[House Hearing, 109 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
BUILDING IRAQI SECURITY FORCES
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY,
EMERGING THREATS, AND INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS
of the
COMMITTEE ON
GOVERNMENT REFORM
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
MARCH 14, 2005
__________
Serial No. 109-19
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Government Reform
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/congress/house
http://www.house.gov/reform
______
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COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM
TOM DAVIS, Virginia, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut HENRY A. WAXMAN, California
DAN BURTON, Indiana TOM LANTOS, California
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida MAJOR R. OWENS, New York
JOHN M. McHUGH, New York EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York
JOHN L. MICA, Florida PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania
GIL GUTKNECHT, Minnesota CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York
MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland
STEVEN C. LaTOURETTE, Ohio DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio
TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois
CHRIS CANNON, Utah WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri
JOHN J. DUNCAN, Jr., Tennessee DIANE E. WATSON, California
CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts
MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland
DARRELL E. ISSA, California LINDA T. SANCHEZ, California
GINNY BROWN-WAITE, Florida C.A. DUTCH RUPPERSBERGER, Maryland
JON C. PORTER, Nevada BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
KENNY MARCHANT, Texas ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of
LYNN A. WESTMORELAND, Georgia Columbia
PATRICK T. McHENRY, North Carolina ------
CHARLES W. DENT, Pennsylvania BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont
VIRGINIA FOXX, North Carolina (Independent)
------ ------
Melissa Wojciak, Staff Director
David Marin, Deputy Staff Director/Communications Director
Rob Borden, Parliamentarian
Teresa Austin, Chief Clerk
Phil Barnett, Minority Chief of Staff/Chief Counsel
Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and International
Relations
CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut, Chairman
KENNY MARCHANT, Texas DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio
DAN BURTON, Indiana TOM LANTOS, California
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont
JOHN M. McHUGH, New York CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York
STEVEN C. LaTOURETTE, Ohio CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland
TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania LINDA T. SANCHEZ, California
JOHN J. DUNCAN, Jr., Tennessee C.A. DUTCH RUPPERSBERGER, Maryland
MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts
JON C. PORTER, Nevada BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
CHARLES W. DENT, Pennsylvania
Ex Officio
TOM DAVIS, Virginia HENRY A. WAXMAN, California
Lawrence J. Halloran, Staff Director and Counsel
R. Nicholas Palarino, Senior Policy Advisor
Robert A. Briggs, Clerk
Andrew Su, Minority Professional Staff Member
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Hearing held on March 14, 2005................................... 1
Statement of:
Christoff, Joseph, Director, International Affairs and Trade,
U.S. Government Accountability Office; Peter R. Rodman,
Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security
Affairs, U.S. Department of Defense, accompanied by Rear
Admiral William D. Sullivan, vice-director, Strategic Plans
and Policy of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and Ambassador
Richard A. Jones, Senior Advisor to the Secretary and
Coordinator for Iraq, U.S. Department of State, accompanied
by Bill Todd, Principal Deputy Assistant, Secretary for the
Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement
Affairs, U.S. Department of State.......................... 15
Christoff, Joseph........................................ 15
Jones, Ambassador Richard................................ 39
Rodman, Peter R.......................................... 39
Cordesman, Professor Anthony H., Arleigh A. Burke Chair in
Strategy, Center for Strategic and International Studies;
Kalev Sepp, professor, Naval Postgraduate School; and Peter
Khalil, former Coalition Provisional Authority official,
the Brookings Institution.................................. 104
Cordesman, Professor Anthony H........................... 104
Khalil, Peter............................................ 148
Sepp, Kavlev I........................................... 133
Letters, statements, etc., submitted for the record by:
Christoff, Joseph, Director, International Affairs and Trade,
U.S. Government Accountability Office, prepared statement
of......................................................... 17
Cordesman, Professor Anthony H., Arleigh A. Burke Chair in
Strategy, Center for Strategic and International Studies,
prepared statement of...................................... 108
Jones, Ambassador Richard A., Senior Advisor to the Secretary
and Coordinator for Iraq, U.S. Department of State,
prepared statement of...................................... 41
Khalil, Peter, former Coalition Provisional Authority
official, the Brookings Institution, prepared statement of. 153
Kucinich, Hon. Dennis J., a Representative in Congress from
the State of Ohio:
Memo dated January 5, 2005............................... 78
Prepared statement of.................................... 8
Sepp, Kalev, professor, Naval Postgraduate School, prepared
statement of............................................... 137
Shays, Hon. Christopher, a Representative in Congress from
the State of Connecticut, prepared statement of............ 3
Sullivan, Rear Admiral William D., vice-director, Strategic
Plans and Policy of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, historical
perspective on ISF reporting............................... 51
Waxman, Hon. Henry A., a Representative in Congress from the
State of California:
E-mail from Ambassador Jones............................. 54
Letter dated February 16, 2005........................... 86
Memo by U.S. Embassy, Kuwait............................. 58
BUILDING IRAQI SECURITY FORCES
----------
MONDAY, MARCH 14, 2005
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging
Threats, and International Relations,
Committee on Government Reform,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 12:10 p.m., in
room 2154, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Christopher
Shays (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Present: Representatives Shays, Turner, and Kucinich.
Also present: Representative Waxman.
Staff present: Lawrence Halloran, staff director and
counsel; R. Nicholas Palarino, Ph.D., senior policy advisor;
Thomas Costa, professional staff member; Robert A Briggs,
clerk; Hagar Hajjar, intern; Jeff Baran and David Rapallo,
minority counsels; Andrew Su, minority professional staff
member; Earley Green, minority chief clerk; and Jean Gosa,
minority assistant clerk.
Mr. Shays. A quorum being present, the Subcommittee on
National Security, Emerging Threats, and International
Relations hearing entitled, ``Building Iraqi Security Forces,''
is called to order.
Election day in Iraq saw less violence than most days
before or since. Why? Broad travel restrictions certainly
helped, but more significantly, Iraqi security forces, knowing
crowded polling places made attractive targets, stepped forward
to protect their emerging democracy; at times they did so
heroically. In Iraq that day, we heard reports of police
sacrificing themselves to tackle a would-be suicide bomber so
voting could continue.
Building on that loyalty, pride and sense of ownership
evident that day and every day is the key to security in the
new Iraq. Current U.S. strategy seeks to bring Iraqi forces
forward in the counterinsurgency fight as quickly as possible
while transitioning coalition forces to an embedded advisory
role; but as we and the Iraqis learned last year, too abrupt a
transfer of front line security to minimally trained, weakly
motivated and poorly led Iraqi forces risks defeats and
defections and emboldens the terrorists.
The fiscal year 2005 supplemental appropriation bill
contained $5.7 billion to train and equip Iraqi security
forces, adding to the $5 billion provided last year. The
fundamental question behind these numbers; how will we and the
Iraqis know with the right number of forces with the right
skills and equipment are ready to assume the difficult,
evolving security mission there? The answer is not just
numbers, capabilities matter as much as quantities. Decisions
about the strategist roles, doctrines, tactics and command
structures of Iraqi security forces will have profound
implications on their ability to confront a violent insurgency
while nurturing a democratic one. But numbers do matter. We
need to know how many have been trained, how many will be
trained, and how many will be deployed by the Iraqi Ministries
of Defense and Interior to secure their nation.
The effort faces daunting challenges. To fill the vacuum
created by the abrupt dissolution of the entire army and police
force after the fall of Hussein's regime, Iraqi security
personnel must learn to fight while they fight. Uneven vetting
of recruits and limited offsite training has left local police
units undermanned, under-motivated and vulnerable to
infiltration by the very insurgents they're meant to fight.
Some in the new predominantly Shiite Iraqi government have
proposed a re-deBa'athification of security forces, a move
which others fear could further destabilize rather than help
secure Iraq. But all these efforts should be guided and
inspired by individual and collective examples of Iraqi
determination to seize a safer future.
Mithal a-Alusi is a Sunni and the first Iraqi political
official to travel to Israel to address an antiterrorism
conference. For his courage, he was removed from his position
on the De-Ba'athification Commission and he lost his personal
security protection. On February 8th, his two sons were gunned
down in Baghdad, and he still remains a target. When I met him
here 2 weeks ago and offered to help him move to the United
States for his own protection, all he wanted was to go back to
Iraq and help his nation become a democracy.
As a recent article on a-Alusi observed, when you hear it
asked whether Iraqis will fight for their own freedom, ask
yourself whether it is possible to fight harder than Mithal a-
Alusi.
In the January 30th election, his and more than 8 million
other purple index fingers pointed the way to a peaceful and
democratic future for the nation. Today we ask how we can best
help them fulfill that destiny.
[The prepared statement of Hon. Christopher Shays follows:]
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Mr. Shays. The Chair at this time recognizes the ranking
member, Mr. Kucinich.
Mr. Kucinich. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
To the witnesses, I understand that shortly we're going to
have the honor of having our ranking member, Mr. Waxman, here,
and I look forward to his presence as well.
I want to first begin by thanking the men and women who
wear the uniform of this country and who serve in the Armed
Forces and who serve valiantly and bravely in Iraq and around
the world. I want to thank their families for giving their sons
and daughters, their husbands and wives to this Nation for
service. Their service is honorable, and no matter what our
position happens to be with respect to this administration's
policy, we can all agree that the men and women who serve ought
to be honored.
I want to thank the chairman for holding the hearing, and I
want to welcome the witnesses.
As the key investigative and oversight committee in
Congress, we're the ones who must shine the light of truth on
the security situation in Iraq. The truth, however, is elusive.
This Congress has been misled time and time again about this
war by this administration. This Congress has been told that we
needed to strike Iraq preemptively in order to find weapons of
mass destruction. We have not found a single WMD. In fact, the
administration has given up to not even looking for WMDs
anymore. We were also told that the United States would be
greeted as liberators, yet 1,500 brave American soldiers have
died so far, and the number increases daily, whether it is by
suicide attacks or improvised explosive devices. Many Iraqi
security forces and innocent civilians have also died
needlessly. And there are thousands upon thousands of our
soldiers who have been injured, as well as innocent civilians
injured as well.
We were told that the administration had a plan for the
occupation of Iraq and for reconstruction. We were told
contracts would be openly bid, and that the process would be
transparent; yet the Inspector General for the Coalition
Provisional Authority recently reported that the Coalition
Provisional Authority could not properly account for a single
penny of some $9 billion in funds turned over by the U.S.-led
authority to the interim Iraqi government. Congress has spent
$5.8 billion already on building Iraqi security forces, and now
we're being asked to foot another $82 billion in costs for
Iraq, including $5.7 billion to build Iraqi security forces. Is
there a plan for spending this money wisely, or is the plan to
keep throwing good money after bad? Will this $11.5 billion be
properly accounted for as opposed to the $9 billion in funds
that have not been properly accounted for?
Mr. Chairman, the current course we are on in Iraq is
absolutely unacceptable. This administration seems to be
blinded by and ignorant to the realities in Iraq. It is
determined to see its policies through no matter how many
wounded and how many casualties there may be, no matter how
foolish and wrong-headed those policies may be.
We're told that these security forces need more time and
more funds for training and for leaders to emerge to assume
chains of command. Mr. Chairman, this administration has had
enough time and more than enough funds already. There is
nothing more than a money pit that drains funds from our
Nation's coffers.
The real problem is the administration has refused to admit
it has made any mistakes. Violence, particularly that aimed
specifically against these Iraqi security forces, has escalated
in recent weeks despite the presence of these forces at polling
places during the holding of the national elections in January.
125 Iraqi National Guard and police recruits died at a medical
clinic recently at the hands of a suicide car bomber. Nearly
every day other Iraqi security forces are killed by the
improvised explosive devices or by suicide bombers. Insurgents
remain in control over numerous areas of the country, and we
are sending out security forces who are lightly armed, have
only a few weeks or months of training, have limited mobility
and continue to incur problems of recruitment and retention.
Most of these security forces have never even handled or
shot an AK-47. Most are being used in support roles, not in
fighting the insurgents who are hardened and hell bent on
making sure that our mission there fails. We are sending these
security forces into situations against an enemy who, it is
well understood, they cannot possibly defeat. How do we
honestly expect them to be ready by the end of this year or
next?
None of these problems are a secret, yet this
administration continues to mislead the American people and the
Congress, its only solution to ask for more and more money and
more time in the hopes the situation will improve, while their
stubbornness is costing lives.
And more importantly, we also want to see our soldiers
return home. We all want to see democracy succeed and flourish
in Iraq, but there are lives here at stake, both American and
Iraqi, and we still have no exit strategy. And Mr. Chairman,
without an exit strategy, I don't see how in the world we can
expect the American people to approve spending another dime in
Iraq. Without an exit strategy, I don't understand how we can
expect the American people to continue to approve of the
sacrifice of their sons and daughters and mothers and fathers.
What are we supposed to tell our constituents whose loved ones
are missing from home, wounded or killed in service to their
country? When will our soldiers be coming home?
It seems to me these deadlines for completing training and
for rebuilding Iraqi security forces are completely artificial.
Nobody knows how long the process will take. And we cannot
support the Iraqis indefinitely financially or at a cost to our
own Nation's military readiness. That is why I believe the
United Nations should step in and shoulder the burden for
training these security forces. They have the experience, long-
term resolve, and the multi-national support to finish the job,
and I urge Secretary Rice to work with Secretary General Kofi
Annan to find a role for U.N. peacekeepers in Iraq. These are
the real questions, the tough questions which need to be asked
by the Congress about the long-term stability and security of
Iraq. We need real answers before we can agree to new funding
requests, we cannot cover our eyes and pretend problems will go
away if we just sink more money into them.
Mr. Chairman, I hope all of our witnesses are forthcoming
and candid in their testimonies. It's in everyone's interest
that they speak honestly to the problems in building Iraqi
security forces. We want equality troops in place and ready to
take over, not just a quantitative figure that looks good on
paper.
I led the effort in this House in challenging that war. It
was a wrong war, and it was wrong to send our troops there, and
we need to bring them home. And I hope this hearing is going to
be the beginning of that step. Thank you.
Mr. Shays. I thank the gentleman.
[The prepared statement of Hon. Dennis J. Kucinich
follows:]
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Mr. Shays. The chairman recognizes Mr. Turner, the former
vice chairman of the committee.
Mr. Turner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chairman, I thank you for your efforts to continue our
review of the operations occurring in Iraq and how we can
improve them, both to make the country safer and more stable
for our men and women in uniform, and for the Iraqi citizens.
I have had two opportunities to travel to Iraq, once in
October 2003, and again this January, 2 weeks prior to the
elections. During the last trip we had the opportunity to
review some of the training opportunities for the Iraqi
soldiers, and also an opportunity to look at some of the
exercises that they were conducting, and it certainly is
incredibly important work, not only for transition from a U.S.-
led to an Iraqi-led security effort, but obviously for any hope
of independence for Iraq as a nation.
It is certainly welcome that we had the announcement by
NATO of their commitment to assist in this process. I know
there are a number of issues that each of you will want to tell
us today, and we will have a number of questions concerning how
we can be effective, and but there is no question this is very
important work.
I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Shays. I thank the gentleman.
At this time, the chairman will announce our panel before
swearing them in. Mr. Joseph Christoff, Director International
Affairs and Trade, U.S. Government Accountability Office, the
Honorable Peter R. Rodman, Assistant Secretary of Defense,
International Security Affairs, U.S. Department of Defense,
accompanied by Rear Admiral William D. Sullivan, Vice-Director
of Strategic Plans and Policy of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as
well as Ambassador Richard A. Jones, Senior Advisor to the
Secretary and Coordinator for Iraq, U.S. Department of State,
accompanied by Mr. Bill Todd, Principal Deputy Assistant
Secretary for the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law
Enforcement Affairs, U.S. Department of State.
I just want to state that I know that some of you had plans
to be elsewhere, and maybe your testimony has been prepared a
little late, and I understand that you fully tried to
accommodate the subcommittee, and the subcommittee sincerely
appreciates it.
Whether people supported the war or opposed the war,
ultimately we want success, and we know that each and every one
of you are working--your responsibilities to work toward that
ultimate goal of success. So at this time, if I could just take
care of business first in terms of asking unanimous consent
that all members of the subcommittee be permitted to place an
opening statement in the record and that the record remain open
for the period of 3 days for that purpose, and without
objection, so orders.
I ask further unanimous consent that all witnesses be
permitted to include their written statements in the record,
and without objection, so ordered.
And at this time if you would stand, we will swear you in
as we do. There is only one person who has never been sworn in
in my 8 years of chairing the subcommittee, and that was--or 10
years, and that was the Senator from West Virginia; I chickened
out.
[Witnesses sworn.]
Mr. Shays. I note for the record our witnesses have
responded in the affirmative.
I think that we're going to start with Mr. Christoff, I
believe that's the case, and then Mr. Rodman, you will be
going. Secretary. And then we will proceed down the line.
Thank you, Mr. Christoff.
STATEMENTS OF JOSEPH CHRISTOFF, DIRECTOR, INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
AND TRADE, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE; PETER R.
RODMAN, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, INTERNATIONAL SECURITY
AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, ACCOMPANIED BY REAR
ADMIRAL WILLIAM D. SULLIVAN, VICE-DIRECTOR, STRATEGIC PLANS AND
POLICY OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF; AND AMBASSADOR RICHARD A.
JONES, SENIOR ADVISOR TO THE SECRETARY AND COORDINATOR FOR
IRAQ, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, ACCOMPANIED BY BILL TODD,
PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ASSISTANT, SECRETARY FOR THE BUREAU OF
INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS AND LAW ENFORCEMENT AFFAIRS, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
STATEMENT OF JOSEPH CHRISTOFF
Mr. Christoff. Mr. Chairman, and members of the
subcommittee, thank you for inviting GAO to this important
hearing.
My statement today is based on GAO's ongoing work reviewing
the security situation in Iraqi. In summary, we found the
following: Data on the status of Iraqi security forces is
unreliable and provides limited information on their
capabilities. And the coalition must fight a growing insurgency
while overcoming problems in the force structure, readiness and
leadership of Iraqi troops.
Let me first describe the multi-national forces plan for
transferring security responsibilities to the Iraqis. Under an
October 2003 plan, Iraqi forces would assume increasing
responsibility for security, first in local and regional areas,
and then throughout the country. As the Iraqis assume more
control coalition forces could begin to draw down.
