have added
    personnel at our own expense to expedite this process. The
    inspection should be finished early next month, and repairs are
    now underway.
        As we knew from the start, and as Federal Highways recently
    confirmed, all tunnels built below the water table experience
    some seepage throughout their life, including other slurry
    walls in Boston. After the I-93 tunnels are completed to
    standards, future leakage will be controlled by the owner as
    part of a normal maintenance program.
        This program should cost well within industry norms, given
    the tunnel's length and their extensive traffic management and
    safety systems. We are confident that with normal care and
    proper maintenance these tunnels will provide excellent service
    to Boston into the next century.
        In conclusion, our goal is to complete this project as
    quickly and as efficiently as possible. Already this project
    has delivered enormous benefits to the Boston area motorists
    and reshaped the urban landscape of the city.
        We and our dedicated employees are extremely proud to be
    associated with this project, and having brought through
    innovative engineering and management the most complex urban
    project ever undertaken in the United States.
        So, again, I appreciate the opportunity to be here today,
    and we look forward to responding to your questions.
        Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. MacDonald follows:]

        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T1590.037

        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T1590.038

        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T1590.039

        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T1590.040

        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T1590.041

        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T1590.042

        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T1590.043

        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T1590.044

        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T1590.045

        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T1590.046

        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T1590.047

        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T1590.048

        Chairman Tom Davis. Mr. MacDonald, thank you very much.
        Mr. Tamaro, thanks for being with us.

                     STATEMENT OF GEORGE J. TAMARO

        Mr. Tamaro. Yes, thank you. I would reduce my presentation
    a little bit in the interest of brevity for the committee.
        Chairman Tom Davis. OK.
        Mr. Tamaro. Slurry wall construction is a particularly
    useful technology for installation of underground walls for
    both permanent and temporary construction. It is particularly
    useful in urban environments and difficult ground conditions.
        It, in my opinion, was particularly appropriate for the
    construction of I-93 Central Artery and Tunnel, and perhaps was
    the only technology available. Slurry wall construction--its
    end product, by its very nature, is very rough textured, it is
    an unfinished concrete wall, and the end product is even more
    regular and could be more problematic if attempted by unskilled
    contractors.
        The slurry wall work is started from ground level. It is
    carried down to predetermined depths. The work is done in the
    blind from ground level, and it requires intuition and a good
    deal of monitoring and testing of the process as it proceeds.
    Slurry wall construction can be expected to have some flaws as
    a result of this in the blind process.
        These flaws are usually observed during the general
    excavation when the walls provide temporary support for the
    construction. Defects are usually repaired as the excavation is
    carried downward, and should be completed prior to the
    incorporation of the slurry wall and to the permanent
    construction. This is the procedure that should have been
    followed for the I-93 tunnel.
        Of immediate concern with the I-93 tunnel are the problems
    associated with a number of slurry wall panels. The area of
    concern is the portion of the slurry wall exposed from the top
    of the walkway to the underside of the roof, where a defect in
    the slurry wall would permit flow of water and/or soil into the
    tunnel.
        The defects are primarily in the slurry wall concrete. The
    steel beams that are the vertical spanning members are not
    affected by the defects in the concrete that spans horizontally
    from beam to beam. These structural concrete defects cannot
    remain and must be repaired as uncovered. The portions of the
    slurry wall above the roof and below the roadway are of no
    concern and have essentially been abandoned.
        Field inspection records for one slurry wall panel, E-045,
    indicate that the panel was not constructed in accordance with
    specifications, and, furthermore, the wall was not adequately
    repaired during general excavation. This defective panel
    remained stable until September 15, 2004, when the defect could
    no longer resist the external water pressure.
        The defect in the wall gave way and permitted the flow of
    water and soil into the I-93 tunnel. The defect in the panel is
    currently temporarily protected by wooden wedges, grout, and a
    steel plate. Alternative permanent repair schemes are currently
    under review.
        As a result of the incident of September 15, the project
    engineering team has inspected slurry walls, as we have heard.
    Several major problems have been discovered, and a large number
    of minor leaks have been identified. In addition, due to
    defects in the slurry wall concrete there is a problem of
    leakage at the contact between the roof--concrete roof and the
    slurry wall. At several locations, water has flowed down--
    flowed down the face of the wall and onto the roadway, where in
    the winter there is an icing problem.
        There is also potential for corrosion at the roof girder
    connections. This is a long-term problem that has to be
    attended, and we have heard discussions about the inspection
    program that has to be undertaken. These connections are the
    main support of the roof system and will require regular
    inspection and maintenance throughout the life of the tunnel.
        There is currently disagreement on the extent of the leaks
    and whether the leaks will be permanently sealed at the
    conclusion of construction. It is uncertain that a permanent
    sealing of the tunnel roof joint will be fully achievable.
        There has been a lot of discussion about quality, and I
    would like to just make a comment--that there is an old adage
    that states that quality will be long remembered after schedule
    and the costs is forgotten. As a casual observer, I am forced
    to conclude that there has been a tremendous amount of
    potential cost overruns and schedule, and I am concerned that
    it may have had its effect upon attention to quality.
        It is now necessary that the project assure the public that
    quality control issues have been addressed, and that they can
    use the tunnel without concern for their safety. This is going
    to take a bit of time to do. It will not happen overnight,
    because there has been this constant droning of difficulties
    associated with the tunnel.
        Thank you very much for permitting me to testify. If you
    have any questions, I am available to answer them.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Tamaro follows:]