In the summer of 2004, MNF-I developed a classified
campaign plan based on this transition concept. As part of that
plan, MNF-I intends to train and equip 271,000 Iraqi security
forces by July 2006. As of late February 2005, the State
Department reports that about 82,000 Iraqi police and about
60,000 military forces have been trained and equipped. However,
these data do not provide reliable information on the status of
Iraqi forces. For example, the number of trained police
includes those who are absent without leave, which DOD
estimates to be in the tens of thousands. Further, State no
longer reports on the extent to which Iraqi security forces
have their required weapons, vehicles and equipment.
Accordingly, it is difficult to assess the status of efforts to
train and equip Iraqi security forces.
It is equally difficult to judge the capabilities of Iraqi
security forces because MNF-I is now developing a system to
assess unit readiness. This system will help to assess the
extent to which Iraqi forces can operate independently of U.S.
assistance. However, this system will take time to implement.
MNF-I faces additional challenges. First, the Iraqi force
structure is changing, making it difficult for the coalition to
adequately train, equip and sustain Iraqi force. For example,
the required number of police and border patrol forces has
increased, the National Guard was merged into the Army, and
special counterinsurgency units were formed.
The second challenge is developing strong Iraqi leadership
and loyalty throughout the chain of command. Over the past
year, coalition forces have observed questionable loyalty some
Iraqi forces, poor leadership in the Iraqi units, and the
destabilizing influence of militias. To address some of these
problems, MNF-I plans to expand its use of military and police
advisor teams within Iraqi units.
The third challenge is developing a police structure that
upholds the rule of law while operating in a hostile
environment. Most police were trained and equipped to conduct
law enforcement functions in a peaceful environment, they were
not trained to fight the insurgency. In December 2004, MNF-I
was adding paramilitary skills to the training of the some
police units. But in addition, the State Department has found
that police in some areas have committed human rights abuses.
The coalition faces these collective challenges while
confronting a growing insurgency. DIA data shows that incidents
against the coalition, Iraqi forces and civilians increased
significantly from June 2003 to February 2005. As shown in
figure 1 of my statement, each monthly peak in the number of
violent incidents is followed by a higher average number of
attacks in subsequent months. In January 2005, General Casey
stated that the insurgency has sufficient resources to maintain
about 50 to 60 attacks per day in Sunni areas. He concluded
that only a combination of political, military, economic and
communications efforts would defeat the insurgency.
Since April 2003, Congress has provided about $5.8 billion
to develop Iraqi security forces. Last month the President, an
additional appropriation of $5.7 billion. However, without
reliable information, Congress may find it difficult to judge
how Federal funds are achieving the goal of transferring
security responsibilities to the Iraqis.
Mr. Chairman, that concludes my statement. I would be happy
to answer the subcommittee's questions.
Mr. Shays. Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Christoff follows:]
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Mr. Shays. Secretary Rodman, we will be going to you, and
then to you Ambassador Jones. And then Admiral Sullivan, will
you have testimony that you would like to share as well, a
statement?
Admiral Sullivan. I do, yes.
Mr. Shays. And Mr. Todd? OK. So we will proceed that way.
Assistant Secretary.
STATEMENT OF PETER R. RODMAN
Mr. Rodman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for your
courtesy. I do not have a prepared statement, but I would like
to make a few introductory remarks, if I may, to set the
context of what my colleagues will share with the rest of the
committee.
Our strategy in Iraq is political as much as it is
military, that's why you have before you a panel representing
the Department of State as well as the Department of Defense.
In a nutshell, our strategy is to help Iraqis build new
institutions, to fill the vacuum left by the removal of the old
regime, political institutions, economic institutions, security
institutions. So, by these political means, we are helping
empower the moderate Iraqis who represent the overwhelming
majority of the country. We help empower the moderates, and we
help further isolate the extremists even while we continue, we
and the coalition and the Iraqi forces continue to hunt down
the enemy by military means.
The political strategy is exemplified most dramatically by
the elections we saw on January 30th. As you know, this is the
beginning of a process that we hope, we expect to unfold
through the remainder of the year. On Wednesday, this
transitional national assembly that was elected by those
elections will have its first session, we expect a transitional
government to be formed very quickly. This summer, a
constitution will be drafted, which will be submitted to
popular referendum, and by the end of the year, new elections
will be held under the new permanent constitution.
On the military side, the focus is now on training,
training Iraqis military and police to take on increasing
responsibility for their own security. That's the subject that
Admiral Sullivan will speak to.
Ambassador Jones, as you know, has served in Baghdad, and
he is, I think, very qualified to speak about some of the
political issues, as well an as some of the police training
issues which the Department of State is involved in. But with
that, let me turn it over to my colleagues.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Shays. Thank you. Ambassador Jones. Great to have you
here, and thank you for your service in Iraq.
STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR RICHARD JONES
Ambassador Jones. Thank you very much Mr. Chairman. My name
is Richard H. Jones; I am the Secretary of State Senior Advisor
and Coordinator for Iraq policy.
As has been pointed out, prior to assuming these duties I
served as the American ambassador in Kuwait, and during that
period I spent 7\1/2\ months as the Chief Policy Officer and
Deputy Administrator of the Coalition Provisional Authority.
That experience, I believe, has given me unique perspectives on
many of the issues that you will be discussing today.
I have a longer statement for the record, Mr. Chairman, but
if you would allow me to summarize it briefly.
Mr. Chairman, you said that the ultimate goal in Iraq is
success; I couldn't agree more. The question is, what does
success mean? Well, for Iraq, success means a country that is
capable of defending its democracy from enemies, domestic and
foreign, who take up arms against it.
Ultimately, only Iraq can successfully defend Iraq. Right
now, of course, the United States is bearing much of the brunt
of the fighting of the insurgency, but Iraqis are taking on an
increasing role. My colleagues from the Department of Defense
are here to discuss our efforts to develop Iraqi security
forces that can take the leading role in combating these
insurgents. That is, if you will, the inner most circle of
security, but there are other circles. One of several outer
circles involves the development of civilian police and
judicial correction systems that can enforce the rule of law
and guard against the type of criminality that goes hand in
hand with the insurgency--kidnapping, hostage taking, narcotics
smuggling and so on. The State Department's Bureau of
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement takes the lead in
that effort. My colleague, Bill Todd, is here to take questions
on specifics in that area.
But we must consider other circles, for example, we should
consider a circle outside the security area, for example, a
reconstruction and economic policy efforts, to root out any
economic basis for the insurgency by creating the
infrastructure and policy tools necessary for sustainable
development of a sound market economy. Such an economy will
inevitably create meaningful employment opportunities that
allow people to lead normal lives and lessen the attraction of
taking up arms.
There is another outer circle, the efforts to create a
Democratic political system, which Assistant Secretary Rodman
mentioned. A system for which the security forces will
willingly fight, a system which keeps the police and justice
systems working and which ensures that the fruits of
reconstruction and economic development are available to all
Iraqis. All of these circles are necessary for security and
they all reinforce one another. We view each of them as
essential to success in Iraq.
Mr. Chairman, during Saddam Hussein's 35-year reign Iraq's
police force and criminal justice system were institutions of
public repression, intelligence gathering and arbitrary
violence; they were state agencies to be feared.
Our programs must totally rebuild and reorient both a
civilian police institution and a criminal justice system to
reflect democratic values, respect for human rights and
adherence to the rule of law. Achieving these objectives
requires intense effort and a long-term commitment. Our police
development efforts have made an important start in meeting the
challenges, and they will continue to do so.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Shays. Thank you very much, Ambassador.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Jones follows:]
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Mr. Shays. Admiral Sullivan.
Admiral Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Congressman
Kucinich, thank you for the invitation to be here today to
discuss our plans to develop Iraqi security forces.
I do not have a prepared statement or an opening statement.
What I have done, however, is brought a couple of slides which
are on the story boards off to your left which, if you think it
will help facilitate the discussion, I would be happy----
Mr. Shays. That would be helpful, thank you.
Admiral Sullivan. I would be happy to walk you through
those slides and then I will take your questions.
The first slide you see tracks the history of how we have
been accounting for Iraqi security forces, and I hope will go
along way toward explaining how these numbers have changed
overtime. At the far left side of the slide is the beginning in
October 2003, and the red line represents how security forces
were tracked up until approximately April 2004.
Mr. Shays. Excuse me, 1 second. I am going to try to--
because I think this is important. I have no objection if
anyone from the press wants to just sit in the corner over
there if they would like to see these. So if anybody would like
to, they could do that. If we can turn it just a little more
this way. Anybody else is welcome to as well.
Maybe what you could do, since the press has moved over,
why don't you move this closer to us, OK. Just bring this board
right there, right there is good.
David, why don't you--folks, seriously, just come on right
up there.
And why don't you turn it more on an angle so the panel can
see it as well. Keep going, keep going, keep going, no, I'm
sorry, there is too much I'm forgetting for these folks there.
Can you see it over there, David? OK, that's good.
Do you mind starting over again, and just give us----
Admiral Sullivan. Not at all, sir.
Mr. Shays. And give us what the axis means as well; kind of
introduce this slide.
Admiral Sullivan. Yes, sir.
As you look down the left side of the axis you see raw
numbers of Iraqi security forces. And along the right side you
see a calendar with dates running from October 2003 through the
present--actually, through January 2005.
Beginning with the red lines, when we began accounting for
and tracking Iraqi security forces, we were essentially
tracking those that were simply on the payroll, and as we did
self-assessments and took a look at what that really meant, we
found that was not a very accurate way to count. In many cases,
individuals who were not actually performing any security
duties were being counted because they were held on the
payroll.
Statement, we sent General Eichenberry, who had served in
Afghanistan and had been involved in the buildup of the Afghan
National Army, to Iraq to do an independent assessment at the
request of General Abizaid to look at how we were measuring the
growth of Iraqi security forces.
Shortly after that were the events in Fallujah in April
2004 when we found when under fire many of the Iraqi security
forces did not perform up to standards; they either didn't show
up, or they ran--not all of them----
Mr. Shays. Where would that be in your graph?
Admiral Sullivan. Just to the right of where Eichenberry
assessment, the first star at the high point----
Mr. Shays. I'm still on the red line.
Admiral Sullivan. Yes, sir.
Mr. Shays. OK.
Admiral Sullivan. So as a result of both the assessments
that had been done in theater as well as the experiences of
April 2004, it was determined that we would only start counting
and reporting those Iraqi security forces that had actually
been through the training programs that were being sponsored by
the Coalition. What that did to your numbers, as you see the
dotted line drop from April 2004 to May 2004 was took us from
about 206,000 total Iraqi security forces to about 132,000
Iraqi security forces.
We continued to report in that manner until approximately
August 2004. In the meantime, General Petraeus had come on in
July and stood up the multinational security training command
in Iraq and done his own assessment and realized that for
various reasons, not all of the graduates of the various
security courses were being equipped as they came out of school
for various supply reasons and whatnot. At the same time, we
looked at something called the Facilities Protection Services,
which was services that were hired by the various ministries to
provide night watchman-type security to those ministries.
Because those individuals were not performing duties that were
directly responsible for security in the country or fighting
the insurgency, we tried to stop counting the Facilities
Protection Service at the same time that we changed our own
standard to only counting those Iraqi security forces that had
been through the MNF-TCI training and were equipped to the
level that they were required to be equipped for the duties
that they were to perform.
So you saw a drop between August 2004, where we were at
about 160,000 to September 2004, where the number dropped to
90,000. So that drop was accounted for by only including those
that were trained and equipped, and dropping the Facilities
Protection Services off the roles.
We have continued to use that same standard through today.
We are just now beginning, and they are developing the metrics
in country, to begin a qualitative assessment of how the
various Iraqi security forces are doing, modelling it after the
kinds of systems we use for our own military to measure unit
readiness.
I think it is important to point out that we have
continually assessed the way that we are developing security
forces and the way that we're measuring the progress of those
security forces, and we have adjusted our plan and our
reporting as we go through that.
I will be happy to take any questions you might have on
this particular chart----
Mr. Shays. We will come back to that. Do you have another
chart?
Admiral Sullivan. I do have another chart, if we can swap
them, please.
This second chart provides you the numbers as of our latest
report from theatre of what we are considering trained and
equipped forces in both Ministry of Interior and the Ministry
of Defense. Now these numbers will change this week as we get
this week's report in from Baghdad.
Now I have divided it up into administrative interior
forces, which as correctly stated by Mr. Christoff, roughly
82,000 MOI security forces. And in the administrative defense,
which includes the Army, the National Guard, the intervention
and special operations forces, as well as the Air Force and
Navy, were just over 60,000 trained and equipped.
I draw your attention to the two asterisks. The numbers per
Ministry of Interior forces include people who might be AWOL,
as Representative Kucinich described, because we aren't able to
accurately track the police and Ministry of Interior forces the
way we are the Ministry of Defense forces, and I will explain
that. So if you look at the double asterisk under Ministry of
Defense, you will see that number reflects anybody who is AWOL
or on leave or otherwise not on duty.
The reason we can track the Ministry of Defense is for the
most part these forces live in Garrison, they get up every
morning and there is a head count so the unit commanders know
how many people they have and whether they are there for duty
or not. The administrative interior forces are different. Like
other police forces they operate on a shift-type cycle, and
there is a very significant cultural difference here. And this
existed prior to the fall of the Hussein regime and exists
today, and that is that they don't have a central banking
system and automatic deposit system for the people in Iraq like
we do in our country.
When I get my paycheck, I don't have to do anything, it
goes right into my bank account. These people get paid in
person. If they are living away from their families, the way
they get that pay home is by going home and dolling out the
money to their families. And this has been a cultural thing
with the Iraqis throughout time.
Under the Saddam regime, when they went home--and maybe
they stayed home and helped bring in a crop and didn't report
back for duty when they were supposed to, they weren't punished
like we would punish our own people for failing to report for
duty. Their enlistment was extended for the number of days that
they were absent without leave. So that's one of the things
that we're dealing with on the AWOL side is a cultural as well
as a logistical problem for these people to get money to their
families or to help their families in their hometowns.
So with those two slides as backdrop, I'm prepared to
answer your questions.
[The information referred to follows:]
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Mr. Shays. Thank you very much. We were given this slide
here--so we have a sheet----
Admiral Sullivan. That should be the same.
Mr. Shays. 142, I think it is the exact same. It says dated
as of March 7th.
Admiral Sullivan. Yes, sir.
Mr. Shays. So we have that one to refer to, so maybe we
should put the other board up. And it would be helpful to get
this, just for the record, in paper size if you are able to do
that.
Mr. Waxman has walked in and I would like to let him start
out because he hasn't yet spoken. Is there any comments before
any--Mr. Secretary, do you have any additional comment before
we start the questions? Well, let me just say that you are
giving us something to which we can work with and it is very
appreciated, and obviously there will be a number of questions.
What I would like to do is leave 10 minutes to pursue the
questions, and that way we can get into it more.
So Mr. Waxman, you have the floor.
Mr. Waxman. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I want to ask Ambassador Jones some questions.
This morning I sent a letter to President Bush revealing
that the Pentagon's own auditors determined that Halliburton
overcharged by at least $100 million under its no-bid Iraqi oil
contract. Most of the overcharges were for petroleum brought in
from Kuwait during the time you were Ambassador. For months
Halliburton's subcontractor in Kuwait was a company called
Altanmia, a commercial marketing corporation, and they charged
inflated prices to import fuel. In late 2003, the Army Corps of
Engineers sought out lower-priced alternatives to Altanmia.
However, based on documents this committee obtained from
the State Department, it appears that you personally intervened
to halt this effort and keep the Kuwait company. On December 2,
2003 you sent on an e-mail saying, ``Tell KBR, Halliburton's
subsidiary, to get off their butts and conclude deals with
Kuwait now. Tell them we want a deal done with Altanmia within
24 hours, and don't take any excuses. If Ambassador Bremer
hears that KBR is still dragging its feet, he will be livid.''
You wrote that e-mail, didn't you? Is that correct?
[The information referred to follows:]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T0923.040
Ambassador Jones. That is an excerpt from an e-mail I sent,
yes.
Mr. Waxman. Why did you write it?
Ambassador Jones. Why did I write it?
Mr. Waxman. Yes.
Ambassador Jones. Congressman, I wrote that e-mail in my
capacity as the Chief Policy Officer and the Deputy
Administrator of Iraq, duties that I assumed on November 17th
of that year, about 2 weeks prior to the writing of that e-
mail.
When I assumed those duties, one of the first jobs
Ambassador Bremer gave me was to increase the supply of
humanitarian fuels for the Iraqi people. Now they had gas lines
of considerable length in the summer, and we had a very
difficult time in arranging fuel supplies for the Iraqi people
at that time. The situation in November was trending along
lines similar to what Ambassador Bremer had seen in the summer.
He was very anxious to increase the supply of fuel for the
Iraqi people, and so he asked me to undertake this, even though
this was actually not in my area of normal responsibility,
because my counterpart had not yet arrived in country----
Mr. Waxman. Let me ask you this; there was an emergency in
May 2003 right after the hostilities ended, and the auditors
took that into account, they said these high prices might have
been reasonable for 1 to 3 months, but this was going on for
almost a year.
They also said the Defense Department refused to show that
they exhausted cheaper fuel sources from Jordan and Turkey. If
the Army was looking for a cheaper way to do the job, why would
you tell them not to look for a cheaper way but to sign another
contract with Altanmia?
Ambassador Jones. Mr. Representative, I never spoke to the
Army about this contract; I never asked them to ignore lower
cost suppliers. If you allow me to continue, I can explain the
complete story to you.
Mr. Waxman. Well, the problem is that we only have a
limited time, so why don't you directly answer the question.
Ambassador Jones. OK. One of my first duties was to obtain
more fuel supplies. The first thing I did was travel to Ankara,
where I met with Turkish authorities in order to clear up
congestion on the borders which was inhibiting our supply of
fuel from Turkey----
Mr. Waxman. Mr. Jones, I'm going to have to interrupt you.
Let me just ask you the next question. You're a political
appointee of the Bush administration, why did you exert such
extreme pressure on civil service contracting officials to get
them to sign their----
Ambassador Jones. I never exerted any pressure on any
contracting officials. I never spoke to KBR about its contract,
I never spoke with anyone about KBR's contract. If you allow me
to continue, Congressman----
Mr. Waxman. Well, you did send them an e-mail.