        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T1590.049

        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T1590.050

        Chairman Tom Davis. So, Mr. Tamaro, how safe is it going to
    be?
        Mr. Tamaro. That is a question I always hesitate to answer,
    because----
        Chairman Tom Davis. Well, you are the independent guy here.
    I mean, you are the----
        Mr. Tamaro. I am not really, because I am not working. I
    have not been working on the project for about 2 months now. I
    can only----
        Chairman Tom Davis. How safe was it 2 months ago?
        Mr. Tamaro. Two months ago, I saw nothing that was of
    concern to me.
        Chairman Tom Davis. OK.
        Mr. Tamaro. The safety question has--it is a difficult one
    to answer, because there are other things that occur within the
    tunnel that could cause concern to the public--the falling of
    debris into the tunnel for an example, which is totally
    unrelated to the question of the structure. The structure is
    safe, in my opinion.
        There may be some leaks occasionally. There are problems
    that have to be addressed. I think that the structural safety
    question is not there. But there can be other problems.
        Chairman Tom Davis. Well, from your work on other large-
    scale projects, like the World Trade Center recovery efforts,
    what are the major mistakes that we made here, and do you think
    they are at least technically corrected?
        Mr. Tamaro. I think one of the biggest problems is when you
    have an integrated team, and you do not have someone who is
    very aggressive for that issue that he is responsible for. For
    example, quality control--the quality control issues begin to
    take a second step or begin to take a second role.
        My experience at the World Trade Center was that I was
    responsible for schedule and costs for the construction of the
    slurry wall and the quality of the work. The Engineering
    Department felt that the schedule and costs may begin to take a
    more important element in my thought process, and assigned an
    independent engineering staff to oversee the quality control
    that I was responsible for.
        So I had a totally independent quality assurance group
    overseeing what I was doing, and they had the authority to stop
    the work at any time, if quality was being violated in any way.
        Chairman Tom Davis. OK. Mr. MacDonald, Federal Highways
    rewarded your company with the Excellence in Highway Design
    Award for the Ted Williams Tunnel portion of the project back
    in 1996. And to my knowledge, there have not been leak issues
    in that part of the project that we have seen in the I-93
    tunnel.
        In your opinion, what is the difference between those two?
    Were the specifications and requirements for the I-93 tunnels
    more difficult to complete? Or did we just have some oversight
    issues?
        Mr. MacDonald. I think there are two different types of
    tunnel construction. I think the tunnels leak. The Ted Williams
    Tunnel leaks, but it is within normal industry practice. And I
    think we have with the--you know, with the high profile issue
    that we had on I-93, there has obviously been a lot of
    attention, a lot of media focus, a lot of other focus on the
    slurry wall construction and the I-93 tunnels.
        So I think that is the primary difference--a very high
    profile, a very high----
        Chairman Tom Davis. But the Williams Tunnel didn't have the
    kind of leak that Mr. Lynch put up there in construction, to my
    knowledge. I think that was----
        Mr. MacDonald. I am going to refer that one to my
    colleagues who were here at the time. Keith.
        Mr. Sibley. Thanks very much, John.
        As John said, the tunnels are two different types of
    structures. The I-90 tunnel is what we call a cut and cover box
    tunnel. That is, we excavated a deep trench in the ground, and
    we cast a floor, walls, and roof, all of reinforced concrete.
    As John described, we did have some leakage. There were cracks.
    Certain joints----
        Chairman Tom Davis. You always get leakages below water,
    right? Don't you?
        Mr. Sibley. That is correct. And the leak injection
    program, very similar, slightly different materials that we are
    using on I-93 was used there. I-93 is so different because it
    has the slurry walls. The slurry walls are cast, as my
    colleague Mr. Tamaro identified, in the blind, and you see what
    you get as you then excavate out.
        So it is a different character of a wall to start with, and
    then the floor is joined to those, the roof is joined to those,
    and it is a different detail.
        Chairman Tom Davis. Nevertheless, the kind of leak we saw
    here probably shouldn't have occurred, all things considered,
    should it in a case like that?
        Mr. Sibley. Oh, absolutely correct. I think that has been
    clear, that the breach should not have happened.
        Chairman Tom Davis. OK. And the I-93 tunnel just--it is
    more complex, because of the nature of the slurry. Is that fair
    to say?
        Mr. Sibley. Yes, correct.
        Chairman Tom Davis. OK. Mr. Amorello, you state in your
    testimony that the Authority has opened nearly every component
    of the project to the public, who are enjoying the benefits of
    the investment. At this point, the press has not been that good
    on this issue. A lot of this predates your being there, in
    terms of the cost overruns and everything else.
        What are we doing at this point to keep this process open,
    to keep the public informed, to try to restore that confidence,
    you know, in the project in the future? And, you know, I am not
    up here. I just catch this occasionally, but that one picture
    is worth 1,000 words. And that hole in the I-93 tunnel
    literally blew a hole in the reputation of the integrity of the
    tunnel.
        And I think we have had explanations today for what
    happened, but what are we doing to make sure that doesn't
    happen again, and to make sure that when this tunnel opens it--
    when it is completely opened to the public, they are going to
    be satisfied that it is safe?
        Mr. Amorello. Mr. Chairman, I am as upset as every resident
    of Massachusetts that event occurred on September 15. And it is
    repeated almost nightly on the evening news, as I mentioned in
    my testimony. The event was unique, as was mentioned in the
    Federal Highway report. It was an isolated incident. It should
    not have occurred.
        The tunnel system that the public is driving on today is
    safe for them to use. I wouldn't have authorized it, the chief
    engineer or the Turnpike Authority wouldn't have signed off on
    it, nor would Federal highway officials have signed off on
    opening these roadways for the public to use.
        We have taken every step to be transparent in the process
    that we have started. Every last Thursday of the month we give
    a project monthly update on the costs of the project, our
    safety record, our employment record, the status of uses of
    contingency, to keep the public fully informed in terms of some
    of the discussions that were held by the earlier panel.
        Lessons learned--I think clearly that was one of the most
    important lessons that this project implemented after the 2000
    price escalation was in the financial report submitted to
    Washington every year to reassure our partners that this
    price--this budget was real and the budget was holding. And for
    the 3-years I have been chairman, that has been the case.
        And at every--as I said, every last Thursday of the month,
    we have a public meeting, open to the public, where project
    officials come out and discuss the issue of the inspections.
    Every Thursday of the week we provide an update on the status
    of the inspections that we are carrying on.
        Chairman Tom Davis. Let me ask you this. I mean, I hear
    everybody saying, you know, mistakes were made. OK? When did
    the Authority become aware of the construction problems that
    led to that breach?
        Mr. Amorello. The Authority, in a 1999 memo to project
    officials, was circulated with a cc to the public employee in
    charge of that particular construction contract. It is my
    understanding the field records indicated that these steps were
    going back and forth between Bechtel/Parsons and the contractor
    to repair the E-045 breach, and the understanding was that wall
    was repaired.
        The breach that occurred on the 15th, there was no
    awareness on I think anyone's part immediately that breach
    would--or should have occurred given that there was repair work
    done at that site I believe in the year 2000. I could be--stand
    to be corrected on the particular--that particular aspect, but
    there was repair work that was conducted, obviously inadequate
    repair work.
        The breach blew out on the 15th, and turnpike officials,
    Bechtel, and our contractors immediately stepped in to repair
    it. And we are now in the process of evaluating the correct
    method for repair. I brought on board John Christian, an MIT
    engineer, geotechnical engineer, and a member of the National
    Academy of Engineering, a Massachusetts resident, to advise and
    consult me on the repair method.
        We have also recently retained STS out of Chicago, Clyde
    Baker who is also here today, to evaluate the repair method
    that we put in place. Inspector General Mead was very clear
    when he and I have had several meetings in the last many months
    talking about the repair method that we put in place, and to
    make sure the public is assured that we have done everything
    possible to make this wall safe and secure for the longevity of
    the tunnel system.
        These engineering experts that we have brought on, along
    with turnpike staff--Mike Lewis, Mike Swanson, and Helmet Ernst
    from the public side--to review the final proposal for the
    repair method.
        Chairman Tom Davis. Right. And it is going to be a whole
    series of inspections, obviously, before it is finally opened
    to the public at that point.
        Mr. Amorello. Correct.
        Chairman Tom Davis. You never know what you will find, but
    at this point there is--things seem to be on track.
        Mr. Amorello. Correct.
        Chairman Tom Davis. Mr. MacDonald, what do you think--can
    we talk more specifically about what happened on that major
    leak in September?
        Mr. MacDonald. Yes, sir, we can.
        Chairman Tom Davis. What happened?
        Mr. MacDonald. What happened? You go back to the
    construction reports at the time that panel was poured. There
    were several things identified on those construction reports
    that should have signaled--well, they shouldn't have happened.
    They should have stopped the work. That is No. 1. No. 2----
        Chairman Tom Davis. Who was asleep at the switch? Was it
    both--was it the State? Was it you all? Was it a subcontractor?
    Was it a little bit everybody? Federal Highways?
        Mr. MacDonald. It was the contractor and Bechtel/Parsons
    Brinckerhoff. So that was mistake one, allowing the panel to be
    poured with the deviations that were identified during the
    construction process.
        The report, then having identified those things, went up
    the chain through the resident engineering process, and that
    was the second opportunity to catch those things, that
    something here was amiss. And a flag should have gone up, and
    that should have resulted in a very focused, very specific
    inspection of that panel as the Artery was excavated. That
    didn't happen.
        The contractor, then, self-reported the issue when it
    discovered a leak, as when the wall was uncovered and water
    intrusion came in, and brought it to our attention.
        Chairman Tom Davis. Now, was this the evening of the big
    leak?
        Mr. MacDonald. Oh, no.
        Chairman Tom Davis. This was before this.
        Mr. MacDonald. This was 3 years perhaps in advance of that.
        Chairman Tom Davis. Oh, OK.
        Mr. MacDonald. Construction was still underway. The
    engineer responded, per procedure, to produce some non-
    destructive examination of the defect, to get the full scope of
    the defect, and then to submit a repair procedure based on
    those findings. That never happened.
        What appears to have happened is the contractor went away
    and repaired it in an ad hoc manner. That should not have
    happened. That whole series of things that led to that breach
    should not have happened.
        Chairman Tom Davis. Now, is that contractor still with the
    project?
        Mr. MacDonald. Yes. Yes, he is. He is still working on the
    project.
        Chairman Tom Davis. OK. Has he been appropriately
    reprimanded?
        Mr. MacDonald. He has been that. He has also stepped up to
    his responsibility for making the fix.
        Chairman Tom Davis. OK. All right. Those are my--I think
    those are my questions.
        I am going to turn the meeting over to Mr. Lynch--I have to
    catch a plane back to Washington--to chair the meeting.
        I want to thank all of you for being with us. I just want
    to say this. You obviously have a serious responsibility, and
    the media are all over this issue, and the public, and
    everything else. You know, all of us I think have a joint
    responsibility to make this thing work from here on out.
        We will sort out the money downstream. The attorney general
    is going to be looking into that, the IG, and who owes what.
    But the safety of this project has to be a priority over the
    next few months, and the--we can't compromise with that at all.
    I think if you have any other episodes like you had on
    September 15th, I think it is going to seriously jeopardize the
    contractors in terms of future government contracts and the
    like. So everybody understands what is at stake.
        Parsons Brinckerhoff has--and Bechtel have great
    reputations with the government traditionally. We have had a
    couple of things go wrong here, but I just want to tell you how
    serious this is. That this has reverberated not just throughout
    Boston and Massachusetts, but throughout the Federal Government
    as well.
        So let us all work together and just make it work. And I
    appreciate your attentiveness to this.
        Thank you.
        Mr. Lynch.
        Mr. Lynch. Mr. Chairman, I just want to thank you for your
    leadership on this, and I do want to say just one thing before
    you leave--is that what I am looking for here among the
    responsible parties, not necessarily to lay the blame at one
    person's door, but to admit that there was a shared
    responsibility here.
        And how to make this right is to make sure that the people
    who are obviously blameless here, the taxpayer and the people
    who pay the tolls, are held harmless. That is the goal that I
    have, and that is going to require the cooperation of you all
    and all of the contractors and insurers and designers and
    everybody else to step up and do the right thing here.
        So that is--I just didn't want you to think that was
    something I said after the chairman left. But that is my stated
    objection--my stated objective here, and that is what I am
    going to pursue. That is what I am going to pursue, and I know
    the chairman is of like mind. So I just wanted to get that out
    there.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Tom Davis. Thank you very much. Thank you.
        Mr. Lynch [presiding]. OK. Why don't I pick up right where
    the Chairman left off. Mr. MacDonald, on most job sites that I
    was on over 20 years--and I know it was different on this one--
    concrete inspection was usually handled by--a firm would come