Ambassador Jones. That e-mail relates to lifting deliveries
of fuel for the month of December under a contract which KBR
had already agreed to several months before with Altanmia. The
only reason that I would mention a specific company is because
KBR already had a contract with that company. And we were
looking to get as much fuel as we could from all sources. We
had started by checking with Turkey, and we determined after my
trip that it would be impossible to increase the amount of fuel
that was coming in through Turkey.
I don't know anything about Jordan, I'm not privy to any
such contracts----
Mr. Waxman. Mr. Ambassador, there is a woman named Mary
Robertson, she was the contracting officer responsible for this
contract. She was so troubled by your e-mail that she wrote it
up in a letter saying, I will not succumb to political
pressures from the U.S. Embassy to go against my integrity and
pay a higher price for fuel than necessary. So she clearly felt
it was pressure. Were you aware of this, or have you become
aware of this?
Ambassador Jones. I have heard that she circulated such a
letter; however, I do not know this person, I have never met
her, I have never spoken with her, I don't know on what basis
she made that claim.
Mr. Waxman. Well, when she made the basis for that claim,
she was a career contracting officer, and she wanted to get
Kuwaiti approval of another company to import the fuel. Did you
make any attempt to persuade the Kuwaitis to approve another
company?
Ambassador Jones. I did not intervene in any way in the
contracting process.
Mr. Waxman. Well, let me ask you, have you ever met Waleed
al-Humaidhi, the general manager of Altanmia?
Ambassador Jones. Not to my recollection, sir.
Mr. Waxman. Let me make sure that you are saying that you
did not meet with him, for the record.
Ambassador Jones. I don't recall meeting with him. It's
possible he could have been in a meeting that I had with the
Kuwaiti Minister of Oil on one occasion.
Mr. Waxman. Well, we were informed that you had met with
Mr. al-Humaidhi in Kuwait.
Halliburton, a U.S. company, the U.S. Government was paying
hundreds of millions of dollars to this company, Altanmia, and
now Pentagon auditors have concluded they were overcharged. Did
you ever have any cause to doubt Mr. Waleed al-Humaidhi's
trustworthiness in his business dealings with the U.S.
Government or Halliburton.
Ambassador Jones. No, because I wasn't privy to those
dealings.
Mr. Waxman. Have you ever heard of Mr. al-Humaidhi?
Ambassador Jones. I have heard of him, certainly. And there
were people in my staff who may have had contact with him, but
personally, no, I never did, other than the possibility that he
may have been in presence in one meeting I had with the
Minister of Oil.
Mr. Waxman. You had no reason to believe that he was not a
credible person.
Ambassador Jones. No, I do not.
Mr. Waxman. Well, according to internal embassy documents
obtained by this committee Mr. al-Humaidhi multiple repeated
allegations to embassy officials at your embassy that
Halliburton executives demanded kickbacks. He said it was,
``common knowledge that Halliburton officials were on the take,
that they solicit bribes openly, that anybody visiting their
seaside villas at the Kuwaiti Hilton with offers to provide
services would be asked for a bribe.'' That's what Mr. al-
Humaidhi said. Did you ever investigate these allegations?
[The information referred to follows:]
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Ambassador Jones. The U.S. Embassy is not an investigative
body, we have no such authority. However, we did refer all of
those allegations to their proper investigating authority,
which is the Defense Contract Audit Agency. So we took the
appropriate steps that we could as U.S. Government officials.
Mr. Waxman. Let me go back to the first question. Why did
you, as a political appointee Ambassador in Kuwait, send an e-
mail, from which I take an excerpt, to tell KBR, the
Halliburton subsidiary, to get off their butts and conclude
deals with Kuwait, now tell them we want to deal with Altanmia
within 24 hours, and don't take any excuses. Why single out
Altanmia if they were----
Ambassador Jones. Sir, Altanmia was the company that had
the contract with KBR already to provide the fuel, and we were
looking for fuel from every source available to us. I had
already been to Turkey and had determined that there was not
going to be any capability of increasing fuel supplies from
Turkey in the short run. We had one source where there was a
contract that was not being fully utilized, and that was the
KBR contract with Altanmia. We had already had contact with
KBR--not me personally, but officials of the Coalition
Provisional Authority had already been urging KBR to increase
the amount of fuel that it was purchasing. They had been
involved in discussions. We had been led to believe those
discussions were almost complete, and then I received a report
that they had broken down. And so that's when I--that was the
context in which I sent that e-mail, but this was lifting under
a contract that had already been agreed to between KBR and----
Mr. Waxman. Mary Robertson, a civil service contracting
officer, said there were other companies that could bid and get
a lower price than Altanmia. As a result of Altanmia's charges,
we paid over $100 million, and later, when we finally figured
out how much we were being overcharged, the U.S. Government
told KBR we won't deal with you anymore, they put out a
competitive bid. Altanmia came in and they are charging a third
of the price to the desk operation for petroleum than what they
were charging when you and others pushed Halliburton into
this----
Ambassador Jones. I did not push Halliburton into anything.
Mr. Shays. The gentleman's time is up.
No, Ambassador Jones, I think it's clear that you didn't,
but----
Mr. Waxman. Mr. Chairman, rather than reach a conclusion, I
think this e-mail stands for itself.
Mr. Shays. No. I purposely didn't interrupt the gentleman
because he has rightfully wanted to get at this issue, and I
understand it; and this committee is helping him get the
documents that he's getting. I just apologize to you, Mr.
Jones, because I didn't tell you, nor did I know, that you
would be asked these questions, and they're almost an attack on
your integrity and you haven't had time to review them. So I
apologize for that.
Mr. Waxman. Mr. Chairman----
Mr. Shays. No, I have the floor.
I want to explain to you, Mr. Waxman, I understand your
motivation because this committee, and has not and the full
Congress has not had the kind of hearings on this that you
rightfully requested, and I hope to resolve that. I think the
solution is to have a hearing on this issue where the witness
is told about it and warned about it and so on.
I just to want say to you, Ambassador Jones, I have been to
Iraq seven times, and I would have written the same memo. We're
in the first 6 months of the rebuilding of Iraq, and we need
that fuel out there. I would have been the first to do it. And
I would stand by that statement any day.
Ambassador Jones. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I appreciate it.
Mr. Shays. Now if there were issues about what contracts
were let out in the future, that's another issue, and I
understand. And I also agree with you, Mr. Waxman, in that
Halliburton was overpaid.
Mr. Waxman. Mr. Chairman, would you yield to me?
Mr. Shays. Briefly I will yield to you.
Mr. Waxman. Thank you. You've been a fair chairman to allow
the questions to be asked.
I was not taking any liberty in asking something that Mr.
Jones needed to review because he was the Ambassador, he wrote
the e-mail; I wanted to ask about that.
And I don't believe, Mr. Chairman, had you been in this
position, if the civil service contracting officer said that
there was a chance to get the oil at a cheaper price, you would
have said no, go with the company that's going to charge the
higher price because you've already overpaying them, let's
continue to overpay them.
Mr. Shays. Reclaiming my time.
Mr. Waxman. Thank you for the courtesy of the questions.
Ambassador Jones. If I could just follow up after that last
comment, Representative Waxman. I wouldn't either, and I never
did. Thank you.
Mr. Shays. And I think the point that I just want to put on
the record is 6 months into the rebuilding of Iraq and we were
starting to encounter some huge problems at this time, I just
would have wanted to resolve each of those problems and then
sort out the dollar amounts in the future.
But I would like to say that I was very grateful to you,
Ambassador Jones, that you came to this hearing to help us
understand what is also an issue that I know Mr. Waxman cares
deeply about, and that is, you know, how are we doing? What are
we doing to ultimately be able to transfer the power and the
responsibility?
I was a strong supporter of our seeing an Iraqi government
take over in June of last year, I thought that was a huge
moment in time. And one of the things that I have lost in my 7
visits in Iraq is that the Iraqis are a very proud people; you
embarrass an Iraqi in front of his wife, you might as well put
a dagger in his belly and twist it.
In the case now, what we're trying to get a handle on, and
it's so important that we do this because ultimately success
means that the Iraqis have the capability to defend their
democracy, something, first, they didn't have a democracy
before, and they are now. But it also means that ultimately our
role becomes a different role. It means that American solders
aren't having to patrol streets, it means American soldiers can
come into the background, and it means that ultimately they
will be called upon to take on particular actions, and not do
the everyday responsibilities that they are being asked to do
today.
Mr. Waxman. Mr. Chairman, I just want to point out that
$100 billion could have been used to train Iraqi security
forces, that was money that could have been used for our
troops; that was money that was wasted by the overpaying for
the petroleum. That was the point. I don't think it's
irrelevant to what we're talking about here, and I just wanted
to point that out----
Mr. Shays. I would like the gentleman not to be too
sensitive here because I'm trying to restrain myself as well.
The point is that I understand----
Mr. Waxman. Well, Mr. Chairman, are we going to hear the
testimony from the witnesses or----
Mr. Shays. I am reclaiming my time.
Mr. Waxman. May I inquire----
Mr. Shays. No, absolutely not.
Mr. Waxman. No, I don't want to inquire. Go ahead.
Mr. Shays. Come on, Henry, this is silly. This committee
will end up with no role if we're not going to do the role that
we have when we have this hearing, and this is an important
hearing.
I would like, if you would, Mr. Rodman, to just tell me
again so I can get refocused; what I think I'm hearing you say
is that your on-duty account of over 200,000 Iraqi security
forces--excuse me, Admiral Sullivan, what I'm hearing from this
is, as you went through it, that we on paper had this number,
but we began to realize that they were really people receiving
in a sense paychecks, but we had no sense of their
capabilities; is that an accurate statement?
Admiral Sullivan. I think that's exactly right, sir.
Mr. Shays. So DOD is attempting to fully appreciate what we
had, so then we began with a number that we thought were
trained. When that number drops down, that dotted line number
drops down, it's a figure, I guess--is that 150,000?
Admiral Sullivan. It's is actually a drop, let me just
check.
Mr. Shays. Is it 132?
Admiral Sullivan. The figure at the beginning of the green
line is 90,000. So we rent from roughly 160 in August 2004 to
90,000 in September 2004. Are you on the red line, sir?
Mr. Shays. I'm going from the red line down to the----
Admiral Sullivan. Yes, sir. 132 is the number at the
beginning--the left hand edge of the blue line.
Mr. Shays. Now, is that military, police and border patrol?
Admiral Sullivan. It's all of the Iraqi security forces,
it's police, border security, Army, National Guard, to the
extent that they exist, an air force, and maybe--all of the
Iraqi security forces to include the border, or the Facilities
Protections Service.
Mr. Shays. Then explain, did we think at that point that we
had 132,000 that were actually trained, or did we----
Admiral Sullivan. Yes, sir. That is the number that had
been through the coalition training programs for each of the
various categories that were in existence at the time.
Mr. Shays. And that's May 2004?
Admiral Sullivan. Yes, sir, that is May 2004.
Mr. Shays. And so then we increased that number, then it
started to level off, and then I'm seeing another drop. Explain
that next drop. And that number, if you could, that peek of the
train represents--what was that number?
Admiral Sullivan. About 160,000.
Mr. Shays. And so at 160,000 you dropped it down. Explain
that now.
Admiral Sullivan. We dropped it down to about 90,000, and
we did two things at that point. First of all, we eliminated
the Facilities Protection Service, which was not a part of the
Iraqi security forces----
Mr. Shays. Explain the Facilities Protection Service.
Admiral Sullivan. These are like night watchman, these are
people who were hired by the various ministries to stand guard
over their----
Mr. Shays. And they were hired by the Iraqi government?
Admiral Sullivan. Yes, sir. And in many cases, each
ministry had their own pool of these types of people. I equate
them to, if you go to Pentagon City Mall and you see the guards
walking around the mall, the Arlington County Police doesn't
count them as part of their county security forces.
The facility protection folks----
Mr. Shays. Does that account for the whole drop, or were
there some other reasons for that drop?
Admiral Sullivan. The second reason, and probably the most
significant reason from the standpoint of measuring our
progress, is that unless the people that were trained were also
fully equipped for whatever role they were playing, we did not
count them. So, for example, a soldier comes out but we don't
have a weapon to give him, we don't count him on that green
line; or if he doesn't have a radio that he needs to perform
the function.
Mr. Shays. So if he's trained but minus equipment, you're
not going to call him trained and equipped?
Admiral Sullivan. Yes, sir. That is the standard we're
using today, trained and equipped by the various programs that
are in existence.
Mr. Shays. And so under that first drop of trained, if we
had then done trained and equipped, it would have clearly been
well below that.
Admiral Sullivan. Yes, sir. Because at that point in time,
we were pumping out the graduates of the various courses faster
than the equipment was arriving, so they weren't all equipped.
Mr. Shays. In one of the contacts that I had with General
Petraeus, and then interacting with the Iraqis, what I was
being told was that Iraqis at one point were fighting next to
our own soldiers, but they did not feel that they had the same
equipment that our own forces had. So you could understand
their reluctance sometimes to engage in battles which were
sometimes--the implication was that they did not have the
courage and so on. They might not have had the experience, but
it was--as we began to understand this more in terms of
equipment and, in some cases, training, it became very
understandable.
And so, should I have some confidence that this trained and
equipped number we are at right now--at what number now?
Admiral Sullivan. We are 142,000. That is both ministries.
That is that chart that you have in front of you there, the
total trained and equipped.
Mr. Shays. So what you are doing now to help divide this up
for us is that you are telling us police and highway patrol,
55,000, the--what is the other?
Admiral Sullivan. Well, there are a number of forces that
have been established under the ministry of interior in
addition to your basic police and your highway patrol. They
include something called the civil intervention force, an
emergency response unit, the division of border enforcement--
that is your border police. There are special police commando
battalions, then there is dignitary protection services.
So all of those fall under the other ministry of the
interior forces.
Mr. Shays. Are you prepared to tell us which groups here
are the better trained? I mean, is the army better trained than
the police?
I mean, I realize their missions are different, but can you
tell us where you have a little bit more confidence?
Admiral Sullivan. What I would do and the way I would
answer that, sir, is first of all, like you said, it is
comparing apples and oranges, because their missions are very
different. So I wouldn't want to say----
Mr. Shays. So we won't compare then. But I guess what I
want to understand is, do we have more confidence in the
training of the army than we do with the police, or do we have
more confidence in the vetting with the army than we do with
the police? Can you speak to that issue?
Admiral Sullivan. I would have to maybe take that one for
the record. But my off-the-cuff response is, I think we have
pretty equal confidence in both forces as they come through the
training programs that have been set up.
Mr. Shays. OK.
Mr. Christoff, would you respond to what you are seeing
here? How do you react to this when you see it? And tell me how
you react to it.
Mr. Christoff. First of all, I have found this chart very
helpful, because we have been, in some sense, struggling to try
to understand definitions, trying to understand what is trained
and equipped. There were prior terms that were used--``full
operational capability,'' ``limited operational capability.''
The one question I am still unclear about is that in
trained and equipped, are all of those forces fully equipped in
terms of having the body armor, the communications equipment,
the vehicles and the weapons that they need?
The reason why I am still unclear about that is because
September 2004 is the last time that there was really any
published information that went into the different categories
about the extent to which these different forces had all of the
equipment that they needed.
Mr. Shays. OK. And I do want to say parenthetically, just
reacting to my esteemed ranking member, I am eager to see us
spend money on training and equipment for Iraqis--so that they
do have the capability. That is one of my lessons learned from
my visits to Iraq, that they, one, need the training; and two,
they need the equipment.
Now, how we spend that money and so on, you know, that is
an obvious issue of whether we are spending it in the best ways
possible. But I want to say, this has helped me for first time
kind of sort out exactly, Mr. Christoff, your challenge.
So your point to me, though, is a better definition of
equipment would be helpful?
Mr. Christoff. To do the type of reporting that I last saw
in September 2004, in which you would break out the different
units and the percentage of weapons that they had available,
etc.
Mr. Shays. Admiral.
Admiral Sullivan. OK. I think I understand where Mr.
Christoff is going here, and that is really the next phase of
this effort. That is to develop the metrics for each of the
units, not only some measure what was just described in terms
of equipment, but also a qualitative assessment of their
ability to conduct their missions.
In our Army, it is called the ``unit status report,'' and
it takes into consideration a large number of things. At the
individual level, it takes into consideration, has the
individual been through the training that is required for him
to perform the job that he is assigned?
Does he have the equipment that he needs to perform that
job? Has he--at the unit level, that is, is that equipment,
whether it be vehicles, weapons, aircraft or whatever, is it--
has it met a certain minimum standard of operational readiness?
If they are required to have 1,000 sets of body armor for a
particular unit, does that unit have 1,000 sets of body armor?
Has the unit gone through unit training so that they know how
to operate together?
So that is a separate and distinct category from individual
training, where you teach the individual how to operate his own
weapon, now you teach him how to operate as a unit. So all of
that goes into a unit status report which is the means by which
we in our own military measure our own unit readiness.
There is a little bit of subjectivity in it, but most of it
is pretty well laid out in the governing directives, as to what
you have to rate yourself. If, for example, you have 100 trucks
and only 60 of them are operating up to standard, then you have
to drop your readiness rating in that particular category. And
that results in an overall readiness rating.
The subjectivity part includes, has this unit been in
combat? Has it been tested in combat with the enemy; and if so,
how did it do? Another unit perhaps has not engaged with the
enemy, so there is more uncertainty as to their readiness. So
that is the next step in this process in how do we begin
assessing the Iraqi units in a similar way that we assess our
own military forces across all of the services.
Mr. Shays. One of the things I am struck by is that you can
train them extensively and have confidence, but if they have
not engaged in encounters with the enemy, you really can't have
the kind of assessment that----
Admiral Sullivan. Even in our own military, not every unit
gets engaged with the enemy. But we still are required to
assess our unit readiness. So that is the subjective part.
Mr. Shays. Right.
Admiral Sullivan. I mean, a commander who has seen a
particular battalion in the fight, and they have acquitted
themselves well, is going to have a higher personal assessment
of what that unit's readiness is than he will of a unit that
hasn't been tested.
Mr. Shays. I just conferred with Mr. Kucinich who--really
his time is now in use, so he has agreed that I can just
continue here a bit. That is the advantage when we have fewer
members, we can get into this a little bit more.
Can you explain to me, and then what I will tell you,
Ambassador Jones, I would be interested, given your experience
being in Iraq, how you react to all of this, and if you can add
a little color and tone to this.
But let me first ask you, Admiral, how about the police?
The same readiness standards?
Admiral Sullivan. They are developing the same kind of
standards. I probably am better off deferring to INL to answer
that question, because there are different categories and
different standards that apply to the police services than
there are to military forces.
Mr. Todd. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Basically, I&L is a
subordinate to the command of General Petraeus and Munson in
general in Iraq, as well as we run the Jordan facility. We
develop the curriculum in Jordan for training we do in Jordan
as well as in Iraq.
We have been working on the readiness of our police force,
as you know, over the last 18 months. A big part of the
readiness, to be quite frank with you, is the FTO program. Our
training is broken down into two parts. One part is the 8-week
training course, and then the next part is the on-the-job
training that takes place supposedly over the next 6 to 8
months.
Over the last 18 months, because of the security situation,
General Petraeus with, of course, General Casey's blessings has
morphed the FTO program into being less rather than more. So
the readiness is in a constant state of play. It is getting
better; the FTO program is improving.
We are improving basically the IPLOs, which are the
advisors that go into the field with the actual police
officers. We have right now over 300 outside of Baghdad, we
have approximately 200 in Baghdad; and we think the force is
getting better.
Mr. Shays. Ambassador, do you care to add any comment, just
in general about the questions that I've asked?
Ambassador Jones. No. I am glad you mentioned the police,
because the comment that I have been wanting to make while
listening to this is that the problem is that the equipment and
training standards are rightfully different for the police than
for the armed forces. Even within the armed forces, different
units get different equipment and training, of course.
But particularly on the police side, what we saw in April,
there were a lot of problems in the south at that time with the
police coming under attack and leaving their police stations,
leaving their posts. And when we went back and looked at the
situation, it was exactly what you were alluding to, they were
basically outgunned by their opponents.
At that time, at least, we were training and equipping the
police for police functions. And they were equipped as you
would expect police to normally be equipped. But, in fact, they
were attacked by forces that were equipped more like an army.
And it is very hard for light police forces to stand up to an
army.
I mean, for example, they were coming under mortar and RPG
fire in their police stations. And, you know, we put it all
into perspective at that point, and realized that, well, yes,
these people cut and run, but it is probably better that they
did so to preserve their lives so they can be used at some
point in the future.
And it did, I think, cause us to reassess how we were
training and equipping people. We realized that we had to plus-
up the equipment that we were giving to the police, because the
problem is, they couldn't choose who their opponents were.
Their opponents chose the fight. If they were only equipped as
sort of a normal police force, they would have a very difficult
time standing up to some of the opponents they were going to
face on the ground in Iraq.
So we had to upgrade that. I think that process has been
ongoing since that time.
Mr. Rodman. Mr. Chairman, I just wanted to broaden the
point that Ambassador Jones just made. The chart on historical
perspective shows us doing a number of things. It shows us
learning some lessons from experience, it shows us adapting to
changes and circumstances.
At the very beginning, when we got there, there was a
premium on numbers. The Iraqi army and police had evaporated.
So there was a premium on getting people out there,
establishing a governmental presence--police on the beat,
people protecting facilities--and we knew they were not trained
to do heavy duty functions, but we needed to establish an Iraqi
presence.
Mr. Shays. I understand, because I was asking you to do
that, and so were other Members of Congress. So we were all
playing a role in this. I am not saying that as a compliment, I
am saying in some ways that we were asking you to do something
that was very difficult.
Mr. Rodman. Well, that is correct. But then in April 2004,
you remember, there was a surge in violence and these people
were tested, police and army units, and we realized that a lot
of them did not meet the test, so we gave ourselves a more
rigorous measure of who really was trained to do a mission.
And the second dotted line--again as Admiral Sullivan has
explained, after General Petraeus arrived, we dropped the
facilities protection people out because that was a lesser--not
as important as the police and combat function. And, in
addition, we started looking toward the Iraqi--the Iraqis
themselves taking on greater responsibility. And so we again
gave ourselves a harder metric of people who were trained and
equipped up to a higher standard, such that we could begin to
look toward an Iraqi force that could take on real
responsibility.
So that is really the story that this chart tells.
Mr. Shays. I am not going to spend a lot more time
questioning this panel when Mr. Kucinich is done. He may then
have a few more questions.
But the question I would like you to think about is what
are those numbers ultimately going to be in each area, where we
have a comfort level that they should have at least the
opportunity, a fair shot, to be able to realize ``success.''
So, Mr. Kucinich, thank you for your patience.
Mr. Kucinich. Mr. Chairman, thank you. Thank you for
holding this hearing and providing the opportunity for the
Congress to ask some necessary questions.
Mr. Rodman began by saying that the strategy is political
as much as it is military. I would respectfully suggest to the
witnesses that the report that you just brought to this
Congress with this slide show, as you call it, or side show as
I would call it, is unfortunately political.
Let me be specific, and the people in the media who are
seated in the corner might want to follow this discussion. If
you look from the peak of involvement, 206,000 troops, and you
go to 90,000, and you see--what you see is a drop-off of about
53 percent in one-half year. And in the latest--of the latest
figures, GAO says the number of Iraqi police is unreliable.
Now, let us take this chart and the GAO report together and
add to it the second chart that the witnesses provided about
the current status of trained and equipped Iraqi security
forces. You start to develop a totally different picture.
First of all, the GAO says that the numbers are unreliable
with respect to both the data from the ministry of interior
forces and the ministry of defense forces. I take it they are
talking about all of the numbers.
Second, the GAO points out there is no consistent, accurate
reporting, which frankly makes these numbers fiction,
especially the ones of the ministry of interior forces.
Third, the GAO says, and this--one of the witnesses
admitted, that with respect to the ministry of interior forces,
the unauthorized absences of personnel are included in these
numbers, which is a polite way of saying that these books are
cooked.
And the fourth point is, the GAO says that the Department
of Defense and State no longer report on the extent to which
Iraqi security forces are equipped with their required weapons,
vehicles, communications equipment and body armor. So much for
security forces.
On the fifth point, GAO has pointed out that there is no
means in place to even measure the success of the Iraqi
security forces.
You should be embarrassed to be here. I mean, this is like
fantasyland. This is as fictive as the weapons of mass
destruction are.
I mean, I am embarrassed for you that you would come to a
congressional committee with this kind of a phony report. Just
look at the numbers. And I sat down there so I could take a
careful look at the chart. Not reliable data. That is the best
that can be said of what you are presenting to this committee,
the best.
Now, speaking of not reliable data, Ambassador Jones, I
just want to reiterate what Mr. Waxman said about the $100
million that was overpaid, that could have been used for
training the Iraqi security forces or for equipping our troops.
But let me for a moment go into another part of your
illustrious background, which is quite impressive. You served
from November 17, 2003, until June 28, 2004, concurrently, as
the chief policy officer and deputy administrator of the
Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq. That is from your
biography here.
It also says something that I think is very interesting,
that you have a proficiency in a number of languages, including
Arabic; is that correct? Well, then would you be so kind as to
enlighten me as to how in the world the Coalition Provisional
Authority, during the time that you were one of the officials,
lost track of $90 billion?
It certainly wasn't because, according to an audit that was
done that this committee is familiar with, they lost track of
how the Iraqi Government was spending $90 billion, that the
Coalition Provisional Authority had the responsibility for
oversight. Hello?
Do you want to give some accounting here, to be the first
person in the administration to offer a guess as to where the
money is?
Mr. Shays. Will the gentleman just yield a second? Do you
want them to first answer your first part and you will have
time to ask this.
Mr. Kucinich. I am asking the Ambassador a question. We can
get back to the other witnesses so they can engage.
Mr. Shays. I just wanted to know.
Mr. Kucinich. I did not ask, Mr. Chairman, a specific
question. I made a statement. I want an answer from Ambassador
Jones.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Ambassador Jones. Representative Kucinich, I haven't seen
the report that you are talking about. So you have me at a
disadvantage. But I believe that the figure you mentioned, $90
billion, could not possibly be accurate.
Mr. Kucinich. Excuse me. I misspoke. It was $9 billion. I
misspoke.
Ambassador Jones. Whatever the figure is----
Mr. Kucinich. It was $9 billion. Thank you.
Ambassador Jones. I see.
Mr. Kucinich. I am glad you see. It was $9 billion.
Ambassador Jones. I do not know what it was. I haven't seen
the report. I just knew that $90 billion could not possibly be
right.
Mr. Kucinich. I just corrected the record.
Ambassador Jones. You have me at a disadvantage. I haven't
read the report. But I can assure you that all of those who
worked at the Coalition Provisional Authority felt that they
had a fiduciary interest on the behalf of the Iraqi people to
use Iraqi funds in the best manner possible, for those Iraqi
funds that we had under our jurisdiction.
And I can assure you that any American funds were also
treated with the same high standards. Whether or not the
standards----
Mr. Kucinich. Let me cite the record. On January 30, 2005,
the same day as national elections were held in Iraq, the
Special Inspector General of the Coalition Provisional
Authority noted in a report that the Coalition Provisional
Authority could not account for $9 billion in funds transferred
from the CPA to the interim Iraqi Government.
Now, Ambassador Jones, you have not read that report?
Ambassador Jones. It hasn't been provided to me, no.
Mr. Kucinich. Do you have any interest in the report?
Ambassador Jones. It doesn't--it does not relate to my
current responsibilities.
Mr. Kucinich. Mr. Rodman, have you read the report?
Mr. Rodman. I have not read it. I have seen that figure
published.
Mr. Kucinich. Mr. Rodman and Ambassador Jones, who is
investigating the IG's findings that $9 billion is missing in
Iraq? Mr. Rodman.
Mr. Rodman. I can get you that answer for the record,
Congressman.
Mr. Kucinich. Ambassador Jones.
Ambassador Jones. I think Assistant Secretary Rodman has
given a good answer.
Mr. Kucinich. The inspector general of the Coalition
Provisional Authority--Mr. Chairman, I sent you a letter on it
asking for a hearing on it. I did not know that we were going
to have two gentlemen who, you would assume, would have some
interest in the fact that $9 billion, which went--which the
Coalition Provisional Authority had responsibility for
accounting for, in funds that were transferred from the CPA to
the interim Iraqi Government, that they can't give any answer
at all.
No clue? I mean, is this possible, that they could have
been in a position of responsibility, that a report has been
issued and you haven't read that report about $9 billion
missing? I find that incredible.
You want to give it a try again, Ambassador? Are you
really--you took an oath here.
Ambassador Jones. I am waiting for you to finish speaking,
sir.
Mr. Kucinich. That is kind of you, but I just asked you a
question.
Ambassador Jones. I told you I have not read the report. I
have not read the report because I was not in my current
assignment when it was released, and I have other duties. I do
not spend my time going over an inspector general's report. An
inspector general is an investigation. That is what he is
trying to find out.
Now, because I haven't read the report, I cannot answer you
to the extent that I would like.
Mr. Kucinich. You have no knowledge of the inspector
general's report?
Ambassador Jones. I saw the press reports. But as I said,
it is not part of my current duties from----
Mr. Kucinich. Did anyone from the IG's office contact you
to------
Ambassador Jones. No. No. It was not my responsibility when
I was in Iraq, sir.
Mr. Kucinich. You were the chief policy officer and deputy
administrator of the Coalition Provisional Authority?
Ambassador Jones. There were two deputies to Ambassador
Bremer. There was an operational deputy. That is where the
money was.
Mr. Kucinich. What was his name?
Ambassador Jones. I was the policy director.
Mr. Kucinich. Who was the operational deputy where the
money was?
Ambassador Jones. There were three during my tenure. The
names are in the public record.
Mr. Kucinich. You never heard any discussion about them
losing control of the money?
Ambassador Jones. From what you have described, it is very
difficult for me to understand which period you are even
talking about, sir.
You said transferred by CPA to the IIG. The IIG did not
exist until June 28th, which is when CPA disappeared, and we
all left Iraq.
Mr. Kucinich. This was during the time that CPA was in
charge, and it was during the time that you, sir, were a member
of that organization. That----
Ambassador Jones. You are speaking about Iraqi funds.
Mr. Kucinich. Listen, are you saying those funds aren't as
interesting to this committee?
Ambassador Jones. No, I am trying to clarify.
Mr. Kucinich. That is exactly what I am saying.
Ambassador Jones. I am not aware that we transferred any
money to the control of Iraqi officials during CPA's tenure.
Mr. Kucinich. Well, the inspector general seems to think
that you had control of $9 billion that you did transfer, and
now you are saying----
Ambassador Jones. CPA had fiduciary responsibility to
administer the development fund for Iraq, DFI. We used those
moneys for the benefit of the Iraqi people in a number of ways.
And CPA kept very detailed records, and that is why I am
perplexed to hear your description of the report. I would have
to read the report to respond effectively. And that is what
Assistant Secretary Rodman has suggested we will do, and we
will do so.
Mr. Kucinich. Mr. Chairman, I have a copy of the audit
report here, the oversight of funds provided to Iraqi
ministries, to the national budget process, from the Office of
the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, dated on
the date that I said.
And I have an executive summary here which points out the
scope of the audit, points out that,
The Coalition Provisional Authority provided less than
adequate controls for approximately $8.8 billion in DFI funds
provided to Iraqi ministries during the national budget
process; did not establish or implement sufficient managerial,
financial or contractual controls to ensure the funds were
being used in a transparent manner. Consequently, there is no
assurance that the funds were used for the purposes mandated by
Resolution 14-83.
With respect to managerial controls, they did not implement
adequate managerial controls over DFI funds provided to Iraqi
ministries to the national budget process; specifically,
authorities and responsibilities over DFI funds were not
clearly assigned, and CPA regulations, orders and memoranda did
not contain clear guidance regarding the procedures and
controls for disbursing funds in a national budget.
With respect to financial controls, they did not implement
adequate financial controls to ensure DFI funds were properly
used. With respect to contract controls, the CPA did not
adequately control the DFI contracting actions.
While acknowledging the extraordinarily challenging threat
environment that confronted the CPA throughout its existence,
we believe the CPA's management of Iraq's national budget
process and oversight of Iraqi funds was burdened by severe
inefficiencies and poor management.
And then it goes on and on and on.
Now, I want to include this in the record, if I may, Mr.
Chairman, and once again express my astonishment that someone
who was in any kind of a policy role with respect to the CPA
wouldn't be literate about the content of this record, and
would tell this committee that they just do not know anything
about it.
Mr. Shays. Well, if the gentleman would yield. Like my time
was up, his time is up. And I would be happy to let him proceed
on this.
But I just have to say that there is only one witness who
would have a tangential responsibility, but his issue was
policy, not operations of the budget. And the one thing I--
someone said, if you are a workaholic, there is one place to go
to; that is Iraq.
I don't have any doubt at all that Ambassador Jones, spent
every waking hour in Iraq working. But he was doing the areas
and responsibilities that he was tasked. If there is a fault
here, then put it on my shoulders for not responding to your
January 31st letter, in general. But this is an issue to which
I have tasked my staff to decide how we are going to allocate
our hearings.
This is an important issue. I don't want to discount it. I
think it is very unfair to Ambassador Jones to put the weight
of this on him. It should really be more directed at me. And I
would just like to say that I appreciate the gentleman's
patience.
Could I ask if there is any point in which the Democratic
side of the aisle is going to deal with the hearing that we are
undertaking, or is it going to be about an issue that is not
part of the hearing? That is what I am wrestling with.
Mr. Kucinich. Well, Mr. Chairman, then let me be of
assistance to you in that regard.
This panel is trying to make a case about the effective
transition toward the handling of the security of Iraq by the
Iraqi security forces. I pointed out that by the very
information that they have presented, they have not made their
case. In fact, they have made a good case that they failed.
Furthermore, the connection is this, Mr. Chairman: We have
to vote this week on $82 billion--something in the area of
that--for a supplemental appropriation for Iraq. And it is
relevant if the people who are coming before us, who are tasked
with responsibility in that area, cannot give us a straight
story on anything--on what happened to $9 billion, on what the
status is of the Iraqi security force.
I mean, as far as I am concerned--and you did the right
thing in calling this hearing, and I am grateful for it--but
this is central to why we are here.
Mr. Shays. Well, the problem is that I will be discouraged
from having a hearing on a topic, because I do not know if one
side of the aisle or the other is going to address the issue.
Ambassador Jones was scheduled to go to Iraq. He is here
today to answer questions about the whole training issue to
which he has tremendous expertise and knowledge. And I just
want to say to you that you made points in the beginning that I
think, if they were true and you feel they are true, they
should have the opportunity to respond to them.
And that is, the essence was, your point was that these
numbers are somehow inaccurate and bogus. And what I felt from
this hearing is----
Mr. Kucinich. The GAO said that.
Mr. Shays. No, what they said was they are numbers, and I
think their numbers were unclear, and what they have done is
come in to try to help us understand. And I think Mr.
Christoff's response was, now I am able to put into perspective
these various issues.
For me, the reason why I was eager to have this hearing was
to begin to understand how we are doing, and what it is going
to take to have success. I do not even feel--and correct me if
I'm wrong, gentlemen of the panel; I do not feel like you are
making a great claim that we have success here.
You are trying to have us understand, as this war
proceeded, how you have tried to sort out what it will take to
have success, and to give us accurate numbers about what you
think that will be. That is what I was getting from this
hearing.
But I am not, again, discounting the issue of concern that
my colleague has. I just didn't give him the panel and the
people who have the expertise to answer his question. And the
reason why I haven't made a bigger deal out of this issue is, I
think you have a legitimate right to be frustrated that we in
Congress haven't come to address the money issue better.
But this is an extraordinarily important hearing about how
well trained the police are, how well trained the border patrol
are, how well trained the army is, what are the numbers that we
can get a handle on. We are starting to get them for the first
time since I have been in Congress. I really appreciate it.
The gentleman has the floor to proceed to this question.
But I hope they can--this panel can address your first point.
Mr. Kucinich. Well, I would like each of the witnesses to
answer the question, yes or no, whether you believe that this
administration underestimated the levels and abilities of
insurgents in Iraq.