    in independently and check the contractor's work, check the
    quality of the concrete, and, you know, the performance
    according to the specs.
        In this case, from reading the documents, apparently you
    had your own field engineers. Is that right? Bechtel had field
    engineers go down and do their own inspection?
        Mr. MacDonald. Yes, we had field engineers do our own
    inspection. I also think, on the concrete testing, we would
    have had a subcontractor perform the inspection.
        Mr. Lynch. Maybe you could explain that division of labor.
        Mr. Sibley. Certainly. As John said, we have a field
    engineer that is assigned to do the quality monitoring of that
    work. First and foremost, the contractor has a quality control
    program. Their engineer would identify the mixed designs that
    they are using, would all be approved submittals before they
    start. They would do a checklist that everything is ready, and
    they would submit that to us for verification as part of the
    assurance step.
        Our field engineer would perform those assurances, also
    sign off on the checklist during the concrete placement. The
    project has a certified laboratory. The laboratory has been
    certified in accordance with ACI and the governing standards.
    We would have a person come onsite, do in-place testing such as
    air content slump, that sort of thing, do some monitoring of
    the actual placement, and then we would break the cylinders,
    and so forth, to verify strength later.
        So it was a double effort of assurance, with our field
    engineer at the point of placement and with the laboratory
    checking the materials. The contractor is quality controlled,
    and they are actually performing the placement and verifying
    they are doing it correctly.
        Mr. Lynch. OK. At some point--so that is--the concrete
    coming out of the truck, if you are pouring it out of a truck,
    is inspected by the contractor. You have somebody there that is
    going to the lab and all of that.
        But after the pour, maybe we could go to--just to kind of
    make sure everybody is following along here--I think it is A1
    or--I think it is the first slide. This is the excavating
    machine for the slurry wall, is that correct?
        Mr. MacDonald. Yes, sir, it is.
        Mr. Lynch. OK. And that clamshell bucket is digging that
    trench in between the soldier piles, is that correct? Is that--
    --
        Mr. MacDonald. The soldier piles are not installed at
    this--well, I can't tell if they are installed at this----
        Mr. Lynch. Yes, I can't either, to tell you the truth.
        Mr. MacDonald. Yes.
        Mr. Lynch. In any event, after the pour, after the pour is
    complete, and you wait a certain amount of time for the
    concrete to set up, and then you begin excavation. Whose
    responsibility--was it the contractor or was it Bechtel's
    engineer--to go down and just inspect the face of the wall for
    any voids or inclusions or any defects that were visible to the
    naked eye?
        Obviously, somebody had to have the responsibility for
    going down and checking the work after the excavation.
        Mr. MacDonald. First of all, the excavation takes place
    some time later.
        Mr. Lynch. Right. Much later.
        Mr. MacDonald. So it is much later when that opportunity is
    available to it. It is the contractor's responsibility to check
    his own work under the quality control process that is set up
    for the project. It was our responsibility to assure that work
    by a layer of auditing of the contractor's process to make sure
    that he had accomplished that.
        Mr. Lynch. OK. So it was theirs initially, and then, if I
    am understanding correctly, you followup.
        Mr. MacDonald. Yes.
        Mr. Lynch. You assure that they have done that. OK. And my
    concern is that, 5 years after they poured the section that we
    had the breach in, for 5 years that wasn't the--I mean, what is
    the date on which that section of wall was excavated? That had
    to be 1999 or----
        Mr. MacDonald. If I may, I would like to turn that over to
    Keith to answer. He is more fluent with the facts on the panel.
        Mr. Lynch. Sure.
        Mr. Sibley. You are right with the date of the placement.
    The excavation would have been in mid-2000. I don't have those
    precise dates. I would be happy to get a specific answer and
    provide that for the record at a later time, but I don't have
    the exact date when that was excavated.
        Mr. Lynch. Yes, OK.
        Mr. Sibley. It would have been done in stages. This is
    among the very deepest part of the job. The particular
    excavation that Modern conducted here was working north to
    south, and they worked toward a bulkhead from the adjacent
    contractor to the south. This would have been toward the end of
    their excavation.
        Mr. Lynch. OK.
        Mr. Sibley. But I can get you that date.
        Mr. Lynch. I do have some notes here about--that the
    engineer's report indicated on April 2 that the slurry was
    deficient. Now, that is not the concrete, but that the slurry
    was deficient and did not meet standards, did not meet specs.
    But I assume that it was some time after that you actually did
    excavation, so it was after April 2, 1999. Would that be----
        Mr. MacDonald. Yes, that is correct. The slurry report
    refers to the--I believe it is the----
        Mr. Lynch. The pour date?
        Mr. MacDonald. It is before the pour date actually.
        Mr. Lynch. OK.
        Mr. MacDonald. Shortly before?
        Mr. Sibley. Yes.
        Mr. MacDonald. Yes.
        Mr. Lynch. OK. That is fair enough. I just want to--you
    know, what mystifies me is that it was somebody's job to go
    down there and inspect the face of that slurry wall, not just
    to walk by it but to actually go down and inspect that, the
    entire length of that wall.
        And, you know, we have a list now of 102 spots, 102 problem
    areas on the slurry walls, and there are still 400 panels that
    have yet to be inspected. And a considerable amount of time
    here--5 years went by--and if this hadn't burst, this would all
    be buried, if this panel hadn't been burst. It just--it
    troubles me greatly, the lack of quality assurance and quality
    control on this project with respect to these panels, I have to
    tell you.
        And I am hearing that there are wet patches and there are
    inclusions, and, you know, why don't we--Leah, if you have a
    second, I just want to run through--maybe we can dim the lights
    again. These are some--well, actually, why don't we go to--why
    don't we run through all of them.
        There aren't a whole lot of them, but I am just going to
    note some of--now, the reason I included this is I understand
    this process--this is--they are removing the panel so they can
    get at the wall behind it, right? And this is--this is part of
    the repair project. It looks like September 15, so this would
    have been the major breach.
        The cost must be prohibitive to keep removing those panels
    and going back behind there. I don't know if something can be
    done to reduce the cost of these continual repairs that we are
    doing in these areas, but it is something you ought to think
    about.
        All right. Next slide. Again, that is the waterfall. That
    is--we have seen that already.
        Go ahead. Next, please. This is another shot of the same
    breach that occurred on September 15.
        We can go to the next one, please. I was a little surprised
    at this. This is apparently the method, the temporary patch
    that was used. I understand it is just temporary, so I guess I
    am not as concerned. But driving oak wedges in there to try to
    stop this.
        Go to the next--there is another shot of the oak wedges
    they are using to stop the flow of water. You know, it just
    appears to be a Mickey Mouse situation. I don't know, guys.
        But go ahead. Go with the next one. This is, again, I guess
    there is some grouting going along in the area as well as the
    oak patch, the oak plug, rather.
        Please, again, Leah. And I understand that this is, again,
    a temporary patch. That shows the metal plate going on over the
    wooden form there, which I guess is bolted to the soldier pile.
    But, again, I guess I am not as concerned now that I know it is
    just a temporary patch, and something more permanent is going
    to be put in place.
        The next one, please, Leah. And this just shows that--let
    us see, this is September 21, so this is a week later. This is
    the patch that they just put on, and there is a stream of
    water, and it looks like maybe some of the--some of the
    grouting is actually coming back out.
        Next one, please. This is a void at the base of a soldier
    pile. It, you know, could create tremendous problems.
        Next one, please. These are all different areas here. As I
    am told, that is actually a hammer that--in the middle of the
    picture there, there is a hammer that fell down into the pour.
    And there is a huge void at the bottom, and they explained to
    me that the void is filled with paste and soil that was still
    soft when probed to 16 inches. So these are--these are deep and
    significant inclusions and voids within the slurry wall.
        Next one, please, Leah. This is a--there is not--that is
    actually just to demonstrate. That is a trowel that was placed
    in the wall just to show how soft the material was. This is a
    clay inclusion in the--clay and soil inclusion of unsound
    material, and it states that a 6-inch tool can be inserted to
    its full depth. So that concerns me greatly.
        Next one, please. This is all exposed rebar along the
    slurry wall. No coverage there. This must be the area around
    the Federal Reserve Bank. As I understand, that is the only
    area that has rebar in it. But, again, there is no coverage. It
    is exposed to water, and it concerns me as well.
        Next one, please, Leah. Now, this is the roof joint. This
    is one of the roof joints. Mike Capuano and I actually last
    February did the walkthrough there, and we saw the work going
    on. But I have to tell you, and I know you are going to say
    that, you know, we haven't buttoned it all up yet, but in the
    meantime, you know, we already have the oxidization of a lot of
    these structure members, and I am just very concerned about it.
        Next one, please, Leah. That is the last one.
        I just want to read to you. This is contract language for
    the I-93 mainline tunnel. And it states that--this is a
    technical spec relating to water tightness of slurry walls. It
    states that, ``Slurry walls shall be watertight, defined as
    free of all seeping water leaks. Moist patches shall be
    considered acceptable for slurry wall construction.''
        ``B) Repair of leaks shall be in accordance with Section
    727.915, which says that simple surface patching, or shallow
    injection, shall not be allowed.'' And the contractor--this is
    what gets me. It says, ``The contractor shall inspect for water
    tightness of all slurry walls on a monthly basis, starting
    within 2 weeks after the first exposure of the wall panels
    during excavation.''
        This is what brings me back to April 2 or some time in
    1999, some time thereafter. And starting within 2 weeks--so it
    will be on a monthly basis, starting within 2 weeks and
    continuing until final acceptance. The inspection reports shall
    be submitted to the engineer--I assume that is Bechtel--within
    1 week following inspection.
        So it is not that we missed a couple of opportunities to
    pick this up. It is--you know, if you--if it should be monthly
    for 5 years, we missed 60 opportunities--60 opportunities to
    pick this up under quality control and quality assurance. And
    that troubles me greatly. Somebody just mailed it in on this.
    No one was out there protecting the taxpayers' interest.
        Mr. Tamaro.
        Mr. Tamaro. Yes, sir.
        Mr. Lynch. Could you tell me, now, I was an iron worker for
    about 20 years, did some heavy highway work and bridges, and
    all of that. But you are a lot smarter than I am; I promise
    you.
        The level of water tightness--now, first of all, this
    tunnel, what did we buy here in terms of the U.S. taxpayer and
    the Massachusetts taxpayer? How long is this tunnel supposed to
    be in service? What is a reasonable expectation?
        Mr. Tamaro. It should last 70 to 100 years. It shouldn't be
    a problem.
        Mr. Lynch. OK.
        Mr. Tamaro. With regard to the water tightness, I would
    like to just kind of bifurcate the question.
        Mr. Lynch. Sure.
        Mr. Tamaro. There are two elements in the water tightness.
    One is the wall itself, and it has been my experience that you
    can get these slurry walls very watertight except for
    occasional flaws. And then, during construction, once they are
    exposed, you go back and you fix the flaws. Once they are
    fixed, they should not have running water down the face of the
    wall. That has been my experience on most of the walls I have
    worked on.
        Mr. Lynch. And if I could ask you, the fact that these are
    42 inches thick, that is a fairly thick slurry wall in my
    estimation. I don't know, maybe that is--maybe you are used to
    that, but 42 inches of concrete would seem to be fairly
    impervious to water seepage.
        Mr. Tamaro. It is more a matter of the installation
    procedure rather than the thickness. A very thin, properly
    executed wall can be more watertight than a thicker wall that
    has not been done with the same level of care. So the thickness
    is kind of irrelevant. The concrete is usually, if it is put in
    correctly, it is water tight. And it is only the jointing and
    the construction aspects of it that can really create the leak.
        Mr. Lynch. Well, based on the spec I just read, do you
    believe that these specs have been met on this project based on
    what you have seen down there?
        Mr. Tamaro. The panel E-045 is a clear example that it did
    not meet that specification.
        Mr. Lynch. And what about all of the others where there is
    water coming through and voids and----
        Mr. Tamaro. Panels that contain inclusions of material,
    soil-like material or defective concrete, are just not
    acceptable. They do not meet the specification.
        Mr. Lynch. OK. Let me ask you about--now, if you say the
    reasonable expectations of a life span for this tunnel is 75 to
    100 years. What effect does continual play of water on the
    structural members, whether it be seeping through the slurry
    walls and, acting on soldier piles or inducing some type of
    breach because of the inclusion in the wall, or the roof joint
    that you mentioned could be a lifelong problem in this tunnel,
    what does that have--what effect does that water play on these
    structural members have on the overall life of the tunnel that
    we bought?
        Mr. Tamaro. That was kind of why I bifurcated the question.
    The slurry wall concrete itself should not be significantly
    affected by seepage. The loss of soil from behind the wall can
    be a problem, but the concrete itself should not be
    deteriorated if it is there and it is sound.
        The steel beams should not be affected by corrosion. The
    slurry wall soldier beam should not be affected by corrosion as
    long as--the majority of them is buried in the concrete or
    outside, so, therefore, it is not exposed to oxygen. The inside
    face could corrode, and I have seen most of these eventually
    stabilize themselves with a little bit of build up of rust, and
    you don't have a major corrosion problem with the soldier