Mr. Christoff.
Mr. Christoff. I do not think I have enough information to
address that.
Mr. Kucinich. I accept that.
Mr. Rodman. The situation changed. I think the regime had a
preexisting plan to resort to guerilla warfare when the regime
collapsed, and they gradually put this plan into effect. And we
have adapted to the changes in circumstances as we have
encountered them.
Mr. Kucinich. So you are saying that this is Saddam
Hussein's doing, this insurgency?
Mr. Rodman. We know for a fact that this was a plan set up
by the Iraqi security services to resort to this kind of
warfare after the regime.
Mr. Kucinich. Is Saddam directing this from his cell?
Mr. Rodman. No. But the direction of the insurgency is
hard-core, former regime elements.
Mr. Kucinich. This plan was in motion--and do you know for
a fact? Have you seen such a plan?
Mr. Rodman. We have information that is a specific plan by
the old regime, and they gradually regrouped and started to put
it into effect, and we have adapted to that.
Mr. Kucinich. So is your answer yes or no that they
underestimated the level in abilities of the insurgents in
Iraq?
Mr. Rodman. We did not anticipate the kind of insurgency as
it evolved; and we have adapted to it, and we are responding to
it to defeat it.
Mr. Kucinich. Thank you.
Admiral Sullivan. Before I address that question, I would
like to address the first comment.
Mr. Kucinich. Why not address my question? Answer my
question, if you would, please; then I would like to hear from
you about anything else.
Admiral Sullivan. I would be happy to respond, sir. I think
Mr. Rodman said it exactly right. We did not anticipate the
level of insurgency that we saw, especially as it built through
the year 2004.
Mr. Kucinich. OK. You had something else you wanted to say,
Admiral.
Admiral Sullivan. I do.
First of all, I am not embarrassed to be here in front of
this committee, and I stand by the numbers that are on that
chart that I showed you. If you will allow me to explain why I
say that, I will.
These numbers are verified every week by General Petraeus
and by General Casey. We trust their judgment. The numbers on
the ministry of defense forces absolutely represent those
personnel that have been trained and equipped through our
training system.
The number under the ministry of interior forces likewise
represents the numbers of personnel that have been trained and
equipped through our system.
And I would submit to you, it would be more ``cooking the
books'' if we took this asterisk off the chart and tried to
represent that all 81,889 of these people were on duty.
Instead, we have tried to be up front with you and admit that
there are gaps in our knowledge as to who is on duty on a given
day.
Thank you.
Mr. Kucinich. May I ask you, Admiral, when you say
unauthorized-absence personnel are included in these numbers
under ministry of interior forces, do you want to explain what
you mean by that?
Admiral Sullivan. Yes, sir. As I explained at the
beginning, the accounting for the ministry of interior
personnel is less precise than it is for the ministry of
defense. They do shift work. At any given time, whatever kind
of shifts they are on, so many of those people are not on duty,
only the personnel whose shift is on duty are on duty.
Second, they do not have the--because they live at home,
they do not have the same kind of requirements for a morning
muster that the military forces do. So there is less certainty.
If patrolman so-and-so goes home to see his family for the
weekend and doesn't come back, they may not know that right
away. So it is just a less precise accounting, and it is the
nature of the business that they are in.
Mr. Kucinich. So there would tend to be an agreement with
the GAO, then, on your part?
Admiral Sullivan. The numbers that I presented to you
represent the numbers of personnel that have been trained and
equipped. It doesn't say they are all standing the beat right
now.
Mr. Kucinich. OK.
To Ambassador Jones, do you believe that this
administration underestimated the level and abilities of
insurgents in Iraq?
Ambassador Jones. I think that the answers that the
previous two witnesses have given are accurate.
I think that in the beginning--and you must recall that
Saddam Hussein was at large for 8 months after the liberation;
that is a long time to try and organize an insurgency, and I do
believe that he played a leading role in rallying his forces.
Obviously, since his capture, he hasn't been able to do that;
but in the 8 months prior to that, he was very active doing so,
and I think a plan that he set in motion continues.
But, as Admiral Sullivan mentioned, we have also seen a
growth in the insurgency. And so I think at any given time, we
probably had a relatively good handle on the size of the
insurgency, but the insurgency has been growing over time. It
goes down sometimes, but it also goes up.
I don't think that there have been wildly inaccurate
estimates of the insurgency at any given time, but rather that
the nature and the size of the insurgency has evolved, and we
have been trying to track that.
Mr. Kucinich. So are you saying that this insurgency does
or doesn't have something to do with Saddam Hussein?
Ambassador Jones. No. I think it definitely does; certainly
its origins do.
Mr. Kucinich. Mr. Todd.
Mr. Todd. I think prior to the war the size of the
insurgency was not contemplated at this level.
Mr. Kucinich. Well, it is also possible that the war
created a level of insurgency, is it not, Mr. Todd?
Mr. Todd. That is above my pay grade, sir.
Mr. Kucinich. OK.
Mr. Rodman.
Mr. Rodman. I don't believe that. I believe this was the
hard core of the old regime, the diehards who had a plan in
advance to organize themselves to do this kind of resistance.
Mr. Kucinich. Why is the hard core of the old regime
growing then?
Mr. Rodman. It is hard to estimate the numbers. It may be
that the political process will start to diminish the numbers
of insurgents, because I think a lot of the Sunni leadership is
opting now to join the political process rather than oppose it.
Mr. Kucinich. Are you going to--may I ask you, Mr. Rodman,
is the State Department going to utilize the experiences and
support of the U.N. and its peacekeeping operations to support
those forces?
Mr. Rodman. Well, first of all, I represent the Defense
Department. But, my understanding is, we have been trying for a
while to bring the United Nations into the process. I mean,
the--the multinational force, as it exists now, has a U.N.
mandate.
There are several U.N. resolutions since the war that have
given, as I say, a mandate to the multinational force. The main
role the U.N. has played most recently has been in helping the
political process in its earlier stages. But I think now--I am
not sure the United Nation's involvement would induce a lot of
other countries to join.
Mr. Kucinich. What would Secretary Rumsfeld's position be
then? Could you speak for him on that?
Mr. Rodman. We are very happy to have a coalition; in fact,
we have 20 to 30 countries in the coalition.
Mr. Kucinich. Has he considered turning operations over to
the U.N. at any point?
Mr. Rodman. I do not think the United Nations would be
willing to undertake this mission, so I think it is an academic
question.
Mr. Kucinich. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Shays. Thank you.
Let me, before moving on to the next panel, understand. Do
you think it is possible, Admiral, that we will have another
drop as we redefine--or when I say ``redefine,'' when we
qualify what we really need?
I mean, we went from training to trained and equipped. Do
you think that we are looking at kind of the last drop, and we
are pretty comfortable with this base to work on?
Admiral Sullivan. In terms of the trained and equipped, we
will not see a drop. I mean, that will continue to climb as we
execute.
Mr. Shays. But will there be some other----
Admiral Sullivan. I take your point. I think if we are able
to refine this unit status report metric that I described----
Mr. Shays. Which gets us on the sense of readiness?
Admiral Sullivan. Yes, sir; in other words, a way to look
at a particular Iraqi unit, for example, and assess whether
they are fully combat ready, marginally combat ready, not
combat ready, whatever kind of metrics we apply to it. What you
may see is a new set of metrics that would be available to
present to you, which describes how we assess the overall
readiness of the Iraqi army.
We are not ready to do that yet because we are still
developing that system.
Mr. Shays. One, it is important that you do develop that
system. We will be eager to have a sense of it. And I think Mr.
Christoff will agree. I am seeing him nod his head.
The other area that I am trying to--the subcommittee is
wrestling with, Ambassador, is, as you come here to speak
about--the reason why you were here to speak about the police,
we know the police have an extraordinarily difficult time
responding to attacks from people who are armed like they were
in the military.
But is it feasible that we would be making the police
capable to fight military? I am wrestling with what you make
police and what kind of capabilities you give police.
Ambassador Jones. No, in fact, we are developing special
police units which would be much more of a paramilitary force
than a traditional police force.
And I think Admiral Sullivan may have something to add on
that, as well as Mr. Todd.
Mr. Todd. Admiral Sullivan can speak to this better than I.
But DOD has a special mechanized brigade that is being created
in Iraq that will help with fairly high-intensity, mid-
intensity conflict situations.
We also have a special commando unit.
Mr. Shays. That is within the police?
Mr. Todd. Yes. In terms of the civilian side, we think that
civilian police are civilian police and most of the guys are
not being trained in paramilitary type things.
What we are doing, though, is morphing the training in both
Baghdad and in Jordan to teach them how to deal with the
insurgency, and how to deal with their survival. We teach them
everything from combat survival skills to more hand-to-hand
combat.
Our gun of choice is a 9 millimeter. We are going to be
teaching them in Jordan, as well as Iraq, on the AKs so they
will be better prepared.
Mr. Shays. In my experience in Iraq, I have encountered so
many, because I have gone outside of the umbrella of the
military and stayed in Basra and Al Kut and other places, and
when I would speak with everyday Iraqis, they were eager to
take on the responsibilities.
I mean, I had a number who--parents or brothers, uncles,
fathers--were in the military, concerned that they had lost
their jobs and saying, You know, these are good people; my dad
is a good man. Or some in the police force and so on.
What I would want to be part of this record is, I am in awe
of the number of Iraqis who are willing to stand in line and in
the course of standing in line, lose their lives. I am in awe
of the number of Iraqis who would come home only to be
threatened that they were helping this new Iraqi Government,
and their lives were being threatened and they still persist.
And then I am also understanding that there are some who
simply had to say, they could not continue if there was no way
to protect them, if their families were being threatened. I
mean, the logical thing would be--and I would be one of them if
I could not protect my family. If I was still participating
with this new government, and there was no way to protect them,
I am not going to have them have to suffer and risk their lives
for it.
But what I think is happening, and what I saw when I was in
Iraq during the voting, was the incredible number of Iraqis who
came to vote, who dressed up, who brought their children, and
were so proud that 165,000 Iraqis had actually taken the
responsibility of conducting this election. And frankly they
did it better that we do in the United States. I was in awe of
it.
There was one point where I was watching these Iraqis vote,
and I went up to the person who had taken the ballots and put
them on top of each of the three ballot boxes--the national,
the regional, and local. Before the person could put it in the
box, they had to dip their finger in, and I wanted to do the
same thing. I wanted to feel a part of this. And I went and
asked this person who was in charge if I could stick my hand in
the ink jar. She looked up at me and then looked around and
looked up at me and said, ``No.'' She said, ``You are not an
Iraqi.'' And I felt a little embarrassed as everyone looked at
me.
And then I thought, you know, they are proud. And there is
this identity, and we are going to win. They are going to win.
I believe that with all of my heart and soul.
I also want to say for the record, since I just believe it
with all of my heart and soul, you should be proud to do what
you are doing.
We are proud, so many of us are proud of what you are
doing. I am grateful that you came to this hearing today, and I
am grateful that you are helping us start to sort out an issue
that we have not gotten a handle on. And I believe, mixed in
this dialog of two different issues, if people are paying
attention, you have given us very, very important advice.
You have honored this committee, you have honored this
Congress by your presence. I am very grateful to each and every
one of you.
Do you have any closing comment or should we get to the
next panel?
Mr. Kucinich. Go for it.
Mr. Shays. Thank you. Before I end, what I do--I would like
this: Is there any question we should have asked? Is there any
point that you choose to make that needs to be made? Any
closing comments?
Mr. Christoff.
Mr. Christoff. No.
Mr. Rodman. I just want to add and second what the chairman
just said, but point out also on election day, it was the
Iraqis that took the responsibility for security, to protect
5,300 polling places around the country. And the insurgents
threw everything they had at the election process, double or
triple the number of attacks around the country, and not one of
these polling places had its perimeter breached by the
insurgents. So that is an indicator.
We are struggling here to find ways of measuring quality,
and one of them is how these Iraqis are performing under the
pressure of battle. And January 30th was an important omen in
many respects.
Mr. Shays. Thank you.
Ambassador Jones. Thank you very much for having us today.
Mr. Shays. Thank you for your patience.
Mr. Kucinich. Mr. Chairman, before we move on, just a
little bit of committee business. I wanted to, without--with
unanimous consent----
Mr. Shays. Gentlemen, you are set to go.
Mr. Kucinich [continuing]. With unanimous consent, include
the full report of the Office of Inspector General for the Iraq
Reconstruction.
Mr. Shays. That will be included.
[Note.--The Office of the Special Inspector General for
Iraq Reconstruction report entitled, ``Oversight of Funds
Provided to Iraqi Ministries Through the National Budget
Process,'' may be found in subcommittee files.]
Mr. Kucinich. By unanimous consent, the Congressional
Research Service report on the International Training for Iraqi
Security Forces.
Mr. Shays. Without objection.
[The information referred to follows:]
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Mr. Kucinich. And then the letter, too. And Mr. Waxman's
letter also by unanimous consent.
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Mr. Shays. We will have a 1-minute recess. Then we will
reconvene in 1 minute.
[Recess.]
Mr. Shays. Our second panel is Professor Anthony H.
Cordesman, Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy, Center for
Strategic and International Studies.
Kalev Sepp, professor of the Naval Postgraduate School, and
Mr. Peter Khalil, former Coalition Provisional Authority
Official, the Brookings Institution.
Gentlemen, as you know, we do swear you in; and if you
would stand, I would look forward to swearing you in and
hearing your testimony.
[Witnesses sworn.]
Mr. Shays. Your testimony is of tremendous interest to this
committee. Quite often, the second panel, having heard the
first panel, is able to help us sort out these issues in a way
that is very helpful.
So what I am going to do is allow you to go beyond your 5-
minute testimony, up to 10 for each of you, if you would like,
and then we can have some dialog. And with not many Members
present, we can have a lot better give-and-take.
So feel free to go through your testimony, if you would
like.
STATEMENTS OF PROFESSOR ANTHONY H. CORDESMAN, ARLEIGH A. BURKE
CHAIR IN STRATEGY, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL
STUDIES; KALEV SEPP, PROFESSOR, NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL; AND
PETER KHALIL, FORMER COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY OFFICIAL,
THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION
STATEMENT OF PROFESSOR ANTHONY H. CORDESMAN
Professor Cordesman. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And
thank you for the opportunity to testify this afternoon. I do
have a formal statement for the record, which basically
attempts to summarize what Iraqi attitudes are toward the
training and the level of development of their forces, and to
provide some additional data in direct response to the
committee's questions about numbers. And I ask that be placed
in the record.
Mr. Shays. Without objection, it will be.
Professor Cordesman. But let me make a few brief remarks.
First, I think that we need to be very careful about how
much attention we give to any of those numbers. We are talking
about a force that is in very rapid change and where much of
what we can quantify, I thought, as was well brought out in the
previous panel, is largely irrelevant.
We are talking about developing warfighting capabilities,
counterterrorism capabilities and counterinsurgency
capabilities, and the number of heads is not a measure of
capability.
Moreover, I think it is quite clear that even the plans we
have today are not going to survive engagement with reality. If
you look at the training methods that have been used, the
training syllabus, the methods of training have changed
virtually monthly since June 2004.
If you look at force levels, the army in June 2004, did not
have a clear goal. It then went to three divisions. Then it
went to four divisions. It recently went to nine divisions. It
has just gone to 10 divisions. And that, all since the end of
January.
And these are numbers in flux because the National Guard
was merged into the army, as an Iraqi not an American division.
Depending on what day this is, there are 13 to 14 different
elements of Iraqi forces in the Ministry of Interior and the
Ministry of Defense. Each serves a different purpose. Each has
some value. Most are not capable of operating independently.
We know that there is a new Minister of Defense and a new
Minister of the Interior coming. Papers are already being
prepared for them. If we go back to what happened in the
transition from the CPA to the interim government, that almost
certainly means there will be still further changes in
virtually every force in the overall pattern of Iraqi forces.
And the real government, in the sense of a truly elected,
sovereign government is supposed to be the product of the
election to be held either at the end of this year or the
spring of 2006. And I can almost guarantee you, from talking to
Iraqis, that with each month that goes by, they're going to
impose more of their own plans and their own demands.
But, having said that--and I think the key message of what
I said is this debate over tipping points is absurd. We are
talking about tipping years, at a minimum, 2005-2006. And just
having talked to Iraqi officials, they are talking about a
continued training and advisory presence through 2010.
We are also talking about some important changes which go
beyond the numbers. We have begun to recognize the realities of
the insurgency. I do not agree with what was said earlier.
We did not anticipate the size of the insurgency. It is not
a product of what Saddam and his forces left as a legacy. It
has mutated far beyond that. There are strong Islamist and
other elements, and it has considerable popular support, a
point made by Iraqi officials when they talk about some 200,000
sympathizers.
But at least we understand we are fighting an insurgency,
and we are fighting real terrorists. We understand Iraqi forces
have to be trained and equipped and led and given unit
integrity for that mission. We begin to understand at least
that our original equipment plan was grossly inadequate, as was
our facility plan.
We still have no clear plan to give Iraqi forces at any
level the equipment they need, but people are working on the
issue, and they are beginning to understand that if our troops
need up-armored Humvees, Iraqis cannot go out in unprotected
Toyotas. We see efforts to correct the facility problem. That
has been done largely in the military. It is now going to the
police and security forces.
In reality, we recognize that much of what was on the first
chart presented to the committee was manpower which should
never have been recruited in the first place. It wasn't
properly vetted; some of it wasn't literate. Much of it was in
poor physical condition or too old. And much of it, frankly,
was not put through the full training process that it was to
have been put through by the Coalition. That is being
corrected, particularly in the police and in the National
Guard.
With the Luck mission, we begin to understand one key
reality: Training never can produce competent combat troops.
Without leadership, without unit integrity, without experience;
this is not a factory. It is the battalions who actually
operate, learn in the field, sometimes from defeat, as you
pointed out, who have the courage to go on, who become
effective troops. No training system will ever produce those by
itself.
We also are beginning to see serious force elements, and
let me use some figures which are somewhat more up to date than
the ones presented on the chart shown earlier, although only by
a couple of weeks. We had one deployable battalion in July
2004. As of yesterday, we had claimed we had 52 deployable
battalions, out of a total of some 96 in structure. We have 24
deployable regular army battalions, and that will be 27 by the
end of next week.