    beams.
        The real concern is the roof connection where your whole
    street structure is resting on that connection, and that
    connection is exposed to water that is seeping in through the
    roof wall joint. And that is the critical element. It is not an
    immediate problem; it requires resolution.
        Mr. Lynch. OK. All right. Thank you. I want to turn it over
    to Congressman Capuano for a while.
        Mr. Capuano. Thanks, Mr. Lynch.
        Mr. MacDonald, you had both written and oral testimony. In
    the written testimony--if I remember correctly, it was on page
    11--there was something along the lines of--you are talking
    about the wall panel repairs, and there is a written statement
    here that they will all be repaired at no cost to the public or
    to the project. Do you stand by that written comment?
        Mr. MacDonald. I stand by that statement. Yes, I do.
        Mr. Capuano. OK. And during your oral testimony, if I heard
    you right, and I would like to clarify it, I believe I heard
    you say, in talking about the--because, again, we have two
    different types of leaks. In your written testimony, I don't
    recall that you addressed the roof and wall joints, but I
    believe I--and, again, correct me if I am wrong--I thought I
    heard you in your oral testimony say that when it came to the
    grouting program there will be no cost to the taxpayers. Did I
    hear you correctly?
        Mr. MacDonald. Yes. Yes. I think the grouting--the grouting
    of the roof is--we are still in construction. We are not done.
    And when we are done, we firmly believe that we are going to
    meet the specifications for this--for the roof wall joint. We
    believe it is the responsibility of the contractors to achieve
    that under the specifications that are in there.
        And if I may just comment on the picture that you showed of
    that joint--and I fully agree with Mr. Tamaro that it is
    critical that we don't get corrosion in there, and we are not
    seeing signs of any significant corrosion in these girder beams
    that you see in the roof base. What you saw in that photo was
    algae. It wasn't rust. So I just want to be clear about that.
        Mr. Capuano. Mr. MacDonald, your company--both the
    companies have been involved with the construction, I am sure,
    of many tunnels of different types and different locations and
    different depths, and all around the world is my estimation.
    Have you ever been involved with a tunnnel that didn't have
    leaks?
        Mr. MacDonald. No, sir. All tunnels leak.
        Mr. Capuano. Mr. Tamaro, have you ever been involved with a
    tunnel or any other similar aspect that doesn't have leaks?
        Mr. Tamaro. I have been involved with tunnels that do have
    leaks, and they are processed for collecting water.
        Mr. Capuano. But have you ever had any one that doesn't
    have a leak?
        Mr. Tamaro. Yes. Yes.
        Mr. Capuano. One that is below the water table?
        Mr. Tamaro. Yes.
        Mr. Capuano. Where was that?
        Mr. Tamaro. Puerto Rico, the Minnia Tunnel.
        Mr. Capuano. And there is no leaks in that tunnel today?
        Mr. Tamaro. There are no leaks in the tunnel.
        Mr. Capuano. Good.
        Mr. Tamaro. To my knowledge.
        Mr. Capuano. To my knowledge?
        Mr. Tamaro. To the last of my knowledge.
        Mr. Capuano. All right. Fair answer, because I was under
    the impression that there were no tunnels anywhere that don't
    have leaks. But that is a very interesting comment, because I
    will go check that now, just because you have piqued my
    interest. That is good to me. I mean, that changes some of my
    opinions of tunnel construction.
        I guess I am going to ask all of you the same question I
    have asked before, and I think most of you have addressed it,
    but I am going to ask it again, nonetheless, to be clear. To
    the best of your knowledge as of today, is the tunnel, all of
    the tunnels, are they safe? And to the best of your knowledge
    today, is there any reason not to believe that they will not
    continue to be safe in the future on the presumption that they
    get ordinary and adequate maintenance programs. Mr. Amorello.
        Mr. Amorello. Yes, and no to the second question.
        Mr. Capuano. Mr. MacDonald.
        Mr. MacDonald. Yes, the tunnels are safe. The tunnels will
    continue to be safe long into the next century.
        Mr. Capuano. OK. Mr. Tamaro, I know that you have said
    earlier that you haven't been involved with the tunnel directly
    for the last several months. But as of the last time you knew
    it, was there any reason to think that the tunnel wasn't safe
    then?
        Mr. Tamaro. I found nothing that would make me say that it
    was unsafe.
        Mr. Capuano. Fine. Thank you.
        Mr. Amorello, Mr. Mead, who was up earlier--I know that you
    are working with Mr. Gee and others relative to putting the
    tunnels under a new comparable program to the bridge inspection
    program.
        Mr. Gee was very clear, which I knew before, but he said
    it--publicly stated it here that your agency has been very
    cooperative in trying to come up--since you will be the first
    tunnel in the history of the country, if I understand it
    correctly, to subject itself to this kind of inspection
    process, you are breaking new ground, and he suggests that you
    are being very cooperative in that. And I congratulate you for
    that, and I hope you have great success and lead the way for
    the rest of the country to follow.
        But Mr. Mead here also suggested, with some of the
    questions that are involved relative to the inspections of
    these panels, he clearly suggested that each and every one of
    these panels be subjected to a full inspection. I think Mr.
    Lynch asked earlier--and I am no--I have no clue what is
    involved with inspecting these, but Mr. Lynch suggested--and I
    am sure he is right--that there is visual inspection, there is
    hand inspection, there is sonar inspection, there is--I am sure
    there is all kinds of methods that I have no clue what they are
    all about.
        But Mr. Mead was very clear in stating that he believes
    that each and every one of these sections should be inspected
    to the best of our technical ability. First of all, do you
    agree with him? And, second of all, if you do, is that our plan
    to get this done?
        Mr. Amorello. I think the inspection process that had been
    put in place after the September 15 breach is addressing each
    and every panel and identifying it to date. To correct the
    record, there were seven found yesterday, so it is 109 panels
    that are defective in some fashion. Again, only two with a
    major defect is similar to the September 15, including the
    September 15 breach.
        If I may, I would like to defer that both to Mr. Sibley
    from Bechtel and to Mr. Lewis from the project, in terms of how
    these inspections take place. And then, if I might, Mike
    Swanson who is here is the chief engineer for the department--
    for the Authority working on the protocol for the future
    inspections. I think it goes to----
        Mr. Capuano. Fair enough. But I want to make it clear--I am
    not an engineer, I don't want to be an engineer, so speak
    English.
        Mr. Amorello. Let me--if it is--Mr. Sibley and then Mr.
    Lewis, but the inspections that are ongoing now and how it--how
    that is occurring, and then Mr. Swanson, who is looking at the
    protocol--and I think Congressman Lynch, anticipating his
    questions on warranties and how we go out into the future--some
    of the costs that we have budgeted, one of the questions by--
    that was asked of the earlier panel, the budget for the
    operation of a metropolitan highway system--that is everything
    inside of 128, the I-93 tunnel system, the Logan connection,
    some--the Viaduct south of the city, the Zacamb Bridge, the
    Kana tunnels, is $76 million; $25 million of that is O&M costs
    associated with just the Interstate 93 tunnels.
        And at some point, when the questions get to that stage, if
    Mr. Swanson could talk about how we anticipate the inspections,
    the cost of the inspections that we built into our budget
    anyway, the logic in the 1997 legislation turning the project
    from the State Highway Department--I wish Chairman Davis was
    here. Taking the project from the State Highway Department,
    transferring it to the Turnpike Authority, was because of our
    expertise in tunnel management and the fact that we have
    resources to maintain these tunnels. Having that, that is why
    we are the authority charged with----
        Mr. Capuano. Fair enough. But I want to make it clear, I
    just asked basically what time it is. I really am not
    interested, because I am not qualified to know how the watch is
    made. You know, I mean, so I just really want to make it as
    simple as you can. All the technical stuff, talk to Mr. Mead.
    But the simple stuff, I am happy to listen to, but I want to
    make that clear.
        Mr. Sibley. Simply, the investigations we are conducting
    since the September breach are twofold. One is we have been
    going through the documentation. When we went back and looked
    at the history of the panel in question, as John identified
    earlier, there are irregularities in the documentation of that
    panel.
        So we did a search through all of our field records for all
    of the panels to see if there were other strings of
    documentation that would indicate troubles, and we put those on
    a specific list of panels to take a close look at.
        Second, then, we have identified--or we have been initiated
    a 100 percent inspection of all panels. There is a section
    where the wall is readily accessible above the tile panels that
    were in some of the photographs. The stainless steel grills are
    up there. We can look through those grills and remove some of
    those grills, and do a 100 percent inspection of all panels.
        We are looking for any indications that may need further
    followup. The team identifies those indications, and then we
    take a senior engineer out, we remove more of the steel in the
    area, make a thorough investigation. If it appears to be
    something worthy of followup, we actually take the tile panel
    off and do a complete review of that panel.
        The photographs that Congressman Lynch went through come
    right out of our reports. Those are panels that the
    investigation has located. Most of these more serious issues
    are in areas that are fairly deep in the project. Both of those
    areas, incidentally, are in areas where there was dewatering
    surrounding it during construction. We are now getting full
    water tables back, so now we have a better chance to see some
    of these issues where water is coming through.
        So it is a two step--documentation, check those
    specifically, visual everything, followup indications, go
    progressively forward. It is a conservative review.
        Mr. Capuano. Since Mr. Mead is still here--Mr. Mead, I
    wouldn't want to call you back, because I know you have had a
    long day already. At some point, I would hope that we could get
    some answers, so maybe at a later point, to tell me whether
    what you just heard and what you may find out in the future
    satisfies the suggestion you made, because, for me, though I
    love you guys dearly, the only guy I really care about is Mr.
    Mead, because he has no vested interest whatsoever in the
    answer, and he is the guy, as far as I am concerned, that has
    to be satisfied.
        And, again, what you just said sounds fine to me. But I
    haven't got a clue. And so I appreciate the answer, and I
    appreciate the brevity, the clarity, the simplicity, but I
    would still hope that at some point you have a lengthy
    discussion with Mr. Mead and his office, so that he can be
    satisfied. Or, if not, to notify us that you are not satisfied.
        I guess for me--you know, I have heard a lot about slurry
    walls. I am not a contractor. I am not a construction guy. I
    haven't had the experience of Mr. Lynch. They get a little
    complicated to me. And, you know, I mean, I think I understand
    it. I am not sure. It sounds--you guys have made it relatively
    simple, I think, but I always try to bring things back to what
    I understand.
        One of the things I understand is basic construction, not a
    lot, but a little bit. And, you know, we have two kinds of
    leaks. You know, you have a hole in the wall, that is a
    problem, you have accepted it, you are fixing it. Whether it is
    temporary--I will be honest, I was a little concerned myself
    when I saw that the way to fix a temporary leak is exactly what
    I would have done, is basically you stuck a cork in it.
    [Laughter.]
        But I guess I will trust you, because I drive through the
    tunnel and I go by that cork, so I hope it holds. And I also
    understand that there is some discussion now as to how to make
    that permanent, and I respect that and I will leave that alone.
        But there is also leaks at the top, and I have been
    educated as to how all of this has happened and how you
    couldn't do it--a different kind of roof because of the width
    limitations on the buildings, and the like, and that you had to
    do a roof basically that, in my mind, is almost inevitable to
    have leaks.
        My house has an overhang. Every house in New England that
    is wisely built has an angled, steeped roof. Nobody in their
    right mind in New England has a flat roof. There are some, but
    those are the people that I think less of than others.
    [Laughter.]
        There is a reason for that. We want rain, we want snow to
    get off and go away, and I understand that. I also understand
    that you couldn't do some of these things, and so within the
    limits you had to come up with a system.
        But I have asked, and the Authority has granted me--I have
    it here, and I have the prop, and all of that--but basically
    asked, well, what is on the top of this roof? Where is this
    water coming from? Not so much the slurry walls. I am talking
    about the so-called low-level leaks, because those are the ones
    that strike me as a bigger concern.
        I mean, you are going to have holes in the walls, you are
    going to fix them, and that is not--everybody--I have heard
    everybody say that is not acceptable, and it is going to get
    fixed. But there is going to be a question on the roof. And the
    reason I say this is because, when I was mayor, we built
    several schools. Every one we built we had to fight with the
    contractors about what was on the roof--how thick the rubber
    was, whether the rocks were this, whether this was this, how
    the drain--every single roof there was an argument.
        So I asked about roofs, and I got a nice little thin piece
    of basic rubber here that is this thick that I am told is
    sitting on top of the cement roof. OK. That sounds neat,
    except, I have to tell you, this thing is pretty flimsy. It
    doesn't strike me that this is even comparable to the roof that
    is sitting on my house.
        So I have to ask: is this sufficient? Is this normal? Is
    this what you have used in other tunnels? And if not, why do we
    get this?
        Mr. Amorello, I guess I will start with you.
        Mr. Amorello. Let me--again, these were decisions made in
    the waterproofing, if I can defer to Bechtel, we will respond
    to that question.
        Mr. MacDonald. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Before I ask Keith
    to comment on the detail of it, the roof system was the subject
    of a thorough review back in 1990. The systems were evaluated
    with a lot of input from ourselves, section design consultants,
    the suppliers of materials that went into the specifications.
        There was a thorough review of these processes initiated in
    1997 when there were some challenges in getting the
    construction satisfactory during the installation of the roof
    membranes.
        So with that said, Keith, maybe you could fill us in on
    more details.
        Mr. Sibley. I am very tempted to talk about the thing you
    had in your hand or the polyuria sprays or the preapproved
    300's, but I recognize your watch analogy, so we will start
    with----
        Mr. Capuano. Thank you.
        Mr. Sibley [continuing]. With waterproofing functions
    essentially as a liner. The concrete roof is placed on the
    steel roof girders that have been talked about. The roof,
    before we backfill with the material, then it goes up to the
    surface, sometimes 4 feet thick, sometimes 40 feet thick. We
    put down this liner. It is loosely called waterproofing.
        We did have a wide variety of waterproofing materials in
    our early specification. It is a performance specification. The
    supplier is chosen by the contractor. They are to make sure the
    supplier reviews the geometry of the tunnel, how deep it is,
    what kind of water is in the area, the water chemistry, the
    details of the construction, and come up with a material that
    they will certify will perform in a waterproofing function at
    that location at that depth.
        In the 1997 task force, we were recognizing that some of
    these materials apparently weren't robust enough, or had
    sufficient installation problems that we were having to review
    a lot of leaks and waterproofing issues. We were concerned
    about the continued use of those materials.
        Initially, to restrict the marketplace, was not well
    received, but this combined task force involving State
    authorities, Federal Highway, some experts, and ourselves, we
    wound up eliminating a few materials.
        Mr. Capuano. Is this the Waterproofing Task Force or the
    Leak Task Force?
        Mr. Sibley. This is Waterproofing. We are selecting
    waterproofing----
        Mr. Capuano. So before leaks.
        Mr. Sibley [continuing]. Materials. Correct. And we limited
    the number, then, of materials that were allowed to be
    considered under this performance specification. The details
    and requirements of the spec remain the same. The contractor
    chooses the material.
        The manufacturer is required to have a rep onsite while it
    started to train the people, test certified installers, and
    basically to assure that the materials such as the one you had
    in your hand will function at the depth and locations called
    for in the tunnel.
        Mr. Capuano. OK. Am I right to understand that this has a
    5-year warranty? Do you know?
        Mr. Sibley. I don't know, but----
        Mr. Capuano. OK. Let us----
        Mr. Sibley [continuing]. I can check that for you.
        Mr. Capuano. I am pretty sure I am right. It is a 5-year
    warranty. My roof has a 20-year warranty. Why does this only
    have a 5-year warranty? And let us assume everything is done
    perfectly. I have to replace my roof every 20 years, because it
    leaks. Material gets old.
        Let us presume everything is done well. Six years from now
    the warranty is gone. I won't even ask the question what
    happens within the warranty; I don't know how you replace it.
    Six years from now, this is done, the warranty is done, and you
    have another 71 to 94 years left. How do you fix it?
        Mr. Sibley. Morris, do you want to take a stab at that one?
        Mr. Levy. Well, I think there is a slight difference
    between the house and the underground tunnel.
        Mr. Capuano. I hope so.
        Mr. Levy. Yes. I mean, the material in a house is subject
    to a lot of the variations in the temperatures, the variations
    in rainfall, ice, and so forth. The material that you have
    underground, it would not be subject to this. It is just
    staying there, and there is no change to it.
        Mr. Capuano. So, then, theoretically they should be able to
    warrant it for 100 years.
        Mr. Levy. Well, as we said, it should stay for that long,
    but I am not sure about the warranty----
        Mr. Capuano. Do you mean even the material?
        Mr. Levy. I am not sure about the warranty of this
    particular material, and Keith would be----
        Mr. Capuano. Well, I am pretty sure it is 5 years. I mean,
    that is fair enough. Again, I guess I will leave it to people
    who understand construction better than I. I have kind of gone
    to the limits of my understanding.
        But I will tell you that it raises concerns for me, not
    because--I understand the engineering problems about you
    couldn't get wider things, you couldn't extend the roof in a
    different way. I know--I understand that, it makes sense, that
    is life. But I have to tell you, forgetting everything else,
    whoever picked this--and, again, not being a contractor it
    raises questions to me.
        I guess relative to the--who is going to be responsible for
    what--and, again, I am just continuing on the roofing analogy.
    Let us presume everything seems to be done well. To get to
    this--just this, and get it on the roof, somebody has to design
    the tunnel. Somebody has to draft the specs for the material
    that goes in the tunnel.
        Somebody has to select the contractors, choose the process,
    choose the material, choose the supplier, prepare the surface
    because, as I understand it you, can't just throw this on a
    piece of cement, you have to prep it and all that kind of
    stuff, select the adhesive, and then apply the material.
        If I have those right, and if I haven't missed anything,
    you have an architect who designs it, a general contractor, at
    least one subcontractor, maybe several subcontractors, the
    material supplier himself, the manufacturer of the material,
    the manufacturer of the adhesive. Then, you have quality
    control, quality assurance, and then you have the Turnpike
    Authority themselves.
        Maybe I am counting it wrong. Maybe I am missing something.
    But just to get this on, you have eight potential parties who
    have responsibility to get that done. Sometimes I am sure some
    of those would be the same people, so maybe it is a little bit
    less than eight, how are we going to determine who is
    responsible? And the reason I ask this is because, very
    carefully worded, wisely carefully worded, that Bechtel/Parsons
    Brinckerhoff will accept your fair share of responsibility, and
    because--and, again, correct me if I am wrong--all I am aware
    of is a $50 million performance bond, or whatever the term
    might be--insurance.
        Are we going to have to hold everybody liable, all down the
    line? Or is that your job?
        Mr. MacDonald. The liability flows primarily two places. It
    flows to the contractor, and many of those parties that you
    described are subcontractors to that contractor. And some of it
    would potentially flow to us. Correct me if I am wrong on this,
    Morris, but I don't think the section design consultants, for
    the most part, are involved in this.
        Mr. Levy. Not in the choice of the roofing material. But,
    Congressman, I think until today--I am not sure that the water
    is coming from the roof. In other words, there is water at the
    joints, and it could well be that the roofing--that the
    waterproofing is still intact, and that the water is coming
    through the concrete, because the concrete goes up the sides.
        Mr. Capuano. But as I understood the way this was supposed
    to be applied, it is supposed to be applied, what, up a foot--
    --
        Mr. Levy. That is correct.
        Mr. Capuano [continuing]. On the soldiers. And, therefore,
    there shouldn't be any water.
        Mr. Levy. The outside wall of concrete is exposed to the
    water. The top of the wall is exposed to the water. And the
    water is coming through the concrete from the top or from the
    side, instead of--that is why we are grouting. We are not
    grouting the waterproofing. We are grouting the----
        Mr. Capuano. Well, one of the reasons I picked this,
    because, again, it is simple for me--and, you know, you get
    into slurry walls, but the same issue applies to slurry walls.
    I mean, you don't just have one guy come in and drop a slurry
    wall in. Somebody has to design it, somebody has go to do this,
    somebody has to pick the slurry.
        I mean, I understand there are different kinds of slurries.
    You have to pick which one you have to do, you have to have it
    inspected, you have 8, 10, 9, 12 people or entities that are
    responsible for any aspect, not just this. Same thing with the
    intelligent transportation system, same thing with the concrete
    selection, same thing with every aspect of it. This was just a
    simple one to me, because it makes sense, something I
    understand.
        And I guess for me, I go through all of this to make sure
    that I am not on the wrong track, that the liability for all of
    these issues, regardless of how they are repaired in the
    future, the liability is going to be a long-term discussion,
    unless what you have said, Mr. MacDonald, is--turns out to be
    accurate, that you will stand up and accept your
    responsibility, whatever that may be.
        And I take you at your word, but I also understand that
    when the time comes this is still going to happen. And when it
    happens, my hope is that each and every one of these people who
    is on this list is going to be held responsible for their
    aspect of it, and that includes you.
        Mr. MacDonald. Congressman, let me respond by again saying,
    yes, we will step up to our obligations under our contract.
    Absolutely. The situation that you described is normal. A
    contractor, section design consultants, a management
    consultant, those are the three principal parties involved in
    this conversation, so it is sort of a normal circumstance.
        The disputes are, unfortunately, a normal circumstance in
    this environment. I, frankly, believe that the issues that you
    are concerned about will show themselves in the near future. I
    don't think it is going to take years to discover potential
    issues that are subject to cost recovery or subject to back
    charges against contractors. For the most part, we are going to
    know that in the near future.
        I think there is a robust process in place now under the
    attorney general's purview. We are committed to work through
    that process. It is a process that has the attributes that we
    have long sought. It is one voice on behalf of the
    Commonwealth, the legislature, the administration, MHD, MTA, a
    fact-based process. So we will fully engage in that process.
        Mr. Capuano. Well, I am going to end with one last thing.
    As I understand it--and correct me if I am wrong--there is
    currently a lawsuit pending relative to notification from 1994
    on some issues relative to the tunnel that--it is kind of
    interesting.
        Even in your written testimony, you suggest that, in 1994,
    Bechtel/Parsons Brinckerhoff was under a contractual constraint
    basically to lie relative to the cost of the tunnel. That is
    what your written testimony says, that you couldn't have public
    commentary--well, I can read it to you.
        Mr. MacDonald. Well, our testimony said that we had an
    obligation to tell our customer what we knew.
        Mr. Capuano. Right.
        Mr. MacDonald. And we did that.
        Mr. Capuano. Maybe you shouldn't lie. You are right. I
    should correct myself that you were constrained to not correct
    a lie publicly given, repeatedly given, by your employer--
    namely, the Turnpike Authority, not Mr. Amorello, but one of
    his predecessors.
        The contract prohibited Bechtel/Parsons Brinckerhoff from
    making any unauthorized statements, and that is relating to an
    earlier statement--in 1994, you provided the Governor and State
    officials with total cost estimates of almost $14 billion. I
    have to tell you, if I were a prosecutor, I would not let you
    off the hook because you had a contract that basically said you
    had to let a lie happen. Different issue; others will decide
    that.
        But as I understand it--am I wrong to think that there is a
    lawsuit pending relative to whether you did or did not inform
    State officials on these issues?
        Mr. MacDonald. There is a lawsuit pending on that matter.
    Again, I don't think your characterization of this thing is
    accurate. I don't think that is what the contract says or that
    is what we did. We went through that process in 1994. We
    continued to give our best advice to the Turnpike Authority
    throughout that period of time.
        Mr. Amorello. Could I just interject that in 1994 the State
    Highway Department, then the Department of Public Works, was in
    charge of the project, not the Turnpike Authority.
        Mr. Capuano. Either way, it wasn't you. [Laughter.]
        Mr. Amorello. No. Just in terms of clarification.
        Mr. Capuano. Well, I respect that, Mr. MacDonald, but I
    would suggest--I will tell you that as--well, as a non-
    practicing attorney now, that if I were advising you, and I--
    you had a client who was telling you, ``Look, we know we are 40
    percent--minimum 40 percent over budget,'' and you know it, and
    your client--in this case the State Highway Department--is
    telling you to shut up, my advice to you would have been to
    walk, because you can see--you can feel the anchor coming
    around your neck.
        Guess what? Here it is. Your client, based on your--again,
    I am not going to--I don't know what the truth is, but based on
    your written testimony, you knew then that your client, the
    Highway Department, was perpetrating a public lie and, one,
    they violated FCC regulations, never mind anything else, that
    you knew was wrong.
        And I think by doing that, even presuming that what you say
    is true, you told the Governor and you told the State
    officials, I still think you have some liability issues on
    that, because you should have walked. You should have walked,
    knowing that your client then was engaged in something immoral
    at the very least, unethical, clearly, and probably illegal.
        Thank you, Mr. MacDonald.
        Mr. Lynch. OK. Thank you.
        Mr. Tamaro, I want to go back to you for a second. How do I
    determine what--the normal amount of water that we should
    expect in this tunnel upon completion?
        Mr. Tamaro. As far as the slurry walls themselves are
    concerned, you should have no water. You should not have
    running water. There will be an occasional seep that requires
    repair.
        Mr. Lynch. All right.
        Mr. Tamaro. The roof joint appears to me beyond what you
    would normally expect. I am going to go a little beyond perhaps
    where I should with a comment with regard to the membrane. From
    what I have seen of the roof, up between the girders, I think
    the membrane is performing on the flat, and the problem is
    exclusive to the turn of the wall and the wall contact.
        I would suspect that the membrane will last the life of the
    structure because of its being protected. I assume, and I don't
    know if you have the proper protection boards and the like, as
    long as it didn't get punctured by whomever was walking around
    on top, the membrane on the horizontal should be satisfactory.
    It is that joint detail and turning up the wall that is really
    the culprit in this problem. And the question is: how does that
    get resolved at this point?
        Mr. Lynch. OK. Let us see. Why don't we talk for a moment