Mr. Shays. I don't like to interrupt your testimony, but
can you put numbers of personnel next to those?
Professor Cordesman. To be perfectly honest, sir, the
numbers are going to be the same kind of numbers you get when
they are reported on by the U.S. Army, which is to say they are
nominal strengths, not real ones.
Mr. Shays. OK. I guess what I am trying to do is--is it
possible for me to hear your numbers compared to these numbers?
Professor Cordesman. Those numbers, as far as I know, sir,
are totally accurate. But if you were to say 24 to 27 regular
army battalions, that is something between 11,000 and 13,000
men. Those are part of the numbers on that chart. Now, they
have just had merged into them 76 battalions from the National
Guard. That would raise the figure by another 30,000 out of the
60,000. There is one mechanized battalion in that total. That
is much more critical than, say, 20,000 of the men on the
chart, because it means there are heavy units. You have a
counterterrorism force, and you have commando battalions that
are key elements there.
If you look at that total of some 82,000 men on the other
side of the chart, the total numbers are largely irrelevant.
But if you look within them, there are now 20 special police
force battalions. Nine of those are police commandoes; nine are
public-order battalions. Two are mechanized, and they have
light-armored vehicles for the first time. Those are the first
units who can actually go out and move, potentially, in the
face of the insurgency. You have SWAT teams coming on line.
There are five of them in service.
For the first time, there is actually a border battalion
trained and equipped to move, as distinguished from sitting
there and hoping that the bad guys come through them. There is
a national emergency police force. Now, how many people is
that? I haven't the faintest idea, because it's quite clear the
advisory teams feel those battalions in the police force are
much too large, very inefficient and need to be cut down and
reorganized.
It is somewhere around 16,000 out of those 82,000 people
that probably have some capability. But if you ask me, frankly,
how many of these units could really stand without the U.S.
Army or Marine Corps presence or the support of the U.S. Air
Force or without U.S. intelligence, the answer at this point is
none. They are not organized or equipped for that mission.
And, quite honestly, it is disingenuous to talk about how
well the Iraqis did in protecting polling places when we have
some 140,000 U.S. troops peaked and reorganized for 1 day to
help protect the people protecting the polling places. That is
not an indictment of what's being done. It produced a
successful election.
Let me then go on, though, to point out a few things about
what does have to happen. It is probably more important by far
that Iraq evolve political unity and inclusiveness than it is
that Iraq move forward in any given military or police
dimension. It is critical for security that the economy and the
distribution of income improve.
We talk a lot about the Iraqi troops, but let me note that
in this latest USAID report, we talk about a vast U.S. aid
program which is today only hiring about 100,000 Iraqis, and
the number keeps dropping. Security is economic, not just a
matter of military forces.
The numbers that you have on that chart for the police and
security forces do not include local police and militias that
are not trained by the United States, but at least in 10 to 12
of the provinces, security is much more a matter of day-to-day
police work, putting it into the threat of criminal activity,
than it is the United States or the multinational coalition's
training effort.
We are just beginning to see governance move into most of
the provinces, aside from the Kurdish areas. None of us know
what the new elected government will be or how it will change
police and security procedures. We are only beginning to know
how corrupt this structure is going to be. And let me say that
the chances of Iraq not having substantial corruption for at
least the next 10 years are nonexistent. To demand they not be
corrupt is simply absurd. It cannot happen.
Mr. Shays. Let me not try to cut you short, but just give
me a sense of how much longer you think you will be going.
Professor Cordesman. Two minutes, sir, I think.
Mr. Shays. OK.
Professor Cordesman. Having said that, on the military
side, our goal really has to be to put forces in the field that
can stand on their own. A plan is being developed to do that.
No plan has been stated in any unclassified forum as to how it
will be done. Any plan we draft then has to be approved by the
Iraqis, and at some point, the Congress is going to have to go
through that plan and fund a level of military equipment,
facilities and aid which it has never been requested to provide
and is not part of the supplemental.
To make this work, the Congress has to be responsive
quickly. It has to have trust in the nature of those
requirements, and it has to accept the fact that there isn't
going to be an efficient or effective accounting system in the
future any more than there was in that $8.8 billion that we
just heard in the first session of this hearing.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Professor Cordesman follows:]
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Mr. Shays. Are you talking about the $9 billion reference?
Professor Cordesman. Yes. I thought, frankly, Congressman,
with all due respect, that was to take a report totally out of
context; talking about the lack of adequate accounting
procedures and somehow act as if the money was missing or no
one knew in broad or even, frankly, fairly detailed terms where
it went. The report did not say that.
Mr. Shays. Well, having not read the report yet, I'm not in
the position to respond to it. But just before I recognize you,
Professor Sepp, the one thing that I have to agree with my
colleagues on the other side of the aisle, because we haven't
conducted hearings in that area, we basically provide the
minority their only opportunity to kind of ambush any witness
that they can try to make a statement or try to understand the
issue.
So my basic view is we should just bite the bullet and have
the hearings on these issues and know what is accounting
issues, know what is waste, what is corruption, whatever. And
until we do that, we are going to end up having these kinds of
bifurcated hearings, which are regretful.
But I hear your point, and I happen to agree with it.
Professor Cordesman. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Shays. Thank you. And I appreciate your statement. I
will say that, when I said 10 minutes, I did not look down and
fully grasp that both of you are professors, and that was a
dangerous thing to do. I think we gave you about 14. But the
other part was that, unlike some professors, you were very
provocative, and you have raised a number of questions.
You speak in some absolutes, which makes me wonder if it
can be quite that absolute. But very helpful testimony. I thank
you.
Professor Sepp.
STATEMENT OF KAVLEV I. SEPP
Professor Sepp. Mr. Chairman, it is an honor for me to have
this opportunity to discuss the training of Iraqi security
forces.
Mr. Shays. It is an honor to have you here. Thank you.
Professor Sepp. Thank you, sir. I believe you are justified
in examining the plans for the training of Iraqi security
forces, as security of the lives and property of the native
population is one of the most important objectives of a viable
counter-insurgency strategy.
Mr. Chairman, I have provided written testimony for the
record. I would now like to outline for you the salient points
that I think would be most helpful to you in your
deliberations.
Mr. Shays. That would be great.
Professor Sepp. As a trained historian, some of these will
be historical in nature and known to you, but it builds to my
point.
Mr. Shays. As an amateur historian, I'll look forward to
it.
Professor Sepp. First, the situation in Iraq. There is a
violent insurgency in Iraq that directly threatens U.S.
strategic interests in the Middle East and Southwest Asia.
Depending which estimate one consults, between 10,000 and
50,000 armed combatants, supported by hundreds of thousands of
auxiliaries and sympathizers, are seeking to overthrow the
existing Iraqi government and expel the coalition from Iraq.
The security situation in Iraq is almost wholly dependent
on the continued long-term presence of coalition forces and
U.S. forces in particular. The situation is due to the near
complete elimination of the old regime's armed forces and
internal security apparatus by its physical destruction and its
disestablishment by coalition military forces and the Coalition
Provisional Authority respectively.
The failure to fill the security vacuum was due to
incomplete planning by the commander and staff of U.S. Central
Command, who confused fighting a war with winning a war. The
absence of sufficient U.S. forces in Baghdad to establish and
enforce martial law at the moment of collapse added to the
degeneration of the security situation.
These failures were compounded by the posting of the chief
of reconstruction, who had agreed to serve for only 90 days,
inferring that a country distorted by a decades old
dictatorship could be rehabilitated in only 3 months.
Mr. Shays. What was that, the chief of reconstruction?
Because I may forget how you said that, I didn't understand
what you said. The chief of reconstruction. Who was that?
Professor Sepp. The Office of Reconstruction and
Humanitarian Assistance.
Mr. Shays. General Garner?
Professor Sepp. Lieutenant General J. Garner.
Mr. Shays. Oh. And he came in before Bremer?
Professor Sepp. Yes, sir.
Mr. Shays. He would only be there for?
Professor Sepp. Ninety days. He told me personally that was
his agreement with the Secretary of Defense.
Mr. Shays. Yes. I hear you. I just needed to make sure we
were identifying the right issue.
Professor Sepp. And on that point, consider by contrast the
lengthy occupation and reconstruction of the American South and
the slow formation of a new army of national unity after our
own Civil War.
The subsequent decision by the head of the Coalition
Provisional Authority to disband the entire Iraqi armed forces
rather than gradually demobilize them placed the burden on
providing security for the Iraqi people entirely on the
coalition occupation forces. That is the situation.
Second, the training of Iraqi security forces by U.S.
military personnel. This is a problem because the U.S. military
has historically not done a good job of training foreign
armies. The Filipino army the U.S. trained before World War II
was handily defeated by the Japanese. The South Korean army
trained by the United States after World War II was initially
beaten by the North Koreans. In the early 1960's, the South
Vietnamese army was trained by the United States for
conventional warfare, which was unsuited to the
counterinsurgency. And then in 1975, they were defeated by the
North Vietnamese.
Further, in the past half century, the United States has
not done well at fighting insurgencies. It was defeated in
Vietnam and, since then, has not taught counterinsurgency in
its military schools. The striking exception to this is the
success in El Salvador in the 1980's. But the military
contributed only a miniscule number of personnel to that
effort, and it came mostly from the special forces, which
functioned outside the mainstream military forces.
Why doesn't the U.S. military do a good job of training
foreign armies? Essentially, the answer is, when it comes to
combat, Americans want to do it ourselves and do it fast. But
in counterinsurgency, the host nation must fight its own
battles, and the timetable is one of years and not months. The
British counterinsurgency in Malaya, comparable in several ways
to the situation in Iraq, lasted over 10 years. The Salvadoran
Civil War, which ended in a U.S. policy success, went on for
12.
All of this is to say, there is no historical evidence that
the larger U.S. Armed Forces can quickly and effectively train
a foreign army to fight a counterinsurgency. An example of this
is the Iraqi 36th Commando Battalion, and its example is
instructive. The unit is held up, justifiably, as the premier
fighting unit of the Iraqi security forces. Only the Iraqi
counterterrorist force is considered near its equal.
The battalion was trained and, until recently, led by U.S.
Special Forces' sergeants and officers. Its recruits were
chosen by the Iraqi political leadership personally to
demonstrate their ability for self-defense. There were no
Sunnis in its ranks. Nonetheless, it lost a quarter of its
recruits just in training. Many of its leaders had to be
replaced, often for issues of corruption and cowardice. There
was no system for a year to replace casualties and desertions.
The Iraqi troops initially went unpaid. They were initially
equipped with uniforms that literally fell apart at the seams
and with the poorest quality weapons.
When senior U.S. commanders deployed the battalion like an
American unit around the country, they were given the wrong
food and sanitation facilities. They were also too far from
their homes. This matters because the Iraqis are actually day-
to-day volunteers and would leave the unit if they did not
receive certain basic accommodations.
So after a year of intensive training and experience and
the full time and attention of half a company of embedded
special forces, the 36th Battalion is competent at only one
kind of mission, company level cordon and search operations.
That is the best in the country after 1 year.
Finally, what can be done? A counterinsurgency strategy
must be implemented, emphasizing intelligence operations and
the training of police as a priority over military units. The
police and military must be trained specifically to fight an
insurgency.
The very best people, best Americans and units, need to do
the training and advising of the police and military units. Not
contractors, who have already performed poorly; not U.S.
National Guard troops, who have accomplished a number of tasks
admirably but are the least trained of U.S. forces and have no
experience or training in counterinsurgency; and not using
partnership relations, which may result in Iraqi reliance on
U.S. units and leaders. Appropriate equipment and technology
must be provided for the police first. This includes even
simple items, like eyeglasses and hand-held radios.
It would help to understand that training must extend
beyond the teaching of simple skills and must include the
culturalization into the mores of service. And this addresses
the point of dealing with corruption. Human rights training
must be included in all programs. It currently is not.
Lots of time is essential. All historical evidence
indicates this is going to be a long war. Finally, we must
trust the Iraqis enough to let them learn how to fight this war
for themselves, and we must have the patience to see it
through. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Professor Sepp follows:]
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Mr. Shays. Thank you, very much.
Mr. Khalil.
STATEMENT OF PETER KHALIL
Mr. Khalil. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Again, it is also a
great honor to testify. Is this working, sir?
Mr. Shays. It is working, but I think the lower you have it
down, the better it is.
Mr. Khalil. Yes. Thank you for the opportunity to testify
today. It is an honor.
By way of quick introduction, I was an independent civil
servant sent to Iraq as part of my country's contingent to the
Coalition Provisional Authority to work on specifically
rebuilding the Iraqi national security forces and the
institutions.
Mr. Shays. Tell me a little of where that accent comes
from.
Mr. Khalil. Australia. I was sent to Iraq as part of the
Australian Government's contingent.
Mr. Shays. That is what wasn't clear to me. Having lived in
Fiji, that is an accent that I have gotten very used to and
love. I lived in Fiji for 2 years.
Mr. Khalil. You won't have trouble understanding my
testimony, then.
I was in Iraq as a civilian security and defense advisor
for the CPA from August 2003 until May 2004. And in that
capacity, I worked very closely with the Iraqi political
leadership on rebuilding Iraqi security forces and
institutions, including the new Iraqi civilian-led Ministry of
Defense.
I would like to also say it was a great honor to serve my
country and also the U.S. led coalition in Iraq.
Mr. Shays. Now, again, how long were you there?
Mr. Khalil. Nine months, sir.
Mr. Shays. Thank you for your service.
Mr. Khalil. I hope, too, that the fine tradition of the
Australian-U.S. alliance continues and that friendship
continues, based not just on our shared strategic interests,
but our shared values, I think.
I should note, too, that I had the opportunity to work
closely with Ambassador Dick Jones. And in my experience in
working with Ambassador Jones, he was an exemplary leader and
an exemplary diplomat. I learned a lot from him by watching his
negotiations with the Iraqi leaders.
The U.S. strategy, Mr. Chairman, concerned with security
and training of Iraqi forces is, at least at the strategic
level, fundamentally sound; that is training Iraq security
forces and having them take over responsibility for directly
dealing with the insurgents so that U.S. forces can gradually
withdraw. You have heard a lot of detailed outlines about the
many types of forces that exist and their numbers and their
training. I would like to focus my remarks in the brief time I
have specifically on the overall strategy for developing these
forces and having them transferring responsibility to those
particular security forces from the coalition security forces,
particularly looking at which types of Iraq security forces
have those capabilities to fulfill that mission.
Mr. Shays. Great.
Mr. Khalil. It is the quality, not the quantity, of Iraqi
security forces which is critical to a realistic transfer of
security responsibility over the next 24 months. Although the
CPA and U.S. military did move quickly to begin basic training
of the different types of Iraqi forces that we have heard
spoken about today, the army and the police and the national
guard, which was earlier known as the ICDC, there was an
initial emphasis on the quantity of forces; that is getting
Iraqi boots on the ground. So while the vast majority of the
Iraqi security forces, and I think we have heard a figure here
of something like 142,000 or 144,000 said to be trained and in
uniform, they do have basic security skill sets, but what they
don't have are the required training or capabilities to conduct
offensive or even defensive operations against the insurgency.
Now, I don't imply by this that there shouldn't be a large
number of Iraqi security forces that do actually exist. It's
just that they each have a role and function, as in any
society, and not all of them can or should be thrown onto the
front line of the insurgency. As the insurgency intensified
through the summer of 20O3, the CPA did develop policies to
train the high-end security forces that have been briefly
discussed today.
And I will talk specifically about the nine battalions of
army special forces, that's the counterinsurgency wing of the
Iraqi army, and some of the Ministry of Interior special
forces. I'm talking about something like six or seven
battalions of special police commando units, three or so
counterterrorism battalions, who grew out of the Iraq national
guard and the army, SWAT teams, and also specific types of
emergency response units, which are much smaller. What those
types of forces do have is the specific role and mission of
effectively countering the insurgency and relieving combat
pressure from U.S. forces.
As far as problems with the vetting, training and
recruitment of both Iraqi police services and the Iraqi
national guard, which are the bulk of those 144,000 we have
discussed, many of those problems can be traced back to the
fact that, initially, throughout 2003 and early 2004, much of
the training and vetting of recruits for these services was
decentralized. So what you had was local United States and
coalition military commanders having the responsibility to
raise and train and equip these local forces, these units. So
it led to a lack of standardization in both recruitment and
training, and in very uneven vetting procedures for the
recruits across the country.
I am talking here about the national guard units and also
the Iraqi police, both local forces, locally utilized and
locally trained. There was real immense pressure on the United
States and coalition military commanders to get Iraqi boots on
the ground, which led to many local police simply being
reconstituted.
What I mean by that is that former police officers were
basically reemployed in the town and told, you are back on the
beat, without having to go through the required police academy
training that was set under the Ministry of Interior. Many
national guardsmen went through very minimal levels of basic
training, sometimes as low as 2 weeks. So both of these forces
were then expected to be the bulk of Iraq forces that were
facing the insurgents.
In a sense, the training and vetting problems have actually
been rectified. Particularly, the raising and equipping of the
Iraqi police services and the Iraq national guard have now been
centralized, first under Major General Eaton in the spring of
2004, and, now, currently, of course, under his successor,
Lieutenant General David Petraeus. So, for example, the
national guard training, which was very uneven across the
country, is now very standardized and involves, under General
Petraeus, 3 weeks basic training and 3 to 4 weeks of collective
training. And you have many policemen being sent back to the
police academies to actually complete the training or begin the
training which they had not actually undertaken in the year
before.
Many of the bad apples who slipped in through the uneven
vetting that occurred in that first year and a half have been
removed. So that is why you see a big dip in the numbers of
police forces. I can't remember the chart myself, because I had
the back of it there, but I think I remember seeing a chart
like that. But there is a big dip of police numbers, I think,
in mid 2004 and late 2004 because many of the police have gone
back into training or have been removed because of new vetting
that is being undertaken by General Petraeus.
However, and there is an important point to all of this,
the national guard capabilities are still limited to basic
security tasks: fixed-point security, route convoy security,
joint patrolling with coalition forces. And the police, of
course, are trained in local policing, basic law-and-order
tasks. Neither are counterinsurgency trained forces, which is a
very important point. They did perform their tasks, both the
police and national guard, with great distinction during the
elections, and they were charged with crowd and cordon and
perimeter security. That's what they were trained to do, to
protect polling centers and government buildings and so forth,
yet they still require heavy U.S. logistical and combat
support.
Now, in contrast to the national guard and the Iraqi police
services, the Iraqi army has had a centralized vetting and
training structure from its inception. So as a result, the
Iraqi army, and I am separating this from the Iraqi national
guard, has attracted a higher quality of recruits who have
underwent, from the beginning, thorough and standardized
vetting, and that included very tough psychological testing.
And the training itself has been of a very high standard from
its inception.
So the key, Mr. Chairman, to a realistic transfer of
security responsibility from U.S. forces to Iraqi forces rests
not only with the Iraqi army special forces, which are numbered
at about nine battalions at the moment. And you were asking
earlier of Professor Cordesman, I think, the number of each
battalion is about 800 for Iraqi army battalions, and that
includes the special forces battalions. But more importantly,
also, on the high-end internal security forces that are being
trained under the Ministry of Interior, and they are important
because they have specialized training and skill sets, and they
have an ability to combine intelligence gathering, and I think,
much better in some ways than United States and coalition
intelligence gathering, because they understand the language
and the culture, but also law enforcement and light infantry
paramilitary capabilities in their tasks of taking on the
insurgents.
They performed well. Some of the units have performed well
in operations in Fallujah and Samarra in late 2004, and even a
unit of Iraqi SWAT team rescued some Iraqi hostages in Kirkuk
with minimal U.S. support. At present, though, the
counterinsurgency and counterterrorism forces that I am talking
about are a very small percentage of the total 144,000 of Iraqi
forces said to be trained and in uniform.
So as I said, you could probably estimate around nine Iraqi
army special forces battalions; six special police commando
units; three mechanized police battalions that were earlier
discussed; the SWAT team is around 270 personnel, I think; and
three counterterrorism battalions that grew out of the national
guard and the army, and Professor Sepp talked about the 36th
battalion, which is part of that.
The Coalition, as far as I understand it, has a goal of 33
or so battalions or 30-plus battalions of these highly trained
internal security forces, including the Army special forces. So
something like 25,000 men, if you want to look at numbers. But
I would emphasize that numbers are not the most important
thing. It is really the quality of these Iraqi forces to
complete these tasks and security missions.
If they can operate at the point of the spear with the
remaining bulk of those 270,000, or projected 270,000, Iraqi
forces acting in a supporting role, there is a very good chance
of weakening and defeating the insurgency, obviously in
combination with political and economic developments, which are
just as important in any counterinsurgency operation.
Just a few quick words about training. I know I am running
out of time, Mr. Chairman.
The important point about training, I would say, is that
accelerating training of Iraqi forces is a very big mistake, if
anyone is contemplating that, or if the administration is
contemplating that. Because if you cut training cycles from 8
weeks to 2 weeks, you are sending out forces that are less than
capable.
Mr. Shays. But if you could add more numbers and do the
same amount, you don't object to that?
Mr. Khalil. That is absolutely correct, Mr. Chairman. If
you have more trainers there, you can put more Iraqis through
the training pipeline, and you will get more out quicker.
Mr. Shays. As long as you can vet them.
Mr. Khalil. As long as you can vet them, yes.
Now, I should point out with the vetting, Mr. Chairman,
that the vetting procedures, the other advantage of
centralizing vetting under General Petraeus is that the Army
vetting was actually quite thorough for the Iraqi army
recruits. There was a Ministry of Defense starter base that was
salvaged from some of the facilities which has the name of
something like 400,000 Iraqi men who had undertaken military
and other police type services, so you could have a look and
cross-check new recruits against that.
Of course, there are many new recruits that don't have
prior military service, and they are usually the young guys who
are joining up in the new army.
The last comment I would make, Mr. Chairman, is on the
relationship between the multinational force, Iraq and the
Iraqi security forces. You have heard that the MNF-I is
mandated under UNSCR 1546 to support the besieged Iraqi
Ministry of Security Forces, the internal security forces,
which under this arrangement retrain primary responsibility for
Iraqi internal security. And during the interim period, the
Iraqi police and other internal security forces did begin
coordinating very well with the coalition and Iraqi military
forces through a network of local, regional and national
structures.
There is some complexity in the command structures of the
MNF-I, and I would refer you to the written testimony for a
fuller explanation of that, Mr. Chairman.
In conclusion, though, there is an authentic Iraqi
partnership with the Coalition, in the sense that the Iraqi
armed forces are very much an active member of the coalition
forces. There are senior Iraqi military officers throughout the
MNF-I command structure, and their involvement makes them real
owners of the operational tactical security objectives that the
MNF-I is undergoing at the moment. I think also it is very
important because it will aid a smoother transfer of full
security responsibility to Iraqis post-December 2005.
Mr. Chairman, there is one last comment I would like to
make in wrapping up, and it is on the issue of the insurgency.
And I noted, very quickly, Professor Cordesman talked about the
insurgency. The best way to look at the insurgency is to look
at it in three-ring circles. The inner circle is the 15,000,
20,000 or 25,000 fighters who are involved in the insurgency.
They are made up of, the 90 percent of them, rather, are made
up of former regime security personnel. So the guards from the
Special Republican Guard, the Mukhabarat intelligence, and so
on. There is a smaller number of that insurgency that are
Islamic Jihadists, both foreign and also Iraqi jihadists.
Mr. Shays. Within the 25 or in addition to?
Mr. Khalil. Within the 25,000, sir, yes.
And then you also have a criminal element, if you like, of
gangs and mercenaries, who are doing--who are conducting
attacks on the coalition for monetary purposes. And that is
part of that insurgency as well.
Then there is an element--when we talk about, why is the
insurgency growing--an element of Iraqis who have joined the
insurgency out of anger, anger and a need to have some sort of
revenge against possibly coalition forces who have killed
relatives or so on. And many of these are also possibly former
military security personnel.
There was a question earlier by Representative Kucinich
about why these hard-core personnel are growing. Well, there
was a large number of ex-military security personnel. Not all
have joined the insurgency. Some are starting to join up based
on a variety of different reasons. But the question as to its
popularity, I think, is very important because it is a minority
within a minority.
The middle circle is approximately around 200,000
sympathizers who are supporting them, and the outer circle is
really the passive population of Iraq. And not all those people
are supporting the insurgents.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Khalil follows:]
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Mr. Shays. Great. Thank you.
Let me first ask, and I am not looking for a debate, but I
want an honest dialog where any of you may differ with someone
else on the panel here.
So are there things you would differ in terms of emphasis
or totally disagree with anything your colleagues have said? Do
you want to start?
And I will preface this by saying that I read all your
biographies, and this is an exceptional panel. I don't know,
Professor Cordesman, if you got your crustiness from John
McCain or you gave it to him, but you are an accomplished
author. We could put professor and author here. Such tremendous
experience you bring to the panel.
And Professor Sepp, your service to your country and your
actual practical experience in the military.
And Mr. Khalil, I was intrigued that you were involved in
strategic planning basically for the military in Australia. Is
that correct?
Mr. Khalil. Yes.
Mr. Shays. So you are a gift to this subcommittee, and I am
looking forward to the dialog that will take place, but where
would you disagree completely or in part with something already
said by one of the three of you?
Professor Cordesman.
Professor Cordesman. I think there are two points,
Congressman. One, my experience with this goes back to Vietnam
when I was in the Office of the Secretary of Defense.
Mr. Shays. Were you working for the Secretary of Defense at
that time?
Professor Cordesman. Yes. And I was working, at that point
in time, in dealing with the training of our VN forces and the
assessment of the intelligence structure in Vietnam. I think
the one thing I would say is that we haven't the faintest idea
of what the numbers of the insurgents are or the number of
insurgents----
Mr. Shays. Now, there is the absolute. When you say
faintest idea. We have very little idea? I mean faintest idea
is such a----
Professor Cordesman. I think we learned the hard way after
the liberation of Vietnam how bad it was in terms of our
estimates of sympathizers, infiltrators and activists.
Mr. Shays. What I'm going to ask is----
Professor Cordesman. Congressman, I'm going to--we could
mince words. Are our intelligence estimates of the insurgents
today in numbers in any way reliable? No, they are not.
Mr. Shays. OK, that's fair. What I just want to say to you
is that I'm a pretty impressionable person. ``Faintest idea''
means we have no idea. But is the range so faint that it could
be 200,000 to 10 million? Obviously, that's not the faintest
idea.
Professor Cordesman. As I say, we can play games.
Mr. Shays. Give me a range.
Professor Cordesman. I won't, because I really don't think
we know. I have heard people come out with estimates of
Islamists. I have worked with people in the intelligence
community for 40 years. I don't find intelligence officers
stand behind those estimates. I don't believe that there are
50,000 Islamists, but I don't know that we know how many there
are.
I heard people began with 5,000 core insurgents. Now we are
talking 20,000 to 30,000. But I think perhaps we don't
disagree. I just don't know what the hell a core insurgent is,
and I don't believe any two people can define it the same way.
Mr. Shays. Fair enough.
Professor Cordesman. When it comes down to the sympathizers
with insurgents, the public opinion polls I have seen since the
summer of 2003 indicate a very large number of Iraqis, both
Shiite and Sunni, supported violence against the coalition.
Now, does that mean they are going to provide arms or
sanctuary? None of us know. But the numbers were so high, even
in embassy polls in the summer of last year, that figures like
200,000, which was a wag by the Iraqi Minister of Defense,
originally, they simply don't mean anything.
Mr. Shays. In fairness to our own folks, they have been
reluctant to give numbers when Congress presses them for it,
because, in part, we really don't know.
Professor Cordesman. If you push the intelligence community
hard enough, you will always get the number, and you get the
number you deserve.
Mr. Shays. Well said. I love the poll that was done, a very
professional poll a year after we were there, and it said two-
thirds of the Iraqis want us to leave, and two-thirds want us
to stay.
Professor Cordesman. Well, one problem we have, in all
honesty, Congressman, is if you break those polls out, and you
actually read all 23 pages of them, and then go into them by
area, they are often extremely useful. When they are summarized
nationally, and people don't read the details, then you get
exactly the results you have said. But it was something like 11
percent of the Shiites surveyed and something like one-third of
the Sunnis surveyed by the Oxford Analytical Poll, which was
perhaps the best in late 2003, which supported violence against
the coalition. How many of them would ever have lifted a finger
to support this? I doubt it.
But if I may, let me just make two points about where we
may disagree. First, I don't believe training is, or ever will
be by itself a way of creating mission capable forces. And I
think General Luck, with his emphasis on putting U.S. advisors
into combat teams, creating combat units with some kind of
integrity and leadership, and creating units effectively
trained on the job is what is going to have to be the only way
that you can create forces approximately as large as the ones
we need.
The second point I would raise is, I don't believe we are
there yet. I believe General Petraeus has done an outstanding
job since June 2004. But remember, and I am quoting here
figures from General Petraeus' office, we had one deployable
battalion in June of last year; now, we have 24 to 27,
according to General Petraeus, in the multinational command.
I don't believe the national guard has been vetted or that
it is anything like ready. And the latest figures I have
indicate that we have just put 52 new battalions into the
regular army, of which perhaps nine have any kind of mild
competence.
Mr. Shays. Is this the national guard you are making
reference to?
Professor Cordesman. We put two other brigades in when we
merged the national guard. So people talk about merging the
national guard into the army, but there were six other
battalions added from other units.
Mr. Shays. Are the units outside the army?
Professor Cordesman. They are outside the army. They had
names. One was the Defenders of Baghdad Brigade and the other
was the Muthona Brigade.
Mr. Shays. Kind of like what Souter set up? I mean it's
their own individual private armies?
Professor Cordesman. Well, they were sort of, not
necessarily militias, but units created for special purposes by
ministers or Governors.
Mr. Shays. Gotcha.
Professor Cordesman. The problem I have with this is when I
look down this, you talk about training. You don't create a
soldier in 8 weeks in the U.S. Army. You can fit him in because
you can put him into a unit with proven combat experience,
leadership, senior NCOs and people who have proven capability.
Iraqis weren't trained at that level, even if we got the right
ones.
We are putting people into units created from scratch. In
case after case, the leaders are still political. They are
people who were appointed for the wrong reasons and aren't
removed when they do not prove to be capable.
Mr. Shays. OK. What else do you disagree with?
Professor Cordesman. I think the other point is, we are not
giving them the equipment they need yet.
Mr. Shays. But did someone here say we were?
Professor Cordesman. Well, when you say you have mission
capable units, and I think Professor Sepp made the point quite
well, if they do not have adequate communications, if they only
have heavy machine guns and mortars, and they have no
protective vehicles and cannot support themselves in movement,
these are not mission capable counterinsurgency units. That is
a description of all of the army units, except one battalion,
which is mechanized, and two battalions of the elite police
forces.
Mr. Shays. OK.
Anything that you would disagree with your colleagues on
the panel, Professor Sepp? It may be an emphasis. I'm not
saying completely disagree, but something they might have said,
you would just disagree with them.
Professor Sepp. The vetting process is not working. In some
provinces, with a majority Sunni population or in the Kurdish
areas, it is functioning. But in the four provinces that the
Marine Expeditionary Force currently operates in, Al Anbar,
Babil, Najaf and Al Qadisyah, there is no vetting.
The senior Marine colonel in charge of liaison to the Iraqi
security forces personally estimates that 75 percent of the
police are insurgents or insurgent sympathizers.
Mr. Shays. So is this the vetting with the police in
particular?
Professor Sepp. In the military forces as well,
accountability in those kind of situations. He described going
to three different company garrisons. Each company, again rough
numbers, each company should have had about 100 people present.
In total, at the three locations, there were five.
During the second battle for Fallujah in November, when I
was in Baghdad on the strategy team, the Marines were almost
certain that they fought and killed insurgents that they had
previously trained and equipped as national guard and police
members. At the same time, in that same month, there was a bank
robbery, because the payroll system had been turned over with
the shift of sovereignty. It had been turned over to the
Iraqis. The equivalent in dinars of about 4 million U.S.
dollars was moved to a bank in Ramadi.
The day after it arrived, the bank was robbed by armed
insurgents wearing police uniforms issued by the United States,
carrying Glock pistols issued by the United States, with
knowledge of the bank that only police would have had. They
didn't get away with all the money because there was so much of
it; they had to leave about a quarter of it behind. They
couldn't load it all in their vehicles.
But this is the degree to which, in some provinces, that
vetting is meaningless and that the insurgents have infiltrated
the military police forces.
Mr. Shays. Meaningless and not possible, or just not done
well? And if you don't know, that's OK, too.
Professor Sepp. That is a very hard question to answer.
Those are the sort of things that could be fixed over time,
over years, with the imposition of a government of security
forces, or of incorrupt security forces in a system like that.
But right now, vetting is meaningless in those provinces.
Let me just add one thing. This is absolutely common to any
counterinsurgency situation. I'm sure Professor Cordesman can
give some very precise stories about these situations in
Vietnam. When I fought in El Salvador, when Sergeant Greg
Fronius was killed at El Paraiso there were 30 to 40 guerilla
infiltrators that had joined the brigade that he was advising
and that had started the initial attack against the cartel from
the inside in a surprise attack.
So this is very common. This has to be understood that this
is simply going to be part of doing business and fighting an
insurgency, and that I would be very concerned with broad
statements about vetting is in place and is functioning and is
centralized and is standardized. The people that have been
there will tell you it's simply not true.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Shays. Mr. Khalil.
Mr. Khalil. Well, yes, I was there for 9 months, and I did
point out quite clearly in the testimony that the vetting was a
problem for the first year and a half, and that's because it
was decentralized. As Professor Sepp was explaining, much of
the vetting was conducted at a local military level. Now, as
far as I understand it and even before I left, I was pushing
very hard to have this centralized because of the problems with
vetting in a decentralized manner.
And we have to also ask, who are we talking about? Which
forces and vetting are we talking about? The police and
national guard are vetted locally, because they are locally
trained and raised forces. The army was vetted, centralized in
Baghdad, now under the Ministry of Defense and under General
Petraeus' command. So as far as I understand it, General
Petraeus has now command over police training and all national
guard training. This national guard is now being put together
with the Iraqi army, and there are improvements in those
vetting procedures. You can only go one way, obviously, when
the vetting was so bad to start off with.
The only other point I would make, Mr. Chairman, and I do
agree with Professor Cordesman that it is very difficult to
talk about the numbers of the insurgents and pin down a number.
That's because it's completely fluctuating constantly. There is
movement across borders of foreign jihadists. Some people are
joining the insurgency. Some people are dropping out. Some of
them are being captured or killed. So it is very difficult to
pin down numbers. But what you can pin down or improve is your
understanding and the nature of the insurgency. And there has
been great strides made in understanding that insurgency.
I don't think 2 years ago we could be talking with as much
knowledge about who makes up the insurgency as you are hearing
on today's panel. And that's very important. I had a chance,
for example, to sit down with the Governor of Ramadi, in Al
Anbar Province and the tribal leaders, and they brought with
them 15 ex-security personnel. And now, clearly, former
Mukhabarat and Special Republican Guard guards who have lost
their jobs and now clearly are part of the insurgency. But
their main grievance was unemployment. They had lost their jobs
and their status.
So you can understand the insurgency. You can even
negotiate with some of the more moderate elements of the
insurgency. Of course, you have to sift out those who are
guilty of crimes against the Iraqi people.
Mr. Shays. Thank you.
Yes, Professor Cordesman.
Professor Cordesman. Just one point, Congressman. I think
this is probably just an accident, but on the Department of
Defense chart and, indeed, the one that I have provided, which
is similar, a point about the police. It says there that 82,000
are trained and equipped. What there is not--but is very clear
in the reporting from the multinational coalition, is 35,000 of
that 82,000 is scheduled for training. It is not trained and
equipped.
And this, I think, illustrates what happens when you take
something this dynamic, and you try to pin your numbers down.
Mr. Shays. Well, my sense of some satisfaction here is that
we are starting to try to understand the numbers. But I have a
sense from you, Professor, that you almost feel that it is
useless; that the numbers are so meaningless as to why even
bother.
But you transition to the concept of capability, and there
I would think we would all agree we would want those numbers.