    about what you described, Mr. MacDonald, as being fairly
    normal. In Attorney General Reilly's testimony, he indicated
    there were 134 issues outstanding for claims against the
    project and a total of $400 million in claims.
        Now, I understand that there is always that back and forth,
    and there are claims. But at this late stage of the process and
    the project, is that something that is normal, where a lot of
    contractors have completed their responsibilities and are no
    longer on the project and have been paid and now are going--we
    are trying to resolve these things and doing cost recovery on
    top of that?
        Mr. MacDonald. I would like to separate it a little bit. If
    I understood the attorney general correctly, he indicated there
    was 134 items for cost recovery. To me, that would translate
    into issues that are potentially at our doorstep or at the
    doorstep of the section design consultants.
        With respect to the $400 million in claims from
    construction contractors, this is the pending amount of claims
    from the contractors for their construction work, some that
    have finished and some that are still ongoing, that is going
    through a claims resolution process, a process which is
    directly managed by the MTA.
        I am not aware that--of anyone who has been paid in advance
    of getting an agreement. So I think there is a little
    miscommunication there about paying contractors for claims.
        So this is a significant amount of money. The fact that we
    have some disputes and this project has had a long--a fairly
    long history of disputes with the construction contractors, I
    think is--you know, is kind of within the normal expectation,
    maybe a little more than we would like to see. We would like to
    get it--we would like to get it resolved as quickly as
    possible, so it is not around for a long time to come.
        Mr. Lynch. OK. Mr. Tamaro, now I remember what the question
    was I wanted to ask you. The idea that we have this slurry wall
    that is 42 inches thick, and normally--well, let me put it this
    way. Along the stretch of the--of the Artery Tunnel in front of
    the Federal Reserve Bank, apparently the engineer that was--or
    the engineer representative for the Federal Reserve Bank
    required that reinforcing steel be put--maintained in the
    slurry wall along that stretch in front of the Federal Reserve
    Bank. Am I correct on that?
        Keith Sibley, how about you?
        Mr. Sibley. Originally, several of the slurry walls were
    preliminary designed with reinforcing steel in them. As the
    final dimensions--a real driving dimensional item here is the
    soldier pile. It is 3 feet. When you add the cover, you get a
    3\1/2\ foot wall. That wall thickness is not really required
    for the soil and water to be held back, but that is what is
    required to swallow the pile that is inserted in the trench as
    we build these walls and then carry the roof loads.
        Once we had that much design in place, we realized that we
    did not need to reinforce the walls in many locations. Two
    locations we do have the walls reinforced. It is along the side
    of one financial, and it is along the side of the Federal
    Reserve Bank.
        Those are adjacent to critical buildings. We did review
    this information with their consultants, and they preferred we
    remain with a conservative design to keep that reinforcing
    steel. We had it there. They preferred we not take it out when
    we realized we didn't need it in many other areas. They didn't
    require that we put it there, but they preferred we not take it
    out.
        Mr. Lynch. How much of the rest of the--apart from those
    two spots--one financial and the Federal Reserve Bank--how much
    of the remainder of the Artery Project had preliminary rebar
    design?
        Mr. Sibley. Actually, I do not know the answer to that----
        Mr. Lynch. Take a stab.
        Mr. Sibley [continuing]. From the study----
        Mr. Lancellotti. We pretty much wanted the original
    standard to have the walls reinforced as----
        Mr. Lynch. OK. So it was the norm.
        Mr. Lancellotti. The norm.
        Mr. Lynch. The norm in the preliminary design was to have
    rebar in the slurry walls.
        Mr. Lancellotti. I can't say whether it was the preliminary
    design or the conceptual design. But in the early stages of the
    project, that is the standard we were discussing. As Keith
    pointed out, later on we backed off of that, and only required
    that----
        Mr. Lynch. Can you move up to that mic, sir. All right. Let
    us take that from the top again, please.
        Mr. Lancellotti. During the early stages of the project, we
    did have, as our concept, reinforced slurry walls. Later on, as
    Keith pointed out, as we went into more of the analysis and the
    design, we determined that it was not needed in all locations.
    We kept it in certain locations.
        I think there are a couple of isolated cases beyond Federal
    Reserve Bank where either we had an air rights issue or a heavy
    load issue where we kept the reinforcing in. But generally, we
    took it out because the analysis and design showed it was not
    necessary.
        Mr. Lynch. Now, let me see if I understand you correctly.
    Because the walls were so thick, you didn't think you needed
    reinforcing steel?
        Mr. Lancellotti. Correct. Based on the loads that they
    would absorb or would be imposed on the wall, it was not
    necessary. That is correct.
        Mr. Lynch. OK. Now, as I understand it, concrete is great
    under a compressive load, but the steel is added because of,
    you know, a moment or a lateral load. In this case, it would be
    from the soil and the water on the side of the panel. Is that
    correct?
        Mr. Lancellotti. That is very--you are a good engineer.
    That is absolutely correct. It is usually from tension, either
    from moment--primarily from moment. It is primarily from moment
    or bending.
        Mr. Lynch. So it wouldn't be the case where if we had left
    the steel in, if we had left the steel in--in the slurry
    walls--and I am not sure if there was a whole lot of steel in
    here in terms of, you know, the size of these panels. But if
    you had left the reinforcing rods in the thing as originally
    designed, we might not be--we might not have had that blowout
    problem for one.
        Mr. Lancellotti. Actually, that panel has reinforcing steel
    in it.
        Mr. Lynch. Well, it was placed properly, is what I am
    saying.
        Mr. Lancellotti. And it still blew out, so I would not say
    it is related to the reinforcing steel.
        Mr. Lynch. Yes. Now, was this a cost-saving measure, to
    pull the steel out?
        Mr. Lancellotti. That is correct. It was part of a cost
    containment initiative; that is correct.
        Mr. Lynch. OK. But you left it in for the Federal Reserve
    and----
        Mr. Lancellotti. And some other isolated areas where the
    stresses warranted.
        Mr. Lynch. OK. Let us just go--I want to compare these two
    pieces, because I think it is important. Mr. Tamaro, given the
    dynamic here with this 3\1/2\ foot wall, what is the impact on
    a lateral load like we were just talking about, with no rebar
    in there and--but say there is a substantial inclusion of soil
    or clay or a hammer or brick or just a complete void within
    that panel, what does that do to the structural integrity of
    that panel?
        Mr. Tamaro. It diminishes the integrity. What happens is
    that the reinforcing goes in sort of as a grid.
        Mr. Lynch. Right.
        Mr. Tamaro. And if there is a void, a hole, a defect, there
    are alternative paths around the defect. And in the case of
    this particular panel, there is concrete missing for a
    significant height of the element. So that you have a piece of
    reinforced concrete to the north of the defect, you have a
    piece of overpour concrete to the south, and you have a defect
    between the two.
        Had there been reinforcing and concrete, you would have an
    element expand from beam to beam. What you have in the case of
    E-045 is you have an element sitting out in space with no
    support at the Perini end of the panel.
        Mr. Lynch. I see. OK.
        Mr. Tamaro. So having reinforcing or not having reinforcing
    would be immaterial. If the panel had been constructed to the
    flanges, behind the flanges of both of the soldier beams, and
    there had been reinforcing and there was a hole, there would be
    an alternative path around it, and we wouldn't have the same
    structural concerns that we have for E-045.
        Mr. Lynch. OK.
        Mr. Tamaro. It would have just been a sealing of the leak,
    and that would have made life a little easier.
        Mr. Lynch. Right. Now, let us go to the general situation.
    Mr. Amorello tells me that we have 109 panels now that have
    inclusions, defects, of--you know what? Can we get a definition
    on--I know the No. 1s classified in the report are the severe
    situations like the breach, and there are only two of those.
        What constitutes a moderate or a No. 2 type defect that we
    have in these walls? I guess there are 33 of them? Or actually
    maybe more now.
        Mr. Amorello. They changed with--34 panels with modest
    repair and 73 require patching or a type of repair. I could
    have Mike Lewis, project director, speak to that, or Keith
    Sibley, if it is easier on the mic.
        Mr. Lynch. Yes, either one. Either Mike or Keith, go ahead
    and tell me what a No. 2 involves, and then I have some
    questions for Mr. Tamaro.
        Mr. Sibley. The No. 1 defect, we had two of those, those
    are the breaches. The No. 2 type of defect is something that
    there are indications in some cases of a piece of an end stop
    left, which would indicate that there is not full engagement of
    a pile for a short section.
        There is an inclusion of material between a primary and
    secondary placement; that is, a vein of material. I think Mr.
    Tamaro described just recently how that is important to the
    performance of the panel.
        Mr. Lynch. Could that be clay or sediment or something
    that?
        Mr. Sibley. That is correct.
        Mr. Lynch. OK.
        Mr. Sibley. Some foreign material. Clay is the most
    frequent, where a joint was not fully cleaned off before the
    next one. Sometimes it goes well into the panel; sometimes it
    is toward the surface. Basically, it requires thorough
    investigation. We have been doing this.
        The contractors are starting to hydroblast the material out
    to confirm precisely the dimensions of what we have, and then
    recommend methods of doing proper repairs. In some cases, this
    will be primarily filling with concrete materials. In other
    cases, it may involve structural consideration for the reasons
    that Mr. Tamaro outlined a moment ago.
        The other 73 minor ones are--we think of as patching. These
    go no less--no more than, say, half the depth of the wall and
    involve some reinforcing steel and concrete repair patching,
    typical of concrete structures.
        Mr. Lynch. Didn't that spec say that simple surface
    patching or shallow injection shall not be allowed? Does that
    fly in the face of what you are telling me now, that you are
    going to do minimal patching here?
        Mr. Sibley. Simple surface patching would be like a
    cosmetic repair. What I just described is a structural repair.
    I mentioned similar that you would do in reinforced concrete
    structures--for example, if you were repairing bridge abutment,
    if you were repairing a retaining wall, something of that
    nature, you clean out the surface, you prepare it to receive
    new concrete, bonding agents, etc., or saturation, you dowel in
    appropriate reinforcing steel, and then you cast additional
    concrete on it.
        If it is relatively shallow, it can be done by----
        Mr. Lynch. Is this shot crete? Is that what you are talking
    about now?
        Mr. Sibley. That would be only in relatively shallow
    situations. In deeper situations, the contractor puts up a
    form--there are some of these in progress right now--and casts
    the appropriate material. If it is large, it can use a large
    aggregate. If it is small, you might use, say, a peastone
    concrete, that type of thing.
        Mr. Lynch. Yes. Who is paying for this?
        Mr. Sibley. I think, as John said earlier, the contractors
    are doing these repairs.
        Mr. Lynch. And they are paying for it on their own dime.
    They are not going to come back to the taxpayer to be paid for
    this, right?
        Mr. MacDonald. That is my understanding, sir, and we are
    paying for our inspection services.
        Mr. Lynch. OK. Mr. Tamaro, based on what you have heard,
    that there are voids next to the soldier pile, and there are
    examples that were shown earlier where it looks like sidewalk
    bricks actually. Let me ask you about that.
        They are doing slurry wall construction. They are pumping
    slurry into this open trench that is the form basically for the
    eventual slurry wall. And it appears that in many, many places
    along this slurry wall, for the length of the Artery, that
    there are things dropping in--you know, a hammer, some sidewalk
    bricks, clumps of soil. It appears that there is clay sediment,
    and it is creating these voids or inclusions that have been
    described here.
        Within that panel--within that panel, what does that do to
    the--again, I know you said it diminishes it, but is this a
    serious concern?
        Mr. Tamaro. Can I just go back and tell you how it happens?
        Mr. Lynch. Sure.
        Mr. Tamaro. So that we can develop it from there?
        Mr. Lynch. Sure.
        Mr. Tamaro. These foreign debris come from either an
    inadequate cleaning of a panel initially--at the conclusion,
    when you are all done excavating, you should clean out the
    panel, make certain there is no debris sitting on the bottom,
    or due to the collapse of some material in the fills after the
    concrete process has begun.
        In the event it is a non-cleaning of the bottom, when you
    put the tremmie pipe down to the bottom of the panel, the
    debris is usually lighter than the concrete, and it is expected
    to rise through the panel and be expelled. When you begin to
    see pockets of material, it is indicative that there is a
    potential sidewall collapse during the placement of concrete.
    The material has fallen down.
        When you see the condition of E-045, that is specifically
    attributable to the fact that they had two elements that they
    were trying to concrete, separated by a steel beam, and they
    tried to do it with one tremmie pipe, and what it did was it
    pushed all the trash into that slot.
        Mr. Lynch. Right.
        Mr. Tamaro. And it collected as a vertical defect.
        Mr. Lynch. Right.
        Mr. Tamaro. That is very serious.
        Mr. Lynch. Right.
        Mr. Tamaro. A pocket of material the size of a bag of
    potatoes is not a problem, if you don't have running water
    coming in. You go back, you dig it out, and you fix it.
        Mr. Lynch. Well, we do have water.
        Mr. Tamaro. But E-045 is an extraordinary----
        Mr. Lynch. No, no, no. But, I mean, I have a list here, and
    they haven't done non-destructive testing on this stuff. This
    is just the stuff that is coming up visually. We have
    inclusions, and we know we have water behind the wall here. We
    have wet spots. You know, in my mind, we have all of the
    ingredients for a failure further down the line.
        Mr. Tamaro. If there is sufficient waterflow to erode the
    contaminated material, you have a potential E-045 problem.