Professor Cordesman. I think, Congressman, what people are
trying to do now, and reference was made in the previous panel
to establishing metrics, is to take the, I think it is now 13,
Ministry of the Interior administrative defense forces that we,
through the multinational coalition, advise or train. There are
many other elements, understand, that are not on those charts,
of militias, police and other units, with either government or
nongovernment support. Break them out by what we call order-of-
battle analysis, which may be familiar to you, so you get by
battalion what the capabilities really are, what the history of
the unit is, something about its leadership, whether you really
believe this unit is ready yet.
And you don't sort of reject forces because they can only
man a checkpoint. You break the order of battle out so you look
at the mission capabilities as well as these other factors.
Now, that gives you the kind of numbers which, to some extent,
you can trust. They will never be precise. You will never know
whether a given battalion will break in combat. But if you go
to that type of analysis, and I believe that is what the
multinational coalition is doing, you will get there.
But the fact is, it didn't make sense to try to do it until
you had enough forces in the field that were actually becoming
operational so the criteria changed. Up till now, you have been
rushing since last June simply to create basic cadres that you
can begin to deploy.
Mr. Shays. OK. I am not looking for a long answer, but what
I am hearing you basically say is that the numbers were almost
meaningless before; that we can, over time, bring value to
those numbers as we dissect it in ways to know who is capable
and then where they are capable; that they may be capable here,
not capable there; but then it becomes a bit difficult to then
give these blanket overall numbers.
In other words, what I am hearing you say is, you may have
40,000 people capable, but they may only be capable in certain
areas, and we are not even sure how we want them capable in
every area. In other words, we are not even sure of the overall
needs of capability. Or am I going off track here at the end
here?
Professor Cordesman. You have made all the key points. We
are fighting a dynamic war. We are constantly adapting. The
training, organization, everything has to change. The question
is, are we creating, month by month, effective combat
battalions and forces for the various missions that have to be
performed?
Mr. Shays. We do not have that chart in front of us, but
what I am hearing you say is that we had first trained, and
even that was questionable; we then went to those who were
trained and had equipment, but even that is questionable
because we don't know what kind of training and what kind of
equipment as we firm that up; but the big key number is going
to be, who is capable?
Professor Cordesman. I think that's exactly right. If you
look at page 18 of the testimony I have given you, all of those
figures are taken from General Petraeus' command. Those kind of
numbers break out in rough terms the mission capabilities of
the forces. At that point, I think you get a picture of the
kind of forces that are being created, and most of them are
useful.
Another way to look at it is simply to go back and break
out each of these forces by actual element, for all 13 or 14
elements, and then break out the elements within them. And
those numbers will begin to give you a picture of real
capability. And what is really striking is the amazing increase
since June 2004 and the amount of momentum that the thing has
been gathering since September 2004.
Mr. Shays. I've had this dialog with the administration
that when you admit mistakes where you went wrong--which to me
is a logical thing to do--it helps you understand where you are
and where you're going, and also it helps you see that maybe
you've had progress. But if you've never made mistakes, it's
like, well, they don't know all the things we overcame because
of the mistakes we made that gives some value to what we've
been doing.
Let me have our counsel, ask a question or two.
Mr. Halloran. I wonder if each of you could give me your
views on de-Ba'athification and this proposed re-de-
Ba'athification that the emergent government is talking about
and its impacts and likely impact on the security situation?
Professor Cordesman. I think this is a horrible term. I
have been visiting Iraqi since 1973. If you wanted to survive
from 1979 on, you almost had to have some kind of link to the
Ba'ath or you had to go into exile or you had to stand aside
from virtually all the political, social and economic life.
What you don't want back in here are people from the special
security services, people involved in war crimes or atrocities,
people who are former regime loyalists who today are supporting
the regime. That is a tiny fraction of people who were part of
the Ba'ath party. And I think this whole phrase De-
Ba'athification Commission--Ba'ath was originally pushed on CPA
in part by people like Chalabi, who had a political agenda that
had nothing to do with protecting the country or serving the
national interest, but who basically were trying to minimize
the opposition and create the climate through which they could
acquire power.
So what we really need is not de-Ba'athification, but
simply to ensure that we're not going to bring back the people
who were truly abusive in the past regime which, what, could be
maybe some unknown fraction of the Ba'ath, but certainly closer
to 5 percent than 15.
Professor Sepp. What strikes me about this is that I don't
know if it's well known or not, that immediately after World
War II the U.S. Department of State had a very extensive
program titled specifically the ``De-Nazification Program for
Germany,'' a very complex and sophisticated document that
showed an understanding of the German political scene and
German culture.
Having said that, there is nothing I can add to Professor
Cordesman's comments, I think that he is exactly correct.
Mr. Khalil. I too agree with Professor Cordesman. One thing
I would add, though, is that Ba'ath party membership was, I
think, about 2.5 million, or something like that, in Iraq. A
third of those, as Professor Cordesman pointed out, were people
who had to join the party to become a teacher or principal of
the school or advance their career. Another third probably
joined for positions of power, and a very, very small fraction
were the real Ba'ath party ideologues, were those who really
abused their power in those positions in the security sector.
The problem is in bringing back people with experience,
it's very difficulty to sort out who was actually abusing their
position of power and who was just joining the Ba'ath party for
membership. There are echelons of Ba'ath party membership which
we're aware of as well. But I think something in the order of a
truth commission or a reconciliation commission is really much
needed in Iraq in the next year or two, because you will see
competing pressures now from very much a Shiite government, if
you would like, although with a British coalition pushing for a
purging even of those former Ba'ath party members who are now
part of the Government Ministry of Security Services, and then
on the other side, people thinking, well, we need to bring
these people back in because they have the requisite experience
to help Iraq rebuild. So it's a key point of friction which
will be coming to a head I think in next year, possibly once
the government is formed, depending on its nature.
Mr. Halloran. One more?
Mr. Khalil, I think it was in your testimony you raised the
prospect of training security forces and the specialized forces
to be too successful, and that we re-empower some kind of
police state in Iraq. How would each of you advise avoiding
that pitfall?
Mr. Khalil. Yes, that was one caveat I put to the--in terms
of building up internal security forces, that you don't want to
build too powerful a structure under the Ministry of the
Interior that could challenge the balance of power. I think
there is an important point here: There needs to be a legal
framework in which it is very well understood how these forces
are used in domestic security operations. Now, that's for the
Army as well as for the internal security operations. At
present we don't have that legal framework.
I was involved in trying to push that legislation through
when I was there. I think the Pentagon shied away from it
because it thought that it would hinder the use of Iraqi
security forces and security personnel in carrying the
insurgency--of giving them free reign, if you'd like.
But it's an important legal framework, because all
democracies have it. Australia has it, you have it where we set
out when and where the Armed Forces can be used in internal
operations. And I think that's something that the future Iraqi
government ought to seriously consider.
Professor Cordesman. I think the only thing I would add to
that is you need security forces that can deal with terrorism
and which can deal with insurgency, and as Professor Sepp
points out, you're probably going to need them for years to
come.
The counterbalance for this is not to create ineffective
specialized forces, it is at the same time to strengthen a
police force which can handle law enforcement that is bound by
the rule of law. It is to strengthen the court system, it is to
keep the pressure up for human rights. It is to carry out the
kind of programs that IRI, or its democratic party equivalent,
have started to ensure that ministers and officials and people
who run for office understand that they really have human
rights and legal efforts. And I think this really calls for
something that we have on the books but where we simply haven't
moved the money forward; and that is, you cannot simply go
ahead and create effective military forces and not push all of
those other aspects in our aid program designed to support the
rule of law, human rights, develop governments, help educate
people in creating modern political parties and in the
responsibility of democracy.
And I find it rather unfortunate that when you look at the
tables on actual expenditures in those programs the spendout
rate has been so low, and the spendout rate on security has
been so high.
Mr. Shays. I think we will be out of here in about 10
minutes, but, is it your testimony that it's difficult to deal
with counterinsurgency, very difficult, or impossible? In other
words, should I be leaving this hearing thinking that it is
almost impossible?
I will tell you how I'm leaving it right now. I am leaving
it with the thought I have never believed that--when people
have asked me how long we will be in Iraq, I said how long have
we been in South Korea? I mean, that's kind of my answer. But I
also know the Iraqis don't want us around for 4 years. I mean,
I believe that. I mean, maybe some of their leaders do. But my
own reading of the Iraqi culture is they are not going to want
us there, and so I am wrestling with that.
I am leaving this hearing believing that we, I don't want
to say have turned the corner, but at least we know what it
takes to do it right, and we are in that process. But I'm
leaving with the sense that there are so many things we could
be doing that would make it more likely to reach success a
little sooner, and we're not doing that.
But I am left with the feeling--when we started out your
panel--with the thought of all the places we have failed to
deal with insurgency. And let me just then also say I'm having
a hard time understanding whether insurgents are under
terrorists or terrorists are under insurgents. I'm not quite
sure where the heading is and I'm not quite sure--are they
equal, is it just another name? Or are they a part of
terrorism?
So why don't we start with you, Professor Cordesman?
Professor Cordesman. First, I think insurgencies can be
defeated. All insurgencies differ, and terms are used very,
very carelessly. We weren't defeated in Vietnam by insurgents,
we were defeated by main force core elements of the North
Vietnamese Army. Those were units using tanks, artillery, and
basically invading. They were not the insurgents. Those might
have been the core of the Tet offensive, although even there
there were strong NVA elements.
What we have here is a different situation, however. We're
talking, at most, 20 percent of the population is Sunni; and
significant numbers of Sunnis are not pro-insurgency. We're
talking four to six provinces where there is a significant
popular base, but those are by no means unanimous, and the one
that has the strongest area, in some ways in support for the
insurgencies or terrorists--whatever you want to call them--is
our Anbar Province, which they have 5 to 6 percent of the
entire population of Iraq.
If we can create Iraqi forces that can stand on their own
and convince Iraqis that Iraqis will defeat the insurgency--not
American that's one key. If the Iraqis themselves emerge out of
this election showing that they can govern, compromise and
create a state which will include those Sunnis who wish to be
part of a government based on democracy, or at least
federalism, that would be another critical step and help bring
victory.
If we can go from the aid program we have today to some
coherent strategy for using that money which relies on Iraqis
and meets Iraqi expectation, rather than some kind of strange
plan we developed here in Washington, and we can get money to
the people so they can see hope, then I think that too can
defeat this insurgency.
What we talked about in terms of defeat doesn't mean that
extremists vanish. There will be people who are Ba'ath
loyalties angry at us, Islamist extremists, probably in Iraq
almost indefinitely into the future. There will be car
bombings, there will be suicide bombings, there will be
assassinations, and there will be violence. That will probably
counter-eliminate at least within the near term. So victory
will always be relative.
Mr. Shays. OK, thank you.
Professor Sepp. I wanted to make another historical point,
Mr. Chairman, just to reenforce what Professor Cordesman said.
In Vietnam, the Viet Cong, the insurgents, were actually
defeated by the Vietnamese police and intelligence services by
the late 1960's through the Wong Hong series of operations that
they conducted. The point was that insurgencies are difficult,
but they can be managed if it's understood how to do that.
For the U.S. Armed Forces, my point and my testimony is it
will be very difficult because they don't have experience or
education in it, and they're trying learn it in a very, very
compressed time right now, and----
Mr. Shays. Are you saying the U.S. Forces?
Professor Sepp. U.S. Force, yes, sir. And a point would be
the plan, the classified campaign plan for Operation Iraqi
Freedom that exists, is not a counterinsurgency plan. They are
writing one right now. But I am aware as briefly as 2 weeks ago
that there are still debates about key points inside that plan.
Until that comes together, it would be very hard to imagine
that all these other components could be unified to accelerate
the end of the insurgency.
Mr. Shays. Mr. Khalil.
Mr. Khalil. Mr. Chairman, very difficult, I think, but not
impossible to fight the insurgency.
And your point about whether they're terrorists or
insurgents, a small element of the insurgents do carry out
terrorist activity; usually the Jihadists and some of the Iraqi
Wahhabists that are part of that. Often many Iraqis say to me,
we don't agree with these tactics, we don't want to see the
United States and Coalition forces in our country. But that
doesn't necessarily translate to support of the insurgents,
particularly those who are conducting terrorist attacks on
civilians and others.
Mr. Shays. Do you happen to speak Arabic yourself?
Mr. Khalil. I do, sir, yes.
Mr. Shay. So you've had opportunity to speak----
Mr. Khalil. It was very helpful in meeting--I didn't just
work with the Iraqi political leadership of Allawi and Hakim
and the rest of them; I met with a lot of tribal leaders across
the country, heads of universities, that kind of thing. And
obviously with our RDC leadership and the interim leadership as
well. But I tried to get out there and meet with as many Iraqis
as possible.
Mr. Shays. Do you see that it's likely that the Iraqis
would allow American troops to be in Iraq 10 years from now?
Mr. Khalil. The majority of the Iraqis don't want to see
that, that's quite clear. The majority, probably 80 or 90
percent, would want all United States and Coalition forces out
of their country in the long term.
Mr. Shays. And if they're experiencing a true democracy,
then we won't belong.
Mr. Khalil. That is usually the case, yes. But the point
about that is, Mr. Chairman, is although most Iraqis of
whatever sectarian background or ethnic background don't want
to see foreign forces on their soil, they don't necessarily
support what the insurgents are trying to do as far as derail
the political process in the future, democratic or not. And in
fact, if you look at the numbers--again we head back to numbers
as a thing today--but if you look at the number of Iraqis
who've joined the government ministries as civil servants, who
joined the new security forces, there are hundreds and
thousands of Iraqis, as you were saying earlier in your
statement, putting their lives at risk and their families'
lives at risk because they believe in a future democratic state
in Iraq, and all those people that were working on the
elections as well, so they vastly outnumber those insurgents
who are trying to derail that process.
And the other important point----
Mr. Shays. Let me just say, with a caveat that I've learned
from all of you, that some of those may in fact be insurgents
themselves. They want a job, they want to be paid, and if they
can work for the government, nothing wrong with that.
Mr. Khalil. I would estimate that those infiltrating
security services are a very small percentage. I wouldn't go as
far as saying 75 percent at all. It depends on the service, of
course, but there was a level of infiltration that has been
cleaned out over the last 6 months as well.
It is true, there are many Iraqis who have joined the
services to get a job, but there are many of us in our
countries who join the public service for a good paycheck as
well; that doesn't translate into supporting the insurgency.
Mr. Shays. Right. No, I wasn't trying to suggest that, but
I'm just suggesting folks want a job, they want to make a
contribution and so on; but the implication is that we can't be
certain that everyone who's doing that is doing it without an
alternative motive, that they also may want to be part of the
government, and they may be very sympathetic. I mean, one of my
staff was in Jordan with training the police, and it was during
the time of the conflict with Sadr, and they were singing a
song in Arabic. And he asked them what they're singing, and it
was ``You kill Sadr, we kill you.'' this was the police in
Jordan.
When I was in Iraq, we asked about that and how it could
happen. And I was told, frankly, that even Mr. Bremer didn't
realize the number of police people that he was seeing around
the country, and it was well above what he had thought it was
supposed to be.
Mr. Khalil. I'm glad, Mr. Chairman, that you mentioned
Muqtada al-Sadr, because he's a very important example. In
fact, the fighting that was going on in Najaf and Sadr City had
a lot of people shaking their heads and a lot of people worried
about this. What has transpired, of course, is that Sadr has
been brought into the political process through pressure by
Sistani, through negotiations allowing the interim Prime
Minister, and so on. But the end result is that this particular
group has decided that they're not going to reach their
political goals by use of force; that they're going to join the
political process. Now Sadr has, I think, three or four members
of the National Assembly that come from----
Mr. Shays. He has more than that, actually.
Mr. Khalil. Twelve, maybe, I think it might be. And that
template can be used for a lot of the moderate Sunni resistance
as well.
Mr. Shays. OK, what I would really love to do is invite you
all over to my house and have dinner because I would like to
continue this conversation, because I find it fascinating and
extraordinarily helpful. This has been a wonderful panel, and
we are blessed that all of you of such stature would come
before us today with such knowledge.
Is there any closing comment that any of you would like to
make? I will start with you, Mr. Khalil. Anybody?
Professor Cordesman. Just one comment. One of the things we
lack most as a country is a sense of history and patience. If
we demand too much too quickly, we will, of course, fail. I
think that what we really need gradually is to teach ourselves
patience. As long as the Iraqis are moving forward, as long as
we can see progress, as long as the aid programs work, more
people are trained, we see elements of democracy. We need to
persist and to continue to support this effort.
What we cannot afford is to set deadlines or demand instant
success or set standards based on U.S. expectations rather than
Iraqi expectations. I think if we are patient and dedicated, we
have a very good chance of giving this war real meaning; but if
we demand too much too quickly we can fail, because we defeat
ourselves. Thank you.
Mr. Shays. Any other comment? Yes, Professor Sepp.
Professor Sepp. Mr. Chairman, I would again reinforce
Professor Cordesman, saying the example is El Salvador, where
U.S. policy to support a new and emerging democratic government
in the face of an insurgency was sustained through three
administrations to its final result where the insurgency was
beaten to a draw and the insurgents came to political
settlement of the war. This can be done, but it will take the
patience that Professor Cordesmen is calling for.
Mr. Khalil. One last point, Mr. Chairman. I think whatever
your moral position was about the war in the first place, I
think if we're going to talk about morality, it is immoral to
drop any support for helping Iraqis develop their future
democratic state. It's immoral to do so and it would cause a
great deal of suffering right now.
So I think I agree with Professor Cordesman and Professor
Sepp as well. We need to continue that effort of assistance,
both at the security level, but also in the political and
economic reconstruction areas, because they're just as
important as security in defeating the insurgency.
Mr. Shays. Well, I think that we are in a very important
mission in Iraq. You have my support. I even ran during the
last election on that issue and said, you know, if my
constituency doesn't agree with it, then on that grounds find
someone else. But, you know, Nicholas Palarino has been with me
on all our trips, and obviously organized them--but when you
meet someone who was literally locked in her house for 10
years, literally, not allowed to go outside because her parents
thought she was very beautiful and would attract the attention
of Saddam's two sons, you know--and when you visit the killing
fields--and, thank goodness Saddam is no longer in power.
Thank you all very, very much. With that, the hearing is
adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 2:37 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]