        Mr. Lynch. Right.
        Mr. Tamaro. If the leak is observed early on, and it is
    addressed quickly, you can stop the leak from becoming a major
    problem.
        Mr. Lynch. OK. Mr. Mead was in here earlier. Actually, he
    might be still here. He recommended that we do a scan of every
    single panel, in light of the pervasiveness of this problem,
    these inclusions, stuff dropping into the slurry wall. Is that
    something that you would agree with?
        Mr. Tamaro. I don't think it would hurt. It is one more
    piece of information. I think the visual check is the most
    important thing that one can do. The visual check and sounding
    of the surface, banging on it, and the like----
        Mr. Lynch. Really? Even though none of that picked up the
    problem in E-045?
        Mr. Tamaro. I think the problem in E-045 was picked up
    somewhere along the way. There was shot crete applied. There
    was grouting of the leak.
        Mr. Lynch. OK.
        Mr. Tamaro. I think it was picked up.
        Mr. Lynch. OK. All right. Chairman Amorello, I just want to
    ask you--at the beginning of this hearing, we started talking
    about this IPO situation, this integrated project organization
    that so many people have now criticized, but at one point
    apparently it was a popular idea because we--we adopted it. You
    came in 2002, is that right?
        Mr. Amorello. That is correct.
        Mr. Lynch. Now, I know the Leak Task Force or the
    Waterproofing Task Force was 1997.
        Mr. Amorello. Waterproofing.
        Mr. Lynch. OK. And then the Leak Task Force was 1999.
        Mr. Amorello. 2000.
        Mr. Lynch. 2000? And you came in in 2002?
        Mr. Amorello. Correct.
        Mr. Lynch. OK. So you have had a chance, based on the date
    that you brought in in 2002, it is still pretty much--well,
    there are some safeguards, I understand. Why don't I let you
    answer the question.
        What was your experience with this IPO situation? What did
    you do? If you did anything differently, or if you are still
    using the same system, I would like to hear about your opinion.
        Mr. Amorello. When I first came in, being new to it, I
    hired the National Academy of Engineers to come in and make
    recommendations. And a panel came up and had several meetings
    in Massachusetts and in Washington.
        And John Christian, a Massachusetts resident who is now an
    advisor to the Authority chaired that panel of national experts
    from the Academy how to finish the project--their
    recommendation came back. The management team and structure you
    have in place is sufficient to carry you to the end of this
    project, to 2005 being the substantial completion date.
        But I wasn't a fan of the IPO, and I think lessons learned
    from this--the IPO was not the manner to oversee this project.
    The instances that the attorney general will speak of in cost
    recovery, trying to recoup costs back where there is so much
    agreement, the Inspector General has made it clear in many of
    his--in his testimony today and in remarks in the past that we
    somewhat dismantled that organizational structure. The public
    employees report to me and to the chain of command here at the
    Authority, and the Bechtel personnel answer to those overseeing
    them from the public sector.
        I would point out that at any given time in the past on
    this project, Bechtel/Parsons Brinckerhoff I believe had at
    times approximately 1,000 employees of their firms working or
    subcontractors for them.
        Mr. Lynch. Not counting attorneys, right?
        Mr. Amorello. I don't want to characterize--it is the
    number of FTEs at any given time under their work program and
    the subcontractors they had within their work programs. And on
    the State side, I believe at some given point we had
    approximately 50 employees.
        But the IPO, a decision made back in the late 1990's, I am
    not a fan of it, wasn't when I came in, took the National
    Academy's recommendation to finish the project with the
    timeline we had left, manage that, opened roadways, kept the
    schedule, kept to budget, at the same time moving public
    responsibilities on the public side and treating it more like a
    standard relationship between a consultant and the public side.
        Mr. Lynch. OK. Let me ask you, who signs off on--do you
    need to sign off on any payments to Bechtel and other
    contractors?
        Mr. Amorello. Contract modifications come in before--at a
    certain level come into the Turnpike Board for approval. The
    State Highway Department also approves them, because these are
    State highway construction contracts. So there are basically
    two layers of public approval on these contracts. The State
    Highway Department is more of a procedural matter, because the
    project is administered and controlled by the Authority given
    the 1997 legislation.
        Mr. Lynch. OK. Well, to the degree that you have any
    authority to sign off on this, you know, I assume you were here
    for my conversation with Attorney General Reilly.
        Mr. Amorello. Absolutely. And the clarification, in terms
    of holding the contractors responsible for their contracts, and
    to provide a piece of information in regards to cost recovery
    and those efforts seeking recovery to section design
    consultants or Bechtel/Parsons as the joint venture.
        And then, the claims and change progress, which, I think
    Congressman Capuano and yourself have talked about, and the
    chairman was talking about construction claims or changes that
    we have instituted as part of the construction process, those
    are settled with the Authority, and they are not settled as a
    matter of an easy decision that we have our own attorneys and
    our own outside consultant exponent to review the claims filed
    by the contractors, and negotiated settlements where possible.
        If we identify in a claim that we are going to pay, because
    it is a legitimate, fair claim by the contractor to make it,
    but we find that claim was as a result of a design error or
    omission, then we submit that over to cost recovery. And those
    are the items that the attorney general's office will be
    looking at. Those were the items that the Ginsburg team was
    dealing with in their cost recovery program.
        Mr. Lynch. OK. While we are on that subject, on cost
    recovery, I have to ask you--you came into this situation in
    2002, and you know you are stepping into a problem because the
    project is already, I don't know, it is out of sight. It is
    over $10.8 billion--or, no, it has to be close to $14 at that
    point, right?
        Mr. Amorello. When I came in, it was $14.625. And today it
    is----
        Mr. Lynch. That is where it is, OK. So you know we have
    problems, and there are enormous concerns about cost recovery,
    getting some of that money back. And with all due respect to
    the gentlemen at this table, we, as a Commonwealth, and you on
    the Authority, we are in a pitch battle, a legal one, with
    Bechtel/Parsons Brinckerhoff, one of the biggest construction
    firms in the world.
        And in casting about for someone to handle our case and
    recovering moneys for the taxpayer from this huge construction
    company, apparently someone--perhaps yourself included--they
    did a search to come up with someone to quarterback our team
    for cost recovery. And I understand you found a fine gentleman
    to do that.
        However, from my research, it appears he was a probate
    judge, someone dealing with divorce and custody and wills and
    estates, to quarterback our team. And I have no--nothing but
    fine things to say about that gentleman and--but
    professionally, as someone who is responsible for watching out
    for the Commonwealth, for the taxpayer, I have to ask you: how
    did you, in a thorough search, come up with someone who, from
    my own review and research, I can find no clear reason why one
    would--if casting about the best person to represent us in that
    conflict? And it was a conflict, a legal conflict--I just
    cannot understand for the life of me why we made that
    selection. And I just want to--I have to ask you that, because
    it is vexing.
        Mr. Amorello. I certainly appreciate and respect the
    question. Judge Ginsburg is a highly regarded Judge of the
    Commonwealth----
        Mr. Lynch. Absolutely.
        Mr. Amorello [continuing]. Regardless of the----
        Mr. Lynch. An expert in probate law, I might add, and a
    respected one.
        Mr. Amorello. And removing the subject matter of his
    jurisdiction in the courtroom, the credentials of him as an
    intelligent legal mind, an individual of the highest
    integrity----
        Mr. Lynch. Unquestioned.
        Mr. Amorello [continuing]. That heading up a team of
    attorneys--and we are talking about a team of attorneys and
    outside engineering consultants, able to administer the
    program, and as Attorney General Reilly pointed out, you have
    two avenues in cost recovery. You either settle the matters or
    you go to court and litigate them.
        I guess there would be a third one. You could just drop it
    and not pursue it at all. But looking at the reality of the two
    matters, the cost recovery team put into place by me was
    looking to move a process that had, as has been mentioned by
    Ken Mead and others, $35,000 and I believe $770, $35,770 for
    the cost recovery in the prior 10 years of this project.
        Judge Ginsburg and his team secured back $3.8 million in
    settlement moneys, and filed 10 lawsuits, and an 11th lawsuit
    that Congressman Capuano referenced against Bechtel/Parsons
    Brinckerhoff on the grounds of fiduciary responsibilities and
    others.
        The attorney general in his remarks said that those 10
    suits were for--or 8 of those 10 suits, and if--were moving
    forward in the process, and that the 11th suit against Bechtel/
    Parsons was--he had stated but did not--dropped it. I think
    that speaks that the cost recovery team instituted by the
    Authority was doing its job, pursuing it.
        When it became a matter of lawsuits only, it was
    appropriate that the chief legal enforcement officer for the
    Commonwealth of Massachusetts, the attorney general, take these
    matters over, and use all of the tools and abilities at his
    disposal that we currently didn't have--don't have as an
    authority, other than through the discovery process in the
    legal cases.
        Mr. Lynch. In fairness, though, the assessment of the
    previous cost recovery team--and I may be wrong, and you are
    completely free to correct me if I am wrong--if I count up what
    we have spent in cost recovery, I come up with approximately
    expenses of approximately $8 billion.
        Mr. Amorello. $8 million.
        Mr. Lynch. I am sorry, $8 million, right. $8 million to
    recover $4 million. So we spent $8 to recover about $4. You
    know, if I am wrong, straighten me out.
        Mr. Amorello. Well, just in terms of when you talk about
    the individual matter of the settlements that were reached with
    Jacobs Engineering and some other firms, the dollars invested
    for those settlements were, I believe--and I stand to be
    corrected on the exact dollar amount, but I believe it was
    about $700,000 to secure back $3.8 million, $4 million in
    settlement.
        The additional moneys expended by the cost recovery team is
    into the establishment of those 10 lawsuits, and I think all of
    us know that the foundation now that the attorney general is
    moving on are those 10 lawsuits and the amount of work put into
    putting a suit before the Supreme Court--the Superior Court of
    Massachusetts is where these dollars that were expended for
    lawyers, for outside engineering consultants, and for the staff
    attorneys that were working on cost recovery.
        Mr. Lynch. I understand. But we are looking at an October
    or November trial date here, and there is still an enormous
    amount of work that needs to be done on these cases based on
    the attorney general's assessment at this point.
        Mr. Amorello. Well, if I may----
        Mr. Lynch. You may.
        Mr. Amorello [continuing]. Congressman, just to point out
    that in the course of this project, in the 10 years of active
    construction, there had been no effort--no meaningful effort in
    terms of cost recovery. Ideally--and I say this with the
    Bechtel/Parsons Brinckerhoff folks, you would like to reach
    settlement and resolve matters in that fashion and not need to
    pursue them in court.
        I respect the fact that the professional relationship
    between the Turnpike Authority and Bechtel/Parsons Brinckerhoff
    has not materially changed in their effort to continue to
    complete this project, while at the same time we filed a
    lawsuit against them and 10 of the section design consultants
    in this course.
        The process was not there prior to that, to the cost
    recovery team that the Authority established. If you can reach
    a settlement--and, again, ideally you want to reach that as the
    attorney general, and hopefully the attorney general will be
    successful in reaching a settlement, but if not, you only have
    the course to go to litigation, and those are the steps that we
    took.
        And at the stage where we were finishing up, the court
    cases had been filed, natural progression to turn it over to
    the attorney general, and his willingness to accept it.
        Mr. Lynch. It is a point well taken. But just two points.
    No. 1, it is usually the quality and the strength of the
    litigation that drives the settlement. It is not the settlement
    that is the driving force, and then it falls to litigation as a
    default measure.
        So it leads me back to my original question, which was--I
    mean, forgive me, but we are in a construction litigation case
    against one of the largest construction companies in the world.
    And we hire a probate judge to handle our case. That is my
    point. I understand the intelligence of the gentleman, his
    intellect unquestioned, a fine human being. It is just I
    question the judgment of that----
        Mr. Amorello. But take the fact--and, again, the two law
    firms that are representing us, and were representing us--
    Looney & Grossman is headed by a former----
        Mr. Lynch. Fine law firms, but who is our quarterback on
    this?
        Mr. Amorello. The quarterback was Judge Ginsburg and the
    team, and these two outside law firms, the other one having one
    of the best legal counsels in terms of construction law--Bill
    Zucker--in the country. So we had the right personnel in place,
    and now it is rightly turned over to the attorney general. We
    fully support him in his efforts in the cases that were given
    over to him to manage and administer and move to either
    successful conclusion with settlements or he moves to
    continuing the litigation.
        Mr. Lynch. Well, I wish I shared your faith. It is just a
    troubling development.
        Mr. Amorello. I hear you.
        Mr. Lynch. OK. I will leave it at that. Maybe I should give
    this back to Congressman Capuano, but I have to ask--it sounds,
    you know, across the table here that there is a shared
    assessment that things are going not perfectly, but things are
    moving along in the right direction and that you are--you feel
    that you are on the right path, and that, as Mr. MacDonald
    says, this bridge--this tunnel will serve the citizens of the
    Commonwealth well into the next century.
        If that is really the case--and I am going to ask each of
    you--Mr. Tamaro, you don't have a stake in this question. But
    are you willing to support efforts to hold the taxpayer
    harmless going forward here? That is my principal concern
    here--that long after all of us are gone, and we already see,
    you know, Modern Continental is gone, God bless them--bless
    Marino, but the company is going under, and Mr. Cashman is
    taking over his responsibilities.
        Reliant Insurance, gone. Other entities that might be
    looked to for recourse are also on the ropes, as they say.
    There are some others that are in shaky condition.
        My concern is that in the long term--and I am not saying 5
    years or 10 years, I am saying this is a 75-year or a 100-year
    tunnel, we have a responsibility to the next generation that we
    give them something that it is not a continual drain on their
    resources.
        So I am looking to set up a structure; some have called it
    a warranty. I am not sure that is the correct word for it, but
    close enough--a way of protecting the citizens of the
    Commonwealth going forward, collectively, meaning the Authority
    and whatever resources it can garner and retain for that
    purpose, Bechtel/Parsons Brinckerhoff in the same fashion, the
    subcontractors, the general contractors, the designers, the
    insurance companies, the reinsurance companies, the bond
    companies, everyone.
        But to hold the citizens harmless from--they are blameless
    in this. They are blameless in this, and in fairness they paid
    for a first-rate tunnel, and based on what I see--and there are
    a lot of reasons for it--I don't see a first-rate tunnel. We
    hired a world-class team here, and I don't see a world-class
    product, quite frankly, not yet. We can get there; they are
    salvageable. But we need the commitment of everyone involved.
        And I know there is a lot of personal pride out there as
    managers and as construction professionals. Right across the
    board, right through Bechtel and each of the firms involved
    here, and it goes right down to the workers on the site. Mike
    and I walked there. You know, there is a considerable amount of
    angst among the workers that they are being associated with a
    project that is being criticized roundly.
        And they would like to do everything that they can to work
    themselves out of it. And I would just like to see the same
    commitment from the firms involved here from the top to the
    bottom, because I think it is solvable. But it requires a firm
    and honest and genuine commitment to getting to that end.
        And, you know, I haven't seen it yet. It looks like this
    thing is barreling toward litigation, and I don't think that is
    the best for anyone. And by God, if we get into that, then we
    will all be involved. We will all be involved, and there will
    be no easy way out. It will be take no prisoners from our
    standpoint in the Congress. And there will be ramifications, as
    Chairman Davis said, for those who seek to acquire other
    Federal contracts.
        We are not playing Tiddly Winks here. This is serious
    business. Our obligation is to protect the people that we
    represent, and your obligation is to fulfill your part of the
    bargain. And we can get there if everyone is fully committed.
        I will turn it over to Congressman Capuano.
        Mr. Capuano. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. I guess I only have one
    or two more questions and then just a closing statement from
    me.
        Mr. MacDonald, I apologize for not asking this before, but
    I want to make sure I get the question asked to you. In your
    written testimony, you say that the contract prohibited the
    agency from making any unauthorized statements to the public.
    Are you still under the same contract to not make any
    unauthorized statements to the public?
        Mr. MacDonald. We are, sir, yes.
        Mr. Capuano. But I presume that since you are under oath
    today, the oath that you took at the beginning of this hearing
    supersedes any contractual agreement.
        Mr. MacDonald. Yes, it most certainly does.
        Mr. Capuano. OK.
        Mr. MacDonald. I would also comment that the chairman has
    authorized----
        Mr. Capuano. Fair enough.
        Mr. MacDonald [continuing]. Us to make statements.
        Mr. Capuano. The reason I ask is because I want to make
    sure I ask the question. Though I am hoping--I think I know the
    answer, I want to hear it. Based on your knowledge today, is
    there anything that the general public or that myself or Mr.
    Lynch doesn't know relative to cost, safety, or security, of
    major impact--major import, that we should know?
        Is Mr. Amorello telling us the truth, unlike some of his--
    not his predecessors but the predecessors of the other agency,
    predecessors who ran the Big Dig? Are we being told the truth
    today relative to cost, relative to safety and security of the
    tunnel? Again, subject to all of the litigation. I am not
    asking you to point fingers. That will be all worked out. But
    to the best of your knowledge, are we currently being told the
    truth about this project?
        Mr. MacDonald. To the best of my knowledge, I think your
    statements are absolutely right. I think you are being told
    everything there is to know about the project. Mr. Amorello
    is--Chairman Amorello is running one of the most transparent
    agencies in the country right now. You know, everything is on a
    real-time basis. From the time we find a defect in the tunnel
    to when it is disclosed to the public is within days. So I
    think it is an extraordinarily open administration.
        Mr. Capuano. Thank you. That is the answer I was hoping to
    hear, and I am glad I got it.
        I just want to close by thanking you all for coming. We
    have been here close to, give or take, 4 hours now. First of
    all, thank you for staying, and thank you for being open and
    honest. And, you know, thank you for sticking with it.
        Mr. Amorello, I know you have had some good days and some
    bad days on this project. And my hope is that we have more good
    days coming than we have had in the past.
        And, gentlemen, thank you all. Mr. Lynch, thank you for
    inviting me, and I appreciate the opportunity.
        Mr. Lynch. Thank you, Congressman. Just in closing, in a
    similar note, Mr. Amorello, I reviewed the chronology of this,
    and I know you came here in 2002 and that a lot of these
    problems were in full bloom before that point. So I suspect
    that they have laid more blame at your doorstep than you truly
    deserve, and I want to make that--as someone who has looked at
    this from day one to the present day, I just want to make that
    perfectly clear.
        I just want to go back to my friends at Bechtel. Again, you
    understand the mission here and the desire here to find some
    solution, not to lay the blame and the costs at your doorstep,
    but to somehow get your involvement and your commitment to
    indemnifying the taxpayers, so that the costs are borne by the
    responsible parties. And I have no knowledge of the
    proportionate responsibility among the parties. I suspect it is
    widely spread.
        Mr. MacDonald, are you committed to that process that would
    seek to make sure that the construction is completed according
    to the specifications and to the highest expectations of the
    people of the Commonwealth? And also, the Federal taxpayers
    that have contributed here. And are you willing to work with us
    on indemnifying the taxpayer from any unreasonable costs above
    what they should have expected?
        Mr. MacDonald. Congressman, we are committed to giving you
    the quality product that you deserve, and we will continue to
    strive toward that end. With respect to the commercial matters,
    at the closeout of this job, and some of the things that you
    have talked about are similar to some things that were asked by
    the Joint Transportation Committee of the legislature here back
    in December.
        And we are committed on taking those ideas on board. We
    followed up with the co-chair, Chairman Wagner LeDoure. Their
    view at the time, having the AG--State attorney general in
    charge of the program, that was the appropriate process to
    sustain that dialog through. And so we are committed to
    sustaining that dialog through that process.
        Mr. Lynch. But I am looking to find something long term,
    some solution to put in place as this project winds down. You
    may be right, and the project may perform as advertised.
    However, there have been enough events during the course of
    this project, and enough problems that have come to light, that
    lead a prudent person to require some type of assurance.
        Whether you call that a warranty or a--whether a policy can
    be put together, it is an insurable risk, in my estimation,
    given the timeframe for this project and what we know now and
    what we will know especially after May 15 and DeLoitte & Touche
    comes in with their report, which may prompt another hearing,
    by the way.
        But are you willing to look at that type of solution
    collectively with all of the other partes?
        Mr. MacDonald. Again, Mr. Congressman, the answer is we
    will look at that in the context of the overall resolution of
    these issues, and we think that the right place to do that is
    through the process with the State attorney general.
        Mr. Lynch. OK. All right. If that is your answer.
        Do any of you have anything you would like to say in
    closing? I should probably offer you that opportunity.
        Mr. Amorello. Congressman, the commitment on the Turnpike
    Authority to finish this project to the level that the public
    expects us to, it is delivering on the commitments that were
    made when it was initiated back in the mid-1980's in terms of
    improving traffic flow.
        We have done the groundbreaking on the north end parks. We
    are seeing the greening of downtown Boston and improving
    transportation. So the project is living up to the
    expectations. These construction issues that we need to
    resolve, while we have the contractors in place, while Bechtel/
    Parsons are here, we will hold them accountable.
        Your suggestion in terms of a warranty, I can assure you
    that the Turnpike Authority will work cooperatively with the
    attorney general, and items that perhaps we project out as
    additional costs that the Authority should not have expected to
    bear on itself as the owner and operator of this tunnel network
    perhaps could be added into discussions in terms of
    settlements, if it is possible with the responsible parties
    from the SDCs and from the joint venture.
        This is an incredible achievement. This highway network,
    despite all of the negative press that has occurred here, it is
    an incredible achievement. The tunnel system under the city of
    Boston is a marvel that we will all take great pride in that we
    are a part of and helped to make it a reality.
        These issues, these hurdles that we need to overcome, we
    will overcome them. I have the confidence in the gentleman to
    my left. I have the conference in the folks sitting behind me
    from the Turnpike Authority, particularly those of us in the
    public sector that want to do the right thing, assure the
    taxpayers and tollpayers that their money was wisely spent and
    that they weren't spent on any additional costs that--for leak
    repairs, or what have you.
        But we will hold all our contractors accountable on our end
    in terms of claims and changes, and we will work cooperatively
    with the attorney general in its efforts at cost recovery, or
    continuing the efforts of cost recovery. But this is--it should
    never be forgotten by any of us in this Commonwealth--an
    incredible project that is going to make a world of difference
    for the future of Boston and New England.
        It has had a great impact for the men and women in the
    building trades for 10 years while construction was going on, a
    rare opportunity of keeping a lot of people that were in a
    business, as you know, that was cyclical and depending on
    cycles. For much of the 1990's, this project kept the city of
    Boston and the region healthy economically, because of the
    spending that went into it.
        And at the end of the day, we will have a first-rate tunnel
    network, a first-rate transportation system, first-rate parks
    on the top, all because of the investment that has been made by
    the national government, by the State government by the
    Turnpike Authority.
        But we have an obligation to you, the Members of Congress,
    to Inspector Mead--I agreed with you earlier when Congressman
    Capuano said the one person he cares about is--if he is still
    behind me somewhere--the Inspector General for the Department
    of Transportation, but also our partners in Federal Highway.
        Administrator Peters has been very supportive of this
    project and efforts, but she is also holding our feet to the
    fire to make sure that the panel replacement that comes in
    meets your expectation and their expectation for longevity,
    durability, constructability, and we will come up with a
    solution with, again, the folks behind me--John Christian,
    Clyde Baker from SDS--to assure the public that no cost was
    incurred.
        And no cost is being--the cost of repair of this panel is
    not a factor for us. The Bechtel folks and the people from
    Modern Continental have stepped up to take responsibility, so
    we are not calculating in any dollar value to say, ``This is
    the fix.'' It will be the best fix that works, with the least
    amount of risk, least amount of impact to our abutters, and
    something that is constructable and durable and will last as
    long as we expect these tunnels to last, and that is 75 years
    or greater.
        Mr. Lynch. Well, thank you. I appreciate that.
        Gentleman.
        Mr. MacDonald. Yes, Mr. Congressman. This has been an
    extraordinarily long game for us, as your management
    consultant. We have been at this for 20 years. The
    controversies that we face today aren't the first controversies
    that we have responded to on this job. These aren't the first
    challenges that we have overcome on this job.
        So we will continue to go forward. We will continue to do
    our best to complete this project as cost effectively and to a
    high standard to deliver the world-class project that you are
    entitled to. We will do that. The challenges today will be
    overcome.
        We have also done that--and, again, as you get to the tail
    of these things, the cost recovery issues tend to take on a
    rather large dimension, and that is what has happened here, and
    it has happened over the past 3 years. It just didn't happen
    this year. It has been an ongoing stress for us, really, since
    the middle of 2001.
        And I am so proud of our people that they have been able to
    stay focused on their job and working with the MTA and the
    Commonwealth of Massachusetts to get this job done. And we will
    continue to do that while we continue to constructively work
    through this dispute.
        Thank you.
        Mr. Lynch. OK. Well, thank you. And I trust that you will
    work with Attorney General Reilly, then, maybe to pursue that
    indemnification of the taxpayers in some shape or form that is
    agreeable to you all?
        Thank you, gentlemen. The hearing is adjourned.
        [Note.--The slide presentation by Hon. Stephen Lynch
    entitled, ``Digging up the Facts: Inspecting the Big Dig and
    the Performance of Federal and State Government in Providing
    Oversight of Federal Funds,'' may be found in committee files.]
        [Whereupon, at 5:55 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]